The GROUNDS OF OBEDIENCE AND GOVERNMENT.  
BY Thomas White, Gentleman.  
Salus populi, suprema lex esto.  Tullius de legibus, lib. 3. 
LONDON, Printed by J. Flesher, for Laurence Chapman next door to the Fountain Tavern in the Strand. 1655.   

TO My most honoured, and best Friend, Sir KENELME DIGBY.  
Sir,  
THe many attempts you have this long time made upon me, to declare a point of Philosophy, wherein partly I was ignorant, and partly loath to meddle (being mindful of the poet's admonition, Incedis per ignes suppositos cineri doloso) have at the last beaten out of my resistance, this little spark of fire, or rather light; borne by the author's intention, to shine, not to burn. For, having by experience of many our debates upon single points, found that such skirmishes were not like to gain the victory of satisfaction upon your so solid understanding; I saw myself forced to lay before your eyes, in one platform or design, the most intimate and bottom principles of Obedience and government. The which, I have strived to do in the most short and summary manner I was able: not willing to be overcurious in so awful a subject. I play therefore the pure Philosopher. I deliver the abstract notions only: leaving to the prudence of particulars, to draw such consequences, as every ones circumstances shall make necessary and evident unto him by the short hints I give. And as for yourself, I doubt not but my time is well employed. As for others, I fear the fortune of my other Writings, may prove constant also to this; that it will find, those who read it not, or who cannot judge of it, severe Censurers: and those who like it, fearful to oppose so loud and clamorous a multitude; or at least, ston with the adverse noise. But for this, let the eternal Providence care. To me such clamours will be no novelties: But the content of having given you satisfaction, an abundant reward of the endeavours of  
Sir, Your true friend, and most obliged Servant, THOMAS WHITE.   

The CONTENTS.  

GRound 1. Wherein consists the Perfection of government. Pag. 1  
Ground 2. That the Nature of Man reacheth not to the Perfection of government. p. 9  
Ground 3. That a rational belief is necessary to human Action. p. 12  
Ground 4. Of the virtue of Obedience, and wherein it consists. p. 19  
Ground 5. That Fidelity is different from Obedience; and in what it consisteth. p. 27  
Ground 6. In what consists Right or Due. p. 34  
Ground 7. Why men desire to live in Community; and of the necessity of government. p. 40  
Ground 8. Of the Authority given to an absolute governor; and of under-sorts of government. p. 48  
Ground 9 Of Slavery and the lawfulness of it. p. 53  
Ground 10. Why a man is to hazard himself for the common good. p. 67  
Ground 11. The Quality and rational power of a supreme governor. p. 78  
Ground 12. Who is such a governor, and the Subjects duty towards him. p. 94  
Ground 13. Of the Qualities of laws and Commands, in respect to Obedience. p. 101  
Ground 14. In what conditions the Subject may resist government. p. 109  
Ground 15. Wherein consists the power and liberty of the Subject. p. 120  
Ground 16. Of the dispossession of a supreme former governor, and of his right. p. 131  
Ground 17. Of a supreme governor dispossessed. p. 144  
Ground 18. The Objection of Divines answered. p. 158  
Ground 19 The Authority of Lawyers insufficient in this Question. p. 172    

THE GROUNDS OF OBEDIENCE And GOVERNMENT.  

The first GROUND.  
Wherein consists the Perfection of Government.  
XEnophon, in his excellent book of the instruction of Cyrus, moves this Question, Why, of all other living Creatures, which are of different Natures from Man, we easily attain to the mastery and rule; but few men are so intelligent as to be fit to govern Men; and those few are the highest and worthiest part of Mankind? But, to me, the very Question seems to bear the solution in its own bowels. For, when one asks, why Man is hard to be governed since he governs other Creatures; he asks, why one, who hath the power to rule others, is himself so difficult to be Mastered: and the answer is, because the powers, by which he reduceth others to his obedience, makes him apter to resist them who seek the conquest of himself; and so renders it a higher task to wield and manage him, than those Creatures which he hath power over.  
For, we need not look into Philosophy, nor study learned books, to know that the nature of Man is inclined to have its own will, and casteth all things which are under his consideration to compass and effect it: as also, that every ordinary man's knowledge and consideration is far beyond any we find in other living Creatures; and, by consequence, is far less easily masterable than any of them.  
Whence we may plainly collect, that were it possible for a governor to make every single person in his Dominion particularly understand, that what was ordered by the government was his own truest interest; such an one would be the most absolute and perfect governor; and infallibly would find the charge of governing most easy and sweet, as well to himself as to his Subjects.  
This Case is clear both in Reason and in Experience. Reason showeth us, that to draw any thing to Action, according to its own fitness and inclination, is both easier to the attempter, and makes the action itself more efficaciously and throughly performed. He that will drive a wedge into a hard piece of wood, strives, as far as the situation gives him leave, to make his hammer fall downwards, because a weight hath, of itself, an inclination that way, and so both the impression is stronger and the arm less strained, knocking and the very fall of a weight increasing by motion downwards: Therefore blacksmithes, whose continual labour is to use the hammer, lay their iron upon their anvil, that is, in such a situation below their heads, as is most fitting to gain the best advantage of the descent of their hammers, which they first raise to give them scope of a descent.  
Upon this principle it is, That they who tutor dogs, Horses, Elephants and Hawks, knowing the ordinary attractive of Beasts to be meat and some kind of Flattery, make them understand, to the proportion of their capacity, that to do the action they breed them for, gains them food; to which they join also certain motions of stroking and gentle words, that make an impression in the Beast of its own excellency, and that it pleaseth its master. In like manner, to deter them from certain actions, cudgels, whips, and harsh words are used; which have a notabler efficacy than one would easily imagine, if he saw it not by experience.  
This, now, being applied to Mankind, drives the effect home. For Man, being a rational creature, (whose inclination it is to work according to knowledge) desires to know that the work prescribed him is good, that is, good for him, or his good. And because if two actions be proposed, whereof the one is better for him then the other, the less good action deprives him of some good which the more good had brought him; his inclination leads him to do the better, and by consequence to know and dispute which is the better; which is as much as to choose betwixt them; and this we call being free, or having natural Liberty to do one and not the other. So that, the Nature of Man is to be free; and to act what ever he does, because it seems to him the best.  
Whence it is evidently concluded, that the perfectest way and most connatural for governing men is, by making them determine themselves to their actions, and to proceed freely, and act, as it were, by their own inclinations. This if the governor can effect, he shall find both his intent generally performed, because the Subject proceedeth with much affection and courage; and seldom or never will his Commands be resisted, or their obedience repented: For, men are not wont to repine often at what themselves choose and judge best for themselves; especially if, even after the action performed and peradventure the attempt failed, yet the Subject remains satisfied, that it was best for him, in those circumstances, to do what he did: Now, if the reasons were solid when the governor proposed them, such must of necessity be, for the most part, the sequel.  
Experience maketh this same as manifest as Reason concludeth it. What Mother or Nurse doth not seek to persuade and win the yet sucking child with gay things, with Flattery and such demonstrations of Love (that is, of the child's good) as the child is capable of? What Master or Father draweth not his boys to school and sitting exercises, by promises and proposals of good, as play, goodcheere, fine clothes, and any other toys suitable to their tempers? The stronger ages have stronger Motives; as, of Honour, Lands, Offices, and the like: by which we see the most part of men led, not only to Labour, but even to hazard their lives and those very goods which are proposed them for motives of their actions.  
On the contrary side, how ill do those enterprises thrive, where the Actors conceive themselves either not concerned or wronged? How diligently are excuses sought out and easily found, and every cause of delay judged sufficient? How readily (if the actors be in great multitudes (as Soldiers or scholars) do seditions and mutinies spring up, and all disorders grow bold and spread themselves, the Commander of the action hated and esteemed an oppressor and a Tyrant, his Officers scorned and disobeyed?  
This then is, of all hands, concluded, that the proper and natural way of government is, by making the obeyer understand that it is his own profit which the action aims at; so to make him work out of the inclination of his own will, and the dictamen of his own understanding.   

The Second GROUND.  
That the Nature of Man reacheth not to the perfection of government.  
NOtwithstanding this inclination be so natural to us, yet Nature is not able to make it perfect in most both persons and actions. Children are not come to the ability of judging; some others are so gross of capacity, they cannot be brought to understand their own good, at least in that time and circumstances which Nature hath provided them; Most spend so much of their day in some one business, which they have chosen either for their livelihood or pastime, that they have not sufficient leisure to attain the Knowledge necessary for other occurrences of their life: Even the greatest Wits are not capable to understand the nature of all things necessary to their own private conditions. The Prince himself must trust the Physician, the Lawyer, the Mariner, the Soldier, the Merchant, the Cook, the Brewer, the Baker, and divers other Trades and Knowledges, which he hath no possibility to understand so perfectly as to be a Master in them.  
Nevertheless, Nature doth not recede wholly from her Principle, in thus subjecting one man's understanding to another's, and the greater most times to the lesser. For it doth not this, otherwise then by making the party subjected see, it is his own good to trust another's skill. Wherefore, it is true, that he follows his own inclination, and is ruled by his own understanding; and so governs himself; only, he is a degree higher, not busying his thoughts about the particular work, but only about choosing the master of the work, or about his own submission, that is, his own action, as he is a man, and his action as that of a man, and not of a Physician or Pilot, or such other particular discipline or Quality. It remains therefore still that he is free, and Master of his own action and the commanding part of it.   

The Third GROUND.  
That a rational belief is necessary to human Action.  
OF those things to whose knowledge we cannot ourselves arrive, but must rely on the credit of others, there are two kinds; some purely to be believed, others to be also acted. As, when we inform ourselves of what passed in some foreign Country, or of the nature of Trees or Beasts we never have use of; we are barely to assent to what is delivered: But, when a Physician telleth us we must take a Purge or keep such a diet; we do not only believe him but act according to our belief. Now, though in truth this second sort belongeth properly to our discourse apart, because the nature of pure belief is intrinsically included in it, as a part in the whole; yet we must first note the errors to be avoided in a mere speculative assent: And these are two; one of defect, and one of excess.  
The vice by defect, warns you to believe no thing but what yourself understand, that is, indeed to believe nothing at all. But, were these men bound to their own Law, that they should take no physic till they knew it would do them good, at least as well as the Physician doth; nor trust their cause to a Lawyer till they understood the subtleties as perfectly as he; and so in other vocations; I doubt they would have neither health nor wealth for Physician or Lawyer to work upon.  
But, because those who advance this proposition are persons of wit, I must not think they stumble at so notorious a block: Therefore, their meaning is only, that we ought not to believe, but what we are able to understand if we had will and leisure to study. But, even so explicated, it is a most wilful proposition, reason being quite on the opposite side: For, let the Authority which denounceth me a Truth, be sufficient to make it credible, and overvalue the mysteriousness of the object; and the higher it is above my knowledge, the more necessity there is of believing it. What is but a little above me, I may easily come to know; and so need not believe but take pains and see it: belief is ordained for Truths whose direct and immediate evidence we cannot compass; and therefore is more proper, more due, more requisite for such as are above our knowledge.  
But, peradventure these smart persons do suppose that all things which have a possibility to be known, are the subject of man's wit; and so take these two to signify the same sense, that the object is such as we are able to understand, and that it is understandable, or doth not couch a contradiction in its terms: and peradventure conceive themselves able to show contradiction in whatever they refuse to believe. If this be their meaning, the maxim they go upon is safe; but they must be very careful not to subsume or apply it to particular instances without much consideration: For, ordinarily, the authority is very great which by understanding men, is alleged for remote and high truths; and so is dangerously neglected, without an exact perusal and anatomy of the truths maintained by it.  
There are others so prodigal of our natural endowments, that they will teach us a kind of contempt of reason and understanding. In a word, their position is, That, though you be certain the proposition made (for aught you know) is false, nevertheless, you may and aught to think it true: which how to excuse, from being an irrational act and a pure folly, is beyond my skill; at the same time to be assured it is uncertain, and to hold it for certain is, to me, an impossibility. Do I not hold that which I am certain of? that is, that this truth is uncertain? How then can I hold it is certain? Put this in the mouth of a witness in any Court of Justice, and teach him that, though he know certainly he doth not perfectly remember whether he saw the man killed, yet he may swear he saw it; what Justice will remain uncorrupted?  
Passion and Precipitation may prevail with us, to judge that clear and evident which is not so, and carry us to believe and affirm it; but that reason should make us believe what it telleth us it seeth no ground for, or not sufficient, is to me, an assertion the most unworthy, the most contrary to reason, and the most biased by interest that can be imagined. If our nature be rational, if all our actions should be conformable to our nature, and governed by reason; there cannot be a more pernicious proposition, then to tell us we must assent, when there is no proportioned motive think we ought to assent.  
Thus much I thought fit to say concerning the errors of belief in speculation; because belief in practical things, and which concerns our actions, depends of it, and includes it, and is, in part, regulated by the same rules. The believing of practical things begins to trench upon the subject of our main discourse: for it is the first and most simple or uncomposed degree of government and obedience, and so the very roots of both are dependent from and to be discovered out of it.  
For, we experience by our ordinary apprehensions, that we esteem a Physician, a Lawyer, a schoolmaster ought to be obeyed, though we do not acknowledge in them the power of a Lord or Magistrate. And so we say, the scholar will never profit, because he will not do what his Master would have him: The client loseth his cause, because he would not obey his counsel: The Patient recovers not, because he followeth not the advice of his Physician. And though we do not say the doctor or counsellor commands his Patient or Client, yet, if we look into it, he both rewardeth and punisheth, which are the concomitants of commanding. For who obeyeth is rewarded with learning, health, and prosperity, and who disobeyeth is punished with Ignorance, sickness, and losses.   

