Quaestio Quodlibetica, OR A DISCOURSE, Whether it may be lawful to take USE FOR MONEY. Iohan. Sarisburiensis Epist. 198. In omni ardu●● dubietate censeo factendum; Vt primo omnium quaeramus & sequamur quid super 〈◊〉 lex divina praescripsit, quae si nihil certum exprimit recurratur ad canon's & exempla Sanctorum, ubi si nihil certum occurrit tandem explorentur ingenia & consilia sapientum in timore Domini. LONDON, Printed for Humphrey Moseley, and are to be sold at his Shop at the 〈◊〉 arms in St. Paul's churchyard. 1653. To the Reader. ASsoon as I had understanding in the affairs of this World, I became sensible how grievous it was to lie under the heavy disease of paying Interest, Consideration, or Use, (term it how you will) for money: And finding it generally condemned by those whose Judgements and learning I did most esteem, I began to question with myself whether the sin were not of that nature that I myself in paying did concur in the same offence with the taker, according to that a Rom. 1.32. of St Paul, in the vulgar Latin, qui talia agunt digni sunt morte, non solum qui faciunt sed etiam qui consentiunt facientibus. Which doubt I found after propounded by Aquinas 2a 2ae q. 78. a. 4. but neither so resolved by him, or his learned Commentator Cajetan, as that I received satisfaction in the point. Upon which occasion I began to search farther, and as for the Scripture I confess the prohibitions in it seemed to me to have much of the Laws framed for no other than the commonwealth of the Jews; And to be of the same nature the b Levit. 25. ●. jubilee, c Numb. 35.11. Deut. 19.3. The Cities for Refuge, d Deut. 15.1, 2. The Release to be made every seventh year were: for it is no way probable God who commanded them neither e ●x●d. 22.21.23.9. to vex, nor oppress a stranger (which it is apparent was of such an one to them as they were to the Egyptians) would have permitted the free exercise of Use towards, him could it not have been without either oppression or vexing. And prohibited the Jews who (either in respect of their often releases and Jubilees) could not give the assurances might be required in such contracts, or for some other reasons alone known to the Divine wisdom. As for the other places in the psalms, Ezekiel, &c. they ever seemed to me no more prohibitions, but were to be referred to the first limitations of it. Besides, what was me thought very considerable, no one Writer I met with condemned the taking increase upon lone of money if offered with willingness, and not contracted for be the party never so poor that paid it, yet I observed that to be against Levit. 25.36. as all oppression in buying and selling. verse 14. Touching the practice of the Primitive Christians there is nothing more plain than that it was not only common amongst them, but allowed by laws, for proof of which there needs no more than the Title DE USURIS found in both the Codex of Theodosius and justinian, and that in so high a manner as the Emperor Constantine at the very time the council of Nice sat, seems to have moderated the excess f De usuris leg. 1. Cod. Theod. l. 2. , yet so as he that lent two bushels was to receive a third usurae nomine, quae lex ad solas pertinet fruges: Nam pro pecunia ultra singulas Centesimas creditor vetatur accipere. I know it is not without question what is the meaning of Centesima, Acursius says it was as much as the principal in a year. g 〈◊〉. ad No●el 2. c. 4. ●d verbum Centesima. Est Centesima quae sorti in anno aequiparatur. And elsewhere gives this example. h Gloss. in Cod. de usuris Leg. 26. ad verb. tertiam pattem, & ad Leg. 28 in principio. Sors est duodecem usura sit in anno quatuor, sed etsi octo tunc est bessis, si aequiparatur sorti tunc est centesima. And so understands it he that made the Gloss upon Gratian. i Dist. 47. c. 2. verb. Centesima. Centesima dicitur usura quae sorti aequiparatur in anno. So that by Constantine's allowance no man was to receive of fruits above a third, but for money by the year the whole sum, which was intolerable. Others are of opinion that the Roman manner of paying for the lone of money being by the month, which Horace k Epist. 2. in fine. shows Haec ubi locutus foenerator Alphius, Iam jam futurus Rusticus, Omnem relegit Idibus pecuniam; Quaerit Kalendis ponere. And of a Debtor to pay use, — l satire. 3. lib. 3. Tristes misero venère Kalendae They therefore m Budaeus de ass. l. 1. think no man should pay more than the hundreth part of the principal by the month, called therefore Centesima, which was 12. per Cent. in the year, a large increase enough to ruin any borrower. But be it which it will it clearly shows as n De usuris C●d. Theo. l. Leg. 2. the Emperor Valentinian and Theodosius say, usury or increase for money was ●ure permissam. Neither the Lay alone, but Bishops themselves (not so careful of their pastoral function as was fit) did o Cyprian de lapsis Ann●tat. Pamel. 23. cap. 4. per alienas provincias oberrantes, negotiationis quaestuosae nundinas aucupari, esurientibus in ecclesia fratribus non subvenire, habere argentum largiter velle, fundos insidiosis fraudibus rapere, usuris multiplicantibus foenus augere, so that not content with what the law allowed they did increase their stock by use upon use, which how unconscionable it might be, and how performed, I will not here dispute, he that would understand how it past may read Acursius his Gloss ad Leg. 28. Cod. Usuris. These exorbitances in the Clergy procured the 17 Canon in the Council of p Conc. general. edit. Rome. 1608. p. 23 Nice, which yet reached none but those that were {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, within the rule of the church, And is undoubtedly there set down not as a thing in its own nature bad and forbid ●ure divino, but as we say jure positivo upon the church's command. For First it did not extend to the Lay, which had it been a sin in itself, could not have been exempted out of the command. Secondly, at the same time the Emperor, so renowned to all posterity for piety and equity in making laws, established the thing itself by an Edict, as did divers godly princes who succeeded. Thirdly, it only provides for the future, {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, he that should after that time take usury, not with any reference to the past, which had been most inconsiderately omitted had the thing been in its own nature bad. q Neque in ulla Lege praeteritum tempus reprehenditur nisi ejus rei quae sua sponte scelerata ac ne●aria est, ut etiam si lex non esset magnopere vitanda foret. Cicero lib. 3. in Verrem. n. 76. p. 75. edit. Rob. Stephani. 1339. As the Heathens observed, laws looked not at offences past if the thing were not in its own nature faulty. So when it provides only for the future, without any censure of the past, there is a great probability it was tolerable before. Fourthly, the other particulars provided for with the like severity, are clearly juris positivi, as that none should use any manual occupation, for so I interpret {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} there. Which how ever it may be very indecently exercised in any of the Clergy, yet certainly hath no other ground for being unlawful than the command of the church, for St. Paul doubtless did it Act. 5.18.3. 1 Cor. 4.12. &c. Lastly, the offence seems to be much in the quantity, for they exacted not less than {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, that is, the whole and half. Conformable to this decree of so famous a council, divers provincial ones held at r Con●. Carthag. 1. cap. 13. Arelaten. 1 c. 12. Arel▪ 11. c. 14. Carthage, Arles and elcewhere did prohibit usury, but ever with the restriction to the Clergy only; indeed the council of Carthage being put in mind by one that in his parts it was condemned in churchmen, Gratus the Bishop of that Sea replies, quod in laicis reprehenditur, id multo magis in clericis oportet praedamnari, which plainly sh●ws it not to be condemned as in it own nature a sin, for then the Lay as well as the Priest had been in all times culpable, but as of that which however in some it might be tolerable, yet was not fitting for them to exercise. And truly the excesses then taken did so much pass all proportion of Charity, as it wel● deserved reprehension, and cause the fathers speak with more earnestness against it than other sins to which men were by nature less addicted than that of Covetousness. And for proof of it, there needs no other testimony than that of Justinian, whose care was veterem duram et graviss●mam usurarum molem ad mediocritatem ducere, &c. and doth therefore establish what should be taken; too long to be here inserted; he that would know more particularly may have recourse to s De u●ur●s Leg. 26. 〈◊〉 just. the law itself. It sufficeth me, that the Emperor having there proportioned what people of several conditions should take, he concludes, Caeteros autem omnes homines dimidiam tantummodo Centesimae u●u●arum nomine posse stipulari et eam quantitatem usurarum etiam in aliis omnibus casibus nullo modo ampliari in quibus citra stipulationem usurae exigi solent; what dimidium Centesima was I must refer you to that I have said before, though Acursius explains it to be half the principal, by this verse, quaerere semisses possunt communitur omnes. It seems by Novel. 121.138. and other Laws, Use in those times, however thus moderated by the Emperor (who likewise took away t Ibid. Leg. 28. Use upon use) was very high. If any shall question how these Laws were censured by the holy Fathers of those times, I confess myself to have read nothing in particular of those concern Usury, yet in general u De vita Constantini. l. 1. c. 26. Eusebius observes Constantine reduced old Laws to more equity, and indeed so we find him to have x De exactionibus Leg. 3. lib. 11. Cod. Theod. done, even those did pertain to debts, which are of near relation. And of Justinian we find this testimony in the sixth general council, y Concil. general. p. 45. b. tom. 3. edit. Rom. 1612 Act. 4. Sext. Synod. {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, Which I translate thus; Justinian a King of happy memory, above all things jealous of the true and Apostolic Faith, the truth of whose belief as much as it did please God by his sincere confession, so much did he raise the most Christian policy; the Godly memory of whose devotion is to this day famous, and the truth of his Faith dispersed throughout all the world by his imperial Edicts is praised. And somewhat after z Ibid. p. 58. Eprope finem Actionis 4 {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}. That is, The great Justinian, the last, but most worthy of all, whose virtue and godliness reduced all things to a better order. How can we then imagine Princes so pious, so careful to correct all they found amiss, should permit what was so full of sin as some now take it to be? And thus for aught I know stands it amongst the Eastern Christians to this day, unless the Mahometan have made in some parts an alteration. But in Europe after the year 800, that Charles the great divided the Empire, it received some change: For in his Capitulars we find a clear determination that it ought not to be; a Carol. Magn. & Lud●vic. pij capit. Lib. 5. cap. 36. lib. 1. c. 5.38.130. &c. Usuram non solum clerici sed nec laici exigere debent: Which is the first prohibition I have at all met laid upon the Lay. The council of Nice, and the b Can. Apost. cap. 44. at post Gratian. cap. 43. Canons attributed to the Apostles, did condemn it in the Clergy, and so likewise did some particular Synods. And that of Carthage did not approve it in them; and Leo the first, who went farthest, did grieve c Leo. Epist. ●. cap. 3. p. 5. condolere the exercise of it did cadere in L●icos qui Christianos se dici cupiunt, intimating it had been a greater perfection of Charity, had they abstained from it; but none extended to a command, or to determine it a thing they ought not to do, before this Decree of the Emperor; which no doubt wanted not Pens to defend it; for about two hundred years after, certain learned men collecting out of Councils and Fathers, such Rules as were most apt for the Government of the Church, and direction of a Christian, called therefore Canonists, as those who were the beginners of the Canon Law, such were Burchardus Bishop of worms, Ivo of Chartres, and Gratian a Benedictine Monk, who writ the last of them, yet began his Work 1151 d Hist. Bologn. da Ghirardacci lib. 3. , and finished it ten years after; neither of them omitted sundry e Burch. lib. 2. cap. 129. Ivo. par. 6. cap. 196. & par. 13. in principio Gratian. Di●t. 47. caus. 14. q. 2. Chapters in condemnation of Usury, and were therein followed by Canonists, Casuist●, and Schoolmen, insomuch as there is hardly any collection of the f Decretal. lib. 5. tit. 19 in sexto lib. 5. tit. 5. Clement. lib. 5. tit. 5. &c. Canon Law since, without one title de usuris, it turning infinitely to the advantage of the ecclesiastic, who by that was made judge of almost all Agreements between man and man, as who shall read the title in the Canon Law, and what the Doctors have writ of Usury, restitution upon it, and participation with the Usurer, &c. may plainly discern. And not content with what hath past in foro animae, in private, they have gone so far, as a g Hieron de Ceval. de cognitione per viam violentiae par. 2. q. 96. temporal Judge, being sometimes ready to give sentence upon a Contract, hath been stopped by the ecclesiastic, on a pretence the Bargain was Usurious. Yet the necessity of human commerce hath caused divers, so great enemies to the name of Use, with their * A Mountain of Piety, is a stock of Money rai●ed by the Charity of good people, who observing the poor ruined by the Usury of Jews, did voluntarily contribute good store of treasure, to be preserved and lent unto them, whereby they upon security might have money at a low rate to relieve their wants, which because the mass is great, and the thing pious and charitable in itself, is called a Mountain of Piety. But in respect the Officers and other charges incident unto it cannot be had without some emolument, therefore the borrower pays somewhat by the month for the lone of that he receives. Cajet. opusc. de monte pietat. cap. 1. There is another sort, which is, when a Prince or State hath need of a good quantity of money, and doth for his supply, either impose a lone upon particular men, or voluntarily receive a good sum from them, and for their security assigns of his revenue 5.6.7. or 8. per cent. This dissers from Use-money with us, in that the lender cannot at his will call it in, or make use of the money itself, otherwise than by transferring his right in the Bank to another, only the Prince at his pleasure may, by paying all in, dissolve the Bank. Antonin. par. 2. tit. 1. cap. 11. in principio. And there wants not learned men which hold both these ways of receving increase to be Usurious, and likewise that defend the contrary, that neither of them is, See Matheo Villani lib. 3. cap. 106. Mountains of piety, their distinctions of lucrum cessans, and damnum emergeus, to palliate so the thing itself, as to call that no Usury, which hath the same effect, at least to my understanding. After the year 1200 much of the ecclesiastic power, especially what concerned heresy, was delegated by the Pope to certain Inquisitors (called since the Court of Inquisition) h In sexto de V●uris c. 8. ●. de quaestioni●us. whom Alexander the fourth, about the year 1255 did expressly charge not to meddle with any Question of Usury, though there wanted not some, who in that Age affirmed, Usura non fosse peccato mortale, as appears by i In Clement. de usuris. cap. Vnico. & Giovan. Villani. lib. 12. c. 57 History, and that resolution of Clement the fifth in the council of Vienna, 1311. Si quis in illum errorem inciderit ut pertinaciter affirmare praesumat, exercere usuras non esse peccatum, Decernimus eum velut haereticum puniendum. Upon which the Inquisitors grew very busy in many parts. At Florence in the year 1345, k Giovan. Villani. ib. upon a great disorder that then fell out, they were forced by Laws conformable to those of Perugia, Spain, &c. to regulate their power, though in l Ludovi. a Paramo. de Origine Inquisit. lib. 2. c. n. 36. Arragon by a bull of Leo the tenth it seems they now proceed in such causes. In Venice, that wise State would never admit the Inquisition m Tattato d● Inquisitione. c. 23.30, 31. Che si trattino causa di usura di qual si voglia sorte, to meddle with any kind of Usury, nor the Trade of any Artisan, &c. Touching the Church of England, farther than that the council of Nice was received both by the n Epist. Constant. apud Socr. lib. 1. c. 6 & apud The●d. lib. 1. Hist. cap. 10. Britons and o Beda l. lib. 4. c. 17. Saxons even at the very first, I know no particular prohibition of Usury, if we omit that imperfect clause p c. 17. p. 299. concil. Spe●●n. in the Council of Calcuith, about 787, till Edward the Confessor, who having lived long in France, and seasoned with the principles of that kingdom q cap. 37. Leg. Ed. p. 151. did, First, banish all Usurers out of his Kingdom. Secondly, if any after that prohibition should be found to exercise it, he then confiscated all he had. Thirdly, he barred them of the protection the Law afforded, and gives this reason, that having lived in the French Court, he had learned, quod usura raedix omnium malorum esset. But as a r Cook Instit. 