AN ANSWER TO Three TREATISES Published under the Title of THE JESUITS Loyalty.  
LONDON, Printed by J. B. for Hen. Brome at the Gun at the West End of S Paul's. 1678.   

The INTRODUCTION.  
IT has been thought requisite by some, whose judgements deserve the esteem which every body has of them, that the Treatises should be answered, which have appeared under the Title of The Jesuits Loyalty. To those among whom we live, in a common subjection to the same Government, but with different sentiments in Religion, we own the satisfaction of knowing what we hold in matters so much concerning civil obedience. And it is not just that those whose Tenets differ from those of these Authors, should pass for approvers of Opinions which they disapprove. These Treatises being attributed to Catholics, and the doctrines contained in them to the Church: Ignorance and obstinacy, wickedness and damnable error being laid to the charge of those who are otherwise persuaded; Protestants, if not Catholic disowned them, would have but too much reason to suspect, we were all of one mind in these matters, silence in such a case amounting to little lesle than Confession. And though they were disowned, yet if no body said why, the disowners' would go near to pass for the strange people which the zeal of these Authors represents them, and Protestants, with extreme scandal to our Religion, apprehended, that the only good subjects among us were the worst of Catholics, if Catholics at all. It was thought necessary to prevent an apprehension of such bad consequence, both to Religion, and ourselves, and show they swerve neither from Religion nor Reason, and are not seduced but convinced into their persuasions, after ●ue weight of all that is offered to the contrary. Besides an answer seemed due to the Church, our Neighbour, and ourselves. The Church is wronged, when doctrines are put upon her which she holds not, and much more when those doctrines are both false and pernicious. Not to remove the scandal is little better than to concur to it. Our Neighbour is wronged when sergeant coin is offered him for current: since he will find little other in these Treatises, it is the part of an honest man to forewarn him. We are wronged by characters which we deserve not, and are not to be blamed if we have no mind to pass for Ignorant, and obstinate and wicked m●n; though in truth, Religion is more concerned than we, that who are sound in Allegiance appear not unsound in Religion. In short, since it becomes Catholics to deal sincerely, and embrace no Tenets, especially in what concerns their duty to God & Caesar, which fear the light; these Authors deserve praise for owning fairly what they hold, and why, and it was thought fit to imitate their example. For these reasons I would not but concur with the opinion of my friends, that an Answer was necessary; but yet I could have wished the task had been imposed on some body else. I have not ventured on it but at the solicitation of those whom I could not refuse, and that in default of another. But while others, some more concerned, and all more able, for several respects declined it, I thought it better to do it, as I could scurvily, than leave it undone. I concern myself only with the what is said, and meddle not with the who said it, as neither knowing the Authors, nor thinking I have any thing to do to inquire. So the Gold be weight, it imports not what hand holds the scales. Besides, as the tartness with which too many season their writings, is to my relish wondered unsavoury, I am not sorry at an Ignorance which preserves me from the Temptation. For though I would, I cannot reflect on those I know not. If any thing slip lesle smooth from my pen, I entreat the Reader to look upon it as a slip, which had I been ware, I had avoided.   

AN ANSWER TO THE FIRST TREATISE.  
OF the three Arguments, which make up the substance of these three Treatises, the first in some respects, seems far the best; the other two are more proper to amuse, than convince, and look more like products of wit and fancy, such as a fertile invention may multiply without end on any subject, than of a settled judgement. They rather skirmish than sight, and so as still to preserve their Reserves entire. But the first fairly engages the Triarii, and gives us the comfort of Alexander, to meet with all the enemies force at once. In truth it is the only proper Topick. For obedience to Princes being evidently taught by Faith, lesle than Faith will hardly serve to justify disobedience in case of Deposition. Notwithstanding in other respects I cannot but think it an ill chosen, and worse managed Topick.  
For first, it is at most but an Argument ad Hominem, such a one as may stop a man's mouth, but contributes nothing to clear the difficulty. It is good only against a Catholic, and He, if he be satisfied with the proof this Author alleges, that the Church truly held, what he says she did, is put to silence, and must allow the conclusion true in virtue of his obligation, to believe as the Church believes. But yet sees nothing of that Truth himself, nor can tell how to make it out, or defend his Church, if it be objected against her, that she holds an untruth. To an Adversary it signifies nothing, unless perhaps to confirm him in his prejudice against the Church, when she is made to require the belief of things, which he may see inconsistent with Truth. However all is carried in the dark, the Catholic run down as with a boisterous shock at Blind-mans-buff, but neither satisfied himself, nor able to satisfy any body else, the rest left without the lest glimpse of light. In short, it is a Topick proper to fright a timorous conscience into a blind obedience, but leaves the understanding altogether at a loss.  
Again, it will not do at last, as he assumes, The Church has held it, and thence infers, it must be true. Another may assume, It is not true: and thence a Catholic infer, the Church has not held it; and an Adversary, that the Church has erred. In either case, it must of necessity come to be examined, whether the point be true or not, and this by Arguments independent of the Authority of the Church. For if the Catholic by any Arguments can prove it is not true:— the Church never held it, is to another Catholic as undeniable, as his consequence, the Church hath held it, therefore it is true. At lest there is no avoiding it with an Adversary: For who acknowledges the Church has held it, and cannot show it is not an error, and by other mediums than the Churches holding it, cannot acquit the Church from having held an error. Wherhfore since of necessity it must come to this at last, it had been a great deal better to have begun there at first, and never troubled us with a Topick, which even if it hold, makes us not a jot the wiser, and which when we have taken a great deal of pains to examine, leaves us exposed to as much in examining another.  
Besides, considering the circumstances in which we live, I know not what worse office he could have done his fellow Catholics, and indeed the Church itself. She is daily traduced with holding doctrines inconsistent with civil government. There is no way to clear her, that I know, but by denying that she holds those doctrines, or that those doctrines are inconsistent. This Gentleman assists the objection with his learned Syllogisms, and fixes the doctrines on the Church, and than leaves her to shifted for herself, with the aspersion of holding doctrines inconsistent with Government, unless he would show them otherwise. To leave her thus with the matter of fact confessed, her Adversaries at liberty to conclude her guilty, and her friends uninstructed how to make out her innocence, in my opinion shows that inconsiderate love is sometimes more prejudicial than professed hate; and I think more foresight would have become his learning, and more concern for her honour his zeal.  
To draw a little nearer, I observe, it is nothing but the old dish newly, and not much differently, cooked, the same oversod bean still. Only whereas usually the inconvenience urged is, that unless the doctrine in question be true; the Church has erred, he chooses to word it, The Church has been in a damnable error of belief, and sin of practice, a wicked and blind Church, a Synagogue of Satan, etc. This sounds a little more big and frightful, but signifies much what the same. For the rest, 'tis but what is met with every where. When the proof comes, on which he lays the stress, there is the fact of Greg. 7. the Councils of Lateran and Lions, with the rest of the Common-places, objected and answered by every body, who meddle with the question, according as they are for the affirmative or negative. These things, if they had been satisfactory, would have been so in other men's Writings, the dispute long since ended, and the pains of transcribing them afresh spared. But since he knows they were not, methinks he should have bethought himself of something more, to make them satisfactory, than barely to transcribe them.  
However to make a formal business of it, this proof is divided into 6. Heads. All which if he can show, he hopes it will be granted a sufficient proof. Sure he has been used to deal with very froward people, such who will not be content unless it be syllogistically proved to them, that the sun shines at noon: or else he is as unlucky at difficulties as some at music, who praise and dispraise still in the wrong place. Was there ever such a pleasant If? or did any man, besides himself, ever doubt, whether those things might be shown, which every body, who knows any thing of the question, knows were never in dispute, but openly acknowledged on all hands? For so it is with the main of what he brings, though in some particulars he has the ill fortune to be out. I am fully persuaded that neither the Sorbon Doctors, nor the rest of the Gentlemen, who it seems are out of his favour, would, to do him a pleasure, stick to yield him freely, perhaps more than he asks, without staying to be for●'t to a confession by the rack of his severe Quotations.  
Alas the difficulty lies not in the matter of fact-which is beyond Ifs and Ands, sufficiently agreed, but in this, whether that matter of fact sufficiently prove what is pretended from it. When he comes to this, all he does is to hope it over, and leave it to take its fortune. That a Scholar should treat a question of this concern in this manner! Keep a pother about the premises, which no body denies, and expect the conclusion, which no body grants, should be yielded to his confidence without any, so much as offer at proof that it follows, or is a good conclusion, which yet is the only thing in question! He knows that all, who descent from him, refuse to grant what he hopes to Bellarmin and the rest, who have produced the same things, with as much and as likely hope as he. He knows that what he tells us is no news; that all has been examined and sifted over and over again, and that after all, there are who remain firm against him. Can it be possible a man of learning should think to hope these people out of their Judgements? That they should for his sake relent, and profess that to be true which they think to be false? Change all on a sudden, and that without any motive? For the motives he proposes, he knows move them not. When a scholar tur●s from proving to hoping, and expects from the good nature of the Readers what he should force from them, whether they will or not, by the unresistable evidence of his discourse, I for my part think he has a great deal more reason to fear than hope, at lest were it my case, I am sure I should not be altogether so confident.  
However it be, the Argument in short is this: Do but grant me that what you and every body knows has been done, proves the Church engaged for my doctrine, and than I will prove the Church is engaged for my doctrine, and that 'tis heretical▪ and what you will, to oppose it. This is the long and the short of the learned Syllogisms, and elaborate Quotations. Which if any one will take for a good Argument, he may fo● me. But I must needs profess I never saw worse Topick worse managed; and am hearty afflicted to see a question so strangely handled, in which, to say nothing of some temporal considerations not altogether to be slighted, our very duty to God and Caesar is concerned.  
But not to affronted his pains and zeal with an answer so general, let us cast a view on particulars. He undertakes to prove, that the opinion, against which he writes, is Erroneous in Faith, Temerarious, and Impious. Never were ill names worse coupled. This is as much to say, you Sir, with whom I am very angry, are a Rascal and a Villain, and besides cannot put of your hat with a grace, or make a handsome leg, or some such diminishing aggravation; which none, but a very merry enemy would use. Haeretical, and Impious are sins of the first magnitude. Temerarious, which for all its great sound is no more but plain Rash, is a moderate blundring fault, of which many an honest man, especially in our nation, is guilty, even he sometimes who speaks against rashness. Neither do I mention this for any great matter there is in it, but to observe by the way, that he was so intent upon heaping harsh names on the Tenet, against which he disputes, that he minded not much what they signified.  
There follow the learned Syllogisms concerning which I shall only say, He has not weaved his web so fast but that it might perhaps be unravelled at every stitch. There is play enough for a Gamester who would take all advantages. Who would examine what made an Error or Practice damnable? whether what is damnable in its own nature, be so in all circumstances, and particularly in those in which the things he alleges were practised, whether the Church act always as a Church, or be responsible for all that is done by her, whether Fathers, or Children; and whether in the cases insisted on by him; with the rest of the many points of which he gives occasion to discourse, might peradventure stop the career before it came to the convincing Quotations, and put him to the charge of more proofs, than those he has provided.  
But since I am at liberty, I conceive it best to gratify his expectation, and deny just where he would have me. For indeed to deny in the wrong place without necessity, may I fear show something disobliging. 'Tis as if a man should rudely call for mutton to him who had provided Capon and Pheasant. I join issue with him therefore where he desires and expects I should, upon the first part of his second Minor, and deny that the Church at any time has believed and practised, as he pretends. And this because I believe it will be found, the Church, or rather men of the Church, were in those times, as now, divided in their sentiments of this business. Some were for such a power, as he would have in the Pope, some were against it, both acted according to their several persuasions. And I conceive that what is done by one part of the Church, and contradicted by another, proves not the Act, and much lesle the Faith of the Church.  
Again, although there had been no difference of sentiments and practices, I do not understand how the Church can be engaged, unless she proceeded on those grounds, on which alone the Church, as a Church, or Congregation of faithful can proceed. To this I apprehended two things necessary: First, that the point have been originally revealed by Christ: and 2dly, that this revelation have been preserved by an uninterrupted and uniform practice of the Faithful. If any, or all, of those who make the Church believe or act on other grounds than these, I conceive they believe and act, not as a Church, or as faithful, but as men, or scholars, or in some other capacity. And because, for any thing appears in his Argument, these conditions may be wanting, I deny any engagement of the Church in his concerns, and for the same reason, his last Consequence too, conceiving, whatever he may hope, that though he do show all he undertakes, it will not follow that the Church has believed, taught, and practised, as he contends.  
And now in truth we are at an end of our Argument; at lest what remains belongs to him, not me. His consequence since it is denied, must be proved, if he will have it pass, and till than there is no more for me to do. It is neither needful, nor indeed much to purpose to examine farther what he says, if what he says will not prove his intent. However since in likelihood something may occur, which though unnecessary, may yet be grateful to the Reader, let us hear at lest what his witnesses say. Kings and Emperors and Popes carry with them too much respect to be denied audience.  
We are told than, that Gregory the 7th. threatened the French King, and his subjects, and deposed Henry 4th. King of the Germane: Besides that he formerly taught this doctrine to the Church, and called the contrary wicked folly and madness, as bad as Idolatry. Farther that Paul the 5th. forbade the Oath of Allegiance; Innocent the 10th. censured the negative subscribers; and Alexander the 7th. the Irish Remonstrance. And all this dilated with several circumstances, not forgetting the very year in which each thing happened, and Vouchers brought, and exactly quoted for every particular.  
I verily believe this exactness might have been spared. These things are too well known to need more ado about them than bore naming. I wish they were not, for the honour of Popes and reverence we allow to their sacred and supreme dignity. And could they be concealed, I for my part would rather loose an opportunity of showing Erudition, than publish them. But since this Gentleman has thought fit to bring them once again upon the stage, what will he make of them? All this is in two words, Popes have appeared for the deposing doctrine all the ways they can. And what than? Is all that Popes think true; all that Popes do, well done? Had he first shown the Actions good, and opinion true, he had deserved well of Popes, by showing them to have abetted goodness and Truth: But that remaining in question, to expose their actions to the same question, is, I fear, not very good piece of service to them. And 'tis a worse to Christianity to assume their proceed in proof of a point of Faith. The Authority of Popes, he knows well, stirs not the balance, unless their Infallibility be cast into the scales. And for that point, I refer it to himself, if it be any more than a probable opinion, and that even according to his own value, if he hold it. For he is not to learn that every body sets not the same rate upon it, many holding it very improbable and very false to boot. Now if it become a scholar to suppose that point, (for he offers not any where to prove it) a point upon which all the stress lies, and which he knows is strongly contested; I cannot think it becomes a Catholic to make a probable opinion a premise to infer a point of Faith. For this is plainly to make his Faith, a probable, and uncertain, and for aught he can tell, false Faith. I would entreat him the next time he writes, to have more concern for Christianity, and lesle for his espoused opinion, and in the mean time, change his hopes of having his Inference pass, into a desire that it may not. For I must hope, with a confidence something better grounded, that God will have more care of his Church; than to suffer her Faith depend on Probabilities, if they be so much, and the Rock on which he has built her, crumble away into slippery sand.  
But now to see how he sets of his ware; how like an Artist he covers the weakness of what he says, by the strong expressions in which he cloaths it, and strives by his big words to fright us into an apprehension there is something in it, if we could find it! If I show, says he, That Popes have taught it as sound doctrine; As if they, or any body in their wits, can be imagined to have taught any, as unsound doctrine. No body yet ever cried stinking Fish. Proving it from Scripture and Tradition: That Scripture should have been pretended is no such wonder, or praise. No Heresy, that I know, but has attempted as much. But for Tradition he must pardon me, if I suspend my judgement till I hear what his witnesses say. For to me it seems a riddle, that Tradition should be so much as pretended. And condemned the contrary, as ●rr●n●ous in Faith, pernicious folly, and madness, and inflicted censures on them that held it: As if people did not use to give hard names to their Adversaries, and do all they can against them. Many an honest man has been called knave. The question is whether those opinions, and those men, deserved those censures, and that harsh language; if they did not, they had the worse fortune; to be wrongfully aspersed heretofore, and for no other reason but because they were so, concluded guilty now.  
Again, we are told, that Gregory the 7th deposed Henry the 4th in a Patriarchal Council. I am very sorry he did so, and wish with all my heart, truth would give me leave to deny that fact. But for the Patriarchal Council, I must again suspend till better information. For I suspect few of the Nations belonging to the Patriarchate were represented in that Council, save the Italians, and know a good part of the Germane Nation by Counter-Councils among themselves directly opposed it. Yet though it were true, I believe it does not, even in his own judgement come home to his purpose. That he did it ex Cathedra, as Vicar of Christ, and successor of S. Peter, etc. I wonder in virtue of what other Authority he could pretend to proceed; or how he could act at all without pretending some: And for the mystery of doing it ex Cathedra, he may, if he please dispute it out with Launoy, for I must confess I do not well understand it. That this sentence he published to the Empire in a Breve, and his Legates in several Nations of Christendom. Since it cannot be imagined he intended to make a secret of it, which way should he publish it, but by Letters, and Messengers? Lastly (for I will mention not more) that he did not only believe, but formally teach this doctrine to the Church by Canons published in a Patriarchal Council at Rome; for which he citys the famous Dictatus Papae. This of all the rest, might in my opinion have best been spared, both for his own and the Pope's credit. For my part I conceive it becomes me to use a little more respect than he has done, and not say all to which this objection tempts me. Had he imitated the prudence of those, who though they balked nothing which they thought material, yet forbore to meddle with these Dictatus, I believe he had deserved better of some body. If he have entertained a fondness for them, and will uphold them whatever come on't, let him if he please, maintain them against Withrington, who flatly denys they were defined by the Council. As for me I will have no more to do with them, only I would gladly know whether he do in earnest believe all they contain. If he do not, methinks it is not fair play to obtrude on others, what he believes not himself: If he do, it is the lesle wonder he makes the Church's Faith but probable, since he can be content with one, to make the best on't, very improbable, and very singular. For I dare say there is not one man in the Church besides, who believes as he does.  
Now all this seems to me, but much ado about nothing▪ The sum total of all these, and if there were as many more, particulars, amounts to no more than this, Popes did it. And for this I think he needed not have brought in his Bill; it would have passed well enough in the gross. But when he urges payment, people desire first to be satisfied whether they are obliged to discharge▪ the Popes debts. He had done something, if he had showed we stood bound for them, obliged to justify all they have done in this particular, and to believe, and that with divine Faith, all was well done, and may and aught be imitated. But barely to show they have done what before he set pen to paper, every body knew they have, and this with so much circumstance and aggravation, is to take much pains where none needs, and none where they do. For all that, I cannot but acknowledge he is a great man in his way: Of all the places, which Art has invented for amplification, I think there is none wanting. There is the Who, and the What, the How, the Where, the Why, and all the rest, not so much as the When forgotten▪ which though a body would think not much material; it importing little, whether these things hap in 1074, or 1084, yet I know not how, his formal In Anno has its Energy. And though I believe the discourse would have shown better spoken, than writ, because this way it loses much of the advantage, which a solemn gravity, a pleasing and emphatical delivery would give it, yet even this is tempting. For there are few who will not be apt to think there must needs be some sense, where they see so much exactness, Authors so accurately quoted for every particular, and care taken of every Minute, circumstance, even the very Year of our Lord.  
Before I pass to the next Head, it will not be amiss to stop at a quotation or two by the way. Out of a letter of the deposed Emperor Henry the 4th. he citys these words; M● quoqu● quem S. S. Patrum traditio soli Deo judicandum docuit, n●● pro aliquo crimine) nisi a fide, quod absit, ●●orbitaverim, 〈◊〉 ●ensuit. The words as they lie in the letter, are these: M● q●●q●● (licet indign●● inter Christian●s sum ad Regnum vocatus) Te teste, quem S. S. Patrum, etc. as he citys, save that he puts Censuit at the last for Asseruit, which is not much material. I would English the period, if I knew how, but I cannot make out the grammatical construction, to which there seems something wanting. However, besides the Parenthesis, of no great import, he leaves out two words, which as short as they are, quite altar the sense, viz. Te Teste, or, according to your own verdict. To say absolutely, the Fathers allow me not to be judged, or, if you will, deposed, but only for Heresy, is much a different thing from saying, even according to yourself the Fathers allow me not, etc. This is what the Emperor says; to make him say otherwise is an evident salsification: Though I do not suspect this Gentleman guilty of it. For I believe he has not seen the letter himself, but taken the quotation on trust from some body, who has not dealt faithfully.  
But yet there is no great force in it, though it pass in his own terms. As for the first half of the period, the Emperor is undoubtedly in the right. For the Fathers do indeed teach, that sovereign Princes are to be left to the Tribunal of God. But for the exception of Heresy, which is in the second part, I would gladly be directed to those Fathers who made it. I have neither met with it myself, nor heard of any who has found it so much as in any one of them. Nor do I know how to reconcile the second part of the period with the first, this exception to the Fathers either doctrine or practice. For since they refer the judgement of a Prince to God alone, I see not how they can allow him to be judged by any body else, even for Heresy. Again Heretic Princes there were in their days, but Deposition was never thought of. They have been excommunicated, but still obeyed. The practice than of the Fathers was against this exception, it appears not, nay, the contrary does appear in their words: what necessity is there to believe the Emperor in this point? will he have Emperors make Articles of Faith too? deposed, and if he credit his own quotations, Heretic, and Arch-Heretick Emperors? For his Henricians had their name from him.  
