THEOLOGICAL DISCOURSES; In Two Parts.  
The FIRST containing, VIII LETTERS AND III SERMONS Concerning the Blessed Trinity.  
The SECOND, DISCOURSES & SERMONS on several Occasions.  
By JOHN WALLIS D. D. Professor of Geometry in OXFORD.  
LONDON, Printed for Tho. Parkhurst at the Bible and Three Crowns in Cheapside near Mercer's Chapel, 1695.   

The Doctrine of the Blessed Trinity Briefly Explained. In a Letter to a Friend.  
SIR,  
THE Doctrine of the Arrians, Socinians, or Anti-Trinitarians, (call them as you please, provided you call them not Orthodox Christians) in opposition to those who believe (according to the Word of God), That the Sacred Trinity, of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are so distinguished each from other, as that the Father is not the Son, or Holy-Ghost; the Son not the Father, or Holy-Ghost; the Holy-Ghost not the Father, or Son; yet so United, as that they are all One God; (which, in the Athanasian Creed, is called Trinity in Unity, and Unity in Trinity; or, in common speaking, Three Persons and One God;) is what you were lately discoursing with me, and of which I shall give you some of my present Thoughts.  
The Scripture tells us plainly, There are three that bear record in Heaven; the Father, the Word, and the Holy-Ghost: and these Three are One, 1. Joh. 5.7. And the Form of Baptism (Mat. 28.19.) is, In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy-Ghost.  
And the Christian Church, from the time of Christ and his Apostles downwards hitherto, as well before as since the Council of Nice, have ever held the Divinity of those Three Persons (as they are commonly called;) and that these Three are but One God. And, that they have so held, hath been, by divers, sufficiently proved from the most ancient Christian Writers, which are now exstant. Which, therefore, I take for granted, as sufficiently proved by others, without spending time at present, to prove it a new.  
That these are Three, distinguished each from other, is manifest: And, that this Distinction amongst themselves, is wont to be called Personality. By which word, we mean, that Distinction (what ever it be) whereby they are distinguished each from other, and thence called Three Persons.  
If the word Person do not please, we need not be fond of Words, so the Thing be agreed: Yet is it a good Word, and warranted by Scripture, Heb. 1.3. where the Son is called the express image of his Father's Person: (For so we render the Word Hypostasis, which is there used; and mean by it, what I think to be there meant.) And we have no reason to wave the Word, since we know no better to put in the Place of it.  
If it be asked, what these Personalities or Characteristics are, whereby each Person is distinguished from other; I think we have little more thereof in Scripture, than that the Father is said to Beget; the Son, to be Begotten; and the Holy-Ghost, to Proceed.  
If it be further asked, what is the full import of these Words (which are but Metaphorical), and what is the adequate Meaning of them; I think we need not trouble ourselves about it: For, since it is a matter purely of Revelation (not of natural Knowledge,) and we know no more of it than what is revealed in Scripture; where the Scripture is silent, we may be content to be ignorant. And we who know so little of the Essence of any thing, especially of spiritual Being's, though finite, need not think it strange that we are not able to comprehend all the Particularities of what concerns that of God, and the Blessed Trinity.  
I know that the Fathers, and School men, and some after them, have employed their Wits to find out some faint Resemblances, from natural things, whereby to express their imperfect Conceptions of the Sacred Trinity: But they do not pretend to give an adequate Account of it; but only some conjectural Hypotheses, rather of what May be, than of what certainly Isabella Nor need we be concerned, to be curiously inquisitive into it, beyond what God hath been pleased to reveal concerning it.  
That the Three Persons are distinguished, is evident; (though we do not perfectly understand what those Distinctions are) That to each of. these, the Scripture ascribes Divinity, is abundantly showed by those who have written on this Subject: That there is but One God, is agreed on all hands: That the Father is said to Beget; the Son, to be Begotten; and the Holy-Ghost, to Proceed; is agreed also; though we do not perfectly understand the full import of these Words.  
