OF All those weighty parcels of Gospel's truth, which the Arminians have chosen to oppose, there is not any about which they so much delight to try and exercise the strength of fleshly reasonings, as that of God's eternal decree of Reprobation: partly because the Scripture doth not so abound in the delivery of this Doctrine, as of some others, lying in a more immediate subserviency to the obedience and consolation of the Saints, (though it be sufficiently revealed in them, to the quieting of their spirits who have learned to captivate their understandings to the obedience of Faith) and partly because they apprehend the Truth thereof, to be more exposed to the riotous opposition of men's tumultating carnal Affections, whose help and assistance they by all means court and solicit in their contests against it. Thus the Author of the Book entitled (Gods love to Mankind) being desired to render a reason of the change his Faith, in passing over to the Tents of the Arminians, he draws forth only this one point to make show of, for the hinge of his alteration. Many Learned men know with what applause that Book of his was received and divulged, by that whole Generation which had then wrapped up the ball of the Errors promoted by it, in the gilded covering of Preferment, and carried it away before them. They being by providence removed from that station and conjunction unto Power, whence they had their effectual influence on the Earth, God foresaw (if he may be allowed to foresee) what reinforcement upon other hands their Abominations would receive, and therefore in his tender love made provision for his Church before hand, as by others, so in especial by the renowned Author of this Treatise, whose pains herein, intended by him for the conviction of them, with whom after much forbearance God intended to take another course, are now seasonably brought to light, to stop the mouths of another Generation risen up in their steed, (enemies of God's Sovereignty and Grace) until He shall be pleased to deal otherwise with them. God is not mo●●ed, that which men sow they shall reap. It is well known what sphere this Learned Author moved in; how far elevated above any possibility of my reaching the least esteem to him or his labours: This (being desired by my worthy and Learned friend the Publisher, to express my thought upon its perusal) I shall take the boldness to say, that this Treatise of our Author, comes not any whit behind the choicest of thos● other eminent Works of his, wherein in this cause of God, he faithfully served his Generation. I doubt not but it will appear to the Reade●, that he hath dealt with the Adversaries of the Truth, in their chiefest ●olds, advantages and strengths, putting them to shame in the calumnies and lies which they make their refuge. JOHN OWEN Vicecan. Oxon. The Riches of God's Love unto the Vessels of Mercy, CONSISTENT WITH His Absolute Hatred or Reprobation Of the Vessels of Wrath. OR AN ANSWER UNTO A BOOK ENTITLED God's Love unto Mankind, Manifested by Disproving His Absolute Decree for their Damnation. IN TWO BOOKS The First being a Refutation of the said Book, As it was Presented in Manuscript by Mr HORD unto Sir NATH: RICH. The Second being an Examination of certain Passages inserted into M. HORDES Discourse, (formerly Answered) by an Author that conceals his Name, but was supposed to be Mr MASON, Rector of Andrews-Undershaft in London. By that Great and Famous Light of God's Church, WILLIAM TWISSE D. D. And Prolocutor of the late Assembly of DIVINES. Whereunto are annexed Two Tractates of the same Author in Answer unto D. H. The one concerning Gods Decrees Definite or Indefinite. The other about the object of Predestination. TOGETHER WITH A Vindication of D. TWISSE from the exceptions of Mr JOHN GOODWIN In his Redemption Redeemed. By HENRY JEANES Minister of God's Word In CHEDZOY. Rom. 9 20. O Man, who art thou that repliest against God, shall the thing form, say to him that form it, why hast thou made me thus? v. 21. Hath not the Potter power over the clay, of the same Lump to make one vessel to honour, and another unto dishonour. OXFORD, Printed by L. L. and H. H. Printers to the University, for Tho: Robinson. Anno Salutis M. DC. LIII. TO THE WORSHIPFUL, And his Honoured Uncle, MICHAEL OLDISWORTH Esquire, And a Member of the PARLIAMENT Of the Commonwealth of ENGLAND. SIR, I Have often heard you profess a deep dislike of the unnatural vanity of the English Nation, in preferring strangers in all callings above such of their own Country men, as far surpassed them. And of this unjust partiality, no profession hath tasted in a greater measure, than that of Divinity; for of our Ministers, such whom God hath best fitted with parts and Learning for the discussing of controversies, have been so undervalved in comparison of some Foreign Divines, whose Learning was little better than systematical; as that they languished in their private studies, and had died in obscurity, unless the fame of their great abilities had been echoed over unto us by the general applause of all Christendom. Nay this sometimes hath not awakened us unto a due estimation of them. Dr Aims was looked upon abroad, as one that amongst Protestant writers had few, either superiors, or equals, for subtlety in Logic, and Scholastical Divinity; and yet he died an exile from his Native Soil, so that his Tomb might have had that inscription upon it, which Scipio by his will apppointed to be on his; Ingrata Patria ne ossa mea quidem habes, Unthankful Country, thou hast not so much as my Bones. Of how great reputation this our Author was beyond the Seas, I had rather you should hear from the able and judicious Rivet, than by me, who am censured by some (who I am sure much overvalue their own judgements) to have too high and admiring thoughts of him. Rivet (in his Epistle prefixed unto a late Book of D. Twisses against Arminius and Corvinus &c.) will assure you that a De auctore, ejus Methodo, Scholasticâ disputandi formâ, acumine & accuratione, judicium lectoribus relinquo; quibus praeiverunt Doctissimi ex toto orbe Christiano viri, etiam ex iis qui in contraria sunt parte, fatentes, nihil acuratius, nihil exactius & plenius in hoc argumento hactenus proditum fuisse. The most Learned men in the whole Christian World, even those who are of the adverse party, do confess that there was nothing yet extant more accurate, exact, and full, touching the Arminian Controversies, than what was written by D. Twisse. b Hoc saltem omnibus piis placere debet, quod usque & ubique in bonam causam fuerit intentus; camque, si quisquam aljus, ab absurdis objectis, & adversariorum calumniis, ita vindicavit, ut ex illius labore habeant non docti tantum, sed etiam minus exercitati, quo se possine extricare laqueis adversantium. ibid. As also That he (if any one) hath so cleared and vindicated the Orthodox cause from objected absurdities, and the calumnies of adversaries, as that out of his labours, not only the Learned, but also those who are least versed in controversies, may find enough whereby to disentangle themselves from the snares of Opposites. Indeed there is none almost that hath Written against Arminianism since the Publishing of any thing of Dr Twisses on that Subject, but have made very honourable mention of him, and have acknowledged him to be the mightiest man in these Controversies, that this Age hath afforded. And yet this Worthy and able Combatant for the Truth and Cause of God, was here at home designed unto Ruin, as I have found in a Manuscript under his own Hand. This I grant was by the Canterburian Faction, but withal I could tell strange Stories of the neglects that were heaped upon him by some, who were (I believe) Zealous (I am sure forward) Sticklers for a Reformation. These Men (me think) should blush at the ingenuous Testimony, which Bishop Hall (though dissenting from him about Church Government) gave of his eminent worth in a Letter of his to Mr W. S. by way of Approbation of a small piece of Dr Twisses Entitled, The doubting Conscience Resolved etc. The Doctor ever declined conference by word of Mouth, as out of modesty, so because he thought the more deliberate way of the Pen, to be quieter, and fitter too, for the bolting out of the Truth: And hereupon he spoke not much in the late Assembly of Divines at Westminster. This, some (who talked their shares) interpreted as an Argument of the former weakness, or at least present decay of his intellectuals. But as c Cicero de Senectute. Sophocles, when his Sons brought him into question for Dotage, is reported to have recited a Tragedy of Oedipus Coloneus, which he had last written, and had in his Hands, and to have demanded whether that seemed the Verse of a Dotard, or no. So our Doctor could have stopped the Mouths of these bold censurers by Publishing very Masculine and Vigorous pieces that he Penned in even his most declining Age. I may wish but I do not expect, to Live so long, as to see any thing Published touching this Argument more convincing the adversary, than this Elaborate and Weighty Discourse; and yet some, who are Perked up into places, unto which their parts and gifts bore no proportion, have very lately bespattered it as lame, imperfect, and I know not what. But the best of it is, this their detracting from it, is not likely to be any disadvantage to it; for it was so far from working that mischievous effect, which it seems they intended, as that it begat in those who heard it, and unto whom it was afterwards reported, only an admiration, and a serious indignation at the immodest impudence of such raw young men, who are no better skilled in polemical Divinity, than the mock d Heylins' Geography & Torshells Hypocrite. Council of the Great Duke of Muscovie are in State affairs, which is made up of the gravest and seem liest men of all Musco, and the adjoining Cities, richly apparelled out of the Wardrobe; which to sorrainers, not knowing this fraud, appear so many Princes, and Noble men; but indeed are mean and unqualified persons, and of no more ability, than so many pictures in a fairewrought hanging, that serve only to cover a Wall. But I appeal from the rash and unrighteous censures of these presumptuous Novices, unto your more knowing and candid judgement, who as you highly reverenced this our Author whilst living, so have you ever since his death borne a zeal unto his memory, and therefore I am assured that this Book of his will find with you, not only a favourable, but also a grateful acceptation; and the same confidence I have concerning all rational, Learned, and Orthodox men, unto whose reading I commend it, and that unto the blessing of the Almighty; and so I rest, Your deeply Obliged, And most Humbly devoted Nephew, HENRY JEANES. TO THE READER. IN the days of our Henry the 8th the whole Convocation offered unto Sr Thomas Moor the sum of four thousand pounds at the least, thereby to recompense, in part, the pains, and travails he had taken, in writing for the defence of the Romish faith; which my Author miscalls the true Catholic Faith. Now the undertake of Sr Thomas Moor for the Popish cause, are not worthy to be named the same day with the performances of Doctor Twisse against the enemies of God's grace, both Jesuits, and Arminians; I was therefore (I confess) transported with a just both sorrow and indignation, when I could not prevail with any (though I solicited divers) to adventure upon the Printing of this following Work of his, without a large supply towards the the charge thereof. ᵃ His Latin Rivet. Ind factum est ut Guilielmus Twissus, vir doctissimus, & in controversiis illis exercitatissimus, causam illam Dei, contra renascentem Pelagianismum, tanquam alter Bradwardinus, iterum defendendum sumpserit, & Librum illum Arminii tam decantatum non esse invincibilem, accurato & luculento scripto probaverit, nihil omittendo quod non excusserit, usque ad minutissima. Quod opus quam fuerit acceptum, ex eo colligi potest, quod. quamvis sit magnae molis, duabus editionibus distractis tertia nuper prodiit apud eundem Typographum, qui primam curaverat. Hoc labore notus & celebris factus Author in transmarinis regionibus, etc. Works have rendered him so renowned in foreign Churches, as that they have looked upon him as the Bradwardine of the Age. The States of West-Friezland, unto whom he was no otherwise known, than by his Answer to Arminius his Book against Perkins, offered him the greatest preferment that a Minister in that Country is capable of, viz. the place of a Professor of Divinity in the University of Franeker, and took order for defraying the charges of his journey, and transportation of his family; and were this Book, that I now present unto thy view (unto which there is not in the English Tongue any peer for solidity, and accurateness in Scholastical Divinity) translated into Latin, I am persuaded that Outlandish Divines would have such an estimate of it, as St Jerome had of certain Books of the Martyr Lucian written with his own hand, which he valued as a precious jewel; or as b Clerks Lives. Beza had of a Commentary of Mr Rollocke upon the Romans and Ephesians; concerning which he wrote unto a friend, that he had gotten a treasure of incomparable value. It was therefore very strange unto me, that there should be any knowing and sober persons who should either despair or doubt of the acceptation thereof; But my wonder would have been swallowed up of a greater amazement, if I had known that, of which I was since by a good hand informed, that this active, unwearied, and victorious Champion of God's grace, lived in great want even whilst he was Prolocutor of the late Assembly of Divines. Nay which is stranger yet, that he was slighted by some of his own calling; who, if they had not much forgotten themselves, would (seeing they swum in all plenty) have imitated (in some degree at least) that forementioned example of the grateful munificence of a Popish Convocation unto St Thomas Moor. Dr Ames, in his Preface to the Diocesans Trial of that Worthy Divine Mr Paul Baine, tells us, that the said Mr Baine, was all his life after his silencing pressed with want, not having, as he often complained unto his Friends, a place to rest his Head in, which me thought (saith Dr Ames) was an upbraiding of the Age and place where he lived with base regardlessness of piety and learning. If I should apply the like censure unto those that neglected this our Author (the Glory of his Age, and Ornament of his Nation) I should not be over bitter, He is now above any recompense to be made unto him in his own Person by us; but we may express a grateful Memory of him, as unto his Children, so unto the Issue of his mind, His Books. I speak not only for the entertainment of those that are Extant; but for bringing into the light those Pieces, that lie in the Hands of his Children; which are likely to be Buried in Dust, and Perpetual Oblivion. If I had but half that Interest in great Personages, which divers of my Brethren in both the Universities, & in the City of London have, I should apply myself with an undeniable importunity, to persuade them unto so good, and great a Work, which will Purchase them a precious Memory with the Godly and Learned in all future Ages of the Church. I have but one thing more to say of the Book, before I take my leave of Thee: If any Arminian whatsoever will give a Just, Full, and Scholastical Answer unto It, I shall by God's help return him a Reply; For 'tis De Causa Dei (as Bradwardine Entitles his Book) And in defence of God's Cause I shall fear no Colours. But if the Ignorant Paper-blurrers of the Time shall Snarl, and Snap only at some few Passages, they are not to expect, that so much as any serious notice should be taken of them. Thine, In all the obligations of Charity and Truth HENRY JEANES. THE FIRST BOOK IN TWO PARTS: WHEREOF, THE FIRST Containeth a Consideration of those Reasons for Which Mr HORD (as he pretended) First questioned the truth of Absolute Reprobation. THE SECOND Examineth those Arguments against the Absoluteness of Divine Reprobation, which M. HORD took to be of a Convincing Nature. OXFORD, Printed by LEON: LICHFIELD, for THO: ROBINSON. Anno Salutis M. DC. LIII. A Table of the Principal Matters contained in this Treatise, wherein the Answer unto Mr. Mason's Additions is referred in such order, as that it is made aptly to cohere with the refutation of M. HORDES DISCOVERSE. AN examination of the Epistle to the Reader. lib. 2. p. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. The main 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Question in these Controversies propounded and stated, together with the different opinions of Remonstrants and Contra-Remonstrants, both Supralapsarians, and Sublapsarians concerning it, examined. lib. 1. pag. 1, 2, 3. etc. usque ad p. 14, and p. 32, 33. usque ad p. 40. l. 2. p. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12. The absolute decree cleared from Mr Hord's reasons both inducing, and convincing. 1. And first to begin with those, for which (as he pretended) he first questioned the truth of absolute Reprobation, where the absolute decree is vindicated from the charge. 1. Of Novelty, lib. 1. p. 40. etc. usque ad p. 60. l. 2. p. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 2. Of Unwillingness to abide the trial lib. 1. a p. 59 ad 84. l. 2. p. 19 20. 21. 22. 3. Of Infamy. lib. 1. a p. 83. ad p. 91. l. 2. p. 22. 23, 24. 4. Of Affinity with the old and exploded errors of the Stoics, and Manichees lib. 1. p. 92, 93. etc. usque ad p. 102. 2. Those arguments against the absoluteness of Divine Reprobation according to both the upper and lower way, which Mr Hord took to be of a convincing nature, are examined. 1. Mr Hord's or Mr Mason's arguments against the upper or Supralapsarian way are answered. lib. 2. p. 25. etc. Where, 1. The upper or Supralapsarian way is vindicated from the dishonouring of God in two particulars. 1. It doth not charge him with man's destruction. lib. 2. a p. 25. ad p. 51. 2. It doth not charge him with men's sins. lib. 1. a p. 14. ad 28 l, 2. a p. 51. ad 116. 2. The upper or Supralapsarian way is cleared from the overthrow of Religion, and holy Life, and that in four particulars. 1. It maketh not sin to be no sin. lib, 1. p. 10, 28, 29. l. 2. a p 110. ad 121. 2. It taketh not away the conscience of sin. lib. 1. p. 29, 30, l. 2. p. 117, 121, 122. 3. It taketh not away the desert and guilt of sin. lib. 1. p. 10, 30, 31, 32. l. 2. p, 122, 123 etc. usque ad p. 131. 4. It maketh not the whole circle of man's Life a mere destiny. lib. 2. p. 127, 128, 130, 131, 132, 133. 2. Those pretended convictive arguments against absolute Reprobation which proceed as it is stated according to the Sublapsarian or lower way. lib. 1. p. 103. etc. And it is fully and clearly evinced that the Sublapsarian Doctrine is not repugnant unto. 1. Testimonies of Scripture. 2. Attributes of God. 3. End of the Word, and Sacrament, with other excellent gifts of God to men. 4. Holy and Pious endeavours. 5. The Grounds of comfort, whereby distressed consciences are to be relieved. 1. The Sublapsarian Doctrine concerning absolute reprobation is not repugnant to Scripture. lib. 1. p. 103, 104. etc. Particularly, not to Ezek. 33. 11. As I live saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way & live: turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways; for why will ye die o House of Israel. lib. 1. p. 103 etc. Nor to Ezek. 18. 32. I have no pleasure in the death of him that dyeth, saith the Lord God; wherefore turn yourselves and live ye. lib. 1. p. 103, 104, 105, 106. Not to Rom. 11. 32. For God hath concluded them all in unbelief, that he might have mercy upon all. lib. 1. p. 107, 108. Not to john. 3. 16. God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son etc. lib. 1. p. 108, 109, 110. Not to 1. Tim. 2. 4. Who will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the Truth. lib. p. 111, 112, 113, 114, 115. Not to 2 Peter 3. 9— not willing that any should perish but that all should come to Repentance. lib. 1. p. 115, 116, 117. Not to those conditional speeches which are in 1 Cron. 28. 9 And 2 Cron. 15. 2. And Gen. 4. 7. And Heb. 10. 38. lib. 1. p. 117, 118, 119, 120. 2. The Sublapsarian Doctrine etc. is not contrary unto God's Attributes; to the clearing of which, a discourse premised concerning Gods Atributes in general is refuted. lib. 1. p. 121, 122, etc. unto p. 128. This done, our Author comes to show in special, how that the Sublapsarian Doctrine doth not oppugn. 1. God's Holiness. lib. 2. p. 133, 134, etc. unto p. 147. 2. God's Mercy. lib. 1. p. 128, etc. unto p. 145. l. 2. p. 147, 148. 3. God's Justice. lib. 1. a p. 145. ad 171. l. 2. a p. 149. ad 156. 4. God's truth or sincerity. lib. 1. a p. 171. ad 187. l. 2. a p. 156. ad p. 167. 3. The Sublapsarian doctrine not contrary to the use and end of God's gifts to men. lib. a p. 187. ad 222. l. 2. p. 166. 167. 4. The Sublapsarian Doctrine not prejudicial to piety and a Godly life. lib. 1. a p. 221. ad 255. l. 2. p. 167, 168, 169 170. 5. The Sublapsarian Doctrine no enemy to true comfort. lib. 1. p. 255, 256 etc. usque ad finem. By this Table (Reader) thou mayst correct the mistitleing of pages, as lib. 1. p. 86, 87, 88, 89. 90. & lib. 20. p. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27. & p. 52, 53, 58, 59 & a p. 133 ad p. 147. READER I would advise thee to begin with the examination of those Arguments against the absoluteness of Divine Reprobation (which Mr Mason and Mr Hord taken to be of a convincing nature) by which Method in Reading thou wilt the sooner meet with that abundant satisfaction, which this work will yield, as touching this controversy, unto all that are capable or desirous thereof. THE FIRST PART. CONTAINING A CONSIDERATION of those Reasons, for which Mr HORD (as he pretended) first Questioned THE TRUTH OF ABSOLUTE REPROBATION. OXFORD, Printed by L. L. Printer to the University, for T. R. Anno 1653. THIS TREATISE DIVIDES ITSELF INTO TWO PARTS, Viz. 1. An Introduction. 2. A Discourse. I. The Introduction. SECTION I. SIR, I Have sent you here the Reasons, which have moved me to change my Opipion in some Controversies, of late debated between the Remonstrants and their Opposites, I do the rather present them unto you, 1. That I may show the due respect, which I bear your Worship, with my forwardness to answer your desires, as I can, with regard to Conscience. 2. That you may see, I descent not without cause, but have Reason on my side. 3. That if I can be convinced, that my Grounds are weak and insufficient, I may think better of my Opinion, which I have forsaken, than I can for the present. In the delivery of my Motives, I shall proceed in this Order, 1 I will state the Opinion which I dislike. 2 I will lay down my reasons against it. Touching the first your Worship knows these two things very well; 1 That the main 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and Question in these Controversies, and that on which all the rest hang, is, What the decrees of God are, touching the everlasting condition of men, and how they are Ordered. 2. That the Men which have disputed these things may be reduced to two sorts or sides. The first side affirms, that there is such an absolute decree, proceeding from the good pleasure of God alone, without the consideration of men's final Unbelief and Impenitency, as, by which he casteth men off from Grace and Glory, and shuts up the far greater part of men (even of those that are called by the Preaching of the Gospel to Repentance and Salvation) under invincible and unavoidable sin and damnation. The other side, disavowing any such decree, say, that the Decree of God to cast off men for ever, is grounded upon the foresight of their continuance in sin and unbelief, both avoidable by Grace, and consequently inferring no man's damnation necessary. TWISSE. Consideration. WOrthy Sir, according to your desire to take into Consideration this writing directed unto you, at length I have gotten some leisure from other employments, to address myself to give you satisfaction in this particular. 1 That I may show myself answerable to that respect which you have deserved at my hands; and not so only, but to my zeal of God's truth, which hath deserved much more at the hands of us both. 2 That you may the better discern which of us two, whom you put to confer, doth maintain the cause of God's truth, and hath the best reasons on his side. As for the change of Opinion here mentioned, such Professions are nothing strange. But whether such a Profession be in truth, or in pretence, and rather liberty taken to manifest that Opinion, which formerly hath been cherished: as also with what conscience void of all carnal respects, such a change or manifestation is made, it belongs not unto us to judge, but to leave that unto God, who trieth the hearts and reins. Sure we are, the heart of man is full of deceitfulness, both to deceive others, yea and to deceive ourselves, the more need there is to be jealous over ourselves, and to carry a watchful eye over our own souls, and whether we have changed a former way, or at the first chose one or other way, and continue to embrace that, whereof we have been at first informed; not to despise, but in the fear of God, to practise that 2 Cor. 13. 5. holy counsel of the Apostle given to the Corinthians, a famous Church, and such as were destitute of no spiritual gift. Prove yourselves, whether you are in the Faith, examine yourselves: know ye not your own selves, that Jesus Christ is in you, except ye be Reprobates? as also to consider how indifferently we carry ourselves, in using means to inform ourselves in the way of truth, and whether they be not such as do discover our chief care hath been to bring our judgements about, to the embracing 1 Cor. 11. 19 2 Thes. 2. 10, 11. of that way (whether Truth or Error) which formerly we did effect. Certain it is, that Heresies must be, and that to this end, that they that are approved may be made manifest. And Illusions shall have their course, when the truth of God is not embraced with love, whatsoever be the pretence of our disaffecting it, whether harshness to affections, or discrepancy to carnal reason. And when such judgements have their course, Who are privileged from being seduced? Let our Saviour speak in this, Matth. 24. 24. So that if it were possible men should deceive the very elect. Upon what may we be assured to stand firm in time of such temptation? Let the Apostle answer us in this, 2 Thes. 2. 13. when after the effectual working of Satan in them that perish, he comes near to them to whom he writes in the way of comfort thus, But we ought to give thanks always to God, for you Brethren beloved of the Lord, because that God hath from the beginning chosen you unto salvation through sanctification of the spirit and faith of the truth. Like as before he did conclude unto himself their election, from observation of the work of their Faith, the labour of their Love, and the patience of their Hope. And the greater is the comfort which hereby is ministered unto us, the greater should be our care, to inform ourselves aright, in the doctrine thereof, and especially to have an eye unto it, that we do not shape it in such a manner, that like as it is impossible we should have any assurance thereof, so it will prove equally impossible we should draw any comfort from thence. 1. But is it so, as here it is put upon you, that you knew very well indeed, that the main 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and Question in these Controversies, and that on which all the rest hang, is, What the decrees of God are, touching the everlasting condition of men, and how they are ordered? I assure you, if you knew this, you know more than I do. I had thought rather that the resolution of the Point concerning Predestination, had depended upon the resolution of the Point touching Grace efficacious, than the contrary. As namely, if Faith be confessed to be the gift of God, and that not with respect to any thing in man, it followeth herehence, that Predestination unto faith, and reprobation from faith, must proceed mecrely upon the good pleasure of God, and not upon foresight of aught in man. There was a time when Austin thought, that God elected some to bestow the Holy Ghost upon August. de Praed. Sanctc. 3. Fidem elegit Deus in praescientia ut quem crediturum esse praescivit, ipsum eligeret cui Sp. sanctum daret ut bona operando vitam aeternam consequeretur. Retract. lib. 1. cap. 23. them, that by working that which is good, they might obtain everlasting life: and who were those whom he thus elected? namely such as whom he foresaw would believe: and what was his reason for it? surely this; Quod ergo credimus nostrum est, quod autem bona operamur, Illius est, qui Credentibus dat Spiritum Sanctum; quod profeciò non dicerem, si jam scirem, etiam ipsam fidem inter dei munera reperiri quae dantur in eodem spiritu. Mark I pray the manner of his Retractation, I would not have said (so) if at that time I had known Faith to have been amongst the gifts of God, which are given in the same spirit. So then as soon as Austin came to acknowledge, that Faith itself was the gift of God, he therewithal came off from affirming, that Quem sibi crediturum esse praescivit, ipsum elegit, cui Spiritum Sanctum daret ut bona operando etiam vitam aeternam consequeretur. And like as before he maintained, that God elected some (to wit, Believers) to bestow the Holy spirit upon them, that by working good works, they might obtain also everlasting life; so now having found that Faith also, is the gift of God, he was accordingly to maintain, that God elected some to bestow the Holy spirit upon them, that both by believing, and working good works, they might obtain everlasting life: so that no longer was the foresight of Faith, to precede election in Augustine's opinion, to wit, after once he knew Faith to be the gift of God. And accordingly in his Book De Praedestin. Sanctorum, addressing himself to the rectifying of the Massilienses in the point of Predestination, wherein they did not as yet discern the truth of God: Adhuc in quaestione caligant de Praedestinatione sanctorum. Cap. 1. And again, Si quid de Praedestinatione Sanctorum aliter sapiunt (Deus) illis hoc quoque revelabit. Ibid. Mark I pray you what course he takes to rectify them herein. cap. 2. prius itaque fidem quâ Christiani sumus donum dei esse debemus ostendere: and whereas he had performed this task very sufficiently before, manifesting by divers pregnant passages of holy Scripture, that Faith was the gift of God, and the Massilienses did elude them by such a distinction as this, Faith may be considered two ways, either as touching Initium, the first beginning of it; or as touching Incrementum the augmentation thereof; and accommodating this distinction said, The passages of Scripture alleged by Austin proceeded as touching the Augmentation of it, which they willingly granted to be the work of God; but not as touching the initiation of it, which they still maintained to be the work of man. Therefore Austin addresseth himself in that discourse of his, to prove that the very Initiation of Faith, is the work of God, and not the Augmentation only. His words are these, Sed nunc iis respondendum esse video, qui divina testimonia, quae de hâc re adhibuïmus, ad hoc dicunt valere, ut noverimus ex nobis quidem nos habere ipsam fidem, sed incrementum ejus ex Deo: tanquam fides non ab ipso donetur nobis, sed ab ipso tantum augeatur in nobis ex merito quo coepit à nobis. And likewise in the 19 cap. of the same Book, having propounded the opinion of the Pelagians, namely that because God foresaw that we would be holy and unblameable before him in love, therefore he elected and predestinated us in Christ, before the foundation of the World; and showed how this opinion, contradicts that of the Apostle Ephes. 1. 4, 5. where it is said, that, God elected us in Christ, and predestinated us before the foundation of the World, that we should be holy and unblameable before him in love: and perceiving withal how the Massilians did avoid this as nothing contrary to their Tenent (though contrary to the Pelagian Tenent) forasmuch as they maintained not, that God foresaw any thing but our Faith, and therefore God elected us before the foundation of the World, that we should be holy and unblameable before him in love, (for these were their words) Nos autem dicimus nostram Deum non praescisse nisi fidem & ideo nos elegisse— ut etiam sancti & immaculati gratia atquè opere ejus essemus; what course doth Austin take to beat them off but this, namely to prove, that, Like as Holiness so Faith also, and that as touching the Initiation thereof, is the work of God. thus: Sed audiant ipsi in hoc testimonio, ubi dicit, sortem consecuti simus, praedestinati secundum propositum qui universa operatur. Ipse ergo ut credere incipiamus operatur qui universa operatur. So that it is clear in the opinion of Austin, that to take both himself and others off from premising the foresight of Faith unto God's election, it is sufficient to prove that Faith is the gift of God, the work of God both touching the augmentation, and touching the first introduction thereof. And thus evincing the condition of Predestination, as excluding all foresight of Faith, from the condition of Predestination, as being throughout the work of God in man, rather than taking a contrary course, as if the main 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 were, what is the condition of God's decree of Predestination, as here it is pretended and supposed. And albeit it is commonly received of all sides (as if it were without question) that Faith is the gift of God: yet we find practices on foot, for the working of a manifest innovation herein. For not to speak of their interpretations of their own meanings, as, in what sense they say God works Faith in us; it is apparent the Remonstrants now a days, do as good as profess, that Faith is not bestowed upon us for Christ's sake, in as much as they deny that Christ merited Faith for us. For when the Author of the Censure passed upon the Remonstrants' Confession, disputeth thus, At si hoc tantum meritus est Christus tum Christus nobis non est meritus fidem nec regenerationem: the Remonstrants in the Answer hereunto, forthwith confess it in these Apol. pro Confess. Remonst. Fol. 95. p. 1. words, Sanè ita est. Nihil ineptius, nihil vanius est quam hoc Christi merito tribuere. Si enim Christus nobis meritus dicatur fidem & regenerationem, tum fides conditio esse non poterit, quam a peccatoribus Deus sub comminatione mortis aeternae exigeret. And by the way mark, I pray, that not any difference is put between Faith and Regeneration; manifestly signifying thereby, that as they grant it to be the work of man to believe, so we are commanded to make ourselves a new heart. Ezech. 18. 31 And as for ordering of the decrees, which here is added to complete the main 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as here is pretended that in my opinion, is so far off from being the main 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as that it is not to be accounted any 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 at all Theological, but merely Logical. Let the condition of the decrees be rightly explicated according to Divinity, and we shall have no need at all of Divinity for the right ordering of them. A mere Logical faculty by light of nature, will serve for this. For the decrees whereof we treat, are merely Intentiones rerum gerendarum. Now for the ordering of these in what kind soever, we have received Rules of the Schools, never yet that I know contradicted by any; namely, that they are to be ordered according to the condition of the things intended, which are but two, to wit, the end and the means; and all do attribute priority to the intention of the end, and posteriority to the intention of the means. It is true, men may err, in designing the right end, as also, in designing the right means, and these errors are to be discovered, and the truth cleared by that science, whereunto the consideration of the end and means belong, and not by Logic. But agreement being made concerning the end and means, there is no doubt to be made, but that according to the most received Rules of Schools, the end must be acknowledged both first in intention, and last in execution, and contrarily the means last in intention and first in execution. 2. But come we to the Decrees themselves, & the different opinions thereabouts, which follow in the next place. Now here I looked for different opinions about decrees, in the plural number, but I find the relation extends no farther than to one decree, and that of Reprobation. So at the first entrance reasons are promised, even in this writing, to be exhibited of change of opinion in certain controversies in the plural number, when in the issue, all comes but to one controversy, and that about Reprobation. Yet the Scripture speaketh fully of Election, sparingly of Reprobation in most places, leaving us to judge thereof, by consequence from the doctrine of Election Yet some passages we have (I confess) that give light and evidence to both alike. For like as it is said Acts 2. last. that God added daily to the Church such as should be saved. so 2 Cor. 4. 3. it is said, If our Gospel be hid, it is hid to them that are lost, and as it is signified Math. 24 24. that 'tis impossible seducers should prevail over the elect. so 2 Thes. 2. both as much is signified ver. 13. and also expressed ver. 10. 11. that they shall prevail among them that perish: and the 1 Cor. 1. 18. we are given to understand jointly, that the preaching of the Cross is to them that perish foolishness: but unto us which are saved it is the power of God. and Rom. 9 18. that as God hath mercy on whom he will, so also he hardeneth whom he will. And like as Acts 13. 48. we read that, as many believed as were ordained to eternal life; which phrase of ordaining to eternal life, I conceive (under correction) to be all one with the phrase of Writing our names in Heaven. Luke 10. 20. and writing us in heaven. Hebr. 12. 23. and this phrase I take to be all one with the writing of us in the Book of life. So on the other side we read, that Whose names were not written in the Book of Life from the foundation of the World should wonder when they beheld the Be●st, and not so only but Revel. 17. 8. Revel. 13. 8. worship him also. But give we every vessel leave to vent that liquor whereof it is full. I come to the consideration of the different opinions here proposed, concerning the decree of Reprobation; and herein, I will endeavour to open a clear way to the right understanding of the truth, that your judgement may have the more free course in discerning it, and withal, to represent unto you, the unreasonable carriage of our Adversaries in the setting down of our Tenent, whereby you may guess, what you are to expect from them prosecuting against it. And herein I will insist upon these particulars. The first shall be the Things Decreed. The second the Cause of this decree. The third, the Persons on whom this Decree doth pass. The fourth shall be that claw of Unavoidable Sin, and Damnation. 1. The Things Decreed are here said to be, The casting off from grace and glory, and the shutting of men up under Damnation. Now I pray observe here in the first place, that, by casting off from grace and glory, we mean no other thing, than the not giving of grace and glory; and by grace, we mean the grace of Faith and Repentance, the grace of Regeneration. For like as in Election God purposeth (we say) to give this grace unto some, which is the same with showing mercy on them. Rom. 9 18. as we suppose; so on the other side, God purposeth to deny this grace unto others, which in Scripture phrase is to harden them, that being made opposite to Gods showing mercy. Rom. 9 18. And for the farther clearing of the terms we say, that God by giving Faith and Repentance, doth cure that infidelity and impenitency, which is natural unto all, as being borne in sin: and by not giving this grace of Faith and Repentance unto others, God leaves their natural infidelity and impenitency uncured. And if this Author means aught else by shutting up under sin, than the not curing of their natural infidelity and impenitency, he doth us wrong, and what he means thereby I know not. As for shutting up under damnation, that is not our phrase, but we love to speak in plain terms, and say, that God doth purpose to inflict damnation on them whom he Reprobates. Thus much for the clearing of the terms, as touching the things Decreed. Secondly, observe I pray, which is of principal consideration, that here we have no cause at all specified, why he refuseth to give them grace; cunningly leaving it to an improvident Reader to conceive, that the cause of the decree, which is here specified, to be the mere pleasure of Gods will, is indifferently appliable to the not giving of grace and glory, and to the shutting up under damnation as the cause thereof, which is a notorious imposture, yet I do not think this Author guilty of it, but others rather, who abuse their wits by cunning courses, to deceive the hearts of the simple. Amongst the Fallacies observed by Aristotle, there is one called Fallacia plurium interrogationum, as when many things are put together, and an answer is required to be made, either affirmatively or negatively to them all, as if they were but one; when indeed the answer cannot be made aright, without distinction of the things demanded, the one whereof perhaps requires an answer affirmative, the other negative. As for example, to instance as touching one of the Controversies here declined: We are often demanded, whether every one that heareth the Gospel, be not bound to believe that Christ died for him? Now I say this phrase Christ died for me includes many things, as the benefits which arise unto me by the death of Christ, may be conceived to be many. But let these benefits be distinguished, and we shall readily answer to the question made, and that perhaps differently, as namely, affirmatively to some, negatively to others; as thus. Do you speak of Christ's dying for me, that is, for the pardon of my sins, and for the salvation of my soul: I answer affirmatively and say, I am bound to believe that Christ died for the procuring of these benefits unto me in such manner, as God hath ordained, to wit, not absolutely but conditionally, to wit, in case I do believe and repent. For God hath not otherwise ordained, that I should reap the benefit of pardon and salvation, by virtue of Christ's Death and Passion, unless I believe in him and repent. But if question be made, whether I am bound to believe that Christ died for me, to procure faith and repentance unto me; I do not say, that I am bound, or that every one who hears the Gospel, is bound to believe this. Nay the Remonstrants now a days, deny in express terms, that Christ merited Censura Censurae. this for any at all. I am not of their opinion in this; but I see clearly a reason manifesting, that Christ merited not this for all, no not for all and every one, that hears the Gospel. For if he had, then either he hath merited it for them absolutely or conditionally. Not absolutely, for then all and every one of them should believe de facto, which is untrue; for the Apostle saith, Fides non est Omnium: Nor conditionally, for 2 Thes. 3. what condition I pray can be devised, upon the performance whereof, God for Christ's sake should give us faith, and repentance? In like sort, if I am demanded whether God did decree, of the mere pleasure of his will, to refuse to give grace and glory unto some, and to inflict upon them damnation. To this I cannot answer at once, there being a Fallacy in the demand. But distinguish them, I answer and say, that, as touching the point of denying grace, God doth that of his mere pleasure; but as touching the denial of glory, and the inflicting of damnation, he doth not decree to do these of mere pleasure, but rather merely for sin, to wit, for their infidelity and impenitency, and all the bitter fruits that shall proceed from them. So that Reprobation according to our Tenent rightly stated, is the decree of God partly to deny unto some, and that of his mere pleasure, the grace of Faith and Repentance, for the curing of that infidelity and hardness of heart, which is natural unto all, and partly to deprive them of glory, and to inflict damnation upon them, not of his mere pleasure, but merely for their final continuance in sin, to wit, in infidelity and impenitency, and all the fruits that proceed therehence. 2. Now as for the cause of this decree, as likewise of all the decrees of God, when any of our Divines say, that it is the mere pleasure of God, as in some places it is expressed of some decrees, let them be understood aright; not as if they distinguished between the decree of God, and the good pleasure of his will; for we know full well, that the decree of God is the good pleasure of his Will, what decree soever it be: but hereby we only exclude, all causes from without, moving God to make any such decree; like as when it is said, Deuteron. 7. 7. The Lord did not set his love upon you, nor choose you, because ye were more in number then any people, but because the Lord loved you, as much as to say, The Lord loved you, because he loved you. Where we cannot soberly devise any distinction between love and love, as between the cause and the effect; only hereby is excluded all cause from without. Now we are ready with open face to profess, that of the Will and decree of God, there neither is, nor can be any cause from without: all things from without being temporal, and the Will of God being eternal, and the Will of God quoad actum Volentis, being the very Essence of God; For God is a pure Act and that indivisibly One, whereby he is said to Be whatsoever he is, as we do conceive variety of perfections in God, yet all these are but one indivisible Act in God; and by this one indivisible Act, he both knows all that he knows, and willeth and decreeth all that he willeth and decreeth. Man when he willeth any thing, as likewise an Angel when he willeth aught, they produce an act of willing passing upon this or that object: but it is not so with God, in whom there is no accident. And therefore Aquinas was bold to profess, that never any man was so mad, as to Aquin. 1. q. 23. art. 5. Nullus fuit ita insanae mentis ut diceret merita esse causam Divinae Praedestinationis ex parte actus Praedestinantis. profess that merits were the cause of Predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating: and why so? why surely upon this ground, because predestination is the will of God: and like as nothing can be the cause of the will of God, as touching the act of willing, so nothing can be the cause of divine predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating. His words are these in the same place; Sic inquirenda est ratio praedestinationis, sicut inquiritur ratio divinae voluntatis. dictum est autem suprà, quod non est assignare causam divinae voluntatis ex parte actus volendi. But because like as the love of God is sometime taken for the good thing which God bestows, like as Jansenius interprets that place john. 14. 21. He that loveth me shall be beloved of my Father, to wit, of the effect of the Father's love; and we commonly say, that Passions are attributed unto God not quoad Affectum, but quoad Effectum: in like sort the Will of God is taken for the thing willed, as 1 Thes. 4. 3. This is the will of God, even your sanctification, that is, this is willed by him. Therefore Aquinas distinguisheth a double consideration in the will of God, one quoad actum volentis, and so it hath no cause from without; another quoad res volitas, and so it may have a cause. So likewise in predestination as considering it either quoad actum Praedestinantis, and so it hath no cause, or quoad effectum Praedestinationis, and so it may have a cause, as there he professeth, both touching the will of God in general, and touching Predestination in special. Of the will of God in general, thus; Non est assignare causam voluntatis divinae ex parte actus volendi, sed potest assignari ratio ex parte volitorum, in quantum scilicet Deus vult esse aliquid propter aliud. And of predestination in special, thus; Sed hoc sub quaestione vertitur, utrum ex parte effectus praedestinatio habeat aliquam causam; & hoc est quaerere utrum Deus praeordinaverit se daturum effectum praedestinationis alicui propter aliqua merita. Now thus we acknowledge of predestination, both in the way of a meritorious cause on Christ's part, and in the way of a disposing cause on our part. For God we say, hath predestinated to bestow upon us, both grace and glory for Christ's sake; where Christ is made a meritorious cause of grace and glory, but not of the act of predestination. And farther we say, that God hath predestinated to bestow glory upon us, as a reward of grace, as a reward of faith, repentance, and good works: and to this purpose it is said that God by his grace, doth make us meet partakers of the inheritance of the Saints in light, Coloss. 1. 12. But as for the bestowing of grace on any, we say there is no cause thereof on man's part, For he hath mercy on whom he will. Rom. 9 18. and he hath called us with an holy calling not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace. 2 Timoth. 1. 9 Now let us apply this to reprobation, which is the will of God, as well as predestination, and if there can be no cause of predestination quoad actum Praedestinantis, because there can be no cause of the will of God quoad actum volentis; Who seeth not, that by the same reason, there can be no cause of reprobation quoad actum reprobantis? And if it be a mad thing to maintain that merits are the cause of predestination quoad actum praedestinantis; it must be as mad a thing to maintain, that any merits of the creature, can be the cause of reprobation quoad actum reprobantis. And this doctrine Aquinas applies expressly to Reprobation itself, upon the 9 Rom. Lect. 2 da, at the end of these words Praescientia peccatorum potest esse aliqua ratio reprobationis: but how? ex parte actus reprobantis? nothing less, but rather ex parte effectus; and what effect? not the denying of grace, but only as touching the inflicting of punishment: thus, Praescientia peccatorum potest esse aliqua ratio reprobationis, ex parte paenae quae praeparatur reprobatis, in quantum scilicet Deus proponit se puniturum malos propter peccata quae à seipsis habent non à Deo. And farther we prove this, both by clear evidence of Scripture, and clear evidence of reason, and thirdly by as clear a representation of their infatuation that oppose this doctrine, and particularly of the Author of this discourse. First by clear evidence of Scripture. Rom. 9 11. Where the Apostle proves, that Election stands not of good works, by an argument drawn from the circumstance of the time, when that Oracle, The elder shall serve the younger, was delivered; together with the present condition of Jacob and Esau, answerable to that time; thus, Before the children were borne, or had done good or evil, it was said to Rebecca, The Elder shall serve the Younger, Therefore the purpose of God according to Election stands not of good works. Now look by what strength of reason the Apostle concludes this of Election, by the same strength of argumentation may I conclude of reprobation, in proportion, thus, Before the Children were borne, or had done Good or Evil, it was said to Rebecca The Elder shall serve the Younger; therefore the purpose of God according to reprobation, stands not of evil works: that is, like as good works are not the cause of Election, so evil works are not the cause of Reprobation, to wit, quoad actum reprobantis, as touching the very act and eternal decree of God itself. Secondly, observe, I pray, whether my reason be not as clear; If God upon the foresight of sin, doth ordain a man unto damnation; (thus I am content to propose it in the most rigorous manner) than this is done either by necessity of nature, or by the constitution of God: Not by necessity of nature, as it is confessed; and the cause is evident, for undoubtedly he could annihilate them, and so he can the holiest creature that lives, as all sides confess. Therefore it must be by the constitution of God: but neither can this hold. For if so, then God did constitute, that is ordain, that upon the foresight of sin, he would ordain men unto damnation. Where observe that the act of divine ordination, is made the object of divine ordination: as much as to say, he did ordain to ordain, or he did decree to decree: Whereas the objects of God's decrees are always things temporal; as for example, We say well, God did decree to create the world, to make man out of the earth, to send Christ into the World, to preserve us, to redeem us, sanctify us, save us. But God's ordination or decree is an act eternal, and cannot be the object of his decree or ordination. I challenge all the Powers of darkness to answer this, and to vindicate the Tenent, which I impugn, from that absurdity, which I charge upon it, if they can. O but some will say, it's very harsh to say, that God of his mere pleasure doth ordain men unto damnation. I am content to do my endeavour, to remove this scandal out of the way of honest hearts, yea and out of the way of others also. First therefore consider, is it fit to resist the evidence of divine truth, because it is harsh to men's affections? Secondly, Wherein consists this harshness? Is it in this, that nothing is the cause of God's decree? and will nothing temper the harshness of it, unless a thing temporal as sin, be made the cause of God's will, which is eternal and even God himself? But let us deal plainly, and tell me in truth, whether the harshness doth not consist in this, That the mere pleasure of Gods will, seems to be made the cause, not of God's decree only, but of damnation also; as if God did damn men, not for sin, but of his mere pleasure. And this I confess is wondrous harsh, and yet no more harsh than it is untrue, though in this juggling world, things are so carried by some, who will both shuffle, and cut, and deal themselves, as if we made God of mere pleasure to damn men, and not for sin, which is a thing utterly impossible: damnation being such a notion, as hath essential reference unto sin. But if God damn no man but for sin, and decreed to damn no man but for sin, what if the mere pleasure of God be the cause of this decree; what harshness I say is this? As for example, Zimri or Cosby perished in their incestuous act, and gave up both lust and ghost together, so going as it were quick to Hell, never fearing the judgements of God, until they felt them. If we say, God decreed they should be cut off in this sin of theirs, and be damned for it, What hatshnes I pray in this, though God made this decree of mere pleasure? For is it not manifest he did? For could he not if it had pleased him, have caused them to outlive this sin of theirs, and given them space for repentance, and not space only, but grace also for repentance, seeing as Austin saith, Quantamlibet praebuerit Contr. julian. Pelag. lib. 5. cap. 4. Patientiam, nisi Deus dederit, quis aget Paenitentiam. Now I pray, what is become of the harshness of this our Tenent as is pretended? And the truth is, the harshness lieth not here, though our Adversaries would fain draw it hither, but rather on the other part of reprobation, as it denotes God's purpose for the denying of grace, to wit, the grace of Regeneration, the grace of faith and repentance: but on this part, they are not very forward to cry out upon our Tenent, as savouring of harshness, but themselves rather driven to such straits, as either to deny faith and repentaince to be the gift of God (wherein the Remonstrants now a days, are come so far as clearly to profess, that Christ merited not faith and Regeneration for any; whence it followeth, that if God doth give faith and repentance unto any, yet it is not for Christ's sake that he gives it,) Or being demanded how it comes to pass, that God gives it not to all, if his mere pleasure be not the cause of this difference, as namely in showing mercy unto some, when he hardens others, they are put upon this shift to say, that if they would believe, God would give them faith, if they would repent God would give them repentance▪ and one that I have had to deal with, on this very argument, spares not to profess that God doth work in man 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Velle, credere, & resipiscere, modè Velit. One thing I had almost pretermitted, and that was, to represent the infatuate condition of this declaration, to wit, as touching the Author's Tenet in opposition to ours, as in saying, that God's decree to cast off men for ever, is grounded upon the foresight of their continuance in sin and unbelief; For this continuance must be understood of final continuance therein, lest otherwise the contradiction to our Tenent be not duly expressed. Now the foresight hereof is made to precede Gods casting men off for ever: but from what? surely from grace and glory, in contradiction to our Tenent as here it is shaped; and consequently in election, the foresight of final perseverance in faith and repentance, must be shaped to precede Gods giving grace, to wit, in another world, as if the other world were apppointed for the giving of grace to some, and denying it another; and that the giving of the grace of faith and repentance, and denying it unto others, was after the one hath persevered in faith and repentance, and the other in infidelity and impenitency unto the end in this World. For this is it we mean by grace, when we say, God in Election destinates it to one, and in Reprobation decrees to deny it unto the other; and in contradicting us it is fit they should use our terms in our meaning, unless they express the contrary, and give a reason of it. 3. As for the Persons on whom this decree passeth, and the aggravation there mentioned, namely of shutting up the greater part of men, even of those that are called, under sin and damnation, This is confessed on all hands, That the greatest part of men are reprobated, even of those that are called; and our Saviour hath expressly given us to understand, That many are called but few are chosen. And it is without question, that if it be lawful for God to deal thus with one, it is as lawful to deal so with the greatest part, yea with all. And experience justifieth that the greatest part of them that are called do not perform true faith and repentance: and if they did and die therein, than the greatest part of them that are called, should be chosen. Whereby it is manifest, that God doth not give Faith and Repentance unto the greatest part of them that are called; and consequently, it is nothing strange, that he shuts up the greatest part of them that are called under Damnation. So that in true account there is no weight at all of aggravation in this. Like as you have read in News from Parnassus, that when the French and the Spaniard weighed their powers in the balance, and the French being found to weigh 25 Millions, and the Spaniard but 20: He thinking to help the matter, and to make himself as weighty as the French, clapped into the scale the Kingdom of Naples and the Dukedom of Milan; but beyond his expectation, the scale proved never a whit the more weighty than before, but lighter rather. 4. As for the last claw, to help the matter with a couple of Epethetes of invincible sin and unavoidable damnation; one of these might have sufficed to be expressed, seeing undoubtedly Damnation is no otherwise avoidable by man, then by avoiding sin the cause thereof. For it is undeniable that man dying in sin, his damnation is unavoidable by the whole power of nature. But as for the avoydablenes of sin, the Author of this Discourse acknowledgeth it no otherwise then by grace; and we willingly profess, that all sin is avoidable by grace. But by the way it is implied, that such a grace is afforded unto all reprobates, whereby they may avoid that infidelity and impenitency for which they are damned. But this we deny. For if this were true than all Reprobates were enabled to believe, to repent, to please God, to discern the things of God, to be subject to the Law of God; but to say this, is directly to contradict the Word of God, which professeth of some, that They could not believe joh. 12. 39 of others that They cannot repent, Rom. 2. 5. Of all natural men, that They cannot discern the things of God, as which seem foolishness unto them, 1 Cor. 2. 14. of them that are in the flesh, that They cannot please God, Rom. 8. 8. of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the affection of the flesh, that 'tis enmity against God, and it is not subject to the Law of God, nor can be, Rom. 8. 7. And of the Israelites in the Wilderness for forty years together, God had not given them eyes to see, nor ears to hear, nor an heart to perceive, Deutron. 29. 4. INTRODUCTION. SECT. II. THE first side is divided; for 1. Some of them present man to God, in the decree of Reprobation, considered and looked upon out of, or above the Fall, and make the Will of God, without any consideration of sin in man Original or Actual, to be the cause of his eternal Rejection, that so he might show his absolute and unlimited power and dominion over him, in appointing to heaven or hell, whom he pleased: and this way go Calvin, Beza, Zanchius, Piscator, Gomarus. That way seems to charge God very deeply, and to make him the prime and principal cause of men's everlasting ruin, and the author also, not only of the first sin that entered into the world, but of all other sins likewise, that are successively committed therein, as means to bring men by a course and colour of justice, to those lamentable ends to which he had from eternity appointed them: and so by good consequence, it makes the pure and holy God, to be unholy, and ascribes unto him, far greater cruelty, then can be found in the most bloody and barbarous Tyrant in the World. Suetonius in the life of Tiberius (one of the veriest Butchers of all the Roman Sueton. Edit. Lugd. 1532. pag. 171. Emperors) reports of him, that having a mind to put the two sons of Germanicus (Diusus and Nero) to death, Variâ fraude induxit ut concitarentur ad convitia, & concitati perderentur; He used cunning contrivances to draw them to reproach him, that so he might cover his cruelty in their death, under a pretext of justice. And a little after he saith of the same Emperor, that (because it was not lawful among the Romans to strangle Virgins) he caused certain little maids to be deflowered by the Hangman, Ibid. p. 175. that so they might afterwards be strangled. This cruelty of Tiberius, exceeded the bounds of humanity, and yet it comes as short of that, which this way lays to the charge of God, as a temporal death comes short of an eternal, and the power of man in drawing men to offend, comes short of that irresistible power, which the Almighty is able to use, in the producing of sin. Besides, it takes from men all conscience of sin, and makes sin to be no sin. We use to say, Necessitas non habet legem, Necessity hath no law. Actions in themselves evil, if an absolute necessity bear sway in them, are transgressions of no law, and consequently are no sin (for sin is a transgression of the law) and men when they do them, they have no reason to be forry for them. The Tragedian could see this, where he saith, Fati ista culpa est, Nemo fit fato nocens, when one evil action is done, the doer is not in fault, but the decree that necessitates him to do it. It takes away likewise from good and evil actions, that defect which they naturally carry with them of Rewards and Punishments, as Saint Hierome tells us, Liberi arbitrii nos condidit Deus, nec ad L. 2. contra jovin. virtutes nec ad vitia necessitate tranimur, alioqui ubi necessit as est nec damnatio nec corona est. Where necessity domineers, there is no place for retribution; and therefore none are drawn by the adamantine chains of necessity to virtues or vices, but left free to the choice of their own wills. When Zeno his servant was punished by him for a fault that he had done, he told his Master out of his own grounds that he was unjustly beaten, because he was Fato coactus peccare, constrained so to do by his undeclinable destiny; and certainly, if malefactors could not choose but play their rude pranks, they could not be justly punished for them. For all just punishments suppose a possibility of avoiding those offences, of which they are the punishments. TWISSE. Consideration. THis Author's pretence being only to oppose that Tenent, which maintains that the decree of denying grace and glory, and of inflicting damnation doth not presuppose the foresight of final perseverance in sin, you may well marvel to what purpose this comes in about the different condition of man, considered by God either as before the Fall, or after the Fall in Adam, it being a question of another nature and merely Logical, to wit, about the ordering of God's decrees of Creation, Permission of the fall of Adam, giving or denying Grace, Salvation or Damnation. The resolution whereof, depends upon the right distinction of these decrees, in reference to the end, and to the means tending to that end. For this being Resolved according to the rules of Divinity, the order between them, must consequently be determined, according to the rules generally received in the Schools, namely thus, The intention of the end is first, than the intention of the means: so that if Salvation be the end, and Creation and Permission of Adam's Fall and Raising therehence by Faith and Repentance to be the means, it must be confessed, that the decree of Salvation must be first, than the decree of Creation, permission of sin, and of raising out of sin. So if the damnation of any be the end that God intends, and creation and permission of sin, and of final perseverance therein be the means; it must be acknowledged, that the decree of damnation, was before the decree of creation, etc. But if salvation and damnation be no ends intended by God, but means rather, as well as creation, and permission of all to sin in Adam, together with the raising of some therehence, and leaving some therein, tending to some farther end, namely, the Manifestation of God's glory in a certain kind, as the Scripture together with manifest reason doth justify. For God being the supreme efficient, must necessarily be the last end. And even there where the word of God doth testify, that God created the wicked against the day of evil, it doth therewithal give to understand, that what is signified by, To the day of evil, doth not denote the end of God's actions (that before being expressed to be God himself, God made all things for himself, not for acquiring aught unto himself, for he is so perfect, that nothing can be added unto him) but for the manifesting of his own most glorious nature: so that if God be pleased to manifest his glorious beneficence on man in the highest degree, and that in the way of mercy mixed with justice; this end requires and bespeaks both creation (no glory at all being manifestable without this) and permission of sin (otherwise it could not be manifested in the way of mercy) and satisfaction for sin (otherwise this mercy could not be mixed with justice exactly) and faith and repentance (otherwise the good which God intends could not be bestowed by way of reward) and last of all Salvation, under which we comprehend, the highest and most blessed condition that the nature of man, continuing a mere man, is capable of. And herehence we conclude, that in case the end is such as hath been specified, and all these actions following, congruous means tending to that end, therefore the decree of manifesting God's glory, as above specified, is first with God, and secondly the decree of the means; which means although they are many materially, yet they come all under one formal notion of means tending to a certain end, which according to the several parts thereof bespeaks them all; and consequently they are all to be considered, as making up the object of one formal decree, called the decree of the means: and the intention of none of them is before another, but all intended at once, as means tending to that end which is first intended. In like manner if God shall be pleased to intend the manifestation of his glory in Man or Angel, in the way of justice vindicative, the means necessarily required hereunto are, Creation, Permission of sin, and Damnation unto punishment, and all three makes up the object of one formal decree, which is to be called the decree of the means. So that like as God doth not intend the creatures creation, before he intends his damnation, in the same respect he cannot be said to intend his damnation, before he intends his creation, or the permission of his sin. And this rightly considered, sets an end unto all quarrel about the different consideration of Man in election and reprobation, which yet is about a School point only, touching the right stateing of the end and the means, and the right ordering of God's decrees concerning them. And doth it not set an end also, to all aspersions of cruelty cast upon the holy providence of God, from the guilt of which kind of blasphemies, nothing can free them; but confidence in their own way, as if it were the way of truth, and that by convincing evidence of holy Scripture? Whereas it appears how little direction they take from the Word of God throughout, for the shaping of their Tenent in this. Yet neither is any such confidence, able to free them from the guilt of such blasphemies which they utter: well it may free them from the conscience of it, yet if it do, that is more than I know. And only to these two ends doth this alien discourse of our different opinions thereabouts tend, as I conceive; namely, to show the difference of our Divines, and to give vent to those aspersions of blasphemy on the first way, as also to make way for a third in part, which comes to be considered in the next Section, in the manner how they fall upon the relation of the second way. Yet Arminius in his Conference with Junius, might have informed him of three opinions concerning the object of Predestination, dividing the fruit of these into two. The condition of man before the Fall, being considerable two ways, either as before the Fall, but after Creation, which they call the Mass created, but not yet corrupted; or as not before the Fall only, but before the creation also, which we commonly call the Mass not yet created, or Mankind not yet created. As touching the most harsh way of these three, upon examination of Arminius his twenty arguments against it, I find nothing worth the speaking of, but mere suggestion of flesh and blood, which yet being duly pondered, do discover most shameful nakedness. His arguments against the making of Mankind not yet created, the object of predestination, I have proposed and answered in my Vindiciae gratiae Dei, lib. 1. De Praedestin. digress. 5. if this Author hath any mind to be doing with them, I shall be ready to consider what he saith, as God shall give opportunity. And in Junius you shall find, how he laboureth to reconcile them, but very obscurely. Piscator also sets hand to the same work, and carrieth himself therein (as his manner is) very clearly, by distinguishing three acts in Predestination. The first whereof he will have to presuppose Mankind not created; for it is the decree of creating man to different ends. The second, he will have to presuppose Mankind created, but not corrupted: for it is the decree of permitting Adam to fall, and all Mankind in him. The third and last he will have to presuppose Mankind both created and corrupted; for it is the decree of raising some out of sin, wherein they are conceived and borne, and leaving some therein. As for the Angels it is without question, that election and reprobation divine had course concerning them, as well as concerning mankind, and as certain it is, that no corrupt Mass could be the object of divine Predestination in their election and reprobation. As for Arminius his ordering of God's decrees in opposition to these ways taken by our Divines, that he hath communicated unto us, in the Declaration of his opinion before the States, pag 47. where leaving out the decree of creating mankind in Adam, and the decree of permitting all mankind to fall in Adam, he takes into consideration only, the divine decrees of saving sinful man. 1. The first whereof is, Whereby he decreed to make his Son Christ a Mediator, Redeemer, Saviour, Priest and King, by his death to abolish sin, by his obedience to obtain Salvation (formerly lost) and by his power to communicate it. And this decree he saith is absolute. 2. The second is, Whereby he decreed to receive into grace such as believe and repent, and those persevering unto the end, to save in Christ, for and by Christ: but such as believe and repent not, to leave under sin and wrath, and to damn as alien from Christ. Where observe, 1. This decree of saving such as believe and repent, he calleth a decree absolute, yet this decree passeth upon no particular persons: such a decree is reserved for the last place. 2. God (with him) receives none into grace and favour, unless they believe and repent: Whereby it is manifest, that with him faith and repentance are no fruits of God's grace and favour: for they must be performed before they are received into God's grace and favour. 3. The third is, Where by he decreed sufficiently and efficaciously to administer the means which are necessary to faith and repentance. This decree whether he conceives it to be absolute or no, he doth not specify; nor whether he decreed to administer them unto all, nor by whom, whether by men only, or by men or Angels, nor whether by means he understands the Gospel only, and we have cause to doubt thereof. And lastly, which is most obscure, he doth not explicate what he means, by sufficient and efficacious administration. Only he adds, that in this administration, he carries himself according, 1. To his Wisdom, which shows what becomes his mercy andseverity, and 2 lie to his Justice, whereby he is ready to follow the prescript of his Wisdom. 4. The fourth and last is, Whereby he decreed to save and damn certain particular persons. Now whereas our Divines generally, what way soever they took, had a care out of their Logic and Philosophy which they had by light of nature, to order the decrees divine, according to the common Rules of Art concerning intentions, as they are found to be either of some end, or of some means tending to an end, this seems to have been no part of Arminius his care. This order of his, I have ransaked in my Vindiciae. lib. 3. digress. 2. And if this Author think good, he may answer thereunto, and do his best to qualify the absurdities wherewith I charge that order of his. But as touching the embracers of this first way, whose names he expresseth, he had need to prove it. For divers think otherwise of Calvin, and they represent their reasons for it, out of his own words such as these, De aeternâ Dei Praedestinatione. pag. 970. speaking of Pighius. Augustinum ridet (saith he) ejusque similes hoc est pios emnes, qui deum imaginantur postquam universalem Generis humani Ruinam in personâ Adae praesciverit, alios ad vitam, alios ad interitum destinasse, & pag. 710. cum de praedestinatione sermo habetur, inde exordiendum esse constantèr semper docui atquè hodiè doceo, jure in more relinqui omnes reprobos, qui in Adam mortui sunt atquè damnati. As for Beza, I know full well he maintained, that man not created is the object of Predestination, but can this Author represent unto us, any place out of Beza, wherein he should affirm, that God doth decree to damn any man but for sin; or that damnation is the end that God intends in the decree of Predestination to death? In his Questions and Answers he professeth the contrary. pag. 111. Postremò non dixi exitium istorum (he speaks of Reprobates) esse finem deo decernenti propositum, sed gloriam ipsius. Nequè etiam simpliciter dixi istos esse exitio destinatos, sed justo exitio destinatos dixi. And in his Book De aeternâ Dei Praedestinatione contrà Sebastian. Castell: ad argument. Castell. 2. pag. 346. Quamobrem etiam illud quoquè probavimus, nos ita loqui non solere, & quanquam à Deo simpliciter conditum dicamus ad perditionem, sed idcircò ut ipsius justa condemnatione Dominus justitiam suam patefaciat. As for Zanchy; Peter Baro, that caused such perturbation in Cambridge about this very argument, he denies this to have been the opinion of Zanchy, In summa trium de Praedestinatione sententiarum; his words are these, Altera sententia est Augustini, posterior etiam Sohnii Heydelbergensis Theologiae Professoris, & aliorum quorundam Protestantium, ut Zanchii, atquè etiam Bellarmini, qui omnes priorem illam improbant, in hoc inter se consentientes, ut sit praedestinatio ab Adami tantum lapsu accipienda. And as touching Piscator, he handles the question about the object of Predestination in a small Treatise, annexed to an answer of his to Hemingius, De Universali Gratiâ; and inquires whether the object thereof be Humanum genus nondum conditum, or conditum, but nondum corruptum, or both conditum and corruptum; and his resolution is, that in the decree of Predestination, there is place for all these considerations, according to three several acts comprised therein, which I have formerly mentioned, and so draws into one all three opinious. As touching Gomarus in the last place, I have seen little or nothing of his; but when Lubbertus in his Book Ad 99 Errores Conradi Vorstii pag. 807. had professed, Massam consideratam esse a Deo, non ut integram, sed ut corruptam; and was charged by Vostius as delivering that which was contrary to the doctrine of Calvin, Beza, and Gomarus, he replies that herein he doth not contradict them, but saith he, Illorum dict a quae quibusdam asperiuscula videntur, lenio, & in commodissimum sensum interpreter. But be it so, that all of them made Humanum genus, not corruptum, no nor integrum, but nondum conditum the object of reprobation. I am of their mind that do so; and was not Dr Whitaker also, whom very wisely this Author conceals? This renowned Professor in the University of Cambridge, in a Public exercise, his Concio ad Clerum, professeth, what Paul speaks De luto & sigulo non posse melius exponi quam de Massâ incorruptâ: and that Bucer understands it thus, Bucerus per Massam intelligit primam humani ganeris originem ex quá homo conditus à Deo & fabricatus est. And he disputes at large, that there is no cause of reprobation, and that neither sin actual, nor sin original is the cause thereof, and professeth this to be the Opinion of the Church of England. And though now a days we be upbraided, as if we had learned it of Papists and School Divines, this great light of Cambridge, spares not to make honourable mention of Schoolman's solid discourse on this point, saying, Hanc sententiam Scholastici si ullam egregiè solideque pertractarum praeserùm qui insigniores sanioresque habiti sunt. Lombardus ait, ut praedestinationis nulla merita sunt, ità nec reprobationis. Now the doctrine which he saith the Schoolmen handle so solidly as none more, is the very doctrine which this Author seems here to impugn, as when he saith, some make the will of God without any consideration of sin in men, original, or actual, to be the cause of their eternal Rejection; for Dr Whitaker expresseth it thus, His igitur isto modo explicatis, sequitur tertiam opinionem solummodò & necessario veram esse, aequè reprobationis ac praedestinationis causam esse dei voluntatem, quandoquidem providentiae divinae munus est omnia ad fines istos certa ratione certisque mediis ordinare. Only as touching the end here mentioned, That so he might show his absolute and unlimited power and dominion over them, in appointing to heaven or hell whom he pleaseth, that I find not in Dr Whitaker. He saith plainly that God predestinated unto death, whom he would, and because he would: Deus igitur ad mortem praedestinavit quos voluit, & quia voluit: (which phrase I willingly confess I like not so well) but that the end thereof is to manifest his absolute and unlimited dominion and power, he saith not; and Beza in the places before mentioned, refers it to the manifestation of God's justice, as the end thereof. And like as he saith, certissimum est damnationem nunquam nisi propter Peccatum infligi; so I should think it nothing less certain, that God doth not ordain any man to be damned, but for sin, especially considering that damnation in the notion thereof, hath an essential reference to sin. Now since I have found such a Champion as Dr Whitaker for the maintenance of this Tenent, have I cause to fear the sharp censures of any professors in the Country? Were he alive, I presume he would be nothing skarred with the imputation of making God, the Prime and Principal cause of men's everlasting ruin; he would I think require a little more learning in the Criminator, then to express himself so crudely. For without all question, God is the prime and principal cause, nay the sole cause of man's everlasting ruin in genere causae efficient is, though this excludes not a meritorious cause of his own damnation on the creatures part, as Dr Whitaker professeth in the words formerly alleging, acknowledged, Damnationem infligi propter Peccatum. And farther I am apt to conceive, and have undertaken to justify, and that to the view of the World, that albeit mankind not created, be the only object of predestination and reprobation, yet no man's reprobation is made by God, citra considerationem Peccati, in as much as I hold that the decrees of creation, permission of sin, and of final perseverance therein, and lastly of damnation for sin, are not decrees subordinate, but coordinate and simultaneous, as being decrees concerning means tending to the same end, which is the manifestation of God's glory, in the way of vindicative justice. And whereas it is farther urged, that hereby God is made the author of the first sin and of all sins; As I find by Dr Whitakers discourse in his Cygnaea Concio, that were he alive he would answer hereunto, That this Author takes his aim much amiss, considering, that the effect of Reprobation is not sin, but the permission of sin, and Gods means to the end intended by him, to wit, the manifestation of his glory in the way of vindicative justice, is not sin, but the Permission of sin; according to that of Aquinas, alleged by the foresaid Doctor thus, Sicut Praedestinatio includit voluntatem conferendi gratiam & gloriam, ita Reprobatio includit voluntatem permittendi cadere in culpam & inferendi damnationis poenam pro culpâ. And as I discern no unholiness in Gods permitting of sin, so neither do I discern any cruelty therein. But Dr Whitaker well perceived that this course of God's counsels, would seem injurious; and therefore after he had proposed his last argument drawn from that of the Apostle, Rom. 11. o altitudo! thus, Vltimò illa Apostoli exclamatio, o altitudo, hanc sententiam confirmat. Neque enim tantae altitudinis est ut penetrari nequeat, Deum odisse homines propter peccatum, etiam antequàm nati sunt; immò rationi convenientissimum est ut Deus ferre nequeat, quod est naturae suae contrarium. But mark wherein the depth the Apostle speaks of, consists in his judgement; Ib i demùm infinitum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & Abyssus est divinae discretionis, quando sine peccati ratione quidam reprobantur & alii qui nihilo erant amore digniores ad vitam & faelicitatem praedestinantur, ut omnis ratio discretionis ad solam dei voluntatem referatur. And because he knew full well that this mysterious depth of God's counsel, would seem very harsh to carnal affections, as savouring of cruel and injurious proceedings, therefore he takes express notice of it, and that in Augustine's language, saying, Iniquum videtur (Augustinus ait) ut sine ullis bonorum malorumque operum meritis unum Deus diligat, odiatque alterum; whence he concludes according to Austin thus, Deus igitur hunc diligit, illumquè odit sine meritis ullis operum aut bonorum aut malorum. Hoc videri possit alicui iniquum, sed est aequissimum, quia sic Deo visum est. Neque Augustinus affirmare veritus est, eos Apostoli verbum evacuare qui judicium divinae discretionis ad opera reducunt praevisa aut praeterita; and so concludes the main point he insists on, thus, Non est igitur peccatum originale causa aeternae reprobationis, nedum actuale. So that both Austin and Dr Whitaker, and all our Divines, knew full well in how harsh an accent this truth sounds in the ears of men; yet because the word of God doth testify this truth unto us, it becomes all Christian hearts to submit, and to acknowledge the equity of it, though we are not able to comprehend the reason of it: Though I know full well, some are so violently carried with the zeal of their own way, that they spare not to profess, that they will sooner deny that there is a God, then yield to that which the Contra-Remonstrants teach; which for aught I know, is no other than this which Dr Whitaker taught and Preached publicly in the University of Cambridge, being at that time Professor Regius. And seeing we acknowledge the seeming harshness of it, as well as our Adversaries, yet because we find it revealed in God's word, we hold it our duty to embrace it, and therehence conclude that it is aequissimum. Doth it become any one to take the course this Author takes, and by a Parallel between this course of God, and the courses of Tiberius, as also by a saying of Zeno's servant, to cry it down as iniquissimum, and thence to conclude hand over head, that the word of God doth not teach it? Is this a Christian course? is this Theological? is this Scholastical? Yet in my judgement the harshness lieth not here, to wit, in the point of God's purpose to inflict damnation; considering that not one of our divines, that I know, doth maintain that God did ever purpose to inflict damnation, but for sin. Or if there be any harshness therein, that is to be found in the kind and degree of punishment and everlastingness thereof, God holding them everlastingly as it were upon the rack and in quick sense of torment. And yet we maintain without contradiction amongst Christians, that it is just with God to do so for one act of drunkenness or adultery, or the like unrepented of; which kind of punishment, never any Tyrant in the world was known to take, or could take. But the harshness in my opinion, is most pregnant to bring forth distaste on the other part of reprobation, which is the purpose of God to deny grace, this being denied to whom he will, and that of mere pleasure; for like as he shows mercy on whom he will, so the Scripture testifies, that he hardens whom he will. And not only Austin and Dr Whitaker and our Divines generally do take notice, how unsavoury this doctrine is in the judgement of flesh and blood, especially in comparing it with God's ordinary course of complaining of men for their disobedience, even of those whom himself hath hardened, but the holy Apostle also Rom. 9 19 Thou wilt say then, and is it so, doth God harden whom he will? Why then doth he yet complain? For who hath resisted his will? Now in this case, how doth the Apostle stop the mouths of such, but thus; O man, who art thou that disputest with God? shall the thing form, say to him that form it, Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour and another unto dishonour? But let us come to the consideration of the Parallel here made between the counsels of Tiberius and the counsels of God. This consists of two parts, according to a double story of Tiberius taken out of Suetonius. The first is his dealing with Drusus and Nero, the two sons of Germanicus, these varia fraude induxit ut concitarentur ad convitia & concitati perderentur, he used cunning contrivances to draw them to reproach him, that so he might cover his cruelty in their death, under a pretext of justice. What these cunning contrivances are, it is specified by Suetonius; but I hope this Author will acknowledge, that it stands him upon, to represent what those cunning contrivances are, which our doctrine imputes unto God, to draw them to sin against God. Our Divines commonly teach, that God as he is able to keep any man from sin (as he did the Angels that stood, when their fellows became Apostates, the cause whereof Austin resolves into amplius Adjutorium given by God, either in their creation or after: De Civit. Dei. lib. 12. cap. 9 Isti aut minorem acceperunt amoris divini gratiam quam illi qui in eadem perstiterunt, aut si utriquè boni aequaliter creati sunt, istis mala voluntate cadentibus, illi amplius adjuti ad eam beatitudinis plenitudinem, unde se nunquàm casuros certissimi fierent, pervenerunt,) so likewise that God's permission is enough to prostitute any man unto sin. And not our Divines only, but Arminius also and others. Arminius Exam. pag. 152. Quoties voluntas permittitur a Deo ut faciat aliquid, necesse est ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolendum, secùs permissio non fieret. And Pag. 157. thus he defines the permission of sin, Permissio peccati est suspensio omnium impedimentorum quibus positis peccatum non fieret. Now let any sober man judge, whether herehence it it followeth not necessarily necessitate consequenti● & suppositionis, that sin shall be, to wit, upon the removing of all those impediments upon the position whereof sin could not be; considering that an impediment of sin in this case and in Arminius his phrase is every thing quo posito peccatum non fuerit. Vorstius in like manner, in Amicitia duplicatione Pag. 213. Fateor quidem permissione jam positâ in actu necessariò etiam poni rem aliquam permittendam, idque ob necessariam talium relatorum ad se invicem habitudinem, atque in arguendo mutuam quandam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quae ferre non potest ut unum sine altero reipsâ sit, nedum ut alterum extra se quidquam verè agate, altero ne quidem adhuc existente, nedum verè patient, aut contra. Navarettus in 1. Quest. 19 Art. 9 §. 2. maintains, Posita permissione infallibilitèr sequi quod permittitur. Austin himself supposeth as much where he saith, Ad omnipotentissimam suam bonitatem pertinere, potius bona ex malis elicere, quam mala esse non sinere. For hereby he gives to understand, that God permits sin with a purpose to work good out of evil. Now this manifestly implies, that upon God's permission of sin, sin shall exist. Nay how can this be avoided, unless we deny that God alone, is he that keeps us from running into sin, and maintain that man can do this of himself, without that special grace of God, whereby he keeps us from sin: yet in the Council of Palestine, it was concluded, that God's grace was required to every act, and Pelagius himself was driven to subscribe thereunto, and to anathematise those that denied. Now let us examine what this grace of God is, which is necessarily required to every good act, whether God doth not work the will thereunto, according to that, I will cause them to walk in my statutes, and keep my judgements and do them: Ezech. 36. 28. or whether it be only such a Cooperate grace, as some now a days blush not to profess as whereby God works in us, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Velle bonum modò Velimus, this I can show under the hand of a zealous Partisan for Arminius. Now I hope there is no such cunning contrivance in the permission of sin. Farther, there are certain occasions & opportunities offered for the committing of sin in the course of the World: We willingly ascribe unto God the administration of these, and so doth Arminius; and that not of Occasions only, but of Arguments also inciting unto sin, Disput. Pub. Thes. 9 De justitiâ & Efficaciâ providentiae Dei in malo. Num. 6. Efficientia Dei circa peccatum concernit tum actum ipsum tum vitiositatem ejus. Efficientia quae circa initium consideratur vel impeditio vel permissio est; cui addimus administrationem argumentorum & occasionum ad peccatum incitantium. Yet there is a greater power of provocation unto sin then all these, & that is by the practices of Satan, who goeth about like a roaring Lion seeking whom he may devour. How comes he to have such liberty? Hath not God power to bind Satan for a thousand years and more if it please him? The Devils sometime besought our Saviour, that he would not send them into the deep; surely they acknowledged thereby his power to send them thither; yet he did not, though he was not ignorant, that their going about was like so many roaring lions, to devour the souls of men by provoking unto sin. As for those that Tiberius set about Drusus and Nero to provoke them, what were they comparable to the Devil and his Angels for the practising of provoking courses? But Tiberius bid his servants to provoke Drusus and Nero and not to spare: but can any say truly that we maintain that God bids the Devil to provoke this Author, or any such Arminian spirit to make such parallels as these? Yet 1 Kings 22. we read when a wicked spirit offers his service to God to entice Ahab that he might go and fall at Ramoth-Gilead, & that by becoming a lying spirit in the mouth of all his Prophets, the Lord not only accepts it, saying, Go forth and do so; but also tells him, thou shalt entice him, and shalt also prevail. That was a great deal more than was in the power of Tiberius, or his instigators, or the Devils themselves. And did not Ahab deserve as much at the hands of God? And why might not this Author and his fellows, have deserved so much at the hands of God, as to have a lying spirit put in the mouths of them, on whom they depend for resolution in points of Divinity, and that they prevail with them also? And why may not he also be thus given over to illusions to believe lies? Nay, what do we talk of desert in this? Did not the Devil provoke Eve and Adam to sin against God in Paradise? Could not God have kept the Devil off? Why did he not? Cur non intercessit & circumscriptorem colubrum cohibuit? to speak in Tertullia's phrase. Doth it not manifestly appear, that it was Gods will to have them tempted, to have them provoked unto sin? & why not? Is it lawful for a man to lay a bait of gold and silver in his servants way to try his fidelity, and whether such a provocation will make a breach upon his honesty; and shall not such a course be lawful unto God? for this nothing hinders their liberty of transgressing. And to serve God while we are not tempted to sin against him, is a poor commendation: If thou faint in the day of adversity thy strength is small, saith Solomon. job. 1. 11. Prov. 24. 10. Stretch out now thine hand and touch all that he hath, and see if he will not blaspheme thee to thy face; as much as to say, Let but job be in this manner provoked, and see whether he will not blaspheme. What is the Lords answer? Lo, all that he hath is in thine hand, only upon himself shalt thou not stretch out thine hand. Hereupon Satan goes to his work. One messenger comes and brings tidings, saying, The Oxen were ploughing, and the Asses feeding in their places, and the Sabeans came violently and took them, yea, they have slain thy servants with the edge of the sword, and I only am escaped alone to tell thee: Upon the neck of him comes another, saying, The fire of God is fallen from heaven, & hath burnt up thy sheep and thy servants, and devoured them, and I only am escaped alone to tell thee. Upon the back of him comes a third saying, The Chaldeans set out three bands, and fell upon the Camels and have taken them and slain thy servants with the edge of the sword, & I only am escaped alone to tell thee. After all these comes a fourth, saying, Thy sons and thy daughters were eating and drinking wine in their eldest brothers house, and behold there came a great wind from beyond the wilderness, and smote the four corners of the house which fell upon thy children & they are dead, and I only am escaped alone to tell thee. Here are provocations enough, and can it be denied, but that God would have Iob's uprightness thus to be tried? And hath not God power thus to try any other nothing so upright as job (whatsoever be the consequents thereof) unto transgression, though it be even to the cursing of their King and their God? as Is. 8. 21. He that is afflicted and famished, shall go to and fro in it, and when he shall be hungry he shall even fret himself and curse his King and his gods and shall look upward: and Revelations 16. 21. There fell a great hail like talents out of heaven upon the men, and men blasphemed God because of the Plague of the hail, for the plague thereof was exceeding great. Yet Job continued in his uprightness, his wicked Wife perceived it, though she herself was enraged, and betrayed the corruption of her heart within, but he was no more effectually brought thereby to sin against God, than Joseph was by the temptation of his wanton Mistress: though David fell fowlly and shamefully, provoked thereunto by the sight of Bathsheba, and did not God by his providence bring him to the sight of Bathsheba, as he brought Shimei and David after this together, as Arminius and his complices confess, when Shimei railed on him? A great provocation to so great a Person as David, if not to bid, yet at least to suffer Abishai to cut off that dogs head, as he called him; yet David would not suffer him, and why? Let David himself answer; The Lord, saith he, hath bidden him to curse David. It may be the Lord will render unto me good, for his cursing this day. He fell not foul upon God, though acknowledging his just providence herein. And to make a Parallel between the courses of God, and the courses of Tiberius that monster of men, in taking a course with Drusus and Nero to provoke them to the reproaching of him, that he might destroy them: Thus David was not corrupted with the provocations of his Subject, as Drusus and Nero were by a fellow Subject to convitiate their Prince. Neither did he far the worse for this, but no doubt found cause to bless God for his grace, in restraining him from breaking forth into any intemperancy of tongue or spirit, like as formerly he blessed God for the good counsel of Abigal, whereby he was restrained from shedding blood, and that his own hand did not save him. And if it be not lawful for us to provoke another unto sin, will it follow forthwith, that it is not lawful for God to provoke? One is provoked by prosperity to corrupt his ways, another by adversity is provoked to break forth into impatience and blasphemy? What then? shall not God be acknowledged to be the Author both of prosperity and adversity? Nay, what doth the Lord long before profess what should be his providence towards the Jews? and that in this very kind of provoking them. Deutron. 32. 21. They have moved me to jealousy with that which is not good, they have provoked me to anger with their vanities: and I will move them to jealousy with those that are no people, I will provoke them to anger with a foolish Nation. But let us consider more distinctly, what this act of provocation is, and wherein it consists, that we may be the better able to judge in what case we may safely attribute it unto God, and in what case not, that so we may neither ascribe that unto him which doth not become him, nor deny that unto him which doth become him, both these courses being equally blasphemous, and so reputed among School Divines. Now Provocation in the most usual phrase of Scripture is by way of exasperation, and it is an incitation unto wrath; and never otherwise taken when man is said to provoke God. And in the same sense it is delivered in the particular fact of Tiberius here mentioned. But when a resemblance is here made between the particular course of Tiberius and the courses of God, God's provocation of man is not to wrath only, but meant of incitation to any kind of sin, whether it be by way of exasperation, or by way of alluring and enticing, according to the several passions and affections of man, which are apt to be moved several ways to sin, amongst which the passion anger is but one. And as it is said of the wrath of man, that it works not the righteousness of God; so it is verified of every other inordinate affection. In the 1 Chron. 24. 1. it is said that Satan provoked David to number Israel. That was not by way of exasperation and moving in him the passion of anger, by the working upon some other passion, whether pride or curiosity: and therefore though it be rendered by the word, Provoked, yet in the Original the word used signifieth properly to tempt. But consider we provocation according to the propriety thereof in the first place, by way of exasperation. Now consider, I pray, whether the Ministers of Tiberius did more exasperated Drusus and Nero, than God exasperated jonah. jonah. 4. 7. For having prepared a Gourd and made it to come up over jonah, that it might he a shadow over his head, and deliver him from his grief; & jonah being exceeding glad of the Gourd, God prepared a worm when the morning rose the next day and it smote the Gourd that it withered. And God proceeded farther than this. For when the Sun did arise, God prepared also a fervent east wind, and the Sun heat upon the head of jonah, that he fainted and wished in his heart to die, and said it is better for me to die then to live. And not only so, but justified himself in this his impatience. For when the Lord said unto him, dost thou well to be angry for the Gourd? jonah stoutly answered, I do well to be angry to the death. It's true, jonah broke not forth into blasphemies against God, as it seems Drusus and Nero did against Tiberius. jonah was better brought up under the wings of God then so. God's grace preserved him from such excess, but that the Ministers Tiberius set about them, did more provoke them by exasperating courses, than God did in like manner provoke jonah, it doth not appear: but had jonah hereupon broken forth into blasphemies, had Ionah's sin been excusable or God's course unblamable? Revel. 16. 21. we read of a great hail that fell upon the men like Talents out of heaven, and men blasphemed God because of the plague of the hail, for the plague thereof was exceeding great. And Isai 8. 21. The Lord prophesyeth, that, He that is afflicted and famished, shall go to and fro, and when he shall be hungry, he shall even fret himself, and curse his King and his Gods and look upward. such plagues are the work of God, for there is no evil in the city but the Lord hath done it. Amos 3. But let them look unto it, that thereupon take occasion to blaspheme. And Tentatio probationis was never yet that I know denied unto God, to try whether they will blaspheme God or no. To this end Satan desired to have an hand on Job, yet not so much to try whether he would blaspheme or no, but being confident he should bring him to blaspheme. Job. 1. 11. stretch out now thine hand and touch all that he hath, and he will curse thee to thy face. The Lord gave him leave, and Job acknowledgeth the Lord's hand in all that Satan did, saying, The Lord gave and the Lord takes away, yet in all this Job sinned not nor charged God foolishly. Satan desires yet farther liberty, saying skin for skin, yea all that a man hath will he give for his life. But put forth thy hand now and touch his bone, and his flesh, and he will curse thee to thy face. And the Lord said unto Satan, Behold he is in thy hand, but save his life. So went Satan forth from the presence of the Lord, and smote Job with sore boyles from the sole of his foot unto his crown, and he took him a potshard to scrape himself withal, and he sat down among the ashes, Then said his Wife unto him, Dost thou yet continue in thy integrity? Curse God and die. She manifested the inward corruption of her irreligious heart. Job might have brought her to a form of godliness by his pious courses in his family, but little power of godliness doth appear upon her. For as Solomon saith, If thou faint in the day of adversity thy strength is small. It seems her heart was soured with Atheism, thinking the world was governed by chance, rather than by divine providence, and consequently it was all one, whether a man did bless God, or curse God, and a madness to make a conscience of walking in integrity, and that in jobs case at this time, whether he did bless God he must die, or whether he did curse God he could but die, and better it was for him thus impoverished, thus afflicted, to die then to live; as for the powers of the world to come, it seems she never had but a taste of them, and that taste never produced any true faith in her concerning them. Here was a sore temptation, the very gates of hell playing upon him with their greatest Ordinance to batter (if it were possible) his shield of faith. But what is jobs answer. Thou speakest as one of the foolish women speaketh. What shall we receive good at the hand of God and shall we not receive evil? In all this did not job sin with his lips. The work of Satan in the impoverishing of jobs estate, and afflicting his person, cannot be denied to be God's work. As for the work of his wife, why might not that be the work of God, as well as the work of Satan? For did not Satan sin in all this? As our Saviour saith that he was a murderer from the beginning, and as St Peter saith, The devil goes about like a roaring Lion seeking whom he may devour; so who can make doubt but these courses practised against job, were fruits of his murdering and devouring disposition? And all sides now a days confess, that the act of the most flagitious sin committed by man or Angel, is the work of God in the way of a principal efficient cause, as well as it is the work of the creature. And as for the sinfulness of the act, either of the Devil or his Wife, that was not it which did or could hurt job: but the works wrought by Satan, the temptation atheistical proposed by his Wife, this was the greatest danger in the consideration thereof to corrupt his soul, for that is it alone that works upon the will to incline it. And as for their sinning herein, that proceeded from the want of God's fear, according to that of Abraham. Genes. 20. 10. I said surely the fear of God is not in this place, therefore they will slay me for my Wife's sake. And albeit God engageth himself towards some, for the putting of his fear in their hearts, that they shall never depart away from him. jerim. 36. 40. yet he hath not engaged himself thus far towards all. For the Apostle plainly professeth, that, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth Rom. 9 18. and hardening we know is denying the fear of God, either as touching the habitual infusion thereof, or as touching the actual excitation thereof after it is infused. Yet I deny not but obduration and excaecation are sometimes promiscuously used, the one for the other, because of the strict conjunction that is betwixt them. And as touching the particular act of Convitiation, Austin spares not to profess, that even when it is committed by man, it is brought forth by God out of his secret providence lib. 9 Confess. cap. 8. Quid egisti Deus meus? unde curasti? unde sanasti? nun protulisti durum & acutum ex alterâ animâ convitium tanquam medicinale ferrum ex occultis provisionibus tuis & uno ictu putredinem illam praecidisti? And whereas Bellarmine endeavoureth to blast the evidence of this place giving testimony unto God's secret providence in evil, I have endeavoured to show the vanity of his discourse in my Vind. Grat. Dei lib. 2. Crim. 3. digress. 2. cap. 13. And in what congruity can it be said, that God bid Shimei to curse David, but that in the same analogy of faith, it may be said, that God bid jobes' Wife in this manner to tempt him? And which of the two was the greatest provocation, Tiberius his Minister's Provocation of Drusus and Nero; or Shimei's provocation of David railing on him to his face, the Subject blaspheming his Prince? undoubtedly the provocation was nothing inferior, only here was the difference; Tiberius gave such commandment to his Ministers so to provoke Drusus and Nero, God gave no such commandment (in proper speech) unto Shimei, but rather commanded the contrary in his law, Thou shalt not speak evil of the ruler of thy people. But Gods secret providence, whereby he makes use of all his creatures in what condition soever he finds them, even of Devils and wicked men, to serve his turn by them, either in the way of judgement, or in the way of mercy, and sometimes for trial of the faith and patience of his children, is in Scripture phrase called Gods bidding or commanding. And indeed it is far more effectual than his commandment. And Austin by pregnant passages of holy Scripture convicted of this truth, spareth not to profess as much in these words, His & talibus testimoniis divinorum eloquiorum quae omnia commemorare nimis longum est, satis quantum existimo manifestatur operari Deum in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas eorum voluntates quocunquè voluerit sive ad bona pro suâ misericordiâ, sive ad mala pro meritis eorum, judicio utique suo, aliquando aperto, aliquando occulto, semper autem justo. De Grat. & lib. Arbitr. cap. 21. And touching this particular case of Shimei, enquiring about the interpretation of it, see I pray, how he resolves concerning it. Quomodo dixerit dominus huic homini maledicere David, Quis sapiens & intelliget. Non enim jubendo dixit, ubi obedientia laudaretur, sed quod ejus voluntatem proprio vitio suo malam in hoc peccatum judicio suo justo & occulto inclinavit. Ideò dictum est, dixit ei dominus. Nam si jubenti obtemper asset Deo, laudandus potius quam puniendus esset, sicut ex hoc peccato posteà novimus esse punitum. And he proceeds farther to show the reason of this divine providence. Nec causa tacita est, cur ei Deus justo modo dixerit maledicere David, hoc est, De Grat. & lib. arbit. cap. 20. Cor ejus malum in hoc peccatum miserit vel dimiserit ut videat (inquit) dominus humilitatem meam & retribuat mihi bona pro maledictio ejus in die isto. And hereupon concludes. Ecce quomodo probatur Deum uti cordibus etiam malorum ad laudem atque adjumentum bonorum. Sic usus est Iuda tradente Christum. Sic usus est Iudaeis crucifigentibus Christum, & quanta inde bona praestitit populis credituris? Qui & ipso utitur diabolo pessimo, sed optimè ad excercendam & probandam fidem & pietatem bonorum non sibi, quia omnia scit antequam fiant, sed nobis quibus erat necessarium, ut eo modo ageretur nobiscum. But let us proceed to provocations unto other sins, not in the way of exasperation, but in the way of allurements. Achan was a covetous person, at the sacking of Jericho, it was his hap to light among the spoil, upon a goodly Babylonish garment, and two hundred shekels of silver, and a wedge of gold of fifty shekels weight. Was not so fair a prey, a sore temptation to a covetous person? How was Demosthenes taken with a rich bowl that was showed him by Harpalus, but there was great danger in it, I confess, yet if desire of prey doth sometimes overrun the sent, may it not as well overcome the fear of danger, especially considering the opportunity of secrecy to convey it closely into his Tent and hide it there? I saw, saith he, and I coveted them and took them, and behold they lie hid in the earth in the midst of my Tent, and the silver under it. Now can it be denied, but that God by his providence brought him into this temptation, and consequently into this provocation, for to tempt is to provoke 1 Chron. 21. 1. And is it not just with God, to bring any man into such temptations of what kind, or in what degree soever (seeing no temptation or provocation in this kind or degree, bereaves a man of the liberty of his will) If not, what meant our Saviour to teach his Disciples, and in them us, to pray unto God that He will not lead us into temptation? And what cause hath Achan to complain of this temptation? We do not read he did; was it not the condition of many others as well as himself? Was this prey that he ceased on, the only spoil of that great City? Were there no Babylonish garments but that one, no more silver or wedges of gold, but that Achan lighted on? Yet they refrained, some out of the fear of God, that restrained them in a gracious manner, and kept them from sinning against him: others though not out out of a fear of God, yet out of the fear of punishment, were moved to beware how they transgressed. For albeit, Libertas sine gratia non est libertas, sed contumacia, as * Austin Epist: 28. writes, yet fear of punishment oftimes restrains from committing capital crimes, though this restraint be not gracious; and considerations of less force than these do prevail many times with carnal men, both to abstain from evil, and to do that which is good, though not in a gracious manner. As we read in the Gospel of a wicked Judge, that neither feared God nor reverenced man, yet he would do the Widow justice to ease himself of her importunate solicitations where with she molested him. Come we to provocations unto sin of another nature, in satisfying the concupiscence of the flesh. David arising out of his bed at eventide, and walking upon the roof of the King's Palace, from the roof he saw a Woman washing herself: and the Woman was very beautiful to look upon: we know what followed hereupon. Now was it not God that lead him into this temptation, into this provocation? Surely if this were not just with God, it were in vain for us to pray, that God will not lead us into temptation; for we need not fear any such temptation, which cannot befall us without violation of God's justice in the course of his providence. Paul the Apostle, lest he should be exalted out of measure, through the abundance of revelations (made unto him, which were very dangerous to puff a man up, and make him swell in the conceit of his own worthiness being admitted into the secrets of God) was sometimes exercised with a thorn in the flesh, the messenger of Satan sent to buffet him. But the fear of God was alive in him, and stirred up his faith to pray unto God three times that it might depart from him: and the Lord made him a gracious answer, not as yet to deliver him, but to support him in this conflict, and give him the victory over it. For the Lord said unto him, my grace is sufficient for thee, for my power is made perfect in thy weakness. This answer put heart into Paul; Therefore, saith he, will I very gladly rejoice rather in mine infirmities that the power of Christ may dwell in me. Mark I pray, Rahter, in mine infirmities. He would not blame God for thus exercising him, but rather rejoice to be thus exercised, for as much as this same should do him no harm; for by virtue of Christ's power dwelling in him he should have the victory. Secondly, it should do him good in preserving him from being exalted out of measure through the abundance of revelations. Therefore, saith he, I take pleasure in infirmities, in reproaches, in necessities, in persecutions, in anguishes for Christ's sake; for when I am weak then am I strong. And had not Joseph as good cause to conceive that it was the will of God, that he by the unchaste motions of his wanton Mistress, should be provoked unto unclean courses, as David had to persuade himself, that it was Gods will by the railing of Shimei he should be provoked unto revenge; that so by the power of his grace, strengthening them against such provocations, they might come forth of their several temptations, as gold out of fire, more bright more resplendent than before? joseph was a fair person and well favoured Genes. 39 6. Now this was a sore provocation to a lustful eye. Beauty is said to be of a dangerous nature, as that which makes a man either Praedonem alienae castitatis or Praedam suae. But Joseph had a gracious and a chaste heart, his beauty gave him no encouragement to prey upon others chastity, but being a congruous bait to the lustful appetite of his Mistress, it was in danger to expose his own chastity to be preyed upon. And as Austin said of God's providence concerning Shimei, ejus voluntatem proprio vitio suo malam in hoc peccatum judicio suo justo & occulto inclinavit. Who seeth not, that the like may be said of Gods dealing with Ioseph's Mistress? and that without all aspersion of unholiness unto God. For if he gives Men or Women over unto their lusts, what will be the issue but uncleanness: Rom. 1. 24, 26. When God gave them up to vile affections, what followed but this? even their Women did change their natural use into that which was against nature, vers. 27. and likewise also the Men left their natural use of the Women, and burned in their lust one toward another; and Man with Man wrought filthiness, and received in themselves such recompense of their error as was meet. Here we have a strange course of God's providence in punishing sin with sin. For these Gentiles in defiling themselves one with another, in a most unnatural and abominable manner, are said to receive such recompense for their error as was meet. In few words, what is meant by provocation unto any sin? Is it to do that whereupon man may take just cause or occasion to do that which he doth without blame? like as the Corinthians provoked Paul, as a fool to lost himself, as himself expresseth it, for he adds, ye have compelled me. But this cannot be affirmed of Tiberius his ministers in provoking Drusus and Nero. For no provocation could be sufficient to make them unblameable in convitiating their Prince, much less can it be said, that God provokes any man in this manner: neither do I think that any of our adversaries (as malevolent as they are) dares impute any such crimination unto us, as if we attributed any such discourse unto providence divine. What then is it to provoke unto sin? Is it to do somewhat upon the consideration whereof, men's passions being moved, they cannot but sin. But this in like sort is equally as untrue, as the former, even of those provocations which were made upon Drusus and Nero by the practices of Tiberius. Or is it the doing of somewhat, whereupon occasion is taken to sin, to blaspheme? this hath no colour of truth in it. For even man without all transgression may do many things, whereupon occasion is taken of doing evil, and therefore we distinguish of Scandalum datum & Acceptum. Nay, though man knows offence will be taken upon the doing of some things, yet if the doing thereof be commanded by God, he must do them, what occasion soever is thereby taken to offend. Indeed if they are things indifferent, I must abstain from the doing of them, in case I know offence will be taken thereat, and that thereby I shall lay a stumbling block in the way of my Brother. For Paul professeth that if meat would offend his Brother, he would never eat meat rather than offend his Brother. But no such obligation lies upon God. For he knoweth full well how some will abuse his mercies, others grow worse and worse by his judgements, breaking forth into blasphemy thereupon: yet no wise man will say that God is the more unholy in the showing of mercy, and in the execution of judgement. He professeth in plain terms, that to them who fear him he will be a sanctuary, but as a stumbling block, and as a rock to fall upon to both the houses of Israel, and as a snare, and as a net, to both the Inhabitants of jerusalem, Isai. 8. 14. As for the last clause of this odious Parallel, concerning the end of Tiberius his course in this, namely that so he might cover his cruelty in their death under pretext of justice. Undoubtedly I should think the putting of them to death was just in case they did convitiate their Prince whatsoever their provocations were. For hereby they deserved death, yea everlasting death and damnation. His sin was in causing them to be provoked hereunto, and so also it might be in the manner of their execution. For it is written of him that fame necavit, he famished them. I know Tiberius was cruel enough, but by the story it seems, that policy, wicked policy moved him unto this; first to intend their deaths because he saw the affections of the people towards them, belike for Germanicus his sake, a worthy man according to those times. For when he found that in the beginning of the year, vows were made on their behalf, to wit, for their preservation he dealt with the Senate, that such rewards ought not to be tendered, but towards such who were of experience and of ripeness of age: and that hereupon the inward character of his affection towards them being discovered, he laid them open to every man's criminations, variaque fraude inductos ut & concitarentur ad convitia & concitati perderentur, accusavit per literas, amarissimè congestis etiam probris, & judicatoes hosts fame necavit. And anon after, the same Author discovers the reason of all this, to wit, that seeing Germanicus was but his adopted Son, and one Drusus by name was his natural son, and his own son Drusus being dead, leaving a son Tiberius behind him, he desired to make him as his natural son his successor in the Empire. Aelium Sejanum ad summam potentiam non tàm benevolentia provexer at quam ut esset cujus ministerio ac fraudibus liberos Germanici circumveniret: Nepotemque suum ex Druso filium naturalem ad successionem Imperii confirmaret. Sure we are God hath no need of any such politic courses; neither hath he need of any pretext of justice to take a man's life from him. It is confessed now of all hands, that God can annihilate the holiest Angel by power absolute. And if it be in the power of God to keep any man from sin, as I think no wise man will deny, surely it is in his power to refuse to keep any reasonable creature from sin. For certainly though Adam were created in innocence, yet he preserved him not in innocency, but left him to himself, having exposed him to Satan's temptations. The Angels had no Satan to tempt them; God preserved the elect Angels from sinning, and how? let Austin speak in this particular; either by giving them majorem amoris divini mensuram in their creation then their fellows; or by giving them amplius adjutorium after their creation. And in particular concerning Adam, the same Author professeth that God gave him, Posse si voluit, but he gave him not, Velle quod potuit. And dares any man deny that it is in the power of God by the denial of his efficacious grace, to make way for the entering of sin into the World, and that wonderful work of the incarnation of the son of God, and the redemption of the World by him; as also for the manifestation of his own glory, both in the way mercy by the pardoning of sin, and in the way of justice by the punishing of sin. Let Arminius be heard in this, Who confesseth that God in the storehouse of his wisdom and power, hath not only sufficient impediments of sin, but efficacious also, by the use whereof, sin would certainly and infallibly be hindered. His words are these, Praeter illa sufficientia, impedimenta etiam efficacia habet in suo sapientiae & potentiae thesauro, quibus productis certô & infallibiliter peccatum impediretur. Exam p. 157. Which if it be true, certainly it was as true, as touching the hindering of the sin of Adam, as of hindering any man's sin else from the time of Adam's fall. And as certain it is that God would not make use of any of these impediments, though it is apparent these impediments Arminius speaks of, are of such a nature as whereby sin would be hindered without any prejudice to the freedom of man's will, as appears by all his instances following of this kind, showing how God did efficaciously hinder the sins of many. And indeed it is evident in reason and such as cannot be denied, unless a man will say, that whatsoever course had been taken by God to preserve him from sin, without prejudice to the freedom of his will, yet nevertheless he would have sinned: which is in so high a degree absurd, as manifestly to contradict the very light of nature. For seeing Adam in the state of innocency was naturally indifferent, as well to stand, as to fall; and morally more inclined to stand then to fall; (for as much as God had made him good) even in respect of this indifferency it cannot be said, that upon every occasion or temptation unto sin, he would have yielded thereunto. For such a condition is not an indifferent condition. Nay Philosophers acknowledge that of three sorts of contingents, one sort is of such which they call, Contingentia aequalitèr, that is, such as fall out as often one way as another. And what Zabarel. lib. 1. Post. Analyt. 182. are these? surely all such and none but such as are subject to a man's free will. And even of Esau borne in sin (so was not Adam) Austin thinks it strange, that any man should deny, but that there was a course to have called him as effectually, as he called Lib. 1. ad Simpli. quest. 2. Jacob, had he been pleased to have used it. Now hereby it manifestly appears, that God hath no need of any provoking courses, exasperating courses to draw them unto sin, let him but withhold those efficacious impediments of sin, which are in the store-house of his wisdom and power, as Arminius acknowledgeth, and sin hereupon shall enter. For the permission of sin (by Arminius his distinction of it) is the suspension of that efficiency whereupon it would be avoided. And if it were a safe course to Exam. p. 157. & 166. judge of what becometh God by that which becometh man, we should conclude even of permission of sin, that like as it becometh not us to permit sin if it lieth in our power to hinder it, in the same manner it becometh not God to permit any sin, seeing it lieth in his power to hinder it. Sed judicia ejus (saith Austin) multa abyssus. Nos certè, si eos in quos nobis potestas est ante oculos nostros perpetrare scelera permittamus, rei cum ipsis Contr. julian. Pelag. l. 5. cap. 4. erimus: quam verò innumerabilia ille permittit fieri ante oculos suos, quae utique si voluisset nulla ratione permitteret. In the 2 Kings 2. 26, 27. we read of a desperate course of the King of Moab, that finding the battle to be sore against him, first tried with 700 men to break through to the King of Edom, but when he could not, he took his eldest son that should have reigned in his steed, and offered him for a burnt offering upon the wall; the sight of which barbarous part of his struck grief into the hearts of the children of Israel, so that they departed from him, and returned into their country. What, therefore shall we condemn God, for sending Abraham to sacrifice his son, his only son, his son Isaac? In the 16 judg. we read a strange story of Samson whose faith is commended Hebr. 11. For there we read how he dies, his heart flaming with desire of revenge, and yet with great devotion prays unto God to assist him, that he might be avenged of the Philistines for his two eyes. O Lord God I pray thee think upon me, O God I beseech thee strengthen me at this time only, that I may be at once avenged of the Philistines for my two eyes. And again, Let me lose my life with the Philistines: & he bowed himself with all his might, and the house fell upon the Princes, and upon the people that were therein; so that the men that he slew at his death, were more than they which he had slain in his life. For both the house itself was full, and upon the roof of it there were about 3000 men and women. Here is a strange massacre wrought by Samson an Israelite upon the Philistines, at that time when the Israelites were in subjection to the Philistines who were their Lords, as sometimes Pharaoh was. For the men of Judah admonished him when they came up to the rock Etam to bind Samson. Knowest thou not (say they) that the Philistines are rulers over us? Wherefore then hast thou done thus unto us? to wit, in taking such courses as might well provoke the Philistines to root out the Israelites. Yet nevertheless he comes sparkling with zeal to destroy many thousands of them, yea the Princes with the rest, and well pleased to destroy himself with them, to be avenged of them for his two eyes. And how could this be done by him without some special & prophetical instigation & animation received from the spirit of God, we know not. And who doubts, but that God animating him hereunto, all this was lawful? which without God's warrant, could be no less than abominable & most damnable sins. Yet undoubtedly God did not animate Herod, & Pontius Pilate, together with the Gentiles, and people of Israel to do what they did against our Saviour, but rather left them to be ordered by his Law, wherein such things are prohibited. And nevertheless the Apostles in their pious meditation with one voice profess, that, All these were gathered together against the holy Son of God, to do those things which Gods hand, and God's council had predestinated to be done: and why the like is not to be acknowledged of the most barbarous facts committed by Tiberius, or any other monster of nature, I know no reason. And as touching shameful courses, no less abominable in the kind of acts flagitious, as these here mentioned of Tiberius were, in the kind of acts facinorous; The Apostle professeth both that God gave them up to vile affections, and to the lusts of their own hearts, to the committing of such abominations, and also that herein they received such recompense of their error as was meet; and the error which God avenged in this manner what was it, but such wherein Tiberius was as deep, as those whom the Apostle speaks of, namely, in changing the glory of the incorruptible God, to the similitude of the image of a corruptible man, and of birds, and of four footed beasts, and of creeping things. And they were but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 into which God delivered up Tiberius, and to such God delivered up them of whom the Apostle speaks; and his actions as well as theirs, were equally the fruits of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, into which God gave them up, that so they might receive that recompense of their error as was meet. I come to the second instance here made of Tiberius his cruelty, which he compares to those courses, which we out of holy Scripture have learned, to be attributed unto God himself. Now this hath long ago been objected by Bertius, in his Preface to the Conference of Arminius with junius; I say objected by him unto Piscator, & thereunto Piscator also hath answered long ago. And whereas Bertius hath replied and allowed Piscator a year for putting in his answer thereunto, whereof had he failed, he would interpret it as a confession of his insufficiency, to make good the cause maintained by him. Piscator answers, that he had no need of so long a time as he prescribed him, for after he had read over his book, in the space of two or three days he addressed himself to an answer thereunto, and within a month finished it. Now if the Author of this discourse were ignorant hereof, his ignorance might excuse him, if otherwise he might have, with more credit, occupied himself in the answering, at the least, of some chief particulars, whereupon Piscator stands, for the justifying of his doctrine delivered by him, not of his own brain, but according to the word of God, than hand over head, to hold up the crimination without taking notice of the dilution thereof, many years a go proposed and set forth to the judgement of the world. But I am content to take into consideration, how Scholastically and judiciously he carrieth himself in this crimination, as well as in the former: and the rather, because it may be that this odious comparison he makes more account of (for the preparation of his Auditors to entertain that which follows with the more propitious affection) than he doth of the strength of aught that follows, whatsoever he doth or may pretend to the contrary to the point then. Tiberius' commanded the Virgins to be deflowered, that they might be strangled. Now is there any carriage of God taught by us like unto this? If God were disposed to strangle any, certainly he hath no need to have them deflowered first. For it is now a days confessed even by Arminius himself, that God can lawfully annihilate the holiest creature that lives, and that without all respect to sin, or the vitiation of them. And annihilation I think is much more than strangulation; this causing only a dissolution between the body and soul, but annihilation, setting an utter end to body & soul by turning them both into nothing. And farther, had Tiberius only permitted the deflowering of them, when he might have hindered it, though this were a foul part in him, yet I hope no Christian will say, it is a foul part in God, to permit any act never so flagitious, or facinorous when he is able to hinder it; especially when he may hinder it without any prejudice to the liberty of man's will: and that this is in God's power Arminius acknowledgeth and supposeth at large in his Examen and Treatise there De Permissione. But Tiberius commanded the Hangman to deflower them. But is this our doctrine, that God commanded the ravishing of any, the murdering of any, or any other sin whatsoever? Do we not all teach rather, that God forbids it, and that under penalty of everlasting death? yet it is true, the word of God expressly professeth out of the mouth of David, that God bad Shimei to curse David, and that he bid the evil spirit to seduce Ahab, that he might go up to Ramoth-Gilead, and that not to be strangled I confess, but, which was nothing better to him, that he might fall, and be slain there. But this is a figurative speech, and signifies not properly any command of God, but rather denotes the secret operation of God's providence in the hearts of men, even of wicked men; for those as well as Devils, God knows how to make use of, to serve his own turn. And Austin professeth, Deum operari in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas eorum De Grat. & lib. Arbitr. c. 21. voluntates quocunque voluerit, sive ad bona, pro suâ misericordiâ, sive ad mala pro meritis eorum judicio utique suo, aliquando aperto, aliquando occulto, semper autem justo: And, touching the particular of Shimei, writes thus, ejus voluntatem proprio suo vitio malam, in hoc peccatum judicio suo justo, & occulto inclinavit. As for Tiberius his causing the little maids to be deflowered, that might be done without their sin, they might be ravished, and in that case, that might be their sorrow but not their sin. And as for the hangman's fault, in this, he was not excusable by Tiberius his causing him to deflower them; For Tiberius his causation herein extended no farther than to command them. And I hope it was no just excuse for the people of Israel in their Idolatrous courses, that therein they did but keep the statutes of Omri, and all the manner of the house of Ahab, Mic. 6. Yet neither doth God command any man to do that which his Law forbids, or to sin against him. And farther we acknowledge with Austin, that sin hath no efficient cause, but deficient. And it is enough with God to expose any man to sin, by not working him to that which is good; it being his office to work us to every thing that is pleasing in his sight. Heb. 13. 20. to cause us to walk in his statutes, and judgements, and to do them, Ezech. 36. 28. yea, to keep us from presumptuous sins, and that they get not the dominion over us. Psal. 19 14. yea, to deliver us from every evil work, 2 Timoth. 4. 18. But perhaps some may say; Our doctrine is that God willeth sin to be committed for which men may and shall be punished; like as Tiberius would the Virgins should be deflowered, that they might be strangled. And I answer, that Arminius himself professeth that, Deus voluit Achabum mensuram scelerum suorum implere, God would have Ahab fill up the measure of his sin, that he might be condignly punished. And why may we not say as well, that God would have Tiberius to fill up the measure of his sins? And yet like as Tiberius would have the Virgins to be deflowered that they might be strangled; so Ahab would have Naboth accused of blasphemy, that he might be condemned for it, and so put to death and stoned; and all these things were done under colour of Religion. Yet Arminius in reference to these very courses, spares not to profess, that God would have Ahab to fill up the measure of his sins, yet doth not Bertius upbraid him for defaming God, with imputing cruelty unto him. Again, the same Arminius professeth that in their ignominious handling of Christ, God would have the Jews, progredi quousque progressi sunt, proceed so far as they did proceed. And was it not Gods will in like manner, that the Gentiles should proceed as far as they did in the same business? Now we know full well by the story Evangelical, how far they went in their mischievous courses against the Son of God. For Judas betrayed him, and the high Priests both hired Judas hereunto, and suborned false witnesses against him; and both the Herodians and Soldiers mocked him, and the people urged Pilate to crucify him, and to dismiss 〈◊〉, and Pilate yielded to the people's desire, took order to have him first scourged, then crucified. And if it may be truly and piously said, that in these ignominious usages of the Son of God, they went as far as God would have them to go; why may it not, with as great truth and piety be avouched, that Tiberius also in these his barbarous courses, went as far as God would have him? Neither doth Arminius give himself to qualify the harshness of these his affirmations. We say that whatsoever comes to pass, it is Gods will it should come to pass, as Austin expressly professeth, Enchir. cap. 95. Nec aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, and the Articles of Ireland, Artic. 11. profess the same. But withal we explicate it as Austin dothin the words following, by adding the different manner, how they shall come to pass by the will of God, according to the different condition of things that come to pass, namely good or evil; thus, Vult fieri, but how? vel sinendo ut fiat (to wit in case they are evil) vel ipse faciendo (to wit, in case they are good. So then good things God will have come to pass by his effection, evil things only by his permission. And Bellarmine opposing our Divines to the uttermost of his power in this particular, being convicted in conscience by the evidence of truth is driven to confess; Bonum esse ut malum fiat Deo permittente, It is good that evil should come to pass by God's permission, or Gods permitting it. Tiberius willed that the Virgins should be deflowered and impiously he willed it. God willed that David's Concubines should be deflowered, and holily he willed it; neither is he delighted with impurity. For the Scripture attributes this unto God, I will give thy Wives unto thy Neighbour, and he shall lie with them in the sight of all Israel and before the sun. And this constupration of David's Concubines served for the chastising of David, as Arminius professeth, Inserviit castigando Davidi; & omnes paenae habent Deum authorem, All punishments have God for their author; they are the words of the same Arminius. It was impiety and cruelty in Tiberius to cause the Virgins to be deflowered and strangled But what Christian dares to impute impiety or cruelty unto God for causing the Children of the Sodomites, some in their Mother's womb, some hanging upon their Mother's breasts, to be consumed with fire and brimstone. It was impiety and cruelty in Tiberius, to will the deflowering of those Virgins, that they might be strangled. But Arminius thought it neither impiety nor cruelty for God to will, that Ahab should fill up the measure of his sin, that so he might accumulate unto himself wrath in the day of wrath; for if he had I presume, he would not have ascribed any such will unto God, as he doth in express terms. Although he well knew the vast difference between the power of man, and the power of God in executing vengeance; the ones power extending only to the execution of vengeance temporal, but God's power extends to the execution of vengeance eternal. Now I find a story immediately following this very story alleged by this Author out of Suetonius expressing the cruelty of Tiberius in a farther degree, as not contented with the death of them whom he would destroy, and therefore he would keep them alive to torment them: Mori volentibus vis adhibita vivendi, when they desired to die, he caused them to live by force; Nam mortem adeò leve supplicium putabat ut cum audisset unum è reis anticipasse eam, exclamaverit Carnutius me evasit, For he accounted death so light a punishment that when he heard one of the condemned persons to have anticipated it, he cried out Carnutius hath escaped me; for that was the condemned persons name. And when he took notice of them that were inward, when one desired to suffer betimes, he answered him, Nondum tecum in gratiam redii. I do not as yet bear these so much good will. Now, why may not some Atheistical person tract the steps of this Author, and in this particular exaggerate the heinousness of God's holy courses as savouring of cruelty beyond all example, beyond the cruelty of Tiberius, because he holds delinquent creatures upon the rack of eternal torment in hell fire? For certain vindicative courses in Tiberius inferior unto these are accounted abominable, cruel, and impious; how much more (if this Author's argumentation be of force) those courses which the word of God hath informed us to be the courses divine, infinitely beyond the courses of Tiberius in the way of severity and rigour? As for the power of God in producing sin, we acknowledge none. Above 1200 years ago it was delivered by Austin, that sin hath no efficient cause, but deficient only. But when the creature sinneth, he sinneth in doing that he ought not to do; or in doing what he doth, not in that manner he ought to do; or in not doing what he ought to do, or not in what manner he ought to do it; not one of all which is incident unto God. All efficiency both divine and humane is found only about the act substrate unto sin; and all sides now a days acknowledge, that God is the author thereof as well as man by an effective concourse, though difference there is about the manner of the concourse: and particularly these; Arminius will have God's concourse to an evil act, to be every way as much as his concourse to a good, and that he concurres to the working of a good act, no more then to the working of an evil act. Which we utterly deny, requiring a double concourse to every good act that is not supernatural, as touching the substance of the act; One to the producing of the substance of the act, another to the producing the goodness thereof, that is, the gracious manner of performing it: For even a natural man may abstain from lying, stealing, whoring, blaspheming; but no natural man can abstain from these in a gracious manner, that is, out of the love of God and that such a love as is, Amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui, the love of God to the contempt of himself: For this manner of performing it is supernatural. Secondly, as touching the matter of divine concourse, to the substance of any natural act. We say God moves the will to the doing of it, as it becomes the first cause to move the second, but how? agreeable to the nature of it, that is, like as he moves natural agents to do that which they do, necessarily; so he moves all rational agents to do that which they do, contingently and freely. What is the Arminian tenant to the contrary, namely this, that God works in man 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Velle modo velit, as absurd an assertion as ever any man breathed. It is true, many times our Divines in speaking of the secret providence of God in evil, do express themselves in phrases of a very harsh accent in the judgement of flesh and blood, but herein they do nothing exceed sobriety, forasmuch as usually they contemper themselves to Scripture phrase rather within the compass thereof, then beyond it. Yet Blasphemy is usually imputed unto them without all fear or wit; not considering, that herein they impute blasphemy to the language of the Holy Ghost. As for example. What an horrible sin is it for Kings and Princes to employ their power and authority, not for the supporting of the Kingdom of Christ, by whom King's reign, but for the supporting and establishing of the kingdom of Antichrist, as in the Martyrdom of God's Saints, delivered over to the secular power, to that end, and that by censures Ecclesiastical? Now if we should say that it is God that works thus in the hearts of Kings, thus to employ their power for the supporting of Antichrist, we should be censured for blasphemers. Yet the Holy Ghost spares not to profess, that God hath put into their hearts to fulfil his will, and to agree and give their Kingdom to the Beast, until the words of God be fulfilled. In like sort, from the first Preaching of the Gospel unto this day, many there have been, and at this day are, who are disobedient unto it, and stumble at it either in the whole or in part. If we should say that they who thus disobey, and stumble at the word of God, are ordained thereunto, such as this Author and his Complices, are ready to cry out upon us as Blaspheamers, and to profess that they will rather deny that there is a God, then hold with the Contra-Remonstrants. Yet S. Peter budgeth not 1 Pet. 2. 8. to profess, that Christ is a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence, even to them which stumble at the word of God, being disobedient, whereunto also they were ordained. When we profess that not any thing in the world comes to pass but Deo volente, God willing it, We are censured as Blasphemers, in professing that God doth will that which is evil, and sin; yet not only the Articles of Ireland, Artic. 11. profess as much, and Austin Enchir. 95. Non aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit: but the Apostles with one voice (as touching the contumelious usages of the Son of God, both by Jews and Gentiles, Herod and Pilate) in their picus meditation poured forth before the face of God, profess, that, Both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and People of Israel, were gathered together against the holy Son of God, to do that which Gods hand and God's council had before determined to be done. In like sort, when we speak of Gods giving men over to illusions to believe lies, others to vile affections, and to uncleanness through the lusts of their own hearts, to dishonour their own bodies between themselves, which consisted in this, that, The Women did change their natural use into that which is against nature; and likewise the men, leaving the natural use of the Women, burned in their lusts one towards another, men with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves the recompense of their error which was meet: and observe herehence, that it is just with God to punish sin with sin. And as it hath been observed before us, from the days of Austin, who when julian the Pelagian said, this was done, deserendo, replies, taking him at his word, who could not but profess that God doth thus, the Scripture expressly testifying as much; and touching the manner mentioned by him, addeth, whether God doth this, deserendo, or alio modo sive explicabili, sive inexplicabili, it matters not. An Arminian spirit spares not to join himself with julian the Pelagian in affronting Austin thus discoursing out of the word of God, and to profess, that that doctrine of Gods punishing sin with sin is a common error; whereas the Apostle professeth in express terms, that, Herein they received such recompense of their error as was meet: and what is recompense here but punishment? and wherein consisted it, but in defiling themselves contrary to nature, as the Scripture plainly testifies, saying, Men with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves such recompense of their error, as was meet. And Arminius spares not to profess, that, Omnis paena Deum authorem habet. Wherein yet we concur not with Arminius. We deny that Omnis paena habet Deum authorem. It is true that Paena positiva, not of all punishment that consists in privation, such as sin is; For Malum, as Austin long ago pronounced, non habet causam efficientem but deficientem. Yet we confess that God could keep any man from any sin, but if he will not, this is not sufficient to make him the author of it. It is only a culpable defect that makes one the author of sin; that is, when he fails of doing that which he ought to do. But God is bound to none to preserve him from sin, any otherwise then his own free will doth bind him; for he hath mercy on whom he will: and so also on the other side, He hardeneth whom he will. Yet I have given no instances in any passages of the Old Testament, which give plentiful testimony of God's secret providence of evil; the evidence whereof did wring from Austin this confession. Contra julian. Pelag. lib. 5. cap. 3. Et multa alia commemorare possemus, in quibus aliquando appareat occulto judicio Dei fieri perversitatem cordis ut non audiatur quod verum dicitur, & inde peccetur, & si● ipsum peccatum praecedentis paena peccati. Nam credere mendacio & non credere veritati utique peccatum est. Venit tamen ab eâ caecitate cordis, quae occulto judicio Dei, sed tamen justo, etiam paena peccati monstratur. And in his Book De Grat & lib. arbitr. cap. 20. enquiring how it is said that the Lord bid Shimei to curse David; Quomodo dixit Dominus huic homini maledicere David? Quis sapiens & intelligit? How did God bid this man curse David? Who is wise and he shall understand? Non enim jubendo dixit, ubi obedientia laudaretur, sed quod ejus voluntatem proprio vitio suo malum in hoc peccatum judicio suo justo & occulto inclinavit. Ideo dictum est, dixit ei dominus. Nam si jubenti obtemperasset Deo, laudandus potius quam puniendus esset, sicut ex hoc peccato postea novimus esse punitum. Neither saith he, is the cause concealed, why God thus dealt with Shimei, Hoc est cor ejus malum in hoc peccatum miserit vel dimiserit (I express it rather in Augustine's words then mine own, because the adversaries of God's truth, think it enough to pass the censure of blasphemy upon aught that we deliver herein.) Now the cause was, Ut videat Dominus, inquit, humilitatem meam & retribuat mihi bona pro delicto ejus in die isto, That God may see my humility saith David, and recompense me good for his cursing this day. Ecce quomodo probatur (thus Austin goes on) Deum uti cordibus etiam malorum ad laudem atque adjumentum honorum. Thus, (saith he) he used judas betraying Christ, thus he used the jews crucifying Christ: and how great good things did he thereby procure to all that should at any time believe? Who also useth the Devil himself, though most wicked, yet he useth him optimè most holily, for the exercising and proving of the faith and Piety of the righteous, not to himself who knows all things before they come to pass, but to us, who had need that after such manner God should proceed with us. The adding hereunto, how God wrought in the heart of Absalon to confound the counsel of Achitophel, he breaks forth into this exclamation in the beginning of the next chapter. Who would not tremble at the consideration of these judgements divine, whereby God works even in the hearts of wicked men what he will, yet rendering unto them according to their deserts. Then making mention of Rehoboam his despising the counsel of the Ancients, as also that 2 Chron. 1. how God stirred up the spirit of the Philistines and Arabians against joram, and they came up upon the land of Judah and laid it waste. Here, saith Austin, it is manifest that God doth raise up enemies to lay such country's waist, whom he judgeth worthy of such punishments. But yet, saith he, will you say they came not up by their own will, or did they so come up by their own will, as to make that untrue which the Scripture saith, namely, that God stirred them up? Nay rather both are true, for both they came up by their own will, and yet God stirred up their spirits to come; which also, saith he, may be delivered in this manner, namely, that both God stirred up their spirit, and also they came up by their own will. Agit enim Omnipotens in cordibus hominum etiam motum voluntatis eorum: For the Almighty doth work in the hearts of men, the very motion of their will, that he may work by them that which he thinks good to work by them, even he who knoweth not how to work any thing unjustly. Unto these he addeth variety of other testimonies all drawn out of the Word, and concludes, His & talibus testimoniis divinorum eloquiorum quae omnia commemorare nimis longum est, quantum existimo minifestetur, Operari Deum in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas eorum voluntates quocunque voluerit sive ad bona pro suâ misericordiâ, sive ad mala pro meritis eorum, judicio utique suo aliquando aperto, aliquando occulto, semper autem justo. INTRODUCTION. SECT. III. BEsides it takes from men all conscience of sin, and makes sin to be no sin; we use to say, Necessitas non habet legem, Necessity hath no law, etc. ut est in superiori Sectione, usque ad finem Sectionis. TWISSE Consideration. THis Motive, as this Author calleth it, hath the first place in the 16th reason of Arminius; whereby he laboureth to disprove their opinion, who conceive the object of Predestination to be the Mass of mankind not created; as appears, in the declaration of his opinion made before the States of Holland, etc. and it is the first particular of six, mentioned in that sixteenth reason of his. And why should he divide it from the rest, and not clap them together, into this rank of motives, to prepare him to the renouncing of that Tenent, which here he impugneth, and add Arminius his other ninteen reasons hereunto to the same purpose; if himself be privy to the cause thereof, I am not? But as it lieth I will consider it. Now it proceedeth upon supposition, that such a necessity of sinning is brought upon man by this decree, as stands in opposition unto liberty. Whereunto I answer. 1. That this decree in reference to the act of denying grace, brings no necessity at all of sinning upon man; it being only the divine decree of not cureing by the grace of regeneration (that is by the grace of faith and repentance) that natural infidelity and impenitency wherein every man is borne; all men being conjecti in necessitatem peccandi, through the sin of Adam, as Corvinus confesseth, they being his own words. Now let every sober man judge, whether to leave that infidelity and impenitency which God finds in a man uncured, be to bring a necessity of sinning upon him. 2. Secondly, we answer, that notwithstanding that necessity of sinning whereupon all are cast, as Cornivus speaketh, yet there is no sin committed by a natural and carnal man, which is not committed by him freely: The act of lying, the act of blaspheming, the act of whoring, the act of drunkenness, gluttony, railing, and in general, every sinful act being freely committed, by every one by whom it is committed, as is apparent by this, that there is not one of these sinful acts, but is forborn by divers natural and carnal men, and therein they do abstain from the committing of it freely. And yet we say, that even in abstaining from these acts, they do not abstain from sin, for as much as they do not abstain from them in a gracious manner, and all by reason of that original corruption which remains uncured in them, until such time as God, who hath mercy on whom he will, is pleased to cure it by the grace of regeneration. 3. But because I imagine this Author le's fly at random, and keeps not himself to the precise genius of the Tenent by him impugned, but rather aimeth at our doctrine concerning providence divine, and the decree of God; according whereunto we willing profess with Austin that, Non aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, Enchir. 95. Therefore I answer in the third Place, That the necessity following upon this will of God, is nothing prejudicial to the liberty or contingency of second agents in their several operations. Although I am not ignorant, that now a days it is the common and glorious course of our Adversaries, very confidently to presume and presuppose, that upon the will of God, passing upon the action of the creature, there followeth a necessity, standing in flat opposition to the liberty of rational agents; and no marvel, for sic factitavit Hercules, Arminius the great Champion of their cause, his learning served him to do so before them. As if the contumelious usages of our Saviour by Herod and Pontius Pilate, together with the Gentiles and people of Israel, were not performed freely, but by mere necessity opposite to liberty. For it cannot be denied, but that all these were gathered together against the holy son of God, to do what Gods hand and God's counsel had predestinated to be done. Acts 4. 28. And in like sort, they that through disobedience stumbled at the word of God, did not freely disobey the Word, because Peter professeth of them in express terms, that Hereunto they were ordained. And after the same manner it is to be conceived of the Kings, that gave their Kingdoms to the Beast, namely that they did it not freely in as much as the Holy Ghost saith, that God put into their hearts to fulfil his will, and to consent and give their Kingdom to the Beast. Yet the Church of Ireland in their Articles set forth by as good Authority, as the Articles of the Church of England, Art. 11. having professed that, God from all eternity, did by his unchangeable counsel ordain whatsoever in time should come to pass; to prevent such like objections as this Author fashioneth, forthwith add, Yet so as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor the contingency of second causes is taken away, but established rather. And Austin in his Book De Grat. & Liber. Arbitr. where he speaks as freely of God's effectual Providence working in evil, as no where more, in so much as our Adversaries take great exceptions against his speeches (such as formerly delivered) and that in express terms: His main drift notwithstanding, and scope in that Book is to prove, that notwithstanding the divine operation, in working the motion of the creature as he thinks good, yet is the creature never a whit the less free in its own operation. And indeed where grace is wanting, there is too much will rather than too little, unto that which is evil; according to that he writes also elsewhere, Libertas sine gratia non est libertas sed contumacia. And if God's operation prejudiceth not the liberty of the creature, much less the will of God. For though not Epist. 28. any thing comes to pass unless God willeth it, whether it be good or evil, yet with this difference as Austin in the same place professeth, He will have that which is good come Enchirid. cap. 95. to pass by the effecting of it, but evil only by his permitting of it. Non aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat vel ipse faciendo. But though Austin and the Church of Ireland, yea and the Word of God teacheth this; yet the Tragedian, as this Author saith, could see the contrary, that is, perceive the evidence of the contrary, which none of these saw. And is not this a pretty Comedy, that a Tragedian and Zeno's servant must be brought in, and that in a confidentiary supposition to out face, not Divines only both ancient and late, but the very word of God? For it is as clear forsooth, that what comes to pass by the will of God, and by the effectual operation of God, doth not come to pass freely; and consequently, that the doctrine (which maintains that evil comes to pass by the will of God, as the crucifying of Christ by the predestination of God, or by the operation of God; as the Rent of the ten Tribes from the two, and the hardening of Pharaoh's heart, so as not to let Israel go, God professeth to be his work) takes away all conscience of sin? All this I say is as clear (if we believe this Author) as that Seneca's Tragaedies are the Oracles of God. And I pray consider, must it not take away as well all conscience of righteousness, whether of faith, or of repentance, or of obedience; unless we deny faith to be the gift of God, repentance to be the gift of God; unless we deny that God is he, Who makes us perfect to every good work, working in us that which is pleasing in his sight, that God is he that putteth his own spirit in us, and causeth Ephes. 5. 8. 2 Timoth. 2. Acts 11. 18. Heb. 13. 20. Ezech. 30. 28 us to walk in his statutes, and to keep his judgements and do them? Yet what doth Seneca speak of the divine will, or divine operation? Did the Tragedian under the term of Fate, denote the divine decree, or the divine administration of things, which is plentifully revealed to us in the word of God? Austin I am sure thought otherwise in more places than one, in Psalm. 31. on these words, Pronunciabo adversum me, He blames those who when they are found in their sins say, Fatum mihi fecit, stellae meae fecêrunt, But saith he, Quid est fatum? Quae sunt stellae? certè istae quas in Coelo conspicimus; & Qui eas fecit? Deus. Quis eas ordinavit? Deus, ergo vides quod voluisti dicere, Deus fecit ut peccarem: Then he tells of others, who said that Mars facit Homicidam, Venus Adulterum. So that Fatum with them were second causes, which we all know in their operations, do both work by necessity of nature, and have no power to maintain the free will of man; and in Psalm. 91. Quaeris ab illo quid sit Fatum, & dicit stellae malae. Quaeris ab illo, quis fecit stellas, quis ordinavit stellas; non habet quid tibi respondeat nisi Deus. It's true indeed, the Pelagians did object the Stoical Fate unto Austin, as if his doctrine favoured of it; and what doth he answer thereunto? Nec sub nomine gratiae Fatum asserimus, quia nullis hominum meritis dicimus Dei gratiam antecedi. Si autem quibusdam omnipotentis Dei voluntatem placet Fati nomine nuncupari, profanas quidem verborum novitates evitamus, sed de verbis contendere non amamus. Yet because we are to give the Devil his right; With what conscience could this Author profess of this Fatum of the Heathens, that their faith thereof did take away all conscience of sin, seeing it did not take away the conscience of sin in her, who is made by the Poet to utter this; as appears in the same Author within a few lines after. For there she professeth, that if God the creator of all, should make his wrath break forth against her, and strike her with a thunderbolt from heaven, yet this were no sufficient punishment for her sins. Queen jocastas' word are these. Non si ipse mundum concitans divum sator Corusca saeva teia jaculetur manu Unquam rependam sceleribus paenas pares. She justifies God and condemns herself, notwithstanding her former words used only as it seems, to pacify the furious mood of her Son and Husband Oaedipus. Will not such one day, rise up in judgement against many Christians, who unless themselves may be exempted from that providence divine, whereby he moves all things agreeable to their natures, are so apt to condemn God of injustice, and justify themselves, as needing not to have any conscience of sin? And which is most strange, they acknowledge Fate in this case to be such, as that it necessitated even God himself; as appears by the last Chorus. Fatis agimur, cedite Fatis, Non sollicitae possunt curae Mutare rati stamina fusi. Quicquid patimur mortale Genus, Quicquid facimus venit ex alto: Seruátque sua decreta colus Lachesis durâ revoluta manu. Omnia certo tramite vadunt; Primúsque dies dedit extremum Non illa Deo vertisse licet, Quae nexa suis currunt causis It cuique ratus prece non ullâ Mobilis ordo, multis ipsum Timuisse nocet, multi ad fatum Venere suum dum fata timent. But as I said before, whatsoever they conceived of Fate, and howsoever they fashioned it, their opinion thereof did not expectorate all conscience of sin in them, or urge them to justify or excuse themselves in their courses. For it appears both of Oaedipus and jocasta, that they not only condemned themselves, but became self executioners of punishment upon themselves for their foul crimes: the one pulling out his own eyes, judging himself unworthy to see the light; and the other destroying herself. Though whatsoever they or the Poets that set them forth conceived of Fate, in this case of theirs, it was only the Oracles of the Devils, and his illusions that abused them; God giving them over thereunto, and that no doubt most justly; when in a wicked curiosity they desire to know, what shall become of them and their children: the Devil gives forth his Oracles as he thinks good, afterwards sets his wits on work to accomplish them thereby, to gain the greater credit and reputation to himself, and so much the more forcibly holds them in his snares. But to proceed. This argument or motive is not yet at an end, but like as this doctrine, is pretended to take away all conscience of sin, which is as much as to say, all desert of sin on the one side; so it may be extended to show, how it takes away all conscience of obedience, and all desert thereupon, on the other side; to wit, in good actions. And indeed were it true, that the doctrine did bereave a man of all free will, it were true, as Hierome saith, that where such necessity is, nec damnatio, nec Corona est But Austin hath spent an whole Book in proof of this, namely; that grace consists with freedom of will, unto that which is good; and want of grace together with God's efficacious operation, even in the worst of things, doth consist also with freedom of will unto that which is evil. But that in the state of nature man hath no free will to that which is good, but is a servant unto sin, I know no man that doth or can deny, unless withal he deny Original sin with the Pelagians; like as indeed it is written of Grevincovius that great Arminian, that, Grevincovius negavit peccatum Originale, quod & testibus convinci potest. And indeed this Author's discourse bears strongly this way, whatsoever Protestation in show of words he makes hereafter to the contrary. For it is apparent, that in this place, the face of his discourse stands for freedom of will in all, as well unto that which is good, as unto that which is evil. And albeit there is so little difference between this and his former motive (touching the conscience of sin) that it seems to be added only to make way for this sentence of Hierome, which yet is nothing to the purpose, unless he can prove, that God's decrees do bereave men of liberty of their wills: yet very unhappily doth he carry himself herein and in far different manner from Hierom's expression, though he placeth Corona in opposition to damnation; one whereof, to wit, damnation, implies the merit of sin preceding: but the other, to wit, Corona, no way implies any meritorious nature of obedience precedanious thereunto. But this Author sticks not to apply a meritorious condition to good actions on the one side, as well as to evil actions on the other. And if good actions were as meritorious, and that naturally too, of the crown of righteousness, as evil actions are of damnation. And withal he will have no more to decree, or work the faith, and repentance, and obedience of one, than he doth the infidelity, and impenitency, and disobedience of another, lest this his will & operation, prove an adamantine chain, of necessity to draw them to faith, and repentance, and obedience, whereas his wisdom thinks it fit, they should be left to their own choice, whetherthey will believe and repent, yea or no. For he doth very confidently presume, that every man hath power to believe and repent, and do any good work; which is as good, as in express terms to profess, that there is no original sin at all; Notwithstanding so many express testimonies of holy writ to the contrary, namely, john 12. of some that, They could not believe. Rom. 2. of others that, They could not repent. Rom. 8. of all that are in the flesh, that, They cannot please God. 1 Cor. 2. of the natural man that, He neither perceives the things of God nor can know them; of the Israelites in the Wilderness, that, God had not given them an heart to perceive, nor eyes to see, nor ears to hear unto that day. Deutr. 29. 4. But these passages of holy Scripture, seem to have no place in this Author's consideration, if so be they have in his Creed. This bed is something too short for him to stretch himself thereon; and therefore he desires to change his lodging, and to pass from the desert of good actions, to the desert of evil actions, which he formerly insisted upon, and he tells a story of Zeno's servant most suitable to his jambick taken out of Seneca, though he quotes the place of neither. Well, Zeno's servant, he saith, when he was punished by his Master for a fault that he had done, told his Master out of his own grounds, that he was unjustly beaten, because he was, Fato coactus peccare: and hereupon making his reckoning without his host, concludes that, Certainly if Malefactors could not choose but play their rude pranks, they could not be justly punished for them: Wherein he tells us what the servant said; but what the Master answered, thereof he saith just nothing. Nay doth he truly relate what the Servant said? Nothing less, but shapes it, as he thinks good, that making his own bed, he may lie thereon more softly. If we may believe Diogenes Laertius who reports the story, the Servants answer was not Fato coactus sum peccare, but Fatale mihi erat furari. For he took his ser●●●● laying the thief, & though the servant took advantage from his Master's do●●●● of Fate, to frame an Apology for himself, yet would not Zeno permit him to 〈◊〉 thereby any privilege from stripes. For, servum in furto deprehensum verberavit. A manifest evidence that even in his opinion, the destiny he maintained was no just excuse for sin. And to meet him in his own plea, when he said. Fatale mihi erat furari, & caedi inquit: this was the answer he made to his servant, which answer of his this Author either conceals, or was not privy to his own ignorance. And indeed Chrysippus the Stoic, though an eager maintainer of Fate Stoical, yet denied not the liberty of men's wills, as appears in Cicero de Fato, though in his opinion this doctrine of theirs did cohere. And Plutarch likewise in his book De Fato professeth as much. Fatum omnia continet, sicut etiam videtur, neque tamen proptereà omnia necessariò eveniunt, sed unumquodque suo naturae modo. Neither did Zeno conceive hereby all place to be taken away for persuasion, as appears by his answer to Crates, when he took him by the cloak to draw him away from Stilpo, saying, O Crates, commodissimè auribus Philosophum teneas. Cum igitur persuaseris, tum illum trahe. Nam si per vim egeris, corpus quidem apud te, sed animus apud Stilponem erit. Neither were any Philosophers more studious of Morality than the Stoics, They wrote De Bonis & Malis, de Affectibus, de Virtute, de Fine, deque primâ aestimatione, & de Actibus ac de Officiis, de Adhortationibus & dehortationibus, as Diogenes writes in the life of Zeno. And Austin de Civit. Dei cap. 9 professeth of the Stoics, that, though Omnia Fato fieri contenderent, yet, Non omnia necessitate fieri dicerent. And more than this, whereas the Stoics were so jealous of maintaining the liberty of men's wills, that they denied them of all other things to be subject to necessity. Austin professeth that their fear, of subjecting the wills of men unto necessity, in this respect was a causeless fear. Ibid. cap. 10. Unde nec illa necessitas formidanda est, quam formidando Stoici laboraverunt, causas rerum ita distinguere ut quasdam subtraherent necessitati, quasdam subderent; atque in his quas esse sub necessitate noluerunt, posuerunt etiam nostras voluntates, ne videlicet non essent liberae, si subderentur necessitati. And then proceeds to show, that there is a certain necessity nothing prejudicial to the will, albeit the will be acknowledged in subjection thereunto. And that necessity he describes to be this, as when we say, that, Necesse est ut ita sit aliquid vel ita fiat; his words are these; Si autem illa definitur esse necessitas, secundum quam dicimus necesse est, ut ita sit aliquid, vel ita fiat, nescio cur eam timemus ne nobis libertatem auferat voluntatis. Herein Austin professeth to go beyond the Stoics, in acknowledging a necessity whereunto the will of man is subject, and that without detriment to the liberty thereof. Yet in my judgement, it would better become a Christian Divine, to inform both himself and others out of the Word of God, and rest thereon for the discovery of the nature of Providence and Predestination divine, then to go a foraging among Poets and Stoics, for the justification of his own, in point of Christian faith, and for the redargution of the way of his Opposites. INTRODUCTION. SECT. IV. THese absurdities following too evidently from the upper Way, Others of the same side wiling to decline them as rocks and precipices, do leave that Way, and present man to God in his decree of reprobation, lying in the fault and under the guilt of Original sin; and say, That God looking upon miserable mankind lying in Adam's sin, did decree the greatest part of them to eternal torments in hell without remedy, for the manifestation of his severe Justice. But notwithstanding this difference among themselves, they agree well enough together. For this little jar is not (in their judgements) enough to make a breach between them, as we may see in the Conference at the Hague, and in the Synod at Dort. In the Conference at the Hague the Contra-Remonstrants have these words. Quoad sententiarum diversitatem in hoc argumento, quod Deus hominem respexit Collat. Hag. Brand. p. 37. in hoc decreto nondum creätum, vel creätum & lapsum, quia hoc ad fundamentum hujus doctrinae non pertinet libentèr alii alios aequitate Christiana toleramus. After this in the Synod of Dort, they permitted Gomarus to go the Supralapsarian way; and the Delegates of South Holland were very indifferent which way they took. For these are their words, An Deus in eligendo consideravit homines ut lapsos, an etiam ut nondum lapsos, existimant (viz. the Delegates aforesaid) non esse necessarium ut definiatur, modo statuatur Act. Synodal. pag. 3. & 48. Deum in eligendo considerasse omnes homines in pari statu. And to say the truth there is no reason why they should quarrel about circumstances, seeing they agree in the substance. For they both say. 1. That the moving cause of reprobation is the alone will of God, and not the sin of man original, or actual. 2. That the final impenitency and damnation of reprobates, are necessary and unavoidable by Gods absolute decree. These two things are the maxima gravamina that the other side stick at. So that these two paths meet at last in the same way. But because this last is chosen by the most, and latest maintainers of the absolute decree, as the more moderate of the two, and the easier to be defended, I will set down the conclusion which I dislike in their way and words. God hath absolutely purposed from eternity, of his mere will and pleasure without any consideration of actual continuance in sin and unbelief, utterly to cast off from grace and glory, Millions of men considered in the fall (even those whom he calls to repentance and solvation by the Preaching of the Gospel) for the manifestation of his severity and Justice. That all mankind is involved in the first sin and the fruits thereof, which are corruption of nature, and the guilt of eternal death, I confidently believe. But that God did absolutely intend to leave men in that woeful state for ever, and upon this only sin, to build a peremptory decree of the unavoidable damnation of the far greater part of mankind, I cannot yet be persuaded. Having thus plainly laid down the position, which I deem to be false, I come now in the next place to deliver my reasons against it, which are of two sorts: 1. Such as first made me to question the truth of it. 2. Such as do for the present convince me that it cannot be a truth. TWISSE Consideration. HEre breaks out the main reason, that moved this Author to represent the different opinions of our Divines about the object of Predestination, that so a way might be opened unto him at pleasure, to charge the former opinion with what he thought good; and as for the proof of his criminations, he might the better ease himself of the burden thereof, by showing the dissent of other Divines of the same profession from the former in this particular, making choice rather to shape the object of Predestination and reprobation, under the notion of mankind, lying in the mass corrupt by the fall of Adam. For surely it is to be presupposed, that they did not descent from their former friends without some reason, and this Author makes bold to insinuate, that these absurdities mentioned by him were the reasons: As when he saith, These absurdities following too evidently from the upper way; Others of the same side willing to decline them, as rocks and precipices do leave that way. But that these were the motives whereby they were induced to decline the former opinion, and to embrace the latter, he proves not, nor so much as adventureth upon the proof thereof, but leaves unto his credulous reader to supply that by his forwardness, to take it upon trust; as if this discourser by his moral carriage, might win the opinion of so much worthiness, as to be a man with whom you may well play at Put-finger in the dark, quicum in tenebris mices. And yet Arminius might have taught him, that there is a middle opinion between these; namely, of those who make the object of predestination the mass of mankind created, but not yet corrupted. And he puts this opinion upon Junius, and appeals to his Theses, as giving evident testimony thereunto. Now there is no show or colour of reason, why, to avoid the absurdities premised by this Author, any man should decline the first way, and embrace the second, which is the way of Junius. And this I conceive to be the main reason, why this second way is altogether dissembled by this Author, or by the spirit that guided him. For albeit it was for this advantage (who hankes after every sorry consideration to serve his turn in the way of motive, learning to represent the multiplicity of opinions hereabouts amongst our Divines:) yet it being a matter of greater moment, to gain the justification of his absurdities charged upon the first way, from the mouths or practice of our Divines, at least in appearance: and some colour hereof he finds by declining the first way and falling upon the third; but no colour at all by declining the first way and falling upon the second. Therefore he thought it a part of his wisdom altogether to dissemble the second, and to represent the opinion of those Divines who decline the first (yea and second too) and fall upon the third. But suppose junius had preferred the third way and not the second, Had he done it out of a desire to decline the absurdities here mentioned? It is apparent by that his conference with Arminius (which yet he set not forth, but the Arminian party after his death) that he maintains all these considerations to have their place in Predestination, and therefore makes Hominem communiter consideratum the object of predestination, which as it is a notion abstract from all the three special notions of nondum conditum, or conditum, but nondum corruptum, or denique corruptum, so it is indifferently appliable unto them all. And indeed Piscator resolves the question about the object of Predestination, namely, that as Predestination includes the decree of creating men unto different ends, so the object must necessarily be mankind not yet created; as it includes the decree of permitting all to fall in Adam, so the object (as he thinks) must be mankind created, but not yet corrupted; and lastly as it includes the decree of choosing some out of that corrupt mass, and refusing others or leaving them in it. so the object of his judgement must be mankind both created and corrupted. And Arminius himself professeth, that the twenty reasons wherewith he disputeth against the first way, may also be accommodated against the other ways. And albeit the followers of the second and third way do think that they can better maintain their Tenent, and free it from the absurdities wherewith the other ways are charged; yet it followeth not herehence, that therefore they did justify them, the contrary whereunto appears in the particular of junius, as before I mentioned. Moulin indeed disputes against the first, but doth he, to decline that, subsist in the third, as touching the making of the corrupt Mass the object of reprobation? it is apparent he doth not. But as reprobation denotes God's decree of damnation, he premiseth thereunto, the foresight of final impenitency. Of this opinion of his, this Author takes no notice. Yet is Moulin sound throughout in the doctrine of election; wherein if this Author did concur with him, we should nothing trouble ourselves to take him off from his concurrence with Moulin in that particular of reprobation. And we of the first way are willing to profess, that God neither damns nor decrees to damn any man, but for sin and final perseverance therein; nor so only, but in plain terms to pronounce, that in no moment of nature doth God's intention of damnation precede the consideration of sin, and final impenitency; though we do not make the consideration of sin to precede the intention of damnation, as Moulin doth. And to my understanding, other reasons there are, which cast Divines upon the third way, than the declining of these absurdities mentioned by this Author; as namely, that the very notions of election and reprobation, the one being conceived to be an act of mercy, the other an act of justice, do presuppose sin. And whereas Arminius in his conference with junius, produceth five reasons against the first way, no less than four of them proceed on this manner; The first thus, Praedestinatio est voluntas Dei de illustrandâ suâ gloriâ per misericordiam & justitiam: At illa voluntas locum non habet in nondum condito ceu condendo. The third thus, Praedestinatio est pars providentiae administrantis & gubernantis humanum genus; ergò posterior naturâ actu creationis vel proposito creandi. Si posterior actu creationis vel propositio creandi hominem, jam homo praedestinationis objectum non est consideratus, ut nondum conditus. His 4th argument is this, Predestinatio est praeparatio supernaturalium bonorum; ergo praecedit communicatio naturalium, & proptereà creatio in naturâ sive actu, sive in decreto Dei. His last reason is of the same nature thus, Illustratio sapientiae Dei per creationem prior est illustratione sapientiae Dei quae est administratio praedestinationis, 1 Cor. 1. 21. Ergo creatio prior est praedestinatione. To all which reasons of his, I have answered in my Vindic. Grat. Dei. lib. 1. part. 1. De Praedestin. digress. 5. in several chapters. Only the second argument of Arminius insisteth upon God's ordination of man's fall. And to be freed from the trouble of answering this argument, is the only thing that I know we gain, by leaving the first and second way, and embarking ourselves in the third. But how freed? surely only so far, as that the doctrine of election and reprobation, supposing Adam's fall, doth not engage us to inquire into divine providence concerning Adam's fall. But nevertheless it cannot be denied, but that had not God permitted Adam to fall, he had never fallen. And we that take the first way, acknowledge no other Providence divine concerning the ingress of sin, as sin, into the world, but in the way of permission. Sin as sin admitting no cause efficient, but deficient only. And it is utterly impossible, that God, either in doing what he doth, or in forbearing to do what he doth not, should in any culpable, or justly unblamable manner be deficient. And if it be farther demanded, whether upon God's permission it followeth, August. de Civit. Dei. l. 12. c. 7. that sin shall be committed by the creature; We readily profess it doth. This Vorstius acknowledgeth a favourite of the Arminians. Nay doth not Arminius himself deliver it expressly, where he saith, That when God permitteth the willing of aught, Necesse est ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolendum? This he delivers without all qualification of the necessity mentioned, which we do not. And this also Navarettus a Papist professeth, and though he be a Dominican, yet I know no Jesuit that opposeth him in this. And if any man infer herehence, that then God determining to permit sin, did determine that sin should enter into the World. We willingly grant that God did so ordain namely, that sin should come to pass by his permission. Non aliquid fit (saith Austin) nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse Lib. 2. the Amiss. great. & statis peccati. c. 14. faciendo. And Bellarmine professeth, that, Bonum est mala fieri Deo permittente: so that herein God doth not will evil, but that which is good in the acknowledgement of Bellarmine; and that in the heat of his opposition against our Divines in this particular. And Arminius is express in saying, Voluit Deus Achabum mensuram scelerum implere. And what is this but, Peccata peccatis cumulare? And though the Jesuits and Arminians do Exam. p. 162. with all their force resist, yet it evidently follows from the notion of efficacious grace embraced by the one, and by the notion of an efficacious impediment of sin, dictated by Arminius himself. For efficacious grace with the Jesuits, consists in the congruity thereof, and the congruity thereof consists in this, that God forseeth that upon the confession thereof sin will be avoided. Now what is the reason why God grants such a grace, whereupon he seeth sin will not be avoided; and denies such a grace, upon the granting whereof, he knows full well that sin would be avoided; but because his pleasure is, that sin shall be committed by his permission, and not be avoided, although he hath given them grace sufficient to avoid it, as they say, and it was most true of Adam in the state of innocency. In like sort doth Arminius distinguish of, Peceati impedimentum sufficiens & efficax, Efficacious hindrance of sin, is that whereby God seeth sin will be avoided; sufficient is only that whereby a man may avoid it if he will. But withal he confesseth, that God in the Promptuary of his wisdom, hath not only such impediments as are sufficient to the avoiding of any sin, but such also, as whereby any sin would indeed be avoided, were he pleased Armin. Exam. p. 157. to grant them. But yet as often as he thinks good to permit sin, he doth not grant such impediments. And is not this a manifest evidence, that it is Gods will, that sin shall come to pass (to wit, as often as it doth come to pass) by his permission? But suppose all our Divines that embrace the third way, do imagine the absurdities here spoken of, to be justly chargeable upon the first way. Yet as he thinks them in an error, while they conceive they can with ease avoid these absurdities by their third way, let him be pleased to conceive, they may as well be in an error, in thinking them justly chargeable upon the first way; and consequently their opinion is nothing sufficient to justify, that they are unremovable by them that embrace the first way. It is true there is no cause of breach either of Unity or Amity between our Divines upon this difference, as I showed in my digressions De Praedestinatione Digress. 1. seeing neither of them derogate either from the prerogative of God's grace, or of his sovereignty over his creatures, to give grace to whom he will, and to deny it to whom he will, and consequently, to make whom he will vessels of mercy, and whom he will vessels of wrath; but equally they stand for the divine prerogative in each. And as for the ordering of God's decrees of creation, permission of the fall of Adam, giving grace of faith and repentance unto some, and denying it to others, and finally saving some and damning others, whereupon only arise the different opinions, as touching the object of predestination and reprobation, it is merely Apex Logicus, a point of Logic. And were it not a mere madness, to make a breach of unity or charity in the Church of God, merely upon a point of Logic? Thus have I justified the improbability and utter unlikelihood, that ever any schism will be made in the Church of God, upon these nice and mere Logical differences, in my Vindic. Grat. Dei, which this Author is acquainted with as appears by a passage that hereafter he representeth therehence, and that farther into the Book then these my digressions are upon the point of predestination, but is content to take no notice thereof, lest it might hinder the course of his Scene, whereunto it is fit he should be serviceable. And as for the two Articles here mentioned, wherein they are said unanimously to agree, and which he calls maxima gravamina. It is true they do agree herein, but it may be in a far other sense, than he is willing should be taken notice of. For as for the first, 1. That the moving cause of reprobation, is the alone will of God, and not the sin of man original or actual. 1. This is true in proportion to election, that like as no good work of man is the moving cause of election, but only the will of God; so no sin or evil work of man is the cause of reprobation, but only the will of God. 1. That so it is of election, the Apostle both 1. Saith, Election is not of Works but of him that calleth. 2. And proveth thus, Before Esau and jacob were borne, or had done good or evil, it was said, The Elder shall serve the Younger; therefore Election is not of Works (that is of good works) but of him that calleth. 2. That so it is of reprobation, I prove by the same argument of the Apostle, thus, Before Esau and jacob were borne, or had done good or evil, it was said the Elder shall serve the Younger; therefore reprobation stands not of works (that is of evil works) but of the mere pleasure of God. 1. And like as this is farther evident by God's course of calling in the point of Election, as the Apostle intimateth, for as much as God calleth effectually whom he will in bestowing faith and repentance upon them. For as the Apostle afterwards professeth, He hath mercy on whom he will. 2. So it is as evident in the point of reprobation, in as much as God refuseth to call whom he will, by denying faith and repentance unto them, as afterwards the same Apostle professeth, saying, that God hardeneth whom he will. 2. And this doctrine we do explicate by distinguishing that which our Adversaries desire to confound, lest their cheating carriage should be discovered, as formerly I have showed. For Predestination and Reprobation, may be considered either quoad Praedestinantis & Reprobantis actum; or quoad Praedestinationis & Reprobationis terminum, as much as to say, quoad res praedestinatione & reprobatione praeparatas, that is, either as touching the act of Predestination and Reprobation, or as touching the things decreed by Predestination or Reprobation. Now as touching the act of Predestination never any man (saith Aquinas) was so mad as to say that the merits of man are the cause of predestination. And why so? Because the act of predestination is the act of Gods will, and formerly (saith he) I have showed, that there can be no cause of the will of God, as touching the act of God willing, but only as touching the things willed by God. Now apply this to reprobation. For is not reprobation as touching the act of God reprobating, the very act also of Gods will? This cannot be denied: and herehence it follows, that like as there can be no cause of God's will, as touching the act of God willing, so there can be no cause of reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating. And like as it was a mad thing in Aquinas his judgement to say, that merits were the cause of predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating; so it is no less madness in his judgement, to maintain that either sin original or actual, can be the meritorious cause of reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating. And what are the reasons hereof in School-divinity? Why surely these. 1. Predestination and Reprobation are eternal, but good works and evil works of the creature are temporal; but impossible it is, that a thing temporal, can be the cause of that which is eternal. 2. The act of Predestination and Reprobation is the act of Gods will, and the act of Gods will, like as the act of his knowledge, is the very essence of God even God himself; and therefore to introduce a cause of God's will, is to bring in a cause of God himself. 3. If works or faith foreseen be any moving cause of Divine election, then either they are so of their own nature, or by the mere constitution of God. Not of their own nature, as it is apparent; therefore by the constitution of God: but this cannot stand neither. For if by the constitution of God, than it would follow, that God did constitute, that upon foresight of man's faith he would elect him, that is, ordain him to salvation. And what I pray is to constitute? Is it any other then to ordain? And herehence it followeth, God did ordain that upon foresight of man's faith, he would ordain him unto salvation: Whereby the eternal ordination of God, is made the object of his eternal ordination; whereas it is well known, and generally received, that nothing, but that which is temporal, can be the object of divine ordination which is eternal. In like sort I dispute of reprobation: if sin be the cause thereof, then either of its own nature it is the cause thereof, or by the ordinance of God: Not of its own nature as all are ready to confess: if you say by the ordinance of God, than it follows God did ordain, that upon the foresight of man's sin, he would ordain him unto damnation. For reprobation is Gods ordaining a man unto damnation, as touching one part of the things decreed thereby; which we come to consider in the next place, and that both in election and in reprobation, having hitherto considered them as touching the act of God electing or reprobating, and showed that thus they can have no cause. But as touching the things decreed, thereby they may have a cause as Aquinas professeth and we profess with him. As for example to begin with election. The things decreed or destinated to a man in election are two, Grace and Glory. Now both these may have a cause: For both Grace is the cause of glory; and Christ's merits are the cause both of grace and glory. But let grace be rightly understood. For in the confuse notion of grace many are apt to lurk, thereby to shut their eyes against the evidence of truth. For no marvel if men be in love with their own errors; and in proportion to the love of error, such is their hatred of Divine truth opposite thereunto. Now by grace, we understand the grace of regeneration, whereby that natural corruption of mind and will (commonly called blindness of mind and hardness of heart) which we all bring into the world with us through original sin, is in part cured. More distinctly we call this grace, the grace of faith and repentance, whereby our natural infidelity and impenitency is cured. Now this grace we say God bestows on whom he will, finding all equal in infidelity and impenitency. For so the Apostle tells us, that, God hath mercy on whom he will. And as God bestows it on Rom. 9 18. whom he will, not finding any cause in man any way moving him, either in its own nature, or by divine constitution, moving him to bestow this grace on any. So the Apostle 2 Timoth. 1. 9 God hath saved us, and called us with an holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace. And indeed we being all found dead in sin, what could be found in one to move God to bestow the life of faith and repentance upon him, more than upon another? And if any such thing were found in man moving God hereunto, then should grace be bestowed according unto works, that is in the Father's phrase (as Bellarmine acknowledgeth) according unto merits; which was condemned 1200 years ago, in the Synod of Palestine: and Pelagius himself was driven to subscribe unto it, otherwise they had condemned him also. But as touching the conferring of glory, God doth not bestow this on whom he will, finding men equal without any moving cause thereunto, even in man; For though there be no moving cause hereunto in man of its own nature, yet there is to be found, a moving cause in man by constitution divine, whereby God is as it were moved to bestow solvation on some, and not on others. For God hath made a gracious promise, that whosoever believeth and repenteth, and continueth in faith and repentance unto death shall be saved, and whosoever believeth not and repenteth not shall be damned. So than though men are equal in original sin, and in natural corruption, and God bestows faith and repentance on whom of them he will, curing their corruption in whom he will: yet when, he comes to the conferring of glory, men are not found equal in moral condition; and accordingly God cannot be said on like manner, to bestow glory & solvation on whom he will; For he hath tied himself by his own constitution to bestow solvation on none, but such as die in thestate of grace. Yet, I confess, some say that God bestows solvation on whom he will, in as much as he is the author of their faith & repentance, & bestows these graces on whom he will, yet certainly there is a different manner in the use of this phrase of bestowing this or that on whom he will. For when God bestows faith and repentance, he finds them on whom he will bestow it, no better than others: But when he comes to the bestowing of glory he finds them, on whom he bestows that, far better them others. Now we come to the things decreed in reprobation, and these are two. 1. The denial of the grace of regeneration, that is, of the grace of faith and repentance, whereby man's natural infidelity and impenitency is cured. 2. The denial of glory, and the inflicting of damnation. The first of these, to wit, the denial of grace mentioned, is made to whom he will. And it must needs be so, in ease God gives this grace to whom he will. And the Apostle professeth, that as God hath mercy on whom he will, so he hardeneth whom he will. And as God denies this grace to whom he will, so did he decree to deny it to whom he will: Yet there is a difference considerable: For albeit God hardeneth whom he will, by denying unto them the grace of faith and repentance; yet notwithstanding, like as it is just with God to inflict damnation upon them, for that sin whether original or actual, wherein he finds them, when the ministry of the word is afforded them: so likewise it cannot be denied to be just with God, to leave their infidelity and impenitency wherein he finds them uncured. But yet because God hath not made any such constitution, namely, that whosoever is found in infidelity and impenitency, shall be so left and abandoned by him: therefore he is properly said, as to cure it in whom he will, so to leave it uncured in whom he will, finding them all equal in original sin, and consequently lying equally in this their natural infidelity and impenitencv. So we may justly say, there is no cause at all in man of this difference, to wit, why God cures infidelity & impenitency in one and not in another, but it is the mere pleasure of God that is the cause of this difference. And if any list to contend hereabouts, we shall be willing to entertain him, and confer our strength of argumentation on this point. 2. But as touching the denial of glory and inflicting of damnation, which is the second thing decreed in reprobation, there is always found a cause motive, yea and meritorious hereof, to wit, both of the denial of the one & inflicting of the other: And God doth not proceed herein according to the mere pleasure of his will, & that by reason of his own constitution, having ordained that whosoever continueth finally in infidelity, in profane courses, and impenitency shall be damned. And albeit on the other side it may be said in some sense (as formerly I have showed) that God saves whom he will, in as much as he is the author of faith, which he bestows on whom he will; yet in no congruous sense can he be said to damn whom he will, for as much as he is not the author of sin, as he is the author of faith. For every good thing he works, but sin and the evil thereof he only permits, not causeth it. And lastly, as God doth not damn whom he will, but those only whom he finds finally to have persevered in sin without repentance: so neither did he decree to damn, or reprobate to damnation whom he will, but only those who should be found finally to persevere in sin without repentance. Now let us apply this to the Article we have in hand, which is this; The moving cause of reprobation is the only will of God, and not the sin of man original or actual: and for the explication hereof, according to that which hath been formerly delivered, We say that reprobation doth signify, either a purpose of denying grace, as above mentioned, or a purpose of inflicting damnation. And each may be considered, either as touching the act of God's decree, or as touching the things decreed. We show how the Article holds or holds not, being differently accommodated. 1. As touching the things decreed, 1. As touching the denial of grace, We say, That God decreed of his mere good pleasure to deny unto some the grace of faith and repentance, for the curing of that natural infidelity and impenitency which is found in all, without any motive cause hereunto found in one more than in another. 2. As touching the inflicting of Damnation, We say, That God decreed to inflict damnation on some, not of his mere pleasure, but merely for their final perseverance in sin without repentance. 2. As touching the very act of God's decree, We say, Nothing in man could be the cause hereof, but the mere pleasure of God, as Aquinas professeth it a mad thing to devise in man a cause of divine predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating, & as I have showed, because both are eternal and the act of Gods will, which is God himself: and withal to devise a cause hereof, is to cast ourselves upon an unavoidable absurdity, as namely to say, That God did ordain that upon the foresight of this or that in men, he would ordain some of them to solvation, and others unto damnation. And indeed the harshness of the Tenent, consists chiefly in confounding these different considerations, whereby a colour is cast, as if we maintained that God did decree to damn men of his mere pleasure and not for sin. 2. As touching the second which is this, That the final impenitency and damnation of reprobates are necessary, and unavoidable by Gods absolute decree. Here as it were to make weight, impenitency and damnation are clapped together, as unavoidable by Gods absolute decree; whereas it is without all question, that supposing impenitency to be final, damnation is unavoidable by the Law of God, as who hath ordained, that whosoever dies in impenitency shall be damned. And as for impenitency, doth this Author, or any Arminian deny it to be a fruit of that original corruption wherein all are borne? I persuade myself they do not. Corvinus professeth of all, That by the sin of Adam, they are, conjecti in necessitatem peccandi. Then again doth he maintain Defence. Armin. pag. 394. that any is able to cure this but God. It seems he doth not by that which followeth, where he signifieth that God (in his opinion) did not absolutely intend to leave men to that woeful estate wherein they were borne. What then? Will he have God bound to cure it in all? If so, then certainly he doth cure it in all. For it were impossible God should not do that, whereunto he is obliged in the way of justice. But nothing more manifest, then that God doth not cure it in all: therefore certainly he is not bound to cure it in all. But I imagine he conceives that God is ready to cure it in all, and it is man's fault that he doth not cure it in any. As much as to say, if man would do somewhat which he may do, than God would give him repentance. Here is good stuff towards; and undoubtedly, this is the critical point as touching the nature of efficacious grace. Yet this I know full well, how careful the greatest Rabbis amongst the Arminians are to decline. And will it not manifestly follow herehence, that the grace of repentance is given secundum merita, according to some good work of man that went before? Which was condemned in the Synod of Palestine above 1200 years ago; Nay what will you say, if their doctrine hereabouts in the issue thereof comes to this, namely that God doth work in man, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Velle credere; modo Velit, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Velle resipiscere, modò Velit, as I can show it under the hand of one? and I have cause to suspect that it comes also from another manner of hand, then his, with whom I have had to deal with. And in this case it shall not be true that God shows mercy on whom he will, in giving faith and repentance, but rather he shall show mercy on whom man will. And like as when a question is made, why such a man is rewarded by the Magistrate, no wise man will answer because it is the pleasure of the Magistrate so to reward him, but rather represent the cause on man's part, why he was reward: so if God shows mercy in giving repentance according to some preparation found in one man, rather than in another, it shall not be said, that God hath mercy on whom he will, but rather the reason on man's part is to be represented, why God doth give him repentance. Yet these Petitions he calls maxima gravamina on the part of Reprobation. And will he not give us leave to propose in proportion hereunto, our maxima gravamina, as touching their opinion in point of election? namely. 1. That it is not the mere pleasure of God, but the faith and repentance of a man foreseen, that is the moving cause of divine election. 2. And that every man hath power to believe and repent, and no man hath more cause to be thankful unto God; for giving him any more grace to believe and repent (in the way of grace preventing) than he gives to reprobates. I speak of reprobate men, but for aught I yet know to the contrary, I may as well deliver it of the reprobate Angels. And as touching that which they call grace subsequent, which is only God's concurrence, seeing God affords that to any sinful act, they may thank themselves, rather than God for that, like as for God's concurrence unto any act of sin. These doctrines are no gravamina to the tender consciences of our Adversaries. The doctrine opposite to this which here he dislikes must needs be this, God hath not absolutely purposed from eternity of his mere will and pleasure, but upon consideration of actual continuance in sin and unbelief, to cast off men from grace and glory. Now this actual continuance in unbelief I presume must be final; and upon the consideration hereof, God casts them off from grace: but I pray from what grace? surely from the grace of faith; otherwise it stands not in any contradiction to our Tenent. So that their doctrine in the issue comes to this, Whom God foresees that they will not believe unto death, he decrees that they shall not believe unto death: and applied unto repentance, thus; Whom God foresees that they will not repent unto death, he decreeth that they shall not repent unto death. This is the sober and savoury doctrine of these impugners of the grace of God: and yet they perceive not what a spirit of giddiness possesseth them in this. It is without question (I think) that God leaves many in that woeful estate which here is called corruption of nature (no more, without any specification wherein it consists) the guilt whereof is eternal death; and seeing that if he so leaves them, it cannot be denied, but that God intended so to leave them. All the question is, Whether God did absolutely intend to leave them. Now had this Author, as he professeth his dislike of Gods absolve intention hereof, so dealt clearly, and showed how he did intend so to leave some, as namely upon what condition, or upon foresight whereof, and withal given some proof of his assertion, his ingenuity had been commendable. Yet we say, that God did not at all intent to leave men in this state. For the term, men in this place being indefinite, it is capable of truth either way. And this Author defines not whether he speaks of some or of all. We willingly grant, he doth not leave his elect in that woeful state, but brings them out of it by faith and repentance; which are expressly called the gifts of God, in holy Scripture. But as for Reprobates, I do not find he gives either faith or repentance unto them. And Austin lib. 5. contra Julian. Pelag. cap. 4. speaking of the Non praedestinati: Illorum neminem (saith he) adducit Deus ad salubrem spiritualemque paenitentiam, quâ homo reconciliatur Deo in Christo, sive illis ampliorem patientiam, sive non imparem praebeat: and if not unto repentance, then certainly neither doth he bring any of them unto faith. Then again, it were worth the knowing of this Author, whether any Infants of Turks and Saracens departing this life in their infancy, are left in this woeful estate. If none are left but all are saved, is it not a pretty guilt of eternal death, for which not any suffers? And you may guess by this whether this Author's Pretence of acknowledgement of natural corruption be not only from the teeth outward: If any heathen Infants dying in their infancy, are left in this woeful estate, and suffer eternal death for that natural corruption, let this Author answer, whether God intended to leave them in this woeful estate absolutely or no. For I profess willingly, I cannot imagine how God should intend this concerning such Infants and not absolutely, seeing before they come to the use of reason, there is no place for Divine foresight of any thing in them, to put a difference between some and others. II. The Discourse itself, consisting of 1. Motives inducing, 2. Arguments convincing. 1. Motives inducing. DISCOURSE. SECT. I. THe Reasons of the first sort are these four which follow. 1. The Novelty of it. I can not find absolute and inevitable reprobation to have any footing in Antiquity. The upper way was never taught or approved by any of the Fathers The first Motive. (even the stourest defenders of grace among them against the Pelagians) for the space of 600 years after Christ: nor the Lower way till the time of S. Austin, which was above 400 years after him. They did all generally agree upon the contrary Conclusion, and taught men in their times, That it was possible for them to be saved, which in the event were not saved, and to have repent which repented not, and that there was no decree of God, which did lay a necessity of perishing upon any son of Adam. This that I say M. Calvin himself doth ingeniously acknowledge, speaking of election, and reprobation, according to God's foreknowledge, Neque haec vulgo recepta opinio solius vulgi est, habuit enim saeculis Lib. 3. Instit. c. 22. sect. 1. omnibu magnes Authores; The Opinion of a conditional decree hath had great Authors in all ages. Reverend Beza speaking likewise of the same opinion, speaks to the same effect in these words; In quem errorem sanè turpissimum. Origenes Veteres plerosque tum Graecos, tum Latinos adegit, Into which most Beza in Rom. 11. v. 37. Prosper in epist. ad August. foul error Origen drew many of the Ancients both Greeks and Latins. But Prosper amongst the rest S. Augustine's Scholar doth very clearly witness it, Pen è omnium (saith he) parem inveniri & unam sententiam qua propositum est, Praedestinationem Dei secundum praescientiam receperunt, ut ob hoc Deus alia vasa contumeliae; alios honour is vasa fecerit, quia finem uniuscujusque praeviderit, & sub ipso gratiae adjutorio in qua futurus esset voluntate & actione praescierit. All did grant with one consent, that God decreed men's ends according to his foresight of their actions, not otherwise. To these Testimonies let me add two or three particular instances for the farther clearing of the newness of it. Minutius Faelix brings in the Pagans objecting to the Christians, that they hold an inevitable event of things, and did feign and frame to themselves an unjust God, who did punish in men their unavoidable destinies, and not their ill choices in these words. Quicquid agitis ut alii Fato, ita vos Deo additis: Iniquum igitur Deum fingitis, qui sortem in hominibus puniat, non voluntatem. The objection he thus answers. Illud Fatum est quod de unoquoque Deus fatus est. Christians hold no other Fates than God's decrees, Qui cum universam praescit materiam pro meritis & qualitatibus singulorum etiam fata determinat; & ita in nobis non genitura plectitur, sed ingenii natura punitur. God that foreknew all men and their actions did accordingly determine their retributions. S. Hierome an eager opposer of the Pelagians in many places of his writings hath the same thing: Ex praescientiâ dei evenit ut quem justum futurum scit prius diligat quam oriatur ex utero & quem peccatorem Hier. ad Gal. cap. 1. 15. Idem ad cap. 1 Mal. Id. lib. 3. contr. Pelag. aderit antequam peccet. To the same purpose he speaks in another place, Dilectio & Odium Dei vel ex praescientiâ nascitur futurorum, vel ex operibus, alioqui novimus quod omnia Deus diligat, nec quicquam eorum oderit, quae creavit. And in his Book against Pelagius he saith, Elegit Deus quem bonum cernit. The sum of all which speaks is but this, that there is no decree of damning or of saving men, but what is built upon God's foreknowledge of the evil and good actions of men. I will shut up my instances with the judgement of the Council of Arles against the Pelagians in Synod. Arelat. 3a. contra Lucedum. Bin. Tom. 2. part. 2. fol. 639. the year 490. or thereabout. This Council subscribed to the Letter which was written by Faustus against Lucidus the Praedestinarian, and made the anathemas and curses which he therein denounceth against him and such like, to be their own; some of which were these, Anathema illi qui dixerit, illum qui peri it non accepisse ut salvus esse possit, and again, Anathema illi qui dixerit, quòd vas contumliae non possit assurgere ut sit vas in honerem. By this and the like speeches which I have met with in the Ancients being convinced, that the doctrine of absolute reprobation (and election too) was unknown unto them, I begin to call it into question. For albeit I make not the decisions and determinations of the Fathers or Counsels the rules of my Faith (because they are but men and therefore subject unto error) yet I honour their grey hairs, and their grave assemblies, and do vehemently mistrust those doctrines which they never approved or taught, but disliked and condemned. TWISSE Consideration. AS touching the pretence of Antiquity; I find many are very apt to make plausible use of this, when either indeed, or at least in their imagination, it seems to serve their turns. And because I am put upon it, I will speak somewhat of it in general, and then proceed to consider it as it is appyable to the present occasion. As concerning the first, I find no small equivocation in the word Ancient: For if we compare an ancient man with a younger, in all probability the ancient is likely to be more wise than the other; because he hath more experience, by reason of the length of his days, according to that of Job. 12. 12. Amongst the ancient is wisdom, and in length of days is understanding. But this holds not of that which is ancient, as it signifies that which goes before another. For it is well known, that youth goeth before old age; yet no man will say, that the opinions of men in their youth, are more likely to be sound, than the opinions of riper age. Neither doth any man call or account youth Antiquity. Yet our Fathers we call our Ancients, because they have gone before us, but little reason there is in my judgement, to count their faith the more sound by reason of such Antiquity; no more than why the opinions of man in his youth, should be reputed more sound, than the opinions of his age. For as there is a youth in man; so there is to be acknowledged a youth of the world; and so likewise of the Christian World, even of the Church of God. The Holy Ghost speaks in this language. For even they who were the great Ancestors of the Jews in the days of Jeremy, are called the youth of Israel, as the youth of God's Church. Jerem. 2. 2. I remember thee with the kindness of thy youth, and the love of thy marriage, when thou went'st after me in the wilderness, in a land that was not sown. Israel was as a thing hallowed unto the Lord, &c Ezech. 16. 60. I will remember my Covenant made with thee in the days of thy youth. In like sort the Ancients counting them immediately from the Apostles days, are the very youth of the Church Christian. Now like as it is not to be expected that a man should have as great perfection of knowledge in his youth, as in his age; so neither is it to be supposed, that the Church of Christ should have as great perfection of knowledge in her youth as in her age. This is to be understood caeteris paribus; otherwise there lies a double exception against it: the One in the way of God's extraordinary mercy, the Other in the way of God's extraordinary judgement. For God may extraordinarily inspire a young man with the spirit of Prophecy, and so make him wiser than the aged. Such was the condition of God's exuberant grace in the days of the Apostles, enduing them with power from on high, not only to instruct them with all spiritual wisdom and understanding in the mysteries of the Gospel, but enabling them also to express it in divers languages, that so they might be able Ministers of Christ, to carry the glad tidings of salvation over all the World. On the other side, the sins of the Christian world not embracing God's Truth with love, may deserve at the hands of God, that he should give them over to illusions to believe lies. Then no marvel if our former light set in obscure darkness, and degenerate days come in place of better and more noble times; which may more easily come to pass, considering that the light of the Gospel is a spiritual light of faith, no natural light of reason; though even this natural light of reason comes to be amended and perfected by that light of grace. But it may be said, that They who lived near the Apostles days, are like to be better acquainted with the truth of God than we. I have found some to please themselves in this conceit, and it runs smooth and glib, and it seems very plausible to win approbation. But as Austin saith of some things, that acutule sonant, but discussa reperiuntur obtusa: so many times it falls out, that reasons plausible at first, when exploration comes, prove very unsound; like the fruit Solinus writes of, which grew about Sodom, Fair to the eye, but being crushed in cineres abeunt & vanam fuliginem. And for the discovering of the emptiness of this reason, I proceed thus. When you say of those Ancients, that they were near to the Apostles. I demand whether the meaning be, they were near to the times of the Apostles, or near to the Persons of the Apostles, or near to the word of the Apostles. The former two, do nothing at all conduce to the perfection of Christian knowledge, or soundness of faith. For certainly both Jews and Heathens professed enemies to the cross of Christ were as near to their Times and Persons as believing Christians, but they were not so familiarly acquainted with their word. But as touching familiar acquaintance with the word of the Apostles; as also the embracing of it by faith: Nothing I trust hindereth us from being as near to the Apostles, as the Ancients were. Nay it is well known, that as touching divers pieces of the books of the New Testament, we receive them for Canonical, which many of the Ancients doubted of. And as touching divers books concerning the times of the Old Testament, they are discovered unto us to be Apocryphal, which to many of the Ancients were not. But it may be said, that these Ancients to whom they pretend so much reverence (which indeed is but reverence to themselves, and to serve their own turns) were so near to the Apostles, that they not only were partakers of their writings, but of their Preaching also by word of mouth? To this I answer. 1. That it is a very rare thing to meet with any such now adays, unless it be some counterfeit Author: neither do I find any such alleged by any, least of all by any Arminian, who yet upon my knowledge do discourse after this manner, as touching their nearness to the Apostles. 2. But suppose there were any such, and they should tell us what they heard preached by the Apostles, shall we take their relations for Oracles, and make the word of God to consist, partly of that which is written by them, and partly of that which is not written, but delivered by word of mouth, and commended unto us by tradition? Then farewell the doctrine of Protestants concerning the rule of faith, that it is only the written-word; and let us with the Papists, join thereunto traditions to make up a complete Rule of Faith. It may be farther said, that by reason of their nearness to the Apostles, they may be better acquainted with the meaning of the word written. To which I answer; if so, then either from the Apostles own mouths, or by relation from others. Of any that report what they heard from the Apostles own mouths, they allege none. If they did, what were this other then to bring in Tradition to be a Rule, if not of faith, yet of interpretation of God's word, which is as foul every way as the former, considering that soundness of faith, is grounded upon the soundness of interpretation of God's word. If only by relation from others, the same exceptions lie against this and over and above, this must be of somewhat far less authority than the former: it being so difficult a matter to report from another without adding somewhat of his own, whether it be much or little, as Chaucer speaketh. Lastly, let the Commentaries of these days, be compared with the Commentaries of the Ancients, and let the indifferent reader judge, which of them are most true, most learned, most substantial. So that I suppose, I may be bold to conclude, that this reason drawn from the nearness of the Ancients to the Apostles, how plausible soever it seems at first sight, yet indeed is of no force. Now to the contrary we have these reasons. 1. Like as it is fit every man should profit in the knowledge of God more and more, as long as he lives: so in all likelihood, the Christian world doth profit more and more, as they draw nearer to the end of the world, excepting those times of God's judgements in giving the world over to illusions to believe lies. Austin did profit, as in other points of Christian knowledge, so in this as concerning Predestination, and blames the Massilienses for not profiting with him. De Praedestin. lib. 1. cap. 4. Videtis quid tunc de fidei & operibus sentiebam, quamvis de commendandâ dei gratiâ labor arem; In qua sententia istos fratres nostros esse nunc video: quia non sicut legere libros meos, ita curaverunt proficere mecum. 2. We have more means and helps for our furtherance in Christian knowledge, than they had, and that in divers respects. First, because we enjoy their labours, they enjoyed not ours, nor the like before them. So that by the reading of their writings we soon attain to that knowledge which they had, they communicating it unto us; and it were very strange we should add nothing thereunto; especially considering that Veritas was wont to be accounted temporis filia: and Aristotle accounts it an easy thing to add; Any man saith he may do that, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and thus, saith he, Arts come to their perfection 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. A tall man is able to discover much farther than a Dwarf, but let a Dwarf be advanced upon the shoulders of that tall man, and he will discover much farther than he. Let then those Ancients go for tall fellows in the discovery of Christian truth, let the Divines of modern ages be but Dwarves, as the Children of Israel seemed to be, but Grasshoppers in comparison of the Canaanites, especially to the sons of Anack; yet if by their pious labours and industries, which they have with much ingenuity communicated unto us, they suffer us to get upon their shoulders, shall not we though Dwarves, be enabled hereby to discover somewhat more than they? The Eagle is a fowl of great strength and soareth high, the highest of all Kites and Hawks, yet let her carry a Wren along with her on her shoulders in her aerial ascensions, when she is weary and can fly no higher, can it seem strange, if the Wren carried thus high by this Anakim of fowls, presumes of her own strength to fly a little higher than she? or is this any glory to the Wren, or disparagement to the Eagle? 2. Secondly Have not we better helps of Art then they, especially as touching the knowledge of the Tongues, and Logical resolutions of the Text. The Latin Fathers most of them were little acquainted with the Greek; neither Latin nor Greek Fathers were usually much acquainted with the Hebrew: Origen amongst the Greek, and Hierom amongst the Latin, had not their fellows for this. 3. Lastly, the Ancients in their days were not so put unto it as the latter; Nothing did more quicken them, or doth us, than contentions with Heretics. And therefore look how they were exercised with Heresies, so it is to be expected they were best seen in those Articles of Faith, which were most shaken by Heretics. This both Austin and Gregory take notice of; and Austin is most frequent herein, some passages to this purpose I shall relate hereafter. Now before Pelagius his days, the Fathers were much exercised in opposing the Manichees, and accordingly gave themselves to the maintenance of freewill, as Aniarius observes by the relation of Sixtus Senensis. But Pelagius was the first that opposed God's grace; and therefore those Bibl. l. 5. annot. 101. Fathers that contended with him, gave themselves chiefly to the maintenance of God's grace. And now am I come to the treating of Ancients no longer in general, but in a special reference to the doctrine of predestination. Now herein the Papists themselves (who in other points labour to beat us down with nothing so much as with the noise of Antiquity) are willing to confess that in the point of grace and predestination we need not trouble ourselves, with inquiry after the doctrine of the Ancients before Pelagius rose, and that upon the ground before mentioned, to wit, because they were nothing exercised hereabouts. As for example Bellarmine, De Grat. & lib. Arbitr. lib. 1. c. 14. having proposed divers passages of the Father's favouring, as it seemed, the doctrine wherewith Pelagius troubled the peace of God's Church, makes Austin to answer for him, Veteres Patres qui ante Pelagium floruerunt, quaestionem istam nunquam accuratè tractasse, sed incidentèr solum, & quasi per transitum illam attigisse. Addit verò (saith Bellarmine) in fundamento hujus sententiae, quod est, Gratiam Dei non praevenire ab ullo opere nostro, sed contrà ab illâ omnia opera nostra praeveniri, ita ut nihil omnino boni quod attinet ad salutem sit in nobis, quod non sit nobis ex Deo, convenire Catholicos omnes & ibidem citat Cyprianum, Ambrosisium & Nazianzenum: yet he takes a course to reconcile them to the truth; so doth Sixtus Senensis Bibl. Sanct. lib. 6. Annota. 251. so doth Alvarez. de Auxil. lib. 5. disp. 37. Again consider. The decrees of predestination and reprobation are secret, neither do they appear of what condition they are, but by the manner of their executions. Now their executions do consist partly in bestowing salvation on some, and inflicting damnation on others; partly in bestowing the grace of faith and repentance on some, and denying it unto others. As touching salvation and damnation we willingly profess, that the salvation of men of ripe years, doth always presuppose Faith and perseverance therein; and the damnation of others doth always presuppose final perseverance in sin unrepented of. But we deny that herehence it followeth, that either faith precedes the decree of salvation, or sin precedes the decree of damnation, or the prescience of either. That faith cannot precede election, nor sin reprobation, is evident; For as much as election and reprobation are eternal, but faith and sin are things temporal: but that which is temporal cannot precede that which is eternal. Neither doth it follow, that because faith precedes salvation, therefore faith precedes the decree of salvation. For it is faith existent in time that precedes salvation; but no Divine will say that faith existent in time, precedes God's decree of salvation, unless it be some such as maintain with Vorstius, that God's decrees are not eternal. In like sort, it is sin existent in time, that precedes damnation; but no wise Divine will say, that sin existent in time precedes God's decree of damnation; the former being a thing temporal but this decree eternal. Lastly, neither will it follow that because faith precedes salvation and sin damnation, therefore the foresight of faith, is antecedanious to the decree of salvation, and the foresight of sin is antecedent to the decree of damnation. For no Enthymeme of this nature is sound, but so far forth as it is reducible into a good Categorical Syllogism, whereof these Enthymems are uncapable. For Enthymems reducible unto good Syllogisms must agree, either in their Subjects or in their Predicates, but these do not. Again all the terms in a good Enthymeme must be expressed in that Syllogism whereunto it is reduced▪ But each of these Enthymemes consisteth manifestly of four terms; as in the first, the●e, Faith, and the Foresight of faith, Salvation and the Decree of salvation; Of the second, these, Sin, and Foresight of sin, Damnation and the Decree of damnation; and consequently that Syllogism whereunto either of these quaternary of terms is clapped, cannot be good; For no categorical Syllogism is good that consisteth of four terms. As for the reducing of them into a Syllogism hypothetical, such Reductions were never heard of in the Schools of the learned and that for just reason; because that is no course to justify the soundness of the Enthymemes, but a mere begging of that which is in question. As in case a man should reduce it thus; If faith be precedanious to salvation, than the foresight of faith is precedanious to the decree of salvation; But faith is precedanious to salvation, Therefore it is precedanious to the decree of salvation. In this hypothetical Syllogism, the consequence of the Major is the very Enthymeme which is in question, for the substance of it and consequently no proving of it, but a mere begging of it. Yet notwithstanding we do not deny, but that God did decree that no man should be saved, but such as being of ripe years, should be found to persevere in faith unto death none should be damned, but such as should be found finally to persevere in sin. The other execution of these decrees consists (as I said) in the bestowing of the grace of faith and repentance on some, and denying it unto others. Now the question is, Whether God be indeed the author of faith and repentance, yea, or no; and because the Arminians dare not professedly deny this. (though lately they are come so far as professedly to deny that Christ merited it) therefore let the question proceed about the manner how God bestows it, as namely, whether he bestows it of his mere pleasure on some, denying it to others, or, Whether the reason why God bestows it on some and not on others, be, because God finds some good work in one, which he finds not in another. This question being decided, it will clearly appear, whether predestination proceeds upon the foresight of aught in man, yea or no. For if God of his mere pleasure doth bestow faith on one, and not on another, it follows undeniably, that God predestinated him hereunto absolutely, and of his mere pleasure, without consideration of any future work of man. But if God bestows faith on man upon consideration of some precedent work of his, which was not the work of God, then (and not otherwise neither) it will follow, that upon the consideration of that future work of man, God did elect him unto faith, or predestinate faith unto him. So that if we desire sincerely and ingeniously to inquire what was the opinion of the Ancients about the absoluteness of predestination, we should state the question as touching Predestination unto faith, and not as touching Predestination unto salvation. For we all confess that God predestinated no man unto salvation, but such as he foresaw, coming unto ripe years, would believe sooner or later. And therefore the main question between the Remonstrants and Contra-remonstrants was, whether this decree were the whole decree of Predestination, and whether there were not another decree of Predestination besides, as namely, whether God did not decree to bestow faith on some, and deny it unto others. And secondly to inquire, Whether this decree of bestowing faith on some, did not proceed according to God's good pleasure, without consideration of any different work in man. And the most compendious resolution hereof, is to inquire of the manner how God carrieth himself in the bestowing of faith and repentance on some, and denying it unto others; as namely, Whether on his mere pleasure he hath not mercy on some, giving them faith and repentance, and of his mere pleasure, denies the gift of faith and repentance unto others. Now let the Fathers, (whosoever thinks good) be admitted to bring in their suffrages on this Article, and remember what was decreed in the first Synod that was gathered, to make peace in the Church after Pelagius had disturbed it, namely, Gratiam non dari secundum merita, that is, as Bellarmine acknowledgeth, Gratiam non dari secundum opera. Lastly, all of us now a day's consent, as De Grat. & lib. Arbitr. l. 6. c. 5. touching God's concourse to the substance of every act of the creature whether good or evil. Now let this Author or any other, represent unto us, what footing he finds in Antiquity concerning this. But I come to answer particularly, according to this Author's text. He cannot find absolute and inevitable reprobation to have any footing in Antiquity. Belike he can find reprobation evitable; a strange phrase either way. These attributes applied to damnation do carry a fair sense with them, damnation being a work of God wrought in time, and undoubtedly may be avoided, may be incurred for the time to come. But reprobation is eternal as God himself, and how that should be fancied to be of an avoidable condition for the time to come, I cannot comprehend, unless this Author be of their opinion, who desire to shape God's decrees of a revocable nature, as being both to impute unto him an impotent immutability, as some are pleased to phrase it. But leave we reprobation unavoidable, take we the absolute nature of it into consideration: this he cannot find in all Antiquity. But consider I pray, he pretends these motives, as inducements to change his former opinion: so then belike, he stood sometimes for reprobation absolute; but did he find any footing in Antiquity for it, what time he embraced it? if he did formerly embrace it, notwithstanding he found no footing in Antiquity for it, why should he now relinquish it, for finding no footing in Antiquity for it? Belike the older he waxeth, the more he groweth in love with Antiquity. Again when formerly he did embrace the doctrine of absolute reprobation, upon what grounds did he embrace it? was it because he was in hope he should hereafter find Antiquity for it? or was it only for the authority of them who brought him up in this opinion? What sorry grounds are these to build a man's faith upon? Yet this is not our course to impose Articles of faith on any, but rather to endoctrinate them out of the word of God. If then a man's Christian faith be built upon the Word of God, is it a Christian course to renounce it, or to question the integrity of it, because he finds no footing in Antiquity for it? What then shall become of the faith of Laics, and such as are unlearned? Must the writings of the Fathers be translated into all vulgar Languages, and the unlearned addict themselves to the study of them, lest otherwise their faith prove a wavering faith, for want of finding Antiquity to favour it? Belike the writings of the Prophets and Apostles, are no part of Antiquity, in this Authors more mature judgement. But if formerly the doctrine of absolute reprobation were received upon the evidence of God's word, as it is fit the faith of every Christian should be grounded thereupon, especially the faith of a Divine called to be a Teacher of others; I should think there were no just cause of alteration, but upon discovery of the error of those grounds, whereupon formerly it was builded; and the discovery hereof alone, were chiefly to the present purpose, namely to show just cause of change of mind, & alteration of judgement, but no such course do I find taken here. These motives and reasons here proposed, may carry a show of reason, why a man being yet to choose his faith in these particulars, possessed with neither way, but indifferent, might prefer one way before another, one opinion before another, but nothing sufficient to justify a change, unless the weakness of former grounds be laid open. For it may be that the former grounds might be such as upon due comparison would be found to overweigh these pretences. For upon view that I have taken of the discourse following, I find not one argument drawn from those places of Scripture that treat of election and reprobation; these I find are purposely declined as so many rocks, as if the Author feared to make shipwreck of his errors (pardon my boldness in so naming them, Austin is my precedent in this saying, Hoc scio contra istam praedestinationem quam secundum scripturas defendimus, neminem nisi errando disputare posse) but in the mean time while he fears to make shipwreck of his errors, let him take heed lest he make shipwreck of a good conscience. But proceed we with him about the inquiry what footing this doctrine finds in Antiquity. Aug. de den. Persev. c. 19 He saith he cannot find it; but it is more than I find that ever he made any convenient search after it, his whole discourse hereupon is of so hungry a nature. The absoluteness of election and reprobation, we conclude in Christian reason from God's absolute carriage in giving and denying grace, understanding thereby the grace of regeneration. Now the absoluteness herein, as we suppose, consists in bestowing this grace on some, and denying it to others, according to the mere pleasure of the Lords will. Now hath not the Apostle (more ancient than all the Antiquity he speaketh of) professed in express terms, that God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth? What need we seek farther amongst the Ancients for the justification Rom. 9 18. of this? And that mercy here is meant, such a mercy in bestowing faith on some, which is denied to others, in converting the wills of some unto good, when others are not converted, I could prove by variety of places out of Austin, whose authority in this case is far more worthy, than all the authority this Author produceth. Neither is this the voice of Austin only, but of Ambrose also in that famous saying of his Quem vult religiosum, facit, so much magnified by Austin. And not Ambrose alone, but Nazianzen De dono Persev. 19 also, and Cyprian are alleged by him, as concurring with him in the foundation of the doctrine of predestination, which he makes to be the freedom of God's grace in converting whom he will. And which is far more than this, yea far more than all that can be produced to the contrary, by the very Prayers of the Church every where in use, he justifies the general concurrence in that which he accounts the foundation of predestination. As when their common course was to pray unto God, that he would be pleased to convert unto the faith of Christ the hearts of Heathens; and wherein did this conversion consist, but in giving them faith and repentance: manifestly giving us to understand thereby, that the whole Catholic Church did concur in this Article of Faith, that it was in the power of God according to his free grace, to convert whom he would unto the faith of Christ, and consequently not to convert whom he would. For if there were any cause on man's part, why he doth not convert some converting others, than there were also on man's part, a cause why God doth convert some not converting others, and consequently grace should be given according unto works, that is in the phrase of the Ancients, Gratiam dari secundum merita (as Bellarmine acknowledgeth) which was ever accounted express Pelagianisme, Bellar. de great. & lib. arbit. l. 6. c. 5. and was as expressly condemned in the Council of Palestina above 1200 years ago, and Pelagius himself was driven to subscribe unto it, by shameful dissimulation so to prevent Anathematization of his own person. But the upper way (saith this Author) was never taught or approved by any of the Fathers for 600 years. Here breaks forth another reason of this Authors (or his that directed him) cunning carriage in distinguishing the two ways of our Divines in maintaining the absoluteness of election and reprobation, to wit, that in the course of his discourse he might serve his turn with both, and where Antiquity served not his turn against the one, yet might it serve his turn, as he thought against the other. But the truth is, there was no such question at all ventilated in those days, as touching the object of predestination, no nor in Augustine's neither, nor many hundred years after, that I know. And no marvel; For it concerns the ordering of God's decree aright, which is merely Logical, as I have showed in my Vind. Grat. Dei. It's true that St Austin doth usually accommodate that of St Paul, Rom. 9 21. concerning the Mass, unto mankind considered in Massa damnata as he commonly calls it, that is, in the corrupt Mass; but not always, but sometimes he speaks of it, and accommodates it clearly unto the Mass of mankind uncorrupt, yea, as yet not created, as there I have showed. And as for the right ordering of God's decrees, and the right stating of the object of predestination and reprobation, We desire no better, nor other ground than that of the Apostle, God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth, that is, he cures infidelity and hardness of heart in whom he will, by bestowing faith and repentance upon them, and leaves it uncured in whom he will by denying faith and repentance unto them. And as for the rigour of this Tenent (as it is commonly accounted) of making the Mass of mankind not created the object of predestination, I have already showed the vanity of that conceit and denomination; for as much as hereby neither is the decree of damnation made to precede the consideration of sin, no nor of final impenitency in any moment of nature, nor in any moment of nature is the decree of salvation made by me, to precede the consideration of final perseverance in faith and repentance. But whereas some, who are most rigid indeed in their discourse, make the decree of saving some and damning others to precede the decree of creating and permitting of sin both original and actual; others who are most dissolute, make the decree of creating and permitting of sin, to precede the decree of saving some and damning others, My Opinion is equally removed from these extremes, and conceives none of these decrees to be either way subordinate, but all coordinate and simultaneous, as being decrees only of various means, tending to one and the same end; thus God doth decree both to create some, and to permit to sin, and finally to persevere therein, and to damn them for their sin, to the manifestation of his glory in the way of justice vindicative. On the other side, God doth decree to create others, and permit them to sin, and raise them out of sin by faith and repentance, and reward them with everlasting life, to the manifestation of his glory, in the way of mercy mixed with justice. Farther consider that as touching predestination itself, there was no question moved thereabouts in the Church of God, before the days of Pelagius; and what credit can they get, who consult with them in such points, wherein they were not exercised. For we find by experience, that to contend with Heretics hath been an ordinary means in the course of God's providence, for the more diligent inquisition after the truth of God and happy discovery thereof. Sancta Ecclesia (saith Gregory) in Epist. lib. 7. epist. 3. De don. Pers. cap. 20. suâ semper eruditione instruitur, dum Haereticorum quaestionibus impugnatur. And Austin in like manner, Didiscimus, saith he, singulas quasque Haereses intulisse Ecclesiae proprias quaestiones, contra quas diligentius defenderetur scriptura divina, quam si nulla talis necessitas cogeret. And on the other side, before question hath been moved on a point, the Fathers have delivered themselves somewhat improvidently, whereupon Heretics have taken advantage to countenance their errors by the writings of the Ancient. This Hierome observes in the point of Arrianisme, proving thereby, that the Ancient Apolog: 2. adv. Ruffin. Writers before the Arrian Heresy arose, were no competent judges in that point. Si me causas vitiorum (saith he) in Patrum Scriptis nescire respondero non statim illos Haereticos judicabo. Fieri enim potest ut vel simpliciter erraverint, vel alio sensu scripserint, vel a Librariis imperitis eorum paulatim scripta corrupta sunt, vel certè antequam in Alexandriâ quasi daemonium Meridianum Arrius nasceretur. Innocenter quaedam & minus cautè locuti sunt & quae non possunt perversorum hominum calumniam declinare. Mark it well, Before Arrius like a Devil from the South rose up, the Fathers delivered some things innocently, yet lese warily, and such as cannot avoid the calumny of perverse persons. Upon the same ground it is, that Austin excuseth Ticonius, and that in Aug. de doctr. Christ. l. 3. c. 33. the same particular wherein he approached near to Pelagianism, to wit, before the Church of God was acquainted with that Heresy; his words are these, Sed non erat expertus hanc Haeresin Ticonius quae nostro tempore exorta multum nos, ut gratia Dei quae per Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum est adversus eos defenderemus, exercuit; & secundum id quod ait Apostolus, Oportet Haereses esse ut probati manifesti fiant in vobis, multò vigilantiores diligentioresque reddidit: ut aduérteremus in scriptures Sanctis, quod istum Ticonium minús attentum, minusque sine hoste sollicitum, fugit, etiam ipsam scilicet fidem donum illius ease, qui ejus mensuram unicuique partitur. Ticonius considered not that faith itself is the gift of God, neither was he so careful to look into the truth of this; and why? surely because he had no enemy to put him to it, as being not acquainted with the error of Pelagius. But this Heresy, saith he, arising in our days, hath put us upon the defence of the grace of God, which is given us through our Lord Jesus Christ, and hath made us more watchful and diligent to observe, that even faith itself is his gift, who distributes to every one a measure thereof. Hence it is that the same Austin, when Prosper signified that those of Marseiles would rest contented if he could make good the opinion which he maintained in the point of predestination, out of the Writings of the former, and more ancient Divines, returns for answer, that there was no need hereof, considering that They living before this Heresy was known, (to wit, of Pelagius) were not at all put upon the discussing of this question, which surely they would have done, had they been constrained Aug. de Praed. sanct. l. 1. cap. 14. to make answer to any such as the Pelagians were. See his own words, Si hujus sententiae defensionem ex divinorum eloquiorum nos praecedentibus Catholicis tractatoribus promerem, profectò high Fratres quibuscum nos agimus, acquiescerent. Hoc enim significastis Literis vestris. This was Prosper's motion; now mark Austin's answer. Quid igitur opus est ut eorum scrutemur opuscula, qui priusquam ista Haeresis oriretur, non habueruni necessitatem in hac difficili ad solvendum quaestione versari, quod proculdubio facerent, si respondere talibus cogerentur. Charity did suggest unto him, this would have been their course, had they been exercised with Pelagius, as he was. For it was his own case. For there was a time when himself thought that albeit holiness and good works consequent to faith together with salvation, were the work of God, yet faith itself he conceived to be the work of man; to wit, before he was exercised with Pelagius as appears, Liber Propositionum ex Epistolâ and Romanos. Non ergo elegit Deus opera cujusque in praescientiâ, sed fidem elegit in praescientiâ, vel quem sibi crediturum esse praescivit, ipsum elegit cui Spiritum Sanctum daret, ut bona operando eriam vitam aeternam consequeretur. For he professeth in the words following that he then conceived, Nostrum esse credere, to believe was a work of our own. Afterwards he retracteth this, Retract. lib. 1. cap. 25. professing, I had never said this, had I known faith itself to be the gift of God, Si scivissem fidem ipsam inter Dei munera quae dantur per Spiritum Sanctum reperiri. Nam quamvis credere & operari utrumque nostrum sit propter liberum voluntatis arbitrium & quae non nisi volentibus nobis fiunt, utrumque Dei donum est qui & credere, & velle, & perficere subministrat. The Papists themselves, notwithstanding the great devotion they pretend towards the Ancients, yet are driven to devise what may be said to excuse them; as in the very point of freewill they desire to excuse chrysostom. Sixtus Senensis, Biblioth●●. lib. 5. annotat. 101. Uel dicendum est sicut etiam Annianus in Praefatione Commentariorum Chryjostomis in Math. annotavit Chrysostomum interdum naturae nostrae vires plus aequo extulisse ex contentione disceptandi cum Manichaeis & Gentilibus, qui hominem asserebant vel naturâ malum vel fati violentia ad peccandum compelli. Nay what think we of Vossius himself, from whose labours it is, and nothing of their own, that our Arminians would seem to breath so much Antiquity. This Vossius professeth, they mistake him that taketh him to be of any other opinion in the point of predestination, than Austin was of. De Historicis Lat. lib. 2. cap. 17. Yet doth he acknowledge that Austin did reject the opinion of the Ancients both Greeks and Latins who went before him, in the point of predestination. Histor. Pelag. pag. 655. Patres Graeci & Latinorum illi qui ante Augustinum vixerunt, ipseque aliquandiu Augustinus, verba Apostoli interpretari solent de electione quorundam ad salutem secundum fidem & pietatem praevisam; & aliorum reprobatione aeterna ob praescientiam malorum operum quae in vita acturi essent. Sed Augustinus (here comes in the Adversative) rejectâ hâc opinione existimabat Apostolorum loqui de quorundam electione ad vitam, aliorum item praeteritione, non habitâ vel in his vel in illis ratione, sive bonorum, sive etiam malorum quae personalia forent. And which is more than this, Pag. 653. professeth a third interpretation of that passage Rom. 9 11, 12, 13. differing both from Augustine's interpretation, and from that of the Father's Greek and Latin that went before him, and makes it disputable, which is truest, though this third opinion hath no footstep amongst the Ancients, and thus he carrieth himself, notwithstanding all the pretence of his reverence of Antiquity. And to vindicate Augustine's interpretation, as well as the rest, from countenancing absolute reprobation, he calls in to help at a dead lift, the doctrine of the Jesuits, concerning Scientia Media. And I desire upon no better terms to contend then this in Scholastical Divinity, whether this doctrine be not a most unsober invention without all ground. And whereas Vossius acknowledgeth Augustine's opinion to be for the absoluteness of election (and he professeth himself to be of Augustine's opinion.) I dare appeal to any learned Divines sober judgement, whether this doctrine of Scientia Media doth not equally justify the absoluteness of reprobation, as the absoluteness of election. Yet after all this, I would not have any think, that I reject any of these ancient Fathers, that seem to be most opposite to Augustine's opinion in the point of predestination. I think they may be fairly and Scholastically reconciled without acknowledging so much difference between them, as Vossius maketh, and that by such an interpretation as sometimes is admitted by Vossius himself, of his own phrase of his own distinction, though he dreams not of the appliable nature of the same to the will of God in predestination. His distinction is of Voluntas Dei antecedens, & voluntas consequens; and this he makes equivalent to that other distinction of the will of Hist. Pelag. lib. 7. God, to wit, Absoluta & Conditionalis. Now this Conditional will of God he interprets not quoad actum volentis, but quoad Res volitas: Like as Doctor Jackson professeth Of Providence in express terms, that the former distinction of voluntas antecedens & consequens, is to be interpreted, namely, quoad res volitas, and not quoad actum volentis. Now according to this construction, there is no difference between them and Austin, nor the least impediment to the making of the will of God, both in predestination and reprobation to be most absolute. For though sin be acknowledged to be the cause of the will of God in reprobation quoad res volitas, that is, in respect of the punishment willed thereby, this hinders not the absoluteness of reprobation quoad actum reprobantis. And unless we understand the Fathers thus, we must necessarily charge them with such an opinion, whereof Aquinas is bold to profess, That never any man was so mad as to affirm, to wit, that any merits should be the cause of Predestination quoad actum praedestinantis. And why so? to wit, because predestination is the act of Gods will, and there can be no cause of Gods will quoad actum volentis. Now who seeth not that by the same reason there can be no cause of divine reprobation quoad actum reprobantis; for even reprobation is the act of Gods will, as well as predestination, and every way it must be as mad a thing to devise a cause of reprobation quoad actum reprobantis. They did all generally agree, saith this Author, upon the contrary conclusion. Now the contrary Conclusion to absolute and unavoidable reprobation is to maintain conditional and avoidable reprobation; but this is not the contrary conclusion here specified by this Author, but rather that damnation was avoidable, such is his loose discourse; whereas there is no question at all concerning damnation, whether it be conditional or absolute. We all confessing, that like as salvation is not ordained to befall any man of ripe years, but upon the performance of faith and repentance and final perseverance therein; so damnation is not ordained to be the portion of any, but upon their final perseverance in sin. In like sort as touching the possibility of salvation, not one Divine of ours, that I know, denies the possibility of any man's salvation while he lives in this World. Doctor Jackson indeed hath an opinion, that a man may proceed so far in sin in this life, that the door of repentance may be shut upon him. We have no such opinion; We acknowledge, that as God calls some at the first hour, so may some be called at the last hour of the day, yea the Thief upon the Cross, yea, inter Pontem & Fontem. In a word, We say plainly, that it is possible for any man at any time to be saved by grace giving repentance: without repentance none can be saved; which is, I presume, without question between us. In like sort it is possible for any man to repent, provided that God be pleased to give him repentance, and whether God will give him repentance or no we know not. Therefore the Apostle instructs Timothy after this manner, The servant of the Lord must not strive, but must be gentle towards all men, apt to teach, suffering the evil, instructing them with meekness that be contrary minded, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, if at any time God may give them repentance, that they may acknowledge the truth and come to amendment out of the snare of the Devil, of whom they are taken Prisoners to do his Will. Here is clearly an acknowledgement of a possibility of repentance, sooner or later, but upon the gift of God, not otherwise. The contrary opinion whereunto, this Author seemeth in this passage very strongly to savour of, but allegeth not one Father for the proof of it, to give us some document of his judicious carriage in the survey of the Fathers which here he pretends to have been made by him, and that with very great ostentation; Yet I seem to be very well acquainted with the spirit that breatheth here; and I wonder the passages of the Ancients to this purpose (which yet I am persuaded are nothing to the purpose) are not collected out of Doctor Ushar's discourse In causa Godaeschalci inscribed to Gerardus Vossius; and I doubt not but the issue will be this, that God is ready to give all men repentance in case they perform somewhat; and so the grace of repentance shall be given according to men's works, which was condemned 1200 years ago in the Synod of Palestine, and ever since accounted no better than flat Pelagianism. And which is worse than this, as that which stands in opposition to common sense, they will be driven to profess, that God is ready to give a reprobate repentance, in case he will repent, yea the very will to repent, in case he will repent. This desperate resolution I have already found by experience, and if I be not deceived, breathed by the very same spirit that breatheth here. At length we are like to receive an account of this Authors judicious survey of the Ancients out of Calvin and Beza. Neque haec vulgò recepta opinio solius vulgi est; (saith Calvin) habuit enim saeculis omnibus magnos authores. To this I answer, 1. That this is far from justifying, that absolute reprobation, and absolute election had no footing in Antiquity, that the Upper way was never taught for the space of 600 years, nor the Lower way till the time of St Austin. Though in all ages it had great Authors to impugn it, yet it might also have in all ages as great Authors to maintain it, and more too, for aught these words of Calvin in his opinion do manifest to the contrary. 2. Albeit not some but all had maintained election and reprobation to proceed according to foreknowledge of men's works, yet this nothing hinders the absoluteness either of election or reprobation. For consider, it is one thing to speak of election unto grace, another to speak of election unto glory; one thing to speak of reprobation, as it signifies a purpose to deny grace, another thing to speak of it, as it signifies a purpose to inflict damnation. It was never known I think, that any maintained, that God upon the foresight of men's faith, did elect them unto faith, or purpose to give them faith; or that God foreseeing men would not believe, nor repent, did decree that they should neither believe nor repent. Upon which brainsick conceit our Arminians are cast now a days, and all the embracers of Scientia Media: But many of them professed indeed that God did decree to bestow salvation upon them whom he foresaw would finally persevere in faith and repentance; and to damn those whom he foresaw would finally persevere in infidelity or impenitency. We acknowledge as much as they, but still the way is open to inquire of the order of these, namely, Whether the foresight of faith and repentance were before the decree of salvation, or after it, or simultaneous with it: Whether the foresight of infidelity and impenitency were before the decree of damnation, or after it, or simultaneous with it; but where is any such question to be found amongst the Ancients? We willingly profess that God did not purpose to bestow eternal life on any of ripe years, but as a reward of their faith and repentance and good works; that God did not purpose to inflict damnation on any of ripe years, but as a condign punishment of their final infidelity and impenitency; and the Ancients who maintained that God decreed to save some and damn others, according to his prescience of the piety of the one, and impiety of the other, had no other meaning that I know, or this Author is able to make good, or any other, as I am persuaded. 3. But let us farther inquire what those Ancients thought concerning faith and repentance; as whether they thought them to be the gifts of God, or no; dares this Author or any Arminian deny, they maintained them to be the gifts of God, the Scripture being so full and express for this? Secondly, inquire what their opinion was concerning the manner how God gave faith to one, and not to another, as 'tis manifest he did not, he doth not give it to all; as namely, whether it was of the mere pleasure of God, that he converted some, and not others; or whether he bestowed faith on some, and not on others, because he found those some to have prepared themselves for the receiving of faith, not so others. If it was of the mere pleasure of God, it manifestly followeth, that election unto grace and reprobation from grace, was absolute: which is the main thing in question in these our days. For we who are accounted most rigid herein, do not affect to say, That God decreed to save whom he will, or to damn whom he will; but to the contrary we say, God decreed to save none, but such as believe and repent, and to damn none, but such as die in infidelity or impenitency: but we profess willingly, that God decreed to bestow faith and repentance on whom he would, and deny it to whom he would, the Scripture being express, that God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. And Austin is most frequent in this profession, and this is that Grace which he acknowledgeth to be the foundation of predestination, and wherein both Cyprian, and Nazianzen, and Ambrose did agree with him. And Ambrose in special sort he magnifies for this profession. And Calvin hereupon observes, that whereas the Pelagians charged him, with differing from the ancients herein. Valet Augustini testimonium, saith he, apud eos, qui libenter in Patrum authoritate acquiescunt. Quanquam non patitur Augustinus se a reliquis disjungi, sed claris testimoniis divortium hoc cujus invidia gravabant eum Pelagiani, ostendit falsum esse. Citat enim ex Ambrosio (lib. de Praedestin. sanct. cap. 19) Christus quem dignatur vocat (here is the critical point of this question concerning the absoluteness of election and reprobation) Item si voluisset ex indevotis fecisset devotos. Sed Deus quos dignatur vocat, & quem vult religiosum facit. Si ex Augustino integrum volumen contexere libeat, lectoribus ostendere promptum esset mihi non nisi ejus verbis opus esse: sed eos prolixitate onerare nolo. This was calvin's judgement, as touching the judgement of Antiquity in this. 4. Yet I confess there was a time when Austin did not conceive faith to be amongst the gifts of God's spirit, but being exercised with the Pelagians, he came to acknowledge the special grace of God in this; and hereupon made faith an effect of predestination, and not any precedent thereunto, and doubts not, but the Fathers would have expressed as much, had they been exercised with the Pelagians as he was; for so much he signifies unto Prosper as before I showed, and withal shows how in the foundation of predestination they agreed with him, in as much as they agreed in the nature of grace, acknowledging the conversion of the heart to be the gift of God; And not they only, but the whole Catholic Church, as appeared by their common prayers, that God would convert the hearts of Infidels; and to say, that God doth not convert the hearts of men according to the mere pleasure of his will, but according to men's preparations, is clearly to maintain that God gave grace according unto works, which doctrine was generally exploded as mere Pelagianism. 5. Suppose they did all acknowledge the decree of election and reprobation, to be conditional, yet if they interpreted this conditionally, not quoad actum Volentis, but quoad Res volitas, this is nothing opposite to the absoluteness of election and reprobation quoad actum elegentis and reprobantis, but only quoad res volitas, to wit, salvation on the one side, and damnation on the other side. And we willingly acknowledge that God hath not ordained that salvation or damnation shall befall any man but in case they believe and repent, or refuse to believe, or repent. Now that the Ancients did in this manner understand voluntas conditionata in God, Vossius himself (upon whom our Arminians do most depend as touching the authority of the Ancients) doth improvidently, and ere he is a ware, confess. Hist. Pelag. pag. 638. his words are these. Aliqua absolutè vult & simpliciter: quomodo creare mundum voluit & extremo die volet resurrectionem carnis. De qua voluntate intelligi debet illud, Psal. 115. 3. Deus noster in coelo, quaecunque voluit facit. & Apost. ad Rom. 9 19 Voluntati ejus quis resistit? Aliqua item vult cum conditione quae idcirco in effectum non prodeunt nisi conditione impletâ: quomodo omnes homines salvari vult, sed per & propter Christum fide apprehensum. Atqui non omnes fide aphrehendunt Christum, sed absque paenitentiâ ac fide plurimi de hoc mundo decedunt. Quo respectu tales in aeternum statuit damnare. De conditionatâ illâ voluntate extant longè plurima apud Veteres Scriptores. Aliqua hoc loco ascribemus. Such indeed are Beza's words upon that of the Apostle, Who hath given first unto God? Rom. 11. 35. Est autem etiam hic locus (saith he) diligenter observandus adversus eos qui fidei, vel operum praevisionem faciunt electionis causam. In quem errorem sanc turpissimum. Origenes veteres plerosque tum Graecos tum Latinos adegit donec; tandem Dominus Augustinum per Pelagianos ad hunc agnoscendum & corrigendum errorem excitaret. The first part this Author conceals, it being by Beza delivered as touching election; and this Author deals purposely on reprobation only. The latter part likewise he passeth by; for Beza confines this which he saith of the Ancients to a certain time, namely, the time preceding the troubles raised by Pelagius. But this Author had rather it should run at random without any determination; and then again, the mentioning of Austin raised by God upon occasion of Pelagius his doctrine, to take notice of this error, and correct it, he well saw was like enough to blast all the show he makes of the Ancients, especially considering how that Pelagian faction was not by Austin only, but by the Catholic Church of those days beaten down. And it is well known how the writings of Austin were countenanced, and how many Counsels of those days, made decrees against the Pelagian Heresy. And for both these passages, it seems he was beholding to Vossius in his Pelagian History, Lib. 6. Thes. 8. which is this, Graeci Patres semper, Patrum verò Latinorum illi qui ante Augustinum vixerunt, dicere solent, eos esse praedestinatos ad vitam, quos Deus p●e recteque victuros praevidit, sive ut alii loquuntur quos praevidit credituros, & perseveraturos, etc. Quod ita interpretatur ut praedestinatio ad gloriam facta dicitur, secundum praescientiam fidei & perseverantiae. And next unto some passages alleged out of Origen he brings in these two passages of Beza and Calvin. Now it liked not this Author to take his course to begin with Clemens Alexandrinus, and his Scholar Origen, as Vossius doth: For albeit Origen was a man for his learning of great authority in the Church of God, in such sort that it was wont to be said, that Origenis ingenium Ecclesiae Sacramentum, and no marvel if many followed him, and 'tis usual even with Hierome in his Commentaries to follow him. Yet after his death, his Writings were found at length to have a very ill savour in the Catholic Church. And amongst other foul opinions found in him, one nearly concerning this very particular we have in hand, was that which Vossius there delivers in this manner, Veterum multorum opinio est, putâsse eum animas corporibus vel praedestinatorum, vel reproborum uniri pro iis quae bene vel male egissent ante conditum corporeum hunc mundum. Judge I pray whether here be not a sweet nosegay for the Devil, as touching the foresight of works, not to come, but of works past before they were borne, and thereupon their souls united either to bodies predestinated unto life, or reprobated unto death. Yet Vossius would not have us think either Origen deceived by Clement (which no man ever said that I know, neither doth Vossius pretend any such thing) or that chrysostom was deceived by them, or those that followed, by him, all this seems to be delivered only to cross Beza, who professed the Greek and Latin Fathers were deceived by Origen. Yet it is well known of what estimation Origen was in the Church, none of the others like him, but what is his reason? because forsooth Ireneus lib. 4. cap. 76. professeth that God did destinate heaven to them that should believe; and to them which should not believe, hell. But could he be ignorant that Fulgentius professeth the self same, lib. 1. ad Monimum; namely, Deum praedestinasse ad regnum quos ad se praescivit misericordiae praevenientis auxilio redituros, & in se misericordiae subsequentis auxilio esse mansuros. Yet this very Author in his Preface professeth that Fulgentius amongst others, albeit they maintained that God did destinate no others to salvation, than such as whom he foresaw by the pure gift of his grace, would have the beginnings of faith, and a good will, and persevere in good, yet notwithstanding they withal maintained, that this prescience divine of their faith and perseverance, did flow from God's absolute decree to save them. Nay Austin himself in Joan. Tract. 42. (as Hunnius and others allege him, and I find it true) hath these words of those of whom our Saviour saith, Therefore you hear not, because ye are not of God; Praecogniti erant quòd non fuerant credituri eâ fide quâ solâ possint a peccatorum obligatione liberari; and afterwards saith, secundum hanc praedestinationem locutus est Dominus. But will it herehence follow that Austin did deny absolute predestination? Vossius himself acknowledgeth the contrary of him, as Praef. in Hist. Pelag. well as of Fulgentius, namely, that God's foreknowledge of perseverance in good, proceeded from God's absolute decree of saving them. And let every sober reader judge whether upon the same grounds it doth not follow, that God's foreknowledge of man's perseverance in infidelity, doth not likewise follow from God's absolute decree of reprobating him. For what is the ground of the former, but this, that God had absolutely decreed to give faith unto some? Now doth it not herehence follow, that God absolutely decreed to deny faith unto others? For as Ambrose saith, and as Austin allegeth out of him, si voluisset ex indevotis fecisset devotos. Yet am not I of Vossius his opinion in this. I say rather, God's foreknowledge of one man's faith, proceeds from his decree not of saving him, but of giving him faith; and God's foreknowledge of another man's final perseverance in infidelity, proceeds from God's decree, not of damning him, but of denying him grace to cure his infidelity. And as for the decree of salvation, I deny it to be in any moment of nature, before the decree of giving grace; in like sort, I deny the decree of damnation to be in any moment of nature before the decree of permitting man's infidelity to continue uncured unto the end. And the critical question in this point consists in this, Whether the granting of grace, or denial of grace, be not merely of the pleasure of God, and not according to any different dispositions in man; by grace understanding grace effectual to the working of faith and true repentance. And unless the Ancients be showed to have maintained, either that faith, and repentance, are not the gifts of God; or, that if they be the gifts of God, that God dispenseth his effectual grace for the working of them, not according to the mere pleasure of God, but according to the different dispositions of men; all that they talk of the Ancients in this point, is merely vain and to no purpose. But I come to Prosper, whose relation, I doubt not, this Author takes to be of greatest moment. Now to this I answer. 1. To say that, Penè omnium par invenitur & una sententia, qua propositum & praedestinationem Dei secundum praescientiam receperunt, doth not prove that there is no footing amongst the Ancients for absolute predestination. Neither doth Vossius allege half so many Fathers for this opinion, as were those Bishops who joined with Cyprian in decreeing the Rebaptisation of Heretics. 2. This seems to be related by Prosper, not so much out of his own opinion, as by way of an objection proposed by the Massilienses, desiring Austin to show how it is to be answered. Illud etiam (saith he) qualiter dilucitur quaesumus demonstres quod retractatis Priorum hac de re opinionibus, penè omnium invenitur par & una sententia, etc. And this is farther evidenced by these words of Prosper. Obstinationem suam vetustate defendunt ut ea quae de Epistolâ Pauli Romanis scribentis, ad manifestationem divinae gratiae praevenientis Electorum merita proferuntur, a nullo unquam Ecclesiasticorum ita esse intellecta ut nunc sentiuntur, affirment. 3. Observe, When Prosper urged them to expound those passages in St Paul, after what meaning they thought best, they forthwith professed ingeniously that they found nothing in the Fathers that gave them content: their words related by Prosper are these, Nihil se invenisse quod placeret. 4. Bellarmine, De Grat. & liber. Arbit. lib. 2. cap. 14. takes notice of this objection drawn out of Prosper and answereth it, according unto Austin in this manner, Augustinus ipse in libr. de Bono Persev. cap. 20. dicit Veteres Patres, qui ante Pelagium floruerunt, quaestionem istam nunquam acuratè tractasse sed incidenter solùm & quasi per transitum illam attigisse. Addit verò in fundamento hujus sententiae quod est, Gratiam Dei non praeveniri ab ullo opere nostro; sed contrà, ab illo omnia opera nostra praeveniri, ita ut nihil omninò boni quod attinet ad salutem, sit in nobis quod non sit nobis ex Deo, convenire Catholicos omnes; & ibidem citat Cyprianum, Ambrosium, Nazianzenum. So that it appears hereby, that Austin did not acknowledge the former Writers to have embraced this opinion, though the Massilienses pretended so much. And herewithal he openeth unto us, a way how to conceive aright of their opinion in predestination; namely, that as many as acknowledge God's grace preventing us in every good work, they all are to be accounted to agree with him in the doctrine of predestination. For it is apparent, that in the contrary doctrine Pelagius grounded his opinion concerning predestination. And Austin himself sometime thought that God, quem sibi crediturum esse praescivit, ipsum elegit, cui spiritum sanctum daret, ut bona operando vitam aeternam consequeretur: and why so? because forsooth he at that time conceived it to be man's work to believe, which saith he, I had never said, had I known faith itself to have been amongst the gifts of the holy Ghost. Retract. lib. 1. cap. 25. and therefore De Praedesti. Sanct. cap. 1. in his answer to the Letter of Hilarius, mark what course Austin takes for the justifying of his own doctrine concerning predestination. Prius fidem quâ Christiani sumus donum Dei esse debemus ostendere. And Bellarmine in the place above cited professeth, that Austin did herehence rightly collect out of the Fathers, Gratuitae praedestinationis sententiam & fidem in Ecclesiâ Catholicâ semper fuisse. Neque olim (saith he) defendi potest praedestinatio ex operibus praevisis, nisi aliquid boni ponatur in homine justo, quo discernatur ab impio quod non sit illi à Deo; quod sanè (saith he) Patres omnes cum summâ consensione rejiciunt. In like sort, Junius in his answer to Baro for the justifying of gratuitous predestination, counts it sufficient to prove, Fidem esse donum praedestinantis & miserentis Dei ex praedestinatione ipsius. And adds saying, Hoc omnes Patres uno consensu ex Christo & Paulo agnoverunt. Ipse Justinus Martyr Apolog. 2. & alii. Gravissimè verò Clemens Alexandrinus (in hac alioqui palestrâ non ita exercitatus) ut sequentia saecula. Stromat. lib. 2. Basilidis & Valentimi dogma esse dicit, quod fides à naturâ sit. In my poor judgement, the Fathers, as many as stated predestination according to the prescience of men's works, had no other meaning but this, that God did predestinate no man to eternal life, but such as coming to ripe years should believe in Christ and repent; no man unto eternal death, but such as should finally persevere in infidelity and impenitency; so making works foreseen the cause of salvation, but not of God's decree. And Aquinas was bold to profess that, Nemo fuit ita insanae mentis qui diceret merita esse causam praedestinationis divinae quoad actum praedestinantis. And 'tis a good rule that Gerson gives, that holy men's Writings are not to be urged precisely according to the letter, De Vitâ Spirituali animae Sect. 1. co. 11. Notet his quód Doctores etiam sancti sunt magis reverenter glossandi in multis, quam ampliandi: quoniam non omnes semper adverterunt, aut advertere cogitaverunt ad proprietatem locutionis. Improprietas autem non ampliari debet, sed ad proprietatem reduci, alioquin quid mirum si augetur deceptio. 5. We know what answer Austin himself makes unto this, De Praedestin. Sanct. cap. 14. Quid igitur opus est ut eorum scrutemur opuscula, qui priusquam ista Haeresis oriretur, non habuerunt necessitatem in hac difficili ad solvendum quaestione versari, quod proculdubio facerent si respondere talibus cogerentur. 6. As before I showed, Fulgentius himself maintains predestination to be secundum praescientiam; yet Vossius acknowledgeth him as well as Austin, to have maintained the absoluteness of predestination. 7. Lastly, this passage concerneth predestination alone, as it signifies the divine decree of conferring glory; but who ever was known to maintain the divine decree of conferring grace to have been secundum praescientiam, according to foresight of any work in man? For this is plainly to maintain, that grace is given according unto works, which in the Ancients phrase is all one, as to acknowledge, that grace is given according unto merits, which is direct Pelagianism, and condemned 1200 years ago in the Synod of Palestine. As for that of Minutius Foelix, We deny that God doth, sortem in hominibus punire, non voluntatem. We do not say, Genitura plectitur; we say that in every one who is punished by God, ingenii natura punitur; We confess that Fatum illud est quod de unoquoque Deus fatus est; and that pro meritis & singulorum qualitatibus, etiam fata determinat. Yet the holy Ghost professeth in the mouths of all his Apostles, that both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, together with the Gentiles, and People of Israel, were gathered together against the holy son of God, to do that which Gods hand, and God's council predetermined to be done; and yet this predetermination divine, I should think, was nothing prejudicial to the liberty of their wills. As for Hierome, this Author saith that he was an eager opposer of the Pelagians, but no where doth it appear, that the point of predestination comes in question between them. These very passages out of Hierome are proposed by Grotius in his Pietas Ordinum Hollandiae, and answered by Gratianus Civilis punctually, and long before by Bellarmine Lib. 2. de Grat. & lib. arb. cap. 14. I answer, what is this any other, but that which the Fathers many of them have professed in saying, that predestination is secundum praescientiam; And doth not Fulgentius affirm the same? Yet is he acknowledged by Vossius, a maintainer of the absoluteness of predestination as well as Austin. Did Hierome deny faith to be the gift of God? or granting it to be the gift of God, did he maintain, that God gave it according unto works? If not, but according to the mere pleasure of his will, having mercy on some, while he hardened others; the case is clear, that he maintained absolute election unto faith. As for God's decree of salvation and damnation, we willingly profess, that God decreed to save no man but upon his final perseverance in faith and piety; to damn none, but such as finally persevere in infidelity and impenitency. Now compare we these decrees together, the decree of giving faith, and the decree of saving; which of these are most likely to be the foremost; it is apparent that salvation is more likely to be the end in respect of faith, and faith the means in respect of salvation, than the contrary. And the general and most received rule of Schools is, that the intention of the end is before the intention of the means. I think the glory of God in the way of mercy, mixed with justice is the end of both; and that the decrees of giving faith and salvation are simultaneous, as decrees of means tending to the same end, and so neither before the other. But Hierome saith, that, ex Praescientia futurorum nascitur dilectio vel odium. I confess he doth in a disjunctive manner thus, vel ex praescientia vel ex operibus. And we know that passions such as Love and Hatred, are commonly said to be attributed to God, not quoad affectum but quoad effectum, and so they may fairly stand for salvation and damnation, which proceed ex operibus in Hieroms phrase. But admit he means hereby, decretum salvandi which rising expraescientia fidei, must presuppose the decree of giving faith to precede. I answer then, there is to be acknowledged an impropriety of speech, and here is place for Gersons rule, Sancti non semper adverterunt ad proprietatem locutionis. And the rather because Hierome we never find exercised in this Controversy. And it is against common reason, that faith should be intended before salvation. And lastly, this were to impute unto him to acknowledge 2 motive cause of Predestination quoad actum praedestinantis: which Aquinas professeth against, as a thing impossible; namely, that there should be a cause of Gods will quoad actum volentis; Nay he is bold to say that, No man was so mad to say that merits are the cause of Predestination quoad actum praedestinantis. The last part of this Author's performance in the point of Antiquity is the Council of Arles, subscribing as he saith, the letter which was written by Faustus against Lucidus the Predestinarian (for so he styles him) and in his Epistle he insists upon two anathemas, the one this, Anathema illi qui dixerit illum qui periit non accepisse ut salvus esse possit. The other this, Anathema illi qui dixerit quod vas contumcliae non possit affurgere, ut sit vas in honorem. First, I will answer as touching the anathemas themselves, then as touching the credit and authority of this story. 1. As touching the anathemas. The first proceeds as well of him that is baptised and afterwards perisheth, as of him that is a Pagan and never was baptised, and perisheth in his Paganism, as the Anathema itself witnesseth, if it be repeated at full, thus, Anathema illi qui dixerit illum qui periit non accepisse, ut salvus esse possit, id est, vel de baptizato, vel de illius aetatis Pagano, qui credere potuit & noluit. By which latter clause it appears, that accipere ut salvus esse possit, is no other than to receive Possibilitatem credendi (I say Possibilitatem not Potentiam, because I find this is Faustus his usual phrase, as it was the phrase of Pelagius before him) and this is as much as to say, that every man hath power to believe if he will. Now observe I pray, This kind of power is merely nature, not that which we commonly call Grace, whereby we understand something distinct from nature. And Austin acknowledgeth both, De Gen. contr. Manichae. lib. 1. cap. 3, that all men, possunt credere si velint; and that this is no more than is signified by that natural illumination wherewith God enlightens every man, when he comes into the world, john. 1. 9 And, De Praedest. Sanct. cap. 5. Posse habere fidem, sicut posse habere charitatem, naturae est hominum. Fidem verò habere, sicut & charitatem habere gratiae est fidelium. And more than this, the state of the question between Pelagius and the Catholics of those days is so proposed by Austin, as not at all to consist about the possibility of believing or doing any good work, but merely about the willing & doing of it. In so much that Austin professeth, that if Pelagius would acknowledge the will and doing of good to be from God, as he did the possibility hereof to be from God, there should be an end of all controversy between them, and Pelagius should be received as a good Catholic. This appears in his book, De Gratiâ Christi contra Pelagium & Caelestium cap. 6. Pelagius his words were these speaking of God Qui ipsius voluntatis & operis possibilitatem dedit. Hanc autem possibilitatem (saith Austin) in naturâ eum ponere de verbis ejus superioribus clarum est. Sed, ne nihil de gratiâ dixisse videretur, adjunxit, quique ipsam ipsam voluntatem gratiae suae adjuvat semper auxilio. Now this adjutorium possibilitatis, in what sense he delivered it, Austin professeth to be obscure, both as touching the nature of it, and as touching the manner how he conceived the nature of man to be aided thereby; but in other places, saith he, where he speaks more plainly, it appears to consist in giving a law, and affording instruction. Now by the way mark Augustine's observation upon these words of Pelagius, Quique ipsam possibilitatem gratiae suae adjuvat semper auxilio; non ait, saith Austin, ipsam voluntatem vel ipsam operationem, quod si diceret, non abhorrere à doctrinâ Catholicâ videretur. Now, voluntatem adjuvari, in Augustine's meaning, is, Voluntatem praeparari à Domino ut velit; & operationem adjuvari is, voluntatem corroborari ne frustrà velit. The one operation he calls grace prevenient, the other subsequent, according to that, Nolentem praevenit ut velit, volentem subsequitur ne frustrà velit. And cap. 25. of the same Book, Non solum Deus posse nostrum donavit atque adjuvat, sed etiam velle & operari operatur in nobis, whereby it appears that Voluntatem atque operationem nostram adjuvari à Deo, is Deum operari in nobis & velle & operari quod bonum est; which if Pelagius had acknowledged he had been received for a Catholic. So that he excepted not against him for acknowledging Possibilitatem volendi, atque agendi quod bonum est. As touching the second Anathema, I say that Vas contumeliae may be taken in a double sense: either to signify a vessel deserving contumely, deserving wrath; or to signify a Vessel ordained to contumely, and to the suffering of eternal wrath. In the first sense, there is no question but a man may change from being a vessel of contumely, or a vessel of wrath, into the condition of a vessel of honour; but in the second sense, it is as impossible there should be any such change, as it is impossible there should be any change in God, whereof I think there is no question: and both Faustus and Lucidus might take the phrase in the former sense: but if they did take it in this latter sense, dares this Author justify them? 2. Now I come to the credit and authority of this story concerning the Council of Arles; and 1. I say, suppose it be a truth; yet about the year 494. there was a Roman Council wherein Gelasius and 70 Bishops with him justify the writings of Austin, and Prosper, and condemn the writings of Cassian and Faustus, by whose procurement it is here pretended the Bishops of Arles subscribed this Epistle of Faustus unto Lucidus. And the Fathers of this pretended Council of Arles are not reckoned up above sixteen. 2. The credit of this story lieth wholly upon Faustus his relation and his honesty therein, a man infamous in the Church for opposing Austin and his doctrine of grace and predestination, as appears by the Writings of Fulgentius, Petrus Diaconus, Alchimus Avitus and others. Ado Viennensis in Chron. ad ann. 492. writes of him thus. Faustus ex Abbate Monasterii Licinensis apud Regem Galliae Episcopus facius, Pelagianorum dogma destruere conatus (which yet may be made apparent to have been merely in pretence) in errorem unde qui ejus sensus in hac parte Catholicos praedicant, sicut Germadius de Viris illustribus scribens, omninò errand. Ita enim liberum arbitrium tàm Augustinus quam caeteri Catholici in Ecclesia Dei docent ut illuminatio, virtus & salus illi à Christo, per Christum, & in Christo sit. Faustus verò iste ita liberum Christianorum arbitrium docere conatur, ut illuminatio, virtus & salus non à Christo, sed a naturâ sit. Contra hunc scribit beatissimus Avitus Viennensis Episcopus lucidissima fide ejus redarguens errorem; similiter & Joannes vir eruditissimus Antiochenus Presbyter. Isidore in his Book De Viris illustribus, testifies that Fulgentius wrote seven Books against Faustus, Qui mirâ calliditate Catholicus videri volebat cum Pelagianus esset. Auctor quoque Vitae 5 ti Fulgentii testatur à Sancto Fulgentio refutatoes libros duos Fausti de Grat. & Liber. Arbitrio. And Petrus Diaconus in his Book De Incarnatione & Gratiâ Christi cap. ultim. Anathema dicit Libris Fausti, And this Bellarmine, de Script. Eccles. writes to admonish them, who in these Letters contend, that Faustus was a Catholic. Farther observe the Bishops who are pretended to have subscribed Faustus his Epistle to Lucidus are numbered these. Auxianus. Claudius. Euphronius. Eutropius. Faustus. Julianus. Leucadius. Megetius. Patiens. Paulus. Pragmatius. But the Bishops that were assembled at the Council of Arles are These. Agricii nomine Cataphronius. Caelestinus. Caesarius. Constantini nomine Leontius. Contumeliosius. Cyprianus. Eucherius. Florentius. Galliani nomine Melerius. Joannis nomine Desiderius. Julianus. Maximus. Philagrius. Praetextatus. Proitianus. Severi nomine Cataphronius. Thus they are reckoned up on both sides by Vossius, amongst whom there is but one name common. To help this, Vossius deviseth a 4th Council of Arles and that the Bishops mentioned to have subscribed Faustus his Epistle, to be the Bishops assembled in the 4th Council of Arles, and not those whom we read to have been assembled at the Third. But that any such Bishops were assembled at a 4th Council of Arles he brings no evidence, that I find; but his own conjecture is the best ground for this. And all this pains is taken to salve Faustus his reputation in this. And the reason that moves Vossius to conceive that this subscription was not a mere fiction of Faustus, is this; Because forsooth if this had been a mere fiction of Faustus, surely Maxentius in opposing him, would not have failed to have cast this in his teeth. Binius is eager in the defence of these Episcopal subscriptions, but withal confesseth, that either Faustus himself, or some in his name, practised to countenance his Books also by the authority of those Bishops. In fine (saith he) hujus Commentarii & Libelli, ipse Faustus, vel alius quis dolosè addider at haec verba, In quo quidem opusculo post Arelatinsis Concilii subscriptionem, novis erroribus deprehensis adjici aliqua Synodus Lugdunensis exegit, ut scilicet (saith Binnius) aliquo fuco venditari posset quasi scriptum de gratiâ & libero arbitrio Commentarium duae Synodi recepissent & approbassent. Now if such were the dishonest art of Faustus in counterfeiting this, why might he not be as dishonest in counterfeiting the former Episcopal subscriptions also? And if Vossius his reason to salve Faustus his credit, were of force in this, why should it not be in force in the other also? For Maxentius we do not find to have excepted against his fidelity, more in the one then in the other? And why might not Maxentius be ignorant of them both? And in Biblioth. Sanct. Patrum. there is an admonition added to Faustus his Epistle to Loentius, ex Indice Expurgat. M. Script. Pelatii, wherein though Faustus his epistle to Lucidus, is acknowledged to have been approved by the Episcopal subscriptions in the Council of Arles, yet as touching Faustus his mendicating authority from those Fathers to his books, De Grat. & Lib. Arbit. The Author thereof spares not in plain terms to give Faustus the lie in these words. Neutiquam tamen ullus ob id existimet ab utroque Concilio approbatos tres libros Fausti de Gratiâ, ut ipse mendaciter innuere videtur in ea quae his subjicitur, praefatoriâ Epistolâ ad Episcopum Leontinum etc. But can Vossius show that Maxentius did cast this juggling course of Faustus in his teeth? But it seems that Vossius had no great need to trouble himself in the vindicating of Faustus his reputation in pretending the subscription of Bishops to his Epistle written to Lucidus. For how doth it appear that Faustus is the author of any such pretence? It is true, in the Epistle itself that he wrote to Lucidus, he professeth that he kept a copy of it, to show to that assembly of Bishops, Hujus Epistolae exemplar mecum retineo in conventu Sanctorum Antistitum, si ita necesse fuerit, proferendum: by the way observe that this resolution of his, was not absolute, but si ita necesse fuerit, and this necessity he signifies wherein it did consist, namely in case Lucidus by his silence, did give testimony of his continuance in his error, as he calls it, His words are these, Quod si eam subscriptam transmittere nolueris, aperte adhuc te in errore persistere ipso silentio comprobabis, ac perinde iam necessitatem mihi facies ad personam tuam publicis conventibus exponendam. Now as for that which follows after the end of the Epistle, Et subscripserunt Episcopi, qui ordine subsequuntur qui in eâ quoque Synodo adfuerunt. Auxanius in Christi nomine Episcopus, Relegi & subscripsi Faustus exemplar Epistolae meae Relegi & subscrip. Paulus Episcopus in Christi nomine, Rel. & subscrip. Eutropius etc. Observe the admonition subjoined by Henricus Canisius. These subscriptions, saith he, are not in the Manuscript. Hae subscriptiones non sunt in Manuscripto Codice. Consider I pray the fair issue of this Authors learned pretence of Antiquity, he honoureth the grey hairs of Faustus, and those grave assemblies mentioned by him whereof we have no certainty; but how honoureth he the grayer hairs of Austin, & of all the Assemblies against the Pelagians, that you may guess, though he concealeth it. And herein his devotion to this kind of Antiquity, where he thinketh it will serve his turn, he is content you should conceive it doth exceed the devotion of Calvin and Beza, yea and of Austin also; whose answer to Prosper he is content to pass by as not savouring so much of piety in his judgement, but the Massilienses zeal of the Ancients represented by Prosper unto Austin, that is suitable to his humour, he relisheth that well, and so well that he thinks it fit vehemently to mistrust those doctrines which they never approved, but disliked and condemned. Yet of any condemnation other then what is implied by Faustus, a man infamous, and whose Writings were condemned by 70 Bishops, he makes no mention. And before Augustine's days, and the days of Pelagius, the Ancients were not exercised with any controversy hereabouts. And was their non-approbation of his doctrine, concerning absolute predestination, any motive to Austin vehemently to mistrust the truth thereof? I think he will not say it was; and therefore I hope he will give Calvin and Beza leave, never a whit the more for that cause, to mistrust the same doctrine, in granting the Ancients to have conceived predestination to proceed secundum praescientiam according unto foreknowledge, he is content to conform himself to their judgement; but in mistrusting the contrary doctrine, hereupon you must give him leave to follow his own, or any, rather than not calvin's or Beza's, but even Augustine's also, though never so much magnified by the Church of God, and his writings countenanced especially against the Pelagians, and the contrary condemned, by other manner of Counsels than Arelatense 3d, and Lugdunense. I remember when Epicurus was demanded why, seeing he followed Leucippus so much, he did not follow him throughout, made this answer saying, I do as a man that is a thirst when he takes the cup to drink, for he drinks what will serve his turn, and sets the rest by: so you must give this Author leave to represent his devotion to grey hairs, so far as they serve his turn, and no farther. Yet I have showed how Austin maintains, as touching the Ancients that went before him, that they concurred with him in fundomento praedestinationis, which he accounted the the doctrine of Free grace, and citys to this purpose Cyprian, Ambrose, and Nazianzen, and by the common prayers of the Church, that God would convert the unbelievers unto the faith of Christ; that the same doctrine, which was in his judgement the foundation of predestination, as he maintained it according to the Word of God, was generally received in the Church of God. Before I part from this, I think fit to add something concerning the stile here given to Lucidus, before the revocation of his pretended error; for here I find him styled the Predestinarian. Now I presume this Author, that pretends so great reverence to grey hairs, and so much prefers Antiquity before Novelty, hath good ground for this his denomination of him, and that out of Antiquity. Now I desire he would be pleased to communicate unto us, his learned reading in Antiquity for this; and the rather, because in the whole story of the business between Faustus and Lucidus, I find no mention of any such attribute given to his person, or to the doctrine (reputed by Faustus erroneous) maintained by him. The term Praedestinatus qualirying a person, I find first in Arnobius junior, and from that time I find not the Praedestinati, or Praedestinatians mentioned till the days of Hinemarus, about the year of our Lord God 850. And as for the story of the Predestinarian Heresy, which this Author licks his lips at, the original whereof is referred to the year 415 by Sigibertus; it is very strange, that in Augustine's days it was not known unto him, or being known, not taken notice of by him, nor by Prosper neither after him. And Alphonsus à Castro in his Book contra Haereses, professeth that the Author of this Heresy he found not, neither in Sigibert, nor in any other; because indeed not one of those who wrote of Heresics makes mention of this Heresy, besides Bernard of Lutzenburg in his Catalogue of Heretics; and he saith no more of it, than what Sigibert mentioneth in his Chronicle. And withal he adds, that after this error was buried, by the space of almost a thousand years, it was revived by John hus the Bohemian. Whereby it appears, that Alphonsus was not of this Author's opinion in censuring this Lucidus for a Predestinarian. And the first that I find to intimate so much is Hincmarus about the year 850. In like sort Prateölus acknowledgeth that, Quis corum Dux & institutor fuerit, nescitur. But Gerardus Vossius hath herein helped us with this conjecture, referring the original of this Heresy to the Monks of Adrumetum; and Bishop Usher in his Historiá Godescalci saith, Vossius was the first that charged those Adrumetine Monks to be the author thereof. Yet if I be not deceived, he might be beholding to Coccius for helping him to this conceit. But this makes the matter more strange another way, namely that Austin should not take notice of this Predestinarian Heresy, seeing none was so well acquainted with the opinion of those his neighbour Monks, as he, being the man, whom they consulted about the difference that rose thereabouts, and wrote two Books thereupon and composed all. And yet I see no reason why Vossius should refer it to the Adrumetine Monks hand over head, when as it is clear by the relation of them, that came over to Austin to complain thereof, and to confer with him thereupon; that they were but few, who were carried away with that error, whereof they complained, and that it was but one, that troubled the place of their Monastery herein, who was as it were the Ringleader to the rest; of which Vossius could not be ignorant. And therefore I see no cause why he should charge them all indifferently, or that party either, who were tainted herewith, as is pretended; seeing there was an Antesignanus who led the rest, of whom Vossius speaks nothing at all; and I suppose he knew some good cause why. Besides, the Predestinarian Heresy is pretended to have risen Ab Augustini libris malè intellectis. Now I find no colour of evidence hitherto, that these Monks of Adrumentum, whom Vossius makes the founders of this Heresy, were led awry by the misunderstanding of Augustine's writings. Neither doth Vossius any where, that I know, take any pains to clear this. And I would gladly be beholding to this Author, that pretends so much zeal unto, and skill in the knowledge of Antiquity, and so boldly styleth Lucidus a Predestinarian, for communicating unto us his rare evidences concerning this point, out of his great observations. And so much the rather, to take me off from mine error, who since the first time that I traveled in the search after this Predestinarian Heresy in dealing with Corvinus, which is now some three years ago. I have been apt to conceive that this Heresy from the first, was but a mere fiction of the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, cunningly to disgrace thereby the doctrine of St Austin. And since the coming forth of Dr Ushers History in the cause of Godescalcus, I have been confirmed herein; as wherein he gives to understand, that whereas Tyro Prosper wrote hereof before Sigibert, although the Printer hath made him to speak as Sigibert doth, namely, that Haec Haeresis orta est ab Augustini libris malè intellectis: yet that is not the language of Tyro himself, but plainly this, Haec Haeresis ab Augustino orta est, and that learned Bishop hath showed out of two Manuscripts of Tyro, the one in Bennet College in Cambridge, the other in our King's Library: and this he farther confirms by comparing the description which Gennadius makes of that, which he calls the Predestinatian Heresy, with the doctrine of Augustin. lib. 5. cont. Julian. Pelag. cap. 4. & de Bono Persev. cap. 15. And withal the same learned Bishop makes it appear, that look what doctrine Sigebertus ascribes to the Predestinatians, the same doctrine was charged upon Austin, and such as concurred with him therein. This I say that learned Bishop proves out of the beginning of the 6 Book Hypemnesticon. Credere nos vel praedicare sugillatis quod Deus quosdam hominum sic praedestinet ad vitam regni caelorum, ut si nolint or are, aut jejunare, aut in omni opere divino vigiles esse, eos omninò perire non posse, nec prorsus sui debere esse sollicitos quos Deus quia voluit semel jam elegendo praedestinavit ad vitam: quosdam verò sic praedestinavit in Gehennae paenam ut etiam si credere velint, si jejuniis & or ationibus, omnique se voluntati divinae subjicerent, in his Deum non delectari & vitam illis aeternam in totum dari non posse, etc. Now this in effect is the very Heresy of the Predestinatians related by Sigebert. Therefore I much desire this Author would take the pains to prove, that this pretended Predestinarian Heresy was indeed received to be an Heresy by the Catholic Church, and not rather a fiction of the remnants of the Pelagians, wherewithal to reproach the doctrine of S. Austin in the point of Predestination. Thus have I examined this Author's pretence of the Novelty of our Tenent. I come to the consideration of that which follows. DISCOURSE. The Second Motive. IT's unwillingness to abide the Trial. I find that the Authors and Abettors of it, have been 2dò. very backward to bring it to the Standard, not only when they have been called upon by their Adversaries to have been weighed, but also when they have been entreated thereto by their chief Magistrates who might have commanded them. A shrewd argument (me thinks) that it is too light. In the Disputation at Mompelgard Anno 1586 held between Beza and Jacobus Andreas with some Seconds on both sides, Beza and his company having disputed with the Lutherans about the person of Christ, the Lords Supper etc. When they came to this Point, did decline the sifting of it, and Beza in Col. Mompelg. pag. 375. Vide etiam Osiander. Brand. Collog. Hagh. pag. 57 gave this reason among others, that it could not then possibly be disputed of, sine gravi eorum offendiculo, qui tanti mysterii capaces non sunt, without the great scandal and hurt of the ignorant, and unacquainted with these high mysteries. The Contra-Remonstrants also in their Conference with their Adversaries at the Hague in the year 1611 could not be drawn to dispute with them about this point, but delivered a Petition to the States of Holland and Westfrizland that they might not be urged to it, resolving rather to break off the Conference, then to meddle with it. In the Synod likewise of Dort, in the year 1618., and 1619. the Remonstrants were warned by the Precedent of the Synod ut de Electione potius quam de odiosâ Reprobations materiâ agerent, that they Act. Syn. p. 1. pag. 133. should rather dispute of the point of Election, than the odious point of Reprobation. Can this Doctrine be a truth, and yet blush at the light, which makes all thing manifest? especially considering these things. 1. That Reprobation is a principal Head of Practical divinity by the ill, or well stating of which, the glory of God, and good of Religion is much promoted, or hindered. 2. That there is such a necessary connexion between the points of Election and Reprobation (both being parts of predestination) that the one cannot well be handled without the other. 3. That Reprobation was the chief cause of all the uproars in the Church at that time. 4. That it was accused with open mouth, and challenged of falsehood, and therefore bound in justice to purge itself of the crimination. 5. That it may easily be defended, if (as some say) it be such an apparent truth, for Nihil est ad defendendum puritate tutius, nihil ad dicendum veritate facilius, saith S. Hierom. The striving to lie close and hide itself, though perhaps it be not so infallible, yet it is a very probable argument of a bad cause. Truth covets no corners, but is willing to abide the trial, whether in men or in doctrines. David knowing his heart to be without guile, offers himself ready to the Psalm. 139. 23, 24, joh. 3. 20, 21. Lords trial, Search me, o God, and know my heart, try me and know my thoughts, and see if there be any wicked way in me. And our Saviour tells us that, Every one that doth evil, hates the light and comes not to the light, lest his deeds should be reproved; but he that doth truth, comes to the light, that his deeds may be made manifest, that they are wrought in God. As S. Paul saith of an Heretic, he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self condemned, and so may we say of Heresy and untruth, it condemns itself, and by nothing more than by refusing the Touchstone. He is to be thought an empty Scholar, who is loath to be opposed, and his gold to be light and counterfeit, that will not have it touched and weighed, and these Opinions to be but errors, which would so willingly walk in a mist, and dwell in silence, when it concerns the peace of the Church so much to have them examined. TWISSE Consideration. Who are these Authors of this Doctrine, who here are said to have been backward to bring it to the standard? Is Beza those Authors? whereof was he the Author? Was it the doctrine of predestination as proceeding of the mere pleasure of God, and not upon foresight of man's faith and works? Is it not apparent that this was the doctrine of Austin 1200 years ago, and that in opposition to the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians? Or was it the doctrine of reprobation, as not proceeding upon the foresight of sin, but of the mere pleasure of God? Is this Author so ignorant, as not to know what are the conclusions of Alvarez in the question, Whether there be any cause of reprobation on man's part. Lib. 10. de Auxil. disc. 110. pag. 866. 1. His first Conclusion is this, Reprobation whereby God decreed not to give unto some everlasting life, and to permit their sin, is not conditionate, but absolute: neither doth it presuppose in God, foresight of the deserts of reprobates, or of their perseverance in sin unto the last period of their life. 2. His next Conclusion is, In the Angels that fell, there is no cause of their reprobation on their part, as touching the whole effect thereof, but before any foresight of their future sin, God, pro sua Voluntate, of his mere will, did reprobate some of them, and suffered them to fall into sin. 3. The third, Infants departing in Original sin alone, there is no cause on their part of reprobation, if they be considered in comparison with others which are not reprobated, and the like is to be said proportionably of men of ripe years. 4. The fourth, Not only comparatively, but absolutely there is no cause of reprobation. Therefore neither sin actual, nor original, nor both of them foreseen by God, was indeed the meritorious and motive cause of the reprobation of any, as touching all the effects thereof, and the proof hereof he prosecutes at large. 5. Reprobation as touching the last effect thereof, presupposeth in signo rationis the foresight of sin original, or actual, for which a reprobate is damned. Mark it well, He does not say as the cause for which God decrees his damnation, but as the cause for which a reprobate is damned. And Aquinas (whose followers the Dominicans are) expresseth this doctrine in this manner, and that more Scholastically and accurately then Alvarez. Praescientia peccatorum potest esse aliqua ratio reprobationis ex parte paenae quae praeparatur reprobatis, in quantum scilicet Deus proponit se puniturum malos propter peccata, etc. in Ad Rom. 9 Sect. 2. in fine, that is, Prescience of sins may be some reason of reprobation on the part of punishment, to wit, in as much as God purposeth to punish wicked men for their sins. Where sin is evidently made the cause of damnation, and that by virtue of God's purpose, but by no means the cause of the decree itself. And the same Aquinas elsewhere professeth that, No man was so mad as to affirm that merits are the cause of Predestination, as touching the act of God Predestinating: and that it cannot be the cause thereof, he proves, because nothing can be the cause of God's will, as touching the act of God willing, but as touching the things willed by God, as formerly he had proved. The same doctrine in effect is taught by Durand in 1. dist. 41. q. 2. Bonaventure applies the same distinction to reprobation itself. Odium aeternum, saith he, implies two things, Principale significatum & connotatum etc. & primum non est ex meritis, sed secundum. This he explicates in the words following, Quod patet si resolvatur, quia Odium est propositum puniendi: Propositum autem nullus meretur sed paenam, that is, Hatred (or reprobation) is God's purpose to punish: Of this divine purpose there is no meritorious cause, but only of the punishment. The same was the Opinion of Gandavensis, Scotus, Halensis, as I have showed in my Vindiciae. Now judge I pray with how little judgement, or modesty this Author intimates Beza to be the author of the doctrine of absolute reprobation. Perhaps he will say his meaning is, that he was the author of the Upper-way, as touching the making of the object of Predestination mankind not yet created. But to this I answer, that Beza doth so indeed, but he was never called to a conference hereabouts, and consequently he never declined it. And that which was declined, he makes to be declined by the abettors, as well as the authors; which cannot be understood of this nice and Logical point, as touching the object of reprobation. The main question is, whether there be any cause of reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating: the Negative whereof, was maintained very generally amongst Schoole-Divines before Beza was borne. And was it ever known, that those I have named did shrink in their heads or decline the trial thereof? What a silly thing is it then to infer, that because Beza at such a time, did decline the disputation hereof, and the Contra-Remonstrants at another time, therefore it is suspectable to be an untruth? Yet let us examine his instances. Beza he saith did decline the sifting of this doctrine (to wit, of predestination) (for on that they were moved to dispute.) I doubt this Author speaks by rote, and that he is nothing at all acquainted with the story hereof, either in Osiander or in Beza, but transcribes only what another hath prompted unto him. For it is apparent by Osianders' History, that they did confer thereof. It is true he stood off at the first, and gave reasons for it, but at length he and his fellows, condescended to the instance and importunity of their Adversaries, and so came on to the Conference hereabout, His words are these. Praefat. in 2. part. Respons. ad Acta Colloq. Mompelg. Quamvis quò evasura essent reliqua satis prospiceremus, mane nihilominus mutata sententia Illustriss. Principe salutato, in reliquam sequentem Collationem consensimus; eâ tantùm conditione additâ, ne propter proximum Paschae Festum, ea disceptatio longius protraheretur. Et ita demùm ad audiendas D. Andreae declamationes rursum processimus. Was it this point alone the sifting whereof, as this Author phraseth it, Beza declined? It is apparent they were no less than three Points. This appears by the second part of Beza's answer Ad act. Colloq. Mompelg. as also by the answer of Jacobus Andreae, as if he were the mouth of the Prince, namely, that if they list not De Tribus illis confer, yet he thought it fit that Theses written by them on those three Articles should be rehearsed in the hearing of all, which afterwards Beza and his fellows might take home with them to address an answer to them afterwards, as they thought good. And these three Articles were concerning, Predestination, Baptism, and the putting down of Images in Churches. Concerning all which Jacobus Andreae gives his reasons, why he thought it fit they should entertain farther Conference; Whereunto Beza makes answer in his preface to that second part of his Answer Ad Act. Colloq. Mompelg. It is true, this reason Beza gave why he thought it not fit in that place publicly to dispute thereof, to wit, of predestination, Quod haec gravissima quaestio publicè in illo caetu allatis utrinque contrariis sententiis disceptari absque nonnullorum offendiculo non posse videretur. For both the mysterious nature of it is such, as few are capable of it; the Massilienses professed as much, as appears in Prospers Epistle unto Austin, De his taceri exigunt (saith Prosper) quorum altitudinem nullus attigerit. And to the same purpose, even they who durst not dislike Augustine's doctrine thereof professed as much, as appears by the Letter of Hilarius unto Austin. Consentientibus etiam his qui hanc definitionem improbare non audent, ut dicant, Quid opus fuit hujusmodi disputationis incerto tot minus intelligentium corda turbari? Then again it was in a Lutheran Assembly, and amongst many brought up in the hatred of the doctrine which Beza maintained, who in all likelihood would be the more exasperated. Causas verum tacendi Aug. de Den. Persev. c. 16. tongum est omnes quaerere (saith Austin) quarum tamen est & haec una ne priores faciamus eos qui non intelligunt. No wise man, saith our Saviour, putteth new wine into old bottells. Quanto minus sapit, saith Beza in that Preface of his, qui de praest antissimo vino prius in utres faecibus adhuc, & vappa obsitos immittendo quam de repurgandis illis & apparandis cogitet. Lastly, Beza perceiveth the practice of Jacobus Andreas standing upon a place of advantage, to urge them to confer upon such a point, the truth whereof is most harsh to carnal affections, that so he might have the better opportunity to make them odious. And truly what Jacobus Andrea's was, I know not, but Beza sets him forth as a man of a most malevolent disposition to the French Protestants: and our Saviour hath admonished us, Not to give that which is holy unto dogs, or to cast pearl before swine. Yet Andreas to serve his turn, and to draw them into a snare, pleads that the doctrine of Predestination, is not so to be put over in the Schools, ut non opus sit eam rudi & imperito populo ponere; yet Hunnius a man of the same profession, is so far different from jacobus Andreas, that he thinks it not fit to preach before the rude people of prescience divine, but very sparingly; how much less would he think it fit to Preach before them of Predestination divine? De Praedest. quest. & respons. pag. 394. his words are these, Interim hoc repeto quod supra monui rudioribus (quibus Apostolus vult lac propinari, non cibum solidum apponi) non esse multum de praescientiâ Dei disputandum, hâc solummodo de causa quia haud perinde capiunt ea quae alias in Scholis in Disputationibus contra adversarios, &, ut Paulus ait, inter perfectos utiliter & ex fundamentis eloquiorum Dei astrui solent. Coram rudioribus ergo simplicior loquendi ratio & ipsorum captui accommodatior est si dicamus, Deum ad haereditatem regni caelestis elegisse & certo salvare decrevisse eos omnes qui resipiunt, & in vera fide filii Dei ex hâc vitâ decedunt. It's well known what order King james took in his time, in the restraint of preaching this doctrine in the Pulpits, by any under the degree of a Dean, and counselled the States likewise to forbid the preaching of those controversal points amongst them. And if it were wisdom in them to take this course, without any prejudice to the truth of the doctrine, why should Beza's withholding from conference hereupon, be any thing prejudicial thereto. But were there not other causes of moment, to move him hereunto, which this Author conceals, and which Beza proposeth in the first place? as namely, that the Prince who invited them hereunto, in his Letters Missive, alleged no other cause of that meeting, but Infaelicem de Coenâ Domini controversiam, that unhappy Controversy about the Supper of the Lord. Secondly, that their Cities sent them over accordingly to this Conference for no other cause, but to confer thereabours. This jacobus Andrea's acknowledgeth, and giveth a reason why in those Letters of the Prince, there was no mention made of those three Articles, whereabout they were afterwards urged to confer, to wit, quod illos in istis quoque dissidere non intellexerat Princeps Illustrissimus. And thirdly, because the Feast of Easter approached, and they desired to be at home in their own Cities by that time. Lastly, doth if follow, that because they declined the sifting the truth of these points (as this Author phraiseth it) after such a manner, to wit, by public disputation; doth it herehence follow, that they declined the sifting of it? They made this offer to propose their opinion herein, and the confirmation of it out of the Word of God, in private before the Prince: and if Jacobus Andreas were pleased to propose any Theses against it, they would take them along with them and upon consideration to address a convenient Answer thereunto; This Beza sets down in that Preface: Let D. Andrews show if he can, saith Beza, hanc Christianae doctrinae partem aut à nostris sive scribendo sive concionando praetermissam, aut a suis rectius & acuratius quam a nostris pertractatam. And truly for my part, I no way like such conferences, being privy to mine own imperfections, as having neither such strength of memory as to command a present use of my knowledge in these points upon all occasions, nor such command of my passions, as to keep them from breaking forth in such sort as might be obnoxious to censures, not knowing how I might be provoked; but certainly I fear not to come to the examination of any of their Writings, or to offer mine own to be examined by any of them. One thing I had almost omitted out of Beza, in his Preface to the First Part of his Answer to these Acts. It was Beza's motion that all things passing between them on both sides, might be set down in writing, under the hands of Collators; and this course I confess I could willingly approve of, and after this manner to confer with any. But this so fair a motion was rejected by Andreas; He would confer rather by word of mouth then by writing. A second motion proposed by Beza was this, that what was spoken on both sides, might be set down in writing by Notaries chosen and apppointed thereunto by common consent. But neither would Andreas admit of this. Petivimus, saith Beza, initio ut utrinque omnia scriptis propria Collocutorum manu subsignatis agerentur. Quod cum D. Andreae non placuisset qui verbis agi malebat (for the Auditory was very propitious to him for the most part) postulavi ut utrinque dicta à probatis & utriusque partis consensu delectis Notariis exciperentur, quae deinde cuique parti recognoscere & addita subscriptione confirmare liceret. Haec enim erat profectò justa & sincera colloquendi ratio ut sic falsationi occurreretur. Quum autem ne hoc quidem admitteret D. Andreas, etc. Now let any indifferent person that is not soured with partial affections, judge whose carriage is to be thought in equity more prejudicial to their cause, the carriage of Andreas, or the carriage of Beza. I come to the Contra-Remonstrants unwillingness to confer upon the point of reprobation. What their reasons were I know not. But this I am sure of, the Scripture is free in speaking of election, and express; not so of reprobation, leaving us to take notice of the condition of reprobation by its opposition to election. And in conformity hereunto, both Austin in his time, and Remigius in his time, and Bradwardine in his time, speaks liberally of predestination, but very sparingly of reprobation. And the doctrine of reprobation as it is nothing less mysterious than that of election; so it is far more harsh to carnal affections. And it is well known that at the time of the Hague Conference, Barnavelt that ruled the roast amongst the States, was too great a friend to the Arminian Party. But, what boldness doth this Author take in passing his suspicious censures upon a doctrine, because some defenders of it, at some time have been loath to come to entertain a public Conference thereupon? For what argument call you this, The Contra-Remonstrants would not be brought to give their reasons on this point; therefore the doctrine of Austin delivered 1200 years (or thereabouts) before, concerning the absoluteness both of Predestination on the one side, and of preterition on the other (as Vossius acknowledgeth) is to be suspended of untruth? And if my readiness to come to the trial hereon doth nothing credit the cause as maintained by others; why should others unwillingness to come to the same trial, be any disparagement to the same cause, as it is maintained by me or any other? It is well known that Peter Moulin, concurring with us in the point of absolute predestination, maintains reprobation to proceed upon the divine foresight of final perseverance in impenitency. If this Author differed from us no more the Mr Moulin doth, and acknowledged the mere pleasure of God, in giving grace to whom he will, and denying it to whom he will, I do not think any friend of his would think any whit the worse of him, or charge him with defection from the truth of God in this. Neither can I think, that he ever was of any other opinion, considering how many worthy Divines opposite to the Arminians, do either conceive, or at least seem to conceive that the purpose of God to damn, doth presuppose in signo rationis the foresight of final impenitency, yet concurring with us in this, that all are fallen in Adam and so brought forth into the world in damnatâ Massà, as Austin calleth it. God of his mere pleasure cures this natural corruption (the fruits whereof are infidelity and impenitency) in some, by regenerating them and bestowing the grace of faith and repentance upon them, and leaves it uncured in others by refusing to regegenerate them, to bestow faith and repentance upon them; We give the hands of Christian fellowship, and brotherly amity one unto another, without all exception notwithstanding some nice differences, which in the issue I hope, will prove to be merely Logical, and nothing Theological. Lastly, however this point of unwillingness in some, to come to confer in the point of reprobation, might cast some colour of suspicion to the prejudicing of their cause; yet lest of all did it become this Author to take advantage hereof, considering that it is his own case, as who declineth not one point only, but all the rest in this his discourse, and cleaves only to that of reprobation, nothing answerably (I presume) to * The Doctor directs his speech unto S. Nathaniel Rich. your expectation, who put this task upon him: and whether it be any thing answerable to the promise he made unto you, yourself are best acquainted therewith. Yet because the Remonstrants hereupon (to wit, upon the Contra-Remonstrants declining this Controversy) have taken liberty to oppose the doctrine of the Contra-Remonstrants in this point, so far forth, as they made construction of their opinion hereupon, by their doctrine concerning election; therefore I will not spare even here, to digress so far, as to take notice what they delivered, and to address an answer hereunto, the rather because I find this discourse of theirs inserted in their Relation of that Conference at Hague. Now, whereas first, by a long deduction upon consideration of the Contra-Remonstrants doctrine in the point of election, they do infer Colloq. Hagh. Bertii p. 120. that like as faith is made by them a fruit of election, so infidelity is by them to be made a fruit of reprobation: this consequence we utterly deny. It only follows herehence, that like as faith, whereby man's natural infidelity is cured, is by them made the fruit of election, so the denial of faith, that is, the not curing of man's infidelity, or the leaving of it uncured is the fruit of reprobation. And indeed considering the means must be his work who intends the end, wherehence it followeth, that look what end God doth intend in man's election, the means tending thereunto must be God's work, as namely, faith; in like sort, whatsoever be the end which God intends in reprobation, the means tending thereunto, must be his work, which cannot be infidelity or sin, but the permission of sin rather and infidelity, or the not curing of that corruption and infidelity which is natural unto us all. Hereupon they proceed to propose two things to be questioned, in congruity to the doctrine of the Contra-Remonstrants. 1. Utrumne Fides in consilio & decreto Dei de electione ad salutem, eam ipsam electionem ordine praecedat an verò consequatur? 2, Ex alterâ parte; An Infidelitas in eodem Consilio & Decreto Dei de reprobatione ad exitium, eam ipsam reprobationem ordine praecedat an sequatur? The latter of these is only pertinent to our present purpose; yet seeing they handle them both, so far as to dispute against the opinion of their opposites in both, and carry themselves herein Magnificentissimè, I am content to weigh their arguments, in the balance of Scholastical consideration, lest some such as this Author, should affect to seem judicious in suspecting my declining of them to savour of some inability to encounter them. Thus therefore they begin. If faith follows election unto salvation, than also the decree of sending Christ as a Saviour into the World, must necessarily follow that election; But this consequent is absurd, and pertains notably to the ignominy of Christ. To this I answer. First out of mine own opinion, Thus. Faith is supposed to follow Election unto salvation, upon no other ground then because the intention of giving faith, is supposed to follow the intention of giving salvation. But this I should deny, and that for this reason, because this subordination is grounded only upon supposition, that salvation is the end which God intends, and faith the means tending unto that end: but this I deny. First, because the end of God's actions, is not the salvation of man, but the manifestation of his own glory. For he made all things for himself, Pou. 16. 