Again, he says, in a Diet of the Empire there was no plea against the Pope's Jurisdiction, not not by the Kings own Advocates. A wise observation, and much to purpose; as if people were obliged to say all they thin● for their ●●rn at all times, and did not insist now on one plea, now on another, as circumstances direct their choice. In the contest between Paul the 5th. and the Venetians, it was debated, whether they should appeal from the Pope to a General Council, and 'twas carried they should not, because they thought it needless so to do. Otherwise they thought it lawful enough, and told their subjects they did therefore refuse to make use of that remedy, to which their Ancestors and other Princes had had recourse in such cases, because the apparent injustice of the sentence against them required it not, Such was the case in hand: The Princes of Germany met to examine and dicide the controversy betwixt the Pope and Emperor according to the Canons, as he himself; out of Vrspergensis observes: And he can find fault the Pope's jurisdiction was not questioned, when by agreement they were to proceed in another method. The Emperor's friends thought him unjustly dealt withal, even according to the ordinary proceed of Law, and because they undertook to make this good in an assembly of the wisest men of their Nation, does it therefore follow they had nothing else to say?  
But now come his witnesses, who are to give in their evidence that the Pope proved this Doctrine by Tradition. This I have longed for a good while, it seeming very strange, that wise men, as Popes are, should attempt a matter so unlikely to succeed. The evidence runs thus: Eos qui dicunt Regem non oportet excommunicari, etc. ad S▪ S. Patrum dicta vel facta mitti●●●. Why but the matter in trial is deposition; pop us not of I beseech you with Excommunication. Speak if you please to Deposition. Consider●nt cur Zach●rias Papar●g●m Francorum deposucrit, & omn●s ●ran●ig●●●s▪ a vinculo Juram●●ti, quod sibi f●●●rant absolverit. Why but this is not Tradition; 'tis a single fact, and that not true neither. For 'twas not Zachary, but an assembly of the Estates of France, who deposed Chilp●ri●. The Pope concurred no farther than by privity and consent, and perhaps dispensing with their Oath, but they deposed. I think it not fit to enter into th●se questions which may ●●e raised concerning that dispensation, it 〈◊〉 that ●●●●posed not▪ and if he had, that one Deposition is ●o proof of Tradition. And so the proof of Deposition by Tradition is mad● up of two instanced, whereof one has no Deposition, the other no Tradition, which is what I suspected before hand it would come ●●▪  
There is not a word more of thi● business i● all this Treatise▪ unless the quotation following ● littl● after, about Gregory the great, be referred to it, which because he citys for another Head, I conceive he intended not. But if he do think it worth insisting on, let him first try to make out against Launoy, that there ever was any such thing. For he contends, that this so much canvased privilege, is a mere forgery, and I apprehended he would not be very wise, who should labour much in expounding a decree, which perhaps was never made. And yet they seem to be lesle wise who forged it; sure they understood little either of St. Gregory, or of the world, who make that wise and holy Pope, one who by his words and actions owned himself a subject to his Emperor, decree Deposition, and not content with that, Damnation. For my part I never heard of any power left with St. Peter, or his successors to damn men, And have been taught all is in Aedificationem. So that even admitting the matter of fact, all that can be made of it, is at most a Commination, to fright people from wickedness by the apprehension of the mischiefs which may attend it.  
Pope's have hitherto furnished matter for his discourse, now he passes to Councils, and produces first the Council of Lateran, an undoubted general Council, and the greatest, for number of Prelates that ever were. Who had a mind to raise doubts, might peradventure find somewhat to say to this confident Gentleman, and be countenanced by the Authority even of a General Council too. For if this Council be so undoubtedly general, how happened it that the Council of Florence calid themselves but the 8th. General Council? How came Cardinal Pool, no ignorant man in the History of the Church, to be of that opinion? To the 8. General Councils held in the East, add the two he citys, of Lateran and Lions, and leave out those of Basil, Constance, and Vienna, The Council of Florence comes to be the eleventh, not the 8th. So that as undoubted a business as he makes it, there have it seems, been those in the world who have doubted of it, or at lest not acknowledged it, which I think is as bad.  
But we will not fall out about this point. I am well content the Council be as general as he pleases. If he will think fit to be a little more wary another time, 'tis as much as I desire. I cannot tell whether he foresaw what I would have, but, as far as I see, he is resolved to gratify me, being so wary in the rest, that he makes no play at all. For he barely relates the matter of fact, but offers not to apply it to his conclusion, nor gives any hint whereby it may be guest what service he would draw from it; So that I am something at a loss what to speak to. I know indeed his journies end, but which way he means to get to it, am quite to seek; Because he undertook to prove the not-deposing doctrine Erroneous in Faith, etc. This Council (I suppose) was intended for a Medium by which to make good that undertaking. Now how he will couple both ends to the middle, and out of this that a Canon was made, in which the deposing doctrine is supposed, infer the contrary Erroneous in Faith, is the difficulty.  
For my part, I conceive, that Councils use to define those things, which they intent we should be obliged to believe, and have been told, that when they do not we are at liberty. I think he will not deny, that to make a Canon is one thing, to define another. I think he will not deny, that 'tis at lest current doctrine, that in Definitions, there is no necessity of believing more than the bore Definitions themselves. Antecedents and Consequents, the very Reasons themselves alleged for the Definition, are expressly excluded. I presume too he will acknowledge, that Canons may be made on suppositions short of the certainty of Faith, and known to be so. And if he will deny none of this, I cannot see how he can hope it will not be denied to him, that because this Canon supposes his doctrine, it follows that the Council did suppose it to be a point of Faith: and much lesle, if it did, that the supposition was true.  
I cannot tell, as I said before, whether he would make his Argument in this manner; but I think he should in this or the like. And than Beauties' doctrine followed generally by Divines, and I verily think by himself, to my apprehension hinders it from concluding. However, as it has been observed before me, this is a plain case, and which cannot be denied, that the Act in question is a decree of something to be done, not a Definition of any thing to be believed, and that we who are not to believe more than barely the Definition should be obliged to believe what is not defined, is a morsel of too hard digestion till he have chewed it better. It is but little short of believing it is defined, because it is not defined. For he would have it believed, because it has been decreed, or supposed; and Decreeing, and Supposing are plainly not-Defining. If he will have it at lest obliging as to practice, he must first make out that obligation from our National Laws; otherwise I must tell him, that is a pretence which would have exposed a man to punishment, even in Catholic times.  
I pass by the Replies he makes to the answers, which he objects against himself; not that I think them satisfactory, but because I think it needless to meddle with them. Withrington had the refusal of them long since, and has acquainted the world why he would not take them for good payment. If I thought it to purpose, it were as easy for me to borrow Answers, as for him to borrow Objections.  
Next, he brings in the Council of Lions, which he serves just as he did the former; tells the matter of fact, which every body knew before, and sets it of with his emphatical aggravations, and leaves us to guests what it makes to his purpose. If people will be good natured, and allow his conclusion follows from it, he is the more beholding to them; if they will stand upon their terms, and expect to see how 'tis connected with hi● premises, they may expect for him. If they cannot find it out of themselves, 'tis like to remain hidden for any care he takes. Now it had been convenient to have said something to this point; otherwise a particular sentence, in a particular case, with particular circumstances, seems not altogether so much as a Canon. This Emperor had made a positive submission to the Church, which how far it authorised the proceed against him, I cannot tell, sure I am, it is a circumstance not always found.  
What he would make of this business, he alone can tell. What I can imagine, is, that because this. Council, or Pope in presence of the Council, did depose the Emperor, they supposed, or took it for granted they had power so to do. And so far it agrees with the former Council: and the same Answer will serve for both, viz. that suppositions are no Articles of Faith. I am sure nothing can be more evident in the world, than that either the common doctrine, of Divines, not excepting himself, must be changed, and we obliged to believe upon the credit of Councils, more than their Definitions: or there is no appearance of necessitating belief where there is no Definition.  
Thus much peradventure is more than needs be said in the case▪ but yet, not to leave the Reader altogether so much in the dark as he does, let us consider the matter over again. The Council of Lateran made a Decree concerning Deposition; The Council of Lions assented to an actual Deposition; therefore they were both persuaded, they, or the Pope, had power to depose. I, for my part, see not what more can be made of it. If this Gentleman be quicker-sighted, he may, when he thinks fit, press it as he pleases; for indeed it belongs not to me to make his Argument for him. But taking it in this manner, which to my dulness gives it as much strength as it will bear, let us see what force it has. Such a man as Launoy peradventure might be apt to make an exception which would not fall in every bodies way, and say, that whatever cla●m may be made from these Precedents in behalf of General Councils, or Popes, in and with them, there is no colour, from them, for Popes without them. I know not whether it might not prove troublesome enough to shake of the importunity of him, who should hung scrupulously upon such a fancy. But I intent not to insist on it myself. For I know not that Councils pretend to the power of Deposing; and though they should, I should think them as unreasonable, as those who will obstinately fix it on Popes.  
For the difficulty, I admit that both Councils were persuaded that they had power to do what they did; and observe that they do not decree this persuasion of theirs to be true, burr something to be done in consequence of it. I observe again, that people may be persuaded of the truth of things by motives of several kinds: by Arguments drawn from Faith alone, or Reason alone, or both together, by sense, experience, and the rest. I observe too, that from the action of a good and sincere man, may be gathered his persuasion of the lawfulness of that action; but not the quality of that persuasion, that is, whether it proceed from Faith, or science, or any other way; no more than I can tell when I see a Tenant pay his Rent, whether he have a Lease for years or lives. I observe farther, that who is truly persuaded of the lawfulness of an action, may, and does without scruple, act in consequence of that persuasion.  
These things, which, I think, no body will question, being put together, it remains to see what they will spell. The Antecedent is, These Councils were persuaded there was in the Church a deposing power. The Conclusion which he would have follow is, Therefore the deposing Doctrine is of Faith. Another perhaps may infer, therefore the deposing doctrine is true. I conceive there follows neither the one, nor the other.  
To begin with the first, I see not what can be clearer, than that if that persuasion of the Councils might proceed from any other ground, it cannot be concluded to have proceeded from Faith, unless something more appear than the bore persuasion. If I should go about to dilate the point, I fear the Reader would think I had a very bad opinion of his capacity. For 'tis in short: of a thing which may be done many ways, we cannot tell which way it was done, purely by knowing that it was done; than which I think nothing can be more plain. I think t●o lesle plain, that the persuasion of those who made up Councils, may proceed from other motives than Faith: because men by ent●ing into Councils, do not leave their former judgements at the door, but carry them in, and speak, and vote according to them, till by conference, or otherwise they come to altar them. That the judgements which they carry in with them are not all grounded on Faith, admits no dispute. For we see it as plainly, and know it as certainly, as that they are men, and have judgements. This being so, I see not how it can be denied but men in Councils may act upon Judgements which they brought along with them, and were grounded perhaps on other motives than Faith. Indeed when they decree any thing to be believed by the rest of the world, or in the common language define it, without all question, they take it for Faith themselves. But this they have not done here, and therefore have neither laid any obligation on us to believe any thing, nor left us any colour of concluding, because they proceeded according to their Judgements, that those Judgements▪ proceeded from Faith, so much as in their own opinion.  
I need say no more to ●is point, the bore possibility of the case being enough for my purpose. For no man I am sure can convince it is thus, if it may be otherwise. But yet to carry it on a little farther, I will add, that as far as we have means to guests at the ground, on which their Judgements were built, we have reason to think Faith was not that ground. For, as I observed formerly, to Faith, speaking of Catholic Faith, there go two things. The point must have been in the first place originally revealed by Christ, and than preserved by a constant and uninterrupted acknowledgement of Christians. Of these two, the later, to Catholics, is the proof of the former: they not doubting of any Article, which has been universally and uninterruptedly believed to have been revealed by Christ, but that it was in truth revealed by Christ.  
Scripture indeed is an unquestioned, and unquestionable ground of Faith too. But it may hap that the sense of Scripture may be controverted; as it falls out in the present dispute: The Pasce oves and Dabo claves, and the rest, being differently understood by the different parties. Catholics acknowledge no means of determining a controverted sense of Scripture with absolute certainty, but the uniform and perpetual consent of the Faithful understanding the controverted places in a determinate sense, and witnessing that understanding by practising accordingly. So that to them the sense written in the hearts of the Faithful, and appearing in their actions, is the security even of the sense of Scripture. This point to Adversaries would ask more clearing; Catholics I presume will not contest it, and I speak only to them. Wherhfore, whether Scripture be insisted on or not, Tradition still must warrant whatsoever can, among Catholics, pretend to be a part of Catholic Faith. The whole stress than will lie in this, whether those Councils were persuaded they had this warrant, for their persuasions of the lawfulness of their actions▪ that is, whether they thought the generality of Christians, in all times and places, did believe Christ had taught, or given deposing power to the Pope. And I am much mistaken, if he who will enter into the consideration of this matter, will not find reason to conclude it neither likely, nor indeed possible.  
For in the first place, if it could have been pretended, I do not see how it could hap that it was not, at some time or other. We see what was alleged in their behalf, and, by this Gentleman's favour, we see it was not Tradition. The Councils indeed speak not for themselves, so that we have no light to guide us, but what breaks from Popes. And from them we see nothing but the Authority of St. Peter, to Bind and Lose, to feed the sheep, etc. in those expressions of the Scripture, which by none of the Fathers before them were ever interpreted in the sense they put upon them. Of the writing foretold by the Prophet Jerem. 31. in the bowels and hearts of the house of Israel, I finde no mention. Now whatever others say, I suppose no Catholic will think Scripture interpreted otherwise than for ten whole, and those the first, Ages, was ever dreamt of, nay not only unattested, but contradicted by their doctrine and practice, any argument of Faith, nay not even though that interpretation should hap to be true, if we speak, as we do, of Catholic or to the generality obligatory Faith.  
To him indeed, who by his greater learning and greater diligence, should with certainty discover the sense of any place, perhaps undiscovered before, that discovery would beget true Faith, as to his own particular, and as many more as by his or any means arrived to see as much as he. But this would concern not more than themselves. The generality of Christians would neither be obliged to examine whether they were mistaken or not, nor to believe them without examination. And though the business belong properly to Faith, yet it partakes much of the nature of Learning, obliging the assent of those who see the truth, but none else so much as to look after it. But I begin to stray. What I insist on is, that nothing has been produced, whereby it may be gathered, that the Councils alleged thought the deposing doctrine attested, as a point of Faith should be. Whence I conceive may be gathered, that no such thing could be produced, and that they had no sufficient motive to take it for a point of Faith, and therefore did not take it for such.  
But not to rely on a negative proof, it is beyond dispute evident, that all the Ages before Gregory the 7th. were positively against deposing doctrine. They taught unanimously, that sovereign Princes were subject only to God: and their crimes, if they committed any, to be judged by him alone. That the two supreme Powers were independent, and neither to meddle with the other; with a hundred such things absolutely incompatible with deposing. No exception of Heresy, or any other case was ever dreamt of, or though it had, could have been thought other than a dream; for no man awake, and in his wits could hope to make it consistent with the than current doctrine. In their own time we are told it was disputed and undetermined among Scholars. It was termed thrusting their sickle into other men's harvest. It scaped not the imputation of novelty, not to say heresy. For my life I cannot see how he, who, notwithstanding all this, will maintain, it was possible these Councils should think Deposing had always been believed by the Church, can avoid the rude irreverence of making them utterly ignorant how the world went not only before, but even in their days: unless, with a more unpardonable and more impossible injury, he make them force upon themselves an assent to that, which they themselves, and all the world besides, knew to be false.  
Farther to look into the practice of former, and their own times, it is as clear, as that there were any such times, that the case happened more than once, wherein, had the doctrine been known, it had been very seasonable to have come to Use and application. To pass by the carriage of Christians to Heathen Emperors, for the, I think, unreasonable exception taken to it, it is known that since the prevailing of Christianity there have been Emperors Apostates, Heretics of several denominations, and Persecutors: Who, not content with erring themselves, have employed all their industry and power to force those errors upon their Subjects: who have taken away the Churches from Catholics, and given them to the favourite sects; afflicted their persons with imprisonment, banishment, death. And all this found nothing but patience and obedience from them. A zealous Prelate would now and than proceed ro Excommunication, and acknowledge and obey the excommunicate Prince when he, had done But there was the Non plus ultra. Knowledge of their own strength, and the easy means they had to make resistance, never tempted their subjects to resist. In their own days, They saw there were soldiers to fight for deposed Princes, Scholars to writ for them, Bishops to hold Councils, and preserve the reputation of Religion to their party. Reconcile this who can with a persuasion in the cited Councils, that Deposing was warranted by the perpetual practice of Christians, who with their own eyes saw Christians practising otherwise. Though the example of former times be enough for our purpose. For they were inexcusable for not putting this doctrine in practice in their circumstances, if they knew it: and if they knew it not, it is undeniable that it could not come to after ages by succession, the only way by which Faith can come.  
Again, who can think this doctrine was formerly held of Faith, when we see it is not so now? Of the Abettors of it, few will stand steadily to it, that it is down right Faith: most plainly acknowledge it is not. Because he shall say he has met with a fair Gamester, I will put it even to this Gentleman himself, who for all his big words I verily believe is of the same mind. Not that I do so much as suspect him of insincerity, or that he speaks not according to his judgement when he says, and would prove his opinion, is of Faith. But I think this judgement of his, grounded on speculation, or perhaps prejudicated education, is contradicted by another grounded in nature, more deeply rooted, and a stronger principle of his actions. For truly I cannot think he would for any good communicate, in holy things, with men, whom he takes for flat heretics. I cannot think he makes any difficulty to communicate thus with those of the opposite way: for example, to receive or give Absolution, or the Holy Sacrament, etc. to, or from them. I suppose whatever he says, he acts in this manner without distinction between the one and the other as to these matters.  
But if he should be more scrupulously nice, than I have any reason to suspect, I must tell him he would run away by himself, and set up a practice of Christianity different from what is publicly owned in the face of the Church. In France there are men of both persuasions; the one side finds the doors open at S. Lovis, the other at Port-Royal, and as they see fit perform the duties of Christianity in either place, none enquiring of them what they hold in this point. This the Church in France, and out of France, sees and blames not. To go about with scrupulous novelties to altar this settled custom, would, I believe be looked upon as little lesle than setting up Altar against Altar. However, while things are carried in this manner, while Churches, Confession-seats, Altars, and whatever belongs to the exercise of Christianity are free for this persuasion, he that will say, this persuasion is by the Church taken for Heresy, must say that Heresy is by the Church admitted to Communion in all the most holy things. And who will say, that though it pass not in the Church for Heresy, yet intruth it is so, must say, there is a point of Faith lost, and the Church has forgotten something taught her by Christ. Both which, if this Gentleman think not inconvenient, I for my part think impossible.  
I am not ignorant that Card. Perron tells us, the Pope tolerates doctrine contrary to his own, for the good of the Church's peace. But than he must suppose the Pope does not take his own doctrine for Faith, otherwise he could not have made him a worse compliment. This is as much as to sail, that the Pope tolerates the casting of the Church's pearl to swine; the prostitution of the Sacraments, and whatever is most holy, to great, and unrepenting, and obstinate sinners; (for such the Cardinal, I suppose, takes Heretics to be) suffers his sheep to go astray, and, without regard to his pastoral duty, freely to feed on the poisonous herbs of Heresy, etc. And all this for the good of the Church. As if any thing could be more contrary to the good of the Church, than to give the right hand of fellowship to Heretics.  
'Tis so far from good, that 'tis most plainly ruinous to the Church. For when once Heretics enter into her communion, she ceases to be a company of Faithful. Neither indeed can Heresy be tolerated in a Church; in a state it may; and 'tis often expedient it should. But that Church unchurches itself which gives admittance to Heresy, I mean so as to acknowledge for members those who profess it: nor can there be a plainer contradiction in the world than that a man should at once be an Heretic, and a Member of the Church, or an Heretic, and a not-Heretick. But the Cardinal understood the world better than to let these things be obtruded on the Pope, and so tells us presently after, that, He is contented to hold his own opinion true, and the contrary erroneous, without binding us to hold his opinion necessary as matter of Faith, and the other Heretical. And therefore I think it but a reasonable request to this Gentleman, to allow us the same liberty the Pope does, and be contented with what contents the Pope. However I think I may safely conclude we have all the reason in the world to believe, that the persuasion of the Councils, employed in their proceed, actually was framed on other grounds than Faith. (though, as I said before, that be more than needs, it being sufficient to my purpose that it might be so.) And consequently that to infer from their persuasions, that what they were persuaded of, was Faith to them, and aught be so to us, a very groundless, is, and very false inference.  
