Im●●●●atur,  
Guilford 〈…〉 nrico Episcopo 〈…〉 is Dom. Decem 〈…〉   

THE SCRIPTURES Genuine Interpreter Asserted: OR, A DISCOURSE CONCERNING The Right Interpretation of Scripture. Wherein a late Exercitation, Entitled, Philosophia S. Scripturae Interpres, Is Examined, and the Protestant Doctrine in that point Vindicated.  
With some Reflections on another Discourse of L. W. Written in Answer to the said Exercitation.  
To which is added, An APPENDIX concerning Internal Illumination, and other Operations of the Holy Spirit upon the Soul of Man. Justifying the Doctrine of Protestants, and the Practice of Serious Christians, against the Charge of Enthusiasm, and other unjust Criminations.  
By JOHN WILSON, M. A. Sometime of Kath. Hall in CAMBRIDGE  
In the Savoy: Printed by T. N. for R. Boulter, at the Turks Head in Cornhill, over against the Royal Exchange. 1678.   

Dignissimo Clarissimoque Viro 
 D. Jonathani Keat, 
 Equiti Aurato & Baronetto, 
 Moecenati plurimum Honorando Pagellas hasce 
 Genuini Scripturarum Interpretis Assertorias, 
 In debitae Gratitudinis & Observantiae Testimonium,  
D. D. D. Joannes Wilson.   

A Prefatory Address to the READER.  
Courteous Reader,  
IT is not any pleasure in Polemic Discourses that hath engaged me in this Contest. A Work of this kind is so far from affording me any true delight, in these declining years of my life, that if so concerning a Truth as I have here endeavoured to defend, had not called for a seasonable Vindication against the assaults of a Daring Adversary, I could, with much more ease, and better satisfaction to myself, have sat down with silence. I cannot but think, that by all, who take the Holy Scripgreatest part whereof do better understand their own Language than another; I accounted the Objection less valuable, and so resolved to proceed. But whereas I have here and there reflected upon some passages in the Discourses of Ludovicus Wolzogen, as they came in my way, I give my Reader to understand, that this ariseth not from any prejudice against the Person of that Noble Author, to whose Honourable Parentage and excellent Learning I shall ever render all due respects. But finding him to have so plainly injured the cause he undertook, and so unhandsomely treated our most eminent Protestant Authors that have with much Judgement and Solidity defended it; I am hopefully persuaded that those few Animadversions which I have made upon his Writings, will not be unacceptable to the Friends of Truth. The intricacy and perplexedness of his Discourse, hath put me to some pains to understand his meaning: for I have not satisfied myself with a slight or transient view: but have perused his Book over and over with intenseness of mind, that I might be sure not to mistake or misrepresent him. And I hope it will appear to the Unprejudiced, upon consulting his Book, and comparing mine with it, that I have done him right. One Advertisement more I must add: viz. That my Citations out of the said Author's Book, De Scripturarum Interpret, relate to a second Edition of it, as it stands before his Censura Censurae: and therefore the numbers of the Pages cited, are not those on the top of the Leaf, but those in the Margin, relating to the first Edition, which I suppose (for I have not seen it) was Printed in a lesser Volume.   

A Brief Summary of the Contents of the Discourse about the Scriptures Interpreter.  

The Introduction,  
WHerein the Question about the Interpretation of Scripture is propounded, the Terms explained, and the following Dissertation divided into two Parts.   

The First Part, That Reason and Philosophy are not the Scriptures Interpreter.  

Chap. 1. THe Terms explained, and the Controversy stated.  
2. The first Argument, from the condition of depraved Reason.  
3. Exceptions against the former Argument removed.  
4. A second Argument, from the Disproportion between Humane Reason and matiers of Divine Revelation; An Exception against it answered.  
5. A third Argument, from an absurdity following thereupon.  
6. A fourth Argument, from another great absurdity.  
7. A fifth Argument, from the inconvenience of opening a gap to the worst of Errors.  
8. A sixth Argument, from one great end of Scripture-Revelation.  
9 The contrary Arguments examined; the first from the multiplicity of senses in the Scripture.  
10. A second, from God's being the Author of Philosophy.  
11. A third, from the supposed sufficiency of Philosophy.  
12. A fourth, from the nature of a clear and distinct perception.  
13. A fifth, from the supposed practice of former Divines.  
14. A sixth, from instances in some considerable Scripture-Assertions, supposed not Interpretable without Philosophy.  
15. A seventh, from the Reasonableness of Religion.  
16. Scriptures alleged by our Divines vindicated.  
17. No contrariety between Scripture and sound Philosophy.    

The Second Part, That Scripture is its own Interpreter.  

Chap. 1. THe Doctrine of the Reformed Churches in this point cleared.  
2. The first Argument, from the Scriptures sufficiency; the first branch,— the Scriptures perfection.  
3. A second branch of the Argument, the Scriptures perspicuity.  
4. An Exception against the Scriptures perspicuity from the ambiguity of words, removed.  
5. A second Exception removed.  
6. A third Exception removed.  
7. A fourth, from the supposed difference between the simple sense of the words of scripture, and the true sense of the Author, removed.  
8. A fifth and sixth Exception removed.  
9 A third branch of the first Argument, the Scriptures Authenticness, urged, and an Exception removed.  
10. A second Argument, from the Scriptures being the Rule of Faith.  
11. An Exception against this Argument from Reason, being part of the Rule of Faith, disproved.  
12. An Exception from the Scripture taken materially and formally, removed.  
13. Several Objections against the Scripture being its own Interpreter, answered.    

The Conclusion,  
REflecting upon some passages in the Exercitators Epilogue.    

The Introduction.  
1. AN Entrance made into the Discourse. The Question about the Interpretation of Scripture propounded, and the Terms briefly explained.  
2. The Rule of Interpretation distinguished from the Means, which are many and various.  
3. The Doctrine of the Romanists concerning the judgement of the present Church, and that other about the consent of the Ancients, lightly touched, and passed by.  
4. The Protestant Doctrine in this point, what it is; and the contrary Novel opinion of a late Exercitator. The following Discourse divided into two parts.  
THE Holy Scriptures being 
§ I.  designed of God to be the Revelation of his Will to the Children of Men, for their conduct in the pursuit of their chief end; we cannot but judge it consentaneous to his unsearchable Wisdom, to order the Writing of them in such a manner, as that his Mind, in them, might, in the due use of his appointed means be understood by those, for whose use and benefit they were intended: And though the subject matter they treat of be often very deep and mysterious, yet the way of proposal is very condescending; and what ever is of necessity to our duty and happiness, is obvious to the diligent and humble Inquirer. Nevertheless many passages in these Sacred Records have those difficulties in them, that may exercise the study of the ablest understandings. Now in our searching out the Mind of God in Scripture, especially in those darker places, the question is, what course we are to take, and by what Rule we must be guided, that we may not bewilder ourselves, or wrong the Scriptures by our mistakes?  
To prepare the way for a Resolution of this Question, I must briefly premise somewhat touching these three Terms, the Scripture, the Interpretation of Scripture, and the Rule of that Interpretation.  
The Scripture we speak of, is the entire Volume of Holy Writ, containing all those Books both of the Old and New Testament, that are generally acknowledged to be Canonical. Whereby I mean, not the Words or Phrases of Scripture taken singly by themselves; but as they are conjoined in Propositions or Sentences; and as those Propositions stand in such a contexture, and with such a dependence on and relation to what goes before and after; and as in this Frame and Order they are the Instrument of declaring the Mind of God to Men. Now, whereas the whole Scripture, though it have the same Divine Original, and be directed to the same ultimate end, yet contains in it great variety of Matter, Doctrine, History, Prophecy, etc. It is the two former that we are especially concerned in; and therefore shall wave the Prophetic part (what is yet ●…fulfill'd) further than it may fall in with any of the other; the best and most convincing Interpreter of Prophecies being the event, unless God should beforehand unfold them by extraordinary Inspiration; which we have not in our days any ground to expect. It is therefore the Doctrinal and Historical parts of Scripture that I chiefly intent in this Debate.  
Interpretation is either Verbal or Real. The former is all one with that which is commonly called Translation. This I shall not meddle with, further, than as it is a necessary requisite to the latter; which is usually called Exposition, which is the opening of the true Sense of Scripture, or unfolding the Mind of God signified to us by those Words and Sentences of Scripture that we are searching into. Now we here suppose two things, which to a sober and considerate Reader need no proof. First, That the Scriptures are not a heap of insignificant Words, or unsensed Characters, as some late Romanists, who cry up Oral Tradition for the only Rule of Faith (so great is the power of prejudice and partial Interest) have ridiculously and profanely affirmed: but that they have a true sense Originally and Essentially in themselves, given them by their Author when they were first indicted. To deny or question this, were to impute that to the most Wise God, that common Civility forbids us to charge upon any man of ordinary understanding. Secondly, That the Sense of Scripture is fixed and immutable, not varying with the times, or altering according to the differing practice of the Church: which was most absurdly asserted by Cardinal Cusanus in Epistola contra Bohemos; as I find it attested by many credible Authors 
* Flac. Illy, Cl. Scr. part. 2. Gerard. Loc, come. de Int. Scr. cap. 2. Glass. Philol. lib. 2. pag. 280. And. Rive●. Isagog▪ cap. 18.  the Sense of Scripture is no other than what it always had, and ever will have to the World's end.  
The next thing to be considered, is the Rule of Interpretation: By which we can understand no more than the Measure, by agreement or disagreement to which we judge of the Sense of the Scripture, whether it be right or wrong, whether it be indeed (what it pretends) the true Sense of the Scripture under Inquiry, or a mistaken Sense unduly fastened upon it. Or, in fewer words, the Rule of Interpretation is that which gives us the objective Evidence by which the true Sense of Scripture is discerned, and for which it is received.  
Here let it be observed, that it is one 
§ 2.  thing to inquire what means we are to use in searching out the Sense of Scripture, and another what is the Rule that must guide us in determining what that Sense is. For though the Rule he also a Means, yet every thing that is to be used as a Means, hath not the place of a Rule. The Means are many, the Rule but one; understanding it not of any subordinate or Ministerial Rule, but of that which is Supreme and Autocratorical. For that is the Rule under our present inquiry.  
The Means subservient to the Interpretation of Scripture, are either General or Special.  
The General are two, Méditation and Prayer.  
1. There must be a fixed intending of the Mind to consider of what we either read in, or hear from the Scripture; and of whatsoever we meet with that may help us to understand it. This the Psalmist speaks of, as the daily practice of every Holy-Blessed Man, Psal. 1. 1, 2. and professeth it of himself, Psal. 119, 15. 97.  
But, secondly, there is need of Prayer also for Divine Assistance to enable us to understand the Mind of God aright. This the Psalmist used, Psal. 119. 18. 19, 26, 27, 73. Though he had the Copy of the Law by him (according to that command of God which we have upon Record in Deut. 17. 18, 19) and did use daily to read it and meditate on it; yet he thought not this enough, but begs of God to have his Eyes opened, etc. When our Saviour discoursed with his Disciples after his Resurrection, concerning Himself and his Sufferings, it is said, Luke 24. 45. that he opened their Undestandings, that they might understand the Scriptures. He did not only open the Scriptures by External Instruction, as it is said before, vers. 27, and 32. But (as the Learned Grotius observes upon the place) he opened their Minds by the Internal Illumination of his Spirit. This the Apostle prays for in the behalf of the Ephesians and Colossians (Eph. 1. 16, 17, 18. Col. 1. 9) though they had the Doctrine of the Scripture already published to them. And the same Apostle writing to Timothy, having exhorted him to consider what he had said to him, he adds this Prayer for him, The Lord give thee understanding in all things. I would gladly suppose there are none that call themselves Christians, but do own the need and use of Prayer for the understanding of Gods Will: which necessarily carries with it an interpretative acknowledgement of the need we have of something from God, above our natural abilities to understand the Scriptures. And I do profess myself to have had the better and more honourable esteem of that great Schoolman Thomas Aquinas, since I read this of him, that it was his manner, whensoever he was 
Lud. Croc. praeloq. in S. Theol. c. 3. ex Ludov. Granatensis.  either to study in private or discourse in public, to pray fervently to God for assistance, that he might learn of Him, what he was to teach others: and that he did candidly acknowledge in secret to his intimate Friend Reginaldus, that what Divine Knowledge he had, was attained by Prayer, more than by any humane Wit or Labour.  
But whose expects success in seeking Divine Assistance, it behoves him to bring with him a meek and humble Heart, awed with the holy fear and reverence of God and of his Word: For want of which too many have greatly polluted these Holy Mysteries with the wanton conceits or profane excursions of an unhollwed Wit; and mortally poisoned themselves and others, by their corrupt handling this Bread of Life.  
The Special Means of Interpretation are twofold. Some are more remote, which I shall only name, not intending any Discourse about them, because my work lies another way.  
These remote helps are. 1. Some competent knowledge of and recourse to the Original Tongues, wherein the Scripture was first penned, with a due observation of the proprieties of each Language. 2. Skill to discern between the proper use of the Words and Phrases of Scripture, and that which is Tropical and Figurative. In these, Grammar and Rhetoric have their use. 3. Some insight into the peculiar Laws, Customs and Proverbial Speeches of those times and places that the Scripture relates to: which requires some knowledge in History. There are sundry passages both in the Old and New Testament, that have respect to the known Customs of the Gentiles, as in their Divinations, Idolatrous Worships, Public Games, and many more that have relation to the peculiar Rites and Modes of speech in use among the Jews. So that there is no part of Phylology but may have its use in the Interpretation of Scripture. 4. There is great use of the several parts of Philosophy, not only moral, but natural; for the clearing of many things in Scripture, that are of natural cognisance; as about the structure of Man's Body, and the faculties of the Soul; the nature, motion, and influence of the Heavenly Bodies, the temperament of the several Regions of the World; as also about the Elements and Meteors; about Numbers and Measures; the Nature and Properties of several Creatures, Beasts, Birds, and Plants; and many other things treated of in the Bible, either by way of History or Parable. 5. Logic hath also its use here, for the better discerning the dependence of one thing in Scripture upon another, and collecting of one thing from another.  
The more immediate Means are chiefly two, 1. A due observation of the several circumstances of the Scripture to be Interpreted; who it is that speaks, where, & when, and to whom, & upon what occasion. Here also comes in the consideration of the coherents with antecedents and consequences, together with the scope and design of the Speaker: all which are of great use to discover the Sense of Scripture. 2. Comparing Scripture with Scripture, or consulting other Scriptures whether parallel with, or seemingly opposite to the place under consideration.  
Now to the use of all these forementioned Means or Helps, both General and Special, Remote and Immediate, I think all agree. But about the Rule of Interpretation there is not so universal an accord.  
The Romanists for the most part will have this Rule to be the Judgement 
§ 3.  of the present Church, meaning their own. But I shall not deal with this. It's weakness, in what Sense soever taken (for they agree not among themselves) hath been sufficiently discovered by the worthy labours of many, both formerly and of late 
* Dr. Stillingflect, Dr. Tiliotson, Mr. Pool, etc. .  
Some few there are, who tell us, that the Scripture supposes the Rule and Summary of Religion delivered from one Age to another, which we are to be guided by in searching out the meaning of Scripture. And this Rule, they say, is to be found in the Monuments of the Church, that is, in the Writings of the Fathers, and Determinations of Councils; from whence we are to receive the Sense of the Catholic Church, and thereby know what was the Doctrine delivered by Christ and his Apostles in the first Age; and according to that interpret the Scriptures. But if this must be our way of proceeding, we may very well despair of ever understanding the Scriptures, except when they speak with so much plainness, that they stand in need of no Interpretation.  
For what a heap of uncertainties must we lay for the Foundation of our Faith? It is sufficiently known, that the Fathers do oft differ from each other, and many times, are not consistent with themselves. Councils have determined contrary one to another. And some things that were (as far as appears to us by all extant Monuments of Antiquity) agreeable to the common Sentiment in our Age, were laid aside in another. Besides, either the far greatest part of the Doctors of the Church in the first Ages wrote nothing, or their Writings are lost: and of those that now go under venerable names, many are plainly spurious, and many dubious; nor is it easy in several of them, for the most sagacious Reader to find out the right. Insomuch as we cannot have any tolerable assurance what was the consentient judgement of the Catholic Church in any one age about the whole Doctrine of Faith, if we set the Scriptures aside. Therefore to frame such a Rule of Interpretation as this, is no better than to build a House of Straw upon a running Stream. There were very few Writers in the two first Centuries; and in the two following not very many: and after this the Church did much decline, and degenerate as well in Doctrine as Manners. Now suppose we were sure that the Writings in each Age were undoubtedly theirs whose names they bear (as it is past doubt we are not) who can assure us, that what was published by those few, was the consentient Judgement of all, or the major part of the Doctors of that Age wherein they lived? Might there not be a greater number differing from them, who either wrote nothing, or whose Works are perished? The plain truth is, That this way of Interpretation does in the upshot resolve the Faith of Christians, not into the certain authority of the Divinely-inspired Writings, but into the fallible Testimony of the most uncertain Tradition. But for the Readers further satisfaction, I refer him to Monsieur Daille's learned Treatise about the right use of the Fathers; a Piece of that worth, that the Lord Viscount Falkland, and his dear Friend Mr. Chillingworth, did highly esteem it, and made great use of it in their Writings against the Romanists; as we are informed by Mr. Tho. Smith (sometime Member of Christ's College in Cambridge) in his Epistle prefixed to the English Translation of that excellent and elaborate Discourse: who further also tells us that we have in that Tractat, a sufficient Confutation of Cardinal Perron his Book against King James, and by consequence of the Marquis of Worcester against King Charles; and of Doctor Vane, and other Epitomizers of the Cardinal, which I do the rather take notice of, that it may obviate the groundless prejudices that some have of late entertained against that Incomparable Piece.  
The received Doctrine of the Reformed 
§. 4.  Churches, both ourown and those abroad hath been hitherto, that the Scripture is its own Interpreter. But of late there hath been an attempt to justle the Scripture aside (as to this use) and place Reason and Philosophy in its room. There is a Belgic Exercitator, who hath written a set Discourse to 
Philosophia S. Scr. Interpres, Exerci●atio Paradoxa.  this purpose. In the entrance whereof, he tells the World, That for the extricating of himself out of those perplexities wherein Divines generally are entangled in their Expositions of Scripture, 
In Prologo.  he resolved upon mature deliberation, to make use of the same method in Theology that Des Cartes had done in Philosophy, and professeth that supposing Scripture for the Rule of Faith, all the difference in opinion among Dogmatical Divines (as he calls them, in opposition to Sceptics) appears to him to arise from hence, that none of them could certainly and infallibly prove their Interpretations of Scripture: and that after long inquiry, he found this to be the only sure and 
Ib. cap. 5. par. 1.  infallible Rule of Interpretation which himself had now found out; viz. the principals of Reason, and dictates of Philosophy. And in this new way (which he glories in the invention of) he professedly declares his dissent from Papists, Protestants, Socinians, and Remonstrants. 
Cap. 16. par. 8.  But he bends his greatest force against the Reformed Churches, endeavouring with all his might to invalidate what they unanimously maintain concerning the perspicuity of the Scriptures, and the singularity of the literal Sense, and especially about the Rule of Interpretation. For thus like a Miles Gloriosus, he begins his tenth Chapter, Devictis velitari brevique pugna imbellibus istis, etc. Having by a light and easy skirmish subdued these weak and feeble Enemies (meaning the Romanists) let us now march another way, and draw up our Battalia against those of the Reformation, and all that fight under their Colours. And in the sequel of his discourse, he hath gratified none so much as the Church of Rome; as in his positive proof (such as it is) of his novel Position, he hath not a little befriended the Socinian; though he would seem to divide himself from them both. However, both in the Astructive and Destructive part of his Book, he is a declared Adversary to the Protestant Cause.  
For my more orderly proceeding, I shall divide my ensuing Dissertation into two Parts; in the former whereof I shall deal with this Exercitator's new Device [of Reason and Philosophy being the Scriptures Interpreter] disproving it, and answering such arguments as I find alleged, or imagine may be alleged for it. In the latter I shall endeavour to clear and assert the Protestant Doctrine [of the Scriptures being its own Interpreter] and answer the objections against it.   

THE SCRIPTURES Genuine Interpreter asserted, etc.  

PART I.  
Humane Reason or Philosophy no sure Interpreter of the Holy Scriptures.  

CHAP. I.  
1. The Proposition denying Reason and Philosophy to be the Scriptures Interpreter, laid down, and the Terms explained. 2. How far they have their use, and what we deny. 3. Who they are that have ascribed too much to them.  
FIrst then, I assert against the Exercitator's 
§. 1.  Position 
* Ph. Scr. Int. c. 5. par. 1. ; That Humane Reason, or Philosophy is not to be admitted or allowed as the sure and sufficient Interpreter of the Holy Scriptures.  
For our more clear proceeding, it is requisite I should explain my meaning before I come to the proof of my Assertion. Let it therefore be considered, That Reason may be three ways taken.  
First, For that power and faculty in Man whereby he is enabled to apprehend, judge, and discourse of such objects as are presented to his understanding. Now this falls under a twofold conception, according to the twofold state of Man, Innocent or Fallen. Man's Reason as it was originally, when God first made him, was pure and clear, not clouded or blinded, not depraved or distorted, there was nothing to darken or disturb it. It was then a glorious Beam streaming forth from the Eternal Light. But Man's Apostasy, as it vitiated his other faculties, so it benighted his Reason, and exposed it to further depravation by the prevalency of disordered Passions and sinful Lusts. Yet even in this state his Reason is not lost, though it be much corrupted I am far from that late Author's mind, that says, 
* Lud. Walzog. in Censura Censur. p. 59  Quae fallet, aut falliter ratio, minimè ratio dicenda. Reason that deceives, or is deceived, is not to be called Reason. Man's Reason, notwithstanding its pravity, is still kept in a Capacity to understand his greatest Concerns, by the assistance of those gracious aids that God affords him; and hath in all ages been of great use for the good of Mankind, in reference both to men's personal and politic affairs. Therefore I need not fear to say, that next to Holiness, Man's Reason is his greatest Glory.  
Secondly, Reason is taken for the exercise of this intellectual Power, in enquiring, discovering, comparing, judging objects propounded. It is by these actings of our Reason that we search after Truth, and make use of it when we have found it, for the conduct and comfort of our lives: and by these it is that we defend the Truth of God against gainsayers.  
Thirdly, It is taken for the Principles of Reason, known or knowable by natural light. And these are either Natural, or Acquired. The Natural or Primary Principles of Reason are those that carry their own evidence with them & therefore upon the first representation, are forthwith embraced by our Reason, without any Discourse. And they are called Natural, not as being formally imprinted, or properly engraven in our Minds by Nature (for we are not born with Actual Knowledge) but because they are founded in, and do necessarily result from the Nature of things and their mutual Respects, wherein as in a Glass, our Understanding sees them represented, and is disposed to assent to them at the first view. The Secondary or Acquired Principles are those which are not so obvious as the former, but by rational Discourse, are truly and sound deduced from them.  
And here falls in the consideration of Philosophy, which is made up of these Principles methodically digested. And by it I understand that true knowledge of God and his Works which is attainable in this mortal state, by the improvement of that Light that is Connatural to the Mind of Man.  
This, though it be much inferior to Scripture-Light, yet it is both an exercise and an advancement, of Reason; a noble Study, and of excellent use if rightly managed, not only for the beautifying, but the bettering the Mind of Man, and raising it to an high admiration, and humble adoration of that Infinite Being, whose Wisdom, Power, and Goodness is so eminently conspicuous in all the Works of His Hands. And if there be any such in the World (as some say there are) that deny or reproach sound Philosophy, or the Dictates of Right Reason, as I know them not, so neither shall I plead their cause.  
Now as to the Case before us,  
First, It is undeniable, That for the 
§ 2.  Interpreting of Scripture, there is a necessary use of the Faculty of Reason, and the several actings of it, as instrumentally subservient to the finding out the Sense of Scripture. Faith doth not exclude Reason, but elevate and advance it by giving it a clearer light; it doth not silence, but regulate and conduct it. There is nothing in Religion but what is perfectly rational, and suitable to man's intellectual nature. It is to our Rational Powers that the Scriptures are propounded: and as our belief of them is one of the highest acts of Reason, so it is by our Reason in its due exercise that we search into them, not only to find out the signification of the Words and Phrases of Scripture, and discern the difference between proper and Figurative Expressions, besides many other things that tend to their Verbal Exposition; but likewise to observe the dependence of one Clause on another, and compare the several parts of Scripture together; thereby it is that we gather Consequences from Scripture-Principles; and hereby do we instrumentally judge of the Mind of God, as signified to us by the Words of Scripture.  
Secondly, We also grant, That the Principles of Reason have their use about those things in Scripture that are discoverable by Natural Light; as that there is a God, and that God is to be worshipped; that the Soul is Immortal; that good is to be done, and evil to be avoided; and many such like. But even in these, considered as they are delivered by the Spirit of God in Scripture, I think Reason is not Magisterially and Authoritatively to Judge of them, being (under this notion) to be received as the Decrees of a higher Court, wherein Man's Reason is but a Servant. In this Case therefore, Reason only gives in its suffrage, and ministerially subscribes, by virtue of its own impressed notions to Scripture-Dictates. Aquinas propounding a question 
Aqu. 2. 2●. Q. 2. 〈◊〉. 4.  about Man's believing such things as may be proved by Natural Reason; resolves it necessary for men's more speedy, more common, and more certain attainment of Divine Knowledge, that they should receiveby Faith, not only those things that are above Natural Reason, but those also that are discernible by Natural Light. Whereby he plainly gives the pre-eminency to Revelation above Reason, even in the Natural Principles of Religion.  
Thirdly, I grant that there is great use of Natural Principles in points of pure Revelation, viz. To show that these are not against sound Reason, and to disprove the objections that are made against them from a pretended contrariety to Natural Light. It was no small advantage to the Christian Cause in the Primitive Times, that the Ancient Fathers in their Apologies for the Doctrine of Christ, against the Heathen Philosophers, turned their own Weapons upon them, and repelled their absurd Cavils by their own acknowledged Maxims.  
Fourthly, I further grant, that no Sense of Scripture is to be admitted for genuine, if we do indeed find it to be certainly inconsistent with or contradictory unto any true and undoubted Principle of Reason. For God, who is the Author of all truth, as well natural as supernatural, cannot contradict himself. This, I confess, is a very ticklish point, and calls for great wariness and circumspection; it being so ●asie and so ordinary for Men to be swayed by Imagination, Interest, and Prejudice, to call that Reason which is as far from being so, as midnight is from being high noon. And Men may, through Ignorance, Incogitancy, or Perverseness, suppose a contradiction where there is none. Nevertheless, this we may safely say, that whatsoever is certainly, and undeniably proved to be a Principle of Reason, there can be nothing in Scripture that really contradicts it.  
But, Fifthly, The Knot of the Controversy lies here, whether Humane Reason by its own Natural Principles, or those Philosophical Axioms that are thence deduced, as its Supreme Commanding Rule, must guide and determine us in examining and deciding what is the Sense of those parts of Scripture that are purely of Supernatural Revelation? And this is that which is here denied.  
The affirmative is maintained by 
§ 3.  some: and indeed it seems to be the great Helena of that sort of Men, who have imbibed the new Divinity of Socinus, and the Foundation of all their Heterodoxies: upon this account it is that they so vehemently oppose the Trinity of Persons in the Godhead, the Eternal Deity of our Lord Jesus, the Personality of the Holy Ghost, the Doctrines of Original Sin, of the Satisfaction of Christ, and Justification by his imputed Righteousness; with sundry other material points, that are commonly called to the Bar of Humane Reason by these Doctors of the Racovian Faith. Not that they have any sound Reason on their side: for their Novelties are extremely irrational, as hath been abundantly demonstrated by those judicious Authors that have dealt with them. But trusting to their own Reason and its Dictates in matters so far above Nature, this hath led them into these dangerous precipices.  
True it is (whether in pretence to blind the Eyes of others, or out of the conviction of Truth, or out of the usual fate of Error to contradict itself) these Men sometimes let fall that which carries with it a fair appearance of disclaiming the Judgement of Reason in Matters of Faith: as may be seen in their great Master Socinus 
* Lib. de Author. Script. cap. 1. p. 16 etc. 4. p. 66. & 71. . And such passages in him and his followers may possibly give some colour to the Exercitator to charge the Reformed Divines with wronging the Socinians, in saying they make Man's Reason the Rule of Interpretation 
* Phillip Scr. Int. cap. 16 par. 7. & 8.  (for himself seems to be ambitious of the honour of finding this out) and it may be they have no where asserted it in Terminis, or spoken it out so broadly as this Gentleman hath done. But notwithstanding all this flourish, when they argue against the forementioned Doctrines, received upon clear Scripture-warrant by all the Christian Churches in the World, from the beginning of Christianity; their grand objection is drawn from Reason, to which they appeal in all these Controversies as to their Oracle; and thereupon set their Wits at work to wrest and wind the Scriptures (alleged in defence of those Doctrines) every way they can imagine, to evade their plain meaning, and fasten on them a Sense of their own making, suitable to their beloved Maxims. Besides many other passages there are of that Party that discover what their Mind is in this point.  
But these are not the first that set this presumptuous Doctrine on foot. I find it laid to the charge of the Manichees (as irrational and absurd as their Conceptions were) that they professedly suspended the Articles of Faith upon the judgement of Reason, and required Men to believe nothing but what they could prove by Reason. So much we learn from him, who was once one of them, but happily delivered out of their snare 
* A●g. Retract. cap. 14 & de utilitate credendi, cap. 1. .   

CHAP. II.  
1. The first Argument disabling Reason and Philosophy for being the Scriptures Interpreter, from the condition of Man's depraved Reason in this lapsed State. 2. The Apostles Words in 1 Cor. 2. 14. urged, and vindicated from some men's mistaken Glosses. 3. The Argument enforced from the foul mastakes of the most Rational among the Heathen in matters of Religion.  
NOW that Reason or Philosophy cannot in the Sense given, be 
§ 1.  the Scriptures Interpreter, I prove by the following Arguments:  
First, Man's Reason, though furnished with the best Principles and 
Arg. 1.  richest Endowments, that Nature affords it in this lapsed State, is so darkened and depraved, that it not only is much disabled for apprehending the things of God, but sets itself against them; and therefore it is not in a capacity by its own Principles to interpret Scripture-Doctrines.  
Something Natural Light discovers of God; but all as! how little? The Principles of Natural Knowledge are but general and confused, not sufficient to guide Man in the things of greatest concernment. It teacheth Man that there is a God; but when he comes to determine what an one He is, how lame and imperfect, how unsuitable and unbecoming are men's natural apprehensions of him! The Apostle says, 1 Cor. 1. 21. that, in the wisdom of God the World by wisdom knew not God. Where he means not the rude and ignorant multitude, but the wisest and most accomplished for Natural Abilities: these, with the study of Philosophy (which is the consideration of God's infinite Wisdom in Creating and Governing the World) did not arrive at the right knowledge of God. The same Apostle tells us of the unconverted Gentiles, Eph. 4. 18. that they had their understandings darkened, and were alienated from the life of God through the ignorance that was in them, etc. and, Rom. 8. 7. he says, the Carnal Mind, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the wisdom of the Flesh, the unrenew'd Mind of Man, is enmity against God; for it is not subject to the Law of God, neither indeed can be.  
But I shall especially insist upon that of the said Apostle in 1 Cor. 2. 14. But 
§ 2.  the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned. By the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Animal or Natural Man the Apostle means him that is in his mere Naturals, having no other wisdom or understanding given him than what is common to him with all Mankind. Such an one receives not the things of the Spirit: that is, he doth not approve of them and embrace them; he finds no relish in them, and therefore rejects them: for they are foolishness unto him; he scorns the mysteries of the Gospel, as if it were nothing but a heap of fantastic trash, a confused medley of absurd unintelligible fancies.  
Neither can he know them, says the Apostle, because they are spiritually discerned: that is, he cannot (as he is in this unrenew'd state) discern the true beauty and excellency of them, because they are not to be discerned, but by a Spiritual Light, and by a Spiritual Faculty, which the Natural Man is wholly destitute of. Or, as the learned Bishop of Down expresseth it, They are taught 
Du●…or Dubit●…. l. 1. c. 2.  and perceived by the aids of God's Spirit, Revelation and Divine Assistance and Grace.  
Great endeavours have been used to 
Exception 1.  wrest this Scripture. Some think to evade the dint of it, by alleging, that 
Schlic●tingi●●. Vel●husius, & alii.  by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is meant one that is led by Fleshly Lusts; because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is sometimes taken for the sensitive part of the Soul, in opposition to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is the Rational.  
To this I answer two things,  
First, Suppose this that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
Sol. 1.  the Natural Man be taken for one seduced by corrupt and inordinate affections; yet this will include all men as they are by nature, and as unregenerate; witness what the Apostle says, Ephes. 2. 1, 2, 3. And you hath he quickened, who were sometimes dead in trespasses and sins, wherein in time past ye walked according to the course of the World, according to the Prince of the Power of the Air, the Spirit that now worketh in the Children of Disobedience: Amongst whom also we all had our conversation in times past, in the Lusts of our Flesh fulfilling the desires of the Flesh and of the Mind, etc. It is the condition of all Mankind by our first Apostasy from God, to be in bondage to sinful lusts, till the Grace of Christ have set us free. And this none but a Pelagian will deny.  
Secondly, It is evident by the context that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is in this place opposed to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Spiritual: and the natural man is (as the Apostle Judas explains it in his Epistle, vers. 19) one that is destitute of the Spirit: and consequently he is one that hath no higher inward Principle to guide him than his own Reason. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (saith the Learned Grotius) Non est idem quod 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, qui corporis affectibus gubernatur sed est is, qui humanae tantum rationis luce ducitur. The Natural is not the same with the Carnal, who is swayed by the affections of the Body; but it is he who is led only by the light of Humane Reason. Or (as I find the Greek Scholiast cited by a late Author) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; the man that is endued with mere humane wisdom. Such an one, whatsoever his natural endowments may be, and how learned or wise soever, according to the best improvement of Nature's Light, is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; So our learned Davinant, Philosophus 
Expos. ep. ad Coloss. in cap. 2. 8.  quà Philosophus nihil aliud est quam animalis home; & ipsa Ratio non illuminata fide ad hanc animalitatem pertinet.  
But let us hear what the Exercitator 
Exception 2.  says to this place. The Apostle, says he, speaks not here of a Man that by Natural 
Phil. Scr. Int. cap. 7. par. 4.  Light hath attained the right knowledge of Truth and Goodness; for a truly wise Man never censures what he does not discern; whereas the Man here spoken of, is one that knows not the things of the Spirit, and yet accounts them foolishness; which cannot be meant of the true Philosopher; for such an one suspends his judgement of things till such time as he hath attained a clear and distinct perception of them. Therefore the Apostle must needs be understood either of a man utterly ignorant, or of one that follows the sway of his blind affections. Such an one, says he, receives not Spiritual Things, that is, the things that belong to the Rational Soul, which is a Spirit.  
To this (passing by so much of it as 
Sol. 1.  is met with already in the former Exception) I answer several things.  
First, Whereas he says, that by the Animal or Natural Man is not meant he that hath by Natural Light attained the right knowledge of truth and goodness. I say so too; for the Apostle means by it, one that hath no other than natural light in searching after truth and goodness; who may there-therefore easily, yea who will certainly mistake, having no better guide.  
Secondly, Whereas he says, a true Philosopher never is rash in his censure of things, but always suspends his judgement till he hath attained a clear perception of them, and that therefore such an one cannot be thought to judge the things of the Spirit foolishness before he know them; this is all one, as if he had said a true Philosopher is a Chimaera: for (it seems) he is one who never determines of any thing till he clearly perceives what it is, and then what he determines is undoubtedly true: whence it will follow, that every true Philosopher is infallible. And where was such an one ever yet to be found? Certain it is, that the most eminent Philosophers (not inferior in their Natural Learning to this Exercitator, or any of his Companions) did in the first breaking out of the Gospel, make a mock of the whole Doctrine of Christianity. Thus did the Philosophers at Athens, when they heard St. Paul: and thus did Porphyry, Celsus, and others, after the Apostles days.  
Thirdly, When this Author will have no more meant here by things Spiritual, but things belonging to the Rational Soul, which is a Spirit; he is grossly over-seen, to speak no worse. For the Apostles words are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the things of the Spirit of God: which certainly is not the Soul of Man, but the Holy Ghost. And when the Apostle Judas describes the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sensual, or natural, by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, having not the Spirit, surely he did not mean they had no Rational Soul; but that they were destitute of the Regenerating Spirit of Grace. And that of this Spirit the Apostle Paul is to be understood in the place under present consideration, the whole tenor of his Discourse, from vers. 9, to 15. doth undeniably manifest: If at least (by this Gentleman's good leave) the Scripture might be allowed to interpret itself.  
The woeful ignorance and perverseness concerning the things of God, that 
§. 3.  discovered itself in the wisest and best civilised part of the World, and such as had improved their natural light to as high a pitch as any other we can read of, is an abundant evidence of what I assert concerning the darkness and pravity of Man's Reason. They became (as the Apostle says) vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened: professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, Rom. 1. 21, 22. They acknowledged a Deity, and that God was to be worshipped: but in the manner and way of worship, how woefully were they mistaken! yea those times and places that were best cultivated, and that flourished most in all Humane Learning, were of all other the most sottish in their Idolatrous Worships, giving religious adoration to Brute Creatures, to Dumb Pictures, to Diseases and Humane Passions, yea to Hellish Furies. And whereas, some that were more sagacious than the rest (as Socrates, Cicero, and such like) saw enough to condemn that way of Religion that was then in use (observing the Rites in fashion, tanquam legibus jussa, non tanquam diis grata, as St. 
Aug. de C. D. l. 61. c. 10.  Aug. observes out of Seneca) yet when they came to inquire and determine of the true Religion, they were confessedly at a loss, and acknowledged that they could better cry down the wrong than find out the right.  
They had what is indelibly planted in all men a desire of happiness: but they were miserably bewildered in their search after it. And whereas they were, some of them, sensible of a dreadful blow that Man's Nature had received, discerning a Combat in themselves between their Reason and their Sensual Appetite; and saw the World generally overrun with wickedness, and consequently vexed with a continual succession of calamities; yet as they could never by nature's light find out the source and spring of all this, and what it was that first brought sin and sorrow upon Mankind; so in vain did they weary themselves in inventing ways of reconciling themselves to God, and procuring his Favour, whom they saw to be displeased, and of curing the Maladies of their disordered and discomposed Natures: in both which they took such strange and horrid courses, as did but increase the evil they lay under, and exceedingly multiply their own guilts. Now it being thus, how can the Principles of Reason and Philosophy be a safe Rule, whereby to interpret the Holy Scriptures.   