4. and reason justifies it. For God being the supreme efficient, must be the supreme end; and being Optimus as well as Maximus, he must needs be both most lovely and most loving, of that which is most lovely, that is, of himself. But because some may conceive that though God's glory be the supreme end, yet man's salvation may be the intermediate end: therefore to this I answer; First, let such show then what is the glory of God, which salvation of the creature setteth forth, and I doubt not, but if that glory be stated right, it will appear, that not salvation alone, but something else is required to be joined with it; as namely, the mission of Christ, yea and faith in Christ, to complete that means, which tend to the procurement of such an end, that is, to the setting forth of such a glory. Secondly, the end whether supreme or intermediate is always such as being rightly understood, doth break such a means; but salvation is not so in respect of faith; for it doth not bespeak it, as is apparent in the salvation of Angels, of Infants; as also in this, that it was absolutely possible for God to save even sinners without Christ, as may be demonstrated and I have demonstrated in my Vind. Grat. Dei. by variety of evident reasons. In a word, if God's supreme end, were the manifestation of his glory on some considered, as merely possible in doing them good in the highest degree, and that in the way of mercy mixed with justice, and that ex Condigno & ex Congruo; it is apparent, that the means required hereunto, and bespoken hereby, is a body consisting of divers particulars, all together completing the integral means required hereunto. For herehence it followeth, that they must be both created, without which no glory of God at all can be manifested upon them and permitted to sin, otherwise God could not do them good in the way of mercy, which supposeth misery, but also that a Saviour must be sent, and he no less than the Son of God, to deserve the pardon of their sin and salvation, otherwise it could not be in the way of mercy mixed with justice de Condigno: and faith and repentance must be bestowed on them, otherwise the good done them, could not be by way of reward: and lastly, salvation, otherwise good could not be done them in the highest degree. And thus in no moment of nature is the Predestination of Christ either before or after the Predestination of man; as our British Divines maintained at the Synod of Dort; but at once God predestinated both him to be our Head and us his Members; like as Aquinas maintained Christ's predestination, and our predestination to be one act in God, and consequently neither could be the cause of another. Thus have I dispatched mine answer unto them, as touching mine own opinion. But supposing the method of the Contra-Remonstrants sound, in making salvation of man, to be intended by God as an end, and both man's faith in Christ, and Christ's Mission to be intended as means. We deny this to be absurd or ignominious unto Christ. Le's hear how they prove it, thus; If the decree of sending Christ be posterior to the electing of singular persons unto salvation, than the intention of man's salvation was posterior to God's intention of satisfaction to his justice, which say they is absurd and foolish, to wit, to decree the salvation of sinners, unless first he decree satisfaction to his justice. But I answer according to the form of the Contra-Remonstrants doctrine: First, by proving their order to be sound: Secondly, by showing the invalidity of the Remonstrants' discourse. First therefore: There was never any other order of intentions acknowledged by the learned, than such as is found between the intention of the end, and the intention of the means tending thereunto. And the Order most received is this; That the intention of the end, is before the intention of the means. Now let every man that is is his right Wits consider, which is more likely to be the end, and which the means of these two, Man's salvation, and Christ's Mission to satisfy for the sin of man. Was ever any man known to be so brainsick as to affirm, that the salvation of man is a means tending to this end, namely, the sending of Christ into the World to satisfy for the sin of man? On the other side, how fair and plausible is it to affirm, that Christ was sent into the world, to satisfy for man's sin, to this end, that man might be saved? whence it followeth evidently by the most approved rules of Schools, that the intention of man's salvation is in signo rationis, before the intention of sending Christ into the world, to make satisfaction for sin. Again, if Christ's sending into the world to make satisfaction for sin, be first in intention, than it should be last in execution, by rules undeniable, and such as are manifest by the very light of nature; Whence it followeth, that man should be first saved and after that Christ sent into the World, that, by his sufferings, God's justice might be satisfied. Now I come to the consideration of the Remonstrants' argument. The Consequence of the Major we grant, but the Minor we deny. And it is a vain thing for them to cry out, that it is absurd and foolish to say, that the intention of salvation, precedes the intention of satisfying God's justice; for words must not carry it: and it is well known that the most empty vessels give the greatest sound. I have showed how absurd it is to conceive, that man was saved to this end, that God's justice may be satisfied, and that 'tis far more probable to say, That by Christ's sufferings, God's justice was satisfied to this end, that man might be saved. For the salvation of man we say, was not intended by God simply, but after a certain manner, to wit, in the way of mercy mixed with justice; which end doth not presuppose the permission of sin, as these Remonstrants' shape the matter to varnish over their consequence, with some colour of probability: but rather it bespeaks, both the permission of sin, and satisfaction to be made for sin, to the end that so man might be saved, not simply, but after a certain manner, to wit, in the way of mercy mixed with justice. But suppose they were considered as sinners, Why should the Remonstrants look strangely upon this doctrine, namely, that God should intend the salvation of sinners in signo rationis, before he intended that his justice should be satisfied? For do not they maintain, that God by power absolute, can pardon sin without all satisfaction? But supposing that God will not pardon sin without satisfaction, in this case they may contend, that God must first intend to take a course, that such satisfaction may be made, and then intent to save. And let them contend but in the name of reason, and not of clamours, and content themselves, with the infatuation of themselves, with such senseless conceits, and not spread this scab unto others also. My reason to the contrary is still the same, namely, that if God be pleased to save sinners in despite of sin, in the way of mercy mixed with justice, the case is clear, that satisfaction for sin, is rather a means of man's salvation, than man's salvation is a means tending to the procurement of satisfaction for sin, and consequently the intention of salvation of sinners, is in reason to precede the intention of procuring satisfaction, rather than to follow after it; as the intention of the end, is rather to be accounted before, then after the intention of the means. Yet say these Remonstrants, if a man will be so obstinate, as (notwithstanding the felicity of these Remonstranticall wits in fruitful inventions and subtle argumentations) still to deny that there is any absurdity herein, thus over and above we prove it. For as yet they have run themselves out of breath. If, say they, the decree of Christ a Saviour, be after the election of particular persons unto salvation, it followeth that God did decree some particular men's salvation, before he ordained Christ's merits to procure their salvation; but this is foolish and absurd. I answer, No more foolish and absurd than the former: and indeed every one of these consequences for the expressing whereof, they affect to seem very inventious, do savour of no invention at all; the Consequents do so evidently, even every one of them appear as clearly in the Antecedent, as a man's face in a glass, and are to be accounted rather Tautologies, than deductions, much less do they relish of any subtlety of wit. So that all this while, they seem to be in travel with nothing but wind, or sick of the disease called Tenasmus, striving mightily to do somewhat, when indeed they do nothing at all. And our former argument still hath place, and here also applied, doth manifest, that seeing the merits of the son of God are the means of man's salvation, than man's salvation is the end of Christ's merits; therefore in all probability, the intention of man's salvation, as the intention of the end, should precede the intention of sending Christ to merit as the means, rather than to be subordinate unto it. And indeed if the sending of Christ into the World to merit, should be first in intention, then should it be last in execution; that is, All the elect should first be saved, and then Christ should be sent into the world to merit their salvation. Therefore to mend the matter (for who is so silly as not to perceive, that if the consideration of Christ's obedience, as satisfactory, will not serve their turn, surely neither will the consideration of his obedience as meritorious, stand them in any stead) they put into this Consequence another clause, without all art, and without all honesty, pretending, that hereby we make salvation destinated to man, before it is decreed to man: as if we put any difference in this case between destination and decree, or as if we make salvation destinated to a man hereby, before it is destinated unto him; whereas we only make the end (that is salvation) intended before the merits of Christ (which are the means of salvation) are intended. And would any man that is in his right wits, say this is to make salvation destinated to a man before it is destinated to him? Farther, it is to be observed, that we may omit nothing, but take notice of the uttermost of their strength, and the rather, because it will notably discover either their ignorance, or which is most likely, (for as much as they do not directly insist, as they might upon a new argument far more plausible with the ignorant) their unconscionableness. For they signify that hence it will come to pass, that the intention of salvation, being before the intention of finding of Christ to merit, salvation shall exist, being decreed as present to God, before Christ is considered as he that by his Cross hath deserved it. Now had they said before Christ hath deserved it, I should readily have granted it. For I hope none of them would deny, that the salvation of many a Prophet and Patriarch, existed not only before God, but actually and really before Christ was crucified. To prevent this elusion of their argument, they express it thus, Before Christ was considered as he that hath deserved it. Yet here they fall foul upon an indecent expression. For I will be bold to deny, that Christ was considered by God, as one that had deserved man's salvation, before he had deserved it. For before he had deserved it by his Cross, to say, that God considered him as one that had deserved it, is either to err or to feign, neither of which is incident unto God. God considered him from everlasting, as one that in the fullness of time should deserve it, by suffering upon the Cross, not as one that had deserved it. For to conceive him after the former manner, is to conceive aright, but to conceive him after the latter manner, is to conceive amiss. But I will take the pains to mend this argument for them thus. If their salvation were decreed before Christ's merits, than their salvation did exist as present with God before Christ's merits did exist, as present with God. But this is not to be admitted: Now I come to discover their ignorance, which they betray in this. First, neither God's prescience, nor God's decree doth make things to exist, otherwise then in Esse cognito & in esse velito; but this is not to exist. Therefore they qualify it by the addition of the manner, ut praesens Deo; which indeed is Terminus diminuens in this case. For it is present to God by virtue of his decree intentionally only, and not really, which alo●e is to exist. But let this Peccadillio pass. Secondly, Who seeth not that this argument tends to the utter destruction of all distinct intentions of end, and means in God? For if there be any such distinct intentions in God, the one must be acknowledged to be before the other. As for example, What was the end of creation? Le's go no farther than the manifestation of God's power and wisdom as the end thereof. Now hence it will follow by the quaintness of this argumentation, that the manifestation of God's wisdom and power in creating the world did exist, as present with God, before the creation. Is not here a proper argumentation. Spectatum admissi risum teneatis amici. Thirdly, to draw nearer to the discovery of their ignorance. I grant it shall first exist; but how? Not in duration; We acknowledge no such priority in God, between the intention of the end, and the intention of the means; though such a priority in this case is found in man. What then? I'll tell you: They commonly call it a priority of nature. But take heed you do not apply it to any of the two kinds of priority of nature mentioned by Aristotle. For try if you please, and you shall find that none of them can possibly serve the turn; What then is this priority of nature so called? I answer, it is only Prioritas rationis: And so I formerly said, that the intention of the end is in signo rationis, before the intention of the means. You may farther demand, Wherein doth this Prioritas rationis consist? I answer out of Durand, it consists in this, that, Ratio unius petitur a ratione alterius, and so indeed, Ratio mediorum petitur a ratione finis. This generally holds of the intention of end, and means, as well in God, as in the creature. For always the nature of the end duly considered, doth bespeak what shall be the condition of the means. So that this makes no priority of existence at all, neither in duration nor in nature properly so called, but only such a subordination between them, that the reason of the one, that is, the nature or condition of the one, depends upon the nature and condition of the other. Now let any sober man judge, Whether the salvation of man be required to the procuring of Christ's merits, and not rather, Christ's merits are required to the procuring of man's salvation; which yet is not true of salvation considered simply, but only as to be bestowed after a certain manner, to wit, in the way of justice, and by way of satisfaction made for sin, that so a man may be saved by grace in despite of sin. In the close of all they signify that this of theirs in the last place seriously considered will make it appear, that this doctrine of their Adversaries, tends notably to the diminution of Christ's honour, and to the annihilation of Christ's merits, to wit, unless Christ's merits be acknowledged the end of man's salvation, and not man's salvation the end of Christ's merits, Christ shall be dishonoured, and his merits annihilated. Here they are quite out of breath, and that which is wanting, they leave to be supplied by the serious (they should say ignorant) consideration of their Proselytes. They presume this colour of dishonour redounding hereby to Christ, will be sufficient to blow up their Adversaries, though it prove of no more force than a squib. This carriage of theirs calls to my remembrance, a mad prank played by the English at Delfe, while they were billeted there, which was told me merrily, by one of the number. One of the Soldiers was billeted in an old Widow's house, and another being a Goldsmith, told him and another consort of theirs, he had a devise to put money in all their purses, for he knew how to make a Rex-dolar of threepences sylver, and in that Widow's house they would ply their business very securely. To work they went, and casting plates of Tin to the quantity of one of those dollars, and stamping them full and fair, this Goldsmith, with the quantity of three pence silver, sylvered them over very fairly, and, lest they should seem too light, hangs them up in the chimney in a bag, that the smoke might bring them to the sadder hue. Thus having met with a mine of Sylver in their lodging, one is employed as a Merchantman to go to the Staple of Cloth, and he lays out their coin in cloth, whereof afterwards they made good silver indeed: at length one of them paying a debt of his to a Dutchman in Delfe, in one of these Rex-dolars, he found the Dutch to betray some suspicious gestures and interpretations upon the coin. That was a fair warning to an intelligent man of arms; and hereupon they get them packing away with all speed; and home they come, and make themselves merry with the relation. In like sort these Remonstrants show a great deal of Tin and trash in these argumentations, and they have not so much as three pence silver to colour it therewithal to cheat the World, if they will be cheated. But they hope the colour of some dishonour by their adversaries doctrine redounding unto Christ, will be taken for a piece at least of good silver. I confess, I am somewhat the more merrily disposed at this time, For being taken off from the midst of a sentence, by the courteous invitation of a Gentleman, to come unto him to his Inn: He was pleased to entertain me with such good discourse, that it did not a little refresh my spirits. His reaches were after new discoveries for the advancement of learning; and endoctrinated me more in one half hour, than seventeen years' study in the University. For whereas I never learned there, more causes than four, he was pleased to acquaint me with nine; which I took some pains to learn without book, and they were these, Matter, Form, Workman, Will, Power, Time, Finding out, Accident, End. And most courteously offered himself to enlarge on every one of them; but having left off at a broken sentence, I was desirous to return to my studies Theological, and to let those Philosophical progresses alone. But I protested unto him seriously, that he had informed me more in the number of causes in a short space, than Oxford had done in many years; he entreated I would consider of them, and I promised I would, and confer of them too, with all the Scholars I companied with; which he took in very goo part; and so I took my leave. And finding my spirit not a little elevated with this recreation, I resolved, forbearing my usual time of supper, to follow these studies close that night, which truly fell out very happily. For one of those causes being found out, otherwise called, Invention (as for Judgement, I do not remember that it was admitted into the number) I made use of it very happily in finding out, or discovery of the foppery of these Remonstranticall argumentations. Now I proceed to the second Question, as more seasonable to the present occasion. And here first they begin with their former artifice, making infidelity on the part of reprobation, answerable to faith on the part of election, which is most untrue, as formerly I showed: Only the not curing of infidelity by the grace of faith, is made by us subordinate to reprobation; as the curing of natural infidelity by the grace of faith, is made by us subordinate to election. But they go on, as in shaping our Tenent at pleasure, so in basting it with their very liberal censures, as absurd and execrable, in such sort, as the bare commemoration of it, they take to be sufficient to represent the horror of it, and to confute it, and this they commit to the judgement of all the faithful of Christ. And indeed their best strength lieth in setting forth their Adversaries doctrine in such colours, as the Devil is painted with. And in this particular, they conceive good hope (no doubt) that propitious Readers will conceive hereby, that the infidelity of man is made by their Adversaries the work of God, as well as Faith; Whereas it is well known, that there is so little need of working men to infidelity, that all being borne in sin, and corrupted and estranged from the life of God, through the fall of Adam, infidelity is as natural and hereditary to a man, as any other corruption. And it is as well known and undeniable, that none can cure it but God, by faith; but this he cures in whom he will, by giving Faith to whom he will, and if he refuse to cure it in any, that, and that alone is enough to make him a vessel of wrath, that so God's glory may be manifested upon him, in the way of justice vindicative. But come we to their Arguments. 1. The first is this. If Infidelity followeth Reprobation unto destruction, than God cannot in justice destroy Reprobates for their infidelity. For there is no greater injustice, then to destroy a man for that, that followeth necessarily upon reprobation which is the work of God. To this I answer. 1. According to mine ordering the decrees divine. Secondly, according to the Contra-Remonstrants Tenent in ordering them. 1. According to my ordering of the decrees divine; In no moment of nature or reason is the decree of damnation precedent to the decree of permitting infidelity, or leaving the infidelity of some men uncured, to wit, by denying them faith, by denying the grace of regeneration. But the decrees of creating all in Adam, of permitting all to fall in Adam, in bringing all men forth into the World in the state of Original sin, of leaving this original sin uncured in them, and last of all, of damning them for their sins; are decrees not subordinate, but coördinate, as decrees de Mediis, tending jointly to one supreme end, which is the manifestation of God's glory upon them in the way of justice vindicative; as also to show the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy, whom he hath prepared unto glory, to wit, by beholding Rom. 9 22. in others that miserable condition, which through God's mere grace and goodness they have escaped. 2. According to the Contra-Remonstrants Tenent, I answer, 1. Many of them do not maintain that infidelity is consequent to the decree of damnation, but in the foresight of God, precedent rather: as appears by the British Divines their Theses De Reprobatione; and Alvarez professeth the same. The denial of grace, and so the permitting of natural infidelity to remain uncured, they make consequent (as it seems) to a negative decree of denying glory. And to the decree of permitting infidelity, they make the foresight of infidelity subsequent; and this foresight of infidelity they make precedent to reprobation, as it signifies the decree of damnation. And thus far I agree with them, That in no moment of nature, or sign of reason did God ordain any man to damnation, but for sin; and consequently in no moment of nature, or sign of reason, did the decree of damnation go before the foresight of sin or infidelity. 2. But suppose, as these Remonstrants collect and pick out their meaning, They make the decree of reprobation, in all points proportionable to the decree of salvation, that like as the decree of giving faith, they conceive to be subordinate to the decree of salvation; so the decree of permitting infidelity, or denying faith (for herein consists the just proportion, and not as they feign it, between faith on the one side, and infidelity on the other) is with them made subordinate to the decree of damnation. Then I answer, 1. Their Consequence should be this, If the permission of Infidelity followeth the decree of damnation, than God cannot in justice damn them for Infidelity. Now here is no colour of good Consequence. 2. If they reply, That in case infidelity followeth necessarily upon Gods permitting of it, the Consequence is as good as in case infidelity followed upon reprobation. For even hereby it appears, that infidelity followeth upon reprobation though not immediately, but by the mediation of the divine permission thereof; but whether it followeth mediately or immediately all is one, as touching the force of the Consequence. Resp. Now to this I Reply, Granting that all is one, as touching the force of the Consequence: but then consider. 1. All the force of the argument depends not upon the consecution of infidelity, simply unto the decree of damnation, but only upon the necessary consecution thereof. And yet no mention at all was made hereof, in the Consequence of the Major, but it is brought afterwards over and above most illogically. 2. In this case all the force of the Consequence depends upon the necessary consecution of sin in general, or infidelity in special, upon Gods permitting of it. So that whether Gods decree to permit the sin of infidelity, be antecedent or consequent to the decree of damnation all is one. Yet these Remonstrants make the force of their argument, to consist only in the subordinating of the decree divine, as touching the permission of infidelity to the decree of damnation, which yet appears by this to be of no force. 3. But if they hereupon take a new course of argumentation, and dispute thus; If Infidelity followeth necessarily upon Gods permitting of it, than God cannot in justice damn a man for Infidelity; pretending no injustice to be greater, then to damn a man for that which followeth necessarily upon permission, which is God's work. Resp. I answer. 1. That thus their former argumentation is cashiered as unprofitable. 2. We deny this Consequence; and call in no meaner name than Arminius himself to bear us out in this our denial. Who expressly professeth, That in case God permits a man, Velle peccatum, necesse est ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolendum. Exam. pag. 153. I could add Vorstius also, herein concurring with Piscator, Perkins, and Navarrettus the Dominican is as expressly in this as any other; as also in subordinating it to the decree of reprobation. Arminius likewise professeth faith and repentance, Nisi Deo dante haberi non posse. Exam. 57 and that both of them are denied to the reprobates by the decree of reprobation. See his own words, At Deus statuit decreto reprobationis reprobis fidem & paenitentiam non dare. Concedo lubens, illam assumptionem, sed rectè intellectam: He laboureth to charm this inconvenient grant of his, but no charm will serve to keep this adder, from stinging and wounding their doctrine of reprobation unto death. He saith, Faith is given by way of suasion. We say, that matters nothing; for so it be given by God wheresoever it be found, and so it be denied to reprobates by the decree of reprobation, we desire no more. We ourselves acknowledge, that faith is not given to the elect, but by way of suasion, the Word working faith, running in this manner; Repent and believe the Gospel; and whosoever believeth shall be saved. For God hath set forth his Son to be a Propitiation for our sins, through faith in his blood. 3. At length he proceeds in his charming course, but most unsuccessefully, as whereby his former saying is nothing charmed. His care rather seems to be to eat his own words, as Satan devoured his own children. For distinguishing suasion into that which is sufficient, and that which is effectual: this effectual suasion, he confesseth to be administered by the decree of election; but as for that sufficient suasion, though withal he accounts it always ineffectual, yet he saith it is administered by the decree of providence, not by the decree of reprobation. At length he confesseth, that by the decree of reprobation is denied grace effectual, that is such a grace as whereupon he foresaw they would believe. Now herein I appeal to the judgement of every sober man. Take we two men into consideration, the one elect as Paul, the other reprobate as Esau. Of two sufficient graces, the Lord forseeth which of them will prove effectual with Paul, and which ineffectual; and he makes choice to give him such a grace, as he forseeth will prove effectual. Again he forseeth of two sufficient graces, which of them will prove effectual with Esau and which ineffectual, and makes choice to afford him only that which he knows will prove ineffectual. Now what can be the reason hereof, but because he purposeth to show his mercy in the salvation of the one, and his justice in the damnation of another. Before Arminius came to this resolution, as expressly to profess, That by the decree of reprobation is denied grace effectual, he found himself in a strait upon his distinction of grace sufficient and effectual, and the description of each; he drew his breath very short; and therefore to get, as it were, more liberty of air, he concluded that discourse with, Haec ex Augustini sententiâ dicuntur. pag. 58. and in the next page. Hisce autem ita explicatis ex ment Augustini & fortè Scripturae sensu. But, What, a mischief, doth this great Doctor mean to tell us? First, that he willingly grants that, Deus statuit decreto reprobationis reprobis fidem & paenitentiam non dare (provided it be well understood) and after all this explication, tells us, that all this explication of his is delivered ex sententiâ & ment Augustini, and but perchance, ex Scripturae sensu, concealing all the while what is his own Opinion. Is this to give us the right understanding of that Assertion (Deus statuit decreto reprobationis reprobis fidem & paenitentiam non dare) most prejudicial to his own Tenent at first fight, and much more by the distinction following of Gratia sufficiens & efficax; which he so well perceived, that he is content to clap it upon Augustine's back to bear the burden of it; and puts it but upon adventure, that it may prove to be the Scripture meaning. And in like sort, when, pag. 98. having proposed two things to be necessarily unfolded by him. Primò, de Gratiâ sufficient & efficaci. Secundo, de utriusque dispensatione, dispensationisque Causis: He leaves off there, giving it over in plain ground. What doth this argue? but that he manifestly perceived, he was not able in any tolerable manner, to shape this distinction in congruity to his own Tenent. Let this Author well consider this, that talks so much of our Divines unwillingness to come to trial in the point of reprobation; When Arminius durst not adventure upon the explicating of his own opinion, touching the distinction of grace sufficient and effectual, and in giving us the definition of each. The like to have been the course of other Arminians, I have known, declining the point of effectual grace, as a precipice and break-neck unto them: And when others have been put upon it, they have placed it in the grace subsequent, and have not been ashamed to make it consist in this, that God by effectual grace, doth work in man, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Velle credere, modo velit, and why not as well, that he works in man, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Credere, modo Credat, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Resipiscere modo Resipiscat. This that I speak, I can show under the hand of one of them, a great stickler for the Arminian Cause; great I say in respect of affection, not of judgement. And I have cause to conceive, that both this Author's Discourse, and that others I have had to deal withal, is but as a smoke, that for a great part, if not for the most of it, comes out of the same Chimney. 4. Let the argument stand as it doth, let infidelity by God's permission follow upon the decree of damnation, and that necessarily. Yet consider. 1. God's permitting of it, is no other than the leaving of it uncured: not that hereby infidelity followeth, which was not before; but being in all before, as the fruit of that natural corruption wherein all were borne, as all confess, as many as concur against the Pelagians, in acknowledging Original sin. By God's permission of it, it continueth to be uncured; What actual sin is there in the World, or habitual sin arising thereupon, which God cannot cure if it please him? If then he will not cure it in some, shall it not be lawful for him to punish it, where he finds the continuance of it unto the end, without breaking off by repentance? 2. Suppose all men had power to do any good thing; if God will not give them Velle quod possunt (as Austin saith he dealt with Adam in his innocency, and gave the Angels that stood, amplius Adjutorium, than he gave the others; whereby it came to pass, that they stood in obedience when the other fell) what shall we say in this case, is it possible that they should Velle bonum, if God will not work it in them, of whom the Apostle professeth, that he works in us both the Will and the Deed? Or shall we hereupon say, they do not sin freely? What shift have they to avoid this, but either by contradicting the Apostle, and saying God doth not work in us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Velle, or by saying that God doth work in us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Velle, modò Velimus, as plain a contradiction as ever proceeded from the mouth of any, The self same act, being made before and after itself; for the condition is always before the thing conditioned. And is this to work in us the Will according to God's pleasure, or according to man's good pleasure? What is it to say, that grace is given according unto works, if this be not? 3. We deny, that any evil act therefore comes not to pass freely, because it comes to pass necessarily, upon supposition of God's denial of grace, to refrain from it. For like as good works, are not therefore not wrought freely by us, because God by his grace works us to the performance of them; (For who dares deny that it is in God's power to make us work this or that freely) in like sort, and much more, evil works are not done the less freely, because God denies special and effectual grace to abstain from them. For, want of grace doth not take away willingness unto that which is evil, but leaves too much rather in man of that kind. As Austin saith, that Libertas sine gratiâ non est libertas sed contumacia. Now where there is contumacy, there is rather too much will then too little. For Contumacy is Wilfulness. 4. The Schools teach, that liberty of will consists only, in electione mediorum, in the election of means to certain ends. Now when the Gospel is preached to a carnal man, whose ends are only carnal, as the Apostle saith, Philip. 3. 20. They mind earthly things; so far forth as he shall find it serviceable to his carnal ends, he may believe it and make profession of it, as many times Hypocrites do, and sometimes in such sort, as it is hard to distinguish, between a true and an Hypocritical professor. This moved the Apostle to exhort the Corinthians, famous for their faith, to examine themselves, and prove themselves, Whether they were in the faith, that is, in faith unfeigned. For there is not only a gross Hypocrisy, whereunto a man's own heart is privy, but a secret Hypocrisy whereof the man himself is nothing conscious; yet such a faith undoubtedly is performable by a natural man. Now when a man rejects the Gospel, the faith and profession whereof he finds nothing serviceable to his carnal ends, doth he not judiciously and deliberately, yea and wisely too (according to the wisdom of flesh and blood) reject it? 5. Austin professeth Lib. 1. De Gen. contr. Manich. cap. 3. That all men may believe if they will, and justifies it in his Retractations. But if the will of man be corrupt, and averse from believing, We justly say, such a man cannot believe; as our Saviour saith, How can you believe that receive honour one of another, and seek not the honour that cometh of God alone. Joh. 5. 44. yet this is an impotency Moral only, which is to be distinguished from impotency Natural. For notwithstanding this, it may be truly said, that, All men may believe if they will, and herein consists the natural liberty of the will. The Moral liberty consists, rather in a sanctified inclination unto that which is good, whereby it is freed from the power of sin and Satan; then in a power to do good if they will, and not otherwise. But I never find that Arminians do distinguish these. 6. It is not sufficient for Arminians to conclude, that such a thing upon supposition comes to pass necessarily, therefore it comes not to pass freely. 1. For upon supposition that God decreed to create the World, the creation of the World came to pass necessarily; yet simply the World was made by God freely. 2. In like sort, upon God's foreknowledge that such a man will not believe it followeth necessarily, that such a one will not believe; and so the like may be said of the most free act that is performed. But will it follow herehence, that it is not done freely? 3. In like sort upon the denial of an effectual impediment of sin, unto a man it followeth necessarily, that such a man will sin, according to Arminius his doctrine, and this holds applied to any particular sin whatsoever. But will it herehence follow according to Arminius, that such a sin is not committed freely? no-nothing less. 2. The Remonstrants' second argument is this. What God cannot perform that God cannot will. But God cannot damn a man for infidelity flowing from such a decree of Reprobation. Resp. 1. But who saith that infidelity floweth from the decree of reprobation? Not one that I know, but Piscator upon these words, Ye therefore hear not my words, because ye are not of God. But understand him aright, it is as if he John 8. 47. should say, Therefore such a man goeth lame, because the Physician will not cure him: yet it is well known the cause of his lameness is from within, and perhaps procured by some distemper of his own: yet in case a Surgeon could cure him and will not, he may be said to be the cause of lameness; but how? per modum non removentis. This is well known by the learned to be a kind of cause whereof notice is taken in Natural Philosophy. And in this sense and no other, it is well known that Piscator makes God the cause of infidelity, and that according to the express Word of God. But in my judgement Piscator mistakes the phrase, To be of God, which he conceives to denote election. I rather take it to denote regeneration, as much as to say, ye therefore he are not my words, because God hath not hitherto by regeneration cured that natural infidelity which is in you. 2. But take the argument according to the former expression, God cannot damn a man for that infidelity which is consequent to reprobation; And than my Answer to the former argument in every particular thereof, may be accommodated unto this. 3. The Third followeth. If Infidelity flows from reprobation, than God can neither require Faith of reprobates, nor seriously offer salvation unto them, but necessarily counterfeit. For it is manifest Hypocrisy, to invite those unto faith and salvation, who are excluded from both by the decree of God. Resp. 1. Here again Infidelity is made to flow from reprobation; whereas nothing flows from reprobation by the doctrine of the Contra-Remonstranes, but the not curing of man's natural infidelity, like as the curing of it by faith, is that which flows from election. 2. I say, There is no simulation at all of God in this. For that which he proposeth is but this, that, Whosoever believeth shall be saved, and Whosoever believeth not shall be damned. He sends his Ministers to Preach this, and to Beseech them to believe, and to be reconciled unto God, yea, all they meet with. But for whose sake? Not for the reprobates sake, but for the elects sake, Who because they are mixed among reprobates, and God hath not revealed to his Ministers, Who are elect and who are not (as neither was it fit he should, many of the Ministers themselves, even of those that not only prophesied in his name, but cast out Devils, being reprobates) therefore it was fit their Commission should be general to Preach to all. Yea, did not the Apostles themselves take notice of this? Doth not Paul profess that, He became 2 Corinth. 6. all things to all that he may save some? And who were those some, but the very elect of God, as the same Apostle elsewhere professeth, saying, I suffer all things for the elects sake. And doth not Austin profess that if we knew who were reprobate, 2. Tim. 2. 10. we would no more pray for them, then for the Devils? De Civit. Dei lib. 21. cap. 24. 4. The Fourth and last. If Incredulity follows the decree of reprobation, than God considered the reprobates in his counsel of reprobation, either as creatable, or as created in the state of innocency, or as fall'n into Original sin. Sed falsa sunt haec omnia. All these things are false. And these things, he saith, are delivered, contra absurdam, detestabilem, atque abominabilem sententiam. Resp. Here is froth enough of words, but a very hungry discourse for substance of argumentation throughout. 1. Yet as I said, All this nothing toucheth them, Who albeit they maintain that God of his mere pleasure, hath mercy on some, giving them faith and repentance (considering all in the corrupt Mass) and of his mere pleasure hardens others (no worse in nature then the former) by denying them faith and repentance, yet as reprobation signifies the decree of damnation, do permit thereunto the foresight of final perseverance in sin. 2. According to my Ordering of God's decrees, Who conceive mankind not yet created to be the object of all God's decrees, they being eternal, and but one act in God, and that act his very Essence, and all other things being temporal. I do not maintain that the decree of damnation, is in any moment of nature or reason, before the consideration of man's final impenitency. As neither do I conceive it to be after this, but both simultaneous; for as much as the decree of permitting all to fall in Adam, together with the decree of final leaving some therein, and the decree of damning them for sin, I take not to be subordinate, but coordinate and simultaneous. 3. Whether we take the First-way for shaping the object of predestination, or the Second, or the Third, I Answer. 1. The difference hereabout is in my judgement merely Logical, nothing Theological; the resolution whereof according to general rules, is easily made by light of nature, if once it be agreed upon in Divinity, What is God's end both on the part of election, and on the part of reprobation, and what are the means that tend unto those ends. 2. Which way soever we take of the Three, I never found any reason given by Arminians of any force to take us from it, as I have justified in my Vindiciae, as touching the First-way; And in my Examination of the Conference between Arminius and Junius, as touching the Second-way; And in my Answer to Corvinus against Tilenus, as touching the Third-way, and therein, I trust, routed and profligated the 20 Reasons of Arminius, proposed against the First and Last-way, but chiefly against the First, in the Declaration of his Opinion before the States. Now I return to the Author of this discourse, and to the remainder of his second Motive, from whence I have digressed. I was here passing over unto the third instance, to wit, of the proceedings in the Synod of Dort; but upon my looking into the History thereof, to prepare myself for an answer thereunto, ere I was a ware, I lighted upon the reasons of that the Contra-Remonstrants motion to be spared, preferred unto the State. And they utterly deny what is here cast upon them, namely, that they deprecated at all, that they might be spared from conferring upon the point of reprobation. But whereas the Remonstrants had encumbered the point of election and reprobation with seven Questions, which pertained not to the state of the Controversy concerning the first Article, and being also imperfect and intricate for the most part, and proposed to this end, to draw their Adversaries away from the true state of the Question; They desired to be spared from answering unto them. And upon this Petition of theirs it pleased the States, that leaving those thorny questions, they should come to the handling of the Articles. This is set down in the Preface to those Acta Synodalia, set forth by the Authority of the States. Fol. 10. pag. 1. For after the proposing of these two questions to the Remonstrants, as touching the decree of Predestination. 1. Whether the entire decree of Predestination were contained in this Article, namely, That God did from everlasting decree to save believers, which no man denies. 2. Whether they thought faith & perseverance therein, did precede election, as the Causes or Conditions thereof. After the Remonstrants had answered affirmatively unto them both; hereupon they bring in their seven, for the most part, intricate questions. Reponebant deinde septem alias tum de electione tum de reprobatione, questiones, ad quas a Pastoribus à Classibus deputatis responderi volebant. Quae cum ad controversiae de primo articulo statum non spectarent, etiam mutilae atque intricatae pleraeque essent; eumque in finem ab illis proponerentur, ut hoc modo a praecipuo controversiae statu rectaque agendi ratione, in ambages ad ducerent. pastors expositâ per Libellum supplicem Illust. Ordd. iniquâ hâc agendi ratione, non quidem deprecati sunt, ne de reprobatione sententiam suam manifestarent (uti Remonstrantes improbè saepius ipsis objectarunt) sed disertè sententiam suam quantum ad Ecclesiarum pacem atque aedificationem sufficere existimarent, non tantum viuâ voce sed & scripto declararunt. Se nimirum cum aeternum electionis singularium personarum decretum ponunt, simul quoque ponere aeternum de reprobatione & rejectione quarundam singularium personarum decretum, quum fieri nequeat ut sit electio, quin simul quòque sit aliqua reprobatio aut derelictio. Difficiles omnes circa hunc articulum quaestiones temere excutere, nihil aliud esse quam inutilibus disputationibus & nihil profuturis litibus, Ecclesiam replere, ejusque pacem perturbare. Declarationem suam hanc Libello supplice expressam, moderatis omnibus, pace●que amantibus ingeniis, sufficere debere: Credi videlicet ac doceri ab ipsis, Deum neminem condemnare, imò verò ne statuisse quidem condemnare quenquam nisi justè propter propria ipsius peccata: Placuit itaque Illust. Ordd. ut missis illis spinosis quaestionibus, ad articulorum pertractationem deveniretur. And Pag. 136. & 156. I find this objection proposed by the Remonstrants in these words. Pag. 156. In Collatione Haghiensi Libello supplice Illust. Hollandiae & Westfriziae Ordinibus exhibito, deprecati sunt Contra-Remonstrantes ne de reprobatione ageretur: & more at large Pag. 195. Thus, Ipsi Contra-Remonstrantes cum in Colloquio Haghiensi jussi essent, ad interrogata quaedam nostra de reprobatione respondere Magistratui morem gerere gravati fuerint, usque adeò ut Collationem caeptam abrumpere se malle profiterentur quam ut summarum Potestatum imperio se constringi paterentur, nihil aliud conscientiae suae praetexentes quam quod Ecclesiae aedificationi obfuturam eam agendi rationem judicarent. Now to this Pag. 157. Festus Hominus, one present in that Conference, stands up and answers, Exposuitque paucis quam non bonâ fide haec de illis dicerentur. Se Libello supplice non fuisse deprecatos, ne de reprobatione ageretur: caeterùm quia Remonstrantes subdolè in ipso Collationis initio, septem questionibus spinosis ac minime necessariis non tantum ad reprobationis, sed electionis quoque doctrinam spectantibus, à recto agendi ordine Contra-Remonstrantes in ambages adducere conarentur. Contra-Remonstrantes Libello supplice apud Illust-Ordd. de tam iniquâ agendi ratione conquestos fuisse atque ut Remonstrantibus mandaretur, ne extra justam agendi rationem jam inchoatam evagarentur petiisse. De reprobatione autem Contra-Remonstrantes quantum ad aedificationem satis erat, sententiam suam clarè ibidem explicasse uti scriptorum editorum fide probari potest. Idem etiam Reverendus & Doctissimus vir, D. Joannes Becius qui & ipse huic interfuerat Collationi, suo praesens comprobabat testimonio. Now I come to the Synod of Dort. 4. This Author saith the Remonstronts were there warned by the Precedent of the Synod, Ut de electione potius quam de odiosâ reprobationis materiâtagerent. And truly at first I wondered not a little, that the Precedent of that Synod should account, the matter of reprobation (which is as much as to say, the doctrine of reprobation) an odious matter, an odious doctrine. For we commonly signify hereby, such a doctrine as deserves to be hated; but I thought withal, that they might express rather, what is the condition of it in the event, namely, that it is entertained with hatred, not of all neither, nor of any of those, that submit their judgements to the word of God; but rather of those, and of those only, who follow the judgement of flesh and blood. Yet I thought good to inquire into the truth of the fact here mentioned; and I find it in the page mentioned, and how the Remonstrants themselves do express this, even as here it is expressed, thus, A Reverendo Praeside moniti sumus ut à negativis enunciationibus abstineremus & de electione potius quam odiosâ reprobationis materiâ ageremus. Yet I confess this did not satisfy me; For why should this Author make choice to express it in the Remonstrants' terms, rather than in the words of the Precedent himself. Therefore I turn to the beginning of that Session, being Sess. 32. There I find this particular, Submonuit & Praeses ut potius quaestionibus illis inhaererent, quae circa suavem de electione doctrinam versarentur, quam ut d● odiosè doctrinam de reprobatione exagitarent. Now I find a great deal of difference between professing the matter of reprobation, or the doctrine hereof to be odious, and admonishing to spare the exagitation thereof after an odious manner. This indeed being their usual course, to make it as odious as they can, like as Arminius, Doctrinam de praedestinatione odiosam reddere conabatur, as it is professed in the Preface to those Act. Synod. fol. 7. pag. 2. and fol. 8. pag. 2. They profess in like manner of the Remonstrants, namely, that in their Remonstrance they endeavoured, Illust. Ordd. odiosam reddere doctrinam Ecclesiarum Reformatarum, and that not only, de divinâ predestinatione, but also the Gratiâ Dei & Sanctorum Perseverantiâ, but all this malâ fide, nec sine apertis, atrocibusque calumniis. Moreover I find, Sess. 39 pag. 151. this decree of the Synod gratifying the Remonstrants, and yielding to their motion made, which was, that they might have liberty to treat as well of reprobation as of election, thus, Quoniam Remonstrantes aliquoties professi sunt, se per conscientiam in Synodo subsistere ulterius non posse, nisi prius caveatur ipsis fore, ut de electione & reprobatione, eâ ratione quam in Thesibus & Scriptis suis hactenus exhibitis proposuerunt, in posterùm agatur. Synodus quò magis ipsis fiat satis, publice ac coràm omnibus declarat, statuisse sese ac statuere sententiam ipsorum, non de electione modò, verum etiam de reprobatione expendere atque examinare. Quantum nempe in conscientiâ ad Dei gloriam, aedificationem & tranquillitatem Ecclesiae, omniumque conscientiarum posse ac debere satis esse, ipsa judicaret. Ad agendi verò modum, qui hic est servandus & ordinem quod attinet, suum esse de eo dispicere, non autem fratrum Remonstrantium qui huc sunt citati, quicquam praescribere, existimat. This decree being read to the Remonstrants, they refused to give way unto it. The 40 Session contains the altercation thereabout, between the Synod and them. They forsooth would prescribe to the Synod de modo Agendi, the Synod must not prescribe to them. And they profess against it Sess. 41. pag. 155. in this manner, Nec satisfit nobis si dicatur Synodum permissuram, ut nostram de reprobatione sententiam tractemus quoad illa ipsa ad gloriam Dei, aedificationem Ecclesiarum, conscientiarum tranquillitatem fore judicabit. Nam hâc ipsâ restrictione, nobis praeciditur libertas & plenaria sententiae nostrae defensio, & contrariae Impugnatio. Praeterquam quòd non levis suspicandi nobis data sit occasio, Synodum, ubi nos de electione disserentes audiverit, nequaquam permissuram ut Contraremonstrantium & eorum quos illi pro Orthodoxis habent, de reprobatione sententiam prout necessarium judicabimus, ad incudem revocari. Hereupon the Synod entreats the judgement of Foreign Divines; and they all with one consent profess, Tantam Remonstrantibus libertatem ad defensionem causae suae concessam esse, quantâ ex ratione & dignitate Synodi Citatis concedi posset. Ac proinde nullam esse causam cur Synodicum decretum mutandum videretur, aut cur Remonstrantes querelam instituerent, vel authoritatem hujus Synodi subterfugerent. Nihil illis esse imperatum quod ullo modo conscientias ipsorum gravare posset. Ac proinde conscientiae velum frustra pervicaciae obtendi. Abundè iis omnibusque modis satisfactum jam esse. Absolutam illam, nullisque circumscriptam limitibus libertatem quam petunt, à Synodo concedi ipsis non posse. Aequum esse ut certis sese legibus submittant, quibus, si exorbitent, coërceantur. Nay in the next Session, which is Sess. 42. there is a representation made of their unreasonable demand in these words. Professi sunt sibi agendi modum a Synodo praescriptum, iniquum videri. Sibi permitti velle non tantum primo loco, sed & circa omnes articulos & Theses, singulaque argumenta de sententiâ Contraremonstrantium, & corum quos illi pro Orthodoxis habent, quoad reprobationem agere, quia in hoc argumento calceus illos maximè urgeat. Hereupon the Opinions of the foreign Divines were required, to wit, Whether it were fit to yield unto them, as to treat of Reprobation, before they treated of Election, Qui consentientibus declarabant suffragiis, ab omni ratione & methodo esse alienum id quod Remonstrantes peterent, ut prius de reprobatione quam de electione agere sibi liceret. Their judgements hereupon are here represented severally and at large; First of our British Divines, then of the Palatine Divines, then of the Divines of the Land of Hesse, then of the Helvetians, then of those who were of the correspondency of Weteraw, then of those of Geneva, then of those of Breme, and lastly of those of Emden. 5. Upon the former bald and base pretences, as if, Conclusum esset contrà Manichaeos', the Author proceeds crowing magnificentissimè, and demanding in this manner. Can this doctrine be a truth, and yet blush at the light which makes all things manifest, especially considering these things? 1. That Reprobation is a principal Head of practical Divinity by the well, or ill stating, or ordering of which, the glory of God, and good of Religion, is much promoted or hindered. 2. That there is such a necessary connexion between the points of election and reprobation (both being parts of predestination) that the one cannot be well handled without the other. 3. That Reprobation was the chief cause of all the uproars in the Churches of that time. 4. That it was accused with open mouth and challenged of falsehood, and therefore bound in justice to purge itself of the crimination. 5. That it may easily be defended, if (as some say) it be such an apparent truth. For, Nihil est ad defendendum puritate facilius, saith St Hierome. Now albeit for the discovery of the vile vanity of this conclusion, I need take no other pains, then to appeal to your, or any sober man's due consideration of the premises duly examined according to my former answer; yet I think good not to pass it over without such particular consideration as it deserves. First, I pray consider, what is that light that makes all things manifest? Is it the light of Conference? In the Conference of Mompelgard there were divers other things disputed of, besides this of predestination. Now is the truth manifested hereby in all those particulars? If it be, I pray, let him signify on whose side, whether on the part of Jacobus Andreas, or on the part of Beza? To whom is it made manifest? To either side, or only to that side, on whose side this Author conceives the truth to stand? Do you not manifestly perceive the crudity of this conceit? Nay, who seeth not, that it is not the condition of conference, but the quality rather and ability of the conferrers, that is apt to manifest the truth. And such men are able to manifest, as well out of conference in their discourses, either Positive, or controversial, as in conference; yea, and far better; Those discourses being more quietly carried, and more free from altercation, than conferences; especially in case they meet with malignant opposites. And indeed it is the Word of God alone, which is that spiritual light, which giveth manifestation to all spiritual truth. And consequently neither are they to be censured as blushing at the light, that prefer to write quietly of these controversies, then to confer about them in some cases; or that prefer conference by the pen as Beza did, before conference by word of mouth, though this better pleased the lips of Jacobus Andreas. Yet neither Beza did refuse to yield to Andrea's his own way, neither did either the Contra-Remonstrants at the Hague Conference, or the Divines of Dort, refuse to treat of reprobation, as well as election, as formerly I have showed by authentical evidences. But suppose Beza and his fellows, whether two or three had altogether declined to confer at all, as in my judgement they had good reason to refuse, must this be censured their blushing at the light? Austin professeth as I have formerly vouched him, that there may be many causes of forbearing to deliver the truth at some times. He little dreamt of exposing the truth thereby to such a censure, as if it blushed at the light. And if some few might be justly censured as blushing at the light, must all for their sakes, by the rules of justice, be made obnoxious to the same censure, and not the Doctors only, but the Doctrine itself? Is it not apparent that a true and sound doctrine, may be weakly apprehended by many, though learned, and Veritas est temporis filia, and the accurate handling and maintaining of the truth in plainer points than this of reprobation, comes not to perfection, but by degrees, and after much ventilating of it in a ruder manner. Thus I think I have cracked the crown of this conclusion; I may proceed with the greater facility to the rest. 1. That Reprobation is an Head to any part of practical Divinity, I never read, nor heard till now. But yet in every theoretical point, as touching the nature of God and his attributes, by the true doctrine thereof, the glory of God, and good of Religion is promoted, & by the erroneous doctrine thereabouts it is as much impaired. For like as it is blasphemy, to attribute that unto God, which doth not become him; so is it blasphemy also, to deny unto him that which doth become him. As for the entertaining or refusing conference thereabouts, I have already spoken sufficiently; yet two particulars more I have to deliver, which I purpose to subjoin to the end of those five considerations here distinguished, as remarkable ones, if my memory fails me not. 2. A Connexion I grant there is, between election and reprobation, and the clearing of the truth in the one, doth give light unto the other. But which of these is to be handled first, that the clearing of the truth therein, may give light to the stating of the other, I should think no sober man would make question. Yet the Remonstrants at the Synod of Dort, were eager to begin with Reprobation, but were therein generally censured by the consent of foreign Divines that assisted there. But that one of them cannot be handled without the other, is a palpable untruth, as appears by the very practice of this Author himself, and his own carriage in this business. For he undertakes only the point of reprobation. 3. As touching the third particular, in charging the doctrine of reprobation, with being the chief cause of all the uproars in the Church at that time; this author takes to himself a strange liberty of discourse. We read and hear of no small stirs in the Church of Rome, between the Dominicans and the Jesuits; but I never read that the Jesuits laid to the Dominicans charge, that their Doctrine as touching the predetermination of the creatures will to every act thereof, was the cause of any uproar in the Church of Rome: But to the contrary rather. I read that in the contention between the Dominicans and Jesuits in Rome itself, wherein Valentianus through some heat in disputation, caught a fever whereof he died within three days after; of the relation whereof, made by one Pet (that had been a Priest) in Oxford I was sometimes an ear witness. The Jesuits were rather taxed for their heterodoxy in the point de auxiliis, as Petrus Mattheus in his History reports it. And from D. jackson's mouth, I have heard what a Spaniard should deliver upon the mention of Molina the Jesuit, namely, that he was the man, qui tantos tumultus excitavit, to wit, in Spain. But as for Churches Protestant, he doth well to limit his crimination to a certain time. For the stir that was raised by Huberus in the Lutheran Churches, was neither caused nor occasioned by our doctrine concerning reprobation. Huberus his cause was, a pertinacious standing for an universal Election. It seems he hath relation only to the Hague conference, and the uproars, as he calls them, amongst the States only, and their particular, or provincial congregations alone (as it seems) he denominates the Churches. Now let us consider, Who made those uproars, were they the Contra-Remonstrants, or the Remonstrants only? If he chargeth this upon the Contra-Remonstrants, let him prove it, lest he be justly censured for one of those wild beasts, an Emperor was sometimes warned to beware of, they were the slanderers. If the Remonstrants were the authors of these uproars, how doth he prove that the doctrine of reprobation, was the chief cause of them, Were not those Arminians voluntary agents in those uproars? If they conceived their opposites doctrine to be unsound, could they not oppose it without uproars, without violent proceedings? Again, their opposites doctrine, was it never received or preached till those days? Or was there any uproar made thereupon, till Arminius his innovating? And is that the chief cause of an uproar, which hath no such consequent ensuing until it meets with some turbulent spirits, which begin to stir as innovators in a Church or State. And yet was reprobation that alone, whereupon they stirred? Is it not apparent, that about the five Articles commonly so called, they conferred alike? But he saith it was the chief cause, and only saith it, yet Molinaeus professing reprobation to proceed, upon foresight of final impenitency, as in truth it cannot be denied, but that as the Contra-Remonstrants professed, as well in that Conference at the Hague, as in the Synod of Dort, that God did never intend to damn any man of ripe years, but for final perseverance in infidelity and impenitency. Did their contentions hereupon, either totally cease or in part? But such criminations are nothing strange. We know after what manner of greeting wicked Ahab saluted the holy Prophet Elijah. Art thou he that troubleth Israel? but he spared not to answer him, I am not he that troubleth Israel, but Thou and thy Father's house. In the like manner were Paul and Silas entertained Act. 16. 20. when being caught and brought before the Magistrates, heard such an accusation made against them, These men which are Jew's trouble our city: and preach Ordinances which are not lawful for us to receive, neither to observe, seeing we are Romans. And no marvel if the Devil roars, when he falls from heaven, like lightning, and his kingdom is shaken. But because he puts us to it in this crimination, I think it fit to give a taste of the violent proceedings in those parts, as I find them ordered in the Preface to the Synod. Dordrac. set forth by the authority of the States. And because uproars concern insurrections against government in Church or State; The first particular I observe of this nature is, Fol. 3. pag. 1. where after Arminius had been much suspected, and divers times urged to declare his opinion, upon certain points which hitherto he had declined, saving in a false manner, his protestation in the issue, proving directly contrary to his practice. The Rectors of particular Churches, soured with the leaven of his doctrine, openly refuse to subscribe the Confession of the Catechism, though the Synod of South-Holland commanded them. pastors Arminii sententiam amplexi passim in Classibus recusabant mandato Synodi de subscriptione Confession is, ac Catecheseos morem gerere. Here we have the beginning of a manifest schism. Now consider we the progress hereof. Hereupon a resolution was made (it being high time) by the States, for the calling of a national Synod, in the year 1605. about November 26. the execution whereof, was by divers practices of the Arminian Faction, delayed, and put off from time to time, for the space of 13 years. Fol. 5. pag. 2. Arminius himself acknowledgeth, de Heterodoxiâ suâ varios rumores omnes jam ecclesias pervasisse, incendiumque à se suscitatum ipsa Ecclesiae tecta super are dici. Fol. 8. pag. 1. In the mean time, Anno 1608. the States declared their purpose was, to call a Provincial Synod in October following, and signification hereof being made, the Rectors of particular Congregations, as many as were addicted to Arminius, being admonished to manifest their considerations in their several Deaneries, that so they might be fairly sent to the Synod that approached. They put this off also. Illi vero ut antea, ita nunc quoque singuli consuetis tergiversationibus pariter hoc detrectarunt. The like refusal was afterwards made in the Synod of South-Holland, though they were urged by the Synod to declare themselves (for as for the Provincial Synod, that was deferred two months longer.) Whereupon the Synod decreed, that they should give up their considerations within a Month's space, or be obnoxious to Censure Ecclesiastical. Hereupon was means made by Utenbogard, for letters from the States unto those Pastors, to send up unto them their considerations sealed, that so they might reserve them to the Provincial Synod shortly to be held. In these proceedings a man may easily smell Barnavells hand all along. Hereupon came forth at length Arminius his Declaration before the States. In answer whereunto Gomarus riseth up, as there we may read, Fol. 6. pag. 2. And amongst other courses of Arminius, makes relation of this, as how Spretis Synodorum Classium & Prebyteriorum judiciis ac decretis ad supremi Magistratus tribunal prima instantia prosiluisse, ibique querelas atque accusationes suas adversus Ecclesiarum doctrinam proposuisse, artibusque aulicis favorem sibi Ecclesiis verò odium consiliare diligenter studiisse. And hereupon besought the States, that seeing Contentiones gliscerent, Ecclesiae turbarentur, Civesque in parts distraherentur, the national Synod which they had promised might be gathered together with the first; which yet by the practice of Utenbogard and others was still delayed. Hereupon Arminius his Faction grew so bold, as publicly to Preach against the received Doctrine, as Bertius spared not to declare himself; but wherein? Mark I pray the Article well, because this Author draws all to reprobation. Now the Articles whereupon Bertius declared himself, to differ from the Doctrine received, were, De justificatione hominis coram Deo, De Praedestinatione, De Gratiâ Dei, & libero arbitrio, De Perseverantiâ fidelium; and upon these very points afterwards, proceeded the Conference between Arminus and Gomarus before the States. And one Venator spared not publicly to broach Pelagian and Socinian errors. Whereupon he was suspended by the Churches of North-Holland. In spite of whom notwithstanding, he continued his courses of Preaching. Now whereas the Orthodox Pastors in the Deanary of Alomar considering he was lawfully suspended, and withal a man of impure life, refused to admit him into their company. Hereof complaint was made to the States, and by Utenbogards' practice a Mandate obtained from them, that they should admit him. Now when the States considering the present exigent, were easily like to condescend to a Provincial Synod, the Arminians moved, that the Deputies to be sent thither, should not be appointed thereunto by the Churches, according to the usual course, but only by the States, presuming hereby, that either none, but such as favoured their cause should be sent, or at least such as were less alienated from their Opinion. fol. 8. p. But though they could not effect this, yet by their practice it came to pass, that the calling, not only of a Provincial Synod, but of the yearly Synods were hindered. Shortly after this, finding what liberty they had, they met together of their own accord privily, Sine Magistratus Supremi authoritate magno numero. Atque ibi inter se initâ per subscriptionem nominum confaederatione seu conspiration, manifestum in Ecclesiis Reformatis Schisma instituunt. That year came forth the Remonstrance. Upon this by the practice of the Remonstrants, Vorstius is brought in to be a Professor in the place of Arminius. For as touching the exceptions taken against him, the Remonstrants professed before the States, he had given them good satisfaction, Fol. 10. pag. 2. Then follow their practices for the removing of such Rectors from their Churches, as were their opposites, and obtruding upon the people such as were of their own Party. At Alcmar, Adolphus Venator, a man of impure life and faith, moved the people to Arms against the Magistrate, whereby he was driven to relinquish his place, and others brought in of Venator his Faction. Fol. 12. pag. 1. Hereupon the Elders and Deacons of that place were removed, and two Pastors, the one having formerly executed his Ministry amongst them for fifty years' continuance. Grevincovius in like sort, with the Magistracy of Rotterdam, to deprive his Colleague there Cornelius Geselius of his Ministry first, and then by their Sergeants to cast him out of the City. Utenbogard sends Remonstrants into Utrecht, and amongst others, Jacobum quendam Taurinum hominem turbulentum & saevum. Fol. 12. pag. 2. In Gelderland also the ordinary and annual Synodical Assemblies were hindered by the practice of Utenbogard, like as still they continued withal their art to hinder the calling of a national Synod, so often promised by the States, and so many years deferred. William of Nassau moved both Utenbogard on the one side, and Festus Hommius on the other side, to consider of a course how these stirs might be pacified. To which motion Festus Hommius makes answer, that in case the Remonstrants differed from the Churches only in five Articles, he could think of a course whereby some peace might be made in the interim, until a national Synod were gathered. This is the more observable, because this Author layeth all the cause of those uproars (as he calls them) upon Reprobation. But he professeth they had great cause to suspect the Remonstrants differed from them in greater points of moment. And these are afterwards declared to be these, Fol. 14. pag. 1. De perfectâ Christi pro peccatis Satisfactione, de Justificatione hominis coràm Deo, de Fide Salvificâ, de Peccato Originali, de Certitudine salutis, & de Perfectione hominis in hâc vitâ. And whereas, they desired the Remonstrants would deal clearly and make known what their opinion was in those points: Utenbogard having laboured to have a hearing before the States alone, There traduceth the actions of his Brethren in demanding the Declaration of their minds hereupon, as if this were to bring in a new kind of Inquisition amongst them, not to be endured. And hereupon obtains of the States, that no such Declaration should be required at their hands. And more than that, finding the Deputies of the Synod by their continual solicitations with the States (as it well became them in their places) to be most prejudicial to their proceedings, they brought it so to pass, that like as formerly their Annual Synods were hindered, so now it was forbidden to the Deputies themselves, thenceforth to take any such stile unto them, or perform any such office as whereabout they were then employed. And so the Relator proceeds in setting down their insolent courses until at length perceiving, that by the mediation of the King of Great Britain, all for the most part, inclined to the convocation of a national Synod, they fell plainly on, upon these desperate Counsels openly professing that the calling of a national Council, would prove prejudicial to the Majesty and Liberty of the Provinces, manifesting themselves hereby utterly averse from such a course; which yet hath been most in use in the Church of God, and that of ancient times, for the pacifying of contentions arising in matter of Religion. I profess, I nothing affect to spend time in such searches and relations, I had rather employ it another way, but you see I am driven unto it, to represent the unshamefased condition of this Narration. 4. And whereas he saith, It was accused with open mouth, and challenged of falsehood, it is apparent that the Remonstrants would very well have rested contented with a mutual toleration of one another in their several ways. For when Utenbogard and Festus Hommius were to meet together, and treat upon some fair course of composition, Utenbogard, together with those of his side, professed they knew no other course for settling peace, but my mutually tolerating one the other; Festus Hommius and others with him on the other side, professed they knew no better course than convocation of a national Synod, and in the interim to tolerate one another, provided they would declare themselves to differ from the received doctrine in the Church, in no other points then in the five Articles. But how they carried themselves herein refusing to declare themselves, I have formerly showed. And farther, in the pursuit of this their practice to enjoy toleration, it is farther storied, by what means they procured a Letter from King James to farther them therein, and after that an Edict to that purpose from some of the States. And consider farther, If any amongst us should rise up, and confederate themselves and impugn any five Articles of the Church of England, and accuse us for maintaining erroneous doctrine therein, and challenge us for falsehood, if they do it with never so open mouth, shall this be sufficient to justify them and condemn us, if we do not come to a trial with them to dispute the case, though We are the Possessors, They the Intruders and Innovators? We maintaining no other Doctrine then that which is by Authority established amongst us, and They which impugn the doctrine received, are they not usually judged amongst us, as such who are rather to be censured then disputed with? And withal consider, that this mutua tolerantia, which the Remonstrants so much pressed and were so glad to enjoy, was with greatest instance stood for long after the Conference at the Hague. Lastly, how often was Arminius himself questioned and called upon to give satisfaction for his Heterodoxies, and how often did he decline it? When at the first, Motion was made for his surrogation into the place of junius beind deceased, than the suspicions of his Heterodox breaking forth, and they of Amsterdam not well liking to let him go from them, amongst whom at that time, he exercised his Ministry; and that because they observed his luxuriant and novelizing Wit, which was like to breed dangerous effects in an University: at length upon the great instance both of Utenbogard and Arminius himself, way was made for him unto the Chair, upon condition he should confer with Gomarus upon some chief heads of Doctrine, and by a round declaration of his mind thereon, remove all suspicion of Heterodoxy, having formerly by a solemn Protestation given his word, that in case he had any singular opinion of his own, he would not spread it. Hereupon he made open profession, that he condemned the chief Pelagian opinions concerning grace natural, the strength of freewill, Original sin, the perfection of man in this life, and Predestination, and that he approved all those disputes, which Austin and other Fathers had written against them; and that in his judgement the Pelagian errors were rightly refuted by those Fathers, and withal promised, that he would teach nothing that differed from the received Doctrine of the Churches; and hereupon he was admitted to a Professors place in the University. In the beginning whereof he laboured by all means to quench all suspicion of Heterodoxy in himself, and maintained the doctrine of the Reformed Churches, De satisfactione Christi, de Fide justificante, de justificatione per fidem, de Perseverantiâ verè fidelium, de Certitudine salutis, de Perfectione hominis in hac vitâ etc. all which he afterwards contradicted, as also did his Followers. This I say, he then at the first maintained publicly, contrà sententiam suam (which let every man judge, whether it be not as much as to say, against his own Conscience) and Corvinus is alleged as in a certain Writing of his set forth in Low-Dutch ingeniously professing as much, Praefat, in Synod. Dordracen, Authoritate Ordinum Fol. 2. p. 1. But after he had been a year or two in the place, he begins to unmask himself, and by his Public Lectures, and chiefly by his dealing with his Scholars in private, his heterodoxy discovered itself. Here upon the deputies from the Churches of South and North Holland are sent unto him, who acquaint him with the rumours that went of him, praying him that if he disliked aught in the doctrine received, he would sincerely declare it unto his Brethren, to the end, either by a friendly Conference, he might receive satisfaction, or the whole business might lawfully be put over to the consideration of a Synod. Arminius his answer was, that he never gave any just cause, why such rumour should be spread of him, neither was it wisdom for him to treat with them as with Deputies, that should make relation of the whole matter to a Synod, though as private persons, he refused not to confer with them, provided that in case they differed, no relation hereof should be made unto a Synod. The Church of Leyden also admonished him, that there might be a Conference between him and his Colleagues, before the Presbytery of that Church. To them he answered he could not yield thereto, without leave from the Gurators of the University, and that he perceived not, that any benefit was like to redound unto the Church by such a Conference. At another time Fol. 4. p. 2. being entreated by the Professors and Pastors with great earnestness, that if he had aught to say against the doctrine received in their Confession and Catechism, he would freely and brotherly communicate it unto them, promising their endeavours to give him full satisfaction, or if not so, yet that he and his Colleagues under certain conditions might come to a fair agreement, to live together in peace, and that the reconciliation being made, nothing which passed between them should be divulged. The answer he made, was this, It was no wise part for him to yield to their motion, neither was he bound thereto, the present meeting being not ordained unto any such purpose, fol. 5. p. 2. Gomarus' openly tells him, how it became him to declare his opinion, neque ejusmodi subterfugiis diutius hâc in re uti, & fol. 6. p. 2. before the States he represents his continual practice thereunto, in concealing his Opinion, His words are these, Quibus insuper artibus opiniones suas disseminare; Publicè scilicet ab Ecclesiis rogatum obtestatumque, sententiam suam occultare, privatim vero Pastoribus quos in eam pertrahi posse speraret, ac discipulis suis diligentèr eam inculcare; argumenta Nostrorum praecipua quibus astrui doctrina Orthodoxa soleret enervare, Jesuitarum verò aliorumque Adversariorum, quibus doctrinam Ecclesiarum Reformatarum oppugnant confirmare, Varias de doctrinae receptae Veritate dubitationes discipulorum animis ingerere, eandemque cum doctrinâ heterodoxâ prius, quasi in aequilibrio suspendere, ac deinde prorsus rejicere, nullam hactenus sinceritatis ac consensus in doctrinâ, licet saepius ab Ecclesiis amanter fraterneque rogatum Declarationem edere voluisse. Now let any indifferent person compare the carriage of Arminius the Innovator, with the carriage of the Contra-Remonstrants, standing for the doctrine heretofore received, and judge impartially which of them betrays the greater distrust of the integrity of their Cause. 5. As for the easiness of defending it, if it be not, or were not so in their opinion, who are here pretended to have declined the sifting of it, What is that to the purpose? Then who are they, who say it may so easily be defended? I never read any hitherto, who do not acknowledge a great mystery in the divine providence. And from the days of Anselm unto this present day, it hath ever been accounted (in my observation) a very difficult point to accord predestination divine, with the liberty of men's wills. But put the case it may easily be defended, as of evident truth by the word of God, yet notwithstanding, if it be found harsh to men's affections, are they likely to admit it with such ease? I should think it ought to be put out of question, that God hath mercy on whom he will, in bestowing faith and repentance upon them, and thereby curing their natural infidelity and hardness of heart, as also that God hardeneth whom he will, leaving their infidelity and hardness of heart uncured; yet when flesh and blood riseth up against this doctrine thus, Why then doth God complain; (to wit, of man's disobedience) for who hath resisted his will? And the Apostle addresseth hereunto no other answer but this, O man who art thou who disputest with God? shall the thing form say to him that form it, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power over the clay of the same lump, to make one vessel unto honour, another unto dishonour? Is flesh and blood, I pray, apt to rest satisfied with this? Now as touching the two things I promised to add, they are these. 1. I pray consider whether in all this, this Author doth not very judiciously pronounce sentence against himself. For you know, your own motion you made unto him, and the promise he made unto you; and I pray consider how answerable hereunto hath been his performance. The certain Controversies, as touching which he professeth change of Opinion, what are they, but the five Articles so much agitated between the Remonstrants, and the Contra-Remonstrants? Do you not perceive how he makes choice only of reprobation to grate upon? Is he not content to lie close as touching four of them? What is this, but according to his language, the coveting of corners? And what willingness of abideing the trial doth this manifest? Yet he pleaseth himself in a conceit, of being as free from guile, as David was when he offered himself to the Lords trial, and thereupon advanceth himself to the greater liberty of censuring others, such as Beza, and Musculus, and their Fellows, together with the Contra-Remonstrants, as too full of that guile, whereof himself, by virtue not of his freewill, but of a grace of God of his shapeing, is void. This is an usual course with those of his spirit, whereof I have had plentiful experience in this very kind. For if you believe them, all the Arminians Geese are Swans, and all our Swans are Geese in comparison to them. He hopes you will not think he hates the light, or refuseth to come to the light, (in his phrase) this is the censure he liberally bestows upon his opposites. For though some of our Divines are willing enough to treat of the five Articles, yet to treat of reprobation, which is a part of one of those, they are not so willing, but this young Master in Israel, out of the plerophorious conceit of his own integrity and sufficiency, is very willing to treat of this of reprobation, though he leaves all the rest alone. Yet I pray make the scales even, What instance can be given, I do not say of Beza, Musculus, or any one of the Contra-Remonstrants, but of any one of the like condition to himself, that being entreated by a friend (as this Author was by you) to show the reasons, why he hath changed his mind from Arminianism, to the opposite opinions, hath carried himself, as this Author hath done, to give his reasons only on the part of one of them, and yet passeth his censure so prodigally on others for refusing trial, by the way implying, a glorious ostentation of his own performances to the contrary, as if he had done a notable piece of service, whereas all that he hath performed hereon, by proof from testimonies of Scripture, are little more than two Leaves, and therein also as it were purposely, declines all those places, wherein the Scripture speaketh directly of election, predestination, and of that, which in effect, is all one with reprobation. Such places pregnantly speaking hereof, he purposely declines, and yet he calls the places he insists upon, pregnant testimonies; and indeed so they are, but nothing at all to the purpose of predestination, election, or reprobation. Yet I marvel not he is so well conceited of his achievements. I remember the Fable of the fly, sitting on a Cartwheel, in a dry summer's day, and saying, See what a dust I make. For, because he hath discharged himself so unworthily with you, he may be bold to conceit, that if he had to deal with Beza, or with any of the Contra-Remonstrants, or of the Synod of Dort, he would make it soon appear, that Heresy and untruth condemns itself (this is the sweet accommodation he makes of that the Apostles 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) to wit, by their refusing the touchstone, and his readiness backed with all sufficiency to come thereto, whereof he hath given so plentiful demonstration in this he hath written unto you; as if he had been with some Oracle of late, who had not only revealed unto him, some reasonable motives, and wise carriages of the matter, but inspired him also with some martial spirit, fit for any encounter, despising his Adversaries, as empty Scholars, and as if their parts were but copper, to his gold. Therefore he may take heart to speak boldly, and show himself in the clear day, when such as Beza make choice to walk in mistress, and dwell in silence. Besides his care is very Apostolical for the peace of the Church, whereas Beza's was not at Mompelgard, nor the Contra-Remonstrants, neither at the Hague Conference, or at the Synod of Dort. For none of these belike, have been so forward to show themselves unto the World, and upon the stage, for the maintenance of their doctrine (at least in the point of reprobation) no not Beza in his Lectures upon the ninth to the Romans. Yet neither this man nor his Oracle hath done aught that I know, but in corners. And in corners I find these spirits exceeding busy; and I have been so happy (for so I account it, although I confess my time might be far more profitably bestowed) as to meet with some of their Mysteries, ere I was aware. And I find their Lion's skins, do smell far more of the Fox then of ehe Lyon. 2. The second is this, Why should their carriage be any prejudice to others, who are as willing to give an account of their faith in these particulars, as any Arminian whatsoever. For my part, I never met with any of them, that I declined, nor I hope never shall. I heartily wish, time might serve me for them all. I have dealt with Arminius his Examen, his Conference with Junius, Corvinus his answer unto Tilenus, I have entered upon Vossius his Pelagian History. I desire I might have time and opportunity, for their Synodalia Dordracena, but most of all with the Jesuits; while I deal with them I learn somewhat, but nothing at all while I am occupied with the Arminians. 3. Let me add one thing more: In the Articles of our Church, the seaventeenth is concerning Predestination and Election, not one concerning Reprobation. If any of us, should forbear to meddle with the doctrine of reprobation in dispute, may we not justly plead, a fair conformity to the wisdom of the Church whereof we are members? And by the way to touch one thing, Might not this be the reason, why this author utterly pretermits the prosecuting his opinion concerning Predestination and election, to wit, lest thereby he should fall foul upon the doctrine of our Church, so evidently set down in that Article concerning the point of Predestination? The Church of Ireland content themselves, with the very form of that 17th Article of ours concerning Predestination: Only they premise two Theses; the one whereof is this, God from all eternity, did by his unchangeable Council ordain, whatsoever in time should come to pass, yet so, as thereby no violence is offered to the Wills of the reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty, nor the contingency of the second cause is taken away, but established rather; The other this, By the same eternal Counsel, God hath Predestinated some unto life, and Reprobated some unto death, of both which there is a certain number, known only unto God, which neither can be increased nor diminished. DISCOURSE. The Third Motive. The Infamy of it. IT is an Opinion (as it is maintained by the Supralapsarians) odious to the Papists, and opens their foul mouths against our Church and Religion, and so abhorred (maintained either Way) by all the Lutherans, that for this very Tenent, they call us damned Calvenists, think us unworthy to be above ground, and in their Writings protest; that they will rather unite themselves to the Papists, then to us. Sir Edwin Sands speaks of men, whom he commends for singular learning and piety, (whose opinion he so sets down, as he declares it to be his own) that they think it were no blemish for the Reformed Relat. pag. 194, 198. Doctors to revive their doctrine, and to abate the rigour of certain speculative opinions, (for so he is pleased to call them) especially touching the eternal decrees of God, wherein some of their chief authors have run into such an utter opposition to all the Romish doctrine, as to have exceedingly scandalised all other Churches withal, yea, and many of their own to rest very ill satisfied. At the closing up of the Conference at Mompelgard, when Frederick Earl of Wortenberg exhorted Ostand. Hist. Eccles. pag. 1040. Colloq. Mompelg. pag. 566, 567. his Divines to acknowledge Beza and his Company for Brethren, and to declare it by giving them their hands, they utterly refused it, saving, That they would pray to God to open their eyes, and would do them any office of humanity and charity, but they would not give them the right hand of Brotherhood, because they were proved to be guilty, errorum teterimorum, of most pestilent errors, of which they reckoned this for one. Hemingius left his own side, and joined with us in the point of the Sacrament, but would come no nearer to us, but maintained a distance in this. It is a Morsel, which the greatest part of the Christian Churches cannot swallow; and therefore I think it would not down very easily with us, and without suspicion. TWISSE Consideration. HIs third Topick place, is drawn from the Infamy of this doctrine, and that amongst Papists and Lutherans. And this is a grand motive with him to abhor it. But I pray consider, was not the doctrine of the Gospel infamous at the first, both amongst Jews and Gentiles? What time the Jews were the only people of God, how doth Tacitus out of his worldly wisdom brand them? Doth he not call them Gentem teterrimam, Cenus hominum invisum Diis? And as touching Hist. l. 5. their religious Rites, mark what censure he passeth upon them, Profana illic omnia, quae apud nos sacra, rursus concessa apud illos, quae apud nos incesta, and comparing them with Annal. the Rites of Bacchus, saith, Liber festos, laetosque ritus posuit, Judaeorum Mos absurdus sordidusque. And speaking of the Christians he calls them, Genus hominum propter flagitia invisum. This censure he passeth upon them in the days of holy Paul, who forbade them to do evil that good might come thereof, and commands every soul to be subject to the Higher Powers, even then, when souls were at the best, and powers at worst. And see I pray what the King of Ashurs' judgement was, concerning the Religion of Samaria and Jerusalem, in comparison to the Religions of their Nations, which were heathenish. Isa. 10. 10. Like as mine hand hath found the Kingdoms of the Idols, seeing their Idols were above Jerusalem, and above Samaria. So that of an heathenish Religion, he had a better estimation then of the Religion of the Jews. Now if some Rabshakeh amongst them should turn heathen (for such a tradition, as I remember is received amongst the Rabbins, namely, that Rabshakeh was a Jew, but turned heathen) and afterwards endeavoured to entice the Jews to do as he did, and that because of the infamous nature of their Religion amongst heathens, how deserved such a one to be entertained by them? Was he not by the Law of God to be stoned to death? In like manner, if in the primitive days of the Church, some Christian should turn Jew or Infidel, and practice to seduce others from the obedience of faith, representing unto them how every where it was contradicted, how Christ himself was counted a blasphemer, a sorcerer, how the Gospel was a scandal to the Jews, foolishness to the Gentiles, and that in killing the holy Apostles, the world thought they did God very good service. Saint Paul himself professing of himself and his fellows, That they were made as the filth of the world, the offscouring of all things. Did this infamy prevail with 1 Corinth. 4. 13. Paul, or any other holy servant of God, to remit any thing, in the maintenance of his Christian faith? Nay, doth he not profess, saying, I pass not for these things, neither is my life dear unto me, so I may fulfil my course with joy, and the Ministration that I have received to testify the Gospel of the grace of God? And that in all things, They approve themselves as the Ministers of God by honour and dishonour, by good report and evil report, as deceivers and yet true. Act. 20 2 Cor. 6. 4, 8. Again, Is it to be expected, that any doctrine should be well spoken of, by such as are opposites and adversaries thereunto? Suppose a rigid Lutheran should by God's providence, be taken off from their ubiquitary doctrine; and in justifying himself for the change of his Opinion, should represent unto them, the infamous condition of that doctrine, both in the judgement of Papists, and in the judgement of Calvinists; I pray consider, How in all likelihood would this plea be entertained? Could he expect any better recompense hereof, then to be cast out of their Synagogues? Suppose a Papist should have his eyes opened, and brought to the truth of God in the point of justification, and, being demanded the reason of this change of mind in him, should answer, that the infamy of this doctrine, both amongst Lutherans and Calvinists is so great, and that such a morsel, which neither Lutherans nor Calvinists can swallow, should therefore (in his judgement) not down very easily with Papists, and without suspicion. Now let any indifferent Reader consider, how this plea in all probability would be received amongst papists. Yet I mean not to quiet myself, or content my Reader with this parallel. Of that which he here delivers of Papists, he gives us no evidence but his bare word in pawn, for the credit of this assertion. Neither gives he any testimony of Lutherans, their calling us damned Calvenists, and though he had, I pray, what were we the farther off from the kingdom of God for that? And I pray consider, is it not in our power to recompense them, and call them, damned Lutherans, if we list to recompense malice with malice, so to serve our own turns? And all this is delivered by him without distinction of Papists, learned and unlearned, Dominicans and Jesuits; in like sort without all distinction of Lutherans, whether rigid or moderate. But let us examine his crimination a part. And first, as for Papists; not one is here named, nor any reference made to any of of them. St Paul's prayer was, that they might be delivered from unreasonable men. I think never Sect rose upmore unreasonable than this Sect of Arminians. This Writing came unto my hands, before I had dispatched a large discourse sent unto me from one of same Sect, and therein I have met with pregnant evidences, that more heads than one, were employed thereabouts. And there I am told to my face, that our doctrine of absolute reprobation, we have learned from the Papists. Another with whom I had to do not long before, professeth in plain manner thus; The Jesuits ten of them for one, favour the absolute irrespective decree, following herein as they think St Austin, but especially their St Thomas, and Scotus, with all the rabble of rotten Schoolmen, and the whole Tribe at this day of the Dominicans, who are buzy zealots for the cause; of whose consent some amongst us are not ashamed to brag. If our irrespective decree, be so jointly maintained by both Jesuits, and Dominicans, and that as they think according to Austin, how is it possible our doctrine herein, can be so odious to the Papists? Or what Papists doth he mean, if neither Jesuits nor Dominicans, nor any such as concur with either of them? Or if it be so odious unto them, as one Arminian Proselyte professeth, how can it be so concordantly maintained by them, as another Arminian proselyte avoucheth? And if we have learned it at the hands of Papists, what will these Lutherans gain, by uniting with Papists rather then with us, that is, with the Masters rather than with the Scholars. And if a Lutheran should be converted to the embracing of our Tenent herein, and to justify himself should plead; That we Calvinists are ready to protest, that in the doctrine of reprobation and predestination, we had rather unite ourselves with Papists then with them, Of what moment think you, would this motive be with them, which this Author most inconsiderately proposeth, as a point of very ponderous consideration? But as touching Papists, their dislike of us, he confines it only to the Supralapsarian-way. And indeed that distinction of the Supralapsarian and Sublapsarian-way. was brought in merely to get thereby some more elbow room. For if they agree with us in the point of God's absolute and irrespective decrees, how improbable is it, that the doctrine of any of our Divines, in stating the object of predestination to be humanum genus nondum conditum, will prove odious unto them; considering this is a mere Logical difference, as I have showed in my Vindic. Grat. Dei cap. 1. pag. 1. De Predestinatione digress. 1. Yet as touching the Supralapsarian-way, that opinion is imputed unto Junius by Arminius, as also to Thomas and his Followers. Collat. Armin. cum Juni. pag. 4. and if so, how improbable is it, that such an Opinion should be so odious to the Papists, as this Author upon his bare word avoucheth. And Alphonsus Mendoza spares not to profess, that supernaturals were intended by God before naturals; and his discourse hereupon, was taken with admiration by his Auditors in Spain, and he was urged as himself professeth, to set it forth in Print. And the Quatuor signa Francisci Mayronis (mentioned by Mr Perkins De Praedest. Modo & Ordine) do manifest that he took the same way; and these quatuor signa, Franciscus Mayro received from the doctrine of Scotus. It is well known that in the Synod of Dort, there met Divines different in this point, who yet neither hated one another's doctrine nor persons for this difference; like as so it is amongst us, as in the place above mentioned I have showed. Nay it is apparent, that Junius took upon him to reconcile all three opinions there abouts, and Piscator after him, who also hath discharged his part herein, far more clearly than junius. And no marvel, junius having first broken the ice. But that the truth may not be carried in the clouds of ambiguities, as they desire, who are in love with error: All the question between these our Divines consists in this, Whether it were the will of God that Adam should fall by his permission, so to make way for God's glorious ends, to wit, the manifestation of his glory, in the incarnation of the Son of God, as also in the way of mercy, in the salvation of some; and in the way of justice, in the condemnation of others. The Supralapsarians maintain, that such was the will of God, lest otherwise way should be made for the manifestation of God's glorious works by accident, rather than by God's providence. Other Divines that take the Sublapsarian way, had rather decline this nice point as difficult, then oppose it as odious. But say I, the doctrine wherein both Jesuits and Arminians do agree, will abundantly serve us to justify us, in the positive and affirmative part of so nice a point as this. For by their doctrine of Scientia Media, God did foresee, that upon such an administration of his providence about Adam as was used, Adam would fall; and more than this, that God could have brought forth other administrations of his providence in very great variety, some whereof were such, that if God had used, Adam would not have fallen. Now being pleased to make use of such an administration of providence divine, upon the purpose whereof, he foresaw Adam would fall; and not being pleased to use such a providence, upon the purpose whereof, he had foreseen Adam would not have fallen; I call here all the indifferent of the World to judge, whether it doth not manifestly follow herehence, that it was the will of God, Adam should fall by his permission. Again, throughout our doctrine, nothing is more harsh than that of Gods determining the will of the creature, to every act of his, as touching the substance thereof. Dares this author betray such ignorance, as hand over head to profess, that this doctrine is odious unto Papists? Whereas the most learned in the Church of Rome, are well known to maintain it in express terms, whereas our Divines course is, to keep themselves to the phrase of Scriptures. And as for the Jesuits who oppose it, and in the place thereof bring in Scientia Media, and Gratia Congrua, shaped after the genius of Scientia Media. I can show an express acknowledgement under the hand of a zealot for the Arminian cause, that between the Gratia praedeterminans of the Dominicans, and Gratia congrua of the Jesuits, there is no such material difference at all, but that the absoluteness of predestination and reprobation doth follow, as well upon the one, as upon the other. To conclude, I would this Author would be so wise, as once more to consult with his Oracle, and inquire, Whether Papists are more ready to join with Lutherans, in their doctrine of Christ's Ubiquity, as touching his Manhood, then with us in the point of Reprobation, or of God's concourse. For suppose we held as Suarez is pleased to state our Tenent, namely, Quod Deus omnipotenti voluntate nobis necessitatem imponat; yet the same Suarez saith, that in this very point, we are not reprehended of them, as if we affirmed aught, Quod vel in re ipsâ contradictionem involvat, aut Dei omnipotentiam superet. I presume no Papist is so well conceited in the Lutherans doctrine in the point of Ubiquity. From that which he affirms of Papists, I come to that which he affirms of Lutherans. And what one instance hath he given of any Lutheran, speaking against our making the corrupt Mass the object of predestination or reprobation? Surely not one, either out of Sir Edwin Sands, nor out of Osiander; Nay what cause is there, why either Papist or Lutheran should, in case the object thus stated (or in a more rigid form of the Mass Uncorrupt) doth no way constrain us to maintain, that God doth intend the damnation of any man, in any moment of nature, before the consideration of him, as departing out of this World, under the power of sin; no nor to maintain, that God doth intend the salvation of any man, in any moment of nature, before the consideration of him, in final perseverance in faith and repentance, provided God suffer him, to live until the use of reason, as I have showed, and endeavoured to justify, and make appear, in my Vindic. Grat. Dei, in the digressions concerning Predestination. For indeed not any of our Divines was, I think, ever known to maintain, that God did intend to damn any man but for sin; Neither do I maintain, that God intended to bestow salvation on any man of ripe years, but by way of reward of his faith and repentance. The true and principal, real (not verbal only) difference between us, and the Arminians, is about Gods bestowing of faith and repentance, and his purpose thereof. Now let any learned Lutheran deliver his mind on this, namely, upon the foresight where of it is, that God gives faith and repentance unto some, and denies it unto others. When Tossanus makes relation of Hunnius his exposition of that place Acts 13. 48. Et crediderunt quotquot ordinati erant ad vitam, thus, id est, qui sese ordinarant & disposuerant ad audiendum Dei verbum; * Et illud fide amplectendum. Hunnius in his refutation of Tossanus his Theses, citys Tossanus to appear before the tribunal seat of the Judge both of quick and dead, and to show in what place of his writings, this is to be found, professing that such doctrine is the very Pelagian Heresy, and that himself never approved it, but disproved it rather, and most constantly impugned it. What Lutheran was ever known so absurd, as to say, that God worketh in us, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Velle credere, modò Velimus? Yet this doctrine I can show in express terms delivered by an Arminian. But come to the consideration of the instances proposed by him. The first is the Relation of Sir Edwin Sands. And I remember well to have read in him somewhat concerning the Predestinary Pestilence, so called by some. And I might wonder at this Author's wisdom, in pretermitting that passage; but upon search finding it about Fol. 59 though my Book hath no quotation at all of pages, I ceased to wonder at his concealing of it. I have rather cause to commend his wisdom therein, although it expresseth that whereupon this Author formerly touched, as concerning the Lutherans readiness to return to the Papacy rather than to admit that Predestinary Pestilence. For predestinary pestilence goeth not here alone, but is joined with the Sacramentary pestilence, For these two points, saith he, are the ground of the quarrel; but he adds I confess, that the Predestinary pestilence was more scandalous at that day than the former. Yet the same Author professeth Fol. 73. of the Lutherans, that if he fetch an elle forwards one way, for an elle he looseth another way, it is only by a kind of boisterous force and violence against the Calvinists, as in Strasborough of late. And the reason hereof he takes to be in part the Absurdities of the Ubiquitary Chimaera. And as for the passage here alleged, I find it about Fol. 86. Wherein I consider, First that the speculative opinions he speaks of are not about the eternal decrees of God only, or especially above all others, as here by cunning carriage it is pretended. For the words run thus; It can be no blemish to them to revise their Doctrine, and to abate the rigour of certain speculative opinions, especially touching the eternal decrees of God, the quality of man's nature, the use of works, wherein some of their chief Authors have come to such an utter opposition, &c So that the points of rigorous doctrine, which were to be qualified in this Gentleman's judgement, are many, but especially three; The first whereof is touching the eternal decrees of God, The second concerning the quality of man's nature, The third concerning the use of Works: So that the doctrine of God's eternal decrees is not the point alone, the rigour whereof especially is to be qualified in this Author's judgement, but this especial care of qualification, is by him referred to the three points formerly mentioned, and that indifferently. Secondly, Whereas this Author relates, that this is delivered, not as out of the relators judgement only, but as out of the judgement of men whom he commends for singular learning and Piety. I find no such matter in the Relation that I have, though I have searched after it, both by considering what went before, and what comes after, as far as he treats of the same matter. Whether this comes in a second Edition I know not: in mine I find no such thing. So that the weight of this motive hitherto, lies wholly upon the authority of this Gentleman. And surely I should think it were nothing hard to counterbalance this authority to the full. And it may be he speaks herein no other thing then wherein he was endoctrinated by his Tutor, as lately an ingenious and grave divine, differing from us in the point of reprobation, most ingeniously acknowledged, that he was brought into that opinion of his by his Tutor, who was a Lutheran: And I doubt we have too many such amongst us. Of late I have heard, that one of good place spared not openly to profess, saying, Call us as we ought to be called, for we are Lutherans: I would we had not too many Popish-hearted amongst us. Thirdly, whereas this Gentleman adviseth us to revise the Doctrines, and this Author accommodates it only to God's eternal decrees; I have already performed this, and qualified the rigour of some men's opinions thereabouts. For whereas some have subordinated God's decree of permitting sin, to the decree of damnation, I have taken another course, and do maintain, that in no moment of nature is the decree of damnation, before the decree of permitting final perseverance in sin. Again, I presume this Gentleman's meaning is not, that the doctrine of the Church of England is rigorous, as touching Gods eternal decrees. I willingly profess, I desire no better trial of the truth of the Doctrine I maintain hereabouts, next unto the Word of God, then to be tried by the 17th Article of the Church of England, and by the Articles of the Church of Ireland, set forth in the days of King James Thirdly, I would it were put unto this Gentleman, if he be living, Whether in his Opinion, God of his free grace doth bestow faith and repentance on some, thereby to cure that natural infidelity and hardness of heart, which is originally found in all, and of his mere pleasure, he denies it unto other: Or whether finding some moral difference or preparation in one more than in another, is hereupon moved to give faith and repentance unto them, and deny it unto others. If he shall acknowledge, that God doth show his mercy to whom he will, that is, of his mere pleasure, and denies it to whom he will, I am ready to profess, that let him state God's eternal decrees after what manner he will, I shall willingly subscribe thereunto; provided it be suitable unto the former ground: and as for the unsuitable nature thereof, if in case it so fall out, let the proof and evident demonstration thereof, lie on me. But if his opinion be, that God bestows faith and repentance on man, moved thereunto by some moral preparation, which he finds in one, rather than in another, I appeal to the Lutherans themselves, whether this be not in plain terms no better than Pelagianisme. As for his calling their opinions in this point, speculative opinions (as this Author would have us observe) I am willing to observe it: and withal I think, he doth it with better judgement, than this Author doth in calling them practical. And whereas it is pretended, that our Divines have been carried into these opinions of theirs, in opposition to Popish Doctrine, This is so out of season in these days (notwithstanding the raw judgement of this Author) that our Arminians spare not to profess (as formerly mentioned) and charge us to our face, that we have learned this doctrine of ours, out of the Writings of Papists. And Grevincovius, against Amesius, spares not to pronounce, that They may with better credit follow the Jesuits, than We the Dominicans, considering that the Dominicans are the great Administrators of the Inquisition in Spain. This is delivered as touching the point of grace and freewill: but as touching the point of election and reprobation absolute, I can show under the hand of an Arminian, that herein there is no material difference between the Dominicans, and most part of the Jesuits; so little difference there is between the Gratia Praedeterminans of the one, and the Gratia Congrua of the other. So that if this be true, it is not probable, that hereby we scandalise the judicious and learned Papists; and what those other Churches are which we scandalise, excepting Churches Lutheran, either this Author knows not, or is well content to dissemble it, to wit, the Churches of Socinians and Anabaptists. And how do we more scandalise the Churches Lutheran herein, than they scandalise us? Was it ever known, that by mere differing in Opinion from other Churches, Christian men were said to scandalise them? Or if it were so, must not the scandal in this case, be equal on both sides? As for the leaving many of our own very ill satisfied, why should that seem strange? What doth Carrier write of many well known to him in this our Church of England, of the same mind with himself, some Papists, some Lutherans? And may there not be as many amongst the Lutherans, as ill satisfied with the doctrine commonly received amongst them, save that they are far more forward, to excommunicate all such, as soon as they appear, than We? Besides all this, The point of scandal is brought in very unseasonably; For if it be a truth that we maintain and profess, if any are scandalised by it, it is a scandal taken, not given: God forbid we should grow so profane, as to account it a scandalous thing to make profession of God's truth; especially this truth we maintain being so near to a clear opposition to Pelagianism, a Heresy condemned by the Church above 1200 years ago. When Frederick Duke of Woortenberg exhorted his Divines to acknowledge Beza, and his Company for Brethren, and to declare it by giving them their hands; The answer of refusal was made by Jacobus Andrea's a most bitter enemy, and one whom Beza describes, tanquam virum sanguinarium, and his carriage throughout was most imperious. And it becomes an Arminian spirit well, to make the rancour of his malicious heart, a rule wherebyto cry down the doctrine which he abhorred. With a far better grace might a Papist cry down our faith, opposite to the doctrine of the Church of Rome, by the Pope's abhorring it, and damning of it to the pit of hell. For surely it is fit he should be of far more authority than Jacobus Andrea's; not to speak of the Anathematization of it in the Council of Trent, nor of the common argument of Papists, in that they deny that we can be saved, many amongst us are of opinion, that a Papist can be saved, therefore better to be a Papist than a Protestant; yet surely it is in the power of our corruption to requite malice with malice, and as much to scorn with our heels their Brotherhood, as they ours. But if through the grace of God, we do not give ourselves leave to requite their malice, if that be no scandal to themselves, there is no cause why it should be any scandal unto us. In Sir Edwin Sands about Fol. 59 there is such a relation as this, Though the Princes and Heads of the weaker sides in those parts both of Palsgrave and Landsgrave, have with great wisdom and judgement (to aslack those flames) imposed silence on that point, to the Ministers of the one Party, hoping that the charity and discretion of the other sort, would have done the like: yet it falleth out otherwise, that Lutheran Preachers rage hitherto in their Pulpits. Now let Arminians if they think good, conclude herehence, that seeing there was so little charity and discretion, in the Lutheran Preachers, it becomes them in their writings and Conclusions, to show as little charity and discretion as they for their hearts; and that grace of God which they fashion to themselves, will bear them out in this, it being merely the power of their own free-wills. But this is not all I have to say in answer hereunto. The phrase in Osiander is not, errorum teterrimorum, but haerescωn teterrimarum, of which this Author saith, they reckoned this for one. And let him speak out and tell us, what were the others. Was not the denial of Consubstantiation another? As also the denial of the lawfulness of that Baptism, which was administered by Women; (the practice whereof King James reform in our Book of Common-Prayer:) As also their not concurrence with them in opinion about the Person of Christ, which by their Ubiquitary Chimaera (as Sir Edwin Sands call it) they do miserably deform. These and other such like were the errors, whereof this Author saith, Beza and his Fellows were proved to be guilty of in this Conference, for so I take his meaning, pronouncing thereby sentence tanquam ex Cathedra Judicis; or the Lutheran Party throughout in that Conference: which Conference was not of Predestination alone, but de Caenâ Domini, de Personâ Christi, de Imaginibus, de Baptismo, and last of all de Praedestinatione. Yet I have not done with this. For I beseech you consider, whether this Author, or his Oracle, be not miserably deceived in all this, and that these teterrimae Haereses are not such as jacobus Andreas with his Lutheran party, laid to the charge of Beza and his Brethren, but rather such as Beza and his Brethren, laid to the charge of the Lutherans; and that not in this Conference, but in their Writings, in Scriptis, so goeth the relation. Whereas this Conference was not by writing, but only by word of mouth; jacobus Andrea's not enduring to give way to Beza's motion as touching the consigning of that which they delivered in writing under their hands. For the relation in Osiander runs thus; Ad haec D. jacobus respondit, Woortenbergicos Theologos Deum oraturos, ut Bezae & ipsius Collegis oculos mentis aperiat. Ut autem illis dextram fraternitatis praebeant non ignor are illos quam horribilium errorum & teterrimarum haereseω● in suis Scriptis coram Fcclesiâ ipsos reos egerint; Ideoque se mirari quomodo eos pro fratribus agnoscere possint aut velint, aut corum fraternitatem expetant, si pro talibus agnoscant, qui damnatas Haereses ab Orco revocent ut Ecclesiae Dei obtendant. Now these words though at first sight they may seem to be referred, either to the Woortenbergers as accusing Beza and his Brethren, of such errors and heresies; yet the words following, Ideoque se mirari quamodo eos pro fratribus agnoscere possint aut velint, aut eorum fraternitatem expetant, si pro talibus agnoscant, qui damnatas Haereses ex Orco revocent: these words I say do far more incline to signify, that Beza and his Brethren, laid these horrible errors and heresies to the charge of the Lutherans; and therefore the Lutherans wondered, how they could desire their Brotherhood, whom they accounted such horrible Heretics; rather than the Lutheran party, should wonder how they should affect Brotherhood with Beza, seeing they neither did affect any such, and if they had it was not fit they should wonder at their own actions. But that which follows puts it out of all question; where comes in manifestly, what the Lutheran Party conceived of the Doctrine of Beza implying thereby, what Beza and his Fellows conceived of the Lutherans Doctrine, was formerly expressed; the words following are these, Contrà verò in quibus & quam tetris erroribus ipsi versentur (that is Beza and his company) hac Collatione iis demonstratum esse: In quibus cum adhuc perseverent ipsos intelligere quòd eos pro fratribus agnoscere non possint. In which words Andreas gives the reason why he and his Fellows cannot acknowledge Beza and his fellows for brethren, because they maintained, tetros errores (as he calls them;) for proof whereof he appeals to the present Conference. And this being delivered on the contrary part to that which is delivered before, as appears by the very first word, Contra verò, it followeth, that in the former part was set down, the reason why Beza and his fellows, should not desire the fraternity of the Lutheran party, to wit, because they laid to the Lutherans charge, that they maintained horrible errors and most pestilent Heresies, for proof whereof, he appeals not to this present Conference, which was carried wholly by word of mouth, but to their Writings. This being clearly the meaning of Andreas, it is apparent, that the charge laid by Beza and his fellows, upon the Lutherans, was of fouler crimes, by Andreas his relation, than was the charge laid by Andreas upon Beza and his Brethren. For Andreas charged Beza only with, errores tetros; but Beza and his are said to have charged the Lutherans with horribiles errores, & haereses teterrimas. So that this Author doth miserably mistake his own evidences, and shamefully abuseth himself first, and others after him, if they will be abused by him. And whether he hath not taken it from some Achates of his upon trust I know not; and if it be so that some Achates hath helped him hereunto, certainly he hath not proved Fidus Achates in this. In the close, it will not be amiss to show, how Mr Mason of St Andrews Vndershaft in London, allegeth this carriage of Jacobus Andreas, as a testimony of the Lutheran uncharitableness, in comparison with the charitable condition of their opposites, in a small Treatise of Contentment in God's gifts. pag. 19 And shall their uncharitableness plead for the truth of their way, or be any just argument, of the untruth of our way, in any sober and wise man's judgement. Of Hemingius his leaving his own side, I never heard or read before, unless that of a Papist he became a Protestant. But the difference is well known between the rigid and moderate Lutherans, and these are called by the other Semi-Calviniani. And what I pray hath Hemingius deserved, that his authority should be greater than the authority of Zuinglius, Calvin, Junius; Zanchius, Piscator. The Lutherans themselves (I suppose) will hardly think him worthy to be remembered the same day with Martin Luther. And as for Martin Luther's doctrine herein, to my judgement, he is far more express and resolute than Calvin, and I find that Beza in his Conference of Mompelgard, doth sometimes twit his opposites with Luther's Doctrine, whereunto throughout that Conference, I do not find they answer any thing at all. When he saith, It is a Morsel, which the greatest part of the Christian Churches cannot swallow; What a wild course doth he take in these his Motives. Must we for every doctrine of ours, examine whether the most part of Christian Churches do embrace it yea or no? Why should we not then run out in this our search, and inquire, what is the Moscoviticall and Grecian Faith, what the Aethiopian, and Abyssine, and so proceed in our contemplative perambulations, all the World over, and what we have found preached unto our people also, to their more profound, and substantial edification, if they list to believe us upon our word. But I suppose he looked no farther than to this Western World, secluding the new discoveries within the last hundred years or somewhat more. And very confidently he must exclude all Popish Churches, or presume they are for him in this. Yet as I said, the very last Arminian, I have had to deal with, hath told me to my face, that my Doctrine of absolute Reprobation, I have learned it of the Papists; and another to this purpose, there is no material difference between the Gratia Congrua of the Jesuits, and Cratia praedeterminans of the Dominicans. And secluding Popish Churches, I know not who they are, whom he calls the greatest part of the Christian Churches. Be it, that the Lutheran Churches are a greater Party, than the Churches of the Calvinists (which is more than I find in Sir Edwin Sands his Relation.) Now suppose the number of the Calvinists and their power were greater than that of the Lutherans; ask I pray any Lutheran in the World whether that were any reasonable motive unto him to change his Religion and turn Calvinist? If it be of no weight to persuade them, why should it be of any moment to prevail with us? I come now to the Fourth and last of these Motives. DISCOURSE. The Fourth Motive. It's affinity with the old exploded and condemned Errors of the Stoics and Manichees. THe Opinion of the Stoics was, that all actions and events were inevitable, and determined, either by the revolutions of the Heavens, and the qualities of the Stars, which reign at men's births, or by the Concatenation of natural things, and the disposition of the first matters of all things, being so put together from eternity, that one thing must needs follow another as it doth, and the Materia Prima being so disposed, that all things cannot successively come to pass otherwise then they do, but must of necessity be as they are, even invito Deo, though God would have some things to be otherwise then they be. The Manichees held, that all men's actions, good or evil, were determined too: Good actions by a good God, who was the author of all good things created, and of all good actions that fell out in the World: Evil actions by an Evil God, who was the primum principium malt, the first and principal author of all evil things that were extant in the world. The Maintainers of the absolute decree, do say one of these two things; either that all actions natural and moral, good and evil, and all events likewise are absolutely necessary, or that all men's ends (at least) are unalterable and undeterminable by the power of their wills, which is upon the matter all one. For in vain is our freedom in the actions, if the end which they drive at be pitched and determined, sith, Omnis actio est propter finem, All actions are done for the ends sake, that it might be obtained by them, which without them could not. Now in these three Opinions, we may note two things. 1. The substance and formality of them, which is an unavoidableness of men's actions and ends whatsoever they be; In this all of them agree and holding that in all things, undeclinable fates, and insuperable necessity do domineer. And therefore Melancthon doth not slack in many of his common Places, to call this absolute decree, Fatum Stoicum, Tabulas Parcarum, and to charge the Church of Geneva (the great defender of it) with a labour to bring in the Stoics errors, as we may see in a certain Epistle of Melancthons' to Peucer, where he speaks thus, Scribit ad me Laetius de Stoico Fato usque adeo litem Genevae moveri, ut quidam in carcerem conjectus sit propterea quod à Zenone differret. O Misera Tempora! Doctrina salutis peregrinis quibusdam dubitationibus obscuratur. And Beza too speaking of Melancthon says, Philippus de his rebus itascribere caeperat, ut Genevenses quasi Stoicorum Fatum invehentes notare quibusdam videatur. 2. The Circumstances or the grounds of their Opinions. The Stoics derive this necessity from the Stars or first matter, the Manichees from duo prima principia aeterna & coeterna, and these last from the peremptory decree of Almighty God, so that in this they differ, but in this difference, the Stoics and the Manichees in some respects have the better. For it is better to derive the necessity of evil actions, or unhappy events from an evil God, or from the course of nature, then from the decree of that God who is infinitely good. The substance of their Opinions is all one, the ground wherein they differ is but accidental to their error. If it be so, for this very reason alone may this doctrine of absolute reprobation be suspected, because these dreams of the Stoics were exploded by the best Philosophers of all sorts: and this of the Manichees was generally cried down by the Fathers, not only as foolish, but as impious and unworthy of entertainment in a Christian heart, or Christian Commonwealth, not so much for any thing circumstantial in it, but because it made all things and events necessary, and so plucked up the roots of virtue, planted vice, and left no place for just rewards or punishments. These are my Reasons of the first sort. TWISSE Consideration. OUR Doctrine I see is cried down, not only as infamous, but also as Stoical, and Manichaicall. Now I had thought the infamy of it had consisted only in the Stoicality of it, and it is no way fit to coordinate the Genus with the Species, in multiplying criminations. But I remember what the Poet observes to fall out sometimes, namely, that, Accedit fervor capiti numerusque lucernis. It calls to my remembrance a story that Mr Bastard sometimes told my good friend D. Hoskins, it was of a neighbour that came to him complaining of a friend of his, that had lost all his five Senses; as for example, his sight and his seeing, and so proceeded in his amplification: with whom Mr Bastard as it were, condoling, answered, Though he had lost his fight, yet if he had retained his seeing, there had been some comfort. True Sir quoth the plain fellow. In like sort, I might say, that though our Doctrine in this point be Stoical, yet if it were not infamous there were some comfort in it, but the heavy crimination laid to our charge is, that it is not only Stoical, but infamous also. But let this be our comfort, that nothing herein is laid to our charge, which was not laid to the charge of Austin, many hundred years ago. This Prosper testifies after Augustine's death, to have been the practice of the Pelagians. Prout sibi obnoxias aliquorum aures opportunasque repererint, scripta ejus quibus error Pelagianorum impugnatur, Prosp. Epist. ad Ruffin. infamant, dicentes, eum liberum arbitrium peni●ùs submovere & sub gratiae nomine necessitatem praedicare fatalem. Neither was he free from this reproach while he lived, as appears by divers passages; as Contr. duas Epistol. Pelagiani. lib. 2. cap. 5. Sub nomine, inquiunt, gra●●ae ita fatum astruunt, ut dicant, quia nisi Deus invito & reluctanti homini in●piraverit boni & ipsius imperfecti cupiditatem, nec à malo declinare, nec bonum posset arripere. This is the objection; His Answer followeth in these words. Nec sub nomine gratiae Fatum asserimus, quia nullis hominum meritis dicimus Dei gratiam antecedi. Si autem quibusdam omnipotentis Dei voluntatem placet Fati nomine nurcupari, profanas quidem verborum novitates evitamus, sed de verbis contendere non amamus. And cap. 6. Fatum qui affirmant de syderum positione ad tempus quo concipitur quisque vel nascitur, quas Constellationes vocant, non solùm actus & eventa, veram etiam ipsas nostras voluntates pendere contendunt. Dei verò gratia non solùm omnia sydera & omnes caelos, utrum etiam omnes Angelos supergreditur. Deinde Fati assertores & bona & mala hominum Fato tribuunt. Deus autem in malis hominum meritis eorum debita retributione prosequitur; bona verò per indebitam gratiam misericordi voluntate largitur: utrumque faciens non per stellarum temporale consortium, sed per suae severitatis & bonitatis aeternum altumque consilium. Neutrum ergò pertinere videmus ad Fatum. And cap. 8. jam de Gratia & Fato quam inani alloquuntur ostendimus. Nunc illud est quod debemus advertere, utrum invito & reluctanti homini Deus inspiret boni cupiditatem, ut jam non sit reluctans, non sit invitus, sed consentiens bono, & volens bonum. In like sort, the Pelagians charged Austin with Manicheisme, De Nupt. & Concupisc. lib. 2. cap. 3. to whom he answereth thus, Quid obtendis ad fallendum communis dogmatis tegmen, ut operias proprium crimen, unde vobis inditum est nomen, atque ut nefario vocabulo terras imperites, dicis, ne igitur vocentur Haeretici, fiant Manichaei. And more at large, Contr. duas Epist. Pelag. ad Bonifacium, cap. 2. Manichaei dicunt Deum bonum non omnium natuarrum esse creatorem: Pelagiani dicunt, Deum non esse omnium aetatum in hominibus mundatorem, salvatorem, liberatorem. Catholica utrosque redarguit, & contra Manichaeos defendens Dei creaturam ne ab illo instituta negetur ulla creatura; & contrà Pelagianos ut in omnibus aetatibus perdita requiratur humana natura. 2. Manichaei carnis concupiscentiam non tanquam accidens vitium, sed tanquam naturam ab aeternitate malam vituperant: Pelagiani eam tanquam nullum vitium sed naturale sit, bonum insuper laudant. Catholica utrosque redarguit, Manichaeis dicens non natura, sed vitium est; Pelagianis dicens, Non à Patre, sed ex mundo est, ut eam velut malam valetudinem sanari utr●que permittant, desinendo illi tanquam insanabilem credere, isti tanquam laudabilem praedicare. 3. Manichaei negant, homini bono ex libro arbitrio fuisse initium mali; Pelagiani dicunt etiam hominem malum sufficienter habere liberum arbitrium ad faciendum praeceptum bonum. Catholica utrosque redarguit, & illis dicens, Fecit Deus hominem rectum; & istis dicens, si vos Filius liberaverit, verè liberi eritis. 4. Manichaei dicunt, animam particulam Dei, naturae malae commixtione habere peccatum; Pelagiani dicunt, animam justam non quidem particulam, sed creaturam Dei, etiam in istâ corruptibili vitâ non habere peccatum. Catholica utrosque redarguit, Manichaeis dicens, Aut facile arborem bonam, & fructum ejus bonum, aut facile arborem malam & fructum ejus malum; Pelagianis dicens, si dixerimus quia non habemus peccatum, nosmetipsos seducimus. His morbis inter se contrariis Manichaei Pelagianique confligunt dissimili voluntate, simili vanitate, seperati opinione diversâ, sed propinqui ment perversâ. jam verò gratiam Christi simul oppugnant, Baptismum ejus simul evacuant, Carnem ejus simul inhonorant, sed etiam hoc modis causisque diversis. Nam Manichaei meritis naturae bonae, Pelagiani autem meritis voluntatis bonae perhibent divinitus subveniri. Illi dicunt, debet hoc Deus laboribus membrorum suorum: Isti dicunt, debet hoc virtutibus suorum. Utrisque ergò merces non imputatur secundum gratiam, sed secundum debitum. But come we to the consideration of the particulars delivered by this Author. 1. As touching the opinion of the Stoics and Manichees. 2. As touching the Parallel he makes, between their opinion and ours, in the point of Predestination. 1. The Chaldeans and Astrologers, did altogether place Fate, in the influences of the stars, and because those glorious bodies, did infatuate the World with a show of Divinity (which the Lord Laboured to prevent in the Jews. Deutr. 4.) no marvel if the vulgar sort did acknowledge no other fate, but that. As Austin saith, De Civit. Dei lib. 5. cap. 1. Id (Fatum) homines quando audiunt usitatâ loquendi confuetudine non intelligunt, nisi vim positionis syderum, qualis est quando quis nascitur sive concipitur. But I do not find that the Stoics did thus distinguish, but by their Series Causarum, they comprehended all causes celestial or sublunary. Ramus indeed conceived such a difference between Possidonius and Chrysippus both Stoics, but Turnebus makes bold to tell him, that herein he erred. Quod autem Possidonium dicis studio Astrologiae oblectatum, Fatum syderibus attribuisse in eo peccas, quod aliam ejus quam Chrysippi sententiam putas, nec eam totam complecteris. Nam si in simul aegrotantibus fratribus causam esse dicebat in syderum & caeli constitutione & affectione, non tamen idcircò in aliis rebus Fatum non esse judicabat. Nay he professeth that according to all the Stoics, Fatum was God himself and nature; and that by Fatum they understood, omnem naturae contagionem, which was Cicero's phrase. As indeed the whole frame of nature is knit together per contactum, which Cicero called Naturae contagionem. And he proves as much of Possidonius out of Cicero De Divinatione. For Quintus therein professing according to the opinion of Possidonius, that all force and course of Divination, was derived from God, from destiny, and from nature, he concludes therehence, that all kind of artificial and natural Divination, were in his opinion comprehended under the notion of Fate. And out of Cicero's second Book of Divination shows, that whereas Possidonius his opinion was, Vim quandam sentientem & divinam quae tota confusa sit mundo, ad hostiam deligendam ducere. He concludes thus; Satis ut opinor, significat Possidonium non in syderibus tantum Fatum posuisse, sed per omnem mundi continuationem & naturae conjunctionem, ordinem seriemque causarum permanare credidisse. Idem Possidonius (saith he) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 scripserat, quod non fecisset, si in syderibus tantum Fatum esse sensisset. And like as Possidonius did not insist only in the stars, for the confirmation of Fate, so neither did Chrysippus in inferior causes. Necessitatem nature acutus interpres (he taxeth Ramus) ad Chrysippum pertinere astrorum ad Possidonium credidisti; errorem errore cumulasti. Nam nec Possidonius in solis astris Fatum ponebat sed in totâ naturae contagione, ut suprà docui: & Chrysippus in eâdem naturae contagione, quâ etiam astra continentur, quod non intellexisti. And that he proves out of Cicero answering Chrysippus in this manner. Ut igitur ad quasdam res natura loci pertinet, ad quasdam autem nihil: sie affectio astrorum valeat, sivis ad quasdam res; ad omnes certè non valebit. Chrysippum enim alloquitur (saith Turnebus) ut vel puero notum est, ut me tui pudeat & pigeat, qui Possidonium intelligis. Thus he disciplines Ramus, and proceed farther, saying, Chrysippum autem in astrorum constitutione, & affectione Fatum posuisse, audi ex Cicerone; si quis, verbi causâ oriente Caniculâ natus est, is in mari non morietur. Vigila Chrysippe etc. Nihil istud argumentum (thus Turnebus concludes herehence) nisi etiam in astris Fatum poneret. So that the four opinions concerning Fate, related by Ludovicus Vives in 4. lib. August. De Civit. Dei cap. 8. and that out of Picus Mirandula, lib. 2. Contra Astrologos; The first whereof is said to be Nature; The second, a Series of causes necessary knit together, the Third the Stars, the Fourth the Execution of Divine Decree. I say all these make but one Fatum with the Stoics, yea with all the Stoics in the judgement of Turnebus. And Austin De Civit. Dei lib. 5. cap. 8. expressly includes the will of God within that Series of causes, which was accounted Fatum in the Opinion of the Stoics, and upon that ground approves of it. As for necessitation by reason of disposition of the Matter Prime, whereby things were brought to pass in despite of God; I find no such thing, neither in Austin, nor in those that comment upon him, Ludovicus Vives and Coqueus, nor in Ramus or Turnebus; but rather to the contrary in Ludovicus Vives, who distinguisheth out of the opinion of Plato, as touching one God whom he made Principem Parentemque caeterorum; the Caeteri belike were such spirits as we call Angels. And that Maximi Dei leges were inevitabiles, and this was called Necessity, and such a Necessity, cui ne Deos quidem (that is inferior spirits) resistere posse. Quae verò ab Astris geruntur, talia interdum esse ut evitari sapientiâ, industriâ, labour queant, in quo sua est Fortuna. Quae verò certis causis progrederentur ac permanerent fixa, id dici Fatum quod tamen necessitatem non afferat electioni. That the Manichees maintained two supreme and coëternall causes of all things, we read; the one the cause of Good, the other of Evil: and that every creature was a substantial part of one or both; and that man in his nature was compounded of both, and that his corruption was essential from the supreme Author of evil, and not such as acrewed to him of disobedience, We read. But of their opinion that all things were determined by them, both good, and evil, I no where read, but in this Author's Legend. Danaeus hath commented upon Austin de Haeresibus, and to every Head of Heresy draws what he hath read thereof in other Authors. But I find no mention at all of this Article amongst 21 shameful errors of theirs which he reckons up. The 19th is this, Voluntatem malè agendi, quod vocant liberum arbitrium, nobis à naturâ ipsâ insitam, non rebellione nostrâ accersitam, vel ex inobedientiâ natam; Quanquam homines propriâ voluntate peccant. And where Austin answereth the criminations against the Catholics made by the Pelagians, I find no mention at all of this. He should have showed from whom he takes this, that understanding their Opinion aright, we might the better judge of the reproachful comparison which he makes. 2 To the consideration of which comparison of his, I now address myself. He proposeth two things, one whereof he saith, must needs be maintained. The First whereof is this; That all actions natural and Moral, good and evil, and all events likewise, are absolutely necessary. Concerning which, I say First; I have cause to doubt that this Author understands not aright, the very notions of absolute necessity, and necessity not absolute. There is no greater necessity, than necessity of nature. And this necessity is twofold; either in Essendo, in being, or in Operando, in working. God alone is necessary in being, and his being is absolutely necessary; it being impossible he should not be, as not only we believe, but School Divines demonstrate, and that with great variety, of evident, and curious conclusions. As for the other necessity, which is in respect of operation: First, this is no way incident unto God, speaking of operation ad extrà, and secluding the mysterious emanations within the Divine Nature; such as are the Generation of the Son by the Father, and the wonderful Procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son. But ad extra this necessity of operation is only found in the creature, and that only in such creatures, as by necessity of nature are determined one way: as fire to burn; heavy things to move downwards, and light things upwards; the Sun, Moon, and stars to give light; and the heavens to turn round; all natural Agents in a word distinct from rational are thus determined, to wit, to work that, whereunto they are inclined by necessity of nature; but yet so that being finite, they are subject to superior powers, and thereby obnoxious to impediment most of them, even to powers create; all of them to power increate. Whence it comes pass that no work of theirs is absolutely necessary, especially in respect of God, who can either set an end to all when he will, or restrain their operations at his pleasure. We know the Three Noble Children, when they came forth of the fiery oven, had not so much as any smell of the fire upon them. And therefore Durand professeth that these things which are commonly accounted to come to pass most necessarily, do indeed come to pass merely contingently, in respect of the will of God. Nevertheless we willingly profess, that upon supposition of the will of God, that this or that shall come to pass, it followeth necessarily that such a thing shall come to pass; like as upon supposition, that God knows such a thing shall come to pass, it followeth necessarily, that such a thing shall come to pass; but how? not necessarily: but either necessarily according as some things are brought to pass by natural agents, working necessarily after the manner aforesaid; or contingently and freely according as some things are brought to pass, by rational agents, working contingently and freely. And therefore as touching the Question of the Schools about the root of contingency, Aquinas and Scotus concur in resolving it into the Will of God, but with this difference; Scotus relates it into the will of God as a free agent. Aquinas resolves it into the Will of God, as an efficacious agent. For the will of God is so efficacious, that he can effectually procure, both that things necessary shall be brought to pass necessarily, and things contingent, contingently; and according he hath provided congruous causes hereof, to wit, both agents natural for the producing of necessary things necessarily, and agents rational for the producing of contingent things, contingently and freely. Thus God preordained that Josias should burn the Prophet's bones upon the Altar, that Cyrus should proclaim liberty to the Jews, to return into their Country; yet what sober Divine hath made doubt, whether Josias and Cyrus did not herein, that which they did freely. And as in doing, so in abstaining from doing. For God ordained that Christ's bones should not be broken; as also that when the Jews, all the Males, came up to the Lord thrice in the year to Jerusalem, None of their neighbours should desire their land. Exod. 34. 24. Yet what sober man should make question, whether the Soldiers did none as freely abstain from breaking Christ's bones, as from aught else, and so likewise the bordering Nations did as freely abstain, from invading the land of Israel. And how often is this phrase used in Scripture, Necesse est, of some things coming to pass, which yet came to pass as contingently and freely, as aught else. And unless this be granted, that God's determination is nothing prejudicial to the freedom of the creatures will, either we must deny faith and repentance to be the gifts of God, or that they are works produced freely, and so every action pleasing in the sight of God. For the Scripture expressly professeth, that God it is, who worketh in us every thing that is pleasing in his sight. And whatsoever God works in us, or bestows upon us in time, the same he determined, to work in us, and to bestow upon us from everlasting. For he worketh all things according to the counsel of his will Ephes. 1. 11. and the counsel of his Will was everlasting, it being the same with God himself. Now I come to the second. 2. And that is this. That all men's ends are unalterable and indeterminable by the power of their Wills; and this he saith is upon the matter all one. 1. Now this is most untrue, there being a vast difference between the actions of men, and the ends of men; The ends of men being the works of God. And what a monster shall he be in the Church of God, that with Vorstius shall dare to affirm, that all the works of God, were not determined from everlasting; or being determined, they are alterable, and that in such sort, as to be otherwise determinable by the wills of men; especially considering that the very acts of men's wills, being wrought by God, (as all sides now a days confess) it consequently follows that they were also determined from everlasting, by the Will and Counsel of God. What should I allege the 11th Article of Ireland for this? God from all eternity did by his unchangeable Counsel ordain, whatsoever in time should come to pass: yet so as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor contingency of second causes is taken away, but established rather. There is no Arminian that I know dares deny, either that every act of man is wrought by God, or that, look what God doth work in time, the same he did before all time decree, and that from everlasting. I know there is a main, and a most Atheistical difference between us on one part, but I do not find them willing to show their horns directly therein, but carry the matter so, as if they would obtrude upon us the acknowledgement, either of the temporal (not eternal) condition of decrees divine, or at least of their alterable nature; whereas themselves dare not plainly manifest themselves, to be of any such Atheistical belief. Let us instance in particular: Let the salvation of some, and damnation of others, be the ends this Author meaneth. Now dare any of them with open face profess, that the salvation of the elect, and damnation of the reprobate was not from everlasting determined by God. Be the supreme ends of God concerning man, the manifestation of his glory in the way of mercy on some, in the way of vindicative justice on others. Dare any of them profess, that any of these ends are not from everlasting determined by God; or being so determined, dare they profess, that these divine decrees are alterable, or possible to be undetermined by the will of the creature? What a prodigious assertion were either of these? If they dare not say, Gods will is changeable, What an unshamefaced course is this, to obtrude upon us an alterable, that is, a changeable condition of God's decrees? But perhaps you may say, here is no mention at all made of God's decrees, but of man's ends. And I willingly confess there is not. And I am persuaded, this Author dares not in plain terms profess, that God's decrees are alterable. But hereby you may perceive, and have a manifest document of the illusions of Satan, and how men's carnal affections, which are more in love with error than truth, do make them to shut their eyes against the one, and open them unto the other. It were a very harsh thing to say plainly, that God's decrees are alterable, and that being determined by him, they might be undone, or made undetermined by the wills of men. Therefore the Devil finds a means to draw us, to entertain the same blasphemous opinion, not barefaced, but hoodwickt as it were, and that is by changing the phrase. For though it be uncouth to hear of an alterable condition of God's decrees, yet it seems nothing harsh to discourse of the alterable condition of men's ends. But give me leave to unmask the Witch, and make it appear how the Devil gulls us in this. men's ends are either so called, as intended by man himself, or as apppointed by God. If this Author speak of men's ends, as intended by man himself, we willingly grant, that they are alterable at his pleasure; as for example, Man intends one thing to day, he may intend another thing to morrow, he intends one thing this hour, he may intend another thing the next, and at his pleasure reverse his former intentions. And no marvel, considering that man partly is of a fickle disposition in respect of his affections, studious of change, and subject to innovation as the Moon; partly of an improvident disposition, he knows not what a Year, what a Month, what a Day, what an hour may bring forth. And therefore though never so wise and constant in his courses, yet may he have just cause to change his resolutions and purposes. But of such ends of man, to wit, as intended by man, it is manifest this Author speaks not. But of ends appointed by God, these be the ends he will have to be alterable and determinable anew by the wills of men, which cannot be without the alteration and change of God's purposes and intentions, which is as much as to say, without the change and revocation of God's decrees. And an end not yet actually existing, but only in intention, can admit of no other alteration then in intention, which this Author considering not, though perhaps he abhors to say God's decrees are changeable and alterable, and shuts out so uncouth an assertion at the foredoor, yet as it were by a backdoor to receive it in, and in the dark and muffled, or veiled only with a different phrase, a different expression; Yet forthwith he takes a new course; For whereas by the word unalterable, he did imply that God's decrees concerning men's ends, should be of an alterable condition; in the words following he changeth his tone, and will not have the ends of man to be determined by God at all, but left unto man to be determined; as when he saith, In vain is our freedom in the actions, if the end which they drive at be pitched and determined. Whereby it is manifest, he will not have the end whereunto men drive to be determined. And this end can be no other than salvation; for that alone I take to be that whereto men drive, and which they labour to attain, every one naturally seeking after Summum bonum, after happiness. So that in the issue it comes to this, The salvation of this Author is not yet determined by God, but left to be determined by his will, and that I take to be in the way of a moving cause, and that moving cause I guess to be, his final perseverance in faith and repentance, whereupon and not till then, shall this man's salvation be determined by God, as much as to say, that God's decrees are as merely temporal as are the executions of them. And herein this Author doth exactly agree with Doctor Jackson perhaps being so happy as to understand him, or perhaps being so happy as to light upon an interpreter of him some one that breathes the same spirit of opposition to God's truth, and that after the same way. For sometimes the Doctor pleads for a revocable condition of the divine decrees. For the Pope never binds his hands by any Grant he makes; and why should God bind his hands by any decree he makes? especially considering that God hath more wisdom and goodness to manage such authority than the Pope. But if it be dishonesty for a man to take liberty to break his promises, I pray what goodness is required to the managing thereof? Yet that Doctor keeps his course in discoursing of an impotent immutability, and saith, it is indecent to attribute any such immutability unto God; whereas immutability is a notion which connotates no power of doing at all, but only a power of suffering, and formally denotes the negation thereof. And what madness is it to say, that the less power God hath of receiving change, the less power he hath of working? Yet this is not all; He hath another device answerable to the latter course of this Author, and that is, that Nothing, concerning any man's salvation or damnation, is determined by God before he is borne, or before his death: and to that purpose he saith that God is still decreeing, as if hitherto he had not decreed aught. And would you know of whom he learned this? Roger's in his exposition of the Articles of the Church of England, a Book dedicated to Archbishop Bancroft, & allowed by the lawful authority of the Church of England, writing upon the 17th Article, and delivering his second proposition, collected therehence, in this form, Predestination hath been from everlasting; when he comes to set forth the Adversaries of this truth, Those wrangling Sophisters, saith he, are deceived, who because God is not included within the compass of any time, but hath all things to come as present before his eyes, do say, that God he did not in the time long ago past only, but still in the time present likewise doth Predestinate. 2. Consider we the reason he gives for so shameful an assertion, as touching the alterable condition of God's decrees, or as touching the ends of men, as yet undetermined by God, In vain, saith he, is freedom in the actions, if the end which they drive at, be determined. Here, First, we have a wild phrase Freedom in actions. For by freedom we understand an active power of working after a certain manner, which power is found in the will, not in the actions. Secondly, a bare avouching that unless God as yet hath left the ends of men living undetermined, or in case he hath determined them, unless these determinations of his be alterable, Freedom of Will is given in vain; as much as to say, unless we admit of such monstrous assertions, the freedom of man's Will is in vain. But we say this consequence is most untrue, and we give our reason for it. For whether salvation or damnation be the ends he meaneth, no creature is capable of either, but only creatures rational; and the one being bestowed by way of reward, and the other inflicted by way of punishment, each of these presupposeth freedom of Will in the parties thus proceeded with: Or whether the ends are the manifestation of God's vindicative and remunerative justice, for the same reason now specified, each of these doth necessarily bespeak freedom of Will in them, who after either way are made useless on whom the glory of God is to be manifested. When he adds saying Omnis actio is propter sinem. This altogether concerns the ends intended, and proposed by the author of the action, nothing concerns the ends proposed by another. And the ends of a man proposed by himself, are either supreme or intermediate, still every action deliberate (for so alone it holds) tends to one end or other, which man himself intends. The supreme end of every one is his chief good; but as touching that wherein this consists, all do not agree. Some place it in wealth, some in pleasure, some in honour, some in virtuous life. By the light of Grace we are taught, that as we are creatures, our end, which we should propose unto ourselves, is the glorifying of God our Creator, though there were neither reward nor punishment. But if there be a glorious reward to be gotten by it, and a dreadful punishment to be suffered of them, that seek the satisfying of their own lusts, and not the glory of God, this is a double hedge unto us, to keep us in the good ways of the Lord, and to move us to make straight steps unto him; but surely the end of the creature, still is the glorifying or God that made him. God makes it his care to provide for us, let our care be to glorify him; for seeing all things are from him, therefore all things must be for him; and seeing we are reasonable creatures, and know this we must go on, in conforming ourselves hereunto, and seeking his glory. And albeit this Author may conceive, that salvation is the end he aims at, yet can I not believe that he makes damnation the end that any man drives at. Nothing being fit to be a man's end, but that which hath rationem Boni, which surely damnation hath not. 3. His Annotations as touching the three Opinions proposed by him, come to be considered in the next place; and these are two. 1. The Substance and Formality of them, which, as he saith is an unavoidableness of men's actions and ends whatsoever they be. And in this, he saith, all of them agree, all holding that in all things, undeclinable Fates, and insuperable necessity do domincere. Whereunto I answer, that this is contradictory to his own premises, as touching the third Opinion. For against the Maintainers of Gods absolute decree, he did formerly object only disjunctively, that either all men's actions were absolutely necessary, that is unavoidable, or at least, that men's ends were unavoidable; which is to infer, that but one of them is avoidable; but here he professeth (as upon that which he had formerly delivered) that by the Third Opinion, both men's actions and their ends were unavoidable. And as for the second Opinion of the Manichees, I find no mention of the unavoidable condition, either of man's actions or ends at all, in the Relation thereof, by those who have most studied their History. And as for the Stoics, I no where find, that they denied the liberty of men's will, or that it was in man's power, either to forbear the doing of that he doth, or to do the things he forbears to do; but rather the contrary, that they made choice, some of them at least, (though Austin delivers it without any such distinction) to exempt the wills of men from subjection unto Fate: though I deny not, but that many vain discourses might be differently entertained by them, having no better light to guide them, than the light of nature, and wanting that which God hath in great mercy vouchsafed unto us, the light of grace, and that in very plentiful manner. Much less do I find by them, that any thing came to pass, invito Deo. Though I willingly confess, that such a generation hath risen up in these days, affirming that God willeth and desireth the salvation of all men, and yet the greater part of men are damned. And what is to come to pass, invito Deo, if this be not, I willingly profess I know not. But Melancthon, he saith, doth not spare to call this absolute decree, Fatum Stoicum, Tabulas Parcarum, and to charge the Church of Ceneva, with labouring to bring in the Stoics errors, as appears by Melancthons' Epistle to Peucer, and Beza's confession in the life of Calvin. To all which I answer. 1. That this Author either was better read in Melancthon then in Luther, or no so just matter could he find in Luther, to cry down the absolute nature of God's decrees. 2. Beza reports what Melancthon seems to some, and that Epistle of his to Peucer might be their ground. Now therein he delivers his mind merely upon Laelius his relation, which was this, De Stoico Fato usque adeò litem Genevae moveri, ut Quidam in carcerem conjectus sit propterea quod a ●●one differret. This I say is Laelius his relation made unto Melancthon, whereupon Melancthon saith no more than this, O Mijera tempora! doctrina salutis peregrinis quibusdam disputationibus obscuratur. 3. Melancthon died four years before Calvin, the one Anno 1560. the other 1564. And therefore if he did pass any censure on the Church of Geneva, it was in calvin's days, many years before his death. Now Calvin and he were very great: Melancthon so well known and esteemed by Calvin, that more than once he appeals to Melancthons' judgement. Once in the point De Caenâ Domini, mentioned by Osiander, Hist. Eccles. Cent. 16. Anno 1558. pag. 666. which was but two years before his death. Likewise in the point of freewill and Predestination, as appears by calvin's Epistle unto him, prefixed to his Books, de Libero Arbitrio, which he sent unto Melancthon: Was it ever known that Melancthon passeth any censure upon them? 4. When Grotius in like manner objected Melancthon, see I pray how Lubbertus answereth him, In Respon. ad Pietatem Grotii. Quod ad Melancthonem attinet, erras si ipsam stare pro Remonstrantibus existimas, etc. Idem Melancthon in 9 ad Romanos, Cur inquit nos ad Evangelium vocavit & non vocavit Alexandrum Macedonem, Augustum, Socratem, Pomponium Atticum, qui non minus civilitèr vivebant quam nos. Hic necesse est causam rejicere in voluntatem Dei. Et Jacob electus est, Esau reprobatus priusquam quicquam boni vel mali fecissent: Ergo opera non erant causa, sed voluntas vocantis. Non addam hic, quomodo cavillentur ista nonnulli. Tantum hoc meminerit Lector, si opera secutura in vita erunt causa electionis, non licuit Apostolo dicere, Non ex operibus. Ex his constat (say't Lubbertus) Melancthonem idem cum Calvino & Luthero de praedestinatione sensisle. Fatetur hoc ipse Melancthon ad Calvinum; suo (inquiens) haec cum tuis congruere, sed mea sunt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, & ad usum accommodata. Idem in Epistolâ ad Erasmum: Ego integrâ conscientiâ non possum Lutheri dogmata damnare. He proceeds farther to show, the different Method used by them in delivering the doctrine of Praedestination. Calvinus, saith he, à Priori docet, illos qui electi sunt, immutabili Dei consilio electos esse, atque inde infert illos perire non posse. Melancthon verò a Posteriori docet, nos ex verâ fide & seriâ resipiscentiâ discere quòd sumus electi, Ego credo in Jesum Christum & seriò resipisco, ergo sum electus: atque ita in ipsâ re consentiunt. Hanc enim Melancthonis argumentationem approbat Calvinus, & illam Calvini approbat Melancthon, tantum abest, ut alter alterius doctrinam rejiciat aut contemnat. 5. When I observed this relation made out of an Epistle of Melancthons' unto Calvin, I could not rest satisfied until I had seen the Epistle itself: at length I found it amongst calvin's, Epist. 49. Therein coming to the point, Ad Quaestionem (saith he) de praedestinatione habebam amicum Tubingae doctum hominem Franciscum Stadianum, qui dicere solebat, se utrumque probare, Evenire omnia ut divina providentia decrevit, & tamen esse contingentia; sed se haec conciliare non posse. Here we have gotten one friend more than we looked for, and that a friend of Melancthons' also: And to what end doth he make mention hereof, but to give Calvin to understand, that with him at Tubing, there wanted not such as concurred with him in opinion, and that as touching the eveniency of all things, by the decree of God's providence, which yet might well consist with Contingency, though we are not able to reconcile these, such is the mysterious nature of God's providence. And herein Stadianus agrees with Cajetan, and Alvarez. For Cajetan having professed that the distinctions devised by the Learned, for the reconciling of God's predestination with the liberty of man's will, did not, quietare intellectum, thereupon he saith, Ego captivo meum in obsequium fidei; In quo (saith Alvarez) doctissimè & pi●ssimè loquitur. Melancthon goes on to represent his carriage in Teaching, Ego, saith he, cum Hypothesin hanc teneam, Deum non esse causam peccati nec velle peccatum, posteà contingentiam in hâc nostrâ infirmitate judicii admitto, ut sciant rudes, Davidem suâ voluntate ultrò ruere & eundem sentio, cum haberet spiritum sanctum, potuisse cum retinere; & in eâ lucta aliquam esse voluntatis actionem. All these things he grants afterwards, to agree with the Doctrine of Calvin. But may not a man proceed farther? and to dispute hereof something more accurately than this, He denies it not: Haec etiamsi subtilius disputari possunt, tamen ad regendas mentes hoc modo proposita, accommodata videntur. In the same manner he goes on, Accusemus ipsi nostram voluntatem cum labimur, non quaeramus in Dei consilio causam & contra eum nos erigamus; sciamus Deum & velle opitulari & adesse luctantibus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (inquit Basilius) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Yet I presume no Arminian will conceive that Melancthon did not acknowledge this very act of willing to be the work of God, considering the Apostle so expressly professeth, that God worketh in us both the Will and the deed, according to his good pleasure; and Leo Serm. 8. de Epiphan. Dubium non est hominem bona agentem ex Deo habere & effectum operis & initium volumatis: & Fulgentius Epist. 4. Ab ipso (Deo) est initium bonae voluntatis. And if Melancthon had any conceit opposite hereunto, yet let the Opinion of the African Bishops prevail in authority above Melancthon, who in their Synodical Epistle write thus (as it is alleged by our Divines Act. Synod. Dordrac. pag. 270) In vivificandis hominibus Deus nullum initium humanae voluntatis expectat sed ipsam voluntatem, bonam faciendo, vivificat. And drawing to an end, I do not write these things (saith Melancthon) to deliver dictates unto you, who are most learned and most expert in the exercises of Piety. And truly I know (saith he) that these things do agree with yours, haec cum tuis congruere sed sunt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, woven with a thicker thread, & ad usum accommodata Thus Melancthon unto Calvin, having received his Books sent unto him, and written of freewill and Predestination. 5. Within two years after I find a Letter written by Calvin unto Melancthon, wherein he professeth his joy of their agreement, as touching the main point, in that whereabout their opinions were asked, albeit with some difference in certain particulars, it is Epist. 63. amongst those of calvin's, and the words are these. Deo autem maximas gratias agere non desino, qui dedit ut in ejus quaestionis summâ de quâ rogati eramus, sententiae nostrae congruerent. Tametsi enim paululum est discriminis in particulis quibusdam, de re tamen ipsâ optime inter nos convenit. The second Annotation of this Author is, the circumstance or the ground of the three opinions mentioned. The Stoics deriving their necessity from the Stars or first matter; The Manichees from the two supreme causes; And the Authors of the third, from the peremptory decree of Almighty God. And that in this difference, the Stoics and the Manichees have the better, it being better (as he saith) to derive the necessity of evil actions, or unhappy events, from an evil God, or from the course of nature, then from the decree of that God who is infinitely good. The substance of the opinion is all one, the ground wherein they differ, is but accidental to the error. To this I answer. 1. Is it so indeed, Better to derive the necessity of unhappy events, from an evil God, or from course of nature, then from the decree of God? Is not God then to be accounted the author of evil in the way of punishment? Is there any evil in the City, and the Lord hath not done it? Or doth it less become him to be the author Amos 2. jer. 9 24. of affliction then of prosperity? Doth not the Lord in the same place, and in the same manner profess, that he delights in the execution of judgement, as well as of mercy? 2. As touching the necessity he speaks of, whether in good, or in evil actions; consider I pray his carriage, He did not object unto us, that we made all the actions of men absolutely necessary, but either so, or the ends of men unavoidable. Yet here he supposeth the former to serve his own turn in this present crimination, he holds it up, as it were contrary to his own conscience. We acknowledge the actions of men to be free, not one being performed by any, but in such sort, that they had power to forbear it, and still have to forbear the like: But upon supposition of God's decree, either to work in us any thing, that is pleasing in his sight (which to be his gracious course, the Apostle expressly professeth, Heb. 13. 20.) or to permit any particular evil, we willingly profess, that as well upon this, as upon God's foreknowledge, it followeth consequently that necesse est, that such a thing come to pass; but how? not necessarily, but agreeable to the condition of our reasonable natures, contingently and freely. And this Arminius in plain terms professeth in the point of evil, to wit, supposing God permits a man to will this or that evil; Necesse est ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolendum, Exam. pag. 153. But I will farther display the doctrine of these Arminians, and prove, First, that no evil comes to pass, but that God did will it. Secondly, that never was there any greater necessity known to the World, then that which these men bring upon good and evil actions, a necessity that binds the Lord himself. 1. As touching the first; These words of Arminius are well known, Deus voluit Achabum mensuram scelerum sucrum implere. But I will prove it by their Doctrine of scientia Media: For hereby they maintain, that God forseeth by what motives sin will be hindered, or not hindered, without any prejudice to the liberty of the creatures will; As also that God in the storehouse of his wisdom, hath such store of moral impediments, as that he knows thereby, how to hinder any sin if it pleased him. His words are these, Praeter illa sufficientia impedimenta, etiam efficacia habet in suo sapientiae & potentiae promptuario, quibus productis certò & infallibiliter peccatum impediretur. And this is the difference with him, between a sufficient impediment of sin, and impediment effectual. Effectual is that upon the use whereof, he knows full well, that sin will be hindered. Sufficient is that upon the use whereof, sin will not be hindered, and this is known to the Lord from everlasting. Now let them tell me, why would not God make choice to use such an impediment, which he knew would prove effectual, but such rather, as he knew would prove ineffectual. Doth it not manifestly appear hereby, that it is Gods will, that sin shall come to pass by his permission? Like as the Scripture is express to this purpose, as where it is said, that Herod and Pontius Pilate with the Gentiles, and people of Israel were gathered together against the holy Son of God, to do that which Gods hand, and his counsel, had foredetermined to be done. Now this is well known to have been no less than the ignominious handling and crucifying of the Son of God. Acts 4. 28. And Revel. 17. 17. God put into the hearts of the Kings to do his will, and to give their Kingdoms to the Beast, as much as to say, to use their Regal power, to the supporting of Antichrist, which we know was in part by Massacring the Saints of God. 2. Now to discover the strange necessity, that these men bring in upon all things: It cannot be denied, but that God knoweth all future things, before they come to pass. Therefore they are presupposed to be future in order of reason before God, knows them to be future; therefore all things future, are either such by necessity of nature, or by some cause; not by any cause, for if there were any cause hereof, to wit, to make them pass out of the condition of things merely possible of their own nature, into the condition of things future, than this cause should be found either within God or without God. Not without God can any cause hereof be found. For this passage of things, out of the condition of things merely possible, into the condition of things future, was from everlasting, therefore the cause hereof must have existence from everlasting. But nothing was everlasting, Extra Deum, out of God; Therefore if any cause hereof be to be found, it must be within God; otherwise it must be confessed, that all things became future by absolute necessity of nature. If to help this, they will devise something within the nature of God, to be the cause hereof, let them tell us what that is. Not the Science of God, for all confess, that secluding the divine will, God's knowledge is the cause of nothing. If they say, the will of God, they concur with us in embracing the same Opinion, which they so much abhor. Nothing remains to fly unto, but the Essence of God; If they plead, that I demand, whether the Essence of God working freely, be the cause of the futurition of all things, or as working necessarily? If as working freely, that is as much as to confess in express terms, that Gods will is the cause thereof: But if they say the divine Essence is the cause hereof, as working necessarily, hence it follows, that all things good and evil come from God, as working by necessity of nature. See I pray and consider the abominable, and Atheistical opinions, that these Arminians do improvidently cast themselves upon, when they stretch their wits to overthrow God's providence, as it is carried in the 11th Article of Ireland, which is this, God from all Eternity, did by his unchangeable Counsel ordain whatsoever in time should come to pass; yet so as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor contingency of second causes is taken away, but established rather. In the Conclusion, that which he vaunts of, as touching the Fathers, is mere wind; for he gives you nothing but his word for it; which of what credit it deserves to be, I leave to the indifferent to judge. And as for the plucking up of the roots of virtue which he fables of: Consider I pray, what Sect of Philosophers were ever known to be more virtuous than the Stoics; and how was Zeno himself honoured by the Athenians, for his grave and virtuous conversation? Hath not Erasmus delivered it, as out of the mouth of Hierome, that Secta Stoicorum was Secta simillima Christianae? Yet I no where find, that they brought in any necessity, that was not subordinate to the Will of the supreme God: But these Arminians bring in a necessity of nature from without God, to make him to do this, or that, if he doth any thing; or at least, to make God himself a necessary Agent, devoid of all liberty and freedom, contrary to that of Ambrose concerning the manner of Gods working, namely, that it is, Nullo necessitatis obsequio, but solo libertatis arbitrio. But according to these Divines it must be quite contrary, Nullo ●ibertatis arbitrio, solo necessitatis obsequio. And thus much as touching the first sort of this Author's Reasons, which he accounts only Inducing; I come to the other sort, which he esteems convincing. THE SECOND PART OF THE FIRST BOOK, Wherein are Examined those Arguments against the Absoluteness of DIVINE REPROBATION, WHICH Mr HORD Took to be of a CONVINCING NATURE. OXFORD, Printed by Leonard Lichfield Printer to the University. M. D. C. LIII. The Second Part of this Discourse, consisting of ARGUMENTS CONVINCING, whereof there are Five sorts. The First sort of Convincing Reasons Drawn from Scripture. DISCOURSE. SECT. I. THOSE of the Second sort, by which for the present I stand convinced, that absolute reprobation is no part of God's truth, are drawn from these five following heads, 1. Pregnant Testimonies of Scripture directly opposite unto it. 2. Some principal attributes of God not compatible with it. 3. The end of the Word and Sacraments, with other excellent gifts of God to men, quite thwarted by it. 4. Holy and pious endeavours much hindered by it, if not wholly subversed. 5. The grounds of comfort, whereby distressed consciences are to be relieved, are all overthrown by it. It it contrary to pregnant places of Scripture, even in terminis, Repugnant to Scripture. as will appear by these instances. 1. Ezech. 33. 11. As I live saith the Lord, I have no pleasure in the death of a sinner, but that the wicked turn from his ways and live. And least men should say 'tis true, God wills not the death of a repenting sinner, the Lord doth in another place of the same Prophet, extend the proposition to them also that perish, Ezech. 18. 32. I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth. In this Scripture we may note three things. 1. God's affection to men set forth 1. Negatively, I have no pleasure in his death that dyeth. 2. Affirmatively, But that the wicked turn. 2. The persons in whose destruction he delighteth not, wicked men, such as for the rejecting of grace die and are damned. If God have no pleasure in their death, much less in the death of men, either altogether innocent, or tainted only with original sin. 3. The truth of this affection, as I live; cupit sihi credi (saith Tertullian, Lib. de paenit. cap. 4.) God would fain have us to believe him, when he saith I will not the death of him that dyeth, and therefore he binds his speech with an oath: O beatos nos quorum causa Deus jurat, O miserrimos si nec juranti Domino credimus. Happy are we for whose sakes the Lord vouchsafeth to swear, but most unhappy if we believe him not when he swears. Now if God delight not in the destruction of wicked men, he did never out of his own pleasure take so many millions of men lying in the fall, and seal them up by an absolute decree under invincible damnation: for such a kind of decreeing men to everlasting death, is quite opposite to a delight in men's eternal life. TWISSE Consideration. TO say that this or that opinion is untrue, because it doth in terminis contradict places of Scripture, is a very superficiary consideration: yet it is not the first time that I have found it to drop from an Arminians pen: But that it is a very superficiary consideration, I prove thus; For to deny God the Son to be equal to the Father, is in terminis to contradict a pregnant place of Scripture, Phil. 2. Where it is expressly said of God the Son, that he thought it no robbery to be equal to the Father: yet notwithstanding it is agreeable to that of our Saviour, where he saith, the Father is greater than I; and so vice versâ. In like manner to say that God cannot repent, is in terminis to contradict pregnant places of Scripture: again to say that God can repent, is in terminis to contradict other as pregnant places of Scripture; yet neither of these is unsound; because each phrase is agreeable to Scripture in some place or other. And the reason hereof is, because in terminis only to contradict the Scripture, is not to contradict the Scripture; But when we contradict the meaning of Scripture, then and not till then, are we justly said to contradict the Scripture; And the reason hereof is, because the word of God consists not in the outward bark or bone of the letter, but in the inward pith and marrow of the meaning. And as for contradiction unto Scripture in terminis, it may easily be proved, that to deny God's delight in the destruction of obstinate sinners, is to contradict a very Nec putemus in verbis Scripturarum Evangelium esse, sed in sensu, non in superficie, sed in medulla, non in sermonum foliis, sed in radice rationis. Hieron. in Epist. ad Galat. c. 1. pregnant place of Holy Scripture, as namely Prov. 1. 24, 25, 26. Because I have called and ye refused, I have stretched out my hand and no man regarded; but ye have set at naught all my counsel, and would none of my reproof: I will also laugh at your calamity, I will mock when your fear cometh; when your fear cometh as desolation, and your destruction as a Whirlwind. And yet never a whit the more, is any contradiction found in Scripture for this: because though they contradict each the other in terminis, yet there is no contradiction if we consider the true meaning: As for example, it is both true that the Father is greater than the Son, as touching the Son's Manhood; And the Son equal to the Father as touching his Godhead. So of repentance, it cannot be attributed to God as it signifies change of mind or counsel; but it may be attributed unto God, as it signifies change of sentence; according to that of Gregory, Deus mutat sententiam, consilium nunquam. So as touching God's pleasure or delight in the death of a sinner, as it is the destruction of the creature he delighteth not in it; but as it is a just punishment of the impenitent creature, he delights therein: Thus Piscator reconciles it, on Ezech. 18. v. 23, & 32. Surely God delights in the execution of justice, as well as in the execution of mercy, as Jer. 9 24. I am the Lord which exerciseth loving kindness, judgement, and righteousness in the earth, for in these things I delight saith the Lord. 2. Here first, the Author declines from the former phrase, of having no pleasure in the death of a sinner, to not willing the death of a sinner; which phrases have no small difference, as Piscator observes upon that in Ezech. 33. 11. for saith he, potest homo velle id quo non delectatur, ut aegrotus potest velle potum amarum, quo non delectatur, potest enim eum velle non pierce, sed propter aliud, nempe ad recuper andam valetudinem. And to deny that God willeth the death of as many as die, is in terminis to contradict a pregnant place of Scripture, as where it is said, that God worketh all things according to the counsel of his will, Ephes. 1. 11. And therefore seeing the inflicting of death is God's work he must will it: But this Author is more happy for invention then his fellows: For whereas others of his opinion, work upon the place as it is rendered in the vulgar Latin, Nolo mortem peccatoris: this Author hath found out an argument from the very phrase of our last English translation, to advantage his cause, as when from Gods having no pleasure in the death of a sinner, he quaintly infers, therefore God doth not of mere pleasure, will or decree their death; But how superficiary this is also, and how foully it falls in the issue, upon the Author himself (as usually it falleth out with men, that affect new and acquaint inventions) I hope to discover in due place. Farther observe; that place, Ezech. 33. 11. I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, according to our last English translation, and that, Ezech. 18. 23. Have I any pleasure at all that the wicked should die, do differently render one and the same phrase in the Hebrew, in the death of the wicked, Ezech. 33. 11. which is word for word according to the Hebrew; that the wicked should die Ezech. 18. 23. which being not according to the precise terms of the original, it followeth that hereby, our Translators did expound the sense of the Hebrew, which is word for word, in the death of the wicked, and so accordingly, that phrase, Ezek. 18. 32. in the death of him that dieth, importeth as much as this, that he who dyeth should die. And as for Tertullian, that which he allegeth out of him, neither makes for him nor against us: we all believe what the Prophet delivereth; but we inquire about the sense of it; But in the same place Tertullian interprets the place not absolutely but comparatively, thus, Vivo inquit Dominus, & paenitentiam malo quam mortem, and indeed thus it is accommodated more than once in the Book of Common prayer, as first in the general absolution; then, in one of the Collects upon Good-Friday: There is a double pleasure, that God may be said to take in the one, but a single pleasure only in the other. For in the death of an impenitent sinner, God delights only in the execution of justice: but in the conversion of such a one that he may live, God delights both in the execution of mercy, which is equivalent to his delight taken in the execution of judgement, and over and above he delights in their repentance; For like as of such as fall from God, it is said, His soul hath no pleasure in them: so of such as turn unto him, it is as true, that his soul hath pleasure in them. 3. But give we him leave to enjoy the interpretation he affecteth, yet consider I pray, whether he doth not enjoy it tanquam Diis iratis, and to his bane: for mark I pray his argument, and consider whether I do not from the same argument, most strongly conclude against him. 1. His argument runs thus, If God delighteth not in the destruction of wicked men, he did never out of his own pleasure, take so many millions of men lying in the fall, and seal them up by an absolute decree under invincible damnation. Now from the rule of contraries, I herehence dispute thus; If this be a good consequence which he makes, then on the contrary it follows, that seeing God doth take pleasure and delight in man's eternal life (as this Author expressly acknowledgeth) therefore he did out of his own pleasure, take so many million of men lying in the fall, and seal them up by an absolute decree under invincible salvation. Now this conclusion is as directly opposite unto him in the point of election, as his conclusion is opposire to ours in the point of reprobation. And my argument must be of the same force and validity with his; because Contrariorum contraria est ratio. Yet I will not content myself with this answer. 2. Therefore consider I pray in the next place, the true meaning of this phrase I have no pleasure: in these places of the Prophet, the Author himself though he doth not plainly profess what is the meaning of it, as it became him to do, and not to depend upon colour of words suitable; yet by his drift he manifests the meaning of it to be this, that God doth not bring death upon a sinner, of mere pleasure, but being provoked thereunto, (and that according to the purport of the first place Ezech. 18.) by the sinner himself; and also, (according to the purport of the second place) only in case of impenitency. And I concur with him in this: And so I conceive it to be delivered in the same sense with that Lament. 3. 32, 33. For though he cause grief (to wit by reason of men's sins v. 39) yet will he have compassion according to the multitude of his mercies, (to wit, in case he reputes jer. 18. 7. judg. 10. 16.) For he doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men. Mark I pray, not willingly; to wit, in as much as he is provoked thereunto by sin, and by refusal to repent. And this is in the former Scripture phrases, not to take pleasure in the afflicting and grieving of men. For if any work be such, as wherein pleasure is taken; we need not inquire after a cause why it is done, but though no pleasure be taken in it, yet for some benefit redounding thereby, a man may do it, yea though it be grievous and bitter unto him: As a sick man is willing to take a bitter potion for the recovery of his health. Now come we to the argument: God takes no pleasure in the death of any; therefore he doth not of pleasure inflict death. We willingly grant it, in as much as he never inflicts eternal death on any, that doth not die in sin unrepented of: And as he doth not inflict death on any of mere pleasure, that is, without just cause on the part of him that dyeth, deserving it: So we willingly confess, that God did never decree to inflict death on any without just cause on the Malefactor's part deserving death. And this is the uttermost whereunto this Author's argument can be extended. And all our Divines unanimously confess, that God neither decreed to damn any man of his mere pleasure, but for his sin wherein he died without repentance. 3. Observe the cunning of this Disputer, to deceive himself first, and then to abuse his readers: For whereas he should have proceeded in his argument by degrees, thus; God hath no pleasure in the death of a sinner, therefore he doth not of his own pleasure inflict death; and thence proceed (if he had thought good) to conclude the like of God's decree, thus; if God doth not of his ownpleasure inflict, than neither doth he of his own pleasure decree to inflict death and damnation: This author leaping over the inflicting of death, as a block in his way (for the last consequence would have betrayed its own nakedness) flieth at first to the application of it, to God's decree: Now I willingly grant, that Gods having no pleasure in the death of a sinner, doth signify, that God inflicts death on no man without a cause, for that were of mere pleasure to inflict: But dares he herehence infer, therefore God doth not of mere pleasure decree to inflict death and damnation on man for sin, for to this alone comes all the force of this argument. Now to show the vanity of this consequence, consider I pray. 1. It is as if he should argue thus in plain terms; sin is always the meritorious cause of damnation; therefore sin is the meritorious cause of God's eternal decree of damnation: Now this Enthymeme hath no force any farther, than it may be reduced into a categorical Syllogism; and this Enthymeme is reducible into no other Syllogism than this; Damnation is the decree of Damnation, sin is the cause of Damnation, therefore sin is the cause of the decree of damnation. But in this Syllogism the proposition contains a notorious untruth: Or thus, Sin is the cause of damnation; therefore the foresight of sin is the cause of the decree of damnation: But this Enthymeme is not reducible unto any categorical Syllogism at all, for as much as it consists of four terms; all which must be clapped into the Syllogism whereunto it is reduced, and consequently make that Syllogism consist of four terms, which utterly overthrows the illative form thereof. 2. We may as well dispute thus; Good works as well as faith and repentance are the disposing cause unto salvation, therefore good works as well as faith and repentance (or the foresight of them) are the disposing cause to God's election, or to the decree of salvation. But shall I tell you, the chief flourish whereupon this Author (and usually the Arminians) doth insist in this his loose argumentation, I conceive it to be this; they hope their credulous readers, unexpert in distinguishing between God's eternal decree, and the temporal execution thereof, will be apt hereupon to conceit, that we maintain, that God doth not only of mere pleasure decree whatsoever he decreeth, but also that he doth decree of mere pleasure to damn men: which yet is utterly contrary (if I be not deceived) to the tenet of all our Divines: all concurring in this, that God in the execution of the decree of damnation, proceeds according to a Law, and not in the execution of reprobation only, but also in the execution of election. And the law is this, Whosoever believes shall be saved, whosoever believes not shall be damned, And like as he inflicteth not damnation, but by way of punishment, so he confers not salvation but by way of reward. But in the execution of his decrees of election unto grace, and reprobation from grace; we willingly profess that God proceeds according to no law given unto men, to prepare themselves hereunto, but merely according to his good pleasure, having mercy on whom he will, and hardening whom he will: And this indeed is the critical point of this controversy: But neither this Author nor his complices (some of them of my knowledge) have any heart to deal on this. I come to his Second pregnant place as he calleth it. DISCOURSE. SECT. II. GOD hath shut up all in unbelief, that he might have mercy on all. Rom. 11. 32. in these words of the Apostle are two [all's] of equal extent; the one standing just against the other; a [all] of unbelievers, and an [all] of objects of mercy; look how many unbelievers there be, on so many hath God a will of showing mercy. And therefore if all men of all sorts and conditions, and every man in every sort be an unbeliever, then is every man of every condition under mercy, And if every man be under mercy, than there is no antecedent precise will in God of shutting up some (and those the most) from all possibility of obtaining mercy; for these two are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they cannot stand together. TWISSE Consideration. I Willingly grant the word [all] in each place is of equal extent, but how? in the Apostles meaning in this place; that is, look in what sense the Apostle takes the word [all] when he saith God hath concluded all under unbelief: in the same sense he takes the word [all] when he sayeth, that he might have mercy upon all. And accordingly in case when he saith the one he meaneth by the word [all] no more but Jews & Gentiles: it follows that when he saith God hath mercy on all, by the word [all] he understands no more than both Jews and Gentile, and that is, certain nations of men only, not all men of all sorts and conditions; And therefore although it were granted him, that all men of all sorts are unbelievers, yet unless he can prove, that in this sense the Apostle speaketh of [all] in saying God hath concluded all under infidelity, let any one that is indifferent, judge whether this argument be of any force. Thus our Divines understand it, to wit, of Jews and Gentiles: Thus Aquinas and Sasbutius Popish Divines interpret it. Aquinas his words are these, omnia, id est, omne hominum genus, tam Judaeos quam Gentes in incredulitate conclusit, ut omnium misereatur, id est, ut in omni hominum genere misericordia locum habeat; And again; non est extendendum ad omnes homines sigillatim, sed ad omnia genera hominum: Fit enim hic distributio pro generibus singulorum, & non pro singulis generum. So Cajetan. Conclusit permissive omnes tam Judaeos quam Gentes in peccatum infidelitatis. The Text itself doth clearly justify this, as appears by the two verses immediately preceding, wherewith this coheres. v. 30. For even as the Gentiles in times past have not believed God, yet have now obtained mercy, through (the Jews) unbelief. 31. Even so now have they (the Jews) not believed, by the mercy showed to you Gentiles, that they also, that is, the Jews, may obtain mercy. This construction was embraced of old by Austin, as appears by Beda upon the Romans, alleging August. de Civit. Dei lib. 21. Conclusit Deus omnes in infidelitate ut omnium misereatur. Quos omnes? nisi de quibus loquebatur, tanquam dicens & vos & illos. Deus ergo & Gentiles & Judaeos, quos praescivit & praedestinavit conformes fieri imagini filii sui, omnes in infidelitate conclusit, & de amaritudine infidelitatis suae paenitendo confusi, & ad dulcedinem misericordiae Dei credendo conversi clamaret etc. And anon after, Omnium itaque miseretur vasorum misericordiae: Quid est omnium? & eorum scilicet quos ex Gentibus, & eorum quos ex Judae is praedestinavit. 2. Observe how he hides himself under an ambiguous phrase, lest he should come with his foul opinion to the light: As when he saith every man of every condition is under mercy. The Apostles phrase on God's part is misereri, to show mercy; on man's part as partaking hereof is to obtain mercy. v. 30. 31. and to obtain mercy is to believe. v. 30. as appears by the opposition: for to obtain mercy and not to believe, are there made opposite, therefore to obtain mercy and to believe are the same: For to believe and not to believe are formally opposite. Now dares this Author avouch, that every man of every condition doth believe? Again the Apostles word ut misereatur, that he may show mercy, is not spoken of the time present; for as much as for the time present, the Lord had mercy only on the Nations of the Gentiles: But the time should come, that God would also have mercy on the Jews, and consequently on all. But when should this come to pass? Surely not till 1600 years after, to wit, when the time cometh which is apppointed for the effectual and general calling of the Nation of the Jews. So that the foundation being most rotten, no marvel if the edifice he builds hereupon must needs totter. For the Jews were thus to be shut up under infidelity, for many hundred years, to wit, until the time came which the Apostle prophesyeth of. And so were the Gentiles also before them, till the time came of their calling. And thus Sasbutius interpreteth the Apostle in this very place. Sensus est (saith he) sic visum est Deo dispensare utriusque populi salutem, judaeorum videlicet & Gentium; ut permitteret utrumque populum suo vitio concludi, sive constringi, sub incredulitate & damnatione. Concludi, inquam, ne ullâ ratione poscit ex incredulitate suâ vinculo se liberare, ut ipsius misericordia gratuita locum habere agnoscatur in utroque populo tam Iudaeorum quam Gentium. Thus we see that both his [all's] are not worth a Bodkin; and to give him two [all's] more to increase his store, we may justly say that all this is nothing at all to the purpose. DISCOURSE. SECT. III. IOhn 3. 16. God so loved the World that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever &c. God loved the World, that is, the whole lump of Mankind, therefore God did not absolutely hate the greatest part of Mankind. God loved it fallen into a guilt of sin and misery, for he so loved them, as to send his Son to redeem them; and a Saviour presupposeth sin. He did not therefore hate the most of them considered in the fall, for love and hatred are contrary acts, and cannot be exercised about the same Object. Many expositors (I know) do take World here in a restrained sense, and understand by it the company of the Elect, or the World of believers only, but they have little reason for it (in my opinion;) for, 1. I think there can be no place of Scripture alleged wherein this word World especially with the condition of whole, as in 1 Epist. of john. 2. 2. (which is a place equivalent to this for the matter of it, and a comment upon it) I say (I think) no place can be produced where World doth signify only the Elect, or only believers; but it signifies either all men, or at least, the most men, living in some certain place, and at some certain time, but without distinction of good and bad: or if it be used any where more restrainedly, it is applied only to the wicked and Reprobate men, who are wedded in their affections to the World, and the transitory delights thereof, and therefore do most properly deserve this name. 2. Suppose it be granted that World in some Scriptures is restrained to the Elect, yet it cannot bear this signification here; because, 1. The words than would have a bad and senseless construction; for thus would they run, God so loved the Elect that whosoever believed in him should not perish etc. And if they run thus, than this would follow, there are two sorts of the Elect, some that do believe, and shall be saved; others that do not believe, and shall be damned, which is a division or distinction unknown in Divinity. 2. Believers and unbelievers, damned and saved comprehend all Man kind, for there is no man but is one of these. Now World in this place includeth believers and unbelievers, the saved and the damned, (as appears most plainly to him that considers the words;) therefore it signifieth here all Man kind without exception of any. Against this Scripture therefore fights this absolute reprobation and hatred of men. TWISSE Consideration. BE it the whole lump of mankind (if that Lettuce like his lips.) I should think by World, is meant homines in mundo degentes, men at any time living in the World without any restraint: But herehence it followeth not, that God doth not absolutely hate the greatest part of mankind; which this Author should have proved, but he doth not; therefore I will not only deny it, but disprove it. First therefore consider, this love is only secundum Quid, in reference to men's persons, namely, so far forth as in case they believe, they shall obtain everlasting life through the Son of God: But if there were no farther love of God towards man, they might be damned, yea every Mother's son for all this. Secondly, if faith itself be a gift of God, and God gives it not to all, but to some only, and those but a few; (for even of them that are called few are chosen:) and withal if God hath absolutely decreed to bestow this grace only on a few, and deny it to the greatest part of the World, will it not manifestly follow herehence, that if absolutely to decree the denial of faith be to hate, then surely God absolutely hates the greatest part of men, notwithstanding this love here mentioned, albeit we extend it to all and every one. Therefore it became this Author to prove, that God is indifferent to give Faith to one as well as to another: and that either absolutely, whence it would follow, that all and every one, should both believe and be saved; or conditionally, and therewithal represent unto us, what that condition is, whereupon God bestows faith on one, and for the want thereof, he refuseth to bestow faith on another. This is the very critical point about the controversies of God's decrees. Here therefore he should have showed his strength: For as for God's purpose to damn, we willingly profess, that as God damns no man but for sin, so he purposeth to damn no man but for sin. But as for his purpose to give or deny the grace of regeneration, the grace of faith and repentance, we as readily profess, that not the purpose only, but the very giving of faith and repentance, for the curing of infidelity and hardness of heart in some, and the denying of it unto others, so to leave their natural infidelity and hardness of heart uncured, proceeds merely according to the good pleasure of his will, according to that of the Apostle, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth; And by a cloud of testimonies out of Austin we can prove, that in this very sense he understood the Apostle in that place. And indeed no other interpretation of that place, can with any modesty be devised, or obtruded upon us. As for the redeeming of all and every one by Christ, distinguisheth that which the haters of God's truth do delight to confound. There is a redemption from the guilt of sin, and a redemption from the power of sin: For we are redeemed from our vain conversation. Christ came into the World to dissolve the works of the Devil: No greater works of Satan then blindness of heart, 2 Cor. 4. 3. and hardness of heart, Ephes. 2. 2. and 2 Tim. 2. last. The pardon of sin, and salvation, God bestows only on believers, and upon condition of faith: Now like as God is ready to bestow these benefits on all and every one, and that for Christ's sake, in case they believe: so Christ hath merited pardon of sin and salvation for all and every one, in case they believe. Such is the sufficiency of Christ's merit, that if every one of Adam's race should believe, every one should be saved: and this present Text proceeds upon this, namely, upon the sufficiency of Christ's merits. But inquire farther whether Christ did not merit for us the grace of faith, and if he did, whether absolutely of conditionally; if absolutely then all must believe de facto, and be saved; if conditionally, than faith is a grace, which God bestows on man conditionally. Now let this Author show us what that condition is, upon performance whereof by man, God will give him faith, and let him try whether he can carry himself so warily herein, as not to plunge himself into plain Pelagianism. This point is a break-neck, or Crevecoeur unto all Arminians, they generally avoid the delivering of their minds clearly hereupon, as a man would avoid a precipice. It is true some Divines do interpret the word [World] here, of the Elect, as Piscator; Rolloc doth not, making no mention of the Elect hereupon. And Piscator's meaning is no more than this, viz. that this love of God in respect of every gracious effect (I mean in the way of sanctifying grace) determins only upon the Elect; for in all likelihood, he followed Calvin in this, Universalem notam apposuit (saith Calvin) tum ut promiscuè omnes ad vitae participationem invitet, tum ut praecidat excusationem incredulis. To the same purpose (saith he) pertains nomen mundi, quo prius usus est. And again, se toti mundo propitium ostendit, quum sine exceptione omnes ad fidem vocat: But here he subjoins a caution, thus; Caeterum meminerimus ita communiter promitti omnibus vitam si in Christo crediderint, ut tamen minime communis omnium sit fides. Patet enim omnibus Christus & expositus est, solis tamen Electis oculos Deus aperit & fide ipsum quaerant. So that this gracious promise is general to all and every one, whosoever believes shall be saved; But yet notwithstanding if it shall appear, that God gives the grace of faith, to none but to a certain number, (which are his Elect) it follows, that the effect of this love of God, to wit, Salvation shall in the issue redound to none but Gods Elect. 1. As for the designing a place where the World is taken for the Elect; we need no such place, as I have showed; yet Piscator conceives that so it is taken, john 3. 17. That the World might be saved by him. But what think you of Rom. 11. 15. Where the casting away of the Jews is said to be the reconciliation of the World. And that 2 Cor. 5. 19 God was in Christ reconciling the World unto himself. I say the reconciled World is only God's Elect, for the reconciled are all saved, as I prove by the Apostles argument Rom. 5. If when we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son, how much more being reconciled shall we be saved by his life. joh. 1. 29. The Lamb of God that taketh away the sins of the World. Are their sins taken away that are damned for them? And joh. 6. 33. He gives life to the World; Is life given to any but to the Elect? 2. The second reasons, why in this place it cannot be so taken, are in effect but one, and that a weak one: 1. Because, that they that understand it of the Elect, understand it so in no other sense, but as I have expounded it. 2. If I should say of the twelve Apostles (Judas excluded, and Mathias substituted in his room) that God so loved them, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever of them believed in him, should not perish but have everlasting life; who can deny, but that this was a truth accommodated unto them? but will it here hence follow, that among those Apostles, some were believers some unbelievers? Suppose all the World were Elect, and it pleased God to give them all Faith, should this Doctrine be the less true, whosoever believes shall be saved? yet in this case it would not follow, that amongst the World of men some were believers, and some unbelievers. But whereas he feigns, that some of our Divines should interpret the word [World] here of Believers, that is such a fiction as is incredible. I come to the fourth. DISCOURSE. SECT. IV. 1. TImoth. 2. 4. Who would have all to be saved and come to the knowledge of his truth. In these words the Apostle delivers two things. 1. That it is Gods will, that all men should obtain an happy end, viz. Salvation. 2. That it is his will also, that they should use and enjoy the means, which is the knowledge of his truth, that so they might obtain the end, the salvation of their souls; there is no let in God, but that all men may believe and be saved, and therefore there is no absolute will, that many thousands of men shall never believe nor be saved. Two answers are usually returned, which give me little satisfaction: The first is, that by All we are to understand all sorts, and not every particular man in every sort and condition. It is true that [all] is sometimes so used in Scripture, but (I believe) not here: for the very Text shows that we are to understand by it, the individuals and not the kinds: v. 1. There is a duty enjoined, I will that prayers and supplications be made for all men, and in this verse the motive is annexed, God will have all to be saved; as if he should have said, our charity must reach to all, whom God extends his love to: God will have all to be saved, therefore we must pray for all: Now in the duty All signifies every man, for no man though wicked and profane, is to be excluded from our prayers; pray for them (saith our Saviour) that persecute you; And pray (saith the Apostle here) for Kings, and all that are in Authority, men in those days (though the greatest) yet the worst, yea very Wolves, and Lions, and Bears of the Church; pray for them, and if for them, then for any other, thus in the duty it signifies every man; and if it do so in the duty, it must have the same extent in the motive too; or else the motive will not reach home, nor have strength enough to enforce the duty. The second answer is, that God will have all to be saved with his revealed will, have Millions to be damned with his secret will. If this answer stand, than (in my understanding) these inconveniences will follow. 1. That God's words (which are his revealed will) are not interpretations of his mind and meaning, and by consequence are not true; for Oratio quae non est mentis significatio, simulatio est. 2. That there are two contrary wills in God; a secret will, that many Sons of Adam shall irrevocably be damned; and a revealed will, that all the Sons of Adam may be saved. 3. That one of God's wills must needs be bad, either the secret will, or the revealed; for of contraries if the one be good, the other is bad; and so of God's contrary wills, if the one be good, the other must needs be bad, for malum is contrarium bono. TWISSE Consideration. THe Conclusion here is very loose; the Arguments being thus; It is God's will that all should be saved; therefore there is no absolute will, that many thousands of men shall never believe nor be saved: and the vanity of this consequence, I will show more ways than one. 1. The Apostle doth not say, It is the absolute will of God that all men shall be saved: nay Vossius interprets this place, and that according to the meaning of the Ancients, of voluntas conditionata, a conditional will in God, not absolute; and he gives instance Hist. Pelag. lib. 6. 7. p. 638. of it thus; It is the will of God that all shall be saved, in case they believe in Christ. Now albeit it be the conditional will of God that all, and every one shall be saved in case they believe, yet this hinders not, but that it may be the absolute will of God, that many thousands of men shall never be saved; as in case his will be to deny the grace of faith and repentance to many thousands, as it is clear and undeniable that he doth. Nay the Remonstrants themselves, and particularly an Arminian that I had to do withal lately, spared not to profess, that Election is absolute; if so, then reprobation also is absolute; and I doubt not but that they will all confess, that howbeit Gods will be, that all should be saved, yet thousands are reprobated. 2. Suppose the Apostle had said, it is the absolute will of God, that all men shall be saved, yet I say it follows not herehence, but that by the absolute will of God many might fail of falvation: for it was the absolute will of God, that every four footed beast should be represented to Peter, let down unto him in a linen vessel; yet nevertheless it might be that many thousands were not represented to him, and that by the will of God. Thus having discovered the vanity of this conclusion; I will now proceed to demonstrate that this place cannot be understood, of Gods will in proper speech, viz. willing all and every one to be saved. 1. Like as it is impossible, that a man at the same time should be saved and damned; so it is impossible, that God should at the same time and duration, both will to save and will to damn the same man: But God from everlasting did will to damn many thousands; therefore it was impossible, that from everlasting he should will to save them. 2. If it be Gods will that all and every one shall be saved; then all and every one shall be saved, For who hath resisted his will. Rom. 9 19 And for confirmation hereof, we find in ourselves, that if we will do aught, we do it if we can; and if we do not aught, the reason is, either because we have no will to do it, or because we have no power to do it. In like sort, that God doth not save many thousands, the reason must be, either because he will not, or because he cannot; not because he will not; for these profess that it is his will to save all and every one; Therefore the reason why he doth not save all, must needs be, because he cannot save them: this was Augustine's argument 1200 years ago. Enchirid. cap. 96. and 97. handling this very place of the Apostle. 3. If God did from everlasting will the salvation of all and every one, then either at this day he doth continue to will the salvation of all and every one, and shall continue for ever to will it, or no; if he doth continue to will it and ever shall, then say that God doth will the salvation of the damned both Men and Devils; albeit it is well known he damns them. If he doth not continue to will it, then is God of a changeable nature; directly contrary to the word of God, as well as to manifest reason: With him (saith james) is no variableness nor shadow of change. I the Lord am not changed, Mal. 3. 6. As for that which he thrusts in, to help make weight, saying, that there is no let in God, but that all men may believe and be saved, this is a most improper speech; for no man is said (in proper speech) to be let from doing aught, but upon presupposition that he would do it; now we utterly deny that God hindereth any man from believing and repenting, whose will is disposed to believe and repent. But seeing all men have infidelity and hardness of heart natural unto them, as a fruit of that corruption wherein all are borne; we deny that God c●●es it in all, but only in whom he will, according to that of Saint Paul, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. And our Saviour upon the same ground, is bold to tell the Jews, saying, Ye therefore hear not my words (that is, Rom. 9 18. Joh. 4. 47. believe them not) because ye are not of God. 2. The first exposition here mentioned was given by Austin, many hundred years ago. Enchirid. cap. 103. and he proves this his interpretation of the word [all] by the congruity of it to Scripture phrase in other places, as where it is said of the pharisees, that they tithe every herb; his words are these, Into locuti●nis modo & Dominus usus est in Evangelio, ubi ait Phariseis, Decimatis mentham, & rutam, & omne olus: neque enim Pharisei quaecunque aliena, & omnium per omnes terras alienigenarum omnium olera decimabant. Sicut ergo hic omne olus, omne olerum genus; it a & illic omnes homines, omne hominum genus, intelligere possumus: yet see the ingenuity of this great light of the Church of God: for forthwith he gives leave to devise any other convenient interpretation; provided that we do not violate God's omnipotency, by saying, that any thing that God would have brought to pass, is not brought to pass; his words are these, Et quocunque alio modo intelligi potest, dum tamen credere no cogamur aliquid omnipotentem Deum noluisse fieri, factumque non esse; qui sine ullis ambagibus si in caelo & terra (sicut & veritas cantat) omnia quaecunque voluit fecit: profecto facere noluit, quaecunque non fecit. This interpretation is generally received by our Divines, because of the congruity thereof to the Text itself; for as much as the Apostle having first admonished them in the general to pray for all, forthwith he descends to specials, as Vossius acknowledgeth, Generi speciem subjicit; now look in what sort the Species is to be understood, after the same manner is the General to be understood. Now the Specialls mentioned, are certain sorts or conditions of men, as Kings, and such as are in authority; therefore the general [all] must in like manner be understood of all sorts, and all conditions of men: upon this consideration also it was that Austin did insist, in the place before alleged: Praeceperat (saith he) Apostolus ut or aretur pro singulis hominibus, & specialiter addiderat pro Regibus, & iis qui in sublimitate sunt, qui putari poterant fastu & superbia seculari a fidei Christianae humilitate abhorrere. Proinde dicens, hoc enim bonum est coram salvatore nostro Deo, id est, ut etiam pro talibus oretur; statim ut desperationem tolleret, addit, qui omnes homines vult salves fieri, & in agnitionem veritatis venire. Hoc quippe Deus bonum judicavit, ut orationibus humilium dignaretur, praestare salutem sublimium. Now I come to consider what this Author hath to say against this exposition, for he gives us very gravely to understand, that it gives him little satisfaction: we are therefore to expect some better satisfaction from him. It is true that [all] is so used in Scripture, not only some times, but very frequently; let him come to instance in his sense, we are ready to instance with him for ours. But the Text (saith he) shows we are to understand the individuals and not the kinds. Where first (I doubt) his ignorance, in understanding the distinction aright, is his best ground of opposition. When Austin urgeth for his interpretation, that of the pharisees tything omne olus, every herb, who doubts but they tithe Individual herbs. In like sort when Peter saw in a vessel let down unto him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 every four footed beast; no question but Individual beasts were let down unto him, not every one of every kind, but of every kind or of most kinds, or of many kinds some, so that the meaning of the distinction is not to exclude all individuals (as this Author seems to carry the matter,) but only, to exclude a necessity of understanding all individuals of all sorts. It is enough if God will save some of all sorts, that is, of all conditions some individuals. Then, seeing he undertakes out of the very Text, to give us better satisfaction, then either Austin or our Divines have hitherto received, it must needs be a shame for him to leave the present Text, and fetch grounds elsewhere, for the clearing of Paul's meaning here. Now let us observe, how congruously or incongruously to his own undertake, he carrieth himself in this business: of the duty enjoined, and of the motive annexed, there is no question: but whereas he shapes the coherence thus, and makes Paul in effect to speak after this manner; our charity must reach to all to whom God extends his love to; God will have all to be saved, and therefore we must pray for all. Though all this were granted him, it makes nothing for him: but over and above here are causeless errors more then enough: For, first, our charity must extend farther than God's love; was not Jacob bound to carry himself charitably towards his brother Esau? though God's hatred of Esau, we know was as ancient as his love to jacob. 2. We are not bound to extend our charity so far as God extends his love; for many thousands there be in the World, (not to speak of the Elect departed this life) towards whom it may be God extends his love, which yet are unknown to us; & are we bound to pray for we know not whom. Again, God's love, with this Author, is extended as far as his will to save, and that is extended to all and every one: and unless God be now changed, it must extend to them now after they are damned, and must our charity be extended towards them also? But he proceeds, let us proceed with him. Now (saith he) [all] in the duty signifies every man; but that we deny; he gives his reason, for no man though wicked and profane, is to be excluded from our Prayers. Against this I have two exceptions, (and yet if the whole be granted him, it maketh nothing for him:) my first exception is this; he promised to give us satisfaction out of the Text itself; but who seeth not but that this rule of his, is brought in quite besides the Text: I from the Text have proved, and from the coherence between the general and the special, that the special being certain particular conditions of men, the general [all] must conformably be understood of all conditions. My second exception is this; he obtrudes upon us, that no man, though wicked and profane, is to be excluded from our Prayers. I confess I do not find myself apt to exclude any from my prayers; but I cannot endure, that a bold fellow should obtrude his rules upon us as Oracles. The Apostle Saint john forbids us to pray for them that sin a sin unto death. But let all this be granted, what then? If it extends to every one in the duty, it must have the same extent in the motive too; but this I deny; he saith, else the motive will not reach home, nor have strength enough to enforce the duty: but this likewise I deny; and show withal, how the motive shall reach home, and have strength enough even to enforce this duty, according to this Author's accommodation of it; albeit God hath a will not to save all and every one, but of all sorts and all conditions some; of Kings some, of them that are in Authority some; For seeing God saves of all sorts some, why should not every Christian Subject, pray for his Prince and Rulers, seeing it may be they are those some, whom God means to save, even of the rank of Princes, of the rank of Governors, and of men in Authority. For God hath not revealed to us, who they are whom he hath elected, and who they are whom he hath reprobated. If he had, Austin tells us what we should do in that case, De Civit. Dei. lib. 21. cap. 24. Si de aliquibus ita Ecclesia certa esset, ut qui sunt illi etiam nosset, qui licet adhuc in hac vitâ sint constituti, tamen praedestinati sunt in aeternum ignem ire cum Diabolo, tam pro i is non or art, quam pro ipso. If it shall be farther urged, that we are to pray for all Kings, and all that are in Authority, not only for our own; I answer, that this is nothing agreeable to the end of such prayers here expressed by the Apostle, namely, That under them we may live a quiet and peaceable life in all Godliness and honesty. And what have we here in England, to do with the King of Bungo, that we should pray for him, or for the Kings in terrâ australi incognitâ, discovered by Ferdinando de Quir, or for the great Duke of Crapulia? 3. As for the second interpretation; I do not find it so usual with our Divines: Cajetan distinguisheth here between voluntas signi and beneplaciti; so doth Aquinas, and this distinction of voluntas occulta and revelata, is usually reduced to that of voluntas signi and beneplaciti; But voluntas signi, and voluntas revelata, is more congruously applied to the things which God commands, then to the things which God himself worketh; as for example, he commands faith and repentance; and the commandments of God, are usually called the will of God in Scripture, though improperly; and thus the distinction is plain. God commands one thing, but it is not necessary, that he should will, that that which he commands shall come to pass: As for example, God commanded Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, yet he determined that Isaac should not be sacrificed, as appeared by the event. In like manner he commanded Pharaoh to let Israel go, yet withal told Moses he would harden his heart, that he should not let Israel go. But this will of God called voluntas signi and Revelata, cannot so congruously be said to pass upon man's salvation. Yet because God may be said to command salvation, in as much as he commands faith and repentance, that we may be saved; and in this sense, men are exhorted sometimes to save themselves; As, Save yourselves from this froward generation; and Save some out of the fire with fear; and That thou mayst both save thyself and them that hear thee; therefore we are content also to admit of this Acts 2. 40. Jud. 23. 1 Tim. 4. 16. distinction, and consider with what judgement and sufficiency this Author doth impugn it. 1. By his first opposition, it appears, that mere ignorance bears him out against this distinction; For we do acknowledge, that Gods revealed will, and his words revealing it, are true interpretations of his own mind and meaning; though not of such a meaning as he expects should be fashioned. For he conceives that Gods will in this case, is only of what shall be done; which is most untrue: Hereby is only signified, what is man's duty to do, although it may be God will not give him effectual grace to do it. As for examples sake, when God commanded Pharaoh to let Israel go; hereby was signified, that God would have it to be Pharaohs duty to let Israel go; though withal he professes to Moses, that he would harden Pharaohs heart, whereupon he should refuse to let them go. So when God commanded Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, hereby it was signified, that it was Gods will to make it Abraham's duty to sacrifice his Son, albeit God had determined, that when Abraham came to point of execution of that which was enjoined him, he would hold Abraham's hand, and content himself with Abraham's readiness, and good heart to obey God in this. 2. As to the second; it is untrue that any such thing followeth as this Author pretendeth, namely, that two contrary wills shall be found in God; For first there is no contrariety in the wills here shaped by the Author himself; thus, many shall be damned, and those, many may be saved. As for the word irrevocable, wherewith this Author stuffs his proposition, that is no attribute of damnation, or the manner thereof, but rather of God's decrees; wherein still he proceeds and spares not to foam out his own shame, desiring to make God's decrees of a revocable nature. Secondly, he understands not the accommodation of the distinction aright, which is not directly to salvation and immediately, but rather to praecepta, consilia, remedia, (as Aquinas expresseth it) of voluntas signi, which is all one in this case with voluntas revelata. 1. Applied to God's commandment, joined with a will not to give grace to obey his commandment, thus, it's Pharaohs duty to let Israel go; 'tis not God's will that Pharaoh shall let Israel go, for he meaneth to harden his heart to the contrary. 2. Applied to salvation, consequent or not consequent, according as men shall be found to obey or disobey God's commandment: thus, it's my will, that as many as believe and repent shall be saved, and consequently it's true, If thou believest (whoever thou art) and repentest, thou shalt be saved. I will give grace to believe and repent to some only, whereby they may be saved; between those in like manner, there is no contrariety at all. 3. And if there be no contrariety at all, then surely it follows not by this Author's Logic, that if one of them be good, the other must be bad. I say by this Author's Logic; for now adays men are given so much to Rhetoric, that they forget all good Logic, if ever they learned any: who I pray gives any such rule, that if one contrary be good, the other must be bad? If heat be good, is cold bad? Or if white be good, is black bad? But as for the case we treat of, if these wills were found to be contrary, one of them should destroy the other, and the other should have no being at all; and in case it hath no being, shall it be said to be bad? Yes, like enough, by the learning of the Arminians. I come to the Fifth. DISCOURSE. SECT. V. 2. PEter 3. 9 Not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance. This Scripture is not so liable to those exceptions, which are made against the former testimonies, for it is a negative proposition, and must be taken distributively; and therefore speaks that in plain terms, which is contrary to absolute reprobation. That which is usually replied is this, that the persons here spoken of, are the Elect only. God is not willing that any of the Elect should perish. But the contrary appears plainly in the Text; for the persons here spoken of, are those towards whom God exerciseth much long suffering and patience; and who are they? Are they the Elect only, or chiefly? No, but the Reprobates rather, that die for their contempt of grace. Reprobates are the proper objects of Gods long suffering and patience, as we may see, Rom. 2. 4. where the Apostle speaking of such as go on in sin, and treasure up unto themselves wrath against the day of wrath, saith that God useth patience towards them, that so he might lead them to repentance: and Rom. 9 22. He endureth (saith the Text) with much long suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction. Reprobates therefore as well as others doth Peter here speak of, and saith, that God would have none of them to perish; if they do perish, it is their own fault and folly, and not God's absolute pleasure, who would have none to perish. TWISSE. Consideration. HEre be odd gambols; as when he saith the proposition here is negative, whereas the propositions are two, and the latter affirmative, as well as the former is negative. As for the taking of it distributively, as he speaks, the Text expresseth the negative distributively; implying belike, that when we interpreted the former place de generibus singulorum, it was not to be taken distributively, which is a very shallow conceit, for it is apparent we distribute it de generibus singulorum; and more than that, of the particulars of each kind, only we do not distribute it of all the particulars. In like manner, though the Text in this place expresseth a distribution, saying, not willing, any to perish, this distribution is not extended to all: Nay, it admits of a greater limitation than the former place did by our interpretation; for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here must be referred to that which goes before in these words, God is patient to us ward not willing any to perish, that is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, any of us to perish, but all to come to repentance, that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, all of us; which can admit of no other sense then all such as the Apostle was; he saith it is contrary to absolute reprobation; that is wind; when he proveth it then we will believe it, his word is no oracle. 2. Let us see how he disproves their interpretation, who accommodate it to Gods Elect. The persons here mentioned (he saith) are those towards whom God exerciseth long suffering and patience, and demandeth whether these are the Elect only or chiefly? and answereth himself negatively; saying, that the reprobates are the proper objects of Gods long suffering and patience, which he proveth out of Rom. 2. 4. and Rom. 9 22. and so concludes the argument very learnedly and judiciously Arminian like, ex omnibus affirmativis, in secundâ Figurâ; which of what force it is every weak Logician knoweth; for thus in effect is his argument, They of whom God will have none to perish, are such towards whom God expresseth much long suffering and patience; But the Reprobates are they towards whom God expresseth much long suffering and patience; Therefore the Reprobates are they, of whom God will have none to perish. 2. And whereas the Apostle saith, God is patient towards us, the meaning according to this Authors judicious enlargement is, towards us who are partly elect and partly reprobates: and so likewise when he saith, 2 Pet. 1. 2. To you who have obtained like precious faith with us, that is, with us of whom some are elect and some reprobates. And 1 Pet. 1. 3. God hath begotten us to a lively hope, by the resurrection of Jesus Christ, that is, begotten us, some of whom are elect and some reprobates. 3. Now because the Apostle saith plainly and simply, who is patient towards us; this Author desiring to frame it in a suitable manner, to that of the Apostle, Rom. 2. 4. whereunto he hath a hungry desire to reduce it, therefore he makes bold to say, that the persons here mentioned by Saint Peter are such, towards whom God exerciseth long suffering and patience: Thus again he is willing very obsequiously to follow Lysander's counsel, who advised, when a Lion's skin would not serve the turn, to piece it up with a Fox skin. We on the other side, though it cannot be denied, but that God doth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 towards such as Saint Peter was, and those to whom he wrote, who had obtained like precious faith with himself and his fellow Apostles, and other believers; which cannot be denied to have been the elect of God, (so he calls them to whom he wrote, 1 Pet. 1. 2.) yet we spare to draw any argument therehence, because we know full well, that God doth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and useth long suffering towards the Reprobates also. So that we could not conclude that we would herehence, but either by a Syllogism vicious in the form, as this Author doth, or by a Syllogism, that would be as faulty in the matter, thus; God shows patience to none but Reprobates; they of whom God will have none to perish are such, as towards whom God shows patience; therefore God will not have any Reprobate to perish. And is not this a proper doctrine, that God will not have any Reprobate to perish, both for the overthrowing of God's omnipotency; for is it not a clear case and undeniable, that all Reprobates do perish? As also for the overthrowing of God's immutability; for can it be denied, that when God damns them, he will have them to perish? Which if before he would not, can it be avoided, but that Gods will must be changed? And lastly, for the bringing in of manifest contrariety into the will of God; seeing they dare not deny that God did from everlasting ordain every reprobate unto damnation: I say they dare not deny this in plain terms, though their carriage is such, as if their meaning were, that Gods will in decreeing their damnation is conditional quoad actum volentis, as touching the very act of willing, whence it followeth that God shall not will their damnation until their death in infidelity and impenitency; for it is fit the condition should exist before the thing conditionated, whose existence depends thereupon. As for that he adds in the close, If they do perish it is their own fault and folly; we make no question hereof, though nevertheless we may well maintain, that it is Gods absolute pleasure, not to take them off from their sinful and foolish courses, nor to set an end to these vicious courses of theirs, which he could if it pleased him, as well as he did set an end to the abominable courses of Manasses, as also to the persecution and bloody courses of Saul; towards whom he did undoubtedly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and exercise much long suffering and patience; though herein there is no difference between them and reprobates, or very little; according to that of Austin, Istorum neminem (non praedestinatorum) adducit Deus ad salubrem spiritualemque paenitentiam, quâ homo Deo reconciliatur in Christo; sive illis ampliorem paenitentiam, sive non imparem praebeat: contrà Julian. Pelagian. lib. 5. cap. 4. I come to the last of this rank. DISCOURSE. SECT. VI TO These testimonies, I may add those conditional speeches, if thou seek him he will be found of thee; but if thou forsake him he will cast thee off, for ever, 1 Chron. 28. 9 If ye seek him, he will be found of you; but if you forsake him, he will forsake you. 2 Chron. 15. 2. If thou do well, shalt thou not be accepted? but if thou dost ill, sin lies at the door. Gen. 4. 7. The just shall live by faith, but if any man withdraw himself, my soul non approbabit eum, shall have no pleasure in him, he shall be a Reprobate. In all these and many other places it is clear (for aught I can see) that God forsakes no man, considered simply in the fall, till by actual sins and continuance in them he forsakes God. Now if God reject no man from Salvation in time or in act and deed, till he rejects God, then surely he rejected no man in purpose and decree, but such a one as he foresaw, would reject and cast off him. For God's acts in time, are regulated by his decrees before time. Ephes. 1. 11. God worketh all things (saith the Apostle) according to the counsel of his own will; and therefore there must be an exact conformity between them, as between regulam and regulatum, the rule and the thing measured by the rule. By whatsoever therefore God doth in the World, we may know what he purposed to do before the World; and by his actual casting men off, when they grow rebellious and impenitent, and not before, we may certainly gather, that he decreed to cast them off, for their foreseen rebellion and impenitency, and not before. Besides it is all one in substance, to cast a man off indeed, and to entertain a resolution to do it; our velle and facere are all one in God's account, and the reason is, because where there is a deliberate and settled will, the deed will follow, if nothing hinder; much more is God's will and deed all one, seeing his will is omnipotent, and irresistible, and whatsoever he wills directly and absolutely, is certainly done when the time comes. All these plain Scriptures doth this opinion contradict in terminis, and not only these, but the whole course of Scriptures, by which it is much safer for a man to frame his opinions, then by a few places picked up here and there, and those obscure ones too: What Saint Austin speaks in another place, I may safely say in this, numquid ideo negandum quod apertum est, quia comprehendi non potest, quod occultum est? Shall we contradict plain places, because we cannot comprehend the obscure? Aug. de bono persever. c. 14. Secundum plura (saith Tertullian) pauciora sunt intelligenda; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ne unus sermo subvertat alios; secundum omnes potius quam adversum omnes intelligendus erit, A few testimonies must be expounded according to the whole course of Scriptures, and not this according to a few testimonies. This is my first reason. TWISSE Consideration. TO the places of Scripture here alleged, I give the interpretation, to prevent the confusion of things that differ, which all affect who prefer the darkness of Error before the light of truth; for it is most advantageous to such, to fish in troubled waters. To the two first, I say; God is first sought of us before we find him, as touching the obtaining of many blessings at the hands of God according to that, Ezech. 36. 37. I will yet be sought of the house of Israel, to perform it unto them. But as touching the obtaining of an heart to seek him, thus God is found of us before we seek him; according to that, Es. 65. 1. I have been found of them that sought me not: witness Saul marching with a commission from the Priests to Damascus, to bind all that called on the name of Jesus. To the third I answer, by distinguishing acceptation, as we distinguish love; Love is either complacentiae or beneficentiae; so acceptation is either unto reward, or unto complacency; Rewards always follow our doing well; but grace of doing well is always a fruit of God's favour towards us in Christ. To the last the just shall live by faith; But there is a grace of God preventing faith; cur ille credat, ille non credat, what is the reason but the mere pleasure of God giving the grace of Faith to one, and denying it to another, according to that of the Apostle, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. They that withdraw themselves my soul shall have no pleasure in them; The meaning is, they shall feel the smart of his displeasure; but before they withdrew themselves God took not that pleasure in them, as to give them his custodient grace, to keep them from withdrawing themselves; which grace, and that out of his good pleasure he afforded unto others: But this grace comes in no account throughout with this Author, like unto the Remonstrants, who would have no other notice taken of any other counsel of God, then that whereby he decreeth to save believers and damn unbelievers. But if you call them to inquire of God's decree, to bestow the grace of Faith and repentance upon some, and not on others; as whether it proceeds absolutely or conditionally, they usually lend a deaf ear to this; whereby it is as clear as the Sun, what estimation they make of the grace of regeneration, of the grace of Faith, and of repentance; and after what manner they give God the glory of it. By the way observe I pray, how he makes the state of man in being a reprobate consequent to his withdrawing himself, which undoubtedly is a Temporal act, and accordingly the act of Reprobation, whereby a man is denominated a reprobate, to be merely Temporal; and consequently such an act must election be also, viz. not eternal but Temporal. Still he keepeth himself in his strength of confusion, as most advantageous for him; as in saying, God forsakes no man, till by actual sins and continuance in them he forsaketh God. But albeit God forsaketh no man, as touching the inflicting of punishment, until man commits actual sin, and continueth therein impenitently; yet before this God did forsake him, as touching the denial of this grace custodient from sin; and the denial of the grace of repentance to rise out of sin, which yet he grants to many; as in showing mercy to whom he will, like as whom he will he hardeneth, and so accordingly cures in some, that natural infidely and hardness of heart wherein we are all borne, and leaves it uncured in others. Now consider we his argument following, which is this. If God reject no man from salvation in time, or in act and deed till he reject God, then surely he rejected no man in purpose and decree, but such a one as he foresaw would reject and cast off God. Now this argument not one of our Divines deny, not only as it is applied to reprobation; but neither do we deny it, applied unto election. For we willingly profess, that like as God bestows salvation on none, but such as he than finds believers, penitent, and given to good works: in like sort we all profess, that God decrees to bestow salvation on none but such as he forseeth will believe, repent, and become studious of good works. Like enough, many do wilfully dissemble the true state of the Question between us: others ignorantly mistake it. The question is not whether God decrees to bestow salvation on such as he forseeth will believe, and reject those from salvation whom he foreseeeth will not believe; but of the order of reason between these decrees of God, and the foresight of obedience the one side, and disobedience on the other; that is, whether like as faith, repentance, and good works in men of ripe years do precede their salvation, as disposing causes thereunto; so the foresight of faith, repentance, and good works, precede election, as disposing causes or prerequisites thereunto. In like manner on the other side, whether, as final perseverance in sin precedes damnation, as the meritorious cause thereof; So final perseverance in sin as foreseen by God precedes reprobation as the decree of Damnation, as the meritorious cause thereof: So that the argument here mentioned (which is all his strength in this place) rightly applied must run thus. Faith, repentance, and good works actually existent precede salvation, as the disposing causes thereunto; therefore faith, repentance, and good works foreseen precede election, as the disposing causes thereunto; and what is this, but as good as in express terms to profess, that election is of faith, repentance, and good works: though it be in direct contradiction unto Saint Paul, professing in terminis (to speak in this Divines language) that the purpose of God according to election is not of works. So on the other side, Final perseverance in sin precedes damnation, as the meritorious cause thereof; therefore final perseverance in sin foreseen, precedes the decree of damnation, as the meritorious cause thereof. And than what is to make reprobation to be of evil works, if this be not? Whereas Saint Paul, look by what arguments he proves that election is not of good works, viz. because before Jacob and Esau were borne, or had done good or evil, it was said of them the Elder shall serve the Younger: by the same argument it is equally evident that Reprobation is not of evil works. Yet we acknowledge an exact conformity between God's decrees and the execution thereof: because like as God damns no man but for sin, so he decreed to damn no man but for sin: where sin is in each place made the meritorious cause of damnation, not of the decree of damnation. And like as God bestows salvation on no man of ripe years, but by way of reward of faith, repentance, and good works, so he decreed to bestow salvation on no man of ripe years, but by way of reward of faith, repentance, and good works; where faith repentance and good works, are in each place made the disposing causes to salvation, but not to election. There was never any so mad (saith Aquinas) as to say that merits are the cause of predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating, and Why? but because so is the cause of predestination to be enquired into, as the cause of Gods will is enquired into: but formerly he had showed that there can be no cause of God's will, as touching the act of God willing: Now let every one judge whether the act of reprobation, be not as clearly the act of Gods will, as the act of predestination; and consequently whether it be not equally as mad a course (in Aquinas his judgement) to devise a cause of reprobation, as to devise a cause of predestination on the part of Gods will. And no marvel, for the act of Gods will is eternal, all the works of the creature are temporal: Then, the act of Gods will is God himself, for there is no accident in God; and therefore they may as well set themselves to devise a cause of God, as a cause of Gods will. His phrase of casting off, is ambiguous; if it signifieth the denial of salvation, it followeth disobedience; if it signifieth the denial of grace, it precedes disobedience, in what kind soever. 3. Our velle and facere are both temporal; in God it is otherwise; for his deeds are temporal, and may admit the works of men precedaneous thereunto; but his resolutions are his decrees, and they are all eternal, and can admit no work of man precedaneous thereunto; yet is God as just in the one as in the other. For like as he damns no man but for sin, so he never decreed to damn any man but for sin; But as touching the grace of regeneration, the grace of faith and repentance, in the granting and denying of this, the Apostle plainly tells us, he proceeds merely according to the good pleasure of his will; as when he saith, The Lord hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth: And here also God is as just in his decrees as in his executions. For if it be just with him, to give this grace to whom he will, and deny it to whom he will; it is as just with him, to decree the giving of it to whom he will, and the denying of it also to whom he will. And why shall not the Lord take liberty to cure infidelity and hardness of heart in whom he will, as he cured it in Manasses and Saul; and leave it uncured in whom he will, as he left it uncured in many a proud Pharisee, and proud Philosopher, notwithstanding all their Morality they boasted of? Very seasonably he confesseth God's will to be omnipotent and irrefistible, when nevertheless, he makes him to will the salvation of all Reprobates, though not one of them is saved. But by that which follows, by will omnipotent and irrefistible, it seems he understandeth only will absolute, which he distinguisheth from will conditionate, which can be no other (I suppose) than this, my will is that all and every one shall be saved, in case he believe and repent. Now seeing it is as true, that 'tis God's will that they shall be damned, in case they believe not and repent not, let every sober man judge, whether this deserve to be accounted, a will of saving rather than a will of damning; especially in case all men naturally, are far more prone to infidelity and impenitency, then to faith and repentance. As for a will conditionate in God, like enough this Author carrieth it hand over head without distinction, as he doth many other things besides: whereas no such will is agreeable to the divine nature, quoad actum volentis, as touching the act of willing, as both Bradwardine by clear reason, and Piscator out of the word of God have demonstrated, but only quoad res volitas, as touching the things willed by him. 4. I have showed the poverty of his performances, by the particular examination of every place alleged by him, and made it plain, how he betrays his own nakedness of interpretation of Scripture, and of argumentation throughout; and therewithal, the vanity of this his boast, that our doctrine of absolute reprobation, doth contradict these plain Scriptures. But he like a brave fellow well conceited of his achievements, and having thereby gotten some authority to himself, is bold to give his word, that it contradicts also the whole course of Scripture; which I verily believe he is as well able to perform, as he hath performed the former; and very judiciously takes upon him to distinguish between the whole course of Scriptures, and a few places picked up here and there, as if they were no part of the whole course of Scripture: Belike by reason of their obscurity, as he pretends, no matter if they were expunged; like as owls are offended with daylight. Our Saviour tells us of some that loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil. None hate the light of God's truth, more than such as are possessed with errors, as with familiar spirits, especially when they have been found to play the Apostates from God's truth. Whether I have dashed myself upon the rocks of Augustine's censure, by contradicting any Scripture that he hath brought, or only his corrupt and vile interpretation and accommodation of them, let the indifferent judge. Yet what more plain than this, God's purpose of election is not of works; especially compared with the manner how Saint Paul proves it. What more plain than this? God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. It is apparent he utterly declines the critical point of these controversies, which is as touching Gods giving grace, even the grace of faith and repentance; and of what spirit that savoureth let every one judge. As for interpreting any place, we do not abridge his liberty in interpreting it after what manner he thinks good, but we are ready to weigh it, and if we find it too light, to esteem of it as it deserves: neither do we refuse to take into consideration, what he or any of his complices are pleased to insist upon. DISCOURSE. The Second sort of Arguments Convincing drawn from God's Attributes. SECT. I. As touching the General. SEcondly it fights with some principal Attributes of God, therefore it cannot be true. For God useth not to make decrees contrary to his own glorious nature, and incompatible with those excellent Attributes, by which he hath discovered part of himself to men. Two things are here to be premised. 1. That Gods chief Attributes are those perfections, in the manifestation of which by acts conformable to them, God is most glorified, which are Mercy, Justice, Truth, etc. For God is more honoured by the exercise of these amongst men, then by the putting forth of his unlimited power and Sovereignty; as a King is more renowned among his Subjects, for his clemency, equity, candid and fair dealing, then for his Dominion and Authority, or any thing that is done only for the manifestation thereof. And there is good reason for it. For, 1. Power is no virtue, but mercy, justice, and truth are; acts of power are not Morally good of themselves, but are made good or evil by their concomitants: if they be accompanied with justice, mercy, etc. they are good, if otherwise, they are naught. For justum oportet esse quod laudem meretur. 2. Power and Sovereignty may as well be showed in barbarous and unjust actions, as in their contraries. Saul showed his authority and power to the full, in slaying the Lords Priests, and Nabuchadnezzar in casting the three Children into the fiery furnace, and Daniel into the Lion's Den; but no mercy, nor justice, nor any thing else that was good. 2. The second thing that is to be preconsidered is, that justice, mercy, and truth in God, are the same in nature with those virtues in men, though infinitely different in degree (as light in the air, is the same with light in the Sun in nature, not in degrees) and that which is just, merciful, and upright in men, is so in God too. And by these virtues in ourselves, and such acts as are conformable to them, tanquam ex pede Herculem, we may safely measure the same in God: For otherwise these things would follow. 1. The common and received distinction of Divine Attributes, into communicable and incommunicable, would fall to the ground: for against it this night be said, that the mercy, justice, truth, and other virtues that are in us, are not Gods perfections in a lower degree communicated to us, but things of a different nature. 2. Men cannot be truly said, to be made after God's image, Gen. 1. 27. Nor when they are regenerated, to be renewed after the same image, Col. 3. 10. And to be made partakers of the Divine nature, 2 Pet. 1. 4. That Picture cannot be the picture of such a man, which doth not in its parts and lineaments clearly resemble him; nor can we be truly the image of God, in respect of our graces, if in these graces there be not a resemblance of God's Attributes. 3. We may not safely imitate God, as we are commanded; Be you perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect, Math. 5. 48. and be ye holy as I am holy. Nor when we show forth mercy, justice, and truth in our actions, can we be properly said to imitate God, if these be one thing in God, and in men another. These two things being thus premised, viz. that God's mercy, justice, and truth, are three of his chief Attributes, in the exercise of which he takes himself to be much glorified, and that we are to measure these Attributes by the same virtues in ourselves. I come to the proof of my second reason against absolute reprobation, which is, that it opposeth some of God's principal Attributes, particularly his justice, mercy, and truth. TWISSE. Consideration. I Cannot but wonder at the performances of the true Author of this Discourse, in comparing that which goes before, with that which comes after; His poverty of argumentation out of Scripture, and the exuberancy of his discourse following. Before he was in some straits, but now he seems to have gotten Sea room enough: yet this is my comfort, I seem to perceive out of what chimney all this smoke proceeds, and to be as well acquainted with the spirit that breatheth here, as if I were at his elbow while he penned it. Agnosco veteris vestigia flammae: such like are Doctor jackson's discourses; and him I have known of old, and his Ephestion also; I profess willingly of Scholar acquaintance, they were my greatest and dearest; But seeing it hath pleased God to put such a difference between us; I would have both them and the World know, I do as little regard them as fear them. Arminius himself is never more plausible, then in such like extravagant discourses as a positive Theologue: But these inspirations were never derived from him; they are flowers of another garden. These have been shapen in a more Philosophical brain whereof some having gotten the reputation, give Oracles therehence, first to form interpretations of Scriptures, in congruity to these Theorems, as the true Author blusheth not to profess; which when he hath persuaded the World of, I see no cause to the contrary, but he may adventure a degree farther, and persuade the burning of the Bible, so far as it concerneth the Doctrine of Predestination and Reprobation, Grace and freewill, and content themselves with these magisterial precepts, as most sufficient and sovereign for the endoctrinations of the Christian World in these points. But he might have spared his pains in proving this consequence, that if our Doctrine of Reprobation be contradictory to God's principal attributes it cannot be true. I say he might have spared the proof hereof, for all that he brings in proof of this is but darkness in comparison of the domestical light, and selfe-evidence, which this consequence carrieth with it. His premises here, and discourse thereof is like unto the Turks parley before the encounter, when he challenged any one of Scanderbegs army to a single combat. For as that parley was merely complemental, and to no purpose, save only, as he might conceit, to abate the fervour of his opposite, who longed to be dealing with him; so this introduction, I find to be of no Scholastical use in the world, but merely Politic, to work some impression upon the reader's affections, where by it may come to pass, that when he reads of God's mercy and justice, as here it is set forth, he may be the more inclined to judge thereof, according to the genius of human mercy and justice. Yet I am content to give myself to be wrought upon by these pretty contemplations, as far as I shall be convicted of any truth and sobriety in them: though I willingly profess I am very suspicious (for I love to betray my infirmities) that there is little or no truth and sobriety at all in them. 1. Now because he hopes to hatch much advantage unto his cause out of these attributes, and to that purpose he sits very long upon them, though his market may be never the better for all that. He tells us these are Gods chief attributes, and as it appeareth by that which followeth, his practice is to disparage his power (which I call the Lords Sovereignty) in comparison to these; Now it seems they are chief indeed in his opinion, for the furthering of his cause; but as for any absolute chiefty they have in God, I am not as yet acquainted therewith, what I may be by this Author's performances I know not; yet in the next page save one, he professeth expressly, That all Gods excellencies are infinitely good, and one is not greater than another; wherein I do much approve his judgement, as savouring of more depth than this, which yet I think not that he, who pretends to be the Author of this discourse, in respect of his minority, should be likely to broach; as for other respects of principality, I shall be ready to take notice of them in due place. But when he saith, God is most glorified in the manifestation of mercy, justice, and truth, it is a very odd phrase: For it is one thing to be glorious, another thing to be glorified; dare he deny that God is as glorious in his power and sovereignty, as in his mercy, justice, and truth? As for the glorifying of him, that depends upon the will of the creature. It may be some are more thankful unto God, for blessing them with health, and riches, and honour, and preferment; then for bestowing his Gospel upon them; but will it follow herehence, that his goodness in giving riches, etc. is more glorious than his goodness is seen in giving us his Word and Gospel? We read that when God laid the foundations of the earth, the Stars of the morning praised God together, and all the children of God rejoiced, Job. 38. 7. did these Angels glorify God for his mercy, justice, and truth, in the creating of them? We read sometimes of God's power, sometimes of his wisdom manifested in the Creation, as Jer. 10. 11. and 51. 11. and Psal: 136. 5. Jer. 10. 12. etc. But no where have I read (that I can remember) he made the World by his mercy, justice, or truth; and Revel. 4. 11. I find the glory of power given unto God in the creation, by the 24 Elders, but neither there, nor any where else (that I know) is the glory of his mercy, justice, and truth, given unto God therein. Thou art worthy O Lord, to receive glory, and honour, and power; for thou hast created all things, and for thy will sake, they have be and are created. And albeit men fail in giving God the glory of his power and wisdom as they should, will it follow herehence, that God is not so much to be glorified for his power and wisdom, as for mercy, justice, and truth? yet who falls in this, that fails not in the use of the Lords Prayer; the conclusion whereof is this, For thine is the Kingdom, and power, and glory? And indeed albeit Power and Wisdom may be showed other ways, then in the way of mercy, justice, and truth; yet God's mercy, justice, and truth, cannot be showed without the simultaneous demonstration of his power and wisdom: And therefore when God comes to make good his gracious promise, for the delivering of Israel out of Egypt: which cannot be denied to have been a singular work of mercy, justice, and truth; the Lord professeth that then he would make himself known unto them by the name, Jehovah, by which name he was not known before. The Incarnation of the Son of God, was it not an admirable work, as well in the way of power, and wisdom, as in the way of mercy, justice, and truth? I am apt to confound God's justice with his truth, ere I am aware, without having that awful regard to the authority of this writer, as perhaps may seem fit: But I hope it is a pardonable fault, considering my education hitherto in divinity; whereby I have attained only thus far, to the acknowledgement of justice Divine; for justice consisteth, in giving every one his due; now this due being either in respect of God, or the creature: Justice Divine in giving God his due, Aquinas hath taught me, that it is all one with God's wisdom, promoting his ends by congruous means; justice Divine in giving the creature his due, I have learned to depend wholly on God's determination, manifested by his promises and threatenings, and this is commonly called justitia fidelitatis, which I take to be all one with truth. But I am very willing to be better informed by this Author, and I give myself to his contemplations, to have my thoughts fashioned by them as they can; and if hitherto they have not transformed me into a new Creed, I cannot help that. Now if it be so that God's power and wisdom accompany the demonstration of his mercy, justice, and truth, I cannot see how God is honoured more by the exercise of the one sort, then of the other, but rather on the contrary. So that albeit a King is more renowned among his Subjects, for his clemency, equity, candid and fair dealing, then for his dominion and authority; yet I do not easily perceive, how God is renowned more for his clemency, equity, etc. then for his power, etc. yet again this seems to me a very poor argument; to conclude Clemency to be a chief attribute of God, because men do more magnify him for that, then for his Power. For consider, a Malefactor going to execution, is called back and saved by the King's pardon, this man (be sure) will magnify the King more for his clemency in saving him, than he would for his justice in putting him to death: but will it follow herehence, that Clemency is a more chief attribute of a King than justice? Solomon the greatest of Kings hath said, the Throne is established by Justice: and it was wont to be said, fiat justitia, ruat orbis. No such thing is said of Mercy. Then again the King could not do this but by virtue of his prerogative, yet the Malefactor magnifies him not for his prerogative, but for the favourable use of it for his good, for that is all he respects: yet ask I pray any man of judgement, which is the chiefer attribute of a King, and more glorious of the two; his prerogative or his clemency? Clemency is a very vulgar virtue, but the royal prerogative is peculiar to one; A Thief after a robbery committed on the highway, meeting with a beggar that beggeth a penny, if he astonish him with the gift of twelve pence, the beggar is very likely more highly to magnify him, than any honest man going on the way, that bestows but an half penny upon him; yet, Whose liberality is the greater of the two? Carnal men renown others for the benefit they receive by them; not according to their true worth: yet there is a farther difference; humane authority may be abused, and Sovereignty on earth is not always joined with good Morality, much less with Piety; but in case a man could not sin, the more honour and authority is laid upon him, the more glorious should he be; as being backed with the greater power to execute his goodness. Thus it is with God, it is impossible he should abuse his sovereignty; yea his mercy and justice are one and the same reality with his power: what a vanity than is it to discourse as this Author doth, in preferring one attribute of God before another, as if God were more glorious in the one then in the other. But he hath farther reasons for this, let us consider them: 1. Power (saith he) is no virtue, nor morally good, but mercy justice and truth are. I answer: Though it be so, yet who will say, the glory of virtue is greater than the glory of power? 2. Especially considering, that virtue is common to the meanest. 3. A little virtue joined with power, shall bring forth far better fruits, than a great deal of virtue without power. 4. Though it be so in man, whose power may be abused, shall we transfer it to God, whose power cannot be abused, his power and his goodness being all one? 5. Moral virtues denote a goodness removable where it is, obtainable where it is not; but no such goodness can be found in God, and consequently no Moral virtue in proper speech, whatsoever is in him, that being natural and essential unto him. 6. Lastly, to power only and sovereignty we owe obedience, and not to goodness, and jurisdiction is far more glorious than subjection. Yet by the way it is untrue (in my judgement) that acts of Power are made good by being accompanied with justice, speaking of Moral goodness; as acts of virtue alone they are morally good, not as acts of power. If justum oportet esse quod laudem meretur; then justice if not alone, yet chiefly, shall be that whereby one is renowned: yet herehence it follows, that every act of God's power shall laudem mereri; because it is impossible that any thing he doth should be otherwise then just, such a justitia condecentiae followeth all his actions; otherwise we must grant, that God hath power to do that which is unjust. 2. And accordingly, though power humane and Angelical, may be showed in barbarous actions: yet power Divine cannot; let him do whatsoever he is able, it shall not be unjust; let God turn all the World into nothing, another manner of destruction then that of Saul's slaying the Lords Priests, or Netuchadnezzars casting the three Children into the fiery Furnace, yet dares this Author say, that God herein should be unjust. I come to the second of his premises. 2. We have had a taste of this Author's faculty in roving at large, and within the Horizon of his own brain, we shall drink a deeper draught of it ere we part. And once again I willingly profess, it cannot enter into my belief, that these conceits have dropped from the fancy of a young Divine; some old beaten Naturalist rather doth employ his brain to do the Arminians this service. I never found hitherto that Arminius, or any of his Batavian followers have thus discoursed, that justice, mercy, and truth in God, are the same in nature, with those virtues in men, though infinitely differing in degree. I conceive Arminius (though wild enough in his 20 reasons, and especially in his reasons drawn from the consideration of God's justice) to be more Orthodox, and far more Scholastical than so; though I nothing doubt, we have a generation amongst us that affect to have all learning in Divinity, to go by their rules of Philosophy, and yet the basest Philosophy I think that ever was devised. And this Author whosoever he be, seems herein to discourse after such a manner, as if he were of the number of those that heard the Devil read Lectures through a grate in the University of Toledo. If justice mercy and truth in God, are the same in nature, with those virtues that are in men, than there is something in man, that is the very essence of God; For undoubtedly whatsoever is in God, is of his essence; yet those are they that attribute Manicheisme unto us. And seeing the virtues of man are accidents, it follows that that, which under the same name is attributed to God, is either an accident in God; or if it be his essence, than the essence of God, is of the same nature with accidents in man. Thirdly; hence it follows, that the Divine perfections consist of degrees, and consequently must needs be accidental unto him, not substantial; for substance admits no degrees. Fourthly; if justice humane be of the same nature with justice Divine, it followeth, not only that, that which is just in man is just with God, but that it must be after the same manner just; that like as men's justice consisteth in obedience to God's law, implying subjection thereunto: So justice Divine must consist in obedience to God's law implying subjection. And like as man is obliged to be just, in the same manner God is obliged to be just. And consequently like as Soul sinned and became unjust in slaying the Lords Priests, so had God been unjust in doing the like. Fiftly; man sinneth in suffering his brother to sin, when it lies in his power to keep him from sin; and consequently, if that which is unjust with man is unjust with God, God sinneth as often as he suffereth any sin to be committed in the world, for undoubtedly he could prevent it. August. contra Julian. Pelag. lib. 5. cap. 4. Nos certe, si eos, in quos nobis potestas est ante oculos nostros, perpetrare scelera permittamus, rei cum ipsis erimus: Quam vero innumerabilia illa permitit fieri ante oculos suos; quae utique si voluisset, nullâ ratione permitteret, But let us see how he proves this, for he adventures upon it like a tall fellow, and that with variety of demonstration. 1. The first is drawn from the received distinction of divine Attributes, namely into such as are communicable unto the creature, and such as are incommunicable; but here he conceals his Authority. But let him bring forth the testimony of any Divine, that maintains any Attribute Divine to be the same quoad nomen & nominis rationem, with any Attribute humane. Yet we may talk of God's Attributes so, as for distinction sake to say, some are such as are also Attributed to man, others are not; without maintaining, that humane virtues are of the same nature with Attribute Divine. Life is a Divine Attribute, it is also attributed to man, to a beast, to a plant; But will any wise man say that the life of God is of the same nature with the life of a Man, of a Beast, of a Plant? What more equivocal than the word Canis? Attributed to a Star, to a Fish, to a Fourfooted creature on the Earth; I answer much more equivocal is every thing in common attributed to God and Man; For whatsoever is in God, is his Essence, but between the Essence of God, and the essence of Man, there is a vaster difference, then between the essence of a Star, of a Fish, of a Dog; how much more difference is there between the Essence of God, and an accident in man, such as his virtues are. In a word, the virtue of Man is of an annihilable condition, and if it be of the same nature with something in the nature of God, why should not something in the nature of God be of an annihilable condition? I marvel not if men of this generation are apt to profess that they will turn Atheists rather than concur in some points with the Contra-Remonstrants; for their discourses breath Atheism in a very high degree. It is a question among Schoolmen, whether Ens (the most abstract notion of all other) be predicated univocally of God and the creature; the Dominicans utterly deny it; Scotus maintains the contrary with some curiosity of argumentation: but his Arguments are answered by the Dominicans and particularly by Versor on the Metaphysics; but never, I think, was it heard of Scotus or any other (till now) that the virtues of man are of the same nature with the Divine Attributes, differing only in degree. I come to his second Argument. 2. It was wont to be accounted that man was the image of God, not in respect of the qualities of his mind and will only, but even in respect of his Essence also; And some have been anciently condemned for denying this: why then do we not say that the Essence of man is of the same nature with the Essence of God differing only in degree. In the next place the power of understanding and liberty of will in man a bodily creature, brings him nearest to God, of all bodily creatures: it was wont to be said that all other creatures had vestigia Dei, but man was imago Dei; as in whom is represented the Divine Nature as intelligent and free; so far forth, as a compound creature of body and soul can represent him; but who hath ever said that the understanding of God was of the same nature with the understanding of man: and the will of God of the same nature with the will of man? It is well known that the understanding, and will humane, are but natural faculties in man; but the understanding and will Divine, is the very essence of God; and if man's essence be not of the same nature with his faculties, doth it become us to profess that the essence of God is of the same nature with the natural faculties of man? As for the graces of God's spirit, what are these but the three Theological virtues; all other are but Moral virtues sanctified by these; Now show me what Faith there is in God of the same nature with our Faith differing only in degree? What hope there is in God of the same nature with our hope, differing only in degree, what charity there is in God of the same nature with our Charity, differing only in degree. These indeed being of all other the most peculiar fruits of regeneration, whereby we are renewed after the image of God, as touching the adventitious qualification of our natures, should have Attributes divine answerable unto them (if any) of the same nature with them, differing only in degree. Yet herein (as I conceive) consists not so much our participation of the Divine Nature, as in that, the Spirit of God the Father, and God the Son is communicated unto us, given unto us to be the immediate fountain of all actions and motions spiritual in us. 3. And albeit these Attributes, which in common do denominate God and man, are one thing in God, and in man another: yet this nothing derogates from our imitation of God; and striving to be perfect and holy in our kind as creatures; like as God is perfect and holy in his kind as Creator. And that I may represent some authority for my discourse, whereas this Author represents none for his, it is a point generally received in the Schools, that in this weakness of our understanding, we come to know what God is by negation rather than by affirmation. Capreolus upon the first of the Sentences Dist. 2. Quest. 1. rehearseth divers passages out of Aquinas to this purpose, as out of 1. Contra Gentes cap. 14. In consideratione Divinae substantiae praecipue utendum est via remotionis. Nam Divina substantia omnem formam quam intellectus noster attingit, suâ excedit immensitate. Et sic ipsam apprehendere non pessumus, cognoscendo quid est, sed aliqualiter ejus notitiam habemus, cognoscendo quid non est; tantóque ejus notitiae magis appropinquamus, quanto plura per intellectum nostrum poterimus ab eo removere. Tanto enim unumquodque perfectiùs cognoscitur, quanto differentias ejus ab alio pleniùs intuemur. Quià in consideratione Divinae substantiae non possumus accipere quid, quasi genus, nec distinctionem ab aliis rebus per differentias affirmativas accipere possumus; eam oportet accipere per differentias Negativas. Id. 3. Contra gentes cap. 47. Per effectus Dei pertingere possumus ut cognoscamus de Deo, quia est, & quod causa aliorum est, aliis supereminens & ab omnibus remotus: & hoc est ultimum & perfectissimum nostrae cognitionis in hac vitâ, ut Dionysius dixit. lib. de Mysticâ Theologiâ. Cum Deo quasi ignoto conjungimur, quod quidem contingit, cum de Deo, quid non sit, cognoscimus, quid vero sit penitùs manet ignotum: unde & ad hujusmodi sublimissimae cognitionis ignorantiam demonstrandam, dicitur de Mose Exod, 20. quod accessit ad caliginem in qua Deus er at. In the consideration of the Divine Essence, we must chiefly use the way of negation: for the Divine Essence, through its immensity, doth exceed every form that our understanding can conceive: So that we cannot apprehend it by knowing what it is; but after a sort we have the knowledge thereof, by knowing what it is not. And so much nearer do we approach to the knowledge thereof, the more we are able to remove from the nature of God. For every thing is known so much the more perfectly by how much the more at full we do behold how it differeth from other things. Now in the consideration of the Divine essence, we cannot take any thing as the Genus thereof; neither can we apprehend its distinction from other things, by differences affirmative; and therefore we must apprehend it by differences negative. The same Thomas in his Third Book Contra Gent. cap. 47. By the effects of God (saith he) we may attain to know that God is, and that he is the cause of other things eminent above them, and removed from them all: and this is the last and most perfect degree of our knowledge in this life, as saith Dionysius in his Book of Mystical Divinity: We are conjoined with God as unknown which verily comes to pass, when we know of God what he is not, but what he is it remains utterly unknown unto us; and therefore to demonstrate our ignorance of this most sublime knowledge, it is said of Moses Exod. 20. that he came unto the darkness where God was. The same Capreolus proceeds to show out of Aquinas in 1 Sent. Dist. 8. q. 1. art. 1. ad 4. How we must make progress in our knowledge of God, by way of remotion or negation. Quando, inquit, in divinis procedimus per viam remotionis, primò negamus corporalia, & Secundò intellectualia, secundum quod inveniuntur in creaturis, ut bonitas & sapientia, & tunc remanet in intellectu Quod est, & nihil amplius, unde est, sicut in quadam confusione. When (saith he) we proceed by way of remotion, or negation, in searching out the Divine nature, first we deny of him all corporal things, and secondly we deny of him all intellectual things, after such a sort as they are found in the creatures, as goodness and wisdom, (mark this well for these and such like are the virtues which this Author saith are of the same nature in God and man differing only in degree) and then there remains in the understanding, id quod est (as much as to say 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ens) and nothing more; and hence the understanding remains as in a certain confusion. And indeed the notion of entity is most general, most abstract, and if any notion signifies one and the same nature, such as may be affirmed of God and the creature, surely this is it. Now observe Aquinas his judgement concerning this, out of the same Capreolus in these words. Ad ultimum autem, Essentiam ipsam, secundum quod est in creatur is, ab ipso removemus, & tunc remanet (intellectus noster) in quadam tenegrâ ignorantiae; secundum quam ignorantiam, quantum ad statum viae pertinet, optime Deo conjungimur, ut Dionysius dicit, & haec est caligo in qua Deus habitare dicitur. To the last (I answer) the very entity or existence in the creatures we remove from God, and then our understanding remains in the darkness of ignorance; according to which ignorance, so far forth as it pertains to our condition (as Viatores) and in the way, we are conjoined with God in the best manner; as Denis saith: and this is the darkness, wherein God is said to dwell. By this let any man judge, whether this Author's discourse be not as opposite to the discourse of Aquinas, as touching the nature of God in resemblance to ours, as the Antipodes are to us. And withal I do not find throughout his discourse following, that he makes any use of these premises. And indeed there is no need of them at all: For if he cannot prove this Doctrine of ours repugnant either to God's Mercy, or to his Truth, or to his Justice, these premises will stand him in no stead: and if he can prove it to be repugnant to those Attributes of his, his argument shall stand in the same force, as well without these premises as with them. Now, how well he makes good the repugnancy of our Doctrine to God's mercy, we are in the next place to consider. DISCOURSE. SECT. II. As touching the First Special. God's Mercy. 1. IT opposeth God's mercy. God is merciful. It is a great part of his Title. Exod. 34. 6. Merciful and gracious. He is mercy in the abstract: 1 John 4. 16. God is love. A Father of mercies, and God of all consolations. 2 Cor. 1. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Saviour of men. 1 Tim. 4. 10. Two ways is the mercy of God spoken of in Scripture, 1. absolutely, 2. comparatively. 1. Absolutely; and so it is set out in lofty and stately terms; it's called rich mercy. Ephes. 2. 4. Great kindness. John 4. 2. Abundant mercy. 1 Pet. 1. 3. Love without height or depth, breadth or length, or any dimensions: love passing knowledge. Ephes. 3. 18, 19 2. Comparatively. It is compared with his own justice, and with the love that dwells in the creatures, and is advanced above both. 1. It is sometimes compared with his justice, and advanced above that, not in respect of its essence; for all God's excellencies are infinitely good, and one is not greater than another; but in other things that concern the expressions of it, particularly in these, 1. In the naturalness and dearness of it unto God. It is said of mercy, Mich. 7. 18. It pleaseth him, or he delights in mercy, but justice and judgement is called his strange work, alienum a naturâ suâ. Isai. 28. 21. He doth not afflict willingly nor grieve the children of men. Lam. 3. 33. 2. In the frequent exercise of itself, Exod. 34. 6. He is slow to anger but abundant in goodness. Mercies are bestowed every day, judgements inflicted but now and then, sparingly, and after a long time of forbearance, when there is no remedy. 2 Chron. 36. 15. All the day long have I stretched out my hands to a gainsaying and rebellious people. Isai. 65. 2. that is, I have been patient a long time, and in that long day I have not been idle, but employed in exhortations, promises, and many mercies, whereby I might do you good. God waits long for men's conversion, as the Mariner for the turning of the wind. 3. In its amplitude or objects to whom it is extended. Exod 20. 5. Visiting the iniquities of Fathers upon their children to the third and fourth generation, but showing mercy to thousands: implying that his mercy is more largely extended then his justice and that look how much three or four come short of a thousand, so much doth his justice come short of his mercy in exercise of it. 4. In the occasions that move God to exercise them: It is a great matter that moves God to punish, as we may see, Gen. 6. 5, 6, 7, 12, 13. When the wickedness of man was great upon the earth, and all flesh had corrupted his way then God thinks of punishment. He would not destroy the Amorites, till their wickedness was full, Gen. 15. 16. Quoties volui (saith Christ to Jerusalem) Math. 23. 37. How often would I have gathered you, that is, I have not taken advantages against you: nor upon the first, second, or third unkindness cast you off, small matters have not moved me to destroy thee O Jerusalem. But how small an occasion doth God take to spare man? When God had examined Sodom, and found their sins to be answerable to their cry, yet then for ten righteous men's sakes would he have spared Sodom. Gen 18. 32. Nay, he would have spared Jerusalem, if the Prophet by searching, could have found one man that did execute judgement, and seek the truth Jer. 5. 1. What a small and slender Humiliation made him to spare wicked Ahab and his house a long time. 1 King. 21. 29. And the repentance of Neneve, whose wickedness cried to the Lord for vengeance; Jonas ●. 2. did easily procure her a pardon. Thus is God's Mercy advanced above his justice. 2. It is also compared with the affection of a Father to his Son, of a tender mother to her child, and of the most affectionate brute creatures to their young ones, and set above them all. It goes beyond a Father's affection to his Son. Matth. 7. 11. If you that are evil, can give good gifts to your children, how much more will your heavenly Father give good things to them that ask him? What doth this [quando magis] imply? but that God's love outstrips a Fathers? and so it doth a Mothers too, Isai. 49. 15. Can a Woman forget her sucking child, that she should not have compassion on the Son of her womb? yea she may forget, yet will I not forget thee. Women are compassionate towards their Children, because they are the fruit of their wombs, and are a part of themselves: but most indulgent are they toward those children to whom they are Nurses, as well as Mothers, to their sucking children: and yet Women may forget their children, their sucking children: but as for God, he can never forget his children. And as if those comparisons were too small to express God's affection to his creatures, he proceeds farther, and compares himself, with one of the most affectionate Females among unreasonable August. Tract. 15. in Joan. p. 16. 18. creatures, the [Hen] Math. 23. 37. O Jerusalem Jerusalem, how oft would I have gathered thee, as a Hen gathereth her chicken under her wings? No bird (saith August.) expresseth such tender love to her young ones, as the Hen doth. Videmus nidificare Passeres quoslibet, ante oculos nostros, herundines, circonias, columbas quotidie videmus nidificare, quos nisi quando in nidis videmus, parents esse non agnoscimus. Gallina vero sic infirmatur in pullis suis, ut etiamsi ipsi pulli non sequantur, filios non videas, matrem tamen intelliges: Ita fit alis demissis, plumis hispida, voce rauca, omnibus membris demissa & abjecta, ut (quemadmo dum dixi) et si filios non videas matrem tamen intelligas. No Fowls discover themselves to be Mothers, so much as Hens do: others when we see them in their nest with their young, we know them to be Mothers, but no way else: but the Hen discovers herself to be so, even then when her Chickens do not follow her, her feathers stand up, her wings hang down, she clocks mournfully, and goes feebly; so that we may know her to be a Mother, when yet we cannot see her brood. He hath also such another speech in another place, and concludes it with these Words, Quare ergo Dominus, nisi propter Aug. in Psal. 58. pag. 212. B. C. hoc, Gallina esse voluit, in sanctâ Scripturâ dicens. O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, quoties volui te congregare ut gallina, etc. Our Lord and Saviour did therefore compare himself to a Hen, rather than any other creature, because of her singular expressions of love to her young ones, even when they are out of her sight. By these things we see how highly the Scriptures speak of God's mercy, especially in the expressions of it to Mankind; To which testimonies let me add these few more, Psal. 8. 4. Lord what is man that thou art mindful of him, etc. Prov. 8. 31. In the children of men did the wisdom of God delight himself, when the foundations of the earth were apppointed. He took not the nature of Angels but the seed of Abraham. Heb. 2. 16. When the bountifulness and love of God our Saviour toward man appeared. Tit. 3. 4. (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) the original word is: where do we read of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. More merciful is God to man, then to all other creatures. With such a mercy cannot stand such a decree; absolute Reprobation being once granted, we may (me thinks) more properly call God a Father of cruelties, then of mercies, and [hatred then of love:] and the Devil's names, [Satan and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] an adversary, a destroyer may be fitter for him then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Saviour; which I tremble to think. Doth mercy please him, when he of his own will only hath made such a decree, as shows far more severity towards poor men, than mercy? Is he slow to anger, when he hath taken such a small and speedy occasion to punish the greater part of men in Hell torments for ever, and for one sin once committed, hath shut up the greater part of men under invincible unbelief and damnation? Is his mercy abundant, doth it extend itself farther than justice, when it is tacked up so short, limited to a few chosen ones, when 100 for one at least, (take in all parts of the World) are unavoidably cast away, out of his only will and pleasure? Or doth his love pass knowledge, when we see daily greater love than this in men and other creatures? What Father and Mother (that have not only cast off Fatherhood and Motherhood, but humanity too) (so the Author's Copy hath it) would determine their children to certain death, or to cruel torments worse than death, for one only offence, and that committed too, not by them in their own persons, but by some other, and only imputed unto them? How much less would they give themselves to beget Children, and bring them forth, that they might bring them to the rack, fire, gallows, and such like tortures and deaths? But to deliver things a little more closely. Four things (in my conceit) being well and distinctly considered, do make it apparent, that this decree is incompatible with God's mercy. 1. That Adam's sin was the sin of man's nature only, and no man's personal transgression but adam's; it was neither committed, nor consented to by any of his posterity in their own persons. 2. That it was the sin of our nature, not by generation, for then the sins of our Grandfathers and Fathers, would be our sins also, because we come from them: and they would be our sins so much the more, by how much nearer we are to the stock, from which we do immediately spring, then to the first root and common Father of Mankind. It is the sin of our nature by imputation only, it was God's will that he should stand up for a public person, and that in him all men should stand or fall. This is generally granted by Divines, and particularly by that excellent servant of God M. Calvin. Neque enim factum est (saith he) ut a salute exciderant ommes unius parentis culpâ. And a little after (he saith) Hoc cum naturae nequeat ascribi, ab admirabili Dei consilio profectum esse minimè obscurum est. And a little after, thus: unde factum est, ut tot gentes vuà cum earum liberis, infantibus, aeterna morte involveret lapsus Adae absque remedio, nisi quia Deo it à visum est. 3. That God did pardon it in Adam, who did actually and voluntarily commit it in his own person. 4. That Christ came into the World to take away peccatum mundi, the sin of the World. joh. 1. 29. That God either did or might have satisfied his wronged justice in the blood of the Covenant for all man kind, and without any impeachment to justice, might have opened a way of Salvation to all and every man. These things being well considered, will make no man (I think) to conclude in his thoughts, that if there be any such decree, God is not merciful to man at all: much less is he more merciful (supposing this decree) to men, than he is to other creatures, but more sharp and severe than he is to other creatures, to the Devils themselves. 1. To other creatures, because the most of men are determined by his omnipotent decree, to such a being, as is a thousand times worse than no being at all; whereas other creatures, even the basest of them, though they perhaps have but a contemptible being, yet they have such a being as is much better than no being at all: it is far better not to be at all, then to be eternally miserable without any possibility of the contrary: for so saith our Saviour speaking of Judas: It had been good for that man if he never had been borne. Men would not have accepted of life and being, when first they entered Math. 26. 24. upon possession of it, if they had known upon what hard conditions it was to be tendered, and that it was to be charged with such an interest, as can no ways be recompensed by the benefits of life; or (did mwn firmly believe this decree) they would at adventure, with Job, curse their birthday, be willingly released from the right of creatures, and desire that their immortal souls might vanish into nothing. What Minutius saith of Pagans, might be truly affirmed of men in general; Malunt extingui Minut. Faelix p. 113. penitus, quam ad supplicia reparari. Nay Parents out of pity to their Children, would wish that they might be borne Snakes and Toads, rather than men; and creatures, whose being shall at last be resolved into nothing, rather than immortal Spirits. 2. Then to the very Devils also, who are set forth in Scripture, to be the greatest spectacles of God's wrath, and ireful severity. In one thing this decree makes most men and Devils equal, Utrisque desperata salus, they are both sure to be damned; but in three things men are in a far worse condition by it. 1. In their appointment to Hell, not for their own proper personal sins, for which the Devils suffer, but for the sins of another man, made theirs only By God's order and pleasure. 2. In their inevitable destination to destruction, under a show of the contrary. The Devils, as they are decreed to damnation, so they know it, they expect it, they look for no other: but men, even those that are apppointed unto wrath, are yet fed up with hopes of Salvation, and made to believe that the whole business is put into their hands; so as that if they do perish, it is not [defectu misericordiae] because God hath no mercy on them, but [defeclu voluntatis propriae,] because they will not be saved, when yet there is no such mercy. Now if it be worse to be deluded in misery, then simply to be miserable, than the condition of men in this respect, is made by this decree to be worse than the state of Devils. 3. In their obligation to believe, and the aggravation of their punishment by not believing. The Devils, because they must be damned, are not commanded to believe in Christ, nor is their punishment increased by not believing: but poor men, who (by this decree) can scape Hell no more than the Devils, must yet be tied to believe in Christ, and must have their torments increased if they believe not. These things being so (I think) I may conclude that this decree of absolute reprobation overthrows the mercy of God in general, and toward mankind. Nor doth that quiet my mind, which is usually answered to these objections; viz. That God by this decree, doth fully manifest his justice and his mercy too; his justice towards the Reprobates, and his mercy toward the chosen vessels: and that it is necessary that his decrees shall be so ordered, as that both these may be clearly manifested by them. This (I say) doth not satisfy; for, 1. God's mercy is revealed to be rich mercy, abundant, long suffering, beyond apprehension, and surmounting his justice, in its objects and expressions. Now such a mercy as this, set forth with such glorious titles, clothed with such lovely properties, and exceeding the ability of any man's conception, such a mercy (I say) is not manifested by this decree. 2. Neither is the pure and spotless justice of God set forth by this absolute decree, as I now come to show. this being my second argument, drawn from the Attributes of God, against absolute reprobation. TWISSE. Consideration. HEre we have a great deal of noise, and the most wasteful discourse that ever I yet met withal, in the enlarging of a most hungry argument; the answer whereunto himself perceives, and sets down (as he thinks good) in a few words, after three large leaves spent in the enlarging of his opposition; namely to this effect; that whatsoever he can say, in the advancing of God's mercy we willingly acknowledge: but withal we say, this mercy of God which makes God so glorious, is peculiarly manifested towards the vessels of mercy, whom God hath prepared unto glory, in distinction from the vessels of wrath, as we read Rom. 9 23. and that in a higher degree than he hath mentioned; this being one special end, why God suffereth with long patience, the vessels of wrath prepared to destruction, Rom. 9 22. namely, That he might declare the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy, which he hath prepared unto glory, v. 23. And after so much froth of words spent to no purpose unless to beguile his reader, and dull him with verbosity, that he might not attend, and observe how accurately he performs in the issue, that which he intends. Consider (I beseech you) what a meager and starveling reply he puts to this. God's mercy (saith he) is revealed to be rich mercy, abundant, long suffering, beyond apprehension; we grant all this, and add that it is glorious also; and makes the partakers of it to rejoice, with joy unspeakable and glorious; but this belongs only to them that believe, and to certain who are called vessels of mercy, in distinction from vessels of wrath, Rom. 9 22, 23. which vessels of mercy, in distinction from vessels of wrath, must needs be the elect only, in distinction from Reprobates: with what face can he deny, that such a mercy is manifested on the Elect by our Doctrine? 2. I farther add that such a mercy is not manifested by his Doctrine as by ours, for the glory of God's mercy consists in this, that it is of free grace pardoning our sins, regenerating us, changing our hearts, giving faith and repentance to some, when he denies it to others; all this I say is of mere grace, by our Doctrine without respect to any preparation or qualification in man; according to that of the Apostle, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth: this is not their Doctrine, if it were, I see no cause of any material difference between us. 3. And I find it strange, that men should grow to such a degree of immodesty, as to affect singularity, and to show a dexterity, in such sort to advance God's mercy, as to obscure and deface his grace, as this Author doth; for all along you shall not find him to magnify Gods free grace: whereas Mercy showed to one rather then to another, in respect of his being better disposed for the receiving of it more than another, is rather of the nature of justice, then of Mercy distinct from justice. 4. And to this purpose he takes no pains to set down, wherein this mercy consists, which he so much amplifies, but carrieth it throughout in hugger mugger, and in the clouds of generality, that it might appear the more likely, to be indifferently extended to all; and albeit sometimes he expresseth it, to be the love of a Father towards his children, yet it is too too probable, that he extends this to all and every one, as the children of God by creation; And therefore particulates not wherein it consists, as namely whether in mercy temporal or spiritual; and as touching mercy spiritual, whether this be not the pardoning of men's sins, together with the illumination of the mind, sanctification of the will, change of the heart, and giving of faith, repentance, obedience, and final perseverance therein. For had he particulated those, he had apparently marred his own market, and been driven to lose that in retail, which he hoped to gain in gross; For these mercies are not extended to all. But their meaning is, God offers these to all, and that any fail of them, it is because man disposeth not himself for the receiving of them. This is the issue of his advancing God's mercy, utterly to disparage the freedom of God's grace. Now of the Divine mercy in this sense, to wit, as freely extended to all, he hath not one word throughout, as I can remember, in so vast premises; all that he speaks of the extension of God's mercy to variety of objects, is dispatched in three lines of these his three large leaves; as where he saith, his mercy is more largely extended then his justice, and that look how much three or four come short of a thousand, so much doth his justice come short of his mercy in the exercise of it; And upon this poor interpretation, he grounds the only substantial part of his reply, to our answer to this his argument. For to say that God's mercy is rich, abundant, long suffering, beyond apprehension, is nothing to the purpose. For all this hinders not, but that the application of it may be, and is, made only to certain vessels, who are called vessels of mercy, in distinction from vessels of wrath, Rom. 9 22. 23. Therefore he adds, That it surmounts his justice in its objects and expressions: wherein what he means by its expressions, I know not. For I find no comparison made by him between God's mercy and his justice in its expressions; but only in respect of the objects, and there the expression of justice, seems more quick than the expression of mercy: And as for the extension of mercy, to more than justice is extended to, he dispatcheth in three lines, as I said, of these three leaves of his discourse. But let us see what force he finds in that comparison to serve his turn. First he sayeth the comparison is between three and four on the one side, and a thousand on the other, as if the odds were a thousand to three or four: but how doth he prove that? The Text compares three or four generations to thousands; not to a thousand generations, but to thousands: and he boldly conceives it to be understood of thousands of generations; though it be much more than the World consists of, from the beginning of the World to the end of it: For suppose the World shall last seven or eight thousand years; how many years will he allow to a generation? Suppose he allow but twenty, to explode the custom of the Germans of whom Tacitus writes, that Sera virginum venus, which to this day is continued: yet a thousand of such generations must make the World to consist of twenty thousand years: But if it consist but of seven or eight thousand years, you must allow but seven or eight years to a generation, to make up one thousand generations. Then again the World was now two thousand years old when this was delivered, so that it had not above six thousand years to continue, and accordingly but six years was from thenceforth to be allowed to a generation; And all this liberality of allowance, is no more than will make the child a coat, to complete one thousand generations; whereas the Text speaks of thousands in the plural number, and the least of plurality is two thousand; so that to help this, we must allow but three years to a generation, by which account they had need be married at two, and have a child at three, and who then should rock the cradle? But leave we these fooleries, and content ourselves with the plain Text, and not piece it out with our brainsick additions. We know that for Abraham's sake who feared him, and for the covenants sake he made with him, he had mercy on thousands of his posterity, to bring them out of Egypt, six hundred thousand men from twenty years old to threescore, and take them unto him to be his peculiar people, which continued for the space of about 1600 years; and now for 1600 years they have been cast off from being his people. And of the goodness of God towards Abraham, in choosing his seed after him, even many thousands of them, the Jews had sensible experience that very day he spoke unto them from Mount Sinai; he did not mean to trouble their brains with any Algebra in counting up a thousand generations. But suppose this were granted him; yet these that fear him, being only within the pale of his Church, what a small handful were these, in comparison to all the world of heathens besides, that hated him? Mark what difference S. Paul puts between the Jews and the Gentiles, when he saith, we Jew's by nature, not sinners of the Gentiles. Gal. 2. And the Psalmist before him Psal. 147. He showeth his word unto Jacob, his statutes and ordinances to Israel, he hath not dealt so with every nation, neither have they known his judgements. According whereunto the Apostle having demanded, saying, What is then the preferment of the Jew? or what is the profit of circumcision? Answereth thus, Much every way, and chiefly because unto them were committed the Oracles of God. Rom. 3. 1, 2. And the same Apostle doth not acknowledge the Gentiles to have obtained mercy at the hands of God, until the time of their calling by the Ministry of the Gospel. Rom. 11. 30. in these words: Ye in times past have not believed God, yet have now obtained mercy through their unbelief. This might suffice for answer to this argument, taking it in the full strength thereof. But I am content to run over the whole discourse, and to take every part of it into consideration. 1. He saith, God is mercy in the abstract, and Love. By this it is apparent that the Attributes Divine, are the very Essence Divine, otherwise they could not be predicated thereof in the abstract, and consequently, they can no more be of the same nature with virtues Moral in us, than the Divine Essence can be of the same nature with an accident. 2. He is a Saviour of men; true, and it is as true: that he saveth both man and beast: and as for men, though he be a Saviour of them all, yet in special sort of them that believe. 3. When he saith of the love of Christ, that it is without height, and depth, and length, and breadth, he doth overlash: for the Apostles prayer is in the place quoted by him on the behalf of the Ephesians, that Christ may dwell in their hearts by Faith, that being rooted and grounded in love, they may be able to comprehend with all Saints, what is the breadth and length, and depth, & height. For though the height of it be such, as is incomprehensible by us in this World, yet the Apostle supposeth an height, depth, length, and breadth thereof, rather than denies it. 4. He saith God's Mercy is advanced above his Justice; not in respect of its essence, for all God's excellencies are infinitely good, and one is not greater than another; but in things that concern the expressions of it. Here we have words, but can any wise man draw it to any sober sense? What I pray is it to advance mercy above justice, in things that concern the expressions of it? He saith it is more natural and dear to God then his justice: what reason is there for this, if the one be equally as excellent as the other? To make this good with some colour at least; he allegeth Mich. 7. 18. Mercy pleaseth him, or he delights in it. The like we read Jer. 9 24. namely, that God delights in mercy: and in the same place the Lord professeth jointly, that he delights in judgement. But Isaiah 28. 21. Judgement is called his strange work; Now three several times, have I received this, from three several hands of Arminians; each giving the same interpretation of it, as if it were called a strange work, because it is alienum a naturâ Dei. I know none but Papists do justify them in this interpretation; in my judgement a most unreasonable exposition; the Lord taking unto himself the execution of judgement, as his peculiar, saying, vengeance is mine and I will repay; And Magistrates are but God's Ministers for this; And he Rom. 12. 19 professeth his delight in this as well as in the execution of mercy. It is true he doth not inflict judgement without cause, for that were not a work of judgement in proper speech, but of power, and absoluteness rather, as in turning a holy and innocent creature into nothing. And in that respect he is said not to afflict willingly; sin always deserving it. Mercy is of another nature, and supposeth free grace, though I Lamen. 3. find little or no notice this Author takes of this, throughout his discourse; Neither do I find that he or any Arminian acknowledge, that the change of a man's heart is wrought in a man of the mere grace of God, without any motive cause in the creature. Neither do all Papists concur in this interpretation, for Lyra and Burgensis are together by the ears hereabouts; and our Divines as Junius and Piscator do render it, opus insolens & terribile, an unusual and terrible judgement, interpreting it of bringing the Babylonians upon them; so strange a work, that they should wonder at it. And as Moses foretold, that God should bring upon them Wonderful judgements. Deut. 28. So the Prophet Abakuk sets it forth in like manner. Abak. 1. 5. Behold among the Heathen, and regard and wonder and marvel, for I will work a work in your days; you will not believe it, though it be told you. For lo, I raise up the Chaldeans, that bitter and furious nation, which shall go upon the breadth of the Land to possess the dwelling places that are not theirs. And, Jer. 19 3. Behold I will bring a plague upon this place which whosoever heareth his ears shall ●ingle. For seeing Gods laws are strange things unto them. Hos. 8. 12. God would bring such judgements upon them, that should be as strange unto them. And in the same phrase it is said that destruction is to the wicked, and strange punishment to the workers of iniquity. Job. 31. 3. Yet be this granted him, it is nothing to the purpose. For be it never so dear unto God, yet if he restraineth his chief mercy which consists in changing the heart (whereof this Author seems unwilling to take any distinct notice) only to the Elect, called accordingly in Scripture vessels of mercy, in distinction from vessels of wrath, which are the Reprobates, this nothing prejudiceth the absoluteness of reprobation. And as for the frequent exercise thereof; we read, Zeph. 3. 5. That every morning God bringeth his judgements to light: and as for the mercy which consists in regenerating man, which alone is to the present purpose; it is apparent, that it is far less frequently showed, than the contrary judgement in obduration; And certainly the vessels of mercy are by far fewer than the vessels of wrath: and as for temporal mercies, the more frequent they are, the worse, where the spirit of regeneration is wanting, through the corruption of man, that makes him thereupon the more obdurate. The vanity of the next, as touching the amplitude of the objects whereto mercy is extended (though this alone is to the present purpose) I have already sufficiently discovered; it being apparent that in Scripture phrase, only the Elect are counted vessels of mercy, and all the rest vessels of wrath. As there be examples of Gods long suffering and patience, so we have fearful examples of the suddenness of God's judgements, taking Men and Women away in the very act of sin. Thus the Israelites in the Wilderness, when the flesh of Quails was in their mouth, the heavy wrath of God came upon them, and sent them to the graves of lust. Zimri and Cozbi perished in their incestuous act, and gave up both lust and ghost together. Balshazzar a King, cut off in his drunken revels, to make good the Prophecy of Isaiah, The night of my pleasures hath he turned into fear unto me. And in like manner the wrath of God seized upon Herod in his pride. But above all, this appears in God's dealings with his Angels, who sinned once, and fell for ever without all hope of recovery. And as for Gods sparing a man in case God gives not repentance, what will be the issue, but filling up of the measure of their sins? For to speak in Augustine's language, Contra Julian. Pelag. lib. 5. cap. 4. Quantamlibet praebuerit patientiam, nisi Deus dederit, quis agit paenitentiam? Now the case is clear, God gives repentance to a very few, who are in Scripture called vessels of mercy; which nothing at all prejudiceth the absoluteness of reprobation. 5. Of the riches of God's mercies to his children, we nothing doubt: but what doth this prejudice the absoluteness of reprobating those whom he never meaneth to make his children? But here it is to be suspected, that this Author accounts all and every one the children of God; for forthwith he confounds this notion with the notion of creatures, quite contrary to the most general current of Scripture, not of the New Testament only, which teacheth us, that we are the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus. Gal. 3. and if children than heirs, even heirs of God, and heirs annexed with Christ. Rom. 8. But of the old Testament also. Gen. 6: 2. The sons of God saw the daughters of men that they were fair, etc. Exod. 4. 22. Thou shalt say to Pharaoh, thus saith thè Lord, Israel is my Son, my first borne; wherefore I say, let my Son go that he may serve me: if thou refuse to let him go, behold I will visit thy Son, even thy first borne. Deut. 14. 1. Ye are the children of the Lord your God. 2. Thou art an holy people to the Lord thy God, and the Lord hath chosen thee to be a precious people to himself, above all the people that are upon the earth. That of the Hen, though we give him liberty to amplify her natural affections, as one of the most affectionate Females among unreasonable creatures, yet doth it nothing profit him for it represents God's love appropriated to his Children, which nothing prejudiceth the absoluteness of his power reprobating others. Nay rather as it justifies his absoluteness in electing them, if we consider the mere grace of God to have made the difference, as the Scripture showeth. Deut. 7. 7. The Lord loved you because he loved you; and Deut. 9 at large he beats them out of all conceit of any righteousness in them, moving the Lord to plant them in the Land of Canaan; so by consequent it justifies the Doctrine of absolute reprobation also: for as much as the Apostle professeth, that like as God hath mercy on whom he will, so also he hardeneth whom he will. Yet hereiss much matter made of the Hen; like as D. Jackson hath done it before him, but he betrays no such authority for it out of Austin as this Author doth: to whom he is beholding for it, himself best knoweth; If the pedigree be enquired into, their conceits may be found to be of kin; yet give me leave to say somewhat of this similitude also. And first, this Author commits a very great Anomaly, in entering upon it with such state, as proves nothing answerable to his own profession anon after, almost in the same breath. Mark the state (I pray) of his entrance hereupon, thus: And as if these comparisons were too small too express God's affection to his creatures, he proceeds farther: now the comparisons preceding were taken from reasonable creatures, as namely from Fatherly and Motherly affections (amongst men) towards their children; and these comparisons he signifies to have been to small, to express God's affections to his creatures: and that therefore the Lord proceeds farther, and compares himself to a Hen, which he saith is one of the most affectionate females among unreasonable creatures; not daring to say, 'tis more affectionate than creatures reasonable; yet most improvidently carried away with affectation of a Rhetorical flourish, he feigns a gradation from creatures less affectionate, to creatures more affectionate, and presently himself beats out the brains of his invention, (before he is aware) as soon as it is borne. As for Augustine's amplification of the affectionate nature of an Hen above other creatures; we may consider that Augustine's Tractates on John, are of the nature of Sermons, and therein the ancients do accommodate themselves to popular amplifications. It is true we do not know Sparrows, Swallows, Storks, Doves, to be Mothers, but when we see them in their nests; but what is the true reason hereof? Is it not because their young ones are wild, and as soon as they are apt to fly, one flies one way, and another flies another way, they come together no more; it is not so with chickens which are tame creatures, and we see the carriage of the Hen towards them, we do not see the carriage of other fowls towards their young ones. Yet we read not the like of a Hen, as of a Stork, that when her nest was on fire, out of a desire to save them with her wings from the fire, hath not forsaken her young ones till she was burnt herself; And we have seen also how a Hen hath sometimes pecked her young ones, and driven them from her, when they would have roosted under her. And in my judgement our Saviour doth not represent his tender affection to the Jews, by the general affection of an Hen to hers, but to that particular carriage of hers in desiring to gather her chickens under her wings. * The Doctor here alludes unto a known song. Neither do I think that he who invited those mighty men, but unto what? unto a Hen, was to express his singularity of affection towards them: be it that God is more merciful to man then to all other creatures; whence I pray proceeds this? is it not merely from the good pleasure of his own will? and if so, why may he not, out of the mere pleasure of his own will restrain his saving mercy to some few, who are accordingly called in Scripture expressly vessels of mercy; distinguished from all the rest who are called vessels of wrath. Whereas he saith, that with such a mercy cannot stand such a Decree, as absolute reprobation. We answer; neither do we say any such decree doth stand with such a mercy; it is rather absolute election stands with such a mercy, than any reprobation. The Scripture plainly giving us to understand, that they on whom reprobation passeth, are not vessels of mercy, but vessels of wrath. But like as God though he spared not Angels when they fell, nor left any way open unto them for repentance, whereby to return to his grace and favour, yet he spared man, and left a way open unto him, to return to his grace and favour by faith in Christ. In like sort, though God were pleased absolutely to elect some amongst men, yet this nothing precludes him from dealing as absolutely in reprobating others, that is, in purposing to deny them the spirit of faith and repentance, whereby they might rise after they were fallen; which grace most freely and absolutely he decreed to bestow, and as freely and absolutely he doth bestow on others, according to that of the Apostle, Rom. 9 18. he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. By this I pray judge of the insipid nature of this discourse, yet see the foulness of his mouth; unless God be indifferent unto all, and make all vessels of mercy, he is a Father of Cruelty, and more properly so to be called, than a Father of mercies, and the very name of the Devil (for so he takes upon him to interpret that name in the Revelation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Destroyer) is good enough for him. And the conscience of his own piety, no doubt expert in Paraphrasing, and shaping some Rhetorical flourishes, and passionate expressions, bears him out with such confidence as to fear no Blasphemy. It is very likely he hath a high conceit of these performances, that he is so bold, as to profess in effect, that if the contrary be true, then will he be guilty of as great Blasphemy, as to have called God Satan; yet see the absurdity (that throughout he may be like himself) of his discourse; whatsoever God be accounted by him in respect of reprobates, doth this any way hinder him from being the Father of mercies towards his elect, who alone in Scripture phrase are called vessels of mercy? His hatred of Esau, doth it any way hinder his love to Jacob? If to damn be to destroy, and no creature hath power to damn but God only, can any be a destroyer in this kind but God, as the efficient cause of Damnation and destruction? But in case our Doctrine holds, doth he damn any but for sin? and shall he in this case be styled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in the sense it is delivered in the Revelation? What thinks he? If many thousands, even all the Infants of Turks and Saracens dying in original sin, are tormented by him in Hell fire, is he to be accounted the father of cruelties for this? And I profess I cannot devise a greater show and appearance of cruelty, then in this. Now I beseech you consider the spirit that breatheth in this man; dares he censure God, as a Father of cruelties for executing eternal death upon them that are guilty of it? Now hath not he himself professed, that all borne in original sin, are borne guilty of eternal death? his words are these, Fol. 2. p. 2. That all mankind is involved in the first sin, and the fruits thereof, which are corruption of nature, and the guilt of eternal death. And this he confidently believes. Now I should think, that there is no show of cruelty in executing eternal death on them that are guilty of it: For if God were cruel herein, then also he were cruel in damning each one whom he doth damn both Men and Angels. Now I pray, let every sober reader judge, which is the greater cruelty of the two, to execute eternal death on him that is guilty of it, or to make him by mere imputation guilty of eternal death, who otherwise is not guilty of it? Is not this latter far greater cruelty than the former? Or indeed the only cruelty; there being no cruelty in the other at all? (like as Cicero said, for a Mule to bring forth having conceived, is no strange thing, but for a Mule to conceive that indeed is prodigious.) Now this latter is this Author's doctrine, expressly professing in the next page to that where now we are, that the sin of Adam (the fruit whereof he makes to be the guilt of eternal death.) is the sin of our nature by imputation only: whence it followeth, that God makes all men guilty of eternal death by imputation only. Now judge I pray which of us makes God the Father of cruelties, he or we? This is the fruit of opposition to God's grace; for how can they taste of that grace of God which they impugn, and in impugning it, how can it be but that they should be given over to the curse of God's wrath, to fill up the measure of their sin, as it is said of the Jews, to fulfil their sin always, for the wrath of God is come upon them to the uttermost; yea and to be stricken with the spirit of giddiness also; and become like a drunken man, that erreth in his vomit, the issue whereof is to defile himself, and those that are nearest to him. Yet he trembles to think of these blasphemies; for in all this you must think his zeal is very warm, and his piety reakes. So Saul persecuted the Saints of God as blaspheamers; but when God did strike him down with a light from Heaven, that he found that himself only was the blasphemer. 1 Tim. 1. Well, I am contented to consider his reaking fit. Doth his mercy please him, when he hath made such a decree, as shows far more severity towards men than mercy? Why (holy Sir) God's severity towards some, who in Scripture are called vessels of wrath, what doth it hinder God's mercy towards his elect? God's severity towards the Jews, did it any whit qualify God's bountifulness towards the Gentiles? I marvel not, he holds up his discourse of God's mercy in general, that so it might be appliable to all; this was a pretty dogge-trick of his. But if God's mercy hath his course towards his children only, as himself makes the accommodation, if God be severe towards those who are none of his, shall this any way prejudice his mercy towards them? or if he take liberty to account all God's creatures his children by reason of creation, why doth he not extend the mercy of God to Devils also, and for shame leave off his former distinction of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and confess ingeniously, that 'tis not worth a rush. But whether he will acknowledge it or no, the Apostle plainly speaks of vessels of mercy, in distinction from vessels of wrath, and surely the course of his wrath on them, doth nothing impair the free course of his mercy toward others. But give we him leave, to breathe on: Is he slow to anger, when he hath taken such a small and speedy occasion to punish the greater part of men in Hell torments for ever, and for one sin once committed, hath shut up the greater part of men under invincible unbelief and damnation? Now, I pray, apply this his devout interrogation unto the Angels that fell, who upon the first sin committed by them, have ever since been shut up under invincible hardness of heart, and damnation. Yet what doth this hinder his slowness of anger, which is to be understood of the execution of his wrath; not of his decree. For all the decrees of God are everlasting, nor can be otherwise. And as for the execution of wrath, the Devils themselves feel it not yet; they are reserved to the judgement of the great day; they believe and tremble; they cried out to our Saviour, art thou come to torment us before our time? Nay suppose all were to be damned to eternal death as soon as they were borne, what injustice were there in this, if so be all be found guilty of eternal death, which this Author denies not? Nay farther, he saith it is God that hath made them guilty of it by mere imputation: yet as for the corruption of nature, which he makes to be the other fruit of Adam's sin, I do not find that he ascribes that to divine imputation. Now what is the nature of this corruption, is it invincible unbelief or no? if it be, than he disputes against himself, as well as against us; if it be not, what unbelief doth he call it, or is it no unbelief at all? So I demand whether it be invincible hardness of heart or no? if not, whether at all it is to be called hardness of heart? if notwithstanding this corruption a man hath power to believe, to obey, power to yield to any spiritual good whereto he shall be excited, why doth he call it natural corruption? The Apostle plainly professeth of them that are in the flesh, that they cannot please God; that the natural man perceiveth not the things of God, and that he cannot know them: of some, that they could not believe: of others, that they cannot repent. But be all this granted, he is never a whit the less slow to anger, that is, to punish; the Devils themselves as yet do rather fear than feel his wrath. Lastly, touching punishing in hell, it is either spoken of Infants, or Men of ripe years, if of Infants departing in infancy; if guilty of eternal death, 'tis no injustice to inflict it; and though he be slow to anger towards some, yet it is not necessary he should be so to others. The Scriptures witness the contrary, in the flood where Infants perished as well as others; and in the destruction of Sodom by fire, where none were spared save Lot and his two Daughters. As for men of ripe years, their damnation is not for original sin only, but for actual sins unrepented of. The Angels fell irrecoverably upon one actual sin; I know not the like condition of any besides. And as for the smallness of Adam's sin, which this Author is pleased to extenuate, by calling it a small occasion, as if he were of his spirit that said, If God turned Adam out of Paradise for eating an Apple, shall not I turn thee out of my service for purloining a fat Capon? Why doth he not charge God rather, for making all men hereupon guilty of eternal death by mere imputation, as himself saith; then for inflicting eternal death only on them that are guilty of it, as we say? But let we him finish the Declamation he hath begun. Is his mercy abundant, doth it extend itself farther than justice, when it is tacked up so short, limited to a very few chosen ones, when a hundred for one at least are unavoidably cast away, out of his only will and pleasure. As touching this I have already showed, how much he is out in his Algebra, but let that pass, unless this Divine take upon him to deliver truer Oracles than Saint Paul, we are bound to believe, that the elect only are vessels of mercy, distinguished from reprobates, as vessels of wrath. Rom. 9 22, 23. and toward these alone it is, that his mercy is abundant, in the way of bestowing saving and spiritual graces. It is untrue, that he hath proved any such thing as he pretends, namely that God's mercy is extended to more persons than his justice. And applied aright, namely as touching mercy seen in pardoning sins, in changing the heart, and saving souls, which are peculiar to Gods elect, the most brazen faced opposite to God's holy truth that liveth cannot deny, but that they to whom these are granted, are far fewer than they to whom they are denied. And if within the Church only (for there only are found such as fear God) his mercy extends to thousands of them that fear him, when but to the third and fourth generation he punisheth the sins of the Father upon the Children, (which is all the proof this Author brings to this purpose) it followeth not herehence, that his mercy extendeth any whit to more than doth his justice, considering the small proportion of those within the Church, and therein of them that fear him, in comparison to those without the Church. And like as visiting the sin of Fathers, which is commonly understood of temporal punishments, so in proportion the mercy is to be understood of temporal mercy. And we well know that it is nothing necessary, that a man that fears God, should have children. And like as God doth not always thus visit the sins of Fathers upon the Children; in like sort it is not always necessary, that God should show mercy to thousands of every one of them that fear him. He dealt so with Abraham, Isaac, and jacob; they to whom the Law was delivered, knew this full well; then again, must not they who look to have an interest in this gracious promise, look unto it, that they walk in the steps of their Forefathers that feared God? By all which may appear, the superficiary nature of this Disputants argumentation, even then, when the zeal of his cause makes him, as most confident, so also most luxuriant. Lastly, do we say that God damns any man out of his only will and pleasure? Do we not profess that he damns no man but for sin? And as he damns no man but for sin, so likewise that he decreed to damn no man but for sin, though there could be no cause of this his decree, but of his mere will and pleasure he made this decree, namely, to damn many thousands for their sins. But let him come to an end of this his roving discourse, when he thinks good and not before. Or doth his love pass knowledge, when we see daily greater love than this in men, and other creatures. What Father or Mother, would determine their children to certain death, or to cruel torments worse than death, for one only offence, and that committed too, not by them in their own persons, but by some other, and only imputed unto them? How much less would they give themselves to beget Children, and bring them forth, that they might bring them to the rack, fire, gallows, and such like tortures and deaths; What do I hear? Doth man or any creature, show more love to their Children, than God doth towards his Elect? Did they ever provide such a sacrifice to make satisfaction for their children's sins, as God did provide for his? Yea but reprobates also are Gods Children, this must needs be his meaning, though in plain terms he spared to express so much. How unnatural then was Christ, who would not pray for the World if they were all his children? And what meant he to profess, that he sanctified himself only for them for whom he prayed? Which sanctification of himself, was in respect of the offering up of himself upon the cross, as Maldonate confesseth, was the interpretation of all the Fathers whom he had read. And in that prayer professeth of them saying, they are thine, and thou gavest them unto me, as much as to say; the World was not his. And farther consider; Is it safe to measure out God's proceedings, by the proceedings of men? What Father or Mother would be content to execute a Child of theirs upon the Gallows, when by some capital crime he hath deserved it? How much less hold them upon the rack of continual tortures; what then? must not God be allowed to inflict eternal death upon his creatures? And what hath an earthly Father or Mother to do, either to determine or execute death on any? This belongs to God not to man, unless he make choice of them, as of his Ministers for the execution of vengeance. But this Author is nothing yet awaked out of his dreams, or his Arminian Lethargy. Yet I hope he will grant that God did foresee all this, even the sins of Judas in betraying, and of the Jews in crucifying the Son of God; yet nevertheless, he was content to bring forth both him and them into the World. Now what earthly Father and Mother, would not make choice rather to be Childless, then to bring forth such children as should deal with them, as Nero dealt with his Mother? Proceed then: and as from the affections of earthly Fathers and Mothers, he disputes against the absoluteness of God's decrees, so also in the next place, let him conclude the like, to the utter overthrowing of God's foreknowledge. Yet who of our Divine saith, that God for one offence hath determined death and tortures to any reprobate of ripe years? Do they not all profess, that as many as die in actual sins unrepented of, God determined to damn them for those actual sins unrepented of? I do not think he can allege any that denies this. Again, what one of our Divines maintains that Infants perishing in original sin, are damned for that sin, which is made theirs only by imputation? What a shameless habit hath he gotten to himself to deliver untruths? yet will he not (I warrant you) be accounted a Pelagian, neither will he plainly deny original sin as Grevincovius is said to have done, and that testibus convinci potuit. Their Tenets are nothing less shameful, then Pelagius his Tenets were, only they have not that ingenuity which Pelagius had, in professing plainly, that there was no original sin conveyed unto us by propagation. Now he comes more closely unto the matter, yet but a little neither; a loose and dissolute discourse is most suitable with his Genius. 1. Adam's sin was no man's personal sin but adam's; true, for there was no man then but Adam; but all men being the posterity of Adam, were then in Adam, in that one person of Adam, and in him all have sinned, saith the Apostle, Rom. 5. and without consent to sin they could not sin. 2. When he saith this sin of Adam, was not the sin of our nature by generation; it is so wild an expression, that I profess I cannot devise any tolerable sense of it. That we were in Adam when he sinned, it was fully sufficient to bring upon us that corruption, that depth of corruption wherein we are all conceived and borne, and not by imputation. What Divine amongst Papists or Protestants is he, that maintains, that Adam's sin, was the sin of our nature by imputation? This is undoubtedly one of Arminius his flowers, which this Author takes up among the rest, to make himself a nosegay to smell unto. It was God's will that all should stand or fall in him. For if it had pleased him, he could have destroyed Adam for his transgression, and made a new stock, from whom to derive the World of Mankind: But resolving all should descend from him, he must withal resolve, that upon the sin of Adam, and of them all in him, they must take from him such natures as Adam's nature, and therein all our natures were made corrupt by sin; excepting God's grace to provide better, both for Adam and his posterity, as he thought good. So that look in what sort Adam's nature was corrupted by sin, in such sort must we receive corrupt natures from him. Here Calvin is brought in with a robe of commendation, as an excellent servant of God: But God knows his heart, and the hearts of all that oppose God's truth in these points. 'tis true that Calvin saith, both in respect of God's power, to have propagated Mankind from another original then from Adam as also in respect of his power, to reform corrupt nature, in whomsoever it pleased him. But did Calvin think it possible, for corrupt nature, to propagate any other nature than itself is? God made man after his Image and likeness; but afterwards we read that Adam brought forth a son, after his Image and likeness; who can bring a clean thing out of that which is unclean, saith the book of Job? And that which is borne of flesh is flesh, saith our Saviour. But doth it herehence follow, or doth Calvin, or any Calvinist, or Lutheran, or Papist, say, that Adam's sin is made ours only by imputation? The case is not alike of other parents. For Adam was created in grace, and endued with the spirit of God: this holy condition was lost by the sin of Adam, and we receiving our natures from him, in the state of his corruption, must therewithal receive, natures bereft of grace, and of the spirit of God. No such detriment to our pure nature was wrought, or could be wrought, by the transgression of any other progenitor, no, nor by any other sin of Adam besides the first. 3. God did pardon it in Adam upon his repentance, so is he ready to pardon it, and all actual sins also of all men upon their repentance. And God renewed Adam too, of his free grace after he was corrupt, and regenerated him by showing mercy upon him; But this work proceeds according to the mere pleasure of Gods will, as the Apostle witnesseth saying, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. 4. Christ came into the World, to take away the sins of the World, that is by satisfaction for sin, to merit the pardon of it, nor pardon of sin only, but salvation of soul also; but for whom? surely for none but such as should sooner or latter believe in him; for God hath ordained that these benefits of Christ's death and obedience, should not be distributed absolutely, but conditionally, to wit, upon the condition of faith. But as for the benefits of faith and repentance, these are not benefits communicable upon a condition; for what condition can precede them but a work of man? and it was condemned 1200 years ago: to say grace is given according unto merits, that Bellarmine interprets simply of works; though Papists are apt enough to stand for merits, and the Apostle saith in plain terms, that God doth not call us 2 Tim. 1. 9 according unto works; these therefore are communicated according to the mere pleasure of Gods will: He might have given faith to all, but he would not, I will show mercy on whom I will show mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion. Exod. 33. These things (he saith) being well considered, will make any man (as he thinks) to conclude in his thoughts, that if there be any such decree, God is not merciful to men at all. A most unshamefaced pretence, and savouring of a spirit that hath expectorated all natural ingenuity: doth not every one perceive, that all this nothing at all hinders the incomprehensible nature of God's mercy towards his Elect? Dares he himself in plain terms deny this, namely that it nothing prejudiceth the course of God's mercy towards his Elect? For what if by the sin wherein they are borne, they be made guilty of eternal death, yet if God be pleased to pardon this sin, nor this only, but all actual transgressions of theirs; yea, and break the yoke of their corruption, and as he seeth their ways so to heal them, yea to heal their rebellions, and backslidings, to subdue their iniquities, to rule them with a mighty hand, to make them pass under the rod, and bring them unto the bond of the covenant, and when he hath brought them thither, to hold them there, to perfect the good work he hath begun in them; As he hath laid the foundation of his temple in their hearts, so to finish it, to be the Author and finisher of their faith, and as of their faith, so of their repentance, to hold them in his hands, so that none shall take them therehence, to keep them by the power of God through faith unto salvation, to build them upon a rock that the gates of hell shall not prevail against them; either to deliver them from the hour of temptation, or to deliver them out of it, or so to order it, that it shall not be above their strength, to be with them when they go through the water, and through the fire, that the floods shall not overwhelm them, the fire shall not burn them, but as he leads them into it, so he will support them in it, and lead them through it, as he led the Children of Israel into the red sea, and in the red sea (as an horse in the Wilderness, that they should not stumble) and out of the red sea, into the Wilderness, and in the Wilderness, and out of the Wilderness; In a word, to fulfil the good pleasure of his goodness towards them, his grace in them, and every good work that he hath apppointed for them; in such sort that the beast shall not prevail over them, until they have finished their testimony: and in which respect Saint Stephen, even when the stones flew about his ears as thick as hail, seems to have gone to his death, as composedly as a man goes to his bed; having ended his Sermon first, his prayer for them in the next place, and lastly the commending of his own spirit into the hands of God: this mercy, this rich mercy, this unspeakable mercy, this Author most virulently, and most unconscionably, in cunning and crafty carriage, labours to obscure and deface, and to dispute us out of the faith of it, if it lay in his power (which lies not in the power of the Devils themselves) as much as himself, and his informers scorn to apprehend any hope of it; And all this as unsipidly and unscholastically, as profanely, by general and indefinite terms, saying, by this Doctrine of ours God is not merciful to men at all; wherein I guess his lurking hole is, in the indefinite condition of the term Men; for dares he say, that by this doctrine of ours we make God unmerciful to all men, even to the very Elect? Yet when he saith, to men at all, the face of his discourse in the common understanding of it, should look this way. But if his meaning be, that he is not made merciful to all, hath himself any farther improved the mercy of God, then by enlarging of it unto the children of God? And if he by children of God, understand all men created by him, and we, only those, whom God hath adopted in Christ and regenerated, I pray consider, which of us, delivereth himself in best congruity to the Scripture phrase and meaning? Can he be ignorant, who they be whom the Scripture styles vessels of mercy? Or that these are set in opposition to vessels of wrath; and would he have us as brainsick as himself to put no difference in the accommodation of God's mercy; between vessels of mercy, and vessels of wrath? As for the comparison between men and other creatures, he is like himself throughout in the execution thereof. 