Let us now turn to the second head, and consider whether at lest it will not follow, that it was True. To make this consequence good, They hold it, therefore it is true, it is evidently necessary to add this universal, Whatsoever Councils hold is true, and because Faith is set aside, Whatever they hold, not by Faith, but Reason, by way ●●discourse. Put this proposition now to Divines; They will tell u● the Definitions of Councils are obligatory; the reasons alleged, even by themselves, are not. This I think is plainly to say, that the firmness of their Definitions is to be refounded into something stronger than their discursive faculties: and to acknowledge the Reasons even of Councils, and judgements grounded on those reasons, in as much as they depend on them, may be faulty. Put it to the sense of the Faithful, and we find them expecting indeed from the providence of God, that Councils be exempt from error in Faith, and manners flowing from it; but not in other things. And this is to say, that in our case, where Faith is excluded, no infallibility is believed. Wherhfore he who will pretend we are obliged to conform our assent to the persuasions of Councils, when those persuasions are bred purely by discourse, pretends we are obliged to take for true, what I think all the learned, and all the Faithful of the Church are persuaded may be otherwise. The truth is, when Councils leave their proper work Defining, or declaring to Posterity the Faith received from their Ancestors, and fall to discoursing, or rather acting on discourses formerly made, which is more properly our case, they are not in strict formality, Councils. I mean in that propriety in which they are held to be infallible, but men assembled to be a Council, and proceeding now not as a Council, but as so many men.  
Whatever be of that matter, because in the way of discourse there is no security against error, but science, or seeing what p●etends to be received for true, connected with some other foreknown Truth whether natural or revealed: and nature endures not we should be obliged to receive for true, that of which we can have no security that it is so: this connexion of the persuasion of the Councils with some acknowledged Truth, must appear, before we can be obliged to own that persuasion for true. Had there been any, I suppose it would have been produced by some body, in so long time as this question has been canvased in the world. In the mean time we have no reason, till it do appear, to believe there is any which can appear: and to urge us, before, to take their persuasions for true, is plainly to urge us to do, what we have no reason to do.  
That actually those persuasions were not true, all those must hold, who hold the deposing doctrine false. And they have to say for themselves, that it is a new doctrine begun in the 11th. age, against the doctrine and practice of ten Ages before: That it is opposite to the doctrine of Christ, who taught us that his Kingdom was not of this world; and by his Apostle that of necessity, we are to be subject to the temporal power, and this for conscience, and that who resist it procure their own damnation: That it confounds the two supreme and independent powers, and the obedience of their subjects, rendering it impossible to know how to carry themselves, when those powers clash, and secure themselves from falling either to God or Caesar: That with an impracticable and impossible project it ●ets up one universal Monarch both in Spirituals and Temporals; of which inconvenience the verbal evasions which are alleged, when they come to be fi●ted prove merely verbal: with the rest of what they urge, who appear for that way. As I am no farther concerned than to answer the Argument in hand, viz. Councils proceeded on contrary persuasions; therefore that doctrine is false. I shall content myself with saying, upon the warrant of the reasons before alleged, that it is a weak and unconclusive Argument, and that to stretch it farther, to engage Faith and the Church for that side, is much weaker.  
Because the question moved by the Author of the Preface to these Treatises, concerning Transubstantiation, belongs to the Coancil of Lateran, I think it best, before I pass farther, to gratify his desire, but briefly, and as is proper for one who is about other business. For the difference he would see, betwixt the coming in of Transubstantiation and Deposition: we hold the one came in with Christianity, the other is not come in yet. And flatly deny what he assumes, that the same approbation of the Church is, or can be produced for both. For what he says, that they have the same Popes and Councils for them, I understand not what it can mean more, than the Authority of the Council, and the Pope who held it. And by what has been said I conceive he will observe difference enough betwixt the two doctrines. The one was plainly defined, the other barely supposed. The Definition agreed with the Law written in the hearts of the Faithful: the supposition shockt it. And so the one was readily embraced: the other could never get quiet possession. Besides if he think Transubstantiation has all its firmness from this Council, I beseech him, in my turn, to reflect, how it happens, that 'tis believed by those who perhaps never heard of the Council. Or if they did, do not value it, as having left communion with the See of Rome, long before the Council was held. I beseech him again to be contented with this little: thinking it very improper to enter far into the Merits of such a cause as Transubstantiation, which deserves and requires exact handling, in a Treatise of another subject. To mingle such disparate matters is but to spoil both.  
The 5th. point which he will undertake to show is, That all Catholic Divines and Casuists that have treated of it, from the first to the last (afore Calvins time) in all the several Nations of Christendom, have asserted this power of the Pope, without so much as one contradicting it in all that time. This Topick, I must confess, frighted me. For what? Must a man be obliged to read all the Divines and all the Casuists of all the Nations in Christendom before Calvin? Has this Gentleman who so confidently undertakes for all, read half of them? Can he answer there is a man in the world who has? If to see the truth of this allegation be necessary to the decision of the question, the question never will be decided. If it may be decided at all, it must be by some other means, and the allegation is plainly impertinent.  
But I must tell him 'tis impertinent on another score. Divines and Casuists are Scholars, men who undertake to prove what they say; and when their proof is good, what they say is to be accepted for the sake of that proof, not for theirs. For they may and do often mistake, and are freely and irreprehensibly contradicted every day. Wherhfore let what he says be supposed true, which whether it be or not, neither he or any man else can tell: and I believe before we have done, there will appear some reason to think it not true: but yet let it be allowed, that all Divines, and all Casuists, and all Canonists, whom he afterwards adds, have asserted this doctrine: I ask whether in this great crowd, there be any one who has brought a convincing proof of what he says? If there be, let that proof be produced; for that alone will do the business. No matter who says it, or whether any besides himself ere thought of it. But if there be none, the thing remains still unproved; for the say of ten times as many more without proof, does not make proof.  
If this Gentleman think number signifys any thing in this case, it will concern him to teach us, how multitude gives authority to those, who pretend to none but in virtue of their proofs, and which way many not-provers should become provers.  
And when all is done, though he could produce this proof, (which if he thought he could, I suppose he would not sand us to look for it where possibly 'tis not to be found) it would not be enough for his undertaking. For he takes upon him to prove his opinion to be Faith, and proof from Scholars, stretch it to the uttermost, will not reach farther than to prove it true, which a thing may be, and not be Faith neither. So that by the favour of this Gentleman's learning, this big sounding Topick is wondrous slender in point of sense: and when he has shown it, he will only have showed himself ● mighty well-read man in things, which deserve not altogether such pains.  
But how will he show it too? For to my thinking, it is something a difficult matter, to crowd such a number of Authors into the small space he has left of his short Treatise. You may, says he, see it abundantly proved by that admirable man Card▪ Perron in his Oration, etc. Truly that speech is something longer than this writing; but yet Cardinal Perron is an admirable man indeed, if he can make it▪ though it were longer than it is, hold them all. But I observe it is with this Gentleman as with the generality of the world, among whom performances ar● not altogether so large as promises. He undertakes for all Catholic Divines and Casuists, and when he comes to make good this undertaking, these All shrink into scholastical Divines, etc. Alas! was there no Divinity in the world; no skill in cases and the Laws of the Church, before the School? Are the Fathers no body, or have they said nothing relating to this matter? Does it no way concern us, That the Clemency of God and tears of Christians are their only remedy against Persecutors? That to resist otherwise than with tears and sighs, Priests neither aught nor can. That Princes have none on Earth who may correct them: That Kings are free from the bonds of delinquency. That no laws punish them who are safe by the power of their Empire, and not accountable to men. That the spiritual Key extends not itself to Temporals without arrogance. That the Church has no power but spiritual: and that to quicken not kill. That the Bishop has no power to meddle with the Palace, and Regal dignity. That Popes, holy and wise and great Popes professed they aught obedience to Emperors, and were subject to their commands. This was doctrine taught in the Church before Calvin, by those who passed for Divines in their days, and if this Gentleman would but give them his good word, I think might do so still. And this doctrine being evidently irreconcilable with a power in the Pope, which extends to temporals, corrects Princes with temporal penalties, causes them to be resisted by violence and Arms, in fine▪ with deposing doctrine: it is evidently undeniable, that some Catholic Divines have not asserted that power of the Pope.  
However because he says the Cardinal has proved the contrary, we will wait on the Cardinal, if only for the curiosity of seeing an impossible thing once come to pass. There the proof dwindles again, into those of his own Nation. Of these he names half a dozen, who, he says, have more exalted the Pope's power, and whose words he therefore forbears to cite. And 'tis very likely that more than six have exalted the Pope's power above what is fitting. Those whose words he quotes, are S. Thomas, (reckoning him among the French, because he studied and wrote in France,) Occam, John of Paris, Almain, and Gerson: choosing them, because they specify the case of Heresy or Apostasy, and because the four last have written in behalf of Princes against Popes.  
St. Thomas s●ys, the dominion of Infidel's way be taken away by the 
2. 2. q. 10. a. 10. 2. 2. q. 12. ●. 2. Comment. ●n Ep. ad Corinth.  Church, and that by Excommunication for Apostasy in Faith, subjects are obsolved from subjection, and the Oath of Fidelity. And St. Thom●● says elsewhere, that subjection even to infidel Princes is by divine right, and that for that reason, the faithful cannot ●e hindered from appearing before their Tribunals. So that in this matter he is looked upon as not throughly settled, and constant to himself, and may be let alone. The reason he gives of the first assertion, is because Infidel Princes deserve to loose their dominion. Which is sufficiently canvased betwixt Bellarmin and the two Barclays; to whom they may resort, whose curiosity will carry them so far. It seems odd enough, to make Demerit in them a premise to infer Power in the Pope: nor can I imagine which way they will be joined together. Since St. Thomas himself has not connected them, I conceive it belongs to him to do it, who expects this authority should work upon us. Of the 2d. I see no reason at all, save that 'tis insinuated▪ that Apostasy may do a great deal of harm. But how that harm should make a spiritual censure have a temporal effect, neither S. Thomas says, nor any body I think can understand. In cases of Temptation from imminent dangers; the Christian remedy as I conceive, is a more diligent and careful practice of virtue, and obedience to Princes in lawful matters I always took to be one.  
The next is Occam, who says the Pope cannot ordinarily depose Emperors or Kings, if his fault be not of the number of spiritual crimes. 
Lib. 8. quest. q. 2. ●. 8.  And it is true, that Occam says so, but whether he thought so, is uncertain. For he declares he will not discover what he held himself, but only so relate what is alleged on both sides, as to conceal to which he adhears. And so gives the words cited for an answer which some make to an objection urged in behalf of the Pope; but tells us in the same place, that there are others who say, the Popes who deposed the Emperors, Otho and Frederic, did amiss; usurping a power which they had not. And elsewhere he says, there is, 
Dial. p. 3. Tract. 1. c. 13. 16.  among divers others, one opinion which gives the Pope a plenitude of power, that is of doing whatever is not contrary to the law of God and nature, and this by Devine Right; according to which he may depose Princes, etc. not regularly, but on occasion, Casualiter, as he calls it. But he says too, there is another, which denys the Pope has any such power, whether by Divine or Human right, whether regularly or casually. So that by the Cardinal's favour, it is manifest out of this Author, whom he produces for the contrary, that there were before Calvins time, Divines who, without any exception of Heresy, or the like, flatly denied the deposing power.  
John of Paris is cited in this manner: If a Prince were an Heretic and incorrigible, and a contemner of the Church's censure, the Pope might do something in the behalf of (he should have said, In, or among, or with) the people: whereof might ensue, that he should be deprived of his secular dignity, and deposed by the people. And this the Pope may do in an Ecclesiastical crime (for so the words would be rendered) the cognizance whereof appertaineth to him, viz. by excommunicating all them who should obey such an one as their Lord. And there the Cardinal stops. It follows in the same period, And so the people would depose him, and the Pope by accident. Than he adds, so likewise on the other side, if a Pope should be criminal, and scandalise the Church, and be incorrigible, The Prince might Excommunicate him indirectly, and depose him by accident, namely, by moving, (perhaps admonishing for I suspect an error in the press) him by himself and the Cardinals. And if the Pope would not acquiesce, he might do something with the people, by which the Pope should be compelled to yield, and be deposed by the people: because the Emperor under corporal penalties, and forfeit of their goods, might forbidden all and every one to obey and 〈◊〉 the Pope, and th●● they can do one to another. If I understand English, what John of Paris says, is, that Deposition is wrought, not by the Pope, but people, and that the Pope's part in it is no other, than the part of Princes in Excommunication. And because he says also (and this is the very period whereof the Cardinal ●i●es a part) that the utmost penalty which the Ecclesiastical ●●dge can 〈…〉 Excommunication, or some such spiritual penalty, and that he 〈…〉 more, unless by accident, that is according to his exp●●●ation▪ a● a Prince can Excommunicate▪ I conceive he says 〈…〉 cannot depose, and that here is another Divine before 〈◊〉 who ●ays, what this Gentleman would persuade ●s none ever did.  
Out of Alm●in the Cardinal brings two places▪ The first makes Occam ●ay, that in case a secular Prince 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉 to the ruin of Christianism or Faith, it is not to be denied (Almains words are, Occam denys not) but that the Pope may depose him, though other Doctors deny it. And here again I think 'tis plain, that there were Doctors who denied the deposing power, whatever Occam did, who as has been observed before argues, and answers according to the several opinions, than on ●oot relating all, and standing to none. The second barely mentions the two places out of Occam, and John of Paris, before set down, by way of relation, without any addition of moment.  
Gerson says, The power Ecclesiastic aught not to presume, or usurp 
De Ecclesias. & Politica Potest. C●●sid. 12.  over the Rights, Dignitys, Laws, and Judgements of the secular power, but when the abusing of the secular power redounds to the impugnation of Faith, and blasphemy of the Creator and manifest injury of the power Ecclesiastic. For than a remembrance must be had of the last clause of this Consideration; that in these cases the power Ecclesiastic hath a certain dominion regitive, directive, regulative, and ordinative. Truly this is not so much, as, I am persuaded will freely be allowed. The Anti-Deposers, forasmuch as I can gather by their writings, will not boggle at a Coercive too, provived it keep within its proper bound, of spirituality. I think they make no doubt but if a Layman, whether private man or Prince, do any thing contrary to the Law of God, the Ecclesiastical power may, nay, aught direct, and regulate, and order, and govern this man according to that Law, (which is all that Gerson says here,) and also by separating him from the communion of the saithful, and participation of the benefits of the Church, compel him. But they do not think the temporal goods, which he abuses, may therefore be taken from him by the Ecclesiastical power. This Gerson says not. On the contrary in his 4th. Consideration, he delivers his opinion for the opposite, in the modest way of intitling it to others. There are says he, who say that this (viz. Excommunication) is the last penalty which the Ecclesiasticai power of Jurisdiction can inflict by the sole primary institution of Christ: what they do more, as when they imprison, or punish corporally, being by the concession of Princes.  
These are all the Divines, whose words are produced by the Cardinal. Whereof four flatly say the contrary of what he pretends, and 5th. speaks on both sides, but with a good reason when he is against him, and none when he is for him. And this is the abundant proof of all Divines, and all Nations which this Gentleman promised. There are besides 2 or 3 Canonists alleged, with whom I will have nothing to do, because I think they have not much to do with the business. They are to tell us what the Pope has commanded. What power he has to command I conceive we are to learn of some body else. And so much for the abundant proof.  
But there is besides, as he says, a convincing one. And that is, that neither Withrington, nor any body else, before Calvin, has been able to produce so much as one Catholic Author that denied this power in the Pope absolutely, or in any case whatsoever. If this be true, they are the more beholding to Cardinal Perron who has produced such Authors for them. But have not they produced them too? Have they not added others, who say, that whether the Pope can depose an Emperor (without exception of Heresy or other case) is a question debated among scholars, and undetermined: That 'tis a novelty not to say heresy: That if these depositions of Kings and Emperors, Translations of Empire and the rest, should move the Pope to do the like, he must know, if Religion and Humility would permit, they might all be truly and most clearly answered. Have they not brought others who teach doctrine absolutely inconsistent with his Tenet; as the Independency of the two powers, the confinement of the Ecclesiastical to spiritual matters, the subjection of Princes to God alone, etc. If he will say these determine not the question, because they speak not particularly of the Pope, & deposing, & Heresy, he may as rationally say, that nothing was taught contrary to Arianism before the Council of Nice, because the word Consubstantial was than first used. In short, this is to say, there is no meat on the board, because it is not served up as he would have it. And if this Argument convince any thing, it is, that he has taken little heed to what has been said on the other side.  
The 6th and last head is, that all Catholic Emperors, Kings (yea even they who were deposed) States, Magistrates, and Lawyers, and finally, all the Catholics in the world, for the time being, have (by tacit consent at lest) approved and received this Doctrine of Popes, Divines, and Casuists, and these Censures, Canons, and Practices of Popes and general Councils. Magnificently said! Why what a glorious noise does this approbation of the whole world make? How do you show this, I beseech you? for this is worth seeing. Have you National Acts of all the Countries in Christendom to produce, wherein these doctrines and practices are approved and received? On the contrary, are there not some Catholics, and some Magistrates, who to your knowledge do not approve and receive them, and whom you call wicked Catholics, and in damnable error for their pains? I pray, Sir, let us see your proof. Truly you must excuse him for that matter. It is too severe to expect the performance of impossibilities. And so he never so much as goes about to bring any proof at all of this big undertaking. The terrible cloud, which threatens the approbation of all the world, vanishes at last into the thin imperceptible mist of tacit consent. And so much if you will allow him, why so. If not, you may let it alone as he does: for he takes no more care about that neither, than barely to say it.  
Now I would feign know what this tacit consent means. The world, as it must always hap, was on those occasions divided into Concerned, and Unconcerned People who were unconcerned did than, as they always did, and always will do, look on, and see what's past, and mind their own business, and let others do what they think fit in theirs. May this be what he calls tacit consent? If their acting, or rather not acting, in this manner signify their consent, plainly they consented to both sides, to what was done against, as well as what was done for the Pope. Besides I have not heard silence interpreted for consent, unless where persons are concerned to speak; and than if they hold their tongues, they may be thought to like that, of which they show no dislike. Otherwise silence may be an Argument of noconcern, but none of consent.  
For the Concerned, though he have discovered the gift he has of confidence more than once. yet I cannot but wonder to see it could carry him to make them, too, of the party, and all, and always, the very deposed Princess themselves and all. May we in earnest rely upon it? For methinks 'tis strange, that all deposed Princes should submit quietly, without making any bustle; and the world hear no more on't. Was there never any opposition, no complaints in words, no defence of those complaints by deeds? To bid like a fair Chapman, can he name the single Prince, for whose tacit consent he can so undertake, as to perform when he has done? This I am sure, that the two he names, Frederick the 2d and Henry the 4th, were not altogether so meek. The first kept his Empire, in spite of all opposition, till his death, and in the mean time afflicted the Pope, and his partakers, with calamities which made him weary of his Life. The other made a woeful bustle for many years, overcame divers of the Competitors set up against him, and held good till his own son, as he complains, shamefully betrayed him, and forced him to resign. And after all, was in a fair way of recovering all again, when death put an end to his life, and the quarrel together, the only end which the business had.  
Saving his better judgement, I should think these things made some noise, and cannot very properly be termed tacit, nor consent, nor approbation neither, unless Enemies be said to approve one another's quarrel, who are together by the ears about it. I should think too that these two Princes could not make all this bustle alone, and that they had some, and a great many, who took their parts, and that strongly and constantly; and that these were Catholics, unless it be shown of what Heresy they were guilty. For as for the Henrician Heresy, than coined to reproach them with, it signifys no more than opposers of the Pope. And the question being whether those opposers were Catholic, it is to beg it, to say they were not, but Henricians: or in other words, the opposers were not Catholics, but opposers.  
Their actions therefore plainly show little consent. Let us hear their words. He tells us. p. 11 that the Emperor Frederick never excepted to the sentence against him, as given a non Judice. I cannot tell which failed him, his Information, or his memory; but one was much too blame. By his often citing Matthew Paris I should guests he had read him. And 'tis strange he should forget what the Emperor writes in a letter to the Prelates and Nobility of England, set down in the year 1646. The words are these, Considerent etiam, &c, Consider also what Justice is to be reputed in the process issued out against us: or by what name it must go, if it may be called a sentence which is published by an Incompetent Judge. For although at the suggestion of our Catholic Faith, according to our duty, we do openly confess, that a full power in spirituals is given by God to the Bishop of the Roman See, how great a sinner soever (which God forbidden) he be, so that what he binds on Earth is bound in Heaven, and what he loosens is loosed; yet it is no where read, that it is granted to him by Divine or human Law, that he may at his pleasure transfer Empires, or judge of temporally punishing the Kings and Princes of the Earth by deposing them from their Kingdoms.  
Again, in his letter to the King the year before, Quid enim vobis, etc. For what is not every particular King of his particular Kingdom to fear from the face of such a Prince of the Priesthood? if we both by solemn Election of the Princes, and approbation of the whole Church, while it flourished with the Faith and Religion of the Clergy, honoured from Heaven with the Imperial crown, and magnificently governing other noble Kingdoms, be attempted to be deposed by him▪ whom it concerns not to exercise any severity upon us, as to damage in Temporals, although just causes were made out. But we are neither the first nor the last, whom the abuse of sacer dotal power does thus molest, and endeavour to throw down from the top to the bottom.  
