AN ANSWER TO Dr. SHERLOCK's Vindication OF THE Case of Allegiance DUE TO SOVEREIGN POWERS, Which he made in REPLY to an ANSWER to a late PAMPHLET, ENTITLED, Obedience and Submission to the Present Government, Demonstrated from Bishop Overal's CONVOCATION-BOOK: with a POSTSCRIPT, in Answer to Dr. Sherlock's Case of Allegiance, etc.  
By the same Author.  
London, Printed for Joseph Hindmarsh. 1692.   

A Catalogue of BOOKS Printed for Joseph Hindmarsh.  

PArey's Surgery.  
Davela's History of the Civil Wars of France.  
Evelyn's Sylva.  
Saunderson's Sermons.  
Bishop Brownrigg's Sermons.  
Snape's Anatomy of an Horse.  
Dr. Raleighs Sermons.  
Dr. Outrams Sermons.  
Mackenzie against Stillingfleet.  
Discourse of Primogeniture.  
Practical Rule of Christian Piety.  
L'Estrange's Tully's Offices.  
Doctor's Physician, or Dialogues concerning Health.  
The whole Art of Converse.  
Arbitrary Government displayed.  
Hudibras; Fourth Part.  
Alamode Phlebotomy, or a Discourse of Blood-letting.  
Eutropuis in English, or a Breviary of the R. History.  
Chalmer's Spellingbook.  
Behn's Miscellany Poems.  
The Whole Duty of Man in French.  
The Works of Mr. John Oldham.  
Tate's Miscellany Poems.  
Maimbourgh's Prerogative of the Church of Rome.  
The History of Count Zozimus.  
Discourse of Monarchy.  
The French Bible.  
The Testament in French.  
Titus Andronicus.  
Majestas intemerate.  
Dr. Pelling's Apostate Protestant.  
Dr. Curtis' Sermon.  
Dr. Allestree's Sermon.  
Sheridon's Case.  
Gouge's Principles.  
Spirit of Meekness.  
Stafford's Trial.  
The History of Passive Obedience Complete, 3 Parts.  
The Case of the Afflicted Scotch Clergy.  
History of the Scotch Persecution.  
Don Sebastion.  
Modern Policy.  
Rebel's Catechism, writ by Dr. Heylin  
Scotch Memorial.  
Proteus Ecclesiasticus.  
Answer to Obedience and Submission to the Present Government, Demonstrated from Bishop Overall:  
Perjured Fanatic.  
Essay on Pride.  
Dr. Talbor of Agues.  
Venice Preserved, a Tragedy.  
eliot against Oates.  
The History of Edward the Third, a Tragedy.  
The Mistake; or False Reports. A Play.  
Slainees Sermon.  
Hindmarsh's Sermon.  
Hool's Vocabulary.  
Erasmus Colloquies. 24 s.  
Ingratitude of a Commonwealth.  
Aristella.  
Castalio's Latin Testament.  
City Politics. Plays.  
Sir Courtly Nice. Plays.  
Banditti. Plays.  
Dame Dobson. Plays.  
The Poet's Complaint of his Muse, by Mr. Otway.  
Seneca's Morals.  
Martin's Letters.  
Disappointment, or, The Mother in Fashion, a Play.  
rolls Loyalty and Peace.  
Hesketh's Sermon.  
Robert's Sermon.  
Loyal Satirist.  
Vindication of the Church of England.  
Pelling's Good Old Way.  
Puffendorfe's History of Popedom.  
Christian Prudence.  
Christianity, a Doctrine of the Cross.  
Historical Relation of the late Presbyterian General Assembly.  
Vindication of the Government of Scotland, during the Reign of King Charles II. By Sr. George Mackenzie.  
The Moral History of Frugality. By Sr. George Mackenzie.    

THE Dr. in●imates, that his Answerer, who writes with great triumph and assurance thinks it unpardonable in him, 
P. 1.  who hath been so weak (by a figure I suppose) as to confess he is not infallible, ever to believe his own senses again. Now if the Dr. thinks it decent to recant in ruffling language, and to propose his new opinions in such a strain of confidence and defiance; he may enjoy his own humour for me, I have once told him my mind about it, and shall give him no farther trouble on that account. And, if he likes it, he may go on and represent some of those men; who not long since stood upon the same bottom with him, and owned the same Principles, only with less heat and violence, by all the spiteful characters and insinuations he can; and at the same time tell the world he is not angry, and complain of rage and venom, changing and confining friendships to a Party. But methinks he might have spared the Answerer for writing with triumph and assurance, if he had done so; except the Dr. can show his Patent, that no body may write so but himself: And I will forgive him, if he can find any thing in my Answer or Postscript, comparable to that Triumphant conclusion of his Vindication; If he (his Answerer) will promise to examine them (his arguments) well before he answers, I shall expect to hear no more of him. Now it is a little of the thickest for a man to boast at this rate, and at the same time to charge his Answerer with writing with Triumph and Assurance.  
In like manner he might have spared the reflection that follows, he tell s me, he shall beg leave to follow his own method, and justify what he hath said in the same order he hath aid it in; And then adds, his (his Answerers) altering of which, has more of art than honesty in it. Now if I had misrepresented his Arguments, or perverted the sense of them, or drawn from them any odious or uncharitable inferences, and with great honesty insinuated that he did not believe a Providence or had inclinations to Rome, 
Vindic. P. 48. 58.  there might have been some colour for this reflection. But if he hath notoriously done all these himself, as will plainly appear in the following discourse, than his own reflection fastens upon him, and he had better have let it alone, for his own sake at least, though it had been civil enough for his Answerer. But some men are very free of their challenges: But when they are answered, they are up in the boughs, and out of all bounds; the Drs. Hypothesis was answered, and there is the plain Dishonesty of the business.  
But as for his Method and Order, 'tis all one to me, he may take which he likes best to justify his Doctrines and Arguments, provided he will but justify them, but that he will not do, and as yet he hath not done; as will appear upon examining what he offers in his vindication.  
The Dr. gins with a Proof from the Observator, 
P. 2.  an admirable Historian to fetch an instance from, 
T●tle of an Usurper Preface.  if he please in his next he may quote Mercurius Politicus or the London Diurnal, but this pretended Letter of King James hath already been so well examined by a learned Author that I have no occasion to concern myself any further with it. But if it were admitted to be true, and not suppositions: There is a great deal of difference between the judgement of King James, as it is expressed in that Letter, and the Doctors; King James expresseth it with words of abatement and caution, you have stumbled upon the threshold of that opinion, which makes God the Author of sin, in saying upon the matter, that even Tyranny is God's Authority; and again you say upon the matter. But the Doctor says it is as sure as can be, and hopes he may be allowed to believe his own senses. As if King James might not have eyes and senses as well as the Doctor: But what King James could not, did not charge directly upon the Convocation, the Doctor plainly declares to be the sense of it, and hath made it the foundation, both of his freedom of thinking, and of writing a Book. Now suppose King James did conceive the expressions of the Convocation had such a tendency, 
Case of Alleg. Preface.  and that upon the matter they might mean so, (which is the utmost can be collected from the words of the Observators Letter) is it impossible, he should afterwards be otherwise informed? And if not, I wonder how the Convocation went on, and proceeded to pass the Book in the upper house of Convocation, and pass the other Books in the lower house. And likewise afterwards to pass the Province of York. This could never have been done, except King James had been satisfied, that the words of the Convocation had no such tendency as he seemed to apprehend. For the Letter contains a direct prohibition to proceed, I shall give you orders about it by Mr. Solicitor, and until then medate no more in it. But of this enough and too much, except we had some better account of the Authority of it.  
And therefore let us come (●s the Dr. says) to try the sense of the Convocation, from the Convocation itself.  
The place is this ch. 28. pag 57, The Conu. having given account of the various revolution of Governments brought about by the Providence of God, who for the sins of a Nation or Country altereth their Governments and Governors, transferreth, setteth up and bestoweth Kingdoms, as seemeth best to his heavenly Wisdom. Add these words, and when having attained their ungodly desires (whether ambitious Kings by bringing any Country into their subjection, or disloyal Subjects by their rebellious Rising against their natural Sovereigns) they have established any of the said degenerate forms of Government amongst their People, the Authority either so unjustly gotten or wrung by force, from the true and lawful Possessor, being always God's Authority (and therefore receiving no impeachment by the wickedness of those that have it) is ever (when any such alterations are throughly settled) to be reverenced and obeyed, and the People of all sorts (as well of the Clergy, as of the Laity) are to be subject unto it, not only for wrath but also for Conscience sake.  
He tells us, 
Case of Alleg. p. 5.  he observed in the first place from the words of the Convocation, That those Princes who have no legal right to their Thrones, may yet have God's Authority, which (says he) I proved, because the Convocation speaks of illegal and usurped Powers, and yet affirms, that the Authority exercised by them is God's Authority.  
To this (saith the Doctor) the Author answers, The Doctor will not, 
Postscript p. 3.  but the Convocation distinguishes between the means of acquiring the power, and the power itself, the means of acquiring power, may be very unjust and illegal, and yet the power afterwards may be very legal. But the Doctor resolves they must be all one, and because the Convocation speaks of the ambition of encroaching Kings, and the Rebellion of Subjects, as a means whereby Governments have been altered, therefore by a Government being throughly settled they must mean usurped powers, as if it were impossible for such beginnings afterwards to acquire a Right, and to terminate in a legal Title; and till that is, the Government is as unjust as the Rebellion and encroachment. These I own to be my words, and further that the Doctor concludes rightly from them, when he says, that according to this Author, a Government which is illegally and wickedly begun, when it is legally settled has God's Authority, and this is all that the Convocation meant by it.  
To this the Doctor replies, As for what he says, that I will not distinguish between the means of acquiring Power, and the Power itself; I do not indeed distinguish as he does, but I distinguish as the Convocation does, that the means are wicked, but the Power and Authority is Gods, which is all the distinction the Convocation makes. Very well, and which I pray are these means that are wicked that the Convocation speaks of? I know of none but the wicked means of acquiring the power, as by Rebellion, and ambitious encroachments; and what is the Power and Authority that is God's? The Convocation mentions not other, but a Government throughly settled, and if the Convocation distinguishes between these (as it plainly does) than the Convocation distinguishes as I do, whatever the Doctor distinguishes; and by reason of that distinction, it cannot be concluded from the Convocation, that because they speak of the Ambition of encroaching Kings and the Rebellion of Subjects, as a means whereby Governments have been altered; therefore by a Government being throughly settled, they must needs mean usurped Powers. And this I take to be the ground of the Do●tors assertion, and he hath not yet contradicted it. He tells us (as above) that he observed from the words of the Convocation: That those Princes, who have no legal right to their Thrones, may yet have God's Authority: Which (saith he) I proved, because the Convocation speaks of illegal, and usurped Powers. But that is the Question, which he begs and takes for granted, which yet is the main thing to be proved, and he did not before, nor hath yet offered to prove it. The Convocation speaks indeed of, and condemns the wicked means of acquiring Power; and the Doctor seems from thence to conclude, that by a Government throughly settled, they mean usurped Powers. He says here, 
Vindic. p. 4.  when the Convocation speaks of the settlement of illegal Powers, which began by Ambition and Rebellion; where he manifestly confounds what the Convocation distinguishes, and because they say they began by Ambition and Rebellion, therefore the settlement they speak of must needs be the settlement of illegal Powers; whereas the Convocation speaks not one word of the settlement of illegal Powers; they speak indeed of the settlement of Powers which began by wicked means: But these are two different things, and the Convocation plainly distinguishes them. And such beginnings may afterwards acquire a Right, and terminate in a Legal Title; and that I think is plainly the meaning of the Convocation, and that from this distinction, for they expressly tell us, in this Chapter, 
Convoc. p. 57  that their attempts (to acquire such Governments) of all sorts are wicked and detestable in the sight of God; and if the Government after it is acquired be as unjust as the means, then 'tis likewise as wi●k 4d and detestable in the si●●● of God; and than it follows, that we can no more become parties to the Government, than to the Rebellion and encroachment; for to say that a man may, (and much more is bound to) support, maintain, a●d abett wickedness, is such a Position in Divinity, that I never before met with. I know the Doctor hath a fine notion, and talks of God's Authority; but that God's Authority was ever actually joined with a thing, the very being of which is wicked and detestable in his sight, is a notion that a man may safely conclude never entered into the heads of the Convocation.  
This is the reason for which I mentioned the distinction, and I thought I had expressed it plainly enough, but the Doctor is only pleased to repeat and take no further notice of it; but instead of that, desires me to show him, where the Convocation says, that a Government which is illegally acquired cannot be throughly settled, till it becomes legal. But what need is there for that? It is not the custom of all Persons (howsoever learned) to express themselves in such a peremptory manner as the Dr. does, he tells us indeed, that God cannot make a King except he oblige the People to obey him; but that is not always the manner of the learned, who are contented with affirmative expressions as more modest. But saith the Dr. if this had been their meaning it had been easily said, and had prevented all mistakes about it, which their words without this limitation, are apt to betray men into, say you so, than I doubt a thorough settlement is not so plain a matter as every body can see, and the Doctor's believing his own senses is but a banter: But however they might have easily said it; and if the Doctor's sense had been their meaning might they not as easily have said that? and I wonder which is e●●er said, A Government which is illegally acquired cannot be thoroughly se●●ed, t●●l 〈◊〉 becomes legal, or a Government thoroughly settled by the consent of the People, without or against the consent and actual claim of the Right Heir. This is as ea●●e said, and all the words besides in the Convocation entire, whereas the words the Dr. thinks they might have said cannot be put in, without putting out a great many other, and making an alteration of the whole sentence; so that if the easiness of saying was any reason, it is against him, and they did not mean his sense, because they might have so easily said it, and have prevented all mistakes, but the truth is, this signifies nothing either way, and all it proves is the want of better arguments: The Question is not what they might, but what they have said, and if they have expressed themselves in words importing it, than they have said it, and that they have done so I think I have proved sufficiently. The Dr. does not think so, and therefore adds.  
I believe all unbiass'd men, 
Vindic. p. 4.  who are not prepossessed with other notions, and concerned that the Convocation should be on their side would never dream of our Author's sense of the Convocation; well I cannot tell what men may dream, but I think except they do dream, they cannot agree to the Doctor's sense, for a through settlement, contrary to a legal visible Title actually contested is a thing only in imagination, and never had any real being.  
As for what he says of being concerned that the Convocation should be on their side, I wonder who is most concerned for that; these who do not urge it, nor act upon the Authority of it, although they believe it plainly and evidently justifies, 
Case of All Pres. ib. p. 3  and speaks for them; or he who grounds his liberty and freedom of thinking (in these matters upon it, who produces it to rescue him from the appearance of Singularity, and maintenance of Paradoxes, which otherwise the Doctrines in his Book are not riously ●able ●o, and who neither hath nor pretends to have any other Authority of the Church of England besides. And it is plain the strength of his Cause depends upon it; so that if the being concerned that the Convocation should be on their side, may be apt to bias men in their interpretation of the sense of it, the Doctor if he please may consider it, for it affects no body so much as himself. But let us hear his Reasons.  
For, saith he, If the Convoc. meant no more than our Author says that a Government illegally begun, when it is ●egally settled has G●●s Authority, what a wonderful discovery is this, that legal Princes have God's Authority, for who doubts of this? what need was there to introduce this with such a long pompous Preface of the changes of Government by the Ambition of Princes and the Rebellion of Subjects? for let Governments begin how they will, when they are once legally settled, no man, that I know of, who owns the Authority of any Government to be from God, disputes theirs.  
This I think I am to thank the Dr. for; for though he brings it as an Objection against the Interpretation I have made of the sense of the Convocation, I take it to be a considerable Confirmation of it. For though I do not believe that no body disputes this nor that the Convocation thought so (as we shall see presently) yet if it were so it makes nothing against my Interpretation, but for it. For where is the harm of interpreting the meaning of the Convocation according to the general sense of mankind? And if no man who owns the Authority of any Government to be from God, disputes that Governments let them begin how they will, when they are once legally settled, have God's Authority; why does not the Convocation mean so too, if their words will bear it, which the Dr. owns; 
Vindic. p. 5.  and I wonder which is most likely to be their sense, that which no body disputes, or that which every body disputes, for I hope we may think, without any Reflection upon them, that a wise and grave Convocation were not as ready to maintain Paradoxes as the Doctor is. And what an admirable Objection is this? What wonderful Discovery is this? who doubts of this? As if a Convocation sat for nothing else but to make wonderful discoveries; and if this signified any thing it is an Argument against half the Book: And all the plain and undoubted Truths they deliver, we must not believe to be their sense, and for this weighty reason, because no body d●sputes them.  
But then the Dr. wonders at my reason, 
p. 5. Answ. p. 21.  viz. Lest it should be thought the wicked ways of attaining this Right was a prejudice to the Right itself, and people should from thence take occasion to rebel, and disturb all the Governments in the world, because they could not show an express order from God, or derive the pedigree of their Governments from Adam or Noah, to prevent the terrible confession that such a Notion would make in the world, they say that the wicked ways of attaining it, or the wickedness of the persons that have it, is no impeachment to the Right itself, but when it is attained it is God's Authority and aught to be obeyed.— V●ry well, these I own to be my words, and where is the occasion to wonder at them?  
That is to say (he says) a wise and grave Convocation write a whole Chapter to confute a Nation without naming it, or giving any hi●t at it, which if ever it entered into any mad man's head, yet never did, never can disturb any Government, till a Nation is fit for Bedlam than to be directed by a Convocation. This is a terrible Objection, for I hope a grave and wise Convocation did not sit to make directions for Bedlam. But what now if by all this Rant about Bedlam and Madness the Dr. means only moral madness (a new sort of Madness to agree with a moral Incapacity) which consists in vicious, absurd, and unreasonable Opinions. And then I hope it may not be so utterly impossible but a wise and grave Convocation may take them into consideration. I confess I then did not, nor yet do think them otherwise than very foul and unreasonable Opinions; but for all that, I do not think but that Governments may, and actually have been disturbed by them, let the Dr. wonder as much as he please. For there are no Opinions so wild, especially in matters of Government, but what have always had too many Followers. But to let that matter alone, let us inquire into the Opinion, whether there were not then or since such Opinions in the world, that plainly centred in this, That Governors were resistable, because they could not derive their Government from Adam or Noah, or by God's express nomination; and I shall leave it with him, whether such a Notion did or can disturb any Government. What does he think of the Original Power of the People and Government being nothing else but compact. This is always finally resolved into this; for when the Advocates of that Opinion are urged with the patriarchal Authority, with the Authority of Noah, and which was derived to his Children, and with God's express nomination, (which they neither can nor do deny) that in these cases Government did not proceed from the People. The Answer always is, Let them show their descent from Noah, or Gods express nomination, and then they shall be allowed to have the same Authority. 
Their present Maj. Gou. proved to be throly settled p. 8.  And there is an Author who hath published a Book since the Doctor's Vindication, and it seems designed in defence of him, who expresses it thus, I suppose all Civil Governments must have their Original either from Submission or from Paternal Authority, because no Prince living can make good his claim as the direct their from Noah. So that Government being founded in compact is always defended by such Reasonings, and is always ultimately resolved into it; and whether that be a notion fit only for a Mad man's head, I must leave to the Doctor's own determination.  
But to seek no farther, the Dr. himself hath said enough of all Conscience in this point; for to clear his own Hypothesis he tells us concerning prescription, That how long soever it is, 
Vindic. p. 7. Case of Alleg. p. 23, 24.  it is Usurpation still: That natural Authority (Paternal and Patriarchal) is so sacred that no man hath Authority to give it away; that if choice and consent of the People makes a Prince, no man is a Subject but who consents to be so, and if Subjects give their Prince Authority, they may take it away; that if Conquest gives a Right, than force, the most unjust force, is Right; that submission is only a forced and after consent not to make a King, but to own him who hath made himself King; that an hereditary Right is either Usurpation which can give no Right or a Right by Law, i. e. by the consent of the People, which (as he says) be observed before could not be done.  
Now let us suppose there are men, who maintain these Arguments and Reasonings, (and the Dr. knows this is no such wild supposition;) let us suppose likewise that they do not believe the Doctor's Hypothesis (and without any great venture a man may suppose that a thousand to one does not, and it is plain that all those who use these very arguments for Resistance do not) and then we are come to this very point before us, for every one of these Arguments are finally resolved into this, that Princes are not irresistible, because they cannot derive their Governments from Noah nor pretend to God's express nomination; so that the Doctor of all men, hath the least reason to wonder, who hath taken such mighty pains to display all the rebellious Hypotheses which stand purely upon this bottom. And in truth these very Opinions and Arguments (excepting our own and the age before us) never swarmed more than in the time that Convocation sat; and there is abundance of this fine Doctrine in Junius Brutus, in a book de jure Magistratus in subditos, in Parsons on the Succession, and Buchanan de jure regni, and some of them are collected by Archbishop Bancroft in his dangerous positions, who was the most reverend Precedent of this Convocation. And all these were published not long before they far. And therefore it was no such great break as the Doctor imagines to think the Convocation had a direct respect to these rebellious Principles which at that time pestered the world.  
But the Doctor says whereas the difficulties occasioned by the changes and revolutions of Government, especially when a rightful Prince is dispossessed, and another settled in the throne, are very great, and worthy of the determination of a Convocation to direct men's Consciences in such cases. Well! but suppose these great and worthy businesses which the Doctor hath written two books about, the Convocation thought them to be mere Bedlam Principles, and which no man in his right mind would ever have disputed, must they needs determine it because the Doctor thinks it worthy of them? There was some reason for the other, for Junius Brutus etc. were rise in the world; but the Doctor's Case of Alleg. and Vindication had not then seen the light.  
But the truth is, they have determined this point sufficiently, in the Case of Joash and Athaliah, and in this Chapter too, and the Question between us is, Whether the sense that I have given, or the sense which the Doctor hath given, is their Determination; and I am content as the Doctor says to let every one judge which is the most probable account.  
2. His second Reason is, When the Convoc. speaks of the settlement of illegal powers, which began by Ambition and Rebellion, it is manifestly unreasonable, unless it had been expressed, to expound this of a legal Settlement by acquiring a new legal Right. Settlement, I grant, as our Author says, is a Term of Law, and used by Lawyers of a legal Settlement, and must always in reason be understood so in Law, when the contrary is not expressed: but yet a firm and stable possession without Right, must be confessed to be a Settlement too, though not a rightful Settlement. I suppose our Author will not deny but that the Government was settled in fact under the three Henry's, though in his sense it was not a legal Settlement.  
I answer, the Dr. plainly begs the Question, for saith he, When the Convocation speaks of the Settlement of illegal Powers, and when is that I wonder? When does the Convoc. speak of any such Settlement. That is the main Question, which the Dr. will take for granted, but will not, and I believe cannot prove it; and yet for all that he not only builds upon it, but makes it serve as a proof that the Convoc. by Settlement meant an illegal Settlement: And this is pure reasoning, The Convoc. meant an illegal Settlement because they meant an illegal Settlement; and that is because the Dr. will have it so; for he does not off●r the least shadow of proof: And all that he says is which began by Rebellion and Ambition: as if the beginnings of a Government and the Settlement of it w re all one; as if becau ● t●e Convoc. in this Chapter speaks or Ambition, Rebellion, and wi●ked means whereby Governments have been acquired, therefore by the Settlement afterwards, they must needs mean the Settlement of illegal Powers. Where is the consequence or coherence of such arguings? and the Dr. may as well say, that the Convocation teaches that Rebellion is God's Authority, as that they speak of the Settlement of illegal Powers If therefore the Doctor will speak to the purpose, let him prove his Principle; let him prove that when the Convocation speaks of a Settlement, they speak of the Settlement of illegal Powers: but it is a wild sort of proceeding, to take the main point in Controversy for granted and then to argue from it, as if it had never been disputed: at this rate a man may make the Convocation-book or any other book say what we please. The Doctor knows that I deny that the Convoc. speaks of the Settlement of illegal Powers, and that on the contrary, Powers, so long as they continue illegal, cannot (in the sense of the Convoc.) be said to be settled.  
But (says the Dr.) it is manifestly unreasonable, unless it had been expressed, to expound this of a legal Settlement, and is it nor expressed? If Settlement means a legal Settlement than it is expressed, as full as the sense of words can express it. But here the Doctor shifts and evades, and does not give a full Answer. He grants that Settlement is a term of Law, and used by Lawyers of a legal Settlement, and must always in reason be understood so in Law, where the contrary is not expressed: But is this my Answer. 
Answ. p. 18.  I grant ●hat I said Settlement was a term of Law; but is that all? did I not say moreover, that most men understand the sense of it, and express themselves by it accordingly? and d d I no● say before the natural and usual Construction of the words, and wh●● is usu●●●y understood by them. But here the Doctor confines it only to the Law, as if there were another and distinct sense of it with resp ct to civil Possessions in common acceptation, which is contrary both to my meaning and to my words. I thought I had asked him a fair Question, 
Postscript p. 1.  w en I desired him to show me any one approved Lawyer, or Civilian (who are supposed to speak the most properly in such matters) or any Historian that ever delivered such a sense of these words, or that ever affirmed or in a mere narratory uva, declared t●at an usurped Possession was a thorough Settl meant or any Settlement at all, when there was a rightful and legal Title in being against it, and that Title actually contesting— But not a word of that. but there is another sense (which no body ever heard of) that is more fit for the Doctor's turn, and that is reason enough that the Convocation must mean so by them, though those Expressions never meant so either before or since: And which is the most pleasant of all, he te●ls ●●e very magisterially, That it argues great perverseness of mind, to reject that sense of the word which is proper to the subject to which it is applied, for such a sense as is fo eign and unnatural. 
Postscript p. 2.  Now the Subject to which these words through Settlement are applied is Government; and I had desired him to sh●w me any approved Author that ever said that Tyrannus sine titulo (the Case the ●●r. puts in his book) w●s a Government throughly settled, or any true Government at all. But no matter for that, the Dr. is resolved to have a Settlement of his own, to serve his own purpose. Let the world say what they will, the notion that I give of a Settlement is that it denotes a rightful and peaceable Possession, which every body, and the Dr. himself owns to be a Settlement, though he will not allow it in the present case, and I cannot blame him, because it overthrows his Hypothesis; the Doctor's notion is a Settlement of Possession without Right, nay against it; nay further against a visible and undeniable Right actually prosecuted, though he cannot (and his answerer put it to him to) show that any Author ever gave such an account of a Settlement, either with respect to any usurped Possession, or with respect to the particular case of Usurped Powers. And I shall leave it with the Reader, which is the most foreign and unnatural sense, and consequently (according to him) which argues the greatest perverseness of mind; to interpret it in the usual, vulgar, and universally received acceptation, or to coin a new sense of it to fit a present turn, and in which it was never understood before.  
The Dr. tells us, to confirm his notion, That it is plain that the right and settlement of government are two very different things, for they may be parted; the first relates to the Title, the second to the settled Possession, and exercise of government. And whenever a Rightful King is dispossessed, our Author must grant, that his settlement is gone, though not his Right; well, if I must grant it I must, and what then? Then saith the Dr. if Right and Settlement may be parted, I desire to know, why there may not be a Settlement without Right, and then it is ridicuous to conclude, that Settlement must always signify Right; and, I wonder, whoever said that Settlement either always or at all signified Right; it signifies a Rightful and quiet possession, and that is neither Right singly, nor Possession singly, but both together, joined with quiet from other pretences, and this is an answer to what the Dr. desires to know, why if Right and Settlement may be parted, there may nor be a Settlement without Right, because Settlement always includes and supposes Right, but on the contrary Right does not include nor suppose a Settlement. But this is nothing but fallacy, and by this way of reasoning, a Man may prove any compounded thing to be without the necessary parts of its composition. A House consists of Walls and other things, but if the Dr. undertakes the business, he can prove a house to be without Walls; for it is plain, that a Wall and a House may be parted, and if a House and a Wall may be parted, then why may not a House be without a Wall; but let us try it in his own Concessions, the page before he grants, that in the Lawyer's sense, Settlement signifies a Legal Settlement; now it is plain (in that sense) that Right and Settlement may be parted; And whenever a Rightful Possessor is dispossessed, the Doctor must grant that his Settlement is gone, though not his Right, and if (in the Lawyer's sense) Right and Settlement may be parted, then (in that sense) Settlement may be without Right: Which, notwithstanding is contrary to what the Doctor himself acknowledges. But all this is trifling and fallacious arguing, à Divisis ad composit a, because the part may be without the whole, therefore the whole may be without the part, or because the whole includes all the parts, therefore every part includes the whole. And how ridiculous soever it may be to conclude, that settlement signifies Right, it is not ridiculous to conclude, that the Dr. pays us with Sophistry instead of Arguments.  
The Doctor goes on; Nay the addition of thorough plainly refers Settlement to Possession, and not to Right, for there are no degrees of Right, no more than there are of Truth. Now whatever another man might have said, the Dr. cannot fairly say this, without contradicting himself: For he tells us over and over, that two Persons may have a Right to the same thing, the Usurper hath a Divine Right, the dispossessed King a Legal Right to the Government. And it is plain that these are not the same, nor equal Rights, and therefore (according to the Doctor there are degrees of Right, and degrees of Right to Government too. The Usurper hath a thorough Right for all the People are his Subjects, and the other hath a Right to catch it, if he can get it. This last, I must confess is a pretty kind of Right, and such as no body ever heard of before, like the Doctor's notion of a Settlement: But it does not concern me to answer that, let the Dr. make it out as well as he can. In the mean time, suppose there are no degrees of Right; are there no degrees of quiet and peace, may not a Government be more or less interrupted in the Possession? and are there no degrees of Evidence? may not the Right to a Government be more or less apparent? and this is the import of throughly, 
Answ. p. 18.  when such a Right is enjoyed plainly, evidently without any contradiction or objection; as I had plainly said before, though the Doctor takes no notice of it.  
As for what the Doctor says, I suppose the Author will not deny, but that the Government was settled in fact under the three Henry's, though in his sense it was not a Legal Settlement. If the Doctor will believe the Author of the unreasonableness of the new Separation. He says, that the Title to the Crown, with respect to the two Houses of York and Lancaster was disputable, and the Doctor knows there is a wide difference with respect to the Possession, when the Title is doubtful; and when the Legal Right and Title is so far from being disputed, that it is evidently acknowledged. But whether the Doctor will believe that Author or no: This I have to say, that whatever Settlement there was in the Reigns of the three Henries it was sub ratione juris upon the supposition of Right. Hen. 4. claimed the Crown upon pretence of a Legal Right, and he was admitted on that pretence; and there is a great difference, between supposing a Legal Title, and upon that supposition owning and submitting to it; and when there is not the least pretence, nay when the Legal Title (as in the Doctor's Hypothesis is plainly owned not to be in the possessor. After Edward 4. had reigned nine years, and was then forced to fly out of his Kingdom; and Hen. 6. was again possessed of the Throne: His Possession though owned by a Parliament was not a Settlement; and for this reason, because there was a visible and apparent Right in Edward 4. against him and that Right actually prosecuted; and it is plain the Nation thought so, when the very acts of Parliament made in the time of that Possession, were declared void ab initio and razed out of the Records. But indeed according to the Doctor's Doctrine, Hen. 6. had God's Authority, and Edward had lost it; and moreover that the Parliament that deposed Hen. 6. in behalf of the Right Heir, set up a Humane against a Divine Right, and were every jot a● unjust, rebellious, and unrighteous, for deposing Henry, as the Parliament was that deposed Richard 2. which would look as strange in English Law and History, as the Doctor's Hypothesis does in Divinity.  
3. 
P. 6.  The Doctor considers what I make necessary to a thorough Settlement of such Powers as begin by Usurpation and Rebellion. 
Answ. p. 19 27.  And that is in short, A Right to the Government, acquired by the Death or Session of the Person in whom the Right was, as was the Case in this Chapter, the variations of Government, the four Monarchies, and the Kings of Babylon over the Jews. And by Prescription which is the possession of a 100 years, as I learned from Bishop Buckeridge, so that (says he) to make a Legal Settlement of a Government illegally begun, the Rightful Prince, and all his Heirs must die, or resign, or the Usurper, and his Heirs must Reign about an 100 years. Now this business of Prescription by an hundred years' Possession, the Doctor perhaps may think it sounds well, and it may be he has something to say to it, and that may be the reason he repeats it so often in his Book. And I shall once for all give him this Answer; That indeed, I quoted Bishop Buckeridge, and he quoted Gregory Tholosanus, and perhaps the Bishop was of his mind. 
Answ. p. 20.  But all that I said was that a Right is acquired by Prescription, without determining how many years went to make a Prescription; whether 60 or an hundred, or the memory of man; it is all one to me, and makes no manner of alteration in what I delivered. It is sufficient that Prescription makes a Legal Title: And that it does so we have the concurrent judgement of all Ages and all Laws, and to deny it is to affront the universal sense and practice of mankind. And let the Doctor tell me what is the meaning and use of that word in the Laws and amongst men, and he will find it means a Title by Prescription. He says indeed, That a Settlement by Prescription, he does not well understand, and what is that to me or to the Question? all men else understand it, and it is declared by all Laws, and that is enough for any man to acquiesce in it, though the Doctor does not understand it, or though he may spin Cobwebs, and by art and subtlety entangle the plainest things. Does he think that all the Laws in the World were made by his understanding? or because he can make some sophistical objections against it; therefore we must forsake the stated Rules of Law, and tread in untrodden paths to gratify his understanding.  
And here the Doctor hath left out part of my Answer; 
Answ. p. ●●.  for to what the Doctor repeated about a Right to a Government, being acquired by Death, Session, or Prescription: I added, Now all mankind are agreed that a Right to a Government by these way● may be attained, and though the ways that are used to attain that Ri●ht, are always unjust (as the Conv●●●ion say, by Ambition, Rebellion, etc.) yet when that Right is attained, these Governments respectively are then lawful Governments, and aught to be obeyed.— And this the Doctor takes no notice of, though it is a reasonable answer, to all his objections about Prescription. For if all mankind are agreed that a Right to a Government by these ways may be attained; then little objections signify nothing, fixed and stated rules lose nothing of their validity, because a disputer can embroil them by wit and artifice. He is a bold man, that will oppose his single judgement to the World, and say that Prescription does not make a Title, when all Laws say it does.  
And this likewise is a considerable reason for my interpretation of a thorough Settlement, and against the Doctors: For it is certainly very reasonable to expound the Convocation, in a sense that concurs with the general judgement of mankind about Government; it is (as the Doctor allows) agreed by all men, that a Government by what ill means soever attained, upon the acquisition of Right is a lawful Government, and aught to be obeyed. But for Usurpation that hath no Right, nay actually opposes Right; those that have asserted obedience was due to such a Government, have been so very few in any age, and so inconsiderable, that the Dr. (though provoked to it) either cannot, or else is ashamed to name them: So that if a thorough Settlement might be understood in the Doctor's sense, and without Right, yet if it might mean also a Settlement by the acquisition of Right, it is plainly more reasonable to interpret that to be the sense of the Convocation; for what reason is there to put a singular sense upon their words, if they will bear a received one? what reason is there to make them deliver a new doctrine contrary to the sense of mankind, when their words may be fairly reconciled to a Doctrine generally received, and about which there is no controversy: But let us hear the Doctor's Arguments against it He observes, 
P. 7.  1. That all the Convocation says relates to the visible and actual alterations of Governments and Governors, and translation of Kingdoms brought about by the wickedness of men by divine providence, etc. Now (says he) this is matter of fact not of Right; and his reason is, unless all alterations of Government are Rightful and Legal. Now this indeed would be something if the Convocation had required us to pay obedience to all alterations of Government: But they do it with this limitation, when such alterations are throughly settled, and if they had thought all alterations of Government were to be obeyed, it had been impertinent to add when they are throughly settled; and I wonder, from whence he draws this Conclusion: And therefore the Settlement of such alterations is an actual not legal Settlement of them; for suppose the alterations are matter of fact, and not of Right, does it follow therefore that the Settlement of these alterations, are matter of fact and not of Right too. Alterations and the Settlement of them are two very different things; for by Settlement their very nature is altered, and they receive a new Character, and there is Duty and Allegiance belonging to them, when there was none before. And it is absurd and inconsequent to argue from the nature of the Alterations, to the nature of the Settlement, which puts them into a new State, and  them with Authority, and gives them a Right to Homage and Subjection; now a thorough Settlement either altars the nature of such alterations, or it does not, if not, then how comes Allegiance to be a duty, to alterations throughly settled, and not to these which are not so; if it does alter their nature and property, then how comes an Argument from the nature of such alterations, to affect the notion of the through Settlement of them? The Dr. adds, This brings the dispute to matter of sense (His eyes I suppose) for if such alterations of Government, and translation of Kingdoms may be made and settled without the Death, Session, etc. and Prescription, than they are not necessary to the Settlement the Convocation speaks of. I suppose that which follows he intends for a Reason; for there may be an actual and visible Settlement without it, which is all that is required to an actual and visible translation of Kingdoms: And that is all the Convocation intended; That is to say, you must believe the Doctor whether he gives any reason or no: For how does he prove, that there may be an actual and visible Settlement without Right, or that Kingdoms may be translated without it? I grant that the Settlement that translates Kingdoms, is actual and visible, and so it must be if it be a Settlement, but if the Doctor will give other People leave to believe their eyes as well as he. His Settlement is neither Actual nor Visible, for it is no Settlement at all. But for all that the Doctor adds, he who will venture to say that a new Prince can't be actually and visibly settled in the Throne, while the old Rightful King is living and makes his claim, shall dispute by himself for me; now this is the whole dispute, and 'tis just as if he had said, if you will not grant what I magisterially affirm, I will dispute no longer: A most admirable and grave Conclusion.  
2. The Doctor says, The Convocation expressly teaches, that the Authority, which is God's Authority, and must be reverenced and obeyed, when such alterations are throughly settled is the Authority which is unjustly gotten or wrung by force from the true and lawful Possessor; Well the Convocation plainly says so, and what then? then (says he) it is plain it is not a Legal Authority by the Death or Session of the Rightful King; for we are to obey it as God's Authority, though it be wrung by force from the true and lawful Possessor; well so far is right, but he adds, and though the present Possessor should have no other visible Title to it, but such unjust force: But where had the Doctor these last words? They are fit enough for his purpose, but the Convocation hath not a word of it, nor any thing like it. They speak indeed of Authority gotten and wrung by force, but do they say that that is any reason why it ought to be obeyed and reverenced? nothing like it; but only when alterations are throughly settled, and is it possible to believe, that by throughly settled they mean nothing but force? The Doctor himself does not think so; for he says, the consent of the People makes a Settlement, and that is something more than force, and therefore according to him, there must be something else visible besides force, before it is a duty to obey such alterations. And then it follows, That the present Possessor must have some other visible Title besides such unjust force. But the Doctor refers us to the words of the Convocation: The Authority either so unjustly gotten or wrung by force from the true and lawful Possessor being always God's Authority (and therefore receiving no impeachment by the wickedness of those that have it) is ever (when any such alterations are throughly settled) to be reverenced and obeyed, etc. Now (says the Doctor very triumphantly) let any man who understands Grammar construe this otherwise if he can. Now I will renounce my understanding in Grammar, if I do not construe it otherwise than he does, and not only so, but plainly show, that his Construction is both false, and also ungrammatical. He says, what Authority is that which must be obeyed and reverenced? it is (saith the Convocation) the Authority unjustly gotten, or wrung by force, from the true and lawful Possessor. Very well, so far we are agreed, he adds, And therefore not a new Legal Authority gained by Death, Session, or a long Prescription: And does the Doctor call this Grammatical Construction? This is the only thing in controversy, and he draws it from the words by inference, or consequence, and are inferences and consequences Grammatical Constructions? And what does he mean by this inference? And therefore not a new Legal Authority, what then? might it not be the old Legal Authority gained by a new Right to it; and why I wonder, might not the Right as well as the Authority be gained from the Possessor? But the Grammatical Construction is directly against him; what Authority is that which must be obeyed and reverenced? it is (says the Convocation) the Authority unjustly gotten or wrung by force from the true and lawful Possessor. And what Authority is that which is wrung from the true and lawful Possessor? it is the Legal Authority; for that is what the true and lawful Possessor was possessed of, and which only could be wrung from him. The Doctor infers, and therefore not a new Legal Authority, and much more sure, and therefore not a new illegal Authority. The Doctor proceeds, What is God's Authority which we must obey? it is no other than 〈◊〉 Authority unjustly gotten or wrung by force, etc. which can receive no impeachment by the wickedness of those who have it. Thus far we are right again, he adds, By what wickedness? Their wicked and ungodly and violent means of getting, and having it for the Convocation, speaks of no other wickedness but the wickedness of Usurpation. And here we are got to inference again, and the only thing in controversy is drawn from the words, and that unjustly. But let us see his Grammar; and I would gladly know, where the Doctor places the stress of this Construction? whether upon the means of getting it, or upon the having it, if upon the wicked means his Construction is true, though not Grammatical: But that is not to his purpose, and no body disputes the violent and wicked means of getting it, and the Authority after it is got, may be legal enough for all that. But if upon the having it (which is the only thing in controversy) his Construction is neither Grammatical, nor true; not Grammatical, for he construes a Substantive by an Adjective or Adverb, and transposes the words; and I wonder by what Rules of Grammar: The wickedness of these that have it, is to be construed their wicked and ungodly having it. He may call it Paraphrase, or Exposition, but he can never say it is Grammatical Construction: And as it is not Grammatical, so also it is not true, for it is not the sense of the Convocation, for they say nothing of the wicked having it, but of the wicked means of getting it they do, as more than once in this Chapter, and expressly their wicked attempts detestable in the sight of God. And therefore I ask, as the Doctor does, By what wickedness? the wickedness of their attempts to g●in the Government by Rebellion and Encroachment; for this is all the wickedness the Convocation speaks of, and not the wickedness of Usurpation as the Doctor is resolved to have it, though the Convocation hath not one single word of it. And if the Doctor had exactly repeated this passage it would plainly have appeared; and (to use some of his own language) he hath honestly cited it, but not so honestly repeated it. He repeats it only The Authority unjustly gotten or wrung, etc. But the Convocation says, the Authority so unjustly gotten or wrung, etc. And what does so refer to, but the wick means and attempts to gain the Government they had mentioned before? And this plainly shows what the Convocation meant by the wickedness of those that have it which is no impeachment to God's Authority, and that is not (as the Doctor fancies) their wicked having it, but their so unjustly getting it; and their so unjustly getting it, is their wicked attempts to obtain it. But so is but a small word, and might easily be overlooked, and especially when it spoils both the Doctor's Grammar and his Argument. I hope he will hereafter forgive me a slip of a Particle, about which he so unmercifully treats me, and that without reason or justice, as we shall see hereafter. In the mean time the Doctor's Grammar and Logic together affords us these admirable Doctrines.  
1. That God's Authority and a Divine Right, are actually annexed to actual wickedness and unrighteousness: For the stress of the Doctor's Construction lies in their wicked having it, i. e. their very being in Power is wicked, their very having it is wicked and ungodly; and that is, their wickedness, injustice, and unrighteousness is God's Authority.  
2. That a man Possesses a thing wickedly which God gives him, and which is not all, but that he would possess the very same thing justly, if men gave it him; if upon the Death, or Session of the Right Heir, &c A Prince acquires a Right, he then certainly legally and justly possesses the Throne; But if God only gives it him, than he hath it wickedly.  
3. That men are bound in Conscience to support and maintain a wicked and unjust Possessor, even in his wicked and unjust Possession; and which is yet more, even to the manifest wrong, and in direct opposition to the Right owner.  
These are Doctrines suited well enough to the Doctor's Hypothesis; But it is no great Credit to any Notions, that they cannot be maintained, but by dishonouring God, and breaking up the foundations of all Righteousness and Justice in the world.  
The Doctor tell us, He proceeded (in the Case of Allegiance) to prove the same thing from other Testimonies of the Convocation Book: and of the Two first that he mentioned he says, I thought fit to take no notice of. And it is true I did not; and the Doctor has Reason to thank me for it. 
Case of Alleg. p. 6. Vindic. p. 9 Convoc. p. 46.  They are these they teach, that the Lord (in advancing Kings to their Thrones) is not bound to those Laws which he prescribeth others to observe. And therefore commanded Jehu a Subject, to be anointed King over Israel, of purpose to punish the Sins of Ahab and Jezebel. But the Doctor seeing that this was by God's express nomination, and therefore nothing at all to his purpose, he adds, And what he did by Prophets in Israel, by an express nomination of the Person, he does by his Providence in other Kingdoms, set up Kings when he sees fit, without any regard to the Right of Succession or Legal Titles. 
Convoc. p. 53.  For as they tell us elsewhere, The Lord both may and is able to overthrow any Kings or Emperors, notwithstanding any Claim, Right, Title or Interest, which they can challenge, to their Countries, Kingdoms or Empires. And can the Doctor say, that by these words the Convocation means, God's making Kings by Providence? or that they make any such inference from them, that a Person possessed of the Throne without Right, and contrary to it, is made a King by God, and aught to be obeyed? If the Doctor can say this, I have done wondering at any interpretations he makes either of the Convocation Book, or of the Scripture in favour of his Hypothesis. For the Convocation in this very place does not only not refer to God's making Kings by Providence, but is as express against the Doctor, as any thing can be. For the Convocation, speaking of, and justifying the facts of Jehu and Ahud in kill King Joram and Eglon, as having an express warrant from God, and being made Kings by God's express nomination, they immediately add, Both which examples (being but in number two throughout the Histories of all the Princes, Judges, and Kings either of Judah or Israel) do make it known to us, that although the Lord may, and is able to overthrow any Kings or Emperors, notwithstanding any Claim, Right, Title or Interest, which they can challenge to their Countries, Kingdoms, or Empires; yet foreseeing in his Heavenly Wisdom and Divine Providence, what mischief private men, under colour of these Examples, might otherwise have pretended, or attempted against their Sovereigns (as being either discontented of themselves, or set into fury by other malicious persons) he did so order and dispose of all things in the Execution of these such his extraordinary Judgements, as that thereby it may plainly appear to any (that should not wilfully hoodwink himself) never to be lawful for any person whatsoever, upon the pretence of any Revelation, Inspiration, or Commandment from his Divine Majesty, either to touch the Person of his Sovereign, or to bear Arms against him, except God should first advance the said person from his private Estate, and make him a King or an Absolute Prince to succeed his late Master, In his Kingdom or Principality. And what they thought of such advancement with respect to other times, is evident in the Canon to this Chapter; where they say with respect to the same matter; Except (which is impossible) he should first prove his credit, in so affirming to be equal with the Scriptures, and that men were bound as strictly to believe him in saying, that God called and stirred him up to the perpetrating that fact, as we are bound to believe the Holy Ghost (by whose instinct the Scriptures were written) when he telleth us, that God raised up Ahud for a Saviour to his people. And more to the same purpose, 
Convoc. p. 48.  If any man shall affirm, that it is lawful for any Captain or Subject, high or low whosoever, to bear Arms against their Sovereign, or to lay violent hands upon his Sacred Person, by the example of Jehu (nothstanding that any Prophet or Priest should incite them thereunto, by Unction or any other means whatsoever, except first that it might plainly appear, that there are now any such Prophets sent extraordinarily from God himself, with sufficient and special authority in that behalf; and that every such Captain and Subject, so incited, might be assured, that God himself had in express words and by name, required and commanded him so to do) he doth greatly err.  
From whence these Two things are obvious.  
1. That these words, The Lord both may, and is able to overthrow Kings, etc. notwithstanding any Right, etc. plainly refer to the facts of Ahud and Jehu, and have an immediate respect to God's setting up Kings by his express nomination, and in the Kingdom of Israel also, and therefore very improperly alleged to prove, that what God did by Prophets in Israel by express nomination, he does by his Providence in other Kingdoms. For that that is the sense of the Convocation, the Doctor proves, for that they tell us elsewhere, that the Lord may and is able, etc. And yet this very elsewhere, has the same reference with the other, and respects the Kingdom of Israel, and God's express nomination. And where is the Consequence? God by express nomination made Jehu and Ahud Princes, and authorised them to kill the Kings, whose Subjects they were before; and he may do so again if he please: therefore if any person, can by Providence get the possession of another Prince's Throne, he is a King of God's making, as much as Jehu or Ahud; and has as good authority to act as they had.  
2. They limit and confine the practice upon this Doctrine, to God's express Nomination. They do not mention them, either to allow or establish a general practice upon them, but to prevent it. And it seems as if they designed to prevent that very Inference the Doctor draws from them: The Doctor infers, That therefore, whoever is possessed of Power by Providence, hath God's Authority: And they infer the clean contrary, that notwithstanding a special and express Warrant from him is necessary; and granting that the Lord may and is able to overthrow Kings, etc. notwithstanding, etc. yet no man had any Authority from him, except he was expressly and by name appointed by him: And the Convocation is so far from substituting Providence in the place of God's nomination, that in the very Case upon the account of which they mention these words, they say, there can be no Authority without God's express warrant, and that such a warrant is now impossible. So that the Doctor's Interpretation and Inference is directly contrary to that of the Convocation. And by this time I suppose the Doctor may be satisfied there was no such need to call for an Answer, and to tell me, I did not think sit to take notice of these Passages. And I do think fit yet further to take notice, that he hath plainly altered the state of the matter with respect to these passages: In his Case of Allegiance he produced this passage to prove, 
Case of Alleg. p 6.  That what God did by his Prophets in Israel, by an express nomination of the Person, he does by his Providence in other Kingdoms, set up Kings as he sees fit, without any regard to the Right of Succession, or Legal Titles. 
Vindic. p. 9  But now in his Vindication, we have another account: For (says he) if they do not prove God's Sovereign Authority, to remove and pull down, the most Rightful Kings, and give his Authority to those who have no Right, and place them in the Throne, of those that have the Right, there is no sense to be made of them. And what is this to Providence, which is the main thing in controversy, and for the proof of which, the Doctor cited those passages? Suppose they do prove God's Sovereign Authority, to remove and pull down the most Rightful Kings, and give his Authority to those who have no Right; Do they prove likewise, that a Providential possession of the Throne, is God's giving his Authority? or that which he did by his Prophets in Israel, he does by his Providence in other Countries? God's Sovereign Authority is no Question between us; The Convocation allows the Doctrine; but says withal, that no man (in those cases) can act upon it, without God's express warrant.  
The Doctor expresses this oddly, And give his Authority to those who have no Right, and place them in the Thrones of those that have the Right. If this is to be understood Grammatically, and which is the Doctor's Hypothesis, That when God has given Authority and Government to a Person, he hath no Right to it; and when he hath taken them away, That Person hath still the Right; This is neither the Sense of the Convocation, nor yet Sense. For the Convocation says, God may overthrow Kings, notwithstanding any Right they can challenge; which intimates not the continuing, but the determining their Right; as Jeram after God had given his Kingdom to Jehu, had no longer Right to it; but was (as the Convocation says) Jehu's Subject; and there is nothing more absurd, than to say, that a man hath no Right to what God gives him; and that he hath yet a Right remaining to what God takes away from him.  
The Doctor goes on, 
P. ●.  Our Author's Hypothesis is as direct a contradiction to this, as words can make it: for if no Prince can have God's Authority, nor must be obeyed, unless he have a Legal Right; either an old Hereditary Right, or a new acquired Right, by the Death or Session, etc. What hard shifts we are put to to obscure what will not admit of a plain answer? What is this to the purpose the Doctor cited those passages, or to the Question before us? And where, I pray, did I ever say, that no Prince can have God's Authority, without such Rights? No doubt he may have it, if God gives it him. And that is the only Question: Jehu had God's Authority without these Rights; But than God expressly and by name, gave it to him. Let the Doctor prove, that possession of the Throne by Providence, is equivalent to an express Nomination; or that it is a sufficient Evidence, that God hath given such a Possessor his Authority; and till then, all his Arguments from God s Sovereign Authority signify nothing. To argue from God's power of disposing Kingdoms, without Legal Right, to his actual disposing them so; and because he can give his Authority to one who hath no Right; therefore he that is possessed of the Throne without Right, has that Authority, is neither Logic nor Sense. And how insignificant then is all this that follows? Then (says he) God is bound to th●se Laws in advancing Kings, which he prescribeth to others, than he cannot set up any Kings or Emperors who have no just Right or Claim: for he cannot unmake a Rightful King, if he cannot absolve Subjects from their Allegiance, nor make a King without a Legal Right, if he cannot give him his Authority, and transfer the Allegiance of Subjects to him. God can remove the man by death, but cannot unmake the King, ●●rss he unmake himself, by resigning his Crown: He can set a man upon the Throne, but cannot make him a King, w● 〈◊〉 the leave of the Right Heir, under an hundred years' prescription. And after having made me say all this frightful stuff, he adds, Where ever our Author learned this Doctrine, I am sure the Convocation never taught it him. And is not this an admirable way of disputing, to make his Adversary say what he please, and then Expose it! But I tell him I learned that Doctrine, neither from the Convocation, nor from any body but himself. But the Doctor is so warm in this wild Rant, that he utterly forgets, that what he says, is equally against his own Notion and Interpretation: The consent of the people, is that which (according to him) settles a Government, and makes it a duty to obey, and without such a consent 'tis no duty. And cannot God set up Kings, without consent of the People? then he cannot make a King: for a King without Subjects is no King: He may set a man upon the Throne, but cannot make him a King, without leave of the people. And so the Doctor may take his Rebuke again, wherever he learned this Doctrine, I am sure the Convocation never taught it him. For they have taught over and over, that the people of all sorts, have no interest in, nor any thing to do with the Government: and it should seem, that one main end of their Book, was to confute, and show the falsity of such Opinions, into which, notwithstanding the Doctor's fine Principle of the Consent of the People is finally resolved.  
But such Arguments as these, will prove any thing in the world: the Papists may prove all their fabulous Legends; God may and is able to work Miracles now, as he did by Moses, the Prophets, and Apostles; and therefore St. Rumbald, and a great many other of their Saints, did all those wonderful things they ascribe to them. And the Doctor knows, such things have been urged, to justify very ill things, (and by men who have owned the same Principles as he does) God may now give the Land to his People, as he did of old Canaan to the Israelites; and therefore they may cut off the Malignants, as a Company of cursed Canaanites, to possess their Estates. God may now give the same liberty he did to the Israelites, to spoil the Egyptians; and therefore whatever we can get from the Egyptian Church of England, is our own. I do not say the Doctor concludes so, but his Arguments do: and every one of these Consequences, are as good as the Doctors. And if Providence comes in the place of Prophecy, and what God did of old by his Prophets, he does now by his Providence; and Providential Events convey the same Right and Authority, as God's own immediate and express direction; then this is very good arguing; and the Doctor's Principles will justify such Practices, though He does not.  
But yet further, to show the unreasonableness of the Doctor's Inference, and that from God's altering Stated and Legal Rules in the Case of Jehu, and by express nomination, nothing can be concluded in favour of a Providential Possession against legal Right; here are these two things to be observed.  
1. That when God set up Jehu against another Right and Title (and the Case is the same of any other so set up by God) there was a clear and evident Revelation of God's Will that he had made him King, and given him his Authority, and about which there could be no doubt or scruple. And such a clear Revelation seems necessary in all such cases. For when men are under sacred Ties and Obligations, from which they cannot otherwise be released but by God himself (for though God is not tied to those Rules he prescribeth to others, yet men are tied to those Rules, the obligation of which holds them till they are discharged by God who is not tied himself, and can release them that are;) it seems necessary that the Evidence of Gods Will in discharging them, should be as clear and certain, as the Evidence they have that the observing these Rules is their duty; otherwise men depart from a certain duty, upon the account of an uncertain discharge from God, and may easily find ways to evade their necessary duties, especially if they are clogged with difficulty, and secular disadvantage. And accordingly when God set up Jehu, the manifestation of God's will was plain and evident, and the persons concerned to know it, could make no doubt of it, being revealed by Prophets, the ordinary and accustomed way of God's making his will known to them. But for Providence, especially in opposition to Law and legal Right, being the manifestation of God's will in order to practice, I think I may appeal to all the world, whether any man can be as certain, that Possession of the Throne by Providence is as evident an indication of God's will that God hath given his Authority and the Government to him, as he is of the obligation of an Oath, and of the Duty of Alleg. to a rightful King; if not, than he releases himself from an evident Duty by a discharge from God less evident; i. e. he has less evidence of his discharge than he has of his duty, and that in the balance of Conscience is no discharge at all. Now it needs not be proved, that Providence is not so evident a Declaration of God's Will as express Nomination; the Doctor himself owns that in all other Cases, Providence is not such a signification of God's Will. And that this Doctrine could never be espied before, nay that it was publicly and professedly disowned, are no great signs of its evidence. And therefore there is a wide difference in the two Cases. Upon the Nomination of Jehu, God's Will was made so evident, that all men concerned to take notice of it, neither did nor could doubt of it: but in the case of the Doctor's Hypothesis 'tis the only thing in question. And not only all men else, but the Doctor himself, not only doubted of it, but believed the clean contrary.  
2. 
Convoc. p. 52.  When God set up a King without or contrary to a legal Right, that King was immediately invested with his Authority, and as the Convocation speaks of Ahud, Independent of any but God himself; he had the sole Right to the Government, and the People were bound to submit to him without any more ado, upon the account of God's Donation. But the Doctor's King, whom he says is of God's setting up too, is quite another thing; he is no King, or if he is, he has no Subjects, till the People have consented; they are not bound to obey him upon the account of God's gift, till themselves have consented: And so for any thing that I can see, notwithstanding God's setting up a King, the People may refuse him, and are not bound to submit to him, except themselves please. T●e Doctor's King likewise hath not the sole Right, for the King God hath pulled down hath his Right still and may justly recover the Throne, if he can, which is one of the finest Evidences of God's giving away another Prince's Crown as ever was heard of. And I wonder when the Doctor will prove, that God ever gave away any Prince's Crown, when notwithstanding he had still a Right to it, and might justly recover it. 
Postscript. p. 2.  And this I had told him before, but he takes no notice of it, although it deserves as much Vindication as any of the rest. But some things will not be vindicated how much soever they need it, and it is not reasonable to require any man to vindicate more than he can  
And this I think is sufficient to show how unreasonably the Doctor concludes from God's express nomination to providence, and from God's Sovereignty in disposing of Kingdoms, to providential Possession; and all that I have further to say is, that I expect the Doctor in his next will call me Atheist, or some hard name, and tell me people will be tempted to suspect I do not believe, or that I ridicule God's Sovereignty, because I do not believe the Doctor's unreasonable Inferences and Arguments from it, as he tells me they will be apt to suspect I do not believe or that I ridicule Providence, 
Vindic. p. 58.  because I do not believe the soul consequences he draws from it.  
To confirm the Doctor's Interpretation, he tells us he observed that the Convocation teaches, 
Vindic. p. 10.  that Obedience was due to such Kings as never could have any legal Right to the Government of Israel, as the Kings of the Moabites and Aramites, of Egypt and Babylon, and yet says, that the Israelites knew, that it was not lawful for them of themselves and by their own Authority to take Arms against the Kings whose Subjects they were though indeed they were tyrant's; and that it had not been lawful for Ahud to have killed King Eglon had he not first been made by God, the Judge, Prince, etc.  
On the other hand (saith the Doctor) our Author affirms, 
Postscript p. 3. Answ. p. 19  that all these Kings had a legal Right, and were legal Powers. And that it appears in all, and every one of the instances the Convocation gives us ●f Government to which they say Obedience is due, that those Governments had such a Right. Well, this I said, and I had thought I had proved it too, and what has the Doctor to say to it? He replies, This is a bold undertaker. And that I suppose I am to take for an Answer, for he says very little beside to the proofs I brought for it. But let us consider what he does say.  
He tells us, Our first Inquiry is what the Convocation thought of the Kings of the Aramites and Moabites, Whether they thought them legal and rightful Kings of Israel? They (saith he) call indeed the Israelites their Subjects as our Author observes, and from thence proves that these Kings had a legal Power over Israel. But the mischief is, the Convocation in express words owns them to be only Kings de facto, to whom they were in subjection; and teaches, that if any person born a Subject, and affirming by all the Arguments, etc. that God had called him to murder the King de facto under whom he lived, etc. which (says the Doctor) is spoke with reference to Ahud is kill King Eglon, who it seems was but a King de facto in the judgement of the Convocation. And I suppose our Author knows what a King de facto signifies in opposition to a King de jure, one who is King without a Legal Right. I answer yes, I do know that, but the mischief is, the Convocation does not speak of a King de facto in opposition to a King de jure, but barely of a King de facto, and I suppose the Doctor knows, that a King de facto when it is not spoken in opposition to a King de jure, does not mean a King without a legal Right. And this is plainly the case; for (1) it is barely and nakedly expressed without any opposition to a King de jure either mentioned or supposed.  
2. The matter plainly proves that it cannot be spoken in opposition to a King de jure, which is that the King de facto may not be murdered by his Subjects, but if a King de facto was spoken in opposition to a King de jure, than a King de jure may be murdered by his Subjects.  
3. The Doctor tells us, that this is spoken with reference to Ahud's kill King Eglon, and therefore King Eglon was but a King de facto. But then this is a reason that the Convocation did not speak it in opposition to a King de jure; for in the Chapter to this Canon, they speak with reference to the same, That the Lord may and is able to overthrow any Kings or Emperors notwithstanding any Claim, Right, Title or Interest which they can challenge to their Countries, Kingdoms or Empires. These words were plainly spoken with reference to Ahud's kill King Eglon, and the Convocation prefaces thus: Both which Examples (i. e. of Jehu and Ahud) do make it known to us, that although the Lord may and is able to overthrow, etc. And the Doctor tells us but the page before, 
P. 9  that there is no sense to be made of these words, if they do not prove God's sovereign Authority to remove and pull down the most rightful Kings, etc. and this was spoken with reference to God's pulling down King Eglon by Ahud. But then Eglon was so far from being a King de facto in opposition to a King de jure, that he was not only a rightful King, but a most rightful King. And therefore the mischief (the Doctor speaks of) that the Convocation in express words owns the Kings of the Aramites and Moabites to be only Kings de facto, is no other mischief but that the Doctor contradicts himself, but that is no mischief with him, otherwise he would not use it so often. And here we plainly see the Doctor's admirable dexterity in interpreting the Convocation to his own purpose. The Convocation says King de facto and no more, but it seems that would not do, and therefore the Doctor says, they say only King de facto, and but King de facto; but these Additions (which perfectly alter the sense) are no bodies but his own, and yet it seems it was not enough to put them in, but he must tell us also, the Convocation in express words owns them to be only Kings de facto, when the Convocation hath not any such word, or any thing like it.  