The Fourth GROUND.  
Of the virtue of obedience, and wherein it consists.  
OUt of this we may easily understand what nature intends by the virtue of obedience, and what are the limits and laws of it. For it is plain, the immediate end is that our works and all that concerns us may be well done, even as to those things wherein ourselves have no skill, or not enough, and the more remote end to be achieved by this is, that our life may be good and happy, and the end of Nature arrived to by us. The conditions likewise are clear: First, that the matter of our action be such as ourselves are not sufficiently skilful in; the second, that our Commander be a master in that art; the third, that he be a good and honourable person, in whom we may rest confidently he will deal with us conformably to his skill, and not wilfully or for his own pleasure, or interest, do any thing against our good and profit.  
If the first be wanting, we also ourselves are wanting to ourselves; for Nature hath endowed us with reason to provide for our own good by this power: again, it is nonsense and folly to expect another man should be more careful of our good, than ourselves: And suppose it were so, it were either our fault or his, and for aught to be mended on one side; our fault if we be not so solicitous as we ought to be, that is, as much as the weight of the affair requires; His if he be more solicitous of our good than the same demandeth, and so he who professeth such a care may be feared to be a busy fellow, and one who aims at his own profit under colour of love, unless it be in an evident neglect of ours, which cannot well be imagined of one who is ready to obey another.  
If the second condition be wanting, there can be no virtue in obedience, since it will nothing mend but rather impair our life, and to the import of that action, destroy our pretence to happiness, to submit ourselves to one who hath no more skill than we, nor can be rationally supposed to bear us more love and care, or that he will or aught to employ himself in our particular business more attentively than we ourselves.  
As for the last condition, without it obedience is a plain precipitation of ourselves into misguidance and absolute ruin, and therefore a pernicious & wicked practice.  
By this discourse we may understand, it is a fallacious principle, though maintained by many, that obedience is one of the most eminent virtues, and that it is the greatest sacrifice we can offer to God, to renounce our own wills, because our will is the chiefest good we have. For, not denying that obedience is a great virtue; it being, truly in itself, the affection to moderate the pride of our understanding, which is subject to make us think too well of our own opinions without having evidence of the truth of them, and so hinder us from candidly seeing and acknowledging the truth (an inclination of all others most deeply rooted in our nature, and both most hard to be conquered, and most pernicious to be followed) and therefore, the virtue which tempers and moderates this passion must needs be very excellent: yet I cannot give it so high a rank, as to prefer it before all.  
For, I see it is only a virtue in case of imperfection, as Penance and some others are; it being grounded on this, that a man is ignorant in those matters wherein he ought to be obedient. But, the reason displeases me more than the conclusion: For what signifieth this, that it is the greatest good we have and can renounce for God's sake? If it be a great good, it is no vice, no excess, but a natural power or exercise of a power given us by Almighty God; and then would I know, why to renounce such a thing is pleasing to him. Can we think it were pleasing to God for any one to bind up his arms or legs, or cut off his hands, pretending to do it for his sake? He that made them gave them us to use; and there by commanded us to use them according to the manner intended by nature; and, if we do not so, we offend him.  
There is a story of Origen, that he exsected his virility, thinking to Please God; but the same story saith, he was reproved by the whole Church, and excommunicated for the fact: Simeon Styletes is reported to have chained himself upon a hill, that he might not go thence; but he was taught that such impotency was fit for beasts, not men. So that, to renounce any natural faculty or the legitimate and fitting use of it, under pretence of pleasing God, is a folly, not a virtue.  
But, let us see what power it is that we must renounce; our Will: and this word doth not, in this place, signify any interessed affection or malicious resolution; but that will which followeth and is guided by our understanding, and that truth which God hath made us capable of: Therefore the renouncing of this will, is, withal, the renouncing of our understanding; that is, of our wits and manhood; so that it is in effect to renounce our rationality, and that by which we are the image of God. If any man should take a fancy to go upon all four like a beast, or subject himself to be led in a string like a bear about the country; would not all wise men cry out on him for bestiality, and think him unworthy the conversation of men? How much greater is the indignity of him who permitteth himself to be carried in his whole course of life, and those actions that most concern him without using that wit or understanding which he hath, and by the sole direction of another?  
He can be accounted so far no better than a clock or watch, which tells the hour by the wit and industry of the maker, not by any sense or worth of its own. If therefore, to renounce our wills for God's sake be to be accounted a sacrifice; as far as my understanding reacheth, it is no other than that the Scripture expresseth upon another occasion, to wit, one by which the sons are sacrificed to the father, the image of God defaced to the glory of him whose image he is.   

The Fifth GROUND.  
That Fidelity is different from Obedience; and in what it consisteth.  
BUt leaving this mistake of simple devotion; of which we needed not have spoken so much, had there not depended on it some matter of greater consequence (as the following discourse will manifest in its due place:) we are to take notice of an equivocation which may draw on some error if not prevented. We use to say serving-men and waiting-maids ought to be obedient to their Masters and Mistresses, whereas indeed, the virtue by which they serve is not that of obedience, but of fidelity and truth, which is manifest to him that looks into the nature of hirelings. For, none think a husbandman, who is hired to till or fence a piece of ground, obeyeth the hirer more than he that selleth a piece of cloth or other merchandise obeyeth the buyer, because he taketh his moneys; but they are said to contract and perform their part of the bargain faithfully and truly. So servants pay their duties, perform their bargains: and Fidelity is their proper virtue; to do it carefully, and uprightly; not Obedience.  
For, Obedience is in such actions as are the proper actions of the obeyer, which concern his life, and by which he may derive good if well done, and harm if amiss. Now in servants the good success pertaineth to the Master, the servant hath his livelihood and wages, whether the event go right or wrong, so he do what his Master commandeth. And hence it followeth, that neither aught he be ignorant in the action he doth, nor solicitous whether his Master be either skilful or honest: For, since what is done concerneth not him but his Master, his duty is to seek to do what he is commanded in the best way he can, without interessing himself about the success. This I say, as far as he is a servingman; but as he is also an honest man, it may belong to him to suggest to his Master what he thinks best; and, sometimes, when it lieth happily in his way, to help such errors of his Master as he can: without trenching on his Master's credit; still providing for his own indemnity: that he be not involved in his Masters either imprudence or iniquity; for by his bargain with his Master, he did not renounce the care of his own preservation.  
The reason of this equivocation is because we ordinarily call obeying the doing another man's will: and distinguish not how, sometimes, this is done with renouncing our own wills, which is in those actions whereof we are Masters, that is, our own actions; and, sometimes, without such renunciation, as in the actions which belong to others, in which we have no will to renounce. Now Obedience as it is a virtue especially attending on the renouncing of our wills, is properly confined to the former sense, not to the other; with which it only hath an alliance in the name, and which truly is Fidelity, as we have already declared.  
But, although Fidelity be a distinct virtue from Obedience, yet is it not such a stranger as not to demand a place in this Treatise: especially because the kind of Obedience we desire to look into, which is that by which commonwealths and Communities subsist, is founded generally on Fidelity or the matter thereof which we call promise, and in that virtue it binds to observance. After which discourse we shall be prepared to venture on the matter itself of government, and to our power, declare the force of it amongst men.  
Man therefore being by his nature and definition a reasonable, that is, an understanding Creature, or one whose primary and principal inclination is to truth or true knowledge; and the outward carriage and action of man being naturally proportionable to his inward substance; it is clear his chief property, by which he behaves himself outwardly like a man, is to speak truth, and to do as he sayeth, when his words have action following them. Hence it is, that though honesty (which in a courtlier term is called Honour, when applied to a rational carriage, and in a more spiritual language, Conscience) be extended to many other qualities, yet it is most frequently and principally expected in his keeping his word; in so much that though he have other faults, either spiritual or carnal, yet if he be true of his word, he, often and in ordinary conversation, passeth for an honest man.  
Again, this virtue of Truth is the principal and first engine of human conversation, and he that hath it not is unfit to be admitted to treat amongst men, but is to be rejected and banished from all Negotiation. Thus you see what engagement every one hath, both by nature and necessity of conversation, to stand upon his word or fidelity: For so we call the virtue by which we speak our mind in reference to action, and are constant to perform what we say.  
Yet, since malice is grown to such a height, all nations, who pretend to the fear of any Deity, have used to make men confirm their faith and promise by the invocation of the Deity they worship; hoping Religion may work in them what Nature is not strong enough to effect. This confirmation is performed in two sorts: One, when we only call God to witness; as when we say, God, who sees my heart, knows this to be truth, or that I mean as I speak: The other, when we pledge our trust in God for a security; as when we wish God may punish us, or never do us good, if we break our promise. And this is properly an execration, as the other an oath; yet both called oaths, and agree in this, that we pledge our belief and fear of God, to another, for his security.  
By which it is evident, that men generally esteem Religion the thing which should pierce deepest into a man's heart and affection; and the strongest Bond and tye of Faith and honesty; and that he, who setteth little by his Religion, hath neither honour nor honesty in him; or at least wanteth the greatest and strongest part of them, and that which ought to rivet in and fix the natural inclination which we have to truth and fidelity.   

The Sixth GROUND.  
In what consists Right or Due.  
THE next consideration may appear too metaphysical a subtlety for a moral treatise: yet such it is, that the ignorance of it is mother of many mistakes and quarrels. We ought therefore, to know that a man, considered in pure Nature, looks on all other things, Men and Beasts, and insensible creatures, as his subjects to work on; his only rule being Reason, which takes nothing to be good but what is good to himself; and makes the rule of his actions, to do what is fitting for him or conformable to his, that is, to a rational nature. By this rule he treats another Man, otherwise then a horse or a dog, and them otherwise then a tree or stone: For Reason is a faculty to use every thing suitably to their natures; as, to take a knife to cut, a horse to ride on, a man to read or write or be his counsellor. And this runs through all his actions.  
But as, though a tailor or Mariner govern himself by this rule, even when he playeth the tailor or Pilot, yet none can doubt but the rules of Taylorship or Steerage are different from this seeking his own good and applying all things to that end: So, neither can any justly doubt but the art of a Lawyer or counsellor is different from this principle which belongeth to all men.  
And to find out the difference, we are to reflect, that he who maketh a promise to another, so it be a perfect one (which we add to decline the question of what promises oblige, what not) puts himself and his promissory into a rank of agency and patiency, on a new score, to wit, that of fidelity and negotiating: So that now, not the nature of the two men, but their words, and what followeth out of them, ground their being active and passive. This power of activity is, in Latin, called Jus or Justum, in English, Right or Due.  
The difference of these two Arts is, One considers only what is noble, and manly, and Conscience; the other, what is according to promise and consent of parties. Whence we find, by the virtue of a promise, a new order grown amongst men following out of promise: Wherein three things are to be considered; The engagement of nature and honesty; The confirmation by oath; and lastly, This right and duty which ariseth from the promise: For, whoever promiseth, submits himself to his promissory, and becomes his Subject, as far as the contract reaches.  
The first mistake that springs from the ignorance of this difference is, the great noise we hear of the Law of Nature and the Law of Nations. For, we are made imagine that Nature hath bound us to certain laws, and not left us to the Liberty of Reason, where no pacts or agreements intervene: As, that men ought to give free Trade to leave the Seas open, to give immunities to ambassadors, and the like: For these either depend on custom and Consent, or are free for every man to dispose of, according to his own profit, necessity, or convenience of his affairs.  
It is true, there is an inclination in man, from reason, to do another any good I can without my own prejudice, and to have a desire to keep peace with all men: But if I do not, it follows not that I wrong him, even though I do him harm or seek his ruin; But I wrong myself, nature binding me to make my carriage to every one rational and becoming a man: For he is no otherwise to me then a piece of cloth or wood, which I cut and shape after my own will, fittingly for my use. And, on the contrary side, the party prejudiced or refused a Courtesy, gets no right over me to revenge himself: But Nature and Reason teaches him, peradventure, that it is good and prudent for him to hurt me, to prevent a greater mischief to himself; and he doth right to himself in harming me, because he doth an action rational and suitable to manhood.  
The different consequents of the two positions, will appear in this: That, if there be, in nature, radicated such an order of right and naturally just or due (as many hold) it is a thing that reason can never infringe nor can any thing justify what God hath showed us by example, and we see wise Politicians practise sometimes, when, without crime or offence offered, they make themselves Masters of convenient places: But, if there be no such right by Nature, than Reason is left Mistress to judge whether it be conformable to the nobility of man to do such an action or no.   