1. He undertakes to show, that God is not so merciful to men as to bruit creatures; most men are determined by God's omnipotent decree, to such a being as is a thousand times worse than no being at all. To let pass the absurdity of the comparison, comparing things incomparable, to wit, being with no being; and ascribing a betterness to no being, which is as much as to ascribe a better being to no being. Doth not he himself acknowledge that as the elect are but few amongst them that are called, so the number of Reprobates, is far greater than the number of the Elect? Doth not himself maintain, that God hath determined all reprobates (that is the most of men) by his omnipotent decree, to such a being as is a thousand times worse than no being at all, according to his judgement, and that this determination Divine is everlasting? or though he dare not in plain terms deny, that God hath determined most of men to damnation. Doth he not here bewray the disposition of his heart, namely, either to maintain that God's decrees are not everlasting, nor determined concerning men, until their deaths, or that they are of a revocable nature? Or will he fly to the qualification of the Divine decree here mentioned, and say that albeit the most part of men are destinated to damnation by the decree divine, yet not by an omnipotent decree? I guess his meaning is not by an absolute, but by a conditional decree; for as for any distinction of Divine decrees, into decrees omnipotent, I never yet read or heard; but this Gentleman being of a phrasifying spirit, we must permit him sometimes to overlash, otherwise we shall not have occasion to say of him, as Augustus said sometimes of Haterius, Haterius noster sufflaminandus est. But if by a conditional decree only, God hath reprobated those whom he hath reprobated, than the decrees of reprobation cannot be eternal, but must needs be temporal; for res conditionata, the thing conditionated cannot exist before the condition itself (whereupon it depends) hath existence. Now the condition of reprobation is merely temporal, to wit, final perseverance in infidelity or impenitency. 2. What if the condition of other creatures, be better than the condition of reprobates? For what sober man should expect that the condition of impenitent sinners should be better in the end, than the condition of beasts, who have made themselves worse than beasts? But then he will say, what shall become of all those amplifications of God's mercy towards men, commended to us in holy Scripture? I answer they all have place concerning Gods children, Gods elect, the Scripture phrase acknowledging no other vessels of mercy, and counting all others in distinction from them vessel of wrath; and one end whereto tends God's providence towards these vessels, the Apostle signifies plainly to be the amplification of his mercy towards the vessels of mercy. Rom. 9 22, 23. Which may be unfolded thus, that by seeing the miserable conditions of vessels of wrath, they may be more sensible of God's mercy towards them, in putting so gracious a difference between them. 3. It cannot be denied, but God foresaw what the condition of most men would be, if they were brought forth into the World; What then did God mean to bring them forth? Where was his mercy in this? Were it not a thousand times better for them not to be borne? And by being borne, was it not infallible that their condition would be a thousand times worse than the condition of beasts, according to this Author's grave and Philosophical discourse? 4. Consider though God foresaw, that being so dealt withal, as God meant they should be, they would never repent nor believe; yet seeing God had other means and motives in store, which he knew full well would prove effectual, to bring them to faith and repentance, were he pleased to use them; (as Arminius acknowledgeth, as I have often cited him, and it cannot be denied by the maintainers of scientia media.) Where was God's mercy, that would both have them brought forth, and use only such means to bring them to faith and repentance, which he knew would prove ineffectual, and resolved not to use such means with them, which he knew would prove effectual thereunto? I appeal to the judgement of every sober man, whether this proceeded not merely from God's absolute decree to make them vessels of Wrath, that is fit vessels in whom should shine the glory of his vindicative justice; even to show the riches of his glory towards the vessels of mercy, whom he had prepared unto glory, as on whom he was pleased to bestow such means of grace, as he knew full well would prove effectual to bring them to faith and repentance, and final preseverance, that so their souls might be saved in the day of our Lord Jesus Christ: Mark I beseech you an evident demonstration from invincible grounds of the truth, which this Author by base and superficiary considerations, labours to deface and extinguish if he could. For what if in the state of nothing, they were so intelligent as this Author feigns them, as to know to what end God made them, and thereupon, would not accept of life? What if afterwards they should curse the day of their birth, and wish they had been made Toads or Snakes? What shall God be therefore straitened in the exercise of his power, to make what creatures he will, and to what end he will? For qui dedit esse, good reason, quo fine sint habeat potestatem: What if the clay were so intelligent as to know, that it should be fashioned into a vessel for a close-stool or chamberpot, when his neighbour clay shall be fashioned into a drinking cup to serve at the table of King Agathocles, and it, out of the clayey stomach and pride thereof, shall repine and grudge to be so basely used, and say (in one of Aesop's Fables) that it had rather continue clay still; shall therefore the potter forgo his sovereignty in making of the same lump one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour? What if God should tell Nebuchodonosor that after he is dead, his scull should be turned to some such base use, and that some common jakes should have the bottom of it pitched with his bones; and he thereupon should wish he had never been rather; shall this be sufficient to derogate from the Sovereign power of God, or restrain him from the like, or from giving Jehoiakims body no better burying then the burial of an Ass? Or cause stately and proud Jezabells' body to be eaten of dogs? O what base manner of discourses are these to deflower the Power and Sovereignty of the Almighty! but I wonder not if after men have prostituted all honesty in opposing the grace of God, they are soon found to lose their wits also. Yet I have not done, I must not pretermit to answer his Scripture passage. What if it had been good for judas he had never been borne; it were as true if there were no absolute decree of God for his damnation, but foreknowledge only that he would be demned; but shall God therefore be forbidden upon the forfeiture of the reputation of his goodness, to bring forth judas into the World? But by the way our Saviour's words do not import hereby, that it were better for him he had not been; for a being he might have had though never borne into life, as many a one hath had, that never saw the light of the Sun, their womb being their grave. But because some men's tongues run riot against me, for the interpretation of this passage, which I make in my Vindiciae, not sparing to profess they will turn Atheists, when that is true, and as ready they have been to profess under their hand, that they will sooner deny there is a God then concur with the Contra-Remonstrants in their Doctrine of Reprobation: I pray let them be enquired of, whether they, or any wise man else, was ever known after such a manner to outface the interpretation that Maldonate giveth of that very place, which here I will subjoin for special reason: thus than Maldonate, De quo verbo nimis fortasse subtiliter quidam disputant, quomodo melius judae fuisset, natum non esse, cum non esse, nullum, damnatum esse, aliquod bonum sit; aliquid enim est, qui damnatus est; omne autem quod est, qua est, bonum est. Hieronymus judicat existimasse aliquos, judam fuisse, antequam nasceretur, Christumque certo consilio non dixisse, melius fuisset homini illi, si numquam fuisset, sed si natus non esset, quasi, etiamsi non nasceretur, futurus fuisset, ideoque naturalia bona sine malis habiturus. Suspicor D. Hieronymum Originistas notare voluisse, qui omnes animas initio creatas fuisse crediderunt & pro suo quamque merito aut expertem manere corporis, aut in corpus tanquam in carcerem mitti; & vero Origines ipse ita hoc loco scribere videtur, ut non longe ab eâ sententiâ abhorrere videatur. Eodem fere modo, Enthymius interpretatur: at length he adds his own interpretation of the place in the words following, Sed non sunt hujusmodi, Scripturae locutiones ad Scholarum excutiendae subtilitatem: sunt enim proverbiales, & sumptae de vulgo, in quibus quidam plerumque hyperbolicum esse solet, ut apud Job. cap. 3. 11. Quare non in vuluâ mortuus sum? Egressus ex utero non saltem perii? Et cap. 10. 18, 19 Quare de vuluâ aduxisti me? Qui utinam consumptus essem ne oculus me videret, fuissem, quasi non essem, de utero translatus ad tumulum. Et cap. 3. 3. Et Jer. 20. 14. Pereat dies in qua natus sum. Haec enim omnia non tam deliberato animi judicio, quam per querimoniam quae mala sua amplificare solet, dicta sunt. Christus ergo ita de Juda loquitur, quemadmodum credibile erat, ipsum de se in suppliciis positum esse locuturum. Erat autem credibile eum dicturum esse utinam nunquam natus essem, melius mihi fuisset non nasci, quam ista pati; cum Job & Jeremias viri sanctissimi multo minor a passi idem dixerint. Add quod Christus non dicit melius futurum fuisse, ut Judas non nascitur, sed melius futurum illi esse, id est, ejus opinion, & judicio: quemadmodum multis res adversas patientibus accidere videmus, ut corrupto dolore judicio mortem vitae anteponant, cum dubium non sit melius esse vivere quam mori. 2. I come to the comparison he makes between men and Devils, objecting that our Doctrine makes God less merciful to men then to Devils. In one thing (saith he) this decree makes most men and Devils equal, utrisque desperata salus, they are both sure to be damned. Now I say, this is most untrue. What man living is in a worse state than Manasses was, when he made his Children pass through the fire to Devils, gave himself to Witchcraft and Sorcery, and filled Jerusalem with blood? On Saul when fleshed with the blood of Stephen, and Ferox scelerum quia prima provenerant, he got a commission from the High Priest to go to Damascus, and bind all that called on the name of the Lord Jesus; yet it appeared in the issue that both these were the elect of God. Do not they themselves profess that reprobation is upon final perseverance in infidelity or impenitency? So that there is no sufficient evidence of reprobation, but this final perseverance in sin. In like sort by their Doctrine, none can be sure of his election until he be dead, because they constitute it upon foresight of final perseverance in faith and repentance. It is true if God should reveal to any that he is a reprobate, he might be sure he should be damned, and that as well according to their shaping of reprobation, as according unto our. But in three things he saith men are in a far worse condition by it; let us consider them. 1. The first is, In their appointment unto Hell, not for their own proper personal sins, but for the sins of another, made theirs only by God's order and pleasure. Now I see why he pretends to oppose the Sublapsarian way (keeping his liberty upon every occasion to ejaculate what his malice can suggest unto him against the Sublapsarian.) For only against the Sublapsarian way this objection hath place; and that not justly, but most unjustly, most untruly. For not one of them that I know, doth maintain that God by reprobation intended to damn, either Cain, or Judas, or Esau, but for their actual sins and transgressions unrepented of. And as for those Heathen Infants who perish in original sin, they perish for that corruption wherein they are borne, which is as natural unto them as the Leprosy of the Father, or any hereditary disease is naturally derived to the Child; by virtue whereof they are borne children of wrath, as the Apostle expresseth, and if to be borne children of wrath, be to be in a worse condition than Devils, seeing to be borne children of wrath, is not our making; if it be of Gods making, and that according to God's mere pleasure; it must be acknowledged, that this is a worse condition, and nevertheless God is to be justified herein: and wisdom is justified of her Children: and if Arminius will not concur with us herein, sure I am Papists will. For thus Bellarmine discourseth, De lib. arbit. lib. 2. cap. ult. Long major justitiae rigor apparet in reprobatione hominum quam Angelorum, tum quia maximam partem hominum, minimam Angelorum reprobavit, tum! etiam quoniam Angelorum nullum Deus paenae sempiternae addicit, nisi propter culpam propriâ voluntate comissam, hominum autem plurimos damnat propter solum Originale peccatum, quod alienâ voluntate commissum fuisse non dubium est. And yet though in this respect, the rigour be greater, nevertheless considering the punishments of Infants, which Austin professeth to be mitissimam, thus it is qualified that undoubtedly it is better for them to be as they are then to be Devils. Though as touching the kinds & degrees of punishment, that is of a mysterious nature, the Scripture concealling it, and we have no help of reason to succour us in the investigation thereof. far better, our care be to avoid it, both as well by orthodoxy of Faith, as by holiness of life. And him that looks for salvation by grace it behoves, to look unto it, how he shapes this grace of God, lest if he be found to mock God, giving the main stock of his conversion to his own Free will, rather than unto God, he may be mocked in the end, and meet with no better Salvation, than the liberty of his will can procure him, which will prove condemnation rather than salvation. See (I pray) what giddiness of spirit he betrays, in laying such a crimination to our charge, whereunto himself is obnoxious in an equal degree, or in a higher degree than we. For he hath confessed, that God of his mere pleasure, makes all Infants guilty of eternal death; now where appears the greater rigour? on our side, who say, God inflicts eternal death on none, but such as are guilty of eternal death? or rather on his side who saith, that God of his mere pleasure, makes men guilty of eternal death? 2. The second is, that their inevitable destination to destruction, is under show of the contrary: the Devils as they are decreed to damnation, so they know it, but men even those that are appointed unto wrath, are yet fed up with hopes of salvation. Is it possible that a man in his right wits should so miserably forget, and so shamefully carry himself? Doth not he himself maintain that all reprobates are from everlasting apppointed to eternal death? It may be his meaning is, that no reprobate is apppointed to eternal death until his death; so making Gods decrees temporal, and denying them to be eternal. But if this be his opinion, what Arminian or Remonstrant concurres with him in this? But if reprobation and election be eternal; how do we feed reprobates up with the hope of salvation, more than he himself? Doth he think none but the elect are his hairs? (for I do not know whether he may run, and whether his shallow wits may carry him: whether to the dreaming of an universal election with Huberus.) And doth he not feed up all his hearers with hope of salvation as well as we? And how do we feed them up with hopes of salvation? Do we feed our hearers with any other hopes of salvation, then are builded upon faith and repentance, and final perseverance therein? And do we not strike them as well with the terrors of God, and fears of damnation, in case they do not believe in Christ, or not break off their sins by repentance? And doth not he the like? Or if he hath good grounds of hope, that all and every one that hears him, is or may be an elect of God, why may not we or any other Minister, have as good grounds as he for such an hope? But what doth he mean so superficially to presume, that we teach that men do not perish, defectu misericordiae divinae, but defectu voluntatis propriae? Why should he so confidently presume, that we should teach such contradiction to the doctrine of Augustine, who professeth expressly of many, that they perish non tam quia ipsi servari nolint, This is alleged also by our British Divines in the Synod of Dort: Rom. 9 18. john 8. 47. Rom. 9 23. quam quia Deus non vult. As is apparent of all Infants that perish in original sin, out of the Church of God: Nay why should he presume of all us to be stricken with the same spirit either of infatuation or obstinacy, as to Preach a Doctrine so directly contrary to the holy doctrine of Saint Paul, professing, that God hath mercy on whom he will, etc. And to our Saviour whose profession is, that therefore men hear not God's word because they are not of God. How otherwise could the damnation of the vessels of wrath, tend to the augmentation of the riches of God's glory towards the vessels of mercy; namely, when they shall consider, that it was the mere grace of God to put so merciful a difference between them and others; regenerating them, and bestowing faith and repentance on them, the bestowing whereof he denied to many thousand others, yet withal it is true that men therefore do not believe and repent, because they will not: but if you ask quare nolunt, saith Austin, imus in longum; yet to this he accommodates his answer thus, men will not many things either quia latet, they know not the benefit of it, or quia non delectat, it is not pleasing to them. At (saith he) ut innotescat quod latebat, & suave fiat quod non delectabat, Dei gratia est, quae humanas adjuvat voluntates: We do not smother this truth of God, that we may delude men, we rather represent how all flesh are obnoxious and endangered unto God; that all are borne in sin, and therewithal children of wrath, and such as deserve to be made the generation of God's curse; and that it is at his pleasure to show mercy on any: only the word of God hath power to raise us from the dead, his voice pierceth the graves, and makes dead Lazarus hear it, and it is his course to call some at the first, some at the last hour of the day; Thus we desire to bring them acquainted first with the spirit of bondage, to make them fear, that so they may be prepared for the spirit of Adoption, whereby they shall cry Abba father: neither do we despair of any that are humbled with fear, we count rather their case most desperate, who are nothing moved hereby, or that persuade themselves they have power to believe when they will, and repent when they will; we account no greater illusions of Satan then these; yet these abominable opinions may be fostered by some, and masked with a pretence of great piety forsooth, and a show of holiness, and a zeal of defending God's glory, and salving the honour of his mercy, justice and truth. 3. The third is, in their obligation to believe, and the aggravation of their punishment by not believing. The Devils, because they must be damned, are not commanded to believe in Christ, yet poor men must be tied to believe in Christ, and their torments must be increased if they believe not. I make no doubt but this Author is as confident of his learned and judicious carriage in shaping this comparison, as that the fruit of Adam's sin is the guilt of eternal death in all mankind. But none so bold (we commonly say) as blind Bayard: and it seems either he knows not, or considers not, that the first sin of Angels was unto them as death unto man; that sin placed them extra viam, and in termino incur abilis miseriae, as death only placeth wicked men in the like case. Now we do not say that God commands man after he is dead to believe in Christ, any more than he commands obedience unto Angels, since their case is become desperate. The Devils are not commanded to believe or repent, because God doth not, nor never did purpose to damn any of them for want of faith, or of repentance, but for their first Apostasy from God. But it is otherwise with man, for God doth not purpose to damn any of them but for sin unrepented of. And therefore as good reason there is, why their damnation should be increased, for want of repentance and acknowledging of God's truth, as why the Devils should be damned for their first Apostasy. If perhaps (as it is likely enough) this Author to hold up his comparison, shall fly to God decree of reprobation, upon supposition whereof, it was impossible that men should either believe or repent; I answer first, that in like sort upon supposition of God's foreknowledge, that they would neither believe nor repent, it followeth as necessarily, as it is necessary that God's knowledge should be infallible, that it was impossible they should believe and repent: and the like followeth as necessarily of the Apostasy of Angels, as of the infidelity and impenitency of man. And as men are pretended to harden themselves in vicious courses upon supposition of the unalterable nature of God's decree; So Austin gives instance in like manner of one that hardened himself upon pretence of God's infallible knowledge. De bono persever. cap. 15. Fuit quidem in nostro Monasterio, qui corripientibus fratribus, our quaedam nonfacienda faceret, & facienda non faceret, respondebat, quali●cunque nunc sim, talis ero, qualem me Deus esse futurum praescivit. Qui profecto & verum dic●hat, & hoc vero, non proficiebat in ●onum, sed usque adeo profecit in malum, ut deserta Monasterii societ●te, fieret canis reversus ad ●uum vonutum, & tamen adhuc qualis sit futurus, incertum est Secondly I answer, that the like may be said of Angels upon presupposition of God's decree to deny the grace of standing unto them, which Austin professeth expressly, namely, that either in their creation minorem acceperunt amoris divini grattam; or that afterwards, the reason why the one sort stood when the other fell was this, to wit, because they were amplius adjuti then their fellows, and consequently the other minus adjuti. And as God gave grace to the elect Angels, which he denied to others: So it cannot be denied, but that from everlasting he decreed, both to bestow it upon the one, and deny it unto the other. Now howsoever I know the Arminian party cannot swallow this morsel; yet by this it appears how supersiciary is that augmentation of the difference between Men and Angels, wherewith this Author contents himself: yet notwithstanding it is not want of faith alone that condemneth any man; by want of Faith man is lest to the covenant of works, to stand or fall according to his own righteousness or unrighteousness: whereof if he fail, and withal despiseth the counsel or God offered him in his Gospel, is there no good reason, his condemnation should be the greater? For certainly it is in the power of a natural man, to afford as much faith to this, as to many a vile and fabulous relation, which is far less credible by judgement natural: we see both profane persons and hypocrites, so far to believe the Gospel, as to embrace a formal profession thereof, and sometimes proceed so far therein, as that 'tis a hard matter to distinguish them from sincere professors: yet we say a true faith is only such as is infused into the heart of man, by the spirit of God in regeneration. Now, what one of our Divines can be represented, that ever was known to affirm, that the damnation of any man shall be increased, because God did not regenerate him, and in regeneration inspire a Divine faith into him? As for our answer in general to this argument considered in brief, and this Author's reply; my refutation thereof I dispatched in the first place. Although he carrieth himself not fairly in relating the answer on our part; in as much as therein he mixeth the consideration of justice divine, which is alien from the present purpose, with the consideration of mercy divine, which alone is congruous; that so while he puts off the plenary justification of his reply, to that which is alien, he may seem to undertake a full justification of his reply to the whole. But I hope we shall be as able by God's assistance, to manifest his sinister carriage in the interpretation of God's justice, as we have done already, as touching his accommodation of God's mercy. DISCOURSE. SECT. III. This I divide into Five Subsections. SUBSECT. I. IT Fights with the justice of God, etc. The Lord, saith David, is righteous in all his ways, Psal. 145. The judgements of the Lord, saith Solomon, are weight and measure, Prov. 16. 11. That is, exact and without all exception. So just is God, that he offers the justice of his decrees and ways, to the trial of humane understanding. Isai. 5. 3. Judge I pray you, between me and my vineyard: and Ezech. 18. 25. He is content to prove himself just by plain arguments, through the whole chapter; Are not my ways equal, and your ways unequal? And he permitted Abraham, when he was in his greatest humility, acknowledging himself to be but Dust and Ashes, to reason with him about the equity of his doings; Wilt thou slay the righteous with the wicked. Shall not the judge of all the earth do right? Gen. 18. 23, 25. And Moses also, Num. 16. 22. is suffered to argue God's justice in the same manner; Shall one man sin, and wilt thou ●e ●●oth with all the Congregation▪ In a word; so evidently just is God in all his proceedings, that many both good and bad, who have felt his justice have cleared God, and deeply charged themselves, witness, Ezra, Nehemiah, and Daniel in their ninth Chapters, and Adonibezek, Judges 1. ●. and the Emperor Mauricius, who having seen his children butchered, and waiting every Osi●nd. Eccles, Hi●●ent. ●. p. 200. minute for the bloody stroke of death, broke out into these words; Justus es Domine, & justum est judicium tuum. Righteous art thou O Lord, and just is thy judgement. With this inviolable justice of God, absolute reprobation (of such especially as are commanded to believe and called to Salvation) cannot be reconciled. My reasons are these. 1. Because it makes God to punish the righteous with the wicked, as it is taught the Supralapsarian way, directly, as it is defended the Sublapsarian way by good consequence. The Sublapsarians present man to God in his decrees of reprobation considered without sin and will have God to determine the infliction of unspeakable misery upon millions of men, without consideration of any evil in them original or actual (as I have touched before) and so they make him plainly to be a destroyer of the righteous. The Sublapsarians (for against their way have I tied myself to bend my reasons) present man to God, considered indeed in original sin, which is a sin (so far as it concerns Adam's posterity) made ours only by God's order and appointment, and so in effect they say, 1. That God did lay upon every man a necessity of being borne in original sin. 2. That he hath determined for that sin, to cast away the far greater part of Mankind for ever; and so they make God to do by two acts, the one accompanying the other, which the other say he did by one: and they will not stick, if they be put to it, to say as D. Twisse doth, Quod Deus potest intercedente libera sua ●●stitutione, illud D. Tw●sse●. 2. di●r. 1. p. 15. etiam absolute poterit, vel sine all ●●● constitutione intercedent●. That is God may decree men to hell (for that is the thing he speaks of) for Adam's sin, which is derived to them by the only constitution of God, he may as well do it absolutely, without any such constitution. It is all one in substance, to decree the misery of an innocent man, and to purpose, that he shall be involved in a sin, that so he may be brought to misery: neither of these Decrees are just. Non iustitia iusta dicetur (saith Fulgentius) si puniendum reum non invenisse sed fecisse dicatur: major vero e●it iniustitia, si lapso Deus retribuat Fulgent. ad Menim. l. 1. poenam, quem stantem praedestinasse dicitur ad ruinam. TWISSE Consideration. With us Christians there is no doubt or question made of the truth of this, that God is righteous in all his ways: yea though he command Abraham to sacrifice his son; and though he caused not only Achan to be stoned for his trespassing about the excommunicate thing, but his children also with him; and though he visit the sin of Fathers upon the Children to the third and fourth generation of them that hate him. And though in the drowning of the World, he caused Infants to perish with their parents, some in their Mother's womb, some hanging on their Mother's breasts: And so in the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah with fire from heaven. And not so only, but the righteous God hath given us power over inferior creatures, to wear them out in serving our turns with them, yea and to knock them in the heads, to cut their throats, and strangle them as we think good: and we are no whit the more unrighteous in executing this power, which God hath given us upon them: yea in giving his own and holy Son to be reviled, blasphemed, betrayed, condemned, crucified, so to make his soul an offering for our sins. In all these ways the Lord is righteous, and holy in all his works, Solomon saith, Prov. 16. 11. That a just weight and balance are the Lords, all the weights of the bag are his work. And the same Solomon in the same chapter saith, v. 4. The Lord hath made all things for himself, yea even the w●●ed against the day of evil. This revives in me the remembrance of a pretty story; An odd fellow came to his Neighbour to borrow a bushel of Malt, saying, the merciful is righteous and dareth; the other answered him in the same element saying, The ungodly borroweth and payeth not again; Where is that saith the borrower? Where is yours saith the other? Why, saith he, the place I mentioned is in the 37 Psahne. So is mine too, saith the other. But proceed we along with him: Whereas he saith God's judgements are without exception, that is untrue, for we find the Apostle Saint Paul to take notice of exceptions made against the ways of God in some particular casts; as when God hath mercy on Rom. 9 18, 19, 20, 21. whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth: upon the proposal of this Doctrine the Apostle takes notice of such an exception as this. Thou wilt say then, why doth he yet complain, for who hath resisted his will: and the justification hereof, the Apostle derives from no other consideration than this, that God is our Creator, and we are his creatures: And that as the Potter hath power over the clay of the same lump, to make one vessel to honour, and another to dishonour; so hath God. O man (saith Paul) who art thou that disputest with God, shall the thing form, say to him that form it, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power over the clay? And as the Psalmist saith, That God's judgements are like a great deep: So the Apostle professeth, That his judgements are unsearchable, and his ways past finding out. And in the common opinion this is Rom. 11. 33. delivered as touching the depth of God's counsel in reprobation and predestination; and by the coherence of the words, with that which goes before it, appears to be spoken upon God's dispensing and denying grace to whom he will, and when he will; As for example; like as there was a time when God had a Church in the World, without distinction of Jews and Gentiles, so afterwards the providence of God was to display itself after three several ways, the first was in gathering a Church unto himself out of the World, from out of the posterity of Abraham, these were called the Jews, in distinction from the Gentiles, who for a long time had not obtained mercy, as the Apostle speaks, Rom. 11. 30. In as much as they believed not: And this dispensation of grace peculiar unto the Jews, with rejection of the Gentiles, continued for about 1600 years. Then God gathered a Church among the Gentiles, with rejection of the Jews, as the Apostle signifies in the place before alleged, saying, now you have obtained mercy through their unbelief. And this dispensation of God's grace peculiar unto the Gentiles, hath continued now, for about 1600 years. And we believe a time shall come, for the calling of the Jews, and then the Church of God shall consist both of Jews and Gentiles, and the general calling of them, as the Apostle signifies, Rom. 11. 12. If the fall of them be the riches of the World, and the diminishing of them the riches of the Gentiles, how much more their fullness: and v. 15. If the casting away of them be the reconciling of the World, what shall the receiving of them be but life from the dead: and v. 31. Even so have these also now not believed, that through your (Gentiles) mercy, they also (the Jews) might obtain mercy. For God hath concluded them all under unbelief, that he might have mercy on all. And hereupon it is, that the Apostle breaks forth into admiration of this various providence of God, and different dispensation of his grace, saying, O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God, how unsearchable are his judgements, and his ways past finding out? So that albeit the justice of God, be apparent to the understanding of man in some of his ways, yet not in all. Neither doth it follow, that because God offers the justice of his courses, to the trial of humane understanding in some particulars, therefore he offers it to the same trial in all; or that the understanding of man is able to comprehend it in all. Not only carnal men cry out sometimes, Where is the God of judgement? Mal. 2. 17. Again, it is in vain to serve God, and what profit is it that we have kept his commandments, that we have walked humbly before the Lord of hosts? But even the children of wisdom, which are apt to justify her, are yet sometimes offended through weakness of faith, or want of judgement to comprehend the depth of God's providence, when they have considered the strange prosperity of the wicked, as Job. 21. 6, 7, 8. and David, Psal. 73. and Jeremy, Jer. 12. But to consider punctually the instances here particulated. First not one of them treats of God's decrees, though this Author boldly claps then in amongst the ways of God: And these places throughout entreat not of the decrees themselves, but of the executions of God's decrees. As that Isaiah 5. 3. Judge I pray you between me and my vineyard; yet this was mere grace and not justice; but the laying of it wast, (as there he threateneth) for the unfruitfulness thereof, was just even in the conscience of man: So likewise the ways of God mentioned, Ezech. 18. 25. are most equal, as namely in rewarding the obedient, and punishing the disobedient. In like sort there is no question to be made of God's decrees, concerning the rewarding the one, and punishing the other. And it is as true, that all this is nothing to the purpose. The main question being touching God's decree, to give the grace of obedience to one, and deny it unto others; and of the execution hereof, in showing mercy on whom he will, and Rom. 9 18; hardening whom he will. No reason hereof can be devised by man without falling into manifest absurdity, or manifest heresy, or both. It is true God will not slay the righteous with the wicked: for the Infants of wicked Parents, until God be pleased to regenerate them, are not to be accounted righteous, as being borne children of wrath. Ephes. 2. 3. And therefore as in the conflagration of Sodom, God took a course to save righteous Lot, yet the Infant children of the Sodomites were consumed Gen. 19 in the same fire with their Parents. And in like manner I answer to that of Moses. Num. 16. 22. Shall one man sin, and wilt thou be angry with all the congregation? You know though Korah might be, and in likelihood he was the principal instigator yet Dathan and Abiram the sons of Eliab, and On, the son of Peleth, the sons of Reuben joined with him in the separation, and with these were joined no less than 250 Captains of the assembly, and they famous in the congregation and men of renown. Nor did those alone perish in this their separation, but their families also. So that whereas when Moses exhorted all the rest to depart from the tents of those wicked men, and thereupon Dathan and Abiram came out and stood in the door of the Tent, with their Wives, and their Sons, and their little Children, all these were swallowed up, and went down quick into the pit: and do you think their little Children were partners with them in this conspiracy? And is not this judgement strange? What can justify this, but the power of God, is Lord over his creature, together with that original corruption that is found in every one when they come into the world? Guests, I pray, how happy this Author is in his observations. This makes me remember, how at my first coming into this place, having to deal with certain Brownists, being willed thereunto by our Diocesan: An old man among the rest, was willing to confer, so we would give him liberty to open his mind at full; we willingly condescended unto him, and thereupon he began to allege places of Scripture to justify his separation; and wheresoever he found the word separate, that he took up for an argument on his side (like him that did set down every ship that arrived in the harbour at Athens, as one of his ships) and amongst the rest, this 16 chapter of Numbers afforded him one authority v. 21. where the Lord speaks unto Moses and Aaron, saying, separate yourselves from among this congregation; whereunto I answered; here indeed is a separation commanded, but from whom? Surely from those who rose up in rebellion against Moses and Aaron: Now if you can prove us to be such, as rise up in rebellion against Moses and Aaron, then, in the name of God separate yourselves from us: But if we are not the men that rise up in rebellion against Moses and Aaron, but you rather, then are not you commanded to separate from us, but we rather are commanded to separate from you; yet we desire only, that you will not separate from us, and all shall be well. But to return, what doth this author think? Was God in a passion, or something precipitate when he said, separate yourselves from among this congregation, that I may consume them all at once, and did Moses moderate him as being more-staid of the two? I hope, if God had done as much as he offered to do, his action had been justifiable, as well in the one as in the other. Certainly God should be just, even in turning his holy Angels into nothing: and was just in exposing his holy Son to tortures unexpressable upon the cross; other manner of proceedings, then were those which were used towards Adonibezek and Mauricius: they justified God from consideration of their former sins: No such course of justification could have place in annihilating Angels, or had course in breaking the Holy Son of God for our iniquities. Yet these instances are remarkable to observe therein, the felicity of this Author's discourse. For first, was it God indeed that executed this judgement upon Adonibezek? Now the Text saith, the children of Judah were Judg. 1. 6, 7. they that dealt thus with him: did God then use their free wills, as his instruments for the execution of this judgement? And how was this? Was it by working them hereunto, or only by concurring with them to this act, as foreseeing they would do such an act, and thereupon decreeing to concur to the producing of that act? If God did work them hereunto, then can God work the will of any man to the doing of any free act freely: for who dares say that the children of Israel did not as freely do this as ought else? But if God only concurred with them, to the doing of it modo vellent, and only, upon foresight that they would do it, decreed to concur to the doing of it, calls he this God's execution of judgement, depending merely upon the pleasure of man foreseen by God? As for the outrage executed upon Mauricius by Phocas, this was no less than abominable villainy, as committed by him. Yet if God used him as an instrument herein, to execute his judgement, than God by the sinful act of one, can and doth punish the same of another, and consequently God must be the Author of that sinful act, whereby he punisheth another, and that by Arminius his rule, which is this, Omnis paena non permittitur sed infligitur a Deo, & habet Deum authorem. Now I come to consider his accommodation of so impertinent a discourse. He saith absolute reprobation cannot be reconciled with this justice Divine: we say there is no need at all of reconcilement: for what an insipid thing is it, to talk of a course of reconciling them, who were never at odds? But he takes upon him to prove the repugnancy between them by three reasons. 1. The first whereof is this. It makes God to punish the righteous with the wicked, as it is taught the Supralapsarian way directly. I confess here is a direct somewhat, but whether a direct truth, or a direct lie, let the indifferent judge. He adventureth the proof of it thus: The Supralapsarians present man in his decree of Reprobation considered without sin: that is true I confess, and it is as true that they present him considered without righteousness also; and for good reason, because God's decree was eternal, and the creature at that time had no being & to consider a thing that hath no being, as having being, is not so much considerare, to consider, as errare or fingere, to err or feign, this I have delivered in my Vindiciae gratiae Dei, and that in the first part of the first book. And this Author pretends he hath read the second, yet he takes no course to refute this or aught else. But let him go on. God (he saith) is made by them to determine the infliction of misery on men without consideration of sin, either Original or actual. First, let it be granted, yet herehence it followeth not, that he is made to be a destroyer of the righteous, or to punish the righteous with the wicked, which was that he affirmed. To determine punishment is one thing, to punish is another thing. Certainly in the opinion of those he speaks of, God punisheth none but the wicked; the very conscience of this Author cannot but convict him of falsehood in this crimination: For certainly by their opinion it doth not follow but that every one is found wicked, when God doth punish him. I may as well say in most absolute congruity, that by their opinion, God doth punish men, before they have any being by creation: for such they were indeed, and neither wicked nor righteous, when God passed the decree of reprobation upon them. But neither do these Divines maintain, that God did decree to damn any man but for sin. Nay, I go farther: let the object of reprobation be men not yet created, and so considered, as I have proved it to be so, herehence it no way follows, that the decree of reprobration, is in any moment of reason or nature, before the consideration or citra considerationem peccati: and this also have I proved. This Author boldly supposeth the contrary to be true, without any proof, yet pretends he hath read my Vindiciae Gratiae Dei farther off then where I have handled this. I say he pretends it, but I do not know how he comes by this, it may be as Capons come by Chickens. Hence he proceeds to the Sublapsarians also, the whole Synod of Dort (as 'tis supposed) our Britain Divines, and all; for against their way he hath tied himself to bend his reasons, but so, that as the Pope by his grants, doth never bind his own hands, for this Author hath power to untie himself at pleasure, and to fly out against the Supralapsarians also: as Scanderbag did against the two Persian challengers; but he was put thereunto, because they contrary to the compact, set both at once on him. But this champion like a tall fellow, and of a brave spirit, as if he should not have his hands full of a whole Synod, le's fly at all: They indeed, I mean the Sublapsarians, consider mankind in original sin; this he may well suppose: but he goes farther, and supposeth also, that this sin is made ours only by God's order and appointment: For so, saith he, they in effect do say. 1. That God did lay upon every man, a necessity of being borne in Original sin. But in this also he speaks at pleasure, quoting no passage of any Author. God may be said to lay upon man a necessity of eternal condemnation, dying in sin unrepented of: yet no sober man will say, that God is the author of a man's condemnation, by God's only order and pleasure; For this implies, that there is no meritorious cause of condemnation in man. God (we say) of mere pleasure, bestows the grace of repentance on whom he will; because he finds all equal in natural corruption, and no difference in any, whereby to move God to bestow grace on him rather than on another. The case is not alike when God comes to bestow salvation and inflict damnation; for some he finds dying in sins, others dying in the Lord: yet we deny not but by power absolute, and secluding the determination of his own will, he could annihilate the righteous as well as the wicked. In like sort the whole course of nature depends merely upon the pleasure of God: yet we say it is natural for a Leprous person, to beget a Leprous person: and so as natural it is, for that which is borne of the flesh to be flesh, though each depends upon the constitution of God. For albeit Adam lost the spirit of God by his transgression, and all supernatural graces wherewith he was endued; yet like as God by regeneration, of his mere pleasure restored them afterwards to Adam, and in due time doth restore them to every one of his Elect: so in their very conception, if it pleased God, he could for Christ's sake infuse them; notwithstanding the sin of Adam; and consequently it is the free act of God, in refusing after this manner to deal with them. Yet this nothing hinders, but that the propagation of spiritual corruption unto all Adam's posterity, may be as natural as the propagation of any hereditary disease from the Father to the child: and over and above, that it is not in the way of mere pleasure, but in the way of justice; for the sin of Adam, which was the sin of our nature, bereaving him of that original righteousness wherein he was ●reated: and causing all mankind to be, 1. Derived from him, whereas he could have otherwise provided, 2. And that from Adam after his nature was corrupt with sin, whereas he could have derived posterity from him before his fall, had it pleased him. And therefore I approve the second Canon of the Synod of Dort, whereunto our English Divines with many others subscribed: where they profess, that the corruption derived from Adam to his posterity was, per vitiosae naturae propagationem justo Dei iudicio derivata. This I take to be much different from saying, Adam's sin is made ours by mere pleasure, or by imputation only. So the fifteenth Article in the confession Ecclesiarum Belgicarum runs thus; Credimus Adami in obedientiâ, peccatum originis in totum genus humanum diffusum esse: quod est totius naturae corruptio, & vitium haereditarium, quo & ipsi infantes in matris suae utero polluti sunt, quodque veluti radix omne peccatorum genus in homine producit; ideoque ita foedum & execrabile est coram Deo, ut ad generis humani condemnationem sufficiat. Our Britain Divines, in their second Thesis upon the third and fourth Articles, explicate themselves concerning the condition of original sin in this manner. Lapsae voluntati inest non tantum peccandi possibilitas, sed etiam praeceps ad peccandum inclinatio; Nec aliter se potest res habere in homine corrupto, nondum per divinam justitiam restaurato: cum ea sit natura voluntatis, ut nuda manere nequeat, sed ab uno, cui adhaeserat, objecto excidens, aliud quaerat, quod cupidè amplectatur, ideo per spontaneam defectionem habitualiter adversa a Deo creatore, in creaturam effraeni impetu fertur, ac cum ea libidinose ac turpiter fornicatur, semper avida fruendi utendis, ac vetita moliendi ac patrandi. Quid mirum ergo si talis voluntas sit Diaboli maneipium? I find indeed in Corvinus such a profession of his, namely, that ex puro Dei arbitrio, qui Adami peccatum nobis imputare voluit, etiam in nos reatus derivatus est. And Walaeus in answer unto him writes thus; Nec quinto illo ad Rom. Capite, ad quod nos hic Corvinus remittit, quicquam tale dicitur aut innuitur, nempe quod ex mero Dei arbittio pendeat haec primi peccati imputatio. 2. The Second thing he puts upon our Divines is, That God hath determined for that sin, to cast away the far greater part of mankind for ever: and so they make God to do that by two acts, the one accompanying the other, which the other say he did by one. To which I answer, First, that if they say that God doth no more by two acts, then, the other say, God did by one, seeing I have proved that the other do no way maintain that God doth punish the righteous with the wicked, which is his immodest and unshamefaced crimination; no nor do they maintain, that God determined to damn any but for sin, and which is more than that, supposing humanum genus nondum conditum, to be the object of reprobation, yet doth it not follow, that in any moment of nature, the decree of damnation is before the consideration of sin; surely neither will it follow, by the Sublapsarian Doctrine, that God doth not decree to punish any man with damnation, but for those sins wherein he dyeth unrepented of; much less that God doth punish the righteous with the wicked, which is the crimination of this Author, proposed, I doubt, against his own conscience. 'tis true, some perish only in original sin, and that justly: for if they be borne children of wrath, is it strange if they die children of wrath? And is it not just with God to inflict eternal death on them, whom this Author professeth to be guilty of eternal death? only he saith, that God of his mere pleasure, makes them guilty of eternal death: That is his saying, not ours: For though we say original sin makes a man guilty of eternal death, by the free constitution of God; yet we say not, that this free constitution of God was made of his mere pleasure, but justo Dei judicio▪ like as whosoever believes not shall be damned, here damnation is by the free constitution of God, made the portion of unbelievers: but dares this Author infer herehence, that it is not made so justo Dei judicio? indeed God gives grace according to the mere pleasure of his will: but no wise man will say, that he damns men according to the mere pleasure of his will; for this phrase implies, that there is no cause thereof on man's part: And indeed there is no cause on man's part, why God should give him grace, but there is cause enough on man's part, why God should inflict damnation on him, and yet this work of God though just, is never a whit the less free. So in damning for original sin only, though God's constitution hereof be just, yet is it never a whit the less free; and though it be free, yet it is never a whit the less just: And like as damnation is inflicted on final impenitents, sola Dei constitutione, only by virtue of this constitution Divine, whosoever reputes not of his sin shall be damned; (for it is apparent, God might have annihilated them, had it so pleased him) yet is it never a whit the less just. In like sort it is by the sole constitution of God, that original sin is propagated to all men, Christ excepted. for God could have derived mankind from another stock after Adam's fall: and as he doth regenerate men usually by his word, so he might if it pleased him, in their very conception give them his spirit, and those supernatural graces, whereof Adam was deprived by sin: yet the propagation of sin from Adam to posterity. is never a whit the less just; no nor any whit the less natural; like as the whole course of nature, depends upon the alone constitution of God. But when I say that God can without respect of sin, inflict any torment upon his creature, this is delivered of power absolute. This power the Lord did execute upon his own son: for what was his sin? Was he not the spotless lamb of God? Yet what agonies did he suffer in the garden, what torments and terrors upon the cross, when he cried out My God, my God, Why hast thou forsaken me? But the like power he doth not execute on us, only he gives us authority to exercise the like power over other creatures: if the powder of an Hare burned alive in an Oven, be found to be wholesome for us, he gives us leave thus to deal with him, and the like: yet have not these creatures sinned either against God, or against us. Of this absolute power of God, I have discoursed more sparingly in the place cited by him, Lib. 1. p. 2. De Electione, digres. 3. If this Author hath any mind to except against it, either in whole or in part, he might have tried his strength, and not contented himself, with showing his teeth only. Yet by his leave, whether those he speaks of, will concur with me in this, it is more than I know, but to serve his turn at this present against those whom he hath tied himself to oppose, as he professeth, he cares little what he avoucheth to save himself of farther pains. By the way let me take notice of one argument more than I dreamt of, for the maintenance of God's absolute power to inflict any pain upon a creature, and that of his mere pleasure, which this Author ere he is aware suggests unto me; And accordingly thus I dispute. If God can out of his mere pleasure make a man guilty of eternal death, surely it seems that of his mere pleasure he may inflict eternal death on any. But God can of his mere pleasure make a man guilty of eternal death, as I prove out of this Author, who professeth that God out of his mere pleasure, made all mankind guilty of eternal death: Now we commonly say, that ab actu ad potentiam valet argumentum. And see farther how miserably he overlasheth. The highest degree whereunto he can improve the harshness of our Doctrine is this, that we should teach, that God doth decree the misery of an innocent man. Now I pray consider, is it not as harsh, that God should decree the death, the agonics, the sorrows, and tortures of an innocent man? And is it not apparent, that God decreed the death and those unspeakable sorrows of his innocent son? Yet we say not that God decreed any other man's death or damnation, but only for sin. But it is all one in his opinion to say, God decrees the misery of an innocent man, and to purpose that he shall be involved in a sin, that so he may be brought to misery. First, I say his opinion is no Oracle, if it were, the world would soon grow wild. Secondly, this sufficeth not to prove his crimination, which was this, that by our Doctrine, we make God to punish the righteous with the wicked, not that we make God to do that which is all one in substance. Thirdly, his best arguments are his phrases, whereby he hopes to season others affections as well as his own; as in saying God purposed man shall be involved in sin: For if he speak of mankind, made guilty of the sin of Adam, he forgets his own Tenet; that God of his mere pleasure makes Adam's sin the sin of his posterity, and thereby of his mere pleasure makes them guilty of eternal death. And as touching our Tenet herein, is there any such harshness in saying, that God causeth a leprous child to be borne of Leprous parents? But if he speak it in general of any sin, for which any man is damned, our Doctrine is, that the sins which come to pass, must needs be permitted by God, and for God to permit any sin, is to will that such a sin shall come to pass by God's permission. Arminius himself professing, that if God permit a man to will that which is evil, Necesse est ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolendum. And the Scripture is express as touching the foulest actions that ever were committed by man, to wit, in the most contumelious usages of the son of God, namely that both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, together with the Gentiles, and people of Israel were gathered together, to do what Gods hand, and God's Counsel had predetermined to be done. And when Fulgentius saith, that God had been unjust, if he had predestinated stantem ad ruinam; ad ruinam here is ad peccatum, and Predestination in the Father's sense, is only eorum quae Deus ipse facturus erat, which God himself meant to effect, not what he meant to suffer. That they took predestination in this sense, it appears by Austin. lib. 2. de bono persever. c. 17. his words are these. In sua quae falli mutarique non potest praescientia opera sua futura disponere, illud omnino, nec aliud quicquam est praedestinare. Mark it well, opera sua, his works, now sin is no work of God, but a work of the creature only. I come to his second reason. DISCOURSE. SUBSECT. II. IT is against God's Justice, because it makes him to require faith in Christ, of those to whom he hath in his absolute purpose denied both ability to believe, and a Christ to believe in. That Reprobates are bound to believe as well as others, it is the constant Doctrine of Divines; amongst whom Zanchius delivers it for a Thesis: Quisque (saith he) mandato Dei tenctur credere Zanch. lib. 5. c. 2. the nat. Dei, q. 1. de praedest. Sanct. se ad salutem aeternam in Christo fuisse electum, maxim is qui fidem in Christum profitetur. And in his explication of this Thesis he saith, Cum dicimus unumquemque teneri hoc credtre, neminem, ne reproios quidem, qui neque unquam credent, nec credere in Christum possunt, excipimus; & nisi credant, gravissime ommum peccant. Every man, especially he that professeth Christ, is bound to believe that he is chosen in Christ to salvation; every man without exception, even the Reprobate himself; and if he believe it not, he commits a most grievous sin above all others. This that he saith, he proves by john 16. 9 The spirit shall convince the World of sin, because they believe not in me: Reprobates therefore are bound to believe. But now they cannot be justly bound to believe if they be absolute and inevitable Reprobates, for three causes. 1. Because it is God's will that they shall not believe; and it appears to be so, because it is his peremptory will that they shall have no power to believe; for its a Maxim in Logic, that Qui vult aliquid in causâ, vult effectum ex ista causa necessario profluentem: No man will say that it is Gods serious will, that such a man shall live, when it is his will, that he shall not have the concourse of his providence, and the act of preservation▪ now will any say (that forget not themselves) that God doth unfeignedly will that those men shall believe, whom he will not furnish with necessary power to believe. Now if it be Gods will, that absolute reprobates shall in no wise believe, they cannot in justice be tied to believe. For no man is bound to an act against Gods peremptory will. 2. Because it is impossible that they should believe, they want power to believe, and must want it still: God hath decreed they shall have none to their dving day: without power to believe, they can no more believe, than a man can see without an eye, and live without a Soul. Nemo obligatur ad impossibilia. To believe is absolutely impossible unto them; and therefore in justice they can be tied to believe no more than a man can be bound to fly like a Bird, or to reach heaven with the top of his finger. 3. Because they have no object of saith. Credere ●ubet, d● fidei nulium objectum 〈◊〉: This decree makes God to oblige men to believe, and to give them no Christ to believe in, and to punish them as transgressors of the covenant of grace, when yet they have no more right unto it, or part in it, than the very Devils. Can God justiy bind men to believe a lie? To believe that Christ died for them, when it is no such matter? If a man should command his Servant to eat, and punish him for not eating, and in the mean time fully resolve that he shall have no meat to eat: Would any reasonable man say that he were just in such a command, such a punishment? Change but the names, the case is the same. TWISSE Consideration. IN this discourse on the point of God's justice, this Author seems to storm, and shows great confidence of bearing down all before him: but the more ridiculous will it prove in the issue, when it shall appear, that all this wind beats down no corn. He takes his rise from a particular opinion of Zanchy, whose opinion is, that all, even Reprobates are bound to believe they are elected in Christ unto salvation, though never they shall believe nor can believe. But doth this Author himself concur with Zanchy in this opinion? If he did, I presume it were upon some better ground than the authority of Zanchy; and in all likelihood we should have heard of those grounds: or doth himself believe, that that passage joh. 16. 9 He shall convict the World of sin, because they believed not in me, doth evince as much, or import as much as that is, whereunto Zanchy drives it? If he doth not concur with Zanchy in either of these, why should he tie us to the particular authority of Zanchy? Must we be bound to stand to every interpretation of our Divines, or every particular opinion of theirs, wherein perhaps they were singular? Secondly, suppose this opinion of Zanchy be a truth, and suppose we concur with him herein, will it from this opinion follow, that therefore even Reprobates, have power to believe? Who seeth not that it is a flat contradiction to the antecedent? For the Doctrine of Zanchy as here it is related, is this, that even Reprobates, though they cannot believe, yet are they bound to believe. Now will it herehence follow that therefore they have power to believe? Whereas it is manifestly supposed in the antecedent that they cannot believe. And to my understanding, the distinction of Elect and Reprobate in this case is most unseasonable. For to what end do we Preach unto our hearers, that all sorts of men are bound to believe, but this, to wit, that every one that heareth us, being privy to his condition, may understand that he, of what condition soever he be, which is supposed to be better known to him, then to the Preacher, or at least as well, is bound to believe. But as for these different conditions of elect and reprobate, no man can be privy to the one, until he doth believe; nor to the other, until final perseverance in unbelief. And if I list, I could allege the opinion of another Divine (who is very peremptory in his way) professing that the Ministers calling upon us to believe, is no commandment at all, but like a King's gracious Proclamation unto certain malefactors, who are all accused of High Treason, giving them to understand, that in case they will voluntarily confess their sin, and accept of his gracious pardon offered them, he will most graciously pardon them. But if they will not, but stand rather to their trial, presuming to acquit themselves right well, and prove themselves to be true Subjects, let them stand to the adventure, and issue of their trial. And that thus the covenant of grace is offered to be received by them only, who fear to come, and dare not come to the trial of the Covenant of works. But I will not content myself, in putting off Zanchy in this manner; although by the way I cannot but profess, that were I of their opinion, who teach that God gives unto all and every one, when they come into the World, a certain grace, for the enlivening of their wills, whereby they are enabled to will any spiritual good, whereto they shall be excited; I see no reason but that the way is open to everlasting life, as well by the covenant of works, as by the covenant of grace: for let perfect obedience be the spiritual good whereto they are excited, let them but will it, as it is supposed they can; and than God will be ready to concur to the doing of it, like as to the work in us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 credere, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 resipiscere, modò velimus, so also I should think, to work in us perfect obedience modò velimus. And in this case I pray consider, what need were there of faith in Christ on their part, more than on the part of the Holy Angels; certainly there would be no need of repentance. Thirdly therefore consider we the constant Doctrine of Divines, not that Reprobates are bound to believe, but that all that hear the Gospel are bound to believe: but in what sense? Piscator saith, as I remember, that the thing, which all such are bound to believe, is the Gospel; according to that Mar. 1. Repent ye and believe the Gospel. Now to believe the Gospel is one thing, the sum whereof is this, That Jesus Christ came into the World to save sinners; but to believe in Christ is another thing, which yet this Author distinguisheth not, though it appears by the course of his argumentation, that he draws to this meaning, and that in a particular sense, which is this, to believe that Christ died for them; as appears expressly in the latter end of this Section. And no marvel if this Author carry himself so confidently in this, being, as he is, armed with such confidence. But I am glad that in one place or other, he springs his meaning, that we may have the fairer flight at him, to pull down his pride, and sweep away his vain confidence: though we deal upon the most plausible argument of the Arminians, and which they think insoluble. My answer is; first, Look in what sense Arminius saith Christ died for us, in the same sense we may be held to say (without prejudice to our Tenet) of absolute reprobation, that all who hear the Gospel are bound to believe that Christ died for them. For the meaning that Arminius makes of Christ's dying for us, is this, Christ died, for this end, that satisfaction being made for sin, the Lord now may pardon sin, upon what condition he will; which indeed is to die for obtaining a possibility of the redemption of all, but for the actual redemption of none at all. Secondly, But I list not to content myself with this; therefore I farther answer, by distinction of the phrase of dying for us, that we may not cheat ourselves by the confounding of things that differ. To die for us, or for all, is to die for our benefit, or for the benefit of all: Now these benefits are of a different nature, whereof some are bestowed upon man only conditionally (though for Christ's sake) and they are the pardon of sin and Salvation of the Soul, and these God doth confer only upon the condition of faith and repentance. Now I am ready to profess, and that, I suppose, as out of the mouth of all our Divines, that every one who hears the Gospel (without distinction between Elect and Reprobate) is bound to believe that Christ died for him, so far as to procure both the pardon of his sins, and the salvation of his soul, in case he believe and repent. But there are other benefits, which Christ by his obedience hath merited for us, namely, the benefit of faith and repentance. For it pleased the Father, that in him should all fullness dwell, Col. 1. And He hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in Christ, that is, for Christ's sake: and Eph. 1. 3. Heb. 13. 21. God works in us, that which is pleasing in his sight through Jesus Christ, and therefore seeing nothing is more pleasing in God's sight on our part, than faith and repentance, even these also, I should think, God works in us through Jesus Christ: and the Apostle prays in the behalf of the Ephesians, for peace, and faith, and love from God Eph. 6. 23. the Father, and the Lord Jesus Christ, that is, as I interpret it, from God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as an efficient cause, and from the Lord Jesus Christ, God and Man, as a meritorious cause thereof. Now I demand whether this Author can say truly, that 'tis the constant opinion of our Divines, that all who hear the Gospel, whether Elect or Reprobate, are bound to believe, that Christ died to procure them faith and repentance. Nay doth any Arminian at this day believe this, or can he name any Arminian that doth avouch this? Nay doth himself believe this? If he doth not, if he cannot show any Arminian that doth, with what face can he charge this opinion upon us, as if we should extend the obligation to believe, much farther than the Arminians do, whereas usually they criminate us, for not extending it so far as we should. And indeed there is a main difference between these benefits and the former: For as touching the former, namely pardon of sin and salvation, God doth not use to confer them, but conditionally, to wit, upon the condition of faith and repentance. But as for faith and repentance, doth God confer them conditionally also? If so, then let them make known to us, what that condition is on man's part, and whatsoever it be, let them look unto it, how they can avoid the making of grace, to wit, the grace of faith and repentance, to be given according unto works. But if these graces are conferred absolutely, and Christ died for all to this end, that faith and repentance should be conferred absolutely upon all, than it followeth manifestly herehence, that all must believe and repent, and consequently all must be saved. So that not only Election (as Huberus that renegade feigned) must be universal, but Salvation also. Thus have I given in my answer distinctly, to that which he delivered most confusedly. Fourthly I come to the scanning of the particular opinion of Zanchy, namely, that every one that hears the Gospel, whether elect or reprobate (for so I suppose it proceeds, to wit, only of them, who hear the Gospel, though this Author, takes no consideration of that neither, but hand-over-head, lays about him like a mad man) is bound to believe, that he is elect in Christ; and will try whether I cannot reduce that opinion of his also, to a fair interpretation. And here first I observe, Zanchy is not charged to maintain, that every hearer of the Gospel, is bound to believe, that he is elect in Christ unto faith and repentance, but only to salvation: that puts me in good heart, that Zanchy & I shall shake hands of fellowship in the end, and part good friends. Secondly, I distinguish between absolute-Election unto Salvation, and election unto Salvation-absolute. The first only removes all cause on man's part of election, the latter removes all cause on man's part of salvation. By cause of salvation I mean only a disposing cause, such as faith, repentance, and good works are, as whereby (to express it in the Apostles phrase) we are made meet partakers of the Col. 1. 12. inheritance of the Saints of light. Now albeit Zanchy maintains as we do, that all the elect are absolutely elected unto salvation, there being no cause on man's part of his election, as we have learned: yet neither Zanchy nor we do maintain that God doth elect any unto salvation absolute, that is, to bring him to salvation, without any disposing of him thereunto by faith and repentance. Now to accommodate that opinion of Zanchy, I say it may have a good sense, to say that every hearer is bound to believe, both that Christ died to procure Salvation for him, in case he do believe, and that God ordained that he should be saved, in case he do believe; where belief is made the condition only of salvation, not of the Divine ordination; and the confusion of these by the Arminians, doth usually make them confident and insolent, and in a word, Magnas Tragoedias excitare. But take a way the confusion of things that differ, their combs are cut, their locks are shorn, and they are but as another man. Now having showed in what sense every hearer, is bound to believe that Christ died for him, and in what sense not, let us consider of what worth this Author's arguments are, breathing nothing but smoke and fire, I will not say, like the great Potan, but like fell Dragon; but I nothing doubt we shall pair his nails, and make him calm enough ere we have done with him, so that a little child shall be able enough to lead him. Now that they cannot be justly bound to believe, if they be absolute reprobates he takes upon him to prove by three reasons. 1. The first is, because it is God's will that they shall not believe, because it is his peremptory will, that they shall have no power to believe. I answer, it is indeed the will of God's decree, that is, he hath decreed not to give any Reprobate a justifying faith, but hence it followeth not, that therefore they cannot believe thus far the contents of the Gospel, namely, that both Christ hath merited, and God hath ordained, that as many as do believe shall be saved. For this, as I take it, is not usually accounted by our Divines a justifying faith, but rather it comes within the compass of such a faith, as is commonly counted faith historical. Secondly I answer, it followeth not, that because God hath decreed to deny them the grace of faith, therefore they are not bound to believe; which I prove by Scripture: For was not Pharaoh bound to let Israel go, when Moses was sent to him from Exod. 7. 2, 3. the Lord, to command him in the name of the Lord, to let Israel go? Yet the Scripture plainly teacheth us, that the Lord told Moses that he would harden Pharaohs heart, and that he should not let Israel go. What I pray is now become of his reason, compared with the light of Scripture? And what have we to do to inquire into God's counsels, as whether he hath decreed to give us grace or no? Is it not enough to bind us to obedience, for God to command this or that unto us? Did Abraham inquire in his thoughts, whether it were his purpose yea or no, that Isaac should be sacrificed? Nothing less; but upon the Lords command, he forthwith addresseth himself to the work, rising early in the morning, and going forward in the Lord's business. Then again, we find by common experience, that natural men are too to confident rather, and presumptuous of their power, then diffident, and distrustful; dicere De Grat. & lib. arbit. c. 2. solet humana superbia (saith Austin) si scissem fecissem: it were better for them if they did acknowledge their impotency, and by what means this corruption of theirs is brought upon them, that would bring them nearer to the Kingdom of God. But if I have a debtor, whom I know to be a Bankrupt, but he knows it not, but having many bags of Brass or Copper pieces, which he takes to be Gold, conceits himself able enough to pay all his debts, and more too: shall I be said to commit any indecent thing, by urging him to pay that he oweth? This argument is as old as Pelagius: but what was Austin his answer? In mandato cognosce quid debeas habere, in corruption cognosce t uo te vitio non habere, in oratione cognosce unde possis habere. 3. Lastly, if God cannot justly command, and by command bind man to obey, in case he hath no power to obey; in like sort God cannot justly complain of their disobedience, who being hardened by God, cannot obey him: And indeed as this Author argueth against the justice of God's commands in this case, so the Apostle brings in one arguing the injustice of God's complaints in the like case. For having delivered this Doctrine, that God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth: forthwith he brings in one tumultuating against it in this manner. Thou Rom. 9 18. wilt say then why doth he yet complain, for who hath resisted his will? And if any man be not ashamed to argue as he did (saith Austin) let us not be ashamed to answer as the Apostle did: and how was that? Surely only thus: O man who art thou that disputest with God? shall the thing form, say to him that form it, Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour? And albeit this, I trow, should be sufficient to satisfy a Christian, yet we observe farther, how this Author confounds impotency Moral, which consisteth in the corruption of man's powers natural, and impotency natural, which consisteth in bereaving him of power natural. The Lord tells us by his Prophet Jeremy, that Like as a Blackamoor cannot change his skin, nor a Leopard his spots, no more can they do good, that are Jer. 13. 23. accustomed unto evil. Now if a man taken in stealth shall plead thus before a Judge, My Lord, I beseech you have compassion upon me, for I have so long time enured my hands to pilfering, that now I cannot forbear it: will this be accepted as a good plea to save him from the Gallows. Again, it is observed that men are naturally prone to run upon the committing of things forbidden them; Gens humana ruit per vetitum nefas: & nitimur in vetitum: yet this is no just excuse. Last; as for faith, it is well known that Divines distinguish between fides acquisita, and fides infusa; that we may call a faith naturally acquired, which is found in carnal persons, whether profane or Hypocritical: and this is a faith inspired by God's spirit. The object of each is all one, and a Man may suffer Martyrdom for the one as well as for the other, which manifesteth the pertinacious adherence thereunto. And it appears that all professions have had their Martyrs; Ucali Fartax a Portuguese borne, endured the Galleys fourteen years, rather than he would turn Turk; yet at length he became a Turk, and only in spleen to be revenged on a Turk, who had given him a box on the ear, and became a great man amongst them: And at the famous battle of Lepanto, he alone maintained his Squadron entire, and beat the Christians. But to return, albeit it be not in the power of nature to believe fide infusâ, yet is it in the power of nature to believe the Gospel fide acquisitâ, which depends partly upon a man's education, and partly upon reason, considering the credibility of the Christian way, by light of natural observations, above all other ways in the World. And when men refuse to embrace the Gospel, not so much because of the credibility of it, but because it is not congruous to their natural affections, as our Saviour tells the Jews, Light came into the World, and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds are evil: Is there joh. 3. any reason why their condemnation should be any whit the easier for this? Neither have I ever read, or heard it taught by any, that men shall be damned for not believing fide infusâ, which is as much as to say, because God hath not regenerated them; but either because they have refused to believe, or else if they have embraced the Gospel, for not living answerable thereunto, which also is in their power, quoad exteriorem vitae emendationem, though it be not in their power to regenerate their wills, and change their hearts, any more than it is to illuminate their minds: yet I never read that any man's damnation, was any whit the more increased for not performing these acts. Thus far I have been content to expatiate in the way of reasonable discourse, to meet with this Disputer in his own element; though every sober Christian (I should think) should rest satisfied with the word of God, which both teacheth us that the natural man perceiveth not the things of God, neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned, & that all men are found dead in trespasses and sins, before the spirit of regeneration comes, that men cannot believe, that they cannot repent, that they that are in the flesh cannot please God; and that a man hardened cannot obey; and yet withal, that God doth command faith, repentance, and obedience, and complains of default in performance. And if any man charge such courses as unjust, what is the Apostles course in meeting with such imputations, but either to show, that the word attributes such a course to God, and therefore it cannot be unjust, as Rom. 9 14. What shall we say then, is there unrighteousness with God? God forbid, for he saith to Moses, I will have compassion on him, on whom I will have compassion, and I will show mercy on him, to whom I will show mecy: or to fly to the consideration of the Lords dominion over all, as Creator over his creatures. I come to his second reason. 2. And that is, because it is impossible that they should believe, they want power to believe, and must want it still. God hath decreed they shall have none to their dying day. I answer: This argument is the very same with the former, not so much as differently dr●st, or cram bis cocta, and therefore my former answer will serve in every particular. Yet add this also, this impossibility is only upon supposition of God's Decree, which nothing hinders the liberty of the creature, in doing freely what he doth, and freely leaving undone what he doth not, as appears manifestly by divers instances. For upon supposition of God's decree, that not a bone of Christ should be broken, it was impossible they should be broken: yet who doubts, but that the Soldiers did as freely abstain from the john 19 33, 36. breaking of Christ's bones, as they did freely break the others bones? And the Text notes the reason why they broke not Christ's bones, to wit, because they saw he was dead already. In like sort upon supposition of God's decree, that Josiah by name should burn the Prophet's bones upon the Altar: Cyrus by name should build him a City, and let go his captives; it was impossible that it should be otherwise: yet I think no wise man doubts but that Josiah did the one, and Cyrus the other, as freely as they did any thing in their lives. And therefore this Author doth miserably overlash in the element of his Philosophy, and rational discourse, in saying, a man in justice can be tied to believe no more, than a man can be bound to fly like a Bird, or to reach heaven with the top of his finger. He might as well say, that because God had determined that the Soldiers should not break Christ's bones, therefore they had no more power to break Christ's bones, than they had power to fly like a Bird, or to reach Heaven with the top of their finger. Certainly there is no man but by grace may be enabled to believe: but never was any man known to affirm, that by grace a man may be enabled to fly like a Bird, or to reach Heaven with the top of his finger. If this be not miserably to overreach, I know not what is. As for his rule, Nemo obligatur ad impossibile, judge I pray of the truth of it by this; What if a man by a vicious conversation, hath made it as impossible for him to do good, as it is impossible for a Blackamoor to change his skin, or jer. 13. 27. a Leopard his spots; Shall he therefore be obliged no longer to do good? And as by our own sins committed by our persons, so by the sin of Adam, which was the sin of our nature, upon the whole nature of man was this impotency brought, as the Scriptures teach, and none that I know were known in the days of Austin, to deny, but the Plagians. I come to the Third. 3. Now this depends upon a notorious confusion of things that differ. For I have showed, how the Lord hath given them a sufficient object of that faith, which he requires of them, as touching Christ's dying for them; namily, to believe that Christ hath merited the pardon of sin, and salvation for as many as believe in him, in such sort, that if all, and every one throughout the World should believe in him; they should be saved by him. And this depends merely upon the sufficiency of Christ's merits, and undoubtedly it was the will of God, that Christ's merits should be of such a value, as was sufficient for the salvation of all, and every one: otherwise it were not true, that if all and every one should believe in Christ, they should be saved by the virtue of Christ merits. But as for any obligation to believe that Christ died to procure faith and repentance for all and every one; I never yet heard or read of any Arminian, that he believed it. Nay in their Apologia Remonstrantium, or Censura Censurae, they plainly profess, that Christ died not at all to merit faith, and regeneration for any. In like sort it is not credible to me, that any Arminian believes, that Christ died for any so, as to procure pardon of sin and salvation absolutely for him, whether he believe or no, provided that he live to be capable of faith and repentance, and to enjoy the Gospel, and the Preaching of Christ crucified. And like as it is no lie, but truth, that Christ died to procure salvation, to as many as believe in him, so in being obliged to believe this, or punished for not believing it, is neither to be obliged to the believing of a lie, nor punished for not believing it. Therefore it is false to say there is no such matter. For look in what sense they are bound to believe that Christ died for them, in the same sense it is most true, that Christ died for them; they are bound to believe that Christ died to procure salvation for every one that believeth: and it is most true, that in like manner, Christ hath procured the salvation of every one that believes: so that here is a truth to feed upon, and they that oppose it, are strengthened in their vain confidence by a mere mist of confusion, which they raise unto themselves and others, that so they may set the better face upon that lie, which they hold in their right hand, wherewith they are so enamoured that they had rather forsake their own mercies, then forgo it. And so I come to the third and last reason in general drawn from God's justice. DISCOURSE. SUBSECT. III. THe third reason why absolute Reprobation infringeth God's justice is, because it will have him to punish men for the omission of an act, which is made impossible unto them by his own decree, not by that decree alone whereby he determined to give them no power to believe, having lost it, but by that decree also, by which he purposeth that we should partake with Adam in his sin, and be stripped of all that supernatural power, which we had by God's free grant, bestowed upon us in Adam before the fall: These are my reasons which move me to think, that this absolute decree is repugnant to God's justice. TWISSE Consideration. I Have already showed how God's decree and impossibility arising upon supposition thereof, doth no way prejudice the liberty of the creature, as by pregnant passages of the Scripture is made plain unto us. And as for the other decree here spoken of; First it is untrue which he supposeth, that, God by a special decree decreed all mankind to be made partakers of Adam's sin, and therein to be stripped of all supernatural power, which before the had by God's free grant. For if it were just with God to decree, that Adam's nature, upon his sinning, should be bereft of all supernatural power, which formerly he enjoyed, this and this alone should suffice to bereave all his posterity of supernatural power to do that which is good. For seeing all his posterity did receive their natures from Adam after his fall, they must therewithal necessarily receive their natures from him, bereft of all supernatural power unto that which is good, until such time, as God be pleased of his free grace to restore it by regeneration. 2. Is it not good reason that God, for Adam's sin, should bereave us of all supernatural power in Adam, as of his mere grace he did adorn us all with supernatural power in Adam? 3. Notwithstanding this depravation of supernatural power in Adam, yet we acknowledge that nevertheless, whatsoever sin a man commits, he committeth freely: and the School hath taught it before us, Aquin. p. 1. q. 23. art. 3. ad. 3. licet aliquis non possit gratiam adipisci qui reprobatur a Deo, tamen quòd in hoc peccatum vel illud labatur, ex ejus libero arbitrio contingit, undè & merito sibi imputatur in culpam. DISCOURSE. SUBSECT. IV. TWo things are usually answered. First, that there are many things delivered for truths in Scripture, (among which this is one) which are above the reach of humane capacity, and therefore are we quietly to submit, as to other revealed truths, so to this, and not to be so bold as to examine the justice of this decree, or any thing else in it, by our shallow and erring understandings. But this answer takes not away the arguments, for I have these things to reply. 1. That though there be divers things revealed in God's word, which are above reason, viz. That there are three Persons and one God; and that Christ was borne of a Virgin; that the world was made of nothing, that the dead shall be raised, etc. to all which we must captivate our understandings, and yield a firm assent propter authoritatem dicentis: yet there is nothing revealed therein, abhorring from, and odious to sound and right reason; for it cannot be, that the most excellent gifts of God, Faith and Reason, Nature and Scripture should overthrow one another: and that the wise God, who is the fountain of all right reason, should discover any thing to us in his word, or enjoin us any thing to be believed, which is vere 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, truly and properly unreasonable. Our faith is an act of our service of God, and God's service is cultus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a reasonable service. Rom. 12. 2. and God's word is also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, milk reasonable and without guile; they are so called, no doubt, to show that there is a sweet harmony between faith and reason, things revealed, and men's understandings: though there be a disproportion, yet there is no contradiction between them. 2. That therefore all those Doctrines which are adverse and repugnant to understandings, purged from prejudice and false principles, are not to be taken for doctrines of Scripture, but devices of men corrupting Scripture by false glosses and interpretations, and consequently, that this absolute reprobation of so many millions of miserable men, out of Gods only will and pleasure, because it is most irksome to the ears and understandings of all sorts of men best and worst, that stand indifferent to the entertainment of any truths, that may appear to be so, is no doctrine of the Text, no part of the word of God. 3. That howbeit some things in Scripture, which are peculiar to the Gospel, are above our understandings, and must without hesitation be believed, yet there are many things there, which have their foundation in nature, and may be apprehended by the light of nature, and demonstrated by reason; and among these things the justice of God's ways is one, as I have showed before out of Isaiah 5. 3. and Ezek. 18. and it is but a mere evasion, when the absolute decree is proved by sound reasons to be unjust, to say, reason is blind, and must not be judge, but the Scripture only: for God offers the justice of his ways to the trial of reason. TWISSE Consideration. THis Author seems to swell, in the conceit of his rational performances, as if never any fly sitting upon a cartwheel in a Summer's day had made such a dust as he had made. And fashioning to himself a victorious conquest, as if all his adversaries were but Pigmies to this Anakim, glad to run into corners, or into Acorn-cups to hide themselves there. For his reasons like some hobgoblins, do so fright them, more than all the spirits that stand by the naked man in the book of Moons: And therefore all the help they have, if we believe this Pyrgopolinices is to charm them, by saying, that many things are delivered in Scripture, which are above the reach of humane capacity, among which this is one, etc. And I take this to be sound. For otherwise, 1 Tim. 3. 16; why should the Doctrine of Godliness, be called a mystery of Godliness. And the Schools teach, that Fides est assensus inevidens: and Cajetan who was no grasshopper, as great an Anakim as this Author, or his familiar spirit takes himself to be, spares not to profess, that about the reconciling of God's predestination with the liberty of man's will (a point that comes so near to this in hand as a point can do) there are many distinctions devised by the learned, but yet he saith of them, that they did not qutetare intellectum, and therefore that he did captivare suum in obsequium fidei: and Alvarez, no dwarf neither in Scholastical, that is, rational Divinity, addeth that herein Cajetan piissimè & doctissimè loquitur. But who they are, that have taken notice, of those arguments here specified, and at the sight of them were so stoned, as at the sight of some Medusa's head, and thereupon came to this course of incantation or pacification, he doth very wisely conceal, and like a man of authority, puts it upon us to take it upon his word. Yet I do not remember that I have rested myself upon any such course, though the holy Apostle thinks it sufficient to clear any course of God from injustice, by proving that Scripture doth attribute such a course unto God, as I have showed out of Rom. 9 14. It is true, the spirit which this Author breaths, is the right Pelagian spirit, according to the Pelagians in Bradwardines' days: for their vaunt was, that they could not be refuted by any reason Philosophical, but only by certain naked authorities Theological, (as I have heard of a Scholar, sometimes challenged by a friend and kinsman of his, for being given (as he heard) to the Arminian Tenet, made a ready answer with protestation, that that opinion was very plausible, but that St Paul was against it.) And therefore Bradwardine undertakes to confute them by reason Philosophical; so far off was he from being cowed with their vain boasts and brags. His words are these; Sicut antiqui Pelagiani ventoso nomine secularium scientiarum inflati consistorium Theologicum contemnentes Philosophicum flagitabant; ita & moderni. Audivi namque quosdam advocatos Pelagii, licet multum provectos in sacris apicibus; affirmantes Pelagium nusquam potuisse convinci per naturalem & Philosophicam rationem; sed vix arguebatur utcunque, per quasdam authoritates Theologicas, maxim autem per authoritatem Ecclesiae, quae Satrapis non placebat: Quapr opter per rationes & authoritates Philosophicas ipsos disposui reformare. And for my part, though I affect not in those points, to go beyond Scripture and Christian reason, yet I am content to be led whethersoever my adversary thinks good to lead me: And as a Scholar of my acquaintance being left handed, and accordingly casting his cloak over the right shoulder, was answered by a Citizen observing it, when he enquired his way, saying, when you shall come to such a place, you must turn on your right hand, meaning indeed, on the left; so likewise I am nothing afraid of this man's Philosophy, nor his Abettors neither, nothing doubting, but as many as I find opposing this divine truth, which we maintain, their best dexterity, in Philosophical and rational discourse, will prove but a left handed Philosophy: and in this very field of argumentation, I purpose to lay upon him ere we part. But let us first consider the things that he replies. 1. He saith, There is nothing in Scripture abhorring from sound and right reason, he adds, Odious too: as if his Philosophy had taught him, that it is the part of reason to hate, and not rather of affections. This rule when we were initiates in the University, we were soon acquainted with: Yet this Author to vent his fullness, casts himself upon an unnecessary proof thereof, and the mischief is, that his proof maketh his cause worse than it was before. For having formerly made the comparison between the word of God, and sound and right reason; in his reason he states the comparison between faith and reason, nature and Scripture, not distinguishing between nature corrupt, and uncorrupt, reason corrupt and uncorrupt. Our service of God is reasonable, in as much as it is performed by reasonable creatures, and the rule thereof is not Rom. 12. 1. natural reason, but merely the word of God. In whom was natural reason more eminent, then in Philosophers? Yet were they wont to be called Haereticorum Patriarchae: and the Apostle hath profess of all such, that the things of God seem foolishness unto them, 1 Cor. 2. 14. Now I pray consider soberly, how reasonable such courses are judged to be, which are accounted foolishness, and what a sweet harmony there is between things revealed, and men's understandings; and whether reasonable, and foolish, be not a plain contradiction; as well as wise, and foolish. If we enjoy a more pure and refined reason than they, let us give illumination Divine the glory of it: and say with him in Job, verily there is a spirit in man, but the illumination of the Almighty giveth understanding. And seeing the word of God, is the only means of Divine illumination, let job. 32. 8. us thank God's word for all. I come to the second Material of his reply. 2. And that is this, that all those Doctrine which are adverse and repugnant to understandings purged from prejudice and false principles, are not to be taken for Doctrines of Scripture, but devices of men, corrupting Scripture by false glosses and interpretations. No marvel that when men oppose the mysteries of Godliness, they fall upon the mysteries of iniquity. Here we have a rule given to try whether a Doctrine proposed, be to be taken for a Doctrine of Scripture yea or no? And mark it well, I beseech you, and I desire that every sober man will mark it well, and judge whether it deserve not to be numbered amongst the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the depths of Satan: And withal judge whether the pretended Author of this discourse, can in any probability be the Author of this, and whether it becomes not rather some old beaten Soldier in Arminianism, that takes upon him to be the Master and Dictator of Sentences. About Regula fidei, the rule of Faith, there is much question between us and Papists; the meaning whereof is, what that is whereinto must be made the last resolution of our Faith? We say it is the word of God contained in the Books of the Old Testament and the New; Papists say, it is the voice of the Church. This Author deviseth a new way, which I think was never heard off before, except among the Socinians, namely, that it is the judgement of understandings purged from prejudice and false Principles. For albeit the Doctrine of Faith, we judge to be contained no where, but in God's word, yet notwithstanding as touching the meaning of it, nothing must be taken to be the true meaning of Scripture, how fairly soever grounded thereupon in show, unless withal it seem nothing repugnant to understandings purged from prejudice and false principles. Into this therefore must be made the last resolution of our faith. Again, where shall we meet with these judges as they are here described, to wit, as having their understandings purged from prejudice and false principles: undoubtedly, like as the Church of Rome, when they have once brought the matter hitherto, that the last resolution of faith, must be made into the voice of the Church, are confident enough, that when the question is made of the voice of the Church, where that is to be found, they shall undoubtedly be able to carry it for the Church of Rome: So these Arminians, or Socinians rather, when they have once brought the matter to this pass, that the last resolution of our faith must be made into the judgement of men's understandings purged from prejudice and false principles; and that the question beginneth to be made of understandings thus purified, where they are to be found, they will be so favourable to themselves, as to conceive, that such understandings are to be found no where, but amongst the nation of the Arminians; or at least among such, whose judgements are naturally inclined towards their Tenets. But is this a decent course to rest in the judgement of any man's understanding, whereas the soundness of his understanding is not, nor cannot be discerned, but by the strength of his argument: and again, considering the judgement of man is miserably corrupted in such sort, as that the things of God seem foolishness unto them, Is it not much fitter that we should judge of every man's understanding by God's word, which cannot err, rather than judge of the meaning of the word by the understanding of man? Let any man use his understanding in opening and interpreting the word of God unto us, and clearing the meaning thereof unto us as much as he can, by reason, by argument, by demonstration, but still let it be indifferent for any to judge, in what congruity his interpretation stands with the Text itself, and no man's judgement to be a rule of Faith unto others. Before he goes off from this, he gives another description of those, whose judgements must be the rule of the right interpretation of Scripture; to wit, such as stand indifferent to the entertainment of any truths. Now this seems to me to be as poor as the former, or rather much poorer. For this indifferency as I take it, is in respect of affections; now albeit a man may be thus disposed, in respect of his affections, yet he may be of a very weak judgement; as for example, I have heard of a good man, that was sometimes wavering about the point of Ceremonies, yet very willing to receive information; and therefore confers with both sides, as well such as held them lawful in the use, as with those that held them unlawful, and still was carried every way with the force of their reasons, who conferred with him for the present. Then again, suppose the indifferent were most fit to judge, where shall we find those indifferent persons, or who shall give rules, and what rules, according whereto to proceed in this our inquisition? Again, who are to be presupposed in likelihood, to be the more indifferent, than such as have not hitherto been versed in these controversies, and is it fit, that they who have been many years versed in them, should stand to the judgement of those who are little or nothing exercised therein? Lastly is the creature fit to judge of the Sovereignty of his creator, or being conceived of the freedom of his own will, to judge how far it is reasonable, God should have power over his will and no farther? When the Apostle calls upon the Corinthians, to judge whether that which he wrote unto them, were the commandments of God or no, whom doth he call unto this office? Doth he call any other but such as are spiritual? If there be any amongst you that is a Prophet, or spiritual, let him know that these things are the commandments of God. 1 Cor. 14. He doth not say, if there be any amongst you, that hath his understanding purged from prejudice, and false principles, let him know that these things which I write unto you, are the commandments of God. And the same Apostle tells us, that the things of God are spiritually to be discerned. 1 Cor. 2. 14. Yet it is remarkable, that he appeals to the judgement not of the best only, but the worst also in this: but something qualified I confess, to wit, provided that they stand indifferent to the entertainment of any truths. Mark it well, of any truths: and who are these? Not possessed with the entertainment of any Truths, but indifferent to the entertainment of them, I say who are these? The regenerate or unregenerate? Here I am at a stand, not knowing which way to take. But it may be this is spoken only in reference to our Doctrine of absolute Reprobation. But of whatsoever it be spoken, let him give instance in either or in both; it seems he is indifferent to have it take place either way, for he proposed it of best and worst. But why should he presuppose an unregenerate man to be indifferent, to the entertainment of any truth? Whereas the Apostle professeth of a natural man, that he cannot know the things of God, and he gives the reason of it, because they are spiritually discerned; and formerly said that they were foolishness unto him. Yet I willingly confess, the Doctrine of absolute Reprobation, is very harsh to the judgement and affections of carnal men; and such as we had never embraced, had it not been for the word of God, which plainly professeth, that election is not of (good) works; and that by such an argument, as whereby it is manifest, Rom. 9 11. 1. That election is as well proved not to be of faith, as not of works. 2. That reprobation is not of evil works; yet the harshness hereof, is nothing like so much appearing in its proper colours, as upon their deciphering and blazing of it, who are as zealous for making election to be upon foresight of faith and works (though this latter member, they are loath to have the World take notice of) as they are opposite to the absoluteness of reprobation. Now whereas before I have showed, that there is a great deal of difference between absolute election unto salvation, and election unto salvation absolute: And that not one of our Divines doth maintain, that God doth elect men unto salvation absolute, but to obtain salvation upon their faith and repentance, and final perseverance therein: In like sort there is as great difference between absolute reprobation unto damnation, and reprobation unto damnation absolute. And if none of our Divines do maintain, that God ordains any man of ripe years to obtain salvation, otherwise then upon their faith and repentance, and final perseverance: how much less do they maintain, that God ordains any man unto damnation, otherwise then for his sin and final perseverance therein without repentance? Whereas these enemies of the grace of God, as Saint Austin sometimes called the Pelagians, to make their cause more plausible to the affections or carnal men carry the matter so, as if we maintained that God ordained them to be damned absolutely, and for the mere pleasure of God, concealing the only cause for which God ordained, that they should be damned, namely, for the wilful transgression of God's holy Commandments. Only the giving and denying of the grace of regeneration, the giving of faith and repentance, for the curing of that natural infidelity and impenitency that is found in all; and the leaving it uncured by denying faith and repentance: this indeed we maintain to be absolute, according to that of Saint Paul, he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. Rom. 9 18. Now, dare any of them deny faith and repentance to be the gift of God? They do not, they dare not; only of late they have come thus far, as to deny that Christ merited faith and regeneration for any. Secondly, inquire whether God gives faith and repentance to some, and denies it to others of his mere will and pleasure, or because he finds some good works in the one, which he finds not in the other. Here is the critical point, we defend no other absoluteness of election and reprobation, but such as depends wholly on this, namely, that God finding men equal in corruption, hath compassion on some, giving them faith and repentance, which he denies unto others: All other absoluteness of Election and Reprobation, besides that which we undertake by clear demonstration to deduce herehence, we utterly renounce. Neither can our adversaries be so grossly ignorant, as not to perceive that this is the critical point of these controversies, the resolution of the truths wherein, will set an end to all contention about Election and Reprobation. Why then do they not deal plainly, and try their strength in this, whereby they should carry themselves fairly and ingenuously, and deal above board. For here alone is that absoluteness of God in execution, which we maintain; but here they are not so prone to show their horns: this argument is not so fit for the raising of clamours and Tragedies. And hating the truth of God as touching his sovereignty over his creatures, to have compassion on whom he will, and to harden whom he will; as also the prerogatives of his grace, to work us effectually to that which is pleasing in his fight, and that in whom he will also: yet not daring plainly to deliver their mind in this, as wherein they are found most absurd, and encumbered with shameful contradictions; therefore by the back door as it were, they hope to discredit it, and by opposing the absoluteness of Reprobation, to supplant and undermine the Doctrine of God's free grace. And not content with this, they miserably corrupt our doctrine also, in the point of absolute Reprobation, drawing it to this; as if not reprobation only, but damnation also were made absolute by us: and that God damned men not so much in the way of justice for their sin, as of his own mere pleasure. At length to come to the third particular of his reply. 3. And that is this, that howbeit some things in Scripture, which are peculiar to the Gospel, are above our understandings, and must without hesitation be believed: yet many things there, have their foundation in nature, and may be apprehended by the light of nature; and amongst these, the justice of God's ways is one, as hath been showed. Isai 5. 3. and Ezek. 18. To this I answer, That the ways of God mentioned Isai. 5. 3. is only in his expecting fruits after so great pains that he had taken, in husbanding his vineyard. And Ezek. 18. consists only in rendering unto men according to their ways. Neither doth it follow, that because the justice of God doth plainly appear in these particulars, therefore it doth appear as clearly, or comprehensively in all others. Is there no difference between the ways of God there mentioned, and the ways of God's justice mentioned in other place; as namely, in causing the Sons of Achan to be stoned to death with Achan himself, for his Sacrilege: in drowning the old World, not sparing the very Infants and sucklings: and for their conspiracy against Moses and Aaron, causing the earth to swallow up not Dathan and Abiram only, but their Wives and Children, and all that they had? So in consuming Sodom and Gomorrah with fire. And as for the punishing of of sin, this is no peculiar truth of the Gospel. I had thought the Gospel, in the proper nature thereof, had been above reason altogether, and no way capable of demonstration. And as for the justice of God, must not this suppose him to be a free agent? Or was this known to Aristotle by all the light of nature whereunto he attained? We that believe him to be a free agent, and withal the creator of all, are ready to demonstrate, that it is in his power to do what he will with his creature, and that not only to annihilate him, though never so holy, but to inflict what pain soever upon him, yea even the torment of hell fire; which Medina acknowledgeth to have been Communem omnium Theologorum sententiam, viz. that this he can do, ut Dominus vitae & mortis; as I have showed in my Vindiciae graciae Dei, and by variety of arguments proved it, more than once in two several digressions, which this Author pretends to have seen, yet answereth not one of them. And as for justice divine toward the creature (whereupon this Author doth with such confidence discourse,) both Vasquez and Suarez Jesuits, in other points concerning God's justice, are miserably at odds, yet jointly concur in this, that all justice Divine, doth presuppose the free determination of Gods will: Now, because I find this Gentleman, so conceited of the purity of his rational faculty, and the power thereof, as to require that all interpretation of Scripture, should veil bonnet to the sovereignty thereof; I purpose to try his ability this way, for the expediting of certain arguments about the absoluteness of God's decrees in general, and particularly of the decree of Reprobation. Therefore to combat with him on his own ground, and in his own element, I dispute thus. 1. No temporal thing can be the cause of that which is eternal, but the sins of men are all temporal, whereas Reprobation is eternal, therefore the sins of men cannot be the cause of Reprobation. If it be said, that sin is not made the cause of reprobation, but as it exists in God's foresight, and so not so much sin as the prescience of sin is the cause of reprobation. I reply, that this device cannot stand, viz. that the prescience of sin should be the cause of reprobation, and that for this reason; The cause of reprobation whereof we inquire, is of the nature of a meritorious cause, But the prescience of God can no way be said to be a meritorious cause thereof. Science and prescience are causes of God's works in the kind of an efficient Physical, not in the kind of an efficient moral, such as are all causes meritorious. If it be farther said, that not so much the foresight of sin, as (to speak more properly) sin foreseen is the cause of reprobation: I reply against it in this manner; sin foreseen doth suppose God's decree to permit sin, and consequently if sin foreseen be before reprobation, than also the decree of permitting sin is before the decree of reprobation, that is, the decree of damning for sin. But this cannot be, as I endeavour to prove by two reasons. The first is this; There is no order in intentions, but between the intention of the end and the intention of the means, and the order is this, that the intention of the end is before the intention of the means. Therefore if the decree of permitting sin be before the decree of damning for sin, the decree of permitting sin must be the intention of the end, and the decree of damning for sin must be the intention of the means. But this is notoriously untrue: For it is apparent that damnation tends not to the permission of sin, as the end thereof; for if it did then men were damned to this end, that they might be permitted to sin. But far more likely it is, that sin should be permitted to this end, that a man might be damned, which yet by no means do I a vouch; other reasons I have, to show the vanity of this argumentation. I rather profess, that permssion of sin and damnation are not subordinate as end & means, but coordinate, both being means tending jointly to a farther end, which, under correction from understandings purged from prejudice and false principles, I take to be the manifestation of God's glory in the way of justice vindicative. 2. My second reason is, if permission of sin be first in intention and then damnation, it follows that permission of sin should be last in execution; but this is most absurd, namely, that a man should be first damned, and then suffered to sin. 2. My second principal argument is this; Reprobation, as it signifies God's decree, is the act of Gods will; now the act of Gods will is the very will of God, and the will of God is God's essence, and like as there can be no cause of God's essence, so there can be no cause of God's will, or of the act thereof. Upon some such arguments as these, Aquinas disputes, that the predestination of Christ, cannot be the cause of our Predestination; adding that they are one act in God. And when he comes to the resolution of the question, he grants all as touching actum volentis, that the one cannot be the cause of the other; But only quoad praedestinationis terminum, which is grace and glory, or the things predestinated. Christ is the cause of them, but not of our predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating. And I think I may be bold to presume, that Christ's merits are of as great force to be the cause, why God should elect man unto salvation; as man's sins are of force, to be the cause why God should reprobate him unto damnation. The same Aquinas (a tall fellow as touching scholastical argumentation) hath professed that no man hath been so mad as to say that merits are the cause of predestination, quoad actum praedestinantis; and why, but because there can be no cause on man's part of the will of God quoad actum volentis. Now reprobation is well known to be the will of God as well as election; and therefore no cause can there be on man's part thereof quoad actum reprobantis. And it is well known, there is a predestination unto death, as well as unto life, and consequently 'tis as mad a thing in his judgement to maintain, that merits are the cause there of quoad actum praedestinantis God by efficacious grace could break off any man's infidelity if it pleased him, that is, by affording him such a motion unto faith, as he foresaw would be yielded unto: this is easily proved by the evident confession of Arminius formerly specified. Now, Why doth God so order it, as to move some in such a manner, as he foresees they will believe; others in such a manner as he foresees they will not believe? but because his purpose is to manifest the glory of his grace in the salvation of the one, and the glory of his justice in the damnation of the other. Herein I appeal to the judgement and conscience of every reasonable creature that understands it, in spite of all prejudice and false principles to corrupt him. 4. In saying sin foreseen is the cause of God's decree of damnation, they presuppose a prescience of sin, as of a thing future, without all ground. For nothing can be foreknown as future, unless it be future: now these disputers presuppose a futurition of sin, and that from eternity, without all ground. For consider, no sin is future in its own nature, for in its own nature it is merely possible and indifferent, as well not to be future, as to become future; and therefore it cannot pass out of the condition of a thing merely possible, into the condition of a thing future without a cause. Now what cause do these men devise of the futurition of sin? Extra Deum, nothing can be the cause thereof: For this passage of things out of the condition of things possible, into the condition of things future, was from everlasting, for from everlasting they were future; otherwise, God could not have known them from everlasting, And consequently the cause of this passage, must be acknowledged to have been from everlasting, and consequently nothing without God could be the cause of it, seeing nothing without God was from everlasting. Therefore the cause hereof must be found intra Deum, within God; then either the will of God, which these men do utterly disclaim, or the knowledge of God; but that is confessed to presuppose things future, rather than to make them so; or the essence of God; now that may be considered either as working necessarily, (and if in that manner it were the cause of things future, than all such things should become future by necessity of nature, which to say is Atheistical) or as working freely; and this is to grant, that the will of God is the cause why every thing merely possible in its own nature doth pass from everlasting into the condition of a thing future, if so be it were future at all. And indeed seeing no other cause can be pitched upon, this free will of God must be acknowledged to be the cause of it: And consequently the reason why every thing becomes future is, because God hath determined it shall come to pass; but with this difference, All good things God hath determined shall come to pass by his effection, All evil things God hath determined shall come to pass by his permission. And the Scripture naturally affords plentiful testimony to confirm this, without forcing it to interpretations congruous hereunto, upon presumptuous grounds that these arguments proceed from understandings purged from prejudice and false principles. 5. My fifth argument is this. If sin be the cause of Reprobation, that is, of the decree of damnation, then either by necessity of nature, or by the constitution of God; not by necessity of nature, as all, that hitherto I have known confess. But I say neither can it be by the free constitution of God; for mark what a notorious absurdity followeth hence, and that avoidable, namely, that God did ordain, that upon foresight of sin, he would ordain them to damnation; mark it well, God did ordain that he would ordain, or God did decree that he would decree. In which words Gods eternal decree is made the object of God's decree. Whereas it is well known that the objects of God's decrees are merely things temporal, and cannot be things eternal: we truly say God did decree to create the World, to preserve the World, to redeem us, call us, justify us, sanctify and save us, but it cannot be truly said, that God did decree to decree, or ordain to ordain: for to decree is the act of Gods will, and therefore it cannot be the object of the act of Gods will. Yet these arguments I am not so enamoured with, as to force the interpretations of Scripture to such a sense, as is suitable hereunto, presuming of the purity of my understanding, as purged from prejudice and false principles. I could willingly content myself with observation of the Apostles discourse, in arguing to this effect; Before the Children were borne, or had done good or evil, it was said the elder shall serve the younger: therefore the purpose of God according to election Rom. 9 11. stands not of works. In like manner may I discourse: Before the Children were borne or had done good or evil, it was said the elder shall serve the younger: therefore the purpose of God concerning Reprobation stands not of works. And like as hence it is inferred, that therefore election stands not of good works; so therehence may I infer, that therefore reprobation stands not of evil works. 6. If sin foreseen be the cause meritorious of reprobation, than faith and repentance and good works are the disposing causes unto election. For therefore evil works foreseen are made the meritorious cause of reprobation, because evil works exsistent, are the meritorious cause of damnation. And if this be true, then also because Faith and Repentance and good works, are the disposing causes unto salvation, then by the same force of reason, faith, repentance, and good works foreseen, must be the disposing cause unto election; But faith, repentance, and good works foreseen, are not the disposing causes unto election; as I prove thus. 1. If they were then the purpose of God according to election, should be of faith, repentance, and good works, which is expressly denied by the Apostle, as touching the last part; and may as evidently be proved to be denied by him in effect of the other parts also, by the same force of argumentation which he useth: as for example, from this anticedent of the Apostles, before the Children were borne, or had done good or evil, it no more evidently followeth that therefore the purpose of God according to election is not of works, than it followeth that the same purpose of God according to election is not of faith, nor of repentance: For before they were borne they were no more capable of faith, or of repentance, than of any other good works. And undoubtedly faith and repentance are as good works, as any other. 2. If God doth absolutely work faith in some, and not in others according to the mere pleasure of his will, than it cannot be said, that faith foreseen, is the cause of any man's election. For in this case faith is rather the means of salvation, than salvation a means of faith; and consequently, the intention of salvation rather precedes the intention of faith, than the intention of faith can be said to precede the intention of salvation. And to this the Scripture accords, Acts 1348. As many believed as were ordained to everlasting life, making ordination to everlasting life the cause why men believed; answerable hereunto is that Acts 2. last. God added daily to the Church such as should be saved: and that of Paul to Titus, according to the faith of Gods elect: So that according to Paul's phrase fides est electorum, but according to the Arminians Doctrine the inverse hereof is a more proper and natural predication, as to say, electio est fidelium. But God doth absolutely work faith in some men, according to the mere pleasure of his will, denying the same grace to others: which I prove; 1. By Scripture. Rom. 9 18. God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth, compared with Rom. 11. 30. Ye in times past have not believed, but now have obtained mercy; where it appears by the Antithesis, that to find mercy is to believe, that is, to obtain the grace of faith at the hands of God, in Saint Paul's phrase. 2. By clear reason: for if it be not the mere pleasure of Gods will, that is the cause hereof, than the cause hereof must be some good works, which he finds in some, and not in others; whence it manifestly followeth, that God giveth grace according unto works, which in the phrase of the ancients is according to merits: and for 1200 years together, this hath been reputed in the Church of God mere Pelagianism. 2. I further demand, what that good work is, whereupon God works it in one, when he refuseth to work it in another? Here the answer I find given is this, that God doth work in man 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 velle credere modo velit. Now of the absurdity hereof, I appeal to the very light of nature, and let all the books that ever were written on this argument be searched, and let it be enquired, whether ever any did express themselves in the manner of so palpable and gross absurdity: as wherein the act of willing is made the condition of itself: whence it followeth evidently, that it must be both before itself, and after itself; for the condition must always exist before the thing conditionated. Yet they are driven upon these rocks of absurdities in spite of their teeth: so shameful is the issue of their discourses, who, in hatred of God's truth revealed in God's word, and in a proud conceit of their own performances in the way of argumentation, dare prescribe rules to all others, how to carry themselves in the interpretation of Scriptures; as namely, to be so wary, as that they do not deliver any thing, repugnant to understandings purged from prejudice and false principles: as if the word of God supposed them that are admitted to the studying thereof, to have their understandings already purged from prejudice and false principles: not that it is given by God for this very end, namely, to purge our understandings: for what is the illumination or opening of the eyes of the mind, other than the purging of the understanding from prejudice and false principles: and how miserable these aerial disputers do betray themselves, and manifest how they are transported with prejudice, and corrupted not with false only, but gross principles, by this it may appear in part. I come to the consideration of his reply to the second answer, which here he represents. DISCOURSE. SUBSECT. V. SEcondly it is answered, that God is not bound to restore men power to believe, because they once had it, and have lost it through their own fault; as a Master is not bound to renew his Servants stock, if he have wasted it by his bad husbandry. But this answer doth yet satisfy me as little as the former: for I grant that God is simply and absolutely bound to no man, he is agens liberrimum, a most free dispenser of his own favours, both what he will, and to whom he will; but yet he is conditionally; determinavit seipsum, he hath bound himself to give supernatural abilities to men by three things. 1. First Decernendo, the Almighty is eternally subject to his own decree, or else he would be mutable; and therefore what gifts soever he hath decreed to men, he is bound to give them by virtue of his decree. 2. Secondly Promittendo. We use to say promise is debt, it is justice to perform what it was free to promise; and whosoever he be that promiseth, and payeth not, is guilty of a trespass (witness Ananias and Saphira) and unworthy of the Kingdom of Heaven. Psal. 15. 4. If therefore God hath made a promise of any gift or grace to men, this promise binds him to performance. 3. Thirdly Legem ferendo. By giving men a Law to keep, which without supernatural power, they cannot keep any more than they can eat a rock. By such a Law the Almighty lawgiver binds himself to his creatures, to give them such power as may enable them to keep that law, or else he becomes the true and proper cause of the transgression of it. We shall find God evermore giving strength, when he giveth a command: when he commanded the creatures to increase and multiply, he gave them a multiplying virtue. when Christ bid the lame man arise, take up his bed, and walk, he puts into his limbs an ability of walking: when Adam had a spiritual law given him to obey, which without spiritual strength he could not, God gave him strength answerable to the law, as all Divines agree, consenting to that noted speech of Austin, that Adam had posse non cadere, though he never had non posse cadere; a power and possibility, though not a necessity of continuing in obedience. That I may bring this home to my purpose. I say that God is bound to restore unto men, power to believe, supposing these ways that follow. 1. That he hath vouchsafed to enter into a New Covenant of Peace with men, when he needed not. 2. That in that Covenant he requireth obedience at men's hands, even at theirs that perish. 3. That he promiseth eternal life to every man, if he obey and keep the Covenant. 4. That he punisheth the disobedient with everlasting death. These particulars supposed, the most free God who is necessarily bound to none, is engaged to give ability of believing to men; nor can he justly without this gift, punish the disobedient any more, than a Magistrate having put out a man's eyes for an offence, can command this man with justice to read a book, and because he reads not, put him to death: Or then a Master (that I may return the Simile in the answer) when he hath taken away from his Servant the stock, which he hath misemployed, can afterward exact of him a just employment of the same stock, and punish him because he employeth it not. I conclude therefore, that the absolute and inevitable reprobation of such men as are called to believe in Christ, and punished if thev believe not, is utterly repugnant to the justice of God, and therefore cannot be a part of his word. TWISSE Consideration. THis Second answer is in like manner, delivered at pleasure, without quoting the Author of it: And no marvel if this Author desires to have the making of his own bed, that he may lie the more softly. Yet touching the similitude here mentioned let it be stated aright: a Master trusts his servant with a stock, not to receive it from him again, though the stock be of a movable nature, but to receive from him in lieu thereof, some yearly emolument. In this case let him say what he can against it: now here his discourse is for the most part at large, showing how God, though a most free agent, may oblige himself to his creature. 1. Decremendo; whether hereby God doth bind himself to his creature (which hath no being at all when God's decrees are made) or to himself rather, it is little or nothing material to the present: what soever it be that God decrees, we are sure that must come to pass, provided that we do not make his decrees of a revocable nature with some; but as touching any use of Gods obliging himself this way unto his creature, this Author is content to say nothing at all, in the accommodation. 2. Promittendo. And we willingly grant, that what God promiseth he never fails to perform, after that manner as he hath promised: as namely in case he hath promised that as many as believe in Christ shall be saved, we nothing doubt, but if all the world should believe in Christ, all the world should be saved. But whether any devise a promise concerning the giving of faith & repentance unto all, & every one; and that whether conditionately or absolutely this Author is content to say just nothing. As likewise, neither doth he take upon him to plead any promise of God, to give to all and every one power to believe or power to repent. 3. Legem ferendo. This alone of all the three serves his turn, and therefore here he doth expatiate, much more than in the former. And herehence he infers, that God binds himself to give supernatural power, to keep the Law he commands, provided the Law be such, as without supernatural power, he can no more keep it, than eat a rock. Now this accommodated to Adam, had need of explication, seeing we read of no other Law given unto him, than of abstaining from a certain fruit: which I do not deliver as if I doubted, but that to the performance of obedience herein, a supernatural power was requisite; but only to signify, that it were worth the labour to give a congruous explication of it. Though of Adam ay nothing doubt but he was endued with supernatural power, to perform other manner of duties than this. And yet again, this denomination of power supernatural, had need also of explication; for though that power which Adam had given him in creation, be supernatural to us, yet our Divines usually conceive it as natural unto Adam, received together with his nature, and such as should have been natural unto us all, had Adam continued in his original integrity. But I am content to let that pass; only whereas he saith, that by such a law the Almighty lawgiver binds himself to his creatuees, to give them such power as may enable them to keep that law; I think rather if any obligation had place in this case, it were rather to maintain the power already given them, than to give it. For every lawgiver rather presupposeth ability of obedience in them, to whom he gives a law; then first gives a law and then gives ability to perform obedience thereunto. And certainly God first created man after his own image, before he gave him any law to be a rule of his obedience unto his creator. So I take the multiplying virtue, was given to his creatures in their creation, before he said increase and multiply: In the curing of the lame man, his word indeed was a word of power, like as when he said let there be light, and there was light. For though it go under the form of a command, yet it was not so properly a command (which is to command obedience) as the going forth of virtuous efficacy to create: like as that also Ezek. 37. O ye dry bones hear the voice of the Lord. And undoubtedly the strength of obedience given unto Adam preceded God's command, for his abstaining from the fruit of the tree, in the midst of the Garden. He had in his creation given him, posse non cadere, not non posse cadere, the event manifested as much: and it is as true according to the same Austin, that God gave him posse stare si vellet, not velle quod potuit. But that God is bound to restore, any such power unto mankind, which they have wilfully lost, is boldly avouched, but let us consider how Scholastically it is proved. 1. The first reason hereof is, because God hath vouchsafed to enter into a new Covenant of Peace with men, when he needed not. To this I answer, that God hath entered into a new Covenant with men, is an indefinite proposition, as touching the persons included in this Covenant, and being not in a necessary matter but contingent, this Covenant proceeding merely from the good pleasure of God, it hath no more force than to signify, that God hath vouchsafed to enter into a new Covenant of peace with some men, which we wilingly grant but not with all, neither doth this proposition, enforce any such meaning. And that God hath not entered into a new Covenant with all, I prove by these reasons. 1. As many as are under the Covenant of grace, sin shall have no dominion over them. Rom. 6. 14. Sin shall not have the dominion over you, for you are not under the law but under grace. But sin hath the dominion over too many, even over the most part of the world, as we find by lamentable experience, therefore too many, even the most part of the World, are not comprised under the Covenant of grace. 2. The covenant of Grace, doth covenant on God's part, not only to give salvation upon condition of faith and repentance, but for Christ's sake to renew men's natures also, and to give them faith and repentance. As appears by divers passages of Scripture: Jer. 31. 31. Behold the days come saith the Lord, that I will make a new Covenant with the house of Israel, and with the house of Judah. v. 32. Not according to the Covenant, that I made with their Fathers, when I took them by the hand, to bring them out of the land of Egypt, the which my Covenant they broke, though I was a Father unto them. But this shall be the Covenant that I will make with the house of Israel, after those days saith the Lord, I will put my Law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts, and I will be their God, and they shall be my people. Ezek. 36. 26. A new heart also will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you, and I will take away the stony heart out of your bodies, and will give you an heart of flesh, and I will put my spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my Statutes, and ye shall keep my judgements and do them. Ezek. 20. 23. I will surely rule you with a mighty hand, etc. 37. And will cause you to pass under the rod, and bring you into the bond of the Covenant. Isai. 57 18. I have seen his ways, and will heal him. Hos. 14. 5. I will heal their rebellions, I will love them freely. And that faith itself and repentance, is the gift of God, who hath taken upon him by his covenant of grace, to be our Lord and our God to sanctify us, is manifest by divers pregnant passages of holy Scriptures. 2. I come to his second reason. And in that Covenant he requires obedience at men's hands, even at theirs that perish. God in his covenant of Grace requires obedience unto salvation, but of his free grace undertakes to regenerate them, and work them to obedience; but how? Agreeable unto their rational natures, that is by admonition, instruction, exhortation, that is to work faith and repentance, by exhorting and persuading them unto repentance: And because this he performs by his Ministers, to whom he hath not revealed who they are, whom he hath chosen, therefore he commands them to Preach indifferently unto all, persuade all, exhort all, unto faith and repentance, whereof also he makes this use even towards reprobates, that whereas they are naturally confident of their ability, to do as much as any other, and as Austin saith dicere solet humana superbia si scissem, fecissem. The Lord by his Ministry takes from them this excuse, so that unto all that hear is this truth delivered, whosoever believeth and repenteth shall be saved: and thereupon every one is exhorted in the name of the Lord to believe and repent. But God resolveth to work faith and repentance in none, but those whom he hath chosen, according to that Acts 13. 48. As many believed as were ordained to everlasting life. And withal the Doctrine delivered in the Gospel is such, and so confirmed, as may justly make them inexcusable that do not believe: when it shall appear, that many a vile legend they are apt to believe, and in the mean time despise Gods holy Oracles, by divine Authority, many ways confirmed unto them. 3. It is most true, eternal life is promised to every on that obeyeth and keeps Covenant with God; but God over and above worketh some unto obedience, unto faith and repentance, bestowing these gracious gifts on them, even on whom he will, when he hardeneth others even whom he will. Rom. 9 18. 4. He punisheth the disobedient with eternal death; true: but according unto what Covenant? Not according unto the Covenant of grace, that is only a Covenant for Salvation, but according unto the Covenant of the law, the Covenant of works. Whereas herehence this Author infers, that the most free God is engaged to give ability of believing unto men: he may as well infer, that he is engaged to give ability unto men to the keeping of his law, and what need was there of Christ's coming into the world? Seeing by his coming into the world, we have gained no better condition by the Arminian Tenet, than to be saved if we will; and if men have ability to to keep the law even by the law, they may be saved if they will: and it will follow as well, that God, without giving this ability to keep the law, cannot justly punish the transgressors of it; as that God without giving men ability to believe cannot punish men for not believing: no more than a Magistrate having put out a man's eyes for an offence, can command this man with justice to read a book, and because he reads not, put him to death. But this is a very vile simile, and stands in no tolerable proportion to that whereunto it is resembled. For the man thus bereft of his eyes hath a will to read, and consequently it is no fault for not reading: for all sin is in the will. But it is not so, in not obeying either Law or Gospel. If a man had a will to obey and believe but he could not, in such a case it were unreasonable he should be punished. But in the case of disobedience unto God, we speak of, all the fault is in the will voluntarily and wilfully, they neither will obey the one, nor the other: like as they that have accustomed themselves to do evil, can not do good, as a blackamoor cannot change his skin. Yet with this difference, that man is never a whit the more excusable, or less punishable for not doing that which is good; not so the blackamoor, for not changing his skin. But such is the shameful issue of them that confound impotency Moral with impotency natural, as if there were no difference. As wild is the comparison following, of the Masters exacting from his Servant a just employment of that stock, which he hath taken from him. An evil servant may have a will to play the good husband in employing his Master's stock, where he pleased to intrust him with it: But though he hath a will to be faithful and thrifty, yet without matter to work upon, he cannot exercise this fidelity of his to his Master's behoof. Show the like will in a carnal man to believe if he could, and if God bereave him of power, in such a case, then conclude the unreasonableness of God's courses herein. But if the Master gave him a stock to employ, upon a reasonable rent to be paid him yearly for certain years: if so be the servant waste the stock, Shall it not be lawful for the Master nevertheless to require his debt? And bid him pay that he owes him? This is the case we speak of. In Adam we all have sinned, saith the Apostle, and thereby have wasted that stock of grace which God had given us, and so disabled ourselves to perform that duty we owe to God: What therefore? Shall not God call upon us to pay our debts, because we are become bankrupts? Especially considering the natural man is proud enough of his abilities to perform any thing that is good. And as for ability to believe, is there not a kind of faith performed by profane persons, by Hypocrites, who concur with the best in the profession of the Gospel? Nay, Is there not a secret kind of hypocrisy, as when a man thinks his heart is upright towards God, when indeed it is not? Otherwise what should move Saint Paul to call upon the Corinthians to examine themselves whether they were in the faith, saying, Know you not yourselves how that Christ is in you, except ye be reprobates? 2 Car. 13. 5. It is true there is a faith infused by the spirit of God in regeneration; but who ever said that any man was damned, because he doth not believe with such a faith? As much as to say, that non-regeneration is the meritorious cause of damnation. Now how well he hath proved that our Doctrine in the point of absolute reprobation is repugnant to God's justice, let the indifferent judge. DISCOURSE. SECT. IV. Which I divide into Three Subsections. SUBSECT. I. THe Third Attribute which it oppugneth, is the truth of God. God is a God of truth, Deut. 32. 4. Truth itself. joh. 14. 6. So called because he is the fountain of truth, and the perfection of truth, without the least mixture of falsehood; the strength of Israel cannot lie. 1 Sam. 15. 29. Never could any man justly charge him with dissembling; Let God be true and every man a liar, (saith the Apostle) that he might be justified in his sayings, and overcome when he is judged. Rom. 3. 4. That is, men may lie, (for all men are liars) but God cannot lie, (for God is true:) if any man should go about to challenge him of untruth, his challenge would easily appear to be a calumny. The truth of God, like a glorious Sun, will break through all those clouds of accusations which seek to obscure and hide it. Simile gaudet Simili; God loves such as are of a true heart. Psal. 51 6. And hath an hypocrite in utter detestation, and therefore he must needs be true himself. No man (for aught I know) doubts of it. But by this decree is God made untrue, and hypocritical in his dealing with all men, and in all matters that concern their eternal estate; particularly, in his commands, in his offers of grace and glory, in his threats, in his passionate wishes and desires of men's chiefest good, and in his expostulations and commiserations also. 1. In his commands; for by this doctrine God commands those men to repent and believe, whom he secretly purposeth shall never believe. Now whom God commands to believe and repent, those he outwardly wills should believe and repent. For by his commandments he signifies his will and pleasure, and he must inwardly and heartily will it too, or else he dissembles: For words if they be true, are an interpretation of the mind, when they are not, are mere impostures, and simulations. 2. In his offers of grace and glory: these offers he makes to such as refuse them, and perish for refusing them, as well as unto those who do accept them to their salvation. This is evident Math. 22. where those were invited to the wedding that came not. And Acts 3. 26. Where 'tis said, To you hath God sent his Son Jesus to bless you, in turning every one of you from your iniquities. Math. 23. 37. How oft would I have gathered of you, saith Christ, speaking of such as neglect the day of their visitation, and so lost their salvation: This is evident also by reason, for as many as are under the commandment, are under the promise too, as we may see, Acts 2. 38, 39 Repent and be Baptised every one of you, and you shall receive the gift of the holy Ghost; for to you, and to your Children is the promise made. In which words Peter makes the command and the promise of equal extent, both universal: And there is reason for it, for he makes the promise his motive to persuade obedience to the command; and it would not have reached home, if it had not respected all those, to whom he gives the command. No man, Reprobate or other, thinks any less; every man that hears the Gospel Preached, takes himself to be under the gracious offer of eternal life; and upon these thoughts hath some desires, some hopes of it, and stirs up himself to forsake some pleasing sins, which otherwise he would not part with, and to do some unpleasing duties, which otherwise he would not do; Now, if God doth not mean that most of those to whom he offers his grace and glory shall have either, will he not be found halting in his offers? Zanchy tells us roundly, that every man that is called, is bound to think that he is elected; otherwise L. 5. the nat. Dei cap. 2. he doth offer great injury unto God, and doth perstringere Deum mendacii, qui illi in verbo dicit se velle salutem ejus, & in hunc finem ad Christum vocasse. In which speech he plainly implies, that if God call a man, whom he hath absolutely rejected, he doth but delude him when he calls him. The like speech hath Bucer; Primum quod Deo debes, est ut credas esse te ab eo praedestinatum, nam id ni credas, facis eum tibi, cum te ad salutem vocat per evangelium, illudere. A man must believe that he is predestinated, Bucer in cap. 8. ad Rom. q. de praedest. or else he makes God to mock him when he calls him. A man therefore that is not predestinate, but an absolute reprobate, when he is called to salvation, is but deluded; it is the necessary result of their speeches. If a creditor should resolve upon no terms to forgive his debtor one farthing of the debt, and yet make him offers to remit the whole upon some conditions, and bind the offers which he makes, with a deep and solemn oath, Would we not say that he is a rank dissembler, and a mere deluder of his poor debtor? We can say no less of God, if it be true that he hath irrevocably decreed, at no hand to save such particular men, and yet promiseth, and sweareth, that he will save them if they will believe his promises and repent. What can such promises be but mere delusions of miserable men? 3. In his threats and commination also (by this doctrine) is God made to be hollow and unsincere, for, Against what sins are they denounced? Always against actual sins: we never read that they are denounced against us for original sins, for the transgression of Adam, or for that corruption ot nature, which we brought with us into the world; and consequently they import that the sins for which men go to hell, are their actual transgressions. But if it be true that God decreed man to hell for original sin, that which those threatenings import and signify is not true, and so God is not sincere to them. Besides; all threatenings imply, that evils threatened may be avoided, for therefore are they denounced, that men by them might come to repentance, and so escape the evil that are threatened: but if some men be peremptorily ordained to destruction, than their destruction cannot be prevented, and so the threatening of damnation (in this respect also) doth signify an untruth, and God in them deals not plainly with men. TWISSE Consideration. THat God is true, we make no more doubt than that there is a God at all: and that God is as far from hypocrisy as hypocrites are far from him. They that beat their fellow servants, and eat and drink with the drunken, we are taught shall have there portion with hypocrites: and we judge it impossible that God should cherish any such disposition in himself, which he so hates in others. But how God is made untrue and hypocritical in his dealings with men in all (or in any) matters, that concern their eternal estate by our doctrine of Reprobation, more than by our doctrine of election, it is a mystery unto me; whether we consider his commands, his offers of grace and glory, his threats, his passionate wishes and desires of men's chiefest good, and in his expostulations and commiserations also. But come we to examine how learnedly and judiciously this is carried throughout in the particulars. 1. That God commands by his Ministers many to believe and repent, whom he secretly purposeth shall never believe we willingly grant; like as he commanded Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, and yet secretly purposed that he should not sacrifice him. This is evident by the word of God, for both his command given to Abraham to this purpose is there expressed, as also his effectual hindering of Abraham, when he came to the point of sacrifysing him; and look what God did, that he secretly purposed to to do: For he doth all things according to the counsel of his will Ephes. 1. 11. Only here is the difference, God commanding Abraham to sacrifice his Son, did positively hinder him from sacrificing Isaac, but God commanding all to hear the Gospel to believe, doth not hinder them from believing, when they are willing to believe. But only refuseth to give them that grace whereby alone their natural infidelity might be cured; according to those words of our Saviour, Ye therefore hear them (my words) not, because ye are not of God. john. 8. 47. Now let every sober man judge, whether God's course be not to be censured for hypocrisy, as well in the one as in the other: yet is this a most trivial argument, and thus usually answered by our Divines, and particularly by Master Perkins. But this author takes no notice of this our common answer, to reply against it, but is content to pretermit it in silence; a manifest evidence that he hath nothing of worth to say against it: for I cannot conceive him to be so ignorant, as not to know this usual answer of our Divines. But let we him proceed in his course. Whom God commands to believe and repent, those he outwardly wills should believe and repent; for by his commands he signifies his will and pleasure, and he must inwardly and heartily will it too, or else he dissembles. All this is as congruously appliable to God's commandment given unto Abraham for the sacrificing of Isaac, as to the commandment of believing and repenting given unto any; although there is a vast difference between God's commandment of Sacrificing Isaac, and his commandment of believing. For God himself gave the one immediately, and that to a particular person, Abraham: But God commands his Ministers to preach his Gospel unto all, that are present to hear them, and why? But as he tells Paul. Acts 18. 9 because he hath much people, in the place whereto he sends them, and yet tells them not who those people are, who his elect are and who are not. But they, though thereupon they proceed to Preach unto all without difference, yet so, as aiming at the salvation of the elect. I do all things for all men, saith Saint Paul, 1 Cor. 6. 22. That I may save some; and who are they? Let himself answer, where he saith, I suffer all things for the elects sake; and by the way where he distinguisheth of Gods willing outwardly and inwardly, I willingly profess I never 2 Tim. 2. 10. read nor heard of it before. God's words and commandments are outward, and uttered by him, but his will is always inward, though it may be, and is signified by his words, and so is his will signified always by his commandments; But what will? Not that such a thing as God commands shall be done, as this Author ignorantly conceives, but that it shall be their duty, (to whom the commandment is given) to do that which is commanded: for if God's will were that such a thing should be done de facto, undoubtedly it should be done and come to pass de facto, for who hath resisted his will? So that here we have Rom. 9 19 a true interpretation of the mind of God by his commandment, to wit, quid ab homine fieri debeat, but no interpretation of any such mind in God, as if fieri vellet, whatsoever he commands. For the case is clear and undeniable that God's will was, that Isaac should not be sacrificed, as well as by his command, to make it Abraham's duty to sacrifice him. The like was the case of Pharaoh to whom the Lord sent a message by Moses to let Israel go: hereupon it was Pharaohs duty to let Israel go, and that upon God's command, God thereby signifying his will to make this act Pharaohs duty; But was it Gods will also that Pharaoh should de facto obey, and let Israel go upon this command? If so, why doth God tell Moses that he will harden Pharaohs heart, and that he shall not let Israel go. Where we have a manifest example of the great difference of the objects of Gods will; the one what Gods will was, that Pharaoh ought to do; and the other what his will was should be done by him: the letting of Israel go, was that which Pharaoh ought to do by the will of God, but the not letting of Israel go by Pharaoh, was that which God willed should come to pass; And why doth not this Author take boldness to censure these proceedings of the Lord with Pharaoh as hypocritical proceedings? The same spirit will serve the turn for both, though not without betraying as much judgement as honesty. In the like sort, it might be urged of the very elect, as of the reprobate, for the very elect are not always converted at the first hearing of the Gospel, nor till the time God hath apppointed for their effectual vocation: yet from their first hearing of the Gospel, this command is made unto them, and thereby is signified God's will that they ought to believe it, yet is it not God's will that they shall believe, and be converted until the time that God hath apppointed. That which in my judgement is more to the purpose is this, that by commanding to believe, he supposeth them at least in pretence to be endued with a power to believe; but then say I in like manner, he supposeth them to be indifferent to believe or not to believe, as they will, that is either to yield or else to resist; now this is indifferent to be objected as well against election, as against reprobation: For like as we say it cannot be that the reprobate should believe de facto, so we say it cannot be, that the elect should not belief at that time, de facto, which God hath apppointed for their effectual conversion. And what advantage this Author can hence work to himself, I will be ready to take into consideration, as soon as it is offered. So that hitherto I hope, I have freed the divine course maintained by us, from all just imputation of imposture and dissimulation: let him look to it how he can clear his conscience from the impiety of his crimination. I come to the Second. 2. Here those offers of grace and glory, which we ascribe to God, he chargeth with imposture and simulation. But he contents himself with the generality of grace, that is for his best advantage. I will answer to each part. As for glory or salvation, we offer it unto none, (neither do we teach that God makes offer of it unto any) but to such as finally persevere in faith and repentance, according to that, Revelations 3. To him that overcometh, I will give to sit with me in my throne, even as I also overcame, and am set down with my Father in his Throne. And be thou faithful unto the death, and I will give thee a Crown of life. And Gal. 6. Be not weary of well doing, for in good time ye shall reap if ye faint not. And accordingly we teach, that it is the will of God, that as many as believe & repent and persevere therein, shall be saved: & no other will of God is signified herein. And if this be true, that God doth will this, and no other thing then this is signified in his offers of glory and salvation. What colour of imposture and dissimulation, doth appear in all this? For glory and salvation, God doth not will that it shall be the portion of any one of ripe years, absolutely but conditionally, to wit, if he repent and believe. And in case all and every one of the World should believe and repent, all and every one (how notorious sinners soever they be found) shall be saved; such is the sufficiency of Christ's merits. I say this is true, not of them only, who are invited to the Wedding. Math. 22. Nor of them only, to whom Saint Peter speaketh, Acts 3. 26. Or to them only, of whom our Saviour speaketh, Math. 23. 37. But of all and every one throughout the World: and it is as true, that none of them shall be saved, if they die in infidelity and impenitency, this God himself signifieth to be his will by his promise, Acts 2. 28, 29. on the one part, and on both parts, Mark 16. 16. And as God signifieth this to be his will, so indeed is his will according to our doctrine, and there is no colour of imposture or simulation in all this. In like sort as touching the grace of pardon of sin, this also God offers unto all that hear the Gospel, but how? Not absolutely but conditionally, in case they believe and repent; and it is God's will that every one who believeth, shall have his sin pardoned; none that I know either thinketh or teacheth otherwise, whether he falleth out either to be elect or reprobate; though how to distinguish men according unto this difference I know not, I leave that unto God. And accordingly as touching the desire and hopes, that hereupon arise in the thoughts of Reprobates, I am nothing acquainted with them, any more than I am with their persons: as likewise neither am I private to their stirring up of themselves to forsake some pleasing sins, which otherwise they would not part with; and to do some unpleasing duties, which otherwise they would not do: But in general I have read in Austin, that God calleth some (though Reprobates) ut proficiant ad exteriorem vitae emendationem quo mitius puniantur. But I can hardly believe, that Herod was any one of them, though he did many things at his admonition, because I see a shameful issue, giving way to the cutting off john Baptists head, for the gratifying of a wanton damsel. Now like as we say, God doth signify his meaning to be, that as many as believe and repent shall have their sins pardoned, and their souls saved: So if it can be proved that there is no such meaning in God, then in my poor judgement it cannot be avoided, but that God must be found halting in his offers. But for my part, I acknowledge such a meaning in God, neither have I to this hour, found any one of our Divines either by word or writing to have denied this to be the meaning of God: and I wonder what this Author means after this manner to carry himself in the clouds of generalities; and whether it be through silliness, or maliciousness I am to seek: but if I may be so bold as to guess, I think the root of all this his superficiary discourse is the confounding of absolute Reprobation with absolute Damnation, and in like sort absolute election with salvation absolute: for as for pardon of sin, and salvation, we acknowledge them to be bestowed on men of ripe years conditionally; and as God bestows them, so also he decreed to bestow them (we say) conditionally, to wit, in case they believe and repent: but in case they believe and repent not, damnation is their portion, and that by the decree of God. But as touching the gift of faith and repentance, these we maintain to be given of God absolutely, according to the mere pleasure of his will: and accordingly denied unto others, as the Apostle signifieth, saying, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. But this Author meddles not hither to with these gifts, but keeps Rom. 9 18. himself to the graces of pardon of sin, and of salvation, which God bestows conditionally; and signifies his meaning to be, to bestow them conditionally, namely, in case they believe and repent, and not otherwise, and such indeed we maintain to have been his meaning, and that from everlasting. So that in all this there is no colour of imposture or simulation. But in that which followeth, he stealeth upon the grace of faith itself; let us see how clearly, and with what felicity he carrieth himself, and whether it be not answerable to his former carriage which he continueth throughout. Zanchy (he saith) tells us roundly, that every man that is called, is bound to think he is elected; but why doth he not speak out and say, that every one is bound (in the opinion of Zanchy) to believe that he is elected, as formerly he related it. I grant that to believe is to think, for credere, is defined to be cum assensione cogitare, but thoughts he knows are very wild, they have their course in dreams; as a hungry man may dream that he eateth and drinketh, but when he awaketh, his soul is empty. And as for that doctrine of Zanchy, I have already given a fair interpretation of it, upon consideration that he speaks it of election not unto faith, but unto salvation: and seeing God hath manifested in his word his determination to give salvation to every one that believeth, it followeth herehence, that every one is bound to believe, that as many as do believe shall be saved: and consequently every one that heareth the Gospel is bound to believe, That God hath determined to bestow Salvation on him, in case he be found to believe. The like construction may be given of Bucers' Doctrine; namely, that God hath predestinated him to obtain Salvation in case he believe, not otherwise. For God hath not predestinated any man of ripe years to obtain Salvation, whether he believe or not. And seeing God hath plainly professed that whosoever believeth shall be saved. Mar. 16. 16. If I do not accordingly believe, that God hath predestinated me to obtain salvation in case I do believe, I do hereby make God to delude me in saying Whosoever believeth shall be saved. And whereas this Author upon the back of this addeth, that a man therefore that is not predestinate, but an absolute reprobate, when he is called to salvation is but deluded; and that this is the necessary result of our speeches. All the colour of this his inference, depends merely upon confusion of things that differ. For he distinguisheth not between absolute predestination unto salvation, and predestination unto salvation absolute: likewise he distinguisheth not between absolute reprobation unto damnation, and reprobation unto damnation absolute: neither doth he distinguish between predestination unto faith, and predestination unto salvation; nor between reprobation from faith, and reprobation unto damnation. And the absoluteness of predestination appears only in predestination unto faith, not in predestination unto salvation. For salvation being bestowed on none of ripe years, but by way of reward of their faith, repentance and good works; hence it follows, that God predestinates none unto salvation of ripe years, but by way of reward of their obedience. But as for predestination unto faith, it is clear, that God purposeth absolutely to bestow faith on whom he will. So on the other side damnation being inflicted on none, but for sin God hath destinated no man unto damnation but for sin. But as touching obduration, like as God hardeneth whom he will, so he decreed to proceed herein, to wit, in hardening of men according to the mere pleasure of his will, that is, absolutely. Now let us not suffer a cauteriate conscience, to smother a plain truth, with the confusion of those things which are to be distinguished. Absolute is opposed to conditionate; and this distinction applied to Gods will is to be understood not quoad actum volentis, sed quoad res volitas; as for example, God decrees that a man shall be saved upon condition of faith, this is called voluntas conditionata, so oVssius expounds it. Hist. Pelag. lib. 7. p. 638. his words are these, Aliqua vult cum conditione, quae idcirco in effectum non prodeunt nisi conditione impletâ. Some things (God) willeth with a condition, which come not unto effect, but upon the fulfilling of the condition; this is plainly understood, not of the act of willing, but of the things willed, which he calls aliqua, and the instance he gives us is this, quo modo omnes homines salvari 1 Tim. 2. 4: vult, sed per & propter Christum fide apprehensum, after which manner he will have all to be saved, but by and for Christ apprehended by faith; where faith is plainly made the condition of salvation, not of God's will; yet this will of God, he calls forthwith a conditionate will, and that according to the ancients, in these words, de hac conditionatâ illâ Dei voluntate extant long plurima apud veteres Scriptores. By which it is manifest, that voluntas conditionata, is by Vossius so called, and in his opinion by the ancients, not on the part of God willing, as if there were any condition thereof, which Bradwardine hath disproved as a thing impossible well near 200 years ago; but on the part of the things willed by God; now the things willed by God are either absolutely so willed, or conditionally; as for example, pardon of sin and salvation, are only conditionally willed by God: to wit, upon the condition of faith and repentance, but as for the gift of faith and repentance, they are willed by God to be bestowed absolutely, to wit, according to the mere pleasure of Gods will, hence it followeth that the will of God to confer salvation, is only voluntas coditionata, and denominates not a man absolutely predestinated, but only conditionally, still understanding it not quod actum volentis, but quoad res volitas, as Vossius himself interprets it, and that according to the ancients. In like sort the will of God to inflict damnation, is a conditionate will according to the same construction that Vossius makes of a will conditionate, according to the Fathers; and denominates not a man absolutely reprobated, but only conditionally. Now this being the will that Zanchy and Bucer speak of, most preposterously doth this Author shape a man hereupon, to be termed an absolute predestinate, or an absolute reprobate: For in this respect, like as the will of God in this case, is accounted not absoluta but conditionata, so the person denominated hereby, in all equity is to be accounted, not predestinated absolutely, but conditionally, nor reprobated absolutely but conditionally. But in respect of another will of God, I willingly confess, one may be accounted predestinate absolutely, and another reprobated absolutely, to wit, in respect of the will of giving the grace of faith and repentance unto one, and denying it to another: And that because faith and repentance are not given and denied upon any condition, but absolutely, according to the mere pleasure of God; as we are ready to maintain. But herehence no species of contradiction ariseth, for like as it is no contradiction to say that God willeth absolutely unto Paul the grace of faith and repentance, and conditionally willeth unto him and every one salvation, to wit, upon condition of faith and repentance: In like sort, there is no contradiction to say, that the same man is predestinated absolutely unto faith, and conditionally unto salvation: In like sort it may be said without all contradiction, that the same man is both reprobated absolutely from faith, and yet reprobated conditionally from glory unto condemnation. And lastly, in like manner, there is no contradiction to say, that the same man is predestinated conditionally to obtain salvation; and yet absolutely reprobated from faith: especially seeing it is all one, to be predestinated conditionally to obtain salvation, and conditionally to obtain damnation: For he that is ordained to be saved in case he believe, is therewithal ordained to be damned in case he believe not: The ground whereof is, that of our Saviour Whosoever believeth shall be saved, whosoever believeth not shall be damned. Now if God may both will unto a man salvation conditionally, Mar. 15. 16. to wit, upon condition he believeth, and yet withal will the denial of faith absolutely unto him, without all contradiction, (as I have already proved) it followeth, that without all contradiction, a man may be said both to be predestinated to obtain salvation conditionally, viz. In case he do believe, and so to be predestinated absolutely, to be hardened, or to have the grace of faith denied him. So that this Author's conclusion depends merely upon confusion of different denominations of a man said to be absolutely, or conditionally predestinated: which may be in respect of different things whereto he is predestinated, to the one absolutely, to the other conditionally, and consequently without all contradiction. For he that is absolutely reprobated from the grace of faith, may yet be conditionally predestinated unto salvation. For to be conditionally predestinated unto salvation, is to be conditionally predestinated unto damnation, and what sober man will say, that there is any contradiction in this, to say, that the same man is both conditionally reprobated unto damnation, and absolutely reprobated from faith. Faith being such a gift of God, that like as God absolutely bestows it on some, so as absolutely he denies it to others. But as for condemnation, that is inflicted on none but for sin, like as salvation is bestowed on none of ripe years, but as a reward of obedience. In like manner God decreed not either to bestow the one, or inflict the other but conditionally, to wit, upon condition of faith on the one side, and upon condition of infidelity on the other. Now if such confusion be committed in these denominations of the predestinate and reprobate, absolutely and conditionally, on the part of things willed by God, as namely in respect of grace and glory on the one side, and in respect of the denial of grace and glory, together with inflicting of damnation on the other; How much more must this confusion be augmented, if not only different things willed by God (as before mentioned) are confounded, but over and above the act of Gods will is confounded with things willed by him. For as for the act of Gods will, that it admits no condition, I have formerly demonstrated by divers arguments; one whereof, and that invincible, is this; If sin be the cause or condition of God's will, or decree of damnation, then either by necessity of nature, or by the constitution of God; not by necessity of nature (as all confess,) nor (say I) can it be by any constitution of God, as I prove thus; If by the constitution of God, than God hath ordained that upon the foresight of sin, he will ordain men unto salvation; where the eternal ordination of God, is made the object of God's eternal ordination; a thing utterly impossible, it being apparent that nothing can be the object of God's eternal ordination or decree, but things temporal. The similitude whereby he illustrates, not his conclusion, but the pretended absurdity of our doctrine, is most alien. For God is not like unto a creditor, Who resolves upon no terms to forgive his debtor one farthing of his debt, and yet makes offer to remit the whole debt upon some conditions. For as God hath professed that whosoever believeth shall be saved, so; Hath not God resolved that Mar. 16. 16. whosoever believeth shall be saved? Was ever any of our Divines known to deny this? But herein they join issue with their adversaries, as the Contra-Remonstrants did with the Remonstrants, namely, in maintaining that this is not the whole decree of predestination; But that there is another decree of predestination besides this; namely, that God over and above hath determined to bestow faith on some. So on the other side, none of our Divines were ever known to deny, that God hath decreed, that whosoever believes not shall be damned; but further they profess, that this is not the whole decree of reprobation, but that there is another decree concerning reprobation besides this, namely, that God hath over and above decreed to deny some the grace of faith, and that absolutely. Now whereas he saith, we maintain that God hath irrevocably decreed not to save some, whom he promiseth that he will save if they believe; Is he well in his wits, for charging us with that, by way of crimination, which no understanding Divine among the Arminians themselves dare deny? I mean as touching the point of God's irrevocable decree. For what Arminian hath dared in plain terms to profess, that God's decrees are of a revocable nature? Whereas the mere prescience of God, is sufficient to make them irrevocable; How much more if God's prescience be grounded upon his decree? as indeed there is no other ground imaginable, without falling upon manifest Atheism. But whereas he fashioneth our Doctrine, so as if we said, that God hath decreed at no hand to save them, to whom he promiseth salvation upon condition of faith; this is a notorious untruth, and such as implieth manifest contradiction: For to say he hath resolved at no hand to save them, is as much as to say, that he hath resolved to save them on no condition. But if he hath promised to save them in case they believe, undoubtedly he hath resolved, to save them upon condition of faith. Only God's resolution to save them, is not held in suspense, considering that from everlasting, he well knew who would believe, and who would not; and therefore he knew this, because he purposed to grant faith unto the one, and deny it unto the other. So that in all this cry, we have little wool, no substance of any sound proof, but mere clamours and miserable confusion; as God sees how well it becomes him to smite them with the spirit of confusion, that build Babel of their own invention, and oppose the truth, the precious truth of his sovereignty over his creatures, and of the prerogative of his free grace, to have mercy on whom he will, like as he shows his power in hardening whom he will, and in smiting with giddiness whom he will. 3. In the next place, we are to hear how God, by our Doctrine in his threats and comminations is hollow, and unsincere. I willingly grant these are always denounced against actual sins, as also that the sins for which men go to hell, are actual sins, if they live to be conscious of actual transgressions. But if God have decreed men to hell for original sin, than God (saith he) is not true, and so not sincere. This is utterly unconsequent; For God can manifest his pleasure otherwise than by his threatenings. Of the Sodomites it is said, they suffer the vengeance of eternal fire; and Infants perished therein, as well as men of ripe years: And the Apostle plainly saith, that we have all sinned in Adam, and that the wages of sin is death, without distinction; and that all are Rom. 5. 12. Rom. 6. 22. Ephes. 2. 3. borne children of wrath, and therefore as many as die in that condition, die children of wrath. And whence hath this Author learned, that the sin of Adam hath brought upon us the guilt of eternal death, as formerly he hath professed: but if I be not deceived, this extends farther than to Infants, and in as much as some of our Divines conceive the corrupt mass, to be the object of reprobation, hereupon he conceits, they make God to damn all Reprobates for original sin; whereas their doctrine is no other than this, that God determines to damn every man for no other sins, but such wherein they die unrepented of, whether they be original or actual. threatenings are denounced unto all to this end, that men may know, that by continuing in sin without repentance there is no hope of mercy, and therefore as they desire to be saved, it is there duty to break them off by repentance: And in particular unto some that by this consideration, God may bring them unto repentance. But these are only Gods elect, but as for others God never brings unto them true repentance, according to that of S. Austin, Istorum neminem adducit Deus ad salubrem spiriitalemque poenitentiam qua homo reconciliatur Deo in Christo sive illis ampliorum patientiam Contra Julian Pelag. l. 5. c. 4. sive non imparem praebeat. Yet God ordains no man of ripe years unto destruction but for sin finally continued in, without repentance; and the threatening of damnation signify no other thing but this, that if they repent not, they shall be damned, which is most true to whomsoever it is pronounced; and this dealing of God is plain enough. But these Divines would not have faith and repentance to be the gifts of God, but the works of men's free-wills, that so they might be their own craftsmen of their salvation. DISCOURSE. SUBSECT. II. 4. GOd is also full of guile in the other things before named, by this opinion, viz. in his passionate wishes, that even those men might repent, that repent not, and might be Saved that through their impenitency are not Saved. Of these we read Deuter. 5. 29. Oh that there were such a heart in them to fear me, that it might go well with them. And in Psal. 18. 13. O that my people had hearkened unto me, and Israel had walked in my ways. And Isaiah. 48 18. Oh that thou hadst harkened unto my commandments. etc. 2. In his expostulations. Isai. 5. 3. judge I pray you between me and my vineyard, what could I have done more for my vineyard? jer. 2. throughout. Especially v. 5. and 31. Have I been a wilderness unto Israel, or a land of darkness? And ●. 32. Can a maid forget her ornaments, or a bride her attire, yet my people have forgotten me days without number. Ezek. 33. 11. Turn ye, turn ye, O ye house of Israel why will ye die? 3. In his commiserations also of the woeful condition of foolish men, that would not be reclaimed. Hos. 11. 8. How shall I give thee up Ephraim, how shall I deliver thee O Israel? My repentings are kindled together, my heart is turned within me, and Math. 23. 37. O Jerusalem Jerusalem which killest the Prophets, and stonest them that are sent unto thee. In all these there is but little sincerity, if there be a settled resolution that the most of those, towards whom those wishes, chide, and melting considerations are used, shall be unavoidable damned Gods fairest offers, his sweetest invitations, his greatest sympathies, and amplest courtesies, (if this doctrine be true) come very little short I think of Absalon's feast, joabs' congee, the kiss of judas, and the Hyaenaes' tears, for in all these, aliud animo vult, aliud verbis significat; he sayeth one thing and means another, and therefore dissembles. This is so evident, that some maintainers of absolute reprobation do not deny it, but ascribe unto God Sanctam Simulationem, duplicem personam, duplicem voluntatem a Holy counterfeiting a double face, a double will, by which they offer extreme injury unto God, for tolerabilius est (saith Tertullian) duos divisos quam unum versipellem Deum praedicare. It is more tolerable to set up two Gods then a double and deceitful God. If this be granted, jesuits have no cause to be ashamed of their Tertul. lib. cont. praxeam. equivocations: nor Politicians of their Holy water, and crafty dissimulations; men need not be afraid to cog and lie, and deal deceitfully one with another, but are ●ather to be commended for their courtship and compliments, and false-heartedness, because in this they do but imitate God, to whom whosoever they be that come nearest, they are the best. But howsoever some do inconsiderately ascribe such things to God, the most (I know) would tremble to entertain such thoughts: and therefore the more horrible it is; to lay such things to the charge of the Almighty, the farther I take this opinion to be from all truth and honesty. TWISSE Consideration. GOD (he saith) by our Doctrine, is made full of guile in his passionate wishes, that even these men might repent, that repent not. The guile I guess consists in this, that God hereby makes show, that he would have them to repent, when yet indeed, he hath no such will. To this I answer, that by the same reason he might conclude, that God carrieth himself with guile, in taking unto himself eyes, and ears, and hands, and heart, for hereby he makes show that he hath the members of a man. But to this we answer, that this show is only unto them that understand that properly, which is to be taken figuratively: so that it is not the word of God, so much as the weakness of men in understanding it, that casts this colour. For these things indeed, are spoken only per 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is a metaphorical kind of speech. And if God takes liberty to conform himself to the members of our body, may not he take as great liberty to conform himself to the passions of our minds, and to assume unto him, the passions of fear, wrath, and jealousy, joy, sorrow, and such like? Isai. 63. 8. For he said surely they are my people, Children that will not lie, so he was their Saviour: yet what followeth in the next verse save one: But they rebelled and vexed his holy spirit. According to the course of this Divines superficial consideration, a man might conceive, that God is subject to error, and improvidence, as well as man; for God said surely they will not lie, but it appeared by the event, that they did lie. So that hereupon we are driven to conclude, that the former passage is delivered per 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in conformity to a man's judgement, who promiseth unto himself better obedience from his child for the time to come, than afterwards he finds. In like sort, God in his passionate wishes, conforms himself to the condition of man, who useth this sometimes, as a means to work impression upon his child, to be more careful to order his conversation towards his parents. And this being apt to work upon a child, though but naturally ingenuous, why may not God use this course? nay if he should not use this course, he could not be said to do all for his vineyard, that could be done, in the way of outward husbandry. So that passionate wishes, are but a passionate kind of exhortation; God through us doth beseech you (saith Paul) we pray you in Christ's stead, to be reconciled unto God. 2 Cor. 5. 20. Yet nevertheless the same Apostle professeth that the Gospel was a savour of death unto death to some, 2 Cor. 2. 15. Now the Gospel includes all these and such like pathetical admonitions; And hereby God doth effectually signify, how much he delights in the obedience of the creature, and in the glorifying of his mercy in their salvation. But yet this mercy of God, in giving the grace of obedience, is not showed indifferently towards all, but only to some, even whom the Lord will. Rom. 9 18. And this consideration drives us to interpret such passionate wishes not properly, but figuratively. For whereas the Lord saith, Deut. 5. 29. Oh that there were such an heart in them to fear me. Who can deny but that God could give them such an heart, if it pleased him? And the same Moses professeth of these very people of Israel, that God had not given them such an heart for the space of 40 years. Deut. 29. 4. you have seen the great temptations and signs; But the Lord hath not given you an heart to perceive, nor eyes to see, nor ears to hear unto this day, and Jerem. 32. 40. He makes promise of giving it to some; I will put my fear in their heart, that they shall never depart away from me. In like sort whereas the Lord saith, Isai. 48. 18. Oh that thou hadst harkened unto my commandments. Psal. 81. 13. Oh that my people had harkened unto me, and Israel had walked in my ways! who doubts but that it was in the power of God, to work them hereunto, by boaring their ears, and circumcising them, by regenerating them, and so making them to be borne of God; that so being of God, they might hear his words. john 8. 47. As also to put his own spirit within them, and cause them to walk in his statutes, and keep his judgements and do them: Ezek. 36. 27. 2. In his expostulations, in that, Isai. 5. 3. What could I have done more for my vineyard? What doth this signify more, than that more could not be done? But how? In the way of outward Husbandry, conforming himself to an husbandman, that hath planted a vineyard. For can it be denied, but that God could have made them fruitful, had it pleased him: and though Paul plants and Apollo watereth, yet, Is it not Gods peculiar office to give the increase? Is it not he that worketh in us every good thing that is pleasing in Heb. 12. 2. his sight through Jesus Christ. Heb. 13. 21. Is not he both the Author and finisher of our faith? Was it not he that gave repentance unto Israel; Acts 5. 31. And to the Gentiles. Acts 11. 18. And must we not wait with our hearers, if so be God may give them repentance? 2 Tim. 2. 25. And as for that of Jerem. 2. 32. Can a Maid forget her Ornament, or a Bride her attire, yet my people have forgotten me. And have I been a Wilderness unto Israel, or a land of darkness. Is not this exprobration of their unthankfulness just, and without v. 31. guile, unless God do actually change all their hearts. Yet this might be a means and also was, and is, and ever shall continue to be a means to bring God's people to repentance. And undoubtedly the worst of them, had power to have abstained from many of those foul sins, yea from all of them, wherewith God doth upbraid them; albeit to abstain from any sin in a gracious manner, be a work of God's special grace, which he affords not, according to men's works (which way tends all this eager but superficiary discourse) but according to his own purpose and grace. 3. Hosea 11. 8. God represents as it were a conflict within him, between his mercy and justice; and his mercy hath the glory of the day; But wherein? To spare them, though their sins deserved at his hands, that he should make them as Adma and Zeboim, as Sodom and Gomorrah. He would rather show himself to be as he is, God, and and not Man; And wherein? But in this, man may pardon his enemy, but cannot change his heart, it is otherwise with God, he can both pardon our sins, and change our hearts, and to this purpose he becomes our Lord and our God, and walks in the midst of us, as the holy one of Israel, to sanctify us, as it followeth in the same place of Hosea, v. 10. They shall walk after the Lord, he shall roar like a Lion, viz. In such expostulations, comminations, etc. but the issue shall be gracious; for when he shall rear, than the children of the West shall fear, that is fear unto him, as Hos. 3. 5. That is, come flying unto him, and to his goodness with fear: like Birds scared from one place, fly with greater speed to another: so conscience affrighted with sense of sin, and apprehension of God's wrath, shall fly from his wrath, unto his mercy, to his goodness: whereof God shall make unto them a full representation in David their King, that is in Christ, as in whom we behold the glory of God's grace with open face, and trepidare in Latin, is found to be of the same signification with festinare. And v. 11. Is manifested as much, as where it is said, They shall fear as a sparrow out of Egypt, and as a Dove out of the land of Egypt; and I will place them in their houses, saith the Lord. That is, come flying unto the Lord with fear. As for that Math. 23. 37. O Jerusalem, how oft would I: etc. This is of another nature, as being delivered by Christ the son of God, made under the Law, who, as in his manhood, he might entertain such desires in proper speech, so by the Law of God, was bound to desire the conversion of his brethren, as well as any other Prophet, or man of God, or minister of his word. But such confusion becomes this discourse right well. In all this (he saith) there is little sincerity, if there be a secret resolution, that the most of these, towards whom those wishes, chide, and commiserations are used, shall be avoidable damned. But what if but one of them, towards whom these are used, by a secret resolution shall be avoidable damned, is there sincerity enough in these courses divine? Sureif this resolution, concerning the unavoidable damnation of the one, doth not prejudice God's sincerity, neither shall such a resolution concerning the damnation of two, or of two hundred, or thousands, or the most, any way prejudice sincerity divine. But this kind of discourse, is spread all over this Treatise, like a scab only to work upon vulgar affection, where judgement is wanting to observe the frothy condition of it. And whereas he saith that in all this God aliud animo vult aliud verbis significat, its most untrue, as to every one should be made manifest, according to the right understanding of it, had he been pleased to accommodate it severally, and show what that is, which God signifies by his word, and what that is, which he willeth in his heart. And indeed, as in the point of God's commandment, I have showed there is no colour of contradiction between it, and God's purpose, but only according to this Authors superficiary interpretation. For to command a thing, is only to will, that it shall be our duty to do it: notwithstanding which, it is apparent, God may purpose not to give grace to work the doing of it. So in every one of the rest, had he instanced as it became him, and showed wherein the guile consisted, the absurdity of this crimination might have been made as manifest as in this. That which he conceals, and which he would have his readers rather take to themselves, than show himself clearly to stand to the maintenance thereof, seems to be this; that every one hath power given him to believe, to repent, to change his heart, yea to regenerate himself, but it sticks in his teeth, and he dares not speak it out plainly. Only he keeps himself to God's resolution, concerning man's unavoidable damnation; yet we maintain not that any contingent things come to pass avoidable, that were utterly against the nature of a contingent thing, which is to come to pass, so as joined with a possibility of not coming to pass. And as for damnation in particular, we acknowledge it throughout, to be avoidable by repentance, and not otherwise, unto men of ripe years: And as for repentance, we say, that there is no man but may repent as long as he lives, through grace: so that in the issue the main point to be debated herein is, whether every man living hath such a grace given him as whereby he may repent. But upon this point though his whole discourse be grounded thereupon, yet is he content to say just nothing; lest their shameful and most unconscionable courses in dishonouring the grace of God, should be discovered and brought to light. But consider in a word or two as touching this universal grace, which they make to consist in the enabling of the will, to will any goodthing whereunto they shall be excited. If such a grace be universal, than every one hath power to believe, and power to repent. But this is untrue, for the Apostle telleth us of some, that they cannot repent. Rom. 2. 4. of the natural man, that he cannot discern the things of God; and that they are foolishness unto him; and while they seem foolishness unto him, is it possible that therein he should discern the wisdom of God? 1 Cor. 2. 14. our Saviour tells us of some, that they cannot believe: joh. 12. 46. and tells others to their face, saying, How can you believe, when ye receive honour one of another, and seek not the honour that comes from God only, joh. 5. 44. Likewise of them that are in the flesh Saint Paul saith, They cannot please God. Rom. 8. 8. 2. It is the habit of faith that enables us to believe, so that if all men have power to believe, it must be confessed, that all men have faith, but the Apostle saith, Fides non est omnium; 2 Thes. 3. 2. Tit. 1. 1. he saith it is electorum; like as Austin professeth Habere fidem, sicut & habere charitatem gratiae est fidelium: de praedest. Sanct. cap. 5. 3. Whosoever hath power to prduce a vital act, hath life in him; and consequently, whosoever hath power to produce any act of the life of grace, hath the life of grace in him: But the acts of faith and repentance, are the acts of the life of grace, therefore whosoever hath power to produce these, hath in him the life of grace. But this is not true of all, for the Scripture testifies of some, that they are dead in sin. Ephes. 2. 1. Are strangers from the life of God. Ephes. 4. 18. Again, than all should be regenerated, but that is untrue, for regeneration is signified, Psal. 19 in Scripture to be wrought by the word of God. 1 Peter. 1. 23. jam. 1. 17. But all have not the word of God. 4. If a man hath power to believe and repent, than the reason why a man doth not believe and repent, is not because he cannot, but because he will not; so that in the issue it comes to this, that a man may believe if he will, repent if he will; But such a power is not grace, but nature rather, as appears by Austin. l. 1. de Gtnesi contra Manich. cap. 3. where he professeth, that omnes possunt credere si velint: now compare this, with that he hath in the same place, where though he saith that omnes credere possint si velint, yet posse credere, simply taken, ariseth merely out of the gift of charity; which he professeth to be gratiae fidelium, de praedest. Sanct. c. 5. But there he professeth that posse habere fidem, is naturae hominum, the very natural condition of all men. I farther prove it by reason thus; Look by what power I can believe if I will, by the same power I can refuse to believe if I will; Now such a power is no other, then whereby a man is indifferent to do good or evil: but such a condition is not grace; for grace is goodness, now goodness doth not dispose any, either to good or evil indifferently, but precisely to that which is good; like as naughtiness disposeth a man only to that which is evil. He sleeps so sweetly upon his Arminian pillow, that his very dreams make him confident of the evidence of his deductions. And he gives reasons for it, and that of most force for conviction, namely the confession of his adversaries; the maintainers of absolute reprobation, for even they, he saith, do not deny this, but ascribe unto God sanctam simulationem, duplicem personam, duplicem voluntatem. But he names none, content to sing to himself & his Muses throughout, when he relats what our sides answer to his profound discourses. And I commend his wisdom more than his honesty in this, for if he had quoted his Authors herein, it may be something might have been discovered that would be little pleasing unto him: yet herein he confounds things much different; for as for a double will ascribed unto God, all the Learned do acknowledge so much, and the Scriptures testify it; as namely, that his decree is called the will of God: as, what the Lord willeth, that hath he done, both in heaven and in earth, and who hath resisted his will? as also that God's commandment is called usually the will of God, as, This is the will of God, even your sanctification, that every one should know how to possess his vessel in holiness, and honour, and not in the lust of concupiscence, as the Gentiles do which know not God. 1 Thes. 4. 4, 5. as for duplicem personam, that is a phrase which I never read before, yet the phrase of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is usually in the Holy Scripture, as when God takes unto him both the members of a man's body, and the passions of his mind; and so speaks in the way of condescension to our infirmities, as to put upon himself the person of a man: and this is undeniable by all that are not Anthropomorphites. And as touching our blessed Saviour, we acknowledge in him duplicem naturam, a double nature, though not duplicem personam, a double person, and accordingly sometimes, he both speaks of himself, and is spoken of, as touching the nature of his Godhead, and sometimes as touching the nature of his Manhood. As for the first, that alone is material to his present purpose, namely, as touching Sancta Simulatio, ascribed unto God by our Divines. Now it were worth the while to know who is his Author in this, and that of the passages alleged by this Author, doth profess that they do represent in God an holy kind of simulation: How could he expect that this should give any satisfaction, seeing he conceals the Author of it? And what reader would not be moved, with a very greedy desire to know the Author of such an interpretation of the passages alleged by this. Divine, that he might consider whether it be rightly alleged or no; and if rightly, with what sobriety they deliver it? Now I remember well to have read in Piscator, that the Scripture attributes in a certain place Simulation unto Christ, not in any passage of this nature we treat of, as namely, Luke 24. 28. Where it is said, he made as though he would go farther: like enough to irritate their devotions, and to provoke their zealous desire so much the more to retain him a little longer. And I willingly profess not the Simulation, but the Dissimulation of this Author in this case hath stirred up a desire in me to be satisfied, as touching the Author of this Sancta Simulatio. Now I find in Piscator his answer to Vorstius his Parasc●uen, the first part pag. 29. both that place of simulation attributed unto Christ out of Luke 24. 28. And also, how that in the examples of God's messages sent to Hezekiah, that he should die and not live; And to the Ninevites by Jonah, Yet forty days and Nineve shall be destroyed, his opinion is, that therein God doth signify care, se velle quod non 2 Kings 20. 1. jonah. 3. 4. vult. His words are these; Adhaec etsi Deus interdum significet se velle quod non vult, non tamen propterea hypocriseos insimulandus est; (for this Vorstius objected unto him) Sed potius sapientia ejus agnoscenda in hominibus ad serias preces & seriam poenitentiam adducendis; ut liquet in exemplo Begis Ezekiae recuperantis sanitatem & Ninivitarum conservatorum: and whereas Vorstius lays to his charge, that in saying God commands one thing, and purposeth another, he doth impute unto God Hypocrisy, (which is the very substance of this Author's answer in this place.) See I pray how he answers it without attributing any holy simulation at all unto God in this case. Ad praecepta vero quod attinet: non statim sequitur Deum agere Hipocritam si quid praecipiat, quod fieri nolit; etenim hypocritam is demum agit, qui simulat pietatem quâ caret. Sane quicquid praecipit Deus, id vult voluntare approbante, si fiat, nisi interveniat praeceptum contrarium, ut factum est in praecepto quod dederat Abrahamo de mactando Isaaco. Interim tamen voluntate decernente non vult ut singuli ea faciant quae omnibus Genes. 22. praecipit, ut liquet in caede Christi per Judam & Judaeos perpetratâ. Acts 2. 4. Hereupon I look farther, and consider what Vorstius hath answered unto this. Now Vorstius his answer hereunto is this. Amic. duplic. p. 137. Non is tantum hypocrita est qui pietatem simulat quâ caret, sed & ille qui dolosè alterum sub blandâ specie decipit, offerens ei salutem quam nunquam in animo habuit ipsi dare. Piscator in his answer hereunto, doth not distinguish between hypocrisy, and a holy simulation, as if he denied the former of God, and affirmed the latter. But Vorstius himself doth not deny unto God, all kind of simulation, but only dolosam, such as is deceitful, Amic. duplic. p. 135. 138. And withal professeth, that God may signify that he willeth some thing which indeed he willeth not. I am persuaded, for fear of starting this, this discourser was loath to name his Author, if so be he himself read that which he here speaks of, sancta simulatio in Piscator, and took it not hand over head from another's information, without all crime of hypocrisy; his words are these. p. 138. Fateor equidem Deum non continuò hypocriseos insimulandum esse, si interdum aliquo modo significet se velle quod revera non vult: posset enim hoc facere si velit ex absolutâ suâ authoritate, nempe cum eis de rebus agitur, quae neque cum sanctissima ipsius natura, neque cum voluntate jam in verbo patefacta quicquid pugnant. And whereas he farther urgeth, that nevertheless, we must not yield easily any manner of simulation attributed unto God, though it be not deceitful, laying it to Piscator's charge, that he did attribute simulation unto God, in the message he sent by Isaiah to Hezekiah, and that other sent by Jonah to the Ninevites; Piscator denies that he affirmed any such thing, or that he alleged the examples of Hezekiah and the Ninevites to any such purpose, though he addeth, that in his opinion, it is not disagreeable to those examples, to acknowledge an holy simulation of God therein: take his own words; Tu hic pugnas sine Adversario: nam ego neque affirmavi facile aliquam simulationis speciem Deo tribuendam esse, neque exempla illa Ezekiae & Ninivitarum huc retuli: Interim non puto ab exemplis illis alienum esse, ut sanct a Dei simulatio in illis statuatur. And this it may be is the only ground of this Authors calumnious pretence in this place; namely, that some maintainers of absolute reprobation, do not deny that which he infers concerning Simulation divine, in the passages alleged by him, ascribing unto God sanctam simulationem: whereas Piscator acknowledgeth not any such thing, in any passages of Scripture alleged by this Author, but only as touching the examples of Hezekias, and the Ninevites, and that in this modest manner only, that albeit he did not allege them to any such purpose, as to maintain simulation in God's courses, yet non puto (saith he) ab exemplis illis alienum esse ut sancta Dei simulatio in illis statuitur. And Vorstius himself acknowledgeth that simulation may be attributed unto God, and I think he doth not mean it of any unholy simulation, and that he thinks God may signify, that he willeth something, which indeed he willeth not. Now judge I pray of the spirit of this man, that taketh such base courses, to calumniate both the servants of God, (who are now at peace with God, but his malice is not at peace with them) and through their sides, the truth of God also. But it may be this Author relates it but from a second hand. But whosoever be the Author, I pray judge accordingly of his Rhetorical flourish upon the back of this, in comparing this opinion of God's courses, which is no more Piscator's, than Vorstius his, in some cases, with Jesuits equivocation, and Politicians Holywater and crafty dissimulations, with Absalon's feast, Joabs' congee, and Hyaenaes' tears; because forsooth, God made show to Hezekiah, that he should live no longer, and to the Ninevites, that their City should be destroyed, though he had no such meaning, and all to stir them up to turn unto God by hearty prayer and repentance, and that to lay this to the charge of the Almighty, is far from truth and honesty. DISCOURSE. SUBSECT. III. THat which is usually said by such as maintain the absolute decree, to clear God from hypocrisy in these things, is, That God seriously wisheth the salvation of the Reprobate, but not absolutely, he would have them to be saved, that are not saved; but yet upon condition they will repent and believe; and therefore though they do perish, yet is God can did and sincere in his offers of salvation to them; for therefore do they perish because they perform not the condition, not because God offers not seriously salvation unto them. But this answer is too short. 'tis true indeed, God will have all men to be saved only upon condition they will believe and repent; according to the speech of Saint Ambrose, Deus vult omnes salvari si & ipsi velint; for if he would absolutely have it so what can hinder it? who hath resisted his will? And it is true likewise that a conditional promise may be serious as well as an absolute; but then the condition must be possible unto them, to whom the offer and promise is made; and the performance of the condition must be a part of God's will, as well as the salvation promised; or else the promise cannot be candid and sincere. In substance it is all one, not to offer a courtesy at all and and to offer it under a condition not possible, and in circumstance it is far better to deny a benefit absolutely, than so to promise it. For such a promise is a denial under a colour of the contrary. The Lawyers tell us that a contract Sub conditione impraestabili nullus aestimatur: And the Logicians, that propositio conditionalis quae habet annexam conditionem impossibilem, aequipollet simpliciter neganti. Any offer which is made upon a condition not performeable by the party is equivalent to a bare negation. It is all one for a man to deny a piece of money flatly to one blind man, and to promise it to another blind man upon a condition that he will look upon it with his eyes, and it is all one for a man that hath a daughter to bestow in marriage to tell the suitor I will give you my daughter if you will but span the earth and touch the heavens with your finger; and to tell him plainly, set your heart at rest I will never bestow her upon you. And thus have I showed the contrariety of this opinion to the principal attributes of God: which is my second general reason against it TWISSE. Consideration. THat Salvation, and that by the ordinance of God, is only obtaineable by men of ripe years, by faith and repentance, as also, that in case every one should believe and repent, every one should be saved, is without question. For hath not our Saviour professed, that whosoever believeth shall be saved; and doth it not undeniably follow herehence, that it is Gods will, that whosoever believeth shall be Mark. 16. 16. saved: Neither is this any wish as this Author feigneth, neither doth any of our Divines say, that ever I read, or till now heard of, that God wisheth that all that believe shall be saved; this being a most absurd speech and contradiction to the ordinance of God. For those things which God or man are said to wish, are such which do not always come to pass: but this ordinance of God, whosoever believeth shall be saved, is more stable than the covenant which God hath made with day and night. Not any Arminian that ever I read, doth express himself in so prostitute a manner, as to say, God seriously wisheth the salvation of Reprobates, in case they believe. For he hath not wished, but ordained, and made it a positive law, that whosoever believeth shall be saved, and herehence it followeth, that if all and every one, from the beginning of the World to the end, shall believe in Christ, all and every one of them shall be saved. But when they speak of velleity in God, or wishing, the object thereof they make not to be the salvation of men in case they repent, but absolutely the salvation of men: which kind of velleity, is resolved indeed in the issue, into a conditionate will, thus; Gods will is, that all shall be saved in case they repent: not thus, I do wish that all may be saved in case they repent, according to the most absurd fiction of this Author. At length he grants that God will have all men to be saved, only upon condition they will believe and repent; and that conditional promise may be serious, as well as an absolute: but then (saith he) the condition must be possible to them, to whom the offer and promise is made, and the performance of the condition must be a part of God's will, as well as the salvation promised, or else the promise cannot be candid and sincere. Whereto I answer, that it is confessed on both sides, that God hath ordained, that all that believe shall be saved, and consequently it must be granted, that the promise of salvation hereupon, to wit, upon faith, must needs be candid and sincere, it being the promise of God. Now shall we herehence infer hand over head, that therefore the condition must be possible unto all, in spite of all other evidences to the contrary, though never so plainly and expressly laid down unto us in holy Scripture; as namely, that a natural man perceives not the things of God, they are foolishness unto him, neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned. 1 Cor. 2. 14. That they that are in the flesh cannot please God. Rom. 8. 8. That they who are accustomed to do evil, can no more do good, than a Blackamoor change his skin, or the Leopard his spots. Jer. 13. 23. This is the immodest course of this Author, to set up one piece of Scripture, by his paltry consequences, to outface another, nothing less evident. Notwithstanding this Scripture discovereth unto us, how this impotency of doing good, is contracted unto us all, by sinning in Adam, as whereupon we were bereft of grace, and of the spirit of God: yet if he would deal fairly, and deny original sin, he should err no more than Pelagius did, and withal, he should have as much ingenuity as Pelagius had: But now though equal to him in the one, yet is he inferior to him in the other. But come we nearer to him than so; What one of our Divines denyeth the performance of this condition to be possible to all men? But is it fit that he should talk of possibility (as he doth at large,) without any reference to the grace of God? And dares he say that it is possible to any man, whether elect or reprobate, without grace? I say he dares not say so much, though like enough, he and all the Sect of them, have a good mind to it. What then is the issue of all this Controversy between us, but to inquire what manner of grace that is, without which it cannot be, that any should believe? Is it only such a grace, as giveth only power to believe? This is no better than plain Pelagianism, as appears by Austin de great. Christ. cont. Pelag. & coelest. c. 6. and in the end, where he comes to make an overture for the compounding of the Controversy between them: Or, Is it some other grace prevenient, working only Morally by way of persuasion? This also appears clearly to have been the opinion of Pelagius, in the same book of Austin cap. 10. And he challengeth him to the acknowledging of another manner of grace, if he will not only be called a Christian, but be indeed a Christian: Or Lastly, is it only grace subsequent, by way of concourse, as to say, that God works in us the act of believing, provided that we will believe? This, this is that Helena, that our home-born Arminians are enamoured with, mere Pelagianism: for who seeth not, that thus the grace of faith is conferred Ro. 9 18, 19 according to the acts of willing in men, which is as much as to say, 'tis conferred according to works. Then mark yet farther absurdities; for thus God hath not mercy on whom he will in giving faith, but on whom man will; and what colour is there in this case, for any such objection to be made hereupon, as is devised by the Apostle? Thou wilt say then, why doth he yet complain, for who hath resisted his will? Further consider; Doth not God in this manner concur to the most sinful act that is committed in the world? And why then do we not as well say; that the commission of sin is not possible without grace subsequent; for certainly 'tis not possible without divine concourse. Lastly say farther, what is the grace required to the very act of willing; Doth God work this also by grace subsequent? As much as to say, God works in us the act of willing, provided we work it in ourselves. Such morsels as these can easily go down with these stomaches, which are apt to tumultuate upon the hearing that God hath power to make whom he will vessels of mercy, or vessels Rome 9 21, 22, 23. of wrath; man must be the crafts-master of his own fortunes, and it were neither agreeable to God's mercy, nor to his justice, nor to his truth, unless their freewill hath the greatest glory of their conversion; and God be admitted no more to the working of that act of faith, and of repentance, than to the working of the most sinful act that is committed in the world. But I find it nothing strange, that as many as refuse to be in subjection unto God, have liberty enough to be made vassals, and be brought in subjection unto their own corrupt and unreasonable fancies. For the word of God forsooth must be tempered, and interpreted according to the rules of their reason; their reason must not be ordered, and squared according unto the word of God. But to proceed, the Lawyer's rule of the nullity of a contract, sub conditione impraestabili, is nothing to the present purpose: For the case is not alike between man and man; and between God and man. God stands not at the pleasure of man, to contract in what manner he thinks good. And when he hath given him power to perform, whatsoever at any time he shall command him; if man disable himself, shall God hereby be deprived of his right to command what he thinks good, and to punish for disobedience as he thinks good? We read of some, that have cut off their thumbs, to disable themselves for military service: is it not just with men to punish such, as run away after they have received their press moneys? But there is yet another geofaile in the accommodation of this rule of Law. For, conditio impraestabilis there, is such as cannot be performed by reason of impotency natural; but the impotency we speak of, in the case between God and man, is merely impotency moral; to wit, therefore they cannot, because they will not, were it not for the corruption of their will, no power were wanting in man to believe, and repent. But as Austin saith, alleged by the Britain Divines out of Retract. 1. 15. Voluntas sine charitate est tota vitiosa cupiditas; and upon the 3d d and 4th artic. De conversione, qua denotat immediatum opus Dei hominem regenerantis. Thesi. 2. They profess that in voluntate lapsa est potentia passiva ad esse hoc supernaturale extrinsecus adveniens, recipiendum, non autem activa, ad idem vel per se, vel cum alio producendum. Jer. 17. 14. Sana me domine & Sanabor. And out of the Synodical Epistle of the Bishops of Africa to the same purpose, they allege this passage, In vivificandis hominibus Deus nullum initium voluntatis humanae expectat, sed ipsam voluntatem bonam faciendo vivificat. And also that of Austin de corep. & gra. cap. 14. Creatio in Christo in libertatem voluntatis facta est, & sine nobis: si in libertatem, tum non ex libertate: si sine nobis, tum penes nos non est hoc Dei opus impedire. Be it all one to deny a piece of money flatly to a blind man, and to promise it upon a condition, that he will look upon it with his eyes: In like sort, as touching the Reprobate, God hath no purpose to give salvation, but to deny it rather; although he give this general rule, that whosoever believeth shall be saved; Mark. 16. 16. and therefore he gives this rule, because he purposeth by these means, to draw his elect unto Christ by faith; such a manner being most agreeable to their reasonable natures. And the reason why the rule is proposed to all, is, because partly God's Ministers are not acquainted with God's counsel so far, as to know whom he hath elected; partly in respect that the more carnal men are, the more confident they are of performing any such duties, I mean of power to perform it, as namely to believe, to obey, to repent: partly to the end, that some hereby may be brought, ad exteriorem vitae emendationem, quo mitius puniantur, as Austin sometimes speaketh: as also because there is a kind of faith, performeable by a natural man; for we see both profane persons and Hypocrites, concur in an outward profession of Christianity, with the children of God: yet there is a great difference between blindness natural, and blindness spiritual; for in the one there is a will and desire to see, not so in the other; the one being impotency natural, the other moral. And in a word, there is no impotency moral in man, that hath not been brought upon him through sin, either original, of actual. As for the spanning of the earth, or touching the heaven with ones finger, this never was in the power of man; but to believe any word of God, I hope this Author will not deny to have been sometimes in the power of man: nay he seems to be of opinion, that it is in the power of all men still, yet he would not be thought to deny original sin. One thing yet remains to be considered; he said to whom the promise of salvation is made, the performance of the condition, must be a part of God's will, as well as the salvation promised: But of what will of God must this be a part? Of his will as it signifies his commandment? We grant it is; for he commands, saying, Repent and believe the Gospel; and by this commandment it is apparent, that it is the will of God, that it shall be the duty of every man, that hears this commandment, to obey it. But will he have it a part of God's will, to work it effectually in all? And how I pray? Either by way of grace prevenient, or by way of grace subsequent? Not by way of grace prevenient, for then all that hear the Gospel, should believe and be saved; for to work Faith effectually that way, is to work the will unto Faith. As for the working of it by way of grace subsequent; this I have been lately taught by an Arminian, to be no other than the working of it by way of concourse, and that depends on the will of man: and we do not deny, but that if any Reprobate will believe, God will concur to the working of this belief; but so we say, (and no Arminian that I know will deny it) that if man will work any sinful act, God will concur to the working of it; in as much as 'tis generally held, that no acts of the creature, can be performed without God's concurrence thereunto. Now how well, and how judicially this Author hath played his part in showing the contrariety of our opinion to the Attributes of God, I am content the indifferent may judge. DISCOURSE. The third sort of Reasons, namely, that it is contrary to the nature and end of God's gifts conferred upon men. SECT. I. Thirdly, it is contrary to the nature and end of God's gifts conferred upon, men which gifts are of two sorts: 1. Gifts of nature, our creation, sustentation; preservation; together with health, strength, beauty, wisdom; etc. 2. Gifts of grace, which have a more immediate relation to everlasting life, and are means either, 1. Of purchasing salvation, viz. the coming of Christ into the world to be made a sacrifice for sin; or. 2. Of applying the salvation purchased, namely, the Ministry of the Word and Sacraments, the long suffering of God, the illumination of men's understandings, the plantation of many excellent virtues in their hearts, and many more of the like sort. What the true use and end of these gifts of nature and grace is, the Scripture doth plainly and particularly show us. First, for the gifts of nature, we find that they are bestowed on all that have them, for the encouraging and enabling of them to serve God, and save their souls: for, Act. 14. 16, 17. the Apostle saith, that God (even in these times wherein he permitted the Gentiles to walk in their own ways, and withheld from them the light of his holy word,) did give unto the people of the world, rain from Heaven, and fruitful seasons, filling their hearts with food and gladness, by these not leaving himself without witness: which implies that he gave them these good things, make himself known unto them, and so that he might draw them to glorify him, according to their knowledge of him, Acts. 17. 26. The Apostle saith directly, that men are therefore made and placed in this world, and appointed to their several times and dwellings; that they may seek God and find him, that is, that they may serve him and save themselves; for what is it to seek God but to serve him? And what is it to find God, but to enjoy his face and favour here and in Heaven? Caelum quip & terra & mare, omnisque creatura quae videri & intelligi potest, ad hanc praecipue Prosper de vocat. gent. l. 2. c. 4. p. 428. disposita est humani generis utilitatem; & natura rationalis de contemplatione tot specierum, & de experimentis tot bonorum, de perceptione tot munerum, ad cultum & dilectionem sui imbueretur authoris, implentis omnia spiritu Dei, in quo vivimus, movemur, & sumus. They are the words of Prosper: therefore is every creature made and ordained, especially, that mankind which is endued with knowledge and ability to discourse, might by the sight of so many goodly sorts of creatures, and the razed of so many blessings, be drawn to the love and service of his and their maker. And a little after, in the same Chap. he saith, Quod ergo in Israel per constitutionem legis, et prophetica eloquia gerebatur, hoc in universis nationibus totius creaturae testimonia et bonitatis Dei miracula semper egerunt: look of what use the law and Prophets were to the Israelites; of the same use were the gifts of creation and providence to the Gentiles. God intended not to do to the Gentiles (as the Manichees say he dealt with the jews) to feed them and fat them up with more outward blessings, as so many hogs and swine with husks and acorns, but to draw them up by these to an expectation of better things, and a careful endeavour to please God, that so they might obtain them. The end of all creatures and of all created gifts bestowed upon man is subordinate to the end of man; man's end is to glorify God on Earth and to enjoy perpetual society with him in Heaven. And their end is to encourage and direct man to achieve that high and noble end which his Creator hath appointed him. TWISSE Consideration. HEre we have a roving discourse: I must pick out of it what I can, to draw it up to some sense of argument: the ground of all the pith and substance of it, is two places in the Acts, and two passages out of Prosper. The first out of Acts 14. 16, 17. God in times past suffered all the Gentiles to walk in their own ways; nevertheless he left not himself without witness, in that he did good, and gave us rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness. Now as for the first verse of these, he is content to say nothing at all thereof; neither to deliver what those ways were, nor in what sense God is said to suffer them to walk therein: which yet may easily be cleared, by comparing it with what is delivered, Acts 17. 30. Where the times preceding the Gospel, are called times of ignorance. The times of this ignorance, and this agreeth with the comparative difference made between Jews and Gentiles, Psal. 147. 19 He showeth his words unto jacob, his statutes and judgements unto Israel. v. 20. He hath not dealt so with any Nation: and as for his judgements, they have not known them. So that by the ways of the Gentiles, I understand the ways of Ignorance; and these are no other than the ways of darkness, and can bring forth no better fruit, than the works of darkness; according to that of the Apostle, Ephes. 5. 8. Ye were darkness but now are light in the Lord, walk therefore as children of the light. And again, the night is Rom. 13. 12. passed, the day is at hand, let us therefore cast away the works of darkness, and put upon us the armour of light. And as for Gods suffering of them to walk in those ways, that is expressed in another phrase, Acts 17. 30. thus, And the times of this ignorance God winked at; and the meaning thereof appears by the Antithesis, in the adversative following, thus, But now he admonisheth every man every where to repent. Thus formerly he dealt with the Jews, giving them a law, and sending Prophets from time to time, to call them to obedience, to repentance: but such were not his gracious proceedings with the Gentiles. But give we him leave to follow his own advantage. God left not himself without witness, in sending rain and fruitful seasons. So it was in most places, I know none but Egypt excepted, and that is to be excepted; not only by evidence of Philosophical inquisition after the cause thereof, in that question, Utrum Aegyptus sit impluviata? but by evidence out of God's word. Deut. 11. 10, 11, 12. The land whether thou goest to possess, is not as the Land of Egypt, from whence ye came, Deut. 11. 10, 11, 12. where thou sowedst thy seed, and wateredst it with thy foot as a garden of herbs; but the land whither ye go to possess it, is a land of mountains and valleys, and drinketh water of the rain of heaven. This Land doth the Lord your God care for; the eyes of the Lord thy God are upon it, from the beginning of the year to the end of the year. Yet had they fruitful seasons by the inundation of Nilus; but this was not so apt to dispose them, to take notice of a divine providence, as the common course of fructifying the Land by rain. But yet the whole world in the frame thereof, was sufficient evidence of the Eternal power and Godhead. Rom. 1. 20. and Psal. 19 1. The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handy work. And albeit Aristotle, the greatest of Philosophers, maintained the eternity thereof without beginning; yet he confesseth ingeniously in his Book De coelo, that all that went before him maintained mundum genitum esse; neither was his discourse of power to raze out that natural instinct hereof, which seems to be graven in the hearts of men, and was the chief ground of that universal acknowledgement of a divine power supreme. Now as God made himself known by his works so I nothing doubt but herewithal it was their duty to know him, and according to their knowledge to serve him and glorify him, in acknowledgement of his glorious nature, so far as they took notice of it; But as for a rule whereby they should worship him, I know none that God had given them, or that they could gather from contemplation of the creatures. And surely the knowledge of God, as a Creator only, is nothing sufficient to salvation; but the knowledge of him as a redeemer: And therefore seeing the World by wisdom knew not God in the wisdom of God, it pleased God by the foolishness of Preaching to save them that believe. 1 Cor. 1. 21. And the Gentiles are set forth unto us in Scripture, as such who knew not God. 1 Thes 4. 5. 2 Thes. 1. 8. And had they means sufficient without, and ability sufficient within to know him? How could it be that none of them should know him? Was it because they would not? How absurd a conceit is this to every one that understands, and considers common Principles of Philosophy, namely, that the things that are subject to our freewill, are contingentia aequaliter, as soon falling out one way as the other? And it is well known not only what pains they have taken, but also with what strange success, in searching after the nature of the first mover, as appears by Aristotle in the 12th of his Metaphysics. Yet did not he attain (for aught ever I could find) to the acknowledgement of his free agency, in the making of the world, and in the government thereof. Yet were they inexcusable (and thus far their knowledge brought them. Rom. 1. 20.) in changing the glory of the incorruptible Rom. 1. 23. God, to the similitude of the image of a corruptible man, and of birds, and of fourfooted beasts, and of creeping things. The other place is Acts 17. 26. That he takes to be more full for his purpose; there the Apostle speaking in an University, and which had been miserably corrupted with the Atheistical doctrine of Aristotle, concerning an eternity of the World, and Gods working necessarily, not freely, tending to the quenching of that light of natural instinct, which is more or less found in all, as touching the Divine providence; yet the Apostle even amongst such makes bold to suppose the creation of the World by God; and that therefore he is Lord of Heaven and Earth; and also obtrudeth upon their natural consciences, that God it is who giveth life, and breath, and all things; and that he of one blood (whom we know to be Adam) made all mankind, to dwell on all the face of the Earth; that he hath assigned the seasons (of the year, and what are they but Spring, Summer, Autumn, Winter, depending upon the motions of the heaven above) and the bounds of their habitations, what is that but the several habitable parts of the earth, for the habitation of all creatures, in whose Nostrils is the breath of life; not that every man, or Nation, hath his place of habitation apppointed by God, (though this also be true, but nothing agreeable to Arminian Divinity, which like an East wind, blasts the providence of God throughout) this the Apostle doth not obtrude upon them; but the former generals only; and all this God hath done 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that they should seek the Lord; now this may be understood two ways, either de facto, God did intend that this indeed should be done by them; or ex officio, that it should be their duty: of this distinction this Author takes no notice, but hand over head, takes it in the first sense, as it were in spite both of the Apostle, saying, Who hath resisted his will? And of the Psalmist, professing that what he willeth he hath done, both in Heaven and Earth. But indeed this is man's duty to endeavour to know him that made him: to this purpose he hath endued him with an understanding heart; The spirit of man being as the lamp of God which searcheth all inwardness; But as for the words following, if happily they might Prov. 20. 27. seek after him and find him; though he be not far from every one of us; so that though he be not far from every one of us, in as much as in him we live and move, and have our being, and though they should seek after him, yet upon an if, the Apostle plainly puts the finding of him. For albeit Durand professeth, that by the very light of nature we may attain to the knowledge of God, touching these things that belong to the unity of his nature; yet who ever amongst the Gentiles attained hereunto, after all their search? God hath set the World in man's heart, saith Solomon, yet can he not find out the work that he hath wrought from the beginning to the end: we are yet to seek in the Eccles. 3. 11. knowledge of the creature, how much more in the knowledge of the Creator? Yet what shall all such knowledge profit a man, if he be ignorant in the knowledge of him as a redeemer? I come to Prosper l. 2. De vocatione Gentium cap. 4. God hath so disposed of the World, as that the reasonable creature, by the contemplation of God's works, and taste of so many blessings, imbuerctur, he doth not say might be drawn, but imbueretur, might be endued, to wit, with the knowledge of God in such sort, as to move him ad cultum & dilectionem Dei. And all here mentioned both as touching the knowledge of God, and touching the service and love of him; is but as the object of man's duty, signifying what ought to be done by him, not as the object of God's decree, as whereby he determined what should be done indeed by him. For had he determined this, who could have resisted him? Shall we say that voluntatis omnipotentis effectus impeditur a voluntate creaturae, as Austin Enchirid. cap. 96. expresseth the absurdity hereof? As for that which followeth, not in the same Chapter, as this Author writes, (whether out of his own reading or mistaking another's dictates I know not) but in the chapter following, to wit, c. 2. the former place being indeed c. 1. according to my book, not cap. 4. As this Author quotes it. And it is a truth considered in general, for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to seek the Lord, God did move both Jews and Gentiles; the Jews by his word over & above his works; but the Gentiles only by his works. But the manner of the revelation made to the one and to the other, was far different, as the same Author expresseth cap. 3. Aliter eos juvit quos ad cognoscendum se caeli & terrae testimoniis conveniebat, aliter illos, quibus non solum elementorum famulatu sed etiam doctrina legis Prophetarum, oraculis, miraculorum signis, & Angelorum cooperationibus consulebat, etc. God (he saith) intended not to feed the Gentiles with outward and more common blessings, but to draw them up by these to an expectation of better things, and a careful endeavour to please God that they might obtain them. But what blessings had the Gentiles more than common blessings; doth he particulate any? And as for the expectation of better things, than the things of this world, whereunto he pretends God doth draw them hereby; what oracle hath he for this? Prosper in the Book wherein he insists hath nothing at all of any possibility of knowledge of God unto salvation, arriveable unto by the mere contemplation of the creature; neither have I found any such Oracle throughout the Nation of the Arminians. Nay he professeth plainly, that that knowledge of God, which is attaineable by the contemplation of the creature is not sufficient, unless he enjoy the true light, to discuss the darkness of man's heart. De vocatione Gent. l. 2. cap. 6. his words are these. Tam acerbo natura humana vulnere sauciata est, ut ad cognitionem Dei neminem contemplatio spontanea plenè valeat erudire, nisi obumbrationem cordis vera lux discusserit. And the Apostle more than once professeth of the Gentiles, that they were without hope; And the taste of the powers of the world Ephes. 2. 12. 1 Thes. 4. 13. to come, seems to be, by the Apostle, ascribed to the word of God as the cause of it. Heb. 6. Yet 'tis true, the Heathen had odd notions of a condition after death, (as many as believed the immortality of the soul) but where I pray, was it upwards in heaven, or downwards rather under the earth, as Styx, Phlegeton? and the Campi Elisii? yet Cicero looks upwards I confess in his Tusculans questions, but yet he goes no farther than the stars; and this was their expectation of better things; though Adrian an Emperor and a Scholar too, bemoans himself, that he knew not what should become of his poor soul, Animula vagula blandula, Hospes comesque corporis; Quae tu abibis in loca, nec ut soles dabis jocos, horridula, rigida, nudula. But this Author most confidently supposeth, that these better things are manifest by the creatures; by the contemplation whereof, he might attain to the knowledge of them: and then I doubt not, but he might entertain a hope to attain them; provided he carefully endeavoured to please God, (which this Author conceives to have been very possible) and therewithal knew what that was, by doing whereof, he might be sure to please God: And all this he obtrudes upon his Reader, by a most dissolute course, without one crumb of reason for it. In like sort, he discourseth very confidently of the end of man, without distinction of any relation hereof; as if the end of man were equally known as well by light of nature, as by revelation of God's word. Solomon telleth us, That God made all things for himself, even the wicked against the day of evil. Was this known to the Gentiles by the light of nature? Not one of all the Prov. 16. 4. Philosophers of old acknowledged the World's creation out of nothing; and who ever manifested any such faith among them, as of enjoying a perpetual society with God in heaven? But it may be they all erred in interpreting the book of nature aright, and understanding the language thereof concerning this point of faith. This Author may do well to clear the World of this error, and that out of the book of the creatures, and then proceed to interpret unto us therehence, a general resurrection also. And if he could find Christ there too, together with the Incarnation of the Son of God, and his death and passion, resurrection and ascension, and sitting at the right hand of God to make request for us, and our justification by faith in him, together with regeneration also, and the general judgement; then no doubt though the Gospel should continue 1 Cor. 1. 32. to be a scandal to the Jews, yet surely through the incomprehensible benefit of his comfortable achievements, it should continue no longer to be foolishness unto the Gentiles; only our faith should then cease, and be turned into sight, before we are brought to the seeing of the face of God. And yet I see no great need of Christ, if it be in the power of an Heathen man to know what it is to please God, and to have an heart to please him; For certainly as many as know what it is to please God, and have an heart to please him, God will never hurt them, much less damn them to hell. Yet the Apostle telleth us, that they that are in the flesh cannot please God: Rom. 8. 8. but whether this Author thinks Heathens, to be amongst the number of them that are in the flesh, I know not. But I little wonder, when an Arminian spirit of giddiness hath possessed him, if he proceed to the confounding not only of the Law with the Gospel, but heathenism also (such as might be) with Christianity. But suppose a man might attain to as much knowledge, by the mere contemplation of the book of nature, as we do obtain by the Revelation of God's word, yet we that conceive the knowledge of God's word to be no impediment to the absoluteness of reprobation, must needs find ourselves as much as nothing straightened herein, by this Author's roving discourse, as touching the general providence of God in his works: as long as that of the Apostle (he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth) shall stand Rom. 9 18. and be received for the word of God; we shall never want ground for maintaining the absoluteness both of election by the one, and by just proportion, of Reprobation also by the other. For so long as God doth absolutely, and according to the mere pleasure of his will, decree to have mercy upon some, by giving them faith and repentance, for the curing of their infidelity and hardness of heart, this is very sufficient to maintain the absoluteness of election unto grace, and if God doth absolutely, and according to the mere pleasure of his will decree, to harden others, by denying them the grace of faith and repentance, so to leave their natural infidelity and hardness of heart uncured, this shall be as sufficient to maintain the absoluteness of Reprobation from grace. As for election unto salvation, though the decree thereof can admit no cause, yet we say that God by this decree, doth not decree to bestow salvation on any man of ripe years, but by way of reward of faith, repentance, and good works: as for the decree of Reprobation from glory, and to damnation; though the decree hath no cause, yet we say that God by this decree, doth not decree to inflict damnation on any, but for sin unrepented of: only I confess, that as touching the interpretation of those words of Saint Paul, (He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will Rom. 9 18. he hardeneth) I do not know how it may be charmed by good wits, lest it may seem repugnant to some reason gathered by contemplation of the creatures; for some affect, such a course in these days, namely to temper God's word according to the light of natural reason; whereas in the simplicity of institution wherein I have been brought up, I have been taught that the light of natural reason ought rather to be regulated by the word of God. DISCOURSE. SECT. II. NOw for the gifts of grace, they are all given to them that enjoy them for the same use and end also. 1. Christ came into the world, not that he might be a rock of offence, at which the greater part of men might stumble and fall; but shed his blood, and by his bloodshed to purchase Salvation unto all mankind, not only for those that are saved, but for those also who through their wilful impenitency and unbelief are not saved; as we may, see, john. 3. 17. God sent his son (saith our Saviour) into the world, not to condemn the world, but that the world through him might be saved; In which words the end of his coming into the world is set down; 1. Negatively [not to condemn the world.] 2. Affirmatively. [But that the world through him might be saved] and therefore fully. The like speech we have, john 12. 47. I came not to judge the world but to save it. These Negatives joined with the Affirmative deliveryes of the end of Christ's coming show that the Salvation of all men was the only end of his coming, the end exclusively, no other end was properly intended but this. The son of man came to seek and to save that which was lost Luk. 19 10. that is every man because every man was lost. And Acts 3. 26. To you hath God sent his Son jesus to bless you in turning every one of you from your iniquities [every one] that is, you that reject him, as well as you that receive him. The end of Christ's coming then into the world was the Salvation of all and every one therein. TWISSE Consideration. IF the gifts of grace are given for the same use and end, for which was given Creation and Providence to the Gentiles; then look to what end the gifts of grace are given, to the same end tends the making and governing of the World by God: as much as to say, look to what end tends the Book of God's Word, to the same end tends the Book of God's Creatures. And like as Christ came into the World for the salvation of all, and every one. So the book of God's creatures was given for the same end, namely, for the salvation of all and every one; and consequently it followeth (seeing God's wisdom prescribes congruous means to the end intended by him) that the book of the creatures, is a very congruous means for the salvation of all and every one. But whether this Author will have that knowledge of God revealed in the book of the creatures, tend only to this end, like as he saith, Christ came into the world, only to this end, I know not: Sure I am that Saint Paul saith, that the invisible things of God are made manifest from the creation in his Rom. 1. 19, 20. works, even his eternal power and Godhead, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that they might be without excuse. In the next place he tells us positively, that Christ came not into the World, that he might be a rock of offence, at which the greater part of men might stumble and fall; but to shed his blood, and by his bloodshed to purchase salvation for all mankind, etc. But this Antithesis which here he makes, is stark naught; For this very shedding of his blood, in a word Christ crucified, this very thing (I say) was it, that was both a Scandal to the Jews, and foolishness to the Gentiles. 1 Cor. 1. 23. And that not only the greater part of men might stumble and fall at this rock of offence, but all and every one, I thought it had been without all question: Nay undoubtedly all had stumbled, that is, had been taken with unbelief, if God in mercy had not provided better for them by the power of his grace. For dare any Arminian deny faith to be the gift of God? But was it not God's will that not only the greater part might stumble, but that indeed they should de facto stumble at this rock, and fall; and consequently that Christ came into the World, with such a purpose of God concerning them? I prove it thus; First out of Isaiah. 8. 14. He shall be as a stone of stumbling, and a rock of offence to both the houses of Israel, for a gin and for a snare to the inhabitants of jerusalem. 2. Again, 1 Pet. 2. 8. The Apostle professeth, that To them who are disobedient, Christ is made a stone to stumble at, and a rock of offence, being disobedient: and addeth expressly, that hereunto they were ordained. 3. Thirdly, Did not God intent that they should not be of God, as many as are not regenerated by him? If he did intend this, (and how can a man be of God, but by Gods making, and how is this possible to be done, without God his intending of it?) Then also he did intend they should not hear Christ's words, and consequently, that they should stumble at him; for therefore men hear not Christ's words, because they are not of God. john 8. 47. Yet let him win his opinion by argument, and wear it. But that out of john 3. 17. God sent his Son into the world, not to condemn the world but that the world should be saved by him, is a great deal too short to make the Child a coat; likewise that john 12. 47. is of no farther extent. The term World in each is an indefinite term, and it is in a contingent matter, and therefore it is equivalent only to a particular proposition, and not to an universal; Had it been delivered not of the world only, but of all the world, nor so only, but of all men in the world? yet Prosper, so much insisted upon by this Author, hath provided to our hands a fair interpretation, namely, that all men in Scripture phrase, is taken sometimes for all the elect only. As De vocatione gent. l. 2. c. 1. Apparuit gratia salutaris Dei omnibus hominibus, & tamen ministri gratiae odio erant omnibus hominibus: habente quidem salutis suae damnum rebellium portione, sed obtinente plenitudinis censum fidelium dignitate. And lib. 1. c. 3. Habet ergo populus Dei plenitudinem in electis & praescitis atque ab hominum generalitate discretis, specialis quaedam est universitas. Yet in my judgement, our Saviour's words in each place tend only to show, that his coming into the World in humility, was only to perform the work of man's redemption; and not to pronounce the sentence of condemnation on any, as he shall do at the last judgement, when he shall come in glory. And yet because much is to be done for a quiet life, let us distinguish the benefits of Christ's merits; Salvation we know is to be conferred on none of ripe years, but such as believe and repent; and undoubtedly if all and every one should believe and repent, all and every one should be saved by him: on the other side, if not one should believe and repent, not one should be saved by him. But what doth this Author think of faith and repentance? Are these also benefits purchased unto us by the merits of Christ? This is the point that puts all the Arminians to their purgation. If they be so, than I demand, Whether Christ purchased these to be obtained by all and every one, absolutely or conditionally? if absolutely, than all and every one must have faith and repentance; and consequently, all and every one must be saved: if only conditionally, then let them name upon what condition the gift of faith is to be obtained, and let them look to it, how they avoid the giving of grace according to men's works, which in the phrase of the Ancients, is the giving of grace according to men's merits. The son of man came to seek that which was lost. Luk. 19 10. We grant that; but when it is added, that is every man, we deny this: As for the reason added, for every man was lost; put these propositions into a Syllogism, and see what stuff it will make; thus, Christ came to save that which was lost; every man was lost; therefore Christ came to save every man. Now let every young Sophister judge, whether here be not four terms; had it been said, that Christ came to save every one that is lost, the place had been indeed alleged to the purpose. It is also said, I am not sent but to the lost Math. 15. 24. sheep of the house of Israel; let this be understood only as touching the exercising of Christ's Ministry among them; for this Author (I suppose) will not say he was sent to redeem them only; will it herehence follow, that seeing every one of them was lost, therefore he exercised his Ministry unto every one of them? how improbable a thing is this? How much less did he exercise his Ministry amongst the twelve Tribes dispersed in Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, etc. Yet my former distinction may serve to accommodate the business, and to clear the truth, although we prove so liberal as to grant him his hearts desire. Lastly as touching that, Acts 3. 26. To you hath God sent his Son to bless you, in turning every one of you from your iniquities; every one of you, that is, saith this Author's gloss, as well you that receive him, as you that receive him not. But let us not carry the matter in hugger mugger, without distinction. If this were the end of Christ's coming into the world, than it was intended by some one or other, and that must needs be God; Now did God intend that they should be turned from their iniquities absolutely or conditionally? If absolutely then all must be turned from them; if conditionally, then show what that condition is; if faith, we willingly grant, that as many as believe shall be blessed, and turned from their iniquities. For Christ indeed died for this end, namely, to redeem us from our iniquities, and to purge Titus 2. 14. us a peculiar people unto himself zealous of good works; But as for faith and repentance which is also a gift of Christ, Christ did not purchase this for all absolutely, for if he did then all should believe; if conditionally, then upon some work of man, and consequently the gift and grace of faith, shall be bestowed according unto man's works; which is express Pelagianism. To the contrary, that Christ died not for all; I prove thus: First, the reason why none can lay any thing to the charge of Gods elect, is because Christ died for them Rom. 8. If therefore Christ died for all, none can Rom. 8. 33, 34. lay any thing to the charge of a Reprobate, more than to the charge of Gods Elect. Secondly, Christ prayed only for those who either did or should believe in him; and for whom he prayed for them only he sanctified himself. joh. 17. And what is the john 17. 9, 19 meaning of the sanctifying of himself for them, but that he meant to offer up himself in Sacrifice upon the cross for them; as Maldonate confesseth, was the joint interpretation of all the Fathers, whom he had read. Thirdly, did he die only for all then living, or which should afterwards be brought forth into the World, or for all from the beginning of the world? If so, than he died for all those that already were damned. Fourthly, if he died for them, than Christ hath made satisfaction for their sins; and is it decent that any man should fry in Hell, for those sins for which Christ hath satisfied? Lastly, if Christ hath died for all, then hath he merited Salvation for all; and shall any fail of that salvation which Christ hath merited for them? Is it decent that God the Father, should deal with Christ his Son, not according to the exigence of his merits? If we had merited salvation for ourselves would God in justice have denied it unto us? Why then should he deny any man salvation, in case Christ hath merited salvation for him? DISCOURSE. SECT. III. 1. THe Ministry of the Word and Sacraments is given also to the same end, and is in its own proper nature and use an instrument of conveying the spirit of regeneration Suffrag. Britain p. 30. 31. Art: 2. Thesi. 5. to those that enjoy it, and to all those: I cannot have better proofs for this than those that our Reverend Divines of Dort have gathered to my hands. Isa. 59 21. This is my Covenant with them (saith the Lord) my spirit which is upon thee, and my words which I have put in thy mouth, shall not depart out of thy mouth, nor out of the mouth of thy seed, nor seeds seed for ever. Hinc patet (say they) from these words it appears, that the Word and Spirit are joined together in the Ministry of the Word, with an inseparable bond by promise of God. Hence it is that the Ministers of the New Testament are called Ministers not of the letter but of the Spirit, not of the letter which kills, but of the Spirit which gives life: and the Ministry of the Gospel is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in the same place; v. 8. the Ministry of the Spirit. 2 Cor. 3. 6, 8. Hence is the Gospel called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 grace bringing Salvation, Tit. 2. 11. and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The word of reconciliation. 2 Cor. 5. 19 To these let me add 1 Pet. 1. 23. where the word is called the seed of the new birth, and 2 Cor. 5. 20. where Ministers are called Ambassadors for Christ, to beseech men to be reconciled to God; and they are so called to show that the Word preached, is by God's appointment an instrument to make men new creatures, and that the matter of Minister's errand is peace and reconciliation; and the proper fruit of it in God's intent is not the obduration and destruction, but the conversion and salvation of men. The same men out of joh. 15. 22. (if I had not come and spoken to them, they should not have had sin, but now they have no cloak for their sin) do say it is evident, that Christ in his Preaching did administer so much inward grace, as was sufficient to convince those that rejected the Gospel of positive unbelief, and so to render them obnoxious to just punishment, and consequently (say I) so much as sufficed by their good husbandry, to have converted and saved them. For that grace leaves none inexcusable, which is unsufficient to convert them. I will conclude that which they say of this gracious intention of God in the Ministry of the Word, with that speech of Prosper cited by them in the same place; non omnes vocari ad gratiam eos, quibus omnibus Prosp. ad cap: Gall: resp. ad object: 4. Evangelium praedicatur, nonrecte dicitur; etiamsi sint qui Evangelio non obaudiant. They that say, that all those to whom the Gospel is Preached (even those that obey not the Gospel) are not called to grace, they say an untruth. God looks for grapes (saith the text) Isai. 5. 2. What doth this imply? but that it was Gods principal aim in the husbandry which he bestowed upon the Church of Israel, that it should bring forth good fruit, though in the end it did not. How oft would I have gathered you, saith Christ to Jerusalem, Math. 23. 37. and in John, 5. 34. These things have I spoken to you that ye might be saved, but ye will not come unto me that ye might have life. v. 40. Intimating no less than this that it was his full intent by his preaching to gather and to save those very particular men that in the end were not gathered nor saved through their neglect or contempt of Christ's Ministry, TWISSE Consideration. NO question but The word of God is the sword of the spirit. Ephes. 6. And the Law of the Lord is a perfect Law, converting the Soul, Psal. 19 And it seems to be delivered in opposition to the Book of the creatures, as if he had said, though The Heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handy work, yet this is the peculiar prerogative of the Book of God's word, and the Doctrine contained therein, that it converteth the soul: and upon this is grounded the great preferment of the Jews above the Gentiles, chiefly that unto them were committed the Oracles of God. Yet this Author is content to make no difference, between the use and end of the Book of Creatures, and the Book of God's word; but professeth the use and end of both, to be the very same. The passage alleged out of the suffrages of the Britain Divines, is most alien from the present purpose: For the Thesis of theirs, proceedeth of the administration of grace by the word, not of regeneration, but of conviction of all such, who believe not, and continue impenitent; that through their own fault, they perish for neglecting or contemning the Gospel. In Ecclesia ubi, juxta promissum hoc Evangelii, salus omnibus offertur, ea est administratio gratiae, quae sufficit ad convincendos omnes impenitentes & incredulos, quod sua culpa voluntaria, & vel neglectu, vel contemptu Evangelii perierint, & oblatum beneficium amiserint. And in the explication of this Thesis, they propose two things to be cleared. 1. That some measure of grace is ordinarily administered in the Ministry of the Gospel; aliquam mensuram gratiae ordinarie in Ministerio Evangelii administrari: and for proof hereof alone, they allege this passage out of Isai. 59 ult. This is my covenant with them saith the Lord, My spirit which is upon thee, and my words which I have put in thy mouth, shall not depart out of thy mouth: So that the word and spirit are joined together always; but not always to regenerate; but either to regenerate and bring to obedience, or to convict of disobedience. And accordingly, The Ministers of the New Testament, are called Ministers not of the letter, but of the spirit: that is not of the Law; the Ministry whereof, is not the Ministry of the spirit, but yet this is rightly to be understood, to wit, of the spirit of adoption, for undoubtedly even the Ministry of the Law, is the Ministry of the Spirit also, but Rom. 8. 2 Cor. 3. 9 of the spirit of bondage, to hold men under fear: it is called the Ministry of condemnation, and the reason hereof I conceive to be, because God doth not concur with the Ministry of the Law, by the holy Spirit, to work any man to the performance of the condition of the Law, which is exact and perfect obedience: but thus he doth concur with the Ministry of the Gospel, namely, by his spirit, to work men to the performance of the condition thereof, which is faith in Christ, and true repentance, therefore the letter, to wit of the Law, is called a kill letter; but the Gospel is joined with a quickening spirit, and therefore Piscator conceives, that the Gospel in this place is called by the name of the spirit. So than the Gospel giveth life by the spirit which accompanieth the Ministry thereof; but to whom? To all, as this Author supposeth? Nothing less, the general experience of the world doth manifest the untruth thereof. But this Author is ready to suppose (though not very forward to speak out in this) that it would regenerate if men were not defective to themselves. So then man must first perform some work on his part, and then the spirit of the Gospel doth regenerate them: as much as to say the grace of regeneration, is dispensed by God according to some work of man, which in plain terms Pelagius durst not profess, but joined with others to anathematise it in the Synod of Palestine. Yet this Doctrine is the very Helena wherewith the Arminians are enamoured. Now the Apostle professeth in plain terms of himself and his fellow-labourers, we are unto God the sweet savour of Christ in them that are saved, and in them which perish; to the one we are the savour of death unto death and to the other a savour of life unto life. 2 Cor. 2. 15, 16. So than it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Tit. 2. 11. and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the word of reconciliation. 2 Cor. 5. 19 And the seed of the new birth. 1 Pet. 1. 23. As where by God regenerates man; according to that of Saint james, of his own will hath he begotten us by the word of truth, jam. 1. 18. Not whereby man doth regenerate himself according to the Arminian tenet, whose doctrine it is, that God works in us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 velle credere and resipiscere modò velimus. Now as God hath mercy on women he will in converting his heart unto obedience, of faith and repentance, Rom. 9 18. and 11. 30. So God regenerates whom he will. So that we all grant that God's word is by God's appointment an instrument to make men new creatures. But whom? Not all indifferently, but the elect of God called the sheep of Christ; john 10. 16. Other sheep have I which are not of this fold, them also must I bring and they shall hear my voice. Mark I pray, who they are that shall hear Christ's voice, to wit, Christ's sheep, called also Christ's people. Acts. 18. 9, 10. Then said the Lord to Paul by night in a vision fear not but speak and hold not thy peace, for I am with thee and no man shall lay hands on thee to hurt thee, for I have much people in this City. Paul knew not who these were, yet for their sakes being thus encouraged, he would go on to Preach, and to become all things to all men, that he might save some. 1 Cor. 6. 22. And who were these some, but the elect, as elsewhere he signifies, saying, I endure all 2 Tim. 2. 10. things for the elects sake, called also the children of God. joh. 11. 51, 52. This he spoke not of himself, but being Highpriest that same year, he Prophesied that Jesus should die for that Nation, and not for that Nation only, but that he should gather together in one, the children of God which were scattererd. This gathering was to be performed by the word the instrument, by God's appointment, to make men new creatures: but upon whom should it work effectually? The Text plainly calleth them, and sets them forth unto us, by the name of God's children. The same men (saith this Author) that is, our Britain Divines at the Synod of Dort, do say out of john. 15. 22. (If I had not come and spoken to them, they should not have had sin, but now they have no cloak for their sin) it is evident that Christ in his Preaching did administer so much inward grace as was sufficient to convince those that rejected the Gospel of positive unbelief, and so to render them obnoxious to just punishment; Now hence this Author frames this inference, And consequently (I say) so much as sufficed by their good husbandry, to have converted & saved them; For that grace leaves none unexcusable which is insufficient to convert them. Now to this I answer, If our Divines had acknowledged any such consequence to be just, they had a fair calling to make profession of it at that time. But consider we the rest of their Thesis delivered in the same place. The first is this, Ex speciali amore & intention tum Dei patris tum Chisti, mortuus est Christus pro electis, ut illis remiffionem peccatorum & salutem aeternam reipsa obtineret, & infallibiliter conferret. It was of the intention and special love of God the Father and God the Son, that Christ should die for the elect, effectually to procure for them, and infallibly to confer on them pardon of sin, and salvation. The second is this, Ex hoc eodem amore per & propter meritum & intercessionem Christi dantur iisdem electis fides, & perseverantia, caeteraque omnia per quae conditio foederis impletur, & beneficium promissum, id est, vita aeterna infallibiliter obtinetur: out of the same love through and for Christ are given, to the same elect, faith and perseverance, and all other things, whereby the condition of the covenant is fulfilled. The third is this, Deus lapsi generis humani misereatus, misit filium suum qui seipsum dedit pretium redemptionis pro peccatis totius mundi; God having compassion on mankind fallen, sent his Son who gave himself, a price of redemption for the sins of the whole World: this I understand of the sufficiency of the price given, whereby it comes to pass, that Christ is remedium universo generi humano applicabile: as I have received from the mouth of one of those, and a principal one, in such sort, that if all the World should believe, all the World should be saved: now mark I pray, how they carry themselves in the explication of this Thesis, and what difference they put between Christ's dying for the elect, and his dying for others. Sic ergo pro omnibus mortuus est ut omnes & singuli mediante fide possint virtute 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hujus remissionem peceatorum & vitam aeternam consequi: Sic pro electis est mortuus ut ex merito mortis ejus secundum aeternum Dei beneplacitum specialiter illis destinato & fidem infallibiliter obtineant & vitam aeternam. So Christ died for all that all & every one by faith intervening, may by virtue of this redemption, obtain pardon of sin, and salvation; the meaning whereof is this, that every one may obtain remission of sin and salvation in case he doth believe, not that they have power to believe; For they profess immediately before, that whereas God hath ordained that after the acceptation of Christ's sacrifice, remission of sin and salvation, shall be conferred on none, but such as believe on the redeemer, here the secret decree of election openeth itself, when the price which was paid for all (mark the explication hereof in the words following) and which unto all believers shall redound, certainly to eternal salvation, yet it doth not profit all, because it is not given to all to fulfil the condition of this covenant; as much as to say, because faith is not given to all. The fourth Thesis. In hoc merito mortis Christi fundatur Mark. 16. 16. universale promissum Evangelicum juxta quod omnes in Christum credentes remissionem peccatorum & vitam aeternam consequantur. In this merit of Christ, is founded that universal promise of the Gospel, according whereto all that believe in Christ shall obtain pardon of sin, and everlasting life. The fifth Thesis, Is that which this Author insists upon, but preposterously applied by him; the Thesis runs thus, In Ecclesia ubi juxta promissum hoc salus omnibus effertur, ea est administratio gratiae quae sufficit ad convincendos omnes impenitents & incredulos, quod suâ culpa voluntaria & neglectu vel contemptu Evangelii perierint. Take the last Thesis in the last place. Non obstante hoc pacto universali de salvandis credentibus, Deus nulle pacto aut promisso tenetur Evangelium aut gratiam salutiferam omnibus & singulis communicare. Notwithstanding this general covenant of saving believers, God is not tied by any covenant or promise to communicate the Gospel and saving grace to all and every one. And that he bestows it on some, passing by others, it is of divine mercy and liberty. But let us examine the sobriety of the consequence, which this Author makes: namely, that if the grace administered in the Gospel, be sufficient to convict them who resist it of positive unbelief, than it is sufficient also by their good Husbandry to convert them. Mark I pray the nature of grace here shaped thus, sufficient by their good Husbandry (to wit, by the good Husbandry of the hearers) to convert them. Now wherein doth this conversion consist? Surely in believing, for of unbelief they are convicted by the Gospel, as many as contemn or neglect it: and hence he infers, that it was sufficient to convert them, which must be by the Antithesis, to bring them to faith, provided that they (that is the hearers) play the good husbands in the using of it; But what is it to play the good husbands? These and such like Phrasiologies, are the usual skulking courses of the Arminians, like the ink which the Fish Saepia casts forth, that she may thereby the better hide herself, and escape from the hands of the Fisher. But certainly it must be some work or other to be performed by the hearer, whereby he shall be brought to faith: therefore I say, it is either the work of Faith itself, or some other work preceding it: not of faith itself, for faith itself, cannot in reason be said to be a work, whereby a man is brought to faith. Secondly, herehence it followeth, that Man's good husbandry, being here distinguished from the work of Faith itself, the act of Faith is hereby made the work of man's will, not of God's grace: if some work preceding faith, whereupon faith is wrought by grace, it followeth that the grace of faith, is given according to man's works: this is the foul issue of their tenet, making faith either not at all the work of God, or if wrought by God, to be wrought according to man's work. And thus they shape the grace of God, conferring faith, not only towards Reprobates, but also towards the elect. Now observe I beseech you, how our Britain Divines do purposely reject this Doctrine in the Synod of Dort art. 3. in their third Thesis, of those which are rejected by them. The Thesis which they reject is, positis omnibus gratiae operationibus quibus Deus ad efficiendam hanc conversionem utitur, voluntatem hominis relinqui in aequilibrio: velitne credere vel non credere convertete se ad Deum vel non convertere. All the operations of grace supposed, the will of man is left in an even balance, whether he will believe or no, whether he will convert himself to God or no: this is the very opinion of this Author, against which our worthy Divines dispute there in this manner. If this were so, than it would follow that God by his grace, is not the principal cause of man's believing and conversion, but man by his free will rather: For in this case God shall not predominantly work man's conversion, but upon condition only, to wit, in case the will first move itself whereby the less work is given to God, and the greater work to man, to wit in man's conversion. 2. Herehence it will follow that God gives no more grace to the Elect than to the Reprobate, and that the elect are not bound to be more thankful to God than the non-elect, because the work of God in both is no other than to place the will in an even balance. 3. The grace of conversion is given with an intention that it shall prove effectual and to move, nay rather to bring man to the producing of the act of faith, in such sort, as it cannot be made in vain; Haec gratia a nullo duro corde respuitur ideo quippe tribuitur ut cordis duritia primitus auferatur. And seeing the good Husbandry of man's consists in obedience to the Gospel it appears hereby, that the grace they speak of is no other than the Gospel, exhorting to repentance, and this we confess is sufficient in a certain kind, to wit, in the kind of instruction and exhortation: and is not this sufficient to convict of unbelief as many as wilfully resist it, and such is the condition of all in hearing the Gospel, to whom God gives not the grace of conversion, for as Saint Austin Ep. 89. saith, Libertas sine gratiâ non est libertas sed contumacia, and no other impotency of belief do we ascribe to a natural man, but such as consists in contumacy, which is merely a fault and corruption of the will, not the defect of any natural power: and therefore as I said, the impotemcy of converting to God by faith and repentance, is impotency moral, consisting merely in the corruption of the will; and there is no question but every man hath as much power to believe as Simon Magus, of whom it is said that he believed. Fides in voluntate est (saith Austin) & credimus quando volumus, but the will of man is so corrupt, that without special preparation by God's grace, it is rather wilfully set to walk in the ways of flesh and blood, than obsequious to that which is good: we make no question but that as Prosper saith, every one that heareth the Gospel, is thereby called unto grace, even to obtain pardon of sin and salvation upon his faith in Christ and is called upon also to believe: but withal we say with our Britain Divines, Art. 3. De Conversione Thesi 1a. In the explication thereof, that God gives his elect not only posse credere si velint (which in Augustine's opinion lib. 1. de gen. contra Manic. cap. 3. and de praedest. Sanct. cap. 5. is common to all,) but velle credere, nay they spare not to profess that if God should work in us only posse credere, posse convertere, and leave the act of believing and converting to man's free will, we should all do as Adam did; and fall from God through our free will, and never bring this possibility into act; take their own words. Quod si vires quasdam infundendo daret Deus tantum posse credere, posse convertere, ipsum interim actum committeret libero hominum arbitrio, certe quod primus parens fecit faceremus omnes: libero arbitrio a Deo deficeremus nec possibilitatem hanc in actum perduceremus. Haec itaque eximia est illa specialis gratia qua non modo possunt credere si velint, sed & volunt cum possunt. Phil. 3. 13. Dat Deus nobis & velle & perficere. As for that which he discourseth of God's principal aim, that the Church of Israel should bring forth good fruit: let us speak plainly, and not cheat ourselves first, and then become impostors unto others: was it that which God did principally intend? God's intentions are his decrees, now if God did decree they should bring forth fruit de facto, who hath resisted his will? Nay take their own rules according to their doctrine of Scientia media. Why did God give them only such a grace to move them unto fruitfulness, which he foresaw they would resist? And refuse to give such grace, as he foresaw would not be resisted, and that without all prejudice to their wills? Let them answer unto this, for that God in the storehouse of his wisdom hath such courses as being used, he forseeth infallibly that any sin will be hindered, Arminius acknowledgeth, as I have often alleged him. But we may safely say, 1. That God intended it should be their duty to bring forth fruit. 2. If he did farther intend that the Church of Israel should de facto bring forth fruit, this he did bring to pass also: but withal let us consider what the Apostle teacheth us, and take that along with us also, namely, that all are not Israel, that are of Israel; and so in his elect he effecteth this. 3. I doubt not but this is pronounced chiefly for the elects sake, and though they are not as yet so fruitful as they should be, yet I nothing doubt, but this passionate expostulation, was a means to turn them to the Lord, that is, some of them: For God calls them not all at once, but some at one hour of the day, some at another. 4. It might be a means to bring others also, though not to true conversion, yet ad exteriorem vitae emendationem. As for that of our Saviour over Jerusalem Math. 23. 37. That is of another condition in two respects. Jerusalem neither saw his tears, nor heard his bemoaning of it; but we hear of it, and read it in his word, and it is equally effectual with the elect of God, and others also; as the expostulation we read Isai. 5. Secondly our Saviour was a man as well as God, and though the Son of God, yet made under the Law, and accordingly as much bound to desire and endeavour the salvation of all amongst whom he was sent, as any Prophet, or Apostle, or Minister of God's word. That in the 5. joh. 34. These things have I spoken unto you, that ye might be saved; What is the meaning thereof but this. These things have I spoken unto you, exhorting you to believe, that ye might be saved; according to that v. 24. He that heareth me, and believeth him that sent me, hath everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation, but hath passed from death to life: and by the words following, in the words alleged by him it appears, that there is no other intention of salvation meant, than in case they believe: But ye will not come unto me that ye might have life, v. 40. And as before I said, Christ being made under the Law, was bound, as well as we are, to desire the salvation of his Brethren, that is to desire and labour the conversion of those to whom he was sent, that so they might be saved. DISCOURSE. SECT. IV. THis is also the use and end for which the Sacraments were ordained, as we may see Luk. 7. 30. Where we have these words, But the Scribes and Pharisees and expounders of the Law despised the council of God against themselves, and were not Baptised of john. In which words thus much is plainly included, that it was God's counsel and purpose in john's Baptism, to bring them to Christ, and in him to Heaven; much more is it in the end of Christ's Baptism which is more excellent than john's was, not in substance but in the fullness of grace administered, and dispensed by it. Mark. 1. 4. All that have been Baptised into Christ (saith the Apostle) have been Baptised unto his death. Rom. 6. 3. And Gal. 3. 29. All ye that are Baptised into Christ have put on Christ, the very phrases there used show, that Baptism is in its original intention an instrument of uniting men to Christ and giving them communion with him in the benefits of his death: except a man be borne of water (saith Christ) and of the spirit, he cannot etc. joh. 3. 5. In which words are delivered two things. 1. The necessity of regeneration; (except a man be born again.) 2. The working causes of it, efficient, the Spirit of God, instrumental, the Sacrament of Baptism, there called water from the outward matter of it. Baptism therefore is appointed to be a means of regeneration to all those that are Baptised, and doth effect it in all that do not put an obstacle in the way to hinder it. For this cause doth the Apostell dignifye it (the layer of regeneration) Titus 3. 5. I will shut up this with Acts. 2. 38. Ephes. 5. 26. Where Peter saith, repent and be Baptised every one of you for the remission of sins: plainly implying that therefore is Baptism ordained to be received that those who do receive it might have their sins remitted. The patience of God also, which is another singular donation and gift of God to men, is exercised to this very end, as appears Rom. 2. 4. Despisest thou the riches of his goodness, and forbearance, and long suffering, not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance? But thou, after thy hardness of heart that canst not repent, heapest up etc. In these words we may note for our purpose, 1. God's end and intent in forbearing sinners, and that is the leading of them to repentance, and so to Salvation, (for repentance is Per se ordinata ad salutem as a means to the end.) 2. The persons to whom God intends this good by his forbearance, and they are such as despise the riches of his goodness, and have hard and impenitent hearts. 3. The issue and event of this their contempt of God's patience, and that is a treasuring up wrath unto themselves against the day of wrath. Out of all which laid togeher ariseth thus much, That God by sparing wicked men, who have hard and impenitent hearts, intends their everlasting good, though they, by the abuse of his patience, and refusal to repent, do treasure up to themselves wrath and eternal misery. The like to this is delivered in the 2 Peter 3. 9 God is not slack, (as some men count slackness) but patient toward us, that is, us men. And why patient towards us? Because he would have none to perish. The end therefore of God's patience is man's repentance and Salvation. TWISSE. Consideration. THough this Author doth little answer your expectation, in confining himself to Reprobation, therein to give you satisfaction, as touching the reason why he hath changed his mind in certain controversies; yet it may be, his purpose is to make you amends, by acquainting you with some mysteries of his, concerning Baptism, out of Luk. 7. 30. Where it is said of the Scribes and pharisees, that in refusing to be Baptised of john, they despised the counsel of God against themselves; hence he infers, that it was God's counsel and purpose in john's Baptism, to bring them to Christ, and in him to heaven: as much as to say God purposed to bring them to Christ and to heaven, but they would not; and so it came to pass that Omnipotentis Dei voluntatis effectus, was hindered by the will of the creature, which Austin accounted a very foul Enchirid. c. 46. absurdity, as if God were not able to bring them to Christ: yet our Saviour professeth, that like as none can come unto him except the Father draw him, so on the other side, every one that the Father giveth me comes unto me, joh. 6. And the Apostle saith, Who hath resisted his will? john 6. Omnipotent facilitate convertit, saith Austin, & ex nolentibus volentes facit. But as for the Text, suppose the Evangelist had called it the purpose of God, yet the object of his purpose is not expressed, and why might it not be God's purpose to make it their duty to hearken to john, and to submit to the Lords Ordinance administered by john, as well as God's purpose that they should obey him, and be persuaded to be Baptised by him: yea and much rather too, considering the foul absurdity wherewith this interpretation is charged, as formerly I have showed; and he must have the stomach of an Ostrich, that can digest it. But where I pray was it ever read or heard before, that God's purpose is at any time despised? God's counsel indeed is too often despised, as when he saith, I council thee to buy of me gold, etc. Revel. 3. And the counsel of God signifieth no other will of God, than is the will of commandment, of admonition, of exhortation, and such like. But whereas he talks of a greater fullness of grace in the Baptism of Christ, than in the Baptism of john, this belief is one of his mysteries concerning Baptism. john Preached Christ unto the people, Acts 19 4. And john's Baptism was the Baptism of repentance for the remission of sins, that is, Preaching of repentance, he administered Baptism unto them in assurance of the forgiveness of their sins, upon their repentance. And therefore he put off the Scribes and pharisees, calling upon them to bring forth fruits of repentance first. So Peter speaks of the Baptism of Christ, Acts 2. Repent and be Baptised for the forgiveness of your sins. So was circumcision unto the Jews a Seal of the righteousness of faith, that is, of the forgiveness of sins through faith. It seems this Author is none of the Rhemists' adversary in this, who upon Math. 3. 11. writes thus. It is an Article of our adversaries, that the Baptism of Christ, is no better than the Baptism of john, they make it of no more value or efficacy for remission of sins, and grace, and justification than was john's: whereunto Mr Fulke makes answer, saying, Remission of sin is proper unto God as well in john's Baptism, as in the Baptism of Christ, and that john in that place compares the Ministry of Man with the authority and power of God, and though some of the ancient Fathers were of another opinion, yet Saint Mark saith expressly, That john Preached the Baptism of repentance. unto forgiveness of sins. And who can separate forgiveness of sins from true repentance? When the Lord promiseth, at what time soever the sinner repenteth, to pardon his sins. The seal of Baptism also added to the doctrine of Repentance, must needs testify remission of sins, namely, the soul to be washed by mercy, as the body is with water. Neither doth this doctrine derogate any thing from the Baptism of Christ, seeing it is Christ that forgiveth sins, and giveth grace in the Baptism ministered by john and ministered by his Apostles: For john's Baptism was by God's institution, not of john's devising. It is true, All that have been Baptised into Christ, have been Baptised into his death, Rom. 6. 3. and Gal. 3. 26. All that have been Baptised into Christ, have put on Christ. But take Baptism aright, and let Peter be an interpreter of Paul. Baptism saveth us, saith he, 1 Pet. 3. 21. But lest you should mistake him, mark what he adds, Not the putting away the filth of the flesh, here is the outward Baptising with water, but the interrogation which a good conscience makes to God. Nay let Paul be an interpreter of himself. 1 Cor. 6. 12: But ye are washed, but ye are sanctified, but ye are justified in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the spirit of our God. Now I willingly confess, that as many as are washed and sanctified and justified by the spirit of God, have put on Christ, and are Baptised into his death, to the mortifying and crucifying the old man in them. And as by the Baptism of the spirit we do put on Christ, so are we united unto Christ, and have a communion with him in the benefits of his death. But as for the intention of Baptism of water, I know none it hath, much less do I know how to put a difference between intention original, and some other intention which he conceals, content to suffer the distinction, to fly with one wing. The Baptise is intention I am somewhat acquainted with: On man's part, to Baptise such as are brought to the font for that purpose, and by Baptism to consecrate them to the service of that God, who is one in nature, but three in persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: on God's part, to seal unto us the righteousness of faith, which I learn out of Rom. 4. 11. In the description of Circumcision, and the meaning thereof, I take to be the assuring of forgiveness of sins to them that believe, and this is congruous to the description both of John's Baptism, and Christ's Baptism set forth unto us in holy Scripture. As for that john 3. 5. Except a man be borne of Water and of the Spirit, he cannot etc. Master Fulke in his answer to the Rhemists on that verse writes thus; It is not necessary in this place by Water, to understand material Water, but rather the purifying grace of Christ, as, cap. 4. v. 11. Whereof the washing with water in Baptism, is an outward sign and seal, which also is termed fire, Math. 3. 11. The water therefore in Baptism is not our regeneration properly, but a Sacrament and seal thereof; Isid. Origen. l. 7. cap. de Spiritu Sancto. Aliud est aqua Sacramenti, aliud aqua quae significat Spiritum Dei; aqua enim Sacramenti visibilis est, aqua spiritus sancti invisibilis est, ista abluit corpus, & significat quid sit in anima, per illum autem spiritum Sanctum anima mundatur, & saginatur. And a little after, Indeed (saith he) the words of our Saviour Christ are not properly of the external Sacrament more then, joh. 6. Of the other Sacrament; except you eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, you have no life in you: whereas all Infants are excluded from that Sacrament, and consequently should be excluded from life, if the words were meant of the outward Sacraments. And the Fathers of the ancient Church, which thought Baptism was necessary, did likewise think the communion to be as necessary for Infants; as Augustine, Innocentius Bishop of Rome, and all the Church of their time, for any thing we can gather by their writings. Finally, when the word of Water in this Text signifieth the purifying grace of Christ, rather than the outward element of Baptism, here can be no argument drawn out of this place, that Sacraments confer grace of the work wrought, but according to the dispensation of God's spirit, who worketh according to his own pleasure; as in this chap. v. 8. 1 Cor. 12. When this Author talks of the necessity of regeneration, I doubt he considers not, that hence it followeth, that either all that die unbaptised are damned, (for I presume he speaks of the necessity of it unto salvation,) or that many thousands are now adays regenerated without any Sacrament of regeneration. That the Spirit of God is the efficient cause of Regeneration, I think no Christian doubteth; but this Author maketh the Baptising with Water to be an efficient also, as when he saith, Baptism is apppointed to be a means of Regeneration to all that are Baptised, and not only so, but that it doth effect it also in all that do not put an obstacle in the way to hinder it. I acknowledge willingly that Baptism material, is an instrument, to wit, both as a sign & as a seal: But that it is an instrument in any other kind of operation, than belongs to a sign and seal, I have not hitherto learned out of the word of God. And as I remember, Arminius was sometimes challenged for Heterodoxy about the Sacraments; and withal, that his Apology was this, he never ascribed any other efficacy unto the Sacraments, than is denoted under the terms of Signs and Seals; but no marvel, if a degenerated condition hath seized on any, that such proficiunt in pejus, and grow more and more degenerate. The phrase used here in calling Baptism a means of regeneration, sounds harsh in my ears, we commonly say, and it is the doctrine of our Catechism, that a Sacrament is an outward and visible sign, of an inward and invisible grace: now this grace in Baptism I take to be the grace of regeneration; and is it a decent expression to say, that the sign of Regeneration is the means of Regeneration? As for Baptismus spiritus, the Baptism of the spirit, that is the very working of regeneration, but Baptismus fluminis, the Baptism of water, that is the administration of the outward sign, and seal of the grace of regeneration. The word Preacheth forgiveness of sins to all that believe, so doth the Sacrament of Baptism; but the word Preacheth this to the ear, the Sacrament to the eye. The word assureth it, for it is God's word, the Sacrament assures it, for it is God's seal, but neither of these worketh the assurance without the spirit of God: and as for the working of Faith itself, I have read that Faith comes by hearing, I no where read that Faith comes by the being Baptised. And sure I am when men of ripe years came to be Baptised, they were first Catechumini, then competentes, and none admitted unto Baptism, unless the word had formerly brought them unto faith. The Apostle calls Baptism the laver of regeneration, by the Rhemists' translation, the fountain of regeneration, by the former English translation, the washing of regeneration, by the last: but whereas this Author dignifies it with this title, because it doth effect regeneration in all that do not put an obstacle in the way to hinder it: if this Author shall prove it (while his head is hot,) we shall give that credence to it, as it deserves; in the mean time, it stands for a bold affirmation; let him take his time to make it appear to be sound: the Rhemists upon the place have this note; As before in the Sacrament of holy Orders [1 Tim. 4. 2 Tim. 1.] So here it is plain that Baptism giveth grace, and that by it, as by an instrumental cause, we be saved. Master Fulkes answer is this, Here is no word to prove that Baptism giveth grace of the work wrought, but the Apostle saith that God hath saved us by the renewing of the Holy Ghost, which is testified by the Sacrament of Baptism (mark I pray the office of Baptism in Master Fulkes judgement, to testify the renewing,) which is Sacramentally the laver of regeneration; not by the work wrought but by the grace of God's spirit, by which we are justified. So speaketh Saint Peter, and explicateth himself 1 Pet. 3. 21. Baptism saveth us not the washing of the flesh of the body, but the interrogation of a good conscience. And because I know no obstacle that an Infant can put to hinder the effect of it, for I suppose the obstacle must be rational, and Infants are not come to the use of reason, to perform any rational act, which may prove any rational obstacle; therefore it seems this Author's opinion is, that all who are Baptised in the Church, are regenerate: this indeed was the profession of Master Montague before he was Bishop; and was answered by Bishop Carelton, as touching the best firmament of his opinion; the Book of our Common-Prayer, where the Child Baptised is said to be regenerate; that is to be understood Sacramento tenus, which is Saint Augustine's phrase, and which he distinguisheth from truly regenerate: And Bishop Usher in his History of Gotteschaleus, allegeth out of the Author of the imperfect work upon Matthew, Hom. 5. this sentence, Eos qui cum tentati fuerint, superantur, & pereunt, videri quidem filios Dei factos propter aquam Baptismatis, revera tamen non esse filios Dei, quia non sunt in Spiritu Baptizati. As also out of Austin De Unitate Ecclesiae, cap. 19 Visibilem Baptismum posse habere, & alienos qui regnum Dei non possidebunt: sed esse donum Spiritus Sancti quod proprium eorum est tantum qui regnabunt cum Christo in aeternum. And lastly out of the same Austin, as he is alleged by Peter Lombard, l. 4. Sent. dis. 4. Sacramenta in solis electis efficere quod figurant. All this is to be found in that Book of Bishop Ʋsher p. 188. Besides many more pregnant passages are collected by him for the same purpose. And not to charge him with authority only, but with some reason; when Saint, James saith Jam. 1. 18. Of his own will he hath begotten us by the word of truth; what I pray is here meant by the word of truth? Is it not the Gospel, to wit, The Preaching of Christ crucified? Now consider to whom doth he write, but to the twelve Tribes, that is, to the Christian Jews, such as were begotten to a lively hope by the resurrection of Jesus Christ, as Saint Peter speaks writing also to the Jews. If then these Jews were regenerated by the Preaching of the Gospel, surely they were not regenerated by Circumcision; and if regeneration were not necessarily annexed to the Sacrament of Circumcision, amongst the Jews, than neither is it necessarily affixed to the Sacrament of Baptism amongst the Christians. For our Divines do usually maintain against the Papists, that the Sacraments of the Old Testament, were as effectual to the Jews, as the Sacraments of the New Testament are effectual unto us Christians. It is true, Baptism is ordained, that those which do receive it may have the remission of their sins, but not absolutely, but conditionally, to wit, in case they believe and repent, as appears both in that place, Acts 2. 38. and Rom. 4. 11. And Baptism as a Seal doth assure hereof, only in case they believe and repent; and therefore none of ripe years were admitted unto Baptism, until they made profession of their faith, and as for Infants, they were also anciently said to be Baptised in fide Parentum. God's patience Rom. 2. 4. And the goodness of God manifested therein, leadeth a Man to repentance: so do his judgements also, Hos. 5. In their affliction they will seek me early; and so doth God's word: and all this only in the way of a moving cause, and exciting to repentance, every morning God brings his judgements to light, he faileth not yet; will not the wicked be ashamed. Zeph 3. 5. But it is the duty of all to be moved by his word, by his works, by his mercies, by his judgements, to turn to the Lord by true repentance. But God alone is he that works them hereunto, without whose efficacious grace none of all these courses will prevail, as Isai. 57 17. For his wicked covetousness I was angry with him and have smitten him, I hid me and was angry. They wanted neither admonition from his word, nor from his corrections yet they profited by neither, as it followeth; yet he went away and turned after the way of his own heart: yet what is God's resosolution, but to overcome their stubborness by the power of his grace, as there we read; I have seen his ways, and will heal them: now who are these whom he leads so, as to bring them to repentance, let Austin answer, Contra Julian. Pelag. l. 5. c. 4. Bonitas Dei te ad poenitentiam adducit, verum esse constat, sed quem praedestinavit adducit, and he adds a reason, Quamtamlibet enim praebuerit poenitentiam, nisi Deus dederit, quis agit poenitentiam. And in the same Chapter professeth, touching the Non-praedestinate, that God never brings them to wholesome and spiritual repentance, whereby a man is reconciled to God in Christ, whether God affords them greater patience than he affords his elect; or nothing less? His words are these, Istorum neminem adducit ad poenitentiam salubrem, & spiritualem, qua homo in Christo reconciliatur Deo, sive illis ampliorem patientiam, sive non imparem praebeat: God intends by this his patience, that it is the duty of all to repent; that is, that they should repent ex officio; but did he intent they should de facto repent? what then could hinder it? Then he would afford them efficacious grace, to heal them, as he promiseth Isai. 57 18. Then would he rule them with a mighty hand, and make them pass under the rod, and bring them unto the bond of the covenant. So then to the point in particular here observed. 1. God leads all to repentance by his goodness, manifested in his forbearance and long suffering, by way of admonition, that it is their duty to turn unto God by repentance, while he gives them time and space for repentance. 2. But as for those whom he hath elected, he not only thus leads, but also effectually brings them to repentance, in the time he hath apppointed, before which time they are found sometimes to despise the riches of his goodness, and to have hard and impenitent hearts, as much as any Reprobate: who more foul in the committing of horrible abominations than Manasses? Who more furious in persecuting the Church of God than Saul? Yet God took away the stony heart (and what is harder than stone) out of their bowels, and so he doth to all whom he regenerates. 3. As touching a final contempt of God's patience, that is peculiar unto Reprobates; as for the elect, though some are called at the first hour of the day, some not till the last, yet all are effectually called, before they drop out of the World. To say that God intends the everlasting good of Reprobates, is to deny the first Article of our Creed, even God's omni potency, as Austin hath disputed 1200 years ago; we find in ourselves, that whatsoever we will do, if we do not it, it is either because we cannot do it, or because our will is changed, but to ascribe either mutability or impotency to God, is intolerable in a Christian, and it cannot be denied, but God did from everlasting intent their everlasting damnation: so that to say he did intend their everlasting good, is flat contradiction; neither is there any way to charm it, but by saying, God intends their everlasting good conditionally; but to intend it after such a manner, is apparently no more to intend their salvation than their damnation, nay less rather; considering the conditions of salvation are utterly impossible unto man, unless God correct, and cure his corrupt nature; but this grace he dispenseth according to the mere pleasure of his will, as the Apostle signifieth in saying, he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. As for that 2 Pet. 3. 9 He is patient towards us, not willing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 any of us to perish, it hath been already considered; but here he interpreteth towards us, as if it had been said, towards us men, and I hope the elect are men, as well as others: but what ground hath he for this liberty of interpretation? Why may he not take the liberty in interpreting of john, as well as Peter, both were pillars; (Gal. 2.) where he saith, They went out from us, but they were not of us, for had they been of us, they had continued with us; and still swalloweth a palpable absurdity following hereupon, even to the denying of God's omnipotency, in as flat contradiction to the Apostle, where he professeth, that God hath mercy on whom he will, which is not to have mercy on all, but on some only, hardening others, as Rom. 11. The election hath obtained it, but the rest are hardened. DISCOURSE. SECT. V. IN the last place those other gifts of God, whereby men's understandings are enlightened, and their souls beautified, (which are knowledge, repentance, fortitude, liberality, temperance, humility, charity, and such like) are bestowed upon all them that have them, (among whom are many that may prove Reprobates in the end) that by the exercise of them, and continuance in them, they might be Saved. The Reprobates are adorned with many of those graces, as appears plainly by many Scriptures, especially Hebr. 6. 4. Where the Apostle says, that it is impossible for those that have been enlightened, tasted the heavenly gift, been made partakers of the Holy Ghost, tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the world to come, if they fall away, should be renewed by repentance: and the graces which the Apostle speaks of here, are not ordinary and common, but special graces, illumination, faith, relish of the sweetness of God's Word, and the taste of Heaven. The persons spoken of, are Apostates, such as are under the possibility of falling away, (for upon a danger not possible cannot be built a solid exhortation) and if Apostates than Reprobates, and the thing intimated is that upon Apostates and Reprobates are these gifts bestowed. The Like speech we have: Hebr. 10. 26. For if we sin willingly, after we have received the knowledge of the truth, there remains no more sacrifice for sin etc. from whence we collect, that men that sin willingly and unpardonably, may receive the knowledge of the truth, yea and be sanctified by the blood of the Testament and the Spirit of grace, v. 29. 2 Pet. 2. 20. They may escape the filthiness of the world i e. be washed from their former sins by repentance, the unclean spirit may go out of them. Mat. 12. 43. They may receive the word with joy, Mat. 13. 20. And many excellent graces they may have besides: All which graces are not given them that they might abuse them, and so purchase to themselves the greater damnation; or that they might do good to others with them, but none to themselves; but rather that as by the former gifts Suffrag. Britt. p. 41. Thes. 2. & p. 43. Thes. 3. of nature, so by these of grace, they may obtain Salvation. If God aim at this in those gifts that are farther off, much more in these, which make those that have them (like the young man in the Gospel) not far from the kingdom of Heaven. Thus we see what end God aims at in his gifts to men. TWISSE Consideration. THese gifts this Author formerly described to be gifts of grace, applying salvation unto men, which he distinguisheth from gifts of grace purchasing salvation, in the entrance upon this reason of his. Now it is apparent, that most of these gifts have been found in the heathen men: and who was ever heard to call these virtues found in the heathen, gifts of grace, applying the salvation purchased by Christ, whereof they were wholly ignorant, like as of Christ himself. And whereas he makes, faith and repentance, to be gifts communicated unto such, who (as he expresseth it,) do prove Reprobates in the end; Saint Austin to the contrary, as formerly I have alleged him out of his 5. lib. contra Julian Pelag. c. 5. Expressly professeth of the Non praedestinate, that God brings not one of them to wholesome and Spiritual repentance, whereby a man is reconciled to God in Christ: And our Britain Divines in the Synod of Dort, upon the 5th Article and fourth position, profess in like manner of all such as are none of Gods elect, that it is manifest they never really and truly attain that change and renovation of the mind, and affections, which accompanieth justification; nay, nor that which doth immediately prepare or dispose to justification. For they never seriously repent, they are never affected with hearty sorrow for offending God by sinning, nor do they come to any humble contrition of heart, nor conceive a firm resolution to offend any more. And whereas he saith, that such do prove Reprobates in the end, he may as well say of others, that they prove elect in the end, which doth wholly savour, of shapeing the decrees of God, to be of a temporal condition, and not eternal; unless he delivers it of the manifestation of it in the judgement of men, which yet as touching Reprobates cannot appear until their death, and 'tis a very hard matter for any man, to pass upon men generally the censure of elect, or reprobates; the hypocrisy of man hath such power to evacuate the one, and the secret operation of God's mercy and grace the other. How far reprobates may attain to the illunination of their mind, and renovation of their wills, and reformation of their lives, is set down more fully by our Britain Divines in the Synod of Dort, than by this Author; not one particular (if I mistake not) being mentioned here, as touching the places of Scripture, containing the indication thereof, which is not set down there, and some there are set down, which are not set down here. In their first position concerning those who are not elect, upon the fifth Article (this Author's quotation here leaving out the Article) and by a wild reference to the page, being fitter to confound a Reader than direct him) the first position there is this, There is a certain supernatural enlightening granted to some of In the English Translation. Pag. 104. Pag. 106. them who are not elect, by the power whereof they understand those things to be true, which are revealed in the word of God, and yield an unfeigned ascent unto them. And in the explication of it Luke 8. 13. The seed which fell upon the stony ground, noteth unto us such hearers, as for a while believe, that is, those that for a while give ascent to things revealed from above, and especially to the covenant of the Gospel; and thereby it is plain, that this their ascent, is no way feigned, because they received the word with joy. Acts 8. 30. And afterwards they Pag. 107. give a farther reason of it thus, For it is not to be imputed for a fault to any man, that he is fallen from an Hypocritical faith, neither can a shipwreck be made of a feigned faith, but only a detection and manifestation of it, nor indeed can he suffer shipwreck, who was never in the ship. 2 Pet. 2. 20. Some are said to have escaped from the filthiness of the world, by the knowledge of the Lord, whose latter end is worse than their beginning: and of those joh. 12. 42. who believed in Christ, but did not confess him, they write that they believed with an unfeigned dogmatic faith, which then lay secretly hid in their hearts: but never showed itself in any outward profession, for fear of danger ensuing. Their second position is this, In these forementioned, there doth arise out of this knowledge and Pag. 108. faith, a certain change of their affections, and some kind of amendment of their manners. This they prove out of Math. 13. 20. They received the word with joy: and 1 Kings 21. 17. concerning Ahabs humbling of himself: and out of Heb. 6. 4. alleged by this Author, and over and above out of v. 6. observe a renovation also, in as much as it is said, That it is impossible they should be renewed again, which implieth, that they had been formerly renewed in some sort, and out of Chap. 10. 19 That they trod under foot the blood of the Covenant, by which they are sanctified; and that they attained to some amendment of life, they prove both by the example of Herod; and out of 2 Pet. 2. 20. where 'tis said of them, that they had escaped from the filthiness of the world. And Chap. 1. 9 Where they are said to have forgotten that they were purged from their old sins. And out of Math. 12. 43. Where 'tis said the unclean spirit was departed out of them, and that all this was not feigned, but that they proceeded out of the power of those dispositions unto grace, and from the inspiration of the Holy Ghost: yet notwithstanding all this in their fourth Pag. 110. position they pronounce, that they never attain unto the state of adoption and justification: and in their explication of it, that they never attain the change and renovation of the mind and affections, which doth immediately prepare and dispose unto justification; For they Pag. 111. never seriously repent etc. at large. Now seeing God brings them no farther, as he doth his elect; with what sobriety can it be said, that God intends their salvation? And as for the point of sanctification, which here is attributed to them, other Divines do not go so far, as to interpet it of any inward sanctification, as Paraeus; Erat autem (saith he) Sanctificatio Apostolorum non interna sed externa in professione fidei, & participatione sacramentorum externa consistens, erant sanctificati, hoc est, a Judaeis & Paganis professione segregati, & pro veris Christianis habiti. Loquitur enim secundum judicium charitatis, quae omnes de doctrina for is consentientes habet pro sanctificatis, licet non omnes cordibus vere sint sanctificati, Non eergo hinc sequitur, Apostatas. Vere fuisse regeneratos. Pro quibus enim Christus ne or are quidem dignatus est, eos multo minus sanguine suo sanctificavit: ideo Johannes Apostatas de Ecclesia renatorum fuisse negat: ex nobis egressi sunt, quia non erant ex nobis. Et Petrus vocat eos canes & porcos redentes ad vomitum, & volutabrum, canis vero etiam post vomitum est canis, & sus lota est sus, canem vero & suem se semper mansisse, & ille & ista per reditum ad vomitum & volutabrum declarat. Cameron likewise in in his Myroth. p. 334. Dupliciter sanctificantur homines alii absolute, ut soli fideles, cum scilicet non tantum ab aliis hominibus segregantur (hoc enim verbum sanctificare saepe significat in Scriptura) a Deo, sed & remissione peccatorum apprehensa & Spiritus Sancti virtute sanctificati, & in sanctitatis study permanent. Alii comparate, qui scilicet separantur quidem ab aliis hominibus externa fidei professione, & aliqua fortè vitae instituti immutatione, at non sanctificantur absolute ut fideles, ad hoc posterius sanctificationis genus pertinet hoc Apostoli dictum, in quo sanctificatus fuit. But albeit they were truly sanctified, (to suppose that for the present) yet if God purposed not to give them perseverance therein, undoubtedly he intended not their salvation. Nay, no Arminian denies, but that God did from everlasting intent the salvation of all such Apostates; and to say that he had a velleity to save them, is to dash a man's self against the rock of absurdity, as to deny God's omnipotency, unless he will say God's mind is changed: and to talk of a conditionate will intending their salvation, is no more to say, that he intends their salvation in case they do believe, than to say, he intends their damnation in case they do not believe. And as for his allegation out of the suffrages of our Divines in the Synod of Dort, that is very wild, neither mentioning the Article, nor rightly quoting the page: though the things here proposed are mostly taken out of the first and second Thesis, concerning the Non-elect, upon the fifth Article: but no glimpse do I find there, of any such end of Gods granting these dispositions, as that thereby they might be brought unto salvation; though as in the elect such like dispositions are, so in the Reprobate, they might be preparations to farther grace, if it pleased God so to ordain as to bring them on forward to justification and true sanctification conjunct therewith, and thereby unto salvation. As for the ends which God doth intend thereby, to wit, by bringing them so far; look whatsoever God doth bring to pass hereby, that God doth intend. For nothing can fall out casually unto God. If they do persevere in this condition, to wit. as touching the outward emendation of their life, it is, ut mitius puniantur, as Austin expresseth himself somewhere, which now doth not come to my remembrance, if they fall from it, whereupon they shall be more grievously punished: this also was intended by God. Or if others are bettered by them, undoubtedly this also was intended by God, as also to teach all others not to content themselves with superficial renovation, superficial obedience; and so likewise illumination clearly takes away that excuse, which some are apt to make, as Austin observes, namely, Dicere solet humana superbia si scissem fecissem. Which how well this Author infringeth, we are to De great. & lib. arb. c. 2. consider in the next place. DISCOURSE. SECT. VI BUt there are some Scriptures which seem to say the contrary. v: g. Rom. 1. 20. Where God is said to reveal himself to the Gentiles by the creatures 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that they might be without excuse. Luke 2. 34. Simeon said of Christ, that he is appointed for the falling, and rising again of many in Israel; and. 1 Cor. 1. 23. I preach Christ (saith Paul) to the Jews a stumbling block. 2 Cor. 2. 16. We are the sweet savour of death unto death: and it seems by these places, that God gives these things to some, that they may stumble, and be left without excuse; What shall we say therefore to these places? Of all these Scriptures in general, I may say this, that they are to be understood of the end, which is many times effected by these gifts of God, and not of the end that is primarily intended in them; and they show what Christ, the Word Preached, and the gifts of nature and grace, are (occasionally) to some men through their voluntary rebellion against God, and his Ordinances; and not what they are (intentionally) in God's first thoughts and resolutions. He intends them for them, for their good, though many times they receive them to their hurt: it is with God's Ordinances and gifts (and that very often too) as it is sometimes with Physic, it is given by the Physician for the Patients good, many times through the distemper of his body, it doth him hurt. And as it is with the Sun, God intends by the shining of it, the enlightening and clearing of men, and other creatures in this inferior World, others are hurt by the light of it, (accidentally) by reason of the climates wherein they live, or the ill affectedness of their eyes and bodies. So the blessings of God, which out of his abundant goodness, are bestowed upon men for their eternal good, through the ill frame and temper of their heart, do effect their hurt; partly because lighting upon naughty hearts, they lose their force and edge, (for quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis;) and partly because of the severity of God, who as he hath an antecedent and gracious will to do men good, so he hath a consequent and judiciary will of giving up wicked men to the lusts of their hearts, and of permitting them to dash against Christ, and other means of eternal life, and so to fall into endless misery and mischief, as we may see, Psal. 101. 11, 12. and Rev. 22. 11. He that is filthy let him be filthy still. Now if this be the meaning of those Scriptures, than they thwart nothing that hath been said of God's gracious intent of promoting the eternal good of men, by his blessings bestowed upon them. For argumentum ab eventu ad intentionem Dei non valet; because no sinful event is properly under God's will and decree, but his prescience only, or at most under a permissive decree, and many things happen in the World, which are besides the antecedent and principal purpose of God, not because there is any want of power in God, but because his will is oftentimes conditional, and therefore not effected, because the condition is not performed. TWISSE. Consideration. THe gifts of grace he speaks of are three. 1. The knowledge of God revealed in his works, 2. Christ, 3. The Gospel; for these alone are they, whereof the objection proceeds, which he proposeth to be answered. Of the first: it is most true, that the end thereof represented in the objection, is effected by it, to wit, the bereaving men of excuse, as namely in a certain kind, which Austin interpreteth, De great. & lib. arb. c. 2. in this manner, Quomodo dicit inexcusabiles nisi de illa excusatione, qua dicere solet humana superbia si scissem fecissem, ideo non feci, quia nescivi. How doth he call them inexcusable, but in respect of such an excuse, which the pride of man moveth him to use, saying, had I known it I would have done it, therefore I did it not, because I knew it not: thus the Gentiles were left without excuse, in turning the glory of the incorruptible God, to the similitude of the image of a corruptible man, etc. And for as much as he had sufficiently manifested himself by his works, to be eternal, and consequently uncorruptible. So that knowledge sufficiently revealed, doth always take away the pretence of ignorance for a man's excuse, whether a man have any need of excuse, as in case he lives not answerable to his knowledge, or no need at all to excuse himself, as in case he doth conform himself to that knowledge which God hath given him, in which case he is not said to be inexcusable, though pretence of ignorance by way of excuse is taken from him, as well as from others; but because he hath no need of any such excuse, as depends upon pretence of ignorance, therefore he is not denominated inexcusable, but such only who would excuse themselves by such a pretence, but cannot. But as touching the other gifts of grace mentioned, to wit, 1. Christ, 2. The Gospel, 'tis most untrue that the end specified, is effected by them: for Christ doth not effect the falling of any; neither is the setting of him up, any cause of any man's falling, neither is the stumbling of any, effected by the Preaching of the Gospel; for what is men's stumbling thereat, but their disobedience thereunto. 1 Pet. 2. 8. Now the Gospel doth not effect any man's disobedience, but the corrupt heart of man alone is the efficient cause thereof. And I cannot sufficiently wonder, at so crude a conceit as this Author manifesteth, by so inconsiderate an expression. I grant the end primarily intended, was no other than God's glory: But as for the salvation of Reprobates, that is neither primarily nor secondarily, nor at all intended by God, as I have often demonstrated; both in as much as God hath from everlasting intended their damnation, and therefore cannot without contradiction intent their salvation. And withal God is unchangeable and omnipotent, and therefore as he can procure the Salvation of any, if withal he intends and wills to procure it, undoubtedly such a one shall be saved. Against all which, this Author proceeds without taking any course to charm those foul absurdities whereinto he precipitates himself. And when he saith of the stumbling of many at the Gospel, that it is not primarily intended, he doth most inconsiderately confess, that it is intended by God, though not primarily, which is enough for us; and the Apostle is express, professing of such who stumble at the word through disobedience, That thereunto they were ordained. 1 Pet. 2. 8. Neither do we say that the Gospel or Christ, is the cause of any man's falling; but only the occasion thereof: man's corrupt heart alone (as formerly I said) being the cause thereof. But God intends their stumbling shall come to pass, which must needs be, in case it is through disobedience that they stumble, and God hath purposed to deny them the grace of obedience, as indeed he hath to many, like as he doth deny it to many; as appear by his hardening of many, even whom he will, like as on the other side, he hath mercy on whom he will. So Christ's carriage was not the cause, but the occasion only of the Jews plotting against him, because they observed that he did many miracles, and if they let him alone, all men would believe in him, and the Romans would come and take away both their place, and the Nation. joh. 11. 47, 48. Yet look what they did against him, God had before intended and determined to be done; For both Herod, and Pontius Pilate together with the Gentiles, and people of Israel, were gathered together, to do what Gods hand and counsel had determined before to be done. Acts 4. 28. Yet not primarily intended neither, for all this was to a farther end, namely, to procure the redemption of the World, yea of some of them who crucified him. Yet there was a farther end than all this, namely, the glory of God, in the way of mercy mixed with justice, and that brought to pass by admirable power and wisdom. This was first in God's thoughts and resolutions, as the supreme end, all the rest were but as means tending thereunto: yet do we not say this was intentionally in God's first thoughts and resolutions, which is as if he should say, intentionally in God's intentions; and with the like genius of sobriety, he distinguisheth between occasionally and intentionally, enclosing the terms with a parenthesis, as if there were some great judgement, though little wit, in this distinction, and therefore would have it observable. Occasion is justly distinguished from a cause, but I never found it distinguished from intention, till now. It seems he would say accidentally or casually, for such alone are praeter intentionem, if any, and so fit to be opposed to intentionally; but this distinction sticks in his teeth, he was loath in plain terms to express so shameful an opinion, as to profess that any thing comes to pass in the World, besides God's intention, which is the distinction of things fortuitous in Aristotle. Nay, he leaves place for God's intention of them secondarily, denying only that he intends them primarily. But still he keeps this conclusion, and holds that up, whatsoever becomes of his premises, as when he saith God intends them for them, for their good, that is his Oracle; but Saint Paul's Oracle is, that the invisible things of God, that is his eternal power and Godhead, are seen by the Creation of the World being considered in his works, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that they may be without excuse, and that the Preachers of the Gospel, were unto God a sweet savour of Christ in them that are saved, and in them that perish; without putting any difference according to this Author's Gemora, that this is to be understood of the one occasionally, of the other intentionally. But to ransack this also, and to speak distinctly, What is the good that God hereby intended them? Was it Salvation? And how did he intend that unto them? Was it intended to be their portion, whether they believed in Christ or no? Undoubtedly his meaning can be no other than this, he intended they should be saved by him, provided they did believe in him: Now what Christian was there ever known to deny this, namely, that as many as believed in Christ, should be saved by him? But let me ask another question, Did God intent they should believe in him? Yes surely in the opinion of this Author: but is not faith the gift of God? They are ashamed to deny this, at least in concione populi, whatsoever they do consessu familiari. Why then did not God give them faith? Why surely because they refused to believe in him, so that had they believed in him, than God would have given them faith; as much as to say, had they bestowed faith on themselves, than God would have bestowed faith on them: this is their sobriety that oppose the grace of God, and such be their sobriety still that fall away from the truth of God. If Physic do the Patient's harm through the distemper of their bodies, this must be through the ignorance of the Physician, who either knows not the distemper of their body, or else knows not how to master it. But spare, I pray, to make God obnoxious to the like ignorance or impotency, when the Lord saith, I have seen his ways and will heal them, Isai. 57 18. When was it ever known that such a patient was not healed? What greater distemper of the soul than back-sliding or Rebellion? Yet when God saith I will heal their back-sliding, and I will heal their Rebellions. Hosea 14. vers. 4. When was it ever known, that any of his Patients, were not the better for his operation, but the worse rather? At length, that breaks out of this Author, that formerly stuck in the way, like a burr in his throat, as when he saith that God intends the cheering of men by the shining of the Sun, but that some are scorched by the heat of it, some hurt by the light of it, is accidentally, as if these effects were not intended by God; as much as to say, that God doth not intend, that the sun should scorch in Zona torrida, though the sun works by necessity of nature, and cannot but scorch there, as the Abyssines felt to their smart, who were wont to pray unto the sun as he was rising to spare them, but after he was passed, and going down, to curse as fast for his scorching of them, whence it is conceived that proverb came, plures adorant solem orientem quam occidentem: as natural it is to the light to scatter the sight, and if by scattering the eye be ill affected, this is as natural to the sun; like as to make sweet flowers send forth their odoriferous savours, as a dung-mixen, to exhale an unsavoury smell: but suppose a man should lose his sight by the light, as some have by the light of the sun, being kept long in some dark place before, shall this be accidental unto God, whereas the Prophet professeth, there is no evil in the City which the Lord hath not done? Like as God's blessing it is, that neither the sun scorcheth him by day, nor the influence of the Moon, or any other planet, hurt him by night. But come we to the Apodosis of the simile, He renews his coccismes of God's blessings out of his abundant goodness, bestowed on men for their good; which is a general speech, and in the generality nothing to the present purpose, we know God saveth both man and beast, he makes his sun to shine, and his rain to fall on the just and on the unjust, but as for the knowledge of God revealed in his creature, whatsoever is brought forth according to it, we doubt not but God intended it, as civil society, and some natural fear of God, and civil conversation; where any thing is done contrary unto it, the Apostle hath discovered unto us, the end of natural revelation is, that they might be without excuse; they cannot say, si scissem fecissem, that excuse is taken from them. As for the dictates of supernumerary Apostles, we have no cause to regard them, especially when they are cantradictitions to the word of God, and Christian reason, the Gospel is unto God throughout a sweet savour in Christ, both in them that are saved, and in them that perish; It is true, that it is through the corruptions of men's hearts, that men do not yield obedience to it, but that corruption God can cure, and doth cure where it pleaseth him; that men do obey, 'tis also through the good temper of their hearts, but through the grace of God, curing that corruption in them, that he leaves uncured in others; And we willingly grant, that he intends their salvation in whom he means to cure this corruption, to bring them to the obedience of faith: but most absurd it is to say, that he intends their salvation, on whom he never meant to show any such mercy, but rather to harden them; where the honest and good heart is wanting, the word proves not fruitful, but only where such an heart is found. Now it is God's work, (I know) alone to take away the stony heart, and to give an heart of flesh. But this Author carrieth himself so throughout, that he would have this work to be the work of man's free will, not of God, any other way than by persuasion, admonition, exhortation, and concourse; many talk of Robin Hood that never shot in his Bow; and this Author talks of the anticedent will of God, which I doubt whether he understands either the meaning of Damascen herein, or of Crysostom either Vossius reduceth it as I have showed before, to Voluntas conditionata, thus, God willeth that men should be saved if they believe, is it not as true, that his will is, they shall be damned if they do not believe? this is the only gracious will this Author magnifyes; but God give me experience of another manner of his gracious will towards me, namely, as he seeth my ways, so to heal them, yea, and to rule me with a mighty hand, so he make me to pass under the rod, and bring me unto the bond of his covenant. But yet see I pray whether this Author be yet come to the sobriety of his senses, in speaking here of God's severity in the way of a will judiciary; as when he gives wicked men up to the lust of their hearts, and permits them to dash against Christ, and other means of eternal life, Now I pray consider, who are those wicked men whom God thus gives over to their lusts? Were we not all such? Did not God find us all weltering in our blood. Ezek. 16.? Had not we all stony hearts. Ezek. 36.? Were we not all blind, lame, deaf, nay were we not dead in sins. Ephes. 2. 1.? Did not the Gospel find the Ephesians so? Did not the Word of truth find the Jews so? James, 1. 18. How then comes this difference that Christ is a stumbling block to some and not to others? We say the difference is, because God hath mercy on some, and hardens others. Rom. 9 18. Because some are borne of God, therefore they hear God's Word, others are not borne of God, and therefore they hear not God's word. joh. 8. 47. The Arminians say God giveth power to every one by an universal grace to will any good whereto he shall be excited. So when the Gospel is Preached, every one hath power to obey it: if he doth obey it, than Christ is a precious stone to him, but if it disobey it, than he is given up to the lusts of his heart, and permitted to dash against Christ, and other means of eternal life. Here we have a phrase, but we are to seek of the meaning thereof; what is it to dash against Christ? It must needs be to commit some sin or other, for that is the object of God's permition, for of all other things God is accounted the Author, not the permitter, the object of permition is nothing but sin, now what sin can that be, whereby we are said to dash against Christ, and other means of salvation, but disobedience to Christ and to the means of grace: so that from the first to the last, the sense comes to this, as many as disobey Christ and the means of grace, they are given over to the lusts of their hearts, and permitted to dash against Christ and other means of eternal life, that is, are permitted to disobey Christ and to resist other means of eternal life. So that their disobedience to Christ and the Gospel is very punctually and judiciously set down to precede by two degrees their disobedience to Christ, and his Gospel. Some may think that this Arminian prosilite doth not carry himself well in his business and for betraying the nakedness of his cause may be in danger to be excommunicated out of their Synagogue. But Sir you must believe it, this is the very leprosy of their Doctrine that over spreads it from the crown of the head to the sole of the foot, and they are in love with it, accounting it not only sanity, but perfect beauty. God indeed is said in Scripture, to give men over to their lusts, when he forbears either courses of admonition and reproof by his word, or by his judgements in his works, or when he forbears to restrain Satan, as formerly he did: but disobedience to the Gospel undoubtedly is, hoc ipso, a dashing against Christ, although God may continue to admonish and exhort even to the end; as to profane and hypocritical persons in the Church, he gives not over this course of his until the end. I have often represented the absurdity of this Author's conceit, of a gracious intent in God, of promoting the eternal good of Reprobates; whereas it cannot be denied, that God hath from everlasting intended their damnation: and as for our saying, that God intends they shall be without excuse, that Christ is set up for their falling, that the Gospel is unto God a sweet savour in Christ, not only in them that are saved, but in them that perish. This Author is so far from overthrowing the truth of it, that (besides other absurdities delivered by him in the way) the Author himself hath no heart to deny it, only saying, that God intends it not primarily, which is rather to grant that he intends it (though not primarily as whereabouts there is no question) than to deny it, and that occasionally they are so; whereas no man but himself hath said (in saying that they do effect this end) that Christ or the Gospel are the cause hereof, but only that they are the occasion. But this hinders not God's intention of them: For undoubtedly God intends as well things occasioned as things caused, though not in his first thoughts and resolutions, which belongs rather to the end than to the means, to wit, to be first intended. So that in plain terms, he hath not hitherto dared to deny, that God intends them, though he manifests a good mind to maintain, that they come to pass accidentally and casually in respect of God; For he spares not to profess, that the scorching of men, and the hurting of weak eyes falls out accidentally, and that to God; for he proposeth this by way of distinction, from that which God intends, which he saith is the cheering of men by the light of the Sun: like as here he denies that men's stumbling at Christ, is a thing intended by God; like as in saying a sinful event is not properly under God's will and decree, but under his prescience only, or at most under a permissive decree. And this I confess, is a very plausible doctrine in the judgement of flesh and blood; save that this Authors faint carriage in the delivering of it, is enough to make a man suspect it, as plausible as it is, yet it is hardly true and sound. For he dares not say, that a sinful event is not at all under God's decree, only that he saith, it is not properly under God's decree. But Saint Peter speaking of them that stumbled at the word of God through disobedience, professeth in plain terms, that hereunto they were ordained, 1 Pet. 2. 6. And all the Apostles there assembled. Acts 4. 