CHAP. III.  
1. Several Exceptions against the foregoing Argument removed, viz. That this holds only where the Scripture is unknown. 2. That it strikes not at Right Reason and Sound Principles. 3. That Reason is of God: And that Truth is not contrary to Truth.  
TO this Argument, all the reply 
§ 1.  that I can conceive will be made, may be reduced to a few particulars, which I shall briefly dispatch.  
It will be said, That this Argument holds of Man's Reason, while 
Exception 1.  he is destitute of the Written Word; but reacheth not them who have the Scriptures to enlighten them.  
To pass by other Answers that may be gathered from what hath been already 
Sol.  said; This Exception yields the Cause: For it supposeth Man's Reason unable to discover the Mind of God without Scripture Light. And if so, than whatsoever Revealed Truth is more darkly delivered in any▪ one part of Scripture, must receive light from the Scripture itself somewhere else, where it speaks more plainly: without which Man's Reason (notwithstanding the best Natural Principles to assist it) would leave him at a loss: consequently it is not the principles of Reason and Philosophy that must be the Rule of Interpretation, but the Scripture itself, as shall be shown hereafter.  
But, say some, when we say Reason 
§ 2.  by its Principles is to Interpret Scripture, we mean it of right Reason, 
Exception 2.  proceeding upon sound Principles, and not of Reason depraved, and Principles corrupted.  
I answer, these are smooth Words, but what do they signify? There were 
Sol.  some colour for this reply, if uncorrupt Reason (either in the Faculty or the Principles) were infallibly to be found. The Exception speaks of Reason abstractly and in the Idea, supposing it freed from all those depravations and entanglements that have captived and debased it: Whereas we are speaking of Reason as it is in Men, who are to make use of it. And we know what is said of Man, Gen. 6. 5. God saw that the wickedness of Man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually. Every Man is thus depraved from his birth; so that we have all need of renewing in our highest faculties, in the Spirit of our Mind, Eph. 4. 23. And this original depravation is increased by a farther contracted malignity through vicious habits and deceitfulness of sinful lusts. In the most it remains wholly thus: and in the best in this life it is but in part renewed; and therefore in danger to mistake, and that grossly, in things Spiritual, when it goes to work only by its own natural Principles. And whereas it may be thought or said, there is no danger so long as Reason performs it works aright: I reply, how shall that be known? by what Rule shall we examine and find out when Reason passeth a right judgement? or how shall the Principles that Reason pretends to use in matters of Revelation, be tried, if not by the Scriptures? Shall the unquestionable Word of God be brought to the Bar of Man's Reason, and be tried by its Dictates? and shall these Dictates of our lame and imperfect Reason in things of God and Eternity be uncontrollable, and admitted without any debate in matters of pure Revelation, as if they were the only SupremeLaw, overruling all supernatural discoveries of God's Will? do we not know that men's conceptions concerning the Principles of Reason are various? Some say, one thing is a sound Principle of Reason, and others will plead for the contrary: besides, there is as great a difference in the application of the same Principle to particular cases. When Reason alone is the warrant 
Dust. Dub. lib. 3. c. 3.  and the guide (says the late Bishop of Down) a Man shall not always find out what 〈◊〉 pleasing to God: and it will be to no purpose to say, that not every Man's Reason, but Right Reason shall be the Law; for every Man thinks his own Reason right; and whole Nations differ in the assignation and opinons of Right Reason: and who shall be Judge of all but God.  
This is certain, that sundry Philosophers of old, who were cried up for Men of strong Reason, and many learned Men of late, who profess a high esteem of Reason, and frequently appeal to that, in their Novel Opinions, are chargeable with many gross absurdities in their Tenets, inconsistent with the plainest principles of natural light. Yea, are not many learned Atheists reckoned, by themselves and others, great Masters of Reason? What Natural Principle more clear and undoubted than this, That two contradictions cannot be true at once. Insomuch as it is conceived by some, that all Principles that are not thought fit to be proved in any Natural Science (if they be truly so) may easily be resolved into this one. A thing cannot at once be and not be. And yet even this Principle of Contradictions hath been denied by some: whereof we have a pregnant instance in Weigelius and his Followers, and a late Carmelite Friar; beside what Aristotle says of some ancient Philosophers. Great is Man's proneness to judge according to his inclinations and interests. It's a known observation, Such as a Man is, such he thinks God to be. And according to the prevailing bent of his Heart, so are his Conceptions of Truth or Falsehood. And it was an old complaint, Scripturarum esse volumus quae nostra sunt. Be it therefore granted, that there are some common Maxims wherein all agree, being such as shine by their own light, and which the Scriptures always suppose: Yet these are so general and so few, that they will not reach far, to be sure not beyond those things that are merely natural. And as for those acquired Principles that are drawn by deduction from the former, there is so great variety of men's apprehensions concerning them, that they cannot be allowed in this case for a sufficient or tolerable Rule of Judgement. For in these we see that those who are for determining all by Maxims of Reason, are greatly at odds amongst themselves; and some in that variety must needs err, if not all.  
But perhaps it will be said, That men's Expositions of Scripture are 
Inst.  likewise various, and many times erroneous; and yet the Scripture is not rejected, because that is always the same and incorrupt; so though men's apprehensions about the Principles of Reason be various and mistaking, yet the Principles themselves are the same all the World over, and continue in all Ages uncorrupt; and therefore may well be admitted for a Rule.  
To this I answer:  
As the Scriptures are the same and incorrupt (notwithstanding men's various 
Sol.  and erroneous apprehensions and Interpretations) so we can tell where to find them, and have recourse to them, and consult with them: they are a standing Record open and obvious to our search. But for the Principles of Reason in matters of Religion, though they lie fundamentally in the nature of things; yet if we lay scripture aside, they are not to be found formally existing any where but in the Minds and Writings of Men, who are confessed to be various, and liable to mistake: and accordingly Natural Principles are variously conceived, and may be dangerously perverted: so that if we had not the Scriptures as a surer Test to try all by, we should be always at great uncertainty, and in apparent danger of miscarrying. For I take it to be a certain Truth, that the Bible is the most perfect comprehension of all Principles of Religion, as well Natural as Supernatural: Nor know I any of the former of these (for of the latter no question is made) but what is more evidently and distinctly to be seen in the Scripture than in any other Record whatsoever.  
But Reason, say some, is of God, 
§. 3. Exception 3.  and therefore cannot deceive us.  
I answer:  
1. Our Senses also are of God, and yet they may and do deceive us. 2. Adam's 
Sol.  Reason was of God; and yet that deceived him, even in his first state, much more may ours now. 3. Though Man's Reason be of God (both as to the faculty and all its sound Principles) yet every thing that Man's Reason suggesteth is not of God. There is (as the Philosophers complained) a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a spurious and adulterate kind of reasoning. And how shall I know whether that which pretends to Reason, and to be of God, be so indeed, but by bringing it to the Test of Scripture, where God hath made known his Mind about Matters of Religion: (for of them I speak) more plainly and more fully than by the clearest Beams of Natural Light.  
But it is further replied, That Truth 
Exception 4. Phil. Scr. Int. cap. 5. par. 7. etc. 8. par 1.  is not contrary to Truth: therefore nothing in Scripture can be contrary to Reason.  
Understanding it of sound Reason, 
Sol.  this is all granted. But then let it be considered. 1. That every thing is not to be accounted contrary to Reason that Reason cannot reach. 2. The former difficulty recurrs; How or where shall we be assured that what is alleged for sound Reason, is so indeed, excepting self-evident Principles, which are, as I said but General and Few) where shall it be tried? seeing there have been, and are many Maxims or Axioms commonly received among learned Men, that will not hold. 3. What if there be no contrariety, but only an appearance thereof? It doth not therefore follow, that Scripture is to be controlled by Reason: but if there seem any opposition, the dictates of Reason are to be reduced and reconciled to Scripture. For the Principles of Reason (such I mean as are true and sound) may carry an appearing opposition to some Scripture Assertions, because perhaps the said Principles though generally received, do admit of some limitations and restrictions, which through the weakness and imperfection of our Reason, we are not aware of. In this case it were bold and dangerous to bend the Scripture to those Principles. That which is variable and fallible is to be overruled by that which is fixed and unerring, as the Holy Scripture undoubtedly is: and whatsoever is indeed contrary to the Voice of God speaking in this Sacred Volume, whatever pretence it may have of Reason or Philosophy, it is but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 1 Tim. 6. 20. It is an honest Speech of Aquinas, which I find quoted 
Qu. disp. de ●ide art. 8. 〈◊〉 Davenant de Jud. Controver. cap. 27  by our Judicious and Learned Davenant: Omnis creata Veritas est defectibilis, nisi quatenus per veritatem increatam rectificatur; unde nec homo nec Angelus infallibiliter ducit in veritatem, nisi quatenus in iis loquentis Dei testimonium consideratur. To which I shall subjoin the judgement of Cartesius, whose Authority may perhaps be of more credit with some now, than either that of a Schoolman, or of an Apostle. Memoriae nostrae pro summa 
Cartes. Prima Philos. par. 1. artic. 76  regula est infigendum, ea quae nobis à Deo revelata sunt, ut omnium certissima esse credenda. Et quamvis fortè lumen rationis quam maximè clarum, & evidens aliud quid nobis suggerere videretur, soli tamen auctoritati divinae potius quam proprio judicio, fidem esse adhibendam. This (says he) must be firmly remembered as our chief Rule, That those things which are revealed to us of God, are to be believed as of all things the most certain. And although perhaps the most clear and manifest light of Reason may seem to suggest to us some other thing; we are nevertheless to give credit to Divine Authority alone, rather than to our own judgement.   

CHAP. IU.  
1. A second Argument from the disproportion between Man's Reason, and Matters of Divine Revelation. 2. An Exception removed.  
MY second Argument is, That there is no proportion between Man's 
§ 1. Arg. 2.  Reason, and the Mysteries of Divine Revelation. These are so sublime, they are out of the ken of a Natural Understanding; they are of a far different kind from the highest Natural Principles. How little is it that Man's Reason by its own Light can discover of the Nature of God, and his Eternal Counsels. The Heathen, who wanted Scripture Light, did but grope as Men in the dark, Act. 17. 27. How greatly are we to seek in judging of the Wisdom, and Goodness, and Power, and Justice of God, if we have no higher light than Natural Reason to direct us? Nor need this seem strange, when we see how much the most knowing Men are at a loss concerning themselves, the nature and faculties of the Soul, and the manner of its union with the Body, and how little insight they have into many of the minuta naturae. Can it then be wondered that Man's Reason should be unable by its own light to have a clear view of the Divine Perfections that are infinite and incomprehensible? Whence was it that so many of the wisest Heathens were so graveled at the proceedings of a Divine Providence, when they saw good Men suffer, and bad Men prosper? How did Cato, that severe Moralist, stumble at the success that Julius Caesar had against Pompey? But what shall we say to that great Mystery of Man's Redemption by Christ? The line of Man's Reason is too short to reach these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 1 Cor. 2. 10. Therefore Evangelical 
1 Tim. 3. 16. 1 Cor. 2. 7. Rom. 16. 25. 1 Cor. 2. Eph. 3. 10. 1 Pet. 1. 12.  Doctrine is frequently called a great Mystery; containing such things as Eye hath not seen, nor Ear Herd, nor have entered into the Heart of Man to conceive; things beyond the reach, not of Men only, but of Angels. It is true, that all Men could not but know God to be very good; they found it and felt it in the daily effects of his sustaining and preserving Providence, and his wonderful patience and forbearance towards them: and they did know also that God is Just, and a Righteous Avenger of Sin; this they might see in the Judgements that he brought upon the World, beside the inward witness of their own accusing Consciences. The wrath of God was revealed from Heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of Men, Rom. 1. 18. And they knew the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the righteous judgement of God, that they who do such wickednesses as they were conscious to in themselves, were worthy of death, Rom. 1. 32. But now how to reconcile these two, the Goodness of God to his Creatures, and his severe Indignation against Sinners, so as with any satisfaction to hope for pardon and acceptance with him; here their Principles of Reason failled them. They saw themselves in a very ill case, and that there was a necessity of somewhat to appease the provoked Anger of the Divine Majesty; but how or which way this should be, they could not tell; and therefore lost themselves in a Maze of infinite Mistakes in their attempts about it. Now it being so, it is impossible that Reason by its Natural Principles should be a competent Judge of Scripture-Revelations. It must therefore submit its own conceptions and Dictates to the Doctrine of Faith contained in the Scripture.  
Here possibly it will be replied (as 
§ 2. Exception.  before to the precedent Argument) That all this may be granted of those that enjoyed not the Gospel and Written Word: but where this is, Reason may be allowed to judge and determine by its Principles concerning the things there revealed.  
To this I answer two things:  
First, This implies a contradiction; 
Sol. 1▪  for it is not the Words or Sentences of Scripture that reveal any Mystery to us further than thereby the Mind of God is made known to us. Now if this cannot be found out from the Scripture itself, but from Principles of Reason, than it is Reason itself that first discovers the Mystery. I grant that Reason (that is the faculty of Reason) is and must be the instrument whereby we apprehend what God speaks in the Scripture. But if there be any part of Scripture so dark, as that its meaning cannot be gathered from the Words, neither considered by themselves, nor compared with other Passages of Sacred Writ; I would know how comes Reason in Interpreting such an obscure place (supposing it to be obscure) to find that such and such Words so placed do contain in them such an Assertion, when the Words and Sentences themselves cannot resolve us? You'll say, our Reason teaches us by the light of its own common notions, that this and no other must be the meaning of such a place. Is it not then plain, that Human Reason fetcheth that Truth (if it be a Truth) from itself, and not from the Scriptures? For the Scripture (according to this Hypothesis) gives an, uncertain sound, only Reason determines it. Remember we are speaking of matters of pure Revelation. Now if the Sentences of Scripture under debate do neither by themselves, nor with the help of any other, clearly and certainly signify any such thing as is fastened upon them; such Arguers cannot say, they have it by Divine Revelation, unless they will pretend to that Enthusiastic Inspiration, which they profess to decry, and falsely charge upon their Opposites.  
Secondly, I add further, that there are sundry things revealed in Scripture, whereof God gives us no other Reason than his own Will. And if our Reason will not rest satisfied with that, it will but weary itself in fruitless inquiries, and dangerously miscarry by its bold determinations. For instance, what account can our Reason give why God should provide a Saviour for lost Man, and none for the lapsed Angels? Why he should clothe his only begotten Son with our dishonoured nature, and expose him to so bitter Sufferings for the Sin of Man? Why he should 〈…〉 severely punish the Crucifiers of his Son, when what they did was foredetermined by himself, in order to Man's Salvation? And why he should suffer so much wickedness to be done, which himself hates, and could, if he pleased, by his Almighty Power hinder? These and many more such instances might be given, wherein Man's Reason is puzzled, as not finding any thing wherein it can acquiesce, but the Will and pleasure of God that thus it should be. Again, God requires we should believe him upon his naked Word, though we know not which way that which he says can be; And accordingly he so manifests to us his Mind, that he will not gratify our vanity or pride in resolving the queries, and satisfying the objections that our curiosity may start about the Truth revealed. It is enough for us to know what he hath said, and to take it upon the Authority of his word without ask how or why? And it is indeed the highest Reason imaginable, that we should give absolute credit to what he speaks 
* The Reason of Man (saith the Bishop of Down) is a right Judge always when she is rightly informed: but in many things she knoweth nothing but the face of the Article: and in these cases our understanding is to submit, and not to inquire further: But if it will not consent to a Revelation, until it see a reason of the proposition, it doth not obey at all; for it will not submit till it cannot choose. Dust. Dubit. li. 1. cap. 2. .  
God's Sovereignty (saith the learned 
Verul. d● Augm. sciem. l. 9  Lord Verulam) reaches to the whole Man, extending itself no less to his Reason than his Will; so that it well becomes man to deny himself universally, and yield up all to him. Wherefore as we are bound to obey the Law of God, notwithstanding the reluctancy of our Will, so are we also to believe his Word, though against the reluctancy of our Reason.  
I shall conclude this with the Words of the learned Grotius, who having asserted the Doctrines of Scripture to be no way contrary to sound Reason, (but agreeable thereunto) he 
De Ver. Relig. Christ. lib. 3.  he hath this remarkable passage. Ultra haec pro comperto aliquid affirmare, aut de Dei natura, aut de ejus voluntate, solo ductu humanae rationis, etc. How dangerous and deceitful a thing it is to affirm any thing for certain either of the Nature or Will of God, beyond what we have in Holy Writ, by the sole conduct of Humane Reason, we are taught by the many dissentient opinions, not only of Schools, but of particular Philosophers among themselves. Nor is this any great wonder; for if they ran out into very differing apprehensious when they disputed about the nature of their own Mind, much more must it needs be so with those who are desirous to determine any thing concerning that Supreme Mind that is so far above us. If prudent Men count it dangerous to search into the Counsels of Kings, which by all our search we cannot discover; who is there so sagacious, as can hope by his own conjectures to find out what God will do, among those things that depend upon his mere pleasure.   

CHAP. V.  
A third Argument from the absurdity of resolving a Man's Faith into himself, and his own Reason.  
IN the third place, If the Sense of 
Arg. 3.  Scripture be to be regulated and determined by Natural Principles, than the last resolution of a Man's Faith in those points (as to the formal object of it) will be into Man himself and the dictate of his own Reason. For the ultimate reason or ground of our believing in this case will not be the veracity of God, speaking in the Scripture, but the Voice of our own Reason, persuading us from its own Principles, when we can see nothing in the Words of Scripture to require it. And this plainly falls in with the absurd conceit of the Quakers: who commonly profess to own nothing that is laid down in the Bible, as the Mind of God, but what is witnessed by the light within them. Which is no more in other terms than this, That they will take nothing from the Scripture but what is agreeable to their own Reason. For the light they speak of, with which they say every Man comes into the World (for which they allege that in Joh. 1. 9) is nothing else but Man's Reason, and the common notions of it: which though some of them have heretofore denied, yet now their chief Heads and Leaders do openly avow. And this is that which they make the standing Rule of what they believe and practise, and not the Holy Scriptures. We rather say with an ancient Schoolman, Apud Aristotelem argumentum est ratio rei dubiae faciens 
Altisiod. apud l. Gerbard Loc. come. de S. Script. c. 11.  fidem; sed apud Christum argumentum est fides faciens rationem. The way of arguing in Aristotle's School is by Reason begetting assent; but in Christ's School it is by Faith, which is instead of all Reason.   

CHAP. VI  
A fourth Argument from another absurdity, viz. That in Matters of pure Revelation the Mind of God may be better known by Natural Light than by Scripture; Or that all supernatural Revelation is to be shut out.  
FOurthly, It will follow from this supposal, That in matters of pure 
Arg. 4.  Revelation, the Mind of God may be better known by the common principles of Natural Light, than by the Holy Scriptures: which carries with it a palpable contradiction. For matters of pure Revelation are supposed to be supernatural; and if these as laid down in Scripture, cannot be understood from the Scripture itself, but must have such a Sense given them, as the Maxim of Natural Reason shall determine; then certainly it is not Revelation, but Reason that discovers them: And so what need will there be of Scripture. Indeed this conceit looks very like that absurd dotage of Weigelius (if it be not the same with it) that Man's knowledge of all things whatsoever must be fetched from within himself, & not from without. Tenôris (says he) & omnia nôris; omnia enim es, non minus quam Deus. 
* i e. Know thyself and thou knowest all things; for thou art all things no less than God.  Which (besides many other prodigious absurdities) plainly shuts out all supernatural Revelation. And that this lies at the bottom of the Exercitators Discourse, I find reason enough to suspect, if not conclude For (besides what he says in his sixth Chapter, the first Paragraph which I shall wave insisting on) in his Epilogue at the end of his Book, he propounds an Objection against his whole Discourse, viz. That if Philosophy be the Rule of Interpreting the Holy Scripture, than the Scripture is useless and written to no purpose: for seeing the truth of all the Senses of Scripture, which are to be searched out and tried by Philosophy, must first be perceived before they be drawn out and examined, to what end is it that we should have recourse to Scripture to learn any thing from it. This is the Objection which himself makes against his own Position. In answer whereto he runs out into a long Harangue of words, and (as his manner is) propounds a frivolous distinction, and tedrously dilates upon it to amuse his Reader. But the sum of all comes to this, That the words of Scripture are of no further use than as they are signs of conceptions and things; and under that consideration they cannot be understood, unless the things signified by them be first known, at least in some gross and confused manner. Whereof he gives us this instance, that where we sinned in Scripture that God is Omniscient, we cannot understand this unless we first know what God is, and what Omniscience is. Therefore, says he, all the benefit that any can get by any Book that is written, is but this, that it stirs up the Mind of the Reader to reflect upon the clear and distinct Ideas of those things in his Mind which the Book treats of; not that the Book can, of itself bring him to the true knowledge of things, much less that it can beget any clear or distinct Ideas in his Mind which were not there before. And thus he tells us it is with the Scripture; all the use of it is to stir up the Reader or Hearer to think of the things that it propounds, and inquire into them, and examine them whether they be so as they are there propounded; and that they may do this, they must make use of Philosophy to try what is there written. Therefore (adds he) the Scripture is to be used, not that it should of itself inform us in the truth, or render the truth more clear and distinct, or make it more firm to us; but that it may give us occasion and matter of meditating on those things which perhaps otherwise we should never have minded. Therefore (says he still) the utility and excellency of the Scriptures above other Books consists only in this, That the things it speaks of are of so great concernment to our everlasting blessedness; not for any use they are of to instruct us in the Truth. This is all the use that he allows the Scripture: from whence I think will inevitably follow that he owns the necessity of no knowledge of God or Religion but what is natural. And so all supernatural Revelation, or at least all necessity of it is denied. And if there be no other use of the Written Word but what this Author assigns it, it's put into the same rank with a Crucifix, or a Deaths Head. Indeed the whole design of his Book, and of that other 
Tractatus Theologico-politicus  Tract that is prefixed to its latter Edition (written, as is supposed, by the same Author) is utterly to undermine and overthrow the credit of the Scriptures. We need not wonder that he so often derides and calumniates the Protestant Doctrine of the Spirits internal illumination of the Mind, which consists in curing the indisposition of the Subject, and fitting it for the right understanding of Heavenly Things: (of which more hereafter in an Appendix to my present Discourse) when he will not allow the necessity of so much as an Enternal Light for the Revelation of Supernatural Objects, as acknowledging no such things. And he that is thus principled, must needs be very ignorant of himself, and of the ruins that Sin hath made among the whole Race of Adam, and the woeful depravation of Man's Nature by his first Apostasy. But for the Readers full satisfaction about the necessity of Supernatural Revelation, I dare commend to his perusal (besides many other useful Discourses that might be named) that excellent Piece of the Eminently-accomplished Sir Charles Wolsly, concerning the Reasonableness of Scripture Belief.   

CHAP. VII.  
1. A fifth Argument, That this would open a gap to the most pernicious Errors, in Matters of Faith. 2. And Practice.  
AGain fifthly, This Assertion le's 
§ 1.  lose the Bridle to proud and 
Arg. 5.  wanton Wits to overthrow the Foundations of Christian Religion; for though there be not the least real repugnancy between the Doctrines of Christianity and the Principles of Right Reason and Sound Philosophy, which undoubtedly there is not (as I have already premised and asserted) yet there being no certain and infallible Record of these Principles, by which, as by the Rule of Judgement, particular men's Reasonings may be tried; If Scripture Revelation must be interpreted by men's Reasonings, I know not the any Error that hath ever crept into the Church of Christ, either in matter of Faith or Practice, since the first publication of the Gospel, but may be introduced anew by this Engine. The heretical Blasphemies of Servetus and Socinus, which sprang up of late years; and those of the Marcionites and Manichees that infested the Church in former times; together with the loathsome impurities of the Gnostics (who esteemed themselves the only knowing Men, or to speak in the new mode, the only Rational Divines) have fair way made them by this Trim Device.  
First, Let us instance in Matters of Faith, whatsoever is said in Scripture about the Creation of the World, the Conception of our Saviour in a Virgin's Womb, the Personal Union of the two Natures, the Resurrection of the Body at the last Day; these, with many more that might be named, let them be brought to the Bar of Reason, and tried by its Principles (as they are to be found in the Minds of Men) and what will it come to? We have seen already what use some Men have made of this way to subvert the weightiest Truths of the Gospel.  
But here it will be excepted perhaps 
Exception.  by some, That the Fundamentals of Christian Religion being clear and plain in Scripture, there is no fear of this inconvenience.  
To this I answer:  
First, If Divine Revelations must be 
Sol. 1.  no otherwise received or understood, than as Men see ground for them in their own Reason, the plainest and clearest Doctrines of Scripture will be rejected. I shall here give two Instances, as I find them quoted by a late learned Author. The one is of Socinus, who says, That he would not believe 
Lib. de Christo Servatore.  Christ to have satisfied for our Sins, though he should read it once and again in Scripture; the infallibility of the Revealer not being sufficient to establish it, unless he had declared it by its causes and effects, and so satisfied men's Reason concerning the possibility of it. Smalcius is the other, who says, That 
Hom. 8. on John 1.  he would not believe the Incarnation of the Son of God, though he should meet with it in express terms in the Bible. The same Author says elsewhere, that 
In prefatione cont. Frantzium.  by Reason alone we determine the possibility and impossibility of the Articles of Faith. To which I might add the bold assertion of a late English Remonstrant in a Volume published some years ago, where he says, I verily believe 
Redemption Redeemed cap. 13. sect. 33.  that in case any such unchangeableness of God's love (viz. as should assure the Saints infallible perseverance) were to be found in, or could regularly be deduced from the Scriptures, it were a just ground to any considering Man to question their Authority, or whether they were from God or no. And a late Belgic Tractator, having affirmed that the miraculous 
Tract. Theologicoponl. c. 6.  Works spoken of in Scripture were not any thing against or besides the established order of nature, absolutely concludes that whatsoever the Scripture affirms to have been done, did all necessarily come to pass according to the Laws of Nature: and if any thing contrary to this could be found in Scripture, or truly gathered from any thing in it; that was certainly added to the Scripture by some sacrilegious hand, as being against Nature, and therefore against Reason.  
Secondly, Men that resolve to make 
〈◊〉.  their Reason the Rule of Interpretation will not stick to charge the Scripture with obscurity in its plainest Propositions, if they suit not with their preconceived notions. The experience of the present age puts it past all denial or dispute, that when Men have espoused an Hypothesis which they are not willing to relinquish, they will quarrel with the most evident Scripture, accusing it of obscurity; and to make their charge good, they will endeavour by their strained glosses, to raise a dust, and darken the Sense of it, though it shine never so clearly by its own light to every impartial and unprejudiced Reader. Hence it is that the Papists do so frequently with open mouth charge the Apostle Paul with obscurity in his Writings; because indeed he speaks more clearly and plainly than they would have him, for that great Doctrine of Justification by the imputed Righteousness of Christ, and against Justification by our own Works. And it may be, some will be as ready to find fault with the same Apostle, when he says, Ephes. 5. 18. Be not drunk with Wine, wherein is excess; but be filled with the Spirit: as speaking too darkly; because indeed they think he speaks too broadly against the debauchery that they practice; and so plainly for the Spirit, which they scorn and deride.  
Thirdly, Nay more, some are grown to that height (as I shall have occasion 
3.  to show more fully in my second Part) as to assert that the Scripture is plain in nothing, but universally obscure; and make this their great ground for their setting up Reason and Philosophy as the Rule to determine the Sense of the Bible. And let this be granted them, they will soon make the Scripture speak whatsoever themselves please: and so the Bible shall be but as a dead Image, and Man's depraved Reason like the Daemon within shall give the Oracle.  
2. Come we next to matters of 
§ 2.  Practice. It is easy to instance in several commands of God in Scripture, that are directly opposite to the whole corrupt interest of lapsed nature: As, when he requires the mortifying of our earthly desires, the love of our deadliest Enemies, the denying our of selves in whatsoever is dear to us in this World, even to the laying down of our lives for the defence of his Truth, upon the bare hope of an invisible happiness in another World. Now considering how Man's Reason is darkened and enslaved, and no where perfectly cured, if men's Reason must by its own Principles interpret the Sense of Scripture, how numerous are the objections that will be made against these and all other Precepts that are not to the Gust of Man's degenerate nature? Thus did the Gnostics of old plead for denying the Faith in persecuting times to save their life: for what! (said they) Doth God delight in the death of Men? he stands in no need of our Blood: Christ came to save men's lives, and not to expose them to hazard. And with these reasonings they shisted off the-command of owning the Truth in the face of danger. And what the Author of the Leviathan hath written of this, with a specious, though fallacious pretence of Reason, is not unknown.  
But I shall instance in two extraordinary commands given to particular persons. The one is that which God did by immediate Revelation give to Abraham, requiring him to offer up his 
Gen. 22.  only Son Isaac for a Burnt-offering. What would the Principles of Natural Reason have said to this, might they have been admitted to interpret this Command. What? Can infinite goodness require such an unnatural act as this, for a Father to lay violent hands on his own Child? Hath not God strictly forbidden Murder? Hath he not always manifested his tender regard to the life of Man? And hath he not planted that tender affection in the Heart of a Parent, that makes him abhor to imbrue his hands in Child's Blood? Therefore surely (would Man's Reason say) the meaning of this injunction is something else, far different from what the words seem to sound: there is some more mysterious sense to be found out, and a milder interpretation to be made of this Divine Oracle, such as may consist with those Notions of God which we are taught by that Internal Light that shines in the Hearts of all Men. It is most rational therefore to interpret it by an Allegory; Isaac must be sacrificed in Effigy, or a Lamb out of the Flock must have Isaac's name put upon it, and so offered up to God: or (according to the notation of his name) we must sacrifice that joy and delight that we have had in our Son Isaac, wherein perhaps we have exceeded, by mortifying our affectious to him, and have him hereafter as if we had him not. The other instance shall be in the command given by our Saviour to the Rich young Man, to sell all, and give to the Poor, and follow Him in hopes of a Treasure in Heaven. We may probably suppose, by the Man's turning his back, what objections his Reason made against it. Are not my Possessions the good Gifts of God? and shall I unthankfully cast away what he hath given me? I am to love my Neighbour as myself; therefore surely not to strip myself of my subsistence to help my Neighbour, and so lose the use and benefit of what I have. True, here is a plain Command. But could not this man's Reason have excogitated some hidden Sense to satisfy the Command, and yet save his Goods? Yes sure, had the Man learned but this new Art of Interpreting that some have got now adays, he might have thought within himself, That selling all was the disengaging of his affections from them; and giving to the poor, his relieving them in a convenient proportion, so as still to preserve his Estate; and follow Christ he might in a good and holy life, though he did not always personally attend him. But now would not this way of Interpretation in either of the forenamed instances, have been a plain eluding of an express command? And yet I am sure the bold attempts of some in our Age, who are great Pretenders to Reason, have in sundry considerable and clear Points of Religion, gone as far as this comes to, and much further, in torturing the Scriptures into a Sense as contrary to that which they fairly give us of themselves, as darkness is to light. And indeed by the help of this Engine, what will not be adventured by audacious Wits, that have cast off the awe of God, and of his holy Word; Men whose glory it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉? Let but others follow the Tract that some have already trodden out to them, and they will make the whole Bible one great Cipher, utterly insignificant of his Mind and Will by whose Authority it was indicted; and that which Erasmus feared in his time, Ne sub obtentu priscae literaturae caput erigere tentet Paganismus, may be unhappily fulfilled in our days.   

CHAP. VIII.  
The sixth and last Argument, from one great end of Scripture-Revelation, to supply the Defects, and correct the Mistakes of our Reason. An Exception of the Exercitator answered.  
LAstly, One great end of Scripture-Revelation, 
Arg. 6.  is to help our Understandings in matters of Religion, partly by rectifying our mistaken and depraved Reason, and keeping us from being misled in the Things of God by the Principles we have received; partly by supplying the defects of Reason, acquainting it with those things, which by its own Natural Light it could never reach, being by their sublimity and mysteriousness wholly above it. Therefore the Doctrine of Scripture doth in its tendency 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, cast down reasonings, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 captivate every Notion or Conception to the obedience of Christ, 2. Cor. 10. 5. For any therefore in matter of doubt or difficulty about the Sense of Scripture-Revelation, to run to the Principles of Reason, is to measure the Rule by that which should be measured by it: And what a base dishonour is this to the Sacred Oracles, to subject them to the usurped Dictatorship of that which is to be regulated by them, and to submit themselves to its final Judgement.  
But here the Exercitator replies, 
Exception. Ph. Scr. Int. cap. 16. par. 9  That in the present case the Divine Oracles are not submitted to the Judgement of Reason or Philosophy; but only the Letters and Syllables, the Words and Sentences of scripture; which are nothing but loquaces soni, aut horum mutae notae, some wordy sounds, or the dumb signs of them, framed for the purpose by Humane Institution, which therefore may without any disparagement be subjected to the Judgement of Reason and Philosophy, which are the eminent Gifts of God. And for the better managing of this Plea, he makes great use of a Discinction which he elsewhere inculcates, to wit, the consideration of the Scriptures Materially or Formally.  
To this I answer:  
1. Surely had the Ancient Church been of this Gentleman's Mind, they 
Sol. 1.  would never have so severely censured the Traditores, that delivered up their Bibles to the Persecuters, to save their own lives in the days of Dicolesian: and it might have been pleaded in their behalf, that they did not give up the Divine Oracles, but only a heap of Dumb Signs or Characters in Ink and Paper.  
2. And the same would have justified the rage of Antiochus in tearing 
2.  and burning the Books of the Law; 
1. Macc. 1. 56.  and the madness of the Papists in doing the like at several times by the Protestants Bibles: all which might, by the help of this shuffle, have pleaded for themselves, that they did not burn the Holy Scriptures, (no by no means) but only a bundle of unsensed Characters.  
3. As for the Exercitators distiction 
3.  (which is the foundation of this conceit) I intent to deal with it hereafter, when I come to speak of Scripture being its own Interpreter. Therefore 
v. 2. par. ch. 12  at present I shall let it pass.   