3. c. 74. p. 163. learned Gentleman wisely observes, Too severe Laws are never duly executed; so happened it with this, which certainly was not all put in practice in England, for in the year 1126 ● in s Sim. Dunelm. An. 1126. Col. 254, 19 at Contuat Florent. Wigorn. Ano 1125. p. 501. a council held at Westminster, by Cardinal de Crema the Pope's Legate, and the Clergy of England, we find it only prohibitory to those of the Church; Usuram & turpe lucrum clericis omnimodis prohibemus, qui vero super crimine tali confessus fuerit aut convictus, à proprio gradu dejiciaetur. And again in another held at the same place by t Apud Richard. Hagulstad. p. 327.66. Albericus Bishop of Hostia the Pope's legate 1138, thus, Foeneratores clericos & turpia lucra sectantes, & publica secularium negotia procurantes, ab officio Ecclesiastico nihilominus removendos ce●semus: Which is indeed no more than a renewing the Nicene Canon, of which before. After this I do not remember any one made directly against it in England. Neither hath Lynwood any title of it, though there be so many in the Common Law, nor at all that I know doth he touch upon it, unless in one u De pig. noribus c. unico verbo Usu●a, fol. 81. a. place, and that very lightly, which shows clearly it was not much prosecuted here. By these steps that which at the first was exercised by Bishops and others, afterwards forbid the Clergy, as what might x 2 Tim. 2.4. entangle them in the affairs of this world, and show minds y 1 Tim. 3.8. too greedy of filthy lucre, allowed by so many Imperial Edicts of the most pious Emperors, first became disliked in the Lay, after that prohibited, and then they proceeded so far, as to determine, to affirm it no sin, was heretical. Upon the whole matter I could not conclude, either by express words, or necessary inference out of Scripture▪ or the practice of the Primitive Church, either giving, or taking use for money lent, to be in its own nature amongst Christians sinful, so as no other circumstance made it s●, as either the exacting the height the Law permitted, or upon the Borrowers poverty, not accepting what he is willing and able to pay, but with rigour forcing from him the uttermost penalty, or using some other way against Charity, not so fit for me to explicate; In short, I saw no reason not to submit to that of Alstedius, z Cas. Conscien. c. 20. n. 29. p. 418. Usura non est intrinsicè sive suo genere mala, sed est res indifferens; nor to deny that of a Epist. 383. Calvin, Nullo testimonio Scripturae mihi constat usùras omnino damnatas esse. Yet I do not take upon me to determine it to be absolutely lawful, I leave that to some Learned Divine, only I have here historically related what I met with in the inquiry. I know many of conscience and Learning are of a contrary opinion, and I take this to be of that nature b Enchirid c. 69. to. 3. S Augustine in one place held Purgatory, utrum ita sit, quaeri potest et aut inveniri aut latere, that every man ought to satisfy himself, and do accordingly. Men of great sincerity and judgement may differ in theological tenets. Cardinal Cajetan, of that integrity Chamier hath left this testimony of him, c Cham. de ca●●ne. to 1. lib. 12. c. 1. n. 3●. p. 424. vir meo ●udicio quanvis Papista tamen candidus, plurimumque distans ab ea pertinacia quam in reli quis deplorare cogimur, is fully of opinion the paying money for loan to those Banks are called mountains of Piety is d unlawful and usurious. Cardinal Tollet, in whose writings to use Casaubous words, cum xcellente rerum philosophicarum et theologicarum notitia par certat modestia, is clearly contrary and against him, holding them very lawful. In these disputes I cannot but think of that of f 〈…〉 citatur a●ud Ant●●●n par 2. 〈◊〉 Sect. 〈◊〉. Aqu. Quando quaestio quae quaeritur de aliquo 〈◊〉 utrum sit peccatum mortale vel non nisi ad hoc habeatur auctoritas expressa scripturae sacrae, aut canonis, seu determinationis ecclesiae, vel evidens ratio, non nisi periculosissimè determinatur; and indeed, if he mean by the determination of the Church the four, nay that of faith that was resolved in the six first general councils, I know nothing to oppose against it; but of this too much. Whilst I was thus in search, this piece I now give thee, was written almost thirty years since by a very Learned Gentleman for satisfaction of a person of worth, and relation unto him, fell into my hands, f●om whence some friends importunate for copies of it, I ●earing the thing itself might ●●ceive injury by ill transcribers (as those of some g S. Aug. Retract. 2 cap. 13. famous writers have done) adventured the p●●ting it to the press, 〈◊〉 knowing how the Auctor may interpret this my bold 〈◊〉 in doing it without his command. The Reader therefore cannot expect it should come out so perfect as it might have done, had it past his last eye. Yet if thou find any just cause of exceptions, let them be known, before the gravel stone or some infirmity make the Writer unable to give thee and the world further satisfaction. However, such as I received it, I give it unto thee, and if thou be'st a Lender and it shall not satisfy thee in the receiving profit for loan of money, I can assure thee it hath me fully in the paying of it. farewell. East-Peckham Oct 9 1652. ROGER TWISDEN. THE PREFACE IF Exceptions be taken either to the Argument or Author of these notes, The Answer must be, This question of usury concerns no Article of Faith; But is a point of Morality, and case of Conscience, and in that regard it admits of a disputation without scandal: the rather, for that the Church of England hath not Defined or Described usury. The Divines of the reformed Churches are divided in this controversy; The greatest part of them oppose or mislike the rigid assertion of such as condemn All Contracts for gain by lending; Namely, Bishop Babington, Mr. Perkins, Dr. Willet, Dr. Mayer, Mr. Brinsley, and others here at home; and abroad, Calvin, Martyr, Bucer, Bullinger, Danaeus, Hemingius, Zanchius, Ursinus, Bucanus, Junius, Polanus, Molineus, Scultetus, Alstedius, Amesius, Grotius, Salmasius. The Author, though he be neither Divine by calling, nor by profession a Scholar, yet as he is a rational man he may, and as he is a Christian he ought, for the direction of his own practice, to examine what may be done with a safe conscience, and what not. The Civilians and Canonists frequently dispute of the nature of usury, he knows not but that any other Laique may do the like. The Argument was first undertaken for the satisfaction of the tenderness of the conscience of others, and not to justify any practice of the Authors, who hath always given, but not taken usury. This point of usury, as it is at this day controverted, is a mere popish question; first broached by the schoolmen and Canonists, no ancient Father or writer that I know of ever defined or disputed it. Since the Reformaton Melancthon and Chemnitius are the only noted men abroad, and here at home Dr. Downam now Bishop of London-derry in Ireland, Dr. Fenton, and learned Dr. Andrew's late Bishop of Winchester. I have made choice of Dr Fentons Treatise to examine, because it is the latest, and I find little of any moment but is in him. I desire his book may be first throughly read, for otherwise, what I write will not so easily be understood. To give some brief account to the ●eader of the substance of the scattered arguments in this Tractate, he must know; That my scope and intention is to show that usury is nowhere in Scripture forbidden to Christians: but that it is as lawful as any other contract or bargain, unless the laws of the Land do prohibit or moderate it as a point of state or policy. And that no State or Commonwealth can or ever did stand without it, or that which in contracts is equivalent to it, since the valuation of the use of money is the foundation and rule which govern the valuation of all other sorts of bargains. I further maintain, that usury was never forbidden to the Jews; only by (reason that by a more special appointment of God they dwelled in a land in the midst of many strangers) Moses made a politic judicial law, that the Jews should take usury of those strangers, and not of their poor brothers: not much unlike as if the King should ordain in London, That citizens should take usury of men of Midlesex, and not of poor tradesmen of the City. More particularly, I undertake to manifest, that the Definitions of usury (wherein Dr. Down. and Dr. Fenton mainly differ between themse●ves) are neither warrantable by the rules of art, nor justifiable by any proof or ground in Scripture, or by any testimony of antiquity either in Councils or Fathers. And that the laws given by God about usury are such as by the Coherence of the Texts, and the Conference of other places, do show that those laws did only intend a prohibition of taking usury of such as borrowed in case of extreme necessity, and were so poor that they were in Charity to be relieved. And yet those laws which did in such case only prohibit usury to the Jews, were not moral or perpetual, but judicial and temporary, and no way bind us, but we are left to the laws and customs of the kingdom to guide us in our Contracts so long as they be not contrary to the rules of Charity. I show that all the properties of Letting do agree to money. And that usury in itself is neither unnatural, ungodly, unjust, or uncharitable. Lastly, I do show that Dr. Downam, Dr. Fenton, and all others that do most condemn usury, are forced to confess at last that usury may be lawful; they all allow the taking of Interest, Mortgages, Annuities and Leases for years, all which by their own expositions and confessions are of the same nature with usury, and do only differ in the manner of the security or contract: after they have eagerly disputed that all Contracts for gain by lending are usurious, at the end they quietly conclude, that the Contracts are not Usury, but only the secret intention of the heart makes it to be usury or not usury. Thus in few words they overthrow at last the foundation of their own doctrine, and play fast and loose by a multitude of their irresolute distinctions, so that either their Conclusion must be that usury is lawful, or else they can conclude nothing at all. If I wrong either Dr. Fenton, or the truth, I desire friendly to be showed my error. I do not follow him here Line by Line, for so I might tire myself, and vex others with unnecessary tautologies: I have only endeavoured to extract the quintessence of his reasons, and to apply myself to the examinatiom of them. His Reasons not his rhetoric I except against, whether Justly or unjustly let others judge to whose Censure I submit these Papers. I would fain know of the Ministers of the gospel who do often reckon up in the pulpit usury as one of the Crying sins, what warrant they have in the gospel for such boldness: we find several sins numbered up by our Saviour and the Apostles, but usury never so much as named for a sin in the whole New Testament. St. Paul in the fift to the Galathians, doth with one breath reckon up together seventeen sins which he reproves, & yet usury is none of them. But many preachers cannot not Reckon up seven deadly sins except they make usury one of them. R. F. Errata. Pag. 3. l. 14. for different lege for a different. pag. 100 l. 26. suit lege suits in law. p. 123. l. 22. for Exod. 0.13. lege Exod. 30.13. p. 131. l. 22. be sold, lege must be just sold. AN EXAMINATION OF Dr. FENTONS Treatise of Vsury. Touching the Definition of Vsury. I Let pass his Chapter of names of usury, because he Confesseth that by them he hath proved little or nothing at all. Page 12. The main point is the Definition, which he saith must not be omitted, or slightly passed over, because it is a great and necessary question to resolve the understanding what that usury is, whereof we dispute, pag. 13. And therefore he doth entitle his first book wholly about the Definition of usury: although when he comes unto the point, he doth nothing less than define it; As may thus appear. actual usury (saith he) pag. 15. is of divers diversely described, a variety tedious to relate. First, in stead of all unlawful Usury, he speaks of a description of part only, to wit of actual usury; whereas he should first define, and then divide: but inverting the Rule of method, he suffers m●ntall usury (which he saith is a sin) to escape out of his description. Neither doth he so much as describe actual usury, only he tells us of diversity of descriptions of others, but never lets us know which he approves. Yet at last he contracts the pith in three words, but resolves not how we should place them; so leaves us to a thus, or thus, or thus. First, he puts Lucre in the place of the Genus, and Covenant in the room of a difference. Secondly, he makes Covenant the Genus, and Lending the difference; and lastly he puts Lending for a Genus, and Lucre for difference. Thus by turning the Genus into the difference, and the difference into the Genus, he leaves us uncertain of his description, yet concludes that within the compass of three words we may find usury; but who knows not that three words diversely placed breed many times different, and some times contrary senses. Yet this is all the definition you are like to find in him. And thus in few lines he passeth over slightly that necessary question which should resolve our understanding what usury is. But let us draw a little closer, and examine the pith of these three descriptions cited by Dr. Fenton, and contracted in three words. Pactum ex mutuo Lucrum. Usury is Lucre for Lone upon Covenant, or The Covenant of Lucre for lending, or Lending upon Covenant for Lucre. 1. Whereas he saith usury is Lucre, he seems to make Lucre or Gain to be the Genus of usury. This undoubtedly is a false Genus; For certainly usury is a sin of Commission, and therefore an action or operation; so that Lucre, or gain which is only a passion or product of Lending, cannot be the Genus of it. 2 He maketh Covenant to be the Genus: Let me ask him but this question; A Father to stir up only, and try the industry of his Son, doth lend him an hundred pound with a peirastical covenant for Gain, not intending with himself to take any interest at all of his Son; Doth any man take this to be usury in the Father, who never meant to take the least increase from his Son? Surely then the bare Covenant cannot be the sin of usury in this case. 3 He saith, usury is lending upon Covenant for Lucre. In this description, as also in the two former, I find a manifest contradiction of his own Principles and Grounds. To lend for gain is no lending at all; for Lending (saith he, pag. 16.) in its own proper nature is free; Letting is for hire or gain. So that by this his Doctrine, Lending for gain is no lending at all, but letting or hiring out. Therefore if Dr. Fenton had been true to his own principles, he should have defined usury to have been Letting upon Covenant for Lucre; or in brief, Letting or hiring of Money. But both Dr. Fenton, and all other Antidaenists cannot endure to have usury called Letting or hiring of money. Moreover, I find in these three descriptions, that he imagineth the Gain or Lucre is for the bare act of Lending; In which he is much mistaken: It is not for the lending, but for the using of the thing lent that men give usury: and answerable to the time for which Money is let, the increase or usury is more or less, although the simple act of Lending be alike in both. The ordinary word usury (which Dr. Fenton derives from usus rei, the use of the thing) teacheth, even children, that usury is given for the Use of the thing, and not for the bare Lending. Again, in these his three descriptions the word Covenant is perpetually found; without any warrant of Scripture: Yet he pretends by deduction to fetch it out of the Text in Exod. 22.25. Thou shalt not be as an usurer unto him, thou shalt not oppress with usury. In the Original it is, Thou shalt not exact, and, thou shalt not impose usury. From whence Dr. Fenton concludes, that there can be no exaction or imposition upon a free person, but by way of Covenant. pag. 26. Under favour, this his inference is false; for exaction may be of things neither covenanted for, nor due. In the construction of our Common Law, and of our vulgar phrase, Extortion and Exaction are thus distinguished, Extortion is a wrong in taking more than is due, Exaction is the taking of that which is not due at all: Which distinction were false, if that Exaction must be by precedent contract. The poor Jews did ordinarily borrow victuals, money, and other necessaries upon Pawns, as may appear by many Texts. The Lender, who did take the pledge as a caution for his principal, might detain it from the poor borrower until he would allow some gain above the Principal, and by such unjust means exact or impose an unconscionable increase without any precedent Covenant. There is small reason to imagine, that such indigent people (as are described by Moses) who borrowed only to supply a present want, should have credit sufficient to take up so large a sum for so long a time as might deserve an Obligation or Covenant for the payment of increase. A man who could not have his Bond taken, might yet have his Garment received for a Pledge; and Pledges were ordinarily given with intention of speedy redemption, because raiment is almost as necessary