AN EXCLUSION OF SCEPTICS From all Title to DISPUTE: BEING AN ANSWER TO THE VANITY OF Dogmatizing. By THOMAS WHITE. — Sciri hoc sciat alter. LONDON, Printed for John Williams at the Crown and Globe in S. Paul's Churchyard▪ 1665. TO THE YOUNG WITS Of Both UNIVERSITIES. THough I doubt not of more powerful and seasonabler provision against that destructive contagion of Pyrronism, which, not long since, has begun to take fresh heart: Yet, hearing no news of any public Cauterization applied to that Tumour of Glanvil's, which has raged now full two years; methought this silence of my Betters turned the task upon my weakness, if not to avert, at least to open & expose to be torn in pieces by eloquenter Pens the injustice of that Calumny imposed on the whole Profession of Philosophers. Reflect then O flourishing England's fertilest hope! the Joy and Crown of your Mother, whose beholding you- with pleasure swells her silent breast! reflect, I say, and seriously ruminate what you strain to live and grow to; what persons you hope and covet to become hereafter: whether wise and skilful to govern Christian Life and Manners: or a crew of Rhetoricians, pleasantly tattling unknown and uncertain things; and betraying those under your Tuition into all Precipices that fall in their way: For, for such blind ones, and leaders of the blind, He sets you out to the world, who inculcates to your England the Vanity of Dogmatizing or promising Truths. I am not angry with the Man, who, with a great deal of wit and an unfordable stream of eloquence (which will ripen with his years) prosecutes what he proposes to himself, and takes for a truth; not without some savour of Modesty: for, neither does he derogote from Faith the power of teaching its Tenets, nor disclaim all hope of attaining Science hereafter through a laborious amassment of Experiments. But, he points to ascertain person (whom he owns his Master) that, giving us the Heads of some Books he had written, thus concludes the second, Here it is where the chief Foundations of Pyrronism are laid; and that mainly established, that NOTHING IS KNOWN. Well, indeed, may the Future despair, if the pains of so may Ages have brought it but to this, that there's nothing known. Have, then, the so many magnificent structures of your Colleges been devised, only to delude the People with a deal of pretty talk, not a jot advancive of Reason? Have so many prodigious wits of your Ancestors been sent abroad over all the Christian World, but to sell Smoak and Bubbles for Jewels & Pearls? Have you yourselves the patience to be tilled on through so many years' exercises, only to the like emptiness? Scorn and hate that so foul a reproach should be cast on the Fame of all past Ages, and present industry. But, what, at length, has enveigled into these conceits that great Interpreter of Epicurus, a Man never to my hearing, mis-spoken of, either for Wit, or Life and Manners? Since I'm utterly a stranger to his Privy-Councils, I'll tell you what his Book seems to offer. There are two Sciences contested about: Physic and Metaphysic (between which that of the Soul and Morals take their places). The First, content with few experiments, surprises Truth by virtue of Demonstration, and fixes it by that force which alone is inerrable, viz. the power of our spiritual Intellect. This eye alone pierces into the strength of Contradiction; and is onlily certain and necessary, as far as it escapes oreshadowing by the senses: but, it is not overlavish too, in making use of them; and advances in growth by reflecting on itself its inmost eye. Physic is more florid, and with a Vernal look, as it were, sooth's our spirit inclined to Body. 'Tis more abundant in Experiments, and mere Historical almost, unless assisted and forced into Rules by this its Companion. That many court this gay one, no wonder, and slight her Elder Sister as 'twere but dry leaves; whereas, yet, on her 'tis the Gallant depends, nor without her help and Principles borrowed from her, is able scarce to demonstrate any thing and advance by Causes connectedly. The ignorance of this necessity has been the ruin of this Author, and many great men's endeavours; nay, and will be, till the utter despair of getting forward teach first a retreat back again to settle Principles. Another rub is the unbridled Impudence of very many Moderns, who loudly crack of Aristotle and Metaphysic, as oft as there falls occasion of setting themselves out. They fill the Booksellers Shops with mighty Tomes: they sergeant the Highest knowledge by pompous skirmishes in their own schools; and by wonderful promises enkindle the native ardour of Science. By these Arts they heap on themselves the honours and fruits due to Science; they flourish gaily and are proposed to be adored in the Chairs. Mean while, look but into the matter, and those vast Mountains bring forth this solution of Questions, perhaps I, perhaps No. Histories are related of what the Ancients, what the Moderns have thought of any proposed Thesis; petty reasons for the I or No are shot out at random, as it were, from bands of Slingers or Archers: so their Pages get breadth, their Tomes bulk: but, when they come to give Judgement, out comes an Edict to this purpose, All the Opinions are probable, but, this last seems to me the more probable. What could be looked for more silly from Midas' ears? What blind Tiresias could not as truly give verdict of Colours, perhaps 'tis white, perhaps not? What wonder now is it, if that ingenious Person derided such solemn trifles? And imagining these men, because none contradicted it, entertainers of Aristotle and his secrets, wholly neglected and contemned them. You, then, O Young Branches, growing up into Wine to rejoice the hearts of Men! remembering that virtue's the Mean hedged in by both Extremes, neither disclaim and detest Aristotle, nor superstitiously adore and embrace him. Those things he has demonstrated, though but few and seeming contemptible, yet receive. 'Tis the nature of Principles to appear vulgar and despicable; but there's not a step can be made in Sciences without them. The foundations of Edifices lie buried under ground, yet 'tis they sustain the magnificent and towering fabric. They that slight Aristotle's Grounds must of necessity, being always in quest of Principles, ever fall short of Science. Yet, far worse than these are they who feign and profess themselves Aristotelians, and are Ignorants the while in the Method of Demonstrating, & neglect what He prescribes: Circumventers of Parents, Spiriters of Youth; whom, enveigled with a show of Philosophy, they betray to vanity and prattle: worst Enemies of the Commonwealth; to which owing Youth adorned with Science & Virtue, they pay it foolishly-confident, sophisticate, and fitted by their education to ill and good alike. For you, let Aristotle be your Master, of few things indeed; but those such as fructify into thousands, viz. The whole race of separated substances, the things necessary to be fore-known to Physical contemplation, and judgement, in fine, of experiments. You have now the Pleas of both sides: 'tis your part to call aside into Council with you that Candour and solicitude which so weighty an affair deserves. The most earnest coveter of Your solid knowledge THOMAS WHITE. THE TABLE. First Plea. THere is Demonstration and Science, page 1 Second Plea. The Sceptics allege nothing Solid, page 11 Third Plea. 'tis imprudent to deny the existence of Science, p. 17 Fourth Plea Refells the Preliminary Objection, page 24 Fifth Plea Refells our Ignorance of the Soul and Sensation, p. 30 Sixth Plea Displays the Pastick virtue, continuity, Adhesion of Parts, and the Mysteries of Rolling, page 42 Seventh Plea Inquires after the Causes of our Modern Shortness in Science, page 51 Eight Plea Wards off from Aristotle the Calumny of special Impiety, page 55 Ninth Plea Wipes off the Aspersions on Aristotle's Doctrine and Terms, page 60 Tenth Plea Maintains certain Definitions and Arguings, p. 65 Eleventh Plea Refutes some Topics babbled against Science, p. 71 An exclusion of SCEPTICISM AND SCEPTICS From all Title to Dispute. First Plea. There is Demonstration and Science. 1. SCepticism, born of Old by an unlucky miscarriage of Nature, for her own Credit, carried off the Tongues of the Eloquent where it had long been fostered, and buried by the steddiness of Christian Faith; this Monster snatched from the Teeth of Worms and Infects, Peter Gassendus, a Man of a most piercing Sagacity, of neat and copious Eloquence, a most pleasing Behaviour and wonderful Diligence, by a kind of Magic has endeavoured to restore again to life. He, a Person (which is the strangest of all) most tenacious of Catholic Faith, and never suspected guilty of mischievous Tenets: whereas, yet, this Scepticism is the Mother of infinite Errors, and all Heresies, and that very seducing Philosophy and vain fallacy which the Saints, warned by the Apostles, have taught us to beware of. Herd, this man, otherwise eminent in his paradoxical Exercitation against the Aristotelians, has dared to expose, not veiled, as before, and wand'ring like a Quean in the dark, but boldfaced and painted, to the Multitude and Market place. By his Example, the Author of The Vanity of Dogmatizing has produced her amongst us beauteously trick'd-up in English: He, too, a great Master of Wit and Eloquence. Nor indeed are vast mischiefs to be dreaded from Vulgar heads. This is the occasion of my undertaking; and this my Design (if Heaven vouchsafe to enlighten and guide my pen) to force back into her Grave this Carcase that would be rivalling Science, and deliver her up a Feast to her former worthy Commoners. Come on then, let's untie the knot of the Question. 3. Since, then, 'tis of Science we are to speak, its genius would in some measure be looked into. Nature herself, therefore, teaches us, that Man is an Animal endued with Reason, to fit him for governing his Action, and Reason is allowed to be That whereby what before was unknown is rendered known: daily Experience also convinces that our Action consists for the most part in such things as are subject to an infinite and insuperable mutability and variation: whence it comes to pass, that that Virtue which is immediate to action cannot properly be called Science (since 'tis not infallible, and the effect of demonstrative Discourse) but a power of conjecturing aptly; and uses commonly to be termed Prudence, either properly or derivatively; properly, if it be concerning the thing to be done, as to its right proceeding from Reason; analogically, if of the action or thing to be done, as it regards some other inferior Faculty subservient to the dominion of Reason. Now Prudence depends on two previous Powers, Art and Inference or Experiment. Art, though it owes its birth to Experience, yet is sustained by universal and unfailing Rules: But, itself understands not the necessary and indefectible efficacy of its Rule; but is content with the testimony of ever-corresponding effects. Inference, or Experience for the most part is true, but necessitates not assent, because not universal. 4. Setting this therefore aside, 'tis clear the Decrees of Art, since she is veracious, have necessitating and necessarily connected Principles, which force the effect of Art to be not possibly otherwise than as Art teaches 'twill succeed. Whence follows, that the subject Matter of Science and Art is the same; and every Art has a proper Science due to itself, if the nature of Man would stretch to attain it. But, the same warning we gave before concerning Prudence, must be repeated concerning Science. For, as he who behaves himself prudently in any Artifice, is not therefore esteemed and styled a prudent man; but only he who rightly tempers his Action in as much as 'tis Humane: so, neither is he, with propriety, to be called a knowing man, who skills the demonstration of Duelling, or Versifying; but he that has the demonstration of those things which are Principles for governing our life, in as much as 'tis Humane: The chief whereof is that which has merited the term of Theology, or Metaphysics: the next is Ethics: then Physics, or Natural Science; whether, because all corporeal Natures, or the World, is proposed to the disputation of men; or because, next Metaphysical Contemplation, nothing so much advances our desired Beatitude as Physics. Nor yet are Mathematics to be excluded; both because Quantity, their subject, is the Vesture of those bodies which Physics speculate through; as also, because the Rules, and as it were, the demonstrableness of Natural things at every step depends on them. Out of all which 'tis clear, that in nothing Equivocation more lewdly cheats Mankind, than in this term of Knowing, or Learned men. For, if Masters in Sciences, analogically so called, are not really worthy this name: how much further off meriting so noble a Title are those, whose ambition strains no higher than, like Parrots, to repeat others sentiments? and how manifestly pernicious are they that have the confidence to apply such learning to the government of humane life; and vent poison, or at best, smoke, under the Reverend name of Science? 