28. Do profess, that both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and people of Israel, were gathered together against the Holy Son of God, to do what Gods hand, and God's counsel had determined before to be done. And ere I part I hope to prove, that any sinful act that comes to pass in the world, is as properly intended of God, as any good act whatsoever, although there be a vast difference in the bringing of them forth: God causing the one, & only permitting the other as it is evil. And that because it comes under God's prescience, & it is well they are not so Atheistical as to deny God's prescience; but I doubt not to make it good, that either they must deny that every thing comes under God's prescience, or they must grant that every thing comes under God's decree. For consider, nothing can be foreknown of God as future, unless it be future. Now let us quietly inquire how any thing becomes future, and if any cause hereof can with reason be devised without the decree of God, let us all become Arminians, and deny God either at all to be, or to be a free agent, but working by necessity of nature: For if future things be future of their own nature, than all things must be acknowledged to come to pass by necessity of their own nature, which is to deny God. But if things be of their own nature merely possible, and indifferent to become either future or non-future, then there must be acknowledged some cause whereby they are brought out of the condition of things merely possible, into the condition of things future. And this cause must exist from everlasting, otherwise it should not be so ancient as the effect thereof, for it is well known that all things future have been future from everlasting, otherwise God could not have foreknown them from everlasting: but all confess that God from everlasting foreknew every future thing; Therefore the cause making them to pass out of the condition of things merely possible (such as they were of their own nature) into the condition of things future, was also from everlasting. Now consider where was this cause to be found? Not without God: for nothing without God either was or is everlasting without beginning; therefore is it to be found within God or no where. Consider in the next place, what is that within God which is fit to be the cause hereof. We say 'tis his decree, but this Author cannot away with that. Therefore Si quid novisti rectius isto candidus imperti. Certainly the knowledge of God cannot be the cause; for as Aquinas saith, that causeth nothing but as joined with God's will, and therefore it is commonly conceived that foreknowledge doth rather presuppose things future than make them so: nothing than remains to be the cause hereof, but the essence of God. Now the essence of God may be considered two ways, either as working necessarily, or as working freely: if it be the cause of things future as working necessarily, than it followeth that God shall produce them by necessity of nature, which utterly overthrows Divine providence. What remains then but that we must be driven to confess that Divine essence makes them future, as working freely, which is as much as to profess, that Gods will and decree is that alone, which maketh things to pass out of the condition of things merely possible in to the condition of things future. And I challenge the whole Nation of Arminians, and Jesuits to answer this argument. Yet this decree we willingly acknowledge is a permissive decree: but look that we understand that aright also; thus God decreeth this or that evil to come to pass by his permission, like as good things he decreeth shall come to pass by his effection: and that upon God's permission, it is necessary that that which he permits shall come to pass, is acknowledged not only by our Divines, but by Vorstius, by Arminians, by Navarettus the Dominican as I have quoted them in my Vinditiae gratiae Dei, which yet they deliver without clear expressing how: which I perform thus, look what God decrees to permit, it is necessary that it should come to pass, but how? Not necessarily but contingently & freely, And the Scripture is express as before expressed, that the most barbarous actions committed against Christ by Herod, Pontius Pilate, together with the Gentiles and people of Israel, in their contumelious usages of him, were all predetermined by the hand and counsel of God. Mark the issue of this Authors most frivolous discourses: for this will whereof he speaks, whereby God is pretended graciously to will man's Salvation, conditional; as much as to say, 'tis God's will that a man shall be Saved in case he believe in Christ; now what Christian was ever known to deny this. Secondly, consider whether this deserves to be called a will to save more than a will to damn, for like as 'tis certain a man shall be saved if he believe in Christ, so it is most certain a man shall be damned if he believe not, and withal consider to which of these the nature of man is most prone, whether to faith or to infidelity. DISCOURSE. SECT. VII. BUt by this opinion the gifts of nature and grace have another end, either God doth not mean them unto those that perish, albeit they do enjoy them; because they are mingled in the world with the elect, to whom only they are directed: or if he do, he meaneth they shall have them, and by them be lifted up above the common rank of men, [ut lapsu graviore ruant] that their fall may be the greater: for how can God intend that those men should receive them or any good by any of them, whom he hath by an absolute decree cut off and rejected utterly from grace and glory. More particularly by, this doctrine, 1. Christ came not into the world to procure the Salvation of them that perish, because they were inevitably preordained to perish. 2. The word is not sent to them, or if it be, it is that they might slight it or contemn it and increase their damnation by the contempt of it; and so these inconveniences will arise; 1. That God is a mere deceiver of miserable men whom he calls to Salvation in the name of his Suffrag. Erittaine. p. 43. Son, by the preaching of his word; because he fully intends to most men the contrary to that which he fairly pretends: 2. That Ministers are but false witnesses; because in their Ministry they offer Salvation conditionally to many, who are determined to damnation absolutely: 3. The Ministry of the Word cannot leave men inexcusable, for Reprobates may have this just plea: Lord, dost thou punish for not believing in thy Son, when thou didst call us to believe by the preaching of thy Word, thou didst decree to leave us (woeful men) in Adam's sin, to leave us neither power to believe, nor a Christ to believe in; how canst thou justly charge us with sin, or increase our punishment for not believing in him, whom thou didst resolve before the world was that we should never believe in. That Ministry gives men a fair excuse which is given to no other end than to leave them without excuse. 4. The Sacraments (by this opinion) signify nothing, seal up, confer nothing to such as are not Saved, but are mere blanks and empty ordinances unto them not through the fault of men but by the primary and absolute will of God. 5. Lastly, other gifts bestowed upon men of what nature soever they be, are to the most that receive them in God's absolute intention, 1. Unprofitable, such as shall never do them good in reference to their final condition. 2. Dangerous and hurtful, given them not of love but extreme hatred, not that they might use them well and be Blessed in so doing, but that they might use them ill, and by ill using of them procure unto themselves the greater damnation. God lifts them up (as the Devil did Christ) to the pinnacle of the Temple that they might fall, and loads them with knowledge and other goodly endowments that with the weight of them, he might sink them into Hell, and so by good consequence God's chiefest gifts are intended, and laid as snares to entrap men's Souls. Men that have them have little cause to be proud of them, (for they are the more unhappy because they have them) or small reason to be thankful for them, or to love the giver of them, but to hate rather, because they are but giftlesse gifts, no better than an usurers bounty, Jaells courtesy Souls bestowing Michal to David, or a bait for a proud fish which he swallows with an hook to boor. TWISSE Consideration. WE have hitherto received a poor and hungry discourse, but now in the accommodation of it he thunders & lighteneth, as his manner is, both the Master and the Disciple would have it in their own power to make themselves elect, otherwise it seems they have little comfort, and therefore they discharge a great noise of thunder against our Doctrine of reprobation: as if they would awe God to give them liberty to elect themselves, otherwise they will powder his absoluteness, in taking upon him to Reprobate whom he list. Me thinks these Arminians talk in the spirit of Dr Story, as if they would scold us out of our faith, I will not say God out of his Throne; but he is able to plead his own, we are unworthy to plead for him, yet thus far he is pleased to honour us, as to admit us to plead for him, like as he is the God that pleads the cause of his people: I have showed how absurdly this Author makes the salvation of reprobates to be intended by God, which yet in the issue is but after a conditional manner, which is no more to intend their salvation, than their condemnation: well let us see the quality of these absurdities he fastens upon us. The first is, that God doth not mean the gifts of nature and grace unto those that perish: where to I answer, That as touching the gifts of nature, there is no colour for this, for they (as the Author sets them down) are these, creation, sustentation, preservation, health, beauty, wisdom; now let any sober man consider whether it be possible, that it should not be God's meaning for as many as do enjoy them, to enjoy them. As for the gifts of grace, these he divides into graces purchasing Salvation, and graces applying Salvation, after it is purchased: the grace purchasing Salvation is Christ; now we say that Salvation is purchased, to be conferred upon every man of ripe years conditional only, namely, in case he believes, and on all that do believe; for our Saviour hath said that whosoever believes shall be saved, whosoever believes not shall be damned: as for the purchasing the grace of faith, that we say is so purchased to be conferred absolutely and not upon condition of any work for that is manifest Pelagianism, and therefore Christ died not to procure that for all, for then all should believe de facto, & be saved: therefore we say, he died to procure this only for his elect. But the Arminians do now openly profess to the world. that Christ merited not faith and regeneration for any: so that God meant not, that Christ should be given to any for the purchasing of faith for him. So that herein certainly they are more to blame than we, by this Author's rules. As for the graces of applying Salvation, these are the Ministry of the word and Sacraments, the long suffering of God, the illumination of men's understandings, the plantation of many excellent virtues in their hearts. I will answer particularly concerning them all, leaving those many more which he conceals, to his own enjoying the contemplation of them. And first as touching the Ministry of the Word and Sacraments, we willingly profess, that we find no monument of the Americans enjoying of them before the discovery of that western world by Columbus Vesputius, and Magellan, no nor to this day in the terra incognita Australi, whereof relation is made by Ferdenando de Quir: but herein I confess the Arminians go beyond us in there spiritual discoveries; for, by the Catoptricke glass of their own fancy, they tell us, that though Christ hath not been preached amongst them by man, yet it may be he hath been preached amongst them by Angels, and deliver it for certain, that having universal grace given them, if they use that well; as many as use it well shall have the Gospel preached unto them, if not by men yet by Angels: but as for the administration of the Sacraments by. Angel's also they have discovered nothing unto us hitherunto that I know. And as for God's patience, undoubtedly they enjoy it as much as we, if they be as long lived as we. And I know nothing to the contrary as touching illumination natural; that I doubt is not meant to be comprehended under the graces, aplying Salvation purchased by Christ, yet why not as well as fortitude, liberality, temperance, humility, chastity, and truly herein I do not find them any whit inferior unto Christians, in some they went beyond us apparently; if we go beyond them in any thing, I for my part take it to be in grace rather than nature. As for illumination spiritual, huhumane I know none they had, and as for Angelical Revelation that is a dish of Lettuce for Arminian lips; I want faith to give me any stomach to it: I come to those excellent virtues which this Author pretends to have been planted in their hearts; had he spared faith and repentance I could willingly have acknowledged the rest amongst heathens, and that according to God's meaning; but what soever and in whom soever they are found, he thinks too hardly of us, when he saith, that God according to our opinion, doth not mean them to those that enjoy them: and if he doth mean them unto such, surely they are directed unto them: how is it possible it should be otherwise, especially as touching virtues, yea and the Ministry of the Word also, for he commanded them to Preach the Gospel to every creature, to wit, where they came: only we willingly confess, than he doth not mean any of those shall bring any of them that perish unto Salvation. Secondly, as touching the lifting up of them up a 'bove the common rank of men by these gifts, hear is a miserable confused discourse, so many things being put together, to make up one term in a proposition; but it is beneficial to some to fish in troubled waters, and if my answer savour of the like confusion it is nothing strange, for he that walks in the Sun, must needs be coloured. But I think I may say, look what gifts men have, caeteris paribus, they are above the rank of those that have them not, but that they are given ut lapsu graviore cadant, That their fall may be the greater, This deserves to be particularly considered. First, in general, I say whosoever doth by occasion of those gifts here spoken of, fall the more grievously (which in many particulars is a mystery to me, to the consideration whereof I purpose to descend in the next place) God did both intend that such a fall of theirs should come to pass by his permission, and that upon such an occasion: for even they that stumble at God's word through disobedience, and expressly said by Peter to be ordained thereunto, thus I look out for a ground for that I deliver, giving leave to the adversaries of God's truth to roave at pleasure in the pouring forth of their impious dictates: but come we to the particulars, & first as touching the gifts of nature, I confess as touching the first of them (creation) that if that had not been, he had never fallen, but nevertheless when God resolved to create, he resolved to create all things for himself, Even the wicked against the day of evil, and if I err in that I have an honourable Prophet to be my companion, even Solomon himself. As for preservation and sustentation, Prov. 16. 4. I willingly confess that if Judas had perished before he had been admitted into Christ's service, his damnation had been the more easy: and God electing him ad prodendum sanguinem (if I may be so bold as to speak in Augustine's language) did determine that his sin by God's permission should be the more grievous, by occasion of his advancement into the number of Christ's disciples. As for health, strength, beauty, wisdom, I see no reason why they should promote any man's damnation, but that a fool, or an ill-favoured, or a weak, or a sickly person, may be as great a sinner as the wise man, or beautiful, or strong, or healthy. How, because Christ died for the salvation of as many as do believe, which we all hold, or died to procure faith & regeneration for none (as the Arminians hold) any man is promoted to a greater measure of sin thereby, is a mystery to me. As touching the ministry of the word, Saint Peter speaks plainly of some, that it had been better for them they had never known the way of right ousnesse, than after they have known it, to depart from the holy Commandment given to them, he saith not this of all, & Austin professeth of some Reprobates, that by the Gospel they are called Ut proficiant ad exteriorem vitae emendationem quo mitius puniantur. As for the patience of God S. Paul professeth plainly, that some after the hardness of their hearts which cannot repent, despising the patience and long suffering of God, and therein his goodness leading them to repentance, do Rom. 2. 5. thereby treasure up wrath against the day of wrath, and Reprobation of the just judgement of God. And I should think that even this God intended should come to pass by his permission, otherwise he would have given them repentance, or shortened their days, for give me leave to say with Austin, Quantamlibet prebuerit patientiam, nisi Deus dederit, quis agat paenitentiam. Contra Julian. Pelag. l. 5. c. 4. As for knowledge, that doth clearly take away excuse, grounded upon pretence of ignorance, and like as our Saviour said to his Disciples joh. 13. If you know these things happy are ye if you do them: So likewise the more men know good things, the more unhappy are they, if they do them not: yet it is not necessary that knowledge should aggravate the damnation of the Reprobate, as in case they do thereby, proficere ad exteriorem vitae emendationem, for in this case surely, mititus punientur, but if they do grow worse by occasion of their knowledge, we spare not to profess that God intended this should come to pass by his permission, why not as well as the crucifying of the Son of God? Act. 4. 28. As for the virtues in the last place, which here are pretended also to be given to work for their harm, and among them faith and repentance, we are so far from affirming, that they are given for the harm of them that perish, that we to the contrary maintain, that they are given to none but Gods elect, and to bring them unto salvation, Acts 13. 48. As many believed as were ordained to eternal life. And faith is called the faith of the elect. Tit. 1. 1. and Acts 11. 18. Then hath God also unto the Gentiles given repentance unto life. Contra Juli. Pelag. l. 5. cap. 4. Mark it well, not unto death, but unto life: And Austin long ago hath professed, that of those who are not predestinated, God brings not one unto wholesome and spiritual repentance, whereby a man is reconciled unto God in Christ. Knowledge is here shuffled in among the rest of these virtues, as if that were not all one with the illumination of the mind, at least most deservedly to be ranged with it. As for other virtues here mentioned, as fortitude, liberality, temperance, humility, chastity, where these virtues are bestowed after a natural manner (for no otherwise, nor in any gracious manner, are they found in Reprobates, as I suppose, ready to be called at any time to an account upon that point, and to manifest six main differences between the moral virtues of heathen men, and the same virtues (in name, and as touching the substance of the acts, wrought by them in Christians) I should think they are rather given for their good that enjoy them, than for their harm, namely, Ut profici ant ad exteriorem vitae emendationem, quo mitius puniantur. All the harm that may come by them, that I can devise for the present, is to grow proud of them: and I willingly profess, that nothing makes a greater separation from God then pride, and it may be, Moralists fret at this, that their Morality is no better esteemed of. But what think you? May a man be proud of humility, for that is one of the excellent virtues here specified; why not, of the natural humility which is in them? As Sir Philip Sidney observes in his defence of Poetry, that Philosophers write Books against vainglory, whereunto nevertheless they set their names. So they might write Books in commendation of humility, and thereunto set their names also. Yet I am not truly of such an opinion, as to think, that God should give any of these virtues, to the end they should grow proud of them: for I do not find it any way requisite to a proud man, that he should be virtuous: for in my judgement, pride is a very humble vice, and disdains not to dwell in the hearts of the meanest. Plato could discern it through Antisthenes' his patched coat: and when Diogenes trod under foot Plato's hangings, saying, I tread under my foot Plato's pride: it is observed that he did this majori festu, with greater pride: And as one sometimes said, a man may be as proud of a Cloakebagge which he carrieth behind him, as Cardinal Campeius was of his Sumpter-horse, that followed after him; and yet that pride of his, might be of no better than of Brickbats when all was known, what show soever it made unto the people. And men of generous minds, and parts, and means answerable, are many times found, through the grace of God, more truly humble, than many a base fellow, that hath nothing to be made reckoning of but his own conceit. As the fly sitting upon the Cart wheel in a dry Summer, said, see what a dust I make. Saint Paul's righteousness which he speaks of, Phil. 3. I take to be better than the virtue of any Philosopher, which yet he accounted but dung, that he might win Christ. But by the way I observe how liberal these men are, in acknowledging the gifts of God in gross, which they will be found utterly to deny if they be examined upon them in particular. As for example, Moral virtues (we commonly say) are Habitus acquisiti, acquisite habits, and that by frequentation of consimilar acts, whereupon the habit ariseth naturally: Now do these men maintain that God is the Author of these acts, otherwise than by concourse, working in them, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 velle & facere modò velint? I can show it under the hands of some of them in express terms. Now I pray you, is not God the Author of every evil act after this manner, as well as of any good, by their own confession? for they grant that God concurres to every sinful act, & works 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 velle and facere thereof also, modò homines velint. Who then is so simple as not to observe, that they make God the Author of virtues after no other manner, than they make him the Author of vices: Yet they are content to talk liberally of the gifts of God, only to cheat the simple; I mean as many as are not acquainted with their juggling: as for us we maintain, that God determines the will, not only to the substance of a good act by determination natural, but also to the goodness of it by determination supernatural: as for example, no virtuous act is truly good, but as it is performed out of the love of God, but what love? Out of such a love of God, as is joined with the contempt of himself (judge you whether such a love may be performed by power of nature) and this amor usque ad contemptum sui, Gerson makes to be the character of the child of God: like as amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei, he make the character of a child of the Devil. But to draw to an end of this confused discourse, wherein are clapped together gifts of nature, seven whereof are reckoned up as creation, sustentation, preservation, health, strength, beauty and wisdom; and gifts of grace, & that either purchasing salvation as Christ, or applying salvation, which are of four forts. 1. The Ministry of the word & Sacraments, 2. God's patience, 3. Illumination of the mind, 4. The plantation of many excellent virtues, eight whereof are particulated, as 1. knowledge, 2. faith, 3. repentance, 4. fortitude, 5. liberality, 6. temperance, 7. humility, 8. chastity, (which by this time I have gotten by heart ere I am aware, I am so beaten to it, through a tedious discourse) of all which hand over head, it is affirmed that either God means them not to them that enjoy them, but as they are mingled with the elect, which hath no colour as I can perceive, save of the Ministry of the Word & Sacraments, for is it sober to impute to any, to say that creation, or preservation, or health, strength, beauty, wisdom, or Christ himself, or God's patience, or illumination of mind, or the virtues he speaks of; as knowledge, faith, repentance, fortitude, liberality, temperance, humility, chastity, are not given to any, but as they are mingled among the elect? Or that they are given for their hurt: touching this last I answer in brief, that it is a very absurd thing to say, that God gives any of these gifts to man to this end, that they may by occasion be hurt by them: but God both gives them, and (in case they prove an occasion of harm, of sin unto them) he permits them through occasion from them to sin, and therein to presevere (as touching Reprobates) to damn them for their sins, to the manifestation of his own glory, in the way of justice vindicative: as also hereby, the more To declare the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy which he hath prepared unto glory. Rom. 9 23. When they shall find, that had not God put a gracious and merciful difference between them and others, Christ had been a rock of offence, as well unto them as unto others: the Gospel had been a savour of death unto death to them, as well as others. All other gifts which God hath bestowed upon them, look in what sort they have been an occasion of falling unto others, so they might have been in like sort, an occasion of falling unto them also: for it is as true as 2 Cor. 1. 15, 16. the word of God is true, that the Gospel is a savour of death unto death to some: and that Christ was set up as well for the falling of some, as for the rising of others: yea a rock to fall upon to both the houses of Israel, and as a snare, and as a net to the Inhabitants of Luke. 2. 34. Isai. 8. 18. Jerusalem, and many among them shall stumble and shall fall, and shall be broken, and shall be snared, and shall be taken. And that as many as stumble at the word, and are disobedient, they were thereunto ordained. And the holy Prophet wanted not faith when he delivered this execration, 1 Peter. 1. 8. Psal. 69. 22. let their table be a snare before them, and their prosperity their ruin. And how poorly this Author labours to charm the energy of these & such like passages, let the indifferent judge by that which is delivered. As for the last of an absolute decree, cutting off and rejecting some from grace and glory, I will end this with representing the sottish condition of this Author, herein parbreaking his stomach, without all judgement and sobriety. First observe, how he claps together grace and glory, as if there were no difference in the manner of Gods cutting off from the one & from the other. (whereas the manner of Gods cutting off from the one, as it is maintained by us, is such as impudence itself, hath not the face to lay any thing to our charge therein.) As for the manner of Gods cutting off from the other, as it is maintained by us, there is indeed such absoluteness, as they malign bitterly, but withal it is so clearly set down in holy Scripture, that their hearts serve them not with open face to vent their spleen against it; and that is a chief reason of this Authors declining the other controversies, and keeping himself only to this, though I verily think, this hath proceeded from the counsel of his abettors: And for the same reason it is, that he claps together the cutting off from grace and glory. But I will take leave to distinguish them, and answer distinctly to both a part, to make their madness and unreasonableness more apparent. And first I will speak of God's absolute decree of cutting off from glory. Now this is well known to be opposed to a decree conditional, as in the end of the former Section this Author calls it, and useth it, as according to their own doctrine, in opposition to ours, but most indiscreetely and unlearnedly. This conditional will of God is to be understood, quoad res volitas, as touching the things willed by God, so Vossius accommodates it in his History of the Pelagian Heresy, as before I have showed, and makes it all one in effect with God's antecedent will: and D. jaokson in his Book of Divine providence treating hereof, professeth in plain terms, that the distinction of Voluntas antecedens and consequens, is to be understood, quoad res volitas, as touching the things willed. Now the thing willed here, is the cutting off from glory: now this Author together with his instructor, will have the will of God concerning this, to be conditional, to wit, that it is Gods will, that no man shall be cut off from glory, but for sin, now we say so too, and profess, that like as God hath not ordained that any shall be damned, but for final perseverance in sin: so likewise God hath not ordained that any man shall be cut off from glory, but for final perseverance in sin. But whereas the Remonstrants maintained, that there is no other decree of Reprobation but this, and so likewise on the other side, that there is no decree of Predestination, but such as is properly opposite hereunto, namely this, That the decree by which God hath purposed in Christ, and for Christ, to save those that believe and repent to the end, is the whole and entire decree of Predestination unto salvation. On this point the Contra-Remonstrants opposed them: and accordingly our Britain Divines, make this the first erroneous opinion, which they reject upon the first Article as touching election. And likewise as touching Reprobation, the first erroneous opinion which they reject, is this, That the decree by which God from all eternity, and that irrevocably, hath purposed out of lapsed mankind to leave none, but the impenitent and incredulous in sin, and under the wrath of God, as being aliens from Christ, is the whole and entire decree of reprobation. This I say is the first erroneous opinion which our Britain Divines reject: which this Author takes no notice of, but most unlearnedly discovers, that he understands not the state of the question. Secondly, Now I come to God's absolute decree of cutting off from grace, this we willingly confess, is merely absolute and unconditional quoad res volitas, as touching the things willed by God; for the things willed by God herein, are the denial of mercy, and grace, to regenerate some; the denial of the grace of faith and repentance, concerning which the Apostle professeth, that God proceeds herein, merely according to the good pleasure of his will, Rom. 9 18. He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. Rom. 11. 30. Even as they in times past have not believed God, yet have now obtained mercy through their unbelief. Where to obtain mercy, in the Apostles language, is plainly as much as to believe. Austin in many places justifies this, Epist. 105. ad Sixtum. 〈◊〉 ille credat, ille non credat, cum ambo idem audiunt: etsi miraculum in eorum conspectu fiat, ambo idem vident, altitudo est divitiarum sapientiae & scientiae Dei: cujus inscrutabilia sunt judici● & apud quem non est iniquitas: dum cujus vult miseretur, & quem vult indurat. And near the end, Audiat haec & non contemnat, quod si contempserit, ut contemneret inveniat se obduratum. Enchirid. 98. Quis porro tam impie desipiat ut dicat, Deum malas hominum voluntates quas voluerit, quando voluerit, ubi voluerit, in bonum non posse convertere? Sed cum facit pre misericordia facit: cum autem non facit per judicium non facit, quoniam cujus vult miseretur, & quem vult obdurate: Here misereri eujus vult, is voluntates hominum quas vult in bonum convertere. See lib. 1. De great. Christi, contra Pelag. & Caelest. cap. 46. He citys this saying out of Ambrose. Sed Deus quem dignatur vocat, & quem vult religiosum fecit. And thereupon breaks out into this exclamation. O sensum hominis Dei ex ipso fonte gratiae Dei haustum, videte si non Propheticum illud est, miserebor cujus misertus ero: & Apostolicum illud non volentis neque currentis sed miserentis Dei: quia ut dicit etiam nostrorum temporum homo ejus quem dignatur vocat, & quem vult religiosum facit. Here Misereri, Rom. 9 18. is all one with Vocare, & Religiosum facere. And lib. 1. ad Simplician: cap. 2. Unde datur intelligi, quod infra utrumque posuit, ergo cujus vult miseretur, & quem vult indurat, ita sententiae superiori potest congruere, ut obduratio Dei sit nolle misereri, ut non ab illo irrogetur aliquid quo sit homo deterior, sed tantum quo sit melior non erogetur: quod si fit nulla distinctione meritorum, quis non erumpat in eam vocem quam sibi objecit Apostolus, dicis itaque mihi, quid adhuc conqueritur, nam voluntati ejus quis resistit: conqueritur enim Deus saepe de hominibus sicut per innumerabiles apparet scripturarum locos, quod nolint credere & recte vivere. So that the meliority of man, which God works sine meritorum distinctione, doth by Augustine's judgement consist in recte vivendo & recte credendo, now here is the proper field of Scholastical combat betwixt us. Ecce Rhodus, ecce Saltus, let them try their strength to the uttermost, to prove that the reason why God regenerates one, and not another, why God bestows faith and repentance upon one, and not on another, is because man hath disposed himself by some good work performed by him, which another hath not: and when they have proved this, then will we truly confess, that Pelagianismus est vere Christianismus, not Semipelagianismus only, as it was sometimes objected to Arminius. But proceed we to the particulars following, for by this Doctrine of God's absolute decree in opposition to their conditional decree, this Author saith; 1. Christ came not into the World to procure the salvation of them that perish. I answer, That look in what sort he came into the World, to procure the salvation of them that perish by their Doctrine, after the same sort he came to procure their salvation by our Doctrine. For as it is their Doctrine, that God decreed that for Christ's sake, salvation should redound to all that believe, so is this our Doctrine also: but we deny that this is the whole decree of predestination. We farther say, that God purposed to bestow Faith on some, and not on others, and accordingly to send Christ to merit faith and regeneration for them, which the Remonstrants in the Censura Censurae, do now a days utterly deny; and if this Author, together with his instructor, think that Christ was sent to merit faith and regeneration for all, then either absolutely or conditionally; if absolutely, than all must believe de facto, and be regenerated; if conditionally, then let them discover unto us this condition, and avoid direct Pelagianism if they can. 2. Indeed we think the word is not sent to all that perish, we find it by manifest experience: in reference to Ministry humane, and if they have so strenuously rubbed their own foreheads, as to feign out of their own heads a Ministry Angelical, let them not expect that we should take their forgeries for Oracles Divine. 3. It is not true, that where it is sent among them that perish, 'tis sent only that they should slight it, it may be sent as well, ut proficiant ad exteriorem vitae emendationem quo mitius puniantur: as for those that do slight it, and stumble at it, being disobedient, Saint Peter plainly saith, that hereunto they were ordained. Let them therefore cry down Peter first, and then we will take it in good part, to be cried down also. And if God sent his Son into the World to be crucified by some; why might not he as well send the Preaching of Christ into the World, to be slighted and despised by others: and Saint Paul hath professed, that the Preachers of it, are unto God a sweet savour in Christ, even in them that perish: Yet we say not that this is the end why God sends it to any: But we say God both sends it, and permits many to slight it, and to persevere in the contempt of it, that he may manifest his glory in their just condemnation, and declare thereby also the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, whom he hath prepared unto glory, by making it appear, what a merciful difference God hath put between them, and others. To the particulars subordinate hereunto, I answer distinctly thus. 1. God deceives none in calling them to Salvation, in the name of his Son, by the preaching of his Word, any more by our Doctrine, than by the Doctrine of this Author: for as he maintains that God intends Salvation to all men, no otherwise than in case they believe, so do we; and as we maintain that God doth fully intend to most the contrary, but no otherwise than in case they believe not, so doth he: only as touching the obtaining of faith and regeneration, here is the difference between us: we maintain with Saint Paul, that God hath mercy on whom he will, in bestowing the grace of faith and regeneration, and hardeneth whom he will by denying of it; so doth not he: and accordingly we say, Christ merited faith and regeneration for his elect. But the Remonstrants openly profess that he merited faith and regeneration for none at all. Hereby let the indifferent judge which of us makes God the greatest deceiver they or we. And the truth is, this Author nor his instructor, are willing to discover themselves in this point, for fear lest nothing should save them from breaking their necks, but to be received upon the featherbed of Pelagianisme: so fearful a precipice is likely there to meet with them; at the margin of this, there stands a wild quotation thus, Suffrag: Britain, p. 43. as if the Author was loath his meaning should be found: or it may be in transcribing the copy sent him he did mistake. But the Article upon which these Theses are delivered he utterly leaves out, like as in his former quotation of the suffrages. But after much searching I guess I find that which he refers unto on the 3. Article, 3. Position, which is pag: 166. in Synod. Dordare: and in the English suffrages of our Divines of Great Britain, the position is this, whom God doth thus prepare by his Spirit (as was signified in the former position) through the means of the word, those doth he truly and seriously invite and call to faith and conversion. I make no question but whatsoever God doth, he doth truly and seriously: And as for that sancta simulatio which this Author formerly upbraided our Divines with, for attributing it unto God, I have formerly discovered the false nature of that aspersion, though he thought to walk in the clouds, that his juggling might not be discovered. The explication of the position is added thus, By the nature of the benefit offered, and by the evident word of God we must judge of those helps of graces which are bestowed on men, and not by the abuse of them. Therefore when the Gospel of its ' own nature calls men unto repentance and Salvation, when the incitements and Divine graces tend the same way, we must not think any thing is done feignedly by God; this is proved too. All these I willingly acknowledge neither do I know any of our Divines that deny it; and more particularly I am willing to particulate wherein I take it to consist. God hereby doth signify that as many as believe shall be Saved: and so I say he doth seriously intend as much; as likewise, that none shall be saved without faith; likewise God doth signify, that he is well pleased, with faith and conversion, in whomsoever he finds it, and herein he deals most truly and seriously, likewise hereby he signifies his own will to make it their duty to believe, which also is most true and serious. But none of all these I know full well, will satisfy these with whom we deal; unless we acknowledge, that God hath a kind of velleity also, both of their conversion and salvation; but let them show me any passage out of these Suffrages where this is acknowledged. They add, If God should not seriously invite all whom he vouchsafeth this gift of his Word and spirit, to a serious conversion, surely both God should deceive many whom he calls in his Son's name, and the messengers of the Evangelicall promise might be accused of false-witness, and those which being called to conversion, do neglect to obey, might be more excusable. All this I willingly grant, neither do I know any Divine of ours that denies it, according to the three particulars formerly specified, wherein I desired to explicate the truth and seriousness of all this, though those worthy Divines of ours go not so far. As for their last clause which is this, For that calling by the Word and spirit cannot be thought to leave men unexcusable, which is only exhibited to this end, to make them unexcusable. I willingly confess I do not sufficiently understand them in this. For albeit I have already particulated divers things werein the seriousness of this Divine invitation doth consist, (neither do I find any end of this Divine invitation mentioned at all by these our Divines, whom from my heart I honour for their just desert;) yet to me it seems most clear, that Revelation doth so necessarily take away excuse, upon pretence of ignorance, and admonition, and invitation, as necessarily takes away excuse, upon pretence of not being admonished and invited, that if God did invite them to no other end than this, namely to take away these excuses, surely these excuses were clearly taken away, and consequently so far they should prove unexcusable: But I guess they take the denomination of inexcusable, not according to the signification formal as it signify bereft of excuse: but rather according to the signification material, connotated thereby which is faultiness, and in this sense I confess, it is ordinarily taken together with the condition of being without excuse, and thus & in this sense I willingly subscribe unto them, and therewithal show what I take to be their meaning, namely this, that if God, making show that if they believe he will accept them, and that they shall be Saved, did not indeed mean that he would in that case accept and save them, than there were no reason why they should be accounted faulty and condemned for their not believing. Thus in a desire exactly to conform myself to the judgement of these worthies of our Church, made choice of by our Sovereign to be sent in so Honourable an Embassage, to countenance that famous Synod of the most reformed Churches; I have made bold to interpret them, and to show my concurrence with them, although I have not consulted with any of them upon that point, which if I had; like enough I might have received better satisfaction: And I hope they will not disdain that without consulting them I have adventured thus to interpret them; and what do I know whether their judgement may not prove to be the very same, and that in deed they had no other meaning. 2. My former answer will serve for this, God's Ministers do offer Salvation conditionally, to wit, upon condition of faith, neither, are any ordained to be condemned, but in case of infidelity: yet I see the cunning carriage of this Author's instructor, for he would fain fly from the absoluteness, or conditionality of God's decree, as touching the things willed quoad res volitas, unto the absoluteness or conditionality of it: quoad actum volentis, as touching the act of willing, although both Uossius practice, and this Authors also in expressing his own meaning of God's conditional will, and Doctor jackson's profession is to the contrary: namely that it is to be taken quoad res volitas only, and not quoad actum volentis: but withal we teach, that God's Ministers do not only teach upon what terms on man's part, God will either bestow salvation, or inflict damnation: but also they teach that upon no terms on our parts, but merely according to the good pleasure of his own will, doth God show mercy unto some, bestowing faith and repentance upon them, and by denying the same grace harden others, and they are the true witnesses of God, equally in both. 3. Neither is there any just excuse hereby left to Reprobates, yet I confess, this were a very plausible pretence, if we had no Oracles of God at all to be the rule of our faith, concerning God, and his providence: but as we have, so we fail not therein, of a direct answer hereunto, Rom. 9 For after the Apostle had professed, That God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth: v. 18. Forthwith he brings in this ojection upon the stage v. 19 Thou wilt say then, why doth he yet complain? for who hath resisted his will? And both Bellarmine and Arminians confess, that where obduration hath place, there is no power of obedience: And the Apostle himself implies no less in that place. Now what doth the Apostle answer hereunto but this v. 20. O man who art thou, which disputest with God? shall the thing form say to him that form it why hast thou form me thus? 21. Hath not the Potter power over the clay of the same lump to make one vessel to honour and another to dishonour? as much as to say, if God be acknowledged to be our Creator, we must give him leave to do what he will with his creature, for doth not every creature do what he will with the work of his hand? Every tradesman in his trade takes as much liberty to do with the workmanship of his hands, as this comes to. And Medina hath not spared to profess, and that tanquam ex concordi omnium Theologorum sententiâ: that if God should inflict the very pains of Hell upon an innocent creature; he shall do no unjust act, though herein he should not carry himself as Judex, Judge, but as Dominus vitae & mortis as Lord of life and Death. And we all know what power God giveth us over inferior creatures, to strangle some, to cut the throats of others, to knock down others, not with reference to the moderation of their pain, but only to the wholesome condition of their flesh unto us. And we know what power God executed upon his own dear Son to break him for our iniquities, on him to lay the chastisement of our peace, that so by his stripes we might be healed. But let that pass, let us try another way that may be answered unto this. Suppose not one shall be condemned for want of faith, but only left to be judged by the covenant of works, who seeth not but that the same plea hath place here as well as in the former case, and God may be as well challenged for injustice, in condemning men for breach of the law, who have no power to keep the law? And who sees not how ready this Author is to justifye this plea, and consequently acknowledge that every man hath power to keep the law; and so to bring us back again to the covenant of works, or to confound the covenant of grace with the covenant of works: which indeed is their course throughout. For they maintain that every man hath universal grace for the enlivening of their wills, whereby they are enabled to will any spiritual good whereto they shall be excited, and who doubts but obedience to the law, and that in all perfection, is a spiritual good: again they maintain that they can believe if they will, and so accordingly do any good thing that they will: and indeed were not the will in fault, I know no natural power defective in the performance of any good, that a man hath a will unto: this I can show under the hands of one of them, in a manuscript sent unto me. And I have good reason to conceive there are more hands in it than one. Thirdly consider, dost thou complain thou hadst no power to believe, but I pray thee tell me, hast thou any will to believe? If thou neither hast, nor ever hadst any will to believe, what a shameful and unreasonable thing is it to complain that thou hast no power to believe? Saint Paul had a most gracious will, but he found in himself no power to do that he would, but what is Rom. 7. 18, 19 the issue of this complaint? To fly to the face of God? Nothing less! but to confess his own wretchedness, and flee unto God in this manner, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? And receiving a gracious answer concerning this, concludes with 24. 25. thanks, I thank my God through my Lord Jesus Christ: if I have a will to believe, to repent, I have no cause to complain, but to run rather unto God with thanks for this, and pray him to give that power, which I find wanting in me. And indeed (as I may add in the fourth place) this impotency of believing, and infidelity, the fruit of natural corruption common to all, is merely a moral impotency, and the very ground of it is, the corruption of the will: therefore men cannot believe, cannot repent, cannot do any thing pleasing unto God, because they will not, they have no delight therein; but all their delight is carnal, sensual, and because they are in the Rom. 8. flesh they cannot please God: and because of the hardness of their hearts they cannot repent, sin is to them as a sweet morsel unto an Epicure, which he rolleth under his tongue. Fiftly, dost thou blaspheme God, because of Leprous Parents, thou art begot and conceived, and borne a leprous child? What impudence then is it in thee, to challenge him for injustice, in that the spiritual leprosy of thy first Parents, is propagated to thy soul. Lastly, if thou renouncest the Gospel, what reason hast thou to complain of want of power to embrace it, so far as not to renounce it? hast thou not as much power to believe, as Simon Magus had? as many a profane person and hypocrite hath, that is, bred and brought up in the Church of God? Hadst thou gone so far as they, and performed submission unto the Gospel, by profesing it, surely thou shouldest never be brought to condemnation for not professing of it, but rather for not walking according to the rule of it; which thou promisedst when first thou gavest thy name to Christ. I come to the third. 3. Look what the Word promiseth, that do the Sacraments scale: the word promiseth Justification & Salvation to all that believe, the same doth the Sacraments seal. As Circumsion Rom. 4. 5. Is said to be the seal of the Righteousness of faith so is Baptism: it did in our Saviour's days and in the days of his Apostles seal to the believer, and penitent Person the assurance of the forgiveness of their sins; over and above Baptism is the Sacrament of our birth in Christ, and the Lords Supper of our growth in Christ, each an outward and visible sign of an inward & invisible grace. But what is the grace were of the Sacrament is a sign? Is it a power to do good if a man will? Call you that grace which is not so much as goodness, for certainly goodness consists not in a power to do good if a man will, but in a definite inclination of the will itself, to delight in that which is good, and to be prone to do it. But this grace whereof Baptism is a sign, is suo tempore conferenda, like as Circumcision was, even to those Jews who yet were not regenerated, until they were partakers of the Gospel. Jam. 1. 18. Of his own will hath he begotten us by the word of truth. Writing unto the twelve tribes of the Jews. And it is very strange to me, that regeneration should so many years go before vocation. But this opposite Doctrine, and the sealing of a blank is nothing strange to me: I was acquainted with it twenty years ago, and I seem plainly to discern the chimney from whence all the smoke comes. 4. As for other gifts bestowed on the Reprobates. 1. We willingly confess they shall never bring them to salvation, be they as great as those who were bestowed on Aristotle, Plato, Aristides, Sophocles, and the most learned moral and wise men of the World, that never were acquainted with the mystery of Godliness: it was wont to be received generally for a truth, that Extra Ecclesiam non est satus; But Arminians take liberty to coin new Articles of our Creed. 2. But yet they may do them good, hereby they may Proficere ad exteriorem vitae emendationem quo mitius puniantur. For certainly it shall be easier in the day of udgement, for Cicero then for Cattline, for Augustus than for Tiberius, for Trajan than for Heliogabalus. 3. And therefore it is certainly false that they are hurtful, and that they proceed out of extreme hatred. And as for love, the Scripture teacheth us that Jacob was loved of God, and Esau hated, each before they were borne. Such is the condition of all the elect as Jacob, of all the Reprobates as Esau; and in Thomas Aquinas his judgement, Non velle alicui vitam aeternam est ipsum odisse. Knowledge I confess of the mysteries of Godliness, where life and conversation is not answerable, doth increase men's condemnation: neither is God bound to change the corrupt heart of any man: if they are workers of iniquity Christ will not know them at the great day, though they have Prophesied in his name, and in his name cast out Devils; neither was it ever heard of, that the graces of edification, and graces of sanctification must go together, and that God in giving the one, is bound to give the other. As for being proud of them, pride for aught I know, requires no other causes but domestical corruption: but he that acknowledgeth God to be the giver of any gift, and hath an heart to be thankful for it, I make no doubt but he hath more grace than of edification only: certainly the gifts they have, sink them not to hell, but their corrupt heart in abusing them. And hath a man no cause to be thankful unto God for one gift, unless he will add another? The Gentiles are charged for unthankfulness Rom. 1. But it seems by this Author's Divinity, it was without cause, unless we will with this Author say, they all had sufficiency of means without, and power within to bring them to salvation: and what had Israel more? Or the elect of God more in any age? True, for according to the Arminian tenet, an elect hath no more cause to be thankful to God for any converting grace, than a Reprobate. In a word, what good act wrought in the heart of man, whether of faith or of repentance, or any kind of obedience, hath man cause to be thankful to God for, when God works it in him no otherwise than modó homo velit, and so they confess he works every sinful act? Have they not in this case more cause to thank themselves than to thank God? And unless we concur with them in so shameless, unchristian, graceless, and senseless an opinion, and in effect, if God converts the heart of man according to the mere pleasure of his will, and hardeneth others: all the gifts that he bestows on man, are censured by this audacious censurer, as Saul's bestowing Michal on David, Jaells courtesy, and usurers bounty, etc. or a bait for a poor fish, as if God needed any such course to permit him to sin in what kind or degree soever, to expose him to any degree of condemnation; or as if the Creator hath not power to do what he will with his creature, any more than an Usurer hath over his poor brother, or Saul over David, or the like. Thus the consideration of his third reason I have brought to an end. I come to the Fourth. DISCOURSE. The Fourth Reason. It is prejudicial to Piety. SECT. I. MY Fourth General against absolute reprobation is, It is a hindrance of Piety: it serveth to discourage holiness, and encourage profaneness. It makes Ministers negligent in Preaching, Praying, and every duty else, that tends to the eternal good of their People. It makes people careless also of hearing, reading, praying, instructing their families, examining their consciences, fasting and mourning for their sins, and all other godly exercises. In a word, it cuts asuder in my opinion the very sinews of religion, and pulls away the strongest inducements to an holy life. Therefore it is no true and wholesome doctrine. That it doth so, it will appear these two ways that follow. 1. It takes away (Hope) and (Fear) Hope of attaining any good by Godliness; Fear of sustaining any hurt by wickedness: and so it takes away two principal props of Religion. This reason may be resolved into two branches. Hope and Fear uphold Godliness: Were it not for these it would fall to ruin: by these are men strongly led on to virtue, and withheld from vice. 1. Hope doth (excitare) stir men up to begin, and (corroborare) strengthen in the doing of any good action begun. By this hope of heaven did our Saviour stir up himself to endure the Crosle and despise the shame Heb. 12 By this he heartened his Disciples to do and suffer for his sake Math. 5. 11. Abraham left his Country and kindred at Gods call, because he looked for a City whose builder and maker was God. Heb. 11. 8, 9, 10. Moses left all the pleasures and treasures of Egypt, and endured afflictions with the people of God, because he saw him that was invisible v. 27. The Martyrs endured racks, gibbets, Lions, sword, fire, with a world of other torments, because they looked for a better resurrection, v. 35. Paul endeavours always to keep a good conscience through the hope of a blessed resurrection. Acts 24. 15. All the heroical acts of active and passive obedience, have sprung from the hope of a weight of glory. Husbandmen, Soldiers, Merchants, are all whetted on by hope to diligence in their callings, as daily experience shows. Hope (saith Aquinas) confert ad operationem, and he proveth it first by Scripture 1 Cor. 9 10. He which Eareth and Thresheth must Ear and Thresh in hope: And then by a twofold reason. 1. From the Nature of hopes object, Bonum arduum & possible, some excellent good attainable by industry. Existimatio ardut excitat attentionem, hope to get that by pains, which is conceived to be a thing of worth, stirs up to pains taking. 2. From the effect of hope, which is delectatio, an inward pleasure, which the party that lives under hope is affected with by his hope. There is no man which hath an inward contentment and satisfaction of heart in the work that he hath to do, but goes on merrily. The hope of Heaven therefore is a great encouragement to piety. 2. The fear of Hell also is a strong curb to hold men in from Wickedness, and therefore (saith one) God hath planted in men a fear of vengeance, that by it, as the ship by the rudder, the soul may be presently, turned aside from any rocks, or gulfs, or quicksands of sin, when it is near them, and so may steer its course another way. For this cause, fear of God, and abstaining from evil, are often joined together in Scripture Job. 1. 1. Exod. 1. 17. And the want of this fear is made the root of all licentiousness in sinning Gen. 20. 11. Nor doth fear only hinder a bad action, but it promotes a good. It hinders a bad action directly, because it is fuga mali, a flying from that evil of misery, which is annexed to the evil of sin; and it promotes a good action accidentally, because men think that they are never so safe from the mischief which they fear, as when they are exercised in such employments as tend to the getting of a contrary state. Work out your salvation (saith the Apostle) with fear and trembling; implying, that the working out of salvation goes not on handsomely except the fear of missing it be an ingredient to the work. The second branch of this Reason is, That by the absolute decree Fear and hope are taken away. For hope is properly exercised about Bonum futurum & possibile haberi, some good thing that may be obtained, not a good thing that must be obtained of necessity: and the object of fear is malum possibile vitari, an evil that may be escaped. For metus est fuga mali, fear is a flying from evil, and therefore supposeth that the evil is avoidable; for no man will fly from an evil that cannot be prevented, but will yield himself up to it, as Caesar did to the murderers in the Senate house. Now by this decree Heaven and Hell are not objecta possibilia, but necessaria. Heaven shall avoidable be obtained, by those that are elected, and Hell must as certainly be endured, by those that in God's eternal purpose are rejected. For men have no power to alter their eternal states: all men by this decree, are precisely determined ad unum, to one state, to necessary salvation, or necessary damnation, without any power or liberty to choose whether. And from hence the conclusion is clear, that the absolute decree, takes away the chiefest inducements to holiness, and determents from wickedness, and consequently hinders a Godly life exceedingly. TWISSE. Consideration. Travellers' report of the Territory of Venice, that the farther they go into it, the stronger and stronger they find it. But such is not the condition of this Author's discourse; for the farther I wade into it, the weaker and weaker it appears. And to this I answer first in general, That our Britain Divines make answer to the like crimination made against our Doctrine upon the 5. Article p. 168. according to the English translation of it; saying, Both God's truth, and man's experience, easily wipe off this aspersion. For this Christian persuasion of perseverance and salvation, not only in respect of its own nature, but also according to the very event in the Church, doth by God's blessing produce a quite contrary effect. First in respect of the thing itself. The certainty of the end doth not take away, but establish the use of the means. And the same holy men, who upon sure grounds promise unto themselves, both constancy in the way of this Pilgrimage, and fruition of God in their everlasting home, know also that these are not obtained without performance of the duties of holiness, and the avoidance of contrary vices: And therefore they turn not their backs from these means, but industriously embrace and prosecute them. 1 john 3. 3. Every man that hath this hope in himself, purifieth himself, even as he is pure. Esay 38. 5. When Hezechiah had received that promise from God of an addition of fifteen years to his life, he did not therefore neglect the use of medicines or meat, but, that this promised event might be brought into act, he applied for the cure of his body, the plaster which was prescribed unto him by the Prophet. The Apostle doth altogether reject this consequence of carnal security imputed to this Doctrine, and that with a kind of indignation Rom. 6. 1. Shall we continue in sin that grace may abound? God forbid. How shall we which are dead to sin, live any longer therein? As if S. Paul would intimate unto us, not only the incongruity, but also the impossibility of such a sequel. 2. As touching the event; true it is, that any the most wholesome truth of God, may be perverted by the abuse of men. But upon this doctrine, we cannot acknowledge that there groweth any such inconvenience, no not the facto, that is, in the event itself. Let us take a view of the reformed Churches, in which this confidence of perseverance and inviolable adoption is believed and maintained. Do we find that thereupon the bridle is let loose unto riot? That piety is trampled down? We give thanks unto God through our Lord Jesus Christ, that amongst ours (who enjoy this full persuasion of spiritual comfort, and are confident that there is an inheritance which cannot be lost, laid up for them in Heaven) there is not found less care of Godliness, nor less endeavour (so far forth as man's infirmity will suffer) to live an unblameable life, then is to be found among any sort of these, who pin their perseverance on their own free will, and will not grant it to flow from any foregoing election of God. This may suffice for answer to the generality of the crimination. From the generality he descends to specialties. And in the first place he urgeth, It takes away hope and fear. He begins with hope, and enlargeth himself in the commendation thereof out of Scripture, By this hope of Heaven, did our Saviour stir up himself to endure the cross, and despise the shame. Heb. 12. He could not allege a more pregnant passage to cut his own throat, and mortify the vigour of his argument; For in this place it depends upon such a notion of hope, as signifies only a possibility of obtaining a future good, and not a necessity of obtaining it, as afterwards himself accommodates it, and so he will have the hope which here he insists upon, such as is mixed with fear; as if our Saviour were in doubt of obtaining a Crown of glory. By this he heartened his Disciples to suffer for his sake. Math. 5. 12. Rejoice and be glad for great is your reward in heaven. Here also we have no hope mixed with fear, whereupon he heartens them; but the very assurance of faith grounded upon Christ's promise, and what greater assurance than this? The like promise for assurance of faith is made Math. 10. 32. And indeed hope in the Scripture phrase (though in these places there is no mention thereof) is but an expectation of enjoying that whereof we have a certain assurance by Faith. The object of faith being Verbum rei, of hope, res verbi, as Luther is said to distinguish them. Such is the hope signified by our looking for the Saviour Phil. 3. 20. For therefore we look for him, because we are persuaded by the assurance of faith, that he shall come, and that as a Saviour unto us, as there 'tis expressed in these words, Who shall change our vile bodies, and make them like to his glorious body. Such is the hope mentioned, Col. 1. 5. as grounded upon their true knowledge of the grace of Christ v. 6. And upon their Faith v. 4. For upon believing we rejoice with joy unspeakable and glorious, 1 Pet. 1. And this joy is in hope of the glory of God, Rom. 5. 2. Of the same nature is that hope Tit. 2. 13. So Abraham's looking for a City whose builder and maker is God. Heb. 11. 8, 9, 10. But was not this hope of his grounded upon assurance of faith to enjoy it? So Moses his seeing of him that was invisible, was by the eye of faith. And the scope of that whole Chapter, is for the commendation of faith; a faith therefore they had of a better resurrection, and the certainty hereof, was the certainty of faith. Now let every sober reader judge, which of our doctrines doth more tend to the justifying of a certainty of salvation, the Arminians or ours. That which followeth of the Husbandmen, Merchants, Soldiers, is far of another nature; their hopes of their ends have no ground of faith: many times it comes to pass, that spem mentita seges, & though aliquis pendens in cruse vota facit, yet most commonly it proves but a vain hope. Merchants many times prove bankrupts; and Soldiers when they are most erected with hope of victory, do sometimes most shamefully take the foil: What a proud message did Benhadab send to Ahab 1 King. 20. 10. The Gods do so to me, and more also, if the dust of Samaria be enough to all the people that follow me, for every man an handful. But Ahab answered him saying. Let not him that girdeth his harness boast himself as he that putteth it off. At the battle of Lipsich upon Tilly's defeating of the Duke of Saxony, word hereof was dispatched with post hast to the Emperor, together with some of the Duke's Ensigns, and scoffs upon the Duke himself; they were confident of beating Sweden and that so all Germany should be theirs; but herein that old Lad reckoned before his host; the same Post brought heavy news to Vienna at length, of a great discomfiture to the Imperialists, and of the victorious Army of the King of Sweden. Yet a hope not only upon weak, but sometimes upon very vain grounds, stirs up the spirit; how much more upon certain grounds of good success, as that of the Apostle Rom. 6. Sin shall not have the dominion over you, for ye are not under the Law but under grace, therefore let not sin reign over you, as much as to say, Play the men, fight valiantly the Lords battles against sin and Satan, for ye shall have the victory in the end. The fear of Hell is a curb to hold men in from wickedness I willingly confess, but the knowledge hereof is not natural, but by revelation divine, which to carnal men who live by fight is of little force: Witness the story of the Welshman who robbing an honest man upon the high way, and being told by him, that he should answer for it at the day of judgement, sayest thou me so (quoth the thief) and wilt thou trust me till that day, then give me thy cloak too. We find by experience, the most unclean person, if he meets with never so beautiful a piece, yet if he knows she hath the Pox; the fear of infection will be of more power to restrain him then the fear of Hell. Yet God by his word works in men, (even in carnal men) as a taste of the sweetness of Heaven, so of the bitterness of Hell; the one to erect with hope, the other to awe with fear: and in both respects they may be said (in my judgement) to have a taste of the powers of the World to come. And like as the Law was added because of transgression, that is, to restrain transgression, as some expound it: so likewise the representation of God's wrath and jealousy, may in the sanctions thereof have good force in this. And in the Godly also I make no question, but it is of good use; though the love of God, hath in great measure overcome that servile fear; yet as their faith is not so perfect, as to be void of all doubting, so neither is their hope so perfect, as to be free from all mixture of fear: But the chaste fear, the filial fear, fear of displeasing God who hath been so gracious unto them, is that fear which is predominant in such. And even fear of God's fatherly chastisements in this world, is an hedge of thorns keeping them within the goodness of the Lord, and far more forcible than the fear of Hell fire to the carnal gospeler. And this Author doth carry himself very unlearnedly in confounding their differences, and discoursing of the fear of God without distinction; As if the fear of of God in Job. 1. 1. were the fear of Hell, and the fear of the Midwives Exod. 1. 17. As if there were no difference between servile fear, and a filial fear. Saint Paul was so confident of his salvation, that he professeth his persuasion, That neither death, nor life, nor Angels, nor Principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, should be able to separate him from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus. Rom. 8. 38. Yet 2 Cor. 5. 11. Knowing therefore (saith he) the fear of the Lord we persuade men. Gen. 20. 11. Abraham said, The fear of God is not in this place, therefore they will kill me for my Wife's sake. But doth this Author carry himself as it becomes a Divine, to take the fear of God, wheresoever he meets with it, for no other fear then the fear of Hell. Certainly the fear of God is as a fountain of life to avoid the snares of death. Yet I presume though our Saviour was nothing affected with the fear of hell, yet was he never a whit the less forward to all holy conversation; Nor Paul neither, though he professeth, I know whom I have trusted etc. The Lord will deliver me from every evil work, and preserve me to his heavenly Kingdom. That fear and trembling Phil. 2. 13. is not fear of hell, but humility, standing in opposition to presumption of a man's own strength; as appears by the reason, wherewith the Apostle enforceth that exhortation of his, To work out our salvation with fear and trembling: for saith he, God it is that worketh in you both the will and the deed, according to his good pleasure. And if the working out of our salvation goes not on handsomely, except the fear of missing it, be an ingredient to the work, as this Author discourseth; than it seems his fear of missing makes him go on more handsomely, in working out his salvation, then either Paul the Apostle, or our Saviour did: for I no where find that our Saviour feared the missing of it; no nor Paul neither, after his conversion; though he knew full well, that conscionable carriage in his vocation, was a necessary means, without which he could not obtain it; and therefore professeth, that he did beat down his body, and bring it in subjection, least Preaching unto others himself should become a cast away. We deny that by the absolute decree maintained by us, hope and fear are taken away; and we prove it by an invincible argument. For undoubtedly the decree of Christ's salvation, was absolute, yet did not this take away either hope or fear: for it is recorded of him, That for the hope that was set before him, he despised the shame, and also, that he was heard in that which he feared: though sinful fear, and slavish fear, was far from him, as far as hell from heaven. The object of Christian hope is not only a good thing possible to be had, but certainly to be had. For we read of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Heb. 6. A full assurance of hope, were it of a thing uncertain, how indecent were it for the Apostle to compare it to an Anchor 1 john 3. 3. He that hath this hope purgeth himself as he is pure. Was this a wavering hope, grounded upon an uncertain apprehension? Mark the verse immediately preceding, and consider whether it doth not enforce the contrary. Now are we the sons of God, but yet it is not made manifest what we shall be: And we know (mark his assurance well) that when he shall be made manifest, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is. The description of fear, is answerable to the description of hope. we were wont to define the one by the expectation, appropinquantis boni, the other by the expectation imminentis mali. Yet it is true the object of the one is such a good, as in its own nature is possible to be obtained, and of the other, is such an evil as is possible to be avoided. But like as eternal life is not attainable without faith and repentance; so neither is damnation avoidable, but by faith and repentance. And we willingly grant that both eternal life is attainable, and damnation avoidable by faith and repentance, yet undoubtedly the unpreventable nature of an evil, doth no way hinder a man's fear, unless he knows it to be unpreventable. Neither doth the knowledge of the unpreventable nature thereof hinder fear, but improveth it rather, in as much as in such a case, there is no place for any hope to qualify the fear. And this is farther apparent by the example of the Devils, of whom Saint james saith That they believe and tremble, surely they do not tremble the less, because their torment is unpreventable by the appointment of of God: yet do they not give themselves up to their sorrows, but cried out to our Saviour, What have we to do with thee thou Jesus the Son of God, art thou come to torment us before our time: Caesar's case was not the case of fear, for fear is the apprehension of an evil before it come; but Caesar was so far from fearing, that though he were forewarned to take heed of the Ides of March (as I remember) lest they proved fatal to him, was so far from apprehending any fear thereupon, that going that day to the Senate House, and meeting by the way with him who had given him that warning, he called him by his name, and to show his fearless condition said, The Ides of March are come; true Sr quoth the other, but they are not yet past. The mortal wound in the Senate House was given him before he feared it; for of thirty and odd wounds there received, it is written that every one of them was mortal. His heroical spirit bore him out nevertheless (not against the fear, for that was now out of season, but) against the sense of mortal pain, in such sort, as not to commit any indecent thing, in dying under the hands of so many Assassinates either in word or deed; for not a word of distemper, was uttered by him, only to Brutus his near Kinsman, and dear unto him, when he came upon him in like manner as the rest, he said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and took care to gather his garments in such sort about ut honeste caderet. Heaven and hell are ordained by God as the portion, of the righteous the one, of the wicked the other. I hope this Author will not deny but that Heaven (according to his phrase) was avoidable obtained by our Saviour, yet this nothing hindered his hope, but rather confirmed it by casting out of fear. And the hope of Christ is the first thing this Author instanceth in, while he amplifies the nature of hope; but in his large expatiation thereon, according to his course he spent so much time, that he might well forget it, before he come to the accommodation of it unto his Argument. And indeed hope in Scripture phrase, is the looking for of Christ, and the glory he brings with him; and what a senseless thing is it to conceive, that the more sure we are of blessedness, the less we should expect and look for the enjoyment of it? Doth not our Saviour bid his Disciples Luke 10. 20. not to rejoice in this, that Devils are subdued unto them, but rather to rejoice in this, that their names are written in heaven. Now let any sober man judge, whether this joy shall be of force to expectorate our hope, and not rather to confirm and increase it. As for Hell, I know none are assured thereof, as of their due portion, but the Devils, yet they fear and tremble never a whit the less for that. But men while they live on earth, not one of them in particular that I know are, or have any just ground to be assured of their damnation. For albeit faith in Christ may well be an assurance of man's election; yet nothing but final perseverance in infidelity or impenitency, can be a just assurance to any man of his damnation. As for the eternal states of men, they are not existent, but only in God's intention, and consequently to alter their eternal states, is to alter God's intentions. Now what Arminian of these days, that is of any learning and judgement, dares boldly affirm, that it is in the power of the creature to alter God's intentions. In like sort with what sobriety can any man deny, that every man is determined either to salvation or damnation, the prescience of God being sufficient hereunto; and we acknowledge that none is ordained by God to be damned, but for final perseverance in sin unrepented of: none to be saved of ripe years, but by way of reward for his faith, obedience, repentance. As for power and liberty to choose either, let that be first rightly stated: Moses Deut. 30. 19 (or the Lord rather by him) professeth that he hath set before them life and death; and exhorts them to choose life, the meaning whereof is to choose that, the consequent whereunto is life; now that was obedience unto the laws and holy ordinances of God. Now as touching the power and liberty, to choose this, we say, 1. That this power was given to all in Adam, and we have all lost it in him through sin: for we all sinned in him, as the Apostle in express terms professeth Rom. 5. 12. 2. The power that we have lost in Adam, is no natural power, but a moral power like unto that whereof the Lord speaketh by the Prophet Jeremy. Jere. 13. 23. Can a Blackamoor change his skin? Or the Leopard his spots? No more can you do good, that are accustomed to evil. Nor will any sober man judge that such an impotency as this doth make a man excusable? In the like sort our Saviour unto the Jews: john. 5. 44. How can ye believe that receive Honour one of another, and seek not the Honour that comes of God only? So that this impotency is merely moral, arising from the corruption of their wills. Had a man a will to believe to repent, but withal had no power to believe and repent though he would, here indeed were a just cause of excuse: but all the fault hereof is in the will of man. This our Britain Divines at the Synod of Dort upon the 3. and 4. Articles of the second Position express in this manner. The nature of man being by voluntary Apostasy habitually turned from God the creator, it runs to the creature, with an unbridled appetite, and in a lustful and base manner commits fornication with it, being always desirous to set her heart and rest on those things which ought only to be used on the by, and to attempt and accomplish things forbidden. What marvel then if such a will be the bondslave to the Devil. The will without charity is nothing but a vicious desire, inordinata cupiditas. Aug: Retract. 1. 5. 3. Yet the same Austin professeth Lib. 1. de Gen. cont: Manich: cap. 3. credere possunt & ab amore visibilium rerum & temporalium, se ad ejus praecepta servanda convertere si velint. And ad Marcel. De spiritu & littra. proves at large that fides in voluntate est. Only it is the grace of God to prepare the will, ut velit, and so to increase with Retract. lib. 1. c. 10. the gift of charity ut possit, so that there is a great deal of difference between posse si velit, and posse simpliciter, in Augustine's judgement posse si velit is less than velle, but posse simpliciter, is more than velle. 4. Lastly what means this Author to discourse thus hand overhead of power and liberty to choose whether as if (whatsoever they pretend) their true meaning were, that man hath power to believe and repent without grace. For as for power to believe and repent through Gods grace no man denies. Why then doth he not try his strength on this point which indeed is the critical point of these controversies, and wherein it will clearly appear, whether they differ one jot from the Pelagians. For the question between the Pelagians, and the Catholics in Augustine's days was not about the possibility of willing or doing that which is good, but only about the act of willing and doing: And herein they granted instruction and exhortation requisite. All the question was about the working of his will, to will and do that which is good, as appears by Austin in his book De gratia Christi contra Pelag: & Caelesti: cap. 6. And repeated again towards the end, coming to an issue of the business, after he had discovered much concerning Ambrose his opinieon thereabouts. But whatsoever his premises be, in his conclusion he commonly speaks it home, as herein saying, It is clear that the absolute decree, takes away the chiefest inducements to holiness, and determents from wickedness, to wit, because it takes away hope and fear; whence it followeth, that seeing Christ had hope of heaven, he was not absolutely destinated unto glory. And seeing the Devils are said to believe and tremble, therefore certainly their damnation is yet preventable, although there is yet this main difference between reprobate men on earth, and Devils, that though the Devils are assured of their reprobation, yet no man either is, or can by any ordinary way be assured of his reprobation. I conclude thus, This his Discourse tends mainly against all certainty of Salvation: whence it follows, that either he had no certainty of his salvation while he was with us, or if he had, it stands him upon now to profess that he hath utterly lost it. DISCOURSE. SECT. II. 2. THe injuriousness of this Doctrine to Godly life, may farther appear by these considerations that follow, one depending upon another. 1. Absolute and peremptory decrees are inevitable, whatsoever the things be about which they are exercised; and men's everlasting states, if they be absolutely determined, are altogether undeclinable. Stat sali lex indeclinabilis, the law of destiny is undeclinable. And the reason is, because it hath an inevitable cause, the adamantine decrees of Almighty God, which are indeclinable two ways. 1. Irreversible, liable to no repeal (as the Statutes are which are made in our Parliaments:) but farre more unalterable than the Laws of the Medes and Persians. As I have spoken so will I bring it to pass: I have purposed, and I will do it. Esay. 46. 11. Men do many times by't in their words again, because they do utter things rashly, and do repeal their Statutes and Ordinances, because they see some inconveniences in them, which they could not foresee: but God never altars or calls in his absolute decrees because they are all made with great wisdom and foresight. 2. Irresistible. It lies not in the power of any creature to disannul them. Who hath resisted his will? Rom. 9 19 Our God is in Heaven: he doth whatsoever he will: Psal. 115. 3. Whatsoever is once determined by his absolute will is no ways alterable by the will of man. It is more possible for a man to hinder the rising of the Sun, or to stay his course in the Heaven, to stop the revolutions of the year, and overturn the whole course of nature, then to make the least alternation in any of God's absolute decrees. 2. men's actions about ends, and things determined by an absolute decree are vain and fruitless; and the reason is, because they cannot make them otherwise then they were determined to be; and therefore in vain do men labour to obtain Everlasting Life and avoid Eternal Death, if there be no liberty and power in their hands to choose Life or Death, but must of necessity take that which is assigned them, be it Life or Death; for by their labour they effect just nothing; for if they be absolutely appointed to destruction, their hearing, reading, praying, almes-giving, and mourning for their sins cannot possibly procure their Salvation; damned they must be. And if they be absolutely ordained to Savation, their neglect of holy duties, their ignorance, their love of pleasures and continuance in a course of ungodliness, cannot bring them unto damnation; they must be Saved: If somany Souls in a Parish be in this manner decreed to Heaven or Hell, the Minister Preacheth in vain, and the people hear in vain. For there cannot one Soul be Saved, for all their pains, which is ordained to Hell, nor one Soul be cast away by their negligence, which is apppointed for Heaven. It is in vain for thee (saith Christ to Saul) to kick against the pricks: (i) to endeavour by thy persecutions and slaughters to root out my Church in the world; because the preservation of it is absolutely Act. 9 5. decreed in Heaven. Teaching us by that speech, that a man's labour in any thing whatsoever, is never profitable, except it be exercised about an end attainable thereby, and without it not possible. 3, Men are not willing to be employed in fruitless actions if they know it. I so run (saith the Apostle) not as uncertainely; so fight I, not as on that beats the Air: but I keep under my 1 Cor. 9 25. body and bring it into subjection, lest that by any means, when I have Preached unto others I myself should be a castaway. The meaning is, I endeavour to keep God's commandments, I fight with the tentations of the Devil the allurements of the world, and mine own corruptions, I keep my body low by watchings and fastings, and other severe acts of holy discipline. But Cui bono? do I all this at random? Uncertain whether I shall get any good, or prevent any mischief hereby? No, but I do this, as one that is sure that by so doing, I shall obtain Eternal Life, and otherwise I cannot escape Eternal Death: intimating in these words the common disposition of men, which is to labour where some proportionable good is to be gotten, or evil prevented, otherwise to spare their heads and their hands too. TWISSE Consideration. TO talk of the decrees divine as things evitable or inevitable, is very absurd: for things denominated evitable or inevitable are only things to come, not yet existent; but such are not decrees divine, they are as everlasting as God himself without any beginning of duration. As for the things decreed by God, they are of a double nature. For God hath decreed some things to come to pass necessarily, other things to come to pass contingently. Now those things that come to pass contingently do so come to pass (and that by the decree of God) as joined with a possibility not to come to pass, and consequently to come to pass so as joined with a possibility to be avoided. Such are Salvation and damnation in as much as God hath annexed these as rewards, unto final perseverance in faith and repentance, the one; unto final perseverance in sin unrepented of, the other. This is the undeclinable law of God's decree, that, whosoever believes shall be Saved Mar. 16. 16. and whosoever believes not shall be damned. But we do not say, that this is the whole decree of predestination and Reprobation, with the Remonstrants, and with this Author. But that there is another decree of God, the effect whereof is as undeniable, as the effect of the former, which this Author dissembleth throughout: and the effect of this decree is not conditional like unto the effects of the former decree, but absolute. And it is the more strange that this Author should so much insist upon the effects of the former, & nothing at all on this: whereas the effects of the former nothing at all serve his turn, but through mere confusion: for he carrieth the matter so as if we maintained that God doth decree to dispense Salvation and damnation absolutely according to the mere pleasure of his will, and not conditionally as he finds his creatures either dying in faith or dying in sin, which is most untrue. And yet his usual course to relieve himself in the case of impertinency and extravagancy is to fly to the effects of the other decree which we willingly confess to be absolute; yet hath he no appetite to deal directly in the discussing thereof. Now we profess that as God according to the mere pleasure of his will bestows faith and repentance on some and denies it to others, according to that of the Apostle. He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. Rom. 9 18. So God from everlasting decreed, according to the mere pleasure of his will to bestow the gift of faith & repentance on some & deny it to others. All the decrees of God we acknowledge to be unchangeable from within, irresistible from without. Yet this Author applies these attributes only to Gods absolute decrees, intimating that it is otherwise with God's conditional decrees: which conceit of his savoureth of the same learning and judgement with the rest. Besides it is his course hand over head to talk of the distinction of God's decrees, into decrees absolute, and decrees conditional: whereas the decrees of God as touching the acts of God willing, admit no such distinction; the act of Gods will being always absolute and never conditional, as both Piscator theologically hath proved against Uorstius and Bradwardine most scholastically hath demonstrated; and by other reasons may be demonstrated and made as clear as the Sun; some of which reasons I have formerly mentioned in this discourse: only quoad res volitas as touching the things willed this distinction hath place; as both Dr Jackson in his book of Providence acknowledgeth of that distinction of Voluntas antecedens & voluntas consequens (which by Uossius interpretation is all one with voluntas absoluta & voluntas conditionata) namely that it is to be understood only quoad res volitas. And in the same sense is voluntas conditionata interpreted, as appears by the practice of Uossius * Histor. Pelag p. 638. and of this Author throughout. Now in this sense we do not acknowledge that God's decrees of Salvation and damnation are absolute, but merely conditional; so that this Author doth but fight with his own shadow in this his argumentation, making as shameful a mistake as ever Don Quixot did, when he conceived the Barber's basin to be the Helmet of Mambrino, and fell furiously upon him, in a zeal of martial glory, to recover Spolia opima, so fat and rich spoils. By the way observe, to alter Gods absolute decrees, is no other thing, then to alter that which is once determined by God's absolute will. For after this different manner doth this Author express one and the same thing in this Section. Now consider, is not the rising of the Sun the course of Heaven, the revolution of the year, the whole course of nature, some of these things which are determined by God's absolute will? With what giddiness then doth he affirm that to hinder or stay or overturn any of these is more possible then to make alteration in God's decrees; seeing to make alteration in God's decrees is but to alter things which God hath once determined by his absolute will. But as for Salvation and damnation these are not determined by God, like as the rising of the Sun, the course of Heaven the revolutions of the year, and the whole course of nature. For these are determined by God to come to pass absolutely; but the Salvation or damnation of man are determined by God to come to pass conditionally. 2. And accordingly man's ends are not determined by an absolute decree, like unto the rising of the Sun. For the rising of the Sun is by God determined to come to pass absolutely, so are not the special ends of men, to wit, Salvation and damnation (for these are the ends of men which this Author speaks of) these (as I said) are determined to come to pass not absolutely but conditionally: And therefore men's actions hereabouts, are not vain and fruitless: And the reason is because man's Salvation is determined to befall him only in case he believe and repent and become studious of good works: In like sort damnation is determined to none of ripe years, but in case he gives off all care of faith repentance and good works. Did God determine a man shall be Saved whether they be good or evil, like as he determined the Sun should rise whether men sleep or wake, whether they be idle or well occupied (for so he makes his Sun to shine and the rain to fall upon the just and unjust) then indeed man's actions in furthering their Salvation were vain and fruitless. But the Antecedent is a notorous untruth. For our Saviour hath professed in express terms that whosoever believeth shall be Saved, and whosoever believes not shall be damned. As for the liberty and power of a man to perform faith and repentance, whether this be granted unto all? Is an other question, which this Author might have discussed had it pleased him, and taken upon him to maintain universal grace; but he declines this throughout, like as others of this sect too, fearing therein some precipice. And herein we are willing to grant that God hath absolutely determined that some shall believe and repent, as he hath determined the Sun rising, not upon any condition in man, but according to the mere pleasure of his will, bestowing the grace of faith on some, and denying it to others. For if God did bestow faith on man upon condition of some precedent work in man, than grace should be given according to men's works (that is in the phrase of the Ancients) according to men's merits, which is direct Pelagianism, and condemned in the Synod of Palestine above twelve hundred years ago. But this Author carrieth himself very preposterously, thus confounding two questions into one: the one, Whether salvation be determined by God, to be conferred absolutely on man? Which we deny as much as himself doth. The other is, Whether faith and repentance be determined by God to be conferred on man conditionally? Which we maintain; and wonder not a little that this Author's stomach (working like the raging Sea) chiefly against this, yet dares not come to the debating of this, no nor so much as in plain terms to speak out his opinion, and profess, that the reason why God bestows faith on one, and not on another, is because he finds some disposition or work in him, on whom he bestows faith, which he finds not in another to whom he denies it. Yet he goes on most ridiculously in the same tenor, saying. If they be absolutely apppointed to destruction, their hearing, reading, praying, almesgiving, and mourning for their sins, cannot possibly procure their salvation: damned they must be. But we still deny that men are absolutely apppointed to destruction, we willingly grant the elect are absolutely appointed unto grace, namely to have regeneration, faith and repentance to be conferred upon them, and that absolutely, not upon any foregoing condition performed by them, but according to the mere pleasure of God; but as for salvation, that is appointed to be bestowed upon them, only by way of reward of foregoing faith, repentance, and good works, observe by the way, how he considers not the contradictious nature of that which he imputes unto us. As first that we deny man to have any liberty or power to choose life and death. And secondly, that we maintain, That their hearing, reading, praying, almesgiving, and mourning for their sins, cannot possibly procure their salvation; which is to imply, that they have power to hear, read, pray, give alms, and mourn for their sins, and consequently that they have power to choose life or death. For to choose life or death, is no other than to embrace such courses, as by the ordinance of God, lead to life or death. Now such are hearing, reading, praying, giving asmes, and mourning for sins; for these courses are the way to everlasting life. Yet as touching the latter, well we may say that Reprobates can neither hear, nor read, nor pray, nor give alms as they ought, nor mourn for their sins; yet surely we are so far from saying, that these courses cannot possibly procure salvation, that on the contrary rather, we are ready to profess that these courses rightly used, shall infallibly procure salvation; for there is none more precious mourning, then to mourn for sin; and our Saviour hath pronounced them blessed, adding, that they shall be comforted. Was it ever heard amongst us, that men should be damned for reading, hearing, praying, and mourning for their sins? Yet the word of God teacheth us, that men may howl, yet be far enough off from mourning for their sins, as Hos. 7. 14. They cried not unto me when they houled upon their beds: they assembled themselves for corn and wine, & they rebelled against me. And if men be damned notwithstanding such mourning, I should think it is nothing strange. Of the same tenor is that which followeth. If they be absolutely ordained to salvation, their neglect of holy duties, their ignorance their love of pleasure, and continuance in a course of ungodliness, cannot bring them to damnation; as if this were our doctrine: whereas to the contrary we maintain, that from election flows holiness. Eph. 1. 4. Who hath elected us in Christ, that we should be holy. And faith, Acts 13. 48. As many believed as were ordained to everlasting life. And 2 Thes. 2. 13. God hath elected you unto salvation, by sanctification of the spirit, and faith of the truth. And indeed our profession is, That God's purpose is to bestow salvation by way of reward of faith, repentance, and good works: And accordingly there is no other assurance of election, then by faith and holiness. 1 Thes. 1. 3, 4. Remembering the work of your faith, the labour of your love, and the patience of your hope, knowing beloved brethren, that ye are elect of God. And therefore Saint Peter exhorts Christians, To make their election and vocation sure, by joining virtue with their faith, and with virtue knowledge, and with knowledge temperance, and with temperance patience, and with patience Godliness, and with Godliness Brotherly kindness, and with Brotherly kindness Love. 2 Pet. 1. 5, 6, 7. 10. But it were pity this Author should have liberty denied him servire scaenae, and to execute his Historical part in conforming our Doctrine to the Heresy of the Predestinatians, (so called) as it is recorded by Sigebert. And indeed the very Doctrine of Austin, was charged with the same crimination: For albeit Sigebert professeth that this Heresy arose ex Augustini libris male intellectis: out of Augustine's Book not rightly understood; yet the learned Archbishop of Armach, had made it manifest, that this very crimination was charged upon Augustine's doctrine. Histor. Gottesc. pag. 22. And that out of the beginning of the 6. book Hypomnestican or Hypognosticon. The words are these, and I pray mark it well, whether it be not punctually the very objection which this Author makes in this place: Credere nos vel praedicare sugillatis (quia cum lege Dei & Prophetis cum Evangelio Christi ejusque Apostolis Praedestinationem dicimus) quod Deus quosdam hominum sic praedestinet ad vitam regni caelorum, ut si nolent orare, aut jejunare, aut in omni operé divino vigiles esse, eos omnino perire non posse, nec prorsus sui debere esse sollicitos, quos Deus, quia voluit semel jam eligendo praedestinavit ad vitam: Quisdam vero sic praedestinavit in Gehennae paenam, ut etiam si credere velint, si jejuniis & orationibus omnique se voluntati divinae subjecerint in his Deum non delectari, & vitam illis aeternam in toto dari non posse; sic electione praedestinatos esse ut pereant. Judge I pray whether this be not the very objection charged upon the doctrine of Austin, which this Author chargeth upon our doctrine. And indeed that most learned Bishop showeth, how that albeit, the Predestinatian heresy is pretended by Sigebert to have risen out of Augustine's books not rightly understood, as also by Tyro Prosper (Ancient to Sigebert) as he is set forth in Print; yet Tyro himself plainly professeth, that the Heresy mentioned orta est ab Augustino, rose from Augustine himself, as appears by the Manuscripts of that Author, which that learned Bishop had searched, one found in Bennet College in Cambridge, and another in the King's Library: whereby it is apparent, that this pretended Heresy of the Predestinatians (no Author thereof being ever known to the world) was a mere nickname devised by the Remnants of the Pelagians, and reproachfully cast upon the doctrine of Austin, as now a days it is upon our doctrine, which is the same with Augustine's. As for the Ministers Preaching in vain in some sense, and in some cases; this is nothing strange to them that have their eyes fixed on God's oracles, and not on the oracles of their own brains. For the Prophet Esaiah thus complains, and that as some conceive in the person of Christ, Then I said, I have laboured in vain, I have spent my strength for nought, and Isai. 49. 4. in vain, yet surely my judgement is with the Lord, and my work with my God. And Jerem. 8. 8. How dare ye say, we are wise, and the love of the Lord is with us? Lo certainly in vain made he it, the pen of the scribe is in vain. And jerem. 6. 29. The bellows are burnt, the lead is consumed of the fire: the founder melteth in vain: for the wicked are not plucked away. Reprobate silver shall man call them, because the Lord hath rejected them. And like as the sowing of seed is sometimes in vain. Levit. 26 16. So why may not Preaching be in vain, which is a sowing of seed also. Yet in respect of God's end, it is not in vain: For he hath the ends he aimed at; for even in them that perish, there ariseth a sweet savour unto God 2 Cor. 2. 15. As well as in them that are saved. And if they stumble at the word being disobedient, Saint Peter telleth us, that hereunto they were odained 1 Pet. 2. 8. Yea and Austin tells us, that even Reprobates by the Ministry of God's word, are sometimes brought ad exteriorem vitae emendationem, quo mitius puniantur. And as for the Preachers of the Word, their labour is not in vain in the Lord. 1 Cor. 15. last. And Esay 49. 4. My judgement is with the Lord, and my work with my God. For even Christ himself was forsaken of many. john 6. Yet was that no disparagement to him before God. They desire indeed that all men might be saved that are partakers of their Ministry, as they are bound in charity, but with submission to the will of God, so that finally their desires in the issue are terminated only in the elect. They became all things to all men, that they may save some. 1 Cor. 6. And who are they let Paul speak. I endure all things 2 Tim. 2. 10. for the elect sake. As for the hearers themselves, as many as are elect, they believe by it sooner or later and are brought to repentance. 2 Tim. 2. 25. And finally to salvation, That thou mayst both save thyself and them that hear thee, (saith Paul to Timothy) So that 1 Tim. 4. 16. to them surely 'tis not in vain; And as for Reprobates they are convicted by it of their unbelief, Suffrag. Britt. on the 3. & 4. Articles. Excuse is taken from them for they cannot plead that they never heard the Gospel, whereby men are admonished to repent Act. 17. 30. Thereby to excuse themselves: yea & sometimes they may be the better for it, in respect of an outward comformity, only it is in vain in respect that salvation is not obtained by them though the Gospel & the Ministry thereof be a means tending thereunto, in as much as it openeth the way of salvation, & discovereth all false ways. But pains for obtaining salvation, and Hell, are ill joined together; For therefore hell is their portion because they neglect the means of salvation, and take no pains about it at least good pains. For our Saviour plainly tells us of some that they shall seek to enter in at the strait gate, and shall not be able Luk. 13. 24. It seems they took some pains, though they were not able to enter. We are accounted Predestinarian Heretics for saying so much; but I hope he will not reckon our Saviour too amongst the number. So Esay 58. 2. Yet they seek me daily, and will know my ways, even as a Nation that did righteously and had not forsaken the statutes of their God: They ask of me ordinances of justice. They will draw near unto God, saying. Wherefore have we fasted and thou seest it not? We have punished ourselves & thou regardest it not. Here is devotion and pains too, in the way thereof, but I think they had never a whit the better interest in heaven for this. Doth this doctrine also savour of the Predestinarian heresy? As for that pretended passage out of Acts 9 It is in vain for thee to kick against the pricks, I find no such saying of Christ to Saul but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an hard thing; for shall he not wound himself that doth so, more than hurt the pricks themselves? So was Paul by those persecuting courses of his, in the highway to damnation; yet it is true also, God's Church is nothing damnified by the persecutions and martyrdoms of God's Saints. For sanguis Martyrum semen Ecclesiae; one is cut off, but many rise up in the place of a few. Like as a seed of corn falls into the ground and dies; but a blade springs out of that one that dies, and brings forth an ear of many grains. By the way I am wondrous glad to hear the acknowledgement of a precious truth, to break forth out of the mouth of this Author ere he is aware, namely, That the preservation of God's Church is absolutely decreed in heaven. For mark I beseech you, wherein the preservation of God's Church consists. 1. One is in preserving them that are called from Apostasy. If this be absolutely decreed, than the perseverance of men in the state of grace is absolutely decreed; and consequently it is absolutely maintained; And if perseverance in faith be absolutely maintained; then faith itself was absolutely wrought, and absolutely decreed to every one that enjoyeth it. 2. Another is the restraining of Tyrants from persecuting the professors of Christ: If this be absolutely decreed, than the free actions of men are absolutely decreed by God: for to abstain from persecuting is undoubtedly a free action of man. 3. But in case both Tyrants are permitted to rage, and many are permitted to fall away; And all are mortal and must die; therefore the next effectual means of preserving the Church, is the raising of others in their place to profess the Gospel. Now this is wrought by the effectual calling and converting of men unto faith in Christ, and consequently the effectual calling and converting of men is absolutely decreed by God. Thus truth hath prevailed over the mouth of error, to make it testify for God's truth and against error: Magna est veritas, ut praevalebit. Here this Author hath raised spirits against himself improvidently; let him try how he can lay them, and conjure them down again. 3. I come unto the third. I willingly grant that men are not willing to be exercised about fruitless actions; And as for the actions specified by Saint Paul; as they were not fruitless to him; so I make no question but that they are in like manner profitable to all that perform them, as Paul did, namely the actions of mortification. We have Saint Paul's word for it, which is of some force (if so be he be not reputed among the number of Predestinarian heretics, as well as Austin and our Divines) If by the spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, ye shall live. Endeavour Rom. 8. goes beyond desire: yet Nehemiah commends himself to God in this manner. We that desire to fear thy name. And the holy Prophet Esay. The desire of our hearts is towards Nehem. 1. Es. 26. Heb. 13. thy name, and to the remembrance of thee. And S. Paul. We desire to live honestly. And to fight with the temptations of the Devil, the allurements of the World, and a man's own corruptions, is undoubtedly a manifest token of a true Soldier of Christ Jesus. And mortification in special; such need not doubt, but that they shall crucify the flesh, with the affections and lusts. For they that walk in the spirit, shall not fulfil Gal. 5. 1 joh. 5. Rom. 16. the lusts of the flesh; their faith shall give them the victory over the world, and God in his good time will tread Satan under their feet. DISCOURSE. SECT. III. TO be exercised in fruitless affairs, it is both a folly and a misery. 1. A folly, for, de necessari is nemo sapiens deliberate, saith the Philosopher. And our Saviour speaking of things above our power; Curio estis solliciti? saith he to his Disciples, Mat. 6. 27. Luke 12. 25, 26. Why take ye thought about such things? Which is as much as if he had said, It is an argument of folly in you, to trouble yourselves about such things, as lie not in your liberty. 2. A misery in the opinions of all men, as the fable of Sisyphus implies, who (as the Poets feign) is punished for his robberies in hell, with the rolling of a great stone to the top of a sharp hill, where it cannot rest, but presently comes tumbling down again. The Moral of that fable is, that it is a torment, and a torment fit for Hell; for a man to be set about any work that is fruitless and vain. Men will rather be exercised in high and hard employments, that produce proportionable ends; then pick straws, play with feathers, or with Domitian, spend their time in flapping or killing of flies, or do any other easy works, which end in nothing but air and emptiness, except they be fools or selfe-tormentors. And therefore when Balaam once saw that the Lord had fully determined to bless Israel, and that all his Sorceries could not effect the contrary; he presently gave over, and set no more enchantments; And reason teacheth every man to do the like. If any man were fully possessed with a persuasion that this temporal estate were determined in Heaven, and that he should be worth just so much, neither more nor less; he would conclude, that his care and pains could not profit him, nor his idleness impoverish him: and so would be quickly persuaded to take his ease. And if it were evident, that every Commonwealth had a fatal period, beyond which it could not pass, and short of which it could not come, and that all occurrences good or bad, were absolutely preordained by the Almighty, than the King would call no Parliament, use no Privy Counsel: for there would be no use of them at all. As once a famous Privy-councillor told our late Queen Elizabeth, men would neither make laws nor obey them, but would take the Council of the Poet. Solvite mortales ammos, curisque levate, Totque supervacuis animum deplete querelis: Fata regunt orbem, certa stant omnia lege. From these three premises laid together, it follows directly, that the doctrine of an absolute decree, which determines men's ends precisely; is no friend to a Godly life. For if events absolutely decreed be unavoidable; if men's actions about unavoidable ends be unprofitable; it in unprofitable employments men will have no hand willingly: men that know and consider this, will have nothing to do with the practice of Godliness. For their ends being absolutely pitched and therefore unavoidable; they will conclude, that their labour in Religion will be unprofitable, and so will not labour in it at all. That which hath been said, may be yet farther confirmed by two witnesses. The one of them is by two witnesses. The one of them is our Calvin, who in his Institutions hath these words: Si quis ita plebem compellet; si non credit is, ideo fit, quia jam divinitus exitio praedestinati estis; is non modo ignaviam Instit. lib. 3. c. 23. Sect. 14. fovet: sed etiam in dulget malitiae. If any man (saith he) should speak thus to people; If there be any among you that believe not, it is because ye are ordained to destruction; this man would not only cherish slothfulness, but wickedness also. Which is as much to say (me thinks) as this; If a man should set out the doctrine of absolute reprobation in its colours, and explain it to a people in a clear and lively fashion, he would hereby open a door to liberty and profaneness. The other witness is a man of another stamp, the miserable Landgrave of Turing, of whom it is recorded by Heisterbachius, that being admonished by his friends, of his vicious and dangerous conversation Hist. lib. 1. de memor. hist. c. 27. p. 38. and condition, he made them this answer: Si praedestinatus sum nulla peccata poterunt mihi Regnum Coelorum auferre: si praescitus nulla bona mihi illud valebunt confer. If I be elected no sins can bereave me of heaven; if I be a reprobate, no good deeds can help me to heaven. I conclude therefore that by this opinion (which is taught for one of God's principal truths;) Religion is, or may be made a very great loser, which is my fourth general reason against it. TWISSE. Consideration. DE necessari is nemo sapiens deliberat; This is true of things necessary by course of nature, not of things necessary merely upon supposition of God's decree. For such things are as often contingent as necessary; For as he decreeth that some things shall come to pass necessarily, so he decreeth that other things shall be brought to pass contingently: As the buying of the Prophet's bones by Josiah, Cyrus his dimission of the Jews out of Babylon to go to their own Country: the contumelious usages of Christ by Herod and Pontius Pilate, together with the Gentiles and people of Israel, were necessary in respect of God's decree; it being expressly testified by the Apostles with one mouth, that all these were gathered together against the holy Son of God, to do what Gods hand, and Gods Counsel predetermined to be done. Act. 4. 28. Yet who is so impudent as to deny, that all these did freely, whatsoever they did against Christ. In like sort you know what was the course of proceedings against Protestants in Queen Mary's days, when they were convicted by Ecclesiastiques of such opinions, which they accounted heretical, and which were made capital by Law of the Land: then they were delivered over unto the secular power, to be put to death. So that herein, to wit, first in making such bloody Laws. Secondly, in executing them for the establishment of Popish Religion: The Kings gave their power to the Beast, that is, employed their Regal power and authority to the countenancing of Romish Religion: this undoubtedly was a contingent thing. Yet was this determined by God (as the Scripture testifies Revel. 17. 17.) God hath put in their hearts (that is in the hearts of the ten Kings) to fulfil his decree, and to be of one consent, and to give their Kingdom unto the Beast, until the word of God be fulfilled. Again, suppose God hath determined my salvation; yet if he hath determined to save me no other way than is revealed in his word, namely, by growing in 1 Pet. 3. Gal. 6. grace, and in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ: If he hath made known unto us that, without holiness no man shall see God. That a man in good time shall reap, provided that he faint not, nor be weary of well doing. Who seeth not that a necessity of Godly life is laid upon all that will be saved. Now God hath revealed this latter expressly unto us in his word, but as for the salvation of particular persons; we have no such revelation at all set down unto us in God's word, but in general thus. Whosoever believeth shall be saved, whosoever believeth not shall be damned. Be thou faithful unto the death, and thou shalt receive a Crown of life. Whosoever continueth unto the end shall be saved. And good works (as Bernard saith) are via Regni, though not causa regnandi. Therefore if any man desire to come to the Kingdom of Heaven, he must be careful to walk in the way that leadeth thither. The Word saith not to any man in particular. Thou shalt be Rom. 10. saved, but, If thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt believe in thine heart, that God hath raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved. Such was not the promise made to Paul concerning the saving of them, who were in the ship with him, but it proceeded in an ansolute form. Acts 27. 23, 24. There stood by me this night the Angel of God whose I am, and whom I serve, saying. Fear not Paul, for thou must be brought before Caesar: and lo God hath given unto thee freely, all that sail with thee. Here is a manifest signification of God's decree and determination to save all that were in the ship: yet did this make Paul or the rest negligent in using such means whereby they might save themselves? It is apparent that it did not: For the Mariners they thought to fly out of the ship; and to that purpose had let down the boat into the Sea, under colour as though they would cast anchor out of the foreship, meaning to provide for themselves, and leaving others to shift for themselves. But Paul perceiving this, and the dangerous condition of it unto the rest, as that which would bereave them of the ordinary means of preservation, he said to the Centurion and the Soldiers, except these abide in the ship, ye cannot be safe. Did not Paul fear the failing of his own credit and reputation? Who having before assured them, and that by the message of an Angel of their safe coming to land; now on the other side tells them, that unless the Mariners abide in the ship, they could not be safe? Nothing less; neither did the Captain and Soldiers fly in his face, as an impostor, and one that had abused them; as by this Authors dictates they might, especially if he had had the Catechising of them; but rather of themselves conceiving it an unreasonable thing so to depend upon the promise of man or Angel, as not to use the best means that lay in their power: Forth with the Soldiers cut off the ropes of the boat, and let it fall away, choosing rather to lose their boat (which yet was of good use too) than their Mariners. This was not all, but Paul useth spiritual means, and by exhortation comforteth them, that so they might take heart, and the better set themselves to the use of the best means, not weakly but courageously for their preservation. This is the Fourteenth day that ye have tarried, and continued fasting receiving nothing. Wherefore I exhort you to take meat, for this is for your safeguard, for there shall not an hair fall from the head of any of you. And when he had thus spoken he took bread, and gave thanks to God in presence of them all, and broke it, and began to eat. Then were they all of good courage and they also took meat. Well at length the ship broke, and the Centurion commanded, that they that could swim should cast themselves first into the Sea, and go out to Land; and the others some on boards, and some on certain pieces of the Ship. Here to the end we see no means neglected; And so it came to pass (to wit by use of such means) that they all escaped to Land. Yet was the promise of their Salvation made to Paul in an absolute form, so is not the promise of Salvation made to us. Now I leave it to the indifferent to judge of the wisdom of this Author's discourse. Yet non deliberation is no suffitient evidence of the needless condition of means. For Aristotle saith that Ars non deliberate, not because he useth no means to bring about his ends, but because the Artificer which is his crafts-master, is not to seek of the means. For the same reason deliberation is not incident unto God, his wisdom is nothing the less in discerning congruous means to bring about his intended ends. As for that of our Saviour Cur estis solliciti de vestitu? Surely 'tis not of any thing above our power in respect of use of means; Indeed to add one Cubit to our stature is not in our power, neither do I know any that take thought thereof, But it is no more in man's power to bless his own cares and labours for the procuring of himself meat, drink, raiment, than it is in his power to add a cubit or two unto his stature. Therefore it becomes us not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is, to distract ourselves with carking cares, as touching the end of our affairs, but he forbids us not to be careful in the use of means. For to this purpose God would not have Adam to be idle in Paradise, he must dress the Garden, though the thriving of aught thereby was not so much by his care as by God's providence. And therefore he hath given us six days to work and commands us to do all our works therein; but as for the issue of our labours, leave that to God & his blessing; And whether our labours are successful or not successful, not to trouble ourselves there abouts. It was spoken to the singular commendation of Dr Raynolds by him that Preached his funeral Sermon, that he was most careful of the means, most careless of the end. Thus I have endeavoured to distinguish those things which this Authors very judiciously confounds. And as it was no folly for Paul to do as he did that all good means might be used for their preservation; so much less was misery, nay they had been in amiserable case, had they neglected any due means to preserve themselves: for St Paul (notwithhanding the message delivered unto him by an Angel, and his promise thereupon made unto the Centution) spared not to profess that unless the Mariners stayed in the ship they could not be Saved: so that this Authors fable of Sisyphus, is no better accommodated then the rest, save that herein he may refresh his reader, & thank him for his courtesy, for representing unto him as in a glass the nature of his proceedings. For in this his discourse he doth very accuratly play the part of Sisyphus for he takes great pains inkindeling a fire, but alas he cannot warm himself thereby; he must blow his nails still; there is no remedy. And truly I see no reason to the contrary, but that a man as profitably bestows his pains in picking straws, or playing with feathers, as this Author doth in such manner of discourses. Domitian killed flies, but this Author doth not so much as flap a fly; only I confess he doth very energetically discover the nakedness of his own discourse. And such be the issue of those that affect a name by becoming Arminian Proselits; and show as little grace in their writings, as it becomes them whose growth in perfection (by their own account) is to appose the grace of God Pelagian like, whom Austin was bold to call the enemies of God's graee; Indeed it was high time for Balaam to leave his sorceries when he saw the Lord was determined to bless Israel. For his sorceries were no means to bless them, but to curse them rather. In like sort, if I am persuaded that God hath apppointed me unto Salvation, it will be high time for me to leave off all care of faith repentance and good works, when this Author shall make it appear, that these studies are no more conducent (in God's ordination) unto salvation, than Balaams' sorceries were to the blessing of Israel, but rather the highway unto damnation, as his sorceries were to the cursing of the Lords people. I make no doubt (what this Author's creed is to the contrary I care not) but that every man's temporal estate is determined in heaven, as well as Paul's escaping safe out of shipwreck, and all that were in the same ship, to the number of two hundred four and sixteen souls, yet both Paul and all the rest did not take their ease, but were vigilant to take all opportunity, to use the best means for their safe arrival at the land; some by swimming, some by sitting on boards, some on one piece of the ship some on another, and so (and not but so) they came all safe to land. And as our Divines in the Synod of Dort observe, albeit the Lord had promised Ezechiah, he should recover, and fifteen years more should be added to his life, yet he refused not the counsel of the Prophet Esay, in laying a plaster of figs unto his sore. We know what was the form of jonahs' Preaching to the Ninivites jon. 3. 4. Yet forty days and Niniveh shall be destroyed. Here we have an absolute form of sentence denounced against them. And the people of Niniveh believed God, Yet did they not give over all courses for the pacifying v. 5. of the wrath of God, but proclaimed a fast, and put on sackcloth, from the greatest of them to the least of them; the King himself arising from his throne, and laying his robe from him, and covering himself with sackcloth, and sitting in ashes, and commanding others to do the like. And mark their reason. Who can tell if God will turn and repent, and turn from his fierce wrath that we perish not. In like sort damnation being determined to none, but to such as are v. 9 finally impenitent: and this being not doubtfully or obscurely, but clearly revealed unto us in God's word, shall our endeavours to turn unto God by Godly sorrow and repentance, be accounted vain and fruitless in the judgement of any sober man? And let this Author look unto it, that these Ninivites do not one day rise in judgement against him; And not the Ninivites only, but the Stoics also, who as they acknowledged some things fatalia, so they confessed there were some things confatalias; And this very argument here used they commonly called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an idle argumentation; because it tended to the humouring of men in their idle courses: And thus is it censured above 1500 years ago by Cicero in his Book De fato. It is the blessing of God that makes men fat, and if God hath determined this, and man knows it, will he therefore sit still and starve himself? It is the blessing of God that makes men rich. God promised as much to the Israelites, in case they kept his Commandments, which commandments did not instruct them in good husbandry; but where they instigated hereby to neglect any usual means of making themselves rich? Nothing less, nay God was jealous lest in presumption of their own wise and thrifty courses they should give the glory of it to themselves and not to God. Deut. 8. 17. Beware lest thou say in thy heart, My power and the strength of mine own hand hath prepared me this abundance. But remember the Lord thy God: for it is he which giveth thee power to get substance. If it be said that God hath not determined to make any man fat, but by feeding; nor any man rich but by labouring in some vocation, or other, I answer, That neither hath God determined to bring any man to Salvation, but by Sanctification of the spirit and faith of the truth 2 Thess. 2. 13. By feeding on God's Word, which is the word of grace able to save Act. 20. 32. our Souls. jam. 1. and to build further and to give us an inheritance among them that are sanctified through faith in him. In like sort if God hath apppointed every Commonwealth a fatal period, yet if he hath appointed to bring them to flourishing estate by certain means, or to desolation no otherwise then by neglecting the means of prosperity, as it is aparent he doth not, would any wise man conclude hence, that it were bootless either to call Parliaments or to make use of privy Councelors? But this Author perhaps will reply, that this is not absolutely to ordain a period to a state, for as much as the period is brought to pass by means. Be it so; Now let the indifferernt consider whether we do maintain, that the periods of men, to wit Salvation on the one side and damnation on the other, are by God brought to pass without means. Do we maintain that God damns or decreeth to damn any man but for final perseverance in sin? Do we maintain that God brings any man to Salvation (if he come to the use of reason) but by faith repentance and goodworkes? But the truth is this Author's ignorance in part, and in part a dexterity that this Sect hath to confound things that differ, is his best armour of proof, to hold up his confidence in spending his powder liberally, but without shot. For salvation is not bestowed, or damnation inflicted absolutely, but that merely upon the foregoing of faith and repentance; this merely upon final perseverance in sin. Only regeneration together with the grace of faith and repentance, is bestowed absolutely by God upon whom he will, and denied to whom he will, according to that of Paul, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. And it is very strange that this being the critical point, and the most momentous point of controversy, and such, the decision whereof carrieth with it the decision of all the rest, this Author should unshamefacedly decline it. But some there be that hate the light because their works are evil; but doth it become him to tax others for declining the trial, when none showeth more vile carriage this way then himself? What that Privy-councillor was, I know not, nor have I any evidence of the truth of the story, but as it lieth dictated at pleasure; I have showed how it nothing disadvantageth our cause, though the Author of that speech were not only a Privy-councillor but a great Divine too. Yet amongst many good, there might be some bad in Queen Elizabeth's days. If that were true which is reported to have been mentioned by Dr Lively in a Lecture of his in Cambridge, namely that a certain Book was found under a Privy-Councellors pillow, whose inscription was this De tribus Mundi impostoribus, Mose, Christo, Mahumite. As for fate stoical (to give the Devil his right) I no where find it maintained by any of them so as to prejudice men's wills, but by many great ones I find this expressly denied and hereof I have already spoken more at large. Still he keeps his course in impugning an absolute decree determining men's ends precisely: What secret mysteries he conceals in the Word, precisely. I know not; but it is aparent, we maintain no such determining the Salvation of any man, so as to exclude a Godly life. We both know and teach that without Holiness (as much as to say without a Godly life) no man shall see God. But we further say, that this is not wholly the decree of predestination, though this Author with his Remonstrants would fain rest here: but we farther say, that a Godly life is the gift of God's grace, and that God bestows this gift on whom he will; but this Author hath no great lust to oppose us here. The more Equivocal a phrase is, the fitter it is to serve his turn, that lies upon advantages, to promote error and obscure truth. And therefore keeps himself to the absolute decree and precise determinations; either not understanding or not considering, that an absolute decree may be takendivers ways, either quoad actum volentis as touching the act of God willing, or quoad res volitas, as touching the things willed, the decree properly signifies the act of God willing; but this Author in considerately takes it quoad res volitas as touching the things willed all along, as appears by his oppossing it to decree or will conditional; And will conditional with him is such, as when the thing willed is not effected because the condition is not performed. They are his own words in the last Section save one of his former sorts of reasons, the very last words. As for example, the will of Saving men is not accomplished, because men do not believe. Then as touching the things willed Gods decrees being considered, here also arise different considerations; for as much as the things willed are different Grace and Glory; As for Glory and Salvation we do not say that God hath decreed to confer that absolutely, but only conditionally; yet thereupon he sticks throughout. supposing his adversaries to maintain an absolute decree concerning the conferring of Salvation abolutely, which is most untrue, wherein he fights without any adversary; yet there he dischargeth himself very strenuously, and lays about him like a mad man. But as for grace, to wit, the grace of regeneration, the grace of faith and repentance; this we readily profess that God doth bestow it absolutely, to wit, on whom he will, according to the mere pleasure of his will. All this, It is the glory of this Author in his discourse most judiciously to confound; which made him the more to abound in matter, that he might seem to say some thing, when indeed it is nothing, supple to the purpose. And to meet with him in every particular of his conclusion; The events (to wit of Salvation or damnation) are not at all decreed by God to come to pass absolutely, but merely conditionally, and consequently not avoidable, but avoydably rather; like as things that come to pass contingently do come to pass with a possibility not to come to pass, and accordingly God decreed they should came to pass contingently; And consequently men's actions hereabouts are not unprofitable, nay they are both necessary for obtaining the ends here intimated, & such as never fail of obtaining them. As for example. Sanctification of the spirit, and faith of the truth, never fail of procuring Salvation; for as much as God ordained by these means to bring men unto Salvation 2 Thess. 2. 13. And by no means else. And therefore most absurd it is to conceive, that the practice of Godliness proves unprofitable, and from such wild promises the unprofitable nature of the prctise of Godliness, can prove no better than a wild conclusion. I come to his two witnesses; the first is Calv. Inst. l. 3. c. 23. sect. 14. Si quis ita plebem compellet; si non creditis, ideo fit, quia jam divinitus exitio destinati estis, is non modo ignaviam fovet, sed indulget malitiae. This (saith this Author) is as much to say as this; If a man should set down the doctrine of Reprobation in its colours, and explain it to people in a clear and lively fashion, he would hereby open a door to liberty and profaneness. Now this Calvin delivereth as out of Austin; as appeareth both by his entrance hereunto, and by his shutting up of it; His entrance into it is this. Et tamen ut singulare aedificationis studium sancto viro fuit, (that is Austin) sic docendi veri rationem temperat ut prudenter caveatur, quoad licet, offensio. Nam iquae vere dicuntur congruenter simul posse dici admonet; The man he speaks of still is Austin, as is apparent to him that shall consider the coherence of this Section with the former. Then he sets down the inconvenient manner of Preaching this truth, as Austin doth, though not in Augustine's words but in his own. Si quis ita plebem compellet; si non creditis, ideo fit, quia jam divinitus exitio destinati estis. etc. And shutting the whole up he expressly names Austin, misliking such manner of Preaching thus; Tales itaque Augustinus non immerito tanquam vel insulsos Doctores, vel sinistros & ominosoes Prophetas ab Ecclesia jubet facessere. What is the mystery then of this, that Calvin is here brought in for a witness, in making a relation of Augustine's discourse, and Austin himself whose judgement Calvin doth but relate is pretermitted, especially considering that Augustine's testimony, where it serves his turn, would give far more credit to his cause then calvin's: you will give me leave to guess at the mystery, which I take to be this; Calvin is well known to be opposite unto him in the doctrine of reprobation; but Calvin acknowledging that this Doctrine might be delivered in a harsh manner, which yet nothing moved him from entertaining it: this harsh manner of propounding it, is enough to serve this Author's turn, to defame it both in his own conceit, and in the conceit of others, such as himself. For as for calvin's opinion to the contrary, that is of no consideration with him, yea though Luther also join with him in this. He is especially in these days, and with some persons so contemptible, as never was honest man more. But to bring in Austin acknowledging this Doctrine, and taking notice of some harsh manners in propounding it, and yet notwithstanding embracing it in despite of the harshness thereof, and showing withal, how this harsh manner of propounding the same truth may be tempered; his Authority this Author well knew, and considered would be of greater Authority to sway for it, than some harshness in the propounder, or this Authors Me thinks, would sway against it: And therefore he thought fit to spare the bringing in of Austin to testify for him, and contents himself to bring Calvin only upon the stage, though he doth but relate in effect the discourse of Austin; Thus as formerly I said, this Treatise savours more of the Fox then of the Lyon. But let us bring him unto Austin De bono perseverantioe. cap. 16. Where the objection made by them of Marseiles against Augustine's Doctrine of Predestination is proposed thus. Sed aiunt ut scribitis neminem posse correptionis stimulis excitari, si dicatur in conventu Ecclesiae audientibus multis. Ita se habet de praedestinatione definita sententia voluntatis Dei, ut alii ex vobis de infidelitate, accepta obediendi voluntate veneritis ad fidem, vel accepta maneatis in fide: caeteri verò qui in peccatorum delectatione remoramini, ideo nondum surrexistis, quia nec dum vos adjutorium gratiae miserantis erexit. Veruntamen si qui estis nondum vocati, quos gratia sua praedestinaverit elegendos, accipietis eandem gratiam, qua velitis & sitis electi: Et si qui obeditis si praedestinati estis rejiciendi, subtrahentur obediendi vires, ut obedire cessitis. But they say (as you write) that no man can be excited by the good of reprehension, if in the congregation before many, the Preacher shall thus discourse. Such is the sentence of Gods will determined as touching predestination, that some of you receiving the will of obedience, shall come from infidelity unto faith, or receiving the gift of perseverance shall continue therein. But if there be any among you who are not called, whom God hath through his grace predestinated to be elected, they shall receive the same grace, whereby to will to be, & to become elect. And if there be any of you, who obey the Gospel, that are predestinated to be rejected, the strength of obeying shall be taken from you, that you may cease to obey. Here is the objection against it, Augustine's doctrine of predestination, and reprobation at full; his answer to it followeth at full; but how? Not in denying aught that hereby is employed concerning his doctrine of Predestination, but to the contrary; First showing that this harsh proposition of things, must not deter us from the embracing of it; Secondly, showing how the same truth may be delivered in a more temperate manner. Ita cum dicuntur (saith he) ita nos a confitenda Dei gratia, i. e. quae non secundum merita nostra datur, & a confitenda secundum eam praedestinatione Sanctorum; that is, These things thus delivered, must not deter us from confessing God's grace, which is not given according unto works, and from confessing the predestination of Saints, according thereunto. Where observe I beseech you how far he joins together the doctrine of God's free grace, with his doctrine of predestination according to his Tenet, which here was opposed by the same Argument, wherewith the Author in this place oppugneth ours. Manifestly giving to understand, that his doctrine of Predestination could not be impugned as there it is, but withal they that impugn it, must deny the freeness of God's grace, & maintain that it is given according unto works or merits. So that as he answers them, so we may take liberty to answer this Author, and say that this argument of his must not deter us from confessing predestination according to God's free grace; lest so we be driven to maintain that Grace is given according unto works. And the reason is manifest; For if it be not of the mere pleasure of God, that he bestows faith on one, & denies it unto another, than the reason hereof must be because God finds some better disposition in one then in another, and therefore he gives him, that is better disposed, the grace of faith which he denies unto another. Now this both in Augustine's judgement & in clear reason appears to be the maintaining, that grace is given according unto works, which is condemned in the Synod of Palestine above 1200 years ago. Yet Austin rests not here, but shows how the same objection may have place, as well for the overthrowing of prescience divine, as for the overthrowing of predestination divine. We (saith he) must no more be deterred by this objection from confessing, the freeness of God's grace, and predestination divine suitable thereunto, than we are hereby deterred from acknowledging God's foreknowledge, and shows how the same objection may be accommodated against God's foreknowledge, thus. Sive nunc recte vivatis sive non recte; tales vos eritis postea quales vos deus futuros esse praescivit, vel boni si bonos vel mali si malos. That is, Whether at this time you live well or not well, such you shall be as God forseeth you will be; either good if he forseeth it will come to pass, or evil if he forseeth you will be evil. Now (saith he) if upon the hearing of this, some are converted unto slothfulness (this is the very objection proposed by Calvin for the matter of it, but the form is different. For Calvin saith the Preacher, doth cherish slothfulness, etc. Austin signifieth only, that by such kind of Preaching, men take occasion of slothfulness, and therefore it is fit that Calvin should in that sense only be interpreted, seeing he only relates in effect that which he finds in Austin,) suppose (saith Austin going on) That hereupon they run after their lust, shall we therefore think, that to be false, which was delivered as concerning God's foreknowledge? Then he tells a History of his own experience, namely how one in the same monastery whereof he was, abused in this manner the doctrine of foreknowledge. For when his brethren reproved him he would stubbornly answer, Whatsoever I am now, surely I shall go out of the World, such as God forseeth I will be. Wherein saith Austin, he speaks truth, but he was so far from profiting by it unto good, that at length he utterly forsook our society, returning as a dog to his vomit; and yet what he will be, saith he, the Lord knoweth. Now who doubts but that our doctrine of justification by faith, and not by works, may be an occasion to some, to abuse the grace of God unto wantonness; such there were even in the Apostles days: but what? Shall we therefore renounce that doctrine? I am not yet come to the tempering of the manner of proposing this doctrine, I have more to say before I come to that. What difference is there in harshness between these doctrines, If ye do not believe, therefore ye do not believe, because God hath ordained you to destruction, and this, If ye do not believe, therefore ye do not believe because God hath not regenerated you: Let any man show how a door is open to slothfulness, more by the one, then by the other; especially considering the ground of all, is man's inability to believe, without this grace of God effectually preventing and working him unto faith. Now this doctrine is plainly taught, and that particularly of certain persons, to their faces: joh 8.. He that is of God heareth God's word, ye therefore hear them not, because ye are not of God. The phrase, to be of God, I interpret here of regeneration, but both Austin of old, and our Divines of late, do interpret of election; and so it is precisely the same with the Preaching of reprobation in his true colours, as this Author interprets it, and passeth this censure upon it, as opening a door to liberty and profaneness; which may I confess well be occasionally to carnal men, or to men possessed with prejudicated opinions, yet here it appears plainly, to be in effect the same with that which our Saviour himself Preached. But take this withal; as it may be an occasion of slothfulness, so it may be a means to humble men, and beat them out of the presumptuous conceit of their own sufficiency to hear God's word, to believe, to repent, and the like; and thereby to prepare them to look up unto God, and to wait for him in his ordinances, if so be as the Angel came down to move the waters in the pool of Bethesda, to make them medicinable; so God's spirit may come down and make his word powerful to the regenerating of them, to the working of faith, and repentance in them. And I appeal to every sober man's judgement, whether to this end tended not the very like Doctrine and admonition proposed by Moses to the Children of Israel in the Wilderness. Deut. 29. 2, 3, 4. Ye have seen all that the Lord did before your eyes in the land of Egypt unto Pharaoh and all his servants, and unto all his Land. The great temptations which thine eyes have seen those great miracles and wonders. Yet the Lord hath not given you a heart to perceive, and eyes to see, and ears to hear unto this day. For is it not Moses his purpose to set before their eyes how little they have profited in obedience and thankfulness unto God, and amendment of life, by all those great works of his, in the way of mercy towards them, and in the way of judgement towards the Egyptians? And what was the cause of all this, but the hardness of their hearts, and the blindness of their eyes? and to what end doth he tell them, that God alone can take away this hardness of heart, and blindness of mind, which hitherto he had not done? Might he not seem to justify them, in walking after the hardness of their hearts by this, and harden them therein by this Doctrine of his? like as this Author casts the like aspersion in part upon the like Doctrine of ours? Yet Moses passeth not for this, so he might set them in a right course, to be made partakers of God's grace, and that by the ministry of the Law, to humble and prepare them for the grace of God, which is the Evangelicall use of the Law. And it is remarkable that in the first verse of this Chapter, these words are said to be the words of the Covenant, which the Lord commanded Moses to make with the Children of Israel in the land of Moab, beside the Covenant which he made with them in Horeb. Wherefore seeing the Covenant made in Horeb, was the Covenant of the Law, it followeth that this Covenant is the Covenant of grace, and these words are the words of the Covenant of grace, which is plainly expressed in the next Chapter v. 6. And the Lord thy God, will circumcise thine heart, and the heart of thy seed, that thou mayest love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, that thou mayest live. And what is the usual preparation hereunto but to humble men by convicting them of sin, and of their utter inability to help themselves, and that nothing but God's grace is able to give them an heart to perceive, and eyes to see, and ears to hear. But yet because we do not speak in the same measure of the spirit, and of power, as Moses and our Saviour did, therefore we labour to decline all harshness as much as lieth in our power, where we see occasion is like to be taken of offence. Therefore first as touching this discourse of calvin's. If you believe not, therefore it is, because you are already destinated unto damnation. I say this is untrue more ways than one. First if he conceives destination unto damnation, goes before God's decree to deny faith: this I utterly deny, and have already proved, that in no moment, of reason doth the decree of damnation precede the decree of denying grace. Therefore Gods decree to deny them grace, is rather the cause why they believe not then the decree of damnation. Secondly whether we take it of the one or of the other, or of both, yet the proposition is utterly untrue. For it doth not follow, that because a man doth not as yet believe, therefore God hath decreed to deny him faith; and because he hath so decreed, therefore he denies him faith. For he that believes not to day, may believe to morrow. Saul was sometimes a persecutor of God's Church; but was it at that time lawful to conclude, that because he did not then believe therefore he was destinated unto damnation: so that the reason indeed is, either because God hath not decreed at all to give them faith, or because the time which God hath ordained for their conversion is not yet come. This is so clear that Calvin himself were he alive, would not gainsay upon consideration. Neither doth he justify this discourse, but only saith, we must be more wise, then so to discourse to our Auditors. But this Author in saying, this is to set down our doctrine of reprobation in its colours, delivers that which is shamefully untrue, and nothing suitable with our doctrine. More necre to the matter we should say rather, That like as therefore a man heareth God's word because he is of God (that is as I interpret it, because he is regenerated of God) so therefore men hear them not, because they are not of God, that is not yet regenerated; but yet nevertheless they may be in good time. Yet here also there is some defect for want of clear explication of this truth; For will you conclude hence, that non-regeneration is the cause of infidelity (as some do in effect)? Why but this is either notoriously false, or if true it is true in such a sense, as whereby God is no more the cause thereof, than a Physician is the cause of a disease, because he will not cure it. For infidelity is a natural fruit of man's hereditary corruption, and God alone can cure it, but if he will not, God is not to be said to be the cause of any disobedience issuing therefrom, otherwise then per modum non removentis, by way of not removing the cause of it; or per modum non dantis quod prohiberet, by way of not curing the cause, that is, by not giving faith. Now what harshness there is in this, to as many as do not concur with the Pelagians, so as in plain terms to profess, that Grace is given according to men's works; And the objection framed against Austin, and grounded upon that doctrine which he acknowledged ran thus. Caeteri qui in peccatorum delectatione remoramini ideo nondum surrexistis, quia nec dum vos adjutorium gratiae miserantis erexit. Therefore you are not risen out of that delight you took in sin, because the succour of God's grace hath not raised you, not as Calvin expresseth it. Therefore you believe not, because ye are ordained to destruction. And this very doctrine, as formerly I said, our Saviour spares not to apply to some particular joh. 8. persons, and Preach it to their faces; like as Moses Preacheth the very same doctrine to the Children of Israel, Deut. 29. 2, 3, 4. Yet Austin to prevent harshness doth not like this manner of proposing it so well, seeing it may be and it is fit it should be delivered coveniently thus. Si qui autem ad huc in peccatorum damnabilium delectatione remoramini apprehenditis saluberrimam disciplinam. Quod tamen cum feceritis, nolite extolli quasi de operibus vestris, aut gloriari, quasi non acceperitis. If any of you do yet continue in the delightful course of damnable sins take hold of wholesome discipline, which when you have done, be not proud thereof as of your own work, or Glory as if you had not received this grace of God. Now what advantageous service this first witness hath done him, I am well content the indifferent may judge. I come to his second witness, that is of the Land-grave of Turing, reported by Hesterbachius; as I remember it is about the Twelfth Century of years since our Saviour's incarnation. This man being admonished by his friends of his dangerous and vicious courses, made this answer. Si praedestinatus sum nulla peccata poterunt mihi Regnum Caelorum auferre; Si praescitus, nulla bona mihi illud valebunt confer. It is not the first time I have met with this story; not in Vossius only, but in an Arminian Manuscript; it seems they make some account of it; yet I see no cause they should make any such account thereof. It is the common voice of profane persons corrupting the doctrine of Predestination to serve their own turns. Myself remember an instance of it in my minority, when I was little more than a child; and I remember both the Person whom, and the place where it was delivered, and it was accounted as a sign of a profane heart; yet this Vossius makes use of, as an instance forsooth of a Predestination Heretic. And I wonder why they do not devise as well a Praescientiarian Heresy; and that by as good an instance as this, of one of Augustine's Monks, who being reproved by his brethren, made the like answer as touching God's prescience, but yet with more sobriety, saying, Whatsoever I am now, I shall be such as God forseeth I will be. Yet herein as Austin professeth, he spoke nothing but truth; but the saying of the Landgrave implies a notorious untruth, namely, that if he were predestinated he should be Saved, though he continued in his sinful courses; Now this I say is a gross untruth; For predestination is the preparation of Grace (as Austin desineth it) and consequently such as are predestinated shall be taken off from their sinful courses in good time, and by Grace be brought unto Salvation. In like sort he supposeth a Reprobate may be truly righteous; whereas Austin professeth of such, as are not predestinate that God brings none of them to wholesome and spiritual repentance, whereby man is reconciled unto God in Christ, what patience soever he affords them. Contr. Jul. Pelag. l. 5. c. 4. Nay this kind of Argumentation, drawn from destiny Stoical, wherewith our adversaries do usually reproach our doctrine of Predestination, like as the Pelagians did in the same manner reproach Saint Augustine's doctrine concerning Predestination. I say this argument was in course, and profligated in the days of Cicero, and censured as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an idle argumentation (as before I mentioned) and it is to be seen in Cicero his book De Fato; and thereupon they distinguished of some things which they called, Fatalia, as victory, and some things which they called, Confatalia, as all necessary means requisite to the getting of the victory. And Origen though he be accounted a favourer of our adversaries Doctrine in his writings, yet he shows the vanity of this Argument applied to fate, whereby undoubtedly he means providence divine. For he proposeth such a kind of objection, as if a sick man should dispute himself from taking Physic after this manner. Either by destiny is it appointed I shall recover or no; If my destiny be to recover I shall recover though I use no Physic, if my destiny be not to recover, all the Physicians in the world shall do me no good. And the vanity of this is represented by the like argument in another manner thus: If it be thy destiny to beget children, whether thou usest the company of Women or no, thou shalt beget children: And concludes thus; Ut enim hic si fieri non potest ut quis procreate, nisi cum muliere concubuerit, sic si valetudinis recuperatio medicinae via efficitur necessariò adhibetur medicus. The Greek of Origen is set down at large by Turnebus in his disputation upon Cicero his book De Fato, against Ramus. Now judge you I pray, what colour of detriment to Religion, hath he produced from our doctrine of absolute Reprobation, and whether his discourse herein is any better than the imagination of a vain thing. DISCOURSE. SECT. IV. BUt there are two things chiefly, which are said for the vindicating of this opinion from this crimination. 1. First, that many of them which believe and defend this opinion, are Godly and holy men, and therefore it doth not of itself open a way to liberty; but through the wickedness of men, who pervert the sweetest, and the surest truths revealed in God's word, to their own damnation. Resp. It cannot (I confess) be denied, that many of this opinion are Godly men, but it is no thanks to their opinion, that they are so; (the true and natural genius of which is to breed sloth, to drown men in carnal security, and to countenance carnal liberty.) but to some thing else, either to God's providence, (who will not suffer this doctrine for his own glory and the good of men, to have any great stroke in their lives;) or to men's incogitancy, who think not of reducing it ad praxim, or drawing conclusions out of it, but rest in the naked speculation of it, as they do of many others; or lastly to some good practical conclusions, which they meet with in the word of God, and apply to their lives (as they do not the former deductions) such as these are for example; Be ye holy as I an holy. Without holiness no man shall see God. If ye consent and obey, ye shall eat the good things of the land. Godliness hath the promise of this life and of the life to come, and such like. And hence we may learn to measure this opinion, not by some few of the men that hold it, but by the sequels, which the Logic even of simple men, if they should apply their brains to ponder and consider it, would fetch out of it. No man that hath thoroughly sucked it in, and understood the force of it, but will either relinquish it, or live according to the natural importment of it, that is, licentiously. 2. Secondly, it is said, that albeit this Doctrine doth teach, that men are absolutely elected, or absolutely rejected; yet it tells no man who in particular is elected, who rejected, (that must appear by themselves and their lives) and so it doth not stifle holy endeavours in any, but rather encourage them in every man, because it makes them to be signs, whereby men must and may get the knowledge of their election. Resp. For answer to this (in my judgement or the present) the ignorance of a man's particular case doth not alter the case a jot. For he that believes in general, that many and they the greatest company without comparison, are inevitably ordained to destruction, and a few others unto salvation; is able out of these two general propositions, to make these particular conclusions, and to reason thus with himself; Either I am absolutely chosen to grace and glory, or absolutely cast off from both, If I be chosen, I must of necessity believe and be saved; If I be cast off I must as necessarily not believe and be damned, Therefore what need I take thought either way about means or end? My end is pitched in Heaven, and the means too; my final perseverance in faith and my salvation; or my continuance in unbelief and my damnation. If I lie under this necessity of believing, and being saved, or of dying in unbelief, and being damned, in vain do I trouble myself about means or end, I have my supersedeas, I may take mine ease, and so I will, it is enough for me to sit down and wait what God will do unto me. And in this manner (it is to be feared) do too many reason in their hearts, and by this very ground (though they will not perhaps acknowledge it) encourage themselves to profaneness. Though men cannot hide their wickedness, yet they will hide their grounds which flesh them in it, either through modesty, or to avoid some farther ignominy. The fool hath said in his heart there is no God: Psal. 40. Suetonius de Vita Tiberii c. 69. p. 180. Says of Tiberius that he was circa Deos & religiones negligentior, quip addictus Mathematicae, persuasionibus plenus omnia fato agi. TWISSE. Consideration. I have already made answer to his objections after my manner; it remains I consider what he delivereth in debilitating those answers which he takes in to consideration. 1. This answer was made by our Britain Divines in the Synod of Dort upon the first Article, but so, as that they proposed it not by itself alone, but jointly with showing that neither the Nature of our Doctrine doth any way prove any hindrance unto piety; as formerly I have made mention thereof. Whereas he saith that many of this (our) opinion are Godly men but that is no thanks to their opinion that they are so. I answer, that neither do we give the glory of our Godliness to our good opinion, nor have cause to thank it therefore; but we give God the Glory both of leading us into this truth amongst many others, and for that Godliness that is in us also. For we acknowledge that God is able to convict our consciences of that truth hereof, and yet refuse to lead us thereby into any Holiness at all. Yet let every sober man judge who are in a fairer way to true Holiness, or who are more likely to be in the state of true Holiness, they that oppose the grace of God in working our wills to faith and repentance, or they that acknowledge it. They who maintain that God of the mere pleasure of his will, regenerates us, endueth us with the spirit of faith and repentance; or they who maintain that God doth not give faith and repentance to whom he will. Neither is it the meaning of St Paul where he sayeth God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth; but rather where he finds an absolute disposition or work in one, which he finds not in an other. Again consider I pray indifferently, who are more likely to be partakers of God's grace; they who truly magnify it as the Author of their faith and repentance and of every good work performed by them, and that in a preventing manner; or they that pretend to make God's grace to be the Author of their faith and repentance and every good work only by giving them power to believe, if they will (which we are able to prove both by the judgement of Austin and by clear reason to be mere nature and not grace) and accordingly exhorting them to believe, and last of all concurring with them to the producing of the act of faith in them in case they will; And seeing grace proves effectual only by this subsequent manner of operation; whether they do not plainly mock God in making him the Author of grace, seeing in respect of this effectual operation they might as well make him the Author of every sinful act as of every gracious act, For it is agreed on all hands that God concurres as well to every sinful act as any gracious act. Whereas he saith, The true and natural genius of our Tenet is to breed sloth, and to drown men in carnal security, and to countenance carnal liberty. I answer these words of his are but wind, his reasons I have already considered, and proved them to be of no weight. For they depend partly upon a vain supposition, as if we maintained that God hath oppointed men unto Salvation though they live as they list, whereas our doctrine is directly contradictious here unto. For we teach that God ordains no man of ripe years to obtain Salvation but by Sanctification of the spirit and faith of the truth as we are plainly taught 2 Thess. 2. 13. And the Evangelist signifies as much, where he sayeth. As many believed as were ordained to Everlasting Life. Act. 13. 48. It may be as well said that as many repented, as many gave themselves to work out their Salvation with fear and trembling to purge themselves from all pollutions of flesh and spirit, and to perfect Holiness in the fear of God, as were ordained to Salvation: partly because we maintain that God gives faith and repentance and regeneration to whom he will, that is only to those whom he hath chosen, denying the same grace and that absolutely; unto all others, which if it be not true; but that God doth grant it, or ordain it according to men's works, than we must all turn Pelagians, whom Austin calls inimicos gratiae Dei; And in such a case judge I pray whether it be possible that such can be partakers of God's grace, namely, if they are the enemies of God's grace. Is it possible that he who partakes of God's sanctifying grace should stand out in hostile opposition against it? Can we be at once both friends of the Bridegroom and enemies of his grace? Further consider more particularly wherein doth this consist, which he imputes unto us, of drowning men in carnal security, is it in denying unto man any grace that he attributes unto him? Surely well we may deny unto every Reprobate such a grace as he himself hates, and impugns to wit, grace effectually preventing the will, and making man to believe and repent, but if you scan every particular of those which he calleth grace, you shall find that we deny not any one of them unto Reprobates more than he doth. This perhaps may seem strange unto you; therefore it deserves the more carefully to be considered; for I doubt not but to make it good. Grace subsequent is the only effectual grace with them, and that consists in God's concurrence to the working of faith in the heart of man, if man will work it in himself. Now dare they say we deny, this namely, God's concourse to the act of faith, whereas we maintain with them that God concurres to every act, even to the most sinful act, that ever was committed since the world began; only we are a shamed to call this concurrence grace, because it is found to have course as well in the producing of evil actions, as in the producing of good. So that if every man in the world should believe, we deny not but that God should concur with him to the working of that belief, we profess that if every Reprobate in the world will believe, God is ready to concur with him to the act of that will of that belief. From the consideration of their grace subsequent I arise to the consideration of their grace prevenient, and that is two fold, one is the grace exciting, to wit, by moral admonition, suasion, exhortation, This act we are willing to call and account a gracious act, & we do as willingly acknowledge that God affords it unto all Reprobates (as well as to the elect) within the pale of the Church. For every one that appears in any Congregation is equally exhorted to believe, to repent, to turn from their wicked ways. So that hitherto we find no difference. We willingly acknowledge that Reprobates are partakers of these operations divine as well as the elect. One grace prevenient remains, which is habitual, and which our adversaries will have to be universal and it consists in a power to believe and repent, and to will any spiritual good whereunto they were excited, and accordingly they call it the enlivening of man's will. This I deliver by experience of what I have seen under the hands of some of them. Yet they will not acknowledge that all are regenerate; yet what is regeneration, but the infusion of life spiritual, and that chiefly into the will; And they will have the will to be enlivened by grace, which cannot be spoken in respect of life natural, therefore it must proceed of life spiritual, unless they will devise a life intermediate between life natural, and life spiritual. Some times they call it a power to believe if they will, and such a power Austin acknowledgeth common to all, lib. 1. Gen. ad litter: cap 3. And justifies it in his Retract. lib. 16. Now this seems somewhat strange, considering the very regenerate have not such strength of goodness, as whereby they are enabled to do what good they would, as Rom. 7. 18. To will is present with me but I find, not to perform that which is good. And Gal: 5. 17. The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh, and these are contrary one to the other, so that ye cannot do the same things that ye would. To help this and to clear Austin from contradiction to express Scripture in this; I find that posse si velit is one thing, posse simply delivered is another thing. And this I find distinguished in that very place of Austin's Retractations; For whereas as he had said in that lib. 1. de Gen. contr. Man. cap 3. That, Omnes homines possunt si velint, both credere, and ab amore visibilium rerum & temporalium se ad Dei praecerta implenda convertere. And coming to retract this, and perceiving what advantage the Pelagians might s●atch hence for the countenancing of their cause, in extolling the power of nature, he wisely prevents that by expounding himself, and clearing his own meaning thus. Non existiment novi haeretici Pelagiani secundum eos esse dictum; manifesting thereby that this was the Pelagian Tenet yet were they not to be blamed for this, but only because they called not in God's grace for further help than this, save only in the way of instruction. For Austin concurred with them still in this particular even then when he wrote his books of Retractations, as there it follows in these words Verum est enim omnino (mark by this Emphasis with what assurance of faith he delivered this) Omnes homines hoc posse si velint: Thus far he goes along with them: but then mark wherein he goes beyond them in these words following; Sed praeparatur voluntas a Domino & tantum augetur munere charitatis ut possint; When he sayeth, praeparatur voluntas a Domino, the effect thereof undoubtedly is ut velint which is the state and condition of the regenerate, who yet may complain that they cannot do that which they would as the Apostle formerly signifies, that is that simply and effectually they have not yet power enough to what they will; therefore Austin adds to the preparation of the will, ut velint, an augmentation of strength ut possint, saying tantumque augetur munere charitatis ut possint; that is; not only to will that which is good, but so intensely to will it, as to prevail over the flesh lusting against the spirit, whereby it comes, ut non modo velint, sed & possint; and consequently & efficiant quod velint. So that posse simpliciter doth include velle; and adds such strength thereto as now to go on to the doing of that it wills without restraint from the flesh. And that this posse is but an augmentation of the gracious disposition of the will, appears by the same Austin de corrept. & gratia. cap. 11. Prima gratia est qua sit ut habeat homo justitiam si velit, secunda ergo plus potest, qua etiam sit ut velit, & tantum velit tantoque ardore diligat, ut carnis voluntatem contraria concupiscentem voluntate spiritus vincat. The first grace is that whereby a man may have righteousness if he will, therefore the second grace is of more power, as whereby a man is made to will and that in such measure, as by the will of the spirit to overcome the will of the flesh affecting that which is contrary thereunto. And in the very next chapter, c. 12. He calls this prevailing will, Posse simply, Tantum spiritu sancto accenditur voluntas eorum, ut ideo possint, quia sic velint, & ideo velint, quia Deus sic operatur ut velint; Their will is in such measure inflamed with the Holy Spirit, that therefore they are able (to do that which is good) because they will in such a measure, & therefore they will in such a measure because God so works as to make them willing in such measure: Austin goes on in this manner Nam si in tanta infirmitate vitae hujus ipsis relinqueretur voiuntas sua, ut in adjutorio Dei manerent si vellent, nec Deus in iis operaretur ut vellent inter tot & tantas tentationes infirmitate sua voluntas ipsa succumberet, & ideo perseverare non possent, quia deficientes infirmitate nec vellent, aut non ita vellent infirmitate voluntatis ut possent. For if in so great infirmity of this life, their will were left unto them, that in the help of God they might continue if they would, & God should not work in them that they would, amongst so many and so great tentations, this will itself would sink (under the burden of them) and therefore could not persevere, because failing through infirmity they would not, or (at least) they would not in such a measure, through the wills infirmity, as to be able to stand. So that posse simpliciter still with Austin includes the will, and is a denomination of the will, arising from the strength of it prevailing above the flesh, lusting to the contrary. In like sort Honorius Augustodunensis de praedest. & lib. arbit: divers times ascribes posse to grace subsequent, like as he ascribes velle to grace prevenient, as when he saith; Deus operatur in electis suis sua gratia praeveniendo velle, & subseqendo posse. And again, gratiam accipimus, cum nos Deus praevenit, ut velimus, & subsequitus ut possimus. And again Gratia Dei praevenit ut bonum quod sprevit cupiat, & sequitur ut illud implere praevaleat. So that in effect this posse comes to be all one with agere or perficere quod volumus. For when we not only will that which is good, but so affectionately will it, as to prevail over the flesh lusting against it, all inward impediments being thus mastered, the perfecting of that we will must needs follow. But as for that posse si velint, this goes before the willing of it And I see no reason to the contrary but that we may with Austin acknowledge such a power common to all; which in the disputations between Austin and Pelagius was called possibilitas agendi quod bonum est; and Austin was so far from excepting against it as maintained by Pelagius, that more than once; he professeth, that in case like as he acknowledged posse to be from God, so he would acknowledge velle and agere to be from God he should be received for a good Catholic in this, by Augustine's judgement. I will cite a passage or two out of Austin expressly signifying this, & that out of his book de gratia Christi, contra Pelag: & celest The first is cap 6. Pelagius his words are these. Qui ipsius voluntatis & operis possibilitatem dedit whereupon Austin writeth thus Hanc autem possibilitatem in natura eum ponere, de verbis ejus superioribus clarum est. Sed ne nihil de grati a dixisse videretur, adjunxit, Quique ipsam possibilitatem gratiae suae adjuvat semper auxilio; non ait, ipsam voluntatem vel ipsam operationem, quod si diceret, non abhorrere a doctrina Apostolica videretur: as much as to say, did he acknowledge this he should be a good Catholic; Now add juvare voluntatem & operationem, in Augustine's phrase is effectually, operari ut velit & operetur homo quod bonum est; as appears by that which followeth. Sed ait (to wit Pelagius) ipsam possibilitatem illud videlicet ex tribus quod in natura locavit gratiae suae adjuvat semper auxilio. Now mark Augustine's interpretation of him thus, ut scilicet in voluntate & actione non ideo laus sit Dei & hominis quia sic vult homo, ut tamen ejus voluntati Deus ardorem dilectionis inspiret; so that adjuvare voluntatem in Augustine's phrase, is inspirare voluntati dilectationis ardorem. So then I see no reason, but that we may well grant unto our adversaries, that all men have a power to believe if they will, and from the love of temporal things, to convert themselves to the keeping of God's commandments; But this is mere nature in Augustine's judgement; for he calls it in that very chapter, naturalem possibilitatem, and cap. 47. coming to an issue: Si ergo consenserit nobis, non solam possibilitatem, sed ipsam quoque voluntatem & actionem divinitus adjuvari, & sic adjuvari, ut sine ullo adjutorio nihil bene velimus & agamus, eamque esse gratiam Dei per Jesum Christum, nihil de adjutorio gratiae Dei, quantum arbitror, inter nos controversiae relinquetur. And indeed to say that a man hath power to believe and repent if he will; this is not to maintain any universal grace otherwise; then as nature may be called grace. For grace is goodness, but goodness doth not consist in a power to do good if we will; but it is an habitual disposing of the will to that which is good only, how much more is it so of grace which we count supernatural goodness. Neither is the maintenance of such a power to do good, any contradiction to holy Scripture, testifying that Men cannot believe, cannot repent, cannot please God, cannot be subject to the law of God, cannot do good; For, this impotency is only moral, and the subject of this impotency is only the will and it consists in the corruption thereof, being wholly turned away from God, and converted to the creature in an inordinate manner; Enemies and strangers from God, their minds being set on evil things. Col. 1. 21. And to say that a man can believe if he will, can from the love of visible and temporal things, convert himself to the observation of God's precepts if he will, which Austin in his latter days, even then when he wrote his Retractations, professeth to be true omninò. And in his Book ad Marcellinum De Spiritu & litera. cap. 31. Professeth it an absurd thing to deny this namely, that every one may believe if he will. Vide nunc utrum quisque credat si noluerit aut non credat si voluerit. Quod si absurdum est etc. And cap. 32. Cum ergo fides in potestate sit, quoniam cum vult quisque credit, & cum credit volens credit. I say to affirm this (namely that a man can believe if he will) is no more than to say, that a dead man can speak if he were alive. For as the Scripture teacheth, that all men are dead in sin, till the spirit of regeneration comes to breath into our hearts, the breath of a spiritual life; So this deadness is to be found no where so much, as in the will. And therefore Aquinas professeth, that a man is more corrupt, quoad appetitum boni, then quoad intellectum veri. The Heathen could profess, Video meliora proboque deteriora sequor. And in my experience I find that Arminians do not satisfy themselves with this universality of grace, as to say, A man can do good if he will, unless they add, that also potest velle; as I have observed in Corvinus. And those whom I have in private been acquainted with do not rest in this, that All men can believe if they will, but they say also, that by universal grace, the will is enlivened, as I have seen under their hands, and thereby enabled to the willing of any spiritual good, whereto they shall be excited. So that if they rested here, to wit, in saying, that by universal grace all men may believe if they will, there is no grace acknowledged by them, tending to the furtherance of the good of mankind, but we acknowledge it as well as they, and make the extension of it as large as they. And therefore the more vain and void of all reason is their pretence, that we for want of acknowledging such an universality of grace as they do, do drown men in carnal security, and countenance carnal liberty. Only though we grant the reality of that which they maintain, yet we deny that it deserves to be called grace, as touching the first prevenient grace as they call it, which we with Austin say deserves to be called nature rather than grace, as we speak of grace, to wit, as distinct from nature, and indeed supernatural. And as for grace subsequent, that consisting only in concourse, we deny that to be grace; for as much as God's concourse is granted as well to any sinful act, as to any gracious act, as now adays is commonly acknowledged on all sides. But as for the enlivening of all men's wills, and enabling them to will any spiritual good whereto they shall be excited (for this is their very form of words) we utterly deny this, and are ready to demonstrate the unreasonableness thereof. For first seeing this cannot be understood of life natural but of life spiritual, it followeth that all men by this doctrine are regenerated; and as they confess this disposition continues in all unto death, so it followeth, that all and every one should die in the state of regeneration also: Secondly, seeing there are but three sorts of qualities in the soul of a reasonable creature, as Aristotle hath observed, to wit, powers, passions, and habits; it followeth that this enlivening of the will must consist, either in giving it new powers, or new passions, or new habits, which it had not before. But neither of these can be affirmed with any sobriety, neither do I find that they look to be called to any such account, but in their aerial contemplations of God's attributes, especially of his mercy and justice, shaped at pleasure, do conceive hand over head, that such an enlivening there must be of the will of man in all, without troubling themselves to inquire wherein it consists. But let us proceed in our trial of the soundness of it, by the touchstone of rational and Christian discourse. First therefore, I say it can be no new power infused into the will by this enlivening; For the will itself is a power; and it was never heard that potentia can be subjectum potentiae, a power can be the subject of a power; and that a power should be in a power, as an accident in the subject thereof. Rational powers are but two, the power of understanding, and the power of willing, and both these are natural, following ex principiis speciei, from the very nature of the humane soul, as all confess. But some may say, are there not supernatural powers bestowed on man as well as natural? I answer, these supernatural powers, are but the elevating of the natural powers unto supernatural objects; as the understanding by enlightening it, and the will by sanctifying it. Never was it said, I presume, that a man regenerate had two understandings in him, by the one to understand things natural, and by the other to understand things spiritual; but that by the same understanding he understands both, but by light of nature the one, by light of grace the other. The holy Ghost saith, That they who are accustomed to do evil, can no more do good, than a Blackamoor can change his skin, and a Leopard his spots: Yet when men of evil become good, they get not new powers properly, but new dispositions rather of their natural powers, which we call habits, and may be called moral powers, but not of indifferency to do good or evil, such as the natural power of the will is, but such as whereby is wrought in the will, a good liking of that which is good, an abhorring of that which is evil; so that indeed these moral powers do not make the will able to will, but rather actually willing of that which is good in general, which general willingness is specified according to objects present, and opportunities offered of doing good in one kind rather than another. Like as justice makes a man willing unto just actions, which willingness is exercised this way or that way, according to emergent occasions. Secondly, no new passions are given by this enlivening of the will; well our passions may be ordered aright, both touching their objects, and touching the season, and touching the measure, & touching the rule of them; and in respect of this gracious ordering of them, they may be called new; like as a man regenerate is called a new man, though as he hath the same members of his body, nor more nor less, so he hath still the same faculties and passions of the soul, no more nor no less; but these faculties are better seasoned, these passions are better ordered, and in like sort, these members of the body, are better employed than they were before; before they were made weapons of unrighteousness unto sin, now they are made, weapons of righteousness unto God. Rom. 6. 13. Thirdly, let us inquire whether by this pretended enlivening of the will common to all men, there are any new habits engendered. For that is the most probable. And so we commonly say that in regeneration, besides the receiving of the spirit of God to dwell in our hearts, which is a great mystery, there are certain habits whereby our natural powers are elevated unto supernatural objects, and thereby fitted to perform supernatural acts; and these are but three, (and accordingly but three sorts of supernatural acts) and commonly accounted the three Theological virtues, Faith, Hope, and Charity; And all moral virtues, which for the substance of them, in reference to their acts whereby they are acquired, and which they do bring forth, are found in natural men, do become Christian graces, as they are sanctified by these three, and as their actions do proceed from these. By faith we apprehend things beyond the compass of reason, by hope we wait for the enjoying of such things, which neither eye hath seen, etc. And by charity, we love God (whom yet we have not seen) even to the contempt of ourselves. Now I presume they will not say that these habits of Faith, Hope, and Charity, are bestowed upon all and every one, by that feigned universal grace of theirs. And what other habits they do or can devise, I have had as yet no experience, neither am I able to comprehend. And indeed faith doth not leave a man in indifferency to believe or no; nor hope to wait, or no; nor charity to love God, or no: but they do all dispose the heart of man to believe only, to wait upon God only, to love God only; they being the curing of infidelity, and despair, & hatred of God, or rather the removing of them, yet but in part, as regeneration in this life is but in part, there being still a flesh in us lusting against the spirit. Gal. 5. 17. Thus we may maintain, that albeit every man hath power to believe if he will, and repent if he will, a will to believe and a will to repent being the greatest work in the work of grace, I mean the renovation of the will, and making it willing to that which is good, though it requires strength also to master the lusting of the flesh, whereby it grows simply and absolutely potent to do every good thing, without any effectual impediment from within, yet nevertheless, till this renovation be wrought by the hand of God, we may well say there is an utter impotency moral to do any thing that is good and pleasing in the sight of God, whereby they cannot believe, they cannot repent, they cannot be subject to the law of God, And if to Preach this doctrine be to breed sloth, to drown men in carnal security, and to countenance carnal liberty; then our Saviour did breed sloth etc. when he told his hearers plainly, He that is of God heareth God's words, ye therefore hear them not, because ye are not of God, joh. 8. 47. As likewise when he Preached unto them in this manner. No man can come to me, except the Father which sent me draw him. joh. 6. 44. And the Evangelist also in saying, He hath blinded their eyes, and hardened their hearts, that they should not see with their eyes, nor understand with their hearts, and should be converted, and I should heal them. joh. 12. 40. And none more than Moses, when he tells the people of Israel in the Wilderness, saying, Ye have seen all that the Lord did before your eyes in the land of Egypt, unto Pharaoh and unto all his servants, and to all his land. The great temptations which thine eyes have seen, those great miracles and wonders, yet the Lord hath not given you an heart to perceive, and eyes to see, and ears to hear unto this day. Yet this Author confesseth that our Saviour's hearers, and Moses his hearers, many of them might be Godly men; but no thanks to this doctrine of theirs that they were so (the true and natural genius whereof (to wit, of Christ's doctrine and Moses his doctrine, for it is apparent, that it is the same with ours in this particular we now speak of) is to breed sloth, to drown men in carnal security, and to countenance carnal liberty) but to some thing else, either to God's providence who will not suffer this Doctrine (for his own glory and the good of men) to have any great stroke in their lives; or to men's incogitancy, who think not of reducing it, ad praxim, or drawing conclusions out of it, but rest in the naked speculation of it, as they do of many others; or lastly to some good practical conclusions, which they meet with in God's word, and apply to their lives (as they do not the former deductions) such as these are. Be ye holy as I am holy: without holiness no man shall see God: Spectatum admissi risum teneatis amici? Yet I pray restrain that, and give your sorrow course rather in beholding such profane aspersions cast upon the holy Doctrine of Christ, his Prophets and Apostles; as if thereby sloth were bred, and men drowned in carnal security, and carnal liberty countenanced. We are of another mind, for Wisdom is justified of her Children; we observe the wisdom of God herein to prevent the greatest illusions of Satan; and such Doctrines as stand in most opposition unto grace. The morality of Heathen men was admirable; yet were it far greater, we conceive no greater opposition unto grace, then to look for justification by it. In the next place, we conceive there is no greater opposition unto grace, then for a man to arrogate unto himself, ability to do that which is pleasing in the sight of God. Our Saviour hath said. john 15. 4. that, As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the Vine, so neither can we except we abide in him. So that either all the World must be engrafted into Christ or else it is not possible they should bring forth sweet grapes. Yet these men will have all and every one, to have their wills enlivened and enabled to will any spiritual good, whereby they shall be excited. Is this doctrine of theirs fit to humble them, and not rather to puff them up with a conceit of their own sufficiency? Is not our doctrine far more fit to humble us, and to what other end tendeth that of Moses, The Lord hath not given you an heart to perceive, eyes to see, and ears to hear unto this day, But to beat them out of the conceit of any sufficiency in them, to profit either by God's word, or by his works, so as to be drawn thereby to do any thing that was pleasing in the sight of God; and can there be any true holiness where humility is wanting? Again, they are only thankful unto God for giving them power to believe, to repent, and for exciting them hereunto; and concurring with them to the act of faith and repentance, for they acknowledge no other grace but this; We are bound by our doctrine to be thankful, not only for these operations, but also for causing us to walk in his statutes, to keep his judgements and do them, for healing our ways, our back-slidings, our Rebellions, they by their Doctrine, are bound to be thankful unto God, for no other grace in the way of grace prevenient, than such as he vouchsafeth to reprobates, and did vouchsafe to Cain, to Judas, and to the Devils themselves; how is it that they are not stricken with fear, least in this case their condition be no better, than the condition of reprobates though God in good time may provide better things for them, than their opinions, have any congruity unto, having course only to the obscuring and defacing of God's grace? We by our doctrine are bound to give God thanks for ruling us with a mighty hand, and making us to pass under the rod, and bringing us unto the bond of the Ezek. 20. 37. Ezek. 37. Deut. 30. 6. Eph. 2. Phil. 2. 13. Covenant; for taking away our stony heart, and giving us an heart of flesh; for circumcising our hearts to love him with all our heart; for raising us out of the dead, when he found us dead in sin; for working in us both the will, and the deed of every good work, not according to any thing in us, but according to his good pleasure: And this is so far from breeding sloth in us, or to drown us in carnal security in the Apostles judgement as that upon this very ground, as by a forceable inducement he exhorts us to work out our Salvation with fear and trembling, manifestly implying, that when men are of another opinion, as namely to think that the will and deed of any good thing is their own work, or if they do acknowledge it to be God's work, yet if they do not acknowledge it to be wrought by God, according to his good pleasure, but according to some disposition whereby they dispose themselves thereunto; that is the highway to make them carnally secure, and how but by a carnal confidence that they have power to turn to God when they list, to believe and repent when they will, and withal that their wills are as pliable to good as to evil, and so make it an easy mater at any time to turn to God. I appeal to the judgement of every sober conscience to judge between us which of our Doctrines most tends to the countenancing of carnal security, according to the Tenor of the Apostles exhortation in this place and that in coherence with the reason whereby he doth enforce it, theirs, or ours. But to proceed, they acknowledge Christ to have merited for them only a power to believe and repent and means to excite them hereunto, and concourse divine to the act of believing and repenting in case they will; we acknowledge not only all this, but over and above that Christ hath merited for us, the working of our wills effectually and predominantly hereunto, and that God makes us perfect to every good work, working in us that which is pleasing in his sight through Jesus Christ. Nay what will you say, if the Remonstrants Heb. 13. 21. now a days openly profess, that Christ merited not for any man faith and regeneration, and I commend them for their ingenuity, in dealing fairly and plainly confessing that which their opinion doth manifestly drive unto. Lastly we confess that God hath power as to show mercy on whom he will, and harden whom he will, so to make whom he will a vessel of mercy, and whom he will a vessel of wrath, this we clearly profess, namely, that God hath such power even over ourselves, and our childerens and all those that are near and dear unto us, as over any others: But this these adversaries of ours now a days utterly deny; now I pray consider whose doctrine savoreth of greater holiness in acknowledging the sovereignty of God over his creatures, theirs or ours? But it will not be labour lost altogether to consider those causes whereunto he is pleased to impute that Godliness, which is found in us. The first is God's providence; and indeed I find them liberal enough in acknowledging God's providence in general terms, and as forward to blast it when they come to particulars. Now as for that providence which is the cause of Godliness, we like plain fellows commonly call it grace, and the ground of this Author's subtlety in calling it providence and not grace, I comprehend not. But what is that operation of providence divine or grace which is the cause of Godliness? Is it any other in his opinion then that universal grace whereby they have power to be Godly and which grace God affords unto Reprobates, and that exciting grace whereby God persuades them to be Godly, and his readiness to concur to any act of Godliness in case we will: and is not all this afforded (in his opinion) to Reprobates as well as to the elect, to them that have no Godliness at all in them, as to them that have? And why may not this doctrine of ours whereby we maintain, that God works in us both the will and the deed according to his goodpleasure, be a means to make us set ourselves to the working out of our Salvation with fear and trembling, considering that the Apostle professeth this doctrine of God's energetical operation of every good thing in us as a strong inducement to work out our Salvation with fear and trembling; and wherein consists any man's Godliness if not in this, to wit, in working out his Salvation with fear and trembling? And is it not apparent that we maintain this doctrine. namely, that God is he who works in us both the will and the deed, and every good thing, and that according to his good pleasure in far more undoubted manner than they do. And how can it appear that they do acknowledge this? To give us power to will that which i good (which is the effect of that universal grace they talk of) is this to work in us either the will or the deed? To excite us by persuasion and exhortation to will & do that which is good, to believe and to repent, is to work either in us the will or deed of that which is good, of faith of repentance? Lastly to be ready to concur with us to the will or deed of faith and repentance if so be we will concur with him to the same, or to concur with us to the producing of the act of willing & the act of doing that which is good, in case we produce the same act of willing and doing that which is good, is this to work in us both the will and the deed? Consider I pray is it not true that God is as ready to concur with us to any sinful act, in case we will concur with him; and doth he not concur with man to the producing of any sinful act, in case man at that time doth produce it; And will any sober man say that this is also for God to work in him both the will and the deed of every sinful act? And why might we not say so, if God works it only by concourse? Lastly to work in us both the will and the deed provided that man will concur to the working hereof not otherwise, is this to work it according to his good pleasure, and not rather according to man's good pleasure? And how I pray, or in what sense doth he say that God by his providence will not suffer this doctrine to have any stroke in our lives? For if he suffers it not, than he hinders it; let it therefore be made appear how he hinders it; To concur with us, if we will concur with him in the producing of any act of Godliness, is this to hinder our carnal security? If so then to concur with us to the producing of any sinful act is to hinder our Godliness. Surely to give power whereby men are enabled to do any spiritual good if they will is not to hinder carnal security, for such a power is given to all by universal grace, yet this doth nothing hinder the carnal security of many thousands. Or doth he hinder it by exciting us to the contrary? Yet if this doctrine (as we conceive) be apt to drown us in carnal security, how can he be said to hinder us from it? For either the doctrine must yield to such excitations & exhortations from carnal security; or such exhortations must yield to the doctrine, especially considering what Austin saith, that if there be any difference between docere and suadere or exhortari; yet even this doctrinae generalitate comprehenditur. And for incogitancy, which is a second device, pretended as the cause why this doctrine doth not expose us to carnality, is it not incredible, these points being so much ventilated by them as none more? The Church of God having been exercised with none more (as I think) these hundred years; that men should not think of, or consider of those dangerous consequences in manners, as these do forge in their own brains. And as for the last, imputing our Godliness to some good practical conclusions; may I not justly say, that if ever any man wrote with the spirit of giddiness, this Author deserves to have a chief place amongst them: For compare his answer to the second objection with this; There he saith such dissolute conclusions as these following, do arise out of this doctrine of ours: If I be chosen, I must of necessity believe and be saved; If I be cast off, I must as necessarily not believe and be damned; what need I therefore take thought either way about means or end. Now will it not as well follow, what need I therefore take thought of holiness, of obedience? For even these are as good practical conclusions. Believe and thou shalt be saved. Repent and thou shalt be saved, and whosoever bebelieveth not shall be damned. As these, Be ye holy as I am holy. Without holiness no man shall see God. If ye consent and obey, ye shall eat the good things of the Land. And by the way observe I pray, with what judgement he calls them practical conclusions; whereas all save two of them, are exhortations rather than conclusions; And those two; to wit, Without holiness no man shall see God, and, Godliness hath the promises, both of this life etc. I should take them to be principles rather than conclusions. Whether simple men do apply their brains to ponder and consider this doctrine or no, I know not; but certainly the learned and Godly maintainers of it, have had cause enough to ponder it, and consider it throughly, and have given evidence enough of their thorough consideration of it; yet have they fetched no such sequels out of it. If simple men do, and our adversaries be of the number of them, and content themselves with such simplicity; yet is it not enough for us that the Apostle doth not? the holy Apostle S. Paul? but expressly enforceth the contrary there from; namely; that because of God worketh in us the will and the deed according to his good pleasure, therefore it becomes us to work out our Salvation with fear and trembling? Now which of us do most exactly concur with the Apostle in mainning that God doth work in us both the will and the deed according to his good pleasure, I am very well content, that all the World both wise and simple, both Learned and unlearned may judge. 2. As touching the second; First let us consider how the objection is shaped. Secondly, as it lies, with what judgement and sobriety it is impugned. 1. It is true men are absolutely elected or absolutely rejected; but we content not ourselves with generalities, wherein as Aristotle hath observed, do lurk many equivocations: Neither do we delight in confounding things that differ. Election and rejection or reprobation, and in general the will of God, may be considered, either Quoad actum voluntis, as touching the act of God willing, or as touching the things willed. Of this distinction this Author takes no notice; It is fit for some and advantageous to fish in troubled waters. Now as touching the act of God willing; both Aquinas hath proved, that there can be no cause thereof; and withal professeth, that never was any so mad as to say That merits can be the cause of predestination, quoad actum praedestinantis, as touching the act of God predestinating. And Bradwardine hath curiously disputed this way that no will of God is conditional, to will quoad actum volentis, And Piscator against Vorstius hath proved the same after his way; and by variety of demonstration this way may be convinced, as in part I have showed in this discourse, both on the part of election, and on the part of reprobation. And both Dr Jackson in his book of Providence, professeth that the distinction of Voluntas antecedens and consequens, or antecedent and consequent will in God is to be understood quoad res volitas as touching the things willed, as much as to say, non quoad actum volentis. And Gerardus Vossius drawing the distinction of will antecedent and will consequent unto the distinction of will absolute and will conditional, applies it only quoad res Histor. haer. Pelag. l. 7. th'. 2. p. 638. volitas, and so interpriteth Father's discourse thereof; And of a conditional will gives this instance; God will have men to be Saved, in case they believe where faith is clearly made the condition of Salvation, a temporal thing the condition of a temporal thing, not the condition of Gods will to save; it being no way fit that a temporal thing should be made the condition of a thing eternal, such as is God's will to save. And this is more apparent by the reading of Vossius himself. Histor: Pelag: l: 7. treating of Gods will to save all. Now if we speak thus of Gods will quoad res volitas as touching the things willed; these things willed being very different, we have reason to consider them distinctly also. Now these things are either grace or glory commonly called Salvation, And as touching grace, to wit, the grace of regeneration, the grace of faith and repentannee, we willingly confess that Gods will to confer them is so absolute, that he hath determined to confer them according to the mere pleasure of his will, not according to man's works (which is plain Pelagianism and condemned in the Synod of Palestine above 1200 years ago) and as he gives them to whom he will, so he denies them to whom he will according to that Rom. 9 18. He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. But as touching Salvation or damnation in which respect this Author usually speaks of the absolute or conditional will of God; we uttererly deny, that God in the dispensation or administration, or execution of these proceeds or ever did decree to proceed according to the mere pleasure of his own will, but altogether according to their works. For albeit God hath made no law according whereto he means to proceed in giving or denying grace, yet hath he made a law according whereto he proceeds in bestowing Salvation, and inflicting damnation. And the law is this: Whosever believeth shall be Saved, Whosoever believeth not shall bedamned 2 Cor. 5. 10. We must all appear before the Judgement Seat of Christ, that every man may receive the things, which are done in his body according to that he hath done, whether good or evil. So that according to that sense wherein this Author usually speaks of the absolute and conditional will of God, we utterly deny that God doth absolutely elect any man to Salvation, or reject any man unto damnation; though he doth absolutely elect some unto grace, that is to the grace of regeneration; to the grace of faith and repentance, and absolutely reject others there from. For as much as he bestows these graces on some and denies them unto others not according to their works, but according to the mere pleasure of his own will, but he doth not inflict damnaton or bestow Salvation according to the mere pleasure of his will, but according unto man's works. And as he carrieth himself in the execution of Salvation and damnation, after the same manner he did from everlasting decree to carry himself, namely to Save no man of ripe years but by way of reward of their faith, repentance, and good works; so to damn none but for their infidelity, impenitency and evil works. As for the manifestation of Gods will of election and reprobation unto any, we say, that ordinarily, man may be assured of his election. For the spirit of God is given to this very end even to shed the love of God in our hearts, that is, God's love towards us. Rome 5. 5. And what is the shedding therefore in our hearts, but his working in us a sense and feeling thereof, especially considering that the sense of God's love to us is the cause of our love to wards God; according to that 1 John. 4. 19 We love him because he loved us first: and accordingly the spirit is said to testify unto our spirits that we are the sons Rom. 8. And if sons than heirs, even heirs of God, and heirs annexed with Christ. And the Apostle St Peter exhorts us to give diligence to make our election & vocation sure; implying manifestly 2 Pet. 1. that men may be sure of their election; otherwise why should our Saviour wish his Disciples to rejoice not in this that Devils were subdued unto them, but that their names were written in Heaven. And by what means may a man be assured hereof, but either Luk. 10. 20. immediately by the testimony of the spirit, or mediately by the fruits of the spirit as the fruits of our election; one where of is faith plainly so signified Act, 13. 48. As many believed as were ordained to everlasting Life. And Act. 2. last. God added daily to the Church such as should be Saved; And repentance is another: Act. 11. 18. Then hath God unto the Gentiles also given repentance unto life. Giving to understand that as many as to whom God giveth repentance, he hath ordained them unto life. And indeed by the work of our faith, and labour of our love, and the patience of our hope, others come to be assured of our election (how much more ourselves, no man knowing the things of man so as the spirit of man 1 Cor: 2.) Thus St Paul professeth his assurance of the election of the Thessalonians 1 Thess. 1. 3, 4. We remember the work of your faith, and the labour of your love etc. Knowing beloved brethren that ye are elect of God. And hereupon he proceeds to assure them, that Antichrist by all his deceivableness of unrighteousness shall never prevail over them; in as much as he prevails only over them that perish 2 Thess: 2. 10. But as for them they are the elect of God; And how doth he know that? Surely by their faith and sanctification which were visible in them v: 13. But we ought to give God thanks always for you, brethren beloved of the Lord, because that God hath from the beginning chosen you unto Salvation by sanctification of the spirit and faith of the truth. But as for reprobation we say that no man can by any ordinary way be assured thereof, seeing nothing but final perseverance in infidelity or impenitency is the infallible sign thereof, whence it follows that no way of desperation is open to one, but the way of assurance and abundance of consolation is opened to the other, and thereby encouragement to proceed cheerfully in the ways of Godliness, being assured that the more holy they are the greater shall be their reward. And surely if certainty of salvation were a means of licentiousness, the Apostle S. Peter would never have exhorted us, to give diligence to make our calling and election sure. And we manifestly seem to perceive strength 2 Pet. 1. 10. of encouragement hereby unto Godliness; as being assured that Christ died for us, to the end we might live unto him. And God receives us as Sons and Daughters to this end, that we should purge ourselves from all pollutions of flesh and spirit, and perfect holiness in the fear of God. As also being assured, that God will not lay our infirmities and 2 Cor. 7. 1. & 6. last. sins unto our charge, and will be ready to keep us from presumptuous sins, and however it fares with us, Yet sin shall not have dominion over us, (and consequently we shall have the victory over it, either by obedience, or by repentance) because we are not under the law but under grace. Rom. 6. 12. Now what encouragement is this to the Soldiers of Christ, to go on cheerfully and courageously in fight the Lords battles against the world, the flesh and the Devil, seeing we are assured the day of victory and the glory of it shall be ours in the end: God keeping us by his power through faith unto Salvation 1 Pet. 1. And delivering us from every evil work (to wit either by obedience or by repentance) and preserving us to his heavenly kingdom; and that either, by delivering us from the hour aftentation which comes all over the world Revel: 3. Or delivering us out of it 2 Pet: 2. 9 Or having an eye to our strength so to order it that we shall be able to bear it 1 Cor: 10. 14. As for those that have not yet any comfortable evidence of their election; yet considering that they may have it, and albeit the number of the elect are by far, fewer than the reprobate; yet considering how few have the Gospel in comparison to those that enjoy it not; though Turks & Saracens and Heathens are without hope Eph. 2. 12. and 1 Thess. 4. 13. Yet we Christians are not yea, albeit of them that are called, but few are chosen Mat. 20. 16. and 22, 14. Yet considering how many corrupt ways there are amongst Christians, Nestorians, Armenians, Abyssines or Coptites, who join circumcision with the Gospel, as in Egypt and Ethiopia, (the Greek Church denying the proceeding of the Holy Ghost from the son) and corrupted with many other superstitions. Lastly considering how far Antichristanity is spread and the abominable Idolatry of the Church of Rome, we whom God hath delivered out of Babylon have no cause (I mean any particular person) to project, that because the elect are but few, therefore we are not of the number of them, and thereupon give over all care of harkening to God's word, which is the power of God unto Salvation and may show its power upon us also we know not how soon, but rather as our Saviour answered (being demanded of his disciples whether there were but few that should be saved) saying strive [you] to enter in at the straight gate, plainly giving to understand, that as the gate is said to be straight that leadeth unto Life, so there be but few that enter thereat & therefore they should strive so much the more to be of the number of those few. For what if along time we have little or nothing profited, what if we have cause to doubt whether we have any true faith or no; such doubts maybe better signs than we are awar of; otherwise why should the Apostle exhort the Corinthians to examine themselves and prove whether they were in the faith or no? But however it fairs with us doth not the Apostle plainly teach us, that God calls some at the first hour of the day, some at the the third, some at 2 Cor. 13. 5. the last? 2. Now I come to the consideration of his answer to the objection, as himself hath form it. And first I observe, that whereas he pretends to build his answer upon consideration of the number of Reprobats without comparison greater than the number of the elect, yet the absurd reasoning which he brings hereupon, doth nothing at all depend on that. For albeit the number of the elect, were greater than the number of such as are Reprobats, and that without comparison; yet the reasoning here deduced from the contrary proposition hath equally place, as in the contrary case, As namely, to reason thus: Either I am absolutely chosen to grace and glory or absolutely cast off from both. Secondly the joining of grace and glory together, as this Author doth join them in this reasoning shaped by him is a miserable confounding of things that differ. For to be absolutely chosen unto grace is to be ordained to have grace conferred upon him not according to any work of his, but merely according to the good pleasure of Gods will, answerably to that of the Apostle, God hath mercy on whom he will, but no man is so chosen unto glory, as namely to be ordained to have Salvation bestowed upon him not according unto works, but according to the mere pleasure of God, if we speak of men of ripe years. For God hath ordained to bestow Salvation on such only by way of reward of their faith, repentance, and good works. So on the other side to be asolutely cast off from grace, is to be ordained to have grace denied him; not according to any work of his, but merely according to the good pleasure of Gods will, like as Paul professeth, that the Lord hardeneth whom he will, But no man is so castaway from Glory, or unto damnation, as namely, to be ordained to be deprived of Glory and to be damned, merely for the good pleasure of God, but altogether for his infidelity, impenitency and evil works. Thirdly, no such thing follows as here is inferred from the supposition of election unto Salvation. For seeing no man is elected to obtain Salvation, whether he believe or no, but only in case he believe, hereupon men are rather excited to labour for faith, then to be careless thereof; and farther we say, that as God hath ordained to bring them to Salvation, so he hath ordained to bring them hereunto by sanctification and faith. 2 Thess. 2. 13. And the word of God is a powerful means to work them hereunto, even to the working out of their Salvation with fear and trembling, & that because they are given to understand that God is he who wroketh in them both the will Phil. 2. 13. and the deed according to his good pleasure. On the other side if a man be ordained to damnation, yet seeing no man is ordained to be damned but for despising the means of grace in case he hear the Gospel; & for aught any man knows he may as well be ordained to salvation as to damnation; this I should think, is rather an excitement not to despise or neglect the means of grace, then to despise or neglect them. Suppose God should not damn any man, but annihilate them, and suppose this were known unto us; by the same argumentation it would follow, that a man should have no care of good works: But this consequent is notoriously untrue. For seeing the perfection of my reasonable nature, whereby I differ from brute Beasts, consisteth in knowledge and moral virtues; and there is no knowledge that doth more ennoble us, than the knowledge of God, and no better rule of morality, than the law of God; surely it stood me upon in reason, to strive according to my power to know God, and to be obedient rather than otherwise; although I know for certain, that after certain years, both body and soul should be returned unto nothing. Come we now to the consideration of this reasoning, in respect of grace. Suppose God hath elected me unto grace; yet seeing he bestows not grace but by his word, therefore there is no reason I should neglect the use of his word, but rather good reason why I should embrace it, and that with all earnestness. Like as in case God hath ordained I shall have Children, doth it hence follow that I need not use the company of a Woman; because seeing God hath decreed I shall have Children, therefore I may be sure to have them, whether I company with a Woman or no, belike right as Capons come by Chicken? On the other side, suppose God hath not ordained me unto grace; yet hence it followeth not, that I should neglect all care of moral virtue, yea or the use of God's word. First not of moral virtue; for next unto grace, moral virtue commends a man, and like as many heathens were famous for morality, without any sanctifying grace; so may I be in the same kind of reputation also. And seeing no better rules of morality are to be found, then in the Scriptures, therefore may I well be moved to give myself to the study thereof. And Austin telleth us, that some, even of reprobates, by the word of God may Proficere ad exteriorem vitae emendationem, quò mitius puniantur. Last of all, consider how the like objections were made against that destiny, which was maintained by the Stoics. Carneades was a great oppugner of the Stoics, yet was ashamed of such a kind of Argumentation as this Author affecteth. For it was commonly accounted ignava ratio; and thus Turnebus writes of it, Ignava autem ista ratio, captiosa cum esset, & calumniae plena, a Carneade non probabatur, alioque argumento factum sine ulla captione oppugnabat. He had other manner of reasons to oppose Fate Stoical, then by so sorry an argumentation as this. And this is delivered by Turnebus, upon that passage in Cicero's book De Fato, Where he showeth how Chrysippus did make answer unto this very argument in effect above 1600 years a go; Take the words as they lie in Cicero, Nec nos impediet illa ignava ratio quae dicitur: Appellatur enim quidem a Philosophis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, cui si pare amus, nihil est omnino quod agamus in vita. Hic enim interrogant (now I beseech you mark the argument well) si fatum tibi est ex hoc morbo convalescere, sive medicum adhibueris, sive non, convalesces. Item si fatum tibi est ex hoc morbo non convalescere sive tu Medicum adhibueris, sive non, non convalesces. If it be destined that you shall recover out of this disease, whether you use the help of a Physician or no, you shall recover. Again, if it be destined that you shall not recover out of this disease, whether you use a Physician or no, you shall not recover. Now compare this, I pray, with this Author's argumentation in this place; If I am chosen I must of necessity believe and be saved; What need therefore to take thought either about means or end? as much as to say, either of believing or of salvation. Again, If I be cast off, I must as necessarily not believe and be damned; In vain therefore do I trouble myself about means, or end; as much as to say, about labouring and endeavouring for Faith, whereby I may avoid damnation: And judge, I pray, whether there be one hairs breadth of difference, between these argumentations. For like as it is unreasonable to conceive, that man is destined to recover out of sickness, but by use of means, such as is the use of a Physician; in like sort, as unreasonable it is to conceive, that God hath destined any man of ripe years to be brought to salvation, but by faith in Christ; or that God hath apppointed any man to be damned, but for want of faith, or want of repentance. Observe I pray the censure that is passed upon it in Cicero, Rectè hoc genus interrogationis ignavum atque iners nominatur, quod eadem ratione, omnis è vita tollitur actio. And farther he showeth how that the same argument, if there were any force in it, might have place, without all mention of Fate. Licet etiam immutare (saith he,) ut Fati nomen non adjunges, & eandem tamen teneas sententiam hoc modo, si ex eternitate verum hoc fuit, ex iste morbo convalesces, sive adhibueris medicum sive non, convalesces. Itemque si ex aeternitate hoc falsum fuerit, ex isto morbo convalesces, sive adhibuer is medicum, sive non adhibuer is, non convalesces; deinde caetera. In the next place there it is showed how Chrysippus made answer to this argument. Haecratio a Crysipo reprehenditur: Quaedam enim sunt (inquit) in rebus simplicia, quaedam copulata: simplex est moretur eo die Socrates, Hinc sive quid fecerit, sive non fecerit, finitus est moriendi dies. At si ita fatum sit, Nascetur Oedipus Laio, non poterit dici, sive Laius fuerit cum muliere, sive non fuerit. Copulata enim res est & confatalis; sic enim appellat qui a ita fatum sit, & concubiturum cum Uxore Laium & ex eo Oedipum procreaturum. Then he illustrateth the absurdity of the deduction in another manner thus, Ut si esset dictum, luctabitur Olympiis Milo, & referret aliquis, Ergo sive habuerit adversarium sive non habuerit, luctabitur, erraret. Est enim copulatum, luctabitur, quia sine adversario nulla luctatio est. And he concludes all of this kind to be but captious argumentations, and that they admit the same solution. Omnes igitur istius generis captiones, eodem modo refelluntur. Sive tu medicum adhibueris, sive non adhibueris, captiosum: tam enim fatale est medicum adhibere quam convalescere. Haec, ut dixi, confatalias ille appellat. And this manner of solution was so sufficient, that Carneades disdained to press the Stoics with this kind of argumentation, though opposite enough to their opinion, as forthwith Cicero expresseth it. Carneades hoc totum genus non probabat, & minùs inconsiderate concludi hanc rationem putabat: itaque premebat alio modo, nec ullam adhibebat calumniam. So that he condemned this as a calumnious argumentation against the Stoics, though himself were a sore adversary of theirs. And therefore if any Christians do reason thus, either in their hearts to countenance them in profane courses; or justify such reasoning, thereby to oppose Gods free grace in election, the unreasonableness thereof being thus set forth, and acknowledged on both sides by the very light of nature, let them take heed and fear least heathen men rise up in judgement against them. As for Tiberius his opinion and persuasion, Omnia fato agi, it is apparent what he understood by Fatum, for there it is said, that he was Mathematicae addictus; whereby it seems, he went no farther than the stars, for the original of his fate. But it Tiberius was circa Deos & religiones negligentior, were the Stoics so too? I had thought that like as none were more opposite to the Epicures than they, so none were more religious and devout among the Heathens than they. Yet there is no opinion so true or good, but by a profane heart may be abused. But as for the efficacy of God's will, we are so far from maintaining, that it takes away either the liberty of man's will, or the contingency of second causes, that we profess with Aquinas, that the root of all contingency, is the efficacious will of God; and with the Authors of the Articles of the Church of Ireland, Artic. 11. That God did from all eternity ordain, whatsoever in time should come to pass; and yet neither the liberty, nor the contingency of second causes, is thereby destroyed, but established rather. DISCOURSE. The fifth and last sort of Reasons. It is an Enemy to True Comfort. SECT. I. I Am come to my last reason against it, drawn from the Vncomfortablenesse of it: It is a doctrine full of desperation, both to them that stand, and to them that are fallen, to men out of temptation, and in it. It 1. Leads men into temptation. 2. Leaves men in it. And therefore it is no part of God's word, for that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, good news to men, a store-house of sweet consolations for them that stand, and such as are fallen. These things are written (saith the Apostle) Rom. 15. 4. That by patience and consolation of the Scriptures we might have hope; implying that therefore was the word written, and left to the Church, that by the comforts contained in it, those poor souls that look towards heaven, might never want in any changes or chances of this mortal life, a sweet gale of hope to refresh them, and carry on their ship full merrily towards the Haven. It leads men into temptation, and into such a one too, as is as sharp and dangerous as any the tempter hath. The Devil can easily persuade any man that makes absolute reprobation a part of his creed, that he is one of those absolute Reprobates; because there are more absolute Reprobates (even an hundred for one,) then absolute chosen ones: and a man hath a great deal more reason to think that he is one of the most, than one of the least, one of the huge multitude of inevitable castaways, than one of the little flock, for whom God hath absolutely prepared a Kingdom. Such a man is not only capable of, but framed and fashioned by his opinion for this suggestion; which is a very sore one, if we may believe Calvin, Bucer, and Zanchius. Calvin tells us, Quod nulla tentatione vel gravius, vel periculosius fideles percellit Satan, that the Devil cannot assault a believer with a temptation more dangerous. And a little after he saith, It is so much Instit: l: 3. c: 24. Sect: 4. the deadlier, by how much commoner it is then any other, Rarissimus est cujus non interdum animus hac cogitatione feriatur, unde tibi salus nisi ex Dei electione? Electionis autem quae tibi revelatio? Quae si apud quempiam semel invaluit, aut diris tormentis miserum perpetuo exeruciat, aut reddit penitus attonitum. So ordinary is the temptation, that he who is at all times free from it is a rare man (we are to conceive that he speaks of those that believe absolute reprobation:) and so dangerous it is, that if it get strength, he which is under it, is either miserably tormented, or mightily astonished. And a little after this, he saith again. Ergo si naufragium timemus, sollicité ab hoc scopulo cavendum, in quem nunquam sine exitio impingitur, He that will not wrack his soul must keep from this rock. Bucer also hath a passage like to this, Vt caput omnis noxiae tentationis (saith he) repellenda est quaestio, sumusnè praedestinati? Nam qui de hoc dubitat, nec vocatumse, nec justificatum esse credere poterit, hoc est, nequit In 8 Rome q. 2. de praedest: esse Christianus: This doubt whether we are predestinated or no? Must be repelled as the head of every pernicious temptation: for he that doubts of this cannot be a Christian. Praesumendum igitur ut principium fidei nos omnes esse a Deo praescitos. Every man therefore must presume it as a principle of faith that he is elected. This very speech of Bucers' Zanchy makes use of to the same purpose. We see then by the testimony of these worthy men, that this temptation is very dangerous and ordinary too, to such as think Zanch: lib: 5: de natura Dei. Quaest: de Praedest. Georg. Major in 2 Tim. 2. Fol.. 1109. there are absolute reprobates. The truth of both will farther appear by the example of Petrus Hosuanus a Schoolmaster in Hungary, who intending to hang himself, signified in a letter which he left in his study for the satisfaction of his friends and Countrymen, the cause of it, in that writing he delivered these three things. 1. That he was of calvin's and S. Augustine's opinion, that men are not dealt withal, secundum bona, or mala opera, according to their works good or evil, but that there are occultiores causae more hidden causes of men's eternal condition. 2. That he was one of that woeful company of absolute castaways, Vas formatum in ignominiam, a vessel prepared to dishonour: and that therefore (though his life had been none of the worst) he could not possibly be saved. 3. That being unable to bear the dreadful apprehensions of wrath, with which he was affrighted he hanged himself. For these are some of his last words there recorded, Discedo igitur ad Lacus Infernales aeternum dedecus patriae meae, Deo vos commendo, cujus misericordia mihi negata est. I go to those infernal lakes, a perpetual reproach to my Country, commending you to God whose mercy is denied me. Out of this example we may easily collect two things. 1. That men who think that there are many, whom God hath utterly rejected out of his only will and pleasure, may be easily brought to think by Satan's suggestion, that they are of that company: And 2. That this temptation is very dangerous; I conclude therefore the first part of my last Reason, that absolute Reprobation leads men into temptation. TWISSE. Consideration. AS I remember, when this Author first had resort unto some prime stickler for the Arminian way to confer with him there about, it was told me that this Author should allege, that our doctrine of election was a comfortable doctrine: but then on the other side, it was alleged, that granting that, yet with all it did expose to dessolutenes of life. And therefore I little expect any such argument as this to be proposed, least of all to be ranged amongst the number of those that are taken to be of a convincing nature. Yet is it the less strange, because the Apostle telleth us of some, that their course is proficere in pejus, to grow worse and worse. But let us consider, whether he speeds any better in this then in the former. And whereas he saith, It is a doctrine full of desperation both to them that stand, and to them that are fallen. I do not find that in the accommodation of this argument, he takes any more notice of this distinction throughout this Section. The Gospel is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and the power of God unto Salvation; but to whom? Surely to them that believe. Rom. 1. 16. and preserve: Be faithful unto death and I will give thee a Crown of Life. Revel. 2. 10. He that believeth in him is not condemned, but he that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the name of that only begotten Son of God John 3. 18. Likewise the comfort which the Scripture ministereth to strengthen men with patience to hold out in the promise of Everlasting Life, though it be long in coming; as which is the portion only of such as are not weary of well-doing, & faint not for according to that of the Apostle, Be not weary of well-doing, so in good time ye shall reap if you faint not. Gal. 6. 9 And as for poor souls, if they be poor in spirit, undoubtedly they are blessed, for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven: And whose doctrine, the Arminian or ours, doth best maintain poverty of spirit, I am very willing the different may judge Yet of the poor of the world and most despised, God doth choose to be rich in faith, and (in this poverty of spirit) heirs of the Kingdom which God hath prepared for them that love him. And God's Kingdom doth most consist of such poor and despised creatures. jac. 2. 5. 1 Cor: 1. 27, 28. And as for this love of God, we acknowledge that God doth not leave it in his elect to the liberty of their wills, but rather that he works it in them by the circumcision of the heart: Deut: 30. 6. The Lord thy God will circumcise thine heart and the heart of thy seed to love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and withal thy soul that thou mayst live. And indeed the Kingdom is promised to none but such as love him. Jac: 2. 5. It is a singular consolation that all things work together for the good of man; but this consolation is applied only to them that love God, which are called according to his purpose. Rome 8. 28. And as for the phrase of looking towards Heaven, if thereby be meant their waiting for Christ's coming, I make no question but such also shall be delivered from the wrath to come. 1 Thess: 1. 10. It being not possible they should wait for him, unless they love his appearing: and the Apostle hath assured such that the Lord hath a Crown of Righteousness in store to bestow upon them 2 Tim: 4. 8. And I take the like phrase to signify no less than the conversion of their hearts to God. Jer: 50. 4. In those days and in that time saith the Lord, the children of Israel shall come, they and the children of Judah together going, and weeping shall they go, and seek the Lord their God, v. 5: They shall ask the way to Zion with their faces thither-wards saying, come let us join ourselves to the Lord in a perpetual Covenant that shall not be forgotten. Now I come to the particular accommodation of this argument against our doctrine. And of this he saith, that It leads men into temptation, and into such a one as is as sharp and dangerous as any the tempter hath. Now the temptation here spoken of consists in this, that The Devil can easily persuade a man that makes absolute reprobation a part of his Creed, that he is one of those absolute reprobates because those are more absolute reprobates (even an hundred for one) then absolute chosen on's, and a man hath a greatdeale more reason to think that he is one of the most than one of the least, one of the huge multitude of inevitable castaways, then on of that little flock, for whom God hath absolutely prepared a Kingdom. And this he pretends to prove out of Calvin, Bucer, and Zanchius; and this together with a story related out of Georgius Major a Lutheran concerning Petrus Glosuanus, a Schoolmaster in Hungary is all his proof. Now in answer hereunto I will proceed by degrees. First he continueth still to serve his turn with the equivocation of this phrase of absolute reprobation without distinguishing: And albeit, it may be gathered by his discourse, that as Others do, so he himself considers it not quoad actum volentis, as touching the act of God willing, but quoad res volitas, as touching the things willed. Yet he is well pleased to confound the things willed into one, as if they had no difference as touching their absoluteness, whereas the denial of grace together with the inflicting of damnation, (which are the things willed by reprobation which accordingly is distinguished into Roprobation from grace, & reprobation from glory, or unto damnation) are so different, that God doth decree indeed the absoluteness of the one, but he doth not at all decree the absoluteness of the other, but merely the conditional nature thereof. For grace he denieth and purposeth to deny absolutely. For the Apostle plainly professeth, That as God hath mercy on whom he will Rome 9 18. By bringing them unto faith. Rom. 11. 30. So he hardeneth whom he will by denying faith unto them. But as for Glory and damnation, like as God doth not absolutely, so neither did he decree absolutely to deny the one & inflict the other, but only conditionally, to wit, in case of final perseverance in sin. Therefore I have reason to understand him of reprobation from grace, as often as he speaks of absolute reprobation, & consequently his meaning must be that God doth not deny grace, but upon condition of man's doing or not doing some thing, so that if either man did something or leave undone some thing, then God would give him grace, which for want thereof he doth not; which is as good, as in plain terms to profess, That grace is given according to works. Then again consider, what is that grace, which is given upon condition, and not absolutely by these men's opinion; Is it which thy call universal, and wherein consists the enlivening of man's will, & the enabling of him to will any spiritual good whereto, he shall be excited? This cannot be given any otherwise then absolutely; for as much as they make it to be given when a man cometh into the world: and to that purpose do allege that, John 1. 9 This is that true light which enlightens every man that cometh into the world. Or Is it exciting grace, that is not given absolutely? This cannot be neither; For this exciting grace is in the ministry of the Word. Now when the Gospel is brought unto a Nation, not only the civil sort; but the most profane are made partakers of it indifferently; so that predestination hereunto must be acknowledged even by the Arminians themselves to be absolute, as it signifies predestination unto grace prevenient. So that if any predestination unto grace, be not absolute but conditional, it must needs be predestination unto grace subsequent. As for example, God doth decree to work in man the act of willing that which is good; this decree (say they) is not absolute but conditional. Now I pray consider what is, or can be the condition hereof, but the act of willing? And this indeed is their doctrine, as I have seen it under the hand of one of them, namely, that God doth work in us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 velle modo velimus, as much as to say, If we will make ourselves willing to believe, to repent, to do any good work, than God will make us willing hereunto. This is the issue of the comfortable doctrine of these Arminians; and unless we concur with them in such unsober expressions, we expose ourselves to the temptations of Satan (yea the forest temptations if we believe this Author;) and bereave our souls of all comfort from the Scriptures; As if divine consolations were like to their argumentations, the one as unsober as the other. But let us consider the force of his Argument; If it be so easy a matter for the Devil to persuade a man of this, how came it to pass that he did not persuade Austin hereof, or Prosper, or Fulgentius, or any of those ancient writers, in this argument against the Pelagians: How is it that he could not perform so easy a matter upon Calvin, Bucer, Beza, Zanchy, Junius, Piscator, or any other of those famous writers in this argument? How is it that he prevails over so few in comparison? Nay, consider was there ever any that was persuaded, or can this Author produce any evidence to prove, that ever any was persuaded that himself was a Reprobate upon this ground, to wit, because the number of Reprobates are by far fewer than the number of Gods elect. though (as he speaks) an hundred for one? I have read of divers, collected by Goulartius within that century of years next preceding his work, that have cast themselves away in despair; yet not all neither upon conceit of their absolute reprobation: And of them that have so conceived, not one do I find that hath entertained this conceit upon the ground here mentioned by this Author Francis Spira is a strange precedent, but the ground of this desperate condition is manifested to have been this, that he conceived himself to have sinned the sin against the Holy Ghost. Many in our days have been known to have made themselves a way, and this very year 1632, hath brought forth many strange examples in this kind; but hitherto I have not heard that the ground of this their desperate resolutions was this, that the Devil had persuaded them they were absolute Reprobates, much less that they were persuaded hereunto by so sorry a ground, as that which this Author allegeth. And as before I signified, all this must proceed of reprobation from grace; And if God deny grace upon the mere pleasure of his will, and not according to men's works, the way is open to desperation, and it is an easy matter for the Devil to persuade us that we are absolute Reprobates; as this Author with great zeal of his cause, belike upon the singular comfort he finds in his own way, disputeth. But over whom hath the Devil this power? Not over Heathens, for they are nothing acquainted with the doctrine of election, and reprobation; but over Christians; Yet consider I pray, who are Christians, but such as believe in Christ? And is it an easy matter for the Devil to persuade such as believe in Christ that they are Reprobates? If so then either as it is reprobation from grace, or as it signifies reprobation from glory, not as it signifies reprobation from grace; for it is supposed they are in the state of grace, to wit, in the state of faith, which is the prime grace. As for reprobation from glory, we do not maintain that God doth absolutely deny that, or that he decreed absolutely to deny that, but only to such as should be found to die in sin. Again, as many as maintain absolute reprobation, they do withal maintain that faith is a fruit of election and consequently by the Genius of their doctrine must conclude that they are elect and not Reprobates. Again, they according to their doctrine do maintain, that who is once in the state of regeneration cannot fall a way totally or finally: Therefore they are not so easy to be persuaded that they are Reprobates at all, but elect rather. Let them, that is our adversaries, look to this, and that they are not easily persuaded by the Devil that they are reprobates, at least, that they neither have or can have any assurance of their election, for as much as they deny faith to be a fruit of election; and whatsoever their faith be, yet are of opinion that they may totally and finally fall from it, and be damned. Farther consider, seeing this Author denies not, but the damnation of every Reprobate is decreed by God everlastingly, and that irrevocably, though upon foresight of final perseverance in sin. I pray what comfort is it for any man that he is not an absolute Reprobate, if so be he is persuaded that he is a Reprobate, and from everlasting ordained to condemnation? Now I will prove that it is an easy matter for the Devil to persuade any Arminian that he is a Reprobate, by the same argument which this Author useth against us. For seeing the Reprobates are more by far than the elect, even an hundred for one, and withal that it is an easy thing for the Devil to persuade any man that he is rather of that number which is greatest then of that which is least, hence it follows by his own form of argumentation that it is an easy matter for the Devil to persuade any Arminian that he is a Reprobate. Yet the vanity of this argumentation I have formerly showed by representing first the vast number of Heathens in all ages in comparison unto Christians. Secondly the variety of Sects in Christian Religion, and that most of them miserably corrupt, together with the vast number of profane persons on the on side, and of Hypocrites on the other, why should any man that is privy to his own heart, as looking towards Heaven, be carried away with so base a pretence, as to conceive himself to be a Reprobate, especially considering the nature of man to hope the best of his fortunes, and that upon no ground to speak of, as it appears in those who venture in Lotteries. Whereas every true Christian believing in the Christ hath a certain ground for the assurance of his election by our doctrine. And truly I am verily persuaded the Devil is more wise then to think so base an illusion as this, is likely to prevail; Save that in case this Author or his Informator do believe as they pretend, hereupon he may take advantage to work upon them according to their own rules to persuade them thereby, that they are Reprobates: and till we find he hath prevailed so with them, we have no reason to conceive that it is an easy matter for him to persuade us that we are absolute Reprobates; no nor then neither considering that we make no such rules, but rather conceive them to be the fancies of cracked or crazed brains. And the Devil had need be more wise than so, if he practice to prevail with us, which undoubtedly, so long as God be pleased by his grace to keep us in our right wits, he never shall: Certainly if they desire to bring this rule into our faith, they must first manifest that the Devil hath so prevailed with them to make them conceive themselves to be Reprobates; otherwise it cannot be they should conceive so easy a matter for the Devil to persuade any of us upon so sorry a ground as this, that we are absolute Reprobates. As for them that are fallen, (to prosecute that distinction this Author gives according to the parts of it, which the Author himself doth not) Christians fallen may be understood two manner of ways, either as fallen from the state of grace, or as fallen only into sin, but still standing in the state of grace. As touching the first we acknowledge no such falling away, St John professing of certain Apostates saying, They went 1 joh. 2. 19 out from us, but they were not of us; for had they been of us, they had continued with us. As for such as fall into sin, we that maintain absolute election and reprobation, do withal maintain with King James in the conference at Hampton Court, that all such shall arise again by repentance. And therefore there is no reason we should conceive, upon the committing of any such sin, that we are Reprobates; lest of all upon so base grounds as here are specified by this Author. Now I come to his proof of this by his three testimonies. 1. The first whereof is the testimony of Calvin: whereto I answer first in general, That not one of these Authors here mentioned take any notice of the ground whereupon this Author builds, namely, of the paucity of the elect in comparison to Reprobates, therehence to conclude, That it is an easy matter for the Devil to persuade them that they are Reprobates, if they should have been sure to have received so much from the pen of this Author. More particularly I acknowledge the words of Calvin here alleged, namely, that the Devil doth not assault the believer with a temptation more dangerous: But why doth not this Author go on to tell, what the temptation is which as it were in a breath Calvin sets down thus, Quam dum ipsos suae electionis dubitatione inquietans, simul prava ejus extra viam inquirendae cupitate solicitat. It consists of two parts. The first is disquieting of them with doubting of their election. The second is, his soliciting of them with an ill desire of enquiring about it, after a wrong way. Both these Calvin so compounds, as to make up but one tentation: In the next place, Calvin shows what it is for a man to inquire of his election a wrong way. Extra viam inquirere voco, ubi in abditos divinae sapientiae recessus perrumpere homuncio conatur, & quo intelligat quid de se sit constitutum apud Dei tribunal, ad supremam usque aeternitatem penetrare. To inquire after it out of the way, is, when a vile man endeavoureth to break into the secrets of divine wisdom, and to pierce into the highest eternity, to know what God hath ordained of him there. This he sayeth is for a man to cast himself into a deep, to be swallowed up of a bottomless gulf, and to throw himself into innumerable snares, such as he can never wind himself out off. And to this he sayeth we are very prone; and hereupon comes in the next sentence alleged by this Author, Rarissimus enim est few there be whose minds are not taken up with this contemplation, Whence doth Salvation come unto thee, but from God's election? Now what revelation hast thou of thine election? And if these thoughts do once take hold of a man, either in cruel manner it torments miserable man continually, or makes him altogether stand astonished. All this is delivered by Calvin of them who inquire about their election a wrong way; the very same way being condemned also by King James in the conference at Hampton Court, or that which he there delivereth much at one. And all this, this Author very judiciously conceals, thinking such a dogtrick well becomes his free will, and his grace also. But then Calvin discovereth also another way, in ea lustranda, that is, in discovering a man's election; and such as wherein, tuta est pacata, addo etiam jucunda, navigatio a man may sail safely, peaceably, and sweetly: and that they who search after their election in a due order, as it is contained in God's Word, they are like to reap thence singular consolation, eximium inde referent consolationis fructtum. Then he shows what this way is, and that we must begin from our vocation (to wit, unto faith and unto repentance) and thence ascend to our election, in this way he professeth no uncomfortable condition, but most comfortable is likely to accrue unto him. The wrong way he warns us to avoid carefully: but withal professeth, that no rock at all is likely to be met withal in this right way. By this I desire every indifferent person will judge aright of this Authors carriage. 2. The next is Bucer in 8. ad Rome q: de praedest: Now Bucers' discourse, as it is related by this Author himself appears to tend to no other end but this, that Christians should not disquiet themselves with doubting, whether they are predestinate or no, but rather without doubt persuade themselves that they are of the number of those whom God hath predestinate. And by this I perceive what is his meaning here in, which formerly I understood not, when this of Bucer was alleged by this Author to an other purpose. And his meaning seems to be this, whosoever is called and believes in Christ, aught to believe that he is predestinate. For indeed faith in his opinion is the fruit of our election, and from the like in the Thessaly: Paul was persuaded of their election 1 Thess: 1. 3, 4. Remembering the work of your faith and labour of your love, knowing that you are elected of God. Now shall others hereby be drawn to be confident of our election, and shall not we ourselves who alone are privy to the secret passages of our hearts, when others are not. Now I pray consider, whether this be so much as to intimate that it is a far easier matter for a man to be persuaded that he is a Reprobate, then that he is of the number of Gods elect. 3. By this I perceive the meaning of Zanchy also, in saying, That every Christian is bound to believe that he is elect: Let us in the name of God examine our faith whether it be true faith or no; but surely so far as we are persuaded of the truth of our faith, so far have we no cause to doubt of our election. But this of Zanchius is no more to the purpose, whereunto this Author allegeth it, than that of Bucers. 4. In the last place, I come to the relation of Georgius Major of a certain Schoolmaster in Hungary, Petrus Hosuanus by name, for so I find him called in Dietricus, though this Author calls him Ilosuanus, mistaking belike the copy which he transcribed. Now Dietricus relates it as out of Georgius Major as this Author doth. But I wonder not a little that Osiander in his last Century makes no mention of it, that I can find, though I have searched after it, as the Woman in the Gospel did after her lost groat: Whether he gave any credit to Georgius Major his relation, I know not; or whether any thing came to his knowledge afterwards, as touching the unfaithfulness thereof. But take we it as it lies in this Authors relation. 1. That he professed himself of Calvins and Augustine's opinion: I hope this makes no more against Calvin and us, than it doth against Austin and all those that took part with him, against the Pelagians in his days, and the remnants of them afterwards. But if his opinion was, that men are not dealt withal secundum bona or mala opera, but that there are occultiores causae of men's Eternal conditions, will any sober Arminian impute this unto us? Do we say that God damns any man but for sin, or that God rewards any man of ripe years with Salvation but by way of reward, of their faith repentance and goodworkes? When the Remonstrants at the Hague conference proposed their doctrine of predestination and reprobation, after this manner, namely, That God from eternity did ordain to save believers and to damn unbelievers, (to this effect), Did any of the Contra-Remonstrants, or any of the Synod of Dort except against the truth of this? But whereas the Remonstrants and Arminians did acknowledge this to be the whole decree of predestination and reprobation: Against this exception was taken both in the Hague conference, and in the Synod of Dort, and Theses also by divers foreign Divines laid down against it, & particularly by our Britain Divines amongst others; All of them maintaining that there was an other decree concerning the giving of the grace of regeneration, of the grace of faith and repentance unto some, and denying it unto others. And this decree, we willingly maintain, proceeds not, no not in the execution thereof, according to men's works good or evil, whatsoever be the end of any that maintain it. The contrary, namely, that grace is given according unto works, being a doctrine generally condemned in the Church from the year 415, at that time it was condemned in the Synod of Palestine, and Pelagius himself driven to subscribe unto it, otherwise himself had been anathematised. But this Author delivers it as the opinion of Hosuanus concerning men's Eternal conditions, whereby I take to be meant Salvation and Damnation. And indeed as here the doctrine is expressed, it is more agreeable with the doctrine of the Predestinarians, as Sigebert relates it, then with the doctrine either of Austin or Calvin: and the same Sigebert writes not that it was Augustine's doctrine, but that it rose out of the misunderstanding of Augustine's writings: Yet I confess that Tyro Prosper before Sigebert spares not to profess, of that Predestinarian hereby, that it rose from Austin; as Dr Usher observeth. But this was a mere practice of the Semi-Pelagians, corrupting the doctrine of Austin, the better to expose it to obloquy and reproach. 2. As for the second, that he was one of the woeful company of absolute castaways. Herein the Author of this discourse accomodates himself to his own stage; Throughout Dietricus his relation, I find no mention of any such distinction as of reprobates and absolute reprobates, but an acknowledgement, certum esse numerum salvandorum, & praedestinatorum vel ad vitam, vel ad mortem; And of himself, that he was ex numero damnatorum, but I do not find the word absolute throughout. That his life was none of the worst, himself was no competent judge: yet I confess there are degrees of profaneness and hypocrisy, and the very reprobates are not equal in sin. And withal a moral life is esteemed in the world in respect of their conversation towards men; but we know that to deny God's truth, and to oppose it against the light of conscience, is of an higher nature in the sight of God, and usually is of more fearful consequence. Of Francis Spira I find no complaints made in respect of his morality towards men, but he laid unto his own charge, That he had sinned against the holy Ghost. Yet neither this Hosuanus, nor Spira do I find to have broken forth into any blasphemy against God's justice in reprobating them. Nay, this latter was heard strangely to discourse of the justice of God, without any murmuring against his power. And in our time we have heard of strange examples, of some that have gone soberly on to the destroying of themselves, in a very devout acknowledgement of God's justice in giving them over. 3. As touching the dreadful apprehensions of God's wrath, I nothing doubt, but when God gives men over to the power of Satan, they may be so improved by him, as to make a man weary of his life, though I find not this specified in Dietricus, who yet relates this story out of Georgius Major. But I read the like in Goulartius his collections of a desperate man in his time dying, that said (among many other horrible speeches) that he wished to be already in Hell. And being demanded the cause of so wicked a desire: For that (said he) the apprehension of torments which do attend me, cause me presently to feel a double Hell; when I shall feel it at the full, I shall not expect it any more. But no mention throughout of any opinion of his concerning Divine reprobation that moved him thereunto. The words here alleged, Discedo ad lacus infernales, Deo vos commendo, cujus misericordia mihi negata est. These, I say, and the matter of these alone, I find in Dietericus his relation out of Georgius Major on 2 Tym. c. 2. p. 59 6. It runs thus. Ait in Hungaria & multis aliis locis notissimum esse de homine quodam Calviniano, Petro Hosuano Rectore Scholae Gengerinae, qui ex desperatione sibi ipsi laqueo injecto vitam finivit, Anno 1562. die 22. Julii; relicto manuscripto, in quo (praeter alia) haec exstitere. O me infaelicissimum omnium, quia satius fuisset me nunquam natum. Verum est certum esse numerum salvandorum; hoc ex me, sed quid ad me? Hoc ità necessariò fieri debuit. Nemo igitur argumentetur, Deus omnes vocat; long secùs se res habet. Calvini sententiam de certo praedestinatorum numero, item Augustini, quisque teneat. De me intelligo quemlibet ante uterum matris pradestinatum, vel ad vitam, vel ad mortem, quod nunquam quisquam nisi in horâ mortis cognoscere potest. Ego sum ex numero damnatorum, ergo Deo nunquam asscribi possum. Hoc certo credatis rectum esse quod Paulus Rom. 9 scribit. Misereor cujus misereor. Discedo ad lacus infernales. Deo vos commendo, cujus misericordia mihi negata est. Et addit Major haec verba, Hic est fructus perversae doctrinae de praedestinatione hominum. Concerning which relation give me leave to observe somewhat. 1. Here is no such thing as this Author relates, that Hosuanus should say that man by Calvin and Augustine's opinion, is not dealt withal, secundum bona or mala opera, (and indeed this deciphering out of Augustine's and calvin's opinion, is notoriously untrue;) neither as touching occultiores causae, of men's eternal conditions, as indeed it is apparent, that in the way of a cause meritorious, there is no other cause of damnation than sin, and in the way of a disposing cause no other cause of salvation than faith, repentance, and good works; And as touching the efficient cause of both, none is or can be the cause thereof but God. But as touching the cause why God gives grace to one, and denies it to another, we willingly confess there is no cause thereof, but the mere good pleasure of God. In like sort, of absolute castaways here is no mention, no nor of Vas formatum ad ignominiam, nor any such saying of himself, that he was none of the worst. 2. Here is no mention made of the cause moving him hereunto, as this Author pretends, but only 'tis said, that it proceeded of desperation. And though Major adds as a Coronis his censure, that, Hic est fructus perversae doctrinae de praedestinatione hominum; yet I hope his censure is no Oracle with us, no nor with Lutherans neither; for I find him branded by Osiander in his Ecclesiastical History. And though he were of Augustine's and calvin's opinion in this point of predestination, and did despair, yet it follows not, that this doctrine moved him to despair. Suppose the conceit of being a reprobate moved him hereunto; might it not move him hereunto according to the Arminian tenet, as well, and according to any tenet, provided they do not believe that God hath as yet decreed nothing, or if he hath, that his decrees may be recalled? And then again by our Doctrine of Predestination it cannot be concluded of any man that he is a reprobate while he lives. Nay, this seems contrary to his own opinion, which was this, that no man can know whether he be predestinate to life or death, till the hour of his death; and his death was not brought upon him, but wrought by him. And as it was in his power not to have killed himself, so was it in his power not to believe that he was a reprobate by this opinion of his. Then again, what moved him to conceive that he was a reprobate, is concealed all along. Now the conscience of sin committed against the Holy Ghost, may make a man conceive he is a reprobate, of what opinion so ever he be concerning reprobation. And as I take it, That famous Doctor of Germany, whom Goulartius mentioneth remaining then at Hall in Swabe, was no Calvinist; of whom he reports out of the History of Germany, That having oftentimes turned his Conscience, some times toward God, some times toward the World, having inclined in the end to the worse part, said and confessed publicly, that he was undone, and fell so deep into despair, as he could neither receive, nor take any comfort or consolation, so as in this miserable and wretched estate of his soul, he slew himself most miserably. It was not the doctrine of Predestination or Reprobation brought him unto this. And though a man hath not sinned against the holy Ghost, yet a conceit of such a sin may drive a man unto this; or of blasphemies in an inferior degree, when God gives a man over unto the power of Satan, as Gaulartius makes mention by his own experience of another desperate man, whom he had heard, who being exhorted to turn from the too vehement apprehension of God's justice unto his mercy, which was open unto him: He answered very coldly, you say true, God is God, but of his children, not for me, his mercy is certain for his elect, but I am a reprobate, a vessel of wrath and cursing, and I do already feel the torments of Hell: When they did exhort him to call God his Father, and Jesus Christ his Son, My mouth (saith he) doth speak it, but my heart hath horror of it, I believe that he is the Father of others, but not of me: When they did lay before him that he had known God, heard his word, and received his Sacrament; yea but (he added) I was an hypocrite, and guilty of many blasphemies against God; And then he returned to his ordinary discourses; I am a vessel prepared to wrath and damnation, I am damned, I burn. The same Goulartius reports out of the History of the times of a Learned man at Louvain, called Master Gerlach, Who had profited so well in his studies, as he was one of the first amongst the learned of that time. And that being touched with a grievous sickness, he sighed continually; and feeling himself to draw near his end, he began to discover the ground of his sighs, speaking such fearful words, as desperate men are accustomed to utter; crying out and lamenting that he had lived very wickedly, and that he could not endure the judgement of God, for that he knew his sins were so great, as he should never obtain pardon, so as in this distress he died, oppressed with grievous and horrible despair. What this wickedness of his was in special it seems he concealed; it might be horrible enough, though done in secret, yet no just cause of despair, unless it were the sin against the holy Ghost. The like is recorded of M. james Latomus one of the chief Doctors of the University of Louvain, being one day out of countenance in a Sermon before the Emperor Charles the fifth, returning ashamed and confounded from brussels to Louvain, and did so apprehend the dishonour, that he fell suddenly into despair, whereof he gave many testimonies in public; the which did move his friends to keep him close in his house, from that time unto his last gasp. Poor Latomus had no other speech then that he was rejected of God, that he was damned, and that he hoped for no mercy nor salvation, as having maliciously made war against the grace and truth of God. He died in this despair, neither was it possible for any friends, or Physicians to make him change his opinion. 3. If this story of Hosuanus be a truth, I like his condition the worse for not giving any reason moving him to this desperation, and making him to conceive that he was a castaway. For it is apparent that by our Doctrine the way is open, (namely by faith in Christ) to be persuaded that he is an elect of God, but no way open to conceive that he is a reprobate. Not any sin before faith, for faith in Christ gives sufficient assurance of the pardon of all former sins, nor yet want of faith, for though a man want faith to day, yet he may enjoy it to morrow, as Palmer told the Sheriff that executed him, saying, As it hath pleased God to call me to day, so it may please him to call you to morrow. Lest of all was the consideration of the great number of Reprobates in comparison with the small number of Gods elect, likely to be the cause thereof; neither is any such mentioned either of Hosuanus or of Spira, or of Latomus, or of Krans, or of any other that ever I heard or read, which is sufficient to discredit this Author's discourse in this place. 4. Lastly, observe the absurdity of this speech, Commendo vos Deo, cujus misericordia mihi negata est: Though he had no heart to commend himself to God's mercy, yet he takes heart to commend others thereunto, as if God though he would show no mercy to him, yet for his sake, and his prayers, and commendation sake, he would show mercy unto others. I find a story in Osiander of one Adamus Neuserus, delivered with a far better grace to discredit calvin's doctrine, not in point of Predestination, but as touching the person of Christ, in opposition to the Ubiquitary Chimaera of the Lutherans, as Sir Edwin Sands calls it; and it is this, Neuserus Pastor Heilderbergensis ex Calvinista Arrianus, ex Arriano Mahumetanus, & Eques Turcici Imperatoris factus, & Constantinopoli circumcisus est, inque des peratione Turcica ad Inferos descendit. Ante mortem suam D. Stephano Gerlachio referens, qua occasione in Arrianismum & Turcismum incidisset, dixit, Qui vult cavere Arrianismum caveat Calvinismum. Yet Dietericus allegeth the former story of Hosuanus, only to requite Lampadius, who gave instance of the uncomfortable ends of certain Lutherans, as also to show that personal faults or unhappinesses, must not prejudice the truth of any cause, albeit it be maintained by them. I could in some part requite Georgius Major with a saying of Augustus the Elector of Saxony, concerning his Lutherans, which I find in Melchior Adamus in vita Penceri. This Pencer had been imprisoned by the Duke of Saxony, and in that state had continued many years, yet at length being set free by the mediation of the Prince of Anhalt. When the Duke found that he continued still in the same faith for which he was imprisoned, Laudo (quoth the Duke) Doctorem Pencerum, facit quod viro bono dignum est, perseverat in sua confessione firmiter & constanter. Ego quid credam, & in quo acquiescam incertus sum prorsus, quod Deus novit. De die enim in diem aliquid novi mei sacerdotes cudunt, & proferunt, & ex uno me errore in alterum pelliciunt, atque implicant dubitationibus perpetuis. One story more; for I am compelled unto it by the Genius of this adversary. The day before I entered upon this Section, a Gentleman of good quality coming to this Town, sent unto me, desiring to enjoy my company with him at his Inn. I had heard well of him before, both of his service in the Low Countries, and at the Isle of Ree. Amongst other things, he fell upon discourse of the good discipline in the Low Countries, especially as touching the preparation of the people to the Sacrament of the Lords Supper, both by preparatory Sermons before the day comes, as also by going to their houses, to know of their purpose to come to the Lords table; and whether any difference between them and their neighbours were any impediment thereunto. In this course of theirs one coming to a certain house, the Master whereof and his Wife were turned Arminians, and making the usual motion unto the Wife (for her husband was not within) she began to rail upon him, and to defy him, and to profess her disdain to come to their Communion at all. The Minister used not many words, but as soon as he heard whereto her speech tended, departed; not long after the Master of the house coming home, and hearing the Minister had been there, and where abouts he began to rail much more than his Wife, disdaining and indignating that the Minister should come unto him about such a business, and calling him black Devil, with protestation that if he had been at home when the other came, he would have had his blood or trodden out his guts. That night this Arminian Bedlam fell sick, and in his weakness vomited blood, which not only came out of his mouth, but out of his nose, eyes and ears, as it is said. Hereupon he sent for the Minister, who came unto him, when he came he confessed his fault and fury against him, beseeching him to pardon him, The Minister exhorted him to make his peace with God, for as for himself he had not offended him, and gave him the best comfort he could; never the less the fellow died. The Gentleman, that made this relation to myself and an other with me, upon the noise of so strange a business, thought good to inquire of the truth; and coming to Leyden (there was this Tragedy acted) he went to his Painter, whom he meant to employ in drawing his picture, and asked him about the matter: This Painter was also become an Arminian, and told him, that indeed the Man had raved against the Minister in the street, but the manner of his death was nothing so as he had heard. After this, the same Gentleman passing over from Flaunders side unto Dort; as he was in the boat, asked the Boatman of the truth of this report. This Boatman also was an arminian, and he tells him it was nothing so, but that the man died by accident, as any other man might; An other in the boat hearing this, turns to the Gentleman, saying, Captain, believe him not, for the story you have heard is a certain truth, but this Rogue (sayeth he pointing to the Boat-man) is an Arminian, and these Arminians are like the Egyptians, let God show never so many miracles and judgements upon them, yet they will not believe; I protest I do nothing affect them, nor please myself in these and such like relations, but I am driven to it, to requite the adversary, who helps out his hungry discourse with such tales as these. DISCOURSE. SECT. II. IT leaves men in temptation: and this it doth two ways, First by making the tempted uncapable of true comfort. 2. By making Ministers unable to give true comfort. First it maketh the tempted uncapable of true comfort; like a Gorgon's head, it doth so trouble their fancies, and amaze them, especially in their paroxysmes and fits, that the strongest arguments of comfort, applied with as much art and cunning as can be, will not fasten upon them. With David they say in their fear, that all men are liars, namely, all such as come to comfort them in their temptation: And the reason is, because it is an opinion incompatible with any word of comfort, that can be ministered to the distressed soul in this temptation. God's love to mankind, Christ's death for all mankind, and the calling of poor sinners without exception to repentance or salvation, with all other grounds of consolation. the tempted will easily elude with the grounds of his opinion: which that we may the better see, let us imagine that we hear a Minister and a tempted soul, reasoning in this or the like manner. Tempted. Woe is me; I am a castaway: I am absolutely rejected from Grace and glory. Minister. Discourage not thyself thou poor afflicted soul; God hath not cast thee off. For he hateth nothing that he hath made; but bears a love to all men, and to thee amongst the rest. Tempted. God hateth no man as he is his creature, but he hateth a great many as they are involved in the first transgression, and become guilty of Adam's sin. And God hath a twofold love, (as I have learned,) a general love, which puts forth itself in outward and temporal blessings only, and with this he loved all men: And a special love, by which he provideth everlasting life for men, and with this he loves only a very few, which out of his alone will and pleasure he singled from the rest. Under this general love am I, not the special. Minister. God so loves all men, as that he desires their eternal good, for the Apostle saith, he would have all to be saved, and he would have no man perish, nor thee in particular. Tempted. All, is taken two ways: for all sorts and conditions of men, high and low, rich and poor, bond and free, Jew and Gentile; and for all particular men in those several sorts and conditions. God would have all sorts of men to be saved, but not all particular men of these sorts; some of my Country, and my calling, etc. but not all; or me in particular. Or if it be true that God would have all particular men to be saved; yet he wills it only with a revealed Will, not with a secret will, for with that he will have a great company to be damned absolutely. Under this revealed will am I, not the secret. Minister. Christ came into the World to seek and to save what was lost, and is a propitiation not for our sins only, (idest) the sins of a few particular men, or the sins of all sorts of men, but for the sins of the whole world; therefore he came to save thee, for thou wast lost, and to be a propitiation for thy sins, for thou art part of the whole world. Tempted. The World, as I have heard, is taken two ways in Scripture; largely for all mankind, and strictly in a more restrained signification, for the elect, or for believers: Or if it be true that he died for all mankind, yet he died for them but after a sort, he died for them all dignitate pretii, he did enough to have redeemed all, if God would have had it so: but he did not die for all voluntate propositi, God never intended that he should shed his blood for all, and every man; but for a few select ones only, with whom it is my lot not to be numbered. Minister. God hath founded an universali Covenant with men, upon the blood of Christ thy Mediator, and therefore he intended it should be shed for all men universally. He hath made a promise of salvation to every one that will believe, and excludes none, that do not exclude themselves. Tempted. God purposed his Son should die for all men, and that in his name an offer of remission of sins and salvation should be made to every one but yet upon this condition, that they will do that which he means the greatest part of them shall never do, (idest) Repent and Believe, nor I among the rest. Minister. God hath a true meaning that all men who are called, should repent and believe; that so they might be saved: as he would have all to be saved, so to come to the knowledge of the truth; and as he would have no man to perish, so he would have all men to repent; and therefore he calls them in the Preaching of the word to the one, as well as to the other. Tempted. God hath a double call; an outward call by the Preaching of the word, an inward call by the irresistible work of the spirit in men's hearts. The outward call is a part of God's outward will, with that he calls every man to believe; the inward and effectual call is a part of his secret will, and with that he doth not call every man to believe, but a very few only whom he hath infallibly and inevitably ordained to eternal life. And therefore by the outward will, which I enjoy among many others, I cannot be assured of God's good will and meaning that I shall believe, repent, and be saved. By this we may see, that no sound comfort can be fastened upon a poor soul, rooted in this opinion, when he lies under this horrible temptation; The example of Francis Spira an Italian Lawyer, will give some farther light and proof to this. This Spira about the year 1548, against his knowledge and conscience did openly abjure his religion, and subscribe to Popery; that thereby he might preserve his life, and goods, and liberty. Not long after he fell into a deep distress of Conscience out of which he could never wrestle, but ended his woeful days in despair. To comfort him came many Divines of worth and note; but against all the comforts that they applied unto him, he opposed two things especially. 1. The greatness of his sin: It was a sin of a deep dye, committed with many urging and aggravating circumstances, and therefore could not be forgiven. This argument they quickly took from him, and convinced him by the example of Peter, that there was nothing in his sin, that could make it irremissible. Peter that committed the same sin, and with more odious circumstances, repent and was pardoned, and so (no doubt) might he. 2: He opposed his absolute reprobation; and with that he put off all their comforts. Peter (saith he) repented and was pardoned indeed, because he was elected: as for me I was utterly rejected before I was borne; and therefore I cannot possibly repent, or be saved. If any man be elected he shall be saved, though he have committed sins, for number many, and heinous in degree: but if he be (ex repudiatis) one of the castaways, necessario condemnabitur: though his sins be small and sew. Nihil interest, an multa, an pauca, an magna, an parva sint, quando nec Dei misericordia, nec sanguis Christi quicquam ad eos pertinet. A reprobate must be damned, be his sins many or few, great or small; because God's mercy, and Christ's merits belong not to him. In this very story, (recorded by Coelius Secundus, and Calvin, with some others who lived at that time, and wrote of it to their friends;) as in a glass we may see the disconsolate condition of a poor soul, that is strongly conceited, that the greatest part of the world, are absolute reprobates, and that he is one of them; he sticketh so fast in the mire and clay, that he can very hardly be drawn out. TWISSE. Consideration. THis Section I may fitly divide into two parts. The first whereof is a pretty Comedy. The second a Tragedy. The first is practised by this Author in a dialogue, shaped by himself and accordingly accommodated to his own stage, as an Interlude of his own making. The Tragedy is related only of Francis Spira; and I willingly confess, It is the strangest that ever, I heard or read, of a man going on soberly to the utter undoing of himself both body and soul. But the relation of it is most hungryly performed by this Author as if his care were only to serve his own turn, and then cares not what becomes of the main condition of the story, which indeed is most remarkable: I have but touched upon it in former passages, but here I shall insist upon it more at large; and the rather, because it is here proposed not more unfaithfully then impiously, to deface or outface the precious truth of God concerning his absoluteness in making whom he will a vessel of wrath. But first I must dispatch my answer to the Antegredients of those two parts. And let it be remembered what formerly I have delivered, that still he confounds reprobation from grace, with reprobation from glory; as if we maintained the absoluteness of the one, as well as we do maintain the absoluteness of the other; which is most untrue. For albeit, we maintain that God hath decreed absolutely to bestow grace upon some, (which are Gods elect,) and absolutely to deny grace unto others, (whom we account Reprobates here upon,) not conditionally; for if grace were ordained to be bestowed conditionally, to wit, upon condition of some work performed by man; then should grace be bestowed according unto works, which in the phrase of the Ancients is all one, with saying, that grace is bestowed according unto merits. And this was condemned above 1200 years ago in the Synod of Palestine, & Pelagius driven to subscribe unto it, lest otherwise himself had been excommunicated. But we, do not maintain that God hath ordained that damnation shall be absolutely inflicted on any but only conditionally, to wit, in case they die in sin. Yet it became this Author's wisdom to confound them, lest distinguishing them as they ought to be distinguished, & carrying himself fairly in opposing the absoluteness of reprobation there alone, where alone it is maintained by his adversaries, to wit, in the particular of reprobation from grace, he should at first dash manifest himself to maintain, that grace is bestowed not according to the good pleasure of God, but according to the works of men; and that upon this ground it is, that he buildeth the comfortable condition of his doctrine, concerning predestination, which indeed makes no difference in God's proceedings between the elect and reprobate, but respects them all alike; For their power to believe and repent is their grace universal, which they say is given to all alike. So exciting grace in the ministry of the Word is equally made to all that hear it, whether elect or reprobate. And these are the kinds of grace prevenient: Then as for grace subsequent, that consists only in God's concurrence unto the act of faith and repentance which depends merely upon man's will (in their opinion) and God is as ready to concur to the working of it as well in one as in another, in case man will. On the other side it would appear that our doctrine is censured as uncomfortable, only because it teacheth man for the obtaining of true comfort to depend merely upon the grace of God, and not upon his own freewill. Again, observe how that like as Gregory observes that the same spirit of Antichrist might be found in them that are far distant in time, so an Arminian spirit savoreth the same things one with an other, and perhaps at unawars, though they in whom it is found be much distant in place. Vossius in his last book of his History of the Pelagian heresy saith, That our Divines do allege that place of St Paul against their adversaries in the point of predestination, as the head of Medusa; a place indeed that clearly justifies God's absoluteness both in predestination and reprobation: And this Author sayeth that our doctrine on the same point is like to Gorgon's head: Now the Learned well know that Gorgon and Medusa's head have no difference. Now whether our doctrine be so uncomfortable as this Author objects, it will appear when we come to examine the paroxysm and fit of temptation, especially the kind of it being such, as this Author out of his fruitful invention hath made choice of to represent, as able to elude the strongest arguments of comfort, and they applied with as much art and cunning as can be; supposing that of this art and cunning also, he hath given plentiful testimony in the succeeding dialogue; which is a very remarkable passage of this Authors sufficiency, especially coming out of his own mouth; Of the integrity whereof there seems no cause to doubt, considering that Arminian ingenuity and modesty whereunto he hath lately arrived. He further adds as much weight to his former assertions as words can, which though they be but wind, yet with some, who Chameleon like live by the air, may prove very weighty, saying, that this doctrine of ours is incompatable with any word of comfort (which is very much, though a word and any word be very little) that can be ministered to a distressed soul in this temptation. Now it is very likely that in his dialogue following he brings in as potent arguments of consolation, as our doctrine will afford. The heads or placss of consolation he reckons up, God's love to mankind, Christ's death for all mankind, and the calling of poor sinners without exception to repentance and Salvation with all other grounds of comfort, and all arguments (he sayeth) drawn from hence our opinion will elude and preclude all consolation from the distressed soul. But give me leave to make a fair motion as touching the special heads of consolation here particulated. If it shall be found that these heads of consolation do admit a double sense, one of the Arminian making, an other of our interpreting; if consolations drawn therefrom in an Arminian sense be eluded by our Tenet, will any disparagement thereby arise to our tenet, provided we find store of consolation from them taken in our sense, especially being ready to admit any indifferent trial concerning the sense thereof, whether theirs or ours prove most agreeable to the word of God; But Ecce Rhodus, ecce Saltus, we are come to the Dialogue itself, where he undertakes to make good, that which he saith And here begins the Interlude. Tempted. Woe is me; I am a Castaway; I am utterly rejected from grace and Glory. CONSIDERATION. Let me take liberty to set down what I should think fit to answer unto such a complaint, Now my Answer is this, Who hath revealed this unto thee? Art thou privy Counsellor to the Almighty? We are taught that secret things belong to the Lord our God, Deut. 29: but the things revealed are for us and for our Children to do them. Now where, and when, and how hath God revealed this his counsel unto thee, namely, concerning thy rejection from Grace, & Glory? We know no other revelations divine then are contained in his Word: Now hath God in his word revealed unto thee more than unto me that thou art a reprobate. The word saith unto thee, If thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus: and believe in thy heart that God raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved, Rome 10. 9 Now how canst thou make it appear that this belongs less unto thee then to any Martyr that ever was content to lay down his life for Christ? Wilt thou say, Thy sins make thee to conceive so: I answer, are thy sins greater than were the sins of Manasses, who made his sons pass through the fire to Molech, gave himself to witchcraft and sorcery, and filled Jerusalem with blood from corner to corner? If his sins were not sufficient to conclude that he was a Reprobate, why should thy sins be thought sufficient to conclude that thou art a Castaway? Are thy sins greater than Saul's were, who was a Blasphemer, a Persecutor of the Saints of God from City to City; Yet was he received unto mercy. Wilt thou say, Thy sins have been committed since thy calling? Yet are they greater than was the sin of Peter, in denying Christ his Master, with execrations and oaths? And these sins were committed not only after his calling; but even within his Masters hearing too. Yet he went out and wept bitterly. And Christ as soon as he was risen, sent word of his resurrection by name to Peter to comfort him. Nay hath not God taught us in his word, that the blood of Jesus Christ cleanseth us from all sin, 1 John. 1.? And how canst thou make it appear, that any one that ever was or is, hath greater interest therein then thyself? wilt thou say this remedy belongs unto none, but such as believe and repent; but I do not. I answer, in like sort there was a time when Paul believed not, and when every one believed not; yet at length they believed, and so mayst thou: wilt thou say, But I cannot believe and repent? I answer, this is the condition of all till God takes away the stony heart out of their bowels, and gives them a heart of flesh, and puts his own spirit within them; wilt thou say God gives grace to others, but not to thee? I answer, there was a time when God had not mercy on them, at length an hour came wherein he called them: so an hour may come wherein he may call thee. And thou hast no more cause to conclude that he hath rejected thee, than every Child of God had before his calling, that God had rejected him: without grace neither thou canst, nor they could believe; but grace can bring all to faith and repentance; and thou hast no more cause to think that God will not bring thee to faith, than any elect had, before his calling, to think that God would not bring him to faith. Now seeing this grace is given in the Word, do thou wait upon God in his own ordinance, (which any natural man hath power to do; as namely, to go hear a sermon) thou knowest not how it may work upon thee, yea though thou comest thither with a wicked mind. For we read of some that coming to take Christ were taken joh. 7. 32, 45, 46. by him. And Father Latimer taking notice of some that come to Church to take a nap, yet never the less (saith he) let them come, they may be taken napping. Minister. Discourage not thyself thou poor afflicted soul, God hath not cast thee off, for he hateth nothing that he hath made, but bears a love to all men, and to thee amongst the rest. CONSIDERATION. And not only poor, but miserable also is that afflicted soul that hath no better comforter; whether we consider the nature of the consolation, or the warrant of it. For first, hath not God made Frogs, and Toads, and Devils, as well as man; And hath an Arminian that boasts so much of strongest arguments of comfort, no better comfort to an afflicted soul, then that she is God's creature, which is the condition of a Frog, and a Devil, and a damned spirit. 2. Then as touching the warrant of it; Is the book of Wisdom the best store-house of comfort for an afflicted soul, a book written by Philo the Jew that living after Christ's passion, resurrection and ascension, yet never believed in him. Again speak out and tell us what is the fruit of that love, which God bears to all men; Hath he ordained to give Salvation unto all, & to this afflicted soul in particular? If he hath not, but damnation rather unto some, and particularly to this soul; (for upon what ground darest thou say, or canst assure he hath not:) art not thou as miserable a comforter to her, as ever Jobs friends were to him? Or hath God ordained to give all men the grace of regeneration, the grace of faith and repentance; if so, then either absolutely or conditionally; if absolutely, than all must be regenerate, all must believe and repent. If conditionally, speak it out, and let thy Patient know what condition that is, on performance whereof by man, God will give him faith; say what thou wilt, the comfortable issue shall be this, That grace is given according to works; and this indeed is the only Arminian consolation. Tempted. 1. God hateth no man as he is his creature, but he hates a great many as they are involved in the first transgression, and become guilty of Adam's sin. CONSIDERATION. Pooresoule, suffer not thyself to be instructed by them that labour to deprive thee not only of the comfort of God's grace, but of the comfort of common sense: Dost thou well understand what it is to hate a man as a sinner, and not as a man? If hatred be no more than displeasure; surely whatsoever be the cause of it, in hating thee he is displeased with thee, as thou art his creature, and that in thy proper kind of man; if withal it signify punishment, whatsoever the cause thereof be, surely he punisheth thee as man, though not for thy nature's sake, for that is the work of God, but for some corruption he finds in thee. And we should prove very sorry comforters; if on such a distinction as this, we should ground any true consolation; which hath his course not only with the Devils, but even with them that are already under the torments of Hell fire. But let not the authority of the book of Wisdom, with thee weigh up and elevate the authority of Scriptures; nor Philo the Jew be preferred before St Paul, or the Prophet Malachy, by whom we are taught that as God loved Jacob before he was borne, so he hated Esau; and before they were borne, what difference was there between them? Yet this passage out of the book of Wisdom is in a Collect of the Papists Liturgy; I conceive a good sense may be made thereof without any prejudice to absolute reprobation, (for of Papists we ate said to have learned it and are reproached for it.) And what is that good sense they make of it? Take it if thou wilt from Aquinas 1. q: 23. art 3: ad. 1. Dicendum quod Deus omnes homines diligit, & etiam omnes creaturas in quantum omnibus vult aliquod bonum: non tamen quodcunque bonum vult omnibus; In quantum igitur quibusdam non vult hoc bonum, quod est vita aeterna, dicitur eos habere odio, vel reprobare: Now if we take this collect from them, let us take also their good meaning with it; and if we can, let us make it better and not worse. We commonly say, that passions are attributed to God not quoad affectum, but quoad effectum: Now the effect of hatred is either the denial of grace, or the denial of glory, or the inflicting of damnation; The two latter are executed only according to men's sins; but the first, to wit, the denial of grace, proceeds merely according to the good pleasure of Gods will; like as the giving of grace (as the Apostle (not Philo) signifies, that God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth; Now to show mercy is to bring a man to faith. Rom. 11. 30. And if grace be not given according to the mere pleasure of Gods will, it must be given according unto works, which is as much as to say in the phrase of the ancients, according unto merits, which all along hath been condemned in the Church of God, as mere Pelagianism. Yet hitherto tends all the consolation that Arminianism can reach forth unto thee; which is to afford thee no better consolation than can be afforded to a Reprobate. 2. As for Adam's transgression, let not that affright thee, who art borne within the pale of the Church, and of Christian parents; for the children of such are holy. 1 Cor. 7. when all others are unclean. Yet why should any man find it strange, that some of them who are guilty of eternal death, should suffer eternal death? And this Author hath formerly confessed, that Adam's sin hath made all his posterity guilty of eternal death. Now albeit God hates many, whether as involved in Adam's transgression, or no, what matters that to thy discomfort, if he hate not thee. And what ground hast thou to conceive, that thou art in the number of them whom he hates, rather than of those whom he loves? He is no good Physician, that looks not into the cause of the disease, to remove that; nor he any good comforter that looks not into the cause of thy discomfort, to remove them; It is to be thought that such an one desires rather to feed thy discomfort, then to cure it. Such is the practice of this comforter, otherwise he should not apply his arguments of comfort (which he magnifies as the strongest) with as much art and cunning as can be: But understand him aright, this art and cunning tends not to the furtherance of thy consolation, but to the advantage of his own Arminian cause;; and to this end, I confess, he doth apply them with as much art and cunning as he can. 2. And God hath a twofold love, a general love, which puts forth itself in outward and temporal blessings only, and with this he loves all men. And a special, by which he provides everlasting life for men, and with this only he loves a very few, which out of his alone will and pleasure he singled from the rest. Under this general love am I, not the special. CONSIDERATION. 1. As touching the distinction, hold thee to it, lest otherwise thou never prove capable of more comfort than a Reprobate is capable of. No Arminian hath the face to deny that God saves but a very few; And the reason is, because very few do believe and repent: in this we all agree. Again, no Arminian denies that very few do believe and repent, and finally persevere therein. Again, no Arminian denies faith and repentance to be the gift of God, and that hereby alone men are singled out from the rest. Now the question is, Whether God singleth out some men from the rest by giving them faith and repentance according to the mere pleasure of his will, or according to their works? We say, according to the mere pleasure of Gods will, for he hath mercy on whom he will. Rome 9 18. Arminians say according to men's works; and hereupon in the issue comes all their consolations to be grounded, that is upon a notorious Heresy condemned above 1200 year ago. 2. But as touching the accommodation of this distinction unto thyself, saying thou art under God's general love not under his special: I pray the tell me what ground thou hast for that? what one of Gods elect, while they were in the state of nature, had not as great cause to be as uncomfortable as thyself; and why mayst not thou be in God's good time in as comfortable a condition as any of them, and to say as John doth, see what love the father hath showed us that we should be called the sons of God? dost thou mourn for thy sin or no? if thou dost not, Why shouldest thou look to be partaker of those comforts which are peculiar to them that mourn? If thou dost, thy Saviour hath said, Blessed are they that mourn for they shall be comforted. Dost thou hunger and thirst after the favour of God, and to be made partaker of the righteousness of Christ which alone can give thee assurance of thine election? If thou dost not hunger and thirst after this, why shouldest thou be cast down, because thou hast not this assurance? If thou dost desire this assurance, and to that purpose hast an hungry appetite after the righteousness of Christ; thy Saviour saith, Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after righteousness, for they shall be filled. Or hast thou a desire to have thy sins pardoned, and thy soul saved; but not any desire that thy soul may be sanctified; what comfort shouldest thou or any such expect at the hands of God? Thou wouldst serve the Devil, but thou, wouldst not go to hell with the Devil. But I tell thee, God hath decreed the contrary, namely, that all such shall have this doom; Go ye cursed into everlasting fire prepared for the Devil and his Angels. Yet I will not leave thee, nor give over all hope of thee; for I am glad to hear thee confess, that though thou desirest thy sin may be pardoned, and thy soul saved, yet thou hast no desire that thy soul should be sanctified; therefore answer me but to one thing more, and I have done with thee; Is it thy grief and sorrow, that thou hast no desire, that thy nature may be sanctified, or is it no grief at all unto thee? If it be no grief unto thee, then still thou takest delight in sin; and how can delight in sin, stand with the fear of God's judgements, and if thou fearest not God, how canst thou break out into such complaints, Woe is me for I am a Castaway: These motions usually proceed from the terrors of God; And if thou art once acquainted with God's terrors, in consideration of thy sinful condition; then be of good cheer, for these symptoms are commonly as the pangs of Childbirth, whereby it comes to pass, that a Christian soul is at length brought forth into the world of grace. And therefore the spirit of bondage, to make us fear, doth prepare, and make way for the spirit of adoption, whereby we cry Abba Father. And by experience I have known some, being Rom. 8. thus cast down, and stricken with fears of being castaways, when they have been demanded which condition they have thought better of, either this present condition of fear and terror, or the former condition of their profaneness, when they were without all remorse or check of consciences; they have readily professed, that this present condition of fear and terror, was the better of the two. Now let us hear how well the comforter plays his part. Minister. God so loves all men, as that he desires their eternal good; for the Apostle saith, he would have all to be saved, and he would have no man perish, nor thee in particular. CONSIDERATION. He proceeds very judiciously I confess, by way of gradation from the Apocryphal, to the Canonical; but at once he makes use both of corruptor stilus, and adulter sensus. The very words of the Apostle he corrupts; for the Apostle no where saith that God would have all to be saved, that God would have none to perish; 'tis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who will have all to be saved in the one; and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, not willing any to perish in the other. Men would do many things that they cannot; it is not so with God. And if it be not adulter sensus, to apply this to all and every one, here is comfort indeed with a witness; For if God will save every one; and withal can save them, whereof there is no doubt to be made, then there are no Reprobates at all; every one is predestinate to salvation by the will, that is, by the decree of God; And who hath resisted his will, saith S. Paul. And will he not have all & every one to believe & repent? If not, then seeing he will have all to be saved, it follows that God, will have all men to be saved, whether they believe or no, repent or no; But if he will have all to believe & repent, by that will whereby he will have all to be saved; seeing God can give all men faith and repentance; what follows but that all and every one shall believe and repent, & be saved, and consequently, there are no Reprobates at all? But I know full well what their interpretation of this is, namely, that God is ready to give faith and repentance unto all, to wit, in case they will; but doth not God give the very will to believe and repent? Yes in case they will. Take this comfort then into thy bosom, and make the best use of it to persuade thee that thou art no castaway; For if thou believest and repentest, all is safe, thou hast as good assurance of thy salvation as God's word can give thee. And though faith and repentance be the gift of God, yet this comforter doth assure thee, that if thou wilt believe thou shalt believe, if thou wilt repent thou shalt repent. For God doth not give the grace of faith and repentance, according to the mere pleasure of his own will, but according to men's works; for albeit the Apostle saith, God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth; yet that is not to be understood of vocation, but rather of justification. And let it not startle thee, that justification in Scripture phrase, is opposed to condemnation, and not to obduration, but to thy comfort be it spoken, it must be opposed to obduration here; lest otherwise faith and repentance should not be given according to men's works, but according to the mere pleasure of God; which is a very uncomfortable doctrine. But be thou assured, that if thou wilt believe and repent, thou shalt believe and repent, such is God's grace; and though it be as true, I confess, on the other side, that if thou wilt not believe and repent, thou shalt not believe and repent; yet that is not to be accounted God's grace, lest so we should say, that God's grace is as active to evil, as it is unto good. So that hereby thou mayst still perceive, that all thy comfort depends on this, that the grace of faith and repentance is given according to men's works. Tempted. All, is taken two ways: for all sorts and conditions of men, and for all particular men: God would have all sorts of men to be saved, but not all, or me in particular. 2. Or if he will have all particular men to be saved; yet he wills it only with a revealed Will, but not with a secret will, for with that he will have a great company damned. Under his revealed will am I, not the secret. CONSIDERATION. 1. That All is taken after these two ways in Scripture, and that in this place 1 Tim. 2. it is to be taken of genera singulorum, I have formerly proved, both by the circumstances of the Text, and by the analogy of faith, for otherwise we should trench upon God's omnipotency and unchangeableness; and lastly by the judgement of Austin. But take the meaning aright, not that God would, but that God will have all men, that is, of all sorts, even of Kings and Princes, some to be saved; but not all and every one. As for the distinction of a revealed will, and secret will applied to salvation, thou mayst learn that somewhere of Papists, but not of us. For the revealed will is God's commandment; now that which God commands is a part of his Law, so is not salvation, but rather a reward of obedience. Yet they apply this distinction only in reference to faith and repentance, whereunto God hath annexed salvation. And it is Gods revealed will that all who hear the Gospel should believe and repent ex officio; but it is not Gods will to give every one of them grace to believe and repent, as we find by manifest experience. It was God's will in like manner to command Abraham to sacrifice his son, but it was not God's determination that Isaac should be sacrificed. In like sort he commanded Pharaoh to let Israel go, but withal he told Moses, he would harden Pharaohs heart, that he should not let them go for a long time. 2. But in the accommodation of these distinctions unto thyself, What ground hast thou to affirm, that God willeth not thy salvation in particular? If thou believest, Gods word assureth thee thou shalt be saved; if thou believest not, yet thou mayst believe; and God's word hath power to bring thee unto faith, as formerly I have discoursed. And as for the best of God's Children who do believe, to the great comfort of their souls, rejoicing with joy unspeakable and glorious. 1 Pet. 1. They were sometimes in as uncomfortable a condition as thou now art. And the rather I put thee upon this, because I see he that takes upon him to comfort thee, doth take a course rather to feed thy humour, then to remove it, in as much as he never inquires into the cause thereof. For albeit he gave to understand, he would apply his argument with as much art and cunning as could be, yet it may be, that was rather with respect to the advantage of his own cause, then to thy consolation. But let us see whether he mends it in the next. Minister. Christ came into the World to seek and to save what was lost; and is a propitiation, not for our sins only, i. e. the sins of a few particular men, or the sins of all sorts of men, but for the sins of the whole World; therefore he came to save thee, for thou wast lost; and to be a propitiation for thy sins, for thou art part of the whole World. CONSIDERATION. Still he continues to afford thee as much comfort as any Reprobate in the world; and if thou desirest no more, thou mayst rest satisfied with this; but withal I confess, he affords thee as much comfort, as he can afford any of Gods elect, for he maketh elect and Reprobate all alike in receiving comfort from God's Word. Christ came into the world to save that which was lost, but unless he came to save all that is lost, it will not follow that he came to save thee. We know that pardon of sin and salvation is procured by Christ, for none but such as believe; and therefore be not deceived, without faith look for neither; by faith be assured of both, and that thou art one of Gods elect and no Reprobate. And observe well he tells thee nothing of Christ meriting faith and repentance; this now a days is plainly denied by the Remonstrants; and this Author is content to say nothing of it; when he is put to it we know what must be the issue of it; if he sayeth Christ hath merited faith and repentance Censura Censurae. p. 59 for thee, the meaning is but this; Christ hath merited that if thou wilt believe thou shalt believe, if thou wilt repent, thou shalt repent. And that Christ hath merited that God should bestow faith and repentance not on whom he will according to the mere pleasure of his will, but according to men's works. The comfort that our doctrine ministers unto thee, is this, If thou dost believe in Christ, thou mayst be assured thou art an elect of God, if thou dost not believe, there is no cause why thou shouldest think thyself a Castaway; for albeit thou hast not faith to day, yet thou mayst have faith to morrow. Give thyself to God's Word: and wait upon him in his ordinances, thou mayst be so wrought upon as that unbeliever was, 1 Cor: 14. Who is there represented falling down on his face, and confessing that God was in the Preacher of a truth. And though at first thou attendest to it, but in a carnal manner, yet God may open thy heart as he opened the heart of Lydia, and make thee attend unto it in a gracious manner. Act. 16. 14. Tempted. The World (as I have heard) is taken two ways in Scripture, Largely for all mankind; and strictly for the elect, or believers: In this latter sense Christ died for the World. Or if for all, yet it was only dignitate pretii, not voluntate propositi; thus only for a few selected ones, with whom it is not my lot to be numbered. CONSIDERATION. Suffer not thyself to be abused by them, who pretending thy comfort, yet seek nothing less, but only the promoting of their own cause. And observe how he takes notice of no other benefits of Christ's death, than such as belong unto men upon the condition of faith, to wit, pardon of sin and Salvation; in which case the mention of Gods elect comes in very unseasonably. And thus is the love of God set forth unto us; so God loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish but have everlasting life: And if it be not thy lot to be numbered amongst believers, than we can give thee, by God's Word, no assurance of thy Salvation. But if thou art not a believer yet, thou mayst be in good time as formerly I have spoken more at large; and therefore no reason to think thou art a Reprobate. And if once thou dost believe in Christ, our doctrine gives thee assurance of Justification, Salvation, and Election; the Arminan doctrine doth not. As for faith and repentance, we say Christ hath merited them also, but to be bestowed how? According to men's works say our Arminians, though foreign Arminians profess plainly that Christ merited not faith and regeneration for any. And if thou relishest this comfort, be satisfied with it; we say faith and repentance are bestowed absolutely according to the mere pleasure of Gods will, and accordingly Christ merited them, but not for all, for then all should believe and repent and be saved; but only for some, and who can these be but Gods elect; whence it followeth clearly that whosoever believes may by our doctrine be assured of his election, not so by the doctrine of Arminians; but if thou believest not thou art in no worse case than the best of God's children have been; for there was a time when they believed not; therefore thou hast no more cause to think thyself a castaway than they had. Minister. God hath founded an universal Covenant with men upon the blood of Christ, and therefore he intended it should be shed for all men universally; he hath made a promise of salvation to every one that will believe, and excludes none that will not believe. CONSIDERATION. This I confess is to administer as much comfort, as is administered to any Reprobate; but how can this qualify thy discomfort, and discontent, which riseth from this conceit, that thou art a Reprobate. And the truth is, that by our Doctrine, we were all in a miserable case, if God's Covenant of grace extended no farther than this. But hath not God promised to be our Lord, and our God that sanctifyeth us, to circumcise our hearts, and the hearts of our Children, to love the Lord our God Ezek. 20. 12. Deut. 30. 6. Ezek. 36. 27, 28. Es. 57 18. Hos. 14. 5. with all our hearts: to take the stony heart out of our bowels, and give us an heart of flesh, and to put his own spirit within us; as he seeth our ways, so to heal them, yea, to heal our back-slidings, to heal our rebellions. All this, this sweet comforter takes no notice of, contenting himself with such a grace to be merited for him by Christ as this, if he will believe he shall believe; if he will repent he shall repent; if he will love God with all his heart, he shall love him with all his heart. Yet when a man doth believe, they are able to give him no assurance of his salvation, or of his election; because they maintain, that a man may totally and finally fall away from grace: And all because their doctrine is, that God's effectual grace in working the act of faith and repentance, is given merely according to men's works. Tempted. God purposed that his Son should die for all men, and that in his name an offer of remission of sins, and salvation should be made to every one, but yet upon this condition, that they will do that which he means the greatest part shall never do (i. e. Repent and believe) nor I among the rest. CONSIDERATION. How doth God mean that the greatest part of men shall never believe and repent, by our opinion? Is it in this sense, that they shall not believe and repent if they will? When was it ever known that any of our Divines ever wrote or taught this? We think rather it is impossible it should be otherwise, & therefore say it is a very absurd thing to call this [Grace] as the Arminians do. Indeed we say that God doth not mean by his preventing grace to work the wills of the greatest part of men to believe & repent: Do not the Arminians say so too? Yes verily, and a great deal more: for they deny that he works any man's will to believe and repent in this manner; but we say God purchaseth thus to work the wills of all his chosen ones, and when he hath wrought them, to keep them by his power through faith unto Salvation; and put his fear in their hearts, that they shall never depart a way from him. Jer 32. 40. And upon this 1 Pet. 1. jer. 32. 40. ground we can assure believers of their election which Arminians cannot; And them that believe not, keep from despair in better manner than the Arminians can, for they leave them to themselves to believe; whereas the Scriptures show that to be impossible: so that they take upon them to comfort such quite against the hair. But we comfort them with a possibility. of being converted unto God by representing his almighty power, whose voice is able to pierce into the graves and make dead Lazarus hear it. This power he showed in converting Saul, when he marched furiously (Jehu like) against the Church of God. Therefore be thou of good comfort, especially considering thou art as it were under the wings of God, thou hearest his voice; many come out of their graves at his call; some at one time, some at another, and so mayst thou God knows how soon; then shalt thou be assured of thine election, which by Arminianism thou canst not be; in the mean time thou hast no cause to conclude that thou art a Reprobate. Minister. God hath a true meaning, that all men who are called should repent and believe, that so they might be saved; as he would have all to be saved, so to come to the knowledge of the truth; and as he would have no man to perish, so he would have all men to repent, and therefore he calls them in the Preaching of the word to the one, as well as to the other. CONSIDERATION. He keeps his course to afford thee the best comfort his doctrine yields, which is as much as is incident to a Reprobate, and how that should make thee conceive better of thyself, then as of a Reprobate, I do not perceive, God's meaning is that as many as hear the Gospel should believe and repent ex officio; that is, that it shall be their duty, for he commands it: but he hath no meaning to bestow on all and every one the grace of faith and repentance, as appears by experience. And if God did will they should de facto believe and be saved, then either God is not able to bring them to faith and to save them, or else his will is changed. In like sort if it were his will that all and every one should know his truth, than God is not able to make all and every one know his truth, for it is apparent that all do not; it is apparent that all have not the Gospel; The Apostle saith, That God will not have any of us to perish but all to come to repentance: he doth not say he would but he will: And this is true of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, such as the Apostle speaks of, believers and elect. But as for others, the Scriptures plainly profess, that God blinds them, hardens them; and of Israel in the wilderness, The Lord (saith Moses) hath not given you an heart to perceive, nor eyes to see, nor ears to hear unto this day. Deut: 29. 4. He calls all that hear the Gospel indifferently by the Ministry of the Word, but he openeth not the heart of all to attend unto it, as to the Word of God, like as we read he opened the heart of ●idia. Acts. 16. 14. Tempted. God hath a double call, outward by his word, inward by the irresistible work of his spirit; with this he doth not call every man to believe, but a very few only, whom he hath infallibly, and inevitably, ordained to eternal life, and therefore by the outward call, which I enjoy among many others, I cannot be assured of God's good will and meaning, that I shall believe, repent, and be saved. CONSIDERATION. Our Doctrine teacheth not that God calls every one by his Word, that is an Arminian interjection. But the outward call belongs to many more than are chosen, as our Saviour saith, many are called but few are chosen; Indeed he gives faith and repentance to a very few, which no Arminian denies; only the Question is, Whether God gives faith and repentance to whom he will, or according to men's works. We saytis to whom he will, proceeding herein according to the mere pleasure of his will; and not according to men's works; which to affirm is manifest Pelagianism, and publicly condemned many hundred years ago. It is true, if thou dost not believe, God's Word doth not assure thee that he will make thee believe; that were to assure thee of thine election before thy vocation; a most unreasonable thing to be expected. But God by his word assures thee, that 'tis his meaning that without faith thou shalt not be saved. Yet there is no cause thou shouldest think thyself a Reprobate; for this was the condition of every one of Gods elect before their calling. It may be thou mayst have experience of the same power of divine grace, to bring thee to faith also, and to repentance; therefore seeing God's Word is the only means to work faith, wait daily at his Gates and give attendance at the posts of his doors; and do not prescribe unto him, or say with 2 King: 6. Joram, Shall I wait upon the Lord any longer? though it be longere he calls thee, yet it may go never a whit the worse with thee for that, for sometimes it falleth out that the last are first, and the first last: and the commendation that Austin makes, of the Theef's faith upon the Cross, is remarkable, De orig, animae, lib. 1. cap. 9 Tanto pondere appensum est, tantumque valuit ap ud eum qui haec novit appendere, quod confessus est dominum crucifixum, quantum si fuisset pro Domino crucifixus. Tunc enim fides ejus de ligno floruit, quando discipulorum marcuit, nisi cujus mortis terrore marcuerunt ejus resurrectione reviresceret. Illi enim desperaverunt de moriente, ille speravit in commorientem. Refugerunt illi authorem vitae, rogavit ille consortem poenae. Doluerunt illi tanquam homines mortem, credidit ille regnaturum esse post mortem, Deseruerunt illi sponsorem salutis, honoravit ille socium crucis. Inventa est in eo mensura Martyris, qui tunc in Christum credidit, quando defecerunt, qui futuri erant Martyrs. 2. From the Comedy I come to the Tragedy, I mean the story of Spira. Sleidan saith of him, that Incredibili ardore caepit complecti puriorem doctrinam: & cum indies magis magisque proficeret, non domi tantum apud amicos quid sentiret de singulis dogmatis, verum etiam passim apud omnes explicabat. Tidings hereof coming to the Pope's Legate then at Venice John Casa Archbishop of Beneventum, he convents Spira, who confesseth his error before him, entreats pardon, and promiseth obedience for time to come. The Legate not contented with this, commands him to go home, and publicly to revoke his error. Sleidan writes no more here of but this, Accipit ille conditionem, & licet etiam tum inciperet ipsum paenitere facti, tamen urgentibus amicis, qui non ipsius modo, sed conjugis etiam & liberorum & facultatum ipsius spem totam in eo positam dicerent, obtemperavit. Osiander writes that pessimo consilio obsecutus, abnegando veritatem caelestem perrexit, eamque publice ut haeresin blasphemavit & abjuravit. The distress of conscience which overtook him hereupon is notorious, the issue whereof was to end his woeful days more woefully in despair. But nothing more strange than his discourses and meditations in the midst of this his desperate condition. As for the particulars following, 1: Touching the greatness of his sin, and that he was taken off from that by the example of Peter, I find no such thing neither in Sleidan, nor Osiander, nor in Goulartius; but rather in this latter, who makes the largest relation thereof taken out of the discourse of one Henry Scringer, a learned Lawyer who was then at Milan, who did see, and many times talk with this poor Spira; I find that which makes to the contrary, namely, that the sin which he laid to his own charge was the sin against the Holy Ghost. And no example I trust neither of Peter, nor any other was sufficient to take him off from despair in such a case. 2. And as for the discourse here suggested of his absolute reprobation, which he opposed against their comforts ministered unto him, no mention thereof, neither in Sleidan, nor in Osiander; nay Osiander writes that he was wished to revoke doctrinam Lutheranam, and this was it which he did (as he sayeth) blaspheme as an heresy, and abjure. Goulartius indeed relates how he conceived himself to be reprobated of God, as justly he might in case he judged himself to have sinned against the Holy Ghost; And as for that which is here set down in Latin, of him that is a Reprobate, namely, that necessario condemnabitur, though his sins be small & few, & that nihil interest multa an pauca, magna an parva sint; quando nec Dei misericordia, nec Christi sanguis quicquam ad eos pertinet. Neither Sleidan, nor Osiander nor Goulartius makes any mention of it. And therefore I wonder not that he neither followeth Sleidan, nor Osiander much less that he follows not Goulartius. He citys Caelius secundus and Calvin as his Authors, and some others that wrote thereof to their friends, but names them not; as neither where it is that Caelius secundus makes mention of it, or in what book of Calvin it is found. I imagined it might be in his Epistles; I have spent some hours in searching therein from the year 1545 to the year 1663., and can find nothing concerning it. Now Goulartius wrote since Caelius secundus, and Calvin and Sleidan, and his relation is large; and it seems he inquired in to it somewhat better than they that went before him. And thus he relates it out of the discourse of Henry Scringer a Lawyer of Milan, who saw Spira at that time, and divers times spoke with him. In a small town of the territory of Milan called Civitelle there was a Learned Lawyer, and advocate, a wise and very rich, man and an honourable father of a family, called Francis Spira, who having said and done divers things against his conscience, to maintain himself and his charge, (observe by the way he delivers the cause only in general concealing the speciality, it being so strange a testimony and evidence against the Romish Religion) being returned to his house, he could never rest an hour, not a minute, nor have any ease of his continual anguish: And even from that night he was so terrified and had such horror of his actions, as he held himself for lost. For (as he himself did afterward confess) he did set plainly before his eyes, all the torments, all the pains of the damned, and in his soul did hear the fearful sentences, being drawn before the judgement seat of Jesus Christ (a fearful example to all Apostates;) The next day and so following he was not seen to resume any courage, but his spirits were strangely troubled, and the terror took from him all rest and appetite. This accident was so grievous to his friends, as some repented them much that they had been the cause of so great an inconvenience, by their entreaties. Others, thinking it did proceed from some choleric or melancholy humour, were of opinion to send him to Padova to be Physicked by the Learned Physicians, revived by honourable company, and settled by the coference of Learned men there, to some of which he was well known. His Wife and Children with some of his familiar friends did accompany him, and he was lodged in one of the chief houses. Frisimilega Bellocat and Crassus (famous Physicians) did visit him, and give him Physic with singular affection: and soon found that he was little sick in body, but grievously in mind, for in all other things he discoursed gravely, and constanstly, so as none of his familiar friends could discern that the quickness of his discourse was any thing impaired. Continuing still in his weakness, many were much troubled, and daily his Chamber was full of People; some curious to see and hear, others were desirous to draw him to hope in the mercies of God; I was present at many of his speeches, with some men of honour and Learning. To deliver that which I could observe, I began first to note his age and his fashion. He was about 50 years old, free from the violent passions of youth, and from the coldness of old age. Nothing came out of his mouth, that was light or foolishly spoken: or that might discover any doting in him; although he did daily discourse of grave and important matters with the Learned, and that some did propound unto him high questions especially in Divinity. 2. I will briefly relate same speeches they had with him. During his abode at Milan and I will not forget that he declared with a settled judgement, that he did see the eternal vengeance of God prepared against the sin, that he had committed: (This was the true cause of his despair, and not an ungrounded conceit of his reprobation; but the conscience of his sin cast him upon this, and made him conceive he was a Reprobate.) For that he did find in himself that those things which God had given to others to rejoice their spirits, all conspired against him in despite of his horrible forfeit: (I doubt the phrase here in the original was not well understood by the Traslatour;) For although, said he, that God for a great blessing had promised to many holy men a goodly issue, and a great number of children, in whose love and obedience they may repose their age; yet in the midst of his miseries, The hands and faces of his Children were as horrible unto him as the hangman's (and indeed for the good of his children he renounced God's truth for mere temporal respects.) It cannot well be expressed what grief & vexation he seemed to receive when his children brought him meat, forcing him to eat, and threatening him when he refused it. He confessed his children did their duties, and yet he took it in ill part, saying, that he did not acknowledge God any more for his father, but did fear him as his adversary armed with judgement. For he had been three weeks in this apprehension, when he spoke these things, without eating or drinking, but what they forced him unto, the which he received with great difficulty, resisting with all his power, and spitting out that which they forced him to take. Some of the Assistants were of opinion to make him afraid, to make him the more apt to receive food, first for the soul, then for the body; ask him if he did not fear greater and sharper torments after this life then those he then felt. He confessed that he expected far more sharp, and had already horror of them: yet he desired nothing more than to be cast headlong in to them, that he might not fear other more grievous torments. They asked him again if he thought his sin so foul as it could not be pardoned through the bounty and infinite mercy of God? His answer was, that he had sinned against the Holy Ghost, which was so great a sin, as is called a sin unto death; that is to say, subject to the eternal vengeance of God, and to the pains of Hell: (now judge I pray whether the example of Peter was sufficient to take him off from desperation; for will any say that Peter in denying his Master sinned against the Holy Ghost;) whereof (to wit, the sin against the Holy Ghost) this poor wretch discoursed amply, learnedly, and too subtly against himself: Learned and Godly men, which did assist him, omitted no testimonies that might assure a wounded conscience that God is merciful, gentle and ready to pardon. But all this could not divert him from this opinion, neither could they draw any other thing from him, then that he desired much that he might return to some hope of pardon. But it fares with me (saith he) as with criminal persons, shut up in close prisons, and fettered hand and foot. Sometimes they are saluted by their friends passing by, who advise them to break Prison, and to deceive their guards if they can. Such Prisoners would gladly follow their counsel, but it is a vain desire: Even so is mine, said he. 3. As for the Scriptures which were cited to him, touching the love and affection of God the Father, by reason of his Son Jesus Christ, he did avow them; adding, that they belonged only to them, whom Jesus Christ did repute his brethren, and his members; but as for him, he had renounced that love, and willingly rejected brotherly alliance, neither was ignorant in how great tranquillity of mind they might be, who had once embraced the promises of salvation, and did wrest them continually therein. For confirmation whereof, this his sad disaster (said he) was propounded for an example before all men's eyes: that if they were wise they should not hold it light, nor happened by any chance, but to learn by his ruin, how dangerous it is, to fall any thing from that which belongs to the great glory of the Son of God: Adding that it was a slippery, and very dangerous passage, yea most fearful to him that stood not carefully on his Guard. Moreover forasmuch as such evident examples, of the vengeance of Almighty God did seldom appear to the eyes of men, they deserved to be the more carefully regarded. That amongst a great number of Reprobates in the World, his calamity was not singular; but his only punishment and ruin did satisfy God, a just Judge to admonish all others to have a care of themselves. He added withal, that therein he did acknowledge the severity of God's judgement, who had chosen him to make him a spectacle, rather than any other, and to admonish all by one man's mouth, to abstain from all iniquity; confessing withal, that there was no reproach or punishment, which he had not deserved, by reason of his foul offence. After he had discoursed thus sincerely and gravely of the justice Divine, he said they should not take it strange, this his long speech touching the true reason of the will of God: for that oftentimes God doth wrest out of the mouths of Reprobates, most assured testimonies of his Majesty, his justice, and his fearful vengeance. How strangely doth he plead for God's justice against himself as a Reprobate? when our Arminians are like to blaspheme that justice of God against Spira, which Spira justifies against himself, using a long discourse upon this sentence, and desirous to show the greatness of God's judgements. There are some (saith he) who have all things so wishfully, as they live in all delights, who notwithstanding are registered for perdition, whereof Jesus Christ propounds an example in the rich man. Luc. 16. That God doth often propound to mankind an hope of reward to draw them to the right belief of his holy will, and ofttimes withdraws them from impieties, by fearful and prodigious signs. And yet as impiety is natural to men, they make not their profit of such instructions, and think not that it concerns them: but impute it to any other thing, rather than to the wisdom of God, to fear and reverence him: Hereupon he made a bitter invective against a certain Philosopher, whom he had known above twenty years before, for that his Morosoph had been so impudent to deliver in his lessons, yea to write it, and publish it in Print, that all the Miracles that Christ had done upon the earth, might well be done by a man that were skilful in the knowledge of natural things. It were hard to represent the admiration wherewith they were surprised, and with what compassion they were moved, that came to visit him, for the discourses which they heard come from his mouth. Every man laboured to reduce this poor man, to some hope of his salvation. Among others there was one, a Reverend man for his holiness of life, who departed not from the Patient's bed, it was the Bishop of Capod ' Istria in the Venetians Territory; (This was Vergerius, who afterwards renounced Popery, and became a Protestant:) He ceased not to exhort Spira, and ceased not by many testimonies of the holy Scriptures, to divert him from that apprehension; Adding that he did not think his spirit was altogether void and destitute, of some good and heavenly inspirations, seeing he spoke so holily and devoutly of the excellency of Christian Religion. 4. Although the sick man knew full well that these admonitions proceeded from a sincere and true heart; yet for that he had divers times rejected them, he began to frown, saying to the Bishop, you believe, as I think, that I do willingly nourish this obstinacy in my mind, and that I take delight in this vehement passion of despair: If you be of that opinion, you are deceived: I will tell you, to the end you may know my resolution, that if I could be persuaded that the judgement of God, might by any means be changed or mitigated for me, it should not grieve me to be tormented ten thousand years, with the sharpest pains of hell, so as I might have any hope of rest after this long sufferance. But even in that whereby you do exhort me to gather any hope, I see all means of health and pardon taken from me. For if the testimonies of holy Scripture have any authority (as they have) do you think that Jesus Christ hath said in vain, that he which hath renounced him before men, he will renounce him before his heavenly father? Do you not see that it concerns me, and that it is as it were, particularly verified in my person? What shall become of him, whom the Son hath disavowed before his Father, when as you say, we must hope for no salvation but in Jesus Christ. Thereupon he did expound certain passages of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and of the second Catholic Epistle of Saint Peter, out of which he drew terrible conclusions against himself. We cannot believe with what gravity and vehemency, his words were delivered, neither was there ever heard man pleading better for himself, than Spira did then against himself. He did allege notable things of God's justice, detesting his forepast life; admonishing all that were about him, very earnestly, not to think that Christian life was a light thing, and easily discharged. That it doth not consist only in having the head Baptised, in reading certain verses and texts of the Gospel, and to be termed an honest man, but it was needful to live as the word of truth doth command him. Thereupon he repeated a Text out of Saint Peter, exhorting us to show through holiness of life, certain signs of the love of God towards us, and of the confidence we should have in him: He said moreover, that he had known many who after they had tasted the sweetness of true felicity, suffered themselves so to be carried away, as they had no longer care to perform that which belonged to a child of God. 5. He protested that he had sometimes imagined, that his sins had been hidden, and that he could not be punished, for that Christ had made satisfaction for them: but then he knew too late, that those things belonged only to the elect, and chosen of God, betwixt whose sins, and the celestial Throne, Jesus Christ sets his precious blood, and the dignity of his obedience, as a veil and shadow to cover them, and doth plant them against the Divine vengeance, as an high and strong Rampart, that sinners repenting them, might not be oppressed, nor drowned with the deluge and overflowings of their offences and sins. As for himself, seeing that he had renounced our Saviour Jesus Christ (here was the true burden of his sorrowful heart) he had, as one should say, overthrown this strong Rampart with his own hands, so that after this ruin, and overflowing the deluge of waters of this vengeance, had covered and swallowed up his soul. One of his most familiar friends said unto him, that he did hold the cause of this his great torment, proceeded from abundance of Melancholy humours, that did so trouble his brain. Spira remembering that he had many times refuted that opinion, and seeing they were to begin again, said unto the other; You may think what you please, but God in truth hath troubled my spirit, and deprived me of judgement; seeing it is impossible for me to have any hope of my salvation. Having continued in such and the like speeches, during his abode at Milan, they carried him back, to his own house at Civitelle, where he died in this despair. DISCOURSE. SECT. III. It makes Ministers unable to afford true comfort to the tempted; and this it doth, because it 1. Takes from them all solid grounds of comfort. 2. Leaves them only weak and insufficient grounds. 1. It bereaves them of the solid grounds of comfort; which are these. 1. The universality of God's love. 2. Of Christ's death. 3. And of the covenant of grace. That Minister which doth explain and apply these three things sound, and wisely to him that is tempted in this kind, doth that which is abundantly enough for the relieving and releasing of him from his temptation, and he that doth not apply these, leaves him as he found him in the midst of his temptation still, whatsoever may be said to the contrary in the hear of disputation. Etsi multa disputantur durius (saith Melancthon) tamen necesse est in vero agone ad hanc arcem confugere, Melanct. loc. come. p. 525. c. de Praedest. videlicet, quod de voluntate Dei indicandum sit ex verbo expresso, & quod promissio sit universalis, & quod sit mandatum Dei aeternum & immutabile audire filium & assentiri promissioni. Though there be many things disputed in this point more harshly, yet when all is done, the universal promise of grace, and salvation, is a Christians only Bulwark in this temptation, and combat. Obtemperemus igitur (saith he) ne vagentur animi quaerentes electionem extra verbum, & relicto Christo, & omisso mandato de amplectenda promissione; sed teneamus certa est indubitata fide promissionem gratiae non inanem esse fabulam; sed Deum vere patefecisse voluntatem suam in promissione, & verè praestare quod promisit. Let us not therefore leave Christ and look for an election out of the word, but let us judge of God's will, in saving men by the promise, and commandment, which are both universal. And in another place of the same book, he hath these words. Sicut est necesse scire Evangelium promissionem esse gratuitam, ita est necesse scire Evangelium promissionem universalem esse, hanc universalem tenere necesse est, adversus periculosas imaginationes de praedestinatione, ne disputemus hanc promissionem ad paucos quosdam alios pertinere, non pertinere ad nos. Non enim dubium est, quin omnium animos haec cogitatio exerceat. As it is needful to know that the promise of salvation is free, so it is needful to know and hold, that it is universal, against some dangerous conceits of predestination, etc. By these speeches we see clearly, what this learned man thought to be the true balm of Gilead, whereby a wounded school should be cured, viz. the universality of the promise (and of God's love and Christ's death too, for they all hang together, and cannot be disjoined.) The reason why these grounds are able to help a man in this case, is twofold. 