REFLECTIONS UPON THE MEMORIAL FROM HIS Most Christian Majesty, Presented by The Count de Briord, His Ambassador Extraordinary to the States-General of the United Provinces at the Hague, December 4. 1700.  
Containing His Reasons for Accepting the late King of Spain's Will, in Favour of the Duke of Anjou.  
In a LETTER from a Friend, to Mr. J. C. Merchant in LONDON.  
LONDON: Printed in the Year 1700.  
Price 4 d.   

REFLECTIONS UPON THE MEMORIAL Delivered to the State's General, By the Count de Briord, the French King's Ambassador, etc.   

REFLECTIONS upon the Memorial delivered into the State's General, by the Count de Briord, the French King 's Ambassador, etc.  
SIR,  
I Have too often, in my own mind, censured others for Complementing themselves (for as such I took it) in Essay's of this kind, when they pretended their unfitness for the undertaking, and that they purely did it at the Request of their Friends, to be guilty of the same Preamble. But if I mistook their designs, and they only were, that they might be able to Charge the Defects of their Performances somewhere beyond themselves, if they should see occasion, when they had exposed their Capacities at the request of their Friends. I have the most reason of any to Preface so to you, especially considering that I am about to Reflect upon the French King's Memorial to the State's General, Containing his Reasons for accepting the Late King of Spain 's Will in Favour of the Duke d' Anjou. It is not to be doubted, but in a Case of this Importance, he has taken care it should not be Jejunely done; and therefore employed the best Heads he had in this Afffair; and if I mistake not, some who I think Judicious, nor they fail in their Opinions, it is shrewdly worded; But Truth and Justice are Weapons not easily Parryed; yet easily used by the Hand of the Unskilful, which is the only consideration that enboldens my attempt.  
The design of this Memorial, I take to be, to soothe the Commonalty wherever it comes, and is full of cunning Insinuations of the French King's Inclinations to the Peace of the Public. I doubt not but all the Princes and States of Europe will very Candidly thank him for it, (as well as the State's General) when they can be persuaded he is endeavouring it, and really solicitous about it, tho' he should not go so far as to prefer it to the advantage of his own Crown. But I think the only way to know, whether that is to be believed, or expected, is to look back upon that Monarch's Practices in all preceding junctures of Affairs of this (or such like) nature; and then we shall see, which he would sooner Sacrifice his Honour or his Interest, and when they drew two ways, which has always been the most prevalent; and upon this consideration, I cannot think the State's General should so much as seem to be surprised at the French King's accepting the Will of the late King of Spain, since he thinks it most for his Interest so to do.  
It is something odd, that His most Christian Majesty should in the First Page of his Memorial so Ironically Treat and Burlesque the States-General as he does: He tells them, If they take time to examine with their usual Prudence, the infinite Troubles, which the Treaty of Partition would produce, That same Prudence will oblige them to desist from the Demand, etc. What is this, but to accuse them of a Precipitancy in the Treaty of Partition; and a want of Prudence, in not well weighing before hand the Conveniences and Inconveniences of it; and yet himself sheer clear enough of that Charge: For by the Treaty of Partition, he added another Method to his Choice of disposing of the Spanish Monarchy; and he knew the King of England, and the States-General, both in Honour and Conscience, thought themselves bound by, and would not recede from the Obligations laid upon themselves by a Ratifyed Treaty, tho' he kept himself above all bonds but those of his own advantage. It is certainly a great Contradiction to abandon the design of a Treaty, for the sake of adhering to the Terms of it; and I would be very willing (if I could) at this conjuncture to distinguish betwixt them; but I cannot see that the Design, and the Terms were any more United when the King of Spain lived, than they are now: For the Design of that Treaty was not to take place in its effect till after the King of Spain's Death; therefore that could make no difference betwixt them. On the otherhand, how far it is in the Power of a King of Spain by his Will, to dispose of his Kingdom, and the Succession of it; and cut off the Right of the next Heir, is not my Province to Determine; but I think, if we look into the 10th page of the French King's Memorial, we shall find he lays no stress upon it for the Duke d' Anjou's Right, for when he is pretending, There's a necessity, in order to preserve the Peace, to make use of Methods different from those that were proposed at Signing the Treaty of Partition. He tells the States in the next Paragraph; The most natural, that which is most agreeable for maintaining the General Peace; and the only just Method, consists in the Resolution, taken by the King to Accept the Will of the late Catholic King: So that it plainly appears, that the Force of the Will lies only in his Resolution to Accept of it; and therefore we have very good reason to suppose, the Will of the King of Spain should have been (with him) no Will, if it had crossed his inclinations, in settling the Crown upon the Archduke; and there is no doubt, but then he would have delivered his Protest against it, strenuously insisted upon the Treaty of Partition, and Challenged, upon their Guarranty, the Assistance of the King of England, and the States-General, to have forced the performance of it. Then on the other hand, if the French King insists upon the Duke d' Anjou's Natural Right, the King of Spain's Will, cannot (any more than his Death) make any difference betwixt the Design and the Terms of the Treaty, unless the French King means his own Private Design, which now, it plainly appears must be absolutely destroyed, if the Terms stand.  