5. It follows, that such Science 'tis we propose to ourselves as is beneficial to Humane life. And concerning this, three things offer themselves to our enquiry. Whether there be at all any certainty attainable, at least of one Proposition or one Reasonment, which we call a syllogism? At this hangs the next, Whether at least, any Habit, or Series of more Truths traced with certainty (such as generally are esteemed those which Arithmeticians and Geometricians profess) may be acquired by humane industry? The last Question, by most (at least in practice) disputed (whate'er in words they pretend) is limited to Physics and Metaphysics; whether about the objects of these any beneficial Multitude of Truths may be spun out connectedly; as the Masters in Mathematics seem already to have done? And herein consists the usefulness of my discourse; and the desperation or difficulty of this Conclusion compels me to clear the former; which of themselves by their own evidence had stood unscrupled, had not the step, and almost necessary consequence they afford to the third, terrified those who feel such difficulty to yield this last. 6. To work, then; let us fix the first step, and assert, as invincibly known, and unshakable by any Art of the Sceptics, that What is is, or that what terminates and specifies an Identical Proposition as its Object is self-evident: as if we should say, that Peter is Peter, Wood is Wood, a stone is a stone; and whatever others carry as open-faced an Evidence. The Sceptics I imagine, will laugh at this Axiom as foolish: because Identical Propositions use to be excluded from the rank of Scientifical ones, and the Sciences themselves; as nothing at all advancing the understanding. But, by this their very laugh they'll yield us the Victory; as confessing Evidence in these, however they be useless: And therefore that wherever the same necessity shall Intervene, there cannot want Evidence. One thing in this position occurs a little cloudy, obscuring it through a Mist caused by the shadow of that most acute Person, Renatus des Cartes; who, severely prying to descry the very first thing falling under knowledge, beat it up at length to this, that the first thing every one knows, is, that Himself thinks. But, the difference of our Opinions, I conceive, has sprung from hence, that, whereas Science may be considered both in its Generation and in its Subsistence; He has taken the former Method, I the later. For, really, if we examine by what degrees Science is born in us, we see, the first thing that happens is to have a passion made in us by Bodies; and the first evident thing that strikes us is that we think. But, if, looking upon Science now existing▪ and as it's 'twere at rest in us, we inquire what 'tis that fasten truth to our Minds, so that we cannot doubt or, as were, waver about it: Nothing will appear more simply or originally manifest then that what is is, wherein, in a manner, is formally included that what is so is, that, whilst it is, it cannot notbe; which, indeed, is, that the understander is certain that the thing is, or has a fixedness concerning the truth which is in him. 7. It being determined that an Identical Proposition is evident, 'tis equally determined that Propositions termed self-known are evident: for, if they be looked into, 'twill be clearly seen, that a self-known Proposition is in some sort composed of an Identical Proposition and another otherwise evident, or taken for evident. For, there are two sorts of self-known Propositions; one wherein the Generical Notion is predicated of a Species; another wherein the Species are predicated divisively of the Genus. Take these for Examples: A Man is an Animal: the sense is, A Rational Animal is a sort, or one of the Animals: The evidence of the Proposition consists in this, that the word Animal signifies, as it were formally in predication, to be one of the Animals; and the word Rational denotes that whereby a Man is one of the Animals. Wherefore in this Proposition, a Man is an Animal; these two Propositions shroud themselves, one of the Animals is one of the Animals; and that other, that Rational is a determiner of Animality: Now this later is not affirmed, but taken for granted, either from Sense as it were, or some other way supposed to be known and past doubt; and in force of the former Identification, 'tis concluded that a Man is an Animal. In like manner when 'tis said, Number is either even or odd, Bulk is either finite or infinite; and whatever Predicates, contradictorily opposed, are predicated divisively of a Subject; two propositions lie in them; one an Identical one, for example, that even and not-even are all, or comprise all the kinds of Number; and another otherwise known, viz. That such a Number, for example, Ten, is a certain Number. This later is known as it were by sense; or supposed, not affirmed: The former is equivalent to this all Number is all Number; and one of all the Numbers, for example; Ten, is affirmed to be one of the even or odd, because, by force of the contradiction between even and not-even, even and odd must of necessity comprise all Numbers, or even and odd and all Number be the same. 8. The same force of Identity is also clear in a syllogism: For example, when in the first Mood, or Barbara, two self-known propositions are taken and another truth, unknown before, is concluded out of them. As, when 'tis argued that Every Man is a living Creature, because every Man is an Animal, and Every Animal is a living Creature: there's made an Identification of Man and living Creature; or rather it is discovered by the double Identification of Animal with the Superior and Inferior. The force therefore of the syllogism whereby it fixes the mind in this Identity, tha● Man is a living Creature, lies in nothing but this, tha● through the former two Identifications it rests fixed as to the Premises. Plain therefore 'tis, that the light of an Identical Proposition shows itself both in self-known Propositions, and in those which are concluded by syllogisms: and, which follows, either that the truth of an Identical Proposition is not evident, or else that self-known propositions, and such as are concluded by a legitimate syllogism are Evident and most certain: and, that it cannot be doubted, so many truths are palpably certain as can be reached by a legitimate deduction of syllogisms. Since, therefore, he cannot be esteemed other than a Mad Sot that should deny the Evidence of an Identical proposition; he cannot be reputed Rational who should at all reject propositions self-known, or collected by legitimate Discourse. 9 Be this, therefore, a Demonstration a priori, as they term it, of this truth, that there is some certainty or Science; that, since 'tis undeniable that what is is, or, an Identical Proposition is true, and every Proposition, whether self-known or Sylogistically-concluded, has no other necessity than what shows itself in an Identical one; there can be no doubt of these, unless Identical ones, too, be called in question. For, since, in a self-known Proposition, 'tis Evident, that the thing signified by one Term is that which is signified by the other: And in a Sylogistically-concluded Proposition, it likewise appears, that because A is B, and B is C, A too is C; or that, unless A be C, A will not be A; for 'tis not A unless it be B, nor B unless it be C: 'Tis Evident that whatever is evinced by a legitimate syllogism, has the same necessity as an Identical Proposition. Since therefore 'twere mere perverseness, and such as cannot fall into humane Nature, to doubt whether an Identical Proposition be true; 'tis absolutely manifest that whatever is concluded by legitimate discourse out of self-known Propositions is engrafted, beyond any danger of ambiguity; or, that there is Science of all such like: And therefore that there is some Science, and that, indeed, of many truths. Now, that which either in a self-known or in a Demonstrated Proposition, is assumed beyond Identical ones is not capable either of truth or falsehood; but, in a manner, is taken by way of snpposition; as if 'twere said, if he be a Man; if it be an Animal: I say, for as much as Man or Animal are the subjects of the Propositions or Premises. Second Plea. The Sceptics allege nothing Solid. 1. NOw, to the Sceptics, or Scepticism itself. What says the Sceptic? Though, says he, nothing be certain, yet many things appear true to us; and, out of such appearance we proceed to Operation. Thou entanglest thyself, Sceptic! for, how, whilst, in common, it most clearly appears to thee that nothing is true; yet assertest thou, in particular, that this appears to thee true? Can these two stand together; it appears that none of those things proposed us are true; and at the same time, it appears that some of them are true? Besides, if any thing appears true, 'tis because it deceives us with the face and similitude of certain or true, (which two, as to us, speak the same thing; for, we say, that is certain which we know to be true, or which is true to us): But, 'tis clear, we cannot affirm any thing to be like another, if we know not that other: If therefore, there be amongst us no Certainty, or nothing known to be true; nothing can ever be or appear like Certainty amongst Men. 'Tis, therefore, stark folly to join these two togther, there is nothing certain, or there's no Certainty; and yet some things appear certain. 2. For all that, the Sceptic will stand to it, that at least this appearance is enough for humane Action: since all Action is singular, that is, in infinite Circumstances upon which Demonstration has no force, but only Prudence, or the power of conjecturing which is to be preferred before other. Notwithstanding, if the Action be truly humane, that is, purely and thoroughly governed by Reason, this Sceptical appearance is not enough for it. For, first, since Prudence is an Intellectual virtue, it cannot be indifferent to Truth and Falsity; but always tenacious of truth. In Action, therefore, governed by Prudence two things fall under consideration; that which is most conspicuous and spied by every one is, whether the Action be like to attain its immediate and next end, to which 'tis destined: And this for the most part is uncertain; but withal, in this consists not the primary effect of Prudence, but a certain faculty of guessing, which they call Sagacity. The other thing, wherein especially Prudence plays its part, is whether this Action be to be done here and so: For which it suffices that two things be certain; One, that the Actor is led by no Passion; the other, that he has used pains, or disquisition enough; which depends on the former; since that will not fall short, unless some Passion makes the Actor precipitate. But, as far as the soul proves deficient in these two, so much, too, she deviates from the Rule of Prudence. Now, these two may be very clear to an experienced Person. Farther, this Tenet, again, of the Sceptics fails of sufficiency for Action in the very first root of Acting, viz. Whether any thing be to be done, or whether Action be wholly to be suspended: For, in vain the understanding tugs at it, what Action to perform; unless it be first evident that something is to be acted: They therefore, who profess not so much as this is known, that something sometimes is to be done, cannot be moved to Action out of pure understanding. Nor can it be replied that it appears to the Sceptic he is to Act: For, since Appearing is common to true and false; Nay, since 'tis known that false is ofttimes more probable and apparent, than true; 'tis plain that neither Probability in general, nor the greater Probability can have any force at all to cause Assent. But, if one has not assented to this Universal proposition, something is to be done; 'tis plain that, as to pure Reason, he has no principle of Acting: And, if he has any other principle besides, Reason, the Action, as far as it springs from that, is not Rational. It must therefore be concluded that all action of the Sceptics is utterly not-humane, but only Brutal; as rising purely from sense and imagination: Or, rather worse than Brutal; in as much as they force Reason to submit to and serve sense. 3. But, that which highlyest crosses this Sect is, that Professors of Science much undervallue themselves, if they vouchsafe to dispute with them or endure to hear them babble. For, since in all humanenature, no Sect is to be found more addicted to prattle, and more greedy of that vanity which follows tinkling Cymbals: At what a distance will they be from their Beatitude, if among the adorers of Science they be not allowed to vent their trifles? Let us, therefore, fairly weigh this, whether they are to be admitted among the Professors of Learning. Scientifical Persons, then, are either Masters or Disciples; that is, such as have already attained the habit of Science, or such as endeavour after it, or are seekers of truth. Since, therefore, 'tis plain, the Sceptics profess not themselves Possessors of the Science; it remains they are to be reckoned among the seekers; wherefore, since this contradicts itself, that one should seek what he thinks is no where, or at least, which despairs possible to be found; in vain they declare themselves Candidates or seekers after Sciences. Add to this, that, since they neither admit self-known Propositions, nor any legitimate Consequence of Discourse; they have no way or Method of seeking, or any trace from which to commence their search: But, if they admit any of these two, they cannot but acknowledge something certain. 4. It ought, therefore, be objected, at the very beginning, to such contemners of Sciences; what attempt you? what's your aim? How have you the confidence to attaque any one that's truly a man? For, whence shall what you say derive any appearance? Is it not just to press on you to prove first whatever you assume; and this without ever coming to an end? You therefore, will never be able to assume any thing that can prove our Tenets false or uncertain. Again, will you use any other form of Discourse then Sylogistical? But, this you deny to be evident and certain. You, therefore, come but to deride, sillily to play the Rooks, and chatter figments like Poetical Magpies. You I reply, perhaps, you dispute ad hominem (as they term it), and show, out of those things which ourselves have accepted, that what we teach thereupon has no certainty. What's your meaning? If indeed you endeavoured this in any one Tenet, it might be allowed you to try what you were able to do: But, if universally you assert us unable to make good Consequences, you call us Beasts and deserve not the hearing. And, you yourselves, how will you evince any one Consequence to be ill? Will you tell us how it ought to be, to be good, you I say that grant none to be evident? ' Again, why will ours be false, and yours good? But, if you affirm your own not good neither; what madness possesses you, that you cannot suffer us to rest even in our Error; when you neither can nor strive to exempt us from erring? 'tis sweeter, sure, to believe one-self in the light, then to know one-self in darkness and all light hopeless. 5. In fine, To what purpose do we amass Arguments against those, who, as far as in them lies, have put off Humane Nature, and made themselves Beasts? For, if to Reason be to advance ourselves, out of certain and known things, to things before unknown and uncertain; and nothing be certain: neither is any Reasoning possible; nor consequently any power of reasoning; or Animal endowed with it. But, if nothing be certain, nothing, too, will be true, since that is certain which we see to be true; that is, truth had, our Truth true to us, True by which we are true. For, clear it is, that our Nature is covetous of Truth in itself; that, when we or our understanding is true, being impregnated with this Truth, it may be made operative, and Master of all things without it; or, that it may pursue useful things, fear such as are to be feared contemn things contemptible, and reject all manner of counterfeit scare-crows. He frustrates, therefore, the whole bent of Nature, that denies there's any certainty; and utterly evacuates, as Nature herself, so also her most vehement desire and aim. What need I mention Humane Conversation, but especially Negotiation? for, if there can be nothing certain in Humane matters, why do we instruct Infants and Boys? why strive we to persuade Youth into those things which seem True to us? for, if there be no certainty acquirable, 'tis to be judged wholly indifferent what every Youth does, or whither he tends: Especially, since not so much as this is certain, that one thing is more probable than another; and far less, that what now is more probable will be so when the Boy comes to choose it. Third Plea. 