The Doctor proceeds, 
Vindic. p. 11.  Let us now see what legal Right and Title our Author hath found, for the Kings of the Aramites and Moabites and Babylonians over Israel, and for all the four Monarchies; and that is the submission both of Prince and People. Well, that is one of them, but not all, which (says the Doctor) he says I grant gives a legal Right, 
Postscript p. 2.  whereas I only said, that the submission of the Prince might be thought necessary to transfer a legal Right, which I think differs a little from granting it does so. Very good, let it differ as little or as much as he please, it is nothing to me, for if he will look again he will find that I only said, the Doctor tells us that the submission of the Prince, etc. And I think also, that saying he tells us differs a little from saying he grants. So that I think this might have been spared: But the Doctor had a mind to charge me with a fault, and he hath thereby showed himself to be only guilty of it. However I take this opportunity to tell him, that it is indifferent to me, whether or no he grants that the submission of the Prince and People confer a legal Right, all the world besides grant it, and that is sufficient for any ordinary Principle though the Doctor should not think fit to like it, nor any thing else though never so plain, if it contradicts his Hypothesis.  
But now the Doctor tells me, The truth is our Author is here blundered for want of clear and distinct Notions of what he writes, and imposes upon himself and others with ambiguous terms. This is a terrible business if the Doctor could but show us where this blundering and these ambiguous terms were. I had told him as plain as I could speak, that besides lineal descent, a Right to a Government might be acquired by the death or session of the right heir, joined with the consent of the People, and by Prescription; and when such a Right respectively was attained, the Government was then a legal Government. I think this is distinct enough, and the Notions are clear enough: and if the Doctor would have given a direct Answer, he should have shown that either a Right to a Government by these ways is not attained, or if it be, that the Governments the Convocation speaks of, and requires Obedience to, had not attained such a Right: but instead of that he runs on with a company of distinctions about legal, and learnedly shows how many several ways Powers may be said to be legal. And what is all that to me, and to the purpose? By legal Powers I understand what he understands by them, if he understands any thing by them, and that is legal Powers in opposition to usurped Powers. Usurped Powers are such as have no Right, legal Powers are such as have a Right, as well a Right acquired, as by lineal descent, and such Powers by the consent of all mankind are legal Powers, and Usurpers the contrary. And the Doctor knows well enough this is my sense, and hath quoted it too but two or three pages before: but the truth is, 
Vindic. p. 6.  the Doctor is blundered for an Answer; and to avoid giving a clear and distinct Answer, falls a distinguishing to no purpose at all, and on pretence of truly stating, confounds the Question, and runs from it, which is blundering with a witness. Has the Convocation any thing to do with his distinctions? When they call the Roman Governors the lawful Magistrates of the Jews, do they mean lawful by the law of Nature? And this I had before mentioned: 
Postscript p. 3.  and he will not directly answer, but hides himself under distinctions, and tells us fine things of a state of nature when all men are free, and may dispose of themselves as they will, and of Conquest and a prevailing force, when they have the same liberty as in a state of nature. And what is all this to a King by Providence and to the Convocation book? If the Doctor has a mind to put the matter upon that issue, let him give his reasons, and I will submit to them, or answer them. But for my part, I love to end one Controversy before I begin another, and do not much care to be drawn from the matter in hand by impertinent Distinctions which are nothing to the purpose. Well! but the Doctor tells us, That Legal (as it respects the Laws and Constitutions of a particular Nation or Kingdom) is understood by all men, who understand themselves, in this controversy of Legal Powers. This is the reason of the distinction between a King de jure and a King de facto; a King de jure is a rightful King by the Laws of the Land, a King de facto whatever Right he may have is not rightfully and lawfully possessed of the Crown, by the Laws of Succession, proper to that Kingdom. And this (says he) is all the mystery I intended. That is to say, the Doctor hath written two books to prove that a person who is not next Heir may be King and have God's Authority: a wonderful discovery! I had told him so over and over, and showed him in what Cases, when a Right was acquired by Death, Session, or Prescription. But this it seems is blundering, ambiguous, and a man does not understand himself. But to say that the same thing is by the Consent and Submission of the People, this is very clear and distinct, and the Doctor understands himself, though no body else except some Commonwealths men, are able to understand it. But this is nothing but shifting the Question, and the Doctor (I'll warrant you) does not understand the force of my Argument; and yet he tells us here, Let us see what Legal Right and Title our Author hath found for the Kings of the Aramites and the Moabites, and for the four Monarchies, and that is the submission both of Prince and People. Very well, and why did not he give a direct Answer to that? Does the submission of the Prince and People make such a Government a legal Government and no Usurpation? And the next Question is, Had not the Aramites, Moabites, Babylonians, and all the Governments the Convocation justify Obedience to, such a Consent and Submission? and if they had then they were legal Kings and not Usurpers. And this was the substance of my Answer, and to which I had added for Confirmation, that the Convocation mentions but two Usurpers (Athaliah and Antiochus) and justifies the Resistance of them both. And what does the Doctor say to this? Why first of all I am a bold Undertaker, secondly 'tis blundering and ambiguous, and last of all there are several senses of Legal; and if there were as many hundred senecs of Legal what is that to the purpose? I use it but in one sense, and that is in opposition to Usurpation, and so all men else use it, in the dispute between legal and usurped Powers, whether the Doctor thinks they understand themselves or no. But here is a tender point, the Doctor cannot deny it, and yet is unwilling to own it; it would be ridiculous for a man that talks so much of the Consent and Submission of the People, to deny that the Submission of the Prince and People together did not transfer a Right to the Government; and if he should own it, than he must own likewise that all the Governments the Convocation require Obedience to, had acquired such a Right, And therefore it was far better to make Distinctions and ask Questions to obscure the business, than to bring the plain matter in controversy on foot by a direct and categorical Answer. But the Doctor tells me such legal Rights as I have found for these Princes will quickly transubstantiate all Usurped Powers into Legal Governments. 
P. 10.  Not all sure, for I expressly limit it to the acquisition of Right by the Death or Session of the right Heir, and by Prescription: and if the Doctor please, I except one, and he may prove it if he can, that is a Government by the Consent and Submission of the People in opposition to the actual claims and pretences of an undoubted rightful King; which is as directly contrary to the Rights I have mentioned as the Doctor's through Settlement is to that of the Convocation.  
In answer to the Doctor's saying that the Kings of the Aramites and Moabites could have no legal Right to the Government of Israel, I had said they had a legal Right, if the Submission of the Prince could transfer a legal Right, which the Doctor said it might be thought to do. 
P. 12.  Now the Doctor tells us all the mystery he intended was that That could not be according to the Constitution of the Jewish Commonwealth, etc. And what then, Can it not be by the Submission of the Governors and People? That was the thing which I asserted, and which the Doctor was to disprove.  
But to this I made an Objection, 
Postscript. p. 3.  If it be said that God was at that time their Sovereign, and he did not submit, 'tis true he did not, but the Text says expressly that God delivered them into their hands. This the Doctor says made him smile, for I had started an Objection which I knew not what to do with. And the Answer is as extravagant as the Objection, for (says he) he has found out something which he thinks equivalent to God's Submission to the Aramites and Moabites, and that is, that God had delivered them into their hands. What then? Did God resign his Government of Israel into the hands of the Aramites and Moabites, and quit his Right and Claim to the Government of them? Spectatum admissi.— Let the Doctor's friends smile as well as himself. Now I do not know what force there may be in smiling, but I have seen that used when men have nothing to answer. And whether that be the case I shall refer to the Reader. And here I shall do two things, 1. I shall vindicate the Answer I have given, and 2. Consider what the Doctor offers to justify the Submission and Subjection of the Israelites to them.  
1. To vindicate the Answer: And the first thing I have to observe is that there is no incongruity in the Expression (as ridiculous as the Doctor represents it) to say that God may resign his immediate Government over a People as their political King. This was done in fact upon the ceasing of the Theocracy in the Kingdom of Judah. Now in the present case the Text saith expressly that God delivered them into the hands of the Moabites and Aramites. And what does that intimate, but that God had so far parted with his immediate Government as their political King? for if God was at that time their political King, how came the Israelites to be the Subjects of these Kings? Might they transferr their Alleg. from God too, when he insisted upon his Right to govern them? But if God appointed them (for the punishment of their sins) to be Subjects to those Kings, and delivered them as such into their hands, and the Israelites knew that he did so, it is plain that God so far consented that they should be their Subjects. And though the Doctor will not allow that the presumed consent of the Prince signifies any thing, I hope he will not think so of the express consent of God. Now the Convocation plainly asserts that the Israelites were the Subjects of these Kings, and the Doctor's Argument proceeds upon the supposition of it. And the Question is how they became so? Either God at that time was their political King, or he was not; if he was, Which way should they become Subyects of another Prince? I doubt, for all his laughing, it will puzzle the Doctor to give another account of it. If God was not their political King, than those in whom the Right of the Government was, together with the People, had submitted, and had thereby made the Governments of the Aramites and Moabites over them Legal Governments. But of this more presently.  
2. To consider what the Doctor hath found out to justify the Submission of the Israelites and their becoming Subjects to these things. And here we are got into a field of Distinctions and nothing at all to the purpose. And the Doctor will grant Legal Powers may be understood in a larger Notion, and that may be said to be legal which is agreeable to the Laws of Nature and Nations, and Submission may make a legal King of him who according to the Laws of the Land can be only King de facto. And this he tells us is worth considering, and then goes on. In a state of Nature wherein we must suppose all men free from any Government but that of Parents, and so might give up the Government of themselves to whom they pleased, etc. But what is this to the purpose? Was that the Case of the People of Israel whom God himself had framed into a Commonwealth? and especially at such times when he was their political King? But (says he) If we fall into a state of Nature and Liberty again, 
P. 13.  or something like it, as in the case of a new prevailing force, when Prince and People are conquered, for then the Government is at an end, and they are as much at liberty to submit to a conquering Prince, as they were in the state of Nature. Now this is perfectly a new Question, and I see no reason to meddle with it; but if the Doctor is weary of his Hypothesis as he hath laid it, and will quit it as not defensible, and will fix the controversy upon this bottom, he shall hear what I have to say to it. But the Doctor (I suppose thinking it not much to the purpose) hath himself enlarged this point. And with respect to private Subjects, he says, When upon a violent change of Government they are as much under the force and power of a new Prince, or a new Government as they could be under a conquering Prince, Force will justify Submission, and then it is the same thing from what quarter the force comes. And agreeable to this he says, in matters of Government it is an unalterable Right of Nature to submit to Force. 
〈◊〉. 14.   
And this is that which he gives as a Reason to justify the Submission of the Israelites to the Aramites and Moabites; for it follows, All men will grant that no humane Laws and Constitutions are so sacred as the positive Laws of God; that Government and Polity which God himself prescribed to the Children of Israel, which they were religiously bound to observe by virtue of their Covenant with God, which certainly was as sacred as any oath. Now those Laws did not admit of the Authority and Government of Strangers, but expressly forbade it, that had they chose to be governed by any foreign Prince, they had greatly sinned in it; but this very Law, as sacred as it was, gave way to necessity; and when they were conquered by the Aramites or Moabites, or any other Nation, it was no fault to submit to them. And if force would justify this in the Israelites who had God for their King, and were obliged by their Covenant with him to accept of no foreign Prince to govern them, it is hard if it will not justify the Subjects of humane Governments (most of which were at first founded in mere force, whatever their Oaths and Obligations be to submit to a new and greater force. This is the Doctor's state of the matter, and I shall consider it immediately.  
For the Doctor says, This gives a sufficient Answer to what our Author adds in the place last quoted, 
Postscript p. 3.  That God's being King of Israel would be an Argument against their submission; for the Doctor tells us, that where God entails the Crown, the People were not to submit to any Usurper if the right Heir was alive, and therefore much more where God himself was their King, and then sure they might lawfully resist those Kings, whose Subjects they were not nor could be, and they needed no especial direction to destroy the Usurpers, as Ahud did King Eglon, but they might, nay they were bound to do it, as Jehoiada slew Athaliah; for I hope God's entail is not of greater force than his own immediate Government. So that either their Submission transferred a legal Right, or their Submission was a sin.  
To this the Doctor replies, 
Vindic. p. 15.  This looks like something very deep, but it is so very a nothing, that I cannot devise what he would be at: that is, because the Doctor has nothing to say to it. For now he comes to another of his shifts; just before instead of giving a direct Answer he brings a company of impertinent Distinctions to blind the business, and in the mist drops the Question, and now instead of answering one Question, falls to ask I know not how many. Would he prove that God was not the King of Israel ●gai●st the Scriptures? o● would he prove 〈◊〉 the Israelites ought not to have submitted to the Moabites, and have ●ad all t●●ir Throats out? or would he prove against ●he Convocation that they were not 〈◊〉 Subjects of King Eglon? No, no, neither so, nor so? And what now if after all this bustle the Doctor knew well enough what I would be at: if nor, what does he mean by that which he says immediately before these words; And this (i. e. what he had said before) gives a sufficient Answer to what our Author adds in the place last quoted. Well, the Doctor has the best faculty at answering that ever was heard of; he can answer and give a sufficient answer too, to he does not know what, I perceive understanding a Question, and an●●●●ing it, are two things; as for the understanding what the Author would prove by these Words, the Doctor does not know whether the Author understands that himself, and why should the Doctor understand another man's proofs better than himself. But then for answering let the Doctor alone, he can give a sufficient Answer to it, let who will understand it. Well, I do not dispute whether he understands it or no, but I am sure he h●th not answered it at all, much less sufficiently answered it; and to gratify him, I shall tell him what I meant by it, and if it does not stare him full in the face, I never saw the like on't. 
●●e of ●ller. p. 3●.  The Doctor had found out a curious distinction of Entails by God himself and Entails by Providence (the main pillar of his Book, and if it fails his whole Book fails with it) by virtue of which he would persuade us that nothing can justify Submission to an Usurper when the King's Son was found, to whom the Kingdom did belong by a divine Ent●●; and Subjects are bound to adhere 〈◊〉 ●●ir Prince of God's choosing, when 〈◊〉 is known, and to prosecute all U●●pers to the utmost, and never submit to their Government. But in other Kingdoms where God makes Kings and entails the Crown by Providence, the placing a Prince in the Throne, and settling him there in the full Administration of the Government, is a Reason to submit to him as to God's Ordinance and Minister; with reference to this I said as above, and I think the consequence is plain enough, though the Doctor will not understand it, if nothing would justify the Submission to an Usurper, when the Right Heir was alive and known, where God entails the Crown, then much more so where God himself was their King; and I would fain see a Reason why God's Entail should be of more force to oblige them to prosecute all Usurpers to the utmost, and never submit to them, than his own immediate Government. This I think is as clear against the use the Doctor makes of this Distinction as any thing can be, and all his little shifts of the heir being known, of anointing him, 
Vindic. p.  and of his actual Possession will signify nothing here, with respect to God's immediate Government. But this the Doctor did not understand, and therefore would give no Answer to it. But any man that considers the Answer he hath given will be apt to suspect that he did not only understand it, but understand also that there was no fence for it, for it hath made him perfectly alter the state of the Question, and utterly forsake his distinction; for he now tells us roundly, they may submit, i. e. becomes Subjects to force, That while the Israelites were under no foreign force, but had liberty to live by their own Laws, they were bound to make him their Prince on whom God had entailed the Crown; while they were under force, they might do as they could, and submit to the Conqueror, which Submission could not give these Usurpers a legal Right according to the Laws and Constitutions of the Jewish Commonwealth; but according to the Law; of nature, which allow submission to a Conqueror, it did. Very well; then pray what becomes of Nothing can justify the Submission to an Usurper when the King's son was found, and Subjects are bound to adhere to their Prince of God's choosing, when known, and to prosecute all Usurpers to the utmost, and never submit to their Government. I had thought that nothing and never would have excluded Force as well as any thing else, and I thought likewise that submitting to Usurpers, had not been prosecuting them to the utmost, and never submitting to their Government; and I desire the Doctor in his next to show me how to reconcile them.  
But to leave the Doctor to reconcile his Contradictions as well as he can, let us a little consider his new state, the sum of which is, That Force will justify Submission from what quarter soever it comes; that in matters of Government it is an unalterable Right of Nature to submit to force; that Force justified the Submission of the Israelites though they had God for their King, and though they were obliged by their Covenant with him not to accept such Kings to govern them; and that by parity of reason, it will justify the Subjects of humane Governments whatever their Oaths and Obligations be. Now from hence I have these things to observe.  
1. That this is nothing to his Hypothesis; for what is submitting to force to a providential King, and God's Authority? Is all Force God's Authority? and may it claim a divine Right to Obedience? etc. This therefore is a new Hypothesis set up to answer Objections, which were made against the old one, and which that would not do. But if possible, 'tis more extravagant and dangerous than that: for,  
2. This makes Force the supreme Rule of Right and Wrong, of Good and Evil: it empowers men to join with, and become Parties to what they know to be wrong, and to resist to the uttermost what they know to be right. It cancels and dissolves the most sacred Obligations, and warrants the entering into other Obligations in direct opposition and contradiction to what they stand in the most holy and solemn manner bound to God and Man. For by Submission to Force the Doctor does not mean a passive Submission (which no body disputes) but an active concurrence and conjunction with it, to own and support it, to become Subjects to it, and swear an Oath of Alleg. to defend it against all men. Now this is the single Question, Will all the Force in the world justify the maintaining and defending it against Right? The Doctor hath an instance, 
p. 13.  If we happen to fall into the hands of Thiefs and Robbers, where the Government can't protect us, we may very innocently for our own preservation promise and swear to them such things as are against the Laws of the Land, and which it would be unlawful for us to do in other circumstances. Very well! But may we by virtue of being under such force, and for our own preservation, swear to join ourselves to them to uphold and support them to our Power, to secure to them their unjust got Goods against the Pretences and Prosecutions of the right owner, and to assist them to get more. These things I doubt, Force and Self-preservation, will not justify. And therefore the Case of the Israelites under the Aramites and Moahites, does not come up to the Question. Whose Rights did they oppose? What Injury did they do to a third Person? and What hindered but they might make a dedition of themselves? There was neither Oaths, nor Claims, nor Titles in their way to hinder them: and what Force would justify in them it will justify in any man or in any Nation besides. 
p. 14.  But the Doctor s●● this was against a pa●●●●●w of C●●, the Government and Polity of Israel, which they were religiously bound to observe by virtue of their Covenant with God, which was as sacred as any oath. And how does he prove this? These Laws did not a ●it of the Government and Authority of Strangers, ●o it expressly forbidden it. But that I think is a mistake; There is a ●a● indeed that obliged them not to set a Stranger over them. 
D●ut. ●●. 15.  But that I think was a temporary Law, and had an immediate respect to the change of their Government, when they were to have a King like other Nations, and did not respect the times before nor after; for the Text says they shall set him King over them whom the Lord thy God shall cho●se, which respects God's express Nomination: and the plain meaning seems to be, When they should come to desire a King like other Nations, and the state of their Government should be changed, they should take such a King as God should appoint, and one of their Brethren. But suppose this was a standing Law, it makes no difference as to the present matter; for what if by their Laws they could not choose a King that was a Foreigner, might they not therefore submit to such a King, when there is no wrong done? The truth is, by that Law th●y were obliged not to choose a King at all, but to take him whom the Lord shall choose, They had no more to do to set up one of their Brethren, than they had to set up a Foreigner. The Doctor would limit this Law to Strangers only, and says, Had they chose to be governed by any foreign Prince, they had greatly sinned in it, whereas it was the very same with respect of their Brethren; and had they of themselves cho●e one of their Brethren to govern them, as in the case of Gideon, they had likewise greatly sinned. S● that the plain intention of that Law was to forbid them making a King of their own heads; and the mention of their Brethren seems either to prevent th●ir hankering after the Kings of the Nations, or to show that God intended to set over them a King of their own Brethren; but does not at all concern their Submission to other Princes, either when they had no King (as was the Case of the Israelites under the Aramites and Moabites) or when their own King of God's setting up had himself submitted to foreign Force, 
Vindic. p. 53.  when it was lawful for them so to do: and the Doctor himself tells us, The Jews were not forbid by the standing Law of the Kingdom to submit to Athaliah while she was possessed of the Throne, and Joash concealed. And I wonder where is the consequence? God forbids them to choose a King of their own heads, therefore they must not submit to another Prince when they have no King, or when the King of God's choosing hath himself submitted. It had been a little more pertinent to the Doctor's purpose, if he could but have proved it, to have urged, that when God had given them a King, and they were under an Usurper, That Force would have justified their deserting their King of Gods choosing, and engaging to maintain and defend the possession of the Usurper against him. The Doctor adds, If Force would justify this in the Israelites, who had God for their King, and were obliged by their Covenant with him, to accept of no foreign Prince to govern them. Now this I take to be strange Doctrine: for as the Doctor hath stated the matter with respect to the Submission of the Israelites, it contains this admirable Proposition, That Force will disengage Men from their Covenant with God, and justify them to covenant directly and expressly against it. For if by virtue of their Covenant with God they were obliged to accept of no foreign Prince to govern them, yet when they were under the power of such a Prince, they might covenant with him to stand by him and maintain him against all Opposers (which is the import of swearing to him, and becoming his Subjects) then by virtue of force they may make new Covenants of themselves, in direct opposition to the Covenant they stand in to God. And so I perceive, that the Covenants God makes with his People, are no better than Oaths of Allegiance; the Dr. in the next Page asks me a curious Question, would he prove that the Israelites ought not to have submitted to the Moabites, but have had all their throats out by a vain opposition? No by no means sure! let them first break their Covenant with God, and a thousand Oaths rather than have their Throats out.  
3. This makes the Drs. distinction of Divine Entails and Humane Entails of Crowns vain and frivolous; and in truth no distinction at all upon the account for which he useth it. For if men may become Subjects to force notwithstanding one Entail, as well as the other where is the difference? what the Dr. says here with respect to Gods Entail, is the ve●y same as to Humane Entails, 
P. 15.  while the Israelites were under no foreign force, but had liberty to live by their own Laws, they were bound to make him their Prince, on whom God had entailed the Crown. And this it seems is the utmost of the business, and then what do Divine Entails signify more than humane Entails? The Dr. owns over and over, 
P. 41.  that Subjects under no force are also bound to make him their Prince, on whom the Laws of the Land have entailed the Crown: So that for any thing I can see men are obliged to, and disobliged from both upon the same reason, for without force, both are obliged, and force dissolves the obligation let the Entails be made by whom they will, the Dr. says expressly in such a Case, 
Vindic. p. 27.  no entail though made by God himself could bind them. And that I think is as much as the Dr. himself can say of a Humane Enta●●.  
3. This is irrecon●●●ble with the Doctor's Argument, of the deposing Athaliah and setting up Joash, and indeed if this Doctrine be true, 'tis impossible to give any justifiable account of it. Was not Jehoiada and the Subjects of Judah under force all the six years of Athaliah's Usurpation? if not, what can be said for Jehoiada and the rest, for not doing their duty when they were at liberty, and as the Doctor says, were bound to make him their King on whom God entailed the Crown, if they were under force, than they might become Subjects to her, (and the Doctor intimates that they did and ought to be justified in it) and might swear to her, and tie themselves as fast as she pleased; for the Doctor says in Cases of force, God's entail did not bind them. But then how came they, and (as the Doctor says) upon the account of that entail too, to set up Joash and slay Athaliah? why truly, I doubt that is not a fair Question, and the Doctor cannot answer it without contradicting himself again. And this he does as plain as words can do it; for he tells us, The manifest difference between Kings set up by Divine Providence, 
Vindic. p. 35.  in the Kingdoms of Judah and Israel, subject to a Divine nomination and email, and Kings set up by Divine Providence in other Kingdoms: The first may be and are deposed, when ever God nominates a new King, or the Right Heir appears; though they had all the Rights and Settlement of the Regal Power before. But than what becomes of force, or how does that take off the binding power of God's entails, if assoon as the Right Heir appear, such a Person who possessed by force is deposed, and as the Doctor says, sinks into the state of a Subject. 
P. 3●●  Why truly here is a very pretty business, first force makes the Divine entail not binding, and then the D●vine Entail makes force not binding, and so they alternately vacate each other, according as the Dr. hath occasion. But to do the Doctor Right, he is here a little more consistent, and he likes f●rce a little better than to part with it so for he tells us, 
P. 27.  Gods entails always obliged the Jews when they had power enough to take the King on whom God had ent●●l'd the Crown, which was evidently their Case when Jehoiada anointed Joash, and show Athaliah, but when they were under force (as under the Babylonians, etc.) no entail though made by God himself could bind them, so that force is the business still, and then the ch●●●es run thus, force on the side of Usurpation makes Gods Ent●il not ●●●ing, and force on the side of Gods Entail makes Usurpation not binding. And so the People either have, or they have not obligations to G●●'s Entail, or ●o Usurpation according as they have power; if they are not able to fight with him, and kill him the Usurper is their King, and they are his Subjects, but if they are, than the Right Heir by God's Entail is their King, and they are no bodies Subjects but his. An admirable Scheme of Government and Obedience; Men may talk what they will of Divine Entails, and Covenants with God, and Rights, and Conscience; but 'tis all but words, f●r force is the sum Total, and Government is nothing else. It makes it a duty to obey the Covenant with God, and it makes it lawful to break it, it makes Divine Entails binding, and it makes them cease to bind. And it seems this Brutal Principle of force is the Rule of the World, and of Conscience too, and Laws, and Oaths, Entails and Covenants with God vary their obligation, and either bind or not bind, either bind for, or against them, as they are backed with power, and according to the variation of Force.  

Vindic. p. 17.  The Doctor proceeds and tells us, that all th●● can be said 〈◊〉 thinks is, that by submission which gives a Legal Right, I mean the sumbission and acknowledgement of these in whom the Right is: Well, I do mean so, 
Answ. p.  but that is not all I mean, for I say joined with the consent and submission of the People; and therefore, I except against the Doctor's interpretation, that is to say, the submission of the People does not give a Legal Right, but the submission of the King does; whereas I had joined them both together.  
In answer to this, as the Doctor calls it, he has five Questions to ask, and it might be enough to observe here, that he does not deny it, nor do any nor all of his Questions imply a denial of it, the matter is plain before him; does such a submission and acknowledgement of F●rce and People given a Legal Right, or does it not? if it does, 'tis as much as I con●●nd for, if not let him disprove it. And this would bring the matter into close dispute, but the Doctor did not care for that; be found where the shoe pinched, and saw he could not deny it, and if he owned it, than he must have proved, that these Governments to which the Convocation say Obedience is due, had not such a submission, which he could not do neither; and therefore instead of giving a direct answer, he leads his reader about, and through a maze of Questions, to cloud and cover the defect of a plain and pertinent Answer. And in truth to lead us quite beside the Question, as we shall see in considering the particulars; The plain Question between us, is, whether the submission of the Prince and People gives a Legal Right? To which the Doctor Answers.  
1. In the first place I desire to know what submission of the King that is, that gives a Legal Right? That is to say, the Doctor desires to make a new Question of it; for whether submission d●●● give a Right, and what that submission is that d●es it are different Questions; suppose men should differ in opinion, as to the nature, degrees, or forms of such submission; does it therefore follow, that submission itself does not give a Right, because all men are not satisfied as to the kind or degree of submission; this is an odd sort of arguing to deny the thing▪ because we are not agreed about the Modus. But since the Doctor is for ask of Questions, he will give me leave to ask him one; 
Vindic. p. 17.  He says, that the submission of the People gives a Right to Obedience, though not a Legal Right, and I desire to know what submission of the People that is that gives such a Right? is it a formal Recognition by the States and Representatives? why possibly that may do something where there are such States and Representatives: But what submission is that where are none, as there were not in the Eastern Countries (and about which is the present Question) I suppose a Parliament was not called in Judaea, nor the Sanbedrim neither (if there were then any such Constitution) to make a formal surrender of themselves to N●buchadnezzar, nor yet afterwards to the Romans. The Doctor insists much upon the submission of Jaddus, and (if it were true) what Convention of the People was there representing the Nation that formally submitted to Alexander? Jaddus himself and the Priests, and perhaps these at Jerusalem; and what is all this to the great Body of the Nation? which the Doctor makes necessary to a Settlement, why truly nothing at all of this, and what then is that submission of the People, that gives a Right to obedience? even a tacit submission under force. And methinks a man that is so very easy to his own Principles, as to admit of any thing that makes for them, should not presently fall of ask Questions, what is that submission of the King, as if it was hard to be found, and especially, when he has made it as easy as possible; and I would fain know if submission of the People under force gives a Right to obedience, why submission of the Prince under the same force does not give a Legal Right? what need is there of any formal Resignation of the Princes, more than there is of a formal submission of the People. 
Vindic. p. 13.  A consent certainly is sufficient; and the Doctor hath told us in respect of the People, and I do not know any Reason, but it is the same in respect of the Prince. For it is a voluntary consent though extorted by force as all Moralists a low such a mixed choice and election to be. And so the Doctor hath answered his own Question: I confess there is a great deal more in this Question, and which needs not now be insisted on; Lawyers and Casuists have pretty clearly determined this point, but I see no necessity yet of diving any farther into it. For there is no dispute that claiming and insisting upon Right is no submission. The Doctor indeed talks a little oddly of it, as we shall see presently; in the mean time he asks again, is swearing Allegiance a submission and acknowledgement? I answer, yes sure, or else it is very hard to know what it is: But then the Doctor hath an objection to this what became then of the Right of the House of York, when the Duke of York swore Allegiance to Henry iv (Henry VI. it should be) He is got into the unreasonableness of a new separation (A Book heretofore despised by him for the weakness of its reasoning) But when does he mean, the Duke of York's swearing before, or at the agreement between him and Hen. 6. if before it did not prejudice his Right, for he had then no visible Right, but was in the quality and condition of a Subject, and so acted, and so ought to act; and when his Title came on foot, the Title to the Crown was disputable and he put in his ●l●●m and made 〈◊〉 Parliament Judges, and till his Ti●●● 〈◊〉 cleared by these he appealed to 〈◊〉 in the quality of a Subject; and 〈◊〉 duties of a Subject were 〈…〉 him; if after, or at the agreement it did prejudice his Right so far as the agreement extended and he had so far parted with his Right, and had made himself by his voluntary act K. Henry's Subject, and owed him Allegiance during his life, and K. Henry had so far a Legal Title.  
The next is a very pretty Question, Is yielding to force, and power, quitting the administrating of the Government, and leaving the Throne, though with an intention to rec●●ver it again, when he can a submission? If it be, does not a King so far submit when he leaves his Country, without any Legal Authority of Government, and leaves his People in the hands of a prevailing Prince? There are shrewd Questions, and if the Doctor had pleased, he might have asked whether the Duke of Savoy had not submitted to the French King, when he is actually at war with him, for the recovery of his Right? he might as well have asked whether flying from an Enemy, or fight with l●t● be not submitting to him? And therefore, in answer I shall only tell him, that 'tis every jot as good a submission, as the Doctor's notion of a Settlement is a Settlement, i. e. 'tis none at all. But (says he) if nothing be a submission, but renouncing his Right, and making a formal resignation and conveyance of power; that is, I suppose, under hand and seal▪ and before sufficient witnesses. But what now, if nothing of that be necessary? what if a virtual Resignation be sufficient? When the King of Spain treated witht the united Provinces as a Sovereign State; all the World were satisfied, that that was a Session; and so is the submitting to be a Subject, or other equivalent acts, though there be no formal conveyance of Power. And now the Doctor desires to know how the Author will prove, that the Israelites thus submitted to the Aramites, Moabites, or Babylonians. I tell him, I will not prove that they made a formal Resignation. And there is no need to prove the other, for they actually became their Subjects; nay, the Doctor says, what other submission they made but a bare yielding to force and power; 
Vindic. p. 13.  and that proves it too, for he tells us, that is a voluntary consent, the extorted by force, as all Moralists allow such a mixed choice and election to be  
2. The next main Question the Doctor asks is, Can the submission of the King give a Legal Right to the Crown, without the submission of the People? I had told him no, but both together, and what then; if not (says he) it seems the People may have some Right, if not to the Government, yet to give away the Government of themselves. Some Right? no doubt of it, the Prince cannot give the Government of the People to whom he please without their own consent? and therefore what? The People may give it away without his consent? that I think will hardly follow; the People have some Right, but have they all? and to be sure they can give away no more Right than they have; and what is their Right, they have a Right not to be disposed of to any Prince besides their own, without their own consent. But have they any Right to throw off their own King and take another? yes, says he, if the consent and submission of a People can make a King when they have none, why can it not do so, when they are under a new force and power, which is the same state, as if they had no King? that is because when they are free, and have no King, they may make one; therefore when they are not free, and when they have a King, they may make another King. This is a pure consequence, the reason why they may make a King when they have none, is because the power is then in them, and they may delegate it, or dispose it as they please, or they may take it themselves; but the Question is, whether they can give it when they have it not; and the being under force is a pretty odd reason that they have it: But saith he, it is the same state, as if they had no King; not quite the same state sure, for if they had no King the Sovereign Power was in them, and then they might give it away, because they would give away no more than their own.  
3. His next Question is, Can't every Private man, or any City or Garrison, when they are overpowered and cannot be relieved by their Prince, submit for themselves to the Conqueror, without the submission of their Kings? I pray mark the consequence, and therefore the submission of the Prince and People does not give a Legal Right; for that was the thing the Doctor was to prove here; but instead of that, he asks another Question, do they not by such submission, according to the Laws of Nations, become the Subjects of the Conqueror till they are retaken? Now these the Doctor takes for granted, and proceeds upon it, and draws a conclusion from thence, that therefore a whole Nation may do so, but for all that there is nothing more extravagant, and no man believes it. Does a private man when he is taken Prisoner, or a Garrison of men when they are overpowered and taken, forthwith become the Subjects to the Conqueror? all the World knows the contrary when a Garrison is taken, the Walls and Bulwarks are the Conquerors; but the men are his Prisoners, and not his Subjects. But it seems according to the Dr. Men are taken like Beasts, nay like the wildest sort (ferae naturae) the property follows the Possession: But every Soldier can teach him a better Doctrine; In the Wars heretofore, and even in those now in the World, how few instances are these of the Subjects of one Prince (I except Soldiers of fortune not Subjects) who when taken Prisoners have listed themselves, and taken pay under the enemy, and actually fought against their own King and Master. Some such Renegadoes there have been; but they have always been branded with Infamy, and if retaken are sure to pay for it; for to treat such perfidious violators of their Faith and Honour, as the worst of enemies, has been the practice of all Princes and all Nations. And yet the Dr. in this case appeals to the Law of Nations; by which, he tells us before, he means general practice and usage: I am content to let that decide the point; and if a Soldier changing sides (upon his being taken) and taking pay under the enemy against his own King, be in the estimate of the World perfidious to a high degree, and a man of no honour; then the Doctor's Principles (maintaining he may do so) are neither Principles of Honour, nor Conscience.  
4. He has another Question, Has a Nation no right when the King is gone, to preserve themselves by making the best terms they can with the new powers? yes, no doubt the best terms they can honestly. But where is the consequence again, and therefore the submission of the Prince and People cannot give a Legal Right; he tells us his Questions are in answer to that.  
5. His next is a very pleasant Question, For what will our Author say to the submission of Jaddus and the Jews to Alexander, while Darius was living. Now the Dr. knows well enough, I have said more to it than he hath answered, or than he will answer in haste; and he tells us, he will not engage in the Quarrel, but assigns me over to a more learned answerer, and yet asks me what I will say to it. This is extraordinary, and I must confess a very dextrous way of answering. But however, what relates to the case of Jaddus I shall examine it altogether, and when I come to consider the Vindicator of Joseph●●. I shall not forget what the Dr. offers in that case, that the Vindicator does not mention, and that is but very little.  
The next thing is the Case of Joash and Athaliah, the story of which in the Convocation the Dr repeats at large, and thither I refer the Reader, not thinking it necessary to transcribe it.  

Answ. p. 17.  My Argument from thence, which the Dr. citys truly was this; It is plain the Convocation does not conceive, that the enjoyment of the Crown with all its dignities, etc. is that thorough Settlement to which is due subjection and obedience as to God's Authority. Athaliah personally enjoyed the Crown with all its dignities, etc. and all places of trust and power, etc. were in her hands and at her disposal (which was the very account the Author I disputed against had given of a thorough Settlement) and this for no less a time than six years, and in as full and ample a manner, as any Usurper or any Rightful King ever enjoyed them; but for all that the Convocation is so far from urging obedience to her, as to God's Authority, that they expressly justify the resisting, nay the slaying her. And this is a clear demonstration, that by a thorough Settlement, the Convocation does not mean a full possession of power merely, for they say when a Government is fully settled, it ought to be obeyed as God's Authority, not only for fear, but also for Conscience sake; but they say also, that when Athaliah was fully possessed, She ought not to be obeyed, but to be resisted and slain: And the conclusion from these premises is, that to be fully possessed of the Throne, is not of itself to be so throughly settled as to make it God's Authority, and obedience to become a duty.  

p. 22.  To this the Dr. answers: Now it were sufficient to observe here, that he has not given the true notion of a full and settled possession. That is, I had not said that Athaliah was settled on the Throne, according to the Convocations sense of a Settlement, and I wonder how I should, when I had expressly asserted the contrary, and the design of the Argument is to prove it; but for all that the Dr. is resolved to make me say it, whether I will or no; and accordingly he goes to prove against me, that the Convocation says not one word of the through Settlement of Athaliah in the Throne, but if we may learn the sense of the Convocation (as this Author concludes we may) from Bishop Buckeridge, they did not think her settled in the Throne; very Right, and did not I say so? And I thought I had given a good reason for it. But then I wonder what makes the Dr. say, thus his whole Argument is lost, that is, it is lost, because the Dr. hath proved it. But I doubt his Argument is lost, for he asserts, that the Possession of the Throne, and the submission of the People makes a thorough Settlement. And though I do not say, that the People of Judah submitted (in such a sense as to become Subjects) to Athaliah; yet the Dr. says it, and says they ought to be justified in it. But then, if notwithstanding Athaliahs' Possession of the Throne, and the People's submission to her; The Convocation says not a word of her through Settlement, nor did think her settled on the Throne: It is as plain as the Sun, that by a thorough Settlement; they did not mean the Possession of the Throne, and the submission of the People; for according to the Dr. Athaliah had both, and yet the Convocation did not think her settled; and therefore there must be something else go to a thorough Settlement, and the Dr. may try his skill, if he can find any thing besides the acquisition of Right. And thus the Drs. Argument is lost, if to have it perfectly confuted from his own words, is to have it lost. But no matter for that, let the Drs. Argument suffer never so much by it, he will have me say, that Athaliah was throughly settled, and makes me believe he does me a great kindness to admit it, for says he, to gratify our Author, let us suppose the Convocation did own Athaliah to have been as throughly settled in the Throne; 
●. 36.  and a little after he tells me, I will suppose, that Athaliah was throughly settled in the Throne; whereas I suppose and prove the clean contrary, and if to suppose that Athaliah was not throughly settled, be to suppose She was throughly settled, than I do suppose it, but the Dr. I thank him, has a mind to make me to contradict myself, as fast as he contradicts himself.  
But the Dr. gives a reason, why I have not given the true notion of a full and settled Possession, for (saith he) he hath left out the principal part of it, as I state it, when the Estates of the Realm, and the great body of the Nation has submitted to such a Prince. Now it is true I have left it out, and how should the Dr. expect I should do otherwise; for he knows I do not believe that is the true notion of a Settlement; and I do not believe that the Dr. can prove that it is: But I suppose the Dr. means, that because I said that Athaliah was fully possessed of the Throne, and did not say likewise, that the Estates of the Realm and the great Body of the Nation submitted to her; therefore my Argument does not affect him. And what the Convocation says of deposing and slaying Athaliah, does not relate to a settled Government; except it appears, that according to the Drs. notion of it, the Estates of the Realm, etc. had submitted to her; and therefore a settled Government may have God's Authority, and aught to be obeyed, though Athaliah had not God's Authority and might be deposed, because she was not settled according to the Drs. account, by the submission of the Estates of the Realm, etc. This I take to be his meaning, though he has not expressed it; but I know I must be careful of giving his meaning, lest he be angry, and tell me again, he will answer for none of my senses. And therefore if this be not his sense, 
Vindic. p. 71.  I desire him in his next to tell me what is, for I can make no other sense of it; But methinks a man that is so very humoursom and touchy, should be careful to deliver his sense a little plainer, and not leave men to guests, and to make it out for him. But if that be his sense, than I make this Answer.  
1. I do own, that the People of Judah (at least the more conscientious part of them) did not submit to Athaliah so as to become her Subjects, and Parties to her Government. But I do believe notwithstanding, that a great part of them, and perhaps the greatest did sided with her and abet her. For it is plain, that She had a Party enough to maintain her Government, and those that would not own it were not able to oppose her. Had Jehoiada been strong enough, I think there is no doubt but he would have deposed her, and established Joash long before. But at the end of six years, he had a great accession to his Party (which probably he had at that time been preparing and working them into a sense of their duty to their lawful King) and there can hardly be given any other account, why he permitted the Usurpation so long; for if the mere showing the King would have done it, and have turned the hearts of the People, that might as well have been done some years before; and the Kingdom have been set upon the Right bottom, and the mischiefs of continued Usurpation have been prevented. But it is no wonder, that power and interest should prevail against Duty and Conscience. Men in those days as well as others might have their Principles corrupted, and their morals poisoned, what Arguments they had to justify themselves by, does not appear (the Drs. two Books would have stored them with abundance) but a little Argument with a great Interest, will go a great way. And it is plain, it was six years before they came to a sense of their duty; and there is little doubt to be made, but Jehoiada travailed all that time with them, to reduce them: and probably upon just Conviction, they deserted the Usurper, and joined themselves to Jehoiada.  
But the Question is not, What they did, but what they ought to have done: That a great part of the Kingdom did submit to her, I think there is no dispute; and it is as little, that a great many did not: and the Question is. Who of these, according to the Principles of the Convocation, aught to be justified, and who ought to be condemned.  
2. The Dr. himself asserts, they did submit; and so Athaliah was settled according to his Notion of a Settlement; and then my Argument affects him.  
3. The Question is not, What is the Drs. Notion, but what is the Convocation's Notion of a Settlement? and I readily grant, that according to that, Athaliah was not settled; nor that they thought she was: But the Reason is, because she was an Usurper, and the Right Heir of the Kingdom was alive, and not because the People had not submitted. For, if they did submit (as the Dr. says they did) that made no alteration in the Case; they were bound notwithstanding to return to their Lawful Ki g, and to Depose the Usurper, whether they had, or not submitted. And the truth is, there is scarcely any thing the Convocation more obviates, than the Notion of People's Consent contributing any thing to the Government, or to their own Duty. They express it, Civil Power, Jurisdiction, etc. deduced by their Consents— depend upon their Consents— did receive any such virtue and strength from the people. 
P. 3. P. 8. P. 28.  Now it s true, these are spoken with reference to Lawful Governments. But then I would fain see a good Reason, why the People's Submission and Consent, which signifies nothing with respect to Lawful Governments, and their Duty to them, should signify so very much against the Lawful Government; or if the People's Consent does not make Allegiance a Duty to Lawful Governments, how comes it to make it a Duty to Usurpation, in opposition to Lawful Governments?  
4. Although the Dr. here tells us, that the Principal part of a Settlement, is the Submission of the Estates, and the great Body of the Nation, as he does also in his Case of Allegiance; yet when he comes to prove this, he himself hath left this Principal part quite out: for the Answerer had said, that Settlement is a Term of Law, and in the notion of it denoted a Rightful and Peaceable Possession; and in Reply to this, 
Vindic. p. 5, 6.  the Dr. tells us, that when the Convocation speaks of the Settlement of Powers which are against Law, it must be understood of the Settlement of Possession, and the obvious Exposition of Settlement, in such cases is a Settlement of Possession: And afterward, 
P. 7, 8.  All the Convocation says, relates to the visible and actual alterations of Government and Governors, which is matter of fact; and therefore the Settlement of such alterations, is an Actual, not a Legal Settlement: And this brings the dispute to matter of Sense, and an Actual and Visible Settlement, is all that is required to an Actual and Visible Translation of Kingdoms. But where is the Drs. Principal Part all this ●hile, of the Submission of the Estates, ●c.? Every Usurper that is in the Possession of the Throne, and Actually governs, has this Settlement of Possession, and this Actual and Visible Settlement; and if Sense must judge, and Matter of Fact, without any further inquiry, than every man that governs, is settled; for there is Possession, and there is the Actual and Visible Administration of Governme t; and Athaliah was as throughly settled, as Solomon; and Cromwell, as King Charles. And so the Doctor hath lost his Principal Part. And though he talks abundance of the Submission of the Estates, etc. yet never undertakes to prove, that that is employed in the Notion of a Settlement; and I suppose there is very good Reason for it; because he cannot: and I desire, he would show me but one good Reason, why such Submission does enter into the Notion of a Settlement. Let that Settlement be Legal, Actual, or Visible, or what he please; But of this more hereafter.  
To the Case of Joash and Athaliah, the Dr. gave Two Answers: 
Case of Alleg. p. 34, 35. Vindic.  He calls them now Two Accounts: And this I gave Two Accounts of in my Case of Allegiance: and in truth, he may call them any thing, 
p. 24.  rather than Answers. And he hath now quitted one of them himself, though he will not seem to do it: so if he please, he may call one his Account, and the other his Answer.  
This (his Answer to the Case of Jo●sh and Athaliah) he says, our Author answers with great triumph. Now I know what the Dr. means by triumph, wheyface charges me with it; and that is not 〈◊〉 insolence or immodesty of express●●●g but giving a clear and distinct A●●●●r. ●ad my Answer been lame or impertinent, he could have b●r● it well enough; ●●d I might have been admitted to speak with humility and meekness; but when it touches the weakness of his Arguments and Reasoning, 'tis Triumphant and Saucy, a●d not to be endured.  

P. 1.  He tells me for Reply, He must begin with my Answer to his Second. Now it may be remembered, what a complaint there was of a●tering his method and order, and which had more of art, than honesty in it. And here he does it himself, and will neither observe his own Order and Method, nor mine; and what has this in it? I am sure it has more Art than Ingenuity; for it is for nothing else, but to blind the defect of the First Answer; which in truth he plainly gives up, though he will not own it. And to show the Art of it, I shall repeat them in order.  
The Drs First Answer is, 
Vindic. p. 24. Postser. p. 4.  That all this Story amounts to, is no more than this, that when the Legal and Rightful Heir is Actually Possessed of the Throne, Subjects may return to their Allegiance, and by the Authority of their King, prosecute the Usurper: My Answer was, The Story amounts to a great deal more; and that is, that Subjects may set the Rightful Heir on the Throne, although it be in the Actual Possession of the Usurper; for so Jehoiada and the People did— The Dr. replies, It is true it does signify something more, with reference to Joash; but I had regard only to the Case of Athaliah. What does he mean by this? How should he regard only the Case of Athaliah exclusive of Joash, especially when he makes the whole stress of the Answer, to lie in the Legal and Rightful Heir's being Actually possessed of the Throne? But the Dr. it seems, had so much regard to the Usurper, that he never regarded the Subjects return to their Allegiance. But let him mean what he please by it, any thing, or nothing, it is all one: for if Subjects may set the Rightful Heir on the Throne, when it is in the Possession of the Usurper, it is as much as my Answer drove at; and if he yields that, he may regard the Case of Athaliah as much as he please. But, says he, It does not signify so generally as he puts it: And I pray mark his Reason, But it signifi●s only this, that Subjects by the express Command and Authority of God (as the Convocation teaches) may place the Rightful Prince on the Throne, though possessed by an Usurper: i. e. as he says afterwards, where God himself hath made the I●●tail. And that is, he perfectly abandons his first Answer, and flies to his Second, It was a peculiar Case, for God himself ●●d entailed, etc.  
In like manner, in the First Answer, the Dr. says, for Joash was first ●nointed a● a proclaimed, before any ●●e starred a finger against Athaliah. My Answer was, Is the Dr. sure Joash was actually possessed of the Throne? He was Anointed indeed; but is Anointing Actual Possession, & c.? But however, who anointed, and who proclaimed him? and who put him in possession? Why truly, no body else but his own Subjects, and those very men that had lived six years under the Usurper. And then I perceive, that Subjects may stand by the Rightful Heir against an Usurper, though possessed of the Throne for some years. But then where is that Fidelity, Allegiance, and Obedience, that the Doctor says, we are bound to pay to Usurped Powers? To this the Dr. replies, Surely just where it was bsfore in the Convocation Book, and in the Scriptures. But I doubt that; but I can tell him where it is: It is in Dr. Sherlock's Case of Allegiance, and in his Vindication of that Case; but neither in the Convocation Book, nor in the Scriptures, nor in any other approved Author. But now to the purpose: But (saith the Dr.) This was an Exempt Case, upon account of the Divine Entail. And that is the Second Answer still.  
The Dr. proceeds in the First Answer, now this is a very different Case from raising Rebellion against a Prince who is in Possession of the Throne, to restore an Ejected Prince. My Answer was, Was not Athaliah in Possession of the Throne, when Jehoiada anointed Joash?— The Doctor replies. I answer as I have before done; s e was in the Actual and Visible Possession of the T●rone, but against a Divine Entails  
I had further answered, That the Question is concerning Allegiance to an Usurper in the possession of the Throne; and as to that, there is no difference; for those pay as little Allegiance to an Usurper, who anoint a King and then depose him, as those who do it to restore ●n ejected one: and I would fain know, what difference there is (as to Allegiance to an Usurper) between anointing a new King, and upon his Authority deposing an Usurper, and doing the same thing upon the Authority of one already anointed The Doctor replies, I grant there is no difference, where it is the duty of Subjects either to anoint a new King, or to restore an old anointed King; but this is a duty only, where the Usurpation is against God's Entail.  
So that here is nothing but the Second Answer over and over again; but the first Answer is perfectly lost, and the Doctor cannot maintain it, and has nothing to say for it; and he might have said so, and there had been an end; but to quit it in the plain field, and yet to pretend to stand to it, to give nothing in Reply, but the Second Answer and yet dress it up, as if it had been the First, savours more of Artifice, than Ingenuity or Reason. A little Ingenuity would have saved us both some pains. But some men, when they find fault with themselves, and when it is for their turn, can be contented to own themselves fallible, and are not ashamed to own that they are still learners; 
Preface to the Case of Allegiance.  but if any man else discovers their mistakes, they cannot abide to own them, but will shift and double, and turn and wind any way, rather than acknowledge a mistake.  
But has the Doctor nothing at all to say for his First Answer? Yes truly (to do him Right) he has something to say, but it is next to nothing; and he had even as good have let it pass, in all points, and assigned the whole business over to the Second Answer, as he hath done in every thing besides.  
All that he says, is this: In the First Answer to confirm what he said, that all that they amounted to, was, that when the Legal and Rightful King is possessed, Subjects may return to their Allegiance: For (says he) Joash was first anointed and proclaimed, before any one stirred a finger against Athaliah. To this I answered, Is the Doctor sure, that Joash was actually possessed of the Throne? He was anointed indeed, but is anointing, actual possession? And it will not be easy to prove it, according to the Doctor's notion of Possession, of having the whole administration of affairs, and all the Authority of the Kingdom in his hands. To this he replies, The Convocation affirms, that King Joash was in possession of his Crown before Athaliah was slain.  

Vindic. p. 30.  And he further tells us, That the Convocation thought it very considerable, that the Princes, Levites, and People, yielded subjection to their lawful King; and having so done, and their King being in Possession of the Throne, joined together for the overthrowing Athaliah the Usurper, if the Convocation had not thought that there was some difference between kill Athaliah, before or after the anointing of Joash, they would not have laid so much stress upon the time, when she was slain. And (saith he) I wonder our Author should perceive no difference: for though it had been the same ●ing ●o Athaliah, whether she had 〈◊〉 killed before or after the anointing of Joash, yet it greatly altered the nature of the fact; and that upon two accounts; both with respect to the Authority, whereby it was done, and the Character of the Person who suffered. The Convocation will not allow a private man to kill a King de facto; and that was the Case of the Jews during Athaliah's Reign, before Joash's Title was Recognised, and he anointed, and placed on the Throne; but when this was done, they had the visible and actual Authority of their King to slay the Usurper. And after, Thus whatever Authority Athaliah had before, when Joash was anointed, she sunk into the state of a Subject, and then to kill her, was not to kill a Queen de facto, but a Subject, who had been an Usurper, but now was a Subject again; and therefore no Fidelity or Allegiance was due to her. Is not this pure Doctrine from a Church of England-Man? As if in an Hereditary Monarchy (and one that was so by Divine Entail too, which the Doctor lays so much stress upon) the King could have no Authority to perform the Acts of Government till he was Anointed, and Crowned, and his Title Recognised by his Subjects. We are hard put to it sure, when we must gather up the very dregs of the Commonwealth Principles, to support our Hypothesis. At this rate Athaliah had hard fortune; for if she had come a little sooner, and before the Ceremony of Anointing had been over, she had saved her Life and her Authority too; and her crying out Treason, Treason, had been the true state of the Case, and they had all been Traitors, in violating the Allegiance and Fidelity they owed to her: for the Do●●●r tells us, that before the Recognition and Anointing, the Jews were private ●●n● and had no Authority; a●d that till ●hen she was Queen de facto, and was not sunk into a Subject; and that Fidelity and Allegiance was due to her: And I suppose, had she come time enough, by virtue of that Allegiance they owed her, she might have commanded them not to have deposed her; at least, not to have slain her: nay, according to the Doctor, they could not do it; for they had no Authority, and she was their Queen. Now, if the Doctor will answer me one Question, I will thank him. Did the Subjects of Judah own Allegiance to Athaliah, till such time as Joash was actually possessed of the Throne, i. e. according to the Doctor, till he was actually anointed, than I desire to know, how he came to be anointed by her Subjects, for that was not an act of Fidelity and Allegiance to her, but a contradiction to it: But if they did not owe her Allegiance, till he was anointed, then (as the Doctor phraseth it) she was sunk into lhe state of a Subject before Joash was anointed. And her Character was lost before (if ever she had any to lose, for that the Doctor has not yet proved:)— And I believe if the Doctor looks again, he will find, that their anointing Joash, was an Evidence that they were his Subjects before, and not as he tells us, that they might return to their Allegiance when he was actually possessed of the Throne, i. e. in his sense, when he was anointed; for their very anointing him, plainly showed they were his Subjects, and so owned themselves before: and the Convocation is as express as can be. 
Convoc. p. 41.  They altogether by a Covenant, acknowledged their Allegiance unto him, as unto their Lawful King, and so dispose of things, as presently after he was Crowned and Anointed: After what? after they acknowleded their Allegiance to him. So that their Allegiance d●d not commence from his anointing; nor cease to Athaliah (if ever they paid any to her) upon his being in Actual Possession (in the Doctor's sense, and) as he would have it: and immediately it follows, which dutiful office of Subjects being performed, that is, the dutiful Office of Crowning and Anointing. This it seems, was the Office of them that were Subjects, and not of such as by that act were to become so And to this purpose I had answered this matter before: 
Postscr. p.  The Doctor knows well enough, that his Anointing and Proclaiming, did not make him King, but that (according to the Rules of Succession in that and other Kingdoms, he was King all the while of Athaliah's Usurpation, and Allegiance was due to him, and upon the account of that they restored him. But saith the Doctor, If the Convocation had not thought, that there was some difference between kill Athaliah before or after the anointing of Joash, they would not have laid so much stress upon the time, when she was slain. Now it is true, the Convocation does mention the time, and seem to lay some weight upon Joash's being in Possession, and not without Reason; this Example of Jehoiada (and which the Doctor observes) was urged by the Papists to justify the Pope's Power of Deposing Princes, and to refute this, that Chapter and Canon seems especially to be directed. And if we consult the Protestant Authors of those times, we shall find, the most insisted on these Two Answers; the first respected the Character of the Person deposed, 
Consult B. Robert Abbot, de Suprem. Potestat. Reg. p. 32. Roffensis, p. 913.  the second the Authority by which it was done. As to the First, they say Athaliah was an Usurper, and no Queen without Right and Title; and what Jehoiada did, any other private man might have done: But not a word of the Doctor's fine limitation of her sinking into the state of a Subject when Joash was anointed: for they never thought her otherwise; only they thought her a great deal worse: The Doctor indeed sprucely calls her a Queen, and is very tender as to the Point of slaying her; but they bluntly called her a Robber, and never troubled themselves about the Punctilio and Ceremony of killing her. Bishop Robert Abbot says roundly, 
 non hic ex auctorata Regina quae nulla fuit, etc. p. 33.  This is not to be called a deposing a Queen, who was no Queen; but the taking vengeance of a cruel Robber, and the discharge of the Allegiance of Subjects to their own King.  
The other Answer respects the Authority, by which she was deposed and slain. And upon this they say, that any man hath Authority to kill an Usurper. And Bishop Buckeridge is very express; 
P. 923.  If Athaliah was not a true Queen, but an Usurper, etc. in this all are agreed, that she may be killed by any Subject; because no body is a Subject to an Enemy. Furthermore (saith he) the order of that management is this, Jehoiada shows and declares, their true, lawful, and natural King: the Princes and People accept him, and then Jehoiada Crowns him; and after all that, they take Athaliah, and slay her, etc. And now observe what follows, If they had first deposed Athaliah, and afterwards Declared and Inaugurated King Joash (videri fortasse poterat) perhaps it might seem, that something had been done by the Authority of the Priest, or Nobles, or People; but seeing that the true King was declared in the first place, and in the second place, punishment was taken of the false Queen and Usurper; those facts are known to be done by the Kingly Authority, and not by any Priestly Authority, or that of the Nobles, or People. From whence 'tis plain, there is not so much stress laid upon the anointing of Joash, as if Athaliah could not have been lawfully killed before, or without it, (as the Dr. fancies) for they say any body might do it: but being done after, it was a clearer proof against the P●pists, that it was done by the Authority Royal, and not Sacerdotal or Papal. And upon this account it seems, the Convocation was so punctual in reciting the order of it, 
Bellarm.  that the Proof might be yet clearer against the Papists. For they urged, that both the Deposing and Killing Athaliah, and the setting up of Joash, was done purely upon the Authority of Jehoiada as High Priest; and the order of it, as being done after Joash was Anointed and Crowned, was a proof without exception against them. And hereby an Objection is prevented: for if it had been done before, it might have been pretended, (as some Papists and Commonwealths men pretend, and the Dr. has given no small Countenance to it) that Joash was not King, and that he had no Authority, till he was Crowned; and therefore it must be done by the Authority of Jehioada. But it being done after, refutes all such Cavils; and therefore there was reason enough for their mentioning and insisting upon his being Crowned before Athaliah was slain; though, they might believe, that Joash had sufficient Authority to perform all Acts of Government, as well before, as after such Anointing and Crowning. And that they did so, is as plain as words can express it. For speaking of the Kingdom of Judah, this they say expressly, After that the Kingdom was held by Succ●●sion, 
Convoc. p. 52.  the very being of the King's Son the True Heir Apparent, after his Father's death, gave unto them all th● Actual Intere t, Right, and Possession (as Possession in those Cases, is to be expounded) of their several Governments, to do any act or acts, as well before, as after any subsequent Formalities and Ceremonies.— So th●t they never t●ought of Anointing as giving Possession, or tha● they were thereby empowered to do any Acts of Government; and the Usurper might have been slain, as justly by the Authority of Joash, as well before, as after his Anointing.  
But all this is mere trifling, and signifies nothing to the main Question: For whether Anointing gives Possession or no, whether Joash was in Possession before or not, is all one in the Present Case. For if he was out of Possession, they put him in Possession; if Anointing was so material, they Anointed him; and all this from a sense of their Duty and Allegiance; and even when the Government was actually administered by an Usurper. 
Postscr. p. 9  And then it follows (as I said) that Allegiance is due to a Prince, though his Throne be possessed by an Usurper. So that let Anointing give as much Possession as the Dr. please, and let him make what Inferences he thinks good from Athaliah's being slain after Joash's Anointing, I am not able to see what he would prove from them. And if they were granted him, he cannot from thence prove, that Allegiance is not due to a Rightful Prince dispossessed, or while an Usurper is upon his Throne, or that the Jews did not pay Allegiance to Joash before he was anointed, or at the same time that Athaliah was on his Throne.  
But the Dr. starts a new Question, and that is, Whether a Private man may kill an Usurper? and expatiates upon it, and has it in I know not how many places in his Book, though it be nothing at all to the purpose: Perhaps he would have me give some Answer to that, because he can dispute about it. I can tell him, that Bishop Buckeridge, and other Learned men have asserted it: and if he have a mind to it, he may try his faculty, and dispute the Point against them. But I do not know any reason, to mix it in the Present Controversy, which is about Submission, and Swearing Allegiance to Usurped Powers: And I think there is some difference between Killing, and Swearing Allegiance to an Usurper.  
I now come to his Second Answer, which relates to his distinction of God's Entailing the Kingdom of Judah to David's Posterity, & of other Kingdoms, where Entails are made by Providence; and to this I had given several Answers.  