And here we might quietly acquiesce (without troubling ourselves further,) did not the clamorous Socinians importunely suggest the Impossibility and Inconsistence of these things, insomuch as to tell us, That, how clear soever the Expressions of Scripture be, or can be, to this purpose, they will not believe it, as being inconsistent with natural Reason And therefore, though they do not yet think sit to give us a barefaced Rejection of Scripture; yet they do (and must, they tell us,) put such a forced sense on the words of it (be they never so plain) as to make them signify somewhat else.  
There is, therefore, in this Doctrine of the Trinity, as in that of the Resurrection from the Dead, a double Inquiry: First, whether it be Possible; and then, whether it be True. And these to be argued (in both Cases) from a very different Topick: The one from Natural Reason; the other from Revelation. Yet so, that this latter doth certainly conclude the former, if rightly understood. And though we should not be able to solve all difficulties; yet must we believe the thing, if revealed, unless we will deny the Authority of such Revelation.  
Thus our Saviour, against the Sadducees, who denied the Resurrection, Matth. 22.29. Ye err (saith he) not knowing the Scriptures, nor the Power of God. The Power of God, if rightly understood, was enough (from the Light of Reason) to prove it not impossible: But, whether or no it will be so (which natural Reason could not determine,) was to be argued from Scripture-Revelation.  
In like manner, St. Paul before Agrippa, Act. 26. first argues the Possibility of it; Why should it be thought a thing incredible with you, that God should raise the Dead? ver. 8. For if Agrippa did believe the Creation of the World, (as many even of the Heathen did, from the light of Nature) he could not think it Impossible for that God (who had at first made all things of nothing) to recollect, out of its Dust or Ashes, a Body which once had been. But whether or no he would do so, depended upon another Question, to be after asked, ver. 27. King Agrippa, believest thou the Prophets? For this was purely matter of Revelation, and could not otherwise be known: For, as to the Immortality of the Soul, and a future state hereafter, many of the Heathens went very far, by the Light of Nature; but as to the Resurrection of the Body, I do not find they had any Sentiments about it (or but very faint, if any:) And if they had, it may well be supposed to be the remainder of some ancient Tradition from the Jews, or their Predecessors. Nor do I see any foundation in Nature, which should make them think of it (before it was revealed) any more, than of the Redemption of Mankind by Christ, (which we should never have thought of, had not God himself contrived and declared it to us.) But, when that of the Resurrection was once suggested, there was no pretence of Reason to think it a thing Impossible, and therefore no reason to doubt the Truth of it, when Declared, if we believe the Scriptures, wherein it is revealed; especially those of the New Testament.  
It is much the same as to the Doctrine of the Trinity. It is a thing we should not have thought of, if it had not been suggested by Divine Writers; but, when suggested, there is nothing in natural Reason (that we know of, or can know of) why it should be thought Impossible; but whether or no it be so, depends only upon Revelation.  
And in this case the Revelation seems so clear (to those who believe the Scriptures) that we have no reason to doubt of it, unless the thing be found to be really Impossible, and inconsistent with Reason. Nor do the Anti-Trinitarians insist on any other ground why they deny it, save only, That it seems to them absolutely Impossible; and therefore think themselves bound to put another sense on all places of Scripture (how clear soever they be, or can be) which prove or favour it.  
So that the Controversy is now reduced to this single Point, Whether it be Possible or not Possible: Whether it be consistent or inconsistent with Natural Light or Reason. (And to that point therefore I shall confine my discourse.) For it seems agreed on all hands (as to those who believe the Scriptures) that, if it be not Impossible, it is sufficiently revealed.  