In another letter to the French, he speaks thus: Cum per aliquot, etc. 
Ap. Jo. Barcl. infinc Lib.  Because we do with good reason hold ourselves, and other Kings, Princes of the world, and Noblemen having Kingdoms, Principalities, honours of whatever kind, and Jurisdiction, aggrieved by some preceding and the present Bishop of the Roman See, in this, That They, contrary to God and Justice usurp to themselves a power, Jurisdiction, and Authority to set up Emperors, Kings and Princes, or whatsoever Potentates, and pulling down, or removing them from their Empire, Kingdoms, Principalitys, and Honours, exercising temporal Authority temporally over them, absolving also Vassals from the Oaths by which they are tied to their Lords, only by promulgating the sentence of Excommnnication against those Lords, etc. I forbear to inquire how it happened, that he could so much mistake in what he says of this Emperor. But I think that 'tis very plain he did mistake, and that this Emperor speaks too loudly and positively to pass for a tacit Consenter.  
Henry the 4th. delivers his sentiments in the letter formerly cited by this Gentleman. Sed Tu, etc. But you took our humility for fear, And therefore have not feared to rise up against the very Regal power granted us by God, which you have dared to threaten to take away from us, as if we had received our Kingdom from you: as if Kingdoms and Empires were in your, and not in God's hand, etc. Again, But what says the true Pope St. Peter? Fear God, Honour the King. But you, because you do not fear God, have dishonoured me his substitute. Whence St. Paul where he spares not an Angel from Heaven if he preach otherwise, has not excepted you teaching otherwise on Earth. For he says: If any, whether I, or an Angel from Heaven Evangelize to you otherwise than we have Evangelized, let him be Anathema. You than condemned by this Anathema, and the judgement of all our Bishops, descend, etc. What think you Sir? does he tacitly consent to that Pope's doctrine and proceed, who tells him, that his attempt upon Regal power, incurred the Anathema of the Apostle? It should seem too there were Bishops also, more than one, who concurred with him in these sentiments, and consented no more than Herald  
Suitably in his letter to Ann● Arch Bishop of Cole●, he speaks thus.  enim. For to mention a few things of many: He has usurped to himself, without the privity of God, both Kingdom and Priesthood. In which he has contemned the pious ordination of God, who would have the two, that is the Kingdom and Priesthood, consist principally in two, not in one, etc. He has studied also to deprive me, whom God called to the Kingdom, not him to the Priesthood, of my Kingdom, because he saw I would hold it from God, not from him, because he made me not King, threatening to take from me both Kingdom and life, whereof he gave neither. This too in my opinion sounds nothing like consent. It is plain he dissented, and dissented on those grounds which move others to descent now, viz. the disjunction and Independency of the two supreme powers, taught by the Father's.  
I will add a passage out of the nameless Author, who writes, this Emperor's life, a friend indeed to him, but no enemy to the Pope. Having said, the Pope, surreptitioufly deluded, by the crimes saigned against him, and the honour of creating a King deceitfully offered him, excommunicated the King, and absolved his subjects from the Oath which they had taken to him: He adds, which Fact displeased many (if it be lawful to be displeased at what the Pope does) and they affirmed that what was done, was done both inefficaciously, and unlawfully. But I dare not set down their assertions, jest I seem with them to condemn the Pope's do. By this again it appears, that there were disapprovers, and many, in those days, as well as now. And it appears too why they make no more noise. People were shy to censure the actions of Popes. And so they are still. And I hope it will be no imputation upon Catholics, that Inferiors are possessed with respect for their Superiors.  
In the latter contests betwixt the Emperor Lewis of Bavaria, and his contemporary Popes, the world was still the same. There is extant in Goldastus an Information, in behalf of the Emperor against the Pope, which alleges several reasons for the nullity of the Pope's proceed. The first is, The Pope, however Catholic and lawful he be, has not power, nor authority, or Jurisdiction in Temporals, and chief over the rights of the Empire, which is immediately from God. Again, whence also appears, that these sentences were pronounced by ano●-Judge since the Pope is not Judge of the Emperor in temporals, how much lesle in a cause of the Empire, of which Temporals depend, as appears, etc. I had not cited this passage for the Author's sake joannes de janduno (for it bears his name) who I suspected might be joannes de janduno, one who passes for an Heretic, if the preface had not informed me the true Author was Henricus de Chal●e●, a Friar, and Chancellor of the Emperor, in whose defence he writes. Not but that he too is branded with suspicion, at lest of Heresy, by the Pope. But neither did the Pope himself scape free. And should we harken to none, who are aspersed with that reproach on the one side, or the other, perhaps there will remain no body to give us information what passed in those days.  
This Emperor was contemporary with Edward the 3d. of England. What has happened, of this nature, since that time, is pretty fresh in our memories, and needs not be looked for in books. By what is said, I think we may safely conclude, the world was than, as now, divided into Approvers, and Disapprovers of Deposing doctrine: and that there was no time in which there were not Disapprovers, save when there were no Approvers. For I think it something a harder task to show, that Deposing doctrine has always been in the world, than that it was not contested, when it did appear. And yet that is so hard, that this Gentleman, as confidently as he undertakes it, has not brought one single word to prove it: and we have seen plain enough why he could not.  
There remains the Conclusion, in which assuming, in confidence of his proofs, that his doctrine has been, (for one Age at lest) the Doctrine of the Church, he infers; If it be an Error the Church was at that time a wicked Church; if otherwise, those are wicked men who oppose it. I have given my reasons why I conceive his proofs will not bear him out, to fix his Doctrine on the Church. 'Tis the Readers right to judge between us: and to him I leave it.  
But suppose I should say, that since the Church is a Congregation of Faithful, and Faithful are men, that word Church may signify either the Faithful, or the men. Suppose too that all the men of the Church, should at some time, have held his doctrine, which is a great deal more than can be proved, because indeed it is not true; but yet suppose it. If he will infer from this supposition, the Church held it, the word Church, to make his inference true, must be taken materially, in the latter sense. Otherwise, according to the Catholic method, the men of the Church bear not the denomination of a Church, but where they hold from Christ, uninterrupted Tradition. And till he make it appear they hold his doctrine in this manner, they may hold it as long as they will, and as many as they will, and not hold it as Faithful, but as Scholars, or how you william.  
If he infer farther, the Church held it, therefore the Church was a wicked Church: because Church, unless the contrary be declared, is understood in the first sense, formally: The Argument is a plain Sophism, taking the word Church in a different signification, materially in the Antecedent, formally in the Conclusion.  
But will it follow at lest, that all the men of the Church were, in that supposition, wicked, and in damnable error? First, I should think this is no such ruinous inconvenience, though it were admitted. For since All, in this case, can signify no more than those All, who concerned themselves in the question, which the far greatest part of Catholic mankind cannot rationally be thought to have done; though All these were damned, there would still remain enough, in whose salvation the perpetual goodness of God, and care of his creatures, would sufficiently appear.  
Yet I cannot think that even so much would follow. They would indeed be in error; neither has God promised any security against it, but in his doctrine, & the voice of the Church to tell us which it is. If men will go otherways, it is at their own peril. But I see no necessity, that this Error should damn, or fix the name of wicked upon them. To be deceived in speculation, & act upon a deceived, so it be a sincere judgement, I have not heard has undergon these harsh censures in other cases  
I▪ but 'tis a damnable sin to withstand the rights of Princes; to be the occasion of war, and Bloodshed, etc. To withstand indeed is damnable; but I do not understand it is so to mistake them. Likewise to make an unjust war is damnable, but if it be thought just, though falsely, yet uprightly, sure there is hope of mercy, or more Christians are in a damnable state upon this account, than for denying the deposing doctrine. Alas! The Rights, even of Princes are not things fixed by the eternal law of God, in an Indivisible point, beyond which if a man hap to tread, he stumbles irrecoverobly into Hell. They depend on human constitutions, and are greater here, lesle there, different every where. They may be, and every day are mistaken, and Princes prosecute these mistakes (for when they differ, they cannot both be in the right) by Arms. Yet if their own conscience condemn them not, no body else does that I know. Churchmen may mistake them as will as others. They having no privilege, that I know, to secure them from error, but by sticking to the S●mper & Vbique & ab omnibus. Which rule whether it be appliable to this case, or at lest to all circumstances of it, may possibly be a question: but I know no other they have. And when they do mistake, I see not why they are more wicked, or their errors more concern the Church than those of the Laity in the same case. But this I only think by the by, to show there are more ways to the wood than one, if there were occasion, and that I took his, more by choice than necessity. I thought it needless to beaten out a new path while there lay one plain and easy before me. For indeed his opinion was never universal at any time. The quarrel, for the most part, was betwixt Pope and Emperor. Italians and Germane sided part with one, part with the other. Not Arms only, but Counsels too, were on both sides. Who thinks in the choice of parties, they were all guided purely by conscience, I doubt has little observed the Histories of those times: in which, besides other things, we find they frepuently changed sides, as their Interest led them. Other Nations looked unconcernedly on, till it came to their own doors; and than they did as much as they thought expedient, not always all they thought lawful. And so it remains at this day, when People act not, till occasion prompt them, and than are guided in their Actions by expedience. In the mean time, for reverence to the Pope, private men according to the example of their Ancestors, if ●hey think contrary to what the Pope does, are willing to keep their thoughts to themselves. And that is the reason, as I conceive, of that silence, from whence he takes occasion to infer a tacit consent.  
To take leave of this Gentleman and his Argument at last, and even accounts at parting: six of his ten proofs, that is more than half of the whole, belong to the Head of the Pope, which would have been granted without one, and when it is so, does not do the business, I think, even in his own Judgement. Three more, whereof one I thought needless to take notice of, belong to the Councils of Lateran and Lions, which how he would apply, he leaves us to guests. The remaining one sends us to Cardinal Perron, where how we speed, you have heard. And for his 6th. Head, which sounds so big, there is no proof at all. And this is the sum total of his performance.  
The Argument is borrowed from Cardinal Perron where it shows a great deal better, dressed up in the ornaments of Rhetoric, than stripped and exposed naked, as his Logic presents it. It is in short; All Catholics at one time held so and so, therefore the Church did. Whereof the Antecedent is manifestly false: and if it were true, the Conclusion would not follow. He ends with a touch upon the Sorbonists, Friars, and Blacloists, to whom if he have a pique, methinks some other pretence of quarrel might have been thought of, besides their Fidelity to their Prince and Country. For sure that is not a crime which can justly deserve his displeasure, and couple them with Libertines, and Politicians and Atheists. And yet, to see how the world goes, quippi●●g language is not the worst, which some of them have suffered, upon that account. But they are men who can speak for themselves, ●if they please, and I love not to thrust my sickle into other folk's harvest.   

AN ANSWER TO THE Second Treatise.  

CHAP. I II.  
WE are now come to another Author, and indeed another Question. Whether Deposing be Catholic Doctrine, being very different from, Whether the Oath of Allegiance may be taken. This Gentleman declines the first, saying it is as far from his thoughts, as foreign to his 
P. 2.  purpose. In which I must at the very first dissent from him. For I conceive that all else is foreign to this purpose. But it being certainly foreign to both our Purposes, the satisfaction of the Reader, to detain him long with useless Preambles, I think it best, without more ado, to fall to the business.  
The first Chapter is spent in stating the Question, which he solicitously 
I.  puts us in mind is not, Whether a Catholic may deny, etc. the Pope's Power to depose Princes, but Whether he may deny, etc. by Oath, and universally abjure it? To deny, and to deny by Oath, are indeed different things: but yet in this case, not to deny by Oath, I suspect will be thought to amount to, not to deny. It is true, in ordinary conversation, we often say what we would be loathe to swear. We speak unadvertingly, on slight surmises, or idle hearsays, and are so understood. If we say what proves false, none lays more than lightness to our charge. For indeed Man would be a very unsociable Animal, if in Company nothing could be uttered but Demonstration. But if we be urged to swear what we say, and refuse it, that refusal is a plain unsaying it; nor will any man believe what we say, or think we expect to be believed. Except Quakers, no honest man ever refused to swear what he seriously and steadily persists to say, in a matter of importance, and where his Oath is duly required. I mean according as he deliberately says; that is, if he say he knows, or thinks, or has heard, etc. He will swear he knows it, that is positively, or thinks, or has heard it. For since an Oath is the assurance we give, that we speak according to our conscience, who will not give that assurance, had as good say, he speaks against his conscience. At lest People will be apt to suspect so: and not altogether without ground, if they cannot be assured of the contrary.  
Now when he makes the state of the Question consist, in denying by Oath, I suppose he means in that manner in which the Oath requires the denial should be made. That is, as the Oath explains itself, according to the plain and common sense of the words. Taking which consideration along with us, I think we shall not fall out about the state of the Question.  
In the next Chapter he gins to argue, and from the authority of Trithemius, and Experience, assumes first, that the point has been long, and still is under debate, and may be so, for aught we know, 500 years hence. This is both undeniably true, and withal a full answer to the former Treatise. For if this Question has been disputed among Catholics, these 500 years, and may be 500 more, I hope none will say it belongs to Faith, but he, who has a mind to give those who are of different Persuasions in Religion, the satisfaction of seeing it confessed by ourselves, that we have not of a long time been agreed about matters of Faith, and in all likelihood never shall.  
He proceeds in this manner: Since likewise, when a point is thus in dispute among Catholic Princes (by the way, that Princes I take to be an error of the Press, because he began with Scholars, and if he do not continued on with them, the discourse is not constant to itself) no one can determinately swear to either side of the point in dispute, as true, etc. I marry! this will do it, if it be true. If no point in dispute can be sworn, this of the Pope's Power undoubtedly cannot. I hope he will bring very good proof of this Universal, both because all the stress lies upon it, and because indeed it sounds something like a Paradox. For few things at this rate will remain, which may be sworn in the World, where almost every thing is in dispute. Besides, 'tis a clear case, that one of the Contradictories is true, and I know not why some body may not see that truth. And 'twould be strange, if he who sees the truth, may not swear, because, who sees it not continues to dispute. As clear as it is, that the Question is disputed betwixt the disagreeing parties, it is not lesle clear, that it is not disputed among those who are agreed. Must their conduct depend on the good pleasure of the other? Must they ask those others leave to say, or swear, what they think themselves? and not take the liberty till all the World think as they do?  
This seems very strange. But yet because strange things now and than come to pass, it is not reasonable his proof should far e'er the worse for being unexpected, provided it be good. This it is: For, says he, this were to swear a thing as true, or to abjure it as false, which is confessedly in dispute whether it be so or not, which is never lawful. How, Sir! never lawful? pray let us consider a little. The proposition to be proved was this: Not point in dispute can be sworn. The proof is, It is never lawful to swear a point in dispute. Why this is saying the same thing in different words, For, It is not lawful to swear, and we cannot swear, signify the same. This is not a reason, but a repetition. When I demanded proof of a proposition which seemed strange, I desired to know, why we could not swear a disputed point, that is, why it is not lawful so to do. The satisfaction he gives me is, that 'tis never lawful. Which is to say, It is not lawful, because it is not lawful. I suspect few will be satisfied with such a proof, and that whosoever thinks the first proposition false, will very hardly be brought to think it a jot the truer, for being otherwise worded; Cannot, only changed into, 'Tis not lawful.  
Hence, he conceives, that for the deciding our Question, there needs no other than barely to suppose it is a Question. For if it be a Question whether the Pope hath such Power, no man can safely swear that without all question he has none. He says, Without all question; because what we swear as true, aught to be unquestionably such, otherwise we fall under the guilt and sacrilege of Perjury. The art of setting of things to advantage, does well in all Trades. This chimes a little more pleasantly, but 'tis the same Tune still. Hence signifies, from having said twice over one of the premises, viz. that we cannot lawfully, or safely swear, he makes it follow, at last, that we cannot safely swear. The rest is the beauty of a Rhetorical Figure, to make it show more handsomely.  
We cannot swear, The Pope without all question has no Power, if it be a question, whether he have or no. True: but whoever went about, or was required to swear, that there is no question made in the World of the Pope's Power? Does he in earnest think those he opposes, of such lost Consciences, that they would swear this? Or Protestants so unreasonable to exact it? They who know altogether as well as we, for they have the same Books to inform them, that there is a question, and who made the Oath of Allegiance for this very reason, because they knew there was one, and desired to know what we held concerning it.  
But he says without all question, because what we swear as true, aught to be unquestionably such. I have already said that there is no question among those who are agreed of it. What they swear is to them unquestionable. Nor do I think any can swear, who questions or doubts the truth of what he swears. But if he think a man, who is satisfied himself cannot swear, because another man is not, he must prove it, if he will have it granted. This is the knot of the business; towards the losing of which I do not found it contributes any thing, to say It is a point in question, more than, as he said before, that 'tis a point in dispute. So that as far as I see, we are even just where we were.  
For a more full evidence, He falls to discourse of the nature of Oaths, and concludes very truly, That to speak contrary to what a man thinks in his Conscience, is a Lie, and to swear so, Perjury. This contrariety, or contradiction, he says, may hap two ways. Either by knowing, or being conscious, that what we swear is not true: or by not knowing, and therefore doubting, or having just cause to doubt whether it be true or no. And this is also true. Only I take him to mean that this not knowing, and doubting, and having just cause to doubt, must be in the Conscience of him who can be perjured by them. And for Doubting, that indeed can hardly be out of it. For no man, I think, can doubt, and not know that he does so. But we see it often hap, that he who knows not, takes himself to know, and that he who has cause enough to doubt, for all that, does not doubt. Let this man swear what he thinks he knows, but does not, and what he has just cause to doubt of, but is not ware of it: I gather from this Gentleman's Doctrine, that whether what he swear be true or false (which altars not the case) he is not perjured, because he does not contradict his conscience, and has no secret checks, and inward protestations against his Action. Whether he sin or not, is another question, to enter into which, were to go out of our way at present: in likelihood we shall meet with it again: But according to this Gentleman, it is not the sin of Perjury. Otherwise his two ways of Perjury, or contradicting the conscience, would be, one by contradicting, and the other by not contradicting it. But, I suppose, we both mean the same. What use he will make of this full evidence, we must expect from what follows, this being all he says here.   

CHAP. III.  
THe next Chapter tells us, that swearing according to the best of the swearers knowledge, will not serve turn: and that we must remember not lesle is required, than to swear according to a true knowledge, etc. And this is neatly set of with a wish, that Knowledge may signify Knowledge, that the best of his knowledge may not prove the best of his no-knowledge, etc. As ignorant as I am myself, I yet think so well of Knowledge, that I am glad to see somebody stand up for her: and hearty wish as he does, that only Knowledge may pass for Knowledge, and her name and esteem not to be abused and usurped wrongfully.  
But I desire to know who it is that is thus severe, and requires no lesle than true Knowledge in our case? Whether it be the nature of the thing, so that severely true Knowledge be a necessary and indispensable condition in all Oaths? or whether Protestants do particularly require it to the Oath os Allegiance?  
If he say the first, I doubt he, who is so careful to bid us remember, has himself forgot what he said but just before. The formal notion and malice of Perjury, in the last Chapter, consisted in swearing contrary to the inward dictates of Conscience. And 'tis beyond dispute, that those inward dictates may be made up of something short of rigorous Knowledge. It may be he will not allow a man with such dictates to swear at all; but if he do, and swear according to them, I am sure this Gentleman's Doctrine will excuse him from Perjury.  
Again, if no lesle than true Knowledge, or downright demonstration, be necessary to every assertory Oath, there are very preposterous do in the World. Magistrates do very ill to put poor people every day to their Oaths, who never heard of a demonstration, or if they did, know not what it means. And yet, I doubt, affairs of the World would go on but scurvily, if none but men of demonstration were capable to take Oaths. Mean time this custom for Magistrates to offer, and people to take Oaths, where there neither is, nor can be demonstration, has hitherto passed for irreprehensible: and I believe the Maxims which would change it, will be confuted by the exigences of the World. It being most certain, that nothing can be true, which is contrary to what is requisite for the good of mankind.  
He may possibly think the case of Tribunals different from ours; because the Oaths required there, are generally of matters subject to Sense; whereas ours can only be known by Discourse. But this difference does not hinder, but that the knowledge by Sense (I speak only of the matter in hand, of the certainty afforded by Sense in the cases wherein Oaths are required of, and taken by particulars, not meddling with the question, Whether absolute certainty may not, in due circumstances, be had by Sense?) is subject to error, as well as the knowledge by Discourse: perhaps more, but 'tis undeniably not infallible. And than the case is the same. For it imports nothing whether the knowledge, according to which we swear, be derived from Sense, or Discourse, when 'tis clear that both may fail, and he who thinks he has true knowledge either way, be deceived. Wherhfore evidently, either rigorously true knowledge, by which, I suppose, he means such as excludes all possibility of deceit, is not always necessary, or no Oath can be taken, not so much as in matters subject to Sense.  