CHAP. IX.  
The contrary Arguments Examined, and Answered; the first from some Positions of the Exercitator about the manifold Sense of Scripture, etc.  
I Come now to examine what was alleged by the Adverse Part, and to answer the Arguments whereby they would prove Reason and Philosophy to be the Scriptures best Interpreter.  
1. The Exercitator argues from some Positions by him formerly laid down 
Arg. 1.  which he supposes himself to have daemon 
Ph. Scr. Int. c. 6. par. 1.  stratively proved in his 4th Chapter, viz. That the next and immediate Sense of the Scripture is manifold, and whatsoever Truths occur to the Readers Mind in the perusal of any Scripture, they are all to be taken for the true intended sense and meaning of that Scripture: and Philosophy being the true, certain, and undoubted knowledge of the nature of things demonstratively deduced from the Principles of Natural Light; therefore by this the several Truths that lie in the Scripture, may be best drawn out and demonstrated, and all false Interpretations discovered, and consequently this is the infallible Rule of Interpretation. This is the Sum of his Argument. For answer, Here are 
Sol.  many things crowded together in this captious Sorites, which must be particularly discussed, that the vanity and folly of the whole may the better appear.  
1. He supposes the immediate Sense 
1.  of Scripture to be manifold, and that one and the same Sentence of Scripture affords great variety of different Senses. This I deny: and do maintain with the consentient Judgement of the Reformed Churches, that the Sense of Scripture is but one. Thus much I grant:  
1. That there may be varions applications or accommodations made of one and the same Li●eral Sense of Scripture, so it be done with due caution; and ●o otherwise can that threefold Sense which some speak of, Allegoricla, Anagogical, Tropological, be allowed.  
2. That one single Sentence of Scripture may and frequently doth contain many very weighty Truths in it; but these are not coordinate Senses of the same Proposition; this is but one; the rest are but either some Specials included in their General, or some deductions from Scripture Assertions, as of Conclusions from their Principles wherein they are virtually comprehended.  
3. I further grant, That sundry passages of Scripture (especially in the Old Testament) have a mystical Sense besides the Literal; to wit, when one thing is propounded as a Type representing somewhat else. But then the thing signified by the words of Scripture is but one, namely, that only which the Literal Sense exhibits, which propounds the Type. The Antitype is not signified by the words in those Scriptures, but by the Type, which those words do immediately speak of. For example, when we find in Numb. 21. 8, 9 how by God's command Moses set up a Brazen Serpent upon a Pole for the Bitten Israelite to look on that he might be healed; these words that relate the History, signify no more than what they literally import. But the Brazen Serpent there spoken of did indeed signify somewhat else; for it did tipically represent the future Crucifixion of Christ for the Salvation of Sinners, as our Saviour himself hath taught us, Joh. 3. 14.  
Indeed this conceit of the multiplicity of Senses serves our Exercitators turn very well, because it helps to render the Scripture ambiguous and thereby obscure; and that is the principal strength of his Cause; of which I shall speak hereafter in due place. Mean while let us see what he hath to say for this fancy.  
Two kinds of proof he uses, the one from Reason, the other from the Testimony 
Ph. Scr. Int. cap. 4. par. 4.  of learned Men. His Reasons are drawn from God's Omniscience and Veracity. God perfectly knows all the several significations of the words that he hath uttered in Scripture, and whatver the Reader can apprehend in them: and he is also most true and faithful, and therefore would not deceive or delude any by his Words. Hence he gathers, that whatsoever sense may be made of any part of Scripture, if it be in itself a Truth, it must be owned for the true meaning of the Spirit of God in that place.  
To this I answer:  
Were all this intended only of the multiplicity of subordinate Senses, depending on and deducible from that immediate Sense, which is but one, the Argument will hold firm. For if any thing do truly lie in any Man's words, or by due consequence be deducible from them, which himself did not mean when he spoke them, he must needs be charged to be either ignorant or fallacious. But being intended (as it is by the Author) of a multiplicity of collateral and immediate Senses, his Argument is a miserable inconsequence.  
Next he attempts to prove this by the Testimony of Learned Men; and begins with the Jewish Rabbins, whose. childish and absurd conceits need no confutation: witness that instanced by this Author, their proving the multiplicity of Senses out of Psalm 62. 12. (the 11. in our English Translation) God hath spoken once, twice have I heard this, that power belongeth unto God. That is, say they, God hath propounded one single Speech, but such as I can understand two ways, that is, many ways (a certain number being put for an uncertain) by drawing several Senses from it: wherein the Power of God consists, that he can so order and dispose his Speech, as thereby to teach men a multitude of Truths. And is not this a goodly gloss upon the Text, and an irrefragable proof of the matter in hand? Whereas the Psalmists twice hearing what God had once spoken, is no more but his diligent and attentive minding of that great and weighty Truth, That Power belongs unto God.  
What he further citys out of the Father's concerning the fecundity of Scripture, containing much in a few words, is all granted, being understood (as before) of subordinate, not coordinate Senses. For that the Scripture should be as a formless Mass, capable of being turned by Philosophy into a thousand shapes (which this Author's conceit tends to) never was, for aught I can find, any part of their meaning.  
2. Whereas he says Philosophy is a true, certain, undoubted knowledge 
2.  of the nature of things demonstrated by Natural Light; I ask, doth Philosophy comprehend the knowledge of all things? Or, is the nature of all things discernible by Natural Light? There are in Scripture many things Historical, Prophetical, and Dogmatical, the knowledge whereof depends wholly upon Supernatural Revelation: What can Philosophy do here? And even in those things that are Natural, and belong to the cognisance of Philosophy, how short is that knowledge that the most learned have attained? Therefore, whereas this Author so proudly derides 
Ph. Scr. Int. cap. 5. par. 4.  our Reformed Divines for complaining of the darkness of Man's Natural Reason; if he were not too wise to be taught, he might have learned more modesty from the ancient Philosophers, the best and wisest whereof did greatly bewail the darkness of Man's Understanding. Even Aristotle (who never, I think, was judged to have disparaged Humane Reason) acknowledges that our Understandings, even as to the most manifest things in nature, are but as the Eyes of the Owl and Bat to the daylight. And though both he and others of them, being unacquainted with Scripture, could not clearly discover the true original of this darkness, yet some weak conjectures some of them have made of it, and (whether by any Tradition received from the Jews, or by some other means I shall not inquire) some general and confused intimation they had, that Man had lost his Primitive Excellency, that the Wings of his Soul (for so they express it) had by some sad fall been so broken, that he could not arrive at any considerable measures of knowledge by his greatest industry. And hence arose that fond mistake among some of them, that the Souls of Men having had a pre-existence before their union with their Bodies, and having offended in that State, were for a punishment of their Error, thrust into these gross terrestrial receptacles and that this caused the imperfection and obscurity of men's Understandings. But to those who own the Scripture, and may learn from thence what Mans Primitive State was, and how he fell, and are any whit acquainted with themselves, methinks it should be no strange Riddle, that the Mind is clouded and benighted even in things Natural, and therefore in Supernatural much more. But where is that Philosophy that this Exercitator cries up for so certain and infallible? and which another Author of like Principles does 
Lambert. Velthus. de usu rationis in Theologia.  with profane boldness, magnify as equal to the Holy Scriptures for its complete perfection and infallible certainty? Where is it? In the Clouds? Sure it never was extant among men, save in the crazy conceits of some haughty self-admirers.  
3. As to what our Author speaks of 
3.  Philosophy being useful to detect false Interpretations of Scripture; I grant, that where such false Interpretations are given, as do really entrench upon the undoubted Principles of Reason, the weakness and folly of them may well be discovered by Philosophy: But all corrupt or perverse expositions are not to be so limited; nor is this enough to render Philosophy a sufficient Rule of Interpretation. The heathen Philosophers could discover the error of their vulgar Religion, but could not direct men to the true and right, as I have shown before. The like may be said in the present case.  
4. Whereas our Exercitator further 
4.  adds in the close of this Argument, that from the beginning of Christianity, those who were the most profound Philosophers, were generally confessed to be the happiest Interpreters of Scripture, I am far from being of his mind, none having more corrupted and depraved the Scriptures, than Men of greatest eminency for Philosophic Learning: which I do not at all impute to Philosophy (truly so called) but to the rashness and folly of Men, who being desirous to advance that wherein they would be thought to excel, have adventured to make use of their Philosophic Principles in matters of a quite different and more sublime nature. But suppose we the utmost that can be supposed; That an eminent Philosopher were furnished with all the most necessary accomplishments for the understanding of Scripture, and should duly improve them for that end; yet this would no more prove Philosophy to be the Supreme rule of Interpretation, than Grammar or Rhetoric; which are every whit as necessary and useful to such a Work, if not more. No further doth any thing help us in understanding the Scripture, than it directs us to those 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or evidences of the true sense that lie within the Scripture itself; that is, by helping us to use the Scripture as the Rule of its own Interpretation,   

CHAP. X.  
A second Argument, from God's being the Author of Philosophy, answered.  
EVery one, saith the Exercitator, is the best Interpreter of his own 
Arg. 2.  Words, and God being the Author 
Ph. Scr. Int. cap. 6. par. 1.  of Philosophy, to him is to be ascribed whatever Interpretation is made of the Scripture by the Maxims of Philosophy, and consequently that is to be owned as the Rule of Interpretation.  
But this is a strange way of Argumentation 
Sol.  in a Man that pretends to Reason. If he have no better skill in Expounding than he hath in Arguing, he will not gain many Proselytes to his Interpretations of Scripture amongst understanding and considerate Men. For,  
1. This Argument may with full as much or more strength, be retorted upon him, and that two ways;  
First, If because God is the Author of Philosophy, therefore Philosophy must unfold all the difficulties in Scripture: Will it not as well follow, that seeing God is the unquestionable Author of the Scriptures, therefore the Scriptures are to resolve all the difficulties in Philosophy? If it be said, that the Scriptures are not designed for any such end, nor fitted for such an use as to untie the knots of Philosophy; their use and design is of greater and higher concernment. I answer, neither is Philosophy designed to clear doubts in matters of Supernatural Revelation, its use being limited to matters of an inferior Orb. Again, we may thus also retort the Argument; If God be the best Interpreter of his own Mind, then doubtless the best Interpretation of his Mind is to be fetched from that which is the only certain and undoubted Record of his Mind, and that is the Scripture.  
Secondly, That God is the Author 
2.  of all true and sound Philosophy, I grant; nor needed the Exercitator to have given himself the trouble of spending 
Ph. Scr. Int. c. 5. par. 3.  so many lines to prove it. But I must mind him of some few things to rectify his mistakes.  
1. He is widely out in supposing that the Wisdom spoken of in the Scriptures by him alleged, is no other than Philosophy. The Holy Ghost in most, if not all, of those places, speaks of something higher and more excellent than mere Natural Knowledge.  
2. Whereas among other Humane Testimonies that the Author heaps up to prove Philosophy to be of God, he brings in Lucretius, lib. 5. de rerum natura; the learned Vogelsangius hath discovered 
Indignat. Justa p. 67.  his shameful mistake, telling him, that the God whom Lucretius there means, when he says,  

— Deus ille fuit, Deus, inclyte Memmi,  
Qui Princeps vitae rationem invenit eam, quae  
Nunc appellatur Sapientia, etc.   
is no other than Epicurus; and must Epicurus' Philosophy be the Scriptures Interpreter?  
3. This I must add by way of limitation to my former concession, that God is not so the Author of Philosophy, as he is of the Scripture. He is so far the Author of the Scripture, as that he hath infallibly directed his Servants in penning its several Parts, and preserved them from Error in that Work: But he is not so the Author of Philosophy, as infallibly to direct any Man in the World so as not to Err in his Philosophy. Here therefore is a very great difference: and seeing that this Philosophy (which we acknowledge, so far as it is sound and true, to be God's Gift) is no where to be found but in the Minds or Writings of fallible Men, by what certain Rule shall we judge of the Maxims of Philosophy in matters of Religion, whether they be undoubtedly true or no? Or which way shall we be assured that the aforesaid Maxims (supposing them to be unquestionably true) are duly applied to the matter in controversy? Whither shall we go in this case to find out such solid satisfaction as may give sufficient ground for that Divine Faith, that we certainly owe to the Doctrine of Scripture?  
Thirdly, Suppose (what is not) that we had a clear and perfect Model or System of Sound Philosophy to have recourse to, so as we may truly say of it, that it is all and every Part and Particle of it of Divine Original, and so complete, that there is no defect in it; yet still we must remember that Philosophy hath its Bounds, and discovers nothing to us but those necessary Truths which fall within the compass of nature; and so far we might take it for the Voice of God: But as for Supernatural Verities, the being and discovery whereof depend upon God's absolute Will and Arbitrary Revelation He never intended that Philosophy should be our guide in these: But here we are to keep solely and wholly to what he hath said in the Scriptures.   

CHAP. XI.  
A third Argument, from the supposed Sufficiency of Philosophy to Interpret Scripture, answered.  
WHatsoever, saith the aforesaid Author, is necessary to the 
Arg. 3.  Rule of Interpretation, perfectly agrees 
Ph. Scr. Int. cap. 4. par. 10. etc. 6. par. 1.  to Philosophy and the Principles of Reason. For they are undoubtedly true, free from all danger of Error, and therefore cannot deceive, being grounded upon unmoveable Foundations; admitting no appeals, impartial, not inclined to this or that side; in a word, so sure and undoubted, that they will force assent; provided they be not bended or swayed by Mens prejudices, or vicious inclinations.  
But, as I said before, where is this Philosophy to be found? If it be any 
Sol. 1.  where, how comes it to pass, that those who have in all Ages been most devoted to the study of it, and most perspicacious and successful in searching the secrets of it, have yet in many things, especially that concerning Religion, so foully erred, and have been at so great odds, not only one with another, but each with himself? Certain it is, that the Principles of Reason and Philosophy, let them be never so Sound and Stable, yet they can prevail upon none any further than they are received into the Mind: and they are no where received but according to the disposition and capacity of the Subject; the darkness and imperfection of whose Understanding much altars the conception of the soundest Principles.  
Besides, my third Answer to the precedent 
2.  Argument will serve here; for let Philosophy be never so infallible, it must be kept within its own proper sphere, and not be applied to matters Supernatural, that are wholly out of its road, and above its reach. Of all Parts of Philosophy, the Mathematics are generally esteemed the most demonstrative, and irrefragable. But if any should attempt by Mathematical Principles to Interpret what the Scripture hath revealed about the Creation of the World, the Incarnation of Christ, the Resurrection of the Body, the Believers Union with Christ, or the like, he might well be deemed to stand in need of a large Dose of Hellebore.   

CHAP. XII.  
A fourth Argument, from the nature of a clear distinct Perception, answered.  
BUt (says the Exercitator) there is 
Arg. 4.  no clear and distinct perception 
Ph. Scr. Int. cap. 5. par. 5, 6.  of a thing, but it begets an intimate persuasion in the Conscience of the Truth of what is so perceived; which Perception and Persuasion coming from God as the Cause, it may not unfitly be called the Persuasion, Dictate, Testimony, Inspiration of the Holy Spirit of God: which Divines commonly, but mistakingly ascribe to that which they call Supernatural Light, out of their low esteem of Reason, and that Natural Light that is in every Man.  
This, I confess, the Author doth not 
Sol.  make use of among the Arguments that he produceth to defend his Cause: yet because it tends to beget a conceit (according to the drift of his Discourse) that what Men apprehend themselves to have a clear knowledge of by Reason or Philosophy, is infallibly certain, and thereby qualified for the sure Interpreting of Scripture, I thought fit not to pass it over without some Animadversion.  
This Assertion is a piece of wild somewhat (for whether I should call it Philosophy, or Divinity, Sense, of Nonsense, I know not) that if entertained, gives ground to Men of corrupt Minds to father their most enormous Conceits upon God and his Holy Spirit. Against it I shall propound a few Considerations.  
1. Do not all Ages of the Church bear witness that erring Persons may be as confidently persuaded of their mistaken opinions as others are of the Truth, strongly conceiving what they hold to be most clear and evident, so far as cheerfully to lay down their lives in the defence of it? So capable are Men of being deluded by their own darkened and corrupted Reason, when they give themselves up to it as their sole guide, that some have denied to the death those Truths, that are in some degree knowable by Natural Light, as that grand Maxim, which is the Foundation of all Religion, That there is a God; witness Caesar Vaninus. But for Doctrines of mere Revelation, how peremptorily they are denied, and upon what ground we need no farther instance than that of the Socinians, or (as they are otherwise called from a more Ancient Ringleader) Photinians; who 
Dr. Pearson in his Epistle to the Reader prefixed to his Exposition of the Creed  of all Heretics have most perverted the Articles of our Creed, and found out Followers in these latter ages, who have erected a new Body of Divinity in opposition to the Catholic Theology, says the Reverend Bishop of Chester. Yet this new Socinian Body of Heterodoxies, (called by the Clergy of England in their Convocation, Anno 1640. a Complication of Heresies,) is by its Fautors maintained with highest confidence, and that under the plausible pretence of clear Perception by the Principles of Reason. Upon this account One of that way denies God's foreknowledge of future contingencies; and upon 
Crellius lib. de Deo & attributis c. 24. Ostorodius Instit. cap. 6.  the same ground another of them denies the Doctrine of the Trinity, and the two Natures of Christ; because their Reason tells them as clearly and evidently as the Sun shines at Noon, that these things are false.  
2. This countenances the absurd opinion of some ancient Philosophers, That 
2.  man is the measure of all things: for according to this, every thing must be accounted true, that a Man is strongly persuaded to be so: whereas the truth of our Perceptions lies in their consonancy to the nature of things, which must be first supposed before we can apprehend them. And therefore that great Maxim that bears such sway with some, that whatsoever I have a clear and distinct Perception of, is infallibly true, is so far from being a sure Test of Truth and Falsehood, that in this dark and degenerate State of Mankind, it infallibly betrays those who trust to it, to innumerable and pernicious mistakes. For suppose the Principle itself should be true, That every thing is as we perceive, provided our Perception of it be distinct and clear: which way shall we be resolved whether this Perception we have of things be clear and distinct, or dark and confused? seeing experience puts us out of all doubt, that persons as far distant in their apprehensions of the same thing as East and West, do yet both of them with much confidence plead the greatest clearness and distinctness imaginable. What shall we think (to pass by other instances) 
1 King. 22  of the contest between Micajah and the four hundred false Prophets about Ahab's Expedition? The false Prophets expressed as high a confidence of their being in the Right, when abused by a lying Spirit, as Micajah, who was truly guided and acted by the Holy Spirit of God. But the Explication that a 
Lud. Welzog. Cens. Cens. 〈◊〉. 68  late Author gives of this so much applauded Rule, viz▪ (That then doth Reason clearly and distinctly perceive a thing, when it perceives it as it is in itself) renders it plainly ridiculous, supposing the thing in question. For when I am enquiring how I shall be assured that my apprehension of a thing is certainly true; the meaning is, how shall I be sure that I understand the thing to be as it really is (for the verity of my Conception consists in its agreement with the object.) Therefore to make a clear and distinct Perception, the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a true and right apprehension, and to explain this clear and distinct Perception by saying it is a Perception of a thing as it is, is to make the same thing the Index of itself, and leaves me as much to seek as at first; for still it will be asked, how shall I know that I perceive a thing as it is, or that my apprehension agrees with the nature of the thing?  
3. I might further add, That we are obliged to believe many things, whereof we cannot have a clear and distinct perception, as the Trinity of Persons in the Godhead, the Incarnation of our Saviour, the Hypostatical Union of the Divine and Humane Nature, and such like. Touching which I grant, we must have a clear perception that they are revealed ere we can believe them; but a clear perception of the revealed objects themselves we cannot have, they being to us incomprehensible Mysteries: upon which ground both these and sundry other Scripture-Doctrines are by some rejected as unintelligible and irrational. But here Des Cartes acquits himself: For he somewhere gives his Readers this Caution, That we should remember 
Princ. Philos. par 1▪ art. 24.  God the Maker of all things to be infinite, and ourselves finite; and therefore if he reveal any thing to us of himself, or other things, that is above the strength of our Natural Wit (such as the Mysteries of the Incarnation and the Trinity) we must not deny them credit, though we cannot clearly understand them. Nor should we at all wonder that there are many things both in his immense nature, and in the Creatures made by him that exceed our capacity.  
4. This fond conceit of the Exercitator 
4.  borders upon that of the Enthusiasts; whose highflown pretences of the guidance of the Spirit, and the internal, living, essential, substantial word within them, comes to no more, when searched to the quick, but their own darkened and besotted Reason, whose absurd Fancies and Blasphemous Dictates they daringly imputed to the Spirit of God. This Clause in our Author brings him under a suspicion of complying with those old Libertines, and present Quakers (whom he professeth to dislike) only with this difference: They put their crude Conceptions into a more fantastic dress of great swelling words to amuse the ignorant Vulgar; and this Gentleman hath put his opinion into a more Manly Garb, to render it the more plausible to the Literate World.   

CHAP. XIII.  
A fifth Argument, from the supposed Practice of the Ancient Fathers, Schoolmen, and others, answered.  
ANother Plea the Exercitator 
Arg. 5. Ph. Scr. Int. cap. 6. par. 2.  useth, is drawn from the Practice of the Ancients, Justin Martyr, Dionysius Areopagita, Origen, and others, making use of the Platonic or Eclectick Philosophy, to Expound the difficult places of Holy Writ, and of the Schoolmen and others in these latter A●●●, making the like use of the Peripatetic Philosophy, which bore the sway in their times.  
To this I answer,  
1. Methinks this is a very lose and inconsequent 
Sol. 1.  way of arguing: For though this Author professeth elsewhere 
* cap. 5. par. 2.  that in the present controversy he intends not by Philosophy, the opinion of Plato or Aristotle, or any other whatever; yet it is plain by his Prologue, and by several passages in the Body of his Discourse, that he intends the honour of being the Scriptures Interpreter to the Cartesian Philosophy. And in this very Chapter, wherein he allegeth the forementioned 
cap. 6. par. 2.  examples of Fathers and Schoolmen, he tells us that other Christians, who had forsaken the Romish Church, did, in their Expositions of Scripture mostly (though not exactly) tread in the steps of the Schoolmen (who made Aristotle's Philosophy their Rule) till that in this last Age the light of the Cartesian Philosophy shone upon some Divines, Quibus sordescere coeperunt Sacrarum literarum interpretamenta, quae hujus lucis radiis non illustrata prodierunt. It seems the Divines of his way despised and vili●ed all Interpretations of Scripture (whether by Fathers or Schoolmen, or by whomsoever made) that were not enlightened with the beams of this new-risen Star: so that all Expositions of Scripture that were made before Des Ca●tes his happy days, must be condemned to the Dust and Moths, as useless and good for nothing. Which by the way serves a little to abate my wonder at the daring folly of some Novelists, in whose Writings I find many absurd, distorted, self-contradicting Expositions of Scripture, not without the highest scorn cast upon all dissenting Interpreters. It seems they are of this Author's persuasion, and perhaps have lighted their Candle at his dark Lantern. But truly, as I do not very well relish the modesty of our Exercitator in this Discourse, so I do as little admire his Logic. For what a wild consequence is this, because the Ancients used the Platonic or Eclectick Philosophy as their Rule of Interpretation, and the Schoolmen used the Peripatetic as their Rule of Expounding; therefore the Cartesian Philosophy, that differs widely from them all, is the surest and most infallible Interpreter? Let no man mistake me, as if I hereby intended any sinister reflection on that noble Author, whom the person I am dealing with pretends to follow. I willingly allow him all the honour that his great Parts and Studious Inquiries may have merited, without the least detraction: Though I think some of his greatest admirers have done him no small injury, partly by their Superlative Eulogies given to him, together with their ready swallowing, and pertinacious defending all his dictates; but especially by extending his Rules and Methods to matters of Supernatural Revelation, beyond his declared meaning, if his own word may be taken, which I am not concerned to examine.  
2. What use soever former Writers Ancient or Modern have made of their respective Philosophy in expounding Scripture, it doth not yet appear that they owned it for their Rule: and if they did, I am sure they did amiss. I highly honour the memory of the ancient Fathers; but I never took them for infallible in their Interpretations, nor did they themselves; nor I suppose doth the Exercitat or, who yet contends for Philosophy to be the Infallible Interpreter. And for the Schoolmen, himself citys some Authors, and might have cited many more, and those of great eminency in the Church of Rome itself, who have long since complained of them for corrupting Divinity by mixing it with their Philosophic Notions; and yet we never find any of these so absurd as to assert Philosophy to be the Scriptures Interpreter.  
3. Lastly, let it be considered, whether this Author have not greatly forgotten and grossly contradicted himself, in using this Argument from Example: for himself professeth to maintain a new and strange opinion in asserting Philosophy to be the Interpreter of Scripture 
* Ph. Scr. Int. c. 5. par. 1. Novam eamque par●doxam (sententiam) adstruere in praesentiarum est animus, scil. hoc munus (interpretandi Scripturas) competere Philosophiae, hancque esse normam certam a● minime fallacem, tam S. libros explica●di quam illorum explicationes explorandi. . And in his Prologue, he tells us, that he had consulted with the Divines of all Places and Ages (that is, I suppose, with their Writings) to find out what method they used, and what Rule they followed in their Interpretation of Scripture; but could find nothing that would give him satisfaction: and therefore he resolved to lay them all aside, and try what he could do proprio mart, by his own industry; and that after long disquisition, he at last fell upon this only sure and infallible way, which he here commends to the World. Now I would know how he could speak this, and yet believe what he here allegeth, that both Fathers and Schoolmen, and other Modern Writers took this course of making Philosophy the Rule of Expounding Scripture?   

CHAP. XIV.  
1. Answer given to a sixth Argument, drawn from instances in some considerable Scripture-assertions supposed not interpretable without Philosophy; viz. Such as speak of God after the manner of Man. 2. Our Saviour's Words about the Eucharist. 3. The Doctrine of the Trinity.  
IN the next place the Exercitator 
§ 1.  argues from instances in some considerable 
Arg. 6.  Scripture-Assertions, which 
Ph. Scr. Int. c. 6. par. 3.  (he says) cannot be interpreted but by having recourse to Philosophy as the Rule of Exposition. And here he insists upon three particulars, which I shall examine in order.  
First he instances in those Scriptures 
1.  that speak of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, after the manner of Men, ascribing to him the Members of an Humane Body, and the affections of an Humane Soul; besides Sense and Motion, with many other things not compatible to an Incorporeal, much less to an infinite and immutable Being. Touching which Expressions, whereas it is truly cautioned by Divines of all sorts, that these are to be explicated by such Scriptures as speak otherwise of God, suitably to his immaterial and unchangeable Being: this Author boldly affirms, that the Scripture of itself is insufficient to direct us; and that there is no way to resolve us which of these different Expressions of Scripture are to be taken properly, and which not, unless we take the Principles of Philosophy and Natural Reason for our guide.  
To this I answer: That Gods infinite and immense Perfections are much more 
Sol.  clearly and fully discovered to us in Scripture than by Natural Light. The Apostle says, 1 Cor. 2. 11. What man knows the things of a Man, save the Spirit of Man which is in him; even so the things of God knoweth no man but the Spirit of God. Therefore the best and safest Conceptions we can have of God, are those which we learn from the Spirit of God speaking to us in and by the Scripture. And if this Author were not extremely prejudiced by a partial fondness for his own darling conceits, he might know, that plain ordinary Christians, who never had aught to do with Philosophic Learning, have by their sole acquaintance with the Scriptures, come to much clearer and sounder conceptions of God, his Nature, and Attributes, than the learnedst Philosopher that ever the World had, could attain by all his Wit and Study without Scripture Light: and that to any Reader that is not prepossessed with false and absurd Notions of God by his own vain imagination, and misguided Reason, the Scriptures that speak so differently concerning that Supreme Being, if prudently compared together, and the circumstances on each side considered, do sufficiently to the satisfaction of sober Minds, discover to us their true and genuine Sense, without giving the least countenance to the sottish and irrational conceits of the Anthropomorphites; though a cavilling daring Wit may and will find something to quarrel with, where the matter is as clear as the noonday Sun.  
His next instance is, The Words of our Saviour at the institution of his last 
§ 2.  Supper, This is my Body: which the Papists interpret for Transubstantiation: The Lutherans for Consubstantiation: The Reformed Churches deny both, understanding the words tropically; whose Sense he says can be no otherwise defended but by the Principles of Natural Philosophy.  
For answer to this, I grant, That in 
Sol.  clearing this controversy, there is good use of the Principles of Philosophy and Natural Reason; and so there is also of Sense; which undeniably convinceth us, that what we see, and feel, and taste, is Bread. Yet sure we are not to make Sense the Rule of Interpreting Scripture. But the true and proper Rule of Interpreting our Saviour's Words, [This is my Body] is that which the Scripture itself, and that alone hath taught us; viz. That Christ assumed a true Humane Body: which is a truth that Reason and Philosophy could never inform us of, it being a matter of pure Revelation. Now this being laid down as the chief Postulatum; the thing to be inquired into is, What is the nature of an Humane Body? and what are the essential Properties of all natural Bodies? And this Natural Philosophy instructs us in, as being no matter of Revelation, but lying within the compass of Natural Light, which teacheth us that every Natural Body is quantitative and divisible, and confined to one certain place; consequently that the Bread in the Sacrament of the Eucharist, cannot be properly and substantially the Body of Christ, which (as Scripture informs us) was once nailed to the Cross, but is now glorified in Heaven. Now the force of all this for the expounding of our Saviour's Words, lies in the former supposition, That our Saviour assumed a true natural Humane Body, together with what was even now mentioned; That the same Body of Christ which he assumed, is at the right Hand of God in Heaven: both which are Scripture-Revelations. Besides, there is a wide difference between these two, a help to overthrow a false Interpretation, and the Rule of establishing the true one. Philosophy may do the former, but not the latter. As in this controversy, the Principles of Reason and Philosophy do convincingly assure us that Bread is not, cannot be the Body of a Man. But they cannot assure us what was our Saviour's meaning, when holding the Bread in his Hand, he said, This is my Body: this must be resolved by what the Scripture itself speaks either there, or elsewhere.  
His third and last instance is the Doctrine of the Trinity, which he says 
§ 3.  cannot be cleared without having recourse 
3.  to Philosophy: and here, having derided the attempts of many to explicate and confirm this great Mystery by their Metaphysical Speculations; he highly applauds the learned Keckerman for his happy endeavours in unfolding and demonstrating it, Ex immotis Philisophiae fundamentis, out of the unmoveable Foundations of Philosophy.  
To this I answer, That the curious 
Sol.  speculations and Philosophic nice●ies of the Schools about the Doctrine of the Trinity, have done it more prejudice than advantage, and given greater occasion to the adverse part to reject it, when they found so strange and incomprehensible a Mystery defended by such thin, airy, cobweb notions. It had been much better, if Men had contented themselves with those discoveries the Scripture makes of this inexplicable Mystery, it being a Doctrine purely of Supernatural Revelation, and not at all discoverable by Natural Light. The Arguments from Reason and Philosophy brought for the proof of it, by the learned Keckerman, and by Claubergius a late Cartesian, are examined by Vogolsangius in his Indignatio Justa, etc. and discarded as insufficient. I grant, that in this, (as in many other Doctrines) it may be of good use to show that there is nothing in what the Scripture says of it, that contradicts any sound Principle of Reason. But to go about by the Principles of Reason or Philosophy positively to demonstrate the truth of it, is a thing which I take to be impossible. I choose to say of this Mystery, as one does of the Divine Essence, Credendo intelligitur, adorando enarratur. It is best understood by believing, and best declared by adoring. He (saith the late Bishop of 
Dust. Dub. li. 1. c. 2.  Down) that should go to Revelation to prove that nine and nine make eighteen, would be a Fool: and he would be no less, that goes about to prove a Trinity of persons by natural Reason. Every thing must be derived from its own Fountain. Thus Aquinas tells us, He that by natural 
Aqu. par. 〈◊〉. q. 32. 〈◊〉. 1  Reason attempts to prove the Trinity of persons, doth a double prejudice to the Faith. 1. He derogates from its Dignity, it being proper to the Doctrine of Faith to be of such things as exceed Man's Reason. 2. He hinders others from embracing the Faith, by using such Arguments as are not cogent; which renders it obnoxious to the Infidel's contempt. This is plain in Scripture, that the Father is God, and the Holy Ghost is God: and that these are three, and all three are but one God: and for other subtleties and curious inquiries of busy and presumptuous Wits, without and beside the Written Word, I think the Truth of God never was, nor ever will be beholden to them.   

CHAP. XV.  
A seventh Argument, from the reasonableness of Religion, answered.  
ONe Argument more I shall touch, which I find alleged by two noted 
Arg. 7.  Socinians, Smalcius and Schlichtingius (as they are cited by a late learned Author in his Socinianism. Confut.) to prove Reason to be the Rule of deciding Controversies of Faith: which may be thought improveable upon the same grounds, to assert that Reason must be the Rule of interpreting Scripture. And it is, That of the Apostle, where he asserts the Service that God requires of Christians, to be 
Rom. 12. 1.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a reasonable service, that is, say they, a Service agreeable to Reason.  
To this I answer two things,  
First, I know no cause to recede from 
●ol. 1.  the Sense that is usually given by our Interpreters, seeing it so fairly offers itself from the Words themselves: and therefore do judge, with the learned Dr. Hammond on the place, that the Apostle calling upon Christians to present their Bodies a living Sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, even their reasonble service; doth evidently oppose this to the Sacrifices of the Ceremonial Law, which were no other than irrational Creatures, first killed, and then offered up to God. But,  
Secondly, Be it given (but not 
2.  granted) that the Apostles meaning is what these Men put upon it, viz. That the Service God requires of Christians, is agreeable to Reason: I have already premised and asserted, that Christian Religion is perfectly rational; whence it will undeniably follow, that there is an excellent harmony, a full and complete accord betwixt Reason and Religion. And although some daring Wits that make high pretences to Reason, have, by their profane Jeers at the Mysteries of Christianity, and their turning the Doctrines and Phrases of Holy Scripture into Drollery, contributed not a little to the Atheism of the present age; yet I am passed all doubt, that no man is or can be an Atheist, that hath not first baffled and besotted his Reason. If any therefore hath gone about to set Reason and Religion at variance, it hath been through some misprision, taking some groundless imagination for Reason, or some corrupt opinion or practice for Religion. But if any shall hence argue, that Man's Reason is to be the Rule of Religion, or that Doctrines of Supernatural Revelation are to be interpreted, and the Sense of them determined by Natural Principles, we deny the consequence, and leave them to prove it. Our Saviour tells us that his yoke is easy; but if any should thence Argue, that therefore our ease must be the 
Mat. 11.  Rule of interpreting his Commands, I think few would be found so blind or foolish (except Men of profligate and debauched Consciences) that would admit of such an absurd Argumentation: And there is no less absurditity in this, That because Religion is a Reasonable Service, therefore our Reason must be the Rule of interpreting the Doctrinces of Rëligion.   