The Seventh GROUND.  
Why men desire to live in Community; and of the necessity of government.  
NOt to make the foundations or underground works bigger than our building; It is time to enter upon our pretended subject of government and Obedience, and examine what it is maketh government necessary to Mankind. And, because the government we look upon is that of a multitude; first it is fit to understand why men desire to live in flocks or multitudes. Neither can any who hath never so little skill in nature doubt, but, as pleasure masters and heads all our actions, so likewise doth it this of living in society.  
The first community is of Man and Wife. Who seeth not the power of pleasure in their mutual society? Aristotle, out of experience, teacheth us that we take pleasure in conversing with handsome persons. And if we consider pleasure to be nothing but the knowledge or sense of our being well or receiving some good; and, that the immediate cause of pleasure is the impression which some natural or apprehended good maketh of its own presence; and that good signifieth connatural or fitting for us; we shall perceive that handsomeness in our own kind must of necessity cause pleasure in us; the impression it makes by our eyes being of the features and colour due to the perfection of our Nature; a gracefulness, not only of gesture and voice, but even of wit and discourse being regularly the ground of the outward beauty. So that (if Nature hath not miscarried) all the parts and actions of a beautiful body are graceful to nature, and breed pleasure in others who enjoy them by conversation and, as it were, communication.  
This then is the first origine of meeting and living together; as, whosoever looks into experience will easily discover: For, he will find most men burdensome to themselves when they are alone, and to seek company to divert themselves, so to elude the length of time. I remember to have heard a Country fellow complain of the loss of a Dog which was stolen from him; and gave for his reason, that he was to travel a whole night alone, and the Dog would have been an excellent companion to him. Bees also, we know, love company. Horses not only labour, but even eat better amongst their fellows: and we often hear sickly stomachs thank those that visit them for the good meal they have made, as if the company helped down their meat. Pleasure therefore and Love is the first combiner of men into Society.  
The next is, that God and Nature have so managed mankind, that no one hath of himself, as much as he desireth; but regularly aboundeth in one kind of goods and wants some other which his neighbour hath: Hence, they mutually affect Society; to be accommodated with such necessaries, as they cannot have but by communication one with another.  
In the third place comes fear: for he that findeth himself stored with those things which he and others love, is subject to fear those whom he suspecteth able to bereave him of them; and so seeketh company of friends for protection. Nor doth any one fear to lose but what he affecteth to have; so that first love marcheth in the van, and fear followeth in the rear. Besides, it is against all generosity, and embases Nature itself, to set the Throne of fear above that of Love; and agreeth neither with Philosophy nor Morality.  
To make a step farther: Granting once men to be desirous to live together, and taking notice of the passions they are subject to, and how self-love corrupteth the judgement of almost all in their own case; it is evident they can never live in quiet and content, unless there be some way contrived of agreement, when passion stirreth contention. They must therefore, necessarily, give consent, to end their controversies by some means. And since reason is our nature; and every one's reason freer to see the truth in another's case then in his own; and a wise and good man fitter than a fool or knave, the most natural way for a multitude to live in peace is to have some man or men, accounted wise and good, chosen, to whose arbitrement all the rest ought to stand; the stronger part combining to force the weaker, in case of resistance; that is, the disinteressed part, which is the multitude, to force the interessed, which generally are but particulars if compared to the body of the people.  
Here you see the nature of government begin to appear. But, to make it perfect, we must farther consider, That many commodities are necessary to a multitude, which are to be furnished by common consent: That likewise there are many foreign enuiers' to a multitude which liveth handsomely and happily: And in conclusion, that to provide for goods and prevent evils in common, is a matter of so great weight and difficulty, that it takethup the whole life of one or more men; and by consequence, these businesses cannot be carried on by the whole body of the community, whose work and aim is to enjoy themselves to their proportion, in getting by their labour, those accommodations of human life, which they esteem necessary or conducing to their happiness. It solloweth therefore, they must entrust some more or fewer to take care of the common concernments.  
Such trusties are called governors, and the commnnity is said to obey them; and according to the principles forelaid, you see the people are supposed ignorant of what ought to be done for the public, this being a business requiring a man's whole time; which they neither can spare, nor do desire to employ in this: way: You see they entrust others in whose prudence and goodness they confide; and themselves execute what their trusties think fitting, either by practising when they are commanded, or giving a sufficient force to their governors to master such restif parties as will not obey: In conclusion, you see government is, naturally, a power or right of directing the common affairs of a multitude, by a voluntary submission of the communities wills to the will of the governors; whom they trust, upon opinion that they are understanding and honest, and will administer the Commonalty by the rules of wisdom and goodness, as is most convenient and advantageous for the people.  
It seems to me no moderate and discreet person can doubt but a government so ordered is both necessary and connatural to a rational multitude, and, in a word, such as human nature requires; and is the best, if not the only, that suits to the disposition of free men and prudent.   

The eighth GROUND.  
Of the Authority given to an absolute governor; and of under-sorts of government.  
BY this resignation of the people's will, it is also evident, the Magistracy receives such an activity and power as, we have explicated before, did arise out of a man's promise to his neighbour: and by consequence, that the people as far as they have renounced their own will, so far they have no power left in them to contradict or resist the orders of the Magistracy.  
I say, as far as the People have submitted their wills: for since this power is in the Magistrate in virtue of their wills, it cannot extend farther than the people's promise: So that if the people bind their Magistrates to certain laws and Limits; he hath no right to transgress such laws, or extend himself beyond the prefixed limits by his instalment, and the original power given him: but above all, he cannot dispose of one chip or dispense in one the least law; farther than he apprehends it as fit and necessary to the good of the commonwealth: and, if he doth, he exceedeth his Patent and power. True it is, there is a great discretion to be used in such limits, and the prudent governor will see that the good of the Community requireth many of those dispensations, which careless governors use out of an overweening of their own height and power.  
Having thus declared the nature and conditions of natural government; it is not amiss to see whether there be any other government; and wherein distinguished from this. And casting our eyes round about us we quickly perceive certain communities which pretend to a defective government: as Companies of Merchants or tradesmen; Universities and colleges of scholars; and cloisters of men and women, who pretend to employ themselves wholly to perfect their souls towards eternal beatitude. All these have a participation of government; but have not the universal administration of human goods and evils: For, power of life and death, generally, they have none; and are subject, for the most part, to appeals from their judgements, in matters of great consequence: neither have they any power of peace and war: And if sometimes any of these royalties belong to them; it is not as they are heads of such Communities, but as they participate of sovereignty by privilege, or accident.  
These therefore are distinguished from the government we pretend to declare; as being slight imitations of it, and certain likenesses, not the power itself; or as some Art or Trade is different from moral Philosophy, which is Mistress of the will, and all her actions; the others being but Ushers to the particular, as it were forms or ranks in which petty things are taught. In fine, these others are to our government, as particulars to the universal. The government therefore which we explicate is that which hath power, either of all things belonging to the people it governeth; or at least, of all comprehensible by Nature and falling under sense and Experience. The first of these we see in the Pope and such Bishops as are withal Secular Princes; the second, in other Christian governments either of Princes or commonwealths, where the Spiritual jurisdiction is acknowledged to be higher and greater, though not commander of the temporal.  
But we seek farther, whether there be any supreme government different from this we explicate, or no: And the occasion is from what we see in certain instances, that there is a kind of command or rather subjection, which we call Slavery, exercised, not only amongst Heathens, but even Christians, who have more conformity to nature.   

The Ninth GROUND.  
Of Slavery and the lawfulness of it.  
ANd first, we must look into the notion of Slavery; which signifies a subjection to command in all things; and that merely for the Master's profit. This all things may either reach to the hindering him from those actions which are necessary to obtain Beatitude; or only to corporal services, with that moderation, that the Master hinders him not from such exercises as concern the procurement of future happiness.  
And clearly, it is against nature for any to submit his will so far as to renounce eternal bliss. There cannot, then, be any Obedience due to such an extremity; and, by consequence, there cannot be any power of commanding such enormities in the compass of nature. The like I conceive of a subjection to be killed or maimed causlessely and without desert, or even tormented; nay, or so penuriously abused as to have no content in life; but perpetually to suffer sickness, hunger, cold, or any other notably afflictive condition, so that his life is rather a punishment than a content to him. For since life is our being, and since being is the thing most deeply recommended to us by nature; it is evidently against the inclination of nature, to consent to the loss either of life or of the profit of life, which is, either to be well in this world or in the next: therefore it cannot be conformable to nature to renounce either; especially, the Quiet in this world being the means to gain bliss in the other.  
Neither doth it scare me to cast my eyes upon so many holy men and women, as have put themselves, voluntarily, upon penurious and painful lives. For, I can easily answer, that they had not displeasing lives; enjoying the fruit of contemplation, and the sweetness of Conscience in expecting a great reward for what they did: So that, they only refused the pleasures of this world, to gain those of the next; which is very rational. But, for a man to renounce the content of this world, who either think not of another, or, at least, hopeth nothing out of his renunciation: this must of necessity be extremely irrational and against Nature; whose universal aims are, to be well, either in the next or this present life. But if there be no su●h subjection natural, there can as little be any power of command gotten either by promise and submission of the subject, or violence of the Commander; who may perforce do what he list, but can never make it conformable to nature, to use an other with such inhuman severity.  
There follows yet another kind of Slavery; which consisteth in being bound to do what his Master commandeth, while his Master affordeth him a convenient livelihood; and being subject to due punishment, without farther appeal, when he deserveth it. And this hath no apparent opposition to Nature; why, in circumstances, a man may not bind himself to it, and be obliged to maintain and make good his word to his dying day. And, of such a kind of Slavery, we may question, Whether nature alloweth a whole people to be involved in it, or it be a thing that only can happen accidentally in nature.  
And Aristotle is the first man whom we are engaged to offend in this matter; who says or seems to say, That some Nations are naturally Masters and Commanders, others, Slaves and Subjects: To which conceit Virgil seems also to incline; 
Tu regere imperio populos Roman memento &c.  
Hae tibi erunt arts—  As if it were proper to that country to command. Neither do I think Aristotle's meaning was any more, then that there was a greater fitness in some Nations to command, then in others: for, himself teacheth, the Barbarous prisoners, whose education had been noble, should not be put to servile offices. So that, it was but a little self-pleasing in these two great authors, and affection towards their Countries, which made them fall into this extremity, of thinking it fit that other nations should submit to theirs: Whereas, had they lived in our days, long experience would have taught them that, in every nation, there are men fit to govern, if Education and Discipline be not wanting; And again, any nation may prove a Slave, even through too much wit, if they have not goodness to temper it. But we must not be angry, even with great ones, if they flatter a little their country: but take warning it be not our own case, either for our country, or, which is more absurd, for ourselves.  
Leaving then this question, Whether any nation be, by nature, borne and designed to slavery? let us see whether, within the Latitude of Nature, it consists that any nation can enslave itself in the sense propounded. I do not here intend to engage in that question; Whether one nation may oppress another, and, by force of Garrisons and Armies, keep them quiet in a Legitimate course of government and Subjection? a question much different from ours, which is only, Whether a whole Nation may voluntarily submit itself to a Government, by which it shall have nothing of its own, nor be able to deserve or get any thing; but be entirely at the disposition of the Magistrate it chooseth, without right or property?  
That we may not walk too much in the dark, the holy Scripture holdeth us out a lantern, in the example of Joseph; who bought up the whole nation of Egypt for Pharaoh their King, so that he rendered him not only the governor as before, but also absolute Lord and Master, and them his slaves; and this by their consent. Nevertheless, I am not able to understand reason in it. To put therefore the case clearly, the meaning is; Whether a whole nation can tie itself so by any promise to one Magistrate, as afterward to be bound, they and their Children, in force of their words, not to have or dispose of their Labours and goods of fortune but at the pleasure of the Magistrate; and that he hath power, arbitrarily and without any farther reason than his own will, to give what one man possesseth to another, and make any one work and obey another, merely because such is his pleasure.  
That which induceth me to declare for the Negative is the Nature of man; whose first and main operation, is judgement and choice; and the matter of this is his outward action: So that, who univer●ally renounceth his judgement in extern action, truly renounceth nature itself, in renouncing the end and action for which it was made. Now, that a single man may be forced to this, I make no difficulty: For, if force can take away a single man's life, much more may it take away his outward action. But, when I speak of a Nation, methinks I speak of Nature itself: For, I understand a Nation to signify a thing in nothing different from human Nature, except in greatness; as a bit of bread from a loaf or a pail of water from the pond out of which it was taken; and so, Reason cannot teach us to do that to a nation, which ought not be done to all human kind. Now, who abhors not to think that the use of judgement and will should be banished out of mankind? Were not that quite to unman us and be-beast our whole nature? On the other side, it being the property of reason to use every thing it knoweth, according as it is fitting to the respective nature of the thing; and nothing being more fitting for man in common and every one in particular, then to judge and govern in his little sphere of activity; reason can never demand or approve of the contrary to be practised universally; as is employed in this Position, that it may be done to a whole nation.  
I look not into the inconvenience of such proceeding: How base and unworthy it renders the subjects; how unfit for the service of the Magistrate; how ready to accept of any occasion to better themselves; and the like; which are sufficient to dehort any wise governor from attempting or desiring it: Because my theme is only upon the contracting an obligation of obedience, out of the force of their promise; and extends no further. And, I suppose, the showing that such a promise invalidateth the principle upon which a promise grounds its constancy, is enough, to show that no promise so made can be constant and firm; since a man stands to his word, because he is a man and hath a principle of judgement or choice upon judgement, by which and according to which he is and aught to be governed: Now then, such a promise being a renouncing and bereaving him of this his manliness; it cannot assuredly be maintained by manliness which is the only or chief strength of a promise.  
But, what must we reply to Joseph? what to many thousands of eminent Christians, who seem to profess and observe, in virtue of a vow, this very kind of subjection? As for Joseph, he justifies himself, in renouncing the Vassalage of his People for one fifth part of their lands and fruits. 1. And, not to make an estimate, how proportionable the fifth of a kingdom is to the furnishing of necessaries for governing; so much at least is plain that, by his remission of four parts absolutely, that is, for ever, he did not execute what he pretended by the bargain; but, by the formality of acquiring all, he obtained what he aimed at, That the People should willingly contribute the fifth part of their Labour and goods generally, and, in case of necessity, willingly obey their governor.  
As for the special obedience vowed by some Christians of exemplary life, it is professedly only, concerning spiritual instruction or exercise, even than when it is applied to the knight's champions of Christendom: And this is expressed by the greatest Divine the school ever had, in his 22●. Qu. 104. Art. 5. ad tertium. So that, neither of these objections prejudice the conclusion we have settled; However the outward undiscerned show may make an appearance to the contrary.  
Out of this conclusion it is easily seen, that the Turkish, Moscoviticall, Tartarian and other whatsoever governments, settled upon this principle, that the Goods and Lives of the Subjects are the Princes, not to defend (as our laws go) but to dispose of at will, without contradiction or limitation, more than of his pleasure; neither do nor can ever breed any obligation of Obedience in the Subject, farther than out of fear or present utility.  
It is not amiss to add this consideration, that those tyrannical governors exact of their Subjects no less than to forgo all that is dear in this world, at their pleasures, life and means, wife and children, and whatsoever hath made impression upon them: So that, truly, there is no protection or security from them; and if they rob you not, it is because they have no occasion, not because they conceive any unworthiness in it. Whence, no good nor profit doth, regularly and according to the intention of the pact and agreement, result to the particular; but all is the high Masters, and the Subjects portion is only to share those scraps he shall cast down to him, as to a Dog, to make him fit to hunt for his master.   