If he think otherwise, I would ask his opinion in a case not feigned at random, but which actually happened. In a Robbery committed in some of the adjacent Countries, one of the Thiefs Horses chanced to be taken. This Horse was rid up to London, and when he came into the Town, had his Bridle given him, his Rider thinking he might possibly found out his own Inn. He passed by several, in several Streets, and at last went into one. The Ostler there being asked if he knew the Horse, replied, he did, that he usually stood there, and that he belonged to such a Gentleman. This Gentleman was taken, and the Sessions than happening to sit, arraigned and condemned, the Ostler swearing there all he had said before. And yet after all, the Gentleman innocent. A Reprieve was got, by the benefit whereof he had time to sand for his own Horse, which used to stand in that Inn, and which proved so like the other in shape, colour, size, and every way, that no eye could found any difference.  
Now would I gladly know what this Author thinks of this Case? whether this Ostler were perjured, and owed a forfeiture to the Pillory? If he think he was, He is of a different judgement from those who understood the Law, and the World better than he. For no punishment was inflicted on the Ostler, nor was it thought he deserved any. If he concur in opinion with them, he must allow an Oath, without true knowledge, may be unblamably taken. For this Ostler swore, not only what he knew not, but what was absolutely false.  
Because a little more reflection on this may peradventure unravel all the difficulty, let us consider what 'twas excused the Ostler, and whether, if what excused him be found in other swearers, it will not also excuse them. He had reason to swear, urged by the love of Justice, and called by the Magistrate. He swore according to the Dictates of his Conscience, and had such motives for those Dictates, that although they deceived him, yet no body judged that deceit, or him faulty. Let another man swear in due circumstances, according to his conscience, and with such reasons for that conscience, that if he fail, the unpassionate. World shall lay the blame upon the weakness of deceivable Nature, not on him. This man, I think, is in the Ostler's case, unperjured, and irreprehensible, even though what he swears should hap to prove false.  
I gather than, that by the Truth requisite in an Oath, and Knowledge requisite to come by that Truth, is not understood Truth in itself, or Knowledge in itself, but Truth to the Swearer, and Knowledge to the Swearer: That is, that what he swears be fixed in him as True, and Known, not as doubted, or thought, or uncertain. And, I conceive, he aught to be provided of such reasons for this fixure, that if they be supposed to fail him, no unbiast man shall think him therefore a lesle honest man, or give lesle credit to his Oath another time. If he doubt, or be conscious of any just cause of doubt, if he be ware that he does not know what he thinks he does, and yet venture to swear, I conceive the Pillory a punishment of the mildest for him, who makes so bold with the reverence due to God.  
And the reason why I am thus persuaded is, because on the one side I see all the World agrees with his former Doctrine, that Perjury consists in the opposition, not to Truth precisely, but, to Conscience. For it is indeed nothing else but a Lie sworn; and every body knows I can Lie, and yet speak truth, as likewise say what is false, and not Lye. So that it cannot be Truth in itself, but Truth to the swearer, which is expected in Oaths. On the other side, I see, that unless this were so, there could not possibly be any swearing in any case. For it being impossible to divorce ourselves from the infirmity of Nature; and Sense, and Discourse, the only ways we have to get Truth into us (I bar Faith, as unconcerning at present, and with which I will not meddle, for fear of embroiling things unnecessary) being both subject to deceit, Truth cannot otherwise be drawn from us by Oath, but as it is in us, accompanied with a possibility indeed of deceit, but against which we have used all cautions of which we are capable, and so that we remain fully satisfied, that actually we are not deceived. And who will not take Truth in this manner, must require more than can be had, and absolutely take swearing out of the World.  
But I stray, and forget that I am only to answer. To return to my task. I cannot imagine what this unbefriended Oath of Allegiance has done, to be treated with harder measure than other Oaths. I am sure he is not to learn, that his Knowledge which must signify Knowledge, is not required to swearing by every body, and that Probability will serve the turn of those who pass for knowing men. I think I need never quote for the matter, especially while the words of Suarez are to be read in the Preface. For he says, not only that Probability, with sufficient care, excuses from Perjury; but likewise that 'tis the common Doctrine. However, I will add a passage or two out of Escobar, because, I suppose, he is as good as a great many, since he pretends to writ the sense of a great many.  
He tells us, that he is perjured, who swears what he takes to be false, 
Mor. Theo.  though it be otherwise true. But not so, if he probably think it true, though it be otherwise false. Again, that in Foro conscientiae, a man 
Trac. 1. Exam. 3. C. 3. In Prax. C. 7.  may swear what he has heard from a man of credit, though not in external Courts, where he must give an account of what he says. Farther, putting this Question, Whether I who know a thing to be true, may induce another to swear it, who knows it not? He answers, Not, unless this other be first persuaded of the truth by some probable ground. For my own part, I must needs declare, I like not this Doctrine, and should not dare to swear what I thought only probable. But since (the worse luck for the World) it is, as Suarez says, common, I see not why this Gentleman needed to be more nicely scrupulous than others are, and must suspect that Kissing goes by favour in more places than one.  
In the mean time, That severe Truth in itself, and that known by severe knowledge, such as admitting no allay of human weakness is absolutely irreconcilable with all mistake, is not indispensably necessary to an Oath, I take to be both clear in itself, and clearly confessed. It remains to see, whether it be required to this particular Oath of Allegiance, by those who framed, and offer it. And because when we know what 'tis they expect from this Oath, we may judge whether this severe knowledge be necessary to that or not, let us reflect what they do, or can aim at by it.  
Is it perhaps to discover the Truth of the Question? Alas! our credit is not so great with them, that they should think any thing the more or lesle true for what we hold concerning it. They will not believe any point in difference betwixt us a jot the sooner, if we swear it five hundred and five hundred times over. They have ways of their own, on which they rely for the finding out of Truth, and care not a straw what we think of it. Again, Truth in matters of this nature, may be discovered otherwise than by Oath. Nay, an Oath is no proper means to discover it. For unless it be supposed the swearer both knows what he swears, and swears according to what he knows, his Oath is no security. But there are other means which will bring those, who faithfully pursue them, with security to her. Wherhfore I see not how it can be imagined they look for Truth itself by this Oath, while they may have that Truth without it; and if they could not, perhaps would be better content to remain ignorant, than be instructed by us.  
Allow them but common sense, and it will move us to believe they expect from the Oath, something which they cannot have without it. Of the Truth of this Question, Whether the Pope can depose? they may be, and are satisfied whether we swear or not; but what we hold concerning it, they cannot know but by our swearing. For this lies hid in our breasts till we declare it. And though we do declare what we hold, if we refuse to confirm our declaration by Oath, we free them not from the suspicion they may have that we deal not sincerely. An Oath is very proper to satisfy them in this point; and because it can satisfy them in nothing else, I think it cannot rationally be thought, they expect any thing else from it. Barely than to know what we hold, and what they cannot otherwise know but by our swearing, is all they can propose to themselves by this Oath. Whether what we hold be true or not, is no such secret, that they need Oaths, and lest of all ours, to found it out.  
Neither does it concern them what degree of certainty we have for what we hold. That belongs to our own consciences, of which we must take care, and be provided to give account to God. But for their parts, I am sure they cannot be imagined to require severe Demonstration in every one from whom they expect the Oath of Allegiance, when they offer it to those who, they know, do not understand so much as what the word means. The Law proposes it indifferently to All, to the Illiterate, Artificers, Ploughmen, Women, if I mistake not, as well as others. To think those who framed this Law so extravagant as to require, or think there can be found Demonstration in these, is in my opinion a greater extravagance.  
But they have taken so much care to explain themselves, in the words they have chosen for the Oath, that if they be mistaken, I know not how it can be otherwise than wilfully. The Wood was all in their own Power, and they might have made their Staff of what Tree they pleased. They might as easily have said, I swear the Pope has no power to depose, and I demonstratively know he has not, as, I truly and sincerely acknowledge and declare in my conscience he has not. If any words can be found which express more clearly, that what they require is, that we should acknowledge the truth of what we swear, only as it stands in our consciences, and without enquiring which way we came by it, or with what degree of certainty we hold it, I should be glad to learn what those words are.  
For my part, as I love Justice even to Enemies, I cannot but think, it would a great deal more become us to acknowledge, and thank their moderation and tenderness in this point, than to perplex ourselves and others with captious Cavils, which they seem even to have taken care to prevent. In the mean time I conceive that this severe knowledge, which he requires, is not required by any body but himself: and that enough has been said to show it, and indeed more than enough. For since he barely says so, I might have spared all this pains, and barely denied it without more ado. For, I hope, he will not pretend he has brought any proof.  
Besides the neat amplification by variety of phrase, there are but two things that look like proof. The first is, when he says, that this want of knowledge will condemn him who swears, at the bar of his own heart. And this is plainly to say, there must be something in his heart to condemn him: some consciousness that the best of his knowledge is indeed no-knowledge. Otherwise, if that best appear good and true knowledge to his heart, there is nothing there which can condemn him. The next is the Case of a Witness who should offer to swear what, being asked, he should confess he knew not; and he too is evidently conscious that he does not know. So that this being all he says, I cannot think himself will say, here is any proof, or any reason why he may not swear, whose heart is not conscious of want of knowledge.  
But though I conceive, the best of a man's knowledge is all that Protestants require in this Oath, and all that is necessary to any Oath, (I mean suppositis supponendis, that the swearer have faithfully, and to the utmost of his power laboured to satisfy himself of the truth, and satisfied himself at lest by such motives as will excuse him from blame before God and man, and that there be no passion, no rashness, no want of sincerity, etc.) yet I do not think this is all the matter will bear. Knowledge may signify Knowledge, provided it do not signify Artificial Knowledge, and be had in this case, if it be necessary, even by the unlearned. For they can tell, as well as the best Mathematician in the World, that the nearest way from Russel-street to  Church, is to go by the Dyal, not through the Arches; that more Corn will go into a round Bag, than a three corner'd one of the same cloth, etc. though they never heard of Circles, and Angles, Sides, and Diagonals, nor know what they mean. If such kind of knowledge as this, not lesle certain nor lesle strong than the Artificial, will serve turn, I do not see why the Oath of Allegiance should be rejected for want of knowledge.  
Whoever has knowledge enough to take a Lease, and manage a Farm, can tell there is a difference betwixt him who holds by Lease, and him from whom he holds it: That the Sovereign Lord holds of no body: That if the King may forfeit to the Pope, and be ejected by him, He is not Sovereign, whom yet he has always called, and believed his Sovereign: That the obligation to obey our Sovereign, according to the Laws of the Land, is commanded by the Law of God: That when People fight against them, they do not obey them: That such disobedience is contrary to what he has been taught is the Law of God; and a hundred such things, which those who have the Art, may wove into absolute Demonstrations, and which afford a very absolute certainty to the rest who were never Apprentice to that Trade. Nor can all the scholastical subtleties in the World, how much soever they may blunder them in the mean time, when they see men up in Arms against the King, persuade them, that fight against him is not fight against him; or that they treat him as their Sovereign, whom they do fight against; or that the Doctrine which says this may be done, is not contrary to that which says, It may not be done; which they can as well know to be the Doctrine of God, as any other which they believe and hope to be saved by.  
But this, as he calls it, qualifying gloss, and milder exposition, cannot be transferred to the Oath of Allegiance. Why so? Because this is only an exchange of one Perjury for another; striving to weather one Rock, and splitting on another. Which be these two inevitable Rocks, I beseech you? Why, if you pretend not to abjure, this is contrary to the express words, according to which you profess to swear, and by which you do expressly swear, that the Pope hath not any Deposing Power. Very good! Express words are things, as luck is, subject to Eyesight. Tom Tinker, if he be not blind, can judge this matter, as well as Aristotle. Let us take than Sir Thomas More's pair of witnesses, our two Eyes, and make them Judges of this difference.  
In the beginning of the Oath, the Swearer, says he, solemnly calls God and the World to witness the truth of what he is about to acknowledge, etc. What are the words in which he does this? my Eyes tell me they are these: I do truly and sincerely acknowledge, profess, testify, and declare in my conscience, That the Pope hath not any Power to depose the King, etc. By your favour, Sir, this is not to call God and the World to witness the truth of what I acknowledge, but the truth of my acknowledgement, or that I am sincerely persuaded, that what I acknowledge is true. I beseech you let us have fair play, and a wrong Card not shuffled into our hands. The words expressly deny the deposing Power to be true in or to the Swearers Conscience; of the Truth in itself, my eyes discern none which speak.  
Than he glances at one of the middle Clauses, in which he says, The Deposing Power is not only abjured, but abjured as Heretical. The Clause is this: And I do further swear, That I from my heart abhor, detest and abjure as impious and heretical this damnable Doctrine and Position, That Princes which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed or murdered by their Subjects, or any other whatsoever. The word Abjure in this place, I take to signify; solemnly renounce; or else for a word of supererogation, added according to the usual redundancy of the Law stile, and signifying but the same with the former in a synonimous expression, as Detest superadds nothing to Abhor, nor Position to Doctrine. Unless perhaps it be taken in the same sense, as when People abjure the Kingdom, or any thing else, when they are required by Law; that is, swear never to come into it more. And than it signifies, I will never hold this Doctrine. Otherwise the words would import, I swear that I swear, or that I forswear, which seems no very good sense, and I think it is not allowable to interpret a Law into nonsense. If this be so, the words express detesting, and abhorring, (and, if you will, never holding the position mentioned) as heretical, but there are none which say expressly, that 'tis heretical, or so much as false.  
The last, and only Clause he citys, says we swear according to the express words, and those express words our eyesight tells us, are not of Truth precisely in itself, but of Truth with relation to our Conscience. And so instead of splitting on his Rock of Perjury, we have got a Lantern to avoid it. Thanks to their care who hung it there, and who for their pains deserve a better return than scrupulous Exceptions, confutable even by eyesight.  
The other Rock, and which he conceives inevitable, Is the charge of Perjury now under his Pen. Viz. Abjuring without necessary knowledge, etc. which, while the dispute remains undetermined by public, and undeterminable by private Authority, he says, is not to be had, nor expected. I have already said, there is no necessity of running upon this Rock at all. Who does, will found it but Sand, and never endanger splitting. For, as is formerly discoursed, rigorous knowledge is not necessary, and though it were, is very possible to be had. Than as sure as he thinks himself, that the point is undeterminable by private authority, I must beg his permission to believe it may be, and is determined even by private men, not authoritatively indeed with respect to others, but effectually as to themselves: or rather, that private men may be and are determined concerning it, and that with sufficient and possibly absolute certainty. For sure Privacy is no hindrance to the discovery of Truth, unless private men be all supposed blind: and I am sure Disputing is much lesle. For it is the nature of Disputes to bring Truth to light, and make us see what otherwise perhaps we should not. Wherhfore that Knowledge cannot be had while the point remains in dispute, and that because it is not effectually determined by public Authority, it is therefore undeterminable, seem to me, not Rocks, but Paradoxes.  
And truly, now this Gentleman, with his Rocks and his Perjuries, has given me occasion to reflect on the Oath of Allegiance, more than ever I did before, I must needs profess I found it no such hideous matter; and the more I reflect the lesle hideous I found it, and begin to suspect it was want of reflection that makes the Idea so terrible. Who will not trust his own eyes, may possibly meet with a glass which may represent the object otherwise than it is. Let us take it in pieces, and consider it a little.  
The first part acknowledges, The King is rightful King of all his Dominions, and that the Pope has no authority to depose him, discharge his Subjects from their Allegiance, licence them to bear Arms against him, and the rest. He who does not acknowledge the King to be rightful King, or does acknowledge the Pope has such Power, has indeed reason to forbear swearing. And this latter is the reason alleged by those who have written against the Oath of Allegiance. But I see not what other good reason there can be. At lest this, of want of knowledge, alleged by this Gentleman, seems not well to bear the name. For the words are not, I know, but I acknowledge; and besides, has he not knowledge enough to swear the first branch, That the King is rightful King? I suppose he will not stick at that; but is his Knowledge of that, true Knowledge? If it be not, I think he can content himself sometimes with Knowledge which does not signify Knowledge; If it be, he may allow others to hope for Knowledge in things not altogether so hidden and imperious, as those, which he says he knows.  
There follows the promissory part, in which, who takes the Oath, 〈◊〉, that notwithstanding any Declaration, etc. of the Pope, he will bear Faith and true Allegiance to his Majesty. And this is the very thing he would be at, and which P. 8. he offers, as the proper matter of an Oath of Allegiance; And which I therefore conceive neither he, nor any body else will except against.  
Than comes the Clause formerly glanced at by him, and fully set down by me, which who refuses, does by that refusal profess, he does not abhor, etc. the Position mentioned as Heretical, etc. For you do not directly swear any thing is heretical. The swearing falls upon the Abhor, and the Abhor upon the Heretical. However, I perceive by him the word Heretical sticks, but I cannot tell where. And 'tis one of the most uncomfortable things in the World, to be still vexed with scruples, and not know what they are. There has been said of this word by divers, what might seem to purpose, unless some body would tells us why it is not. Methinks it is but reasonable, if we must remain unsatisfied at that word, we should be told, wherefore that which has been said to satisfy us, will not do. To take no notice of any thing to the contrary, and still go on in doubts and dissatisfaction, is, I think, the very thing we call Scruple. However, it is not possible for me to judge whether the Exceptions which I found this Gentleman has to that word, be rational, or not, unless I knew what they were. All I can do, is ingenuously to declare what I think of the matter, and leave him and every body to judge whether my thoughts be rational, or no.  
I know it is an usual exception, that the Pope's deposing Power cannot be abjured as Heretical, because the direct contrary Proposition, being neither expressly found in Scripture, nor Counsels, nor unanimously believed by Catholics, among whom it is contested, is conceived therefore not to belong precisely to Faith: And Heresy is opposite to Faith, False being different from, and not enough to make Heretical. I know also that divers things have been alleged to show there is more of scruple than substance in this exception, and that there is no reason to understand the word Heretical in that rigour, when 'tis plain the Protestants do not understand it so, and we commonly enough understand it otherwise.  
For is it not undeniable, that Protestants know every jot as well as ourselves, that this Proposition, The Pope has not power to depose, is not expressly, totidem verbis, to be found in Scripture, or Councils, nor believed by all Catholics? Is it not utmost extravagance to think, that when they swear themselves they mean to say by the word Heretical, that the Proposition abovementioned is found there, or oblige us to think so, when they require the Oath of us? Wherhfore if Oaths be to be taken in the sense of the Givers, as I conceive they aught; They seem to have reason enough, who deny this sense of the word Heretical can be the sense of Protestants, and the meaning of the word in that place.  
Again, Among ourselves, is it not as plain, that this word is commonly taken in another sense? Have we not seen the Jansenists and Jesuits object Heresy to one another? Do we not see a hundred like Instances almost every day, where every body knows (the hot men themselves and all) that what they call Heresy, is not in Scriptures, or Counsels, nor usually believed? Now, because we are obliged to swear according to the plain and common sense of the words, and there is a plain and common sense of this word, different from that to which these severe men would restrain it, I see not why the exception, which some make to this severity, is not, to say the lest, as rational, as the severity with which others except against the Oath.  
But all this, in my Opinion, is wide of the mark. I conceive this Gentleman is mistaken, when he thinks the Pope's deposing Power is in this clause abjured as Heretical. That Power was renounced before. To make it renounced again here, is, with an idle Tautology, to make the dead man be killed over again. As for that Point, The Oath contented itself with a bore acknowledgement, only providing it should be true and sincere. Here it requires detestation, as of an impious and heretical Doctrine, without all doubt; what is now treated with more rigour, cannot be altogether the same, with what was treated more mildly before.  
And this, I think, is plain by the words of the Oath, which are to be our Guides in this matter. The words (for the Reader, I hope, will pardon a second repetition) are these: And I do further swear, That I from my heart abhor, detest, and abjure, as impious and heretical, this damnable Doctrine and Position, That Princes which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed or murdered by their Subjects, or any other whatsoever. All Speech denying or affirming something of something, the way to understand it, is to mind what it is which is denied or affirmed, which the School Language calls the Predicate, and that of which this Predicate is affirmed or denied, which they term the Subject. Of the Proposition now, which I here swear that I abhor, what is the Subject? Is it not manifestly, Princes excommunicated or deprived by the Pope? And the Predicate, is it not plainly this? Deposed or murdered by their Subjects or others, if you stick to the precise words; though if you take the sense, the Predicate is, deposable, or murtherable, etc. For what the phrase of our Language expresses by may be deposed, Logical exactness would word by, are deposable, etc.  
That Princes than can be excommunicated or deprived, is not here denied or affirmed; for they are already so of whom the Proposition speaks, excommunication and deprivation making up a part of the Subject, of which something else is praedicate. But what is abhorred, is, That such Princes can be deposed or murdered by their Subjects or others; this being the thing which is affirmed of those excommunicated and deprived Princes. The Pope is supposed to have done his part, and to have already deprived, or deposed. There follows the Subject's share, the supplying what the Pope falls short of, and actually pulling out of his Throne him who will not voluntarily quit it. For if he do, the case cannot hap. Subjects cannot depose him who has deposed himself. The Oath speaks of a Prince already deposed by the Pope, but yet still to be deposed by some body else. We have nothing to do with any case in which both these are not found.  