'tis imprudent to deny the existence of Sciences. 1. LEt us raise our Style, and enlarge it to entire Habits. Can it be believed, that men of excellent wits should be so fond as to deny those things that Humane life is full of; and without which there's no living, at least commodiously? I mean Arts. Let's consider what part of our Action or Life is exempt from their service: what Arts go to the providing us Food, clothes, Houses, Delights? Our minds are cultivated with Liberal ones: the Fields, Mountains, Seas are mastered by Arts. To conclude, What is there that falls under man's use, wherein some kind of Art is not exercised? Art, therefore, what is it, but a Rule which commonly fails not? This, than (if men's souls but own themselves) is certain, that Art, for the most part, fails not. What if I should say, that it never fails? but either the Artificer is unskilful, or else, through laziness or knavery follows not the prescription of the Art, as oft as any Error happens. But, be it so, that Art sometimes fails; at least, the whole course of our actions is grounded on this that, commonly it fails not: Wherefore since what never fails is certain, Art, which in most cases never fails, in most cases is certain; and whoever denies this, either out of ignorance or stomach, opposes himself to very Nature and the Order of things. This is, therefore, a throughly-attested Truth, that there are entire and complete Habits of Certainties: since, both of the several Arts, in common, 'tis certain that for the most part they attain their effect; and the same is as evident of the several Members and Joints in each Art in particular. 2. The next place Mathematics challenge, which have gained the true name of Science: first, Arithmetic and Geometry, each of so large an extension, that they make up many entire habits; and if they be acknowledged for Sciences, they leave no room for opposing others, upon pretence of the abundance of their Doctrines, or the largeness of their Subject. Such, again is the steddiness of Attestatition to these Sciences, of so many Ages, so many eminent Wits, by showing and perpetuating so many Effects, beyond the estimation of humane Prudence; that there can be no doubt but they winch against Nature itself that calumniate these Sciences. Let's behold the multiplicity of syllogisms; the derivation of far distant Truths by intermediate Propositions, immediate to one another; and how many Principles or fore-known Truths are sometimes made use of towards the search of some one: and we shall see these Sciences will not sustain themselves alone, but extend their power to others also; and persuade, nay, evince, that there's nothing but may be demonstrated, if there want not Industry. 3. Yet I am not ignorant what uses to be urged against these Sciences, especially against Geometry: which though in other works I have sometimes repelled, yet here too, as in their properest place, they are again to be repeated; chiefly because the Sceptics no where, in my judgement deserve more applause. For, plain it is, though nothing be farther from the meaning of the Geometricians than what the Sceptics lay to their charge; yet nothing appears clearer in the Terms they use, than what they mean not: Providence so ordering it, That those things which best guard themselves by their own evidence should be most infesed with prejudices; to warn us, in more obscure points, not to desert evidence, though we be hard put to't with weighty, perhaps, but obscure Arguments. For, what's more manifest than that Geometricians require a straight Line to be drawn from one point to another? That they dispute, whole Volumes full, conconcerning Lines and Superficies? That they demand a Line to be drawn out in infinitum? That a Circle be made? An equilateral Triangle? And a thousand such like: That none of all which, yet, can exist in the world, 'tis either certain, or, at least, so ambiguous that it ought not to be presumed without Demonstration; whereas the Geometricians neither attempt nor promise any such thing. 4. Notwithstanding in all these, 'tis no hard matter to satisfy an attentive Reader. For, I ask, whether or why 'tis not lawful for a Mathematitian to speak universally of his Object, in the same manner as both the Learned and Unlearned talk of theirs? He may then speak of the body proposed to him, as 'tis long, not treating at all about it, as 'tis broad; since for a Body to be broad is nothing else, but to be long according to two Dimensions. In like manner, since a Body to be deep signifies it to be long according to three Dimensions; what an envious part 'tis not to allow the same to be considered as broad, abstracting from the third Dimonsion? These things being clear to the utmost pitch of evidence; and so that we cannot speak otherwise according to Nature; let's see wherein lies the fault of the Geometricians. You urge that they assert there is a Line in being, that is, Longitude without Latitude; I deny it: You prove it, alleging they mark a Line with letters, saying the Line A. B. I demand, to what purpose serves this marking? Is it for any thing but to notify the Longitude of the Body they measure? If that be all, than the sense which serves the Mathematicians turn in the word is, that the Body proposed, according to Longitude, is equivalent to the distance between A and B. And, if he assumes any more, it must of necessity be something impertinent to his Discourse, which Geometricians, of all men, are farthest from. 5. The very same may be said for their manner of speaking concerning a Superficies. But, for Points, the solution is more evident: For, in stead of this word the Point A, or the Point B, put the word End or Term, and there will remain no shadow of difficulty. For, who can doubt but that a Body, as Long, is terminated: and therefore can forbid an End or Term to be assigned it? For the rest, 'twill easily appear the like Discourse serves: For, when he demands a Line to be produced in infinitum, the clear sense of the Geometrician is to have it drawn out as far as is necessary for his work; which never does or can happen to require it actually infinite. Not an infinite, therefore, but an indefinite Line the Geometrician asks; that he may use any as big a part of it as he needs. In like manner, if he demands a Circle or straight Line to be made; 'twere fond to think he expects them scored out Mathematically on Paper or Sand: Since the Demonstration he intends is Universal and exists in the understanding only, not in Paper. It suffices therefore, that the accurateness of the Circle or Line be in his Mind, to which the paper yields a phantasm; a weak one, indeed, but fit enough to delineate the rigorous form in his Mind. Some, too, will not allow a Line can be cut just in the middle. Nor do I deny this to be petty work of Geometry: But, neither do I expect the Sceptics should be able to prove this impossible: And therefore, against a perfect Demonstration, such as Euclid's is, to listen to slight-babling reasons were to trifle, not philosophise. 6. Is not this hugely remarkable, or rather to be admired? That those things which advance Geometry, above other Sciences, in a great measure are false; taken for granted in order to use, but not credited for Science: For, Mathematic is not certainer or more evident than other Sciences; but easier and more adapted to fancy, not understanding. For, if in Geometry we were still to use strike Terms, and always to repeat this Body, as long, abstracting from its Latitude, or, as broad, abstracting from its depth, the whole discipline, losing that inveiglement of clearness by which it tills on the reader, would be but tedious work. Now, because we may use the names of Points, Lines, and Superficies, as they were Things; and, according to this gross apprehension, make visible Figures: Geometrical truths strike almost our very corporeal Eyes. Whether as much may be done in other Sciences, at least as to some part, is not yet clear; but, from the way of Algebra, it may be conjectured not utterly out of the reach of humane industry. 7. This, at least, may pass for evident, from the manner we have expressed of the Geometricalcontemplation: that the Geometricians use to draw their Consequences and Positions, not from the sounds of their words, but the Notions in their minds. But, herein kind Nature has been indulgent to those Disciplines; that they are excused from any necessity to resolve the Equivocation of their terms: but having once explained them, they may, without any rub, proceed, whence we see that if at any time, they are put to explicate their words, Geometry grows even as troublesome as Metaphysic: as appears in that question bandied concerning an Angle of Contact; because they reflect not that an Angle speaks a Quantum, whereas yet they confess it cannot exist without a space. Plain then 'tis rendered that the first task in the other Sciences is, to make the question clear between the opposite Parties, not only in Term, but also in meaning: and that this is the main fault of the weak Managers of other Sciences, that they stick obstinately at using the words in a fore-received sense, and that no clear one; nor can be bronght to an agreement about their explication. 8. It must be concluded, that, in Physic also and Metaphysic, there's a capacity of infinite Demonstrations, if industry be not wanting. For, who is so senseless as pertinaciously to deny, that a formal syllogism may be made even about the Subjects of these Sciences, or, when made, is of force? It must, therefore, be said, either that the Discoursers in these Disciplines cannot comprehend their own meaning, and declare what they feel in their mind when they pronounce such words: or else, that they may reduce them into a syllogism and breed Science. Plain too, it is, that, in that part of Physic, which is truly called such, viz. that which treats of sensible Qualities, not so subject to obscurity through the equivocalnesse of the Terms, Demonstration will cost less pains: in Metaphysics 'twill prove harder, because the Commoner the words are, the more they are subject to equivocation. But, on the other side, because, the Commoner the things treated are, the simpler are their Notions, and consequently, more evident the connexion of the terms: Demonstrations in Metaphysics must needs be most evident and secure, and such as deserve the evidence of all other Sciences should depend on them. Fourth Plea Refells the Preliminary Objections. 1. NOw we must give ear to the Complaints, (shall I call them?) or rather Reproaches of the Sceptics: though themselves are no slight Causes of those ills which they object to the Lovers of Dogmatizing; who, whilst they even acknowledge it the entire work of a Man, and one minding his business too, to dilate the bounds of any Science; themselves, pursuing mean studies and the applause of a smooth-tongue, strive, under pretence of impossibility, to avert from that Heroick thought the Scientifically-disposed Genius of others. Yet, would they do even this but solidly, I should think it pardonable: but, if they fall not on this neither in a legitimate way; how are they not to be exploded? Now, perhaps, the defects of mis-seekers may be more; but I'll content myself with the proposal of three. Let the first be of those who seek things incapable of Truth; or who, of that which has no being at all, inquire how it is or may be made: as if one should require a Triangle, equal to an assigned Circle, to be inscribed in it. Let the second be of those, who complain that those things are unknown, which, though true in themselves, are yet, either, absolutely, or at least as yet, out of the reach of human power: as if one should be angry that the Wars or Government of the Planetary Commonwealths (supposing those Globes planted with Rational Creatures) are unknown to us. For, 'tis fondness to quarrel at our ignorance of such things, for reaching the knowledge whereof Nature has afforded us no Ladder of Accidents. The last defect is of such as lament those things are unknown, which, by honest industry, may be searched out, and will, if the ardour of inquisition grow ripe. For, 'tis ignorance and importunity to allow no time for increase of Sciences. Amongst these I reckon not those self-tormentors, who fret that those things are unknown, which are publicly known to others, but unknown to them; because, upon some extrinsical prejudice, they neglect enquiring into what others have said: which race of Men is, at this day, most frequent among the Courters of Science; but withal most insufferable: For, what can be viler than to shut the eyes against things most manifest to the understanding; upon the Calumnies of such as profess they know not these things which others constantly affirm are most evidently comprehended? 2. Let now the Complaints themselves speak, viz. Those with which the Contemner of advancing Dogmatically has stuffed his 3, 4, 5, and 6 Chapters: But, first le's examine those things which he indulgingly reproaches. They are the two, as it were, acknowledged Ne plus ultras of Philosophers, viz. The Causes of the Seas Ebbing and Flowing, and of the Wonders of the Loadstone. I'll endeavour to look into them severally. And, as to the first, though that may well be reckoned among the things whose Accidents are not-yet-enough comprehended by us; and therefore I might justly exact that they, who think it incomprehensible, should take care to have the Phoenomena's cleared, and teach us, by just calculations of Seamen, what days, in the several Regions, the Sea Ebbs and Flows happen: Otherwise, I may deservedly lay the blame on industry, and excuse Philosophy: Yet I will not proceed so rigorously with a courteous Adversary; but argue, that These things may be convinced concerning this vicissitude of the Sea: That the motion is caused by an extrinsical Mover: That that is no other than the wind: That what rules the winds is but various aspects of the Sun and Moon to the divers Climates of the Earth. Which, if they be true, if evident from the Phoenomena's; what remains, but that the Phoenomena's be more acurately traced; and the ignorance of particulars laid to the charge of Industry, not of Art: and so Philosophy scape scot-free? 3. Le's run over our Proposals one by one. The first is that the Seas motion is from something extrinsical, or without it. This is Demonstrated by Aristotle in his Books of Physics; as they who have studied him know: The Dialogues, too, De Mundo have made this some part of their pains; and, if a proper place for it occurs in this Treatise, I shall not be loath of my labour to explicate the same again: here this proposition is to be assumed, not proved. That the Author of this motion is the wind comprehends more than one thing, viz. That the wind is a sufficient stirrer of the Sea; and that it, in particular, concurs to this motion called the Flux. As to the first part, (not to mention how many Deluges or overflowings of the Sea have infested the Coasts by the winds help), we need not travel beyond the Thames; in which, almost every Winter, the Flood happens, sometimes more than once in a day, to be beaten back or pour in more abundantly than ordinary, to the overflowing the Streets in the Suburbs of London, That, again, the Wind causes this course of the Tides, besides the necessity which the perpetual west-wind, flowing from the Atlantic Sea to the East-Indies, carries with it; the Six-months strong Currents, which take their turns constantly backward and forward between Africa and America, conformable to the Winds always keeping the vicissitude there, are a manifest testimony. Add to these, that, through the whole Coast of China, certain Tempests, with most vehement Rains and overflowings of Rivers, are daily expected at the New and Full Moons; whence the variation of the Fluxes at the same just periods is increased. Now, that the Winds and Rains and rising of Storms depend from the Sun and Moon is so notorious that 'tis past contest. These things, then being clear; the causes of Ebbing and Flowing cannot be obscure: though the certain Compasses they fetch be unknown, because the observations of them are not-yet exactly calculated. 