The tenth GROUND.  
Why a man is to hazard himself for the common good.  
IT is true, this debt in the subject, of hazarding life and limbs and all that is estimable in this world, is exacted, as well in just and legitimate governments as in those hideous Tyrannies; But, there is a recompense for it, and the good of the whole reflecteth on the part; and if one lose his life, his children and relations at last feel the sweetness of it; and this makes men hazard with courage, and die with comfort. And clearly, were there not this obligation, no commonwealth could stand. What City could be defended, if the Citizens would not venture their lives upon the walls? What Army could be managed, if the soldier would never be brought into the danger of death, or would fly as soon as the bullets began to play about his ears? all wrongs must be suffered at their hands who would expose their own lives to hurt others; and no justice maintained, or innocency defended. Nature therefore makes it most clear that such an obligation is unavoidable, and the daily necessity of it beateth it out so flat and plain, that we can no way escape so manifest an evidence.  
But if it be by the direction of nature, certainly it is also rational, and hath some principles of its truth and reasonableness. Now, in Morality the reason of all action is the good obtaineable by it; which if less or not greater than what we hazard and, peradventure, lose in the attempt, it is no good nor can be a rational motive of such an action. We ought therefore to seek out this great good.  
Aristotle proceeds as cunningly in this business as became so wise a Master; and, according to his fashion, where his skill reached not to explicate the particulars, remained in common terms: telling us, that Bonum commune divinius est quàm particulare: But, in what this Divinity consists, he nowhere expresses. Truly, if there were a Platonic Idea of the particular's goods, which might be termed the common good, I could understand that there were a Divinity in it; but himself hath extinguished that flash of Plato's, beyond reviving. I understand also, that the notion of common, compared to the notion of individual, hath a kind of excellency by its universality, which rendereth it very august and lustrous, and of a higher degree than the particular. I know again the perpetuity a commonwealth pretendeth to, compared to the mortality of a single person, vesteth itself with a kind of infinity, which giveth it a glorious appearance. Nay, when I see the same man work for a commonwealth, in a free way of doing it good; and again, for a private friend: I see a vast distance between his pretended ends; and an eminent generosity in one over the other: Whence, I believe, it cometh that heroes and heroical virtues are chiefly taken in respect of doing good to whole countries or Cities.  
But when, on the other side, I see the same great Master teach us, that Good is the same with desirable; and every ones good, what is desirable to him; I find it is an intricate labyrinth of equivocation wherein we endlessely err, while we think that Good taken in common, should be accounted Good, truly and properly. As, who would be so wild as to bend any strong labour here in England to profit the King of Persia or Siam, if he expected no good to reflect on himself by it? Much less would any account it good to be robbed or maimed, because it was good to another who possessed his money or was afraid of him: and yet if we stick upon the common Notion of good, without determining to whom it is good, ●oth these must be esteemed not only goods but great ones; for, so they are to some body, though nothing or harm to the esteemer. Then, to cry, The Common good, is a mere deceit and flattery of words; unless we can show that the common good is as great to us as we make it sound.  
Neither can the authority of learned Nations and the many endeavours of worthy men persuade us the contrary. For these Nations generally were of Popular governments, where plainly the common good was the good of them who were to reward the causes of it: so that, it was no wonder the Common good should be so highly exalted and cried up; where it was the particular good, both to them to whom it was commended, as also the commenders themselves were to arrive to their own private pretences through that notion of the common good. The like is of all Princes and governors; who if they be wise, conceive the common good in most circumstances, to be compared to them as their own proper good.  
It remains therefore, to see what may be the ground on which an understanding man ought to value so highly the common good; and expose his life and all that is dear to him, upon the score of the public. Clear it is, that he who ventures his life, ventures all this world: For if he dies, what reward remains there in this world? Fame is a slender recompense, when the fruit of it (which chiefly consists in being respected in company, and having a power amongst his associates) is once passed. The good of his wife and children; that may rejoice a dying man; but if there rest nothing after death, it is a comfort which soon expires; being indeed nothing but a flash. It is then past dispute, that for him, who expects nothing in the next world, there can be no rational motive of voluntarily endangering his life for the common cause; if himself be not particularly interessed in it.  
I know Philosophers reply, that there is no harm in death, nor pain after it, and we are but as if we never had been; so they dispute to take away the fear of death. But first, I would ask them, why, even in such a case, the fear of death should be taken away? What signifieth this to a sound Philosopher, to take away the love of his Summum Bonum? of the end for which he is to do all his actions? Again if he must embrace death, upon what motive must he make his onset? shall he propose to himself none? or a less good than he loses? or entertain frantic apprehensions of glory after he is nothing? These are not answers for Philosophers and considerate persons; but for some harebrained foolhardy flashes or doting orators, who, with a multitude of fine words, can plausibly dress up contradictions and nonsense.  
This therefore remains certain, that there is no good to be expected here equivalent to the hazard of death; and consequently, none can be rationally valiant, who sets not his hopes upon the next world: And as, before, we made it apparent, that he who was not constant to his Religion, could have no rooted Honour or Honesty in him; so, now it is likewise evident, he cannot rationally be either valiant himself or trusted by others in danger, farther than he is a fool. Since then, on the contrary side, the nature of commonwealths makes it beyond dispute that hazarding is necessary; it is both evident there is another life to be expected, and that it imports good Government to plant deeply in the breast of the subjects a rational apprehension of it. The cause therefore, and solid reason why men ought to be valiant, is the hope of reward hereafter for doing good to our neighbour here: and the commonwealth being our nearest and greatest Neighbour, as including our Friends, Parents, Acquaintance, and all of mankind that our knowledge reacheth to; to perform service to It is, certainly, the greatest act of charity towards our Neighbour; that is the highest extern act which God hath granted to us, and, consequently, to be preferred before all others; and, as such, to expect a profit and recompense in the next life.  
I know, it may be objected, that in beasts also is to be found a kind of valour, even to the hazard of their lives for their Mates and little ones, and yet no reward of the next world can be pretended for them. But, we are to reflect, that beasts are not governed by any reason given them to govern themselves by; but like Clocks and other Engines, by the wit of their Makers: and therefore it ought not to be expected they should be addressed to that which is their individual greatest good, as Man is by his Reason; but only to what is fittest for their creator's intention; which being only to continue them for the use of Man; and this passion of audacity which we see in them, being fit for that, we are not to seek a further reason for them to hazard their lives, nor to draw any consequence from them to mankind, whose propriety is to govern himself by the knowledge of his own good, and not to be forced out of that for the good of any other, so the notion of good be rightly taken.  
By this we, in part, understand wherein consists the worth and excellency of a Magistrate and his Office: to wit, that all others ends being purely for the good of their private persons or family; the Magistrates aim is at the universal good of the whole eternal body of the commonwealth, the extent of the persons, the long and far-sighted care, and the abstraction from his private good, manifestly exalt this function, beyond comparison, above that of private men and their intentions; and placeth it, as it were, in an orb of honour proper to its dignity.   

The eleventh GROUND.  
The Quality and rational power of a supreme governor.  
THus is our supreme Magistrate or governor mounted on his Throne of Justice and sovereignty. He hath for his strength, that right the People have bestowed on him; divesting themselves, by this submission, from interposing in Common affairs. He hath besides, the strength of the People; both their Wealth and Swords being delivered up to him; so that, if he be wise, he can make himself and his laws obeyed. But chiefly he hath his own Prudence and goodness, which is supposed to be the choicest that could be found in that people; and the Credit of it to be his strength and support.  
For, if we look into it; As we see that, in the natural generation of government, the people truly intend to be governed by one whom they esteem the Wisest and Best amongst them: so afterward, when they apprehend their Magistrate no Solomon, yet they still conceive he is the best they can obtain or prudently aim at; That is, if they should attempt to change, it would bring greater inconveniences than their continuance under this weaker Magistrate. So that, as it were, the Essence and form of his power to govern, is wisdom and goodness; at least, such a degree of both as is supposed and apprehended the greatest possible, according to the circumstances wherein they are. His End we find to be The common good: and to that is he wholly and adequately bound, by his own goodness, by the people's Intention, by his own Acceptance, by the nature of the Charge itself, and by the very form of his life and Profession: In so much that, he faileth from his Duty, from the expectation of his Subjects, and his own goodness, if he doth the least action for his private interest, or otherwise then out of his esteem that it is for the greatest good of the commonwealth.  
And truly, if it be duly considered, we may plainly see that his private interest is not distinguished from the public. For, how can it be? First for Honour, 'tis plain, the welfare of his Subjects is his highest honour; Their knowing they are well by him, and so their love to him, his strongest security; Their expressing still on all occasions content with his actions, and esteem of his person, his greatest pleasure; and in fine, the more wealth they have, the greater Commander is he: so that really, this private interest (if he be indeed a good governor) is the true felicity of his People. I do not, by this, intend to cut off from supreme Magistrates that promise and magnificence we see usually in persons of that quality: But, whereas it may be practised either for pride and vanity, that is, to procure an esteem of the private merit of the Magistrate, or else, to facilitate the government by the awe and reverence it printeth in the Subject; I expect the supreme Magistrate to be so discreet, as to understand the former is merely a shadow or faint and fading colour, the other a real profit and necessary instrument, and so to be embraced for the good of the people.  
Neither must we leave our Magistrate here, but transplant our discourse into a new consideration. For, if he hath gotten a Commission, he hath not, by that, lost the quality of a rational, wise, and good man; but joined to that a new obligation of being new fixed upon the Common good, as the effect and scope of the actions of his whole life: Insomuch that, to determine the quality of his action, we must make one complexe of the whole person; and ask, What a wise and noble mind, having such limitations upon him, by word or oath engaged in his instalment, may or aught to do concerning the limitations?  
And first, it is undoubted on both sides, that neither may he, without great cause, make a breach in those hedges his way is fenced with; nor, if he make some small and inconsiderable breaches, that he violates therefore his oath. For, the nature of human action is such, as not to consist in an indivisible; but, of itself, to have a moral Latitude▪ our understandings not being able to reach to such small and petty differences as nature maketh and our operations contain, as far as they depend from nature.  
But, the Question cometh, When some great fault discovers itself in the limitations, and the end of government is prejudiced by such a defect; and nevertheless it is no doubt but 'tis the intention of the people or the trusties of the people to bind their Magistrate to such conditions; Whether, in such a case, he be bound to his orders and oath, or whether the duty of a wise and good man doth enfranchise him to do what is truly best for the people, though it be against their wills?  
The question seemeth hard: and therefore it is not amiss to note, that truly best signifieth that it be not only best, if it had been fore-ordered or if it were in practice; but that it be best to be brought into practice; and that, notwithstanding all damages and dangers which are to be incurred in the settling of it; Otherwise, it is clear, he ought to stand to his oath. Another caution is, that the Magistrate do not only think it so best, but know it by certainty and science; otherwise, he proceedeth not wisely, to hazard a disturbance of the commonwealth upon slight and weak appearances.  
These two suppositions premised, we are to consider what it is that engageth the Magistrate on both sides. And, for his promise, it is above declared, that he is engaged to it by the connaturality and beauty of Truth in man's nature: Now not Truth only is conformable to man's nature, but also that nobleness and goodness that bindeth man to man; which in its highest pitch, that is, as it looketh upon a commonwealth or a little mankind, is the beauty and virtue of a governor.  
Again, I see a governor hath in himself, as it were, two Truths, or degrees of truth belonging to his person: One, which is the public Honesty, either considered betwixt him and his subject or some aliens; and this forfeited maketh his public credit weak and unfit for the use of government: the other is but a splendour reflecting on his own person, by which he appeareth in the face of honour and a man of his word. For this latter it is very evident, the affection to the public aught to oversway it; because being but a private good it should do homage to those virtues which carry a man to the common interest. For the former, the damage ensueing is to be esteemed and poised against the profit or necessity of the commonwealth: For, if it be evident, that the good of the change openly and vastly exceeds the damage proceeding from the discredit; clearly he is bound to admit of the discredit, to purchase the advantage accrueing by the change: But, where there is none or little difference, there the balance hangs upon quietness side, and change is not to be ventured on.  
This seemeth so plainly and evidently concluded, that a rational man cannot resist it. But, to those who are used to maintain their credit by custom more than by reason, it is a bolus of hard digestion, to tell them they must break their word for the common good: and seemeth to be of the same nature, with that famous definition of an ambassador, witty in England, harsh in other Nations, that he is sent ad peregrè mentiendum pro patriâ, which where the equivocation of lying abroad is not understood, is, in verity, a scandal to Statesmen, whose negotiation hangs so tenderly on their credit, that, it once being broken, they have lost a principal instrument to penetrate the hearts on which they are to work.  
Therefore, let us see whether the high Magistrate (in proceeding as we have declared) does truly force the rampart of veracity so necessary for a government. Let us first begin with his promise, and consider what it is. He is entrusted to do for the common good: and the reason why he is entrusted is, because the entrusters conceive themselves either through their incapacity or attendance to other employments, ignorant of what is truly the common good. They entrust him, therefore, with more than they understand; and so his power is to proceed, according to his understanding, though it cross theirs: he then of necessity, must be false to his Oath, if he do not, according to his trust, act for the common good what he evidently sees in a high degree to import it. Further, because we know, in moral businesses, the end aimed at, is more principal than the means ordered to it, and hath such a command over them that they are to be or not to be, according as is fitting for the end: And in the Oath or Promise of our high Magistrate, if he observe his limitations, he destroyeth the end for which they were put: he offends against both his Oath and Fidelity to his people, if he maintain such limitations, when he is obliged, for the public good, that is, when he ought to break them.  
Yes but (replieth the man who thinketh himself wedded to an outward and seeming honesty in this cause) howsoever, at least he breaketh that part of his Oath, in which he swore directly, to those limitations. Let us therefore see even that point, and ask, what was the people's will in exacting his Oath or Promise? Doth any one will what he understandeth and knoweth not? If one should say to another, I give thee what is in that trunk; in which himself had put a suit of apparel, and, without his knowledge, his servant had taken that out and put in bags of gold to the same bulk; would any Divine, or Chancery Judge, or prudent person assert he were bound to bestow on that promissory all his gold, which was in the trunk? I think not; and the reason is, because it is the will and understanding which hath the power to give strength to a promise or contract; and here the will is wanting; for he knew not what he said, nor intended to give any thing but a suit of clothes.  
How many promises do Divines and Lawyers pronounce null, though they were good and valid when they were made, by reason of the change of accidents following, which could not be foreseen? If one promise his Daughter in marriage to his neighbour, and she dyeth; is he bound to fulfil his engagement, or seek his neighbour another wife? Nay, if the neighbour be discovered not to be the man he was taken for; not to have a competent estate and such like conditions; he may justify the disperformance of his promise; nor shall he forfeit his credit if he doth not keep his word, but rather, if he do, be accounted a weak man.  
Now, to come to our purpose, let it be supposed the people were made understand, when they exact the promise from their Magistrate, that such limitations would destroy their peace, and contentment: doth any one think they would bind their governor to maintain them? If they would not, 'tis evident, howsoever their mouths pronounced the words, their hearts were ignorant and inculpable of such an exaction; for they knew not what they did, they understood not nor meant what they spoke.  
But suppose that truly they knew the incommodities that were to follow, and yet they would have them observed: For, this happeneth often in this our subject, that some (especially great men, and sometimes the populace) understand the inconvenience of a Law, and yet for private interest will have it maintained: What then is the duty of the supreme Magistrate, who is sworn to maintain the said laws? The question is clearly answered by the condemnation of Jephthe; who, when he had rashly vowed to sacrifice the first thing that met him from home, did impiously murder his daughter. All understanding men know, a wicked oath is not to be observed. He that should give a mad mana sword, because he had vowed or sworn it, deserved to be hanged for the murders by him committed: Now, an ignorant and wilful man, what is he but a mad man? Or what is madness but a wilfulness in doing evil? If the action be nought and such as the exactor cannot, with reason, desire, he cannot by any oath bind a swearer to it: Now to observe conditions which shall ruin the government and destroy the end for which they were instituted, is an action contrary to all reason, and to which the promissory cannot bind the promiser, in any wisdom and goodness: He is therefore bound, rather to the destroying then fulfilling such conditions; neither is he therefore perjured, but were rather unjust and wicked, if he observed them. This so resolved, it appeareth plainly, that no supreme Magistrate can be bound to any laws contrary to good government; farther than either the danger of changing them, or the not clearly seeing them to be such, may hold his hand.   