Plainly therefore it is not, as this Gentleman supposes, the deposing Power, as it is lodged in the Pope, which is here denied, but the execution of that Power by Subjects or others. It is not Pope-deposing, but Subject-deposing Power which is now in question, or if you will, not the Power, but the Practice. And the Question is, Whether this Subject-deposing Power may be abhorred as impious and heretical? Now I, for my part, conceive it may and aught, and think this so manifest, that I would take Bellarmin himself, or this Gentleman for Judge, who yet say the direct contrary, if the case were not too clear to need one.  
For does not Bellarmin say, and whether he do or not, do we not all know, That we are obliged by the Law of God to obey our King, and that to deny obedience to our Prince is against the Law of God? He adds indeed, while he is King, and while he is Prince. But I desire not more. It is evident by so much, that unless a King deprived by the Pope, cease to be a King, he is to be obeyed, and that 'tis contrary to the Law of God, or flat Heresy, to say the contrary, even in the judgement of Bellarmin.  
Now I entreat this Gentleman to reflect, that whoever comes to this Branch of the Oath, has already sworn another, in which he has declared before God and the World, that he acknowledges there is no unkinging Power in the Pope, and therefore that notwithstanding the Pope's deprivation, the King remains still truly King. Wherhfore if he offer to disobey, or which is worse, depose such a King, he disobeys the King while he is King. Which if he hold to be lawful, he falls into what is by Bellarmin, and of all hands, confessed to be Heresy. Indeed if his Conscience will not allow him to swear the former Clause, and tell him the Pope has Power to depose, neither will it suffer him to take this. But than let him say so, and stand to it, that the Pope indeed has such Power, and not scruple at this Clause, which of itself is liable to no exception, but what is drawn from the other. For Subject-deposing is manifest Heresy, unless Pope-deposing be true.  
Neither can it be shifted of by saying, that since Pope-deposing is not Heresy, Subject-deposing (by warrant from him, for I speak of none else) cannot be Heresy. I admit the Antecedent, because the Oath not meddling with that Point, obliges us not to inquire after it; but there is no appearance of the Consequent. If it be not Heresy to make Disobedience lawful after deprivation, because that deprivation is not known to be invalid by Faith; neither is Disobedience heretical, before deprivation, because, even before, he is not known to be King by Faith. 'Tis by the Laws of the Land, and Eyesight, not by Faith, we know such a man to be our King, and we know by Faith we are not to resist him, whom we do not know by Faith to be our King. And so it is in all things commanded by the Divine Law. I do not know by Faith that this Woman is married, or the Money in that man's hands is not mine, or that Creature is a man. But yet 'tis undeniable Heresy to say, I may lawfully lie with that Wife, or take that man's Money from him, or kill that man. However, I know the King to be King, resistance is heretical, if he be King. And that I am fully persuaded, and resolved in Conscience, that he is King, after deprivation as much as before, I have already sworn, and therefore can no more refuse to abhor resistance to him as Heretical, than to abhor Adultery, or Theft, or Murder as Heretical.  
I must confess I wonder how this word Heretical comes to be such a Bugbear, unless by mistaking, through inadvertence, one thing to be sworn instead of another. I see people fancy, and this Gentleman is in for company, the Pope's deposing Power is there abjured as heretical, and I suppose they think it hard to censure for Heresy, what too many Catholics, too much unreproved, Alas! hold for true. And yet all this while there is no such matter. That Power is neither affirmed, nor denied here; another thing is denied of it, viz. A lawfulness in Subjects, or others to proceed upon it. This indeed is abhorred as heretical, the other Point is not touched.  
Yet though it be not, in truth all depends upon it. For who believes Pope-deposing true, has reason to check at acknowledging Subject-deposing Heretical. He who holds the former false, must think the latter Heresy, or renounce his Faith, which evidently teaches Kings are to be obeyed. So that (to say what is) this exception against the bore word Heretical, is in reality an invention to maintain the Pope's Power with lesle envy. Bluntly to say, that the Pope can turn any King out of his Kingdom, sounds scurvily. Few men's Consciences are so depraved, that they can hear it without check. But if people can be frighted into an acknowledgement of such a Power in the Pope, and the Port reached by a side wind, the business is done every jot as efficaciously, and a great deal more speciously. Now as Heresy is on the one side an excellent tool to work upon a timorous Conscience, and brings the commendation of Zeal to those who appear wary of it, so on the other, it does the work excellently in this case. To say Subjects can depose is not heretical, declines the offensive harshness of saying the Pope can depose; But yet it says it. For there is no reason assigned by any, nor assignable, but a Power in the Pope, to exempt it from Heresy, or hinder it from being acknowledged so by all the World. Manifestly than this seeming exception against the word Heretical, is in truth an assertion of the Pope's deposing Power. I think it would not be so common, if every body were ware what they did, and minded, that while they only think to avoid Heresy, they do in reality bring the King into subjection to the Pope, and establish a Power in him, which is neither consistent with civil Government, nor with their own thoughts. For there are not many, even of those who refuse the Oath, who do in earnest believe that the Pope can depose the King.  
But I must desire not to be mistaken, as if I thought, because the Doctrine is heretical, all those who have held, or practised according to it, excluded from the hopes of salvation. I believe it is not difficult to found more than one Heresy in more than one man: and should every one who is caught tripping that way, be hopelessly damned without more ado, the way to Heaven would be a great deal more narrow than it is. I, for my part, think well-meaning goes far in all cases: and that (till the contrary appear) the failings of men are rather to be imputed to ignorance, and weakness of nature, than malice of their minds, which I take to be the great obstacle in the way to Heaven. However, I declare, I think this consequence, all who do ill things, are therefore ill men, very false, and should think myself wronged, if any should go about to pin it upon me.  
The next Clause denies Absolution from this Oath whether by the Pope, or any other. And here again the words relate, as expressly as may be, to the belief and conscience of the swearer, nor does he swear more. So that who is persuaded accordingly, has nothing, that I see, which can rationally check him from swearing.  
The next renounces Dispensations to the contrary. And this, I suppose, is free from exception. For it is the very thing he offers afterwards in his promissory form, where he says, he will bear true Allegiance, notwithstanding any Dispensation to the contrary. Which I take to be renouncing these Dispensations, and conceive this Gentleman does so too.  
He citys the following Clause at length, which only confines our meaning to the common sense of the express words. Now I should never have thought it possible, that this rush should afford a knot. For methinks 'tis all the reason in the World, that people when they swear, should mean what they say, and I am sure they say what the words, which they use, plainly signify. But, to see how men's judgements differ, he has found here what, he would have us believe, makes much to his purpose. This, he says, ratifies and binds afresh all that went before, by a repeated and reflex Oath looking universally back upon the premises. And because among those All, the Pope's Power is one, and the chiefest, that Power is here forsworn again. True; but according to the express words in which it was forsworn before. And these express words are not, he has none, but I acknowledge he has none. I, but this is a mental reservation excluded by this Clause. Just the contrary. To mean I acknowledge, when I swear I acknowledge, is no reservation, but the direct sense of what I swear. But if you, by Acknowledge, will make me mean more than Acknowledge, you make me mean more than the words say, and drive me into a guilt, if it be one, from which the words take care to preserve me.  
What we acknowledge, and what we swear, that is, what we swear absolutely, and what with reference to our Conscience, is contained in the branches foregoing. This Clause meddles not farther with it, than to require what we have sworn, be sworn as it aught, with sincerity, and without hidden meanings of our own, different from the plain sense of the words. And because this Gentleman seems an Enemy to secret reservations, I believe on second thoughts, he will allow, that to give security we have none, is not a thing at which our Conscience aught to check. At lest, could we agreed on the rest, I am confident we should not break of the Treaty on this point.  
The last Clause speaks of the willingness and heartiness with which we swear. Of this every man may have true, or at lest sufficient knowledge, from the familiar converse with his own thoughts, as he a little before instructs us. Wherhfore, I suppose, he who is conscious of willingness, and heartiness, may without scruple venture on this branch. And this being all, I must needs declare upon the whole, I cannot perceive the Devil altogether so ugly as he is painted, and that the representations made of this Oath, seem a great deal more hideous than the Oath itself.   

CHAP. IU. V  
I Have been larger in the last Chapter than I designed, or expected; but hope to make the Reader amendss, and be lesle tedious in the rest. After the main shower is over, the after-drops use not to last long, and a slighter covering will serve to keep us dry. The Title of his next Chapter promises to show the manifest unlawfulness both of swearing, and forswearing the deposing Power. When he, comes to performance, he handsomely dilates on the competition, betwixt the two supreme Powers, in the Question of our Duty to God and Caesar, and than inquires, what a Private Christian, and Loyal Subject shall do, to comply with both? And all I can understand by his answer, is, That he must fit still and do nothing. For he will not allow him to judge, at lest so far as to swear, and if he do not judge for one side, he can act for neither, or if he do, must act without judgement. But if he may judge, 'tis plain he may swear his judgement. Now doing nothing seems to me a very surprising, and no very commendable way of performing Christian Duties, and absolutely impossible besides. For a man must, in these cases, act one way or another in spite of his teeth. Nay, not-acting may hap to be equivalent to the highest acting.  
But to do otherwise, says he, is to assume the right of Judicature, and as bad as to swear odd, or even, upon the sight of a handful of Guineas. Judging is plainly an equivocal word, being sometimes meant of Authoritative Judgement, such as is a Rule for the Actions of others; sometimes for Not-authoritative, and which only serves to guide the actions of him who judges. In the first sense methinks he should not take it, because it seems excluded by the very Question, which is only of private men, and they judge only for themselves. But if he do, as the word Judicature which he uses is but seldom taken otherwise, I can only say, I know of no private man who pretends to that right of Judicature, and by his judging to oblige others to judge as he does. If any do, let him bear his own sin, and the innocent not be involved in the guilt of his presumption.  
But if he take it the second way, I cannot understand why it should appear so strange a thing, if men make use of the gifts which God has given them. He never made man a rational and judging creature, with design that he should not use his judgement when he had it. On the contrary, I conceive he expects we should judge of what we are to do, or leave undone, and act according to our judgement, and from him who does not, I believe, will require a severe account. Nor do I understand what Principle, besides Judgement, there is of Action, but Passion. I cannot think he would commend us to that for a guide, but if he do, I must entreat him to leave me to that which God has given me.  
Besides, if we must not judge of this Question, why does he writ of this Question? The Arguments he alleges, what are they for, but to make us judge, as he does. But nature is a little resty, and will have its flings. Twenty to one but some will judge quite contrary. If he will not allow these to be as free from blame as the other, he had even as good say, You may exercise your Judgements as much as you will, so it be on my side; but you must not judge against me.  
He cannot pretend for a difference, that he only judges of the Oath of Allegiance, but not of the Question betwixt the two Powers. For he judges of that Question too, and by judging first of that, comes to judge himself, and persuade us to judge of the Oath. He judges that Question to be undeterminable, and this as a private man, and by his private judgement; which hinders not another private man from making a private judgement that 'tis determinable. And if this man pursue that judgement, and determine himself, and take the Oath, I see not, as to the right of Judicature, what greater liberty he takes than this Gentleman allows himself. Both judge, both act according to their judgement, (for refusal is as much an act of the soul, as embracing) plainly either both, or neither usurp on the right of Judicature. As for his odd or even, if he make the case equal, that as one swears only on the sight of Guineas, the other swears only upon hearing the Question, I think as he does, there is no ground for an Oath. But I conceive, as the Guineas may be told, the Question may be examined, and peradventure True or False as certainly be found there, as odd or even among the Guineas. What he has said to the contrary, we have heard before, and if he will allow him the right of Judicature, the Reader will judge of it. For my part, I shall not easily be persuaded, that God has left us no means to know how we should perform those duties which himself requires and commands.  
The Fifth Chapter undertakes to confirm the Premises from this Topick, That the Point in Question is confessedly a mere opinion, and therefore cannot be abjured, because opinion does in its notion imply suspense, and indetermination. He has indeed so far reason on his side, that this word Opinion, as it is opposed to Science, does signify as he says. And I, for my part, agreed with him, that it is not allowable to swear upon such an Opinion. Yet I believe he knows there are who think otherwise, and who infer the direct contrary to what he does. For while he says 'tis an Opinion, therefore you may not swear, others in other cases say, 'Tis an Opinion, therefore you may swear. If I should turn him over to them, and make them his Paymasters, or desire to remain in quiet, and not be pressed with his Argument, till they were agreed about it, I know not how he could refuse me.  
But I will not take all advantages. The word Opinion every body knows is as ordinarily taken for Sentiment, or Judgement, in contradistinction, not to Science, but Faith. In which sense many are usually called Opinions, of which men may, and divers have, absolute certainty. As I doubt not but St. Thomas, for example, was very certain of divers matters, which yet in the Schools pass to this day but for Opinions. In this sense of the word, Opinion and Certainty may stand very well together, nor can I believe the Sorbon, or the Author, or Publisher of the Questions understood it in any other. I see not what reason there is to suspect there was never more than suspense and indetermination, even in the dullest of them. Nor can I imagine, that when the Sorbon declares the deposing Doctrine false, erroneous, contrary to the word of God, etc. she can be fancied to say at the same time, she was in suspense and undetermined, whether it were so or no.  
As for what he obtrudes upon her, that her Declarations in 1663. were to regulate (not the Faith, but) Opinions of those under their charge: if it were so, it is plain enough that Opinion in that place is opposed only to Faith, and so admits of certainty. But I cannot found that even so much is true. I have met with the Articles themselves in more places than one, but not with any Decree of Forborn concerning them, wherein those express words should be. In the King's Declaration concerning them, the word Sentiment is used, not Opinion, for that wherein he desires an Uniformity among his Subjects. The same word is used by the University of Paris, in their Decree of the Year 1626., upon occasion of the Book of Santarellus. So that I see no great reason he had to beaten the Sorbon for game, which, though he should put up, I think would make no very good sport. For I cannot tell what all this signifies, more than dearth of good Arguments.   

CHAP. VI  
THe following Chapter would not concern me, but for the odd use he makes of it. The business is to confute Withrington, and I should think it matters not much what becomes of Objections against Withrington, while we have only to do with Objections against the Oath of Allegiance. Withrington was a man who, when he was alive, could speak for himself, and now he is dead, might have rested quiet in his grave, if this Gentleman had pleased. For I think it no great wonder, if from one who has writ so much as he, there scaped sometimes what will not endure a severe Test. Whether he have been guilty of a weakness, from which I believe few in his case exempt▪ I think no such important inquiry, that any man should busy himself about it, unless he be one of much leisure, and much curiosity, and much concern for Withrington.  
But from the defeat of Withrington he draws an Argument against the Oath, as if it were unintelligible, since Withrington understood it not, and no man, he truly says, can swear what he understands not. To me now this seems a very odd consequence, nor can I understand why the fate of the Oath of Allegiance should depend on Withrington. Suppose he did mistake in something concerning this Oath, as I think this Gentleman has more than once; is the Oath therefore unintelligible? The truth is, Withrington makes divers discourses, and deductions, with which those who see not so far as he did, neither do, nor need trouble themselves. Among those, in a Book not written precisely of the Oath, he has found what he accepts against. Now I do not see but the Oath may be plain enough, whether his exception be rational or not; but yet because he would have us believe it is of consequence, and frights us with woeful snares, and apparent dangers, we will see what it is, and do our best to avoid those snares and dangers.  
He tells us than, that Withrington, and his Friend C. I. say, That by one Clause of the Oath is denied indeed the Pope's Power to authorise, but not to declare, or command. And pray why may they not say so, if it be so? For the Clause does speak of authorising, and it does not speak of declaring and commanding. I see no such subtle obscurity, and learned intricacy in speaking plain Truth. It seems they say too, That this Authority to declare and command, doth not exceed the limits of a Spiritual Power. Whether it do or not, is a Question with which the Oath meddles not; and whether Withrington and his Friend be mistaken in it or not, imports not the Oath. Neither are they mistaken in that, however they far in this matter; for what they say of the Oath, is manifestly true. Truly methinks this Quarrel might be compounded. This Gentleman may take his choice, and say declaring and commanding does, or does not exceed the limits of a Spiritual Power, as he pleases, and no harm done that I see. All the mischief, if he choose the contrary to Withrington, is, that Withrington was once in his life mistaken, as another may be another time. He may also dispute it with Withrington as long as he pleases: The Oath will remain neuter in the War, nor will all the subtle obscurities and learned intricacies they can raise, hinder the plainest man that is, from perceiving, that the Oath speaks only of authorising.  
But yet he apprehends the thing so obscure, that he desires to borrow his Readers eyes to help him out. I cannot but think his own eyes are better than mine, and that 'tis not their fault, if he see not better than I. However, such as they are, with all my heart they shall be at his service. Let us than, if we can, between us look out the mighty inconvenience, which he would have us believe there is, in denying the Pope's Power to authorise, and not denying his Power to command.  
If Temporal Princes, says he, as is here supposed, have Power and Authority to Invade or annoyed Foreign Princes, or their Countries, nay to depose them, when the good of Souls and necessity of the Church shall require. Whether what he says be supposed, or not, I cannot tell. For I have not the New-year's Gift which he citys, and Withrington, in the place to which he refers, talks not of that matter: whether he do elsewhere, cannot be known but by reading all his Books. And, I hope, he does not expect I should take so much pains to look for no matter what, I know not where. But this sure is no such mystery. Every body knows that Sovereign Princes have Power and Authority to make just Wars, and every body sees that if they prove successful so far, the conquered Prince will be beaten out of his Kingdom. Every body knows too, that the good of Souls, and necessity of the Church, may be a pretence of making War, either just, or which at lest may be proved so by the Ratio ultima Regum. If this be all the learned obscurity, in which he thinks Withrington and his fellow plunged, there is no man in the World who is not as deep in the mire as they.  
Mary, whether all this amount to Authority in one Prince to depose another, is another Question. Power I see they have, if they can prevail. Besides Power, I see nothing but Reason, by which they judge, whether truly, or untruly, that they may use their Power as they do. If this be that which he, or Withrington means by Authority, He who says Princes have no Authority to depose, or do any thing else which they can do, says they have not Reason, and are not men. But I conceive most people mean by Authority, a certain kind of Quality, which, whenever it appears, aught to be submitted to, in virtue of that appearance, and he who does not submit, wrongs both him who has the Authority, and himself too. I know of no such thing among Sovereigns. On the contrary, it seems to destroy the very notion Sovereignty. For a Sovereign is one who has no Authority above him. So we see that if one Prince assail, the other defends himself; if he be beaten out of his Kingdom, he recovers it again if he can; and every body thinks he does well all the while, which would not be, if he were thought all the while to oppose a lawful Authority. Now because in the Language of the World, to say one Prince has Authority to depose another, is to say, that this other is obliged to quit his Kingdom, when the first declares he aught so to do, as a Magistrate is obliged to turn private man, as often as his Prince recalls his Commission. He racks the words to a violent sense, who says there is any deposing Authority among Sovereigns.  
If the Pope is to be Judge of this necessity. Questionless he may judge of it, and so may every Metropolitan, and every Diocesan, and every ghostly Father, and every Privy-Counsellor, and every man whose judgement a Prince will desire, or harken to. All these may and do judge whether that necessity be such, as to engage the Prince to a War. And the Prince may follow their judgements, or not, as he sees fit, or unfit. I am much mistaken if there be ever a Prince in Christendom who thinks himself bound to enter into War upon any man's judgement but his own. Let the Pope judge it never so necessary, till he judge it so too, or at lest expedient, there will be no work for Soldiers.  
If the Pope hath Power (though not to authorise, yet) to declare, and not only to declare, but to command the doing of all this. What than? what terrible mischief will come of all this at last? Why than, truly his Opinion is, that this Doctrine, as it contributes little to the security of Princes, and as little to the satisfaction of intelligent Readers, so it is not every one can easily understand, or be able to reconcile it to Truth and itself. A wondered inconvenience! That every body should not understand every thing, at lest not easily, and this only in his Opinion! Surely there needed not have been so much cackling for this Egg.  
It is not reasonable I should, for Withrington's sake, enter into the merits of a Cause, which requires more labour than I think due to his defence, and which is unconcerning besides. Only because he would persuade us the defence of the Oath drives men into Doctrines unintelligible to Readers, and insecure to Princes, it will not be amiss to see whether Withrington were so hard put to it. As for the first Point, I wonder why the difference betwixt Authorising and Commanding should appear so unintelligible. Does not Authorising signify doing something, in virtue whereof it is now lawful for him who is authorised, to do what before it was not lawful for him to do? Does not every body see that unlawful things are sometimes Commanded, and that they become not lawful by being Commanded? Or if you will say, that only lawful things can validly be commanded, and therefore who puts a Power to Command, supposes a lawfulness in the thing commanded: There is still a palpable difference betwixt commanding what of itself, and independently of the command, is lawful, and making lawful what before it was made so, was not lawful. If he think Readers so little intelligent, that they cannot perceive this difference, I wonder why, and to whom he writes. For nothing he does, or can say is plainer.  