Now for us who understand so little of God's infinite Essence, and which it is impossible for us fully to comprehend, who are ourselves but finite, and mostly conversant with material Objects; in so much that we cannot pretend to understand the Essence of our own Souls; and, when we attempt to explain it, must do it rather by saying what it is not, than what it is; (so hard a matter is it for us to six in our Mind or Fancy, a Notion, Idea, or Conception of a spiritual being, which falls not under our Senses:) 'Tis hard, I say, for us (who understand so little of a Spirit) to determine (of what God is pleased to reveal) that it is Impossible, or inconsistent with his Essence, which Essence we cannot understand.  
But what is it that is thus pretended to be Impossible? 'Tis but this, That there be Three Somewhats, which are but One God: (and these Somewhats we commonly call Persons.) Now what Inconsistence is there in all this? That Father, Son, and Holy-Ghost are Three, is manifest; and are in Scripture-Language distinguished. That there is but One God is manifest also, and all those Three are this God: That the name Person is no incongruous Word, is evident from Heb. 1.3. where it is used. If it be said, It doth not agree to them exactly in the same sense in which it is commonly used amongst men; we say so too, nor doth any Word, when applied to God, signify just the same as when applied to men, but only somewhat analogous thereunto.  
What kind or degree of Distinction (according to our Metaphysics) this is, we need not be very solicitous to inquire; or, whether in our Metaphysics (accommodated to our Notions of Finite Being's) there be any Name for it: 'Tis enough for us if these Three may truly be so distinguished, as that one be not the other, and yet all but One God.  
Now, that there is no Inconsistence or Impossibility, that, what in one regard are Three, may in another regard be One, is very manifest from many Instances that may be given even in Finite Being's, such as we converse with: which, though they do not adequately agree with this of the Sacred Trinity, (nor is it to be expected that they should, Finite, with what is Infinite;) yet there is enough in them to show, there is no such Inconsistence as is pretended.  
I shall spare to instance in many Resemblances which have been given long since by Fathers and Schoolmen, or by later Writers. Which, though they they are not pretended to be adequately the same with that of the Sacred Trinity, (as neither will any thing else be that we can take from finite Being's;) yet are they sufficient to show that there is no Inconsistence in it. (Which is all that is here incumbent on us to prove.) I shall only name a few.  
I Will begin with what concerns the most gross of Finite Being, that is, Material Bodies.   illustrative diagram of a cube 
Suppose we further, Each of these Dimensions infinitely continued; the Length infinitely Eastward and Westward, the Breadth infinitely Northward and Southward, the Height infinitely Upward and Downward: Here are Three infinite Dimensions, and but One infinite Cube; and these Three Dimensions (though Distinct) are equal each to other (else it were not a Cube;) & though we should allow, that a Cube cannot be infinite (because a Body, and therefore a finite Creature:) Yet a Spirit may; such as is the Infinite God. And therefore no Inconsistence; that there be Three Personalities (each infinite, and all equal); and yet but One Infinite God, Essentially the same with those Three Persons.  
I add further, That such Infinite Cube; can therefore be but One, and those Three Dimensions can be but Three, (not more nor fewer:) For, if Infinite as to its Length (Eastward and Westward), and as to its Breadth (Northward and Southward), and as to its Height (Upward and Downward); it will take up all imaginary space possible; end leave no room either for more Cubes or more Dimensions: And if this infinite Cube were (and shall be) Eternally so, its Dimensions also must be Infinite and Coeternal.  