as food. The borrowing in this kind being of things of so small value (that the use of them for a small season was hardly valuable) might be a great reason of the prohibition of usury by Moses in such cases. Neither is a man that lends upon Pawns in the like hazard with him that takes Bonds, or such security. It is the confession of Dr. Fenton, that When the Law against usury was given, there was none that borrowed but only the poor for need, and upon necessity. Therefore, without better warrant by direct and literal proof from the Scripture, it cannot be evinced that this word (Covenant) must necessarily be required in the definition or description of Usury, although Dr. Fenton conclude, it is no usury except it be by Covenant, or by some dumb Contract at the least. Dr. Downam omits this word Covenant in his definition of usury. I am strongly persuaded by a place in Nehemiah, to think that usury doth not consist in contracting for gain. I find in the sixt Chapter, a grievous oppression described; A great cry of the people against their Brethren the Jews, they were forced to take up Corn for themselves, their sons and daughters, upon mortgage of their lands, vineyards, and houses, they sold their children for bondslaves. These were men oppressed by Contracts, and were to pay twelve in the hundred, as appeareth by the eleventh verse. And yet for all this, there are such passages and circumstances of the text as move me to think that this Oppression was not properly Usury. First, Nehemiah never calls it usury, but only a burden; neither the word Neshec, nor Tarbith, nor Marbith is to be found in this Chapter, and yet these are the only words in the Law to express usury. Secondly, N●hemiah never tells the Nobles and the Rulers, that they had broken the Law against Usury. Any man would think, that to rebuke and reclaim men from their sin, the way had been to have named it in particular, or the Law by which it was prohibited: but Nehemiah doth neither of these, he only tells them, it was not good what they did, and asks them if they ought not to walk in the fear of their God because of the reproach of the heathen their enemie●; not because of a particular Law against usury, but for that the name of God should not be blasphemed by the heathens, when they saw how miserably the Jews did oppress one another. Thirdly, Nehemiah tells the Nobles, that he and his servants might have exacted as well as the other Nobles: Whereas if this exacting had been usury, he could not justly say, that he might have exacted, for it had been against the Law. Lastly, Nehemiah doth not threaten to punish them as he was a Magistrate, but entreateth them by his charitable example to leave off their exacting that burden. So than Nehemiah never naming usury, nor mentioning the Law against it, but supposing the act of the Nobles to be lawful, but not expedient, doth incline my belief to think, that this Oppression was not properly usury, although it had a Covenant for gain. And one reason why this was not usury might be, because the people were not primarily such poor necessitated brethren as are described in the first laws against usury: For though these fell into want, yet at the first they had lands, houses, vineyards, and olive-grounds, for which they were to pay unto the King a yearly Tribute. Another reason that avails with me to persuade that all contracts for gain are not prohited as usurious, is the testimony of our Saviour, Luke 19.23. who mentions a Bank of usury in the Jewish Commonwealth, out of which a man by delivering in his money, might at length receive his own with usury. Although our Saviour do neither show dislike nor approbation of such a Bank, yet for it to be within any City of the Commonwealth of Israel, without the ordinance, or at least allowance of the Prince or Magistrate, is a thing most improbable. And almost as unlikely that the State should tolerate such a Bank if all usury were of itself unlawful, and also so pernicious to the Commonwealth by the oppression of it as Dr. Fenton pretends. I find many reproofs in the Gospel of the false glosses and interpretations of the Scribes and Pharisees, whereby they perverted the Law in many things; but I find not any rebuke of the Magistrates for this of usury, if it had been such a public violation of the Law, it could not have been forgotten by our Saviour Christ and all his Apostles. But to what purpose is it to dispute about the terms of the description of usury? or what sort of Contract it is? when it appears plainly in Dr. Fenton, that not only the Covenant of lending, but also (in his opinion) buying, selling, letting, exchanging, and the rest, may be all Contracts of usury. To give an instance, these are his words, pag. 21. With a hundred pound I purchase an annuity of twenty pound per annum for ten years: This is Bargain and Sale, differing in the manner of the Covenant, yet is it the same thing in truth with usury. And so in another place (pag. 129.) he saith the like. I must say this is an express contradiction, to affirm that purchasing is buying, and another manner of Covenant differing from Lending, and yet to say in truth it is the same with usury, which he saith is Lending, this is to make buying and lending all one, and to confound all Contracts. As the term of Covenant is not to be found within the Texts against usury, so in the Fathers of the Church there is no mention of it; they abuse us therefore, who pretend the consent of the Primitive Church for the condemning of all Contracts of gain for the use of money. The truth is, the Canonists and schoolmen were the first broachers of these descriptions of usury which are now pressed upon us by some few Modern Divines. Antiquity was more modest and observant of the phrase of Scripture, which doth deliver the Laws against usury in such restrained terms as are by a just construction appliable properly to the Rules of Charity and Equity, for the relief of the poor only. From the Canon-Lawyers (who are the Pope's learned counsel in the Law) hath Dr. Fenton borrowed not only his descriptions, but also his arguments and distinctions at the second or third hand: For he takes all from Dr. Downam, Dr. Downam from Melancthon and Chemnitius, and these two fetch it from Canonists, Casuists, and schoolmen. And although Dr. Fenton be free from the sin of usury by borrowing freely his whole Treatise from Dr. Downam without paying the interest of one new Argument or Reason: Yet if Dr. Fenton did not Contract with Dr. Downam for the borrowing of the Treatise, he is little less than a Plagiary, and if we take this word in as large signification as they do the word usury, it will follow, that though Dr. Fenton be not guilty of paying Usury, yet he hath offended against another Law in Exod. 21.16. Deut. 24.7. which is the greater sin; for although the Law of God appoints no punishment for an usurer, yet a Plagiary was to be punished by death. Of Testimonies of Scripture. I should have proceeded now to examine the properties of lending and letting, and how they differ; but because I find mention of them in several places of my author, I will reserve them a while, and first handle the texts of Scripture that are most material in this controversy. Three texts only are to be found in the law of Moses about usury. In the two first the poor is most expressly named, and in the third necessarily implied. Exod. 22.25. If thou lend to my people the poor with thee, thou shalt not be as an usurer unto him. Thou shalt not oppress with usury, Levit. 25.35. If thy brother be impoverished or fallen into decay with thee, thou shalt relieve him— take thou no usury of him or increase— thou shalt not give him thy money upon usury, nor lend him thy victuals for increase. By these two texts we have an exact description of the poor, who must be one impoverished and fallen into decay, one, whose hand (as the text is) is weakened and shaketh that he cannot labour, one, whom thou hast need to receive and relieve, and one who is forced to borrow victuals for necessity. The third text though it doth not expressly name the poor; yet that it hath reference only to such is most probable. First, because as in the former text in Levit. where the poor are described, and one of their properties mentioned to be borrowing of Victuall●, so in Deut. 23.19. where the name of poor is omitted, yet the property of borrowing food is set down, which to be the custom only of the poor in extreme necessity, common experience doth daily teach us. Secondly, the law here doth only use the word of biting or Nescher, which word is also only used in the first text, where the poor is named. Thirdly, if we will allow (as all men do, and as we needs must) this law in Deut. to be the same with that in Exod. & Levit. then it must have the same object the poor, and the same end, which is the relief of the same poor, for we find no other reason or end alleged in Scripture for the prohibition of usury, but that the poor brother may live with thee and have sufficient for his need. God where he ties men to lend, he provides & binds them to lend freely. The law is, if there be among you a poor man of one of thy Brethren, thou shalt not harden thy heart, nor shu● thy hand from thy poor brother, but thou shalt open thy hand wide unto him, and shalt surely lend him sufficient for his need in which he wanteth. Deut. 15.7, 8. For the observation of this law God was careful that this lending should be without usury: he makes no law to bind men to lend unto the Rich, and therefore there is no law to restrain taking usury of them: The lending to the poor was to be so free that it must be in the next degree to giving, and we find that to this law that commanded Lending, is added in the very next ve●se, Thou shalt surely give him, and thy heart shall not be grieved when thou giv●st unto him. Likewise in Levit. 25. it is said, thou shalt relieve him, and then it follows presently take no usury of him Thus the Scripture doth couple the work of Charity with the prohibition of usury, to teach, that they are both conversant about one and the same Object. Therefore he that shall make the Rich also the object of this law in Deut. he must of necessity invent some new End and Reason of it more than the Scripture doth afford, and also make the laws themselves to differ; whereas a true reason why the law in Deut. is in so short terms, may be, for that the law having been twice before more particularly set down, Moses doth in Deut. only repeat it in brief and few words, as being sufficient to call it to their remembrance, now they were ready to enter into the land of promise. If we consider also the unmercifulness of the Jews amongst themselves, it was high time to make provision for the poor, they would not stick it seems to strip a poor man stark naked for a debt, as appears by the law concerning the restitution of pledges before sun set if they were the covering only & raiment for the skin wherein a man might sleep, Exod. 22.26. Besides they would forbear to lend to the poor because they were in danger to lose their debt if they did not recover it before the seventh year. The law is Deut. 15.1. Every seventh year, every creditor tha● landeth aught unto his neighbour shall release it,— that which is thine with thy brother thy hand shall release. This releasing of debts had the same end with the prohibition of usury, the relief of the poor, and although this law of releasing be delivered in the general terms of neighbour & brother, yet they must be understood only of the poor brother as it is most apparent by the exception following in the fourth verse, which saith this release must be save where there shall be no poor among you: and in the 11. verse, after the releasing of debts, and the lending to the poor enjoined, the conclusion is, for the poor shall never cease out of the Land, therefore lend to thy Brother, to thy poor, and to thy needy in the Land. These places do teach us that this word Brother is sometimes in a special sense used for the Poor. This law of releasing made men afraid to lend, and therefore God warns them in the ninth verse, Beware that there he not a thought in the wicked (or Belial) heart Saying, the Seaven●h year, the year of release is at hand, and thy e●che evil against thy poor Brother, and thou givest him nought. Now since the law of God which prohibiteth usury only in three places hath in the two first expressly named the poor, and described them, and in the third clearly intimated them, By what Reason, Conscience, and Charity, can any man extend those laws to all men in general, which the Holy Ghost hath so carefully restrained to the poor? And since the Law first given against usury doth mention oppression of the poor, I wonder Dr ●enton would not fetch his definition from the text, & call usury oppressive lending to the poor: but never mentioning oppression of the poor, he calls it a Covenant of gain for lending; which is quite beside the text, which seems only to forbid usury to such as stand in need to be relieved by our Charity. And for this cause I do conjecture Calvin did say, that unto 〈◊〉 it did not appear by any testimony of Scripture that all usury is altogether condemned, and it is conceived that one reason why the law of Moses doth appoint no kind of judicial punishment for usury, might be, because the sin is determinable only by the judgement of a man's own Conscience and not by any precedent contract for gain. As for those texts in the Psalms, Proverbs, and Ezekiel, their general words cannot make any new law, but their rebukes and exhortations relate to the breach or observance of the law formerly given by Moses: And even Ezekiel who most declames against usury, Eze. 18.17. joins it with making the poor sorrowful, not giving bread to the hungry, and not clothing the naked. Nor can these texts be any exposition of the laws of Moses against usury, because the laws themselves are expressed and explained in more particular significant terms by Moses than by David, Solomon, or Ezekiel, who give but a touch. Of the Names of usury. I know the adversaries to all usury do much triumph in their Origination of the Hebrew term for usury; because it is derived from a root that signifies to bite, they conclude it is like the sting of a Serpent, and in that regard to be esteemed as an abominable sin. Answ: First we must remember that Dr. Fenton doth confess that names have been no definitions, and therefore are not demonstrative arguments in any question. 2ly, I do acknowledge that the original word Neshee might well denote some malignant ●uality in usury, and I conceive a true reason of it might be, for that the first kind of borrowing which was in the world, or at the time when the law against usury was given, was in Case only of necessity, and to ask an overplus in such Cases was a sin that well deserved the worst name. We all know that Riches of money and many other goods were brought into the world by degrees, as arts & trades were multiplied by the industry and wit of man. Stately buildings, rich furniture, gorgeous apparel, and dainty feasts were not prepared against the Creation of Adam; It was a long time before so much silver was digged up and Coined as would fill men's Coffers that they might spare or employ large sums by the negotiations and traffic of others; men first looked after things necessary only, and the want of such things taught them to borrow of one another. Also when the law was given, the People of God (saith D. Fenton p. 10.) were travelling in the desert, and afterwards being troubled with wars in the Land of Canaan, there was little borrowing of money, but only by the Poor for the Supply of their want, and of them to take usury was more sensible biting, & oppression, in that they borrowed not to lay out for Commodities, but to spen● for necessity. Therefore David in his troublesome days used the word Neshee only for usury, as best filting those times where the poorest w●re most bitten by this sin. In these passages of Dr. Fenton, we may note, what manner of borrowing Caused the first name of usury, which name afterwards for the similitude only of the increase might be applied to all other sorts of borrowing, although they were not of the same uncharitable nature. The like observation of a good name used for a bad thing Dr. Fenton produceth in the Latin name of usury. Usura (saith he) was originally a a good honest word until usury did mar it. For Usura intruth is nothing but usus rei, primitively taken for the use of other things as well as money. In Conclusion, although the uncharitable gain that was practised upon necessitated borrowers did justly deserve a befiting name of biting, yet a gain that is taken from such as borrow where necessity constraineth not, is but an equivocal biting, Because properly there can be no biting but where there is oppression, and oppression is only of the poor. A man may deceive a Rich man, but oppress him he Cannot, the reason is evident, oppression is a Violent action of Injustice, necessity compels a poor man to borrow, and the lender forceth him to pay an increase, in this is a violence which a rich man cannot be subject unto, because no necessity forcing him to borrow, it is not necessary but arbitrary whether he will borrow upon increase: for although there be a moral necessity that if he will borrow he must pay an overplus, yet that he must borrow is not absolutely necessary: so than it is the necessity of the borrower that must concur to make a violent action in the lender. If a rich man be forced to pay the whole forfeiture of a bond, it was his own folly to enter into such an obligation without necessity, whereby he doth enable the lender to deceive him by a legal means, who in extremity makes benefit of all that which the law did provide only for a caution of his indemnity: This deceit of the lender is injustice, but it is not the violent sin of oppression which is properly found in Biting usury. A second word there is found in Scripture which they say is an exegetical addition, which signifieth any increase at all. If what were said were true, it neither hurts nor helps the question if the text be understood of the poor only, for although all increase from the poor, yet what is that to the taking usury of the Rich? But let us see a little how they strain this word [tarbith] for increase, first if tarbith do signify of itself a multiplying, as it doth indeed, or an excessive increase, it is then all one with Neshee, which Dr. Fenton makes to consist in the quantity of the gain, but I think to be in the quality of the person from whom it is taken, and then where will they find their exegesis if these terms be Synon●mas. Secondly I would know how Dr. Fenton can prove that the Scripture useth tarbith for the usury of money: The Prophets (saith he) who be true expositors of the law join both words together, applying them both indifferently evermore to one and the same thing. It is true that the Prophet Ezek. joins Neshee and tarbi●●, and so doth Solomon; but it is false that they apply them both indifferently evermore to one and the same thing, for they apply them not at all, they neither name money nor victuals; I can find them but once applied in the whole Scripture, and that is by Moses in Levit. 