4. Nor is the Magnetical Philosophy less evident, if we'll have but patience to look into't by piece-male. For, it cannot be doubted, from the sudden turning of Iron-tools fit for the purpose, and other Bodies apt for Magnetical direction; but that power of Direction, which we call Magnetical, is attained by a flux of unperceivable Atoms derived from one Body into another: And as little, that because a perpendicular or horizontally-sidelong position of the Magnetical body is apt to beget in it that virtue; the primarily Magnetical body is the Earth we tread on, or at least the crust of it next us. Nor, again, is it questionable, from the perpetual Motion of corruption and generation of this Magnetical virtue in those bodies; but there is a certain perpetual flux of Atoms upwards and downwards, as also between the Equator and the Poles; whereby this virtue is infused and fed. Neither, again, will any stick at it, that the Magnetical Body, if it be set at full liberty, must be carried according to the flux of the like Atoms; as that which swims in a River follows the violence of the stream: and consequently, the declination, too, or variation of the Needle point out the Channel of the Earth's Atoms, which are proper to it. All which if we solidly remark, and pursue with a steady discourse; I see not what great Mystery lies in this Magnetical virtue and operation, beyond possibility of bringing clearly to light. These secrets, therefore, of nature were, heretofore, like the head of Nilus, undiscovered; but now, themselves attest not the defect but proficiency of Science. These then thus touched on, let us fall to the Objections themselves. Fifth Plea Refells our Ignorance of the Soul and Sensation. 1. IN the third Chapter, therefore, of his most eloquent Discourse, he objects our ignorance of that thing we ought to be best acquainted with, viz. Our own souls. Concerning which, what a kind of thing 'tis in this our earthly habitation, he neither teaches nor inquires at all, as far as I can discern; only that it is, he asserts, may be most clearly gathered from its effects; but, to ask what it is, he says is like the mistake of Infants, that look behind the Glass for the Body whose superficies they saw painted on its foreside. And, in my judgement, he had said rarely, had he stopped here: but in his following Questions, he shows his deficiency even in this. For, he asks farther, whence the Soul comes? and how 'tis united to the Body? He is therefore most manifestly detected, to think that the Soul, lying hid in the Body, is of itself a certain substance, which may directly be made, come, and be joined to another thing: whence he terms it subsistence, which doubtless denotes a Thing and Substance. Now, that this is a most important error in Philosophy none can doubt, that's able to discern the opposition of One and Many. For, 'tis plain, that either a Man is not a Thing; or else that his Soul and Body are not two Things; if one thing cannot at once be many, nor many one. Nor am I scared with the distinction (which the Boys that gabble Philosophy have always ready in their Budget) of a perfect and imperfect thing: which says just nothing, unless imperfect signify to which somewhat is wanting to make it a thing; which supposed, an imperfect thing is not a thing, and the distinction vanishes. Otherwise, the same cannot be one thing and more things: Wherefore either a Man is not a Thing, but a Pair of Things consisting of an Intelligence and a Beast; or his Soul and Body are not two things. 2. When, therefore, he asks, Whence comes the Soul? it must be answered with a question, Whether he doubts whence the man comes? For, if whilst the man lives, there be but one only thing which is called the Man, 'tis he alone can have come; and he beats the wind that inquires whence the Soul comes? Nor am I shaken with the Authority of our Forefathers, though never so Reverend: I mean not of those who profess themselves unable to grapple with the Question; for these deliver the Candle into the hands of Posterity, advising them to pursue on the same Race, that it may be seen whether any thing purer occur to them than to themselves, ready to Patronise whoever shall clear the Truth. But their opposition I resist, who clamour 'tis the Faith of all Churches that Rational Souls are framed by God. For, now I'm accustomed to it, to distinguish between what's due to the sincerity of Faith, and what to Scholastical subtlety. If I attribute the Making of Man, as he's Intellectual, to the singular power and operation of God, I have submitted myself to the keys of the Church's Doctrine, and subscribed to the Tradition of the Saints. But, whether that action, which is the Generation of Man, consists of two actual parts, or be but one alone, by more notions equivalent to more really-distinct actions, is a purely speculative Question belonging to the Schools. And so it must be said that one Thing, a Man, equivalent to a Beast and an Intelligence, is brought into existence, by one action, equivalent to two, the Generation of an Animal and the Creation of an Intelligence. 3. By this truth we are led to the evident solution of the two following knots; the econd being how the Body and Soul are united? Which, 'tis plain, is herein faulty, that it supposes two things to be united existing either before the Compound, or not destroyed but tied together in it: which is clearly false, not only out of the 'fore-declared Truth, but also out the definition of a Part. For, Parts are called such, whereof, by a Motion, called Composition, one thing is made; or into which, what was one is resolved by Division, or destruction of the Unity. Now, Unity, not Union, is the form of what is One: And, in that which is One, to seek for the colligation or cement, is to seek by what the same is made the same. The same Error runs through the following Difficulty, which laments that 'tis unknown how the soul moves the Body: Which is utterly knocked on the head, by denying the soul moves the Body. For, true it is, that one animated Member moves another; but not, that any substance, which is a pure soul, moves immediately any Member in which the soul is not. I appeal to other Animals, in which there's frankly denied to be a Soul independent of the Body: and I desire to have shown me what motion there is in man, which is not in them. I confess freely, that one Member, the Brain especially, moves the rest after another manner in Man, than in other Animals; and this by reason of the difference in their Souls: but first it ought to be made evident by experiments, that a Humane Soul, without the help of the Body, or some Member acting together with it, moves another Member; before we are to inquire into the manner how this either is or can be done. 4. The last darkness which he bemoans in this Chapter lies in our ignorance of that Motion, whereby the spirits are derived out of the brain into the fit Nerves for the Animal's natural Action. And, if indeed the Objection brandish an Argument common to all Animals, I should soon quit the field: for I confess myself not so skilful in Anatomy, that I can lay before the eyes, why, from the Motion of Anger boiling in the heart, the spirits should start into those Muscles, by whose streining the Animal is carried towards its Adversaries; and, from the Motion of Fear, spirits flow into the opposite Muscles, by which the Animal flies fromwards them; whereas they, in a manner, add strength to and enforce both alike. Yet, I make no question at all but, by force of the Brain's Motion, caused by the motion of the heart, it comes to pass that the entrance into one sort of Channels are shut, others opened, and that thence comes this admirable and as-yet-not-sufficiently-seen-through direction of the spirits. But, the Authors seems to make Man's case proper to himself; alleging Will, and perhaps Election, to be, as it were, the first Author of this direction. Still, therefore, he slips into the same Error. For, first, he should demonstrate some act of the will, without some either precedent or concomitant Motion of the Heart, (which, when 'tis violent, we call Passion; when we endeavour at any thing, Desire or Flight, or some other such like we style it): But, if there be no such, than the cause of this direction is purely Mechanical, as he calls it, and not any certain inexplicable power. Now, that there cannot possibly be any such exempt act of the will, 'tis clear enough to them who allow there's no knowledge without a beat of Fancies: For, Fancies cannot choose but both be stirred themselves and stir others, by the usual ways of Nature. By Motions, therefore, derived from the heart, whether in Man or in Animals, all Motions, whether Natural or Free, Universally are performed: and, by consequence, are subject to the contemplation and scrutiny of Philosophy and accurate Mechanics. 5. The fourth Chapter objects that the Natures of Sensation and Memory are inexplicable. As to the former, first he acknowledges the substance of sensation is seated in the Brain alone: Then he inclines to Des Cartes' fantastical conjecture, shall I call it, or deviation from the manifest footsteps of Nature; about Motion's being brought down from the heavens to our Eyes, through the continuedness of a very thin Ether: But, because he esteems Aristotle's conceits, too, not incredible, I may be excused from that speculation. At length, therefore, he falls again into the old Error, enquiring how corporeal things can have any force upon a naked Spirit? He supposes therefore, the Soul in the Body to be a kind of thing, not the form or affection of the thing, Man; and so, is upon the same false haunt again, nor needs repeating former discourses to beat him off it. But, left he should say nothing new, he objects that, by sense alone; there's no discerning the Quantities, Distances, Figures and Colours of things. I wonder, I must confess, at these Objections from a curious and ingenious Man; things so clearly explained & demonstrated in Optics. Who is so ignorant, that he knows not that bigger things, at the same distance, strike the eye in a more obtuse Angle and stronglier? Who knows not that Figure, if plain, as objected to the eye, is nothing else but Quantity more spacious or contracted this or that way? but, if it be a solid one and participate of the third dimension, it borrows its variety from Distance. Again, that Distance is nothing else, but a certain Magnitude spread between the Eye and the Object; which if it be past judging of, neither can the Eye attest the distance. Lastly, that Colour is nothing else, but the confused figuration of a Superficies, according to its parts undistinguished to sense. Whence it remains clear, that the Eye needs no other Geometry for all these, than what is necessary to judge of a magnitude from the variety of an Angle. 6. His next pains is about Memory. To show the explication of that impossible, he commemorates and rejects four ways of resolving it. I must take another path than any of those. First, I must weaken this consequence, that If any thing about Memory has not hitherto been explicated, we must therefore make account it never will be, or that 'tis impossible to be explicated. We must be aware too, that always some things will be unknown; either because their trivialness merits not the pains of learning them; or in that at length the bulk of things known will be grown so great, that more will be burdensome to the understanding. Now, to complain of such like is to have forgot human shortness. What, therefore, seems my task in this Question is, to bring into play those things which are already established and evident about memory; and, for those that are unknown to make an estimate whether, some time or other, they too will come or merit to be known. First, then 'tis evident, we must distinguish what is Memory and what Remembrance. For, Memory is only a Conserving of the impressions made by the objects, whereby the Animal is rendered able to use them when he lists or needs. But, Remembrance is a certain Motion whereby that power of using the impressions is reduced into Act and Use. Concerning Memory, therefore, a reason is to be given both of its station or rest, and of the causes or manner of its Motion: and of both, if I be not mistaken, Nature and Experience offer evident footsteps, for tracing them. 7. In the first place, that all things that move the sense have certain minute particles of their body shorn off; as to the Touch, Taste and Smell, is too notorious to abide contest. He that denies the same force to the Light, returning from the things to our Eyes, must deny, too, that the Sun extracts exhalations from the Earth and Sea: there being no other diversity in the operations, but that the one is greater and stronger, the other weaker and less. Now that these Atoms get up to the Brain, by the waftage of the Spirits, (that is, a certain liquid and most subtle substance) can scarce be denied by one never so peevish, that's but put in mind how Waters and Oils are impregnated. These Atoms, therefore, must of necessity strike, not without some violence, upon that part of the Brain, whose being-struck causes perception. Again, that a stream or any thing liquid dashed against a resister should not leap back again is most clearly repugnant, both to experience and reason. And, that a substance any thing viscuous, in a viscuous vessel besides (such as those are about the brain) being repulsed, should not stick to any thing solid is equally impossible: as also, that a notable part of that stream should not cling together, is against the Nature of gluyness. The Walls therefore, of the empty and hollow places of the Brain must of necessity be all hanged and furnished with little threads. Conclude we, then, that through all the senses, except Hearing, the Animal is enabled, by Atoms constantly sticking in it, to make use again of the Impressions made by Objects. In fine, since sound is made by a collision of the Air; 'tis evident by Anatomy, that it drives the Hammer of the Ear to beat upon the Anvil, by which beat 'tis not to be believed but certain particles must fly off and strike the Fancy: the orderly storing up▪ therefore, of these is apt to constitute the Memory of sounds. The structure, then, of Memory (if I am not mistaken) is rationally enough declared. 