The Twelfth GROUND.  
Who is such a governor, and the Subjects duty towards him.  
We have long talked of a supreme governor; it is time we should point him out, that he may be known. And, since all agree that there are three sorts of government, Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy; when they are simple, there can be no doubt who is the supreme magistrate. Now, mingled they may be, all together, or some two of them: And again, their mixing may be either continually, as when all parts mixed are so often engaged that their Authorities run jointly, or else some are continual, others but at certain terms.  
If Monarchy be mixed, either with Aristocracy or Democracy, so that they be continually joint actors; the Monarch is but a Servant, and the other part the Master: as is to be seen i● the Italian dogs, and the Lacedaemonian Kings; for his force is nothing, compared to his consort.  
If Democracy and Aristocracy be so mixed, the quarrel is more balanced; and because it is a government divided in itself, and therefore dangerous; no doubt but, if the Aristocracy get power enough, she is in the posture of supreme Authority. The example of this we have in the Roman commonwealth, in the time, specially, of Sylla's conquest; when, if he had settled the State in the Senate, there had been no fear of Caesar and Pmpey's mangling that commonwealth, as afterwards fell out.  
Monarchy and Democracy can hardly be so mixed, that Democracy be perpetual, and Monarchy by spurts: For that is not Monarchy; the said Monarch being not long enough in power to be accounted a settled Magistrate; as we see in the Decemvirs, Tribunes and Dictators amongst the Romans: So that, the Monarch hath not the power in his hand to change any thing, which is the case we aim at. And the like is of Aristocracy; when its employment is the ordinary and continual, and Monarchy only by turns and seasons.  
There remaineth only Monarchy in continuance, compared to Aristocracy and Democracy at certain turns. And in both, it is clear, the Monarch is the supreme governor in ordinary; and so the Magistrate of whom we speak, who may alter the inconveniences, if occasion serve. As for the People, they are but a weak part, if the governor be wise: So that he is, by this posture, in the state of doing that good to the Commonwealth which his judgement and conscience dictate to him to be necessary. The comparison to Aristocracy is much harder; every one of the Aristocracy being, generally and regularly speaking, a petty Monarch; and the whole of them easily assembled; and, when so, having the power in their hands: So that the Monarch is not (by virtue of his ordinary condition) in a posture to be able to rectify what he seeth necessary to be altered; therefore he is not the man we call the supreme Magistrate, but the assembly of the Nobility, whereof he is but an eminent and considerable one.  
The Subject, being correlative to the Magistrate, requireth upon that title, to be reflected on; but much more because the nature of the Magistrate cannot be well understood, unless the duty of the Subject be jointly declared. We must therefore declare, or seek out at least, what Honour and Conscience obligeth the Subject to: and, to perform this, we must reflect upon his motive of Obedience; which, as is before insinuated, was grounded on the love and necessity of living in Community, that, from it, he may receive good, and, by its protection, secure himself against evil. To this end he entrusteth the charge of the common administration to the Magistrate; taking himself as one unskilful or unable for such employment. We see therefore, the end of the Subject in his obedience, immediately, is the public good or the good of the Commonwealth: a farther though more cordial and deep in the subject, is the good he is to receive out of the Commonwealth being well; which is nothing else but that the particulars of the Commonwealth be so. Evident then it is, that the immediate motive which the Subject is to propose before his eyes, in his obedience, is the good of the Commonwealth; that is, the very same motive the Magistrate ought to have in administering, and which he had when first, in his own person or in his forefathers, he submitted himself to this rule.  
We know, by consequence, how excellent a virtue this act of Obedience is; having a motive of so great a price and high elevation above other ordinary employments, which reach no farther than to his private good. But, herein the same virtue is less in the Subject then in the Commander; that, because the common good is the very private good of the Commander, therefore it is not related to any private good of the same nature; and so not commanded or limited by any other, as in the subject it is by the end of his idioticall good.  
The next thing that occurreth is the Subjects fact by making this trust; and that is, that he hath made away all power of judging and caring for the common good, farther than by the eyes and hands of the Magistrate, his Trustee, otherwise they have not made him supreme governor: So that, if he thinketh or judgeth any thing to go amiss, or interpose his opinion, in any real and effective way, even so far as to disgust himself or any other against the government; he breaketh his promise and engagement to his governor: Much less is it in his power to recall the trust and seek any way to take it out of the hands of his sovereign. As for his oath of Allegiance, I believe every man sees, it takes its strength from these two; and, by consequence, is to be understood to reach whither they carry it, and strengthen the obligation that they ground: but, not to extend itself to what they do not; only what they begin and, as it were, make, the oath doth, by Religion and reverence to God, enholy and consecrate, and so give it the greatest strength that falleth upon human Liberty.  
By this discourse, we learn, that the Magistrates security, from honesty and conscience, is the greatest that human nature can frame; being grounded upon the noblest virtue, fortified by the virtue of veracity so natural and principal as is above signified; the subject having made as great an alienation of his propriety to government as will can ratify; and lastly, elevated it above his cwne soul by the invocation of him who is master both of soul and body, of time and eternity. Whence, nothing but the frailty of human condition can prejudice a governor once estated legitimately in his seat of Justice; nothing can make a Subject more delinquent, then to work against this duty of obedience; no wonder, therefore, if Rebellion be connumerated with Soothsaying and Idolatry. and Obedience preferred before sacrifice, even in the sight of God.   

The thirteenth GROUND.  
Of the Qualities of laws and Commands, in respect to Obedience.  
OUt of what hath been said concerning the Subject's Obligation to Obedience, we may understand a distinction made by many, of the validity and lawfulness of commands. For, the lawfulness to a sovereign Commander, is no other than that he truly thinketh it to be for the good of the common; that is, for the greatest good, all things considered: which if he doth, it is, by the former discourse, lawful for him to command, what he pleases, without reproach of conscience or honour to him; and on the other side, if he swerve never so little, he so far breaketh his trust: and the greater the abuse is, the greater also his fault and shame. But, the subject is to remember that he hath put his confidence in his governor; as being himself ignorant and not having leisure to look into the depth of the policy: and therefore he is to think and judge well of his Magistrates counsels, and make account he doth not understand the bottom of them; and so be prompt and forward to obey.  
The validity of the command consists in the obligation the subject hath to perform it: And this may fail in two degrees; One to the not fulfilling the command, by avoiding it; the other, by resisting it. This latter is no ways in the Subjects hands, unless it be in such a case as his oath of Allegiance and Obligation to the good of the Community, cease or bind not: The former can never happen as long as it can be presumed to be the Commanders will this Subject, in these circumstances, should perform this command; For, so long, his trust obligeth him not to fail. But, because a governor many times is not rightly informed, nor can a Law reach home to all particular accidents; it is very incident that; in some special cases, the Subject may presume it is not the Magistrates will he should be bound to this particular service. And this is so ordinary that, among us, there is a particular and highest Court, to declare when we are not bound to the written laws.  
Yet is it necessary to believe that even that Court is able to satisfy all cases, or that private men are bound not to avoid a law without having recourse to that Court, or to obey all decrees of that Court if they can prudently avoid it: because no Court (especially amongst refined pleaders) can be without many formalities; which are not the substance of Justice, and therefore may prudently be declined, neither honour nor conscience obliging to such proceedings. But they must ever have for their rule, that the Lawmaker intended not to include them, in these circumstances, within the compass of his Law.  
Some make us a threefold division of laws; the first absolute or commanding; the second permissive; the third they call penal laws: The first they aver to be obligatory, because directly intended by the lawgiver; and of this sort is verified what we have newly discoursed.  
The second (were it expressly the sense of the Law to permit a thing) is also of the former kind and only distinguished in the matter: For it would make the thing permitted truly lawful. But this is not the Writers meaning: For they do not conceive it was the lawmakers intention to allow of the practice; but only not to punish it, or to ordain somewhat in supposition of the case. As when usury is limited to such a rate, that greater is forbidden; but to such a rate is so permitted, that he that hath borrowed is bound and compellable to pay so many in the hundred; but no man is bound to borrow; nor as they say, allowed to take Interest, though the Law constrain the borrower to pay. But, how the Law can forc● the one to give, and yet not allow the other to take, is to me, a hard proposition and like a riddle; and therefore, I believe, the law itself is to be condemned or the practice to be justified; and that truly there neither is nor can be such a kind of Law, as shall compel a thing to be done and not approve of the doing.  
The third sort also seemeth to me no less contradictory: for though I confess there are penal laws unquestionably, that is, such as constitute punishments for offences; yet these Masters mean not such, but under the cloak of the name, teach disobedience to certain laws, persuading us the lawgivers intention is indefinite, that either a man should do such a thing, or suffer such a punishment if he be discovered to have committed the fault: which is directly against all goodness. For first we are to consider whether the thing commanded be useful to the commonwealth; if so, it clearly argues it is the direct will of the Lawmaker. Again, it is to be looked into, if it be universally neglected, what damage accrueth to the Common; and this also will assure us, by the necessity of it, that it is intended for the common good, and therefore to be executed to the possibility of the Subject. Again, how unworthy a thing is it of a governor, who is sapposed to be all equity and goodness, to lie at the catch with his Subjects, to entrap them for a thing he doth not aim to have done? Besides, the name of punishment supposeth a fault; so that, the law must be supposed to speak improperly; which, in its dogmatic way of proceeding, is absurd.  
Yet do I not deny but laws may be made indefinitely; as, to command every townsman to march or pay so much moneys, leaving it to his Liberty to do which he listeth: But this is no penal Law, nor hath it any likely hood of one; but is merely a disjunctive Command. Neither likewise do I entrench upon such orders in Communities, which being almost impossible to be rigorously observed, have some other obligation annexed to the failing; to be performed by the conscience of the Delinquent, whether discovered or no. For, this clearly remaineth voluntary, and is ordered to make the failing rare, and to acknowledge a defect and fault in the not observing; and so hath not that crossing of the will, and that force which one feeleth when he is discovered and, by authority, chastised. So that, in conclusion, there is but one sort of Law in all these; and that binding the Subject, in force of his promise and oath, to the proportion of his concurrence to the Common good, by his act of Obedience.   