25.36, there Dr. Fenton might have found them both named together, and then applied, Neshee to money, and tarbith to victu●lls, so that the law of God nowhere in plain terms forbids the increase of money: which point is carefully observed by the translators of our Bible; for they all consent and agree to translate Neshee only for usury: the words tarbith or marbith they have never translated by the name of usury. And in the Proverb: 28.8. whereas in the Original it is tarbith, our divines have rendered it unjust gain, thereby intimating they did not think all increase or gain to be meant, but only such as was unjust. It will be said, that since money and victuals are both in the same text, they are both of one nature, so that tarbith may be referred indifferently to either of them. Answ. The text doth conjoin them, not for being of one nature in spending or using, but the law did intend only the mention of such things as the poor in extr●●●●y do nec●ssarily borrow for mainte●ance of life, which is either v●ctualls itself, or money which doth easiliest and soonest p●ocure v●ctuall●: Otherwise these two d●ffer as Dr. Fenton hath sh●wed in the example of a loaf and money, the first is sp●nt, the latter is used: victu●lls then when they are spent are quite consumed and no further use can be made of them, it is oth●rwise wi●h money which cannot prop●rly be said to be spent, the same 100 l. that hath been used by one, may be used after by a 100 men successively: and in the passing of it away some other Commodities may be procured by it of greater or equal value, which may be used for increase; so that the use of money is in a sort perpetual. This difference well considered, there might be a greater reason to prohibit the usury and increase of victuals, than usury only of money: But I do not rely upon the argument from the names of Neshee or tarbith, and the rather because I think the true propriety of them (as of many other words) is quite lost as to us A third strain of Dr. Fenton is to have the word tarbith to expound and explain the term Neshec: we find Neshec used alone in Exod. Deut. and the psalms: tarbith is never used alone, but is joined with Neshec in Levit. Prov. and Ezek: so than the first is used in all texts, the latter but in some. Now the question is, whether a particular word which is always used shall expound a general which is used but sometimes; or on the contrary as Dr. Fenton thinks, for he telleth us, p. 39 it is the manner of Scripture after a law is given and a sin forbidden in a sensible term, by the addition of a more general to express God's meaning more fully, lest men should seek liberty in restraining the former terms more narrowly; thus he, but what sense is there in his words to express a sensible by a general? he should have said a particular by a general, or a sensible by an insensible, and then his error would have been more sensible; for I trust it is the nature of things sensible to express things insensible, and of particulars to expound generals, as may manifestly appear by the instance alleged by Dr. Fenton, and which makes somewhat strongly against himself. Theft saith he is set down in the Sensible term of stealing, the Holy Ghost ●dde●h dealing falsely or Circumventing, teaching thereby overreaching in bargaining by Cunning to be theft. Here I ask if Stealing be a sensible term, whether dealing falsely or circumventing by cunning be a general, surely Dr. Fenton must not say it, for deceit in contracts is but a particular kind of theft or stealing, and therefore not a more but a less general term then stealing: so that quite contrary to Dr. Fenton his doctrine the general sin of stealing is explained and expressed by the particular sin of deceit in dealing, therefore it is more reasonable that the particular term of biting should expound the meaning of the general word increase, since nothing is more usual than when a matter hath been particularly expressed, to mention it afterwards in more general term. Besides this shift of expressing the Sensible by the more general term, is to imagine the wisdom of God subject to human infirmity, as if God had not been able to perfect his law till the cavils of men, and their Seeking liberty to restrain the terms taught him how to mend it. No doubt if the law of God had intended the prohibition of all increase, it could have done it in plain and short terms (as it doth in murder, Theft, & Adultery) by saying thou shalt take no increase by lending or letting money, but instead of increase the law saith biling or oppressing of the poor; if murder and usury were prohibited & permitted alike, why doth not the commandment say thou shalt not murder thy poor brother but a stranger thou Mayest murth●r? Surely God doth not use these qualifications for nought. It is demanded by Dr. Fenton upon the law thou shalt not trouble any widow or fatherless Child, whether it follow that I may trouble a married woman or a child that hath a father? Ans. I may not. But yet the reason is not for that I am prohibited by this special law for widows and Orphans, but for that by a general commandment of not stealing I am forbidden to oppress or trouble any man: The like may be said of the words of Solomon, thou shalt not rob the poor, yet I may not rob the rich: though these words forbid me not, but because of the former general commandment. But the like cannot he said of usury, there being no former general law that forbids taking increase of the rich. But Dr. Fenton saith that usury▪ bites the rich as well as the poor, and doth promise to prove it, but it seems he forgot it, I am in doubt he is never able to do it. Indeed he would persuade us that to lend to the Rich is to enable him to oppress the commonwealth and so consequently the poor: But he doth not show how the commonwealth can be wronged by usury, and yet no particular person be first oppressed; sure I am the text speaks not of oppressing the commonwealth, but expressly names particularly thy poor brother to whom thou lendest that he be not oppressed. So that the law points at an apparent and sensible person whom usury bites. But D. Fenton comes and tells us p. 36. Alas good simple widows! can they tell when, or whom, or how many their usury doth bite? nay can the wisest usurer of them all tell? Thus Dr. Fenton because he sees that in some cases he cannot show how any particular person is oppressed by usury, therefore he flies for Sanctuary to the commonwealth, to hide himself in the crowd, whilst he must confess he cannot tell who is oppressed, but yet the commonwealth or some body in it (God knows who) is oppressed. But let us see how he knows in general that the commonwealth is oppressed by usury, Forsooth he saith, it makes things dearer & enhances the prices of the Mercat. p. 36. Ans. the dearness of things is caused either by the scarcity of the things themselves, or by the plenty of money. As for the scarcity of Commodities it cannot be caused by usury, for it neither eats up corn nor cattle, nor wears out apparel, nor destroys the native commodity of any Country. But Contrarily merchants and others (who by usury are enabled to trade) do export such things as are cheaper and plentifuller here than in other Countries, that so they may gain there: and do bring back such things as are dearest and of most necessity at home, that so also they may gain here. So that usury doth not only not cause a scarcity; but it is the means of plenty in a kingdom, for as it Consumes not that we have, so it procures us that we want. As for dearness by reason of plenty of money, it is no misery but the happiness of any Realm to know such a dearth: those places are not the Richest where things are cheapest, for then Scotland would excel England, but it is the want of money which makes things cheap in such Countries: Nor let any man think that if usury were not, things would be one whit cheaper, for by Dr. Fentons confession, p. 38. if usury were not, men would tenter their wits either in trading themselves or employing others, so that the same gain would be raised an other way; for in the point of usury the question is not whether gains may be made of money, but who shall have the gains. As for raising the mercat it is not caused by usury, the governors and Rulers of the Rates and prices of all things are the owners of money and the masters of stocks, for the Lenders rule the Borrowers, and the richer govern the meaner, The moneyed men proportion the valuation of goods, & by practice & custom agree in a common gain to be raised by the Contracts of bargaining, selling, letting and the like. For instance, the masters of money of this kingdom by their trading raise so much gains as ordinarily amounts to 20. or 30. in the 100 at the years' end; which being considered by the meaner sort of people, they reckon with themselves, that if they can borrow at 10 in the hundred that then by such trading their gains may both pay the use and leave them 20. or 10 l. gainers: so that the borrowers do trade by buying & selling in the mercat at the same prices that the owners of money do, & it is the rates of the mercat that rules their using, and not their usury the mercat: The difference is only that the owners prove the greater gainers and grow richer than the borrowers who keep but part of their gettings, because that their stocks are not their own: And questionless the Common estimation of men would not value at 8. or 10 in the 100 if it did not ordinarily produce a Competent increase both for borrower and lender. If any man object that the prime gain which comes by buying and selling, and leads the rate of usury, is too great, I know no other answer but this, if Common custom may not determine reasonable gains, I know not how it will be resolved, since there is no rule in Scripture for it: but that men may grow rich by gain I find both practised and warranted by Scripture, neither are men restrained from gaining more by trade than is simply necessary for life and being. If Dr. Fenton and those that condemn all usury had been so observant of the letter or literal sense of the Law as they do pretend, they would never have troubled themselves so much about Contracts which are not named in the Law: but would rather have Concluded that the very taking of usury or increase (though it be not contracted for) is utterly unlawful by the law in Levit. 25.36. where it is said, Take thou no usury of him. How then can these men justify the Taking of their foenus liber●le, which they commend, or the foenus nauticum, which they allow, or the Contractus Societatis or partnership, which they so much extol, since all these are expressly forbidden by the law, If to take any increase be unlawful? To the Jews themselves the letter of the law did seem to condemn the taking of a gratu●ty, nay, some of them did think it usury if a man did but salute or bid good morrow to him that had lent him money, if he did not use to do so before he borrowed it: because in the original it is said, thou shal● take no usury of any word, Deut. 23. our translation hath it, usury of any thing: Surely such salutations were not contracted for, nor were of any valuable price or money worth. I do not find any text brought by Dr. Fen. out of the New Testament against usury; for the truth is, there is none, although D. Dow. & some others do cite two texts, first Mat. 5.42. Give to him that asketh; & from him that would borrow of thee tu●n not away. If we ask D. D●wnam whether every one be b●und to lend to every one that asketh, his answer is, Respect is to be had of thine ability, and of his necessity, and also (if it be not a Case of urgent and present necessity) of his honesty: if his necessity urge him to borrow, and thine estate enable thee to lend, thou art bound to lend unto him, especially if his honesty deserve to be respected: Lect. on the 15. Psalm. pag 224. Why may not the same respects be observed in the interpretations of all texts against usury? Secondly he citys Luk. ●. 35 Lend, looking for nothing thence. Lastly both he and Dr. Fenton do apply all texts that do mention lending freely, or charitableness to the poor, or mercifulness to our neighbour, as heaps of so many places against usury, although the name be not so much as to be found in the whole New testament as Condemned. For my part I do gladly hear all exhortations to Charity, and think them more than needful; and if any man be so great an usurer as that he make himself thereby unable to be merciful to the poor, such a man may be justly condemned, and I shall never defend him: But to conclude, because a man must give to the poor, therefore he may not let to the rich, is no good consequence. The text ●hat bids me lend freely, doth not thereby forbid not to let at all, but that upon several occasions and according to divers Circumstances I may do either; if the Commanding to observe one sort of Contract were the Prohibiting of all other kinds, it would follow that I might neither give money to the poor, nor sell victuals to the rich, because I am Commanded to lend both. But let us admit that both in the Old and New testament the laws against usury had been moral and delivered in as general terms as can be devised: Be there not many laws and texts which must of necessity be expounded otherwise than the bare letter sounds, and according to such a sense as may stand with natural reason, so that it contradict not any other plain or necessary doctrine, nor overthrow the ●●●l●gie of Faith? There is a law of our Saviour Christ that saith, swear not at all, and again he saith, to him that asketh, Give; Neither of these laws must be literally understood, but interpreted according to the rule of natural re●son, & discretion. Christ forbiddeth his disciples to carry gold, or silver, or any manner of coin in their purses: I do not think that Dr. Fenton and others have followed the letter of this law, but I trust they will grant an interpretation over and besides the bare letter. There be divers such texts, as, if thy eye offend thee, pull it out; pray continually; if any sue thee for thy Coat, let him have thy Cloak also: all which if they were not otherwise understood than the bare words do bear, would bring great confusion with them, and such inconvenience as no reason nor law could or might allow in any case. The light of Nature must help to guide us in the interpretation of many texts. It is Dr. Fen. own confession, p. 34. that usury is a Question of that nature, as is not only determinable by the law of God in Scripture: but also by the law of Nature, those maxims and Principles of Common equity, which are written in the hearts of men by the finger of God, which point had need be well considered, because as Mr. Hooker saith, a number there are who think they cannot admire as they ought the power and Authority of the word of God, if in things divine they should attribute any force to man's reason, for which Cause they never use reason so willingly as to disgrace reason. Pag. 97. Nor let any man think (saith he) that following the judgement of natural discretion we can have no assurance to please God; for to the author and God of Nature how shall any operation pr●ceeding in natural sort, be in that respect ●nacceptable? the nature which himself hath given to wo●k by, he cannot but be delighted with, when we ex●rcise the same any way without commandment of his to the Contrary. Pag. 60. Now if any place in the Bible may receive an interpretation from the rules and principles of natural reason, why might not the texts of usury? since it is conversant altogether about