1. Because they are directly contradictory to the temptation; a will to save all, a giving of Christ to death for all, and an offer of grace to all, cannot possibly stand with an absolute antecedent will, and intent of casting away the greatest part of mankind, or indeed any one man in the world. Upon this follows the second reason. 2. Because they serve to convict the tempted, that he cannot be in that condition in which he supposeth himself to be. For if two contradictories cannot be true, he that evinceth the truth of the one, convinceth the understanding of the untruth of the other: and he that makes it appear that this contradictory, [God would have all to be saved, redeemed, and called to repent and believe,] is true, puts it out of doubt to the understanding, that the other contradictory, [God will have most men to be absolutely, and inevitably damned,] must needs be false, and so raiseth up that poor soul that was pressed down with an erroneous conceit and fear that it was true. In this manner did Junius (though not in the same temptation) relieve a Woman perplexed exceedingly with a strong persuasion, that she and all her Children should be damned; because she was busied about her Children at a certain time, when she should have been at Mass. Junius maketh short work with her, tells her that her employment about her Children, was a duty pleasing unto God, but the Mass was a mere Will-worship: and so delivering her of her error, (upon which the temptation was built,) gives her present ease and comfort. In like manner tell a man that fears he is an absolute reprobate, that there are no such absolute Reprobates, and that his fear is but a mere fancy, and his doubt a dream; convince him once by contradictory grounds that there is no man in the World in that state in which he thinks himself to be, and you drive out one nail by another, and expel the temptation. These are the Sword of Alexander, which will cut asunder the Gordian knot of absolute Reprobation, and these are the true Nepenthes of a sick soul. Now these true Grounds of hope and comfort, a Minister cannot make use of, that holds absolute Reprobation; if he do usurp them, he cannot maintain them against the replies of the tempted, unless he relinquish his opinion; because (as I have said) there is a plain contradiction between them, and no man is able to maintain two propositions; which speak contrary things, to be both true, any more than he can make it good, that the same thing may have a being, and yet not have a being at the same time. For example, a Minister comes to comfort a man, that thinks himself to be an absolute Reprobate; and how doth he set about it? He tells him, that God would have all to be saved, that Christ died for all, etc. But what right hath he to these grounds of comfort, holding the contrary conclusions. viz. That God will have a great many to be damned, and to have no part in Christ? Well he usurps them notwithstanding, but is he able to maintain them against the answer of the tempted, can he make a good reply? No: for thus the tempted answers, God would have all to be saved with a revealed will, and, Christ died for all sufficiently, not intentionally: Or if God did intend that he should die for all, yet he intended it upon a condition, which he purposeth, the most should never perform; What can the Minister reply upon this? If he will make a direct reply, that shall take away the answer, he must deny that God hath two wills contrary to each other; a secret will, that many shall be avoidable damned, and a revealed will that all may be possibly saved; and he must also deny that God hath an intent, that Christ should not die for a great many; or that he intended he should die for all, upon condition they should believe and repent; and yet intent that the most should never believe and repent. But can he deny these things? He cannot, except he deny his own conclusion, and opinion, which is, that there are many thousands, eternally and avoidable rejected in God's absolute purpose, from grace and glory for ever: For that conclusion is all one, with the answer of the tempted, and contradictory to those arguments of comfort, which he is glad to make use of. Absolute reprobation therefore, bereaves that Minister, who believes it, of the solid grounds of consolation, and so makes him unable to recover a poor soul wounded with this temptation. TWISSE. Consideration. 1. HEre in this Section the question is, Whether our Doctrine of absolute Reprobation, bereaves a Minister of the solid grounds of comfort? Still we must remember how magnificently this Author goes on, to confound things that differ. For whereas we maintain that God hath decreed to proceed absolutely with men, only in the giving and denying of grace, not absolutely in the giving of salvation, or inflicting of damnation. And this Author, though he so carrieth the matter all along, as if we maintained Gods proceeding to be absolute herein, to wit, in granting salvation to some, and inflicting damnation upon others, yet hath he no means to help himself herein, and cast a show of a true crimination, but by flying to God's absolute proceedings, in giving or denying grace. And albeit in this point, wholly consists the Crisis of this Controversy, yet this Author utterly declines the sifting thereof, as some precipice and breake-neck unto his cause; to wit, Whether God gives and denies grace according to the mere pleasure of his will, or according to men's works; albeit the issue of all his comforts comes to this, namely, that either God is not the Author of our faith, (which now adays the Remonstrants with open mouth profess, that Christ merited for none,) or if to juggle with the World they pretend an acknowledgement, that God is the Author of it, yet they plainly profess, that he dispenseth it to some, and denies it to others, according to some good condition, or disposition, he finds in the one, and which he finds not in another. But let us take into consideration what these solid grounds of comfort are, whereof a Minister is bereft by our Doctrine; Three I find here mentioned; A treble Universality. 1. of God's love. 2. Of Christ's death. 3. Of the Covenant of grace. As if universality now adays were a better Character of the Arminian faith, then of the Roman Religion. I may take liberty to equivocate a little, when this Author equivocates throughout, and that in a case, wherein i● is most intolerable, in a case of consolation to be ministered to conscientia timorata, as Nider calls it, a poor afflicted soul as this Author expresseth it. To the discovery whereof I will now proceed, having signified in the first place, that all these consolations are no other, but such as every Reprobate is capable of, as well as the Children of God, which is so apparent as needs no proof; only in the issue of their Tenet, the faith of them freeth a man from the conceit of being an absolute Reprobate. So that in effect it comes to this; Thou poor afflicted soul, be of good comfort, for if thou wilt hearken unto me, and embrace those solid grounds of comfort which I will reveal unto thee, assure thyself they shall be as the Balm of Gilead unto thy soul; whereby thou mayst be confident, that albeit it may be thou art a Reprobate, and that God from everlasting hath ordained thee unto damnation, that yet certainly thou art no absolute Reprobate, no more than Cain, or Esau, Saul, or Judas, or the Devils were; For these my principles will assure thee that there never was, nor is, nor shall be any absolute Reprobate throughout the world. 2. I come to the examining of them particularly, & to show that every one of them is as it were against the hair. So evident are the testimonies of Scripture against them all; and they are obtruded upon a superficiary and most most unsound interpretation of Scripture in some places. For 1. as touching the first, the universality of God's love; For hereby God's love is made indifferent unto all, and consequently towards Esau as well as to Jacob, whereas the Scripture professeth that God loved Jocob and hated Esau; and this the Apostle makes equivalent to the Oracle delivered to Rebekah concerning them before they were borne. 2. He might as well have proposed it, of the universality of God's mercy; whereas the Scripture expressly distinguisheth between vessels of mercy & vessels of wrath. 3. This love is explicated by them to consist in a will to save all. Now election is but Gods will to save; and the Scripture plainly teacheth, and it is confessed by all that I know (excepting Coelius Secundus to whom this Author it seems is most beholding for his story of Spira) that though Many are called yet but few are chosen. And whereas it is confessed, that the most part of men are Reprobates, that is, from everlasting willed unto condemnation; yet never the less they bear us in hand that all men even Cain and Judas, yea and (as I think) the Devils and all were willed by God unto Salvation. And that there is no contradiction in all this. And every poor afflicted soul must believe hand over head that all this is true (what species of contradiction soever be found therein which this Author from the beginning of his discourse to the end hath taken no pains to clear) lest otherwise he forfeits all hopes of comfort, upon such sovereign grounds as are here proposed, by faith wherein aman may be as well assured of his Salvation and freedom from damnation, as any Reprobate in the World. For albeit he be a Reprobate, and God should reveal this unto him, yet upon these grounds he may be confident that he is no absolute Reprobate. 2. I come to the Second comfortable supposition, and that is, the universality of Christ's death, namely, that he died for all. Now this is opposite to Scripture evidence, as the former; yea and to Christian reason, if not more: For albeit God so loved the World, even the whole World, that he gave his only begotten Son that whosoever believes in him should not perish but have Life Everlasting: which gives a fair light of exposition to those places where Christ is said to have died for the sins of the World, yea of the whole world, to wit, in this manner, that whosoever believes in him shall not perish but have everlasting life. yet the Scripture speaks as often of Christ's death in a restrained sense, as where it is said Christ gave himself a ransom for many. And that his blood was shed for his Apostles, and for many, for the remission of their sins. And that Christ should save God's people from their sins. And that God hath purchased his Church with his blood; And Christ gave himself for his Church. And that he is saviour of his body; And that he died for the elect. And in the 17 of John, our Saviour would not pray for the World, but only for those whom God had at that time given unto him; and who afterward should believe in him through their word; And look for whom he prayed with exclusion of the rest for their sakes he sanctified himself: Now that this is spoken in reference to the offering of himself up unto God, upon the cross, it was the joint interpretation of all the Fathers whom Maldonate had read as he professeth on that place, and there reckons up a multitude of them. Then again, Christ's death and passion (we know) was of a satisfactory nature; and therefore if he died for all, he satisfied for all the sins of all men; why then are not all saved? Why is any damned? Is it just with God to torment with everlasting fire, for those sins, for which he hath received satisfaction; and that a more ample one, than man's satisfaction can be, by suffering the torments of Hell fire? For therefore it shall never end, because it shall never satisfy. Again, how many millions were at that time dead and in hell fire; and did Christ satisfy for their sins by his death upon the Cross, and they continue still to be tormented? Again, the obedience of Christ in general, is of a meritorious nature, even meritorious of everlasting life; Now if Christ hath merited everlasting life for all and every one, how comes it that all and every one do not enjoy Everlasting Life? Shall not God the Father deal with his own Son according to the exigency of his merits, whether it be that they are so meritorious in their own nature; or by the constitution of God; either merely, or jointly with the dignity of their nature, in reference to the dignity of the person who performed them, as being not only man but God, even the eternal Son of God one & the same God with his Father, Blessed for ever. Now it can be made good that all sins of all men are fully satisfied for, by the death of Christ, & that Christ hath merited in better manner Everlasting Life for all & every one, than they could have done for themselves, although they had passed the whole course of their lives, as free from sin as the very elect Angels; this I confess is a comfortable doctrine with a witness; though God leave men to themselves and to the power of their own free wills to do what they list. And I see no reason, but that in the midst of all Riot and excess, they may be as confident of their Salvation, as if they had all faith; as of certain Lutherans it is written, as I saw in a letter of an English Divine written from Rome. I make no question but their answer will be, that albeit Christ hath thus satisfied for all sins of all and every one, and merited Eternal Life for all and every one, yet the benefit of his merits and satisfaction by God's Ordinance shall redound to none, but such as believe, and repent, and persevere therein unto death. And what comfort can herehence arise to an afflicted soul, unless she do believe and repent? If she do believe and repent, our Doctrine gives assurance to such of their election, the Arminian doth not. Here I presume they will say, that every one may believe if he will, repent if he will; and may they not as well say, that every soul afflicted with despair, may leave of to despair if they will, and consequently leave of to be afflicted if they will? And I confess this way of consolation hath a very short cut, if the afflicted soul would hearken unto them. Especially considering that I do not find, that in these their discourses they take any notice of any sin to hinder this, no not so much as of the sin against the Holy Ghost, or of that sin which St John calleth a sin unto death. But I do much doubt whether this were the manner of comfort which the Prophet Esay thought himself enabled for by God's grace, when he said, The Lord God hath given me the Es. 50. 4. tongue of the Learned, that I should know how to speak a word in season to him that is weary: he wakeneth Morning by Morning, he wakeneth mine ear to hear as the learned. Wherefore let me make bold in behalf of the Patient, to move unto you a question: Doth not the Scripture teach us that faith is the gift of God, that repentance is the gift of God? Eph. 2. 8. Phil. 1. 29. Act: 11. 18. 2 Tim: 2. 25, How then is it possible for me to believe and repent, unless God give me the grace of faith and repentance? I presume you will answer, that God gives faith and repentance, first, in as much as he gives all men power to believe and repent, And secondly, in as much as he concurres with them to the act of faith and repentance in case they will. But I pray thee tell me, is not the will to repent also the gift of God? And if I have not as yet the will to repent, how is it possible I should repent? Can any man repent without a will to repent? Is not repentance chiefly the charge of the will? But you will say (I suppose) that even this will to repent God is ready to work in me, if I will repent. But in case a man will repent, what need hath he of any Divine assistance to cause in him this will to repent, seeing he hath it already? Lastly, doth not God give a man a power to refuse to believe, to refuse to repent if he will? And is he not as ready to concur with him to any sinful act if he will, and to work the very will also of doing it in case he will? And are not these then the gifts of God as well as others? To conclude, what think you of the gift of faith, hath Christ merited it for us or no? It seems by your Doctrine he hath not; as when you teach that albeit Christ hath satisfied for all, merited Everlasting life for all; yet the benefit of Christ obedience and death, is by the ordinance of God appliable to none, but such as have faith: whereby it appears, that you do not make faith to be any of those benefits, which redound unto us by the obedience of Christ. For though it be decent to say, that salvation as a benefit procured by Christ's obedience, can redound to none but to such as believe; yet it is very indecent to say, that faith itself, as a benefit of Christ's death, shall by the ordinance of God redound to none but to such as believe. And indeed the Remonstrants now adays, do openly profess, that Christ merited faith for none. And they are to be commended In Censura Censurae. p. 56. for dealing ingenuously, and confessing that, whereunto the Genius of their Tenet doth carry them. Our Arminians deal not so plainly: but as they pretend that faith and repentance are the gifts of God; so they pretend that Christ merited them for us, to wit, he merited universal grace for all and every one, whereby every man may believe if he will, and repent if he will. And how comfortable this particular is, I have already showed; for it is as much as to say, you may cease to despair if you will, you may cease to be afflicted if you will. Secondly, Christ merited, that God should concur to the working of faith and repentance in them, provided that they would work it in themselves. Yea the very will to believe and repent, God will work in them modo velint. So that still the resolution of all comfort, is into a man's own freewill; For God gives not faith and repentance to whom he will, or according to the mere pleasure of his will, but rather according to men's works. And this direct Pelagianism, condemned so many hundred years ago, is that most comfortable doctrine of Christianity, which our Arminians do afford. And this discourse as touching the universality of Christ's death, may be applied also to the universality of God's love, which ends in this, that all men shall be saved if they do believe; and that every man may believe if he will; and that God is ready to work faith and repentance in them, provided that they will be as ready to work it in themselves. 3. And now I come to this Authors third Topick place of consolation, drawn from the universality of the Covenant of grace. Now this is as strange as any of the former, or rather much more, and when the Covenant of grace is so much enlarged, we have cause to fear that it is confounded with the Covenant of Works. And indeed if it were true, as some of this sect profess, namely, that there is an universal grace given to all for the enlivening of their wills, whereby they are enabled to will any spiritual good whereunto they shall be excited; and to believe if they will, and from the love of temporal things to convert themselves to the keeping of God's Commandments if they will; I see no reason but that the Law is able to give life, though the Apostle supposeth the contrary; and the way is as open unto man for justification by the works of the Law as it was unto Adam in the state of innocency. And if the Covenant of grace be universal, and ever was, for that I take to be this Authors meaning, than God was no more the God of Abraham, and of his seed, then of all the World; nether was the people of Israel more the Lords portion then any other Nation of the World: yet Moses was sent unto Pharaoh in their behalf with this Message; Thus saith the Lord, Israel is my son, my first borne, wherefore I say unto thee, Let my son go that he may serve me; if thou refuse to let him go, Behold I will slay thy son even thy first borne Ex: 4. 22, 23. Thus God accounts them albeit they were miserably corrupted with Idolatry; as it appears. Ez: 20. 6. In the day that I lift up my hand upon them, to bring them forth of the Land of Egypt; 7. Then said I unto them, Let every one cast a way the abominations of his eyes, and defile not yourselves with the Idols of Egypt; for I am the Lord your God. 8. But they rebelled against me, and would not hear me; for none cast away the abominations of their eyes; neither did they forsake the Idols of Egypt: then I thought to pour out mine Indignation upon them and to accomplish my wrath against them in the midst of the Land of Egypt; 9 But I had respect unto my name that it should not be polluted of the Heathen. So he proceeded in despite of their sins, to carry them out of the Land of Egypt; and brought them into the wilderness and gave them Statutes, and Judgements, and his Sabaths; v: 10, 11, 12. But they rebelled against him in the Wilderness, whereupon he thought again to pour out his indignation upon them in the Wilderness to consume them v. 13. But he had respect unto his name, v. 14. and his eye spared them and would not destroy them v. 17. And again, when their Children provoked him by rebelling against him, whereupon he thought of pouring out his Indignation upon them v. 21. Nevertheless he withdrew his hand, and had respect unto his name v. 22. Then as touching the generation of that present time he professeth he will rule them with a mighty hand v. 33. And the issue thereof is no worse than this, I will cause you to pass under the rod, and bring you into the bond of the Covenant v. 37, And again, mark with what a gracious promise he concludes v. 43. There shall ye remember your ways and all the works wherein ye have been defiled, and ye shall judge yourselves worthy to be cast of for all your evils, which you have committed 44. And ye shall know that I am the Lord, when I have respect unto you for my name's sake and not after your wicked ways, nor according to your corrupt work, O ye house of Israel, saith the Lord God. Here is the peculiar fruit of the Covenant of grace, to master their iniquities, to bring them unto repentance, and to deliver them, from the dominion of sin and Satan. If God perform this Grace to all and every one throughout the World, then is the Covenant of grace universal, and all and every one are under it, but if there be few, very few, over whom sin hath not the dominion, then certainly very few are under the Covenant of grace. For the Apostle plainly signifieth this, to be the fruit of the Covenant of grace; where he saith, Sin shall not have dominion over you, for ye are not under the Law but under grace, Rome 6. 14. And the like we have, Heb. 8. 8. I will make with the House of Judah a new Testament. 9 Not like the Testament that I made with their fathers, in the day that I took them by the hands to lead them out of the Land of Egypt: For they continued not in my Testament, and I regarded them not, saith the Lord. 10. For this is the Testament that I will make with the House of Israel, after those days, saith the Lord, I will put my Laws in their mind, and in their heart I will write them, and I will be their God, and they shall be my people. 11. And they shall not teach every man his neighbour, and every man his brother saying, Know the Lord: for all shall know me from the least of them to the greatest of them. 12. For I will be merciful unto their unrighteousness, and I will remember their sins, and their iniquities no more. According to this Counant proceed those gracious promises, whereof the Scriptures are full. I have seen his ways, and I will heal them. Es: 57 18. I will heal their rebellions. Hos. 14. 5. The Lord will subdue our iniquities. Mich. 7. I will circumcise your hearts, and the hearts of your children, to love me with all your heart, and with all your soul Deut 30. 6. I am the Lord your God which sanctify you, &c: And therefore these comforts which here are so much magnified, as only and fully sufficient for the relieving of an afflicted soul in the hour of temptation, are but so many lies (to speak in the Prophet's phrase) that this Author holds in his right hand; and if through the illusions of Satan he take hold of them, they may cast him into a dream, like unto the dream of an hungry man, who eateth and drinketh and maketh merry, but when he awaketh his soul is empty. For all these comforts so magnificently set forth, have no force, save in case a man believe them now, if a man believeth, our doctrine can assure him of Everlasting Life; and so of his election, which the Arminian cannot. For we teach that which our Saviour hath taught us, He that believeth in the Son hath Everlasting Life; and he that obeyeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth upon him: But as for the performing of faith, they leave that unto man, together with God's concurrence. And in like sort for the maintenance of their faith, they teach a man to put his trust in himself with God's concurrence, as if otherwise a man's condition were uncomfortable, and the way were open to desperation. But what doth Austin answer to such like discourses of old, the Predest: sanct: cap: 22. An vero timendum est, ne nunc de se homo desperet, quando spes ejus demonstratur ponenda in Deo, non autem desperaret si eam in se ipso superbissimus & infelicissimus poneret? Is it to be feared, lest a man despair, when it is proved, that a man's hope is to be placed in God, and that he is free from despair, in case he place his hope in himself, most proudly, and most unhappily? As for that which he citys out of Melancthon, it is every way as much to the purpose as that which he cited out of Calvin in the first Section. Melancthon sayeth we must judge of Gods will by his Word; so saith Calvin, his words are these; Qui recte atque ordine electionem investigant qualiter in verbo continetur, eximium inde referunt consolationis fructum. To inquire after a man's election in the Word is the way to reap singular consolation; But they that inquire after the eternal counsel of God without the Word in exitialem abyssum se ingurgitant; they plung themselves into a gulf of perdition. Yet when Melancthon sayeth, multa disput antur durius, the comparative there is not to be rendered as this Author renders it more harshly, but rather thus, somewhat harshly. And of Melancthons' concurrence with Calvin, in the doctrine of predestination, as touching the substance of the doctrine, I have formerly showed out of his own Epistle, who professeth that he differeth only tradendi ratione in the manner of delivering it; and of his own, professeth that they are of a popular nature, thus, Mea sunt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & adusum accommodata; as it were woven with a thicker thread, and fited to use and practise. No man doubts but that as Melanchton saith it is Gods immutable commandment to hear the Son, and to assent to the promise; and the promise is universal, to wit, that, whosoever believeth shall be saved: Therefore let us not seek election besides the Word; it is a grave counsel, and well becoming Melancthon; and Calvin gives the very same council, in the very Book, Chapter, and Section last related by this Author. But he saw it fitter for his turn to represent Melancthon professing as much, rather than Calvin. We nothing doubt but God will perform that he hath promised; and therefore whosoever believeth shall be saved according to our doctrine, not so according to the doctrine of Arminians; who maintain that a man may totally and finally fall away from faith. Roger's upon the Articles of the Church of England, Art. 17. Not only acknowledgeth this universality of God's promises, according to the Tenor of that Article; but concludeth herehence That they are not to be heard that say, that the number of the elect is but small; and seeing we are uncertain whether we be of that company or no, we will proceed in our course as we have begun; and accounts all such adversaries of this truth, touching the universality of God's promises: and let every sober man judge whether this Author doth not justify this their discourse, whom he accounts adversaries to the truth of that Article in that particular. The same Rogers in his 8 proposition, as touching the comfortable nature of predestination, writs thus, This doctrine of predestination is to the Godly, full sweet, pleasant, and comfortable, because it greatly confirmeth their faith in Christ, and increaseth their love towards God. But (saith he) to the wicked and reprobate the consideration hereof is very sour, unsavoury, and most uncomfortable, as that which they think (though very untruly and sinfully) causeth them either to despair of his mercy being without faith; or not to fear his justice being extremely wicked; whereas neither from the Word of God, nor any confession of the Church can man gather that he is a vessel of wrath, prepared to damnation. What more contradictions to this Author's discourse of the uncomfortable condition of predestination, according to our way; yet who was this Author? was he at any time accounted an innovatour in this Church? His books dedicated to Archbishop Bancroft, writing upon the Articles of the Church of England; perused, and by the lawful authority of the Church of England allowed to be public. And because some choosing to play at small game rather than sit out, may say, that he speaks not a word of absolute election, or absolute reprobation; let his 5. Proposition be observed, which is this, Of the mere pleasure of God, some men in Christ Jesus are elected, and not others unto salvation: this he proves by that Rom. 9 11. That the purpose of God might remain according to election. And that Eph. 1. 5. Who doth predestinate us according to the good pleasure of his will: And that 2 Tim. 1. 9 Not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace: And that Exod. 33. 19 And Rom. 9 15. I will show mercy to whom I will show mercy: And as touching the other part of not choosing others, that of Solomon Prov. 16. 4. The Lord hath made all things for his own sake, yea even the wicked against the day of evil. And Rom. 9 21. Hath not the Potter power over the clay to make of the same lump one vessel unto honour, and an other unto dishonour. And coming unto the Errors, and adversaries of this truth. Hereby (saith he) is discovered the impiety of those men which think that, 1. Man doth make himself eligible for the Kingdom of Heaven, by his own good works and merits; so teach the Papists. 2. God beheld in every man whether he would use his grace well, and believe the Gospel or no, and as he saw man, so he did predestinate choose or refuse him. 3. Besides his will, there was some other cause in God, why he chose one man, and cast off another, but this cause is hidden from us. 4. God is partial and unjust for choosing some, and refusing others; call many and electing but few. The other place alleged by this Author of Melancthon, partly repeats the same matter concerning the universality of the promises, (no mention at all with him either of the universality of God's love, or of the universality of Christ's death, or of the universality of the Covenant of grace) partly opposeth it to dangerous imaginations of predestination; & what are these but such as proceed without the word. For without doubt it is to be understood in opposition to that which he formerly delivered, advising us to judge of the will of God by his express Word; and all one with seeking election extra verbum formerly specified: of both which Calvin speaks more at large in that very place aleadged by this Author in the first Section of this last sort of Arguments; And there Calvin commends the one as a most comfortable course, and sets forth the danger of the other in far more emphatical manner then Melancthon doth, and therewithal discovereth the true Balm of Gilead, wherein it consists, in the same manner that Melancthon doth, and more fully: but it served not this Authors turn to represent Calvin thus discoursing, though he could not be ignorant there of, if himself read the place, which he allegeth out of Calvin and took it not upon trust at another's hand. By the way I observe he makes the universality of the promise, mentioned by Melancthon, all one with the universality of the Covenant of grace mentioned by him. As if the Covenant of grace consisted only in this, Whosoever believes shall be saved; and accordingly you may guess of his meaning as touching the universality of Christ's death, namely, that the benefit thereof shall redound to all that believe; as good as in plain terms to profess, that Christ died not to procure and merit faith for us, which the Remonstrants do now adays openly profess; but I do not find that our Arminians hitherto dare to concur with them therein. And in like manner the universality of God's love is to be understood; namely, of willing salvation to as many as believe, not of willing grace unto them, at least not of any meaning to bestow faith and repentance upon them. Yet not any will yet show themselves so ingenuous as to confess in plain terms, that God gives not faith and repentance to any man, but leaves that to be wrought by the power of their wills, pretending that God hath enabled all men with a power to believe. And indeed if faith and repentance be a gift, and special gift of God; it is strange that God should bestow them upon us extra Christum, not for Christ sake; And whence it followeth that those gracious promises of circumcising our hearts, of sanctifying us, of writing his law in our mind and inward parts, and his fear in our hearts; never to depart from him, of healing our ways, our backslidings, our rebellions; of taking away the stony heart out of our bowels and giving us a heart of flesh; and causing us to walk in his statutes, and keep his judgements, and do them, are nothing belonging to the Covenant of grace in this Authors judicious consideration. And to conclude, if all men be under the Covenant of grace, what force or substance at all is there in that promise which God makes unto his people of Israel, namely, that he will cause them to pass under the rod, and bring them unto the bond of the Covenant. As also in that Ezek. 16. 60. I will remember my Covenant made with thee in the days of thy youth, and I will confirm unto thee an everlasting Covenant. 61. Then shalt thou remember thy ways and be ashamed, when thou shalt receive thy sisters, both thy elder and thy younger and I will give them unto thee for Daughters, but not by thy Covenant. 62. And I will establish my Covenant with thee, and thou shalt know that I am the Lord. I come to the consideration of the reasons why these grounds are (pretended to be) able to help in such a case, 1. Because they are directly contradictory to the temptation; a will to save all, a givinig of Christ to death for all, and an offer of grace to all, cannot possibly stand with an absolute anticedent will, and intent of casting a way the greatest part of mankind, or indeed any one man in the world. To this I answer. 1. Though they be contradictory to the temptation, yet if they carry manifest evidence of notorious untruths in their foreheads, delivered as they are without explication, what true comfort shall an afflicted soul receive therehence, when by embracing them he shall but hold a lie in his right hand? For do not these comforters themselves acknowledge, that God hath from everlasting decreed the damnation of the greatest part of men? Yet they would have a poor afflicted soul believe that notwithstanding this he wills the salvation of all, even of them whom he hath appointed unto wrath; it is the Apostles phrase 1 Thess. 5. 9 To endeavour to persuade them of this, what is it but to make a sickly creature to feed on fire, or digest Iron, as if that could ever turn into good nourishment. In like sort to persuade him that Christ hath made satisfaction for all the sins of all men, & merited salvation for all & every one; when, notwithstanding Christ's merits of their salvation, the greatest part of the world shall not be saved; And notwithstanding Christ's satisfaction for their sin, they must be put to satisfy for them, & that by suffering the torments of hell fire, & that for ever. 2. Let these points be explicated, & then no comfort at all will appear therehence to an afflicted soul in some case; As for example, when they shall understand that God's love tends only to the saving of them in case they believe, & repent, & mortify the deeds of the flesh, & persevere in such like gracious courses unto death: alas what comfort is this to a sick soul, when he feels in himself no power to believe, no power to repent, no power to any spiritual good, contrary wise prone to evil, either not taking delight in God's Word, or nothing profiting by it; Will it suffice to out face them herein, & tell them they have power to believe if they will, to repent if they will to mortify the deeds of the flesh if they will; to crucify the affections & lusts if they will, yea to have victory over the world if they will, and to quench all the fiery darts of the Devil if they will? And withal that their wills are enlivened to will any of all these, yea to will all these, and any other spiritual good whereunto they shall be excited? Whereas the Scripture teacheth us, that men are dead in sin, before the time of their effectual calling; and that such was the condition of the Ephesians, before the Gospel was Preached to them, and they converted by it; and that till they embrace Eph. 2. 1, 2, 3. 2 Tim. 2. last. the Gospel, all men are led captive by the Devil, to do his will. 3. What poor comfort is this to persuade a man, that he is no absolute Reprobate; when upon the same grounds, namely, that the number of Reprobates is far greater even an hundred for one, than the number of Gods elect, he may still be perplexed with doubts and fears, yea and with as strong an apprehension that he is a Reprobate. And amongst all the examples that I have lighted upon, of desperation upon this ground, they have not proceeded according to this distinction of reprobats absolute or not absolute, but simply upon an apprehension that they were Reprobates, & that not upon the consideration of the small number of Gods elect, and the vast number of Reprobates, but upon the conscience of some sin or other, which they conceived to be unpardonable, a sin unto death, a sin against the Holy Ghost, and that particularly consisting in opposing Gods truth, or blaspheming it, or making war against it: which I would this Author might be pleased well to consider before his feet be too much fastened in the mire, and there be no getting out of it. His second reason followeth. 2. Because they convince the tempted that he cannot be in that condition in which he supposeth himself to be, for two contradictoryes cannot be true. This is no new reason at all, but a mere application of the reason formerly delivered. But this Author considers not how he mars his own course of consolation, casting his spiritual patient to believe hand over head things directly contradictory, as namely, that God wills the Salvation even of those whom he hath from everlasting ordained unto damnation; and is not his patient like to take much comfort in this speculation; namely, that albeit he be one of those whom God hathordained to condemnation, yet he wills his Salvation. What a poor comfort is it to conceive that though God will have him to be damned, yet not inevitably; whereas Gods will is as effectual in bringing contingent things to pass contingently, as in bringing necessary things to pass necessarily: so rain to morrow is a contingent thing, yet God can bring it to pass as infallibly, though in a contingent manner, as he brings to pass the rising of the sun. What comfort to a poor afflicted soul, that though God wils his condemnation, yet not absolutely but respectiuly; (for these terms alone do stand in proper opposition in the judgement of Arminians) to wit, that he will not damn him but for his sin. As for the consolation here ministered, that God would have all and every one (for unless it proceed in that sense it is nothing to the purpose,) to be saved, redeemed, and called to repent and believe; this is full of collusion: First in mixing many things together of a different nature; For as for the two first, that will, they have to proceed merely conditionally, to wit, in case they believe and repent; manifestly implying, that the divine gift of faith and repentance, is no benefit of Christ's redemption, nor any of those good things which Christ hath merited for us. Now as for the rest he was ashamed to profess in the same Tenor, that God would have all to believe and repent but only called to believe and repent. But seeing it is apparent that all are not called, I presume this calling is to be understood also not absolutely but conditionally; Now the condition thereof certainly is not faith and repentance, but somewhat else, which he expresseth not. And is it not requisite the patient which is to be raised and relieved should be acquainted with this condition, which yet is no where mentioned (as I remember) throughout this discourse? But be it that God will have this poor soul to be saved and redeemed in case he believe and repent; Unless God also willeth his faith and repentance, what door of hope or consolation is opened to the poor, soul yet dwelling in the valley of Anchor? I wonder not a little what he meant to say only, God we will have all to be called, to believe and repent, and not to speak home and say, God will have all to believe and repent For what? Doth he not indeed acknowledge faith & repentance to be the gifts of God; and if he doth give them, did he not from everlasting will to give them? will you give me leave to guess at the mystery of his meaning in this? Had he said, God will have all to believe and repent, as he sayeth, God will have all to be saved and redeemed; like as their meaning is well known as touching Gods will to save, namely, upon condition & that condition also is well known to be faith and repentance: In like sort had he said God will have all to believe and repent, he saw belike this would have brought upon him more trouble than he would well brook; to wit, by demanding whether God will have all to believe and repent absolutely or conditionally: Not absolutely I presume, lest so they should grant election unto faith & repentance to be absolute; Therefore they must be driven to show upon what condition God will have men to believe & repent, that is, upon that condition God doth bestow faith & repentance upon men. Now they are very loath to come to this. But is it not fit that the soul which is to be comforted upon this ground should be throughly acquainted with this condition? For it is a vain thing to discourse of a power in man to believe and repent, and to say it is given them by the grace of God, considering that the Scripture is not more pregnantly averse from countenancing any such power granted unto all; as it is clear, it professeth faith and repentance to be the gift of God, and consequently no man can exercise that pretended power without a farther grace, whereby God gives faith itself, and repentance itself, and not only a power to believe, and a power to repent. Therefore it is very necessary for an afflicted soul, that is to be comforted upon this ground; to have this mystery revealed unto her, namely, upon what condition God will give one faith and repentance. But this Author keeps himself close in this point, and budgeth not for fear, belike of discovering some mystery of iniquity on their part. But whiles he conceals this, doth he not play the part of a proper Mountebank, when he pretends the selling of Balm, and sovereign oils, when indeed he means only to juggle and collude with his spectators? And there is good reason why he should conceal this, or rather I doubt whether he that shows himself on the stage herein, is sufficiently acquainted with the mystery himself; For whereas they cannot endure, that God should absolutely dispense the grace of Faith and repentance to whom he will, but upon a condition to be performed on man's part: Hence it manifestly follows, that the grace of faith and repentance is collated by God, according to men's works, which is plain Pelagianism, and condemned above 1200 years ago, in the Synod of Palestine, and in no Orthodox Synod or Council reversed or retracted ever since. Another reason there is of this concealment, and that is to prevent the manifestation of the strange absurdity of their Tenet, discoverable by the light of nature; For the condition of Gods working faith and repentance in us, is this, modo nos velimus credere & resipiscere; as much as to say, as many as will believe shall believe, which is as true of the most sinful act that is committed by man, that God gives it in the same manner. And more than this they dare not deny, but that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 velle is the gift of God, but modo velimus, whereby it comes to pass, that the act of willing is the condition of itself, and consequently, both before and after itself. And these shameful issues do justly befall them, because they abhor to profess, that God causeth us to walk in his statutes, and to keep his judgements, and do them. The course that Junius took to quiet her conscience, who thought she was damned for neglecting to go to Mass, by proving unto her that the Mass was a mere will-worship, was fair and reasonable, but the course this Author takes to comfort an afflicted soul, I have showed to be most unreasonable. Absolute reprobate hath a different sense, according as it is differently applied, If applied unto damnation, or the denial of glory; we utterly deny that either the one is inflicted, or glory is denied absolutely, but merely upon supposition of sin. But applied to grace, we willingly confess, that God doth absolutely give the grace of regeneration, the grace of faith and repentance, to whom he will, according to that of Saint Paul, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. Rom. 9 18. compared with Rom. 11. 30. Where to show mercy, is apparently to bring men unto faith; neither can it have any other sense, Rom. 9 18. being set in opposition to hardening; and in reference to the objection rising therehence, in the words following. Thou wilt say then, why doth he yet complain, for who hath resisted his will: v. 19 And while this Author denies that faith and repentance are given according to the good pleasure of Gods will, which is to give them absolutely; he must be driven to confess, that they are given conditionally: and if a man will take any comfort therehence, he must be acquainted with the condition, which yet this Author, undertaking the office of consolation upon this ground, doth from the first to the last conceal, as if he feared to discover the shameful nakedness of his cause, which I have adventured to display, and whereof I desire the indifferent reader would judge. So that indeed this discourse is a new snare rather, to entangle a poor soul in sadness and heaviness inextricable, fowler-like, than any true office of consolation, where she may escape as a bird, out of the first snare of the Fowler, by breaking it and delivering her. Indeed these grounds of hope and comfort, a Minister cannot make use of, that holds absolute Reprobation. What sober man would expect he should: but such a one is never a whit the worse comforter for that; For as for these grounds, I have already discovered them, to be void of all truth, of all sobriety. For if men be not absolutely Reprobated from the grace of faith and of repentance, but conditionally, (For as for the denying of glory, or inflicting damnation, we utterly deny that God hath decreed that they shall have their course absolutely according to the mere pleasure of his will, having made a Law according whereunto he purposeth to proceed therein) it became this Author, performing the part of a Comforter on this ground, to make known the condition which he utterly declineth. And with all I have showed the reasons of his carriage thus in Hugger Mugger, to wit, that their shameful Tenets might not break forth, and be brought to light, We abhor to say that God gives the grace of faith and repentance according to men's works; We abhor to say that God works in men the act of believing and repenting, provided they will believe and repent; or that he works in them the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 velle of every good work modovelint. But our comsolations proceed, as I have showed, in this manner, If any man man doth believe and repent, we can assure such a one by our doctrine that he is an elect of God; this Arminians by their doctrine cannot, as who maintain that a true believer may fall a way from grace and be damned; which is to hold the souls of the best children of God upon the rack of fears, and terrors, and tortures continually, and make them walk as it were upon pinnacles of the Temple; for they have no assurance of steadfastness, but in their own wills, to keep them from dropping into Hell fire, which burneth under them. If men do not believe and repent; we will inquire into the cause of their fears & grounds of their apprehensions that they are Reprobates; and show that they have no just cause for such apprehensions whether it be the conscience of their sin; or want of faith that doth affright them; For as much as the holiest men living before their calling, had as great cause to be affrighted as they; yet had they thereupon conceived themselves to be Reprobates, this had been but an erroneous conceit. If perhaps it be not the conscience of sin in general, that affrights them, but rather the conscience of some sin in special, which they conceive to be a sin unto death, or a sin against the Holy Ghost, which they conceive to be unpardonable; we will confer with them thereabouts, and try whether they understand aright the nature of that sin, and endeavour to scatter those mists of illusions in this particular, which Satan hath raised, desiring to swallow them up in desperation; if it do not prove to be a sin against the Holy Ghost, we will set them in a course to get the spirit of faith and of repentance. For albeit God alone can give them, yet seeing his Word is a Word of power, even a voice that pierceth the graves; we willperswade them to give themselves to be wrought upon by God's Word, and we will pray for them who yet want spirit to pray for themselves. And albeit they cannot prepare themselves in a gracious manner to the hearing of God's Word, yet let them come; and when they are come let his Word work; yet if forthwith we have not that comfortable experience of God's goodness towards us, let us not give over to wait at the lords gates, and to give attendance at the posts of his door. Give him leave to be the Master of his own times, let us not prescribe unto him; We know his course is to call some at one hour of the day some at an other, and at the very last hour he calleth some. This is the way of consolation that we take. We do not take any such course as this Author at his pleasure obtrudes upon us, that God would have all to be saved, and that Christ died for all; I have already set forth this Author's collusions in his triple universality of God's love, Christ's death, and and of the Covenant of grace. We rather will exhort him to believe, and herein we will take such course as God in his Word hath directed us unto; and we will pray unto God that his Word may be, as the rain that cometh down, and the snow from Heaven & returneth not thither, but watereth the earth, and maketh it bring forth, & bu●d hat it may give seed to the sour, and bread to him that eateth. So his Word may be that goeth out of his mouth, it may not return unto him void, but accomplish that which he will, and proper in the thing whereto he sends it, And remove all vain grounds of apprehensions of terrible things against themselves; What if a great many be reprobated from grace, and shall never have any part in Christ? it doth not follow that this afflicted soul is any of them; what one is there of the children of God which was not sometimes dead in sin: and if pangs of childbirth go before the delivering of a child into the world of nature, why should it seem strange that pangs of childbirth are suffered before a man be brought forth in to the world of grace? And these fears and terrors wherewith this poor soul is perplexed, may be unto her as pangs of childbirth, to bring her forth into a new world. We say that by God's Word we are to conceive that ye are elected upon our faith and repentance; Thus Paul concluded the election of the Thessalonians. 1 Thess. 1. 3, 4. And 2 Thess. 2. 13. Thus Melancthon would have us seek it; but by the Arminian doctrine it is in vain to seek after it, for as much as none can find it. We acknowledge that as our Saviour saith, Few are chosen, therefore we admonish every one, to strive to enter in at the strait gate. This was our Saviour's exhortation, delivered by way of answer to a question made unto him by his Apostles, Whether there were but few that should be saved. We teach that Christ hath died for the people of God, for the elect of God, for his Church, for his body, not only to make satisfaction for sin, and to procure salvation for them, in case they believe, but to procure also the Holy Spirit for them to make them believe and repent, etc. And this is wrought by the word, which is the sword of the spirit. We take not the course he obtrudes upon us; We make no such distinctions for the consolation of the afflicted as he feigns: We deal plainly, and spare not to profess, that albeit salvation is open to all that believe, and that by the ordinance of God; yet that no man is able of himself to believe or repent, for as much as the Scripture testifies, that all are dead in sin in the state of nature, and led captive by the Devil to do his will; and that the very Law of God, doth strengthen sin, such being the course of man's corruption, that the more he is forbidden this or that, the more it provokes him to transgress, taking occasion by the law to work in man's heart all manner of concupiscence; this is our course, to beat down the pride of man, and beat out of him all conceit of ability to do any good, as of himself; and so to cast him down at the feet of God's mercy. Yet God is able by his grace to quicken him; and being brought up in the Church of God, wherein is the balm of Gilead able to heal our ways be they never so sinful and that that is administered, not according to the vile works of men, (as if they had, any power to prepare them for the participation of God's grace,) but of the mere favour and good pleasure of God, Who calleth (as the Apostle speaks 2 Tim. 1. 9) with an holy calling, not according to our own works, but according to his own purpose and grace; And that for the merits of Christ, who hath merited not only pardon of sin and salvation for all that believe, but faith also, and regeneration for all his elect; and being as we are members of God's Church, we have no cause to despair, but sooner or later God may call us as continually he doth some or other, and we know not how soon our turn may come. And as for God's purpose touching the performance of the condition of faith; we plainly profess, That God purposed to give faith and repentance only to his elect, according to that, Act. 13. 48. As many believed, as were ordained to everlasting life; And Acts 2. last. God added daily to his Church such as should be saved. Now hear I pray their doctrine on the other side, which set out our manner of consolation, devised most ridiculously at their own pleasure, so to expose our doctrine to scorn. Doth God purpose to bestow faith and repentance upon any other besides his elect? This they must avouch if they contradict us, and that he purposeth to bestow it on all and every one; but how? Not absolutely on any, that is, not according to the mere pleasure of his will; how then? Surely conditionally, to wit, according to men's works; that so not Semipelagianism only, but plain Pelagianism may be commended unto God's Church for true Christianisme. And what is that work in man, whereupon God works faith or repentance in them? Surely the will to believe, the will to repent. So that if all men will believe, will repent, then in good time through God's grace they shall believe, they shall repent; and if this be not to crown God's grace with a crown of scorns, as Christ himself was crowned with a Crown of Thorns, I willingly profess I know not what it is. We utterly deny that God hath two wills, one contrary to the other. We acknowledge that in Scripture phrase God's commandment is called his will, as, This is the will of God even your sanctification, 1 Thess. 4. 3. But this is not that will of God which the Apostle speaks of, when he saith, Who hath resisted his will, Rom. 9 19, For his will of commandment is resisted too oft. But the will he speaketh off, there is the will of God's purpose and decree, whereof the Psalmist speaks, saying, Whatsoever the Lord will that hath he done both in Heaven and earth. Now suppose God command Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac, and yet decrees that Isaac shall not be sacrificed, both which are as true, as the word of God is true, yet there is no contradiction. For as much as his commandment signifies only Gods will, what shall be Abraham's duty to do, not what shall be done by Abraham; On the other side God's decree signifies what shall not be done by Abraham. Now what contradiction I pray is there between these, It is God's will that it shall be Abraham's duty to sacrifice Isaac, but it is not God's will that Isaac shall be sacrificed by Abraham; for as much as when Abraham comes to the point of sacrificing Isaac, the Lord purposeth to hold his hand. In like manner God commanded Pharaoh to let Israel go; It was his will then, that it should be Pharaohs duty to let Israel go; but withal he to●d Moses that he would harden Pharaohs heart, that he should not let Israel go; whereby it is man i● est, that God decreed that Israel should not be dismissed by Pharaoh for a while, and that (as is signified in the Text) to make way for his judgements to be brought upon the land of Egypt, whereby God meant to glorify himself, as in the sight of Pharaoh, and of his Egyptians, so in the sight of the children of Israel, and of the bordering Nations; No contradiction at all in this, no more than God's word is found to contradict itself. And nothing but ignorance makes our adversaries so bold as to impute contradiction to us in this. We grant willingly that God did intend that most should never believe and repent; For as much as he intended to deny the gift of faith and repentance unto most, as it is apparent he doth; neither dares any Arminian deny it. Only they feign, that God would give faith and repentance unto all, in case they would prepare themselves; which not only includes manifest Pelagianisme, but over and above ends in nonsense, as I have but erst, and often times before, made as clear as the Sun. God's eternal rejection of many thousands, which is impossible to be avoided, (for how is it possible, that what was from everlasting, should be avoided by man or Angel, who are brought forth in time, not to have been from everlasting?) though it be all one with the answers of the tempted, and is contradictory to the comforts, which this Author deviseth out of his own brain, and proposeth too in a most colluding manner, as before I have showed; and withal not so well sorting with the manner of comforts which he feigns, and at mere pleasure obtrudes upon us, (which yet he cannot evacuate without betraying the shameful nakedness of his cause, when denying God to bestow the gift of faith and repentance absolutely on whom he will, and according to the mere pleasure of his will, he is driven to manifest how he takes sanctuary in Pelagianism, maintaining the grace of faith and repentance, to be conferred by God on men according to their works; and that in a most unsober manner, as I have showed at large;) yet notwithstanding is this eternal decree of God concerning the rejection of man, nothing contrariant to better grounds of consolation ministered by our doctrine, than any can be ministered by Arminians: as who do not so much as undertake to minister better comfort to any, than such as is common to them with Reprobates. But as for all those that are brought up in the Church of God, who we can assure them that there is no cause (excepting guilt of that sin which is unto death, or which is against the Holy-Ghost) why any of them should conceive themselves to be Reprobates; nay the affliction of conscience being the most ordinary means, whereby God doth prepare men for a comfortable translation out of the state of nature, into the state of grace; they have cause to conceive comfort in this, that these fears and terrors may be as pangs of childbirth, to deliver their souls into the world of the sons of God; and this valley of Anchor, a door of hope; & this Bethany (a house of sorrow or mourning) the highway unto the vision of Peace; as Bethany was commonly taken by our Saviour in his way unto Jerusalem. For conclusion, we have heard a strange cracking of thorns in this, but all proves but a squib; their best light of consolation, goes out in an unsavoury snuff of Pelagianisme. Let us remember, though Thunder, and Earthquakes, and Lightning, have their course in the vain imaginations of men, yet God is still and ever will be, in the small voice of his word. Let us give God's truth, the glory of our consolation; As for Error, and that dangerous error in defacing the glory of God's grace, let us never seek any comfort therein, and let them that love it, take what comfort in it they can; I do not envy them, but rather pity them; I would their hearts served them to have compassion upon themselves. DISCOURSE. SECT. IV. SEcondly, it leaves a Minister weak grounds only, and insufficient to quiet the tempted, and therefore it makes him unable to comfort. His grounds that are left him are insufficient, because they cannot convince, and make it evident to the understanding of the tempted, that he is not that which he fears (i. e.) a Reprobate: out of temptation probabilities will uphold a man's hopes, (as they did Manoahs' wife: Judg. 13. 22, 23. If the Lord would kill us he would not have received a burnt offering at our hands, nor showed us all these things;) because men are not so mistrustful then: but in temptation men are very suspicious and incredulous, like Jacob, who would not be persuaded that Joseph was alive, and a great man in Egypt, till he saw the Chariots that were sent to fetch him thither, Gen. 45. 25. And like Thomas, who would not believe that Christ was risen till he saw the print of the nails and spear. john 20. 25. They will not believe any thing that is said for their comfort, till it be made so apparent, that they have nothing to say to the contrary. Myself have known some, who in their temptations have often put their comforters to their proofs, to their protestations, nay to their oaths too, before they would believe their words of comfort. And in this temptation, men are so strongly possessed with a fear of the greatest evil in the World, eternal rejection from God, that they will not easily, without manifest conviction, believe the contrary. But such grounds as these, a Minister that holds absolute reprobation hath not, he can say nothing that is able to make it appear infallibly, and avoidable to the tempted, that he is no absolute reprobate. All that he can say is, Be of good comfort, you are a believer, you are a true repenting sinner; therefore no reprobate; for faith and repentance are fruits of election, and arguments of a state contrary to that which you fear. But this the tempted will deny, he will say that he is no believer, etc. And how will the Minister convince him that he is? He must prove to him by the outward acts of faith and repentance, (for they are only apparent to him,) that he doth repent and believe, but this proof is not demonstrative, doth not convince him, because opera virtutum simulari possunt, the external acts of saith, repentance or any other grace, may be counterfeited; The Devil may seem to be an Angel of light, Wolves may go in Sheep's clothing; Judas may make the World believe by his Preaching and following Christ, that he is a true Apostle; And Simon Magus (though he remain in the gall of bitterness, and bond of iniquity,) may be thought by his receiving of Baptism, to be a true believer; And so may any Hypocrite by some exterior act, of faith and repentance, cousin the best discerner of spirits among men, and gain the opinion and esteem of a true penitent and believer. Actions externally good or good in appearance, may be evil indeed for want of a good rule, a good manner, a good end, & some other good circumstances, with which an action which is good must be clothed [For bonum non oritur nisi ex integris.] and so by consequence cannot certainly prove the man that doth them to be a good man, or to have the grace of faith, repentance, or any other, truly planted in his heart. Which being so (I say) that the Minister cannot, by the eternal acts and fruits of faith and repentance, which he seeth come from him, make it evident to the tempted (for the silencing of all replies) that he is (without doubt) a true believer, and a true repentant, and consequently no reprobate. For still the tempted may say, You may be deceived in me, for you can see not a whit more in me, than hath been seen in many a Reprobate; If this be all you can say to prove me to be none, I am not satisfied, I may be a Reprobate, nay I am a Reprobate, and you are but a miserable comforter, a Physician of no value. This that I say Piseator doth ingeniously confess, where he saith, that no comfort can possibly be Piscat. contra Shafman de praedest. Thes. 85. instilled into the souls of Reprobates afflicted with this temptation; Whence it follows, that the greatest part of men, must bear their burden (if they fall into this trouble) as well as they can; the Gospel cannot afford them any sound comfort. 2. That the elect in this case may be comforted, but it must be this way, viz. by their feeling of the burden of sin, and their desire to be freed from it by Christ; which proofs (as I have said) are but only probable not infallible arguments of a man's election, and therefore unsufficient comforts. And in the end of the same Thesis, where he saith, That a man should reason thus with himself, Grace is offered to some, with a mind of communicating it to them, therefore it may be that I am in that number; he implies that the doctrine of absolute Reprobation, which teacheth this communication of grace to some few only, affords but [a fieri potest] a peradventure I am elected, for a poor soul to comfort himself withal. TWISSE. Consideration. IN the last place we are to consider how truly he affirmeth that our doctrine leaveth a Minister none but weak grounds, and those insufficient to quiet the tempted. And whereas he saith We cannot conceive, and make it evident to the understanding of the tempted that he is not (that which he fears) a Reprobate; we willingly acknowledge it. For not to be a reprobate is to be an elect. Now how can any Arminian convince and make it evident to the understanding (I do not say of the tempted, but) of one that is a believer, and walks on comfortablely in the ways of Godliness; is he (I say) able to convince such a one, and make it evident unto him that he is one of Gods elect? I do not think they dare profess that they presume they can; or make it evident to their own understanding, that themselves are of the number of Gods elect. How unreasonable then is this course, to require of us to convince a man, that acknowledgeth neither faith nor repentance in him, (for this is the condition of a man tempted, as himself fashioneth it;) and to make it evident to his understanding that he is an elect and no reprobate; when himself cannot convict him that believeth of this; no nor their own consciences neither, notwithstanding all their confidence, that they alone are in the right way of salvation. Was there ever heard a more unreasonable course then this? Again, to fear to be a reprobate, or lest he be a Reprobate, is one thing, to persuade himself that he is a Reprobate, and to despair thereupon, is another thing. We say, and that according to our Doctrine, that there is no cause why any man (who hath not sinned the sin unto death, the sin against the Holy Ghost) should persuade himself that he is a Reprobate and despair thereupon; we do not say there is no cause of fear. In as much as he hath no evidence of his election, there is just cause to fear; but then again, seeing he neither hath nor can have any evidence of his reprobation (excepting the guilt of the sin against the Holy Ghost) he hath every way as good cause to hope. And for the comforting of such a one, I would make bold to tell him that there is more hope of such a one as himself, then of those who go on in the ways of their own heart, and in the light of their own eyes without all remorse and check of conscience, without fear or wit, not considering that for all these things God will bring them to judgement. And towards such I would think it fit to use all means and motives to make them fear. The Apostle seems to me to take the like course with better men than such, even with such as went on in a fair and comfortable profession of Gospel; namely to make them fear and suspect themselves, as when he saith, Prove youre selves whether you are in the faith, examine yourselves. Know ye not that Christ is in you except ye be Reprobates. 2 Cor. 13. 5. And for good reason; for as Paul was jealous over the Corinthians with a Godly jealousy, for fear, least as the Serpent beguiled Eve through his subtlety, so their minds should be corrupt from that simplicity which is in Christ. 2 Cor. 11. 2, 3. And in like manner entertained fear, lest when he came he should not find them such as he would, and that he should be found unto them such as they would not etc. 2 Cor. 12. In like manner I should think it is good for a man to be jealous over himself with a godly jealousy, lest their minds should be corrupt, their ways corrupt, more than they are a ware of, and there upon give themselves to the examining of themselves and to the searching and trying of their ways whereunto the Holy Ghost exhorts us, Lament. 3. 40. And there is good comfort to be taken in such a jealousy, such a fear, such a course; For we find that the spirit of bondage making us to fear, is the forerunner of the spirit of adoption, whereby we cry Abba Father, Rom. 8. 15. Certainly they are in better case, and nearer to the Kingdom of God, than such as fear not, yet is their no cause of despair, for as much as the elect of God had no evidence of their election before their calling; Nay, after their calling they may be much afflicted with the fears and terrors of God, thinking themselves to be in worse case, than indeed they are. David found cause to pray that God would restore him to the joy of his Salvation; yet Bertius would not say that David was fallen from grace, and that propter graves causas; yet who hath written more eagarly to maintain that Saints may fall away from grace then Bertius? But this Author bears before him such a spirit of confidence, as if he would have all men ordered by his rules. When Manoahs' Wife, Judg. 13. 22, 23. discourseth thus, If the Lord would kill us he would not have received a burnt offering at our hands, nor showed us these things; He doth obtrude upon us that Manoahs' Wife had no faith, but only a probability of this; that is his gloss; yet this acceptation of a burnt offering at their hands was manifested by no less than a miracle; and the difference between Abel's offering and Cain's offering is laid down to be this, that The Lord had respect to Abel, and to his offering; but unto Cain and to his offering he had no regard. Gen. 4. 4, 5. And David's prayer for acceptation, and finding favour at the hands of God is set down in this manner, amongst other particulars, Let him remember all thine offerings, and turn thy burnt offerings into ashes, Psal, 20. 3. Yet why should he conceive that Manoah and his Wife were not in temptation, and that a very sore one, strengthened with the express word of God, namely, that No man can see God & live; which in these days was generally received amongst them & applied by them in this particular. For Manoah said unto his Wife, we shall surely die because we have seen God; & could a probability to the contrary put by such a temptation as this? How was the great Prophet Esay exercised with this when he cried out, Woe is me, for I am undone, because Esay 6. I am a man of polluted lips, and dwell in the midst of a people of polluted lips, for mine eyes have seen the King and Lord of Hosts. What temptation hath he that thinks himself a reprobate like unto this, excepting still the guilt of that sin which is unto death? What ground of Scripture can they represent to prove that they are reprobates; as those Ancients had ground for this, that they must die who had seen God? It is one thing to be in temptation, it is an other thing to yield to the temptation, and to be overcome with it; and that upon no ground, which yet this Author confounds, as a course very propitious for his turn, and suitable with the part that he acteth. As for Jacob, the cause was this, he that now enjoyed as it were, the death of Joseph for many years; his sons pretending they knew not what became of him; yet brought his Coat imbrued with blood unto their old Father, who there upon conceived some evil beast had devoured him; and who could expect that at the first hearing he should believe now the report of the same sons to the contrary; especially considering how those brethren of joseph were astonished when Joseph himself told them, saying, I am Joseph, doth my father yet live? for the text saith, his brethren could not answer him, for they were astonished Gen. 45. 3. at his presence. And though jacob at the first believed not the report, they made to be true, yet neither is it said, or likely, that he believed it to be false. But the Text saith, his heart failed him, denoting a condition between hope and fear, as the Geneva noteth in the Margin. As for Thomas his incredulity, which he ascribeth unto a temptation; v. 26. he may as well ascribe the infidelity of Turks & Jews unto a temptation. The person tempted here represented doth not say (I hope) as Thomas did, Except I see in his hands the print of the nails, and put my finger into the print of the nails, and put my hand into joh. 20. his side I will not believe it. And what power do Arminians attribute unto temptation, do they ascribe more unto it, then to the operation of God which with them extends no farther than this, as touching grace, then to excite them to believe, which yet they may resist if they will? And may they not also resist the Devil's temptations if they will? Especially considering that in persuading them that they are Reprobates the Devil proceeds upon no ground, which is not common to every one of Gods elect, when he saith They will not believe any thing that is said for their comfort, till it be made so apparent that they have nothing to say to the contrary. It seems this Author hath had some extraordinary experience of the condition of persons tempted, I had thought the condition of persons (not tempted only, but) giving way to the temptation, had been for the most part unreasonable, until it pleaseth God to bring them to their right wits: and like as fears property is to betray the succours that reason offereth; so is the Devil's practice to take them off from attending that to they cannot answer, and holding them to their uncomfortable conclusions, in despite of the weakness of their own premises and strength of contrary principles; Excepting the case of finning against the Holy Ghost, which was the case of Francis Sptra, and accordingly his conclusions were most true as his premises strong; and his comforters had little or nothing to say to the contrary. And in such a case the only course to quench the fiery darts of desperation, is to inquire diligently about the matter of fact, whether he hath committed any such sin as he layeth to his charge; and thereupon to discourse of the nature of that sin, which is commonly called a sin unto death, and not only so, but a sin against the Holy Ghost, which our Saviour pronounceth to be unpardonable; and the Apostle signifieth as much, when he saith that in such a case, there is no more sacrifice for sin, but a fearful expectation of fire. And it may be, this Author's discourse, runneth with reference to such examples as this of Spira, but fashioned at pleasure to serve his turn, as formerly he did set down the story out of Coelius Secundus & Calvin as he said, but without any quotation of the place where. But to enter upon a comparison between their doctrine and ours, and that upon supposition of this rule delivered by him. I say first, that by our doctrine, we can make it so evidently appear, that the tempted hath no ground at all to conceive himself to be a reprobate, whatsoever his condition be, (except guiltiness of the sin against the Holy Ghost) I say we can make it so evident, that neither he, nor any Arminian, can say any reasonable thing to the contrary; not denying but that they may say enough to the contrary in an unreasonable manner. And my reason is, because whatsoever his condition be, it is no other than is incident to one of Gods elect. Secondly, I say, as touching the Arminian doctrine, two things; The first is this, There is no condition of man so holy in this life, as whereby any man can have any assurance, by Arminian doctrine, that he is an elect of God, and consequently no reprobate, much less can they give any assurance to any man in the time of temptation (as this Author speaks of it) that he is no reprobate. The Second is this, Arminians can give assurance to no man that he is no reprobate; for as much as all their grounds of comfort are common to the reprobate as well as to the elect: wherehence it manifestly followeth, that their doctrine can afford no better comfort than a reprobate is capable of. For their grounds are universal as they profess, that is common to all, to wit, as touching the love of God, that it is common to all; as touching the death of Christ, that he died for all; as touching the Covenant of grace, that it also is common to all. And if this will comfort any man, namely, to be assured, that he is in as good a case as any Turk or Saracen, or any reprobate in the World, I find this Author is ready to assure them hereof, and rather than fail he will swear it, though I never heard matter of faith put to be tried by man's Oath till now: I had thought only matters of fact, had been tryable and assurable by Oath, not matter of faith. Yet I will not spare to profess, that though they should swear either of these universalities to be true, I would no more believe them then I would believe the Devil. For the Apostle adviseth, saying, Though that we or an Angel from Heaven Preach unto you otherwise then that which we have Preached unto you, let him be accursed. Gal 1. 8. But let us examine the comfortable nature of these universalities, whether they be such as a sober man can say nothing to the contrary. I begin with the universality of God's love; the comfort herehence proceeds thus, as I conceive; God loves all, wills all to be saved, therefore thou art no reprobate. Now consider whether I may not soberly say to the contrary, that by the same reason there is no reprobate in the World, or ever was; whence it follows, that I have no more comfortable assurance that I am no reprobate, than I have assurance that there is no Reprobate at all in the World. Secondly, would you have me believe hand over head, that God would have all to be saved without distinction; may not I soberly inquire, whether your meaning be, that God will have all and every one to be saved, whether they believe or no, whether they repent or no; or only thus, That God will have all to be saved in case they believe and repent, not otherwise. Now this is our doctrine, as well as yours, grounded upon this Scripture, Whosoever believeth shall be saved. Now doth this doctrine assure any man that he is no Reprobate, nor of the number of those whom God hath rejected from salvation? Perhaps you will say, it is sufficient to assure him, that he is no absolute reprobate, and that so this Author is to be understood, though hitherto in this Section he delivered it simply. Admit this, Now judge I pray you, whether I may soberly oppose against it thus; Although I am no absolute reprobate, yet if I am a reprobate, and may be as much assured of it, as that there is any reprobate in the World, what comfort can arise to my poor afflicted soul from hence. Again consider, that neither we who oppose Arminians, do maintain that God hath ordained to deny any man salvation absolutely, but only conditionally, to wit, in case he die in sin without faith, without repentance. But suppose I am persuaded, that God hath rejected me from the grace of faith and of repentance, what comfort can you Arminians administer to my sick soul in this case? For dare you deny faith and repentance to be a gift of God? So than if I conceive myself to be a reprobate from grace, will you comfort me by saying, that I am no absolute reprobate from grace? Then belike God hath determined to give or deny grace, not according to the mere pleasure of his will, but according to men's works; And have you no better balm of Gilead to administer to a sick soul, then to take sanctuary in such a Doctrine as is direct and flat Pelagianism? In the same sober manner we shall have somewhat to say against that comfort that is reached forth to an afflicted soul, from the universality of Christ's death; Thou doubtest thou art a reprobate, but be of good cheer, for Christ died for all and every one; as much as to say, thou hast no more cause to believe that thou art a reprobate, then to believe that there is any reprobate in the world. Secondly, be of good cheer, for albeit thou art a reprobate, and God foreseeing thou wilt die in sin, hath from everlasting ordained thee to condemnation, as well a Judas that betrayed Christ; yet I can assure thee, thou art no absolute reprobate no more than Judas was. And whereas it may be thou art verily persuaded, that he that believes and reputes, and perseveres herein, shall not be damned, for as much as all confess, that God hath not ordained that damnation shall be inflicted absolutely, according to the mere pleasure of God, but merely according to men's works; but all thy fear is, lest thou art reprobated from grace, and that absolutely; considering that God (as it seems) in the giving and denying of grace proceeds merely according to the mere pleasure of his will, because the Apostle saith, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. Rom. 9 18. Yet be of good cheer, for I can assure thee, that is nothing so; but as there are no absolute reprobates from glory, and unto damnation, so there are no absolute reprobates from grace, but merely conditionally it is that men are reprobated from grace, like as merely conditionally God doth elect men unto grace: And to speak in plain terms without dissimulation; God gives faith and repentance unto men, according as they dispose themselves thereunto, for want of which disposition, he denies it unto others. And if thou desirest to be more particularly informed in this mystery for thine unspeakable consolation; know for certain, that if thou wilt believe and repent, thou shalt believe and repent. And albeit in the Synod of Palestine, anno 415. it was concluded, That grace is not given according unto merits, and Pelagius was driven to subscribe thereto, for fear of excommunication too, in case he had refused it; yet take this comfortable mystery along with thee; that this was but a fruit of the Predestinarian Heresy; which that very year if thou markest the story well, had his original, and was brought forth into the World. And lastly, as touching the universality of the Covenant of grace, that is as comfortable as the former; for all are under it, and therefore thou amongst the rest, and consequently thou art no more a reprobate than any other; certainly no absolute reprobate, for there are none such; judas was not, and therefore thou mayst assure thyself thou art not. And indeed there are none that maintain, that God decreed, that any man should be denied glory or damned absolutely, but only conditionally, to wit, in case he finally persevere in infidelity or impenitency: And whereas thou mayst fear lest thou art absolutely reprobated from grace, to wit, from the grace of faith and repentance; take heart and fear no colours. For albeit it be fit to confess, considering the times that faith and repentance are the gifts of God, yet know that God doth not dispense them, according to the mere pleasure of his will, but according to men's works, whatsoever some men cry out to the contrary, charging us with Pelagianism; but if thou art wise thou wilt take comfort in this, as in true Christianisme. As for those that maintain absolute reprobation, none of them is able to make it appear unto thee, that thou art no absolute reprobate. And I willingly confess, that if faith and repentance be not evidences hereof, we are not able to make it appear, either to others that they are not, or to ourselves that we are not Reprobates. But by the way it is manifest, that this Author by his grounds, can give no assurance of election, no not to a believer no certainty of salvation; and yet he pretends to be a comforter, when he leaves him in doubt whether he shall be saved or damned; yet upon this pillow Arminians sleep sweetly, and presume that others may sleep sweetly also, that they are not absolutely reprobates; And no marvel; for even in the course of the holiest conversation, their doctrine can administer no assurance either of election or salvation. But perhaps they will say, though they can give no assurance of election absolute by their doctrine, yet they can give assurance of election conditional. But wherein I pray doth this consist? Forsooth in this, that if they finally persevere in this their holy conversation, they shall be saved. But I pray consider, Doth not our doctrine afford the same assurance as well as theirs? It cannot be denied, but that it doth, and more than so; for our doctrine gives assurance of perseverance in the state of grace, to them that are once in the state of grace; the Arminian doth not. And the Apostle assures the Thessalonians, that upon his knowledge they were the elect of God, and that from the work of their faith, the labour of their love, and the patience of their hope. 1 Thess. 1. 3. 4. And that the man of sin shall not prevail over them. 2 Thess. 2. 13. Because they are elect; whereof also he was assured (as there he signifies) by their sanctification and faith. It is true the outward acts of faith and repentance may be counterfited: And it is as true, that whether they be counterfeited or no, it may be discerned; otherwise why should the Apostle be so bold as to profess, and that by observation of their works, that he knew they were elect of God. 1 Thess. 1. 4. The Devil may transform himself into an Angel of light, but yet we have a sure Word of God, whereby to discern his practices to corrupt either our faith, or our manners, otherwise we poor Creatures were but in a very evil case: so his Ministers also transform themselves, crafty workers as they are, into Ministers of righteousness; but St Paul discovered them and warned the Corinthians of them; Wolves may go in sheep's clothing, but our Saviour assures us that we shall know them by their fruits; none more proper fruit of a false Prophet then his false doctrine; And we have a true touchstone to discover that, and make the Devil's claws to appear in their proper form and colours. And we know how soon Simon Magus discovered himself to be in the very gall of betterness, and bond of iniquity. Yet I nothing doubt but we may be deceived; but most commonly it comes to pass that Hypocrites are the greatest deceivers and cozeners of themselves; and it is not their condition to be exercised with fears lest they be Reprobates, and to confess that their faith, their repentance is counterfeit. It is most likely they deal without Hypocrisy in this. But when any do lay such sins to their own charge, we will not take them at their word, but we will inquire upon what grounds they deliver this & we will inquire whether now they are well pleased with this their former Hypocrisy; If so, what cause is there, why they should be disquieted in themselves upon the consideration of that wherein they are well pleased? But if it be their sorrow, if this cause heaviness of heart unto them; here we have a double evidence of some sparks of grace in them; First in confessing their former Hypocrisy. Secondly in being humbled with sorrow in the consideration of it; Now God hath promised, that if we confess our sins, God as he is faithful and just will forgive them. And if they are humbled in the consideration of it, and tremble at the apprehension of God's judgements against Hypocrites, they are so much the fitter for God to take up his habitation in their contrite heart and humble spirit Es. 57 15. And Es. 63. 2. I hope there is no miserable consolation in all this; To minister this Physic is to be a Physician of some value. And certainly whatsoever was our former course, whether in the way of profaneness, or the way of hypocrisy, when God brings us to consider it and to confess it, and to be acquainted with his fears, and terrors here upon, we have cause to conceive good hope, that God is now in a gracious way to draw them nearer unto him, who before were strangers from him. Certainly we will be bold to tell them, that there is no just cause why they should despair. I come to the last particular he insisteth upon; and that is Piscator's confession; which because he conceives it serves his turn, therefore he ascribes unto him ingenuity in this. But what saith Piscator? That no comfort can possibly be instilled into the souls of Reprobates. Piscator's words are these, Reproborum anxiis animis nulla consolatio instillari potest. This Author adds Possibly to make it the more weighty as he thinks. We acknowledge God to be the God of consolation, and his spirit alone to be the comforter, and if God will not give them Christ, surely they can have no true consolation in Christ; which yet depends merely upon supposition of the will of God; like as none but God can give rain; and if it be his will it shall rain to morrow or not rain, either shall come to pass according to his will, and it is impossible it should be otherwise then he willeth; yet is rain a contingent thing, and God will have it come to pass contingently, that is, so as with a possibility to the contrary. Now that God gives not all unto Christ, our Saviour professeth, John. 17. Thine they were and thou hast given them unto me; and afterwards, for their sakes I sanctify myself, This is spoken in reference unto the offering up of himself unto his Father upon the Cross, as Maldonate acknowledgeth to be the interpretation of all the Fathers, whom he he had read. He died we confess to procure Salvation for all that believe; but did he die to procure faith for all? If so, then either absolutely or conditionally. If absolutely, than all must believe and be saved. If conditionally, to wit, upon condition of some disposition of man, than it follows that Christ hath merited that faith should be conferred on men according to their works, which is manifest Pelagianism. But what is this to the purpose, namely, that comfort cannot be instilled into the souls of Reprobates? The question is of comforting the Tempted, not supposing them to be reprobates. For what ground have we to suppose any man to be a Reprobate, considering that there is no evidence hereof, but either the committing of sin against the Holy Ghost or final perseverance in infidelity or impenitency; and is it to be expected that Christian doctrine should afford any consolation unto these? But out of the case of sin committed against the Holy Ghost there is no cause why any man, living in the Church of God, should despair, or conceive himself to be Reprobate; albeit, until he believe in Christ, we can assure him that he is one of Gods elect; whereof the Arminian doctrine can give no assurance albeit men do believe, and albeit an Angel from Heaven should assure them that their faith is a true faith. It is true Reprobates must bear their burden of discomfort that know themselves to be Reprobates; but who are they? For my part I know none, nor do I know any reason why any man should conceive himself to be of that number, unless he hath sinned against the Holy Ghost, and let them look to that who oppose the truth of God, and blaspheme it against their conscience. Therefore to talk of a burden that is to be borne by we know not whom in particular, no nor they themselves who are of that number, is a very vain discourse. 2. As for that which Piscator saith of the elect, it is to be understood only at such a time as when they begin to feel the burden of sin; which is not always with the first, nor at the same time in all. As for that he saith of feeling the burden of sin, and a desire to be freed from it by Christ, that they are only probable not infallible arguments of election. I answer, First it is better to have probable arguments of election than none at all; neither am I privy to any probable argument of a man's election that may be attained to by the doctrine of Arminians. Secondly a man may have good ground of consolation, though he hath not yet any infallible argument of his election; First in as much as Christ calleth and encourageth such a one to come unto him, saying, Come unto me all ye that travail, and are heavy laden. Blind Bartimeus was not a little comforted when it was told him, that Christ called him; how much more when we hear him calling us; Secondly in as much as he doth not only bid us to come unto him, but promiseth that he will ease us, and what is that but that he will comfort us. And it is no small comfort to be in the way to the obtaining infallible arguments of a man's election. Lastly, to desire to be freed from sin by Christ's, is it any less than to hunger and thirst after righteousness; And hath not our Saviour pronounced all such blessed, and promised they shall be filled? That the grace of Salvation is communicated to some few is a thing with out question; For if but few be chosen as our Saviour professeth, undoubtedly there are but few that are saved. And directly our Saviour signifies as much, when he answers to the question proposed by his Disciples (whether but few shall be saved) in this manner, strive to enter in at the straight gate &c: & for a man to conceive that it may be he is one of the number of Gods elect, is enough to keep him from despair, and from conceiving that he is a Reprobate. Secondly, this is spoken of him that is yet but in the way to the state of grace: Whereas by the Arminian doctrine he can have no better asurance, though he be in the state of grace. Lastly, Piscator gives to understand that this doctrine doth afford this comfort, to wit, in the apprehension of a possibility that he is elect; he doth not say that it affords but this: Nay, by his doctrine he manifesteth how the way is open to a far better consolation than this, to every one that groans under the burden of sin, and desires to be freed from it by Christ, which he expresseth and concludeth in this manner, Whosoever feels the burden of his sin desiring to be freed from it by Christ, and craving the grace of God, him Christ will ease and save. Mat. 11. last. But thou feelest the burden of thy sins, and desirest to be freed from it by Christ, and cravest the grace of God, etc. For in this case he conceives there is a difference between such a one and a Reprobate. For Reprobates in such a case, feeling the burden of their sins, do not seek the grace of God, but rather fly from him as from a severe judge; as he shows by the instances of Cain and Judas. And indeed until there be in man some better condition wrought then in a Reprobate, what ground have we to conceive better of him then of a Reprobate, Nor that he is to be concluded to be a Reprobate, but both our judgement concerning him and his judgement concerning himself is to be suspended; considering that there was a time when the best of God's children were in such a case, yet afterwards it hath appeared that even in that former uncomfortable condition, they were the very elect of God, and in like manner as comfortable may be the condition of these, we know not how soon; For God calls some sooner, others latter. ERRATA. PAge 2. line 27. read affect: p. 4. l. 15. r. so also to regenerate himself, & indeed as we are commanded to believe, so etc. p. 10. l. 20. r. that desert. p. 11. l. 43. r. first. p. 13. l. 57 alleged, acknowledging. p. 15. l. 36. amica. p: 17. l. 42. but by. p: 21. l. 2. course. p: 25. l: 32. thee. p. 26. l. 1. manner. ib. l: ult. of paena. p: 27. l: 33. Then. p: 31. l. 19 have God. ib: l. 56. did not. p: 33. l. 47. in his. p: 34. l. 24. proposito. p: 35. l: 2. concession. p: 37. l: 7. so he decreed to bestow it on whom he will. p: 39 l: 12. positions. p: 40. l: 33. addicitis. l. 41. oderit. p: 43. l: 43. Anianus. l: 58 praeveniri. p: 45. l: 34. loath. p: 47. l. 53. gratiam. p: 48. l: 21. libro. p. 51. l. 34. conditionality. p: 53. l: 20. diluatur. l. 53. neque enim. p: 56. l: 26. labitur. p: 59 l: 1. peace. l: 23. as that. p: 62. l: 19 pejores. l: 35. coram rudioribus, p: 63. l: 5. D. Andreas. l: 49. suspected. p: 65. l: 12. bespeak. p: 66. l: 39 have not. p: 68 l. 23. too bright. l: 54. finding out. p: 70. l: 44. Saturn. p: 73. l: 44. premit. p. 75. l. 22. deal de. l. 47. necessarium fore. p: 76. l: 26. puritate tutius, nihil ad discendum veritate facilius. p: 77. l. 4. or any. p: 78. l: 46. conciliare. p: 80. l: 12. but by. p: 82. l: 39 worthily. p: 84. l: 15. of other. ib. l: 17. of any. p: 89. l. 50. or to Beza and his brethren accusing Lutherans of those errors. p. 92. l. ult. libero. p: 93. l. 6, 7. facite. p: 94. l: 1. necessarily. p: 95. l: 8. resolves it. p: 97. l: 41. vessels on. p: 98. l: 41. à Zenone. p: 99 l. 2. scio. p. 108. l. 20. po. sit. l. 32. addition. p: 109. l. 33. distinguish. p. 110. l. 20. the two. p. 112. l: 59 voluisse. p. 117. l. 7. patientiam. p: 119. l: 5. or the. p. 136. l: 7. than he. p: 140. l. 30. & non omnipotent. p: 142. l. 4. quiddam. l. 13. nasceretur. l. 39 Supralapsarian. p: 143. l: 5. stroke. p: 147. l: 52. as Lord. p. 151. l: 5. more largely. p. 162. l: 2. conceited. p: 199. l. 26. this belike. p: 201. l. 20. filth. p. 202. l. 12. patientiam. p: 244. l: 51. apostatarum. p: 207. l. 27. definition of. p: 210. l: 50. it doth end in a will conditional; p. 211. l. 39 poor fish. p: 221. l: 27. by this have all the godly at all times encouraged themselves to well doing, as we may see generally. Phil. 3. 20. Colloss: 1. 5. Tit. 2. 12, 13. and particularly, Heb. 11. Abraham & c- p: 223. l. 31. lame post. p: 224. l: 1. good ways. p: 229 l: 10. absolutely? l: 59 histrionical. p. 230. l: 11. quosdam. l. 31. law of. p. 233. l: 1. burning of. l. 14. employed. p. 234. l: 12. yet his. l: 30. was it. p: 236. l: 52. premises. p. 237. l. 36. vel accepta perseverantia. l: 49. deal its. l. 54. ista cum. p. 240. l: 5. is there. p: 242. l: 21. a certain. l: 22. there he gives and works faith in that one, and not in another. p: 243. l: 48. praecepta. p. 248. l. 58. proposeth this. p. 249. l. 9 is this. p: 253. l: 30. fatum. p. 254. l. 4. morietur. p. 256. l. 14. and persovere. l. 23. indifferent. p. 259. l. 23 if they had we. p. 260. l. ult. heresy. p: 264. l: 17. deal them. p: 270. l. 37. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 273. l: 39 purposeth thus. p. 275. l. 3. marcuerat. p. 277. l: 11. did rest. p. 282. l. 6. if it. l: 15. from bream. l. 42. change of. p. 287. l: 57 upon what p. 291. l. 34. deal who. p. 292. l. 36. external. p. 298. l. 7. comforter and that all the consolation which he ministers is in Christ and if. l: 30. we cannot. p. 299. l. 19 not that. THE SECOND BOOK, BEING AN EXAMINATION OF Certain passages inserted into Mr HORD'S discourse (formerly answered) by an Author that conceals his name, but was supposed to be Mr MASON Rector of Saint Andrews Vndershaft in LONDON. OXFORD, Printed by H. HALL. for TH. ROBINSON. 1653. TO THE READER. THe Author of this Treatise was persuaded to Pen the reasons of his opinion against absolute Reprobation, that he might satisfy a worthy friend of his, who required it. What satisfaction that learned Gentleman, his friend, hath received by these reasons, I know not: but sure I am, they have given good content to some others, who have read them, and do still desire a Copy of them for their farther use. To ease whose pains in transcribing this Treatise, it doth now appear in this form. If any of contrary opinion, shall undertake to answer or refute it; I wish, he would set down his opinion and reasons with that perspicuity and modesty, that our Author hath set down his. Such a course of disputing will gain more credit to himself and his cause, then voluminous Vagaries about impertinent things If any shall use railing speeches, or unnecessary diversions from the cause; I shall ever interpret that to be a strong sign of a weak cause: or, at least, I shall think it to be an argument of an obstinate mind, who neither knoweth how to yield to the Truth, nor to defend his error. I hope the Reader, who loveth his own salvation, will be a more indifferent judge in a question, which concerneth him so nearly. And so I leave him to God's blessing. THE PREFACE. WHen first I lighted upon a treatise entitled (God's love to mankind) and read a little way in it, I had reason to be acquainted with it; though the Author's face I had never seen: Upon the first relation of the change of his opinion in certain controversies, as he pretended; I was entreated to confer with him thereupon by word of mouth: My answer was, that it was more fit to confer in writing, and if he would be drawn to communicate the reasons of his pretended change; I should willingly take them into consideration. This motion was made in the year 1631. being then at London; the year following in the month of July (as I remember) was the discourse of Mr Hord's scent unto me, and I was urged upon my former promise to make answer thereunto. At that time I had another business under my hand, which I could not dispatch in less than two months' space or more: but I was wished to take my own time. As soon as I was free from my former task, I set hand to this, and returned my answer thereunto, unto the Gentleman that set me on work, about the end of Hillary term Anno Dom: 1632. But observing the bulk of the treatise now in print, twice as big, as that in manuscript or more. I expected a reply to my former answer; but upon perusal, I found nothing less, whereat I wondered not a little, having never heard of any such treatise until the last summer, 1635: for surely they had time enough to answer it. To help the credit of their cause in this; it seemed good unto them to raise a mist, that their absurd carriage might not be discovered, to wit: by antedating the print thereof, which yet was but newly found creeping in corners. Another devise there is by a large interpolation and addition, here and there foisted into the body of the former discourse, and yet not all at once, but by paths, a great part of it being but lumber; and the adding of more testimonies, as if the matter were to be carried by number and not by weight, or as if the Author of them were willing to make ostentation of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and fullness of his common place book. Only the upper way of our Divines maintaining the absoluteness of God's decrees is here inpugned at large, with the Author's best strength I doubt not; which task was omitted by Mr Hord: And besides there is one Divine attribute more here mentioned, in contradiction whereunto the Doctrine of our Divines is pretended to proceed, and the prosecution hereof amongst the rest is here set down, by way of superfaetation upon the former, not only that so the argument might be the more complete, but also to cast a colour; that this discourse of Mr Hord's hath not as yet been answered. It may be it would fain have showed itself unto the world in this masculine shape and vigour before this time, if Doctor Duppa while he was Vicechancellor at Oxford would have given way to the printing of it, if it be true as I have heard, that it was offered unto him to be licenced for the press. Doctor Potter also of Queen's College performed a friendly part to some body in checking the Stationers for selling the copies of it, forwhich courtesy, I do account myself so much in his debt as that comes to; and should much more, had he sent me one of the copies, as he did no less than six on the same day to his friend Doctor Aigleonbee; as the Bookseller confessed to a Scholar a friend of mine. Well Mr Hord's treatise is at length come to the Press, and shows itself in public without shame, though I thought it had been sufficiently confounded almost three years ago; yet this Mistress blushes not, though dares not open her mouth to clear her reputation in any one particular of that which I laid to her charge, manifesting her to be no Daughter of God's truth, but a mere Bastard, begotten by a carnal wit, upon a specious pretence by miserable deflowering and adulterating the word of God; one builds a wall as the Prophet speaks, and another daubeth that with untempered mortar. Mr Hord is well known to be the Author of the first by me formerly answered. But what Mason's hand was used in the addition, that is concealed; but that may break out into pregnant evidences before we have gone through with it. The Prefacer at the first chop begins with a notorious untruth, and that in more particulars than one; for first, whom doth he mean by the Author of this Treatise? M. Horde? That which M. Horde sent to his worthy friend is yet to be seen, containing not half so much as this; it was not above 30 leaves manuscript, and that not closely, but written at large; And this contains 55 leaves in print. But it may be M. Horde hath since enlarged his own discourse, and so continues to be author of it, not in part only, but in the whole. And I confess it may be, he is as much the Author of the one as of the other; if it be true as some have told me of the very first, sent to his friend indeed, namely that it was the very strength of M. Mason; him I know of old, and should be acquainted with his sufficiency, though it was a long time ere I had so much as heard of his zeal for the Arminian cause, and after I heard so much, it was yet longer ere I could believe it, until I saw it under his own hand: And whereas M. Horde coming to his second convincing Argument, as he calls it, drawn from Attributes Divine, layeth down certain premises, the second whereof is this; That justice, mercy, truth, and holiness, in God are the same in nature with these virtues in men, though infinitely differing in Degrees. I willingly confess I stood amazed, and albeit I conceived it, and do conceive it to be one of the absurdest positions that ever dropped from the pen of a School Divine; yet the adventure was so great in my judgement, that I was apt to imagine that it proceeded not from a vulgar spirit. This conceit of mine was improved by the reasons he brings to justify so strange a Paradox: for they are plausible & make a fair show at the first, like the fruit of Sodom; but crush them once, come to the Scholastical discussion of them, & forthwith In Cineres abeunt & vagam fuliginem, they vanish into smoke and emptiness. A second untruth is this, that he saith, The Author was persuaded by a worthy friend to pen the Reasons of his opinion against absolute reprobation; for he was only put upon showing reasons of the change of his opinion in the controversies of late debated between the Remonstrants & their opposites, as M. Horde himself confesseth in his Preface. M. Horde indeed is willing to draw the matter unto the consideration of God's decrees, as if that were the main Thing enquired after. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 most absurdly, and quite contrary to the doctrine of Augustine, who shapes the decrees of God in conformity to the doctrine of grace; and accordingly to certify the Massilienses in the doctrine of Praedestination, he thinks it most fit to begin with proving that Faith is the gift of God, yea the very beginning of it. Now he liked not to follow Augustine's course, and in the first place to deal upon the point of grace. And herein he savours of M. Mason's spirit, for that is his course, as I have seen under his hand; yet suppose that this be the main thing, controverted, namely the quality of God's decrees, whether they be absolute or conditional only. How doth he satisfy his friend, or perform the promise made in letting election pass untouched, and dealing only upon reprobation? And this I know also to have been M. Masons genuine course, far worse than the Remonstrants in the Synod of Dort, for they made a motion, that they might deal upon reprobation in the first place, and then upon election, wherein notwithstanding they were condemned in the judgement of all foreign Divines, assistant there. But this Author and M. Mason too, on my knowledge, affect to deal upon reprobation only. Yet I have always been, and still am glad to see the utmost of their strength, or any man's strength on any of the five points, and should be very glad to see what they could say upon the point of free will, which is most congruous for them, though they meddle not at all with grace. For even on that point I seem to have profited more, lately by dealing with some English Arminians, than ever before, having always acknowledged, that to be a point very obscure, like as is the nature of original sin which was one of the three points, concerning which I did not look to live so long, as to meet with convenient satisfaction. M. Horde (I heard) conferred with M. Mason, about Election, and told him that the doctrine of our Divines therein seemed very comfortable to the children of God, whereunto M. Mason should answer, by granting that, but then adding, it was very prone to provoke men to looseness of life. This concession was as a shooing horn to draw M. Horde on to the Remonstranticall Tenet, nothing doubting, but in the end to take him of from entertaining so good an opinion of our doctrine of Election, as if it were not any such comfortable condition; & teach him to magnify the comfortable condition of the adversaries doctrine, depending upon a threefold cord, which as the proverb faith, cannot easily be broken. 1. The universality of God's love, 2. The universality of Christ's redemption. 3. The universality of the Covenant of grace: Thus the comforts of the Remonstrants are multiplied and advanced, which in the issue comes to this, that their condition is as comfortable as any reprobates condition throughout the world, whether Cain's or Ishmael's, or Esau's or Doeg's or Iudas, or the Grand Senior among the Turks, or the whole guard of his Janissaries: for God's love is towards all, Christ's redemption extends to all, and the Covenant of Grace belongs to all. And what comfortable creatures must these needs be, upon so various and comfortable considerations? And the whole Nation of the Arminians, are herein inferior to none of them all. And though they will not be so saucy as to promise unto themselves perseverance in the state of grace; yet they will be so bold as to promise both to themselves and to all their Proselytes perseverance in this estate of consolation, nothing inferior to any Reprobates consolation in the world. But the mischief is, that hence it follows, that the consolation of any of God's children, whether Abraham, Isaac, jacob, David, or Solomon, Prophets, Apostles, Martyrs, the blessed Virgin Mary, nor any other excepted, was never greater, than the consolation of the wickedest Christian that ever lived, whether profane or hypocritical, Provided he did believe these mysteries of Arminian godliness; namely that God's love is towards all, Christ died for the redemption of all, and lastly that the Covenant of Grace belongs to all; for these are the sweet and precious flowers of consolation that grow in the gardens and writings of these Divines; to the astonishment of the world, in considering the power and efficacy of Satan: and that, even in the Church of God, so many should be given up to so strange delusions. He doth not know what satisfaction that learned Gentleman his friend hath received by these reasons, nor I neither; for I am not privy to the least satisfaction he hath received. But on the contrary, rather how he hath found the vileness of these Remonstranticall Tenets discovered, and the vanity of all supports used to underprop them. Sure he is, They have given good content to others; give we him leave to be liberal in his own commendations: we do not know how far he dwells from neighbours: yet no marvel if they give good content to many, who have been seasoned with the like speculations: I have seen a manuscript with this inscription, A survey of the new Platform of Predestination; the method of it is much like to this, and it ends with a dialogue in the point of consolation; as if both Authors had dipped their pen in the same inck-pot. And now to hear and see Demogorgon himself play his part, and explicate his Mountebank faculty in displaying the strength of his Opobalsamum; as he did of his Catholicon, whom the Frenchman brings in his Satire Mennippised, no marvel if they are well persuaded that no Pandora can equal that for universalities of graces: when in the mean time they all fall short of that unum necessarium, which yet like enough they are ready to forswear, and profess they will turn I have read this in one of their letters directed to a Scholar of Oxford who imparted it to me open Atheists rather than believe it: still he keeps himself upon the commendation of his Proselyte, which cannot but reflect some sweet content upon himself, who is the Engineer and perhaps the Spirit that animates him and sets him on work, For if the man such praises have, What then shall he that inspires the knave. He commends the Author for perspicuity in writing and modesty, and he wisheth that whosoever undertakes to answer it fully will perform the like. For my part I cannot change my stile: but my desire is, I may discover their fopperies, as perspicuously as I can, and I hope nothing to fail in performance; like enough the Author of the preface as well as the Author of the discourse desires to be gently handled and that he calls modesty, yet when a man will have his horse to be well curried, it is not for want of love to his horse; but because the condition of his horse requires to be so dealt withal: I thank God, I never projected any immodest carriage; never could any adversary move me so far; But as an excellent footeball-player of our House, who would lay any man on his back handsomely without hurt (and he was a Bishop's Son) being desired to show any other how to do the like; answered with protestation that he never proceeded by any rules: but as he found his opposite, so he Coped with him. In like sort, as I find my adversary; so I deal with him for the present, as the Condition of his carriage to my seeming deserves, and if I handsomely lay his opinions on the ground without doing him any harm, methinks I should be rather loved then hated of my very enemies for this; As for the present my Opposite seems to have a care of my credit, for the gaining whereof he chaulkes me out a way, to wit: by writing perspicuously, and modestly, without voluminous vagaries about impertinent things. This he delivers very gravely and demurely, which is in my judgement very ridiculous; and, if I do express it and answer it as it deserves, I think, I should carry myself decently in answering him according to his ridiculous condition, and telling him that he doth not well in showing such charity towards his adversary, which the world will be apt to interpret, as proceeding from a cowardly disposition. The Spaniards at the Fort of Breast, when Sir John Norris went forth in hunting of the hare, and his hounds pursued the hare into the very Fort, they took his hounds and hanged them up over the wall, not in spite of so renowned a General, but to represent their fearless condition, and that they looked for no favour at his hands. Magnanimity, not malice moved them unto this, which magnanimity might strike fear into their Enemies, though it did not, who took the Fort, though it cost them dear. I write with a purpose to expose myself to the censure of the world as they shall find cause; but I regard not the censures of an Adversary: especially in such a cause which Bradwardine Styles, The cause of God against Pelagius. And truly I confess I get something by this very phrase of my Adversaries Voluminous vagaries about impertinent things: which makes me conclude, that certainly both this Author, and his Interpolator have seen my answer to Mr Hord's Treatise, wherein I have some vagaries I confess, to refresh my Spirit upon emergent occasions. For, being taking of from my studies to see a stranger who desired my company; I was suddenly instructed in a new learning of Nine causes, who never was acquainted with above 4. before in the University, and one of the nine was finding out, of which I made good use upon my return; in finding out the Sophestry of the Remonstrants, in certain Arguments of theirs. This liberty of Spirit to refresh myself and my Reader, it may be this Author spite's: whereas I am persuaded I should take no offence on his part for the like; But it may be his gravity transports him to be of the same mind with Raynold the Fox, who having lost his own tail in a Gin afterwards he endeavours very composedly to persuade his fellows to cut of their tails also. And to that purpose suffered his wit to exuberate in representing and amplifying the incommodious condition of such a member: Railing speeches, I know no reason why any man should fear from his adversary; for such, Hierome hath taught me, do defile the Railer only, not him that is railed on. And if any man be pleased to spit in my face that way, though I am naturally very melancholy, yet I am persuaded he shall find little melancholy predominant in my answering him. As for unnecessary divisions for the cause, which he doth seriously and wisely admonish his Adversary to beware of. I willingly profess, I love to have Sea room, and not to be confined unto straits by any sullen rules of my Adversary; and truly I perscribe to none, but as I find him, so I frame myself to grapple with him, as congruously as I can. If God be on my side, why should I be afraid of any colours. Let the Devil and all his Angels of Darkness lie in camp against me; I shall not budge: But here is danger mentioned, which I profess, I did not project, and that is the dashing of myself upon the rocks of my Adversaries displeasure. And his interpretation of my courses to my displeasure. For if I do not conform to his sullen rules of Stoical morality, he shall ever interpret it; (I mark well the Phrase, he comes not willingly on to make harsh interpratations, but he shall do it) as much as to say the uprightness of his judgement and the justice of his disposition will urge him hereunto, namely to interpret it, As a strong sign of a weak cause, or at least an Argument of an obstinate mind: But soft and fair, who made my Adversary my Judge; by whose interpretations I am to stand or fall? How Imperiously doth he carry himself in this; as if he were some Bugbear, or dreadful Adversary do I say? or Magistrate rather, see the poverty of my wit and of my Spirit too; the one was never so inventious of any such trick, nor the other so audacious, or immodest (if I may be so bold so to speak) as to serve myself therewith, to scare my Adversary, despairing by fair ways to overcome him, and make him yield, or else his obstinacy known to the world: for who seeth not, that I have as much authority to threaten him with the sharpness of my interpretations of him; as he to threaten me not with the like austereness of his? I am willingly content the world may judge between us, both of the cause debated and of our carriage therein throughout, and who hath the truth on his side, and shows most learning and honesty in the maintaining of that he undertakes; I willingly confess, the five points controverted are tender points, and the knowledge of the truth herein, merely concerning a man's salvation; But this Author deals only upon the half of one of them, and that most needless also: And the resolution of the Doctrine of Election depends upon the resolution of the doctrine of Election depends upon the resolution of an other point; namely, whether Grace be conferred freely, or according to men's works; That it is conferred freely, and not according to works; hereupon it is that Austin builds the absoluteness of predestination and election, wherence it followeth evidently, that as many as do maintain the Decree of predestination to be conditional, must also in Austin's judgement maintain that Grace is given according unto works, which was of old condemned in the Synod of Palestine, and all along in divers Synods and Provincial Counsels against the Pelagians. Now if Predestination be absolute and not conditional; it follows that Reprobation also is absolute and not conditional; which consequence I presume, the Author of these additions will not deny. But as there is a great deal of craft in daubing; so these crafty Crowders are apt to work upon generalities and in distinctions: Reprobation we know is as well from Grace as from glory, and God's reprobation from glory is joined with a purpose to inflict damnation. Now as touching Reprobation from grace, we readily profess that God hath both ordained to deny grace unto some of his mere pleasure; like as he hath ordained to bestow that upon others of his mere pleasure; and also of his mere pleasure hath made such a decree. And these Authors dare not mainifestly oppose us in this argument, lest the sour leaven of their Pelagian Tenet manifest itself to the whole world, namely in maintaining that grace is conferred according to works: But as touching reprobation from Glory, and God's purpose to inflict Damnation, These Jugglers so carry the matter, as if they would make the world believe our Doctrine is, that God decreed to deny men Glory and to inflict Damnation, not for their sins; but merely, because it is his pleasure so to do, a most unshamefast crimination: For albeit that God hath made no law, according whereunto, he proceeds in giving grace unto some, and denying it unto others, but herein proceeds merely according unto his pleasure, and not according to men's works; it being manifest Pelagianism to affirm the contrary; yet we openly & willingly profess (And all the Christian world knows it to be true) That God hath made a law whereunto according he proceeds in the distribution of rewards and Punishments, namely these, Whosoever believeth shall be saved, whosoever believeth not shall be damned: And according to this law, God hath decreed from everlasting to proceed in pronouncing the sentence of Salvation and Damnation on mankind, namely to bestow Salvation not of his mere pleasure, without all respect of the works of men, but as a reward of their faith, repentance, and good works, and to inflict damnation not of his own mere pleasure without any respect to the works of men, but as a due reward for their sins never broken of by repentance. Only this decree thus to proceed in the execution of rewards and punishments, we profess God hath made according to the mere pleasure of his will, whereby it is apparent, that these men play the part of notable Impostors, when they abuse the world's credulity in making them believe, that we maintain any such absurd decrees or executions of decrees, which they obtrude upon us; and to this purpose these are willing to take the benefit and advantage of Confusion; for it is most profitable for some to fish in troubled waters, and to walk in the dark: But when the light of distinction comes, this madd's them to see their impostures discovered, and their sophistications made to appear in their proper colours. The eye of the Adulterer (saith job) waiteth for the twilight, and sayeth, no eye shall see me, and disguiseth his face, They dig through houses in the dark, which they marked for themselves in the day, they know not the light, but the morning is even to them, as the shadow of death, if one know them, they are in the terrors of the shadow of death; Now there is a course of adulterating the word of God, and deflowering his truth every way, as abominable in the sight of God, as the deflowering of women; yea and much more abominable; In my answer to the former discourse, as I remember, I proposed certain arguments to prove the absolute nature of Reprobation. This Author doth not accommodate himself, nor his Achates neither to answer so much as one of them. Thus having Prefaced concerning these concealed Authors, and therewithal made answer to the Preface of this Interpolator, I come to make answer to the Additions themselves. The Answer to the Additions. 1. Some say that God of his mere pleasure antecedent to all sin in the Creature, original, or M. Mason's Ad-Vitions pag: 2. actnall, did decree to glorify his Sovereignty and Justice in the eternal rejection and damnation of the greatest part of Mankind, as the end; and in their unavoidable sin and impenitence, as the means. 2. The rest of that side thinking to avoid the great inconveniences, to which the supralapsarian way lies open, fall down a little lower; and present men to God in his decree of Reprobation lying in the fall & under the guilt of original sin, laying. 3 That God looking upon miserable mankind lying in Adam's sin, did decree, the greatest number of men (even those men whom he calls to repentance and salvation, by the preaching of the Gospel) to Hell torments for ever and without all remedy, for the declaration of his severe justice; This way went the Synod. Let the Reader observe that this Author in stating the opinion of our Divines allegeth no passages out of any of them, no nor so much as quotes the place of any of Answer their writings where this doctrine is to be found in the term wherein he delivers it, that so, he may take the greater liberty to shape their opinions according to his own pleasure; first, as touching the first observe. 1. How he shapes this opinion. 2, the Persons to whom he imputes it; concerning the first, the Decree is shaped as consisting of two parts; The one sets down the end, which God intended, the other the means whereby this end is procured. 1. As touching the end, it is hard to say, by his shaping of it, whether the manifestation of God's glory be made the end, or man's damnation; and if any one conceives hereupon, that man's Damnation is the end which God intended in the opinion of our Divines, like enough this Author will be well enough pleased with it. 2. Consider how God's Soveraingtie and Justice are coupled together, as appearing in the eternal rejection and damnation of his Creatures, as if both of them did appear equally in each. 3. Then rejection is proposed without distinction and specification, that we might know whether he understands it of rejection from Grace, or rejection from Glory. 4. And in the fourth place, he couples rejection with Damnation, as if both were of equal yoke; signifying Acts temporal; whereas rejection in the Common notion thereof is all one with reprobation, and reprobation is commonly taken for an act eternal, to wit, The eternal purpose of God to deny grace, permit sin, and inflict damnation for sin. 5. Damnation is here brought in as belonging to the Decree of the end; and quite left out in the Decree of the means: whereas by the very light of Nature it is apparent, that Justice vindicative is manifested no where more, then in the execution of punishment. 6. And lastly Damnation in itself is no manifestation of Justice any more, then of Injustice; unless it be executed as a condign punishment for sin; yet most absurdly he talks of manifesting justice in man's Damnation, without specifying the meritorious cause of Damnation; without consideration whereof, Damnation is no manifestation of Justice, either Divine, or humane. 7. Whereas he sets forth the Persons damned to be the greatest part of Mankind, this is only to speak with a full mouth, and to gull a partial Reader, who may be well pleased to have his mouth filled with an empty spoon: For the Scripture teathe expressly, that even of them that are called but few are chosen; and clear reason doth manifest, that look how God may deal with one, in the same manner it is lawful for him to deal with Millions. We love to speak distinctly, and accordingly we say, that all God's decrees; are of doing something for the manifestation of his own Glory. I say of doing something, for no glory of God is manifested in Decreeing, but in executing his Decrees; As when Solomon saith, God hath made all things for himself, even the wicked against the day of evil Prov: 16: 4. So then the manifestation of God's Glory is the end of all his actions. And accordingly if rejection here be taken for God's Decree, no glory is manifested herein, and too absurd it is to account God's eternal Decrees to to be means for the accomplishing of his ends: But if Rejection be taken here for a temporal Act, to wit: Of final dereliction in sin, than it may be a means for the manifestation of God's glory in a certain kind, namely, his Sovereignty; for like as God hath mercy on whom he will, in not leaving them finally in their sins; but delivering them from the power of it, by bestowing on them the Grace of Faith and Repentance. In like manner, God hardeneth whom he will, in denying the same Grace of Faith and Repentance, and so finally leaving them and permitting them to continue finally in their sins, without breaking them of by repentance. So that God proceeds herein merely according to his pleasure, for the manifestation of that Soveraingtie which he hath as a Creator over his Creatures. Even the same that the Potter hath over his Clay, to make of the same lump one vessel unto honour, an other unto dishonour. No Justice is manifested in this difference, I mean no such Justice as proceeds in reference to the works of men; for he doth not bestow Grace upon men, because of their good works; nor deny grace unto them, because of their evil works; but finding men equal in the state of sin, he bestows Grace upon the one to cure sin in them, and bestows it not upon others. Yet God is just herein in another respect, namely in as much as he doth no other thing in all this, but such as he hath a lawful power to do; As for Damnation, that is clearly an Act temporal; and this the Lord inflicts on none but for their sins: And like as in giving or denying grace, God manifested no justice Compensative, but Sovereignty, only proceeding therein merely according unto pleasure: So in inflicting damnation & denying glory, he manifests vindicative Justice alone, not proceeding according to mere pleasure herein but according to men's works, and that according to a Law which himself hath given unto men, namely this, Whosoever continueth in sin without repentance shall be damned. 2. The second part of this Decree is concerning the means; and the means he makes to be sin and impenitency: It is very well he took liberty to set down their opinion without specifying their words, lest they should fly in his face, and convict him of shameful slander. He that intends the end is the Author of the means: this is universal, we say that the permission of sin and of impenitency is the means, and this we acknowledge to make way, as well for the manifestation of his mercy in pardoning sin, as of his Justice in punishing it; it being apparent that neither mercy in pardoning, nor Justice in punishing can have place; unless sin be permitted to enter into the world: Over and above this sin is styled unavoidable without all distinction, such is the proper language of the Arminian Court; we say all sins are avoidable by Grace, and that no sin can be avoided in an acceptable manner without Grace, and here I speak not of grace restraining only, but of Grace sanctifying. Here if it pleased him, he might have put in Damnation also for sin, as without all doubt a principal means of promoting the manifestation of God's Justice; and Thomas Aquinas expressly professeth, that Reprobatio includit voluntatem permittendi culpam & damnationem inferendi pro culpa. Reprobatition includes God's will to permit sin, and to inflict Damnation for sin; here is the Decree concerning means. And as for the end hereof, both Aquinas (and Alvarez after him) professeth, that the manifestation of God's glory in the way of vindicative Justice as intended by him, as the end of all this. 2. As for the Persons here named to take this way 1. Calvin though this Author placeth him amongst the Supralapsarians, yet Lubbertus doth not in his treatise of predestination, but opposeth Vorstius in this particular; Cornelius de Lapide, a Jesuit upon the 18: verse of the 9: to the Romans, agrees with Lubbertus in this; Calvin's own words are these de praedestinatione pag: 710. Cum de Praedestinatione sermo habetur, inde exordiendum esse constanter semper docui atque hodie doceo, jure in morte relinqui omnes Reprobos, qui in Adam mortui sunt ac damnati jure periere, qui naturâ sunt filii irae, When we treat of Praedestination, I ever taught and to this day teach, that we ought to begin it from thence; That all Reprobates are justly left in death, who are dead in Adam, and damned, and that they justly perish, who by nature are children of wrath. 2. Lubbertus shows Beza also to concur in the same. 3. Piscator in a small Treatise of the object of Predestination, annexed to his answer to Hemnigius of universal Grace, though he makes the Decree of making all men in Adam to different ends, and of permitting them to fall in Adam to precede the consideration of the Corrupt Mass, as it is evident they must, Yet the Decrees of Election and Reprobation he subordinates to the foresight of the corrupt Mass. 4. And as for Zanchy, let but his General definitition of Predestination be considered, it will appear that he distinguisheth the particulars of the Decree of Predestination as Piscator doth. 2. I come to the second opinion; and as for the great inconveniencies which here is pretended, that the Authors thereof desire to decline. I have answered hereunto upon, the Treatise of M. Hord, and showed that not so much to decline inconveniencies have some embraced this way, as rather because this way seems to be more familiar and plain, and chiefly because the formal Notions of the particulars of the Decrees of Election and Reprobation, the one in the General seeming to be a work of mercy, the other of Justice, seem to suppose a consideration of man in the state of misery. But supposing that some might take this way to avoid inconveniencies, yet I have showed in my answer to Arminius, that none of these are at all avoided this way. And then again both these opinions have I endeavoured to reconcile in my Vindiciae, and withal showed that the difference whatsoever it comes to, is but in apice logico; in a point of logic: both sides concurring in the maintenance both of God's Sovereign prerogative over his Creatures, to make one vessel unto honour, another unto dishonour, by giving faith and repentance unto the one, and denying it to others; as also in the prerogative of Grace as only effectual to the working of men unto faith and Repentance. 2. God decrees both to Create all men in Adam, and to permit them all to fall in Adam; These be the Divine Decrees concerning means tending to the manifestation of his Glory in the way of Mercy and Justice; except man were created, no Glory at all could be manifested in him; unless all were suffered to fall in Adam, there were neither place for mercy, nor Justice: these are general decrees concerning all; then there are special degrees of difference to be joined to these general decrees; 1. The one is of raising some out of sin by Faith and Repentance, and bestowing Salvation on them by way of reward for the manifestation of God's mercy. 2. The other is of leaving others in sin, and permitting them finally to persevere therein, and inflicting Damnation for their sins, the end whereof is the manifestation of God's Justice: The decree of manifesting these is alone the decree of the end, all the rest are decrees of the means tending to these ends; whereof the two first are general and concern all, whether Elect, or Reprobate, the rest are special, concerning either the Elect alone, or the Reprobate alone. 3. Now here is a colour cast, as if the special Decrees did praemise the two general Decrees: But this is a mere colour, as I have showed you in my Vindiciae, 2. And even they that take this way, maintain that God ordains no man to Damnation but for sin, and that both actual, as well as original, which is utterly pretermitted by this Author. 3. The Scripture is express that of them that are called, few are chosen. 4. It is untrue that the Synod went this way, they meddled not at all with the ordering of God's decrees. Mascovius also Professor of Divinity at Franekar, a violent and stiff maintainer of the most unsavoury speeches which have been uttered in this Controversy, and one that undertook in the very Synod to make M. Mason's Additions p. 3. good against Lubbert his fellow Professor, that God did will sins, ordain men to sin, and would not at all that all men should be saved. And besides this, openly and peremptorily affirmed, that except these things were held and maintained by them, they could not possibly keep their own ground, but must come over to the Remonstrants; This man was not only not censured, but publicly declared in the Synod to be pure and Orthodox, and dismissed only with this kind and friendly motion. That he should hereafter take heed of such words as might give offence to tender ears; and could not well down with those who are uncapable of such mysteries. For all this the Author quotes Antidotum Remonstrantium pag: 32, this book I have not seen much less have I it at this time in my possession, and therefore I must take it all upon Answer. trust. And seeing this man was declared in the Synod of Dort, (as this Author writes) to be pure and Orthodox, it seems they did not censure these speeches of his as unsavoury speeches, but rather justified them, though with acknowledgement, that they might give offence to tender ears, and could not well down with those, who were as yet uncapable of such mysteries; so that this Author censureth these speeches of Maccovius for unsavoury speeches, without the least disproof of them (yet is Maccovius, and then was, a Professor of Divinity in the University of Franekar) In like sort by consequent he censureth the judgement of the Synod, as an unsavoury judgement, and their approbation of Maccovius, as an unsavoury approbation; Let the Reader judge of what Spirit this Author is, and whether it may not be said of him, as Moses said of Corah and his complices, ye take to much upon you ye Sons of Aaron: Nay what if this censure of his reflects upon the very Phrases of the Holy Ghost? The two first phrases namely, to will sins, and to ordain men to sin, are all one: For to ordain men to sin is but to will, that such men shall sin, or that there shall be such sins of men. Now the Scripture frequently justifies this; for the 10 Kings to give their Kingdoms to the Beast, what is the meaning of it, But to employ their Regal power in supporting the Popedom? Now was not this a great sin? Yet the Scripture expressly professeth that is was the will of God it should be so. Rev: 17. 17. For God hath put in their hearts to fulfil his will, and to do it with one consent, for to give their Kingdom to the Beast, until the words of God be fulfilled. As expressly doth Saint Peter testify of some men, that they are ordained to stumble at God's word, and to be disobedient, Christ is a stone to stumble at, & a Rock of offence even to them which stumble 1 Pet. 2. 8. at the word, being disobedient, unto the which thing they were even ordained: and by whom could they be ordained hereunto but by God? In like sort we know the abominable Outrages committed by Herod, Pontius Pilate, together with the Gentiles and people of Israel, against the Holy Son of God (for judas betrayed him, the high Priests suborned witnesses against him, Herod with his Herodians despitefully used him, Pilate condemned him, the Roman Soldiers scourged him, spit in his face, buffeted him, arrayed him like a King in scorn, and crowned him with a Crown of thorns, and last of all Crucified him between two thiefs) yet of all these the Holy Ghost testifies, That in this doing against the Holy Son of God) they did what God had determined to be done; The words of the Text are these, and that as delivered with one accord by the Apostles and their fellows; for when Peter and john were let go, they came to their fellows and showed all that the High Priests had said unto them, And when they heard it, they lift up their voices to God with one accord, and said, O Lord thou art the God which hath made Heaven and earth, the sea and all things that are therein, which by the mouth of thy servant David hast said, why did the Gentiles rage and the people imagine a vain thing; The Kings of the earth assembled, and the Rulers came together against the Lord, and against his Christ, for doubtless against thy Holy Son jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the people of Israel gathered themselves together, to do whatsoever thine hand and thy Counsel had determined before to be done. Now every one knows that to determine to be done, and to ordain to be done, and to will to be done are all one: why doth not this Author censure these speeches for unsavoury speeches, as well as those of Maccovius? Why doth not he expose this Synod of the Apostles and others to the same censure? whereunto he exposeth the Synod of Dort? Nay can it be avoided, but that already he hath done so, and that these censure● of his must necessarily prove the pouring forth of Blasphemy against the Holy Ghost? Seeing the speeches are used by the Apostles, which he censureth for unsavoury, being utteredly Maccovius; Is it not apparent that whosoever renounceth those speeches, most also renounce the word of God? And shall it be a reproach to us that we cannot keep our own ground, unless the Holy Ghost keeps his ground, and maintain his own Dialect to be savoury in spite of the vice aspersions, that this Author or any other of his Spirit doth usually cast upon it, not sparing to term such speeches, unsavoury speeches As for the last phrase That God would that all men should be saved, this is no Scripture; nay it doth imply a man fest Blasphemy, namely that God cannot save them: It is true, the Scripture saith that God willeth that all men should be saved, but what is meant by this note of universalities in Scripture, let Scripture itself be Judge. The Pharisees did T●the omne olus as Austin observes not every particular her be, to give the T●th thereof, but every kind of herb to give the Tenth thereof; so Peter saw in a vessel let down from Heaven 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not every four footed beast in particular, but all manner of four footed beasts, see Mat: 3. 5. It is said all judea went forth to john and all the region round about jordan, what can the meaning of this be, but that from all parts of Judea and the Region round about Jordan, of all sorts some went forth to john not that there was not one man left behind in all Judea, and in all the Region round about Jordan. And accordingly Saint Austin interpreted this place above 1200 years ago, namely that God will that of all sorts, some be saved, even of Kings and Nobles some, though but few of such 1 Cor: 1. 27. Now this is not denied either by Maccovius, or by any other of our Divines, only they deny it to be the will of God, that all and every one shall be said; for if this were his will, it would follow, first that God is not able to save them, which is to deny the first Article of the Creed, as Austin in this very particular disputed many hundred years ago. Secondly it would follow, that God is changed: for certainly when he damns men he hath no will to save them. And what is Election Divine? is it any other than the will of God ordaining unto salvation? Now who dares say that all are Elect? Hath not our Saviour expressly told us, that even of them that are called, but few are chosen? Yet might that Synod well admonish Maccovius to take heed of such words as might give offence to tender years, and be careful to express the same truth in as inoffensive way as we can: And accordingly having a digression in this very Argument, in my Vindiciae Gratiae I proposed it in this manner, Whether the holy one of Israel without any injury to his Holy Majesty, may be said to will sin after a certain manner: and I maintain the affirmative after this manner; Deus vult ut peccatum fiat ipso permittente, God will have sin to come to pass by his permission; and Bellarmine confesseth that, Malum esse Deo permittente bonum est. It is good that evil should be by God's permission, which was also the saying of Austin long before. And that non aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo: Not any thing comes to pass, except God Omnipotent will have it come to pass, either by suffering it, or himself working it; And the eleventh Article of the Church of Ireland framed in the days of King J'ames runs thus; God from all eternity, did by his unchangeable Counsel ordain what soever in time should come to pass; yet so as there by no violence is offered to the to the wills of the reasonable Creatures, and neither the liberty, nor the contingency of second causes is taken away, but established rather. And Arminius himself professeth that Deus voluit Achabum mensuram scelerums vorum implere; God would have Achab to fill up the measure of his sins, and what is it to fill up the measure of his sins; but to add sin unto sin? And this he delivereth without all qualification. By these instances it appeareth, That they of the first side can easily bear one with another in this difference. M. Mason's Additions pag: 3. And to say the truth, there is no reason why they should quarrel about circumstances, seeing they agree in the substance for which they both contend. 1 That the moving cause of Reprobation is the alone will of God, and not the sin of man original or actual. 2. That the final impenitency and Damnation of Reprobates are necessary and unavoidable by God's absolute Decree. Answer The difference which this Author takes into Consideration is about the object of Predestination; and the difference in opinion thereabouts is usually to be observed threefold (though this Author is pleased to take notice of a secondfold difference,) for some conceive the object of Predestination to be mankind as yet not created; others conceive the object thereof to be mankind created, but not yet corrupted. A third sort maintain the object thereof to be mankind both created and corrupted. Now D. junius hath endeavoured to reconcile the three opinions, making place for each consideration in the object of predestination; And Piscator after him adventured on the like reconciliation, and hath performed it with more perspicuity and with better success in my judgement, than junius; And that according to three different acts concurring unto Predestination; The first is, saith he, God's purpose to create mankind in Adam unto different ends, now this Act doth clearly require the object thereof to be mankind not yet Created. The second Act he conceives to be God's Decree to permit all men to fall in Adam; Now this Act he conceives as clearly to suppose the object thereof to be mankind created, but not corrupted. The third & last Act he conceives to be God's decree to choose some, to show compassion on them in raising them out of sin by saith and repentance, and of Reprobating others, leaving them as be finds them, and permitting them to finish their days in sin, to the end he might manifest the glory of his grace, in saving the one; & the glory of his Justice in damning others. Now this third Act he supposeth manifestly to require the object thereof to be mankind both created and corrupted: Now the Authors of these several opinions have no reason to go together by the ears about these three opinions, but with Brotherly love to entertain one another: First, because the difference herein is not so much in Divinity, as in Logic and Philosophy; difference in opinion about order in intentions, being merely Logical, and to be composed according to the right stating of the end intended, and of the means conducing to the end; it being generally confessed, that the intention of the end is before the intention of means conducing thereunto. And that look what is first in intention, the same must be last in execution. Secondly, the Authors of these several opinions about the object of Predestination, do all agree in two principal points. 1. That all men, before God's eternal predestination and reprobation, are considered as equal in themselves, whether as uncreated, or as created, but not corrupted, or lastly, whether created or corrupted. 2 That God's grace only makes the difference, choosing some to work them to faith, & repentance, & perseverance therein; while he rejecteth others, leaving them as he finds them, & permitting them to finish their days in sin, whereby is upheld and maintained. 1. First, the prerogative of God's grace as only effectual to the working of men unto that which is good. 2. And secondly, the prerogative of God's Sovereignty in showing mercy on whom he will, to bring them to Faith and true repentance, and hardening others; that is, not bestowing of grace and repentance upon them And seeing they all agree in these momentous points of Divinity, they have no cause to take it offensively at the hands of one another, that they differ in a point of Logic. Now I have adventured, on this argument to find out to myself, and give unto others some better satisfaction, then formerly hath been exhibited, and that by distinguishing Two decrees only on each part, to wit, the decree of the end, and the decree of the means: As for example, 1. On the part of Predestination and Election, I conceive the end to be the manifestation of God's glorious grace in the way of mercy mixed with Justice, on a certain number of men. And the Decree of the means is to create them and permit them all to fall in Adam and to bring them forth into the world in their several generations clothed with original sin; and to send Christ into the world to die for them, and for Christ's sake first to bestow the grace of faith and repentance upon them, and finally to save them. 2. On the part of Reprobation I conceive the end to be the manifestation of God's glory in the way of Justice vindicative; And the decree of means to be partly common and partly proper; the common means are to create them and permit them all to fall in Adam, and bring them forth into the world clothed with original sin; the special means are to leave them as he finds them, and permit them to finish their days in sin, and so not showing the like grace to them, which he showed to others. 1. So that the moving cause of Reprobation is the alone will of God, and not the sin of man original and actual; like as on the other side, the moving cause of election is only the will of God, or not faith, or any good works, whereupon this Author is loath to manifest his opinion; This doctrine is not only approved by Doctor Whitaker Doctor of the Chair in the University of Cambridge, and that in his Cygnea Cantio a little before his death, but justified and confirmed by variety of Testimonies both of Schoolmen, as Lombard, Aquinas, Bannes, Petrus de Alliaco, Gregorius, Arminensis; of our own Church and the Divines thereof, as taught by Bucer at Cambridge, by Peter Martyr at Oxon: professed by the Bishops and others, promoted by Queen Elizabeth and farther in the year of our Lord 1592.: there was a famous recantation made in the University of Cambridge by one Barret in the 37. of Elizabeth whereunto he was urged by the heads of houses of that University. The Recantation runs thus, Preaching in Latin not long since in the University Church, (Right worshipful) many things slipped from me, both falsely and rashsly spoken, whereby I understand the minds of many have been grieved, to the end therefore I may satisfy the Church & the truth which I have publicly hurt; I do make this public confession, both Repenting and Revoking my Error; First I said that no man in this transi●●ie world is so strongly underpropt, at least by the certainty of Faith, that is (unless as I afterwards expounded it) by Revelation that he ought to be assured of his own Salvation; But now I protest before God, and acknowledge in my conscience that they which are justified by faith have peace towards God that is, have reconciliation with God, and do stand in that grace by faith therefore that they ought to be certain and assured of their own Salvation, even by the certainty of Faith itself. 2. Secondly, I affirmed that the faith of Peter could not fail, but that other men's faith may; for as (I then said) Our Lord prayed not for the faith of every particular man, but now being of a better and more sound judgement according to that which Christ teacheth in plain words, joh. 17. 20. I pray not for these alone, that is the Apostles, but for them also which shall believe in me through their word; I acknowledge that Christ prayed for the faith of every particular believer, and that by the virtue of that prayer of Christ; every true believer is so stayed up, that his faith cannot fail. 3. Thirdly touching perseverance to to the end, I said that, that certainty concerning the time to come is proud, for as much as it is in his own nature contingent of what kind the perseverance of every man is, neither did I affirm it to be proud only, but to be most wicked; but now I freely protest that the true and justifiing faith, whereby the faithful are most near united unto Christ, is so firm as also for the time to come so certain, that it can never be rooted up out of the minds of the faithful by any temptation of the flesh, the world or devil himself; so that he that once hath this faith shall ever have it; for by the benefit of that justifying faith Christ dwelleth in us and we in Christ, therefore it cannot but be both increased (Christ growing in us daily) as also persevere unto the end, because God doth give constancy. 4. Fourthly, I affirmed that there was no distinction in faith, but in the Persons believing, in which I confess I did err. Now I freely acknowledge the Temporary faith (which as Bernard witnesseth is therefore feigned, (because it is temporary) it is distinguished and differeth from the saving faith, whereby sinners apprehending Christ are justified before God for ever, not in measure and degrees, but in the very thing itself. Moreover I add that Saint james doth make mention of a dead faith, and Paul of a faith that worketh by love. 5 Fifthly, I added that forgiveness of sins is an Article of faith, but not particular, neither belonging to this man or that man, that is (as I expounded it) that no true faithful man either can or ought certainly believe that his sins are forgiven: But now I am of an other mind and do freely confess that every true faithful man is bound by this Article of faith to believe the forgiveness of sins, and certainly to believe that his own particular sins are freely forgiven him, neither doth it follow hereupon that, that Petition of the Lord's prayer (to wit) forgive us our trespasses is needless; for in that Petition we ask not only the gift but also the increase of Faith. 6 Sixtly, these words escaped me in my Sermon viz: As for those that are not saved, I do most strongly believe, and do freely protest, that I am so persuaded against Calvin, Peter Martyr and the rest, that sin is the true and proper cause of Reprobation; But now being better instructed I say that the Reprobation of the wicked is from everlasting, and that saying of Saint Austin to Simplician to be mòst true; viz: If sin were the cause of Reprobation than no man should be elected, because God doth know all men to be defiled with it: And that I may speak freely, I am of the same mind and do believe concerning the Doctrine of Election and Reprobation, as the Church of England believeth and teacheth in the book of the Articles of faith, in the Article of Praedestination. Last of all I uttered these words rashly against Calvin, a man that hath very well deserved of the Church of God (to wit) that he durst presume to lift up himself above the high and Almighty God, by which words I do confess that I have done great injury to that most learned and right good man, and I most humbly beseech you all to pardon this my rashness, as also in that I have uttered many bitter words against Peter Martyr, Beza, Zanchy, junius, and the rest of the same religion, being the lights and ornaments of our Church, calling them by the odious names of Calvin●sts and other slanderous terms, branding them with a most grievous mark of reproach; whom because our Church doth worthily reverence, it was not meet, that I should take away their good name from them. Doctor Fulke in like manner maintains that reprobation is not of works, but of God's free will, Rome 9: Num: 2. His words are these, God's election & Reprobation is most free, of his own will, not upon the foresight of the merits of either of them; for he hath mercy on whom he will and whom he will he hardeneth verse: 18. Yet here is to be distinguished, for the explication of the truth, That God's decree of Reprobation may be considered either as touching the Act of God reprobating and willing, or as touching the things hereby willed or Decreed; As touching the Act of God reprobating, we say as Aquinas saith concerning the Act of God predestinating, namely that no cause can be given thereof as from man, like as no cause can be given of God's will; God's will being eternal, but whatsoever is in man being Temporal. But as touching the things decreed or willed by Reprobation, these are either the denial of grace, or inflicting of damnation; As touching the denial of grace we clearly profess, that like as God of his mere will and pleasure doth show mercy on some in bestowing the grace of faith and repentance upon them; so God of his mere will and pleasure doth harden others in denying unto them the grace of saith and repentance; and thus it is that Doctor Fulke maintains God's election & reprobation to be most free of his own free will, not upon the foresight of the merits of either of them; but touching the inflicting of damnation, we maintain that God neither doth inflict damnation, nor ever did decree to inflict damnation of his own mere pleasure and will, but altogether for sin, either original or actual: further we maintain, that in no moment of time or nature God doth decree to damn any man before he forseeth the sin for which they shall be damned. 2. As touching the second we willingly grant, that by virtue of God's decree, it necessarily and unavoidably follows, that whosoever dieth in final impenitency shall be damned, neither do I think this Author dares to avouch the contrary. Secondly, as touching final impenitency, we willingly profess that upon supposition of God's decree finally to harden a man and to deny a man the grace of repentance: (It being clearly the gift of God as Scriptures testify. Act: 5. 31, and 11. 18. 2 Tim 2 25) it is impossible that such a man should repent, nevertheless both repentance is possible, and final impenitency is avoidable simply (to wit) by grace 3. But this Author loves not to explicate himself, but I suppose he secretly maintains, that every man hath such a power, by grace, whereby he may repent if he will, concerning which Tenent of his, we nothing doubt but every man hath such a power, but we deny that such a power is grace; we say it is nature rather, and that for this reason; look by what power a man may repent if he will, by the same power he may ref use to repent if he will: Now if this were grace, than were grace inferior to a moral virtue: for no moral virtue leaves a man indifferent to do good or no; to do good or evil; but inclines and disposeth the will only to that which is good; so Justice disposeth a man only to just actions, not indifferently to that which is just, or to that which is unjust, 'tis true nevertheless a man that is just may do an unjust Act if he will, but this is not by virtue of the habit of Justice wherewith he is qualified; But only by reason of the freedom of his will which is natural unto him; for justice undoubtedly inclines a man's will only to that which appeareth just, and so every moral virtue inclines the will only to a virtuous Act, not indifferently either to acts virtuous, or to acts vicious; like as on the contrary a vicious habit inclines the will of man only to acts vicious, not indifferently, to acts vicious or to acts virtuous! Secondly grace is supernatural, it were a Monster in Divinity to say that supernatural grace doth indifferently incline a man either to good or evil; it is impossible it should incline a man save to acts supernatural; now every supernatural act must needs be gracious, it cannot be sinful or evil; lastly whosoever hath a willto repent, such a one hath not only a power to repent, but actually doth repent, as touching the chiefest facultiein, the change whereof repentance doth consist; for that is the will, and it is God that worketh in us both the will and the deed, in every kind of that which is truly good; and surely to have a will to repent is a good thing, if he want power, let him and us, pray for that out of that will and desirewe have to repent, ut quod volumus implere valeamus, that what we desire to do we may be able to do, and we have no cause to fear that God will despise so gracious desires. To these speeches let me add that of Remigius Archbishop of Lions, who, to Rabanus Archbishop of M. Mason's Additions p. 5. Mentz, objecting that Saint Austin wrote a book called Hipognosticon against Pelagius and Coelestius, wherein he denied that Reprobates were properly praedestinati ad interitum, predestinate to destruction, answereth, that Saint Austin said not so (but some other man) as it is supposed to purge the Church of calumny, which some ill affected ones did cast upon it; namely that it taught that God by his predestination did impose upon men a necessity of perishing, and did withdraw the word (Praedestination) from the point of Reprobates, and gave it only to the Elect, and so gave great occasion of further Error and mistake; In this speech of his, it is clearly employed that it was the constant Doctrine of the Church then, that Reprobates lie under no necessitating Decree of Perdition. Here we find inserted a passage taken out of Remigius Arcsh-bishop of Lions his answer Answer. to Rabanus Archbishop of Mentz, as it is to be found in the History of Gottescalchus written by Doctor Ʋsher Archbishop of Armach, pag. 107. Now that discourse of Remigius is not in answer to Rabanus Archbishop of Mentz, but unto Hincmarus' Archbishop of Rheims. And withal this Author is pleased to geld it as he thinks good: For whereas Remigius hath it thus; quasi Deus sua praedestinatione necessitatem imponeret hominibus in suis impietatibus permanendi, & in aeternum pereundi: This Author renders it thus; That God by his predestination did impose upon men a necessity of perishing, leaving out altogether the former, namely of imposing upon men a necessity of perishing in their impieties: And every sober man may well wonder at his dealing in this, especially seeing he hath left out that which is most material and most considerable; for neither by Austin's Doctrine nor by our Doctrine, hath God imposed upon any a necessity of perishing, but such as finally persevere in their impieties: And will any man that is well in his wits oppose this? Sure I am, nor Hincmarus, nor any other was known to me to oppose this in the Church of God. Neither is there any necessity inherent in man, on whom it is said to be imposed, but a consequent denomination to God's unchangeable or irresistible will, to damn all such as persist finally in their sinful courses, without breaking them off by repentance: All the question is about the necessity of Reprobates persisting in their impieties, which might be objected, & as it seems was objected against Austin's doctrine of Predestination, & by this Author is objected against ours: now by this objection, Remigius clears the Doctrine of Saint Austin, professing this to be a calumnious imputation, and such as needed not for the answering thereof, that any such course should be taken as the Author of the book (entituled Hypognosticon) takes; (to wit) by denying that God predestinates any to Damnation, for this necessity of persisting in sins was not imposed upon them by predestination in their opinion, who thereby understood no other thing then God's decreeing of such things which himself purposed to effect in due time; as both Remigius manifested in these words, pag. 155, of the same book: Non praedestinat nisi quae fuerat ipse facturus, quae utique omnia bona & justa sunt; And Austin in like manner, de bono perseverantiae, cap. 17. In sua quae falli mutarique non potest praescientia, opera sua disponere, illud omnino nec aliud quicquid est praedestinare, so the Synod of Valens, Can: 3. Praedestinatione autem deum ea tantum statuisse (dicimus) quae ipse vel gratuitâ misericoràiâ, vel juslo judicio facturus erat. In malis verò ipsam malitiam praescisse quia ab ipsis est, non praedestinasse quia ab illo non est: And that for good reason, because, Malum non habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem, as Austin writes De Civit. Dei lib. 12. cap. 7. But as for this necessity in sinning, this both we and they willingly profess to flow from the sin of Adam, which God alone can cure in man and none other, as the same Remigius acknowledgeth Histor. Gottesca. pag. 3. Anima humana & voluntas humana sicut verè manet in morte non diligendo, ita verè transfertur de morte in vitam diligendo: But by whom is this translation wrought? that follows; hac dilectione non fit verè liberum arbitrium id est verè libera voluntas nisi illo liberante, id est libertatem largiente, qui ait, si vos filius liberaverit, tune verè liberi eritis, & nisi illo munere Spiritus Dei, de quo dicit Apostolus; ubi autem Spiritus Domini, ibi libertas: By this love the will is not made free, but he freeing it, who saith, if the Son shall make you free, then shall ye be free indeed, and not otherwise then by the gift of the Spirit of God whereof the Apostle speaks, where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty; nay I am verily persuaded that Hincmarus himself against whom Remigius disputeth, is more Orthodox in this argument than this Author; for thus writes Hincmarus: as is to be seen in the same history of Gottescalchus. pag. 39 quosdam in Massa peccati & perditionis justè deseruit, à qua praedestinatione sua (id est in gratiae praeparatione) occulto (sed non injusto) judicio nequaquam eripuit; Some men God justly deserted in the Mass of sin and perdition; from which by his predestination, that is, preparation of grace, he never delivered by judgement secret, but not unjust, whereas this Author will have all men to be delivered from this Mass of sin and perdition; by a certain universal grace bestowed upon them, whereby they are put in a kind of indifferent estate to believe or not believe, repent or not repent if they will, which Hincmarus never acknowledged; yet this necessity of sinning, incident to all that are brought forth into the world, in Massa peccati & perditionis, in the Mass of original sin and perdition: is not such either in their, or our opinion, as whereby they cannot but sin; although they would abstain from it; though this be obtruded upon us as it was upon Remigius: whereupon he pleads for himself, and such as were of his mind in the Doctrine of predestination after this manner, pag 53. Nemo it a sentit aut dicit quod Dei praedestinatio aliquem invitum faciat peccare, ut jam non propriae voluntatis perversitate sed Divinae praedestinationis necessitate peccare videatur; No man (saith he) doth so think or speak, as if God's predestination made a man to sin against his will, in such sort as he should seem to sin, not through the perverseness of his own will, but by the necessity of Divine predestination, so say we; neither is this impotency of doing good, any where else, but in the Corruption of the will, it being a moral impotency according to that of Saint Austin, Libertas sine gratia non est libertas sed contumacia; Liberty without grace, is not Liberty, but wilfulness, and Remigius Histor: Gottescal: pag. 29. Exquibus (saith he) speaking of Reprobates, Nemo potest salvari, non propter violentiam aliquam Divinae potestatis, sed propter indomabilem & perseverantem nequitiam suae iniquitatis; Not one of them can be saved, not because of any violence of Divine power, but by reason of the untameable & persevering naughtiness of their own iniquity, & p. 144. De Reprobis nullum salvari ullatenus existimavi, non quia non possunt homines de bono ad malum commutari & de malis ac pravis boni ac recti fieri, sed quia in meliùs mutare noluerunt, & in pessimis operibus usque ad fiaen perseverare voluerunt; not only of the Reprobates do we judge to be saved, not because they could not be changed from evil to good, & of evil & depraved become good & right, but because they would not be changed into better. & would to the end persevere in wicked works; So than they could be changed but would not: But in what respect is it said they could be changed? was it in respect of the freedom of their wills without grace? Nothing less; see his own words, pag. 34. Si dixisset generaliter, nemo hominum sine Dei gratia libero benè uti potest Arbitrio, esset Catholicus: Had he said generally that no man can rightly use his free will, without the grace of God, he had been a Catholic. But all the question is about the manner how this grace doth work (to wit) whether God gives men grace to believe and repent if they will, and leaves to them to perform the Act of faith and repentance; or whether God worketh the very Act of faith and repentance, not to dispute of this point out of God's word, which clearly teacheth, that, God works in us the will and the deed, according to his good pleasure. Philip. 3. 13. And that he makes us perfect to every good work; working in us that which is pleasing in his sight through jesus Christ: Let us take notice of the discourse between Hincmarus and Remigius on this argument; that Heb. 13. 20. till the love of God comes, man is dead; his will is dead to that which is good; Now love is only given to the believers, posse charitatem habere naturae est hominum, charitatem autem habere gratiae est fidelium, De praedestinatione sanctorum, cap. 5. For thus writes Hincmarus, pag. 3. 113. Bonum quod agimus & Dei est & nostrum, Dei per praevenientem gratiam, nostrum per subsequentem liberam voluntatem, The good that we do is both God's work and ours; of God by Grace preventing, ours by free will following: To this Remigius answers, and first he saith, Hincmarus discoureseth after such a manner, as if a good work were partly God's work and partly ours: And again as if the beginning of a good work were God's, but the effect thereof of man's free will; although as he (Hincmarus) doth endeavour to temper this speech of his, by the addition of grace, not by the fullness of it; gratiae adjunctione non etiam plen●tudine, by the adjunction of grace, not also by the fullness of it: So he should have done saith Remigius, cum verè totum sit Dei; seeing indeed the whole is God's work; As the truth itself saith, without me ye can do nothing: And the Apostle; what hast thou that that thou hast not received? whence the blessed and glorious Martyr Cyprian hath so defined it, saying, we must glory in nothing, seeing nothing is ours: and concludes thus; Bonum itaque nostrum totum Dei est, quia totum est ex Deo; & nihil boni nostri, nostrum est, quia nihil boni nostri est ex nobis: Therefore our good works, are holy God's, and no good of ours is ours, because it is not of us; and to reconcile this seeming contradiction, in calling it our good, yet denying it to be from us, he concludes thus, omne bonum nostrum, & totum Dei est, donando; & totum nostrum est, accipiendo: Every good thing of ours is wholly God's in as much as he gives it, and it becomes ours full and whole, for as much as we receive it. Fulgentius is plain for it to, lib. 1. ad Monium, pag. 6. These whom God foresaw would die in sin, he decrees should live in endless punishment; I may take in Saint Austin, and Prosper also, who are judged to be the Patrons of he absolute Decree, as it is set down in the Sublapsarian way; even they do many M. Mason's Additions p. 6. times let fall such speeches, as cannot fairly be reconciled with absolute Reprobation. I will only cite Prosper; for Saint Austin, speaks in him; he discoursing of some that fall a way, à Sanctitate ad immunditiem, from holiness to uncleanness; saith, they that fall away from holiness to uncleanness; lie not under a necessity of perishing, because they were not predestinate; but therefore they were not predestinate, because they were known to be such by voluntary prevarication. Not long after speaking of the same men; he saith, Because God foresaw they would perish by their own free will; therefore, he did not by any predestination lever them from the children of perdition. And again in his answer to the twelfth objection, he hath these words. God hath not withdrawn from any man ability to yield obedience, because he hath not predestinated him; but because he foresaw he would fall from obedience; therefore he hath not predestinated him. They are I confess the words of Fulgentius in the 25: chapter of his first book ad Monium, and in the very next chapter, he doth express himself in this manner Answer. on the point of predestination unto glory; praedestinavit illos ad snpplicium quos à se praescivit voluntatis malae vitio decessuros; & praedestinavit ad regnum quos ad se praescivit misericordiae praevenientis auxilio redituros, & in se misericordiae subsequentis auxilio mansuros: He predestinateth those untopunishment, whom he foresaw to be such as would depart from him through the fault of a naughty will; and he predestinated to the kingdom those whom he foresaw to be such as would return unto him by the help of mercy prevenient, and would persevere in him by the help of grace subsequent; So that upon the same ground he may as well deny predestination unto salvation to be absolute in the opinion of Fulgentius, as predestination unto damnation: Now Vossius in his preface to the Pelagian History, having first confessed that all Ancients agreed in this, That God did not ordain any other unto eternal salvation, than such who by his mere gift of grace should have the beginning of faith and good will, and persevere in that which is good, as it was foreseen by him: In the next place acknowledgeth, that Austin and Prosper and the Author of the book de vocatione Gentium; and Fulgentius, unto this common opinion of Catholics did add this; That this prescience Divine did flow from God's absolute Decree to save them. This I say Vossius writes, though, I see no cause to regard his judgement in this Argument. His distinction is very well known of will absolute and will conditional; which will conditionate he examplifies thus, as when God will have salvavation conferred upon a man in case he doth believe; what one of our Divines doth deny a conditional will, in this sense in reference to salvation? Now what one of the Ancients (the Pelagians excepted) can this Author produce; that doth affirm any such will to be in God, for the bestowing of faith upon a man? For to maintain this, were in plain Terms to maintain, that it was the will of God that grace should bestowed according unto works: But if the grace of God be bestowed merely according to the good pleasure of God, as Saint Paul saith; God hath mercy on whom he will? By this it is aparent, that this decree is absolute, and consequently that predestination is absolute; And thus Austin coupleth together the doctrine of the bestowing grace not according unto works, And his Doctrine of predestination as inseparable, each to be granted or denied together with the other. Because this Author pretends it to be needles to cite Austin, and sufficient to cite Prosper, adding that Austin speaks in him, to wit, after he was Dead; such is this Authors juggling course with his Reader; therefore I will represent Austin himself proposing the objection made by the Massilienses, against Austin's doctrine of predestination, as it was sent unto him by Prosper, and then answering it, not leaving it unto Prosper to answer for him: See the objection, sed aiunt (ut scribitis) neminem posse correptionis stimulis excitari, si dicatur in conventu Ecelesiae audientibus multis, It a se habet de praedestinatione definita sententia voluntatis Dei, ut alii ex vobis de infidelitate, accepta obediendi voluntate, veneritis ad fidem, vel accepta perseverantia maneatis in fide etc. But they say (as ye write) that none can be stirred up by the Goad of correption, if it be said in the Congregation in the hearing of many, such as touching predestination is the determinate sentence of the will of God, that some of you receiving an obedient will, shall come from infidelity unto faith, or receiving perseverance shall continue in the faith: But the rest, who continue in sinful delights, therefore you have not risen, because the succour of commiserant grace, hath not as yet raised you. But if there be any not yet called whom God hath predestinated to be elected by his grace, (or whom his grace hath predestinated to be elected) ye shall receive the same grace, whereby to will and be Elect. And as for those that do obey, if you are not predestinated to be Elect, the strength of obedience shall be withdrawn that you may cease to obey: Thus far the objection, Austin's answer followeth thus; When these things are said, they ought not to to deter us, from confessing God's grace (to wit) which is not given according unto works, and from confessing predestination according thereunto; like as we are not terrified from confessing God's foreknowledge, if a man should discourse thereof in this manner before the people; whether now ye live well or not well, such shall ye be hereafter, as God foresees ye will be, either good, if he foresees ye will be good; or evil, if he foresees he will be evil: for what if upon the hearing hereof some give themselves to sloth, and from labour prone to lust go after their concupiscences; shall we therefore conceive that to be false which was delivered concerning God's foreknowledge? And so he proceeds to justify the truth of this doctrine which was objected against him by way of Crimination, I say to justify it as touching the substance of it, though as touching the manner of proposing it, he confesseth that to be unreasonably harsh in some particulars; and shows how that may be proposed in a more decent manner, still holding up the same truth, Thus Austin was able to answer for himself, whilst he was living; Now let us consider how Prosper answers for him after he was dead. And first let us consider the objection itself; now it is this, That they who are not predestinate unto life, although they live piously and righteously, it shall nothing profit them, but they shall be reserved so long until they perish: Now this is painely a part of the objection made by the Massilienses and they were Galli, * And it is sometimes more harshly proposed by the Massilienses then by the Galli. whom Prosper answereth, for the objection proposed to Austin was, that, strength of obedience should be taken from them; But in the objection of the Galli, whom Prosper answers it is set downe in a milder manner, thus, They shall be reserved until they perish. Now Austin himself accomodates his answer hereunto in particular, De bono Perseverantiae, cap. 22. 1 For showing the unreasonable harshnessein this manner of proposing it: I wonder (saith he) if any weak man in a Christian people can by any means hear with patience that which follows; as namely when it is said unto them, ye that do obey, if ye be predestinated to be rejected, the strength of obedience shall be withdrawn from you that you may cease to obey; For thus to speak what seemeth it to be other, then to curse or to prophesy evil after a sort; Then he proceeds to she who the same truth may be delivered in a fairer manner, still holding up the truth of the doctrine of predestination; If (saith he) a man think good to speak something of such as do not persevere, and need be so to do. What fails of the truth of this sentence if it be delivered thus? But if some do obey, that are not predestinated unto the kingdom and to glory; they are temporary ones, and shall not persevere in the same obedience unto the end. Then he proceeds to show how the same objection may be framed against God's prescience, thus; Et si qui obeditis, si praesciti estis, rejiciendi obedire cessabtis; If any of you do obey, if with all ye are foreseen to be rejected ye shall cease to obey, whereby ye may observe, how Austin in framing the objection, leaves out the Phrase of withdrawing the strength of obedience, as containing a calumnious imputation, and such as Austin had nothing to do with in the course of his opinion concerning predestination. Thus Austin hath plainly answered for himself, and needs no other to answer for him, and his answer proceeds without all colour of prejudice to his own doctrine, concerning the absoluteness of predestination By this let the Reajudge of the ingenuity of this Author, who conceals all this from his Reader, bearing him in hand, that Austin speaks in Prosper making answer to his objection, whereas indeed there is a vast difference between Prosper's answer for Austin, and Austin's answer for himself: But like enough Prosper was willing to condescend to the Galli, * and to gratify them with an answer, that in his judgement might be more acceptable and satisfactory unto them; To the consideration whereof I now proceed, and therein to consider Prosper, not Austin's mind, concerning predestination, as which he hath sufficiently manifested in answer to the same objection, as I have showed; Therefore (saith Prosper) They are not predestinated, because they were foreseen to be such hereafter by their voluntary prevarication, what will follow herence? That foresight of sins was the cause why they were not predestinated unto life? I answer, first by denying this consequence, for it may as well follow that the Creators' love is the cause why sins are forgiven him, for the Gospel saith of the woman, Luk: the 7. Therefore many sins are forgiven her, because she loved much; such illations are not always causal, but very often merely rational. Secondly, let it be causal, and that foresight of sin is the cause of non predestination unto life, and accordingly of predestination unto damnation, yet here I have a double answer. First it is the most general opinion, that reprobation as it signifies a purpose to damn, and accordingly to exclude from heaven, presupposeth the prescience of sin: M. Perkins expressly professeth as much, and other Divines at the Synod of Dort; yet this hinders not the absoluteness of reprobation, which appears in the purpose of God to deny grace, and that absolutely to some, like as he bestows it upon others; I mean the grace of faith and regeneration; otherwise grace should be given according to works: Now let any passage be produced out of Prosper, or any other Orthodox writer amongst the Ancients to show, that God in distributing these graces unto some, and denying them unto others, did not proceed absolutely, but according unto works; and according to this doctrine, it is well known that Austin shaped his doctrine concerning predestination, as it hath been showed at large in the answer to M. Hord, in the first section; secondly that there may be a cause of predestination and reprobation, Aquinas doth not deny, but how? quoad res volitas, as touching things willed, or, praedestinatione & reprobatione praepartas, by predestination and reprobation prepared, and in this sense Aquinas himself confesseth that, foresight of sin is the cause of reprobation, the nineth to the Romans; & see how he explicates himself, his words are these, Lect: 3. praescientia peccatorum potest esse aliqua ratio reprobationis ex parte poenae quae preparatur Reprobatis: in quantum scil: Deus proponit se puniturum malos propter peccata quae à se ipsis habent, non à Deo. The foresight of sins may be some reason of reprobation as touching the punishment, which is prepared for Reprobates, in as much as God decreeth to punish wicked men for their sins, which they have of themselves, not of God: But of reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating, there can be no more cause thereof, then there can be a cause of God's will as touching the act of God willing. And upon this very ground it is, that Aquinas professeth that * never any man was so mad as to affirm that there may be a cause given of predestination, as touching the p. q. 23. art: 5. in Corp. act of God predestinating; Let us therefore forbear to impute any such opinion to Prosper or any other of the Ancients; which none ever was so mad as to maintain in the judgement of Aquinas. The same answer will serve for the next, derived out of the same place in Prosper: As for the third of withdrawing strength of obedience; This indeed was objected unto Austin, as if in his opinion God did so; whereas I have showed also how Austin signifies that he had nothing to do with that, and therefore he leaves that quite out. And indeed Austin's is clear and express, that as many as God hath not predestinated, those he never bring's unto wholesome and spiritual repentance, whereby a man is reconciled unto God in Christ. Cont: julian: Pelag: lib. 5. cap. 4. And consequently he never brings them to any true obedience. The whole sentence in Prosper hath no more moment than the former, and therefore admits the same answer. A testimony or two I will borrow likewise from some person of note, and those Saint Austin's followers too, who lived about 400 years after Saint Austin's time. Remigius the great Patron of Gotteschalke the zeatous M. Mason's Additions p. 6. 7. preacher and publisher of absolute reprobation in those times, in his answer to that epistle, which we suppose to be the Epistle of Rabanus; saying, that God did make the nations of the world, and that he doth will that all men should be saved; he gives such an answer as cannot stand with absolute reprobation; This, saith he, is very true, because God layeth on no man a necessity of perishing, as he hath laid on none a necessity of sinning: And a little after he is plainer; Those whom God did fore know would live and die in their wickednesses for reasons most just, should perish, as himself saith, Him that sinneth against me, even him will I blot out of my Book. In the Valantine Synod assembled in the favour of Gotteschalke, we may find these words; Therefore do the wicked perish, not because they could not, but would not be good, and by their own fault original or actual, also, remained in the Mass of perdition; And in the end of their 3. Cannon: they pronounced Anathema to those, that hold that men are so predestinated unto evil as they cannot be otherwise. That any should be (saith the Council) predestinated unto evil by the power of God; so as he cannot be otherwise, we do not only not believe, but also if there be any that will believe so great an evil, with all detestation we denounce them accursed; as the Council also did. This Author grants Remigius to be a Patron of absolute reprobation: But these Answer. words of his, this Author saith, cannot stand with absolute Reprobation: Remigius undoubtedly thought they could; otherwise he must have renounced the Doctrine of absolute reprobation and the Patronage thereof, which yet he did not; as this Author acknoledgeth: Now is it enough for this Author, to say that these words cannot stand with absolute Reprobation and barely to say it, without proving aught? and truly I have found such to be the imperious carriage of this Author in manuscript, now I see it in print; But let us endeavour to clear Remigius, by proving the Contrary: endeavour to clear Remigius, by proving the contrary. Therefore it is well known that the Term absolute stands in opposition to Conditional. Now this distinction of will absolute and will Conditional Gerardus Vossius doth accommodate in respect of the things willed of God, and gives instance of God's will of saving, which he saith is conditional: forasmuch as God purposeth not to bestow salvation on any, but such as believe, faith being by God's ordinance the Condition of obtaining Salvation. In like sort Doctor jackson in his book of Providence acknowledgeth the distinction of voluntas antecedens, and consequens is to be understood not on the part of God willing, but on the part of things willed: Now the things willed in the decree of Reprobation, are two, contrary to things willed in Election: For as in Election God doth will the conferring of grace, and the conferring of salvation; so in Reprobation God doth will the denial of grace and inflicting of damnation: Now Remigius in the passages here produced, speaks altogether of God's will to inflict damnation, and he denies that God's will is to inflict damnation on any man absolutely, but only conditionally (to wit) in case of final perseverance in sin, and so say we with Remigius: But as touching God's will to deny grace, we utterly deny that God will have grace to be denied upon a condition, for nothing can be devised to be the condition thereof, but sin either original or actual. And if upon such a condition grace should be denied, it should be denied to all seeing before grace is given, all are found to be under sin actual or original, and consequently all should be Reprobates, even every mother's son. 2. And if to avoid this, it be said: although all be sinners, yet grace is denied to none, but such as want a certain particular obedience; Then upon the performing of that obedience grace should be conferred; this is as much as to say that Grace is conferred according unto works; which doctrine hath ever been abominated by the Orthodox in opposition unto the Pelagians. Now the Apostle clearly makes for us in this, professing that God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. Now though there passages produced out of Remigius carry some show against absolute reprobation from glory, or unto damnation; yet have they no colour or show of opposing absolute reprobation from grace; As for necessity of perishing, that is merely conditional (to wit) in case of final continuance in sin without repentance; And as for necessity of sinning, that we confess is found in all, in state of nature, Corvinus confesseth it to be the doctrine of Arminius that, all men naturally are cast upon a necessity of sinning. * In answer to charity mistaken. And Doctor Potter proposeth it as the doctrine of the Church of England, that, in a natural man there is no libertas a peccato, liberty from sinning; which yet is to be understood aright, not but that it is in his power to abstain from any particular sinful act; for no supernatural act is or can be sinful, every sinful act must needs be an act natural; and power either to do or to abstain from any natural Act, is not to be denied to any natural man. But it is impossible that any natural man should abstain from any sin, or do any natural good act (so commonly accounted) in a gracious manner, until grace comes, so to season the heart of man as to love God, even to the contempt of himself, and out of his love to do that good which he doth, and to abstain from that evil, from which he abstaineth. 2. But if the question be of the manner how this necessity of sinning is brought upon the nature of man; we say, it is not by the pleasure of God: But by the sin of Adam, according to that of the Apostle, Rome 5. By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin: for man by reason of sin was justly bereft of the Spirit of God, and begetting children in this Condition, he begets them after his own Image and likeness, that is bereft of the Spirit of God. And we hold it impossible for a man bereft of God's Spirit, either to do that which is good, or abstain from doing that which is evil in a gracious manner. 2. Secondly, I come to the Synod of Valense, when they say, the wicked not perish because they could not do good, but because they would not. These words may seem to imply that even the wicked could do good if they would; and truly I see no cause to deny this: But that we may safely say with Austin; that, omnes possunt Deo credere & ab amore rerum temporalium ad divina praecepta servanda se convertere, si velint: Believe God if they will, and from the love of all things temporal convert themselves to the keeping of God's Commandments if they will; for if a man would go to Church but cannot, because he is lame, would read in God's word, but cannot, because he is blind: These impotencies are natural not moral: but the impotency brought upon mankind by the sin of Adam is moral not natural. Now moral impotency is found no where but in the will, or at least is chiefly there, and secondly in the understanding also, as touching knowledge practical; and accordingly when Scriptures testify that they who are in the flesh cannot please God, Rome 8: cannot repent, Rome 24: cannot believe Ioh: 12. This impotency consists chiefly in the corruption of their wills, noted by the hardness of heart, Rome 2. 4. Eph: 4. 18. Again I have already showed out of Remigius, that a wicked man can do that which is good, but by what means? (to wit) by grace, not otherwise. The words are these; Si dixisset generaliter, nemo hominum sine Dei gratia libero bene uti potest arbitrio esset Catholicus; had he said generally, not any man can use his free will without grace, he were Catholic. And pag. 36: the same Remigius hath these words, In infidelibus ipsum liberum arbitrium ita per Adam damnatum & perditum, in operibus mortuis liberum esse potest, in vivis non potest; free will so damned and lost in Adam, may be free in dead works, in living works it cannot: Yet pag. 174: thus he distinguisheth, answerably to the passage alleged by this Author. De reprobis nullum salvari ullatenus existimamus, non quia non possunt homines de malo ad bonum commutari, ac de malis ac pravis boni ac recti fieri, sed quia in melius mutari noluerunt, & in pessimis operibus usque ad finem perseverare voluerunt. And pag. 143. Florus of the Church of Lions where Remigius was Bishop, sets down the same truth more at large, thus, Habet homo post illam damnationem liberum arbitrium, quo voluntate propria inclinari potest & inclinatur ad malum, habet liberum arbitrium, quo potest assurgere ad bonum, ut autem assurgat ad bonum non est propriae virtutis sed gratiae Dei miserantis; Nam & qui mortuus est, potest dici posse vivere, non tamen sua virtute, sed Dei, Ita & liberum arbitrium hominis semel sauciatum, semel mortuum potest sanari, non tamen sua virtute sed gratia miserantis Dei, & ideo omnes homines admonentur, omnibus verbum praedicatur, quia habent posse credere, posse converti ad Deum: ut verbo extrinsecus admonente & intus Deo suscitante, qui audiunt, reviviscant: Man hath after that damnation (to wit) such as followed after Adam's fall) free will, so that of his own will he can be inclined and is inclined to evil, he hath free will whereby he may rise unto a good condition: but that he doth arise to that good condition, is not in his own power; but of the grace of God compassionating him; for of him also who is dead, it may be said that he may live, yet not by his own power but by the power of God. So man's free will also being once wounded, once dead may be restored, not by his own power, but by God's grace pitying him and therefore all men are admonished, to all the word is preached, because they have this that they may believe, they may be converted unto God, that by the word outwardly admonishing & God inwardly raising, they which hear may revive. As touching the last, condemning those who say that any should be so predestinated to evil by God, that they cannot be otherwise, this Author would fain insinuate into his Reader an opinion; That wicked men may change from evil to good of themselves; But neither doth the Council of Valens, or Remigius a chief man therein, intimate any such thing; But only that it is in God's power by his grace to change them, and so hath changed and will change the hearts of many, namely of all his Elect, but not of one other. That the Remonstrants did not at that time desire that it should be talked of, among the common people, who might have stumbled at it, but disputed of, amongst the Judicious and Learned, who as the threshing M. Mason's Additions p. 8. 9 5. Oxen who are to beat the corn out of the Husk, are to bolt out those truths which are couched and hidden in the letter of the Scriptures. That the doctrine which is loath to abide the trial even of learned men, carrieth with it a shrewd suspicion of falsehood, the heathen Orator shall witness for me; who to Epicurus seeing that he would not publish his opinion to the simple people; who might happily take offence at that, answereth thus. Declare thy opinion in the place of Judgement, or if thou art afraid of the assembly there, declare that in the Senate amongst those grave and judicious Persons. Thou wilt never do it, and why? but because it is a fowl and dishonest opinion. True religion (as Vives saith) is not a thing guilded over but gold itself: the more it is scraped and discovered, the brighter and goodlier it is; and so is the truth. Vives de Verbo sidei, lib. 1. pag. 16. Disputations illustrate and set forth true opinions more than silence can; let us not fear therefore (saith he) lest our faith when it is laid open appear filthy to the beholders. Id ib: Let fa se and superstitious religions in which there is no soundness be afraid of this. The Jew is loath to reason with the Christian touching his law: And the Turk is forbidden to dispute of his Alcoran, because their religions are brittle like glasie broken with the least touch, Vives lib. 4. pag. 479. But the Christian who is confident of the goodness of his faith feareth no examination; but rather as much as may be, soliciteth and provoketh his adversary to the Cumbate. Truth whether it be in men or doctrines, is best when it is uncovered. Of the five considerations proposed in this discourse, as it was first penned and transmitted to a friend, the fifth is changed and in the place thereof this inserted, and it concerns Answer. the third instance given of the Synodical Divines in the Synod of Dort. Now it is already showed in the answer to the former discourse how immodestly the Author carrieth himself, in charging that Synod with unwillingness to come to the trial, who justified their proceedings in the judgement of all the foreign Divines there present, for whereas the Remonstrants did once and again profess that they could not in conscience any longer stay in the Synod, unless it were provided for, that they might treat of Election and reprobation. And that after that manner which they had set down in their Theses and writings exhibited to the Synod; hereupon the Synod to give them satisfaction herein ordered, that their opinion not only concerning Election, but also concerning reprobation should be weighed and examined: so far forth as they in conscience should judge to be sufficient, for the glory of God, for the edifying and quieting of the Church and all men's consciences; but as touching the manner of proceeding herein, it pertained to them to consider and ordain as they thought good. And it became not those who where cited to appear, to prescribe unto the Synod. This decree being read the 40 session contains the altercation here abouts, between the Synod and them. They forsooth would prescribe to the Synod, de modo agendi; The Synod must not unto them. The Synod hereupon entreats the judgement of foreign divines. And they all with one consent profess that the Synod had granted the Remonstrants as much liberty for the defence of their cause, as in Equity could be granted and could well stand with the honour of the Synod. And therefore there is no cause why the decree of the Synod should be altered, or why the Remonstrants should complain or decline the Authority of the Synod; that nothing was put upon them burden some to their consciences: And therefore it was in vain to pretend scruples of Conscience, as in the Session 42 there is a representation made of their unreasonable demand; namely in the first place to deal upon reprobation &c: whereupon the opinion of foreign divines was required; as whether it was fit to yield unto them in this, and to treat of reprobation before they treated of Election, who declared by concurring suffrages that course (proposed by them) to be most unreasonable: now let the reader judge how unshamefast that crimination is, which this Author chargeth that Synod with, and consequently all the the foreign divines therein assembled, who justified those Synodical proceedings with their unanimous consent. Surely this Author hath an high opinion of himself, and his own sufficiencies, who thinks this Bolt of his soon shot, more worth than the concurrent verdict of all those divines, Chosen as eminent persons by their several Churches, and sentunto that Synod from many places of Christendom. Now he who in the progress of his unshamefast discourse, spares not thus to Tax a Synod and all the foreign Divines that assembled therein, no mervell if he forbear not to charge the Contra Remonstrants in the Hague conference with the same Crimination, though never so injuriously; Thus indeed the Remonstrants in the Synod of Dort, Criminate their adversaries as appears in the Synodalia Dodcacena pag: 136. In the conference at Hague the Contra-Remonstrants deprecated that they might not be put to deal on Reprobation, and more at large pag: 159. in the same writings; We read how Festus Hommius one of the Contra-Remonstrants in that conference at the Hague, hereupon stood up, Exposuitque paucis quod non bona fide haec de illis dicerentur, how unfaithfully this relation was made, se libello supplice non fuisse deprecatos ne de reprobatione ageretur; That they did not in their supplication entreat that no disputation should be had of reprobation▪ and therewithal the truth of the matter as formerly I have set down in answer to the former discourse, and as for Beza in the conference with jacobus Andreas in the point of predestination: It is true at the first motion he declined it, and he gives his reasons, 1. namely that thy were not called by the prince of Mompelgard to dispute on this Article but on another which was expressed in the prince's letters, as jacobus Andrea's acknowledgeth: 2 and accordingly they had Commission from their Church that sent them, to dispute on that whereunto they were called and not on any other. 3. and so they came provided to dispute on that which was expressed in the Prince's letters who invited them. 4. Then again it was in a Lutheran assembly. 5. neither would Andeas yield to Beza's motions that the conference might be transacted by writing. 6. nor that which was to be delivered by them should be taken by notaries. 7. Yet they offered to propose their doctrine on that Argument before the Prince, and to hear what Jacobus Andrea's had to say against it and promised to return him an answer thereunto; Thirdly, consider it was not predestination alone, whereof they were unwilling at that time and in that place to confer about, But two other Articles also, namely as concerning Baptism, and Images in Churches; why then, doth not this Author plead as well for Images in Churches, as for the conditional nature of reprobation: as well he may upon the same ground? Fourthly, what sottishness possesseth this Author to conclude, that because Beza at such a time, and in such a place, and upon such and such terms, did refuse to dispute thereon; Therefore all that profess the same doctrine with Beza do refuse to come to trial there abouts, and consequently that doctrine is suspectable of untruth; whereas it cannot be concluded of Beza simply that he refused to come to a trial, because once at a certain time and in a certain place, and in a conference upon certain terms he did refuse to come to a trial: For my part, I refuse not to come to a trial with any of them upon any particular: But I no way think fit to entertain a conference here about by words of mouth, but rather by writing; so it will be more quietly carried, so it will be more free from alien discourse; so each party shall have time both duly to weigh the Adversaries Argument and with due consideration to put in his answer thereunto; And is it not far more decent that the holy things of God should be handled premeditately, rather than subitaneously? Fistly, what if Beza were of opinion that God hath chosen some unto eternal life, and passed by others without any respect had to the personal goodness of the one, or naughtiness of the other, and that this is Saint Paule's doctrine, Rome 9 This was Saint Austin's opinion also as Vossius acknowledgeth in his history of Pelagian heresies p. 655. Now will any man think him well in his wits who discourseth after this manner; surely Austin's doctrine concerning election and reprobation is suspectable of untruth; Because Beza maintaining the same doctrine some 1200 years after, was unwilling to come to a trial thereabouts at a certain time in a certain place, namely at Mompelgard before the Duke of Wirtenberg? Lastly, observe the strange inconsiderations of this Author; for the Author of the former discourse promised the Gentleman his friend to whom he wrote, to give him the reason of his change in opinion, not in this point only of reprobation, but in the other points also, for he perceived he was become an Arminian: Now whereas he gives him the reason of his change in one point only, declining all the rest, doth he not manifest his unwillingness to deal on all the other 4 points? And may not we conclude after this Authors manner, that this betrays no small suspicion, that certainly his cause is weak and ill grounded in all the rest? In like manner doth this Achates carry himself, he that helps of the other to make his task for him. It is his usual course to deal only upon the point of reprobation, as in this place; so in a writing of his to a certain Scholar, and as I have seen under his hand; It seems he is well conceited of his sufficiency on this point: And truly I am very glad to see what he can say for himself, even on the point of reprobation That which follows is to little purpose, save to show the plerofphorie of his common place-book: and how easily it is for him to abound, not only in things necessary, but in things unnecessary also: Therefore he tells us what Cicero writes of Epicurus, which may with a far better grace be retorted upon himself then upon Beza, or the Contra-Remonstrants at the Hague conference; or the Fathers of Dort, how unfacetiously it is applied unto them I have already showed, and further it is well known both by calvin's, and Beza's writings, and by that which was done in the Synod of Dort, set forth to the view of all the world, that they have not concealed their opinions from the world on those points controverted; All that are able to read and understand Latin, may soon come acquainted with them: And M. Hord dealing only upon reprobation which is but a part of one of the five Articles, and forbearing to meddle with Election or any other of the five, contrary to the promise made by him unto his friend, doth he not hereby bewray consciousness of his own insufficiency to meddle thereon? And like enough he hath learned this wisdom from his Abettor (and this is his course) who loves to deal in hugger mugger, and sets others on work, contented to blow the coals; yet walks gloriously at the light of his own fire, and the sparks that he hath kindled, vaunting (as I hear) that his piece cannot be answered, and in such terms he commends it unto the Country. In like manner let the indifferent Reader judge, whether, that which he produceth out of Lodovicus Vives be more against us, then against the Author himself that produceth it; for both Calvin, and Beza and generally our Divines have publicly professed their opinions, not on predestination only, but on reprobation also, and upon all other points controverted between us and the Arminians; whereas this Auhour sculkes and pulls in his horns as if he dared not to be seen on other points; only declares himself upon the point of reprobation; I mean M. Horde; but as for the other which blows quicksilver into him, he is loath to be known, as if his occupation were with Brontesque Steropesque & nudus membra Pyracmon, to take pains to make thunderbolts for jupiter, or for Mercury rather; for he is content an other should be the chief speaker. 5ly. The jew he saith, is loath to reason with the Christian touching his law, and the Turk is forbidden to speak of his Alcoran; But have I showed myself loath to reason with this Brontes, in any particular difference between us, or with any amongst them that wears a head upon his shoulders? I trust, I never shall, as long as I breath, As for this Author, the world is witness how deeply guilty he is in this kind, contrary to his own promise: But he may thank his prompter that he deals in this, and he indeed had made no such promise to to confine him, but out of his foxlike carriage, makes choice to deal only on this, where he hopes to meet with a favourable wind from vulgar and popular conceits, to to fill his sails to carry him prosperously into their affections, be his Arguments never so weak: never so insipid. Now it is well known unto him, that my answer to the former discourse hath now been in the the hands of others for the space of two years and a half, and not the smallest passage thereof do I find answered here. And this seconds conscience knoweth whether he hath not been full well acquainted with it, before this piece of his did see the light of the press: Now because this alone might justly prove notoriously prejudicial to the whole, see what a dogtrick hath been played, to antedate the edition thereof, as if it were printed Anno 1633, when it hath been but a few months since this hath been known unto the world, that the Reader may imagine if it please him, that this was printed before my answer was returned to the former discourse. And to what purpose is the discourse brought to the Bulk, which that hath at present, so many odd things being inserted thereunto; but to provide for their indemnity that shall say, This was never it answered, whereat I wonder not a little, namely at the cunning and crafty carriage of this second, who for good reason may be accounted the first, in as much as he useth the other but as a stalking-horse to promote his own game, I say I may, and do wonder not a little at this, for he both carrieth himself and others boast of him, as if he were some formidable Creature, and Lion like to affright all others that should deal with him, when in very truth all his performances savour far more of the Fox then of the Lyon. And it is also disstastfull to all the Greek Churches; Moulin in his Anatomy speaking of the Supralapsarian doctrine; saith, if it should be so that God hath reprobated men without the consideration of sin, or hath M. Mason's Additions p. 10. 11, 12, 13 ordained them to sin. Yet it is the part of a wise man to conceal these things, or not to know them rather than to utter them: because, when they are taught and defended they fill men's heads with sceuples, and give occasion to the adversaries to the defaming the true religion. The same may as truly be said of the Sublapsarian way, for as I have said, they are in substance all one; And Sir Edwin Sands is of the same mind too; for in his most excellent book called A survey of the pag. 10. State of Religion, in the western part of the world; speaking of the deadly division between the Luthernas and the Calvinists in Germany, he hath these words; that, though ●he Palsgrave and Lansgrave have with great judgement and wisdom, to slake those flames, imposed silence in that part to the Ministers of their party, hoping the Charity and discretion of the other party would have done the like; yet it falls out otherwise; for both the Lutheran Preachers rail as bitterly against them in their pulpits as ever, and their Princes and people have them in as great detestation; not forbearing to profess openly, that they will return to the Papacy rather than ever admit that Sacrementary and predestinary Pestilence. And as for the Grecians, we learn also by Sir Edwin Sands his relation, that they do mightily descent from the doctrines touching the eternal Counsels of God, which Calvin (as some conceive) first fully revealed or rather introduced into the Christian world, and some of his friends pag. 11. and followers have seconded; as thinking it very injurious to the goodness of God, and directly immediately opposite to his very nature, In regard of which, on of their Bishops hath written a book against it, which hath been sent to Geneva and there received. And to say on thing more, besides this infamy among Christians, it is very probable that among the too many scandals given to the Jews by Christians among whom they dwell; This doctrine is not on of the pag. 12. least rubs in the way of their conversion. For they think it a bad opinion (saith the same judicious and learned Gentleman) which some of great name have seemed to hold, that God in his everlasting and absolute pleasure should affect the extreme misery of any of his Creatures, for the showing of his justice and severity in tormenting them, or that the calamity, casting a way and damnation of some, should absolutely and necessarily redound more to his glory then the felicity of them all, considering that his nature is mere goodness and happiness, and hath no affinity with rigour and misery. And secondly the determination of the end doth necessarily involve the means that precedes the end, as pag. 13. if a man before determined to damnation, he must unavoidably sin else he could not be damned. As touching this paticular of M. Moulyn: I have addressed an answer puctually Answer. thereunto in my Vindiciae amongst my degressions touching predestination, yet I am content to say something concerning the point itself and his judgement thereupon. Reprobation hath two parts, which this Author most judiciously confounds, the one is God's decree to deny grace, the other is his decree to inflict damnation; As touching the first, the very execution thereof proceeds merely according to God's pleasure, howmuch more the decree itself, which is eternal, and cannot possibly have any precedaneous thereunto; whereas the execution is temporal, and temporal things may have somewhat precedaneous thereunto. Now that the execution thereof is merely according to God's good pleasure is apparent; the execution thereof being no other than the denial of grace; And as God of his mere pleasure gives faith and repentance to whom he will; so of his mere pleasure he denies it unto others; otherwise grace should be conferred according unto works, which was condemned in the Synod of Palestine, Pelagius himself subscribing thereunto above 1200 years ago, and all along afterwards it was condemned in divers Synods gathered together for suppressing of the Pelagian Heresy. Now did M. Moulin think it no wise part to publish this doctrine, That grace is not given according unto works; but according to the mere pleasure of God? Nothing less; Saint Paul plainly professing that God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will, he hardeneth. Come we to reprobation as it signifies God's decree to inflict damnation without consideration of sin, our adversaries would fain shape our opinions thus, and none more eager this way, than this Author, I mean him that is thought to be the suggester at first, and since the Interpolator and Promotor of all this; But this is a most notorious untruth; nay how can we maintain this, who embrace the definition of reprobation given by Aquinas, where he saith, that repobation includes a will to permit sin, and to infer damnation for sin, so doth M. Perkins, and him have I justified against Arminius in my Vindiciae; And not any one of our Divines doth maintain that God intends to damn any man but for sin, and final perseverance therein without repentance. And the former point concerning the first act of reprobation, being granted, which neither Sir Edwin Sands, nor any Lutheran that I know, denies; the doctrine concerning this latter act of reprobation will be found to contain no difficulty at all, forasmuch as we utterly deny that God either doth inflict, or ever did decree to inflict damnation according to his mere pleasure; but merely for final continuance in sin without repentance. Now let every sober Reader consider, whether there be any harshness in all this: But as M. Moulin discourseth here, so did the Massilienses of old concerning Austin's doctrine, as which they would not have at all broached, as appears in the Epistle of Prosper.— Yet I commend this Author for his ingenuous confession, that the same may be said of the Sublapsarian way. But to our prejudice he tells us that Sir Ed: Sands is of the same mind, and therefore considering the excellency of the book, written by him, whereunto we may add the excellency of the discourse written by this Author; let us for the credit and transcendent sufficiency of these two, renounce not Calvin and Beza only, (poor Snakes as they were) but the whole Synod of Dort; and all the outlandish divines assembled there, and manifesting their concurrence in opinion with those Synodical Divines, yea and Fulke and Whitaker, and the University of Cambridge as they were then affected, when they drove Barret to a recantation; Yet Sir Edwin Sands in the place produced, betrays not his own judgement, but makes relation of the bitterness of Lutherans in opposing Calvinists: In like manner both Jews and Gentiles did oppose Christians even unto blood, for preaching Christ crucified, which was a scandal to the one, foolishness unto the other. And shall the truth of Christianity be any whit the worse thought of for this? why then shall our Doctrine of predestination and reprobation be suspected as untrue, because the Lutheran party, do also bitterly oppose it? especially considering, that we with Austin no otherwise maintain predestination then as it depends and is grounded upon this, that grace is not given according unto works, as Austin professeth to have been his opinion, de bono perseverantiae, cap. 14. And we are ready to renounce whatsoever contradicteth this: and the Lutherans themselves profess concurrently with us, that grace is not given according unto works. And by the way observe the Lutheran spleen is exercised not only against the predestinary pestilence, (as they call it) but the sacramentary pestilence also. That is, against their doctrine who oppose their ubiquity and consubstantiation, yet in the very next page the same Knight affirms, that all the Lutherans are not carried with the same stern humour, but they only who are called Lutherani rigidi, & that the greater part perhaps which are the molles Lutherani, are quiet enough, neither account they otherwise of the Calvinists, then as of erring brethren; whom the rigids have (as is said) threatened to excommunicate as Schismitiques and Heretics.— 3 The Grecians are said to oppose the doctrine of Calvin in the point of predestination; yet we know our English Divines subscribed unto the same Doctrine in the Synod of Dort; together with all the foreign Divines there assembled, and the sum thereof is but this, that God, both in the election of some, and preterition of others, had no respect to the personal goodness of the one, and personal naughtiness of the other. And that this was the very doctrine of Austin, and of Saint Paul also in the opinion of Austin, Vossius acknowledeth, and Austin professeth that this doctrine herein is shaped merely according to the rule so generally received in the Church of God against Pelagians, that grace is not given according unto merits, de bono perseve: cap. 15.— 4. Concerning the Jews, this doctrine of ours, this judicious (not Sir Edwin Sands) thinks it probable that doth hinder their conversation: And indeed that learned Knight doth profess, that they are opposite to the doctrine here recited by this Author, and in the same sentence he professeth them in like manner opposite to our doctrine, in maintaining that the devil and his Angels shall be cast into everlasting fire; for thus goes Sir Edwin's relation, as they think it a bad opinion which some men seem to hold, that God in his everlasting and absolute power should affect the extreme misery of any of his Creatures as here it lies, so contrary wise, they think with Origen, that Hell in the end shall utterly be abolished; and that the devils themselves after a long course of bitter repentance, and punishment shall find mercy at his hands, that did create them: But as touching our difference from this in this particular; This Author doth not express aught so much as probable, to hinder their conversion; as touching the former he hath; for that served his turn, this doth not, and his wit and wisdom being so ne'er of kin, no marvel if he makes the one to perform service of love to the other But let me say something concerning the opinion itself here related, as in the first place; That God doth not effect the extreme misery of his creatures in his absolute pleasure, what is the doctrine opposite hereunto but this, namely that God decrees to damn no man but for sin, and not according to his absolute pleasure? Now what one of our Divines was ever known to contradict this; and to affirm that God intends to damn many of his creatures not for their sins, but of his own absolute pleasure? for my part I never read any that maintained this: But we generally say that God in electing some and passing by others, as touching the conferring of grace, proceeded and decreed, and that from everlasting to proceed, not according to men's works, but according to his absolute pleasure; now this was Austin's judgement as well as ours; and Saint Paul's too, in the opinion of Austin, as Vossius acknowledgeth in the place formerly cited. And Saint Paul speaks plainly, when he saith, God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth, and as plainly in saying, That, before the Children were borne, or had done good or evil, that election might stand not of works but of him that calleth, it is said that the elder shall serve the younger, As it is written jacob have I loved, and Esau have I hated, Rome 9 11, 12. And I durst appeal to every sober man's consciencewhether one of these Jews in reading this would not as readily condemn Saint Paul himself, as they condemn us: As for the other part of the doctrine here proposed, namely that the damnation of some should redound more to God's glory, than the felicity of them all. I answer that it is as clear as the light, that the glory of God in the way of vindicative justice had not at all appeared, if all had been saved, no nor the riches of his glory upon the Vessels of mercy, whom he had prepared unto glory, if God had not suffered with long patience some vessels of wrath prepared to destruction, if we believe Saint Paul Rome: 9 22, 23: rather than the Jews: and it is apparent that the Lord God, who made allthings for himself, took this course, namely, to make even the wicked against the day of evil, and accordingly as to show mercy on whom he will, so Prrov. 16. 4. to harden whom he will, also Rome 9 18: otherwise as I have often said, grace should be conferred according to merits, that is according unto works, which is expressly contradictory both to the word of God. 2 Tim: 1. 9 Tit. 3. 5. And to the decrees of Synods and Counsels, all along against the Pelagians. ● 5. I willingly grant that the determination of the end doth necessarily involve the means, that not only preceded but procure the end. But I will utterly deny that sin is the means of damnation, we say rather that permission of sin is the means, whence notwithstanding it follows, not that sin shall come to pass unavoidably, but rather avoidably; whether we consider the free will of man or the decree of God; for every particular sinful act is a natural thing, and undoubtetdly man hath free will as to do, so to abstain from doing any particular Act: and albeit God hath determined that these particular sinful Acts (instance the particular outrages committed against the holy Son of God by Herod, Pontius Pilate, together with the Gentiles, and people of Israel, Acts 5. 28.) shall come to pass by his permission; yet seeing withal he hath ordained them to come to pass contingently that follows that they shall come to pass in such a manner, as joined with a possibility of not coning to pass, otherwise they should come to pass, not contingently, but necessarily. But it is grown to be this Authors natural genius miserably to overreach; while he keeps himself to his own forms inshaping the opinion of his adversaries, impatient to be beaten out of them and to have his veteres avias à pulmone repelli, oldgrandmothers vain conceits to be pulled out of Lastly this Author shapeth us to make damnation an end intended by God, which we conceive to be a very shallow project; we know nothing but Gods own glory that can be this end: And therefore even there where Solomon professeth that God made the wicked against the day of Evil: herewithal acknowledgeth that God made all things forhimselfes. Pro: 16. 4. At length we have gotten clear aboard to come acquainted with this Authors full discourse, and not by patches, as hitherto we have done. For here he promiseth to acquaint us with the reasons that have convinced him of the untruth of absolute Reprobation as it is carried the upper way and like a Martialist, a man at arms, he tells us they fight against it, and thus the interpolator discourseth. The first part of the first Argument against the supralapsarians. sect: 1. They are drawn ab incommodo from the greater evils and inconveniences, which issue from it naturally: M. Mason's Additions p. 14. 15. 16. which may be referred to two main heads. 1 The dishonour of God. 2 The overthrow of religion and government. It dishovoureth God. For it chargeth him deeply with two things, (no way agreeable to his nature.) 1 men's Eternal torments in Hell. 2 Their sins on Earth. First It chargeth him with men's eternal torments in Hell, and maketh him to be the prime, principal, 2nd invincible cause of the damnation of Millions of miserable souls: The prime cause, because it reporteth him to have appointed them to destruction of his own voluntary disposition, antecedent to all deserts in them; and the Principal and invincible cause, because it maketh the Damnation of Reprobates to be necessary and unavoidable through Gods absolute and uncontrollable decree; and so necessary that they can no more escape it then poor Astyanax could avoid the breaking of his neck, when the Grecians tumbled him down from the Tower of Troy. Now this is an neavy charge, contrary to scripture, God's nature, and sound Reason. 1 To Scripture, which makes man the Principal, nay the only cause (in opposition to God) of his own ruin. Thy destruction is of thyself o Israel, but in me is thine help. As I live saith the Lord, I will not the death of the wicked etc. Turn ye, turn ye, why will ye die He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the Children of men. To which speech for likeneile sake I will join one of Prospers. God's predestination is to many the Hos: 13. 9 Ezec: 33. 11. Lament: 3. 33: cause of standing, to none of falling. 2 It is contrary to God's nature, who sets forth himself to be a God merciful, gracious, long suffering, abundant in goodness etc. And he is acknowledged to be so by King David. Thou Lord art good and merciful, and of great Kindness to all them that call upon thee: And by the Prophets Joell, Jonah, and Michah. He is gracious and merciful, slow to anger, and of great Kindness. Resp: ad 12. Object: Vincent: Exod: 34. 6. And who saith Micah, is a God like unto thee, that taketh away iniquity etc. He retaineth not his wrath for ever because mercy pleaseth him. 3 'Tis contrary also to sound reason, which cannot but argue such a Decree of extreme cruelty and consequently remove it from the father of mercies. We cannot in reason think that any man in the world can so far put off humanity and nature, as to resolve with himself to marry and beget Children, that Ps: 86. 5. after they be borne and have lived a while with him, he may hang them up by the tongues, tear their flesh with scourges, pull it from their bones, with burning pincers, or put them to any cruel tortures, that by joel: 2. 13. Ion: 4. 2. Micah. 7. 18. thus torturing them he may show what his Authority and power is over them. Much less can we believe without great violence to reason, that the God of mercy can so far forget himself as out of his absolute pleasure to ordain such infinite multitudes of his Children, made after his own image, to everlasting fire; and create them one after another, that after the end of a short life here, he might torment them without end hereafter, to show his power and soveraingty over them. If to destroy the righteous with the wicked, temporally, be such a piece of injustice, that Abraham removeth it from God with an Absit, wilt thou destroy the righteous with the wicked? that be far from thee O Lord. shall not the judge of all the world do right? How Gen: 18. 25. deeply (may we think) would that good man have detested one single thought, that God resolveth upon Answer. the destruction of many innocent souls eternally in hell fire. Here this Author carrieth himself like another Ptolomeus Ceraunus; or as if he had some chief place in the lightning legion, not by his prayers, but by his discourse, he seems to thunder and to lighten all along. When the Lord appeared to Elias, he was neither in the mighty wind, nor in the earthquake, nor in the fire, but in the still and soft voice. I hope to prove all this to be but Ignis fatuus; Mountebancks use to make great ostentation and cracks, but commonly they end in mere impostures, and it is no hang strange, when men opposing the grace of God, lose their own wits, and please themselves in the confusion of their own senses. For when men are in love with their own errors, they hate the light; yea the very light of nature in the distinct notice of it, would be an offence unto them. Can this Author be ignorant of that which every mean Sophister knows, that there be four kinds of causes, Material, Formal, Efficient, Final; that he should expatiate thus in speaking of a cause without all distinction? Is it strange that God should be a prime cause, and principal in execution Deut. 32. 35. Ps: 94. 1. Rome 13. 4. of vengeance? Doth he not profess saying vengeance is mine, and I will repay? Is he not called the God to whom vengeance belongeth? And are not his magistrates his Ministers to execute vengeance temporal here in this world? And can any sober man doubt whether God be invincible whom the Apostle pronounceth to be irresistible? Again an Rome 9 19 efficient cause admits farther distinction; for it is either Physical or Moral: Physical is that which really works or executes any thing: as every tradesman hath his work, which his hands do make; so God hath his work, which he executes, and his work is judgement jer. 29. as well as mercy. I am the Lord which show mercy and judgement and righteousness; for in these things I delight, saith the Lord; and he would have us when we do glory, glory in this, that we do understand and know him to be such a God. A Moral efficient is twofold, being only of a moving nature, to move others to do somewhat; as namely either by persuading, or by meriting or deserving: He that persuades moves an other to do some what; he that meriteth, thereby moves another, either to reward him or punish him. Now to walk in the light of this distinction, and not to please ourselves by walking in darkness; though God be the prime, principal, and invincible cause of man's damnation in the kind of a cause efficient physical (which should not seem strange to an ordinary Christian, who knows full well that vengeance is God's peculiar work, as the judge of all the world, and that he delights in the execution thereof) yet this hinders not but that Gen: 18. 25. man may be the cause of his own damnation in the way of a meritorious cause, justly deserving it. Omnis poena Deum habet Authorem, All punishment hath God for the Author of it: This is a principle acknowledged both by the Arminians and Vasquez the Jesuit; but never is punishment inflicted on any by the hands of God, save on those who formerly have deserved it. Consider we farther, as touching the several kinds of causes formerly mentioned; if the question be which is the principal, Aristotle answereth, that this is not confined to any one kind of them; sometimes the material cause, sometimes the formal cause, sometimes the efficient, sometimes the final cause is the demonstrative cause, the cause propter quam, the cause by virtue where of the effect hath its existence; but this peculiar and special cause is described thus, It is that whereby satisfactory answer is made to the question demanding why such a thing is. Now in execution of punishment or condign vengeance, this satisfactory answer is made by representing the meritorious cause, never by representing the efficient cause: as for example, if it be demanded why such a malefactor is executed upon the gallows; no sober man will answer, because the Sheriff commanded it to be so, or because the Judge would have it so; but because he robbed upon the high way, or committed some criminal fact or other, which is capital by the laws of our land, and to be punished with hanging upon the gallows. In like sort if question be made why devils or wicked men are damned, is it our doctrine to refer the cause hereof to the mere pleasure of God? Do not all confess that God inflicts damnation upon them merely for their sins and transgressions wherein they have continued unto death without repentance? Yet we acknowledge that God could have taken them off from their sins while they lived if he would, by giving them repentance, as he hath dealt with us, and that merely of his free grace. For we willingly confess that our sins are our own, but our faith is not, our repentance is not. When I say our own, I mean in respect that they are of ourselves; otherwise we acknowledge both faith and repentance to be our own accipiendo, in as much as we receive them; but they are God's gifts, and so they are his dando, in as much as he gives them as Remigius speaketh. Now what is become of this Authors pompous discourse? Is it not the like the cracking of thorns in the fire, making a great noise; but the light of distinction, like fire, sets an end unto it, and makes it appear in its own likeness, and proves nothing but a squib. For albeit God in his decree makes the damnation of reprobates to be necessary and unavoidable; yet seeing he makes it not to fall on any but for their sins, what colour of dishonour unto God, in ordaining that judas shall necessarily and unavoidably be damned for betraying the Son of God, and afterwards most desperately murdering himself? If hereupon he could no more avoid his damnation, than Astionax could the breaking of his neck, when the Grecians tumbled him down from the tower of Troy; will any man that is not bereft of common sense make strange of this? It is true God did appoint both judas and all other wicked persons, that never break off their sins by repentance, unto destruction, of his own voluntary disposition. For God works all things according to the counsel of his will, and if Eph: 1. 11. it pleased him he could annihilate them upon the fresh foot of any sin; or after they have suffered the vengeance of hell fire, as many years in hell as they lived here in sin; yea and the devils in hell; as Origen was of opinion; and the Jews at this day are of the same by Sir Edwin Sands his relation; whether this Author be of the same or not, I know not. And lastly we willingly confess that the decree of God was antecedent to the deserts Eph: 1. 4. of men; for reprobation is as ancient as election; and election was made before the foundation of the world, if we believe Saint Paul rather than any other, who either by word or deed doth manifest himself to be of a contrary opinion. Still damnation is inflicted by God only for sin, and in degree answerable unto their sins; and only because of their sins as a meritorious cause thereof; though God makes use of it to his own ends and the manifestation of his own glory as Solomon professeth namely, that God made all things for himself, even the wicked against the day of evil. And Saint Paul tells, that as the Lord suffereth with long patience the vessels of wrath prepared to destruction that Prov: 16. 4. he might show his wrath and make his power known. So likewise another reason hereof he specifies to be this. That he might declare the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy which he Rome 9 hath prepared unto glory. For when we shall behold the unspeakable misery brought upon others by reason of their sins; how rich will God's glory appear unto us, when we consider 23. that had it not been for his free grace delivering us from sin, we had been swallowed up of the same sorrows. And thus Alvarez writeth, disput. III. The glory of God's mercy in his elect, and in like manner the manifestation of divine justice on Reprobates; is truly and properly the final cause why God did permit sins both in Reprobates and Angels. And he proves it out of this passage of Saint Paul. So Aquin: 1 p. pag. 23. art. 5. This is the reason saith he why God hath chosen some and Reprobated others, that representation might be made of God's goodness towards the Elect in the way of mercy pardoning them, and on the Reprobates in Rome 22. 23. the way of justice punishing them. And Alphonsus Mendoza a Scotist concurres with them in this; and we see they make Saint Paul's doctrine their foundation. And indeed albeit at the day of judgement there will be found a vast difference between the Elect and Reprobates, the one having departed this life in the state of faith repentance, the other in infidelity and impenitency, in such sort as God will bestow on his elect eternal life by way of reward, and inflict eternal death on the other by way of punishment; yet in conferring the grace of regeneration, of faith and repentance upon the one, and denying the same graces unto the other, the Lord carrieth himself not according to men's works, but merely according to the pleasure of his own will, showing mercy on whom he will and hardening whom he will; in which respect he is said to make men in what condition he will; as Rome Rome 9 18. 9 20. Shall the thing form say to it that form it, why hast thou made me thus? Though indeed he makes but one sort of them after a new fashion, leaving the other in the state of natural corruption wherein he findeth them: And likewise is compared by the same Apostle to a Potter, who out of the same lump makes one vessel unto honour, and an other unto dishonour. But to return, I have, I trust, sufficiently showed that in all this which he hath delivered, when things are rightly understood, and duly considered, there's nothing found alien from the holy nature of God, no more than it is repugnant to his holy nature to decree and execute vengeance, condign vengeance, even the vengeance of damnation on men for their sins; in such sort that it shall unavoidably overtake all those that break not off their sins by repentance before their death. Nothing more agreeable to Scripture, nor to the nature of God revealed unto us in holy Scripture than this, and consequently nothing more agreeable to Christian reason. But as for natural reason; God forbid we should make that the rule of our faith, as concerning the resurrection of the dead and the powers of the world to come, the rewards of heaven, and the torments of hell, where the worm never dieth, and the fire never goeth out. And may it not seem very strange, that a Christian and a Divine, and one magnified by the Arminian party for great abilities should undertake to prove this doctrine to be contrary to Scripture, to the nature of God and to sound reason. Well let us proceed to observe how well he performs what he undertakes. And here he saith. 1. That the Scripture makes man the principal, nay the only cause (in opposition to God) of his own ruin. We answer, the Scripture makes man the only cause of his own ruin in the meritorious cause; thus man's destruction is of himself; But this nothing hinders God from being the cause why vengeance, destruction and damnation are executed upon man; for he is the God to whom vengeance belongeth, & he delights as well in showing judgement, as in showing mercy. Indeed did we maintain that God damns the Reprobate whether man or Angels of his mere pleasure, this Argument of his were seasonable. We know full well that God of his free grace shows mercy; but judgement only upon provocation, and herein he proceeds slowly too; for he is slow to wrath, and easy to be entreated. Yet God's afflicting is not always for sin; neither doth it always proceed in the way of punishment: when we suffer for Christ we have cause to rejoice that he counts us worthy to suffer for his name; neither were the afflictions of job brought upon him for his sins, but for the trial of his faith, and to make him an example of patience to all succeeding generations; and as for that of Ezech: I will not the death of the wicked; It is the usual course of men of this Authors spirit thus to render the words, whereas our last English translation renders them thus, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked. Now as a man may will that wherein he takes no pleasure; as a sick-man takes a bitter potion sometimes for the recovery of his health; so God may will that wherein he takes no delight. And whether it be meant of first or second death it cannot be denied but God wills it; for he works all things according to the council of his own will. Then again Eph: 1. 11. if we consider the infliction of death as an execution of judgement, God not only willeth this, but delights therein also, as it is expressed. That of Prosper is nothing to the jer. 9 24. present purpose, we treating here of the cause of damnation, not of sinning; we say God is the God to whom vengeance belongeth, not to whom sin belongeth. Besides sin, as sin, hath no efficient cause at all, but defficient, as Austin hath delivered many hundred years ago. It is true, it is in God's power to preserve any man from any sin; it is in his power to take any man off from any sinful course by repentance, if he will; but he is bound to none, he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth; and in all this he is not culpable. In the next place he tells us; It is contrary to God's nature but what? To damn men for their sins neverbroken offby repentance? for all our divines maintain that God is Author of damnation to none but such; and to such God is not merciful nor gracious, nor suffers them any longer, nor shows any goodness towards them; while they lived he did; yea much long suffering and patience, inviting them thereby to repentance; yea and by his; word also inviting many; but after they die in sin, therewithal an end is set to the dispensation of God's gracious proceedings with them. Much less do we deny him to be good and merciful and of great kindness to all that call upon him. For God's mercy doth not exercise itself by necessity of nature, but by freedom of will; yet he heareth the cry of Ravens and not a Sparrow falleth to the ground without the providence of our heavenly father, and the very Lions roaring after their prey, do seek their meat at the hands of God: These mercies are temporal; but as for spiritual mercies, for the working and cherishing of Sanctification these are not extended unto all, but to some only, even to whom he will. And accordingly the elect of God are called vessels of mercy. Yet to the Rome 9 18. Rome 9 23. execution of damnation on any he proceeds not till after death, and stays no longer; so slow to wrath he is towards the worst, and no more slow to the best of them. Who is a God like unto thee, saith Micah, that taketh away iniquity? here this Author out of wisdom maketh a stop, leaving out that which followeth and passing by the transgressions of the remnant of his heritage: That restriction belike he did not so well brook; but having leapt over that; he is content to take in that which followeth, he retaineth not his wrath for ever, because mercy pleaseth him: to wit, towards the remnant of his heritage, of his people. But I hope nought of this can hinder God from being the Author of damnation to all that die in sin without repentance without any prejudice to his holiness, though he retaineth wrath for ever against them. We come to his reason which he calls sound, saying that it cannot but argue such a decree of extreme cruelty. But what decree? of that whereby he hath decreed to damn all that continue in sin without repentance? For to none other hath God decreed damnation in the opinion of any of our divines. But that which he commends as sound let us examine. We cannot in reason think, saith he, that any man in the world can so far put off humanity and nature as to resolve with himself to marry & beget Children, that after they are borne and have lived a while with him, he may hang them up by the tongues, tear their flesh with scourges, pull it from their bones with burning pincers, or put them to any cruel tortures, that by thus torturing them, he may show what his authority and power is over them. Much less can we believe that God should ordain infinite multitudes of his Children to everlasting fire. Is it credible that this Author himself doth not believe that very doctrine which here he impugneth Doth he not believe that God hath ordained infinite multitudes of those whom he calls God's Children to everlasting fire? doth he not I say believe this as well as we? Doth he not believe that whosoever dyeth in sin without repentance shall be damned? doth he not believe that God of his mere pleasure hath made such a decree? It is incredible he should not be of the same faith in this. Are not all God's ordinances made of his mere pleasure? could he not both ordain and execute the annihilation of sinners if it pleased him? and that either immediately upon the committing of sin, or after some certain years enduring the punishment of hell fire. And as for hell fire itself, could not he qualify or increase the tormenting nature thereof as he should think good? All this I nothing doubt but he believes, unless with Origen and the Jews, he be of opinion that the fire provided for the devil and his angels is not everlasting: what madness then, what frenzy possesseth him so to dispute against us, as to dispute against himself? Undoubtedly this Author would have his Reader so propitious unto him, as to understand and interpret him beyond that which his own words do import; as namely thus, That God hath not only of his absolute pleasure made such an ordinance, that all who die in sin without repentance shall be damned; but rather thus; That God hath ordained that Infinite multitudes of his children shall be damned, not for their own sins, but only out of his absolute pleasure. For this is generally the unshamefast carriage of men of this Authors spirit. Now what one divine of ours can he show to have maintained this? Yet this is the imputation he chargeth upon us, that by our doctrine God resolveth upon the destruction of many innocent soul, eternally in hell fire. Yet this is a very Amphibologious expression. For when were they innocent in his meaning? when they were damned? If this be in his meaning, can he name any divine of ours that affirms this? Or doth he mean they were innocent when God entertained this resolution? And doth not he as well as we maintain that there was a time, when Angels were innocent though afterwards they became devils; yet both then and from all eternity God had entertained such a resolution; For his decrees were everlasting as we say; neither hath he hitherto manifested his opinion to the contrary; whether he maintaineth such an opinion secretly in his breast, I know not; If he doth, and shames to declare it let him pull himself by the nose; in the passages he produceth out of Cicero concerning Epicurus, and out of Virus concerning such like pag: 9 Yet we do not say they were innocent when God made his decree of Reprobation. I should show myself an Ignoramus to say so, We say they were neither innocent nor nocent then, forasmuch as till the Creation no Creature had any being but God's decree of Election (and consequently Eph: 1. 4, of Reprobation also) had its being before the foundation of the world. 2 This manner of reasoning which this Author calleth sound, I have found long a go in Castalio, as superficiary a Divine as ever put pen to paper. And by the way observe, all the Devils and Damned men he calls God's Children: this is the language of their Court. Now what Gal: 3. 26. Gal: 4. 6. Rome 8. 14. vers. 17. one Divine of ours maintains that any of God's children are destinated to eternal fires? S. Paul tells us We are all the sons of God by faith in Christ jesus: and because we are sons, God hath sent the spirit of his son into our hearts crying Abba Father; And that as many as are led by the spirit of God. And if we are children we are also heirs, even the heirs of God. and heirs annexed with Christ. And this distinction to wit the children of God, and 1 Io: 3. 10. children of the Devil, hath been ever since the fall of man, as S. john signifieth where he saith. In this are the children of God known, and the children of the Devil, whosoever doth not righteousness is not of God, neither he that loveth not his brother. And anon after Io: 8. 49. Gen: 4. 26. he giveth instance in Cain and Abel. Yea & our Saviour gives us to understand the same, where he saith to the Jews, Ye are of your father, the Devil, and the lusts of the father ye will do. And whereas we read that in the days of Enosh men began to call upon the name of the Lord; forthwith we read c. 6. 2. (For the 5. chap. coming in between contains only the Genealogy of the world from Adam) of the distinction between the sons of God joh. 37. 7. Mat: 2. 10. and daughters of men, thus, the sons of God saw the daughters of men that they were fair, and they took, them wives of that they liked. It it is true, Adam is called the son of God in reference to creation; And no marvel; For he was created in the state of grace: so likewise the Angels for the same reason. When the stars of the morning praised them, and all the Children of God rejoiced. It is true we thus read, Have we not all one father? hath not one God made us? Piscator interprets these two interrogatories into one: As if God in the first place were represented as a common father unto all; but our Geneva Divines do not, but the name of father in this place they refer to Abraham. And in not referring it unto God they have the consent of the Jewish Rabbins Aben Ezra and David Kimhi; who yet more handsomely do refer it to their common father jacob, then to Abraham, the Covenant of God including all the Sons of Jacob; not so all the Sons of Abraham, no nor the Sons of Isaak but jacob only. 3. Consider is it decent to conform the courses of God with the courses of men? May not we consider in like manner against the Lord's foreknowledge, as well as against his decree, & reason thus: what man of common humanity would resolve with himself to marry and beget children, did he foresee their wicked courses, and what will become of them for it, namely, to be condemned to everlasting fire with the Devil and his Angels? what shall we therefore conclude that God did not foresee the wicked ways and ungodly courses of all Reprobates, that they would continue in them and die in their sins without all faith in Christ and true repentance towards God? And if he did foresee what would be the ends of them in case he did create them and bring them forth into the world, yet seeing he would nevertheless create them and bring them forth into the world, one after another in their several times and ages, shall we brand the holy name of God, and reproach him for unnaturalness, and barbarous cruelty? Rather I will say what means this Auhour so unconscionably to corrupt the state of the question, by mentioning only the shortness of their life, and utterly concealing the wickedness of their life, the only meritorious cause of their torments which they suffer, and accordingly to shape the ends intended by God, to be only the demonstration of his power and Soveraingtie over them, without all mention of his justice; whereas we say that in the inflicting of damnation, the chief glory which, God manifests is only the glory of his justice proceeding herein according to a law which himself hath made (as most fit it is the Creator should give laws to his creature) and the law is this, whosoever believeth and repenteth shall be saved, whosoever dyeth in sin without repentance shall be damned. Not one of our Divines (that I know) maintains, that inflicting damnation, the Lord proceeds merely according to the good pleasure of his will, in the communicating of faith and repentance, we willingly confess the Lord proceeds merely according to the good pleasure of his will; and it is express Pelagianism to affirm that grace is given according unto works. And herein this Author is very well content to walk in the dark and conceal his most corrupt opinion most opposite to the grace of God. But that damnation should be inflicted without respect to sin as the meritorious cause thereof what one of our Divines can he produce that affirmeth? Yet thus he is pleased to disguise our opinion (when he finds the poverty of his strength to wage fair war) and so expose it to the hatred of me; as if God ordained to damn men not for their sins, but of his own mere pleasure. Thus of old the enemies of the Gospel dealt with Christians: for first they would clothe them with bear skins, and then set dogs upon them. All that he hath to say to excuse his shameless crimination (though so much he doth not express here) is only this, that our Divines maintain the decree of damnation to preceded the foresight of sin. Yet this is untrue of the most part of them, who premit both the foresight of sin original before reprobation from grace, and of sin actual before the decree of damnation; I willingly confess for my part, that I concur with neither; and if I should, I should withal make the decree of permitting of sin to preceded the decree of damnation, for which I see no reason; but yet I do not make the decree of permitting sin to follow the decree of damnation. I hold these decrees to besimultaneous, thus, that God at once decrees both to create men, and suffer them all to fall in Adam, and to bring them forth in their several generations into the world, and to bestow the grace of faith and repentance upon the one, and so to save them, and to deny the same grace unto others, finally permitting them in their sinful courses, and so to damn them for sin; and all to manifest the glory of his mercy to the one, and the glory of his justice on the other, yea and his soveraingty too, but wherein? not in rewarding the one with Salvation and inflicting damnation on the other; but only in giving grace to the one, and not to the other. And all the difference between our Divines is merely in apice Logico, a point of Logic To wit, as touching the right ordering of decrees, concerning ends, and means tending to the ends; all concurring in this, that, God hath mercy on whom he will, in bestowing faith and repentance upon them, and whom he will he hardeneth, in denying the same graces unto others. Now when this Author shall fairly prove that according to our opinion, God destroyeth the righteous with the wicked; then and not till then, shall he prove that our faith differeth from the faith of Abraham. What Divine of ours was ever known to affirm that God damneth any one that dyeth in repentance? Yet it cannot be denied but that temporal judgements befall the righteous, as well as the wicked. When the Lord swept away 70 thousand with a three day's pestilence in the land of Israel; was it not possible thinks this Author, that any of God's dear children should perish by that pestilence? To be carried away into captivity by an heathenish nation, I should think is a greater calamity then to die of the pestilence; yet those who were carried away into Babylon with King jechoniah, the Lord represents by jer. 24. the basket of good figs; and those the Lord professeth that he had sent them away into Babylon for their good. Were all damned will this Author say, that perished in the flood? Saint Peter seems to be of an other opinion, where he saith, To this purpose was the Gospel preached, also to the end that they might be condemned also to men in the flesh, but might 1 P. t. 4. 6. live according to God in the spirit. Truly I do not say so much of them that perished in the conspiracy of Corah, when the earth opened her mouth and swallowed up the conspirators, nor them only but their wives and children also, especially considering that inter pontem & fontem, mercy may be sought and mercy may be found. Sect. 2. Containing the first Objection with the answer thereunto devised, and my reply thereupon and an answer thereunto. M. Mason's Additons p. 16. 17. But God say some is sovereign Lord of all creatures, they are truly and properly his own. Cannot he therefore dispose of them as he pleaseth and do with his own what he will? Object. The question is not what an almighty sovereign power can do to poor vassals, but what a power that is just and good may do. By the power of a Lord his absolute and naked power he can cast away the whole Answer. mass of mankind; for it is not repugnant to Omnipotency or soveraingty, but by the power of a Judge, to wit, that actual power of his, which is always clothed with goodness and justice, he cannot. For it is not compatible with these properties in God to appoint men to hell of his mere will and pleasure; no fault at all of theirs preexisting in his eternal mind. It is not compatible with justice which is a constant will of rendering to every one his due; and that is vengeance to whom vengeance belongeth, namely to the obstinate and impenitent. God is good, saith Saint Austin, and God is just, he may without any desert free men from punishment, because he is good; But he cannot without evil deserving condemn any man, because he is just. In an other place also he saith, If God be believed to condemn any man that by sin deserves it not, he is not to be believed to be free from injustice. 2. Nor is it compatible with goodness which is an inclination in God of communicating that good which is in himself unto his creatures, as far as he can without wronging his justice. And therefore if God be (as the Scripture reporteth him) good to all; it cannot be that he should of himself without any motive in the reasonable creature, provide for it from everlasting the greatest of all miseries, and that before he thought of making it or bestowing any good upon it. As touching the Objection I hope this Author will say so too. As touching the first, Reply. namely, that he is the sovereign Lord of all creatures; and our Saviour Christ will say it for him, if he will not; as touching the last, namely, that it is lawful for him to do what he will with his own. But I find no need at all of this consideration, to make answer to his former vain discourse: for he may see plainly that I have made no use of these principles: but they have their place to justify God in other courses; namely, 1. In punishing children for the sin of their fathers in great variety of judgements temporal; as in the conflagration of Sodom, and in drowning of the old world. 2. In damning many Infant children of heathen men dying in original sin unremitted; as M. Mason in his lectures at Magdalen Hall maintained, that, the punishment of original sin unremitted was eternal damnation. And M. Hord confesseth as much in his preface, Sect: 4. 3. Yea and in making the Soul of Christ the holy Son of God an offering for the sins of others. But consider we his answer. To appoint to hell, what is it but to appoint to the sufferings of the torments of hell? Now doth any of our Divines maintain that God appoints any man to the suffering of hell torments of his mere pleasure, and not for sin? They do not, and therefore this Authors discourse depends upon a mere fiction devised in his own brain. 2. The distinction which here he makes is the distinction of Arminius, who maintained that God can do that per potentiam, by power, which he cannot do per justitiam, by justice, which I have disproved at large in a peculiar digression on this argument in my Vindiciae; and not one of my reasons there brought doth this Author once offer to answer. And Lib. 1 p. 2. digres. 4. this opinion of his doth manifestly imply that God hath a power to do that which is unjust. 3. He supposeth very judiciously to his own advantage, that there is a justice in God towards his creature secluding the ordinance of his will; whereas both Suarez and Vasquez opposite in other particulars concerning God's justice, do yet agree in this, that there is no justice in God towards his creature, but upon supposition of his will and Vindic. l. 1. p: 3. digres. 1. ordinance as I have showed. 4. He may as well say that it is not compatible with the justice of God to punish (as it signifies to inflict paineon) him who is holy. For justice is as well opposite to the punishing of an Innocent, as to the punishing of him in such a degree. And consequently God cannot in justice put an holy man to death, much less annihilate him; which if he saith, he shall contradict Arminius. 5. If it be not compatible with God's justice to inflict hell pains on any man, no fault of his preexisting in the eternal mind, then either Christ suffered not the pains of hell, or was not without fault; or lastly God was unjust in inflicting those pains upon him. 6. In the last place observe, for all this he gives us nothing but his bare word. So that if we give him leave he is like enough to dictate unto us Articles of belief at his pleasure. 1 By what right is vengeance due to the obstinate and impenitent? Is it due by any other right then by the ordinance of God? Cannot God pardon it if it please him, yea and cure it too? And if he be pleased to punish it, cannot he punish it as well by annihilation of the obstinate (so to set an end unto his sin as to himself) as by condemnation of him? That of Austin is spoken in reference to God's law, whereby he hath ordained that without evil deservings he shall not be condemned (yet Christ suffered hell pains without any evil deservings) In respect of the like law, he shall be unjust, if he he should not reward them, who die in faith and repentance, with everlasting life. This is only in respect of potentia ordinata, such a power as is ordained by his will. But as for potentia ahsoluta, power absolute, all confess that God can annihilate the holy Angels. 2 How doth God communicate grace unto his creatures? is it not by necessity of nature, or freedom of will? Philosophers were wont to argue the eternity of the world by this, that Bonum est sui communicativum, That which is good is apt to communicate itself, yea naturally and necessarily: And therefore God being optimus the best, as well as maximus the greatest, was most communicative, and that naturally and necessarily. If the same be this Authors opinion, he is as Atheistical as they: But if by freedom of will he communicates his goodness, than he communicates his goodness, as when he will, so likewise how he will, and to whom he will. As Saint Paul expreslely professeth saying, God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth, of such places as these this Author Rome 9 18. takes no notice, but so much the more Atheologically. Yet I am willing to take notice of what he brings, namely, that God is good to all; And so he is in doing them good, many and sundry ways; in maintaining their being, But he is not in such sort good to all as he is said to be good to Israel. For he hath not dealt so with any nation, as with them. 2. 'Tis untrue that God communicates unto his creatures that good which is in himself: for the Ps: 73. 1 good which is in himself is of a more transcendent nature, then to be communicable unto creatures; such conceits are Manichaicall. God is essentally whatsoever he is: But the Ps: 147. 20. goodness this Author speaks of, is of an accidental nature unto us; And is it decent and not rather abominable to transform the essence of God into an accident, that so it might be communicated to the creature. 3. If God's goodness incline him to communicate goodness unto the creature, as far as he can without wronging justice, than it inclines him to communicate holiness unto all to preserve all from sin, to bring all to faith and to repentance, and so to save all. For how could his justice be wronged in this? 4. When he saith, than God of himself cannot without any motive in the reasonable creature provide for it from everlasting the greatest of all miseries; observe what an hungry proposition this is; for will he say that God can provide for any creature the greatest misery save one, though not the greatest of all without any motive in the creature? But if he can so provide the greatest save one, why not the greatest of all? What colour of reason to put any difference in this! And if the greatest save two, why not the greatest save one? And so we may go on till we come to the least misery, thereby to convince the unreasonableness of this assertion. For in clear evidence of truth, reason cannot discover where to make a stand. 5. And what is the motive he means, but the motive of sin? And what sin did God the Father see in Christ the Son, that moved him to ordain his dear Son to the suffering of hell pains? 6. And as he allegeth Austin to little purpose, so to the contrary what he writes the predestinatione & gratia is well known. Si humanum genus quod creatum primitùs constat ex nihilo; sine debito mortis nasceretur, & tamen ex iis Creator Omnipotens in aeternum nonnullos damnare vellet interitum, quis Omnipotenti Creatori diceret, quare fecisti sic. If mankind which is well known, at first to be made of nothing, were born without the debt of death and sin; Yet if the Almighty Creator, would damn some of them to eternal destruction, who would say to the Almighty Creator, why hast thou done so? And observe his reason, Qui enim cum non essent, esse donaverat, quo fine essent habuit potestatem For he that gave them being when formerly they had no being had power to dispose to what end they should be. There is nothing more evident by the light of nature than this. I willingly confess that that this book though it go under Austin's name, yet it is thought to be none of Austin's, and that amongst other Raynaud: in adit. ad lib. Intitul. Valerianus Integer doctrinae labisque purus. considerations, by reason of this very sentence in particular, which seems unto me very harsh, and contrary to Austin's doctrine in other places. But Raynaudus hath discovered at large the vanity of this reason, and shows by variety of testimonies the concurrence of Antiquity in bearing witness to the same truth. And albeit he confesseth the book not to be Austin's, yet he proves that Fulgentius was the Author of it, always accounted to be an Orthodox Father and well known to be a follower of Austin's. Sect: 3. Containing a Reply to the second Objection, and Answer thereunto. M. Mason's Addit. p. 17. 18. Object. 2. Perkins lib. de predestin: p. 25. It is further objected, that we do and may slaughter our beasts for our daily use, without any cruelty and iniquity, And therefore God may as well and much more appoint as many of us as he pleaseth to the torment of hell, for his glory, and yet be just and good to notwithstanding. For there is a greater disproportion between God and us, than there is between us and beasts. 1 For answering hereunto we are first to premise thus much, namely that our slaughtering of Beasts Answer. for our daily use is by God's ordinance, and appointment. We had not the authority of ourselves, but God of his bounty towards us, gave it us, as we may see Gen: 9 2, 3. Where we may observe, 1 That God delivereth up all creatures, Beasts, Birds, and Fishes into the hands of men. 2 That the end why he doth so, is that they might be meat for men, and consequently they might be slain. Which being so, our slaughtering of Oxen, Sheep and other creatures for our daily use is to be accounted Gods doing, rather than ours. And therefore the objection should be made this. God may without any breach of goodness or justice appoint bruit creatures to be slain for man's use, therefore he may ordain men to be cast into hell torments for his own use, that is for the declaration of his soveraingty. 2 This being premised I answer further that this comparison holds not, For there is little proportion between the Objects compared, and less between the acts. 1 There is but small proportion between the Objects Beasts and Men creatures of a different nature and made for a different end Beasts are void of reason and liberty in their actions; creatures whose being svanish with their breath, made only for the use and service of men upon earth But men are reasonable and understanding creatures, able through the Creator's bounty to discern between good and evil, they are the very Image of God's purity and eternity and were made for the service of God alone upon earth, and his blessed and everlasting society in heaven So that albeit there be a very great distance between God and man, yet nothing so great as between God and Beasts It followeth not therefore that if God may appoint beasts to be killed of his own free pleasure for man's use. he may with like equity and reason appoint men of his own will to destruction, for his own use We read that God required of his people many thousand beasts for sacrifice, but not one man The first borne of other creatures he challenged for burnt offerings (except they were unclean beasts) but the first borne of men were to be redeemed. Which showeth that he put a wide difference between the blood of men and beast. Besides in the 9 of Genesis he gives men power to kill and feed upon all living creatures; but he straightly forbids them to shed man's blood, and gives this reason of the prohibition, Man is the Image of God; so that we may well conclude, that there is but small proportion between the Objects compared-men, and Beasts in respect of this Act of killing and slaughrering. 2 There is far less or rather no proportion at all between the Acts compared Killing and eternal tormenting. A man may kill, but he cannot without barbarous, injustice and cruelty torment his beast, and prolong the life of it, that he may daily vex and torture it, to show what power and sovereignty he hath over it: so I doubt not (though there be some that will not grant it, but charge the Arminians with contumely against God for affirming it) I doubt not, I say, but God may kill a man of his own free pleasure; yea and resolve him into nothing without any cruelty and injustice; because in so doing he doth but take away what he hath given him. But he cannot without both these antecedently decree to keep him alive for ever in Hell, that he may there torment him without end, to show his soveraingty. For this is to inflict an infinite evil upon a guiltless creature, to whom he had given but a finite good: And so is the comparison most unequal too, in the acts compared, and therefore proveth just nothing. Belike as many as have not the word of God, to read this Authors acute observations out of Gen: 9 2. 3. (For he would not seem to be any of the blunter sort) do Repl. sin as often as they kill a chick to feed upon, though beasts of prey do as much as this comes to, and more without all sin. 2 Yet M Perkins thought it enough to take notice that commonly it is received as lawful, without enquiring whence this authority proceeds And no Christian doubts, but our very bodies, and souls and all, we have from our maker. 3 Are all beasts for meat? Or hath not man power to slaughter any but for meat? Where doth the Author find this in Gen: May we not kill Lions, Bears, wolves, unless we eat them forthwith, or powder them up, that by degrees we may make meat of them? so of snakes, and Adders and all the Serpents that Lybia brings forth? 4 I deny that our slaughtering of oxen is in this respect, or in any respect to be accounted Gods doing rather than ours. For God's appointment in this, is but of the nature of a permission, not of a command. We may live by fruits and herbs and Marmalads and sucketts, or butter, milk and cheese, if we think good. Were it a Commandment, yet would it not follow that it is Gods work rather than ours. For he commands good works and forbids evil works. Now will this Author herehence conclude, that our good works are rather Gods works then ours. I trow he will not 5 Therefore we keep to our own argument, and not regard his infatuation of it, and we were in a pretty case, if we should suffer our adversaries to shape our Arguments If they once have the grinding of our Tools, no marvel if they soon grind out all the edge of them. We say it is lawful for man to do all this that is spoken of, upon our fellow creatures, and shall not God have as much power over us? Doth not the Apostle himself dispute after this manner, and make the power which God hath over us, equal to the power which the Potter hath over the work of his own hands and over the clay also. Shall the thing form say to it that form it why hast thou made me thus? hath not the Potter power over the clay of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour and another unto dishonour? We cannot take life from a creature without pain, deadly pain: if we have lawful power to inflict pain upon another creature, hath not God greater power to inflict pain, yea the greatest pain upon us, and that without all respect to sin? And that this God can do as Lord of life and death, both Vasquez the Jesuit acknowledgeth, and Medina pronounceth ex concordi Theologorum sententiâ, by the unanimous consent of all Divines, as elsewhere I have showed and proved by variety of demonstration; like as Raynaudus confirms it by the concurrant testimony of the Ancients in the places formerly mentioned. 2. In the next place he comes to his answer, and saith that the comparison holds not. And I commend this Authors wisdom in troubling himself with no more objections, than he thought himself able to Master. For who would not keep his shinns whole the best he can? But I wonder he comes off no better, even then, when he makes choice of such adversaries, as he thinks he can well grapple with. 1. Little proportion will serve turn; it is enough for us that they are all God's creatures; and surely there is less proportion between the Creator and the creature, then between one creature and another. Yet sure I am, every creature that hath life is more noble than a creature without life, such as a Potter's vessel is; yet look what power the Potter hath over his vessel; the Apostle tells us that God hath the same power over his creature man. Secondly, the Author was sensible of the weakness of this bowstring, and seeing it would Rome 9 21. not hold, therefore he relies upon another, and that's his own deforming and disfiguring our argument, drawing it from the comparison of man's power over his fellow creatures, with God's power over us; to conclude therehence that God the Creator hath as great power over his creature; as man by God's grant hath power over his fellow creatures. From this due course of comparison which we propose, this Author draws us to a wild comparison of the power of God over beasts, with the power of God over man; which is not ours, but an immodest and unshamefast fiction of this Author; and that grounded upon immodest foundations as before hath been showed. Thirdly, yet why not so great a difference between God and man, as between God and beasts? Is not the distance infinite? Is it possible to be less, seeing man is but finite, and God infiinte? For still the perfection of man is but in the way of perfection create. But God's perfection is of a transcendent nature it being uncreat: which when Schoolmen have considered, they have affirmed that the perfection of creatures is to be measured not by approximation to God who is, ens primum, the first being, but by their remotion rather à non esse, from not being; As I remember to have read long ago in Paulus Venetus, and which then seemed to me most congruous, nither to this day do I see any just cause to oppose it. 2. I come to the second answer; And here I find this discourse to breathe the spirit of Arminius, as truly as if it were spit out of his own mouth. Now Arminius on this point I have answered at large, as this Author well knows: he is content to pass that by, and keep himself still like a Sow in beans, without raising any noise of solving aught hath been Exam: praedest. Perkin: p. 41. delivered in proof hereof. But though he lets pass that which I have delivered without answer, renewing only Arminius his objection; yet I will not let this his answer to his own objection pass without a reply. 1. Therefore whereas he saith there is no proportion between killing and eternal tormenting. Imarke his cunning carriage, he doth not say there is no proportion between killing and tormenting which are two acts; and acts are somewhat capable of proportion. And surely if he had, killing would appear to be the worst of the two; since to kill is to torment and somewhat more, even to destroy the being of a man. Therefore the comparison which he shapes is between killing and eternal tormenting; that is not between two acts, as he pretends to from the comparison, but between one act, and the eternal duration of an other act, which is the quantity thereof in reference to time, such is this Authors juggling. Yet notwithstanding the disproportion of these things, hence it follows not, that killing is the more desirable of the two; considering that many apain there is which man would be content to endure, rather than to lose his life? So far is it from being worse, and that beyond all proportion. Austin somewhere professing of infant's pain in hell, that is poena mitissima, the mildest pain, & such as they had rather endure then to have no being at all. 2. But take it for an intolerable tormenting; if there be no proportion between killing and eternal tormenting; whereas there is some proportion between man and beast, than it were reasonable for any man to desire to be turned into a beast rather than to be eternally tormented: now let every reasonable creature consider, the sobriety of such a choice. 3. If only the eternity of it makes killing to be preferred before tormenting, than it is not to be denied, but tormenting a creature in hell fire a thousand or ten thousand years may be performed by God upon an innocent man, only eternal torment cannot. Yea and so ten thousand to an hundred thousand years, and so forwards until it comes to be eternal, which indeed can never be; it being a thing utterly impossible to attain from a beginning unto eternity by degrees. A finite added to a finite being never able to make it infinite. And therefore to maintain a thing infinite in quantity, Aristole hath taught us that it is to maintain a multitude of infinites (and indeed an infinite of infinites.) For if the parts be but finite, it is impossible that the whole consisting of finite parts can be infinite. 4. Though man cannot without barbarous cruelty torment his beast, and prolong the life of it; Yet I hope this Author will not deny this to be in the power of God, and that for the least sin committed by man. And this was it that I proposed in my answer to M. Hord, to show the power of God in such a kind, wherein it were abominable cruelty in man to exercise his power: like as the barbarous cruelty of Tiberius is set forth by them that write the history of his life. And the truth is, it is a very difficult point to resolve how it can stand with justice divine thus to deal with a creature, though a sinner. Yet I know many courses are taken to solve this difficulty, and the best that I have met with is this in my judgement; That a man dying in sin, his sin continueth eternal (never broke off by repentance) as well as the pain, yet this upon examination is found to have its flaws, and will not satisfy. So that the best and final resolution is to have recourse to God's absolute power, as a Creator over his creatures. And that absolute power will make it good even over an innocent creature as over a creature nocent. And it were very strange to affirm that God hath not as much power over us as we have over our beasts, namely to put them to pain, to do us service. Now if it be lawful to inflict but one degree of pain upon an innocent creature, what reason can be given why he cannot inflict two degrees, and if so why not three, and so ascending to the highest degree? Then as touching the duration of it, if he can inflict such a pain for an hour, he may as well for two hours; and for a whole day: And if for a day he may as well for two days, yea for a week▪ 1 for a week he may as well for a month, and if for a month, he may as well for two or three; if for three, as well for six; and if for six, as well for twelve; and if for a year, as well for two; and as well for four, and so in infinitum; from tenns to hundreds, and from hundreds to thousands For no reason can possibly make evidence where we ought to make a stand; in such sort as that an affliction in such a degree is lawful, and immediately after increasing becomes unlawful. 2. Yet consider we speak not now of decreeing, but of executing (whereas the objection proceeded concerning God's decreeing) Now between the decree and the execution, sin may intercede by God's permission, and that necessarily thereupon as Arminius himself confesseth. But now to the point whereon we are in present, we suppose the person to be most holy, even as holy as the Son of God; on whom notwithstanding were inflicted, as all confess, either hell pains, or that which was equivalent to hell pains. 3. Yet this evil thus inflicted will never come to be infinite, still it continueth finite, though in infinitum; it being utterly impossible by addition to make that which is finite become infinite. 4. But were it infinite, yet this Authors caution would help us against the Author himself. For the good which God hath given such a creature, is also infinite, to wit his being. How much more if God preserve that creature from sin, which by Arminius his cofession, makes a man more miserable, than hell pains itself. Lastly that there is such an absolute power in God Raynaudus justifies both out of the twelfth of wisdoome. Cum sis justus, just omnia disponis. Ipsum quoque qui non debet punire Austin condemnare externum existimas à tuâ virtute. This reading he professeth to be corrupt and nothing coherent with the text; And the true reading aught to be this, Ipsum quoque qui non debet puniri condemnas. And shows that this reading is followed by Austin, q. 53. and Saint Grigory. 3. Moral: cap. 11. This also he justifies to be Orthodox by the testimony of the Ancients. Macarius' homil. 15. Deus sui juris est, quod vult facit. Si velit pro potestate & jure suo mittit justos in Gehennam, ac peccatores in regnum. Out of Chrysostomt l. 2. De compunctione cordis sub finem. Si te agentem quod tibi preceptum est conjicii jubeat Dominus tuus in Gehennam, aliqua tibi datur contradicendi potestas. Out of Austin in Psal. 70. in the beginning Multum movet Dei amor & timor, Timor Dei quia justus est; Amor quia misericors est. Quis enim diceret ei quid fecisti, si damnaret justum? quanta ergo misericordia ejus est, ut justificet injustum? Then he represents the Schoolmen maintaining the same. Ariminenses, Camariacenses, Medina, Secarius in cap. 7. josuae à 39 and Lorinus in cap. 12. Sap: v. 12. Yet is not Raynaudus of their opinion who maintains reprobation to be before the foresight of evil works; nevertheless he is peremptory in justifying this; And Fulgentius whom he conceives to be the Author of that book de praedest. & gratia, which goes under Austin's name, in a little treatise of his entitled Censura inofficiosae censurae, which is added to his Valerianus integrae vitae labisque purus. Sect. 4. M. Mason's Additions p. 18. 19 D. Twis: his Vindiciae l. 2. p. 1. Digres. 1. But it is replied by some (who will rather speak unreasonably and against common sense than lay down the conclusions which they have undertaken to maintain) that it is more eligible to be tortured in hell then to want or lose a being. For he that wants a being enjoyeth no good, but he that is tormented in hell, hath a being, and by consequent something that is good. If therefore God may take away a man's being that is innocent, and turn him into nothing for his pleasure, much more may he torment him in hell. I am glad to see my name so often remembered by this Author in his margin; for a long time I desired to know his way by certain evidence; for I would not suffer myself Answer. to be carried away with rumours; and withal I found some contradiction in the relations I received from different persons, but at length I was so happy as to see it under his own hand, and there to observe not his judgement only, but the strength of his affections also. Now let the Reader observe the cunning carriage of this Author, and how far off it is from all ingenuity. For what I discourse, being drawn thereunto by Arminius his excursions, that this Author obtrudes upon me, as if the defence of the cause I took in hand had drawn me thereunto, notwithstanding that I have professed the contrary. For thus I write l. 1. pag. 1. De electione Sect: 4. pag. 127. In the canvasing of this section Arminius runs out at large, saving that most of these things which here he heaps up are aliena, and nothing pertinent to the present purpose; as pertaining rather to the decree of reprobation, then to the decree of election. And a little after I write thus; Hence it is that Arminius expatiates and transfers his disputation from the point of election, to the point of Reprobation too unseasonably: Yet wisely affecting the incolumity of his wavering cause. By that right (saith he) which God hath over his creature, he cannot ordain any man to the suffering of pain without the foresight of sin. To wit that his cause might stand upright, and that this examiner might omit nothing that tends to the making of his opinion plausible with his propitious reader, it was needful that he should make use of some such transition, though never so unreasonable but seeing such are the wiles and artifices of our Adversaries to confound all Scholastical method, it shall not be unseasonable for me to weigh what he delivers as briefly as I can. Therefore after I had refused Arminius on that point, where he denies, that God can do that injustice, which he can do by power; after this manner I enter upon a new digression concerning this point. Hitherto have I followed Arminius in his extravagants. For M. Perkins hath not proceeded so far; as to affirm that God hath power to afflict an innocent creature, neither hath his Adversaries objected any such thing unto him, as justly inferred from aught delivered by him. So that all such have well hardened their foreheads, who feign that our opinion cannot well subsist without the help of so horrid and so harsh an assertion, to wit, That it is better to be miserable, than not to be at all. It is true, some may conceive that though this were a truth, it were to be suppressed, rather than affirmed by reason of the harshness of it. Let every one consider aright that I undertake the defence of M. Perkins, and it is he that hath uttered this harsh assertion, (namely, That God can inflict hell pains without any demerit in the creature) out of Cameracensis: And it stood me upon to defend M. Perkins so far as I had reason for it. Now finding the main argument whereby Arminius maintains the contrary (to that other, yet more harsh proposition) to be most unsound; and even this assertion which sounds most harsh in the ears of many, not only to be maintained by Austin himself and and diures Schoole-Divines, but answered by many arguments, the solution whereof was never expedited by any; have I deserved so sharply to be censured for representing all this in the way of justifying M. Perkins, whose defence I undertook against Arminius? 1. My words are these translated, God can annihilate the holiest creature, which Arminius confesseth, how much more is it in his power to afflict an innocent creature, and that for ever, considering that not only according to Schoole-divines, but also according to Austin, yea according to the truth itself, it is more to be desired to have being under any pain, then to have no being at all. And afterwards I propose not one argument of mine own for the justifying of this, but only represent the discourse of Austin hereupon, as it is analized by Durandus that School Divine. Now why are not the Schoolmen censured, as men speaking unreasonably and against common sense? Nay why is not Austin censured as one that had rather speak unreasonably and against common sense; then lay down the conclusion which he hath once undertaken to maintain, as well as myself? Yea and much more considering that the discourse proving this, is Saint Austin's; and had I not added on the by these four words etiam secundum ipsam veritatem, there had been no place at all for any censure to be passed upon me. If a man finding himself convicted by Austin's discourse shall confess that what he writes is true, is it equity to censure him as one who had rather speak unreasonably and against common sense, then lay down the conclusions which formerly he hath undertaken to maintain. When in the mean time no censure is at all passed upon Austin, who alone is the player of the game, he that stands by professing only in his judgement, he plays his game well. 2. If Austin hath spoken unreasonably and against common sense, how comes it to pass that this censurer hath not taken the pains to represent unto the world the unreasonableness of his argument? This author spends his mouth frankly in censuring, but takes no pains to free his Reader from error, by solving arguments produced by Austin for the proof of that which this Author conceives to be an error. 3. Nay he doth not so much as answer that one argument, which here is proposed by me. An argument which the Scoole-men use as sufficiently convincing the truth, as Durandus and Ricardus. Yet considering the unreasonable condition of such adversaries, who take no course to convince or confute their opposites, but imperiously to cry them down; I have taken the pains to call to an account both Austin's arguments and others proposed by Schoole-Divines, and to devise with myself what answer might be made unto them, so to perform that for my adversaries, which they show no hart to perform for themselves, and I was borne in hand that such a digression of mine should be extant long ere this. 4 Yet by the way I wonder not a little that one thing is pretermitted. For if I mistake not, this very Author is the man that heretofore hath been very full mouthed in censuring, not so much the doctrine itself, as a certain answer I made to an argument brought out of Scripture against it; namely from those words of our Saviour, It had been better for that man if he had never been born. My answer was, that it was spoken according to the judgement of man, though indeed erroneous; and that after this manner phraseologies of Scripture do proceed I there showed. Now this Author hereupon spared not to profess, that if this were true he would turn Atheist. I wished that Friend of mine to whom he spoke this, to persuade him the next time he met with him, to inquire and consider well, whether Maldonat the Jesuit doth not embrace the same interpretation. And indeed if such protestations would carry it, this Author would prove a very potent and formidable adversary, I have seen the like under his own hand, namely this, As Plutarch said of the old heathens who sacrificed men that they might pacify their gods: that it had been better with Diagoras to say, There is no god, then to think that God is such a one that delights in the blood of men: And hereupon he adds this Protestation, I protest unto you I think it less dishonourable to the blessed Trinity, to say with the Atheist, there is no god, then to feign such a God, as the decree of Reprobation maintained by the Contraremonstrants maketh him to be. This man I find is resorted unto and consulted with by the Arminians, as if his judgement were an oracle; and I willingly confess he deserves to be in some great place unto them: and no place in my judgmentmore fit then to be unto the, à protestationibus. Yet I do not prescribe but leave it to their discretion to prefer him as they think good: but how comes it to pass, that here he is silent in reviving the reproaches he cast upon my answer to the Scripture before mentioned? Is it because Maldonat the Jesuit hath been since found by him to embrace the same interpretation? And he is loath to fall so foul in censuring such as he is? Yet here he falls foul on me for professing my approbation, not of Schoolmen but of Austin's discourse. This makes me call to mind what was delivered of him sometimes by a London Minister; as that he should persuade a young Divine to study Bellarmine; as also what censures others have passed upon some writings of his. And it hath been my hap to see under his own hand such a counsel as this given to a friend of his. These things have I represented unto you the rather, because I would give you occasion to learn that in your younger days, which I have learned by late and long experience in myself, and that in these two things. First in reading Bellarmine and other adversays to our Church; I have divers times noted such speeches in them, as to my thinking involved contradiction, or had show of absurdity, or might either give advantage to ourselves, or breed prejudice unto them; but when afterward I came in cooler blood to weigh the words better, and to consider the circumstances more narrowly. I found that I did mistake their meaning, and that an itching desire to find an advantage, made me to take shadows for substance. And the like mistake in myself I observed, when I read the fathers, or the Scriptures, ready to interpret every thing either in favour of mine own cause, or in prejudice of the adversaries: And concludes sententiously thus; Nimirum ita est ingenium nostrum, facile credimus, quae nimium volumus. If such be the genius of this Author, though he thinks not good to spare me for Austin's sake, yet methinks he should spare me for Richardus sake, or at the least for Maldonat's sake. This calls to my remembrance an Epigram which D. Hoskins my chamber-fellow in New-Colledge sometimes made upon the fleas, (that sore troubled him as he lay in his bed.) And the conclusion was thus; But if there's nothing that can slack Your rage and your correction, Yet o remember you are black; And spare me for complexion. So we proceed. Sect. 5. M. Mason's Additions p. 19 20. To the first part of this reply, namely, that it is more desirable to be in hell, then to be nothing. I oppose three things. 1. The speech of our Saviour concerning Judas: Woe be to that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed, it had been good for that man if he had never been born Two things especially are set forth in these words of our Saviour. First the misery of Judas the betrayer of the lord Woe be etc. Secondly, the greatness of his misery, It had been good etc. It is as much as if the Lord had said, Judas the traitor shall be damned, and therefore so woeful will his condition be, that it had been good and happy for him, if he had never received a being: good in earnest, as the Interpreters do generally expound it, not in the opinion and esteem of weak minded, faint-hearted-men only as some few understand it. For first let it be granted that Scripture speaketh of things sometimes according to men's opinions, yet without reason to fasten such an expostion upon any Scripture, is to do, as dunces do in the Schools, who being not able to answer a place in Aristotle wherewith they are charged, shift it off, and say, (loquitur ex aliorum sententiâ, he speaks according to the opinion of others.) 2. This scripture cannot in reason be thus expounded. First because it is an argument and ground by which Christ declareth the truth and greatness of the misery of Judas, Woe to the man &c And why woe? Because it had been good etc. But it were no argument to show his woeful estate by, to say that it had been good for him, that he had never been born in the opinion of men, who mistake the case but not in truth. 2. because this exposition would teach and encourage men to be Atheists and Epicures. In the second of Wisdom, we read how voluptuous men do stir up one another to enjoy the good things, that are present, to fill themselves with wine and ointments, to leave some token of their jollity in every place and to practise all manner of wickedness. And what is their motive? a false persuasion that their souls shall die with their bodies; and that they should have no being after death. If this conceit would flesh them thus in their opinions and voluptuous courses, how freely and eagerly (may we think) would they pursue their carnal and sinful delights, if they could be but once persuaded, that, after all their pleasure they should be in better case than if they had no being? Secondly, I oppose common consent. Where shall we pick out a man, but will say (if he speak from his heart) that he were better to vanish into a thousand nothings, then to be Aug. Epist. ad Bon. 160. cast into hell. What is the reason why men are so afraid of hell, when they are touched to the quick with the conscience of their ungodly lives, and the expectation of eternal vengeance, that with Job they curse their birth day, and wish an hundred times over that they had never been, or might cease to be, that so they might not come into the place of torments, but because they judge a being there to be incomparably worse, than no being any where? And why are men who are sensible of hell fire so strongly kerbed in the fear of feeling it, even from darling and beloved sins, but because they apprehend it to be the most terrible of terribles? Fear of being annihilated can never do that, which the fear of hell doth. M. Mason went great bellied with these choice conceits, and therefore he will bring Answer. them in though it be by the cares, in spite of his own friends: like as Arminius did before him, to vent a certain argument of his, which yet had a very unhappy issue to the betraying of the Authors nakedness most shamefully; and his argument was this, To be happy is better then simply to be; therefore to be miserable, is worse than simply not to be; now the consequence is most inconsequent. For therefore to be happy is better than simply to be; because, to be happy, includes being, & adds happiness thereunto. And one good added to another good must needs make the whole compound better. In like manner, If to be miserable doth include the evil of not being and add another evil thereunto, the whole compound must needs be worse. But to the contrary it is apparent, that, to be miserable doth not include the evil of not being, but the good of being rather; and consequently there is no just proportion between misery and happiness, And therefore though to be happy is better than simply to be (as including being, and some good thing more) yet thence it follows not, that to be miserable, is worse than not to be; for as much as, To be miserable, doth not include the evil of not being and add some evil more to it. Now the first that affirmed this harsh position, namely, that to be miserable is not worse than not to be at all, was Austin, and he not only affirms it, but disputes it, and proves it by variety of arguments, not one whereof is answered by this Author or by any friend that I know. And from Austin the Schoolmen have taken it, and added this one argument to confirm it over and above those of Austine's, To turn a man into nothing is to destroy a man's universal being; but to inflict torment upon him doth destroy only particular being, to wit, his being in ease and pleasure. Now to have a man's particular being destroyed is not so bad, as to have a man's universal being destroyed. Now I come to consider how this Author carrieth himself in overthrowing his own fiction. For albeit the position impugned by him, be no fiction (for it was the opinion of Austin and of divers Schoolmen) yet the bringing it in here, as if it were an answer made by us to any of our Adversaries objections (as this Author doth) as if we stood in need o● any such aid is a mere fiction. And first he states it at pleasure to serve his own turn, of being in hell to be more desirable, whereas the Author whom he opposeth delivers it of, esse mi erum to be miserable and misery is as well in respect of sin, as in respect of bodily torment Nay it is confessed by Arminius himself, That the misery of sin is greater, than the misery of torment. So, that if it be uncouth to say, that to be under the torment of hell is better than not to be at all; it ought to seem more uncouth to say, that it is better for a man to be guilty of sin, then to have no being at all. Now I do not find that this Author in all his Mountebank-like amplifications, did take this into consideration. Again when it is said. That to be miserable is better then not to be, this is to be understood aright, not as if misery itself were desirable, but being only, though with the adjunct of misery thus, to have a being though in misery is more desirable, then to have no being at all And so if it beapplyed to the misery of torment, and that in hell, it ought to be taken thus, To have a being though in hell is more desirable then to have no being at all. And it is apparent, that in not being at all, there is nothing at all desirable, but in being; though under the greatest pain there is something desirable, to wit, being. Now I consider his reasons. He objecteth the saying of our Saviour to judas. Woe be to that man by whom the son of man is betrayed, it had been good for that man if he had never been born: and indeed the betraying of the Son of God his Lord and master, was a most facinorous act, especially being committed by the way of a kiss, & with sweet words saying Hail Master. And Schoolmen do distinguish between, the misery of sin, and the misery of pain, in such sort that albeit they deny the latter to be worse than not being, yet they do not reason so of the former. But because judas was not so sensible of the miserable condition of the one, as of the other; therefore our Saviour sets forth the woeful condition of that state whereof he, and generally all are most sensible. Whence we may well argue, that our Saviour speaks in conformly to man's sense and judgement, and it was not long ere the terrors of a guilty conscience took hold of him, and he went forth and hanged himself. Yet our Saviour saith not, It had been good for judas if he had never received any being, but only this, If he had never been borne▪ now being is not received in a man's birth but in the conception rather. And undoubtedly, if judas had perished in his mother's womb it had been much better for him. As Archbishop Whitgift sometimes in the Court of high commission said, of one that was accused and convicied o● some foul crime committed by him in the very house of God That better it had been, that his neck had been broken at the first, then that he should live to be o●scandalous to the Church of God And yet as if our Saviour's words were not enough for this Author in saying, It had been good for that man; therefore he patcheth it out with a supplement of his own, thus, It had been good and happy for that man, if he had never received being. So that whereas Aristotle made happiness to consist in an aggregation of all good things this Author with his divinity thinks good to mend Aristtotl's Philosophy, by placing happiness in the want of every good thing very learnedly and judiciously. Vulcan who made thunderbolts for jupiter, when he was cast out of heaven had a shrewd fall, and contracted such lameness as stuck by him ever after. So this Author who forgeth thunderbolts and arguments for others, being fallen upon opposition to the prerogative of God's grace and his Sovereignty over all creatures; no marvel if his logic and philosophy halteth; and his infirmity so contracted may increase so far, as in the end to bereave him of common sense. He contents himself as his manner is with saying, that Interpreters do generally expound it as he doth; some few he confesseth understand it other wise, but most concur with him, to wit, that, it is delivered in earnest; what a jest is this as if any Interpreter was ever known to say, that our Savour spoke not in earnest. Neither do I know any that interpreteth the place as he shapes it, as if our Saviour spoke according to the opinion of weak-minded faint-hearted men only. Not one that I know putteth any such difference of men under the torments of hell. Like as the Prophet speaks of the stoutest, as well as the weakest, Can thy heart endure, or thine hands be strong in the day that I have to deal with thee, or the Lord rather by Ezech: 22. 14. the Prophet. The Schoolmen suppose without difference, that the damned wish they had never been borne, or rather that they had never been. So the Saints of God in this life have broken forth into passionate expressions in the time of their extremity; Maldonate on this place gives instance in many; but the question is whether these proceed from the judgement of right reason; or erroneous rather, through the vehemency of passion, whose course is as Aquinas observes, extinguere rationem, to extinguish reason. And it is one of the three things as Aristotle observes in his books De Animâ, that hinders the mind in her judgement. The other two are, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Disease, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sleep; the third is passion; how much more when passion is stirred up by the sorest disease of all other the torments of hell fire? 1. But if I am glad to see the issue whereto he drives his discourse. For he grants that the scripture speaks sometimes according to men's opinions: but without reason to fasten such an expression upon any Scripture, is to do as Dunces do etc. he gives no instance; I will supply the want thereof, and that out of one of those dunces a follower of john Duns an eminet school-man, from whose name schoolmen are called dunces, whom this Author was wont to magnify; Lychetus a Minorite is the man, who is the first that I have found hitherto maintaining that God's purpose of election of any particular man may cease; and the purpose of reprobating the same may come in the place thereof. So the purpose of reprobating judas may come in the place thereof, and that without all change in God. This is a doctrine that now a days grows in request Penotus hath taken it up without betraying from whom he had it: And Franciscus à sanctâ Clarâ after him, and some of our Arminians I find enamoured with it. Now this Lychetus, when he is charged with the doctrine of Scotus as directly opposite hereunto, his answer is in part that he speaks according to the opinion of others. Now I desire not upon better terms to contend with M. Mason. For Austin hath given many reasons to prove that simply and absolutely not to be, is not a thing desirable, above being, though joined with never so great misery of pain. And the Schoolmen acknowledge that Austin herein delivers his judgement, and withal they concur with him as Scot, Biel, Durandus, Maldonat. And it is evident that to be turned into nothing, is an universal destruction of being; so is not inflicting of punishment, as both Durandus and Maldonat argue the case. And saying that not to have any being at all is better for judas then to be in torment, here is something affirmed of a subject that makes him of a better condition than otherwise, which hath no place, but upon supposition of a subjects existence, & that in distinction from an attribute affirmed of him, which constitutes him in a condition of betternes, now that that which is nothing, by reason of being nothing, should be better the something, is one of the wildest expressions, I think that hath been heard of since the world began; And therewithal creatures began to have a being. Again consider, take Gabriel the Archangel most holy as a creature, and let every sober man judge, whether it were better for him not to be, then being holy as he is to be tormented in hell fire. I should think that albeit God should torment me with hell fiire yet if he should preserve my soul from sin & in the love of him out of the sense of his love towards me, I should have infinitely more cause to rejoice then to complain, how weak soever I am at this present. Thirdly, if it be better and more desirable to have no being at all, then to be in hell fire; then this is to be uderstood of hell fire, either without limitation of time only: or with limitation. If only it hold in respect of everlastingness, than it follows it is better to be in hell fire, provided a man shall not everlastingly continue there, then to have no being at all, though it be for a thousand years, not only twice told; but a thousand times over and over, and that multiplied Cubically, and yet no end of multiplication of the time of tormenting. If it be better to have no being at all then to suffer hell torments so long, than it is better to have no being at all, then to suffer hell torments half so long: For no reason can be given to the contrary; In a word it will follow, that it were better to have no being, then to suffer hell torments one hour, or half an hour, or a quarter, or a minute, or half a minute. For no reason can define the bounds within which it will be better to suffer the pains of hell fire, then to be turned into nothing, and beyond which it will be worse. But M. Mason saith secondly. This Scripture cannot in reason be thus expounded: And he gives his reason for it: Because it is an argument and ground by which Christ declareth the greatness or truth of the misery of judas: and I pray let every sober man judge, whether this be not a sufficient amplification of that misery, that they shall wish they had never been, or that they might be turned into nothing, rather than suffer such torments. How many prefer death before this world's misery, and so go on to destroy themselves; will it therefore follow that death indeed, though it should be an utter abolition of man, is not so bad as to suffer the miseries of this world. The mistake of a damned person wishing not to be, consists not in conceiving his torments to be unsufferable with any content or patience, but in conceiving that by not being, he should have ease, which is a most absurd conceit, arising merely from distraction of mind throug extremity of anguish. So that all things rightly considered, here is no encouragement for men to become Atheists & Epicures, unless this be an encouragement thereunto, that their pain shall be so extreme and unsufferable, as to make them desire, and utter they know not what, such distraction of mind and and perturbation of judgement shall surprise them. A false persuasion that men's souls shall die with their bodies, and that they shall have no being after death, urgeth every man indifferently to take his delights and pleasures while he may; whether this delight and pleasure be taken in courses vicious, or in courses virtuous, because death sets an end, as to them; so to their pleasures and delights. But if their greatest happiness, or misery doth begin in joy, or sorrow after death; and this is well known unto them: sober reason doth suggest unto them to provide for the obtaining of that happiness, and declining that unhappiness, above all other, according to that Lady's resolution in Sophocles, and that upon this ground 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, there I shall continue for ever. But when he saith the wicked will the more eagerly pursue their carnal and sinful delights, because after all their pleasures they shall be in a better case, then if they had no being. I long to have the judgement of any lewd person throughout the world concerning this; as namely whether he takes any comfort or encouragement to sinful courses from this; that albeit he shall be cast with the devil and his Angels into hell fire that never goeth out. Yet this condition is a better condition, than not to have any being at all; whereas this better condition consists only in this, that being is better than not being; not in this, that he hath any ease, or is less obnoxious to torment and sorrow, which shall be so unsufferable, as to provoke him to wish, that he never had any being at all. Or that forthwith he might be turned into nothing. Secondly, I oppose common consent. Where shall we pick out a man but will say (if he speak from his heart) that he were better to vanish into a thou and nothings, then to be cast into hell? What is the reason why M. Mason's Addit. p. 20. men are so afraid of hell, when they are touched to the quick with the conscience of their ungodly lives, and the expectation of eternal vengeance, that with Job they curse their birthday, and wish an hundred times over, that they had never been, or might cease to be, that so they might not come into that place of torments; because they judge a being there to be incomparably worse, than no being any where? And why are men, who are sensible of hell fire, so strongly curbed and held in with fear of feeling it, even from dailing and beloved sins, but because they apprehend it to be the most terrible of all terribles? fear of being annihilated can never do that which fear of hell doth. And is he well in his wits that talks of a thousand nothings? I looked whereto it would come with such like wild discourses, even to run out of common sense at last. Answer. Yet all this that he discourseth of, for the substance of it is no other, than Austin hath taken notice of in his very argument; and shows the vanity of it, and the error of man's imagination, conceiving the condition of being nothing, to be a condition of ease and rest from sorrow & pain; again ask the same men whether they would not be content to be turned into dogs, wolves, snakes, toads, rather than to be under the torments of hell fire; ask again whether they would not be content, to be turned into devils, so they might be free from the torments of hell fire. Ask the adulterer whether he would not be content to lie with an other man's wife all his days, rather than to suffer (shall I say) the torments of hell fire? Nay rather than die possessed of the joys of heaven. Ask this Author whether he would not be content to maintain stiffly, that grace is given according to works, and that a man is justified by his works, rather than suffer the pains of hell fire, yea though it were against his own conscience. As for me were I a damned creature, yet according to this judgement which God hath given me considering that the glory of God's justice is manifested in my condemnation, though extremity of pain would transport me into as wild wishes, as this Author justifies; yet according to right reason I should rather be content to suffer, then wish that I were turned into a bruit beast, or into a devil, or into nothing. I think the whole nation of sober divines would justify me in this undoubtedly God is able to work me or any man to this resolution without sin. 2. If, because men through fear of hell and expectation of eternal vengeance do with Job curse their birth day once, and wish they had never been; therefore it is better to be nothing then to be in hell: By the same reason, because they do no other than Job did, it must follow, that it was better for job to be nothing, then to be under such torments. But if Iob's desire was an unsober and unreasonable desire in this, why might not their desire be as unsober and unreasonable also, proceeding not so much from calm reason, as from the strength of passion inflamed and disordered through extremity of torment. We know that men upon the rack do sometimes make confessions, even against the light of their own consciences. And fear of evil sometimes distracts as much as the sense thereof; as in him who hearing the sentence of death passed against him at Paris, fell into a sweat of blood. And it was wont to be said, that pejor est malo, timor ipse mali. Francis Spira in the time of his distraction confessed as much of hell itself. And if one desire, once having course, prove unreasonable, why should the renewing of it a thousand times over prove less unreasonable. And let the judicious observe the hand of God, in striking this Author with such giddiness even in this argument, (which he conceives of all other to be advantageous to his cause) so as at every turn to supplant himself, and to betray the shameful nakedness of his discourse. As first, in talking of a thousand nothings. Secondly, In putting the case of some cursing their birth day, but how? as job did. Now will any sober man make the like collection of Iob's cursing his birth day, as this Author doth from others cursing theirs. Thirdly, and lastly in calling hell fire the terrible of all terribles. Who seeth not that this proceeds in reference to such things, which as they are feared, so they may be felt; and supposing a subject existing, as to fear it before it comes, so to feel it when it is come but such is not the condition of being nothing. And when he feigns us to conform to his crude conceptions, namely to conceive annihilation to be a thing feared, he pleaseth himself in his own fictions. He no where finds me to speak of annihilation as a thing to be feared, no more than I speak of it as of a thing that is to be felt. Only I say that it is a condition no way desirable by a reasonable creature, no more than the suffering of hell fire. But whereas hell fire cannot be suffered of any unless he hath a being, here is something found desirable, to wit the continuance of being. But in the condition of being nothing, there is not found any thing to be a fit Object of man's desire. The third thing which I oppose is common sense; which judgeth pains, when they are extreme to be worse than death. Hence it is that Job being tormented in his body by the Devil cursed his birth day, magnified M. Mason's Addit. 3. p. 20. 21. the condition of the dead, and wished himself in the grave, plainly preferring the loss of his being, before that miserable being which he then had. And hence it is that men even of stoutest and hardest spirits (as we see by daily experience) would (if they might enjoy their option) choose rather to have no bodies at all, than bodies tormented with the stone or gout, or any other sharp and sensible disease It is a known saying grounded on this judgement of sense. Praestat semel quam semper mori, better it is to die once then to be always dying. This the tyrant Tiberius knew very well, and therefore he would not suffer those, towards whom he purposed to exercise his cruelty, to be put to a speedy death, but by lingering torments. And Suetonius repo●t●th of him in that chapter, wherein he reckoneth up his barbarous and cruel practices; These, saith he, who would have died through the extremity of their torment, he used means to keep alive (nam mortem adeo leve supplicium putabat) For he accounted death so light a punishment; that when he heard that one Carnulius, a man apppointed to torments, had prevented him, he cried out, Carnulius me evasit Carnulius hath escaped mine hands. To a prisoner entreating him to put him quickly to death he gave him this answer, Nondum tecum redii in gratiam, I am not yet friends with thee; accounting it a great kindness to put him quickly to death, whom he might have tortured. Many that were called into question did partly wound themselves in their own houses, Ad vexationem ignominiosam vitandam, to prevent that pain and ignominy, which they knew they should endure; And partly poisoned themselves in the midst of the Court, as they were going to their a●●aingment for the same cause Seneca speaking of one Maecenas, who was so a frayed of being dead, that he said he would not refuse weakness, deformity, nec acutam crucem, no nor the sharpest crucifying, so that he might live still in these extreamityes, he calleth his desire. Turpissimum votum, a base, and most ignoble, and unnatural with, and censureth him for a most effeminate and contemptible man; because in all his evils he was afraid of that which was the end of all evils, the privation of his being And certainly we must needs conceive and censure them to be stocks and stones, rather than flesh and blood, who can so put of all feeling, and sense, as to think a tormented being in hell, to be a lighter and lesser evil, than no being at all. We know that death to such as job was, is not only better than extreme pains, but better than all the joys of this world; by how much to be present with the Lord Answer. Christ, is better than to be absent from him; and we know, saith Paul, to the unspeakable comfort of all true Christians, that when the earthly house of this our tabernacle is dissolved we have a building of God not made with hands, but eternal in the heavens. So that I wonder not a little at these wild discourses of this Author. When he saith that even the stoutest and hardest spirits would choose rather to have no bodies at all, than bodies tormented with the stone or gout, what other is this then to desire that they were impassable; would they not desire to have no souls too? and to be without sense like stocks and stones? But let every sober man judge whether this be a reasonable desire; what Christian justifies job in cursing the day of his birth? What Martyr hath not rejoiced in suffering, not natural diseases, but the cruelest torments that most cruel, and spiteful Tyrants could devise to be inflicted upon them? And even to suffer other evils by course of nature brought upon us with patience, acknowledging the hand of God therein, and submitting unto his will, justifying him as righteous in all his ways, and holy in all his works, and condemning ourselves: even this long a go hath been accounted for Martyrdom in the judgement of chrysostom. It is true such proverbs have had their course in most nations. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, praestat semel quam semper mori. And amongst us. Better eye out then always aching, better one dead then always dying. But shall we take this hand over head without a difference between a Christian & unchristian, and heathenish interpretation? As many as had an opinion of the immortal condition of the soul, and withal of different conditions of men in joy, or sorrow, according to the condition of their life spent in their courses virtuous, or vicious, if they were well persuaded of their life past, they might accordingly think it better for them to die then live; And it is no less desirable to them, who had no comfort in their life past. Bradwardine hath such a meditation. Mallem non esse quam te offendere, I had rather have no being at all then to offend thee, speaking unto God. Yet in sinning against Bradward. lib. 2. c. ult. him we are matter of his glory, which we are not, when we have no being at all. Matter of his glory I say, either in pardoning sin, or in punishing it, or both. But what sober man will justify such a saying, I had rather have no being at all then be troubled with the stone, or gout? Is not this the proper place for patience to have its perfect work. And if it be urged that this holds true only in evils tolerable, not in case they prove intolerable. I answer that surely the pain of stone or gout is not intolerable, not any in the judgement of Paul, whose profession was this I am able to do all things (his meaning is to suffer all things) by the power of Christ that enableth me: and when upon his prayer jav, 1. 4. that the messenger of Satan might be removed from him, he received this answer from the Lord, My grace is sufficient for thee, and my power is made perfect in thy weakness, What is Paul's resolution hereupon, though in himself a very weak creature? I will gladly therefore rejoice in my infirmities, that the power of Christ may dwell in me. Therefore I take pleasure in infirmities, in reproaches, in necessities, in persecution, in anguish, for Christ's sake. For when I am weak than I am strong. Doth not this extend to the very torments of hell suffered by our Saviour for our sakes. Undoubtedly, if the glory of heaven possess the soul, though the pains of hell seize upon the body, such a one shall have more cause to rejoice then to complain. These courses of Tiberius I had cause to take notice of in mine answer to M. Hord. For, whereas he slandered our doctrine concerning the absoluteness of God's decrees, and conforming them to the cruel courses of Tiberius: whereupon I showed, that if such comparisons were not odious, but allowable, we might in like manner compare God's courses in punishing sin temporal with torment eternal, with courses of Tiberius here specified. And because nothing hath a greater show of cruelty in Tiberius then such courses of his as these. Hence they may with the same liberty conclude, that the divine Majesty is cruel (which is a horrible thing to utter) and unjust in punishing men everlasting in hell fire, for sins committed by them for a very short space in the course of their lives. But let this Author consider, were heathen Princes more exasperated against any then against Christians, or were more cruel courses taken against any then the servants of God. Yet did these Christians prevent their bloody and barbarous desires by murdering their selves? Did they not rejoice in tribulation? Yet death they might well prefer before the sweetest life. That they might enjoy the Lord Christ And Austin hath long ago in this very argument showed, that even in destroying themselves they aimed at being at a state of freedom from sorrows. So far were they from affecting to have no being at all. And first, he distinguishes of the will as it signifies an appetite natural; or as it signifies an absolute desire. As it signifies nature or appetite natural; so by no means can it desire to have no being. All natural desire being for rest, but nature finds no rest in its destruction: Rest of nature supposeth its being, and adds somewhat over and above thereunto, namely freedom from trouble, unde siquis dicat vellem non esse, magis quam miserum esse; respondebo, mentiris, quia cum miserum nolis esse tamen vis. Thus Durand analizeth Austin's discourse hereupon. Then he proceeds to show that the deliberative appetite cannot affect not being, for the avoiding of evil, save only according to erroneous reason. All which this Author takes no notice of, but pleaseth himself in his own confusion. All creatures have in them, vestigia Dei, saith Luther, to wit, in respect of their being; But man is, Imago Dei. Shall right reason suggest the destroying of this for pain's sake? Durandus proceeds & shows how according to erroneous reason a man may destroy himself, by reason of some present miserable condition urging him; conceiving that thereby he shall arrive to some secret existence wherein he shall be free, as from the good things, so from the evil things of this world. Unde Agustinus ubi supra dicit, quòd aliqui urgente miseriâ sese interimunt, eo quòd confugiunt ubi melius fore putaverint. A second manner is this, the vehemency of evil suffered may so over-cloud and trouble reason, as to make them conceive, that to have no being at all is better than to be in misery, which is absurd, saith he; for as much as the privation of evil is not good, but by reason of obtaining of the contrary good; but no such good can be obtained in being nothing, howsoever men through error of judgement may feign it otherwise. In which case he makes choice of nothing (thinking to make choice of something) and consequently his election is erroneous, as Austin concludeth. But Seneca is the best flower in this Authors present discourse; and the censure which he passeth upon one Maecenas, who, so he might live, would not care what torments he suffered. Where by the way I observed; that albeit this Author represents the common sense of heathens only in this. Yet all heathens were not of the same mind. Secondly, I observe that Seneca who censureth him did look for an immortal condition after death, which it seems was no part of Maecenas his Creed. And upon this ground his censure might proceed. And indeed otherwise it is very strange that he should censure him for effeminateness, in respect of a resolute mind to endure tortures, which we know full well is usually accounted virile aliquid, rather than muliebre, the part of a man, more than the part of a woman. Thirdly, I find in Austin, that this was the opinion of Varro and the Stoics, that it became a man to destroy himself, rather than to endure some evils, and in this doctrine of theirs, he finds some contradiction to another doctrine of their own, which was this, Hanc esse naturae primam quodammodo & maximam vocem, ut homo concilietur sibi, & propterea mortem naturaliter fugiat, This is the first and greatest voice of nature, that man should be at one with himself, and therefore naturally flieth death. And herein Austin himself acknowledgeth them to deliver a truth. Now consider, is a man at one with himself when he destroys himself? Is he not rather at odds with himself in making a man's fortitude to be a self destroyer? If so be that deserves to be called fortitude, as there Austin speaks: Or how can the duty of preserving a man's self, be the greatest voice of nature, if there be found a voice of nature countermanding it, and commanding a man to kill himself? In suffering evils there is place for the exercise of patience, of true fortitude and magnanimity of mind: But in the utter destruction of nature there is no place for the exercise of any virtue: which virtue was so far advanced by the Stoics, as touching the power of it, as to be able to descend into Phalaris his Bull, as Cicero discourseth in the last of his Tusculane questions Yet not only great evils, for the insufferable nature of them did urge them to destroy themselves, but meaner evils most unreasonably. What moved Cato to destroy himself, but because he would not come under Caesar? His stout spirit could not endure subjection. Yet he read over Plato's discourse of immortality the night before, and felt the edge of his sword, which some censure as an argument of some pusillanimity. The Spaniard, who was whipped through Paris never changed his pace, affecting to maintain the reputation of spanish gravity and resoluteness, though he smarted the more for it. And shall not our being in the likeness and Image of God, be preferred before not being, though conjunct with any dolorous suffering: when this Author will have no being, to be a lighter and lesser evil than hell pains; doth he not most manifestly signify that it is a burden more easy to be borne? Thus ere he is aware most contradictiously he supposeth that, even in not being, there is a being. For how is it possible that an evil can be borne, and that with more ease than some other evil, by him who hath no being at all. But let him strain his wits to devise where first pain begins to be so great, that a man's utter destruction is to be preferred before it, seeing it is apparent that all pain is not such. The 6. Sect: To the reason on which the reply is grounded, which is melius est esse, quam non esse. It is better to be, then to have no being. I answer that it is a Sophism or, a fallacy a non distributo ad distributum. To be in itself is M. Mason's Addit. p. 22. better than not to be, but it is not universally true in all particulars. Again it is true in some cases, & ex hypothesi, si caetera sint paria; If there be any equality in the Adjuncts, It is so far from being simply true; that our Saviour limiteth it, and putteth a case wherein it is not true but the contrary to it is true: That is the case of Judas of which we have said somewhat before. It had been good etc. Which words St. Hierome expounding saith; it is simply and plainly averred by our Saviour, that it is better to have no being, than an evil being. This was the judgement too of Job. Why died I not saith he, in the birth? why did the knees prevent me? and why Hierom: in. Matt: c. 26. v. 24. job: 3. 