(1.) This Distinction is not in the Convocation Book, 
Postscr. p. 5. Vindic. p. 24.  and so does not affect their sense. To this the Dr. replies, I grant it. And then it seems, there may be a fair account given of the Deposing and Slaying Athaliah, without having recourse to the Drs. Distinction; for the Convocation have done that, and the Dr. grants his Distinction does not affect their Sense. But then I would fain know, how it comes to affect the Case of Joash and Athaliah so much, that it can by no means be solved without it. I know the Dr. says, he did not concern the Convocation Book in the Story. But I think that makes no great matter: the Convocation concerned themselves in the story; and that may do as well as if the Dr. himself had concerned them in it, and very punctually declare and justify Jehoiadas setting up Joash the Rightful King, and slaying Athaliah the Usurper. And that it seems may be done without the help of the Drs. Distinction; for that does not affect their Sense. But saith he, though the Convocation takes notice of the Story, yet they neither make nor answer this Objection (which the Dr. raised from the Story) in direct terms. But if the Objection be concerning the Anointing Joash, and the Deposing and Slaying Athaliah, they had made it sufficiently; and as for answering it in direct terms, if by that the Dr. means, they have not answered it as he hath done, it is true enough; but for all that, they have answered it directly enough; and the whole Chapter and Canon were designed for an Answer to it. But still the Dr. tells us, they had another design in mentioning it, and fitted their answers wholly to that, That no Priests in the Old Testament, did ever Depose from their Crowns, any of their Kings, 
Convoc. p 41.  how wicked soever; or had any Authority so to do. And because the Example of Jehoiada used to be urged by them to this purpose, they show that no such thing can be proved from it. Very well, and so they do. And do they not also tell us, that Jehoiada the High Priest set up Joash, and slew Athaliah? and therefore though it cannot be proved (as the Convocation says) that any Priests in the Old Testament did ever depose from their Crowns any of their Kings, yet it can be proved, that Jehoiada restored the Rightful King, and slew the Usurper. And if the Convocation had been of the Drs. mind, and had thought that an Usurper now might not be deposed, and that Subjects did not owe Allegiance to a Rightful King, while his Throne was possessed by an Usurper, it is credible, that they would not have intimated it, to prevent the inconveniences that might arise from this Example. In other Cases we see how very Nice and Cautious they were, and there was but reason. In the Case of Jehu they say, 
Convoc. p. 47, 48.  If any man shall affirm, that any Prophets, Priests, or other Persons, having no direct and express Command from God, might lawfully imitate the said facts either of Samuel or Elizeus in anointing and designing Successors to Kings, which otherwise had no Just Interest, Title, and Claim to their Kingdoms; or that it is Lawful for any Captain, or Subject, high or low whatsoever, to bear Arms against their Sovereign, or to lay violent hands upon his Sacred Person, by the Example of Jehu (notwithstanding that any Prophet or Priest should incite him thereunto by Unction, or other means whatsoever, except first that it might appear, that there are Now any such Prophets sent extraordinarily from God himself, with sufficient and special Authority in that behalf; and that every such Captain and Subject so incited, might be assured, that God had in express words, and by name, required and commanded him to do: He doth greatly err. So likewise they say, 
P. 53.  with respect to the fact of Ahud kill King Eglon; and of Jehu, Both which Examples (being but in number two throughout the Histories of all the Princes, Judges, and Kings, either of Israel or Judah) it seems they thought Athaliah was none of them, (what a Queen soever the Dr. hath made of her) do make it known to us, that although the Lord may, and is able to overthrow any King, etc. yet foreseeing what mischiefs private men under colour of those Examples, might have pretended or attempted against their Sovereigns, he did order, etc. as that it might plainly appear to any (that would not wilfully hoodwink himself) never to be lawful for any person whatsoever, upon pretence of any Revelation, Inspiration, or Commandment from his Divine Majesty, either to touch the Person of his Sovereign, etc. And this yet more fully and largely insisted on in the Canon, 
Conyoc. Can. 27. p. 54.  which is levelled to prevent the drawing of that fact of Ahud into example; and which I beg the Reader to peruse, and he will soon be satisfied, how wonderful careful the Convocation was, when any extraordinary Examples came in their way, and which were not to be followed in latter Ages, to prevent all mistakes and abuses, that might by corrupt minds be drawn from them.  
And now let us compare with these, the Case before us; here is a plain Example of Setting up a Rightful King, and of Deposing and Slaying an Usurper; and that Example justified by the Convocation. Is it possible for the Dr. himself, or for any man else to believe, that if the Covocationn had thought that (in these days) an Usurper ought not to be deposed, or that men were not bound to pay Allegiance to the Rightful King, when his Throne is in the Possession of an Usurper, that they would not have taken the same care in this, as they do in the other Examples, and plainly and clearly have said, that the practice of Jehoiada and the People was not Now to be drawn into precedent; for certainly, there is not less, but a great deal more Reason, to believe, that men may think it their duty, to own Allegiance to a dispossessed King, as the People of Judah did, than to kill a Lawful King, as Ahud did; and to seek no further, such a man as Dr. Sherlock, being so long before he could persuade himself to the contrary, is a demonstrative Evidence of it; and consequently it required yet the greater Caution to prevent it. But instead of that, they speak laudably and commendably of it; and rather give encouragement to it, 
Convoc. Can. 23. p. 42.  and recommend it, than otherwise. If any man shall affirm, that it was neither lawful for Jehoiada, and the rest of the Princes, Levites, and People, to have yielded their Subjection to their Lawful King; nor having so done, and their King being in Possession of his Crown, to have joined together for the overthrowing the Usurper; or that Jehoiada the High Priest, was not bound as he was a Priest (Let the Dr. mind that) both to inform the Princes, and People, of the Lord's Promise's, that Joash should Reign over them, and likewise to Anoint him. This looks very like encouragement; and rather seems, that they intended it for an Example, than to prevent its being so; and is very differing from the method they use in the Cases before mentioned. And all that they add as Caution, hath no manner of respect to the Deposing of an Usurper, or paying Allegiance to a Rightful King, while such a one is seated in the Throne, but the contrary. Or (say they) that this fact, either of the Princes, Priests, or People, was to be held for a Lawful Warrant, for any afterward, either Princes, Priests, or People, to have Deposed any of the Kings of Judah, who by Right of Succession came to their Crowns, or to have killed them for any respect whatsoever; and to have set another in their places, according to their own choice. But not one single word of Deposing an Usurper, or any thing like it or of Cautioning Subjects, from paying Allegiance to their Rightful King by that Example, when an Usurper was on his Throne: And the Pretermission of it, is a clear Indication, that they thought it Now a duty. And I believe, no good reason can be given, why the Convocation should be so very express and particular in Cautioning against Resisting and Killing of Kings, from those other Examples; and yet give no manner of Caution against Deposing and Killing an Usurper, from this Example; except they thought those were not exemplary, but this was. And let any man consider the Method the Convocation uses, and he will certainly find, that when ever they mention any Examples, which are not to be drawn into Practice in Succeeding Ages, they plainly declare so, with all possible Industry and Caution: And their not doing so here, and especially having from this very Example cautioned against Deposing a Rightful King; it is a plain proof, that they did not think, that this Example of Jehoiada and the People of Judah, was an Example of that kind; but might so far as they justify it, be drawn into practice. And this I think (if men are not wilfully blind) is a sufficient evidence, that the Convocation never thought that an Usurper might not be deposed, or that Subjects might not p●y Allegiance to their Lawful King, though his Throne was possessed by an Usurper; or further, that by a thorough Settlement, they never meant usurped Powers, and especially in opposition to a Rightful King.  

Vindic. p. 25.  But (saith the Dr.) though the Convocation does not answer a Question which they never proposed, if the setting up Joash and deposing A●haliah be the Question, the Convocation both proposed and answered it; yet (saith he) this is a good answer to it, i. e. the Dr. thinks so, but the Convocation did not, for they do not make it by his own Confession But however, he says, it is agreeable to the sense of the Convocation in that place, for they take notice, that Johoiada when he had sent to the Levi es and chief Fathers, etc. acquainted them with the preservation of their Prince, and that it was the Lords will that he should reign over them, which plainly refers to that Divine Entail of the Crown upon David's Posterity; so that 'tis evident the Convocation itself answers the difficulties of this story by the Divine Entail: What difficulties are these? of owning their Rightful King and deposing the Usurper? The Dr. indeed hath made some difficulty of that, but the Convocation thought of none, they plainly and roundly assert it was lawful and their duty so to do? The difficulty of the High Priests Authority to depose a King they obviate, and that the Person deposed was an Usurper, and what he did was as a Subject, and not as High Priest; but they make no manner of difficulty, of their yielding subjection to their lawful King, and then deposing the Usurper: And I believe any man that attentively considers what the Convocation say in this Chapter and Canon, will find that that is the main, if not the only ground of their Answer, that because it was lawful, and a duty for Subjects to yield their Subjection and Allegiance to their Lawful King; therefore what Jehoiada did in setting him up, and deposing the Usurper, was not peculiar to his office of High Priest, but as a duty in common to him with the rest of the Subjects; so that they are so far from disputing about it, or using any Arguments to confirm it, that they take it for granted, and proceed upon it, and ground their Answer upon the supposition of it. But says the Dr. the Convocation taking notice that Jehoiada had acquainted them, that it was the Lords will Joash should reign over them, plainly refers to that Divine Entail. And this he undertakes to prove more fully in the next page, but to save him any further trouble, I shall readily own that when the Convocation speaks of the Lords will, and the Lords purpose, that Joash should reign, they do refer to that Entail upon David s Posterity. And 'tis next to impossible to think they should do otherwise, for it was by virtue of that very Entail, that Joash had a Right to the Crown, and had there been no such Entail, Joash would have had no more Right than Athaliah herself; and therefore the mentioning of it was proper and necessary. It was upon that account that Joash was their lawful King, and Athaliah was an Usurper. And it was highly reasonable that Jehoiada should justify his proceed upon it. But what is this to the purpose, do they mention this Entail in opposition to humane Entails? not a word of that: And how then can he say, that his distinction and answer is agreeable to the sense of the Convocation? For they speak it in one sense, and he in another, they speak it without opposition to humane Entails, and he purely in opposition to them; they urge it, and so does Jehoiada to justify his proceed as acting according to the Rule and Standard of Right in the Kingdom of Judah; and the Dr. urges it, to prove the unjustifiableness of acting in the same manner in the like case in any other Country; at this rate the Dr. if he please, may prove from the Convocation, that Rebellion and Resistance is lawful in other Countries though not in Judah; for the Convocation refers to Gods Entail when it speaks of the obedience of the Jewish Subjects; and therefore according to the Dr. Kings that are so by Gods Entail, must not be resisted, but Kings that are so by Humane Entails may: And I wonder what reason he can give, why the Convocation when they speak of Divine Entails to justify the adhering to the lawful King, and deposing an Usurper, is to be understood any more in opposition to Humane Entails, than when they speak of the very same, to justify the Duties of Obedience, and Nonresistance; but the truth is, this is nothing else but shameless fallacy; and howsoever it might look in another, it is not very pardonable in Dr. Sherlock: All that the Dr. proves is that, the Convocation and Jehoiada himself, when they justify his adhering to his Rightful King, and deposing the Usurper, refer to the Divine Entail, which was the foundation of the Regal Right in the Kingdom of Judah; and upon the account of which he was the lawful King, and the other an Usurper. And from hence would make his Reader believe, that they taught that in other Kingdoms, where the Entails of the Crown are made by Humane Laws; the Subjects ought not to stand by the Rightful King, nor depose the Usurper, but stand by him and assist him against the Rightful King; which is a wild and extravagant as well as a sophistical conclusion; and any man but the Dr. would conclude the direct contrary; that because in the Kingdom of Judah, the Subjects were bound to own their dispossessed King, and assist him in the recovery of his Rights, and depose an Usurper that wrongfully possessed his Throne; because God by Entail had fixed and settled the Crown in one Family; and by that had made the Right to the Government to be in them, therefore in other Countries, because the Laws had entailed and fixed the Crown in a certain Family, the Subjects are bound to do the same to their Rightful King; For though the Entails be differing, the Reason and Equity of both is the same; the King of Judah had a Right to the Government by Divine Entail, and the Kings in other Countries by Humane Entails, but they both have right, and the Laws of doing Right are eternal and immutable; however the fixing and determining that Right may be various. And I believe the Dr. is the first, that from hence made a negative argument, for though there have been those who have said, the examples of Government and Obedience in the Scriptures do not affect us; because the Polity and Constitution of the Jewish Commonwealth was differing, but to say that, because the Jews were bound to observe their Laws of Government, because they were appointed by God himself; therefore the Subjects of other Governments are not bound to observe the Laws of their respective Constitutions, is a strain beyond the Moon, and fit only for the Dr. when he maintains paradoxes. Upon the Restoration of Edw. 4. the Parliament and Kingdom did as Jehoiada had done before, they had recourse to the Laws of the Land, which were the Standard of the Right to the Crown; and they did the same upon the Legal Entail, as Jehoiada did upon the Divine Entail, they established the Rightful King and deposed the Usurper; and I believe it was never questioned, but they acted as warrantably and justifiably as Jehoiada, though he did it by virtue of a Divine Entail, and they by virtue of a Humane Entail; but it must be confessed that the Drs. distinction, though it was then known, yet the corrupt and perverse use of it was never known before, till he hath now found it out to support an Hypothesis every way as absurd, as the use he makes of this distinction.  
I had further said with respect to the Convocation as the Dr. observes, That they do not speak of this (the distinctio between Divine and Humane Entails) when they call Athaliah an Usurper, and justify the proceed of Jehoiada and the People against her; but the Reason they give is general, The Right Heir of the Kingdom being alive, which extends to all Kingdoms that are entailed and go by Succession. To this the Dr. replies, that I make very bold with the Convocation, for (saith he) they do not offer to justify the proceed of Jehoiada, and the People against Athaliah, by saying that the Right Heir of the Kingdom was alive, but only prove by that She was an Usurper, who had no Legal Right to the Throne, the Right Heir being living. But if our Author will think again; I presume he will own that they are two very different questions, whether such a Prince be an Usurper, and whether he may be deposed and murdered. In answer to this I have only these things to observe.  
1. That here is one point gained, and that is, that according to the Dr. The sense of the Convocation is, that the Death of the Right Heir makes a Legal Right to the Crown to him that Possesses it; for he says, that they prove from the Right Heirs being living, that Athaliah was an Usurper, and had no Legal Right to the Throne, plainly implying, that if he had been dead, she had not been an Usurper, and would have had a Legal Right to the Throne; and he tells us that an Usurper is such a one as hath no Legal Right to the Throne. And so the Dr. must grant me that a Legal Right may be conveyed as well by the Death, as by the Session of the Right Heir. But then all his impertinent distinction vanishes, when he talks before, of Legal with respect to the Law of nature, 
Vindic. p. 11.  the Law of nations, and the Laws and Constitutions of a particular Nation, and (saith he) in this last sense, Legal is understood by all men who understand themselves, in this controversy of Legal Powers, that those only are Legal Powers, who have the rightful Authority of Government, according to the Laws and Constitutions of the Kingdom which they govern: Now I suppose the Dr. will take it ill if I should say he does not understand himself; and therefore by Legal he means Legal according to the Constitutions of the Kingdom, than I hope whatever he had said before, he will not now think it so great a blunder for me to assert that a Right to a Government, may be acquired by the Death or Session of the Right Heir, for we are to suppose the Dr. understands himself, 
Vindic. p. 11.  and has clear and distinct notions of what he writes, though he will not allow it to his Answerer, when he says the same things that he does. But then I doubt half the former part of his book will come to nothing; for I had asserted that all the Governments the Convocation requires and justifies obedience to, had acquired such a Right; which the Dr. does not disprove, but falls a distinguishing between the Laws of Nature, Nations, and a new Law never heard of before; the Law of force, which it seems does more than all other Laws, for it cancels the obligation of them all. And then tells me upon these terms he may agree with me, 
Vindic. p. 16.  whereas now he hath agreed the point upon my own terms; and so hath confuted all that he said before; for if a Legal Right to a Government by those means may be acquired, if all the Governments the Convocation justifies obedience to, had such a Right, if all the Governments they justify the resistance of, had not such a Right, than the distinction is between Right and no Right, and then by a thorough Settlement, they do mean the acquisition of a Legal Right, and cannot mean usurped Powers; which (according to the Dr. himself) have no Legal Right (if men understand themselves) though perhaps they may have something or other no body knows what, by the Laws of Nature, Nations, or Force.  
2. The Dr. says, the Convocation does not offer to justify the proceed of Jehoiada, and the People against Athaliah, by saying, that the Right Heir of the Kingdom was alive. Now the Dr. tells me, that because I had said this, I make very bold with the Convocation; and I shall leave it with the Reader who makes more bold with the Convocation I that had said they give that as a Reason to justify the proceed, or the Dr. who says they do not: In this Chapter, after having recited the Usurpation of Athaliah, the preservation of the Rightful Prince, the Subjects owning, anointing him, and deposing and slaying Athaliah; add, in all the process of which action, nothing was done, either by Jehoiada the High Priest, or by the Rest of the Princes and People of Judah and Benjamin, which God himself did not require at their hands. And to this they add immediately, Joash their late King's Son being then their only natural Lord and Sovereign, although Athaliah kept him for six years from the Possession of his Kingdom. And if they do not give this as the reason of the whole, I wish the Dr. would tell me what they give it for. But (says the Dr.) they only prove by this, that She was an Usurper, who had no Legal Right to the Throne, the Right Heir being living: Now it is certain, that this proved her an Usurper; but did not the Divine Entail prove her an Usurper also? that surely is the direct proof of it, and the ground and reason why the other proves it. The same Law that declared the Right to be in Joash, declared Athaliahs to be Usurpation. And why I wonder, should the Right Heirs being living any more declare, that She had no Legal Right to the Throne, than the Entail of the Crown did; and when his being alive, and being their natural Prince, declared it so only by virtue of that Entail. And I desire the Dr. to tell me, how Joash's being alive proved Athaliah to be an Usurper, any otherwise than that the Crown of Judah was entailed on David's posterity. But than what means this trifling nicety? why truly the Dr. was afraid lest his beloved Usurpation should suffer; And therefore adds, that he believes I will own that they are two very different Questions, whether such a Prince be an Usurper, and whether he may be deposed and murdered; murdered is a very hard word, and I do not care to meddle with it; the Convocation calls it slaying, and I think (with the Drs. leave) there is some difference between slaying and murdering; and a little more than there is between the Right of an Heir, and the Entail that makes that Right. But to gratify him I do own, that whether a Prince be an Usurper, and whether he may be deposed and slain are two different Questions; but I say likewise, that whether an Usurper may be deposed and slain when the Right Heir is living, is but one Question, and such a Question too, as the Convocation makes no difficulty to answer nor any Author of note, that I have met with besides, in any Age who as far as my re●ding serves, Civilians, Historians, Divines, have all unanimously asserted, that an Usurper may be deposed; and let any man consult, Barclay, Roffensis, Bishop Abbot, Sulitiffe, Widdring tun, or any other Author that answers Bellarmin with respect to this instance; and he will find that ●he Reason they all give to justify Athaliahs' deposing, was that She was an Usurper.  
And here I shall renew my request to the Dr. and desire him to show me any one approved Author of any Age, that ever asserted, that Tyrannus sine Titulo might not be deposed, or if he cannot do it himself, that he will request that learned Pen he tells me of, that is to inform me of the sense of the Primitive Christians; for it is no great credit to this Doctrine, that it hath had no better Patrons than Goodwin, Jenkins, etc. and only trumped up to serve the vilest purposes; and from that time to this hath not had one single Assertor, till it is now transmigrated to Dr. Sherlock.  
I had further said, that the Convocation thought of no such difference, but that a thorough Settlement of a Government, (and though attained by the same ill means) was the same thing, and had God's Authority in Judah as well as any other Nation; as in the instances of the Babylonians, Macedonians, and Romans, whose Government over the Jews was not attained by honester means than Athaliahs'; and was as much contrary to the Entail upon David's house, as hers, and yet they justify and require obedience to them, but justify the slaying of her; and therefore it is plain, that by a thorough Settlement they do not mean a full Possession of Power, [for (what the Dr. hath left out) Athaliah had as full Possion of Power] in the Kingdom of Judah as had the Babylonians, Macedonians, or Romans; nor do they reckon God's Entail upon David's posterity any ground of difference in this matter, for the Government of Judah by the Babylonians, was as much contrary to that Entail, as the Government of Athaliah.  
Now (saith the Dr.) all this is answered in one word, The Entail God made upon David 's posterity did always oblige the Jews, when they were at their own choice, and had power enough to take the King, on whom God had entailed the Crown, which was evidently their case, when Jehoiada anointed Joash and slew Athaliah; but when they were under force (as they were under the Babylonians, Macedonians, and Romans) no Entail tho made by God himself could bind them. And then I hope it will be granted, that no Humane Entails can bind any People, who are under force, if a Divine Entail cannot do it.  
To this I answer, This is no answer to the main point; the Question is whether in the sense of the Convocation, a thorough Settlement (by what means soever attained) did not oblige the Subjects of Judah to obedience as much as in any other Country; and though contrary to the Entail on David's posterity; and it is plain they thought so, for they urge the very same duties of Obedience and Nonresistance to the Babylonians and the Romans, as they do to the Kings of David's Family. The Babylonians and Romans, when their Government was throughly settled among them, their Authority was as sacred and  as Joash's, or any other of their Kings who were so by the Divine Entail; and let the Dr. if he can, show me any one duty of Subjects, which they require as due to the Kings of Judah by the Divine Entail; which they do not also require as equally due to the Babylonians, and Romans, which is clear to a Demonstration, that they thought of no such difference in this matter, but that a thorough Settlement in the Kingdom of Judah was the same thing, and every way as valid as in any other Country. And the Inference is plain, that therefore whatever possession of Power Athaliah had, and whatever submission there was of the People to her afore that the Dr. is resolved to suppose) they did not mean that to be the thorough Settlement, which has God's Authority, and to which obedience is due; for they urge obedience and nonresistance to the Babylonians and Romans, but justify the deposing and slaying of Athaliah. But to this (which is the main Question) the Dr. says not one word, and all that he says is, that when they were at their own choice and had power, they were bound to take the King on whom God entailed the Crown, but when they were under force, no Entail tho made by God himself could bind them. And what is all this to the Convocation speaking of a thorough Settlement, without any respect to the difference between Divine and Humane Entails? what if the Dr. (to save a better answer) has found a difference between choice and force? The Convocation takes as little notice of this distinction, as it does of the other: But the Dr. hath an extraordinary faculty at distinguishing; when the case of Athaliah and Joash presses him, than he is for distinguishing between Divine and Humane Entails; and Athaliah might be deposed and slain, because She was an Usurper against a Divine Entail, and her Government was a nullity when the Right Heir appeared; when he is pressed with the instances of the Babylonians and Romans, who (according to him) were likewise Usurpers against the same Divine Entail, than he is for distinguishing between choice and force, when they are at their own choice and have power, they are obliged to take the King by God's Entail, when under force God's Entail does not bind them. So that this last distinction hath eaten up the former, and the whole matter is resolved into force, if they had power, than the Government of the Usurper was at an end, and a nullity; and they were bound to prosecute and depose the Usurper: But if they had not Power, the Usurpers was a very good Government, and aught to be obeyed for Conscience sake. And so we are furnished with admirable measures of Obedience and Government, if they have Power they are bound in Conscience to resist and depose, if they are under force they are bound in Conscience to submit and obey, so that either way the Rule of Conscience is not a Divine Entail, but only force. But then I wonder what the Dr. will say to that manifest difference that was between the Usurpation of Athaliah, and the Government of the Babylonians and Romans: They were plainly under force all the six years of Athaliahs' Usurpation; and how came it to pass, that that would not make them Her Subjects, and her Authority as  as that of the other? if force would do it, 
Vindic. p. 13.  why would not Athaliahs' force effect it as well, as Nebuchadnezars or the Roman force? Athaliahs' force indeed was the force of the Kingdom, and the Babylonians was a foreign force; but I suppose the Dr. does not care to make that a difference, and he expressly affirms the contrary, for private Subjects, when the Prince and Government of the Nation is violently changed, and they are under force, force will justify submission, and then it is much the same thing from what quarter the force comes. And why then would not the force coming from Athaliahs' quarter, do the same thing and take off the binding Power of the Divine Entail, as well as when it came from the Babylonish quarter? And why were not they Athaliahs' Subjects, as well as to the Kings of Babylon, and her Authority as ? The Nation, the Laws, the Entails, were the same, and there was force in one Case as well as the other; why truly there was this difference that Athaliah was an Usurper, and the Kings of Babylon were none. And if the Dr. can find any other difference, he would do well to show it.  
Well! however that be let us see what kind of Subjects this Doctrine makes of the Jews to the Babylonians and Romans. He tells us, Kings set up by providence in Kingdoms, 
P. 35.  subject to a Divine Entail, may be and are deposed, whenever the Right Heir appears, though they had all the Rights and Settlement of the Regal Power before: Now the Doctor owns that the Babylonians and Romans were set up by Providence over Judah, in a Kingdom Subject to a Divine Entail; and therefore according to this Doctrine they might be, and were deposed upon the appearance of the Right Heir as well as Athaliah; I speak it with the Doctor's limitation, supposing they had power enough to depose them, (for we are not to suppose the Subjects of Judah could do more than they had power to do) But then wherein lay that dreadful guilt of Perjury, and Rebellion of Zedekiah so severely taxed and threatened in Scripture? not with respect to the Rights and Settlement of Nabuchadnezzar; for the Doctor tells us Kings set up by providence, may be and are deposed though they had all the Rights and Settlement of the Regal Power before; not with respect to the Oath which he had taken to Nabuchadnezzar; for the Doctor tells us again, 
p. 37.  that no Oath can oblige against a Divine Entail; and therefore it was only for the want of Power, and the dreadful account the Scripture gives us of the Perjury and Rebellion of Zedekiah; and which was followed with such a remarkable vengeance; and likewise those frequent Rebellions of the Jews, and that Pharisaical spirit of Rebellion so justly taxed by the Convocation, and by the Doctor too (though ridiculously applied) it seems the only fault and guilt of them was, their foolish attempting without sufficient Power, for if they had power enough they might not only lawfully but they were bound to do it; for he tells us elsewhere, 
p. 41.  though God may see fit sometimes to set a Providential King upon the Throne, yet whenever he nominates a new King, or discovers the Right Heir to whom the Crown belongs by a Divine Entail; the Reign of such Providential Kings is at an end, and the Subjects may and aught to depose and kill them; That is as he says before, 
p. 36.  whenever God is pleased to put it into their Power to place him (the Right Heir) on the Throne; so that it seems the Jews were rare Subjects all this while, and this an admirable Scheme of Obedience, may men swear Allegiance to a Prince, and tie themselves to him by all the sacred Bonds possible, and then so soon as they have Power, depose and kill him? nay are as much bound in Conscience, to kill him when they have Power, as they were to swear to him when they had none; which is an extraordinary account of Fidelity and Allegiance, and very fit for an extraordinary Hypothesis.  
But here the Dr. is hard put to it, and woefully contradicts himself; in the Case of Athaliah the Divine Entail is set up, and is to answer all Arguments; and then when the Right Heir appears the Reign of such providential Kings is at an end, 
Vindic. p. 41.  and the Subjects may and aught to depose and kill them: And he says it yet further with this Circumstance, 
P. 35.  though they had all the Rights and Settlement of the Regal power before, etc. So that in that Case neither Rights nor Settlements, nor any thing else, is valid against a Divine Entail, but the Usurper is to be deposed and killed. But now in the Case of the Babylonians (the Drs. Usurpers too, to all intents and purposes as much as Athaliah, and a little more; for according to him, they were Usurpers both against a Divine Law, and a Divine Entail) force is to do the business, and the Divine Entail itself signifies nothing at all, nor is of any validity against that. For says he, when they were under force, (as they were under the Babylonians, 
P. 27.  Macedonians, and Romans) no Entail, though made by God himself could bind them. I have but one thing more to add, that this again is as flat a contradiction, and in express terms to what he says in his Case of Allegiance as ever I met with: For he tells us upon this very matter, 
Case of Alleg. p. 21.  That the Prophet Jeremy's argument is prophesy, or an express command from God to submit to the King of Babylon; and there was great Reason for an express command from God at that time, and I pray observe his reason: Because himself had entailed the Kingdom on David 's Posterity, and therefore without an express command from God, they could not subject themselves to any other Prince, while any of that Family were living. So that it seems, than force nor any thing else would justify their submission without an express command, but the Drs. business now is to answer objections, and if that cannot be done without contradicting himself, who can help it, that is the fault of the objection.  
2. My second Reason against the use the Dr. makes of his distinction was, 
Answ. p. 5.  that the Drs. Arguments will equally justify submission to Athaliah in the Kingdom of Judah, notwithstanding such Entail as to any Usurper in any other Nation.  
To this the Dr. replies, Well? and suppose he can prove it, what then? why than I have proved what I intended to prove, and that is, that the use the Dr. makes of this distinction in the present case is impertinent and trifling, as we shall see presently; But saith the Dr. Did I ever deny, that it was lawful to submit to Athaliah while She was possessed of the Throne, and the true Heir concealed? Now I do not know what the Dr. means by denying, perhaps he may have some distinction in reserve to salve the business, and if he have let us see it, in the mean time he hath expressly affirmed the contrary, and that I think is denying it. In his Case of Allegiance, he tells us, that God himself had entailed the Kingdom of Judah; 
Case of Alleg. p. 35.  and therefore nothing could justify their submission to an Usurper, when the King's Son was found; and he further says in the same place, that Subjects are bound to adhere to their Prince of God's choosing when he is known, and to persecute all Usurpers to the utmost, and never submit to their Government. And this I think is denying it with a witness, for if nothing could justify their submission to an Usurper, and if they were bound never to submit to their Government, than I think it is plain enough, that it was not lawful for them to submit to Athaliah, while She was possessed of the Throne. The Drs. limitation here, and the true Heir concealed, and when the King's Son was found, and when the Right Heir was known signifies nothing, for he plainly says here, If any one should be condemned for it, Jehoiada was the man, who knew that Joash was living; and yet for six years together while he thought fit to conceal the secret, he submitted himself to Athaliah, and acted under her Authority, and neither blames himself, nor any of the Nation for doing so: Now I hope, that when the King's Son was found, and when the Right Heir was known, what force soever it might have with respect to the rest of the Subjects, it could have none with respect to Jehoiada, (for he that hide him need not be told where to find him;) And than it follows if nothing would justify their submission to an Usurper, when the King's Son was found, than nothing would justify the submission of Jehoiada to Athaliah; if Subjects when the Prince of God's choosing was known, were bound never to submit to the Usurpers Government, than Jehoiada who knew that Prince, was bound never to submit to Athaliah, but than what becomes of the submission that he now talks on, and in the next Page says it is certain they ought to be justified in it, i. e. it is certain the Dr. contradicts himself; for that nothing can justify submission, and they ought to be justified in their submission, is as flat a contradiction as words can make. But the Dr. had forgot what he said before, and who can help that. 
Vindic. p. 79.  But methinks he that is more afraid of other men's inventions than their memories, may a little fear his own memory, and not say he never denied that, which he hath flatly denied, in the present controversy, and in the present case.  
But saith the Dr. Does he find in Scripture, that the Jews are condemned for submitting all this while to Athaliah? No truly I do not find it, and does the Dr. find in Scripture, that they did submit to her, so as to become her Subjects? When the Dr. finds that, it is time enough for me to find the other, and that I suppose will be a good while first; but though it is not to be found in Scripture, I can tell him where he may find it, and that is in Bellarmin, and as far as I know he will be hard put to it to find it any where besides. Bellarmin indeed says it, but with a little more modesty than the Doctor He does not say they did submit, 
Credibile est p●●ulure cons●●●● su● regnum ejus a● pro●●●● pra●sertim cum omnes suit P●egis desuncti cred●●artur. sine ●●um aut●●● r●tate aut ratione, sc●um ex cer●●io suo hunc populi cons●●sam finxit Bellarmin●s. Vindic. p. 33.  and they ought to be justified in it, but (credibile est) it is credible, that the People approved her Reign by their consent, and especially when all the King's Sons were thought to be dead. But Bishop Buckeridge roundly answers, That without all Authority or Reason Bellarmin had only feigned this consent out of his own head.  
At length the Dr. tells me, I mistake the Question, that is a new Question not put before in his former book; It is not (saith he) enough for him to prove, that my Arguments will justify submission to Athaliah, while She was in the possession of the Throne, and of the power of the Kingdom: for let the entail be what it will, a Divine or Humane Entail; it is always lawful to submit to power: (though he had denied it before) But the Question is, whether my arguments give as  Authority to Athaliah, who usurped the Throne contrary to a Divine Entail, as they do to other King's de facto (have a c re of calling them Usurpers) who are throughly settled in their Thrones, contrary to mere Legal Rights, and Humane Entails; if they proved this, I should confess my arguments were n●ught, as proving too much.  
Now it might be sufficient here to observe, that the Dr. grants me, that his arguments will equally justify submission to Athaliah as to any Usurpers: and if his Arguments give  Authority to an Usurper, and if they equally justify Submission to Athaliah as to any other Usurper, than they equally give to her  Authority. But what they give to her, and whether his Arguments be naught, we shall see presently.  

Vindic. p. 33.  But lest I should mistake, the Doctor tells me again, The Question between us is, or aught to be this, if I intent to oppose him (that is him now, not him in the Case of Alleg.) not whether the J●ws might lawfully submit to Athaliah while in the Throne, for this I grant (now) they might lawfully do; but whether they having so submitted, and she being thoroughly settled in the Throne, (for that our Author will suppose, though I suppose and prove the contrary) it were not as unlawful upon my Principles for the Jews to set up Joash and to kill Athaliah as it is for any other people to depose and murder a King de facto, whose Government is throughly settled among them.  
What is it that the Doctor would have me to do? Would he have me prove this according to his Principles? I beg his pardon for that, except I was better assured what his Principles are: about this very matter he hath one Principle in his Case of Resistance, another in his Case of Allegiance, and another in his Vindication of that case, and perhaps he may have yet another in his next book; and would he have me prove things by Prophecy? How can I divine what his Principles are, or will be? nor perhaps he himself: it is enough in all Conscience that I have proved that his Arguments equally justify submission to Athaliah as to any Usurper, according to what he hath delivered in his Case of Alleg. though I do not prove it according to various and changeable Principles, which are one thing to day, and another to morrow. And that I have so done, will appear upon the Examination.  
I had insisted upon two, His Argument from Providence, and from the necessity of Government for the preservation of humane Society.  
1. His Arguments from Providence. 
Postscript. p. 5.  These (I said) equally fit Athaliah, and she had the same pretensions to Providence as any other Usurper hath or can have, and which I proved from the Doctor's own account of Providence, and showed that they were as applicable to Athaliah as to any other Usurper. And this the Doctor gives us in short, and says, The sum of all he says (i. e. all that the Doctor hath a mind to answer, for that he hath not summed up what is most material will appear presently) is this, That according to my Principles Athaliah was placed in the Throne by God, by his Counsel, De●ree, Order, and peculiar Order. Well, (saith he) I must own it, for I know none but God who can advance to the Throne, and I know no more hurt in owning that God exalted Athaliah to the Throne, than that he exalted Baasha who slew Nadab the son of Jeroboam and reigned in his stead; and God by his Prophet tells Baasha, I exalted thee out of the dust, and made thee Prince over my People Israel, 1 King. 16.2. But though the Doctor knows no more hurt in it, I hope he knows, there is a great deal of difference, for Baasha was a rightful King, and no Usurper, and Athaliah was an Usurper, and no rightful Queen, and (if the Doctor please) no Queen at all. A very pertinent comparison! The Question is concerning an Usurper, and the Doctor proves it by an instance of a rightful King; as if, Because it is said of Baasha who was a rightful King, that God exalted him, and made him a Prince over his People; therefore Athaliah and every other Usurper if by God's Providence they can get possession of the Throne, God makes Kings and Queens of them too. An admirable consequence! The Scripture affirms of a rightful King, that God exalted and made him a Prince, and the Doctor affirms the same of an Usurper, though the Scripture says no such thing of Athaliah, or any other Usurper. God permitted them to be Usurpers, but he never made them Kings or Queens; and if God had made Athaliah a Queen, I wonder how the right Heir and the People should unmake her again? If God gave her his Authority, which way should the People take it away again. But as inconsequent as this is, the Doctor has it over and over, pag. 50. He says Athaliah was God's providential Queen though an Usurper, as much as Baasha was God's King. And how does he prove it? why God himself by his Prophet says the one, and the Doctor says the other.  
This single instance, if men would consider it without prejudice and partiality, would be sufficient to determine the Controversy. Baasha raised himself to the Throne of Israel by as ill means as Athaliah usurped the Throne of Judah. But Baasha was a rightful King and aught to have been obeyed, and Athaliah was an Usurper and aught to have been deposed; and the reason of this difference is manifest, because the Crown of Judah was entailed, but the Crown of Israel was not, and the possession of the Throne by Athaliah was in prejudice of the right Heir, but the Possession by Baasha in Israel was not, for no person had a better right to it than himself. And this is a plain Answer to that tedious Account the Doctor gives in the two next Pages of the difference between the Kingdoms of Judah and Israel after the division of the ten Tribes; whereas the plain difference is, that the one was hereditary and not the other; and therefore in Israel possession of the Crown gave a Right to it, for there was no better Right against it, but in Judah it did not; and this seems the true reason why the Convocation mentioned the right Heir of that Kingdom being then living, i. e. there was a plain and visible Right in being against the Possessor, and which they were bound to own and stand by what possession soever an Usurper h●d got of the Throne. And this is a sufficient Answer to what he says in the next pages: but there is one thing more deserves to be taken notice of, and that is the Reason he gives of the different behaviour of David and Jehu because Saul was a King by God's nomination, and Joram only a providential King. His words are, This is the Reason of the different behaviour of David and Jehu, 
Vindic, p. 35.  David was anointed as well as Jehu, but he never pretended to the crown while Saul lived because there was then an anointed King on the Throne: but this was not Joram 's Case, he had no more than a providenti● Right, which in the Kingdom of Israel must give place to God's anointing, and therefore Jehu was King of Israel as soon as he was anointed, and Joram was his subject. This is a pure Reason; as if God by his nomination of a person, had divested himself of the Right of nominating another in his life-time, if he had so pleased; and if the mere nomination is a Reason against another nomination, why is not the setting up a King by providence a reason of not setting up another by providence in the life-time of the first King, for there is no more difference between Nomination and Nomination than there is between Providence and Providence. I know the Doctor says, that when God nominated any King, it was always for life, but that is said without proof, for where does he find such a Clause in the gift, that they should be Kings during life. But the true Reason of the different behaviour of David and Jehu was not because Saul was an anointed King, and Joram a providential King, nor yet from their being both anointed, for the Doctor may find that long before this time (of Elisha's commanding the anointing of Jehu) that God had commanded E●ijah to anoint H●zael King of Syria and Jehu King of Israel, which if Elijah obeyed (as there is no great doubt of it) both Hazael and Jehu were anointed 20 years before they were actual Kings, though Benhadad of Syria and Ahab of israel were according to the Doctor providential Kings, and therefore they did not immediately enter into possession by virtue of their being anointed, or because the Kings into whose places they were to succeed were providential Kings; but David was anointed not as King in present, 
Convoc. p. 46.  but as Successor to Saul, as the Convocation intimate, and Jehu at this second anointing (if he was anointed before, as the command of God to Elijah seems to import, and as many learned men believe) was anointed King at present, and appointed so for a particular end, to destroy the family of Ahab. And the Text is express, Thus saith the Lord, 
2 Kin. 9  I have anoinied thee King over Israel, and thou shalt smite the house of Ahab thy Master, etc. So that together with his nomination, and anointing at that time, he had a command from God, and which he was immediately to put in execution, and God gave him accordingly Power and Authority to fulfil it: but not the least intimation of the Doctor's fancy, because Joram was a providential King, or because a providential Right in the Kingdom of Israel was to give place to God's anointing; for whatever Right there was in the Kingdom of Judah or any other Kingdom, it was to give place to that. But if men, without any warrant from the Text, and of their own heads, will be framing Schemes from Scripture to serve a wretched Hypothesis, it is no great wonder if humane Writings, such as the Convocation Book, do not escape their corrupt Interpretations, and Applications of it to serve the same end. But to return,  
The Doctor adds, And what does he prove from this? That according to the Doctor's Principles Athaliah was placed in the Throne by God, by his Council, Decree, Order, and peculiar Order: That is what I prove. Now Athaliah (says he) had the actual administration of sovereign Power, and therefore according to the Doctor, she was Queen by God's Authority, though not by the Law of the Land, and Allegiance must be due to her as well as to any other; and all the Doctor's Arguments are as conclusive and valid for Submission to Athaliah as for submission to any body else.  
To this the Doctor replies, Grant all this, and what then? Why then the Doctor's Arguments are lost by his own confession; for but fifteen lines before he says, that I say his Arguments will equally serve Athaliah as any other King or Queen de facto, and he says, if they will, he will give them up for lost. But says he, Why then this justifies  submission of the Jews to Athaliah while she was possessed of the Throne and no right Heir appeared. But if he would have concluded any thing to the purpose, he should have said, And therefore it was unlawful for Jehoiada to have anointed Joash, and to have killed Athaliah. But what need was there for me to have concluded that? I was disputing against the use the Doctor then made of this Distinction, and for that purpose it was sufficient to show that his Arguments equally concluded for submission to Athaliah as for submission to any other Usurper; for whatsoever he says now he had said before from his Distinction that N thing would justify their Submission to an Usurper, 
Case o● Alleg. 35.  and they were bound never to submit to their Government when the right heir was found. I know he seems in many places of his Vindication to lay some stress upon the King's son being found and known; but in truth he means nothing by it, for he equally supposes and justifies the submission of Jehoiada, who knew of the right heir's being alive as well as the rest of the Subjects, who he supposes did not know it. But I suppose the Doctor would have had me to conclude against his Vindication before I ever thought of it or he himself. He tells me indeed, 
●dic. 40, 41.  I mistake the use of his Distinction which was not to prove that because God had entailed the Kingdom of Judah, etc. that therefore the Subjects might not submit to any other Kings whom the providence of God placed on the Throne, for it appears from what I have already discoursed, that they both actually did and luwfully might submit to such providential Kings. But where I pray does this appear? Not in the Case of Alleg. but if it appears at all, 'tis in the Vindication of that Case; for he hath discoursed nothing at all of it in the Case of Alleg. except saying they ought never to submit, he proving they might lawfully submit. But it seems when I am discoursing: against the Case of Alleg. I do not conclude to the purpose, except I conclude against the the Vindication. But after all, the Doctor perfectly mistakes me, and makes me conclude before I have concluded; for after reckoning his Arguments from Providence, I thus concluded with an Argument from the whole, 
●script. ●6.  But if these reasonings be naught with respect to Athaliah, so they are also with respect to any other Usurpation; for if they be not certain signs of God's Decree and Council, that a person so possessed of the Throne, should be owned as King, and submitted to, than they are no Rule for us; if they are, than they are a Rule to the Jews, and 'tis mere trifling to talk of God's entailing the Crown, as if God was tied any more to his own Entails than he is to humane Entails, and his own Decrees and Orders, would not cut off his own Entails as well as those of men. And this is the force of my Argument against him. And I believe it concludes to the purpose, or else the Doctor would have given a better Answer to it, and showed how it did not conclude; but instead of that, he tells us a long story of the difference of the Kingdom of Judah and Israel and other Kingdoms, and repeats his distinction over again, and then tells me, 
Vindic. p. 35.  Had our Author considered this he would not have said, that 'tis mere trifling to talk of God's entailing the Crown, as if God was tied any more, etc. But I have considered it, and find no reason, but upon the same occasion I might say it over again, and the Answer that follows is so very poor, that I wonder he should think that by reason of it, I should be discouraged in having said it, or find any reason to retract it. For (says he) though God may cut off his own Entails if he please, yet men cannot. Very good! and what then? And the mere events of Providence can never prove that he has done it. Methinks the Doctor that tells me I do not conclude to the purpose, should have himself a little more concluded to the purpose, and the conclusion ought to be this. And the Decrees and Orders of God cannot cut off his own Entails as well as those of men. But when the Doctor talks of persons possessing the Throne by Providence, than it must be God's Counsel, Decree, Order and peculiar Order; but when his Arguments are turned upon himself, then forsooth it must be the mere events of Providence. But this is disguising an Answer, and imposing upon his Readers; Why did not he put it into the same terms that he first proposed it in, and which his Answerer urged upon him, and wherein the Argument consists, and then the vanity of his Answer would be evident: for though all men know that the mere events of Providence can never prove that God by them has cut off his own Entails, nor that he thereby hath cut off humane Entails (which the Dr. also owns,) but that his Decrees, Orders, and peculiar Orders, cannot do it is another Question, and that which turns upon him. For the Question is not, Whether the mere events of Providence can cut off divine as well as humane Entails, but whether the events of Providence according to his account of them, i. e. Whether God's Decrees, Orders, and peculiar Orders, cannot cut them off? Joash had God's Ent●il for his being King, and Athaliah according to the Doctor had God's Decree, Order, and peculiar O●der, for her being Queen; and if the world were to judge who had the best Title according to this account, I believe they would rather judge it on the behalf of Athaliah, and that God's peculiar Order, which was immediate and present, was to take place before an Entail that was made by him long before. But, saith the Doctor, we must never interpret providential events to contradict an express Revelation. 
Vindic. p ●6.  And this is true enough according to the account that the world hath hitherto had of Providence, who have always believed that the events of Providence are no warrant to act against a known duty, (and the Doctor if he pleases may consider it.) But the Doctor hath given quite another account of it; God's Providences are his Order and his peculiar Orders, which are to be taken notice of and obeyed as Rules of Practice are evident and demonstrative Declarations of his will in order to practice. And I cannot very well see what more he can make of express Revelations. The manner of notifying it indeed is not the same, but God's Will is the same, is as evident, and aught to be complied with as much as if it had been expressly revealed. 
Postscript p. 6.  And this I had said, If the Possession of the Throne by Providence be a clear and demonstrative Evidence that such a Person hath God's Authority, and that God would have him obeyed as King than it is so notwithstanding any Entail made by himself. There is a difference between divine and humane Entails, but the Question is, Whether God's Orders are not as valid against his own Entails, as well as against humane Entails? And when there is a plain manifestation of his Will, it does not as well supersede the Rules made by himself, as set aside those made by men? And here I shall rest it; If the Possession of the Throne by Providence be a demonstrative Evidence that God hath given the Crown to such a Person, and that it is God's will he should be owned and obeyed as a King of his making, than it is so notwithstanding any Entail made by himself; if it be not such an Evidence, than it is not so notwithstanding humane Entails.  
But there is one thing more I had mentioned from the Doctor which he hath here omitted, and I suppose for some good reason or other: from his Doctrine of Providence he had laid down this as one Proposition, That all Kings are equally rightful with respect to God, 
Case of Alleg. p. 14.  for those are all rightful Kings who are placed in the Throne by God, and it is impossible there should be a wrong King, unless a man could make himself King whether God will or no. This I had applied to Athaliah, and said, If all Kings, then surely Athaliah among the rest, and I only supposed that Athaliah could not do what was impossible, nor (if she had never so much mind to it) could she make herself Queen whether God would or no. But I add, than it follows that Athaliah was a rightful Queen with respect to God, nay she was as equally rightful with respect to him as Joash himself, or as David or Solomon, for he says, That all Kings are equally rightful with respect to God. But then I wonder how Athaliah who was a rightful Queen with respect to God, should be otherwise with respect to God's Entail, or that she who was rightful Queen with respect to God, might justly be deposed and slain, with respect to his Entail. But the Dr. did not think fit to take notice of the mention I made of this Proposition, and I suppose by this time the Reader is satisfied of the reason.  
But (says the Doctor) This he knew did not follow from my Principles, i. e. the Doctor did not say it was unlawful for Jehoiada to have anointed Joash and to have killed Athaliah. And it would be pretty strange if he should. But this follows from his Arguments; and that is enough to show their faultiness. But I pray mark his Reason; For (saith he) I expressly distinguish between Gods making Kings by a particular nomination as he made Kings in Jewry, and entailed the Kingdom of Judah on David's Posterity, and his making Kings by his Providence, as he does in other Nations; that is to say, the Doctor defends his Distinction by his Distinction. I was here arguing against the use he made of his Distinction, and he tells me he expressly distinguishes so, and therefore it did not follow from his Principles. Very logically answered!  
The next Argument I had mentioned of the Doctor's, and which he says, 
Vindic. p. 36.  There will be no great occasion to take notice of, was from the necessity of Government to the preservation of humane Society; for (saith he) I readily grant what he contends for, That these Arguments will equally conclude for submission to Athaliah as to any other Usurper. Well! that is as much as I can desire; and then, if I mistake not, he must grant too, that his Distinction is frivolous and his Arguments weak, and not concluding: for what Submission is that which the Preservation of humane Societies will justify to be paid to an Usurper? why truly according to him a full and entire Submission, the very same to all intents and purposes that is due to the most rightful Prince in the World. For Bishop Sanderson, 
Case of All. p. 38.  and the zealous Loyalists (as he says) own it lawful for Subjects to pay some kind of submission and compliance to usurped Powers, but not to own their Authority. But this will not satisfy the Doctor, and therefore in Answer to Bishop Sanderson he tells us plainly, That nothing can preserve Society, without Authority in the Usurper and Duty in the Subject. And if humane Societies must be preserved, than the necessities of Government give Authority to the Prince, and lay an obligation of duty on the Subject: if God will preserve humane Societies, we must conclude, that when he removes one King out of the Throne, he gives his Authority to him whom he places there. i e. He took it away from Joash and gave it to Athaliah. For if we must conclude so from the necessity of Government to preserve humane Society, I wonder why the Jews (upon the same Reason) were not to conclude so as well as we; and than it concludes too much, and that is, it concludes that the Doctor's Argument is naught. But the Doctor goes a little further, and says he, 
Case of All. p. 39  I would ask whether the care of my own preservation, etc. does oblige me in conscience to obey and submit to the Government, and the Prince who governs, and to wish and pray for, and do my utmost to endeavour their Prosperity? if it does, I see no difference between this and Alleg. and what I am bound in conscience to do, I may swear to do: if it does not, than I am at liberty to disturb the Government notwithstanding all my gratitude when I can, nay am under an Obligation by my Alleg. to the dispossessed Prince, to do it when I can. And how does this contribute to the safety and tranquillity of humane Societies. This is pretty well; and if it was but true one would have thought Athaliah as well established in the Allegiance of the Subjects as any Prince in the World, and a little better than Joash himself. But the Doctor hath yet one step further. 
P. 40  Suppose (saith he) the Government does not think it safe to leave all men at liberty to disturb it when they please, and when they have a promising opportunity, but should require an Oath of Fidelity, which is the universal practice of all Governments, what shall Subjects do in this Case? which question concerns as much the Subjects of Judah, as any other: and they must even swear; for he tells us, should every man refuse, and the Prince had power enough to compel, what must be the effect of this, but the utter ruin and destruction of the Nation. The Land indeed would remain where it was, but the people must either be destroyed ●r imprisoned (I suppose a million or two in a Jail) or transplanted (from the Temple to some other habitation) or into some foreign parts, as the Ten Tribes, who were carried away captive, I suppose not as a just Judgement for their Rebellion and Idolatry, but for their not taking an Oath to an Usurper: However, 'tis a plain Case; they must swear, and tie themselves to the Usurper (if he has a mind to it) by all the obligations possible. For the Dr. believes it will be hard to persuade any considering man, that that which in such Cases is necessary to preserve a Nation, is a sin; and that which will infallibly destroy it, is a duty or virtue. And so he plainly resolves, that the Preservation of Humane Societies does of necessity force us to own the Authority even of Usurped Powers. And to the same purpose, is what he says concerning the presumed consent of the ejected Prince; that if the Princes leaving his Kingdom for his own safety, will justify him, why will it not justify Subjects, when their King has left them, to submit and comply with the prevailing Powers, as far as it necessary to preserve themselves, that is, even by Oaths of Allegiance, if that be necessary; that is, when Joash was hid to save his life, the Subjects of Judah, to save their interests and preferments, might join themselves to Athaliah, espouse her Cause and Interest, become her Subjects to all intents and purposes, and take an Oath of Fidelity to her, to defend her against all men; even against him whom they owned and acknowledged had the Right to the Throne.  
This I had said before; 
Posts●. p. 8. Vindic. p. 36.  and the Dr. tells me, that it is my mistake, to suppose that the Jews knew that Joash was living; and says, if I was not guilty of this mistake, he knew not what sense to make of what I say about swearing an Oath of Fidelity to her, to defend her against all men, even against him whom they owned had a Right, etc. But if he would have taken it all together, he might easily (had he so pleased) have seen another sense in it. And that is not that I thought, that they knew Joash was then living (which makes little difference in the matter, as we shall see presently) but that the Drs. Argument proved, they might own and swear Allegiance to her, whether they had or not known, that Joash or any other Right Heir had been living: and that I think is plain enough that it does. And I chose rather to speak to it here, than after, where the Dr. mentions it, that the sense of it might be the more evident to the Readers which was plainly to show the tendency of the Drs. Arguments, not my own opinion of the matter of fact.  
The sum is this, the Submission that the necessity of Government, to the Preservation of Humane Society justifies to be paid to Usurped Powers, according to the Dr. is the Obedience and Subjection of Subjects. To own their Authority, to support their Government to the utmost, even against the dispossessed & Rightful King, and to swear Allegiance to them, etc. This is the Submission the Dr. pleads for, from the necessity of Government to preserve Humane Societies; and the Dr. readily grants, 
Vindic. p. 36  that these Arguments will equally conclude for submission to Athaliah, as to any other: And asks me what then? And the Answer is at hand, than his Arguments conclude, that the Jews might own her Authority, endeavour her Prosperity to the utmost, even against the dispossessed King, and swear Fidelity to her, etc. Now I ask the Dr. and should be glad to see his Answer: Did the necessity of Government for the preservation of Humane Society, justify such a submission as this to Athaliah, or did it not? If it did, than his distinction is in vain; if not, than his Argument is in vain. For I had said, and which the Dr. does not disprove, 
Postscr. p. 8.  that these are arguments from the nature of the thing, which are equally the same in all Governments: for the ends of Government are the same in all Countries; and self-preservation, and preservation of Society, and the necessity of Government, in order to it, these are the same with respect to Judah, as to any other Society. The Ends of Government, and the Conservation of Humane Socieyt, will justify as much and no more in one Kingdom, than in another; what they would justify in England, that they would justify in Judah, and è contra. The Question is no more but this, Will the necessity of Government for the Preservation of Humane Society, justify such a Submission as the Dr. contends for, or will it not? If it will, than it would justify such an entire submission to Athaliah, and then the deposing her, was Perjury and Rebellion: If it will not, than it will not justify such a Submission in any other Country. And here I must rest it, till the Dr. thinks fit to give an Answer to it:  

P. 36.  But the Dr. says, the Jews did actually submit to Athaliah: what ● in the sense the Dr. contends for, to become her Subjects, to own her Authority, to submit to her as a Queen of God's sending and making: This I doubt, the Subjects of Conscience did not, though I believe also, there were a great many others of them that did. The Dr. indeed says, it is evident from the story they did. But what story does he mean? The Scripture account, as far as I can find, intimates no such thing: and the Dr. in his next will do well to tell us, what story he means. But the Dr. here lays great weight upon the Subjects not knowing that Joash was living, and takes some pains to prove it. As if (saith he) they could not very innocently and lawfully submit to the Government of Athaliah, while they knew of no other King they had: and says, that my supposing the Jews knew it was my fundamental mistake, etc. But this makes but very little difference. For,  
1. What is this to the necessity of Government, to the preservation of Humane Societies? This is the Question before us; and this the Dr. says, justifie● their submission, and then they are justified, not because they did not know the Right Heir living, but because the necessity of Government, for the Preservation of Society, justified them.  
2. What is this to Jehoiada, who knew of the Right Heir's being alive, and probably enough, many more of the Princes, whose Submission the Dr. justifies, as well as the rest, might he or they become her Subjects, and take an Oath of Allegiance to her, and at the same time be actually contriving to Depose and Kill her; and which he was bound in conscience to do: Will the necessity of Government, to the Preservation of Society, justify the swearing Fidelity to Usurpers, with intention at the first opportunity to depose them? Upon my word, if it will justify this, it will justify any thing: And let the Dr. show me where the fundamental mistake of this is.  
3. What is this to the Entail upon David's Posterity? Joash indeed, was a ●ranch of it▪ but was he the last of the Family? Was there not one of the Line left to succeed? So that suppose, they did not know that Joash was living, did they know no other Heir? Or can it be believed, that those who were so exact in their Genealogies, did not know who was the next to succeed? If therefore their Submission was (as the Dr. asserts) innocent and lawful, it must be upon my Principles, and not upon his: He who they thought the Right Heir, had himself submitted, and that justified their Submission; supposing still that they did submit: for that the Dr. has not proved. By this time, I suppose, the Dr. needs not desire to know of the Author, 
P. 36.  by his own Principles, had it been customary in those days, what should have hindered them to have sworn Allegiance to Athaliah? for he allows possession to be something, when there is no better claim against it: and suppose Joash had been dead, or they h●d thought so, had there been no better claim against Athaliah? But here I must do the Dr. right, he does say indeed, if they know nothing of Joash, and did believe that the Royal Line was extinct. But then I cannot tell for my life, what he means by his Question. The matter is, whether the Jews might become Subjects to Athaliah, while Joash was living: the Dr. places a great deal, in his being concealed; and says, they might lawfully do it, when he was hid: and then to make me say so too, asks me, whether by my own Principles, they might not have done it, if they believed the whole Line was extinct? A very grave Question, and much to the purpose! Well, I see there is no dealing with such a Disputer, that will make such turns upon his Adversaries. I had thought there had been some difference between Possession against a Right, and Possession when there was no better Right. And I desire to know of the Dr. why they ought to have submitted to Athaliah, or innocently might. The Concealment of Joash will not serve the turn, except the whole Family of David had been concealed likewise; and the Dr. I doubt, will be as little able to make that evident from the story, as that Jehoiada and the People submitted.  
The Dr. tells us, 
Vindic. p. 37.  he asserted in the Case, that Government and Allegiance are such Relatives, as do mutuo se ponere & tollere, the one cannot subsist without the other; if the Prince can't govern, the Subject can't obey. 
Postscr. p. 9  To this I had made a short reflection, which the Dr. does not think fit to take notice of: And therefore because they can't obey him, they must fight against him, and kill him, and do their utmost to ruin him. And yet I conceive, there is some difference between actual obedience, and actual hostility. And I wonder where is the Consequence; A King is hindered from actually governing his people; and therefore the people are bound to do their utmost to hinder him still, or to knock him on the head. For, says the Dr. And therefore as far as he quits his Government, he quits their Allegiance, and leaves his Subjects as he does his Crown, to be possessed by another, and must recover them both together. Now (say he) This the Author says, is as plain a fallacy, as ever he met with; and proves from the example of Joash, that it is so. But here the Dr. does not repeat fairly his own words nor mine: For though I had said it was a plain fallacy, yet it was not only with respect to those words of his which he hath repeated, but to the whole; and more especially to that which follows, and which he hath omitted: for he adds in the Case of Allegiance, He may have a Legal Right to both, but he cannot actually have the Subject's Allegiance without the Crown; nor can the Subjects pay him their Allegiance, without his being restored to possession of the Throne, no more than they can obey, when he cannot command. These I suppose, the Dr. did not add as superfluous words, but designed by them either more fully to explain his meaning, or to prove his Assertion; and to these my Answer was more immediately suited; at the foot of these to wind up his Argument, the Dr. says, this is as certain as any Proposition in Logic. My Answer was, it is as plain a fallacy as ever I met with; and the instance before us (of Joash) lays it open. The Dr. replies, but I have said so much already to that Case, that I will trouble my Reader no further with it. A special Reply: and let the Reader judge of it. I said, I ask the Dr. was the restoring Joash to the Throne, an act of their Allegiance or no? If not, what duty was it? But if it was, than Allegiance follows the Person of the King, though he be out of the possession of his Throne. And this is as direct against the Drs. Assertion as any thing can be: for if the Restoring Joash to the Possession of his Throne when he was out of Possession, was an act of their Allegiance to him, than a Prince may actually have the Subject's Allegiance, and they may (nay, they ought) to pay him Allegiance without (if before be without) his being restored to the possession of his Throne. But forsooth the Dr. did not think fit to trouble himself, nor his Readers with an answer to it. And I cannot blame him; for why should a man trouble his Readers with any thing, when he hath nothing to say to it? It is a wise way to scorn an Argument, which we cannot answer. But to gratify him, what does he think of the Case of King Charles the Second? I hope he may vouchsafe to trouble his Readers with an Answer to that, though he does not to the Case of Joash: was the restoring him to the Possession of his Throne, an Act of the Subjects Allegiance, or was it not? If not, the Dr. will be very kind to tell us what it was some civility perhaps or kindness; to him and his family, but no act of duty. And so the Parliamentary Acts of Recognition, and owning him King all the time of his absence, and the Act of Indemnity, etc. are mere Compliments of State, but in reality, nothing at all: For he quitted the Allegiance of the Subjects, when he quitted the possession of the Throne, and they owed him no Allegiance, nor could they pay him any, till he was restored to the possession: And beside, the Dr. hath told us, 
Case of Alleg. p 2●  that there is a vast difference between maintaining and defending a Regnant Prince, and restoring a dispossessed Prince. But now, if the Restoring him, was an Act of their Allegiance, than Allegiance is due to the Person of the King, when he is out of the Possession of the Throne, and they are bound to pay it to him, before he is possessed of it. And when the Dr. thinks fit to trouble his Readers, he may answer it: and if he does not think fit to answer me, let him answer the Acts of Parliament, and the Justice of the Nation. And his fine business of Divine and Humane Entails, giving very different Rights to Princes will signify nothing here: For King Charles was King, not by Divine, but by Humane Entail.  
The Dr. proceeds upon my Answer, and says that I say, By Government, he means, the Actual Administration of it; and then Government and Allegiance are so far from being such Relatives, that they are no Relatives at all; they are only the Acts of Relatives, and to say the Acts of Relatives are Relatives, is so far from being as certain as any Proposition in Logic, that it is Logical Nonsense. To this the Dr. replies, Well! Logical Nonsense I hope is the best sort of Nonsense however. Well! Best or worst, Nonsense it is; and if the Dr. had rather have it of the best sort, with all my heart.  
But (saith he) my meaning is plain enough, and certainly true; which is as much, as any Proposition in Logic can be. By Government, I do mean the Actual Administration of Government; not as that signifies the particular Acts of Government, but the Actual Possession of Power and Authority to Govern. By Allegiance, I mean that Obedience and Subjection that is due to Government. Something is the matter sure, that we must distinguish so nicely. I wonder what is the difference between Actual Possession of Power, and Actual administering it: And if there was any difference, whatever he means now, in his Case of Allegiance, he certainly meant the administering, i. e. the performing the Acts of Government: for his Argument is, 
Case of Alleg. p. 42.  If the Prince cannot govern, the Subject can't obey. And what does he mean by the Prince cannot govern, but that he cannot perform the Acts of Government, cannot exercise and administer it. And the same he means with respect to the Allegiance of the Subject. 