Covenants and Contracts which are grounded only upon the laws of Nature and Nation●: and many Cases there be which are confessed by all to be no apparent breaches of Charity, nor any injustice found in them; Insomuch that Dr. Downam is brought thereby to such a straight as he is forced to maintain that there be other respects which make usury unlawful besides the hurt of our neighbour, p. 44. & 125. But if Charity be the fulfilling of the whole law, I will give them leave to talk their fill, yet I cannot believe how usury can be a sin if it hurt not my neighbour. Their pretences of the oppression of the commonwealth by taking usury of the Rich is but a mere Sanctuary of ignorance, and a fiction which can never be proved, since it is practised in the Richest commonwealths. Whether the law of usury be judicial. To prove the laws against usury to be moral and not judicial Dr. Downam produceth a main argument which is not in Dr. F. his words are, The law which Commandeth free lending is not judicial, but moral; for the same law which commandeth the affirmative forbiddeth the Negative. Ans. 1. Dr. Downam mistakes in thinking free lending and lending for gain to be terms of affirmation and negation: Lending and not lending which are Contradictorily opposed are only Affirmative & Negative terms; Lending freely or for gain are only several sorts of lending, and differing in qualities, and though their qualities differ yet they are both positive and affirmative; for it is an axiom C●ntrario●um utrumque membrum 〈…〉 vu●, In Contradictions and Privations, one term is always negative, but it is not so in Contraries. Secondly let me retort Dr. D●wnams argument in a stronger Case. The law which 〈◊〉 resting on the Sabbath is not judicial but moral, therefore the law which forbiddeth Kindling a fire on the Sabbath day is moral, for the law which commandeth the affirmative, forbiddeth the negative: what will Dr. D●w. answer to this his own argument? here is affirmation and negation, Resting and not Resting in the kindling of a fire, not Contraries only but Contradictories, yet I presume Dr. Downam will not conclude that kindling a fire on the Sabbath day is a breach of the moral law. Dr. Fenton is of opinion that if God doth forbid biting and oppr●ssing usury only by his law, that th●n the law must needs be moral, and not judicial, except we will give liberty to Christians to oppress and bite their Brethren. pag. 44. The answer is, The Equity of the law is still in force, the rigour of it is abrogated; or thus, the poor should not be oppressed is moral, that they should not be oppressed by usury is judicial. To make the meaning of this distinction clear, we must know that All judicial laws were made for the hedging in or enclosing of the moral law, and whereas the moral law was delivered either in general affirmative commandments, or Negative prohibitions, the judicial comes after and gives some particular politic directions in the observation of them; for example, the moral law saith in general ●hou shalt sanctify the Sabbath, than comes the judicial and saith, Ye shall kindle no fire through●ut your habitations upon the Sabbath day, Exod: 35.3. so the moral law tells us thou shalt not steal, the judicial adds, if a man Steal an ox, or a sheep, he should pay five or four sold for it, and in most cases but double, Exod: 22.1.4. So then there is a general equity in all judicials which is moral and eternal. There is a law Levit. 25.23. the land shall not be sold for ever: whereby selling of inheritance is forbidden, and this law did bind 〈◊〉 1 Kings 21.3. that he would not ●ell his inheritance to king Ahab. The equity of this law which binds all men even infidels, to preserve or procure an inheritance or estate for their posterity remains still in force▪ yet absolutely, not to sell any land is esteemed no otherwise than a judicial law fitted for the commonwealth of the Jews: so the perpetual equity of Sanctifying the Sabbath, and of not Stealing abides▪ although the kindling of a fire on that day is now arbitrary; and the Compensation of stealing is left to the positive laws of each nation. The same law that forbids us to steal, bids us to relieve the poor, and so doth the equity of the law of usury. It is sufficient that the general equity of this law be observed, and the poor relieved, but that in particular they must be relieved by the not taking usury of them is not necessary. It was a sin in any Jew to take usury of his poor, although he did relieve him otherways, because God did restrain him to that particular manner of relieving the poor. But with us it is otherwise; if by any other means we do sufficiently relieve the poor, then even the taking of V●ury of them is no sin nor oppression. Concerning the Judicials of Moses we must also observe, that they were not so particular, but that many things were lest to the Ordinance of the Magistrate or high Priest, and human ordinances (as Mr. Hooker doth observe) are many times presupp●sed as grounds in the statutes of God, Deut. 24.10. There is a judicial Law which ordereth only the manner how a pledge must be taken; this necessarily doth presuppose some former human law that did order that pledges might be taken. Even that ill law or custom of divorce, Deut. 24.1. is regulated by a judicial law, that it might thereby be made less hurtful. The reason why I note these things is, because the law of God concerning usury did presuppose and was grounded on a former law or custom of the Jews which was then i●●ase and practice; And the special● caution for the Poor might leave the Rich to the customs and laws of the magistrates which did always regulate all sorts of contracts. And whereas the law of Moses did allow usury only to Strangers; It doth not follow but that others that were neither Poor nor Strangers were left to the ordinary laws of the Country. No Magistrate could give a dispensation for usury towards the Poor, nor a Prohibition for it towards Strangers: so much as God ordered no human laws might alter; as for other cases not specified, they were left to the ordinary policy of the State. For we must not think that God provided all the civil laws of Israel: His especial care was to ordain laws for the reformation of such sins as had been learned by his people of the Egyptians, or for the prevention of such as might be taught them by the Canaanites. I know that Dr. Fenton doth infer that the law which prohibits usury is Moral●, pag. 45. because the allowance of it to strangers is only a judicial, for unless it had been a sin, what needs a toleration: since lawful things have no need of a permission? Ans. 1. If the allowing of usury to strangers be no Law at all but only an Exception or proviso annexed to a former law, than it can be no judicial; all laws do Command or Forbid something, but this if it be an exception doth neither, because it leaves the thing indifferent as it is the nature of all such provisoes in statutes. But if they will have it to be a Law, than it must bind affirmatively, and not only that one May, but that one Must take usury of a stranger, for in the original it is thou shalt lend upon usury or shalt cause to bite; And the Hebrews understand this to be a commandment and not a Permission only. Secondly whereas they Compare the allowance of usury to the permission of Divorce, they err notoriously: for the difference between allowing and permitting is most manifest, as Dr. Downam Confesseth pag: 298. We allow those things only which we suppose to be good, or at least indifferent: But we permit only such things as are esteemed evil. God hath said by Moses thou mayst or thou shalt take usury of a stranger, he never saith thou mayst divorce thy wife if she displease thee, or thou shalt put her away. But the law is, If she do displease thee, and find no favour in thine eyes, and if thou shalt put her away, and ●f she do marry an other, and if he also put her away, Then (saith the law) her first husband may not take her again. Deut. 24.1, 2, 3, 4. so that the end of the whole law of divorce is only to keep the woman from returning to her first husband after a second marriage; all that goeth before is but by way of supposition: But if any man will Contend that the Writing of a bill of divorce is enjoined in the law, it must follow that it is not a Permission but a Command, contrary to our saviour's doctrine who calls it a Permission, Mat: 19.8. And if it be a Command, we must needs understand it as an order only how and after what manner the divorce should be, to wit by bill in writing: but not as an order that did Command men simply to be divorced. It is very little less than blasphemy to say that Moses law should allow any thing that was evil. It is the power of the lawgiver to make both the Rule & the Exception to it. It is an over-bold speech of Dr. Fenton to say, that notwithstanding Moses law had given liberty to the Jews to take usury of strangers, yet it was a sin to do it, and that they Could not be absolved in the Court of Conscience, although they might be absolved in the external Court, pag. 45. Whereas Dr. Fenton doth pretend that a Reason that moved God to permit this sin of usury to strangers, was to prevent the greater oppression of his own People, and that the hardness of the Jewish hearts was such that if they might not have taken usury of Strangers they would have made a Prey of their own Brethren. ib. Ans: How much doth this derogate from the laws of God? as if they were not able to bridle one sin but by the toleration of some other; and if the hardness of men's hearts must be born with, since men's hearts are as much hardened in other sins as in usury, why are not some other sins tolerated as well as usury? surely the Idolatry of the Jews was as great as their usury, & their hearts went a-whoring after strange Gods, yet Dr F. cannot show that any Idolatry was permitted them in any kind. I find some Criticism used by Dr. Downam, upon the Hebrew names in Scripture which signify a Stranger, pag: 208. but I cannot find that Dr Fenton doth make any use: the three sorts of her, Toshab, and Nocre (which he translates to be Advena, Inquilinus, and Hostis) are insisted upon by him. He would have Nocre to signify an alien by birth, Religion, affection, and Dwelling. This distinction he labours not to prove, neither do I think it sound, because I am informed by those that are skilful in the tongues that the Hebrew root doth signify to be ignorant or not to know, so that whosoever was unknown, was Nocre, a stranger, though he were not of another nation, if he were but only of an unknown family; the word is used by Solomon Pro. 5.20. and 6.24. where he calls a Whore a strange woman, no man must think that he means such whores only as are of an other nation or religion, but all such as were not to be known to them as wives; So God forbids the Jews Deut. 17.15. that they should not set a 〈◊〉 to be King over them: sur●ly he meant such strangers as dwelled amongst them, there was little danger that they would Choose an Enemy that dwelled in another Country. I find in Levit. 22.10. it is said, there shall no stranger eat of the holy thing, that is, whosoever is not of the priest's family; so that the word stranger may sometimes signify an Israelite of another family or tribe. Dr. Downam affirms that a Jew was permitted to take usury of such strangers only as were enemies and aliens both in affection and religion, birth and habitation: so that if a stranger did but dwell or converse amongst the Jews, they might not take usury of him. But Dr. Downam should remember that a Broth●r and a Stranger in the levitical law are Membra dividentia, he that is not a brother is a stranger, and è contra, &c. Now a brother Levit: 25.42. is only an Israelite circumcised brought out of Egypt, If therefore the law had prohibited only the taking of usury of an Israelite, and allowed only the taking of it of an enemy stranger, than the law had been very imperfect and defective, because there had been no direction in the law for such strangers as had been sojourners or proselytes, who are neither Brethren nor enemies; if any man think that a proselyte or sojourner might be accounted a brother let him but read Levit: 25. verse 39, 40, 42, 44, 45, and 46. I Know D.F. p. 46. would have us think that a Jew might take usury of a stranger, because he might also kill him: But I must deny that any private man might kill a stranger but in a public war; neither can the like text be showed for the allowing of the murder of a stranger by a private man. Many places there be in which the Jews were enjoined to be Charitable to strangers, Thou shalt not vex a stranger, Exod. 22.21. Love ye the stranger, for ye were Strangers in the land of Egypt. Deut. 10.19. Thou shalt not oppress a stranger, for ye know the heart of a stranger, because ye were strangers in the land of Egypt, Exod: ●3. ●. There was in many Cases the self same Charity to be showed to the stranger as to the poor; The corners of the harvest-field, the gleaning● of it, and the single grape●, Thou shalt leave for the poor and the stranger, Levit. 19.9. Also the third years t●th, the forg●●●●n sheafs, the feast● of Pentec●●●, and of Tabernacles, were appointed for the relief and benefit of the stranger, the 〈◊〉▪ & the ●idow. There are many more laws to be found in the books of Moses which are made for the benefit of the poor; the equity of them certainly continues unto this day; but no man but a Jew is so mad as to say the rigorous observation of them is to be required of us; why then must the law against usury more than all the rest be necessary? It may as well be affirmed that all the judicial laws are moral; let them show us by what rules they do distinguish these laws: I do apprehend that the judicials were conversant about the morality of outward actions, as about the distinctions of rights, the distributions of inheritance●, the Punishments of Crimes, as of Blasphemy, Perjury, murder, Adultery, Manslaughter, Fornication or the like, about the rites of marriage, of Divorces, of Bondage, of usury, of Witnesses, and of many other actions, the equity of all which is reducible to some one commandment or other of the moral law. If all the levitical laws be read over, it cannot be found that ever any judicial was delivered with such restrictions, qualifications, and diminishing terms, as the law of usury: thy brother, thy poor brother, thy poor brother that is with thee; the general name of neighbour is not so much as used about it: it is nowhere said thou shalt take no usury of thy neighbour. Besides this law hath an allowance which no other judicial hath. And lastly, this law of usury taken in the sense of our adversaries (for all increase from the rich also) can be no breach of Charity in some Cases, and then there will be no Equity in it, which is found even in all judicials. Indeed I find Dr. Downam brought to such straits as to maintain that there be other respects which make usury unlawful besides the hurt of the neighbour, pag. 295. But if it be forbidden by the moral law, and that law be a branch of the second table (as Dr. Fenton affirms) how it can be a sin without breach of Charity to the neighbour, passeth my understanding, since Charity is the fulfilling of the law. Whereas Dr. Downam doth compare usury to an officious lie, which is a sin, though it hurt not but help the neighbour, pag. 277. It is true an officious lie is a sin: but a sin against the first commandment of the first Table as it is repugnant to Truth which is an essential Attribute of God: Every one that lieth doth thereby deny and forsake the true God. Let Dr. Downam tell us, which commandment of the first Table is by usury violated. It is not sufficient to say, that all usury is a breach of our allegiance to God, this is but begging of the question, unless this disobedience can be referred to some particular precept of the Decalogue, as the officious lie is to the first; as for general disobedience, it is a sin that goeth through all the commandments, and is to be referred to each particular precept according to the several objects of it. It is further insisted on, that the prohibition of usury is coupled in Ezechiel 18, with sins against the Moral Law, from thence an inference is made, that itself must be Moral. Answ. 1. If we look upon other Scriptures we shall find Judicials and Morals mingled together in the giving of the Law: We may see in Levit. 