Than for the security of Princes, methinks it is something, that Withrington allows not the Pope can make it lawful for one to Invade another. If you urge that he allows the Pope can command them, and therefore supposes they lawfully may; nay farther, that they aught do so, when the Pope commands, because lawful Commands are to be obeyed: I conceive he might reply, that he supposes no more than all the World knows to be true. For we see Princes may, and do Invade one another every day. And for the Obedience urged to the Pope's Commands, in that Case, what if he should say, the Obedience of Princes is, as the Service of Christians, rational, not blind: That being entrusted with the Temporal Sword by God, and accountable to Him, not the Pope, for the use of it, They both may, and aught to consider first with themselves, whether what the Pope commands be lawful; and when they have found it lawful, whether it be expedient: and rest in both upon their own judgement, and those in whom they confided, not the Popes. If Withrington should answer in this manner, he might, for aught I see, easily enough clear himself, and his Doctrine, of prejudice to Princes. For by this account, they would never make War at the Pope's Command, but when they found that War both lawful and expedient by their own judgements. And this as often as they do, they will certainly make War, whether he Command it, or not, nay though he Command them never so much to keep the Peace.  
For my own part, I conceive, that though War be never so lawful, and expedient, and necessary too, if you will, the Pope cannot command it. Because (to abstract from what the Pope has to do with the Temporal Sword) I think Command imports an obligation of performing the action commanded, purely in virtue of the command, whether the obeyer see the lawfulness or expedience of the action, or no; nay, though to his judgement it appear not-expedient. And because Princes in such cases act in virtue of their own sight, not of the Pope's Authority, I conceive they cannot properly be said to be commanded, or to obey, even when they do what is said to be commanded; nor can I believe the Pope speaks in that strain to them. Yet if Withrington would call it Commanding, he would speak but as many do. For we ordinarily enough say, we have obeyed our ghostly Father, for example, when we have followed his directions in things which with our own eyes we saw convenient. But whether the word Command shall signify so, or so, being a pure Question de nomine, I think it not worth disputing.  
Especially while Protestants are wiser than to amuse us with such unconcerning Speculations. They saw what truly imported, that all the danger lay in Authorising. For could the Pope make it lawful for one Prince to Invade another, there might be Invasions as often as the Pope pleased, and opportunity served. Against this mischief they provided; with Commands they would neither trouble themselves, nor us, seeing that if the thing commanded be unlawful; no command of it can be obligatory; and if it be lawful, it will be done without, and even against commands, whenever it is found expedient.  
But to return to our matter, this Doctrine, If this Gentleman mistake not, foully clashes both with Truth and itself. Pray how with Truth? and how with itself? But I might have saved my Question. For all he answers to it, is to say the matter over again, with the imputation of a seeming riddle, and than ask, whether it be not a mere mock pretence of security to crowned Heads? To which, as luck is, what is said before will spare me the pains of answering. But whereas he intimates the relief of troubled Consciences depends on this nice Distinction of Authorising and Commanding: I should think no man's Conscience need ever be troubled with it at all. If that will do the business, let it even be let alone; and Withrington for starting, and this Gentleman for chasing it, share the blame of troubling those Consciences between them. For the Oath obliges neither of them to meddle with it.  
At last he comes to something, and tells us, this Distinction is in very deed no Distinction at all, neither in respect of the King, or swearer. Not to the King, because it is all one to him whether he be invaded or deposed by the Pope's Authority, or only by his Command. Very true, if he be Invaded and Deposed. But it is not all one, whether he can be Invaded or Deposed, or not. They who broached the Distinction, say he cannot, neither by the Pope's Authority nor Command purely, and in other cases than such, in which he would have been Invaded and Deposed though there had been no Authority, or command of the Pope interposed, nor any Pope to interpose them. And I think there is no King but will acknowledge, this is not all one as to say, He can as often as the Pope pleases.  
In respect of the Swearer, he says, it is no Distinction, because he cannot securely, and without self contradiction swear that the Pope hath not any Power and Authority to Depose Princes, if he have Power and Authority to command others to Depose them: Why so pray? Because this authoritative Injunction is enough to entitle him to the fact. Very well! Than an unauthoritative Injunction is not enough to entitle him to the Fact, and the Pope's Injunction to Depose, say the Distinction-men, is unauthoritative; And his very commanding others to Depose, both makes and denominates him the Deposer. What? Whether there be Deposing or not; or if there be, whether the Deposing follow from his Command, or from something else? Do I burn the House which I Command to be burnt, if it be not burnt, or if it be, is burnt on other motives than my Command?  
Now, if the Distinction-men say, that Deposition, even when it is commanded by the Pope, and when it happens, does not follow from the Pope's Command, but from the Expedience and Necessity seen by the Deposing Prince, and in cases where no Commands of the Pope to the contrary could hinder it, they are far enough from being obliged to grant his commanding Deposition in that manner, denominates him the Deposer. And yet the Pope may be said a Deposer too, if you please, as the Counsellors who advice the Deposing Prince to the War, and the Soldiers who fight for him, may be said Deposers. But the Pope's Command being no cause of the effect, even when it happens, how a not-cause should necessarily come to bear the denomination of an effect, which follows, when it does follow, from other causes, is in my Opinion something harder to understand, than the nice distinction he thinks so unintelligible.  
Lastly, he tells us, That if it be true, what those Authors assume, that Temporal Princes have power to Depose one another, the Pope, as a Temporal Prince, may put in for his share among the rest. Undoubtedly, and for the whole too, if he be strong enough. But if those Authors assume, or suppose, as he said before, that this kind of Deposing Power has any thing to do with the Oath, they are much out with their Assumes, and their Supposes. It is a wild Fancy, and which cannot, without injury, be fixed on the wisdom of the English Nation, to imagine they ever dreamt of Depositions of this nature. Alas! it is not an Oath which can secure our, or any King from being driven out of his Kingdom, if another, who is strong enough, will in earnest undertake it; no more than Laws can hinder a man, who is stronger than I, from taking away my Purse, or Life, if he william.  
It was the standing Right to Depose, claimed by the Pope, and by no body else, against which that wisdom provided this Oath for security. Against strength, or that Right which may accidentally accrue to Temporal Princes, by breach of Treaties, or however their Quarrels become just, they neither did, nor could provide. For who can tie up another man, both stronger than himself, and out of his reach? Reason, and their mutual agreements are all the ties which are, or can be among Princes. And there is no security but Force against him who will break them. In short, I flatly deny there is any thing in this Oath which concerns the Power of Temporal Princes. And I denied before, that the Power, by which they Depose, is the deposing Power meant by the Oath, or any body else.  
And so I beg the Readers pardon for detaining him so long, with an entertainment so slight. All has been, to know whether Withrington spoke properly, or not, when 'tis not a straw matter whether he spoke, or no. While the Oath speaks not of Commanding, it is little to purpose to know what others say of it. Yet the Chapter made a pretty show, the prettiest, I think, of any in the Treatise, and people would have thought, peradventure, there had been something in it, if it had been skipped over. But the substance is no more than you see.   

CHAP. VII. VIII.  
THe Seventh Chapter, to make way for a Parallel with the Oath of▪ Allegiance, compares first two more general Propositions: There is absolutely no Authority to depose Princes, and There is absolutely no Authority to depose Popes. The first of which, he says, was proposed, and rejected in France: the second cannot safely be sworn. And in this indeed he has divers Catholics to take his part, though I do not approve of the reason he gives, why it cannot be sworn, (viz. because it is disputed) of which enough is said before. Neither can I tell whether the case be absolutely the same betwixt Popes and Princes. Those who think Popes may be deposed, think also, that Popes, in some cases, are subject to a superior Power in the Church, by which they may be deposed. Now put a Prince so independently sovereign, that he is subject, in no case, to any Power, but that of God alone, his condition will be different from that which these men take to be the Popes. And it will not follow, that because Popes may be deposed, such Princes can.  
But this matter concerns not the Oath of Allegiance, nor indeed the Parallel which follows. He says, if this Oath be spelt backwards, reading Pope for King, and King for Pope, it cannot safely be taken by any Catholic. And what than? So the Oath of Allegiance can be taken, not ma●ter whether the other can or no. Only I deny that it aught to be refused, for the reason he gives, the public and unreproved disputableness of the case; (For what else he says, is only to show that it is disputed) as thinking it very unreasonable to say, let it be disputed as much as it will, that it is unlawful for him who is in his conscience fully persuaded of the Truth of either side, to swear that he is so. For that must go to the Parallel, to make it exact. And whether it do or not, the Truth may be seen with certainty, and sworn with security, notwithstanding the Controversy.  
As for the thing itself, I cannot tell, but I suspect that few, either Catholics or Protestants, would scruple to swear, if there were occasion, that Kings have not Power and Authority to depose Popes. Provided that King-deposing Power be understood in the same sense, as Pope-deposing Power is understood in the Oath. For if it be meant of Deposing by Force, undoubtedly there are Kings strong enough to drive the Pope out of his Chair. But understanding it of an inherent right, I conceive there is none, not not among the Enemies of the Pope, who thinks Kings have the same Power over Popes, which Popes claim over Kings. Neither does joining with the Church altar the case. For as the hardness and weight of the Hammer with which I strike is lodged in the Iron, not in my Hand; The Authority of the Church joined to the King, does not cease to be in the Church, because the King uses it, or rather is used by it. He himself puts the Deposition to be by Authority of the Church; what Authority Kings have besides, is but to use their own Power as they see fit.  
To meddle farther with what I conceive little material, I think not proper. It will be time enough to consider better of it, when the case happens. Till than it seems an unconcerning speculation, which I leave to those who think it worth their pains.  
The following Chapter indeed concerns the Oath; but, for the greatest part of it, not me. The substance is to show, that the proper matter of an Oath of Allegiance is outward action, not inward persuasion, and therefore would have Will-not sworn instead of Cannot What is requisite for the public safety, belongs to the determination of those to whom it is entrusted, and they are to resolve on the shall, or shall not: my privacy is confined to the may, or may not. Besides, though I see no reason in the world why any man's Conscience should check at the Cannot; yet I have a great aversion from entrenching on the liberty of others. I love to do as I would be done to; as I should not take it well to have other men's Persuasions obtruded on me, so neither do I think it allowable in me to obtrude mine on other men. I thought it a charitable service to examine whether the Cannot need be bogled at, if it be urged; but to make it be urged, I think neither charitable, nor rational. Let this Gentleman persuade those whom it concerns, to be content with his Will not; I, for my part, will throw no rub● in his way.  
On the contrary, I will do him all the service I can. I will freely avow, I think he is in the right when he puts Action, not Judgement, for the proper matter of Allegiance. I conceive Magistrates need not be, and are not much concerned what people think, so they always do what is fitting. Only Judgements which have influence on Actions under their care, cannot, I think, be excluded from their care. I will also avow, that I verily believe there are among the Will-nots as good Subjects, and who in all Emergencies, even against the Pope, would approve themselves such, as Cannots can be for their hearts. I would freely be bound, body for body, for some of them; For I know they would be Cannots in their Actions, whatever they are in their Speculations. Whether they can, as this Gentleman says, give us good security for their Allegiance, is for them to judge, who are to look to that security. And to them I refer him, with this assurance, that I shall be very glad if they can agreed.  
I see not what I have to do, till he comes to the Cannots, and says of them, they may change as well as the Will-nots. And I cannot deny but Man is a Creature subject to change, nor can I see what security an Oath, or any thing else can give, that an honest man shall never turn Knave. I do not think the framers of the Oath, or any other, expected by it to altar Nature, and tender Man unchangeable before his time. But yet the Cannot seems to have some advantage of the Will-not. For who is persuaded that nothing can tender disobedience lawful, is more likely to prove obedient, than he who thinks disobedience may indeed become lawful, but yet engages never to be disobedient. For why should he not do a lawful thing?  
This Gentleman now will undertake to answer for both. I thank him for his kindness, and shall not be behind hand with him in good Offices, when I can be serviceable to him. He says, that both may be fixed by Oath, though with this advantage to the Will-not, that the Will may be fixed immediately, and Opinion only by means of the William. I shall not contest upon the point of Precedency, nor envy any Advantage of the Will-nots. But if he have nothing else to answer, I wish he had only answered for himself. Whether what he say in behalf of his way be satisfactory, I have already said, is for them to consider, whom it concerns him to satisfy. I, for my part, shall be satisfied with any thing, and whether I be or not, is no great matter.  
But for what concerns the other, I doubt they will not think themselves fairly dealt with, by allowing them only bore Opinion (that is in his Language, a state of suspense and indetermination) to make them pass for men, who would swear any thing, even while they were in suspense, and undetermined concerning it. He may think ill of them, if they have deserved it: but sure they have not deserved he should think so ill.  
Again, What can be made of this fixing Opinions by Will? It seems to tread on the heels of a Bull. Since his very notion of Opinion implys not fixure, I cannot easily discern what good sense the words can bear. Does he mean, that by willing long enough, and strong enough, I can will my Opinion into Certainty, or not-seen Truth into seen Truth? This, I conceive, is something hard to be done, and when it is done, it is not fixing Opinion, but unfixing Opinion, and fixing something else in its stead. Or does he mean perhaps the just contrary, that the Will shall have that influence on the Opinions, that they shall never cease to be Opinions, nor the Judgement ever pass farther, and arrive at Knowledge? This may properly enough be called fixing Opinions: but I do not think the Gentlemen of the other way will think themselves much obliged to him, for teaching them an Art, how to be sure never to come to Knowledge. Nor do I think it will be much satisfactory to any body else, to know such order shall be taken for their security, that as nothing is, so nothing ever shall be known of the matter, in which they desire to be secured. What else remains for him to mean I see not, but that, whatever our Opinions be, we may be fixed to Act according as we shall swear. But this is to fix not Opinion, but Action. And whether the Action can be securely fixed, till the Judgement, as well as the Will, be first fixed, concerning the lawfulness or unlawfulness of that Action, is the difficulty he is to clear to those, whom it concerns, and in which I wish him successful.  
For my part I conceive this beginning at the Will to be a preposterous and unnatural Method. I apprehended the nature of Man requires he should be led by his Understanding. I see they are called Wilful who follow the dictates of their Will, (and Wilfulness is not reckoned among the Virtues) unless that Will be first settled by Reason, and that to follow it otherwise is always dangerous, and often blamable and vicious. 'Tis plainly for the blind to lead him who has Eyes; For the Understanding is the Eye of the Soul. The right way than of fixing both Will and Action, I take to be by beginning at the Understanding, and fixing her first by the sight of Truth, and by her the William. For he, I think, will constantly act one way, who sees he aught to do so.  
Thus, I apprehended, the Gentlemen of the other way may say they are fixed in the present case. They may say, They will therefore always stand by their King and Country, because they see that such is their Duty. They may see that God has commanded that Duty without this Exception, Unless the Pope depose. They may see the reasons alleged for that exception deficient and unconcluding, and the reasons against it strong and convictive. And their sight may ●●ther produce absolute certainty, or, what in this case is equivalant, a full persuasion that it is so. For that is as much as the moderation of this Oath requires. Hence they may rationally hope, that the imperfection of a changeable nature, of which it is impossible for them, or any body else, to divest themselves, will not bring them into the suspicion of being changeable in their Allegiance.  
For there are but two ways by which they can change, either by▪ changing their Judgements, or ceasing to act according to them. And for their Judgements, they cannot change till what now appears True, come to appear False, and the contrary True. And this, besides that to them who see the Truth with certainty it is absolutely impossible, is otherwise in our case a wild supposition. For when numbers of the best Wits of Christendom, for several hundreds of years have strained themselves to the utmost, and yet failed to show them this Truth and Falsehood, which are supposed may appear at last, to fear a change of Judgement from new Lights, is not much better than to hope to catch Larks with a Net made of the falling Sky. I believe Protestants will think themselves well enough, if they be safe till that day come. If they do not, I know not how they can be secure of one another. For they are men too, subject to the weakness of changeable Mortality, as well as their Neighbours. And if they cannot be secure of other men's Judgements, because of new supposed Lights, neither can they be secure of their own.  
As for changing the second way, by ceasing to act according to their Judgements, or turning Knaves, the case is, I suppose, excluded by the very tender of the Oath. For it is to no purpose to require Oaths of those who are not thought honest men, and will continued so. Protestants know well enough, that 'tis not Conscience, but Fear, which works upon Knaves, and could never propose the Oath as an expedient to secure the Allegiance of other than honest men.   

CHAP. IX.  
THe two last Chapters promise' an Answer to the Author of the Questions, as far as concerns ours at present: yet the first seems only to take a care of the Jesuits, who to my apprehension might have been passed by, without prejudice to our Question. For sure to understand whether the Oath of Allegiance may be taken or not, it is not absolutely necessary to know how either French or English Jesuits have behaved themselves. I, for my part, have a veneration for the Jesuits, and all Religious; though I must confess, I love all Orders better than any one, and Truth better than all. I wish them all the reputation they deserve, and to deserve all they desire, and shall never by my good will raise any cloud, which may hinder it from shining in its full lustre. Leaving the Jesuits than to enjoy, without disturbance, the Fruits of this Gentleman's Labours, the good Opinion of the Reader, I turn to what may appear more nearly related to our business.  
His first Exception against the Author is, for mistaking the matter of Fact. And truly I think he did mistake one Censure for another, the Censure of the Admonitio, for the Censure of Santarellus, which, as this Gentleman says, was not passed till some days after the Decree, by which the Jesuits were commanded to subscribe. But I'do not perceive what this mistake makes or mars, and, I suppose, no body would mistake willingly, but for some advantage. That the Jesuits in France actually did subscribe the Censure against Santarellus, which is all he pretends, we still have reason to believe. The Decree mentioned, besides subscription to the Censure against the Admonitio, requires the Jesuits of Paris within three days to bring into the Court an Act, by which they should disavow and detest the Book of Santarellus expressly, and procure the like Act from the rest of the Jesuits in France within two Months. It orders farther, That two of their body be deputed to writ in the name of the rest, Doctrine contrary to Santarellus, and bring their writing into the Court within eight days, and this under penalty of high Treason. Whether this Order were obeyed, I cannot tell, but the former was. The Act is extant, whereby disavowing and detesting the bad Doctrine of Santarellus, they promise' to subscribe the Censure which should be made of that pernicious Doctrine by the S●rbo●.  
I hope I shall not be challenged of mistaking too, because this Act bears date 16 March, a day before the Decree. I suppose, that whenever it was signed, it was not brought into the Court before the Decree past, else methinks it would not have been required, if it had been there already. And it might very well be made before, in pursuance of a former Order, given them by word of mouth, when they appeared some few days before personally in Parliament. However it were, it is apparent by the Act, that the Jesuits did promise to subscribe the Sorbon Censure against Santarellus, and actually did subscribe, or break promise. So that while the substance of what is said in the Questions remains in its full force, I see not how it imported this Gentleman to use so many words about a circumstantial mistake.  
His next Exception I was very sorry to see. He blames the Author for cutting of part of the Doctrine of Santarellus, with an unreasonable, etc. which he says, may beget a mistake in the Reader, and give a different face to the matter. For it may be justly doubted, whether the Faculty would have pronounced so severe a judgement against the first part of the Doctrine, (viz. The Pope can depose for Heresy) had not the last aggravating circumstance (or rather cause) deserved and sharpened the Censure. Those circumstances are, That the Pope may depose, if it be expedient, if the Prince be faulty, negligent, useless, etc. Now for the Author, I conceive, by not citing the whole, when he promised only a short Extract, he has done no great injury to the Reader, and none at all to Santarellus, or those of his Order, by forbearing to say all the bad he knew. And for the thing itself, if this Gentleman have a mind to maintain, that the first part of the Doctrine does not deserve the Sorbon Censure, we shall see how good his Reasons are, when he lets us know them. In the mean time I can hardly think they are of his mind in France. For sure it was not for those aggravating circumstances alone, that Mariana, and Suarez were burnt, and Bellarmin condemned. The Exception he takes to the Censure, for not being separately applied to each Proposition, to my apprehension, makes against him. For it is a sign there needed no separation, and that the whole was corrupted into one mass of perdition. And so I leave the deposing Power to this Gentleman's protection, if he think fit to undertake it: wondering how favour to it should concern the Question in this Chapter, which in the first was foreign to this purpose: and grieving, that to depose even for Heresy should be thought a Doctrine which needs aggravating circumstances, to deserve a sharp Censure.  
There follows a pretty severe reprehension of the Author, for conjecturing the different conduct of the French and English Jesuits, might proceed from the difference of their Interests. To which I can only say, that we are all Mortals, and our tongues, and much more our thoughts, will sometimes run before our Wits. I wish he were the only man in the World, into whose thoughts a suspicion of Interest in Religious men had ever fallen. Were it in my Power to regulate matters, neither should the not-Religious suspect, nor the Religious give occasion of suspicion. For if any do, I doubt they have the severer account to make of the two. Whether they do or not, I will not so much as conjecture; though I believe this Gentleman understands the World too well, not to know the suspicious Author is not without Companions in his fault, if it be one.  