I say further, If in this (supposed) Cube, (we suppose in Order, not in Time) its first Dimension, that of Length, as A. B., and to this Length be given an equal Breadth (which is the true generation of a Square) as C. D., which completes the square Basis of this Cube; and to this Basis (of Length and Breadth) be given (as by a further Procession from Both) an equal Height E. F., which completes the Cube; and all this eternally, (for such is the Cube supposed to be,) here is a fair Resemblance (if we may parvis componere magna) of the Father, (as the Fountain or Original;) of the Son, (as generated of him from all Eternity;) and of the Holy-Ghost, (as eternally Proceeding from Both:) And all this without any Inconsistence. This longum, latum, prosundum, (Long, Broad, and Tall) is but One Cube; of Three Dimensions, and yet but One Body: And this Father, Son, and Holy-Ghost; Three Persons, and yet but One God. And as, there, the Dimensions are not (in the Abstract) predicated or affirmed each of other, or the Cube of either, (the Length is not the Breadth or Height, nor either of these a Cube;) but (in the Concrete) Cube is affirmed of all; this longum, latum, profundum, is a Cube, and the same Cube: So here, (in the Abstract) the Personality of the Father is not that of the Son, nor either of these that of the Holy-Ghost, nor the Deity or Godhead any of these; but (in the Concrete) though the Personalities are not, yet the Persons are, each of them God and the same God.  
If it be objected, that those Concretes are Affirmed or Predicated each of other; (that longum is also latum and profundum, (this Long is Broad and Tall;) but not so here, the Father is not the Son or Holy-Ghost: I answer, That, if the words be rightly considered, the Analogy holds here also: For when we say, this Long is Broad and Tall (where Cube or Body is understood) the full meaning is plainly thus: This Body, which, as to one Dimension (that of Length), is said to be a long Body, is the same Body, which, as to another Dimension (that of breadth,) is said to be a broad body, and which, as to a third Dimension (that of Height), is said to be a tall body. So here, That God, which (as to one Personality) is God the Father, is the same God, which (as to another Personality) is God the Son, and which (as to a third Personality) is God the Holy Ghost. So the Analogy holds every way, nor is there any Inconsistence in either Case.  
I proceed to the Consideration of somewhat more Spiritual, and less Material than that of a body locally extended.  
Suppose we then a Created Angel, or Humane Soul: At least if those who deny the Blessed Trinity will allow that there are such beings; but if they be Sadducees, who do not acknowledge either Angel or Spirit, or that the Holy Scriptures are the word of God, which testify both, (which I doubt is the case of some of them) let them speak out, that so we may know whom we have to deal with, and not pretend to nibble only at the Athanasian Creed, or some Expressions therein, while the quarrel is indeed at somewhat higher, (though, ad amoliendam invidiam, they think fit to dissemble it,) and that they do but faintly believe (if at all) that the Holy Scriptures are the Word of God, or the Doctrines therein contained to be such. And we have reason to suspect it, when they spare not to let us know, that, were this Doctrine of the Trinity therein delivered in Words as express as could be, they would not believe it.  
But suppose we, (what they would seem to grant, and what I am so charitable as to think divers of them do believe) That there are spiritual beings, such as Angels and the Souls of Men: and that these Spiritual Being's are endued with Knowledge (or Wisdom) and force (or an executive Power) to act according to that Knowledge. That there is some such thing, at least in Man, (whether Body or Soul) they cannot but acknowledge; for themselves be, and know, and do. And though we cannot fully comprehend, much less express in Words, how all this is so; (for we are here at a loss, as well as in higher things:) Yet, that it is, they cannot deny, though they do not know How.  
Now, to Be, and to Know, and to Do, are certainly distinct each from other, (though perhaps we are not all agreed, of what kind, or in what degree this Distinction is:) To be is not the same as to know, for that may be where this is not; and to do is (for the same reason) somewhat different from both those, for a Man may Be and may Know what he doth not Do; yet 'tis one and the same Soul (at least one and the same Man) which Is, and Knows, and Does. There is therefore no Impossibility or Inconsistence in it, That what in one regard are Three, may in another regard be One. Thus in the Sacred Trinity, if we conceive of the Father as the Original or First: Person, who begets the Son; the Son as the Wisdom of the Father, begotten of Him; and the Holy-Ghost as the Spirit of the Father and the Son, as proceeding from both, and yet the same God with both; (or what other Distinction there may be of these Three Persons, who are but One God, that we do not know;) there is no Inconsistence in it, that these Three may be One; Three in one regard, and One in another.  