He goes on then, and tells them, The former (that is the design of the Treaty) maintains a General Peace, the latter (that is the Terms of it) causes an Universal War; and therefore the Decision, what Measures to take, should be made by the Explanation of the First Article of the Treaty, viz. To maintain the General Peace of Europe. I am very much afraid he'll prove a false Prophet, and if he does, may the fate of a false Prophet pursue him. I cannot think the Guarantees of the Treaty of Partition will sit still, and see the Treaty broke, was it only upon Punctilio of Honour; and I think 'twill plainly appear to be too much their Interest to assist the Emperor, to expect they should be Neutral: For should the French King, (which joined with Spain, etc.) I don't see is so difficult to be done, to be too hard for the Emperor, and so Command his Arms, or indeed otherwise engage them; they will make too Formidable an Enemy, to be thought not worth minding; and the balance not so much kept in Aequilibrio as might be wished. And therefore the French King must greatly reflect upon the Conduct, and foresight of those concerned in the Treaty, in endeavouring to impose that belief upon the public, That his accepting the King of Spain 's Will, Maintains a General Peace. Then on the other hand had the French King kept to the performance of the Treaty of Partition, I can't for my part see who could, or dared, attempt the disturbance of the Peace of Europe upon that account; and therefore I shall consider the difficulties he mentions as the Grounds of his specious pretences.  
But first I think it may not be amiss, to obviate the Objection made against the Validity of the Treaty, and the French King's being any ways bound by it: Because, says he, the Emperor had not Accepted of the Partition before the Death of the King of Spain; 'tis therefore void, and ceases to be Obligatory, the three Months being past which was allowed him for Acceptance. This is the scope of the Objection, which will be easily Answered; if we consider, that by the secret Article of the Treaty the Emperor was to have two Months more granted him to consider of it, which were not determined; but suppose they were, the 7th. Article of the Treaty has made Provision for the Emperor's refusal. It runs thus, Immediately after the Exchange of this present Treaty, it shall be Communicated to the Emperor, who shall be invited to enter thereinto; but if, after three Month's time, from the Day of the said Communication, and the said Invitation, or the day that his Catholic Majesty shall die, if it happen before the Expiration of the said three Months; his Imperial Majesty, and the King of the Romans, should refuse to enter thereinto, and to agree to the Share assigned to the most Serene Archduke Charles; The two Kings (of France, and England) or their Successors, and the State's General, shall agree upon a Prince to whom that part shall be given: And in case, notwithstanding the present Convention the most Serene Archduke shall take possession either of the part which might fall to him, before he has Accepted the present Treaty, or of that part which might be assigned to Mons. Dauphin, or to him who shall have the Duchy of Milan in Exchange, as abovesaid; the said two Kings, and the State's General, by Virtue of this Convention, shall hinder him with all their Forces. Now, I doubt not, but the French King would take very haniously, any Reflection upon his Care, or Conduct, in this Affair, in having agreed to he knew not what, (which, if he did, was his own fault) but than he ought to forbear that Plea for his Breach of the Treaty; lest it necessary says a severer Charge, and proves, that his Agreeing to the Treaty was purely a design to provoke the King of Spain, (or