The Fourteenth GROUND.  
In what conditions the Subject may resist government.  
NOw, to return to the former part; it is evident, if it be rational to resist the government, it will be lawful also to break and remove it: For, these two actions are of the same nature; and, in truth, pure resistance and disobedience is the annulling it. For, government, consisting in the power of commanding, that is, of having no resistance; to resist is not to acknowledge it, but maintain there is no such power, at least, in this case; that is, to take it away in this case; that is, to set another Judge or knower when obedience is due and when not; that is, not to keep the Subject in the nature of ignorance, in which is grounded his being a Subject. This being the nature of this disobedience or resisting, the Magistrate is bound with all his strength to crush and break it; and, by consequence, it draweth along the concussion of the whole state, if the Subject be able to make good his resistance. Out of this it is clear, that a Subject may not use this resistance; but in case when it is fitting to attempt the dissolving of the government.  
It follows first, that it cannot be done, but when the occass●on is greater than the value of the public peace and good of the commonwealth. No man therefore can justly attempt such a disobedience, to save his own life and goods, or the life and goods of his own family, how great soever, if contained within the bounds of a private family, or but a part of the commonwealth. Now, how far this extendeth, I dare not subtilise; it being a kind of moral consideration and a prudential esteem to weigh it in particular; the common notion reaching no farther, then that it be not so notorious a part of the commonwealth, that it be a homogeneal part of it, such as is fit to make a commonwealth of itself, to determine whose nature, is not the intent of our present embarkment.  
The next consideration is, that neither an universal harm, if moderate and such as may be supported with less damage than follows out of the State, is a sufficient cause of resistance to the sovereign Magistrates command. As for example, an enormous tax (such as was thought to be that which revolted Guienne from Edward the third of England, or the Low Countries from Philip the second of Spain:) as both their wars may well testify; in which the taking of any one town was of more consequence than all such a tax would have been. How far this also reaches is not for me to esteem; Who should ask me, if the governor exacted for one time all the Subject had, so there remained a ground to work upon of new, and within a little time to live contentedly; I should be troubled to confess it were a sufficient injury to take up arms against him, because I cannot judge which were the greater mischief to the Subject.  
Thirdly, if the wrong be of that nature as to ruin the whole commonwealth, yet not suddenly but after many years, if often repeated; I cannot allow it a sufficient cause of open resistance. The reason is clear; for, on the one side there is no inconvenience so small but (in process of time) may grow to be the ruin of the commonwealth, if it be often repeated and so excessively multiplied; and on the other side, long time breeds so great changes or, at least, is subject to them, that the pure nature of the offence is not able to justify a rebellion and breach of unity in a commonwealth, and so, not the resistance to the governor. How much the time in which the ruin would follow should be, to make it a sufficient cause, who can judge? Only this we see, that what will not ruin in a set time, will never do it; and I have seen people live happily, where it was said, they paid the value of their whole subsistence to their Magistrate once in seven years. Nor do I pretend, by these instances, to set any rule for enfranchising the subject; more than this, When evidently the tyranny of the governor is greater than the mischief hazarded. When ever this happeneth, be the material conditions what they will, the subject is free: And if this be not, whatsoever the circumstances be, the subject ought not to stir. For, this and this only is the final cause measuring all attempts, What is best for the People; and known it is that, if it be not evident to be better to stir, it is evidently better to remain quiet: for, not-a-cause is sufficient for not changing; but, for a change and such a change, it ought to be a clear and evident abbetterment.  
There is further to be looked into what part of the commonwealth it ought to be that is sufficient to justify such a quarrel. For, as there is no doubt, but the whole commonwealth, that is, such a portion of it as makes the governor's party inconsiderable, is sufficient: so, there will be less doubt on the other extreme, if the number resisting be a pure single part, it is not sufficient to proceed to this extremity. The question than is, whether the party rising aught to be the major or equal or, at least, inconsiderably less than those who side with the Magistrate. But here we must observe the greatness of the commonwealth divided. For if such parts be of themselves, fit to make commonwealths, nothing considered but the quantity or the number; it cannot be doubted but that will susfice: now what that quantity is, belongeth to another science.  
Besides all these considerations, there remaineth another; that it can be effected: For who is to attempt an action, aught as well to weigh the cost of compassing, as the worth and recompense when it is compassed: so that, unless the hazard of missing and the labour of obtaining, being both added into the balance with the present quiet, be all overswayed; it cannot be prudently done to engage for a change.  
Some will tell me, never did people expect with so much patience as I require: And your Gallants, who pretend to generosity, will exclaim, it is better to die in the field then suffer such indignities: Nay, some will think or, at least, vaunt it fitter to lie in prison or rot in a dungeon, or seek his fortune in Barbary, then to be under such a slavery. My answer to these last Gallants is, that they should first try what it is to rot in a Dungeon, or to wander amongst Barbarians; before they engage themselves and other ignorant persons in such adventures. To the second, that I understand not those spurgalls of honour, which disquiet their fiery humours: I only discourse of what is fitting to make a sweet and contented life, to them who think it consists in enjoying natural goods of Science and virtue for our minds, and the accommodation of our senses for our bodies: Those high and aereal goods of honour, and vapouring words I esteem as Ajax (when his eyes were open) at his death; virtue (said he, meaning honour) I followed thee as a thing, but I find thou art but words. To the foremost, I answer, I do not aver men either have been wise or will be so wise; only endeavour to lay before them what it is to be so; let them look to the exercise. Neither on the other side do I justify the Prince who putteth his subject to such extremities, or think it prudence in him to do it, or that he doth not deserve all the mischief which may light upon him for it: I leave both to the force of nature, to their wit or folly, and to the force of reason or passion which governs in persons and present circumstances; keeping myself in the common notions which belong to Science.  
Still there remains one difficulty, which may breed great variety in the resolution; and it is, who is to be Judge, Whether the neglect of the Magistrate be so great, as to deserve resistance? For, if the Magistrate himself be endowed with that power, it is a folly to think that circumstance will ever come; and, if it belong to the people, such hotspurs, as we spoke of, will make it come long before the season be ripe for it. But, the truth is, this question seemeth in a manner superfluous: For it supposes, there is a question and ambiquity to be decided; and by the conditions put, it is clear there can be no question of the necessity of the resistance; for they are such as to put the question beyond all ambiguity in the very conscience of the Magistrate, the objects beating on the subject in every one's particular beyond denial and dispute. And besides, as long as truly there is any disputableness, the trust reposed in the Magistrate makes him Judge; For, being entrusted as a man both knowing and good, and the people taking themselves as ignorant in what they trust him; clearly he remains sole Judge, as long as there remains a case to be judged. And therefore his either ignorance, or carelessness, or Tyranny ought to be so evident, that it be beyond all question; or else the subject must have patience for his own good, which is his aim in putting himself under government.   

The Fifteenth GROUND.  
Wherein consists the power and liberty of the Subject.  
YEt may some think, on the other side, that the doctrine delivered contradicts itself. For, it being before determined, that the people hath alienated all right of judging or meddling in government; how can it ever happen that they should have a right to interpose again, or that such circumstances can possibly fall out in which they may resist the Magistrate? And this objection is so much the stronger, by acknowledging so great a power in the Magistrate of breaking all laws and limitations of government, by the force of reason placed in the circumstances of power and authority, as hath been declared: whence it seems, since that authority in the Magistrate cannot consist with an opposite authority in the subject, to bridle and curb him; they can never have this power to resist.  
And the truth is, the people acteth not what it doth in such a case, by any authority acquired, but by the force of nature; that same force by which the Magistrate oversways the laws, but in other circumstances. And first that the people hath no authority to oppose their superior is manifest: For, authority is a thing instituted by consent and depending on promise; but here is no need of consent nor any thought of it; here is no public meetings or leagues; and if there were, they would be of no value against a former tradition of their wills to their Magistrate: It cannot be therefore, that the people proceed by any such contract.  
Whence is it then that the people come to any such power? The answer is, As, when they first instituted Government, they did it in the force of Nature; without having any other Power than the pure force of Rationality: so, if, by any circumstance they be devolved into the same state of Anarchy that their promise made binds no more; then Rationality teacheth them and giveth them, by force of nature, to institute another government. Now, the excessive disorders, expressed in the forementioned conditions, make it evident they are not in a government, that is, in a conspiracy to the common good, which is the offence of government; but in an Anarchy, and therefore remitted, by the evil managing or insufficiency of their governor, to the force of nature to provide for themselves, and not bound by any promise made to their governor: the whole end and intention of their promise being, purely, to submit to government, that is, conduce to the common good & safety; which having failed, there is no more obligation in their oath or promise, then if they had never made them. This is, therefore, the ground of the people's opposition, and only circumstance to justify their breaking their oath and promise: so that, in truth, the Magistrate, first, by his miscarriages, abdicateth himself from being a Magistrate, and proveth a Brigand and robber in stead of a Defender; and the people, in the way of natural preservation of themselves, make resistance against him.  
I should pass farther to the change of government, did not the loud and universal cry of all common people, especially of our Northern Countries, diverting my pen, force me to attend their importunity. They say, this Doctrine delivered ruineth their Liberty; and people are but a knot of slaves and Galley-birds, if this be the course of government. They must be satisfied, or, at least, their courage allayed, by reason, if it be possible. For this word Liberty prints itself in such a letter, that it leaves unstudied no man, as one speaketh. The Pelagian thinks he hath lost his natural liberty, if it may be commanded by God's omnipotency. The worldly man accounts himself a slave, if rational government be conserved: he must have licence to commit wickedness and ruin government, or else he is in chains. Let us then repeat the nature of government, and see wherein consisteth the Liberty of the Subject, that we may know when he hath it, and what belongeth to it.  
The people (we said) to fall to their own business, and the improving of nature, choose one or more to manage the common interests; holding them wise and capable, and themselves unskilful; and this with a great deal of reason: for nothing but experience, and much debating is able to beget a sufficient art or knowledge, in such subtle points and turnings. Besides, they esteemed a few fitter for resolution, and easier to agree then their own multitude; where so many private aims are hard to be avoided, and if not prejudicial to the common. Upon these grounds, it is plain, out of the very nature of government, that they reserve no power in themselves to consult of common businesses. For, how absurd is it that he who hath no skill shall give counsel, or sway the resolutions of those whose art and profession it is? Or, what wise man could undertake a government with truth and honour, if, in his greatest difficulties, he must depend on the advice, or rather wilfulness of an ignorant rabble?  
Let us look now what is left for the obeying party; and we shall find, it is to govern their private affairs, as far forth as they fall not within the verge of the common good or harm. But, once put that the private man's business either hinders, or is necessary to help the common designs: and, as evident as it is that the common is to be preferred before the particular; so evident it is, that even his proper business is not to be managed, so far, by his private understanding and liberty. If the soldier, when he is commanded to stand Perdue, should have his private considerations allowed him, what could the Army do? If the Citizen, being commanded to watch his turn upon the walls, might bring an excuse that he had nobody to look to his shop, the City would soon fall to the enemy's prey. Private interest, then, must yield, when the public is concerned, or else no government can be hoped for: and, he that will leave matters of great consequence to the resolution of the governed party, must make them the governors.  
Wherein then consists the Liberty of every Subject? In not being controlled in his private affairs. If there be not justice administered both against Robbers and Riotous oppressors, the Citizen is not free: if he be molested in his domestic manage, otherwise Men when the common demandeth his assistance, he is not free. But, for serving the common, it is the freest act he hath: It was his choice to elect it, it is his good to conserve it, and will be his destruction to infringe it. As it is no liberty to have an immunity to hang or maim himself, or his wife and children, or to commit any other unnatural act; no more is it to be esteemed Liberty, to have the privilege to subtract himself from the service of the commonwealth. They are therefore seditious spirits, who, using the name of Liberty, provoke the Subject against the Magistrate; and in themselves, ordinarily, it is either ignorance or faction, which is the true Mistress of such attempts. Nor can it be feared, that government, carried connaturally and as it ought to be, doth any way prejudice the Liberty of the Subject, what seizures soever it makes either upon goods or persons.  
Yes, but governors will exceed the moderation of the true laws of government. First, the Commonwealth hath a presumption of their goodness to the contrary. Secondly, admit they do, must we seek to remedy it by a greater wound which is, by taking away the life and soul of government? Again, the oppression is either in common upon all, or in particular upon some few: If in common, it is almost impossible to be heavy upon every one; for, many little sums easily rise to a great one, and many hands make light work: If the wrong be done to particulars, we ought to consider that accidental harms cannot be prevented neither in nature nor in human affairs; and so are objects of pity rather than of hope to be amended, and to be tolerated rather, in respect of the great good which is in the common peace, then expose all to such confusion as must be, and ever hath been where the government is, in part, placed in unexperient hands.  
This, therefore, is resolved, that the plenitude of power in the governor hinders not the liberty of the Subject: which is to be contained within an inferior sphere, and the sphere itself within the sphere of government; and to be carried by it, as the private good by the common, when the necessity of the public requires. Likewise, the propriety of right of the Subject is to be taken, not against the governor or common right, but against the encroaching of another party: as, whoever understands what common and particular signify, easily understands that the common and particular are not two; as the part and the whole make not two, because the part is included in the whole; but part and part make two, because one hath no community with the other. Therefore, it stands not with reason, that any private person should claim a right against the commonwealth, or the governor, which is all one; for, so he makes the commonwealth a part distinguished from himself.   