I might show the same as to the Understanding, Will, and Meaning, which are all the same Soul: And the known Metaphysical Terms of Vnum, Verum, Bonum, which are all but the same Ens. And many other Instances of like Nature.  
But we hold (it will he said) a greater Distinction (than that of Vnum, Verum, Bonum) between the Three Persons in the Sacred Trinity. Be it so. (But what that greater Distinction is, we do not pretend to comprehend.) However, it is from all these Instances evident, that there is no Impossibility, or Inconsistence with Reason, that what in one regard are Three, may in another Regard be One. Which is what we undertook to show.  
'Tis true, that not any, nor all of these Instances, nor any of those given by other Learned Men do adequately express the Distinction and Unity of the Persons in the Sacred Trinity, (for neither hath God distinctly declared it to us, nor are we able fully to comprehend it, nor is it necessary for us to know.) But because we do not know 
a Eccles. 11.5.  How the bones grow in the womb of her that is with Child, shall we therefore say they do not grow there? Or, because 
b Job 11.7.  We cannot by searching find out God, because we cannot find out the Almighty to perfection, shall we therefore say, things cannot be, when God says they are, only because we know not How? If God say, 
c 1 Joh. 5.7.  These Three are One? shall we say, they are not? If God say, 
d Joh. 1.1, 14.  The word was God, and, The word waes made Flesh, shall we say, Not so, only because we cannot tell, How? It is safer to say It is, when God says It is, though we know not (in particular) How it is. Especially when there be so many Instances in Nature, to show it not to be Impossible or Inconsistent with Reason. The thing is sufficiently revealed to those who are willing to be taught, and 
e 2 Thes. 2.10  receive the truth in the love of it. (Nor is it denied, by those who gainsay it, but that, if the thing be possible, it is sufficiently revealed; there being no other Exception made, as to the Revelation, but the Impossibility of the thing.) 
f 1 Cor. 11.16. Rom. 2.8.  But if any man list to be contentious, and to 
g 2 Tim. 6.4. Tit. 3.9.  quarrel about words, it is no wonder if 
h Act. 28.28. Matt. 13.13.  hearing they do hear and not understand; and that God 
i 2 Thess. 2.10, 11. Rom. 1.21.18.  give them over to believe a lie, who do not love the truth. But 
k Psal. 25.9.  the humble he will teach his way. And, while we be so, we be safe.  
August 11. 1690. Yours, John Wallis.   

The Second Letter Concerning the Sacred TRINITY.  
SIR,  
I Understand by your Letter (of Sep. 20.) that you have printed a Letter of mine concerning the Trinity; and have sent me some Copies of it to Oxford. But I am not there to receive them; and so have yet seen none of them: (But your Letter thither was sent me thence by the Post.) I have, since yours, received (by the same way) a Letter directed to me, subscribed W. J. But I know not from whom. I suppose it is some body in London, to whom you have presented a Book, for which he returns me thanks.  
That Letter to me was thus, (with the Post-mark at London, SE. 23. from whence I supply the Date, which in the Letter was wanting) For the Reverend Dr. Wallis, Professor of Geometry, at Oxford.  
SIR,  
I Received the Honour of your Letter; and return you humble and hearty thanks for it. 'Tis writ in my Opinion, in a Modest, Peaceable, and Christian Style: And I wish it may please others as well as it doth me. I am afraid however, that it will not give satisfaction to the Scholastic Athanasian Trinitarian. For they are so particular, and withal so positive, in the explication of the greatest of Mysteries, as if they understood it as well as any Article of their Christian Faith.  
Your Explication of Personality, gives no distaste to me, when you say (page 3.) They are distinguished by Personality: And, by Personality I mean, that distinction whereby they are distinguished. Yet I'm afraid the Highflown School-Trinitarians will say, This is Trifling, and idem per idem. Though to me it hath this good Sense, That we know there is a Distinction betwixt them, which we call Personality; but we can affix no Notion to this Personality, which is common to it with other Personalities, either Humane or Angelical; and therefore we can only say, It is that distinction whereby the three Hypostases are distinguished.  