8. I cannot see why the like tract may not carry us to the explaining of the Symptoms of Remembrance too; or why their Solution should be desperate. For, there's nothing clearer than that the fore-explicated motion of the Atoms is set on work by a wind, as it were. For, that Passion is a certain ebullition of Spirits reeking out of the heart, 'tis visible even to the eyes, in Anger, and Love, and Bashfulness. If we make inquisition what effect these motions have on the Fancy, we experience, that those Objects occur to the mind, tumultuously and all on a heap, as it were, which solicit these Passions; so hastily and in a huddle, that they prevent mature weighing. It appears, therefore, that the Atoms, roused from their places by such like vapours, fly about the cognoscitive part, in a kind of confused tumble. If then, there are certain winds and blasts, which we call Motions of the appetitive faculty: is it not plain, that the cavities of the Brain will be brushed, as it were, and the Images sticking to the walls be moved to the place destined for attaining their effect? And that these Atoms are carried neither merely by chance, nor yet in a certain order, is evident by this; that, upon inquisition, the things we seek for do not suddenly and perfectly occur; which were a sign of election; and yet manifestly, such abundance of them suit to our purpose, that 'tis clear, they could not run thus without any industry at all. As, therefore, when we treated of directing the Spirits into the Nerves, we allowed the several Passions each their ways into certain parts of the Brain: so, here, 'tis also manifest, the same Passions have the places and series of some certain Atoms, in a manner more obvious to them, than others. 9 But our new admirer of Nature is perplexed, how this multitude of Objects, swimming in the cavities of the Brain, should possibly be, without entangling and confounding one another: and by what Art they shift out of one another's way, so as to be able to keep humane knowledge distinct. And here, I must confess, I had need crave the help of a Machine: for, really, we have no Candle, nor Spectacles enabling us to look into the subtle paths by which the Atoms avoid and slip by, to escape ruining one another by shocking. But, in exchange, I ask how many Sunbeams (which Philosophy now questions not to be Bodies) pierce straight to our eyes, through the vast continuity of Air, and so many little Bodies flying up and down in it? There's no body, if we credit Experience and Reason, without its steams, and a sphere of vapours derived from it: How do these steams find free paths to run in and attain such wonderful effects? The Magnetical, Sympathetical, and smell-producing streams, have not their courses broken, or ends intercepted by one another. They that have not the confidence to deny these, why are they loathe to allow the same may happen in the wide passages of the Brain? But you'll reply, that to multiply a difficulty is not to salve it; but to profess the rest of Nature inscrutable, when 'tis our task to clear this particular. Well then, thus I cut the very knot asunder: In currents of greater Atoms, where 'tis easier to make experiment, 'tis plain, that many are confounded, many lost; yet, out of the very nature of Multitude, that some are preserved entire, and those enough to serve Nature's turn. So it passes even in the Brain: whatever Object enters requires time for affecting the Sense; which, if it be too short, the Object is lost almost before it be perceived; if long, it roots in the knowledge by the multiplicity of the images, and the frequent sight of the same Object does as much; nay, that knowledge often repeated, works the same effect, is evident beyond dispute. This being so, we must conclude, that such is the art of Nature as, for things to be remembered, there shall not want that abundance of images, which is necessary and sufficient to force their way through the Crowd of all others they meet. 10. 'Tis plain that, in this Answer, I have preferred the Digbaean Method before the rest: Because that, as near as is possible, traces Nature step by step. I concern not myself in the rest; as studying Philosophy, out of a design to build, not destroy. Only, I'd remember the ingenious Author that he mis-imposes the third opinion (which relishes nothing of Philosophy) upon Aristotle (who taught the Digbaean way); deceived by the counterfeit stilers of themselves Aristotelians, whereas they are nothingless. In this same Chapter, the Author seems solicitous about the will's following the understanding: But, because, he disputes nothing on't, neither will I; only, hint that the will, as spiritual, signifies not any thing else, but the very understanding perfect, or ripe for action to follow out of it. That Mystery of whence comes ill, I deny not, has been brought down, by the contests of the Ancients, even to our ears; nor question I but 'twill last as long as the bold and ignorant shall endure: But, as the Author mis-insinuates, I doubt not that St. Augustine himself has most clearly convinced it; nor can it any longer be troublesome to any, but those who either know not, or neglect his Doctrine. Sixth Plea Displays the Pastick virtue, Continuity, Adhesion of Parts, and the Mysteries of Rolling. 1▪ IN his fifth Chapter he falls upon the obscurity of the formation of natural Bodies, especeially living ones: Yet, not so smartly but that what he says may, with ease enough be repulsed. I say, then, that there are two Methods, by which the formation of living Creatures may be rendered intelligible; without any farther difficulty than what may, without a Miracle, be refunded into the Wisdom of our Maker. Conceive the first, thus: Let's say the seed of a Plant or Animal contains invisible parts of all the Animals Members: These, le's say, supplied with moisture, increase, with some slight Mutation, whereof the reason may be easily rendered (for example, that some parts drier and harder, others are more throughly watered and grow soft); and what great matter will be apprehended in the formation of living things? The other Method is, that, observing the progress in Chemics, which must of necessity hold the very same in Nature if self, we'd see that things concocted with a Gentle fire result into three more remarkable parts: A kind of thin and, as it were, fiery one, though condensablein to the Species of Water; another Oily and answerable to Air; a third expressing the Nature of Salt and, as it were, hardened water; with all which there's mingled and lies at the bottom a fourth, that's dry and of an Earthy quality, however they call it. The same we ought to expect from Nature; since the acting of Heat upon Moisture is the End of both Fornaces. This laid for a ground, suppose, in a proper vessel, a Drop of prepared Liquor, so kept warm and preserved that it may be increased, too; is it not plain that, by the very action, some parts will become drier, others more subtle and liquid? And that the dryer will grow into different figures? Especially into certain hollow Vessels; if, by the beats of the boiling moisture, they be extended and thrust out in length? And that all of them will cling together, where they begin first to divide? And see you not now the figure of the Animal and its respectively homogeneous parts formed? And that their connexion and variety, and its other heterogeneous parts follow the variety of either the Fire or Liquor. 2. He that shall comprehend these things well, will not lament that the Plastic virtue is an empty name and a word without a thing. But, if he be ingenious and conveniently at leisure, he'll either, in spring time close-observe the breeding Plants in Gardens or the Fields; or at home pluck up Seeds buried in Pots, just while they are taking life; and daily rake into the bowels of Berries and Seeds: and I dare promise him so manifestly connected steps of advance, that, after many experiments, he shall foretell, merely out of what he sees the day before, what will be the next days issue. Those things which appear wonderful confusedly in the whole, taken asunder discover and fairly offer themselves to view. If one observe the spreading of figures or Colours, he shall find the principles of these founded in the nature of Juice; the reasons of those chalked out by some manner of their production: for both Fruits and even slips are, by art, variable into any kind of forms. Much more the figures of different salts or concrete Juices spring, not from any intrinsical nature, but from their usual generation and the diffidulty or facilness of their place and Motions. Nor let any be scared by the talk of Artists, that admire and amplify those things whose causes they understand not: or of our Author, amazed at the constancy of natural operations; why our Hens should never be coloured like Peacocks-tails or Parrots. For, in different Regions, great varieties spring from the diversity of Food and Air: And, for what is out of our reach about these things, we must be beholden to time. 3. In the same Chapter he raises two other Questions, which he thinks absolutely inexplicable: to me, on the other side, they seem to have scarce any difficulty in them. The later in Him is concerning the Composition of Bulk or Continuum: A question both debated by the Ancients and desperate to the Moderns. The former, though the later in Nature, is concerning the sticking together of parts, or, why one Body is more divisible, another less. The former question supposes another, whether there be parts actually in a Continuum, whereof the affirmative side, though they wrangle in words, yet is commonly taken by the Moderns, as it were a self-or-sensibly-known truth; but, by the whole School of the ancient Peripatetics and that of the Thomists following them, hist out, as demonstratively convicted. The issue of the matter is that, about the Composition of Bulk, the Moderns, after a world of laborious trifling, confess Philosophy at a stand: The Peripatetics deride them as groping in the dark. For, if there be no parts till they are made by division; they are manifestly out of their wits that seek how those should be united which are-not at all? The arguments of those that assert actual parts cite even sense; concerning which there's nothing certainer than that it cannot discern any part in a Bulk; since the term of each part is invisible, whereas sense requires a notable quantity to judge of. Their other Arguments commonly assume our manner of speaking, and end in Logical trifles, how we ought to speak, not what the thing itself has really in it. Now, this no-very-difficult contest being decided, all the controversy concerning the composition of Bulk is over. 4. About the other question there's even as wise work. The followers of Democritus strive to resolve it into hooks and corner'd hold-fasts: Not seeing, that nothing can be imagined so one, or an Atom, as that itself is not composed of many parts, concerning which it must be asked how they come to stick so fast together? But, this difficulty they, at least, slip over, asserting that these in minutest Bodies, by force of Nature, resist whatever divisive power, not so the Compounds of them: That is, the greatest and invincible coherence of parts they carelessly ascribe to the force and quality of Nature, and are narrowly inquisitive about a less. The first resolution, therefore, 'tis plain, is refunded into Nature itself, and the division of Body or Bulk into Rare and Dense, or having More and Less of Quantity in equality of Bulk. Which Differences most Demonstrably dividing the Notion of Quantitative and constituting more Species of it in things; there remains no greater Difficulty in the Adhesion of the parts of the same Continuum, than whether there be any such thing or not: For, if there be any, by its very being a Continuum, of necessicity it must be whereof parts may be made, not wherein parts are; else (as we have pressed above) the same thing would be one and many, divided and not-divided, in the same Notion. Therefore 'tis that substance, from its very Quantity, whence it has its refolvableness into parts, has also its easier or harder resolvableness, which they call its parts more or less sticking to one another. But, as soon as ever the speculation is strained up to Intellectual Notions, these Naturalists' stomach turns: as if Philosophy enjoined us not to know our own thoughts, and made it unlawful to understand what we speak. 5. His Sixth Chapter is all dedicated to the Motion of Wheels; nor, if we believe an Author that wants for no wit, is it any ways solvable. But, before he attaques that fatal Difficulty, he objects a certain previous one to us, which the Ancients object to Aristotle; but he, I confess, in a clearer form. For, he considers a Wheel moved about its Centre, and plainly concludes that no part of it moves; but the whole is moved, and the several parts together change place. But, what inconvenience this conclusion drags along with it, I am utterly ignorant: For, though he strives to reduce at large, that one part first quits the place before another is in it; yet evidently the words, not the thing, breeds all the contest: For, what hinders that, altogether and at-once, both the quitter should first notbe and the succeeder first be in the same place? Another solution might be given, did the Argument exact it: But, as I said, the quarrel is about the words and manner of speaking, not the thing. The Author subjoins a second difficulty, how, in a Wheel turned about, the parts nearer the Centre, in the same time, come to run over so little a space; whereas they are connected with the remoter, which fetch so large a Compass? And, after he has acknowledged it to arise from hence, because they are not carried alike swiftly; he infers that, if the swiftness of the Motions be unequal, the strait line drawn from the Centre to the Circumference must be crooked: Whereas 'tis most evident, the right line would be crooked, if the nearer and distanter parts from the Centre were carried with equal velocity. 