some, of the Grandees for him) to give the Kingdom by Will, (as far as that Gift will go) to a Prince of France, lest it should be divided; and so the Treaty was broken (in his Intention) before it was made. How well this agrees with what he says in the 11th. page of the Memorial: The high Dignities of Kings does not excuse them frem considering whether the Wars they undertake be just. Then what Reasons could his Majesty (who is known to be a just Prince) offer for resuming Arms to divide a Monarchy, which is settled entirely upon the lawful Heir. And just before in the 10th. page: If any Prince have a Right to oppose the Dispositions of that Will, there needs no more but to read them, to be convinced that this Right belongs only to the Dauphin. By the way, how the reading the Dispositions of the Will should convince of a Right to oppose them, is, at present, to me a Paradox: But put the Case the Right is in the Dauphin, was it not so when the Treaty of Partition was ratified, and was not the Dauphin a Party thereunto? (See the 4 th' Article of the Treaty,) and could not the French King then, as well as now, have obtained more considerable Advantages by his Arms, if he had designed to make use of them (as now he does) than the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, the Province of Guipuscoa, and the Duchy of Lorraine, etc. which he says, he had no design to acquire by a Treaty: What then could he design by the Treaty, but to give the World one Instance more (of which we have had singular, in the Breach of the Pyrenean, and other Treaties) of his Infidelity (unless the Partition should prove for his Advantage) and laugh in his sleeve at those that gave any Credit to his Promises, and stumbled at his Painted Trap Door.  
I come now to consider what he has Offered, for the Certainty of an universal War if he had stood by the Treaty of Partition. First, the Milaneze, the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, the Provinces, the Places comprehended in the Partition, all of them put themselves in a Condition, (he should have said Posture, tho' that is not true) to maintain their Union with the Body of the Spanish Monarchy, and a little lower. Thus the Archduke becoming King of Spain, etc. There must be a necessity in order to execute the Treaty, to Conquer the Kingdoms reserved for the share of the Dauphin, etc. These are very great Reasons, should it prove true, that the Places reserved for the share of the Dauphin were really in a Condition to maintain their Union with the Spanish Monarchy, against the united Power of the Guarantees. How comes the French King all of a sudden to be so modest (tho' I believe we shall find him otherwise by and by) or doubtful of his own strength, (that use to Hector all Europe,) to suppose that France, England and Holland in Union, should speak twice for the performance of the Treaty when there are none to withstand it, but what might have been blown away by the Breath of their Guns; and they would have had more Wit, than to have fling against Six high, when they might part Stakes; and the King of Spain (I mean supposing the Arch Duke to have been so) would never have been reduced to those great Extremities the Memorial speaks of, before he would part with the Share of the Dauphin, since he must know 'twas impossible for him to withstand the Arms of this Triple League, tho' backed with the Emperor's Assistance; and Savoy durst not (tho' if he did, to no great purpose) turn his Arms against France, etc. on that Occasion; neither would it be so much worth, for him to hazard his own ruin by being on the weaker side, considering the Contingencies of his Title, which must not Commence, till after the extinction of the Heirs of the Princes of France, and the Archduke.  