11. 12. 13. Eccles. 4. 1. 2. 3. did I suck the breasts? For now should I have lain still, and been quiet, and should have slept then and been at rest. In which words he plainly implieth, that he thought it better to have had no birth and being, than such a painful and miserable being. This was also the opinion of Solomon. So I returned saith he, and considered all the oppressions that are done under the sun; and behold the tears of such as were oppressed, and they had no comforter etc. Wherefore I praised the dead which are already dead, more than the living which are yet alive. Yea better is he, then both they, which hath not yet been, who hath not seen the evil works that are done under the sun. The words do clearly show that Solomon did think it better to be dead, and to be deprived of being, then to be oppressed by the mighty, and to be without comforters, that is then to have a miserable and mournful being. Indeed so Hierome saith, but that is not all he saith. For he labours to prevent suspicion Answer. that judas had some being before he was borne: which was the error of Origen. And the words of our Saviour seems to favour it as jansenius observes. Quibus verbis Origenianum quid significare videtur, quasi homo ille fuerit antequam nasceretur, quia nulli potest benè esse nisi ei qui fuerit. And Hierome himself upon Eccles. 4. 3. writes that some were of that opinion; namely, Arminas nostras antequam ad nostra corpora ista descendant versari apud superos, & tam diu beatas esse, quamdiu coelesti Jerusalem & choro perfruantur Angelico. Neither doth Hierome there pass any censure upon the Authors of such an opinion. Here indeed upon Mat. 26. 24, he saith, We must not hereupon think that judas had a being before he were born, because a well being can agree to none but such as have a being. Which argument Hierome doth not answer. For when he adds, sed simpliciter dictum est, multo melius esse non subsistere quam malè subsistere. This rather confirms the antecedent, namely, that it had been well for judas, if he had not been; then gives any tolerable or colourable answer to the consequence made therehence. And is not the authourity of Austin as good as the authourity of Hierome in this? jansenius embraceth Hieromes exposition; but Maldonat doth not, but at large disputes for another interpretation, the very same which I delivered before I were aware of Maldonates' exposition. And jansenius though he follows Hierome in expounding this place, yet he professeth, that both Euthymius of old, and Caietan of late do understand this place in the same manner that Durandus doth, namely, de nativitate ex utero, of judas his bringing forth into the world, distinguishing his birth from his conception, ut sit sensus, after this meaning, Bonum erat vel fuisset ei, si cum erat in utero matris suae non fuisset editus in lucem, sed mortuus tunc fuisset; & sepulchrum ipsius uterus matris extitisset; si enim tunc mortuus fuisset non incidisset in tantam & talem condemnationem, quantam & qualem natus propter immensum perditionis scelus erat excepturus. It had been good for him, if being conceived in his Mother's womb he had never been brought forth, but then had died, and his Mother's womb had been his grave. For had he then died his condemnation had been nothing like so heavy, as now it is. Let me add here Maldonat's interpretation of this place which is memorable. Of this passage some dispute subtly more then enough how it could be better for judas not to have been, whereas not to be is no good; to be damned is some good (meaning in respect of being) For he that is damned is somewhat and every thing that is, as it hath a being is good. Hierome signifies that some though judas had a being before he was born; and that Christ of purpose said not, it were better for that man, if he had never been; but if he had never been born, to signify that though he had not been born; yet he should have had a being, and so to have had natural good things without evil. I imagine that Hierome herein noted the Originists, whose opinion was that as souls were from the beginning created, and each according to his merit either to remain without a body, or to be cast into a body as into a prison. And indeed Origen so writes on this place, as he seems not to be far off from such an opinion. After the same manner almost doth Euthinius interpret this. But such like phrases of speech are not to be accommodated to the subtillty of the Schools. For they speak proverbial speeches and vulgar, which commonly are somewhat hyperbollicall, as job 3. 11. Why hast thou brought me out of the womb? would I had perished, that the eye might not see me, that I had been as if I had not been, from the womb carried to the grave. And Ier: 20 14, 15, and chap: 33. Let the day perish wherein I was born. For all these proceed not from any deliberate judgement of the mind; but by way of complaint, whose course is to amplify evils. Christ therefore in like manner speaks of judas, as it was to be thought he would speak of himself being in torment. Now it was very credible that he would say; I would I had never been born, it had been better for me never to have been born, then to suffer these pains: considering that Job and Jeremy most holy men have uttered the like speeches, under far less sufferings. Add to this that Christ saith not, It had been better that judas had not been born born; but that it had been better to him, to wit, in his opinion and judgement: As we see it befalls many suffering bitter evils, to prefer death before life, sorrow & pain before judgement, whereas without doubt to live is better than to die. In the next place this Author saith, this was also the opinion of Solomon. Better is he then both they, which hath not yet been; The words, saith he, do clearly show that Solomon didthinke it Eccles. 4. 1, 2, 3. better to be dead and deprived of being, then to be oppressed of the mighty, and to have no comforters, that is then to have a miserable and mournful being. Surely Solomon was not ignorant that of them that are dead there are two conditions; some in the state of damnation; others in the state of salvation. To be with God in the state of salvation, we make no question but that it is a better condition, then to be living here on the earth in the greatest happiness that the world can afford. But to be dead and in the state of damnation, can it enter into the heart of any sober Christian, to believe that Solomon ever thought such a condition to be better than to live here on earth, in the most afflicted condition that is incident to the sons of men? And doth this Author well in coupling death with deprivation of being, as if every one, or any one that is dead were deprived of being? Surely all the dead are not deprived of all kind of living. For God is the Father of Abraham, Isaak, and jacob; And he is not the God of the dead but of the living. Again consider who are more oppressed by the men of this world than the Children of God? For as our Saviour told his disciples The world will love her own, but because ye are not of the world, and I have chosen you out of the world, therefore the world hateth you All that will live godly in Christ jesus shall suffer Io: 15. 19 persecution, saith Paul, and through manifold temptations we must enter into the kingdom of God. And our Saviour forewarned his disciples, Ye shall be hated of all men for my name's sake. Now is it credible, that, this Author should believe or conceive that ever King Solomon was of such an opinion, as to profess, that it is better for the Children of God to be deprived of being then to live in oppression? Consider farther, the words chiefly pertinent to this Authors purpose alleged out of King Solomon are these, Better than they both is he which hath not yet been. Now I presume this is spoken not of such an one, who as yet hath not been; though hereafter he shall be. For such an one may be in as great oppression when his time comes, as any other is, or hath been, amongst those that have lived before him▪ But rather of such an one as never yet hath been, nor never shall be Now judge whether this can admit any sober sense, unless in a vulgar phrase, according to the intemperate expressions which in time of oppression are uttered by men wherein as Maldonat observes, there is always something hyperbolical, and such as must not be examinedaccording to the subtlety of the Schools. For consider, is there but one such that never yet was, nor evershall be; or are there many such? If many such, how come they to differ, who have nothing wherein to differ? What a vain imagination is it to talk of particulars that never had, or shall have existence, to ascribe unto them a better condition than is found Tusculan, quaest. 5. in them, that have not being only but life also? We know Cicero hath professed & that according to the opinion of Stoics, that a virtuous man may descend into Phallaris his Bull without any destruction of his happy condition. I have consulted Solomo jarhi upon this place, and he tells us what he hath seen in the Jews Midrach, namely, that there are 974 generations which have grown old and wrinkled from the creation, who yet never were created, and belike the Authors thereof conceive that Solomon spoke of one of these. Rabbi Aben Ezra, proposeth the question, how can any better condition be said to be unto him, who was never created. And his answer is, that we must not wonder at such a speech of Solomon; for such speeches have their course. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by reason of the shortness or straightness of the languages; and therefore we must express ourselves figuratively, and to speak hyperbolically is to speak figuratively. I betake me to Mercer hereupon to acquaint myself with his judgement upon this place. Hoc autem dicitur; saith he, semper magnitudine aerumnarum hujus vitae considerata. Coeterum Christus aliâ ratione habitâ beatos pronunciat, qui persecutionem patiuntur propter justitiam maximè & Dei nomen; quia spiritualia & coelestia considerat repositam illis coronam gloriae in futurum. Noster Solomon externa tantum & praesentis vitae incommoda perpendit quae vere hydra est. Thus he speaks always having his eyes fixed upon the greatness of the miseries of this life, but Christ in an other respect pronounceth them blessed who suffer persecution for righteousness sake, especially and for the cause of God, because he considers spiritual and heavenly things, the Crown of Glory laid up for them against the time to come. Our Solomon considers only outward things and the incommodities of this life present, which indeed is as it were a Serpent with seven heads. This is the first expression of Mercer in his interpretation of this place, which is as much as to say, that, Solomon speakesherein according to the judgement of a natural man. But Mercer hath yet a farther reach than this, which followeth by way of instance or exemplification thus, Sienim earum ratio habeatur ab eo qui illas perfert, mortem peroptat, aut etiam nunquam fuisse. For when he that suffers these miseries shall consider the weight & heaviness of them he will be ready to wish he were dead, or that he had never been; & no marvel: For as Maldonat observeth, even holy men of God such as job & jeremy, have broken forth into such imprecations, judicio dolore corrupto, as he speaks, the pain which they suffer corrupting their judgement, this is to speak not only according to the judgement of a natural man, but according to the judgmet of a man himself that suffers such miseries. Furthermore Mercer taketh notice of the School-mens discourses to the contrary, juxta Scholarum subtilitatem, according to accurate judgmment, as Maldonat speaketh. Sophisticantur nostrorum nonnulli, praestare adhuc malè esse, quam omnino non esse. Some of ours dispute that it is better to be in an ill case, then to have no being at all. Now doth Mercer oppose this? Nothing less he rather admits it, and without contradiction thereunto, proceeds in his interpretation Sed ut ut sit, vis malorum consideratur. Buthowsoever that be, the force of the evil is considered, to wit, as before hath been showed. 1. As in the judgement of a natural man looking no farther than to the evils of this world. And 2ly, according to the sense & judgement of him that suffers them, Quomodo & Christus dicebat de juda, melius fuerat homini illi si nunquam natus fuisset gravitatem praevidens tormentorum illius. After which manner Christ said of judas, It had been better for that man if he had never been borne, foreseeing the greivousnesse of his torments. The Ancient Greeks and Latins used the like proverb, Optimum non nasci, aut ubi natus sis, quam ocyssime aboleri. Graecum epigramma inquit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The best condition was not to be borne; the next to die soon. Such were the conceits of natural men in consideration of the evils of this world. And Cicero is full of such passages in the first of his Tusculans questions. In the last place I meet with a fair translation of this passage of Solomon in Piscator, who sets his translation on the other side to the translationns of junius, & thus it runs. Sed beatiorem ut risque judicabam eum, qui non videt facta ista mala quae fiunt sub sole. But more happy then both I judged him that hath not seen the evil works that are done under the Sun. For albeit in the Hebrew something more there is, which is not here expressed, to wit, which hath not been. Yet he conceives the last words to contain the fuil sense of them; and therefore he interprets these words of those who have perished in their Mother's womb, or in their infancy or childhood, not of those who never had any being, perceiving manifestly the foul absurdity of such a speech according to accurate calculation. And Mercer himself professeth that both these expressions are of the same force in Solomon, and so that is more plainly set down in the latter, which is more obscurely expressed in the former, which is a very usual course in Scripture. To this assenteth Sir Fran●s Bacon in his Colours of good and evil; where against this Mathematical position (as he cause it) that there is no proportion between something and nothing, and that the before the M. Mason's Adait. p. 22. 23. 24. degree of privation 〈◊〉 eater then the degree of diminution; he excepteth that it is fal●e in sundry cases, and among the est in 〈◊〉; namely, when the degree o● diminution is more ●●●●tive than the degree of privation In this case at 〈◊〉 〈…〉 much better than a diminution. Hence the 〈…〉 forms of speech. Better eye out l●e 〈…〉 Make or mar &c Some evils o● pains (perhaps) either for their lightness because they may be well end ●e●; or for their 〈…〉 because they are quickly over; are less: hen resolution into nothing And a man had better for a wh●●● 〈…〉 them, then loose 〈…〉 to be ●●d of them: because his being may afford 〈◊〉 presently, or afterward such and ●o many 〈…〉 things, as will more than recompense 〈◊〉 pain●s. But when his pains a●● so many and violent, 〈…〉 no other good than a poor being, or to ●inch him, that he cannot enjoy or Joy in the good● that remain, it were a thousand times better for him to have no being; and such a●e the pains of 〈◊〉▪ which for the● greatness are infinite, producing many miserable weep and waitings & ●●●●ning of teeth all symptoms of intolerable griefs, and for their ●eng●● eternal. The wo●me never ●●eth, the fisc is never quenched but the breath of the Lord as a river ofbr●●▪ stone doth kindle it forever. And therefore it is incomparably better to cease to be, then to live in th●se torments, which cannot be equalled by any good, which a being can make us capable of, much less by that poor little 〈◊〉 good, which is all the good the damned enjoy in hell. This Sophistical evasion therefore and all others of the like sert notwithstanding. I doubt not but I may safely say, that the unavoidable damnation of so many mi●●ions, cannot be absolutely and antecedently intended by God, without the greatest injustice & cruelty which may in no wise be imputed unto God. Plutar●h speaking of the Pagans, who to pacify the anger of their gods, did sacrifice to them men and women; it had been much better with Di●gor is and his fellows to deny the being of a God, then confessing a God to think he delights in the blood of men. How much rather may we say it were better to be an Atheist and deny God, then to believe or report him to be a devourer of the Souls of men? The like argument is pressed by Eusebius against those cruel and merc●●es gods of the Pagans, doubtless, saith he, if there were any foot-step or spark of goodness in them for which they might deserve to be called good, they would be disposed to do good, and desirous to save all men, they would love justice and take a care of men. And being such how could they delight in their slaughter etc. Yea he concludeth that they were devils or evil spirits; and not Gods or good spirits, because if they were good they would do good; whereas those that are evil use to do hurt. I will therefore shut up my first reason with the speech of Prosper, God indeed is the Creator of all men, but yet of no man for this end, that he might be damned; the reason why we are created is one, and why we are damned an th●r. The Authority of S. Francis Bacon is most alien from the present purpose, according to Answer. the instance given by him, which is only of a destruction of a member, as Better eye out then always aching. Yet this holds not, save of such an aching, as is more evil and dangerous, than the sight is beneficial, but we speak of the universal destruction of the creature. The same appears by the generality of the exception given, as in case the decree of diminution be more sensible (for so I conceive it should be, and not sensitive) then the decree of privation. Whereby it is manifest that he speaks of such a privation whereof the creature is sensible, though sensible with less smart and pain then the decree of diminnion. Otherwise if it be taken in comparison of no sense of the one, and some sense of the other, it would follow herehence that death is to be preferred before a pain: For every man is sensitive of the one, no man is sensitive of the other. I desire no fairer way to come to an issue in this particular, then that which is here proposed by this Author. He grants that some evil & pains, either for lightness or shortness are less than resolution into nothing. Yet with a perhaps only As if by reason of a pain in his back, he were in doubt to resolve whether it were better for him to be turned into nothing, then to endure it. Is this man yet resolved whether it be better for him to suffer Martyrdom for Christ, then to be (I do not say resolved; for as I know no composition of nothing; so neither do I know any resolution into nothing) turned into nothing? ●t is not credibile: How then comes in this parenthesis of a perhaps, was it to set a good face, upon his argument? or was it because he saw the dangerous consequence of this his concession, being direct & absolute? For I find him more cunning than solid throughout like a crafty Crowder For seeing himself confesseth that some pains & Sorrows are willingly to be suffered by every reasonable man, rather than that he should be turned into nothing. Let us divide the latitude of pains & sorrows into a thousand degrees, if he think good: And then let him set down unto us at which degree it begins to make a man more miserable, then to be turned into nothing. In like manner as touching the durance of these sorrows; if he saith that the suffering of hell pains for an hour, for a day, for a year doth not make a man worse, then to be turned into nothing. Let him define unnto us where that proportion of time in suffering hell begins, which makes a man more miserable then to be turned into nothing Divers Divines maintain that Christ suffered hell pains for us: Will this Author say that this made him more miserable then to be turned into nothing? Had he suffered them to this very day, what hellhound will dare to say it had been better for him to be turned into nothing? If S. Austin prayed, Da Domine quod jubes & jube quod vis. Lord give me grace to do what thou commmandest, & then command what thou wilt. Pelagius spighted Austin for this.) May we not in like manner pray Lord give us grace to bear what thou layest upon us, & then lay upon us what thou wilt? Nay is it not Augustine's profession that the punishennt of infants dying in Original sin is mitissima & such as they themselves would not choose to be turned into nothing, to be freed from it? And is it not in the power of God to give a man strength to bear the very pains of hell & that without sin? Did not Christ suffer them without sin, even such sorrows as the Greek Church professed in their Liturgy to be unknown sorrows, as Bishop Andrews sometims observed in a passion sermon of his? And if it be in the power of God to enable a man to bear the pains of hell for an hour, a day, a year; is it not in his power to enable them to hold out in suffering them, & that without sin for the space of ten thousand years, & that in infinitum? Again all this while this Author takes no notice of the misery of sin, which Arminius (his well beloved) professeth to be greater then the misery of punishennt. And he gives his reason for it, becuse illud bono divino, hoc humano oppositum est. That is opposite to a divine, this to ā humane good? Will he say that it is better for a man to be turned into nothing, then to rob, steal, take the name Exam. Praedest. Perk. p. 103. of God in vain, profane the Lords sabbath, to lie with another man's wife, to oppose truth against his knowledge & conscience? If this be his opinion can he plead the common consent of the world, or the common sense of man for this? See by the way how he virifies the being of man which he calls a poor little entitative good God looked upon all things that he had made, & behold they were very good, not the least fly, or emmet, or worm is excepted from the commendatio, yet man was made after the Image & likeness of God. In other creatures are found vestigia Dei, footsteps of God, as Martin Luther observes out of the Ancients, but man is Imago Dei the very Image of God; Yet this Author calls it a poor little entitative good; & barely saith it, & when he hath done, wipes his lips from all sophistication, & claps that upon the back of his adversaries very authoritatively. Then the question is only of Miseria paenae, whether it makes a man worse than annihilation, not in a complicate condition with sin, which is the condition of the damned. Yet thus he carrieth it to serve his turn; whereas in Arminius his opinion, the sinful condition of the damned, makes them more miserable than their torments. But if the torments of hell in themselves are able to make a man in a worse condition then to be turned into nothing, than an holy Angel or Saint should choose rather to be turned into nothing, then to suffer the torennts of hell. And the School divines dispute severally of the misery of sin, and the misery of torennt, & that with such different resolutions upon the point, as to maintain, that albeit the misery of torment is not so bad as utter amnihilation, yet the misery of sin, is. Yet therein I willingly profess I am not of their mind. For what? are not the Children of God sinners? Now what sober Christian will affirm, that it were better for them to be annihilated, then to be sinners. If you say, therefore it is not better for God's children to be annihilated then to be sinners; because they are not only sinners, but they are in the state of grace. I proceed farther, and demand whether God's Elect before their calling, being yet in the state of sin, as Manasses and Saul before their vocation, were better to be annihilated, then to be as they are. What if I am a sinner, yet while I have any being I may mourn for my sin, I may serve God, I may enjoy his favour in the pardoning of my sin, is not this a better condition than not to be, which is a condition conjunct as well with the destruction of sanctity as of sin? But the former argument, which he takes so much pains to enervate, he calls a sophistical evasion, and adds that so are all others of the like sort, very magisterially and resolutely. But what those others are he doth not so much as name. Not so much as one of Austin's, whose discourse alone I proposed on this point; together with an argument of Durand's, neither of all which doth he touch, yet I am the mark set up by him to shoot at, not Durand, not any one of the Schoolmen, not Austin whose discourses alone I proposed. And as for the argument here mentioned, melius est esse, quam non esse; It is better to be then to have no being, therefore it is better to be in hell torment then not to be. This is neither argument, nor any of those that I proposed out of Durand and Austin. Durand's argument is, To be annihilated is an universal destruction of man's nature, not only of his well being, but of being: but hell pains is the destruction only of his well being not of his being. Neither is it answerable to the argument formerly mentioned by him p. 19 which was this. He that wants a being enjoyeth no good, but he that is tormented in hell hath a being, and by consequence some thing that is good. Now this argument cometh nearest to Maldonats' discourse upon that of our Saviour, speaking of judas. It had been good for that man he had not been borne. Some, saith he, dispute subtly more then enough, how it could be better for judas, not to have Mat. 26. 24. been; whereas not to be is no good, to be damned is some good. For he that is damned is somewhat; And every thing that is, as it hath a being, is good. And we know that man's being is no common good but a special one, as being made after God's own Image and likeness. And look with what judgement this Author extenuates, being humane, calling it a poor, little entitative good; with the same judgement he might extenuate Angelical being. For even among Angels some have their portion in hell fire. But now he comes to his first proposition, that unavoidable damnation of so many millions can not be absolutely and antecedently intended by God, without the greatest injustice and cruelty. The question is of the suffering of hell pains, whether it be worse than to be annihilated? This Author runs upon the term damnation, which is a civil and judicial act. Is there no difference between these? They that say Christ suffered the pains of hell, do they say Christ was damned? Then to speak with a fuller mouth he puts in the damnation of so many millions, whereas if the damnation of one may be intended by God without injustice after what manner soever, undoubtedly the damnation of never so many millions may. Then he helps himself with the Epithet of unavoidable added to damnation, and the term absolutely affixed to God's intention, to no purpose that I know, but to abuse himself and others by confusion; for fear lest the truth should break forth to their conviction. To intend damnation avoidable, what is it but to intend it conditionally. And to intend damnation not absolutely, is all one with to intend it conditionally. Now to intend the damnation of any man conditionally is with this Author as much, to intend his salvation as his damnation. Yet this he calls the intention of damnation. And Bradwardine hath long ago maintained and demonstated by evidence of reason, that there is no conditionate will of God: And this Author will not say (I suppose) that God did intend that Christ should suffer hell pains conditionately, or that if he did intent it absolutely, he was unjust in so doing. Now both D. jackson expressly confesseth, that the distinction of will antecedent and consequent in God▪ is to be understood, not as touching the act of willing, but as touching the thing willed. And Gerardus Vossius acknowledgeth that after the same manner must the conditionate will, which is ascribed unto God, be interpreted. Now we willingly confess that the thing willed and intended by God to Reprobates, namely, damnation, befalls none, but in case they die in sin without repentance. And as already I have showed not any of our Divines maintain that God intended to damn any man but for sin. Only the main point of difference between us is, as touching the conferring & denying grace, even the grace of regeneration, the grace of faith and repentance. Herein we willingly confess that God carrieth himself merely according to the pleasure of his own will, according to that of the Apostle, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. Now on this point this Author keeps himself close, and earth's himself within his own concealments, lest he should betray the bitter Leven of Pelagianisme, in maintaining that grace is conferred according unto works, which cannot be avoided by him, if once he comes to deal on this Argument. He thinks he hath great advantage in the point of Reprobation, and very free he is here, but declines the point of election, and point of conferring grace, which argueth a naughty disposition, practising by indirect courses to circumvent and suppress the truth, rather than confer any thing for the clearing of it: yet see his confused carriage in the very point. For when he speaks of damnation avoidable and unavoidable, he takes no pains to manifest in what sense he takes it to be avoidable; as whether by power of nature, or power of grace. Is it his meaning that any man's damnation is avoidable by grace? We deny it not. Or is it his meaning that it is avoidable by nature? we utterly deny this. But this man counts it his wisdom not to speak distinctly, but work his advantage upon confusion of things that differ; but let all such take heed, least utter confusion be their end. But if it be his meaning that all men have power to avoid damnation if they will, to wit, in as much as they have power to believe if they will, to repent if they will: I would he would deal fairly once, and come to this. The Scripture is express, That they that are in the flesh cannot please God, that the natural man discerneth not the things of God, that they are foolishness unto him, Rom. 8. 1 Cor. 2. 14. joh. 12. Rom. 2 Deut. 29. 34. Phil. 1. 29. Eph. 2. 8. Acts. 18. 11. 1 Tim. 2 25. neither can he know them because they are spiritually discerned. That, they cannot believe, cannot repent. Of the Children of Israel in the wilderness that, God had not given them eyes to see, ears to hear, nor hearts to perceive forty years. And truly we take faith and repentance to be the gift of God. And the habits of them not to be a power to believe and repent if a man would, but an habitual and moral inclination of them to believe, to repent. And habits (as it was wont to be said) Agunt ad modum naturae, do work after the manner of nature. And it is very strange that supernatural grace should not. And long ago I have learned in Austin, that to do good, and obey God if a man will, is rather nature than grace. For the will alone is all in all as touching acts moral, good or evil; and till the will be changed, we are as far off as ever, from performing any thing that is pleasing in the sight of God. This is the peculiar glory of God's grace, To make us perfect to every good work, and to work in us that with is pleasing in his sight through jesus Christ, and this he doth according to his good pleasure. For grace is not conferred according unto Heb. 13. 21. Phil. 3. 13. works. That was condemned as a pestilent doctrine long ago in the Synod of Palestine, and all along in divers Counsels against the Pelagians. How gladly should I embrace any delineation of this Authors opinion in the point of grace and free will, the rather, because I seem to smell who he is by this which followeth. For I remember sometime under whose hand I read it; namely, that, Plutarch speaking of the Pagans, who to pacify the anger of their gods, did sacrifice to them men and women, should say, It had been much better with Diagoras and his fellows to deny the being of a God, then confessing a God, to think he delights in the blood of men. But albeit this supercilious and confident professor be of Plutarch's mind in this, I willingly profess I am not. I know no natural reason why he should delight more or less in the blood of beasts, then in the blood of men. Only it pleased him by the blood of Bulls and Goats to represent the delight he took in the satisfaction made in the blood of his own Son. We know in what errand the Lord sent Abraham three day's journey, namely, to sacrifice his Son upon mount Moriah; had not God hindered him it had been done; Abraham knew no other but that it should be done, when he answered his Son saying, My God will provide himself of a burnt offering. Abraham did not Gen. 22. break forth in this man's language, to say he would rather deny there was any God, then believe he delights in blood; neither had he delighted in blood, though Isaak had been sacrificed, but in the obedience of his servants. Nor had Isaac received any loss by this. For Abraham knew that God was able to raise him from the dead. Did not Samson sacrifice himself. Christ was content to shed his precious blood for us, and we by his grace shall be content to shed our blood for him, & that according to his good will and pleasure. Let heathens thus discourse who are nothing acquainted with the powers of the world to come; but a foul shame it is for Christians to comply with them. But, how much rather, saith this Author, may we say it were better to be an Atheist, then to believe or report him to be a devourer of the souls of men. Yet I cannot be persuaded it is better to be an Atheist then to belive even this. For I must not give ground to a confident Theologue for his bare protestation sake. What is it I pray for God to be a devourer of the souls of men? Is it any other then to be a tormenter of of them in hell fire? Now doth not this man believe that God deals so with millions of souls? Doth not he profess, that, the breath of the Lord as a river of brimstone doth kindle that fire? what out recuydance hath possessed the spirit of this Cavalier that he should flaunt it to the world in this manner? It seems his achievements known so well to the world have puffed him up, that he swells with the conceit of it: And 'tis enough for him now to brave it with protestations instead of arguments, wherein having known him so well heretofore, I cannot but wonder at the poverty of his spirit; he will battle so long upon his credit and reputation with the world, that it will crack at length; and he prove bankrupt: So that protest what he will no man will trust him for a groat. Now in that manuscript of his, which it was my hap sometime to have a view of, his protestation upon the book of that saying of Plutarch was somewhat different, thus. I protest unto you, I think it was less dishonour able to the blessed Trinity to say with the Atheist there is no God, then to form such a God, as the decree of Reprobation maintained by the Contraremonstrants, maketh him to be. This protestation though it had course in private, yet here it is changed that it might not see the light of the Press. For it is well known that this toucheth nearly a whole Synod of the Church reform; and that countenanced by King james and divers worthy Divines of this Kingdom subscribing to it, some yet living, and two of them in Apice Episcopali, in Episcopal dignity. Yet what is that doctrine of the Contraremonstrants that he pincheth upon? It is well known that their general tenet is that God ordains no man to damnation but for sin; some difference there hath been, and is about the ordering of God's decrees, which is merely apex Logicus, & what my opinion is thereabouts is well known; namely that in no moment of time or reason doth God ordain any man to damnation, before the consideration of sin, more particularly thus; that all besides the Elect, God hath ordained to bring them forth into the world in their corrupt mass, and to permit them to their selves, to go on in their own ways, and so finally to persevere in sin, and lastly to damn them for their sin, for the manifestation of the Glory of his Justice on them, & of the greater mercy on the vessels of mercy, whom he hath prepared unto glory; inasmuch as he hath of his free grace provided better for them, then for millions of others. Only as touching the grace of regeneration, of faith and of repentance; he did not only ordain of his mere pleasure to bestow that on his Elect, and not on Reprobates; but in time he doth of his mere pleasure confer that grace on some; denying it to others. This doctrine is so dishonourable to the Trinity in this Author's judgement, as that to deny there is any God at all, he thinks to be less dishonourable: A prodigious assertion! We have the less cause to be moved, when he preferred the annihilation of our natures, before the suffering of hell pains. When he seems to prefer the annihilating of the blessed Trinity, before the renouncing of his own vile fancies. As for that of Eusebius, true it is, the god's of Paynims sought only the destruction of those that served them, and that not of their bodies but their souls also. The true God put Abraham once upon the sacrificing of his Son, for the trial of his faith and obedience, but perceiving his obsequious readiness, took a course to restrain him. Of him it it is true, He saveth both man and beast, and the eyes of all do wait upon him, and he gives them meat in due season, he heareth the cry of Ravens, and not a sparrow lights upon the ground without his providence; The very Lions roaring after their prey do seek their meat at (the hands of) God. Yet if he be pleased to save our souls, we have reason to submit unto him in doing what he will with our bodies, which yet one day he will raise, glorious bodies, when mortality shall be swallowed up of life. We acknowledge no other end of man's creation, and of all other Divine Acts of God, but his own glory. For even there where Solomon professeth, God hath made even the wicked against the day of evil, he withal acknowledgeth, that both them and all things, he hath made for himself. God of his mere pleasure created all, but of his mere pleasure he damneth none. But every one that is damned is damned for his sin, & that wilfully committed & contumaciously continued by them that come to ripe years. For as Austin saith Libertas sine gratia non est libertas, sed contumacia: Liberty without grace, is not liberty, but wilfulness or contumacy. I come to the second part of his first argument. The second part of the Argument. Sect. 1. M. Mason's Addit. p. 24. 25. Secondly, this opinion chargeth God with men's sins on earth, and makes him the Author, not of the sin only that entered by Adam into the world, but of all other sins, that have been, are, or shall be committed to the world's end. No murders, robberies, rapes, adulteries, insurrections, treasons, blasphemies, persecutions, or any other abominations whatsoever fall out at any time, or in any place, but they are the necessary productions of God Almightys decrees. The Scripture I am sure teaches us another lesson. Thou art not a God, saith David that hast pleasure in wickedness. And the Prophet Esay tells the people, that when they did Psal. 5. 4. Es. 66. 4. Iam: 1. 13. 14 evil in the sight of the Lord, they did choose the things which he would not. Let no man say when he is tempted I am tempted of God. For God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man; but every man is tempted when he is drawn away with his own concupiscence. And St. John when he had referred all the sins of the world to three heads, the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life; tells us that, they are not of the Father, but of the world. To which speeches let me add the speech of Stracides (though not of the same authority.) Say not 1 Jo: 2. 16. thou it is through the Lord that I fell away; for thou oughtest not to do the things that he hateth. Say not thou he hath Ecclus. 15. 12. caused me to err; for he hath no need of the sinful man. 2. Pious antiquity hath constantly said the same, and pressed it with sundry reasons; some of which are these as follow. If God be the Author of sin, than he is worse than the Devil; because the devil doth only tempt and persuade to sin, and his action may be resisted, but God, by this opinion, doth will and procure Prosper resp. ad Object. 11. Vincent. by a powerful and effectual decree, which cannot be resisted. This is Prospers argument, who to some objecting that by St. Austin's doctrine, when Fathers defile their own Daughters, and Mothers their own Sons, Servants murder their masters, & men commit any horrible villainies, it cometh to pass because God hath so decreed. Answereth that if this were laid to the Devil's charge, he might in some sort clear himself of the imputation. Quia etsi delectatus est furore peccantium, probaret tamen sc non intulisse vim criminum. Because though he be delighted with man's sins yet he doth not, he cannot compel men to sin: What a madness therefore is it to impute that to God which cannot be justly fathered upon the Devil. 2. He cannot be a punisher of sin: For none can justly punish those effences of which they are the Resp. Obi. 4. Vincent l. 1. ad Monim. c. 19 l. 2. cont. Martion. c. 9 Basil. Homil. Quod Deus non est &c. Authors. This is Prospers argument too. It is against reason to say that he which is the damner of the Devil would have any one to be the devil's Servant. This reason Fulgentius useth likewise illius rei Deus ultor est, cujus Auhor non est. Tertullian also before them hath said. He is not to be accounted the Author of sin, who is the forbidder yea and the condemner of it. 3. He cannot be God, because he should not be just, nor holy, nor the Judge of the world, all properties essential to God. And this is Basil's reason, who hath written a whole Homily against this wicked assertion. It is all one (saith he) to say that God is the Author of sin, and to say he is not God. 3 Upon these and the like considerations I may well conclude, that, the opinion which chargeth God with the sins of men, is neither good nor true. It is first laid to the charge of our Divines that by this their opinion, they make God the Answer. Author of sin; not of the first only that entered by Adam into the world, but of all other sins, that have been, are, or shall be committed in the world, as murders, robberies, rapes, adulteries, insurrections, treasons, blasphemies, heresies, persecutions, or any other abominations. But in all these wasteful discourses not a word of proof. The charge is made in the first place, the proof last. All that he labours to prove here is, that God is not the Author of sin. Bellarmine hath bestowed, or rather cast away a whole book on this crimination, to him Arminius refers Perkins, telling him that he should have answered Bellarmine. I have taken some pains to perform that task upon that motion of Arminius. I would I could receive from this Author a reply to any material particular thereof, the rather because I understand in part his Zeal for Bellarmine in his age, correcting the harsh exceptions he hath made against him in his younger days. And let every indifferent Reader compare this Author's discourse, with that discourse of Bellarmine, and judge indifferently what an hungry piece this is in comparison to that of Bellarmine's; And whether his pains had not been better bestowed in replying upon my answer thereunto, then to add such scraps as these to that full table of Bellarmin's provision; and whether these deserve any answer, that whole discourse of Bellarmine being refuted throughout. Bradwardine disputes the question, Si & quomodo Deus vult & non vult peccatum. I say he disputes it indifferently on both sides; and let every Scholar judge and weigh, whether it be not a very ponderous argument, and consider well his resolution, and where he differrs any thing from our Divines in this Calvin observing how frequent the Scripture is in testifying God's hand to be operative in abominable courses, thereupon writes a Treatise. De occultâ Dei providentiâ in malo; in all which he exactly conforms himself to Scripture expressions. And these and such like vile Criminators may as well tax God's word for making God the Author of sin, as Calvin; who most accurately conforms himself to the testimonies of Divine Scripture. I remember to have heard a disputation sometimes at Heidelberge on this Argument, where Copenius the Precedent or Moderator made manifest, that look upon what grounds they criminated Calvin for making God the Author of sin; upon the same grounds they might criminate the very word of God to make him the Author of sin. For Calvine throughout in his expressions conforms himself to the language of the holy Ghost. Yet, what one of our divines can he produce, affirming that, God takes pleasure in sin. Piscator confesseth that, God taketh no pleasure in the death of him that dyeth, upon that place in Ezechiel; how much less in wickedness. And he illustrates it in this manner: For albeit it cannot be denied, but that God willeth the death of him that dyeth. For he is the God to whom vengeance belongeth; yet he takes no pleasure in it. Like as a sick-man would be content to take a bitter potion for the recovery of his health; yet he takes no pleasure in that bitter cup. And in like manner, albeit, God hardened Pharaoh's heart that he should not let Israel go; and as the Apostle speaks, hardeneth whom he will. Whereby it comes to pass infallibly that they do not obey the Gospel, as appeareth by the objection following. Why then doth he complain. For who hath resisted his will? And albeit the Saints of God expostulate with him in this manner; Why hast thou caused us to err from thy ways, Es. 63. 17. and hardened our hearts against thy fear? Yet we know that God takes no pleasure in disobedience, or in the hardness of any man's heart, nor can be the Author of evil, with Sir Francis Bacon's distinction in the book formerly mentioned by this Author. Non quià non Author, sed quià non mali. So that albeit he hardens whom he will unto disobedience, & in the prophet Esayes phrase causeth men to err from his ways. Yet the Lord himself we know is righteous in all his ways, & holy in all his works, though we are not able to dive into the gulf, and search out the bottom of his judgements, and no marvel. For they are unsearchable; Yet we make no question but through God's mercy convenient satisfaction may be found without any such shanefull course of dismembering scripture, and taking notice only of such passages as represent God's displeasure against sin Es. 63. 17. Rom. 11. & sinners, and dissembling all other passages which drove Austin to confess, occulto Dei judicio, by the secret judgement of God, fieri perversitatem cordis, the perversity of man's heart hath its course, much less by setting them together by the ears. And I nothing doubt but the issue will be on the part of such, as are of this Authors spirit, either wholly to deny original sin, or so to emasculate the vigour of it, as to profess that it is in the power of man to cure it; or notwithstanding the strength of it, to believe & repent if he will; which Aug: de great: & lib: arbit. though they pretend to be wrought by a certain universal grace; Yet I nothing doubt but we shall be able to prove that such a power is mere nature and no grace. Be it so that wicked men in their wicked courses do chose the things that God would not, Who would think that this Author, who makes such a flourish should content himself with such beggarly arguments; or that the world should be so simple as to be terrified with such scarecrows? For is it not apparent that in scripture phrase there is voluntas praecepti, a will of Es. 66. 24. commandment, as well as voluntas propositi, a will signifying God's purpose and decree? So then though they choose the things that God willed not in reference to his will of commandment; yet it might be God's will, that is his purpose that even such sins should come to pass. For was it not the will of God that Pharaoh should not let Israel go for a while? Did he not harden him to this purpose that so he might make himself known in the land of Egypt by his judgements? & did he not reveal this to Moses to the comfort of the children of Israel, & keep them from despair in contemplation of the obstinacy of Pharaoh's Lib. 1. de Amiss. gratia. spirit, when they were assured that God had an hand in hardening Pharaoh to stand out? And doth not Bellarmine profess that malum fieri permit sin & Deo bonum est, it is good that evil should con to pass by God's permission? And shall it be unbeconing the divine nature to will that which is good? And where is it that Bellarmine affirmeth this? even there where he opposeth the same Doctrine of ours which this Author doth. but with more learning an 100 fold then this Author betrayeth, and withal carrieth himself with far more ingenuity. For he takes notice of those places of Scripture whereupon our Divines do build, and accommodates himself to aswer them by some interpretation that he thinks good to make of them, which this Author doth not 2. But what if there be no such text as this Author builds upon? For look what the word is, used in the original Ps. 5. 4. the same is used Es. 66 4 Now that in Ps. 5. 4 This Author renders not that wouldst not iniquity, but that hast no pleasure in iniquity And why then shall not that Es. 66. 4. be accordingly rendered thus. They choose the things wherein I had no pleasure, or wherein I had no delight, and not as he expresseth it the things that I would not. Hereupon I imagined our Enlish tranlation had thus rendered it, but consulting that, I found the contrary. For thus they render it. They choose the things wherein I delighted not. It is true the Geneva renders it thus: But doth it become him to prefer and follow the Geneva translation before the last and most authentical translation of the Church of England? In like manner the practice of Geneva must be of authority to cry us down in the point of the morality of the fourth commandment. Were not the man well known to be sound at heart, his favourites might well suspect him to prevaricate, in making so great a cry, and yet yielding so little wool. In the next place he allegeth that of james. Let no man say when he is tempted that he is temptedof God. For God tempteth no man: But every man is tempted, when he is drawn away with his own concupiscence ja: 1. 13. 14 Now Peter Martyr on the first to the Romans deals at large upon this place, and disputes strangely indiscoursing of God's providence in evil. I would this Author had taken the pains to answer him at least, that he might perform somewhat tanto dignum hiatu, worthy of the great gaping he makes. It is true Bellarmine hath taken him to task after a sort in his vl chapter of his second book de Amiss. gratiae & statu peccati. And I have replied upon Bellarmine at large in my Vindiciae, in that large digression wherein I take Bellarmine to task in that book of his, whereunto I refer the Reader. Yet to say somewhat of this place before I pass. It is apparent that the Apostle in this place doth not so put off from God the works of tempting as to cast it upon Satan; but only so as to show, that whatsoever the divine providence is there about, either by the ministry of Satan (who is God's minister in hardening men to precipitate courses (I Kings the last) or otherwise, yet still the sinner is unexcusable; for as much as he is then only tempted (effectually) For so it is to be understood; otherwise it were not true, as it appears in the case of Joseph tempted by his Mistress) when he is drawn away by his own concupiscence. It is true, the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and pride of life is not of the Father but of the world, they are the members of that body of sin which we brought with us into the world. This is propagated unto us all by natural generation. Col. 2. 11. Gen: 5. 3. Ps. 51. 5. joh. 3. 11. Holy jacob the Son of holy Isaak a Patriach, & of holy Rebeccah a Prophetess was borne in sin as well as Esau; and Seth as well as Cain, and this seemeth to be called the image of Adam, after his fall Behold I was shapen in wickedness, saith David, and in sin hath my Mother conceived me. And except a man be borne again he cannot see the kingdom of God. This, though a mystery, yet is nothing strange to us, whom God in mercy hath reserved unto these times or grace; But it was very strange to Nicodemus a Ruler in Israel. This hath been the condition of man ever since the fall of Adam; and arising merely from the withdrawing of God's spirit from him, and that most justly upon their first sin in tasting of the forbidden fruit. So that even this condition proceeded originally, as from the sin of our first parents in the way of a meritorious cause, so from the just judgement of God taking his holy Spirit from him, which God was not bound to do, as appears by this, that by virtue of the Covenant of grace which he hath made with us in Christ, he doth not take his spirit from us, though too often we sin againsthim. No not from David, notwithstanding those foul sins committed by him, at appears by his prayer unto God; that, he would restore him to the joy of his salvation, signifying therereby that he had lost that. And that God would not take his holy Spirit from him, manifesting hereby that still he retained that. And considering that God proceeded with Adam herein in the way of judgement, Austin acknowledgeth Concupiscence to be a punishment of sin, as well as sin, and a cause of other sins, in his fifth book against julian the Pelagian cap. 3 As for that of Siracides, say not thou, God hath caused me to err. As it is true that no man must cast the blame of sinning upon God, & think himself blameless: So it is as true that in consideration of our own inability to stand of ourselves & prones to fall (even to fall away like water spilt upon the ground that cannot be recovered; contain itself it cannot, but it may easily becontained) the Church doth sometimes expostulate with God (such is the liberty and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which he vouchsafeth unto his Children) in an holy manner saying, Wherefore hast thou caused us to err from thy ways, and hardened our hearts against thy fear; Not that this he doth, infundendo malitiam, by infusing malice into them but, non infundendo gratiam, by not infusing such grace into them as to preserve them from sin For as Martha said unto jesus, Lord if thou hadst been here our brother Lazarus had not died. So may we say if the strength of thy grace had been operative in us, we had not sinned in this or that particular. It is true God hath not need of the sinful ma: much less of his salvation or damnation. But if he will of mere pleasure manifest his own glory, either in the way of mercy pardoning, or of justice punishing, he must permit sin to enter into the world, & forbear that providence whereby, as he did keep the Elect Angels, so he might have kept man also from sinning. As for the reasons of p●o●s Antiquity to prove that God cannot be the Author of sin, they are very needless in this controversy between us & our adversaries, the question between us not being thereabouts, but rather about the manner of God's providence. Our Adversaries so denying him to be the Author of evil, as withal they deny him to be the Author of any good in the actions of men. We on the contrary take care, so to maintain that God is not the Author of sin, that withal we maintain that he is the Author of all good, both moral and natural, and much more supernatural. Yet as I have considered the seven reasons of Bellarmine to this purpose collected out of the Ancients; so I am content to take into consideration the three reasons produced by this Author. 1. As touching the first to manifest how superficiarily and absurdly he carrieth himself therein, observe the wildness of his reasoning besides all rules of sobriety. If God (saith he) be the Author of sin, than he is worse than the Devil, because the Devil doth only tempt and persuade to sin, and his action may be resisted. Let all the Universities of the world be judge between us of the shameful irregularity of this discourse. His syllogism is hypothetical; for the first proposition is hypothetical and conditional. Now all such syllogisms by the rule of all Schools must proceed either from the negation of the consequent, to the negation of the antecedent; or from the affirmation of the antecedent, to the affirmation of the consequent; but no such process is made here. And indeed it should be framed thus to infer the proposition undertaken to be proved. If God be the Author of sin, than he is worse than the Devil; but God is not worse than the Devil; therefore he is not the Author of sin. But this Author disputes after no such manner. But his affection carrying him all along to cast some foul aspersion on our Doctrine in some particular or other, and being withal in heat of passion, he doth most shamefully involve and entangle himself And indeed quite besides his present purpose, he aims only at this to prove that our doctrine concerning God's powerful and effectual decree, doth more make God the Author of sin then the Devil, which is utterly alien from that he proposed in this place. Yet I am willing to do him this favour, to help a lame Dog over the stile, and to expedite him in this Argument, whereof he cannot so dexterously deliver himself though quite besides the purpose. Thus therefore the argument should proceed according to his irregular intention. If God doth will and procure sins by a powerful and effectual decree, which cannot be resisted, then is God worse than the Devil. But by the doctrine of our Divines God doth will and procure sins by a powerful and effectual decree which cannot be resisted; therefore by the doctrine of our Divines, God is worse than the Devil. Thus have I endeavoured to bring this argument to some shape, which had no tolerable proportion before. Now let me show the corrupt nature of it, that the Reader may discern what spirit he breathes, that is the Author of it in a mixture both of ignorance and abominable profaneness. And first I begin with the major proposition. And here first let the Reader judge whether it be not this Authors opinion, that, God doth will and procure sin by some decree, though not by a powerful and effectual decree that cannot be resisted. For otherwise did he acknowledge every will of God as it signifies his decree, to be powerful, and effctuall and irresistible, what need he cumber his Reader with such unnecessary Epithets, cast in like lumber only to trouble the course of disputation? Now if he grants that God doth will and decree sin by a powerful and effectual decree. 1. He must contradict himself. For formerly he cited, Es. 66. 4, to prove that men in wicked courses, do choose the things that God would not. 2. If God doth will it, but not by a powerful and effectual, & irresistible decree, let him show what that decree is, whereby he wills sins. Now this is commonly accounted a decree conditional; and let him speak plainly then & tell us upon what condition it is that God doth will and procure sin in the world, and I am verily persuaded he is to seek what to answer. 3. If God doth will and decree it, it cannot be avoided, but it must be, by a powerful and effectual decree which cannot be resisted; seeing the Apostle saith plainly speaking of his decree, that it cannot be resisted. Upon these considerations I am persuaded, that this Author doth utterly deny that God doth at all will sin, or decree that any such thing shall come to pass in the world, & that these attributes of powerful, and effectual, & irresistible, are used by him not for distinction sake, but merely for amplification, that so he might speak with a full mouth. Now having brought this Author home to himself, and delivering himself and his meaning plainly, I am very willing to cope with him on this point. Yet what need I, having so fully disputed the point in a certain digression in my Vindiciae lib. 2. degrees. 4. The title whereof is this, Whether the holy one of Israel without any blot to his Majesty may be said to will sin. And forthwith I answer, that, God may be said thus far to will sin, in as much as he will have sin to come to pass. And for explication sake it is added, that whereas God will have all the good things of the world, whether natural, moral, or spiritual come to pass by his working of them: Only evil things he will have come to pass by his permitting them. But this Author affects to work upon the ignorant; and he doth not affect to trouble their brains with answering my reasons, lest thereby he should raise many spirits, and afterwards prove unable to lay them. And this discourse of M. Hord's some of that sect thought good to have it copied out, and communicated to people in the Country, as accommodated to their capacities, and so more fit to promote their edification in the plausible way of Arminian religion: well therefore in the proof of this tenet, namely, that God will have sin come to pass by his permission. I prove first by Scripture. God hath put in their hearts (that is in the hearts of the 10 Kings) to fulfil his will. Now mark what is the object of God's will, in the words following, and to agree, and give their kingdones unto the beast until the words of God shall be fulfilled: now by giving their Kingdoms unto the beast, is not to depose or dethrone themselves, or to part with their Kingdoms, but only to submit their regal authority to the execution of the beasts wrath against the Saints of God. Like as in the days of Popery, when the Saints of God were by Popish Prelates condemned for heresies, than they were delivered into the hands of the secular powers, the sheriffs to burn them at a stake. Now this the holy Ghost makes the object of God's will, and their agreement thus to execute the Pope's Antichristian pleasure is said to be God's work. For God is said to put it into their hearts to do this evil of his. Of disobedient persons the Apostle professeth that they are ordained to stumble at God's word, 1 Pet. 2. 8. 2 Thes. 2. 11. Rom. 1. 24. wherein undoubtedly they sin. Paul likewise testified of some that God sends them strong delusions, that they should believe a lie. of others that God gave them up to uncleanes through the lusts of their own hearts to dishonour their own bodies between themselves. And to a Reprobate mind, to do those things which are not convenient. Now let every sober man judge whether when God blinded the eyes of the one and hardened the hearts of the other, it were not his will, that those foul things which were committed by them should come to pass by his permission. Then consider what the Apostles with one consent testify concerning those abominable Acts. 4. 28. acts committed against the holy son of God, namely that both Herod & Pontius Pilate with the Gentiles & people of Israel, were gathered together to do what Gods hand & his counsel had before determined to be done. This the Apostles deliver to the very face of God in their prayers & holy meditations. And let every Christian consider, whether it the Scripture had not made mention of this, & any one of us had used the like prayer & meditation, this Author & all that are of his spirit, would not have been ready to spit in our faces & cry us down for notorious blasphemers. Yet the Apostles endued with the spirit of God feared not to be found guilty of violating the Lords holiness in all this. Hence I proceeded to the passages of the Old Testament for the confirmation of the same truth. As namely that whereas the desolation of the holy Land begun by the Assyrians, finished by the Babylonians, could not come to pass without many enormous sins. Who can deny, that it was God's will that these things should come to pass, considering that Assur himself is acknowledged by God to be the rod of his wrath and the staff of his indignation, whom God would send against an hypocritical nation, & against the people of his wrath would he give him a charge to take the spoil, & to take the prey, & to tread them down like the mire in the streets? Hence I proceeded to show how that it is Gods usual course to punish sin with sin. Now when God exerciseth his judgements, shall not those things justly be said to come to pass by his will, which are punishments of foregoing sins? See the judgement of God denounced against Amaziah the Priest of bethel. Thou sayst prophesy not against Israel, & drop not thy word against the house of Isaac. Therefore thus saith the Lord, Thy wife shall be an harlot in the Cities, Amos. 7. 16. 17. & thy sons & thy daughters shall fall by the sword. And in like manner Solomon saith The mouth of a strange woman is a deep pit, he that is abhorred of the Lordshall fall therein. The incest of Absolom defiling his father's concubines in a shameless manner, came it not to pass Prov. 22. 14. by the will of God, whose word is this; Behold I will raise up evil against thee, out of thine own house, & I will take thy wives before thine eyes, & give them unto thy neighbour, & he shall lie with thy wives in the sight of this sun? The defection of the ten tribes from the house of David, came it not to pass by the will of God, when God himself testifies that it was 2 Sam. 12. 11. his work, & not his will only? Thus saith the Lord the God of Israel, I will rend the kingdom out of the hands of Solomon, & give ten tribes to thee, speaking to jeroboam; here we have Gods will for it. And again the word of God came to Semaiah the man of God saying, speak to Rehoboan the son of Solomon King of judah, & unto all the house of judah & Benjamin, & to the remnant of the people, saying, Thus saith the Lord, ye shall not go up, nor fight against your brethren, 1 Kings. 11. 31. the children of Israel; return every man to his house; for this thing is from me. Here we have God's word for it. Who can deny that the hardening of pharoh's heart, that he should not let Israel go; the selling of joseph into Egypt by the hands of his unnatural brethren came to pass by the will of God? I proceed to prove the same truth by evidence of reason. First because God permits sin to come to pass as all confess, though he could hinder it, if it pleased him, & that without all detriment to the free will of the creature why then doth he permit it? but because he would have it come to pass, & accordingly permission is reckoned up by School Divines amongst the sins of Gods will, like as also is God's commandment. Now what God commandeth if it be done, it is said to come to pass by the will of God, albeit the things that God commandeth, seldom; the things he permits, always come to pass; according to the common tenet of Divines, even Vostius & Arminius not excepted. Again it is the common opinion of all, that therefore God permits sin, because he can and will work good of it, which plainly supposeth that sin shall come to pass if God permits it, & consequently it must needs be the will of God, it shall come to pass. Thirdly it is granted on both sides that the act of sin is God's work in the way of an efficient cause, not the outward act only which is natural, but the inward act of the will which is moral, even this as an act is the work of God: How can it be then but the deformity and viciousness of the act, must come to pass God willing it, though not working it, considering that the deformity doth necessarily follow the act, in reference to the creatures working it, though not in respect of Gods working it? Lastly all sides agree that God can give effectual grace, whereby a man shall be preserved from sin infallibly. Wherefore as often as God will not give this grace which is in his power to give, doth it not manifestly follow that he will not have such a man preserved from sin? To these I added the testimony of divers; as that of Austin. Not any thing comes to pass, unless Good Enchiria. cap. 9 5. will have it come to pass, either by suffering it to come to pass, or himself working it. If good he works it, if evil permits it, 'tis true of each that he wills it. & cap. 96. It is Good, saith Austin, that evil should come to pass. And Bellarmine himself so far subscribes hereunto, as by professing that It is good that evils shoul come to pass by God's permission. The same Austin confesseth that The perversity of the heart comes to pass by the secret judgement of God And again that after a wonderful and unspeakable manner, even those things which are committed against the will of God (to wit against the will of his commandment) do not come to pass besides the will of God; to wit the will of his purpose. Anselm the most ancient of school Divines in his book of the concord of foreknowledge with free will; Considering Cont. julian: l. 5. c. 3. saith he, that what God willeth cannot but be when he wills, that the will of man shall not be constrained by any necessity to will or no; and withal will have an effect follow the will of man. In this case it must needs be that the will of man is free, and that also which God willeth shall come to pass, to wit by that will of man. Now observe what in the next place he concludeth hence In these cases therefore it is true that the work of sin, which man will do, must needs be, though man doth not will it of necessity. And in his concord of predestination and free will. In Good things God doth work, both that they are, and that they are good, in evil things he works only that they are, not that they are evil. Hugo de sancto Victore 1. De sacr. 4. p. 13. When we say God willeth that which is good, it sounds well; but if we say God willeth evil it is harsh to ears, neither doth a pious mind admit of the good God, that he willeth evil, for hereby he thinks the meaning is that God loves and approves of that which is evil, & therefore the pious mind abhors it, not because that which is said is not well said, but because that which is well said is not well understood. To these I add the testimony of Bradwardine at large. A man reputed so pious in those days, that the Kings prosperous success in those days was chiefly imputed unto his piety; who followed him in his wars in France as Preacher in the camp. In the last place I make answer to the Sophistical arguments of Aquinas and Durandus, and the frothy disputation of Valentianus, all of them standing to maintain the contrary. Now let every sober Christian judge of this Author's proposition, when he saith that If God doth will and procure sin etc. he is worse than the Devil. For I have made it evident by variety of Scripture testimonies, by reason, and also with the concurrence of divers learned Divines; that it is Gods will that sin should come to pass, even the horrible outrages committed against the holy son of God were before determined by God's hand and counsel. Now what follows herehence by this Authors discourse; but that the holy Apostles yea and the Spirit of God do make God worse than the Devil. So little cause have we to be impatient, when such horrible blasphemies are laid to our charge, when we consider what honourable compartners we have in these our sufferings. Yet see the vanity of this consequence represented most evidently; For albeit the will of God's decree be powerful & effectual and irresistible, and consequently every thing decreed thereby shall come to pass powerfully, effectually, irresistibly, yet this respects only the generality of the things eveniency, not the manner how For only things necessary shall by this irresistible will of God, come to pass necessarily: But as for contingent things, they by the same irresistible will of God shall come to pass also; but how? not necessarily but contingently; that is with a possibility of not coming to pass. Now the free actions of men are one sort of contingent things They therefore shall infallibly come to pass also by virtue of God's irresistible will; but how? Not necessarily but contingently, that is with a possibility of not coming to pass in general as they are things contingent: And in special they shall come to pass not contingently only but freely also; that is with a free power in the Agents by whom they are acted to do otherwise. Yet there is another difference according to the moral condition of these actions For if they are good and so far as they are good they come to pass by Gods working of them, but if they are evil, and so far as they are evil they come to pass only by Gods permitting; according to that of Austin. Non aliquid sit nisi omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo. Not any thing comes to pass, but God willing it either by suffering it (to wit in case it be evil) or himself working it (to wit in case it be good.) And according to that eleventh Article of Religion agreed upon by the Archbishop, and Bishops, and the rest of the Clergy in Ireland, which is this; God from all eternity did by his unchangeable counsel ordain whatsoever should come to pass in time; yet so as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor the contingency of the second causes is taken away but established rather. Farther consider it is confessed by all, that God concurres in producing the act of sin, as an efficient cause thereof not moral, but natural. And Aquinas himself, though he denies that, Voluntas Dei est malorum, Because indeed as Hugo de Sancto Victore observes by the will of God is commonly understood in this case Voluntas approbans; his will approving it, and loving it. And so it is justly denied that God doth will evil things, speaking of the evil of sin. Yet Aquinas professeth, and disputes and proves that Actus peccati est a Deo, the Act of sin is from God. Like as the Act of walking is from the soul, though the lament in walking ariseth from some disease in the leg. Now the Devil concurres not in this manner to any act of sin; neither is the efficient cause thereof in the Kind of a Natural efficient, but only Moral by tempting and persuading. What therefore? shall we conclude as this Author doth without fear or wit or honesty, that by the confession of all men God is hereby made worse than the Devil? To what abominable courses do the wild wits and profane hearts of these men expose them? The greatest works of Satan in moving men to sin are comprehended under blinding and hardening of them. Now these operations are also attributed to God. And like enough he doth usually perform them, not by the ministry of his holy Angels, but by the Ministry of Satan and his Angels of Darkness, as we read. 1. Kings 22. v. 21. 22. 23. Ioh: 13. 27. Acts 5. 3. What then shall the Devil so far possess our hearts as to break forth into such intolerable blasphemies as to conclude hereupon that God is bad, or worse than the Devil. The providence of God I willingly confess is wonderful, and mysterious in this, like unto the Nature of God, to be adored rather than pried into. So this providence to be dreaded rather than for satisfaction to every wanton and wild wit to be searched into. Yet all confess that the Lord could hinder all this if it pleased him, and rebuke Satan and restrain the power, and stop the course of sin, and prevent occasions leading thereunto, but he will not, and why? But because he knows it becomes his almighty power and wisdom infinite, rather exmalis bene facere, quam malum esse non sinere, To work good out of evil, than not at all to suffer evil. Lastly what means this Author to carry himself so as to betray so strange ignorance in mitigating Satan's operation in tempting unto sin; as if this were not sufficient to make him the Author of sin. Especially considering the reason that moves him hereunto, which is merely the delight that he takes in dishonouring God, and being a desperate spirit himself to make as many as he can partakers of the same desperate condition. For cupiunt perditi perdere, saith Cyprian, cum sint ipsi paenales, quaerunt sibi ad poenam comites; being damned themselves they desire to damn as many as they can: And being bound in chains and kept to the judgement of the great day, they desire to have as many companions as they can in drinking of that cup of trembling, and sucking the very dregs of that cup of trembling and wring them out. For as the Historian observes. Maligna est calamitas, & cum suo supplicio crucietur, acquiescit alieno; Calamity makes a man of a spiteful nature, and when himself is tormented, he takes content in this that others suffer with him. And as the Orator observes, Nullum adversarium magis metuas, quam qui non potest vivere, potest occidere. No adversary more to be feared, than he who cannot live himself, yet can kill another. This makes a coward resolute; when he must needs die, he will fight like a mad man, and kill all he can. I say what means this Author to carry the matter hand over head, as if it were without question; That he is not the Author of sin; who only is a Moral cause thereof, but rather he that is the natural efficient: whereas great Divines carry it to the contrary. As namely Dominicus Soto in his first book of nature and grace chap: 18. Although (saith he) there are many that think it hard to explicate, how in the hatred of God, which hath an inward and indivisible malignity, God can be the cause of the entity, but not of the fault: Yet this is not so hard to be understood. Then he proceeds to show how this may be. First laying for his ground what it is to be the cause of sin, thus; In moral actions he is altogether, and is judged to be the cause, who by a law, or help, or counsel or favour or persuasion moves any one either to good or evil. Observe I pray the doctrine of this School-Divine directly contrary to that which this Author supposeth without all proof. For in the judgement of Dominicus Soto, he only is to be accounted the cause of another man's sin, who is the moral cause thereof, as by tempting, counselling, persuading thereunto, And upon this ground he proceeds to free God from being the Author of it after this manner. But as for God he by all these ways moves his creatures to that which is good and honest, and none at all to evil. Neither is the doctrine of Dominicus Soto alone; but the common doctrine of the Divines of Salamancha, as Molina confesseth in his disputation 23. And albeit Molina the Jesuit were of another opinion. Yet Vasquius the Jesuit professeth that he was ever of the same mind with Dominicus Soto and the Divines of Salamancha in this; In his 129 disputation upon the first part of his Sums. As for Prosper he hath no such argument. But first observe the Objection whereunto he answereth, was made against the Doctrine of Austin; as the Author acknowledgeth. Whence it followeth that look how this Author chargeth our doctrine, after the same manner was the doctrine of Austin charged above 1200 years ago; let the indifferent hereby take notice of the congruity of our doctrine with the doctrine of Austin in this particular, and the congruity of this Authors spirit in charging us with the spirit of the Semipelagians in charging Austin after the same manner. Secondly consider the objection there made 'tis this. Quod quando incestant Patres filias, & matres filios; vel quando Servi Dominos occidunt ideo fiat, quia ita Deus predestinavit, ut fieret. When father commit incest with their Daughters, and mothers with their sons. Or when servants kill their Lords; therefore this comes to pass, because God hath so predestinated that it should come to pass. Consider, in this objection the fault of these abominable courses is not laid upon those that commit them, but only upon God; as if God's predestination did work in such a manner, as to compel men or women to commit such and such abominations. And so Prosper conceives the Argument to proceed, as if this were their intention. And accordingly makes answer. Si Diabolo objiceretur quòd talium facinorum ipse Author, ipse esset incentor, were it objected to the Devil that he were the Author of such sins, and did inflame men to the committing of them (which indeed is the Devil's course and not Gods) yet I think, saith he, that the Devil might in some sort disburden himself of this crimination, & talium scelerum patratores de ipsorum voluntate vinceret, and make it appear that their own wills were the committers of such sins. Quia etsi delectatus est furore peccantium, probaret tamen se non intulisse vim criminum. Because though he took pleasure in the fury of sinners, yet might he justify that he forced no man to sin. After the same manner proceeded the 11. objection of the Galls; Quod per potentiam Deus homines ad peccata compellit, God by his power compels men to sin. And as touching the notion of predestination it is true the Ancients used that only in reference to those things which were wrought by God. Nihil ergo talium (to wit of wicked actions) negotiorum Deus predestinavit ut fieret. Predestination being only Enchirid: c. 95. of such things, which come to pass by Gods working of them. Yet the same Austin professeth that such things which come to pass by God's permission (of which kind are all manner of sins) even those came to pass God willing them, though not by Gods predestinating of them. And as touching Senacherib who was slain by his own sons; the Lord professeth saying, I will cause him to fall by the sword in his own land. And upon Esa: 37. 7. Amos. 7. 16. Amaziah the Priest of Bethel the judgement was pronounced from the Lord, Thy wife shall be an harlot And whatsoever comes to pass it is Gods will it should come to pass, saith Austin, how much more that which comes to pass in the way of judgement. 2 I come to his second reason to examine whether he carrieth himself any thing more handsomely in that. If God be the Author of sin he cannot be the punisher of sin. This argument is better shaped then the former; but forthwith he tells us that he cannot be in justice the punisher of that whereof himself is the Author. Wherein are two particulars neither of which were expressed in his argument, the one is the application of it to the same sin whereof he was the Author, which was not expressed in the Argument. And without this application the Argument is of no force. For earthly Magistrates are sinners, yet the punishers of sin in others, yea of the same kind of sin. As though a Magistrate be a profaner of the name of God, yet he may execute the law on them who do profane the name of God, and that justly. Then what is it that makes a man the Author of sin? It is well known, that though it be unlawful for a man to permit sin, if it be in his power to hinder it, yet unless God permit sin, it cannot be committed by any, Nos certe, saith Austin, sieos in quos nobis potestas est ante oculos nostros perpetrare Scelera permittamus, rei cum ipsis erimus. Quam vero innumerabilia ille permitit fieri ante oculos suos, quae utique si voluisset nullâ ratione permitteret. Certainly if we suffer those, over whom we have power, to commit sin, we shall be guilty together with them. But how innumerable are the sins which he suffers to be committed before his eyes, which if he would, he could hinder, so that by no means they should come to pass. Or is he the Author of sin who is the efficient cause of the act of sin? It is Aquinas his doctrine, that, the act of sin is from God, and that in the kind of an efficient cause; and it is commonly received to be the first cause in the kind of efficients, subordinate to none, and all other subordinate to him. Nay more than this Scotus professeth, and after him the Dominicans, that, God determineth the will to every act thereof (though sinful) as touching the substance thereof, but how? Surely no otherwise then to come to pass agreeably to their nature; necessary acts necessarily, free acts freely. So Barwardine maintains that God necessitates the will of the creatue; but how? To perform acts thereof freely. Suppose they did maintain that God in his omnipotency did impose a necessity upon our wills, as Suarez imputes to our Divines that they so teach. Yet in this case Suarez the Jesuit will justify them, that therein they deliver nothing that either doth include contradiction, or De auxil. l. 1. c. 2. num. 7. that doth exceed God's omnipotency. Neither did I ever meet any colour of reason, why God might not as wholly determine the will to any free act thereof, as concur with the will to the producing of the same act. And that in the concurrence of God and man to the same act, the first cause should be in subordination to the second; or the second cause not in subordination to the first, is against all reason, and obnoxious to manifold contradiction, as I have showed in my Vindiciae. Whereas for God to move a creature to every lib. 2. Digres. 7. act of his congruously to his nature, and so to determine him, is most agreeable to reason, and nothing at all obnoxious to contradiction. And yet notwithstanding I see no sufficient reason to conclude these determinations, as touching things natural, such as is the substance of every natural act, there being a power to perform that in a natural Agent. Of supernatural acts the case is different. It seems to me enough, that God will have this or that evil come to pass by his permission. For when God created the world out of nothing; what transient action of God can be imagined, when there was no matter at all for any such transient action to work upon; God's will was sufficient to have that to exist which before had no being: And why may not the will of God be sufficient for the existence of the motion of each creature after it hath existence? But supposing these determinations of the creatures wills to be necessary, if God will not determine them to good what will follow herence? Surely nothing but evil; unless man can determine himself to that which is good without God. For as for simple concurrence without subordination in working, as I said before, that cannot be affirmed without palpable and gross contradiction, as I have proved in the digression formerly mentioned, proceed we yet farther. I know nothing doth more intimately concern God's secret providence in evil, than the hardening of the creature to disobedience. Now the Scripture which is the very word of God, and the dictates of the Holy Ghost doth plainly and expressly teach, that albeit God commanded Pharaoh to let Israel go, yet withal he hardened his heart that he should not let Israel go for a long time, which refusal of his was wilful and presumptuous disobedience. In like sort as touching obedience and disobedience to the Gospel, the Apostle tells us plainly that, God hath mercy on whom he will, to perform the one, and whom he will he hardeneth, thereby exposing them to the other. And hereupon this objection is made, Why then doth God complain (to wit, of man's disobedience) for who hath resisted his will? And we know what answer the Apostle makes hereunto. O man who art thou that disputest with God? shall the thing form say to him that form it, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power of the clay of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, another unto dishonour? Now will any sober Christian conclude herehence that because, God hardened Pharaoh that he should not let Israel go, therefore he is the Author of sin. The Lord hath bid Shimei to curse David. Consider what Austin writes upon this. Quomodo dixerit Dominus huic homini maledicere David, quis sapiens & intelliget? Non enim jubendo dixit, ubi obedientia laudaretur; sed quod ejus voluntatem proprio vitio suo malam, in hoc peccatum judicio suo justo & occulto inclinarit, ideo dictum est, Dixit ei Dominus. How said the Lord to this man that he should curse David; Who is wise and he shall understand? For he said this not by commanding Shimei so to do, in which case his obedience had been commanded; but in as much as Shimei's will through his own viciousness being evil, the Lord inclined it to this sin by his just and secret judgement. Thus saith he, The Lord useth the hearts of the wicked to the praise and benefit of the good: so he used judas betraying Christ: so he made use of the Jews crucifying Christ. And how great good did he procure therehence to all believers? Who also useth the Devil who is worst of all, yet he makes best use of him to exercise and prove the faith and piety of the godly. So he wrought in the heart of Absalon to refuse the counsel of Achitophel, and make choice of that counsel which was nothing profitable. Who may not well tremble in the contemplation of those Divine judgements, whereby the Lord works in the hearts of wicked men whatsoever he will, yet rendering unto them according to their merits. Then he proceeds to give other instances of Scripture to manifest God's working in the hearts of men, and when he hath done, he concludes in this manner; His & talibus testimoniis divinorum eloquiorum satis, quantum existimo, manifestatur operari Deum in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas eorum voluntates quocunque voluerit sive ad bona pro suâ misericordiâ, sive ad mala pro meritis eorum, judicio utique suo aliquando occulto, semper autem justo. By these and such like testimonies of Divine Scripture, I take it to be sufficiently manifested, that God doth work in the hearts of men, to incline their wills whithersoever he will, either to those things that are good, of his mercy, or to such things that are evil, for their deserts, in the way of judgement, which is sometimes known, sometimes secret, but always just. And all this he shows, to be wrought by God without prejudice to the freedom of their wills. And why should David pray after this manner. Lord incline mine heart to thy testimonies, and not to covetousness; If it were not in God's power to incline the hearts of men to covetousness? Yet I trust no sober Christian will conclude from this prayer of David, that God by executing such a power is the Author of sin. Lastly this argument is drawn from God's justice, so is the third, which is to confound rather than to distinguish the reasons produced by him. We say that God cannot possibly be the Author of sin, the necessity of his nature stands in opposition thereunto. For first sin hath no cause efficient but deficient only, as long ago it hath been delivered by Austin. 2ly, a cause deficient or defective is either in a culpable manner, or in a manner nothing culpable. As for example, that Agent is defective culpably, that either omits the doing of that which he ought to do; or omits to do it after that manner which he ought to do it: now I say it is impossible that the divine nature can be defective either of these ways, and consequently it is impossible that he should be the Author of sin, whereas he saith this is Prosper's argument it is untrue. He saith indeed it is against reason, that God who damns the Devil should will that any man should be a Servant to the Devil: but forthwith he expounds himself. 1. Expounding what that condition is of being the Devil's servants, whereof the objection did proceed. Now the objection was this, That the greatest part of men were created for this, that they should do, not the will of God, but the will of the Devil: Now this objection saith Prosper proceeds from the Pelagians: Qui Adae peccatum transiisse in omnes diffitentur, who deny the sin of Adam to have passed unto all. So that, to do the will not of God, but of the Devil, is to be in the state of natural corruption, and under the power of original sin, whereby they are not God's servants, but the Devils; this is not the condition of God's children in the state of Grace. Now Prosper shows how original sin passeth over all, not by the will of God; and secondly, how it passeth over all by the will of God: Not by the will of God instituente; but by the will of God judicante: His words are these. Haec servitus non est institutio Dei, sed judicium. This slavery of sin which came upon all by Adam's sin is not God's institution but his judgement. As much as to say it came not upon a man by God's first creation, but by his judgement upon him, because of his first trangression; so that if divine judgement be the will of God; it is apparent Prosper is so far from denying that slavery to have come upon all men by the just will of God, as that he expressly acknowledgeth it. It is true as Fulgentius saith, that, God is not the Author of sin, but the revenger of it. And it is as true that it is as just with God to punish sin with sin, as Scripture justifies; as St. Austin observes, and improveth at large divers Scriptures to this purpose, in his fifth Book against julian the Pelagian, and third chap. Tertullian in saying, he is not to be accounted the Author of sin, who is the forbidder, yea the condemner of it, falls directly upon the same ground that Dominicus Soto, with the Divines of Salamancha, and Vasquez the Jesuits, in explicating what that is which makes me to be the Author of a moral action; as namely, by commanding, by counselling it, and persuading it; and indeed condemnation is but consequent to a law forbidding this or that. Now it is apparent that God in this respect ought to be accounted the Author of every good action, but of none that is evil. For he commands only that which is good, and counselleth and persuadeth thereunto, but forbiddeth and dissuadeth every thing that is evil. Of this no notice at all is taken by this Author, neither taketh he any care to show what that is, that maketh any agent justly to be accounted the Author of sin. 3 His third reason is all one with the former as drawn from God's justice and holiness and his being Judge of the world. For it is the property of the Judge to condemn transgressors, whereupon his former Argument insisted, and that also was drawn from God's justice. But I remember well what the Poet coupleth together when he saith, Accessit fervor capiti numerusque lucernis. Honesty retains the Creature from being the Author of sin not his nature, he being peccabilis by nature, but so is not God; It is impossible absolutely for him to be found defective any way in a culpable manner. He may withhold Grace from any man, I speak of Grace preservative from sin. Neither is he unjust herein; for he is bound to none. At length he comes to prove the crimination laid upon his adversaries, as followeth. Sect: 2. But this opinion doth so. For albeit the writers that have defended it (Piscator and a few more of the blunter M. Mason's Addit. p. 25. 26, 27. 28. sort excepted) have never said directly and in terminis, that God is the cause of sin; yet have they delilivered these things; from which it must needs follow by necessary consequence that he is so. For they say. 1. That, as the decree of Reprobation is absolute, so it is inevitable. Those poor souls which lie under it must necessarily be damned. It is saith Marlorate a firm and stable truth, that the man Comment in Jo. c. 15. v. 2. whom God in his eternal counsel hath rejected, though he do all the works of the Saints, cannot possibly be saved. 2. That without sin this decree of Reprobation cannot be justly executed. God, saith Piscator, did Piscat. cont. Shalm. p, 29. Thes. 25. create men for this very purpose, that they might indeed fall; for otherwise he could not have attained those his principal ends. He means the manifestation of his justice in the condemnation of Reprobates; and of his mercy in the salvation of the Elect. Maccovius also saith the same. If sin had not been, the manifestation of justice and mercy (which is as much as to say, as the damnation of Reprobates) had never been. Maceov. dis. 17. pag. 11. 3. That God decreed that Reprobates must avoidable sin, and sin unto death, that his eternal ordinance might be executed, and they damned. We grant saith Zanchy, that Reprobates are held so fast under God's almighty decree, that they cannot but sin and perish; and a little after he saith, We doubt not Zanch. l. 5. the nat. Dei c. 2. de praedest. part. 4. resp. ad post. arg: prope finem. therefore to confess, that there lieth upon Reprobates by the power of their unchangeable reprobation a necessity of sinning, yea of sinning to death without repentance, and consequently of perishing everlastingly. Calvin also saith, that Reprobates obey not the word of God, partly through the wickedness of their own hearts, and partly because they are raised up by the unsearchable judgement of God to illustrate his glory by their damnation. I will end this with that speech of Piscator. Reprobates are precisely appointed to this evil, to be punished everlastingly, and to sin: And therefore to sin that they might be justly punished. Calv. l. 3. Instit. c. 24. Sect: 14. 4. That as he hath immutably decreed that Reprobates shall live and die in sin. So he procures their sins in due time by his Almighty hand, partly by withdrawing from them grace necessary for the avoiding Pisc. resp ad dupl. Vorst. part. 1. p. 220. of sin, and partly by moving and inclining them by his irresistible and secret working on their hearts; to sinful actions. Calvin saith, that men and Devils and Reprobate-men are not only held fast in God's fetters, so as they cannot do what they would, but are also urged and forced by God's bridle ad obsequia praestanda, to do as he would have them: & in the next chapter these are the words, that men have nothing in agitation, Calv. instit. l. 1. c. 17. Sect. 11. that they bring nothing to action, but what God by his secret direction hath ordered, is apparent by many clear testimonies. In that Section following he saith. And surely unless God did work inwardly in the minds of men, it would not be rightly said, that he takes away wisdom from the wise. In these two chapters Ibid. c. 18. Sect: 1. that which he mainly driveth at, is to show that God doth not only behave himself privatively in procuring the sins of men, but doth also put forth powerful and positive acts, in the bringing of them to pass. And in the second book and fourth chapter after he had said, that God may be said to harden men by forsaking them, he putteth in another way by which God hardeneth them, & that he saith cometh a great deal Instit. l. 2. c. 4. Sect: 3. nearer to the propriety of Scripture phrases, namely, by stirring up their wills. God doth not only harden men by levaing them unto themselves, but by appointing their counsels, ordering their deliberations, stirring up their wills, confirming their purposes by the Minister of his anger Satan. And this he proveth by the work of God on Sihon King of the Amorites▪ and then insinuateth the end too, why God thus hardens men in their Deut: 2. 30. wicked courses; which is that he might destroy them. Quia perditum Deus volebat, obstinatio cordis divina fuit ad ruinam preparatio; Because God intends his ruin he prepared him for sin by his induration. The sum of all these propositions is this; God who from all eternity appointed many miserable men to endless and unavoidable torments, decreed, for the bringing about of their intended ruin, that they should without remedy live and die in a state of sin: and what he thus decreed from everlasting, he doth powerfully effect in time, so governing, overruling & working upon the wills of those Reprobates, that they have no liberty or ability at all in the issue, of avoiding their sins, but must of necessity commit them. Thus they teach; and therefore by just consequences they make God the Author of sin; as it will plainly appear by these following considerations. Poets tell us there was a time when Giants on earth set themselves to fight against God Answer. in heaven; & because the place of his habitation was out of their reach, they laid mountain upon mountain hill upon hill, Pelion upon Ossa, that so they might make their approaches unto him, & beseige him in his own fastness: this fable is a monument of the shipwreck of that truth among heathen-men, which the Lord had preserved unto his Church upon record in his holy word. For when after the great Deluge in the days of Noah, men began to be multiplied upon the face of the earth, they consulted how they might fortify themselves against the like inundation for the time to come; and thereupon encouraged themselves saying, Go to let us build us a City and a town, whose top may reach unto the Heaven that we may get us a name, lest we be scattered upon the whole earth. But how didthe Lord deal with these presumptuous adventurers? The Poet's feign that jupiter destroyed them with his thunderbolts; and as for one of them Typheous by name, a proud fellow, he laid him fast enough under the hill Aetna in Sicily, where he breathes out smoke & fire like the great Polan out of a Tobacco-pipe somewhat bigger than a good Caliver. But the Scripture tells us, how that for their saying, Go too, let us build. etc. the Lord answered them with a Come on, let us go down and there confound their language, that every one perceive not one another's speech. This Author herhaps is but a pygmy for bodily presence, yet he may be a Giant for his wit, and found 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to fight against God in a spiritual way in the opposing of his truth. As Gamaliel sometimes advised the high Priest with his counsel to take heed, lest they were found even fighters against God. It is true this Author no doubt persuades himself that he fights for God, in as much as he affects to free him from being the Author of sin. But let not the simple Reader be deluded with shows, but seriously consider whither all this do, which he makes about the point of Reprobation doth not clearly tend to the overthrowing of God's free grace in election: which is so much the more foul, because he doth it underhand; as conscious to himself of his own impotency to impugn it openly, or fearing the general opposition of our Church against him, & therefore he practiseth to undermine it. And this I have found to be his course divers years ago in his private undertake to draw proselytes unto him, namely to decline the point of grace, & of election, to deal only upon Reprobation▪ and there to put his concurrent to begin, as if he would have a young Divine to inform a Sexagenarian, as I have seen under his own hand. But see the hand of God upon him in confounding his language, as when he stands for Reprobation evitable & avoidable, & reproacheth his adversaries for maintaining Reprobation inevitable & unavoidable. This is the phrase of his School. For I do not remember to have met with it any where, but in him, & his disciples: Now what man of common sense doth not observe this phrase to be appliable only to things that are to come; but of a contingent nature; so that they may be avoided & declined; but by no means apply able to things already done, & that more than many thousand years ago. For what sober man could hear with patience another discourse of the avoidable nature of Noah's flood now in these days, & to maintain that it is at this day avoidable: what fustian like to this? Might he not as well take liberty to discourse of the Equinoctial pasticrust? It was wont to be said, that this alone God himself could not perform; namely to cause that which is done to be not done. As Aristotle in his Eth relates a saying of one Agatho to that purpose. Now reprobation is confessed by all to be of the same age with election; & election was as the Apostle tells us, performed by God before the foundation of the world And is not this Author then besides himself, when he pleads for evitable & avoidable Reprobation. But albeit this Author makes the worst of our opinions and expressions, yet I will not requite him by making the worst of his, that were base & inglorious, and to be overcome. I will therefore hearken to the Apostles counsel where he saith, Be not overcome with evil, but overcome evil with good. I will make the best of his, and according to the distinction of God's will used in Schools; as it is taken either quoad actum volentis, or quoad res volitas, as touching the act of him that willeth, or the things willed. So I will imagine that he speaks of Reprobation, which is the will of God, not as touching the act of God Reprobating & making such a decree, but as touching the thing decreed, & this thing decreed he will have to be of an avoidable nature. Now this we willingly grant, & utterly deny, that this any way hinders the absoluteness of God's decree. We say with the 11 article of the Church of Ireland, that God from all eternity did by his unchangeable council ordain whatsoever should in time come to pass, yet so as hereby neither the contingency nor liberty of the second causes is taken away, but established rather. So that whereas we see some things come to pass necessarily, some contingently; so God hath ordained that all things shall come to pass that do come to pass; but necessary things necessarily, contingent things contingently, that is, avoidably & with a possibility of not coming to pass. For every University Scholar knows this to be the notion of contingency, yet will not I content myself with the article of Ireland, for this Aquinas thus distinguisheth. For 1. p. quaest. 19 art. 8. having proposed this question, Whether the will of God doth impose a necessity upon the things willed. To this question this Author with whom I deal would answer affirmatively, saying, it doth impose a necessity on all such things, or at least obtrude such an opinion upon us; & himself undoubtedly thinks that in case Gods will be absolute it must cause a necessity upon all things willed thereby, both which are utterly untrue, & this last utterly denied by Aquinas. For first, every will of God is absolute in the judgement of Aquinas, which I prove thus; That will which hath no cause or reason thereof is absolute: This proposition I presume this Author will not deny: But the will of God hath no cause in the judgement of Aquinas therefore every will of God is absolute by his doctrine: Yet this absolute will of God imposeth not a necessity upon all things willed by him, but only on some things. 1. p. 19 art. 5. & quaest. 23. art. 5. Corp. Divina volunt as non omnibus sed quibusdam necessitatem imponit. And in the body of that question thus he writes, The distinction of things necessary and contingent proceeds from the Aquin. 1. p q. 19 art. 8. concls. distinction of God's will. For when a cause is effectual and powerful to work, the effect followeth the cause, not only so far as to be brought to pass, but also as touching the manner of its coming to pass. Therefore seeing the will of God is most effectual, it not only followeth that those things come to pass, which God will have come to pass, but that they come to pass after the same manner also, after which he will have them come to pass. Now God will have some things come to pass necessarily and some things contingently, that there may be an order in things for the perfection of the world. And therefore for the producing of some effects he hath fitted causes necessary, which cannot fail, by which effects are brought forth necessarily: And for the producing of other effects, he hath fitted causes contingent, such as may fail in working, from which effects are brought to pass contingently. So that upon suspicion that God doth will a thing, that thing shall certainly and infallibly come to pass; but how? Not always necessarily or contingently. And that certain and infallible eveniency of things is called also necessity in the Schools; but not necessity simply, but only upon suspicion, which may well consist with absolute contingency. But to make the point yet more clear; Let us distinctly consider the things decreed; For they that have an evil cause delight in confusion, and fear nothing more than the light of distinction. Now the things decreed by Reprobation are either denial of Grace, which is joined with the permission of sin: Or damnation for sin, according to that on Aquinas, Reprobation includes 1. p. q. 23. art. 3. in corp. Includ it voluntatem permittendi aliquen cadere in culpam & inferendi damnationis poenam pro culpam. the will of permitting sin, & inflicting damnation for sin. Now both the permission of sin, and damnation of God's part are his free acts; and therefore come to pass freely. But upon supposition that God will deny a man Grace, it is impossible that such a man should have grace. Secondly, secluding grace, there is no actual transgression for which a man is damned, but may be avoided; man having power for that naturally; though naturally he have no power to perform every good act. The reason is because amongst good acts some are supernatural, as the acts of the three Theological virtues, Faith, Hope, and Charity: But no sinful act is supernatural, all such are natural. Now it is confessed on all hands that, notwithstanding man's corruption by reason of original sin, yet he hath still power and free will to perform any natural act, and accordingly he hath free power to abstain from it. So that judas had free will to abstain from betraying his Master; After he had betrayed him, he had free power to abstain from destroying himself; so that as these sins of his for which he was damned were avoidable by him, in like manner his damnation for these sins was avoidable. And albeit God had determined that judas by Divine permission should betray his Master, and destroy himself, according to to that of Austin, judas electus est ad prodendum sanguinem Domini; judas was ordained to betray his master. And that of the Apostles jointly. Of a truth against thy holy Son jesus both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and people of Israel were gathered to do what thy hand, and thy counsel had before determined to be done. Acts: 4. 28. Yet herehence it follows only, that it was necessary (to wit, upon this supposition, namely, of the Divine ordinance.) that these things should come to pass, namely, both Act. 4. 28. judas his betraying of Christ, and Herod's mocking of him, and pilate's condemning him, and the people's crying out away with him, together with their preferring of Barrabas a murderer before him, and the Soldier's crucifying him. But how came it to pass? Not necessarily, but contingently, that is in this Authors phrase evitably and avoidably, inas much as it was joined with an absolute possibility to come to pass otherwise; Nor with a possibility only but with a free power in the agents to have forborn all these contumelious carriages of theirs towards the son of God. For both judas had free will to abstain from betraying him, and Herod with his Herodians could have abstained from their contumelious handling of him, and Pilate from condemning him, and the Priests and people from conspiring against him; and the Soldiers from crucifying him, only they had no power to abstain from all or any of these vile actions in an holy manner, as no man else hath power to abstain from any evil in a gracious manner, without grace: Yea without the Grace of regeneration which alone plants in us both faith in God, and a love of God to the very contempt of ourselves, and no performance of any good or abstinence from any evil, is acceptable with God unto eternal life, unless it proceed from this faith and this love. That which is here produced out of Marlorate is a strange speech, and such as I never read or heard from any before: and such, as whereof I can give no tolerable construction. And is it fit that every extravagant passage that is found in any Writer of ours should be brought forth to charge our doctrine with? It were a fitter speech for a Papist who maintaining the absoluteness of Reprobation, doth withal maintain an apostasy from grace, which we do not, If Marlorate had any such opinion he sings therein to himself, & to his own Muses What Divine of ours maintains that God hath decreed to damn any man otherways then by way of punishment for sin continued in unto death without repentance? Had he spoken of Good works moral only, it is true any hypocrite is capable of them; and none taste deeper of Damnation than hypocrites. But as for the work of true faith & true repentance; it is the general profession of our Divines, that as faith and the spirit of repentance once given, never fail, so they shall infallibly bring a man unto everlasting life, and free him from condemnation. But any thing serves this Author's turn to vent his stomach: And I am persuaded, there is not one more of all our Divines that he can show to concur with Marlorat in this. And if there were is it fit their improvident & inconsiderate expressions should be cast in their teeth that avouch them not, but rather conceive them to be void of all sobriety? Brentius apud Marloratum in illud, joh. 15. 2. Omnem palmitem in me non ferentem fructum tollet, etc. Caeterum haec sententia occurrit curiositati carnis quae solet argutè, magis quam reverenter de praedestinatione disserere, & pro suo ingenio colligere nullum à Domino ad vitam aeternam electum posse damnari, etiamsi pessimè vivat. Nullum item à Domino ad ignem aeternum deputatum posse salvari etiamsi optimè vivat; se itaque velle pro suâ libidine vivere. Ut ut enim solicit lahoret, non tamen posse decretum Dei infringere. Respondet hic Christus, Omnem palmitem, etc. qnod dicitur. Quid ad te de occultâ Dei praedestinatione? Hoc tu videris, ut tu in me maneas, & fructum feras, reliquae dispensationi & prudentiae Dei committenda sunt. Nam etiamsi videar is ad aeternam salutem praedestinatus, non tamen fructum feras, abjicieris in ignem tanquam infructuosus palms. He instances in Saul, than whom there was not a better man in Israel. That which is here cited out of Marlorat his Expositio Ecclesiastica, it is set down as in Calvin's Commentary: but no such thing is found in Calvin. And it may be that is the fault of the Printers mistaking. And Marlorat's own exposition succeeds in a few words thus. Quae ideò dicuntur non ut fideles inde ansam arripiant de suâ salute dubitandi sed ut carnalis securitas & ignavia ab hominibus tollatur. And the next sentence whence this question is taken seems to cohere with this, though a great C. as if it were Calvin's comes in between, and it begins thus. Certum est enim dècretum Dei à nemine infirmari posse; quia Deus non est ut homo qui poenitentiam agate, & retractet sententiam semel decretam. Then follows the passage here alleged, and at the heels of it these words: Time igitur, & in solam Domini eligentis manum respice ut salutem per Dominum nostrum jesum Christum assequaris. Undoubtedly Marlorat approves of Brentius his exposition, otherwise he would not have placed it in his Expositio Ecclesiastica. Now Brentius brings in the very saying for which Maldonat is criminated, as the objection of some carnal person. Therefore when Marlorat seems to justify such a saying, it must be in another sense; and that either of good works in show, of which Brentius also observed, that such might have been found in Saul: Or of works in distinction from faith. And accordingly he concludes with exhortation fear: that is not to be secure, how good soever his works are; but to have an eye to God and trust only to him, that so he may obtain salvation through Jesus Christ. Calvin in joh. 15. 6. Arescere dicuntur instar emortua sarmenta quae à Christo resecta; sunt quia sicuti initium vigoris ab ipso est ita & continuus tenor. Non quòd ex electis aliquem contingat unquam execari: sed quia multae hypocritae in speciem ad tempus florent & virent, qui postea in reddendo fructu spem domini frustrantur. They are said to to wither like a branch cut off, such as are cut off from Christ: because like as the beginning of their vigour is from him, so also their continuance. Not that at any time it falleth out that any of God's Elect is cut off, but because many Hypocrites carry a fair show for a time as if they were green and flourishing, who afterwards in rendering fruit make void the Lords Expectation. 2. The decree of Reprobation as touching one part of it, cannot be executed without sin; For it is a decree of inflicting damnation for sin, so that there is no place for damnation, where sin and that as a meritorious cause precedes not. I had thought this Author needed not to run out to Piscator and Maccovius for proof of this; neither Arminius nor the Author is of any other opinion I am confident, then that the decree of damnation cannot be executed on any without the precedency of sin in the party who is to be damned. But there is another part of Reprobation For as Aquinas speaks, it includes the will of permitting sin. Now the execution of this decree, which consists in the permitting of sin, doth not require the precedency of sin. For when God first permitted the Angels to fall, this permission of his did not require any precedency of sin in them; nor the permission of Adam to fall; it cannot be said without manifest contradiction, that it did. For before the first sin there was no sin. Piscator saith that, God created men for this very purpose that they might fall; he saith, hoc consilio, which is as much as to say, with this purpose, not, for this purpose; to wit, to permit them to fall; And God purposing this, purposed that they should fall by his permission. For Arminius confesseth that in case God permits a man to will this or that, Necesse est ut nullo argumentorun genere persuadeatur ad nolendum. It must needs be that no argument shall persuade him to will that, which God permits him to will. And that it is good that evil should come to pass by God's permission, both Austin hath affirmed, & Bellarmine subscribed. And shall it not be lawful for God to will that which is good? Undoubtedly neither justice punishing, nor mercy pardoning, can be manifested without sin, either to be punished, or pardoned, or both: neither is it credible to me that this Author thinks otherwise. And is not the manifestation of God's mercy on some, and his justice on others, the supreme end of God's providence towards mankind, and consequently by the most received rules of Schools first intended, even before the permisson of sin? For if the permission of sin were first intended, then by the same rule of Schools, it should be in the last place executed; that is, God should first manifest his mercy and justice in pardoning some, and punishing others, and afterwards suffer them to sin; such is the learning and judgements of these Divines. And as for the foresight of sin, it is apparent, that it presupposeth God's purpose to permit it; and more than that, it presupposeth the fruition of it. Now it is well known, that sin in its own nature is merely possible. How comes it to pass, that from the condition of a thing merely possible, it hath passed into the condition of a thing future? This cannot be done without a cause; and that cause must be eternal; for the effect was eternal. For from everlasting sin was future; for from everlasting God knew it to be future. Now there is nothing everlasting, but God himself, therefore he must needs be the cause of this transition whereby a thing merely possible in its own nature became future. And therefore, either by his knowledge he was the cause thereof, or by his will and decree. Not by his knowledge; for that rather supposeth them to be future, then makes them such. It remains therefore that the will of God, and that alone makes every future thing to pass out of the condition of a thing merely possible, into the condition of a thing future, and that from everlasting. Let this Author satisfy this argument, and I will ease him of all further pains, and lay down the bucklers before him. 3. It is untrue that by our Doctrine Reprobates do avoidable sin. I have already demonstrated the contrary. For as I said, Malum semper habitat in alieno fundo, every actual sin is a natural act; a work of grace may be supernatural as touching the substance of the act, so is not the work of sin, but always natural. Now no Christian that I know affirms that a man in the state of sin is bereft of free will in things natural. Nay we generally confess, he hath free will in things moral, only as touching things spiritual he hath no freedom left therein: therefore as I said before, judas might have naturally forborn to betray his Master; naturally forborn to destroy himself. If some object, the common opinion of Divines is, that in a state of nature there is no liberty for sin. I answer; first out of Aquinas, that this is to be understood of sin in general, Thom: 1. part q. 23. art. 3. ad tertium. not of any in particular: Licet aliquis non possit gratiam adipisci qui reprobatur à Deo, tamen quod in hoc peccatum vel illud labatur ex ejus libero arbitrio contingit. Though a man that is reprobated of God cannot obtain Grace, (for how should he obtain it if God will not give it? will they say that Grace is given according unto works?) yet that he falls into this or that sin, this is a contingent thing, and proceeds from his own free will. So say I every sinful act committed by man in the state of natural corruption, is committed freely in such sort that he might have abstained from it, but I do not say that he could abstain from it in a gracious manner. But whether he doth that which is good, he doth it not in a gracious manner; so that still he sinneth more or less, and all by reason that as yet he hath neither faith in God, nor love of God, which are the fountains of all gracious actions, both in doing that which is good, and in abstaining from that which is evil. As for Zanchi's saying, That God holds Reprobates so fast that they cannot but sin. This act of God is no other than his denying them grace to break of their sins by repentance, and to turn unto God. Now the Apostle professeth that as, God hath mercy on whom he will, so he hardeneth others, even whom he will, in denying this grace unto them. And mark what objection he shapes hereupon, thou wilt say then why doth he yet complain? (to wit of men's disobedience: for of nothing else doth the Lord complain.) For who hath resisted his will? Observe the chains wherewith God holds them fast irresistably, to wit the chains of obduration. Let the Author therefore charge St. Paul as well as Zanchy for making God the Author of sin, and indeed he might have abounded in passages out of holy Scripture alleged to the same end, whereunto he allegeth these out of our Divines; yea and Papists too. But Piscator, Zanchy, and Calvine, these are his proper marks to shoot at, ever since he learned in his age to correct the errors of his youth in taking frivolous exceptions against Bellarmine. As for a necessity of sinning brought upon all by the sin of Adam. Arminius acknowledgeth it, and this Arminius is acknowledged by Corvinus in his answer to Lilenus. Only God takes it away from his Elect at the time of their calling and regenerating, and leaves it upon the rest; and who can say black to the eye for this? Will we not give him liberty to have mercy on whom he will, and harden whom he will? Then let us fly in the face of Paul as well as Calvine & Zanchy for so plainly teaching this. The hardness of men's hearts is the immediate cause why they obey not God's word; But there is another cause also that our Saviour takes notice of, and that is this; That God doth not regenerate them, or hath not elected them. Of this our Divines may well take notice, because Moses before hath done the like. The Israelites profited neither by hearing of God's word, nor by the seeing of his mighty works, I say by none of these did they profit unto repentance; and what was the reason hereof? Surely the hardness of their hearts, as Moses signifies, Thou art a stiffnecked people. Yet he takes notice of another cause and that is this, Yet the Lord hath not given our hearts to perceive, nor eyes Deut. 9 6. to see, nor ears to hear unto this day. So our Saviour in the Gospel; He that is of God heareth God's words, ye therefore hear them not, because ye are not of God Now to be raised up in Deut. 29. 3. 4. Calvin's Phrase, to illustrate God's glory in their damnation, is no other than to be brought forth into the world, and not to be borne of God, that is, to have the grace of regeneration denied them, and consequently to be suffered to go on in their sins; and lastly to be damned for their sin, to the manifestation of the glory of God's justice. Solomon saith as much, The Lord made all things for himself, that is for the manifestation of his glory, even the wicked against the day of evil. And St. Paul Rome 9 by showing mercy towards some, signifies how God forms some after one manner, by hardening others Prov. 16. 4. he form's them after another manner comparing the 18. v. with the 20. And in the 21. He justifies God in this, and that in reference to different ends, which are the manifestation of his glory different ways, saying, Hath not God power over the clay of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour. And verse 22. What if God to show his wrath and to make his power known, suffered with long patience the vessels of his wrath prepared to destruction. v. 23. And that he might declare the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy which he hath prepared unto glory? What one of our Divines expresseth himself in this argument more fully, or more liably to carnal exceptions following the judgement of flesh and blood, then St. Paul doth in this? Here by the way as touching Piscator, I must fetch after mine answer in his behalf, to that which in the entrance to this Section was delivered of him, and overseen by me. For this Author confessing that our writers have never said directly in terminis, that God is the cause of sin, which introduction of his is the very same which Bellarmine useth, opposing our Divines on this very argument, lib. 2. Deamissione gratiae & statu peccati. cap. 4. Afterwards by a parenthesis brings in an exception of Piscator, and some other of the blunter sort, without naming one of them. And though he name Piscator yet he quotes no place; for if he had, he should withal direct his Reader to the grounds whereupon Piscator affirms this, namely that, God is the cause of man's fidelity. And it is the very place formerly mentioned in these words. He that is of God heareth God's words, ye therefore hear them not because ye are not of God now what reasonable man can deny, but that it is a sin not to hear God's words; then doth not our Saviour plainly profess, that the true cause hereof is, because they are not of God? Now if to be of God in this place doth signify God's Election, than the cause of their sins hereby is made God's not electing of them. But if this phrase, To be of God, signify God's regenerating of them, as I think it doth, than God's not regenerating of them is made the cause of this their disobedience in not hearing God's word's: and indeed the evil of sin hath no efficient cause but deficient only, as Austin hath delivered long ago. And God is not bound to any, either to elect him, or regenerate him; so that in failing to regenerate man, he doth not deficere, or fail in any culpable man ner: now let every indifferent Reader judge, whether here be not, Dignus vindice nodus a knot worthy to be loosed; & it will require some worth of learning in him that solves it. And is it decent for this Author to censure a man for a conclusion made by him out of the word of God, without showing the faultiness either of his interpretation thereof, or of his consequence framed therehence? So that this Author's wit & cunning is more to be commended in not specifying the place where Piscator delivers this doctrine, then either his learning or his honesty. He was loath to raise spirits, & afterwards to prove unable to lay them. Therefore thus I answer in behalf of Piscator; though God her by me made the cause why some hear not God's words, to wit, in as much as he doth not regenerate them, nor give the eyes to see, nor ears to hear, & an heart to perceive according to that of Moses. Yet he doth not make God any culpable cause, neither indeed is he any culpable cause, while he fails Deut: 29. 4. to perform so gracious a work towards them: the reason whereof is this. He and he alone is a culpable cause, who fails in doing that which he ought to do: ut God all be it he doth not regenerate a man, yet he fails not of doing that which he ought to do. For it is no duty of his to regenerate any man; for he is bound to none. Now to be the Author of sin is not only to be the cause thereof, but to be a culpable cause thereof. Undoubtedly God could preserve any man from sin if it pleased him, and if he doth not, he is nothing faulty. Secondly I answer that in true account, God is only the cause, why our natural infidelity is not healed, our corruption not cured. Like as a Physician may be said to be the cause why such a man continues sick in as much as he could cure him, but will not: So God could cure the infidelity of all, but will not. Only here is the difference, the Physician may be a culpable cause, as who is bound to love his neighbour as himself; but God being bound to none, is no culpable cause of man's continuance in sin, and in the hardness of his heart, albeit he can cure him, but will not. As for Piscator's saying here mentioned, Reprobates are appointed precisely to this double evil, to be punished everlastingly, and to sin; and therefore to sin that they may be justly punished. Hereing are two things charged upon Piscator. 1. That Reprobates are precisely appointed by God to perish everlastingly. To this I answer that no Arminian that I know denies Reprobates to be appoinby God to everlasting damnation. All the question is about the manner of appointing them; namely whether this appointment of God, proceeds merely according to his mere pleasure, or upon the foresight of sin. We say it proceeds merely according to the good pleasure of God, and not upon the foresight of sin preceding. And this we not only say, but prove thus. If reprobation proceed upon the foresight of sin, than it were of men's evil works. Now look upon what grounds the Apostle proves, that election is not of; good works, upon the same ground it is evident that reprobation is not of evil works: for the argument for the one is this. Before jacob & Esau were borne or had done good or evil; it was said to Rebekah the elder shall serve the younger, therefore election is not of good works. In like manner thus I reason concerning Reprobation, Before jacob and Esau were borne or had done good or evil it was said to Rebekah, the elder shall serve the younger, therefore reprobation is not of evil works. 2. If God doth ordain any man to damnation upon foresight of sin, than this sin foreseen is the cause of the Divine ordinance; but sin foreseen cannot be the cause why God ordained man to damnation; as I prove thus. If it be the cause then either by the necessity of nature; or by the ordinance of God; not by necessity of nature. For undoubtedly God if it pleased him could ordain to annihilate them for their sins, instead of punishing them with eternal fire. Nor can it be the cause of any such decree by the free ordinance of God. For if it were, mark what intolerable absurdityes would follow, namely this, That God did ordain that upon the foresight of sin he would ordain men unto damnation; whereby God's eternal ordination is made the object of God's ordination; whereas all know that the Objects of God's decrees (which are all one with his ordinations) are things temporal, not things eternal. 3. If the foresight of sin goes before the decree of damnation, than the decree of permitting sin goes before the decree of damning for sin; that is the permission of sin was first in intention, and consequently it ought to be last in execution; that is, First man should be damned for sin, and not till afterwards permitted to sin. The second thing charged upon Piscator is this, that, Reprobates are precisely appointed to sin. Now here the crimination grates not upon the manner of being appointed thereunto; otherwise a way could be opened for a progress in infinitum. Now why should it be any more a fault in Piscator to say of some that they are appointed to sin; then in Peter to say of some that they are appointed to disobedience: or in all the Apostles to profess that all the outrages committed by Herod and Pilate, by the Gentiles and people of Israel were such as God's hand & his counsel had before determined to be done? or why doth Piscator make God to be the Author of sin in this, more than Peter and all the Apostles? And considering this man's unconscionable carriage in this, let the Reader take heed how he suffers himself to be gulled by this Author, and drawn to censure such speeches in Piscator, as making God the Author of sin, when hereby he is drawn ere he is aware to pass the like censure on the Apostles? And the holy Ghost himself, whose expressions are the same for substance with the expressions of Piscator. It is farther observable that Piscator saith, That Reprobates by reason of this Divine ordination do sin necessarily. I answer, Piscator was an excellent Scripture Divine, but no School-divine; and therefore no marvel if he want the accurateness of Scholastical expression. Yet I salve him thus. They sin necessarily Eph: 28. upon suspicion that God will have them to sin by his permission; but this is no necessity simply so called, but only secundum quid. But God decrees the manner of things coming to pass, as well as the things themselves; as before I showed out of Aquinas. So that all be it it must needs be, that sin come to pass, in case God hath decreed it shall come to pass; yet if the question be, after what manner it shall come to pass, I answer, not necessarily, but contingently and freely, that is not only with a possibility of not coming to pass, but with a free power in the creature to abstain from that sin which is committed by him. For God ordained that every thing that doth come to pass shall come to pass agreably to the nature thereof, and accordingly moves every creature to work agreeably to their natures. Necessary agents, necessarily, contingent agents contingently. Free agents freely. And as formerly was mentioned, every sinful act is a natural act; and a man hath free power even in the state of corruption either to do, or to leave undone any natural act. And Piscator in other places dealing with Vorstius, clearly professeth as I well remember (though the the place come not to my memory) that wicked men do commit those things freely which are committed by them. And it is an excellent saying of Austin, that, Libertas sine gratiâ non est libertas sed contumacia, Liberty without grace, is not liberty but wilfulness; & indeed they show too much will therein, rather than too little: and in denying liberty to them that want grace, he speaks of liberty moral, which is only unto true good, not of liberty natural, which hath place only in the choice of means, and is inseparable from the nature of man: But true morality sets a man's soul in a right condition towards his right end. 4. It may be this Author could not be so inconsiderate as not to perceive that even those expressions concerning God's decree, which he criminates in our Divines are Scripture expressions; therefore to help his cause here he imputes unto them, that they maintain that God decreed this immutably; as if himself could be content to grant that these things are decreed by God, but not immutably. And would this Author have the will of God to be of a mutable condition, like unto ours? I am confident he dares not profess so much; for albeit he licks his lips at a conditional decree, yet how doth he conceive this to be mutable? For to resolve to save men upon condition of faith, and repentance, and perseverance; and damn others in case they continue in infidelity and impenitency; if accordingly none be saved but such in whom faith and repentance, and final perseverance therein is found, none damned but such as persevere in sin unto death; what change is there in all this? Unless this be it, that God did not resolve to save any particular person until his final perseverance was accomplished; And so God may be said in process of time, to change from not willing to willing one man's salvation, and another man's damnation: In which case God's decree also should not be eternal, but begin in time. Again as touching that which follows of of God decreeing that Reprobates shall live and die in sin. I answer, to decree not to regenerate Reprobates, is to decree that Reprobates shall not be regenerated, for they are not able to regenerate themselves; and to decree that they shall not be regenerated, is to decree that they shall live and die in sin, by God's permission, he resolving never to show such mercies to take them of from their sinful courses by repentance. And so long as they are not borne of God, they will not hear his words, as our Saviour testifies saying, Ye therefore hear them not, because ye are not of God. As for sin procured by the hand of God, which he obtrudes upon our Divines; not one passage doth he produce for that. Yet as I remember I have read such an harsh expression in Piscator dealing against Io. 8. Vorstius, which at this time doth not come to my remembrance; but withal I remember that Piscator being charged therewith by Vorstius, forthwith represents certain passages of Scripture concerning Gods' providence in evil, and appeals to the judgement of every sober Christian, whether to do that, which therein is attributed to God, be not to procure sin. It is apparent that Joseph acknowledgeth, that the Lord sent him into Egypt, yet was this brought to pass by the parricidial hands of his brethren. And it is no less plain that God hardened Pharaohs heart that he should not let Israel go And by Arminius his Definition of effectual grace, it is evident that by Gods denying it, sin doth follow infallibly. And so likewise upon God's permission of willing this or that, he professeth that it must needs be, that by no kind of argument shall such a one be persuaded to nill it. I come to the means whereby he is said to procure it. The first is, by withdrawing grace necessary for the avoiding of sin. Now of this he gives no instance out of any of our Divines. 2 I know no grace which this Author accounts necessary, that any of our Divines teach to be withdrawn by God. 3 God indeed doth not determine their wills to that which is good; but this Author doth not account any such determination necessary to the avoiding of sin. 4 Prohibition, denunciation of judgement, dehortation and such gracious actions, God doth neither withdraw, nor withhold from the wicked, who are partakers of this grace as well as God's children, as often as they meet in the same congregation for the hearing of Sermons. 5. An effectual restraint from sin, I know none but the fear of God; yet this he withdraws not from the wicked; for they never had it; nor from the children of God; only he doth not stirrre it in them at all times, so often as he suffers them to sin, which yet may be to gracious ends. As I for the confirmation of their faith, that nothing, no not sin shall separate them from the love of God; when they shall find the goodness of God minding them of their errors, and bringing them to repentance. 2 As also to make them smart for their former security and wantonness in beholding the uncomfortable issue of it. 3 To provoke them to walk more carefully and circumspectly for the time to come, standing upon their guard, and keeping the watch of the Lord. 4. To cure their pride, according to that of Austin. Audeo dicere, Utile est superbis in aliquod apertum manifestumque cadere peccatum. I am bold to speak it, It is good for a proud man to to fall into some open and manifest sin. I come to the second stay, whereby he objects to our Divines that they maintain that God procures the sins of men, and that is by his moving and inclining them by his irresistible and secret workings on their hearts, to sinful actions. To which I answer first that not any of the passages alleged by him out of Calvin (who alone makes totam paginam in this of his) makes mention of God's irresistible working; or of moving or inclining unto sinful actions. And let every sober man judge whether a bridle is fit to urge men to action, and not rather to restrain from action, and this is the force of the first Quotation. But this Author through heat corrupting his imagination took a bridle for a spur. His second testifies only this, that man doth nothing but what God decreed, and by his direction appointeth; and this also upon pregnant testimonies of scripture; never undertaking to show calvin's interpretation to be false, or his accommodation of them to be incongruous. In the third he grants that God works in the mind of men. In the 4. he saith that God stirs up the wills, and confirms the purposes of wicked men for the execution of his judgement by Satan the minister of his wrath. Where consider he doth this by Satan, that is he gives them over to Satan for this; so that 'tis Satan that stirs up their wills and confirms their endeavours, by God's permission without restraint either immediate or mediate by the ministry of his good angels; and all this is but to execute God's judgements. And that it is just with God to punish sin with sin, both scripture testifies in divers places, and Austin confirms with variety of Scripture testimonies, in his lib. 5. contra Julian: Pelag: cap. 3. The last is that God's work it is to harden man's heart, and thereby prepare him to destruction? And let every sober reader that is not willing to be cheated both of his faith and honesty all at once, examine these places in Calvin, and the Scriptures whereby he proves that which he affirms; and let him but ask the Author these questions. If Calvin delivers nothing in all this but what he proves out of Scripture, why is he found fault with more than the word of God. If Scripture be misalleadged and misunderstood by him, why do not you confute him? 2 Though Calvin in all this makes no mention of Gods inclining wicked men to sinful actions; yet Austin doth as before I have showed, and that by, variety of Scripture testimonies. And if this be to make God the Author of sin, why hath he not so much ingenuity as to confess at least in the close of all, that Calvin makes God the Author of sin, no more than Austin doth; and neither of them more than the word of God doth, and therewithal renounce the Scriptures and turn Atheist. 3 As the Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh to his destruction, so did he the heart of Sihon also Nowsee what Cardinal Caietan writes upon thisvery place. Utramque homines partem (spiritum & cor, hoc est superiorem & inferiorem) male dispositam Deut: 2. 30. à Deo intellige negatiuè penes dona gratuita; positiuè autem quoad judicium, inclinationem & prosecutionem bòni sensibilis. Ita quod Deus spiritum Regis durum (hoc est non cedentem petionibus) reddit, & non dando ei gratiam acquiescendi, & coo operando eidem, ad affectum securitatis & boni proprii, & similiter roboravit cor ad affectum boni, victoriae, & hujusmodi. Each part of King Sihon, his spirit and heart, that is the upper and lower part being ill disposed by God (understand this negatively) as touching gifts of grace; but positively as touching his judgement, affection, and prosecution of a sensible good. So that the Lord made the King's heart hard; that is not to yield to the request made, both by not giving grace to rest satisfied, and by cooperating with him, to the affecting of security and his own good. And in like manner he hardened his heart to the affecting of victory, and the like. I have not heard that this my opposite hath been ever ready to censure Caietan for making God the Author of all this; yet no passage I am persuaded throughout all Calvin's works can be found comparable unto this. Yet was Caietan Noah Jesuit, he need not spare his censures. I come to the sum of that which he hath delivered in a whole leaf. The first whereof is this, that we teach, That God appointed many miserable men from all eternity to unavoidable torments Now that God appointed many from eternity to everlasting torments, this Author acknowledgeth as well as we. As for the avoidable condition of them, it is confessed on both sides, that they are avoidable only by breaking off their sins by repentance before their death; and by this we acknowledge them to be avoidable of all and every one, as well as they. But we say God doth not grant this grace to all. For he is not bound to give it to all, Noah nor to any; but he vouchsafeth this grace to whom he will, and he denieth it to whom he will, and this St. Paul hath taught us, where he saith, God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. The second is, that we teach, that God to bring about their intended ruin, decreed that they should without remedy live & die in a state of sin. To this I answer, that it is a most absurd conceit, to make the tormenting of any man God's end. We have learned of King Solomon that, God made all things for himself; here is the end of his actions, the manifestation of his own glory And albeit, he made the very wicked also against the day of evil; yet the end thereof was, for himself, as formerly specified, that is for the manifestation of his just wrath, and that God hath power without any difference in the matter, to make some vessels of wrath, and some of mercy, as he thinks good. The Apostle plainly teacheth us, where he saith, Hath not the Potter power over the clay of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto Rome 9 21. dishonour. And if any man's wicked proud heart make insurrection against this truth, the Apostle hath taught us to stop his mouth with this, shall the the thing form say to him that form it why hast thou made me thus? Shall not God have as much power over the mass of mankind, as the Potter hath over the clay? So that this is God's end not man's damnation, but his own glory. Haec loquendiratio saith Calvin, this manner of speech, finem creationis esse interitum aeternum, the end of man's creation is his everlasting destruction, nusquam Cal: opuse: 735. apud me occurret, shall never be found in my writing. So Beza in his questions and answers, I say God hath ordained not judicio, for judgement, but, judicio, for just judgement, that is to manifest his justice upon them. Secondly, we deny that God suffers them to persevere in their sinful courses without giving them grace to repent, to the end that he may damn them; But with Alvarez every way standing as much for absolute Reprobation as Calvin; that God suffers them to sin, and to persevere therein, and damns them for their sin, to this end, namely, for the manifestation of the glory of his justice. And as for this Author's opinion in premising the foresight of sin to the decree of damnation, I have already represented the manifest absurdity thereof, as namely in this, that seeing God cannot foresee sin, unless he first decree to permit it, it follows that by his opinion, the decree to permit sin must preceded the decree of damnation, that is sin is first in intention, and then damnation. Whence it follows that if sin be first in intention, it must be last in execution; and consequently men shall be first damned for their sin, and after that suffered to commit sin; this is the glorious issue of the premises of this Author. His third and last is, that by our doctrine, God for the effecting of all this powerfully doth so govern and work upon the wills of Reprobates, that they have no liberty or ability at all in the issue of avoiding their sins, but must of necessity commit them To this I answer, that no other power is requisite for the effecting of all this; then 1. To suffer all men to fall in Adam, 2. To bring forth all men in original sin, which alone deserves damnation as Mr. Hoord confesseth, and as this Author sometimes read in his Lectures at Magdelen Hall. 3. Not to regenerate Reprobates, but to suffer them finally to persevere in their ungodly courses, without giving them grace to break off their sins by repentance. 2. Yet we deny, that all power and ability is taken from Reprobates to avoid actual sins: We grant willingly, neither Elect, nor Reprobate, have any power to avoid sin original, all of them being conceived and brought forth into the world in the corrupt mass. But as for actual sin, not only regenerate have power to avoid that, and that in a gracious manner; but every Reprobate hath power to avoid that in a natural manner. My reason is because though a good work may be an act supernatural; yet a sinful work cannot be so, but every actual sin is an act natural for the ground and substance of it But every natural & carnal man hath power freely, either to do any act natural or to abstain from doing it, though when they abstain from doing it, as from committing murder, adultery, theft, slander, or the like, they never abstain from it in a gracious manner: Like as any moral good work, they have liberty to do, but they cannot do it in a gracious manner. This proceeds merely from the Spirit of regeneration; which Spirit of regeneration the Lord never bestows upon any Reprobate. Sect: 3. Thus they teach, and therefore by just consequence they make God the Author of sin; as it will plainly M. Mason's Addit. p. 28. 29. appear by these following considerations. 1. It is ordinary to impute sin to those who have not so great an hand in the production of it, as hath the Almighty, by the grounds of this opinion. For first, the Devil is called the Father of lies, and by the like reason of all other sins. And therefore he that committeth sin, is said to be of the Devil, and to be the child of the Devil. And sin is called the the work of the, Devil, which the Son of God appeared to lose. And why is the Devil so called, but because he doth egg and Jo: 8. 4. 4. 1 Io: 3. 8. 10. v. 8. allure men by inward suggestions and outward temptations to fall into sin? This is all he doth or can do. But God doth much more, if he necessitate, and by his decree first; and next by his powerful and secret working in the souls of men, determine their wills irresistibly to sinen. For to determine is infinitely more than barely to persuade; for as much as sin must needs follow the determination, but not the persuasion of the will. God is therefore a truer cause of sin, by this doctrine than the Devil. 2. Wicked men are esteemed Authors of their own offences; because they plot, purpose, choose, & commit them, and are immediate Agents in the acting of them. But God by this opinion doth more: for he overruleth the projects & purposes of wicked men, and by an uncontrollable motion proceeding from an immutable decree, carrieth all their deliberations, resolutions, choices, and actions precisely that very way; so as they cannot choose but do as they do, whatsoever they may think to the contrary. They have indeed (potentiam in se liberam) a power in itself free to choose what they refuse, or to refuse what they chose, to determine themselves this way or that way, as liketh them best; but they have not (Liberum usum) a free use of this their power. God doth determine their will before it hath determined itself, and maketh them do those only actions, which his omnipotent will hath determined, and not which their wills out of any absolute dominion over their own actions, have prescribed. More rightly therefore may God be called the Author of those offences. For deeds whether good or bad are owned more truly by him that overruleth them, then by the servile instruments that only execute and do them. 3. Wicked counsellors and they who allure and advise men to sin, are accounted by God and men to be the causes of those sins to which they are the persuaders, and have been punished for those misdeeds which others through their instigations have committed. Jezabell Ahab's wife was reputed and punished as the murderer of Naboth; because she counselled and contrived the doing of it as we may see, 1 Kings 21. 23. 25. But what is counselling to enforcing? Evil counsels may be refused, but an almighty power cannot be resisted. God therefore that useth this (according to their doctrine) in the production of sins, is much more an Author of them, than he that only useth the other. After two leaves spent, first in the charge; and secondly in proving that God is not the Author of sin in a fumbling manner, and thirdly in representing the doctrine of our Divines Answer: at pleasure, now at length he comes to make it plainly appear, that by just consequence they make God the Author of sin, as he saith, will plainly appear by certain considerations following: which in few words come but to this in general, namely, that God doth more than the Devil, or wicked counsellors in alluring and advizing others to sin, more than wicked persons in acting of their own sins. But by this discourse of his, he is as far off as ever from proving that we make God the Author of sin. For consider, either by doing more he understands, that God doth the same which the Devil & wicked men do; & more: or though he does not the same, yet he doth that which is more than that. If his meaning be that God doth the same which the Devil & wicked men do, this is notoriously untrue, considering them as tempters, & advizers, and persuaders unto sin. For God on the contrary forbids sin, persuades to repentance, to obedience both by his word and by his spirit; and indeed the spirit works not, but by the word which is called the sword of the spirit; All holiness of life is comprised within the compass of ten commandments; these were given by the Lord from mount Sinai, pronounced by the sound of a trumpet; to these the Lord calls his people saying, stand in the ways and behold, and ask for the old way, which is the good way and walk therein & ye shall find rest unto your souls. For the transgression of these the Lord expostulates with them, Hear o heavens and hearken o earth, I have nourished and brought up a Ier: 6. 16. people, & they have rebelled against me. When they have gone astray he exhorts the, and that most pathetically to return by repentance, by promise of salvation, and threatening judgement Esa. 1. if they do not repent. O jerusalem wash thine heart from wickedness, that thou mayst be Ier: 4. 14. saved, how long shall thy wicked thoughts remain within thee? I have seen thy adulteries, and thy neighings, the filthiness of thy whoredom on the hills, in the fields, and thine abominations. Woe unto thee o jerusalem, wilt thou not be made clean? When shall it once be? And to provoak Ier: 13. 27. them the rather unto repentance, he represents himself unto them as easy to be entreated, as slow to wrath, and one that by his patience and long suffering leads them to repentance. And to this end he gives charge to his Ministers, namely, by representing the gracious nature of God to admonish them of their sins, to call them to repentance, to obedience. And to this purpose to represent his promises which he hath annexed unto godliness, both the promises of this life, and the promises of a better life that is to come. Yea and his threats also both of judgements in the world to come, to the casting both of body and soul into hell fire; and thereupon to exhort us to fear him above all others. And judgements of this world, as, famine, pestilence, and the sword of the enemy, To deliver them over into the hands of beastly people, skilful to destroy; To send Serpents, and Cockatrices among them that will not be charmed, and that shall sting them; and that without all mercy. Surely these are not the courses of Satan or wicked counsellors. Therefore they do not as God doth, neither doth God do that which they do and more also. 2. If it be said that albeit the Lord doth not as the Devil doth, and wicked men do in persuading them to sin; yet he doth that which is more than this. I answer, that nevertheless he cannot be accounted the Author of sin, in case the doing of this alone doth constitute an Agent the Author of sin. Now as formerly I have showed this was the opinion of Dominicus Soto, and of the Divines of Salamancha: yea and Vasquez the Jesuit professeth, that he was ever of that opinion. Again if to do more than this, be to become the Author of sin; both this Author and all that are of his Spirit do maintain as well we, that God doth that which is far more than this. For I presume he will not deny, but that God is he, and he alone, who doth support our natures in the committing of sin; & who maintains our senses in their vigour and quickness, without which we could take no pleasure in sin, and that concurres to every act of sin, in the way of cause efficient, not morally, which alone makes one to become the Author of sin, by the judgement of Divines formerly mentioned; but physically and naturally, which no creature can do, namely become a natural coefficient cause to the act of another man's will. Nay which is most considerable, I presume this Author hath so much accurateness in School-learning, as not to deny that when the Devil tempts us, or wicked counsellors do tempt us to sin, God concurres with them in this act, and that in the kind of a cause efficient physical. For in him we live and move and have our being; what is Act: 17. 28. it to have our being from him, but that he is the Author of it in the kind of a cause efficient? In the same sense do we live in him, and in the same sense do we move in him. It stands us upon as much to maintain this, as to maintain that God is our Creator. For unless all things do subsist in him neither were all things created by him. Now this is a great deal more then to persuade. For a weak man is able to persuade, but no creature is able to perform these parts which God doth in the act of every thing created by by him. So that hereby the Reader may evidently perceive, that the discourse is as far off as ever, from proving God by this Doctrine of ours to be the Author of sin, any more than he is constituted the Author of sin by the doctrine of this Interpolator. But I am content to examine the things he proposeth particularly and severely. 1. The Devil, saith he, doth only allure men by inward suggestions, and outward temptations to fall into sin: But God doth much more if he do necessitate, and by his decree first; and next by his powerful and secret working in the souls of men, determine their wills irresistibly to sin. For to determine is infinitely more than to persuade. Now to this I have already answered by showing. 1. That albeit God doth more than this, yet seeing he doth not this: if the doing of this alone constitutes one the Author of sin, as many great Divines have concurrently maintained; still God is free from being the Author of sin. This Author barely supposing, not once offering to prove the contrary. 2. Himself confesseth that God concurres to the act of every sin, and that in the kind of a cause efficient natural. And I may be as bold as to say of this, that it is infinitely more than to persuade; like as he saith of God's determining the will and necessitating thereof. Now I proceed to a more particular examination of his discourse. And here first I wonder not a little at this Author's distinction of the devil's inward suggestion from his outward temptations. For I confess freely I know no outward temptation of Satan, distinct from his inward suggestions. Outward occasions and provocations to sin I know none wrought by Satan, any farther than as he in some cases is God's instrument, as in afflicting job. For surely God hath not given over the world, or any part thereof to the government of Satan; this is in his own hand still; and hereby occasions and opportunities are offered from time to time for a man to advantage himself in sinful courses, either in the way of profit, or satisfying his unclean lusts. And Arminius confesseth that the administration of Arguments and occasions, which provoke to such an act, as cannot be committed by the creature without sin, if not by God's intention, yet at Disput. theol. pag. 108. least according to the creatures affection, and often according to the events that arise therehence. This administration, I say Arminius confesseth, doth belong to the Divine providence. And these arguments, he saith, are objected & there to the mind (of man,) or to his senses outward or inward; and that either by the mediate work of the creatures coming between, or by God's immediate action. And that the end of this Divine administration is to make trial whether the creature will abstain from sin, even then, when it is provoked thereunto. As, for the trial of David, was Bathsheba going ●o●th to wash herself objected to David, whereupon he was inflamed with lusts joseph was not, though far more strongly solicited by the temptations of his wanton Mistress. Secondly, to necessitate the will or determine the will are no phrases of our Divines. The first is used only by Bradwardine (as at present I remember) sometimes Archbishop elect of Canterbury; The other is that phrase of the Dominicans. Now they are of age and able to answer for themselves. Why doth not this Author answer a chapter or two in Bradwardine, a chapter or two in Alvarez, where they dispute this and resolve the question affirmatively. Surely hereby he should perform a work more worthy of a Scholastical Divine, then by so hungry a discourse as this. Secondly, consider neither Bradwardine maintains that God necessitates; nor Alvarez that God determines the will to sin, but to every natural act, in which kind of acts sin is to be found: Why then should this Auhour carry himself thus in his crimination? We know sin is merely privative in the formal notion thereof; an obliquity such as concerning which, Austin hath long ago delivered, that it hath no efficient cause, but deficient only. And divers ways Divines have showed how God may be the author of the act, yet not the Author o● the sin, and illustrated it by various similitudes. As of a man riding upon a lame horse, he makes him go, but doth not make him halt. The sun shining upon a dung-mixton, makes it evaporate, but doth not make it stink. The sun makes flowers to evaporate and send forth their favours as well as a dung-mixton; but that the one evaporates a sweet odour the other an unsavoury, is from the nature of things themselves on which the sun beats. In like sort the Sun by the heat thereof provokes all things to engender according to their kinds, even frogs and toads & snakes, as well as other creatures profitable for the use of man in the way of food; yea of viper's flesh good use is made in the way of physic. And God knows how to make good use even of the sins of men. and of the rage and malice of Satan. If an underw-heele being out of his place, the upper wheel in a jack or clock will set him going in a wrong way, as well as all the rest in a right way; his motion is from the upper wheel, his irregular motion from himself. A good Scribe meeting with moist paper will make but sorry work The writing is from himself, the blurring from the moistness of the paper on this very question whether the act of sin be from God, Aquinas maintaining the affirmative, illustrates it by a distinction of the halting motion of a lame leg; the motion, saith he, is from the soul, the 〈◊〉 is from the imperfection of the Organ, the infirmity of the leg. Yet this Author carrieth it hand over head, as if to be the Author of the action, were to be the sin; not considering that himself maintains, that God is the Author of the action, and that in the kind of a cause efficient natural. Thirdly, when Bradwardine maintains that God necessitates the will to every good act thereof, he withal professeth that he necessitates it ad liberum actum suum that is to work every act thereof, freely. So when Alvarerz maintains that God determinates the will to every act thereof, he withal maintains that God determines the will to work free ye and so Aquinas. For when he works upon contingent causes, he moves them to bring forth their effects contingently; like as when he works upon necessary causes, he moves them to produce their effects necessarily. And like as to move contingent causes to produce their effects contingently, is to move them to produce their effects with a possibility to the contrary. So to move free causes, to produce their effects freely, is to move them to produce their effects with an active power to the contrary. But to proceed, whereas he saith, that sin must needs follow the determination; it is as true. 1. In this Author's judgement, that it must needs follow upon God's concurrence to this act. If he say that this concurrence is necessary to every act, I answer, it is necessary to the substance of every act, but not at all required to the sin; though this Author carrieth it blindfold after this manner. Secondly, so say we is determination required to the substance of every act. And God's concourse with the creature is not coordinate, like as one man concurres with another in moving a timber log, which is the expression of the Jesuits, thereby manifesting the vileness of their opinion, as we can demonstrate, and that more ways than one by evident demonstration, as I have already showed in my Vindiciae. Let this Author answer Lib. 2. digres. 7. & 9 those digressions if he can, I am confident he will never answer them while his head is hot; nor all the Rabble of the Arminians. We know God is the first cause, and all other are but second causes in comparison to him. Yet we willingly confess that the providence of God is wonderful and of a mysterious nature in this; but such as whereunto the Scripture gives pregnant testimony, as scarce to any thing more. So jealous he is least his providence should be denied in evil, wherein indeed it is most wonderful; and he takes unto himself the hardening of men's hearts, and blinding of their minds, and prostituting them to abominable courses, even to vile affections and thereby to punish sin with sin, as Rome 1. Therein saith the Apostle, they received the recompense of their error. This hath Austin also by Scripture suggestion testified at large in his book. De gratiâ & Libero arbitrio in two large chap: & likewise in his fifth book against julian the Pelagian & third chap: this also the Adversaries have been driven to confess in a strange manner, as to give instance first in Bellarmine whose words are these. God saith he, praesidet ipsis voluntatibus easque regit & gubernat, torquet & fl●ctit in iis invisibiliter operando, ut licet vitio proprio malae sint, tamen à divina providentia ad unum potius malum quam ad aliud, non positiuè, sed permissive ordinentur. God is precedent over the Wills, and so rules and governs, wrists & turns them, working invisibly in them, that albeit through their own fault they are evil, yet by the divine providence they are ordered to one evil rather then to another, not positively but permissively What one of our Divines hath said more than this comes to, or so much, professing that God rules and governs the wills of men by his invisible operation, ordering them to one evil rather then to another which St. Austin calls inclining them? And the Prophet David we know prays, that God would incline his heart unto his testimonies and not to covetousness, arguing thereby that God hath power to incline a man's heart to covetousness. But Bellarmine saith more than this, in saying that, God wrists and bends them, torquet & flectit; those are his words; although he seems to blast all this in the end by saying that this is done permissiuè, by permission, in flat contradiction to himself, whose express purpose is to show that God doth not only suffer wicked men to perform evil acts, and to desert the godly, but somewhat else also, namely, to rule and govern their w●lls, to wrest and bend them by an invisible working in them, to commit one ev●●● rather than another. Secondly consider their general doctrine of congruous grace, standing in a necessary conformity and correspondency to another vile doctrine of theirs concerning the foreknowledge of God, called by them Scientia media By this doctrine of theirs God foresees in what ease and by what motives man being moved to abstain from this or that sin, he will abstain from it: And again in what case and after what manner being moved to abstain from sin, he will not abstain from it And God makes choice at his pleasure how to move him, whether after such a manner in which case he foresees he will abstain from sin; or after another manner in which case he foresees he will not abstain. Now who is so blind as not to observe, that as often as a man sinneth, it is the will of God, that is the decree of God he shall sin, by the very grounds received by our Adversaries. Thus much as touching my first answer concerning the necessary consequence of sin upon God's operation to be acknowledged by our Adversaries, according to the tenor of their own doctrine, as well as by us. 2. My second answer is this. Albeit God determines the will to any virtuous act, morally good; whether in the way of doing some moral good, or in the way of abstaining from some motall evil; yet unless God give man some faith and love, as fountains out of which every moral work must proceed, that it may be acceptable with God; such an one shall necessarily sin, though not as touching the act done, yet as touching the manner of doing; for as much as without true faith and love he can neither perform any moral good work, nor abstain from any moral evil work in a gracious manner. Now let every sober man judge, whether God be bound to give every man faith and love, without which all is one as touching the preserving a man from sin in general, whether the will of man be determined by God, to an act morally good, or morally evil. In each of which God determines the will only to the substance of the act: So that whether God cooperates to the substance of the act or Noah, and whether this cooperation be by way of determining the will or Noah; still there will be a necessary consequence of sin to every act of man, if God doth not bestow the spirit of regeneration upon him, which spirit of God we know was given to our first parents; though not under this notion of the Spirit of regeneration, and whereof they were justly bereft upon the first sin committed by them; And because all we have been derived from them since their fall, therefore we have received our natures from them deprived of the Spirit of God, and therein continue until such time as it pleaseth God for Christ sake, to restore it unto us, which he doth in regenerating us. Thirdly, and lastly upon the very permission of sin, it follows necessarily that sin shall be, by the doctrine not of Piscator only, but of Vorstius and Arminius also; yea and of the learned amongst the Papists, as Navarettus and Penottus: And the very definition of Permission of sin by Arminians justifies it; as also the Jesuits doctrine concerning gratia congruâ. For if God will not afford that grace, upon the grant whereof men will abstain from sin, as God well knows; but such a grace, upon the grant whereof man will abstain from sin, which also is well known unto God; doth ●t not manifestly follow that such a one shall sin, though not sin necessarily, but contingently and freely. 2. In the next place he tells us that wicked men are esteemed Authors of their offences: Now by the way this is not so; To be a sinner is one thing to be an Author of sin is another thing. And to be an Author of sin is in reference rather to another's sin, then to ones own. And Martinius tells me that, Author est cujus autoritate & sententiâ aliquid fit, cujus testimonio ut aliquid credamus, adducimur. Qui hortatur ut fiat. Itaque authorem & dissuasorem Cicero opponit. He is the author by whose authority and judgement a thing is done, by whose testimony we are induced to believe aught; who exhorts to the doing of aught. And therefore Cicero makes Author and disswader opposite. But to proceed with this Author who set the Printer on work for the edition of this piece. Men, he saith, do plot purpose, choose and commit offences, and are immediate agents in the acting of them. But God by this opinion doth more; for he overuleth the projects and purposes of wicked men, and by an uncontrollable motion, proceeding from an immutable decree, carrieth all their deliberations, resolutions, choices, and actions precisely that very way, so as they cannot choose but do, as they do, whatsoever they may think to the contrary. To which I answer, that it becomes every man to give the Devil his right, & and not make him worse than he is, nor wicked men neither. Now no wicked man doth will or choose sin as sin Nemo vult esse incontinens, saith Aristotle, although they do such things as do sufficiently evidence their incontinent disposition. For the object of the will is only good; neither can any thing be willed by man, but, sub ratione boni, under the show of good: whether this good be in the kind of profit, or in the kind of pleasure, or in the kind of honesty. So Lucretia when she killed herself, she did it for the preservation of the integrity of her mind in the opinion of the world, and that they might know that she consented not unto Tarqvinius; but was forced by him. So then the act is it they do or choose to do for some motive or other, which whether it be pleasure or profit, or credit they get thereby, that makes not the act sinful, but only that it is against some law or other, forbidding it And this act, (all sides confess) is the work of God, as well as the work of man; as in whom we move, like as in him we live, and have our being. And Bradwardine maintains that of every act of the creature God is a more immediate cause then the Act: 17. creature itself, who●e act it is. This he proves of the creatures conservation, of the creatures action, of the creatures motion; & to this he proceeds by certain degrees. And in all l. 1. c. 2. 3. 4. this God doth not transgress any law, as man doth too often in the performing of many a natural act, and only in performing acts natural is sin committed, never in performing any act supernatural; all such acts are in a peculiar manner the work of grace 2. God overruleth no man's good projects or purposes, otherwise then as when accepting their intentions he will not have them put such in execution because perhaps he hath reserved that for another time & person. As when David was purposed to build God an house, & was encouraged therein by Nathan: yet the Lord sent Nathan shortly unto David to give him to understand, that he reserved that work for Solomon his Son; yet so well accepting David's purpose that he promised to build his house. But if God at any time overruleth the wicked projects and purposes of men, whether good or evil, let us bless him rather for this than curse him; by cursing them that maintain this good providence. Yet in overruling them, whether he doth it immediately, or by the ministry of his good Angels; not by working immediately upon the will, as this Author dreameth. For that is not the way to work agreably to the reasonable nature of man (though so he work also by general influence afforded common to all agents) but by representing to the understanding congruous motives to divert them from that they do intend; whether in a gracious manner, as he diverted David from his purpose to massacre the whole house of Nabal; or only in a natural way, whereby he diverts wicked men from their ungodly designs, by representing the danger thereof, to make them fear, & so to restrain them. Will the Devil himself be over prone to blaspheme God for this? yet in this alone he doth more than either the Devil or man can do; though this be not all that he doth. For he doth cooperate to every design and execution of the creature, be it never so abominable; which neither man, nor Angels can do. And he hath power to give over unto Satan, and to harden any man, and that more effectully than any Devil can do. The Devil could not say with truth that He would harden Pharaoh's heart, that he should not let Israel go. Nor when he had let them go, I will harden Pharaoh's heart that he shall follow after them, to bring them back. The Devil could not say in truth, as the Lord did to David, I will take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them to thy neighbour, and he shall lie with thy wives in the sight of the sun. Nor as he said to jeroboam, Behold I will rend the kingdom out of the hands of Solomon, and will give ten tribes to thee. Nay the very permission of sin so as whereby it shall infallibly come to pass, is not in the power of any creature, but in God alone. And shall it follow, that because God doth more, both as touching the act itself, and touching the sinful condition of it, than any creature can do, therefore God is the Author of sin? whereas when God moves a man or carrieth him on to any good moral works, whether in doing that which is virtuous, or abstaining from that which is vicious, this man shall certainly sin, though not in so great a degree, unless God be pleased over and above to regenerate him, and to bestow faith, and love on him, for as much as in this case, though he do an act virtuous, yet shall he not do it in a gracious manner. & though he do abstain from an act vicious yet he shall not abstain from it in a gracious manner. Let this man therefore proceed, & maintain (if he thinks good) that except God doth bestow the spirit of regeneration upon all and every one throughout the world, he is the Author of sin, not only when he moves them to such acts which are evil, but also when he moves them to the doing of such as are virtuous, or to the abstaining from those that are vicious. As for his phrases no wise man will regard them, but only such as are content to feed on husks for want of better food. As, when he talks of motion uncontrollable, which makes a noise, as if men's wills would control his motion, but cannot: whereas God as the first mover moves the creature most congruously unto his nature; without which motion of his the creature could not move at all. The like noises makes the phrase immutable decree; as empty things many times give the greatest sound: whereas by virtue of God's immutable decree it is, that it cannot otherwise be; then that as necessary things cannot but come to pass necessarily; so contingent things cannot but come to pass contingently, and the free actions of men freely. But by the way he manifests how he licks his lips, at a Mutable decree of God, even of that God with whom, as St. james speaketh, there is no variableness, nor shadow of change. He doth acknowledge, we maintain, potentiam in se liberam; but then he saith, we do not maintain, liberum usum; a most absurd distinction. For no power deserves to be styled free, save that it is of free use and exercise. And what a prodigious thing is it to affirm, that it is not within the almighty power of God to cause that this or that shall be done by a reasonable creature freely: this is it that Bradwardine proposeth to the judgement of all to consider, whether it be not an unreasonable thing to deny this unto God. God doth determine their will before it hath determined itself, and maketh them do those only actions, which his omnipotent will hath determined, and not which their wills out of any absolute dominion over their own actions, have prescribed. Thus he relates the opinion of our Divines; whereas neither determining, nor necessitating (as I said before) are the expressions of our Divines, but of Papists; yet he lays not this to the charge of Papist's: No nor to the charge of Bellarmine, for saying that God doth not only rule, and govern, but wrest and bend them, and that to one evil rather then to an other. If Scholars of our Universities use any such phrases, it is no other than they find in use among School-divines. It is true indeed Jesuits oppose the Dominicans in this. This Author sides with the Jesuits, but why doth he not take to task any one chapter in Alvarez on this point to answer, to overthrow their grounds, which are no other than the very word of God, and clear reason doth justify. And the ground of the Jesuits in opposing, is merely an invention of their own, concerning a certain knowledge of God called a middle knowledge; a vile invention, and a palpable untruth, and controulable of manifest contradiction. For they suppose a thing knowable by God, as future, before God's will hath passed upon it to make it future, being in its own nature merely possible; and consequently cannot pass out of the condition of a thing merely possible, into the condition of a thing future without a cause. Now no cause can be devised hereof with any colour of reason, but the will of God. For first, the cause hereof must be eternal, seeing the thing itself, of the cause whereof we dispute, is eternal to wit, the fruition of any thing. This I say was eternal, for it is known with God from all eternity. Now there is no eternal cause to be found, but in God alone, therefore the cause why things merely possible in their own nature, became future, and that from everlasting, must be found in God alone. Therefore it must either be the will of God; or the knowledge of God that did make it future; and seeing the knowledge of God rather supposeth them to be future, then makes them so; what remains but that the will of God must necessarily be the cause hereof? Nay consider whether the Jesuits themselves do not manifest more ingenuity by far, than this boisterous Theologue, that thinks to carry all with the blast of his words, the resolution of whose arguments generally, neither having the word of God for their ground; nor any confessed principle of reason. Whereas not the greatest, Angel of God will take upon him such an authoritative manner of discourse. For did we grant, that God by his Almighty will did impose any necessity upon our wills. Yet Suarez confesseth that Suarez: de auxil. lib. 1. c. 2. num: 7. so to work, doth neither involve any contradiction, nor exceed the Almighty power of God: Whereas we are ready to prove and have already proved, that their doctrine of God's concourse without subordination of the second causes to the first, implies flat contradiction We say the wills determination of itself is the work of God, otherwise faith and love and every gracious act shall not be the work of God. Again the wills determination of itself, is no other than the wills operation; and this Author that opposeth us dares not deny the wills operation to be the work of God. But what School divine can he produce that delivers himself in so absurd a manner; as to say that God first determines the will, and that afterwards the will determines itself; especially speaking of such actions of the will as are produced by the power of nature? The wills determination of itself, we say, is the work of God moving the creature agreably to the nature thereof; that is to be carried necessarily to that which is its end, and appears to be good in genere convenientis: and freely to the means, which appear to be good, in genere conducentis, as fit to pronounce the end intended. All confessing (Durand excepted) that God works the act; the question whether he works the act absolutely, the will a second agent subordinate unto God, as to its Creator? Or conditionally, modo vellimus, provided that we will it, God the first agent subordinate to the will of the creature? This Author will have it to be wrought by God, that is conditionally, in dependence upon, and expectation of the operation of the creature, which we say is most absurd First because thus the first agent is made subordinate to the second agent, which is most unnatural. Secondly, observe a manifest contradiction. For the question is about, actus volendi, the act of willing, in man. Now if God produce this act upon supposition, that man produceth this act, than the same act is produced by God upon supposition, that it is produced by man. If it be produced by man, what need is there of God's producing it by way of supplement? Thirdly, by this means the thing is made the condition of itself. For hereby it is said, this act is made upon condition that it doth exist; & so the self same thing shall be before & after itself. 4. Thus man's production of the act shall be no work of God, which holds off faith and repentance, as well as of any natural act, in this Authors opinion. Fiftly, It is not possible the will can produce the act unless God produceth it, If then God doth not produce it unless the will doth produce it, in this case there shall be no act produced. For if I go not to London unless you go with me; nor you go to London unless I go with you; here is no going at all till one saith I say I go, and his resolution carrieth the other with him if the others depend thereupon. 6 Whereas to help at a dead lift the Jesuitical doctrine of, Scientia media, middle knowledge, is called in after this manner; God foreseeing that at such an instant the will of man will produce such an act, if God be pleased to concur; and upon this foreknowledge God resolves to concur This doctrine I have already confounded by showing the apparent falsity of this supposition. For seeing the wills producing such an act at such an instant, is a thing merly possible in its own nature, & no more future than not future; It is impossible that this should pass out of the condition of a thing merely possible into the condition of a thing future without a cause: And no cause hereof can be but the will of God, as I have often proved. It follows that the wills producing such an act, depends rather upon the will of God to have it produced, then on the contrary, that Gods producing such an act, depends upon the creatur's will to produce it. As for that which follows of the absolute dominion that the will of the creature should have over its action (I presume he means independent) it sounds more like the voice of the Devil, then of a sober Christian. Yet it is more than I know that Lucifer himself challengeth any such absolute Dominion over his actions unto himself; If he doth, I know no greater sin that he or the creature can be guilty of; unless in case gross ignorance doth excuse it. To deny God to be▪ the first Agent is to deny his Godhead; and if he be, primum agens, he must be primum liberum too, the first free agent. And to make ourselves to be prima libera, the first free agents, what is other then to advance ourselves into the very Throne of God's Sovereignty; and do we not fear lest his wrath smoke us thence. And if all this that he contends for were granted him, that nothing but mere necessity were found in the motion of men's wills; yet Suarez will justify us from speaking contradiction, or delivering aught that exceeds the compass of God's omnipotency. And what if all the world were innocent, yet God should not be unjust in casting the most innocent creature into hell fire; as Medina professeth, and that by the unanimous consent of Divines, and Vasquez the Jesuit acknowledgeth this to be in the power of God as he is Lord of life and death, and in the last chapter of the book, de praedestinatione & gratiâ which goes under Austin's name, there is an express passage to justify it. And albeit that work be not Austin's, yet it is lately justified to be the work of a great follower of Austin's, and as Orthodox as he; namely, the work of Fulgentius as Raynaudus the Jesuit hath lately proved, and justified that passage also; together with that which is usually brought by School-Divines to prove it out of the twelfth Raynaud: in in Vindcationi. chapter of Wisdom, and shows the right reading, as followed by Austin and Gregory. And withal represents a pregnant passage taken out of the fifteenth Homily of Macarius to the same purpose. And out of chrysostom in his 2. De compunctione cordis, about the end thereof. And out of Austin upon Psalm the seventieth, about the beginning. And to these he addeth Ariminensis, Cameracensis, Serarius, and Lorinus, all maintaining the same. And this is evident by consideration of the power, which it pleased the Lord to execute upon his holy Son, and our blessed Saviour, and by the power which he gives us over brute creatures. This I say, if all that he contends for were granted, should rather be concluded therehence, namely, that in this case the creature should be innocent, then that God should be the Author of sin; especially considering that God performs in all this no other thing than belongs unto him of necessity; as without which his moving of the second causes, it were impossible the creature should work at all, which we have made good, by showing the manifest absurdity of their contrary doctrine, who maintain a bare concourse Divine either in subordination unto the agency of the creature, or without subordinating the operation of the creature, to motion Divine. But we do subordinate it, as without which the second cause could not work at all, and by virtue whereof it doth work, and that freely, so far forth as liberty of will is competent to a creature; but not so as to make the creature compeer with his Creator. Let man be a second free Agent, but set our God that made us evermore be the first free Agent; lest otherwise we shall deny him the same power over his creatures, that the Potter hath over the clay of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour and another unto dishonour. This power in my maker, the Lord hath given me eyes to discern as taught us in his holy word, and an heart to submit unto it; and to his providence in governing my will, even in the worst actions that ever were committed by me, without any repining humour against his hand; though I think it lawful for us in an holy manner to expostulate with God sometimes in the Prophet's language and say, Lord why hast thou caused us to err from thy ways and hardened our hearts against thy fear? Which yet I confess he brings to pass at no time, infundendo malitiam, by infusing any malice into me, who naturally have more then enough of that leaven in me; but, non infundendo gratiam, not quickening in me that holy fear, which he hath planted in me, of which grace I confess willingly, I have a great deal less than I desire, though the least measure of it is a great deal more than I do or can deserve. Neither shall I ever learn of this Author after his manner to blaspheme God if at any time he shall harden my heart against his fear. Though this Author speaks commonly with a full and foul mouth, yet his arguments are lank and lean; and of no substance but words. As when he saith that, God overrules men's wills by our opinion. Now to overrule● a man is to carry him in despite of his teeth. We say no such thing but that God moves every creature to work agreably to its nature, necessary things necessarily, contingent things contingently, free Agents freely; though nothing comes to pass by the free agency of any creature, but what God from all eternity, by his unchangeable counsel hath determined to come to pass. As the eleventh Article of Ireland doth profess by the unanimous consent of the ArchBishop, Bishops and Clergy of that Kingdom, when those Articles were made. So I speak warily and circumspectly, the rather because one Doctor Heylin doth in a book entitled, The History of the Sabbath, profess, Chapter 8. page 259. That, that whole book of Articles is now called in, and in the place thereof, the Articles of the Church of Ireland confirmed by Parliament in that Kingdom. Anno 1631. A thing I willingly confess at first sight seemed incredible unto me; namely, that Articles of Religion agreed upon in the days, of King james, should be revoked in the days of King Charles; but expect to hear the truth of that relation. For the Author thereof hath never as yet deserved so much credit at my hands, as to be believed in such a particular as this. But to return, this Authors text is nothing answerable to the margin. For first, imperare to command, is one thing, and to overrule is another thing: though he that doth, imperare command aught, is commonly accounted the Author thereof, as a cause Moral, from whom comes the beginning of such a work. But utterly deny that God commands evil, and the truth is we acknowledge no other notion of evil than such as the Apostle expresseth in calling it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an incongruity to the law of God, which law commands somethings and forbids other things. I come to his third reason. 3. I grant wicked counsellors and persuaders are deservedly accounted the Authors of sin: The common use and acception of the words as I showed in answer to the first, is observed to denote such. Therefore Cicero makes Author and disswader opposite; and by law they are punishable in the same degree with the Actors. But God is no counsellor or persuader to any lewd course, but forbids it, and dissuades it, and that with denunciation of the greatest judgements among trangressours. 2. I willingly confess that councelling is far inferior to enforcing; yet in Scripture phrase earnest entreaty, or command is oftentimes expressed by compelling as Mat, 14. 22. Mark: 6. 45. Luk: 14. 23. Gala: 6. 12, and 2. 14. 1 Sam: 28. 23. 2 Chron: 21. 11. And no marvel for hereby many times men are drawn full sore against their wills to do that which they would not. It is true God's power cannot be resisted, but neither hath any man any will to resist that motion of God whereby he works agreeable to their natures, than indeed there were place for resisting. If the Lord carrieth on a covetous person, such as Achan to covet a wedge of gold and a Babylonish garment, and coveting it move him accordingly to take it, and convey it away secretly, and hide it in his tent, what resistance doth he make in all this? Or what is done in all this less agreably to his covetous disposition, then to the disposition of Toads and Adders, when he moves them according to their nature to sting and poison? So he moved the Babylonians compared to Serpents and Cockatrices to sting a wicked people. Do not the Scriptures Ier: 8. 17. plainly profess that God did send them? Is not Assur in this respect called, the Rod of God's wrath and the staff in his hand? Was it not called the Lords indignation? Es: 10. 15. Is he not compared to an axe and a saw, shall the axe boast itself against him that heweth therewith? Or shall the saw extol itself against him that moveth it? Still he confounds the act with the sinfulness thereof, speaking of God's producing sins; whereas sin is never produced, it being only an obliquity consequent unto the act of such a worker as is subject to a law. And our Adversaries confess that God is the cause of the act; as well as we. Yet will they not hereby be driven; to profess that in producing the act he produceth the sin. As for that which he speaks of Enforcing, we may well pity him, that when he wants strength of reason, he supplies that by phrases. We deny that God enforceth any man's will. Nay it is the general rule of Schools, that, voluntas non potest cogi, the will cannot be forced: We maintain that every act of the will, especially in natural things (such as a sinful act must needs be: for only gracious acts are supernatural) is not only voluntary (which is sufficient to preserve it from being forced) but free also, by as much liberty as the creature is capable of, only we deny that the will of man is primum liberum, a first free agent, that is the prerogative of God alone, the first mover of all, and the supreme Agent thus: I have dispatched my answer to his first reason consisting of three parts I come unto the second. Sect: 4. If we could find out a King that should so carry himself in procuring the ruin and the offences of any Subjects, as (by this opinion) God doth in the affecting of the damnation and transgressions of Reprobates, M. Mason's Addit. 2. p. 29. 30. we would all charge him with the ruin and sins of those his Subjects. Who would not abhor, saith Moulin, a King speaking thus. I will have this man hanged, and that I may hang him justly, I will have him murder or steal. This King saith he should not only make an innocent man miserable, said & sceleratum, but wicked too, and should punish him for that offence (cujus ipse causa esset) of which himself was the cause. It is a clear case, Tiberius, as Suetonius reports, having a purpose to put some Virgins to death, because it was not Molin. Anat. c. 12. de praedest. pag. 37. lawful among the Romans to strangle Virgins, caused them all to be deflovered by the hangman, that so they might be strangled. Who will not say that Tiberius was the principal Author of the deflowering of those Maids? In like manner (say the Supralapsarians) God hath a purpose of putting great store of men to the second death; but because it is not lawful for him by reason of his justice, to put to death men innocent Sueton. vit. Tib. cap. 61. and without blame, he hath decreed that the Devil shall deflower them, that afterwards he may damn them It followeth therefore that God is the main cause of those their sins. If a King should carry himself as God did in hardening Pharaoh's heart that he should not let Israel go; and when he had let Israel go, to harden his heart that he should follow after them; we would acknowledge such a one, not to be man but God. And then surely Answer. whatsoever our Arminians would think of such a one, we would think no otherwise than Solomon did of him of whom he professed, that, he made all things for himself, even the wicked against the day of evil. If God doth but permit a man to will this or that, necesse est, saith Arminius, it must needs be, ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolendum, that no kind of argument shall persuade such one to abstain from willing it. And I hope Arminius hath as great auhority with this Author, as Mr. Moulin deserves to have with us. No King hath power to dispense any such providence as this. St. Paul tells us plainly, that, God hath ordained some unto wrath; and as he hath made of the same lump some vessels unto honour, so hath he made other vessels unto dishonour. The Lord professeth that he kept Abimelech from sinning against him. Thus the Lord could deal with all if it pleased him; Why doth he not? is it not for the manifestation of his own glory? For to this purpose he hath made all things. And that, he suffers with long patience vessels Gen: 20. 6. of wrath prepared to destruction. And what to do doth he suffer them? But to continue and persevere in their sinful courses without repentance; the Apostle plainly tells us that it is, to declare his wrath and make his power known. This is not the voice of any Doctor of ours now a days, but of St. Paul. And shall Mr. Moulin be brought in to affront St. Paul? For recompense let the Jesuits be heard to whom the nation of the Arminians are beholden for their principal grounds; Wherefore doth God give effectual grace unto one and not unto another, but because he hath elected the one and rejected the other? And I appeal to every sober Christian, whether the absoluteness of reprobation doth not as invincibly follow herehence as the absoluteness of Election. But touching Mr. Moulin, I have heard that Doctor Ames sometimes wished that he had never meddled in this argument. I am not of Doctor Ames his mind in this; though it were I think most fit every one should exercise himself in those questions, wherein by the course of his studies he hath been most conversant; so should the Church of God enjoy, plus dapis & rixae multo minus, invidiaeque. I do admire Mr. Moulin in his conference with Cayer as also upon the Eucharist, and on Purgatory, he hath my heart when I read his consolalations to his Brothers of the Church of France; as also entreating of the love of God. I would willingly learn French to understand him only, and have along time desired, & still to get any thing that he hath written. I highly esteem him in his Anatomy though I do not like all and every passage; yet but few are the passages wherein I differ from his opinion. I have been very sorry to observe how by his doctrine in the point of reprobation he overthrows his own Orthodox Doctrine in the point of Election. I would he would answer Sylvester who hath replied to his admirable letters written to Monsieur Balzak. I could be well content, were I once free, to supply what is wanting to Waleus his Apology for him against Corvinus. But to the point, the passage here proposed by him is I willingly confess somewhat harsh. I will have this man hanged, and that I may hang him justly I will have him murder or steal. But compare it with that of St. Paul formerly mentioned, God suffers the vessels of wrath prepared to destruction, that he may declare his wrath, and make his power known. And that of Eli's children, They obeyed not the 1 Sam: 2. 25. 2 Chron: 25. 20. Ier: 52. 3. voice of their Father, because the Lord would slay them. And that Amaziah would not hear: For it was of the Lord that he might deliver them into his hands, because they sought the Gods of Edom. And that of jeremiah Doubtless because the wrath of the Lord was against jerusalem and juda, till he had cast them out of his presence, therefore Zedekiah rebelled against the King of Babel. And observe how near Mr. Moulin is to expose these holy passages of Scripture and the doctrine contained in them in like manner unto scorn, ere he is aware. And let him soberly consider, and without any humour of complying with our Adversaries out of a desire to charm them who will not be charmed, to what end God doth finally permit some to persevere in sin, and can he find any other but this, for the manifestation of the glory of his vindicative justice in their condemnation? And without any desire to charm, I have showed plainly, that God doth not permit any man to sin, and finally to persevere in sin to the end that he may damnethem: But that he both permits them finally in sin, and damns them for their sin, for the declaration of his wrath and power on them; and also that he may declare the riches of his glory, upon the vessels of his mercy, whom he hath prepared unto glory: If he put a difference between permission of sin, and a will that they shall sin; I would entreat him not to stumble at this. For what difference between God's will to permit man to sin, and to will that man shall sin by his permission: And the tragical acts committed on the holy Son of God by Herod and Pilate, the Gentiles and people of Israel, the Apostles say not they were permitted by God, but that they were predetermined by the hand and counsel of God. Mr. Moulin's Act: 4. 28. care is to avoid harsh expressions; & it is a commendable care. For why should we causelessly expose the truth of God to be the worse thought of, and provoke men to stumble at it by unnecessary harshness? Yet I find the Scripture itself delivered by the holy Prophets and Apostles is nothing so scrupulous. Malim dicere, saith Mr. Moulin, I had rather say, Deum non decrevisse dare alicui gratiam, quâ convertatur & credat; that God hath Anat: p. 23. decreed not to give some one grace whereby to be converted and believe; quâm dicere eum decrevisse ut homo sit incredulus & impoenitens, then to say God hath decreed that man should be incredulous and impenitent. And he gives his reason thus. Vox enim decernendi aptior est ad ea designanda, quae Deus statuit facere, quam ea quibus statuit non mederi. For to decree is fitter to denote such things as God hath purposed to do, than such things as he hath purposed not to cure. And indeed the Ancients in this sense take the word predestination, to be only of such things as God himself purposed to work; as Grace and Glory, and the damnation of impenitent sinners. But if God decrees not to cure impenitency and infidelity in some; judge whether upon this ground. it may not well be said, that God decrees that the impenitency and infidelity of some shall continue uncured And Mr. Monlin confesseth that God decreed that the Jews should put Christ to death. His words are these, Deus vetuit homicidium, idem tamen decrevitut judaei Christum morte afficerent. God forbade murder yet Anat: p. 16. he decreed that the jews should kill Christ. Yet by the way consider, God hath no need of the sin of man, that he may put him to death justly. For undoubtedly God could annihilate any creature that he hath made, the most holy Angels without any blemish to his justice. Yea by power absolute he could cast the most innocent creature into hell fire, and continue yet just still, as formerly hath been showed, and Raynaudus justifies, and represents variety of testimonies for this, not only of School-divines, one of whom professeth that it is concors omnium Theologorum sententia, the common opinion of Divines; but of the Ancient Fathers also. And therefore though to strangle Virgins was not lawful for Tiberius; yet a greater & more severe work then this is lawful for God. Neither doth God command any impure course to any, but under pain of eternal damnation forbids it. But as he hardened Pharaoh's heart that he should not let I srael go; so can he harden any man's heart to do as foul a work as this. And St. Paul testifies that he gave up the heathens to their hearts lusts, unto uncleanes, to defile their own bodies between themselves, which turned the Rome 1. 24. truth of God into a lie, & worshipped & served the creature forsaking the Creator, who is blessed for ever amen For this cause God gave them up to vile affections; for even the women, did change v. 26. the natural use into that which is against nature. And likewise the men left the natural use of the women, and burned in their lusts one toward another, and man with man wrought filthiness. v. 27. And this is noted by the Apostle to have been a work of judgement. For it follows, they received in themselves such recompense of their errors as was meet. I grant Tiberius was the principal Author of deflowering those Maids. For he commanded it, and that, as I have showed, makes a man the Author of a crime, both out of School-divines, and out of Orators; but God gave no such command to these heathens thus to defile themselves. And this Author doubts not, but God cooperates to the substance of every act; notwithstanding the absoute dominion of the will over her actions, for which he pleads. And it cannot be denied unless the word of God be therewithal denied, that, in him we move, as well as in him we live and have our being. And though God gave not commandment to Absalon. to defile his Father's Concubines, yet he tells David saying; I will take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them to thy neighbour, and he shall lie with thy wives in the sight of this Sun. For 2 Sam, 12, 11 thou didst it secretly, but I will do this thing before all Israel, and before the Sun. It is utterly untrue which this Author obtrudes upon us, as if we thought it unlawful, for God by vers. 12. reason of his justice to put to death men innocent and without blame. Was any more innocent than the Son of God? yet he gave him to suffer somewhat more than the death for the sins of men. Neither must we be gulled with his phrases of the Devils deflowering of men, when by him they are carried away into abominable courses, so as to oppose Scripture & blaspheme God, the language of the holy Ghost being this that all the outrages committed upon the holy Son of God by Herod and Pontius Pilate, the Gentiles and people of Israel, were such as, God's hand and counsel had before determined to be done. And the like cruelties or worse were executed upon the Saints of God by their Kings, who employed their sovereign power in execution of the beast's behests; yet this is called the will of God. God hath put into their hearts to fulfil his will, and to agree to give their kingdoms to the beast until the word of God be fulfilled. And the truth is if God permit such abominable courses and hardens men's hearts, occasion being offered they will commit them, according to the common proverb. He must needs go whom the Devil drives. And the very definition of the permission of sin given by Arminius doth convince this, though he carrieth himself very superficiarily explicating God's providence in this, and the nature of obduration; which I have prosecuted at large in my Vindiciae, in answer to Bellarmine, especially where I treat of the abduration of Pharaoh chap: 11. Neither do we make damnation Lib. 2, Digr: 2. the end whereunto God permits sin; but both permisson for sin and damnation for sin, we make the means tending to another end, namely, the manifestation of God's glory in the way of justice vindicative, which in Scripture phrase is called the declaration of his wrath. And to make God the Author of sin by these courses, is clearly Rome 9 22. to charge the holy Ghost with blasphemy, seeing the holy Ghost gives clear testimony to all this in the word of God. Sect. 5. That God is the Author of men's salvation and conversion, all sides grant; and yet he doth no more in the procuring them then these men report him to do in the Reprobates impenitency and damnation The M. Mason's Addit. 3. p. 30. 31. salvation and conversion of the Elect, say they, he hath absolutely and antecedently, without the foresight of any deserving of theirs, reselved upon, and by irresistible means in their several generations, draweth them to believe, repent, and endure to the end, that so they might be saved, and his absolute decree accomplished. On the other side, the damnation, the sins, and the final impenitency of Reprobates, he hath of his alone will and pleasure peremptorily decreed; this his decree he executeth in time drawing them on by his unconquerable power and providence from sin to sin, till they have made up their measure, and in the end have inflicted on them that eternal vengeance, which he had provided for them. What difference is here in the course which God taketh for the conversion and salvation of the Elect, and the obduration and damnation of the Reprobates? And therefore what hindereth but that God (by their grounds) may as truly be styled the prime cause and Author of the sins of the one, as of the conversion of the other? The Father's thought it a plain case; and therefore they did make sin an Object of prescience, and not predestination and bend the most of those arguments by which they refuted this foul assertion, against an absolute, irresistible and necessitating decree. as I could easily show, but that I fear to be over long. Only I will cite some few of those Author's words whom the learned & reverend Bishop hath alleged in favour and for the defence of the Predestinarians, and the maintainers of Gotteschalk's opinion The Church of Lyous in their answer to the positions of Johannes Scotus, which he framed against Gotteschalke hath these words, Whosoever saith, tthat God hath laid a constraint, or necessity of sinning upon any man, he doth manifestly and fearfully blaspheme God, in as much as he maketh him, by affirming that of him to be the very Author of sin. Remigius Arch. Bishop of that Church explaining the Church's opinion in that point of prescience and predestination in seven several rules; in the fifth of those rules, he hath these words to the same purpose. God, saith he by his prescience and predestination, hath laid a necessity of being wicked upon no man. For if he had done this, he had been the Author of sins. And thus in my judgement doth it plainly appear that by absolute Reprobation, as it is taught the upper way, God is made to be the true cause of men's sins. Observe the false carriage of this Author, That God is the Author of men's salvation Answer. and conversion, he saith, all sides grant; as if there were no difference between Arminians, and the Orthodox; between him and us in this. We say God works faith and regeneration in us, and that for Christ's sake. The Remonstrants in their Censura censurae, in express terms deny that Christ merited faith and regeneration for us; and judge by this indifferently, whether they make faith and regeneration to be the gift of God. Or when they do in terms profess this (as Epicurus, verbis Deos posuit, re sustulit) whether they do not equivocate. Ask this Author in what sense he makes God to be the Author of man's conversion, whether any otherwise then, 1. In giving men power to believe if they will to repent if they will. 2. In persuading unto faith & repentance. 3. In concurring with man to the act of faith & repentance. Now as touching the first, that mere nature & not grace, Deo credere & ab amore rerum temporalium ad divina praecepta servanda se convertere omnes possint si velint, saith Austin, All men can, if they will, believe God, and from the love of temporal De Gen: cont. Manich. l. 1. cap. 3. things convert themselves to the keeping of God's commandments. Now this is no more, then, posse fidem habere, posse charitatem habere, to be capable of faith of charity, and this is, naturae hominum, of the nature of man; As Austin testifies in another place, where he saith posse fidem habere, posse charitatem habere, naturae est hominum, fidem habere, charitatem habere, De praedest. Sanct: 1. c. 5. gratiae est fidelium. To be capable of faith and charity, is the nature of man, but to have faith and to have charity is the grace of the faithful. Consider in reason; supernatural grace is not in reason to be accounted inferior to a moral virtue; but so it will prove, if it be but a power to be good if we will. For moral virtue doth not give a man a power only to do good if he will, but it inclines and disposeth the will unto virtuous actions. So justice is not an indifferency of condition leaving it to man whether he will be just or no; but it makes him just, and so disposoth him to just courses. Again if grace supernatural doth only give power to believe if one will; this being a free power, it is indifferent as well not to believe, as to believe; as well not to repent, as to repent. For liberty is always to act opposite; whence it will follow that by virtue of supernatural grace a man is disposed not more to faith, then to infidelity, not more to repentance then to hardness of heart and Impenitency. 4. Consider, a man hath no need of supernatural grace to enable him to refuse to repent, seeing naturally he is sufficiently disposed hereunto; & necessarily by reason of that natural corruption which is hereditary unto him. By all this it is apparent, that a power to believe wrought in a man by supernatural grace, is not a free power working freely; but rather a necessary power working necessarily; like unto the condition of a moral virtue, which restrains man's natural indifferency to good or evil, and disposeth him only to good. And consequently as many as maintain no other power to be given unto man by grace, then to believe, if a man will; they deal like Pelagians, who called that which was merely natural, prevenient grace. Lastly if God be the Author of man's conversion, because he gives him power to convert, if he will; he may as well be called the Author of non conversion, and perseverance in sin, because God gives power not to convert, and to persevere in sin, if he will. 2. As touching the second, If God be the Author of man's conversion, because he persuades thereunto, then certainly he is not the Author of sin, because he persuades not thereunto. 3. If God be the Author of conversion, because he cooperates thereunto, then certainly he may be as well said to be the Author of every sinful act. For that he doth cooperate thereunto, I am very confident this Author will not deny. Now I could earnestly entreat the Judicious Reader to examine well this Author's opinion in these particulars, and compare them with his former discourse, that he may have a clear way opened unto him to judge with what conscience he carried himself in his former discourse, imputing unto us that we make God the Author of sin; albeit in treating of God's providence in evil, we generally have the express word of God before our eyes; and in our explication thereof do rather qualify the seeming harshness thereof, then aggravate it. For undoubtedly by the tenor of his discourse, look upon what grounds he denies God to be the Author of sin, he must withal deny God to be the Author of faith, of repentance, of conversion; And look upon what grounds he makes God the Author of conversion; upon the same grounds he must make God the Author of sin: As in case to give power to believe, if we will; and to cooperate with us in the act of faith, be to make him the Author: Or if only upon persuading us to believe, God is said to be the Author of faith; than it follows as a sufficient Apology for us, that we make not God to be the Author of sin; seeing none of us conceive him to be a persuader of any sinful act; but rather a disswader and forbidder thereof and that upon pain of eternal damnation. But on the contrary we make a vast difference between God's operations in sinful actions, and God's operations in actions gracious. As first, every sinful act is always within the compass of acts natural; no supernatural act is or can be a sin. Now to the producing of any act of morality, every man notwithstanding his corruption hath in him a natural power. But there is no natural power in man to the performing of an act supernatural. God must inspire him with a new life called in Scripture, the life of God; and make him after a sort partaker of the divine nature; and give his own Spirit to dwell in him, in such sort, that, being crucified with Christ, Eph: 4. 18. 2 Pet: 1. 4. Gal: 2. 20. Rome 8. 11. we hence forth live no more, but Christ liveth in us. These supernatural acts are but few according to the three Theological virtues, Faith, Hope, & Charity, whose offsprings they are; the love of God to the contempt of ourselves hope in God to the contempt of the world, as touching the worst it can do unto us: and faith in God, to the quenching of the fiery darts of the devil. As for all other good acts, in the producing of them, God hath a double influence; one common as they are acts natural, touching the substance of them; another special as touching the gracious nature of them, proceeding from faith and love. But as touching evil acts, he hath no influence in the producing of them, but that which is common, and to the substance of the acts; none at all as touching the evilness of them, the reason whereof is that which was delivered by Austin long ago. Malum non habet causam efficientem sed deficientem, Evil hath no cause efficient, but deficient only. And it is impossible that God should be defective in a culpable manner. The creature may, the Creator cannot: And the ground of the creatures defective condition is accounted to be this, that he was brought out of nothing, & consequently of a frail condition. And it is received general as a rule in Schools, that a creature cannot be made, impeccabilis per naturam, that is such a one, as by nature cannot sin. This was delivered long ago by Anselm one of the first of School-divines; In evil things God doth work, quod sunt, that they are; non quod mala sunt, not that they are evil; But in good things God doth work, Et quod sunt, & quod bona sunt, both that they are and that they are good. Here this Author sets down our opinion concerning Election and Reprobation at his pleasure. We say with Austin that, predestination is the preparation of grace, that is the Divine decree of conferring grace; And both he and all confess, it is also the decree of conferring glory. And because in making of this decree, God had respect unto some only, not to all, both men and Angels, therefore in this consideration it is called the decree of Election, in distinction from the decree of reprobation. Now this grace is of a double nature; for either it is grace custodient from sin, and the decree of granting this was the election of Angels, called in holy Scripture, The elect Angels; or grace healing, after men have sinned, and the decree of granting this is the election of men, commonly in Scripture called God's Elect, in reference unto this. It is farther to be observed that Austin grounds the Orthodox doctrine of predestination and election upon the Orthodox doctrine concerning grace. And the absoluteness of the one he built upon the freeness of the other, in not being given according unto men's merits. As it appears, de bono perseverantiae cap. 15. Where having proposed some exceptions of the Massilienses made against his doctrine of predestination, coming to make answer thereunto, he begins thus, Ista cum dicuntur, saith he. ita nos à confitenda Dei gratia, id est, quae non secundum merita nostra datur, & a confitenda secundum eam predestinatione sanctorum deterrere non debent When these things are objected, they must not deter us from confessing God's grace, I mean such a grace as is not given accordiog unto works; nor from confessing the predestination of Saints according thereunto. Now if the absoluteness of predestination be grounded upon this, that, grace is not given according unto merits, (the scripture phrase denies it to be given according unto works. But Bellarmine acknowledgeth that in this Argument, merits and works are taken by the Ancients in one and the 2 Tim: 1. 9 Tit: 3. 5. same sense.) it followeth that as many as deny the absoluteness of predestination must therewithal maintain, that, Grace is given according to men's merits or works. And the reason is evident: For if God doth not give grace according unto men's works, but of his mere pleasure decreed to give grace unto some, and not upon consideration of their works. And this is to elect absolutely, and antecedently without the foresight of any deserving, yea of any works; though by that expression which this Author useth he doth sufficienty manifest, that his opinion is, that God elects not only upon the foresight of men's, works but upon the foresight of men's deservings. It is farther considerable to prevent the reaches of such crafty foxes as we have to deal with, whose course is in joining the decree of conversion and salvation together, to translate that which belongs unto one, unto the other most unreasonably: For albeit God proceeds according to the mere pleasure, and without all respect to works, in conferring grace, and decreeth accordingly to confer it: Yet he proceeds not merely according unto pleasure, and without all respect of works in conferring glory; but according unto a Covenant which is this, whosoever beleiveth shall be saved, and accordingly he bestows the kingdom of heaven by way of reward for faith, repentance, and good works. This hath Christ deserved at the hands of 1 Pet: 1. 9 Mat: 25. his Father that our weak performances should be thus rewarded. Lastly, it is farther to be considered that God, as he thus bestoweth salvation by way of reward of our faith, repentance &c. so from everlasting he did decree to bestow salvation, namely, by way of reward. Not that either faith, or repentance, or good works, any or all of these were the cause (lest of all the deserving cause) of God's decree, or antecedaneous to his decree; but of his mere pleasure decreed both to give the grace of faith and repentance, and to bestow eternal life by way of a reward thereof, as may farther be proved and that clearly divers ways. 1. By the Apostl's discourse; where he discourseth after this manner, Before Esau and jacob were borne, or had done good or evil, it was said that the Elder shall Rome 9 11. serve the younger; therefore election is not of works: But if election did proceed upon the foresight of faith, repentance, and good works, or any of them, than it might justly be said, that it were of faith, repentance, or good works or of all of them; And the force of the Apostles argument extends to conclude, that election is no more of faith or of repentance, then of works; not only because faith and repentance are works, and so accounted in Scripture phrase, as it appears. Io: 6. 29. But chiefly because before men are borne, they are uncapable of faith and repentance, as of good works. 2. If faith were a motive cause unto election, then either it were so of it's own nature, or by constitution Divine: not of its own nature as it is apparent. If by constitution divine, mark what strange absurdities follow; namely this, that God did ordain, that upon the fore sight of faith, he would ordain men unto salvation, whereby God's eternal ordination is made the object of his ordination, whereas the Objects of God's decrees are always things temporal, never any thing that is eternal. 3. It cannot be said that God giveth salvation to the end he may give them faith, but it may far more congruously be said, that God gives faith to the end that he may save them; therefore the intention of salvation is rather before the intention of giving faith, than the intention of giving faith is before the intention of giving salvation. Or better thus, if God foresee faith before he decrees salvation, than the intention of giving faith (without which God cannot foresee faith) is before the intention of giving salvation; and consequently the giving of faith should be the last in execution; that is men shall first be saved, and aferwards have faith bestowed upon them, to wit, in another world where they live by sight and not by faith. I come to the decree of reprobation; the Objects whereof are two, proportionable to the two objects of election or predestination. The first is permission of sin, the second is, Damnation for sin, according to that of Aquinas, Reprobatio includit voluntatem permitendi culpam & damnationem inferendi pro culpâ. Reprobation includes a will to permit sin, and to inflict damnation for sin. The first object of reprobation I say is, permission of sin; not Sin as this Author would have it, but permission of sin: Because these decrees, to wit, of permitting sin, and inferring damnation for sin, are decrees of means conducing to a certain end. For like as in election God decreeth to bestow faith, repentance, and obedience on some, and to reward it with everlasting life for the manifestation of his glory in the way of mercy mixed with justice: So in Reprobation he decrees to permit others to sin, and finally to persevere therein, and to damn them for their sin to manifest his glory in the way of vindicative justice. Now whosoever intends an end must also be the Auhour of the means conducing to that end. Now God, though well he may be the Author of permission of sin, yet he cannot be the Author of sin: Albeit upon God's permission of sin it followeth that sin shall exist. Now to permit sin is all one with denying grace, whether it be grace Custodient to preserve from it, or grace healing to pardon and cure it after it is committed. Now like as the Lord hath mercy on whom he will in pardoning their sin, and healing it by faith and repentance: So he hardeneth whom he will by denying faith and repentance. So that as God of his mere pleasure grants the grace of faith and repentance unto some; so of his mere pleasure he denies it unto others. And so in Reprobation he decreeth of his mere pleasure to deny it. But albeit the Lord of mere pleasure proceeds in the denying of faith and repentance, whereby alone sin is cured, and so of mere pleasure suffers some finally to persevere in sin, yet in inflicting damnation he doth not carry himself of mere pleasure without all respect to men's works; but herein he proceeds according to a law which is this, whosoever believeth not, and repenteth not, shall be damned. And like as God damns no man but for his final perseverance in sin. So from everlasting he did decree to damn no man, but for his final perseverance in sin. So that by virtue of the Divine decree of reprobation, sin and final perseverance therein is constituted the cause of damnation; but by no means is it constituted the cause of the decree of reprobation; neither doth the foresight of sin precede it. For first, like as upon this doctrine, that, Grace is not given according unto works, the absoluteness of predestination is grounded in the judgement of Austin as by necessary consequence issuing there from: In like sort upon this, that grace is not denied according unto men's works, as necessarily followeth the absoluteness of Reprobation. Secondly, look by what reason the Apostle proves, that Election is not of good works, namely because, before the children were borne or had done any good, it was said the Elder shall serve the Younger; by the same reason it evidently followeth that reprobation is not of evil works, because, before they were borne or had done good or evil, it was said the Elder shall serve the Younger, Esau's reprobation being as emphatically signified under his subjection to jacob his younger, as Iacob's election was designed by his dominion over Esau his Elder brother. 3. If sin be the cause of the decree of Reprobation, then either of ' its own nature, or by constitution divine. Not by necessity of nature; for undoubtedly God could annihilate men for sin, had it pleased him. If by constitution Divine, mark what absurdity followeth, namely this, that, God did ordain that upon foresight of sin, he would ordain men unto damnation. 4. If foresight of sin precedes the decree of damning them for sin, than the decree to permit sin much more precedes the decree to damn them for it, as without which there can be no foresight of sin; and consequently permission of sin is first in intention, and then damnation; and therefore it should be last in execution; that is, men should first be damned, and afterwards permitted to sin, to wit, in an other world. 5. And lastly Reprobation is the will of God; but there can be no cause of God's will, as Aquinas hath proved; much less can a temporal thing be the cause of God's will, which is eternal. Upon this ground it is that Aquinas professeth, Never any man was so mad, as to say that any thing might be the cause of predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating. So may I say, it were a mad thing to maintain that any thing can be the cause of Reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating. For the case is altogether alike; the will of God being alike uncapable of a cause in both, whereas this Author saith, that, God by our opinion doth draw men on by his unconquerable power from sin to sin; 'tis mere bombast. All men being borne in sin must needs persevere in sin, unless God gives grace to regenerate them. For whether they do that which is morally good, they do it not in a gracious manner; or whether they abstain from evil, they do it not in a gracious manner. He that is of God heareth Io: 8. Corvin. defence. Armin. pag: 39 God's words, ye therefore hear them not saith our Saviour, because ye are not of God. Arminius acknowledgeth and Corvinus after him, that all men by reason of Adam's sin are cast upon a necessity of sinning. He asks what difference is there in the course which God taketh for the conversion of the Elect and obduration of Reprobates; and I have already showed a vast difference; and here in brief I show a difference; He hath mercy on the one in the regenerating them, & curing the corruption he finds in them, he shows not the like grace to others, but leaves them unto themselves; as touching the evil acts committed by the one, he concurreth as a cause efficient to the act which for the substance of it is naturally good. For ens & bonum convertuntur, every thing that is an entity so far is good, but he hath no efficiency as touching the evil, as which indeed can admit no efficiency, as Austin hath delivered of old, Man himself is only a deficient cause of sin, as sin, and that in a culpable manner, which kind of deficiency is not incident to God. But to every good act he concurres two manner of ways & that in the nature of a positive efficient cause in both, namely, to the substance of the act by influence general, and to the goodness of it by influence special and supernatural. It is true the Fathers made sin the object of prescience, not of predestination; the reason was because they took predestination to be only of such things which God did effect in time; Now sin is none of those things that come to pass by God's effection, but only by God's permission. And that such was the notion of predestination with the Fathers, I prove first out of Austin. In sua quae falli mutarique non potest praescientiâ opera sua futura disponere, De bono perseveran: c. 17 illud omnino nec aliud quidquam est praedestinare In his foreknowledge, which can neither be deceived nor changed to dispose his own works, that is to predestinate and nothing else. And sin, not being the work of God, no marvel if it come not under predestination. Secondly, out of the Synod of Valens, Praedestinatione autem Deum ea tantum statuisse Con: 3. dicimus quae ipse vel gratuita misericordiâ, vel justo judicio facturus erat. We say that God by predestination ordained only such things as himself would work, either of his free mercy, or in just judgement. Again it is as true that they made even sin itself the Object of God's will, witness that of Austin. Non aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo. Not any thing comes to pass but God Almighty willing it, either by permitting it or working it. So the eleaventh article of the Church of Ireland; So Arminius Enchirid. 95. Deus voluit Achabum mensuram scelerum implere, God would have Ahab to fulfil the measure of his sins. So scripture often mentioned. And Austin gives the reason of it, malum fieri bonum est, it is good that evil should be. Bellarmine confesseth as much, namely that, Mala fieri Act: 4. 28. Rev: 17. 17. Deo permittente bonum est, It is good that evils should come to pass by God's permission. And shall not God have liberty to will that which is good? When he saith of the Ancients, that, They refuted this foul assertion of an absolute, irresistible and necessitating decree as he could easily show, but that he fears to be overlong. It is nothing but froth; It is not the first time I have had experience of such like Pyrgopolinices eloquence of his. Bradwardin hath demonstrated that the will of God is absolute throughout speaking of his decree, and none conditional and his demonstration is this, If there be any will of God conditional, than the condition whereupon it proceds must be willed by God or no; to say it is not, is to acknowledge some things to exist in the world, in the producing whereof, God hath no hand, which is generally disclaimed; And Durand, who affirms some such thing, is opposed generally, and indeed his arguments are very sleight. But if God doth will that condition; then either he wills it absolutely or conditionally; If absolutely, than the cause is gained. For then that which was first willed, was willed also absolutely not conditionally. As for example, if God wills a man's salvation upon condition of faith, if withal God's will be, and that absolutely to give him faith, it followeth that God wills that man's salvation, and that absolutely. If it be answered that the condition is willed not absolutely, but upon another condition; of that other condition I inquire whether God willed it or Noah. If no, than something is produced in the world, in the production whereof God, hath no hand, which is very inconvenient; If you grant that he willed that also, I farther demand whether he willed it absolutely or conditionally? If absolutely then all that depended thereupon were absolutely willed, and so the cause is obtained. If you say this condition was willed also conditionally, so a way is made to a progression in infinitum, which is a thing unsufferable by the consent of all. And as many as are put to give instance will forthwith manifest the nakedness of their cause. This demonstration of Bradwardine I sometimes represented to this very Author in our private walking and communication, and he professed it was a very ingenious argument. As for the other term irresistible this manifests this Author's meaning, that some will of God, speaking of his decree, is of a resistable nature. Whereas St. Paul to the contrary plainly gives us to understand that God's will is irresistible; & the Psalmist saith, that the counsel of the Lord shall stand. And my counsel shall stand, and I will do whatsoever I will. And therefore his decrees are resembled to mountains of brass. As for the lost term necessitating. For the Gentleman pays us in words, for want of better coin, not considering that words are Es. 46. 10. Zach: 6. but wind, he would cheat his Reader by this, presuming he would be so simple, as to believe that God by this decree of his takes away the liberty of the creature, but it doth not; nor any contingency, as the eleaventh article of Ireland doth particulate: and Bradwardine who peculiarly useth this phrase, understands hereby no other necessity then upon supposition, which Alvarez shows by general concurrence of School-Divines, that it may well stand with absolute contingency and liberty, it being no other necessity, then that which is called, secundum quid, in some respect; And such a necessity Arminius maketh consequent to permission: & Bradwardine is express that God necessitates the will to produce a free act. And he nothing differs from Aquinas his doctrine, where he maintains that God's will imposeth no necessity upon the creatures will; because he ordains both necessary things come to pass, necessarily, and contingent things, contingently, that is with a possibility to the contrary; & likewise free actions freely, that is with a free active power in the Agent to do otherwise. But come we to the consideration of the passages produced out of the Ancients. For I presume they are the choicest. For though he feared to be overlong, and therefore could not exhibit all; yet therefore it behoved him to represent the best. And I believe he could produce more of this nature. For I have been an eye witness of it under his hand now four years ago. And though he produce them not, I hope to do it for him ere we part, to show how little I fear his concealments, and somewhat of the Predestinarians also, being glad of such an opportunity to discover the wildness and precipitation of his judgement touching that which is called the predestinarian heresy here touched by him. The first is a passage taken out of the Church of Lions, denying that God hath laid a necessity of sinning on any man. Another out of Remigius; both represented (yea & many more of this nature) by that most reverend and most learned Archbishop of Armagh Doctor Usher in his history of Goteschalk, 138. and 173. To these I answer. First these Ancients are about 850 years after Christ; yet marvelous orthodox considering those times in the point of predestination. And let no man think that they deny a necessity of sinning laid upon all by original corruption, the consequent of Adam's prevarication. If they were of any other opinion, should it become us to follow them in this? Doctor Potter acknowledgeth it as the doctrine of the Church of England, that libertas à peccato, liberty from sin, is not incident to a natural man; it is true he desires to quash it by saying there is yet in man, Libertas à necessitate, à liberty from necessity; but from what necessity? From the necessity of sinning? If so, why should he then deny a liberty from sin; yet he never taketh any pains to clear this from contradiction, but blindfoldly follows Bernard, without caring much to understand him. And he looks to be pardoned because Vossius did so before him. M. Fulke, in his answer to the Rhemish Testament, usually distinguisheth between libertas à peccato, & libertas à coactione, liberty from sin, and liberty from constraint; and denying all liberty from sin to a natural man, yet grants unto him a liberty from coaction. I have taken some pains to show Doctor Potter's superficiary carriage in this, and to clear Bernard; which it may be I will add to this by the reason of the homogeneous nature of it. In the mean time liberty from sin is utterly denied to a natural man, and that by the doctrine of our Church. And no marvel seeing Arminius himself, and Corvinus, those great patrons of nature's power, do acknowledge this, as before I mentioned; only they say God is ready to remove this necessity of sinning from all, and every one. 2. But the meaning of Remigius and the Church of Lions is the same with that of Prosper formerly mentioned, in his answer to the objection of Vincentius, where he confesseth, Hominem non redemptum Diabolo esse captivum, a man not redeemed is captivated by Satan; and that, creatura peccatrix poenalem dominationem Diaboli merito patitur, cui (relicto vero domino) sponte se vendidit. The creature sinning deservedly suffers the dominion of Satan by way of punishment, as to whom he sold himself voluntarily. Haec quippe servitus non institutio est Dei sed judicium. This slavery of man to Satan is not God's institution but judgement; that is God brought it upon him not of his mere pleasure, but in the way of judgement. Like as Aug. cont. julian: Pela: l. 5. c. 3. Austin in like manner acknowledgeth, concupiscence to be, not sin only, but the punishment of sin also. So Remigius and the Church of Lions say; that God imposed it not on Adam but man falling from God brought a necessity of sinning upon him, & upon all his race; God hereupon justly withdrawing his holy Spirit from him. 2. Why he should allege the first passage under the name of the Church of Lions, I know not; The reverend Bishop acknowledgeth Florus to be the Author thereof, a Deacon of Lions pag. 126. Although the same Reverend Bishop acknowledgeth that other book also that goes under the name of the Church of Lions now extant in the Bibliothecâ Sanctorum Patrum; and wherehence Vossius communicateth unto us his excerpta, was written by the same Florus pag. 115. He had more reason to father his next passage, which he produceth out of Remigius upon the Church of Lions. For albeit Maldonat citys the book entitled Liber de tribus Episcoporum epistolis (whence this passage is taken under the name of Remigius) yet he who set it forth ascribes it to the Church of Lions, and that by the direction of the Copy, which was in the hands of Nicholas Faber, as appears Goteschalc: hist.: 170. But none do I find to ascribe this work of Florus to the Church of Lions, though the Author of another book under that title, the Bishop acknowledgeth to be Florus. 3. Florus acknowledgeth that the very Saints of God are under a necessity of sin in a sort, p. 149. In Sanctis licet sit liberum arbitrium jam Christi gratiâ liberatum atque Sanctum; tamen tanta est illa sanitas, ut quamdiu mortaliter vivunt sine peccato esse non possint, & cum velint atque desiderent non peccare non possunt tamen non peccare. In the Saints of God though there be freedom of will, as freed by the grace of Christ, and made holy, yet this health is such, that as long as they carry this mortal body about them they cannot be without sin: and though they would and desire to be without sin, yet they cannot be without sin. This I conceive is spoken in respect of the flesh lusting against the Spirit; & of the law in our members rebelling against the law of our mind, & leading us captive to the law of sin. How much more are the wicked in bondage Rome 7. to sin and Satan, as the same Florus showeth pag. 142? For whereas Scotus taught, that a man had not lost his liberty, but only the power and vigour of his liberty. Florus opposeth him thus, Non rectè dicit, quia nec sentit, he saith not well, because he thinks not well; sed sicut vigorem & potestatem libertatis, ita ipsam perdidit libertatem, ut jam ipse ad verum bonum unde cecidit liber esse non possit. As he hath lost the vigour and power of his liberty; so he hath lost liberty itself, insomuch that unto true good, from whence he is fallen, he cannot be free; to wit, until he be freed by the grace of Christ. In like manner Remigius discourseth also, granting free will only to evil, p. 36. In infidelibus id ipsum liberum arbitrium ita per Adam damnatum & perditum, in operibus mortuis liberum esse potest, in vivis non potest. In infidels free will itself, so damned and lost in Adam, may be free in dead works, cannot be free in living works that is, is not free to produce works belonging to a spiritual life. So that they unanimously confess that in respect of original sin, there is a necessity of sinning, but this is rightly to be understood; namely thus, that true good they cannot do, so that whatsoever they do is evil, only that it is free unto them to do this or that evil, which is most true. Secondly, thus far they qualify this necessity of sinning, that never any man is carried by the Divine providence, so as to sin whether they will or no. For albeit Rabanus charged them, whom he opposed herewith, pag. 53. Si enim secundum ipsos qui talia sentiunt, Dei praedestinatio invitum hominem facit peccare, quomodo Deus justo judicio, damnat peccantem, cum ille non voluntate, sed necessitate peccaverit. For if, according to them who think such things, God's predestination makes a man to sin against his will; how doth God in his just judgment damn him that sinneth, when he sinned not voluntarily but necessarily? Thus they criminated their adversaries: but Remigius answers on their behalf, who were thus falsely accused Nemo ita sentit aut dicit quod Dei predestinatio aliquem invitum faciat peccare, ut jam non propriae voluntatis perversitate, sed divinae praedestinationis necessitate peccare videatur. No man so thinks or speaks, that God's predestination makes a man to sin against his will; so that a man should seem to sin, not by the perversity of his own will, but by the necessity of divine predestination. But this is the work of Divine predestination, that he who sins willingly, & perseveres willingly in his sins, shall against his will be punished. And the truth is taking predestination as it signifies preparation of Grace, or God's decree to confer this, rather God's not predestinating a man, or not giving grace, and not making him to be of God, is the cause why a man sinneth, according to that of our Saviour. He that is of God heareth God's Jo: 8. words▪ ye therefore hear them not, because ye are not of God. Yet this is rightly to be understood. for God's not conferring regenerating grace is rather the cause why their natural corruption is not cured, then that they go on in their sinful courses: for naturally carnal men are prone enough to sin, and in this course they necessarily continue, until God changeth their hearts; necessarily I say, but not against their wills. For sin is as a sweet morsel, which they roll under their tongue. This may suffice for answer unto these passages, and withal to represent the vanity of this Author's discourse, endeavouring to brand our doctrine with making God the Author of sin; more of this hereafter; For I am acquainted with that which he here conceals, and with certain adjuncts thereunto, both touching the opinion of the Church of Lions concerning falling from grace; as also this Authors bold adventure in two particulars in justifying Vossius, citing the confession of Pelagius as one of Austin's sermons; as also defending him in the point of the predestinarian heresy, which Doctor Usher maintains to be a mere fiction of the Semipelagians to bring Austin's doctrine thereby into disgrace. But Vossius conceives that there was indeed such an heresy, and that the Monks of Adrumetum were the Authors of it. And this Interpolatour takes Vossius his part, and labours by certain arguments to make it good against he judicious observations of that most reverend and learned Archbishop of Armagh. It may be I shall represent my answer thereunto by wa●●● digression; but first I must dispatch my answer to this I have in hand. Sect: 6. Many distinctions are brought to free the Supralapsarian way from this crimination all which (me thinks) M. Mason's Addit. p. 31. 32, 33, 34. are no● better than mere delusions of the simple and inconsiderate, and give no true satisfaction to the understanding. There is say they a twofold decree. 1. First an operative, by which God positively and efficaciously worketh allthings. 2. A permissive, by which he decreeth only to let it come to pass. If God should work sin by an operative decree, than he should be the Author of sin, but not if he decree by a permissive decree to let it come to pass, and this only they say they maintain. It is true that God hath decreed to suffer sin; for otherwise there would be none. Who can bring forth that which God will absolutely hinder? He suffered Adam to sin, leaving him in the hand of his own counsel, Ecclus. 15. 14. He suffered the nations in time past to walk in their own ways Act: 14. 16. And daily doth he suffer both good and bad to fall into many sins; And this he doth, not because he stands in need of sin for the setting forth of his glory; for he hath no need of the sinful man. Ecclus. 15. But partly because he is (summus provisor) supreme moderator of the world, and knoweth how to use that well which is ill done, and to bring good out of evil; and especially for that reason which Tertullian prelleth, namely, because man is made by God's own gracious constitution, a free creature undetermined in his actions, until he determine himself; And therefore may not be hindered from sinning by omnipotency, because God useth not to repeal his own ordinances. 2. It is true also that a permissive decree is no cause of sin, because it is merely extrinsecall to the sinner, and hath no influence at all upon the sin. It is an antecedent only, and such a one too, as being put, sin followeth not of necessity. And therefore it is fitly contradistinguisht to an operative decree. And if that side would in good earnest, impute no more in sinful events to divine power, than the word Permission, imports, their main conclusion would fall, and the controversy between, us end. But first, many of them reject this distinction utterly, and will have God to decree sin (efficaciter) with an energetical and working will. Witness that discourse of Beza wherein he a verreth and laboureth to prove, that God doth not only permit sin but will it also: And witness Calvin too, who hath a whole section against it, call it a carnal Colloq Mompel: 2 part. p. 177. Cal: instit. lib. 14. c 18. Sect: 1. vers. 2. distinction invented by the flesh, and (effugium) a mere evasion to shift off this seeming absurdity, that that man is made blind (Deo volente & jubente) by God's will and command; who must shortly after be punished for his blindness; He calleth it also (figmentum) a fiction, and saith they do (ineptire) play the fools that use it. By many reasons also doth he endeavour to lay open the weakness of it, taxing those who understand such Scriptures as speaks of God's smiting men with a Spirit of slumber and giddiness, of blinding their minds, infatuating and hardening their hearts etc. Of a permission and suffering of men to be blinded, and hardened, Nimis frivola est ista solutio, saith he, it is too frivolous a gloss. In another place he blameth those that refer sin to God's prescience only, calling their speeches (argutiae) tricks and quirks which Scripture Id: ibid. lib. 2, c. 4. Sect. 3. will not bear; and those likewise that ascribe it to God's permission, and saith, what they bring touching the Divine permission in this business will not hold water. They that admit the word permissive, do willingly mistake it, and while, to keep of this blow, they use the word, they corrupt the meaning. For 1. Permission is an act of God's consequent and judiciary will, by which he punisheth men for abusing their freedom, and committing such sins day by day, as they might have avoided; and to which he proceedeth (lento gradu) slowly and unwillingly, as we may see, Psal: 81. 11. 12. Israel would none of me, so I gave them up etc. Ezeh: 18. 39 Go and serve every one his Idol, seeing ye will not obey me etc. Rome 1. 21. 24. Because when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, therefore God gave them up unto their hearts lusts, to vile affections and to a Reprobate mind. Rev. 22. 11. He that is unjust let him be unjust still. In these places and many more we may see, that persons left to themselves are sinners only; and not all sinners, but the obstinate and wilful, which will by no means be reclaimed. But the permission which they mean, is an act of God's antecedent will, exercised about innocent men lying under no guilt at all in God's eternal consideration. 2. Permission about whomsoever it is exercised, obstinate sinners, or men considered without sin, is no more than a not hindering of them from falling, that are able to stand, & supposeth a possibility of sinning or not sinning, in the parties permitted; but with them it is a withdrawing or withholding of grace needful for the avoiding of sin, and so includeth an absolute necessity of sinning. For from the withdrawing of such grace sin must needs follow; as the fall of Dagon's house followed Sampson's plucking away the Pillars that were necessary for the upholding of it. Maccovius in two disputations, expounding this word (Permission) circumscribes it within two acts. The first of which is a Substraction of Divine assistance, necessary to the preventing Colloq: Theol. disp: 9 pag. 10. of sin; And having proved it by two arguments, that none may think he is alone in this, he saith, that he is compassed about with a cloud of witnesses, and produceth two. The first of them is our reverend and learned Whitaker, some of whose words alleged by him are these, Permission of sin is a privation of the aid, which being present, sin would have been hindered. The second is Pareus, for saying that that help (which God withdrew from Adam) being withdrawn, Adam could not so use his endowments, as to persevere. And this doctrine, saith he, is defended by our men, as it appeareth out of Pareus lib, de great primi hominis c. 4 p. 46. Their permission therefore of sin being a substraction of necessary grace, is equivalent to an actual effectual procuring and working of it▪ For (Causa deficiens in necessariis est eficiens) a deficient cause in things necessary is truly efficient) and so is but a mere figleaf to cover the foulness of their opinion. Here we have a very demure discourse proceeding in a positive manner, proceeding from Answer. one that takes upon him to be a Master and dictator of sentences; wherein there is little or nothing sound that he delivers of his own; or to purpose that he delivers of others. Nothing of any colour of pertinency, besides what he delivers in the last place touching our opinion of the nature of permission of sin. And I willingly confess, The divine permission of sin is a very obscure point, and in my judgement most come short in the explication thereof Arminius hath a large digression upon this place of Permission in general, and of permission of sin in special: It was the first piece of Arminius, the examination whereof I undertook only with a mind to search after satisfaction therein. And finding no content therein, I gave myself to inquire thereof in a positive manner; wherein I proceeded very far, setting down in foul papers, as they came to hand, whatsoever came into my mind thereabout, which grew into a large proportion, and then set myself upon preconceived grounds reasonably well disscurssed by me, to deal with Arminius some five Sections after the beginning of his discourse on this argument, which five first Sections I took not into examination, until I had dispatched the whole. And having an occasion to deal upon this argument when I came to the defence of M. Perkins his answer to the third crimination, whereupon I deal in the second book of my Vindiciae, I thought good to digress after the second Section, & to call a certain proposition of M. Perkins to account, which was this, Quod Deus non impedit, ideo evenit, quia Deus non impedit. It is the third Digression of the second book, the title whereof is this, Propositio illa Perkinsii (quod Deus non impedit, ideo evenit, quia Deus non impedit) sub examen revocatur. There is no digression throughout that book of mine that affords more variety of Philosophical and Theological contemplations, then that; and all about the nature of permission. First, in things natural. Secondly, in things moral. And these first in good things. Secondly, in evil things. In the course whereof many obscurities and difficulties do offer themselves to be cleared, & solved by distinction; where coming to an end, I deliver myself in this manner. I perceive in how slippery an argument I exercise myself, too much exposed to the calumny of adversaries, and too apt to incur the dislike of good men; whereas in all my labour I aim at nothing else, then according to my power to explicate the mystery of Divine providence governing all things after a wonderful manner; And to dissemble nothing, but represent all difficulties that do occur, that both my adversaries may have at hand what to impugn; Our Divines wherein to take pains, either by way of explication of what yet remains obscure; or by confirmation of what they shall find to be sound yet unsufficiently proved. Now that Digression of mine being so large, I wonder not a little that no one particular thereof is here called to an account by this Divine. And so may others too when they shall consider against whom this man's stomach works most. For he cannot be ignorant of my answer to M. Hoord his proselyte, if not therein to himself. Again, the exception here in the last place taken against our doctrine of permission, is exactly the same with Arminius his exception against Mr. Perkins in dealing upon the third crimination, which there I have answered at large, and that in such manner, that I willingly profess, I was utterly to seek at this time, of what I had there delivered; so that upon my consulting the place, the things I there met with, seemed new unto me, in discovering many ways the inconsequence of Arminius his discourse, which yet is the very same with this of Mr. Mason's. Yet he hath not replied upon any one line of all that I delivered there, though they are above 600 in the second Edition of that book. But it may be he takes that for no better than an idle discourse (yet an answer it is to this very exception of his) & 'tis enough for him to convince the justness of that exception made by Arminius, by sound argument. And what is that but a rule given by him, upon his own credit, without indication of the least authority to confirm it; And though on the contrary I have divers and sundry ways manifested the falseness thereof: well I am not resolved to suffer him to pass unanswered, how idle soever his discourse may appear to be. Four distinctions of ours he proposeth to invade; not one of them is pretermitted by Arminius in his answer unto Perkins, nor any part of that his answer pretermitted by me. But this is written in English for the indoctrinating of the people, as I remember what was said of M. Hoards discourse; namely, that it was fit to be copied out, and communicated unto the Country. He saith these distinctions are, delusions of the simple; when he proves it, than it will be time enough to believe it. But whereas, he saith, they give no true satisfaction to the understanding, this is rightly to be understood, to wit, in reference to an Arminian understanding corrupted with the leaven of Pelagidnisme. Yet is he not privy to the understanding of all, so much as of all that are of his own Tenet. But suppose they do not. The distinctions used by School-Divines to accommodate God's predestination with man's free will, are many and learned, but Caietan professeth of them all that they do not, quietare intellectum, satisfy the understanding; but what follows; Therefore saith he, Ego captivo meum in obsequium fidei; I captivate mine unto the obedience of faith to wit, because Scripture is evident for both: And why should it seem strange that God's providence in governing the world should be of a mysterious nature. And however this Author may censure Caietane in this, yet Alvarez professeth that herein, doctissimè, & piissimè loquitur; he speaks most learnedly and most piously. Yet permission, in the judgement of Suarez, is not merely a negation of prohibition, but conjunct with a positive operation in concurring to the act of sin; which Aquinas hath proved to be à Deo, from God, though the obliquity of the act be not. And the truth is, man himself is not operative in sin, otherwise then as touching the substance of the act. For sin, as sin hath no cause efficient, but deficient only, as Austin hath long ago delivered; neither hath he been opposed herein by any that I know. Observe how with him to hinder, and absolutely to hinder is made all one; yet to will, and absolutely to will in God, is not all one in his opinion. I do not find that God left Adam in the hand of his counsel. For he forbade him to eat of the forbidden fruit, which is somewhat more than to dissuade from it. And yet to persuade or dissuade another, is not to leave him in the hands of his own counsels. For it is to impart unto him another counsel. Yet though we dissuade a brother, and so not leave him in the hand of his own counsel; yet we still leave him to his own free will. Both these I have insisted upon more at large in the second book in my Vindiciae, Sect: 2. Digres. 3. It is true God hath no need of setting forth his own glory, no more than he hath need of making the world; but the existence of sin may be and is necessarily required to the setting forth of God's glory in some attributes of his. For neither can the glory of God's mercy appear in pardoning sin, nor the glory of his vindicative justice, (called in Scripture his wrath, Rome 9 23.) in punishing sin, unless there be sin to be pardoned, and sin to be punished: Nor the glory of his power and wisdom in working good out of evil, unless God give way to the committing of Evil. And if upon God's permission of sin, it be not necessary that sin exist, than it is not in the Almighty power of God infallibly to procure the manifestation of his glory, either in the way of mercy pardoning it, or in the way of justice punishing it. But seeing these reasons are not considerable with this supercilious Theologue, it should seem likely, that look what he substitutes in the place thereof, will prove substantial, and satisfy such understandings as his own: And that he represents out of Tertullian, namely, because man is made by God a free creature. This reason was represented by Arminius before him, and that out of Tertullian, Arminius his husks are pleasing Lib: 1. cont: Martion. to him. Such was the condition of the prodigal child when he forsook his Father; the provender of Swine was acceptable to him. Yet he could not have enough of that. Is not man a free creature to perform natural acts as well as moral; and moral good as well as evil? Nay are not the Children of God made free by Christ to the performance of actions spiritual? What therefore must God only permit them to perform them, and by no means work them to the performance of faith, and repentance, and all manner of obedience; yea and keep them from sinning against him, as he kept Abimelech, Gen: 20? See how this Author displays himself ere he was aware; and withal what the reason is why he affects to deal upon reprobation only, not upon election or grace lest his vile opinion miserably defacing the glory of God's grace might appear with open face in ' its proper colours. Yet it breaks forth more than he could wish, in setting down the end why God permits sin, to wit, because men are free creatures, therefore it becomes not God to work their wills to this or that, but only to permit them to do what they will; if they will sin to permit them; if they would do any good work whether it be faith or repentance, or any other good work, or to abstain from sin, to permit that also; whereby it is apparent that God by his opinion hath no more hand in working a man to any good work (excepting the act of commanding and persuading the one, and not the other) then in working them unto evil. For because they are free creatures, therefore it becomes God to leave them unto themselves, and permit them to do what they will, whether it be good or evil: otherwise God should nullify his own institution in making them free Agents. Yet consider farther how herein he contradicts the very principles of his own side, both Arminians and Jesuits. For Arminius maintains that God can hinder a man effectually from the committing of sin without any prejudice to the liberty of their wills. The like do the Jesuits maintain in their doctrine of grace effectual in the way of congruity, namely, that God can bring any man to faith, to obedience, to any good work, and accordingly preserve him from any sin by virtue of grace effectual, which is shaped by them in such a manner, as to be no way prejudicial to the liberty of their wills. But Tertullia's authority hath abused his fancy, and exposed him to lay open himself in so shameful a manner. Yet Tertullian will not serve his turn any more, than it doth serve Arminius his turn, as I have showed in my answer to Arminius lib. 1. part. prima de praedest. Sect: 7, and that at large. Secondly, the reasons he brings for the contradistinction of decree permissive, from decree operative, are very vain. For 1, the decree operative is extrinsecall to the sinner, as well as the decree permissive. Secondly, neither hath it any influence at all upon the sin (as which admits no efficient cause thereof being of a mere privative nature) but upon the substance of the act, which I presume this Author will not deny. Thirdly, the decree permissive is not an antecedent only, but such as being put, sin follows of necessity, as well as upon the position of the decree operative; that is of necessity, by supposition, not necessity absolute. For as Aquinas hath delivered and proved, not only the things themselves come to pass by virtue of God's decree, but, modi rerum, several conditions of them. As for example, necessary things, necessarily; contingent things, contingently; free actions, freely; And that thus the things permitted do always come to pass, not only Piscator with our Divines, as Mr. Perkins, Doctor Whitaker and Pareus do avouch, but Vorstius also and Arminius, as I have showed in my Vindiciae, lib. 2. digres. 3. Arminius his words are these, if God permits a man to will this or that, necesse est, it must needs be, ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolendum, that no kind of argument move him to will it. Navarettus the Dominican professeth the same, in quaest. 19 pag. prima art. 6. pag. 65. col: 1. 1. That this distinction is rejected by our Divines this Author brings no tolerable evidence. As for Beza here it is confessed, that he acknowledgeth God to permit sin, and whereas he adds that he wills it too, it is nothing contradictory to the former. For to permit sin (speaking of permission divine) is to will that sin shall come to pass by God's permission. And Austin hath professed of those things that come to pass by God's Enchirid. 9 5 permission, that they come to pass, Deo volente, God willing them. And the Scripture acknowledgeth as much, that the Kings in prostituting their Royal authority, to the executing the pleasure of the Beast, did herein fulfil the will of God. So that God's permissive decree is as effectual in its kind, as the operative decree in ' its kind; thus far, that like as what God means to work shall come to pass; so look what God means to permit, that also shall come to pass. Neither do I know any Arminian or Jesuit, that denies God's operative decree, as touching the very act of sin, by way of concurrence in the producing of it. When Calvin will have the evil of sin come to pass, Deo volente, God willing it, he denies not any more than Beza doth, that it comes to pass by God's permission of it. But Calvin rests not in a bare permissions and no marvel. For the Scripture saith not, that God permitted Pharaoh to refuse to let Israel go, but plainly and energetically thus; I will harden Pharaoh's heart that he shall not let Israel go, I will harden Pharaoh's heart that he shall follow after them, I will rend the Kingdom from Solomon; not I will permit it to be rent; and so throughout. Bellarmine himself contents not himself with a bare permission, but farther saith, God doth rule and govern the wills of wicked men; yea, torquet & flectit, he wrists and bends them. And Austin often saith, he inclines them unto evil. And whereas it is farther added out of Calvin that a man is blind, volente & jubente Deo, God willing and commanding it. Is it not express Scripture, Es. 6. 10. Make the heart of this people fat, make their ears heavy, and shut their eyes. So that Calvin doth but accommodate himself to Scripture phrase. But when we come to the explication of this either in Christian reason, or by comparing one place of Scripture with an other, we say that to Make their hearts fat, their ears heavy, and to shut their eyes: And to give them the Es. 6. 10. Rome 11. 8. Dent: 29. 4 Spirit of slumber, eyes that they should not see, and ears that they should not hear; Is no more then, not to give them hearts to perceive, nor eyes to see, nor ears to hear. Yet where Calvin saith this, I cannot find, the quotation here is so disturbed; but I guess the Author would refer us to lib. 1. Institut. cap. 18. prima & secunda Sect: But I find no such thing there, but speaking of God's providence in blinding Ahab, thus he writes, Vult Deus perfidum Ahab decipi; God will have perfidious Ahab to be deceived. This is plain out of the Sect: 1. 1 Kings 22. 20. Who shall entice Ahab that he may go, and fall at Ramoth Gilead; operam suam offert Diabolus ad eam rem, The Devil offers his service for this, saith Calvin. And doth not the Scripture expressly testify as much? There came forth a Spirit and stood before the Lord, and said I will entice him; And the Lord said unto him, wherewith? And he said, I will go out and be a false Spirit in the mouth of all his Prophets. Calvin goes on, Mittitur cum vers. 21. certo mandato, ut sit Spiritus mendax in ore omnium Prophetarum; God sends him with a certain command to become a lying Spirit in the mouth of all Ahab's Prophets. This also the Scripture testifies as expressly, as the former; Then the Lord said, thou shalt entice him and prevail also; Go forth and do so. Now let the indifferent judge, whether this Author vers. 22. might not as well calumniate the Holy Ghost the Inditer of this Scripture, as Calvin who proceeds but according unto Scripture in that which he delivers. Now let every sober man judge whether hereby it doth not manifestly appear, Excoecari Achabum, that Ahab was blinded by the Devil, Deo volente ac jubente, the Lord willing and commanding it; but this taken apart from the instance in reference whereunto it is delivered, a man might suspect his meaning were, that God commands a man to shut his own eyes, & blind himself. And judge I pray whether to say, that this whole providence of God concerning Ahab, was no more than permission, deserves not to be called, figmentum, a fiction, as indeed Calvin calleth it. To this he adds the joint profession of the Apostles touching God's providence in crucifying of Christ; in Absalom's incest, the Chaldees bloody execution in the land of juda, and the Assyrians before them, which in Scripture is called the work of Act: 4. 28. Act: 2. 23. 2 Sam: 16. 22, & 12. 12. God etc. And concludes it to be manifest, Nugari eos & ineptire, qui in locum providentiae Dei nudam permissionem substituunt, that they do but toy and trifle, who in place of God's providence substitute a naked permission. And this Author doth but calumniate Calvin's expression, in rendering the word ineptire, by playing the fool. Ineptire in the propriety thereof, is in this case to fail of fit and congruous interpretation and accommodation. And may he not justly tax those who understand such Scriptures, as speak of God's smiting men with the Spirit of slumber and giddiness, of blinding their minds, infatuating and hardening their hearts of a permission, and suffering of men to be blinded and hardened? I had thought common sense might have justified him in this; taking Calvin aright, who denies not permission in all this, but nudam permissionem, naked permission; as much as to say these Scripture passages do signify more than permission; And as I have said before Bellarmin himself doth not satisfy himself with a naked permission in such like providence divine as here is mentioned. I think he may justly say that to explicate excecation and obduration by permission is such an explication as will satisfy no sober man, and that such a solution is too frivolous. And as for God's prescience, it is apparent that the horrible outrages committed upon the holy Son of God, the Scripture testifies not to have been foreknown only by God, but by the hand and counsel of God predetermined also; & more than this, clear reason doth justify that the ground of God's foreknowing aught, is his foredetermining of it, as I have often proved by invincible demonstration. 2. Who mistakes the nature of permission most, we or this censurer, let the indifferent judge. It is apparent that he puts no difference between permission humane, and permission Divine. Sure I am Suarez requires to permission divine a concurrence to the act, the obliquity whereof is permitted. And more than that both Scotus of old without question, and the Dominicans of late, and Bradwardine before them maintain this concurrence to be by way of determining the will to every act thereof. But all these mistake the nature of permission, if we believe this Author upon his word wherein he carrieth himself very authoritatively, no Pope like him. Yet he is ready to give his reason for it, though with manifest contradiction to himself, but let us consider it. 1. Permission is an act of God's consequent and judiciary will, by which he punisheth men for abusing their freedom etc. Most untrue, and manifestly convictable of untruth by that which himself delivered but a little before in this very Section, where he said, It is true that God hath decreed to suffer sin; for otherwise there would be none. By this it is manifest that whensoever sin is committed, there had place God's permission of sin, otherwise there would have been no sin, therefore permission had place in the very first sin that was committed by man, and Angels. Judge Reader with what felicity he comes to censure and correct the mistakes of others about permission. As Austin sometimes said of one opposing him, noverit se esse obduratum; so mayest thou not say of this Author in this discourse of his, noverit se esse excaecatum, let him take notice how himself is blinded? The Lord giving Israel up to their own hearts lusts; he like a resolute Doctor will have to proceed by way of mere permission. Yet the Lord saith not, he permitted Ps: 81. 11. 12, them to their own lusts; and Rome 1. 24, 26, 28. Observe, first look what he permitted came to pass throughout, even to abominable courses. Secondly, observe, the judgement of God is noted herein. They received the recompense of their own error as was meet. What? And are God's judgements executed only by God's permission, and that by the hands of them that are judged and punished? Such is the accurateness of this Authors divinity coming to correct the mistakes of others about permission. And for the proof of all this we have this author's bare word without any reason or authority represented by him. As for that of Ezechiel not chap: 18. 39, but chap: 20. 39 Go and serve every one his Idels; this hath the form of a command, rather than of a permission; but the Lord hereby signifies, that in serving him, while they serve other Gods, they do but profane his holy name in serving him, and undoubtedly they provoked God more hereby, than the heathens who served not him at all, but other Gods only. So that the Lord seems to signify, that he had rather, they should not serve him at all, as Revelations 3. I would thou wer'st either hot or cold, but seeing thou art lukewarm, I will spew thee out of my mouth; But be it as the Author would have it, did here God begin to permit them? their former disobedience was it not a consequent of God's permission? For if God had not permitted their disobedience, surely it had not been by the Authors discourse in the beginning of this Section. As touching that Revelations 22. 11. I hope by the same rule of this positive Theologue, not only their continuing to be unjust, was by God's permission, but their first being and beginning to be unjust was by God's permission also. And surely if this man's word be of any credit, all sinners were first permitted to sin, otherwise they had never sinned, and not the obstinate and wilful only. Were not the Angels innocent before their first sin? was not Adam innocent before his first sin? and did not God permit both Angels and men to sin their first sin? If not; what truth is in this author's word, when he said, God hath decreed to suffer sin? for otherwise there would be none. And if he be not worthy to be believed, in this his credit is cracked, and deserves not to be believed in aught. 2. We have been more beholding unto this Author, since he came to meet with our distinctions, then throughout all his former discourse; as I have showed already in part, & shall discover more by God's help (not his permission only) ere we part from this. He seems to be conscious of some thing and fearful of giving too much advantage, as appears by his expression, when he saith that permission (of sin; for so he should say) supposeth a possibility of sinning or not sinning. Now this is nothing congruous to his former expressions whereby it was made to suppose that, a man is able to stand. For to be able to stand, is to have an active power in him whereby he is able to stand; but to have a possibility of standing, or not sinning is not so. For though a man hath no power in himself to stand or to abstain from sin, yet if there be a power in God to makehim stand, and to preserve him from falling, this is sufficient to make good, that a man hath a possibility of standing and abstaining from sin. And we are willing to confess that God is able not only to preserve any man that stands from falling, but also to raise any Hist: Gotesch: pag. 142. man that is fallen; and to make him stand. Thus Florus, Habet homo post illam damnationem liberum arbitrium, quo propriâ voluntate inclinari potest & inclinatur ad malum, habet liberum arbitrium quo possit assurgere ad bonum; Ut autem assurgat ad bonum, non est propriae virtutis, sed gratiae Dei miserantis. Name & qui mortuus est dici potest posse vivere, non tamen suâ virtute, sed Dei. Ita & liberum arbitrium hominis semel sauciatum, semel mortuum potest sanari, non tamen suâ virtutè, sed gratiâ miserantis Dei. Et ideo omnes homines admonentur, omnibus verbum praedicatur, quia habent posse credere, posse converti ad Deum; ut verbo extrinsecus admonente, & Deo intus suscitante, qui audiunt, reviviscant. After Adam's fall man hath free will, whereby of his own accord he may be and is inclined unto evil, he hath free will whereby he may arise unto that which is good; but to arise unto Good is not of his own power, but of God's grace commiserating. For of him also who is dead, it may be said, that he may live, yet not of his own power, but by the power of God. So the free will of men being once wounded, once dead may be healed not by ' its own power, but by the grace of God showing mercy. And therefore all men are admonished, the word is preached unto all, because this they have that they may believe, they may be converted unto God; to the end that by the word admonishing outwardly, and God stirring them up inwardly, they which hear may be revived. Observe by the way a manifest incongruity in saying that permission is a not hindering them from falling, who are able to stand For they who are permitted to fall, and not hindered from falling, are supposed to stand, and not only to be able to stand. It seems this Author cannot endure that Permission of sin, should consist in the withholding of a grace needful, to abstain from sin. Whence it followeth evidently that in this Author's opinion, either God's permission of sin is not the withholding of any grace at all; or if it be it is the withholding only of such a grace, without which nevertheless man may keep himself from sin; and consequently, though such a grace be granted, yet it is indifferent for him to sin, as well as to abstain from sin; If it be no withholding of grace at all, it follows that like as when a man sins it is not for want of grace: So when a man abstaines from sin, it is not by virtue of any grace of God granted him thereunto; Yet the Lord tells Gen: 20. 6. King Abimelech expressly I kept thee from sinning against me. If he pretends that some grace is withheld whensoever a man sinneth, but will not say that is was necessary for the avoiding of sin it followeth that when man is permitted to sin, he is no more apt to sin, then while such grace was denied him, and consequently no more apt to abstain from sin when such a grace is granted him, and consequently in granting such a grace he permits him still to sin, as well as in denying it; and in denying he permits him to do good, as much as in granting it; So that still it is not God that keepeth a man from sin, as often as he abstaineth from it, but merely the power of his own free will. Whereby it is evident that this Author as well denies, that God is the Author of any good, as that he is the Author of any evil: But man is Author of the one as well as of the other. The power of doing good he will grant is from God, neither can it be denied, but that the power of doing evil is from God. He will grant likewise that God is ready to concur to any good act if man will, and I presume he will not deny, but that God concurres also to the substance of every evil act. The only difference that remains is this; God persuades only to good, and dissuades only that which is evil. Now this third and last assertion we grant as well as he. Yet he lays to our charge that we make God the Author of evil, but cares not at all how he denies God to be the Author of any good in the actions of men, and makes no place for any grace save such, as is hortatory, which is performed usually by the ministry of men. Yet consider what Bradwardine sometimes Archbishop of Canterbury Elect hath written in this kind before Luther or Calvin were borne. The title of the fourth chapter of his second book is this. That free will being tempted cannot of his own strength without the help of God and his grace overcome any temptation. Of the first this, that free will strengthened with what created grace soever cannot without another special succour of God overcome any temptation. of the sixth this, that, That special succour of God is the unconquerable grace of God. Of the seventh this; That no man though not tempted, can by the strength of his free will alone without created grace or with created grace, how great soever it be, without the special assistance of God avoid any sin: & all these propositions he demonstrates with variety of argument. Behold the ingenuity of this Author; He flies in the face of Calvin and Beza, and other our Divines, for maintaining that unless God by his grace keep and preserve a man effectually from sinning, it cannot be that he should abstain from sin. Bradwardine maintained the same before any of these were borne yet he saith nothing to him, le's all his arguments alone; but upbraids us for maintaining the same doctrine, without giving any reason to convict us of our error. Add to this, which I have omitted, the corollary of that seventh chapter in Bradwardin formerly mentioned is this, That it is the will of God, which preserves them that are tempted from falling, and them that are not tempted, both from temptation and from sin. Not one of the arguments whereby he confirms any of these positions, doth this Author go about to answer. In like manner Alvarez. Positâ permissione divinâ infallibiliter Lib. 9 the auxil disp: 101 p. 803. num. 7 lin: penult: peccat homo; upon supposition of God's permission, man sins infallibly. The proposition he intends to prove in that disputation is this, Therefore a man is not converted because he is not aided of God. But both he and we deny that hereupon a man sinneth necessarily always, but only in some cases. In some cases it followeth, as namely a man borne in sin, and in the state of corruption, the natural fruits whereof are infidelity and impenitency, until God affords a man the grace of regeneration, he cannot believe, he cannot repent. They that are in the flesh cannot please God. Thou after the hardness of thy heart that cannot repent. Therefore they could not believe. In which case God is not the cause of infidelity, and Ro: 8. Ro: 2. Io: 12. impenitency; but these proceed naturally and necessarily from that original corruption wherein they are conceived and borne. God is only the natural cause why this their natural corruption continues uncured. For none can cure it but God, it being a work nothing inferior to the raising of them from the dead. Yet he is no culpable cause of this. For as much as he is not bound to any, but he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. So that necessarily without the grace of regeneration, every man continueth in his natural corruption, devoid of faith, of hope, and love. These being supernatural, and whereunto no man can attain with out supernatural grace. In like manner, hence it followeth that no natural man can perform any moral good act in a gracious & acceptable manner in the sight of God, because ●he fountains of such performances, are not found in natural men. But they have a free power as to commit any natural evil work; so to abstain from it; though not in a gracious manner: Free power as to abstain from any virtuous act, so to perform it also, though not in a gracious manner. They may be temperate, chaste, just, and the like; but their virtuous actions are not truly virtues in a Christian account, because they know not God, nor Christ, much less do they believe in him, and perform these virtuous actions out of their love unto him. If Maccovius, and Whitaker, and Pareus be of the same mind, and the Dominicans with them, and Bradwardine before them all; let the indifferent Reader consider what an hungry opposition is made by this Author, not offering to answer any one of their Arguments, nor of mine neither, in my Vindiciae; Nor saith aught by way of reply upon any answer to the like argument of Arminius. The resolution of all that here he delivers, determining in a rule l. 2. digrs. 3. Criminat. 3. Sect: 2. himself proposeth, without reason or authority to justify it. A rule as here it is applied containing a notorious untruth. For causa deficiens in no case can be efficiens in proper speech, any more, then causa efficiens can be accounted deficiens, unless it be understood in divers kinds As for example, efficiens naturaliter may be deficiens moraliter, and deficiens moraliter may be efficiens naturaliter. An efficient cause naturally, may be deficient morally, and so a cause deficient morally, may be efficient naturally. Lest of all can it have place in the present question, which is of the cause of sin. For sin as sin, evil as evil, non habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem; hath no cause efficient, but deficient only; as Austin hath long ago determined; and it is a rule generally received and never that I know denied of any. Again causa deficiens in necessariis may be culpable I confess, and so interpretatiuè (as they say) may be interpreted to be as good as an efficient. As in a civil consideration it is said of the Magistrate, that, Qui non vetat peccare cum possit, jubet. He that forbiddeth not a man to sin when it is in his power, or when he hath authority to forbid, 'tis as if he should command the committing of that sin. Now this is only in such a case, where the necessity respects the person who is the deficient cause, as namely in case he be bound in duty to afford help and succour to him that cannot keep himself from sinning without the succour of an other, not otherwise. And therefore it reacheth not to God, who is not bound to preserve any man or creature from sinning; Lest of all is he bound to regenerate a man that is borne in sin. Adam was created in all sufficiency that the reasonable creature was capable of, without any proneness unto evil, but rather in a moral propension to that which was good; And his fall hath brought this corruption upon all mankind, even a necessity of sinning, as Arminius and Corvinus confess. He wanted no power to do that which was good, or to abstain from sin, but ever since his fall, impotency to that which is good, & proneness unto that which is evil hath been the natural inheritance of all mankind. And as for the permission of Adam's fall, his sin was in a thing naturally indifferent, the holiness of his nature not inclining him more to abstain from that fruit any more, then to partake of it. Neither do we say that God did withhold from Adam any grace that these our adversaries maintain to be necessary for the avoiding of that sin which was committed by him. How Adam himself was brought by Eve to eat of that fruit is not expressed. As for Eve the temptation which Satan used with her, & which did prevail is expressed: He alured her with the representation of the powerful nature of that, to make them as Gods knowing good and evil, & he made this seem credible by the very denomination which God gave unto the Tree, the Tree of knowledge of good and evil. It seems not likely that she knew who it was that spoke unto her in the Serpent, nor that she was acquainted with the fall of Angels. Then again the desire of knowledge, is no evil thing itself, or stands in any contradiction to the integrity of a reasonable creature: Nay nothing more agreeable to the nature of the best, it brings such a perfection with it. Only the error was, in affecting it this way. God did not keep the Devil off; nor reveal unto her who it was that spoke unto her; much less his apostatical condition; lest of all his project to supplant them. Neither did he quicken that holy fear which he had inspired into her to resist it at the first, & to go to her husband to acquaint him with it. She might think that the knowledge of good and evil might make her more fit for the service of God, then unfit. All which considered, her will being moved to seek this perfection by tasting of such a fruit, there was no cause or reason to hinder her from tasting it, save only the consideration of God's prohibition. For the will of every reasonable creature is naturally apt to affect that which is good, and though that good may prove evil in some circumstance, yet if that circumstance be not considered, the will proceeds to affect it. How long the Devil was exercised in this temptation we know not. Inconsideration is conceived by Durandus to be the original of that sin of theirs; and God was not bound to maintain this consideration quick in her, and of the danger of such a transgression. In fine she came to a will & resolution to taste of it; to the producing of this act, as a natural thing, the Lord concurred, as all confess, namely to the substance of the act. The question is whether he concurred to the effecting of it absolutely or conditionally? It was as true of Adam and Eve, that in him they lived and moved and had their being, as it is of us. We say God as a first cause moves every second cause; but agreeably to their natures; Necessary agents to work every thing they work necessarily; Free agents to do every thing they do, freely. But to say that God made them velle modo vellent, to will in case they would will, is so absurd as nothing more; The act of willing being hereby made the condition of itself, and consequently both before and after itself. See what I have delivered concerning this in my Vindiciae lib. 2. Digr: 3. and Digr: 6. of the nature of permission, more at large, where unto this Author is content to answer just nothing. Sect: 7. There are two things say they in every ill act. First, the material part which is the substance of the action. M. Mason's Addit. p. 34. 35. Secondly, the formal part which is the evil or obliquity of it. God is the Author of the action itself, but not of the obliquity and evil that cleaveth to it, as he that causeth a lame horse to go, is the cause of his going, but not of his lame going. And therefore it followeth not from their opinion that God is the Author of sin. First, all sins receive not this distinction, because of many sins, the acts themselves are sinful; as of the eating of the forbidden fruit, and Saul's sparing of Agag, and the fat beasts of the Amalekites. Secondly, It is not true that they make the decree of God only of actions, & not of their aberrations. For they make it to be the cause of all those means that lead to damnation and therefore of sinful actions, as sinful, and not as bare actions. For actions deserve damnation, not as actions but as transgressions of God's law. 3. To this simile I say that the Rider or Master that shall resolve first to flay his horse, or knock him on the head, and then to make him lame, that for his halting, he may kill him, is undoubtedly the cause of his halting: And so God if he determine to cast men into hell, and then to bring them into a state of sin, that for their sins he may bring them to ruin, we cannot conceive him to be less than the Author, as well of their sins, as of those actions to which they do inseparably adhere, and that out of God's intention to destroy them. This distinction of that which is material and that which is formal in sin is commonly used by Aquinas 1. secun: q: 71. art: 6, in corp: Augustinus in definitione peccati posuit duo, Answer. Unum quod pertinet ad substantiam actûs humani, quod est quasi materiale in peccato; cum dicit dictum vel factum vel concupitum; Aliud autem quod pertinet ad rationem mali quod est quasi formale in peccato cum dixit contra legem aeternam. So then the substance of the act is the material part in sin; And the opposition of this act to the law of God is the formal part of it, both according to Aquinas; and according to Austin also. And q: 75. art: 1. corp. He defineth sin to be Actus inordinatus, an inordinate act, and distinguisheth the act from the inordination of it. q: 79. art: 2. He proposeth the question, whether the act of sin be from God? and in the conclusion resolves it thus, Cum actus peccati sit ens, necessariò est à Deo, Considering that the act of sin is a thing having being, necessarily it is of God. And in the body of the Article, Dicendum quod actus peccati & est ens, & est actus, & ex utroque habet quod sit à Deo; The resolution is that the act of sin, is both a thing that hath being, and an act, and in each condition it hath, that it is of God. And he proves this both by authority and by reason. As for the defect of this act, that non reducitur in Deum tanquam in causam, sed in liberum arbitrium, that is not charged upon God as the cause thereof, but on a man's free will. And he illustrates it thus, Sicut defectus claudicationis reducitur in tibiam curvam sicut in causam, non autem in virtutem motivam à quâ tamen causatur quicquid est motionis in claudicatione. Like as the defect called halting is charged upon a crooked leg as the cause thereof, and not upon the motive faculty, though from it proceeds all the motion that is found in the halting: Neither did I ever read any School. Divine that contradicted this distinction. Mr. Mason doth without alleging any authority for it. Yet he might have alleged Arminius opposing after this manner, though before him, that I know, not any. 1. We say not only of many sins, but of every sin, which hath any act therein, that the Acts themselves are sinful, because every such sin, being actual, it is Actus cum defectu, an act with a defect, that is an act defective. As Aquinas speaks in the place immediately before alleged, and this defect is in respect of the law of God. As Austin defineth sin to be, dictum, factum, concupitum contra legem Dei, A thought, word, or deed against the law of God. And this is enough I think to denominate it sinful But the argument used by this Author is the very same which was formerly used by Arminius, and whereunto I have answered; lib. 2. the permiss. Sect: 21, and that after this manner. Be it so that the act itself is forbidden, and consequently the act itself is inordinate; but what will it therefore follow that these two are not to be distinguished, to wit, the act, and the inordination of it? a strange liberty of disputing. A man's hand is sometimes inordinate, as being monstrous, either having too much, or too little; as either wanting five fingers, or having more than five: what therefore shall it not be lawful for us to distinguish between the hand and the monstrosity of the hand? 2. The wall itself is white; what therefore shall we not distinguish between the wall, and the white colour of it? A man himself is virtuous and vicious; shall this hinder us from due distinguishing between the man and his moral condition, whether virtuous or vicious; Many other arguments are represented by Arminius which this Author toucheth not; yet in the place forementioned I have shaken them all to pieces, such is the rotten condition of them. And over & above I have proved, not that in every sin the act is to be distinguished from the inordination of it; but that in every sin of commission there is place for this distinction, and that after this manner. Every sin of commission, is an act inordinate; but in every inordinate act we are to distinguish between the act itself, and the inordination of it. And that the act and the inordination of it are two, I prove thus. That if they are one and the same then we may well say that the act is an inordination; but this is most false. For nothing can be affirmed or predicated of the same thing both in the abstract, and concrete (God himself excepted) As for example you may say of a wall, that it is white, you cannot say of it that it is whiteness. For the wall is in the predicament of substance, but whiteness being a colour is in the predicament of quality. 2. Again an inordination is a privation of order. But no act is formally a privation, and consequently neither can it be formally an inordination. 3. An entity positive, & a term privative cannot be one and the same formally, but two distinct notions. Now every act is a positive thing, but inordination is a mere privation. 4. Lastly God is confessed by all to be the cause of the act, but if the act be all one with the inordination, he should be the cause not of the act only, but of the inordination, that is of the sinfulness also. 2. Observe his shifting carriage. It is our Tenet that God is the Author of the action itself, but not of the obliquity: and himself hath expressly acknowledged this to be our tenet in the beginning of this Section Now whereas he makes show here of proving that we make God the Author not of the action only, but of the obliquity also, he performs no such matter; but only this, that we make the object of God's decree, not the action only, but the aberration also; but in all this there is no contradiction unto us; We willingly grant that in as much as God permits sin, he will have sin come to pass, by his permission, every good thing that comes to pass, he will have it come to pass by his being the Author of it and effecting it; the evil that comes to pass, he will have come to pass also, not by his being the Author of it and effecting it, but only by his permitting of it. So that still that of Austin holds good. Non aliquid fit nisi omnipotens fieri velit. Not any thing comes to pass unless God will have it come to pass. And according to the eleaventh article of religion established in the Church of Ireland, God from all eternity did by his unchangeable counsel ordain whatsoever in time shall come to pass; and according to the express word of God testifiing that the ten Kings in giving their Kingdoms did herein do the will of God. And that the horrible outrages committed upon the person of Rev: 17. 17. the holy Son of God by Herod. Pontius Pilate, the Gentiles and people of Israel were by the hand and counsel of God before determined to be done We say sinful courses (not hand over head) but unrepented of, lead unto damnation, but not as means. For they are neither man's means; for if they were, than the end also whereunto they tend, should be intended by him; Neither are they any means of God: For all means are the works of him that intends the end; So is not the sin of man the work of God, but the permission of sin is his work: And this is the means which he intends thereby to bring to pass his intended end, which yet on the part of Reprobates is not the damnation of them, but the manifestation of his glory in the way of vindicative justice, which in Scripture phrase is called the Declaration of his wrath. For God made all things for himself, even the wicked against the day of evil. And to this end he doth not only permit them both to sin, and to Ro. 9 23. Prov: 16. 4. persevere therein without repentance, but also to damn them for their sin. And this work of God namely the permission of sin is as requisite for the manifestation of his mercy on the part of his Elect, as for the Declaration of his wrath, on the part of reprobates. Yet who was ever found so absurd as to say that we make the sinful actions of men to be the means which God useth to bring about the salvation of his Elect. So little cause have we to make use of this distinction as the action itself and the sinfulness thereof, to show in what sense it is a means which God useth whereby to bring about the damnation of man. For we utterly deny sin to be any such means of God, but the permission thereof only is the means whereby to bring about not their damnation, as this Author suggesteth, but the means (together with the damnation for sin) whereby he bringeth to pass the declaration of his just wrath. But men of this Authors spirit; unless they be suffered to calumniate at pleasure; and corrupt their opposites Tenet at pleasure, they can say just nothing. It is true actions deserve damnation only as they are transgressions of God's law, but we deny that these transgressions are God's means, but only the permission of them is his means; and by permitting these transgressions, as also by damning for them, he brings to pass his glorious end, to wit, the declaration of his just wrath. 3ly, It is most untrue that God brings any man into a state of sin; He brings himself into it most freely, God having no other hand in the sin but as permitting it, that is as not preserving from it. Indeed if he did bring men into sin, and they not rather bring themselves thereinto, he were the Author of it. But it is well known that sin cannot transcend the region of acts natural. All acts supernatural must needs be the work of grace, and truly good; But every sinful act is merely natural, never supernatural. Now never any of our Divines denied a man liberty in his greatest corruption, unto acts natural; the Devil himself hath liberty thus far. It is true original sin is brought upon all by the sin of Adam; For hereby the fountain of humane nature became corrupted; but in this very sin of Adam we had an hand, if there be any truth in Scripture which testifies that, In Adam we all have sinned. This is the doctrine which the Author spites, though he be more wise then to publish to the world his spleen against it: And I have Ro. 5. 12. seen under his hand where he denies original sin to be veri nominis pecatum, sin truly so called And albeit M. Hoord makes a flourish in saying that God might justly damn all mankind for the sin of Adam; and that also was this Author's doctrine in the lectures which he read at Magdalen Hall; yet I have good cause to doubt whether this be his opinion now, and not rather the same with Pelagius his opinion, saving the difference which Pelagius did put between not entering into the Kingdom of heaven and damnation. As for all other sins which we call actual, they are, as I said, natural only, and not supernatural; and therefore no man wants liberty, as to do them, so to abstain from them; Only he wants a moral and Spiritual liberty to abstain from them in a gracious manner, according to that of Aquinas. Licet aliquis non possit gratiam adipisci qui reprobatur à Deo, tamen quod in hoc peccatum vel illud labatur, ex ejus libero arbitrio contingit. Thom: 1: p. q: 23. art. 7. ad tertium. Though a man who is reprobated of God cannot obtain grace, yet that he falleth into this or that sin it comes to pass of his own free will. It is true also even in God's providence concerning acts natural, there is a great mystery. For as God foretold David that, his neighbour should 2 Sam: 12. 11. 12. lie with his wives; and though he sinned secretly, yet the Lord would do this openly. So he foretold that, upon that Altar which jeroboam erected, a child that should be borne of the house 1 Kin: 13. 2. Es: 45. 13. Ezra: 1, 2 King: 23. 16. 2 Sam: 16. 22. of David, josiah by name, should burn the Prophet's bones. And that Cyrus also should build him a City and let go his captives: Yet who doubts, but that Cyrus did freely deliver the Jews out of Babylon? and josiah did as freely burn the Prophet's bones upon the altar in Bethel, as ever they did action in their lives? So Absalon did as freely defile his Father's Concubines. Then again we deny that the damnation of any man is the end that God intends, but the manifestation of his own glory. And therefore though he hath made the wicked against the day of evil; yet both that, and all things he hath made for himself. And to this tends both the permission of sin, and the damnation of Reprobates for their Prov: 16. 4. sin; And in no moment of nature, are either of these intended before the other, both being jointly means for the procuring of another end. And if permission of sin were first in intention with God, and then damnation as these men would have it, it followeth evidently by the most generally received rules of Schools that permission of sin should be last in execution, that is men should first be damned, and afterwards permitted to fall into sin. This is the issue of these men's Orthodoxy and accurate Divinity. Section 8. The will is determined to an Object two ways. 1. By compulsion against the bent and inclination of M. Mason's Addit. p. 35. 36. it. 2. By necessity according to the natural desire and liking of it. God's predestination say they, the termineth the will to sin this last way, but not the first; It forceth no man to do that which he would not, but carrieth him towards that which he would. When men sin, 'tis true they cannot choose; And it is as true, they will not choose. It followeth not therefore from the grounds of their doctrine that God's decree is the cause of men's sins, but their own wicked wills. 1. The Ancients made no distinction between these two words (Necessity) and (Compulsion) but used them in this argument promiscuously; and did deny that God did necessitate men to sin, lest they should grant him hereby to be the Author of sin, as I have touched before, and shall intimate again afterward. Nor did the School men put any difference between them, as may appear by the testimony of M. Calvin, who speaking of the School-distinction of the will's threefold liberty; from necessity, from sin, from Misery, saith, This distinction I could willingly receive, but that it confoundeth necessity with coaction. 2. That which necessitateth the will to sin is as truly the cause of sin, as that which forceth it, because it maketh the sin to be inevitably committed, which otherwise might be avoided; and therefore if the Divine decree necessitate man's will to sin, it is as truly the cause of sin as if it did enforce it. 3. That which necessitates the will to sin, is more truly the cause of the sin, than the will is; because it overruleth the will, and beareth all the stroke, taketh from it, ' its true liberty, by which it should be Lord of itself, and disporser of ' its own acts, and in respect of which it hath been usually called by Philosophers and Fathers too, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a power which is under the insuperable check and control of no Lord but itself. It overruleth, I say, & maketh it become but a servile instrument, irresistably subject to superior command and determination; And therefore is a truer cause of all such acts and sins, as proceed from the will so determined, than the will is. For when two Causes concur to the producing of an effect, the one a principle overruling cause, the other but instrumental, and wholly at the Devotion of the principal; then is the effect in all reason to be imputed to the principal, which by the force of ' its influx and impression produceth it, rather than to the subordinate and instrumental which is but a mere servant in the production of it We shall find it ordinary in Scripture to ascribe the effect to the principal Agent. It is not ye that speak, saith Christ, but the Spirit of my Father that speaketh in you. I laboured more abundantly than Mat: 10. 20. 1 Co: 15. 10. they all, yet not I, but the grace of God which was in me. And I live: yet not I, but Christ liveth in me saith St. Paul. Gal: 2. 20. In these and many other places the effect or work spoken of, is taken from the instrument, and given to the principal agent; Which being so, though man's will work with God's decree in the commission of sin, and willeth the sin which it doth, yet seeing what the will doth, it doth by the commanding power of God's Almighty decree, and so it doth that otherwise it cannot do; the sin committed cannot so rightly be ascribed to man's will, the inferior as to God's necessitating decree the superior cause. 4. That which makes a man sin by way of necessity, that is with, and not against his will, is the cause of sin in a worse manner, then that which constraineth him to sin against his will; As he which by powerful persuasions draws a man to stab, to hang, to poison himself is in a grosser manner the cause of that evil, and unnatural action than he that by force compels him; because he maketh him to consent to his own death; And so if God's decree do not only make men sin; but sin willingly too; not only cause that they shall (malè agere) do evil; but (malè velle) will evil, it hath the deeper hand in the sin. God determines the will to sin by necessity, though not by compulsion: this he obtrudes upon our Divines as their opinion, but quotes none, is it likely that he who quotes Beza to Answer. show that in his opinion, God doth not only permit sin, but will sin; And Calvin to show, that a man's mind is blinded, volente & jubente Deo; would not quote some or other of our Divines to prove that which he obtrudes upon them? If his common place book could afford him any such quotation out of any one of them, to show who they be, and where they say that, God determines the will to sin by necessity though not by compulsion. Was there ever the like crimination made against any without naming them that say so, and the place where, and their own words? Or hath this man or any of his spirit deserved any credit to be trusted this way? The very phrase of determining in Latin is no word of course with our Divines in this argument. It is the phrase of the Dominicans. But do they say that God determines the will to sin? I do not think he can produce one of them that expresseth himself so unscholastically, so absurdly. Alvarez saith that, God by his effectual decree predetermineth second causes to work. He saith that God doth predetermine De aux: disp▪ 22 Disp. 24. Disp. 26. the will to the act of sin, as it is an act. That the first root of contingency is the will of God. Then to what doth God determine the will in their opinion? Is it to the act only and not to the manner of its production? Namely, to produce it voluntarily and freely? Nothing less though this Author counts it his wisdom to conceal this. God by his omnipotency doth cause, that man whose heart he moves to will and will freely. Again, God's general concourse is a divine, immediate influence into second causes whereby they are, foremoved, applied ibid. Disp: 118. pag. 485. ibid. de aux: Disp 1●1. pag. 490. ●. 3. and determined to work every one according to the condition of its nature; The natural cause naturally; the free cause freely; as I have professedly delivered. Disput. 18. 23. And that in such sort freely, as they can choose to do otherwise if they will, and that in the very instant wherein they do what they do. But come we to consider his answer. 1. Touching that which he saith of the Ancients, he gives us his bare word for it, as touching the confounding of necessity and compulsion; yet Bernard I confess willingly, in talking of liberty from necessity, understands by necessity coaction. He saith farther, that those Ancients did deny that God did necessitate men to sin, lest they should grant thereby that God is the Author of sin. But I do not think he can show this phrase of necessitating the will any way to be found among the Ancients, what he hath touched before I have considered, what he shall intimate hereafter, I hope I shall not let it pass unsaluted. And the truth is to necessitate hath such an Emphasis with it as to persuade that whatsoever a man is necessitated to do, that he doth by constraint against his will. And it is a rule commonly received that Voluntas non potest cogi, The will cannot be forced; which is most true, as touching Actus eliciti, the acts of the will inward and immediate, and not so of actus imperati, acts outward and commanded. But Bradwardine who alone useth this phrase amongst School-Divines, takes it in no such sense, but only for an effectual operation of God upon the will moving it to work this or that, not necessarily, but freely; which this Author most judiciously dissembleth all along for despairing to prevail by true and substantial information of the understanding; perturbundis affectibus suffuratur; by a corrupt proposition of his Adversaries tenet, hopes to work distaste upon the Readers affections. Bradwardines' position is this, God can after a sort necessitate every created will to ' its free act, and to a free cessation, & vacation from act: and hath a Corollary to this effect; That Bradw, de causa Dei l. 3. c. 1. some kind of necessity, and liberty are not repugnant, but may consist together. Again, God doth after a sortnecessitate every created will, unto every free act therefore, and to every free cessation Id ibid., c. 2. and vacation from act that by necessity antecedent naturally. And he adds a Corollary, that some kind of antecedent necessity and liberty are not repugnant, and may consist together. This distinction of liberty from necessity, liberty from sin, liberty from misery, I find in Bernard, and Vossius allegeth it only out of him, and the Schoolmen might take it up after him. Bernard hath many obscure passages in the prosecuting of it, especially in reference to the two first members. Neither doth Vossius take any pains to clear them from a manifest contradiction in show: And no marvel if Doctor Potter doth not, in stating the opinion of the Church of England in the point of free will, which he undertakes very magnificently in his answer to charity mistaken; he was content to be led by his blind guide: now the seeming contradiction is this. If there be in a naturallman no liberty from sin, then is he necessarily carried into sin; and how then is there any liberty in him from necessity? unless necessity be taken as all one with constraint. And Bernard sometimes in that very treatise doth clearly express himself to understand thereby coaction. And so M. Fulkes in his answer to the Rhemish testament, denying unto man liberty from sin, yet grants unto him a liberty from coaction. And indeed sin to the profane person is like a sweet morsel which he rolleth under his tongue, as the book of job speaks, he comes not constrained thereunto; but naturally takes delight therein; & I doubt too many there be, who though they are driven to confess, that a natural man hath no liberty from sin; yet they please themselves with a certain expression of Lindan's, that a man hath free will unto sin; hoping therehence to conclude when time serves, that a man as he hath freedom to commit it, so he hath freedom to abstain from it, and so by a back door to draw in a Tenet quite contrary to the first, namely that even a natural man hath liberty from sin. I am not sure that Lindan did well understand his own expression, so as to know how to make it good, much less that they are able who lick their lips at it. But of this, and the clearing of Bernard, and of the difference between liberty natural, and liberty moral I have else where discoursed at large. And Calvin observing this contradiction might well blame them that confound necessity, with coaction; whereby a way is opened to conclude, that because a man is free from constraint of sinning, therefore he is free from necessity of sinning; whereas original sin doth necessarily incline him to sinful actions & courses in general; though to this kind of sin in special, or to this particular, in what kindsoever, it doth not: yet by the way it is to be considered, that Calvin in some particulars, as namely in gracious courses, did attribute so much to the efficacy of God's operation upon a man's will, as that the actions performed thereby though voluntary, yet in his opinion were not to be accounted free; & indeed they are wrought in opposition & as it were in spite of a certain principal of corruption that in part remains in the very best of God's children. But we see no reason to the contrary, but that, when once God hath planted in us a principle of new life, of the life of grace, by the spirit of regeneration, though all the powers thereof do incline only to that which is good, like as the powers of natural corruption incline only unto evil, yet the particular use and exercise of those is always free: Like as the particular use and exercise of the powers of our corruption is always free to the committing of this or that sin according unto emergent occasions standing in congruity to every man's particular disposition. 2. The Author keeps himself to the language of his own Court, but he should not so imperiously put it upon his opposites to concur with him in the language of Ashdod. We know nothing that necessitates the will to sin, but that original corruption, wherein every man is conceived, and which we brought with us into the world. For that makes us impatient of a yoke, like unruly Heifers; And nothing is more burdensome unto us in our corrupt nature, than the holy laws of God; The statutes of Omri are not so, nor all the manner of the house of Ahab; these are punctually observed, when God's holy ordinances are proudly despised. God moves every creature to work agreeably to ' its nature. Necessary Agents necessarily, contingent Agents contingently, Free Agents freely. He doth not move to any such act as is sinful, save only where the fear of God is not at all found, or not quickened, but the motions and suggestions of Satan entertained; nor then neither always; and that not only in his own children, but even in the hearts of the wicked to restrain from sinful courses in spite of Satan's temptations, by injecting into their minds the consideration either of danger, or of shame ensuing, so in a natural way to restrain from the committing of such an act as is sinful; especially when he seeth it prejudicial to the peace of his Church in general, or any member thereof in particular; otherwise if he gives them over to Satan, and moves them agreably to his suggestions entertained by them, as being naturally well pleased with them, why should this seem strange to any? So that not any sin is inevitably committed by the most wicked creature that lives upon the face of the earth, but he hath power enough (I do not say to avoid it, an absurd phrase as if sin were a thing to be forced upon a man whether he would or no, but) to abstain from it, though not in a gracious manner, that being in the power of them only who have the spirit of regeneration dwelling in them. 3. In the same language he prosecutes his vile cause, giving manifest evidence to the world that it cannot be supported without lies, nor embraced by any but those whom God in his secret judgements hath given over to strong illusions to believe lies, It is not incredible to me that ever any Papist or Protestant hath affirmed that God necessitates the will to sin; They generally acknowledge that evil hath no cause efficient, but deficient only: The term of God's operation is no other than the substance of the act, which as an entity, and as an act must necessarily proceed from God, as Aquinas hath delivered. And albeit they maintain that God's concurrence to the producing of the act doth work upon the will of the creature which, from the first time that Divines came resolutely unto the acknowledgement of this Divine concourse to the act of sin, hath also been received as I have showed in my Vinaiciae. For Peter Lombard disputing on either side about this concurrence, leaves it indifferent to the Reader to embrace either part: Either the affirmative that God doth concur to every act, though it be sinful or the negative. Yet I say as many as do maintain the affirmative, do so maintain God's motion upon the creatures will, as to move it only agreably unto its nature, namely to work freely not necessarily. Like as he moves necessary Agents to work necessarily, and contingent Agents to work contingently. And if this Author be ignorant hereof, which may well give him boldness. For who so bold as blind Bayard? What doth he other in all this but betray his own shame coming to discourse on such an argument, as an ass comes to play upon an harp, as the proverb speaks. But if he be not ignorant of this, what unshamefastnesse doth he manifest all along, making bold only upon the simplicity and ignorance of his Reader to gull him, and abuse him, and draw him along to oppose the free grace of God in predestination and regeneration, under colour of making God the Author of sin in the point of reprobation; which yet he despairs of making good against us without notorious untruths, and that undoubtedly delivered against his own knowledge. For what Author hath he produced to justify this that any of our Divines maintains that God necessitates the will of man to sin? Not any that I know using this phrase Necessitate but Papists, and amongst them none that I know but Bradwardine a man renowned in his time both for eminent learning, and eminent piety, as appears by Sir Henry savil's preface unto that book of his; and he no where affirming that God necessitates any man unto sin; but only to the substance of the act; & that not so as to make the will work necessarily, as the phrase imports in a vulgar ear, and unto a popular judgement (whereupon alone this Author takes his advantage most unconscionably) but agreably to ' its nature, that is contingently and freely. For were he able to produce any one of our Divines that affirmeth this, why doth he not? Is there anything throughout this whole discourse that more requires he should name the man, and quote the places, where this is affirmed, than this? Yet here we find a blank; he carrieth it on magnificently upon his own bare word, which deserves no credit at our hands; And is it possible to believe so foul a crimination without all evidence produced, unless faction and partiality hath blinded his eyes? Should he have laid to our charge that we maintain that God necessitates the will to any good act, and to overrule the will therein, we should utterly deny it without distinction. It is true he overrules the will of the flesh, but not the will of the Spirit, the regenerate part, but moves it agreably to ' its nature, and to work not only voluntarily but freely whatsoever it worketh. For albeit the regenerate part is like a moral virtue (though as much transcendent to it, as a thing supernatural transcends a thing natural) inclining only to that which is good; yet is it always moved to this particular good rather then unto an other most freely. Like as a man's natural corruption inclines a man only to evil; yet to this kind of evil or to this particular evil, rather than to that, Man is moved most freely. So that if we maintain not that God works a man to every good act, otherwise then freely; let the very conscience of our enemy's judge, whether we can maintain that God necessitates the will either of men or of Devils unto sin. For it is apparent that God hath a Double influence unto a good act. One unto it as unto an act, and that is influence general; Another unto it as unto a good and gracious act, and that we acknowledge to be an influence special and supernatural. But as touching an evil act, all sides confess that God hath but a single influence thereunto and that general, namely, as it is an act, not as it is evil. And albeit this influence which we call concurrence unto the act, be joined with an influence into the will of the creature to move it to the producing of the same act; yet this motion is no other then whereby the will is moved to work agreably to ' its nature; that is freely. Like as all other Agents are moved by God, the first Agents to work agreably to their natures, necessary things to work necessarily, contingent things contingently. So that in all this there is no overruling of the will, no liberty taken from her; but rather she is maintained and established in her free condition, and moved agreably thereunto; like as in the eleaventh Article of Ireland it is expressed. For after it is laid down that, God from all eternity did by his unchangeable counsel ordain whatsoever in time should come to pass; It is forthwith added that, hereby no violence us offered to the wills of the reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor the contingency of the second causes is taken away but established rather. But because of another claw that here is subjoined by this Author, it is to be considered that the liberty of the creature is not equal unto the liberty of the Creator God himself: But like as all other causes are but second causes, God alone the prime cause; All other Agents but second Agents, God alone the first Agent. So likewise all other free Agents are but second free Agents, God alone primum liberum, the first free Agent. So that no liberty of the creature doth or can exempt it from the Agency of God, In whom we live and move and have our being what a proud thing & presumptuous were it for the creature to aspire unto such an exemption. Who oppose us in the point of free will more than Papists? Yet see how Alvarez disputes against this vice and presumptuous conceit, so much maintained by the Jesuits, and after taken up by the Arminians, who live by their scraps, as if they would be content to wash their dishes. The Jesuits discourse thus, That the will may be free, she must have the Dominion of her act, true saith Alvarez, debet habere Dominium sui actûs, Disp. 22. num: 44. non tamen oportet quod habeat primum & absolutum Dominium sui actus, she must have the dominion overher act, but not the first and absolute deminion of her act. And Disput. 117, he proposeth this question, Whether the will hath her dominion of her act, and what dominion this is. In the resolution whereof he proposeth three conclusions. 1. The free will of man hath the dominion of her act as the next cause thereof. In this conclusion the Divines on both sides do concur. 2. Free will created in the actual use of Dominion and power which she hath over her acts, depends on God as of an absolute Lord, predeliberating, and predetermining before the foreknowledge of the creatures future cooperation what the free will, will do in particular. This conclusion is held of all those Divines who maintain that God by his motion or effectual grace, not only morally, but efficiently and physically doth cause us to work that which is good, & it is proved, saith he by all those reasons whereby it hath been formery showed that God by his decree & effectual motion doth predetermine all second causes, even such as are free, to work, preserving their liberty and nature 3. The dominion of her act is not first in the power of free will created, but in the power and dominion of God, especially in respect of acts supernatural Our meaning is that all dominion & actual use of dominion which the created will hath as causa proxima the next cause, or doth exercise over her free acts which she produceth, proceedeth from God, as from the chiefest & first cause efficient, & aught to be resolved into him as into the first Author & first absolute Lord thereof And the truth is the question of free will, is commonly confounded though there is place of momentous distintion. For as for free will unto good that is merely Moral, and the resolution thereof, is according to the resolution in the point of original sin. But free will unto actions in general under an appearance of good, this is natural liberty; and the resolution thereof depends upon a right understanding of God's natural providence in governing the world, and working with all creatures in their several kinds, such operations as are agreeable to their several conditions. The first liberty consists in disposing man aright towards his end; like as moral virtues tend to this. But the second liberty consists only in the right use of the means, unto what end soever is projected by us. The appearance of good moving herein is only, in genere boni conducentis, in the kind of good conducing to the end propounded; whether that end can be good or evil, right or wrong. But the appearance of good moving in the former is only, summiboni, of our chiefest good, the enjoying whereof will make us happy. But to return, this Author with whom I deal in present, stands for the will of man's absolute dominion over her acts; as before he did express; whereas Alvarez professeth utterly against this, Neither do I blame him for contradicting Alvarez in this; but for carrying himself like a positive Theologue, nor so only, but like a peremptory Theologue contenting himself to dictate rules to others without all proof, save this that otherwise we make God the Author of sin. Yet this is not any express Argument of his neither; but he obtrudes premise, upon us, which I think was never affirmed by any Divines of these days, unless it be by some Libertines, against whom none that I know have disputed more effectually than some of those very Divines which here are traduced by him. But observe the vile and abominable issue of this Authors doctrine in this particular, making man as he is a free creature to be the Lord of his own free act; yea and to have the absolute dominion thereof, as formerly he did expesse Sect: 3. For seeing the act of faith, of repentance, and the like are free acts; if liberty cannot be maintained unless a man hath the absolute dominion of his own act, hence it manifestly followeth, that God doth not determine the will to believe, to repent, or to any good work, yet the Scripture professeth that God is he, who makes us perfect unto every good work, working in us that which is pleasing in his sight through jesus Christ. That it is God who worketh in us both the Heb: 13. 