6. At length the Author loftily enters upon his boasted experiment, professing before hand, he'll stop the mouth of the boldest obstinancy. Thus he proposes it. Let one Axletree have three Wheels on it, one at each end, both alike, and a third in the Middle far less. Let the bigger rest upon the floor, the lesse● upon some table. Let them all be drawn in a progressive Motion, till, having fetched a full compass, they mark the floor and the table with the very same points, in which, at first, they rested on them. The three scored lines will be found equal; whereas the middle one is scored out by the contact of a Circle far less than the other two, yet 'tis as long as them: Which, with no likelihood, can be denied impossible; since, 'tis clear, things that touch, as far as they do so, are, necessarily equal. This is the knot; this the evident repugnancy. But, alas! let's observe that Motion is called in to help tie the knot the harder; and that the motion is of two kinds, a Right and a Circular, compounding a third progressive motion of the Wheel. Observe we farther, that the Right (or straight) Motion of the three Wheels is equal; and that the Circular Motion of the great Wheels is equal to the Right Motion; but the Circular motion of the Middle little Wheel is less than the Right Motion: And, which follows, that the greater Wheels are moved with the same celerity according to both motions; but the lesser is moved stronglyer in the Right, than in the Circular. Now, the compounded Motion is not that which is scored upon the floor or table, which, 'tis clear, is a simple and purely Right one; but a certain crooked Motion in the Air, making, with the scored Motion, a certain Area (whose quantity, Torricellus has demonstrated): as is manifest beyond dispute to whoever but takes any one point of the Circle or Wheel; and withal, that the progressive Motion of the bigger Wheels is greater than that of the lesser Wheel. These things thus explicated, there appears nothing in this objection more intricate, than in this simple Proposition, that of two bodies, which are carried according to one line with equal velocity, one may, at the same time, be carried swiftlyer than the other, according to another line: which is so evident, that any one, that's a Mathematician, cannot doubt of it. 7. Yet still Galilaeus presses closer that, in the circumvolution, the several points of the lesser Circle or Wheel are just fitted, in an immediate succession, to the several points of the space in which 'tis carried: And, therefore, that it cannot be understood how the Right can be longer than the Crooked. But, that which deceived Galilaeus was his not having discussed Aristotle himself, but been overcredulous to his Modern Interpreters, or rather Corrupters. For, Aristotle has taught us that a Movable, in actual Motion, always possesses a bigger (and not-equal) place to itself; which is most evident: For, since no part of Motion can be but in Time; and, in every part of time, the thing moved quits some place and gets some new; 'tis plain, there cannot be found any so little motion, wherein the Body moved, has not possessed both the place in which it had rested, and some part of a New one. This supposed, though the Movable were conceived indivisible; yet certain it would be that, in whatever determinate part of time, or by however little a part of Motion, it would score out not a space equal to itself, but some line; and, in the conditions of our present dispute every point of the lesser Wheel will draw a line proportionate to a part of the Circle of the greater Wheel. And, since really there are no either instants in Time, or indivisibles in Motion, or Points in a Circular Line: 'Tis evident, this Argument has no force; but in virtue of that false apprehension which we have convinced in the 'fore-alledged defence of Geometry. Seventh Plea Inquires after the Causes of our Modern Shortness in Science. 1. IN some of the following Chapters he, tightly enough, searches into the Causes of Errors and human Ignorance: Yet, methinks, I could suggest two which he has overslipt. One is the Laziness or rather Vanity of this Age: For, whoever has got himself but talk enough to wove a learned story amongst the ignorant or half-learned, such as understandings unaccostomed to Sciences are apt to be dazzled with: partly out of irksomeness to pursue harder things, partly out of confidence of his own wit, he slights descending into those Mines whence our Ancestors have digged out Science; and to take those pains himself which alone Wisdom regards and follows. Let this Author be my witness; who, about the end of his former Chapter, complains of the Obscurity of our Speculations concerning Motion, Gravity, Light, Colours, Sight, Sound; all which the Digbaean Philosophy makes as clear as day: Whence also (though there they are more copiously and clearly explicated) we have borrowed our Discourses of the Loadstone, the derivation of the Spirits into the Members, the Memory and Remembrance, the Formation of living Creatures, and whatever almost we have alleged for solving the proposed Difficulties: the very dictates of Nature leading us the way. Such like Philosophers, therefore, read the eminent and highly elaborate Works of others, as if they were Romances invented for pleasure, or as Spectators behold a Comedy: what on the sudden takes them they commend; if any thing more knotty than ordinary occurs, they either out of laziness let it pass unregarded, or break some bitter jest on't. 2. Another cause of Ignorance, waved by our Author, appears to me to be a certain special Error in the nature of Demonstration. For, they feign to themselves a certain Idea of Demonstration, which should not only have this force on the Understanding, to render the Truth proposed evident; but, so, besides, that no objection can with any likelihood be opposed against it. Which is as much as if they should require this Demonstration to clear whatever follows out of, or any way relates to it; or, that one Demonstration should be a kind of entire Science. For, otherwise, how is it possible but opposition may be raised against this, out of things not-yet seen-through and conjoined with this Truth? An Understanding then, adapted to Sciences, out of very Principles and what it already knows, is secure of a deduced Truth: nor fears any thing can be inferred opposite to the Truth it knows; whatever pains it may cost to get out of straits. For, it knows, that those things are certain, which the Understanding, out of a steady sight that a Thing is a Thing, or that the same is the same, has fixed to and in itself: and patiently waits till the distinction between the entanglements show itself, and the confusion vanish. 3. In that these Contemners of Sciences endeavour not at fixing any thing in themselves by a severe contemplation of Truth: as soon as any Truth pretends but to evidence, as if they were incapable of owning it, they quit their station, and betake themselves to enquiring whether any one has opposed that same: and if they find Impugners, they assume it for most evident, that such a Truth is not evident. For, say they, were it evident, 'twould be so to all; 'twould convince every understanding. But, they may just as well say, the Sun is not visible, because 'tis not seen by them who turn their backs on't, or keep their eyes shut. For, as in corporeal sight, some corporeal motion is necessary, by which the Ball of the Eye may be set against the Object: no less to see and fix in the mind this very evidence, that the same cannot be and notbe at once, a certain Application, and as it were, opening of the mind is required; even to conceive and give birth to the very evidentest evidence. And, for want of this, so many of the Ancients and Moderns have not owned, but corrupted, the evidence of that very first and most notorious Principle. Whence they can never attain that Scientifical Method which shines so clear in Arithmetic and Geometry, but are wholly entangled in Logical and Equivocal trifles; and fill babbling Volumes with fopperies. Let these lusty Compilers of Tomes show the world but one leaf, or one page deduced, or, at least, attempted in a Geometrical Method; and then, let them complain there's no Science, or that it lies hid in an unfathomable Well: now the sordid Sluggards, only mettlesome at repaoaches, conceit a Lion in the way, and stir not a foot, so much as to behold the very way. Eighth Plea Wards off from Aristotle the Calumny of special Impiety. 1. ANd now I seem at an end of the Task set me: did not the same persons strain, as enviously as possible, to defame Aristotle, with all manner of Contumelies; that the ignominy of that one man may make way for them to tear Science itself out of the hands of the Learned, and throw it into the dirt of Probability. For, he alone, of all the Ancients, has left any Monument of Demonstration in Metaphysics and Physics. The Academics, where they leave the Peripatetics, were Orators, not Philosophers. For, Socrates himself was merely a Disputer and a Doubter. Plato and Aristotle divided his School. Plato proposed to himself, with his wholy-divine Wit and purest Eloquence, to set out Probability, and make himself admired for speaking specious things concerning the Principles necessary to Human life. Aristotle very concisely hunting after truth by Experiments, and Marrying with the inspection of Nature, the power of deducing Consequences, designed to show the world Science in Physics and Metaphysics worthy to vie with Geometry: And, therefore, as long as a Popular form of Commonwealth nourished the power of Orators, He was less esteemed. For, those Famous persons affected to manage Science after the manner of Civil Causes, without a solid and firm Judgement. The Orators at length, wearing out of credit, the Authority of Aristotle grew stronger; and has been derived from the Romans to the Arabians; from them, to our Schools: the Italians first (to our knowledge) recalling into the West, the Science of the Arabians, which the wars long since had chased away. 2. 'Tis highly unjust, and a sign of a Cavilling spirit, to pry into his Life, whose Doctrine you go about to impugn: For, these Oratorial preventions of the Reader argue the Writer has no mind a candid Judgement should be given of the Truth; but lies in wait to distort Justice by stirring the Affections. Wherefore, hissing out those things which are tattled against Aristotle's manners, let's trace what's objected against his Doctrine. Peter Gassendus, then, in his Third Exercitation, objects it as certain, that 'tis Aristotle's Opinion, in his Book of Metaphysics, that God is an Animal: Whereas, on the contrary, in the 8. Book of his Physics, Chap. 6 and 10. He so expressly makes God a substance immaterial, indivisible, immovable either by himself or by accident; that impudence itself cannot be able to deny God, in his Opinion, notan Animal. He adds, that God is tied to the out-most Superficies of the highest Heaven, which is extream-heedlesly said in the Peripatetical Way: Whether you construe without Heaven, in imaginary spaces (whereas Aristotle most expressly attests there are no such); or an Indivisible adherent to Heaven; whereas, both the First Mover must necessarily be said to be in that which is first Movable or Moved; and, 'tis well known, that, in Aristotle's way, the Superficies is moved only through the Motion of the Body whose it is; as also, the Superficies (as we have said above) is a certain being divided, or term, or no-farther of a Body, and not any Entity in which God may be placed. 3. The next accusation argues God bound up to the Laws of Fate and Necessity. But, here, the Calumniator is clearly in an Error. For, there are two kinds of Fate; one a Stoical; their's who assert that whatever things are, exist in force of Contradiction, since, of necessity, every thing must either be or notbe; and this Fate Aristotle rejects: The other Fate is a Course of Causes. Since, therefore, 'tis evident and agreed by all, in the Peripatetical way, that God is the First-Being, and by consequence, the Cause of the whole Series of the rest; most clear it is that, in Aristotle's School, He is not Subject to Fate, but himself the Fate of all other things; which is the most wise Tenet of the Saints, and the marrow of Christian Doctrine. Like this is the other, that He is Subject to Necessity. For, the term, Necessity, is ambiguous: For, as 'tis attributed to Animals contradistinctly from Liberty, so it takes away perfect knowledge; which no Peripatetic ever denied to God, to whom Aristotle's Doctrine forces the very top of knowledge to be attributed. There's another Necessity springing from perfect knowledge; to which nothing lying undiscovered, one perfect in knowledge, and, consequently, God, can take but one way. But, this necessity implying the determination of an Understander to Particulars, out of Common Principles, manifestly speaks Election or liberty actuated. 4. He is farther calumniated to have taught that God knows not despicable and petty things; and, the 12. of his Metaphysics is cited, where this is not found but by way of doubting: But, his best Interpreters conclude, out of other Texts, that Aristotle attributes the knowledge even of these too, to God. This crimination, therefore, argues an ill will, drawing the words of that excellent person to the worst sense. Yet, at least, He makes the World increated. But this may easily be denied. He asserted it, indeed, not-generated, or, impossible to have begun by Motion and the force of Natural Causes; which is most consonant to Christian Faith: But, as to the Creation of the World, he has not a word on't: Yet, 'tis one thing not to have acknowledged it, or reached so high; another, to deny; amongst modest Men that babble not incertainties. Yet, I confess, he thought the World itself Eternal: But, in his very Error, he showed himself the chief of Heathen Philosophers. For, whereas, they all with one consent declared, that nothing is made of nothing, 'twas inconsequent for the World to have begun by Motion, which could not exist without Time; and no beginning of Time, either out of its own essence, or by the action of moving Causes, could appear. 'tis plain, therefore, that this Error of Aristotle's argues his excellency above the rest, who by Chance, and not by Science light on the Truth. 5. The last calumny about his Tenets concerns the Immortality of the Soul, which Gassendus says, Aristotle in many places denies: but as disfavourably as before; since, his best Interpreters attest that he acknowledged it; and Plutarch records him to have written concerning the Soul, upon Eudemus' death; out of whom is cited that famous Story of a dead man's Soul begging revenge of his Friend. Whence is evidenced that those Interpreters err, who, out of Aristotle's Principles, endeavour to conclude the Soul not immortal, and that this was Aristotle's own sense. It hits strangely in fine, that the Author, otherwise very ingenious, should judge this a fit Objection, that Aristotle denied the Resurrection of the dead: which, 'tis most certain, the light of Faith first discovered to Mortals; though, after its acceptation on that account, its conformity also to the progress of Nature might be discerned. This farther, that he concludes, saying, that Aristotle speaks many things wholly disagreeable to our H. Orthodox Faith: as if Plato and the rest of the Philosophers had tendered the World none but Tenets agreeable to Faith: which is by so much an unworthier part of Gassendus, in that he himself in his Preface, promises he'll show that, 'tis by Faith alone, any thing comes to our knowledge of God and the Intelligences; and that all Arguments about these things, drawn from the light of Nature, are vain. A worthy Epiphonema, indeed, to close up his Sixth Book, designed against Metaphysic, or the supreme Science. Ninth Plea Wipes off the Aspersions on Aristotle's Doctrine and Terms. 