P. 43.  The Subject cannot obey: i. e. cannot actually pay his Allegiance. And this he must mean, if he means any thing: And so he says after, He may have a Legal Right, but he cannot actually have the Subject's Allegiance, nor can Subjects pay him their Allegiance; i. e. cannot perform the Acts of it. I know there is a difference between the Acts of Allegiance, and the Duty of Allegiance. A man may owe Allegiance, where he cannot pay it; and it may be due to a Person, to whom the Subject cannot perform the Acts of it. But this is so far from doing him service, that it confutes his whole Argument: for what if when the Prince can't govern, the Subjects can't obey; yet if the Subject may owe the Prince Obedience, what if the Subject cannot pay the Prince Allegiance; yet if Allegiance be due to him, the Drs. Argument falls. And what then makes him distinguish thus Critically? Why truly, I had said, That the Actual administration of Government and Allegiance are not Relatives, but the Acts of Relatives. And to be even with me, By Actual Administration, he does not mean the particular Acts of Government, and by Allegiance the Duty, and not the particular Acts of it: And what is this to the purpose? Are they not the Acts of Relatives, for all that? What if Actual Administration, should signify Actual Posssession and Authority; is it not an Act of the Relative, when it signifies so, as well as when it signifies particular Acts of Government? What if Allegiance means that Obedience and Subjection which is due to Government, is not that an Act of the Relative, as well as when it means the particular Acts of Allegiance? Actual Authority is not the particular Acts of Government, but it is the Act of the Relative: the Duty of Allegiance, is not the particular Acts of Allegiance, but it is the Act of the Relative. And therefore let the Dr. mean what he please by them, it makes no Alteration in the Case. For either way they are Acts of Relatives, and therefore not Relatives themselves. And this is the Single Question, and I ask him, If the Actual Administration of Government signifies Possession of Power and Authority to Govern, and Allegiance means that Obedience and Subjection which is due to Government, are they then Relatives? Why truly the Dr. cannot say that, though he hath a great mind to it, but says, if the Author will be so severe, as not to allow me to call these Relatives. But the Dr. is mistaken, if he thinks I contend with him only about a mere propriety of expression: For the whole stress of the Argument depends upon it. And if the Dr. mistakes the use of an Expression; and argues and builds upon such mistake, there is no reason to give up the Argument, out of Compliment to the Expression. Relatives se mutuo ponunt & tollunt. But if the Actual Administration of Government and Allegiance, are not Relatives, than they do not se mutuo ponere & tollore, which the Dr. concludes from their being Relatives. And this perhaps he would have me give him out of good manners, for he hath not proved it, nor does he now directly assert it: But (saith he) they are the Relations which make the Relatives, and do mutuo se ponere & tollere. Now if the Dr. can prove, that Actual Possession of Power, is the Relation that makes a King; or if he can prove, that the Actual Possession of Power (he adds indeed and Authority to Govern; but if he means by that, more than Possession of Power, he speaks ambiguously, and aught to have explained himself) and the Allegiance of the Subject do mutuo se ponere & tollere, I will not dispute with him about Terms and Expressions. Now to prove this, he asks, What is the Relation of a King to a Subject? His Dominion and Government. What is the Relation of a Subject to a King? His due Allegiance and Subjection: Then Dominion and Government makes a King, and Allegiance a Subject; and Allegiance has as neccessary a Relation to Dominion, as a Subject has to a King: If there be no King, there can be no Subject: If no Dominion and Government, there can be no Allegiance. Paternity is the Relation that makes a Father, and Filiation a Son: and Paternity and Filiation have as mutual and necessary respect to each other, as Father and Son. These are called by Logicians Relative Acts: i. e. Logicians call Paternity and Filiation, Relative Acts: This is extraordinary, and the Dr. would have done well, to have told us, who those Logicians are that call them so. Relations I know, they are called; but Relations and Relative Acts are two things. But for all that, the Dr. proceeds upon it, and asks, Why then may not I call Government and Subjection Relative Duties? He may call them so if he please; but if he has no better Authority for it, than that Logicians call Paternity and Filiation Relative Acts, he has none at all. But saith he, by which I explained what I meant by Relatives. The Dr. called Government and Allegiance Relatives; 
Case of Alleg. p. 42.  and argued upon the supposition, that they were Relatives; and from thence drawed a peremptory Conclusion, and said, This is as certain as any Proposition in Logic; and to extend Allegiance beyond the actual administration of Government, is to preserve a Relative without its Correlate: for when one of the Relatives is lost, the Relation is destroyed. And I hope no body will be so obstinate, as to say, that by Relatives, the Dr. meant Relatives; but that he meant Relations or Relative Acts, or Relative Duties, or any thing rather than Relatives; for by Government and Subjection being Relative Duties, the Dr. had explained what he meant by Relatives; i e. he had said Government and Allegiance were Relatives, and they are not Relatives, And can any body believe the Dr. should mean things are, what they are not, though he says so over and over: For this is all his Explication, He was speaking of Government and Subjection, but he was speaking of them as Relatives, and affirmed them so to be, but seeing they are not so, therefore when he calls them so, he does not mean what he calls them, but something else: Now is it not a thousand times better ingenuously to own the mistake of an Expression, than to be put upon such shifts to disguise it; and then to colour the matter the better, to laugh away the notice of it; as the Dr. very gravely, This I'm sure, is only a Logical Banter, and so let it pass.  
Well! but the Dr. hath explained himself now; and for once let us take a new account for an explication, and see whether he hath mended the matter; but here we are at some loss, in the Case of Allegiance, Government and Allegiance were Relatives, but in the Vindication (by way of Explication) they are the Relations that make the Relatives; and a few lines after, they are Relative Duties; and a little after, 
Vindic. p. 11.  they are Relations again. I remember the Dr. told me, I blundered for want of clear and distinct notions of what I wrote. But mocking is catching: And here the Dr. blunders to some purpose, if speaking confusedly, backwards and forwards be blundering, and all for want of having, or for want of laying down clear and distinct notions of what he writes. For as to Government and Subjection being Relative Duties, I doubt he must explain himself again. For Duties it seems they are, and I desire to know what Duties? Are they the Duties of Relations? If not, I desire the Dr. in his next, to tell me what Duties they are: but if they are, than they are not the Relations themselves, but such as flow from the Relation. And this is a plain contradiction to what he asserts before, that they are the Relations that make the Relatives. But truth will out: And this is the plain state of the C●se; for it is certain they are duties, and relative duties too, in the sense those words are generally taken; that is, such duties as arise from Relation, and are due to Relatives, And this plainly confutes the Drs. notions and arguments, for than they are not nor can be the Relations that make the Relatives; for the duty flowing from the Relation, and the Relation itself are two very different things; not do they mutuo se ponere & tollere; for the failure of the actual duties of the Relative does not destroy the Relation. And this is the Drs. fundamental mistake, he confounds the Relation with the duty of that Relation, and accordingly he asserts,  
That the actual Administration of Government, as that signifies the actual Possession of Power and Authority to govern: And Allegiance as it means that Obedience and Subjection which is due to Government, are the Relations which make the Relatives, and do mutuo se ponere & tollere. For what is the Relation of a King to a Subject? His Dominion and Government; what is the Relation of a Subject to a King? his due Allegiance and Subjection; then Dominion and Government makes a King, and Allegiance a Subject; and Allegiance has as necessary a Relation to Dominion, as a Subject has to a King, etc. In answer to this I have these things to observe.  
1. This is an illogical, and preposterous way of arguing, 'tis notum per ignotius, the Relatives are well enough known, but the Relations between the Relatives being abstracted things, are not so easily, and in some cases perhaps not at all understood. The Relatives Father and Son all men understand, and that there is a Relation between them; but there are not many, that have any formal Conception of Paternity and Filiation; the Relatives Husband and Wife are evident enough, but the Relations between them are not so; and for aught I know have not a name in any Language; and if they were expressed very few would be the wiser, who notwithstanding would know well enough, that there was a Relation between them. And the Case is the same with respect to King and Subject, and the Relations between them; the Relatives are plain and obvious, and well known, but the Relations are abstracted things, and not so distinctly apprehended: And this is the reason, why several Relations have no names, and cannot be expressed without difficulty and artificial explication. And hitherto men have not been very inquisitive about them, and there was no reason for it, as answering no end, or no good end, either a fruitless curiosity or worse, to evade a Duty and perplex plain things. For the Relation is inseparable from the Relative; and when you have found the Relative, you have found the Relation, where a King is there is the Relation of a King, and where is a Subject there is the Relation of a Subject; it would be a wise course, for a Son to seek his Father, by enquiring into the Relation of Paternity, or a Wife her Husband, by enquiring into the Relation of an Husband; at this rate we should soon have a mad World on't, and we should have as dutiful Children, and obedient Wives as we have Subjects: And this it seems pleases the Dr. best, he is for seeking the Sun in the dark, and the Subjects must find out their King by the Relations, which is the backside of an Argument, and gins at the wrong end. In the Case of Allegiance the Dr. urged, that Government and Allegiance were Relatives, and did mutuo se ponere & tollere. And the Argument was proper and logical, if he could but have proved it; but when that would not do, than he is for a new strain, and contrary to all methods of argumentation, is for proving the business by Relations, and would feign know, whether the Relative continues when the Relation is destroyed. And this is the difference between the Dr. before, and now, in his Case of Allegiance, the Relation ceased with the Relative, but in the Vindication the Relative ceases with the Relation, that is, because a direct Argument cannot do it, a preposterous one must; and because the notion of a Relative which all men understand, cannot be perplexed and entangled, the Dr. is for proving his point by Relations, which are not so well explained, nor put into terms, nor perhaps can be. The Relatives in all Cases are plain enough, but the Relations between them are not so plain, nor are capable of being so; and the Dr. thought it more for his turn, when he was beaten out of the plain road to take by ways; and according to some new Rules of Logic, to prove a plain thing, by an obscure one.  
And this is an answer to his Question, what is the Relation between King and Subject? And let our Author think of any thing else, wherein to place this relation if he can, besides Actual Dominion, and Sovereign Power on the one hand to make a King, and the obligations to Subjection and Allegiance on the other hand to make a Subject. And what if I could not think of any thing else? nor of that neither? do Relatives cease to be Relatives, or must the Corrolate go round about the wood to look for his Relative, because he cannot expressly name the relation between them. There is a Relation between Husband and Wife, Master and Servant; and when he tells me what is the Relation between these Relatives, it will be time enough to answer him, and when he answers that he will answer himself; what is the Relation between Husband and Wife; why truly if the Dr. will express it Logically, it is (in fine language) Husbandhood and Wifeship. And so by way of Logical Argument, if the Relation of Husbandhood ceases the Wife is gone. And it a man has a mind to prove, that a Husband or Wife, are or are not so related, he must prove it forsooth from the Husbandhood and Wifeship, and then it is as plain as can be, and every body understands it; for the Dr. tells us very Logically the Relative ceases with the Relation.  
2. That Actual Possession of Power and Allegiance, are not the Relations which make the Relatives. This the Dr. asserts, and aught to have proved it, (for it is the foundation of this part of his discourse:) But instead of that, he asks a Question or two; what is the Relation of a King to a Subject? his Dominion and Government; (Actual Dominion he means,) what is the Relation of a Subject to a King? His due Allegiance and Subjection; and so the matter is fully proved it is so, because it is so; and this is very usual with him, he takes for granted what hath most need to be proved; and then builds upon his own suppositions, and raises the force of his Arguments from them. Here he tells us, that Government and Allegiance are Relations, and to prove this he turns it into Question and Answer, and in that form says the same thing over again; and then away he runs with it, and draws his Arguments and Conclusions from it. And then Dominion makes a King, and Allegiance a Subject, and if the Relation then of a King to his Subjects be Dominion and Government, does he continue a King, etc. As if this was any more proved, when it was in the form of a Question and Answer, then when it was in a Proposition: Well! though he has not proved that Government and Allegiance are the Relations, that make the Relatives; he hath said enough in all Conscience to prove they are not so; for he tells us, that By Allegiance, i. e. the Relation that makes the Relative of a Subject, he means that subjection and obedience that is due to Government; that is to say one Relation is due to another, filiation is due to Paternity which is extraordinary fine. And accordingly he asks, what is the Relation of a Subject to a King? His due Allegiance and Subjection, and afterwards in the next page, he calls it, the obligations to Subjection and Allegiance. And are not these pure Characters of a Relation? it would sound rarely to say the Duty of filiation, or the obligations of filiation. And so to avoid one piece of Logical nonsense, we must make 2 or 3. And here we are at a loss again, on one side of the leaf, the Relation of a Subject, is his due Allegiance; on the other, 'tis the Obligations to Allegiance; and due Allegiance itself, and the Obligations to Allegiance are two things; and which would he have us take for the Relation, the Duty, or the Obligation? Allegiance itself, or the obligations to it? And all this blundering arises for want of laying down a clear and distinct notion of Relation, which is nothing else, but the respect the Relatives have to each other; and because they have such a Respect, thence arise the Respective Acts, Duties, and Obligations; but these are not the Respect but flow from it, and are consequential to it. The Relation of a Father is Paternity, that is, a Father is related to his Son by being his Father, for being the Father of a Son is Paternity: But Paternal Authority, or the duty of Parents are not the Relation, but result from it: The Relation of a Son is filiation, that is a Son is related to his Father by being his Son. And this is the same in all other Relations; as the Relations of Husband and Wife, Master and Servant, King and Subject; the Relations consist in the respect that the Relatives have to each other; the Relation of a King to his Subjects is being their King: But Kingly Authority is no more the Relation of a King, than Paternal Authority is the Relation of a Father, but only results from his Relation, and is in nature consequential to it. But I expect the Dr. will ask me, what is the Relation of a King? But he knows well enough of the complaint of penury of words in this point; and that Aristotle says in such cases, we must invent words if it be needful to express it. But it is all one to me, let him call it Government, Sovereignty, Sovereign Power, Magistracy or Kingship; or what he pleases, provided he will but observe these two conditions. 1. That the meaning of them be not extended beyond the notion of Relation, for they, and I think any other words whereby this may be expressed, are words of ambiguous signification; and as in one sense they may mean the Relation of a King, so in another sense, they may mean the acts or duties that result from it: Government may mean actually governing, and then it may be the Act of the Relative, or the Act of one that is not the Relative; but neither in one sense, nor the other is it the Relation of the Governor; and if it means that, it is in an abstracted sense, and is not to be taken for actual Government, actual Administration, or actual Power: For no act or duty of the Relative can be the Relation; but only for the bare and naked respect of the Governor to the Subject; for Logicians tell us, that Relationes sunt nudae formae per quas Relata referuntur.  
2. That they only terminate on the Relative, for the Relative is the Subject of the Relation; and the Relation is the Relation of the Relative, but of no body else, though he should stand in the place of the Relative; if the Dr. likes to call the Relation of a King Government, be it so, but than it is only the Government of the true King, that is that Relation, but not of another, though he actually administers the Government of Sovereign Power, let it be so, but than it is the Power of the true Sovereign, that is that Relation, not the Power of every one that gets into the place of the true Sovereign; Paternity is the Relation of a Father, but this Relation can be extended to none but the true Father, what Power and Authority soever another man may get in his Family; the Relation of a Husband (call it by what name you will) is confined to his Person; and though another man cohabits with his Wife, he does not therefore stand in the Relation of a Husband to her, nor she in the Relation of a Wife to him.  
The truth is, all the Drs. Actual Administrations, actual Government, actual Possession of Power are no Relations at all, nor yet do they mean any thing, but as they proceed from the Relative. But if they proceed from any other besides the Relative; they neither make, nor prove, nor are any signs at all of a Relation: Government is the Authority and Administration belonging to the Relation of a King; and when it is administered by the King, 'tis valid and authoritative, and draws the Allegiance of the Subjects after it; but if it be administered by one that is not the King, that Administration does not make him a King, nor confer the Relation, nor make him stand in such a Relation to the Subject. All Kingly Acts receive their force and validity, as they are Acts of the King, and not as Acts of Power; and the very same Acts done by another are nothing at all. Actual Allegiance or the same Obedience that is due to the Rightful King, may be performed with the same fidelity, or with greater, and may be sworn too, to one that is no King. But this does not make the Relation of a Subject; at that rate a man may be a Subject when he please, and to whom he please, and he may discharge himself as oft as he please. And I wonder what reason there is why actual Government should make a King, any more than actual Allegiance makes a Subject; for the Dr. tells us, the Relations make the Relatives, Government makes a King, and Allegiance makes a Subject: And if actual Government makes a King, then actual Allegiance makes a Subject; for according to him Allegiance is as much the Relation of a Subject, as Government of a King. This the Dr. seems ware of, and therefore says, 'tis the Subject's due Allegiance: But if it be due Allegiance that makes a Subject; then I doubt it must be due Government also that makes a King; and that is not mere Administration but Lawful Authority.  
3. That actual Administration of Government, or actual Possession of Power, and Allegiance do not se mutuo ponere & tollere. Here the Dr. tells us, They have a mutual and necessary respect to each other; Allegiance has as necessary relation to Dominion, as Subject to a King; if there be no King, there can be no Subject, if no Dominion and Government there can be no Allegiance: By this he means actual Dominion, 
P. 38.  as he says afterward, where actual Dominion and Government ceases, the Kingship is lost and the obligations to subjection and Allegiance with it.  
Now it would be sufficient here to turn the Drs. Argument, and Questions upon himself, and to ask as he does, what are the Relations between actual Government and Allegiance: For it seems they are related as much as the Relatives themselves. He tells us indeed, that Government and Allegiance are the Relations between King and Subject. But I desire to know what are the Relations between Government and Allegiance; for these it seems have a mutual and necessary respect to each other. Now 'tis egregious Logic to talk of the Relation of a Relation; and this is Progressus in Infinitum: For if there are Relations between the Relations, then what are those Relations between them? for those Relations must have as mutual and necessary a respect to each other as the former Relations, and so on without end. And this is pure disputing, and shows the vanity of such new methods of argumentation; hitherto men have been satisfied, that the Relations are between the Relatives, and there was an end; but to talk of Relations between Relations is absurd and ridiculous, and makes the Question everlasting.  
But as to the mutual being and ceasing of actual Government and Allegiance, as to the reasons against it, something hath been said before, and more will be said presently. I shall now only show the absurdity of it from example, but it is such a one, as evidences the falsity of this assertion, and the fallacy of the Drs. Reasonings to support it better than any Arguments or trains of discourse. It is the Case of that glorious Martyr King Charles the First. Now if this be true then when King Charles was kept Prisoner at Holdenby, Hampton Court, the Isle of Wight and St. James'; He ceased to be King, and the People of England owed him no Allegiance, nor were his Subjects. For I suppose, actual imprisonment is not actual Possession of Power. And so it seems the High Court of Justice was in the right, and they did not murder their King, but only Charles Stewart: For though the man was in being the King was gone, and went away with his actual Power. And the Dr. afterwards, for when God has taken away his Government, he has taken away his Authority to govern; for God never gives the Civil Authority, without the Civil Sword.  
The actual Possession of Power, and the Duty of Allegiance are Relations at least; and (saith the Dr.) if the Relation of a King to his Subjects be Dominion and Government, does he continue a King, when he has lost his Dominion and Government, or do his Subjects continue Subjects when he ceases to be King? And so by plain dint of Argument it seems King Charles' Government was at an end some time before that horrid murder; and no duty of a Subject was owing to him, for one Relative cannot subsist by itself without its correlate. Now the short of the matter is this, either King Charles was King notwithstanding his imprisonment; and notwithstanding his being divested of all actual Power, or he was not, if not then the attempting his life what crime soever else it might be, was not Treason, nor within the Stat. of the 25. Edw. 3. And the Indictment of the Regicides upon that Stat. was faulty, and they ought to be indicted, not as Traitors, but as Murderers. But if he was King all that time, then actual Possession of Power, actual Administration, and actual Government, and the Allegiance of the Subject, have not such a mutual and necessary respect to each other, as that the Allegiance of the Subject ceases upon the Princes not being in the Possession of actual Power. Something of this I had said before in the Case of Joash That Allegiance was due to him before he actually administered the Government; 
Postscript p. 10.  nay, when an Usurper actually administered it, and so it was to David when he fled out of the Country.— But the Dr. it seems would trouble his readers no more about that case. But here is another Case, though the reason be the same, and if he please he may trouble himself to answer it, and acquit himself from the Infamy, that that Case charges upon his Doctrine and Arguments.  
In the mean time, how is the Doctrine he delivers here agreeable to the Answer he gives, with respect to the times of Usurpation between 48. and 60. I had told him, that his account of a Settlement would fit Cromwell and those Usurpers; and though he had mentioned some differences, yet they made no difference in the Argument. This the Dr. denies, and says they were not settled according to his account of a Settlement not having a national consent; and therefore they might, or they might not submit; it was lawful, but not necessary nor matter of Conscience, and they might be determined by their honour or interest; well suppose all this, and that those Usurpers were not so settled, were not each of them actually possessed of Power, Did they not actually administer the Government? And this the Dr. (in that very answer) expressly asserts, That the Power of the Nation was for some time in their hands: 
Vindic. p. 69.  And if it was in their hands then they actually possessed it, and for the time they possessed it, they must (according to him) be Sovereigns, at least Sovereigns of Gods making, and the Allegiance of the Subject was so long due to them. For it is as certain as any proposition in Logic, that actual possession of Power and Subjection are relations, and have a mutual and necessary respect to each other, and that Dominion and Government makes a King, But than what becomes of the fine pretences of Honour, Interest, and his notion of a thorough Settlement; for if these Usurpers were not settled according to his account of a Settlement, they were possessed of Power according to his account of Possession of Power: And if Actual Government makes a King, Cromwell was a King, and had the Relation of a King; and the People were bound in Conscience to submit to him; and then I would feign know how the Drs. Honour and Interest would excuse them. Now though the Dr. will not allow me, that his account of a thorough Settlement, fits Cromwell to all intents and purposes, his Account of Possession of Power, and administration of Government, fits him just as if it had been made for him. Now (to say no more) this is as great a Reflection upon those Worthies of our Church and Nation, as I had charged upon his account of a thorough Settlement. Well! but this I suppose is a prejudice and no argument: But I will tell him what is an argument, and directly against him; and that is, that his Answer there is a plain contradiction to all his Arguments and Assertions here; and I pray him to reconcile them. He hath given us a great many distinctions already, but none of them will serve the turn; and if he please to find out one more to make his Answer there, and his Doctrine here to agree. For if actual Possession of Power, and Allegiance have a mutual and necessary respect to each other, let him tell me, if he please, why the Rumps and Cromwel's actual Possession of Power, and the Subjects Allegiance had not as mutual and necessary respect to each other, as the Actual Possession of Power by any other Usurper.  
The Dr. (by way of objection to what he had said) says, All that I know that can be said in this Cause (and which those men must say, who make Allegiance inseparable from Right) is only this, that the Relation continues as long as the fundamentum Relationis, that whereon the Relation is founded continues, and that being a Legal Right, while this Right remains, such a Legal King, though he be fallen from Power is King still, and Subjects are Subjects still, and own Allegiance to him. By this time, I suppose, the Dr. may know that something else may be said in this Cause: And I know no manner of necessity why we must say so now; for the single question is whether Actual Government and Allegiance, are the Relations that make the Relatives, and do mutuo se ponere & tollere: And this may be sufficiently determined without mingling the Fundamentum Relationis in the dispute. But this objection he made for his own sake; and though it be not needful for us to say, that the Relation continues, as long as the Fundamentum Relationis continues, it was very needful for him to say so. And it is the very answer he gives, to what I said to prove, 
P. 40.  that Actual Government and Allegiance do not mutuo se ponere & tollere, if a Subject be taken captive, or otherwise hindered from paying actual Allegiance, is the Relation lost, and does he therefore immediately cease to be a Subject? And therefore neither doth a King, if he be hindered from the Actual Administration of Government, cease to be a King; but hath the same Right to our Allegiance in, and out of Possession. To this the Dr. replies, these two cases are not parallel, in the first case, though the Subject is taken captive; yet the Foundation of the Relation is not destroyed, for his Prince is on his Throne still in the Actual Administration of Government, though he be violently torn from him, so that his Relation may continue, because he has a Prince to whom he is related. But when the Prince is fallen from his Kingdom and Power, the Foundation of the Relation is at present destroyed. And now we see the meaning of the Drs. objection, which was not to answer an objection of ours which we never made, nor need to make, but to prepare an Answer to an Argument, which otherwise he could not Answer. But for all this artifice he must have a good hand at reconciling contradictions, that can reconcile this Answer with his foregoing assertions. The Foundation of the Drs. Argument is, that Government and Allegiance are Relations, and do mutuo se ponere & tollere; and then the ceasing of Allegiance destroys the Relation of Government, as much as the ceasing of Government destroys the Relation of Allegiance; and when a Subject falls from his Allegiance, he dissolves the Relation of the Prince to him, as much as the Princes falling from actual Government, dissolves the Relation of a Subject. For this I take to be the meaning of muto se ponunt & tollunt. But the Dr. whatsoever he had said the leaf before, is now for making a single not mutual Respect of it: The Prince is in the Throne, and in the actual Administration; and therefore the Subject is the Subject still, whatsoever becomes of his Allegiance, and that is nothing destroys the Relation between King and Subject, but the Princes losing actual Government; but than what becomes of mutuo se ponunt & tollunt, and Actual Government and Allegiance, having a mutual and necessary respect to each other? that is not for me to know, and the Dr. may reconcile it, and if he please he may take his Fundamentum Relationis along with him to help him out. And yet after all I must confess the Dr. has given a very good answer; for he says, that the King is on the Throne still, though the Subject is violently torn from him, and the Relation may continue, because he has a Prince to whom he is related, and this is certainly true. But than it follows, the Relation of a Prince may continue, because he has Subjects to whom he is related, for mutuo se ponunt, as well as tollunt: And if the Relation of a Subject continues, though he be violently torn from his Prince, the Relation of a Prince continues, though he be violently torn from his Subjects; for the respect is mutual, and the King hath no more Relation to the Subject, than the Subject to the Prince. But this same actual Administration serves many purposes: In the Case of Allegiance it was a Relative, a little before it was the Relation that made the Relative; and now it is Fundamentum Relationis. And what will it be next? In the Case of Allegiance, it was as certain as any proposition in Logic that Actual Administration of Government and Allegiance were Relatives, and did mutuo se ponere & tollere three pages before it was as certain as any proposition in Logic, that they were Relations and did the same thing; and now 'tis as certain as any proposition in Logic, that actual Administration does all the mutual business itself. And it is as certain as any Proposition in Logic; that when men leave the plain and beaten paths, they get into a wood, and know not how to get out again.  
And now it is time to come to his Answer; and when he had made us say what he pleased, and tells us moreover we must say so, one would have thought that at least he should have answered that. But he will not vouchsafe any clear and plain answer to his own objection: For to a Legal Right being the Fundamentum Relationis; He thus answers, Now to shorten this dispute, 
P. 39  I shall only observe, that a Legal Hereditary Right is not the Fundamentum Relationis. And what then! Legal Right may be the Foundation for all that. There are different kinds of Legal Right, and an Hereditary Right is one; the objection is general of a Legal Right, and the Answer is special of one of the Species. But let us hear his reason, for then there would be no Foundation, for this Relation between Prince and Subjects in any but Hereditary Kingdoms, and why so? are there no Legal Rights to Government in any but Hereditary Kingdoms? and may not an Hereditary Right in Hereditary Kingdoms be the Foundation of the Relation, not as 'tis Hereditary, but as 'tis Legal, and other Legal Rights be the Foundation in other Kingdoms? But (saith he) the same R●●●●tion can have but one Foundation; very well, and then an Hereditary Right cannot be the Foundation, but a Legal Right may. For the Foundation may be one as 'tis Legal, though divers as 'tis Hereditary, or Elective: But (saith he) there are a great many ways whereby Princes are advanced to the Throne, an Hereditary Right, the Election of the People, the nomination of God, a Divine Entail and Conquest, which very much differ from each other; And what if they do differ in other respects: They may not differ as to their being Legal, for a Prince advanced to the Throne any of these ways, or any other, may have a Legal Possession of it; (And we are not now disputing when Conquest becomes a Legal Title) But if all these be different foundations there must be different kinds and species of Kingship. That may very well be though not because the foundations are different in this respect: Different Laws and Constitutions may make different kinds of Government, though all these kinds are Legal according to the differing Laws of the respective Countries. And I wonder what the Doctor means when he immediately adds, whereas the Relation between King and Subject is the same in all? Now he tells us, that Government is the Relation of a King, and Allegiance the Relation of a Subject, and if the Relation be the same in all Countries, than Government and Allegiance are the same in all Countries. And that is, that the Government and Allegiance in Poland is the same Government and Allegiance with that in England, and both the same with that in Turkey, and all three the same all over the World. Now I always thought, that the English Government, and the English Allegiance were founded on the English Laws and Constitution; as the Government and Allegiance in other Countries, were founded on their respective Laws. And then the foundation of the Relation between Prince and Subject, is the respective Constitution of each Country; which though they differ specifically, as they are different Laws, yet they agree in the general as they are Laws. Now saith the Doctor, we must find out such a foundation for this Relation, as will serve all Sovereign Princes; very well! and here we have found it, and that is the Laws of each Country. But this will not serve the Doctor; and therefore he says, and that can be no other but the Authority of God, by which Kings Reign, and to which Subjects own Obedience: Very well, and grant him that too, the Question still returns, Is the Authority of God the foundation of this Relation abstracted from the Laws of each Country, or annexed to them? if abstracted from the Laws, than Government and Allegiance are the same in all Countries; for where the foundation of the Relation, and the Relation are the same, the Government constituted upon that foundation, and the duties flowing from that relation are the same likewise: But if they are not the same, as 'tis plain they are not, then whence arises the difference, not from the authority of God abstracted from Laws (for that is the same in all Countries) but from the different Laws; and then the Authority of God is the foundation of this Relation, as that Authority is annexed to the respective Laws of each Country; there is a plain difference in this matter all over the World; and Subjects in one Country are bound in Conscience to observe Duties of Relation differing to what Subjects are bound in another; and let the Doctor if he can give any other reason for it.  
The Doctor indeed tells us, that this is not always annexed to a Legal Right, but is always annexed to a full and settled possession of the Throne. No man can have God's Authority who has not the actual Power and Authority of Government. But this is gratis dictum; and if the Doctor will give me leave, I should rather believe, that God's Authority was with King Charles the Second in banishment, than with Cromwell who was possessed of his Throne: for God's Authority is the Authority of Government; it is so, but it is the Authority of a Legal Government; illegal Government is no more God's Authority, than Injustice and Unrighteousness are God's Laws. But when Princes fall from Government, i. e. when they cannot actually govern, so far they lose God's Authority; but that does not follow, for God's Authority is annexed to the lawful Governors in and out of Possession; as it was to Joash, David, and King Charles, though each of them was hindered from actual Administration, by the respective Usurpers that possessed their Thrones.  
The Doctor adds, I grant in all other Relations, where the Relation itself does not consist in the Authority of Government, nor the foundation of the Relation cease by falling from the actual Authority of Government, the case is different. What does he mean? That the Relatives, or (as the Doctor will have it) the Relations of King and Subject do only mutuo se ponere & tollere, or that when the foundation of that Relation ceases, that Relation ceases; but it is not so in all other Relations: he tells us, that Authority is the Relation of a King, and God's Authority is the foundation of that Relation; and that when these cease, the Relation ceases and the Kingship is lost. And then tells us, the Case is different, i. e. to my understanding this case differs in other Relations: now though there is a difference between the Relation of King and Subject, and other Relations, yet as to their mutual being, and ceasing, there is no difference; and that I think is the Case, 
Postscript p. 9  and was the Case I put, and which the Doctor here refers to. To say that actual Administration of Government and Alleg. are Relatives, is to say that the actual Government of a Master and the Obedience of Servants are Relatives; so that if a Master be spirited away, or taken captive, so as he can give no directions in his Family nor actually govern it, his Servants cease to be his Servants, and the Relation is extinct, etc. And here let us try the Doctor's Argument; Now though the Government of the Master, and the Obedience of the Servant, are not Relatives, yet they are the Relations that make the Relatives, and de mutuo se ponere & tollere; for what is the Relation of a Master to a Servant? his Dominion and Government: and what is the Relation of a Servant to his Master? his due Obedience and Subjection: then Dominion and Government ma●es a Master, and Obedience a Servant; and Obedience has as necessary a Relation to Government, as a Master has to his Servant; if no Ma●●er, the●e can be no Servant; if no Government of a Master, no Obedience of a Servant; for if the Master can't command, the Servant can't o●e. And let me ask the Doctor's Question, What is the Relation between Master and Servant? let him think of any thing else if he can, wherein to place it, besides the actual Government of a Master on the one hand to make a Master, and the obligation to subject him on the other hand to make a Servant; then where the actual Government of a Master ceases, his Mastership is lost, and the Subjection of his Servants with it. The Man is in being, but the Master is gone. Now upon this way of arguing I doubt the absurdity will follow which I urged upon him before, that if a Master, after his Captivity, return to his Liberty, and to his Family, his House and Family are bestowed upon another Master that will govern it, for they have nothing more to do with him; the Relation was only between his actual Government and their Obedience, and according to the Doctor in his new book, When the Relation is destroyed the Relative ceases. Now to evade this I suppose the Doctor says, The case is different in all other Relations; for he immediately instances as between Parents and Children, Masters and Servants, where the Relation is founded in nature, or purchase, or civil Contracts under the superior Direction and Government of the Civil Authority, though the Master of a Family, as he says, be spirited away, or taken Captive, his Servants, House and Family, do not presently fall to the lot of the next Possessor, but must be disposed of by the Laws of the Country, and the Authority of the Prince; for such private and peculiar Interests are subject to public Laws and a superior Authority. This is true enough, but no Answer; for the present Question is whether actual Government and Obedience be Relatives, or in the Doctor's new language Relations, and do mutuo se ponere & tollere: if the Doctor would have given a direct Answer to this, it would have showed the weakness and inconsequence of his Argument from Relatives and Relations. But instead of that he turns off to another business, and gives a Reason why a man's House and Family does not fall to the next Possessor, because the Laws of the Country have provided for it; and so they have; and have not the Laws of the Country provided for Alleg. also? and I would fain see a Reason why the Alleg. of the Subject is not under the direction of the Law, as well as his House or Estate? or why the Government must fall to the lot of the next Possessor, any more than the Subjects House or Family? For all Property is founded in Right, as well the King's Property as the Property of the Subject, and the Law hath taken as much, and a great deal more care of the Property of the King, than of that of any of t●e Subjects. And I wonder why the Law should not do the King Right as well as the Subject. And this is no more than the Consequence of what the Doctor himself asserts, for he tells us the dispossessed Prince hath still the Legal Right: and if he hath the Legal Right, than the Law would restore him to the possession of it, if the Law might take its course, and was duly observed. But (saith the Doctor) The Authority of God is at his own disposal; right, and so is every thing else at God's disposal as well as Authority; and the Doctrine of Providence sufficiently proves it. But that does not make every man's House or Family fall to the lot of the next Possessor, but they must notwithstanding be disposed of by the Laws of the Country. But then why does it make the Crown fall to the lot of the next Possessor? Are there no directions of Laws for that as well as for the other? The Doctor's Reason, When the King's Sovereignty, i. e. his actual possession of the Government, is lost, there is no higher Tribunal to appeal to, but to God, who removeth and setteth up Kings, is fallacious; for the Law is to be appealed to, which determines the Rights of Kings, and secures them too, as well as the Rights of the Subject. Richard Duke of York appealed to the Laws, to make good his Right against Henry 6. and the Laws carried it against the Possessor. But it seems the Law secures the Subjects Right out of Possession, and will do him justice, and help him to recover it; but for a King out of Possession, the Law makes him a Right indeed; but he must get into the Possession of it when he can, the Laws can lend him no assistance; and though it does Right to every man else, it will do him none.  
The Doctor comes to my third Reason against his Distinction about a Divine Entail, 
Postscript, p. 10.  with respect to the Case of Joash, which was, The Doctor's Distinction is against him; 'tis true God did entail the Kingdom of Judah on the Family of David, and for that reason they ought not to submit to an Usurper: but this is so far from being a reason why they may submit to one in other Kingdoms where Entails are made by Laws, that it is a reason and a very good one why they ought not.  
Here the Doctor tells me I mistake the 〈◊〉 of his Distinction, and the substance of what he says is, Which was not to prove that the Subjects mi ht not submit to any other providential Kings when there was no King by such Entail, or no such King was known; but it w●● to show, that when God nominated a new King, or discovered the right Heir, the Reign of such providential Kings was at an end, and the Subjects may and aught to depose or kill them: that is to say, they ought to be killed for being God's providential Kings; for that is the Crime, and I would fain have the Doctor tell me how God's gift becomes a criminal and capital Offence; God makes them Kings, and they ought to be knocked on the head for being so; for what are they to be killed for but their Usurpation? and it is a pretty, odd reason, that a man ought to be put to death because God hath made him a King, and given him his Authority. Their knowing the right Heir makes no difference; for though that may justify the deposing the Usurper because there is a better Right to the Crown, yet what justifies the slaying him? for so long as he possesses the Throne (long or short as God pleases, as the Doctor says, 
Case of Alleg. p. 26.  yet so long as he possesseth it) he has a Right from God, and a providential Title. But then why would not God's Right as well save his life, as justify his Government. 
Vindic. p. 30.  The Doctor says indeed that Whatever Authority Athaliah had before, when Joash was anointed she sunk into the state of Subject, and then to kill her was not to kill a Queen de facto, but a Subject who had been an Usurper, but now was a Subject again. Right; but was it not to kill her for having been a Queen de facto, i. e. for having a Right and Authority from God to govern Judah for six years: but saith the Doctor, and therefore no Fidelity add Allegiance was due to her. And what then? May every Subject be killed because no Fidelity and Allegiance is due to them? According to him, they owed her Fidelity and Alleg. when she administered the Government: And it is a strange Reason that they ought to kill her for that very thing for which they owed her Fidelity and Alleg. Will the same thing deserve Death and Alleg. too, nay will it deserve Death for the same Reason for which it deserved Alleg. i. e. the possession of the Throne. But to return.  
The doctor pretends to make a mighty difference as to the use of his distinction, in their having no King by God's Entail, or their not knowing of such a King, whereas this neither concerns the Case of Joash and Athaliah; Joash was their King by such Entail, and the Doctor justifies the submission of Jehoiada, who knew of such a King, notwithstanding his Distinction and the use he would make of it. Nor does it affect the Case in dispute; for who doubts but Subjects may submit to the Possessor, if they have no legal King, or know of none; but the Question is, Whether they may lawfully do the same, when they have a rightful King, and know it: and whether a humane Entail does not make a rightful King in other Kingdoms as well as a divine Entail did in the Kingdom of Judah? and consequently whether Subjects in other Kingdoms can lawfully submit and own the Authority of an Usurper when the right Heir is living and known, any more than they could do so in the same circumstances in the Kingdom of Judah. And that they cannot, I think I have sufficiently proved; and let us see what the Doctor says to disprove it.  
My reason was, For God's entailing the Crown of Judah was the Law of that Kingdom in that respect, and the People of other Kingdoms are as much bound to observe their own Laws, as the People of Judah were theirs. All humane Laws that are just bind in Conscience, and (according to the Doctor's own Principles) those Laws were made by God's Authority. So that the Doctor mistakes the Question; we do not oppose humane Laws to God's Authority, but we oppose Laws which are made by God's Authority, and which are Rules to us, to Providence, which is no Rule. When God entailed the Crown upon David's Posterity, they had then a legal Right to it, and so hath every family in other Kingdoms, upon which an Entail is made by the respective Laws of the Country. Thus far the Doctor hath repeated; but there is something else that I added, which is both a proof and illustration of this matter, and which i● seems the Doctor did not care to meddle with. And it is this; 
Postscript p. 10.  King Charles the Second had as good a Right to the Crown of England as Joash had to that of Judah, and Cromwell 's Usurpation was no more a bar to him, nor gave him by his possession of the Throne, any more Right to our Alleg. than Athaliah 's was against Joash, or than her possession gave her a Right to the Alleg. of the People of Judah. This I thought was a pertinent Example to illustrate and confirm the truth of what I have said, and perhaps the Doctor thought so too, and therefore let it alone. This to my Understanding (which the Doctor is satisfied is not very good) would have brought the controversy home; 
Vindic. p. 71.  and if the Doctor would have answered directly, he must either have asserted that King Charles had not as good a Right to the Crown of England as Joash had to that of Judah, or else he must have forsaken his Distinction, and I now give him notice of it, and desire him in his next to give me a plain and categorical Answer to it.  
In the mean time let us consider what Answer he hath made to so much as he hath taken notice of; but here he is at the old trade again, of ask twenty Questions instead of answering one. But (saith he) what would our Author prove from this? That in every hereditary Kingdom the legal heir has a legal Right to the Crown as well as in Judah; and did I ever deny it? No Sir, you did not deny it in direct terms, but you have done as good as deny it; for you allow he hath a legal Right still; but than it seems it is such a Right, as those Persons who next to himself are most concerned in it, are bound to keep him from it: for what legal Right hath a King of any Kingdom, but by the Laws of that Kingdom, and whom do the Laws of that Kingdom respect but the People of that Kingdom; and if the People who are under the immediate direction of those Laws are bound to do him no Right, nay are bound to oppose it, than he can have no Right done him by virtue of the Laws that give him his Right, and that I think is equivalent to no Right at all. The Doctor in his Case of Alleg. gives a pleasant account of this matter; 
P. 26.  He tells us, That God's Providence (in setting up an Usurper) does not divest the dispossessed Prince of his legal Right nor forbidden him to recover his Throne, nor forbidden those who are under no obligations to the Prince in possession, to assist the dispossessed Prince to recover his legal Right. That is to say, a Foreigner who is not concerned in the Laws of the Country, may do the Prince Justice according to the tenor of these Laws, when the Kingdom whose Laws they are, are in Justice and Conscience bound to the contrary. The Prince hath his legal Right by the Laws of the Land, and the People are under the direction and obligation of the Laws of the Land. And if the Laws have any effect, in all reason it must be on the People whose Laws they are; and it is unaccountable how a Stranger may justly give the Prince his Right according to the Laws of the Land; and yet the People whose Laws they are, cannot in justice do it, nay are bound in conscience to hinder it as much as they are able; it is as much as to say, that a Judge and Jury whose proper business it is ought not to do Right to the oppressed, but the Mob, or any body else, may justly do it. I know an injured Prince may crave aid of a Foreigner, and he may justly assist him, but it is in those cases only, where his Subjects are bound to do him Right, but will not. But I would fain know how it is righteous in a Foreigner to do Right according to the Law of the Land, and yet unrighteous in the People to do it, nay very righteous to oppose it. But the Doctor hath given us such a Legal Right that never was heard of, A Right in Fiction and in nubibus, which neither hath nor can be executed by virtue of the Laws, nor the Provisions it makes. The Law makes a Right, and every person within the compass and extent of those Laws is bound to oppose it; but any body else, who is out of the bounds and power of the Law, may honestly effect it: in short, it is such a legal Right, which is under the cognizance of foreign force, but out of the notice, power, or obligation of the Laws that make it: it is such a legal Right which justifies any person, who is not concerned with the Laws, to establish it. But those who are under the direction of the Laws by which the Right is, are bound to prevent it. And that is, it is a legal Riddle, which no body can expound.  
The Doctor goes on with his Questions, Or (would he prove) that the standing Laws of every Country are the Rule for Subjects in setting up Kings, when it is their own Act and Choice, and who denies this too? Now I am not very well satisfied with the wording of this; Free Act and free choice in setting up Kings, is not very suitable to hereditary Kingdoms; and in the same manner he expresses it a little after, No man ever denied but that in making Kings, Subjects are bound by the Laws of the Land when it is their own free and voluntary Act. But supposing he means innocently however he hath expressed it: This I say, if it be the Duty of Subjects, and they are bound to own their legal King, then how comes the contrary to be their duty, and they are bound to disown and reject him. Force I grant may suspend a Duty, and hinder the performance, but can never make it none, or alter the nature of moral duties. This is a pure account of a moral duty; it is the Subjects duty to own the King by legal Right when they are free, but when they are under force it is their duty to kill and destroy him. If it be a duty when they are free, how comes the contrary to be a duty when they are under force. The being free, and being under force, makes some difference as to t e actual performance, but none as to the habit and obligation; while the force continues the Act is suspended, but the habit remains and the obligation continues; and if it be a duty when they are free, 'tis a duty also when they are under force. And the free choice, and voluntary Acts the Doctor speaks of is no d fference in the du●y, though it may be in the performance of it. Alleg. was due to Joash, and to Charles the Second, all the time of their dispossession, though their Loyal Subjects, who were under the force of the Respective Usurpers could not perform it. The Dr. says, his Hypothesis is not concerned in this Question. But I think it is, and that considerably: for if the Question be admitted, that the Subjects are bound to own and adhere to the King by Legal Right, when they are free, I would fain know how they become bound to the clean contrary, to disown him, and reject him, when under force, how it is their duty in Conscience to set him up when free; and their duty in Conscience also, to destroy him, and kill him, when under force. But of this before.  
As to what the Dr. says, that no man ever denied, but that in making Kings, Subjects are bound by the Laws of the Land, when it is their own free and voluntary Act: I shall leave him to dispute the Point with the Convention: And because we are upon Questions, he may answer these Two when he please: 1. Whether the setting up King William, and Mary, were not their own free and voluntary Act? And, 2. Whether it were agreeable to the Laws of the Land, or in the Drs. own words, Whether they made the Law their Rule? If he answers the First affirmatively, and the Second negatively, 'tis plain satire and Invective against them; and the Convention, I suppose, will not take it well from him, as he says, the complying Nobility and Gentry will not take it well from me (p. 65.) if he answers both affirmatively. His Hypothesis of Illegal and Usurped Powers is a mere trifle, and shows only how the Dr. can dispute about nothing to the purpose.  
The Dr. hath not done with his Questions; but hath three or four more, which I am not concerned to repeat; nor can I guests for what end he made so many Questions, or any at all: He asks indeed, what I would prove; and then fills a whole Page with Questions. But he understands it well enough: for immediately after his Questions, he adds, The sum of his Argument is this, that a Humane Entail of the Crown, made by the Laws of any Country, does in all Cases, and to all intents and purposes, as much oblige Subjects, as a Divine Entail, which is only the Law of the Kingdom too: for the People of other Kingdoms are as much bound to observe their own Laws, as the People of Judah were theirs. Now if this be that which I would prove, what need was there of so many previous Questions, to entangle a plain thing; and I own this is that which I would prove; only I except against his all Cases, and to all intents and purposes, which are his words and not mine; and I will no more answer for his sense, than he will for mine: My words are as much bound, which the Dr. sums up too; and adds, in all Cases, and to all intents, etc. as much oblige: whereas it is enough if they oblige as much in the present Case, and to the Present purpose, without running any further. And I do assert, that Entails of the Crown made by Humane Laws, do as much oblige the Subjects to own the Authority of their Rightful King by those Laws, and to disown the Authority of an Usurper, as the Entail of God upon the Posterity of David, did oblige the Subjects of Judah, to own Joash, and to Depose and Slay Athaliah: and let us see what the Dr hath to say to it.  
He replies, The Dispute in general, about the Authority and Obligation of Humane Laws, is very impertinent to this purpose; for no man denies it. Very well: but I doubt they must oblige as much, and in such Cases only, as will fit the Drs. turn. But yet (saith he) we think Divine Political Laws, much more sacred, and universally obligatory, than any mere Humane Laws, though made by men, who have their Authority of Government, and consequently of making Laws from God: and I believe the Author is the first man who has equalled Humane Laws, with those Laws which are immediately given by God. Now I thought the Dr. had some fetch in putting in these same in all Cases, and to all intents and purposes. But did I ever say, that mere Humane Laws, were as sacred as Divine Laws? but as to their obligation, the Subjects in other Countries are as much obliged to observe their Political Laws, as the People of Judah were theirs; though the one is made by God himself, and the other by his Authority. And this for the Reason that I gave; because all Humane Laws that are just bind in Conscience. And need the Dr. be told, what is the meaning of Humane Laws binding in Conscience, which hath an immediate Respect to the Law of God. And the formal Reason that Humane Laws oblige in Conscience, is not, because they are mere Humane Laws (as the Dr. hath a mind to phrase it) but because it is the declared Will of God, they should be obeyed; and the obligation in Conscience to Humane Laws, is resolved only into the Law of God. And I hope the obligation may be equal with respect to the Law of God, though the Laws themselves are not equal in all Cases, and to all intents and purpose. And I wonder where is the singularity of asserting this, as the Dr. out of extraordinary candour hath a mind to insinuate.  
But (saith he) the Dispute between Divine and Humane Laws, and a Divine and Humane Entail of the Crown, are of a very different nature, though they be both the Laws of the Country for which they are made: i. e. though they are both Laws, and though they both receive their binding power as they are Laws: and though the difference the Dr. contends for, is, that the one is a Law of God; and the other is a Law of man: Yet it seems the Dispute about Laws would not serve the Turn; and therefore they must be considered not as Laws, but as Entails; though I must confess, I can see no difference in that: for if they are Entails, they are Laws; and they are Laws, as they are Entails. And I do not very well see how their Consideration can be severed, or what need there is for it. But for all that, 
P. 43.  the Dr. tells us, it will easily appear, if we compare God's making Kings by a Providential Settlement of them in the Throne, with a Divine, and with a Humane Entail. A Divine Entail is God's settling the Crown on such a Family by the express Revelation of his Will; and though God should after this, settle a Prince in the Throne by his Providence, to whom the Crown did not belong by this Entail, such a Providence will not justify Subjects, in submitting to such a Providential King, when it is in their Power to set the Right Heir upon the Throne: for this would be to expound Providence against the express Revelation of God's Will: But a Humane Entail, is only a Providential Settlement of the Crown on such a Family; and what is se●●●d only by Providence, may be un●●●led by Providence again: for where God makes Kings only by Providence, he can unmake them by his Providence also, and make new ones. And what is all this to the Purpose? and what signifies this tedious Relation of his Hypothesis, which we must have at every turn? And what is this, to the difference of the dispute between Divine and Humane Laws, and Divine and Humane Entails? All that concerns that, is that a Divine Entail is God's Providential Settling the Crown, by the express Revelation of his Will: i. e. it is a Divine Law. And a Humane Entail, is only God's Providential Settlement of the Crown on such a Family; and that is, he hath settled it by a Humane Law. And I would fain know, whether it binds as an Act of Providence, or as a Law. But it seems the Laws of Entail, are to be submitted to, not as Laws, but as Providences. And if we must talk in this Cant, I say, that a Divine Entail, is God's Providential Settlement of the Crown, by express Revelation; that a Humane Entail is God's Providential Settlement by a Humane Law, but Usurpation is a bare Act or Permission of Providence, and no Settlement of the Crown at all. And why does a bare Act or Permission of Providence, defeat a Providential Settlement by Humane Law, any more than it does a Providential Settlement by Divine Law? The Dr. says, what is settled by Providence, may be unsettled by Providence again. Very well, but than it is the same degree of Providence. The Dr. says, we must not expound Providence against the express revelation of God's Will. And I reply, we must not expound a bare Act or permission of Providence, against a Providential Settlement by Law.  
But all this while my Answer is not touched, which is that the people of other Kingdoms are as much bound to observe their own Laws, as the people of Judah were theirs. God's Entail was the Political Law of that Kingdom, and a Humane Entail is the Law of other Hereditary Kingdoms: and the Laws of other Countries oblige in Conscience, as well as the Laws of Judah. And if it was not lawful to own the Authority of an Usurper in the Kingdom of Judah, because contrary to their Laws, and their obligations to them; neither is it so in any other Country for the same reason But here the Dr. shifts, and tells us that the Dispute about the Authority and Obligation of Humane Laws is impertinent to the purpose, but gives no reason, except his saying, for no man deny; it, be a reason; he says after, that the Dispute between Divine and Humane Laws, and Divine and Humane Entails, are of a very different nature. And it may be so, or it may not be so, for any thing he hath said (for his comparing a Divine and Humane Entail makes no difference in that particular) but this is trifling and amusing, not answering. The single Question is, whether they are Laws or no Laws, and are to be considered as such; is a Humane Entail, the Law of an Hereditary Kingdom; and does it oblige as such? Then if other Kingdoms are as much bound to observe their Laws, as the people of Judah were theirs, it plainly follows, that Usurpation cannot be admitted against a Legal Right in other Kingdoms, any more than it could in the Kingdom of Judah. But this is impertinent to the purpose, i. e. to the Drs. purpose.  
The Dr. goes on, This discovers the fallacy of what he adds, We do not oppose Humane Laws to God's Authority, but we oppose Laws that are made by God's Authority, and which are a Rule to us, to Providence, which is no Rule. Well! This I said, and where is the fallacy? Now (saith he) I would ask the Author, whether the Laws of England, which entail the Crown, are not Humane Laws? To which I answer, yes: and moreover, they bind in Conscience, with respect to the Laws of God. But I cannot tell what the Dr. will call them, whether Providential Settlements, or Providences: for it seems they have no influence on the People's Subjection, otherwise than as they are Providences, and not as Laws backed with God's Authority. But (saith he) if they be, I ask whether they do not oppose these Humane Laws to the Authority of God, in making Kings by his Providence? I answer no: for God makes Kings by his Providence according to Legal Right. But it is another Question, Whether an Usurper possessed of the Throne by Providence, be a King of God's making, or be made a King by God's Authority. And the Question, as the Drs. puts it, is Sophistical: he mixes and confounds what ought to be divided, Whether Kings are made by God's Authority, and whether they are made by Providence, are two Questions, which he makes one; when Kings are made according to Legal Right, they are made by God's Authority; for the Laws have God's Authority: But that a Providential Possession of the Throne is God's Authority, or that a Person so possessed, is made a King by God's Authority, is that which the Dr. hath not yet, and I suppose, will not be able to prove.  
The Dr. adds, to avoid this, he will not call them Humane Laws, but Laws made by God's Authority. To avoid what? That Sophistical Question before? I never so much as thought of it. And I do not see how I should; for it affects nothing that I have said. And now I do know it, I do not see any such strength in it, as will need any Art or Pains to avoid it. But to save him further trouble, I will tell him all the design I had in saying the Laws were made by God's Authority, was only to show the obligation of Humane Laws, that they bond in Conscience, and were a Rule to us, and which Providence was not: and therefore all the pains the Dr. takes to prove, that Humane Laws are not Divine Laws, concerns not me at all, nor the Question: He disputes only against his own fancy; and therefore I shall not trouble the Reader with that, but go on to the next.  
Well! (saith he) but these Laws are our Rule. They are so, when they are not overruled by a Superior Authority; 
P. 44.  but that they may be by the Authority of God. Very true. But are the Acts or Permissions of Providence, that Authority of God that overrules the Laws? Divine Laws are under God's Authority, as well as Humane Laws, and may be overruled by him when he please. But that is no proof, that Acts of Providence overrule them. And the Question is not whether God's Authority may overrule Humane Laws, but whether by mere Providence he doth overrule them: and till God doth overrule them, they are our Rule. And the Providence of God is not our Rule. Well, this I said: To this he replies, if by this he means, we must not make Providence the Rule of Good and Evil to us, i e. that we must not think it lawful for us to do what ever the Providence of God does, I grant it: For the Laws of God are the Rules of Good and Evil, not his Providence: Very well; We must not think it lawful to do whatsoever the Providence of God does: but may we think it lawful to do any thing that the Providence of God does, as it is merely an Act of Providence, in opposition to a plain and known Rule, allowed and authorised by God himself, as is the Case of Humane Laws? This is the single point: But let us see what a kind of Rule the Dr. makes of Providence. But (saith he) if he means the Providence of God cannot direct our duty, cannot lay some new obligations on us, and discharge the old ones, this is manifestly false in a thousand instances. What does Providence do this as a Rule? That is the Question: And I doubt to make it out, that we must have a new notion of a Rule, as we have had of Providence, and a through Settlement: What if Providence direct our duty? it does not make it; but the duty is to be measured by the Rule, and not by Providence. What if Providence lays new obligations on us, and discharges the old ones? the obligation and the discharge too, are to be taken from the Rule, and not from Providence; and we are not to practise by Providence, but by the Rule. And if Providence be contrary to the Rule, it directs no duty, nor lays any new obligations, nor discharges the old ones, Except it be quite contrary to the Drs. meaning; if a man by Providence usurps another man's possession, all the Duty Providence directs to, and all the obligation it lays, is to have justice done, and the possession restored to the right owner. So that I doubt the Drs. thousand instances will come very short; and what are those Instances? Every new Condition Providence puts us in, every new Relation it creates, it requires some duties, and lays some new obligations on us. And what then? Is Providence the Rule of those duties, or those obligations? This is manifestly false; or is Providence the Rule of that Condition, or of that new Relation? This is manifestly false also: Suppose Providence puts a man into a state of sufferings, or into a state of plenty, or any other state; the justice or injustice of these sufferings, or prosperity, etc. are not to be measured from Providence, but from some other Rule. Man and Wife come together by Providence, but whether they are related, and a relation is thereby contracted, is not to be known by Providence, but by the Rule that directs and appoints that Relation. But if a Man and Woman come together, but not according to God's Ordinance, they are not Man and Wife, nor is there any such relation between them; though one is by Providence, as well as the other: from whence nothing is more plain, than that Providence is no Rule in such cases, nor is any Relation to be known merely from Providence, but from some other Rule. And this shows the fallacy of what follows: I shall instance (saith he) only in the Case before us, if the Providence of God can remove one King, and set up another, this does not alter the duty of Subjects to their Prince, yet it changes the object of their Allegiance, as it changes their Prince, the Laws of God prescribe the duty of Subjects to their Prince, but the Providence of God makes him. Now grant all this, the difficulty still remains: Is Providence the Rule whereby to discover, whether or no the object of Allegiance is changed, or whether one King is removed from being King, and another set up? When a Master is removed from his Family, or a Husband from his Wife, there are by Providence; but if it be not according to the Laws of God in one Case, and according to the Laws of the Society in the other, the Acts of Providence are no Evidence, that the objects of the respective duties are changed, nor are a Rule for the Servants or Wife, to pay the respective duties to those who possess the place or station of the Persons so removed by Providence. But the truth is, all this is Ambiguous and Sophistical. God makes, and removes, and sets up Kings by his Providence, and so he does Husbands and Masters. But every Person that possesses the places of these by Providence, is not therefore a King, a Husband, a Master, but such only who possess them according to the respective Laws and Rules that constitute and appoint them. And therefore although it be true, that God makes Kings, Husbands, and Masters, by his Providence; yet it is true likewise, that Persons may by Providence sustain the places of them, and yet be neither of these. And therefore Providence is no Rule, nor can determine our Practices and Duties; but in all such cases we are to be judged by Laws, and not by Providences. A Woman is not determined by Providence, whether a Man that co-habits with her, be her Husband; nor is a Subject determined by Providence, whether the Person that Possesses the Throne be his King, but by the Laws, which direct to the Person (as all other Laws do) as well as to the Duty: and which are a Rule to us, warranted by God himself, and backed with his Authority; and Providence is no Rule, nor have we any wa●●ant or direction to observe it as such. And therefore, notwithstanding all the Dr. hath here said, the charge stands good against him. That the Dr. mistakes the Question, 
Postscript, p.  we do not oppose Humane Laws to God's Authority, but we oppose Laws which are made by God's Authority, and which are Rules to us, to Providence, which is no Rule.  
And now (saith he) let us consider the opposition he makes, between Humane Laws of Entail, and Providence; for he confesses, they do oppose Laws made by Divine Authority, that is the Laws of the Land which entail the Crown, to Providence, or to the Providence of God in making Kings. I do confess it, and I thought I had told him wherein the opposition consisted, that the one was a Rule, and the other none: but (saith he) that is they think themselves bound in Conscience, to adhere to that king, though out of possession, who by the Laws of the Land has a Legal Right to the Crown, against that King, who is actually settled in the Throne by the Providence of God. Now if we will consider the sense of things, and not the words; this is no more than to say, that they oppose the Providence of God against Providence, his former Providence against his later Providence; that is, they will not allow the Providence of God, to change and alter, whatever Reasons the Divine Wisdom sees for it: but what God has once done, that they are resolved to abide by, whatever he thinks fit to do afterwards, which is to oppose God's Authority, and to Shackle. (Does not tell me, 
Vindic. p. 24.  That I writ at that Rate, that some people may suspect that I had a mind to ridicule Providence; and what does he think of this Reverend Metaphor when appyled to Providence, to shackle) and confine Providence, that it shall not alter its usual methods in the government of the World, or when it has disposed of the Crown once, shall never be at liberty, while that Family lasts, to dispose of it again to any other: what are these Laws, which he says are made by the Divine Authority, and are our Rule? They are the Laws of Succession, which entail ehe Crown. And how does God settle the Crown on any Family by such Laws? No otherwise but by his Providence. And an Hereditary King by Humane Entail, is as much a Providential King in respect of God, as the first of the Family; and to oppose the Laws of Entail, against God's setting up a new King by other Acts of his Providence, is to oppose Providence against Providence, etc.  
Now the fallacy and weakness of these Arguments are discovered from what was said before, that Humane Laws are a Rule of Practice, and that Providence is no Rule of Practice: and therefore Providence is not to determine us against the Laws, but the Laws are to determine us against Providence: nor does it make any manner of difference in this, to say, that the Laws were made by Providence, and the Possession of the Throne contrary to these Laws, is by Providence likewise; and therefore to stand by the Entail against the Possession, is to oppose a former to a latter Providence. For is there no difference between Providence concurring to the making and establishing Laws, which are Rules of Practice, and so warranted by the Law of God, and the bare Acts or Permissions of Providence, which are no such Rule, nor so warranted? So that (with the Drs. leave) the opposition is not between Providence, and Providence; but between a Rule, and no Rule: and (if we must speak so) between Providence fixing a stated Rule, and the bare Acts of Providence, which are no Rule. And here is the plain fallacy of his Argument; it is true, the Laws of Entail were made by the Providence of God; but they do not receive their binding power, and oblige the Conscience, from Providence, but from the Law of God. Providence concurred to the making them Laws, but the Law of God makes them obligatory. And therefore as mere Providence did not make them binding; so neither does mere Providence destroy their obligation. And how extravagant does this Doctrine look, when applied to other instances of Legal Right? All the Laws of a Country are made by Providence, as well as the Entail of the Crown: And he that usurps another man's estate, is the providential possessor, and to urge the Laws of property against the Possession, is to oppose providence against providence; providence that made the Law against an after providence that put him in Possession. The Drs. Evasion which he uses afterwards; 
P. 46.  that private injuries are reserved by God to the Redress of Public Government does not reach the case; for besides that injuries to Princes over to be redressed by the Laws, as well as private injuries, and the Law is the Rule in one case as well as the other: the dispute now is about opposing providence to providence, a former providence to a latter; and though the Laws will dispossess a providential Possessor (and so they will in all cases if they might take place) Yet the Question is, whether according to this Doctrine, the present wrongful Possessor, hath not the same Title with the first occupier or last Proprietor: For it is all but providence, the one hath it by the Law, that is by one Act of providence, the other hath it by Possession, that is by another Act of providence. And Possession is to prescribe to the Law, as being the later providence, and not Law to the Possession, as being the former providence: And to talk of redressing injurious Possession by the Law, is to redress providence by providence, a later providence by a former; and that is almost as absurd, as to oppose providence against providence, a former Providence to a latter: For it is all but providence still; And the Dr. desires to know, why the providence of an Entail is more sacred and obligatory, than any other act of providence, which gives a settled Possession of the Throne.  