There are several things more might be considered, as the grand Reflection upon the State's General in the 15th page, where he tells them, That, in truth, he is persuaded, that they never had any design to obtain the effect of their last Memorial, and so goes on to banter 'em, and makes them worse than Trifles. Then again, That they should, in that their Memorial, have named the Princes that were ready to join in it (the effecting the Partition)▪ The Troops for being the Guarantees of the Articles of it: They should have mentioned those the Republic of Holland was to furnish by Sea or Land. Truly I can't see what occasion there was for the States-General just in that Memorial (which was, as I take it, only to put him in mind of the Treaty, when they found he was going to break it) to Name the Prince's ready to join, (which he knew as well as they) since the 10th 11th and 13th Articles of the Treaty were so plain; and that all engaged in that Treaty, (to him not unknown) were obliged to be ready so to do; neither could he expect, that they should by that Memorial mention the Number they were to furnish; because by the 14th Article, all the Guarantees were to agree what proportion each should Contribute; so that 'twould have been very preposterous for them, then to have ascertained their Number, without any such agreement. He has one very pretty Turn I cannot pass: After he had supposed upon his rejecting the Will, the Archduke had entered upon the Regency: he says in his 13th page, He must have been obliged to attack a Living Prince, Prosessor of the Crown of Spain, and its certain that the Measures he had taken with the Allies, related only to the Division of the Succession of a Prince, whose Death appeared to be very near. Certainly the French King must think he writes to very weak Heads, or he could never suppose thus to shame 'em, Would not the Archduke then have come in as Successor to that King, whose Succession the Division related to; and did not he stand obliged to the Division of that Succession according to the Treaty? Ay, but the Emperor was all alo●●, endeavouring to promote the Archduke, and therefore re●●s●d, or at least delayed Signing the Treaty. That the French King knew, at the making of it; and that can be no Plea for abandoning his Sacred Word, as that of a King ought to be.  
In the next Paragraph he does the Guarantees the Justice to declare, that their design was Peace, That they stipulated no particular Advantage to themselves, etc. But acted the part of disinterested Mediators, betwixt the King and the Emperor, etc. But this is brought as an Argument, That they having received no prejudice, should not intermeddle. Surely there's the most Honour, in standing to a Treaty where there is the least Interest to Sway; and in all likelihood will be the most Justice too; but where does all this end? Why, in the Old Story, with a a little addition: The Emperor had not Signed the Treaty, and therefore, There was no Treaty, except with the Mediators; this needs no farther Answer, than to refer you again to the 7th Article of the Treaty, and what has been said before.  
At length, Sir, we are got to consider of the Renunciation, by reason of the following Expressions in the 12th page of the Memorial. The Disputes raised, as to the Validity of the Renunciation of the late Queen, served for a Motive to this Accommodation. In effect, it had been of no use, if the Nullity of that Renunciation had been acknowledged as fully during the late Catholic King's Life, as it is declared in his Will. Before I say any thing of it, I shall recite the Title of the French King, as I found it in the Introduction of a Relation of the French King's Expedition into the Spanish Netherlands, in the Years, 1667 and 1668. page the 3d. of the Introduction. In the Year 1659. a Treaty of Peace was concluded between the two Crowns, (of France and Spain,) and together with a Marriage between Lewis the XIV. now King of France, and the Lady Maria Theresa, (Eldest Daughter to Philip the iv King of Spain, and Elizabeth the Daughter to Henry the IV, and Sister to Lewis the XIII. King of France, For whose Portion the King her Father, obliged himself to pay 500000 Crowns of Gold, and pretended Salic Law debars Females, from Succession to the French Crown; as also to the end, that the two Crowns, being too Great and Puissant to be United into one Kingdom, all occasions of such a Conjunction might be avoided: It was Covenanted, (among other things) That neither the Infanta, nor her Children and Descendants, in what degree soever, should ever succeed in the Kingdoms, Signories or Dominions, which do or shall belong to his Catholic Majesty, as well within, as without the Kingdom of Spain, notwithstanding any Law or Custom, which by this agreement (which is to continue in the full Force and Vigour of a Law for ever) Their Majesties did abolish. This Renunciation the Infanta Confirmed in these very Terms by an Oath, in the presence of the Kings themselves, the Princes of the Blood, and the Chief Nobility of both Kingdoms.  
So that you see both Kings were engaged in it, as well as the Infanta; (whose Oath I have not by me or else would insert it) but I think it will not be amiss to Transcribe the very words of the Renunciation itself, by which it will be more evinced.  