CHAP. XVI.  
1. A Transition to the Exercitators Reply to some Scriptures alleged by our Divines against his Heterodoxy. The fond Conceit of Lud. Wolzogen, That in this Controversy Scripture is not to be heard, disproved. 2. And his Plea that he makes for himself in his Censura Censurae, disabled. 3. A return to the Exercitators Exposition of the Scriptures alleged by our Writers. His self-contradiction noted. And the Scriptures cleared.  
THe Exercitator having (after his manner) asserted his own Position, 
§ 1.  comes, in the seventh Chapter of his Discourse, to answer the Scriptures that some have made use of to oppose it. Before I deal with them, I cannot but take notice of the disingenuity of Ludovicus Wolzogen, who having undertaken the Patronage of the Protestant Cause against this Adversary, doth so shamefully throw down his Arms, and run out of the Field: For when he comes at this seventh Chapter of his Antagonist (and again at his twelfth) wherein the Exercitator endeavours to evade or enervate the Scriptures 
Lud. Wolzog. de Scripturar. Interpret p. 217.  brought against him this: valiant Champion not only waves the vindication of them; but for his own more plausible excuse, expressly maintains it to be a preposterous thing in this Controversy about the Interpretation of Scripture, to use or admit the testimony of Scripture at all; and affirms that the Cause must be decided by Reason: And therefore, as all along his Discourse, he never makes use of Scripture to defend himself, or strike his Adversary; so he lays an imputation of folly upon all our Divines that use this way of arguing in the present Case. And he gives two pitiful Arguments to prove this fond Assertion.  
1. One is because the Controversy 
Id. ib. p. 219.  is about the Scripture itself, which is not to be heard in its own Cause, unless such places can be alleged in the explication whereof both parties agree.  
To this I answer, 
Sol.   
1. If this be granted, than whatsoever controversy we have with the Papists about the Authority, Perspicuity and Perfection of the Scriptures, though we have never so clear proof in the Scripture itself for these things, they must all be waved as invalid. But these have hitherto been accounted controverted Points of Faith, and consequently to be resolved from Scripture the only Rule of Faith: & so is this about the Scriptures Interpretation: however the Exercitator, and with him this Author, denies it; while yet both of them acknowledge it to be a Question, wherein the whole of Religion is concerned, and (next to that of the Scriptures Authority) 
Exercitator in Prologo, etc. 1. Wolzog. ubi sup. 5. & p. 90.  the very foundation on which all Doctrines of Faith and Manners rely; and which involves in it whatsoever Differences or Controversies there are between dissenting parties in Religion, that own the Scriptures. And is it not strange that Men should own this Controversy to be so momentous and fundamental, and yet to deny it to be a matter of Faith, or to be determined by Scripture Testimony? But,  
2. Why may not the Scripture be heard speak for itself, as well as Reason 
2.  for itself? The Question under debate is whether the Rule of Interpreting Scripture, be the Scripture itself, or Man's Reason? Does not this as nearly touch Reason as Scripture? And yet must that be allowed to give testimony in its own Cause and not the Scripture? It appears by this (as by many other passages in his Book) that this Author is a better friend to the Exercitators opinion, than to the Protestant Doctrine. And indeed,  
3. This is the very Language of our 
3.  Popish Adversaries; who tell us, the Scripture cannot be its own Interpreter, because the Question is concerning itself. To which our Writers answer 
V. Riveti Isagogen, cap. 19 § 30.  truly, That the Scripture being the Voice of God, its testimony for itself is above all other whatsoever, even in its own Cause.  
His other Argument is, Because till 
2. Wolz. ubi sup. p. 247.  the dissentient parties have agreed about the Interpreter of the Scriptures alleged, they have no Sense, and therefore can testify nothing: And up-upon this account he condemns those of the Reformed Churches that allege Scripture in this Controversy, and blames the Exercitator for answering their Allegations.  
To this I answer,  
1. That any part of Scripture is without 
Sol.  its Sense till it have an Interpreter, is a gross absurdity and falsehood. The Scripture hath its Sense, whether any Man interpret it or no. Interpretation doth not (I am sure it should not) bring the Sense and put it into the Scripture, but receive it from the Scripture.  
2. This Author acknowledges some Scriptures to be so clear, that the Sense is obvious: and if such Scriptures can be produced in the present Controversy (as no doubt they may) Why should the difference about the Interpreter, preclude them?  
3. Were this Argument allowed, it would for ever debarr us from alleging Scripture against the Romanists in any Controversy that we have with them: it being notorious to all Men, that this is one great difference betwixt us and them, who must be the Supreme Interpreter of Scripture? which they challenge as the Privilege of their Church; and we ascribe to the Scripture itself.  
But it is a miserable Plea that this 
§ 2.  Author makes elsewhere for himself, 
Lu. Wol. Cens. Censurae p. 233  viz. That he had to do with one whom he esteemed to be no Christian, but an Heathen (for so he accounts the Exercitator) who would no more regard the Testimony of Scripture in this Case, than a Jew would regard any proof from the New Testament; and therefore it was, that he declined dealing with him about those Testimonies from Scripture. It seems than he would make the World believe, that what he had said about this, was only spoken ad hominem.  
By which it plainly appears, that our Author began to see he could not 
Sol.  stand his ground, but was not so ingenuous as to confess his Error, and therefore runs behind this Bush to hide himself. For,  
1. His Words, which I quoted before out of his Book, De Scripturarum Interpret, do evidently show that he speaks according to his own Mind, that it was a preposterous thing in this Controversy to allege the Testimony of Scripture; and that in this Case no such proof was to be allowed, (see him page 217. 219. and 247.) and not only so, but alleges the Reasons beforementioned (such as they are) for this wild Position.  
2. He knows very well that the Jews (to whom he compares his Antagonist) do not at all own the Authority of the new Testament, but professedly reject it: Whereas the Exercitator (whatever his Religion be) does avowedly own the Divine Authority of the Scripture, and delcares himself willing to be dealt with in that way, in that he citys our Divines Arguments from thence, and endeavours to answer them; for which this Author reproves him. So that the case is not the same. And yet I appeal to the Author's Reason: Should any Jewish Writer either cite any Testimonies out of the New Testament for himself, or endeavour, by his own Interpretations, to evade any Testimonies thence alleged against him (which is plainly the Case here) whether should a Christian that pretends to answer him, do well to say, That the New Testament is not here to be heard, and that it were a preposterous thing to allege it? Should he not rather endeavour to answer the objections that are made, and clear the places cited? And if in case he should do, as this Author doth here, might he not justly be condemned for a Betrayer of the Christian Cause? If it be said, 
Object. Lu. Wolz. loc. cit.  that though the Exercitator acknowledge the Divine Authority of the Scriptures, yet he holds them to be universally ambiguous and obscure, further than Humane Reason expounds them; and therefore it was to no purpose to use Scripture to him, till they had agreed about the Rule of Interpretation. I answer, The Exeroitator does indeed charge the Scripture with obscurity 
Sol.  because of its ambiguity; but it is upon this ground, because, hesays, all words whatsoever are ambiguous: If therefore this should shut out the Scripture from bearing witness in the Controversy, than all Arguments from Reason, must upon the same account, be excluded too; for they must be made up of Words and Phrases, the ambiguity whereof (according to the Exercitators Doctrine) will render them obscure, as well as the Scripture.  
Come we now to speak something to 
§. 3.  the Scriptures alleged by our Divines, 
Ph. Scr. Int. c. 7.  which the Exercitator labours to evade. But methinks it is a pleasant thing to see how he betrays his own Cause, by acting against his own Method and Principles. For having all along cried up Philosophy as the only Interpreter of Scripture; when himself comes interpret the Scriptures brought against him, one would think he should bring his own Tools to this Work, and labour, by Philosophic Principles, to make out the Sense that he gives of these Scriptures. But he waves this, and seeks to fetch out his own Sense from the Scripture itself, by examining the Antecedents and Consequents, and the Author's scope. Now he either takes this way of Interpretation to be right, or he does not: If he do not, he doth but juggle with his Reader, and designs to cheat him: but if he do indeed think it to be right, he yields the Cause, that not Philosophy, but the Scripture itself is the Rule of Interpretation.  
Now for the Scriptures alleged: The 
1 Cor. 1. 19, 20. 21. 1 Cor. 2. 6.  first is that in 1 Cor. 1. 19, 20, 21. where the Apostle speaks very contemptibly of Humane Wisdom; the like may besaid of the next, 1 Cor. 2. 6. Now in these places, saith the Exercitator, the Apostle does not go about to deny or condemn true Wisdom, but the earthly, sensual Wisdom of the World, that is grounded upon vain opinions, and puts Men upon the eager pursuit of earthly things, such as Riches, and Honours, and Sensual Pleasures.  
I answer, The Apostle, having to do with those who thought meanly of the 
Sol.  Doctrine of Christ Crucified, and affected a name for that which the world counted Wisdom; endeavours to lay all Humane Wisdom in the dust, and to discover its insufficiency to conduct man to true happiness; for which he prefers the Doctrine of the Gospel (which was so derided as foolishness) above that which the World so much admired. This therefore is no impertinent allegation against the Exercitators opinion. That in 1 Cor. 2. 14. I have already pressed in the prosecution of my first Argument; and have vindicated it from the corrupt glosses that some have put upon it.  
The last is that in Coloss. 2. 8. Beware lest any man spoil you through 
●●l. 2. 8.  Philosophy, and vain deceit. Here, saith the Exercitator, the Apostle doth not condemn sound Philosophy, but that which is vain and useless.  
I answer, Undoubtedly he doth not 
Sol.  condemn Philosophy truly so called: But he gives a caution to take heed of being deceived by it; as Men may be, when the use of it is extended beyond its Line, and is not kept within its own proper Bounds. Thus, saith our learned Davenant, Philosophy or Humane Reason, which is the Mother of Philosophy, 
Davenant. in Coloss. 2. 8.  is always found vain and deceitful, when it is carried beyond its proper limits, That is, says he, when it attempts to determine of those things, that fall not under the cognisance of Natural Reason; such are those that belong to the Worship of God, and to the Salvation of Man, as the Points of Justification, Reconciliation with God, and other Matters of Faith, that are above the reach of Reason, and depend altogether upon Divine Revelation.   

CHAP. XVII.  
1. That Sound Philosophy asserts nothing contrary to Scripture granted. 2. Two Principles instanced in, and Wolzogen's Tergiversation taxed. 3. The two great Articles of the Creation of all things out of nothing, and the Resurrection of the same numerical Body proved against the Exercitator, to be asserted in Scripture.  
THE Exercitators next Work is to answer the great Argument, 
§ 〈◊〉.  which, he says, some urge against his 
Ph. Scr. Int. 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. p. 1  opinion, viz. Philosophy, and consequently Humane Reason, asserts many things that are repugnant to Divinity and the Scriptures, and therefore they cannot be allowed for the Rule of Interpreting Scripture. He denies the Antecedent; and so do I. What Authors they be in the Reformed Churches that thus argue, I know not. But this I know, that it is no uncommon thing for pugnacious Wits, to draw the Sword upon the shadow of a Dream, and make Hector-like declamations against Utopian Adversaries. Set aside those Authors, who are engaged by some Atheological Hypothesis, which they have espoused (as the Papists and the Lutherans in the Doctrine of the Eucharist) I know not any Man of Learning and Understanding, who hath such a thought, that there is any thing in Scripture derogatory or contradictory to true Philosophy or Sound Reason; or that believes any thing true in Philosophy to be false in Divinity. Whatsoever is true any where, is true every where. Here therefore our Author may put up his Dagger.  
But there is one thing which I cannot 
§ 2. Ph. Scr. Int. c. 8. par. 2.  well pass over, That the Exercitator pretending to confute those who assert a contrariety between the Principles of Philosophy and Divinity, and instancing in these two, Ex nihilo nihil fit, and Idem non potest, numericè reproduci, Instead of solving the knot, he cuts it, and plainly affirms both these Principles to be true, absolutely, and without limitation both in Philosophy and Divinity, confidently asserting that the Scripture doth no where teach us, That the World was made of nothing, or that the same numerical Body shall rise at the last day. And here Wolzogen unworthily deserts the Christian Cause, not vouchsafing to write one word in vindication of these grand Truths against this bold Adversary; but tells us he is content the Man should enjoy his own opinion, though, he says, he could easily have refuted him: Which makes his silence the more inexcusable, and brings him under greater suspicion of Heterodoxy, notwithstanding all his Rhetorical Flourishes. But it is time I should return to our Author, who, if he had not been too much in love with Novelty, might without the least prejudice to his Cause (unless it have some other Monster in the Belly of it that is not yet come to the birth) have answered, that these Axioms are true in a limited Sense both in Philosophy and Divinity; viz. That by a finite created Power, nothing can be made of nothing; and that by the like limited power, the same numerical Body that perisheth, cannot be reproduced. But that nevertheless to an infinite Power all things that imply not contradiction are possible.  
But it seems by this Author's words, 
§. 3.  that he disowns the received Doctrine of the world's Creation out of Nothing; and the Reproduction of the same individual Body.  
1. By denying the former, he must necessarily maintain the Eternity of Preexistent Matter: whereas if God be the Maker of all Being's besides himself (as the Scripture sufficiently assures us) than nothing besides himself could be Eternal; but he must in making the World make the Matter whereof the World consists, which Matter therefore must be made of nothing. The first Article in the most ancient Creeds (as the Reverend Bishop of Chester hath 
Dr. Pearson Expos. of the Creed, Art. 1.  observed) had instead of these words Maker of Heaven and Earth, or together with them, this Clause, The Maker of all things visible and invisible, agreeably to that of the Apostle, Coloss. 1. 16. which distribution is so comprehensive, that it will not admit of any Exception, all things whatsoever being either visible or invisible: and whatsoever can be supposed necessary to the making of the World, it must of necessity come under one of these two Members of the distribution, and consequenly be of Gods making. And indeed if it were otherwise, than something else besides God, must have a necessary, uncreated, independent Being: which carries with it so broad a Contradiction, as Man's Reason left fair to itself cannot allow. Again,  
2. By disclaiming the latter, this Author evidently denies the Resurrection; for that imports the rising again of the same Body that fell, according to that known Speech of Damascen so oft cited by our Divines, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And if the same numerical Body rise not, but another is made de novo for the Soul to animate, this is not a Resurrection but a new Creation; and then the first Creation of the World may as aptly be called a Resurrection as that which is so styled by the Holy Ghost in Scripture. But I think the Scripture speaks plain enough in this Case, (though this Author will not own it) when it says, that at the last day, This corruptible must 
1 Cor. 15. 53.  put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality. And that 
Phil. 3. 20, 21.  our Lord Jesus Christ shall then change our vile Body, that it may be made like unto his glorious Body. And that, If the 
Rom. 8. 11,  Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead, dwell in us, he that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also quicken our mortal bodies by his spirit that dwelleth in us. Add to this that Argument from the description of the place whence the Resurrection shall begin; which I cannot better represent to the Reader than in the words of the learned Bishop 
Expos. of the Creed. p. 382.  of Chester, They which sleep in the dust of the Earth (Dan. 12. 2.) and they which are in the Graves, (Joh. 5. 28.) shall hear the Voice and Rise. And, Rev. 20. 13. The Sea shall give up the dead which are in it, and Death and the Grave deliver up the dead which are in them. But if the same Bodies did not Rise, they which are in the dust, should not revive; If God should give us any other Bodies than our own, neither the Sea nor the Grave should give up their dead. That shall Rise again which the Grave gives up; the Grave hath nothing to give up, but that Body which was laid into it: therefore the same Body which is Buried, shall at the last day be revived. And whereas the Socinians (who are our Adversaries in this, as well as in many other Articles of our Faith) to evade this Argument, will have the Graves spoken of in Joh 5. 28. to be the Graves of ignorance and impiety there meant; and the Rising to be men's coming to the knowledge of Christ, etc. the aforesaid learned Person answers them, That Christ expressly, speaks of bringing Men to 
Ibid. in Marg.  Judgement, vers. 27. and divides those that are to come out of their Graves into two Ranks, vers. 29. neither of which can be so understood: The first are those which have done good before they come out of their Graves; these therefore could not be the Graves of Ignorance and Impiety, from which no good can come: The second are such who have done evil, and so remain as evil Doers, and therefore cannot be said to come forth of the Graves of Ignorance and Impiety, or to Rise by the Preaching of the Gospel to newness of life, because they are expressly said to come forth to the Resurrection of Damnation.  
But if the Exercitators Principles will allow him to write after the rate he here doth, I think none that hath any veneration for the Scriptures, will be overfond of such a corrupt and fallacious Interpreter. But when Men are hammering out a new Divinity, they must either find out a new Scripture, or a new way of Expounding the Old, to countenance their own Dreams, that when, by this Artifice, they have turned out the true Christianity, they may bring us in a Pagan Religion finely set out in the stately dress of Eternal Reason.  
No wonder they cry out of Systems 
Lu. Viers in Aug. de C. D. l. 18. c. 41. Novi ●ominem non tam ●octum quam arrogantem ●actabundumque, qui se & scripturum multa profitebatur: Et non secus vitaturum quae quis antea dixisset, quam aspides vel basiliscos: long enim malle se scientem prudentemque falsum pro vero affirmare, quam alienae opinioni acquiescere.  as Chains and Fetters to their desultorious and volatile Wits. They had rather (as one says of wanton Heads) ●e the Purchasers of Error than the Heirs of Truth. Of whom the Lord Verulam 
* Sermon. fidel. cap. de Veritate,  gives us a very fit Character. Certè sunt, qui cogitationum Vertigine delectantur, ac pro servitute habent fide fixa & Axiomatis constantibus restringi, Liberi Arbitrii usum in Cogitando non mixùs quam in Agendo affectantes. Verily, says he, there are some who are delighted in a giddiness of opinions, and take it for a bondage to be restrained by a fixed Faith and settled Principles, no less affecting the use of their Free Will in thinking than in acting. And so I have dispatched the first Part of my Work, and proceed to the second.    

Part II.  
The Holy Scripture the only sure Interpreter of itself.  

CHAP. I.  
1. The Proposition asserting the Scripture to be its own Interpreter, laid down. Lud. Walzogen's rashness and inconsistency with himself in giving the Sense of our Reformed Divines in this Point. 2. Their true meaning cleared, and something touched about the Analogy of Faith. 3. The Judgement of Divines Ancient and Modern in this Business.  
HAving endeavoured to 
§ 2.  disprove the new pretended Rule of Interpretation, I come, in the next place, to assert the Doctrine of the Reformed Churches, and lay down this Proposition, that the Holy Scripture is its own only sure Interpreter. But before I enter upon the opening and confirming of it, I must remove something that lies in my way. Ludovicus Wolzogen in his two Books de Scripturarum Interpret, attempting to answer the Exercitator, professeth to maintain the received Doctrine of the Protestant Churches in this Point: but pretends to a more clear and distinct handling of it, than hath hitherto been performed by our Divines. Whereas indeed, that which he propounds to maintain is a novel fancy of his own, never yet owned by any Orthodox Divine that I have read or heard of: viz. That the Scripture interprets itself by the Usus loquendi, the custom of speaking; and that this is the only sure and undoubted Rule of Interpretation. But whereas he most immodestly chargeth all that have gone before him, with confusedness in this Controversy, as not well understanding either it or themselves; his learned self, when he comes to take it in hand, is so intricate and perplex, so various and inconstant, that it's a difficult matter to understand what he would have. He turns himself into so many forms, and winds himself so many ways, and falls into so many self-contradictions, that he seems to design the entangling of his Reader, and the hiding of himself in a Castle of Clouds.  
First, One while he will have us understand this Usus loquendi, of the vulgar 
1. Wolzog. de Scripturar. Interpret p. 26. & 42.  use of speech, common to the Scriptures with other Writings: and gives us his Reason why this must be the Rule of Interpretation, because common use is the only Master of Speech, and the Custom of Speakers and Writers gives Law to the signification of 
Ib. 46, 47, etc.  Words; and that the use of Speech is form by much and long Custom, which, when it hath at last prevailed, does, as it were, imprint a public Character upon Words, which come by tacit consent to be received of all: and 
Ib. p. 70, 71 72.  he professes he sees no Reason why any should deny that the Interpretation of Scripture depends upon this use of Speech: which himself says is founded upon Humane Institution, but adopted and approved by the Wisdom of God in Enditing the Scripture. Now that this Usus loquendi should be the Rule of Interpreting the Holy Scriptures, is far wide from the Truth, and from the Judgement of all Protestants, and as far as I know of all other Expositors. For,  
1. When they say the Scripture is its own Interpreter, (or which is all one) the Rule of Interpretation to itself, they understand it of something in the Scripture, that is peculiar to the Scripture, and not any thing that is common to it with other Writings: But the vulgar and customary use of Speech is the same in all Writings, where the same Language is made use of.  
2. It is granted on all hands, that this Usus loquendi, or Custom of Speech, hath its place among those means that I spoke of in the entrance of my Discourse, that do remotely conduce to Interpretation; but it reaches no further nextly and immediately than to Verbal Interpretation (which is called Translation) by guiding us to the right understanding of Words and Phrases, and the several Modes of Speech. But this comes not up to that which we call Real Interpretation, which is the Exposition of the Author's Mind signified by those Words as they are so and so placed. We do not therefore shut out the Use of Speech, but suppose it, and look at something further. For instance, suppose I were to inquire into the Sense of that place, Joh. 1. 1. (which is the instance given by Ʋander Weayen) I may, by the Use of Speech, 
Advers. Wolzog. li. 2. p. 12.  know what these several Words, Beginning, and Word, and God, signify: But I must have something else to guide me to the right meaning of the entire Sentence, In the Beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. And Wolzogen himself acknowledges, 
Lu. Wol. li. 2. p. 107.  that there is a wide difference between words taken singly, and in their first original, and taken as conjoined in Propositions. I may add with very good reason, that there is also a wide difference between Propositions taken singly, and taken in such or such a contexture of Discourse. Now the use of Speech will not help us to distinguish here.  
3. How can the common use of Speech be a Rule in Matters of pure Revelation? I think all acknowledge, that the Sense of Words varies according to the difference of the subject matter about which they are used. Now matters of pure Revelation are so remote from vulgar use, that they had never been spoken or written by any Men, if the Holy Ghost had not Indicted them, and communicated them to us in the Scripture. And the Apostle tells us, that these things are delivered not in Words which Man's Wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth. 
1 Cor. 2. 13.   
4. If the common use of Speech be so sure a Rule of Interpretation as this Author makes it, I wonder what was in his Mind, to say of the Penmen of Scripture, That if they were now living amongst us, they could not be the sufficient Interpreters of their own Writings, because they often wrote they knew not what. Certainly the customary use of Speech which obtained in the times wherein they wrote, must needs be much better known to them than it can be to any now living. Why then might not they interpret their own Writings, if they were now with us, having the best insight into that which this Author cries up for the only sure Rule of Interpretation?  
5. If the customary use of Speech must be the Rule of Interpretation, the inconvenience urged by the Exercitator cap. 11. par. 6. will not easily, if at all, be avoided: viz. the interpreting of Scripture according to the erroneous apprehension of the Vulgar.  
6. If this be so certain a Rule, as he will have it, so as that he who uses it, shall not fail to find out the true Sense of Scripture (for so himself speaks 
* Wolzog. ●●. Sc. Int. p. 12. ) how is it that the Sense of Scripture may not be found in all parts one as well as another? for the use of Speech is the same in all. And yet he acknowledges, that in many things (not necessary to Salvation) let the Reader be never so diligent in his search, he cannot find the meaning of Scripture: and the reason hereof, he says, is to be fetched, not from the nature of the thing, nor from the darkness of our minds, but ex 
Id. ib. p. 15, 16 & p. 172, 173, 174.  ipsa constitutione Scripturae, from the very frame of Scripture itself.  
Secondly, But now, whether this learned Author did not well consider 
2.  what he wrote, or had not well digested his own Notions, or whether he designed to amuse his Reader with intricacies and ambiguities, or whether he were aware of the inconvenience of his former Expressions, and their liableness to exception, or what other were the cause, I shall not inquire: But this is plain to any that attentively reads his Discourse, that when he had once and again given the honour of being the only sure Rule of Interpretation of Scripture, to the common and customary use of Speech; he afterwards falls to a singular use of Speech, 
a Id p. 76, & 227.  distinct from the vulgar, arising from the different Character of the Writer, the different occasion of Writing, the different nature of the things about which he Treats; and that under this singularity of the usus loquendi, the custom of Speech, we are to consider the Antecedents and the Consequents of a Text, 
b Id. p. 79.  and the parallel places. And elsewhere he says, 
c p. 132, & 137.  all the circumstances of the place under consideration are to be examined: and this he calls, Usus loquendi Scripturarius 
d p. 127.  the Scripture use of Speaking. And when he objects against himself, 
e p. 138.  that the customary manner of speaking is dubious and uncertain, he answers it thus, That though it be 
v. etiam p. 262, 263.  so, yet God's manner of Speech in Scripture is fixed. So that what was before called the common and vulgar use, is now confined to God's use, and the Scripture-use of Speaking; which certainly does not receive Law from the custom and consent of Men; but is wholly framed and ordered by the disposal of Divine Wisdom, though in it he makes use of such words, as receive their single signification from common use.  
Besides, this Author tells us elsewhere 
f Cens. Cens. p. 121  that Usus loquendi, or custom of Speech, includes in it the Analogy of Faith, and all other things that are taken out of Scripture, in order to the finding out of its true Sense. Now if this be indeed the meaning of his Usus loquendi, his opinion comes very near to that of the Reformed Churches, if it be not the same with it. But than what needed all this stir, as if our Divines had not discovered their Minds plainly and distinctly, but this Author must come and mend it? whereas he hath rather darkened and obscured it by his intricate and inconsistent Discourse. For whoever before him, took Usus loquendi in such a sense as this? And I much wonder that he who is so much for the custom of Speech, should vary so widely from it in his Writing. For I am sure this Phrase Usus loquendi, according to that mode of Speech that hath hitherto obtained, was never taken so comprehensively as to include the scope of the Text, with the Antecedents and Consequents, and all other circumstances, and the Analogy of Faith, and what ever lies in the Scripture that serves to the discovery of its true sense. Except Men will assume a power to themselves of coining a new Sense of Words, I cannot imagine what ground they can have to talk after the rate of this Author.  
Our Divines speak much more properly 
§ 〈◊〉▪  and clearly in this business, viz. That the Holy Spirit of God hath, in Enditing the Scripture, so attempered his Speech, and so ordered and disposed the several Parts and Parcels of this Sacred Book, that his Mind (so far as it is necessary for us to know it) may be discovered, either from the obvious sense of the particular Sentences and Propositions of Scripture considered in that Order and dependence wherein they are placed, or by a due comparison of one part of Scripture with another; so as that the Reader may gather the Sense of Scripture from the Scripture itself. This is that which our Divines mean, when they say that the Scripture is its own Interpreter. And when they say at any time, that the Spirit of God is the Interpreter of Scripture, either they speak of the Objective evidence that the Spirit gives of the Sense of Scripture; and then they understand it of the Spirit as speaking in the Scripture; which being the Voice of the Spirit, is to us (as I said) our Supreme Rule: Or they speak of the Spirit as the efficient cause of that Subjective light ●hat is let into our Minds enabling us to understand the Scriptures. And this belongs to another inquiry, and doth not concern the Question about the Rule of Interpretation. Now when our Writers say, the Scripture is its own Interpreter, they are to be understood Metonymically. As when they say the Scripture is the Supreme Judge of all Controversies of Faith, they mean no more but that it is Judex Norma●is, or the Supreme Rule of Judgement, according to which Controversies are to be ultimately decided; so by proportion is it in the present Case. And as when the Papists speak of the infallible dectding of Controversies, whether they say the Pope is the infallible Judge, or the Sentence given by the Pope is the infallible Rule of decision, it comes all to one. So when our Divines say sometimes, that the Spirit speaking in the Scripture is the infallible Interpreter of Scripture, and other while, that the Scripture is the infallible Rule of Interpretation, here is no such difference as should just give occasion to any to say, that our Divines speak variously or uncertainly, or that they agree not one with another, or with themselves; for in the issue the meaning of them all, is one and the same.  
Now here I must look back upon what I had said in the Introduction to my Discourse, concerning the special, immediate means of Interpretation; viz. a due observation of the several circumstances of the Scripture to be Expounded; and the comparing of Scripture with Scripture. In the use of which means lies the applying of the right Rule of Interpretation: It is the using of Scripture to expound Scripture. And when a dark or difficult Scripture is compared with some other, wherein the same Truth or Doctrine is more clearly and perspicuously delivered, this is conceived by many learned Men to be intended in that of the Apostle concerning the Analogy of Faith, Rom. 12. 6. Whether it be so or no, I shall not at present debate, much less determine; No● shall I inquire whether that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 form of sound Words, spoken of by the same Apostle, in 2 Tim. 1. 13. be the same with this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as some conceive it is. But this I may have leave to say, that I see no incongruity or inconvenience in using the Expression, or in saying that to explain obscure places of Scripture by such as are more clear and easy, is to expound Scripture according to the Analogy of Faith.  
Analogy, saith Quintilian, is that which the Latins call Proportion, the force 
Quintil. ●i. 〈◊〉. c. 6.  whereof is this, That what is in doubt may be referred to something like it that is out of question, that so the uncertain may be proved by the certain. And why may not the like use of the Word be allowed in this case? Sure I am, eminent Writers both of the Roman and Reformed Churches have thus used it. Analogy, says Aquinas, is, when the 
Sum. p. 1. q. 1. a. 10.  truth of one Scripture is evidenced not to oppose the truth of another. The Analogy 
Controvers. 1. q. 5. c. 9 Analogia fidei nihil aliud est, quam constants & perpetua, sententia, Scripture▪ in apert●s & minime obscuris Scriptur● locis.  of Faith, saith our learned Whitaker, is the constant and perpetual Sentence of Scripture in those places that are undoubtedly plain and obvious to our Understandings. I might allege to the like sense many more Authors, whose excellent Worth sets them sufficiently above the contempt of the Exercitator, and others of his mind, that jeer and deride the Analogy of Faith. But waving the terms, that which I am concerned to assert, is the thing itself; that in expounding Scripture we must be regulated and determined by the Scripture itself: and that whatsoever it speaks darkly and uncertainly in any place, is to be explained by itself in those other places; where it speaks more plainly; which plain places do sufficiently interpret themselves by their own light.  
Now this way of Interpreting Scripture by itself, hath been approved of 
〈◊〉 3.  as the best and safest, by most eminent Authors Ancient and Modern. Clemens Alexandrinus, Iraeneus, Hilary, and others, are cited to this purpose, by 
a Pillaret. ●o. 1. 〈◊〉. 16. c, 6.  Chamier, 
b Is●gog. ●d S. Sc. c. 18.  Rivet, 
c Lection. Gresham. par. 1, Lect. 15.  Dr. Holdsworth. As Esdras and his Companions of old, so should we now interpret Scripture by Scripture, comparing among themselves those things that are Indicted by the same Spirit, saith the learned 
d De Imp. sum. p●t. ●irc● sacra.  Grotius, plainly referring to that in Neh. 8. 7, 8. Mr. 
e Ser. on 2. Pet. 3. 16.  Hales of Eton in his Golden Remains says, Other Expositions may give Rules of Direction for understanding their Authors: but the Scripture give● Rules to expound itself. When the Fathers (saith the 
f Dust. Dubit. l. 3. c. 3. p. 36●.  Bishop of Down) confirmed an Exposition of one place of Scripture by the Doctrine of another, then and then only they thought they had the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Scripture demonstration: and Matter of Faith and necessary belief: and that this was the duty of the Christian Doctors, Origen doth expressly affirm.  
And however, the Roman Doctors (of this latter age especially) have vehemently contended against this, that the Authority of their Church may take place; yet we find that in some of them, that comes full up to what we say. I shall give one instance, 
g Li. 3 d● Christo revelato c▪ 21.  Josephus a Costa (as I find him cited by Chamier and Rive●.) Nihil perinde Scripturam videtur ap●rire atque ipsa Scriptura. Itaque diligens, attenta, frequensque lectio, ●um meditatio, & collatio Scripturarum, omnium fumma Regula ad intelligendum ●ihi semper vis●. na●… ex ali●● Scripture is aliae optime intellig●●tur. Nothing seems to me to open the Scripture like the Scripture itself Therefore diligent attentive, and frequent Reading, with Meditation, and comparing of Scriptures, hath always seemed to me the chief Rule of all for understanding; for by some Scriptures others are best understood.   

CHAP. II.  
Arguments to confirm the Proposition; the first from the Scriptures sole sufficiency to be its own Interpreter, made good by three things, and first by its Perfection.  
I proceed to some Arguments for the confirmation of this Second Proposition, I shall pass over many of those that are numerously brought in by other Writers; choosing to insist upon those that I take to be of greatest force; and against which the greatest endeavours have been used to overthrow them.  
My first shall be this▪ The Scripture is of all other best fitted to be the Rule 
Arg. 1.  to guide us in the determining of its own sense and meaning. Nothing else is so well qualified for this use. And this may be evinced by its three properties, its Perfection, Perspicuity, and Authenticness. It is the most Perfect, Perspicuous, and Authentic Record of the Mind of God. Of these Three I must distinctly Treat.  
First, this, and this only, is the perfect 
Branch 1.  Record of the mind of God, fully manifesting it to us so far as it is necessary for us to know it, in order to our duty and our happiness. The Apostle speaks clearly and fully for this, 2 Tim. 3. 15, 16, 17. From a child thou hast known the Holy Scriptures, which are able to make thee wise unto Salvation, through Faith which is in Christ Jesus. All Scripture is given by inspiration from God, etc. Here two things are evidently Asserted, viz. That the Scriptures contain in them what is sufficient both for a Minister of Christ to Teach, and for any Christian to know, to make him wise unto Salvation. Neither of which can be, if there be not that in the Scripture itself, out of which the Mind of God therein delivered may be sufficiently understood without the supplement of some other overruling Principle. For 1. How can the Scripture make any man wise unto Salvation, if it fall short in point of objective Evidence necessary to beget that Divine Knowledge, wherein all saving Wisdom consists? 2. How can it sufficiently furnish a Minister for his work of instructing his Hearers▪ and conducting them to Life, if from thence he cannot fetch enough to clear the Truth he is to deliver to them?   

CHAP. III.  
The second branch of the first Argument; the Scriptures Perspicuity proved.  
SEcondly, the Scripture is a perspicuous 
〈◊〉  Revelation of God's Will. Whatsoever may be the ignorance or darkness of Men, which hinders them from knowing what God hath said in these Sacred Records; yet the objective perspicuity of them is generally asserted by Protestants against the Romanists. Not that all Truths revealed in Scripture are so low and common as in their own Nature to be obvious to Man's Understanding: but that (as to the manner of their delivery) they are so laid down in the Scripture, as that they may be understood by and from the Scripture: yet we mean not that every part or passage of Scripture is clear: (For that there are many difficulties therein we acknowledge.) But that the mind of God is somewhere or other in Scripture plainly propounded, so far as it is necessary for us to know it, one part of it giving Light to another; so that the whole Scripture taken together is a Perspicuous Manifestation of his will. This is proved by Moses' words in Deut. 30. 12, 13, 14. Speaking of the Law; and the Apostles words, Rom. 10. 6. etc. Speaking the same of the Gospel. Hence the written Word is frequently compared to a Light, and is 
Ps. 19 7. 8. Ps. 119. 105. 130. 2 Pet. 1. 19 2 Tim. 3. 15 Matt. 22.  said to give understanding to the Simple. Had not the Scriptures been Perspicuous, how could Timothy in his Childhood have understood them? How could our Saviour out of them have convinced the Sadduces of the Doctrine of the Resurrection? Or the Apostles, out of them prove irrefragably the 
Acts.  truth of their Doctrine against the gainsaying Jews? Or how could the Bereans try the Apostles Doctrine by searching the Scriptures? These are undeniable 
Act. 17. 11.  Proofs that the Scriptures are Perspicuous, and that they have a plain and certain sense obvious to a considerate Reader. But all this will signify nothing, if the Scripture have not that Light in it that may discover itself, and clear up its own meaning without borrowing Light from some other Principle.  
Now because much of the stress of this Cause lies on this, we must a little consider what is said against it. The late Romanists do generally cry out, that the Scriptures are obscure; partly that they may have the fairer colour to take them out of the People's hands, lest they should mistake, or pervert them, (though none among them have been more guilty of that than their Doctors of greatest name for Learning:) partly, that they may bring in their unwritten Traditions, as expository of Scripture-Revelations; and partly also, that they may establish a necessity of an Infallible, Visible Judge here on Earth to Interpret Scriptures, and decide all Controversies. Yet I know not any of them, but will own that many things in the Scripture are clear. But there is a late Writer, that denies this. My next work therefore shall be to deal with him, and clear the Truth from his exceptions in some of the following Chapters of this Discourse.   