19.9, the prohibition of Reaping the corners of the field, and gleaning the Vineyards, which were Judicials, set immediately before the forbidding of Stealing, Lying, and Swearing, which are parcels of the Moral Law. In the 13 verse of the same Chapter it is said, Thou shalt not defraud thy neighbour, nor rob him: The w●ges of him that is hired shall not abide with thee all night until the morning. The former of these is Moral, the latter is Judicial. And also in the 16 verse, the prohibition of Enchantment, or Witchcraft, is set between the forbidding of eating blood, and rounding the corners of the head, and marring the corners of the beard. Secondly, whereas Dr. Downam saith pag. 219. The Holy Ghost deciphers a wicked man, that should die the death if he did any of these things. we find first that the words in the Original are, if he do like to any one of these things; or as our new Translation hath it in the margin, or that doth to his brother besides any of these. Thirdly, whereas Dr. Downam conjoins these sins by the disjunctive Or, our new Translators use the Copulative And. Lastly, to confound Dr. Downam's opinion, the Text in the 13 verse saith, He hath done All these abominations he shall surely die. And good reason; for some of the crimes were capital by the Law of Moses, as Idolatry and Adultery, but usury, or the taking and keeping of a pledge hath no kind of punishment appointed by Moses, neither hath any man denied, but that the law of restoring the pledge was Judicial, and not Moral. But let it be granted to Dr. Downam (that which he can never prove) that death is threatened by Ezekiel to Usury; May it not still be a Judicial Law for all that? Was not the Law in Exod. 21.1. a Judicial, whereby it is ordered that an Hebrew bond-servant should at seven years' end be free and at liberty? Yet God doth threaten the people for breaking this Law, by reassuming their servants with a liberty to the Sword, to the Pestilence, and to the Famin●, Ierem. 34.17. Also in Numb. 15.35. the man that gathered sticks on the Sabbath day was stoned by God's appointment, and yet the Law was but Judicial, and not Moral. Before I conclude this question about the nature of the Law against usury, it is not impertinent to remove a scruple that is objected. It may be asked of me that maintain there is no Law in Scripture now in force against usury, what Text can be showed that it is lawful? Answ. There needeth none; for if the Law of God do not now forbid it, it is sufficient that the Law of Nature, Reason, and Custom doth make it lawful. About things easy and manifest (saith Mr. Hooker) by common sense, there needeth no higher consultation— the means of some things is such, that to search the Scripture of God for the ordering of them, w●re to derogate from the reverend authority, and dignity of the Scripture. If I should ask Dr. Fenton what Text he hath to prove that letting of Land is lawful, it would ask him sometime to find it; or how he can warrant the selling of Land which is expressly forbidden in the Law, Levit. 25.23. It may be I can allege as good a Text for usury. I think the 6 of Luke which is alleged against it may with better reason be produced for it, and if we will stand to the literal and common sense of the word in the original, we may conclude that it is not only allowed, but commanded there; what exceptions can be taken, if a man should translate {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, lend upon usury; Is not that the proper signification of the word in all Authors? Hath not the Latin borrowed the words▪ Danista an usurer, and Danisma usury, from the Greek? Although our Translation saith only Lend, this general word may also comprehend Lending upon use. It accords with the Original, and crosseth not the Translation. But it may be Lending upon usury may be here in this Text allowed by our adversaries, if we will observe, as it followeth in the Text, to look for nothing again. These words of looking, or hoping for nothing again, although they be answerable to the vulgar Translation, yet in the Original they have another more proper signification, as is showed by Beza, who is no friend to usury; you shall have his words in his Annotations upon Luke 6.35. I confess (saith he) that I never read in any other place the word {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} in this signification [to hope for] when as properly it signifieth to Despair. And surely it may seem that our Lord in this place did consider what doth many times hinder men from lending their money to their poor brethren (to wit the fear lest they lose what they lend to the poor) and therefore he would remove that fear from us, and bring us to this pass, that as often as we help our neighbour for God's sake, we should never think that it may be to our loss, since God makes himself a pledge and surety that we shall receive with much usury whatsoever we lend: If we follow this interpretation, than instead of [looking for] we must say [despairing] and so the ●●riack Interpreter understood this place— They are deceived which wrest this place for the prohibition of usury; as if Christ had forbidden us to covenant or exact any thing above the principal. Thus far Beza; wherein we have his opinion and reason, and by the help of his direction the Text may be most fitly translated, Lend upon usury not Despairing; for to lend looking for nothing again, is, as the Bishop of Winchester hath observed, not to Lend but to Give. Of the Properties of Letting. Dr. Fenton and Dr. Downam cannot endure to hear that usury should be called Letting of money. Many are the properties that are (as they think) inseparable from Letting, and cannot be found in the putting out of money. Hiring or Letting (say they) is of such things as are not spent in the use, But have a fruitful use in themselves naturally; which use may be valued a part and be let, the property remaining in the letter, and the thing if it miscarry without the fault of the hirer belongeth to the letter only. If we ask from whence they collect these distinctions and properties of Letting, or whether they have any rule for them in Scripture; They answer, though there be no Text for them, yet the Law of Nature and Reason which ordereth and regulateth all human contracts, doth teach them. Let it be so: And let us have leave a little to examine by the same Law of Reason and common sense these properties of Letting, and see whether any or all of them may be applied to money. I confess things hired are not to be spent in their use. Neither is money properly said to be spent in the use, it is not to speak like a Grammarian, to say any thing is spent in the use, for spending and using are in propriety of speech distinct actions, howsoever by reason of some similitude between them they be used promiscuously by the vulgar phrase. A thing used doth remain the same after the use to be used again; but a thing spent perisheth or is consumed in the spending, so that no further use can be made of it. Money is not thus spent, at the most it is but said to be spent to him that hath made no profitable use of it, in itself it remains unspent and useful to others. Thus much Dr. Fenton saw very well, & therefore he doth not urge this property as Dr. Downame doth, but seems to yield, and say pag. 65. That also of spending money in the first use, as if the use and property were inseparable, so much stood upon by School Divines (he might also have said Canonists) is much subject to cavil, for there is sensible diference between spending a loaf of bread, and disbursing money for gain— a loaf once eaten hath no second use to him that eat it, or to any other: money laid out remaineth still the same to be used by another; and the same in the Equivalent to him that laid it out: and the same individual pieces which once delivered shall never happily return again to the same person; there may be some difference in a philosopher's brain, but not in a merchant's purse, it is all one whether it be the same shilling or another as good. Things let (say they) must have a fruitful use naturally in themselves. If this property were true I would confess money might not be Let. But Common sense doth Confute this assertion. What fruitful use hath a house naturally? doth one house beget or bring forth another? is it not an artificial thing as tools, instruments, and furniture? all which are lawfully Let although they have no more fruitful use by nature than money hath. All things that are useful either by Nature or Art, that have either fructum in themselves, or questum by industry, are the object of Letting: no man will deny the artificial use of money, yet I find Dr. Fenton to contradict himself in this point of the use of money, his words are, pag. 20. The moneys of a tradesman be his tools by which he getteth his living: if therefore they be retained from him, to his sensibl● detriment, satisfaction is due in justice and equity without touch of usury. In an other place (pag. 94.) forgetting this he determines that Nothing whatsoever it be, natural or artificial, but it serveth either to feed, or to clothe, or to work withal, or to play withal: yet for money there is no use to be made of it. Money having thus an artificial use distinct from the spending of it, this use of it is valuable a part, and to be guided by the same rule which serves for the true valuation of any other Lettable thing: we see by daily experience that the valuation of the use of money is more certain than of other things. It remains then, that money hath an artificial use which is valuable, and in that respect may be let as other artificial things are. To proceed. Another property (say they pag. 16.) of Letting is, that the use only is passed over, the property resting in the Lender. Whereas Lending passeth over the property with the use for the time it is Lent. Is this true? Then a man had need take heed of Lending, If when he lends he loseth the property of the thing lent? Surely I should think that the use and possession only (and not the property) is passed away in Lending and Letting also. He that hath Lent his money during the time that it is Lent and out of possession, hath power in law and a right to give or bequeathe at his pleasure, which he could not dispose of, if he had no property in it. A property in the sum Lent, or to the equivalent, which is all one as Dr. Fenton hath ingenuously confessed. It is a frivolous exception to say he hath not a property in that Individual shilling which he lent, since art hath so ordered it that all shillings are the self same in use, and as one shilling. If all other natural and artificial things, which are confessed to be Lettable, were of equal value and use; if all horses and sheep were alike in all things without any real difference in their goodness and use, it would be all one to him that had let his horse, to receive his own horse or another. We must understand (saith Dr. Fenton) a special kind of Lending which for penury of words, and narrowness of our English wanteth a proper term. In Latin it is called [Mutuum] or mutuatio— which is saith he the free passing over both of use and property for a time, at the time ended to receive the like again; thus he. If it be passed over but for a time, then at the time ended the same again must be restored; why then doth he name only the like again? if only the like be restored then the thing itself is passed over for ever. Dr. Wilson the Civilian in his book of usury puts the Case how hiring of money may be lawful; if a man borrow a 100ls only to make show of, either at some bank, or otherwise to persuade the world that he hath a 100l of his own, and if he never spend it but presently restoreth the self same 100 pound which he borrowed, in this Case the Lender may lawfully take and Contract for hire or use of his money because it is not spent in the use. This Case is borrowed from the Papists, and allows a man to take usury for helping to cozen the world, although himself be no way damnified by the want of his money. But the grand impediment of Letting money is that the Borrower (say they pag. 17.) stands to the hazard of it, which they think to be against the law of Ezod. 22.14. Answ. Concerning hazard, we find that in the Law Exo. 22.12. about beasts delivered to a neighbour only to keep, that if a beast be stolen he shal● make restitution to the owner thereof, which Case shows the owner doth not stand to the hazard but the keeper only, who yet hath not so much as the use or property but only the possession of the beast, so Jacob tells Laban Gen. 31. 3●. that if any of his sheep were stolen by day or by night, that he made them good; therefore their rule faileth which saith every thing perisheth to the right owner. pag: 17 It may be answered, that whatsoever the Law was for things deposited, yet for things Let the Law is clear that the borrower shall not make it good or stand to the hazard, because it came for the hire. Exod. 22.14. This Text is either not understood, or wrested to a false sense, as may best appear if we cite the whole Text which Dr. Fenton hath curtailed to fit his own turn; the words are, If a man borrow aught of his neighbour and it be hurt or die, the owner thereof not being with it, he shall surely make it good, but if the owner thereof be with it, he shall not mak● it good, If it be a hired thing it came for the h●re. Answ: 1. It may be thought the Text intends beasts only and not other goods or money, because the four precedent verses to which the Text hath reference are restrained to ox, ass or sheep, or any beast: and the same words of dying and hurting are used in this verse which are used in the tenth verse where beasts only are meant, which words are not so proper to express all sorts of hazards of other goods: withal there is greater reason that the hazards of beasts should not light upon the borrower, because, they by the course of nature are daily subject to decay and perish, and many secret diseases lurk in them which the borrowers cannot discern; whereas other goods, and especially money, are not of so perishable a disposition, but their sudden destruction is most times by the act or folly of man, and not from the God of Nature. But if it be granted that the Text understands all goods, then indeed it comes home to the point of usury; but it makes for it and not against it: for the law is for things ●et, that if they be hurt the owner thereof not being by, he (the borrower) shall surely make it good. Now in Usury the owners do not, and for the most part can not stand by and see how their money miscarries. Indeed when a thing is hired for some particular end wherewith the Letter is made acquainted, than he may stand by and see how it perisheth, and of such a lending the Text is best understood. It is plain that the Letter (though he had the property) did not always stand unto the hazard but only when he stood by, that it might appear (saith Dr. Fenton pag. 17.) not to be the Borrowers default. The rabbins exposition of this text may give some light to the understanding of it, and it is thus; The words are, if it be hurt or die: that is, hurt in the use, or die in the work for which it was hired: If a man (say they) hire a tool for some particular, if it be hurt in doing the work it must not be made good: so if I hire a horse to plow with, and the horse whilst he is in ploughing die, than I am free. But if I borrow goods or beasts, and they be lost or stolen, or hurt, or taken away by violence, or die, I am bound to pay all, if such violence do not befall it in the time of the work. If I borrow a horse to plow with, and he die either before or after the ploughing I must make him good. To apply this Text to money, the most that can be gathered is, that if money be hurt in the using of it without the Borrowe●s default it must be at the lender's hazard. But since money is not ordinarily hired for any one particular use expressed, but in general to be employed at the Borrowers discretion; how can the Lender of money be comprehended within that law which did only relieve the Borrower in case the thing hired did perish in that special use for which it was borrowed? The ground of the equity of this Law is, if the thing hired be not ●ble in its own nature to do the thing for which it was hired without perishing, the Hirer is not to be it the hazard of it; money all men know to be able of its own nature to do the thing for which it was hired; if by any casual or external accident money perisheth, the Law provides no remedy in such Cases. It is one of the singular benefits and the privilege of money in traffic that it is not of a perishable nature. The ends why policy found out the use of money were many: the Chief are, that it might be Durable, Portable, and Partible. But to grant them that he that stands to the hazard should have all the gains: Is there not hazard to be found in the Letter as well as in the Borrower of money? many that have Contracted for usury by bonds and other security have lost both Principal and Use, and have been thereby undone; surely such people find hazard in it. It is a rule in the Civil law, that omnis mutuatio plerumque damnesa, ●oque meretur compensationem. It is fit therefore in equity, that since the Lender stands in hazard there should be a gain due to him also. But this gain they allow, So it may be conditional, if the borrower gain. And this conditional gain can only be by Partnership. As for letting of money upon Condition of the Borrowers gain, it is a course as mischievous and impossible as the letting of land upon like Condition; without experience no man can sufficiently describe it. It would make all bargains to be nothing but suit in law, no debts should be due but upon proof and witnesses examined; nay there is no possibility of knowing men's gains or loss●s without racking their Consciences, and opening a gap to perjury for every unthrift in his own Cause. Or if loss and gain could be discovered, how shall it appear, whether it be by default of the party or by the act of God? many times they both concur, and are so twisted that no eye of reason can distinguish them. In effect, hereby every man is tied to have an eye to watch the disbursing of every penny which he lends, which is a thing impossible, and therefore the law of reason and of all nations doth think it fitter to tolerate sometimes a mischief which may happen by an unfortunate