But you still use a greater Latitude, as to the Notion of these Persons, or Personalities, when you call them somewhats (page 9) That, you say, which is pretended to be impossible by the Anti-Trinitarians, is only this, That there be three somewhats, which are but one God; and these somewhats we commonly call Persons. This I take only to signify, that the true Notion, and the true Name of that distinction is unknown to us, yet the distinction is certain.  
But the Deep-learned School-Trinitarians, who decide all things to an Hairs breadth, will, I imagine, ridicule this Expression.  
A late Learned and Ingenious Author, you know, hath gone much further in his determinations about this point. He makes your three somewhats, 
Dr. Sherlock.  not only three Persons, but three Substantial Being's, (page 47.) and three Infinite Minds, (page 66.) And the contrary, he says, is both Heresy and Nonsense.  
Three Infinite Minds, is the same as three Infinite Spirits. And, by Infinite, the Author understands here, not Infinite in Extension, but in Perfection. So that the three Hypostases are three Spirits, whereof each is Infinite in Perfection.  
Then, saith the Anti-Trinitarian, they are three Gods. For what better Notion, or what better Definition, have we of GOD, than that he is A Spirit Infinitely Perfect. And, if there be three such, there are three Gods. In like manner, three substantial beings really distinct, are three Substances really distinct. And if each of these Substances be endued with Infinite Perfection, it will be hard to keep them from being three Gods.  
We do not well know what particular Explication of the Trinity those Persons gave, whom the Ancients call Tritheites. But this we know, that the great offence which is taken at the Christian Doctrine of the Trinity, by the Jews and Mahometans, is, from the appearance of Polytheism in that Doctrine. Which appearance, methinks, is rather increased than lessened by this Explication: And, consequently, the scandal which (to them) follows upon it.  
But the Learned Author hath an expedient to prevent Polytheism, notwithstanding the real distinction of his three Infinite Spirits. Which is, by making them mutually conscious of one another's Thoughts and Actions: whereby, he says, they would be so united, as to make but one God. That, methinks, doth not follow, That upon this mutual consciousness they would be but One God. That which follows is this, That they would be three Gods mutually conscious. For there is no reason why this mutual consciousness should make their Godhead cease, if without this they would be three distinct Gods. No Union amounts to Identity.  
It came in my way to mind you of this more punctual and demonstrative Explication of the Trinity, as it is said to be, that you might not expect that every one should be of your Mind, nor approve of your Modesty as I do.  
Your Similitude and Comparisons, are as just as the Nature of the Subject will admit. The great defect of the First, seems to be this; that it cannot be said of any One Dimension, that it is a Cube, or a Body: Whereas it is said of every Person, that he is God.  
Your Second Comparison interferes again with the Learned Author . For he says, (page 72.) 'Tis a mistake to think that Knowledge and Power, even in Men, is not the same thing; whereas you suppose them distinct, and, upon that, ground your Similitude.  
I cannot but be of your Mind in this particular also. For Power belongs to the 
† I should rather say, To the Executive Faculty or, Power of Doing.  Will, and Knowledge to the Understanding. And 'tis plain, that we know many things that we cannot do: And, on the contrary, we can do many things, and know not how they are done. It may be the Ingenious Author would be hard put to it to tell us how he pronounces his own Name; that is, what Organs of Speech are moved, and how; by what Muscles and Nerves; and what the whole Action is that intervenes betwixt the inward Thought and the outward Sound; or betwixt the first Cause and the last Effect. Or, if he be so good an Anatomist and Philosopher as to understand all this, at least his little Son, or little Daughter, who can pronounce the same as well as himself, know not in what manner, or by what means they do it. So, Fools and Children can move their Hands, Fingers, and all the Members of the Body, as well as Philosophers: Though they do not know, in what Method, or by what Mechanism, they are moved. These things are the Effects of Will, independently on Knowledge. And 'tis as plain, on the other hand, that we know how many things are to be done, which yet we cannot do, for want of Strength or Force. I can lift a Weight of two or three hundred Pounds, but I cannot lift one of five or six hundred; though I understand as well how the one is moved as the other. And a brawny Porter shall raise that of five or six hundred, though he understands Staticks less than I do. I can bend a Stick, but cannot bend a Bar of Iron: Though I use just the same Method, and understand as much how the one is done as the other. And innumerable instances of like nature show, Knowledge and Force to be different things. But this, Sir, I say only in your defence.  