CHAP. IU.  
The Exercitators exception against the Scriptures Perspicuity, from the ambiguity of words Answered.  
THe Belgic Exercitator whom I have oft mentioned before, that he may make sure work, rises higher in denying the Scriptures Perspicuity, than any that I have ever met with: and with confidence affirms the Scripture to be universally obscure, and that no part of it is of itself clear and 
Ph. Scr. Int. c. 11. par. 6. Ibid. c. 6. p. 1. & c. 11. par. 9  plain; and thereupon denies, that one part of Scripture can be expounded by another. Yea, this he lays as the foundation of his main Assertion, against the Scriptures Interpreting itself.  
And one great Reason he gives, is 
Exception. 1.  (what he hath taken a great deal of tedious pedantic pains to prove in his third Chapter,) That all speech being made up of Words and Phrases is obscure and doubtful, because the words whereof it consists are capable of different significations, and consequently may be taken in a various sense: and thus it is with the Scripture, it is universally ambiguous, and therefore obscure.  
To this I Answer, 1. If this Reason 
Sol. 1.  hold, then there is no Speech or Writing in the World, but will fall under the same unhappy fate. No Law of the Land, no letter of a Friend, no Oral Discourse, no Treatise of whatsoever Subject, and how accurately soever written, shall be accounted Intelligible. For all Writings and Discourses are made up of the same kind of Words and Phrases, and capable of being adorned with the same Tropes and Figures that the Scripture is, and every whit as liable to be taken in for different senses. And thus no man shall know how to speak or write any thing that can be clearly understood: and that excellent gift of Speech which God hath bestowed upon men to be an instrument of society and converse, shall be of no other use, but to be made an Engine of deceit and treachery.  
Secondly, if things be thus, to what 
2.  end did this Author trouble himself to Write, and others to read this Book of his? if all Speeches and Writings be ambiguous and obscure, and not to be understood without an Interpreter, of what use is this Jewel of his fancy? Did he hope to lead the whole World of Interpreters out of their Labyrinths into the right path, by such an ignis fatuus, that by its ambiguities and uncertainties may scare and amuse them, and carry them hither and thither according to the wind of their own imaginations? Or hath he attained to a faculty above all other Writers? even the best and holiest to write in such Words and Phrases as might open his meaning, without entangling his Readers in ambiguities? If he thinks his Book be free from this blemish, methinks he might have had the modesty to conceive, that the Penmen of Scripture knew how to write as well as he: If his thoughts of his Book were otherwise, he might have kept it to himself, and fed the Moths with it.  
Thirdly, yet again, if it be thus, that all words in whatsoever contexture be 
3.  so ambiguous and obscure, what will become of this Infallible Interpreter, which our Author would set up? For whatsoever Interpretation be made of any Scripture, it must be framed in such words as other men use, and as all kind of Writings are drawn up in: and if when all is done, these be obscure, what are we the better? For certainly according to this Author's argument, even the first Principles of Nature, and the most unquestionable Maxims of Philosophy, when turned into Words and Sentences, will be as ambiguous, and consequently as dark as the Scriptures.  
Fourthly, whereas his impeaching the Scriptures of Ambiguity and Obscurity, 
4.  is not only to disable them from expounding themselves, but that he may set up Philosophy as the only Interpreter; he instances in several Scriptures, 
Ph. Scr. Int. c. 3. par. 24.  which he says are thus Ambiguous and Obscure; in the clearing whereof Philosophy cannot possibly afford us any help. As for Example, when he supposeth of our Saviour's Words in Joh. 5. 39 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That it's doubtful whether this be to be taken Imperatively, search the Scripture: or Indicatively, ye do search the Scriptures. Can any Principle of Philosophy satisfy us whether the Verb 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 there used, be of the Indicative mood, or of the Imperative? So when he says its doubtful, whether our Saviour's words to Peter, John, 21. 16, 17, 18. should be taken Interrogatively, Dost thou love me? Or Affirmatively, Thou dost love me. And his words to his Disciples, Math. 26. 45. Whether they are to be read Imperatively, sleep on now, etc. Or Interrogatively, Do ye sleep on, & c? And so of Pilat's words to our Saviour, What is Truth? Whether they are a serious question, or an Irony. In these and many other, if the matter and coherence do not resolve us, Philosophy cannot relieve us. How then do these Allegations serve our Author's end? which is that the Scripture cannot Interpret itself, but all its Interpretation must be regulated by Philosophy?  
Bùt Last, I deny this Charge laid 
5.  against the Scripture, (of its being Universally Ambiguous, and Obscure) as highly contumelious to God the Author of it. For it supposeth, either that he could not, or that he would not speak his Mind to the Sons of Men; (for whose Eternal concerns he designed this Sacred Volume,) in such a manner as they might understand it, and be bettered by it. As it was out of Love and Mercy to Sinners that the Scriptures were Indicted, that they might have a sure Guide to Blessedness; so they are Written for all sorts and ranks of Men to make use of: and therefore they are for the most part drawn in a vulgar condescending style. But if they cannot be understood without Philosophy (yea a very great insight into Philosophy, as this Author sometimes intimates) not one of a thousand of them that have the Scriptures, will be able to understand the Mind of God in them: they being (according to this Man's words) so totallydark and doubtful.   

CHAP. V.  
A second Exception, from the Exercitators unsatisfiedness about the meaning of our Divines, when they speak of any Scriptures being perspicuous in themselves, removed.  
SEcondly, whereas it is usually said 
Except. 2.  by our Divines that such places of Scripture as are clear and plain in themselves, do Interpret such as 
Phil. Scr. Int. c. 11. par. 2. 3, 4, 5, 6.  are obscure; the great Question is, what do they mean by a place that is clear and perspicuous in or of itself? I have made inquiry about this, (saith the Exercitator) and can find nothing solid or satisfactory.  
To this I answer in few words, That 
Sol.  Place or Text of Scripture is plain and perspicuous in itself, whose sense so fairly riseth out of the Words, and their connexion with what goes before and after, that the Intelligent Reader need not miss of it, if he be not wanting to himself. And I appeal to any man that is not resolved to cavil, whether there be not thousands of Scripture-Sentences whose sense is thus clear and evident.  
But here the Exercitator Replies, 
Object.  The words whereof Scripture-Propositions consist have their signification from Humane Institution, and their 
Ibid. par. 3, 4. 5.  sense depends upon common use. If therefore the sense of Scripture be any where so plain as to be known by the Words than it is not Scripture, but Usus Loquendi, the common use of Speech, that is the Rule of Interpretation. But this, says he, is of all other the most dangerous and deceitful Rule to go by, causing many monstrous conceptions of God and things Divine, suitable to the apprehensions of the Ignorant and besotted Vulgar.  
To this captious Objection I Answer 
Sol. 1.  Two things.  
1. We are now speaking of such Scriptures whose sense is obvious, and so (according 
Phil. Scr. Int. c. 2. par. 7.  to the Exercitators own Rule given in the beginning of his Discourse) need no Interpreter. For he plainly says, (if at least there be any plain sayings to be found) that the proper Object of Interpretation is such a Speech as is obscure. This Cavil therefore is here is very disingenuous, being against his own premised Rule.  
In Scripture there is somewhat common 
2.  with other Writings, and something proper to itself, as each particular Writing hath. The words it useth are of the same kind with those of other Writings, and, singly taken, are supposed to have the like signification according to common use. But as those words are framed into Propositions in the Scripture, and those Propositions conjoined in such a contexture of Discourse; so they may, and oft do, carry a peculiar Sense, which ariseth not from Humane Institution appointing the signification of such Words, but from Divine Ordination placing those Words in such an Order, without which they would not signify what they do. And though the several Words and Clauses of Scripture taken separately from the place wherein they stand, may have a dubious or indeterminate Sense; yet take them together, with the whole discourse to which they belong, and whereof they are parts, and the Sense may be undeniably clear and determinate. And this is one way whereby Scripture expounds itself, as the other is, (what hath been most insisted on) by comparing dark places with those that are plain.  
Take for instance one of those nominated by the ●xercitator; the words 
P●. Scr. ●●t. c. 11. par. 5.  of our Saviour in Matth. 5. 34. Swear not at all. What it is to swear is I think well known, (though not seriously considered) by the most. And the Word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 at all, what it signifies in common use we all know. And if this Clause were taken singly, it would seem to import an absolute▪ Prohibition of Swearing at any time, in any manner whatsoever. But take it as it here stands, as a branch of that whole discourse, that begins at Verse 33. and ends at ver. 37. And so Interpreters understand our Saviour's meaning, either to forbid all Swearing by the Creature, and in familiar Discourse: or to caution them against the common conceit and practice that then obtained, of Swearing rashly and fallaciously by the Creature, upon supposal that such oaths were no● obliging because the name of God was not interposed.   

CHAP. VI  
A Third Exception, that what is clear to one is obscure to another; where he denies all Perspicuity and Obscurity but what is Relative.  
BUT that which is plain to one 
Except. 3. Ph. Scr. Int. c. 3. par. 3.  may be obscure to another, saith the Exercitator; who thereupon asserts, That there is no Perspicuity, or Obscurity, but what is purely Relative to the Understanding of the Reader or Hearer: and (according to his wont modesty) condemns the Reformed Divines, (and he might have added the Ancient Fathers) for affirming the Scriptures to be in themselves Perspicuous, though Obscure, in regard of the indisposition of men's Minds.  
I Answer, 1. If there be no Objective Perspicuity, nor anything clear in it 
Sol. 1.  self, but only as it relates to the actual exercise of men's apprehensive Faculties; than it seems there is no difference between a clear day, and a cloudy, but only in reference to our sight: and the Sun must not be said to shine bright, because Men that have lost their Eyes, or are shut up in a Dungeon cannot see it. But I think the vanity of such a conceit is Perspicuous enough, whether the Exercitator see it or not. It hath been hitherto esteemed by all Men (as far as I know) a considerable excellency in any Writer, that his Speech and Style is clear and perspicuous; and the contrary, Darkness and Obscurity hath been blamed in those who affect to Speak or Write cloudily and enigmatically: which certainly implies, that there is a Perspicuity, and a contrary Obscurity, that is absolutely inhering in the Speech itself. And yet in the denial of this, Wolzogen, and his friend Velthusius join with the Exercitator, asserting with him, that there is no Perspicuity in the Scripture, but what is Relative to those that Read or Hear it. And this they endeavour to confirm or illustrate by Similitudes. A Speech, says 
Li. 1. de Scr. Int. p. 104.  Wolzogen, can no otherwise be called Perspicuous absolutely in itself, than a Man's Blood can be said to be red while it runs in his Veins, and no Eye sees it; or the Snow that falls in the extreme North-parts, where no man feels the horror of it, can be accounted Cold. These, (says he) do consist in Sense, without which, we cannot have any Conception of them. And so nothing is Perspicuous further than it is perceived. To the like purpose Velthusius 
De usu Rat. in Theolog. p. 15.  speaks; That Light is not in the Object, but in the Sense; as heat is not in the Fire, nor cold in the Ice; but in the Sense of him that Feels either the one or the other; no more than pain is in the Sword or Knife that makes a Wound. So says he, neither is clearness in the Object that is to be known, but in the Minds perception of it. Truly, I do not much admire these Mysteries of the New Philosophy. Hitherto both Light and Colour, Heat and Cold have been esteemed qualities inherent in their proper Subjects, and not to consist in a Relation. But if it be as these Men say, it seems nothing is Cold or Hot, Light or Dark, save only as and when it is discerned by one that sees and feels it. But on the contrary (to pass by other Arguments) we find in the History of the Creation, that darkness was upon 
Gen. 1. 2, 3  the face of the deep. And when God said, Let there be Light, there was Light. Both which were, before there was any sensitive Creature in being to discern them. If any shall here say (as some are ready to do when clear Scripture goes cross to their darling Notions) that those words in the History of the Creation are used not according to the reality of the thing, but according to Vulgar Conception; I shall not think such profane boldness worthy a Reply. Perhaps it will be pleaded, that the Scriptures were not written to teach us Natural Philosophy. Be it so; neither were they penned to teach us any falsehood, or to deceive us into mistakes concerning God or any of his Works. All the several parts of that Sacred Volume are so ordered, as to have some tendency, immediate or remote, to the great end for which it was End●●ed, the conducting of us to Happiness. But surely the God of Truth never designed to bring us to Happiness by a Lie. Verily I have little encouragement to trust men's Reason in matters of Revelation, when I find them talking so absurdly in matters of Natural Cognisance. And yet when all is done, Wolzogen grants, that 
Li. 1. de Scr. Int. p. 104, 105  the Scriptures are so framed, that nothing is wanting in them to render them perspicuous. And truly, as far as I understand, this is all that our Protestant Divines mean, when they say the Scriptures are perspicuous in themselves. What's the matter then? why he tells us their meaning is very good, but the Expression is incommodious. Which is but another taste of his Civility; this being his humour throughout his Book to nibble at somewhat or other in the most learned Writers of the Reformed Churches. But I return to our Exercitator. And,  
Secondly, I answer, when the Apostle 
2.  says, 2 Pet 3. 16. that some of those things whereof St. Paul Treats in his Epistles, are hard to be understood, if there be no perspicuity or obscurity but what is Relative, he might as well have said that they are all hard to be understood: for doubtless there are some Men so stupidly ignorant, or obstinately perverse, that they understand none of them. But surely when the Apostle says, that some of them were difficult, he did not intend to say they were all so.  
Thirdly, The Apostles preached the 
3.  Gospel in the demonstration of the Spirit 
1 Cor. 2. 4  and of Power; and did by manifestation of the Truth▪ commend themselves 
2 Cor. 4. 2.  to ever Man's Conscience in the ●…ht of God: with such perspicuity and convincing evidence did they speak. And yet, as the same Apostle intimates, their Gospel might be and was ●id to them that were lost, in whom 
Ibid. v. 3, 4  the God of this World had blinded the Minds of them which believe not, lest the Light of the glorious Gospel, which is the Image of God, should shine unto them. There is therefore an absolute objective perspicuity in the Scriptures themselves, whatsoever may be the incapacity of men's Understandings.  
Lastly, to conclude this, I wonder 
4. Ph. Scr. Int c. 3.  at this Author's Wit or Memory, that he so grossly contradicts himself in this very Chapter, out of which this Exception is taken. For having premised, that the obscurity of Speech ariseth chiefly from its ambiguity, and at large discoursed of the several sorts of Amphibolies in Words and Sentences (all which do evidently prove, if any thing, an obscurity that lies in the Speech itself, without respect to the Reader or Hearer) he afterwards expressly tells us, that there is a twofold ambiguity of Speech; the one absolute, 
Cap. Cit par. 26.  considered in itself, and the other Relative, and with respect to us. By which he unravels what he had said in his third Paragraph, acknowledging that a Speech may be ambiguous, and consequently obscure in itself. And if there be an absolute obscurity, there is also an absolute perspicuity; for which he before derided the Divines of the Reformation.   

CHAP. VII.  
1. A fourth Exception against the Scriptures Perspicuity from the difference and contrariety between the simple sense of the words of Scripture, and the true sense of the Author. 2. The instances given to prove this considered. e. g. Such as speak of the Arm and Finger of God. 3. That in Jo. 14. 16. 4. Our Saviour's Words, This is my Body. 5. Those places where God is said to be Lord and King, and to have begotten a Son, and to love the World. 6. The aforesaid distinction condemned, and the Author's self-contradiction noted.  
IT is further Objected by the Exercitator, 
Sect. 1. Except. 4. Ph. Scr. Int. c. 3. par. 4.  That the sense of Scripture is twofold, either sensus simpliciter dictus, or Ver●s. And he thus Explains himself: The sense of the Scripture is either the simple sense of the Words, which they of themselves offer to the Reader; or the true sense and meaning of the Author in those Words. These says he, are seldom the same, but different, yea opposite: and the sense which the words offer may be plain and easy, when the sense that the Author intends by them, which is a clean other thing, is very dark and obscure. And so confident is the Gentleman in this conceit, that he superciliously slights Expositors of Scripture for not minding this distinction, 
Ibid. par. 7.  and (for want hereof) taking oft times the simple sense for the true one.  
To make this wild and senseless distinon good, he instanceth in several passages of Scripture, wherein he would make us believe this Twofold sense is to be found. I shall therefore before I proceed, endeavour to clear those Passages, or the principal of them.  
Sect. 2. One instance he gives is of those 
Sect. 2. 1. Ibid. par. 4.  expressions in Scripture, The Arm and Finger of God. The simple sense of which Words, and that which they do of themselves offer to the Reader, he says, is very obvious, being known by common use: but ●he thinks no Divine so void of Wit, as to take that obvious sense for the true meaning of the Author.  
By this it appears, this Gentleman 
Sol.  conceives, that the sense which those Words of themselves offer, is proper without any Trope or Figure; as if God had a bodily Arm or Finger, as a Man hath. But by his favour, he is greatly out. The Arm and Finger of God, according to common acceptation with any that are versed in the Scriptures, have no other than an improper sense, nor do they signify any more than the Power of God: though the word Arm or Finger either singly taken, or applied to Men, signifies somewhat else; according to that known Maxim, Verba sunt intelligenda secundum subjectam materiam, Words are to be understood according to the subject matter about which they are used. And this holds in all manner of Speeches and Writings whatsoever; the matter in hand directs to the sense of the Words.  
A second instance is in Joh. 14. 6. 
Sect. 3. 2. Ibid. Sol.  where our Saviour says, I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life. What obvious sense it is, that this Author conceives from common use of speech to be in these words, different from our Saviour's meaning, I cannot divine: Nor can I see how they can signify any more or less to him that is acquainted with the Doctrine of the Gospel, than what our Saviour means by them; who calls himself The Way, by no unapt Metaphor, because (as himself expounds it in the latter end of the Verse) it is by Him that Sinners are to come to the Father; that is, to Reconciliation with him, and fruition of him. It is by Him, that is, by the Merit of his Blood, by the Light of his Doctrine, by the Conduct of his Pattern, and by the Power of his Spirit. And herein he is The Truth, that is, the Substance and real Completion of all the Types and Shadows under the Law; and consequently he is The Life, (by a known Metonyme of the effect for the cause) in that he is the Author, that is, the Purchaser and Bestower of that Eternal Life that Sinners come to enjoy in God.  
A further instance is given in those 
3. Sect. 4. Ph. Scr. Int. c. 3. par. 7.  words of our Saviour, This is my Body; where he affirms, That the plain and easy sense which the words of themselves offer to the Reader, is that which the Romish Church takes them in: but the sense of our Saviour in speaking them, which he grants to be that which the Reformed Churches give of them, this, he says, is dark and obscure.  
But I suppose he cannot be ignorant, 
Sol.  that there are considerable Doctors of the Romish Church, eminent for Learning, who have acknowledged, that they should never have entertained that sense of the words which asserts Transubstantiation, if the Authority of the Church had not moved them. And our Writers have abundantly manifested the gross absurdity of that sense; and among others, Dr. Brevint in his late excellent Discourse of the Mystery of the Romish Mass, hath clearly, and to great satisfaction, proved the Protestant sense of that speech of our Saviour's from the very words themselves. I cannot well understand by this Author's discourse, of what settled Persuasion he is in matters of Religion. He now and then insinuates something that carries with it a dislike of the Romanists and their way: But it is plain enough by this, and many other passages in his Book, that the Reformed Churches are little befriended by him.  
Lastly, He instances in those Scriptures 
Ibid. 4. Sect. 5.  where God is said to be Lord of Heaven and Earth, the King of Nations, and King of Kings; and where he is said to have begotten a Son, Psal. 2. and to have loved the World, Joh. 3. 16. In all which, he says, the obvious, but mistaken, sense, and that which the Vulgar apprehend, is, that God, after the manner of men, is a Lord and King, and doth beget and love; which he esteems to be grossly absurd. To these I answer distinctly.  
1. As for the places where God is 
Sol. 1.  called Lord and King, and said to Reign over the Nations, with all of like import; in these we are taught, by what we find elsewhere in Scripture, to remove from God whatever savours of imperfection, and to ascribe nothing to him but what suits with a most excellent and most perfect Being. Nor do the aforesaid Expressions, in their plain and obvious sense, signify either more or less, than that God is the Universal Sovereign of the World, Ruling his Creatures with infinite Wisdom and Power, according to their different natures and conditions; the Inferior sort by instinct and natural necessity; his Intellectual Creatures by Laws, as the proper Instrument of Moral Government. And what the Exercitators sentiments are about this, I cannot conjecture. If he be for that Novel Opinion of Thomas Anglus ab Albis, that God doth not properly Govern us by Laws, (as Kings do their Kingdoms) but, as an Engineer doth his Engine, by Physical Motion; and that therefore he is called our Lord and King only in a Metaphorical sense; I must enter a dissent against such an absurd and Atheistical conceit, and put him to prove his Assertion, and answer the Arguments that are in print against it.  
2. As for the second, Of begetting a Son, Psal 2. 7. Interpreters do much 
〈◊〉.  differ about it. Some conceive the first and immediate sense of the words to respect David, whom God had delivered out of his great afflictions, and raised to a Kingdom; which deliverance and exaltation was to him as a second Birth. And this they illustrate by what is said of the Roman Emperors, that they had two Birth-days; the one of their Persons, when they came into the World; the other of their Empire, when they were seated in the Throne: and that Christ is here intended only as the Antitype prefigured by David. Others understand these words properly and immediately of Christ, and that with respect to one of these two; either, 1. To his Eternal Generation, in reference to which he is called the Eternal and only begotten Son of God. The truth of which Generation we are upon Scripture-testimony to receive, without searching into the manner; it being a Mystery infinitely above our reach: which therefore he that will boldly intrude into, may justly fear to be overwhelmed with its Glory. Or, 2. To the Temporal Manifestation of that Eternal Generation; a thing being then said to be done, when it is manifested to be done. And so the words are applied by the Apostle Paul to our Saviour's Resurrection; 
Act. 13. 33  whereby, as the same Apostle says elsewhere, He was declared to be the 
Rom. 1. 4.  Son of God with power. Though I know there is, who understands those words of Christ's Resurrection immediately and in itself; partly because it was, as it were, a second Birth to the Humane Nature; partly because it was, as they conceive, the beginning of his Instalment into his Regal Office; which might be called his Birth by Analogy to what was said before concerning the Roman Emperors. I shall not take upon me to determine, which of these ways of Explication is to be adhered to. But be it what it will, this I need not be afraid to say, that it is Scripture, if any thing, that must clear the difficulty, and decide the difference; it is not Philosophy in its highest Exaltation that can be a sufficient Rule to resolve us; the matter in hand being so wholly foreign to the best and clearest Natural Light.  
3. Then for the last instance, Joh. 3. 16. where God is said to love the 
3.  World; though in this (as in all other things) we are not to measure God by ourselves; yet this is undoubted, that by God's love to Mankind, is every where plainly and clearly meant his Will to do them good, discovering itself in answerable effects, and the Complacency that he takes in the good that he doth for them, or works in them. Nor do I think that any man, who heedfully reads the Scriptures, can take it otherwise. And this is no way unbecoming the Divine Perfections, but fully agreeing to his Nature, and the Manifestations that he hath made of himself both by Natural and Supernatural Light.  
Now as to this distinction which the 
§. 6.  Exercitator so much applauds, condemning all others that are not as fond of it as himself▪ I find sufficient reason to reject it; and do affirm, that the Words and Sentences of Scripture taken in such a coherence among themselves, and connexion with the whole, (and otherwise than thus they have no sense that is properly theirs) do exhibit to the Reader no other sense than what is indeed the: Author's meaning; being written for no other end but to signify his mind for our safe guidance to Blessedness. And to think that they have any other sense than what is indeed the truemind and meaning of the Author, is ●o charge the Holy Scriptures with the vilest Imposture. What 
Num De●… vo●is & lingu● artifex dif●rtè loqui non po●●st 〈◊〉 Imò vero su●ma providentia c●rere fu●o voluit ●a quae divin● sunt, ut omnes intelligerent qua ipse omnibus loquebatur. Lactant. 〈◊〉. 6. de vero cultu, c. 21.  would we think of that man, that should either spe●k or write so, as that his words should carry one meaning, and himself intent another? Would he not be judged a Deceiver? And shall we dare to fasten such a piece of Hypocrisy upon the Holy God, and that in a business wherein Man's Everlasting Happiness is concerned? What thoughts have these men of God, who can talk thus of the Scriptures that are his acknowledged Word!  
But let it be considered, before I leave this matter, whether our Author do not by this distinction contradict himself. For, 1. When he is (in preparation 
Ph. Scr. Int. c. 2. Par. 3. 4. Vocabula (circa quae Interpretatio versatur) ut habet Cic. in Top. sunt rerum notae, ●ut potius, ut nos putam●s, conceptuum. Primo enim iis utimur, ut quod me●te concepi●…, aliis notum faciamus; cumque conceptus nil sint nisi rerum repraesentamina in Intellectu, iisdem secundo etiam illae res denotantur atque designantur.  to his future discourse) explaining what he means by the material Object of Interpretation, he plainly asserts, that Words are first and immediately the signification of the inward Conceptions of the Mind; ●and because those Conceptions are representations of things in▪ the Understanding, hence the Words that declare those Conceptions, are used to signify and denote things. Now if so, how comes it about that the Words of Scripture can have a different sense from what the Author intends, seeing (as the Exercitator acknowledgeth) they are signs or notes of the Conceptions of his Mind.  
2. This same Author, when he is proving a multiplicity of true senses in the same Text of Scripture, and that 
Phil. Scr. Int. c. 4. par. 8.  whatsoever Interpretations, be they never so many and various, are given, if they be Truths in themselves, they are also the true Expositions of that place, useth this Argument, That else God would be chargeable with deceiving Men, by using such Words as he knew Men would be ready to take in such different senses, as he never meant▪ This the Author rejects with abhorrence, as not agreeing with the Divine▪ Perfections. How well he agrees with himself, and how this may be reconciled with the forementioned conceit of such a twofold sense as we have been speaking of, the simple sense of the Words of Scripture, and the true sense of the Speaker, let the Reader judge.   

CHAP. VIII.  
1. A fifth Exception, That the plainest Scriptures may be wrested. 2. A sixth, from the multiplicity of Commentaries and Expositions, removed.  
IN the next place, it will be said 
Sect. 1. Except. 5.  that the plainest Scriptures are liable to be wrested and perverted by Men of corrupt minds: therefore they are not perspicuous enough to Interpret themselves.  
Suppose what is indeed too true, (and sufficiently made good by our Adversaries 
Sol.  in this cause) that the plainest Scriptures may be perverted. So may the best and truest Principles of Reason and Philosophy. Nor can any Man devise how to speak or write so, but a wicked and malicious Wit may put an absurd or horrid sense upon the most innocent Words. And of this, I think, we have instances enough every day. But what is this to the sense which the Words and Sentences of Scripture (in such a Contexture, and with reference to, and dependence upon the Antecedents and Consequents, and the whole Tenor of the Author's Discourse) do offer to the Reader? That the Scripture thus considered, is of itself liable to such ambiguous senses, is a profane and senseless calumny, bringing that Holy Volume under the same condemnation with the Devils Oracles, that were purposely contrived by that great Enemy of Mankind, to cheat and abuse the Pagan World.  
But, may some say, do not many 
Object.  take the Words of Scripture in a far different sense from what the Author of Scripture intended?  
No doubt they do; what then? 
Sol.  That is not, because the Words give them that sense, but because they impose that sense upon the Words, to make them comply with their own apprehensions.  
In the sixth place, the Exercitator 
Sect. 〈◊〉. Except. 6. Ph. Scr. Int. c. 4▪ par. 1.  argues against the perspicuity of the Scriptures, from the multitude of Commentaries, Animadversions, Interpretations, (for he loves to heap up words) written by Learned Men upon the whole Scripture, or the several parts of it: whence he concludes it as a thing unquestionable, that the Scripture is obscure, so obscure that it cannot Interpret its own sense.  
I answer; That there are some difficulties 
Sol.  in Scripture, that may exercise, yea, and exceed the ablest Wits, and that many things in it may be obscure to the Reader, for want of using the right means to understand, is confessed. But the multitude of Expositions doth not at all prove the Scripture to be so obscure, as to be disabled for being the supreme Rule to Interpret itself▪ For whatsoever Notes▪ or Commentaries are written upon the Bible by▪ Learned▪ Men, they are either such as truly conduce to the supposed End, the right understanding of the Scripture, and consequently to the due practical improvement of what is so understood, or they fail of this, and do rather darken and cloud the Text. These of the latter sort do not deserve the Honour to be esteemed Interpretations of Scripture; for they render the sense of it more in●…icate and perplex. And truly it hath been no unusual thing for Men that write only to make ostentation of their Learning, and draw the eyes of others upon them, or to make trial of their Wits in their attempts upon the Scripture, to vent some odd Notions, that serve rather to amuse than edify the Reader, and leave him more in the dark than when he perused the Text alone without their Gloss: as it hath fared with some voluminous Commentators upon Aquinas; who under pretence of expounding their Author, have run out into so many intricate and frivolous Questions, that by that time they have done, they have left the Author's Text less intelligible than it was before they meddled with it: Truly so it is with some that have undertaken to write upon the Holy Scriptures. But I take such men's Writings rather for Depravations than Expositions. And the chief cause of this evil hath been (what this Exercitator is not well aware of) that they made too much use of their Philosophic Notions in their Endeavours to Interpret Scripture-Revelations. On the other hand, if Commentaries or Annotations on Scripture be such as do contribute any help towards the unfolding of the true sense, this hath been chiefly by collecting and comparing the several parts of Scripture together, and considering the circumstances of each Text expounded, and so fetching the sense of Scripture from the Scripture itself; which is the only sure and warrantable way of Interpretation.   

CHAP. IX.  
1. The third and last Branch of my first Argument, the Scriptures Authenticness. 2. The Exercitators Exception removed. 3. Wolzogen's Exception, denying God to be the Interpreter of Scripture, answered.  
HAving vindicated the second 
Sect. 1.  Branch of my first Argument, viz. The Scriptures Perspicuity, from the many Exceptions made against it; I proceed to the third and last, viz. That the Scripture is the only Authentic 
Branch 3.  Record of the Mind and Will of God. For it is the certain and undoubted Voice of God himself; and what that speaks, He speaks. And who so fit to Interpret the meaning of his Words as himself? Ejus est Interpr●tari, cujus est condere, is an approved Rule in the Civil Law; He that made the Law, is fittest to Interpret it. And in the present case the Reason is evident: God best knows his own Mind; and he hath no where so plainly and fully revealed his Mind as in Scripture. Certainly there can be none so sure and infallible Interpreter of these sacred Records, as the Holy Spirit that indicted them; and he Interprets them, not by suggesting to us any thing for their understanding which is not there already; but by speaking to us more clearly from some part of Scripture, what is delivered more darkly in others. Can any Man, or sort of Men in the World, pretend to know the Mind of God better than himself? or give us better assurance what his Mind is, than the Word which himself hath appointed to be written for this very purpose? Whatsoever sense may be put upon any Scripture-Assertion, and by whomsoever framed, it cannot challenge our undoubted reception, unless we can discern the Voice of God in it. And that is no where to be heard with evidence and assurance, (especially in matters of Supernatural Revelation, which is that we chiefly deal with in this Controversy) but from the Scripture itself.  
But here the Exercitator comes in 
Sect. 2. Except. 1. Ph. Scr. Int c. 13. resp. ad arg. 9  with his Reply: For acknowledging that without controversy God is an Infallible Interpreter, and that the Scripture is the Voice of God; he nevertheless denies that therefore it will follow that the Scripture can be its own Interpreter, or the Rule of Interpretation to itself; because, says he, the same Author may write several Treatises, and yet it follows not that the one should Interpret the other.  
To this I answer, The comparison 
Sol.  is very unequal. Men write of different Subjects many times, and for very different Ends; and may withal so far forget themselves, or be so unconstant to themselves, as to cross in one Discourse what they have written in another. But God, the Author of Scripture, hath designed that whole Volume to one and the same Use and End, to be a Declaration of his Mind to Men, that they may thereby be directed in their greatest affairs, and have a sure Guide to Happiness. It is therefore every way most consistent with his Wisdom and Goodness so to order the enditing of Scripture in matters of so great excellency and necessity, that his Mind may be known from the Scriptures themselves, either by the plainness of the particular Sentences, or by the dependence on, and connexion with, the Antecedents and Consequents, or Collation with the more remote parts thereof.  
But there is another Author, who 
Sect. 3. Except. 2. Lud. Wolz. Li. 2. de Scr. Int. p. 202, 203 & p. 250.  pretending to maintain the Protestant Cause against the Exercitator, deals less candidly with us than that professed Adversary. For in stead of answering the aforesaid Exception, he says again and again, That God is not, nor can properly be said to be the Interpreter of Scripture, or the Expositor of his own Mind therein. And he gives us this strange reason for it: Because to this it's necessary that by an Oracle (that is, I suppose, either by audible Voice, or secret instinct) he should (according to the Enthusiasts fancy) expressly pronounce to us, that this or that is the sense of such or such a Scripture. Unless he do this, he cannot be allowed by this Dictator to be the Interpreter of the Scriptures.  
To this I reply; Do we not all acknowledge 
Sol. Joh. 7. 38, 42. c. 19 37. Rom. 4. 3. c. 11. 2. Gal. 3. 30.  that the Scripture is the Word of God, and that God speaks to us in it, and that what that says, God says? And is it not the usual Language of the Holy Ghost in the Bible, that the Scripture saith thus and thus? which sure can be no otherwise taken for truth or sense, but as the Scripture is the Voice of God to us. And Wolzogen 
Li. 1. de Scr. Int. p. 26.  himself says several times that in the Scripture God speaks to us after the manner of men. And seeing sometimes the Text is so plain, that it speaks clearly its own mind, and sometimes what is spoken in one part of Scripture, is explained by what is spoken in another, (both which himself acknowledgeth) why may it not with as much propriety be said, that God is the Interpreter of his own Mind in Scripture, though he use no other Voice than that of the Scripture in speaking to us? For how improper soever such an Expression may seem to this Gentleman, it is agreeable to Scripture-language. And me thinks he who so hotly contends for the Usus loquendi, as to make that the only supreme infallible Rule of expounding Scripture, might give our Reformed Divines leave to speak according to this Use, without his supercilious censure. In the mean time this Author may do well to consider, whose Cause he most favours by such manner of arguing. I know none that can so heartily thank him for it as the Romanists, who use the same way of cavilling against us, when we say that the Scripture, or the Spirit of God in and by the Scripture, is the sole supreme Judge of all Controversies of Faith. This, say they, cannot be, unless the Spirit of God do, by an audible Voice, decide the Controversy, telling the one party they are in the right, and the other they are in an error. And because he doth not so in the Scripture, therefore they deny him to be the supreme Judge of Controversies by the Scripture. Thus Gretser the Jesuit in the Conference at R●tis●on Seventy five years ago: Behold, says he, 
Ann. 1601. V. J. Gerard. Exeg. Tom. 1. loc. come. c. 22. par. 464. & Dan. Chamier. Panstrat. To. 1. Li. 1. c. 14.  we are here disputing the Cause: If the Spirit of God do, by the Scriptures, judge and determine Controversies, let him now come, let him come and pass sentence out of this Book, (the Bible that lay before him) and say, Thou Gretser art wrong, and thou H. art in the right. Now what doth Wolzogen by his Argumentation, but justify the profane insolency of that petulant Jesuit? The Ancients were of another mind; they acknowledged God speaking in the Scripture to be the Judge of Controversies. Thus speaks one of them to his 〈…〉; Nemo vobis credat, nemo 
Optat. Miiev. li. 5. cont. Parmen.  nobis, de Coelo quaerendus, etc. Let none give credit to us or you; we must seek a Judge from Heaven: but what need we go thither to him, having his Testament here in the Gospel? And if the Spirit of God may, with congruity enough, be said to speak in the Scriptures, as Judge of Controversies, he may with as good congruity be acknowledged to speak in the Scriptures, as Interpreting his own Mind there laid down.  
And so I have done with my first Argument.   

CHAP. X.  
A second Argument from the Scriptures being the only Rule of Faith, affording a double Proof for the Scriptures being its own Interpreter.  
MY next Argument follows: That 
Arg. 2.  which is the only Rule of Faith, is the only Rule to interpret its own sense. But so is the Scripture. That the Written Word of God is the only Rule of Faith, is acknowledged by all that sincerely own the Protestant Cause. Now from hence I thus argue. 1. The supreme Rule of Faith is that which infallibly guides and determines us per Modum Objecti, what we are to believe. Now it is the Scripture in its true and genuine meaning that we are bound to believe. Whatsoever therefore objejectively determines what we are to believe, must accordingly determine the sense of Scripture. And if any thing else besides the Scripture be the Rule to determine this, that must eo ipso, upon that very score, be acknowledged for the Rule of Faith. 2. Whatsoever is the Rule of Faith, must be the Rule of deciding all Controversies of Faith: This I think no Man will question. Now let but this be supposed, that the Scripture is the only supreme Rule of deciding all Controversies of Faith, (which no sound Protestant can deny) it will necessarily follow, That it must be the supreme Rule of clearing all Doubts and Difficulties within itself. For where the Scripture is on both sides owned for the Rule, the knot of the Controversy lies in this, whether this or that be the sense of the Scriptures that are alleged on both sides; for were that agreed, the Controversy would cease; and whatsoever determines that, decides the Cause. Thus 
Ph. Scr. Int. c. 1. par. 1.  much the Exercitator acknowledges. What ever therefore it be that's made the Rule of Interpreting Scripture, and determining the sense of it, is thereby made the Rule of deciding all Controversies of Faith, and is to such as so use it, the Rule of their Faith.   