The Sixteenth GROUND.  
Of the dispossession of a supreme former governor, and of his right.  
THis rub being taken away, our march is free to consider the action of the change of government; by what it is effected that the former governor remaineth no longer in his authority, and the new one beginneth to have the power. For, we speak of a supreme governor whose power is sworn to; and so fortified, by an allegiance due from the people, and a right obtained by himself. And, we may presently reflect, that our former discourse, Of the people's resistance to a sovereign Magistrate, reached not to the resolution of this. For, there we supposed the Magistrate to have behaved himself so unworthily, that he was truly no governor but a Tyrant and Robber; and so had really deposed himself, and disannulled the Subjects oath and obligation by renouncing, in deeds and practice, the nature of a governor. Now, our Question supposeth the governor not to have come to that extremity: but, either to have been good or innocent: or that it is doubtful whether his excesses deserved expulsion: or, at least, if they did deserve it of themselves, yet the circumstances were not fitting for it; but the expulsion happened either by the invasion of a stranger, or the ambition of a Subject, or some popular headless tumult; for, these three ways a Magistrate comes, forcibly and unjustly, to be outed of his power.  
And first, if the Magistrate have truly deserved to be dispossessed; or it be rationally doubted that he hath deserved it, and he be actually out of possession: In the former case, it is certain, the subject hath no obligation to hazard for his restitution, but rather to hinder it: For, since it is the common good that both the Magistrate and the Subject are to aim at; and clearly, out of what is expressed, it is the common harm, to admit again of such a Magistrate; every one, to his power, is bound to resist him. If you say, he may or will repent and amend, that importeth not our Question, or Whether he be to be restored? but, Whether he be to be chosen of new? For, since it was merely his possession and the interest of not changing or troubling the commonwealth which obliged the Subject to maintain him; it being supposed his own desert did condemn him, this change and trouble of the commonwealth being now turned on the other side and another in possession, clearly neither he hath any right left, nor the Subject any obligation to maintain but rather oppose him. Now, if his desert be doubtful, then is it also doubtful whether he hath right or no: and certain, that the common good is not to be disturbed for it; Nature teaching that we need no reason to be quiet and remain where we are, but that to make a change we must see a strong cause and motive.  
The next case is, if he be innocent and wrongfully deposed, nay, let us add, One who had governed well and deserved much of the commonwealth: yet he is totally dispossessed; and so, that, it is plain, in these circumstances, it were better for the common good to stay as they are, then to venture the restoring him, because of the public hazard. It is clear, in this case, there is a comparison between the general good of the commonwealth, on the one side, and the particular of this man or family on the other. Let us, then, put the case on his part; and see, If he be generous, if he hath settled in his heart that every single man ought to prefer the common Interest before his particular safety, profit, or honour; if he be fit for a governor, that is, one that is to espouse the common good as his own individual; what he will, in honour and conscience, resolve: whether he be not obliged absolutely to renounce all right and claim to government; and, if he does not, he be not worse than an infidel: For, if he that hath no care of his domestics, be reputed so; with how much more reason, he that is ready to plunge a whole Nation in blood, for his own Interest?  
Let us cast the accounts on the other side; and see, that the Subjects aim ought to be the public peace, and quiet enjoyment of their lives and interests: It will appear that, if he be bound to renounce his claim, they cannot be obliged to maintain it: and besides, that they are wilfully blind, if, where the whole concernments of themselves, their wives and children lie at the stake, they will venture all for an aereal fancy, without regard to the end of government, public peace; merely for the means, this man's government, without whom the end may be obtained. It cannot, therefore, be rational on either side, for a dispossessed governor to be restored with hazard: unless it be certain the succeeding government be a pure Tyranny, and so the dispossessed person necessary for the quiet and peace of the commonwealth; and therefore, that both sides pretend the good of the commonwealth, as well he that is to be restored, as those who seek to restore him.  
But some cry, he had right; he hath not deserved to lose it; Justice must be done whatever follows on it; happy they that are unfortunate in so good a Cause, they shall not lose their reward, however it fares with them now. Well for them, if this plea will serve them in the next world; nor will I dispute whether the evidence of what I deliver be so great as that ignorance may not excuse them: That question belongs to the tribunal of God only: I must say that, before men, who are clad with flesh, and whole hearts cannot be pierced by other men's guesses, the Law is, that not only the intention be good, but also the action be intelligent and prudent; otherwise, we are subject to believe, that some vanity or secret hopes do bias the actor and make his proceeding irrational. I must also tell them, that this principle, Fiat Justitia & ruat coelum, is seldom practised amongst the wise; who all agree that Charity and Prudence ought still to moderate the rigour of Justice. It is also too metaphysical for a moral way, to think that Justice is a Platonic Idea in the concave of the moon; no ways to be changed by circumstantial occurrences: Whereas, the truth is, Justice is but a partial and commanded virtue; and that which governs in man, is reason or his own nature and inclination to make all his actions connatural and fit for a rational Creature; and so may consult whether Justice be in some to be administered, and pronounce that Summum jus est summa injuria.  
But, the capital in this matter is, that truly there is no justice on either the Magistrates or people's side, to bind to the restoring him: both these depending on the promise made, and the force of the promise being none, since the ground of it is changed. For, the substance of the promise made to a Magistrate, is, To obey him as a Magistrate, that is, as far as is fitting for the commonwealth and peace; he being nothing but the instrument of the common good: Now, take away that fitness for the commonwealth, and that which gave strength to the promise is gone, and the promise itself is no more a promise, nor can any obligation arise from it. Who knows not, that the promise of any man depends on his intention, his intention on his knowledge, his knowledge reacheth no farther than his consideration and present memory when he maketh the promise? So that, in nature, a promise reacheth only to presupposed and thought on circumstances: and who, when he sweareth to a Magistrate, expecteth to see him dispossessed and turned off?  
Nature annuleth promises: as, when we promise to come such a day, and either die or are imprisoned before. Morality annuleth them: as if we promise to run such a horse against another a month hence, and the horse in the mean time falleth lame; who will condemn the master for not venturing on such a race? Is not the man better than his word? If then the man himself be less than the common good, which he must violate by keeping his word; can his word be greater? But a promise must many times be kept even with loss of life? I deny it not: But, first, I must be assured it is a promise; which before I have declared to be none: For, our case is case of Nature not of Law, we admit no presumptions; nothing what he meant to do or should have done, we only regard what was done. Secondly, if it were intended to be so promised, it was wicked and irrational; for, to promise to regard a private man's good against the common, is unnatural and wicked; therefore, it never was a promise, can never bind as such, nor be professed with honour, either to be made, or, if made, to be kept. I need not insist upon the confirmation by oath: for, every one understands, if the Oath be but a confirmation of a precedent promise, and there were no promise, there can be no oath, to have the nature and force of an oath.  
So that, this is manifest, a Magistrate actually dispossessed hath no right to be restored, nor the Subject any obligation to seek to restore, but oppose him. For, what is man, or rather mankind (for, so we have styled a nation) better than a herd of sheep or oxen, if it be to be owned, like them, by masters? What difference is there between their Masters selling them to the Butcher, and obliging them to venture their lives and livelihoods for his private Interest? We know it is natural, that the part should venture for the whole; but that the whole should venture the loss of itself to save the part, I cannot understand. The governor is the highest and noblest part, yet but a part; the People is the whole, the End, (though not by office, yet by worth and dignity) the Master and Lord, for whom those who are Lords by office are to be vested and devested in Lordship, when it is necessary for the common good: who thinks otherwise, deserves not the name of a man.   

The Seventeenth GROUND.  
Of a supreme governor dispossessed.  
BUt one will object, if he were wrongfully dispossessed, he suffered wrong; it cannot then but be reason he should have reparation. And this cannot be denied. But beside the government taken from him, he was peradventure injured in his reputation and spoiled of such aliments as are fit to maintain him according to the quality of his birth and education: And, for these, he may, as a private man, demand reparation; but so, as still to remember he is a Denizen of that country, a member of that people, and compared to it as a particular to its universal; and may demand his share, yet so that if it cannot be obtained without the concussion of the public, he is to renounce it and sacrifice that interest to the good of his country.  
Likewise, on the opposite side, the commonwealth may demand reparations against the dispossessed Magistrate, who abused it or his subjects during his government: Not touching any thing he did upon intention of the public good, though it were breaking of known Laws or any injurious violence offered, with pretence of serving the commonwealth; For, the trust put in his hands vindicates him from all such actions, as long as they bear the face of any intention of the Common good. But, if, for private men's satisfaction, or his own lust, or covetousness he did any wrong, of that he may be asked an account: not while he is in government but after the dispossession, when now the common distemper followeth not the prosecution of such riots, and so, his public protection being gone, he is but a private man, and consequently, by the force of nature, subject to a stronger; obligations of common good and former promises being now faded away, and he left in the condition of a stranger, saving that his demerits follow and pursue him, if other merits do not counterbalance them and exempt him.  
Again, when he is to be judged, he cannot be proceeded against by Law; which can judge none but the offenders against it. Now we have had often occasion to declare that the chief Magistrate is not under the Law; the common good for which the laws themselves were made, being committed to his trust, and the end he is to look after being higher than the laws, which are but a part of the means to arrive at that end, and therefore inferior and subordinate to it. But those who could put their own agreements, that is, the laws under his feet, could not put Nature under them, nor authorise him to do any irrational or unhandsome action: Therefore, when the structure of the commonwealth is dissolved, that is, disjointed from him, than any who hath suffered wrong in the fore-declared manner may be party against him and proceed as if there were no commonwealth; by the Law which, in a wilderness, warranteth us to kill a tiger or Robber that seeketh to kill us, not pretending Law for our action, but that it is manlike & rational. Neither ought it be called punishment that is done against a dispossessed Magistrate, but rather revenge, or some other name that includeth no order to Law.  
By this we understand the truth of that famous question; Whether a sovereign be under the laws? to which is ordinarily answered, that he is, as far as his example and direction is necessary to his subjects; but not so, that the Law, as such, hath any superiority or force upon him. To declare this more plainly, we must remember, the Rule of his actions is, To do what reason teaches a man in his posture ought to do, that is, what is fitting for the public: Now generally speaking, the common good requireth that the laws be observed betwixt fellows of the same commonwealth; wherefore Nature teacheth him to give example of that observance, as far as his public office permits.  
Besides, in the very person of the sovereign are to be distinguished, his being one of the commonwealth, and being the head or Magistrate: So that, though his being a Magistrate exempts his public actions and also his person and private actions from the inquisition of the Law; yet it doth not exempt his private actions from the proportion to those of the subjects, that is, from being good or bad, because like or dislike to the actions which the Law commandeth or forbiddeth. So that, he is not, even in his private actions, subject to the laws at his rule; for that is only reason; but, as they are a kind of way chalked out to him for the material part of his action; as the Architect frames his house for him; or the gardener his walks: That is, the laws are to him as an art under him, an art to show him what is to be done, not to command or punish him for not doing; nay, not so much as necessitating him to do, at least, universally, whether the business be purely betwixt subjects, or betwixt himself as a private person, and his subjects.  
For, the principle of common good being higher than the art of making laws, may, nay ought in some cases, differ from the prescriptions of the Law. Yet this must not authorise him to dispense frequently with the Law; the government being not possible to be good in which there is no constancy: But, if the circumstances require any Law to be often forced; the Law itself ought to be limited, that the practice of the subject may be firm and customary, which is that maketh the Lawe-please. Thus in conclusion, though the Magistrate be not commanded by the laws, nor personally subject to them, yet reason (which is his rule) bindeth him to observe them as the good of his people; and (ordinarily speaking) essential to his end, which is the common good. The laws therefore are his matter to work on, or instruments necessary to work by, not his rule or Mastering directions.  
There remains yet untouched the question that seemeth most troublesome to many, When the change of the government is valid, and such as the subjects obedience is due to the new Magistrate and to be subtracted from the old, how unjustly soever he were bereaved of it. And, others have sought by term of years to decide the difficulty: among whom, one was Pope Vrban the eight, an intelligent and generous Prince and well versed in politic government. He published a decision that after five years quiet possession of an estate, the Church was not bound to take notice whether the title were lawful or no; but acknowledge the possessor, in ecclesiastical businesses. So much he said for aims sake. But, we must proceed upon other principles, that is, the forelaid and main basis of our discourse, that the common good aught to be the rule of the Magistrates title, and the subjects obedience.  
Out of which this followeth, that when ever (considering all things) the common good is clearly on the possessors side, than the dispossessed hath no claim. Neither ought we expect till we have assurance, that it will not be better for the subject if the late owner (after great dangers, gaineth his former power: For, first, this itself is uncertain; secondly, the success of endeavours to restore him must be hazardous; thirdly, many and great mischiefs, during the time of the attempt, are altogether unavoidable; and all this to be balanced against those uncertain hopes. Nor, again, must we expect that the wills of all the subjects concur, actually, to the acceptance of the new governor: For that is either impossible or of so long expectation, as to ruin all dissensions and jealousies in the mean time: Nay, the vulgar sort are so easily led by fancy, that they understand not the common good, nor what they should wish.  
But you may demand, How shall it be known when the common good holdeth itself on the possessour's hand? I answer, we must first see who are the common, whose welfare is to be preferred before private interests. And presently it appeareth that, dividing the whole people into governors and governed; the governed part is the public to whose good the governors are to direct their pains: And that these are they that spend their lives in seeking their own profits, either by improving the Land, or in Arts and Handicrafts: Whence, it follows, when their good stands on the possessors side, then clearly he begins to gain right and power; and this is plain to be, when the Merchant, the Husbandman, and Tradesman, with their appendices, are in an undisturbed practice of their functions, and begin to be afraid of change upon the noise of an invasion.  
This resolution could not be doubted, were it not that one might object, that what is said seems true, abstracting from circumstances; but it ought to be considered, that such men see nothing but the outward appearances of what passes in human negotiations, and so there may many circumstances lie hidden from them, which would make them think or wish otherwise if they knew them: As, for example, home-discontents, and foreign conspiracies; which if understood, would make these honest men prefer a war, after which there is to follow a peace far exceeding the present quiet and such a one as deserves the intervening disturbance and damages.  
And indeed, I allow these men understand not such mysteries of State, nor penetrate the value of the hazard: But, if they do not, why are they not also exempted from engaging on those motives? and than the rest of the commonwealth will be but so many private men, who must follow the common▪ again, if they think themselves well, they manifestly consent to the present government, and therefore cut off the title of the dispossessed governor. Besides, who can answer they shall be better by the return of the dispossessed party? surely, by common presumption, the gainer is like to defend them better than he who lost it.  
But, let us overslip this opportunity and end of the common Good: how long must we expect, till it shall be supposed the right of the former Magistrate is extinct? Some Ages? as we kept our title to France, and France did to Sicily and Naples: Or at least some generations? as the durance of the Spaniards wars upon Holland: Or, till the former Magistrate declares the relinquishment of his right? Or, till his followers are weary of inventing new devices, to blind, & ruin their unwary friends? All these are soon discerned to be mere uncertainties; and rather nets to catch fools and bring them to the ambitious desires of some few men, than any grounded reason. But, what if an open Enemy should come, could or ought the Subjects join against him with their new Magistrate? If not, the whole public must perish: If they may, than the case is the same against their old Magistrate; since his right stood upon the common peace, and that is transferred from him to his rival by the title of quiet possession.   