1. I Must now return from Gassendus to the Author of The Vanity of Dogmatizing; since he has selected the strongest Mediums: justly preferring them before that numerable rabble which Gassendus has heaped together, even to cloying; out of love to reproaching, rather than Science. Our English Academic, then, first by way of Preface, as it were, seems to decline that envy, which the honourable train of Aristotle's Followers would be apt to procure him; applying that sentence of Seneca's, The Multitude is an Argument of the worst: so prone we are to err, even in the plainest things. For, 'tis evident, the Vulgar, in some things, follow men of excellence, as it were, their Captains; in other things are governed, or rather hurried by their own judgement. The former Method is that of Nature itself, that many Ignorants may, by the virtue and Authority of a few, be carried to good: But, that the Vulgar should judge of things themselves know not, and by a tumultuary consent, precipitate the counsels of the prudent; this is opposite to the Laws of Nature and Reason. Here now inquire whence Aristotle has got an Authority with the Vulgar? and 'twill clearly appear he has been made the Coripheus of Philosophers by the sway of the very Princes of Scholastical Theology: to whom if you compare the Judgements of Orators or Critics, they'll dwindle away to nothing. The Fathers themselves (those great Persons pardon me if I say so) are of another different Trade; nor have fallen upon any Philosophical Explication of Faith, otherwise than as forced to it by the importunity of Heretics. 2. The Author subjoins, that in the opinion of the wise, Peripeteticism is a mass of Terms that signify nothing. But this Author knew not that his own Terms are so equivocal, that themselves speak nothing. For, who has sufficiently sifted this, who, or by whose judgement they are called wise, that have pronounced this of the Peripatetics? If we consult Aristotle's Works themselves, or his ancient Emulators, 'tis clearer than the Sun, none ever of the Philosophers so industriously, and by distributing so many of his Terms into obvious senses, took care for the clearness of his Dictates, and eluded the entanglement of Equivocations. 'tis manifest then, the Wise men had little skill in Aristotle. They have mistaken, therefore, for Aristotelians some Apes cloaking themselves with Aristotle's name, and expose other men's Tenets for Peripatetical ones: and (which he seems not to know) in very truth Pyrronians. For, whoever, in mighty Volumes and Questions piled one on another, teaches nothing else, but, that one part, indeed, is more likely, but either side is defensible; in such a World of twattle says no more, than had he passed sentence in one Word, that Nothing is clear. This Calumny, therefore, touches his own Friends, not Aristotle. 3. Then, he prosecutes his Plea against the Peripatetics by certain Doubts; which either are not, or seem not, clear to him, in spite of Reason. The notion of Materia prima, which asserts it to have neither Quiddity, nor Quantity, nor Quality, he contests is a Description of Nothing. ' Strange, that Men be so humoursome! Are there, perhaps, in all Nature more usual words than Being and Power? Who is so sottish, that he speaks not thus of a piece of Brass or Marble assigned for the purpose, that it is not-yet, but may or will be a Statue of Mercury? Do they not, peradventure, understand themselves that speak thus; or, when they say, it may be, or has an aptitude to be a Mercury, Do they say the Brass or Marble is Nothing, or, is nothing of Mercury? How, then, besides Mercury, or the Form of Mercury, is there not a certain power or aptitude to be Mercury, which neither is Mercury actually, nor yet a notion of Nothing or Nothing? Or if, in respect of the Figure which constitutes Mercury, there is some aptitude which neither is that, nor yet a Notion of Nothing; why may we not affirm the same of a Quantum or Bulk, and say, a Boy is not yet big, but may be big? For he that asserts this does he not, at the same time, deny Bigness; and yet clearly he names an Aptitude to Bigness? Nor, perhaps, is there any difference in respect to Entity; for we scruple not to say that Tallow or Oil may be Flame, and yet that they are not yet Flame: the Tallow, therefore, or Oil neither are the thing, Flame, which they may be, nor so big as they will be when they are Flame, nor so hot; and yet they may be Flame, they may be greater, they may be hotter: and there is in them a certain power, which neither has Quiddity, Quantity, nor Quality; since they are referred to all these, and are in a present state of privation in respect to them. Now whoever professes this unintelligible, directly condemns Mankind for a company of Fools, that know not what they say in their vulgarest speech and commerces: And, he that denies Matter itself destroys that solemn Maxim of Philosophy, that Nature makes nothing of nothing. 4. There are two other Terms which trouble our Sceptic, Form and being educed out of the power of Matter. As for the first, 'tis strangely odd, that too much speculation should so render ingenious men no better than the most stupid. Can any man be born such a Bruit, as not to own that one thing is distinct from another? or, if it be distinct, can he assert 'tis distinguished by nothing? Does the difficulty lie here, that this, by which 'tis distinguished should be called a Form? what a strange unreasonableness is this, not to let me call that a Form, which I see distinguish one from the other? May not I say of two brazen Statues, that they agree in Brass, and are distinguished by their Figures? Or, if there be a third of Marble, shall I be chid for saying, the brazen ones are distinguished from the Marble one, in that this is of Stone, those other of Metal? As, therefore, before, I distinguished power and being in substance, Quantity, and Quality; I may, now, in the same, find grounds for the denominations of Form and Subject in each of them. 5. As to the later Term, being educed out of power, let the ingenious Man reflect whether that which, out of some dark hole, softly and by degrees comes forth n●o open view, is improperly said to be educed or brought out. Again, let him remember (if he have ever seen a piece of Marble formed by a Statuary) how, at first it cannot be imagined what the Artist means to form: after a little pains, there appears a confused resemblance of a Humane Creature; then, whether it be a Man or Woman; and at length, what Man it is. Behold, how a man, which was potentially in the Marble, and confused in the dark, as it were, is by little and little educed by Art out of that confusion into clear light, and the Marble is palpable and expressly made a Caesar. Philosophers consider as much in Nature; whether you observe the seeds of living things, or the Community of the Elements to be mixed into a compound, or the abstraction of Matter from the Elements, whence this Phrase to be educed out of the power of Matter signifies Matter out of its aptitude to many, to be determined, by the operation of Nature or Art to one certain thing; through a motion from confusion to distinctness: and not to be, as it were, infused, with a dependence from the subject, as this Anti-Peripatetick fancies out of I know not what Dreamers. For, there are none of these trifles extant in Aristotle. Tenth Plea Maintains certain Definitions and Arguings. 1. NExt they shoot at two of Aristotle's Definitions, either of them most exact, and as clear as can be, to those that understand any thing in his way. The first is the Definition of Light, in these words, Light is the act of a prespicuous thing: which seems obscure to this race of people, because the use of the Word Act is framed by Philosophers, and not taken from Tully, or found in Calipine. Let them know, therefore, that Act is derived from Agere, to do, or Agi, to be done, or the Participle Actum, done; and used by Philosophers for that, by which what was intended by the Agent at the end of his Action is termed or demonstrated donc. In Greek, perhaps, 'tis more elegantly called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as it were, the Operation of the Causes, taking the Operation, not for the Flux of the Action, but, for that which remains introduced by the Operation, which is such a Flux. But, because our language affords not a proper word correspondent to the term, Act; our Sterling Philosopher is all in choler against Aristotle. For, if he had put but ordinary words, instead of terms of Art, saying, Light is a certain perfection of a body, that has this in its Nature, to let coloured things appear through it, making them de facto appear through it; as we experience Objects are seen through illuminated Air, which are not seen through it darkened: what had he found worth making such a wide mouth over? Now because he has spoken most neatly and briefly, poor Aristotle smarts for it. 2. The other Definition has the same fault. The Definition is this, Motion is the Act of a thing in power, as in power. For, since a thing is said to be in power, to that it may be brought to by Motion; for example; One that's sick, to Health; Wood, to firing, or to be fire: 'tis plain, that Motion is that perfection, or act with which the subject is affected whilst 'tis yet in power, or, till the sick person be in health, or the Wood be fire; as in power, or in that state by which it may attain the intended perfection. Behold here a most clear and learned Definition, and subject to no other reproach than a certain umbrage, from a ridiculous story concerning the Greek term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which I believe framed by the Philosopher to express his intention emphatically. The story's this; That a Critic, I know not who, went to one Ciccus, esteemed a Magician (I imagine, because he wrote of Magic) to inquire of the Devil what was the meaning of that word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Aristotle; and returned as wise as he went, and mocked at by the Oracle. That it may appear then what a Dunce Devil our Philosophers have consulted; lte them take notice that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a word made up of three, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, with the addition of a feminine termination, which is proper for signifying Abstractions: and so signifies the Manner the subject of Motion is found in at the end of the action; which is the very same thing with the term Act, as 'tis explicated above. 3. In his seventeenth Chapter there is a new Calumny forged against Aristotle; the more unworthily, in that he; above the rest, has endeavoured at clearness. His Philosophy is accused to be litigious, and through the wavering use of his Terms, confused and obscure. This accusation is found guilty of a double Ignorance: One, of what Aristotle's use is; for he's the carefullest that ever writ, to distinguish and form the significations of his Terms: The other is, that he takes Sceptics for Peripatetics. And, that the Sceptics endeavours are the vainest that can be, I easily grant; that they little trouble themselves about fixing the use of their words, to be left more at liberty to sell any trifles they list for Vanity or profits sake; that they are petty Orators, or rather janglers, not Philosophers; that they take upon them the name of Aristotelians, to corrupt Youth and draw Disciples after them. I deny not that these are to be shunned like the Plaigue, by all pursuers of Science; nor is any thing of solidity to be expected from them: this one thing puts me out of patience, that Persons, otherwise ingenious and desirous of knowledge, should be averted by these Cheats, not only from true Science, but from all hope of ever gaining any, in the things most necessary to human life. 4. They back their feigned Plea against the Philosopher out of his own Words and Actions. Their first crack is upon that saying of his, that his Books of Physics were so published, that they were not made public. The sense whereof was, that the Matter or Subject handled in them is so abstracted, that, without the assistance of an experienced Master, they could not be understood by those unused to his way; which we see hold to this day: For, scarce any one comprehends those Books, unless aided by the old Commentators. Whence our Moderns, for the most part, are quite besides the Cushion as to Aristotle's meaning; though he himself has spoken, as clearly as possible the brevity He prefixed to himself could bear. The next Calumny is grosser and more luckless; that those things which he has collected, to furnish Logical Disputants, and perfect the Act of Disputing previously to giving Judgement, should be applied to his Method of Demonstrating, and to his practice not in disputing but defining. For, as, in Plays, 'tis a commendation to entangle the story, that it may come off at last with greater admiration: So, 'tis the task of the Inquirer to confound the Question, with proposing Difficulties before it, that the Demonstrator may clearly Vnidicate it, and, as it were, dispelling the clouds, restore it to Light. 5. This Plea required Instances out of that work of his. The Author presses three: Upon Gassendus' credit, I believe, or some other slight Looker's into it; for, in the Book itself there's nothing to be seen: The first runs thus. He proves the World to be perfect, because it consists of Bodies; that Bodies are perfect, because they consist of a triple dimension; that a triple dimensions is, therefore, perfect, because consisting of three; and that three is perfect, because two we call both, and never say all till we come to three. Look into his First book De Coelo, Chap. 1. You shall find these last words make no part of the Demonstration, but are additional only: and that the Demonstration, itself is this; Because the World consists of Bodies, the perfection of the World is to be perfect in the Notion of Body. Now, the perfection of Body lies in this, that it be spread every way upon three prependiculars, as the Geometricians demonstrate. And thus are both the several Bodies, and the World; but in a divers manner; For the several Bodies are terminated each to others; whence, though they are spread according to all the lines, yet not to the whole, or utmost extent of them. But, because there is no space beyond or without the World (as 'tis demonstrated in the fourth of his Physics), the World is spread according to all and the whole lines, or, perfectly every way; and by consequence, must be said perfect in the Notion of Body, and, so, absolutely. 