CHAP. XI.  
1. An Exception against this Argument, affirming Scripture and Reason jointly to be the Rule of Faith. 2. This Novelty disproved and condemned.  
AGainst this Argument some may 
Sect. 1. Except. 1.  have the confidence, it may be, to make this Exception, That Scripture is not the only Rule of Faith. The Papists join unwritten Traditions with the Scripture, and will have us take both together for the complete Rule of Faith. This I shall not deal with, there having been so much said by our Divines about it in the Controversies between us and the Church of Rome. But there is another Generation of Men that join Human Reason with the Scripture, to make up the Rule of Faith. Lambertus Velthusius, one of the Seniors of the Gallo-belgic Church at Utrech, is charged with this by Ʋander 
Li. t. adv. Wolzog. p. 114.  Weayen, who citys this among many other erroneous Positions, out of one of that Authors Belgic Tracts, That Scripture and Reason are the Rule of Faith. So then we have here a new unwritten Word found out to be part of the Canon. So fertile of Monsters is this Novaturient Age. But, I hope, this Doctrine will not be so easily received as it is boldly obtruded.  
Hitherto Principles of Reason and 
Sect. 2. Sol.  Articles of Faith were wont to be contradistinguished: and though some things knowable by Natural Light, are likewise propounded to our belief in Scripture, yet such were never, that I know of, owned for Points of Faith, otherwise than as they were attested in Scripture. And in all Logic that I have been acquainted with, Arguments à Testimonio are put into one rank, and those that are drawn à Natura rei are put into another; these latter properly belonging to Science, the former to Faith. Our Understandings (saith 
a Medit. de usu & ab. rat. in reb. The●l.  C. Streso, and after him 
b Deut. Dub. li. 1. c. 2.  Dr. Tailor) apprehend things three ways; The first is 〈◊〉, whereby it receives first Principles. The second 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, whereby it draws Consequences from those Principles. The third is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of such things as we assent to from Testimony. And it is a known speech of St. Austin, Quod intelligimus, 
De util. cred.  debemus rationi, quod credimus Autoritati: That we understand, we owe to Reason; but that we believe, we owe to Authority. And we have hitherto taken it to be essential to a Christians Faith, that in its Assent it rely upon the Infallible Veracity of the Revealer, as the ratio formalis credendi.  
Perhaps it will here be said, (for I 
Object.  cannot imagine what else can be said) That the Principles of Reason are the Word of God, and by him written in our Minds; therefore our Assent to them is a belief of Divine Testimony, as well as our Assent to what is written in the Bible: and consequently they are part of the Rule of Faith.  
What can be the meaning of this, 
Sol.  that these Principles are written in our Minds, I cannot understand any further than this, that there is begotten in our Minds a clear perception and firm persuasion of them. But the great Question will be, By what Act doth God write these in our Minds, or beget in us this perception and persuasion of them? Surely, they will not say, that when God creates the Soul of Man, this perception or persuasion of these Principles is concreated by him in and with the Soul: for if so, how is it that during our Infant-state we are such strangers to them, and do so continue, till we come gradually by observation and experience to be acquainted with them? And when we come to discern them, and to be persuaded of them, how come we to be assured that they are of God? There must be some difference between the Testimony and the Thing testified. The Principles of Reason are supposed to be the Res testata, the Thing testified. But what is the Testimony, or the Actus Testificandi? My perception or persuasion cannot be it: for if so, than whatsoever I perceive and am fully persuaded of, I must believe to come from God: and what will that come to at last? These Principles of Reason are not Complex Propositions formed by God in our Minds, or suggested to us by a Divine Afflatus: this would make every Man an Enthusiast. The best account I can give of them is, that they are such General Truths, as have their foundation in the nature of things, and their mutual habitudes and respects; which our Reason apprehending, doth therein discover the aforesaid Principles thence resulting. And because it is God alone, who gives to all things their several Being's, and constitutes them in such and such habitudes each to other, and hath given us our Reason, whereby we are enabled to discern them; therefore he is said to be the Author of those Principles, which lie fundamentally in his Workmanship. And we do not take them for Truthus upon the credit of any foregoing testimony that God gives to us of them: but we assent to them propter evidentiam r●i, because our Reason sees them perfectly agreeable to the nature of things; and thereby finding them to be certainly true, thence it gathers that they are of God, from whom all Truth comes. But now the method of Faith is widely different from this: Here we first own the testimony of God speaking in the Scriptures, and thence we are persuaded that what the Scripture speaks is true, and so we come to embrace the many severals therein asserted, by yielding a particular assent to them as we find them.  
But, will some say, before we believe 
Object.  the Scriptures, we must be convinced by Reason that these Scriptures are of God.  
Very true; but the effect of such a 
〈◊〉.  conviction is not properly Faith, but Knowledge. And when I know by satisfying Grounds of Reason, that the Scripture is indeed the Voice of God, then do I by Faith assent to what that speaks as God's testimony. And whereas there are some Truths, which are knowable in some measure by Natural Light, and yet are revealed likewise in the Scripture; it is commonly and truly said by our Divines, that as they are received by Natural Light, and upon Rational Grounds, so they are the Objects of Science: but as they are revealed in the Scripture, so, and only so, they are the Objects of Faith: which (as the Apostle tells us) is the evidence 
Heb. 11. 〈◊〉.  of things not seen, that is, of things not discernible by Natural Light, whether of Sense or Reason; or at least that are not considered as such, when we receive them as Objects of Faith; which therefore is called the evidence of them, because it discerns the truth and reality of them in the infallible testimony of the Revealer.  
Now besides what hath been already said, it may further be proved that Reason is not any part of the Rule of Faith. For  
1. Were this granted, it would necessarily 
1.  follow, that Scripture of itself is an imperfect Rule, and if so, it is no Rule at all. That cannot be owned for a Rule that is not adequate and commensurate to what is to be regulated by it. The known description of a Rule given by Varinus, and so frequently quoted by our best Authors, hath never, that I know of, been questioned: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. A Rule or Canon is an immutable Law, and an unerring Measure, which at no hand will admit of addition or diminution. This is one great Argument used by our Protestant Writers, to shut out Popish Traditions from being any part of the Rule of Faith, because the Scripture is a perfect and sufficient Rule of itself, and must be so, or else it cannot be a Rule at all. Of which the Reader may see enough for his satisfaction in the Learned Bishop of Down his Ductor Dubitantium, Lib. 2. Cap. 3. Rule 14. p. 359, etc. And the Argument is every whit as good to exclude Reason as Tradition in this case. And that the Scripture is a perfect discovery of the Mind of God, (so far as is necessary for us to know it) I have proved before in my first Argument.  
2. The Principles of Reason (as I 
〈◊〉.  have formerly showed in the proof of my first Proposition) have no formal existence any where but in the Minds or Writings of fallible Men, considering them as separate from the Scriptures: for set the Bible aside, there is no Infallible and Authentic Record of those Principles, to which we can have recourse. And this utterly disables them for being so much as a partial Rule of a Christians Faith.  
3. Principles of Natural Reason, (let us suppose them never so fixed and 
3.  infallible) are wholly alien to matters of supernatural Revelation, which are the proper Object of Faith. And to measure these by them, were as ridiculous as to attempt by a Carpenter's Rule to take the distance of the Heavens, or to spread a Fowler's Net to catch the Winds. However therefore there is (as hath been already acknowledged and maintained) great use of Reason and its Principles in subordination and instrumental subserviency to the knowledge of Divine Matters, yet that it is in any degree to be owned as the Rule of our Faith, must not, will not, cannot be allowed by any that are true to the Christian Cause.   

CHAP. XII.  
An Exception of the Exercitator, grounded upon a distinction of the Scriptures taken materially or formally, propounded, and the folly and fallacy of it detected.  
BUt here the Exercitator gives us a distinction, which he makes often 
Except. 2. Ph. Scr. Int. c. 13 par. 1. & 〈◊〉. 16. par. 9  use of, as being very fit for his turn, That the Scripture is taken either materially, and so it signifies no more but the bare Words, Phrases and Sentences of Scripture: or formally, and so it signifies the sense and meaning of these Words and Sentences. Now, says he, when we say the Scripture is the Rule of Faith, we do not mean the bare words, but the sense; and that is the thing we inquire into by the help of Philosophy; and when we have thereby obtained the sense of Scripture-Propositions, that sense we own for the Rule of our Faith, and of deciding Controversies in Religion. But (adds he) when the Reformed Doctors say, the Scripture is its own Interpreter, they can mean only the Words and Sentences of Scripture without the sense: for it is the sense that they are seeking for, and that cannot be the Rule to find out itself.  
To this I answer: 1. The distinction 
Sol. 1.  of the Scripture considered materially and formally, or in respect of the matter and form, is generally received: But was never, that I know of, taken in the sense of this Author, but in a far different meaning; viz. The Scripture, as to the matter, is the Word of God; and formally considered is the same Word as written. But this Gentleman's Exposition of it serves his turn very well; viz. That the Words and Phrases of Scripture are as rude matter, till the sense (as the form) be given it by Philosophy, or Humane Reason.  
But, 2. The distinction, as here used, 
2.  is a miserable subterfuge, arguing some Wit, but no Honesty. For when we say, the Scripture is the Rule of Faith, and it is the Rule of Interpretation to itself; in both we mean neither the words, nor the sense separately, but conjointly, For, 1. The Scriptures are no otherwise the Rule of our Faith, than as they are the Revelation of the Mind of God to us. Now the Words or Sentences separated from the true sense, (supposing they could be so separated) are not the Mind of God: and the sense separated from the Words and Sentences, (if it might be so separated) would be no Revelation: for we know not the Mind of God but by the Words; and his Mind as clothed with these Words, or these Words as exhibiting his Mind, so they are our Rule.  
Again, 2. When we say the Scripture is a Rule of Interpretation to itself, we mean that if the place under consideration be plain, it delivers its own sense to the Reader that well minds the contexture and dependence; if it be dark, we have recourse to some other plain Scripture, and by the evident sense of that, wherein the Mind of God lies more clearly in the words, we find out his Mind in that other, where it lay more darkly.  
The fallacy of this Author in charging us to mean only the Words of Scripture, when we say the Scripture is its own Interpreter, lies in this, he would make the World believe that we mean it of one and the same Sentence of Scripture, even where it is most obscure. Now, as himself premiseth, 
Phil. Ser. Int. c. 2. par. 7.  that Interpretation supposes some obscurity in the thing to be Interpreted; so he could not but know, that in the case of obscurity, we mean it of the Scripture according to its different parts; that the Scripture where it is plain is a Rule of Exposition to itself in those parts that are more intricate, (which himself also acknowledgeth 
Ib. c. 11. par. 1.  to be our meaning elsewhere in his Book.) And yet we use no such incongruity as he supposeth, in saying the Scripture expounds itself, each part of Scripture being Scripture; no more than in saying that the Civil or Municipal Law expounds itself, when one part of the Law explains another.   

CHAP. XIII.  
1. An Answer to some other Objections against the Scripture being its own Interpreter. e. g. That Protestants assert a necessity of the Spirits Illumination. 2. What Correspondency hath one part of Scripture with another? etc. 3. Some difficult places of Scripture are not explained elsewhere. 4. Many Rules of Interpreting Scripture are prescribed by Divines both Ancient and Modern.  
I Shall now consider what may be further 
Sect. 1.  Objected against my present Assertion, besides what I have already met with in clearing my foregoing Arguments.  
And first, the Exercitator Objects, 
Object. 1. Ph. Ser. Int C. 10. par. 2.  That the Divines of the Reformed Churches maintain a necessity of the Spirits Internal Illumination for our right understanding of the Scripture: therefore the Scripture is not a sufficient Interpreter of itself.  
I answer; What the Spirits enlightening 
Sol.  is, and how far necessary, may be more seasonably discussed in another place, and therefore I intent to speak something to it in an Appendix to this Discourse. But at the present we are to consider, that the Spirit is said to make known to us the Mind of God two ways: 1. Objectively, as it speaks to us in the Scripture, which is of the Holy Spirits enditing. 2. Effectively, as it acts in us to help our weak understandings. Now these two are widely different one from the other. The former notes the Objective Evidence that is given us of God's Mind, which is by the Scripture: and this is enough to render the Scripture a sufficient Rule of Interpretation to itself, whether the other were necessary or no; because there is in the Scripture a sufficiency in the nature of an Objective Light to discover the Will of God; the latter concerns only the Subjective Light which the Spirit affords to our dark understandings, that we may discern what is in the Scripture; the necessity whereof doth not at all impeach the sufficiency of the former; because that which makes this latter necessary, is not any obscurity in the Object, but an indisposition in the Subject or Faculty that is to apprehend it.  
But it's further objected, What 
Sect. 2. Object. 2. Ph. Scr. Int. C. 11. par. 2.  correspondency hath one part of Scripture with another? or what right or power hath one Penman of Scripture over the Writings of another, that the words of the one should be Interpreted by the others? Thus argues the Exercitator.  
To which I answer: 1. May we not 
Sol. 1.  with much more reason say, What correspondency hath Philosophy with Scripture? Have not the several parts of Scripture, all which were indicted by one and the same Infallible Spirit, more correspondency one with another, than any of them can have with Philosophy, which is the immediate product of fallible Reason?  
2. The Author may do well to consider 
2.  what good correspondency there is between the several parts of his own Book, and whether this Objection do not evidence him to be inconsistent with himself. For in his third Chapter, 
Phil. Ser. Int. C. 3. par. 21.  when he would prove that the words in 1 Kings 3. 12. concerning the Wisdom of Solomon, are to be understood by an Hebrew Idiotism, and mean no more than that the Wisdom given to Solomon was very eminent, and above the ordinary rate; he appeals to two other places that speak of the Piety of Hezekiah and Josiah, and says, Hoc ita se habere, ex duobus aliis ejusdem Scriptoris locis non obscure elucescit, etc. That it is so, appears plainly by two other places of the same Writer, viz. 2 Kings 18. 5, 6. and C. 23. 25. Which he says, can no otherwise be truly understood but in this sense, that their Piety was eminent and extraordinary. It seems our Author was then in the mind that one part of Scripture may have correspondency with another, and this so far as that the one may expound the other. But now the case is altered. If it be replied in his behalf, That these places by him quoted, were penned by one and the same Writer, and therefore might well have correspondency each with other; but this makes nothing for those who interpret one part of Scripture by some other that was not written by the same Hand: I rejoin, That the first and second Book of Kings were indicted by the same Spirit, I grant, and shall make some use of it in my third Answer to this Author's Objection: But that they were both written by the same Hand, or (suppose they were) that the Writer intended by the latter to explain what he had written in the former, is more than he, or any other for him, can prove.  
3. The Scriptures, though written 
3.  by parts, and at several times, and by several persons, yet they all own God for their Author, by whose Spirit they were indicted; and they are all together to be taken for his Counsel to Sinners. And then what injury or incongruity is there in making use of what one hath written more plainly, to unfold what was more darkly written by another? When we compare the Evangelists together, to explain what one says more briefly, by what another lays down more fully; we do not in this so much inquire into the sense and meaning of the Evangelists, as into the Mind of God whose Secretaries they were. The like may be said of the Prophets: If the Prophets or Apostles spoke of their own heads, or wrote only a signification of their own private Sentiments, there might be some colour for this Objection. But the Apostle tells us, That no Prophecy of Scripture is of private Interpretation: 
2 Pet. 1. 20, 21.  that is, 
a This sense is given by Learned Camero, Rivet, Dr. Pearson on the Creed, and I take it for the móst genuine. P●. Ser. Int. C. 4. par. 5.  the Prophets in their Writings were not the Interpreters of their own Mind, but of the Mind of God by whom they were sent, and by whose Spirit they were acted; as it follows in the next Verse, For Prophecy came not in old time by the will of man; but holy men of God spoke, as they were moved by the Holy Ghost: And thus much the Exercitator acknowledgeth, where he saith, That God is the Author of the Scriptures, and that he did always guide his amanuensis to write the Truth, giving them the assistance of his unerring Spirit; and that whatsoever they wrote●… pure Truth, free from all mixture of Falsehood or Error.  
But there is another Discourse prefixed 
Tractatu● Theologico. Polit. cap. 7.  to a latter Edition of the so oft-mentioned Exercitation, (and thought by many to come from the same Author) the Writer whereof sticks not to assert this audacious Falsehood, That the Prophets in their Narkatives, and in all matters▪ of Speculation, (that is, whatsoever was not matter of moral Duty) did disagree among themselves; and consequently that what is said by one, is not to be explained by the words of another. Which (with other passages of like import) does at once call in question the whole Truth, and consequently the Divine Authority of the Scriptures. For if the P●●men of Scripture elash one against another, in their Writings, either God was not the Author of wh●● they wrote, but themselves, or the God of Truth must be charged with Falsehood; for of two di●…ent Opinions both cannot be true. Whose design it is that the Author of that Theologico-Political Tractat drives, except that of the great Enemy of Mankind, I know not: But he sufficiently manifests a vile esteem of the Holy Scriptures, and a desire to beget the like in others: For he takes very earnest pains, 
V. Trast, cit. c. 9 10.  with the utmost of his art and skill, to ●●ke up and exagitate their seeming disagreements, as real contradictions, casting a great deal of scorn upon all Expositors, as Fools or Madmen, that attempt to reconcile them. His discourse in this and sundry other odious passages, which I abhor to mention, doth apparently tend to promote the cause of the Antiscripturists; besides the help 〈◊〉 affords (which is not a little) to the Romish Interest. The Author indeed would seem, by some Expressions here and there, to intimate his dislike of the Pontifician Party. But we know it is consistent enough with the Politic Principles of Men of that way, to speak much more than he hath done, against that very Cause that they are studiously projecting, under that Covert, to advance.  
But I return, from this Digression, to what I was about. If any thing in the Laws of a Kingdom be difficult and perplex, and there be something in some other Law of the same Kingdom, (though written or printed by other hands) that speaks more clearly of that matter; what wrong is it to the Law, or the Lawmaker, or Printer, if a Learned Council, comparing one with another, expound that which is more dark in one part of the Laws, by that which is more perspicuous in another, both proceeding from the same Authority, and both obliging to the same persons? Judge alike in the present case. This Objection therefore is of no force.  
But it is further urged, That there 
Sect. 3. Object. 3. Ph. Scr. Int. c. 1 par. 7.  are some difficult places of Scripture, that are no where explained in any other part; and some things that being but once spoken in Scripture, cannot be explained by any parallel place. And here our ●●ercitator refers us for instances, to his great Friend Stapleton.  
For answer, 1. Whereas it is said, 
Sol. 1.  there are difficulties in some parts of Scripture, that are no where cleared; how does any Man know this? Doth it follow that there is no such thing because we cannot find it? Do we think ourselves of so piercing or capacious understandings, that nothing in the Scripture that is intelligible, can escape our discovery? Those who have acquainted themselves with Ancient and Modern Expositors, do know that many difficulties which former Interpreters have in vain struggled with, and some that they have wholly left untouched, (either as not apprehending them to be difficulties, or conceiving them insuperable) have been made very clear and plain by some later Writers. Verily, God will have us know, that the opening of his Mind doth not depend only or chiefly upon the pregnancy of Man's Wit, but upon his gracious assistance and blessing, which he affords or withholds when and where himself sees fit.  
Again, the Scriptures were penned not only for the past and present, but 
2.  for all succeeding Ages of the Church to the end of the World: And as some parts of them, which peculiarly concerned some Ages past, were perhaps better understood in those Ages than they can be by us now (as certainly many things were that belonged to the Jewish Oeconomy) so I know not but we may rationally suppose, that some other parts of Scripture, which to us seem unintelligible, may have special reference to the Church in after-Ages, and that those whom they so nearly concern, shall have more light afforded for the understanding of them in their days, than we have in ours: As without doubt some Prophetic Scriptures not yet accomplished will be made clear by the event, when they come to be fulfilled.  
If there be any difficulties in any one 
3.  part of Scripture, which cannot be cleared from some other by the best inquiry we can make, it will be a vain thing to attempt the finding of it out any other way: but we must be, in such cases, content to be ignorant of their meaning. Nor yet will those Scriptures be utterly useless or in vain to us, if from their obscurity we can learn this needful Lesson, the more reverently to adore the Majesty of the written Word, and more humbly to acknowledge our own ignorance and weakness. And to this may be referred what is objected about the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, where the sense is not obvious.  
Yet again it is objected; If the Scripture be its own sufficient Interpreter, 
Sect. 4. Object. 4. Pb. Scr. Int. c. 11. par. 8.  what mean those many Rules that Divines give for the right understanding of Scripture? If the Scripture itself be the only Rule, what need is there of all these? Thus the Exercitator, who makes a particular enumeration of several Rules that are given by St. Austin and others.  
To this childish Cavil (which the Author brings in by the by) I answer; Whatsoever Rules are given by Divines for the right Interpretation of Scripture, (such as are sound and good) are only to direct the Reader how with most ease and greatest certainty to fetch the sense of Scripture from the Scripture itself. Those Rules therefore being but subordinate and ministerial, do no way contradict or overthrow this which is the Supreme and Autocratorical. Suppose a Master-workman having a Building to frame, employ some under him, who are as yet raw and unskilful, till they have gotten some insight into the Carpenters or Mason's Art; when he shows them (as they must have a learning) how to use the Square, or the Rule, or the Plumb-line; surely his direction that he gives them doth not at all argue the uselessness or insufficiency of those Instruments for the purpose to which they are designed; but rather the contrary: so is it in the present case; those inferior and subservient Rules that are prescribed by any for the expounding of Scripture, are designed and directed (if they be such as they should be) to teach Men how to make use of the Supreme Rule, the Scripture itself, for the better finding out of the Mind of God in it.  
Having confirmed my Proposition, vindicated my Arguments for it, and answered the Objections against it, it is time for me to draw to a Conclusion. As for the Exercitator, with whom I have mostly dealt in this Controversy, when I weigh his Arguments, I cannot but wonder at his confidence. But he who hath no better Weapons, must fight with a Bulrush. And it is now become the mode of Polemic Writers that have Prurient Wits, to sharpen their dull Arguments with high confidence in themselves, and a proud contempt of their Antagonists: in both which this Author excels; but it is such an excellency, for which no Wise or sober Man will envy him.     

THE Conclusion.  
THE Author whom I have chiefly and designedly dealt with hitherto, having engaged himself in a Contest with the whole World of Christian Writers, especially with the Expositors of Scripture, and having, in his own apprehension, won the day, comes in his Epilogue to make preparation for his Triumph, bringing forth his Spoils, and telling us how greatly he hath blessed the World with his Exploits; and lest we should be ignorant of our Happiness acquired by his Victorious Arms, he sets it out in six considerable Points.  
1. He tells us, This new way of Interpretation being sure and infallible, will, if it be taken, forthwith banish all Disputes about the sense of Scriptures, and thereby restore Peace to the Christian World. But I wonder how this should be effected by Philosophy, which is itself so full of Disputes, and the Professors whereof are at such variance among themselves. Let them first reconcile their own Differences, before they undertake so great an Enterprise elsewhere.  
2. It will be a great ease to the Interpreter; because whatever sense he can make of any part of Scripture, if Philosophy allow it for a Truth, he may be sure it is the sense of that Text; this way allowing a plurality of immediate senses in the same Scripture, and where it is thus, it is easier (says he) to find the true meaning, than where (according to the Protestants opinion) the sense is but one. And yet sure, when we speak of enquiring after the sense of Scripture, we mean the whole sense, not part of it only. And if many senses may be more easily found out than one, than perhaps our Author may find it an easier thing to gain a thousand Proselytes than one to his new way.  
3. This will save Men the labour of searching Commentators; because in this way they may, by their own industry, find out the Mind of God, without any help from others. And so they may, according to his Principles, without ever looking into the Bible at all.  
4. By this way we may best find out all Corruptions, Depravations, and Mutilations of the Original Text, whether Hebrew or Greek. And is it not pity the Ancient Church did not think of this happy Expedient, that they might have called a Council of Learned Philosophers (such as Porphyry, Celsus, and others) to draw them up a more correct Copy of the Bible?  
5. & 6. By this we may know how to judge of all various Lections, which are Genuine, which not; yea, by this we may discover the Errors of Translations made out of depraved Copies, or Spurious Readins, though we have no skill at all in the Original Tongues. Doubtless a singular Receipt, that will help a Man to distinguish of Colours in the darkest Midnight as well as at Noonday. We see what a rare Pampharmacon this AEsculapius hath prescribed, (which he may well call his Nostrum) that can work as great Wonders as the Headsman's Axe, that infallibly cures all Diseases with one Blow. For that his grand design is utterly to cashier the Scripture as useless and unprofitable, is plain enough by sundry passages in his Book; but especially that in his Epilogue, which I lightly touched at in the first part of my Discourse, Chap. 6. but deserves a more severe Castigation. The Scripture with him is of no use to instruct us in any thing we know not, nor yet to confirm us in what we know. All the use he allows it is only this, that by reading therein we may be occasioned and excited to consider of the things there treated of, and examine the truth of them by Philosophy: And as much as this might be said of the Jews Talmud, or the Turks Alcoran. Was there ever any who called himself a Christian, since the Christian Name was heard of, that hath manifested a more vile esteem of God's Written Word, or a more bold contempt of the whole Christian Doctrine? Hath God in mercy left us this only Authentic Record of his Mind to conduct us in our way to Blessedness? and is this all it is good for? It seems by this Man's account all the Knowledge that we have any use for, is in us already by Nature's Light, and whatsoever is delivered in Scripture, must be tried by that. What could a blind Pagan have said more to the Scriptures dishonour?  
As it is passed all doubt that the Lord of Heaven and Earth, in whom we live, and move, and are, aught to be worshipped and served by his Rational Creatures; so me thinks it should be as unquestionable that he cannot be served rightly and acceptably, but by such a Worship as is according to the appointment of his own Will. The meanest Man living, that hath any depending on him, looks they should serve him according to his Mind, and not according to their own arbitrary choice. And shall we think the Great Sovereign of the World will be pleased with a Worship of men's own ●●aming, without any order or direction from him? Now by which way or means could we know what that Worship is which God approves, if we were in this inpsed state, left to the mere conduct of Natural Light, and had nor Divine Revelation to inform and guide us? What pi●…ful Work did the ●…st and learnedst of the. Heathen make about this? 〈◊〉 what 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 did they admit into their Religious Worship? as I have already 〈◊〉 in the first part of my Discourse.  
Besides, there are in Scripture many things Historical and many Prophetical: Can these 〈◊〉 known by Natural Light? or can we judge whether these be true or no by the help of Philosophy? Moses gives us the History of the Creation, 〈◊〉 the general Deluge, of the Destruction of Sodom, of Israel's Deliverance out of Egypt by strange Wonders; and the bringing of them (after forty years wand'ring) into the Promised Land, and their Establishment there for some years, till for their Idolatry, and other sins they were removed, is recorded by other sacred Writers: besides many other remarkable Histories of more personal concernment. Now if we must not take these for truth from the testimony of Scripture, which way shall we be satisfied? Reason indeed may convince us that these things are not impossible: But whether they were really so or so done as is reported, all the Principles of Reason, all the Maxims of Philosophy will never resolve us. The like may be said of the many Prophecies concerning Christ, and the afterstate of the Church; and about the four great Monarchies that were successively to arise, with their progress and period: If these and such like be examined by Philosophy, what can it say to them? Must these be all rejected? So it seems by this Author's Discourse: for he hath no kindness for any thing in Scripture, but what may mind us of what we know naturally, and may by the Principles of Reason be examined and determined. And then what shall we say to the great Doctrine of Man's Salvation by Christ, which is the grand Subject and principal Scope the of Scriptures? Was there ever any syllable of this made known to the World otherwise than by Revelation? There is indeed a Natural Theology; but I could never yet see ground to be persuaded that there is a Natural Christianity. The knowledge of God as our Creator and Preserver, is in some measure (but very imperfectly) attainable by Natural Light: But the knowledge of Christ as the Redeemer of Sinners, reconciling them to God, and delivering them from the power of Satan, had never been attained, had there not been something above Nature to discover it. If any think otherwise, let them tell me how it comes about that in those Countries where the Doctrine of the Scriptures was never published, there is not the least print or footstep of this great Mystery to be found. But certainly he that talks of the Scriptures after the rate of this Author, cannot be thought to apprehend himself to stand in any need of a Redeemer; or to have any better esteem of the Gospel, than that Triple-Crowned Gentleman at Rome 
Leo 10.  is said to have manifested long since in his discourse with Cardinal Bembus.  
For aught I see, this Man owns nothing in the Scripture but what may be reduced to three Heads; 1. The Being of God, and his Attributes; 2. The Immortality of the Soul, and consequently Mans future state in another World; and, 3. The Rules or Laws of Moral Duty: because of these we have some notice by Natural Light. But how miserably defective is that Light even in these? So that here also we stand in need of a further Guide. Some knowledge the Heathens had of God, and of Man's future state: but, alas, what does all that they have written hereabout come to, but some faint guesses, and probable conjectures? And though they have in their Ethics many excellent things, and of great use; yet they fall extreme short in sundry particulars of very weighty concernment, whereof we should have been utterly ignorant, if the Holy Scriptures had not afforded us a more clear and perfect Rule of practice. And it hath been observed by some, that those Gentile Philosophers, who flourished after the general promulgation of the Gospel, though they continued still in their old Gentilism, yet they wrote much more clearly and sublimely of the Nature of God, and of Man's Duty here, and his Eternal state hereafter, than those who were before them. Whether the cause of this were the converse they might have with Christians and their Writings, or whether that plentiful effusion of the Spirit that was vouchsafed in those times might in some degree (as to common enlightenings) extend itself beyond the Churches Pale, I will not determine. But sure something there was beyond mere Natural Light, that made them, in their Notions of God and Religion, so much 〈…〉 of their Predecessors.  
I shall shut up all with this hearty and serious Wish, That all who call upon God by Jesus Christ, would highly honour and esteem the Holy Scriptures, making them their study and delight in order to the bettering of their Hearts, and manifesting the power and purity of this Word by a sober, righteous, and godly Conversation: which would more effectually vindicate this Blessed Book from the Scorns and Reproaches of Atheists and Antiscripturists than all Disputes.   

AN APPENDIX Concerning Internal Illumination, And other Operations of the Spirit upon the Soul of Man.  
Vindicating the Doctrine of the Protestants and the Practice of all Serious Christians from the Charge of Enthusiasm, and other Unjust Criminations.  
In the SAVOY: Printed by Tho. Newcomb, for Robert Boulter, at the Turks Head in Cornhill, over against the Royal Exchange. 1677.   

A brief Account of the Contents of the following Appendix.  

CHAP. I. THe Protestants Doctrine concerning the Spirits Illumination, explained and defended.  
CHAP. II. The Nature of Distresses of Conscience and Spiritual Joys opened, and the reality of them proved.  
CHAP. III. True Zeal in the Exercises of Religion justified.    

An Appendix concerning Internal Illumination, and other Operations of the Spirit upon the Soul of Man, etc.  