The Eighteenth GROUND:  
The Objection of Divines answered.  
REason hath played its part; but Authority cannot be silenced unheard. Let us therefore harken to what it saith. And, first steps up the Divine to preach us, out of Scripture, the duty we owe to Priests and Kings; no less than death and damnation being the guerdons of rebellion and disobedience. The Lawyers come yoked from the Popes and Emperor's Court, taking for maxim, Tempus non occurrit Ecclesiae & Regi. The practice seems to confirm the same; we seeing both some Noble men and divers Cities make protestations against the possession of others for many years and ages. But, which is more, they will speak reason too at least, by the Divines mouth; who telleth us, that God, by nature, is high Lord and Master of all; That whoever is in power receiveth his right from him; That Obedience consists in doing the will of him who commandeth; and concludeth that this will ought to be obeyed till God taketh away the obligation, that is, till he who is to be obeyed himself releaseth his right.  
The Authorities they cite out of Holy Writ are, for the most part, mere commands to obey where obedience is due, without specifying what or when it is due. This command is extended to wicked and evil governors as well as good. One place there is, where Samuel denounceth to the people the evils that will come to them by the power of the King; and calleth them Jus Regis, or, as the Hebrew text, Judicium Regis, or, Legem Regis, and afterward, Regni. And these words are, in two senses, true; one, that the King would do the wrongs there mentioned, by force; the other, that the people, since they would have a King, ought not to resist him when he did such things. Yet do I not deny but, if the particulars there mentioned, be interpreted gently, all that is there recited might, with justice, be practised by a King: As, when it is said he should take away their Vineyards and Olive-gardens; it may be understood, upon confiscation and by other lawful ways. Besides, they may peradventure allege that God, by his special command, transferred the kingdom from Saul to David, from Roboam to Jeroboam, and some others. But, they should also let us know, what they deduce from hence: For in such changes, God gave no new Authority or Power to such Kings, but the same their predecessors had: So that, in fine, all that is brought out of Scripture falleth short of proving that no time can make void the right of a King once given him from the hand of God.  
The reason of this weak way of alleging Scripture is, that when they read that God commandeth or doth this, they look not into nature to know what this commanding or doing is; but presently imagine God commandeth it by express and direct words, and doth it by an immediate position of the things said to be done; whereas in nature the commands are nothing but the natural light God hath bestowed on mankind, and which is therefore frequently called the Law of nature. Likewise, God's doing a thing is many times only the course of natural second causes, to which because God gives the direction and motion, he both doth and is said to do all that is done by them; as truly as the weight of a Jack turns the meat upon the spit, and the spring of a Watch makes the clock of it strike: A notion not only of a large extent and usefulness in itself, but, which gives me just occasion of complaining against these verbal and wind-blown Divines, as the bane of Christendom and Christian doctrine. For, whereas the Scripture is a book enriched with all Science and depth of learning; this sort of Grammar Divines, without either logic, Philosophy, or Morality, merely by the virtue of their Dictionary, and such like lip-learning, undertake to be interpreters of the sacred Bible, and in stead of the sense of the letter, obtrude to the Readers their own low and many times phrenetical fancies.  
Let us instance in our present question. The first position they take is, That God is Lord and Master of all things. What seems, nay truly is more conformable to Scripture and Reason then this assertion, as it lies in words? And yet many not looking into the nature of God and rational and intelligent substances, make a shift to pervert it into a mere blasphemy: For, if the sense be only this, that God is omnipotent and no resistance possible in any creature to his absolute will; nothing is more certain, nothing more holy. But, this is not the meaning of the Divines; but, that there is an Attribute or notion in God of being Lord and Master, to which they do not say we cannot, but, ought not resist, and rather admit that we can. And herein is the first faltering, that, in effect, they deny the Omnipotency, and reduce that which is a true physical power to a moral obligation. But this is not all.  
The next point is, that, if even this Morality were founded in that great nature of being, and being intelligent, which is in God almighty; and that they also held his commands were to be obeyed, because they proceed from an understanding which cannot err, and which is essentially the very order and well being of all creatures; the former would seem pardonable: But, they will have it quite contrary, that therefore things amongst creatures go well, because not reason, not the eminentiall being of themselves in God is their offspring, but because a high and overpowering will or voice commandeth it so. A position in respect of God, absolutely blasphemous; as far as it makes him work without the guidance of his understanding, that is, like the lowest order of creatures, as stocks and stones &c. It is again afflictive and vexatious to mankind; taking away that sweetness of obeying, which consists in the persuasion that because creatures are the participation of God's own nature, every one in its degree and mankind in the first and highest place, therefore all God's command and government, are most conformable to their good, as it were salves to their sores, and allurements to the bringing them to their final end and perfection.  
But, that which is more to our purpose is, that, upon this blasphemy against God, they build the greatest inconvenience that, peradventure, is to be found in man's nature; to wit, That God gives to all in Power the likeness and participation of this irrational Dominion which they conceive in him; and that truly there is in superiors a kind of dote or free gift of Mastery derived from God, in virtue whereof he is Master of the inferiors and what belongs to them, either wholly or in a certain measure, according to the extent of the power given; that, lawfully and validly, he may dispose of all or a certain part of the things under his charge, merely because such is his will and pleasure, & that the subject ought to be content to let him do his will, upon this score, Because it is God's will that this man's will should be fulfilled. Which doctrine, though it be manifestly against Christ's directions left to his disciples, and the practice of all good men; yet, because this Treatise doth not pretend to Divinity, I will only insist upon its natural inconveniences.  
As first, that it is not connatural to mankind: which, consisting, for its better part, in understanding, is not governed conformably to its disposition, unless it be so guided that the understanding be principal and satisfied in itself and leader to the will and action; which course of proceeding when it is observed, than is a man truly a man and his action goes on with sweetness, as is before declared. Again, it maketh the governor proud, insolent, and careless. Proud, because he taketh himself to be of another orb than his Subjects; that they are all slaves and beasts, himself only Master, himself only intelligent and a man. Infolent, because fully persuaded, by this doctrine, that he can do them no wrong; that they are bound to suffer what he lays on them; that his pleasure is and must be their content and rule. Careless, because he thinks he hath no account to make, either to God or Man: not to God, since he hath submitted the people to his will and disposition; and therefore he being incapable of doing them any wrong, cannot be charged with any crime: Much less is he solicitous to content his Subjects, in whom he taketh it for an insolency to repine at any thing, and esteems it their duty to commend all he does, and to have his authority for their rule to judge all things by.  
On the other side, the Subject becomes base, restive, ambitious. For, the worth and dignity of man, which is his Liberty or guidance of himself, being taken away, it follows, he must be servile and flattering, a slave, a body without soul and understanding. The more worldly and rustic part must, of necessity, grumble and feel it harsh to see their labours disposed on to people, of whom they have opinion that they are idle, vicious, and unworthy: and therefore, desire liberty from such a yoke, and to become masters of their own goods and labours; and are easily susceptible of propositions tending to that purpose, when they come from fair tongues. Lastly, the higher Spirits have government in admiration, and take it for the only happiness; and therefore have their hearts wholly bent, how, by flattery, by cunning, by force, to arrive to this power to depose him that is in possession, and sit down themselves in his seat of glory. If their hopes mount not so high, for the impossibility of the fact and the remoteness of their quality; then their aim is, by adulation and compliances, to come near the highest, to be participant of his authority, and have the like power to rob and oppress, which they esteem virtuous and glorious in him, and not unjust but fitting in themselves, as far as they can do it by the participation of that dote which God hath bestowed upon the highest Magistrate.  
Lastly, we must look into the lame proceeding of the common good and public actions of such a government; where the Subject, by the consequence of this doctrine, is set eagerly upon his own interest, thinks all lost that is done for his, not governor or Protector, but Lord and Master, and therefore alienated from him. Whence, it must come to pass that, what he can cozen, what he can excuse, what he can delay, he is still forward to; and, by a secret instinct of nature which abhorreth such a government, thinketh it well done, though he cannot give an account to justify his action. In a word, who sees not this commonwealth to be a kingdom divided in itself always in affection, and very near in outward action; wanting thereunto nothing but an occasion, and some head to manage the sedition? who sees not that the whole government is violent; and so may indeed continue whilst actual force hangeth over it, but hath not the possibility of a natural duration and length.   

The nineteenth GROUND.  
The Authority of Lawyers insufficient in this Question.  
THE Divines error being thus discovered, our plea against the Lawyers will be of less either debate or consequence: for, this question belongeth not to their science or employment. The maxims, the rule, the highest tribunal of their Judgements is the text of the Law, the agreements of men, and, at most, to declare the lawmakers intention: But, to judge whether the lawmakers intention be conformable to nature and such as it ought, whether he exceedeth his power, whether he be Master of the laws, and the like, is beyond the verge of their jurisdiction. Therefore, nothing is more absurd, then to demand that Lawyers should plead cases between the sovereign Magistrate and the Subject, where the common good and government is interessed: For, there, things are not to be carried by the Dictates of Justinian or Lancelotus, or the command of Caesar or Peter's successors, but either by the Science of politics, or the certitude of Faith and Tradition; which are the only two rules a high governor hath. If the Divine findeth any thing contrary to the known Law of God, he may speak: If the Philosopher find any thing against the Nature of Man, his mouth is not to be stopped: The Lawyer, what can he say? It is against the agreement heretofore made by the government of the country? The governor may reply, Yes; but what you say is against the present good of the country, with which I am entrusted. Is the country made for the laws, or the laws for the country? The laws therefore must give place, where the good of the People is against the former Resolutions. If any Law be repealed by the Authority which made it, or by another equal; is it the lawyer's part to plead what was Law before, or what is now? when a supreme governor speaketh as such, as declaring what the present necessity requires; if any former Law be against it, it is by his declaration annulled; it was Law before, but it is not now. But the Lawyer will reply, There is no Law in the Land which giveth such authority: It is easily answered; it is not a case for which a Law is to be made. See the Roman government: when there came an exigence of desperation, all their Magistrates, all their forms ceased; a dictator was made, whose word was Law, nor could any man appeal to Law. Such is the Case when the high governor pronounceth against the Law: for he ought not to do it, but when the Law standeth not with the good and safety of the Subject; and when he doth, Law is not to be pleaded against him.  
Again can any Law be enacted of what shall be done in case of a conversion of the government? It is clearly a folly to pretend it. The ordering of the commonwealth is, then, in new hands: The former's power is expired: and to prescribe rules to them who will assuredly be their own Judges, is a piece of great simplicity. The Lawyer may peradventure reply, There is no power in the Land to repeal the former laws or to oppose them. I think he will be wiser; yet, if he doth say it, I ask him, Who made the former laws? was it not the People, by themselves or their deputies? and which is the stronger, if they make them by their deputies, or by themselves? Certainly, it will be answered, By themselves; for the deputies have no power but what they impart to them. Is it then possible to put a Case, in which there is no power in a country to repeal laws? Evidently, who says so must say there is no People in the country? For, if there be People, there is in them a power to dispose of themselves, more strong than in Deputies.  
But the Lawyer may say, the People cannot speak their minds freely. I answer, certainly, they not only can, but cannot choose but speak their minds, in the case we put. Who knoweth not that Liberty and speaking of one's mind belo●geth to all circumstances a man can be put in? The Merchant that, in a Tempest, throweth the precious fruits of his venture and labour into the Sea, doth not he do it freely and willingly? The Hollanders of late made a peace with the Spaniard; we, both with the Hollander and the Dane, and are pretending to others: In any of these, were all parts pleased? Did no party agree to somewhat which he would not have done, but in consideration of his present circumstances? Or, was there ever peace made after a war, but one part grudged at somewhat? must none of these be accounted freely done? must none of these promises bind, and be kept, upon Honour and Veracity? This is to destroy all commerce of mankind; nay, not to allow man so much wit as to know what is fit for him to do in time of necessity. If then the People speak, in one circumstance, something that they would not in another; it is not to be said they speak not their minds, but that, according to circumstances, they alter their minds, as all wife men do. They agree and submit to the present conjunctures, not because they are not free, now as before, but because circumstances are changed, and now render it fitting. But, I said that, in the case I put, they could not choose but speak. My case was, that Then a governor is acknowledged, when the People casting off the care and thoughts of innovation, fall to their trades and manufactures: Can it be denied that by so doing they acquiesce to the present government? which if they do, can it be questioned whether they consent or not to the repealing of all such laws as cannot stand with the present government? Such laws therefore are repealed, not by deputies, but by the Deputants and Masters of the Deputies. The Lawyer, therefore, must either proclaim the present government none, or not plead Law against it: for it is pure folly to admit both, that is, fair and full contradiction. In a new government, all laws prejudicial to it are annulled, by the pure admission of it: Other indifferent laws so go on, as to be subject to its judgement, whether and how far to stand; but a wise governor will continue them as far as he can with prudence, because innovation is contrary to the sweetness which is in custom, as in a kind of nature.   

The Conclusion.  
Be this then so resolved, That God himself hath no irrational and dead title of Lordship over his Creatures, but only his all-right-settled Understanding, and irresistible Omnipotency. And, as he hath none in himself, so likewise not given any to those he hath put in Authority; but, that their power is either in the submission of the Subject by promise and agreement, or in the rational disposition of the Magistrate, which maketh him work what is conformable to human nature; and the obedience or obligation to obey in the Subject is out of this, That he hath entrusted the Magistrate with the government, and is, by that, to suppose he doth regularly what is best (all things considered) for the common good.  
That, by consequence, the title of the Magistrate begins and dies with the good of the commonwealth; and holdeth purely so long as it is good for the people. That, no laws made by the power or agreement of men, can judge betwixt Subject and sovereign, in dispute of the common good and government; but only the tribunals of God and Nature, or Divinity and the science of politics: And therefore, the maxims of Law have no force in these questions; Now, if Princes lose their pretences by the force of Nature, it is ridiculous for private men to build hopes, upon rotten titles of ages long passed, upon weak maxims of Law, after Nature, by her revolutions, hath cast all Law and mortal acts and agreements.  
And so is finished this small Treatise, to the profit of them who are able and willing to make use of it. Some, by the method I have used, something new in moral discourses, may imagine the Doctrine I deliver, to be more subtle in explication then solid in practice: But, let them either look into the Causes of governments, or the Effects; they will see nature and practice both conspire to give testimony to the truth. The cause of all moral effects, if morally carried, are the end and intention for which they are sought and endeavoured after; This is manifest to be the well-being of particulars under a government. The practices, which are the Effects, will show, That governments break when it is not well with the Subjects, but they are oppressed by the governor; That wise and good governors are forced sometimes to break disordered rules which hinder their free administration; That people, as it were, forced by natural changes, violate the promises made to their governors, cast them off when they think them pernicious, and proceed against them, per viam facti, as they speak in the schools, not by laws, which cannot be made for such matters. These are, in a manner, the whole subject of the precedent Discourse.  
FINIS.