Your Conclusion also agrees very well to my Sense. And I think them exceedingly to blame, that presume to measure these Infinite Natures, and all their Properties, by our narrow Understandings. The Anti-Trinitarians generally are not great Philosophers, yet they take upon them as if they were the only Masters of Reason: And in the most Sublime and Mysterious Points, will scarce allow Revelation to be of greater Authority than their Judgement.  
But however, on the other hand, (though I never felt any Inclination or Temptation to Socinian Doctrines, yet) I cannot hearty join with you in the damnatory Sentences; neither would I have us Spin Creeds, like Cobwebs, out of our own Bowels. In the Name of God, let us be content with what is revealed to us in Scripture concerning these Mysteries; and leave the rest to make part of our Heaven, and future Happiness. To strain things to these heights, makes still more Divisions in the Church. We that now have School-Trinitarians, and Scripture-Trinitarians; and either of them will have their Plea, and Pursue their Interest; till, by Zeal for Opinions which are disputable, we have destroyed Christian Charity and Unity, which are indispensable Virtues and Duties. I am, Sir, with Sincerity and Respect,  
Your obliged humble Servant, W. J. London, Sept. 23. 1690.  
If you know from whom it is, pray thank him from me for his Civilities therein. And you may please to tell him, that he doth understand me aright, and puts a true sense upon my words: By personality, I mean that distinction (whatever it be) whereby the Three are distinguished; but, what that is, I do not pretend to determine. And if I should guests (for it will be but Guessing) how it may be; I should not be positive, that just so it is. (Upon the same account, that it is not thought prudent in a Siege, to enlarge the Line of Defence too far.) There is a Distinction (this we are sure of) between the Three: This Distinction I call Personality: And by this word I mean that Distinction, whatever it be: But, what this Distinction is (or what degree of Distinction) I cannot well tell. If this be Trifling, I cannot help it, (nor, if they please to ridicule it:) But, to me, it seems to be good sense.  
If others will venture to determine it more nicely than I have done; they perhaps may understand it more distinctly than I pretend to do; but will give me leave to be ignorant (therein) of what the Scripture doth not tell me.  
Of the Damnatory Sentences (as he calls them) I had said nothing. Nor do I think, that the Author of the Athanasian Creed did intent them in that Rigour that some would put upon them. And, if it be well considered how there they stand, he will find them annexed (at least so they seem to me) only to some Generals which he thought necessary, (as, That we ought to hold the Catholic Faith; That the Trinity in Unity is to be Worshipped; That the Son of God was Incarnate;) not to every Punctilio in his Explications. Which are but as a Comment on these Generals, how he thought they were to be understood, or might be explained. Which Explications I take to be True, and Good; but not within the purview of those Clauses: And that a man may be saved (even in the judgement of that Author) who doth Hot know, or doth not fully understand, some of them. His true meaning therein, seems to me to be but this; That the Doctrine therein delivered (concerning the Trinity, and the Incarnation of Christ,) is the sound Orthodox Doctrine; and such as (for the substance of it) ought to be believed by those who expect Salvation by Christ. Certainly his meaning never was, that Children, and Idiots, and all who do not understand the School-terms, or perhaps have never heard them, should be therefore denied Salvation.  