6. The second Instance is, that Aristotle asserts, were there more Worlds, the Moon would fall down upon the Earth. This consequence the Arguer thinks sprung from such a fancy as theirs, that fear the Antipodes should drop into Heaven. But, he reflects not how great pains the Philosopher took to establish the Centre of the World in the Earth: Which granted, this consequence would depend not from fancy but reason, as himself seems to confess. 7. The third Instance, too (drawn out of lib. 2. cap. 5. De Coelo. Is utterly perverted. For, Aristotle teaches not, that the heavens are, therefore, carried towards the West, because the West is the Nobler, (as the Argument makes it); but, that the West is the Nobler, because the heavens are carried towards it. Now, there's this difference betwixt the two; that in the former Method, 'tis assumed without proof, that the West is the Nobler; in the later, it follows out of those things which Aristotle had concluded; viz. That there's nothing Accidental in Eternal Things; and, by consequence, that the Motion towards the West is Natural to the heavens; and Natural Motion is to the more honourable: whence it clearly follows, that the West is Nobler than the East. It follows, I say; for, if the Principles were true, 'twere a Noble Demonstration. Eleventh Plea Refutes some Topics babbled against Science. 1. ABout the end of the Chapter he expresses indignation, that the learned so employ all their pains upon Logic, Physic, and Metaphysic; that the Sciences, usefuller to human life, viz. concerning the heavens, Meteors, Fossils', and Animals, but especially Politics and Economics, are much neglected. Nor can I deny that these are neglected in the Schools: but, what's guilty on't, but the Scepticism that reigns there? For, if the Sciences were taught in Aristotle's Method, there would be room enough for all; nor would nature be taunted with the usual calumny, that Man's life is too short for the Arts: But, the necessary ones once known, there would advance still a surplusage of leisure, to take abundantly, in any of these Sciences, that delight which human Curiosity should be drawn to. But, they are the Sceptics that envy this happiness to men; confounding all things with endless contests; especially those common truths which Aristotle has demonstrated: such as are Formal Divisibility, that what ever is moved is moved by another, that a Continuum or Bulk is divisible in infinitum, that there's no vacuum: and such like; without the owning whereof before hand, 'tis in vain to make Experiments for acquiring Science: Since, they will all come at length to be resolved into these Principles; or else there will be ever a straining after Science unproffitably, without any Principles at all. 2. In his eighteenth Chapter, he reproves the Peripatetical Doctrine as insufficient to solve Phaenomena's. But, this he does out of Error or Spleen: For, if he takes the Doctrine of our Modern Philosophical Apes to be Aristotle's own, he's strangely in an error; but, if he denies Aristotle to have taken pains to solve Problem's, he'll be shown guilty of Injustice by all his Books of Natural Philosophy, those especially which usually follow his eight Books. Which of the Moderns has more happily unboweled Nature than Digby, who at every turn is mindful of Aristotle, and candidly accepts his Dictates? The Adversary urges that the Systeme of Heaven is mis-contrived by Aristotle. Open the accusation, you'll find the sum and very knot of it to be, that Aristotle had not an Optic Table: else supposing those Phaenomenas' of the Sun, which enlightened Aristotle's Age, his Discourse, in his Books De Coelo, merits all admiration. That the Intelligences are the Movers of the Heaven is Christian Doctrine. That there is a certain Fire swimming upon our Air is nothing else but Cartes's Ether, or a kind of rarer Element embracing the convex of our sky. If Aristotle has erred in a very few things; why, yet, so much anger? shall we not allow Philosophy its growing time? If, yet, he may be said to Err, and not rather ingeniously, and ingeniously to propose, who professes he conjectures, not Demonstrates; as Aristotle does in his Books De Coelo. 3. His ninteenth Chapter inveighs against Aristotle's Doctrine as unfruitful and barren; but, weakly and falsely. Weakly, because all the inventions he speaks of belong to Artificers and Handy-craft-Men; not Philosophers, whose office 'tis to make use of Experiments for Science, not to make them. Falsely, because Aristotle's way of Doctrine being about Common Notions, without which there's no comprehending Particulars; nothing is truly invented without it. ay, but they are Generals that are found in Aristotle. It must be replied, that he and his Disciples deserve thanks for devulging them, and fixing a step to climb thence farther and higher. But, (if my Divination fails me not) I see, were Aristotle's Principles plucked up, Philosophy unable to give an Account of ordinary Effects. I'm sure, the Philosophy which admits Vacuities is reducible to no Rules for acting: And Cartes's Vortices, I shrewdly suspect no way serviceable to invention. Concerning his Tenets, which savour of impiety, we have spoken before. For his contradictions, the places are not cited: but, whoever is skilled in Aristotle knows, he uses to draw Examples out of others Books and vulgar sayings; and that nothing is to be esteemed his own, which falls not into the Course of his Doctrine. Whence, 'tis no hard matter to find contrary Opinions in his works: but, those things alone are to be ascribed to him, which either are asserted in their proper places, or brought by him for confirmation of his known Tenets. 4. The twentieth Chapter renders manifest the eminence of Peripateticism above all other Methods, by its very impugnation of it. For, it assumes, it cannot be known that one thing is Cause of another, otherwise than because they are found together: which we deny not to be an occasion of suspecting, but no Argument of Causality; for, if nothing else be clear, 'twill be still-unknown, which of the too is the Cause, which Effect. But, the Peripatetics conclude not A. to be the cause of B. till, defining both, they find, out of their very Definitions, that A cannot be, but it must follow out of its intrinsecals that B is. For example, a Peripaterick collects that Fire is the Cause of Heat; because Heat is nothing else but Atoms flowing from Fire: and on the other side, he knows that Fire cannot exist, but it must send out such particles. Cartes's paradox, of Light and the Sun, is just as if we should expect the Skies falling to catch Larks. That wonderfully ingenious Man is so celestial, that he has not so much as Sand to found his structures on. Peripatetics choose rather to collect a few Certainties, acknowledging a Multitude of uncertainties, than, grasping at all, to hold nothing. Sure I am, none more largely pretends Demonstration, than des Cartes: So that, nothing is more unseemly than for his adorers to profess Scepticism. 5. Not a jot stronger, to establish the impossibility of Science, is the argument from the variety of Opinions amongst those that are called Philosophers. For first, it must be evident that they are Philosophers: before their judgements deserve esteem in Philosophical matters. Do they profess to Demonstrate? Do they model their Books in Euclid's Method? Do they interweave Definitions with self-known truths? And admit no other for proof? All which may be observed in Aristotle and his ancient interpreters, though not expressed in Euclids form. These things if they do, either they are not rational, or all will be of the same mind; as Geometricians are. If they neglect these, 'tis not a pin matter for their judgements in Philosophy. Our Author tells a story of the power of Fancy, which I doubt is imperfect: For, it seems, he would have one Man be able to order another's thoughts without ever acting by his senses or Fancy: Since, he relates, that one compelled others, absent from him, to think and speak what he pleased. For, though I allow Men to have a very large power over Animals, by the help of their Fancies; for example, to tame or enrage them, by means of sounds or showing them figures; perhaps, too, to strike them sick or cure them, and such like: Yet, that the Fancy should be moved to those things, which move it not by any sense, 'tis hard to believe. For all that, I do not altogether deny the Motion made upon the sense to be every way like, and Univocal to that which is in the mind; and, when it happens, to be derived rather from the vehemency of the affection, than the pure Motion of the Fancies impressing it. 6. In this twenty first Chapter, he divines of Future Science; particularly, of some not-yet discovered manners of acting at distance: which I'll rather await, than discuss or hope for. About the end of the Chapter, he assumes, that nothing can be known, unless it be resolved into the first Causes. Whence, he should have seen clearly that the First Causes, and Metaphysics, which treats of them, is most known of all to Nature, or next to our first knowledges: And that Naturalists strive in vain, who negotiate much about the particulars of Nature; and comprehend nothing through their ignorance of Metaphysic. Take for example the stir about Vacuum; which Metaphysics declare as impossible, as for nothing to be a thing: about the spring of Rarity and Density; which the Metaphysician most palpably demonstrates is out of, or, extrinsical to the things that are Rare and Dense, and many such like; whose truth those that essay by Experiments, but without the light of Metaphysic, shall find an endless work on't. Metaphysical Principles must be taken from Aristotle, not des Cartes, though a Person of most eminent Wit. For, Aristotle, by contemplation, formed into method those things which he found engrafted in nature: Des Cartes, in his Physical principles (as if he meant to prescribe the Creator an Idea) designs in the Air and in the Concave of the Moon, as they say, what himself thought was to be done, according to Art. From which kind of Fabric there's no benefit to be hoped for by the Reader. 7. The next Chapter is sick of that error, which Aristotle has very often detected and confuted; viz. that nothing is known unless it be perfectly known: for example, that we know not God is, unless we see him, that any Man cannot make use, and be sure of that Cartes's first-known thing or Object of knowledge, I think, therefore I am, unless he comprehends the all things of that I; so, as to know the Nature of his Matter and Form, the Number of his Elements and Members, and the Causes and Motion by which he was begotten, and in short, whatever is connected with him. Which is clearly to profess, he knows not the question in hand: For, none of the Dogmatizers either arrogates to himself or hopes for so perfect a knowledge. 'Tis a piece of the same heedlessness, not to know that all that see a white wall have the same apprehension of whiteness, though their several sensations vary the degree and perfection of it. Whence, our Author had done more prudently to have sat down in silence, and pardoned the affecters of Science their error; than, by merely Topical and Delusory Reasons, to have averted minds, born to excellent things, from the first desire of Nature, and gathering fruit, at least, in some degree; according to that of the moral Poet, Though you of Glycons' mighty limbs despair, Do not to keep away the Gout forbear. 8. For all that, our Academic makes no scruple, in general, to lay all kind of mischief to those that proceed dogmatically, such Art (as the Philosophers says) it requires to find a mean. First he asserts this Method is the Daughter of ignorance? who would have looked for this brand from a Sceptic? you that profess yourselves to know nothing, do you object ignorance to others? Quis tulerit Gracchos de seditione querentes? Next, he calls it the Inmate of untamed affections: upon what title? for, if there be any Science, that will The peaceful Temples keep well fortified, Built by the Sages Doctrine.— You that profess you know not whether there be any or no; how rashly do you affirm it to dwell always with untamed affections? since, if there be none, it dwells no where. The third inconvenience of Dogmatizing is, that it stirs men up to controversies. The rising Sun seems to me guilty of the very same Crime, in disturbin the Slugabeds, and summoning every one to their work: For, such a kind of fault it is, to inculcate Truth to those that live in ignorance and error. A fourth crime is, that one who adheres to any Science, lays ignorance to the charge of those that know not his demonstration. I cannot deny it; For, 'tis the Nature and Title of light to reproach those things, as dark, which admit not its beams. But, herein the Demonstrators are modester than the Sceptics, that, at least, they except some, and speak well of Nature; whom, with all her Children, the Sceptics condemn to the Dungeon of Darkness for ever. 9 Like this is the next, that the confidence of Science in error bars the Gates against the liberty to get possession of truth. How blindly does the Sceptic dispute these things? who freely owns that truth is no where, which men might have the liberty to get possession of. He concludes at last, the Dogmatizer has a petty and enthralled Soul. So strangely things are nicknamed that are unknown! For, 'tis Science's part to dilate the Soul, and render it capable of great things: and this the pleasure of one that knows, to look down on Sceptics as all in a tumult below, and Lucret. See them at a loss at every turn, And breathless hunting out the way of life. Which to make one's life and Task is the miserablest of all things, and an utter casting off Rationality; and the whole felicity Humanity affords. These things, as they are all most true, and scarce deniable, even by a Sceptic, to follow out of the possibility of Demonstration, that is, if there be any Rational Nature, yet I would not have them so asserted, as to Patronise palliated Sceptics, who admit, indeed, that there is such a thing as some both Physical and Metaphysical Science, in common; but neither tend to it by any legitimate Method, nor own any thing, in particular, demonstrated: and yet, by the press of the Herd, in a society, thrusting one another on, and by loads of Scribblers, they most absurdly fly at and arrogate to themselves the highest degree of Doctorship, and the top of Sciences and name of Wisdom. The Father of Nature grant Mankind may at length be eased of this Yoke; which galls the necks of the Sons of Adam: and, that the studious of truth may understand it alike dangerous to think every thing and nothing is demonstrated. FINIS.