The rest of the Proofs and Inferences, that the Dr. makes use of in this particular, are wild things and mean nothing; and as to what he says, that They will not allow the Providence of God to change and alter, etc. This is proving the Question backwards, for the Question is not whether they will allow providence of God to change and alter his methods; for that he may do, and his Laws too if he please, but whether God widow l allow us to change, altar and transfer our duties merely upon the accounted of his providence: And what he says, that what God has once done that they are re●●●ved to abide by, we say yes, till God himself discharge us, and the Question returns whether acts of providence release us, when the Rule holds us: And as to limiting providence, what Authority hath he to extend providence any more than we have to confine it? and this is the Question, whether we who say it is no Rule of practice, nor aught to determine us against a Rule do limit providence; or he who makes a Law, and a Rule of it, and makes the bare acts of it, to dissolve all the obligations of Laws and Oaths, does extend providence beyond the true meaning of it, and beyond all the Accounts which from Scripture or sound reason can be given of it?  
What follows (in my Answer) the Dr. tells us is pretty, and nothing more, The Land of Canaan was divided among the twelve Tribes by Gods express command: And this (saith the Dr.) answers to Gods entailing the Crown, on the posterity of David, the Possession in all other Countries is only by Providence, and this answers to a Humane Right and Title to the Crown, well (saith he) there is something of likeness between them, and what then? and than repeats my words. And therefore according to the Drs. way of reasoning, 
Postscript. p. 11.  every man who wrongfully possessed himself of another man's estate in that Land (Canaan) must be made to restore it, for God had expressly given it to the other, and to his family. But in all other Countries, if a man by providence get his neighbour's estate, he must have it, for the event is God's Act, and 'tis his evident Decree and Counsel that he should have it.  
To this the Dr. replies; The fundamental mistake, which runs through all those kind of arguments is this, that they make the events of providence in private injuries, thefts encroachments, to be the very same with God's disposal of Kingdoms, and to have the same effects: Now whose arguments are these that make the events of providence the very same in both cases? why truly the Drs. own, does he not tell us in his Case of Allegiance, that the Scripture never speaks of God's bare permissi●● of any Events, 
p. 12.  but makes him the Author of all the good or evil, which happens either to private Persons or public Societies; The Events of all things are in his hands, and are ordained and disposed by his Wil and Council, as they must be if God governs the World. Now if this be the Case, than all Events are the same with respect to providence. The Event of Usurpation, and the Event of unjust Possession differ as to the matter, but as to the Will, Counsel, Order and Decree of God, they are both the same; for the Dispossession of a priva e man, is the same Providential Will, Order, Counsel and Decree, as the Dispossession of a King. And if this be a mistake, than the Drs. Doctrine is a mistake, and his Fundamental Doctrine is a Fundamental mistake, and I cannot help that: And to mend the matter the Dr. hath gone one step farther, and to have the same effects. And why not I pray? The reason and ground why Usurpation is to take effect, and draw the Allegiance of the Subject after it, is because it is God's Counsel, Decree and Order: And if these be the same in all other Events; why do not they take effect also, when the reason and ground is the very same? and I would fain see a good reason, why the Providential Counsels and Orders, are not as valid against the Legal Right to a private Estate, as the Legal Right to the Crown. The Doctrine of Providence affords us no difference, and God's Government equally extends to all Cases and Persons: The Scriptures give us none, but equally attribute the depression and exaltation of private men to the Providence of God, as they do the setting up and pulling down Kings, and not one of the Drs. Arguments, so far as they concern Providence, but what are equally applicable to private property as to Thrones and Kingdoms: And let him disprove this by showing any one if he can. But the Dr. tells us that All private injuries are reserved by God himself to the correction, and redress of public Government and Humane Courts of Justice; and therefore his providence has no effect at all on such personal Rights. Now this is true, and a good reason why the providence of God does not take effect against Legal Rights. But how will this agree with the Drs. Doctrine and Argument? Does God reserve the redress of these contrary to his own Decrees and Orders? Do such reserving exclude himself and his own interpositions by providence? When God has done this once, shall he never be at liberty to dispose it otherwise, and will not the Dr. allow the Providence of God to change and alter, whatever reas●ns the Divine Wisdom sees for it; but what God has once done, he i● resolved to abide by, whatever h● t●●●ks fit to do afterwards which is to oppose God's Authority, and to shackle and 〈◊〉 providence, that it shall not after its usual methods in the Government of the Wo●ld; which are his Arguments but the very page before, and if they prove any thing at all, they are equally valid against such a Reserve as against any other Legal Right; and if the D●. will answer them fairly, he will save any man the trouble of answering his Book. The Dr. adds, But the very nature of the thing proves, that such disputes which are too big for a Legal decision, or any Humane Courts, for the decision of which God has erected no universal Tribunal on Earth; he has reserved to his own judgement, such as the Correction of Sovereign Princes, and the transferring Kingdoms and Empires. And here the final determination of providence in settling Princes on their Thrones, draws the Allegiance and Submission of the Subjects after it, and in such Cases God does not confine himself to determine on the side of Humane Right, but acts with a Sovereign Authority, and gives the Kingdoms of the World to whom he please, as he can best serve the wise, and many times unsearchable designs of his providence by it. To this I answer, and because he hath the same in other places, I shall do it distinctly.  
1. The Rights of Princes may and aught to be determined by Law, as well as those of Subjects. I have already instanced in the differences between the Houses of York and Lancaster, where the Law hath decided the controversy, and the Case hath been the same in other Kingdoms; but I wonder whoever insisted on a Providential Title, or thought it a sufficient competition for a Legal Ti●le: There is never a Prince nor private Man in Christendom, nor the Dr. himself, that would change his Legal Title for a Providen ial one, which is a pre●ty plain Case, that however some People may talk of it, no body believes it. But because there are no Judges and Juries appointed, and the Rights of Princes are not to be tried in Westminster Hall, nor in other Courts of Judicature; therefore Possession and Providence must determine it: But this is manifestly false, for the Law is as proper a Judge of the Rights of Princes, as of any other; their Persons are not under the Law, but their Titles are, and the Laws declare who is, and who is not King; as much as they do who is, or who is not any inferior Proprietor. And as to what the Dr. says of a Tribunal, I suppose he means to enforce this upon the Subject, (for the matter is declared by the Law, and there needs no Tribunal for that, no more than there needs a visible Judge of controversies, in matters of Religion, 'tis a duty under the direction of the Law, and every Person concerned is bound to take notice of it.) But as for the other, if the Law may take its course, there are Tribunals enough: But indeed when the Prince is dispossessed, there is no Tribunal to force this, and to punish the neglect, that is, there is no Power to hang a Man, if he does not take notice of the Law; and there is power to hang him if he does. This makes some difference as to punishment, but none as to duty, for the obligation arises from the direction of the Law, and not from the external force to compel the observance, and the direction of the Law binds when there are, and when there are not Courts of Judicature to put it in execution.  
2. There is no Tribunal for the Correction of Princes but Gods: Very true! And therefore they are not accountable to the People for maladministration; Their Persons are sacred, their Authority  and unalienable. And these were the Inferences, that hitherto the Men of the Church of England have drawn from this Doctrine; but the Dr. hath found out a new Inference, that the Subjects may resist him, and shake off his Authority, and kill him too if need be; and all for this weighty Reason, because they have put another in the possession of his Throne: I know the Dr. calls it Providence, but that is the English of it.  
3. 'Tis true God hath reserved to himself the Correction of Sovereign Princes, and sometimes he doth here actually correct and punish them, and dispossession is sometimes designed as a Punishment by God himself. But still the Question returns, is such a dispossession by providence a sufficient evidence, that God hath given away the Kingdom from the dispossessed to the Possessor of the Throne; and till that can be made out all these Arguments and Inferences signify nothing. And that is manifestly false in the Case of David, he for the punishment of his sins was dispossessed by his own Son; but God by that providence did not take away the Kingdom from David and give it to Absolom: And God had then erected no Universal Tribunal for the decision of such Cases, no more than he has now. The Question therefore, is not whether there are some Cases too big for a Legal Decision or Humane Courts, or whether God hath reserved to his own judgement the correction of Princes, and transferring Kingdoms: But the Question is, whether the Possession of the Throne by providence divests the Rightful King of the Crown, and of the Allegiance of the Subjects, while his Person is in being, and his Legal Right remains. And that the matters being reserved to God's own Tribunal does not prove; the nature of the thing indeed proves that cases that cannot be redressed by public Government, are reserved to God's own judgement; but their being so reserved (which is the full of the Drs. Argument) does not prove, that therefore every Providential Possession of the Throne, is God's final determination or any warrantable evidence to conclude from thence, that God hath made him a King, and the People his Subjects. Dr. Sherlock makes another Collection from providence in this very case. No Usurpations can extinguish the Right and Title of the natural Prince; such Usurpers, 
Case of Resist. p. 132.  the they have the Possession of the supreme Power, yet they have no right to it; and though God for wise reasons may sometimes permit such Usurpations; yet while his Providence secures the Persons of such deposed and banished Princes from violence, he secures their Title too.  
4. The Dr. says, that in correction of Princes and transferring Kingdoms, God does not confine himself to determine on the side of humane Right, but acts with a Sovereign Authority, and gives the Kingdoms of the World to whom he pleases. And what then? and therefore the Possession of the Throne by providence is God's giving the Kingdom, but that does not follow: And God's acting with a Sovereign Authority (which the Dr. intimates as a Reason) does not prove it, for in all acts of Providence, God acts with a Sovereign Authority if by Sovereign Authority the Dr. means acting independantly, and without respect to the Laws and Rules God hath prescribed to others. This is the same in cases under the cognizance of Laws and Humane Courts, as well as in those which are above them, and such acting by a Sovereign Authority is no Rule for mankind, nor warrant for practice. But if by Gods acting with a Sovereign Authority the Dr. means, That God as Lord and Proprietor of the World may dispose of it as he sees good, and actually does so in such a way as may warrant practice, and confer a good Right and Title, as when he ordered the Israelites to spoil the Egyptians. This was an Act of Sovereign Authority, but cannot be called Providence, but comes under the notion of a Law, and they were warranted to take the Egyptians goods not from providence giving them opportunity, but from God's express will impowering and authorising them so to do. In like manner God may if he please dispose of Kingdoms, and private estates by his Sovereign Authority; but if he does so, he extinguishes the Legal Right of the former owner, and conveys it to whom he gives it. And it can never be concluded that he does so from providence only, the ends and designs of which are mysterious and to us unknown, but from some further evidence and notice of the Divine Will: But the Dr. confounds God's providence with his Laws, and makes one a Rule of practice as well as the other. God governs the World by his providence, as well as by his Laws, but he hath not made his providence, nor directed us to observe it as a Rule of life. And therefore the Drs. proof is preposterous, for although there are cases reserved to Gods own judgement; although God may act by a Sovereign Authority, that is nothing to his purpose, except he proves likewise, that the events of providence are God's final sentence; and that he would have the World take notice of them as such. But instead of that the Dr. is for beginning at the other end, and proves that God's providence is his final determination, and a Rule to be observed, because there are Cases reserved to his own judgement: And therefore this proves indeed, that there is a difference in the two Cases, but does not prove, that there is any difference in providence, which is the only thing that needs to be proved; the one is under public Government, the other is immediately under the Government of God, but they are both immediately under Providence: And a direct answer must affect that, and show how providence is less Gods Act, or a less Act of his Sovereign Authority, with respect to private Possessions than to Thrones; how the same Providence, which in one Case is Paramount to Laws, dissolves their obligation, cancels the bond of Oaths, and disposes Crowns, in the other does nothing at all, but is under the Authority of a Justice of Peace or a Constable. But this (which is the main point) the Dr. does not attempt to answer, but instead of that tells us, that in one case, God hath erected humane Judicatures, but the other are reserved to his own judgement, i. e. there is some difference as to the things but none as to Providence, which is the only question: For a humane Judicature does not alter the nature of Providence; and if providence be God's Decree, Order, and Council, than it is so notwithstanding any humane Judicature; and it is somewhat strange, that a humane Judicature should determine against God's Orders, and Decrees any more than humane Laws. And here I desire to be resolved in 2 Questions.  
1. How it comes to pass, that a humane Judicatory is a greater confinement to Providence than a humane Law.  
2. Whether God hath erected humane Judicatories to determine the Rights of private men, any otherwise, or for any other purposes than he hath humane Entails to determine the Rights of Kings; and if not, than I suppose it will follow, that as humane Judicatories are a Reason why Providence (as the Dr. says) has no effect at all on such Personal Rights, so humane Entails also will be a Reason why providence has no effect at all on such Regal Rights, or at least the one will be as good a Reason as the other.  
At last the Dr. comes to prove his point from the Poet, and tells me, The Poet would have taught him the difference between these two Cases: And I confess, I should rather have expected this Doctrine in a Poet than in a Divine.  
Regum timendorum in proprios greges,  
Reges in ipsos Imperium est Jovis.  
Now the Poet is not for him neither, for all that he says (as the Dr. quotes him) is, that the Government of Kings is over their own Subjects, and the Government of Jupiter is over Kings themselves. And that he might very well think without the Drs. notion of Providence; and what opinion the Poet had of Providence does not appear. But however, though this is not for the Drs. Purpose, it must be owned, that the Method is very proper; for proofs from a Poet do very well suit with Poetical Divinity.  
The Dr. goes on; Besides according to my Principles, 
P. 47.  Kings must be throughly settled in their Governments, before it becomes unlawful for Subjects to dispossess them; and than if he will make the Cases parallel, be who unjustly seizes another man's estate, must be throughly settled in it, before it becomes unlawful to dispossess him, but that no private man can be, who is under the Government of Laws, who has not the Possession of his Estate given him by Law; and when he has, whether right or wrong, he must not be violently dispossessed again. Now I crave the Drs. good leave, to return him one of his own Compliments, is he in ●est, or in earnest? and certainly such things as these were never said in earnest by a man of the Drs. Character. The dispute is between the Providential Possession of the Throne, and of a private Estate, now to make the Cases parallel, in the private Case there must be a Legal Possession; that is there is a Parallel between Possession and Possession, but between Providential and Legal, which is the only thing in controversy, there is none. We are not now disputing about the notion of a thorough Settlement; and for once let us take it in the Drs. sense, and see what a fine Parallel he makes, a thorough Settlement of an Usurper on the Throne, is an actual and visible Settlement, not a Legal one; the Settlement of a private Person in an estate, is a Legal Settlement; and to make the Cases Parallel, one must be actually settled, not legally, and the other must be legally settled: And so a thorough Settlement in one sense, is Parallel to a thorough Settlement in another sense; even just as a Trial of skill, is Parallel to a Trial at Law, or the Drs. Picture is Parallel to himself. But Parallel is a term in Mathematics, as Settlement is a term in Law. But when they come to be applied to Usurpation, they must change their signification, and mean the clean contrary. And there is all the reason in the World, for if Usurper signifies a King, why may not Settlement signify Illegal Possession, and Parallel signify inequality? Now 'tis no marvel the Dr. tells his Answerer, he expects to hear no more from him; for who is able to answer such terrible arguments as these?  
The Dr. here tells us, that by his Principles Kings must be throughly settled in their Governments before it becomes unlawful for Subjects to dispossess them: Now I cannot tell what his Principles are, but this I can tell, that his Arguments prove no such thing. I know indeed, that to get the Convocation of his side, he hath given us a new sense of a thorough Settlement, and that (as the chief) is the Consent and submission of the States and the great Body of the Nation. And when he hath done that, he takes his leave on't, for his Arguments neither concern a thorough Settlement in his sense, nor in the true sense: For what has God's removing and setting up Kings, 
Case of Alleg. p. 12. 14.  the events of Providence being his Decree and Order; That those are all rightful Kings who are placed in the Throne by God, that he is our King who is settled in the Throne in the Actual Administration of Sovereign Power, etc. That the Scripture account means only the Powers that be, i. e. those that are in the Actual Administration of Government, etc. 
p. 21.  And what is all this to the People's consent? And here I ask the Dr. this plain Question, does the People's consent convey any thing to the Government, or does it not? if not how comes it necessary? or how comes it to be only unlawful to dispossess Princes when they are throughly settled, i. e. when the People have consented, but not before: But if it does convey any thing, than Providence alone does not do it; and than it does not follow, that when a Prince is in the Possession of the Throne, and in the Actual Administration of Government, that he hath God's Authority; for that is a strange Authority from God which the People may choose, or refuse at their pleasure. But the truth is the Drs. notion of a thorough Settlement, hath rooted up the very foundations of Government, and plainly centre in the Commonwealth Principles. And that is the bottom of the business, and for the proof of this I will be tried by the Dr. himself. In his Case of Allegiance disputing against a Legal Right, 
p. 25.  he thus delivers himself: To say that God sets up no Prince, who ascends the Throne without a humane and legal Right, is to say that the Right of Government is not derived from God without the consent of the People; for if God can't make a King without their consent declared by their Laws, (and if the Dr. will give me leave, I say without their consent declared by themselves, or the States, or the great body of the Nation) the Authority must be derived from the People, not from God, or at least if it be God's Authority; yet God cannot give it himself without the People, nor otherwise than as they have directed him by their Laws: I add by their consent; But what becomes of the Drs. through Settlement by the Consent of the People all this while, why it may be, he had forgot it: But however he tells us, that it is his Principle, and that may be too; but heretofore men used to bring Arguments to prove, and not to confute their Principles.  
The Dr. goes on, as our Author has stated the case, it signifies nothing to the present purpose, for whether private men's estates be settled by a Divine or Humane Entail, it is the same case if they suffer injury from their Fellow Subjects, they must seek for redress from Public Government. That is, the saying, that the Land of Judah was entailed by a Divine Entail, as well as the Crown, is not to the present purpose, though the great stress of the Drs. Answer lies in the difference between a Divine and a Humane Entail And it is plain enough from thence, that a Divine Entail made no difference as to Providence and Property between that and other Nations: But his reason is that private injuries may be redressed by public Government; well! and that is a reason to prove that no providential dispossession of a private man, is any warrant against Law. But it is no reason to prove, that a providential dispossession of a Prince is such a warrant, but the contrary, for being above or under the Law makes no alteration in the nature of Providence; and it is odd to say, that Providence has power and efficacy in Cases where the Law has none, but has none where it has. But this hath been considered before; and as to the matter of God's settling the Land of Canaan by Divine Entail: The Dr. after having said, that he could have told me, how to have applied the Case to the purpose, (and methinks he that hath said so little to the purpose, need not have neglected what had been to his purpose) shows some difference between the Land of Canaan and other Countries: But those are not at all to his purpose.  
In Canaan (saith he) where God allotted every tribe and family their inheritance, none could pretend to a Right to any portion of Land, but what was allotted him. But in other Countries which were left in Common, Possession and Occupation gave a Right: Very true, but not when they were not left in common, but property was enclosed by Laws, Legal Possession then only gave a Right. But saith he, Thus in Judah none had an ordinary Right to the Crown, but those that were nominated by God, or had the Crown descended on them by a Divine Entail. But in other Country's Possession and Occupation gave a Right to the Allegiance of Subjects. Now if the Dr. would have made this Parallel he should have said, in other Countries, where Government was left in Common; and than it had been true enough, for no body had a better Right; but it is not so, where the Crown is entailed by Laws, Possession gives no more Right to the Crown, than it gives to private Estates.  
In Canaan (saith he) when God had settled such an inheritance in a family, it could never be perpetually alienated, and though it were sold, it could be sold for no longer time than till the year of Jubilee, when all estates were to return to their old Proprietors again. Right; and this was the Law of Canaan, and by virtue of that they did so return, but had there been no such Law, would the Land-once sold, have then by virtue merely of a Divine Entail, returned to their old Proprietors? But in other Country's men may part with their Estates for ever: Right again, because the Laws permit them so to do: But if the Laws of other Countries, had provided that all Estates should return to their old Proprietors at such a year, they would have done so too, though the Provision had been made only by a Humane Law. Thus (saith he) in the Kingdom of Judah, though God by his Sovereign Authority might set up a Providential King, yet this did not cut off the Entail; but whenever the true Heir, appeared, Subjects if they were at Liberty, were bound to make him King, and dispossess the Usurper; but in other Kingdoms, a Kingdom may be lost, as well as an inheritance sold for ever. Thus that is just as an Estate in Judah and other Countries, might or might not be sold, but according to the Laws of each Country; in like manner, as in the Kingdom of Judah the Inheritance of the Crown was not alienable, though the Estates for a time were, even so, in other Kingdoms a Kingdom may be lost, as well as an inheritance sold for ever. And that is to say again, that as in other Kingdoms an inheritance may be sold by the consent of the parties interessed, even so a Government may be lost, without, and contrary to the consent of the Proprietor, and right owner. For such Parallels as these, otherwise or quite contrary might have served, as well as Thus; The Dr. tells me what I say in this Case is pretty, because that between the Divine Entail, and Gods express command concerning Canaan, and the Possession by providence and a Humane Entail there is some likeness. I am sorry I cannot return all his Compliment, this is very pretty indeed, but there is no likeness at all.  
We are come to the Drs. Answer to the objection, 
P. 48.  that the Laws of the Land are the measure of duty, and Rule of Conscience, etc. and the sum of the Answer is, they are so, when they do not contradict the Laws of God, but when they do they are no Rule, but their obligation must give place to Divine Authority, and suppose the Law should forbid owning any King, but the Right Heir; and the Law of God should command obedience to him, that actually possesses the Throne we must obey the Law of God. To this I answered, where is this Law of God, 
Postscript. p. 11.  that commands us to obey Usurpers? where is it affirmed in express terms, or deduced from thence by evident consequence? He replies, he hath showed it before, and it is in his book still and there I may see it. As if I had not at all considered, what he had said in his Book in my Answer. But to say, that he would examine that presently would not have been so sharp, nor half so magisterial, as to say it is in my book still, and there he may find it. But by his favour, I cannot find that he hath showed it, either in his former, or in his new book, and that he hath only said it, but not showed it, will appear presently. But I had said, that this Law had need be very clear and evident, and the Dr. had need be very sure of it, when he builds not only his Book, but his practice upon it, in plain contradiction (by his own confession) to the Laws of the Land: He replies, I never confessed this was contrary to the Laws of the Land; but on the contrary, that the Laws of the Land, if we will believe learned Judges and Lawyers, do allow and justify it. I don't know what he means by confessing, but if to maintain, that a Person possessed of the Throne contrary to Law is to be owned and obeyed as King; if to write a Book in justification of that Doctrine, and to call that Book his Reasons, be to confess it; then the Dr. hath confessed it to the purpose. And I don't know how I should prove this, except I should reprint his Case of Allegiance, with a new Title, and call it his Confessions. For there is not a page nor an argument but confesses it, bating only some part of the Answer to this objection: But the objection itself, and the first answer as plainly confess it as words can do. The ground of the objection is, that it is contrary to the Laws of the Land, and therefore contrary to our duty; and the substance of the Answer is, that what he hath said i e. what he had said before concerning Providence and Usurped Powers is an Answer to it, And it is so, when the Laws do not contradict the Laws of God: And yet he never confessed it; and all for this poor shift, because, in answer to an objection, and a second answer too, Foreign to his whole Book; he had said, that according to the opinion of Learned Judges and Lawyers, the Laws do allow it; now the Question is, whether his Hypothesis or his Arguments to prove it, proceed upon any such allowance, or have any manner of respect to it. And I wonder what the Question of providence as he handles it, has to do with his opinion of Judges and Lawyers, or the Laws themselves; for he debates the matter in direct opposition and contradiction to humane Laws. And to say he never confessed what is the subject matter, the whole scope and drift of his Book; because ex abundanti, and what does not in the least relate to his Hypothesis he had mentioned the Judges and Lawyers for the Laws, is a mean Evasion; and (if the Dr. likes his own words better) a childish piece of Sophistry, and argues great contempt of his Readers. 
p. 43.   
The Dr. tells us, (as to the evidence of this Law commanding obedience to Usurpers) That the Scripture is plain in the Case, and that he is pretty sure of it: But (saith he) he proves the Scripture cannot be clear in the point, my Words are [that it is not clear is evident not only] from the Controversies about it, in the late dismal times of Usurpation, that (saith the Dr.) is to say, nothing can be clear in Scripture which is matter of controversy, and thus we must either be Sceptics in Religion, or seek for an infallible interpreter. Thus Heretics oppose the Articles of Faith: Thus Papists dispute against the Scriptures being a Rule of Faith. And whither these arguments will carry our Author, I cannot tell, but they look very kindly towards Rome; and if that be his inclination, I can pardon his zeal in this Cause; what, and is Dr. Sherlock come to take up with these sordid and scandalous arts to hunt his Adversaries by a cry of Popery? I perceive the same Principles will always have the same practices. This is indeed very spiteful, but it is withal very ridiculous; the Dr. does not deny, but though he was not factious, yet he was hearty and zealous against taking the Oaths; 
P. 79.  and had he at that time any kind inclinations towards Rome? But malice is foolish, and that is answer enough to such charitable inuendoes: Well? But thus Papists dispute against the Scriptures being a Rule of Faith. And what if they do? and therefore whoever disputes thus against the Scriptures, not being clear in a particular Text, looks very kindly towards Rome: An admirable consequence! As if there was no difference between concluding, that the Scriptures are not clear from the controversies about them; and therefore are not a Rule of Faith, and concluding from a particular controversy, that the Scriptures are not clear in a particular point. And I hope a man may think a particular Text obscure, and may collect it from the disputes of learned men about it, without any great fear of running into Scepticism or infallibility. But be that as it will, it is not the Case here, and the Dr. does not fairly represent my words or meaning: For I never said, The Scriptures cannot be clear in the point, for I think they are clear enough to any unprejudiced man. But all that I said was, That it is not clear that there is such a Law of God, That is, it is not clear, that the Drs. sense is the sense of Scripture, and I hope there is some difference between saying the Scripture is not clear, and saying his sense of it is not clear: So that (if the Dr. please) the Question is not whether the Scripture be clear in the point, but whether the sense he hath given of it be clear. And that it is not I said, is evident not only from the controversies about it in the late times of Usurpation, but, etc. which the Dr. thus expounds, That is to say, nothing can be clear in Scripture, which is matter of controversy; that is to say, the Dr. expounds away my meaning, and then disputes against his own exposition, for I believe that the contrary to what the Dr. asserts is clear in Scripture; though Dr. Sherlock and Dr. Goodwin have controverted it, and I think it is not the less clear for any thing they both have said about it. But I think likewise, that the sense some men give of Scripture, and particularly the sense the said two Drs. have given of the 13 to the Romans, etc. is not clear; and that it is not so, may be evident from the controversies about it, which I did not express so generally, much less with an universal negative as the Dr. expounds it, but with limitation to a particular time and occasion, in the late times of Usurpation; for though it cannot be said that nothing is clear which is matter of controversy; yet it may be said that something is not clear which is matter of controversy, and it may appear not to be clear, not merely from its being controverted, but from that joined with some other circumstances, as is the Case; and the controversy about it in the late times, may be an evidence that it is not clear, though the bare controversy about it may not.  
And let any man consider the state of this Controversy in those times, and the Parties engaged in it, and he may easily be satisfied. Now the Drs. Hypothesis and Arguments were proposed by those Advocates for Usurpation, with all art and skill, and as much to advantage as the Dr. himself hath done: (And if the Dr. doubts of this, I will upon his request make it good by enumeration of particulars,) and it must be confessed, that that was a fit season to examine into this Doctrine; and the members of the Church of England were at that time as judicious and learned for their intellectuals, and as pious and sincere for their morals as any age hath bred. And that which gives a lustre to their virtues, and recommends to the World, not only their memories and practices, but their Doctrines also (as far as a mere humane example can recommend them) is that (after the example of their glorious Sovereign) they were all Confessors, and some of them Martyrs for the Doctrine of the Church, and the Laws of the Land. And these were the men that held the other side of the Question: And of this very case it is that the Dr. speaks so contemptibly and scornfully: That is to say nothing can be clear in Scripture which is matter of controversy, as if there was no difference between a bare controversy, and a controversy in these circumstances; for this I plainly refer to, and it is next to impossible that the Dr. should understand me otherwise; for what can I possibly mean by the controversies about this Doctrine in the late times? but what was managed by the Regicides, and their Abettors, on the one side, and if the Dr. please on his side of the Question; and on the other by the Loyal and Excellent members of the Church of England. And I wonder what he means by being clear, is that clear which appears, or is pretended to appear only to men of vicious and corrupt Principles, and for corrupt ends (I speak here of the late times) and does not appear, nor can be seen, by men of the greatest integrity and abilities? And this is plainly the Case, and let the Dr. if he can show me any one Person (when this controversy was at the height) who owned his Hypothesis, who was not likewise very corrupt in his Principles relating to Government, or on the other hand, any one Person, who was of true Principles, and of the Church of England, that embraced this Doctrine or Exposition, or who did not (as far as appears) perfectly and in express terms disown and abhor it. And this I think if the bias be not very great, may easily satisfy any man, that the Controversies in the late times about this Doctrine, are a sufficient evidence that such a sense as the Dr. contends for, is not very clear, except a man is resolved to call that clear which no body can see but himself. And this plainly shows the inconsequence of his Inferences. Thus (saith he) Heretics oppose the Articles of Faith; Yes just thus, that is, they produce all the Orthodox plainly and clearly determining on their side; Thus Papists dispute against the Scriptures being a Rule of Faith: That is by showing when that controversy was in debate, that all and every one of the Protestants gave their judgements, that the Scripture was no Rule of Faith.  
I added to show the Drs. sense was not clear: That no learned men could ever espy this Law before the times of John Goodwin. To this he replies, what does he think of Mr. Calvin and Grotius, who have both passed for learned men? And they espied this Law before John Goodwin. Now I expected the Dr. would have produced one at least of the Church of England on his side; but such a one it seems was not to be found, and therefore he gives us two Foreigners, both learned men indeed, but against one there is just exception, and the other is not for him. Mr. Calvin for any thing I know may be of the Drs. opinion; and any man that considers the turbulent State of Geneva at that time, and the Revolution there, will be able to give a Reason for it, and I think there is no great Question, but as he suited his Church Discipline, so he did his Doctrines about Government, to the circumstances of that State. And his Doctrine of a power reserved to inferior Magistrates, 
Calv. Inst. l. 4. c. ult.  to restrain and coerce Kings, is another instance of it: And the one hath just as much Authority as the other. And to say no more, the Judgement of Mr. Calvin in point of Government hath always been exploded by the Church of England: and it is a great evidence the Dr. is very much straightened for Authors when no body but Mr. Calvin can be found to concur with him. He might if he had pleased have named Dr. Goodwin, and it would have done as well. But as for Grotius, the Dr. interp●ets him as he does the Scripture. Grotius does say indeed, 
Grot. in Rom. 13.1.  That God rules and changes Governments not only by his common Providence, by which he leaves many things in their natural order, but with Wisdom suited to the advantage or the punishment of the Subjects, etc. And what then! therefore he believed the Apostle meant usurped as well as legal Powers? or that it is the Law of God, that every person possessing himself of the Throne by Providence, is a King of God's making, and aught to be owned as such? I wonder how he will draw this out of Grotius' words? And Grotius himself plainly asserts the contrary, 
De jure belli & pacis, l. 1. c. 4. Restat ut de invas●re Imperii videamus non postquam longa possess●ne aut pacto jus nactus est, sed quamdiu durat injuste possidendi causa, & quidem dum possidet actus imperii quot exercet vim latere possunt obligandi, non ex ipsius jure quod nullum est, sed ex eo quod emnino probabile sit cum qui jus imperandi habet, etc.— Nec minus licebit invasorem imperii interf●ere si diserta auctoritas accedat ejus qui jus verum imperandi habet.  and that when he speaks to the Question ex professo, He tells us that an Usurper, not after he hath acquired a Right, by long possession or agreement, but so long as the Reason of his unjust possession remains. While he is in possession the acts of Government which he exercises may oblige, but not from any Right derived from him, which is none, but from the presumptive consent of the Right Heir; and then puts the Question, Whether it be lawful to depose or to kill such an Usurper? and in some cases affirms it; and among those this is one, If it be with the Authority of him, whose the Right is, whether that Right be in a King, Senate, or the People. And to these (saith he) we are to reckon the Tutors and Guardians of young Princes, as Jehoiada was to Joash when he deposed Athaliah. And it is yet more remarkable what he adds, Besides these cases, I do not think it lawful for a private person to depose or kill an Usurper. And for what reason? not one single word of the Doctor's Hypothesis nor any thing like it, of his having God's Authority or being God's providential King; but truly from the old beaten reason, the presumptive consent of the true King. It may so be (saith he) that he who has Right to the Government had rather leave the Usurper in possession than give occasion to dangerous and bloody troubles, etc. And again likewise speaking of Contracts personal and real, the latter of which he says are Leagues and Contracts made with Princes, which bind their Successors and People as well as themselves: and then adds, A League made with a King remains in force although he or his Successor be driven from his Kingdom by his Subjects, and his reason is, For the right of the Government is with him, though he hath lost the possession. 
Sane cum Rege initum f●edus manet etiamsi rex idem aut successor regno s●●●itis sit pulsus. Jus en●m regni pours ipsi●m manet ut●●●que posse s●m●m amiserit contra si alieni regni invas●r volente vero rege, aut oppr ss●r, etc. be●lo impe●atur, nihil en siet contra foedus, etc. ibid. lib. 2. cap. 16.  And on the contrary, if an Usurper, or an Oppressor of a free People, before he hath a sufficient consent of them be invaded by War, the true K. consenting, this is no breach of the League because they have only possession, but they have no Right. And this is the meaning of that which F. Quintius said to Nabis (Livy lib. 34.) We made no friendship and society with you, but with Pelops the just and lawful King of the Lacedæmonians.  
And here by the way we have not only the sense of Grotius, but a very good Argument likewise; for if in real Contracts made with a King, as sustaining the person of a supreme Governor, if these bound to his person out or Possession, and not to the Usurper in Possession, it is plain the Prince out of Possession is the King, and the Usurper is none; for the Contract or League was made with him as King of such a Country, and if he ceases to be King, the binding power of the Contract ceases as to him; for as the Dr. phraseth it, the Man is in being, but the King is gone, and the Contract goes away with it, and being real and not personal, passes to him that is King. But now if such a Contract does not pass to the Usurper, nay if it be no breach of it to fight with and to invade him, and if it remains with the dispossessed ●rince, than he is the King of that Country, and the Usurper that possesses his Throne is not. And Groti●s says, The Qualities in Leagues of Kings, and their Successors and the like, properly signify Right, and the Cause of an Usurper is odious. This Argument will reach a great way, and any man may improve it to de●ect the fallacy both of the Doctor's and of some other Arguments. But it may be sufficient here to observe, that though the Dr. cites Grotius, and seems to triumph in it, yet that he is not for him but directly against him.  
What follows is extraordinary; What (saith the Dr.) thin●s he of Bishop Overal's Conversation? were there no learned men in it, and yet they 〈◊〉 this Doctrine before John Goodwin was thought of? What kind of Argument does the Dr. call this? This is the thing in controversy, and the Dr. produces it to prove his point. This is very usual with him, but it is so very absurd, that it needs no Answer. At last he asks me, What I think of the Primitive Christians? And I do (as I ought) think of them with great reverence, and with great deference to their Judgements. He tells me I may guess at their sense, by what Grotius hath cited. But he must guess strangely indeed, that can guess a sense for the Doctor's purpose, for all that he citys out of Clemens his Co●llitations, Irene●s, and Tertullian, is no more than that God choses, constitutes, and makes Kings, and sets them over the People, which is as much for the Dr. as Grotius himself; for who denies that God makes Kings? but the Question is whether the possession of the Throne by Providence is an evidence that God makes such a one King? But he remits me to their practice, and to their submission to the reigning Emperor; and tells me, I shall quickly be informed by a learned pen. As soon as he please, for I shall never refuse information; and in order to it I shall plainly state the Case.  
Let him then show me any one approved Instance in practice, or any approved Doctrine among the Primitive Christians, That they either actually did, or thought they lawfully might submit and become Subjects, and pay Allegiance to a Prince in the possession of the Throne, and for that reason because was in possession, when the King whom they owed and to whom they had sworn Allegiance was alive and claiming, and whom they owned and acknowledged to have the legal Right to the Crown. And this I shall confess will be an Information to the purpose. But for Examples that are foreign to the Question, and which the Dr. intimates, submitting to the reigning Emperors by what means soever they gained the Throne, these are wide of the mark, and we have had enough of them already.  
The Dr. proceeds, I grant indeed that the resolution of Conscience ought not to depend on such niceties of Law and History as learned men cannot agree about, and that is the reason why legal Rights and Titles are not to be a rule and measure of our Obedience to Princes, who are possessed of the Throne. But is this a reason to reject the Directions of Scripture too because some men will dispute the plainest Texts. Now saith the Dr. This hath nothing else but Scepticism or Infallibility at the bottom; yes by all means, To say that the Doctor's sense is not clear because no learned man espoused it but himself, or to say that a little private Opinion, set on foot for the basest purposes within our memory, is not so clear as the concurrent judgement of all learned men; This, it seems, has nothing but Scepticism or Infallibility at the bottom. And this a man gets by dealing modestly with some men. Had I said the Doctor's Exposition had been absurd and ridiculous, contrary to the sense of all the learned, all would have been well, and the Dr. must have proved the contrary as well as he could; but when I only say it is not clear for the same reason, This is Scepticism and Infallibility, and I cannot tell what. And see how finely he expresses it. Is this a reason to reject the directions of Scripture, because some men will dispute the plainest Texts? And who I pray are these some men? Why (to confine ourselves within our memories) Archbishop Ferne, Bishop Sanderson, Dr. Hammond, and all the rest of the loyal Sufferers for King Charles the First and Second. And if I may have leave to add a later instance, a little while ago Dr. Sherlock himself. These were the men that in this point disputed the plainest Texts. And who are the other some? Why Dr. Goodwin, Mr. Dury, Mr. Sanders, and all the Advocates for the Rump and for Cromwell; and after these Dr. Sherlock: a very fair Account! and the Scepticism and Infallibility is as plain as can be.  
But after all my Argument is not touched, 
Postscript, p. 11.  which is, That the Laws of the Land are the Rule of Conscience if they do not contradict the Laws of God. Now if the Laws of the Land be clear in the case, and if it be not as evident there is such a Law of God which contradicts these Laws,  Conscience would soon determine, that we were bound to follow that which is certain and plain, rather than that which is not so.  
Now the Dr. tells me, if I will give him leave to be sure of any thing, he is pretty sure, there is such a Law of God; that be to himself, it is not matter of dispute. But that the sense he gives of these Texts is not so plain, is evident to a demonstration. And I think the concurrent Judgement of all learned men against it, is a sufficient proof of it; but they are but some ●en, and the Dr. will not admit them, because it runs men into Scepticism and Infallibility; but I hope he will not except against himself. He tells us, He had some of these thoughts long since; 
Pref. to the Case of All.  but stick he did, and could find no help for it; and there he had stuck had it ●ot been for Bishop Overal 's Convocation book; what, and the Text so very plain in the case? How could there be such mighty hesitancy and doubt, and such great difficulty about a plain; Text? Cannot a man of the D●ctor's Character, by study and consideration (for he tells us, he put his thoughts in writing) understand the plainest Texts? And I hope (out of respect to the Dr.) a man may say this is no great evidence of their plainness. I suppose the Dr. acted with sincerity in his Inquities, and added reasonable diligence and industry, and yet after all he stuck, and was not clear in the point; and in such a case to talk of some men disputing the plainest Texts (when they do but stick as he did) is mere swaggering and turns upon him: for if the Texts be so very plain, how came it that he himself enquiring sincerely and diligently and using all just means for information could not understand them? if they are not so plain, how come their plainness to be an Argument? for upon this very point my Answer turns, which the Dr. takes no notice of. And I shall now leave it with him. The Laws of the Land are the Rule of Conscience if they do not contradict the Laws of God, (and this according to the Dr.) Now if the Laws of the Land be clear in the Case, and if it be not as evident there is such a Law of God which contradicts these Laws, than unbyass'd Conscience would soon determine, that we are bound to follow that which i● evident and plain rather than that which is not so.  
We come now to the Doctor's Testimonies out of Scripture; and first from the Old Testament, 
Vindic. p. 50.  That God giveth Kingdoms to whomsoever he will, that he removeth Kings, and setteth up Kings, Dan. 17.2.21.37. Now (saith the Dr.) the whole of his Answer is, That Usurpers are no Kings, and therefore though God removes and sets up Kings, he does not set up Usurpers; and the whole of his proof is, that Athaliah was an Usurper and no Queen. Now the Dr. who talks so much about the honesty of altering his Order, should himself one would think, have dealt more justly, and not have mentioned only part of my Answer, and in downright terms affirmed it was the whole. Now my Answer was this, 
Postscript p. 12.  These (the Expressions of the Prophet Daniel) are certainly true but nothing to his purpose, for God did always set up and remove Kings; but this was no evidence that God would have Usurpers obeyed as Kings, as is evident in the case of Athaliah. And God did as much remove and set up Kings in the Kingdom of Judah as in any other Kingdom; and therefore it cannot from these Expressions be necessarily concluded, That every person that gets possession of the Throne is a King, and aught to have the duties belonging to a King paid to him. And is this no more than saying an Usurper is no King? or need the Dr. be told wherein the force of this Answer lies? which is, That these Expressions are no Evidence that every person possessed of the Throne is a King, or that God would have them obeyed as Kings: and that is not (as the Dr. is pleased to say) only that an Usurper is no King, but that which the Dr. citys to prove his Hypothesis, does not prove it, and the reason of that is, for that the Prophet Daniel delivers a general Doctrine not peculiar to Times and Seasons, or Countries, but what was always so, and God gives Kingdoms to whomsoever he will, and removeth and setteth up Kings in all Ages and Places, and particularly in the Kingdom of Judah as well as any other Kingdom. Now if this general Doctrine did not prove that God had given the Kingdom of Judah to every one that possessed the Throne and took it away from him that was dispossessed, if it did not prove in particular, that God had given it to Athaliah and took it away from Joash, than it is as clear as the Sun, that it cannot necessarily be concluded from this passage in Daniel, that Possession of the Throne is an evidence that God gives, and Dispossession an evidence that God takes away the Kingdom; for God gave Kingdoms, removed and set up Kings, as much with respect to the Kingdom of Judah as to any other Country. But this it seems is no Answer, and yet: however it comes to pass) it answers all that the Dr. hath replied, as we shall see presently. Well but I said that Usurpers were no Kings; I did so, and I thought I had given a good reason for it, and that is, That all learned men deny that an Usurper is a King. But that it seems is no Reason with the Dr. Let all learned men, or all the world say what they will, if it does not serve the Doctor's tu●n it is Nonsense. For that is his whole proof that an Usurper is a King. To say (saith he) that a King without a legal ●itle, or an Usurper who has a settled possession (in the Doctor's sense of a Settlement) of the Regal Power is no King, is Nonsense; yes just as much Nonsense as to say that a Man who cohabits with a Woman, and is not lawfully married, is not her Husband. For (saith he) Regal Power and Authority makes a King, as S. Austin Regnum à Regibus, Reges à Regendo. Certainly proofs are mighty scarce when scraps of Poets and the derivation of Words are brought for proofs, Doctor à docende, and therefore every man that teaches is a Doctor. And yet S. Austin must be quoted for this too, and the Book and Chapter punctually on the Margin. He might as well have cited Calepin or Robert Stephens, and their Authority in such casuistical points as these, would have been a little more than S. Austin's: however he goes on, and tells us it is certain, i. e. the Dr. confidently affirms it, though he does not prove it, that he who has the exercise of the Regal Power and Authority is King whether we will call him so or no; and he is no King who has no Regal Power, whatever his Title be. i e. Cromwell was a King, though he was not called so; and King Charles the Second, the first twelve years of his Reign, was no King, though he was called so. And this makes our Laws Nonsense with a witness, which own him as King all the time of the Usurpation; and yet the Dr. adds, If this be not so (i. e. his proposition before) our Laws are Nonsense, which distinguish between a King de jure and de facto, if a King de facto be no King, ●ho it signifies one who is actually King. Now this is Sophistry, and it lies in the Ambiguity of the Expression, a King de facto signifies one that is actually King; but if it be spoken in opposition to a K. de jure, than it signifies one that is in the place of King, but is in truth no King; and a King de facto in that sense is no more a King than a Counterfeit is the real thing itself, because it is called by the same name. And the Law itself, 
1 Edw. 4. cap. 1.  where this distinction is made, plainly expounds what is meant by a King de facto by calling the same Persons most commonly pretenced Kings, i. e. Persons who had that name, but in reality were no Kings at all: And a pretenced King is no more a King than a Hypocrite is a Christian, he is one in name and show, but in reality no such thing. Although I believe there is some difference between a King de facto and a mere Usurper, as there is a difference between administering the Government sub ratione juris, and without any pretence of Right at all. But I shall not engage in this Controversy, the Dr. already being so well answered by a learned pen.  
But (saith he) What sense does this make of what the Prophet Daniel says, that God changeth Times and Seasons, removeth Kings and setteth up Kings. By Kings here, according to our Author, the Prophet means, not Usurpers but rightful and lawful Kings. And then the meaning is, that God pulleth down rightful Kings, and setteth up rightful Kings. Now as for setting up rightful Kings, our Author likes it very well, but how does be like pulling down rightful Kings, which is as much against Law and Right, as to set up Kings without Right? and that it seems he does. Very well, and so he does; and does this contradict any thing that I have asserted? God removed Saul and set up David; he removed Joram and set up Jehu; he removed Jehoiakim and set up Nabuchadnezzar and all rightful Kings: and where is the harm or absurdity of this? The Dr. says, that to reconcile it to our Author's Hypothesis, the removed King must signify an Usurper; and the King set up, a Rightful and Legal King. Now if the Dr. can make this out from my Hypothesis, I will give him the Cause. He tells me, He doubts not, but our Author would be ashamed to say this. And he is in the right: I should be ashamed to say that, and a great many other things too: but it seems he is not ashamed to charge that upon my Hypothesis, which is a direct contradiction to it. My Hypothesis, as he repeats it, and disputes against it, is, that an Usurper is no King; and therefore the Removing a King, cannot, according to that Hypothesis, signify the Removing an Usurper, but of a Rightful King, i. e. a true King, not a pretended one: but then I think it follows, that the setting up of Kings, must signify the setting up of true Kings likewise, and not Usurpers, who are not Kings. And this I do insist upon (and it is not a strife about words) and let the Dr. prove if he can, that an Usurper is a King, either in the sense of Scripture, or in any good Author, or by the general consent of mankind. And if he cannot, then for him to interpret what the Scripture says of Kings, in favour of Usurpers, is purely arbitrary; and he may as well apply the Directions and Precepts of Scripture concerning Husbands, to him that commits a Rape; For an Usurper is no more a King, than a Ravisher is a Husband. And here is the plain state of the Case, The Scripture asserts (and if the Scripture had been silent, the Doctrine of Providence sufficiently evidences) that God removes Kings, and sets up Kings. And this proves, that what Kings are removed, they are removed by God, and what Kings are set up, they are set up by God: But this does not prove that those are Kings, which are not Kings, or that Usurpers are within the intention of those words, or that every Providential Dispossession, is God's unmaking a King, or every Providential Possession of the Throne, is God's making a King; for this was manifestly otherwise in the Case of David and Absalon, Joash and Athaliah, and if the Dr. please, in the Case of King Charles the Second and Cromwell. And ●his Answer the Dr. had before, if he would but have minded it. However when Persons have Possession of the Throne, 
Postscript, p. 12.  who have a Legal Title, either by Descent, or other Acquisition, and who are Kings by the consent of all mankind, it is plain that God sets them up: And it cannot necessarily be concluded, that any more is meant by God's setting up Kings; and if it cannot necessarily be concluded, then there is not from thence any sufficient warrant to call every Usurper God's King, and to pay Duties to them accordingly.  
But (saith he) this is evidently the Prophet's meaning, to attribute all the Changes and Revolutions of Government, not to Chance or Fate, but to the Divine Providence: Well, this is true enough, whether the Prophet meant it or no. The Dr. adds, That whenever we see one King removed, and another set up, whoever they be, they are removed and set up by God. And this is true enough, as the words lie; but in the Drs. sense it is manifestly false; for the people saw David removed, and it was by God also; but God by that Removal, did not give away his Kingdom; they saw Absolom set up too, and this also (in a sense) was by God, but God by that setting up, did not make him a King, and give him the Kingdom. But (saith he) who (God) ruleth in the Kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will. Does whomsoever signify those only, who have a Legal Right? Does giving, suppose an antecedent right in him, to whom it is given? Does giving it to whomsoever he will, signify giving it only to those, whom the Laws give it? Do we use to say, a man may give his Estate to whom he will, when his Estate is entailed, and he cannot alienate it from the Right Heir? we should think this a very absurd way of speaking among men? and yet thus our Author must expound God's giving a Kingdom to whomsoever he will, to signify his giving the Kingdom to the Right Heir. Now here are as many Sophisms, as there are lines: and first of all, I do readily acknowledge, that whomsoever does not signify those only who have a Legal Right; but the fallacy is evident: for God gives all the World, as well as Crowns, to whomsoever he will. But for all that, no body hath a right to private Estates but by the Laws of the Land. And it would be a fine Plea, in Westminster-Hall, to argue upon God's Donation by Providence; Another man hath a Legal Title, but God gives the World to whomsoever he will; and though he hath no Legal Title, what then? Does whomsoever, signify those only who have a Legal Title? Thus likewise giving, in the notion of it, does not suppose an antecedent Right, but with respect to God's giving, and a Right by Humane Laws it does: for God gives Property to them, who have such a Right; and he does not give it them who have no such Right, though they may possess it by fraud and injustice. But here the fallacy lies in dividing what ought not to be divided: for what is given by just Laws, God gives; and the antecedent Right is the Gift of God; and what God gives by Laws, which he hath made a Rule, is not to be defeated by Providence, which he hath not made a Rule. He asks again, Does giving to whomsoever he will, signify giving it only to those to whom the Law gives it? I answer no; it does not signify so; neither does it signify Possession only. But this I can tell him, it signifies every jot as much so in Kingdoms and Governments, as it does in private Possessions and Estates. And the Proposition in Scripture is as universal, that God gives every thing, all the Profits, Honours, etc. in the World, to whomsoever he will: or if it was not in Scripture, it is a Doctrine plain enough; and every man that owns Providence must own it. And it is a pure consequence, that every man who is unjustly possessed of an Estate, hath a Divine Right to it, though not a Legal one; because forsooth giving it to whomsoever he will, does not signify, giving it only to those to whom the Law gives it. It is in vain here for the Dr. to answer as he does often in his Vindication, 
Vindic. p. 58.  That those matters are referred to the Redress of public Laws; but these God reserves to his own cognizance and disposal. For the Question here, is about the importance and signification of these Expressions. And here his Questions turn upon him; Does whomsoever, signify those only, who are redressed by Public Laws? Does giving signify only a Sentence of a Judge, or the Verdict of a Jury? Does giving to whomsoever he will, signify giving it only to those, to whom the Law gives it? And if they do signify so, than his Questions are vain; if they do not, than his Argument is vain, and there is nothing to be concluded from these Expressions for the Drs. purpose: for they are equally affirmed in Scripture, and equally true of private Estates, as of Governments. The Expression is the same, and the Latitude is the same in both Cases: He that gives Crowns, and that gives Estates to whomsoever he will, equally gives them to whomsoever he will. And what difference soever there is between Thrones and private Estates, between matters above Humane Tribunals, and such as are subject to them, there is none at all in giving them to whomsoever he will. And if it be a good Argument for Possession against Legal Right, that God gives to whomsoever he will, then 'tis likewise a good Argument in all cases: for God gives to whomsoever he will in one case, as well as the other. And whomsoever and giving; and giving to whomsoever God will, signify the very same in both cases; whomsoever no more signifies those who have a Legal Right, nor giving, an antecedent Right in him to whom it is given, nor giving to whomsoever he will, giving it only to those to whom the Law gives it, with respect to private Estates, than it does to Governments. And if it cannot be concluded from such a signification, that a wrongful possession against Law, is God's gift, and aught to be owned as such, the Drs. Argument from such a signification, is trifling and fallacious. And that is the only thing in question. And the truth is, such kind of Arguments prove nothing. For the Proposition in general, that God gives Kingdoms, and that he gives Riches and private Estates to whomsoever he will, is denied by no body that believes a God and Providence. And that is not the Question; but the Question is, whether a Providential Possession against Legal Right, be a suffient Evidence of That Will? And that it cannot be concluded from those general Expressions, nor from the Doctrine of Providence, is plain enough from the instance before: and this shows, how unsuitable the Case is which he brings for a Parallel, Do we use to say a man may give his Estate to whom he will, when his Estate is entay'ld, and he cannot alienate it from the Right Heir? I say no: We do not use to say so, because it is none of his to give. But this we use to say, that if any man has an Estate of his own to give, he must evidently give it, before the Person to whom he gives it, can have a good Title to it: And if he that claims by such Gift, has no other Evidence but Possession, I doubt that will be no bar to the Heir at Law. And it would be a Ridiculous Plea for such a Possessor, to say that he that owned the Estate, might give it to whomsoever he would. And whomsoever did not signify the Heir at Law; nor did giving to whomsoever he would, signify giving it only to those, to whom the Law gives it. And if the Dr will give me leave to use his own Expressions, Thus the Dr. expounds God's giving Kingdoms to whomsoever he will. And after a train of such wretched fallacies, the Dr. concludes with this Magisterial Rant, He may if he please, call this expounding Scripture; but I doubt every body else will give it to some other name; and I hope he himself upon second thoughts will be ashamed of it. Now I do not know what the Dr. will be ashamed of: but if Sophistical Arguments, especially if they relate to the interpretation of Scripture, be matter of shame, I shall leave it with him, who has the most occasion to be ashamed.  
But (saith he) it is more absurd still, if we apply it to the occasion, viz. those great Revolutions and Changes of Empires, which the Prophet foretold, and which he attributes to God: And where is this great absurdity? Why saith he, when Kingdoms and Empires are overturned by violence, it is nonsense to talk of God's setting up only Rightful Kings, not Usurpers. Yes, by all means; To say that Nabuchadnezzar was a Rightful King, is nonsense. And to say that the Romans were Rightful Governors, is nonsense; and the Convocation speak nonsense, 
Convoc. p. 82.  when they expressly affirm it. To say that forceable and violent Beginnings, may afterwards acquire a Right, is nonsense. These it seems are such things which no body can understand, and they plainly contradict the Reason of Mankind. Now I grant, that nonsense is an absurdity; but I think 'tis absurd likewise, to charge any Proposition with nonsense, and not be able to make it out. But (saith he) Kingdoms are not transferred, nor Kings removed, nor set up by Law: And therefore when the Prophet tells us with respect to such violent Revolutions, that God changes times and seasons, that he removeth and setteth up Kings, an ingenious man must be hard put to it to say, this is not meant of Usurpers, but of Rightful and Legal Kings. And why so I pray? Is it so very hard to conceive, how violent Revolutions, may end in a Legal Right, and become Just Governments? Or is there any necessity from the violence of the Revolution, to conclude, that a Prince settled in the Throne upon such a Revolution, could not have acquired such a Right? This is plainly false in fact: The Revolution in Judaea by Nabuchadnezzar, was as violent as any, and yet he had acquired a Right to the Government of it, by the Submission of the Legal Prince, as well as by God's express Will: And this is the first instance that these words of Daniel refer to; and the same is to be said of all the rest of the Governments within the Compass of that Prophetical Interpretation. And therefore the violence of the Revolution, is no Argument for the Unrightfulness of the Government. And though the Prophet tells us, with respect to such violent Revolutions, that God removes and sets up Kings, it can never from thence be concluded, that by setting up Kings, is meant Usurpers; because in the very Case to which the words refer, those Kings were not Usurpers: And because the nature of the thing does not imply it: for a Revolution may be violent, and yet the Government settled upon it, be Legal and Rightful, and not Usurpation. And this I take to be the state of the Case: Revolutions are not made by Laws, but through Settlements are: and it is not a Revolution, but a thorough Settlement, that distinguishes between an Usurper, and a Rightful King; or if the Dr. please, between a King and no King. He that in a violent Revolution, as violently possesses himself of the Throne, and hath no more Right to it after, than before, is an Usurper, and no King; but he that afterwards acquires a Right, is a King, and no Usurper. The Dr. differs as to the notion of a Settlement; but the inference, even with respect to his own notion, is the same: for he owns, that it is not a duty to obey a Person in Possession of the Throne, till he is thoroughly settled (in his sense). And that is, till then, he is no King; for he is a King of Clouts, whom no body is bound to obey; so that either way it is not God's setting up, or setting upon the Throne, that denominates a King, but that joined with other Circumstances, and the Question between us is, Whether that is the Consent of the States and People, or the Acquisition of Right.  
The Dr. says, If I will allow the dispossessed Kings to be Legal Kings, he wonders how I should fancy, that those Kings who dispossess the Rightful Kings, and place themselves in their Thrones, should in my sense be Legal and Rightful Kings too. And yet I had told him how, as plain as I could speak, by the Death or Session of those dispossessed Kings. And the Dr. if he please, may wonder still; but it had been as well, if he had answered it.  
I now come to his Testimony from the New Testament, Rom. 13.1, 2. Let every Soul be subject to the Higher Powers; 
Vindic. p. 52.  for all power is of God, etc. To this I said, that by Powers, the Dr. understands Usurped as well as Lawful Powers. 
Postscr. p. 12.  And his Reason is, because the Scripture makes no distinction between Kings and Usurpers. And to these, the Dr. adds those words he had mentioned in his Case of Allegiance (between Kings whom we must, and whom we must not obey): And then tells me, these last words I conceal, because they spoil all my Argument. And if they do so, I will confess it was ill done to conceal them: But if they do not, 'tis humoursome and captious to complain of it. And let us see his Reason; For (saith he) he adds, I thought the Case of Athaliah had been a Distinction, and had this precept been given in those days, I wonder whether any body would have doubted of whom it ought to be understood, of Athaliah, or Joash. Very well, this was my Argument; but how comes this to be spoiled by those last words? That I cannot tell; and it may be, the Dr. will tell me in his next. But at present he replies, There was a distinction between Athaliah and Joash, that she was an Usurper, and he a Rightful King: and the Dr. makes a Distinction, between an Usurper, and a Rightful King, with respect to their Usurpation and their Right: But (saith he) this I say, the Scripture makes no distinction between a Rightful King and an Usurper, with respect to the obedience of Subjects, while they are settled in the Throne. No! What does he think of setting up Joash when out of possession; and deposing Athaliah, when in possession? This I think is a distinction between a Rightful King and an Usurper, with respect to the obedience of Subjects. And, with the Drs. leave, I am apt to believe, that Killing on the one hand, and Crowning and Allegiance on the other hand, is a considerable distinction in that respect. What follows that in reference to this, the Case of Athaliah is no Example of such a distinction, because the Jews might and did lawfully submit to her, and that she was afterwards deposed, was owing to the Divine Entail. This hath been urged, and answered before, and it is not at all to the Drs. purpose now. For the Question here is only, whether there be such a distinction in Scripture, with respect to the Subject's Obedience. And if the setting up Joash, and the deposing and slaying Athaliah, be not a Distinction, there is no such thing as a Distinction in the World. The Dr. adds, Had this Law been given to the Jews at that time, while Joash was concealed, it must have been expounded of Athaliah, who had possession of the Throne, when Joash was known and anointed, it must have been expounded of him, as having a Divine Right to the Throne of Judah. That is to say, this Law would have been expounded of the Usurper, if there be no Right Heir, or none known; but when the Right Heir is known, it is to be interpreted of him, and not of the Usurper. As if any body could think this Law would have been expounded of Joash, if he had not been living, or had not been thought to have been living. But what I pray has this Concealment to do in the matter? The Distinction is not between the Concealment of the one, and the Possession of the other, but between Right and Usurpation, and both visible: between Joash out of Possession, and Athaliah in Possession of the Throne. And here is the Question, of whom ought this Precept to be understood, of Athaliah or Joash? if of Athaliah, than she was ordained of God, and to resist her, had been to receive Damnation, which was plainly false; for she was resisted and killed, and both justified: Besides, if it was to be understood of her, than it could not be understood of Joash; for it cannot be interpreted of Two Competitors. But if it must be understood of Joash, than a Rightful Prince out of Possession, is the Higher Powers in the sense of this Text, and an Usurper in Possession, is not. And then the whole Reason of the Drs. Argument fails, than the Powers that be, may be the Rightful Powers out of Possession, in the intention, and according to the direction of that Text. And then there is a Distinction in Scripture between Kings whom we must obey, and Usurpers (the Dr. calls them Kings) whom we must not obey; which is the thing to be proved.  
I proceeded, But (saith the Dr.) if the Apostle had intended such a Distinction, he ought to have said it in express words, and why so I pray? The Dr. replies, I gave him a reason for it, which he is pleased to conceal, why should we think the Apostle here intends a distinction unknown in Scripture? But sure I did not conceal this, for I had spoken to it just before, as much as I thought needful; and I did not see any reason to repeat it again. The Dr. adds, he said, had there been any such Rule before given to submit to lawful Powers, but not to submit to Usurpers, there had been some pretence of understanding St. Paul's all power, of all Legal Power; but there being nothing like this any where else in Scripture? If he had intended any such distinction, he ought to have said it in express words, or else no body could reasonably have understood him to intent this Precept of Subjection to the higher powers, only of Powers that had a Legal Right. Now I cannot tell why the Dr. should say I concealed this, for I answered it, and that I think is not concealing it. I had said are there not general Rules about right and wrong, which extend to all Cases and Persons? And if they extend to all Cases and Persons, than there are Rules in Scripture about the Right and Wrong of Government, and about Legal and Usurped Powers, and so I meant it, and could mean nothing: and so that if the Dr. had any Reason to disprove this he had no Reason to say, 
Vindic. p. 53.  This I thought a very good Reason, and did not expect to have been asked for more, till they had been answered: for that is a very good answer to it, as we shall see presently.  