bargain upon an absolute contract, than to allow of a perpetual inconvenience which would follow a conditional Covenant and overthrow the contracts of all commonwealths. In all letting there is a consideration had of the casualties, and because there may be a possibility of extraordinary gains it must countervalue the extraordinary loss if any happen, both which being contingent, and seldom happening, they are set one against the other, and a middle indifferent rate between them, which doth ordinarily happen, belongs to the Lender, who is not to partake in the extremes: Because it is rarely to be showed that any loss can befall a man in liveless goods merely by the act of God, without the concurrence of some fault of man, either of negligence, ignorance, indiscretion, wilfulness, or the like. To conclude, the rule that guides the valuation in all Contracts, is not what Casually is or may be, but what ordinarily is like to happen. As for Partnership (which is a project much magnified by the adversaries of usury) let it be examined what it is. Those are truly Partners who in a joint stock communicate their pains and travel: so that an equal industry and privity goes along with the employment of the stock. There the Trust being reciprocal, the covenants may be equal, and the Laws do relieve men upon their Covenants and mutual agreements in such Partnership: But in this their pretended Partnership, where there is but a trust of one side, no equality of pains, no privity in trade, no partnership in the matter of stock, nor in the form or consent of negotiation, but only a Partnership in the gains, this cannot truly be called a Partnership, but it is only the office of Master and Servant under another name, or false title, and differs only in the manner of the wages, which in this their case of Partnership is contingent, and in the other absolute. Besides, in this their counterfeit Partnership, a man may make no covenants that can be good in Law, nor so much as take a Bond for his Principal, but he must only trust to the honesty of his friend, since no articles can be made that shall be legal except they be usurious: nor can be drawn so reasonable as an honest man will be bound by them, or so firm that a dishonest man cannot safely break them. It seems to me, that after all the stir about usury, Dr. Fenton, and all his fellows do allow of usury under another name, Interest; they all agree a man may lawfully take so it be against his will; that is, when a man detains his money from him against his will; but if a man be so courteous as to consent that another shall keep his money, he must then stand to the courtesy of the borrower. Now that which they do call Interest, they do allow in two cases; Either where there is, first Damnum contingens, a loss arising; or secondly, where there is Lucrum cessans, gain ceasing: so that if either a man receive damage, or that his gain be but hindered, he may take interest. Now in all lending a man's gain is hindered, because he hath not his money to employ when occasion serveth, or shall be offered: Nor is it requisite that ceasing gain must be certainly proved; for that is impossible, being a thing contingent, but a probable estimation of it may be allowed (by Dr. Downam's confession pag. 166.) & in all probability gain ceaseth, or is hindered, wheresoever there is Lending. Therefore by this their own Scholastical distinction there is Interest due for all Lending. Only successive or interusury which is before delay of Payment they would fain exclude. But if Interest be (as their own Melancthon saith) a debt which he oweth by the Law of Nature, who hath been to another an effectual cause of damage, or hath hindered his gain, because Nature teacheth that no man must be enriched by the hindering of another, according to the Rule of St. Paul 2 Cor. 8.13. That one be not eased, that another may be burdened: Then it will follow, that delay of Payment doth naturally begin from the first minute of Lending; if any will abridge himself of the privilege of Nature by the giving day for payment, yet if it be by a Covenant conditional to pay so much interest at the day appointed, than such a Contract is but the ratifying of a natural debt, with a dilatory payment for the benefit of the Borrower. Thus after all their pretended impediments of Letting money, they are forced to confess at last, that an interest may be justly due and taken; which is nothing else but a hire, a recompense, or an increase of it. The sole doubt they make is about the contracting for interusury. Neither is Dr. Fenton nor Dr. Downam, so stiff against contracts when they come to the point▪ as at first they made show of. Dr. Fenton saith, pag. 64. It is great reason that the debtor should trust the creditor's charity & not the creditor rely upon the fidelity of the debtor; and Bonds may in some cases be lawfully made, which cannot so lawfully be exacted. This he speaks of contracts without any condition of hazard expressed. Also Dr. Downam doth add, That if there be a covenant of the one side in eventum lucri, to partake of the gain, and on the other side but a purpose of bearing part of the loss— I would not altogether condemn such a contract, pag. 163. Thus both these Divines do consent that a contract may be made for interest, if there be but a purpose in the Lender not to exact or oppress thereby. Yet like men uncertain and doubtful what to conclude, they sometimes allow a man to take interest so he do not contract for it, at other times to contract for it, so he do not take it, (pag. 27.) One while a Bond may be lawfully made, so it be not exacted; another while it is lawful to take where it is not lawful to covenant or contract. Again, Dr. Fenton saith, pag. 129. That the poison of usury is in some contracts so closely and cunningly conveyed, as the very turn of the intention of the mind may alter the case to make it just or unjust; the contract remaining one and the same. If one and the same contract may be just and unjust, than all contracts are not unjust by his own confession. In another place (pag. 125.) he tells us, We may puzzle him with some cases so cunnin●ly contrived wherein we can find no difference either in justice or Charity from other lawful contracts: Then quaere whether it be within the Definition of usury— If it appear just and lawful, it shall not appear usurious, it may perhaps border or coast upon usury. Yet our conclusion shall still remain entire, That Usury properly so called is simply unlawful. A trim Conclusion. But what are we the wiser for knowing that all usury is unlawful, unless he teach us what is properly called usury? This is the main doubt, what is usury, and what is not; whether all increase, or increase only from the poor; whether all contracts for gain by money be usury. If Dr. Fenton may be puzzled, and not be able to tell us what Contracts differ from Justice and Charity, and what not; If one and the same contract may be just and unjust; if that usurious contracts, as they do approach unto equity so far forth do decline the nature of usury, then are we still ignorant what properly is usury, only we may know that it is unlawful if we knew what it were. This is the last and safest retreat that Dr. Fenton findeth. Concerning human Testimonies of Fathers, Councils, Divines, Heathens, and Laws. As for the Testimonies of Fathers and Councils we do affirm that neither Father nor council did ever define usury to consist in the contracting for gain, they were not so curious or subtle in those Ages, as to define it at all. But most of those few passages that are in them may best be understood to mean only such usury as was an oppression to the poor. As for Aristole, Plutarch, Cato, Seneca, Pliny, and some others, I shall offer the confession of Dr. Fenton (pag. 65.) Who is persuaded that the very conceit of these grounds (of the Philosophers arguments) hath moved many to think more favourably of usury itself than there is just cause— The force of the philosopher's argument taken from the barrenness of money, and the unnatural brood of usury, being mingled with metaphors, if it be not rightly apprehended, is obscure and doubtful. That also of spending money in the first use, as if use and property were inseparable— is much subject is cavil. By these passages we may see what little confidence Dr. Fenton putteth in the arguments of the Heathen Philosophers against usury. As for the bare authority of these men, the speculative determinations of so few Philosophers, are no way to be compared with the grave wisdom of whole states which by practice and by customs in all ages have approved thereof. I know the abuse of usury hath given just cause both to Christians and Heathens to declaim bitterly against it. Merchandising (as Dr. Fenton tells us) also Letting of Land, and other tradings have their manifold abuses, and yet are things lawful in themselves; and whereas all other trades do oppress but within their own Circle or limits, and in such particulars wherein they deal, usury dealing with money which is used in all trades, hath made the abuse thereof more general, and therefore all men have the more frequent occasion to speak against it. The civil law which was gathered out of all the best ancient laws both Heathen and Christian, and which is most in use at this day, doth allow usury. The laws of Venice, Genoa, and the Low-countries (three simply the richest states in Europe) do allow thereof, and yet are free from poor, which persuades that usury is not so hurtful to a state. As for the statute laws of this land they do vary, and one statute mislikes and repeals another, but they all allow usury of Orphans; And the Law last made since the death of Dr. Fenton in the 21. year of king James doth allow eight in the hundred. The Constant practice of the Common Law of this land, and also of the Chancery in point of equity, doth not only allow Interest where there is a Contract for it, but also doth give it where there is none. To end this point, if all Laws and states had thought all usury to be unlawful, and also mischievous to a commonwealth, And if that Partnership be a means both lawful and beneficial, It were strange that no practice nor Law of any nation would never establish this latter; And for all the world to tolerate a sin when so easy a remedy had been at hand, had been an universal madness. Argument against usury. It is to some doubtful, therefore unlawful, because Whatsoever is not of faith is Sin. Answ: This argument doth not make it simply unlawful to all, but only to such as doubt, and therefore it proves not the point. For Dr. Fenton his position is, that all usury is of itself a sin, and so nothing indifferent. By this Doctrine he first perplexeth the understanding of the weak, and so makes them doubt, and when he finds them doubtful, he useth their doubting to prove it unlawful, because they doubt, whereas if it be simply a sin of itself it is as well a sin if a man doubt not as if he doubt. And the place of St Paul Rom: 14. by him alleged, speaks not of sins, but of things indifferent (as eating) which by doubting only are made sins to the doubters, and to nobody else. Now if the Cause why men doubt whether all Usury be sin, be only for that Dr. Fenton and some others teach so, than the sin of those that doubt may fall heavy upon the Causers of it. And if Dr. Fenton allow Usury to be doubtful, it cannot but argue rashness peremptorily to determine there is no doubt of it, thereby to ensnare the Consciences of the simple. Besides the doubting spoken of by the Apostle, though it were of things indifferent, yet formerly before the coming of Christ they were things necessarily prescribed by the Law, but, after, taken away by the Gospel, so that to doubt of them was consequently to condemn the gospel, and deny the faith in Christ. But the doubting of Usury is no establishng of the ceremonial Law, or overthrowing of our belief and faith in the gospel. Neither is all doubt●ing meant but such only as overcometh Faith, for there is no faith but it is mingled with some doubting. Lastly it is not necessary that faith should be always grounded upon the Word of God, for if a man be persuaded of any thing by the light of Reason, or by Sense, he is justly said to believe it. To the confirmation of this doctrine I must produce some places of judicious Hooker. The will of God (saith he) by which we are to judge our actions, no sound divine in the world ever denied to be in Part made manifest, even by the light of Nature, and not by Scripture alone, pag: ●7. And he adds in another place, that there may be a certain belief grounded upon other assurance than Scripture— we are said to believe whatsoever we are certainly persuaded of, whether it be by reason or sense, pag: 60. And in a third he gives this reason; It ●s not required, nor can be exacted at our hands, that we should yield unto any thing other assent than such as doth answer the evidence which is to be had of that we assent unto: for which cause even in matters divine concerning some things we may lawfully doubt; of some things we may very well retain a● opinion that they are probable, and not unlikely to be true. Then are our Consciences best resolved and in most agreeable sort unto God and Nature settled, when they are so far persuaded, as those grounds of persuasion which are to be had will bear, which thing I so much the rather set down, for that I see how a number of souls are for want of right information in this point oftentimes grievously vexed, when bare and unbridl●d conclusions are put into their minds: they finding not themselves to have thereof any great certainty imagine this proceedeth only from lack of faith, and that the Spirit of God doth not work in them, as it doth in true believers: by this means their hearts are much troubled, they fall into anguish and perplexity; whereas the truth is that how bold and confident soever we may be in words when it cometh to the point of trial, such as the evidence is, which the truth hath either in itself or through proof, such is the hearts assent thereto, neither can it be stronger being grounded as it should be: pag. 73 74. Thus far Mr. Hooker. Therefore it is no argument to conclude that because the Scripture doth not allow usury, therefore it may not be used: for if the Scripture do not absolutely condemn it, it is sufficient if reason or Sense do guide our belief for the practice of it. I leave those that doubt to consider what Dr. Fenton himself saith within a few lines in the same page. pag: 75. This usury which we have in hand is no principle of faith, no mystery of Salvation to be apprehended in the simplicity of belief: but a point of Morality belonging to the second table, and so determinable by the rules of Equity and Charity. It is objected (pag. 77) that it is Scandalous, and therefore unlawful. A●s. If scandal be taken and not given, it is not in itself unlawful. Still he flies from the question. Of the unnaturalness of usury A fourth Reason of Dr. Fenton is, p. 91. that the increase of money is unnatural. Therefore unlawful. Ans. This is no argument of Divinity from Scripture, but of Philosophy from Aristotle. Secondly, if it were of force, it serves only against usury of money, but not of all other things. Thirdly, it is confessed, that money considered as it is a metal, is not perhaps by nature apt to generation and increase; and yet even that may be doubted of: But money considered as it is money, which Art not Nature hath produced, may be allowed an artificial increase or gain, as well as houses, ships, and many other things not natural. Policy hath ordained the value of Metals to be the common rule and measure for the worth of all things vendible, and by common estimation it is accounted in the place and stead of such things; so that in opinion and use money is both land, house, horse, corn, or any thing that is valued by it; even man himself, who in worth exceeds all other creatures, is by God's own valuation prized at a certain sum of money, and fifty Shekels of Silver were accepted by God in the place and stead of a man who by vow belonged unto him. Leviticus 27.3. It being then so apparent, that Money is by Art taken, and used for all things valuable, both by man and God himself (Who had his peculiar Coin, the Shekel of the Sanctuary, for all sacred uses, Exodus 30.13.) It follows in all reason, that since the nature of most things that are valued and sold is to bring forth an increase, that money itself also which is esteemed for them should do the like, or else Art is frustrated of her intention, who found out the use of money only for the ease and benefit of Trade, which proves to be a discommodity if the benefit of increase be lost by the conversion into money. It is further objected by Dr. Fenton, That money may not be let for hire, as a horse, a h●use, or 〈◊〉, because these things are the w●rse for letting. ●nsw. What thinks h●, may a● man take hire for a house when he binds the Lessee to leave it in as good repair as he found it? Many times a horse by a moderate journey after long rest is the better, whether may the Letter take money for his hire? If this Argument were sound, that no hire ought to be taken, but where the things are the worse for using, than I believe all the Rent that hath been paid for land since N●●h● Flood hath been unjustly taken: For it will hardly appear that any Acre of land is worse now