Placuit utrique Regi pactione instar legis semper valiturâ sancire, ne unquam serenissima Infans Teresa, aut posteri ejus ulli, ad feros usque Nepotes, quocunque gradu sint, admittantur ad successionem ullam, sive Regnorum, sive Principatuum, Provinciarum, Ditionum, Dominiorum quorumcunque Regis Catholici, non obstante lege ulla, consuetudine, aut alio Jure in contrarium, cui utriusque Regis authoritate plenissimè derogatur, contemplatione dictae aequalitatis, & publicae utilitatis quae inde emanatura speratur. It was to Consented by both their Majesties, and by them confirmed, that neither the most Serene Infanta Teresa, nor any of her Issue or Posterity, in what degree soever, be admitted to succeed in any of the Kingdoms, Dukedoms, Provinces, or Dominions of his Catholic Majesty, any other Custom, Constitution, or Law to the contrary notwithstanding: So that if any such Custom or Constitution were, it was by authority of both Kings absolutely annulled and destroyed. And this only to adjust the Dominion of both Crowns, so as each of them might receive an equal benefit by it.  
By this Sir to me it plainly appears that the King of Spain's Will cannot make void a Renunciation so strongly confirmed. We find, as the Heirs receive a Right from the Parent, it is in the Power of the Parent to restrain it; but I won't pretend to be so much a Civilian, to argue, much less to determine, this Point. I will only observe, the French King but renounced the ever having a future Right, not a Right that he ever had; tho' I doubt not but his Civilians, knowing his Mind, have given him their Absolution (which is not much to be wondered at, since, in a more curious Frame of Government than his Judges have been found, that would make the Will of their Prince Law) and should a Qualm happen to overshadow his Conscience, the Sorbon too, must direct their Decision, by the Regal Nod; and there I'll leave him, till the first have got more Courage, than to submit the Law to his Will; and the latter more The Fear of God, than to substitute the Sacred Oracles (which they pretend to unfold) to his unbounded Ambition. And I'll only say he that won't be tied by an Oath, will no more be secured by any other Bond, than Leviathan, when you bob for him with a single Hair.  
To conclude, Sir, in the last Page his Majesty is mightily transported with the good Opinion he has of himself, and with what he would presuade the World, the State's General have, or aught to have, of him. When he had in the preceding Paragraph suggested, that the delay of the two Months for the Emperor's consideration, proposed by their Memorial, might settle the Archduke in the Throne, he tells them, that He is willing to believe that this was not their Design; they know too well that it's their Interest to merit by their Good Conduct the Honour of his Affection and the Continuation of his Good Will. And again he doubts not but they will change their Complaints into Thanks, and Congratulate the King of Spain, as soon as possible, upon his Accession to the Crown, and that they will endeavour to merit of the King the goodwill and Protection that they and their Ancestors have received of his Majesty and his Predecessors.  
This should have been his Language at the Treaty at Reswick, and then he'd soon have had an Answer; and whoever considers how high he begun, and how low he ended; and the Haughty Spirit of that Prince, can never suppose he'd have parted with so many Important Places, as he then did, had he been in such a Protecting Capacity as he writes himself; or the Merit of the Honour of his Affection; and the continuation of his Good Will, been so highly worth aspiring to.  
Neither are the Dutch in so poor, and forlorn a Condition now to want his Aid, and Protection; and were they otherwise willing to condescend, to be of his Party, this is enough to rouse their Indignation, and incline them to show him they stand not in need of his Favour.  
Indeed, when I think of the French King, he brings Belshazzar to my mind; He is Glorying in his Achievements; His Heart (for aught I know) is Merry, He is prideing himself in the Sacrilegious spoils of the Protestants, and TEKEL is his Charge. He lives as if there was none above him, The Spirit of Persecution is reigning in him; and the Cries of the Oppressed loud against him. I have nothing more to do at present, but to crave leave to Subscribe myself,  
Sir, Your real Friend, and humble Servant, N. T.  
FINIS.