He goes on, But (saith our Author) does not the nature of the thing sufficiently distinguish it? He replies, the nature of the thing distinguishes between a Legal King, and an Usurper; but the nature of the thing does not prove, that usurped powers are not the higher powers, and ought not to be obeyed, but I think proves the quite contrary: that is to say, the nature of the thing distinguishes between who has, and who has not a Right to the Government. And that I think is sufficient to distinguish between who are, and who are not the Higher Powers. And it had been superfluous to distinguish in express terms, what is employed in the very Precept; as the Precept to obey Parents, Husbands, Masters, do not expressly distinguish between those which are, and those which are not so; for 'tis always employed, and an express distinction is needless. And there is no Rule in Scripture given, to submit to lawful, and not unlawful Husbands, and Masters, any more than there is to submit to lawful and not unlawful Governors. But I think for all that, no body questions of whom the Precept is intended; or that those that are the lawful, are those only that are meant, although there be no express distinction excluding the unlawful from any share or partnership in it. But the truth is, that is always employed, and such cases are under the direction of general Rules: And therefore I said, Are there not general Rules about Right and Wrong, 
Postscript, p 12.  which extend to all Persons and Cases? By which I meant, that the Rights and Wrongs that respect Government, are under the direction of those Rules, as much as the Rights and Wrongs that concern Private Property. He that unjustly possesses another man's Throne, is as much an unjust Possessor, as much bound to Restitution; and men are as much bound not to partake with him, and become party's to his injustice, nor to support and abet it against Right, by virtue of these general Rules, as they are the same in private Cases He that abets an unjust Possessor of the Throne, is as much Particeps criminis as he that abets an unjust Possessor of any other man's estate. And now let us hear his reply, Yes (saith he) there are (such general Rules) such is the Apostle's Rule in this Chapter, to give to every one their due: But then the Question returns what is their due? Before I consider his Answer, I shall crave leave to give him this Answer to his Question, Possession of the Throne is their due. And this I think can never be denied by a man that owns the dispossessed Prince hath still a Legal Right, by virtue of which he may recover his Throne if he can; and if he hath a Right to it, than it is due to him: And I would fain know how engaging, and endeavouring all we can, and swearing to keep him from his Right, be a compliance with this Precept to give to every man his due. The Dr. hath a subtle Distinction between a Right to the Government, and a Right to Allegiance, which I shall consider presently, but if it was granted him, it will not evade the force of this Argument; for suppose the Possessor of the Throne had a Right to Allegiance, and the dispossessed Prince a Right to the Government; how comes Allegiance to warrant an Act of injustice, to pray and fight, and do all we can, against a manifest Right, and which we know to be so. If he ought to have the Government, 
Case of Alleg. p.  as the Dr. expresses it, he ought to be King but is not, then 'tis injustice to keep him from it; for no man ought to have what can justly be kept from him. And then I would fain know by what Rules of Conscience, Allegiance (if it were due) can justify our acting against a moral Law. For if obedience be not his Right, the Crown is, and obedience to the most Rightful Prince in the World will not excuse our aiding and assisting him, in the unrighteous taking or keeping another man's Estate, if it be notorious and manifest.  
We come now to the Drs. Answer to this Question, What is their due? whether Subjection and Obedience be not due to the Prince, who governs, not to the Prince who does not, and cannot govern, whatever his Legal Right to the Government be? And to this he says, because the controversy turns on it he shall particularly consider it. The Arguments he says is this, He who by the Laws of the Land has a Right to the Crown, has a Right to our Allegiance; and whether he be in or out of Possession to own any other King, and to submit and pay Allegiance to any other, though actually possessed of, and settled in the Throne, is a great injustice to our natural Prince, and a violation of that precept to give to every one their due. To this the Dr. Answers, Here are two things to be considered, 1. The Right to the Crown. 2. The Right to Allegiance.  
As for the first the substance of his Answer is, The fundamental prejudice and mistake, seems to be, the making no difference between a Legal Right to the Crown, and a Legal Right of Subjects to their Estates; but the Dr. apprehends a great difference, that in settling an Estate, nothing more is required but a mere Humane Right, but to make a Legal King, besides an Humane Right to the Crown he must have God's Authority: Nothing but a Legal Descent and Possession gives Right to a Legal Estate; and therefore the Law must have its effect: And is the only adequate Rule of right and wrong in such Cases; and though the Providence of God allots men's private fortunes, yet he gives no man a right to an Estate which he gets by fraud, nor exempts them from Legal punishments, but leaves all such mere Legal Rights, under the general influence of Providence, to the care of Public Government. But if a mere Humane Right cannot make a King, but God's Authority makes a King; if God reserves this Authority in his own hands, and does not inseparably annex it to Humane Entails of the Crown, if God's Authority without a Humane Right can make a King, but Humane Laws cannot make a King without God's Authority; this may satisfy us, that when God thinks fit to interpose his Authority, a mere Legal Right is not sufficient Reason to adhere to a Prince God has removed from the Throne; nor the want of a Legal Right, sufficient reason to disown a Prince, whom God has set upon the Throne. Now here is some variety of expression, but very little new matter but what the Dr. had said, and what is answered before; but he hath a peculiar delight in repeating his Answers over and over; but I hope I may be excused if I do not follow him in that. And therefore as to the difference in the Events of providence, with respect to Government and private Estates; and as to God's reserving his Authority in his own hands, and his interposing by providence: I shall refer the Reader to the Answers I gave before to them; at present this Answer is sufficient: That the Law, and not Providence, is the adequate Rule of right and wrong with respect to Governors, as well as with respect to the Possessors of private Estates, and the Law ought to have its effect in one case, as well as the other; and I would feign know how providence comes to be a Rule of right and wrong in any case, or what sense the Dr. can make of such a proposition? 'tis mere trifling and fallacious to say, that to make a Legal King, besides a Humane Right to the Crown, he must have God's Authority. And what then? therefore he that has Possession and no Legal Right has God's Authority? This is a wild consequence; He that is Master of the Temple hath a Legal Right to it, but besides that Right he must have God's Authority to preach and administer the Sacraments; and therefore whosoever by Intrusion and Usurpation Preaches and Administers the Sacraments there, is Master of the Temple. The Dr. knows well enough, that we have no controversy with him about God's Authority; but about the Communication of it, whether this Authority be communicated by the Events of providence (the methods and intentions of which are unsearchable) or by fixed and stated Rules, allowed and commanded by God himself to be observed; or whether the Subject in whom this Authority resides, be him that has a Legal Right to the Government, or him that has no Right; so that it is not at all to his purpose to prove, that a Legal King must have God's Authority, or that God's Authority makes Kings; for no body doubts of that, but the Question is, whether the Authority of God be annexed to the Legal Right, or to the Events of providence. He says, God does not inseparably annex his Authority to Humane Entails. Right, but then he does annex it, though not inseparably, and no body can separate it but himself, and the Question is, whether a mere eventual Possession be such a separation; God does not inseparably annex property to Legal Right, but may dispose of it by his own Sovereign Will and Council; He gave the Egyptians goods to the Israelites, as well as Jorams Crown to Jehu. And therefore the fundamental mistake the Dr. speaks of, of making no difference between a Legal Right to the Crown, and a Legal Right of Subjects to their Estates is no mistake at all; for there is no difference with respect to God's Sovereign Will, no difference with respect to providence, which is the main Question. Well, but for settling an Estate, nothing more is required but a mere Humane Right: But to make a Legal King, besides an Humane Right to the Crown, he must have God's Authority; by settling an Estate, the Dr. means a Right to it; otherwise it is not to the purpose, which is concerning a difference between Legal Right to the Crown, and a Legal Right to private Estates; as he says afterwards, nothing but a Legal descent, and a Legal Possession gives Right to a Legal Estate. And this is his own mistake, for God is Proprietor of all the World; and all the World is his as well as Authority, and no man can have a Right to any part of it, but as that Right is derived to him from God, mere Humane Right, or mere Humane Law, gives no more Right to a private Estate, than it does to Authority; for all is Gods, and it is not the peculiar Case of Authority, but every thing else passes by delegation and commission from him; no man hath a Right to his Estate or Goods, and no man hath a Right to Authority but what God gives. But the only Question is, how these Rights are conveyed; and that is by the respective Laws of each Country, he that hath a Right by Law, hath a Right from God, and he that hath not a Right by Law hath no Right from God: The Laws as authorized and appointed by him, are the Channels whereby this Right is conveyed; and he that possesses himself any other way, makes a property to himself, but he hath no Right to it, and God does not give it him: This therefore is not (as the Dr. talks) confining God, but observing the Rules and Methods he himself hath warranted and directed. There are indeed some Cases, wherein the Law makes a Property, and God does not; but this is quite contrary to the Drs. Hypothesis and confutes it: And that is, when by fraud and injustice and corrupt means, men gain Estates; they may have a Title in Law to their unjust acquisitions, but they hold them by Usurpation, and have no Right to them with respect to God, and are bound to restore them, which is a Demonstration they have no Right to them, nor hath God given them, though he permits them by his providence to possess themselves of them. And this plain and undeniable Doctrine, sits hard upon more principles than one of the Drs. And from thence it plainly follow, he that attains any thing by unjust and wicked arts, hath no Right to it in respect of God, whatsoever he may sometimes have in respect of Men; and if he that unjustly gains a shilling is so far an Usurper, and hath for that reason no Right to it from God, than he that by as bad or worse arts Usurps a Throne, has likewise no Right to it in respect of God: And this directly contradicts the fundamental Doctrine of the Drs. Books.  
But perhaps the Dr. may like this better in his own words, and he may find them in his Discourse of Religious Assemblies (p. 85.) There is a vast difference between God's permitting the prosperity of bad men, and that constant providence which watches over good men; bad men may advance themselves by injustice, oppression, and perjury, but they are not advanced by the blessing, but by the permission of God, for God never blesses any wicked arts; and therefore such men's prosperity is very uncertain, and as tottering as the Thrones of Usurpers; for though they have a good Title with respect to men, yet they are but Usurpers, with respect to God, and therefore are tumbled down at his pleasure.; Now this I take to be very good Doctrine, and the Dr. hath not formally renounced it, but he hath inverted the Argument, and set it with the heels upward; and Now those that by the most wicked and unjust arts are Usurpers with respect to men, have a Divine Right and a good Title with respect to God, which is such a way of God's giving Right, and men receiving a Right from him, that no Casuist in the World ever dreamt of before.  
2. As for the Right to Allegiance, The Dr. tells us, it was the great design of his book to prove, that Allegiance was not immediately due to a Legal Right to the Crown, but to Government, that therefore he denies a Prince who has the Legal Right, no Right which he can justly claim, who denies Alleg. to him, when he is out of the Throne. And (saith he) methinks our Author should have answered all that I said upon this Argument, before he had so dogmatically told us, that the general Rules about right and wrong, which extend to all Persons and Cases, made it needless, for St Paul to have told us, that by the higher Powers, and the Powers that are, he meant only Legal Powers. Now I thought I had answered his Argument from providence, and which also till now the Dr. tells me otherwise, I took to be the great design of his book; and his Argument, that Government and Allegiance are Relatives was not quite neglected, and the Dr. sound it so; and what is it that I have not answered upon this argument? why as he now repeats it, That Allegiance is not due to Legal Right but to Government, etc. Now I have proved over and over, that Allegiance is due only to the Legal Prince; that it is not due to an Usurper, who actually administers the Government, but to the Legal Prince when he does not actually administer it. And that I think is answering it; but some men complain for want of answers, when they have more already than they can tell what to do with. But the Dr. is sure the Reason of things does not prove the contrary: For when the Allegiance and Obedience of Subjects, is a duty only for the sake of Government, for the ease and safety of it, it is very strange, that it should not be due to a settled Government, but due to a Prince, who does not, and cannot govern; cannot govern? who hinders him? why, as the Dr. puts the Case, the Usurper and his Confederates; and that is an argument that they own him no Allegiance; just as Cromwell and his accomplices first disabled the King, and then cried they owed him no Allegiance, because he could not protect them. But Allegiance is for the sake of Government, and therefore whoever actually governs (let him be who he will) hath a Right to Allegiance; but first, arguments drawn from the sake and end of things to prove the transferring of Rights and Duties are absurd and inconsequent; Marriage is for the sake of Conjugal Society; and if a Husband is imprisoned or under force, so as he cannot keep his Wife company; it is very strange, that she should not be a Wife to him that does keep her company, and not to him, who neither does nor can; and just such another argument, is the Drs. from the sake of Government: But the Truth is Allegiance, is not due to Government, nor is it for the sake of Government, but it is due and owing to the Person of the Prince, by the Laws of God and Man; and therefore follows his Person, whether in or out of Possession. But let us put the Argument into the terms of the Question, and instead of Government put Usurpation, and then see what the Reason of things prove, and then I think it is plain enough, that the Allegiance and Obedience of Subjects, is not a duty only or at all for the sake of Usurpation, nor were they ever intended for the ease and safety of Usurpation, but the contrary, what is a duty for the sake and safety of the Legal Government, is for the prevention and destruction of Usurpation: And it is somewhat extraordinary to say that was for the sake of Usurpation, which was designed to prevent it.  
The Dr. proceeds, if I may have liberty to dispute with this Author upon his own Principles, 
Vindic. p. 56.  I desire to know of him, whether Allegiance be due to any Prince upon any other account, than his being invested with God's Authority? Let him say it at the utmost peril of his Cause. Now I confess I am not very fond of giving up my Cause gratis, except the Dr. could give me some better reasons for it; yet because the Dr. threatens, and he intimates, 
P. 65.  that I am no very cool man, and so may be apt to be provoked; this I will say, and let him make his best of it; That Allegiance is due to the Prince upon the account or by the obligation of Humane Law: Now this is either another account or the very same; if another account, than the Drs huffing Question means nothing, and there is no peril in saying so, if the very same, then Humane Law in this Case is God's Authority, and God's Authority is derived by Humane Law, and then his Arguments mean nothing. And this Answers his following Questions, How then does God invest any Prince with his Authority of Government, whom he does not immediately nominate as in the Kingdom of Judah? why truly just as he invests a man with a property to any of his Goods or Estate, even by Law and Common Right. But saith he, it must be either by annexing his Authority to the Legal Office, or by placing such a Person on the Throne by what means soever he does it, or by both. I do not know what the Dr. means by Both; the controversy is, when there is a competition between Legal Right and Usurpation, and then the Question is, which of these are invested with God's Authority? And then I say, that God annexes his Authority to the Person, who hath a Right to the Government, and not to the Usurper who hath no Right. And this is an answer according to my Principles which the Dr. pretends to dispute upon. But if the Dr. had rather have it in h●s own expressions, than I say, that God does annex his Authority to the Legal Office. And he, whose the Legal Office is, has God's Authority, whether he be or be not actually possessed of that Office; the Office is his who hath a Right to it, and the Authority is his from God, and no body else hath either the Authority or the Office, but intrudes upon both, and invades God's Authority, as much as he does another man's Office. But saith he, than it is certain, no Prince can have God's Authority, who is not in Possession of the Throne, and then no Allegiance can be due to him. Now this consequence lies a great way of, and at first sight a man would be apt to admire how it should follow from the premises, for though it might do pretty well from one of the branches, from placing a Person on the Throne by what means soever; yet how comes it to follow from the other, from God's annexing his Authority to the Legal Office. The Propositions are complex and made up of several parts, and the conclusion is drawn from one of them; for how does it follow, because God hath annexed his Authority to the Legal Office; therefore no Prince hath his Authority who is not in Possession of the Throne? is there any more an inseparable connexion between the Legal Office of a King, and Possession of the Throne, than there is between a Legal Estate, and an Illegal Possession of it? A Legal Estate is the right owners, whether he be possessed of it or no, and a Legal Office is his who hath a Right to it, and all the Authorities, Privileges, and Preeminencies that are annexed to it are his, whether he actually has the office in Possession or not. Property is annexed to Right and not to Possession; and whosoever hath a Right to any thing that thing is his, and no bodies else, and whosoever hath a Right to an Office, the Office is his, and the exercise and administration of it, does not alter the Property; Well, but the Dr proves it, If, says he, God's Authority be annexed to the Regal Office, a Prince must be in the actual administration of the Regal Office and Power, before he can have God's Authority. Now this is nothing but the old story of Actual Administration over again, only it was before applied to King and Government, and here it is applied to the Regal Office. But the Argument and Answer is the same; the Regal Office is his who hath a Right to it, whether he be possessed of it or no; And if God's Authority be annexed to the Regal Office, it is annexed to his Person whose the Office of Right is, and not to his, whose it is not; every thing is the right owner's, whether it be in his own Possession, or injuriously kept from him. Another man may usurp it, but if he does it is none of his own, he may have the Possession, but the Property is in the right owner The Regal Office is the King's Property, and he hath all the Authority annexed to it, whether he can, or cannot actually administer it; but the Usurper has neither the Office nor the Authority, and all that he has is an unjust administration, and a wrongful Possession of that which is none of his own; and I would fain know which way he should have the Authority, when the Office to which the Authority is annexed is none of his. But the Doctor proves this from a Parallel Case, as a man must be actually married before he can have the Authority which the Divine Laws give to a Husband, that is to say, a man must be a Husband, before he can have the Authority of a Husband; right, and so a man must be a King, before he ●●n have the Authority of a King: So soon as a man is married he hath a Right to the Marital Authority; and his Right and Authority commence and end together: The Drs. saying Actually married is superfluous, except there had been some Marriages which are not actual, but this was put in to complete the Parallel, and to ●u●t with the Actual Administration of the Regal Office, which notwithstanding is no Parallel 〈◊〉 all; there is a likeness between Actual and Actual, and yet not in the Drs. sense neither, for actual with respect to the administration of the Regal Office, is opposed to a Legal Right; but actual with respect to marriage is opposed to nothing, only a word put in to make up a similitude of sound, but not of sense. But however as to marriage, and the Actual Administration of the Regal Office, there is no likeness at all; and if the Dr. would have made the Cases Parallel, he ought to have instanced in the actual administration of the Marital Office. And this would plainly have shown the weakness of his Argument: The Husband hath the Authority annexed to his Person, though he does not or cannot actually govern his Wife, nay though another actually governs her; his Authority lasts as long as his Right, and the ungovernableness of his Wife on the one hand, or imprisonment or other impediments on the other hand, putting him into such circumstances as he cannot actually administer this Authority; these make no alteration in the Authority, though they do in the exercise and administration; but the Authority of a Husband remains with him whether he does or does not, whether he be or be not able actually to put it in execution; which shows plainly, that the Authority which is annexed to any Office, is not likewise annexed to the actual administration of it: But he who has the Right has the Authority too, though he does not or cannot, nay though another does and can actually administer it. He that administers without an antecedent Right, administers likewise without Authority; and if the actual administration may be without the Authority, than the Authority may be without the actual administration. But saith the Dr. (a little after) To call a Right to the Crown the Authority of Government, is contrary to the sense of mankind, when they speak of Sovereign Princes; methinks the Dr. should have but little stomach to appeal to the sense of mankind, which he so notoriously contradicts: His fundamental Doctrine concerning Providence and Usurpation, and almost all the Arguments to support them, are contrary to the sense of mankind, except the Doctrines of John Goodwin and his Fellows be the sense of mankind. Well! let that be as it will let us hear his Reason; for (says he) he has the actual Authority, who actually administers the Government, and it is actual Authority, which is God's Authority, not Authority in fancy and Idea, for God does not give Authority to govern without the Power of Government, which is a very fruitless and insignificant Authority. I answer, That he who actually administers the Government, and has no Right to it, has no Authority at all; and therefore no actual Authority, he hath actual Power, but actual Power, and actual Authority are two things. And what does he mean by Actual Authority? If he means by it real Authority, as he seems to do by opposing to it Authority in fancy and Idea, than I say it is actual, ie. Real Authority which is God's Authority, but I say likewise, that he that hath the Right hath this real Authority, and he that Usurps and hath no Right, hath Authority only in fancy and Idea, for his Authority has no foundation and is built upon nothing; for whatsoever stands upon force and not Right is Equivocal Authority and the name is abused whensoever it is so applied, 'tis the Authority of Lions and Bears, of Banditti and Mo●s Troopers, who have indeed real force, but the Authority is Chimaera and imagination. And what I pray is actual administration of Government without Right, but actual force? But it seems according to the Dr all Authority that is not reduced into act and exerts itself in power, and forcible administrations is authority in fancy and Idea, a ve●●●●uitless and ●nsignificant Authority, and such Authority as is not God's Authority, and God does not g ve it; and what then does he think of the Authority of King Charles the First after he was impr●oned, nay after he was condemned, had he then God's Authority or not? Did God's Authority leave him so soon as the Rebels had laid hold of him, or so soon as they had condemned him? could they by prosperous villainy, as they had beat his Armies so drive from him God's Authority too? could they by a most abominable and cursed sentence degrade him from his Regal Character, and release the Subjects from the duties of Allegiance they owed to him, and to God's Authority with which he was invested? This I suppose the Dr. will not say, but than it follows, that Authority without Actual Administration is not Authority in fancy and Idea; and that God does give his Authority to govern without the Power of Government (in the Drs. sense) And the divesting of Power and actual administration is not divesting a Prince of God's Authority, which remains with his Person, and the Character is indelible. I do not know what the Dr. means by a very fruitless and insignificant Authority, wicked People would not obey it▪ and they murdered the Lord's Anointed; and so far indeed it was fruitless; but if that be a reason of the insignificanc● of Authority, 'tis a Reason against God's Authority too, for neither will they obey him; but that is no impeachment to God's immediate Authority, nor yet to his Authority vested in his Vicegerent. He was the Lords Anointed still, and so remained to the last minute of his life; the Regicides had the Power of Government, and he had not, but that did not transfer God's Authority from him to them; but he was the same King, and had the same Authority from God upon the Scaffold as he had upon the Throne; from whence 'tis plain enough that Authority is not annexed to actual Power or actual Administration; wicked People may take away the Power of Government, but they cannot take away the Authority. And this is the very same in all the instances of Authority in the World, the respective Powers of Father, Husband, Master, may be suspended by the ungovernableness of those under their Power, or by other accidents, or they may be exercised by other Persons: But the respective Authorities all this while are annexed to the Rightful Persons, and not to the Exercise or Administration: No man hath any more Authority than he hath Right, and he that exercises an Authority without Right, makes an Authority to himself, but he hath not God's Authority. In all such Cases indeed, there is not Power to force and compel, which the Dr. calls a fruitless and insignificant Authority; but for all that it is not Authority in fancy and Idea, but real and valid; the Authority of a Parent (and Paternal Authority is as much God's Authority as the Regal) does not cease to be the same Authority, nor to bind to obedience, when he has not Power to restrain the undutifulness and rebellion of his Children; and if it were our own Case, we should soon distinguish that we had Authority, though we had not Power, and they were bound in Conscience to obey us, though we were not able to make them. And here is the state of the Case, Authority binds the Conscience, and Power can force the outward man: And that it seems i● very significant, which can hurt, imprison or fine us, but it is a very fruitless and insignificant Authority, which only obliges in Conscience.  
The Dr. proceeds to consider the Parallel case I had instanced in (13. 
Vindic. p. 57  Heb. 17.) The Apostle exhorts to obey them, that have Rule over you meaning the Ministers of the Gospel: Now the Apostle makes no distinction between lawful Ministers and Intruders, and yet we must understand it of lawful Ministers.  
He answers, But these Cases are by no means Parallel; For the Author to the Hebrews had no Reason to make any such distinction, which yet was necessary for St. Paul to have done, had he intended his Precept should be understood only of lawful Powers; his proof is, The Apostle to the Hebrews knew who had the Rule over them at that time, that they were lawful Ministers, and he exhorts the Hebrews to obey them, and had he added such a distinction, it would have insinuated, that he knew some among them who were not lawful Ministers, and such a suggestion without naming the Persons, would have made them jealous of them all, and spoiled his Exhortation of obeying them.  
To this I answer, 1. The Drs. Reason is absurd. 2. The ground of it is improbable.  
1. His Reason is absurd, and that is, Had he added such a distinction, it would have insinuated he knew some among them not lawful Ministers, and without naming them, would have made them jealous of them all, and spoiled his exhortation of obeying them. A mighty ground of Jealousy indeed! I suppose for some of the Drs. Reasons, because of the difficulty of examining of Titles, 
Case of Alleg. p. 192.  and carrying men into the dark Labyrinths of Law and History, (which is one of the Drs. weighty Reasons for submission to actual Government and Usurpation:) And was it so hard a matter for them in those days to know who were, and who were not their lawful Ministers, who were, and who were not sent, and constituted by the Apostles? and methinks it is a pretty odd reason, if the Apostle had named lawful Rulers, it should make them suspicious of their lawful Rulers; it might have put them upon inquiry where there was doubt, and there is no harm, but a great deal of reason in that, but it would have secured and confirmed their obedience where there was no doubt: The Dr. tells us, the Hebrews knew whom St. Paul meant by these who had the Rule over them, and St. Paul knew they were such as ought to be obeyed. Well! did the Hebrews know St. Paul meant them as lawful or as actual Ministers, if as lawful Ministers the Drs. reason of jealousy is a trifle, for than it had been the same thing, whether he had or had not expressly named it, for it is implied, and that is all one with naming it, and then the adding such a distinction in express terms imports no such insinuation as the Dr. suggests (which I think is plainly the Case): If only as actual Ministers, than I doubt by virtue of this precept, they were to submit to a Minister de facto, though not de jure, for if there was danger in naming lawful Ministers, lest they should be jealous of their actual Ministers, that Reason extends to all actual Ministers; and so there is a fair gap opened for Usurpers, Heretics, and Apostates and they, if they could persuade the People to own them, might claim the benefit, and be within the intention of this Precept; for it seems lawful was not to be named, lest it should make them jealous, which had indeed been a sure way to prevent their jealousy, but not their being seduced, which seems to be the main end of the Apostle in this Precept. But this is more absurd still, if this Precept be considered as a standing and perpetual Rule for all Ages of the Church: Do all People know whom the Apostle meant, as well as the Hebrews? and did St. Paul know that all that bear spiritual Rule ought to be obeyed? Must not lawful be named lest it should be insinuated, some are not lawful Ministers or lest any Body should be jealous of their Pastors? This is inconsistent with the Apostles own Cautions, to beware of Dogs and to avoid Heretics, and with all experience. And I suppose the Dr. will not deny but that it had been better for them, and for Religion, if some People had been jealous of their Pastors: And the truth is (as the World goes) a little jealousy does well, and there is no great Reason to take every man for a Minister within this Precept, who calls himself so, and actually Rules; and this Precept is no Caution against jealousy; and in other places St. Paul directly advises it. So that if the Dr. was any Reason with respect to the Hebrews, it is none with respect to the rest of the World, except the Dr. can think there never was, nor never can be any actual Ministers but who were lawful ones and ought to be obeyed: And the Dr. himself tells us, to justify his exposition of the 13 to the Romans in the next Page upon the account of actual Government, with respect to the rest of the World, he ought to have made this distinction in express words if he intended any distinction should have been made; and I conceive the Epistle to the Hebrews, is of as general direction as the Epistle to the Romans.  
2. The Ground of the Drs. Reason is improbable; and that is that there were no false Teachers among the Hebrews; that there were Seducers and Heretics before the time of the writing this Epistle (which is generally concluded to be the last but one of St. Paul's Epistles) is evident from all the Rest of the Epistles, and that Judaea among all the Plantations of Christianity, should be the only Climate without them, is not very accountable. The Apostle in this Chapter cautions against seducement. (Heb. 13.9.) Be not carried about with divers and strange Doctrines. And these I suppose were not the Doctrines of their Lawful Ministers, whose Faith he advises them to follow (v. 7.) as well as to submit to them (v. 17.) And to apply this to the Drs. reason, I wonder why the distinction of strange Doctrines, should not make the Hebrews jealous of all the Doctrines their Ministers taught them, as well as the distinction of lawful Ministers should make them jealous of all their Ministers. Reason's sure are very scarce when such things as these are given for Reasons; but something must be said, and it is great pity the Dr. should be pressed with an Argument and have nothing to say to it.  
But (says he) St. Paul gives a general charge to be Subject to the higher Powers and generally affirms, that all Power is of God; and therefore, if he had not intended that we should understand this, as universally as he expresses it, of all powers however they came by their Power, he should have limited it to Legal and Rightful Powers: Very well! and I pray is not the charge to the Hebrews as general as that to the Romans? it is not said indeed obey all them that have rule over you; but it is expressed indefinitely (which is equipollent to an universal) and in construction it is to be understood universally, and means the same, as if it had been expressly said All them that Rule. And if it did not the Drs. Reason would be yet more pleasant, for if by them that have Rule over you, may be meant some and not all of them that have Rule, than the Apostle did more than insinuate that he knew some among them that were not lawful Ministers, and without naming the Persons, such a suggestion would have made them jealous of them all, and spoiled his exhortation of obeying them; So that if for nothing else, for the sake of his own Reason, he must be forced to admit, that it is to be understood in an universal sense. There is but one thing more, and that is St. Paul generally affirms that all Power is of God, and is not all Spiritual Power of God as well as Secular? That the Dr. will not deny: Now we must remember the Dr. tells us, these cases are by no means Parallel: And yet when he comes to state the Case of the 13 to the Romans, he has not made the least title of difference. All Secular, and all Spiritual Power is of God, the charge in both is general, and the Precepts require to obey all them that Rule in one Case as well as the other; and if these Cases be not Parallel with respect to the present controversy, no man living knows what a Parallel is. For what are the Drs. Reasons for his Case? why the General charge, the universality of expression, the want of express limitation, and here they are all, and in a Case of obedience to Rulers also. And as an addition to the Parallel, we may cast in the Drs. Principle and Argument from Providence, which equally fits a Providential Pastor, as a Providential King; and therefore there is the same Reason to understand both precepts with the same limitation, and by all Rulers and all Powers we are to understand all Lawful Rulers and all Lawful Powers, and as an Usurper in the Church, is no Bishop, nor Priest, nor Church Ruler, within the intention of this Precept, though he actually Rules; so neither is an Usurper in the State a King, nor the Higher Powers within the intention of That Precept though he actually governs.  
I added, The Drs. Reason is against him, there has ever been a distinction in the World between Legal and Usurped Powers, and 'tis probable 〈◊〉 St. Paul (who was so learned 〈…〉 knew it, and if he had intended to 〈◊〉 obedience to Usurped Powers, 'tis probable he would have said so in express terms, but since he never said it, we have reason to conclude he never intended it.  
The Dr. replies I doubt not St. Paul did kn●w it, and 〈◊〉 also that the Pharisees made this objection against their submission to the Romans, and ●●r that reason he affirms that all Power is of God, and that they must be sub●●ct to the Higher Powers, without any distinction which he would not have done, if any ● sti●ction aught to have been made, when he known the di●●ute was about the Romans whom they looked upon as Usurpers over Israel, who were God's peculiar People and Inheritance.  
Now I doubt not but the Pharisees as well as other People did distinguish between Legal and Usurped Powers, and there was no fault in that; I doubt not likewise but they as well as the rest of the World, did think that Allegiance was not due to Usurped Powers, and that was not their ●aul● neither; but their fault was that they thought as the D● d●es, that the Romans were Usurped Powers, as the Dr. rightly, they looked up●n the Romans as Usurpers over Israel, when in truth they were their lawful Magistrates, and the Convocation expressly affirms they were so But from whence does the Dr. collect that the Apostle had an eye to this opinion of the Pharisees as he states it? 
P. 82  The Epistle was written to the Converts at Rome, amongst whom as there were several Jews, so there were a great many Gentiles, and of those Jews 'tis probable there were not many, if any at all of the Pharisees, who (according to the account we have of them in the Gospel and other Histories) were of all the Jews the most obstinate against Christianity and implacable enemies to it; now the Dr. intimates, that this opinion of the Pharisees was singular and peculiar to them only. And it does not seem reasonable that St P●ul should obviate an objection, which perhaps not one of them made to whom i● wrote, and for whom he intended the direction of this Precept; and as the Dr. intimates no body else made it besides the Pharisees, and who would give as little heed to St. Paul, as they did to Chri●●ianity itself. And I believe another and more convenient reason may be assigned, the Christian Converts either then actually were, or in a short time would be in a state of Persecution from the Heathen Emperors, and this might tempt them to undue behaviour towards their lawful Governors: The Pleas of Liberty, Religion and the illegal and unauthoritative acts of Kings were as plausible then, as they have been since, and I believe any man that impartially considers the scope and tendency of this precept, will find, that the end of it was to press the necessity of obedience, and to show the wickedness and danger of Resistance in any case, and not to answer an objection of the Pharisees, which in all probability was foreign, and not at all concerned the Roman Jews and Gentiles, who had embraced Christianity; 
Case of Resist. ch. 4.  and truly just so the Dr. himself interprets it, and never till now (to serve a good purpose) thought that it had any respect to the Pharisees or their objections. And to this I add, that if the Apostle had intended to obviate this objection of the Pharisees it seems reasonable, and as I said, 'Tis probable he would have enjoined obedience to Usurped Powers in express terms, and this would have effectually answered the objection, and there would have been no avoiding it; but as 'tis now expressed 'tis matter of dispute, and the Pharisees might have been of the same mind with the Dr heretofore, and thought St. Paul only meant it of Legal P were; and had that been the Apostles end there cannot easily be given a Reason why he did not roundly express it? There would have been no danger from the Government, as the Dr. knows by experience, who puts the Question of Usurped Powers, and writes a Book upon it; and the objection would have been plainly answered, and the Subjects might without hesitancy rest satisfied upon it: But if we may believe the Dr. the Case had not been the same, if he had expressly named Lawful Powers, though he had intended it, for that would have insinuated, that he knew some who were not lawful Powers, and such a suggestion without naming them would have made The Pe ple jealous of their Gover●●●●s, and spoiled his exhortation of obeying t ●●; and so if the Dr please he hath given as a Reason why St. Paul should not name Lawful Powers had he meant them. But why he should not name Usurped Powers, had he intended them, he hath given no Reason.  
But the Dr. adds, Tho there was a distinction between Legal and Usurped Powers, there was no distinction made in point of obedience to them, but only by the Pharisees; and therefore with respect to the rest of the World, he ought to have made this distinction in express words, if he intended any distinction should have been made.  
Now as to the Pharisees, I suppose the Dr. hath enough already, and to shorten the Dispute, I will grant him, that if there was no distinction with respect to the rest of the world, between Legal and Usurped Powers in point of obedience to them, than it was reasonable for St. Paul, to have expressed lawful powers, had he intended by this Precept to have enjoined obedience only to them. But than it follows, if there was always such a distinction, than there is the same reason that he ought to have expressed Usurped Powers, had he intended to enjoin obedience to them. Now I had urged him over and over, to show me any one approved Author, who had asserted, that Tyrannus sine Titulo, The Case of his Book, and the Case now before us, was any lawful or any true Government; and the same I had put to him with respect to the Text in hand: and after all, he names but two, Mr Calvin and Gr●●tius, one against whom there is just exception; and the other is directly against him: And after such a slender proof, peremptorily to say, that all the world besides the Pharisees, make no distinction with respect to obedience, between Legal and Usurped Powers, looks as if he depended more upon confident assertions, than clear proofs. Let him prove this if he can by induction of particulars; the World is wide enough, and men have not been nice in giving their judgements in this particular. The Question is handled by almost all the Civil Law●ers, Moralists, and C●si●●s extant; and I will join issue with him upon it when he please: but to invent a new Scheme of Government, and without any proof, to father it upon all the world, is a little th● 〈◊〉 for any man but the 〈◊〉.  
I had charged upon this interpretation of the Convocation Book. That i● justifies a●●●rea●on. 
Postscript, p. 13.  ●ome impious D●c●r●●e, by m●●●●g the Acts or Permissions 〈◊〉 Providence, a 〈…〉 against ●●ght and Justice. This the 〈…〉 a very unreasonable and ●●p●●e Doctrine: and 〈◊〉 further, were I sensible that any thing I have said, would justify this Doctrine, I would immediately renounce it. Now whether the D●. be sensible of it or no, is not for me to determine; but that he does justify such a Doctrine. I think I have made it evident enough But after a recital of what he had said before and which I think has no need to be repeated so many times over; to be even with me, he tells me, The truth is, our Author writes at that rate, 
Vindic. p. 58.  that it is to be feared, some people will suspect, that he does not believe a Providence, or does not understand it, or has a mind to ridicule it. These are hard words, if the Dr. could but prove them. But this is the least in his thoughts. Why did not be produce any one Doctrine, or o●e Expression of mine that tended that way? There is one small reason for it; because he could not. I have nothing to say to the ingenuity of such a practice, let the Dr. satisfy himself about that, as well as he can But when he is so hard put to it to discharge his account of Providence from justifying an unreasonable and impious Doctrine, when he hath not answered any one of my Arguments, nor so much as offered at them, (as we shall see presently) in the very same case to ●all a recriminating, and crying out of dis●●●●ving and ri●i●u●ing Providence, is a strain of B●llin●ga●e Logic, and nothing else but outfacing an Argument, instead or answering it. And this will be yet more plain, when we see his Reason: For (says he) let me ask him, this God in the K●●●s in England, or not? But how comes this Question to prove, that 〈◊〉 or ●i●●cu●● Providence? For it is brought ●or th' t ●●●son, if his Particle [For] means any thing. And if the proof depends upon answering this Question, the Dr. should have ●●id a little, before he had told me, what some people will suspect, except those people would suspect also what I would answer. And then I do not know, how far a previous suspicion, may justify the charge of a future fact: or because the Dr suspected▪ that I would give an epicurean, Ignorant, or Atheistical Answer; therefore to save further trouble, and to dispatch the business all at once, he might charge ●●e with not understanding, or ridiculing Prov dence, by way of anticipation. He goes on, i● He does (God makes Kings in England) 〈◊〉 which I hope our Author will grant, or he renounces the Jure Divino with a witness) and is that such a business? Why may not a man renounce the Jure Divino, as well as Legal Powers, 
Pref. to Case of Alleg.  if there be occasion, is any man forbidden to grow wiser, and to alter his mind when he sees good reason for it? Methinks be might let renouncing alone: but if God does make Kings in England, how does he make them, he sends no Prophets among us to anoint Kings? But to save him the trouble of any more Questions, I answer, though God sends no Prophets, he sends Laws among us, to tell us, whom he hath appointed to reign over us. God doth not govern mankind like Beasts in a Desert, where every thing is Prey and Possession, but by the Rules of Society, which confine and determine Property, and fix the bounds of it: And it would be a wise Question to ask, How does God make a man a Right Possessor of an Estate in England? He does it by his Providence, but it is according to Laws: How did God make Kings in Judah, after he had entailed the Crown? why he made them by his Providence, but it was according to that entail; and so in other Kingdoms God makes Kings, and private Proprietors by his Providence, but it is according to the standards of Right and Justice, that are fixed and settled among men, and authorised and confirmed by God himself, and by the express declarations of his will: And whatsoever exceeds, and is contrary to these, is Invasion and Wrong, Robbery and Rapine, expressly disallowed, and forbidden by God himself. And to say God gives by his Providence, what he forbids by his Revealed Will, is an Impious Doctrine, and justifies my charge against the Drs. interpretation, that it makes Providence a Rule of Practice, against Right and Justice. And a man may as well say, that God gave to Adam and Eve the forbidden fruit, though he forbidden them upon pain of Death, to eat of it, because all Events are by Providence; and they were permitted by Providence to take it.  
And this answers what follows: Suppose, says he, a Prince ascends the Throne, by the most unjust force and ungodly arts, 
P. 59  who places such a Prince on the Throne, if God don't? Our Author according to his Principles must answer, that by God's permission he usurps the Throne, but is no King, much less a King of God's making; well, let him call him what he please, it seems a Prince may ascend the Throne, and govern a Kingdom for many years, without God's Authority; and then I desire to know, whether God rules in such a Kingdom, while an Usurper fills the Throne: I say yes, God does govern by his Providence, but not by communicating his Authority to the Usurper. And what does the Dr. think of those times of Usurpation in this Kingdom between 48 and 60? Did God govern in the Kingdom of England all those 12 years or not? And therefore what he says, for indeed will any man say, that God governs such a Kingdom, as is not governed by his Authority or Minister? is perfect fallacy by his own Principles; for he himself says it: and I ask him, had the Rump or Cromwell God's Authority or not? If they had, than four or five Leaves of his Book, and his account of their not being settled, and all that he says on that Head, is mere trifle, and contradicts what he says here: For if they had God's Authority, they ought to be obeyed, and no pretences of Loyalty could excuse it. But if not, than God may govern a Kingdom, when those persons, who actually govern for many years, have not his Authority; nor yet are his Ministers (otherwise than as the Devil and wicked men are Ministers to execute the designs of his Providence, but not as deriving any Authority from him: or thereby claiming any Right by virtue of their Actual or Providential Government.) And thus his following Question is answered, Does Providence and Government signify only his permission? that God looks on, and sees men snatch at Crowns, and take them and keep them, and exercise an Authority, which he who is universal Lord of the world never gave them? Now here is a large compass, and if the Drs. Argument signified any thing, it would prove, that all the Sinful Events that ever were, or shall be in the world, have God's Authority respectively annexed to them: for if it does follow, that because Providence and Government do not signify permission, that because God does not merely look on the affairs of the world, therefore whatever Authorities and Powers men snatch, and exercise, and keep, God who is the universal Lord of the World, gives them. Then it plainly follows, that whatever Powers men have, and whatever Possessions or Goods they snatch or keep, though never so unjustly, they are all the Gifts of God, and there is a Right and Property in them derived from the Universal Lord of the World. But to our Instance And then the Rump and Cromwell, and the High Court of Justice, exercised God's Authority, and Charles the First was murdered, and his Son robbed of his Crown by God's Authority: For Providence and Government signified the same in those days as they do now. And I wonder what the people's consent signifies according to this Doctrine? Does Providence and Government signify permission, when the people do not consent, but not when they do? Does God look on, and see men snatch at Crowns, and take them, and keep them, and exercise an Authority, which he never gave them, when there is no consent in Parliament, but otherwise when there is? One of these, the Dr. must forsake, and I believe he had better stick to the Authority of the Regicides and Cromwell, for then his Principles will be consistent, and all of a piece, whereas now they agree like fire and water, and perpetually clash and contradict each other.  
Here the Dr. starts an Objection, that to say that prosperous Usurpers are placed in the Throne by God, and have his Authority, is to make God a party to their wickedness. And thus he answers, This is another Argument, not merely against God's making Kings, but in general against God's Providence and Government: for if God cannot direct and overrule rule the wickedness of men to accomplish his own wise Counsels and Purposes, without being the Author of those sins, whereby such events are brought to pass, there is an end of the Providence of God, or of his Holiness or Justice. And then he takes abundance of pains to prove, that God can overrule the ambition of Princes, and the faction and Rebellion of Subjects; that if he can permit the wickedness of men, without being guilty of their sins, To direct and overrule their wickedness to wise purposes, can be no blemish to Providence: And who denys this? But what is all this to the purpose? Is there no difference between overruling wickedness, and giving Authority to it? Is it the same thing to overrule the Ambition of Princes, and Rebellion of Subjects to wise ends, and to Crown them with the Highest Privileges and Prerogatives, to stamp a Divine Character on them, and to command all men to Obedience and Reverence. God can, and does overrule the wickedness of men, to accomplish the wise and just designs of his Providence; but is that any argument, that a wicked possession, is a Divine Right, and a Patent from Heaven, when a man is spoiled of his Goods or Estate, by the most wicked and unjust means, God may overrule that wickedness, to chastise and correct the Right Owner for his Sins, or to cure his Dotages and Carnal Affections, or to improve his Patience and Virtues. But does this create a Right and Property in the Cheat or Robber? In the Present Case, God may overrule the wickedness of Usurpation, to chastise the Sins of a Prince or People, or to try the constancy and fidelity of men to their Principles, or for other wise ends; But is this a proof, that an Usurper is Jure Divino? To overrule wickedness, and to transfer a Right to it, are two very different things. The Dr. instances in the Crucifixion of our Saviour, which was the most glorious design of God's Providence, and was accomplished by very wicked means, and which were overruled by God, to serve that glorious end; but that did not give any Authority to Judas to betray him, nor yet convey any Divine Right to the Thirty Pieces, which he received as the Reward of his Treachery.  
And therefore the Dr. hath not put the Objection right with reference to the dispute between us; and it ought to have been this, That to entitle a wicked Usurpation to God's Authority, and a Divine Right, is to make God a Party to their wickedness. And then I would fain see, how this comes to be an argument against God's Providence in general? For what though God can and does direct and overrule the wickedness of men to accomplish his own wise counsels and purposes, without being the Author of those sins whereby such events are brought to pass? How I pray does this deny any thing of God's directing and overruling wickedness? Is it all one to direct and overrule wickedness to wise Counsels and purposes, and to give authority to it? To give authority to wickedness, is to own and authorise it, to put upon it his own image and superscription: And to ascribe this to God, is to make him a party to it, if it be possible to know what that word means. And therefore what follows is quite beside the purpose: The Dr. supposes no man will deny, but God may give the Kingdoms of the World to whom he please, 
P. 60.  and pull down one Prince, and set up another without injustice; and then tells us, the only dispute can be about God's bringing such events to pass by the wickedness of men, and what hurt is there in this, if God can so overrule the ambition of Princes, or the faction and rebellion of Subjects, as to do that in pursuit of their own lusts which God for wise and holy reasons, thinks sit to have done. Why truly I know no hurt in all this; only it is not at all to the purpose, till the Dr. will please to show us, how overruling comes to signify giving Authority. He supposes again, an Ambitious Prince, which God may permit to ravage, and depopulate, and subdue Kingdoms; and then asks, Which most becomes the Divine Wisdom to suffer such men, when they please to overturn Kingdoms, and to bring horrible desolations on the World, only to gratify their own lusts, or to give the Reins, and prosperous success to them, when he sees fit, to new model the World, etc. and then adds, I am sure, this much more becomes the Wisdom and Justice of Providence, than a bare permission of such violence, without any farther design, which does not become the wise Governor of the World. Not to meddle with those bold expressions, what does, or what does not become the wise Governor of the World, I am sure, it becomes us to speak a little more modestly. And suppose God hath some farther design, in permitting such Violences and Desolations, than barely permitting them, does it follow therefore, that he gives his Authority to those Violences and Desolations? The Drs. Inference is, And if God may permit such wickedness and violence, without being a Party to their wickedness, much more may he overrule their wickedness for wise ends, and make them Executioners of his Justice, in punishing a wicked Age, and transferring Kingdoms, that is to say, As God by permitting the wickedness of men, is not a party to their wickedness; so neither is he by overruling it. Right! But where is the Consequence, and therefore the entitling Usurpation to his Authority, is not making him a Party to their wickedness; he adds indeed, And then why may not God give them those Kingdoms he hath overturned by them? This is the only Point, and it is dwindled into a Question: And the very Question destroys all that is said before. God may give them those Kingdoms if he please: But then if he does, this is not overruling wickedness, but conferring a just Title; and God indeed is not a Party to their wickedness, because they are Righteous Possessors. But then we are never the nearer to satisfaction: The Question still returns, Is Prodence, in opposition to common Right, such a Gift? So that all this while, we are but where we were. The Dr. gives a Reason, For I suppose it is as agreeable to the Sovereignty, Wisdom and Justice of God, to give a Kingdom to a Violent Usurper, as to suffer a Wicked, Impious and Tyrannical Prince to ascend the Throne with a Legal Title, which, says he, God often does. Now here are two things to be observed.  
1. God may give a Kingdom to an Usurper, if he please, as well as he did to Jehu; but then when he hath given it him, such Gift extinguishes his Usurpation, and he justly and honestly possesses it; and whatever wickedness he might be guilty of before, it is none to wear that Crown which God gives him. So that indeed in such a Case God is not a Party to their wickedness; but the Reason is not, because God permits wickedness with a farther design, or because he overrules it, to accomplish his own wise ends; but because it is not Wickedness and Injustice.  
2. What the Dr. brings for a Parallel, confutes him. God may permit an Impious and Tyrannical Prince to ascend the Throne, and he may likewise permit him to ravage and depopulate, with a farther design to overrule them to accomplish his own holy and just purposes. But then this does not give God's Authority, to his Impious and Tyrannical Acts. And I would fain see a good reason, why God's having a farther design in permitting wickedness, and overruling it, gives his Authority to Usurpation, any more than it does to Tyranny?  
And the truth is, the Drs. account here furnisheth us with admirable measures of Justice and Righteousness; and let us translate this Doctrine to other matters of Providence besides Government, and see then how it looks; and this we may do by the Drs. allowance: for he tells us, it is an argument not only against God's making Kings, but against Providence in general. And therefore I suppose, no man will deny, but God may give the goods of this world to whom he please, he may take them from one, and give them to another without injustice, the only dispute can be about God's bringing this to pass by the wickedness of men; and what hurt is there in this, if God can overrule the violence and rapine of men, as to do that in pursuit of their own lusts, which God for wise and holy reasons thinks fit to have done: suppose a wicked and cunning man, spurred on by covetousness, whom God may permit by fraud and violence to wrong and oppress all his neighbours, I ask any man, which most becomes the Divine Wisdom, to suffer such men, when they please, to spoil their neighbours, only to gratify their own lusts, or to give them success when he sees fit to chastise and punish such persons in their goods or estates. I am sure this much more becomes the Wisdom and Justice of Providence, than a bare permission of such violence, without any farther design. And if God may permit such wickedness, without being a party to it, much more may he overrule it for wise ends, and make them the Executioners of his Justice, in punishing wicked people. And then why may not God give them those Goods or Estates, which he hath taken away by them? For I suppose, it is as agreeable to the Sovereignty, Wisdom and Justice of God, to give such Goods or Estates to a violent Robber or Oppressor, as to suffer a Legal Proprietor to riot and revel, to spend them upon his Lusts and Vices, or to make them Instruments of Injury and Injustice? And is not this pure Doctrine, and admirably suited for the advancement of Righteousness? And it is notwithstanding the true state of the Drs. Arguments here; for such reasonings extend equally to all Cases of Providence, to the Case of private property, as well as to that of Crowns and Sceptres: And the whole Scheme is as applicable to one Case as well as the other. The Dr. tells me upon another occasion, 
P. 51.  which I here return him, he may if he please, call this giving account of Providence, but I doubt every body else will give it some other name; and I hope he himself, upon second thoughts, will be ashamed of it.  
The Dr. repeats my charge against his interpretation again, That it justifies an unreasonable and wicked doctrine, 
Vindic. p. 61.  by making the Acts or permissions of Providence, a Rule for practice against Right and Justice: and says, as for Right and Justice, it has been considered already; let us now consider, how far the Providence of God may be the Rule for practice.  
It is indeed (saith he) an impious Doctrine to justify every action, and every cause which has success; God many times prospers very evil designs, when he can serve any good end by them; and therefore to measure the good or evil of things, by external success, to conclude, that it is God's Cause which the Providence of God prospers, confounds the differences of Good and Evil, and destroys all the standing Rules of Right and Justice. Now the Drs. Hypothesis is this very same impious Doctrine. For of two Persons claiming the Government, who is, and who is not King, who hath, and who hath not a Right to Allegiance: That the obligation of an Oath made to the Person of the Governor ceases, though his Person and his Legal Right be still in being. That 'tis necessary, and a duty, to take an Oath contradictory to that, to another Person; all this is purely to be determined by Providence, without any manner of other Right or Title, and contrary to a plain and known Rule, acknowledged by the Dr. himself, and by all the world. And if this be not to make external success the measure of Good and Evil, and to conclude, that to be God's Cause, which is prospered by Providence, I wish the Dr. would tell me, what is. And if he please likewise to favour me with the Solution of this Question, Whether Usurpation be God's Cause? if it be, whether the Dr. hath any other proof of it, besides external success, and the Providence of God prospering it? if it be not God's Cause, what can justify our swearing to abett, support and maintain it? So that either the Dr. must maintain this Impious Doctrine, that God's Cause is to be measured by Success and Providence, or another as impious, that we are bound in Conscience, to do the utmost to maintain that which is not God's Cause.  
But, saith he, yet it is so far from being an impious Doctrine; that it is a necessary duty, to conform ourselves to the Divine Providence, and to discharge those duties and obligations, which the Providence of God lays on us, according to the nature and intention of the Providence: Now if by the nature and intention of Providence, the Dr. means, that God by such a Providence, intends to lay such duties on us, it is true enough, and we are bound to conform ourselves to the Divine Providence, and to discharge those duties: as when God by his Providence puts us into a state of affliction, it is our duty to conform ourselves to his will, and to perform the Duties that Providence points out to us by that dispensation, to be patiented, constant, and faithful, to be sure to keep a good Conscience, and not be affrighted from our duty, nor discouraged in the practice of it. These are duties that are consequent upon such a state, and which the Divine Providence directs us to, and the nature and intention of the Providence, is plain and evident. But this is not at all to his purpose. But if by the nature and intention of Providence, the Dr. means, that what things come to pass in the world by Providence, it is our duty, and the intention of Providence, that we should comply actively with them, own them, and adhere to them. This is manifestly false in a thousand instances, and particularly in all Robberies, Usurpations, and Invasions of other men's Rights. The Question therefore is not, Whether we are to conform ourselves to Providence, and to discharge duties according to the nature and intention of Providence; but whether it be the intention of Providence, that we are to espouse, and embrace, and pursue the interest of Usurpation, and all other Events that are manifestly unjust and unrighteous. The Question therefore still returns, What are the Duties and Obligations, that the Providence of God lays on us, and what are the Intentions of Providence? Does God when he permits wicked and unjust Usurpations, and other Villainies, require us to fall down and reverence, to join ourselves to them, and to plead the Cause of Unrighteousness? This is to interpret God's Providence in contradiction to his Laws: But what is all this to Providence being a Rule, which the Dr. said he would consider, how far it might be? He adds, Thus the Providence of God, in some sense may be the Rule of our Practice, and may make that our duty which was not; and that cease to be our duty, which was so before. And thus it always is, when the Providence of God changes our Relations, or condition of life, as in the present case, when he removes one King, and sets up another; for he must transfer my Allegiance, when he changes my King: that is to say, when a Woman is married, she is obliged to the duties of a Wife; when her Husband is dead, Providence hath set her free, and she owes her dead Husband no duty: So, when God removes a King, the duty of Subjects cease; and when they have another Lawful King, they own him Allegiance. Very true. But the Question returns, When is a King removed? Is dispossession, making him no King, and discharging the Subjects Duty? or is possession, making the Usurper a King, and obliging the Subjects? or is that the intention of providence? The Providence of God, changes Relations; but dispossession and distance, is no change of Relation. A Woman is not free by every providential removal of her Husband from her, but by such a Providence only, as puts an end to his Life or Right: nor are Subjects free by every providential removal of their King, but by such a Providence only, as puts an end to his Right and Title: And on the contrary, if a man sets himself in the place of a Husband, the hand of Providence is not to be owned, nor is he to be submitted to as a Husband of Divine Right: A providential Husband is no Husband, but an Adulterer; and a providential King is no King, but an Usurper. And as to Providence being a Rule in any case, 
Vind. p 44.  the Dr. hath urged these very things before, which I have already answered, and shall not need to repeat.  
And here the Dr. falls a Rallying for almost two Pages together, This unreasonable and impious Doctrine of Providence, 
Vind. p. 62.  is the fault of my Case of Allegiance: for some men cannot endure to hear, God makes Kings; for that argues, there is a God. A fine way of calling his Adversaries Atheists. And so on he goes in the Rallying strain, had he said any thing else, he might have escaped as well as his neighbours; but since he hath entitled God to the matter, this spoils all, and is an impious Doctrine: And if that be his fault, he is content to suffer obloquy and reproach, for maintaining such impious Doctrines. Now if the Dr. can rally off the Absurdity and Impiety of his Doctrine about Providence, much good may it do him; I shall leave such arguments to take their chance. And I do not believe the Dr. has so mean an opinion of his Readers, as to expect any great wonders from them but such things, though they are not likely to convince, yet they may amuse, and serve for a blind to prevent the perceiving the force of the argument against him, and the weakness of his Answer; whether the Dr. had any such end, by this long Excursion, he knows best. But however it comes to pass, my answer to him is perfectly lost, and we have not here the least word of it, nor the least intimation, as if the Dr. knew of any such thing. And therefore I shall beg the Reader's Patience to lay it before him. It immediately follows in the Postscript.  
The Dr. had raised an Objection to his Hypothesis, 
Postscript, p. 13. Case of Alleg. p. 34.  Have not Pirates and Robbers as good a Title to my Purse, as an Usurper to the Crown? Does not the Providence of God order and dispose of all these Events? To which he answer, the dispute is not about Humane and Legal Right in either case, but about Authority, now no man pretends, that Thiefs and Pirates have God's Authority. To this I answered, What is this to the purpose? I know Thiefs and Robbers have not God's Authority, neither hath an Usurper: but have they not God's Providence, as well as an Usurper? And if Possession of Authority by Providence, gives a Right to it, Why does not the Possession of my Purse by the same Providence, give a Right to it? The Dr. puts it into the Objection, Have not Robbers as good a Title to my Purse, as an Usurper, to the Crown? And it is certain, they have as good a Title; for they have the very same I grant, taking a Purse, and taking Authority, are two things, and so are also Usurpation and Right: But the Question is about Providence, and that is the same; he that takes a Purse, takes it by Providence, as well as he that takes a Throne, and if Providence gives a Right, the one hath it, as well as the other. But the Scripture (saith the Dr.) expressly tells us, that Kingdoms are disposed of by God, that all power is of God; and does not the same Scripture tell us, that the Earth is the Lords, and the fullness thereof; that he disposes of it, as he pleases: that when Job was robbed, he said, the Lord hath taken away. But if the Scripture had not said so, the Dr. says it; for he tells us, all Events are God's Act and Deed; and than it must follow, that the possession of my Purse by a Thief, is as much God's Decree and Council, as the possession of the Throne. The Doctor found'st all this in God's Creation: God (saith he) is the natural Lord of the World, 
P. 15.  because he made it, and no Creature hath any Right to govern the World, or any part of it, but as he receives Authority from God: And is not this the same, in all other respects? Are not all men's Estates Gods, as well as Authority? And has any man a Right to his Estate, but what God gives him? And does it thence follow, that whatever any man can get by Providence, though it be never so much against the Laws and Common Right, it is his own, because God is not tied to Humane Laws, and hath a Right to the World by Creation, and may give it whom he please? And I wonder, what reason there is, that 'tis a more certain sign to us, that the possession of power by providence, gives any more Right to it, th' n the possession of Goods or an Estate gives a Right to them.  
Of all this, the Dr. hath not thought fit to take any notice. He tells us indeed, before, 
P. 58.  that he had already stated the matter about right and justice, and had shown the difference between the right of private men to their Estates, and of Princes to their Thrones, between a thieves taking a Purse, and an Usurper a Crown, by the Providence of God, etc. Now I confess, this he had said upon another occasion; and when the force of my argument lay another way; but he ought to have considered my answer here. For here it was that he himself raised the Objection, and answers it: and my answer directly affects him, and his whole Hypothesis: or if he would not reply to it in its proper place, he ought at least to have took notice of the force of it: he tells us, he she●'d the difference between a thieves taking a Purse, and an Usurper a Throne: but where hath he showed any difference with respect to Providence? Why, a Thief hath not as good a Title to my Purse, as an Usurper to the Throne, when he hath the very same: Where hath he showed any difference with respect to God's right by Creation? which is the foundation of his Hypothesis, and which affects all private Estates, as well as Government and Authority. And where hath he showed any difference in the Evidence, that a Providential Possession of Power, is a more certain sign to us of God's Gift, and a Divine Right, than the same Providential Possession of Goods or an Estate? This is the force of my Answer, which he hath taken no manner of notice of, and which would have been evident, had he answered this in its proper place. But if he had not been pleased to answer it, he might have bestowed some of his compliments upon it, and have called it a Jest, or a Banter, or something, as he does other arguments he cannot tell what to do with.  
He proceeds to consider another of my Arguments against the interpretation he gives of the sense of the Convocation, 
Vind. p. 63.  That it is inconsistent with their main and fundamental Doctrines, viz. Passive Obedience, and Nonresistance. He replies, But if the Convocation taught both (as certainly they did) it is a sign that whatever our Author thinks, or whatever he can prove the Convocation did not apprehend any inconsistency between them. Now methinks, the Dr. might a little have considered my argument, and not have given such a short answer; especially when he complains so much of concealing what he says. The sum of all was, that that interpretation of a thorough Settlement, 
Answer to the Pamphl. p. 21.  which best agrees with Passive Obedience, we are in justice bound to believe, that it is the sense of the Convocation, as best agreeing with their fundamental Doctrines and the main design of the Convocation. And to say that a Government is thoroughly settled, when it hath acquired a Right by Prescription, or the extinction and submission of the Right Heir, does not in the least interfere with the Doctrine of Passive Obedience; but when a Person hath got full possession of power, and the lawful King is alive, and is so far from submitting, that he actually contests his Right, and demands the Allegiance of his Subjects in order to it; to say that they must quit their Lawful King, become Subjects to the possessor, transfer all their Allegiance and Duty to him, do all they can to establish him in the Possession, and as much to keep the other out, become irreconcilable and mortal enemies to him, and if need be to fight against him, and kill him; (for all these necessarily follow from that notion) This is such a notion of Passive Obedience as never was heard on. And what now is the Drs. short Answer to all this, why it is certain the Convocation thought this was not inconsistent with Passive Obedience, that is, they thought and taught, that men for the interest of an Usurper, might fight against and kill the Rightful King to whom they had sworn Allegiance; and at the same time when they acknowledge the Legal Right to be in him; which if any man that reads the Convocation can believe, he may believe any thing in the World, and one would have thought the Dr. should have showed us how this was reconcilable with Passive Obedience, before he had so dogmitacally asserted, that the Convocation taught it. And this is absolutely necessary to justify his interpretation, for the main design of the Convocation was to assert the Doctrine of Passive Obedience, and that is plain and evident, and if the notion of a thorough Settlement was not so evident, their notion of Passive Obedience is to regulate and direct to their sense of a thorough Settlement, and not the notion of a thorough Settlement to direct to their sense of Passive Obedience: And therefore if the Drs. notion of a thorough Settlement be not reconcilable with Passive Obedience, it cannot be their sense; except we can also believe that they contradict the main Design, and the Fundamental Principles of their whole Book. But the Dr. tells us, I observed in the Case, that the Doctrine of Obedience and Allegiance to the Present Powers is founded on the same Principles, with the Doctrine of Nonresistance and Passive Obedience, viz. that God makes Kings and invests them with his Authority, which equally proves, that all Kings who have received a Sovereign Authority from God, must be obeyed, and must not be resisted; Right, he does observe this, but then he hath left out in his repeating it, that upon which the whole controversy turns, and yet at the same time complains of concealing, 
Case of Alleg. p. 36.  and that is, and are in the actual administration of it (which is the only evidence we have, that they have received it from God. For what though Passive Obedience be due to God's Authority; is it therefore due to Usurpation and actual Administration which is not God's Authority? and (to use some of the Drs. expressions) He may harangue upon this Argument, as long as he pleases; 
P. 64.  unless he can prove, that God invests every Usurper with his Authority, while the Rightful King is living and claiming. And that he does not do so, is manifest from this very Doctrine of Passive Obedience: For the Doctrine of Nonresistance and Passive Obedience is founded on an  Authority; consider then what are the Rights of an  Authority, and what the duties of Passive Obedience. 1. The Rights of Sovereign and  Authority are, that he cannot forfeit his Crown, that he cannot be judged nor deposed by his Subjects; And therefore when once King, he is always so till death or a voluntary and legal Resignation. 2. Nonresistance does not merely signify not to fight against the King, but 1. That upon no pretence we must renounce his Right, and 2. Must never set his Crown upon another's head. 3. Must not transfer our Allegiance to another. Now the Dr. will not except against this Doctrine for the sake of its Author, and he may please to observe, that we are not so apt to invent as he is to forget, and he may try if he can solve the matter by his distinction between Zeal and Faction. But if this be the case, than these things necessarily follow. 1. That Transferring of Passive Obedience from the Rightful King to the Usurper, is a Proposition inconsistent with itself, and made up of contradictions, Passive Obedience signifies one thing, and transferring it the clean contrary. And to talk of transferring Passive Obedience is just as if we should say fight Nonresistance, or Rebellious Allegiance. 2. The Argument from the Doctrine of Passive Obedience equally affects his interpretation of Scripture, as his interpretation of the Convocation, for Passive Obedience, is as evidently and plainly enjoined by the Scriptures, as by the Convocation; and for the proof of this, I refer myself to Dr. sherlock's Case of Resistance. And if his interpretation of Scripture be irreconcilab e with the Doctrine of Passive Obedience, than it is not reconcilable with Scripture, and then it ●●ot true, and if to fight against and kill a King, to whom we have sworn Allegiance and whom we still acknowledge to have a Legal Right and Title, be not Passive Obedience, than the Drs. expounding the 13th to the Romans of Usurped Powers, in opposition to a ●●g●tful King is not the sense of Scripture, but his own private sense; it is not sufficient here to say it is certain they teach both; and therefo e they are not inconsistent, for that is proving things the wrong way, for it is certain they do not teach both i● they are inconsistent. And therefore if the Dr. would regularly prove, that they do teach both, he ought to have made it appear by showing they are not inconsistent, and not come off with a short reply, it is certain they do so.  