than in his days; since many Acres are bettered by tillage and manuring, which by lying waste are hurt; and houses also decay most for want of inhabiting. The true rule of Letting is not only the lender's loss in the impairing of the thing lent, but the Borrowers gain by the use of it. And we must consider, as well what the owner is the worse by the want of that use, as what the thing lent is impaired. If another use my land, though it be not the worse, yet he is the better by having the crop of it, and I am the worse by wanting that benefit of it which he made; therefore I justly challenge Rent for it. The like case is for money, the Borrower hath the use of it, and though the money be not the worse for using, yet the Lender is the worse by missing the commodity which the other makes of it, and the Borrower is bettered by the employment of it. Also it is objected (pag. 148.) That money is void of all immediate use in itself to the possessor while he doth enjoy it. Ans. So it is with Land, which immediately neither clothes nor feeds any man, but by the mediation of tillage and pasturage both are effected, and though no man immediately eats or wears money, yet by the means of it food and raiment are procured. Another objection is, That money the more it doth increase the more it may, which is unnatural, and contrary to other increase. Answ. It is so in other sorts of increase; for one Sheep brings forth a Lamb, and that Sheep and Lamb in time bring forth a double increase, which multiplies to a third, and so forward: so one hundred pound brings forth ten pound▪ and both together in time increase to produce eleven pound. The only difference is, that money is more durable than other fruitful things, which by course of Nature are more perishable. Of the ungodliness of usury. It is ungodly and impious, against the first Table, because it dependeth not upon God's Providence, but is assured by ●onds against the Act of God. Ans. 1. Dr. Fenton forgets that he said usury belongs to the second Table; Why is it here made a breach of the first? Secondly, the usurer's security is to arm himself against the ●●dinary frauds, negligencies, or other follies of the borrower. If by the hand of God an extraordinary loss do happen, by the like means also an extraordinary gain may be raised sometimes, both which belong to the borrower, except the mercy of the lender, to whom he is to trust, relieve him▪ And surely the usurer hath greater cause, and seems also to trust God more than any other man, and is least armed against him. He had need pray against foul-weather, tempest, wind, and wrack; for although he be no Husbandman, Merchant, Tradesman, nor Labourer, yet by the thriving of all these he must live, if all or any of these miscarry, it is not his bonds many times which help him. Neither against the hand of God only is he unarmed, but against the frauds of men many times his security cannot defend him. How many have been defrauded of their principal debts by fraudulent deeds of gift, by concealing of goods, and divers other ways? It is true some few in a City may sometimes attain to a noted wealth by Usury; but these are but as ciphers in comparison of hundreds, who living by the like employment of money do scarce attain to a moderate gain whereby to maintain themselves in their first condition; and many tim●s as skilful Usurers as the best, what by the loss sometimes of interest, sometimes of principal, and other while of both, and many times by the lying still of their money for want of reasonable security, have proved in the end perfect beggars by this trade. And what greater argument can there be of the hazard and danger of money that is lent, than the common opinion of the world, which esteems a small revenue in land of Fee simple, more safe and certain than almost a double increase in money with perpetual hazard? and for this cause land is dearer than money. As for taking of Bonds for payment, it is no more injurious to the Providence of God than to have a bond or covenant of a Tenant for the payment of his rent; for although some years by the unseasonablness of the year, or by some other act of God, the land yields not the rent contracted for, yet the Tenant is absolutely bound to pay it without any condition of gaining so much by the land: And the reason is grounded upon great equity, and is all one both for contracts of land and money to be abs●lute. Neither GOD n●r Nature have proportioned the valuation of Lands Commodities, or Moneys; no Text can be brought to prove an Acre must be sold at such a price, or a commodity at such a rate, the worth of things in proportion one to another, is a human arbitrary custom, grounded upon the several necessities or opinions of each particular Nation. Thus the common estimation doth allow Lands, Goods, and Money taken with all casualties, hazards and charges, to be worth one year with another about a certain value; and it is reasonable that such a certain value should be contracted for: so that as the Seller or Letter is not to participate of the extraordinary gains that may be raised, so he is not to sustain the losses if any do happen. Of the Injustice of usury. It is further urged, (pag. 98.) that it is unjust, because it takes hire for loan, and sells Charity, which should be free, so that things are not lent but let, if they go for hire. Ans. 1. Dr. Fenton can show no reason why money may not be let, as well as len●; as well as a house or a horse which may be both: I ought in great necessity to lend freely to the poor, yet this work of Charity doth not hinder me from letting the same thing where there is not the like necessity. If the use of money for a time be worth money in buying and selling, as Dr. ●. confesseth (pag. 99) The rule may better hold in Letting, which is no work of Charity, though both in Letting and Selling Charity is to guide us. It doth not follow that because I must lend a shilling for a day, therefore I may not lend a pound for a year. Besides, even in letting for hire, there is often both Charity and friendship showed: As, if I let a thing for half the value the use of it is worth to one whom others dare not trust with their goods. If some things which are spent in the first use may be sold for increase, why may not other things that are used be let in the same sort since letting is but a temporary kind of selling, and selling in effect a perpetual kind of letting. If such things as are bought this day for ten pound may be sold to morrow for eleven pound, may not the same ten pound which by buying and selling may increase in one day to thus eleven pound, may it not by letting increase in a whole year to as much? Nor can there be any reason showed, since money hath a gainful use in itself (and as Solomon saith, answereth all things) why I may not as well let a hundred pound in money, as a hundred-pounds worth of cattle, houses or lands, which I buy with my money: And because they often tell us that he that bears the hazard must have the gain, I must ask what they will say to a lease for life wherein both parties hazard, yet but one gains. Dr. Andrews Bishop of Winchester hath an argument against usury taken from the Rule of our Saviour, Luke 6.31. as ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise. Nemo (saith he) sibi vellet Vsuras infligi, cum fratre sic agat igitur. No man is willing to have usury taken of him, therefore he must not take himself; every man desires to borrow freely, therefore he must lend freely. Ans. The Rule of our Saviour must necessarily be thus expounded, Whatsoever ye will, that is, Whatsoever you will according to right reason or commom justice; for if any man be so unreasonable or so frantic as to will that others should kill him, yet my Lord of Winchester will not say that therefore that man may kill another. So he that desires to borrow freely, breaks the Rule of common equity and rectified reason, by coveting his neighbour's goods; for he that desireth to benefit himself by the use of another man's goods, doth therein uncharitably desire the hindrance of his neighbour. Also it is objected, that the greatness of gain which is made by usury is unlawful. pag. 100 Ans: 1. This is no proof against all increase of money; but only against excessive gains: whereas it should be proved that usury of a penny in the hundred is a sin, as well as of ten pounds. Secondly, By this Rule all gain of merchandising is condemned, which is ordinarily far greater than that of ten in the hundred. Thirdly, The greatness of gain by Lending must be estimated by the common opinion of the Country: otherwise how can any man's Conscience warrant him to purchase any inheritance? Men buy land to them and to their heirs for ever, that is till doomsday; which when it will come no man knows, and yet as if every purchaser knew the hour, he bargaineth for land at fifteen or sixteen years' purchase. But the last day may come within a year, or within fifteen, or perhaps not within fifteen hundred years: howsoever it be uncertain, yet the public valuation doth esteem it Certain; And no man buys land at 15. years' purchase, upon Condition that doomsday come not before, because perhaps then he may have a dear penny worth: Nor upon Condition that if the world last longer than fifteen years that thence forward the purchaser should pay a further sum. No, but custom thinks fit to make an absolute bargain, though by the mere act of God it may be made a dear purchase. As the argument of the greatness of gain in usury makes against trading or merchandising, so thereby also bargaining for leases for term of years will be made unjust; And this may the better appear if we examine one of Dr. Fentons examples of usury in this kind: If saith he (pag 21.) purposely to avoid the Statute I will purchase an annuity of twenty pound per annum with an hundred pound for ten years, this is bargain and sale, yet the very same with usury, differing only in parchment, and manner of Covenanting, subject to the same iniquity and in quality; poisoned with purpose of avoiding the Statute and penalty of usury. Ans. ●. If only the purpose to avoid the Statute makes his Case to be usury, then before the Statute it was no usury, for there could be no purpose to avoid a penalty that was not, and this is to make usury a breach only of man's Law and not of Gods. Let us ask Dr. Fenton whether a lease for years and annuity bought with money be usury simply in itself; he dares not say it, his answer is, pag: 129 We cannot condemn it for usury, and yet he seeth most apparently it is of the very self same nature with Lending upon bonds, and differs only in the security: upon bond a man ties himself, upon a lease a man ties his land, in both these there is the like increase by money, and both pay alike at the end. Secondly, this Case I find put of a lease that brings in above ten in the hundred, thereby to make it more odious: but give us leave to put it in other terms, and then ask his opinion, If with a hundred pound I purchase an annuity of ten pounds per annum and twenty shillings over yearly for ten years, Is this usury because it is an increase above the principal? It is the very selfsame bargain in nature with his, it differs only in the quantity of the increase. Now both by his definition and argument, as well the increase of a penny is Usury as of ten pounds in the hundred, so then by his doctrine a man may not buy a lease worth one penny more than his principal. If it be pretended that bargain and sale of leases be lawful if it be reasonable, otherwise not; then if the unreasonableness only of the bargain make it a sin of usury, than the former doctrine which saith all increase is usury, is thereby denied, And I confess that an unreasonable bargain is a sin, but of theft in general not of usury. Thirdly, The principal purpose in buying an annuity or lease for years is to gain by a hundred pound, which since it could not safely be done by bonds, therefore by a second intention men labour to avoid the Statute, so that to gain and in gaining to avoid the Statute is the purpose of such Contracts, and not chiefly to avoid the Statute, which might best be avoided by not purchasing at all. Fourthly, It is no sin to avoid a statute by lawful means; if the Contract of bargain and sale be in itself lawful, why should it be a vice and not a virtue thereby to avoid the penalty of the Law, since laws are purposely made to force men to avoid them by lawful means. Fiftly, Whereas Dr. Fenton (pag. 129.) concludeth, that if simply without any pretence such annuity of rent be bought or sold, we cannot condemn it for usury. It follows that the pretence or intention of the heart, and not the Contract makes it usury: and that (as he himself confesseth pag. 128) if the intention be right, that which formally is usurious, upon the matter may i● justice be equivalent to a lawful Contract. If formal usury may be no usury, we must look for a new definition of usury in the Consciences of men, and not in Dr. Fentons treatise; And if usury be committed in Buying and Selling, what Contract will be found in the world without usury? To Instance in some other Contracts, let us consider of the absolute buying and selling of land, or of purchasing an annuity for life; because these two Contracts are esteemed by most men to be the lawfullest of all others, yet in both these, the just and ordinary valuation both of fee simple land and of leases for lives is grounded and guided by usury only, and as the use of money goeth higher or lower, so the prices of these rise and fall, so that in very truth he that purchaseth land is the greatest usurer in the world▪ because he maketh the greatest and certainest gain by his bargain, for example; Admit land is bought and sold for sixteen years' purchase, and let the inheritance of the land be made away for so little a sum as the land will bring home in sixteen years; what Conscience is there to keep that for ever, which in so short a time payeth the purchaser his principal? There can be no other reason yielded for this great disproportion but this, that both the Purchaser and Seller do equally value the use of the money, and do make the bargain accordingly. The purchase-money considered with the Use of it would last about a thousand years in paying yearly so much as the Rent of the land is, therefore the Purchaser expects to enjoy, and the Seller intends to part with the land for ever, because the inheritance of the land after a thousand years is not valuable, for that ordinarily within four or five hundred years the possessions of the ancientest families come to a period, or decay. In like manner, an annuity for life is bought for nine years' purchase, not because a man's life is ordinarily taken to last but nine years, but because the money with the use will last almost twice nine years in paying the annuity: so that if the Purchaser of the annuity die within eighteen years, the Grantor may be a gainer, or at the least a saver, by the bargain; but if he live above eighteen years the Grantor must be at loss. This Casuality of a lease for life, wherein the Buyer hopes by his own life to be a gainer, and the Seller hopes by the death of the Buyer to be a gainer, hath made some men (if we will believe Thomas Aquinas) to think that a lease for life is the worst kind or double usury, because there is an usurious intention on both sides, as well in the Grantor as in the Grantee to gain. If many men who are fit for Callings live idly on Usury, they sin, but no otherwise than those that let their lands: they may and aught to serve God and their Country in some Calling, if they do not, it is no fault of usury, but an abuse of it. Neither let any man fear that usury will bring idleness in the world for if all men be idle there can be no usury. It is the usury-employment of men by their trading that makes the use of money to be at so high a value, and many must be idle if they borrow not a stock to set them on work. Of the uncharitableness of usury In the last Chapter of Dr. Fenton his second book, I did expect some extraordinary argument against usury, because it treats of the breach of Charity by usury, and the opposition between them: I did long to see it proved; but now I am come to it, I find it the shortest Chapter in his book, both in quantity, and proof, the little that he saith is in effect, that usurers are commonly uncharitable. pag. 106. Answ. I did expect to have i● proved that all usury is in it sel● uncharitable, and he tells u● that all usurers are so: It is the fault of the men, and not of the thing. Thrift which of itself is a virtue, being abused is the hindrance of Charity, and yet Thrift is no breach of Charity: A thrifty man and an usurer may be merciful to the poor, because they are many times better able than others. If usury of itself were a breach of Charity: than not to lend to usury were an act of Charity; which is but a mere Privation and no Act at all. The reason why usurers be commonly found merciless, is for that in many men Covetousness makes them usurers, and not usury brings them to be Covetous. Many usurers are found well-disposed to Charity, and give twice as much to Charitable uses as those that have twice their estate in Lands and are no usurers. Since then all usurers are not uncharitable, and those that be, are found, and not made such by usury, it is but small Charity to say that usury of itself is the breach of Charity. FINIS.