21. will and the deed according to his good pleasure. So that if a man should live Methusalch his age, and spend that whole time in a gracious conversation; yet that God doth work in him either the will or the deed of one gracious act more, it is merely of his good pleasure; so little cause have we to presume of perseverance in that which is good by out own strength. And again all this God works in us for Christ his sake. Christ hath deserved even this at the hands of God his father. What then is the meaning of this, that God should cooperate with us to the will and the deed, provided that we will? Consider the absurdity of this (upon the supposal of the possibility of such a cooperation, which yet by evident reason may be demonstrated to be utterly impossible.) Did Christ merit any thing for the Angels? yet doth he not cooperate with them to every act of theirs as well as to any of ours? Nay is it possible that any act should exist without God's operation? And is it reasonable to subject such a course of Divine providence to the merits of Christ? Thus we see whereunto this Author tends in this discourse of his, namely so to maintain God to be no Author of sin, as withal to maintain that he is no Author of that which is good, no not of faith, repentance, or any gracious act that is freely performed by any creature man or Angel: we on the other side desire & endeavour so to carry ourselves that while we vindicate God from being the Author of evil, we may not therewithal deny him to be the Author of any thing, that is good and gracious; which is this Authors course, as appears manifestly in the issue. And observe his crafty carriage fox like; Had he dealt upon predestination, and the efficacy of grace, and therein professed plainly that faith and repentance being free acts, every man's will hath an absolute dominion over them; and therefore God doth not determine the will thereunto: For that were to make God the Author of faith and repentance; how many thousands would have been ready to have flown in his face, and abhor such abominable doctrine. Therefore he baulks that, and deals only upon reprobation; and here he layeth to our charge that we make God the Author of sin, by necessitating and determining the will to sin (though his premises herein I have shown to be most false) therefore he maintains that God doth not determine the will so much as to the act whereunto the sinfulness accrues; both because man's will is free; and because so he should be the Author of sin. And if once he can make his Reader to swallow this, he doubts not but to take him in the point of predestination and grace also; and make him wary to take heed of maintaining that God determines or necessitates the will of man to any good act whether it be of faith or of repentance, and that for fear of denying man to have the absolute dominion over his will, to work himself to faith and repentance at his pleasure: and secondly, for fear of making God the Author of faith and repentance and every good act; Like as by saying that God doth determine or necessitate the will to sin, we make him the Author of sin. Behold Reader the issue of this man's Divinity; and whether he be not leading thee into the very chambers of death, by working thee with him to oppose the free grace of God, both in predestination and in regeneration, and the power and efficacy therereof in working thee to faith, to repentance, and to every thing that is pleasing and acceptable unto him, & that through Jesus Christ. Yet we have showed a manifest difference between God's moving the creature unto that which is good, and moving the creature unto such acts as are evil. For in evil be moves only to the substance of the act, whereof our Adversaries themselves acknowledge God to be the Author, that is the efficient cause, and this he performs by influence general. But as touching every good act, the Lord moveth not only to the substance of the act by influence general, but also to the goodness thereof by influence special. He proceeds to tell us what Philosophers teach concerning the condition of the will. And because it is very absurd for a Christian to go to school to Philosophers to learn the condition of Divine providence; he tells us of Fathers too that maintain the same as he saith, but he quotes neither the one, nor the other. Now I would gladly know what Father hath ever taught that God hath no power over the will of man to convert it, and ex nolentibus volentes facere, of unwilling, to make men willing, to work men to faith, to repentance, to all kind of pious obedience. And as for God's secret providence in evil, how plentiful is the Scripture concerning this? God is said to have sent joseph into Egypt, though this was brought to pass by the parricidial hands of his brethren; To tell David, that the sword should not depart from his house, though this could not be taken up or used, but by the free will of men; To send Senacherib against a dissembling nation; and to profess that this proud King in all his bloody executions upon the people of God, was but as the axe, or the saw in the hand of God. The like is testified concerning Nabuchodonosor after him. Nay the Prophet demands, Whether there be any evil in the City and the Lord hath not done it; speaking of the evil of punishment, though wickedly executed by the hands of wicked men; that the Lord caused the King of Assur to fall by the sword in his own land, though this was done by the hands of his own children. And as in violent courses, so in impure courses the Scripture as plainly testifies the secret providence of God to have place therein. And what doth Austin observe from the like places both in his fifth book against julian the Pelag: c: 3, and in his book de gratia & libero arbitrio, professing, occulto Dei judicio fieri perversitatem cordis, that the perversity of the heart, or will, comes to pass by the secret judgement of God; And the power that God hath over the wills of men to incline them even to evil; that is his phrase as I have formerly showed, abundantly representing the places where he delivers this. He proceeds not so much in Scholastical discourse, as in rhetorical amplification, more like a Shrew vexing himself and fretting that he cannot have his will, then like a disputer. That which necessitates the will makes it become but a servile instrument, irresistably subject to superior command and determination; this action of command comes in most unseasonably, it denoting a moral action, commanding not only things agreeable, but sometimes contrary to the will of the person commanded. No such thing hath place in God's moving of the will of man (did he move it unto sin which yet is most false; for he moves it only to the substance of the act.) But why should it seem strange that the creature should be a Servant to the Creator, and his instrument, and a servile instrument. Yet the notion of servility is very alien from the matter in hand, that having place only in proper speech as touching moral obedience; that which we treat of, is rather of motions natural, and of the subordination of the second cause to the first, the second Agent to the first. And was ever any sober man known to oppose this with such froth of words as this Author doth? Doth this Author himself think it possible that the Creature can move itself, or perform any operation without God's concourse? I do not think he doth. Do we not live in God, have we not our being in God? And what is this other then to say that our life and being depend on God, in the kind of a cause efficient? And doth not the same Apostle, and in the same place testify, and that in the words of an heathen man (to show that all such did not so maintain the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 condition of the will, as to maintain the exemption of it from influence Divine) profess that in God we move also? And the truth is all the question is about the manner of this concourse divine; whereabouts this Author spends not a word, as if he kept his breath for some other purpose then to deal on that point, which alone is controverted. The irresistible subjection he speaks of is no more than the bereaving of the will of her liberty, which is most untrue For proof whereof I appeal to every man that will but look upon Alvarez, that maintains this divine motion of will under the notion of determining; And upon Bradwardine, who alone, that I know maintains the same divine motion under the notion of necessitating: Whereas he infers herehence that God is a truer cause of all such acts and sins that proceed from the will so determined, than the will is. Oftentimes he hath set before us such Coleworts; but we have nothing but his bare word for it. And it depends merely upon this that the action of the creature is not free. Whereas both Bradwardin maintains that God necessitates the creature to every free act of his; And Alvarez, that God determines the creature to work freely. Now is it a sober course hence to infer, that the act is not free? As much as to say it cannot but be free, therefore it is not free. And yet we know that every one naturally is prone to sin, and in the best of God's children there is a principle that inclines to sin. God is confessed by our very opposites to be the true cause of the act; yet not at all the cause of the sin by his concourse. Only they differ from us as touching the nature of this concourse; We say God concurres to the producing of the act as it becomes not an Agent only, but the first Agent; not a cause only, but the first cause; and man as a second Agent, and second cause that moveth in God as the Apostle testifies; like as he lives in God, and hath his being in God. But these men devise God, and man to move to the producing of the same act, as two men in lifting a timber log, most indecently: And to free this concurrence from chance, they say sometimes that God works this or that act in us modo velimus, that is, upon condition that we will But when they consider that God works the act of willing, as well as aught else; & are demanded to answer upon what condition he works this what condition will they devise of this? will he say; modo velimus, provided that we will? As much as to say, God will produce the act of willing, provided that it be produced already by us. Others say that God foreseeing that the will of man, at such a time will produce such an act of willing in case God be pleased to concur to the producing of it, hereupon he resolves to concur to the producing of it, whereby the final resolution is rather into the will of God, then into the will of the creature, I say the final resolution of every sinful act committed by the creature. Secondly here is devised a thing future without all ground. For whereas the act of willing (as for example in judas, the act of willing to betray his Master, is it in ' its own nature merely possible not future how then did it pass into the condition of a thing future and that from everlasting (For from everlasting God knew it as a thing future) this could not be done without a cause? And what cause could there be of an eternal effect, but an eternal cause which is God alone: And in God nothing can be devised to be the cause thereof, but his will or decree. Therefore to avoid this they must be driven to conclude that all future things became future by necessity of nature; if not of their own nature; yet at least by the necessity of God's nature, he producing them all not freely, but by necessity of nature This is that Atheistical necessity whereupon our Adversaries are cast, while they oppose such a necessity as depends upon God's decree ordaining all things to come to pass agreably to their natures, necessary things necessarily, contingent things contingently and accordingly ordaining necessary causes working necessarily, for the producing of the one; and contingent causes working contingently, for the producing of the other; as Aquinas discourseth. 1. pag q. 19, in the Article whose title is this, Utrum divina voluntas necessitatem rebus imponat, whether the will of God imposeth a necessity on things that come to pass in the world? The reason this Author brings is a mere Socysme, saying the same over and over again; As when he saith, For when two causes concur to the producing of an effect; the one principal overruling cause, the other but an instrumental & wholly at the devotion of the principal, then is the effect in all reason to be imputed to the principal, which by the force of ' its influx and impression produceth it, rather than to the subordinate and instrumental, which is but a mere servant in the production of it. To which I answer, that which he calls overruling, I have often showed how absurdly it is imputed unto us. For how can that be called overruling which works not the will contrary to ' its nature, but moves it only agreably to the nature thereof. As for the cause principal, what Scholar of any brains ever denied God to be the cause principal in any action to the producing whereof he concurres? For is he not the first cause and the first Agent? Are not all other second causes and second Agents? But this Author hopes his Reader will understand this in reference only to the sin, not to the natural act under it, whereas God as touching the sinfulness of it is no Agent at all, much less a prime Agent; no cause at all, much less a prime cause. Then secondly let God never so effectually work any creature to the producing of an act connatural thereunto, yet if he works the creature thereunto agreably to its nature, that is if it be an necessary Agent, moves it to work necessarily, if it be a contingent agent, moves it to work contingently; if it be a free agent, moves it to work freely; then by Arminius his confession our cause is gained. For God shall be found free from blame, and the creature void of excuse. Now this is clearly our doctrine, and in effect the doctrine of all them, who say that God determines the will, as the Dominicans; or that God necessitates the will, as Bradwardine. For they all acknowledge hereby that God moves the creature to work freely, in such sort that in the very act of working they might do otherwise if they would. They confess this providence of God is a great mystery and not sufficiently comprehensible by humane reason. Cajetan professeth thus much as before alleged, and Alvarez maintains it in a set disputation; And supposing God's concourse as necessarily required to every act of the creature, they are able to prove by evident demonstration, that no other concourse can be admitted, than this whereby God moves every creature and that effectually to every act thereof, but agreably to ' its nature and condition. And this is farther demonstrated by God's fore knowledge, of things future. Another Arminian with whom I have had to deal in this argument, being pressed with this reason drawn from God's foreknowledge and urged to show how things possible became future & that from everlasting (for from everlasting they were known to God as future) had no way to help self but by flying to the actual existence of all things in eternity. And I have good ground for strong presumption that this Author with whom now I deal had his hand in that Pie, which was above four years ago. See the desperate issue of these men's discourses; who are drawn to take hold of such a Tenet to help themselves withal; which their best friends the Jesuits, the Authors of Scientia media, do utterly disclaim. And on the other side the Dominicans who embrace the actual existence of all things in eternity, are utterly repugnant to the doctrine of Scientia media. So that when the Jesuits are reconciled to the Dominicans in the point of actual existence of all things in eternity; And the Dominicans to the Jesuits in the point of Scientia media, than these men with whom I deal are like to prevail, which I doubt will hardly be before Elias comes. Thirdly consider, if when one cause is principal, overruling the other, the effect must be imputed rather to the principal then to the other. It follows evidently that when the causes do equally concur without any such overruling of one the other, than the effect is equally imputable unto each, & consequently the sin (For such is this Author's language in this Argument) is equally imputable to both, to God as well as man; And he is to be accounted the Author of it, as well as man. I appeal to every man's sober conscience that is able to judge indifferently between us in this. But if to avoid this they deny that the concurrence is equal, but that God's concurrence is conditional, to wit, in case the creature will, and so man is to be accounted the Author of sin, and not God, hence it followeth, that seeing God's concurrence unto the act of faith and repentance is of the same nature in the opinion of these men; God is not the Author of faith and repentance any more, than he is the Author of sin, in the language of these disputers. Or if they fly not to this, as I have found this Author (as I guess) to deny God's concourse to stand in subordination to man's, than my former argument is not avoided; But a third reason ariseth herehence against his former discourse of God's concourse, namely, that if God and man do equally concur unto the act of sin, then, as I have already showed, that they are equally guilty of sin. So in the working of faith and repentance man is as forward as God and as much the Author of his own fatih and repentance as God is, in direct contradiction to the Apostle who saith that, Eph: 2. 8. Faithis the gift of God & not of ourselves. We willingly grant that God is the principal agent in producing every act, whether it be natural or supernatural For in him we move as Act: 17. 26. well as in him we live & have our being But we deny sin, as sin, to be any act but a privation of obedience to the law of God, as the Apostle defines it to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Yet let us examine that which he delivers of the principal agent, & the texts produced by him, that we may not be carried away as he is with a superficiary apprehension of things. And first consider) we might plead as well for such acts as this Author calls sins, as he doth for acts gracious by his superficiary discourse. For doth not joseph comforting his brethren say unto Gen: 45. 8. them in like manner. Now than you sent me not hither, but God. But consider farther in that passage alleged by him out of Mat: 10. 20. It is not ye that speak but the spirit of my Father which speaketh in you. Was not this speech of the Apostles a free action? The labour of Paul more abundantly then of all the rest of the Apostles, was it not a free action in Paul? ●f God determined them unto these actions, than freedom of will humane stands not in opposition to determination divine; and consequently though the act be evil that is, done by man; yet may God determine the creature to the doing of that act, without any impeachment of the creatures liberty. If God did not determine the wills of his Servants but only afford a simultaneous concourse to their actions, why is he called the cause principal, since it is confessed, God doth afford the like concourse to every sinful act, as touching the substance thereof. Again he repeats the same, when in case of divine determination, he saith, the sin cannot be so rightly ascribed to man's will the inferior, as to God's necessitating decree, the superior cause. To which I answer again, being drawn thereunto by his Tautologies; by the same reason it may be inferred, that when the fire burns any combustible thing, the burning is rather to be ascribed to God the more principal cause, then to the fire the less principal, the first cause being more principal than the second and if it please God so to order it, the fire shall not burn as it appears in the three noble children cast into the furnace of Babylon, when they came forth there was not so much as the smell of fire upon them. Secondly I answer as before, by the same reason, when the concourse unto the sinful act is equal on man's part, & on God's, each shall equally be accounted the Author of that sin, and not man more than God; Now such a concourse is maintained by this Author. Thirdly in the working of faith and repentance; since by these men's opinions God affords only his concourse he shall be no more the Author of man's faith and repentance than man himself is. Lastly be it granted that God is a more principal cause then man in producing the act; yet there is no colour of imputing unto God the causality of the sin, who hath no Agency therein, by doing what he ought not to do, or not in that manner he should do, this is found only in the creature, who being a free Agent, otherwise then as original sin hath impaired liberty, which I hope this Author will not deny, is justly answerable for his own transgression. As for example, God determined that Cyrus should give the Jews liberty to return into their own land; yet this action of Cyrus was as free an action, as any that was performed by him throughout his life. God determined that Josiah should burn the Prophet's bones upon the Altar at Bethel, yet josiah did this as freely as aught else: God determined that Christ's bones should not be broken, yet the soldiers abstained from the breaking of his bones with as much liberty as they had used, in case they had broken them. This divine providence we willingly confess is very mysterious, and as Cajetan saith the distinctions used to accommodate it to our capacity do not quiet the understanding; therefore he thought it his duty to captivate his into the obedience of faith. And Alvarez in a solemn disputation proves that it is incomprehensible by the wit of man. 4. His last is delivered most perplexedly. I can make no sense of it as the words lie, but I see his meaning. He supposeth that God by our Tenet makes a man to sin willingly, & that he saith is worse than to constrain a man to sin against his will. Where observe how this man's spirit is intoxicated when he delivered this. For first he calls that worse which is merely impossible, and that by his own rules. For he holds that sin cannot be, except it be voluntary, speaking of sin committed by any particular person. Secondly he supposeth that by our opinion God makes a man to sin, which is most untrue. For when he acknowledgeth that no sin can be committed by man without God's concourse; will he say that God by his concourse helps a man to sin? He helps him to the producing of the act, not to the committing of the sin. And indeed be the act never so virtuous, if it proceed not out of the love and fear of God, it is no better than such as the Heathens performed; of which Austin hath professed that they were no better than splendida peccata glorious sins: So that if God doth not give a man these graces of his holy Spirit in every act that is performed by him he shall sin, and not only in acts vicious; and God is not bound to bestow these graces on any. Section 9 Sin may be considered as sin, or as a means of declaring God's justice in men's punishments. God M. Mason's Addit. p. 37. 38. doth not predestiminate men to sin, as it is sin, but as a means of their punishment. He is not therefore, say they, the Author of sin. 1. A good end cannot moralise a bad action; it remaineth evil though the end be never so good Bonum oritur ex integris. ●end, manner, yea matter too must be good, or else the action is naught. He that shall steal that he may give an alms; or commit adultery, that he may beget Children for the Church; Or oppress the poor to teach them patience, Or kill a wicked man that he may do no more hurt with his example; or do any forbidden thing, though his end be never so good, he sinneth notwithstanding. And the reason is because the evil of sin is greater than any good that can come by sin; forasmuch as it is laesio divinae majestatis, a wronging of God's majesty; and to Divino bono opposita, directly prejudicial to the good of Almighty God as much as any thing can be. This Saint Paul knew very well, and therefore he tells us plainly that we must not do evil that good may come thereof. Whosoever therefore willeth sin, though for never so good an end, he willeth that which is truly and formally a sin, and consequently God, though he will sin for never so good ends, yet willing it with such a powerful, and effectual will, as giveth a necessary being to it, he becometh Author of that which is formally sin. 2. The members of this distinction are not opposite, for sin as sin, and in no other consideration is means of punishment. If God therefore willeth it as a means of punishment, he willeth it as a sin; his decree it determinated at the the very formality of it. 3 This distinction fasteneth upon God a further aspersion, and loadeth him with three special indignities more. 1. Want of wisdom and providence. His counsels must needs be weak if he can find out no means to glorify justice, but by the bringing in of sin, which his soul hateth, into the world and appointing men to commit it, that so he may maaifest justice in the punishment of it. 2. Want of sincerity and plain dealing with men. Tiberius as Suetonius reports, having a purpose to put the two sons of Germanicus, Drusius and Nero, to death used sundry cunning contrivances to draw them to revile him, that reviling him they might be put to death; and herein is justly censured for great hypocrisy. And so if God having appointed men by his absolute will to inevitable perdition, do decree that they shall sin that so they may be damned for those sins, which he decreeth, and draweth them into; he dissembleth, because he slaughtereth them under pretext of justice for sin, but yet for such sins only as he hath by his eternal counsel appointed as the means of their ruin. 3. Want of mercy in an high degree, as if he did so delight in blood, that rather than he will not destroy men's souls, he will have them live and die in sin, that he may destroy them, like to those Pagan Princes of whom Justin Martyr Apol: 2, two or three leaves from the beginning saith, They are afraid that all should be just lest they should have none to punish. But this is the disposition of Hangmen rather than of Good Princes: And therefore far be those foul enormities, and in particular this latter from the God of truth and Father of mercies. And thus notwithstanding these distinctions, it is in my conceit most evident that the rigid and upper way makes God the Author of men's sins, as well as punishment. And so much for the first general inconvenience, which ariseth from this opinion, namely the dishonour of God. I willingly profess I am to seek what that Divine of ours is that saith God doth predestinate men to sin, as a means of their punishment. Here this Author is silent, names Answer. no man, quotes no place; Like as in the former he carried himself in this manner. The Ancients generally take predestination in no other notion, then to be of such things which God himself did purpose to bring to pass by his own operation, not of such things as come to pass by God's permission, Neither can I call to remembrance any Divine of ours that talks of God's predestinating men unto sin. But the Scripture affords plentiful testimony of God's will, ordination, and determination, that the sins of men come to pass by God's permission. Was it not God's will that Pharaoh's heart should be hardened, so as not to let Israel go for a while, when he told Moses that he would harden Pharaoh's heart that he should not let Israel go? Was it not God's appointment that Absolom should lie with his father's Concubines, when he denounced this judgement against him, that he would give his wives unto his neighbour, who should lie with them before the sun? Was it not his will that the ten tribes should revolt from Rehoboam, when he protested of that business, that it was from him? Was it not God's will that the Jews and Gentiles should concur in crucifying Christ when the Apostles profess, that both Herod & Pontius-Pilate, with the Gentiles, and people of Israel were gathered together to do what God's hand and counsel had before determined to be done? Doth not Saint Peter profess of some that stumbled at the word being disobedient, that hereunto they were ordained? And Act: 4. 28. 1 Pet: 2. 8. Rev: 17. 17. that the ten Kings in giving their Kingdoms to the beast did fulfil the will of God, as touching this particular? But that God should will or ordain it as a means of punishment, as if the end which God aimed at, were the punishment, is so absurd and contradictious unto Scripture, that in my opinion it cannot well enter into any judicious Divines heart so to conceive. And mark how this Author shuffles herein: for first he saith that sin may be considered either as sin; or as a means of declaring God's justice in punishing it. And why doth he not keep himself unto this? especially considering, that not permission of sin only, but the punishment of sin also are jointly the means of declaring God's justice. And where King Solomon professeth that God made the very wicked against the day of evil, in the same place he manifesteth what is the end of this; namely in saying that he made all things for himself, that is for the manifestation of his own glory. And this glory is not only in the way of justice; but in the way of mercy also; which this Author as his manner is, very judiciously conceals; this attribute of mercy lying not so open to this Authors evasion as that of justice. And is it possible God's mercy and the demonstration thereof should have place where there is no sin? considering that no other evil, or misery, had entered into the world, had it not been for sin, according to that of the Apostle, By one man sin entered into the world, & death by sin. Neither are these generals the only end that God aimed at in this, but many other particulars Ro: 5. there are, whereby the glory of God's wisdom and power, and grace doth appear, by occasion of sins entrance into the world. The horrible facts of Jews and Gentiles committed upon the person of the Son of God, were such as whereby the Lord brought to pass the redemption of the world. if Christ had not been crucified what satisfaction had been made for the sins of the world? how could he have been set forth as a propitiation for our sins through faith in his blood? & yet this is not all the glory of God that breaks forth by the permission of sin. The punishment of one sin by another is an admirable work of God's providence, and that more ways than one. For God can punish, and doth, one man by the sin of an other. The Assyrians and Babylonians committed outrages enough upon the people of God, yet hereby the Lord was just in punishing the sins of Esa: 10. Habak: 1. his own people, Senacherib blasphemed the God of Israel, the creature his Creator, most unnaturally, this unnaturallnes of his towards God, the Lord avenged by the unnaturalness of his own children towards him: This was the work of the Lord, as himself acknowledgeth. I will cause him to fall by the sword in his own land. Man seeketh the face of the Ruler, but every man's judgement is of the Lord. Many unjust judgements have their course in Es: 37. 7. Prov: 28. the world, yet Solomon saith, every man's judgement is from the Lord. It is just with him to punish unjust courses with unjust courses, and there is mercy in this; for no better way than this to bring men's former wicked courses to their remembrance. As Adonibezek when the thumbs of his hands, and great toes of his feet were cut off, than he remembered his former cruelty; and how that 70 Kings had eaten bread under his Table, having the thumbs of their hands and feet cut off; And herein he acknowledged the just hand of God saying. As I have done to others so hath God done to me. And as many as will not in like manner acknowledge the just hand of God in like cases, let them take heed lest Adonibezek one day rise up in judgement against them. Thus it is just with God by one sin of the same man to punish another. For because the Gentiles knowing God, glorified him not as God, but were unthankful, turning the glory of the incorruptible God into the Image of corruptible things, therefore the Lord gave them up unto a reprobate mind, to do those things which are not convenient. Therefore God gave them up to vile affections. Therefore Ro: 1. 28. verse 26. verse 24. verse 26. God gave them up to their hearts lusts, unto uncleanes to defile their own bodies between themselves. And what were these inconvenient things? what was this uncleanes? Wherein consisted this, defiling of their bodies between themselves? The text expresseth it thus. For even their women changed the natural use into that which is against nature. And likewise also the men left the natural use of the women, & burned in their lust one towards another, & man with man verse 27. wrought filthiness. But was there any judgement of God to be observed in this? The Apostle hath discovered this also unto us in the words immediately following thus, And they received in themselves such recompense of their error as was meet; observe manifestly the just hand of God in all this. As for the manner how God brought all this to pass, we answer with Austin, whether it be modo explicabili, or inexplicabili, by a way that may be explicated by us, or whether it be inexplicabile, the Apostle troubleth not himself hereabout, his care was only to show how great a judgment this was: & this is prosecuted farther by Austin in the same place, Aug: contra Julian: Pelag. l. 5. cap: 3. showing by variety of particulars, all taken out of the word of God; in the place formerly quoted. Neither is this all the glory of God that comes to be manifested by the permission of sin. For he knows not only how to judge one sin by another, but to heal one sin by Lib. 5 cont. Jul. Pelag: cap 3. another also. Audeo dicere, saith Austin, utile est superbis in aliquod apertum manifestumque cadere peccatum, that so they may be humbled and brought to sobriety, and pass the time of sojourning here with greater care and fear. Now consider in how hungry a manner this Author sets down our tenet concerning God's providence in willing, and decreeing, that sin shall come to pass in the world by his permission; when he talks of sin being a means of punishment, a most absurd expression, both in a sinister stating of the end, punishment not being the end, but a means coordinate to an other end, to wit, the manifestation of God's glory, who hath made all things for himself, that is for the setting forth of his own glory; as also in a sinister stating the end, sin being not a means (as most absurdly he styles it) but a meritorious cause of punishment: Like as in reference to the manifestation of his glory, it is not the means, but the material cause thereof, But the permission of sins, that and not sin is the means together with the punishment thereof, tending to the manifestation of God's glory in the way of justice? 1. A good end cannot moralise a bad action. We grant it. But seeing it is impossible that the divine hand can do any bad action, the end of his actions is sufficient to justify his courses. For as Aquinas hath delivered; God's wisdom is his justice. For he is a debtor to none but to himself; and how to himself? Not otherwise then in all things which he doth, to carry himself so as it becometh himself; Aquia: q: 23. de volunt. Dei arti●. 6. that is to order every thing to a right end, which is only the manifestation of his own glory. For himself is most lovely; and 'tis his nature to be most loving of that which is most lovely. Now to order all things aright to their congruous ends, is the part of wisdom. And see how extravagant this Author is in every one of his instances. For to steal, to commit adultery, to oppress, to kill, is to sin, and in willing any of these, a man wills his own sin. But the Argument we treat of, is of God's willing the sins of others; as when God's hand and his counsel determined that those things should be done, which by Herod, Pontius-Pilate, the Gentiles, and people of Israel were committed against the holy Son of God; and when the Kings gave their kingdoms to the beast herein they are said to do the will of God and when every man's judgement is said to come from the Lord; not only judgment just, but even judgements unjust to wit, of men, yet God hath a just hand in plaguing others by them; man ought not to do evil that good may come thereof; but God's willing it to come to pass by his permission is no evil at all; Nay it is good; nor so only, but the thing willed by him is good by the confession of Bellarmine, even then when he is opposing us in this very argument; Malum fieri Deo permittente bonum est, it is good that evil should come to pass by God's permission: And it was avouched by Austin many hundred years before Bellarmine was borne. And he professeth that God would never have suffered sin to have entered into the world, had he not known that it appertained to his almighty goodness, rather to work good out of evil, than not at all to suffer evil. Compare the judgement of Austin with the judgement of this Author, and consider whether they differ not as much as light and darkness. And what wisdom were it for God to permit sin (when it is in his power to hinder it, as this Author acknowledgeth in the sixth Section) if it be a greater evil. (and that to God, as it appears by his expression of it, Laesio divinae majestatis, the hurt of the Divine majesty) than the good that can come thereby can be? So that the crucifying of Christ was greater in the kind of evil, than the redemption of the world that came thereby, was in the kind of good. No man of common discretion will permit aught (if it lie in his power to hinder it) to his own disadvantage, unless he can make thereby, not only an equal advantage, but a greater. But let us farther consider the superficiary speculation of this Divine, more becoming children in the Church of God than a grave and learned Divine. Sin, he saith, is laesio Divinae majestatis, the wronging of the Divine majesty; but in what sense I pray? Is God any thing the worse for any man's disobedience, and transgression of God's law? Surely like as he is no way advantaged by our obedience, so is he as little disadvantaged by our disobedience. Yet I affect not to carry that I deliver by the authority of mine own bare word, which is this Authors coarse most usually; I represent Scripture for it. If thou sinnest, what dost thou against him; yea when thy sins are many, what dost thou unto him? If thou be righteous what givest thou him, or job: 36. 6. verse 7. verse 8. what receiveth he at thy hands? Thy wickedness may hurt a man as thou art, and thy righteousness may profit a Son of man. And in reason, look of what nature the benefit is that redounds from the creature unto God, of the like nature is the detriment. Now God by making the world acquires no internal perfection unto himself, but only makes his glorious nature known, and accordingly if the world should have an end, this manifestation should cease; but his glorious nature should still continue the same. And as he manifests his glory by the world, so some creatures he hath made intelligent, fit to take notice of his glory, and accordingly requires at their hands they should acknowledge it, and that not in word only, but by their dutiful obedience; and that for the farther manifestation of his glory, to their good and wonderful happiness, if they obey; and their extreme sorrow and misery, if they continue rebellious against him. So that whereas the end of all God's actions being but the manifestation of his glory, he doth not lose so much as this, by the sins of men; For he can glorify himself in their just destruction; Nay he can manifest his glory another way; namely both the glory of his mercy in pardoning their contempt of his majesty done unto him; which men so proud many times they are, can hardly do; but in such a case prove implacable. Likewise of his grace in curing it, as also his power and wisdom in procuring a strange satisfaction to be made for it in a wonderful manner, and that by his own blood; That so way may be made for the manifestation of his, not royal only, but Divine magnificence in bestowing the kingdom of Act: 20. 28. heaven upon them. So far is he from being any way hurt by the sins of men in any true real account. And accordingly as he permits sins daily; so he offers his free grace daily for the pardon of them; and to this tended the daily sacrifice among the Jews, of a lamb every morning and a lamb every evening. But why then is sin, said to be laesio Divinae majestatis? I answer this is to be understood not of any hurt done to his majesty in itself, but as in the minds of men, who hereby manifest their contempt of the divine majesty. And they that do contemn him would put him out of his throne if they could, & wish that there were no God; & the fool would fain bring his heart about to think so. But though earthly Kings may be dethroned & sometimes have been, yet he that sitteth in heaven laughs all them to scorn that rise up against him. And bids the potsherd strive Es: 45. 9 with his follow potsherds, not with his maker. Who will set the thorns & briers against me in battles I would go through them & burn them together. For God is a consuming fire. It is true Es: 27. 4. Heb: 12. 29. Zeph: 3. 5 we must neither do evil that good may come thereof; nor permit it neither, if itlye in our power to hinder it. God neither will do any iniquity nor can do, but yet is lawful for him to permit evil that good may come thereof. Yea & will, or decree that evil shall come to pass by his permission, as I have proved at large in a digression to this purpose & therewithal discovered the Sophistical arguments of Aquinas, & Durandus, to the contrary, not to speak of Valentianus; not one part of all which large digression do I find answered by this Author. I have often alleged pregnant passages of Scripture to this purpose &; Arminius confesseth expressly that God would have Ahab to fill up the measure of his sin; which could not be done but by adding sin unto sin; Yet this is made the object of God's by Arminius. This will of God to have sin come to pass by his permission, is effectual. For whensoever God permits it, it comes to pass, as both Arminius and Vorstius acknowledge, not Piscator only: And amongst Papists Navarettus & Alvarez as before I have showed; Yet God hath no efficiency in the sin, but only in the act whereunto sinfulness adheres; and the saying of Austin is well known. Non aliquid fit, nisi omnipotens fieri velit; Not any thing comes to pass, but that which God will have come to pass. And the eleaventh Article of Ireland is most express for this. I am driven to repeat the same things often; this Authors frequent Tautologies urge me thereunto. 2. Though the members be not opposite it matters not; it is sufficient they are disparate; the purpose of it being to show, not that God doth not will sin, but only to show under what notion he willeth it. Yet it is false and absurd to say that sin is a means of punishment. For to him it belongs to work the means, who intends the end, but sin, as sin, is no work of God; but the permission of it is his work, and his means, not to this end that he may punish it, but he doth both permit it and punish it for the manifestation of his glory in the way of justice, like as he doth also permit sin in others, not to pardon it; but he both permits sin, and pardons it to manifest his glory in the way of mercy. 3. I come to the consideration of the special indignities wherewith God is loaded by this our doctrine as this Author pretendeth. 1. And indeed is God's wisdom and providence so strong, as that he is able to find means to glorify his justice without the permitting of sin? (For God hath no other hand in sin as sin, but of permission; to the substance of the act he cooperates as a cause efficient, as all confess.) For of what justice do we treat in this argument? Is it of justice remunerative, or justice vindicative? Was it ever heard that permission of sin was required to make way for God's justice remunerative? Or is it possible that way can be made for the manifestation of God's justice vindicative (in Scripture called God's wrath) unless sin be permitted to enter? For though he hates Rome 9 2 3. it; yet this Author confesseth that God permits it, as without whose permission it could not enter into the world. Sect: 6. In the last place this Author helps himself with a phrase of God's appointing men to commit it, which he obtrudes upon us thinking to make the balance on his part the heavier, not considering that words are but wind. We say the horrible outrages committed upon our Saviour, God foredetermined to be done; And told David that he would give his wives unto his neighbour, who should lie with them before the Sun; And that it was his will that the Kings should give their Kingdom to the Beast; this we deliver according to God's word; whereas all this our opposits discourse is quite besides the word of God; as if he would have us take his absurd conceits in steed of oracles. And doth he not know that Austin sometimes said that, judas electus est ad prodendum sanguinem Domini, judas was chosen to betray his Master? Or will he answer that he was the first that said so? 2. To the second I have already answered, and that at large in my answer to M. Hoord, in the preface and second Section. There I have showed how that it was merely devislish policy in Tiberius to move him to take this course, to make way for a grand child of his own, to bring him to the imperial throne, This moved him to seek the death of Germanicus his two Sons, whom Augustus made him to adopt as successors in the empire, & lest the putting of them to death without cause might provoke the people to mutiny against him; therefore by cunning contrivances he caused them to be provoked to revile him, that so he might have some cause to justify his destroying of them; which yet he did not by any public execution; he was loath to come to that for fear of raising some tumult thereby; Fame necavit, he famished them. Now how hath Satan possessed the heart of this unhappy Divine thus to blaspheme the holy one of Israel by comparing his ways to these abominable courses of Tiberius, not fearing lest his tongue rot in his head while he is uttering of them? Cannot God take the life of any man from him, be he never so innocent, and that what way he will, even by punishment, if it please him? For is it not of God's mere mercy that he promiseth, Not to famish the soul of the righteous? As for provoking courses, is it not apparent by these our opposites confession, that to all the provoking courses in the world God doth concur, and that as an efficient cause of every action? And accordingly he did concur with these provoking courses used by Tiberius. And did not God profess that he would provoke the Israelites by a foolish people, and by a foolish nation he would anger them? How did Shimei provoke David by railing upon him; And how did David interpret it, The Lord, saith he, hath bid him to curse David? Not that he gave any such command in proper speech, but by his secret providence brought this to pass, using to this purpose the vicious disposition which he found in Shimei, but caused it not. And observe what Austin speaks in the like case of his mother Monica exercised with the opprobrious speeches of her servant, Quid egisti Deus meus? unde curasti? unde sanasti? Nun protulists durum & acutum ex alterâ animâ convitium tanquam medicinale ferrum ex occultis provisionibus tuis, & uno ictu putredinem illam praecidisti? My God what didst thou? how didst thou cure her? how recover her? Didst thou not bring forth an harsh and sharp reproach out of an others heart as a medicinal instrument in thy secret providence, and with one stroke pared away all that rottenness? Thus Adonibezek when his thumbs and great toes were cut off by his enemies, he acknowledged that God had done to him, as he had done to others. And Solomon testifies that, every man's judgement cometh of the Lord. If every man's judgement, then surely unjust judgements and not just only. And although they are unjust as they proceed from man; yet are they just as they proceed from God. Like as the parricide of Adramelech & Sharezer committed upon their Father Senacherib, the Lord takes unto himself when he saith, I will cause him to fall by the sword in his own land. Yet what was David the worse for Shimei's cursing; neither would he thereby be Es: 37. 38. 7. urged to requite evil for evil upon his subjects; the more inexcusable were the Sons of Germanicus for reviling their Prince Tiberius, though never so much provoked thereunto. Neither was this fact of Tiberius a fruit of Hypocrisy, which is the counterfeiting of holiness, justice was pretended indeed not holiness & that through fear. For the wicked man is continually as one travelling with child, A sound of fear is in his ears. The cunning contrivances job 15. 20. 21 that Tiberius used are specified by this Author, but he doth not specify the cunning contrivances that God useth by our opinion, as he obtrudes upon us Belike he was to seek of them, yet we express God's providence herein by no other terms then the word of God itself doth suggest unto us; Namely of blinding the mind, of giving over to strong illusions, of hardening the heart, of giving over unto their hearts lusts, unto vile affections, unto a Reprobate mind. To all which is required no other thing then the not curing of that natural corruption, and habitual vicious disposition which is found in the wicked whether in the way of luxury, or in the way of uncharitableness, and malice; or in the way of ambition & pride. And secondly the administration of congruous occasions unto this their corrupt disposition, which Arminius himself confesseth to be the work of God's providence in his Theses of providence, and which in Scripture phrase is styled the leading into temptation; against which our Saviour taught his disciples to pray. Thirdly the giving them over to the power of Satan. And lastly God's general concourse in moving all creatures to work agreably to their natures, necessary things necessarily; contingent Agents contingently; and free Agents freely. But my answer to this I have prosecuted at large in more sheets than here are leaves in my answer to M. Hoord. 3. As for want of mercy, we willingly confess according to the tenor of God's word (as this Author delivers himself without all respect thereunto) that God shows no mercy in hardening them. For to harden in Scripture phrase is opposite to God's showing mercy. And as he is bound to none; so he professeth that, He will show mercy on whom he will show mercy, and will have compassion on whom he will have compassion. And this the Ex: 33. 19 Apostle takes hold of in prosecuting the doctrine of election and concludeth from hence in part, & in part from God's hardening of Pharaoh, that God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth, by hardening meaning such an operation, the consequence Rome 9 18. whereof is always disobedience; as appears by the objection derived therehence in the words following; Thou wilt say then why doth he yet complain? (now he complains only of disobedience) For who hath resisted his will? Manifestly implying that when God hardens man unto disobedience, it is his secret will that he shall disobey. Like as when God hardened Pharaoh that he should not let Israel go; It was God's secret will that he should not let Israel go for a good while: Secret I say in distinction from the will of command, which is always made known to them who are commanded. But it pleased the Lord to make this will of his known to Moses, though it was kept secret from Pharaoh; yet afterwards he told Pharaoh to his face by his servant Moses saying. And indeed for this cause have I appointed thee to show my power in thee, and to declare my name to all the world; though Pharaoh believed it not as appears by that which followeth; yet thou exaltest thyself against me, and lettest them not go. But this Author together with M. Hoord goeth by other rules, which his own fancy suggests unto him, he will have God's love and mercy extended to all and every one, Christ's redemption to extend to all and every one; the Covenant of grace to comprehend all and every one; and upon these universalities he grounds his transcendent consolations; whence it comes to pass, that Abraham the father of the faithful, was of no more comfortable condition, than the grand Signior among the Turks: And the grand Siginior had as good grounds of consolation as Abraham himself. Yet this not showing of mercy on the vessels of wrath prepared unto destruction tends to the greater demonstration of his mercy on the vessels of mercy prepared unto glory: As the Apostle testifies Ro: 9 23. And let this Author tell Saint Paul if he thinks good, That this is the disposition of hangmen rather than of good Princes. And this is the perpetual tenor of this Author's discourse to conform God's courses to the conditions of courses humane. Man is bound to show mercy on all; God is not. God is free to pardon whom he will, man is not. If we permit men to sin in case we can hinder them, we shall be guilty with them, but how innumerable are the sins committed in the world, which if God would hinder could never be committed? As Austin discourseth lib. 5. contra julian: Pelag: cap. 4 In nothing did Nero's cruelty show itself more, then in prolonging the lives of men, that he might torment them the more. What then? Shall we tax God for cruelty in keeping men's bodies and souls alive for ever in hell fire to torment them everlastingly without end? See what a door of blasphemy is opened against the just God that will do no iniquity, by this author's unshamefast discourse. Zeph: 3. 5. By this let the indifferent Reader judge of this author's present performance, & withal take notice of that which himself hath dissembled all along touching his own tenet; namely that of every sinful act committed by the creature, God is the efficient cause, as touching the substance of the act, as for the sinfulness thereof we hold it impossible that God can have any agency at all therein, or any culpable deficiency; forasmuch as he neither doth aught which he should not do, or after what manner he should not, nor leaves undone aught which he should do, or after what manner he should do, all which are incident to the creature who is subject to a law; but not at all to the Creator who gives laws to others, but himself works according to the counsel of his own will in all things. The sum is, whatsoever we deliver as touching God's secret providence in evil, we have express scripture for us, nothing but pretence of carnal reason against us; which when it comes to be examined, is found subject to manifest contradiction, both as touching their feigning things future without the decree of God; And as touching their conditional decrees, and conditional concurrences; ours is not in any particular; The greatest show of contradiction on our parts is in the point of necessity and liberty; Now to clear this, as others, have taken pains, so have I in my Vindiciae proving divers and sundry ways, that these two do amically conspire, to wit, the Lib. 2. digr: 5 necessity being only upon supposition; the liberty and contingency simply so called; only it is not to be expected that there should be no difference between the liberty of the creatures, and the liberty of God the Creator; Or that the creature in her operation should be exempt from the operation of God; The second cause exempt from the motion of the first; whereunto this Author addresseth not the least answer. As for the difference which this Author puts between the upper way and the lower in making God the Author of sin; compare this with Arminius his profession; Namely that the same twenty reasons which he objected against the upper way, may all of them be accommodated against the lower way, all of them admitting of the same distinctions (which this Author invades) to clear God from being the Author of sin. The second inconvenience. Section 1. The second inconvenienceis the overthrow of true religion and good government among men. To this, this opinion seemeth to tend for these reasons. M. Mason's Addit. pag, 38. 39, 40. 1. Because it maketh sin to be no sin indeed, but only in opinion. We use to say necessity hath no law; creatures or actions in which necessity bears sway are without saw; Lions are not forbidden to prey, birds to fly, fishes to swim, or any bruit creatures to do according to their kinds, because their actions are natural and necessary; they cannot upon any admonition do otherwise. Among creatures endued with reason and liberty, laws are given to none, but such as can use their principles of reason and freedom: Fools, madmen, and children are subject to no law, because they have no liberty. To men that can use their liberty, laws are not given neither, but in those actions which are voluntary. No man is forbidden to be hungry, thirsty, weary, sleepy, to weep, tolaugh, to love or to hate; because these actions and affections are natural and necessary; the will may govern them, but it cannot suppress them. And so, if to deal justly, to exercise charity etc. with their contraries, be absolutely, and antecedently necessary too, whether this necessity flow from a principal within, or a mover without, we are as lawless in these and in the other. Now if necessity hath no law●, than actions in themselves evil, if under the dominion of absolute necessity are transgressions of no law and consequently no sins. For sin is a transgression of the law. This that I say hath been said long ago. For Justin Martyr speaking against destiny hath these words, 1 Jo: 3. 4. If it be by destiny (that is by absolute necessity; For that the Fathers do generally call by the name of destiny;) that men are good or bad, they are indeed neither good nor bad. A speech like to this he hath a little Apol: 2. a little beyond the middle. after. It would seem, if this be so, that virtue and vice are nothing, but things are judged to be good or bad by opinion only, which, as good reason teacheth, is very great injustice and impiety. And surely well might he say so. For to what purpose was the Son of God made man, and being man made a sacrifice for sin? Why was the ministry of the word and Sacraments ordained? To what end are heaven and hell propounded? Why are exhortations, dissuasions, or any other means to hinder men from sin applied, if sin be nothing, but a mere opinion? Christ, the Christian faith, the word and Sacraments, and whatsoever according to the Scriptures hath been done for the applying of the pardon of sin, are all but mere fables, nay very impostures, if sin be nothing. And by consequence it is no matter at all, whether men be Christians, Jews, Turks, or Pagans, of what religion, or whether of any religion at all. Now whether tendeth this, but to the ovethrow of religion? 2. Because it taketh away the conscience of sin. Why should men be afraid of any sin that pleaseth or may profit them, if they must needs sin? Or what reason have they to weep and mourn when they have sinned, seeing they have not sinned truly, because they sinned necessarily? The Tragedian saith, when a man sinneth, his destiny must bear the blame. Necessity freeth him from Fati ista culpa est: Nemo fit faio nocens. all iniquity. Sins are either the faults of that irresistible decree that causeth them, or no faults at all. If either; then sorrow, fear, or any other act of repentance whatsoever, may as well be spared as spent. This conceit being once drunk in, religion cannot long continue; For the affections have been the strongest planters, and are the surest upholders of it in the world. Primus in orbe Deos fecit timot. I come to the consideration of the second inconvenience wherewith our doctrine is Answer. charged; And that is nothing inferior to the former; to wit, The overthrow of true religion and good government amongst men. With what judgement these are termed inconvenices I am to seek, and I wonder what mischiefs are greater than these inconveniences; But I come to consider how well he makes good his charge. 1. If sin be no sin certainly the opinion must be erroneous that conceives it to be sin. I had thought there had been no predication more true than that which is identical. We are taught that sin is a trangression of God's law. That the wages of it, in the just judgement and decree of God is no less than death even everlasting death, both of 1 Jo: 3. 4. Ro: 6. 23. body and soul; That God sent his own Son, and made his soul an offering for sin; that so he might set him forth a propitiation for our sins, through faith in his blood. But let us Es: 53. v. 2. Co: 5. 21. Ro: 3. 25. see this Author's reason to prove his crimimination. He begins with an axiom, that, Necessity hath no law; and hereupon he doth expatiate with his instances too too impertinently; a course which Bellarmine takes not, whom yet I have answered on this very argument in my Vindiciae; lest of all doth he offer to make any reply upon any parcel of my answer unto Bellarmine. Now this axiom is not applied to Agents unreasonable, but only reasonable, by them who treat thereof. As in case a man be driven to steal, to relieve natural necessity; yet all confess that a man is not only unexecusable, but also not to be pitied, if he hath brought this necessity upon him; And never any sober man that I know, denied stealth to be a free action, for all this. It is true Lions are not forbidden to prey, nor fishes to swimne, nor bruit creatures to do according to their kind. For they are unreasonable, and consequently not capable of command, otherwise then by spur, or goad, or the like; nor capable of admonition, in like sort, children afore they come to the use of reason are not capable, of admonition As neither mad men are, nor fools, such as we call natural; But this Author is none such. For than his wit would not serve him for opposition as it doth. It is true likewise, that as man is made after the Image of God, not as touching his part vegetative; nor as touching his part sensitive; but only as touching his part reasonable, consisting of an understanding, whereby he is enabled to know his superiors, and their commands, and admonitions; and of a will whereby he is able to perform obedience both inward and outward, it having command over all parts of the body to set them in motion; whereupon if their Lord command them to come they come, if to go they go, if to do this they do it; As the Centurion signified, to our Saviour the readiness of his servants to do their Master's commands. At length he comes to conclude that, if to deal justly, to exercise charity etc. with their contraries be absolutely & antecedently necessary too, whether this necessity flow from a principle within or a mover without, we are as lawless in these as in the other, by these he means acts of the soul rational; by the other, he means acts of the soul vegetative, or sensitive. Now we utterly deny that any of these are absolutely necessary; Nay we deny that any thing is of absolute necessity, but the being of the Divine nature; and the internal emanations thereof which constitute the distinction of persons in the Trinity. For albeit some Agents created are Agents necessary, working necessarily; yet the works which they bring forth are not of absolute necessity, because they may be hindered in their operations; either by Angels as some of them; or at least by the power of God, all of them. And as there are necessary Agents working necessarily; so there are free Agents working contingently and freely; as Angels and men. And albeit a question may be made as touching acts supernatural, whether the creature hath any free power to perform them freely; such as are the acts of the three Theological virtues, faith, hope, and charity, and none other, (which yet we do not deny, but grant upon the infusion of a supernatural principle into our souls, which we count formally the life of grace; the cause whereof we take to be the Spirit of God given unto us, and dwelling in our hearts;) yet there deserves to be no question, but that as touching all actions of moral virtues, and of the contrary vicious actions, that there is a free power in man to perform them naturally; until such time as by a vicious disposition, procured by a custom in vicious courses a man is habitually inclined unto evil; whereby he is made a slave to vice, and thereby hath deprived himself of a moral liberty unto actions virtuous. For like as a man holding a stone in his hand hath power to throw him or no, or to throw him which way he will; but as soon as he hath thrown him out of his hand; it is no longer free unto him whether he will throw it or no. In like manner before a vicious habit contracted, man hath freedom moral unto actions virtuous, but not after. This is the doctrine of Aristotle, and thus he illustrates it. For certainly the habit of virtue is not an indifferent power Eth: l. 3. 5. to do an act virtuous or vicious, but it is a moral propension and inclination only to acts virtuous. So is the habit of justice a moral propension and inclination to perform only that which is just. The like may be said of every moral virtue in special. How much more doth supernatural grace consist not in a power to believe, if a man will, to love God if he will, to hope and wait for the joys of heaven if he will, and if he will to refuse to perform any of these acts, but rather an holy and heavenly habit, or weight wrought in the soul of man, moving and swaying it only to gracious acts pleasing & acceptable in the sight of God, which indeed constitutes a spiritual liberty from sin, and makes a man become the holy servant of God, willing to receive direction from him, and delighting to be ordered by him in all our ways. On the other side with out grace a man is left in that natural corruption wherein he was conceived & borne, which makes him a slave to sin and a vassal to Satan led captive by him to do his will. Yet not withstanding there remains in every one his natural liberty still, which consists only in Eph: 2. 2. 2 Tim: 2. last. the choice of means conducing to man's end; whereas moral virtue and grace do order the will a right towards aright end; moral virtues according to the knowledge natural which he hath of his right end natural, grace according to the knowledge supernatural, which a man hath of his right end supernatural, which is to be rightly disposed and ordered towards God his maker; So that this natural liberty still continueth the same; As for example, he that it virtuous so far forth as he is virtuous, continueth still free; not as freedom signifies an indifferency to perform an act virtuous vicious, but being thereby disposed only to virtuous actions, he is free whether to exercise this or that virtuous act, according to occasions offered; or in the same kind of a virtuous disposition; whether he will do this or that in particular, as to give in such a proportion, or in such a season, or to such or such persons, in all which being of a virtuous disposition he is ready to receive directions from the dictates of recta ratio, right reason, otherwise called wisdom. In like manner a vicious person still keeps his natural liberty, though he hath lost his moral, and is become Servus tot dominorum, quot vitiorum, a slave to so many Lords as there are vices in him, as Austin somewhere speaketh. I say he keeps still his natural liberty. For let him be a Robber, he still continueth free to make choice of his complices, of places wherein to lie in wait for his prey, of weapons, and the like. Let him be an impure person, still he continueth free to choose whom he will corrupt, to contrive what course he thinks best for the satisfaction of his lusts. Let him be covetous or ambitious, still he contintinueh free to make choice of the means conducing to the end obtained by him. In like sort let him be regenerate, a child of God; by this spirit of regeneration he is moved only to do those things which are pleasing to his heavenly father, but still his natural liberty continueth the same, as whether to exercise the grace which God hath given him in one kind or in another, or in the same kind in what particular he thinks good. If he thinks good to pray, it is free to him to fall upon the confession of his sins, or upon thanksgiving, or upon supplication, & that either for blessings temporal, and the relief of his natural necessities; or for grace, and the relief of necessities spiritual; or to exercise himself in every kind of these, and that in what order he thinks good. So likewise if he give himself to meditation, and make choice of what matter he thinks good, as also of time and place, in all this he is free. None of all these distinctions doth this Author take notice of, but hand over head talks of freedom to perform, either acts vicious, or virtuous; whereas the virtuous man's will, as he is virtuous, is inclined to virtuous courses alone; and the vicious man, as he is vicious, is inclined to vicious courses alone, and not to virtuous. And it was wont to be said, that, Habitus agunt ad modum naturae, habit's (whether virtuous or vicious) they work after the manner of nature, that is naturally and necessary, as before I have declared of a moral necessity, which still consists with a natural liberty; either in virtuous, or vicious exercises to make choice of particulars in respect of all variety of circumstances, according as their reason suggests unto them in the use of means conducent to the end intended, whether that end be good or bad. No dominion of absolute necessity in all this; Much less is any man good by absolute necessity but by freedom of will accustoming himself unto good actions according to the dictates of reason. But a man that is dead in sin hath no power to regenerate himself; this work of regeneration is wrought merely by the power of God: Like as the raising of a man from death to life, whereunto it is often compared in holy Scripture, as also to creation; And by regeneration we are said to be made new creatures, now as God works this in time, so from everlasting he did decree to work it; and it was wont to be the general Tenet of Protestant Divines in opposition unto Papists, that a man in his first conversion is merely passive, in which particular Roffensis a Popish Bishop about an hundred years ago opposed Martin Luther. As for a sinful or a vicious act, that is always an act natural; For acts supernatural can neither be vicious, nor sinful; but merely gracious. And all confesse that as all men have natural power to perform any act natural, so have they power also to abstain from it. Only until a man is regenerate he cannot but sin; yea though he do that which is good as touching the substance of the act, or abstain from that which is evil in like manner; yet can he not perform the one or abstain from the other in a gracious manner, Therefore you hear not God's word, saith our Saviour to the Jews, because ye are not of God. They that are in the flesh cannot please Io: 8. Rome 8. God, That all men are cast into a necessity of sinning, both Arminius and Corvinus confess, as formerly I have showed. And Doctor Potter acknowledgeth it the doctrine of the Church of England, that no natural man hath libertatem a peccato, though forthwith he nicks it, in saying they have libertatem a necessitate, not explicating it that so he might clear himself from contradiction, whereas Doctor Fulke usually puts the distinction between liberty from sin, and liberty from coaction, and denying the former unto a natural man, he granteth the latter. Now truly this Theologue taketh very profitable pains to prove that sin is not nothing; and exuberates in the proof hereof to the very solid conviction of all those that imagine it to be nothing, if there be any such creatures in terra Australi incognitâ, which is not very likely; but rather in the Lunary world, or in the Jovial world which is waited upon with four moons, as they that came lately from the discovery thereof, have made report unto us. But by the way, I hope he doth not juggle with us, and under colour of making sin to be some thing, labour to draw us to an acknowledgement that it is some positive thing, as Doctor jackson in his last book the 8th, as I take it of his Commentaries upon the Creed laboureth to prove with great strength of affections; Like as in the same vigour of resolution he professeth that whether God punisheth sin necessarily or no it is not determinable by the wit of man; but he is not over prodigal of his reasons for either. We are very willing to grant that every sin as sin is something privative, and as touching the act substrate, it is something positive also; And when the Apostle defineth sin by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 if in that word the first letter be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 privative, clearly the form of sin is made to consist in privation, as much as to say an incongruity to the law of God; that is a privation of congruity thereunto. Now we are come to an end of this, let me admonish the Reader of the wisdom of this Author; All along; he supposeth that by our doctrine sin comes to pass by absolute necessity, this I say he supposeth, he proveth it not, though we utterly deny, that any such necessity is consequent to our doctrine. And this himself knows full well. Alvarez, who maintains that God determines the creatures will to every act thereof, even to the act of sin, utterly denies that any absolute necessity of humane acts followeth hereupon; or any necessity that stands in contradiction to humane liberty. Bradwardine also sometime Archbishop of Canterbury elect maintains, that God necessitates the will to every act thereof, yet denies peremptorily that humane acts comes to pass by absolute necessity, or by any necessity that stands in opposition to the liberty of the creature; Only he saith that some kind of necessity, and that antecedent may well consist with the liberty of the creature. All this, this Author knows; yet takes no pains to disprove their tenet, or answer any one of their arguments; no nor to make good his own consequence, which is the only thing we deny in this present argument of his. As for the other part, namely that in case sin come to pass by absolute necessity, and without any free will in the creature, than sin is no sin, which no man denies; This he proves at large, or at least illustrates at large. Secondly observe he talks of things necessarily coming to pass, not only absolutely but antecedently; whereby he seems to grant that sins may come to pass necessarily, but not so absolutely as antecedently, and takes no pains to explicate these his distinctions. And in my judgement they have more need of explication, as they are accommodated to sins coming to pass in the world, then as they are acommodated to the eveniency of faith and repentance; Yet I imagine this word Antecedently is brought in of purpose in reference to good actions rather than in reference unto evil. And whether he will have this term Antecedently to be an addition to the former term Absolutely, or only of equivalent force, I know not. But it is the common course of these men to confound their Reader with terms proposed without all explication. But let us endeavour to boult out the meaning of these perplexed discourses as well as we can. Will this Author have saith to come to pass necessarily and that absolutely, but not antecedently? Or will he have faith to come to pass necessarily, but not absolutely and antecedently? or will he have faith come to pass not necessarily at all: If not at all necessarily to what purpose doth he clog his Reader with such unnecessary compliments, of absolutely and antecedently? If God decrees to bestow faith upon a man, doth it not, necessarily follow hereupon that such a one shall believe? dares this Author deny it? Yet we account not this absolutely necessary, but merely upon supposition. Neither doth God's decree impose necessity upon all things; as Aquinas hath long ago disputed and proved; but only upon some things; that is that some Agents shall work necessarily; other Agents contingently and freely. In a word God both decreeth things to come to pass & the manner of them also; that is that some things shall come to pass necessarily, other things contingently and freely. But God's decree, we say, is absolute not conditional, of giving faith. And indeed all his decrees are absolute as touching the act of God willing; as Bradwardine hath demonstrated by clear reason; and Piscator out of the word of God. But the decree of giving faith is not absolute only as touching the act of God decreeing, but as touching the thing decreed. For faith is not given by God to any upon a condition to be performed by man; For if it were, than faith should be given according unto works, that is, grace should be conferred according to men's works. And when I consider this Author's compounding of these terms absolutely, and antecedently, I begin to suspect that like as then a thing comes to pass antecedently, when it comes to pass by an Antecedent decree in this Author's language, (though most absurd.) So in his language, the things are said to come to pass by absolute necessity, when they come to pass by an absolute decree; the decree in his opinion being sufficient to make a thing come to pass necessarily; & an absolute decree to make it come to pass absolutely necessarily. This undoubtedly is his meaning, upon which I am stumbled are I am aware. Now let the sober Reader judge how far these odd conceits are from all sobriety. Did not God decree to make the world, nay did he not absolutely decree this and antecedently, not conditionally and consequently? What therefore will it here-hence follow that the world had its existence necessarily, and that by the way of absolute necessity? I had thought this had been the peculiar and incommunicable perfection of God himself, namely to exist necessarily, and that in the way of absolute necessity. As for all other things which are but God's creatures, they have only a contingent existence derived originally from the free will of God the Creator. For this I take to be the transcendent perfection of God, To be most necessarily; to work most freely; Necessity and that absolute, being the greatest perfection of being: So that Bradwardine conceives this to be the prime and original perfection of God, esse necessario, to be necessarily. On the other side freedom in the highest kind, is the greatest perfection 〈◊〉 operation; and God alone so works, as without subordination to any superior Agent; but no creature, man or Angel so works, as without subordination to God the first Agent, the first cause, the first free worker. Now I come 〈◊〉 the second particular of this second inconvenience. 2. And that is that our doctrine taketh away the conscience of sin; and this we willingly grant is consequent upon the former. For if sin be no sin, there is no cause why any man should be troubled with the conscience of sin. But all this being grounded upon a vile and most untrue imputation never yet proved, namely that we make all actions both good and evil to come to pass by absolute necessity, there can be no more truth in the consequent then there is in the Antecedent. We say that every sin that is, or ever was committed in the world is and ever was committed freely, not only voluntarily; much less doth any sin come to pass by any absolute necessity. For albeit there be some things that come to pass necessarily by necessity of nature, as proceeding from Agents natural, working naturally and necessarily. Yet is no work of nature wrought by any absolute necessity. God being able to set an end to nature and the works thereof whensoever it pleaseth him; and while nature continueth according to the good pleasure of God, he restrains the course thereof, or changeth it as he thinks good. How much less do the actions of men, not only in respect of God's agency, who is the first cause, but in respect of man's agency, a second cause, and working deliberately and freely come to pass not necessarily, but contingently, and freely; So far off are they from coming to pass by absolute necessity; to exist by absolute necessity being the incommunicable perfection of God himself. But I confess this Author showeth some humanity in the proof of it, to wit, out of the Tragedian very judiciously and learnedly. Fati est ista culpa; nemo fit fato nocens. It is the fault of fate or destiny, and what comes to pass by destiny is no fault of man's. Yet Zeno the great Patron of Fate, finding his servant in a fault, when his servant excused himself upon fate, saying it was destiny that he should steal; made a ready answer saying, Et caedo, it was his destiny also to be punished; So far was he from justifying or excusing his servant upon any such ground, or forbearing to punish him. And doth not this Author know that jocasta for all her acknowledgement of fate governing all things; yet in conscience of her incestuous courses destroyed herself in the same Tragedian? But consider, indifferent Reader, whether this Author doth not carry himself, as if he were dealing with little children, and his purpose were not to inform them; but to abuse and mock them. For is that all ways the faith or opinion of the Tragedian, whatsoever he puts into the mouths of this or that Actor? Do not they represent the absurd pretences of some, as well as the reasonable discourses of others? Then again who are they that maintain, Fatum, destiny? Where hath he found this maintained by any of our divines? Yet I confess this Author deals ingeniously in one thing, to wit, in walking so fairly in the steps of this forefathers. For thus the Pelagians accused the doctrine of Austin, not only after he was dead, as appears by Prosper's Epistle ad Ruffinum; but even while he was living as appears by Austin himself; Nec sub nomine gratiae fatum asserimus, quia nullis hominum meritis dicimus Dei gratiam antecedi: Si autem quibusdam omnipotentis Dei voluntatem placet fati nomine nuncupari, profanas quidem verborum novitates evitamus, Aug: contra duas epist. Pe. lag: ad Bonifacium. sed de verbis contendere non amamus: neither do we maintain destiny under the name of grace, in saying grace is not prevented by any merits of man. But if some are pleased to call the will Almighty God by the name of fa●e (or destiny) we avoid the profane novelties of words but we do not love to strive about words. Where observe how first the same crimination was made against Austin's doctrine by the Pelagians, which this Author makes against ours. 2. The doctrine which the Pelagians opposed in this crimination was this, Grace is not conferred according unto works. 3ly, Austin disavows all antecedency of works to the bestowing of grace, how much more to the decreeing of grace to be bestowed on any, which yet is the beloved Helena of this Author therefore he talks so oft against an Antecedent decree. Then again it is manifest that the greatest maintainers of destiny and sat, did not maintain it in any opposition to the free wills of men. And Austin himself professeth that such a necessity as is expressed in these words, Necesse est ut fiat, it must needs be that such a thing shall come to pass, contains no inconvenience, nor is any way prejudicial to the free wills of men. His words are these; Sienim necessitas nostra ida dicenda est, quae non est in nostra 〈◊〉, ●●detiamsi nelumus, efficit quod potest, sicut est necessitas mortis; Manifestum est 〈◊〉 nostras, quibus recte aut perperam vivitur, sub tale Austin: de civet Dei l. 5. cap. 10. necessitate non esse, Multa●●im 〈◊〉, quae si nolemus, non facerimus. Si autem illa desinitur esse necessitas, secundum quam dicimus necesse esse ut aliquid ita sit vel ita fiat, nescio cur eam timeamus, ne nobis liv● 〈◊〉 voluntatis auferat. If that is to be accounted our necessity, which is net in our power, but whether we will or no, worketh as it can such as is the necessity of death; It is apparent that our wills whereby we live well or ill are not under the the necessity of fate. For we do many things, which if we would not we should not do them. But if necessity be defined to be such a thing as when we say it must needs be that a thing be thus, or thus come to pass; I know not why we should fear lest such a necessity should bereave us of free will. And this Austin delivers to meet with the vain fears of those, who placed our wills amongst those things which are not subject to necessity, lest so they should lose their liberty. Observe this well and compare it with the present discourse of this positive Theologue, who thinks to outface Austin with the authority of his bare word. In the words following he manifests that he speaks all this while of necessity in respect of God's decree not simply, but considered as irresistible; by the way making no bones of avouching some decrees of God to be resistable, notwithstanding the Psalmist's protestation Whatsoever the Lord willeth, that hath he done both in heaven and earth; And St. Paul's emphatical expression of the same truth, saying, Who hath repsted his will? But this Divine is a brave fellow; and thinks to carry all with his breath. For where hath he given us any reason to prove that any decrees of God are of any resistable condition? But let his decrees be never so irresistible, and let that be true which Austin saith, that, Non aliquid fit nisi omnipotens fieri velit; Not any thing comes to pass, unless God will have it come to pass. Art. 11. And after Austin the Church of Ireland in their Articles of religion. Yet if God will have every thing come to pass agreeably to the nature & condition thereof thus, necessary things necessarily, contingent things contingently, as Aquinas hath not only said, 1. p. q. 19 art. 8. but proved; hereby is no impeachment to the liberty of the creature, but an establishment thereof rather, as the Arch-Bishops, Bishops, and Clergy of Ireland have professed in the foresaid Article; that I may show some authority for my sayings, as this Author represents none for his, but carrieth himself like a Master of Sentences, as if he were in his own sufficiency of more authority and credit to be believed, than the Pope in a general Council: And albeit myself after many others, and some formerly mentioned have showed in a large digression to this purpose that necessity upon supposition, may well Vindic: l. 2. digres. 5. stand with contingency, and liberty simply so called. And in the first place have instanced in necessity of infallibility consequent to God's prescience, which though Cicero thought could not consist with man's liberty, yet Christians have always been of a contrary opinion; until the Sect of the Socinians arose; and Arminians are very apt to show them so much courtesy as to bear their books after them. Secondly I have proved a necessity upon supposition of God's decree to permit sin. For the Lord takes upon him to be the keeper of us from sin, as Gen: 20. 6. He professeth as much to Abimilech, that he kept him from sinning against God. In case God will not keep a man from sin, what can be expected, but that he will undoubtedly sin without any prejudice to the liberty of his will, considering that of Austin; Libertas sine gratia non est libertas sed contumacia, Liberty without grace, is not liberty but wilfulness. Thirdly and lastly upon supposition of God's will; And this I prove evidently to pass on every thing which God forseeth as future considering that contingent things are merely possible in their own nature; and cannot pass out of the condition of things merely possible into the condition of things future, without a cause: And no other cause of this transmigration can be devised with any colour of reason or probability, save only the will of God. Neither do I find that digression of mine in any the least part weakened, or so much as assailed by aught that this Author hath delivered; Who showeth himself upon the stage, rather to brave his opposites with the bare authority of his words, then with sound argument to dispute aught. Sect: 2. Because it taketh away the desert and guilt of sin. Offences if fatal, cannot be justly punished. 2. The M. Mason's Addit. p. 40. 41. 42. reason is because those deed for which men are punished or rewarded must be their own, under their own power and and sovereignty, but such are no fatal acts or events. Neither temporally nor eternally can sin bepunished, if it be absolutely necessary. Not temporally, as God himself hath given us to understand by that law which he prescribed the Jews Deut: 22. 25. Which was that it a Maid commit uncleanness by constraint, she should not be punished. His reason was because there was no cause of death in her; what she yielded to was through compulsion, being overborne by power; As a man that is wounded to death by his neighbour; so was a Virgin in that case a sufferer rather than a doer. This particular law is of universal right: No just punishment can be inflicted for sin, where there is no power in the party to avoid it. The speech of Lipsius is but a mere crorchet contrary to reason, (Fatali culpae fatalis poena) fatal faults must have fatal punishments. Did magistrates think men's offences unavoidable, they would think it bootless, and unreasonable to punish them. Nay not only so, but we see by daily experience, that Judges following the direction of reason have very remissely punished such faults as have been committed through the power of the head strong & exorbitant passions. Yea we may read of some who have not thought it fit to punish such faults at all. Valcrius Maximus telleth that Popilius a Roman Praetor sitting in judgement on a woman who had in Val: max. l. 8. c. 1. Gell: l. 12. c. 7. a bitter passion slain her mother, because she had murdered her children (neque damnavit, neque absolvit) neither cleared her nor condemned her And Aulus Gellius reporteth of Dolabella the Proconsul of Asia, that when a woman of Smyrna was brought before him who had poisoned her husband and son for murdering a son of hers, which she had by a former husband; he turned her over to the Arcopagus, which was the gravest and most renowned judgement seat in the world; The Judges there not daring to acquit her, being stained with a double slaughter, nor yet to punish her being provoked with just grief, commanded the accuser & offender to come before them an hundred years after. And so neither was the woman's fact justified, the laws not allowing of it; Nor yet the woman punished because she was worthy to be pardoned. If wise, magistrates have spared such offenders as have been overswayed with passions, which did but incline, not determine them to their irregular actions; they would never have punished any trespassers, if they had thought them to be such by invincible necessity, Or if offenders did think that their offences were their destinies, and that when they murder, steal, commit adultery, make insurrections, plot treasons, or practise any other outrageous villainies, they do them by the necessity of God's unalterable decree; and can do no otherwise: they would and might complain of their punishments as unjust, as Zenoes' servant did; when he was beaten by his master for a fault, he told him out of his own grounds that he was unjustly beaten. Because he was (●fato coactus peccare) constrained to make that fault by his undeclinable fate. The Ad●umctine Monks, misled by Saint Austin Epist. 105. ad sixtum Presbyterum, (which he calleth a book wherein he setteth down his opinion concerning God's grace) did so teach grace that they denied free will. And this Saint Austin confuted in his book De gratia & liberoarbitrio. And thinking the grace of God (as Saint Austin taught) to be such as could not stand with freedom of will, they thought that no man should be punished for his faults, but rather prayed for that God would give them grace to do better. Against this Austin directed his other book, De correp: & gratiá. In which discourse though it be grace that is still named, yet predestination is included. For as Kimedontius saith truly in his preface to Luther De servo arbitrio. Between grace and predestination there is only this difference (as Saint Austin teacheth Libro de praedest. Sanctorum cap. 10.) that predestination is a preparation of grace, and grace a bestowing of predestination. As Zenoes' servant and these Monks did, so would all men judge; did they considerately think that men could not choose but offend. And what would be the resultance of such a persuasion, but an inundation of the greatest insolences, and dissolution of all good government. Indeed if our doctrine make sin to be no sin, and therewithal take away the conscience Answer. 3. of sin; it is not to be marvailed, if it take away the desert and guilt of sin: For as sin is no sin; so likewise it is as fit that the desert and guilt of sin, should be the desert and guilt of no sin; and so no desert or guilt at all. This Author to serve his own turn takes great libery of discourse in talking of offences fatal; these were called by Austin profane novelties of words. Yet elsewhere he professeth that if no other thing were meant hereby then the divine providence. Sententiam teneant, linguam corrigant; let them hold their orthodox meaning, but let them correct their language Now by providence divine is meant the will of God, working every thing that is good, and permitting every thing that is evil. And without this will of God not any thing comes to pass in the judgement of Austin. Non aliquid sit saith he, nisi onnipotens furi velit, vel sinen●o ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo, Not any thing comes to pass, unless Almighty God will have it come to pass, either by suffering it, or by Enchirid. c. 95. 〈◊〉 working of it to wit, if evil, suffering it, if good working it; but of each he professeth that God wills it The abominable outrages committed upon the person of the holy Son of God, were such as God's hand and God's counsel sore determined, that is as much Act: 4. 28. Rev: 17. 17. as to say, antecedently determined to be done. And the ●en Kings in giving their kingdoms to the Beast, are said herein to have agreed to dce God's will. Yet this Author dares not say, that these actions could not be justly punished Yet the maintainets of destiny (as I have showed out of Austin) denied that the wills of men were subject to destiny; while De civet. Dei l. 5. c. 10. this Author talks in their language, why doth he not talk in their meaning? And if he talks in our meaning why doth he not talk in our language? Now Austin farther saith (is I have showed out of the same place) that they who exempted the wills of men from all necessity, seared a vain and causeless fear; professing that as to some necessity the will is not subject, such as is the necessity of death, which befalls us whether we will or no. So to some necessity it may be subject without any danger; and that necessity he expresseth to be such, as when we say, it must needs be that such a thing come to pass. Now such a necessity and no other is granted by us as consequent to the will of God, so that if God will give a man faith, it must needs be, such a man shall believe; if he will give repentance it must needs be, that such a man shall repent; If he will keep such a man as Abimelech from sinning against him, it must needs be, that such a man shall be kept from Gen: 20. 6. sinning against him. If God will not give a man faith, nor repentance, it must needs be, that such a man will not believe, will not repent. In like manner if God will not keep a man from sin, but suffer him to sin; it needs must be that such a one shall sin. If God harden the heart of Pharaoh, so that he shall not set Israel go, undoubtedly so it shall come to pass. If God put it into the hearts of the Kings to give up their kingdoms to the Beast, they shall infallibly give their Kingdoms to the Beast. If he gives men over unto a Reprobate mind to do things inconvenient, undoubtedly being thus prostituted by God to their own corruption from within, and to the power of Satan from without, they shall do those inconvenient things, be they never so abominable; yet not necessarily, much less in the way of absolute necessity, (as this Author wordeth it, affecting to speak with a full mouth (which is a quality natural to these Arminians, and runs in a blood) but proveth nothing) but contingently and freely, not only with a possibility, but also with an active power to the contrary. And if freely, then surely their works are their own, proceeding from their own power and sovereignty, but yet not supreme and absolute dominion and independent in their operation, on God their maker. God must have the prerogative still of being the first mover, the first cause, the first Agent, the first free Agent; So far off are we from maintaining that the actions of men have their being by absolute necessity; that we utterly deny any thing in the world to have ' its existence by absolute necessity, saving God alone, as before I have showed. Sciendum, saith Durand, quod loquendo de necessitate simpliciter, voluntas divina In first didst 46. quaest. 1. nec imponit, nec imponere potest rebus necessitatem; nec res creatae sunt capaces talis necessitatis. We are to know that speaking of necessity simply so called, the will of God neither doth impose, or can impose any such necessity on things, neither are creatures capable of such necessity. But if we speak of such necessity as creatures are capable of under the divine liberty, by causes intermediate; it is to be said that all things do not come to pass of necessity; but some do, and some do not. God will have some things come to pass by the mediation of causes necessary, & those come to pass necessarily; Others come to pass by the mediation of causes contingent, and those come to pass contingently; Whereby, saith he, 'tis manifest that they say not well, who say that all things come to pass of necessity in reference to the Divine will; because, as hath been showed, in respect of the Divine will, all things come to pass freely; and therefore speaking absolutely, they may not come to pass, although, upon supposition that they are willed, they cannot but come to pass; but this is only necessity upon supposition. 1. Indeed if men did sin against their wills; and virgins sometimes are ravished, & men are slain by force full sore against their wills, they deserved no punishment. But is it possible that a man can will that which is evil against his will? Every ordinary Scholar in the University knows that axiom, Voluntas non potest cogi, the will cannot be forced. Lipsius' his speech, fatali culpae fatalis poena, fatal faults have fatal punishments, this Author saith, is but a mere crotchet contrary to reason. As if he would teach the very maintainers of fate, yea the very first to understand themselves. For fate wherewith our doctrine is charged by our opposites is commonly called Fate Stoical. Now Zeno was the father of the Stoics; yet when his servant was taken playing the thief, pleaded for himself, saying it was my destiny to steal. Zeno answered him in his own language, that it was his destiny to smart for it too; right in this same sense that Lipsius spoke. Yet Zeno knew full well that he punished his servant freely. And Zeno is well known to have been a great Master of morality for all this, which could not consist with denying the liberty of man's will, as this Author well knows. And Austin censureth those who feared to subject the will to all manner of necessity, as men transported with vain and causeless fears; manifesting thereby that some necessity may very well consist with a man's liberty. Magistrates though they believe with Austin that, Not any thing comes Artic: 11. to pass, unless Almighty God will have it come to pass; And with the Church of Ireland, that God from all eternity did by his unchangeable counsel ordain whatsoever should in time come to pass. And with Aquinas that the root of contingency, is the effectual will of God; yet may they well think it reasonable enough to punish offences; seeing that God decrees that some things, even all the actions of men shall come to pass contingently; as well as other things shall come to pass necessarily. For to come to pass contingently is to come to pass avoidably; and if they be the actions of men, freely also. It is incredible that any sober man should remissely punish faults for the exorbitancy & strength sake of the passions, whereby they were committed, but rather in consideration of the potent causes which raised such passions in them, under a colour of justice. And we commonly say the greater the temptation is, the less is the sin. So Peter surprised suddenly with fear denied his Master. Yet what saith Aristotle. In some things no force is sufficient Arist. l 30. 1. for excuse; but a man ought to die rather any manner of death, then commit them. For those things in Euripedes are ridiculous, which moved Alcmaeon to kill his mother. Indeed Plato Ibid. maintained that things done through passion were not voluntary. But Aristotle a better Master than he, disproves it, and by excellent reasons confirms the contrary. And whatsoever Popilius the Roman Praetor judged of her, who slew her mother, provoked by her Mother's fact in murdering her children; yet let our laws be consulted, and the opinion of our Judges in such a case; and whether such a one were not to be condemned; and whether Popilius his judgement deserves to be admitted for the correction of the laws of our land, and working a reformation in this particular. We should soon have a wild world, if every one being provoked by the insolences of others should thrust themselves into the throne of God for the execution of vengeance; Yet none more unfit for this, than the daughter to execute God's vengeance upon the mother that bore her. Yet it was wont to be held, If I forget not, that potestas patria originally was power of life and death. But all is fish that comes to this Author's net; like as her fact who poisoned her husband and son for killing a son of hers; destroying two for one without all authority most unnaturally; and that not hastily, but in a deliberate way by poisoning. And doth it become Christians to admire such heathenish courses of men nothing acquainted with the divine providence? And was this so doubtful a case, whether so wicked a wretch avenging herself by poison secretly given upon her husband and son for the death of another son of hers, that the sentencing thereof should be put over until an 100 years after? But what of all this? These wilfully affect revenge, the execution whereof belongs not to them; but it is just with God to punish sin with sin; one man's sin by another. As of Senacherib the Lord professeth, that he would cause him to fall by the sword in his own land, this was brought to pass by his own children falling upon him furiously, and as unnaturally as the actions of any of these. How was innocent Naboth used, and by public sentence condemned to be stoned to death, and accordingly executed by the practice of wicked jezabel? Yet Solomon spareth not to profess that every man's judgement cometh of the Lord. Never were more abominable courses executed upon any, then upon the holy son of God: Yet these were all foredetermined Prov: 28. by the hand of God, and the counsel of God, as the Apostles with one voice acknowledge. By the same providence was joseph sold into Egypt, God working thereby the preservation Act: 4. 28. of them that sold him; Thus Sihon was hardened, and the Canaanites, and the Egyptians with Pharaoh their King to their own destruction. Thus the Lord punished David's foul sin by the murder of Amnon contrived by his own brother; and by the sword of Absalon rising up against his own father; and by the sword of Shimei's tongue cursing David; wherein David acknowledged the hand of God. Thus he punished the Idolatry of the Gentiles by giving them over to vile affections, and so prostituting them to abominable courses. What outrages were committed by Senacherib that proud and blasphemous wretch upon the people of God; yet is he called the rod of God's wrath and Es: 10. the staff in his hand; is said to be God's indignation. And if God leaves any man to his corruption, and offers occasions and temptations from without, which are naturally apt to actuate such corruptions; and withal gives them over to the power of Satan; what is to be expected, but that they will break forth into murder, as in Senacherib's sons; and the Jews crucifying the Son of God; into stealth sacrilegious, as in Achan; into adultery and that in an incestuous manner as we see in Absalon; into insurrections, an example whereof we have in the ten Tribes revolting from Rehoboam; into treasons as judas betraying his own Master; and into all manner of outrageous villainies, whereof the Scripture makes plentiful mention, and of the providence of God therein? As for God's determining to the act, that is nothing at all material to the point in hand, though this Author in his crude conceits, is much intoxicated therewith; For as much as, whether the wicked are exercised in actions good for the substance of them; or in abstaining from that which is evil, they never a whit the more either perform the one, or abstain from the other in a gracious manner; and all for want of grace supernatural, which God is not bound to bestow on any. All sides confess that Divine concourse is necessary to every act, as without which the creature cannot move. For in God we move, as well as in him we live, and in him we have our being. And about this concourse a question is made, to wit, Whether God's influence be only into the act, and that upon condition, modo nos velimus, provided that we will, is as absurd and contradictious a conceit, as can be devised; seeing the greatest question is concerning the act of willing: And is it possible that God shall work this act upon condition that it be wrought by us? why, if it be wrought by us, what need is there of God's working it? Can the same act be the condition of itself, and so both before and after itself? To avoid this precipice others fly to God's prescience, that at such an instant man will produce such an act of will, provided that God will produce it, which is worse than the former. For hereby each Agent's operation is made the condition of the other, whence no operation at all can proceed. Then again a thing is feigned to be foreseen by God as future, which hath no cause of the futurition thereof, being in its own nature merely possible, that is no more future indeed, than not future: And nothing but the will and decree of God can make it pass out of the condition of a thing merely possible into the condition of a thing future, as is made manifest by invincible reason. Therefore we say the influence of God necessarily required to every action, is made into the will itself moving it agreably to the nature thereof, to do whatsoever it doth, not voluntarily only, but freely also; taking liberty aright and as it ought to be taken, that is in the choice of means tending to an end, whether that end be a man's right end or no. For it is confessed by Moralists that the motion of the will towards its congruous end, is natural and necessary, not free. But this brave Gentleman carrieth himself aloft, and superciliously despising to enter into any of these lists of argumentation; and as if the matter were conclusum contra Manichaeos', confidently supposeth, without all proof, that we maintain that all humane actions come to pass by absolute necessity: Whereas to the contrary 'tis evident that nothing in the world hath its existence by absolute necessity, saving God alone. 'Tis true, God's decree is unalterable, and whatsoever comes to pass comes to pass by his will saith Austin: and the Church of Ireland; By the effectual will of God, saith Aquinas, as which, he makes the root of all contingency; And therefore as necessary causes work necessarily by the will of God; so by the same will of God do contingent Agents work contingently; and free Agents work voluntarily and freely. And observe the immodesty of this Author, he tells us what Zeno's servant pleaded for himself with his Master; but he doth not tell what Zeno answered him, that he conceals; it is enough for him to gull and cheat poor ignorants. The Adrumetine Monks, he saith, were misled by Austin; a vile imputation cast upon that man whose memory hath been always honourable in the Church of God; and the memorial of his opposites rots. Did Austin mislead them? did he draw them into error? If they did mistake Austin, shall it be true therefore to say they were misled by him? How many mistake and misunderstand God's word; what then? shall we be so audacious and blasphemous, as to say they are misled by the word of God? Why may not such impudent persons proceed, and say they are misled by the holy Ghost? Then that which he saith of these Monks, as misled by Austin, it is a notorious untruth; Cresconius and Felix that came over to Austin of their own heads to complain of some in their Monastery; laid to their charge indeed that they so taught grace, that they denied freewill; & that this they pretended to have learned out of Austin's book written to Sixtus the Presbyter. But Austin was not hasty to believe this crimination: And therefore he saith disjunctively of that Monk of whom they complained, Aut librum meum non intelligit, aut ipse non intelligitur; either he understands not my book; or himself is not well understood by his brethren. If the information were true, than that Brother of whom they complained mistook Austin. For Austin doth not any where so maintain grace, as to deny freewill. But if that Brother understood Austin aright in that foresaid book of his, than he maintained no such opinion as Cresconius and Felix laid to his charge, but they rather misunderstood him. And this appeared to be most true afterwards. For Florus was the man whom Cresconius and Felix accused, and whom Austin desired of Valentinus the father of them, that he would send over unto him, as Coccius acknowledgeth, & accordingly he was sent over to Austin, as appears in Austin's book De corrept. & gratiâ cap. 1. With whom when Austin had conferred, he found him most orthodox as himself professeth in the chapter mentioned, and therein much rejoiced, and withal signifieth to Valentinus that they deserved rather to be checked who misunderstood Florus. And therefore when Austin in his Retractations comes to take notice of his book De gratiâ & libero arbitrio, and the occasion of writing thereof, he sets it down not absolutely, because of those who so do maintain grace, as withal they deny freewill, but with a disjunctive addition, thus, or because of those who think when grace is maintained, therewithal that freewill is denied. The first was delivered in reference to the crimination made before him by Cresconius, and Felix against Florus; but the latter was according to Austin's suspicion at the first, which proved afterwards to be a truth, as appears by the first chapter of Austin's book the correptione & gratiâ; where Florus is justified and magnified by St. Austin, and his criminators condemned. And seeing there were none such among the Monks of Adrumetum, as the accusants pretended, who so maintained grace, as to deny freewill; therefore that also must needs be false which followeth in this Author, when he saith that against them also St. Austin wrote his other book De correptione & gratiâ: And the truth is the whole business was ended and the tumult appeased between those Adrumetine Monks, before Florus came over; as appeared by the relation made unto him by Florus concerning the amicable composition of all things there. And Austin in this very passage which this Author grates upon, professeth that he writes not against them; only he answereth such an objection (For I conceive it to be no other) more fully which was made by some of them formerly against Florus, and the doctrine of Austin maintained by Florus. The relation whereof was brought unto him by the same Florus, as it seems. But of this more at large in This digression in his late book against. Corvinius pag. 174. 175. etc. my digression concerning the predestinarian heresy, which I purpose to subjoine to this. Austin saith indeed that, Praedestinatio est gratiae praeparatio, gratia verò ipsa donatio. Predestination is the preparation of grace, Grace the gift itself which was prepared; not the bestowing of it: How can it be? Can a gift temporal be the bestowing of a thing eternal? What entertainment Zeno's servant found at his Master's hands (which this Author conceals) I have often showed who taught no such doctrine as destiny as to free a knave from stripes; who as so great a Philosopher had a better judgement in the nature of fate then his servant; and himself so well thought of by the whole State of Athenians. Yet was not Zeno so well instructed in the mystery of Divine providence, as we are by the word of God; even from the selling of joseph all along to the crucifying of the Son of God; & from thence to the Kings giving up their Kingdoms to the Beast, which should come to pass in the latter part of the last times of the world. But let him make himself merry with Zeno's servant, who taken in a thievish fact was content to help himself with any pretence; but Zeno we know did not approve of his appology, but prepared a Rod for the knaves back in despite of that. And as for the Monks, the relation that here he makes is merely a fiction of his own brain without all ground. Thus his foundation being ruined, no marvel if the house he builds thereon must needs totter and fall on his ownpate. Sect: 3. 2. Nor if this be true can sin be punished eternally, or that tribunal be just on which the sentence of eternal M. Mesons Addit. p 42. 43. 44 fire shall be denounced against the wicked at the last day. To this I have the father's bearing witness generally and plainly. Tertullian hath there words; The recompense of God and evil can with no justice be given to him, who is good or evil, not freely but of necessity. Saint Hierome saith, where necessity domineers, lib. 2. contra Maxion: Epiph: adversus baer: l. 1. haer. 5. vum. 3. Aug: l. 2. contra Faust. c. 5. Presp. ad object. 10. Vinc: Fulg. l. 1. c. 1. ad Moni. c 22. Bern: l. de great. & lib. arbit. p. 908. there is no place for retribution. Epiphanius saith, the stars which impose upon men a necessity of sinning, may be punished with better justice than the men themselves. We place men's nativities under no fatal constell●tions, saith Saint Austin, that we may free the will by which a man liveth either well or ill, from all bands of necessity, because of the righteous judgement of God. Prosper speaking of the judgement of God, by which he decreed to render unto every man according to his works, saith, this judgement would never be if men did sin by the will and determination of God. Fulgentius also saith the same. It is great injustice in God, to punish him whom he doth not find, but make an offender. This was Saint Peruards opinion too; it is only a will free from compulsion and necessity saith he, which maketh a creature capable of reward & punishment Out of these testimonies laid together may be collected three things. 1. That the Ancients did use to call a necssity of humane actions good or bad, by the name of destiny, from what external cause soever this necessity did arise. 2. That they did use these two words (Necessity) and (Compulsion) promiscuously; and therefore thought that necessity as well as compulsion did take away the wills liberty. 3. (Which is for our present purpose) that they believed and contended that the judgements of God on sinners could not be just, if they were held by the Adamantine chains of any absolute necessity, under the power of their sins. I will therefore conclude this Argument with the words of Epiphanius writing of the error of the Pharisees, who believed the immortality of the soul, and the resurrection of the dead, & yet held that all things come to pass by necessity. It is, saith he, a point of extreme ignorance; or madness rather, for him that Epiph. l. 1. adv. haer. 16. p. 35. n. 3. confesseth the resurrection of the dead, and the great day appointed for the revelation of God's righteous judgement, to say that there is any destiny, any necessity in men's actions For how can the righteous judgement of God and destiny comply and stand together? And (let me add) how can the belief of this and true piety stand together? For where this persuasion that men's sins are necessary, and that therefore there can be no righteous judgement, is rooted in religion will quickly be rooted out. 4. It tends to religions overthrow; because it makes the whole circle of man's life, but a mere destiny. By it all our doings are God's ordinances, all our imaginations branches of his predestination; and all events in Kingdoms and commonweals the necessary issues of the divine decree. All things whatsoever though they seem to do somewhat; yet by this opinion, they do indeed just nothing; the best laws restrain not one offender the sweetest rewards promote not one virtue, the powerfullest Sermons convert not one sinner, the humblest devotions divert not one calamity; the strongest endeavours in things of any nature whatsoever, effect no more than would be done without them, but the necessitating, overruling decree of God doth all. And if laws do nothing, wherefore are they made? If rules of religion do nothing, why are they prescribed? If the wills of men do nothing, why are men encouraged to one thing, scared from another? there? and if good endeavours and onsets do nothing (being excited, continued, limited, controlled and every way governed by an active, absolute, and Almighty decree, to what purpose are they used? Who seeth not plainly whither these things tend? To nothing more than to the subversion of piety and policy, religion & laws, society and government? This did the Romans see full well; and therefore they banished (Mathematicos, the teachers & abetters of destiny) out of Rome. These and the like inconveniencies which come from the uppper way, did work so with Prosper, as that he calls him no Catholic who is of this opinion. Prosp. ad cap. Gal: Sent. 1. Whosoever saith that men are urged to sin, and to be damned by the predestination of God, as by a fatal, unavoidable necessity, he is no Catholic. They did also make the Arausican counsel denounce a curse against such. That any are predestinated by the divine power to sin, we do not only not believe, but with the greatest detestation that we can▪ we denounce Anathema to such (if there be any such) as will believe so great an evil. Thus far of my ●easons against the upper and more harsh and rigorous way. 2. Undoubtedly if sin cannot be punished temporally, it cannot be punished eternally. We have no need, I should think of the Authority of any fathers to justify this. Where Answer. doth this Author find, that we maintain that a man is good or evil, not freely but by necessity, that Tertullian is brought in as opposing us here? Yet we think this is worthy of distinction: For was not Adam made by God habitually good? Durand. I am sure, maintains that in his creation he was endued with all Moral virtues: & this we read in Scripture, that all things which God made were very good: & as other things were made very good in their kind: So I presume man was made very good in his kind: and how this could be unless he were made virtuous, I cannot conceive. So likewise man being brought forth in the corrupt mass; when afterwards he is made good either in the way of justification, or in the way of regeneration; these are no free acts of Man, but rather the free acts of God. I presume this Author dares not say that man regenerates himself But as for the denomination of goodness and badness in man, that ariseth from any actions of his, I willingly grant all such goodness or badness is acquired freely, not necessarily. And as Tertullian takes necessity, to wit in opposition unto liberty; So I presume doth Hierome too; otherwise these two Fathers were yoked together unequally in this place. Now we know no such necessity domineering in man, as stands in opposition to liberty. Much less do we maintain any necessity over the will of man, depending upon fatal constellations; And as Epiphanius, and Austin discourse thus of necessity in reference to fatal constellations; So it seems likely that Hierome and Tertullian did discourse of necessity in the same sense. To sin by the will of God in Prosper is to sin by the predestination of God, as appears both by the Objection itself, and Prosper's answer thereunto throughout. Now predestination in the father's meaning is of no other things, then such as God purposed to work. And accordingly we answer that no evil in the world, as evil, comes to pass by God's will to work it; but only by God's will to permit it. And it is Austin's express profession, that Non aliquid fit nisi omnipotens fieri velit. Not any thing comes to pass, unless God Almighty will have it come to pass; but how? Not all after one manner, but after a different manner; some by working them, others by permitting them; vel sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo; either by suffering it to come to pass, in case it be evil, or himself working it, in case it be good. Fulgentius justifies this sense in his sentence here alleged. For to sin by God's will in Prosper, is all one with being made an offender (or made to sin) by God, in Fulgentius. Now we say God makes many a man good by regeneration; but he makes none evil; only he doth not cure that natural or habitual viciousness, which he finds amongst men, in all. For He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth; and indeed he is bound to none. St. Bernard clearly maintains that there is no liberty from sin in any natural man; and consequently every natural man is cast upon a necessity of sinning; and therefore that liberty from necessity which he grants to man, can be no other than liberty from compulsion; And so Dr. Fulke usually makes the distinction run between Liberty from sin, and liberty from coaction; & denying the one he grants the other. That the Ancients did call that necessity, which ariseth from the will of God upon the will of the creature by the name of destiny; This Author brings not the least colour of 1. proof; neither do I think he is able to bring any, save only of the Pelagians, who traduced Austin's doctrine of predestination by the name of destiny. And so they traduced his doctrine in denying that grace was conferred according to men's works; whereupon it was that he built his doctrine of predestination, as is apparent De bono perseverantiae. c. 15. In the second I wonder this Author observes not how he contradicts himself. For if they used these words Necessity, & compulsion; promiscuously; doth it not evidently follow that 2. they distinguished them not? but always took them of equivalent signification. But I do not find that Austin took necessity of the same signification with compulsion; when he distinguisheth of necessity; saying some necessity is such, as whereby a thing befalls a man, whether he will or no; as the necessity of death; and to such a necessity he saith, the will is not subject. Another necessity there is, as when we say, It must needs be, that this, or that come to pass, and he confesseth plainly that the will may be subject to such a necessity, without danger or prejudice to the liberty thereof. 3 And well they might hold that God's judgements were not just on sinners, if they were held by any absolute necessity under the power of their sins. We say that nothing hath either existence, or continuance, by absolute necessity, save God alone. But I guess this Author calls that necessity absolute, which flows from God's absolute decree. Now if he will have God's decrees to be conditional, it stands him upon to prove it, not boldly suppose it. Especially seeing Aquinas hath professed that never any man was so mad as to say that there is any cause of God's predestination, as touching the act of God's predestinating; and that there can be no cause hereof he proves because there can be no cause of God's will, as touching the act of God willing, as formerly he had proved. And Doctor jackson in his book of providence confesseth that the distinction of God's will, into a will antecedent, and a will consequent, is not to be understood as touching the act of God willing; but as touching the things willed. And accordingly, seeing reprobation in it 's kind is the will of God, as well as predestination in its kind; it followeth, that as there can be no cause of the will of God, as touching the act of God willing; no cause of predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating; so neither can there be any cause of Reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating. And look how mad a thing it is for any man to maintain that there is some cause of predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating. So as mad a thing it must be every way to avouch that there is a cause of Reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating. And truly the Apostle St. Paul plainly manifests that upon what ground he proves, that Election is not of good works (namely because before jacob or Esau were borne, or had done good or evil, it was said, The elder shall serve the younger) upon the same ground we may be bold to conclude, that Reprobation is not of evil works. And the same reason manifests that faith and infidelity are excluded from being the causes, the one of Election, the other of Reprobation; as well as good and evil works. And both Piscator by evidence of Scripture, and Bradwardine by evidence of reason have demonstrated, that no will of God is conditional, which is to be understood, as touching the act of God willing. And it may be evidently further demonstrated thus; If any thing be the cause of God's will, then either by necessity of nature, or by the constitution of God; Not by necessity of nature, as is evident and all confess, there being no colour of truth for that; besides such an opinion were most dangerously prejudicial to God's sovereignty, and liberty. If therefore they say, it is by the constitution of God, mask I pray what an insuperable absurdity followeth hereupon. For seeing God's constitution is his will, it followeth that God did will that upon foresight of this or that he would will such a man's salvation, and such a man's damnation. And thus the act of God's will is made the Object of God's will, even the eternal act of God's will; Whereas to the contrary it is apparent, that the objects of God's will are things temporal, never any thing that is eternal But as touching things willed, we readily grant, it may be said there is a cause thereof as School-Divines do generally acknowledge. And thus Gerardus Vossius speaks of the conditional will, which he faith the Fathers do ascribe to God. For this is the instance which he gives thereof, as for example, when God ordains to bestow salvation on a man in case he believe; here faith is made the condition of Salvation, but not of the will of God And in like manner we willingly grant that reprobation is conditional, inasmuch as God intends to inflict damnation on none, but such as die in sin without repenance But albeit predestination, as touching this particular thing willed, may be said to be conditional according as the Schoolmen explicate their meaning; and reprobation likewise as touching the particular of damnation mentioned: yet no such thing can be truly affirmed either of the one or of the other, as touching the particulars of granting, or denying the grace of règeneration, which are intended also by the decrees of predestination & reprobation. For albeit God intends not to bestow salvation on any, but upon condition of faith; nor damnation on any, but upon condition of final impenitency and infidelity. Yet God intends not to bestow the grace of regeneration on some for the curing of their natural infidelity and impenitency. Nor to leave the same infidelity and impenitency uncured in others, by denying the same grace of regeneration unto them. This I say God doth not intend to bring to pass upon any condition; For if he should, than grace should be conferred according unto works, which was condemned in the Synod of Palestine and all along in divers Synods, and Counsels against the Pelagians. So that albeit God proceeds according to a law in bestowing salvation, and inflicting damnation; yet he proceeds according to no law, in giving or denying the grace of regeneration for the curing of our natural corruption; but merely according to the pleasure of his will, as the Apostle testifies saying, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. And if the conferring and denying of this grace be absolute; how much more are the decrees hereof to be accounted most absolute? And consequently that one man is delivered from the power of his sins, whether original or habitual; another is not, but still continueth under the power of them; This I say, doth, & must needs come to pass by virtue of God's absolute decrees. Yet no absolute necessity followeth hereupon. First because no greater necessity then that which is absolute can be attributed to the existence and continuance of God himself. Secondly God did absolutely decree to make the world; yet no wise man was ever known to affirm that the world's existence was, and is by absolute necessity. In like sort, God did absolutely decree, that josiah should burn the Prophet's bones, upon the Altar; That Cyrus should build his City and let go his captives; That no man should desire the Israelites land, when they should come to appear before the Lord their God thrice in the year; That God would circumcise their hearts, and the hearts of their children to love the Lord their God withal their heart, and with all their soul. To put his fear in their hearts, that they should never depart away from him; To cause them to walk in his statutes and judgements to do them. To work in them both the will and the deed, according to his good pleasure. Yea to work in them every thing that is pleasing in his sight through jesus Christ. Likewise 1 King: 13. 2. Es: 45. 13. Ex, 34. 24. that Absolom should defile his father's Concubines, that the Jews should crucify the Son of God; that some through disobedience should stumble at the word; that the Kings should give their kingdoms to the beast. Yet these actions were done by them as freely as ever they Deut: 30. 6. Jer: 32 40. Ezech: 37. 24. Ezek. 36. 27. Phil: 2. 13. Heb: 13. 21. did aught in their lives; All these things I say by Scripture evidence were decreed by God to come to pass; The good by God's effection the evil by God's permission; and decreed absolutely on their parts that did them; if not, let it be showed upon what condition on Absolon's part, he should defile his father's Concubines; upon what condition on the Jews part, they should crucify the Son of God; upon what condition on their part, others through disobedience should stumble at God's word; And upon what condition on their part, the Kings should give their kingdoms to the beast. And if they take Arminias his way, let them reply upon mine answer to Arminius; if Bellarmin's, let them reply upon my answer to Bellarmine, that we may not trouble the world with out Tautologies: If a different way from both these, I shall be glad, to be acquainted with it, & give it such entertainment as according to my judgement it shall be found to deserve. So that with Epiphanius, though we are ready to concur in denying destiny, which as before we heard out of him was a necessity derived from the stars; yet with Austin we may still hold that the wills of men need not to be exempted from all necessity, to maintain the liberty thereof, and he gives instance in such a necessity as whereby we say, It most needs be that such a thing come to pass, as no way prejudicial to man's liberty. And Arminius confesseth, that upon supposition of God's decree it must needs be that the Soldiers should abstain from the breaking of Christ's bones; yet I nothing doubt, but this action was as as freely performed by them, as any other. For albeit a thing must needs come to pass which God hath decreed to come to pass, yet it is indifferent to come to pass necessarily or freely; which also God determines according to the nature of the things themselves; namely that necessary things shall come to pass necessarily, and contingent things contingently. And to this purpose he hath prepared different Agents, as Aquinas observeth some necessary working necessarily, some contingent Collatine: cum Junto pag: 83. working contingently. 4. Still this Author harps upon the same string imputing unto us, that we make the whole Circle of a man's life a mere destiny; his meaning is that we take away all liberty, which is most untrue. As for destiny it is well known as before I have showed that this was the usual crimination, which the Pelagians cast upon the doctrine of St. Austin; and that, because he maintained that grace was not given according unto man's works. And what was Austin's answer hereunto, I have showed before: Si cui voluntatem omnipotentis Dei Fati nomine placet nuncupari, profanas verborum novitates evitamus, sed de verbis contendere non amamus, If men please to call the will of Almighty God by the name of destiny; we avoid profane novelties of words, but we do not love to wrangle about words. For God to work us to faith, to repentance, to every good work; yea to the very will and the deed, and that according to his good pleasure (for which we have express Scripture, both in the old and new Testament, as erst I showed) & absolutely to decree this is to make the whole circle of man's like, as touching good courses, but a mere destiny, if we believe this Divine; whereas if this be decreed to be done conditionally, than grace must be conferred according to works, which is as true Pelagianism, as ever dropped from the mouth of Pelagius, & which himself was sometimes driven torenounce yet this Pelagianism is the only true divinity, if we believe this Author. Again if non aliquid fit nisi omnipotens fieri velit, Not any thing comes to pass, unless God Almighty will have it come to pass; whether good or evil; which was sometimes delivered by Austin; and of late professed by the Church of Ireland in the days of King James, this is to make the whole Circle of man's life a mere Destiny; if this Author be of any credit so far as to make his words to be received as Oracles; yet God's word is express from the unanimous consent of the Apostles, that both Herod & Pontius-Pilate, with the Gentiles and people of Israel were gathered together against the holy Son of God to do what God's hand & God's counsel had before determined to be done: Yet were they gathered together to do such acts, as more facinorous were never known to be done since the world began: And if we believe this Author, all this came to pass by mere destiny: And if this be to come to pass by mere destiny, why should we not believe it? Have we better or more complete testimony for aught throughout the whole book of God, then for this? All things that come to pass must needs be the issues of the divine decree; not only such things as come to pass necessarily, by necessary Agents working necessarily; but even such things also as come to pass freely, by free agents working contingently, and freely, as Aquinas hath proved and Austin and the Church of Ireland acknowledged, and the word of God hath justified, and clear reason demonstrated, for as much as otherwise no future thing could be foreknown by God from everlasting. For nothing can be from everlasting known by God as future, unless from everlasting it were future. But without the decree of God passing upon it, no contingent thing can pass out of the condition of a thing merely possible (such as it is in its own nature) into the condition of a thing future. So that whosoever denies God's decree to pass upon every thing that comes to pass throughout the world, must therewithal deny the foreknowledge thereof in the mind of God; Let but this Author avoid this one argument if he can; but he will never answer it while his head is hot●● conceive I have had sufficient experience of his strength already this way, and of the shameful issue of his adventure therein. He that said, Non aliquid fit nisi omnipotens fieri velit, Not any thing comes to pass, unless the Almighty will have it come to pass, said also that God so works in every creature, as without all prejudice to their own motions. And when the Apostle said, that In God we move, his meaning was not, that the creature did nothing, or moved not at all. All that followeth is of the same stamp a farthel of unshamefast untruths. Belike when God saith, I will cause them to walk in my statutes and to do them, God caused them to do just nothing. In like manner when the holy Prophet expostulates with God in the person of the Church after this manner, Lord why hast thou caused us to err from thy ways, and hardened our hearts against thy fear, the meaning is, why hast thou caused us to do just nothing. In like manner when God restrains offences, he doth it not by his laws, When he promotes virtue he doth it not by rewards; when he converts sinners he doth it not by sermons: when thousands were converted in one day, it was not by the ministry of Peter and his fellow Apostles. This Authors meaning seems to be, that unless man converts himself, it is not done by sermons. But see how he overlasheth; when carrying the matter so as if God's decree necessitated and overruled all by our opinion; yet most absurdly he exempts from this divine decree man's endeavours. And who seeth not that to overrule is to carry the reasonable creature on to do contrary to his own will and judgement. For unless he doth toss strenuouslly he can prevail nothing with any sober and indifferent Reader. In like sort to necessitate denotes such a motion whereby the creature is carried to do a thing necessailry but this is not Bradwardines' opinion, who alone amongst Schoole-Divines, that I know, useth this phrase of necessitating. For he saith that God necessitates the creature to his free act, & this necessity is but modal, according to that expression of Austin necesse est ut aliquid fiat, which Austin confessed 1200 years ago to be no impeachment to man's liberty. But because that phrase Necessitating, is not only of an harsh sound & apt to be taken in a quite contrary sense to that of the author's; therefore other School-Divines, and generally our Divines use it not. And how immodest a course is this to think to choke us with other men's phrases, and that in a quite contrary sense to that wherein the author's take it? And as if he had very substantially concluded the point, that laws do nothing, rules of religion, and men's endeavours do nothing, whereas he hath performed no part either of a Philosopher or of a Divine in all this, but of a mere trifler; he proceeds to demand why the one are made, the other prescribed; why men are encouraged to some things; and scared from the other. He might as well ask what meant King Hezechiah to have any care either of his food or of taking Physic for those 15 years which God told him, he had added unto his life? What meant Paul to tell the Master of the ship, that unless the Mariners were detained in the ship they could not be saved; what meant some to trust to their swimming, others to boards & brokempeeces of the ship to get to land, when the Lord by his Angel had told him, that he had given him the lives of all that sailed with him? In the very days of Cicero the Stoics were acquainted with such like arguments made against their destiny, and knew how readily to answer them by distinguishing between Fatalia and Confatalia, as appears in Cicero's book de Fato, and Turnebus his answer to Ramus thereupon, more at large. Therefore this Author disputes not logically, if he did, the vileness of his argumentation would soon appear according to its proper colours; but carrieth the matter all along in Rhetorical flourishes, as if his wit served him for that best, whereat I wonder not a little, that he should forsake that wherein his faculty lieth most, according to the reputation that goes of him, & trust to that wherein his best dexterity hath been accounted but inficete. If our doctrine tends to the subversion of policy, religion and laws, society & government In the next place we expect when he will turn stark Atheist and profess as much of the word of God, seeing it is manifest our doctrine chiefly is founded upon the word of God even in that which sounds most harsh unto carnal judgement; namely as touching God's secret providence in evil, this Author not accommodating any answer to any one of those places whereupon our doctrine is grounded. And as for God's providence in working us unto holiness, his contrary doctrine cannot stand without maintaining that Grace is given according unto men's works; which is expressly contradictory to the word of God. 2 Tim: 1. 9 Tit: 3. 5, and opposed by the church of God as the sour leaven of Pelagianism, from the Synod of Palestine all along. For ask this Author wherefore God bestows faith upon one & not upon another, & he hath nothing to answer, but either by denying plainly, that faith is the gift of God; which hitherto they are not grown so impudent as to deny expressly; though the Remonstrants in their Censura censurae come so far, as to deny that Christ merited faith and regeneration for any man; Or they must answer that the reason hereof is, because the one by some act of his or other hath prepared himself for the reception of divine influences, the other hath not. Or in plain terms as one hath expressed it, that God doth work in us Credere to believe, modo velimus provided that we will believe. But doth he not work also the very act of willing? Saint Paul saith he doth; yea every thing that is pleasing in his sight. And how Phil. 3. 13. Heb. 13. 21. doth he work in us this will? Is it upon condition, that we will? This is the absurdity whereunto they are driven, still fetching in a priority of man's act to the divine influence, working us to that which is good, yet most preposterously. For what need is there of influence divine to make us to will if of ourselves we will already? And this also utterly overthrows God's prescience of things future, which can have no true foundation besides the divine decree. As for Mathematici which were banished out of Rome, were those Divines, or Astrologers rather? If they subjected the event of all things to the influence of the stars, shall Austin be blamed or the Church of Ireland for subjecting all things to the council of God's will, and that according to the express testimony of holy Scripture both as touching good and evil; only with this difference; good things to his will of working them, evil things to his will of permitting them. As for Prosper's saying in the last place, we make no contingent things throughout the world, much less the actions of men to come to pass unavoidably, no not upon supposition of God's decree; but by virtue of his decree both contingent things come to pass contingently, that is with a possibility of not coming to pass; & free things freely, that is joined with an active power in the Agent, either to suspend his action; or to do otherwise; as well as necessary things come to pass necessarily. This I say we avouch with Aquinas, and accordingly with him maintain the root of contingency to be the effectual will of God. Again I have often showed that Predestination in the phrase of the Ancients is only of such things as God decreed to bring to pass by his effection; notwithstanding this, Austin was bold to profess, that not any thing came to pass unless God would have it come to pass; but evil things only by suffering them; good things by working them, As for compulsion which is Prosper's phrase, and which this Author corrupts rendering i● by the urging, which is ambiguous. We deny that man is compelled to acts supernatural; much less do we grant compulsion to acts natural; such as are all sinful acts; yea too connatural unto him, compared in Scripture to sweet morsels which they roll under their tongue, as the book of job resembles it. By all which we may judge indifferently both of this Author's sufficiency and modesty. Austin never said that God predestinated any man to sin. For predestination with them (as hath been said) was only of such things as God determined to work. Yet the same Austin confidently professeth of Enchirid. c. 95. those things which come to pass by God's sufferance (and these we all know to be evil things) that they come not to pass, unless Almighty God will have them come to pass, Thus far in answer to this Author's additions to M. Hoards discourse, and concerning the upper and more harsh and rigorous way which M. Hoord left unprosecuted. pag. 49, there is a passage added, a citation out of Peter, but it is of the same nature with the rest, & adds no strength to the argument; and my answer satisfies it as well as the rest. P. 52. etc. Is inserted a representation, how the doctrine of our Divines fighteth with God's holiness. Sect. 1. It fighteth with God's holiness, and maketh him the principal cause of sin in the greatest number of men M. Masons Addit. p 52. 53, 54 55. I know that the defender of it doth not think so. For the main reason which moved the Synod of Dort, & some other Divines before and since, to bring down predestination thus low, and begin their Reprobation after the fall, was, that they might maintain a fatal and absolute Reprobation of men, and yet avoid this imputation, as Doctor Twisse hath noted. But what they intended (for aught that I can see) they have not Vindic: great: l. 1 par: 1. cap. 4. initio. compassed. For it followeth evident enough, even from their conclusions too, that of all the sins of reprobates, which are the greatest number by many degrees God is the true and principal Author. Two things they say which taken together, methinks, infer it. 1. That God of his own will and pleasure hath brought men into an estate, in which they cannot avoid sin, 2ly. That he leaveth the Reprobate irrecoverably in it. 1. That God of his own will and pleasure hath brought men into an estate in which they cannot possibly avoid sin; that is into the state of original sin, which consists of two parts. 1. The guilt of Adam's transgression. 2. The corruption of nature. In both these they say mankind is interessed, not through the force and efficiency of natural generation, because we all derive our nature from Adam, as our first principle; but by God's free and voluntary order and impuration. It came not to pass by any natural means (saith Calvin) that all men fell from salvation, by the fault of our first parem. That all men Instit. l. 3. c. 23. Sect: 7. are held under the guilt of eternal death in the person of one man; it is the clear and constant voice of Scripture. Now this cannot be ascribed to any natural cause it must therefore come from the wonderful council of God. A little after he hath the same again with as great an Emphasis. How is it that so many nations with their children, should be involved in the fall without remedy, but because God would have it so. As roundly doth Doctor Twisse affirm the same. The guilt of original sin is derived unto us only by imputation, the filth only by propagation, and Vindic. great. l. 1. par. 1. digr. 4. c. 3. propè finem both these only by God's free constitution. A little before he hath these words; The fault of our nature cometh rome God's free appointment For he doth not cut of any necessity but of his mere will only impute the sin of Adam to us To this purpose he speaketh a great deal more in the same place. To these sayings Saint Bernard hath the like speaking of Adam's sin he saith, Adam's sin is another's, because we knew not of it; and Bern: Serm. 1. Domi: 1 post. 8. Epiphan. yet ours, because it was through the just though secret judgement of God, reputed ours. And this that they say is agreeable to reason. For if we be fallen into the guilt of the first sin and the corruption of nature, only because we were in Adam's loins when he sinned, and derive our being from him, than these two things will follow. 1. That we stand guilty of all the sin● which Adam committed from his fall to his lives end. For we were virtually in his loins, as well after his fall as before; and in every passage and variation of his life he was still a principle of mankind. But where do we read that we are guilty of any other of his sins? To the n●st sin only doth the Scripture entitle that sin and misery, which entered into the world and invaded all mankind, as we may see. Rome 5. 15. 16. 17 etc. 2. That children are guilty of the sins of all their progenitors, especially of their immediate parents. For they were in their loins when they sinned, and more immediately then in Adam's. But children are not guilty of their parents faults, nor obnoxious to their punishments, because they are their children as we may see. Exod: 20. 5. where God saying that he will visit the sins of the fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generation of them hate him; plainly implieth that children are not simply charged with their father's sins but conditionally if they be haters of God, as their fathers were; if by imitating their wicked parents they become partakers of their sins. In Ezech 18 14 etc. The Lord signifieth thus much in his Apology against the cavil of the Jews For first he saith, that if a wicked man begetteth a son that feet. his father's sins, & doth not the like, he shall not die for the iniquiry of his father. This implieth that the derivation of being Ezek. 18. 20: from the patent doth not render the child obnoxious to the punishment of the father's sin, nor consequently to the sin. For the good child is not obnoxious, and yet the good child is equally in the father's loins with the bad, and equally receiveth nature and being from him. And then the Lord tells them expressly thus much in two propositions. 1. Affirmatively, The soul that sinneth it shall die. And that it may be known that he speaks exclusively, only the soul that sinneth shall die; he delivers his mind. 2. Negatively, The Son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of her Son etc. Our Saviour in that woeful speech of his to the Pharisees, Fulfil ye also the measure of your fathers. Behold Mat. 23. 32. 34. I send unto you Prophets. etc. them ye shall kill and crucify, that on you may come all the righteous blood. etc. Intimateth apparently, that the Pharisees were not inheritors of their father's sins & punishments by birth; but by the commission and imitation of their father's sins, they came to inherit both their sins and plagues. Miserable would our case be on whom the ends of the world are come, if children should be guilty of all their Ancestors prevatications. What a world of sins should we be to answer for, personal sins, parents, progenitors sins, to a thousand past generations? A thing with no reason to be imagined. This is the first thing Whereas I am quoted here to give the reason which moved the Synod of Dort, and some other Divines to begin Reprobation after the fall, namely this, to avoid the imputation Answer. of making God the Author of sin I doubt this Author hath so long enured himself to leasings, that it is grown natural unto him to deliver untruths. For first I make no mention (in that fourth Digres of mine in the matter of predestination) of the Synod of Dort; neither indeed were they the Objects of my thoughts in this particular. cap. 4. That Digression of mine is spent in answering the arguments of those who dispute against Massa nondum condita, and stand for massa corrupta, to be the object of election and reprobation. In the first chapter I make answer to Mr. Elnathan Parr in an English tract of his, wherein he deals upon this argument. In the second chap: I deal with others that make choice of the lower way; because it seems to be the easiest way, which I express in the very words of Mr. Doctor Abbats, Bishop of Sarisbury ere he died, and I conceived that indeed this motive prevailed with most; and therefore I thought good so much the more throughly to discuss that. But do I say they took this course to free God from the imputation of sin? Nothing less; my words are these in the Digression cap. 2. Quod plurimos movet, illud est, nimirum quod in sententia illâ de massâ nondum conditâ, omnia sint, ut aiunt, intricata & perplexa, & infinitis difficultatibus involuta; in hac verò de massâ corruptà predestinationi hominum praestruendâ contra clara sint omnia, & cum Scripturarum autoritate, judicioque antiquitatis planissimè consentientia; where I mention two reasons that moved them to take this way 1. This, in that opinion concerning the Mass of mankind not yet created, all passages are intricate, perplexed, and entangled with infinite difficulties; but in the opinion concerning the Mass corrupt, all things are clear. 2. This, that in this other opinion, all things are most plainly found to agree both with the authority of Scriptures, and with the judgement of antiquity. Now after I had endeavoured to discover the insufficiency of this plea in the second and third chapter of that fourth Digression in the matter of predestination. In the fourth chapter I propose mine own judgement concerning the true benefit of this way in making the corrupt mass of mankind the object of election and reprobation; not the judgement of others, as this Author carrieth the matter; but mine own judgement. For thus I begin. Ad extremum, vis liberè pronuntiem, quid unicè proficiatur ex hac nostrá praedestinationis Objecti sententiae temperatione. Dicàm igitur quid sentiam. Hinc nimirum efficitur ut à lapsu primorum parentum, decreto praedestinationis subjiciendo & subordinando liberemur huic unicè provisum esse, ab istius quasi mediae & temperatioris opinionis assertioribus mihi plusquam probabile, aut verisimile videtur, ne scililicet alias peccatum fieri statueretur, decernente Deo, tanquam medium ad fines à Deo, in praedestinatione sibi praestitutos accommodatum; unde etiam quam author peccati constituendus sit, nullâ solidâ ratione explicari posse videtur. In the last place, will you give me leave freely to profess, what we profic by thus tempering our opinion touching the object of predestination? I will therefore deliver what I think. So that herein I purpose mine own opinion only, not the opinion of others. Herehence thus we gain that we are freed from subjecting and subordinating man's fall unto God's decree of predestination. It seems to me more than probable or likely, that the maintainers of this middle and temperate openion do provide only against this inconvenience; (that is their way doth indeed provide against this, and against no other inconvenience in my opinion) to wit, lest otherwise the sin of Adam should be said to come to pass God willing it, as a means conducing to those ends which God intended in predestination; from whence it follows as it seems, that it cannot be explicated by any solid reason that God is not made the Author of sin. All which is delivered by me as my opinion, conceiving that others think so too; namely not that God is hereby made the Author and principal cause of sin; but that the contrary cannot be explicated by any solid reason. Now Cajetan confesseth as much, namely that in these mysteries, all the distinctions that are used, do not quietare intellectum, satisfy the understanding; and therefore he doth captivate his own into the obedience of faith. And Alvarez justifies him in this, professing herein that he speaks doctissimè & piissimè, most learned and holily. And in a peculiar disputation he maintains that the mystery of God's providence and predestination, standing with the liberty of our wills, is incomprehensible by us in this world. Lastly, consider, this is delivered only of the first sin of our first parents, which this author perverts most shamefully, when he avoucheth that I should acknowledge our Divines, many of them, to embrace this way to avoid the imputation of making God the principal cause, not of Adam's sin alone, but of sin in the greatest number of men. And to confess a truth, if sin be made the means for the procuring of the ends which God intends in predestination, undoubtedly God himself should be the author of sin. For whosoever intends any end, he, and none but he, must be author in working the means which tend to this end. Therefore I said, only that in this case, It seems that the sin of Adam was intended by God as the means; Whereas in truth and upon due consideration it appears that not the creatures sin, but God's permission of the creatures sin, is the means whereby God brings to pass his glorious ends. Yet not the permission of sin alone, but joined together with the pardoning of it, and saving his elect in despite of it, is the complete means (together with the procuring of Christ's merits) for the manifestation of God's glory in the way of mercy; And in like manner, not the permitting of sin alone, but joined with the punishment of it, is the complete means for the manifestation of God's glory in the way of justice vindicative, which in Scripture phrase is called, the declaration of his wrath. And whereas I said that hereby it seemed that it could not by any sound reason be manifested, that God was not the Author Rome 9 22. of sin, by the first way, this Author avoucheth of the defenders of the lower way which seems most temperate, that from their conclusions it followeth evidently, that of all the sins of Reprobates, which are the greatest number by many degrees, God is the true and principal Author. Observe, this (he saith) followeth evidently from their conclusions; and forthwith he tells us that he thinks so, or, to his thinking, it doth so. And why is he not the Author of all the sins of the elect also? whereas original sin continues in them also, they carry about them a body of death, and have cause to complain, of a Rom. 7. law in their numbers that rebelleth against the law of their mind, and leadeth them captive to the law of sin. Only there is a principle of spiritual life in them, that renews their repentance daily as their sins are renewed; but they look not to be freed, from sin as long as they live in this world. But let us examine how well he makes good that which he affirms of the sins of the Reprobate, that God is made the Author of them by our Cornel: in Ep: ad Rome▪ c. 9 18. doctrine, of Reprobation. I find that Cornelius a Lapide a jesuit shapes Calvines doctrine of election and Reprobation, this lower way, and imputes unto him that from Reprobation, according to his doctrine, in Reprobis manat certus & necessarius lapsus in peccata quaelibet, A certain and necessary falling into all manner of sins, doth flow in Reprobates. But not from these principles mentioned by this Author, but rather from two other principles. The 1. that God destinated Reprobates to everlasting punishment, as to their end; and unto sins, as to the means thereof. The 2. is that man doth nothing freely in negotio damnationis suae; but that in all things he is driven of God, as a bowl by him that throws it, as an hatchet by him that hews with it, and as Clay is moved by the Potter, whom he cannot resist. This he imputes, to the defenders of Reprobation the lower way, and particularly to Calvin. This Cornelius denies not, for aught I know, that by the just judgement of God, though executed according to his will and pleasure, hath brought all men forth into the world in original sin, or that any man can be recovered out of it whiles he lives in this world. And as for these two conclusions which he imputes to Calvin: as they are false in themselves, so they are as falsely charged upon Calvin. Haec loquendi ratio, nunquam Calvin. de occult. Dei provide. apud me occurret, finem creationis esse aeternum interitum. Calvin expressly denies, that God creates any man to this end, that he may damn him; Neither is sin any means whereby God brings a man to damnation, but the permission of sin is God's means, and that together with damning for sin, is the complete means, whereby God brings to pass his end concerning Reprobates, which is the manifestation of his glory in the way of vindicative justice, called his wrath upon those Reprobates; and in the way of mercy upon his elect vessels of mercy, whom he hath prepared unto glory, as S. Paul plainly teacheth us. The other principle which he obtrudes upon Calvin, is as false, and as falsely laid to his charge. In good actions he Rom. 9 22. 23. grants the elect are so carried to that which is good, as not freely. For he takes Liberty to consist in an indifferency to do that which is good, or no; wherein I willingly confess he is in an error; but that reprobates do not that evil freely, which they do, is no where affirmed by Calvin that I know nor by any learned or sober Divine. For albeit we all concur in this with Bernard, that no natural man hath libertatem a peccato, liberty to keep himself from sin: Yet that he is carried into this or that particular sin, we all confess it is done freely. And the reason is evident, drawn from the difference between gracious actions, and sinful actions. Every gracious action is supernatural, either as touching the substance of the act, such as are the acts of faith, hope, and love; or as touching the manner of performing them, such as are all virtuous actions, which are not acceptable unto God, unless they flow from the former principles, faith, hope, and love: Hereupon there is some colour, that such are not performed freely; but there is no such colour, as if man were not free in performing actions vicious; considering that all vicious actions are natural actions, none of them supernatural. And surely every natural man as he hath power to perform any action natural; so hath he power to abstain from it. But proceed we along with our present Author. 1 The first doctrine, that he obtrudes upon us, is such, that I little thought there had been any difference between him and us thereabouts, consisting of two particulars. 1. The one, that God brings all men forth into the world in the corrupt mass, or in the state of original sin. 2 The other, that man, in the state of original sin or natural corruption devoid of the spirit of regeneration, is under the servitude of sin, hath no liberty from it. Now in these particulars I could not imagine that this Author differed from us, unless with Pelagius he entertains an affection to deny original sin. For if all men be borne in original sin, seeing it is God that takes us out of our mother's womb, and by whom we are brought forth into this world, it cannot be denied, I should think, that God bringeth all men forth into the world, in original sin. As for the second, Doctor Potter confesseth it as the doctrine of the Church of England, that man in state of nature hath no liberty from sin. It is true, this liberty he distinguisheth from that liberty, which is called, liberty from necessity, which he grants to a natural man; to whom he denies the former, which cannot stand without contradiction. For if a man hath no liberty from sin he must needs sin. And therefore Doctor Fulke upon the Remish Testament doth usually distinguish between liberty from sin, and liberty from coaction. And both Arminius and Corvinus confess that by the sin of Adam all men are cast upon a necessity of sinning, though God be ready to deliver us from this necessity of sinning upon reasonable terms to be performed on man's part, which latter doctrine we utterly renounce as manifestly breathing the spirit of Pelagius, in a particular generally condemned in the Church of God, namely, that grace is conferred according to works or merits. This makes me conceive that this Author carrieth himself cunningly in the proposition of this doctrine which he imputes unto us, and that he hath a reach more than every one is aware of. And indeed the phrase he useth of bringing men into an estate, is very harsh, though applied to Adam and Eve our first parents, much more applied to their race and posterity. For albeit Adam was created in a better state, and afterwards brought into the state of sin, and bondage of corruption: yet what sinister judgement moved this Author to impute this unto God, rather than to Adam himself? what if God took his holy spirit from them upon their fall, whereupon they found themselves naked and were ashamed? was it not just with God to do so? Doth not M. Hord profess, that it were just with God to damn all for original sin, if he would; which doctrine was delivered by this Author in his Lectures at Magdalen Hall, myself being an hearer, and a taker of notes from him, upon this very argument. But it may be this is to be accounted amongst the errors of his youth, mistaking Bellermine, which now he is to wise to correct in his age. Who brings malefactors to the Gallows, is it the Judge or Sheriff, and not their sins rather? Yet this, though absurd enough, satisfies him not, but withal he adds that God doth this of his own will and pleasure which phrase is prone to work a persuasion in the Reader, that hereby is signeted that God brought not man in this state in the way of justice for his sin, but merely of his own will or pleasure; But what Divine of ours was ever known to maintain any such prodigious assertion? Who can deny but that the Judge condemns a malefactor unto death, & Sheriff takes order to execute him. Now if question be made why such a man be hanged, will any wise man refer this to the will and pleasure of the judge or Sheriff, and not rather to the malefactors' deserts? In like sort it is God that condemns a man, and inflicts eternal punishment upon him, but is there any colour to say that he doth this of his will and pleasure, and not rather that he doth it in the way of justice provoked thereunto by men's sins? Lastly when it is said that God brought him into the state of corruption, who would not think that thereby were meant that God was the positive Author of this corruption? whereas it is apparent that man himself averted himself voluntarily and freely from God, the unchangeable good; and converted himself unto the creature, which is but a changeable good; And God hereupon taking his Spirit from him and that most justly; left him where he found him, and that irrecoverably, save by the grace of regeneration. Yet this phrase is more harsh applied to the race & posterity of Adam, in whose production he hath no other hand, then that which necessarily belongs unto him, as the Author of nature, namely, the quickening of them, and fashioning of them in the womb, and bringing them forth into the light of this world. If from a leprous Sire there springs a leprous fruit, should this seem strange? We all derive our nature from Adam fallen from God, and converted unto the creature, and bereft of God's Spirit most justly for his transgression; why should it seem strange then, that our natures should be no better than Adam's was after his fall? It is true the propagation of original sin, hath always been accounted of a mysterious nature, as touching the manner of it, and very strange and odd conceits have been entertained hereabouts; Some saying that the soul is derived from the parents a strange conceit even in Philosophy not only in peculiar reference unto the soul reasonable; but generally I find Philosophers have entertained peculiar contemplations about Datores formarum, in a more general way. Others have thought that the soul is defiled by the body, as a sweet and sovereign oil may be corrupted by a naughty box; which is worse than the former, no marvel that a bodily thing should corrupt that which is bodily; but that a body should corrupt the soul, the one being corporal the other spiritual is beyond comprehension: far more probable or rather without question that the soul rather corrupts the body. The positive inclination unto evil is that which hath troubled all and made some conceive that it could not proceed immediately from God; For if so, then surely not impura, but pura. Others and particularly Arimininsis, as remember, that the corruption came from the breath of the serpent, others as Johannes Bicconius; that the soul though coming pure from God yet knit unto the body, the Lord for the sin of Adam gives it over to the power of Satan, who as an universal cause supplies the place of a particular cause in the positive corrupting of it. This at the first seemed unto me as very singular, so a very strange adventure, and that Baccorius is a very rare School-man and more used in the Arabian philosophy then all the rest, save such as were of his own profession. And that I take to be the reason, why Aquinas discourseth as he doth of Intellectus Agens, making it a●ticulty of the soul; and Durand discourseth in such sort of that argument, as i● he never understood the state of the question; which I take to proceed from this that they were so little acquainted with Averro's philosophy, wherein Zabarell was well seen. And I find him sometimes congratulating his good fortunes in finding that this johannes Bacconius was in some particulars of his mind, he doth not say, he learned it of him. But I know no School Divine comparable to him for depth of philosophical speculations; yet am I not of his mind in the point of original sin. I willingly confess it is one of the three points wherein sometimes I persuaded myself I never should be satisfied in this world▪ And that which most troubled me was the positive nature of it. Wherein Cajetan is thought to discourse strangely also, even to the palate of Pontificians; And Aquinas his definite on of it, call it, Habitus corruptus; hath cost me no small pains in the discussion thereof. At length I conceive there is no great cause of so much pother to be made about it, save that certain prejudices which we lay for grounds do cast us there upon. The harmony of man's nature in all parts, excepting its due subjection unto God, I willingly confess was natural, but whether it did profluere ex principiis naturae, either specificae, or individualis, or was caused and maintained while Adam stood in his integrity by the special hand of God's providence; as some Schoolmen profess finding the difficulty of maintaining the former (which yet might be consequent naturally to it's due subjection unto God for aught I see yet to the contrary) I dispute not. But as for its due subjection unto God in faith and love, and such a love as joined with the contempt of itself; I have reason to conceive that this was not natural, as flowing from the principles of nature either specifical or individual, though this latter I heard sometimes maintained publicly in the University, but rather wrought in man in his creation by virtue of supernatural grace, and the holy Ghost's residence in him; which supernatural grace, and holy Ghost's residence had been natural unto all his posterity, had Adam continued in his integrity. I call it natural in as much as it had descended unto all his posterity, after the manner of an inheritance natural. But Adam by his transgression forfeited this blessed condition, not to himself only, but to all his posterity, being justly bereft of the Spirit of God, and left by the Lord where he found him; averted à bono incommutabili, and converted ad bonum communicabile in an inordinate manner, which conversion to the creature is positive, and not evil in itself, but as it is joined with aversion from God; & this makes it an inordinate conversion to the creature, not for God's sake, that it is not out of the love of God to the contempt of himself, which is the character of a child of God but out of the love of himself to the contept of God, which is the character of a child of this this world. So that as original righteousness whereunto we are restored in part by the grace of regeneration, transcends all motall virtues; so original sin transcends all moral vices & is found in the most virtuous amongst heathen men (of whom some have been very renowned in this kind, & great masters of their passions) as well as amongst the most vicious. And it is hard to resolve who have been greatest enemies to the truth of God and holiness; and generally to the holy ways of God, whether the most virtuous or the most vicious among heathen men. I come to his second position, which he casts upon us, as dissenting therein from himself; and it is this, That God leaves the Reprobates irrecoverably in it. Now on this point I would gladly know his contrary Tenet in what sense it proceeds, namely, That Reprobates are not left irrecoverably in original sin, or in such state wherein they cannot avoid sin. For I cannot comprehend his meaning herein. But it was wont to be said of Africa that, semper aliquid apportat novi, always it brings forth some new monster in course of nature. So men of this Author's spirit: are always bringing forth some new monster in Divinity. For what thinks he? was ever any Reprobate recovered out of original sin? Nay was ever any child of God recovered out of it while he lived upon the face of the earth? Or doth he think himself recovered out of it, or is it in his power to avoid it? Perhaps he will say though he cannot avoid sin original, yet he can avoid sin actual; and so not only the children of God may if they will, but even Reprobates also. But what? may they avoid all sin, or some only? What one of our Divines denies that a Reprobate hath power to avoid fornication? We see heathens do avoid: it Or stealth? For heathens do so. Or murder? Even heathens have been found very moral and that generally. But this we say; All men in the state of nature, whether they do good as touching the substance of the act; yet they do it not in a gracious manner; Or whether they abstain from that which is evil, they do not abstain from it in a gracious manner; nor can do. Nay since the fall of Adam, who ever lived free from sin, the Son of God only excepted? Doth notholy Paul profess of himself saying, I do not the good that I would, but the evil that I would not, that do I. To will is present with me, but I find not to perform: hat which is good. And if God may justly damn all for sin original as Mr. Hoord affirms, why may not God leave all irrecoverably in it; and that justly? So that herein I find myself in a brake, not can devise with myself in what tolerable or colourable sense he can affirm, that Reprobates are not left irrecoverably in the state of original sin; or in such a state, in which they cannot avoid sin; I say in what sense he can deliver this different from us, I cannot devise. For we willingly grant that there is no particular actual sin from which a Reprobate hath not power to abstain, though he cannot abstain from it in a gracious manner without grace, and that grace we account the grace of regeneration; which is a supernatural principle of gracious actions, both as touching faith in God, and the love of God, to the contempt of ourselves. Now I guess his meaning is, that no Reprobate is so left and abandoned in original sin, but that God gives him grace to believe if he will, to repent if he will, to love God if he will, & that above all things. I guess, I say, that this is his meaning; but I would have him express it, that I might see it under his hand. For till then I find no apparent difference between him & us, as touching these two principles from whence he deduceth, that God is thereby made The principal cause of sin in the greatest number of men. And if once he deliver himself fairly, and comes to this, the issue of the question to be debated between us will be fair and clear; namely about this their universal grace, whether all men elect and Reprobate by virtue of supernatural grace given unto them, have power to believe if they will, repent if they will. And against this I will dispute after this manner. First in all this there is no difference between us excepting that this power is said to be wrought in man by supernatural grace. For we say with Austin Deo credere, & ab amore temporalium ad divina Aust de Gen: cont Manich: l. 1, c. 3. praecepta servanda se convertere, omnes possunt si velint. All men can believe God, if they will; and from the love of temporal things convert themselves to the keeping of God's commandments if they will. For all the moment of inclining a man to works of morality lieth in the will of man. And therefore mark what follows in Austin, Sed praeparatur voluntas à Domino (supple ut velit) tantumque augetur munere charitatis ut possit. But the will is prepared by the Lord (to wit to make it willing) and so much augmented by the gift of charity as to make it able. And I prove, that look what I supply is according unto Austin Enchirid. c. 32. interpreting that of the Apostle, neque volentis, neque currentis, sed miserentis Dei; it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth but of God that showeth mercy. For he shows; that the whole both to will and run, is to be ascribed unto God, qui hominis voluntatem bonam & praeparat adjuvandam, & adjuvat praeparatam; who both prepares the good will of man that after he may help it, and helps it being once prepared; where plainly man swilling that, which is good, is made the fruit of God's preparing it; but because there is in man a will of the flesh, resisting this will of the spirit; therefore there is need not of grace preparing only, but of grace adjuvant and helping also, to enable it to do what it hath a will unto, whence immediately followeth, running as well as willing. And these two graces praeparant, and adjuvant, are afterward called by the names of grace prevenient, and subsequent, thus; Nolentem praevenit ut velit, volentem subsequitur ne frustra velit. Him that is unwilling the Lord preventeth to make him willing, and willing he followeth him that he may not will in vain. And that this double grace is required by reason of the reluctancy between the flesh and the Spirit, I prove out of the same Austin writing thus, Prima gratiâ est, Aust: de cor: rep: & great: c. 11. quâ fit ut habeat homo justitiam si velit; secunda ergo plus potest, quâ etiam fit ut velit, & tantum velit tantoque ardore diligat, ut carnis voluntatem contraria concupiscentem voluntate spiritus vincat. The first grace is that whereby it comes to pass that a man is righteous if he will; The second grace therefore is of more power, whereby it comes to pass also that a man doth will, and that so resolutely, and with such fervency loveth (compare this with that of Austin de Gen: contrae Manich: lib. 1. cap: 3.) that by the will of the Spirit, he overcommeth the will of the flesh fight against it. So that a power to do good if a man will is one thing; to will that which is good is another thing; and lastly to be able to do that which it wills is a third thing; yet both these two last are comprehended under sic velle, which Austin calls tantum augeri munere charitatis, to have the gift of charity ibid. cap. 12. so much increased in him, as thus; Tantum Spiritu sancto accenditur voluntas eorum ut ideo possint, quta sic velint, ideo sic velint, quia Deus sic operatur, ut velint. The will of God's children is so inflaned by the Holy Ghost, that therefore they are able to do good, because they have a will to it in such a manner (that is with such fervency and eagernes) therefore they have a will to it in such a manner, because God so works, as to make them willing; to wit, in such a manner. Secondly we say that to believe if a man will, to repent if he will is to be accounted nature, rather than grace, which I prove thus. Supernatural grace is not inferior to a moral virtue, but a moral virtue doth more than leave a man indifferent to do virtuously if he will; For it inclines the will to virtuous courses only, and not vicious; Like as vice inclines the will only to vicious courses, and not to virtuous; how much more doth supernatural grace not leave a man indifferent to do good if he will; but inclines the will only to such things as are pleasing unto God, and not to things displeasing unto him. Again to have power to believe if we will, is to have power to have faith if we will; But this Austin hath expressly professed to belong to the nature of man, in distinctio fró the grace of the faithful. Posse fidem habere, sicut posse charitatem habere naturae est heminun; Aust: de praedest: Sanct: cap. 5. fidem habere, sicut charitatem habere, gratiaeest fidelium. The nature of man makes him to have power, to have faith, to have charity; but the grace of the faithful makes a man to have faith, to have charity. It may be objected out of the former place taken out of Aust: deCor: & great: c. 11, that habere justitiam si velit, is, gratia prima; to be righteous if he will is the first grace. I answer, Austin there speaks of the grace that Adam had before his fall, which was this, posse si velit to abstain from eating the forbidden fruit. And this first grace is called grace in this respect, that there was in Adam no flesh lusting against the Spirit; So that if Adam had but a will to abstain, he should have no cause to complain as Saint Paul doth, To will is present with me, but I find no means to perform that which is good; Now such a posse si velit is not found in any man now a days, no not in the regenerate. But all men that have a will to do good by the grace of God, have withal a posse secundum quid, a power in part a weak power; but this is not sufficient to denominate them simply able to do that which is good; unless the love of God be increased in them, so as to overcome the will of the flesh lusting against the spirit, as I have represented Austin thus expounding it. Thirdly whether tends this, that all men have power to believe if they will, to repent if they will? But to maintain that faith and repentance are not the gifts of God, bestowed of his free grace on whom he will; but that they are the works of man's free will, directly contradictory to the word of God expressly professing that faith is the gift of God, and that not of ourselves. So repentance is the gift of God; yea that it is God who worketh in us that which is pleasing in his sight through Jesus Christ. Heb: 13 21. Eph: 28. Act: 5. & 11. 18. 2 Tim: 2. last. Phil. 3. 13. Yea both the will and the deed, and that of his good pleasure. 4ly. If all reprobates have power to believe and repent if they will, and so consequently to persevere if they will; how comes it to pass that not one of them doth believe, repent, and persevere; seeing it is confessed among Philosophers that such contingents as depend upon the free will of man, are equally propendent on either side to pass as often one way, as the other. But proceed we along with this Author. 1. Here he grants expressly that the state he speaks of is the state of original sin; in which state we acknowledge that man hath not libertatem à peccato, freedom from sin. And Doctor Potter towards the end of his answer to Charity mistaken confesseth it to be the doctrine of the Church of England. Yet do not we say, but that it is in the power of any man to abstain from any particular sin, it being but a natural act, and a man hath free power to perform any natural act or to abstain from it; so far forth as to become very virtuous, as much as any man among the heathen, many of whom have been renowned for virtuous conversation. Calvin in the passages here alleged hath nothing concerning, either the guilt of Adam's transgression passing upon his posterity, or the corruption derived therehence unto them; but only of their falling from eternal salvation in the one; that all are enthralled to eternal death in the other; And that Adam's fall hath enwrapped all in eternal death in the third. My passages quoted, and related out of my Vindiciae are more to the purpose: I say indeed the guilt of Adam's transgression is derived unto us, that is to our persons by imputation; but that very sin of Adam was the sin of our natures, as Austin speaks. Non modo natura facta est peccatrix, sed & genuit peccatores. Not only our humane nature became a sinner, but also begat sinners. August: de nuptitis c. 34. And accordingly it is justly imputed unto our persons, otherwise how could it be just with God to condemn any man for original sin; which yet is expressly acknowledged by Mr. Hoord. And the Apostle saith expressly, that in Adam all have sinned. And Austin gives the reason of it. De Adamo omnes peccatum originale trahunt, quia omnes unus fuerunt. All draw original sin from Adam, because all were that one. So that I have no cause to doubt but this Author is of the same opinion until I find him to avouch the contrary; and so much the rather because he finds it is the opinion of Bernard also. And that the corruption consequent is derived to us only by propagation, I think it is without doubt amongst all, who concur not with Pelagius in maintaining that it is derived unto us by imitation, and so only. Yet notwithstanding it cannot be denied, but that God might have caused the punishment of Adam's sin to rest upon himself only, and immediately destroyed him and created another, and propagated mankind from him. Yea supposing his ordinance of propagating mankind from him, yet God of his mercy might have derived others from him of his mere grace endued with the holy Ghost, if it had pleased him; like as whom he justly damns for sin, he might have caused them to have lived one year or more longer, and in that time bestowed the spirit of grace upon them to break off their sins by repentance, and from grace translated into glory. As for the reasons here mentioned by Mr. Mason to justify that which myself and others have delivered on the former point, I have no cause to justify, because they proceed from a false ground, supposing that the reason of this imputation of Adam's sin, and propagation of his corruption unto all his posterity, is merely built upon this foundation that we were in Adam's loins when he sinned, which is untrue. 1 In his first reason he doth miserably overlash; for we could not be guilty of all the sins which were committed by Adam from his fall to his life's end, no not upon the ground whereon this Author builds; so long we were not in his joins, nor any longer than till he begat Seth; for from Seth sprang Noah, and we all from him. Neither is it credible that Adam continued to beget children till the last year, and month, and day of his life. Indeed we no where read that we are guilty of any other of his sins, besides the first; The reason whereof shall be given in the next place. 2 Therefore I say, in answer unto them both, that the ground of imputing Adam's sin unto his posterity, is not only because we were in adam's joins, but because the first sin of Adam was it, that bereft his nature of God's image; and so brought corruption upon himself by an aversion from the Creator and unchangeable good, and conversion unto the Creature, wherein the Lord left him, bereaving him of his spirit; and this nature, by this sin alone so corrupt, is the fountain of all our natures; Like as if Adam had stood, of the same fountain of integrity we had all received incorrupt natures; so that the like cannot be said of any other sin of Adam afterwards committed by him, nor of the sin of any other our progenitors succeeding him. For as for the wicked, they have no such spirit of God to lose; And as for the Godly, they have indeed the spirit of God, but so as not to be taken from them by the sins committed by them, any more than it was from David upon the committing of so foul sins in the matter of Uriah; neither do any Godly parents propagate their state of grace to their posterity. And Aquinas is so bold hereupon as to profess, that, Impossibile est, quod aliqua peccata parentum proximorum, vel etiam primi parentis praeter primum, per originem traducantur. 1. 2. q. 81. ant. 2. in corp. It is impossible that the sins of our immediate parents, or of our first parents, besides the first, should be derived unto posterity by propagation. For, saith he, a man generates the same with himself in kind only; not in individual. And therefore those things, which pertain to him as a particular person, as acts personal, he doth not propagate unto his children. Now to the nature of man, something may pertain naturally, something by the gift of grace. And this original righteousness as a gift of grace was bestowed on the whole nature of mankind in our first parents, which Adam lost by his first sin; so that like as original righteousness had been propagated to posterity together with the humane nature, so also the opposite inordination. But as for other actual sins, either of our first parents, or of others, they do not corrupt the nature of man, as touching that which pertains to nature, but as touching that which pertains to his person; therefore other sins are not propagated unto posterity. And this reason which Aquinas gives, was long before given by Anselm, De conceptu virginali & originali peccato, cap. 23. Section. 2. 2 They say that God hath immutably decreed to leave the far greatest part of mankind in this impotent M. Mason Addit. p. 55. 56, 57 condition irrecoverab●ely, and to afford them no power and ability sufficient to make them rise out of sin to newness of life; and this decree he executeth in time: and both these he doth out of his only will and pleasure. Of this proposition there be three branches 1. God decreeth to leave them. 2. He doth leave them. 3. He doth both out of his alone pleasure. 1 God, say they, hath decreed to leave them without sufficient grace, and consequently under an everlasting necessity of sinning. This is the very Helen which they sight for, the main act of that absolute reprobation, which with joint consent and endeavour they labour to maintain. Most of them cast their reprobation into two acts; A negative, which is a peremptory denial of grace and glory to some men lying in the fall; And a Positive which they say is a preordination of the men thus left, to the eternal torments of hell. Others among them define Reprobation by an act merely negative, and call it (Non electionem, decretum quo statuit non eo usque misereri.) Thes our Divines in their suffrage define; and in their explication of Suffr: Brit: art: 1. de Repr: Thes. 1. the Definition which they give, they say that the proper acts of reprobation, as it standeth opposed to election, are no other than a denial of that same glory and grace, which are prepared in the decree of election for the sons of God. But in this they all agree, that by the decree of reprobation, grace necessary for the avoiding of sin, is flatly denied to reprobates. And if at any time we hear them say, that God hath gratified Reprobates with some grace, (For so saith Walaeus, reprobates are left, under the common providence Walae: Defence: Anat: Armin: c. deRepr. Suffr: Brit: thes: 4. de Reprob. of God, and consequently under some common endowments. And our Divines in the Synod say, Reprobates though they are not elected, yet receive many of God's graces;) they are to be understood of such Graces and gifts as are insufficient to make them avoid sin, as we may see in these two cited places, and many more. 2 God doth actually, according to his eternal and unchangeable decree, leave the Reprobates in their several times and generations without his grace, under a necessity of final sin and impenitency. This is the second branch of that second proposition. And this they must needs say; For God's decrees cannot be frustrated; what he purposed before time, without fail he doth in time. I shall not need therefore to prove, that they say so; Nevertheless to let it be seen how positively and Categorically they say so, I will give an instance or two. The Divines of Geneva at the Synod, among their Theses of Reprobation, have this for one, Those whom God hath reprobated, out of the same will by which he hath rejected them either be calleth not at all, or being called he reneweth not throughly by the spirit of regeneration, ingraftcth not into Christ mystically, nor justifieth &c Like to this is the speech of Lubbert, who speaking of reprobates saith; To them Act: Synon: Suffrag: Gener: de Reprob: either he revealeth not the way of salvation, or giveth not faith and regeneration; but leaveth them in sin and misery. The same author speaking against the position of the Remonstrants (viz: That God doth supply to all men sufficient and necessary means of salvation, with an intention of saving them) letteth down this Antithesis, God doth not administer to all men means needful and sufficient to salvation, and that with an intention of saving Act: Synon: Suffr. Lubbert de Reprob. them. And to this his Antithesis Polyander, Wal●us, and Thyscus three other professors of Divinity in the Lowcountryes did set their hands. It is a usual course with this Author to lay unto our charge, that God hath immutably Answer. decreed this or that; So that if we had said that all this were decreed by God not immutably, but mutably, we should not incur the danger of his displeasure so immutably, and avoidable as we do. Now to decree not immutably, but mutably, is a phrase that I no where meet with, but among men of this Authors spirit; the congruity whereof I willingly profess, is so far from mine understanding, as no phrase more. If they would in the name of common sense expound themselves unto us, than we should soon consider what Answer we are to give in. We willingly profess, that all God's decrees are unchangeable, but of decreeing a thing unchangeably, not any of our Divines discourse, that I know of. We say that God decreeth some things to come to pass necessarily, and some things to come to pass contingently; so doth Aquinas: and we understand his language right well, and approve his doctrine in this particular. We willingly confess that as God hath chosen some, whom he means to deliver from that bondage of sin, and Satan, whereinto all are cast by the transgression of Adam. And how to deliver them? Surely by bestowing the spirit of grace, and regeneration upon them, so to open their eyes and bring them out of darkness into light, and from the power of Satan unto God; In few words by bestowing faith and repentance upon them. All others he hath from everlasting determined not to show the like grace and favour unto. For we see by experience that to many he gives not faith and repentance. And look how he carrieth himself towards any persons in time, after the same manner he determined to carry himself from everlasting. And the Scripture expressly tells us that even of them that are called, but few are chosen; and consequently the number of reprobates must needs be far greater, than the number of the elect. Now as many as God hath decreed to deny faith and repentance unto, we hold it impossibile for them, upon this supposition, to be recovered out of the bondage of sin and Satan; because the Scripture in divers places expressly tells us, that faith is the gift of God, repentance is the gift of God; and therefore to whomsoever he will not be so gracious, as to give faith, and repentance, we judge it a thing impossible upon this supposition, that any of them should believe, should repent. And more than this, as touching every particular here delivered, we account it so apparently, testified in holy Scripture, that we wonder not a little with what face this Author can deny it. Nay, we verily believe that he believes all these as well as we. And the true point of Substantial difference between us is concealed by him all along, which is an argument of no ingenuity; but yet I bear with him in following Lysander's counsel, when the Lion's skin will not hold out, to piece it out with a fox skin; lest otherwise his Pelagian tenet would be discovered in a most palpable and gross manner. For undoubtedly he believes that faith is the gift of God; as also that it is impossible, that they should believe, to whom God will not give faith. But his tenet is, that God is ready and willing to give faith to all, not absolutely, but conditionally; to wit, in case they make themselves fit for it, by performing somewhat on their parts. Now this is as good as in express terms to profess, that Grace is conferred according to merits, or according unto works: For between works and merits in this controversy there is no difference, as Bellarmine acknowledgeth; And in the Epistle of Prosper to Austin they are taken promiscuously, as of the same force and signification. Now this doctrine is expressly contradictory to the word of God. God hath saved us and called us with an holy calling not according to our own works but according to his own purpose and grace. The like we have, Tit. 3. 5. And in like manner this doctrine hat: been condemned 2. Tim. 19 in the Church of God, as the sour leaven of Pelagianism, from the Synod of Palestine above 1200 years ago all along; and Pelagius himself was driven to subscribe to the Canons of that Synod of Palestine, wherein Anathema was pronounced upon them, that do, or shall maintain, that Grace is conferred according unto works. If God hath decreed not to bestow faith upon a man, if he hath not decreed to bestow upon him the gift of charity, it is impossible, that any work can be done by such a one proceeding from faith and love, and consequently such a one hath no liberty from sin, and that no such liberty is found in a natural man, in an unregenerate, is the doctrine of our Church by D. Potter's confession, a Cathedral Divine, I do not say by the constant doctrine of D. Fulke in his answer to the Rhemish Testament, and if no liberty from sin be found in such a one, it follows that such a one remains under a necessity of sinning, not that every sin, whether of lying, stealing, whoring, murder, or in any other kind is necessarily committed by him; For a natural man may be as moral as any heathen hath been, many of whom have been very famous and renowned in the world for their morality; But whether they are exercised in virtuous actions, or in abstaining from actions vicious, yet still they sin, forasmuch as they neither perform the one, nor abstain from the other in a gracious manner, out of faith and love. And therefore Austin was somewhere bold to style them Splendida peccata glorious sins. For novimus non officiis sed finibus discernendas esse virtutes, Virtues are to be discerned not by their offices, but by their ends. The Helen we fight for is nothing but the word of God, and the truth manifestly contained therein; namely concerning the prerogative of his grace, as effectual to every good work, and most Freely given to some and denied to others, not according to men's works, according to that of S. Paul God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will, he hardeneth. This is a part of God's sovereignty; And it stands all true subjects upon to maintain the lawful Sovereignty of their Princes; how much more doth it become the creature to stand for the lawful prerogative and Sovereignty of his Creator, especially when he proceeds herein according to the tenor of God's word, clear reason and the unanimous consent of all the orthodox in the Church of God clearly opposing Pelagius herein from the Synod of Palestine 1200. years ago to this day. The difference of opinions here feigned by him about the point of Reprobation, amongst our Divines is like the feigning of a knot in a bulrush. For what is a peremptory denying of grace and glory to some men lying in the fall, other than a denial of that grace and glory, which is prepared in the decree of election to the sons of God, though indeed neither of them make it a denial, which is done in time, but rather Gods decree to deny it. For do not the latter Divines maintain it to be peremptory, as well as the former? For what difference doth he devise between a flat denial, and a peremptory denial; and as for the latter decree belonging to reprobation here mentioned, namely a preordination of the man thus left to the torments of hell do not the latter Divines acknowledge this decree to belong to Reprobation also? Only they profess that God preordaines none to eternal torments in hell but for their sins actual as well as original, of as many as live to ripeness of age. Now I would fain know what Divine of ours maintains the contrary. 1. Our Divines in saying, Reprobation is, Decretum quo statuit non misereri do manifest, that not denying grace, but the decree of denying it, is Reprobation. Walaeus speaketh of no common endowments, though that be a truth, which here is attributed unto them; else how should they be called common endowments. 2. If he decrees to leave Reprobates without grace, and consequently under that necessity of sinning into which all are cast by the sin of Adam; it is nothing strange, I think that God should accordingly leave them therein; though in a different manner, the Lord prostituting some to their own losts and to the power of Satan, more than others, and making some even by the ministry of the Gospel, proficere ad exteriorem vitae emendationem, quo mitius puniantur; as Austin some where speaketh. If God's decree cannot be frustrated, as here is avouched; I wonder he should charge us with teaching, that God decreeth this, or that immutably. For if he should change any of his decrees, they should undoubtedly be frustrated. Indeed we do not say, that God decrees Hypothetically to give grace, to wit upon condition, that men will make themselves fit for it, and for failing herein to deny them grace. And I am very glad to observe so good correspondence in the suffrages of Protestant Divines in the Synod of Dort, and our English also M. Mason Addit. p. 57 & 58. 59 with them. Sect: 3. 3. God both decreeth and executeth this leaving of men to themselves, of his alone absolute will and Suffr-Brit. art. 1. de Repr. explic. thes. 1. Orthodox Ibid. thes. 3. heterodox. pleasure, This is the third branch 1 That they say so; witness the suffrage of our English Divines. We affirm that this non election is founded in the most free pleasure of God. And that no man lying in the fall is passed over by the mere will of God, is numbered by the same Divines among the heterodox positions; To this purpose also speak The Palatinate Ministers. The cause of Reprobation is the most free and just will of God. Act. Synod. palate. thes. 3. Ibid, thes: 4. That God passeth over some and denyeth them the grace of the Gospel, the cause is the same free pleasure of God. Thus the Divines of Hessen; God decreed to leave some in the fall, of his own good pleasure; The proof of this they fetch from the execution of this decree in time. God doth in time leave some of mankind fallen, and doth Judic Theol. Hassiac. not bestow upon them means necessary to believe etc. and this out of his most free pleasure; This they jointly affirm and prove it by this reason especially. All men, were looked on as sinners. If sin therefore were the cause, that moved God to reprobate, he should have reprobated or rejected all; But he did not Reprobate all; therefore for sin he reprobated none, but for his own pleasure, in which we must rest without seeking any other cause. 1. Now from these two things laid together, viz. 1. That God did bring men into a necessity of sinning. 2. That he hath left the Reprobates under this necessity, it will follow that he is the Author of the reprobates sins. 1. Because (Causae causae est causa causati) the Cause of a cause is the cause of its effect (if there be a necessary subordination between the causes and the effect) whether it be a cause by acts negative, or positive. But God is the chief or sole cause (by their doctrine) of that, which is the necessary and immediate cause of the sins of reprobates, namely their impotency and want of supernatural grace; therefore he is (by the same doctrine) the true and proper cause of their sins. 2. Because Removens prohibens, &c. that which withdraweth and withholdeth a thing, which being present would hinder an event, is the cause of that event. As for example he that cutteth a string in which a stone hangs, is the cause of the falling of that stone; And he that withdraweth a pillar which being put to uphold a house; is the true cause in men's account of the falling of that house. But God by their opinion withholdeth from reprobates that power, which being granted them, might keep them from falling into sin: therefore he becometh a true moral cause of their sins, In whose power it is that a thing be not done, to him it is imputed, when it is done, saith Tertullian, In cuius manu est quid ne fiat, ei deputatur, cum iam fit. It will not suffice to say that God by withholding grace from reprobates becometh only an accidental, Tertul: l. 1. contr. Maction. c. 22. not a proper and direct cause of their sins. For a cause is then only accidental in relation to the effect, when the effect is beside the intention and expectation of the cause. For example; Digging in a field is then an accidental cause of the finding a bag of gold, when that event is neither expected not intended by the husbandman in digging; But when the event is looked for, and aimed at, than the cause (though it be the cause only by withholding the impediment) is not accidental. As a Pilot who withholdeth his care and skill from a ship in a storm; foreseeing that by his neglect the ship will be drowned; is not to be reputed an accidental, but a direct, and proper cause of the loss of this ship. This being so it followeth that God by this act and decree of removing and detaining grace necessary to the avoiding of sin, from reprobates, not as one ignorant and careless what will or shall follow, but knowing infallibly what mischief will follow, and determining precisely that which doth follow, viz: their impenitency and damnation, becomes the proper and direct cause of their sins. That God of his mere pleasure showeth mercy on some, and hardeneth others is the Answer. Ro. 9 18. express word of God. Therefore he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. Now to show mercy is to give the grace of faith and obedience, as appears by the opposition of it to obduration, which is such as whereupon followeth disobedience; as appears by the objection following hereupon; Thou wilt say then why doth yet complain, For who hath resisted his will? Now God complaineth of nothing but disobedience. Again to give faith, is to show mercy. For to have faith is to obtain mercy. Heretofore ye have Ro. 11. 30. not believed, but now have obtained mercy through their unbelief. Where to believe & to obtain mercy are made equipollent, & of the same signification. And in reason, if God did deny faith, because of some unpreparedness in the creature, than God did expect that the creature should first prepare himself, and make himself fit for faith, that so God might bestow it upon him; & so grace should be conferred according to works; which is contradictious to express testimony of holy scripture, testifying that God hath saved us & called us with an holy calling, not according to our works but according to his own purpose and grace; & all along hath been condened in the Church of God for Pelagianisme. Thus we have been entertained with a discourse containing nothing, but the opinion of our Divines, which none of us deny: Yet in the proposing hereof he hath wasted a whole leaf and more Now he comes to his argument drawn from these two laid together. 1. That God did bring men into a necessity of sinning. 2. That he hath left the reprobates under this necessity. Hence he concludes that God is the Author of the reprobates sins; But this we utterly deny. Therefore this he undertakes to prove by two reasons. 1. Because the cause of the cause is the cause of its effect, if there be a necessary subordination between the causes and the effect. But God is the chief or sole cause (by their doctrine) of that which is the necessary and immediate cause of the sins of Reprobates, namely their impotency and want of supernatural grace. For answer whereunto I say, first beginning with the minor. 1. That the want of supernatural grace is not the immediate cause of the sins of Reprobates, nor the chief cause; much less the sole cause. And I prove it evidently. Let instance be given in any sin committed by a Reprobate; let it be the sin of murder, or of fornication, or of theft, or of lying! For if it were, than every reprobate should be guilty of murder, of fornication, of lying, of stealing For, positâ causâ principali & immediatâ ponitur effectus; Where a principal and immediate cause doth exist, there the effect must needs exist. But it is apparent, that albeit every reprobate doth want supernatural grace, yet every reprobate is not guilty of murder, of fornication, lying, and stealing. Secondly, If the want of supernatural grace were the immediate and principal cause of all the sins of reprobates; than not only every Reprobate should be guilty of committing all the sins formerly mentioned, but at all times every one of these sins should be committed by them; Because at all times they want supernatural grace. And the truth is, every one of these sins may be abstained from without supernatural grace, and for carnal respects: Only without supernatural grace they cannot be abstained from, in a gracious manner; as namely out of faith in God, and love to God. He that hath neither faith nor love cannot abstain from these vile courses out of faith and love. In like sort, heathen men in their generations have been exceeding virtuous, according to the world's account of virtue, in moderating their passions, and ordering their conversation aright one towards another; and all this hath been performed by them without supernatural grace. Thirdly, The immediate cause of all their sins rather of the two, is their natural corruption, whereby they are habitually turned away from God; and converted unto the creature in an inordinate manner. Like as the immediate cause actionis laesae, of a natural function of the body imperfect, is the disease or infirmity that hath seized upon some part of the body; And the Physician who is able to cure it, and will not; is the cause why it continueth uncured: But no wise man will say, he is the cause why this or that member in a sick man's body doth not perform its operation as it should. In like manner as touching the vicious actions of the soul, the want of supernatural grace is the cause, why those vicious actions continue uncured, because God alone by his grace can cure them; but no sober man that is well in his wits, should say that is the cause of vicious actions; but acknowledge rather the corruption thereof to be the cause of these vicious actions. And indeed all moral philosophy refers the cause of every vicious action, unto the vicious habit depraving the will, and inclining it to vicious courses. Fourthly, Yet farther to represent the wildness of this Authors discourse. The vicious habit itself is not the sole cause; no nor the principal and immediate cause of a vicious action in particular. For if it were, than that particular vicious action should always be committed by it; So that an impure person should always commit fornication; a Liar should always lie; a Thief should always steal; a Murtheret should always commit murder. For it is a rule generally received, that the immediate and principal cause being existent, the effect must needs exist also. And indeed albeit, habits, whether good or evil, do work after the manner of nature inclining and swaying the will to the accomplishment of them; Yet the will of man being a free, and not necessary Agent, proceeds not to work, but according unto judgement and occasions and opportunityes from without. And albeit a purser that maintain himself by robbery hath a fair opportunity offered him to advantage himself to take a purse; yet if upon consideration he finds himself too weak to go through with it, or that he cannot do it safely, he will forbear. For albeit a vicious habit doth naturally, and necessarily incline him to a naughty end, yet in the choice of the means conducing to this end, he is free. How much more plainly doth it appear, that the want of supernatural grace is far off from being either the sole cause, or the immediate, or the principal cause of any sin committed by a Reprobate. Rather of the two the intestine corruption of the Reprobate is the cause of his sins, and the want of grace is the cause why this corruption is not cured. Now albeit a Physician may sin in not curing a sick person, when it lies in his power to cure him: For we are in charity bound to do to others, as we would have others do unto us; yet God is bound to none, I will show mercy on whom I will show mercy, Exod. 33. 19 and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion. 2. Observe how sluttishly he carrieth himself in the next reason taken from removens prohibens. His rule proceeds both of withdrawing and withholding a thing which being present would hinder an event. But he gives instance only in withdrawing, as in cutting a string whereon a stone● hangs; which who so doth, is the cause of the falling of the stone: And in withdrawing a pillar upholding an house, which who so doth, is the cause of the fall of that house: which is most true in natural things, yet not the immediate cause, that is to be referred to the nature of the stone, and house; which being heavy things do naturally move downwards. But this Author contents not himself with conforming the condition of Agents voluntary to the conditions of Agents natural and necessary; but changeth his terms also, and puts the phrass of withdrawing, into the place of the former phrase, which was withholding. Now it is true God withholds that grace from Reprobates, which he gives to his Elect; but he withdraws and takes no inward grace from them. Yet this phrase of withholding is very improper; For it signifies a forcible restraint of that which was going; Whereas God being Master of his own grace, gives it to whom he will, and denies it to whom he will; For he is bound to none. And is it not lawful for him to do what he will with his own? But albeit he carry himself very sluttishly in opposing us, yet I willingly confess he carrieth the matter very clearly in contradicting himself; as when he concludeth, that God in withholding that power (that is that grace) which would keep them from sin (for this alone is our Tenet) hereby becomes a true moral cause of their sin. I say, herein he contradicts himself very handsomely. For himself confesseth that God could hinder any man from sin, but he doth not: And doth it not herehence evidently follow, that God hereby becomes the Author of sin, yea of every sin that is committed in the world? But I see what he will reply by the face of his discourse, namely this; He saith not that God by withholding that grace which would keep him from sin, becomes the Author of sin; but only by withholding that grace which might keep him from sin. And indeed so he doth; but mark therewithal how sluttishly he carrieth himself in 2 particulars. 1. In deviating from his confirmity to his own instances. For each instance given is in such a thing withdrawn whereupon the event absolutely followeth; and which not being withdrawn the contrary event not only might be, but would be; as if a string holding a stone being not broken, the stone not only might be held, but would be held. So if the not been withdrawn, not only the house might have been held up, but would have pillar had been held up. But upon granting grace he doth not say the creature would have been kept from sin, but might have been kept from falling into sin. Now what Legerdeimaine is this? And could he presume his Reader would prove so simple and Sottish, as not to observe this incongruity? 2. He deviates from our tenet. For we do not say, that upon granting grace supernatural the creature may abstain from sin, if he will, but that hereby is wrought in him a will to abstain from sin, a desire to do that which is pleasing in the sight of God, though not in such perfection, as to work out all natural corruption that is found within us; but that still there is sin dwelling in us; still there is a flesh fight against the spirit; Yea, a law in our members rebelling against the law of our mind, and leading us captive to the law of sin. Hence proceed the manifold and daily sins even of the children of God; but God's spirit is prevalent with them to renew their repentance, even for sins of weakness, and sins of improvidence and inconsiderateness; and to keep from presumptuous sins, that they may not prevail over them; That it may not be said of them, as it was of too many among the Israelites, in the wilderness, Psal. 19 Their spots are not the spots of thy children. Nay, which is more, consider; Arminius confesseth that God doth hinder sin in such a manner, as by granting such a grace, Deut. 32. whereupon they not only may, but will and do abstain from sin; but he doth not thus hinder it in all. What therefore? shall he be accounted the Author of such sins. Yet I willingly confess, Arminius and this Author shake hands in this, that the Reprobates have such a grace, as whereby they may abstain from sin, if they will. Yet holy Paul confesseth of himself, even then, when he was in a better condition (I trow) then that of Reprobates, to wit, when he wrote the Epistle to the Romans, saying, What I would that do I not, but what I hate that do I. And again, To will is present with me, but I Rom. 7. 15, 18, 19 Rome 6 find no means to perform that which is good: For I do not the good thing which I would; but the evil which I would not, that do I. But we deny that a Reprobate hath so much as a will to do good; For such a will undoutedly pleaseth God. But they that are in the flesh cannot please God. As for the solution which he feigns to himself of his own argument, by distinction of an accidental cause, and a proper and direct cause; that is none of ours. This is a gambell of his own, to delude his reader. God we say is the direct and proper cause of that sanctification which is found in his children to the subduing of their lusts, an inordinate affections; and as direct and proper a cause of leaving their natural corruption uncured in others: Nor so only but of prostituting men unto their lusts, and giving them over to their vile affections, to commit abominable things, not affording them so much as a natural restraint from such vicious courses, which he could, and that without any supernatural grace. And by this postitution of them, he knows how to pay them home for their other ungodly courses, in such sort, as they shall receive thereby such recompense of their error as is meet; as Saint Paul hath told us Rom. 1. But this Author takes little notice of God's word thereby to inform himself of God's providence; but roves whithin the sphere of his own imagination, and rational discourse, (yet as corrupt as well beseems him who opposeth the free grace of God) as if he would coin unto us new oracles, the devises of his own addle brains. And as for Tertullia's rule, which this Author insists upon. In whose power it is that a thing be not done, to him it is imputed, when it is done. Observe whether this Author doth not make God the Author of every sin that is committed in the world, as well as we. For himself, in the 6. Sect. of the second inconvenience, confesseth that if God had not decreed to suffer sin, there would be none; and adds Who can bring forth that which God will absolutely hinder. So then undoubtedly it is in God's power, that sin be not done. For he can hinder it; what followeth then? but that to him sin is to be imputed, when it is done, by Tertullia's rule, approved by this Author, quite contrary to the judgement and doctrine of Austin, putting Aug: cont: Jul: Pelag: l. 5. c. 4. this difference between man and God, the creature and the Creator; that if we suffer others to sin, when we can hinder them, rei cum ipsis erimus; but how many sins (saith he) do we see committed in the world, which could never come to pass if God would hinder them. Showing how our doctrine opposeth God's mercy according to his conceit, and coming pag: 63. to deliver things more closely, as he saith, and comprehending that which he hath to say under 4. particulars: The 2. whereof this; That it was the sin of our nature, not by generation, as I have showed, but by Gods own voluntary imputation. The proof whereof and the confirmation of it out of M. Calvin being set down at large in some 13. lines or more in M. Hordes discourse, is here utterly left out, which will be the more remarkable by comparing it with what he delivers, concerning another attribute of God here inserted; and which he pretends, also to be impugned by our doctrine, p. 54. where he seems to sup up that which here he delivered. Num. 3. These words are inserted. I think I may conclude with the words of Prosper, He which saith M. Mason Addit. p. 64. Senten: super 8. c. Gall: that God would not have all men to be saved but a certain set number of predestinate persons only, he speaketh more harshly, than he should of the height of God's unsearchable grace. Nay he speaks that which cannot stand with his infinite grace and mercy, especially to the sons of men. The 8. objection of the Galls was this That God will not have all men to be saved, but a certain number of persons predestinate. Now Prospers answer hereunto is very large, and Answer. it begins thus, If about the salvation of all mankind, and calling them unto the knowledge of his truth, the will of God is maintained to be so indifferent throughout all ages, that God may be showed to have neglected no man altogether; the unsearchable depth of God's judgement is hereby assaulted. For why did God suffer all nations in ages past, to walk in their own ways when the Lord chose jacob to himself, and dealt not so with every nation? And why are they now become God's people, which before were no people of God, & c? All this makes nothing for this Author. The next is directly against him, not only at large; but in this very particular, wherein he alleadeth Prosper not in his answer to this 8. objection, but in his sentence proposed afterwards upon it. For what is this Authors meaning, (in citeing him to affirm, that God not only willeth their salvation whom he hath predestinated, but all men also; or at least that such as say the contrary, do speak more harshly than we ought to speaks of the depth of God's inscrutable grace) but to cast a colour that Prosper concurres with him; and judgeth that God is indifferunt to save all. But the reason why he only saves some, and not others, is, because some prepare themselves for grace, and accordingly he bestows it upon them: Others do not prepare themselves, and accordingly God doth not bestow it upon them. Now prosper directly contests against all such, as maintain this opinion, and that in two particulars. 1. In taking upon them to give the reason of God's judgements, and that drawn from the wills and actions of men; and which is no less impiety, in thinking that grace is bestowed by way of reward for good works; Or restrained from men by reason of their evil works. His words translated run thus, But whosoever referreth the causes of God's works and judgements throughout to the wills and actions of men, and will have God's dispensations varied according to the changeable condition of man's free will; such a one professeth the judgements of God to be scrutable, and his ways such, as may be found out. And that which Paul the Doctor of the Gentiles durst not touch, this man thinks he can unlock and make known. And that which is a fruit of no less impiety, the very grace of God whereby we are saved, is given by the way of reward for good works, and denied, or restrained for evil works. So that in each particular Prosper is directly contrary this Authors tenet. Now seeing the most part of men have not the grace of salvation, that is, such a grace as is of saving nature. And the reason by God doth not give it them, is not in consideration of their evil works; let any other sober and judicious Aminian be judge, whether God can be said to will their salvation (in such a sense as we speak of it) when he denyeth them the grace of salvation, and that not for their evil works sake, but (which necessarily followeth hereupon) merely according to the good pleasure of his will. And indeed in Prospers large answer to this eighth objectionto the Galls, which taketh up almost a whole column in Austin, this Author finds nothing at all to fasten upon for his advantage. But yet you will say in his eighth sentence which he proposeth, it is as this author allegeth: I grant it; but observe his censure well; The inscrutable depth of God's grace may suffice to keep us from speaking so rashly, as to say that God wills not all to be saved, but only a certain number of persons predestinate. Where observe, first, he counts it an harsh speech to say, that God willeth not, that all men shall be saved; the reason whereof undoutedly is this, because it is expressly contradictory 1 Tim: 2. to a text in Scripture. But then if we object, how can God be said to will their salvation whom he hath not predestinated, to whom he will not give the grace of salvation, & that not for their evil works sake; but according to the mere pleasure of his will. Now Prospers answer in my judgement is this, The depth of God's inscrutable grace will bear us out in it; so that we need not cast ourselves upon so harsh an expression, as to deny that God will have all men to be saved, which is contradictious to the letter of God's word. In effect it is, as if he should say; It is a secret. This I take to be Prospers meaning, and herein I remit myself to the judicious; But sure I am that Prosper is directly contrary to that opinion whereunto this Author, by virtue of this sentence of his, desires to draw him. In like manner the Author of the book, De vocatione Gentium, which is commonly thought to be Prospers, though Vossius affects to entitle it unto another upon no other ground, but because he conceits that Author, not to be so rigorous in the doctrine of predestination, as Prosper. But let the judicious compare Prospers carriage in this particular, with that Authors, and observe whether they do not exactly agree For that Author holds up that text of Paul, God will have all to be saved, as Prosper doth, without assaying to clear it by interpretation as Austin doth, and will have it go for a secret; and withal he expressly concurres with Prosper in expressing first, that God doth not give grace for men's good works sake, nor denies it for their evil works. For the ages wherein God so plentifully communicated his grace were no better than the former. Observe farther that Austin himself in his Enchiridion treating of this place of Paul, God will have all to be saved, after he hath given two interpretations thereof, the last whereof interpreting it of genera singulorum, 1 Tim: 2. not singula generum, is most generally received, as most congruous both to Scripture phrase in general, and in special unto this very text of Paul, as Piscator observes, and Vossius against himself improvidently confesseth. Yet see the ingenuity of this great light in God's Church. If any man can give any other convenient interpretation, let him, provided we be not driven to deny the first article of Creed, whereby we confess that God is omnipotent. And this I conceive proceeded out of a desire to hold up the meaning of that text to the uttermost, that the very letter of it may be applied so we might not be driwen to so foul an inconvenience, as to say that God willeth that man's salvation, which is never saved; which is as much as to say, that such a one therefore is not saved, because God cannot save him. Observe farther; in the days of Hincmarus and Remigius, these controversies being revived in the cause of Goteschalk, the church of Lions writes a book wherein it treats of the meaning of this place of Paul, whereof he gives four expositions according to the ancient fathers. First, That it is to be understood of genera singulorum, not singula generum; of all sorts of men, not of all men of all sorts. Secondly, That none is saved but by the will of God. Thirdly, That God works in us a will or a desire that all may be saved. Fourthly, That God will have all men to be saved, if they will; Then they propose their judgement concerning these four expositions distinguishing between the three, first, and the last, thus, In the three first expositions of these words, wherein it is said, that God willeth all men to be saved, no absurdity is to be found, no repugnancy unto faith. But as touching the fourth and the last; here we are to take heed, for it gives occasion to the Pelegian pravity, in as much as it affirms, that God, that he may save men; doth expect the wills of men: (Now this Pelagian pravity, is the very substance of our Authors orthodoxy whom I deal with.) Against this error, (saith the Church of Lions) we read Definitions have been made in the ancient counsels of the fathers. This I take out of the extracts, which Vossius hath made out of that book, which goes under the name of the Church of Lions, in his Pelagian history. l. 7. c. 4. p. 755, 756. there is an addition of some few lines in the third Sect: concerning God's justice, but P 65. Sect. 3. sub. sect. P. 66. & 67. they add no moment at all to the rest; and therefore the answer made in that third Sect: to M. Hord may suffice. And in the same sect: and subsection subordinate to the second assertion, which he obtrudes upon the maintainers of the lower way; which was this, God hath determined for the sin of Adam to cast away the greatest part of mankind for ever; this Interpolation is inserted. This is so clear a case that Calvin with some others have not sticked to say, that God may with as much M. Mason Addit. justice determine men to hell the first way, as the latter. See Instit: l. 3. cap. 23. s. 7. Where against those who deny that Adam fell by God's decree, he reasoneth thus; All men are made guilty of Adam's sin by God's absolute decree alone, Adam therefore sinned by this only decree. What lets them it grant, that of one man, which they must grant of all men? And a little after he saith It is too absurd that these kind patrons of God's justice. should thus stumble at a straw, and leap over a block. God may with as much justice decree Adam's sin and men's damnation, out of his only will and pleasure, as out of that will and pleasure the involving of men in the guilt of the first sin, at and their damnation for it; That is the substance of his reasoning. To the same purpose speaketh Maccovius; Fromhence we may see, saith he, what to judge of that opinion of our adversaries viz. That God cannot justly ordain men to destruction without he consideration of sin. Let them tell me which is greater to impute to one man the sin of another, and punish him for it with eternal death, or to ordain simply, without looking at sin, to destruction? Surely no man will deny the first of these to be greater. But this God may do without any wrong to justice, much more therefore may he do the other. As touching the assertion itself here charged upon our Divines, namely that God hath determined for the sin of Adame to cast away the greatest part of mankind. I have Answer. thereunto answered at large in my consideration of M. Hordes discourse: Yet let me add something by way of an apt accommodation of that before delivered to clear the ambiguous phrase of this Author, as touching the phrase of casting away. For it may well be doubted whether by casting away (which he makes the Object of God's determination) he means the act of damnation, or the act of denying grace. If the act of damnation, it is most untrue. For Reprobates are not damned for original sin only, but for all the actual sins that have been committed by them; And as they are, and shall be damned for them; So God from everlasting decreed they should be damned for them. Secondly, According to my Tenet, in no moment of nature is God's decree of damning reprobates, before the prescience, not of original sin only, but also of all their actual sins. Indeed I do not make the prescience of sin to go before the decree of damnation; Nor do I make the decree of damnation to go before the prescience of sin, but I conceive them to be simultaneous. It is true many infants we say perish in original sin only, not living to be guilty of any actual sin of their persons; why should this seem strange, when M. Hord himself professeth in his preface sect. 4. That all mankind are involved in the guilt of eternal death? If all are guilty of eternal death, than it were just with God to inflict eternal death upon all for original sin; How much more is it just to inflict eternal death upon some few, being guilty of it. Therefore observe the foxlike carriage of this Author. For this former free acknowledgement of the guilt of eternal death adherent to original sin in M Hordes discourse, is quite left out in this, though there it was professed with this asseveration, I confidently believe it. For he well perceived, that this position utterly infatuates the strength of his discourse in this place. And I have still looked when these men will come to a plain denial of Original sin. Now if God may justly cast all mankind away for sin original, and that as touching the inflicting of damnation upon them for it; how much more evident is it to be just with God to cast away all mankind for original sin, as touching the denial of grace unto them? Now let us proceed to that which is here inserted out of Calvin and Maccovius. Now Calvin saith not that God may with as much justice determine men to hell the first way, as the latter; He speaks not at all of God's decree of damnation, he speaks only of God's decree that Adam suâ defectione periret, by his fall should be obnoxious to destruction And he proves it by their acknowledgement, that it was by the counsel of God, that all à salute exciderent unius parentis culpâ, should incur the loss of salvation by the fault of one parent. Hereupon he demands saying, What lets them to grant that of one man, which they must grant of all men. And a little after, It is too absurd that those kind patrons of God's justice should thus stick at a straw and leap● over a block And whereas Calvin saith, as he relates him, that All men are made guilty of Adam's sin by God's absolute decree alone. First, This is untrue; No where doth he say, that this came to pass by God's absolute decree alone. If he had, I had thought this Author would have justified him, as well as M. Hord, who in this very place professeth that Original sin is a sin made ours only by God's appointment. Indeed as M. Hord is now set forth in print, this passage is not found: but in M. Hord's own copy thus it ran; M. Mason belike hath gelded him; Yet that of M. Hord's was accounted the quintessence of M. Mason's strength in this argument; and he took upon him the propagating of the manuscripts thereof as myself know in some particulars. Likewise the involving of men in the guilt of Adam's sin and of eternal death, is M. Hord's phrase in one place, as before I have showed out of the fourth Section of his preface; and that by the only decree of God, did he express in this place. The same argument is used by Maccovius applied to purpose (so was not that of Calvin's. As for that saying of Maccovius, that God may ordain men to destruction without respect to any sin of his that is so ordained, is not this manifest. 1. In the case of annihilation? For doth not Arminius confess that God can annihilate the holiest creature that is? 2ly, As touching the suffering of hell pains. For did not Christ suffer them by the ordinance of his Father? Or was this suffering of his for any sin of his own? This have I proved more than once in my Vindiciae to be in the power of God: And Medina professeth as much, and that ex concordi omnium Theologorum sententiâ; And Vasquez the Jesuit concurres with Medina in the same opinion. And lately Raynaudus in his justification of Valerianus; who proves this to have been the confession of many of the ancient Fathers, and particularly of Fulgentius in that book of his De praedestinatione & gratiâ, which goes under Austin's name. And is it not evident by M. Hord's acknowledgement, when he saith that men are made guilty of Adam's sin, and of eternal death only by God's decree? Which passage of M. Hord's this Author hath razed out, and wipeth his lips, as if he had done no iniquity with his Index expurgatorius; not that he hath changed his opinion, as I verily think; but because he saw what a funestous blow it gave unto his cause in this particular: Yet is he magnified as a man unanswerable, none daring to take the bucklers against such a Don Quixot; But let the judicious consider this his practice well, & whether he be a man of such authority, as deserving that they should pin their faith on his sleeve, especially considering that he takes no notice of what I have answered to M. Hord, to reply thereupon; and that there is scarce any thing in all this which I have not answered in my Vindiciae; Yet he continues to clamour still; at least by other Jack a Lents whom he sets up, but answers nothing, but that which is of his own shaping, that making his own bed he may lie the more softly. But let The Reader seriously consider this, that will not be gulled and cheated of his faith, as Pope Caelestinus was of his Popedom; and remember what Austin sometimes said, Si lupi concilium fecerunt, ut pastoribus non responderent cur oves consilium perdiderunt, ut ad luporum speluncas accederent? If the wolves have consulted together, Aug: Ep: 171. and resolved not to make answer to the shepherds; why have the sheep so far lost all good counsel, as to come to the dens of wolves? Pag: 67. Sub-Sect: 2: concerning God's justice there is a passage inserted out of M. Perkins, but it is of no more moment than the rest. In the same sub-section, the three causes why repobates cannot in justice be bound to believe, are much changed from that they were in M. Hord's discourse, sent unto his friend, which Copy was sent unto me. Yet upon better consideration I find it is not so much changed, as at first sight I conceived. The order of the two first reasons is changed; only in the first here some similes of exageration are wanting, which are not wanting in the second of M. Hord's. The second here is most altered. For whereas in M. Hord's first discourse which he tendered to a Friend of his, the reason ran thus; Because it is God's will they shall not believe; To wit, in our opinion it is altered here thus, from an affirmative to a negative, It is not God's unfeigned will they shall believe; Yet himself lays the same thing to our charge in an affirmative manner pag: 78: treating of God's truth sub-sect: 2: the very last words which I answer apart, all that page almost not being found in M. Hord's first discourse. The words are these, Can God speak thus to Reprobates, who by his own decree shall never repent? etc. And in this very place at length he riseth to this affirmative, thus, It may rather be said, it is God's unfeigned will they shall not believe, because it is his will they shall want power to believe. So that I need not to trouble myself with adding any farther answer to this, more than I have to M. Hord and to that page 78 concerning God's truth, Sub-sect: 3. Pag: 69, and Sub-sect: 4. In dealing on God's attribute of justice; After the Author had proposed his reasons which moved him to think that our doctrine of God▪ s absolute decree is repugnant to God's justice; he proposeth our answers thereunto, which formerly were but two; but now are enlarged with the addition of a third. The first whereof is, for the form of it, changed throughout. The comparison of the ways of God with the mysterious attributes of God is changed, not only as touching the form, but as touching the matter; here is no pleading for a reasonable service of God, as there was. His making man's understanding purged from prejudice and false principles, as it was proposed there, purged from prejudices, corrupt affections, and customs, as it is proposed, to be the Tribunal, according to whose judgement interpretations of Scripture concerning what is just in the courses of God must be allowed or disallowed, I have sufficiently canvased there; Let the Reader be pleased to turn to it, and compare my answer to this Sub-section, and observe how little spirit he had, so much as to question against any one piece of my answer. Here he adds a reason of his former uncouth paradox, to wit that, justice in men and God are for substance but one, and the same thing, though different in degree, as the greater and lesser light. I have sufficiently profligated this in the first Section concerning God's attributes. For this very rule he premiseth in general to the ensuing discourse of his, most congruously; wild premises and grounds to wild discourses. The difference he puts between the ways of God & the mysteries of godliness I have there also refuted, showing that albeit some ways of God's justice are agreeable to the judgement of man, as these mentioned, Es: 5. and Ezek: 18, yet all are not, as there I show at large. And lastly because he likes rational discourse so well, I am contented to deal with him at his own weapon, by six rational demonstrations justifying the absoluteness of God's decrees, in answer whereunto, he is content to carry himself very judiciously, even as mute as a fish. The second answer of ours which he brings in to reply upon, is inserted a new, & that I come to consider in the next place as I find it set down pag. 10. 71. 72. M. Mason's Additions. It is answered that these decrees are set down in Scripture to be the will of God, and therefore they must needs be just. For God's will is the rule of all righteousness. To this answer I have these things to reply. 1. This rule in divinity is much abused by the maintainers of absolute reprobation, and may not be admitted in their sense and meaning. For God's will is not a rule of justice to himself, as if things were therefore just, because he willeth and worketh them; but his justice rather is a rule of his will & works, which are the expressions of his will He therefore maketh decrees and executeth them, because they are agreeable to that justice which dwells in the Divine nature: as he maketh nothing which hath not pot●nitam objectivam, a power of being created without implying contradiction to himself, or any thing in him; So he willeth and doth nothing, but that which may be willed and done saluá justiti●, without wrong to his justice, St. Hierome speaking of the Prophet Hoseas taking a wife of fornication. Hos. 1. 2. Saith it was done in typo, typically, not ●●ally Hieron. Proem. in Hosea. quia si fiat, turpissimii est, because if it had been d●ne indeed it had been a most foul thing. But thou wilt answer, saith he, Deo ●ubente, nihil turpe est, God commanding it nothing is dishonest. Thus much we say, saith the father, that God commandeth nothing but what is honest, but he doth not by commanding dishonest things, make those things honest which are abominable, plainly giving us to see what he thought viz: that God doth not will a thing & of make it good; but willeth it because it is in itself good antecedently, & before the act of God's will about it. And thus much doth Zanchy (though a rigid maintainer of absolute reprobation) not obscurely confess Zanch. l. 3. the nat. Dei c. 4. q. 9 thes: 2. in his treatise De naturá Dei; where he letteth ●all such speeches as make God's justice antecedent to his will and therefore the rule of it, rather than a thing regulated by it. Neither can God will any thing, saith he, which is not just. And again, The Prince's pleasure hath the strength of a law, is a Rule saith he, among the Canonists. But this is true where the King is just and a 〈◊〉 nothing but what is just. In which words he plainly maketh the justice of the King am●●edent to that will of his, which must be a law. Many more speeches he useth there to the same purpose. God's will therefore is not a rule of justice to himself. To whom then? To us. For by it we are first to ●qua●e all our thoughts, words, and deeds. Secondly to examine them when they are spoken, and done. Primum in aliq●o 〈…〉 regula ●ostcricrum, & supremum inferiorum. 2ly. I reply that the●● absolute accrces of men's inevitable salvation and damnation are no parts of Gods revealed will. The scriptures teach us no such matter. And therefore to say that they are, is but a mere begging of the question. It hath always been ordinary with false teachers, to make God's word a father to their false opinions, that they may stand the faster and win the greater credit. The Papists ground their Transubstantiation, & the Lutherans their consubstantiation and obiquity upon the Scripture, Hoc est corpus meum, This is my body. And the defenders of absolute reprobation do so too. They make their cause to be Gods and entitle his word to it; because they see it is the surest way to defend it, being herein like to some contentious Mat: 26. people, who being in law and having a bad cause which they are like to lose, they entitle the King to it, that they may the better uphold it. 3ly Absolute Reprobation can be no part of Gods revealed will. The reason is, because it is odious to right reason, & begetteth absurdities. For nulla veritas parit absurda; no truth begetteth absurdities. Divers truths are revealed in Scripture, which are above, but not contrary to right reason, whether they be matters of faith or life: Faith and reason nature and Scripture are both Gods excellent gifts. And therefore though there may be a disproportion, ye● there can be no repugnancy between them. The worship which God requireth is Cultus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a reasonable 〈◊〉. And the word of God is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, milk reasonable and without guile. Ro: 12. 2. 1 Pet: 2. 2. These things therefore, being laid together, it will appear to be but a mere shift and evasion, when absolute reprobation is proved to be unjust, and therefore unworthy of God; to say Gods will is the rule of justice; this is part of Gods revealed will, and therefore most just, whatsoever reason may cavil, and say to the contrary. Doth not this Author observe the contradictious nature of this proposition God's will is a rule of justice to himself. For a rule of justice to any one is a rule to his will, to be regusated thereby; & can the will be said to be the rule of justice to the will without contradiction? The rule propounded was this, God's will is the rule of all righteousness; but the other rule is the rule corrupted by this Author, when he talks of a will, as a rule of justice to the will. 2. But whether things are therefore just, because God wills them; or that therefore God willeth them, because they are just; undoubtedly that which here is proposed is a truth, namely that whatsoever the Scripture sets down to be the will of God, that must needs be just. Neither have we any need to improve it any farther than thus. For it is well known, that our Divines in their doctrine of predestination, and reprobation do depend on nothing so much, as the evidence of God's word; As this Author throughout this discourse of his depends on nothing less. And therefore he hath cast himself upon a strange practice in the former passage, namely to evacuate all our reasons drawn out of the word of God to confirm our doctrine, pleading that the interpretations we make of Scripture are all false, because the contrary doctrine which he maintains, is justified before the tribunal of humane reason purged from prejudice, and false principles, corrupt affections and customs; Which is as much as to profess in plain terms, that to find out the truth concerning the decrees of predestination and reprobation, we must leave the oracles of God, and hearken to the oracles of reason, provided that it be purged from prejudice and false principles; from corrupt affections and customs. Now I had thought that the spirit of God alone could purge us from such prejudice and false principles; corrupt affections and customs; And that this spirit of God worketh only by the word herein, which is called in Scripture the sword of the spirit; Yet this Author Eph: 6. tells us not, where this reason thus purged is to be found; save that in general he saith; that is just or unjust which is so esteemed in the judgement both of best and worst that stand indifferent to the entertainment of any truth, as is to be seen in the former reason according to M. Hord's discourse. Now who these best are but the Arminians in this Authors fancy; & the worst, but Anabaptists or heathens; or both I know not; Sure we are none of them in his understanding purged from false principles and prejudice, from corrupt affections and customs; because we do not stand indifferent to the entertainment of his tenets, which he calls Truths. 3. Where can he show that I have made use of any such principles to answer any argument of his against us. I do not find that any where he can drive me to this though this be the Apostles course, as we may see Ro: 9 Is there any injustice with God? God forbid, how doth he prove it, but thus, because the Scripture attributes such a course to God; I will show mercy on whom I will show mercy, and I will have compassion, on whom I will have compassion. 4. But where hath he learned to be so audacious as to say that, Things are not therefore just because God wills them, but that his justice is rather a rule of his will and works? Before he told us, that justice in man, and God were of the same nature; Now that justice which is the rule of our will is, Justitia obligans, justice binding us to do this or that; and is God's justice obligatory likewise to bind him? In making the world, I do not doubt, but God did that which was just; but was there any justice in God obliging him to the making of the world? who seeth not, what an Atheistical conclusion followeth herehence, namely that the world was from everlasting, if not necessarily by necessity of nature; yet necessarily by obligation of justice? otherwise for an infinite space of time wherein the world was not made (which must needs have been if the world were not, from everlasting) God had been and continued to be unjust. The Schools have taught me that there is a justice of condecency consequent to all the actions of God, no justice of obligation precedent to it. And whereas St. Paul tells us that God works all things according to the counsel of his will, both Alvarez and Suarez though School, Divines of opposite families, yet concur in this that this Counsel is, à libera voluntate acceptum, accepted of God's free will. And it is observable, that the Apostle calls it not the Counsel of his understanding, but the counsel of his will And Vasqu●z and Suarez both Jesuits, but very opposite about the nature of justice in God; yet both concur, that there is no justice in God towards his creature, but upon supposition of the determination of God's will. It is most true that supposing the end which God intends, the wisdom of God directs in the right use of congruous means; and no other justice then this his wisdom doth Aquinas acknowledge in the Divine nature. And great is the wisdom which God manifests in the government of this world, yet the same wisdom as great as it is doth not equal the infinite wisdom of God. But of this I have disputed more at large in my Vindiciae. Where l. 1. part. 3. de reprob. digr: 1. this question is discussed. Whether the will of God be circumscribed or regulated by justice? To no parcel whereof do I find the least savour of an answer in this Author. But let us examine how well he proves his own Tenet; And that is first by the authority of Hierome in his preface to his commentaries on Hosea. 2. By the authority of Zanchy; whereto I answer. 1. That if the interpretations of Scripture must be judged of before the Tribunal of reason purged from prejudice and false principles, from corrupt affections and customs; must not the opinions of such as Hierome and Zanchy be judged of before the same tribunal also? 2ly, touching Hierome himself. 1. It is true Hierome in that preface understands that command given Hosea to be only in a Type, and for the reason here mentioned; but in his Commentary he interpreteth it secundum historiam, literally. Neither was the Prophet as he saith, to be blamed in this. For he was not the worse, but he made her the better. Praesertim especially he was not to be blamed, because he did this not luxuriously or lustfully, or of his own will, but in obedience to the command of God. Now let the indifferent judge whether Hierome be not as much for us upon the text, as for our adversary in the preface. 2. Observe that Hierome is nothing for him in the preface. For Hierome speaks there of God's will of command, but we treat of God's will as it signifies not his command given to man, but his own purpose and decree to do this or that himself. Judge of the extravagancy of this Author by this, and whether his understanding be sufficiently purged from prejudice and false principles, from corrupt affections and customs; as to make the last resolution of our faith concerning the ways of God thereunto, or the understanding of such as he is, whether best or worst, or of both sizes upon a mere pretence of their indifferency for the entertainment of truths. We willingly grant with Zanchy that God can will nothing which is not just; Not that hereby we make any justice to precede the will of God; but because he hath a lawful power to do what he will; And there is a justice of condency consequent to all his actions. It is otherwise, I confess, with a man though the greatest of men, as wise as Solomon; though vessels after God's own heart, as David: But hence it followeth not, that because in an earthly King there is a justice antecedent to his will, therefore it is so in the King of heaven and earth. If this Author think otherwise, let him know I am not yet sufficiently convicted of the purity of his understanding purged from prejudice and false principles etc. as thereinto to make the last resolution of my faith. Yet I confess he carrieth himself magnificently as if he had attained to this purgation, as when he saith, That these absolute decrees of salvation and damnation, are not part of God's revealed will; But where hath he proved the conditional decrees that he stands for, are any part of God's revealed will. Where doth he find that God decreed to bestow faith and repentance upon a man, because of some good works of his, or deny it to others for failing of some good work? As for salvation and damnation we plainly profess, that God intended not to damn any man, but for sin, nor to bestow salvation on any man of ripe years, but by way of reward of his faith, repentance, obedience and good works. Doth not he beg the question all along, when he carrieth his conditional decrees in a confidentiary manner, without once offering to prove thè by any one place of Scripture? Here jexpected he would not beg the question, when he chargeth us to beg the question most insipidly; When it is well known that our Divines are frequent in proving their doctrine out of Scripture; which if it fail of sound proof in the judgement of his understanding purged from prejudice and false principles; yet with no modesty; whatsoever their judgement be) can he tax them for begging the question. For to beg the question is not once to offer to prove what they say; which is this Author's discourse all along. But to supply the place of arguments, he usually foists in a phrase at pleasure in expressing our Tenet of God's decrees; as of Decreeing immutably and unavoidably; Or as here he speaks of Damnation and salvation inevitable; whereas we do not use to clog our own expressions, or our Readers apprehensions with any such bugheares. We rather say that God decrees all things to come to pass, that do come to pass, and that agreably to their natures, as necessary things necessarily; and contingent things to come to pass contingently. And surely for doctrines of faith, I think every sober Christian hath cause to entitle the King to be the Author of them, this Author doth not so much for his: Nay the Scripture to him seemed so evidently to make for us (which I desire every wise Reader well to observe) that this drove him to such a sluttish shift, as to except against our interpretations of Scripture upon no other ground but this, that the Doctrine confirmed thereby is not consonant to the understanding of men purged from prejudice and false principles, corrupt affections and customs, in the designing of what is just, and what is unjust; And let every indifferent man judge whether this be not a desperate course, carrying with it a secret acknowledgement that the Scripture indeed doth favour the way we take in the Doctrine of predestination and reprobation. And indeed the ninth to the Romans Gerardus Vossius calls Gorgon's head whereby we think (so evident is the Apostles meaning on our side) to turn all our opposites into stones, though such vaunts are none of ours; but himself it seems had been stupefied by it, had he not timely taken hold of Scientia media, the Jesuits invention, and as vile an invention as ever reasonable men conceived. 3. Lastly he tells us like a resolute Sir, that absolute reprobation can be no part of God's revealed will; and his reason is; because it is odious to right reason. He doth not show how it is contrariant to God's word; but bravely presumes that his reason is right, as if he were of the number of that synedrion whose understandings are purged from prejudice and false principles, from corrupt affections and customs; and ere he is aware bewrays what he means by reason, when he attributes hatred unto it; And I verily believe his best reason is the strength of his affection. By the way let the Reader observe, that he is as opposite to absolute election, as to absolute reprobation; only he dischargeth his right reason and the spleen thereof against absolute reprobation, not against absolute election. We may easily guess the true notion of his right reason in this; his whole discourse savouring far more throughout of the foxes, then of the Lion's skin. Now I have given him six reasons for the absoluteness of reprobation, because he appeals to reason purged from prejudice and false principles, and not one of them hath he answered, though they went out of my hands now full three years ago. I will adventure to give him some reasons for it also out of God's word. For I desire to follow the crooked serpent which way soever he winds and turns. Therefore thus I dispute, Predestination is absolute, therefore reprobation is absolute. For if reprobation be not absolute, but proceeds according to men's evil works, than predestination is not absolute, but proceeds according to men's good works, whether faith or other obedience; according to that of Austin. If Esau be hated for the merit of unrighteousness, incipit & jacob justitiae merito deligi, jacob begins to be beloved Aug: adSimplician. l. 1. q. 2. for the merit of his righteousness; and a little before. Si enim quia praesciebat Deus futura Esavi opera mala, propterea eum praedestinavit, ut serviret minori; propterea praedestinavit & jacob ut ei major serviret, quia futura ejus bona opera praesciebat, & falsum est jam quod ait, non ex operibus. For if therefore the Lord praedestinated Esau that he should serve the younger, because he foresaw his evil works. For the same reason he predestinated jacob that he should rule over the Elder because he foresaw his good works; and so false is that which the Apostle saith, not of works. Now that predestination is absolute I prove thus. It is not upon the foresight of faith, much less of works, therefore it is absolute. The anteceedent I prove Rom. 9 11. thus; That which proceeds according to the good pleasure of the Lord's will, is not upon the foresight of faith; But predestination proceeds upon the good pleasure of God's will; ergo, The Major proposition I prove thus. This phrase, God's will excludes all outward causes; And no wise man will refer the cause of a man's absolution Eph: 1. 5. to the good pleasure of the judge, when a man's innocency is the cause of it. For that is the cause of a thing, whereby answer is made to the question, why such a thing is done; And this is the perpetual phrase of Scripture; as, Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine own? And, All these things worketh the same spirit, distributing to every man severally as he will; and, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. Mat: 20. 15. 1 Co. 12. 11. Rome 9 18. Col. 1. 19 Mat: 11. 26. Phil: 2, 13. Ps: 44. 3. It pleased the father that in him should all fullness dwell. It is so o father because thy good pleasure was such. It is God that worketh in you both the will and the deed according to his good, pleasure. The Lord loved you because he loved you. Deut: 7. 7. They inherited not the land by their own sword, neither did their own arm save them, but thy right hand, and thine arm. and the light of they countenance because thou didst favour them. 2. My second argument is, Therefore God gives faith because he did predestinate them; As many believed as were ordained to everlasting life; and God added daily to the Church Act: 13. 48. Act: 2. last. such as should be saved. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in this place is as much as, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; as appears by the equipollency of both sentences. Now hence I infer; Therefore God gives not faith because he hath not ordained them to everlasting life. For if the affirmation be cause of the affirmation; the negation is cause of the negation. And the Scripture as ordinarily subjoineth the denial of grace to reprobation, as the granting of grace to predestination. For as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, such as perish, is opposite to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, such as shall be saved; And as the consequent of the one is said to be Faith; so the consequent to the other is the denial of the same or like grace. As for example, All they that are of God hear God's Jo: 1. 47. Act: 2. ult. & 13. 48, 2 Co: 4. 3. 2 Thes. 2, 10. 13 word; so others hear them not because they are not of God; as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Such as shall be saved are added to God's Church: so in whom is the Gospel hid? only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in them that perish. Among whom doth Antichrist prevail by all deceivableness? only in them that perish. Like as for the Elect on the contrary 'tis not possible they should be seduced. Mat: 24. 24, and 2 Thes: 2. 13 3. If predestination were upon the foresight of faith, than it should be only upon the foresight of such a faith as perseveres to the end; whence two inconveniences follow 1. That no man can be assured of his election until his death, which is quite contrary unto Scripture. For Paul was assured of the election of the Thessalonians by observation of the works of their faith, the labour of their love, and the patience of their hope, 2. In this 1 Thes: 3, 4. case none can be strengthened against the power of temptation by the assurance of their election; But thus we are strengthened by Chest. Mat: 24. 24. by St. Paul. Rome: 8. 29. 2 Thes: 2. 13. 4. Election is absolute, therefore reprobation is absolute. The antecedent I prove; If it be neither of faith nor of works, than it is absolute, but it is neither of faith, nor works. Rom. 9, 11. Not of works, expressly; Not of faith as appeates by the same reason whereby Paul proves it is not of works. For the reason is this, Before the children were borne or had done good or evil, it was said the Elder shall serve the younger; Therefore election is not of works. Now say I we may as well conclude therehence, therefore it is not of faith; forasmuch as before they were borne, they were as uncapable of faith as of works. The consequence I prove thus; Look by what reason St. Paul proves, that the election of jacob was not of good works, because before they were borne 'twas said, The Elder shall serve the younger; by the same reason it is evident that the reprobation of Esau was not of evil works; the subjection of Esau unto his younger brother, as lively representing his reprobation, as the dominion of jacob over his elder brother represents his election. 5. Predestination is defined by Austin to be Praeparatio gratiae, the preparation of grace, therefore reprobation which is opposite thereunto must be the not preparation of grace; that is God's decree not to give grace, like as the opposite is God's decree to give grace. Now God gives grace not according to works. For he hath mercy on whom he will And hereupon Aug: de bono persever. c. 15. Austin builds his doctrine of predestination. Now by his doctrine predestination is absolute as Gerardus Vossius confesseth in his preface to his history of the heresy of Pelagius; How can it be otherwise? For if God confers grace not according to men's works; but according to his own purpose and grace. How much more did he decree to give it 2 Tim: 1. 9 Rome 9 18. not upon any foresight of works, but of his mere pleasure. And the Scripture as clearly testifies, that as God hath mercy on whom he will; so whom he will he hardeneth; that is of mere pleasure he denieth grace to some, as of mere pleasure he grants it unto others; And therefore reprobation grounded hereupon must needs be as absolute, as predestination grounded upon the other. 6. Like as in Scripture phrase Faith is said to be the faith of God's elect, election is not said to be of those that are foreseen to to believe; So the worshippers of the Beast are Tit: 1. 1. said to be those. Whose names are not written in the book of life; They that are not written Rev: 13. 8 & 17. 8. in the book of life, are described to be such that admire and worship the beast. And the not writing of men's names in the book of life doth as significantly represent their reprobation; as the writing of men's names in heaven. Luc: 10. 20. Rev: 20. 12: doth represent their election. Thus as formerly I gave six reasons to justify the absoluteness of reprobation, because he pretended the absoluteness thereof was repugnant to reason; so here I have given six more derived out of the word of God, to prove that this doctrine is the revealed will of God, to stop his empty mouth that clamoureth and only clamoureth that it is no part of God's revealed will. And that this doctrine is not only conformable to right reason, but by convincing arguments in right reason demonstrable I have already showed; And that all the absurdities this Author blatters of, they prove to be no better than the mere imagination of a vain thing. That which here he discourseth of a reasonable service, comes out of its place, it belonged to the former reason in M. Hord's treatise, and there I have answered it, and showed the absurd interpretation that he makes of it. He vaunts that he hath proved reprobation absolute to be unjust, when he hath performed no thing less; But making only a great crack, he goes out like a squib; and throughout meddles not with one argument that our Divines bring out of Scripture, or reason to justify their doctrine concerning the absoluteness of reprobation. And it is apparent that he denies the absoluteness of election, as well as the absoluteness of reprobation, and consequently must necessarily maintain that grace is given according to works; whereupon it was that Austin grounded his doctrine concerning the absoluteness of Predestination: And upon the like ground have we as good cause to ground our doctrine concerning the absoluteness of reprobation, it being every way as evident, that Grace is not denied according unto works, as that it is not granted according to men's works; And the Scripture is equally as express concerning both, where it is said that as God hath mercy on whom he will, so also whom he will he hardeneth. Pag: 75. 76. Treating of God's sincerity Sub-sect: 1. There are two passages inserted Ro: 9 18. taken out of Piscator, before the passages alleged out of Zanchy and Bucer. For having said that, Now God's meaning is (by this doctrine) that the most of those to whom he offereth his grace and glory, shall have neither; forthwith he gives instance in Piscator thus. And so Piscator saith, Grace is not offered by God, even to those who are called with a meaning to give it, but to the Elect only, Gratia non offertur à Deo singulis ●licet vocatis, animo communicandi eam, sed solis electis. In the same book he hath such an other speech; Non vult Deus reprobos credere li●etli●gua profiteatur M. Mason's Additions, Lib. de praedest. contra Schafin. p. 74. pag. 143. se velle. Though God in words protest he would have reprobates to believe, yet indeed he will not have them. they make God to deal with men in matters of salvation, as the Poets feign the Gods to have dealt with poor Tantalus. They placed him in a clear and goodly river up to the very chin, and under a tree which bore much sweet and pleasant fruit that did almost touch his lips, but this they did with a purpose that he should taste of neither. For when he put his mouth to the water to drink, it waved away from him; And when he reached his hand to the fruit to have eaten of it, it withdrew itself presently out of his reach; so as he could neither eat nor drink. Just so dealeth God with reprobates; (by their doctrine) He placeth them under the plentiful means of salvation, offereth it to them so plainly, that men would think they might have it when they will, & yet intendeth fully they shall never have it, withholding from them either the first grace that they cannot believe, or the second grace that they cannot persevere. Did not those gods delude Tantalus? yes doubtless. And if God do so with reprobates, what did he but delude them, and dissenible with them in his fairest and likeliest offers of salvation that he makes them? And this do Zanchius and Bucer grant by evident consequence, as appeareth by a speech or two of theirs, which cannot stand with their conclusion; and therefore I suppose fell unwarily from them. This treatise of Piscator De praedestinatione against Schaffman I have the second editition printed at Herborne Anno 1598. But these words according to their quotations Answer. here, are not to be found; the several distinct passages are distinguished by numbers, which in all editions hold the same, not so the pages. Yet the latter passage quoted p. 143. I meet with in mine p. 128. According to the like difference I try whether I can find out the other, but in vain. But yet I meet with such matter of discourse as whereunto this passage is very congruous to be there delivered if any where; yet no such thing is there delivered as num: 74. Schaffman's argument is this, If God calls all to salvation than he will save all. To this Piscator answereth, The proposition is false; But he calls with, animo simplici atque vero, a simple mind and true. Sane saith Piscator, as much as to say, I grant that; but so as that he calls them with condition of repentance and faith; Therefore as he promiseth salvation seriously unto them that perform this condition, and therefore performs this promise. So on the contrary he doth seriously threaten death and damnation to them who do not fulfil the condition, and performs unto him that commination. Then, though God be not capable of hypocrisy yet he doth not always will that what he commands shall be always performed by him to whom he gives that command; Whether by commanding he means to prove a man; as to prove Abraham, he commanded him to sacrifice his Son; or because to him whom he commandeth, he will not give grace to perform that command, as he deals with reprobates. And num: 120. To Schaffman's objection which was this; God is no hypocrite, he answers thus; But yet he gives not grace to all to perform what he commands them. For promiscuously he commands as well reprobates as elect to believe; as many as he calls by the preaching of the gospel; but he gives this grace to his elect alone according to that, To you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, but to them it is not given. So that undoubtedly God offers grace (to wit pardon of sin) with a purpose to communicate it to all that shall believe, according to Mat. 13. 11. the judgement of Piscator, neither doth he offer it with a purpose to communicate it to any unless they believe. But the grace of faith is not offered to any with a purpose to communicate it upon a condition. For than grace should be conferred according unto works, which is manifest Pelagianism. As for the other which I meet with p: 128. num: 120: take it at full, and not as it is dismembered by this Author, who cares not how he calumniates, so he might advantage his own cause. Schaffman's objection was, Deus est unius & linguae & voluntatis, God is both of the same tongue and will. Whereto Piscator answers thus, Your meaning is that God, look what he professeth with his tongue, that he willeth; But this (saith he) is not always true, nor in all particulars. For by his tongue that is by speech uttered, he professed that he would have Abraham to sacrifice his Son Isaac; yet he would not have him sacrificed. With his tongue he professed by his servant jonas that he would destroy Nineveh within forty days, yet he would not so do. With his tongue by the ministers of the Gospel he professeth that he would have the reprobates to whom he speaketh among his Elect, to believe the Gospel, in as much as he commands them so to do; yet he would not have them to believe, in as much as he will not give them the grace of believing, without will no man can believe. What therefore is God an Hypocrite? Away with such a blasphemy. He alone is to be accounted an Hypocrite, who counterfeits holiness when he has none; Such counterfeiting is not incident to God. And let the Reader observe well the immodest carriage of this Author. Piscator when he saith that God in words professeth he will have Reprobates to believe, he shows withal in what respect he doth so, to wit, quatenus mandat ut credant, in as much as he commands them to believe. And indeed God's command is usually called God's will, and by none more than by these our opposites. But this Author draws this to the signification of God's will simply so called, which is the will of purpose; And to that purpose leaves out the words whereby Piscator explicates himself. Who knows not that God commanded Pharaoh by his servant Moses to let Israel go? this is to profess with the tongue in Piscator's phrase, that God would have Pharaoh to let Israel go. And God's commandment is called God's will in Scripture. This is the will of God even your sanctification. 1 Thes; 4. 3. But to speak properly it is but the signification of God's will of good pleasure (properly called the will of God) that it should be Pharaoh's duty to let Israel go, but withal he revealed to Moses that he would harden Pharaoh▪ s heart, that he should not let Israel go. Now let the indifferent judge what this Author hath gotten by these passages of Piscator, save only the displaying of his own immodest and calumniating courses▪ then he thinks to please his Reader with the story of Tantalus; wherein there is no congruity to that whereunto it is applied, For Tantalus à labris sitiens fugientia captat Flumina,— He was an hungered, and would fain eat but could not: He was a thirst, and would fain drink but could not. God deals so with no man; neither reprobate Jews, nor Gentiles had any desire to be partakers of the mercies of God offered them in Christ. The Gospel was a scandal to the one, and foolishness to the other; But to them that are called it is the power of God and wisdom of God And as they hunger and thirst after God's righteousness in his dear Son; so are they satisfied therewith, Let him that is a thirst come and drink of the water of life freely. And He every one that is a thirst, come ye to the waters, Rev: 22. 17: Esa: 55. v. 1. 2. 3. and ye that have no silver, come buy and eat; come I say buy wine and milk without silver and without money: Wherefore do ye lay out your silver, and not for bread? and your labour without being satisfied? Harken diligently unto me, hear and your souls shall live; and I will make an everlasting covenant with you, even the sure mercies of David. Here is no sending of them away empty, which thirst after these waters of life; They all shall draw waters Es: 12. 3. of the wells of salvation. So that here is no such dealing with them, as the Poets feign was their Gods dealing with Tantalus. My answer to that which he produceth out of Zanchy and Bucer the Reader shall find in my answer to M. Hord. Pag. 76. 77. In the point of threats and comminations; after these words, We never read that threats are thundered out against us for original sin. In M. Hord's discourse it is added, Or for that corruption of nature which we brought with us into the world: But this Author leaves it quite out, with what mind let the Reader judge, and whether he can well brook that original sin should be styled a corruption of nature which we bring with us into the world. Pag. 78. In the same second sub-section after that of Abslaon's feast, Ioab's congee, the kiss of judas, and the Hyaena's tears etc. There is a good passage left out which followeth in M. Hord; and in the place thereof this, which here followeth, foisted in; Let the Reader consider with himself, wherefore that was left out; it seems he was ashamed of that calumniation. But thus it follows here. Nay the whole ministry (wherein God commandeth, offereth, chideth, entreateth, lamenteth &c.) if this M. Mason's Additions. be true, is but a mere imposture; a giving of words without any meaning of answerable deeds; And an imposture so much the greater, by how much the show of kindness is the heartier. For how can a good thing be offered with stronger shows of a good meaning, then when it is offered with exhortations and entreaties to accept it, with clear demonstrations of the excellency of it, unfeigned wishes, that the parties to whom it is offered would accept it; and bitter lamentations for their folly in refusing it? With all these enforcements i● Gods tenderof salvation to Reprobates accompanied; and therefore in show most hearty and serious. In a word thusspeaks God, by this doctrine, to Reprobates in the ministry. O ye Reprobates (once most dear beloved of me in your father Adam but now extremely, and implacably hated; and by mine eternal & uncontrollable order scaled up under invincible sin and misery) amend your lives and believe in the name of mine only begotten Son. If you repent, and believe not, there is no remedy, you must be damned; but if you repent and believe ye shall be saved; Though your sins be as red as scarlet, I will make them to be as white as wool. Think not that I would have you die. For I swear, as I live, I will not the death of him that dyeth. I would have no man to perish, but all to come to repentance. I beseech you therefore be reconciled. I have cried and called unto you; I have a long time waited upon you, that you might repent; And still am I knocking at the doors of your hearts for entrance. O that there were an heart in you to fear me and keep my commandments, that it might go well with you for ever. What shall I do unto you; how shall I entreat you? will you not be made clean, when shall it once be? Can God speak thus to reprobates, who by his own decree, shall never repent, nor be saved, without the deepest dissimulation? Judge indifferent Reader whether ever more passion were showed with less common Answer. sense. For let the enforcements be never so great and serious in the ministry of the word, under which all the expressions here mentioned are comprehended, yet is it possible, that men can yield unto them obedience by faith and repentance, unless God gives faith and repentance? For doth not the Scripture clearly testify that faith is the gift of God. To you it is given both to believe in him, & to suffer for him: that it is the work of grace. Act. Eph: 2. 8. Phil: 1. 29. 1 Col. 4. 7. Eph: 6. 23. Act: 5. 31. Act: 11. 18. 18. 27. What hast thou that thou hast not received? And doth not the Apostle accordingly pray on the behalf of the Ephesians, not for peace only, but for faith and love also from God the father and our Lord Jesus Christ? Is not repentance also the gift of God? Him God raised to be a Prince and a Saviour to give repentance unto Israel & forgiveness of sins. Then hath God also unto the Gentiles given repentance unto life. If so be God may give them repentance. What then? Shall this author's not Logic, but Rhetoric whereinto his 2 Tim: 2. last Logic is transformed to the wonder of all that know him in the University, like some Medusa's head, turn us into stones, and in spite of Scripture evidence drive us to deny, that either faith, or repentance, is the gift of God? For if it be the gift of God, is not somewhat else required to the working of faith in us over and above all these enforcements? Not one Arminian hitherto have I found daring to deny that faith is the gift of God: Yet ever since I read them in their Censura Censurae to deny that Christ hath merited faith and regeneration for us, I looked when they would come to deal seriously and sincerely; And if they have any such meaning, clearly to profess as much, namely that faith is not the gift of God. But if this Author's meaning be that God gives it to all that have it, and is also ready to give it to them that have it not, próvided, that they will do their own part, seeing he chargeth us to make God's ways void of truth and sincerity, how comes it to pass that this Author carrieth himself so subdolously & shows so little sincerity and clearness in dealing plainly, & telling us that this is his meaning? Is it because we are ready to conclude upon him that he is as errand a Pelagian, as ever was, in maintaining that grace is conferred according to works? Why doth he carry himself and his opinions in huggar muggar if he be of that mind, and doth not plainly show himself to be a Pelagian, and prove to the world that Pelagianismus est verus Christianismus, Pelagianisme is true Christianity? and in the next place oppose Paul also in saying that God saved us and called us with an holy calling not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace; and that he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he 2 Tim: 1. 9 Ro. 9 18. hardeneth? 2ly, Consider further the strange infatuation of this Author, more ways than one. For 1, inquire of him, whether after all this work of the ministry performed by him unto reprobates, he thinks not himself bound to pray unto God for a blessing upon his labours, whereby it may become effectual unto them, and that upon this ground, because Paul may plant, and Apollo may water, but God is he who gives the increase. And let him express what the increase is, which he beggeth at the hand of God, whether it be not the performance of those duties whereunto he hath exhorted them in the most emphatical manner, that the word of God doth afford any example of. And if no more be required for the working of man's will to that which is good (having as this Author supposeth a power to perform obedience if they will) than these enforcements which he so much amplifies; whereto tend his prayers after all these enforcements are used? is it that God will afford his concourse to the act? Why is this a work of grace? Doth not God afford this to the most sinful act that is, without all prayers? And is it decent to maintain that God of himself is forward enough to afford concourse to such acts as are evil, be they never so abominable; but to concur with us to that which is good, he stands off and must be entreated and solicited by our prayers earnest and fervent, otherwise he will be slack to concur to that which is good, though nothing slack to concur to that which is evil? Nay is it possible that man should will aught, or do aught, and God not concur with him, to the producing both of the will and the deed? Now I had thought prayers tended to the procuring of works of grace, such as concourse is not, as which is performed of God 1. To sinful acts, as well as to pious acts. 2. And that necessarily upon supposition that the reasonable creature doth aught. Consider farther, if his prayers tend only to the procuring of God's concurrence, and this concurrence is upon supposition of man's concurrence; let the indifferent, I say, consider the genius of this man's prayers. For albeit the form of them runs thus, that God will convert his hearers to faith, to repentance, and to work in them that which is pleasing in his sight through Jesus Christ; yea to work in them both the will, and the deed, according to his good pleasure, to circumcise their hearts, to love the Lord their God with all their hearts, & with all their souls, to heal their backslidings; yea as he seeth all their ways, so to heal them, to cause them to walk in his statutes, and to keep his judgements, and to do them; yea to put his fear in their hearts, that they may never depart away from him. (For thus he must pray, if he pray in faith built upon God's promises, we having special promises for all these particulars;) yet his meaning is no more than this, that as many of his Auditors as he finds willing to do aught of this, that God will concur with them to make them willing; And as many as do perform it, he will concur to the performance of it; as for those that are unwilling, he will not pray that God will make them willing, though that hath been ever the Lords course towards some, as Austin often professeth, And as for that prayer of Austin, Da Domine quod jubes & jube quid vis, Lord give me to do what thou commandest, and then command what thou will. Like enough he spites it as much as ever Pelagius did. But if any are forward to hate & to despite God's word, or the professors of his truth, he will not pray unto God to concur with them thereunto. For he knows God's forwardness to concur to the performance of every abominable act without his prayers: Nay in despite of any prayers to the contrary: And doth he not think it in vain for the holiest man that ever was to pray for this? 3. Again observe he saith that by our doctrine the whole ministry is a mere imposture, & why? because it is in show hearty and serious, but in truth nothing so. But what moves him to say this, doth not God procure hereby the conversion & salvation of millions? vea of many of those who have crucified the Son of God; who have persecuted his Church? Do we not believe that a time shall come wherein the Jews shall be converted in spite of all their former obstinacy, & in despite of all their blasphemies poured forth against the Son of God? But he will say, that grace is showed only to the Elect by our opinion. But here let every indifferent person judge between us of the equity of this his discourse. The whole ministry is a mere imposture; because all the enforcements wherewith the tender of salvation unto Reprobates is accompanied is in show most hearty & serious, but endued nothing so. For what? have the elect of God no part in the ministry? Or dates he say that by our doctrine these insorcements are nothing hearty & serious to them? Thou wilt say the Author's meaning is, that the whole ministry is a mere imposture towards reprobates; but he saith not so; but thus, The whole ministry is a mere imposture; and afterwards in giving his reason for it, he pleads, that enforcements in show hearty & serious made to reprobates are nothing so; & hence he concludes that the whole ministry is a mere imposture without any distinction of persons, to whom it is a mere imposture 4. Yet I willingly confess that it is foul enough, that God's courses should be courses of imposture towards any even towards reprobates. But how doth he prove, that God takes any such course with reprobates? To whom hath God sent his word & vouchsafed the ministry hereof according to all the enforcements mentioned accompanying his tender of salvation unto them? is it not unto his Church? What is the preferment of the Jew above the Gentile? much every way, saith Paul, chiefly because unto them were committed the Oracles of God. And was the Church of Jews, a Church of reprobates, Were they not the City of God, but the city of the Devil? If these enforcements had been used to the Nativites, there had been some colour for such an imputation; but seeing 〈…〉 of God's word in all these enforcements is used to the people of God, his precious people, chosen out of the world to put his name amongst them; shall this ministry be so carried, as concerning reprobates? All that he hath to say for this is no other, but that a great part, or the most part of the people to whom he sends his prophets are reprobates. Be it so, but how doth he prove that God intends this ministry; for the salvation of reprobates; or that he intends it at all for them? If God commands them, as he commanded jeremiah saying, Go & cry in the ears of Jerusalem, Thus saith the Lord; they must do so without difference. For they are not able to put a difference between the Elect and Reprobate, to know who are the one, and who are the other. Austin was willing to pray for all, but yet he professeth, that if they knew who they were, whom God had ordained unto damnation, they would pray no more for them, then for the Devil himself; so that either the Prophets were not Aug: de civi: Dei lib. 21. c: 24. si Eclesia nosset qui praedestinati sin● ire in aeternum ignem cum diabo lotam pro ●is non magis oraret quam pro diabolo of Austin's mind, or else that they thought that their ministry in God's purpose and appointment tended to the salvation only of Gods elect: But because they knew not, who they are, therefore they prayed for all, and used their ministerial enforcements indifferently towards all. But like enough this Author will deny, that the Prophets were of Austin's mind; Therefore I will prove they were in this; The Prophets were undoubtedly of St. Paul's mind; but St. Paul was of St. Austin's mind in this therefore the Prophets also were of St. Austin's mind. Now that St. Paul was of St. Austin's mind, and that his ministry, though performed towards all, yet was intended for the salvation only of God's elect, I 1 Co: 9 19 vers: 22. 2 Tim: 2. 10. prove thus, Though I be free from all men, yet have I made myself a servant unto all men that I might win the more. Observe, he doth not say that he might win all; Again, I became all things to all men that I might save some. Who are these some at whose salvation he aims? I answer they are God's elect, and none but they; and this I prove out of those words of his where he saith, Therefore I suffer all things for the elects sake that they might also obtain salvation which is in Christ jesus with eternal glory. Now if his sufferings were for their sakes, undoubtedly his whole ministry was for their sakes; for this alone Act: 20. 23. 24. brought his sufferings upon him. The holy Ghost witnesseth in every City saying, that bonds and afflictions abide me; But I pass not at all, neither is my life dear unto myself, so that I may fulfil my course with joy and the ministration that I have received to testify the Gospel of the grace of God. 5. But be it, that God intends it for Reprobates also, yet not for their salvation; But first to take away excuse from them, as to this purpose he sent Ezechiel. Ezek: 2. 3. 4. 5. Son of man I send thee to a rebellious nation For they are impudent children; I do send thee unto them, and thou shalt say unto them, Thus saith the Lord God; but surely they will not hear neither indeed will they cease; for they are a rebellious house, yet shall they know that there hath been a Prophet among them. Or otherwise as Austin hath observed, ut proficiant ad exteriorem vitae emendationem, quo mitius puniantur, that they may profit to an outward amendment of their lives, that their punishment may be the less. And consider whether in all this he doth not openly invade, not so muchour doctrine, as the manifest evidence of God's word. For it is apparent that God gives commands to those whose hearts he means to harden, that they shall not obey those commands, though those commands were not made in a cold manner Ex: 4. 22. 23. v. 21. but with strongest enforcements. Thou shalt say to Praraoh, thus saith the Lord, Israel is my son, even my first borne, wherefore I say to thee, let my son go that he may serve me. If thou refuse to let him go, behold I will slay thy son, even, thy first borne. Yet before this he told Moses saying, I will harden his heart, and he shall not let the people go. And after this, The Lord Ex: 9 12. hardened the heart of Pharaoh, and he harkened not unto them, as the Lord had said to Moses. And hereupon the Lord deals with him in the way of greater enforcement than before. v: 13. For the Lord said unto Moses, Rise up early in the morning, and stand before Pharaoh and tell him, Thus saith the Lord God of the Hebrews, let my people go that they may serve me, For I v: 14. will at this time send all mine plagues upon thine heart, and upon thy servants, and upon thy people, that thou mayest know that there is none like me in all the earth. For now will I stretch 15. out mine hand, that I may smite thee, and thy people with pestilence, and thou shalt perish from 16. the earth. And indeed for this cause have I appointed thee to show my power in thee, & to declare my name throughout all the world; Yet thou exaltest thyself against my people, and lettest them not go. Behold tomorrow this time I will cause to rain, a mighty great hail, such as was Ex: 10. 1. not in Egypt since the foundation of it was laid. And The lord said unto Moses, Go to Pharach; for I have hardened his heart, and the heart of his servants, that I might work these my miracles in the midst of his realm. Here we have plain enforcements & those of great power used by the Lord, yet still the Lord continues to harden Pharaoh's heart, and professeth as much, not fearing the censure of any vile wretch to cast upon him the imputation of imposture throughout the whole course of his ministry. And the truth is all the learned concur in distinguishing between, Voluntas praecepti, & voluntas propositi; and count it absurd to infer the purpose of God, or his will to have such a thing done from his commanding it, though this command be joined with exhortation, expostulations, wishes, or whatsoever other emphatical expressions; all which the learned conclude under Praeceptum, as a sign of God's will: And the Pelagians of old urged it no farther than as God's precept backed with what exhortations and enforcements soever, thence to conclude that man had power to yield obedience, but not to conclude, it was God's will it should come to pass; and to impute desires unto God in proper speech, which never are accomplished, what an unscholasticall course is it? even as much as to deny him to be God, and to bereave him of his blessed condition, by frustrating him of his desires: Whereas the time shall come, that the Elect of God shall be so blessed, as to have no desire of theirs in vain. Neither doth the objectour introduced by St. Paul break forth into any such blasphemy, as to charge God with any imposture in hardening Ro. 9 19 whom he will; when nevertheless the ministry of the word hath course with them as well as with any other; but rather proposeth it as a thing unreasonable, that God should complain of men's disobedince, when himself hath hardened their hearts, whereby it comes to pass that it cannot be that they should obey God as they ought. For who hath resisted his will. Yet we know what answer the Apostle maketh to stop the mouths of all such, as call God to an account for his proceedings. But o man who art thou who disputest with God? Shall the thing form say to him that form it, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay of the same lump, to make one vessel unto honour and another unto dishonour? And wilt not thou allow as much power unto God over thee, or over the matter whereof thou wast made, as the Potter hath power over the clay? Proud man thinks himself able enough to believe, to repent. Now God by his passionate expressions in the Prophets discovereth the vanity of this proud conceit, and laboureth by their little profiting by all these pathetical moving courses to manifest the strength of man's corruption; And when they will not learn and receive this instruction by his works; he tells them the plain truth of it to their faces. Ye have seen all that the Lord did before your eyes in the land of Egypt, to Pharaoh and all his servants, Deut: 29. 2. and unto all his land. The great temptations which thine eyes have seen, those great vers. 3. miracles and wonders: Yet the Lord hath not given you an heart to perceive, nor eyes to see, nor ears to hear unto this day. Is this the course of imposture, when he tells them to their faces, that albeit he commands them, exhorts them, expostulates with them, and expresses forms of desire of their obedience in his word; yet except God gives them an heart, they cannot perceive; except God gives them eyes, they cannot see; except the Lord gives them ears they cannot hear: What can be more plain dealing then this? Like as our Saviour no less plainly told the Jews to their face; He that is of God heareth God's words; ye therefore hear them not, because ye are not of God; Yet was he earnest and pathetical enough in exhorting them to repentance by the ministry of john the Baptist; by his own ministry. jerusalem, jerusalem that killest the Prophets, and stonest them which are sent unto thee; how often would I have gathered thy children together as an hen gathereth her chicken under her wings, and ye would not. Behold your habitation is left unto you desolate. For I say unto you ye shall not see me henceforth, till that ye say, Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord. I come to this Author's Prosopopey; for the truth is his Rhetoric surmounts his Logic, whereat I wonder not a little. O ye Reprobates, once most dear beloved in your father Adam. But where hath he found in any of our Divines that Reprobates were at all beloved in our father Adam? We all hold Reprobation to be as ancient as election, which St. Paul testifies to have been before the foundation of the world. And to ordain to damnation I should think is to hate rather than to love; and this ordination divine was from everlasting. And the Scripture hath taught us that the divine nature is without variableness or shadow of change. He speaks in the language of his own Court, when he talks of sealing up Eph: 4. 30. 1 Pet: 1. 5. 2 Tim: 4. 18. under invincible sin and misery. The Scripture speaks of sealing unto the day of redemption by God's holy spirit which gives them assurance, that they are kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation; That God will deliver them from every evil work, & preserve them to his heavenly kinngdome. But no such spirit is given to Reprobates to assure them of their damnation, so to seal them up under invincible sin & misery. They are under the power of Satan; but he hath neither power nor authority to assure them of their damnation. And albeit this Author fashions a discourse to reprobates, as if they were a sect well known; Yet we are so far from knowing who they are, that they are (in our opinion) neither known to themselves, nor known to Satan, no nor to God's holy Angels, unless he reveal it unto them. If we should have any cause to address ourselves to Reprobates (which kind of case and occasion is incomprehensible by me) we should describe them no otherwise then thus; O ye who are not only for the present under the power of Satan (and so are all God's elect before the time of regeneration) but will continue vassals unto him, even unto death, going on from sin, to sin and never breaking them off by repentance, but continuing to despise the goodness of God leading thereunto. Now this being only in reference to the time to come; I cannot speak to any in present under this form absolutely, but hypothetically. For none are Reprobates to us, but such who finally persevere in impenitency; Therefore I cannot exhort them to amend their lives under the stile of Reprobates, but as such, who although they are under the power of sin and Satan, may for aught I know belong to God's election, and in good time come out of the snare of Satan; And because the ministry of the word is the only means whereby God brings men unto repentance, and that by instruction, admonition and exhortation; therefore I do instruct them in the knowledge of God that made them after his own Image; and how this image of God came to be defaced in them, to wit, by the sin of our first parents, and how hereupon we became to be shapen in sin, and borne in sin, and therewithal children of wrath, and such as deserve to be made the generation of God's curse; then I represent unto them the mercy of God towards man in giving us his Son to bear our sins in his body upon the tree, and suffer a shameful and bitter death upon the cross for them; and that for this his Son's sake he offers unto us the pardon of all our sins upon our repentance, and faith in Christ, and thereupon I exhort them unto repentance: We farther say that God takes no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, but takes pleasure in a man's repentance. We do not say, neither doth the word of God say, that he willeth not the death of him that dyeth. For undoubtedly he willeth the damnation of all them that die in their sins without repentance. We do not say that God would have no man to perish, but all come to repentance. Neither doth the Scripture say any such thing; For that were to deny God's omnipotency. For seeing many there be that perish; if this were contrary to God's will, than God's will should be resistible, and we should be driven to deny the first Article of our Creed; As Austin hath long ago argued the case. But indeed Peter writing to them, who had obtained like precious faith with 2 Pet: 1. 1. 1 Pet: 1. 23. the Apostles themselves; and such as were Elect unto sanctification of the spirit; and were begotten again to a lively hope by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead; to them he writes saying, The Lord of that promise is not slack, but is patient towards us (not to us Reprobates; God forbid that we should so corrupt the interpretation of his words; but rather to us Elect, to us called, to us begotten of God) not willing any to perish (to wit of us) but all come to repentance, to wit all of us, whensoever through our frailty we turn out of the good ways of the Lord. God cries unto you by us, and calls upon you by us; and hath along time showed great patience, and long suffering, and hereby led you unto repentance; & by his word stands knocking at the doors of your hearts, and calling upon you to open unto him. And the more to move you, he is pleased to express himself in the affections of a weak man, who is not able to accomplish his desires, O that there were an heart in you to fear me and keep my commandments; and with great passionatnesse cryeth out unto you, What shall I do unto you, how shall I entreat you? As if he were to seek what course to take, and willing to use every provocation to excite you and stir you up, sometimes by gracious promises, as Come and let us reason together, though thy sins were Esa: 1. Jer: 13. 27. as scarlet etc. Sometimes by threatenings, Woe unto thee o Jerusalem, wilt thou not be made clean, when shall it once be. And withal he gives us to understand, & requires us to preach as much unto you also, even to acquaint you with the whole counsel of God, & tell you, that as many as are ordained unto eternal life, as many as to whom the arm of the Lord is revealed; Act: 13. 48. Es: 53. 1. Jo: 8. 27. as many as are of God, they obey this calling, they believe, they hear God's words, and turn unto him by true repentance sooner or later; They that do not, it is because they are not of God. And albeit those words are the words of Moses, O that there were an Deut: 5. 29. heart in you to fear me! speaking to them in the name of the Lord; yet the same Moses tells the same people plainly that The Lord had not given them an heart to perceive, nor eyes Deut: 29. 4. to see, nor ears to hear unto that Day. And albeit the Lord professeth in like manner by his Prophet Esay, O that thou hadst harkened unto my commandments, than had thy prosperity Es: 48. 18. been as the flood, and thy righteousness as the waves of the sea. Yet this very disobedience of theirs was consequent to the Lord's obduration of them, as appears Es: 6. 9 Go say unto this people ye shall hear indeed, but ye shall not understand; ye shall plainly see & not perceive. Make the heart of this people fat, make their ears heavy and shut their eyes; lest they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and convert, and he heal them. Then said the Lord how long? (should this obduration continue) And he answered until the Cities be wasted without inhabitant, and the houses without man, and the land be utterly desolate; And the Lord have removed men far away, and there be a great desolation in the midst of the land; Yet I dare not say of any of you, that ye are Reprobates. For God may open your eyes before you die to see your sins, and touch your hearts that ye may bewail them. And whensoever this blessed condition doth befall you, I will stir you up to give God the glory of it, who alone it is, that worketh in us that, which is pleasing in his sight; Yea both the will and the deed according to his good pleasure. If he never works any such thing in you, the more inexcusable are you, who presuming of your own power to believe, Heb: 13. 21. Phil: 2. 13. to repent; yet are nothing moved with such passionate expressions, unto repentance. If you do believe there is such impotency in you to good, and that it must needs continue in you, while God continueth to harden you by denying his grace, and thereupon ye except against God's course in complaining of their disobedience, whom he hath hardened saying Why then doth he complain; For who hath resisted his will? I put all such over to St. Paul to receive answer from him Rome 9 20. 21. 22. As touching this Author's conclusion; Dares he himself say that by God's decree Reprobates shall ever repent or be saved? What then is his meaning? why doth he not express himself in this particular; but most unshamefastly earth's himself like a fox, unwilling to bring his vile opinion to the light, which I take to be no other than this, that God's decree of giving faith is not absolute but conditional; namely to give faith to as many, as shall prepare themselves for it; And to deny it to none, but such as fail to prepare for it; as much as in plain terms to profess that Grace is given according unto works, The very filth of Pelagianisme: Yet hath he no where discovered wherein this preparation consists; that he keeps to himself, and to his own Muses. P. 80. I find another addition to the third Sub-section in these words. To offer salvation under a condition not possible is in circumstance a great deal worse. For it is a denial M. Mason's Additions. 2 Sam. 5. 6. under colour of the contrary; a denial joined with a scoff and derision; as was that of the Jebusites, who told David that he should not enter into the fort of Zion, except he took away the blind and the lame. Their meaning was they would never deliver it up unto him; and because they thought it impossible for him to take away the blind and the lame, they told him if he did so, than they would yield it up. It was an Ironical & scoffing denial of his demand. If the King should make an unrepealable law that no Germane should be made a Citizen of London or free Denizon of the kingdom, & then make a decree to give some bountiful gratuities, but to the Citizens of London, or to the subjects of the kingdom only, & to none but them; And yet for all this should command it to be proclaimed, that he will give them to the Germans upon concondition they will be made free men of London, or be incorporated into the Kingdom; would not any man say that the King in this case did dissemble and delude the poor Dutchmen? And if any should say there would be no dissembling in it; For if they would become Citizens or subjects, they should have the promised gratuities, a man might truly answer, that therefore the King doth counterfeit and cousin them, because he makes a tender of them upon a condition not possible by his own decree. In like manner if God have made a decree, that such men shall never believe, and yet offer them heaven upon condition, they will believe, it may most truly be said that God doth not only deny them heaven but deny it with a bitter derision, which is far from that candour and goodness that dwelleth in him. M. Hord's discourse at the first went no farther than to prove, that In substance it is all one to offer a courtesy under a condition not possible, and not to offer it at all. Here this Author Answer. adds that it is in circumstance a great deal worse. For he saith it is a denial joined with a scoff and derision, as was that of the jebusites. In my answer to the former part in M. 2 Sam: 5. 6. Hord I have showed that the reason why Salvation is proposed in scripture to be obtained upon a condition to be performed by man, is because God intends to save those, whom he doth save after a manner a agreeable to their reasonable natures; Namely by instruction, in a law of works, in a law of faith, by admonition and exhortation strengthened with promises to the obedient, with threatenings to the disobedient. And albeit men are not able to perform this obedience of themselves, being disabled by that natural corruption, which they have drawn from the Loins of our father, in whom our natures received a mortal blow, through his disobedience, and became disabled to perform any thing acceptable in the sight of God (for they that are in the flesh cannot please God) therefore the Lord is ready according to the covenant of grace to circumcise the hearts of some, namely of his Elect, To love the Lord with all their hearts, and with all their souls, to put his spirit within them, to cause them to walk in his statutes, to keep his judgements and do them. It is true this offer of salvation is proposed to all within the Church, whether Elect or Reprobate; and no marvel. For the Ministers of God's word are not acquainted with the counsels of God, as touching the election or reprobation of any man in particular: therefore they preach unto all, but knowing full well that this their ministry shall be effectual only to God's elect, as touching their salvation. Therefore as they endure all things 2 Tim: 2. 10. for the elect sake. So for the elects sake it is that they preach the whole counsel of God, according as the Lord himself instructed Paul saying, Fear not, but speak & hold not thy peace; Act: 18. 9 for I am with thee, and none shall lay hold on thee for to hurt thee. For I have much people in this City. Who are this people but the Elect of God. Yet God makes this use of preaching his word to all, that hereby excuse is taken from them. For hereby it is made known unto them That a Prophet hath been among them. As for the point of derision. First this Author prescribes unto God very demurely, that he must not deride him. Yet will he think it lawful Ezech: 2. 5. full for himself to mock a dog offering to give some what unto him, when he means nothing less; but man is grown so proud that he will take it in scorn to be mocked of any, yea of God himself, little thinking that he may well deserve to be derided and mocked. Yet the Scripture may teach us this, and that God will mock some, and therein deal with them according to their works; Because I have called and ye refused; I have stretched out mine hand and none would regard: But ye have despised all my counsel and would none of my correction, I will also laugh at your destruction, and mock when your fear cometh. Prov: 1. 24. 25. 26. Secondly I answer that man naturally is presumptuous of his own strength to believe, to repent; and shall God then be censured for mocking him, when he calls upon him to believe, to repent? Dicere solet humana superbia si scissem, fecissem, saith Austin, This is the course of man's pride to say had I known it, I had done it. If they are sensible of this Aug. de great. & lib. arbitr. cap. 2. impotency, can they not say with Austin, Da Domine quod jubes, & jube quod vis; Lord give what thou biddest, and then bid what thou wilt? Again if God commands nothing, but what he hath power to command, as namely to believe what he saith, and to do what he enjoins; why should this be censured mockery in reference to man's disability to perform it, when this disability is brought upon him by the sin of Adam, in whom we all were, and in him we have all sinned? And which is more; what means this Author Ro: 5. to carry the matter thus hand over head, as to talk of an impossible condition without all distinction? Dares he say, that faith and repentance are possible by power of nature? Or doth any of us deny it to be possible by grace? If this be so it followeth that all the question between us should be drawn to this issue; whether God gives the grace of faith and repentance unto all; Yet indeed the truth herein deserves to be put out of all question, it being apparent that, Fides non est omnium, all men do not believe. Nay it is called in Scripture the Faith of God's elect: So that the, question is about the nature of that grace, 2 Thes: 3 Tit: 1. 1. without which faith and repentance cannot be performed. Why doth not this Author express his meaning in this, and clearly profess what that grace is whereby the conditions of faith & repentance are made conditions possible? His subdolous carriage throughout in concealing his Tenet is sufficient to disparage his cause with all that are indifferent and judicious. The Scripture plainly professeth that faith is the gift of God, repentance is the gift of God; But as he carrieth the matter nothing less appears, then that this is his opinion. Yet I know he dares not in plain terms oppose the clear evidence of Scripture in this. Now if faith be the gift of God, & withal he gives it without difference to all then all must believe, which is notoriously & palpably untrue. If he gives it only to some, then all the rest are mocked by God according to this Authors discourse; as often as he saith unto them believe, and ye shall be saved. And to whom he saith this, to them he saith also, Oh that there were such an heart in them to fear me etc. If he saith, he gives faith absolutely to none, but conditionally, and upon the same condition he is ready to give to all; this is clearly to confess that the grace of God is given according to man's works. Again 'tis God that worketh in us both the will and the deed, and that according to his good pleasure, Phil: 2. 13. if according to his good pleasure, How can it be said that it is according to the preparation of the creature? Then what condition can be devised whereupon God works in us the will? If he say the grace which God gives to all, and whereby to believe, to repent is made a thing possible unto all (For thus we must proceed groping after his meaning, he affecting nothing more than to sculke and earth himself in his concealments) I answer first; The Scripture makes no mention of any such power given to any; but to the contrary professeth of all persons unregenerate, that they cannot please God; that They cannot discern the things of God. 1 Co: 2. 14: that They cannot believe, that They cannot repent Ro: 8. Jo: 12. 40. Ro: 24: that they are not subject to the law of God nor can be. 2ly. The Scripture plainly saith that faith is the gift of God, repentance is the gift of God; It doth not say that the power to believe if they will is the gift of God. If he saith by faith is meant such a power, whereby a man may believe if he will, I prove the contrary; then all men should have faith. For in this man's opinion, all men are endued with this power: But the Apostle plainly saith that, All men have not faith. Again faith is described to be, The faith of God's Elect; but a power to believe if we will, this Author makes common to the Elect Tit: 1. 1. with Reprobates. Moreover if to give power to believe if a man will, be to give him faith, then in as much as God gives power to sin if he will, he may be said as well, that God gives sin. Add to this that to have power to believe, if one will; is rather nature than Aug. de pradest. Sanctorum c. 5. grace. For it is no more than posse fidem habere; and this is the nature of man as Austin testifies. Posse fidem habere naturae est hominum, fidem habere gratiae est fidelium; 'Tis the nature of man that he may have faith, but it is of the grace of the faithful, that a man hath faith. And indeed if faith given us of God, did only enable us to believe, if we will; it were far inferior to a moral virtue, which doth not give man power to be virtuous, if he will; or to perform a virtuous act if he will: but makes him virtuous, and disposeth the will to virtuous acts only, and leaves him not indifferent, whether he will perform virtuous acts, or no. To return then, if no other grace be required to free God from mocking and deriding his creature; surely we are as free as our adversaries from making God to deride and mock his creature. For we are ready to grant that all men may believe if they will, repent if they will with Austin l. 1. de Gen: cont: Man: cap: 3. & De spiritu & litter â ad Marcellin. cap: 32. & De praedest. in: Sanct: cap: 5. And our reason is this. Not to be able to do that which a man will do, is impotency merely natural; but the impotency that we speak of, which is hereditary to all mankind by reason of the fall, is impotency moral, and resident in the will of man. For who doubts but that the will to believe, is to believe? For credimus si volumus: So the will to repent is to repent. For repentance in the root thereof is nothing else but the change of the will. And Pelagius of three things proposed. Posse, Velle, & Agere; he willingly granted the first, to wit, Posse bonum, to be from God; but he denied the other two to be the works of God; but of our free wills; which if he had acknowledged to be the works of God, as well as the first Austin tells him that, ab Apostolicâ doctrinâ abhorrere non videretur; he should not seem to vary from the doctrine of the Apostles. And for aught I see this Author goes not one Aug: de grati â Christi. cap. 6. step beyond Pelagius. He acknowledgeth that God doth persuade and exhort to believe; so did Pelagius. ibid. cap. 10. He saith also that God doth concur to the act; but so he doth in his opinion to every sinful act; so that this is but a general concourse: and what Pelagian was ever known to deny, but that God might have as great an hand in any good act, as in any natural act? Now since we acknowledge all this as well as he; what colour hath he to impute unto us, that we by our doctrine so fashion God's providence, as to make him deride and mock miserable people. Though the Jebusites did mock David, as this Author gives his word for it, (though I do not find that Ribbi David Kimhi, or Piscator count it any derision, but a plain representation of their confidence, that David was never able to take it, such was the strength of the tower●, that the weakest, even the blind and the lame were sufficient to defend it.) Though withal Kimhi acquaints us with a strange story out of the Jews Darashe, of a Covenant made between Abraham and King Abimelech, and that concerning not him alone, but his Son and his Nephew, to suffer them quietly to enjoy their own; And that the Nephew of that Abimelech was alive at that time when David came to besiege that fort: And that therein the Jebusites had erected two Images, the one blind to represent I saack who in his old age was blind; and the other lame representing Jacob, who by wrestling with God became lame, and in the mouths of these Images was kept the Covenant which was made between Abraham and Abimelech. The instance he gives of a proclamation which takes up the greatest part of this supplement (as a great part of this Author's discourse, is spent in such insicete representations) is most incongruous, not only to the matter whereunto it is applied, but to the parts of itself. 1. To the matter whereunto it is applied. For it is proposed in such a case, as men could not obtain a certain incorporation, though they much desired it. Now such a thing is not incident to Reprobates, namely that they cannot believe though they would For had they a will to believe, undoubtedly that would be accepted of God. Then. 2 it is incongruous to the parts of the Simile itself. For incorporation only is precluded unto Germans by the unrepealable law, he feigns without common understanding. For undoubtedly all laws of men are repealable by the same authority, whereby they are made. And afterwards the condition of obtaining certain bountiful gratuities, by virtue of the foresaid incorporation, is proposed most undecently, not of their being incorporated into that society, but of their will to be incorporated. Now it is apparent that by the case feigned their incorporation only is precluded unto them, not their will to be incorporated. In the accommodation he saith, God hath made a decree (by our doctrine) that such men shall never believe. Now what one of our Divines can be produce to justify this? We say God hath decreed not to give them grace to work them unto faith, but to leave them unto themselves. And is not this Author of the same opinion? Nay doth he not extend it farther than we do, even to the Elect, as well as Reprobates? We say not so, but that his elect he doth not leave unto themselves to work out their faith if they can, but works them by his grace and holy Spirit thereunto. Himself seems to be conscious of the falsehood of this his imputation dealing upon the point of God's justice. Sub-sect. 2. For having there proposed three causes why Reprobates cannot justly be bound to believe; The second of them was this in M. Hord's discourse, Because it is impossible that they should believe; because God hath decreed they shall have no power to believe till their dying day. This reason is changed in this author's refining of that discourse (as indeed all these reasons are changed by him more or less without replying upon aught that I have answered thereunto, but only putting out, or putting in at his pleasure, to cast a show that the former discourse of M. Hord's is not answered; such is his subdolous carriage to undermine that truth, which he is not able to oppose in a fair manner with any sound reason; least of all by evidence of Scripture, that flying in his face at every turn; and therefore his best wisdom is to shut his eyes against it.) And here he saith not in representing his second reason, that God hath decreed they shall have no power to believe, to their dying day; but thus rather; Because it is not God's unfeigned will they shall believe. But now again in this supplement of his, he returns to the first, and saith that by our doctrine, God hath made a decree that such men shall never believe. Quo teneam vultus mutantem Protea nodo. But I confess it is an honour to God's truth, that it cannot be opposed, but in so vile a manner. Yet I have already showed, that we deny not unto reprobates a power to believe if they will. We deny not the ministry of the word unto them, exhorting them to believe. We deny not but that whosoever hath a will to believe, or doth believe, God must necessarily concur to the producing of that will, and that act of his. All this we grant, which is the uttermost whereunto this Author comes; but over and above we say, that God doth not only give his elect a power to believe if they will, and persuade them to believe; but that also he works them to believe, and not only concurres with them in producing gracious acts, but makes them to concur with him also; this is the grace, and this alone that he denies to reprobates. Pag. 85. Treating of the use and end of God's gifts, the Author hath an addition of some seven lines concerning the Lord's supper, but nothing at all to purpose. Pag. 87. Of the fifth Section next following; The passages out of the suffrages of our Britain Divines in the Synod of Dort quoted by M. Hord, here they are expressed, namely that there are certain internal works preparing a man to justification, which by the power of the word and Spirit are wrought in the hearts of men not yet justified, such as are the knowledge of God's will, and sense of sin, fear of punishment. Now I have showed that these our British Divines go much farther; and yet in their fifth Article and fourth position, they profess of all such as are none of God's Elect, that it is manifest they never really and truly attain that change and renovation of the mind and affections, which accompanieth justification; nay nor that which doth immediately prepare, and dispose unto justification. And therefore the preparation that this Author speaks of as out of them, must needs be a remote preparation. And withal they add, that They never seriously repent, they are never affected with hearty sorrow for offending God, for sinning, neither do they come to any humble contrition of heart, nor conceive a firm resolution not to offend any more. Now let every sober person judge, whether God proceeding no farther with them then this, can be said to intend their conversion and salvation. The other position of theirs is this, Those whom God by his word and Spirit affecteth after this manner, those he truly and seriously calleth and inviteth unto conversion. I make no question, but whom God calleth, he calleth seriously, and whom he inviteth unto conversion, that is as I take it, unto repentance, he inviteth truly & seriously thereunto. But that God intendeth either their conversion or salvation, I utterly deny. For did he intend it, undoubtedly he would work it; For certainly this is in his power. Faith is his gift, and repentance is his gift, and perseverance in both is his gift. And unless he gives faith and repentance we hold it impossible that any man should believe or repent. And what a monster is it in Divinity to maintain, that God's intentions are frustrated, which cannot be maintained without denying God's omnipotency? For no man's intentions are frustrated, but because it lieth not in his power to bring to pass the things intended by him. Pag. 88 In the next section following is inserted a sentence of Prosper which no man denies. It is this They that have despised God's inviting will, shall feel his revenging will, but it is rightly to be understood, namely of despising his inviting will all along; and finally; Otherwise if they break of their contempt by repentance, there is mercy enough in store with God to pardon them, and his revengeful hand shall not be felt by them. Pag. 89. And seventh section, concerning the use and end of God's gifts; divers passages of our Divines are mentioned, showing the end of God's providence in affording his word unto reprobates. As first out of Calvin, Behold he directs his voice unto them that they may be the more deaf; He kindles a light, but that they may be made more blind; He giveth Instit. l. 3. c. 24. num: 13. them a remedy; that they might not be healed. Now Calvin herein points to that of Esay. Go and say to the children of Israel, hearing hear but understand not, seeing, see Esay. 6. 9 but perceive not. Make the heart of this people fat (or obstinate) and make their ears heavy, and shut their eyes; lest they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their hearts, & convert and be healed And Calvin doth but relate what the Lord saith to Esay: Ecce vocem ad eos dirigit. Behold (by this place of the prophet Esay) to what end the Lord sends his prophet to speak unto them. Now if Calvin doth herein misinterpret that place of the prophet Esay, it became this Author to except against his interpretation, and discover the unsoundness of it; But taking no such course, and consequently by his silence (being an adversary) justifying his interpretation; while he reproacheth Calvin in this particular, he reproacheth the Holy Ghost, whose words he represents delivered unto his prophet. The next passage is taken out of Beza in his Praelud. on the 9 to the Rome p. 434. where he saith It ought not to seem absurd, that God unto Reprobates, living in his Church, doth offer grace in his word and Sacraments. For he doth it not to this end, that they may be saved, but that they may have less excuse than others, and at length be more greviously punished. And indeed why should this seem alien from the course of God's providence revealed in his word, testifying that the invisible things of God, to wit his eternal power and Ro: 1. 2: Godhead are made manifest by his works, to the ena, men might be without excuse. And what this excuse is. S. Austin tells us saying, It is spoken of such an excuse, as men in their pride are wont to pretend saying, Si scissem fecissem; had I known it, I would have done it. And Eze: 2. 5. The Lord manifests the same end of his sending Ezech: unto the Jews. For he told him, They would not hear. For they were a rebellious house, vet saith he, they shall know Aug: de great: & lib. arbit c. 2. that there hath been a prophet among them. And let every indifferent man judge whether the very place in john. (If I had not come and spoken unto them, they should not have had sin, but now have they no cloak for their sin,) doth not justifye that conclusion which Maccovius draws therehence, namely that Therefore God sent his son unto them, that Jo: 15. 22. by the contempt and hatred of his son they might procure unto themselves the greater damnation. For he professeth that by his coming and speaking unto them, all excuse was taken from them. And let every one judge whether contempt in such a manner doth not procure greater damnation. And old Simeon professeth that Christ should be set up, as to the rising of some; so to the falling of others: And long before the Lord professeth that he should be as a net, and a snare to both houses of Israel. Yet I am not of Maccovius his mind in saying, that God proposeth his word unto Reprobates to no other end, but this: But certainly he proposeth it not unto them to the end that they should be saved by Es: 8, 18. it. And let every sober man judge whether it be not better to ascribe such intentions unto the divine nature as are fulfilled, rather than such as are not fulfiled. P. 94. Where he lays to our charge that our doctrine hinders piety and godly life Sect: 2. he hath this passage inserted. It is absolutely decreed that Devils shall be damned; were it not a fruitless thing in them by prayers tears and Addit. endeavours to seek to alter it? It is also simply decreed that the soul of man shall be immortal: Is it not a labour in vain for any man to use means that his soul may be annihilated? It is ordained that the sun shall rule the Day and the Moon the Night: that the one shall finish his proper course in a year, the other in a month: Would not a man's endeavour to make an alteration in these things be unprofitable and ridiculous. Although that which I have said upon this Section in answer to M. Hord be sufficient to Answer: show the absurdity of this Author's discourse, yet I think good to accommodate what there I have delivered to this also, especially to the particular instance of Devils. And first it is a thing worthy our consideration that he saith. It is absolutely decreed that Devils shall be damned, Now if this be true, than the divine decree concerning the damnation of Devils is an absolute decree, now this decree is not temporal but eternal. Now if the eternal decree of God concerning the damnation of Devils be absolute, why should not God's eternal decree of the damnation of men be absolute also: let him mumble upon this argument and acquaint us with his answer thereunto when he thinks good. When he discourseth of the fruitless nature of the Devil's prayers and tears and endeavours to alter this decree, he seems to me to suppose that the Devils are not bereft of their freewill to pray, and which were more than wonderful in their state of innocence, to shed tears and to perform holy endeavours; and if this were true it were unreasonable for us to deny that Arminians had the like power left unto them. But if they have no such freedom of will, what totter took this Author to discourse of the fruitless exercise of such a power. Would he not think our brain were cracked, if we should tell him how fruitless his course would be to clamber up into the world of the Moon, seeing it is as possible for him to be Lunatic here, as well as there. Yet if the Devils have any such freedom of will left them whereby they may attain to holiness, their endeavours that way though fruitless in respect of the altering of God's decree, yet surely would not be fruitless in another respect. For better it were by far, I should think for them to repent and submit to the will of God in suffering Hell pains, then to blaspheme in suffering them. But be it so, that not only Gods decree be absolute concerning their damnation; but that their first sin did put them quite out of the way, and is to them as death to men. Yet such is not the condition of men. And albeit the decree of damnation both of Devils and men be absolute, yet neither the one nor the other was decreed to be brought upon them absolutely, but upon the Angels, in case they kept not their own habitation: upon men in case they did not only sin, but finally persevere in sin without repentance: Though in this respect there is no place for the repentance of Angels, yet place there is for the repentance of men, and by repentance to avoid the wrath to come. And lastly, the Devil knows his condition to be irrecoverable, No man on earth knows his estate to be so. For albeit according to our doctrine a man may be assured of his election: yet by our doctrine no man can be assured of his reprobation. Add this hereunto, Although a man did know he were reprobated to damnation, yet not knowing to what degree and measure of damnation he is ordained, there is place to use his best endeavours in the way of civility and morality, that his damnation may be the less. In case he did know this also, yet place still remains to be as moral as he can. For damnation joined with a condition of better morality, is better than damnation joined with a condition of less morality. This may suffice as an answer to the other instances, which are far more wild than the first: as touching the immortality of the soul which he saith is simply decreed; and it is decreed to be immortal without any course to be taken by man to promote the immortality thereof: But do any of our Divines maintain that God hath decreed our salvation in such sort, as to be brought to pass without any course to be taken by men of ripe years to promote their salvation? What proportion is there beetween immortality & salvation. God intends salvation to no man of ripe years, but by way of reward of faith, repentance, obedience and good works. Doth God bestow immortality upon the soul by way of reward? Was not the soul of man immortal assoon as it was created? Is such the salvation of Gods elect? And what giddiness possessed the spirit of this Author when he discourseth of the vain labour of any man, that should use means that his soul should be annihilated? Supposing that such means there are, and may be used, by the form of his speech, when he saith, that it is labour in vain for any man to use such means. As for that which followeth of the Sun and Moon. An instance of the same nature hath been given in this very Section and an answer thereunto accommodated in my refutation of M Hordes discourse, which this Author could not be ignorant of, as appears by his altering and changing it almost throughout yet takes no notice thereof to reply thereunto, but keeps himself as still as a sow in beans, thinking it his safest course to be silent. The truth is, God (we say) bestowing salvation and inflicting damnation proceeds according to a law, which he hath given unto man: but not so in the giving or denying grace, not so in showing mercy on some and hardening others, but according to the mee●e pleasure of his will. It were far more congruous to accommodate the instances he gives to the divine proceedings in this particular. But here he dares not budge, lest his Pelagian spirit should be manifested to all the world, in maintaining that not only in conterring salvation, and inflicting damnation, he proceeds according to men's works, but also in giving and denying grace. P. 96. Two lines are inserted a little above the Latin verses, but of no moment distinct from the rest. P. 97. Section the 4. of the crimination last save one, where he saith that three things are usually answered to vindicate our opinion from this crimination, but he conceals who they be, that thus answer: yet would not be thought to feign it. And the first of these is this That many of them which believe and defend this doctrine are holy and good men, etc. Now here comes in that which he inserts. The like defence to this did the Epicures of old make in favour of their sensual and swinish doctrine, which was, that happiness consisted in pleasure. They said that many of their Sect were honest men, and so much Tully granted to be true, but with exception still against their doctrine. I take, saith he Epicurus himself Addit. to be an honest man, yea and many Epicures have been and are faithful in friendship, square and constant men in all conditions of life, ordering themselves and their lives, not by pleasure, but by duty. But saith he, this proceeded Cic. de finibus 2. p. 107. not from the principles of their opinion, but from their own virtuous inclinations; & the force of honesty by their so doing appeared to be more prevailing in them, than the force of pleasure, which they pleaded for. A little after he hath words to the same purpose; As other men's doctrines are esteemed to be better than their deeds; so these men's deeds seem to me to be better than their doctrine. Like to this answer of Tully to the defenders of Epicurism, will I shape mine. I nothing doubt, but this Author pleased himself well in this comparison, and others likewise of his own sect. For like lettuce, like lips, yet all this is carried with a show Answ. of charity, in acknowledging the holiness forsooth, and goodness of their oposites; but it ends in this comparison, right Epicurus like, whose morality (forsooth) was pleaded to countenance his sensual and swinish doctrine. But whatsoever our lives be, for testimony whereof we nothing desire to be beholding to the charity of our opposites; Yet surely our doctrine concerning the absoluteness both of election, grounded upon no other foundation than this, that Grace is not conferred according unto works, as Austin testifies; and of reprobation grounded accordingly upon no other foundation than this, that Aug. de bono persever. 