CHAP. I.  
1. What our Protestant Divines mean by that Illumination of the Spirit, which they assert as necessary to the understanding of the Scriptures: and the Exercitators censure of it as Enthusiasm, approved by Wolzogen. 2. The Falsehood of that Calumny discovered. 3. Wolzogen' s disingenuity and inconstancy. 4. The necessity of the aforesaid Illumination proved. 5. In what sense it is supernatural. 6. Some of the Exercitators Cavils answered. 7. In what sense this Illumination is immediate.  
IN the foregoing Papers (designed 
Sect. 1.  to clear and vindicate the Protestant Doctrine concerning the Supreme Bule of Interpreting Scripture) I have had occasion frequently to deal with the Belgic Exercitator, and to take notice of what he hath said that seems to be of any moment, so far as concerns that point. But whereas he is pleased in the procedure of his Discourse to step out of his way, and deridingly to oppose the Doctrine of the Reformed Churches about the Spirits assistance in the Interpretation of Scripture, as savouring of Enthusiasm; I than waved meddling with that part of his Book; thinking it more expedient to say something to it in an Appendix by itself, this being a Question altogether distinct from that other of the Rule of Interpretation.  
In the Fourteenth Chapter of his oft-mentioned Exercitation, he quotes several of our Protestant Authors of great Name and Worth, giving in the words of some of them, and referring us for others to the cited places. The drift of their several Discourses about this point seems to be, that there needs an effectual operation of the Holy Spirit, to enlighten men's understandings, and cause them rightly to apprehend, and readily to approve the Mind of God in Scripture. That their meaning may be more clearly propounded, we must distinguish of a twofold understanding of Scripture. There is a Natural and merely Grammatical perception of the truth of Scripture-Propositions, which a Man, destitute of the Spirit of Grace, may attain by common assistance in the use of ordinary means. And there is a Spiritual apprehension of the things themselves contained in those Propositions, (which includes in it a hearty believing and embracing them) that is not attained without the sanctifying work of the Spirit, renewing the mind by enduing it with an heavenly, supernatural Light. This I find thus expressed and illustrated by the late Reverend Bishop of Norwich: Natural Men, says he, have their Principles 
Treat. of the Sinfulness of Sin, p. 119.  vitiated, their Faculties bound, that they cannot understand spiritual things, till God have as it were implanted a new understanding in them, framed the heart to attend, and set it at liberty to see the Glory of God with open face. Though the Veil do not keep out Grammatical Construction, yet it blindeth the Heart against the spiritual Light and Beauty of the Word. We see even in common Sciences, where the Conclusions are suitable to our innate and implanted Notions, yet he that can distinctly construe and make Grammar of a Principle in Euclid, may be ignorant of the Mathematical sense and use of it: Much more may a Man in Divine Truths be spiritually ignorant even where in some respect he may be said to know. For the Scriptures pronounce Men ignorant of those things which they see and know. In Divine Doctrine Obedience is the Ground of Knowledge, and Holiness the best Qualification to understand the Scriptures. To this Spiritual Understanding there is need of the aforesaid Supernatural Light. And this is that which (as far as I can understand) our Divines mean, when they assert the necessity of the Spirits Illumination. Thus speaks the Church of England, 
a 2 Homily of the Scripture.  The Revelation of the Holy Ghost inspireth the true meaning of the Scripture into us: In truth we cannot without it, attain true saving knowledge. Yea, of this mind was Erasmus (no Enthusiast) who thus speaks; 
b De rat. conc. li. 1. Errat vehementer, qui credit se consequi posse veram Canonicarum Scripturarum intelligentiam, nisi afflatus eo Spiritu quo proditae sunt.  He erreth vehemently, who believes he can ever attain to the true understanding of the Canonical Scriptures, unless he be inspired by the same Spirit that indicted them. And again; 
c Ib. li. 2.  They have the Book of Scripture, but not the Scripture, that want the Spirit; without which the Scripture is not understood. And M. Luther 
d Luther on Gen. 47. cited by Gerard in Exeg loc. come. de S. Script. c. 15. par. 336.  quoting a Speech of Aben-Ezra, Sine supra & infra, (i. e. without Points and Accents) the Scripture cannot be understood; adds a third, sine intra, without somewhat within, viz. the Light of the Holy Spirit.  
Now let us hear the Judgement of the Exercitator, and his pretended Answerer Wolzogen about this: As for the former; If, says he, the meaning of 
Ph. Scr. Int. c. 14. par. 1.  these Divines were this, that no sense of Scripture, by what way or method soever found out, can be fully certain to any, unless by the Natural Light of our understanding we can clearly and distinctly perceive it, and be fully persuaded of its truth, and that this clear perception, and the sense a Man hath of it, be that inward persuasion and testimony of the Spirit which they intent; this will be granted them: But if they mean not the Natural Light of Man's understanding, or what is built upon that, but a Supernatural Light, above and beyond Man's Natural Reason, not included in the Mind, or acquired by 
Ib. par. 3.  it, but infused and inspired from above; this, says he, we disclaim and condemn for Enthusiasm. This is the sum of the censure that he passeth upon this Doctrine. And Lud. Wolzogen, who pretends to take up the Bucklers against him in defence of the Protestant Cause, in stead of vindicating the forecited Authors and their Doctrine, joins with the Exercitator in the calumny; as appears undeniably by his own words; for thus he speaks; Because 
Lib. de Sc●. Int. p. 125, 126.  the Holy Spirit doth indeed still exert some power in the minds of Men, therefore some have believed that he opens the sense of the Scriptures, and interprets them to the Faithful. Which opinion the Exercitator doth justly decry, and determine that it contains mere Enthusiasm. Where he expressly approves and applauds what the Exercitator had said against the Doctors of the Reformed Churches, charging them with Enthusiasm for maintaining a necessity of a Supernatural Light for a saving perception of the Mind of God in Scripture. And himself doth so frequently strike upon this string in several places of his Book, that he seems to design the blemishing and defaming of our most eminent Protestant Writers, and the Doctrine which they have asserted against Papists and Pelagians.  
These Men cannot be ignorant, that 
Sect. 2.  the Divines whom they thus impeach, have all along, in answer to the like imputation from Popish and Socinian Authors, expressly and vehemently disclaimed all compliance with Enthusiasts, and that some of them have written learnedly and smartly against that sort of Men. They utterly disavow their expecting any such Illumination, as was given to the Prophets and Apostles; and do plainly deliver their minds, that what they assert, doth not consist in discovering any new Doctrine unrevealed in Scripture, but in qualifying and disposing the mind for a right understanding and receiving that which the Scripture propounds: For they suppose (what the Scripture plainly affirms, and what none ever denied but Pelagius and his followers) that the mind of Man by the Fall is blind in the things of God, that it cannot rightly and sufficiently, unto salvation, discern the things of the Spirit, when presented to it, unless that inward blindness be removed: That the Scripture propounds to us the Truths we are to receive; but the Spirit disposeth us to receive them; which the Reverend Bishop of Chester thus expresseth: 
Dr. Pearson on the Creed, p. 327.  The same Spirit which revealeth the Object of Faith generally to the Universal Church, (viz. by the H. Scripture, which was given by the motion and operation of the Spirit of God, as he had said a few lines before) doth also illuminate the understanding of such as believe, that they may receive the Truth: For Faith is the Gift of God, not only in the Object, but also in the Act. And a little after, concluding his Discourse on this Head, he saith; Thus we affirm not only the 
Ib. p. 328.  Revelation of the Will of God, but also the Illumination of the Soul of Man, to be part of the Office of the Holy Spirit of God, against the old and new Pelagians. That Subjective Light whereby the mind of Man is enabled to see Divine Truths, this all sound Protestants own to come from the Spirit of God, immediately irradiating the mind, and curing that spiritual darkness that possesseth it, whereby it is indisposed for understanding spiritual things in a spiritual manner: but all the Objective Light or evidence that we have of the Mind of God, they acknowledge to lie in the Scripture itself. And therefore our Learned Whitaker, in his Contest with the Romish Doctors, makes this clear and candid profession in the name of all the Protestants: Internas Persuasiones 
Whitak. Op. in fol. Tom. 2.  sine externo Verbo tanquam Satanae ludibria cavemus. Ex Scripturis Sapimus, cum Scripturis Sentimus, propter Scripturas Credimus. We eat Internal Persuasions without the External Word, as the Delusions of Satan. We fetch our Wisdom from the Scriptures, we regulate our Sentiments by the Scriptures, we build our Faith upon the Scriptures.  
But Wolzogen, as he deals most disingenuously with our Protestant Divines 
Sect. 3.  in reporting their Doctrine, inserting somewhat of his own that quite changes its meaning, and so rendering it more obnoxious to censure; so he is very variable and uncertain in delivering his own mind. And yet in the winding up says as much as all that comes to, which he, together with the Exercitator, calls Enthusiasm. For he tells us, That the Spirit corrects that 
Lud. Wolzog. de Script. In●. p. 64, 65.  corruption of the mind which hinders us from discerning the sense of Scripture.— And,— That he exerts his power about 
P. 253.  the constitution of our minds, (which he had acknowledged before to be covered 
P. 13.  with the darkness of a natural ignorance) by enlightening them. But then he says, This is not by putting any new light into our minds, for all that shines in the Scripture. Where he strangely confounds the Objective and Subjective Light, as if they were all one. Sure, it is not enough for a Man's seeing of visible Objects, that there be an External Light in the Air, but there must be an Internal Light in the Eye; and if this be lost, (as it is in the blind) it must be restored, or the Man will never see, though there were never so much Light about him. Yet after all, the aforesaid Author tells us elsewhere, That the Spirit of God so powerfully and efficaciously 
Censura censurae, 144.  affects our minds by enlightening, exciting, moving, leading them, that the darkness of our natural ignorance being dissipated, we may savingly perceive the Divine Objects presented to us in the Scripture. And again,— he says, 
Ib. p. 266.  The Eye of the mind being vitiated, the Holy Spirit restores its sight. And yet more, I grant, says he, that in this business the Spirit of God imprints a new 
Ib. p. 280.  light upon our minds, if by this be meant that he gives us as it were a new faculty of receiving that Light that shines in the Scripture, not any new Light, (i. e. not any new Objective Light) distinct from the Scriptures. Now truly this (for any thing I can see) is that very Doctrine of our Reformed Divines, which the Exercitator had so boldly charged with Enthusiasm, and that with this Author's approbation.  
But I perceive there are some Men, 
Sect. 4.  (whereof the Exercitator is one) who make account that all the darkness Men are in, even as to matters Spiritual, is only a want of such a Light as shall discover the Object, without curing the Faculty. Thus Schlichtingius writing against Meisuerus in defence of Socinus, says, Homo intellectu praeditus in divinis mysteriis ita caecus est, quemadmodum is qui oculos quidem habet, sed in tenebris sedet: amove tenebras, & lumen affer, videbit. Oculi hominum sunt intellectus, lux est Christi doctrina. Man endued with understanding is no otherwise blind in Divine Mysteries, than as he who hath eyes, but sits in the dark: remove the darkness, and bring him a light, and he will see. The eyes of a man are his understanding, the light is Christ's doctrine. To this purpose speaks the Author of a late Pamphlet, that when once the mystery 
Treatise of Hum. Reason, p. 58.  of Christ Jesus was revealed, even Humane Reason was able to behold and confess it; not that Grace had altered the eyesight of Reason, but that it had drawn the Object nearer to it. But that defect of the Mind of Man which the Scripture speaks of, is evidently an internal darkness; not only a darkness about him, but a darkness within him; which the greatest external light, without something else, will never redress; no more than the bringing of a light into a dark room, can make a blind Man see. And if it were not thus, I see no reason why Man should be counted any more blind or ignorant in reference to matters of Heaven and Eternity, than in reference to Arts and Sciences, and common Trades, which he is wholly at a loss in, till the Principles of them be clearly and distinctly propounded to him. But lamentable experience makes it abundantly manifest, that Men of quick understanding and greatest proficiency in these matters, yet remain as blind as Beetles in Divine Mysteries, notwithstanding all outward means of Instruction. The Apostle Paul was trained up in the Doctrine of the Law at the feet of Gamaliel, and very strict he was in the righteousness of the Law, according to the understanding that he had of it. And yet being destitute of the Spirit of Grace, he tells us, that he was all that while without the Law; because he was destitute of the true spiritual 
Rom. 7. 9  knowledge of it. That Disciplinary knowledge that he had from his Teachers, was not sufficient, because he wanted the inward light of the Spirit to cure his blindness, and remove his prejudices. This the Apostle John calls, Giving us an understanding that 
1 Jo. 5. 20.  we may know him that is true. And this was promised of old, when the Lord says by his Prophet, I will put my Law 
Jer. 31. 33  into their inward parts, and write it in their hearts; which, besides an external Revelation, implies necessarily an internal Illumination. Most true it is, that as the light of the body is the eye, so the light of the Soul is Reason: but if (as our Saviour says) this light which is in us be darkness, how great is that 
Mat. 6. 23.  darkness? And that it is so with this internal eye, as to matters Heavenly, till the Spirit of Grace enlighten it, is 
Ephes. 5. 8.  evident by Scripture and all experience.  
But as far as I can understand, there 
Sect. 5.  are two things in the present point that are especially quarrelled at: viz. That the Spirits enlightening of our minds is affirmed to be Supernatural, and to be Immediate. I shall say something to them both.  
First, Some are angry at our Divines for maintaining such a thing as Supernatural Illumination. The 
a Ph. Scr. Int. c, 5. par. 6. etc. 14. par. 3.  Exercitator rejects all Supernatural Light as a Figment. And 
b De usu ration. in Theol. p. 8, 9, 10.  Velthusius (for whose Orthodoxy Wolzogen's credit lies at stake 
c In Epist. ad Academiae Franckeranae Senatum, Anno 1667. ) denies the distinction of Natural and Supernatural Light, and affirms peremptorily, that our knowledge of whatsoever Object, whether natural or revealed, is attained by one and the same Internal Light, and that with him is no other than the natural light of reason. Now if his meaning were no more but this, that whatsoever Objects are presented to us, Natural or Supernatural, they are all perceived by the same natural faculty of Reason or Understanding; I know no Man so absurd as to deny it. But if he means (as he must if he mean any thing) that our Reason or Understanding apprehends all Objects of what kind soever, by no other inward light but what is connatural to it, needing no supernatural light to help it; he must pardon us, if we prefer the Authority of Scripture, and the Judgement of the Catholic Church before his Novel Conceits. Surely, when David prayed for the opening of 
Ps. 119. 1●  his eyes to see the wonders of God's Law, and when St. Paul prayed that the Ephesians might have the eyes of 
Eph. 1. 17, 18.  their minds enlightened, they did not conceive that by the Spirits enlightening no more was meant than the natural light of Man's Reason: for they knew, that themselves, and those they prayed for, had that already, as they were Rational Creatures; and therefore there was no more need to pray for that, than to pray that God would make them Men.  
But for the further clearing of this, the word Supernatural may have respect either, 1. to Man's nature as finite, and so far innocently imperfect; or, 2. to Man's nature depraved, and so sinfully defective. If we consider Man in his first state, though his actual knowledge was short of what by further experience he might have attained; and at the best, had its bounds from the finiteness of his being; yet I doubt not, but he had sufficient light connatural to his understanding for the perception of the highest Mysteries, whensoever they should have been propounded to him with clear Objective evidence. But it is not so with Man fallen. The light of Man's natural understanding is now so weak and dim, that there needs a new supervenient light, raising and quickening the mind to a greater perspicacity than lapsed Nature hath, or can of itself attain to for the right understanding of spiritual things, how plainly soever propounded. And in this sense we own and assert the saving light of the Spirit to be supernatural, in that it elevates the understanding to such a power or ability of knowing heavenly Mysteries, as Nature in its lapsed state hath not of itself, nor can recover by its own greatest industry without the special Grace of God 
* Dicimus habere singulos sideles supernaturale ●umen, quod per verbi ministerium Spiritus illorum mentibus infundit; in quo lumine ips● judicant, & propriae, mentis oculis percipiunt dogmata illa, quibus assentiuntur actu Fidei Catholicae, esse divina. Davenantius de Judice & norma controv. cap. 30. . It is an acknowledged truth, that every thing is received according to the capacity and fitness of the Recipient. To a right understanding of any thing, there is required a suitableness between the Faculty and the Object. The eye cannot perceive smells, nor the ear hear colours. Nor can any sensitive power reach to the apprehension of things purely intellectual: so neither can the mind of a mere natural Man that is darkened and depraved by sin, (while it so remains) duly apprehend matters spiritual and heavenly. It is the Observation of a late Author, that the 
Mr. Gla●vil in his Philosophia Pia, P. 45.  best and most effectual remedy for the thorough curing of our Intellectual diseases, is that which altars the Crasis and disposition of the mind; because (as he very well argues) 'tis suitableness to that, which makes the way to men's Judgements, and settles them in their persuasion: there being few (as he further adds) that hold their Opinions by Arguments and dry reasonings; but by congruity to the understanding, and consequently by relish in the affections. Now as sound Philosophy doth (according to the aforesaid Author) go far for the cure of men's mistakes, by giving their minds another tincture; to wit, in such things as lie within the sphere of Nature; so where this comes short, (as in things of supernatural Revelation it certainly doth) there is need of supernatural aid. This Mr. Baxter hath very well expressed; I think, says he, that in the very hearing 
Animadversions on the Lord Herbert's Book De Veritate, P. 135, etc.  or reading, God's Spirit often so concurreth, as that the Will itself shall be touched with an internal gust or savour of the goodness contained in the Doctrine, and at the same time the understanding with an internal irradiation, which breeds such a sudden apprehension of the verity of it, as Nature gives Men of Natural Principles. And I am persuaded that this increased by more experience and love 
Modus Sciendi in dogmatibus fidei est per inspirationem, per testimonium Spiritus, & per modum gustus; ut verissimè Halen●is, Part. 1. q. 1. art. 2. Sic Daven. de Judice & norma controv. c. 30. 2 Cor. 4. 6.  and inward gusts, doth hold most Christians faster to Christ than naked reasoning could do: And were it not for this, unlearned, ignorant persons were still in danger of Apostasy by every subtle Caviller that assaults them. And I believe that all true Christians have this kind of internal knowledge from the suitableness of the truth and goodness of the Gospel to their new quickened illuminated sanctified Souls. The Apostle tells us, God who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ. Where he manifestly compares the great Work of God in enlightening the dark heart of Man with spiritual knowledge, to the first forming of Light, which was 
Gen. 1. 2. 3  the Act of a Creating Power, when Darkness covered the face of the Deep. Let the greatest External or Objective Light be afforded, if there be not likewise, in order to the reception of that, a Subjective Light infused, it will prove, as we find in Joh. 1. 5. The Light shineth in Darkness, and the Darkness comprehended it not.  
Two passages in the Exercitator I 
Sect. 6. Ph. Scr. Int. c. 5. par. 6. Object. 1.  shall here take notice of. The one is, where he says, That the opinion of our Divines concerning this Supernatural Light, seems to him to have had its Original from the received Axiom of the Aristotelick Philosophers, That nothing is in the Understanding that hath not been first in the sense. Which, says he, the Divines receiving for an undoubted truth, did never call off their minds from their senses; and finding the knowledge drawn from thence to be very lame and imperfect, and next to nothing, they judged all rational knowledge to be no better: yet happening by chance sometimes to make use of their mere understanding in the perception of some things, and thereby attaining some true and solid knowledge, which they found to be of a far other nature than that which they used to fetch from the senses, therefore they took this latter kind of knowledge to be something Divine and Supernatural.  
To this I answer, 1. By what Power or Authority doth this confident Gentleman 
Sol. 1.  break Windows into the breasts of others, and take upon him to know the secret thoughts and inward conceptions of their minds? Did they ever tell him, that this was their apprehension of things? or that their Doctrine of Supernatural Light was built upon the Authority of Aristotle, or deduced from any of his Axioms? Or doth his New Philosophy furnish him with skill sufficient to search the hearts of Men touching their particular Sentiments, as he pretends it doth to show him the mind of God in Scripture-Revelations? I think it furnisheth him for both alike: But I wish it had taught him better to know himself.  
2. Neither were Aristotle nor his Followers such Dolts or Blockheads in maintaining the forementioned Axiom, as to take it in that absurd meaning, that nothing could be received into the Understanding, but what is the Object of Sense: For they clearly maintain the knowledge of those things that fall not under sense; as of God, and Angels, and of Universals that are abstracted from sense. But that all our knowledge of things without us, comes in by the Senses, especially by those two that are not unfitly called the Senses of Discipline, Sight and Hearing, is, I think, evident enough by all Experience, besides what we find in Scripture concerning the knowledge we have of God; which is either Natural, or by Revelation. Now as for the former, the Apostle sure was not deceived by Aristotle's Axiom, when he tells us, That the invisible things of God from 
Rom. 1. 20  the Creation of the World, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his Eternal Power and Godhead. And for the knowledge of things revealed, we are taught by the same Apostle, that Faith cometh by 
Rom. 10. 17.  hearing. And our Saviour's most usual method of Preaching by Parables, may show us how requisite it is for Man in this state to have his understanding informed even in things Spiritual and Heavenly, by the help of sense and sensible Objects.  
The other passage is that where he says, That this Supernatural Light is 
Object. 2. Ph. Scr. Int. c. 14. par. 3.  a thing unintelligible, he knows not what to make of it, nor how to conceive of it: Is it (says he) something ordinary, or is it extraordinary?  
To his Demand I answer, It is beyond the reach of corrupted and depraved 
Sol. 1.  Nature, and so it is extraordinary: but it is the inseparable privilege of renewed Nature, and so far it is ordinary, for it is communicated to all who partake in the saving Grace of Christ.  
But, 2. Whereas this Author says, 
2.  He knows not what this enlightening of the Spirit is, I easily believe him, considering what our Saviour says of the Spirit of Truth, which he promised to his Disciples; That the World could 
Jo. 14. 17.  not receive him, because it seeth him not, neither receiveth him. And it is no wonder for Men to speak slightingly or contemptuously of the things they know not: Upon which very account many excellent Truths plainly revealed in the Gospel, are, by audacious Wits, exploded and derided as unintelligible Mysteries.  
Yet, 3. Me thinks men's Reason 
3.  might tell them, (if it were not woefully blinded by pride, prejudice, or passion) that the unaccountableness of the nature of a thing, or of the manner how it is, can be no sufficient Argument against its existence. The most perspicacious Inquirers into the Secrets of Nature, do acknowledge themselves convinced of the certain existence of many things, the nature whereof, and the manner of their production, they are not able to conceive, much less to discover. Thou knowest not (says Solomon) what is the way of the Spirit, 
Eccles. 11. 5.  nor how the Bones do grow in the Womb of her that is with Child. It is beyond the ken of Man's understanding infallibly to know, or demonstratively to prove, 1. The way of the Spirit or Soul, whether it be produced by Creation, or Traduction, or what other way. And, 2. How the Body is formed in the Womb. I know some learned Men have gone far in their Discoveries, but the ablest of them have been put to a stop, meeting with some knots which they could not untie. I might ask these Curious Questionists, How they can solve the many Doubts that may be raised about the Species of sensible Objects, and about the Phantasms in the Mind; or give us a satisfying account, whence they come, how they are framed, and where it is that they are first received? Or, I might demand of them, Which way the Soul and Body are united to each other, and how they come to act one upon another, with a thousand more difficulties that occur, where the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is unsearchable, though the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be undeniable. How much more may this be affirmed of things purely revealed, the sublimity whereof so vastly exceeds the former?  
Secondly, Another thing these Men 
Sect. 7.  dislike is, That the Spirits enlightening of the Mind is said to be Immediate.  
1. Now if the word Immediate be 
1.  taken as it is sometimes explained, for such as supersedes Man's use of God's appointed means, as if he were to expect some internal voice or impulse to reveal to him the Mind of God; we disclaim all Immediate Actings of the Spirit in this sense. But if Immediate be taken (as it may very properly) for such an operation of the Holy Spirit as doth Immediatè attingere mentem; that by itself, without the interposition of any second cause, reacheth the mind of Man; so we maintain, that there is no effectual operation of the Spirit of God upon the Soul of Man, but what is in this sense Immediate. For what created Agent is there to come between the Spirit of God and the Soul of Man? or that can by its own efficiency come at the Soul of Man to work upon it? This nothing can do but an Infinite Spirit, If any will say, That there is something else comes between the Spirit of God and the Soul of Man, in this business, let them assign what it is. Is it the Scripture itself? That can act but Objectively; nor can it do that, further than it is understood and believed. That therefore which works upon the Mind by a proper efficiency to redress the indisposition of the Faculty, and to enable it to know and believe, must be something else; and that can be no less than the Spirit of Wisdom and Revelation, which the Apostle prays for in behalf 
Ephes. 1.  of his Ephesians.  
I further add this, that an Immediate 
〈◊〉.  Work of the Spirit is defensible also in another sense, viz. as it is opposed to a necessity of outward means on the Spirits part. For as it is in the outward and visible Administrations of Providence, God hath tied us to the use of means for our own preservation and subsistence, yet he hath not tied up himself to means, so but that he can, and sometimes doth, step out of his ordinary way, and work for us more immediately, where means are wanting, or whensoever he thinks fit to act without them: So may it be said in this case, (the invisible Dispensations of Grace) it is our duty to use the means afforded us for our information in the things of God; and it were bold presumption for any Man to expect the Spirits help in the neglect of those means. But God hath no where told us, that I know, that he hath bound up himself from communicating his Light and Grace in a way extraordinary without means, either where the means are denied, or whensoever he is pleased to wave their use. And therefore that distinction given by 
De Scr. Int. p. 58. etc.  Lud. Wolzogen of the Spirits power, into Soluta and Ligata, will not, without some limitation, be received by considerate men.   

CHAP. II.  
1. Wolzogen' s bitter Invective against the Pastors of the Reformed Churches. 2. The Nature of Distresses of Conscience, and Spiritual Desertions opened, and the reality of them proved. 3. Of Spiritual Joys from the sense of God's love; the reality of them also asserted. 4. A Conjecture at the Original of that conceit that resolves the aforesaid different apprehensions and impressions into the different temper of the Body.  
BEfore I shut up my Discourse, I 
Sect. 1.  cannot let pass, without some Animadversion, what Lud. Wolzogen hath written in the latter part of his second Book, De Scripturarum Interpret: where he thinks it not enough to have owned and applauded the Exercitators profane scoff at the aforesaid Doctrine of the Reformed Churches about the Spirits enlightening, as a piece of Enthusiasm, 
Pb. Scr. Int. c. 14. par. 3.  the effect of a deluded fancy, attributing that to the Spirit of God that is the natural effect of the mind, or the apprehension of some imaginary good. But (as if he were glad of such an occasion) he breaks forth into a most bitter Invective against the Doctors and Professors of the Reformed Religion, (for that his aim is at them, is evident by the whole Series of his Discourse, notwithstanding all his palliations) for owning and 
De Script. Interpr. p. 257, etc.  maintaining any such supernatural and immediate Operations of the Spirit; and daringly ascribes all to the heats of an exalted Imagination, or the vapours of melancholic Blood, and the unusual Joys of a recreated Temperament, or perhaps to the clearer light of some discovered Truth, and sometimes to the deceitful Dreams or wild Commotions of a distracted Mind, falsely conceited to be the Divine Breathe of the Holy Spirit: And this he especially censures in those, who having attained to some eminent Gifts of Utterance, a tenacious Memory, a lively and ready Fancy, with a fluent Elocution, are fervent in their Devotions; whose Performances, he says, are cried up for the actings of the Spirit; not that the Persons thus qualified are so weak, as to think that this comes from the Spirit of God: but that they are willing others should believe so, that they may make the better advantage of such a reputation to gain power into their hands, and as a torrent carry all before them, filling all with Schism and Sedition. This is the sum of his angry Rhetoric in this matter. And his Friend Velthusius speaks in the same Dialect. And no doubt 
De usu ration. in Theolog. p. 71, 72.  there are others in the World of like mind with them: by whom those strong impressions of joy or sorrow that are made upon the hearts of Christians from the sense of sin and wrath on the one hand, or of the saving love of God on the other; and those fervors of spirit that they sometimes feel and express in the solemn services of Religion and exercises of Devotion, are censured as proceeding from the different temperament of the Body, and the suitable workings of a deluded fancy, or aseribed to Enthusiastic impulses, or such like imaginary causes. But let the whole be brought under an impartial examination, and I doubt not but this will appear a groundless calumny, to all that shall give sober Reason leave to judge without the interposure of Prejudice or Passion.  
First then, let us consider of those different apprehensions and impressions beforementioned, and see what Scripture and sound Reason teaches us concerning them.  
Man, as he is an Intelligent Creature, hath a power connatural to him, of reflecting upon himself, and judging of his own state and ways, as he stands in relation to God and Eternity. This power of Reflection is commonly known by the name of Conscience; which, as it is appointed to be Man's Domestic Guide and Monitor to show him his way, and mind him of his duty; so it is a constant Inspector over him, not only as a Witness of what he is and does; but as a Judge also in the Name and place of God to pass sentence upon him, and give him some fore-taste of those future joys or sorrows that shall be the portion of the Children of Men in another World.  
Begin we with the Distresses of an 
Sect. 2.  afflicted Conscience, arising from the sense of Sin, and Gods deserved wrath for it. This may be considered, either as the case of one newly awakened by the Terrors of God to a sad debate with himself, having hitherto been a stranger to the state and way of Holiness; or of one already regenerated and begotten again by renewing Grace; one that hath formerly experimented in some degree the sweetness of a Heavenly Life, but is now brought into a dark uncomfortable condition, through want of the sense of Gods saving love, not without sad impressions of his dreadful displeasure.  
Though I shall not wholly exclude the former out of my present debate, yet it is the latter that I intent chiefly to treat of. Those to whom this befalls, during this distress, walk disconsolately, find little or no sweetness in any duty they perform, any Ordinance they attend upon, any blessing they make use of. Sometimes they strongly suspect, if not peremptorily conclude themselves to be reprobates and castaways, to have no Grace in their hearts, no part in the Redemption of Christ, but to be Enemies of God, Captives of Satan, and Vessels of Wrath fitted to destruction. And this is one part of God's Paternal Discipline, wherewith he is pleased to exercise some of his beloved Children; whether to correct their unthankfulness under former enjoyments, or to put their Graces to greater trial, or to fit them for some special service, or to humble them for some heinous sin, and make them more watchful for the future, or to magnify his own Grace in upholding them under all their Agonies, and reviving them after their violent Conflicts; or for what other holy ends he may have in it, which we are not now concerned to discuss. This Spiritual Desertion, (as it hath been hitherto called by sober Divines of all Persuasions, as far as I know) admits of degrees, being not so sharp and dreadful to some as to others▪ some are but for a while under it, others for several months or years: some have a taste of it in the time of their health and strength, and outward prosperity, others under bodily weaknesses, or outward disquiets, or upon a Deathbed.  
The case of one in this distress of spirit must needs be sad. Solomon tells us, The spirit of a man will sustain 
Prov. 18. 14.  his infirmity: but a wounded spirit who can bear? So long as the spirit remains whole and untouched, it can bear up under all other pressures and troubles. But when the wound reacheth the Soul, when Conscience affrights the Sinner, when this tells him, (whether truly or mistakingly) that God hath forsaken him, and cast him off, that the Almighty reckons him his Enemy, and sets him up as a mark whereon to spend the arrows of his indignation; this breaks him all in pieces, this proves a weight so heavy, that the burdened Soul would certainly sink under it, were there not a secret support vouchsafed by God's gracious hand. This makes David cry out, My sin is ever before me: and elsewhere; 
Psal. 51. 3.  Thine arrows stick fast in me, 
Psal. 38. 2. & seq.  and thy hand presseth me sore. There is no soundness in my flesh because of thine anger; neither is there any rest in my bones because of my sin. For mine iniquities are gone over my head; as an heavy burden, they are too heavy for me.— Besides other instances that might be given. Nor can this be a wonder to any, were these few things considered.  
1. The loving kindness of God (as the 
Psal. 63. 3.  Psalmist speaks) is better than life. This is it that makes all a Christians enjoyments truly comfortable, and that allays the bitterness of the most afflicting crosses, that animates against the sharpest and most dreadful conflicts against all other evils. Let a Christian live under the sense of God's reconciling love, and he passes cheerfully and undauntedly through whatsoever befalls him. Let this therefore be withdrawn, and he is presently overwhelmed with darkness; 
Psal. 88 14  the sweetest blessings are tasteless, the lightest afflictions are intolerable. He looks upon God as an Enemy, and now every thing appears to him as a messenger of death.  
2. As the love of God is highly valuable, so who knows the power of his wrath? If the sense of this, when it 
Psal 90. 11  fell upon the Innocent Son of God for the sin of Man, made HIM shrink, and drew from Him those doleful complaints, Now is my Soul troubled, and 
Joh. 12. 27  what shall I say? And, My Soul is 
Mat. 26. 38  exceeding sorrowful, even unto death. And again, My God, my God, why hast 
Mat. 27. 46  thou forsaken me? How can guilty Sinners think to grapple with these Terrors? Well might Job cry out as he did in his distress; O that my grief 
Job 6. 2, 3, 4.  were throughly weighed, and my calamity laid in the balances together! For now it would be heavier than the sand of the Sea, therefore my words are swallowed up. For the arrows of the Almighty are within me, the poison whereof drinketh up my spirit: the terrors of God do set themselves in array against me. And Heman, Thou hast laid me in the lowest 
Psa. 88 6, 7  pit, in darkness, in the deeps. Thy wrath lieth hard upon me: and thou hast afflicted me with all thy waves. And 
Ib. v. 14, 15, 16.  again, Lord, why castest thou off my Soul? why hidest thou thy face from me? I am afflicted and ready to die, from my Youth up: while I suffer thy terrors, I am distracted. Thy fierce wrath goeth over me: thy terrors have cut me off. How bitterly did Francis Spira express the dolours of his woeful Soul! O (says he) that I might but feel 
Relation of the fearful state of Fr. Spira, p. 89.  the least sense of the love of God but for one small moment, as I now feel his heavy wrath that burns like the torments of Hell within me, and afflicts my Conscience with pangs unutterable!  
3. In this case the poor distressed Creature is his own Tormentor. He musters up discouraging Arguments against himself; and catches hold of whatsoever may strengthen his fears and increase his own suspicions of himself; and studiously disputes against whatsoever comforts are offered him. Whatsoever threats he finds in the Word against Hypocrites and Apostates, he is ready to apply to himself: Whatsoever dreadful Examples of God's fierce wrath upon the worst of Sinners he either reads or hears of, he presently puts himself into their place, and conceits their condition to be his. The precious promises of God, and the former experience he hath had of God's goodness to him, all are now turned into matter of terror and torment. The presence of God is a trouble to him, as 
Job 23. 15  Job says; and the remembrance of God terrifies him, as the Psalmist speaks; 
Psal. 88 3. Ib. v. 2.  and his Soul refuseth to be comforted.  
4. Satan, by God's permission, taking advantage of such a gloomy season, endeavours, by his horrid suggestions, to heighten the tempest that is already raised in the heart of a Christian, as violent winds increase the storms in a raging Sea. It is the main design of that devouring Adversary to destroy utterly. In order to which, as he labours to encourage careless Sinners in their security and presumption, so on the contrary he endeavours with all his might to drive distressed Souls into utter desperation. And though he attain not the utmost of his aims, yet thus much he usually accomplisheth, to exasperate the present trouble, and increase the disquietment by his bold and violent injections. This is sufficiently intimated to us by the Apostles discourse concerning the incestuous Corinthian, who had been cast out of Church-Communion; whom he persuades 
2 Cor. 6. 7.  them to receive and comfort, lest he should be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow; adding afterward, how ready himself was to forgive him, lest 
Ib. v. 10. 11  Satan should take advantage, etc. Whence we may gather, that this is one of Satan's devices to tread down such as he finds already cast down with sorrow, and to lay on more load, where he sees the burdened Soul now ready to sink.  
5. In such a condition as this, till God himself be pleased to let in some beam of light into the disconsolate Heart, no succour from the Creature, how excellent soever, can give any relief. The wound is in the Soul and Spirit, which none can come at to bind up and heal, but the Father of Spirits, and the God of all consolation. If he 
Job ●23  hide his face, saith Elihu, who then can behold him? As it is he who had the chief hand in giving the wound, so it is he alone that can work the cure.  
Now what is there in all this, that is any way inconsistent with the grounds of Religion, or principles of sober Reason? Is not the guilt of sin, and the wrath of God to be trembled at? And is not sinful Man capable of feeling the bitterness hereof? Nay, doth it not stand him greatly in hand to be affected with them? Are these nothing but the reeks and vapours of melancholy overwhelming the fancy, and filling it full▪ of fears and dreadful apprehensions? This indeed would be very grateful to the Mad Crew; who will readily gather from hence, that whensoever Conscience gives them any close stinging gripes for their wickedness, (as I doubt not but it doth sometimes) it is but making themselves believe that this is nothing else but a Melancholic Qualm; and then they will soon conclude, that the best way to be rid of such an unpleasing Guest, is to run to a Tavern or a Playhouse, to drink or sport away these Fanatic Vapours, and Superstitious Fears, that break People of their ease, and are Enemies to the peace of Mankind. And such Mountebank-Medicines may possibly for a while skin over the sore, and smother the checks of Conscience, by casting the careless Sinner into a Frolick-Fit: But whenever God comes thoroughly to grapple with the guilty Soul, and set his sins in order before him, casting Fire-Balls of wrath and horror into his Conscience, the Poor Wretch will find that these Anodynes will prove but miserable Comforters, and that it is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of 
Heb. 10. 31  the living God.  
But what do we think of the Scripture-instances given before, Job, David, Heman▪ What of the lamentable state of Fr. Spira, besides other Examples, not a few, of later years? What, were they nothing but Melancholic Fancies, that drew from those distressed Souls such bitter complaints, and dreadful outcries? When the last-mentioned Person fell into that woeful Agony, his Friends supposing that Melancholy, 
The Relation before cited, p. 49, etc.  overshadowing his judgement, might be the cause of his trouble, conveyed him to Milan, a noted University in Italy, and had the advice of three eminent Physicians; who, after due examination, and mature consideration of things, returned this Verdict, That they could not discern that his Body was afflicted with any dangerous Distemper originally from itself by the predominancy of any humour: but that extreme grief oppressing the Spirits, stirred up ill humours in the Body, and thereby discomposed him. And when they had endeavoured, by Physic, to consume those humours, or at least to divert the course of them from the Brain; but all without the desired success; Spira nothing it, thus bespeaks them; Alas, Poor Men, how 
Ib. p. 52.  far wide are you? do you think that this Disease is to be cured by Potions? Believe me, there must be another manner of Medicine; it's neither Plasters, nor Drugs that can help a fainting Soul cast down with the sense of sin and the wrath of God. It's only Christ that must be the Physician, and the Gospel the sole Antidote. The Physicians, says the Relator, easily believed him, having understood the whole truth of the matter, and therefore wished him to seek some spiritual comfort.  
I grant indeed, that Melancholy, where it is predominant, gives great advantage to the increase of sadness, and the multiplying of perplexing fears: and when Conscience is awakened, its fears and disquietments may be heightened by Imagination, and this set on work by small accidents, as the sound of a Knell, or the rattling of Thunder, or some frightful sight. But still the first and principal cause of the distress is something really formidable to a sober and sedate Mind. And if any should judge otherwise, I think, I may without any imputation of rashness or uncharitableness, suspect them to doubt whether Vindictive Justice, and the Everlasting Pains of Hell, be a reality. And if any should be of that. mind, let them, if they think good, solace themselves with such dreams, till experience resolve the question.  
Come we in the next place, to speak 
Sect. 3.  something of the joys that are begotten in a Christians heart by the discovery of God's love to him. Touching this, thus much we find;  
1. That the love of God is shed abroad 
Rom. 5. 5.  in the hearts of Christians by the Spirit of God. And that the same Holy Spirit witnesseth with their spirits that they 
Rom. 8. 16, 17.  are the Children of God, and Heirs of Glory. Where the Apostle speaks of a twofold witness of our Adoption. 1. The Spirit of God witnesseth this, partly by begetting that Grace in the heart that is the peculiar Character of 
Tit. 3. 5. 2 Thes. 2. 13. Eph. 4. 30.  a Child of God, (in which respect he is said to seal Believers to the day of Redemption; viz. by stamping the holy image of God upon them) partly by enabling them to discern this work, and see this seal stamped upon them. 
1 Cor 2. 12  2. The regenerate Conscience, enabled and assisted by God's Spirit to see this, doth thence infer a Christians Sonship.  
2. Where this is wrought, it serves to fill the heart with exceeding joy above what the greatest earthly comfort can beget. Witness that of the Psalmist; There be many that say, Who 
Psal. 4. 6, 7.  will show us any good? Lord, lift thou up the light of thy Countenance upon us. Thou hast put gladness in my heart, more than in the time that their Corn and their Wine increased. And that of the Apostle, who speaking of Christ, says; Whom having not seen, ye love; in whom 
1 Pet. 1. 8.  though now ye see him not, yet believing, ye rejoice with joy unspeakable and full of glory. The testimony that Conscience 
2 Cor. 1. 12.  gives to a Christian of his Integrity, is (as St. Paul tells us) matter of much joy. But there are who conceive, that besides this, there are sometimes afforded some more immediate refreshments from the Holy Spirit. And of this mind is a learned Author, in a Treatise published some few years ago, where he thus speaks: The Feast of a good Conscience 
Causes of the Decay of Christian Piety, Chap. 1.  is the true Christians daily diet; and sure, whatever the rich men of the World think, he only can be said to far deliciously. Nay, he hath yet more supernatural food, Manna reigned down immediately from Heaven, the Holy Spirit sent on purpose to refresh and support him; those Joys which differ rather in degree than kind from those which are to be his final portion.  
3. Hence are Christians enabled to pass cheerfully through the sharpest trials and sorest afflictions that can befall them in this their mournful pilgrimage. We rejoice, saith the Apostle, 
Rom. 5. 2, 3  in hope of the glory of God. And not only so, but we glory in tribulation also. And the Hebrews took joyfully the spoiling 
Heb. 10. 34.  of their goods, knowing in themselves that they had in Heaven a better and an enduring substance.  
4. Where these Joys are in their full tide, they carry the Christian triumphantly through the bitterest pangs of death: of which there are numerous examples in all Ages of the Church.  
These comforts are not afforded to all in like measure, nor to any always at the same height. It seems good to the Wisdom of God so to dispense them, as that those who have the largest portion, shall know that there is a wide difference between Earth and Heaven; and that they are yet but Pilgrims, and in their wilderness-state, though he sometimes gives them for their encouragement a Pisgah-sight of that Heavenly Canaan, towards which they are passing.  
But what! must all the forementioned joys and refreshing comforts that the Holy Scripture speaks of, and the experience of the Saints bears witness to, be counted no better than a juggle or a cheat? the transport of frantic raptures, or the mere illusion of an Enthusiastic fancy, refreshed with brisk and active spirits, and filled with warm and sprightly imaginations? Was it such an imaginary comfort that David prayed for, when he says, Make me to 
Psal. 51. 8.  hear joy and gladness, that the bones which thou hast broken may rejoice. And again, Restore to me the joy of thy Salvation. 
Ib. v. 12.  And when the Psalmist says, In the multitude of my thoughts within 
Psa. 94. 19  me, thy comforts delight my Soul. And again, To the upright there ariseth light 
Psa. 112. 4.  in the darkness. Is this nothing but the raising of the Blood, and the breaking out of the natural spirits from the oppression of melancholic fumes, and refreshing the drooping fancy? When the Apostle professeth, that he was filled with comfort, and exceeding joyful in all his tribulations: Was this nothing but 
2 Cor. 7. 4.  the effect of a Sanguine Complexion, or the product of pleasing Phantasms? Did this make Paul and Silas sing in their chains? or was it this that cheered the hearts of those Blessed Martyrs, who with so much joy and triumph embraced the Stake, and clapped their half-consumed hands in the midst of the flames? To say nothing of the many instances that might be given, both in elder and later times, of Persons, eminent for Wisdom and Holiness, who, in languishing sicknesses, when their Bodies have been so wasted, and their strength so impaired, that they could not stir to feed or help themselves, (the whole frame of nature being broken by cruciating and consuming pains) yet have then felt those inward Joys in their Souls which they could not siother; but as Men that stood upon the threshold of Glory, and had a ravishing sight and sense of the unconceivable pleasures of that other World, have, with that vigour and alacrity (and yet with judgement and prudence) poured out Praises and Thanksgivings to their Gracious Redeemer, that it hath at once delighted and astonished the hearts of their intelligent Friends that came to visit them.  
I cannot think it possible that the truth of these things should be questioned 
Sect. 4.  by any that do indeed believe the Scriptures, and have felt the power of the Word upon their hearts. But there is a Scoptick Generation of Men, whose minds are so tinctured with a profane gaiety, that the whole Bible is become to them no better than a Playbook or a Romance, upon which they love to exercise their drolling Wits, by putting the Doctrines and Discourses of the Prophets and Apostles into a ridiculous dress, the better to expose them to the scorn of Infidels; as if they read that sacred Volume to no other purpose, than (as a late Author speaks of some) 
Gentleman's Calling, Sect. 6.  to enable them to blaspheme God in his own stile.  
I have indeed oft wondered what should betray any to this fond and irrational conceit of resolving the Agonies of distressed Consciences, and the contrary Joys of serious Christians under assurance, into the different temperature of their Bodies, and the suitable workings of their Fancy; till I met with a piece of new Divinity in a late Belgic Tractator, and then I began to suspect out of what Chimney came all this smoke. For this account doth that Gentleman give us of the Holy Prophets mentioned in Scripture: That their Revelations proceeded from the 
Tractat. Theologico. Polit. cap. 2.  strength and height of Imagination, and were diversified according to the different temper and constitution of their Bodies, which caused different workings in their fancy. Hence, he says, those Prophets that were of cheerful and debonair complexion, prophesied altogether of Peace and Prosperity, Victory over Enemies, and all things to men's hearts content, these being such things as best suited with their Imaginations. On the other side, those Prophets that were sad and melancholic, or of angry and morose tempers, they altogether prophesied of War and Bloodshed, Desolation and Destruction, these being such things, as their drooping and dejected Fancy did most run upon. Accordingly he tells us, that whatsoever Revelations the Prophets received, they did not at all better or advance their Understandings, or beget in them any solid knowledge: They were good honest Men indeed, but none of the wisest: for Men of note, for Wisdom, never were Prophets; that being a work that belonged to the Imagination, and not to the Judgement. In the same Chapter he undertakes to give us a reason why Josiah, when he had heard the Book of the Law read in his ears, and was thereby made apprehensive of some impendent calamity; would not send to the Prophet Jeremy, (though then living) because (forsooth) he was a Melancholic Man, and one, who, by his many sufferings and hard usage, 
* Let the Reader take notice of this Tractators foul mistake: for where do we find that the Prophet Jeremy met with any such hard usage till after Josiah's death?  was grown weary of his life, and therefore was not likely to prophesy any good. But he chose to send rather to the Prophetess Huldah, who being a Woman, and so [it seems, according to the softness of that Sex] more inclined to tenderness and compassion, was a fitter instrument for God to reveal his Mercy by. This is a piece of that Author's Political Atheology. And truly I know no kind of Divinity (if we may call any such thing by that name) from which this conceit, that we have under consideration, can more fairly be thought to derive its original. But if we must look any higher for its pedigree, I cannot tell whom to father it upon, (next to the Father of Lies) unless it be that Arabian Philosopher of great note for 
Avicenna.  Learning, who is said to ascribe the Miracles wrought by the Primitive Christians to the power of an exalted Imagination; by virtue of which, he says, they had entertained a strong conceit of the Deity of their Master: and this fancy (in his apprehension) was that which wrought such Wonders in Christ's Name. Whether that which heightened this Pagans confidence to so bold and absurd an assertion, were any extraordinary skill he had in the Anatomy of the Brain, or the Laws of Mechanism, I know not. But whatever grounds he might be supposed to have, I think none that heartily owns the Christian Name, will ascribe such a ridiculous persuasion to the depth of his Philosophy, but to the height of his Infidelity.   