My next Argument is, That this interpretation repreaches the Virtue and Loyalty of those admirable men, who suffered between the years 42 and 60. The Dr. replies, and therefore it cannot be the sense of the Convocation, for no doubt the Convocation in 603. had great regard to the Loyalty of these who suffered between 42. and 60. by a spirit of Prophecy I suppose. A very wise observation! And why might not the Convocation in 603. have regard to the Loyalty of the members of the Church of England in 42. or 60. or 90 either? if they designed their Book as a direction for practice, it must regard future time, as well 42. as 603. and as well 90 as 42. But the Dr. knows well enough the Question is concerning a Principle of the Church of England; and here we have a body of men, undoubted Sons of the Church of England, and as great and eminent for piety and virtue as that Church ever bred; and most of them living at the time of this Convocation, and some of them probably members of it: And here was a Case, where their sense of this Principle was tried to the bottom; and besides their plain Doctrines, their sufferings were a convincing Testimony, that they did not believe, that the Drs. notion of a thorough Settlement was any Principle of the Church of England. And considering all circumstances, this brings the dispute almost down to our very senses. 
Answers to the Pamphlet, p. 22.  As I said, it would have been thought madness for a Church of England man to have doubted, who (in the late times) acted most agreeably to the Principles of that Church in the point of Alleg. and Government, Archbishop Juxton, Bishop Cousins, Bishop Gunning, etc. or Hugh Peter, Dr. Owen, or John Goodwin, or whether the Regicides were Church of England men too, in the same points, etc. So that with the Drs. leave this Argument does not lie so far off, as to need any Prophecy to make it good, but is plain; easy, and natural; and seeing we are about the interpretation of a Church of England Principle, from whom are we most likely to learn it, from the Doctrines and Practices of those excellent men, and who gave such illustrious evidences of their own sense of it, or from Peter's, Bradshaw, Martial or Milton? and I shall crave leave to believe (except the Dr. can give me some better Reasons) that the Virtue and Loyalty of those admirable men, are better interpreters of the Church of England Principles, than the villainy and wickedness of those Advocates for Usurpation. But these, it seems, are hard and spiteful words, which the Dr. tells me, I give to my Adversaries: That indeed is very easily said, but it had been much fairer to have given a plain and rational answer to them.  
Concerning this the Dr. said, it is a great prejudice but no Argument, 
Postscript. p. 14.  nor can be form into an Argument: I answered, I thought an Argument from example had been an Argument, though not always a very good one. He replies Right! what and cannot be form into an Argument? 
Vindic. p. 64.  That is a little strange, but the Dr. to avoid that repeats another sentence, not that which I answered, I suppose by virtue of keeping his own Order and Method; and I would fain know how that is an Argument, which cannot be formed into an Argument. This agrees like the rest of his Principles. Well! He tells us, Example is only a prejudice not an Argument against plain reasons which cannot otherwise be answered: Let Reasons be first answered, and then when there is no Reason against a thing, the example of great and wise men without any other reason, carry some Authority with them; especially when we have other good reasons for doing any thing, example gives some more strength. And thus the example of Jaddus may be an argument, when other examples are none. The meaning is, that an example against the Drs. Reasons is a Prejudice and no Argument, and an example the Dr. mentions against other men's Reasons, is an Argument and no Prejudice; for I had urged against him his producing the example of Jaddus, which was but a single and a suspicious example. But that it seems must be an Argument, because it is for the Drs. turn, but the examples of so many excellent men are but Prejudices, because they make against him. But by the Drs. favour the examples of these great and good men, is an Argument and a very strong one to prove the sense of the Church of England, in the point of Submission to Usurped Powers, and such a one as confutes all the Drs. little Reasons to the contrary: He urges some Arguments to prove the Church of England on his side; and to these we oppose the evident and undoubted practice of that Church, in such remarkable and discriminating instances, as plainly distinguished between those that were true Sons of that Church, and those that were not so; and to talk of Reasons against plain matter of fact, is disputing against common sense, and such reasons are like the Arguments against motion, which are best confuted by walking up and down. But says he, though he knows the example of Jaddus was alleged by me, only to prove the sense of the Convocation; and the Dr. knows these great examples were alleged by me for the same Reason. He adds, and how Jaddus himself understood his Oath of Allegiance to Darius, which saith he, is a very different case from what he urges; yes by all means! The examples of those great men did not prove how they understood the Oath of Allegiance; nor what they thought of submission to Usurped Powers in Possession against a Legal King out of Possession, nor what was the sense of the Church of England in those Cases: I suppose, because some of them lost their lives, and all their livelyhoods and Estates against their own sense and judgement, and against the sense and direction of that Church of which they professed themselves, and were in truth the most eminent and faithful Members.  
But, says he, to let pass his transport of zeal, and to forgive the froth and folly of it. (These I suppose the Dr. designs for Civil and obliging expressions, for he had but just before complained of my hard and spiteful words) when he urges the examples of these great men there are many things he ought to have considered.  
1. He should have considered whom he reproached, as well as whom he commended. Right! and I did so, but he tells us, he reproaches all those who in those times of Confusion submitted to the Usurped Powers, and lived quietly and peaceably under them. But who told him so? there is no such thing in my Answer or Postscript, is there no difference between living peaceably and quietly, and becoming Parties to the Usurpation, siding with it against the Legal King, pleading the Cause of it, and swearing to be true and faithful to it? These last indeed are reproached by the Virtue and Loyalty of those excellent men, and who can help that? Virtue and Truth is always a Reproach to Vice and Error. But perhaps the Dr would have had me justified the exclusion of Charles the Second, and the adherence to the Usurpers against him. And this indeed would not have reproached them. But it would have reproached much honester and better men than they; it would have reproached all those Gallant and Loyal Sufferers for their King and the Laws. But no matter for them, they are not for the Drs purpose now; but he is grown on a sudden so very tender of the Usurpers Party, that they must suffer no reproach, and rather than that, the best men of our Church must not be commended for fear it should reflect on them. But saith the Dr. The King found a great many true Friends and Loyal Persons at his return among those men. I suppose by virtue of their taking the Engagement, and writing Books to keep him out, and using all their endeavours and interests for that purpose. Well, but suppose some of them were true friends to the King; why then they are not to be reproached, not for their being Parties to the Usurpation against him, but because they were his true friends. i e. because they deserted the Usurpers; for they could not be true Friends and Loyal to both. And if I have said any thing to reproach them for being the King's friends, and abandoning his Enemies, I am content to suffer reproach myself. But as the Dr. hath worded this, it is not easy to understand what he means: He says they were true Friends and Loyal Persons upon his return. Does he mean that were then so only, but before his return and in the time of Usurpation were virulent and mortal Enemies to him, but so soon as he returned they became Friends and Loyal. Methinks this is no extraordinary character: They were his friends, when he could advance them, but in his extremity and when he had need of them they were his enemies; i. e. they were true friends to themselves and not to him, and such a kind of friendship, if it must not be reproached, does not sure deserve commendation. The Dr. further tells me, I reproach all those Loyal Persons, who suffered under those Usurpations and comply now: And also, all those who have now sworn Allegiance. But how can the Dr. tell that? I meddle with no bodies Principles but his, and the Dr. in the next paragraph tells me, I ought not only to consider what was done, but upon what Principles they did it; and I have considered his Principles, and have shown, that they reproach the best Men of our Church; but that it seems will not do, and I must consider what was done also, and reproach all them that did it, though they act upon other Principles, and though I consider no bodies Principles but the Drs.  
2. The next Advice is, If our Author will argue from Examples, he ought not only to consider what was done, but upon what Principles they did it, whether they were all of our Author's mind, that it is absolutely unlawful in any case whatsoever to submit to a Prince, who is possessed of the Throne, while the Legal King, or his true Heir is living, though dispossessed. Now I think there is all the evidence in the World that they were of this mind: This was the very case, there was a Person (the Dr. may call him Prince if he pleases and agreeable enough to his Principles) possessed of the Throne, and the Legal King and Heir dispossessed. And it is plain in fact they refused to submit to the Usurper in the Throne, and adhered to the Legal King out of the Throne. And if the Dr. can find any other reason or assertion of theirs for this practice, besides the absolute unlawfulness of owning the Usurper, he would do well to produce it. He says, it is probable some few might be of his mind. But why does not he name one single man of them that was not of this mind? that he can never do, nor does he in the least undertake it. But boldly affirms, that it can never be proved, and it is very improbable, for it was neither the Doctrine of the Church, nor the Law of the Land. But that is the matter in dispute, and by what Rules of Logic is the grand matter in controversy brought for a proof? The Question is whether it be the Doctrine of the Church, or Law of the Land; and the practice of those great men is urged against the Drs. interpretation, and is a proof against him; and how comes the thing to be proved, to be brought in proof against that which proves it against him? But this is usual with him. But says he, that it was their general sense (that it was absolutely unlawful to submit to the Usurper, while the Legal King is living though out of Possession) can never be proved. No? that is very strange, the Assertion is plain enough in Bishop Sanderson, Dr. Hammond, and all them that wrote upon the point; and one would have thought the practice of all the rest was a very good proof of their Sentiments in this matter; can any man believe, that men would lose their lives and estates, and expose themselves to the greatest difficulties and extremities for not doing what they thought they lawfully might do? And in such a case to call for proofs is to abuse men's patience, and in the Drs. language argues great perverseness of mind.  
But after all the whole advice in this Paragraph is nothing to the purpose, I brought the examples of these great men, against the Drs. Principles and Interpretations; and he advises me to consider, whether they acted upon my Principles; and what is that to the purpose? if the Dr. can prove they did not act upon my Principles, or that they acted upon Principles that are contrary to them, I am contented to own that their examples is an argument against my Principles, as they are now against his Principles. But this he will not meddle with, and instead of that, he is for advising me (I thank him) to prove it myself.  
3. Another thing I ought to have considered, he says is, when he resolved to argue from example, he should have carefully considered, whether there are not more and greater examples on the other side, whether supposing the Case to be as he represents it, there be any thing like it in all story either sacred or profane, whether both Jews and Christians did not always submit to the Present Powers, when the Government was settled by what wicked means soever it began. Now the Case which the Dr. represents, and which I dispute against, is the lawfulness of submitting to, and joining with Usurped Powers in opposition to the Legal King, when out of Possession and claiming and insisting upon his Right: And I had over and over provoked him, to give any approved instances of any men that owned his Hypothesis. And when he cannot be prevailed upon to produce one single instance and example: To tell me, I ought to consider whether there are not more and greater examples on the other side is extraordinary: If there be more and greater examples, why does not he show them, and clear his Hypothesis from the charge of Singularity and Parodox? But when he does not name one, nor so much as offer at it, when he immediately tells me, he shall not enter upon this Argument, but turns me over to some body else that will do wonders in this point no man knows when; to talk of more and greater examples, and the practice of Jews and Christians, which his Reader must find out as well as he can, and to confront the most plain and visible examples with imaginary ones, and practices in the Clouds; And after all the urging and provocation to name not one, and yet still to insist upon it, and cry there are more and greater. This is such a way of vindicating as is as new as his Hypothesis, and very well agrees with it, and if this be disputing we shall never have done.  
Now the Dr. comes to consider what I had said further upon this head, I said, the Dr. owns that this is a Prejudice, and so it is, 
Posts. p. 14.  and a very considerable one; and I wonder what he hath said to remove it, not one word to the purpose; he tells indeed of some differences, but not one that is any difference as to the matter before us, of Submission to Usurped Powers, and he replies, let us then try that. And in order to that he gins.  
But to state the matter so plain, 
Vindic. p. 66.  that our Author himself had he never so much mind to it, shall not be able to mistake or misrepresent it. And have I mistaken or misrepresented it? That the Dr. would insinuate, but then he should have told me where and in what instances; that it seems is another Question; however the Dr. is resolved to have it so, or would persuade a credulous Reader to believe it, though he hath not named one particular wherein I have mistaken or misrepresented him; and this will appear more fully upon examining what he says in reply; he tells us, he must first premise that they are two different Questions, when it is lawful to submit to Usurping Powers, and when 'tis a duty: 'tis lawful when we are under force as can compel us; 'tis a duty when the Government is throughly settled. Very well! This is the Drs. State of the matter now, but where hath he stated it so before? there is not a word of it, nor any such distinction in his Case of Allegiance; and how then should I know it? I suppose by Inspiration? and it is a pretty way of mistaking and misrepresenting him, because in answering his Case of Allegiance, I did not divine what he would say in his Vindication; But the truth is the Dr. mistook, he found the former state of the matter would not do, and if he had kept close to that he could not have answered what had been objected to him, and therefore hath given a new state of the Question. And he might have said so, and not by an insinuating preface, have laid his own mistakes at other men's doors. Let him show me if he can, that he hath in this manner stated the Case in his former Book; if not, why does he talk of mistaking and misrepresenting it? Well! let us take his new State, and see what he can make of it. He tells us, while we are in this state (under force) we may either submit or not submit without sin, and then that which must turn the scale, are arguments from interest; and here is the ground of this new State, he had said before, and it was objected to him, 
Case of Alleg. p. 48. Posts. p. 15.  That the Friends of Monarchy were bound in Interest to restore the King. And he did not know how to get off from it without inventing this new distinction, which yet will not serve his turn; for having applied what he said before to those times of Usurpation he adds; This is so far from lessening and reproaching their Loyalty, that it is greatly for the commendation of it, that when they were not bound in conscience to submit to those Usurpations, though by submission our Author intimates, they might have made better terms for themselves, yet they rather chose to venture their lives and fortunes to restore the King, which is not, as our Author insinuates to prefer their interest to their Consciences in serving the King; but where Conscience was not concerned to the contrary, to venture their interest, their lives and fortunes to restore the King: Now here is a very pleasant state of the Case  
For 1. The Dr. tells us, in such a state interest is to turn the scale; and yet in the close of his reply, he says, it was to venture their interests, lives and fortunes to restore the King; this looks very like a contradiction, for what does he mean by venturing their interests, but venturing the loss of them. And those who might have preserved their interests by submission to the Usurpations; and which according to the Dr. it was lawful for them to do, chose rather to venture their lives and fortunes to restore the King; i. e. in short, they chose rather to hazard their lives and interests, than to preserve them. And if interest must turn the scale, it is plain enough, that whatever Conscience did, interest lay on the side of Usurpation. And when so many of the Nobility, Gentry and Clergy, were utterly undone for their obstinate Loyalty, in such a Case to talk of men's being Loyal for interest is to contradict common sense.  
2. The Dr gives an admirable account of the Grounds and Reasons, why the Royal Party did not submit to those Usurpations, and that is not Conscience but Interest; not but that they thought it lawful for them to submit, but they refused it upon other accounts, even when they thought they lawfully might. But where had the Dr. this fine account? Is there the least intimation of it in any history of those times? in any Pamphlet or discourse concerning it? or did ever any man besides the Dr. say it? there were some indeed, that thought or pretended to think they were mistaken, and they might lawfully own those Usurpations, and the Drs. argument from providence was urged for that purpose: But I think the Dr. is the first that ever affirmed that they themselves thought so. Their general arguments were drawn from the Duty of Allegiance, the obligation of their Oaths, and the Laws of the Land, which plainly import they thought Conscience was concerned, and that it was unlawful to own those Usurpations This therefore is nothing but fancy and imagination, and the Dr. says it without any ground in the World. He may make reasons for himself, and coin new distinctions to justify them, but what warrant has he to make reasons for other men? It is no wonder he makes thus hold with the Convocation, who can fasten such a sense on the practices of those loyal sufferers, not only without any manner of foundation, but contrary to their express declarations: if we must be making new Hypotheses, and framing new Schemes of Government to justify ourselves, let us prove them as well as we can; but for shame let us never entitle other men to them, who plainly acted by different Principles, and have as plainly declared their sense to the contrary; if the Dr. thinks this imputation severe, let him acquit himself from it, by showing if he can, but some few among those many Loyal Sufferers, who thought Conscience was not concerned in the Case, and that they thought it lawful to submit, and become Subjects to those Usurpations, in opposition to their Legal King.  
And this is yet more extravagant, if we reflect on the dismal circumstances of those times, and to how many difficulties and fatal miseries, that Revolution exposed the Loyal Party, a great part of which might have been prevented in particular men, if they would but have complied, and joined themselves to the Usurpers. In such a Case to Question, whether they were acted by Principles of Conscience, or to say that they thought Conscience was not concerned either way, is to scorn and abuse their sufferings, and makes themselves murderers, and destroyers, and lays all their desolation and ruin at their own doors; for what can such men answer to God, themselves, or their families, who suffer themselves to be undone and perish, when they might lawfully have prevented it. And this is that admirable Character the Dr. (to save his own Hypothesis) hath found out for these noble and conscientious Sufferers: He was charged with reproaching their Virtue and Loyalty; and to get himself off that, he hath reproached them as much on the other hand.  
3. The Dr. distinguishes between when it is lawful, and when it is a duty to submit, and applies this distinction to those Usurpations, thereby intimating, that it was lawful, though not a duty, for the Loyal Party to submit to them. The consequence is, they had no obligation in conscience to King Charles the second; for if it was lawful for them to submit and become Parties to the Usurpation, it was likewise lawful for them to discharge themselves of King Charles, for they could not be the Subjects of both, and then they were not bound in conscience to him; they might respect him for their own ends, and endeavour to restore him to better their condition (as the Dr. says) and for the sake of their interest; but Duty they owed him none at all, they owed him just as much as they owed Cromwell, and no more. He was charged with reproaching their Virtue and Loyalty, and he hath now fairly compromised the matter, and made them have no Loyalty at all. For I pray what kind of Loyalty is that which is no duty? They might love and respect the King, or rather themselves; but to be loyal to him they could not, for that arises from Duty and Obligation, and 'tis mere name and compliment when there is none. And thus that renowned Loyalty which the world had in so much veneration, is sunk into just nothing. Between the Royalists and the other Party the scales were even in point of Conscience, advantage might turn the scales, and the whole is resolved into selfishness and private interest. And what a hideous account is this of that glorious scene of invincible Fidelity, Fortitude and good Conscience? It is much for the honour of an Hypothesis that it cannot be vindicated but at the expense of the glory and reputation due to the best Men and the best Practices: And which is yet more extraordinary, the Doctor would make us believe, that this is so far from lessening and reproaching their Loyalty, that it is greatly for the commendation of it; yes sure it is greatly for the commendation of a man's Loyalty, that he loves himself, and can better his condition by it. This may suit well enough with some men's Loyalty; but the Loyalty between 42 and 60 was quite of another make, and hitherto the World hath thought that the commendation of it consisted in suffering for their Fidelity, in parting with their Interests rather than their Loyalty, in submitting to the hardest Circumstances rather than violating their natural and sworn Allegiance.  
The Dr. adds now, That they were not bound in conscience to submit to these Usurpers. (The Question is whether the Doctor's Principles and Arguments do not equally conclude for their Submission to those Usurped Powers?) and this he says he ●oved, because their Government was never settled, i. e. according to his notion of a Settlement. And that is aga n according to one branch of it, a national consent in Parliament or by the People's Representatives. And here the Dr. takes a great deal of pains to prove that the Rump and Cromwell had no such national consent, 
Vindic. p. 40, 41.  and therefore their Government was not throughly settled. To which I answer,  
1. That all the Doctor's Arguments equally conclude for Submission to those Usurpations as to any other.  
2. That they might be settled according to the Doctor's notion of a Settlement, notwithstanding what he hath opposed to the contrary.  
1. That all his Arguments equally conclude for Submission to those as to any other Usurpations, though they had not the formal consent of the People. I shall mention two. His Arguments to prove his notion of a Through Settlement, and His Arguments to prove the necessity of submitting to Usurped Powers.  
1. His Argument to prove his Notion of a Settlement. His Answerer had objected against it, 
Vindic. p. 5, 6.  That Settlement was a term in Law and employed Right, which he admits in ●ettlements according to Law, but in Settlement of Powers against Law, it must be understood of the Settlement of Possession, and the obvious exposition of Settlement in such cases is a Settlement of Possession. Very well! This Settlement (such as it is) the Rumpers and Cromwell had, for they were possessed of the Government, and administered the Power, and made Laws, and governed the People. And we may take the Doctor's remark along with us to confirm the point. It argues great perverseness of mind to reject that sense of the Word which is proper to the Subject to which it is applied. That is, it is very perverse to say, that the Settlements of Usurpation are any other than the Settlements of Possession. And then I doubt it must likewise be perverse to say that the Rumpers and Cromwell were not settled Governments. To the same purpose the Dr. says afterwards, That all the Convocation says relates to visible and actual alterations of Government. 
P. 7, 8.  Now (says he) this is matter of fact, not of Right: and therefore the settlement of such Alterations is an actual not a legal Settlement of them. And actual and visible Settlement is all that is required to an actual and visible translation of Kingdoms. Is that all that is required? Then they had all that is required; for their Governments were as actual and visible as any other: Cromwell for some years possessed the Government, and died in the possession of it, and left the possession to his son; and therefore as far as actual and visible will go, it is as good a Plea for those Usurpations as for any other. This is what the Doctor offers in proof to justify his Notion of a Settlement, and which in all respects fits Cromwell just as if it had been made for him. And if they are Arguments sufficient to prove a Settlement, than they likewise prove that Cromwell's Government was such a Settlement.  
2. All the Doctor's Arguments for Submission to Usurped Powers equally conclude for Submission whether there be such a consent of the People or no; as his Doctrine and account of Providence, Then God sets up Kings, 
Case of Alleg. p. 12. 14. 36.  when by his Providence he advances him to the Throne, and puts sovereign Authority into his hands. He is King who is settled in the Throne in the actual administration of sovereign Power. That the actual administration of Authority is the only evidence we have that they have received it from God. His Argument from Relatives or Relations or what he will please to call it, that Government and Alleg. are such Relatives or Relations as do mutuo se ponere & tollere. That actual Dominion and sovereign Power is the Relation that makes a King. 
Vindic. p. 37, 38.  That God invests a Prince with his Authority by placing him on the Throne, 
p. 56.  and he has the actual Authority who actually administers the Government, and it is actual Authority which is God's Authority. Now all these, if they have any force at all, equally conclude for Submission to all Usurpers, whether they have or have not the consent of the People, and that makes no manner of alteration in the Argument; for a providential advance to the Throne, and the Possession, and actual administration of Power, and the evidence of it, and actual Authority. these are all the same whether the People consent or not. And if the Rump and Cromwell had not a national consent, yet they were providentially advanced to the Throne, and actually administered the Government; and therefore according to his Arguments they must have God's Authority, and therefore aught to have been obeyed. And the same is to be said of his Arguments from Scripture, of Gods removing and setting up Kings, which according to him means no more than removing from, and putting into the actual administration of sovereign Power, 
Vindic. p. 50.  and he tells us from S. Austin, that Reges are a Regendo, and peremptorily asserts, it is certain he who has the exercise of the Regal Power and Authority is King, whether we call him so, or no. Let them be called Rump or Protector or by any other name or names. And so likewise for his Interpretation of the 13 to the Romans, 
Vindic. p. 57  the general Expression all Powers, The Scriptures giving no direction, but to submit, and pay all the Obedience of Subjects to the Present Powers, 
Case of All. p. 18.  and the making no distinction between rightful Kings and Usurpers, between Kings whom we must, and Kings whom we must not obey, etc. Now all this reasoning extends to all Usurpers without any manner of limitation from the consent of the People, for all those Usurpers (the Rump and Crom.) were the Present Powers, and therefore (according to him) within the intention of that Precept, whether the Nation consented or no; and the Scripture hath made no distinction between Usurpers who have, and Usurpers who have not the People's consent, And (as he says) Why should we think the Apostle here intends a distinction unknown in Scripture. 
Case of All. p. 20.  The Doctor to prove his Exposition argues thus; When the Apostle says All power is of God, there is no reason to confine this to all legal Powers, unless it were evidently the Doctrine of Scripture that Usurped Powers are not of God, which is so far from being true, that the contrary is evident. And this is a reason directly against all that he says here, When the Apostle says All Power is of God, there is no reason to confine this to all Powers consented to by the People, unless it were evidently the Doctrine of the Scripture, that Powers without the consent of the people are not of God, which is so far from being true, that the contrary is evident. And the consequence is, That this Precept is to be interpreted of all Usurpers, or of none, and the Dr. must interpret it of the Rump and Cromwell, or discharge his Argument as insufficient. And let the Dr. at his leisure show me where in Scripture All Power and the Present Powers and the obedience to them is limited to a national Consent, or where there is such a distinction that the higher Powers by the consent of the People ought to be obeyed, and the higher Powers without their consent may not; if he will not undertake it, all his Argument from a national consent signifies nothing, if he will he must renounce with a witness. But the truth is, This business of the People's Consent seems to me to be put in for no other end, but to stop the mouth of an Objection, which the Dr. foresaw would open wide upon him, but does not at all concern his Hypothesis which stands or falls without any manner of relation to it. For how come the People to have any share in God's Providence in setting up Kings? or what have they to do with God's Authority? or how comes it to pass that their consent makes it a duty to obey God's Authority, and their dissent makes it no duty? Those men indeed that say that all Power is originally in the People, and that they may resume it, and dispose it as they please, for them to say that the consent of a People settles a Government or makes it, is agreeable enough to their Principles, and the People derive to the persons governing the Authority that is originally in themselves. But for them that maintain it as a Principle that all sovereign Authority is of God, to talk of the People's consent as necessary to make Obedience a duty to that Authority, is a contradiction; and it is a fine Doctrine to say that the Authority is derived from God, but the Obedience to it is derived from the People's own consent. And this it seems was the case here, for the Dr. tells us with respect to those Usurpations, that it was lawful to submit to them, though they were not bound in conscience to do it. Now if it was lawful for them to submit and become Subjects to those Usurpations, than they had God's Authority; for it is not lawful to become Subjects to persons who have not God's Authority, if they were not bound in Conscience, than their obedience to God's Authority depended purely upon their own consent: And that is, God by his Providence gives the Usurpers Authority, and the People by their Consent make it a duty to obey it. And so the matter is divided; the Authority of Government is from God, and the duty of the People from themselves. If the Dr. hath a mind to deliver his present Argument from these consequences, let him give some other account of the People's consent, and I am afraid it must come to one of these two, either that Usurpers have not God's Authority, or if they have, than the People's consent is not necessary to make obedience a duty: if the first, than his Hypothesis, and most part of his two books, signify nothing; if the last, than all that he says on the present head signifies as little.  
2. Those Usurpations might be settled according to the Doctor's Notion of a Settlement, notwithstanding what he hath opposed to the contrary. Now it will be needless to repeat the Doctor's Notion of a Settlement at length. He does not think convenient to insist upon it himself. He takes sanctuary only in one small branch of it, The submission or consent of the great Body of the Nation. And methinks since the Dr. insists so much upon it, he should have given us some small proof, or if that could not be had, something like a proof, that the People's Consent is included in the Notion of a Settlement, or that a settled Government to which God annexes his Authority by plain construction means the People's consent All the rest of the Branches (for this same thorough Settlement according to him is a great composition) viz. The whole administration of Government, 
Case of All. p. 9  the whole power of the Nation, all things done in his name, and by his Authority. These the Dr. hath taken great care of, and all his Arguments are one way or other a proof of. But this of the People's Consent must shift for itself; if it will serve to answer an Objection well and good, but for proving it no matter for that, though it seems, (as the Dr. now states the matter) it is not one branch but the chief, nay for any thing I can see it is all the Settlement, or however it is so essential to it, that all the rest are nothing widow hout it, Possession of the Throne by providence, T●e whole administration of the Government and the Power of the Nation, all things being acted in the Usurper, name, and by his Authority. All these, and I know not how much more, signify nothing at all with respect to the duty of Obedience without the People's Consent; and the Dr. does not deny but Cromwell had all this; and whether he had the People's Consent we come now to examine. Now what the Dr. means by the People's Consent we have in pag. 69. 
Vind. p. 69.  
Case of All. p. 47.  for having in his Case of Alleg. expressed this by National Consent, National Act, and the Representatives of the Nation, it was answered, As to the National Consent in Parliament, that is part of the Constitution, but what is that to Usurpation, which may as well usurp upon all branches as upon one? He replies, I do not urge a National Consent in Parliame t, considered as part of the Constitution, but barely considered as a N●tional Consent; for a National Consent and Submission is necessary to the Settlement of any new Government; and this must be declared by one means or other. And according to this account, Cromwell had the Consent of the great body of the Nation to his Government, by other Acts virtually declaring it, and by a formal and express Consent so far as Representatives illegally chosen could make such a Consent.  
1. By Acts virtually declaring it: When he was proclaimed Protector, there were general Acclamations, and such other Expressions as are usual upon the proclaiming a new King, and after that more express Acknowledgements: he was publicly and solemnly treated by the City under the Character of Supreme Governor, and in that Character owned and submitted to by the most, if not by the whole of the Nation; so that if the Consent of the People may be virtually declared he certainly had it.  
2. He had a formal and express Consent so far as Representatives illegally chosen could make such a consent. He summoned two Parliaments, both of them met upon his Writ; both of them owned his Authority, and solemnly recognised it. But to this the Dr. hath some Objections.  
1. That the Parliament summoned according to the directions of the Instrument (of Government agreed on by Cromwell and his Officers) never could make a National Consent. And I pray mark his Reasons, for they are two; 1. For they were not chosen according to the ancient Usages and Customs of the Nation, a very weighty Reason according to the Doctor's Principles, for neither is an Usurper a King according to the ancient Usages and Customs of the Nation. And if the Consent of the People by their Representatives cannot be made but by the ancient customs and Usages of the Nation, than a Parliament called by an Usurper can make no such Consent. This Reason I suppose came from him unawares.  
2. His second Reason is, Nor were they the Representatives of the Nation, but only of a prevailing Party and Faction; and his reason of that is, for that Artic. 14. (of the Instrument) 'tis provided no persons aiding, advising, assisting, or abetting in the War against the Parliament since 41. unless they had been since in the Parliaments Service, and given signal Testimonies of their good affections, should give any Vote in the Election of Members. And what proportion did these bear to the whole Nation? Most of those that had been active in the King's Service were fled, several turned to the Government and were within the Qualification; and how many were the rest? certainly very few in comparison of the whole. So that notwithstanding such restriction, those that were elected might represent the great Body of the Nation, which is all the Dr. requires to such a Consent. But here the Dr. objects again, That after such Election they were not Parliament men, unless they were approved to be Persons not disabled by the major part of the Council; and accordingly he tells us, that many persons who were returned in the second Parliament were not approved, which occasioned a Remonstrance subscribed by near a hundred. And what then? One Parliament I hope, is sufficient to give the people's consent. The people in two years' time (the distance between the two Parliaments) might grow weary of the Usurpation, and send up Members of another temper; but what did that signify to their choice before? were any of the first Parliament secluded upon that account? That the Dr. does not say; but for that he tells us, The first Parliament began to be very busy about the New Government (but in what particulars he does not say) but the Protector sent for them into the Painted Chamber, and taught them better. Well! than they were better taught, and complied with him. And he before their next sitting, appointed a New Test; and one branch of it was (as the Dr. repeats it) I do hereby freely promise and engage myself to be true and faithful to the Lord Protector. And he tells that day one hundred and thirty Members took it, and for aught appears to the contrary, all the rest took it afterwards. And is not this a pure argument, that they did not consent to his Government? I suppose because they took an Oath to be true and faithful to him. And so the Dr. hath fairly proved his point.  
Well! however that be, it can never be denied, no not by the Doctor himself, but that a very great number did expressly consent? And what became of them? Why truly, according to him, they became Subjects; for it was lawful to submit: and when they had submitted, it became a duty to them, though the rest were free. So that all they that took the Engagement, were Subjects to the Rumpers; and all that took the Oath to Oliver, of otherwise expressly consented to his Government, were his Subjects, and the rest were Subjects to King Charles, or rather to no body, but were in interest engaged to him. And what a special Society have we got here? one part of the same Society are Subjects to one person, another part to another, or rather, absolutely free: one Party are obliged in Conscience and by their Oaths, to support one Government with their Lives and Fortunes the other Party are obliged by Interest (a Principle found by experience, to be much stronger than Oaths or Conscience) to pull it down, and to set up another; and according to their differing obligations, they were bound to cut one another's Throats at the first opportunity. Now the Dr. may call this a Humane Society if he please; but it suits better by half with a Society of Wolves and Tigers. The Dr. has forgot, 
Case of Alleg. p. 38, 39  that one of his principal Aruments for Submission to Usurpers, is the necessity of Government to preserve Humane Societies; for Humane Societies must not dissolve into a Mob, or Mr. Hobs' State of Nature. And yet it seems to answer an Objection, it must dissolve into something very like them. To serve that purpose, the Dr. supposes that no man who considers it well, will call that a Civil Government, or a Civil Society, to which Authority and Obedience is Essential. But to serve another purpose, All Authority and Obedience is stated quite away, and they may submit, or not submit without sin, i. e. there is a Society, where is neither King, nor Subject, no Authority to command, nor Duty to obey. When the Dr. is to prove submission to Usurpers, from the necessities of Government to preserve Humane Societies; why then, if God will preserve Humane Society, we must conclude, that when he removes one King out of the Throne, he gives his Authority to him whom he places there, for without Authority, Humane Societies must disband; Power may tie men together a while, but can never unite them into a Civil Body, without the Bonds and Ligaments of Duty and Conscience. But when the Dr. is for vindicating his Arguments from laying any Reproach on the Loyal Sufferers, than he states the matter so plain, as no body can mistake or misrepresent it: and that is, that we must conclude no such thing at all; we must not conclude, that God has given his Authority to him that is placed on the Throne, and the necessities of Government for preservation of Humane Society, do not give Authority to him that governs, and lay an obligation of duty on the Subject, and Societies must hang together as well as they can. For there are no Bonds and Ligaments of Duty and Conscience. For he tells us very expressly, that the Subjects were not in those days bound in Conscience to submit 
Vind. p. 66.  to those usurped powers, who notwithstanding actually governed, and exercised the whole administration of Government for some years. Well! I perceive some Objections will not be answered, except a man contradicts himself; but they must be answered, however.  
The Dr. goes on to tell us, that since here was no such settlement as would oblige the Subjects in conscience to obey and submit, 
Vind. p. 70.  he shown there were other very great reasons why they should not submit. And this, he says, answers all my little objections.  
Now we are once again to remember, that the Dr. quarrels with me, for altering his Order and Method; and tells me, there is more of art than honesty in it: And here again he has done it himself. For all that is said before on this Head, was urged by him in the last place, and accordingly in the same order answered: and in his Vindication he hath begun with it, and inverted his own order; and 'tis plain Artifice, to disguise the weakness and insufficiency of those other matters he then urged; for had he replied to them in the same order, every Reader might have perceived it. The Objection (which he calls a prejudice) which he laid down, 
Case of Alleg. p. 45, 46.  and which he was to answer, was, That his Hypothesis equally served all Revolutions, Rump, Protector, etc. and yet under that Usurpation, the Loyal Party thought themselves bound in conscience to oppose it at their utmost peril: And shall we arraign them all as resisting God's Ordinance? His Answer is, There is a great difference between the two cases; and he undertook to show it upon many accounts: and adds, And all together will be more than answer enough. My Answer was, Those were no differences as to the matter before us of Submission to Usurped Powers. 
Postscr. p. 14.  And what does he reply to this, with respect to those many differences he reckons up? not one single word; but resolves all his Answers into the former Reply. For instance, he had urged as one great difference, The great Villainies of those days, open and barefaced Rebellion, the murder of one of the best Princes. I answered, the Dr. maintains, that submission is due to Usurped Powers, by what ill means soever they attained it; that therefore makes no difference in his argument. He replies, What not to prejudice wise and good men against all compliances? He should have added what he says in his Case of Allegiance, though they had been lawful; and that would have shown the unreasonableness of urging prejudices, for the practice of wise and good men, against what had been lawful. He adds, for who that could possibly avoid it; and to explain this, he tells us in a Parenthesis (that is where strict duty does not oblige, nor  force constrain) would submit to such men: i e. The former Reply of not being bound in conscience, because that Government was not settled. He urged the barbarous usage of the King's friends. etc. I answered, this made some difference in point of interest, but none in point of conscience. He replies, nor did I say it did; only it created an Averseness. (He had before said, it made it useless and impossible; but now it created an averseness, as more agreeable to his present Reply) which was a Reason not to submit, when they were not obliged in conscience; the former Reply again, though not one word of it in his Case of Allegiance. He urged the Church of England was overturned, Bishops, Deans, etc. turned out. I answered, the Case was concerning Civil Government, not Ecclesiastical: he replies, But yet whoever loves the Church, will not choose to submit, (when they are not obliged in Conscience) to such Usurpations in the State, as overthrow the Church. The former Reply still; and of which there is not the least mention in the Case of Allegiance; but I think the direct contrary: For I ask, had they been bound to submit notwithstanding such invasions on the Church▪ if the Government had been throughly settled? This he intimates by his Reply; 
P. 47.  and then I would desire him to explain what he means, when he says in his Case of Allegiance, they had no way to keep their Live, especially if they were of any value, but by renouncing the Church of England, as well as by submission to that Government, which (says he) I believe notwithstanding their ready compliance in taking the Oaths, the Clergy at this day, would more universally have refused, than they did then. What if it be a duty to submit, and take the Oaths? Does Allegiance to the Civil Government cease to be a duty, if they overturn the Church? This will reflect upon St. Paul's Doctrine, and the practice of the Primitive Christians, under the Heathen Emperors. And I doubt I had very good reason to make this Answer, I hope the being disabled to keep a Living, especially if it be a good one, is not a sufficient Reason to rebel. The Dr. is pleasant in his Reply, and tells me, he would desire me carefully to consider it, for it did not concern them. Very well! but it concerns him, or else his reason above, is very ridiculous: for if men may refuse to submit, when it is a duty, because they cannot hold a good Living according to the Constitutions of the Church: Then I doubt it follows, that Civil Duty is to be measured, not by a Through Settlement, but by Ecclesiastical Preferments.  
Another difference the Dr. mentioned, was, The whole Government in Church and State was overturned, which was the Fundamental Constitution of the Nation. I answered, This was but changing the Form of Government; and the Convocation speaks of Degenerate Forms of Government; and Usurped Powers are not to be limited to a King, but to a Government; and the usurping upon the Lords and Commons, as well as upon the King, is but Usurpation still. He replies, I grant it, but when such degenerate Forms are not thoroughly settled, the subversion of the Fundamental Constitution, is a reasonable prejudice against submission, when it is not a duty.  
So that we have nothing but the s●me Answer over and over. In his Case of Allegigiance, he mentions a great many differences; and I had suited my Answers to them, and showed they made no difference in the Argument; and when he comes to reply, he gives one Reply to them all. And that is, that all his differences are come to one single difference; and the Question at last is come into a narrow compass; and with respect to the duty of Submission to Usurped Powers, the Question is not, whether they attain the Usurpation by Villainies, or by barbarous usage of honest and loyal people, or by encroachments on the Church, and the persecution of its members, or by overturning the Legal Constitution; but the single Question is, whether the Government be settled, and all the rest signify nothing to the Argument. And this I had told him, if he would prove the Government of those Usurpations was not settled, 
Postscr. p. 15.  he might let all the rest alone. And which he hath now done in his Reply, though he would not seem to do it: so that my Objections, as little as they are, have obliged him to quit these differences, as making no difference in the Argument, which he cannot deny, though he cannot endure to own it. For what difference did the villainies of those days, make in the Argument? Why truly, it prejudiced wise and good men (as all villainies do one as well as another) and where no strict duty obliged, who would submit? That is, the difference in the Argument lies not in the prejudice, but in not being a strict duty. What difference did the Barbarous usage of the King's friends, make in the Argument? Why, it created an aversion (as Hanging, and Imprisonments, and such like kindnesses are apt to do) and was a reason not to submit, when they were not obliged in conscience; i. e. the difference in the Argument, lies in the not being obliged in conscience, and not in the aversion. What difference did the overturning the Church, and the being disabled to keep a good Living, make in the Argument? Why, whoever loves the Church (and a good Living) will not choose to submit, when not obliged in conscience. So that had Cromwell restored Episcopacy and the Church Lands, all would have been well, and he might have had a Case of Allegiance due to Sovereign Princes wrote in justification of submission to him. What difference did the overturning the Constitution make in the Argument? Why, it is a reasonable prejudice (as the people's making whom they please King in an Hereditary Monarchy may be) against submission when the Government is not thoroughly settled, and when it is not a duty: i. e. the difference in the Argument lies in the Government not being settled, and not in the prejudice. It is therefore evident enough, that all those make no difference in the Argument; and if the Dr. had replied in the same order, with his own method and my Answer, every body would have perceived it; but instead of that, he is for new stating the matter. And the Reason of their noncompliance, is to be resolved into nothing but prejudice and interest; although he himself had put it into the Objection. They thought themselves bound in Conscience to oppose that Usurpation at their utmost peril: 
Case of Alleg. p. 46. & 48.  and at the end of his Answer expresses it, those who thought it their duty never to submit to that wicked Usurpation.  
I am now come to my Parting Objection in the Postscript, of which the Dr. gives us this fair account, 
Vindic. p. 71.  That it is so very ridiculous, that had he begun with it, I should have thought he had only intended it for a Jest; but I am now so well acquainted with his way of reasoning, that I am satisfied he is capable of thinking it an Argument. Upon my Word, this is very big; and a man would imagine, there was something very wretched and trifling in the Argument. But I am so well acquainted with his way of replying, that I am confident here is something he cannot answer, and therefore it is to be run down with scorn and contempt. If Arguments will not be answered, let them be hooted at; and perhaps with some Readers, that may do as well: and though I do not believe, that the Dr. is capable of thinking, that such things are Answers; yet I do not know, but he may be capable of thinking, that some people may take lofty and scornful words, for good and plain Answers. Well! let us see how ridiculous the Drs. Answer makes it.  
The Argument is this, If possession of Sovereign Power contrary to Law, 
Postscript, p. 15.  be God's Authority, and aught to be obeyed, than whatsoever Sovereign Power a Prince possesses himself of, is likewise God's Authority, & aught to be obeyed. He answers, But where do I say, that possession of Sovereign Power contrary to Law, is God's Authority? A pleasant Question, Where did he not say it? It is but all over his Book: What is Usurpation, but possession of power contrary to Law? And if the Dr. hath any other definition of it, he would do well to produce it. But for a man who writes a Book, to justify submission to Illegal and Usurped Powers, as having God's Authority, to ask me, where he said, that possession of Sovereign Power contrary to Law, is God's Authority, is a Jest indeed. But here the Dr. is very angry, as if I had done him some wrong, and tells me, I do not pretend that he said it in express words, but this I suppose is the sense of what he says: and adds, But I desire he would keep to my words, for I will answer for none of his senses, unless I were better satisfied both of his understanding and honesty. Now I do not desire the Dr. should answer for any of my senses, unless he could answer a little better for his own. Let him but answer for his own, and I will be satisfied; but he will not do that. And I must tell him, that denying his sense, is not answering for it. For for all his impertinent Rhodomontade, that which I have said, is his sense, or else his Book is not his sense: for what does he mean by Illegal Powers, but powers contrary to Law? And (which is the Cream of the Jest) he immediately adds, I say indeed, that a Prince who is settled in the possession of Sovereign Power, though he have no Legal Title to the Crown, has God's Authority; i. e. he says the same thing, that he makes such a terrible swaggering at me for saying: for says he, and what then? therefore Possession of Sovereign Power contrary to Law, is God's Authority, how does this follow? And how does it otherwise then follow? For what I pray is a Prince not having a Legal Title, but a Prince contrary to Law? and what is such a Prince's possession of Sovereign Power, but the possession of it contrary to Law? And if he hath God's Authority by virtue of his possession of Sovereign Power contrary to Law, than it follows that possession of Sovereign Power contrary to Law, is God's Authority. And does not he tell us, 
Vind. p. 46.  That the Authority of Government, is always God's Authority: And what does he mean by Government, but the Possession of Sovereign Power? And what hath he to say to this? He adds, Cannot God settle a King upon the Throne, without a Legal Title, but he must be presumed to give him Authority, whenever he has power, to govern by an arbitrary will, against the Laws of the Land? Cannot God make a King, without giving him Authority to do all that he has power to do? Now the Dr. has the best faculty of turning his Questions that ever I saw, when he is to prove, that God gives his Authority to Illegal and Usurped powers; then the Question is, Cannot God make a King without a Legal Title? Is God confined to Humane Laws in making Kings? And when he is to prove, that these Usurpers are to govern according to Law, than he is for ask, Cannot God set up a King, without a Legal Title, but he must be presumed to give him Authority to govern against the Laws of the Land? No doubt but God can do both; but that is not the Question. And if we must answer by Questions, his Question plainly turns upon him, Cannot God make a King, without confining him to govern by the Laws of the Land, as well as without a Legal Title? No doubt he can do that if he please. And this brings us to the merits of the Cause, which the Dr. would fain shift off. And the Question is, if a Prince in a Limited Monarchy, possesses himself of Arbitrary Sovereign Power, and actually administers it contrary to Law, whether according to his Principles he hath not God's Authority, and aught to be obeyed, and we have not the same Evidence that he hath it that we have, that Usurped Powers have God's Authority. And that is Possession and Providence: and if we must presume, that God gives his Authority to an Usurper, who is in possession of Sovereign Power contrary to Law, I would fain see a Reason why we must not presume, that God gives his Authority to a Prince, who possesses and exercises Arbitrary Sovereign Power contrary to Law? And if the Law must be our Rule, against the possession of Arbitrary Power, why is it not also our Rule, against Usurped Powers? The one is as consistent with Sovereign Power, as the other: The one God may give as well as the other; & the Evidence that God does so, is the same in both. The one is as contrary to the Law as the other; and the denial of it, as much confines God to Humane Laws as the other. And here my Argument plainly affects him, which he takes no manner of notice of; The assuming an Illegal Power, 
Postscript, p. 16.  is no more against the Laws, than Illegal and Usurped Powers: And God, when he gives Authority, is confined to our Laws and Constitutions, no more in the extent of Power, than in the Person; and the only Evidence that we have that God gives it, is the possession of it by Providence; and whatsoever Power a Prince is possessed of, hath the same Evidence; and consequently is a branch of the same Authority. And Arbitrary Power is not inconsistent with the notion of Sovereign Power, and whatever limitations of Government there are now in the World, they are only limitations made by Humane Laws, and of no force against God's Authority. But this it seems was so very ridiculous, that the Dr. had not one single word to say to it. And I must tell him, that I am not only capable of thinking it an argument against him, but I am capable of thinking it such an argument as he cannot answer, without quitting some of his Principles. And because he despises it so much, I do here provoke him to it. And in the mean time, 'tis very ridiculous, to scorn an argument; and when he comes to answer it, to leave out the whole strength and force of it.  
The Reason I added to confirm my Argument, was, For the formal Reason of Obedience to such a Prince, is, because he hath God's Authority; and the Evidence that he hath that Authority, is, because he is possessed of Sovereign Power. He answers, Suppose this, though God's Authority be the formal reason of our obedience to a Prince, yet it is not the Rule of our obedience. Very well! Then the Law is our Rule: and why I pray, is not the Law our Rule, with respect to the Person, as well as with respect to the duty we own him. The Law directs to the Person, as well as to the duty, and directs the duty only to that Person: By the Law a Prince ought not to have Arbitrary Power; and by the same Law, an Usurper ought to have no power at all. If therefore the Law be our Rule, for the same reason that we ought not to obey the acts of Illegal Power, we ought not to obey Usurped Powers at all. 
Vindic p. 72.  But the Dr tells us, The Authority of God, is only an authority to govern according to the Laws of God and Nature, or the Laws of the Land. Now the Doctor knows well enough, that in this Argument I oppose Arbitrary Sovereign Power, not to the Laws of God and Nature, but to the Laws of the Land, even in the same sense the Dr. understands Usurped Powers; and if possession contrary to Law, gives Authority to Usurpation, why not to Arbitrary Power? But that I doubt, is a Ridiculous Question too: for men do not love to be asked more Questions than they can answer. He adds, Tho Sovereign Princes may have such an Authority as must not be resisted, yet in a Limited Monarchy, they have no more Authority from God to transgress the Laws of the Land, than in an Absolute Monarchy, to transgress the Laws of God and Nature. The Proposition couched in these words, is this, That in a Limited Monarchy, a Power that transgresseth the Laws of the Land, is not God's Authority. And then farewell to Usurpation, that has not God's Authority: For the very being of Usurped Powers, is a fundamental transgression of the Laws of the Land. And if men have no Authority from G●d to transgress the Laws of the Land, than an Usurper hath no Authority at all. Arbitrary Power transgresseth the Laws of the Land, and therefore it is not God's Authority; and Usurpation transgresseth it ten times more: and therefore, if the Reason be good, that also is not God's Authority. He goes on, indeed Arbitrary Government is not the possession of Sovereign Power, which is God's Authority, but the Arbitrary Exercise of it. What does he mean by this? Is not Arbitrary Power God's Authority in an Absolute Monarchy, as well as limited power in a Limited Monarchy? If he means this, he ought to have proved it; and he may yet prove it, if he thinks it will help his Hypothesis. But it is the Arbitrary Exercise of it: Of what, of God's Authority, or of Sovereign Power? If Arbitrary Government, be the Arbtrary Exercise of God's Authority, than it ought to be obeyed; for God's Authority ought to be obeyed, in what manner soever it is exercised. It or Sovereign Power, than I desire to know, why the Arbitrary Exercise of Sovereign Power, is not the Possession of Arbitrary Sovereign Power, as well as the Exercise of a Limited Power, is the Possession of that Power. The Dr. tells us over and over, of the wonderful efficacy of Actual Government, Actual Authority, Actual Administration, which are but other words for the Exercise of it; and which are the only Evidences that God gives it, and 'tis that whereby God invests them with it. And why is not the Actual Exercise of Arbitrary Power, or the Arbitrary Exercise of Sovereign Power (for I know no difference) as well the Evidence that God gives it, and signs of his investing them with Arbitrary Government, as Actual Government, and Actual Administration is an evidence, that God gives to them that Government they actually administer. Arbitrary Government, not confined by Humane Laws, is one kind of Government, and a Government limited by Humane Laws, is another kind; and why is not actual administration, an equal Evidence, that God gives one, as well as the other, that he makes a Legal King an Absolute Monarch, as well as that he makes a Person who hath no Right, a Sovereign Prince? He that usurps upon the Rights of his people, is no more an Usurper, and generally much less, than he that usurps upon the Rights of the Prince: The Drs. main Principle of Providence, and his main Arguments to prove it make no difference. And it is a little mystical, and must so remain, till the Dr. explains it, why the very same Reasons will not make it a duty to submit to Arbitrary Power contrary to the Laws of the Land, as well as to submit to Usurped Powers contrary to the same Laws. He adds, And though we must obey God's Authority, it does not hence follow, that we must obey the exercise of Arbitrary Power. Now I wish he had given us a reason for this, and then we should have seen the force of his Answer. I confess, because we must obey God's Authority, it does not follow, that we must obey the Exercise of Arbitrary Power: And what is the Reason? Because the Exercise of Arbitrary Power in a Limited Monarchy is contrary to the Laws of the Land, and so is Usurpation too: and if that be a good reason against our obedience to Arbitrary Power, 'tis as good a Reason against our obedience to Usurpers  
He goes on, And yet I do not attribute God's Authority (which we must obey in Conscience) to the bare possession of Power, but to the settled possession of it, that is, with the consent and submission of the People, and could a Prince change a Limited into an Absolute Monarchy by a National Consent, Subjects were then as much bound in conscience to submit to an Arbitrary Power, as they are now to obey the Laws, but then this would not be an Authority against Law, but the Law would be changed. And this I had said before, and drawed an Inference from it: That an Illegal Power is not throughly settled, 
Postscript, p. 17.  nor does bind the Subject to obedience, till it becomes Legal; for a National Consent may part with the Rights of a Nation, as well as the consent of a Prince may part with his own Rights. But this was very ridiculous too: for the Dr. did not think fit to take notice of it, though it plainly confutes his notion of the People's Consent. The people may pass away their own Rights; but what have they to do with the Government, and to give away the Rights of that? And why may not the Consent of the Prince, part with the Rights of his People; as well as the Consent of the People, part with the Right of the Prince? And a man may as well say, that the Consent of one man, may give away the Patrimony of another, as to say, the Consent of the People, may dispose of Government, and the Rights of a Prince against his own Consent. And here is the plain difference, the Consent of the People to Arbitrary Power, makes that a Legal Government, and there is no wrong done; but the Consent of the People to Usurpation, violates the Rights of the Legal Prince, and defrauds him of what by Law is his due.  
He proceeds, But do not I say, that when the Laws of the Land contradict the Laws of God, they are no Rule to us, but their obligation must give place to Divine Authority. He should (says he) have cited the whole, That the Laws of the Land are the Rule of Conscience, when they do not contradict the Laws of God; but when they do, they are no Rule to us; So that the Laws of the Land must be the Rule of our obedience to Princes, unless they contradict the Laws of God, and I do not know that any of our Laws do that, Say you so? then the Laws of Succession must be the Rule of our obedience; and we must obey none but the Legal King. And he must find out a new notion of Contradiction, before he can prove, that the Laws of Succession in an Hereditary Monarchy, contradict the Laws of God.  
He adds, It is a certain truth, as our Author must confess, that if the Laws of the Land contradict the Laws of God, they are no Rule to us: But this proves nothing in particular, without proving the Laws of the Land are contrary to the Laws of God. If then he can prove, that by the Law of God we are bound to obey the Arbitrary Will of the Prince against the Laws of the Land whenever he will command things against Law, and has power to crush us, if we will not obey, I will readily grant, and so must he, that it is our duty to do it; but till he prove this, he must not take it for granted, there is such a Law.  
Now here we have a strain of the Drs admirable Ingenuity. An unwary Reader may be apt from hence to conclude, that the Design of my Argument ●re, had been to prove, that it was a duty to obey Arbitrary Power against the Laws of the Land; whereas it is the clean contrary, and proceeds upon the supposition, that it is not a duty: and from thence I show the absurdity of the Drs. Principles and Arguments, which equally conclude for submission to Arbitrary Power, as to Usurpation. And yet by a fine piece of dexterity the Dr. would thrust the absurdities of his own Doctrines upon me, and by a shameless insinuation make me appear to argue for obedience to Arbitrary Power, when I only argue from his Principles, and from thence show the inconsequence and absurdity of his Arguments. For thus it follows in the Dr. What he means by this argument, 
Vind p 73.  I cannot tell; if he does think there is such a Law of God, I suppose he intended in good earnest to prove, that we must submit to the Arbitrary Will of the Prince, and to condemn the opposition that was made in the late Reign to such arbitrary proceed, if he did not believe there was any such Law of God, how ridiculous was it to pretend that we must submit to Arbitrary Will and Power against Law, because when the Laws of the Land contradict the Laws of God, they are no Rule to us. Now what kind of interpretation of the Convocation are we to expect from him, who deals thus with his Adversaries? If contrary to all Justice he can turn the sense the clean contrary, to expose an argument, which he cannot answer, what wonder is it, if he wrists the Convocation to serve his Hypothesis. Does he act at this rate, and yet talk of the honesty of his adversary? Let him show where I have played such egregious tricks with any of his arguments, and I will bear the infamy, and ask his pardon to boot; but if he cannot, it returns double upon him, both in making a false charge, and condemning his adversary for that, of which himself is only guilty.  
For a conclusion of this Point, I shall bestow another Jest upon the Dr. (which also I am capable of thinking an Argument) and it is raised from his New Hypothesis of force, 
P. 13, 14.  which be tells us, will justify submission from what quarter soever it comes, that force justified the Jews acting contrary to the positive Laws of God, which they were religiously bound to observe, by virtue of their Covenant with him, and which was as sacred as any Oath, and that it will justify the Subjects of Humane Governments, whatever their Oaths, or obligations be, to submit to a new and greater force. Now from hence, I jest or argue (which the Dr. please) with respect to the Cases of Reading the Declaration, and of the Gentlemen of Magdalen College (the very instances I had urged against him) and the very words with a little variation will form it: 
Postscript, p. 16.  We thought the Laws were our Rule, and they, their Statutes, and so it seems they were, if there were no greater force to dissolve the obligation. Now I suppose, no body at that time disputed K. J's power, or force, if he had only commanded them to choose another Precedent contrary to their Statutes and their Oaths, and had not been able to crush them if they refused, than the Statutes were their Rules, and their Oaths bound them, and they were obliged in Conscience to observe them. But if he were able to crush them (as what he actually did, he was certainly able to do) then all their obligations ceased, and they might have obeyed his Command contrary to their Statutes and their Oaths, by virtue of the power and force he had in his hands to crush them and undo them. Now here is the single Question, Had the Gentlemen of Magdalen College complied with the Will and Power of the King contrary to their Statutes and Oaths, had they in so doing, been perjured? If they had, than Laws and Oaths bind against force, and men are bound to stand by them, let the Persons be never so able to crush them for Refusal. And if that force, and ten times more, would not have excused them from perjury, had they complied; I wonder how it should do it, in the greater and more public instances. For, how comes an Oath to Local Statutes, to be of more force, than an Oath of Allegiance? or (as the Doctor speaks in the instance of the Jews) than God's Covenant with his people? Or how the Statutes of a College, should be more obligatory, than the Laws of a Nation. Now we must remember that this was the Case of private Subjects, and of a private College, upon the account of which, the Dr. says, Force will justify submission, and then it is much the same thing from what quarter the force comes, when a man is under the power of a new Government, which he cannot resist, which will not protect him; nay, which will undo, and ruin him, if he will not submit, 'tis all one, etc. Now I only desire to know, why force coming from the quarter of the Legal King, will not justify submission contrary to Laws and Oaths, as well as force coming from any other quarter. And if he in any case, will ruin and undo a private Subject if he refuses, why that will not justify his actions contrary to the Laws, and his Oaths, as well as the same coming from an Usurper. And if this be the case, Laws and Oaths may serve to talk on, but in truth are of very little use, and tend to very little purpose.  
The Dr. says, He shall only add, That when the Convocation speaks of a settlement, 
Vindic. p. 73.  they mean the settlement of a Government within itself, and not with respect to foreign force and power: for so they express it, when they have established any of the said degenerate forms of Government amongst their own people, and then the Government may be throughly settled within itself, before it have a peaceable possession and settlement. The Dr. it seems was sensible, that he had not said one word of an essential branch of a Through Settlement, and that is peaceable Possession, free from the disturbance of other Claims and Pretenders. To talk of a Settlement of Possession, when the Right Owner puts in his Claim, and actually prosecutes his Title, is to contradict the sense of mankind. And he that will say, that a Possession without either Right or Peace, that when there is a dispute about the possession, but none at all about the Right or Title, is a Through Settlement, He may say any thing, and make words signify what he please: He may tell us if he will, that Usurpation signifies Law and Right; that Rebellion signifies Allegiance; that Breach of Faith signifies Fidelity; for these are not greater contraries to each other. And this I had told him before, When there is a Prosecution but of a pretended Right, 
Postscript, p. 2.  it cannot fairly be said, that such a possession is throughly settled, but when there is a plain, visible, and indisputable Legal Right against a Possessor, and that Right actually prosecuted, in such a Case to call bare possession a Through Settlement, is one of the strangest things in the World. But this the Dr. thought fit to let alone, and yet he says but just before, that he hath particularly answered all the little appearances of Reason and Arguments in the Postscript: and methinks if this would not have passed with him for a Reason, it might at least have gone for a little appearance of Reason, and might have been answered. Well! but the Convocation mean the Settlement of a Government within itself, not with respect to foreign force and power. No doubt of it: for when a Prince and People have given up their Right and submitted, what has a foreign Power to do in the matter? And if the Dr. please to prove, that the Natural and Legal King is a foreigner, I suppose it may do his Argument some service. But this is just such another Argument at this, if one man usurps upon another's Right, and unjustly possesses himself of his Estate, if the Right Owner can manage the Suit against him with his own Money, or with the Rent and Revenue of the Estate, than the Possessor is not settled in his possession; but if he borrows the money to manage it, than the other is as firmly settled as can be. But the Convocation express it, when they have established any of the said degenerate forms of Government amongst their own people. 