15. grace is not denied according unto works; shall be found no swinish doctrine, but the very truth of God. And let them that oppose it look well to their ways, lest they be not found goatish together with their doctrine at the day of judgement. But how comes this Author to be so stupid in reading Cicero, and so little understanding him; as in these words to conceive, that he professeth himself to have a good opinion of Epicurus? I confess I marked it the more diligently, because I remember well the comparison that Plutarch makes between the virtuous gloriation of Epaminondas his mother, and the vile gloriation of Epicurus his mother, professing she never saw an happier day, then when she saw her Son Epicurus generating, cum Cyzezena meretriculâ, operis cum Polyano divisis; unless this were the morality of her Son, wherein she gloried that he was not so jealous, but that he could admit a corrival in the satisfaction of his filthy lusts. And indeed I had also observed other where, that he was a very temperate man, but to this end, that he might take the greater pleasure in the flesh, his senses being the more quick, when they were not clogged and overcome with surfeit. But come we to Cicero his judgement. He takes notice that Epicurus was commended as Comis in amicitiis tuendis, a man of a fair nature in maintaining friendship; yet (saith he) though these things were true (for I affirm nothing) he was not acute enough. I think this is spoken in reference to his doctrine nothing answerable to this commendation of him. For he measured friendship by profit, as in that very book Cicero relateth. Then he takes notice of another commendation given of him, in these words, At multis se probavit, he approved himself to many; Et quidem jure fortasse, and truly for good cause perhaps. This is Cicero his concession with a perhaps. But observe what he brings in upon the back of this; Sed tamen non gravissimum est testimonium multitudinis; but the testimony of the multitude (the many) is not most weighty, or most considerable. For in every art or study, or any science, or in virtue itself, every thing that is best, is most rare. Then follow the words which this Author alseadgeth not, Ac mihi quidem videtur, quòd ipse vir bonus fuit. And to me truly it seems that he was a good man; This had been to contradict himself, having formerly said, Nihil affirmo, I affirm nothing; he takes into consideration what others said of him, but as for him, he would say nothing of him neither in commendation, nor vituperation. But his words run thus, Ac mihi quidem, quòd & ipse bonus vir fuit, & multi epicurei fuerunt, & hodie sunt, & in amicitiis fideles (For it seems indeed that he and Polyaenus cum Cyziz●n● meretriculà were very faithful one to the other) & in omni vita constantes & graves, nec voluptate sed consilio officia moderantes; hoc videtur, (here comes in videtur and not till now) major vis honestatis & minor voluptatis. He still affirms nothing of the life of Epicurus, but taking that which others affirmed of him, and admitting it, saith hoc videtur major vis honestatis & miner voluptatis: this testimony of others concerning these particulars did argue more force of honesty, & less of pleasure. Ita enim vivunt quidam, ut eorum vita probetur refellatur oratio For so some do live, that their life is approved, but their opinions condemned And on this point only (to wit concerning his opinion) had Cicero to deal with Epicurus at this time; Atque ut caeteri existimantur dicere melius, quam facere: Sic ●i mihi videntur facere melius, quam dicere. And as others are thought to speak better than they live; So these seem to me to live better than they speak. By these he means not Epicurus, or Epicureans, but those some, of whom he spoke immediately before. And whether this be not the true meaning of Cicero, I appeal to the judgement of every sober man, that shall consider his words. And to requite this Author, and pay him in his own coin; I will not tell him what one of his own Sect hath given forth concerning one that preached in a great place, namely that his Auditory should profess, that the Author must needs be an Arminian, he preached so honest a sermon; Though on the contrary I have heard of a great Arminian of Cambridge, that he should profess to a friend of his, coming to him to confer with him, and take him off from his opinion, if it might be, saying in the close that it was not for the honesty of their conversation who maintained the same, that he was of the same mind; and gave his reason for it out of his own experience, which I will not mention. But I will make bold to represent what I have read of the Pelagians, to answer this Author, and so to recompense him in the way of charity. For chrysostom placeth Pelagius inter viros piè ac sanctè magnaque cum tolerantiâ viventes, amongst men living piously and holily, and with great patience; as Vossius observes cap: 3. hist: Pelag: and Claudius Menardus before him in his notes upon Austin's book against julian the Pelagian. Austin in his 106 epistle acknowledgeth Paulinus to have loved him as the servant of God. And in his retractions he professeth saying, Pelagii ipsius nomen non sine laude posui, quia vita ejus à multis praedicabatur: I made mention of Pelagius his name August: retract. lib 2. cap. 33. not without commendation; for as much as his life was magnified by many. And in his third book De peccat: meritis & remiss: c: 1. he saith, the report that went of him was as of an holy man, and one that had profited much in Christianity. I find likewise good commendations given of Coelestius also and julian the Pelagian: And I make no question but an honest and pious man may be soured with the leaven of Pelagianism, in that way of Arminianism ere he is aware, but God may take them off from it ere they die: Though the eager opposers of God's truth this way, even by such as were termed Semipelagians, Prosper spares not to call Vasa irae, vessels of wrath, in his Epistle to Ruffinus; And the exiled Bishops of Africa in their Synodical Epistle, style them no better than Vasa irae, vessels of wrath. And upon the conclusion of the Synod of Palestine what tumults were raised, and what abominable acts were committed by the party of Pelagius, is set down in part both by Austin, in the end of his book De gestis Pelagii, and in a certain epistle of Innocentius Pope of Rome. To conclude; Leviathan God's enemy is represented in Scripture, as a crooked Serpent. It pleased King james to stile Arminius sometimes the enemy of God. And Austin I am sure styles the Pelagians, Inimici gratiae Dei; The enemies of God's grace. And no marvel if they carry themselves like crooked Serpents, turning and winding for their advantage. I have laboured to find out the Meanders of this Author, which I little suspected at the first, and to meet with him. every where, and encounter him in his greatest fastness: And let the indifferent judge whether every where he be not found to hold a lie in his right hand. I would to God his eyes were opened, that he might see how he forsakes his own mercies, by forsaking the fountain of living waters, to dig unto himself pits, even broken pits that can hold no water. While he looks to be saved by no other grace inherent, than such as whereby he hath power to believe if he will, repent if he will. A lamentable condition, that a man of understanding, and knowledge, and good morality should be thus blinded, nothing perceiving that this is mere nature, and not grace. But what infatuation hath seized upon the Christian world, when such discourses are magnified as sound and excellent; yea rare pieces, and unanswerable? Let us give God the glory of keeping us in our right wits and senses; otherwise even Flies with us shall go for Elephants, and the very illusions of Satan shall be advanced, as strange performances, not only of sober speculations; when they are equally estranged both from soundness and sobriety; such as all along look a squint upon God's word; yet seldom take notice thereof, or are conformed thereunto; but rather proceed in manifest opposition thereunto, and withal are found clearly devoid of all sound reason, though thereof Pelagians have always vaunted most, but these vaunts are but wind, and prove no more substantial, than the imagination of a vain thing. FINIS. An Answer to a Letter of D. H. concerning Gods Decrees definite or indefinite; By Dr. TWISSE. SIR, YOur Letter hath two parts, the one concerning the decree of God, especially in comparison between a decree indefinite and definite; the other concerning the election of Angels: Of both in order. I. Concerning the first, I will endeavour to satisfy you my way; and if that succeeds not, to gratify you your own way. My conceit of a decree indefinite, proposed digress. 3. cap. 6. you prefer as more 1, suitable to my manner of ordering Gods decrees. Three reasons there I proposed why I durst not embrace that conceit. 1. The first was, because it seems to be of a more imperfect nature than is fit to be attributed to God. To this is answered, that we need not to attribute any such decree to God, but only to resolve a definite decree of God into two conceits, according to our apprehension, whereof the one is indefinite, the other definite; As in God's purpose to make Peter and Paul vessels of mercy, there are included two conceits in our apprehension; the one indefinite, to wit, to make some vessels of mercy; the other definite, to wit, that Peter and Paul shall be two of them. You seem to approve of this. Now I have cause to doubt of the soundness of this, for these reasons, 1. If no such decree can be attributed to God, then in vain do we discourse of the priority thereof before other decrees of God, which indeed are attributed to him, and that decently. And indeed all the decrees whereof we dispute are truly attributed unto God, though they have not that distinction one from another in God as the like decrees are distinguished in man. And an indefinite decree, relishing of imperfection, both in that respect cannot be decently attributed unto God, as also because it doth imply an indefinite and confuse knowledge in God. 2. The priority of decrees in God, is only secundum rationem, and this Durand expounds most clearly in this manner, quando ratio unius sumitur ab altero, in 1. dist. 41. q. 2. so ratio mediorum sumitur à ratione finis. But ratio decreti definiti non sumitur a ratione deoreti indefiniti. Because God intends such an end, therefore God doth appoint such and such means: but it cannot be said, that, because God doth intend to make some indefinitely to be vessels of mercy, therefore he doth intend that Peter and Paul shall be two of them. 2. My two other objections are these, Indefinites are before definites only in such sort as communia are priora specialibus, and this is only prioritate naturae generantis, non intendentis; and we speak of priority in intention, not in the way of generation. And again, that which is first in the way of generation, is last in intention; and therefore this makes rather against it, than for it. To this you answer, that rather on the contrary Universalia are priora singularibus, non tam natura generante, quam intendente. For Homo prius intenditur quam Socrates: Non enim species est propter Individuum, sed Individuum propter speciem. Or, if this be not true in universalibus physicis, yet is it in politicis sive aggregatis, which have a more resemblance to our present matter. To this I answer, 1. The comparison we speak of between a decree indefinite and definite, is not the same with a comparison between the species and the singular; but only as between singulars and singulars; singulars indefinitely proposed as aliqui, and singulars proposed definitely, as Hic & ille, Peter and Paul. Now though individuum be propter speciem, as that which nature intends principally; and individua for the maintenance of the species: yet is it not so congruous to say, that particulars definite are for particulars indefinite, etc. The instance I gave in reducing it to a comparison between generalia and specialia, was to bring it, as near as I could, to such a State wherein the evidence of truth might plead for itself. As indeed it is manifest, that generalia are only priora specialibus quoad naturam generantem, specialia priora generalibus quoad naturam intendentem; which I delivered out of the remembrance of my old Philosophy, as a thing which I conceived to be without question. Zabarell de methodis lib. 1. cap. 6. Ordo naturae non unus est, sed multiplex, vel saltem duplex: Non solum enim simplicia sunt naturae priora compositis, sed etiam composita simplicibus, ut ex Aristotele colligimus, in cap. 1. lib. 2. de partibus animalium: si namque ordinem naturae intelligamus habita ratione generationis naturae, elementa sunt priora misto, mistum animali, animal homine; quod si per ordinem naturae intelligamus ordinem perfectionis seu ordinem scopi & intentionis naturae, homo est natura prior animali, animal misto, & mistum elementis. But I confess the case is different between a species and the particulars thereof, whether we consider nature particular, or nature universal: For, as for nature particular, though it intends and works only for a particular like itself; yet, whereas particulars may be infinite, and it is found to have no power to produce one particular rather then another; this consideration hath puzzled many in enquiring how it comes to pass that this particular agent brings forth this particular effect at such a time; whereas he was indifferent to have brought forth any one particular of many thousands in that kind. And, after Suarez in his Metaphysics hath tried many ways hereabouts, at length resolves upon Ariminensis his invention, who reduceth it to the determination of Gods will: and this conceit, after Suarez, is embraced with great approbation by Hurtado de Mendoza. Which because it concerneth a manner of God's concourse, and that a very strange one, as they expound it; I have taken occasion to consider it in a peculiar digression. So that in that case the particular produced is not intended by nature at all (as being indifferent to any) but left to be determined by the will of God. And as for nature universal, whose end is the maintenance of the universe in the several kinds of the parts thereof; it likewise, so there be particulars succeeding whereby the species rerum are maintained, regards not at all, whether these particulars be produced or others. But these intentions are not answerable to the intentions of God, which are altogether of particulars, whereupon man's understanding works in drawing therehence unities specifical and generical, according to that of Aristotle, Animal aut nibil est aut posterius est. And Navarrettus, writing of divine concourse; suppo●endum est id quod solent Logici & Metaphysici dicere de unitate universa●● quae non est unitas positiva sed negativa: Non enim universale est positive unum in multis sed cum reperiatur plurificatum in multis, & non magis determinatum ad unum quam ad alterum, habet in se quandam indifferentiam, non quidem positivam respectu multorum, atque adeo non habet unit atem positivam; sed negative se habet ad illa multa, & consequenter, est unum negative in multis, hoc est, habet unitatem quae non magis reperitur in uno inferiorum quam in altero. But yet the case I say in present consists not in comparison between a species and the singulars thereof, but between particulars and particulars; either as indefinitely considered under the notion of aliqui, or definitely under the notions of Hic & ille. But you think in universalibus Politicis, as in the gathering of an Army, or erecting of a College, the truth you speak of is more apparent, and the resemblance more congruous to the matter in hand. Let us consider them. A certain number of Soldiers for completing of an army I confess is intended first, afterwards a choice of persons: so the maintenance of a certain number of Scholars is intended first, and afterwards they proceed to the election of Scholars. Here is totum per aggregationem, but it is by aggregation of parts in a certain kind, which is of greatest consideration, to wit, of parts succeeding one another, as a river is said to be one by succession of parts which never return. All which parts are impossible to be subject to the consideration of the Founder or General, because the College continueth long after the Founder is dead, and so may the Army also, one General succeeding another by the appointment of the State. A more proper resemblance is found in a man purposing to distribute a sum of money to a certain numbr of persons: as, put the case, twenty pound to forty persons, as a Gentleman hath dealt with our town. The choice of such persons as are most necessitous he leaveth to some persons of trust. Now, if the Gentleman himself knew of himself every person in the Town, and their necessitous condition; from the first undoubtedly he would appoint, not a certain number indefinitely to receive it, but assign rather such persons particularly on whom it should be bestowed. And in like sort a General were it in his power to levy whom he list, and withal knew for certain every man's sufficiency, he would from the first resolve upon and design, not only such a number, but such particular persons also for that service: And, that in the ordinary course it is otherwise, this proceeds from such an imperfection as is not incident unto God. And last of all, both the General and the Founder have respect to fitness in them whom they choose, which it is not in their power to procure. But God hath power to provide himself both of fitness and of persons also to that service whereto he is pleased to design them. Yet Didacus Alvarez seems to acknowledge such an indefinite decree, and he is gravis author I confess: And he plainly professeth, that permissio peccati prop●r quod quis damnatur est effectus reprobationis. Whence it manifestly followeth, First, that the reprobation of Infants as many as die in original sin in their infancy, cannot premise the foresight of original sin, because they undergo condemnation only for original sin. Secondly, that no man's Reprobation can premise original sin, because every man that undergoes condemnation, undergoes it not for actual sins only, but original also: yet this tenet of his he delivereth not obiter, but maintains it eagerly by argument. As for this of an indefinite degree, he toucheth only by the way, without so much as explication of his meaning therein. And again in that discourse of his he hath some other strange conceits, as I have showed in my first digression upon election: in the perusing whereof at this time it seems, you are. As for Beza, that which I there delivered is merely by collection: but what his opinion was, may appear by his own expression, De praedestinatione, in 9 ad Rom. in these words, Denique verbum istud [Faciendi] & nomen [Luti] ac [Massae] adhue informis, manifest mihi quidem videtur declarare, Deum in hac similitudine nobis preponi, de humanototo genere in primo illo homine, protoplasto propterea vocato, condendo statuentem; unde Singuli homines ad finem usque seculorum propagarentur, eo jam tum consilio, ut in unis quidem, quos jam tum in libro vitae suis temporibus nascituros, eligendos, vocandos, credituros, justificandos, glorificandos describebat, ad salutis decus per gratiam in Christo evebendis: in aliis vero per contrarios gradus in aeterni exitii dedecus juste praecipitandis, gloriam suam patefaceret. In like sort Piscator in his disputation de objecto praedestinationis, defines predestination this, Praedestinatio est aeternum Dei decretum quo constituit condere homines ad diversos fines speciales, nempe alios ad fruendum salute aeterna, alios vero ad sentiendum cruciatus aeternos, seu ad aeternum exitium: itemque constituit permittere, ut isti omnes, integri conditi, in peccatum laberentur; idque propterea, ut quos conditurus erat ad salutem servaret ex misericordia; quos vero ad exitium, puniret ex justitia: & denique constituit ex lapsis illos quos conditurus erat ad salutem, servaret ex misericordia, quos vero ad exitium, puniret ex justitia: (all which cannot be understood but of persons definite) & denique constituit exlapsis illos quos ad salutem conditurus erat, eligere ad ho, ut eos ex misericordia servaret; quos vero ad exitium, reprobare ad hoc, ut eos ex justitia puniret: (this likewise cannot be understood but of persons definite) atque ita omnibus istis modis gloriam tum misericordiae suae parcentis, tum justitiae punientis, tum vero imprimis potestatis suae summae patefacere. And by these passages appears the error of my construction both of Beza and Piscator's meaning; for it was grounded upon supposal that election in them both signified an internal act in God, the very decree of God, which is eternal: But here it appears they took Election for an external and temporal act, and yet distinct from vocation: of which opinion of Piscator I have considered. digress. 2. de praedestinatione. And here it appears that Beza had entertained some such conceit, as when he saith nasoituros, eligendos, vocandos, credituros, justificandos, etc. And indeed I well remember him to distinguish between electio & decretum eligendi. Yet now, to gratify you your own way: I am content to leave that which I have said in that Digress. 3. of an indefinite decree as it lieth; and to propose the reasons II. alleged against it only by way of disputation, not by way of assertion, and leave it indifferent unto the Reader to judge as he shall think most agreeably. And to confess a truth unto you, it is but lately I came to this order; following the rigorous Tenet before as seemeth most consonant to reason, though harsh to men's affections; and being but lately fallen upon it, I am apt to conceive, that something may be wanting to the full clearing of the truth in this point; a way whereunto I hope I have opened: yet if you shall think it inconvenient, I shall be content to pretermit it wholly, and leave out all my digressions of this argument, or any other. II. Now touching Angels, I pray let not aught that I have written make you sorry for aught that you have delivered touching the election of Angels: And do not you conceive of me amiss, as if I did conceive you to harbour any ill opinion thereabouts: For I profess I do not, neither have you given me any cause; yet from nine years of age I have known you. The first time I wrote of that, I only said, it seemed strange unto me; my reason was, because I never knew any, either by writing or otherwise, Protestant, or Papist, sound in maintaining man's election by grace, but that in like sort he maintained the election of Angels to be of grace. And whereas you professed otherwise only as an opponent: I conceived you did it but as myself or any other Scholar will do, to try the uttermost of another's strength with whom we dispute. But when the second time you wrote hereon, you professed to doubt whether Arminius acknowledged any election at all of Angels; that seemed to me as strange, because I am persuaded that no Arminian or Lutheran denieth the election of Angels: though like enough they are apt to fashion it according to their opinion of the election of men. As for the construction of that place in Timothy touching the elect Angels, I could not ascertain myself in what sense it might be conceived to proceed without acknowledging their election, and I was loath to divine at random. Now as you express yourself herein more particularly; so will I particularly make answer. First, I grant that a conditional decree is no election. But seeing it is impossible but God should foresee, on whose part the condition would be performed, and on whose part not; herehence it followeth, that God must accordingly Elect the one, and Reprobate the other: and so there must be acknowledged even an election of Angels after their manner. Like as the Arminians, beside that conditional predestination of men you speak of, do acknowledge a precise election of some upon foresight of their obedience, and reprobation of the other upon foresight of their disobedience. Touching the exposition of that, 1 Tim. 5. 21. I have consulted Hemingius, a man as erroneous in the point of election as any Lutheran; yet he interpreteth the place thus, Hos Electos ad discrimen Reproborum vocat. I grant it denotes the dignity of their persons, but still in respect of choice: as when we say a choice Book, a choice Jewel, as much as to say, which a man would make choice of, and prefer before many: so the Elect Angels are so called in respect of choice, which choice to my understanding can have no congruous reference, but to the choice of God. It is true we have, nothing like, such Scripture evidence touching the election and reprobation of Angels, as of Men. But whereas in these points both Scripture evidence and light of Christian reason do concur; so the light of Christian reason doth make it as evident on the part of Angels, as on the part of man; namely, that nothing can possibly be the cause of Gods will or predestination quoad actum volentis, or praedestinantis. And Aquinas, as you have heard, professeth, That never any man was so mad as to profess, that any thing without God could be the cause of predestination, quoad actum praedestinantis; and herein you yourself agree. Now touching Austin; I am glad you have lighted upon him. I do ●b● not but he shall persuade you in this point, though I could not. And first I will accommodate an answer to your allegations; Secondly, I will endeavour to show clearly his opinion in this point. Your first allegation is, Caeteri autem per ipsum liberum arbitrium in veritate steterunt; De corrept. & gratia. cap. 10. but yourself perceive it might be answered, that this might be delivered inclusa gratia speciali. And it may be proved that this phrase of speech doth not exclude special grace: for in the same Chapter it is afterwards said of man thus, In quo statu recto ac sine vitio, si per ipsum liberum arbitrium manere voluisset. Here you must not exclude special grace in this case; For si manere voluisset, undoubtedly this will of his had been wrought by special grace, as Austin manifesteth in the chapter following: For Cap. 11. he distinguisheth of two graces or two adjutories, the one was, ut posset pernianere si vellet, the other was, ut vellet quod potuit; his words are these, est in nobis per hane Dei gratiam, in bono recipiendo & perseveranter tenendo, non solum posse quod volumus, veruns etiam velle quod possumus: Quod non fuit in homine primo, unum enim horum in illo fuit, alterum non fuit. Namque ut reciperet bonum, gratiâ non egedat, quia nondum perdider at: ut autem in eo permaneret, egebat adjutorio gratiae, sine quo iâ emnino non posset: & acceperat posse si vellet, sed non habuit velle quod posset: nam si babuisset perseverasset. But you bring a second place to prove that Angels could have stood by their freewill, secluding special grace, and that is this, Credimus Dominum Deum— sie ordinasse Angelorum & hominum vitam ut in ea prius ostenderet quid posset eorum liberum arbitrium, deinde quid posset suae gratiae beneficium, justitiaeque judicium. I grant the Angels had power to stand if they would, and power to fall if they would; and this power was manifested in the standing of the one, and in the fall of the other. But herehence it followeth not, that therefore the act of standing was not of God's grace. But you will say the benefit of grace was afterwards manifested: And I answer, that grace was the grace of confirmation, opposite to the Obduration of the evil Angels; which grace of confirmation, though it were manifested after the obedience of the good Angels, consisting in assurance that they shall never fall; yet herehence it followeth not, that their standing was not by grace, though that grace whereby they stood was different from that grace whereby they were confirmed: for before their obedience, so they stood, as that withal they might fall; but since their obedience they now so stand, that they cannot fall. Now for Augustine's opinion hereabouts, it is plain enough from other places. De civ. dei, lib. 12. cap 9 aut minorem acceperunt amoris divini gratiam, quam illi qui in eadem perstiterunt, aut si utrique boni aequaliter creati sunt, istis mala voluntate cadentibus, illi amplius adjuti ad eam beatitudinis plenitudinem pervenerunt. So that he doth manifestly acknowledge, that the good Angels had such an adjutorium which the wicked had not: whereupon Leonardus Coquaeus, neither Jesuit nor Dominican, but an Augustinian, commenting, writes in this manner: ea ratione intelligitur majus beneficium collatum Angelis honis quam malis, etsi enim gratiam aequalem habitualem ab initio sint consecuti, it a tamen efficax fuit motio divina et auxilium dei speciale in Angelis sanctis, ut in Deunt toti converterentur, persisterent in bono, et beatitudinem eandem assequerentur; non ex vi libertatis arbitrii certe factum est, ut it a differenter afficerentur, et quod gratia fuerit efficax in his et non in istis, Deo maxime tribuendum; et ex duobus bominibus aequaliter affectis, si unus salvetur, alius vero damnetur, intelligo semper majus auxilium gratiae collatum ei qui fit salvets, idque cum Augustino hoc loco, & passim, ubi de hac materia disputat, neque totum id refero in libertatem arbitrii, quod unus velit consentire et respondere gratiae, alius non; facit enim etiam ut velimus, et consentiamus: neque infallibilem illam nostram consensionem puto tantum ex infallibili praescientia Dei; imo si per impossibile secludamus omnem praescientiam dei, ipsa gratia ex se infallibiliter movet hominem vel etiam Angelum, ut, licet non necessitate coactionis, necessitate tamen immutabilitatis efficax ex se sit, et gratia dei magis in uno quam in altero; et quod unus convertatur, alius non, quod uni detur auxilium efficax, in alio sit quidem sufficiens, minime tamen consequatur suum effectum, mysterium esse ubique docet Augustinus, at si posita aequali gratia qua unus converteretur, alius non, id ex solo consensu vel d●ssensu liberi arbitrii penderet, nullum certe mysterium in●sse mihi videretur. Neque hic reddit Augustinus causam eur ex Angelis alij salvati fuerint, alij minime, quod hos deus praescierit salvandos vel cooperaturos suae gratiae, alios minime cooperaturos; sed quia qui salvati sunt, vel majorem acceperunt divini amoris gratiam, vel certe si aequaliter boni creati sunt, id est, in aequali gratia, illi amplius adjuti fuerint: adeo ut negotium salutis Angelorum benorum in majus auxilium gratiae referat; ut, quod alij cadant et non respondeant gratiae divinae, eique non cooperentur; id quidem ascribendum sit libero horum arbitrio: quod vero in aliis gratia sit efficax, ade●que illi cooperentur, ipsi deo potissimum tribuendum sit. Than which I never found a more illustrious testimony for the prerogative of God's grace in, and sovereignty over his creatures in any Thomist or Dominican, that at this day hath maintained the cause of God, (as Bradwardine calls it) against the Jesuits. Neither did I ever take notice of the place before, but by occasion of this present search to give you satisfaction concerning the opinion of Austin; only rested contented with that which I supposed to be the common opinion of all, that the case is the same as touching the operation of God's grace both in Angels and men, and Christ in Scripture is accounted the head of Angels as well as of men. But that whole Chapter in Austin, lib. 12. the civet. dei. cap. 9, is worth any man's reading, where he disputes the case at large, where he hath another sentence more illustrious than the former, this; et cumid egit eorum voluntas bona ut non ad seipsos, qui minus erant, sed ad illum qui summe est, converteretur (hence is taken I guess that conceit of Master hooker's, that the fall of Angels was the converting the contemplation of their mind from God upon themselves) eique adbaerentes magis essent, ejusque participatione sapienter beat que viverent, quid aliud estenditur nisi volunt atem quamlibet bonam, inopem fuisse in solo desiderio remansuram (inopem remansuram, a pretty phrase unable to remain) nisi ille qui bonam naturam ex nihilo sui capacem fecerat, ex seipso feceret implendo meliorem, prius faciens excitando avidiorem. If you get any thing by my conference I am glad, I assure you I get by yours, both touching the clearing of Augustine's opinion hereabouts, and others concurrence also, wherein I do much rejoice; and the rather, because, as you may observe, I have hitherto proceeded thereupon, rather by supposition than of confirmation. Another place to this purpose I find alleged out of his Enchirid. cap. 100 Hac sunt magna opera domini exquisita in omnes voluntates ejus; et tam sapienter exquisita, ut cum Angelica et humana natura peccasset, id est, non quod ille, sed quod veluit ipsa, fecisset, etiam per eandem creature voluntatem (qua factum est quod creator noluit) impleret ipse quod voluit, ben● utens et malis tanquam summe bonus, ad eorum damnationem quos juste praedectinavit ad poenam, et ad eorum salutem quas benigne praedestinavit ad gratiam. But this hath but a touch, and that subject to ambiguous interpretation, the other is more full and clear. I come unto the Theses. You desire I would show you in a word where your error is in these, but you may remember what one professed sometimes, namely that ad quaestionem longam od●rat responsionem brevem, yet I will endeavour to satisfy you in this also first, and afterwards so to satisfy as I may satisfy myself also. First therefore, my brief satisfaction as it were in a word shall consist in two points. 1. You have but nine Theses, and the eighth is as a succinct recapitulation of all that went before, and the conclusion there mentioned is no more than that which every one grants, namely this; that God did decree first to produce that subject, and afterward to work such an effect thereupon: And indeed it is an ordinary course to confound the order of execution with the order of intention. Zanchius his definition of praedestination I do exceedingly approve of, answerable to this of yours, for thus it lieth, Generalis, bocest, omnium hominum praedestinatio est aeternum etc. Dei decretum, quo apud se ab aterno decrevit, primum quidem omnes homines tum creare ad sui imaginem justos, tum ut in peccatum a Satana tentati suo libero arbitrio labe entur, permittere: deinde b●● rum alios liberare, et liberatos spiritu suo comitari, et tandem aeterna vita donari; alios tum indurare, tum aeterno exitio perdere; idque ut in illis divina bonitas et misericordia, in istis autem divina potentia et justitia declaretur, atque ita in omnibus deus glorificetur. Where, if you mark it well, you shall find he makes no order between the decrees of creation, permission of sin, liberation and salvation on the one side, of induration and damnation on the other side, but only between creation itself and permission of sin, and liberation itself and salvation on the one side, and dereliction and damnation on the other side, all which he considers as means, and in the last place notes the end of all to be the patefaction of God's glory in goodness and mercy on the one side, and of his power and justice on the other. 2. Again, in your first Thesis containing the main body of your tenet, you will have the foresight of the subject, or occasion, whereupon any thing is decreed absolutely to be wrought, always to go before the decree itself, as well as the decree of the end goeth before the decree of the means. The irregularity whereof as touching God (though as touching man's decrees I confess it is right that you speak) I will show as briefly as I can before I answer your reason brought for confirmation of it. 1. If the foresight of the subject and occasion goes before the decree of working upon the subject; then much more must the decree of making the subject, as also of making or permitting the occasion, go before the decree of working upon the subject, and upon such an occasion, (for no subject whereupon God works can be without Gods making, but it is nothing so with man, who finds subjects whereupon to work rather than makes them) Now this is a thing impossible. For, 1. First, nothing is first in intention but the end, and 'tis not possible that the subject or occasion should be the end whereunto God works upon the subject thus or thus: 2. Secondly, that which is first in intention is last in execution. And therefore if the making of the subject, and permitting of the occasion whereupon God means to work, were first in intention, it should be last in execution, that is, God should first work upon the subject before he had made the subject, or permitted the occasion whereupon he works. But yet I confess if you have a reason for what you say, unless you may receive some satisfactory answer unto that reason of yours, it will be a very hard matter to satisfy you; Therefore I come to the consideration of your reason, which is this. The foresight of a thing is nothing but the consideration of it tanquam reipsa & certo futurum. But whoso will resolve absolutely to work such an effect upon such a definite subject, or to make such an use of such a particular event, must consider that subject and that event tanquam reipsa futurum: for else his decree will be but conditional. To this, I answer, 1. First, according to their opinion, that are accounted the most rigid interpreters of predestination. 1. Your proposition is most sound. 2. As for your assumption, which you suppose to be true, they suppose to be utterly untrue; as directly contrary to the most general rules touching the order of things in intention, and execution: And Alphonsus Mendoza takes upon him to prove at large, that the supernaturals of Peter and Paul were intended before their naturals. 2. The only reason (saving the plausibility of the proposition itself) to justify it, seems to be this, God cannot work upon a subject, unless the subject first be, and that occasion also whereupon he works; therefore God cannot intend to work upon a subject unless first he intent to produce that subject, and permit (at least) the occasion whereupon he intends to work. As much as to say, because I cannot ride to London without a horse, therefore I cannot intend to ride to London, unless first I intent to get me a horse. Whence it manifestly followeth, that in execution I must first ride to London, and afterward get me an horse to that purpose. And the confounding of the order of execution with the order of intention, seems to be the cause why this proposition of yours seems to be so plausible. 2. Now I will answer your proposition, according to my own Tenet in ordering Gods decrees, which is likely to give you better satisfaction in the way of your own apprehension. Now I grant your proposition; acknowledging that in this case so it falls out, that he must needs consider the subject as reipsa & certo futurum. But how, non tanquam praecedaneum (whereto your discourse tends) but tanquam conjunctum; the reason is, because I make the decrees of creation, permission of sin, and raising out of sin, not subordinata, but coordinata & conjuncta. So I say in like manner, God doth jointly decree to give both grace and glory; I do not say God doth decree jointly to give them, but he jointly decreeth to give both grace and glory. And so Austin defines predestination to be praeparationem gratiae & gloriae. So that in the same moment that he decreeth glory, he considers grace not as praecedaneum in intention, but conjunctum. So on the other side God doth jointly decree final dereliction of some in sin and damnation for sin, as Aquinas professeth of reprobation, that it includes voluntatem permittendi culpam, & damnationem inferendi pro culpa: so that in the same moment that he decreeth damnation, he considereth their final impenitency non tanquam quiddam antecedaneum, but tanquam conjunctum. And judge you what force this hath to qualify the harshness of Tenets hereabouts, and what disadvantage to our opposites the Arminians, who upon the subordination of these decrees cry out upon our Tenets and expose them to obloquy, saying that we maintain that God doth first decree to damn men, and then to this purpose he exposeth them to sin those sins for which they are damned. And herewith they charge the Authors of Massa corrupta for the object of election and reprobation, aswell as the Authors of Massa nondum condita, or condita, but nondum corrupta. And the twenty reasons which Arminius hath given against the Authors of Massa nondum condita; he professeth that with little difference they may be accommodated against the Fautors of Massa corrupta. All which notwithstanding, I have considered, and I hope refuted also, both the one way against Arminius, and the other way against Corvinus, in a Digression by itself, which contains a whole choir of paper, one of them; but that is in my answer to Corvinus, which is not yet perfected. Doctor Jackson my ancient friend, partly by his traditionary writings that pass in hugger-mugger from hand to hand, four pieces whereof as many as I could come by, I have answered; and partly by his treatise of divine essence, withdrawing my studies another away: yet an answer to that I hope to smith by Whitsuntide; and then to return: For in the second part which is newly come forth I find little considerable save some few chapters touching contingency: My greatest business about him is to understand his language. Now to draw to an end; as your first Thesis is an acknowledgement of the eternity of God's decrees; so the second, of their unity both in time and nature, God willing all things uno & eodem actu. Now judge I pray whether of the two opinions is most suitable hereunto; that which makes the decrees of God before spoken of, coordinata & conjuncta, or that which makes such a concatenation of them by consequents after consequents: as for example, God's decree of raising men out of sin presupposeth the foresight of sin; the foresight of sin presupposeth the decree to permit sin; the decree to permit sin supposeth the foresight of the futurition of the creature; and the foresight thereof supposeth the decree of creation: especially considering Aquinas his argument, whereby he proves that praedestinatio Christi cannot be the cause praedestinationis nostrae, to wit, because God by one and the same act predestinates both Christ and us. And withal considering that praerequisitum will as much hinder the unity of God's decrees as Causa. I had thought to have gone over your Theses more exactly, but seeing the length already spun out, I resolve to be the briefer. 3. Whereas in your third, you conceive the order of God's decrees is to be understood 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: I judge rather Durands instruction to be more sound, before mentiotioned; to wit, that there is only prioritas amongst them secundum rationem; and that he expounds thus, quando ratio unius sumitur a ratione alterius, as ratio mediorum sumitur a ratione finis. And priority in intention is only of the end in respect of means tending thereto, as you rightly conceive it in your fourth Thesis. 5. Of the fifth I have already spoken enough, wherein I have laboured partly to discover the error of your argumentation, and yet withal so as to give you satisfaction in your own way. 6. The sixth contains only an inference upon the former, and the inference is not suitable; for your assumption in the former Theses did but contend, that God must consider it; here you infer, that he must presuppose it; But it followeth not: For to consider it, 'tis sufficient that it is conjunctum; But to presuppose it is to maintain that it is antecedaneum. Besides it is as much peccant against the order, between the end and the means, as the former, whereof I have spoken sufficiently. 7. Of the seventh, your reason (you confess) is the same as before, to wit, in the fifth, which I have already considered. Neither is there any necessity why one should be before the other: they may, nay must be both together intended; For consider, if the pardoning or curing of sin be in intention after the permitting of sin, than it should be before it in execution, which were as much as to say, that God must first pardon and cure sin, before he can permit sin. This is plainly irregular; that irregularity which you conceive on the contrary is only in show, and rising merely from confounding intention with execution. Better to say, God doth first intend to cure sin, and then intends to permit it; (for herehence followeth a due order in execution, to wit, first sin is permitted, and after cured) then to say, God first intends to permit sin, and after to cure it; for herehence proceeds a most preposterous order in execution, namely, that first sin shall be cured, and then the being of sin permitted. And indeed when men say, God doth first intend to permit sin, and then to cure it, it seems their meaning is only this, not that God doth first intend, etc. but that God doth intent first to permit sin, and then to cure it, which is most true. 8. Like as in your eighth Thesis you do express it ere you are aware, and no otherwise. 9 And as in your eighth, so in your ninth, you do express it most congruously thus, we may conceive God decreeth to permit the occasion first, and afterwards to make that use of it which he intends: which I say is most congruous, constituting this priority only in execution, not in intention. I come to your conclusions drawn from the premises. 1. God's decree to manifest the glory of his power and goodness ad extra, is before his decree to create mankind, because that is a decree de fine, this de medio. Resp. 1. Though this be a truth, yet it is not the whole truth; for it seems by power and goodness you understand only that power and goodness which was showed in his creation; but this was not the last end: For this end was obtained the very first moment of Adam's creation, after which Adam lived above 900 years, and all mankind since, many thousands, and every one knows, the last end of a man's work is of chiefest consideration, when he sets himself to make his work, neither doth it become the wisdom of man to carry himself otherwise: as Beza professeth, saying, Statuere deum prius ordine causarum decrevisse hominem condere, quam quid eo condito faceret deliberaret: (here is the point, mark it well) is such a thing as quo nihil absurdius dici potest, quum finis in omnis sapientis artificis ment praecedat ipsius operis aggressionem, ut certissimum sit dei de humano genere decretum, creationem et ipsius creationis fines omnes antecessisse; wherein he distinguisheth between finis creationis and finis hominis creati. And as the creation manifested his power and goodness in making man out of nothing, so man by this almighty power thus made, was made, and intended to be made, to a certain end; which cannot be imagined to have been in any other kind than to be either a vessel of mercy, or of wrath. And when Solomon saith, God made the wicked against the day of evil, and withal signifieth that even this also was for himself, that is, for the manifestation of his glory, this cannot be in the way of that power and goodness you speak of, but something else; even the making of him a vessel wherein one day shall shine the glory of God in the way of justice and sovereign power over his creatures. 2. And therefore it cannot be as you conclude in the second place, that God's decree to create mankind is before his decree to manifest his mercy or justice in mankind. For though that be a decree to produce a subject, yet considering that this is the decree touching the end whereto he makes him: in all reason the decree of the end whereto a subject is made is before the decree of making the subject to that end. And we have an express testimony of the Holy Ghost for this, namely, that as God created all things for himself, so he created the wicked against the day of evil for himself. But by the way, I observe how you mistake the opinion of your opposites; as when you say, that this decree of manifesting God's mercy or justice, is a decree of working an effect in that subject, for this is utterly untrue; This were to make the decree of salvation of the one, and of damnation of the other to be before the decree of creation. And although some such thing may be conceived out of a superficial apprehension of it, as proposed by Beza and Piscator; yet both in true account of that opinion in general, and mistaking of it in special, no such thing is avouched. Nay, whereas yourself maintain, that the decree of damnation is before the decree of permission of final impenitency (a point no way congruous to your Tenet about massa corrupta) you have often read in my writings, that I account the decree of damnation in no moment of time to precede the decree of permission of final impenitency. Then the case of Angels is utterly against this; unless you maintain the one to be elected upon the foresight of their obedience, the other reprobated upon the foresight of their disobedience: which I am persuaded you shall not find any Orthodox Divine in the point of man's election, to maintain. 3. Conclusio tertia. God's decree to permit sin is before his decree to manifest either his mercy in pardoning sin, or his justice in punishing sin, because that is a decree, de eventu; this a doing of something by occasion of that event. Resp. 1. To your reason here mentioned I have answered before. 2. There is no priority or posteriority in intention, but only in respect of finis and media ad finem. 3. It is untrue, that the former decree is a decree of an event, and the latter of doing something by occasion of this event. For what? is God's permission, the event you mean? If so; then Gods working grace may be accounted an event also, and so God's decree of salvation upon his working grace shall follow upon his decree of working grace, which is manifestly Arminianism. Is the sin permitted the event? First, why should you call it an event? is it because you conceive it to fall out besides God's intention? Arminius himself professeth the contrary. The articles of Ireland profess, that God from eternity did by his unchangeable counsel ordain whatsoever in time should come to pass, yourself acknowledge, that God's decree of permitting sin, is a decree de eventu: yourself acknowledge, that God did foresee that man would sin in case he did permit him to sin; which is as much as to say stice: food did intend that sin should come to pass by his permission: which is 〈…〉 and express profession of Austin where he saith, Non ergo aliquid fit nisi omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo: so that whether things come to pass Deo faciente as good things, or Deo sinente, as evil things; still they came to pass Deo volente as Austin professeth. Now this sin is apparently the cause of the damnation of many thousands; for as much as many thousand infants are damned only for sin original; And therefore like as upon this sin existent, God doth not take an occasion only, but a cause of damning many thousands; so if the decree of permitting this, be presupposed before the decree of damnation, you may say as well, that God upon the foresight of this sin, doth not only take occasion, but a cause also, of decreeing their damnation. And this may be applied to the reprobation, not only of infants, but of all that are damned, forasmuch as all that are damned, are damned for original sin, only here is the difference, such reprobates as die in their infancy, are damned only for original sin, but others are damned not only for original sin, but for their actual sins also. Again it is manifest, that the decree of permitting sin original, is no more a decree de eventu, and Gods decree to manifest his mercy in pardoning it, is a decree of doing something by occasion of that event: than God's decree of permitting all actual sins of his elect, from the first to the last, is a decree de eventu, and Gods decree to manifest his mercy in pardoning actual sins, is a decree of working something by occasion of that event; and I cannot but wonder, this being again and again put to your consideration, that you do not take notice of the equipollency of these: whence it manifestly followeth, that the decree of pardoning sins shall presuppose massam corruptam, as well with actual sins, as sins original. Again, if God's decree of showing justice in punishing sin, is but a decree of taking occasion of doing something: then God's decree of damnation for men's actual sins, is but a decree of taking occasion of doing something; and consequently, by what reason the decree of punishing sin, presupposeth the decree of permitting sin original, by the same reason, the decree of damnation, shall presuppose the decree of permitting not only sin original; but all actual sins also. By the same reason the decree of salvation, is but a decree of doing something upon the occasion of faith, repentance, and good works. For if sin deserve not to be accounted a cause moving God to resolve to punish a man with damnation, but rather an event, by occasion where of he resolves to punish with damnation: much less shall faith, repentance, and good works be accounted a cause moving God to decree to save any man, but only an event, by occasion whereof, God doth decree some men's salvation. Yet look by what reason the decree of punishing with damnation doth presuppose the decree of permitting sin, by occasion of which event punishment by damnation is decreed, by the same reason the decree of salvation, doth presuppose the decree of giving faith, repentance, and good works, by occasion of which events, salvation is decreed; for why should not faith, and good works be accounted an occasion of the decree of salvation, as well as sins are the occasion of the decree of damnation. 4. The fourth conclusion is this; Gods decree to produce the person of Peter, is before his decree to manifest his mercy in Peter, by the reason aforesaid, Thes. 8. Resp. That eighth Thesis aforesaid made no mention of priority in decree or intention, but only of priority in execution, by virtue of God's decree: for the words of that eighth Thesis are these; God decreeth first to produce that subject, and afterwards to work such an effect thereupon. Not that God did first decree to produce the subject: but only that God did decree first to produce the subject: manifesting hereby, that your intent is, only to reason from the order of execution, and therehence to infer the like order in intention, which is the ordinary course of Arminians at this day. And you signify your meaning to be this, in that eighth Thesis, though in the issue you fail of right accommodating it; for your words are these, If any decree be concerning the working of a certain effect in such a subject as cannot possibly exist without the producing of that subject, than we may suppose, that he doth first decree, (thus you would say, though indeed you say otherwise) to produce that subject, and afterwards to work such an effect thereupon, which in plain terms is to argue thus; The permission of Adam's sin presupposeth the creation of Adam, therefore the decree of pe● to create Adam's sin, presupposeth the decree of Adam's creation: Now this is the Resp. ●gh way to Arminianism, and Pelagianism in the highest decree, as I showed you in my first; the evidence whereof, as it seems, drove you to acknowledge it, and to devise some other course, for maintenance of the Tenet of massa corrupta: yet thro' ghout, all the reason you give, is resolved into this: for as there I said, herehence it will follow in like manner, that because damnation presupposeth all actual sins, therefore the decree of damnation presupposeth the decree of permitting of all actual sins, and consequently, the foresight of them. In like manner, because salvation presupposeth all manner of good works in men of ripe years, therefore the decree of salvation, presupposeth the decree of giving effectual grace, for the performing of all manner of good works, and the foresight of them, which is direct Pelagianism in the highest degree. And these considerations persuade me better than heretofore, that the maintainers of massa corrupta for the object of predestination, must be cast upon the maintenance of Arminianism, and Pelagianism in the highest degree, whether they will or no. 5. Conclusio quinta: Gods decree to permit Peter to sin in Adam, is before his decree to manifest his mercy in Peter by occasion of this sin, ex Thes. 9 Resp. 1. Your Thesis Nona I have already answered. 2. God's decree to permit Peter to sin in Adam, is no more before his decree to manifest his mercy by occasion of that sin, than God's decree to permit Peter's personal sins all his life long, is before his decree to manifest his mercy in pardoning them. And what place you make for these decrees whether in election, or out of election, you have no where showed. 3. God doth manifest his mercy by occasion of Peter's sins both original, and actual, not only in the way of pardoning sin, but in the way of saving his person, in despite of sin, whence it followeth by the course of your argumentation, that the decree of permitting all Peter's sins throughout the whole course of his life, precedes the decree of manifesting God's mercy in his salvation. 4. And because God's decree of saving Peter, is a decree of doing somewhat by occasion of Peter's faith, and repentance, and good works, it followeth by your manner of reasoning, that the decree of saving Peter, presupposeth the decree of giving Peter faith, and repentance, and good works. 6. Conclusio sexta: Gods decree to produce the person of Judas, is before his decree of manifesting his justice in Judas his person. Thes. 8. Resp. This is all one with Conclusio quarta, and admits the same refutation. 7. Conclusio septima: Gods decree to permit Judas to sin in Adam, is before his decree to manifest his justice in Judas, by occasion of that sin. Resp. 1. This is all one with conclusio quinta, and admits the same answer: 2. Why do you say by occasion of that sin, and not by reason of that sin? perhaps you will say, because that sin is not the cause of Judas his damnation (for I cannot devise any other reason) but this is not sound, for that sin is the meritorious cause of Judas his damnation: For though he be damned for actual sins, yet is he damned for original also? Again, many thousand infants are damned only for original sin. 3. May you not as well say, that God's decree to permit judas his personal sins, is before his decree to manifest his justice in judas by occasion of those sins? and consider I pray how little agreeable that is to your Tenet. 4. And if the decree of permitting judas his personal sins, be before God's decree of punishing him with damnation, why should not the decree of giving faith, and repentance, and good works, be before God's decree of rewarding with salvation? 8. Conclusio octava: Gods decree to manifest his mercy in Peter, or to make Peter a vessel of mercy, (which is properly decretum electionis) is before his decree to call Peter, to give him faith, and repentance, etc. because that is a decree de fine, this de medio. Resp. 1. I do not dislike the order of these decrees: but I say there is no congruity between them, such as should be between the ends, and the means. For there is no show of mercy expressed in giving faith and repentance; but only employed, in as much as both faith and repentance implies, a state of misery preceding; the permission whereof alone hath congruous reference to the showing of mercy, as the means stand in congraity to the end. Faith and repentance and good works are means tending to another end, namely, to the manifesting of God's remunerative justice: for as much as God means to bestow salvation on men of ripe years by way of reward of their faith, repentance and good works. And it is without all contradiction, that in Peter and every elect, appears, not only God's mercy, but his justice also, and that in the highest degree, both in the pardoning of their sins, and saving of their souls for the merits of Christ Jesus. And God hath ordained his son to give salvation. job. 17. 2. 2. And I wonder not a little, that you should subordinate any Medium tending to the demonstration of God's mercy, rather than the permission of misery. 3. Especially considering, that God when he purposed to show mercy on Peter, he purposed to show mercy on him. 1. In pardoning not only his sin original, but all his actual sins also. 2. In saving him not only in despite of sin original, but in despite of all his actual sins also. Neither have you any way to avoid this, but by saying, that God made Peter a double vessel of mercy, and that by two decrees, which I think was never heard of since the world began. 9 Conclusie Nona; Gods decree to manifest his justice in Judas, or to make Judas a vessel of wrath (which is properly the decree of reprobation) is before his decree to deny Judas faith and repentance, etc. by the same reason. Resp. Here again you err marvellously, in making a Medium most incongruous to the end intended. To deny faith and repentance, what is it more, than not to give it, and by faith you mean, I doubt not, faith in Christ crucified etc. But it is clear, that God gave no such faith and repentance unto the elect Angels; yet far be it from us to think, that this was a medium tending to any end of reprobation. 2. The truth is, nothing but permission of sin is a congruous means to the manifesting of God's justice. For should God afflict a man or any creature, that is not a sinner (as Medina maintains ex communi omuium theologorum sententia, he can, and that in the highest degree) this shall not be in the way of Justice vindicative, nor as Judex, but as Dominus vitae et mortis; like as man hath power to afflict inferior creatures, and that in such a manner, non quo illis fiat mitius, sed quo nobis salubrius. 3. God's justice in Judas is manifested no way more, than in his damnation, and that for actual sin, as well as original; and in many thousand infants only for original sin; and to make the permission of actual sin only, subordinate to the decree of manifesting God's justice, and not the permission of sin original, is very strange. And Alvarez that gravis Anibor professeth generally, that permissio peccati propter quod quis damnatur, is effectus Reprobationis; and therefore cannot be premised before it. And every man that is damned, is damned for original, as well as actual sins, and many thousand infants only for original. As touching the order of decrees subjoined: Had you proceeded thus, God intended first to create, then to permit sin, then to raise some, and finally derelinquish others, and lastly to save some, and damn others, and that to the manifestation of his glory in the way of mercy on the one, and justice on the other; it had been exactly agreeable to Zanchius his definition of predestination. And yourself fall upon such a course, ere you are aware, in divers of your Theses, as I have showed. 2. The first being apparently a decree, as concerning the end God aims at; all the decrees ensuing, should be decrees de mediis, tending either to that end, immediately or mediately, which you have not explicated, neither indeed are they capable of any such explication: Nay rather you have already manifested your meaning to be, that the end there specified, is only the end of creation; not so much as the end of the things created, much less of the things intended by the subsequent degrees: yet it is set in the first place, as though all the things intended in the decrees following, tended to the end mentioned in this decree, besides all congruity. 3. As touching the foresight of God interposed; The first is mysterious, as would manifestly appear, if the ground of it were opened. You think that Angels were left to themselves, yet did not God foresee that hereupon they would fall, nor that hereupon they would not fall; but that some would fall, and others not fall: which Austin, as I have showed, professeth arose from hence; that they which stood, had such an adjutorium, as they which fell had not: which if it be true, man also, had he received the like adjutorium, had not fallen. But be it as you will, inquire to what end God suffered him to fall, especially this fall of his proving fatal to thousands; I say this fall only; it was fatal to all reprobates, though not only this fall: for all reprobates are damned for original sin, though not for that only. The second foresight is not rightly expressed; God cannot be said to foresee what he can do: for only things to come are said to be foreseen, things present are not: but God's power whereby he can do this, or that, is from everlasting present with him. Now because you see that this order of yours is utterly opposite to that maxim, Quod prius est intention, posterius est executione; you answer, that that maxim holds only in respect of finis & media ad finem; and therein you say right: But whereas therewithal you imply, that there is another order in intention than between finis & media, herein you innovate Philosophy, and bring in an order in intentions, that was never admitted in any Schools. I am sure in Aquinas you found no other priority admittable, but between finis & media. And Durand acknowledgeth this priority in God's intentions, to be only secundum rationem, and that is, quando ratio unius sumitur ab altero. But where no such priority is found, why should we admit of any priority at all in the decrees of God? yet if you, or any man else can make good this new Philosophy, by any reason, I shall be ready to yield unto it. As for the last, give me leave to say unto you in Homer's language 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. If ever it became you to retract aught, I am persuaded it well becometh you to retract this: you were as good to say, God did permit Adam's sin to no end, for you specify none, and the circumstances of qualification stands you in no stead: you may as well say of all the sins committed in the world, that God doth permit them to no end, for you specify none, and the circumstances of qualification stands you in no stead: you may as well say of all the sins committed in the world, that God doth permit them to no end; yet from Augustine's days it hath been acknowledged, that God doth both punish sin with sin, and that by sin men are brought sometimes to reformation: Audeo decere (saith Austin) utile est fuperbis in aliquod apertum manifestumque cadere peccatum. Were the permission of sins concurring to the crucifying of Christ Jesus to no end? yet never was the permission of any sin of greater consequent, than the permission of Adam's sin; as whereby the whole race of mankind was corrupted, and way made for that great work, wonderful both to men and Angels, in the redemption of the world, by the incarnation of the Son of God, and his passion upon the cross. God created even the wicked against the day of evil, and that for Gods own sake, as Solomon testifieth: and did he not as well permit him to become wicked, for Gods own sake, and his glories sake? Austin of old hath acknowledged, that even malum esse bonumest, and Bellarmine after him, Bonum est malum esse Deo permittente. Nec duhitandum est, Deum facere bene, saith Austin Enchirid. 96. Etiam sinendo fieri quaecunque siunt male: Non enim hoc nisi justo judicio sinit. And seeing the permission of Adam's sin could not be justo judicio, in respect of any sin precedent (for it was the first) therefore it must be justo judicio, in respect of some good end intended to be consequent. The very sin of David with Bathsheba, and against Uriah, Arminius acknowledgeth to have been permitted by God to excellent ends, particular and definite, quo diligentius seipsum observare●, peccatum suum exemplo aliorum defleret, egregium humilitatis, resipiseentiaeque specimen, & exemplar praestaret, & gloriosius ex peccato resurgeret Exam. praedest. pag. 166, 167. Nay, yourself have acknowledged out of Austin, the ends of God in this, when you alleged out of lib. de corrept. & gratia, cap. 10. this passage; credimus Deum sic ordinasse Angelorum & hominum vitam, ut in ea prius ostenderet quid p●ssct eorum liberum arbitrium; deinde quid posset suae gratiae beneficium, justitiaeque judicium. Apply this to man, first he showed what his free will could do; wherein? but in his fall; Secondly, quid posset gratiae beneficium justitiaeque judicium: how was this showed, but in the raising of some, and derelinquishing others? As for the circumstances wherewith you charm this strange saying, they serve you in no stead: man is in doubt what end to resolve on, upon the event or non-event of something, because he knows not whether it will fall out or no: so if God were to seek, whether upon his permission of Adam to sin, he would sin or no; he might be uncertain what to intend. But you suppose, that before God decreed to permit him to sin, he knew he would sin if he were permitted. And as for the distinction of particular and general, it cannot be accommodated to ends; for ends intended are only particulars, for they are intended to be produced, and such things are only singulars: like as by singular means they are produced, and actiones versantur only circa singularia. Again, it is untrue, that God's decree was negative: For, as Austin saith, Enchirid. cap. 100 Non utique nelens sinit sed volens: And actus volendi is positive in God. And again, Cap. 95. Non ergo fit aliquid, nisi omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo. Yourself, ere you are aware, draw near to the truth, which breaks forth as loath to be suppressed; As when you say, a man suffers an house to fall, because he can dispose of it many ways being fallen, to his own behoof. Apply this to God concerning the fall of Adam, permitted by him. So saith Austin, Nec sineret bonus fieri male, nisi omnipotens etiam de malo facere posset bene. Here is the general, de malo facere posse bene. What are the specials in the passage by yourself alleged, they are two, ut ostenderet gratiae beneficium, justitiaeque judicium. Now consider I pray, posse de malo facere bene is not causa adaequata, why God should permit fieri male. But only velle de malo facere bene. For this power of his extends to infinite particular sins, which he doth not permit. And Austin acknowledgeth both, not only the posse as you do, when he saith, nisi posset de malo facere bene: But the velle also, and that according to the specials of gratiae beneficium, justitiaeque judicium; As appears in the passage alleged by you. For he saith, Deum sie ordinasse hominum vitam, (non quia posse● ostendere, sed) ut ostenderet quid posset gratiae beneficium, justitiaeque judicium. So that he plainly manifests, that the cause moving God so to deal with Angels and men, was not his power to show, but his will and resolution to show both the power of his grace and of his justice: which applied to men, is showed in raising some after they are fallen, and derelinquishing others. I conclude as Abigal said to David, Hereafter it shall be no grief unto you, nor offence of mind, that I have been a means to keep thee from running a dangerous course in the way of life: So hereafter it may be no regret unto you, that God's providence hath brought you to this conference, whereby to preserve you from running dangerous courses in the way of faith. You in your Letter acknowledge reprobation absolute, which is utterly contradictory to your opinion, seeing you premise before it, the consideration of that sin, for which men are damned: For you premise the consideration of sin original; And many thousand infants are damned only for that, and all that are damned are damned for that, though not only for that. An Answer to a Discourse of D. H. about predestination; By Dr. TWISSE. 1. THe reasons why our Divines fall upon the corrupt mass, as the object of H. predestination, is not only that which you allege (viz. because commiseration and dereliction presuppose the corrupt mass, etc.) but also, and much more rather, as I conceive, because the very last end of predestination being, as you acknowledge, the manifestation of God's glory per modum misericordiae parcentis in some, per modum justitiae punientis in others, could not be intended without presupposition of sin. For neither could God possibly intend to spare any, nor justly intent to punish any, if he had not considered them as in a state of sin. Resp. The question is, whether God's intention (that is, his decree) to spare or punish, T. presupposeth sin. You think it doth, and that it cannot possibly be otherwise: I think it doth not, nor can possibly be so, that any thing in man can be pre-required to the decrees of God, yet I proposed the only special arguments that ever I observed in sixteen years' study in these points and answered them. You perceiving the inconsequence of that argument, as it seems, persuade yourself there is another argument of more force than that: But mark I pray with what issue; In foregoing the proof I proposed and answered, you instead thereof bring no proof at all, but rely upon this proposition (Good could not possibly intend to spare any, nor justly intent to punish any, if he had not considered them as in a state of sin) without all proof, as evident of itself. And if you mark it well, you shall find, that this proposition, is the same proposition in effect, the best proof whereof that I found, I laboured to overthrow, by showing the inconsequence thereof divers ways. And seeing you rely finally hereupon without proof, you beg the question, and instead of giving a new reason, you give none at all. And the truth is, I find many apt to be carried away with the plausible show of this proposition, and either look not at all farther for any proof thereof, or if they do, they proceed no farther than thus. The manifestation of mercy in sparing, and justice in punishing, presupposeth sin; therefore the decree (or intention) of manifesting God's mercy in sparing, and justice in punishing, presupposeth sin, which was in effect the same consequence or enthymeme, which I proposed to answer, as you may easily perceive if you mark it well: for commiseration and manifestation of mercy are all one. Now because this proposition is such a witch to bewitch men's fancies to entertain it, I will endeavour to discover the vanity of it, and that in the very decrees of men, all which are temporal, whereas God's decrees were eternal. The decree of showing mercy in pardoning sin doth no more presuppose sin, than the decree of showing the power of balm in curing a green wound, doth presuppose the wound, or the decree of showing the power of a cordial against poison, doth presuppose the empoisoning of a man's body; or the decree of advancing a subject by way of reward, doth presuppose his service: or the decree of a Patron; to present his son to a benefice, doth presuppose his fitness for it, or the decree of Solomon to bring Shimei his grey hairs unto the grave in blood, did presuppose the offence for which this was brought to pass; but rather from these decrees and intentions, each Author in his kind proceedeth to bring to pass every thing that is required to the accomplishment of that end which he requires; As I prove by instance in every particular. 1. I have known one, that to show the power of his balm, hath wounded his own flesh, and pouring his balm into it, hath cured it in the space of twenty four hours. Ask wherefore he wounded his flesh, every one seeth, that both he wounded it, and healed it with his balm, to make the virtue of his balm known: So that his intention of manifesting the virtue of his balm, did not presuppose the wound but drew after it, both the making of the wound, and the pouring of balm into it, as the means tending to the demonstration of the power of the balm. 2. So we have known another to take poison, and afterward his cordial against it, both the one, and the other, jointly tending to the manifestation of the virtue of his cordial. 3. A King intending to promote a favourite, but withal to do it without envy of the Nobility, may resolve to do it by way of reward, which purpose presupposeth not good service, but rather hereupon he will employ him in service, as in some honourable Embassage, or in the Wars, to the end that he may have occasion to advance him upon his service, without envy of the Nobles. 4. A Patron having a young son, may entertain a resolution to bestow a living upon him when time serves; This intention doth not presuppose his fitness, (without which he cannot be admitted) but because he hath a purpose to prefer him thereunto, therefore he will take order to bring him up like a Scholar, and send him to the University to make him fit. 5. Last of all, Solomon you know upon David's admonition on his death bed, entertained an intention to bring Shimei to his grave in blood, yet not for his cursing of David, but for a new transgression; therefore he takes a course to ensnare him, and bids him to build him an house in Jerusalem, and not to pass over the Brook Kidron upon pain of death. Now it was not indeed in Solomon's power effectually to ensnare him, and so certainly to bring upon him the execution of death: But this is in the power of God; For let him but expose any creature unto temptation, and derelinquish him therein, without giving him his grace to support him, that creature shall certainly fall into sin, otherwise if any creature can keep himself from sin without God's grace, than God's grace shall not have the prerogative of being the cause of every good action; But this prerogative of God's grace must and by God's grace shall be maintained unto the end. And upon this foundation the prerogative of his sovereign power also over his creatures in disposing of them as he thinks good, and making some vessels of mercy and some of wrath, which Arminius himself professeth he dares not deny to be in the power of God, to wit, to make vessels of mercy and vessels of wrath, and that ex massa nondum condita, in his Analysis of the ninth to the Romans. But I proceed to the form of your Syllogism. 1. The reason (you say) may be laid down Syllogistically thus: H. 1. God could not intend to pardon any without supposition of that, which is necessarily required to make them capable of pardon: But sin is necessarily required to make them capable of pardon; therefore God could not intend to pardon any without supposition of sin. 2. God could not intend to punish any without consideration of that, which is in justice required to make them punishable: But sin is required in justice to make any person punishable; therefore God could not intend to punish any without consideration of sin. Resp. 1. In both Syllogisms the Minor we grant, the Major we deny, as being in T. effect the very same proposition which is in question; and all the evidence it carrieth with it consisteth in the parts which have a show of an Enthymeme thus: 1. Sin is necessarily prerequired to the pardoning of sin, therefore it is necessarily prerequired to the decree of pardoning sin. 2. Sin in justice is prerequired unto punishing, Ergo 'tis in justice prerequired to the decree of punishing. Now this is the very proof which formerly I laboured to disprove, by showing the inconsequence thereof, yet the proposition whereon you rely, either must depend upon this proof, or upon none at all. But I will proceed with you a little farther upon these Syllogisms you propose. 2. Sin (you say, and that truly) is necessarily required to make men capable of pardon. And this general truth brancheth itself into two specials: 1. Sin original is necessarily required to make men capable of pardon for sin original. 2. Sin actual is necessarily required to make men capable of pardon for sin actual. Now because God doth intend to pardon all the sins of his elect, not only original but actual, committed throughout the whole course of his life, it followeth that God could not intend to pardon these actual sins without the presupposition of them. 3. By the same reason of yours I dispute thus: 1. God could not intend to bestow salvation upon any man by way of reward without supposition of that which is necessarily required to make him capable of reward. But the obedience of faith, repentance, and good works, is necessarily required to make a man capable of reward, Ergo, God could not intend to bestow salvation on any man by way of reward, without supposition of faith, repentance and good works. 2. As God cannot intend to punish any without consideration of that, which in justice is required to make him punishable: so God cannot intend to punish any in such a degree, without that which is required in justice to make him punishable in such a degree. Now not only sin original, but all actual sins of every Reprobate, together with their final impenitency therein, is required in justice to make every one of them punishable in such a degree; Ergo, could not God intend to punish any Reprobate in such a degree, without consideration of all their actual sins. And as men's actual sins are the meritorious causes of their damnation: so the consideration of them shall be the meritorious cause of their reprobation, or at least, of that decree whereby God doth decree to inflict damnation upon them in such a degree. And by just proportion of reason, like as faith, repentance, and good works are the disposing causes unto salvation, so the consideration of faith, repentance, and good works shall be the disposing causes of their election unto salvation: But you proceed, and I am content to go along with you. 3. And this reason, especially for the latter part of it, which concerns the manifestation H. of God's glory per m●dum justitiae punientis, may be farther confirmed thus: That which tends not to God's glory simply, but only upon supposition [if sin be] could not be intended by him simply, but only upon that supposition. For so far and no farther doth God intend any thing, as it makes for his glory: But to punish men, or any other creatures, is a thing that tends not to God's glory simply, but only upon supposition (if sin be) Ergo, it could not be intended by God simply but only upon that supposition. Resp. You need not have mentioned the tending of this to God's glory: your argument T. is in force, and greater force without it. For I hold, that to punish without supposition of sin implieth contradiction: paena being properly opposed to praemium, and as reward formally hath a respect to obedience going before, so hath punishment unto sin. 1. Now first to follow you in your own course, I reason thus; That which tends to Gods glory not simply, but only upon supposition of obedience in faith, repentance, and good works, cannot be intended by him simply, but upon that supposition; but to reward with salvation, and everlasting life, tends not to God's glory simply, but only upon supposition of faith, repentance and good works. Ergo, it could ot be intended by God simply, but only upon faith and repentance. 2. But to your Major I answer; No man saith, that God doth intend to punish any man but for sin. Now hereupon many (not only Arminians, but some Orthodox also) are apt to be deceived, and to think, that these words, but for sin, are to be referred to the Antecedent removed, which is God's intention. But it is not so, those words are only to be referred to the Antecedent next before, which is to punish. And I prove it thus: When any man saith, God intends to punish man for his sin, the meaning can be no other, than if he had said, God doth intend, that punishment shall be inflicted on man for his sin; where it is manifest, that sin is noted only as going before the punishment, not as going before God's intention. But as soon as this confusion of sense is opened by distinction, than they fly to this kind of argument, sin goeth before the execution of punishment, therefore the consideration of sin goeth before the intention of punishment, which is the argument I formerly proposed, and the inconsequence whereof I presume you do manifestly perceive. Now to that which followeth: 4. Although the reason which you allege on our behalf be inconsequent, as you H. have framed it: yet I suppose it may be reduced to a true Syllogism thus: The decree of liberation from sin, presupposeth sin: election is the decree of liberation from sin, Ergo, election presupposeth sin. If you deny the Major, I prove it thus: That which presupposeth sinners, presupposeth sin. The decree of liberation from sin, presupposeth sinners: Ergo, the decree of liberation from sin, presupposeth sin; you will perhaps yet deny the Minor; but I prove it thus: The decree of liberation from sin, presupposeth some that have need to be delivered, for else it were vain, and to no purpose: Only sinners have need to be delivered from sin: Ergo, the decree of liberation from sin presupposeth sinners. The like argument, and in the like form, may be framed touching the decree of dereliction in sin: Or if you take reprobation for the decree of damnation, it may be said thus: The decree of damnation, presupposeth some persons justly damnable, for otherwise it were either an unjust, or at least and unwisean indeliberate decree. But only sinners are justly damnable. Ergo, the decree of damnation presupposeth sinners, and consequently sin. For peccatum is de formali ratione peccatoris qua peccator est, as you know. Resp. Every one indeed knows that peccatum is de formali ratione peccatoris, and hereupon it is manifest that the second Syllogism gives no mite of proof unto the T. first. For seeing formalis ratio of any thing, cannot be separated from the thing itself, and consequently neither peccatum from peccator; you may easily perceive, that when we deny that the decree of liberation from sin presupposeth sin, we must therewithal necessarily deny, that it presupposeth sinners. Your third Syllogism addeth as little force unto the former, being merely identica probatio: For every man knoweth, that to be a sinner, and to have need to be delivered from sin is all one, in such sort as whatsoever is denied of a sinner, must be denied of him that hath need to be delivered from sin, forasmuch as every sinner hath need to be delivered from sin. Thus while you decline that proof, which in my observation, alone hath course, and the implication whereof in the Major proposition is all the evidence of it; you fall upon no sound proof at all. The truth is, if you observe, you may perceive your Major proposition involves this Enthymeme. Liberation from sin presupposeth sin, sinners such as have need to be delivered from sin, Ergo, the decree of liberation from sin, presupposeth both sin and sinners, and such as need to be delivered from sin. Of any other force of proof that you give, I am not conscious. 2. If the argument form touching the decree of dereliction in sin, be of the like form, it will admit no doubt the same answer. 3. The Major of the last Syllogism, hath a clause annexed unto it, as a reason of it, thus, else it were in vain and to no purpose. If this reason pleased you, you might have relied upon it, in the first Syllogism of the three, whereas now you may perceive, they contain no proof but identical. 2. Your course of argumentation tends to prove, that it is impossible it should be otherwise than you conceive, which is more than to say, it were otherwise only vain, and to no purpose. Thirdly I answer that which is vain, and to no purpose, is either to no end, or to no good end: But the decree of liberation from sin, whether it presuppose sin, as you say, or not presuppose sin, as I say, still it tends to the same end, and that a good end, to wit, the manifestation of God's mercy. But I err, your meaning seemeth to be this, it is vain in respect that it cannot obtain the end it aims at, unless it presuppose sin. But how do you prove that God's decree of liberation from sin, cannot take effect, except it presuppose sin? you have no means to prove it but this: Liberation from sin cannot take effect without it presuppose sin, Ergo, the decree of liberation from sin cannot take effect without it presuppose sin. And while you decline this way of proof, you light upon no proof at all. 4. Touching your last Syllogism, I deny your Major, that is, I deny that the decree of damnation presupposeth persons justly damnable. Then you say it is unjust; but I deny this consequence, and though you bring no farther reason for your affirmation, yet will I prove my negation thus: The decree of damnation for final perseverance in sin, no man will say, to be unjust: But God decrees to damn no man but for final perseverance in sin, Ergo, God's decree of damnation is not unjust. Here I suppose you will reply, that if God decreeth to damn no man but for final perseverance in sin, than it followeth, that the decree of damnation presupposeth not only sin in general, but final perseverance; and so you may think my opinion more dissolute than yours, and your opinion more rigid than mine. And I doubt not, but so it will appear in the end, especially in the point of election; but yet not for any force in this consequence. Wherefore I answer, that this consequence is very unfound, though it hath deceived many, and though the usual course is, to content themselves with proposing it, without all proof, thinking it needeth no proof; yet will I easily disprove it, and show the vanity of it, as already I have done the like. Now I pray what is the meaning of this, God doth not decree to damn any man but for final perseverance in sin? hath it any other meaning than this, God doth not intend, that damnation shall be afflicted on any man, but for his final perseverance in sin goeth before damnation; Ergo, the consideration of final perseverance in sin goeth before the decree of damnation. The inconsequence whereof I have formerly showed, neither do I find any exception you make against my course in discovering it. And by the way give me leave to tell you, what I seem to have found in the course of my studies in these points: Arminianism and Pelagianism is one of the unlearnedst heresies that ever was, depending merely either upon principles, which they establish to themselves at pleasure without all ground, or upon consequences, most inconsequent; yet both their principles, and their consequences are very plausible at first sight to judgement, and the Tenets themselves, most apt to bewitch carnal affections. And if the Trumpets in the Revelation do contain a prediction of heresies growing upon the Church, as most have thought, (though now adays it begins otherwise to come about) and the star called wormwood, as a star signifieth some plausible Heresy, as Piscator conjectureth; I see none so fit as the Pelagian Heresy to be notified hereby, though as bitter as wormwood in opposing the grace of God; in maintaining the prerogative whereof, how can it be but he should be zealous, that hath tasted of it, and of God's goodness in making him a vessel of mercy, when he might have made him a vessel of wrath. But you proceed. 5. Whereas you argue, that if election presuppose original sin, it presupposeth H. actual sins also. I answer, it follows not: For though God hath decreed to free his elect from all their actual sins, as well as from their original, yet he hath not done it by one and the same decree: But first he hath resolved to free them from that general curse, and malediction, whereto they were obnoxious in Adam, and this is included in their very election; afterward he hath resolved to purge them also from all their actual sins, which they shall commit by the effectual application of Christ's merit, and this is by another decree consequent upon their election, being one of his decrees de mediis. Resp. Herein you carry yourself like a right Scholar, in making way out though it be a new way. As if the decree of freeing from Original sin, were a different T. decree from the decree of freeing from sins actual, and before it. And albeit the actual sins of Gods elect are many and much different, some committed before their calling, and for many years, some committed after their calling, throughout the whole course of their lives, yet you can be content to make the decree of God in freeing from all these, to be but one decree; only the decrees of freeing from actual, and from original sins must be different decrees. 1. When you say, first he hath resolved to free them from original sin, and afterwards he hath resolved to purge them from actual sins, I doubt your meaning is no more but this, God hath resolved first to free them from original sin, and afterwards to purge them from actual sins. And my reason is, because many times I have observed speeches to ran thus, when the meaning hath been but so as I have expressed. But I will manifest, that in the execution, freeing from malediction in Adam, and purging from actual sins go together: much less can they differ in intention; which I prove thus: No man is delivered from the malediction, whereto he was obnoxious in Adam, but by faith in Christ, he is therewithal freed from all his actual sins committed before his calling: Therefore seeing they are at once freed from malediction in Adam, and from many actual sins, it followeth that God did intend at once thus to free them; and how could this be done by different decrees, one going before another? 2. Now I will prove, that God did at once intent to free from all sins, both actual and original, though he did not intend, that this should be done at once; Forasmuch as actual sins are committed successively, one a long time after another. God intending to give faith and repentance to his elect, did therewithal intend to free them from all their sins, for these are the only means whereby we are freed from sin. But God did at once intent to give faith and repentance to his elect: Ergo. He did at once intent, to free them from all their sins. Against this argument, the greatest colour of exception is from the consideration of actual sins, that have their course after their calling. But this again is as easily removed by consideration, that as sins have their course, so faith and repentance have their course; and God intended at once to give his elect faith and repentance, and final perseverance in both, though perseverance cannot be had at once, that being against the nature of it. 3. Whereas you say only of actual sins, that we are purged from them by the effectual application of Christ's merits; I hope your meaning is not, to exclude the purgation of original sin, and liberation from malediction in Adam from the effect of Christ's merits. The blood of Jesus Christ cleanseth us from all sin. And David repented of his original sin, as well as of his actual, and so do we. And when in respect of the law of his members, leading him captive to the law of sin, the Apostle cries out, wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me, etc. Immediately he comforteth himself in this manner, I thank my God through Jesus Christ. 4. When you say, that God's decree of purging us from actual sins, is one of the decrees de mediis, you do not tell us what you call that other decree, whereby God decreeth to free us from that general curse and malediction whereto we were obnoxious in Adam. But by the difference you put, you leave us to interpret it, of God's decree the fine: Now there is no such proportion, or disproportion between these decrees, that the decree of freeing from original sin, or from the malediction in Adam, should be decretum de fine, and the decree of purging from actual sins, should be decretum de mediis. 1. For the end of God's actions is merely his own glory, according to that, Prov. 16. 4. God made all things for himself, and that Rom. 11. 4. last, from him and for him are all things. The freeing from sin Original etc. may be a means to this, it cannot be the end which God intends. 2. If salvation be considered as the end which God intends, as commonly Divines consider it, (though this course of consideration hath been the mother of great perturbation, in the ordering of God's decrees) yet freedom from sin original, is rather a means to this: Therefore not to be accounted the object of God's decrees concerning the end. Again, who doubts, but that the freeing from sin original, is as well a means of salvation, as the purging from sins actual. Therefore the decree thereof is to be reckoned amongst the number of the decrees de mediis. 3. Yet will not this suffice, to make the decree of freeing from sin original, to be different from the decree of purging from sins actual, as this is accounted a decree de mediis: unless the freeing from sin original be the end, and the purging from sins actual a means tending to that end. For priority and posteriority in intention, hath no place, but by reason of mutual respect between the end and the means tending to that end. But in no congruity can it be said, that the purging us from sins actual is a means to free us from sins original, or from that malediction, whereto we were obnoxious in Adam. 4. If freeing from original sin be first in God's intention, and afterwards the purging of us from sins actual; it followeth, that the freeing from original sin shall be last in execution, so that God shall first free us from actual sins, and then proceed to free us from original sin. I proceed to the next. 6. In like manner we say of the Reprobate: It is one decree whereby God resolves H. to leave them in the State of original sin, another whereby he doth resolve to leave them in their actual sins also; And although this latter doth follow always upon the former, yet the former is only properly called reprobation. Wherefore it followeth not, that if the decree of reprobation supposeth original sin, it supposeth actual also. Resp. 1. The answer unto the former may in every particular be accommodated unto T. this. 2. These you speak of are not different, but one decree, and the same: As I prove thus; Gods decree to leave them in the state of original sin, is all one with God's decree finally to deny them faith and repentance: And Gods decree finally to deny them faith and repentance is all one with God's decree to leave them in their actual sin. Also Reprobation, as it signifieth God's decree of leaving in the state of sin, was never conceived to be other, than the decree of denying them faith and repentance unto the end: which whether it be not a decree of leaving them in actual sins as well as original, let any man judge. For God by this decree of final dereliction, did not only decree that they should be left in their sins before they come to the use of reason, but in their sins committed after also, in their youth, in their middle age, in their old age: otherwise it could be no decree of final dereliction. 7. Although God doth actually damn men as well for their actual sins, as for their H. original: yet the foresight of original sin, being enough to salve God's justice in the decree of damnation, we are not compelled to grant any more, as antecedent to that decree, but may take in the rest, as consequent rather. Resp. As God doth actually damn men aswel for their actual sins, as for their original; T. so undoubtedly God did from everlasting decree to damn them for their actual sins as well as for their original. For when God doth actually damn them for their actual sins, then undoubtedly he doth will to condemn them, otherwise he should damn them against his will: Now the will of God, being an eternal action, is eternal; therefore from everlasting he did will to damn them for actual sins: For his will to damn them, and his decree to damn them is all one. Now I think you do not make two decrees of damnation of the same men, one for their original, another for their actual sins: Therefore in the same moment that he decreed to damn for sin original, he did decree to damn for actual also. 2. If the foresight of sin be required to salve God's justice in the decree of damnation of men of ripe years; the foresight of original sin will not serve the turn: For seeing God doth not intend the damnation of man indefinitely, in respect of the degrees thereof, but definitely, that is, according to the very degree in which he will inflict damnation; It is manifest, that foresight of original sin cannot salve God's justice. For to intend damnation in such a degree as is due only to sins actual, upon foresight only of sin original, is as unjust, as to intend damnation upon no foresight of sin at all: For even in this case you allow, that as some degrees intended are due to sin original, upon foresight whereof alone, they are intended; so again some degrees intended, are due only to actual sins, upon no foresight whereof in your opinion they are intended. 3. It is very strange, that you should maintain, God's course is justified in decreeing to damn upon foresight of original sin, and not upon the foresight of actual sins: whereas damnation for original sin only, is so far from being justifiable in the sight of flesh and blood, as that it is indeed the second degree of the greatest absoluteness of God's power, that ever was or shall be showed in this world, or in the world to come. 1. The first degree and greatest, was the crucifying of the same God for others sins, being without all sin of his own. 2. The second is the damnation of Infants, for the sin of Adam; which Adam himself, notwithstanding, we believe to be saved. 4. I pray consider the difference betwixt your opinion and mind; you maintain that God decreed to damn all reprobates before the foresight of any of their actual sins: I no way like this Tenet, but maintain, that in the same moment, that God decrees to damn any Reprobate, he decrees to damn him for all his actual sins, aswell as original sin, and final perseverance in them; And that in the same moment he foresaw all their sins: not that the foresight of their sins is antecedent or subsequent to, but concomitant or conjunct with his decree of their damnation, in the same moment, not of time only, but of nature also. Undoubtedly actual sins are more apt to justify God in damning any man, than sin original; yet you maintain that God decrees to damn a man, without the foresight of that, which doth more justify God in damning any man; only you deny, that he can decree to damn any man, without the foresight of that, which doth less justify God in the actual damnation of any one. You will have the foresight of man's actual sins to follow the decree of damnation, which I dare not avouch, not only because it is harsh to men's affections, but because it is repugnant in my judgement to manifest reason; only I deny the foresight of all sins to be antecedent to this decree: I say, 'tis neither antecedent to it, which is the dissolute opinion, nor subsequent after it, which is the rigid opinion, and each of them equally untrue; but it is conjunct or concomitant to it, in the same moment of nature: both these degrees being the decrees de mediis, and so making up one formal complete decree de mediis ad eundem finem tendentibus, which is the manifestation of God's glory in the way of justice; as I have showed at large in my third digression, amongst those which I hear are lately brought into your hands. But I wonder not a little what you are fallen upon in the next place. 8. As touching the election and reprobation of Angels I have nothing to say, because H. the Scripture saith nothing. It is true, that it could not be made ex communi massa corrupta, because there was none such; But why it might not be out of the foresight of their personal obedience or disobedience, I know no great matter to object. Nor will it follow, that if they were elected upon such considerations, we must be so too: for our case is wholly different, as the Scripture denyeth that of us. Resp. Hitherto you have discoursed as it were out of the month of our Divines; who yet as I have showed in my eighth Digression, are for the most part nothing for T. this opinion which you propose, being rightly understood. But in this point not one is for you; nor ever could I observe any of our Divines that maintained not the election of Angels, to be of as free grace as the election of men, or the reprobation of Angels, to be of as free Sovereignty and absoluteness in the denial of grace, as the reprobation of men. Arminius never durst profess this which you do; but still puts it off as a matter he hath nothing to do withal, treating only of the predestination of men: which he would never have done, had he any hope to make good that opinion, which you seem more to incline unto, than to the contrary. But though you see no great matter to object against it, yet others do, that hold it absolutely impossible to be otherwise; namely impossible, that any thing in the creature should be the cause of the will of God quoad actum volentis; or of predestination, quoad actum praedestinantie, Insomuch that Aquinas professeth, never any man was so mad, as to maintain that there could be any cause of the will of God. p. 1. q. 23. Art. 5. in Corp. Cum praedestinatio includat voluntatem, sic inquirenda est ratio praedestinationis, sicut inquiritur ratio divinae voluntatis: Dictum est autem suprà, quod non est assignare ●iusam divine voluntatis ex parte actus volendi: sed potest assignari ratio ex parte volitorum, etc. Deus vult esse aliquid propter aliud. Nulius ergo fuit ita insanae mentis, qui diceret merita esse causam Divina praedestinationis ex parte actus praedestinantis, sed hoc sub questione vertitur; utrum ex parte effectus praedestinatio habeat aliquam causam: Et hoc est quaerere, utrum Deus praeordinaverit se daturum effectum praedestinationis alicui propter aliquam causam. And whereas Suarius hath laboured to help himself with a shifting distinction, between causa and ratio; as if there might be ratio voluntatis divinae from without, though not causa: and finding these terms promiscuously used by Aquinas in his sums, flieth out to his book contra Gentes, and Ferrarienses thereupon, to get hold of somewhat therehence for his advantage; yet I have endeavoured to beat that fox out of his holes, in my third Digression upon election. 2. Are they not called in Scripture the elect Angels? Now mark Augustine's discourse; If upon the foresight of man's obedience God elect any man, it shall not be said, Non vos me elegistis, sed ego vos elegi; but on the contrary rather, vos me elegistis non ego elegi vos. For if election of Angels followed upon their obedience, they did first choose God, that is, choose to obey him, before God did choose them, that is, choose to save them. 3. If Angels were elected upon their obedience, then either by necessity of nature this came to pass, or by the free constitution of God; It cannot be said, by necessity of nature, Ergo by his free constitution, whence it followeth, that God did ordain, that upon the obedience of Angels he would ordain them to eternal life. Now judge you whether one decree of God can possibly be the object of another decree, all decrees of God being eternal; and the objects of God's decrees being merely temporal: as appears in the decree of creation, preservation, redemption, vocation, justification, sanctification, salvation. 4. No good act can be wrought but by God, and by his grace; it is he that works in us both the will and the deed of his good pleasure; Do you not think it is so in Angels also? otherwise what cause have they to give God thanks for their election, as namely, if it sprang from their obedience. But suppose you deny this; yet all confess no natural action can be wrought (much less gracious) without God's concourse, as the efficient cause thereof. Now consider, doth God concur modo nos velimus, which is Suarius his devise? consider I pray you, the contradiction included in this Tenet: God is the cause working not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 perficere, but also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 velle, as they confess: Now is it possible, that God concurreth ad velle modo nos velimus? can the same thing be the condition of itself? It may as well be before itself. Again, supposing we do velle, it is not possible by the power of God, that we should not velle: for factum infectum reddere me Deus quidem potest. But this I have farther prosecuted in a Digression by itself, proving that God doth determine the will to every act thereof, and showing the great concurrence herein, (and upon what grounds) of school Divines, from Albertus Magnus his days downwards. But I proceed with you. 9 To that which you say concerning infants, I think I may answer, that although H. there were no other thing that made way to their salvation, or damnation, but only the fall of Adam; yet it followeth not, that God decreed to permit Adam's fall, as a Medium tending thereunto. For what if he decreed to save or damn some sine mediis, supposing them in a state immediately capable of salvation or damnation, as by Adam's fall, and their original sin contracted hereupon, they were? yet I add farther, concerning infants that are saved; there is somewhat else decreed to make way to their salvation, besides Adam's fall: namely an application of Christ's merit to them in baptism, or otherwise. And for those that are damned; since their original sin makes them immediately justly damnable, it was enough for God to decree to leave them in the state they were, and so to damn them; there being no other remedy to bring to pass his end in the matter. Resp. In general observe I pray you the disproportion of your Tenet concerning T. Infants, and others. God doth not decree to damn Infants (as you say) but upon the foresight of all the sin, for which they are damned; but God doth decree to damn all others, not upon the foresight of all their sins for which they are damned, nor upon the foresight of those sins for which they are chiefly damned, and which do justify God most in their damnation; but only upon the foresight of original sin, for which least of all they are damned, and which doth least of all justify God in their damnation. But I come to the particular scanning of the parts. 1. You utterly mistake my words; I said not, the fall of Adam was the only way, or any way, for the salvation of Infants: But this I said, and say; the fall of Adam was the only way of manifestation of God's mercy in the salvation of Infants: For mercy supposeth misery, and the misery of Infants is only in respect of sin original, not at all in respect of sins actual, wherein they are nothing culpable. Now to the manifestation of God's mercy in their salvation, the permission of Adam's fall, and their fall in Adam, was a Medium: and I prove it thus, if God did permit Adam to sin, and these Infants in Adam, to this end, namely to the manifestation of his mercy in their salvation; then this permission of Adam's fall, and their fall in Adam, was a Medium tending to the manifestation of his mercy in their salvation: But God did permit Adam to fall, and these Infants in Adam, to this very end. Ergo. I prove the M●●●r thus; he did permit Adam to fall, and these Infants in Adam, to the manifestation of his own glory in them: But no glory of God is more conveniently manifested in the permission of Adam's fall, and these Infants in Adam, than the glory of his mercy in the pardoning of their sins, and saving their souls in despite of sin: Therefore this is to be accounted the end as much as any. 2. I nothing doubt, but that infants are saved sine mediis; I spoke not of the Media of their salvation, but of the manifestation of God's mercy in their salvation: I make no question, but that they are saved, by the merits of Christ, whether they have the ordinary means of applying Christ unto them, or no. 3. Touching reprobate Infants, I prove the permission of Adam's fall, and their fall in Adam, was a Medium, tending to the manifestation or God's justice in their damnation. For if God did permit Adam to fall, and them in Adam, to this end, namely, to the manifestation of his justice in their damnation, than this permission was a Medium tending thereto. But to this end God did permit Adam's fall, and their fall in Adam: which I prove thus; He did permit it for the manifestation of his own glory, as to this end he doth all things. But no glory of God is so conveniently manifested hereby, as the glory of his justice in their damnation; unless you will say with Alphonsus Mendoza, and Didscus Alvarez, that rather the manifestation of God's glorious grace towards his elect, in consideration that he could have made them vessels of wrath as well as others, is the cause, why God doth not save all, but permits a multitude to sin, after much different courses, and damns them for sin. 4. Since their original sin (you say) they are justly damnable; But I pray consider, how came they to be thus justly damnable? was it only by the will of Adam? was it not by the will of God also? That the first sin of Adam alone, and no other, is imputed to his posterity; how could this come to pass but by the will of God. 2. That the sin of Adam becomes fatal to all his posterity, and not so the sin of any man else, to his posterity, how is this, but by the will of God? 3. Could not God have derived a child from Adam in the state of his innocency, if he had so thought good? 4. How come we to be borne in original sin, but by the will of God, who could have destroyed Adam after his sin, and made another Author of generation of mankind. In all this, appears the will of God, and forceth us to acknowledge the power of God over his creatures, to dispose of them as he thinks good. But along to the rest. 10. Although we say, the fall of Adam was considered in the decree of God's election: H. yet we do not say, it was preintended; (neither indeed can God properly be said to intend any thing which he permits only;) wherefore it followeth not, upon our opinion, that the fall of Adam was the end of man's salvation, and damnation, or that it was to be in execution after it: For the respect of Media and Finis is, where things are intended only. But you will say, God intended the permission of the fall, though not the fall itself, and if that were first in his intention, the same consequents follow. I answer, it was one thing to consider Adam's fall as a thing that would be, if it were not hindered, another thing to resolve positively to permit it. And though perhaps God did both, yet we make the former act only, to have been precedent to his election, not the latter. Resp. 1. I spoke nothing of God's intention that Adam should fall, but only of God's intention to permit him to fall; and showed, that if the permission of Adam's T. fall, was first in intention, and then man's damnation, it will manifestly follow, that in execution it shall be last; that is, God shall first damn men for sin, and afterwards permit Adam to fall into sin, and all in Adam. To this you say, that it is one thing to consider Adam's fall as a thing that would be, if it were not hindered; another thing to resolve positively to permit it. But this answer is to no purpose. For my argument doth not depend upon the confusion of these things, which you say do differ, and therein say truly my argument depends upon a principle, that is totâ A●ademia notissimum, and justified also by all experience, that what is first in intention is last in execution. 2. But what say you? do you not make the permission of Adam's fall precedent to election and reprobation? why then let us shake hands; for the case is clear, that then the foresight of Adam's fall, neither could be precedent to election: For the foresight of Adam's fall in no moment of time before God's resolution to permit it: For though God foresaw that Adam would fall, if God permitted him, yet could he not foresee, that he would fall absolutely, until God were resolved to permit him. 3. Some things you touch by the way, I may not omit, you say nothing can properly be said to be intended, which he permits only. This is very worthy of consideration, what think you of Adam's eating of the forbidden fruit? did God intend that or no? Perhaps you will say, that God may be said to intend that, because he did only permit that as evil, but concurred to the effecting of it, as a natural action. But then consider, how was it possible, that God should intend that this act should come to pass and not the evil of it, whereas the evil, considering Gods interdict, was inseparable from it. I should answer it thus; As touching the substance of the act, God intended it should come to pass, and it came to pass by God's effection; for so God intended it should come to pass, to wit, by his effection: But as touching the evil of the action God intended it should come to pass, and it came to pass, but only by God's permission: for so only he intended it should come to pass, to wit, by his permission. Hereupon you may fly out, and deny that God did intend so much as the act itself of eating the forbidden fruit. But I pray why might not God intend and determine, that that act should come to pass, aswell as the Jews crucifying of Christ? yet what say the Apostles with one mouth, both Herod, etc. why not aswell as the Kings giving their Kingdoms unto the beast? yet it is expressly said, that God put it into their hearts to do his ●ill even in this, to wit, giving their Kingdoms unto the beast. In a word, I have a Digression to this purpose, in the second book, Digressed. The title is this, A● sanctus Israelis, etc. It is the only point wherein I oppose Aquinas, and Aquinas herein opposeth himself manifestly against Austin, as there I show. 11. In your laying down the order of God's decrees, I would gladly understand H. one thing. Whether you make his first decree de fine, to have been definite or indefinite? I mean, whether he resolved at first, to declare his mercy upon such and such persons as Peter, Judas, etc. or indefinitely upon some only? If you make it indefinite, it may be, such a decree might pass upon Massa nondum condita. But that is not the decree of election. If you make it definite, me thinks your arguments before alleged are strong— against it. Resp. Your distinction is good of a decree definite and indefinite; in the same terms you shall find it disputed of, in the third Digression of those that are come to your T. hands: and sound labouring to hold up a decree indefinite, but all in vain. The truth is Massa nondum condita is not to be taken positively, but privately rather as it denies creation and corruption precedent to God's predestination, forasmuch as all these decrees of creation, of permission of Adam's fall, of liberation final from sins by faith and repentance, and lastly of salvation, are but one formal complete decree de mediis, tending to one complete end, which is the manifestation of God's glory in the way of mercy mixed with justice: On the other side, all these decrees, to wit, of creation, of permission of Adam's fall, of final dereliction in sin, and lastly of condemnation for sin, do make up but one complete decree de medijs, tending to one end, which is the manifestation of God's glory in the way of justice. As for the strength of your arguments, alleged against this opinion, I remit to every indifferent man's judgement to consider thereof. As touching the first arguments you propose, I could gratify you thus far, that the decrees you speak of, do consuppose sin, but not presuppose sin. Forasmuch as my Tenet is, that in the same moment with those decrees, God doth consider their sin, but not in any moment before it. This I say my Tenet alloweth me to grant, but I cannot acknowledge that any of your arguments prove thus much. But then again, I maintain that these decrees consuppose other sins, aswell as original; yea the decree of damnation consupposeth in the same moment all their actual sins, yea even final impenitency; forasmuch as God decreeth to damn no man of ripe years, but for all the sins that ever he shall commit, and final impenitency in them: whereas you maintain that God first decrees to damn them, and then forseeth the actual sins of theirs, for which they shall be damned. FINIS. Addenda & Corrigenda. PAg 1. lin. 24 read parts. p. 2. l. 30 r. rectify ib: l. 56 r. were of. p. 4 l: 33 r. diversions from. l 54 deal. not. p. 7 l. 36 is intended p 9 l. 35 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 10 l. 16 twofold. p. 11 l. 10 and not. p. 15 l. 4 wholly God's, because they are wholly from God. p. 16 l. 30 first showing. l. 50 this objection. l. ult creatures love. p. 17 l. 43 world healthful l. 47 he decreed should perish. p. 24 l. 3 judicious author. l. 4 conversion. l. 17 affect. p. 27 l 49 kind of a meritorious. p 29 l. 21 Vines. l 32 they are the sons of God. l. 45 praised me. l. 54 we discourse. p. 30 l. 23 of men. l. 50 to the dead. ib according to men. p. 32 l. 10 del. not. l. 19 very philosophically takes. l. 56 to some p. 34 l. 28 over man his. l. 59 that it is. p. 35 l. 8. from ten l. 53 puniri. p. 36 l. 33 unsesonable. l. 36 refuted. p. 37 l. 48 unto them. p. 39 l. 4 friend of his l. 45 at the font. p. 40 l. 16. deal if. l. 18 exposition. l. 24 Judas may cease, and the prupose of electing Judas may &c: l. 35 and in saying. p. 41 l. 40 of being l. 45 in this. p. 43. l. 20 less evident, that death was not desirable. l. 51 defignes. l. 54 at a being in a state, l. 56 deliberative desire. l 60 esse nolis. p. 45 l. 48 all souls. p. 53 they are. p. 46 l. 2 pain corrupting their. p. 47 l. 2 praeoptat. l. 23 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 48 l. 5, 6 degree l. 8 degree of diminution. l 10 any pain. p. 49. l. 18 my argument. p. 50. l. 7 in this l. 22 will. p. 51. l. 22 the corrupt. p 53. l. 33. permittente Deo. p 55 l. 1: But God by this opinion doth will and procure it by a powerful and effectual decree, which cannot be resisted p. 56 l. 5 this will. l 53 signs of p. 57 l 8 God: p. 59 l. 9 of Thomas. p. 60 l 16 as holily. p. 61 l. 45 is just. p. 62. l. 4 restrains. ib l. 14 good works. l. 22 that therefore God. l. 28. double evil. l. 48 for it by. p. 63 l. 5 Potan. p. 64 l. 7 efficacy of. l 16 supposition. l. 18 necessarily but either necessarily or etc. l. 19 supposition. l. 24 of Aquinas. l. 26 on Gods. Marg: pro culpa. p. 65. l. 34 quotation. l. 45 to fear. l. 48. emortui sarmenti quia Christo resecti sunt; l. 49 multi. p. 66 l. 7 saith not l. 12 nill that. l. 25 futurition. l. 47 from sin. l. 56 or whither he abstain from that which is evil, he doth not abstain from it in a gracious manner; p. 67 l. 12 this of. l. 24 you hearts. l. 51. man's infidelity. p. 68 l. 57 manner of appointing hereunto, for if they be at all appointed hereunto, undoubtedly they are precisely appointed thereunto. p. 69 l. 12 supposition. p. 70 l. 28 second way. p. 73 l. 24 as we. l. 44 severally. p. 74 l. 46 author of the Sin. l. 48 del. good. p. 76. l. 13 will not. p. 78. l. 3 futurition. l. 29 procure. l. 30 as a second. p: 80 l. 12 of England. l. 22 but we l. 31 against. l. 38 if he should work them contrary to their natures then etc. p. 81 l. 7 effecting. p. 83 l. 29 of sin. p. 84 l. 24 acts. p. 85 l. 1 any natural act. l. 50 mere pleasure as the apostle professeth that God hath mercy on whom he will; it is evident that God of his mere pleasure etc. p. 86 l. 18 as uncapable. p. 89. l. 59 nec recte. p: 93 l. 30 will do p. 94 l. 2 nill it. p. 97 l. 36 the cause l. 54. my answer. p. 100 l. 44 with their. p, 102 l. 56 and that p. 104 l. 4 Credible. p 105 l 2 agent. p. 118 l. 41 or vicious. p. 121 l. 41 will of. p. 127 l. 14 of destiny. p. 134 l. 44 asser●oribus. l. 47 quin author l. 50 I propose. p. 140 l. 21 so as to come to pass. p 146 l. 22 pillar had not. l. 23 del. pillar had. p. 147 l ult. why God p. 151 l. 38 & so. p. 157 l. 7 without which. p. 164 l. 56 it may. p. 186 l. 47 decrees. p. 193 l. 2 wherein 'tis manifest that final perseverance in sin goeth before. l. 3 But if you farther proceed to make it good according to your usual course thus; final perseverance in sin goeth before damnation. Ergo &c p: 195 l. 35 mine. l. 54 decrees. p. 198 l. 36 is in. p. 199 l 10 and some. l. 11. privatively. A VINDICATION OF Dr. TWISSE FROM THE EXCEPTIONS OF Mr JOHN GOODWIN IN HIS Redemption Redeemed. BY HENRY JEANES, Minister of God's Word in Chedzoy. OXFORD, Printed for T. Robinson. 1653. TO THE Reverend and Learned Mr JOHN GOODWIN. SIR, I Have assumed so much boldness, as to examine some passages that you have in your Book (entitled Redemption Redeemed) against D. Twisse: wherein I believe that you yourself will acknowledge, that I have carried myself as a fair adversary, as an adversary only unto your opinions, and not unto your person, which I love & honour, as in other respects so for the good and great gifts and parts God hath bestowed on you. Many of my friends have earnestly dissuaded me from this vindication assuring me that I must expect from you instead of a reply, nothing but a libel. But for my part, I shall hope and pray unto the Almighty for better things of you. However I am not hereby deterred from entering into the lists with you. However I am not hereby deterred from entering into the lists with you, neither shall I deprecate your utmost severity in rational argumentation, for the discovery of any thing, that you conceive to be weak and unsound in this my discourse. You may perhaps think and say that so small a trifle is unworthy a diversion from your more serious employments; but for that, I am contented that the learned Reader judge betwixt us. Indeed I had long ere this finished an answer unto your whole Book; but that there was a general, and (as I think) a just expectation, that some in the University of Cambridge, who dissented from you, would comply with your fair invitation of them, to declare themselves in some worthy and satisfactory answer to the particulars propounded in your Book: But upon their long silence (which I can neither excuse, nor will I accuse (as being altogether ignorant of the causes thereof) I renewed my thoughts of setting about this work, and intended in the interim, to have annexed to this piece of D. Twisse, a Table referring unto such passages in this, and other of his Books, as do in great part satisfy whatsoever you have delivered, in your forementioned Treatise, in opposition unto the absoluteness of Divine Reprobation: But from these resolutions I was quite taken off, by certain information, that the Learned M. Kendal (heretofore Fellow of Exeter College in the University of Oxford) hath undertaken you. But I detain you and the reader too long with Prefacing, I shall therefore presently without more ado address myself unto the encounter with you. In three places you except against D. Twisse. I shall consider them severally. To begin with the first. Mr GOODWIN p. 25. 26. c. 2. §. 20. IT is indeed the judgement of some Learned men, that the purpose or intent of God to permit, or suffer such, or such a thing to be done, or such Dr Twisse. or such an accident to come to pass, supposeth a necessity (at least a syllogistical or consequential necessity) of the coming of it to pass. But that the truth lieth on the other side of the way, appears by the light of this consideration. If whatsoever God hath decreed, or intendeth, to permit to come to pass in any case, upon any terms, or any supposition whatsoever, should by virtue of such an intention or decree, necessarily come to pass, than all things possible to be, (or at least ten thousand things more than ever shall be) must be, yea, and this necessarily. For (doubtless God hath decreed, and intendeth, to leave natural causes, generally, to their natural and proper operations, and productions; yea and voluntary causes also, under a power, and at liberty to act ten thousand things more, than ever they will do, or shall do. For example; God intendeth, and hath decreed, to permit, that fire shall burn, what combustible matter soever it shall take hold of, or that shall be cast into it, that one spark of it falling into a barrel of dried Gunpowder, should suddenly fire it, etc. But it doth not follow from hence, that therefore every thing that is combustible in the world, shall be burnt with fire; or that every barrel of dry Gunpowder shall be blown up with sparks of fire falling into them. So (in the instance formerly mentioned) God had decreed to permit the Lords of Keilah to deliver up David into Saul's hand, in case he had stayed in their City, till Saul's coming to demand him: this is evident from 1 Sam. 23. 12. the Text. But it did not follow from this permissive decree of God, that therefore these Lords must necessarily deliver up David into Saul's hand: for we know they did it not. So likewise, God hath decreed to permit any man to destroy the life of another whom he meets with (I mean, in respect of a natural power to do the execution) but it followeth not from hence, that therefore every man must necessarily murder, or destroy the life of his Brother, that cometh in his way. So that evident it is, that no decree of God whatsoever, which is simply and purely permissive, doth import any necessity at all of the perpetration, or coming to pass, of the thing so decreed. God permitted Adam to eat of every tree in the garden of Eden (the tree of knowledge Gen. 2. 16, 17 of good and evil only excepted) & therefore certainly had decreed, or intended this permission: yet was not Adam any ways necessitated by any virtue or influence of this decree upon him, to eat of every of these trees; nor is it in the least degree credible, that ever he did eat of every of them, nor yet of any one of them, but only that, which was prohibited unto him, his ejection out of this garden following so suddenly after this patent, or permission granted unto him. The reason why no decree of God, that is purely and barely permissive, either induceth or supposeth any necessity of the coming to pass, of what is only so decreed, is this. First, because no such decree doth any ways interest God to any manner of interposal, either by his wisdom, power, or providence in what kind soever, towards the effecting or bringing to pass of what is so decreed. So that such events, which are no otherwise decreed by God, then thus, are in the same posture of contingency, in the same possibility of being, or not being, wherein they would have been, had there been no such decree at all concerning them. Secondly, neither doth any such decree in God, suppose a futurity of such a concurrence of causes simply requisite and necessary for the bringing of things, so decreed, to pass, which will actually bring them to pass. Though God hath decreed, that a spark, or coal of fire falling, i. e. in case it shall fall into a barrel of Gunpowder, shall fire it, yet it doth not follow from hence, that he hath decreed, that any such spark or coal, shall fall into it, without which notwithstanding the effect decreed, viz. the firing of this powder, will not come to pass. Or if he said, that God hath decreed that such a spark, or coal, shall fall into the said barrel of powder, now is not the decree barely permissive, but operative and assertive, and such which engageth the decreer to interpose effectually for the bringing of the thing decreed to pass. But such decrees as this, in matters of that nature we deny to be in God. JEANES. DR Twisse doth grant, that God's permission in a complicate notion, as it takes in other acts of God's providence, doth infer the things permitted: And what he saith of God's actual permission in time, is appliable unto his permissive decrees before all time; for as his workings are agreeable unto his effective, so his permissions are suitable unto his permissive decrees. But now that he any where affirmeth, that the decrees of God, which are simply, purely, and barely permissive, See the Second Book of this Treatise, from pag. 90. unto pag. 99 or that the bare, single, and sole permission of God, do import any necessity at all of the perpetration, or coming to pass, of what is only so decreed, and permitted, I utterly deny. And if you had been so well versed in D. Twisse, as it was fit for him, that undertakes a refutation of him, you would never have charged him with that, which he, in a whole digression, professedly impugneth; for which, you may see, how he is taxed (though very modestly) by M. Rutherford, in a Scholastical disputation of his, De Divinâ providentiâ cap. 8. D. Twisse in the third Digression of the second Book of his Vindiciae &c. examineth that proposition of Perkins: Quod Deus non impedit, ideo evenit, quia Deus non impedit. That which God doth not hinder, doth therefore come to pass, because God doth not hinder it, (i) because he doth permit it: where he not only professeth his dislike of it, but also refutes it. This Section than might very well have been spared for in it you fight but with your own shadow, and do not at all oppose the opinion of D. Twisse, who fully accords with you in this particular; That Gods simple and sole permissions, and consequently his decrees, that are simply, purely, and barely permissive, are not illative of those things which are only so decreed, and permitted. To clear this I shall give you an abstract of this Digression. He examineth the truth of this proposition. 1. In the matter, or object of an act natural. 2. In the matter, or object of an act moral, good or bad. 1. First, as concerning natural actions, he hinteth a distinction, between a proper permission of them, and a permission of them improperly so called; that is opposed unto a natural, real, or Physical restraint, this unto a moral restraint, which is by way of dissuasion. First then if we take permission properly, as it is opposed, unto a natural, real, and Physical restraint, and denoteth a suspension thereof, D. Twisse is so far from affirming, that they come to pass, upon God's single, sole, and bare permission, as that he maketh God's positive effection (whether by way of predetermination, or concurrence, he leaves to be discussed in another place) requisite unto the existence of them, without which they never can exist; for God is the principal and immediate Actio Dei Physica sive naturalis ea est, quâ concurrit cum omnibus causis secundis ad actus suos, sive influendo duntaxat in actus ipsarum, quod placet Arminio, Jesuitarum vestigiis insistenti; sive movendo causas secundas ad agendum, quod nobis verisimilius videtur, quemadmodum & inter Pontificios Dominicanis, quae quidem controversia non est hujus loci, sed suo loco repetenda. Hujus concursus divini ratione, nobis videtur absurde dici rem aliquam ideo evenire quia Deus non impediat. Omnis enim res, omnis actus, omnis eneitas, ideo fit, quia Deus vult ut fiat, non permittendo sed efficiendo, idque principaliter. Etenim Deus est causa principalis, & immediata uniuscujusque entitatis, juxta omnes fere Scholasticos, Arminio etiam consentiente, pag. 177. Nec Arminianis, quod sciam, hactenus reluctantibus. Absurd autem dicitur, Deum permittere id fieri, quod facit ut fiat, idque principaliter ipsum efficiendo. Neque hic opus est recurrere ad permissionem, cum omnes in rebus naturalibus agnoscant, & amplectantur Dei efficientiam principalem & immediatam. Vind. lib. 2. pag. 131. cause of all beings and entities, and therefore of all natural actions. And again afterwards. Quare ad actiones naturales quod attinet, quatenus permissio notat suspensionem actionis naturalis, sic Deus non versatur circa easdem dum fiunt, sed positiuè facit. pag. 132. Secondly, if we take permission as it is opposed unto, and denoteth a suspension of, a restraint improperly so called; a moral restraint by way of dissuasion; so D. Twisse is express in denial of any necessity to be inferred, from such a permission of the coming to pass, of what is so. permitted. Ad actiones naturales quod attinet, quatenus permissio not at suspensionem actionis moralis in suadendo aut dissuadendo positae, sic non sequitur, quicquid permititur illud fit. Neque enim quod suadetur quocunque modo, & quantumvis efficaciter, necesse est, ut fiat, nec quod dissuadetur quocunque modo quantumvis efficaciter, necesse est, ut non fiat; Ergo multo minus ex co quod permititur aliquid fieri, vel non fieri, sequitur necessario oportere illud fieri vel non fieri. Secondly, from natural actions he proceeds on to moral, and he beginneth with good and gracious actions; in which he resolveth that natural permission, hoc est, non in genere morali sed Physico, can have no place, for (saith he) this would suppose, that the creature can be carried unto actions truly good, without any special supply or assistance of God's spirit and grace, which we deny can be in the state of nature entire and pure, how much less is it possible in the state of nature corrupted: whence also (saith he) it would follow, that God doth not antecedently work and cause every act truly good, and that by a special supply, aid, or assistance. As for God's permission of good actions in genere morali, he referreth to what he hath spoken touching the like permission of natural actions, only he addeth, that God always concurreth unto an act truly good by a special assistance & that both as a Physical and Moral agent: wherefore (saith he) in this gracious administration of things there is no place at all for permission, as it is opposed unto effection or farthering; for God worketh, causeth, and promoteth every good work in his children; although permission may have room there, as it simply signifieth non-hindrance, for questionless God doth not hinder the good works of his people, which he himself causeth and worketh. Thus you see, that by D. Twisse his opinion, good works do not follow upon God's bare, single, and sole permission, for they cannot be performed without the powerful operation of God's holy spirit, which worketh in us both the will and the deed. Lastly, as touching evil or sinful actions, in them divine permission challengeth a proper and peculiar place, both as permission is opposed unto efficiency, as also unto restraint. First, as 'tis opposed unto efficiency, for the obliquity of them being a privation, is not capable of an efficient cause. Secondly, as 'tis opposed unto restraint, for God doth not hinder sinful actions many times, though it be always in his power. But now if we speak of the permission of sinful actions, in genere morali, or suasorio; so all unanimously affirm, that God persuadeth or exhorteth none unto evil: for if God should interpose his authority, by commanding, advising, or exhorting, whatsoever should be done hereupon, would be lawfully done. But though God himself doth not exhort or persuade unto sin, yet he gives way many times, and that justly, unto the temptations of Satan, and his instruments; nay, he himself by his providence, lays before men outward objects and occasions, suitable unto their inward corruptions; as a goodly Babylonish garment, two hundred shackles of silver, and a wedge of Gold of fifty shackles weight, before the covetous eyes of Achan: beautiful and naked Bathsheba before the lustful eyes of David. Next he suffereth those corruptions, that is, either he doth not cure them by his renewing grace, or he doth not bridle them by his restraining grace, but lets them have their full swinge, without check or control: In his children he doth not actuate and rouse their graces, but lets them lie as it were in a deep sleep, etc. Besides, he concurreth unto those motions of the soul, (as touching the entity of them) unto which men are stirred, by view of objects, that are agreeable unto either their unsubdued or unbridled lusts. From the complication of all these, a particular obduration, and sinful action followeth, so that you take in also, the concourse of God, so far as concerns the substance, or matter of such a sinful action. Now from this variety of providences going before a sinful action, D. Twisse draws this following conclusion. Ex quib us manifestum videtur, ex solâ permissione nequaquam consequi, quod fiat aliquid; & proinde etiam minus verum videtur illud Perkinsei, Quicquid Deus non impedit; ideo fit, quia Deus non impedit. From which it seems manifest, that it in no ways followeth, that a thing cometh to pass upon God's sole permission, and therefore that of Perkins seems not to be true, whatsoever God doth not hinder therefore cometh to pass, because God doth not hinder it. In the next place he bringeth in, and answereth objections. First, This is the opinion not only of Perkins but of Piscator also. Secondly, our adversaries (by name Vorstius and Arminius) grant it, and their concession should be embraced, as making much for the defence of our opinion. Thirdly, there is a reason, which at the first blush seems convincing, unto which not only Vorstius, but also Piscator yieldeth, and 'tis drawn from the nature of Relatives: For, seeing permission and the thing permitted are Relatives, it seems necessary, that they exist together: upon supposal then of the permission of the coming to pass of such a thing it seems necessary, that that which is so permitted, do come to pass. Unto these he dispatcheth an answer severally, in the same order as they were propounded. First, as for our Divines, he acknowledgeth, that they have so thought, but truth is to be preferred before any testimony; Amicus Socrates, Amicus Plato, magis amica veritas: For 'tis but reason that we should have regard unto, and care of, only truth, that so we may (with the Apostle) say, we can do nothing against the truth, but for the truth. Secondly, he showeth, how that for the existence of a thing, Piscator doth not acquiesce in God's sole permission, but flieth unto God's government, and that so powerful, as that it bows, bends, and turns the Veruntamen & hoc etiam advertendum est; cum contra Piscatorem in hunc modum disputaret Vorstius, Permissio in eo, cui permissio fit, nihil omnino novl per se causat aut efficit, sed tantum vires & facultates semel illi datas, ab alienâ laesione tutas praestat, & liberum istarum exercitium eidem relinquit: imo nihil prorsus extra ipsum permittentem efficit, nisi quod actionem hujus impedientem cohibet, aut potius retinet, & quasi suspendit. Est enim ipsa per se tantum decretum non impediendi: hoc est, for is non agendi. Quomodo autem is, qui non agit, eo ipso quod non agit, aliquid extra se causet, vel alteri necessitatem agendi offerat? Aut quomodo is qui necessitatem hanc alteri offered, eo ipso nihil agere, sed alterius tantum actionem permittere, sive non impedire, sine contradictione dici possit? Videas jam quomodo ad ista Vorstiana respondeat Piscator, in marginalibus suis annotationibus. At ego (inquit) non dico quod Deus tantùm permittat ea quae permittit: Sed dico quod illa ipsa etiam gubernat; Respons. ad Amic. Collat. Vorstii p. 231. Idem p. 131. Explicat quid sibi velit, cum ait, Deum gubernate. Denotant (inquit) illa effectionem quandam Dei quoad peccara, sed non denotant effectionem talem, quâ Deus ipse efficiat peccata, quatenus habent rationem peccatorum, ●en quatenus sunt peccata; sed denotant gubernationem Dei, quâ ut Creator voluntates humanas flectit quocunque voluerit. Ex his manifestum est, Piscatorem sol● permissione Dei minime acquievisse, ad hoc ut aliquid consequentèr fieri dicatur, sed ad gubernationem Dei confugisse; & ejusmodi gubernationem qua voluntates humanas flectit quocunque voluerit. wills of men whither he pleaseth. As for the concessions of Arminius and Vorstius, seeing they are erroneous, a patronage of our opinion drawn from them is not to be valued so much, as to be built upon. Verum tanti non est hujusmodi patrocinium, ut errone is quantumvis propitiis innitamur assertionibus. As for the reason, that is of no force or strength, for we may as well conclude, that because God did from eternal will or decree to create the World, therefore the World from eternal was created; or because God from eternal foreknew that the World should be, therefore the World did exist from eternal: for there is no less relation, between the willing of a thing, and the thing willed; the decree of a thing, and the thing decreed; the foreknowledge of a thing, and the thing foreknown; than there is, between the permission of a thing, and the thing permitted. And there is between them as a relation, so also a reciprocation: whereupon it followeth, that if God willeth or decreeth a thing, it is willed or decreed; if he foreknows a thing, it is foreknown; if he permits a thing it is permitted: but as it doth not follow, a thing is willed or decreed, therefore 'tis actually existent; a thing is foreknown, therefore it is; In like manner it doth not follow, a thing is permitted, therefore it is actually: and indeed if God's mere permission did infer the existence of a thing upon this ground, because permission and the thing permitted are relatives, it would hold as well concerning the permission of man, as God; But 'tis manifest, that it followeth not upon man's permission, that whatsoever he permitteth, cometh to pass. But it may be objected, it is necessary that whatsoever is willed by God, do at some time or other, come to pass, therefore we may say the same of what is permitted by God. He denyeth the consequence, and he giveth this reason for his denial, because God's permission is not so effectual unto the existence of a thing, as his volition; and yet he acknowledgeth, that this kind of consequence is true in natural causes, but this is not in regard only of permission, but from the determination of a natural cause to work, unless it be hindered: as concerning rational and free agents, this consequence, a thing is permitted to come to pass, therefore it doth come to pass, is of no Ad rationem vero quod attinet, eam nullius esse pretii constanter affirmamus. Nam pari rationis efficacia concludi posset, quia Deus voluit ab aeterno, sive decrevit mundum creare, ergo mundus ab aeterno creatus est, vel quia Deus ab aeterno mundum futurum praescivit, ergo mundus ab aeterno extitic. Etenim relatio nihilo minus intercedit inter volitionem & rem volitam; decretum & rem decretam; praescientiam & rem praescitam, quam inter permissionem & rem permissam; Unde quamvis sequatur, Deus voluit mundum ab aeterno, ergo ab aeterno mundus est volitus; Deus scivit mundum ab aeterno, ergo mundus ab aeterno est scitus; Deus permisit aut permittit actum fieri, ergo actus est aut fuit permissus. Attamen inde nequaquam sequetur; ergo quod volitum est, existebat, quum primum volitum erat; aut quod permissum est, existebat, quum primum permissum est. Dices, atqui quod volitum est a Deo, necesse est ut aliquando sit; ergo & quod permissum, similiter necesse erit, ut sit. Imo, inquam, nequaquam sequitur. Neque enim par est utrobique ratio, sed valde dispar; quod & cuilibet manifestum est. neque enim permissio tam efficax est ad existentiam rei, quam volitio. Nec tamen diffiteor hoc genus consequentiae procedere in causis naturalibus, sed non ex solâ vi permissionis, sed ex determinatione causae naturalis ad agendum nisi impediatur. De causis vero rationalibus & libere agentibus, nunquam obtinet hoc genus consequentiae, permittitur aliquid fieri, ergo fit. At, inquies, sunt relata; & relata sunt simul naturâ. Agnosco esse relata, & quatenus sunt relata converti ad consequentiam. Positâ ergo permissione rei, necesse est ut res sit permissa; perinde atque positâ volitione rei necesse est, ut res sit volita; item positâ praescientia rei, necesse est ut res sit praescita. Sed quemadmodum non sequitur, res est volita, ergo est; aut res est praescita, ergo est; perinde etiam non sequitur, res est permissa, ergo est. Quemadmodum nec sola praescientia, aut volitio rei sufficit ad hoc, ut res existat; ita etiam neque sola permissio rei sufficit ad hoc, ut res extra causas suas constituatur. Haec tamen ratio, fateor, imposuit Piscatori, pag. 231. Ad Amic. Collat. Vorstii. Ubi sic disserit; ubi autem permissio est, ibi etiam est factum quod permittitur. Quomodo enim dici potest permitti illud, quod non fit? Certe pari ratione dici potest, permitti illud quod non fit; quemadmodum dici potest, volitum esse quod tamen non fit; licet ad existentiam rei, multo efficacior sit volitio, quam permissio. Imo quomodo non dici possit, permitti aliquid quamvis non fiat, cum permittere nihil aliud sit, quam neque facere ut aliquid fiat, neque ne fiat impedire. Pergit Piscator, quip, inquiens, haec sunt relata, & proinde simul natura. Quum igitur Deus decrevit permittere peccata, necesse est ut illa fiant. At jam ostendimus, ex eo quod relata sint, hoc tantum sequi, positâ permissione, rem esse permissam; sic & positâ volitione rei, sequitur rem esse volitam; & positâ praescientiâ rei, sequitur rem esse praescitam; at hinc minime sequitur propterea rem actualem aliquam existentiam sortiri: ita etiam, licet positâ permissione, res merito dicatur esse permissa, at hinc non sequitur propterea rem esse simpliciter, & extra causas suas actualiter constitui; Quod si haec consecutio legitima esset, quod contendit Piscator, non modo ex permissione Dei, sequeretur rem e vestigio existere; sed & ex quavis cujusvis hominis permissione; atqui manifestum est (nec Piscator credo resisteret) ex hominis permissione nequaquam sequi, quicquid permititur fieri, mox existere. force at all. The last and principal objection is concerning the permission of sin in particular; without grace sin cannot be avoided, and the permission of sin stands in the denial of grace: it is clear therefore that upon the permission of sin, sin necessarily ensueth. First, he answereth, this in no-wise followeth from the nature of permission in general (as some Divines, have thought) but from a peculiar manner of God's permission, standing in a constant denial of grace without which sin can be shunned by none. Secondly he distinguisheth of a twofold consideration of sin, indefinite or definite, and that either in regard of sorts and kinds, or else particular actions. First, he grants, that upon the permission of sin, that is, the denial of grace, sin followeth indefinitely, and in general; so that as long as God withholds his grace, a man sins, either in doing what is forbidden, or else in doing what is commanded in a wrong way or manner. He also sins in omitting what is commanded, or in abstaining from what is forbidden in an unholy, and ungracious way or manner. And this he exemplifieth both in the unregenerate and regenerate. First, whiles God denies to, or withholds from, an unregenerate man, his habitual grace, or grace of regeneration; whilst he suffereth his spiritual diseases to go uncured, his corruptions unsubdued, and unmortified, so long he cannot but sin in all his rational and deliberate, both actions and omissions. First, all his actions are sins of commission, either a doing of what is forbidden, or a sinful performance of what is commanded, not out of right principles, nor for the due and requisite end. Secondly all his omissions are sinful, for they are either of what is enjoined, or else if they be of what is prohibited, they are not sanctified, proceeding from the love of God, and directed unto the glory of God above all. Next as for the regenerate, if God deny unto, or withhold from them, never so little a while, his actual grace, the actual supply, and assistance of his spirit, they sin in whatsoever they perform, or forbear; And indeed it is no wonder, that upon Gods suspending the aid of his actual grace, the regenerate break out into sin, in whom there is a flesh always lusting against the spirit, whose graces are imperfect, and corruptions natural, and therefore active, upon removal of impediments; For sin in Adam followed upon the sole suspension of actual assistance to will that good, unto which he had an habitual fitness; and yet in him propension unto good was perfect, without any mixture of inclination unto evil. Secondly, he denyeth, that upon the bare permission of sin, sin followeth definitely, either for sorts and kinds, or particular actions. But here first, he implieth an exception of general, and comprehensive sins, that either lie at the root of, or are concomitant unto every sin, as inordinate self-love etc. Fortè dici potest, ex carentià justitiae originalis, sequi necessario, ut creatura feratur in amorem sui inordinatè, adeo ut quicquid operatur, illud faciat propter se, non autem propter Deum. Secondly he desireth, chiefly to be understood concerning the imperate or external actions of sin, and such actions of the will, as are of efficacy, purposes, resolutions, etc. For upon God's permission, that is, not curing, or healing, not subduing of particular sinful habits. v. g. Covetousness, luxury, there do necessarily follow such sinful actions of the will, as are styled usually to be of complacency, that do, quoad specificationem, for their sort and kind, answer such habits, to wit, velleities, desires, wouldings, and wish, likeing, approbations, etc. A covetous man whilst under the reign of covetousness, cannot but love, like, and covet after things which he judgeth to be gainful; a luxurious voluptuary cannot but love, approve, and long after things which he knoweth to be pleasant and delightful unto his senses. Omnino videtur Deum non posse impedire, ne avarus velit & concupiscat ea, quae videntur utilia; vel libidinosus ea, quae titillant tanquam jucunda: nam velle & concupiscere, nihil aliud est, quam desiderare; at avarus quà avarus necessario talia desiderat & concupiscit, alias non esset avarus, & libidinosus quà libidinosus talia desiderat, aliâs minime dicendus esset libidinosus. Lib. 2. part. 2. pag. 15. For habits work ad modum naturae necessarily. A covetous person, as covetous, necessarily desireth and coveteth things profitable; a lustful or unclean person necessarily desireth such objects and actions as are unclean, etc. And yet of these too, we cannot say that they follow merely upon his permission, secluding his concourse. These limitations premised; let us return to consider what he denyeth, to wit, that upon the bare permission of sin, sin doth not follow definitely for sorts or kinds, or particular actions. Sine gratiâ (saith he) abstineri potest a peccato definite quo ad certam speciem, vel etiam in individuo consideratam. There is no particular sin, especially of commission, but may be abstained from without grace: And therefore upon the mere and bare denial or withholding of grace, this or that particular sin doth not follow. For first, those that are destitute of habitual grace, the grace of regeneration, may yet be free from divers particular sinful habits. v. g. Covetousness, Luxury, etc. Secondly, in those that have such particular sinful habits; those habits are not actuated, especially by outward actions, upon God's bare and single permission, his sole denial of grace. This he proves by reason and Scripture. First by reason, because the subject of an actual sin of commission, is a natural act, and unto the performance of a natural act, Gods bare permission is not sufficient, Malum (quod dicitur) semper habitat in alieno fundo; & peccatum omne quod in commissione versatur, semper habet actum aliquém naturalem substratum; adeo ut ejusmodi peccatum aliquod nunquam exeat in actum ex solâ negatione gratiae, nisi etiam aliqua alia rerum administratio fiat, secundum quam actus aliquis naturalis patretur, quae sit propria materia ta lis deformitatis. Secondly by Scripture, in which Gods wonderful providence working and prostituting men unto sin, is never set forth unto us, by a sole and single permission: But he is said, sometimes to give men up unto vile affections, unto a reprobate mind, unto strong delusions, to send an evil spirit between men, to put a lying spirit in their mouths, to mingle a perverse spirit in them, etc. He told David, that he would take away his concubines, and give them unto his Son Absalon; He told Jeroboam, that he would rend the Kingdom out of the hands of Solomon, and give ten tribes unto Jeroboam, which was done by their defection, and revolt from the house of Judah. Now they who think that all these things might be dispatched, and accomplished by God's sole and single permission, take I confess (saith he) a short cut, but they send away the Reader, that is desirous to find out the truth, empty and void of all satisfaction. Upon this he concludes, that as often as any thing comes to pass according to God's permission, so often God's permission is not solitary or single, but hath another government of things, another administration of divine providence, accompanying it; which he explaineth at large touching sin: unto the performance of this or that particular sinful action, there are required a leading into temptation, an affording of objects, occasions, and opportunities, a letting loose of Satan, the concourse of God by way of previous motion unto the matter, or subject of the action, a removeall of all impediments, whether holy and gracious, or else but merely natural. The explanation of all which, you may there see at large in this digression. Out of this he inferreth a distinction of permission, into efficacious and unefficacious, and concludes that the permission of sin is not so much efficacious of itself, as in regard of that either obduration, or excecation, or both, concerning either temporal, or spiritual good things, with which it is conjoined. Hinc constare poterit permissionem peccati particularis commodè dividendam esse, in permissionem efficacem & inefficacem, & permissionem efficacem non tam ex sese efficacem esse, quam proratione ejus, cum quâ semper conjuncta est, obdurationis, excaecationis, aut utriusque, sive quoad bona spiritualia, sive quoad bona temporalia. But I shall trouble neither the Reader, nor you, with transcribing any more out of this digression. And indeed this is enough to satisfy him, and convince you, that you have wronged D. Twisse, in pinning upon him such an opinion, which he opposeth with far greater strength of argument, than you yourself. This is sufficient to answer this whole section; But I shall examine whatsoever is considerable in it. The proposition you charge upon D. Twisse is this, That the purpose or intent of God, to permit, or suffer such or such a thing to be done, or such or such an accident to come to pass, supposeth a necessity (at least a syllogistical or consequential necessity) of the coming of it to pass. He that is acquainted with the works of D. Twisse, knoweth, that this proposition is to be understood. 1. Concerning only the permission of evil. 2. Concerning not only God's act, the permission of evil, but also the being of evil by God's permission. 3. Concerning not a single, sole, and bare permission, but an efficacious permission, that hath several acts of God's providence accompanying it. First, it is to be understood only concerning the permission of evil, and that as touching the Formal, the pravity or obliquity of it, which being a privation is uncapable of being an object of an effective decree. This I might clear from most of those places, wherein this distinction between an effective and permissive decree is propounded; but I shall spare to name them at this present, and content myself, with the alleging of one place, where he expressly puts this limitation upon the proposition we speak of, De Scientiâ Mediâ. pag. 133. col. 2. Non pauci sunt, non modo ex nostris, sed & ex Theologis nobis oppositis, tam Pontificiis, quam Arminianis, qui putant, infallibitèr futurum esse, quicquid etc. Deus permittere decreverit, hoc est autem, duntaxat in genere mali. Nam quae fiunt bona, ea fieri decrevit Deus non tam ipso permittente, quam faciente, in quocunque genere bona fuerint, sive in genere boni moralis, sive naturalis sive supernaturalis; summa, sive in genere entis bonum fuit, sive in genere moris. And by this it is apparent, that your instance in God's decree to permit fire to burn combustible matter, is altogether impertinent, for that is quid bonum in genere entis. Secondly, he makes God's permissive decree to be, not only concerning God's act, the permission of evil, but also the being of evil by his permission; so that not only the permission of evil is the object of his will, but the being of it also. Sententia Perkinsei nostrorumque Theologorum est, lapsum Adami evenisse voluntate Dei transeunte, non duntaxat in suam permissionem, sed etiam in rem permissam, hoc est, Deum voluisse, ut Adamus laberetur, ipso permittente. Vindic. l. 2. part. 1. pag. 127. What he speaks of God's will, to permit Adam's fall, may be accommodated to his permissive will or decree, of any other sin. Lastly, that he speaks of not a bare, but efficacious permission, so termed, not Formally, but by way of concomitancy, the Digression which I have abbreviated is a proof of undeniable evidence; And I am so confident of your ingenuity, as that I doubt not, but you will acknowledge as much: and therefore your objection, which runs only concerning a decree that is simply, barely, and purely permissive, is nothing at all to the purpose. Well then, take this proposition, (the purpose or intend of God, to permit or suffer, such or such a thing to be done, inferreth a necessity of the coming of it to pass) in the sense and meaning of D. Twisse, to wit, concerning an efficacious permission of evil; and if you can accommodate your objection unto it, I will confess that you can work a miracle in Logic. MR GOODWIN. BUt that the truth lieth on the other side of the way, appears by the light of this consideration, If whatsoever God hath decreed, or intendeth to permit to come to pass, in any case, upon any terms, or any supposition whatsoever, should by virtue of such an intention or decree necessarily come to pass, than all things possible to be; or at least, ten thousand things more, than ever shall be, must be, yea and this necessarily, JEANES. IF you supply the propositions that are wanting, and make this a complete Syllogism, it will be in secundo modo Syllogismi connexi, qui tollit consequens, ut tollat antecedens. And then your conclusion, if your Syllogism be true for form, will be, Therefore whatsoever God hath decreed, or intendeth to permit to come to pass in any case, upon any terms, or any supposition whatsoever, shall not by virtue of such an intention or decree necessarily come to pass. And then if in your Syllogism there be not committed that fallacy, which is called Ignoratio elenchi, never Syllogism framed in this world, was sick of this disease; for the conclusion you infer, is no-wise opposite unto any thing in D. Twisse. Can you (dare you) say, that D. Twisse any where affirmeth, that whatsoever God hath decreed, or intendeth to permit to come to pass, in any case upon any terms, or any supposition whatsoever, shall by virtue of such an intention or decree, necessarily come to pass? Consult all his books that are extant, whether in Latin or English; and if you can prove any such passage to be in them, either in express terms, or by just consequence, I will acknowledge that I have wronged you, in as shameful and public a manner as you will prescribe: and if you cannot make good, that D. Twisse hath said any such thing, it will be very agreeable unto justice, that you make a retraction of your mistake. The palpable grossness of the injury that you do D. Twisse, will the better appear, if you compare the conclusion which you father upon him, with the example you bring a little after. God intendeth, and hath decreed to permit, that fire shall burn what combustible matter soever it shall take hold off, or that shall be cast into it, that one spark of it, falling into a barrel of dry Gunpowder, should suddenly fire it; but it doth not follow from hence, that therefore every thing that is combustible in the World, shall be burnt with fire, or that every barrel of dried Gunpowder, shall be blown up with sparks of fire falling into them. Here you make as if the permissive decree D. Twisse speaks of, were concerning God's permission of things to come to pass, not absolutely but conditionally, in such a case, upon such terms, upon such a supposition; and as if he affirmed, that whatsoever God hath decreed to permit to come to pass, only conditionally, should by virtue of such a decree come to pass absolutely, and necessarily. This is one of the absurdest assertions that ever dropped from the pen of a rational man, and in D. Twisse there is nothing sounding like it: you do very ill therefore (that I say no more) to asperse him with it. Nay D. Twisse is so far from making a bare, permissive * conditional decree, to be illative of the absolute existence So called in regard of its object. of whatsoever God hath decreed to permit to come to pass conditionally, as that he denyeth any such inference to be made from an effective conditional decree. Though it were very strange (saith he against Cotton pag. 97.) that any thing should not be accomplished which God doth will absolutely, yet surely, it is nothing strange, that that should not be accomplished, which God doth will to come to pass only upon a condition, for the condition failing, there is no reason why we should expect the accomplishment thereof: How often doth he tell you, that for God to decree the salvation of all men, only conditionally, in case they believe and repent, is no more to decree their salvation, than their damnation; for as he hath purposed salvation to men upon condition of faith, and repentance; so on the other side, it is as undoubtedly true, that God hath ordained, that whosoever, coming to ripe years, shall not believe and repent, shall be damned: and as to decree the salvation of all men only conditionally, is no more to decree their salvation than their damnation; so to decree to permit a thing to come to pass only conditionally, in such a case, upon such terms, upon such a supposition, is no more to decree the permission of it, than the not permission of it to come to pass: what is said of conditional propositions, is true of conditional purposes, both effective and permissive, Nihil ponunt in esse, sc. absolute & simpliciter, & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. To go one step farther, D. Twisse is very unlikely to conclude from God's decree, barely to permit a thing to come to pass conditionally, in such a case, upon such terms, or upon such a supposition, that therefore the thing so decreed, shall absolutely come to pass, because if we speak of positive things, he is clearly and constantly of the opinion, that we cannot say truly, that they shall come to pass, so much as conditionally in such a case, upon such terms, etc. Unless God decree not barely to permit, but to work and effect the thing conditionated, upon supposal of such conditions, De Scientià Medià. p. 430. Ad eundem modum concedimus omnem enunciationem conditionatam de futuris conditionatis esse necessariam, modo Deus decreverit, posità tali conditione, rem ipsam conditionatam effectam dare: quod nisi ponamus Deum decrevisse, prorsus praeter omnem Analogiam disserit Suarez; dum prophetiarum comminantium & promittentium eandem rationem esse vult, atque propositionum de futuris contingentibus conditionatarum qualiumcunque, quas etiam prophetias appellat Suarez. Now if he will not allow us to make any inference of the conditional futurition of positive things, from a decree that is barely permissive, and conditional, it would be very strange, if he himself should make such a permissive conditional decree, to be illative of the absolute futurition of whatsoever is so decreed. And thus have I done with your conclusion, which I affirm not to be opposite unto any proposition in D. Twisse his Books, and I hope you will pardon me, if I presume so far, as to challenge you to prove the contrary. In the next place, I shall make bold, to question the truth of the consequence of your Major proposition, which is this, If whatsoever God hath decreed, or intendeth to permit to come to pass, in any case, upon any terms, or any supposition whatsoever, should by virtue of such an intention or deeree necessarily come to pass, than all things possible to be, etc. must be, yea, and this necessarily. And the reason why I question it, is because I much doubt, whether God hath decreed, or intendeth to permit to come to pass conditionally, in some case, upon some terms, or upon some supposition or other, all things whatsoever, that are possible, all things (I say) that are possible, (whether unto all natural or necessary, or else all free and rational agents) that is not only such as do exist, have existed, or shall exist for the future, but also all that are in any possibility of existence, whose existence implieth no contradiction. And that your satisfaction unto this, may be the fuller and distincter, I shall branch it into some particulars, which I shall entreat you to clear up unto me. First, there are many things that are merely possible, numberless millions of men and Angels, which have not, never had, never shall have actual existence: and unto these there is possible, as great a variety of both actions and sufferings, which that God hath decreed to permit to come to pass conditionally, in some case, upon some terms, upon some supposition or other, is not (I confess) within the compass of my Creed; but yet I shall be willing to be instructed by you, provided that you prove what you undertake to teach me. Now that I am not much to be blamed for making a doubt of this, will (I hope) be confessed by you, if you please to consider. First, that Didacus Alvarez (a very learned man) holds it to be the Resp. etc. pag. 63. & 143. more probable opinion that there are not in God conditional decrees, concerning all future conditional contingents, which may be framed by our understandings in infinite combinations, as well concerning things actually existent, as also things possible, but only in comparison of those future conditionals, which are revealed by God, Christ, or the Prophets, etc. And he insinuates this reason out of Ledesma, because other conditional decrees would be in vain, impertinent, and no ways conducing unto God's providence, and government of the World: which reason is as well appliable unto conditional permissive, as conditional effective decrees. M. Rutherford (I know) argueth somewhat against this, but I believe you will not plow with his Heifer. Secondly, that D. Twisse not only affirmeth but proveth, that things merely possible, are not the object of God's decree, in his Book against jackson p. 283. 333. & 394. Look we (saith he) upon the decrees of men, the wisest of men, were they ever known to decree that a thing may be done? But rather supposing many things may be done, they make choice to decree the doing of such courses, as seem most convenient: things are possible without any reference to the decrees of God, but only in reference to his power. That is possible unto God, which he can do, or which he hath power to cause, that it be brought to pass; As for example, before the World was made, it was possible that the World should be made; was this by virtue of God's decree? Did God decree it to be possible? If he did, seeing his decrees are free, it followeth that he might have chosen whether the World should have been possible or no. His arguments are appliable unto Gods permissive as well as effective decrees, unto his conditional, as well as absolute decrees. From agents merely possible, pass we on unto such as do exist in some difference of time or other, and unto them some things are possible only in regard of an obediential power, some things are possible in regard of a natural power. First some things are possible, and that unto all sorts of second agents, only in regard of an obediential power; thus 'tis possible for ten thousand Asses besides Balaam's to speak, for ten thousand pieces of iron (besides that mentioned 2 Kings 6.) to swim; 'tis possible for wine to be made of ten thousand pots of water etc. Besides those six we read of john. 2. It is possible of stones to have children raised up unto Abraham: Now that God hath decreed to permit all things thus possible to come to pass conditionally, in some case, is as I take it false, and I shall give you my reason out of D. Twisse his Digression, De naturà permissionis. lib. 2. part. 2. pag. 16. col. 2. Irrationalia dicuntur permitti, quoties sinuntur ferri secundùm naturam suam, quemadmodum cum lapis sinitur ferri deorsum; ignis sinitur grassari in domas hominum: itaque circa agentia naturalia dum versatur permissio, palam est praesupponi, non modo propensionem, sed & determinationem ad agendum; non sic, quoties versatur circa agentia rationalia; nam & rationales substantiae, quando permittuntur agere, sinuntur etiam ferri secundum naturam suam; aut alia esset ratio permissionis rerum rationalium, quam irrationalium, quod minime videtur. Irrational agents are said to be permitted as often as they are suffered to be carried according to their natures; as when a stone is suffered to move downward, fire to rage upon the houses of men: So also rational substances when they are permitted to act, they are suffered to be moved, or carried agreeably unto their natures, quoties permittuntur sibi pro domesticae inclinationis ratione quà libet feruntur, ib. pag. 11. c. 1. or otherwise the nature of the permission of things rational and irrational, would differ in regard of form, where as the difference between them is only in respect of the matter about which each is conversant, as he showeth presently after the words quoted. Again of those things which are possible unto all sorts and kinds of agents, there are some which God hath absolutely decreed to effect, or bring to pass by his operation, some which he hath absolutely decreed to hinder or restrain. Now whatsoever God worketh or effecteth, he doth not permit, as permission is opposed unto effection, and therefore it cannot be the object of a bare permissive decree, but of an operative or effective. Secondly, what he hindereth or restraineth either immediately by himself, or mediately by second causes, he cannot be at all said to permit, and therefore he never decreed to permit it; more briefly, God cannot be said to decree the bare and naked permission of that whose effection or working he hath decreed; he cannot be said to decree the permission of that, whose hindrance or restraint he hath intended, but of things possible, he hath decreed the effection of some, the restraint and hindrance of others: and therefore there are many things possible, which he hath not decreed barely to permit. I but perhaps you will say, that though whatsoever God hath absolutely decreed to effect or hinder, he hath not decreed to permit to come to pass absolutely, yet he hath decreed it shall come to pass conditionally, in such cases, upon such terms, and upon such a supposition. But this is spoken gratis, and therefore I do beseech you to evidence it by dint of argument, unto which if convincing, I hope I shall submit. But I imagine I see a backdoor, at which you intent to run away, and save yourself the labour of meddling with that work, which I have here cut out for you, and that is the clause which you have added by way of Parenthesis in your consequent (or at least ten thousand things more than ever shall be (Here your consequent hath two propositions in it, one universal, than all things possible must be, yea and this necessarily; another particular, at least ten thousand things more than ever shall be, must be, and this necessarily. And these two propositions are propounded in a disjunctive manner, so that if the first be routed and miscarry, the other may serve as a reserve to fly unto, this is the shift of a diffident and fearful disputant, that knows not well what to say or hold: and therefore beneath that acumen, which I may justly expect from a man of your great Wit and Learning: how commendable it is, will appear, if you take your consequent by itself, and sever it from the antecedent, and then parallel it with others of the like nature which no man can deny to be absurd and ridiculous; as all men are white, or at least ten thousand times more than are black: all men are unregenerate, or at least more than are regenerate: all men are healthy and sound, or at least more than are sick. But you pretend unto a proof of the consequence of your Major, we will hear what you say. Mr GOODWIN. FOr doubtless God hath decreed, and intendeth to leave natural causes generally, to their natural and proper operations and productions, yea and voluntary causes also, under a power, and at liberty to act ten thousand things more, than ever they will do or shall do. JEANES. YOur Major is, If whatsoever God hath decreed or intendeth to permit to come to pass, in any case, upon any terms, or any supposition whatsoever, should by virtue of such an intention or decree, necessarily come to pass, than all things possible to be, or at least ten thousand things more than ever shall be, must be, yea and this necessarily. Now how the consequence hereof is proved by this your proposition (I confess) passeth my skill. The readiest way to examine the consequence in a connexe Syllogism, is to reduce it unto a categorical, and the way of that, every ordinary Logic will inform you is, by giving a reason of the consequence by a categorical proposition, and placing it in the room of the Major in your categorical Syllogism. Now take the proof that you bring of the consequence, or sequel of your major proposition, (for doubtless God hath decreed, and intendeth to leave natural causes generally, to their natural, and proper operations, and productions, yea and voluntary causes also, under a power, and at liberty, to act ten thousand times more than ever they will do or shall do) and let it be placed in the room of your major, and then in what Mood and Figure will you infer your conclusion, viz. Whatsoever God hath decreed, or intendeth to come to pass, in any case, upon any terms, or any supposition whatsoever, shall not by virtue of such an intention or decree necessarily come to pass. And thus you see how weakly you impugn that proposition which is only of your own setting up. But let us look upon this passage in itself, setting aside the reference it carrieth of a proof unto the foregoing words, if you understand Gods leaving of natural causes unto their natural and proper operations, etc. And so also his leaving voluntary causes under a power, and at liberty to act ten thousand things more than ever they will do or shall do, so as to make it exclusive of that influence which is by way of previous motion of second causes themselves, whether natural or voluntary unto all their operations, why your doubtless will not carry it, as long as the arguments, by which D. Twisse lib. 2. Digres. 7. proves, that God moves all second causes unto their operations, remain unanswered by you, and you bring no proof to the contrary, but your bare word. MR GOODWIN. SO likewise God hath decreed, to permit any man to destroy the life of another whom he meets with (I mean in respect of a natural power, to do the execution) but it followeth not from hence, that therefore every man must necessarily murder or destroy the life of his brother that cometh in his way. JEANES. UNto this I oppose these following arguments. First, God withholds many bloody minded men from actual murder, as well as he did Abimelech from committing adultery, and unto him cannot be permitted the doing of a thing, who is restrained therefrom; for permission and restraint are opposed privatively, and therefore cannot be found in the same subject at once, in regard of the same action. Secondly, permission of the sin of murder essentially implieth, a withholding of grace effectual and necessary, for the avoidance of the sin of murder: but God doth not withhold from every man that grace, which is effectual and necessary for avoidance of the sin of murder; And therefore he doth not permit every man to commit it. Thirdly, permission of outward and imperate acts (aswell as restraint, unto which it is privatively opposed) supposeth a propension or inclination unto them, a purpose or desire of them in the agents unto whom they are permitted: but there is not in every man a propension or inclination, a purpose or desire to murder every one that cometh in his way; Therefore God doth not permit every man to murder every one that cometh in his way. The Major is a principle with Arminius in his Tractate de permissione; in personâ cui permittitur, duo ponenda, actus istius respectu, Primo, vires sufficientes ad actum praestandum, intellige, nisi impediatur: Secundo, propensio ad actum producendum, citra hanc enim frustrà permittitur actus, citra illas omnino non permittitur; nam necessario ad actus praestationem requiruntur: utut adsint illae, nisi propendeat persona, cui permittitur actus, ad actum ipsum, nullo fine & in vagum permittitur. Imo nec recte dici potest, quod alicui actus permittatur, qui actus illius praestandi affectu nullo tenetur. But this Testimony perhaps may be of small authority with you, however his reason deserves your consideration. D. Twisse indeed dissents from him, as touching the permission of the elicit acts of the will, but fully agreeth with him, as concerning the outward and imperate acts thereof, Hear his own words. Circa irrationalia agentia si versetur permissio, praesupponit, fateor, ejusmodi propensionem etc. Agentia vero rationalia quoties concernit permissio, eadem ratio erit quoad actus ipsorum imperatos: Neque enim proprie dicitur quis aut permitti, aut impediri, ne faciat aliquid exterius, nisi praesupponatur hoc ipsum velle, & intendere actu interno aut elicito: ex quo commode dicitur vel permitti facere quod intendebat, vel ne faciat quod volebat impediri, hactenus it aque agnosco propensionem quandam ad agendum praecedaneam esse permissioni. Unto what Arminius and D. Twisse say, I shall add this reason of mine own. Permission and restraint are opposed privatively, and therefore as Aristotle hath taught us: l. Categ. Cap. 10. S. 11. Sunt circa idem, Nulli rei competit privatio, cui non possit etiam competere habitus: And therefore we call not any thing deaf, blind, or dumb, but what is capable of hearing, sight and speech. In like manner no outward action can properly be permitted unto a man, but what he may be hindered and restrained from: but now a man cannot be hindered, or restrained from the performance of an outward action, unto which he hath no propension or inclination, of which he hath no purpose or desire, no more than he can be constrained unto that, from which he is not averse, therefore neither can such an action be permitted unto him, if we take permission properly, (as Bannes saith) as it is not nuda negatio, sed privatio. By this time the Reader, I suppose, is satisfied, that God doth not permit every man to murder or destroy the life of every one that cometh in his way; and therefore consequently, he hath not decreed or intended any such permission. As for the limitation which you bring to qualify your assertion, it nothing mends the matter: for I have proved the assertion to be false in itself, by arguments, that fear not the light of your trial or examination: and false assertions cannot be made good by any limitations whatsoever; so much I learned when I was a Boy from Keckerm. System. Log. lib. 2. cap. 4. Quicquid subjecto limitatiuè tribuitur, id verè tribuitur. But suppose this assertion were justifiable, by some limitation or other, yet not by this, which you bring; because this natural power to do the execution, (as you speak) is insufficient to denominate the permission of murder; because 'tis consistent with the opposite of such a permission, restraint from murder, etc. First, because 'tis insufficient to denominate the permission of murder: A natural power to perform an action is essentially requisite unto the permission thereof, but it is not only the essential requisite thereunto, and therefore an insufficient ground for the affirmation of it. If it be lawful to affirm a predicate of a subject in respect of the presence of one essential requisite unto the said predicate, when there are wanting any other things essentially required thereunto also, as absurd propositions as are imagineable, will be hence justified: As that beasts and plants are men, and Men beasts; for of beasts and plants there are affirmed divers things, which do agree unto man essentially; and so on the other side, divers things are predicated of men essentially, which are also essential unto beasts and plants. Secondly, a natural power to destroy the life of another, is consistent with the opposite of such a permission, to wit, restraint from the murder of him: a power to produce an act may be hindered majoris aut aequalis saltem potentiae oppositione, saith your Arminius, by opposal of a greater, or at least an equal power: though a man have not only a power, but a will, a desire, and purpose to take away the life of another, yet he may be restrained, not only by fear of punishment, dictates of a natural conscience within, but also by opposition of a greater or equal power without. Now permission and restraint are privatively opposed, and therefore we cannot say, that an action is permitted in regard of that which is common unto both permission and restraint, and may be found, as well when an action is restrained, as when it is permitted. If I should say that a blind man sees, in respect of the first natural power of seeing; that a deaf man hears, in respect of the first natural power of hearing; you would say that my limitation were absurd and ridiculous: because this natural first power of seeing is found both in the blind and the seeing; and we may say the same of the first power of hearing. Yet this limitation is as justifiable as yours; for the natural power you speak of, to do the execution, is found as well in the restraint, as in the permission of murder MR GOODWIN. GOD permitted Adam to eat of every tree in the Garden of Eden (the tree of knowledge of Good and evil only excepted, Gen. 2. 16, 17.) and therefore certainly had decreed, or intended, this permission: yet was not Adam any ways necessitated by any virtue, or influence of this decree upon him, to eat of every one of these trees; nor is it in the least degree credible, that ever he did eat of every of them, nor yet of any one of them, but only that which was prohibited unto him, his ejection out of this Garden following so suddenly after this patent, or permission granted unto him. JEANES. THE permission spoken of, Gen. 2. 16. was Moral or Legal, in genere officii, not natural or Physical, in genere facti, and therefore nothing at all to the purpose. Mr GOODWIN. NEither doth any such decree in God, suppose a futurity of such a concurrence of causes, simply requisite and necessary, for the bringing of things, so decreed, to pass, which will actually bring them to pass: though God hath decreed that a spark, or coal of fire, falling i e. in case it shall fall, into a barrel of Gunpowder, shall fire it, yet it doth not follow from hence, that he hath decreed, that any such spark, or coal shall fall into it; without which notwithstanding the effect decreed, viz. the firing of this Powder will not come to pass. JEANES. FIrst, Arminius tells you, that the absence of one necessary cause is sufficient to denominate a restraint. Ad productionem effecti requiritur causa integra, sufficient ad ejus impedimentum unius causae necessariae absentiâ. And if this be true, than permission doth imply a concurrence of causes simply requisite and necessary, for the bringing of things so permitted to pass, which will actually bring them to pass if they be not hindered; and consequently a permissive decree doth, though not suppose (that's not our language) yet, infer the futurity of such a presence of all requisite and necessary causes. Besides Secondly, Scheibler Met. lib. 1. c. 14. t. 2. p. 2. n. 44. out of Zabarell acquaints us, how restraint is sometimes taken privatively, pro privatione actionis inferendae, and absence not only of one requisite and necessary cause, but also of one necessary condition is sufficient to denominate such a restraint: Sic distantia loci (saith he) impedit ne ignis calefaciat aliquod corpus, non quasi distantia illa habeat efficientiam, vel influxum aliquem, sed solum distantia illa dicit privationem actionis in igne, & passionis in calefactibili. In regard of this acception of restraint, fire cannot be said to be permitted to burn combustible matter, unless there be an approximation of the fire unto the said combustible matter, for distance of place hinders the fire from burning: distance of place between fire and a barrel of Gunpowder, doth hinder the fire from firing or blowing up that barrel of Gunpowder, if you take hindrance or restraint in such a sense as Scheibler speaks of: Answerably unto which fire cannot be said to be permitted to fire or blow up such a barrel of Gunpowder, between which, and it, there is such a distance. Mr GOODWIN. OR if it be said, that God hath decreed, that such a spark or coal, shall fall into the said barrel of Gunpowder, now is not the decree barely permissive, but operative and assertive, and such which engageth the decreer to interpose effectually, for the bringing of the thing decreed to pass. But such decrees as this, in matters of that nature, we deny to be in God. JEANES. IF By matters of that nature you mean, in such contingent things as the falling of a Spark or Coal into a Barrel of Gunpowder; why, Doctor Twisse hath an argument which he takes to be unanswerable, clearly evincing, that whatsoever thing comes to pass, that is good with a transcendental goodness, or Metaphysical, God hath decreed it by an operative or effective decree. You have it in his examination of M. Cottons Treatise etc. p. 68, 69. As also in his Consideration of that Scoffing Pamphlet of Tilenus, viz. the Doctrine of the Synod of Dort and Arles reduced to the practice. p. 18, 19 Nay I say more, (saith he) that every thing, which cometh to pass, in the revolution of times, was decreed by God; which I prove by such an argument, for answer whereunto, I challenge the whole nations of both Arminans and Jesuits. It cannot be denied, but God foresaw from everlasting, whatsoever in time should come to pass, therefore every thing was future from everlasting, otherwise God could not foresee it as future. Now let us soberly inquire, how these things which we call future, came to be future, being in their own nature merely possible, and indifferent, as well not at all to be future, as to be future. Of this transmigration of things, out of the condition of things merely possible (such as they were of themselves) into the condition of things future, there must needs be some outward cause. Now I demand, what was the cause of this transmigration? And seeing nothing, without the nature of God, could be the cause hereof (for this transmigration was from everlasting, but nothing without God was everlasting) therefore something within the nature of God must be found fit to be the cause hereof. And what may that be? Not the knowledge of God, for that rather presupposeth things future, and so knowable in the kind of things future, then makes them future: therefore it remains, that the mere decree and will of God, is that which makes them future. If to shift off this, it be said, that the essence of God is the cause hereof; I farther demand, whether the essence of God be the cause hereof, as working necessarily, or as working freely; If as working necessarily, than the most contingent things became future by necessity of the Divine nature, and consequently he produceth whatsoever he produceth by necessity of nature, which is Atheistical: therefore it remains, that the Essence of God hath made them future, by working freely, and consequently, the mere will and decree of God is the cause of the futurition of all things. He speaks indeed of Gods will and decree indefinitely, but that thereunder he comprehends an operative or effective decree, is undeniable. But the force of this reason, you may think easily to evade, by your denial of God's foreknowledge: your reasons for which denial, I shall in the next place proceed to examine. Mr GOODWIN, pag. 29. cap. 3. Sect. 2. THat Prescience or foreknowledge are not formally or properly in Quid est praescientia nisi scientia futurorum? Quid autem futurum est Deo, qui omnia super graditur tempora? Si enim in scientia res ipsas habet, non sunt ei futurae, sed praesentes; ac per hoc non jam praescientia, sed rantum scientia dici potest. Aug. lib. 2. ad Simpl. vide plura, ib. God, is the constant assertion, both of ancient and modern Divinity The learned Assertors of the Protestant cause are at perfect agreement with their Adversaries the Schoolmen, and Papists, in this. Nor is it any wonder at all, that there should be peace, and a concurrence of Judgement about such a point as this; even between those, who have many Irons of contention otherwise in the fire, considering how obvious, and near at hand, the truth herein is. For 1. If foreknowledge were Properly and formally in God, then might Predestination, Election, Reprobation, and many other Nec zelus, nec ira, nec paenitentia, nec proprie misericordia, nec praescientia esse potest in Deo. Greg. Moral. l. 2. c. 23. things be properly and formally in him also; in as much as these are, in the letter and propriety of them, as compatible unto him as foreknowledge. Nor can there be any reason given for a difference. But impossible it is that there should be any Plurality of things whatsoever, in their distinct and proper natures, and formalities, in God, the infinite simplicity of his nature and being, with open mouth gainsaying it. 2 lie If foreknowledge were properly, or formally in God, there should be somewhat in him corruptible, or changeable. For that Quid est praescientia nisi scientia futurorum? Aug. l. 2. ad Simpl. q. 2. which is supposed to be such a foreknowledge in him to day, by the morrow, suppose the thing, or event fore-known, should in the interim actually come to pass, must needs cease, and be changed; in as much as there can be no foreknowledge of things that are present, the adequate and appropriate object of this knowledge (in the Propriety of it) being res futura somewhat that is to come. Thirdly (and last) there is nothing in the Creature univocally and formally the same, with any thing which is in God. The reason is; because then, there must either be somewhat finite in God, or somewhat infinite in the Creature: both which are impossible. But if Prescience or foreknowledge, being properly and formally in the Creature, should be properly and formally also in God, there should be somewhat in the Creature, univocally and formally the same, with somewhat, which is in God. Therefore certainly there is no foreknowledge, properly so called, in God. JEANES. Divers Heathen Philosophers I have found censured for denying of God's Prescience or foreknowledge, as Cicero by Austin lib. 5. De Civ. Dei cap. 9 Seneca by Aureolus 1. distin. 38. Aristotle by Vasquez and others. But that Christian Divines either ancient or modern, (unless you will appropriate that name unto Socinians) are so unanimous in impugning of God's foreknowledge, is great news unto me, and not only unto me, but unto all others, I believe, that have read any thing in either ancient, or Modern Divinity. Hierome in his third book Adversus Pelagianos, teacheth (as Franciscus Amicus informs me) that he who takes away Prescience from God, takes away the Godhead: Eum qui a Deo praescientiam tollit, divinitatem tollere. As for Austin, whom you quote in the Margin against this Prescience of God; let any one read that place but now quoted. Lib. 5. De Civ. Dei. cap. 9 and he must needs confess, that he is a zealous Assertor of God's foreknowledge against Cicero, who opposeth it in favour of the liberty of man's will. And so saith Austin. Dum vult facere homines liberos, facit sacrilegos: multò sunt autem tolerabiliores (saith he) qui vel sydera fata constituunt, quam iste, qui tollit praescientiam futurorum. Name & consiteri esse Deum, & negare praescium futurorum, apertissima insania est. They who make the stars the fates of men, are more tolerable than he, who taketh away the foreknowledge of things to come. For to confess that there is a God, & to deny him to be foreknowing of things future, is a most open madness. And again in the same place. Sed quoquomodo se habent tortuosissimae concertationes, & disputationes Philosophorum; nos ut confitemur summum, & verum Deum, ita voluntatem, summamque potestatem ac praescientiam ejus confitemur. Afterwards again. Religiosus autem animus utrumque eligit, utrumque confitetur, & fide pietatis utrumque confirmat; that is, both the liberty of the will, & God's prescience. Quod verò Cicero negat ordinem omnium causarum esse certissimum, & Dei praescientiae notissimum, plus eum, quam Stoici, detestamur. Aut enim Deum esse negat, etc. Aut si esse confitetur Deum, quem negat praescium futurorum, etiam sic dicit nihil aliud, quam ille, dixit insipiens in cord suo, non est Deus. Qui enim non est praescius omnium futurorum, non est utique Deus. To confess that there is a God, and to deny his foreknowledge, is to say with the fool in his heart, that there is no God: For he, who doth not foreknow things to come, is not God. Other testimonies you may see quoted in Suarez lib. 1. De scientià futurorum contingentium absoluta. cap. 2. Out of other places of Austin, as also out of Fulgentius, and Anselm. But I may very well spare this labour of citing the Ancients, seeing M. Hord, or M. Mason (I know not well which) tells us that the Fathers did generally make sin an object of God's prescience, and therefore they maintained, That there was prescience in God. As for the Schoolmen they in their Commentaries upon Aquinas. Sum. 1. p. Q. 14. Art. 13. And on Lombard lib. 1. dist. 38. 39 do generally resolve, nemine contradicente, (that I know) That God's foreknowledge of things to come, is a point certain de fide. And amongst those that are called Protestants, I know none that oppose it, save the Socinians; against whom, in this particular, you may read Stagman Photinianis: disp. 13. And Johannes Junius in refutat: praelect. Fausti Socini, cap. 8. 9 10. 11. The Arminians, however now some of them walk in the clouds, and will not speak out, yet at first the Ringleaders did not stick to profess, that election was upon foresight of perseverance in faith, and reprobation upon foreknowledge of perseverance in infidelity and impenitency. D. Twisse tells us, That God's foreknowledge of things future, is a point assented unto by, and uncontroverted amongst all Christians; De Scientia Media, p. 245. Extra controversiam est apud Christianos omnes, futura omnia, quantumvis contingentia, Deo not a fuisse, idque ab aeterno; neque mirum, cum nihil positivum aut sit, aut futurum sit in rerum naturà, cujus productionem non operetur ipse Deus, idque in genere causae efficientis, consèquentérque cujus productionem non ab aeterno decreverit, quá de re nulla fere inter Christianos hodie, saltem eruditiores, viget Controversia. And hereupon it is that he censureth the proofs brought by Suarez for the confirmation of it, to be needless. Pergit Suarez in confirmatione ejus, de quo Christianus nullus dubitat abidem. And again in his book against M. Cotton p. 69. he saith, That for men with Cicero to deny, that God foreknows things to come, is to turn Atheist. But against this cloud of witnesses I foresee that you will take sanctuary in those two terms, Formally and Properly, though none save Atheists, and Socinians deny the Prescience of God; yet notwithstanding this, it is, say you, the constant assertion both of Ancient and modern Divinity, That Prescience or foreknowledge are not Formally or Properly in God. To make this good, you only quote Austin in your Margin and Gregory, unto whose sayings alleged by you, every Schooleman almost, that dissenteth from the Dominicans about the presence of things in eternity, gives an answer, of which if you be ignorant, you must needs be a very great stranger to School Divinity. You tell us next, that the Learned assertors of the Protestant cause are at perfect agreement with their adversaries the Schoolmen, and Papists in this assertion, That prescience or foreknowledge are not properly, or formally in God. This is a thing which those, that dissent from you, would in all likelihood question, and yet you bring not so much as one instance out of either Protestant or Papist to make it good. That there is such a peace and concurrence of judgement about this, between Protestants and Papists, I never read or heard of before. And if you can prove it by an induction, I will confess my ignorance. If any such unwary passages, as you here speak of, have dropped from the pens of either Protestants or Papists, I suppose they are to be qualified, and understood in the like manner, that Suarez understands, and qualifieth the speech of those, who deny knowledge to be properly and formally Ne in aequiucco laboremus, supponendum est quid nomine scientiae significetur: non enim intelligimus qualitatem aliquam, vel habitum, aut actum propriè factum, seu elicitum à potentiâ, neque etiam cognitionem per discursum comparatam, aut aliam similem imperfectionem includentem: in quâ significatione videntur accepisse scientiam, qui dixerunt non esse proprie in Deo, sed per Metaphoram vel causalitatem illi attribui, id est, quia causat in nobis scientiam. Hos enim non est verisimile intellexisse Deum ita carere scientiâ, ut sit prorsus stolidus: nam cum faterentur Deum esse fontem omnis scientiae creatae, non est verisimile credidisse Deum esse omnino inscium. Igitur, quia putarunt scientiam includere imperfectionem, ideo formaliter & proprie in Deo esse negarunt. Illae autem imperfectiones quasi materiales sunt, inventae in scientia humanâ, vel Angelicâ, non vero pertinent ad rationem formalem scientiae, ut sic, quae hic abstractissimè sumitur, praescindendo à creata, & increata, & solum significat claram & evidentem ac perfectam cognitionem, seu perceptionem veritatis, seu objecti scibilis, sive illa perceptio fiat per qualitarem, sive per substantiam, sive cum effectione, & receptione, sive absque his imperfectionibus. Metaph. Disp. 30. Sect. 15. num. 2. in God. They take (saith he) knowledge as signifying a quality or habit produced by some power or knowledge, gained or gotten by way of discourse or inference, or including some such like imperfection. In like manner if any either Protestants, or Papists, have denied foreknowledge to be properly and formally in God, they are to be understood concerning such a foreknowledge, as is found in men, in whom 'tis clothed with many imperfections, from which 'tis abstracted, as it is ascribed unto God. But I shall take a more particular and distinct notice of these two terms Formally and Properly in reference unto the attribution of foreknowledge unto God. And first let us inquire whether foreknowledge can formally be ascribed unto God. The term Formally may be opposed unto either Eminently, or Extrinsecall denominations. First unto Eminently. Perfections are either secundum quid, in certo genere, after a sort, in such a kind, or else simply such. The former do so essentially imply some imperfection, limitation, or composition, as that they cannot possibly be abstracted therefrom, and therefore are ascribed unto God only eminently or virtually. But now the latter do include no imperfection, or repugnancy with, or opposition unto any greater, or equal perfection. And these perfections are ascribed unto God Formally, as you may see proved by Suarez Met. Disp: 30. Sect. 1. num. 8. 9 De perfectionibus ergo simpliciter dicendum est, omnes esse in Deo formaliter, quia in suo formali conceptu nullam imperfectionem, sed puram perfectionem involvunt, neque inter se repugnantiam includunt, unde sic illas habere, id est, formaliter, melius est, quam aliquà earum career, & ideo de ratione Entis summe perfecti in totâ latitudine Entis est, ut has omnes perfectiones formaliter includat. Add in his perfectionibus non posse cogitari altiorem modum continendi illas, quam formaliter, quia intra suam formalem rationem, nec limitationem, nec imperfectionem includunt, neque altior gradus Entis excogitari potest, quam ille, ad quem hae formales perfectiones pertinent, qualia sunt vivere, sapere & alia hujusmodi. Now foreknowledge is to be ranked amongst the perfections of this latter sort; because it may be sequestered or abstracted from all those imperfections, as it is found in Men or Angels. You think indeed that it will necessarily infer mutability, but that is an imputation from which I will anon easily free it. Besides, a perfection simply such, is defined by Anselm in Monolog. cap. 14. Quae in unoquoque est melior ipsa quam non ipsa; that is, as Scotus expounds it in 1. dist. 8. q. 1. Ad. 1. quolibet suo incompossibili. Now the light of nature evidenceth that the knowledge of things to come is better, and a more noble attribution than any thing whatsoever is repugnant unto such foreknowledge, and therefore this foreknowledge (in such an abstract notion as we speak of) may formally be ascribed unto God. But now this I would have to be understood as Suarez speaks of such Respondeo, verum esse nullam perfectionem creatam, secundum adaequatam rationem quam habet in creaturâ, esse in Deo formaliter, sed eminenter tantum: non est enim in Deo sapientia creata, nam ut sic est accidens, & finita perfectio, & idem est de caeteris similibus. Dicitur ergo Deus quasdam ex his perfectionibus continere formaliter, quia secundum eas habet aliquam formalem convenientiam cum creaturâ, ratione cujus illa perfectio secundum idem nomen, & eandem rationem, seu conceptum formalem attribuitur Deo & creaturae, saluâ analogiâ, quae inter Deum & creaturam semper intercedit. Quando vero non est talis convenientia, nec formalis denominatio, sed sola efficacitas divinae virturis, tunc dicimus intercedere convenientiam eminentialem. Atque ita in Deo nulla perfectio est formaliter nisi vel secundum proprium conceptum Dei, vel saltem secundum conceptum abstrahentem a Deo, & creaturis. Metaph. Disp. 30. Sect. 1. num. 12. kind of perfections in general. And again afterwards. Recte, etc. Intelligitur esse longe diversum modum vivendi divinae & creatae substantiae: & quod de divinis attributis positivis superius diximus, in hoc manifestillimum esse secundum modum, quo sunt in creaturis, non esse in Deo formaliter, sed eminenter. Esse autem in Deo formaliter secundum modum altiorem, qui omnem imperfectionem creatutarum excludat. Disp. 30. Sect. 14. num. 7. They are not in God formally in such a sense, or after such a manner, as they are in the Creatures, but they are in him formally, in a higher way and manner, which excludes all imperfections whatsoever of the Creatures. Secondly, formal attributions may be opposed unto extrinsecall denominations. Now the word foreknowledge, signifieth something that agreeth unto God formally, and something that is ascribed unto him only by extrinsecall denomination. For the understanding of which we must observe, that it is one and the same undivided knowledge, by which God without any the least alteration, understands things whilst future, when present, when past, and this I affirm to be ascribed unto God formally, because 'tis in him, and that by way of real identity with his Essence, and all his other attributes. But now this knowledge undergoes several appellations, which are attributed unto it by extrinsecall denomination, from the various condition of the things known, so long as the things themselves are to come, it is called Foreknowledge, when they come, co-knowledge, after they are gone and passed, after-knowledge: D. Twisse against Jackson pag. 313, 314. I deny not then, but that the formal denomination of foreknowledge is extrinsecall. God's knowledge is so denominated in regard of its pre-existence unto the thing known: but that which is affirmed of a thing only by way of extrinsecall denomination, may be ascribed thereunto properly, which brings me unto a second Quaere. Whether Foreknowledge is, or may be ascribed unto God properly? The learned Assertors of the Protestant cause, you say, are at perfect agreement with their adversaries the Papists in this, That prescience, or foreknowledge, are not formally or properly in God. You will not deny D. Twisse to be a learned Protestant, and how he dissents from this assertion which you father upon all Protestants, you may read in his book against Doctor Jackson p. 316. The question only was (saith he) whether foreknowledge might be properly attributed unto God, in respect of things to come: now I see no reason (saith he) but it may, as well as it is attributed unto man. Amongst the Papists Suarez comes behind few modern Schoolmen, and whether he thinks foreknowledge not to be properly in God, let his own words inform you. Lib. 1. De Scientia futurorum absolutè cap. 7. In omni etiam proprietate certissimum est scientiam Dei, sicut & Deum ipsum, duratione antecedere omnium rerum creatarum existentiam. But Suarez is not herein singular. For the Schoolmen generally in their Commentaries upon Aquinas, and Lombard in the places but now quoted, having propounded this Question, An in Deo sit scientia futurorum etc. Resolve it affirmatively: And as at other times, so especially in determinations, and resolutions of questions, that Rule hath place: Analogum per se positum stat pro famosiori analogato; if a word have two significations, one proper, another improper or Metaphorical, and it be put by itself without any thing to determine, or limit it unto the improper acception thereof, it must be taken properly. This to be the meaning of that rule Scheibler instructed me, when I was a Puny in Philosophy. Met. lib. 2. cap. 6. num. 17. Respondeo, illam propositionem, Analogum per se positum, hoc est, sine aliquo addito, stat pro famosiori, valere solum de analogo proportionis, hoc est, quod de uno praedicatur propriè, de alio impropriè, per similitudinem, vel metaphoram, id positum sine addito significat suum principale analogatum, veluti cum de risu loquor, intelligo eum de risu hominis, non de risu prati. Austin in lib. 5. de Civit. Dei. cap. 9 Censures the denial of God's foreknowledge as a madness, as a blasphemous, and Atheistical speech etc. And this he would never have done, if he had thought as you, that foreknowledge is not properly in God: For that which is ascribed unto God only improperly, metaphorically, & by an Anthropopathy, as hands, eyes, ears, repentance, grief, etc. may without madness, blasphemy, or Atheism, be denied of God in propriety of speech. How have the Schoolmen toiled themselves, and puzzled their readers, about the reconciliation of God's foreknowledge of future Contingents, with the liberty of man's will, and the contingency of things? This was a point that Armachanus studied for twenty years' space * Twisse de Scientia Media. pag. 402. 403. . Now had those men been so well read in ancient and Modern Divinity as you, they would have eased themselves of this labour. For you assure us, that it is the constant assertion both of ancient and Modern Divinity, that prescience or foreknowledge are not properly in God. That this was reputed in the days of Jeffery Chawcer, a difficult, nice, and controverted matter, which no one but an Austin or a Bradwardine could throughly discuss, or bolt unto the bran, appears by the verses of the said Chawcer, related by Sr Henry Savill, in his Epistle prefixed to Bradwardine, which I shall here insert. But what that God afore wot, must needs be, After the opinion of Certain Clerkis. Witness of him that any Clerk is, That in School is great altercation In this matter, and great disputation, And hath been of an hundred thousand men. But I ne cannot boult it to the brens, As can the holy Doctor S. Austin, Or Boece, or the Bishop Bradwardin. Whether that Gods worthy foreweting Sraineth me needly to do a thing, (Needly clepe I simple necessity) Or if the free choice be granted me To do the same thing, or do it nought, Though God forewot it or it was wrought. Or if his witting straineth never a deal But by necessity conditionele. I will not have to done of such matter. Had you lived in those times, you could easily have put an end to all this great altercation; provided that they would have received that which you take here for a principle, that foreknowledge is not properly in God. For if this be so, than all disputation concerning the reconciling of God's foreknowledge with liberty and contingency is frivolous, and to no purpose. What anxious disputes have been amongst the Schoolmen for many hundred years' continuance touching the manner or the ground of Gods foreknowing future contingents? Bonaventure maintained that God did foreknow future contingents by the Ideas of them in his mind. Aquinas made the ground of Gods foreknowing them to be their presence or existence in eternity. Scotus his opinion was, that God foreknows them by seeing the determination of his own will touching their coming to pass. Other grounds of God's foreknowledge of future contingents are assigned by others, which you may find mentioned almost in every Schooleman. Bellarm. l. 4. the great: & libero Arbitrio, and before him Occam and Ariminensis were of an opinion, that the way, or manner of Gods foreknowing future contingents, is a point that is incomprehensible, & unexpressible in this life. Were you called to be an Umpire between these great Schoolmen in this thorny, and knotty Question, you, instead of unloosing or untying this Gordian knot, would like another Alexander have cut it in pieces, and have told them that they disputed like a company of Buzzards concerning the ground or manner of that which may in propriety of speech be denied of God. Your opinion you see doth not so fully accord with ancient and Modern Divinity, as you pretend, & how dissonant it is from the truth will soon be manifested, by bringing it unto the rule of Theological truth, the Scriptures, in which the infallible prediction of things to come, do clearly and abundantly witness, that foreknowledge is properly in God: for prediction presupposeth prescience, it being utterly impossible to foretell infallibly what one doth not foreknow certainly. Hereupon it was that Tertullian said Deum, quot fecit Prophet as, tot habere testes praescientiae suae lib. 2. contra Martion. c. 5. That God hath so many witnesses of his prescience, as he hath made Prophets. This infallible prediction of things to come is so proper & peculiar unto God, as that thereby he distinguisheth himself from all false Gods. Esay 41. 21, 22, 23. Produce your cause, saith the Lord (unto the Idols of the Gentiles) bring forth your strong reasons saith the King of Jacob; let them bring forth & show us what shall happen. Let them show the former things what they he, that we may consider them, and know the latter end of them or declare us things for to ●ome: show the things that are to come hereafter, that we may know that ye are Gods. He that is God can show the things that are to come hereafter, and therefore he foreknows them; for that cannot be foretold, which is not foreknown. And that without a Metaphor, or any other Trope. From Scripture go we to natural reason, and that will prove, that foreknowledge agrees properly unto God. Arguments of this sort may be drawn, First from the nature of foreknowledge. Secondly from several attributes of God. Thirdly from his actual providence or efficiency. First, from the nature of foreknowledge. Foreknowledge is a knowledge of things before their existence. And in God there is a knowledge of things before their existence. Thou understandest (saith David) my thoughts a far off. Psal. 139. 2. This argument you may find in D. Twisse against Jackson. p. 314. Till things do coexist with God, his knowledge of them, saith he, is foreknowledge of them, as well as ours. For it is before them, and only before them; for it is neither with them, nor after them. Not with them, for than they should coexist with God, and that from all eternity, which is most untrue; for if they did coexist with God, than they did exist, and that from all eternity, which is most untrue. much less is it after them, for if so, than their coexistence with God were passed: but we suppose it to be to come. And impossible it is that the same things should at once be both past, and also to come. You have it also in Suarez in the place before quoted. In omni etiam proprietate certissimum est scientiam Dei, sicut & Deum ipsum duratione antecedere omnium rerum creat arum existentiam. It is most certain that the knowledge of God, as well as God himself, doth properly or in all propriety of speech antecede in duration the existence of all created things whatsoever, and therefore it is properly foreknowledge. Unto Suarez who is no enemy unto Arminianism, I shall add D. Jackson a professed Arminian arguing after the like manner in his Treatise of the Divine essence and Attributes Sect. 2. Cap. 8. p. 105. If God (saith he) as all grant, be before all worlds, his knowledge being coeternal to his being, must needs be before all worlds. And Austin himself grants a scientia a science, or knowledge in God most infallible, of all things that have been, are, or shall be, before they are, were, or could be; for they could not be coeternal to him, who is before all worlds, the beginning of the World itself, and of all things in it. Now all knowledge of things not yet present, but to come, is foreknowledge: to determine or decree things future, is to predetermine or fore-decree them. And seeing God from eternity hath both known, and decreed the things that then were not, he is said; to have foreknown and fore-decreed them. Secondly, Arguments proving foreknowledge to be properly in God may be taken from God's Attributes; from his infinite perfection, from his infinite happiness, or blessedness, from his unchangeableness. First, from his infinite perfection: He is of all beings the best, and most perfect, Deus optimus maximus was a title that the ancient Romans by the light of nature gave him. Nothing then can so much as be imagined to be better than God. But 'tis better to know things to come, then to be ignorant of them, And therefore we must either deny that there is a God, or else ascribe unto him the knowledge of things to come. This is Doctor Twisse his argument De scientiâ media pag. 246. Verum, si Deus is sit, quo nihil melius excogitari potest, & melius sit cognoscere futura, & quicquid co gnoscibile est, quam ignorare; videtur hinc sequi, aut Deum prorsus negandum esse, aut scientiam futurorum contingentium ei tribuendam. Secondly, from his infinite blessedness or happiness, which is such as that he hath all things desirable. But if he should not have known things to come he should be without a perfection, desirable by every intelligent or rational nature. This was Bradwardines' argument; Si Deus quaedam vera nesciret, posset desiderare & velle scire illa; omnis enim rationalis natura naturaliter scire desiderat, quare & cum per partem proximam habeat voluntatem universaliter efficacem, posset illa scire & non novitèr; quia tunc non semper esset actualissimus, scientissimus, perfectissimus, beatissimus, & immutailis penitus, contra tertiam partem & sextam: necessario ergo aeternalitèr omnia vera novit. Thirdly, from his unchangeableness, which is affirmable of all his other Attributes, and consequently of his knowledge. But now his knowledge if it were not of things whilst they were to come, it would by actual existence of them be enlarged, and so changed. This argument is urged by Durand, Cumel, Rada, Suarez, and others. God knows thing whiles present, for otherwise he should be ignorant of that which men and Angels know, therefore he knew them whiles future, otherwise by the presence of them, something de novo should accrue unto God's knowledge, which cannot be without a change. Constat (saith Durand) quod Deus cognoscit contingens dum est praesens, putà Socratem currere. alioquin ego cognoscerem illud quod Deus ignoraret: si ergo non cognoscebat hoc prius quando fuit futurum, sequeretur quod aliquid accrevisset suae scientiae quod est impossibile. In 1. lib. Distinct. 38. Q. 3. Suarez also argueth to the same purpose. Piaeterea declaratur hoc modo; quia vel Deus scit haec contingentia, quando ponuntar in esse, vel non: Hoc posterius nemo dicit, quia angelus, vel homo hoc cognoscit, saltem quando sunt prasentia: Ergo multo magis Deus: si autem nunc illa cognoscit, Ergo & antea, quia scientia Dei augeri non potest, Ita ut aliquid novum sub illam cadat, tum propter immutabilitatem, tum eriam quia panlatim discere, quocunque modo fiat, magna imperfectio est; Confirmatur, quia si Deus in tempore aliquid de novo inciperet velle, imperfectionem in illo indicaret: Ergo multò magis ●● aliquid de novo scire inciperet. Lib. 1. De Scientia●●turorum contingentium absoluta. cap. 2. The last sort of arguments which I shall mention, are drawn from God's actual providence or efficiency. God is the cause of all things, of him (saith the Apostle) are all things, Rom. 11. 36. Now he is the cause of all things by his knowledge, and by his will. First by his knowledge, and that practical, which is resembled unto that of an Artificer, who hath a foreknowledge of what artificial works he resolves upon; for he hath samplers and patterns of them in his Cognitio divini intellectus (saith A●uin ●●) comparatur ad res alias, sicut cognitio artificis ad artificiata, cum per suam scientiam fit causa rerum. Artisex autem suae artis cognitione etiam ea quae nondum sunt artificiara cognoscir, ●orm● enim artis ex ejus scientiá efiluunt in exteriorem materiam ad artificiatorum constiturionem: unde nihil prohibet in scientia artificis esse formas quae nondum exterius prodierunt: sic igitur nihil prohibet, Deum, corum quae non sunt, notitiam habere. lib. 1. contra gentes cap. 66. Deus est causa omnium rerum & futurorum contingentium, & liberorum (saith Cumel) in primam partem Summ. Q. 14. Art. 13. Disp. 1. Per suam scientiam practicam, ergo prius scit & cognoscit futura couringentia & libera quam producantur & fiant; sicut artisex prius haber ideam artificiati & cognoscit rem producendam & e●●iciendam, quam efficient & producat pos●ea ad extra in tempore; igitur Deus qui artifex est universorum futurorum contingentium prius cognoscit futura contingentia, quam illa in tempore fiant. mind. Rada propounds this argument very briefly. Deus omnia operatur ad extra, ut artifex verò rem, antequam illam efficient, praecognoscit: aliter enim irrationabiliter operabitur. Parte prima. Controu. xxx. pag. 487. Secondly, the will of God is the cause of all things, as is demonstrated by Bradwardine and by Aquinas and such as Comment upon him, in prim. part. Q. 19 Art. 4. Now the will of God is unchangeable from within and irresistible from without, and therefore in it all things future may be certainly and infallibly foreknown. Bradwardine (from Esay. 46. 10. Declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, my Counsel shall stand) infers the infallibility of God's prediction from the firmness, immutability, and unresistiblenesse of his will. The Prophet signifies, saith he, that he can therefore declare the things that are not done, because his Counsel shall stand, and he will do all his pleasure: Quasi velit innuere, quod per hoc annuntiet, vei annuntiare possit ab exordio novissimum, quia omne suum consilium & volunt as immutabiliter stabit, & siet. De causa Dei. lib. 1. cap. 218. pag. 224. This argument Cumel enforceth by comparison with man's foreknowledge of things in their causes. A Mathematician can foreknow an Eclipse of the Sun or Moon in its cause, and therefore much more can God foreknow all future contingents in the determination of his own will. Effectus potest evidenter cognosci antequam in tempore producatur in sua causâ, sicut Eclipsis evidenter cognoscitur in sua causâ, antequam sit, a Mathematico, & ab Astrologo: sed Deus per seipsum & per propriam voluntatem est causa omnium Entium contingentium, & liberorum, & praedefinit illa futura contingentia & libera. Ergo Deus per seipsum & per propriam scientiam, quam habet, cognoscit futura contingentia & libera. As for the testimonies you bring in the Margin, they and divers others are alleged generally by the Dominicans, to prove the existence of things in Eternity, and it is very strange unto me that you take no notice of the common answers that are usually given unto them. The place out of Gregory is misquoted, but that might be an escape of the Printer; in my book it is, Moral. lib. 20. cap. 25. And a little after he gives the reason why prescience is not properly in God. Praescire dicitur qui unamquamque rem, antequam veniat, videt: Et id quod futurum est, priusquam praesens fiat, praevide●: Deus ergo quomodo est praescius dum nulla nisi quae futura sunt, praesciantur? Et scim●● quia Deo futurum nihil est, ante cujus oculos praeterita nulla sunt: praesentia non transeunt, futura non veni, uni: Quip quia omne quod nobis fuit & erit, in ejus prospectu praesto est: Et omne quod praesensest, scire potest potius quam praescire. The ground upon which both Austin and Gregory deny foreknowledge to be in God is, because nothing is future but all things are present unto God. Unto all these and divers other Testimonies which occur in the Dominicans, I shall rehearse the answers of several men. First, Rada, Par. prim. controv. triges. Art. 2. pag. 493. Adomnes authoritaies unica solutione sit satis. Dico enim quod non intelligunt sancti, omnia esse Deo secundum rem praesentia sed secundum esse objectivum & cognitum: omnia enim in seipso videt & intu●tur. Secondly, Suarez gives the same answer, but he explains himself more fully: The Fathers (saith he) speak by way of exaggeration to declare the perfection and exactness of that knowledge which God hath of things to come, for he knows them so distinctly, and accurately, with all their circumstances, as if they did exist actually present. This knowledge of them therefore is not so much abstractive as intuitive, not Parres per quandam exaggerationem locuti sunt ut declararent perfectionem scientiae, quam Deus habet de futuris; nam illa tam clare & distinctè cum omnibus circumstantiis intuetur, ac si pra sentia actu jam existerent: ideoq, scientia illa non est abstractiva, sed propriissima intuitio. Ad hoc ergo significandum dixerunt illam non tam esse dicendam praescientiam, quam scientiam. Name more humano loquendo, quae prasciuntur, non ita clarè & distinctè cognoscuntur. Nam Astrologus qui praescit suturam esse Eclipsin, non apprchendit & cognoscit illum effectum distincte prout in re futurns est cum omnibus conditionibus & circumstantiis eius: & ideo non habet de illo scientiam intuitivam, sed abstractivam. At vero Deus ram distinct intuetur futurum antequam sit, sicut quando est, tamque veram scientiam intuitivam illius habet. Quocirca in eo sensu in quo illi patres voluerunt illam scientiam propriè appellare praescientiam; Illa particula Prae non solum excludit realem existentiam, sed etiam praesentiam objectivam exactam, & omnimodam ●ffectus tie cogniti. so much prescience as science. Thirdly, D. Twisse De scientia media pag. 390. gives the same answer that Bradwardine did unto the like saying out of Boetius and Anselm above 200 years ago, to wit, That all things are present unto God in esse volito as decreed by him, sunt ei praesentia, id est per suam insuperabilem & immutabilem voluntatem, praesentialiter determinata, & decreta certitudinaliter ut fiant futura. And this you may see how he clears both out of Austin, and Gregory. Fourthly, Becanus gives another answer which I take to be the more satisfying: And 'tis, that the scope of both Austin, and Gregory is to show, That there is not such a prescience or fore knowledge in God, as there is in us, viz imperfect, and conjectural. etc. Respondeo, scopus Augustini est ostendere non esse talem praescientiam in Deo, qualis in nobis est. Nos enim imperfect, & quasi per coniecturas praescimus futura: at praesentia clare & perfect cognoscimus. Deus autem tam perfecte cognoscit futura, quam prasentia. Hic patet discrimen inter nos & Deum. 1. Quia nostra cognitio perficitur ex praesentia rerum: non autem Dei cognitio. 2. Quia res futurae sunt Deo praesentes per praesentiam perfectam nobis per imperfectam 3. Quia nos eandem rem bis cognoscimus: semel imperfect, quando futura est, & semel perfect, quando praesens est. At Deus semel tantum, quia cognitio Dei est aeque, perfecta, sive res futura, sive praesens sit. Nec aliud vult Gregorius; uterque negat praescientiam in Deo, qualis in nobis est. Sum. Theolog. Seolast. part. 1. Tom. 1. cap. 10. quest. 10. From your Testimonies I come to the examination of your Reasons. Mr GOODWIN. NOR is it any wonder at all, that there should be peace, and a concurrence of judgement about such a point as this, even between those who have many Irons of co●●ention otherwise in the fire, considering how obvious and near at hand the truth herein is. For 1. if foreknowledge were properly and formally in God, then might Predestination, Election, Reprobation, and many other things, be properly and formally in him also; in as much as these are in the Letter and propriety of them, as compatible unto him as foreknowledge. Nor can there be any reason given for a difference. But impossible it is, that there should be any plurality of things whatsoever, in their distinct and proper natures, and formalities, in God, the infinite simplicity of his Nature and being, with open mouth gainsaying it: JEANES. YOur Argument with open mouth gainsayeth that which no body will affirm, but is mute in the proof of that which only will be called for, to wit, That whatsoever is properly and formally ascribed unto God, is really distinguished from God's Essence, and his other attributes. If you think I do you any wrong by this censure, reduce your Argument unto categorical Syllogisms, and make the best of it you can. Mr GOODWIN. SEcondly, if foreknowledge were properly or formally in God, there should be somewhat in him corruptible, or changeable. For that which is supposed to be such a foreknowledge in him to day, by the morrow, suppose the thing or event foreknown, should in the interim actually come to pass, must needs cease, and be changed, in as much as there can be no foreknowledge of things that are present, the adequate and appropriate object of this knowledge (in the propriety of it) being res futura, somewhat that is to come. JEANES. Several answers unto this trite and baffled argument you may read in Schoolmen commenting in primam partem summae. Q. 14. Art. 15. I will not trouble you with the rehearsal of them, but shall only propound that which I take to be most plain and obvious unto even an ordinary capacity. We must distinguish betwixt God's knowledge considered in itself, and the extrinsecall denominations thereof. God's knowledge in itself is not changed by any variation of its objects, which are one while future, and then present, and anon after past and gone, but 'tis one and the same knowledge without any the least alteration (ex parte Dei cognoscentis) by which he knows things whiles future, when present, when past; for he knows and sees them in esse volito pro certo aut tali tempore, as decreed to existant such a time. And to know a thing as decreed to exist at such a time, is to know that it shall be future until that time come; that it shall be present as soon as that time comes, and as long as it lasts; that it shall be passed as soon as that time is gone and ceaseth to be: Quare licet alitèr atque alitèr cognoscat res futuras & praesentes ex parte rerum cognitarum, non tamen aliter atque aliter ex parte cognoscentis. Nam videre aliquid apud Deum in esse volito pro certo tempore, est & videre illud futurum esse, donec tempus illud advenerit, & praesens esse cum primum advenerit, & praeteritum esse simulatque tempus illud elapsum fuerit. D. Twisse De Scientiâ Mediâ. pag. 389. And again, pag. 26. Praesertim cum sub notione ista, esse voliti pro certo tempore, caeterae notiones quales sunt esse praesens, esse praeteritum, esse futurum, mirabiliter uniantur, & amicissime conspirent; quip cum esse volitum apud Deum pro certo tempore sit & esse futurum, donec illud tempus advenerit; & esse praesens simulatque advenerit & quamdin duraverit; & denique esse praeteritum, quam primum tempus illud esse desierit. So than you see these various considerations of the objects of God's knowledge in regard of futurition, presence, preterition, are admirably united in esse volito pro certo tempore, and therefore can be no prejudice unto the immutability of his knowledge; whence it is become a proverb in School Divinity, that God non aliter novit facta, quam stenda. But though God's knowledge be in itself immutable, notwithstanding the succession that is in the coexistence of objects with it, as a rock in a river, stands unmoveable, notwithstanding the succession in the waters that glide by it, yet this is no hindrance, but that there may be and is a change in the extrinsecall denominations of God's knowledge from the variation of the objects thereof; so long as these objects are to come, God's knowledge of them is termed foreknowledge; when they actually exist, than it looseth the denomination of foreknowledge, and may be called co-knowledge; and so when they are past and cease to be, it may be called after-knowledge. Now a change of these extrinsecall denominations do not import any change in God's knowledge in itself, because as Vasquez tells us, Vera mutatio non accidit nisi per veram receptionem, aut amissionem formae realis in ipsa re existentis. A real change is by a true and real either receipt, or loss of a real form existing in a thing itself. Mr GOODWIN. THirdly (and last) there is nothing in the creature univocally and formally the same with any thing which is in God. The reason is, because then there must either be somewhat finite in God, or somewhat infinite in the creature: both which are impossible. But if prescience or foreknowledge (being properly and formally in the creature) shall be properly and formally also in God, there should be somewhat in the Creature univocally and formally the same, with somewhat which is in God. Therefore certainly there is no foreknowledge, properly so called, in God. JEANES. THe Minor of this Argument reduced into form, which you place first, will be denied by the Scotists; The Major which you put in the second place, will be denied generally by the Thomists. As for the Minor of this Argument put in the first place, There is nothing in the Creature univocally and formally the same with any thing which is in God. This the Scotists deny, as you may see in Scotus himself lib. 1. Distinct. 3. Q. 1. Distinct. 8. Q. 3. Rada part. 1. Controver. 21. Faber Faventinus Philosoph. Natural. Theorem. 95. And they bring such subtle reasons as you will confess, when you read them, to be worthy of an answer. As for your reason, they are not within Gun-shot of it. For these attributes which they affirm to be in the Creature univocally the same with those in God, are to be understood quoad communes non proprias rationes, quoad conceptum convenientiae non discrepantiae, In such a notion and consideration as is abstracted from finite and infinite, and so more general than either God or the creature. Conceptus communis (saith Scotus) est ex se formaliter neuter respectu eorum quibus est communis: But the objective conceit of these attributes, which denominate God and the creature, is common unto God and the creature, and therefore formally neither finite nor infinite, but abstracting from both. But perhaps my dulness cannot pierce into the depth of this argument. You may do well for my conviction to improve it unto the utmost, and yet, if I be not mistaken, the uttermost that you can prove thereby is, that which will not be denied unto you by the Scotists, to wit, that nothing, no not Fns, of all predicates one of the most abstract and transcendental, can be affirmed of God and the creature univocally, in regard of a physical univocation. Rada part. 1. Controu. 21. Art. 1. pag. 328. 333. and that these attributes which denominate God and the creature are predicated equivocally; if we speak of a * Whereas our Author p. 125. Of the first book of this Treatise affirmeth, that every thing in common attributed to God and man, is much more equivocal than the word Canis attributed to a Star, to a Fish, to a fourfooted creature on the earth, if he be to be understood in regard not of this Physical, but of a Logical equivocation. I must needs confess, that I descent from him for reasons that I shall presently specify. Physical equivocation, it is manifest. First, because the objective conceit of them, as denominating both God and the Creature is one and the same, only by the abstraction of the understanding, and not Physically or a part rei. This you have yielded unto by Scotus in answer unto the objection of Henricus, that Primo diversa in nullo conveniunt, sed Deus est primò diversus a quacunque creatura etc. Unto this Scotus answers lib. 1. distinct. 8. Q. 3. Deus & Creatura non sunt primò diversa in conceptibus; tamen sunt primò diversa in realitate, quia in nullà realitate conveniunt. Et quomodo esse possit conceptus communis sine convenientiâ in re vel in realitate, in sequenti dicetur. Deus & Creatura (saith Rada a famous Scotist) sunt primò diversa subjectiuè, quia scilicet in nulla realitate per differentias contrahibili conveniunt, sed non sunt primò diversa objectiuè & quoad intellectum, sicut nec decem praedicamenta, quia Ens de eis praedicatur in quid. part. 1. controver. 21. Art. 2. pag. 214. Secondly, Physically and a part rei, there is a greater distance between God and the creature, than there is between any creatures; for 'tis an infinite distance. This is all which is proved by that reason of Bannes in 1. par. Thom. Q. 13. Art. 5. That all created perfections in comparison of uncreated, are but painted and umbratick, the best of created beings in comparison of God are but shadows and pictures, Esay 40. 17. All nations before him are as nothing, and they are counted to him less than nothing. Omnis perfectio creata comparatione ad increatam perfectionem, est quasi depicta & umbratica, Ergo etc. The major of your Syllogism put into form, and placed in the second place, to wit, (If prescience or foreknowledge being properly and formally in the creature, should be properly and formally also in God, there should be somewhat in the creature univocally & formally the same with somewhat that is in God) will generally be denied by Thomists, who will acquaint you with a middle kind of predication, betwixt equivocal and univocal, to wit, analogical, according unto which they affirm those attributes to be predicated, which denominate both God and the creature. In 1. part. Thom. Q. 13. Art. 5. They instance in Ens, which is properly and formally predicated of God and the creature, and yet neither univocally nor equivocally but analogically, analogià quae est per attributionem intrinsecam, and not only analogia proportionis, as laughter is affirmed of a man and a green or flourishing meadow; nor yet only analogia attributionis quae fit per extrinsecam denominationem, as when health is predicated of a sensitive creature in the first place, as the subject in which it is seated, and of meats, drinks, medicaments, urines, secondarily, in reference unto, and by extrinsecall denomination from that health which is in a sensitive creature, unto which they are referred either as causes or tokens of it: see Suarez, Scheibler, Morisanus, Logic: Mexic. To make this matter more plain, I shall distinguish of a twofold acception of Univocal; one Logical, the other Metaphysical. First Logical, in which 'tis adequately opposed unto equivocal, and so every predicate is univocal, that is, not purely, & merely equivocal, which imparts only its name, and not any common signification thereof. Predicates thus Univocal, are said to be Logically univocal, because this kind of univocation is sufficient as to Logical ends and purposes, as for the framing a contradiction, and to be the middle term in a demonstration. Secondly, there is a Metaphysical acception of Univocal, in which 'tis inadequately opposed unto Equivocal, that is, partly unto Equivocal, and partly unto Analogical. An Equivocal predicate only imparts its name, and not any common signification thereof. An Analogical predicate imparts both its name and signification unto the things of which it is predicated, but unequally, in regard of that inequality, which is of essential dependency, secundum prius & posterius, as they say; so Ens is predicated of substance, and Accident; analogically of substance in the first place, and primarily, as its principal analogate; of Accident in the second place, with attribution, order, or reference unto, and dependence upon substance. These things thus premised, I lay down these two conclusions, against which whatsoever you object I shall be ready to answer. The first conclusion, Divers attributes, which denominate God, and the Creature, are predicated of them univocally in a Logical acception of Univocal, as it is adequately opposed unto Equivocal; that is, they are not predicated of God, and the Creature, merely and purely Equivocally. For first, not only the bare words, but a common and abstracted signification of them is found both in God and the Creature, I might instance in Ens, substance, goodness, wisdom, justice, etc. Secondly, because otherwise nothing can be known, or demonstrated of God by, or from the creatures, but still there would be the fallacy of equivocation, Ex cognitione unius aequivocati nihil potest cognosci alterius: And this is as well against the Philosopher, who proveth many things demonstratively of God; as against the Apostle Rom. 1. 20. saying, The invisible things of him from the creation of the World are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power, and Godhead, so that they are without excuse. This is a reason given by Aquinas. p. 1. q. 13. art. 5. Nomina quae dicuntur de Deo & creaturis, non dicuntur purè aequivocè ut aliqui dixerunt. Quia secundum hoc ex creaturis nil possit cognosci de Deo, nec demonstrari, sed semper incideret fallacia aequivocationis, & hoc est tam contra Philosophum 8. Phys. 12. Metaph. qui multa demonstrative de Deo probat, quam etiam contra Apostolum dicentem. Roman. 1. Invisibilia Dei, per ea quae facta sunt, intellect a conspiciuntur. This is all that the Scotists can prove by their arguments, which they bring to prove the Univocation of Ens, as predicated of God and the creature; and this they fully and strongly prove. And indeed if the matter be well looked into, the contention here between the Thomists and the Scotists, is a mere strife of words, de modo loquendi. The second conclusion, No attribute whatsoever denominating God and the creature, is predicated of them univocally, as Univocal is opposed unto Analogical: for those attibutes which do agree unto God most properly, are predicated of God, & the creature unequally, in point of essential order; of God primarily, & independently, of the creature secondarily, & dependently, with relation unto God. In God they are by his Essence, in the creatures but by participation. This I might exemplify by instancing in that which is under debate, infallible knowledge of things to come, that are contingent, is affirmed of God chiefly, & in the first place; of the creature only dependently upon, & derivedly from God: whereupon an infallible, underived, & independent foreknowledge of future contingents is incommunicable unto any creature. james 4. 14. You know not, saith james, what shall be on the morrow. Before I take my leave of this section, I shall desire you, that whereas I affirm, that what words are attributable unto God properly, dicuntur de Deo prius quam de creaturis, you would be pleased to understand it in regard of the things, or perfections signified by those words, and not barely in regard of their imposition. This limitation Aquinas puts unto the Question. p. 1. Q. 13. art. 6. Nomina, quae proprie de Deo praedicantur, quantum ad rem significatam per prius dicuntur de Deo, quam de creaturis, quia a Deo hujusmodi perfectiones in creaturas manant; sed quantum ad impositionem nominis per prius a nobis imponuntur creaturis, quas prius cognoscimus, unde & modum fignificandi habent. Mr GOODWIN pag. 29, 30. cap. 3. Sect. 3. IF it be objected, that this argument lieth as strong against the propriety of knowledge, as of foreknowledge in God; in as much as foreknowledge is every whit as Properly and Formally in the Creature, as knowledge; I answer True it is, there is no knowledge neither in God, according to the precise and formal notion of Knowledge, or in such a sense, wherein it is found in men. And this the first and last of the three reasons mentioned do infallibly demonstrate. Knowledge in the creature is a principle or habit, really and essentially distinct from the subject, or soul, wherein it resideth: yea and is capable of augmentation and diminution therein, and of separation from its Whereas that which is called knowledge in God, neither differs really or essentially from his nature, or from himself, but is really one and the same thing with him (as will farther appear in the following Chapter) nor is it either capable of growth, or of decay, or of separation. Only in this respect, knowledge of the two, is more properly attributable unto God, than foreknowledge, viz. because foreknowledge in the proper notion, or formal conception of it, includes or supposeth a liableness to a change or expiration (viz. upon the coming to pass of the thing foreknown; which must of necessity come to pass in time) whereas knowledge imports nothing, but what may be permanent and perpetual, and so is (of the two) more appropriable unto him, who changeth not. JEANES. HEre you plainly flinch from that which is likely to be controverted between us: for you have not so much as the shadow of an argument to prove, that knowledge is not in God, according to the precise and formal notion of knowledge: but you spend a whole Section in the proof of that, wherein you are sure to meet with no adversary at all, viz. that there is no knowledge in God in such a sense, wherein it is found in men; why Sir, the concession of this will no ways advantage you, or prejudice us: 'tis the first part of your disjunctive proposition that calls for proof, in which, why you are so silent, I cannot guess, unless it be, that you are conscious of the falsehood of it, & therefore dared not to propound it Categorically, but only disjunctively; & the truth of disjunctive propositions is salved, if but one part of them be true. So then perhaps you thought, how ever the World went you would be safe and secure, as having two strings unto your bow. I will say no more of this, but that it is very unlike M. Goodwin, thus to decline the combat, and run unto the maintenance of a fort, where you could not reasonably expect so much as one assailant. If you be pleased to return into the field again, and come up roundly to a charge, I mean a proof of that which you have not yet so much as offered, or pretended to prove, viz. That there is no knowledge in God according to the precise and formal notion of knowledge, I shall be willing and ready to encounter you, and I do hope that by God's assistance I shall be able to stand the shock of all your Argumentation. M R GOODWIN pag. 105, 106. Cap. 6. Sect. 14. IT is the sense of one of the greatest Patrons of the adverse cause, that the precept, or injunction of God, is not properly the will of God; * Mandatum Dei non est voluntas Dei proprie dicta; quia illo non tam significet quid ipse vult fieri, quam quid nostri officii sit facere. D. Twisse. Vindiciae Gratiae etc. p. 171. because (saith he) he doth not hereby so much signify what himself willeth to be done, as what is our duty to do. I confess that no signification whatsoever, whether of what a man willeth, or decreeth to be done, or of what is the duty of another to do, can properly be said to be the will of the signifier: but yet that will, wherewith, or out of which, God willeth or commandeth us to do, that which is our duty to do, is as properly his will, as that whereby he willeth, or decreeth things to be done. My will, or desire, that my Child should obey me, or, that he should prosper in the world, is as properly my will, as that, whereby I will or purpose, to show the respects of a father unto him in providing for him; being as proper, natural, and direct an act of that principle or faculty of willing within m●, whereby I will the latter, as that act itself of this faculty, wherein I will the latter, is. For the Principle or faculty within me of willing, how numerous or different soever the acts of willing, which I exert by virtue of this faculty, may be, is but one and the same. And this faculty being natural, there can be no such difference between the acts proceeding from it, which should make some to be more proper, and others less; though some may be better, and others worse, But this difference can have no place in the acts of the will of God. Therefore if the precept, or preceptive will of God, be not properly his will; neither can any other will of his, or any other act of his will, be properly such. If so, then that will of God, or act of will in God, whereby he willeth or enjoineth faith and repentance, and consequently, salvation, unto all men, is as properly his will as that whereby he willeth the salvation of any man. Therefore if there be any secret or unrevealed will in God, whereby he willeth the destruction of any man, at the same time when he willeth the salvation of All men, (be it with what kind of will soever) these two wills must needs enterfeare, and contradict the one the other. Nor will that distinction of the late mentioned Author salve a consistency between them, wherein he distinguisheth, between the Decree of God, and the thing decreed by him; affirming, that the thing which God decreeth, may be repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the thing which he commandeth; though the decree itself cannot be repugnant to the Command a Rem a Deo decretam cum re a Deo mandata, pugnare posse dicimus; decretum vero Dei cum mandato pugnare posse non dicimus. Twisse ubi supra . The vanity of this distinction clearly appeareth upon this common ground, viz. that Acts are differenced and distinguished by their Objects. Therefore if the object of God's decreeing will, or the thing decreed by him, be contrary to the thing preceptively willed, or commanded by him, impossible it is but that the two acts of his will, by the one of which he is supposed to will the one, and by the other, the other, should digladiate, and one fight against the other. Therefore certainly there is no such pair, or combination of wills in God, as the distinction of voluntas signi, and beneplaciti (as applied in the question in hand) doth suppose. It is impossible that I should inwardly and seriously will, or desire, the death of my Child, and yet at the same time seriously also will and enjoin the Physician to do the best to recover him. JEANES. D. Twisse is not singular herein, divers great Schoolmen, Aquinas, Durand, Cajetan, Bannes, Gregory de Valentia, and many others, say the same of not only Gods command, but all other signs of the will of his purpose or good pleasure. The words of some few of them, shall for the satisfaction of the reader be inserted in the Margin; and the rather, because you in the 16 Section of this Chapter, tell us, that the Schoolmen were the first coiners of this distinction of Gods will in Voluntatem signi, & voluntatem beneplaciti: and how their interpretation thereof, holds intelligence (as you speak) with that sense of D. Twisse which you here impugn, the Reader may see Vindic. Lib. 1. pag. 173, Dicendum quod in Deo quaedam dicuntur proprie & quaedam secundum Metaphoram, cum autem aliquae passiones humanae in divinam praedicationem metaphorice assumuntur, hoc fit secundum similitudinem effectus, unde illud quod est signum talis passionis in nobis, in Deo nomine illius passionis Metaphorice significatur; sicut apud nos irati punire consueverunt, unde ipsa punitio est signum irae, & propter hoc ipsa punitio nomine irae significatur, cum Deo attribuitur. Similiter id quod solet esse in nobis signum voluntatis, quandoque Metaphorice in Deo voluntas dicitur, sicut cum aliquis praecipit aliquid, signum est, quod velit illud fieri; unde praeceptum divinum quandoque Metaphorice voluntas Dei dicitur, secundum illud Matthaei 6. Fiat voluntas tua, sicut in coelo & in terra; sed hoc distat inter voluntatem & iram, quia ira de Deo nunquam proprie dicitur, cum in suo principali intellectu includat passionem, voluntas autem proprie de Deo dicitur, & ideo in Deo distinguitur voluntas proprie, & Metaphorice dicta, voluntas enim proprie dicta vocatur voluntas beneplaciti; voluntas autem Metaphorice dicta est voluntas signi, eo quod ipsum signum voluntatis voluntas dicitur. Aq●in. part. 1. Sum. Qu. 19 art. 11. Communiter dicitur quod distinctio voluntatis divinae in voluntatem beneplaciti, & in voluntatem signi, est distinctio voluntatis in voluntatem proprie dictam, & Metaphorice, nam voluntas beneplaciti est voluntas proprie dicta, vel actus suus volendi, quo aliquid sibi placet, sed voluntas signi dicitur Metaphorice voluntas Dei, eo modo quo signum nominatur Metaphorice nomine rei, cujus est signum, ut imago Herculis vocatur Hercules Et h●c potest esse dupliciter, uno modo ratione similitudinis inter signum & signatum ut in exemplo jam posito; alio modo ratione proportionis quasi arguendo, Quod sicut se habent signum & signatum in uno, sic se habeant in alio; & sic est in proposito nostro: Quia enim in nobis ille qui praecipit, vel consulit aliquid fieri, videtur illud velle: similiter qui prohibet aliquid fieri, videtur velle illud non fieri; qui autem aliquid facit, vult illud fieri, qui vero permittit aliquid fieri cum possit impedire, videtur illud velle; ideo in Deo idem ponitur scilicet quod praeceptum, consilium, prohibitio, operatio, & permissio sunt, vel dicuntur voluntas divina propter dictam similitudinem vel magis proportionem. Durand. lib. 1. dist. 45. Q 3. Haec divisio divinae voluntatis in voluntatem beneplaciti, & voluntatem signi, non est univoci in univocata, sed analogi in analogata. Nam de signo divinae voluntatis non dicitur voluntatis nomen nisi Metaphorice, & analogice, propter habitudinem illius ad voluntatem divinam proprie dictam. Quam rem aliis verbis Cajetanus expressit in hac quaestione. Art. 11. Cum dixit non dividi hic rem aliquam, sed vocem ipsam, seu nomen divinae voluntatis Gregori de Valentia. Tom. 1. Disp. 1. Q. 19 punct. 2. 174. Some of them profess in terminis, that the will of sign or signification, is called the will of God only improperly, and metaphorically by way of similitude or proportion, and therefore the distribution of Gods will into a will of sign and will of purpose or good pleasure is not real, but only verbal, divisio vocis; from whom they do not descent, who say that 'tis divisio Analogi in analogata. For as Scheibler a Lutheran, and of your opinion for the main in these controversies, observeth, that they are to be understood of such an analogy which is by extrinsecall reference and denomination. Intelligunt enim eam analogiam, quae est per extrinsecam habitudinem & denominationem. Voluntas enim signi vocatur voluntas extrinseca denominatione, in quantum scilicet significat beneplacitum divinum, quod absolute est voluntas Dei, ad eum modum quo multa dicuntur sana, per habitudinem ad santitatem animalis, quae primo talis est: Metaph. lib. 2. cap. 3. tit. 15. art. 4. punct. 2. n. 535. For the will of sign is called will by extrinsecall denomination, as it signifieth Gods good pleasure or decree (which absolutely is the will of God) after the same manner that many things are said to be healthy or wholesome, in regard of reference unto the health of a sensitive creature, unto whom health is in the first place properly and intrinsically attributed. Unto these suffrages of the Schoolmen, I shall add reasons drawn from three attributes of Gods will properly so called; It is internal, eternal, irresistible, and God's precept or injunction is external, temporary, and resistible. 1. God's will properly so called is internal in God, really undistinguished from his Essence, whereas God's precepts or injunctions, are external without him, really distinguished from him. 2. The proper will of God was from eternal, the commands of God are given in time. From the Eternity of God's will, I shall also draw this following Argument. The will of God properly so called is uncapable of interruption, reiteration, and multiplication, for in eternity there is a most absolute and perfect unity and indivisibility without any succession of parts, but now the Commands of God may be very often reiterated and multiplied, precept upon precept, precept upon precept, line upon line, line upon line. Esay 28. 10. Oh Jerusalem, Jerusalem, how often would I have gathered thy children together. Math. 23. 37. 3. The will of God properly so called is irresistible, Who hath resisted his will. Rom. 9 19 Whatsoever the Lord pleased that did he in heaven and in earth, in the Sea and all deep places. Psal. 135. 6. The Counsel of the Lord must stand and cannot be withstood. By all the powers of the World and darkness my counsel (saith the Lord) shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure Esay 46. 10. But now God's precepts and prohibitions are every day violated, broken and resisted by wicked men. Unto these reasons I might add your own confession, I confess (say you) that no signification whatsoever, whether of what a man willeth or decreeth to be done, or of what is the duty of another to do, can properly be said Praelatus enim religiosus quandoque praecipit subdito aliquid grave, volens eum per praeceptum ligare, & tamen nec vult, nec intendit, quod res quam praecipit fiat; unde cum subditus parat se ad exequendum praeceptum, Praelatus revocat; ita quod Praeceptur est directe signum voluntatis praecipientis quod velit obligari subditum ad exequ●ndum praeceptum, sed non est directe signum quod velit rem praeceptam impleri; talia enim praecepta sunt vel ad sumendum experimentum de obedientia subditi, vel ad ostendendum pluribus obedientiam unius quasi pro exemplo. to be the will of the signifier. But now I subjoin, God's precept or injunction is only a sign of his will, and therefore however it be usually termed in Scripture the will of God Mat. 6. 10. Mat. 7. 21. Rom. 12. 2. 1 Thess. 4. 3. It is to be understood only improperly and Tropically; and that first Metaphorically, 2. Metonymically. First Metaphorically, and by an Anthropopathy, when God commands a thing, he carrieth himself as men do, when they purpose, will, desire, and determine that such a thing should come to pass; for amongst men usually their commands are manifestations and declarations of their purposes and desires; I say usually, because sometimes superiors enjoin some things to inferiors only for trial, and, upon their readiness to obey, recall and revoke such commands. How Gods commandments and other signs of his will, are the will of God Metaphorically, Aquinas illustrates in the place but now quoted; seeing passions are ascribed unto God only Metaphorically, hence the signs of such passions in us, when ascribed unto God, are called by the names of the passions themselves. Punishment is with us a sign of Anger, and therefore God's punishments are termed his wrath or anger; so our commands are signs usually of our wills, of our desires, and intentions, and therefore the commands of God are termed in Scripture the will of God. But I think with D. Ames, that the commandments of God are termed the will of God, not only Metaphorically, but also Metonymically, because they are signs of a proper will of God. Media illa (saith Ames) per quae voluntas ista r●●elatur, recte vocantur voluntas signi, non tantum Metaphorice, quia solent inter homines indicare quid velint: sed etiam Metonymice, quia sunt vel effecta, vel adjuncta, propriam Dei voluntatem ex parte indicantia. Medul. lib. 1. c. 7. 53. And this also is observed by D. Twisse, in his consideration of the Doctrine of the Synod of Dort and Arles reduced to the practice, p. 54. Now we say, even God's commandment notes the will of God also in proper speech, to wit, what shall be our duty to do; for undoubtedly whatsoever God commands us, it is his will in proper speech, that it shall be our duty to do it. However then, it is the sense of D. Twisse, that the commandment of God cannot properly be said to be his will, yet he doth not deny that it signifieth or betokeneth the will of God properly so called, in which regard it is termed the revealed will of God, because it revealeth God's will: all the Question is, what will of God it revealeth or signifieth. D. Twisse (you see) roundly expresseth himself, that it signifieth, or revealeth God's will of obligation, what he will oblige and bind men unto; what he will have to be their duty: but it doth not at all signify the will of God's purpose concerning what shall come to pass actually; it doth not signify God's will of operation or permission, i. e. it doth not reveal what good God hath decreed to work, what evil he hath decreed to suffer or permit in all those to whom his commands are given; briefly, it signifieth or revealeth man's duty, and Gods will of obliging unto it. Mic. 6. 8. He hath showed thee O man what is good, and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God. Obad. 12. 13. 14. It doth not reveal the event or issue of things what shall actually be, by Gods working or permitting providence; This you have asserted by Durand an ancient Schooleman, Praeceptum (saith he) non semper indicat voluntatem praecipientis, qua praecipiens velit rem praeceptam fieri, sed illam qua praecipiens vult obligare illum, cui praecipit, ad faciendum quod praecipitur, & hoc & semper. And a little before in the same place, Praeceptum non est directè & semper signum quod praecipiens velit rem praeceptam fieri, sed solum quod velit subditum obligare ad faciendum illud quod praecipitur, & hoc clarum est in praeceptis divinis, per quae Deus vult simpliciter nos obligare, sed non vult simpliciter rem praeceptam fieri, alioquin semper fieret. Lib. 1. dist. 47. Qu. 3. God's command unto Pharaoh, that he should let Israel go, signified only his duty, that he was bound to let Israel go, not the event, that he should actually consent unto their departure. God's command of Cain, Judas, etc. to believe, and repent, did not signify that God did will the actual existence of their faith and repentance, but only that it was his purpose to bind them to faith and repentance as a duty. And thus you have a confirmation and clear explication of D. Twisse his meaning, against which your discourse in this Section, if it were reduced unto Syllogisms, would not conclude with the least show of probability. Mr GOODWIN. BUt yet that will wherewith, or out of which God willeth or commandeth us to do that which is our duty to do, is as properly his will, as that whereby he willeth or decreeth things to be done. JEANES. FIrst, here you make to will and to command terms equivalent or Synonimous (as you do afterwards to will and to enjoin) which is very unreasonable, for 'tis the very thing in question, and D. Twisse affirmeth, that to command is to will only improperly, and therefore equivocally. For you then to use to Will and Command, as words of the same import and signification, before you have proved them to be so, serves for nothing but to breed confusion, distract the Reader, and disturb the course of Disputation. Secondly, I confess that the will wherewith, or out of which God commandeth us to do that which is our duty to do, is as properly his will, as that, whereby he willeth or decreeth things to be done; for they are one and the same will really, distinguished only ratione ratiocinate, by their objects, in regard of our manner of conceiving. And if any one in imitation of your subtlety in the following part of this Section, should object, that acts are differenced, and distinguished by their objects, therefore if the object of that will, wherewith, or out of which God commandeth us to do that which is our duty to do, be really distinguished from the object of that will, whereby he decreeth things to be done, impossible it is, but that these two wills of his, should be also really distinguished, I shall for answer refer them unto Ferrariensis upon Aquinas contra gentes lib. 1. c. 77. Adverte quod ex ista probatione (viz.) (that actus secundum objecta distinguntur) vult habere, S. Tho. quod distinguibile proportionatum objecto est actus; & ideo si plura objecta faciant aliquam pluralitatem, illa erit actuum pluralitas: Non autem intendit, quod per quaecunque plura objecta plurificentur actus. Unde sensus illius propositionis est, quod actus est id quod proprie & primo plurificatur, quando pluralitas objectorum aliquam pluralitatem inducit. The sense of this proposition, Acts are differenced and distinguished by their objects, is, that if many, or different objects do infer any plurality or distinction, 'tis only of acts; not that every plurality, or distinction of objects doth always argue a plurality or distinction of acts. 3. But thirdly, this concession will not in the least degree advantage you; for the inference that you make afterwards, That if the precept of God be not properly his will, neither can any other will of his be properly such; for no rational and Scholastical Divine will deny God's decree, of things to be done, to be properly his will; and I have made it good, that God's commandment is not properly his will, and you bring nothing like an argument to prove the contrary: but in the next place, you illustrate this by a comparison from the acts of willing, proceeding from the principle, or faculty within man of willing, let us hear what you say. Mr GOODWIN. Mr will or desire that my Child should obey me, or that he should prosper in the World, is as properly my will, as that, whereby I will or purpose to show the respects of a Father unto him in providing for him: being as proper, natural, and direct an act of that principle or faculty of willing within me, whereby I will the latter, as that act itself of this faculty, wherein I will the latter, is. For the principle or faculty within me of willing, how numerous or different soever the acts of willing, which I exert by virtue of this faculty, may be, is but one and the same. And this faculty being natural, there can be no such difference between the acts proceeding from it, which should make some to be more proper and others less, though some may be better, and others worse, but this difference can have no place in the acts of the will of God. JEANES. FOr answer, I shall distinguish betwixt the Flicite acts of the will, which proceed from the will, as their only and immediate principle, and such acts of the will as are only imperate, that is, performed at the beck and command of the will, but proceeding immediately from other faculties v. g. the understanding, loco-motive faculty, the parts and members of the body, etc. as walking, speaking, writing, and the like. Now I confess there can be no such difference between the elicit acts of men's wills, which should make some to be more proper, and others less: But yet notwithstanding this I affirm, that the imperate acts of men's wills, such as their injunctions, and precepts, whether by tongue, pen, or otherwise (to give an instance pertinent to the business in hand) are not called properly acts of their wills; and this I shall not dictate, but confirm by these three following arguments. First, every act of the will properly so called, is voluntary, intrinsically, and of itself, but now these imperate acts of the will are voluntary only extrinsecally, by denomination from an act of the will moving, stirring up, and applying the power or faculty from which they proceed unto operation. 2. Those acts which proceed from other faculties, distinguished really from the will, are not properly acts of the will, or acts of willing (as you phrase it) but these imperate acts of the will proceed from other faculties really distinguished from the will, and therefore cannot properly be said to be acts of the will, and of these faculties too. 3. The acts of the will, are not properly objects of acts of the will. The act of willing is not properly a thing willed, a decree is not decreed. Actus (saith Suarez) qui per seipsum est intrinsece voluntarius, non comparatur ut proprium objectum, vel effectus ad illum actum, quo est voluntarius, quia est voluntarius seipso, & non est proprie objectum vel effectus sui ipsius: habet ergo aliud objectum in quod directe tendat, & est effectus potentiae, a qua elicitur, & solum per quandam virtualem reflectionem, quam in se includit, est voluntarius: unde dici solet volitus per modum actus, non per modum objecti. Met. Disp. 19 Sect. 5. n. 17. But these imperate actions of the will are properly objects of the will, and things willed, and therefore cannot in strictness and propriety of speech be said to be acts of the will. M. GOODWIN. THerefore if the precept or preceptive will of God be not properly his will, neither can any other will of his, or any other act of his will be properly such. JEANES. I Have searched for the premises out of which you infer this conclusion, and I must needs profess unto you, that I can find none: it is possible the fault may be in the dulness of my understanding, and you shall find me willing and ready to confess as much, if you will put your argument into Mood and Figure for me, and conclude this proposition out of any thing you have delivered in the former part of this Section. Mr GOODWIN. IF so, then that will of God, or act of will in God, whereby he willeth or enjoineth faith and repentance, and consequently salvation unto all men, is as properly his will, as that whereby he willeth the salvation of any man. JEANES. FIrst, until you can find a Major and Minor unto your former conclusion, this which is inferred therehence is presumed and not proved. 2. You here make Wills and enjoineth all one, concerning the unreasonableness of which, I have spoken already. 3. I wonder what you mean in talking of an act of will in God, whereby he enjoineth faith and repentance, The injunction or precept of faith and repentance, is an act without God, not in him, and belongs unto his will, not formally, but effectively. 4. Your mentioning of an act of will in God, hath occasioned me to think of some thing, which for clearing of mine own meaning, and avoiding of mistakes, I shall communicate unto the Reader: And it is carefully to put a distinction betwixt these two expressions, To be properly the will of God, and To be properly an act of the will of God. That God's decrees are properly the will of God, may be demonstrated out of most Schoolmen; that they are properly acts of Gods will I deny, and that for two reasons. 1. If God's decrees were properly acts of his will, than his will were properly a power, But his will is not properly a power, for will is ascribed unto God, not as a power distinct from the act, but as an act not elicite but subsisting: And here I shall give you the words and reasons of Suarez, than whom there are few Modern Schoolmen more rational. He having proved that the will is not in God per modum potentiae secundum rem, sed per modum actus ultimi & puri, he propounds the doubt secundum rationem, & modum concipiendi nostrum, wherein hear his resolution. In hoc eodem modo loquendum est, quo de intellectu & scientià locuti sumus, quod scilicet ex parte rei conceptae, non potest concipi potentia volendi in Deo, quia non potest concipi potentia agendi vel recipiendi ad intra. Nec fingi potest quod sit potentia ad agendum & recipiendum, non secundum rem, sed secundum rationem; quia loquendo ex parte rei conceptae involvitur repugnantia in his terminis; nam agere secundum rationem, non est agere, sed fingere actionem. Ex parte autem modi concipiendi nostri, concipimus in Deo aliquid ad eum modum, quo in creaturis concipimus potentiam volendi, scilicet virtutem amandi se, ut sic, quam praescindimus ab actuali amore, sicut de actu primo & secundo in scientia diximus. But here I desire to be understood, as Franciscus Amicus explicates himself touching this particular Curs. Theol. Tom. 1. Disp. 14. Sect. 1. Dupliciter considerari potest potentia vitalis; uno modo, ut dicit distinctionem ab actu; secundo, ut importat positivam perfectionem percipiendi aut tendendi ad objectum; primo modo involvit imperfectionem Deo repugnantem; secundo modo perfectionem Deo convenientem. Quare concedo in Deo esse voluntatem, secundum positivum conceptum potentiae; Nego autem esse potentiam, secundum imperfectionem distinctionis ab actu secundo, quam potentia ut sic per se importat. The power of willing may be considered two manner of ways; First, as it implieth distinction from its act; and so it involveth imperfection repugnant unto God, Secondly, as it importeth a positive perfection of tendency towards its object or thing willed, and so it may be attributed unto God. 2. If God's decrees were properly acts of Gods will, than they should be properly Elicite acts, but they are not properly elicit acts, but subsisting. ●nunciantur fateor (saith our Author) tanquam actus a Deo eliciti, & sic dici possunt per anthropopathiam, quemadmodum & passiones humanae attribuuntur Deo. At eruditi probe norunt omnia decreta Dei esse unicum duntaxat actum volendi in Deo, qui quidem actus volendi non differt realiter ab ipsa voluntate Dei, quae quidem voluntas Dei non differt realiter ab ipso Deo, qui est actus simplicissimus. Vind. lib. 2. p. 2. p. 101. But I return from this digression unto M. Goodwin. M. GOODWIN. THerefore if there be any secret, or revealed will of God, whereby he willeth the destruction of any man, at the same time when he willeth the salvation of all men, (be it with what kind of will soever) these two wills must needs enterfeere and contradict one the other. JEANES. THis you gather from what you have not at all proved, but only pretended to have proved, viz. that the precept or injunction of faith and repentance, is properly the will of God. And for the contrary I have brought undeniable proofs, and therefore though there be any secret or unrevealed will in God, whereby he willeth the destruction of any man, at the same time, when he willeth or enjoineth his faith and repentance, those two wills do not as you say enterfeere or contradict one the other. For unto contradiction it is required, that all the terms must be taken in the same sense and signification; now this condition is not here observed: For that he willeth the destruction of any man, is with a will in proper speech, that he willeth the faith and repentance of all men, unto whom the Gospel is preached, is with a will improperly so called, viz, his commandment. Mr GOODWIN. NOr will that distinction of the late mentioned Author, salve a consistency between them, wherein he distinguisheth betwixt the decree of God, and the thing decreed by him; affirming, that the thing which God decreeth may be repugnant to, or inconsistent with the thing that he commandeth, though the decree itself cannot be repugnant to the command. a Rem a Deo decretam cum re a Deo mandata pugnare posse dicimus, decretum vero Dei cum mandato pugnare posse non dicimus. Tuisse ●●● sup. JEANES THis is not barely affirmed, but strongly proved by D. Twisse, and of his proofs you take no notice, but only object against what he saith: This if it be a laudable, is a very easy, and compendious way of handling a controversy, for it would save a man the labour of that, which hath still been accounted the most difficult task in polemical Writers, to wit, solution of Arguments; but I shall acquaint the Reader with what you conceal, and I do not doubt, but upon representation thereof, he will acquit the Doctor, and his distinction, from that vanity which you lay to his charge. Rem a Deo decretam cum re a Deo mandata, pugnare posse dicimus; interea decretum Dei cum mandato pugnare posse non dicimus; virumque demonstramus. Rem a Deo decretam cum re a Deo mandata pugnare posse, sic oftendimus; sacrificatio Isaaci & non-sacrificatic Isaici pugnant inter se, sunt enim termini contradicentes. At harum altera fuit a Deo mandata Abrahamo, uti docet Scriptura, simulque eodem tempore non-sacrificatio fuit à Deo decreta, ut colligitur ex eventu. Nam Deus eam efficaciter impedivit, ne fieret. Quare res a Deo mandata, pugnare potest cum re a Deo decreta. Rursus, dimissio populi Israelitici ex Aegypto, & non-dimissio pugnant inter se, sunt enim sibi invicem contradicentes: at altera, nempe dimissio, fuit a Deo mandata Pharaoni; altera, puta non-dimissio, fuit a Deo eodem tempore decreta. Name & mandavit Pharaoni per Mosem & Aaronem ut populum dimitteret; simul etiam significavit, se obduraturum cor Pharaonis, ut non dimitteret; ergo res a Deo mandata, pugnare potest cum re à Deo decreta. That things commanded and decreed by God, may be contradictory, the Doctor proveth by undeniable instances. The sacrificing of Isaac, and the not sacrificing of Isaac, are terms contradictory; but the sacrificing of Isaac was the object of God's command to Abraham. Gen. 22. 2. The not sacrificing of Isaac was the object of God's decree, as appears by the event. v. 11. 12. Therefore the object of God's commandment, and the object of his decree, may be contradictory. Again, the letting of Israel go out of Egypt, and the not letting of Israel go out of Egypt are terms contradictory; but the letting of Israel go was commanded unto Pharaoh, his not letting of Israel go was decreed and determined by God. Exod. 7. 2, 3. and 10. 1, 2. God told Moses that he would harden Pharaohs heart, that he should not let Israel go. Therefore a thing commanded by God, and a thing decreed by God, may be contradictory. Concerning the first of these instances, you say something pag. 451, 452. But there is nothing argumentative in what you say, but may receive an answer from your own rule of interpreting Scripture. pag. 92. 99 108. 109. In the next place the Doctor proves, that the commandments and the decrees of God are not repugnant. Nec tamen decretum pugnare cum mandato, sic probamus. Mandato significat Deus quid sit nostri officii, ut a nobis fieri debeat; decretum vero divinum nihil aliud est, quam propositum divinum de aliquo, ut vel fiat, vel impediatur ne fiat, idque efficaciter. Mandatum docet quid ipse probaturus sit, si modo ab homine fiat, quid improbaturus si non fiat: decretum statuit quid ipse facturus sit, aut impediturus, ne sit. Ista autem non pugnant; tui est officii ut hoc facias, sed non est mei propositi per gratiam efficere ut facias. Pari ratione potest Deus mandare alicui fidem, & resipiscentiam, & interea apud se statuere, quod non credat, aut resipiscat, negando scilicet gratiam efficacem, qua sola fieri potest ut credat aut resipiscat. God by his command signifieth, and showeth what is our duty, what ought to be done, or left undone by us; God's decree is nothing else, but his purpose that things shall come to pass, or not come to pass; the command teacheth, what God will approve or disapprove; his decree determineth, what he himself will do or hinder, etc. Now these are no ways repugnant. It is thy duty to do this, but it is not God's purpose to give thee grace for the doing of it: Thou art bound or obliged to do this, but yet thou shalt never actually do it: faith and repentance are thy duty, and yet thy faith and thy repentance shall never actually exist, or come to pass. By this that the Doctor hath said it is plain, that there is no opposition between God's command to all that hear the Gospel, believe, and repent, and his purpose of denying faith and repentance unto many, nay most of them. And thus you see what the Doctor hath to say for himself, let us next hear what you can say against him. Mr GOODWIN. THe vanity of this distinction clearly appeareth upon this common ground, viz. that acts are differenced and distinguished by their objects, therefore if the object of God's decreeing will, or the thing decreed by him, be contrary unto the thing preceptively willed or commanded by him, impossible it is, but that the two acts of his will, by the one of which he is supposed to will the one, and by the other the other, should digladiate and one fight against the other. JEANES. FIrst, here again you perplex the disputation with talking of two acts of Gods will, but supposing that by one of them you mean God's decree which is in him, and by the other his commandment which is without him, performed usually by the Ministry of the creature, and therefore not his will properly so called, I utterly deny the consequence of your argument, and how just and reasonable this my denial thereof is, will appear, if you please to reduce your Enthymeme into a categorical Syllogism, for than you will find the proof of its consequence to depend on this, That whatsoever acts are differenced and distinguished by their objects, do digladiate and one fight against the other; and this is a proposition so grossly false, as that I am very confident you cannot back it with so much as one, either testimony or reason. That acts are differenced and distinguished by their objects, is a common and received rule; but that all acts are opposite, whose objects are repugnant, is an assertion that as yet I never so much as read or heard of in any either Philosopher or Divine; and 'tis this alone will serve your turn to conclude a digladiation or repugnancy between the Decree and the Command of God from the opposition that D. Twisse admitteth to be between the things Decreed and the things Commanded. 2. If we take opposition and repugnancy as the Ramists, who divide it into disparation and contrariety, we may safely say, that God's decree and his commandment are things opposite, for they are disparate; but this will no wise prejudice D. Twisse, who speaks in the language of the followers of Aristotle, neither will it any ways advantage you, for the opposition or repugnancy that is between things disparate is only as touching an essential predication one of another, we cannot say that Grammar is Logic, or that temperance in a man is fortitude, and so we cannot say that God's decree is his commandment, or his commandment is his decree: not of a denominative or concretive predication of the same subject: the same man may be valiant, and temperate, a Grammarian and a Logician. See Scheibler Top. cap. 14. n. 7. & cap. 15. n. 19 MR GOODWIN. IT is impossible that I should inwardly and seriously will or desire the death of my Child, and yet at the same time seriously also will and enjoin the Physician to do his best to recover him. JEANES. IF you would hereby insinuate, that we affirm, that God doth inwardly and seriously will or desire the death or damnation of his Children, and yet at the same time also seriously enjoin his Ministers, who are spiritual Physicians, to do their best to recover them out of the snare of the Devil, you do wonderfully misconceive and misreport our opinion; for we say, that unto none hath he given power, right, or privilege to be his Sons, but unto such as believe on his name; and all those who believe, he hath ordained unto eternal life, and will keep by his power unto salvation; but of this see our Author, In the first Book of this Treatise. p. 133. 134. 137. What hath been said is sufficient to convince him, that will not wilfully and obstinately shut his eyes against the light, that the command of all who hear the Gospel to believe and repent, and the purpose of God to deny faith and repentance unto many, are not contradictory. I shall, before I discharge myself of this Section, evince as much briefly concerning this latter purpose, and that purpose or decree out of which the command proceedeth, and which is signified thereby. Here we must premise, that the commandment of God doth signify a decree or decreeing will of God, though not such a decree or will as the Arminians usually shape for themselves. 1. It signifieth the decree of God concerning the commandment itself, 2. Concerning the thing commanded. First then, the command of God signifieth God's will or decree of the commandment itself, of the external transient act of commanding. Eph. 1. 11. God worketh all things after the Counsel of his own will. God's commanding then of things in time, is a sign that from everlasting he did decree to command them. But secondly, It signifieth a will or decree of God also concerning the thing commanded, viz, as touching the obligation to it, not as touching the existence or nonexistence of it, it signifieth, that God from everlasting did decree, that the thing commanded should be man's duty, should be a thing Morally good, but it doth not signify or reveal, that the thing commanded should actually exist, and be performed by every one unto whom the command is propounded. Indeed the obedience of the elect, for whose salvation only the commands of God are given, was both commanded and decreed, or determined by God Ezek. 36. 26, 27. And hence we may infer, that the command of faith, repentance, obedience, etc. all which God hath determined to be necessary unto salvation, do imply, and reveal in a general, and indefinite way, that God from eternity did purpose to work faith, repentance, and obedience in those, whom he had designed to salvation. But this concession will not satisfy Arminians, who will be contented with nothing, unless we will grant them, that God willeth and desireth the faith, repentance, obedience, and salvation of Reprobates; which we cannot do, but withal we must renounce and disclaim God's omnipotency, and immutability. These things thus briefly premised, That God's purpose or decree of commanding faith, and repentance unto all that hear the Gospel, and his purpose or decree to deny faith and repentance unto many, are not contradictory, is manifest: because God's purpose or decree of commanding faith and repentance, refers unto the thing commanded, faith and repentance, only as concerning the obligation to them, not as touching the existence of them; now to decree and purpose, to bind and oblige all to faith and repentance, and to decree and purpose, that some yet shall never actually believe and repent, cannot be proved by any rules of Logic to be contradictory. Before I proceed unto the consideration of your next and last passage against D. Twisse, I shall only represent unto you, that our Author, whom you take to be one of the greatest patrons of that cause, which you account adverse, doth dislike the accommodation of that distinction of voluntas signi and beneplaciti, or a secret and revealed will, unto 1 Tim. 2. 4. (the place which you have under debate,) as well as you, though, I confess, upon different grounds. In his Book against Jackson pag. 534. he informeth us, that neither Calvin embraceth it, nor Beza, nor Piscator, but all concur upon that interpretation which Austin gave many hundred years ago. Peter Martyr proposeth it (saith he) amongst divers others, but embraceth it not, neither do I know any Divine of ours that embraceth it. Cajetan indeed embraceth it, and Cornelius de Lapide, and Aquinas amongst other interpretations; If you take (saith he speaking to D. Jackson) a liberty to put upon us the opinions, and accommodations of distinctions used by Papists, you may in the next place make doubt, whether we have not subscribed to the Council of Trent. And again in the next page 535. Neither do I like (saith he) Cajetans interpretation after this manner, when he saith, Est sermo de voluntate signi, qua Deus proponit omnibus homimbus praecepta salutis, doctrinamque Evangelii; and that for two reasons: First, because God doth not propose his Gospel to all: Secondly, if God should propose the Gospel to all, and bid all men to believe, this is no certain sign that God will have them to believe; like as it is no certain sign that God will give them grace to believe, without which they cannot believe; For it is manifest that God doth not give the grace of faith and repentance unto all that hear the Gospel, nor to a major part of them; but it is a sign I confess that God will have it our duty to believe, by commanding us to believe. The interpretation of this place, which D. Twisse sticks to, is that of Austin, that God will have some of all sorts or conditions to be saved, and he makes it good from the coherence, as here, so in his consideration of the doctrine of the Synod of Arles and Dort etc. p. 61. and p. 62, 63, 64. he gives a full and satisfactory answer unto that which you call more than a Topicke argument against this exposition, unto which why you do not reply, I cannot but wonder, but perhaps you never read it; And yet again 'tis very strange, that you, who have searched so narrowly and throughly into these controversies, as you profess, should be unread in all the works of him, whom you confess to be one of the greatest Patrons of the Adverse cause (as you call it) I will lay down that which you call more than a Topicke argument, and compare it with the objection of Tilenus, and then put down D. Twisse his answer unto Tilenus, and refer it unto the Reader, whether it do not fully satisfy, that which you suppose to be a demonstration. M. GOODWIN. pag. 104. IF it may be said that God will have all men to be saved, because he will have some of all sorts to be saved, it may more properly & truly be said of him, that he will have all men to be destroyed (at least in their sense, who hold an irreversible reprobation of persons personally considered from eternity) because not simply some, but a very great part of all sorts of men now extant in the world, will in time perish, and that according to the decree or will of God, the tenor whereof is, that all persons dying in impenitency, and unbelief shall perish: yet the Scriptures do no where say upon any such account as this, either in terminis, or in substance, that God will have all men to perish, and not to come to the knowledge of the truth which is somewhat more than a Topicke argument, that God is not therefore said to will that all men should be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth, only because he will have some, some few of all sorts of men to be saved, and to come to this knowledge, but simply because his will is to have all men with out exception (viz. as they are men, and whilst they are yet capable of Repentance) to be saved, and in order thereunto to come to the knowledge of the saving truth. (i. e.) The Gospel. TILENUS. NOW if this New Evangelist do tell the Infidel that the passages of Scripture, which say that God would have all men to be saved, are to be understood of some of every Nation, and condition, the Infidel will reply that then the Scripture ought with much more reason to say, that God would have all men to be damned; because that in every Nation there are far more of these than of them, and how that in all reason the denomination should be taken from the greatest number. DR TWISSE upon the Synod of Arles etc. Pag. 62, 63, 64. I Deny that the Scripture ought with much more reason, or with any reason to say, that God would have all men to be damned, although put the case that in every Nation & condition there be more of these, than of them; and his reason drawn from the denomination to be taken from the major part is nothing to the present purpose. For the question here about the interpretation of Saint Paul's phrase is only this, whether the word All be to be interpreted of all sorts, or of all and every one; so that the rule of denomination taken from the major part is nothing pertinent to this, The question being only, whether genera singulorum, or singula generum be here meant, not whether some of all sorts, or all and every one of all sorts. Which being resolved, and that hereby is meant, genera singulorum, it may be farther questioned, whether genera singulorum do imply every particular of these kinds, or only some of them? For it is well known, that the phrase is indifferent to the one as well as the other, and that genera singulorum, are equally preserved entire in some particulars, as in many, or most, or all. Like as the Species of the Sun is maintained exactly as well in that one Sun, which shines by day in the firmament, as if there were twenty Suns. Secondly, though the reason here given from the denomination to be taken from the greater part, were pertinent, yet were it nothing pertinent to the Apostles purpose in this place, to say, that God would have all men to be damned; For this were no agreeable reason to move them to pray for all, for Kings, and all that are in authority. As if the Apostle should say thus, I will have you to pray for all, for God will have all to be damned; for saith Austin, if God's Church knew who were predestinated to be sent into eternal fire with the Devil and his Angels, they would no more pray for such, than they would pray for the Devil himself. So that this Author doth miserably overlash in this his subtlety, and betrays more nakedness than any sober and wise Infidel were like to do. Then again, the instances of Scripture are clearly against him. For when every fourfooted beast (as the Scripture speaks) was seen by Peter in a vision; in all likelihood they were not the most part of every kind, but the smallest rather of every kind: and accordingly this Author might conclude, that considering denominations are taken from the major part, therefore it is rather to be said, that every fourfooted beast was not seen by Peter, for certainly the major part of every kind was not; yet in this sense to speak of it, in that case was nothing pertinent, but rather contrariant to that which followeth: Rise Peter, kill and eat.. In like sort seeing in all likelihood more people stayed at home both in Jerusalem, and in Judea, then were they who went out to John, and according to this Author's rule, it were more fit to say, All Jerusalem and all Judea stayed at home, when John the Baptist Preached: yet was it nothing congruous, but contrariant rather to the Evangelists scope to write so; His purpose being to set down of what estimation was the authority of john by the confluence of all people from all parts unto him & therefore when he writes that all Judea, and all Jerusalem went forth unto him, the meaning can be no more than this, namely, that from all parts of Judea and of Jerusalem some flocked unto him. JEANES. I come unto the third and last exception in your Book against Doctor Twisse. pag. 245. Mr GOODWIN. HAnging upon the Cross he prayed for his enemies, and those that crucified him, that they might be forgiven. May it not as well be inferred from hence, that therefore all his enemies, and all such, who (in any sense) crucify him, shall be forgiven by God; as it is argued from his praying for Peter, that his faith might not fail, that the faith of no true believer shall fail. Doctor Twisses notion upon the case is not so authentic; and though admitted, will not heal the difficulty: Christ (saith he) prayed for his enemies, ex officio hominis privati, i. e. according to the duty of a private man, but for his elect, as Mediator. This is said but not proved, nor indeed probable. For very unlikely it is, that Christ being now in a full investiture of his great office of Mediator, should wave his interest in Heaven, by means hereof in his addressements unto God for men, and pray only in the capacity, and according to the interest and duty of a private man; This would argue, that he prayed not for them with his whole heart, nor with an effectualness of desire to obtain what he prayed for. But let it be granted, yet still it follows, that whatsoever Christ prayed for, was not simply, or absolutely granted or done; and if whatsoever Christ prayed for, was absolutely granted, it is not material, as to matter of impetration, whether he prayed as Mediator, or as a private man. But the intent of Christ's Prayer for those that crucified him, was not that all their sins should be forgiven them, much less that simply and absolutely (i. e. without any intervening of faith and repentance) they should be forgiven (which had been to pray for that which is expressly contrary unto the revealed will of God) but that that particular sin of their crucifying him should be forgivem them i. e. should not be imputed unto them, by way of bar unto their repentance, either by any sudden or speedy destruction; or by delivering them up to such a spirit of obstinacy or obduration, under which men seldom or never repent. JEANES. THis exposition of D. Twisse proceeds upon supposition, (not grant) that Christ prayed for all that had a hand in his crucifying; and taking this supposition to be true, this following argument, for the proof of this exposition, may easily be gathered out of D. Twisse. If Christ prayed for all that crucified him, then either according to the duty of a private person, or by virtue of his office, as he was Mediator; but he prayed not for all his persecutors by virtue of his office, as he was a Mediator: therefore if he prayed for them, it was only in answer of his duty, as he was made under the Law, and a private person. The Minor which is only likely to be questioned, is thus confirmed; some that were guilty of his crucifying, were in all likelihood Reprobates, as is not only confessed, but proved by Arminius. Oravit (saith he) pro iis qui crucifixerunt eum, pro inimicis suis, inter quos & non-electi fuerunt: Pincipes enim saeculi crucifixerunt illum; at plurimis illorum sapientia Dei, & virtus quae est Christus, non est revelata. The Princes of the World crucified the Lord of Glory. 1 Cor. 2. 8. And unto most of them the wisdom and power of God, which is Christ, is not revealed. Now in joh. 17. 9 where we have the model, rule, or Epitome of Christ's intercession, that is, of his praying as Mediator, he disclaims all prayer, and consequently mediation for Reprobates. I pray not for the World, but for them which thou hast given me. Where World is taken pro turbà Reproborum etc. (saith D. Twisse) for the rout or rabble of Reprobates: and he proves it thus; In his, Mundus opponitur iis qui dantur Christo a Patre; at dari a patre, significat statum electionis. joh. 6. 39 Significat enim statum bonum praecedaneum vocationi efficaci; omne quod dat mihi pater, veniet ad me. Venire autem ad Christum, est credere in Christum per vocationem efficacem. Vind. l. 1. p. 2. pag. 181. The World in these words is opposed, unto them which are given unto Christ by the Father; but to be given unto Christ by the Father, signifieth the state of election, for it signifieth a good and happy estate or condition, precedaneous unto effectual vocation. joh. 6. 37. All that the Father giveth me shall come unto me; but to come unto Christ, is to believe in Christ, by an effectual vocation. Thus you see, that notwithstanding your pleasure to say otherwise, it is not barely said but proved by him, that Christ prayed not for all his Crucifyers by virtue of his office as he was Mediator. In the next place, that Christ according to the duty of a private man, might pray for all that crucified him, even for those of them that were not elect, is rendered probable by two arguments in D. Twisse. The first is, Christ's subjection unto the Law. Gal. 4. 4. He was made under the Law: and therefore bound to fulfil all righteousness. Math. 3. 15. And one branch of the Law, as is evident, by Christ his own gloss upon it, Math. 5. is to love our enemies, to forgive private & personal wrongs, to pray for them which despitefully use us, and persecute us. this was a point that he pressed much upon his Disciples in his life time, and it being a duty (though of frequent use) yet difficult and harsh unto flesh and blood, it is not unlikely but that he might exemplify it by his own practice at his death. A second Argument in D. Twisse to prove that it is not improbable that Christ as a private man, affectu humano, prayed on his Cross for all his Crucifyers, even such of them as he knew, not to belong unto the election of grace, is drawn from comparison of such a prayer, with the like prayer, that Christ made in his agony in the Garden, O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me. Math. 26. 39 Father, if thou be willing, remove this cup from me. Luk. 22. 42. This bitter cup of his death and Passion, he knew full well that he was to drink up, as a Mediator for his elect, both by his Father's decree, call, command, as also by his own voluntary undertaking; for to this end and purpose he came into the World, and sanctified himself. joh. 17. 19 and therefore though these words were part of a most solemn addressement unto God, yet were they not put up by him in the capacity, and according to the duty and interest of a Mediator for his elect. Twisse Vindic. l. 1. p. 2. pag. 188. And this is enough to satisfy you, that you are out in passing your censure upon D. Twisse his notion on this place, that it is said not proved, which I am persuaded you would have forborn, if you had so throughly perused him, as it was fit you should, before you had in public thus censured him. Let us see in the next place, with what strength of Argument you oppose his exposition. M. GOODWIN. NOr indeed is this probable, for very unlikely it is, that Christ being now in a full investiture of his great office of Mediator, should wave his interest in heaven, by means hereof, in his addressements unto God for men, and pray only in the capacity, and according to the interest, and duty of a private man, this would argue that he prayed not for them with his whole heart, nor with an effectualness of desire to obtain what he prayed for. JEANES. FIrst, you cannot deny but that in these words of Christ, Father if it be possible, or if it be thy will, let this cup pass from me, Christ prayed not as a Mediator for his elect, for so he was engaged to drink off this Cup; but as a man naturally declining, and abhorring death, and the ignominy of the Cross, as they are in themselves evil: and yet all your arguments, mutatis mutandis, with due change may be applied unto this interpretation, as well as unto D. Twisse his notion (as you call it) upon Luke 23. 34. Secondly, in answer unto your objections, we may make use of a distinction of prayer, brought by Suarez in tertiam partem Sum. Aquin. q. 21. Art. 4. Prayer is nothing else but an unfolding of the will unto God. Now in Christ's manhood there was a twofold will, one absolute and effectual, another conditional and uneffectuall, which may otherwise be termed, a velleity, a will of simple complacency, a will of a thing only secundum quid, in some particular respect, according to some particular consideration: of such a will of his we read. Mar. 7. 24. He entered into an house, and would have no man know it, but he could not be hid. Answerable unto these two acts of the will in Christ, there may be attributed unto Christ two sorts or kinds of prayer; one proceeding from an absolute and effectual will, and this was always heard: the other from a conditional and uneffectuall will, and this was not always heard; such was his prayer in his agony, let this cup pass from me: and of this sort or kind of prayer, is that passage, Psal. 22. 2. In reference unto Christ, understood, O my God, I cry in the day time, but thou hearest not, and in the night season and am not silent. Now to apply this distinction, Christ could not pray as a private man for those of his persecutors, for whom he did not pray as a Mediator, if we speak of that kind of Prayer, which cometh from an absolute and effectual will, which is styled by Gregory de Valentia, Voluntas rationis undequaque deliberatae, because it proceedeth upon regard had to all circumstances: And the reason is, because with this kind of Prayer, he never prayed for any thing, but what he knew would be granted; for he never absolutely and effectually willed any thing, but what was agreeable unto Gods absolute will, the will of his decree or good pleasure, and this is all that your arguments can prove. But yet notwithstanding this, he might pray (taking prayer for a representation of a conditional or uneffectuall will) for the pardon of even those of his persecutors, who he knew should be condemned, and for whom therefore he prayed not as Mediator: or more plainly, he might express a velleity, a gracious, merciful, and charitable desire, to have all his crucifyers pardoned, so as it were not contrary unto God's decree, unto which he did submit, and in which he did acquiesce, as he did in his prayer for the removal of his Passion, not my will but thy will be done. An answer very like unto, if not coincident with this, may be easily gathered out of D. Twisse; and it is, that Christ, as a private man, prayed for the pardon of all his persecutors, taking prayer for an expression of Christ's antecedent will, not as prayer is a representation of his consequent will. An Antecedent will, as Alvarez explains it, is the willing of a thing considered absolutely, as it is in itself, abstracting from all other considerations of it: A consequent will, is the willing of a thing considered with all circumstances wherewith it is clothed. Thus a Merchant willeth the preservation of his wares with an antecedent will, as the preservation of his wares is considered in itself; but he doth not will it with a consequent will, as it is considered with this circumstance, as 'tis accompanied with hazard, and danger of his life. Thus also a judge with an antecedent will, wills the life of a Prisoner, because his life is in itself, a thing good and desirable: but he doth not will it with a consequent will, as he is guilty of Murder, incest, or any the like capital crime. Now D. Twisse, though he reject the application of this distinction to God, with whose simplicity and infinite knowledge several successive considerations of one and the same thing are utterly incompetible, yet he denyeth not, but it may have place in the manhood of Christ. Ratione diversarum considerationum non nego (saith he) distinctionem istam competere posse in hominem; quip cui variae considerationes occurrere possunt invicem succedentes: sic Christus naturali sui conservandi desiderio ferebatur, cum a patre peteret, ut calix transiret; at consideratâ voluntate & decreto patris de Calice isto ad bibendum ipsi propinato, eidem se submittere consultum duxit. This distinction in regard of divers considerations of one and the same thing, may be ascribed unto man, in whom are found several considerations of the same thing succeeding one another: So Christ as man, out of a natural desire of selfe-preservation, prayed that the cup of his passion might pass from him; but the will or decree, the command of his Father, his own office, and man's salvation being considered, he submitted himself to the drinking up of this cup, even to the very dregs; nevertheless not my will but thy will be done. Luk. 22. 42. If this cup may not pass away from me except I drink it, thy will be done. Mat. 26. 42. He did not will his passion with an Antecedent will, but he willed it (you see) with a Consequent will. Joh. 4. 34. And so he prayed against it, as a prayer is a proposal of an Antecedent, not consequent will. Now that Doctor Twisse resembles this prayer of Christ, for the forgiveness of all his crucifyers, unto Christ's deprecation of his death and passion, and makes it to be as that, an expression only of an antecedent will, a desire of their pardon, considered absolutely in itself, abstracting from God's decree unto the contrary, I shall evidence by giving you D. Twisse his own words. Vind. lib. 1. p. 2. pag. 188. Non dicit Molinaeus istam voluntatem Christi hominis, secundum quam oravit pro crucifigentibus ipsum, contrariam fuisse voluntati divinae; potuit enim fieri cum submissione voluntati Dei tacite factâ, licet non expressà, ad formulam precationis illius: pater transeat a me calix iste; Sed non mea voluntas fiat, sedtua. And again afterwards in the same page. Anon homini sanctissimo convenit, privatam offensam remittere, & palam protestari, se (nisi Deus aliter statuisset) percupere ut ipsis ignosceret; de quibus tamen Deus aliter forsitan constituerit, quod & ipsi forsitan innotescit? Anon petiit salvator, & ardenter obsecravit, ut si possibile esset, calix transiret, cum tamen Deum aliter constituisse, ne scilicet eum transiret calix, ipsi satis constaret? etc. Denique, Christum illis bene voluisse, ut homo erat, quos antecedaneo decreto ab omnis boni spe ac possessione absolute exclusit Deus; hoc enim addendum fuit (licet illud fraudulenter nimiùm dissimulet Corvinus) etiam haec sententia quid horrendi, quaeso te inculcat? Praesertim cum non sic voluisse dicamus, consideratâ istâ, de eorum a salute exclusione, voluntate divinâ; sed duntaxat, si per voluntatem Dei aliter constitutum non fuisset, & si penes ipsum esset, ut eligeret, utrum in persecutores ipsius vindictam exerceret, aut suspenderet; pro eâ quam ut homo in omnes (etiam in injuriis remittendis) charitatem exercere debuit, vindictam suspensam mallet quam exercitam. And this in general unto all your Arguments, I shall say something to each of them apart. Mr GOODWIN. FOr very unlikely it is, that Christ being now in a full investiture of his great office of Mediator, should wave his interest in Heaven, by means hereof in his addressements unto God for men, and pray only in the capacity and according to the interest and duty of a private man. JEANES. Unless variation of Phrases be argumentative, here is nothing but a begging of the question, only it is in state and good language. MR GOODWIN This would argue that he prayed not for them with his whole heart. JEANES. IF we understand Prayer in the sense but now mentioned, what absurdity is it to say, that Christ, as a private man, prayed for the forgiveness of all his persecutors with his whole heart, that is, as intensely, earnestly, vehemently, and zealously as he could, in the utmost degree possible to an humane nature. In Luk. 22. 44. 'tis said, that Christ prayed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 more earnestly, and his Sweat was as it were great drops of blood falling down to the ground. That this prayer was with the whole heart of Christ, you will not deny, and yet the former part of this prayer (if thou be willing remove this cup from me) was not the prayer of Christ as Mediator, but only an expression of an antecedent or conditional will and desire, like unto this his prayer upon the Cross for the justification of all his persecutors. There is nothing considerable which can be objected against this, but that hereupon it would follow, that seeing prayer is a representation of the will before God, that therefore in Christ there are two contrary wills, if he prayed for the pardon of all his persecutors as a private man, and did not pray for it, but rather against it, as a Mediator. But this receives a very easy solution. To will or not to will, or nill one and the same object, are not contrary, unless it be in respect of the same circumstances or considerations. For Christ as a private man, out of humane pity to wish and desire the justification of all his crucifiers, as a thing good and desirable, if God had not decreed otherwise; and not to will, but rather nill the justification of some of them, upon consideration that they are not given unto him by the Father, but excluded from salvation by the will of his decree or purpose; these indeed are divers, but not repugnant acts of the will, because they proceed upon general considerations, and therefore though the object be one materially, yet 'tis formally diversified: Thus between Christ's desire of declining his death, and his willing acceptance thereof, there was a diversity, but no contrariety, because they were not in respect of the same circumstances; he desired to decline it, as it was in itself evil, and contrary to nature; but as the means of man's salvation, he joyfully embraced it. To clear this farther, I shall propound a distinction of contraries out of Rada. Part. 3. Controu. 10. Art. 2. Contraria sunt in duplici differentiâ, alia absoluta, quae a quibuscunque causis causentur contraria sunt; ut calor & frigns, quae non dicunt essentialem ordinem, & dependentiam ad aliquid extrinsecum, exceptâ dependentiâ ad causam: Alia sunt contraria, quae & dicunt ordinem, & dependentiam essentialem, non solum ad suas causas, sed ad alia extrinseca, & objecta; cujusmodi sunt scientia & ignorantia, velle & nolle, gaudium & tristitia; quocirca non erunt contraria nisi ad idem formale objectum comparentur. MR GOODWIN. THis would argue that he did not pray for them with an effectualness of desire to obtain what he prayed for. JEANES. THis only proves, what will easily be granted, that Christ prayed not for all his persecutors, with a prayer proceeding from an absolute and effectual will. But there is one thing which I shall not dissemble, but freely acquaint the Reader with; And it is, that many great Scholars both Papists and Protestants do deny, that the proposal, expression, or representation of a conditionll and uneffectuall will or desire, is properly a prayer: I shall allege but two; the first shall be a Papist, to wit, Becanus Sum. Theol. Tom. 5. cap. 17. q. 3. Licet in Christo (saith he) distingui debeat duplex voluntas; una efficax, altera inefficax: non tamen distingui debet duplex oratio, una procedens ex efficaci voluntate, altera ex inefficaci. Nam oratio si vere oratio est, semper procedit ex absoluta & efficaci voluntate orantis, nunquam ex inefficaci. Qui enim petit aliquid fieri, efficaciter illud desiderat, & ideo adhibet orationem, tanquam medium quoddam ad obtinendum id, quod petit; hinc solet dici, orationem natura sua utilem esse ad impetrandum. Unde sic concludo: qui vult aliquid voluntate inefficaci nullum medium adhibet ad illud obtinendum; quia si adhiberet aliquod medium, jam vellet illud voluntate efficaci: at qui orat, adhibet aliquod medium ad obtinendum, nempe ipsam orationem: ergo qui orat, non vult voluntate inefficaci, sed tantum efficaci. Although in Christ there ought to be distinguished a twofold will, one effectual, another uneffectuall; yet notwithstanding, prayer ought not in the like manner to be distinguished: for there are not two sorts or kinds of Prayer, one proceeding from an effectual, the other from an uneffectuall will; for prayer, if it be truly prayer, always proceedeth from an absolute and effectual, and never from an uneffectuall will of the party praying: For he that petitioneth for the doing of any thing, doth effectually desire it, and therefore useth Prayer, as a means for the obtaining of that which he requests: Hence it is wont to be said, that Prayer is in its own nature useful or profitable for obtaining or procuring. Whence I conclude thus; He who willeth any thing with an uneffectuall will, applieth or useth no means for the procurement thereof; because if he should make use of any means to procure it, he should will it with an effectual will: but he who prayeth, makes use of a means for the obtaining of what he Prays for, to wit, Prayer itself: therefore he who Prayeth, willeth that he prays for, only with an effectual, and not with an uneffectuall will. He goes on in the confirmation of this opinion. Haec sententia est probabilior: pro quâ nota, aliud esse orare; aliud, simplex seu inefficax desiderium proponere: quod facile in nobis ostendi & explicari potest. Nam nostra oratio debet esse conjuncta cum certâ spe seu fiduciâ consequendi id quod petimus. jacobi 1. 6. postulet autem in fide, nihil haesitans. Et Math. 21. 22. Omnia quaecunque petieritis in oratione credentes, accipietis. Quando autem proponimus seu manifestamus alteri simplex seu inefficax desiderium nostrum, non facimus id cum certâ spe, seu fiducia consequendi illud, sed potius cum contrario affectu: ut si dicam, O mihi praeteritos referat si Jupiter annos. This opinion is the more probable, for the opening of which we must mark, that it is one thing to pray, another thing to propound a simple or uneffectuall desire; which may easily be shown and explained in ourselves; for our Prayer ought to be conjoined with a certain hope or assurance of obtaining that which we pray for. jam. 1. 6. Let him ask in faith nothing wavering or doubting. Math. 21. 22. And all things whatsoever ye shall ask in prayer believing, ye shall receive. But when we propound or manifest a bare, simple, uneffectuall desire, we do not do it with a certain confidence of obtaining what is so desired, but rather with assurance of the contrary. A seond testimony shall be taken out of Doctor Ames, an acute and learned Protestant. Coron. art. 5. c. 5. Juxta sententiam Arminii etc. nulla propria est oratio, quae non sit absoluta: quae etiam sententia non est temerè damnanda, cum inniti videatur rationibus non contemnendis; praesertim illà, quae deducitur ab orationis natura: Oratio enim est submissa repraesentatio voluntatis nostrae apud Deum ut ab ipso perficiatur. Explicatio velleitatis, quâ quid vellemus, si aliud non obsisteret, non est oratio proprie dicta. jam vero nihil volumus proprie, quod non absolute volumus; atque adeo nil petimus quod non absolute petimus, Quamvis in dispositione precantium conditionis ratio virtualiter saepe contineatur. Petimus quidem nonnunquam, ut unum fiat si alterum contingat; cujus quidem consequentis rei futuritio ut conditionata sit rogamus: Sed ipsa tamen petitio est absoluta, quoniam absolute petimus, ut posito uno, ponatur & alterum. According to the opinion of Arminius, there is no proper prayer, but what is absolute; which opinion is not rashly to be condemned; seeing it seems to be grounded upon considerable reasons, especially that which is drawn from the nature of prayer: for prayer is a submiss and lowly representation of our wills before God, to the end, it may be performed by him. The unfolding of a velleity, whereby we would will a thing if something did not hinder, is not prayer properly so called: But now we will nothing properly, which we do not absolutely will; and therefore we pray for nothing properly, which we do not absolutely petition for, although the nature of a condition be often virtually contained in the disposition of the parties praying, who may be ready to submit their wills unto Gods. Indeed we sometimes pray that one thing may be done, if another thing come to pass; and here we pray, that the futurition of the following thing be conditional, but the prayer itself is absolute, because we pray absolutely that one thing do exist upon the positure or existence of another. If this which these men say be true, than Christ prayed for the justification of all his crucifiers, as a private man, only improperly, and not in the proper and strict acception of Prayer; for which improper notion of the word, we have warrant from Scripture, when Christ said, Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me, Non oravit (saith Becanus) sed simplex naturae desiderium proposuit: He did not pray but propound the simple, bare, and naked desire of his nature: but though this his expression of his natural desire and love of life, be not a prayer in regard of either a critical or Philosophical use of the Word, yet you see, 'tis agreeable enough unto the language of the holy Ghost in scripture, to enlarge the signification of the Word so far, as to apply it thereunto: for Matthew says expressly that he prayed. Math. 26. 39, 42. But here for mine own part, I must freely profess that I better like Aquinas his interpretation of the place; that Christ prayed not for all his Crucifyers, but only for those of them, that were predestinate unto the obtaining of eternal life, by and through him. And of this prayer what a fruitful and plentiful Harvest he reaped, you may read in the 2, 3, and 4. Chapters of the History of the Acts of the Apostles. There you shall read, that the Lord daily added to the Church such as should be saved; at one time three Thousand, and another time five thousand; of whom a great and considerable number denied the Holy one and the just, and desired a murderer to be granted to them, and crucified and killed the Prince of life. Acts 2. 36. Acts 3. 14, 15. Rivet on Psal. 2. quotes a testimony of Austin favouring this gloss: videbat quosdam suos, inter multos alienos: illis jam petebat veniam, a quibus accipiebat injuriam. In making good this to be the sense and meaning of the place, I shall proceed by degrees: proving first, that it cannot be gathered out of the Text, that Christ prayed universally for all that crucified him. Secondly, That the contrary may be cleared from the Text, both considered in itself, and compared with other places of Scripture, as also by reason. Thirdly, That those of his persecutors for whom he prayed were such as belonged unto the election of grace. First, All the Logic in the World, though racked never so much, cannot infer out of the Text, that Christ prayed universally for the pardon of all his Crucifyers: for out of an indefinite term, a universal cannot be concluded, saith our Author, in defence of Moulin his denial that Christ prayed for all without exception. Vindic. l. 1. part. 2. Digres. 7. p. 136. Secondly, That Christ prayed not for all his Crucifiers without exception, may be cleared from the Text, both considered in itself, and compared with other places of Scripture, as also by reason. First, From the Text considered in itself; Father forgive them, for they know not what they do: Here Moulin, from the reason adjoined to the Petition, concludes, That he prayed not for all that had a hand in Crucifying him, but only for those who did it out of ignorance; and in all probability some of them, especially some of the rulers, did it out of pure malice. And whereas Corvinus objecteth out of Acts 3. 17. against Moulin; That even the Rulers did it through ignorance: Doctor Twisse upbraideth him with his unskilfulness in framing consequences, and making an indefinite proposition equivalent unto an universal. It doth not follow, (saith he) The Rulers did this through ignorance, therefore all the Rulers did it through ignorance. That some did, is certain from that place; and so it is, that some of them were converted, and obedient to the Faith Act. 6. 7. Besides he adds, that the Rulers, in all likelihood, did it out of affected ignorance, resisting the evidence of the holy Ghost, speaking in, and by Christ, and bearing witness to the divine Authority of his Doctrine by miracles: Whereas 'tis possible that Christ might pray for the executioners, that assisted and acted in his crucifying, perhaps not out of malice, but merely in the simplicity of their hearts, in obedience to their Superiors, not knowing any thing. Tum vero ad ignorantiam istam quod attinet, quam populo judaico, & primoribus populi vitio vertit Apostolus; quid obstat, quo minus affectata fuerit in multis, (resistendo scilicet evidentiae Spiritus sancti per Christum loquentis, & per miracula doctrinae ipsius testimonium ferentis) praesertim in primoribus. Qui vero ipsum in crucem egerunt, (pro quibus etiam oravit) erant illi ministri, & superiorum mandatis ex officio inserviebant: poterat ergo Christus orasse pro iis, qui non malitia pulsi, Sed cordis simplicitate in Superiorum obsequium ducti Christum in crucem sustulerunt. He also addeth, that he prayed only for them that were present at his Death; and 'tis probable that the Rulers, at least such of them as were not afterwards converted, were not present at his Death. Esto vero, non fuerint conversi, sed & nihilo minus probabile est, primores istos non adstitisse presentes Christo, qui crucifixionem ipsius promoverent, pro quibus tamen & solis oravit Christus in cruse. Secondly, that Christ prayed not for all and every one of his crucifyers, D. Ames confirmeth, from comparison of this text with other places of Scripture. Coron. Art. 2. c. 9 Art. 5. c. 5. Amongst these his enemies there might be some that had committed that great and unpardonable sin against the holy Ghost Math. 12. 24, 31, 32. There were some, by the confession of Arminius himself, that were finally impenitent; and final impenitency in general, and the sin against the holy Ghost, which formally includes final impenitency, are sins unto death, for the pardon of which, if known, prayer is not lawful. 1 john 5. 16. And therefore (saith Austin) if God's Church knew, who were predestinated to be sent into eternal fire, with the Devil, and his Angels, they would no more pray for such than they would pray for the Devil himself. Now Christ knew who had committed the sin against the holy Ghost, and who would be finally impenitent; for he himself knew full well what was in man. joh. 2. 28. Yea he knew from the beginning who they were that believed not. joh. 6. 64. See the Learned and reverend M. Owen in his Treatise of Universal Redemption. p. 44. 45. Thirdly, that Christ prayed not for all his crucifyers, may be confirmed by an argument shaped in imitation of that, which Doctor Twisse urgeth against a common and general intercession, which Corvinus ascribeth unto Christ. If Christ prayed, that all who crucified him should be forgiven, than it was either that they should be forgiven absolutely or conditionally; not absolutely, for then all of them were pardoned; if conditionally upon condition, than this condition was either on God's part, or else to be performed on his crucifyers' part: it could not be on God's part, modo scilicet ipsi visum fuerit, for then all of them should be pardoned according to your opinion; for you hold, that God truly and unfeignedly desires the salvation, and justification of all and every one of the Sons of Men: If you say that 'tis a condition on the part of his crucifyers, why this condition can be nothing else but faith and repentance; and then I demand, whether he prayed for their faith and repentance or no? If you answer, that he did not pray for the Faith and Repentance of all and every one of them, then say I, neither did he pray for their pardon; for he that truly and sincerely prayeth for any thing, prayeth also by just & undeniable consequence for all the necessary antecedents and consequents, causes and means, fruits and effects thereof: If you hold, that he prayed for the faith and repentance of all and every one of his crucifyers, than the argument may be renewed as in the beginning; for I ask you again, whether he prayed for their faith and repentance absolutely or conditionally; if absolutely, than all and every one of them did believe and repent, which the Remonstrants themselves deny: if conditionally, than this condition is either on God's part, or else on the part of the crucifyers of Christ; if upon condition on the part of God, it can be nothing but this, if he will or please, and then all of them should believe and repent, for (as Arminians gloss that text 1 Tim. 2. 4) God will have not only all sorts and kinds of men, but also all and every individual man to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth: if it be a condition on the part of those who crucified him, then pray do you assign that condition, and either I shall drive you upon the same rock of absurdity, upon which Doctor Twisse forceth Corvinus, to wit, that Christ prayed for his Crucifiers, that they should believe and repent, upon condition that they do believe and repent; or else I shall renew the argument, so as that a progress from one condition to another, and that without end, shall be unavoidable. Lastly, that he prayed only for those of his crucifiers, who belonged to the election of grace, is evident from what hath been already said out of D. Twisse upon joh. 17. 9 For thence I have inferred, that he prayed only for his elect as Mediator, that Chapter being the platform of Christ's intercession, as mediator for his Church: and you affirm it to be improbable, that Christ prayed under the notion and capacity of a private man, for any for whom he did not pray as Mediator. But now in the last place, let us hear how you expound this prayer of Christ. Mr GOODWIN. BUT the intent of Christ's prayer for those that crucified him, was not that all their sins should be forgiven them, much less, that simply and absolutely, that is, without any intervening of faith and repentance, they should be forgiven; (which had been to pray for that which is expressly contrary to the revealed will of God) but that that particular sin of their crucifying him should be forgiven them, i. e. should not be imputed unto them by way of bar unto their repentance, either by any sudden or speedy destruction, or by delivering them up to such a spirit of obstinacy or obduration, under which men seldom or never repent. JEANES FIrst, I say of this your comment, as you did of D. Twisse his notion upon the place, this is said but not proved, Nor indeed probable, because First, Scripture is a stranger to this acception of remission. Secondly, 'tis very irrational to take remission in this sense, which by your Doctrine may be consistent with its contrary: to wit condemnation. Though this particular sin of their crucifying him, were not imputed to them by way of bar unto their repentance, either by any sudden or speedy destruction, or by delivering them up to such a spirit of obstinacy or obduration, under which men seldom or never repent. yet according unto what you teach of grace, and ascribe unto the power of man's will, they might notwithstanding all this not believe and repent, but resist the grace of God, and die in final unbelief and impenitency, even for this sin, and so consequently be condemned for it. Christ's prayer might be granted, this particular sin of their crucifying Christ might be forgiven unto them, and yet they might be everlastingly damned for it, and their other sins. How you can reconcile these things passeth my understanding, but I shall not be unwilling to learn. Lastly, you seem to intimate, that some sins are so foul, as that they are of themselves a bar to repentance, for the desert of which God doth sometimes deny men either time for, or the grace of repentance. And hereby you entrench upon the freeness of God's grace in man's effectual vocation, which is the free gift of God, and therefore dispensed, not according to men's preceding carriages good or bad, but merely according to the good pleasure of his will: but this argument I shall spare farther to prosecute, and refer you to our Doctor, who hath abundantly laboured herein, as in other places, so especially in his examination of Mr Cotton his Treatise of Predestination, a pag. 190. usque ad 204. and again, p. 234, 235. etc. usque ad 246. As for that which followeth, as also that which is in the beginning of this Section, the examination of it is beside my present design, which is to vindicate Doctor Twisse from what you object against him. Yet if the Reader desire satisfaction thereabouts, he may meet with it in Doctor Ames his Coronis ad Coll. Hag. Art. 5. c. 5. Whither I shall in this haste refer him. And thus have I done with the defence of Doctor Twisse against your opposition of him: when I consider your fluent Wit, and ready Pen, I may expect from you a very speedy reply, Which may be, as sharp, so specious and Rhetorical enough. I shall desire this favour of the judicious Reader, that he would suspend his censure until he hath my rejoinder, which I shall not defer long, if God grant me his assistance. FINIS.