CHAP. III.  
1. Regular Zeal in the Duties of Religion justified: 2. And vindicated from the charge of Enthusiasm; 3. Madness; 4. Dissimulation, and placing the whole of Religion in such fervors; 5. And of aiming at ill ends.  
I Come now in the last place, to speak something of the prejudices taken 
Sect. 1.  at those fervors that appear in some in the Exercises of Religion, breaking forth in earnest and pathetical Expressions, whether in bewailing of Sin, o● petitioning for Mercy, or Thanksgiving for Blessings received, or dispensing the Word of Reconciliation to the People. This is sharply censured by the aforesaid Author Lud. Wolzogen, as savouring of Enthusiasm, or bordering upon Frenzy, and cunningly designed for the driving on of some ambitious ends.  
To this I Reply, We are commanded to be fervent in spirit, serving the 
Rom. 12. 11. Eccl. 9 10.  Lord: and that whatsoever our hand findeth to do, we should do it with our might. The Psalmist says, I cried with 
Psal. 119. 145.  my whole heart. And even that Heathen Prince, to whose Royal City the Prophet Jonah was sent with a threatening message, requires his Subjects to cry mightily unto God. The Apostle 
Jon. 3. 8.  says, It is good to be zealously affected 
Gal. 4. 18.  always in a good thing. And is there any thing so good, as that it can better challenge the height and heat of our affections and endeavours than Religion, in the services whereof we have so immediately to do with God, who calls for the heart, and hath declared his abhorring of a dull, lukewarm 
Rev. 3. 15, 16.  temper? I grant, that it is too possible for Zeal to have its excesses and irregularities: And among the rest, there is an indiscreet Zeal sometimes appearing in some well-meaning Persons, that wants the conduct of a well-ordered Judgement: which as I take to be much more pardonable than a careless or profane indifferency; so I conceive it may have ministered some occasion to those vile reproaches that are cast upon all that are seriously and heartily Religious.  
But that fervour of spirit that I undertake for, and assert to be not only justifiable, but commendable in the Duties of Religion, is that which is raised by a right apprehension of the Object about which it is conversant, guided by a composed understanding, and attended with an humble awful Reverence becoming sinful dust in its appearance before the Great and Holy God.  
Should not Sinners in their addresses to the Most High, have their hearts deeply touched with sorrow for the sins that they apprehend themselves, or others for whom they are concerned, to be guilty of, or liable to? Doth it become an Offender, that is to beg his Pardon, to do it in a stupid manner, as if he had no more sense of his fault than a Stone or a Brute? And what incongruity is it for us in our Petitions for Mercy, to have our desires raised to the highest pitch that we can reach? Is the pardoning and purifying Grace of Christ of so little worth or use to us, as they need be but coldly or carelessly asked, as if our words freezed between our lips, or as if we did not greatly pass whether we were heard or no? Or can we expect that God should hear those Petitions, which we ourselves scarce feel when they go from us? Did ever any Malefactor plead at the Bar for his Life, or an hunger-starved Beggar crave an Alms at the door, after this dull and sleepy rate? And when we are blessing God for his Benefits, should we not, with the Psalmist, call upon 
Psal. 103.  all our powers to praise him? And should not those, whose work it is to dispense the Word of Life, deliver their Message in such a manner, as that their Hearers may discern they are in good earnest, and that the Word spoken to them is that whereon their Eternal Life or Death depends? Is it not requisite that the Servants of Christ should, in this work, be (as is recorded for the honour of Apollo's) fervent in spirit? 
Act. 〈◊〉▪  especially considering the quality of most Hearers, who are so hardly raised to a due point of zeal and fervency, that (as Mr. George Herbert speaks) they need a Mountain of Fire to kindle them. 
Priest to the Temple, Chap. 7.  The said worthy Author adviseth Preachers to make choice of moving and ravishing Texts: and to dip and season all their Words and Sentences in their Hearts before they come into their Mouths, truly affecting, and cordially expressing all that they say, so that the Auditors may plainly perceive that every word is heart-deep: with other passages of like import. In short, what cause of blame is it for any in the exercises of Devotion, whether public or private, to endeavour what they can to have their own and others hearts affected in some measure suitable to the work in hand, and to have their expressions in some due proportion answerable to the affections of their hearts? This is all I plead for; and the utmost (as far as I know) that can be charged upon the Generality of the Persons accused. What some particular here and there may be guilty of, I am not concerned to vindicate. That there are many follies and extravagancies in some of all Persuasions, he must be a great Stranger in the World that knows not; and miserably enslaved to the Interest of a Party, that confesseth not. But the Lord knows we have all more cause to blame ourselves for our coldness and remissness, than others can have to blame us for too much fervour. I heartily wish, that both they and we were all more thoroughly Baptised with this Fire.  
But let us a little examine the pretensions 
Sect. 2. Object. 1.  of our Accusers. As for the charge of Enthusiasm, which some make use of to asperse what they dislike in Religion: 
* Sol. Vox per se bona, vitio hominum est i●famata: est enim sanctus Enthusiasmus, de quo Hesychius. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, M. Martinius in Lexic. Philolog.  The Word (saith a late Learned Author) is of itself good, but fallen into discredit by the vice of Men; for there is an holy Enthusiasm; when the Soul is wholly irradiated or enlightened of God. But taking it in the worst sense, as it is by these Objectors, I may say of it, as Mr. ●iales of Eton once said of the words Schism and Heresy, that it is made a Theological Scarecrow. For it being inconsistent with some men's Principles to acknowledge any efficacious supernatural Operations of the Spirit of Grace upon the heart of Man, and as contrary to their disposition and practice to be seriously fervent in Religion, it becomes their Interest, to brand whatsoever lies out of their road with the opprobrious name of Enthusiasm; that is, (as they sometimes explain it) a pretence of being acted by the Holy Spirit, or a false conceit of Inspiration.  
What the Sect of Enthusiasts was, appears sufficiently by the testimony of those Learned Men who have written against them both in former and later times. From whom we have this account; That those who were censured and condemned by the Church of Christ under that Notion, were such as slighted, if not rejected, the Scriptures as a dead Letter, a lame and imperfect Guide, insufficient to be the Rule of Faith or Practice; in room whereof they professed to be acted by Immediate Revelations, which they called the Internal and Spiritual Word, teaching them higher Wisdom than any contained in the Scriptures. And whatsoever was strongly suggested to them, or made any vehement impression upon their minds, as that which they thought they should believe or do, they embraced it as a Divine Inspiration, and Magisterially imposed it upon others, were it never so inconsistent with, or opposite to the Doctrine of the Holy Scriptures, or the Dictates of sound and sober Reason. And being by this means laid open to Satanical Delusions, they were easily drawn to believe the grossest absurdities, and some of them to practise the vilest wickednesses, contrary to common Honesty and the Public Peace, justifying all by their pretended Revelations. This is the Character we have of Enthusiasts, both Ancient and Modern, from Authors of unquestionable credit. And if there be any where in this World any of the remainders of that Sect, (as it's probable enough there are) that entertain such wild and frantic Conceptions, let them bear their sin and shame. But of this I am sure, that the Persons thus charged by Wolzogen and his Complices, can safely appeal to all unprejudiced Persons that know them, and to the most Wise and Holy God, who is greater than all, that they are as clear from any compliance with that Infatuated Generation, as the best of their Accusers. For,  
1. They heartily own and submit to the Holy Scriptures, as the only sure and sufficient Rule of Faith and Life. Accordingly whatsoever Conceptions may rise within them, or be suggested to them in matters of Religion, they bring them to the Bar of Scripture, to stand or fall according to its Judgement, not imposing their Sentiments upon the Scripture, but receiving the sense of Scripture from the Scripture itself; according to what hath been asserted in the precedent Discourse.  
2. In matters difficult and obscure, that are more darkly laid down in Scripture, (especially in the Prophetic parts of it) they forbear to determine peremptorily, choosing rather to satisfy themselves with a modest hesitancy, and abhorring to make their Judgements the measure of another's Faith, or superciliously to censure or despise any for their different apprehensions.  
3. They plead for no other Spirit of Revelation, than what the Apostle prays for in behalf of the Ephesians, Chap. 1. Vers. 17, 18, 19 which Revelation consists not in discovering any New Object to be received, unrevealed in Scripture: but only in qualifying the Subject by curing the native and acquired blindness and carnality of our minds, that we may rightly understand and embrace the Truths which the Scripture propounds.  
4. They solemnly profess and declare to all the World, that whatsoever they are taught by the Holy Spirit, as it is by and from the Scripture, so it is in the regular exercise of their rational Faculties; and such as they are ●eady at all times to give an account of from Scripture-grounds to any sober intelligent Person that shall demand it. They therefore disown and reject the absurd Principles and arrogant Presumptions of the falsly-called Mystical Theology, (set on foo● anciently, and revived in later years) that pretends to Ecstatick Raptures and Deifications of the Soul, by an utter cessation of all Intellectual Operations. The Original of which Fantastic Theology, Dr. Meric Casaubon derives from 
Treatise concerning Enthusiasm, Ch. 3.  the Heathen Philosophers; intimating withal, the great Affinity between this and the New Method so much cried up of late: Which those whom it concerns, may consider of at their leisure.  
In the mean time I take that for granted, which hath been (agreeably to plain and evident Scripture) the acknowledged Doctrine of the Catholic Church, however denied and derided by some late Innovators; That the Holy Spirit of God is (according to Christ's own promise) given to dwell 
Joh. 14. 20 Ch. 15. 26. 1 Jo. 3. last. Rom. 8. 9, 14. Ps. 143. 10 Eph. 3. 16. Rom. 8. 15 & V. 26. 27 Chap. 5. 5. 2 Cor. 3. 18 Eph. 5. 18, 19, 20. Ezek. 36. 26, 27.  in the Hearts of Christians, to beget and preserve spiritual life in them, to conduct them in their way, to strengthen them with might in the Inner Man, to shed abroad the love of God in their Hearts, and witness their adoption, to assist them in holy services, and gradually to perfect the work of Sanctification in them. To spend many words in proving this, which is already so clear to all unbyass'd Judgements, were to to light a Candle before the Sun. As for that ridiculous sense that some have endeavoured to fasten upon these, or some of these Scriptures, as if they were to be understood only of the Spirit as given to the Church in common, and not to particular Christians, it is so utterly inconsistent with the scope of those respective places, and runs so contrary to the whole stream of Scripture and all Antiquity, that I think it needless to waste time in refuting it. He that will but considerately read over the several places, and faithfully examine the Context, may easily see the vanity of it. That of the Learned Grotius is clear and full, Not only 
Non tantùm ●ota fideli●… collectio, ●e● & fideles s●●gu●● recte appel●antur ●●mplum, q●ia in i●sorum men●ib●s▪ 〈◊〉 Spir●●us▪ 〈◊〉 Dei habitat, ●rot. A●not. a● Eph. 2. 22.  the whole Collective Body of the Faithful, but also particular Believers are rightly called the Temple [of the Holy Ghost] because the Spirit of God dwelleth in their Minds. And if those who are careful (according to the Apostles counsel) not to quench the Spirit, but to stir up the Grace of God in them, have their hearts more warmed and enlarged in holy Duties, than others, who either want that measure of Gifts, or are defective in improving them, I cannot conjecture why this should be made a matter of reproach, but that some Men are angry at every thing that is not just of their own size, or not suitable to their gust; and therefore are resolved to revile and calumniate it, though by those wounds the heart and life of Religion be found to lie a bleeding.  
To shut up this, I might here mind the Objector, and those of his way, how much it concerns them to acquit themselves of that Enthusiasm which they impeach others for. It's known to be one of the first Principles of that Grand Enthusiast Valentius Weigelius; 
V. Commentarium Jo. Hoornbeck de paradoxy & heterodoxis Weigelianis.  That he who would know the truth, must forget whatsoever he hath learned from Men and Books, and lay it all aside, as if he had never been acquainted with any thing, and retreat into himself, and fetch all his knowledge from thence. Let 
Cartes. diss. de Methodo, & de Principii● Philosophic.  this be referred to our Author's Consideration, wherein this differs from the great Principle of his admired Master.  
But let us hear what is further Objected, to justify these Mens prejudices.  
Secondly, It is said by some, These 
Sect. 3. Object. 2.  heats are but the Frantic Freaks of a Crazed Brain, and the product of a Religious Frenzy.  
I answer: 1. We need not be much moved with this senseless charge, when 
Sol. 1.  we find the Penmen of Sacred Writ to have little better measure made them by the same hand. For of them we are told, that they wrote many times they knew not what, and gave forth Oracles, 
Lud. Wolz. de Script. Int. p. 1▪ 6.  when they were beside themselves: (his word is alienata ment:) which was one of the vile Positions of the Montanisis and Cataphrygians 
a V. Riveti ●●●gog. ad S. Scr. c. 2. Sect. 5 ubi ●uper hac r● citat. Hieronym. pro. in Esaiam. , rejected and condemned both by Ancient and Modern Divines. And yet to justify this Assertion, our Author 
b C●n●●ra Ce●sura, p. 131, 132  gravely citys Cicero de Divinatione, calling the Raptures of their Pagan Vates by the Name of Furor; and Virgil calling Sibylla a Mad Prophetess: and Justin the Historian, Lib. 24. where speaking of the much-famed Oracle at Delphos, he tells us of a very deep Cave in the Mount Parnassus, near Apollo's Temple, out of which proceeded a cool Air, which being driven upward by a certain Wind, did turn the minds of the Prophets into Madness; who being thus inspired, were forced to give Responses to those who came to consult with the Oracle.  
Wolzogen is much briefer in citing this of Justin, for he says no more out of him but this, That the minds of the Prophets were turned into madness, when they were filled with God. But I have related it something more largely out of the Author himself, that the Reader may the better understand the Historians meaning. And is it not a goodly piece of service, and greatly for the honour of Religion, that a Christian Writer should compare the temper of the Lords Prophets, speaking by Inspiration from Heaven, to the Fanatic Fury of those Diabolical Prophets, that were evidently acted by a blast from Hell? He that hath so little Reverence for those Worthies, who were infallibly assisted in what they preached and wrote, as to speak thus reproachfully of them, no wonder if he trample upon the Servants of the same Lord now. But what do I speak of the dishonour done to the Servants of God by a Man, that speaks so irreverently of God himself and his Holy Word in many passages throughout his Book? as is obvious enough to the view of every unbyass'd Reader.  
2. Let it be considered, what colour there can be for this Imputation, 
2.  when the Persons thus charged are known to be sober and considerate, and in all their discourses and affairs as rational as other Men, and as composed every way as any of those who thus traduce them. As therefore when some said blasphemously of our blessed Saviour, He hath a Devil, and is mad, 
Joh. 10. 20, 21.  why hear ye him? Others made answer, These are not the words of him that hath a Devil. As if they had said, Men possessed or mad do not speak after this rate, or carry themselves after this manner. So may I say of those who are now reproached for Madmen by a Generation of the same profane temper; Examine the behaviour of those who are thus calumniated, observe their grave deportment, their serious discourse, their circumspect carriage, their prudent conduct of affairs; and let sober Reason judge whether these be the effects of Madness.  
Tush, may some say, this is nothing. 
Exception.  Men may have a partial or particular madness, that takes them in some things, while they remain sober in others. They may be very sedate and composed in their other affairs, and yet in matters of Religion they may be quite beside themselves.  
For a Reply to this: 1. Be it so; 
Rep 〈◊〉  then perhaps the Objectors may be as much concerned in this as any others, and the charge may be retorted upon themselves; though they speak and act like Men of Reason in other things, yet it seems in matters of Religion they may be mad. Ipsi viderint. Let themselves look to it. The Prophet Jeremy 
Jer. 50. 38.  saith of the Babylonians, that they were Mad upon their Idols. And I have heard many years ago, that Doctor Holdsworth, than Vicechancellor of Cambridge, did, in his Speech at the Public Commencement, complain of some in his time that were ad insaniam usque superstitiosi, superstitious unto madness.  
But, 2. We will not let it go thus. The Persons we are speaking of, and 
2.  pleading for, are such as can and do give as intelligent an account (whensoever required) as any other, of what they profess and practise in matters of Religion, from the unerring Word of Truth. This they plead for; to this they appeal; by the Precepts of this they live; and in the hopes of what is there promised, through the Grace of Christ, they resolve to die. And if this be the Cognisance and Character of Madmen, then let us henceforth look for Sober Persons no where but in Taverns, Playhouses, and Bedlams, and reckon all other for Mad.  
3. Many instances might be given 
3.  of those, who while, in the days of their vanity, they were strangers to the power and life of Godliness, had the same contemptible apprehensions of these things, and have, with a kind of disdain, wondered what those persons ailed, whom they perceived to be zealously affected in matters of Religion above the common rate. But after they came to feel the persuasive efficacy of that Regenerating Grace, which some are bold to deride, changing their hearts, they have seen things with other eyes, and with indignation wondered at themselves, that they should be so slight and stupid in matters of so infinite concernment. I doubt not but St. Paul, while he was a persecuting Pharisee, wondered at the Christians, as a company of Madmen, for what they professed and did: But afterward, when his eyes were opened to see his error, he counted himself no better than Mad for what he had formerly done against them. 
Act. ●6. 11   
To which I may add, in the last 
4.  place, That many of those, who, in the days of their health and jollity, have derided the persons we speak of, for a company of silly, distracted Fools; when a Deathbed hath awakened their Conscience, and brought them to a more sober use of their Reason, and a more serious view of Eternity, have then changed their minds, and heartily wished themselves of the number of those whom they have formerly reproached, and would be glad to have some of their Oil to put into their own dying Lamps, before they were to engage in their last conflict, and pass from hence into another World. But however, the time is hastening, when these Calumniators will be sufficiently convinced of their folly, and take their own reproaches home to themselves; when that shall be fulfilled that the Author of the Book of Wisdom tells us; That the Righteous Man shall 
Wisd. 5. 1, to 6.  stand with great boldness before the face of such as have afflicted him, and made no account of his labours. When they see it, they shall be troubled with terrible fear, and shall be amazed at the strangeness of his Salvation, so far beyond all that they looked for. And they resenting and groaning for anguish of spirit, shall say within themselves, This was he whom we had sometimes in derision, and a proverb of reproach: We Fools counted his life madness, and his end to be without honour: How is he numbered with the Children of God, and his lot is among the Saints!  
But, may some say, there have 
Sect. 4. Object. 3.  been many Pretenders to the Spirit, both in former and latter Ages, who have abused the World.  
1. Very true; and what will you 
Sol. 1.  conclude from thence? There likewise have been, and are, many Pretenders to Learning and Honesty, who, by their cunning slights and artifices have deceived many. Is this any prejudice to Learning and Honesty where they indeed are? Or must we resolve that these are no where to be found, because of such false Pretenders? Is this to argue like Men of Reason?  
2. The Apostle tells us, That the 
2. 2 Cor. 3. 13, 14, 15.  Devil transforms himself into an Angel of Light, and teaches his Ministers the like art of Imposture. It is one of his grand methods of deceit, to imitate in and by his Servants, the operations of the Holy Spirit of Christ, that he may thereby cheat the World, and bring the true workings of the Spirit of God into suspicion and disgrace: As in former times he made use of Apollonius Thyanaeus, and others, to do strange wonders, the better to discredit the true Miracles of Christ and his Apostles.  
But, 3. Without further debate, let 
3.  men's fruits evidence by what Spirit they are acted. If Men be proud, boasters, self-admirers, scoffers at Holiness, fierce, unpeaceable, implacable, haters of those that are good, greedy Prosecutors of this present World, etc. These, and such like, we are sure, are not led by the Spirit of Christ, but captivated by that unclean Spirit, that works effectually in the Children of disobedience. But if I see in any the evident fruits of the Spirit of God in humility, love, meekness, self-denial, crucifixion to the World, and an heavenly conversation; I should be as loath to charge such with false pretences, as I would be to fall under their coudemnation, who call good evil, and evil good.  
But perhaps it will be further said, That men's fervour and fluency in 
Object. 4.  exercises of Devotion, are made the heights of Godliness, and mightily cried up as if they were the whole of Religion.  
I answer; It is past all doubt that there are, among Persons of all Persuasions, 
Sol.  some self-deceived Hypocrites, who place the All of Religion in Externals. Thus many among the Papists place their Religion in saying over so many Prayers, (though in a Language that they understand not) in going on Pilgrimage to the Image of this or that Saint, in using certain Rites prescribed them by their Guides, and performing the Penances enjoined them, and other such like outward Observances. And I doubt not but amongst Protestants there are too many (of several Persuasions) that place their Religion in being for this or that particular way of Worship, different from others, and in the practice of those things, which are (at the best) but subservient means, instrumentally conducing to express or excite the inward Devotion of the Heart, wherein the life of Religion consists. But as they who thus do are in a miserable mistake; so who they are that do so, falls not under the cognisance of any Mortal, unless they discover their hypocrisy by their open wickedness. Indeed whoever they be that take up with any (though the most plausible, costly, and laborious) services of Religion, while they indulge themselves in their sin, and walk in contrariety to Christ's Gospel; By the Grace whereof 
Tit. 2. 11, 12.  we are trained up to deny ungodliness and worldly lusts, and to live soberly, righteously, and godly in this present World, (as I fear multitudes do) such are self-condemned Hypocrites. But where there evidently appears a serious care to credit the truth professed by a suitable Conversation, by labouring to walk in all good Conscience towards God and towards Men; to censure such (whatsoever Persuasion they be of) for making any outward Exercises of Devotion, the All, or the Chief of their Religion, is such a piece of uncharitableness, as is enough to nullify any Man's Religion in the World who so judgeth. Would Men be persuaded to dwell more at home, and be better acquainted with searching their own hearts, they would not be so ready to step into God's Throne, and take upon them to censure the hearts of others, which none can have the immediate inspection of, but that Omniscient Spirit, to whom all secrets are open.  
And the like reply might serve to 
Sect. 5. Object. 5.  the last and bitterest part of the charge, viz. That these fervours and fluent 
Wolzog. ●oc. cit.  expressions in the services of Religion, are made use of to drive on some ambitious design, to get a name in the World, that being cried up for Men divinely inspired, they may have the advantage to get power into their hands, and rule all, and so fill the World with Schisms and Seditions.  
We are now come to the bottom of 
Sol.  the Vessel, where we have the dregs of the Adversaries passion. It seems he would parallel those he thus bitterly calumniates with those Demagogues of old, who, by their bewitching Oratory charmed the Hearts of the Vulgar, and thereby accomplished their own ends upon them. For answer to this, I shall say in the general, (as once one said in another case) Grave crimen, mi homo, si verum; aeque gravis calumnia, si falsum. This is indeed a grievous crime, if true; and as grievous a calumny, if false. More particularly, I shall reply these few things.  
1. The best Actions in the World 
1.  are capable of being blacked and blemished by a malevolent Spirit, fastening the vilest ends upon them. Holy Job, as upright as he was, (God himself bearing witness thereto) yet was slandered by the Devil, as aiming at base unworthy ends in all the Service he did for God. And the like hath been the lot of God's most faithful Servants in all Ages. When their Enemies knew not what fault to find with their known and declared Actions, they would either feign some horrid crime to accuse them of, or (more plausibly) make use of this malicious artifice of the great Accuser of the Brethren, to blemish their most innocent practices, as intended for a cunning Engine to carry on some base design; by which means they have endeavoured to raise suspicions of them in the minds of their jealous Governors, and enrage the Rulers of the World against them. Thus, when the Jews, after their return from Captivity, 
Ezra 4. 7. to 17. N●h. 2. 19 c. 6. 5, 6, 7.  were busy in rebuilding the City Jerusalem, in the days of Ezra and Nehemiah, their Adversaries calumniate them for it, as if they intended to rebel against the Sovereign Powers that were over them. Our blessed Saviour and his Apostles were charged with Sedition for Preaching the Gospel. And thus were the Primitive Christians after them, accused by their Pagan Persecutors for their Religious Assemblies, as designed to practise Sedition, and hatch mischief. Many such instances might be given: But all experience doth abundantly witness it, that the wisest, holiest, and most commendable Works that ever were wrought by Men, are liable to be thus perverted by the cunning malice of an embittered Enemy.  
The calumny that we are to encounter, 
2.  is so grossly senseless and irrational, that to any considerate and impartial Eye it overthrows itself. For whosoever he be that designs to insinuate himself into the minds of Men for his own advancement to rule over them, must use such means for the attainment of his ends, as shall best comply with the humour of the multitude, and gratify them in what they best like. But this is evident, that the greatest part of Men every where are at enmity with all seriousness and fervency in Religion, and cry it down, as not suiting with their careless worldly temper. They best relish such a dull kind of outside, heartless Devotion, as may stand with the quiet enjoyment of their lusts, and not disturb their dead and sleepy Consciences: And therefore the less life and vigour there is in those exercises of Religion, wherein they think good to bear a part, the more pleasing they are to them: they dread all other as much as a Child doth the sound of a Trumpet, or the terrible crack of Thunder, as that which amazes and affrights them, and breaks them of their beloved ease. Who is there that looks abroad in the World, and sees not this? And therefore whenever any have hardened themselves into the confidence of casting reproaches upon such as are observed to be most hearty and fervent in the Worship of God, they usually have the Vogue of the profane multitude to side with them; and are by that advantage emboldened more freely to pour out their venom, though sometimes they run so far beyond all bounds of Candour, Modesty and Truth, that they give the deepest wounds to their own reputation in the esteem of those who are sober and ingenuous.  
Did the Persons thus accused take 
3.  to themselves the honour of what good they have or do; or did they endeavour or attempt to gain or exercise any Dominion over the Faith or Consciences of their Brethren, there might be some better colour for this Imputation. But it is evident to all, that they disown all such self-admiring and self-exalting conceits, making themselves Servants to all, in order to the furtherance of their Master's honour, to whom they desire to sacrifice all they have, not seeking their own emolument or advancement, but the profit of many, that they may be saved.  
But it's usual with those, whose Worldly Interest is their Summa Ratio, to measure others by themselves, and to lay that at the doors of those whom they distaste, which they are conscious of in their own hearts, and which every one can discern to be too conspicuous in their lives. I shall conclude this with those words of the Apostle, Judge nothing before the time, till the Lord 
1 Cor. 4. 5.  come, who both will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of the hearts, and then shall every Man have praise of God.   
FINIS.   

Books to be sold by Rob. Boulter, at the Turks-Head in Cornhill, over against the Royal-Exchange.  

FOLIO.  
RUshworth's Collections.  
Baronage of England, in two parts, by William Dugdal Esq  
Hooker's Ecclesiastical Policy.  
Cursellei Opera.  
Bishop Tailor's Cases of Conscience.  
Spiritual Refinings, in two parts, by Anthony Burgess.  
— His 145 Sermons on John 17.  
— His Treatise of Original Sin.  
Curia Politiae, or the Apologies of several Princes, justifying to the World their most eminent Actions by Reason and Policy.  
A Concordance to the Holy Scriptures, with the various Readins both of Text and Margin, by S. N.  
Sixty five Sermons by the Right Reverend Father in God, Ralph Brownrig, late Lord Bishop of Exeter. Published by William Martin, M. A. sometime Preacher at the Rolls, in two Volumes.   

QUARTO.  
An Exposition with Practical Notes and Observations on the five last Chapters of the Book of Job, by Jos. Caryl.  
Husbandry Spiritualised, or the Heavenly use of Earthly things, by J. Flavel.  
A Treatise of the Sabbath, in four parts, by Mr. Dan. Cawdry.  
Vindiciae Legis, or a Vindication of the Law and Covenants from the Errors of Papists, Socinians, and Antinomians, by Anthony Burgess.  
The Saints Everlasting Rest, or a Treatise of the blessed state of the Saints, in their enjoyment of God in Glory, by Richard Baxter.  
— His plain Scripture-proof of Infant-Baptism.  
The saurus medicinae practicae, ex praest●ntissimorum tum Veterum tum Recentiorum Medicorum Observationibus Consultationibus Consiliis & Epistolis, summa diligentia collectus ordineque Alphabetico dispositus, per Tho. Burnet.  
A Treatise of the right use of the Fathers, by John daily.  
Annotations on the Book of Ecclesiastes, by a Reverend Divine.  
The Doctrine of Justification by Faith, by John Owen, D. D.  
Man of Sin, or a Discourse of Popery; wherein the numerous and monstrous Abominations in Doctrine and Practice of the Romish Church are by their own hands exposed to open sight, that the very Blind may see them. By no Roman, but a Reformed Catholic.  
De Origine Moribus & rebus Gestis Scotorum Libri decem. Authore Joanne Les●aeo Episcopo Rossensi.   

Large OCTAVO.  
A Discourse of Growth in Grace, in sundry Sermons; by Samuel Slater, late of St. Katherine's near the Tower.  
The Grounds of Art, teaching the perfect work and practice of Arithmetic, both in whole Numbers and Fractions, by R. Record.  
A Cloud of Witnesses, or the Sufferers Mirror; made up of the Swanlike Songs, and other choice Passages of several Martyrs and Confessors, to the end of the Sixteenth Century, in their Treatises, Speeches and Prayers, by T. M. M. A.  
A Treatise of the Divine Promises, in five Books, by Edw. Leigh Esq  
The unreasonableness of Infidelity, in four parts, by R. Baxter.  
— His Method for getting and keeping Spiritual Peace and Comfort.  
— His safe Religion against Popery.  
Quakerism no Christianity, clearly and abundantly proved out of the Writings of their chief Leaders, with a Key for the understanding their sense of their many usurped and unintelligible words, by John Faldo.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Hesiodi ASCRAEI quae extant, Cum notis Cornelii Scrivelii.  
A Treatise of the Bulk and Selvedge of the World, wherein the Greatness, Littleness, and Lastingness of Bodies, are freely handled, with an Answer to Tentamina de Deo, by N. Fairfax, M. D.  
Small Octavo and Duodecimo.  
A Saint indeed, or the great Work of a Christian opened and pressed from Prov. 4. 23. by J. Flavel.  
Artificial Arithmetic in Decimals, showing the Original, Ground, and Foundation thereof, by R. Jagar.