Convoc. p. 57  But that same own is his own; for it is not in the Convocation Book (which I note only to remind the Doctor, that little particles may slip from his Pen, as well as from others; and may make him a little more cautious, how he treats his Adversaries too severely on that account). And what then? Why then they have not established the said forms of Government amongst other people: And it would be an extraordinary Establishment indeed, if the Settlement of a Government in England should be established in China, or among the People of other Nations. And where I wonder should a form of Government be established, but among the people where it is established. And this is all the mystery of the business, and all the Convocation meant by it. And what is this to the purpose? This shows indeed, that an Establishment among one people, is not an Establishment among another people; but this does not show, that Usurpation, is an established Government by the consent of the people, when there is an undoubted Right and Title actually prosecuted against it. But I think it shows, that the sense of the Convocation is clean contrary, and the way of Expression, which the Convocation here uses, seems a good argument against the Drs. interpretation; for had they thought that the Consent of the people, was the main or only thing that established and settled any such new Government, here was the fairest occasion to have expressed it, and it can hardly be supposed they should do otherwise; and had they been of the Doctor's mind, they must have expressed it thus, When they have established any of the said degenerate forms of Government by the consent of the people. And I believe no fair Reason can be given, why they did not so express it, if they had believed it. The Dr. makes it a Reason against the interpretation of a Through Settlement by the acquisition of Right. 
Vindic. p. 4.  If (says he) this had been their meaning, it had been easily said, and had prevented all mistakes about it. And in the present Case, if this had been their meaning, it had not only been as easily said (which proves nothing) but it had been unreasonable not to have said it. It had been the plain and natural expression of their sense: and if they intended it, it is unaccountable, why they should not express it. Here they speak of the people, and with respect also to the Establishment of a New Government; and if the consent of the people in their judgements, had been the only thing that established such Governments, in all fair construction, it ought to have been expressed, when the nature of the thing, the subject matter, the form of expression, all directly lead them to it. But instead of that, all that they say, is, that such New Governments are established amongst their people, But not by them, nor by their consent. And I think from thence, there is all the reason in the World to conclude, that it was not their sense, that the Consent of the people, was the only, or the main thing that settled a New Government. And this is one Argument more against the Drs. interpretation of the sense of the Convocation.  
I now come to his Examination, 
Vindic. p. 74.  of what I alleged out of Bishop Andrews and Bishop Buckeridge, two Members of this Convocation, and of Dr. Jackson, a Learned Divine of those times, against the Drs. sense of the Convocation.  
Now here the Dr. tells me, The thing I am to prove from them is, that those who ascend the Throne by Usurpation without a Legal Right, have not God's Authority, and must not be obeyed, and that such Princes can never in the sense of the Convocation, be settled in their Thrones, or have God's Authority, till they gain some new Legal Right, by the Death or Session of the Rightful Prince, or by a long Prescription. And what need is there of all this? It is not sufficient against him and his sense of the Convocation, if I prove from them, that Usurpers are no Kings, nor have God's Authority, nor have the duties of Subjects belonging to them? I did not cite them to justify my Reasons (which yet would be easy enough to do) but against that interpretation. And that they are expressly against it, will appear upon Examination.  
The first is Bishop Andrews, who was a very Learned Member of that Convocation, and understood the sense of it as well as the Dr. and it is not very probable, that what he had, determined for Doctrine solemnly and in Convocation, be would contradict, and deliver the clean contrary in his particular Writings. I crave leave to cite the whole, because the Dr. hath not, that so we may the better see the Drs. Evasions. Upon these words, By me King's reign (Prov. 8.15.) he tells, that the Act Regnant is twofold: Some are Reges, Kings, 
Answ. to Pamphl. p. 27.  and yet reign not (as true Heirs defeated) and some reign, and are no Kings (as do all Usurpers on the Throne per fas nefasque) always it is one thing to be a King, another to reign; Joash was true King all those six years he reigned not; Athaliah reigned all those six years, yet true Queen she never was any: of such God saith, Hos. 8.9. Regnaverunt sed non à me. Why? for per me Regnes Regnant, by me Kings reign, Kings of lawful and true descent, they reign by me: Those were none such, so they reigned without any per from me; but when these meet, and they that be Reges de jure regnant de facto, than it is as it should be, and per me it is that they so meet.  
To this the Dr. says, The whole of it is no more but this, that the Bishop will not allow the name of King, to any but Kings of lawful and true descent; they are Kings, though they reign not, as Joash was; others are no Kings, but Usurpers, though they reign, as Athaliah did. And (says he) what is this to the purpose? Truly not very much, as the Dr. hath ordered the matter. He would fain persuade his Reader, that all the difference between the Bishop and him, is only about a Name, as if the saying they are, and they are not Kings, meant no more than they are, or they are not so called: the asserting the Right Heir to be King, though he does not reign, and the Usurper to be no King, though he does reign, according to him, is nothing at all but a trifling dispute about names. And when the Bishop says, always one thing it is to be a King, another to Reign, he only meant a nominal difference, and nothing at all besides. For the Dr. tells us, the whole is no more but this he will not a●cu● the name of King, etc. Now I am so well acquainted with the Drs. faculty at interpretation, as not at all to wonder at this: But he must have a very mean opinion of his Readers, that can think such things will go down with them: Is it possible, that any thing can be expressed more contradictory, than the Bishop's assertions here are to the Drs. The Bishop says, Some are Kings, and yet reign not as true Heirs; the Dr. says the contrary, He ought to be King, but is not; the man is in being, but the King is gone: The Bishop says, some Reign, and are no Kings, as Usurpers; the Dr. says, that all that reign are Kings, and particularly Usurpers. The Bishop says, that lawful Kings, reign by God; and Usurpers do not; the Dr. the clean contrary. And yet the Dr. can with great Modesty ask, What is this to the purpose? Alas, nothing at all; only it contradicts every thing in the Drs. two Books. But (says he) does not the Convocation allow Joash to be the true Heir while he was kept from the Crown? How nicely does he express this, the True Heir? Yes, the Convocation does not only allow him to be the True Heir, but the True King also, though the Dr. does not, but dates his Authority from his Coronation; and is not this very pretty? The Bishop says, Joash was true King all those six years he reigned not: and the Dr. answers, he was the true Heir, i. e. he was not the true King: for according to his Principles, there is as much difference between the true Heir, and the true King, as there is between something and nothing; And Athaliah an Usurper, though she reigned six years? Right! the Convocation does say so; and so does the Bishop, and so does the Doctor. But here is the difference, the Bishop says, Athaliah was never any true Queen, the Dr. says she was; and as true a Queen, as Joash was a King, bating only the irresistableness of her Authority; nay, in the matter now compared, she was a true Queen, than Joash was a King; for, for those six years she was a true Queen, and Joash was only a true Heir, i. e. she was Queen, and Joash was not King. A very fair Reconciliation! The Bishop's words are, Joash was King, and Athaliah was not Queen all those six years, and the Drs. sense is, Athaliah was Queen, and Joash was not King all those six years. And yet the Bishop might be of his mind, though he would not allow them the name of Kings. Yes, just as much as two persons are of the same mind, who manifestly contradict each other: What he adds about the Convocation's speaking of a King de facto, and what Doctrine he hath proved from thence, I have answered already. But for him to say, that notwithstanding his saying, that true Heirs who reign not, i. e. in the Drs. language are out of possession, are the true Kings, that Usurpers who reign, i. e. are in possession of the Throne, are not true Kings; Bishop Andrews might be of the same mind with the Doctor as to obedience to such Usurpers, is to suppose all his Readers out of their wits. For if any man can believe, that that Learned Bishop did think, that the Duties only belonging to a King, were due to a Person whom he thought to be no King, and were not due to the Person whom he thought was the King; it is high time to leave disputing, and go range ourselves in the Forest: For we must give over communicating our minds, if the sense of men cannot be learned from the plainest Expressions.  
The Dr. goes on, But the Bishop will not allow, that such Kings (if he pleases, such Usurpers, and no Kings; for that is the Bishop's Expression) reigned by God. Right! But then he does not mean, that such Kings do not exercise God's Authority; But that God did not by his antecedent will and appointment, place them on the Throne. But how does the Dr. know that, or where had he this? Does the Bishop say, or in the least intimate any such thing? No matter for that; the Dr. is resolved to make him say so, because it is for his purpose. And is not this a pure Interpreter of Authors? What Authority has he to make senses for men, which they never made themselves? He might have said, and with the same Justice and Truth, that the Bishop when he said, Usurpers were no Kings, he meant they were Kings, when he said, they did not reign by God, he meant they did reign by him. Grant but this liberty, that men may clap their own distinctions upon others, and we may easily make them say what we please: and at this rate the Dr. may make Bishops, or Convocations, or any body else, speak what he hath a mind to. Let him show if he can, where this distinction of Exercising God's Authority, though not Reigning by him, and of his Antecedent Will, are in Bishop Andrews. And if he can't, let him try if he can make another distinction, to avoid the charge of inventing a sense, and fastening it upon the Bishop, to serve his own turn.  
He adds, Thus St. Chrysostom on the thirteenth to the Romans, why did Bishop Andrews cite St. Chrysostom? Nor that neither; nor had any reference to him: and how then comes St. Chrysostom to explain the Bishop's sense? Suppose St Chrysostom was of that mind, does it follow, that therefore the Bishop was? If this be not his meaning, what does he understand by his Particle [thus]? Well! but thus St. Chrysostom on the thirteenth to the Romans: why, doth St. Chrysostom say any thing, of such Kings exercising God's Authority, though God did not by his antecedent will and appointment place them on the Throne? nor that neither; but the Dr. hath taken this distinction from Dr. Jackson, and fastened it upon Bishop Buckeridge and St. Chrysostom, though neither of them say one word of it, nor any thing like it. And in truth, in reference to Dr. Jackson himself, he both mistakes and misapplyes it, as we shall see presently. But as for St. Chrysostom, the Dr. tell us, he allows all power and authority to be of God, and to be ordained of God, and therefore ought not to be resisted, whoever has it: but yet will not say, that all Princes, who exercise this Power wickedly and tyrannically, whatever their Title be, are ordained of God. But where had the Dr. this? St. Chrysostom (as far as I can find) says nothing of this. There is nothing in him, of whoever has this power: He says indeed, the Apostle does not say, There is no Governor, but what is of God, but he speaks of the thing itself, there is no power but of God. And from whence I think it plainly follows, That a Governor, or in the Drs. words, one that actually governs, might not be of God, and consequently, such a one is not within the Precept of the Apostle, according to St. Chrysostom. But the Dr. gives a Reason, He (St. Chrysostom) thought it a reproach and blemish to the Goodness and Justice of Providence, to say that wicked, impious, tyrannical Princes, were ordained by God; but yet granted, that the Authority they exercised was God's, and must be obeyed. But this is all his own, and a Reason he hath made for St. Chrysostom, to make him speak what he thinks fit; for where does St. Chrysostom say any thing of reproaching and blemishing the Justice and Goodness of Provividence? And where does he say, that the Authority exercised, was God's Authority, and aught to be obeyed, whatever the Persons were; or as the Dr. says before, whatever their Title be? Upon this the Controversy turns, and St. Chrysostom hath not the least word of it. And I believe any man that attentively considers St Chrysostom, will find, that he delivers a Doctrine directly contrary to what the Doctor hath made for him. For he plainly intimates, that all Governors are not of God, though Government itself is; and when he comes to explain this, he does it by an allusion from Marriage; That a woman is joined to a man by God, that is, by God's Institution of Matrimony, not that every one that co-habits with a Woman, is therefore joined to her by God. Now if it will be admitted, that this allusion explains St. Chrysostom's meaning (and I think that cannot be doubted) than we have a pretty clear account of what he means, when he says, all Governors are not ordained of God; Marriage is of Divine Institution, as well as Government: But as every man that co-habits with a woman in the Drs. phrase, is in possession, is not therefore joined by God, n●● is any Matrimonial Relation contracted; so every one that possesses the Throne, is not therefore ordained of God for a Prince or Ruler; an Adulterer is not a Husband of God's making, however he may unlawfully or providentially cohabit with a woman: nor is an Usurper a King of God's making, however he may providentially exercise the Government: and the Doctor may as well say, that St. Chrysostom granted that any man that co-habits with a woman ought to be obeyed, and to have the duties belonging to a Husband paid to him, though they are not joined together by God, as that he grants, that a Governor exercises God's Authority, and aught to be obeyed, though he will not allow that such Governors are ordained of God.  
The Doctor adds, The Bishop and others will allow what St. Chrysostom would not, that most wicked Tyrants, who have a Legal Title, 
P. 75.  are ordained of God, but are afraid to own that Princes, who ascend their Thrones by unjust means, are set up by God; but it does not hence follow, that they denied their power and authority to be God's, or that Subjects ought to obey it. And he adds, the Convocation affirms no more in that mighty place. And then he concludes, so that Learned men may differ in this point, whether illegal Usurpers are placed in the Throne, by the overruling Counsels and appointment of God, or only by his permissive Providence, and yet agree in the main Conclusion, That the Authority they exercise, when settled in their Thrones, is God's Authority, and must be obeyed. Now this is a dextrous method of interpretation, and a curious way to avoid the force of any Allegations. And Authors must be very stiff and stubborn, if they will not yield and be brought over, when we may make distinctions for them, which they never made themselves, and then draw a sense for them out of our own Distinctions. The Question is concerning the sense of Bishop Andrews: The Doctor citys St. Chrysostom, to prove the Bishop's sense; and to make that good, he says, the Bishop and others will allow more than St. Chrysostom would; and at length concludes, That Learned Men may differ as to the placing an Usurper on the Throne, whether by the Counsel or permission of God, and agree in the main conclusion, that they exercise God's Authority. But where I pray, is this difference? And where is this agreement? is there any thing like it in Bishop Andrews? Not a word of that. He tells us indeed, we have an express determination of this matter by Dr. Jackson. And suppose we have, what is that to the purpose? We are not now enquiring into Dr. Jackson's sense, but into Bishop Andrew's sense: Suppose Dr. Jackson did differ with the Dr. about God's Council, and permission of Usurpers and yet agree in the main Conclusion, does it follow, that Bishop Andrews did so likewise? or that when he says, Kings that reign not, are true Kings, and Usurpers that reign, are not Kings, he speaks it with reference to such difference, or to such agreement, though he hath not the least word or intimation of it, nor any thing like it? But of this before.  
And now let us see what Dr. Jackson says, the Doctor tells me, it is in that very Sermon to which I appeal. The words that concern the Controversy are these: But doth the Ru●e of our Apostle hold as punctually of the Magistrate, as of the Magistracy? Doth every one which resists the Magistrate, or men invested with the power of Jurisdiction, resist the Ordinance of God, as directly, or in as high degree, as he that resists the Power itself, wherewith he is invested, as he that seeks to overthrow the Magistracy? And then he repeats the observation of S. Chrysostoms' and Oecumenius, who observe, the Apostle speaks not of this or that Magistrate in particular, sed de re ipsa, and then asks, Is there any power, not inherent in some men's persons? Any Magistracy without, a Magistrate? And from thence concludes, the Magistrate must not be resisted, as well as the Magistracy. The Doctor hath repeated this at large, but for what purpose I cannot imagine: for how does any thing here, concern the dispute between us? He adds, that in the next Section Dr. Jackson makes a great difference between the power itself, and the acquasition or exercise of power. That our Apostles Rule doth not so punctually hold, of the means of acquisition of power, or of the exercise of it, as it doth of the power, or Magistracy itself, albeit the power or Magistracy be always God's positive and primary Ordinance always an effect of his gracious Providence, always a blessing to any Land or People; or the award of his antecedent will; yet the manner of acquiring this power, or the annexing it to this or that person, is not always the positive Ordinance of God, no effect of his bounty and benignity, no consequent of his antecedent will, but sometimes rather the award of his consequent will & an act at least permissive of his punitive Justice. From these words the Doctor draws this Conclusion, So that all Princes are not from God in the ●ame sense that all power is, but all Princes have that power, which is from God, and must be obeyed. But from whence does this follow, there is not a word in this last Paragraph of all Princes having that power which is from God, and must be obeyed; i. e. all Usurpers as well as Lawful Princes, as Doctor Jackson afterw rds expresses it, Tyrants by Title, but I think the clean contrary; in the former Paragraph he had said, that the Rule of the Apostle held as well of the Magistrate, as of the Magistracy, and they must not be resisted: But in this Paragraph he plainly tells us, that the Apostle's Rule doth not so punctually hold, of t●e means or acquisition of power. 'Tis true indeed he says, that Magistracy is always God's positive and primary Ordinance, but the means of acquiring this power is not so, but sometimes the award of his consequent Will, which the Doctor hath put into great Letters, as if they were much for his purpose; whereas all the meaning of that is, as Dr. Ja k on himself explains it, that the one is always an e●fect of his gracious Providence, always a blessing towards a Land, or People, but the other is sometimes an act at least permissive of his punitive justice. But what is this to Obedience or Resistance? I hope God's punishing people by an Usurper, is not an argument, that therefore they ought to obey him in conscience: and the truth is, Dr. Jackson in this Paragraph does not at all concern himself, with any thing that relates to Obedience to Usurpers, but speaks to that in the next Section, and there plainly affirms, that Usurpers may be resisted; and that will be considered presently.  
In the mean time, before I take leave of Bishop Andrews, I shall give the D another Quotation out of him, and shall leave it to his consideration, and Distinctions: 'tis in a Sermon preached 16.0. on 1 Chron 16.22. Vnxit in Regem, Royal Unction gives no Grace, but a Right Title, on●y in Regem, to be King, that is all, and no more; it is the administration to govern, not the gift to govern well; the Right of ruling, not the ruling right; it includes nothing but a due Title, it excludes nothing but Usurpation: who is anointed? on whom the Right rests; who is inunctus? he who hath it not; suppose Nimrod, who cared for no anointing, thrust himself in, and by violence usurped the Throne, came in like one steeped in vinegar, than anointed with oil, rather as a Ranger over a Forest, than a Father over a Family, he was not anointed nor any that so come in: But on the other side, David, or he that first beginneth a Royal Race, is as the head, on him is that right of ruling first shed; from him it runs down to the next; and so still even to the lowest borders of his lawful issue. Remember Job 36 7. Reges in solio collocat in perpetuum, it is for ever God's claim, never forfeits his character never to be wiped out, nor scraped out; nor Kings lose their right, no more than Patriarches did their Fatherhood.  
My next Testimony was from Bishop Buckeridge, (another Learned Member of that Convocation): 
Vind. p. 76.  And the Dr. says, He speaks exactly the sense of the Convocation: And I say so too; but here we differ: for I affirm, that he does not speak the Doctor's sense. And if he would have repeated what I have cited out of him, it would have plainly appeared: But he did not care to do that; and therefore I must be forced to do it; 
Answer to the Pamphl. p. 27.  and we shall soon see the difference. I had cited out of him, that he had laid this down as a general Doctrine, There is a great difference between a Tyrant reigning by a lawful Title, 
Dispar vero est ratio Tyranni legitimo jure regnantis, etc. Roffens. p. 919.  and a Tyrant without Right and Title, and invading the Kingdom by force; if a Lawful King exercise Tyranny, he cannot be compelled by the Bishops, Nobles, or People, etc. such a Tyrant being in the Throne by a just Title, is ordained of God, and he who resists him, resists the Ordinance of God: But if any man snatcheth the Kingdom by force and Tyranny, he is not a King, but an Enemy, and it is lawful for any of the people to do the same to him, as they may do to an enemy. And what did the Doctor say to this? why truly not one single word, nor so much as vouchsafe to take the least notice of it. And let any impartial and unprejudiced Reader judge, if the Doctor's Hypothesis and Interpretation of the Convocation be not as direct a contradiction to this as words can make it. The Bishop makes a manifest difference between a Prince by Right and Title, and an Usurper, with respect to the People's Obedience, that a lawful King though he rules tyrannically must not be resisted, that an Usurper is no King but an Enemy, and may be resisted as an Enemy. Nay he adds further, 
Communis opinio est, quod in hoc cast. licet unicuique subdito talem Tyrannum & invasorem occidere. ib.  That it is the common opinion that in such a case it is lawful for any Subject to kill such a Tyrant and Usurper, and which opinion he himself expressly approves (pag. 922.) And now does not every body see what Agreement there is between the Doctor's Hypothesis, and the Doctrine here delivered by Bishop Buckeridge? The Doctor tells us, as the sense of the Convocation, That those who have no Title to the Throne may have God's Authority. The Bishop (by necessary implication) intimates that those only who are in the Throne by a just Title are ordained of God, and consequently those only have God's Authority. The Doctor says, that such Princes in possession of the Throne without Title ought to be obeyed for Conscience sake; the Bishop says they may be resisted and killed. But this the Doctor did not think fit to meddle with though it directly affects him, and the whole design of his book; but instead of that fal●s upon another citation, and makes some Cavils upon it (for they are no better) as we shall see upon the examining it.  
He tells me, I did well to cite the Passage honestly, but not so to corrupt it with my comment; for (says he) he turns a disjunctive into a conjunctive: The Bishop says, neither by the consent of the People, nor by the prescription of six years, which supposes that either the consent of the People or a long prescription would give a Right; and he expounds it of both together, That a Right to the Government is acquired by a Prescription, and that is a long uninterrupted possession joined with the consent of the people.  
But why did not the Doctor go on? my very next words are, 
Answ. to Pamph. p. 28.  And so it follows a little after when in answer to Bellarmine 's objecting, etc. And what does and so it follows mean? I prove this last part therefore not from the disjunctive before, but from the Answer that follows, which is to Bellarmine's instances of Tyrannical Government that became lawful by the Consent of the People, as the Caesars, 
P. 921.  Goths and Lumbards', (accedente populorum consersu) These Examples (says he) are nothing to the purpose, for these Governments were in their infancy, scarcely constituted and confirmed, etc. And then immediately adds, Governments indeed acquired by the Right of War by Prescription usually become lawful; 
Imperia vero jure belli acquisita, etc.  but in the Tribe of Judah, the Kingdom by the appointment and promise of God belonged to the male Heir of David 's line, and the chief Priest, Nobles, and People, could not transfer it, and it had been impiety in them, to have confirmed Athal, by consenting to her; no● was it in their power or consent to neglect or la● aside the Heir of David: and put these together, Governments indeed acquired by the Right of War became lawful by Prescription, but in Judah the People's consent signified nothing. And what is this but Prescription joined with the People's Consent? nay he expressly joins them in the Sentence immediately following, Praescriptio & Consensus Regni. And is & there a Disjunctive too? The whole Sentence is, Electio senatus, populique vel Exercitus, Praescriptio & Consensus Regni, 
P. 922.  sive Reipublicae, quae in aliis regnis Electivis aut nondum constitutis aut jure belli acquisitis locum habere possunt, in Regnum Judae locum non habent. In which short Sentence there are no less than four Disjunctives: and what fair reason can be given why this only should be expressed by a Conjunctive, except he had intended it should also be understood in a conjunctive sense. So that if the doctor had considered the whole of what I had cited, and the place I had referred to, he might have saved the trouble of crying out of prevaricating and corrupting. But why did not I express this? And what then? must a man corrupt an Author because he does not cite his words, though he gives his sense? But the reason was, because it was not at all to the purpose for which I cited the Bishop. My end was, to show against the Author of the Pamphlet, that his Notion of a Through Settlement was inconsistent with the Sense and Doctrine of Bishop Buckeridge. And therefore all the conclusion I draw from thence is this, That the Author's full possession of Dignities, Prerogatives, etc. to which our Allegiance is due, is a Notion that before now never saw the light among the true sons of the Church of England.— Now that Author had said nothing of the People's Consent, and I was not concerned to obviate a Notion which the Author with whom I had to deal had not mentioned nor insisted on. And that Answer was out of my hands, and gone to the Press, before the Doctor's Case of Alleg. came abroad, and his new business of the People's Consent took vent. And I dare be bold to say, that that Author, nor any man else of the Church of England, ever thought of it before, except it had been with thoughts of abhorrence: for 'tis a Notion with a Commonwealth in the belly on't, and plainly centres in Commonwealth Principles: for if the Consent of the People can make Allegiance become a duty contrary to Laws and Oaths, their Dissent may make it no duty contrary to the same Laws and Oaths. If their Consent can make one King, or (which is the same thing) make their Allegiance due to him when by the Laws and their Oaths they have obligations to another, they may make or unmaker Kings as often as they please; for their consenting to one is the discharging another, and at length all the business of Governments will be resolved into the People's Consent. But to return.  
But does not the Bishop say, That Athaliah had not acquired a Right to the Crown, neither by the Consent of the People, nor by the Prescription of six years? Right, but what follows is not so, which shows what his judgement was that such an Usurper as Athaliah might acquire a Right to the Crown, either by the Consent of the People or long Continuance. Bellarmine indeed had objected, That Athaliah's Government was approved by the People's Consent, and that she had reigned quietly six years. And the Bishop answers, she had acquired a Right neither by the Consent of the People, nor by Prescription. But it does not follow that therefore he thought the Consent of the People in such a case as Athaliah's, where the right Heir was in being and claiming, would make a Right. He proves indeed they did not consent because they ought not to have consented, which is both against Bellarmine and against the Doctor; and one of his Reasons is, That Jehoiada had been a Traitor to the heir of the Crown, and to the King himself. And the Reason he gives of that is, (and let the Doctor observe it, 
Filius enim in regnis haereditariis in ●●so instanti & articulo mortis paternae rex est ipso jure, & ipso facto. p. 920.  For in hereditary Kingdoms in the very instant and moment of his Father's death, the son is King ipso jure & ipso facto. He seems indeed to argue from Bellarmine's Principles, and sarcastically returns them upon him, siccine vero, is it so indeed? What is the reason then that so soon as they hear of the then King Joash, they so easily and so unanimously conspire against Athaliah? Had they no scruple of Conscience, no remorse, to betray her whom by their own free Consent they had made their lawful Queen? And it is demonstration that the Bishop answers upon supposition only, and not upon his own Principles, as if he had thought the Consent of the People in such a case would have made a lawful Prince and have conveyed a Right and Title to the Government; for he expressly says in this very Case, p. 922, That the Consent of the Kingdom (in the Doctor's phrase) a National Consent, had no place in the Kingdom of Judah, and upon this occasion delivers a Doctrine in general concerning hereditary Kingdoms, The Priests, 
In vero rege haereditario declarando & inaugurando potestatem habent sacerdotes, Proceres, & populus, at jus Regni confert deus & natura non Respublica. p. 923.  Nobles and People, have a power in declaring and inaugurating the true King; but God and Nature confer the Right to the Government, and not the Commonwealth. Which is a sufficient evidence what the Bishop's judgement was in this point, and that his judgement was not (as the Doctor says) that such an Usurper as Athaliah might acquire a Right to the Government by the consent of the People. But suppose it was? What service would that do the Doctor? the Doctor's own judgement is otherwise. If the Bishop did think that an Usurper might acquire a Right by the consent of the People, the Doctor thinks he is mistaken. And how can such an instance, if it were true, serve his purpose? But the Doctor is for drawing the conclusion without admitting the Premises; nay he is for drawing the same conclusion from contrary Premises. Suppose the Bishop did believe that the consent of the People conveyed a Right and Title to the Government, (in the forementioned case of a competition between an Usurper in Possession and the right Heir out of Possession) and from thence should conclude that these Governments should be obeyed, not as usurped Powers, but as having a Right, and being legal Governments. And what signifies this to the Doctor, who admits they have not Right nor are legal, but usurped Powers? The Doctor hath a pleasant Evasion for this, 
Vindic. p. 23.  i. e. (says he) Such a Right as makes Obedience due to Princes thus settled without a legal Title. Which is a very dexterous interpretation of the Bishop. The Bishop's words are, by their consent making a lawful Queen, 
P. 920, 921.  conferring a Right and Title, acquiring a Right to the Government [Reginam legitimam fecerunt— ut usurpatrici jus & titulum Regni conferret,— nec jus Regni acquisivit] which according to the Doctor's vein of Interpretation signifies a Right to Obedience without a legal Title. And yet at the same time tells me, I greatly prevaricate in pretending to give the Bishop's sense. 
Vind. p. 23.  But what the Bishop's own judgement was, with respect to the People's consent conferring a Right to the Government, may be seen above, and also an express determination; as may be seen at large p. 291.  
My next citation is out of Dr. Jackson, and the Doctor allows it, That a mere Usurper or a Tyrant by Title may be resisted by violence even to Deposition or Death. And then he makes his Exceptions, Our Author confesses Dr. Jackson will not allow Resistance to be made by every body, but he says it with this Qualification save in the Right and Interest of the right Heir, or by his Commission or Command. And here he tells me, I have made a Conjunctive a Disjunctive Or for And. Now I own that is made in the Print, but it was not made in the Copy, which was carefully and verbatim transcribed from Dr. Jackson, but by the mistake of the Printer, and I must tell the Doctor, I had not the Correction of the sheets as they came from the Press, but they were forced to take their chance, and there were a great many more Errors than that; and 'tis likely there will be as many in this; and I know not how to avoid it. But after all, there was no need of such an outcry about it, for the change of that Particle makes no change in the Argument; and 'tis equally valid against him with and without that Particle.  
The Doctor hath not transcribed what I cited out of Dr. Jackson, but hath given us the next Paragraph, and appeals to the Reader on which side Dr. Jackson is, and therefore I shall observe his method, and consider whether what he hath cited makes for him, and then show how that which I have cited makes against him.  
The Paragraph is this, and the Doctor hath cited it at length: So than a Tyrant or Usurper may be deposed or resisted, but thus resisted he may not be by every man who knows him to be an Usurper: for a man may transgress this Rule of the Apostle and resist God's Ordinance by resisting the power wherewith he is invested, though not simply by resisting him, Aliud est Magistratum esse aliud 〈◊〉 in Magistratu esse, aut Magistratum gerere. It is one thing to be a true and lawful Magistrate, another thing to bear or execute the office of a true Magistrate. The Acts of a false Magistrate or Intruder, whilst he is in Magistratu in the office itself, are of validity, his Person is to be obeyed, not resisted by every man, until he be declared to be an Usurper or Intruder by some higher Power or Authority. Few Tyrants have gotten investiture or admission to Royal Power by more indirect means than Richard III. in this Kingdom did, yet many Acts and Exercises of Royal Power, though proceeding from him, were legal, and of validity; nor did they resist the Ordinance of God that bare office under him, and obeyed his Summons, whether for Parliament, or other business of State. It had been a sin for any man of his own private head to have killed him, a belt all the space of his reign he did resist the Ordinance of God; this belongs to the higher Powers only, or unto them to whom the supreme Power by Right is annexed: and so Henry of Richmond was authorized by God's Ordinance to execute Vengeance and to bring Condemnation on this Tyrant, which every man might not have done, which perhaps no other might have done save in his Right and Interest, and by his Commission and Command.  
This is the entire Paragraph, which the Dr. leaves his Reader to judge on which side Dr. Jackson is, and I will leave him to judge whether these plain propositions are not deducible from it, and then let him make his best of the rest.  
1. That every man may not resist an Usurper, though he knows him to be so.  
2. That the Acts of a false Magistrate or Intruder, while he is in the office are of validity, his Person is to be obeyed and not resisted by every man. But than it is with this qualification, until he be declared to be an Usurper or Intruder by some Higher Power and Authority; but then by consequence when he is so declared, his Acts are not of validity, nor is his Person to be obeyed, (and let the Dr. remember that too) and who are those Higher Powers that may declare this, why if the Dr. would have mentioned what I had cited, it would have appeared to have been the Rightful King: And it is sufficiently expressed in this Paragraph, them unto whom the Supreme Power by Right is annexed; and this confutes all the Drs. Principles and Arguments. For then the Prince out of Possession is our King and the Higher Powers, And there is nothing of duty owing to an Usurper, whensoever he please to declare him so: I wonder the Dr. did not think of this, and tell us as he does about receiving a Commission from a dispossessed King. That the great Question is, whether Subjects may lawfully hear a Proclamation from the dispossessed Prince; which would have been a fine compliment to Dr. Jackson. He supposes the Rightful Prince may declare the Possessor an Usurper, but at the same time supposes there are no ways whereby he can declare it, or (which is all one) that no body c●n take notice of his Declaration. For this Declaration ●l●i●●ly (in the sense of Dr. Jackson) respects those under the Usurper, as the validity of his Acts, the obedience to his P●●s●n.— These respect only those under the Usurpers Power; and then I would ask the Dr. whether a Rightful Prince actually insisting upon his Right, and making war in prosecution of it, be not a sufficient Declaration as to this point?  
We are now come to matter of fact, the Case of Richard the Third: And from what Dr. Jackson says▪ these things are plain.  
1. That Richard the Third came to be invested with Royal Power by very indirect means.  
2. That many Acts of Royal Power though proceeding from him were legal.  
3. That they that bore office under him, or obeyed his summons to Parliament did not resist the Ordinance of God.  
4. That it had been a sin for any man of his own private head to have killed him. And this the Dr. hath put into great black letters, as if there were some very great matter in it: But in truth it is nothing at all, for I do not know that it is a Question between us, whether any man of his own private head may kill an Usurper, whatever some learned men have said about it. But this I can tell him, that Dr. Jackson expressing it with this cautious limitation, plainly supposes that be thought it might be done by private men, though not of their own private Heads. And therefore,  
5. Every man is not Avenger of such as resist the ordinance of God, i. e. of Usurpers, which plainly supposes that some men are: And Dr. Jackson immediately tells us who are, This belongs to the Higher Powers only, or unto them to whom the Supreme Power by right is annexed, i. e. The Rightful Prince hath Authority, and is an Avenger of an Usurper. And so Henry of Richmond was authorized by God's Ordinance, i. e. he was the Right Heir for that the Dr. plainly means by God's Ordinance, (This indeed is a mistake in History, but that is nothing to the Argument) and upon that account, had authority to execute vengeance on him; which every one might not, which perhaps no other might have done save only in his right and interest, and by his Commission and Command; i. e. tho others may not do it of their own private heads, yet they may in the right and interest, and by the Commission and Command of the Right Heir. And now we have it with the Conjunctive, and what hath the Dr. to say to it? he tells us, who ever doubted, 
Vindic. p. 77.  but a Rightful Prince, when dispossessed unjustly may recover his Throne if he can, and dispossess the Usurper, or that those who lawfully receive Commissions from him may lawfully fight in his quarrel. But the great Question still remains, whether Subjects may lawfully take Commission from the dispossessed Prince, to fight against the Prince, who is settled in the possession of the Throne; this Dr. Jackson does not say, and therefore he can do our Author no service. Right he does not say it, nor was there any reason for it, but this he says, that the Right Heir, or dispossessed Prince is the Higher Powers, and it is a great Question indeed, whether the Subjects may lawfully take a Commission from the Higher Powers, and the instance makes this as clear as the Sun, Dr. Jackson says, perhaps no other Person might have done it, save only in his right and interest, and by his commission and command; and in whose right and interest, etc. did he mean? why truly in the right and interest, and by the commission and command of Henry of Richmond; and who I pray were the men that took Commissions of him, and fought for him? why truly no body else, but the Subjects of England even at the same time that the Usurper actually governed; and then the Subjects may lawfully take Commissions from the Right Heir, to fight against the Prince, who is settled in the Possession of the Throne. The truth is any man who is not concerned it should mean otherwise, will easily see, that what Dr. Jackson here obviates is the resisting or killing an Usurper of a man's own private head, but by no means to prejudice the Right and Interest of the Lawful Prince; as appears plainly by the former limitation, that the Acts of a false Magistrate are of validity, and his Person is to be obeyed, until he be declared an Usurper by some Higher Power. And the Case of Richard and Henry is but an example to illustrate the Doctrine he had before delivered; and when Henry of Richmond had declared Richard an Usurper, (as he manifestly did by making war upon him) the validity of his Acts of Government and Obedience to his Person fell from him, and centred in the Higher Powers and in the Ordinance of God; and 'tis ridiculous to question the lawfulness of taking Commissions from the Higher Powers, to fight against a Prince who hath no Authority, and when there is no obedience due to him. And by this time the Dr. may see what great Reason he had to appeal to his Reader to judge on which side Dr. Jackson is.  
As to the validity of the Acts of Government by an Usurper, the Dr. may be satisfied in the Case of Allegiance to a King de facto. And that worthy Author hath since given him abundant satisfaction.  
We have now seen how much that which he hath cited out of Dr. Jackson makes for him, in the next place let us consider, how much that which I have cited makes against him, he did not care to repeat it; but thus it is as much as concerns the Case of Usurpation.  
He who is a mere Usurper, or a Tyrant by Title may be resisted by violence even to deposition, or death, albeit he happens to exercise his power with such moderation, as would become a just and lawful King;— it is a truth unquestionable, that a Tyrant by Title, etc. may be resisted without resisting the Ordinance of God: And the Reason is plain, for that he could neither usurp, nor continue his power otherwise than by resisting some Higher Powers, or by resisting the Ordinance of God; and among others he instances, in case he usurp or exercises Royal Authority over such as have been formerly governed by Royal Succession; he openly resists power much higher than his own, whether this power be yet actually annexed to some known Persons, that have Right or Title to the Kingdom by Succession, or whether in defect of the Ancient Royal Issue, etc. from hence these things are plain.  
1. That an Usurper may justly be resisted and deposed, and therefore he hath not the  Authority of a Sovereign Prince. And the Drs. Title to his Book, and his Hypothesis do not agree; the Title is the Case of Allegiance due to Sovereign Princes: And his Hypothesis concerns only obedience to Usurped Powers.  
2. The formal reason why they may be resisted or deposed is, because they resist some Higher Powers, or they resist the Ordinance of God; and from whence it plainly and undeniably follows.  
1. That Usurpers are not the Higher Powers nor the Ordinance of God, for 'tis a contradiction to say, that those are the Higher Powers or the Ordinance of God, whose very essence and constitution consists in resisting them And this strikes at the Root of both the Doctor's Books.  
2. That the Right Heir or the King out of possession, is the Higher Power and the Ordinance of God, for otherwise it could not be said, that an intruder into the Office Royal could never usurp or continue his power otherwise then by resisting some higher power or the Ordinance of God; and as he afterwards expresses it with respect to a Government by succession. He (the Usurper) resists power much higher than his own. And if the Right Heir or King out of possession be the Higher Power and the Ordinance of God, than he is the Person within the Precept of the Apostle in the 13th to the Romans and not the Usurper. And therefore whatever may be due to an Usurper in the exercise of Royal Power in indifferent cases, nothing can be due to him in prejudice of the Right Heir, for our duty to the place and power the Usurper holds (which is the utmost Dr. Jackson allows) can never be interpreted to the wrong and injury of the Person, to whom that place and power of Right belongs, and whose it is: For I hope no duty to Usurpers will excuse us for resisting the Higher Powers, and the Ordinance of God; and if the Right Heir be the Higher Power and the Ordinance of God, than whosoever resists him, resists the Higher Power and the Ordinance of God: And I would fain know, if the Usurper by resisting the Rightful Prince, resists the Higher Power and the Ordinance of God, why also every man else that resists the rightful Prince does not likewise resist, the Higher Power & the Ordinance of God. And the Dr. may try if he has a distinction that can make it a duty to obey Usurpers, in opposition to St. Paul, who commands us to obey the Higher Powers, and who are ordained of God.  
And thus Dr. Jackson himself expressly determines it in the very case of Richard the Third, He tells us, (3. Tom. p. 881.) They were not Traitors that and yield obedience to the Laws made by him, or submit themselves unto the Magistrates of his appointment, save only in Cases wherein the Laws made by him might prejudice the fundamental Laws of this Kingdom, or cut off the Right of Succession to the Crown. But in case the Magistrates Earls, or Barons created by him, should have commanded their inferiors to ta●e arms against the known and lawful heir to the Crown, to have yielded obedience to them in this case, had been Treason; as Rieh himself during all the time of his Reign was no better than a Traitor.;  
I have one thing more to observe from hence, and that is, that the Rightful King out of Possession is not only the Higher Power, but that he has the Power actually annexed to his Person, for thus Dr. Jackson expresses it, the Usurper openly resists Power much higher than his own, whether the Power be yet actually annexed to some known Persons that have Right or Title to the Kingdom by succession; which overthrows at least one half of his two books, and all his Arguments about actual Authority, etc. And besides fully answers his little exception about receiving Commissions from them; for it is ridiculous and a contradiction to talk of Power being actually annexed to the Person of a Prince, when he cannot exercise any Acts of Power and Authority.  
The Dr. comes to examine another citation I produced out of Dr. Jackson. And ushers it in with this laudable preface; But this he has so shamefully mangled, that a little discretion would have taught him rather to have left it out, then to have betrayed so much dishonesty in his quotations. These are hard words, and the Dr. is bound in honour to make them good, for it is shameless with a witness to charge a man at this rate, and have nothing to say to justify it; And let us see what it is he does say: He says, he will give the Reader the entire passage.  
1. Jehoiada in that he was High Priest, was a prime Peer in the Realm of Judah, and invested with the Power of Jurisdiction next in order and dignity to the Higher Power; This (saith the Dr.) our Author leaves out: Right I did so, and what reason was there to transcribe more than was necessary, and concerned the question. I wonder he did not charge me with dishonesty for not quoting the whole Sermon. But he says, it is very material, because it shows by what Authority he did it, as the ordinary Supreme Magistrate in the vacancy of the Throne, than it seems the Throne was vacant, and I would desire the Dr. to tell me when according to his Principles; when Athaliah was on the Throne, it was filled with God's Providential Queen, when Joash was crowned it was filled with a King by Divine Entail; but according to the Dr. it was never vacant, and consequently according to him Jehoiada never had any such Authority. But the truth is the Throne was vacant all the time the Usurper possessed it, i. e. it was not legally filled: And Jehoiada as a Prime Peer of the Kingdom was to take care and to exercise his Authority, that the Right Heir might be restored; as Dr. Jackson says, In the Right of this Prince, and for the actual annexion of the Supreme Power to his Person (unto whom it was de jure annexed) Jehoiada being the chief Magistrate, did by force and violence depose her. And not as the Dr. seems to insinuate, that he had any power to make a Decision of a controversy between the Right Heir, and the Usurper, and which way soever he determined it, the People were bound to acquiesce; for Dr. Sherlock adds, that is not merely in his Right of Priesthood, as the Papists pretend, nor merely as a Subject, but as being the Higher Power and Authority to whom the judgement of such matters belonged, as he had observed before; what have we got here? can the Prime Peer of a Kingdom judge authoritatively and judicially of Kings? if the Dr. could persuade Dr. Jackson to say this, it might do his Hypothesis of the People's consent in Parliament some service; but his Doctrine about providence would suffer as much by it on the other hand, for then there would be a Tribunal on Earth for the decision of differences between Kings and Usurpers; 
Vindic. p. 46.  and then the Events of Providence would make no difference between private injuries and usurpations of Government. Let that go as it will, he tells us, Dr. Jackson had observed this before: Now indeed Dr. Jackson did observe, that an Usurper's Acts are of validity, etc. till he be declared to be an Usurper by some Higher Power or Authority; now transfer this to Athaliah and Jehoiada, and see what wise work we shall make on't, that is to say all the time of Athaliahs' Usurpation, Jehoiada was the Higher Powers, and then Athaliah's power must be inferior to his; and so at last he has made a pure Queen of her, to have a Power inferior and under the Authority of her own Subjects; for he tells us, Jehoiada submitted to her and aught to be justified in it. 
Vindic. p. 27.  But the truth is Dr Jackson observed nothing at all of this; by the Higher Powers he means, the Right Heir and Lawful King as I have showed before; and in this very place the Dr. citys out of him; he says Jehoiada was invested with the Power of Jurisdiction next in order and dignity to the Higher Power; and I suppose next to the Higher Power, is not the Higher Power itself. And therefore Jehoiada deposed and killed Athaliah, not merely in right of his Priesthood, nor merely in Right of his Peerage, But Dr. Jackson says, expressly in the Right of this Prince, i. e. the Infant Joash unto whose Person, The Power Royal was by Right annexed. And to whom by virtue of his high Station, and his Relation to him as being the King's Uncle, he might be Guardian; and therefore the fittest to preside and manage that undertaking, but it does not therefore follow, that if he had neglected it, or took part with the Usurper, but any other Peer or Subject might have undertaken it in the same Right, and by the same Authority; and Dr. Jackson plainly intimates it by the inference he draws from hence which the Dr. conceals, though he told us he would give the Reader the entire passage; Is it then all one in these men's Divinity, for a Subject or Peer of any Realm to stand for the Right of his Liege Lord against a Stranger or Usurper, etc. So than it seems a Subject or Peer (and I hope or is a Disjunctive, a Subject that is not a Peer) may stand by the Right of his Liege Lord against an Usurper as well as a Prime Peer. The Dr. here charges me with shamefully mangling this passage of Dr. Jackson, and I shall leave it with the Reader, whether he hath not shamefully interpreted it. He adds, This is the very account the Convocation gives of it, that Jehoiada did this being the King's Uncle, and the chief Head and Prince of his Tribe, that is, not a private Subject, but a chief Prince in the Kingdom of Judah. Now the Dr. deals with the Convocation just as he hath done with Dr. Jackson, and to show what a fair interpretation he makes I shall cite the passage: Now after six years, that Joash, the true, and natural Heir apparent to the Crown, had been so brought up. 
Convoc. p. 41.  He the said Jehoiada being the King's Uncle, and the chief Head or Prince of his tribe, sent through Judah for the Levites and chief Fathers both of Judah and Benjamin to come unto him to Jerusalem, who accordingly repairing thither, and being made acquainted by him with the preservation of their Prince, and that it was the Lords will that he should reign over them; they altogether by a covenant acknowledged their Allegiance to him, as unto their Lawful King, and so disposed of things, as presently after he was crowned and anointed; which dutiful office of Subjects being performed, they apprehended the Usurper Athaliah and slew her, as before it was by the said States resolved. In all the process of which action nothing was done, either by the High Priest, or by the rest of the Princes and People of Judah, which God himself did not require at their hands: And what is all this to Jehoiadas being the Higher Power and Authority to whom the judgement of such matters belonged? where is any judicial or authoritative Act of his? he convened them indeed, and which he might do as High Priest, and Prince of his Tribe, and acquainted them with the Preservation of their Prince; and the Convocation attributes no more to him in particular; but the acknowledgement of their Allegiance, and the business of deposing and slaying Athaliah was resolved on by common consent; (by the said States) There is nothing of Authority ascribed to Jehoiada in this, and they express it yet plainer in their Canon. Or that Jehoiada the High Priest was not bound, as he was a Priest both to inform the Princes and People, of the Lords promise, that Joash should reign over them, and likewise to anoint him. Now as I take it informing is not commanding them, nor directing them by an act of Authority. And if Jehoiada had not done as he was bound, if he had not informed them, nay if he had informed them otherwise, yet if they had been informed any other way, I suppose they might have done their duty, and have acknowledged their Allegiance to their natural Prince, and have resolved together to depose and slay the Usurper, what Authority soever Jehoiada had, or how much soever he had informed or commanded them to the contrary; was it their duty to adhere to their natural Prince or not? if it was, the interposition of Jehoiadas Authority either way could not influence that; the great Authority of the High Priest might indeed facilitate and expedite the setting him on the Throne, but could not make that a duty which was not, nor make that cease to be a duty which was so before.  
And now let me ask the Dr. where is the shameful mangling and dishonesty in my not citing this passage of Jehoiadas being a Prime Peer, and invested with Power of jurisdiction next to the Higher Power? For what is that to the purpose for which I cited Dr. Jackson? The single question is, whether it be lawful to obey an Usurper in possession of the Throne, in opposition to the Right Heir out of possession; and what was the height of his Station, and the power of his Jurisdiction to that? as high as he was, it was not lawful for him, and his fact plainly declares it. His high dignity indeed made it reasonable for him to interpose his Authority in behalf of the Right Heir, and was the fittest to conduct and manage an affair of that nature, but it made no difference in the lawfulness of the thing; for if it be unlawful for a Prime Peer to join himself to an Usurper in opposition to the Rightful Prince, 'tis unlawful for a private Subject. And that was all that I was concerned in; it was foreign to the question to meddle in the dispute with the Papists, to whom this was an Answer, for they urge this fact of Jehoiada as an Act of Authority annexed to the Priesthood, And the Dr. says in express terms, That this was an Act of Authority and Jurisdiction. I will not return his scurrilous invendo of looking kindly towards Rome; but he hath given the Papist greater advantage in this Controversy than any Protestant ever did: For if it be granted, that this was an Act of Jurisdiction and Authority in Jehoiada, the Question hath a new face, and 'tis splitting an hair, whether that was the Authority of the High Priest, or of the Prime Peer; whereas all Protestants have fixed it upon a clearer bottom, and say that what he did, was in the Right of his Prince, and not by any Authority of his own; and remove the controversy off of that bottom, and admit that Jehoiada acted in a way of Jurisdiction, it will be very difficult to prove, but that the High Priest, qua so, had the highest Authority in that State, next to the King; and consequently if Jehoiada acted authoritatively it was in the capacity of High Priest, and not as the King's Uncle or as a Prime Peer.  
He proceeds out of Dr. Jackson, secondly, the Power Royal or Supreme was by right, 
Vindic. p. 78.  by the express Ordinance, and positive Law of God, annexed unto the Infant Prince, whom Jehoiada 's Wife had saved from the Tyranny of Athaliah, as being next Heir now alive unto David. In the Right of this Prince, and for the Actual annexion of the Supreme Power to his Person (unto whom it was de jure annexed) Jehoiada being the chief Magistrate in the vacancy, did by force and violence depose her who had usurped the Royal Sceptre by violence, and cruel murder of her Seed Royal. The Dr. adds, all those words in a different character are left out by our Author. And that is true, and some of them very material ones, and that is true too; for instance, In the Right of this Prince, and for the actual annexion of the Supreme Power to his Person (unto whom it was de jure annexed) Jehoiada being the chief Magistrate in the vacancy, did by force and violence depose her. Now I think this is very material to prove these two things. 1. That Jehoiada did not act judicially, and by way of Authority determine the Gove nment t●●t ●s●●, and depose Athaliah, but he ●●d it in 〈◊〉 Right of the Prince. And ●●ing the 〈…〉 Magistrate in the vacancy made 〈…〉 ●●wer and Authority, for the actu●● 〈◊〉 of the Supreme Power to his Person, unto ●●om it was de jure annexed; ie. He did right to his Prince, not as a Judge, but as a Prime Minister of great power. 2. That the Drs. outcry about the change of one particle for another (or for and) is a mere Cavil, for if what Dr. Jackson says here may interpret his sense, than the Particle and in that sentence (save only in his right and interest and by his Commission and command) is to be understood disjunctively; for 'tis not to be supposed, that such an Infant Prince could give Jehoiada a Commission And then a Subject especially if he be the Prime Peer, may depose an Usurper in the Right of a dispossessed Prince, without his Commission, or, if it may be supposed, than a Subject may lawfully take a Commission from a dispossessed Prince, to fight against an Usurper in the Possession of the Throne; and the Dr. may take his choice, and suppose which he pleases. But these it seems, were not so material as the Dr. thought fit to take notice of, but he names two, Jehoiada being the chief Magistrate in the vacancy, which (he says) shows this was an Act of Authority and Jurisdiction: But of that enough hath been said already. The other is, By the Express Ordinance, and positive Law of God, and the next Heir now alive unto David, which plainly refers to the Divine Entail on David 's Family, and distinguishes this from the Case of other Usurpers. Now I confess had I cited this passage against the Doctor, it had been reasonable for me to have repeated these words, because he lays such a mighty stress on them; but I have told him already, that by the Citations, I had only respect to the Author against whom I wrote; and my Pamphlet was in the Press, before his Book was published, and I never saw it afterwards, till it was abroad. That Author says nothing of the Divine Entail, though the Dr. does; and his Arguments about it I have considered before. But that Dr. Jackson made no such difference between the Case of Athaliah and other Usurpers appears plainly from the general Doctrine, which he delivers before. And with 〈◊〉 having recourse to that, if the Doctor would have come Dr. Jackson and me right, ●●d have repeated what I had cited out of him, it would evidently have appeared to the Reader, that Dr Jackson made no manner of difference in that respect; nor thought that the Divine Entail made any alteration, with respect to Usurpation, or the duty of Subjects; 
Answer to Pamph. p. 28.  for he draws from hence a general inference, which concerns all times and places: for it immediately follows; and which I had cited from him, and which the Doctor omits and suppresses, Is it then all one in these men's Divinity, for a Subject, or Peer of any Realm (not only of the Realm of Judah) to stand for the Right of his Liege Lord, and for the ancient Liberties of his Native Country, against a Stranger or Usurper? And for a Stranger, no Native Member of this or the like Christian Commonwealth, to throw down the Lawful King from his Throne? or to authorise his Subjects or others, to do to him, as Jehoiada did to Athaliah? And to bring in a Stranger or Alien, as he to cast out a Stranger or Usurper? This immediately follows in Dr Jackson, and I had cited them verbatim from him, which directly answer his Exceptions, and which he perfectly suppresses, and yet tells his Reader, he would give him the entire passage; and yet notwithstanding he could make this Preface to his Examination of this passage: But this (Citation from Dr. Jackson) he has so shamefully mangled, 
P. 77, 78.  that a little discretion would have taught him rather to have left it out (as it seems the Drs. discretion taught him to leave out what made against him) than to have betrayed so much dishonesty in his Quotations. Now all that I shall observe from hence is, that the Doctor is very clamorous in his charges, but very unfortunate withal; for they always turn upon him, and come home to him.  
The Dr. tells me, I conclude my Postscript with Rage and Venom: that is to say, 'tis very furious and venomous to charge Dr. Sherlock with maintaining of Paradoxes, though he hath done nothing else in his two last Books; and any man that hath heard of the Distinction of Tyrannus sine Titulo, & Tyrannus exercitio, is able to discover it. And he cannot be prevailed upon to clear himself of it, but leaves it to a Learned Pen to do it for him; which is a small demonstration, that he cannot do it himself. It was very venomous too, I suppose, to join him in this matter with Goodwin, Eton, and such as they: and I must confess, they are not very laudable Companions: But people that maintain the same Doctrines and Opinions, have no great reason to quarrel at their company: And if he does not like them, he may try if he can tell where to get any better: Would he have had me joined him with Bishop Sanderson, when he hath used his utmost skill to confute him, or with Dr. Hammond, and the other famous Worthies of our Church, when they maintain the clean contrary to what he does?  
I had cited a passage out of his Case of Resis●an e, and this is venomous too; 
Postscr. p. 17.  and how can I help it, if his Case of Resistance contains such Venom? But for part, I took it for antidote, and for that end recited it, as a Preservative and Antidote. And the Argument I raised from it, is this, That what the Doctor had laid down concerning Usurped Powers, 
Postscr. p. 18.  was the sense of the Church of England at that time. And the Reason I gave for it was, for this passage was never questioned, till he hath now done it himself. But this was so very venomous, that the Doctor would not come near it. Well! he tells us, he hath changed his opinion indeed about the Authority of Usurpers. And I have nothing to say to that; he may change his opinion as often as he please. But he tells us, he has Scripture and Reason, the Authority of the Church of England, to justify this change. But I do not think these are half so changeable as the Doctor's Principles, nor will turn with the Compass, he pretended he had them before, and with as much assurance as he does now: And whether he hath them now to justify him, is the subject of our present Controversy.  
He adds, But what a charitable opinion our Author has of the present Government, 
Vindic. p. 79.  and of all that comply with it, we may see in the parallel he makes between my Case, and that of Hazael. As if swearing to King William and Queen Mary, were as great, as notorious, as see f-evident an impiety and wickedness, as all the villainies which the Prophet Elisha foretold Hazael, 
2 Kings 8.12.  that he would be guilty of: I know the Evil that thou wilt do unto the Children of Israel; their strong holds wilt thou set on fire, and their young men wilt thou slay with the sword, and wilt dash their children, and rip up their women with child.; Now the Doctor's Reader, (especially if he be easy of belief) is to suppose that I said all these matters, and made such terrible comparisons; whereas in truth I said no such word, nor any thing like it. I compared indeed Hazael's change of mind, 
Postscr. p. 18.  and the Doctor s and what is that to the Government, or to those that comply with it 〈◊〉 wonder the Doctor did not tell me, that 〈◊〉 paralleled his Case of Allegiance, with Hazael's slaying the young men, and this would have been dreadful indeed, and would have shown, what an opinion I had of his Arguments; whereas I do not think they are half so formidable, nor will do any mischief at all. Hazael indeed, thought it was impossible for him do those things, the Prophet told him he would do, and which afterwards he actually did. And had the like Question been put to the Doctor concerning his present Opinions and Practices, I believe he would have returned such an Answer: i. e. he would have thought it as impossible for him to own and practise what he has done, as Hazael thought it impossible for him to do what he afterwards did. And what is this to my opinion of the Government, and of those that comply with it? But this is another Artifice of the Doctor's: He would fain interpret what I say against him and his Hypothesis, to be against the Government, and all those that comply: whereas I dispute against no body but him. He does not know, whether I have, or have not a charitable opinion of the Government, or the Complyers; but he knows what opinion I have of his Hypothesis and Arguments: and let him defend them as well as he can, without troubling himself with Inquiries that do not concern him, and entitling other men to matters that are peculiarly his own.  
To my Parting Request, the Doctor answers, I do affirm it again, That I was never factious against taking the Oaths, nor made it my business, to dissuade men from it; when my Opinion was asked, I declared my own thoughts, but never sought out men to make Proselytes. Now he had been told, that never was a very long time, 
Postscr. p. 18.  and some body or other might chance to remember. He answers, He fears not our Memories so much as our Inventions, and bids us produce the man. And yet for all this swaggering, the matter is not so very plain, but it needs a Distinction to help him off. And thus follows:  
Tho our Author seems very well acquainted with the thing called Faction (i. e. 'tis a very factious thing to write against the Doctor) yet he is not willing to understand the word; and therefore I must tell him, that when I say, I was never factious against the Oath, I do not mean, that I was never hearty and zealous against taking the Oath; for I hope there may be Zeal without Faction; or that when I was pressed to discourse the matter, I did not talk with as much warmth and concernment as other men. But Faction is quite another thing, it shows itself in Separations and Schisms, in Rancour and Bitness, Envyings and Emulations, in violent oppositions to Government, in changing and confining friendship to a Party, in Censures and Reproaches, in stigmatising al● Persons of another Persuasion as perjured Knaves. These were intended for a Compliment to his Adversary and the Non-swe●rers. For he tells me, I seem to be well acquainted with the thing (faction), and so I am to thank him for all these fine Characters. Now I have no Answer to hard names, but methinks he might have spared Schismatics, 
Postscr. p. 10.  till he had answered a small Question I put to him, about that affair.  
Now this is a very pleasant business, the Doctor, I suppose, would persuade me, to prove him a Schismatic, Bitter and Envious, a violent opposer of Government, etc. for not taking the Oath. And yet he is so kind to bestow all these favours upon us. And I do not know why they might not fit him as well in the same Capacity. But what he said or did, is Heartiness or Zeal, what we do is Faction, and I know not what. Now I will readily grant him, when he said he was never engaged in any Faction against the Oath, he did not intent to call himself a Schismatic, Envious, Censorious, and all the hard Names above, but that he did design likewise to quit himself of Heartiness and Zeal, is evident enough, from the second Page of the Preface to his Case of Allegiance. There he tells, Tho I refused to take the Oaths, I never engaged in any faction against it. And how does he prove that? It follows I never made it my business to dissuade men from it; when my opinion was asked, I declared my own thoughts; but I never sought out men to make Proselytes. What is this to Schism, and Rancour, and Envy, and Emulation, and all the rest of th●t Black Catalogue? May not a man make it his business to dissuade men from what he conceives an ●●l Thing, and persuade them to what he conceives a Good Thing, without presently being guilty of Schism and the Seven Deadly Sins? So that to dissuade men from the Oath, especially when not asked, is that which he means by Faction, or else his Paragraph is inconsistent with itself. And as to Faction in this kind, I tell him again, that never is a very long time. And a man that makes such a bold assertion, had need be sure of his own memory, before he charges other men's inventions. Well! But the Doctor is now for owning, that he was Henry and Zeal●us against taking the Oath. And are not these pure Characters of Zeal never to make it our business to dissuade men by all fair ways, from what we are Zealous against, and never to persuade them to what we are Zealous for? I wo●der what he means by Zeal: it is indeed opposed to Faction; but it is opposed likewise to Coldness and Indifferency. And which is yet more remarkable, he says in the same Preface, that he wished he could have done (taken the Oaths) as others did. This is an extraordinary instance of Zeal, to be Zealous against what we think an Ill Thing, and at the same time wish we could do it. He says he thought it an Ill Thing, and a few Line, after tells us, he wished he could take it? This is such a Zeal, as never was heard of: Does Zeal against a thing, use to show itself in wishes and desires towards it? This is an Argument of great insincerity, but very little Zeal; so that whatever the Dr. may speak of his Zeal and Warmth to stop an Objection, which could not otherwise be avoided, it is plain enough, that he took all care to represent it as little as possible; and he hath given such a cold and languid account of his management, while he was engaged against the Oath; That any man that is not blind or prejudiced, may plainly see, that his wh●le design, was to represent himself as low and indifferent as he was able, and by palliating and diminishing methods, to recommend himself to one Cause, by pretending such a flatness and unconcernment, as would make wise men suspect he was not very sincere in the other.  
He adds, Whereas though there had been a material perjury, a different opinion may excuse from formal perjury; 
Vindic. p. 80.  for no man is formally perjured, who does not know it. I shall not explain this by instances; for if our Author is for writing Secret Histories, I am not so at present. This is dark and mystery, and so it must remain, till the Doctor explains it. He seems to insinuate, that he knows some body or other, who have taken an Oath against their Consciences: and it m●y be so, for any thing I know. Both he and the Author of the Letter to him, are very angry and plevish with me, for charging them with Rebellion and Perjury, 
Vindic. p. 72.  although there is not the least word of it in my Book: and the Doctor knows what construction the World has always made; 
Lett. p. 32.  when men are careful and solicitous to obviate an accusation, which was never made against them.  
As for his Parting and Conclusion, I have only this to observe, That the Doctor hath the modestest way of ending his Books that ever I saw. His Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity, and his Doctrine of Selfconsciousness, he ends thus, I am pretty confident he will never be able to reason to any purpose, in this Cause again. Although he hath given his Adversary the greatest Advantage, and instead of vindicating, hath mightily prejudiced that Article of the Christian Faith, by clogging it with New Notions; and which in a settled State of the Church, would hardly have escaped Ecclesiastical Censure. His Case of Allegiance concludes, with hoping he may satisfy them (those not of his mind) that he hath something to say for himself, a Meiosis, very great, considerable, unanswerable. And he ends his Vindication, with telling me, if I will promise to examine his Arguments well before I answer, he shall expect to hear no more from me. And yet a man would be apt to imagine, that false Reasonings, Artificial Shifts and Distinctions, plain and downright Contradictions in the Premises, were an unequal foundation, to support so much Triumph and Glory in the Conclusion. However the Doctor finds he is mistaken; he hath heard from me again. But whether I have examined his Arguments well, I shall leave to the Reader's Judgement, and to the Doctor's Examination.  
FINIS.