As to what he objects to me, That it cannot be said of any one Dimension, that it is a Cube, or a Body; whereas it is said of every Person, that he is God: He might observe, that I had already obviated this Objection. For though we cannot say (in the Abstract) that length is a Cube, (and so of the rest;) yet (in the Concrete) this Long thing (or this which is Long) is a Cube; and so, this which is Broad, or this which is High, is a Cube: Just so; we do not say (in the Abstract) that Paternity is God; but (in the Concrete) the Father is God; (and so of the other Persons.) The Personality is not said to be God, but the Person is. Which fully answers that exception.  
What he citys of a Learned Author falls not within the compass of what I undertook to defend; (and that learned Person will excuse me, if I do not pretend to understand all his Notions; and leave it to him to explain himself.) But what I have endeavoured to defend, is as much (I think) as we need to maintain in this point.  
Where that Author calls it a Mistake to think that Knowledge and Power (in the same Man) are not the same thing: I suppose (not having the Book at hand) he means no more but this; That though they differ indeed (to use the School-language) ex parte rei, yet not ut res & res, but rather ut modus & modus; that is, not as two Things, but as two Modes of the same thing. And if he should say the like of Length, Breadth and Thickness; I would not contend about it: For, even so, it will serve my Similitude well enough, If that of the three Persons be more than so: It is then (I think) such a Distinction as to which (in our Metaphysics) we have not yet given a Name. But of this, I determine nothing (because I would not spin the Thread too fine: And content myself to say, It is that, of the three Personalities in one Deity; without determining, How great that is. And I may the rather be allowed thus to forbear; Because I find, even in matters of ordinary Conversation (such as those but now mentioned) the Schoolmen are not well agreed, what things shall be said to differ ut res & res, and what only ex parte rei. Much more, therefore may I be allowed a like latitude of thought in the present case.  
I add no more but that I am  
Yours, John Wallis. Soundess, Sept. 27. 1690.  
FINIS.   

Books Printed for, and Sold by Tho. Parkhurst, etc.  
1. A Body of Practical Divinity, consisting of above 176 Sermons on the lesser Catechism; Composed by the Reverend Assembly of Divines at Westminster, etc. By Thomas Watson, formerly Minister of St Stephens Walbrook London.  
2. A Paraphrase on the New Testament, with Notes Doctrinal and Practical by plainness and bervity; fitted to the use of Religious Families in their daily reading of the Scriptures; and of the Younger and Poorer sort of Scholars and Ministers who want fuller helps: By the late Reverend Mr. Richard Baxter.  
3. Of free Justification by Christ, written first in Latin by John Fox, Author of the Book of Martyrs, against Osorius, and now Translated into English, etc.  
4. A Calm and sober enquiry concerning the possibility of a Trinity in the Godhead; in a Letter to a Person of Worth, occasioned by the lately published considerations on the Explications of the Doctrine of the Trinity; by Dr. Wallis, Dr. Sherlock, Dr. S—th, Dr. Cudworth, etc. Together with certain Letters (hitherto unpublished) formerly written to the Reverend Dr. Wallis on the same Subject.  
5. A Letter to a Friend, concerning a Postscript to the Defence of Dr. sherlock's Notion of the Trinity in Unity; relating to the calm and sober Enquiry upon the same Subject.  
6. A View of that part of the late considerations addressed to H. H. about the Trinity, which concerns the sober Enquiry on that subject; in a Letter to the former Friend: These Three last by John whither M. A.  
7. The Confirming work of Religion, or its great things made plain by their primary evidences and demonstrations, whereby the meanest in the Church may soon be made able to render a solid and rational account of their Faith; by R. Fleming Author of the Fulfilling of the Scripture.  
8. An Earnest call to Family Religion, or a discourse concerning Family Worship; being the substance of 18 Sermons, by Sam. Slater A. M.