But leaving that matter to him to whom the Author has, and every body shall make their accounts, He proceeds to say in behalf of the Jesuits, that if the Cause of the French and English were the same, the English could not in likelihood run any hazard by writing after the French Copy; but it is not the same; there being a bore Subscription in France, and an Oath in England, and therefore no wonder if they act differently in different circumstances. This is in two words, The Jesuits always do well. Which every body may believe that pleases, for any thing I mean to say to the contrary. It concerns not our Question that I perceive: and if it did, I should undoubtedly side with Religious men, where I could with truth.  
But the difference betwixt Subscribing and Swearing, which he makes another mistake in the Author, I take to concern our Question something, and proper to be considered. The Author says, That certainly no sincere and generous honesty will solemnly and deliberately attest under his hand, what he will not in due circumstances swear to be true. What mistake or harm can there be in this? Truly it seems so clear to me, that I wonder how they fell out about it, unless perchance this Gentleman, who thinks the Author mistaken in his Position, be himself mistaken in the Author. What the Author says is this: He who attests a thing is true, may swear it is true. I hope he does not understand him to say, that the Attestor may swear that is true, which he attests is doubtful, or barely probable, or uncertain. If he do, he misunderstands the Author, and the mistake is on his side. Again, by True, I conceive not more is meant than True to the Attester, or that it be lodged or settled in his Judgement as such, and that he be not conscious that what he attests is true, is peradventure not true. Not but that 'tis possible the grounds, on which he relys, may deceive him; but he must not be ware of any deceit, but be fully persuaded there is none. Otherwise he cannot assert, it is true to him, his own heart witnessing, that it is not true to him, or if he do, he is no honest man.  
This being so, what fault can be found with the Author? Is it not plain, that an honest man neither will, nor can attest that to be true of which he is not fully persuaded that it is so? Is it not plain, that what is fully persuaded is true, to him is true, not doubtful, or uncertain, or only probable? If it be indeed true to him, he may swear it is true to him, and in due circumstances aught. Who refuses to swear, plainly refuses to do what he aught, and that is plainly to be wanting to what honesty requires.  
What has this Gentleman to say against this? How! swear to be true? says he; and yet this Gentleman (the Author) knew full well (had he reflected on it) that the only Question here is, of swearing or abjuring Opinions. Very like he did so; and he knew well too, that Opinions in that place signifies Tenets, or Points controverted, whereof one side is, and must be true, and, notwithstanding the controversy, may be seen to be so. And he understood, as all the World understands, that when a man has attested one of the disputed Opinions to be true, he has attested that he is not in suspense about it, but resolved that that side of the contradiction is true, and that it is not Opinion to him, as Opinion signifies suspense, and indetermination. Why may he not swear this, if he can, and do atttest it?  
Why this Gentleman is sure, the daily practice of the Church, in a free and inoffensive subscribing of Opinions, abundantly confutes it. For what more usual amongst our greatest Divines, in resolving Cases of weight and concern, than to deliver and attest their Opinions under their hand? Very well. And, I pray, what does Opinion signify here? A state of suspense, and indetermination? So that when we consult these great Divines, in cases of weight, the satisfaction and security we get from them, is, that they are in suspense about the matter, and attest their suspense under their hands. Truly if this be so, we plain men of the World are wonderfully abused.  
We know ourselves ignorant in matters which concern the conduct of our Souls, and take you to be knowing, who profess and exercise the Trade. Yet we are not so ignorant, but that we know there are several Opinions among you, and, if that were all, could take one at a venture which pleased us best, and never trouble you. But we desire to proceed securely, and come to learn of you, which of these Opinions is true, and we aught to follow. And when you have given us your resolution under your hand, we apprehended, that your are resolved yourselves, not in suspense and undetermined, and that the Opinion you commend to us, is true, as far as your judgements, on which we rely, can secure us. If it be otherwise, and your own jugments unsettled, in that wherein you undertake to settle us, we are plainly deceived. For we take your attestation for assurance that they are settled, and settled according as you attest.  
Truly these great Divines at this rate will run the hazard of being conjectured little honest men. And if this Gentleman have indeed a kindness for the Jesuits, as one would guests by his writing, he will desire they should not be of the number of great Divines at this time. An honest man, who were ignorant of what he is asked, would say so, and sand him who asks, to some body else who were more knowing. Or if it were a Point which no body knew, he would tell him ingenuously, and save him the pains of a fruitless enquiry. But to take upon him to be knowing, where he is conscious that he is not knowing; to resolve another, and in matters of weight, where he is not resolved himself; to deceive those who rely on him with an attestation of suspense, instead of an attestation of truth, which we desired, and thought we had gotten; are things which among us, do not pass for fair dealing, and which when we observe among those of our own Tribe, we think them not honest men who do them.  
Wherhfore I must needs believe Divines do not act in that manner, and that they are verily persuaded that whatever they attest under their hands for true, really is true; however the greatest of them may have their failings now and than. And I must needs give it with the Author against this Gentleman, not being able to see any thing which should hinder a man from swearing as much as he attests. Nor do I think it reasonable, that any one should venture his Soul, where he who bids him venture, refuses to venture his own. Nay, though his attestation should signify no more than that he is in suspense, the Author would still be in the right, who obliges only him to swear a thing is true, who has attested that it is so, and therefore means no more than that an honest man will solemnly attest not more than he will swear. And such an Attester I hope may safely swear that he is in suspense; though when he has done, if he never will attest more, he had best keep it to himself. For those who know it will be tempted to swear too, that they will never come at him more.  
And for the consequence from subscribing to swearing, I take it to be so far from a gross offence to Reason, and Conscience, Logic, and Divinity, that could I answer for all as much as for one, I would say positively they do all oblige a man to subscribe not more than he can and will swear. I mean, as I conceive the Author meant, so as he subscribes. If he subscribes for absolute, or evidently known Truth, he will swear that 'tis, or that he knows it True. If he subscribe for True to his judgement, as it is generally, and always understood, unless the contrary be expressed, he will swear it is true to his judgement: if for probability, that 'tis probable, and so however he subscribes. For indeed subscribing is calling the World to witness, that he is indeed persuaded as he subscribes, and who refuses to call God to witness too, in due circumstances, gives more reason than an honest man would, to suspect, that he deals not uprightly with the World.  
The last Quarrel he has with the Author, is for saying, That the Jesuits are the strictest of all Religious in maintaining and extending the Pope's prerogatives. This concerns the Jesuits, not me; and though it did, I should think it were good before I meddled with it, to know of them, whether they take it for an Aspersion. For if they do, I can tell them an infallible way to wipe it of. 'Tis but doing what this Gentleman says they may without hazarding their concerns, writing after the French Copy, subscribing a disavow, and detestation of the Doctrine of Santarellus. If they did so, I, and every body, who think them sincere men, should verily believe they truly did disavow and detest it; and, because I believe them good men too, and would not disavow, what they thought were true, that they were persuaded the Doctrine of Santarellus is false. And than I am persuaded, whatever this Gentleman has, they would have no scruple to swear, in fitting circumstances, that they are so persuaded. I will drive it not farther, for fear it should reach the Oath of Allegiance, which in my Opinion is not far distant from this case. Nor had I said so much, but only for the Example, which the matter afforded me, to show the consequence from subscribing to swearing, is not so far distant as this Gentleman would persuade us.   

CHAP. X.  
THe last Chapter is made up of what else he has, or thinks fit to say, against the Author, a mighty weak man, in his Opinion, and who generally mistates the Question, even contrary to his own express Assertions, and speaks but little to it when he has done. Truly if the Question be mistated, it had been ne'er a whit the worse, if he had said lesle: but methinks it does not hung very well together, that the Question should be mistated by him, whose Assertions are expressly contrary. I know not how a Question should be stated but by expressions, and those which are contrary to mistating; I should think, state it right. I shall only say, that there are some, peradventure as impartial Judges, and as careful Examiner's, as other men, who have something a better Opinion of the Author, and who think not a jot the worse of him for what this Gentleman has said against him. And there are who suspect the Author's weakness was not the only reason, why this Gentleman would not answer the whole, since he has showed so good will to undertake him, by answering part. For my part, let every one judge as he pleases. Who judges amiss, the fault and harm will be his own. I only mind what imports our business.  
The first thing he here dislikes, is fetching over a Parallel from France to England, as ask why we may not profess as much as they To this he says, 'Tis one thing to profess as much as they, and another to swear as much as they profess; whereof, though the first might, the second cannot safely be done, for the reasons formerly inculcated. I cannot tell whether this, though the first might, signify it may, or it may not: for it may be taken either way. But if he be not disposed to renounce the deposing Doctrine, even as fully as the Oath of Allegiance requires, I would wish him to have a car● so much as of professing what the French did; for fear of being drawn farther than he has a mind to go, and found the consequence from professing to swearing, strain as well as from subsoribing. For subsoribing is but one kind of professing. For the rest, it is the old story over again. Where I have met with the reasons, he speaks of, the Reader will see what I think of them.  
As for the Question he asks, How it comes to pass that the Oath of Allegiance having been so long translated; The French Universities have not voluntarily delivered their free judgement, and unanimously subscribed it? With the leave of those to whom he speaks, I must wonder he had so little acquaintance with the World as to ask it. I think few, besides himself, ever fancied a French University should subscribe an English Oath of Allegiance. As for delivering their judgements, perhaps they would, if they were solicited by such as had credit with them. Otherwise Universities do not use to assemble and make Decrees to satisfy every private man. Private Doctors are sometimes more forward, but than they carry lesle Authority, and every body knows that they are there as in other places, some for the Deposing Power, and some against it. I believe it were not hard to found French Doctors, who should declare the Oath unlawful; and those who thought otherwise would be shy enough of provoking the Pope causelessly, and incurring his ill will, to pleasure, not so much as a friend, but, a mere stranger, and one with whom they have nothing to do. Besides they have been told stories, of pretences which the Pope has by human right, as it appears by the History of the Irish Remonstrance, the Divines of Louvain were. Till they have studied the case, which till it concern them they never will, They have reason to hold their hands. But though there were nothing of all this, it is not the custom of one Nation to thrust themselves, without interest, into the concerns of another. 'Tis enough for the French that they defend their own King, and 'tis enough for other Nations, that they defend him by Arguments applicable to other Kings, and which if other Nations will not apply, the fault is their own. Who expects the French should do other men's work, and charge their own shoulders with the burden of all Princes concerns, understands little of their humour. Every one is for himself. We interposed not betwixt the Jansenists and Jesuits, and are like to hear as little of them in our Quarrels. If there were nothing else, the French have more civility, than by taking upon them to decide our differences, to asperse our Nation, as if we had not men of conscience and learning among ourselves.  
The next Quarrel he has to the Author, is for saying, The Deposing Doctrine, however it may by some be held speculatively probable, yet as to any execution, is practically no Power at all, against one in Possession, and consequently may be abjured as such. This he calls his next Argument, and says, It begs the Question, taking for an uncontrovertable truth, the only Point in controversy. For the Deposing Power hath been held, not only speculatively probable, but safely practicable. True, it was so: but sure it was held safely practicable only in force of a barely probable Speculation. For to say it was more than probable, is to say, it was certain. And that, I suppose, this Gentleman will not do, both for discovering more kindness to it than concerns the Question, and also because it were to unsay all that has been said in his Treatise, and allow that one side of a controverted Question may be certainly seen, and consequently sworn. Now if the Author had begged that a Power only probable, however it have been held, yet be not safely practicable, nor any Power to turn Kings out of their Kingdoms, and embroil Nations in confusion and misery, I think he had been no impudent Beggar. For not so much as any private man was ever dipossest of a long enjoyed Estate, by any Court of Justice, upon pretence of a bore probable Title in another man to it.  
I must confess I have a great curiosity to know what this Gentleman himself thinks of the matter, whether Deposing were safely practicable, as it was held, or not. If he think it was, truly he has reason to quarrel with the Author, and all who maintain the Oath, because they deny it is safely practicable. But than it were to be wished, he would own his true reason, and stand to it, that people may know what to speak to. For if he think it was not safely practicable, I see no rational ground of quarrel he can have to the Author, who says but what himself thinks true, and begs no more than he is willing to give.  
But after all, the Author did not go a begging. He was not so poor at this time. This Gentleman mistakes him, and calls that his Argument which is not. He discourses in this manner: A certain general Rule is to be observed notwithstanding an Exception that's uncertain. The Precept of Obedience to Kings is certain Catholic Doctrine, the Exception, unless the Pope Depose, uncertain. Therefore the Precept obliges, notwithstanding the Exception. Hence he infers, in the words cited by this Gentleman, that though the Exception, or Power of the Pope be held probable, the practice cannot be allowed, as 'tis manifest it cannot, if we must act according to the certain Precept. This, if it be Begging, is as fine begging as one shall ordinarily meet with. Few dress up their Proving more gaily.  
There follows, says he, another Argument: And so there does indeed a great way of. For the Author it seems, in the 15 Pages which this Gentleman skips, has nothing to purpose, or else worth notice. The business is, (for I am unwilling to transcribe many lines) whether renouncing Obedience to the Pope's Commands, do not amount to renouncing his Power. This Gentleman makes two parts of the Argument. The first which he tells us is quite besides the Question, and so had great luck that it was not skipped over with its fellows, he contracts into these words: Either deny the Pope's Authority, or obey it. To this he says, That if those good Subjects, who will swear they will adhere to the King, though the Pope should Depose him, will but say (though not swear) he cannot Depose him (which is no more than with the French Divines to deny the Deposing Power) than the Gentleman (the Author) and the first part of his Argument are satisfied Not very well, I doubt, nor any body else, unless they mean as they say. For who says what he does not mean, will hardly pass either for good Subject, or good man. Their conscience must either bear them witness, that the Pope indeed cannot Depose, or they cannot say so without lying, and few people are satisfied with Liars. But if their conscience be in earnest persuaded so, manifestly it is not check of conscience, which hinders them from doing all that the Oath of Allegiance desires, swearing that it is so persuaded. So that bore saying, if you bar lying, may prove as bad, and of as scurvy consequence, as subscribing, and professing, and trepan a man, before he be ware, into swearing.  
For my part I am wonderfully ill satisfied with all this, and see this offer to say, and refusal to swear, with extreme grief. 'Tis well that all Catholics are not of that mind. If they were, those who think ill enough of us already, would soon think worse, and take us for a sort of people, who cared not what we said, or subscribed, and who perhaps would profess for true what we thought false, and contrariwise, or never concern ourselves what were true or false, as long as we were not put to our Oaths. None but Magistrates, or who had Power to administer Oaths, would deal with us at this rate, nor they neither after a while. For he whose word will not be taken, will not long be believed upon his Oath. I hope, and doubt not but, this Gentleman is provided against this scandal. But I am sure, if any Maxims would infer it, they are not Catholic Maxims. As I am only acquainted with common roads, and know nothing of the nearer ways of Casuistry, I apprehended things in this manner. Words I take to be signs, and witnesses to the hearer, of what is in the speakers mind. Who puts into his words, what is not in his mind, wrongs his hearer and himself, and overthrows the Basis of all human Conversation, and Traffic, Veracity. Every honest man seems a kind of Peer in judgement. What he says on his faith, (and this he does as often as he speaks deliberately in a matter of moment,) is as guilty, or not guilty upon my honour.  
Swearing I take to add nothing to saying, save a stronger confirmation to those, who not relying on our honesty, require God should be engaged, with whom, they think he must be madly wicked who dares dissemble, since none can deceive him, nor hope to scape his severe hands. But there must be the same grounds for both, viz. Truth, or the things being in the words, as it is in the mind. Without this you cannot say, with it you may, in due circumstances swear. Neither does swearing add or altar, nor saying diminish any thing of this, nor does swearing false, more wrong our Neighbour, though it does God and ourselves, than saying false. Wherhfore I cannot understand how any one can fear perjury, by swearing what he says, but he who has said what is against his conscience. For Perjury, as this Gentleman rightly observes, is nothing but a Lie sworn, and so of necessity there must be a Lie before there can be Perjury. So that I see not how he who thinks himself in danger of Perjury, by swearing the Pope cannot Depose, can avoid the danger of lying (damnable as well as the other, though not so grievously) by offering to say it. The conscience must be safe in both cases, or neither, and all the several ways of checks, which this Gentleman has found in his Second Chapter against Swearing, must as necessarily be avoided in Saying, unless a man care not to be damned, so it be not altogether with the deepest.  
For the Second, and only pertinent part of his Argument, he puts these words of the Author: What wise and real difference as to Government, and the practical part of Human Life, is there betwixt these two; I'll swear never to obey my Commander, and I'll swear he has no power to command me? The answer, he says, is easy. The last is an assertary Oath, and swears to a disputable piece of Doctrine as to an absolute Truth, which is down right Perjury. This is still the old Song, to the Tune of the whole Treatise, which what harmony it makes to my ears, I have often enough said. I shall only observe it has something a begging countenance, as well as its neighbours, while it assumes the Doctrine sworn is disputable. For the Author, he sees, is of opinion, that forswearing the Practice, amounts to forswearing the Power, and puts the Question, whether there be Power, or not, out of dispute, so that the later is not disputable to him who can swear the former. Again, This absolute Truth is a supposition more than needs, or will, be granted. 'Tis as the Oath is. If it run as the Oath of Allegiance, Truth to the best of the swearers judgement will serve turn. And I conceive the Author, where he speaks of true, meant not otherwise, it being so generally understood, and certainly meaning nothing else in our case. For what else is material, there will be occasion to speak of it in the next branch.  
Which, he says, being a promissory Oath, and tending wholly to practice, engages not for the absolute Truth of any Doctrine, but only for the swearers Allegiance and Loyalty, and therefore requires no absolute certainty to build on, but only a safe and practically probable Opinion. That this is a promissory Oath I agreed, that we may agreed at lest in something. But this promissory Oath, to my apprehension, does engage for the Truth of some Doctrine, and if it did not, could not engage for the Allegiance and Loyalty of the swearer. As for absolute Truth, and absolute Certainty, which he puts in, such an Oath as the Oath of Allegiance requires them not, so that if he had an eye to that, they are rubs which he has found out to cast into a way, which was otherwise smooth. Let but his words and judgement agreed; let him engage for Truth enough to satisfy his Conscience, and Certainty enough to answer for so much Truth, and he may safely take the Oath of Allegiance, for any thing more that it engages him to, or requires of him. Taking Truth than for such Truth as is requisite to the Oath of Allegiance, I conceive, that he who swears he will never obey the Pope in the case of Deposing, does as much engage for the truth of this Doctrine, That the Pope cannot Depose, as he who swears in the Terms of the Oath.  
And I am so persuaded, because I think it as much Perjury, or, if it have another name, as great a sin, to swear what is unlawful, as what is false. I think also, that the lawfulness of what we swear, must be as much known, and fixed in our conscience with as great a certainty, as the Truth: and that the inward checks against Injustice, make a man as deeply accountable to God, as checks against Falsity. Wherhfore, unless he who swears, that he will always disobey the Pope, be satisfied in his conscience, that it is, and always will be lawful to disobey him, I think he cannot swear. That promissory Oath therefore engages for this Truth, That it is always lawful to disobey him, nor is there any difference whether he swear in the promissory, or assertory form. But it cannot be lawful to disobey him, who has power to command, nothing being more evident, than that such power imports an obligation to obey. Wherhfore he who expressly, or virtually swears it is lawful to disobey the Pope, swears also he has no power to command. Now he who takes the Oath of Allegiance does no more, and he who swears in the promissory form, to my apprehension does no lesle. So that I cannot imagine how those who refuse the one, offer the other.  
But if there be a difference, as this Gentleman apprehends there is, and that the promissory Oath do not engage for any Truth, I conceive, there can be no security of Allegiance by the Promissory. Every body knows, that who promises an unlawful thing, is so far from being obliged to keep his promise, that he is obliged not to keep it. And I speak of Promise by Oath. If the Pope have power to command, disobedience is plainly unlawful. Who promises to disobey him, and yet allows that perhaps 'tis true that he has power to command, promises to do what perhaps is unlawful, and what he acknowledges to be so. If any man's conscience will allow him to make such a promise, every man's judgement will tell him, that it can not more than perhaps oblige, and that perhaps who makes it, may be obliged to break it. Who thinks this a sufficient security of Allegiance, may do so, if he pleases: but, I doubt, he will have a hard talk to make others think so. For the promiser may perhaps be obliged not to perform, and 'twill not be thought reasonable the security of Princes should depend on maybe's. For my part, I see not what can be plainer, than that, if unlawful promises are not to be kept, those promises are only secure, where lawful things are promised. Wherhfore who cannot, or will not engage for the lawfulness of what he promises, cannot engage that his promise shall be performed.  
I know not whether it may be said, That 'tis lawful to do what is not seen to be unlawful. And therefore since, whether the Pope have power or not, I do not see he has, it is lawful for me to disobey him, and oblige myself always to disobey him by promise. But this will not do: because I cannot oblige myself for ever, nor for longer than till I remain in ignorance. As soon as I see the Pope has Power, my disobedience becomes unlawful, and I am bound to break promise; my performance therefore evidently depends on my sight. But I do not see what security I can give that I shall never see, what I confess perhaps is to be seen, and which may be seen, it may be the next day, it may be the next hour, after I have made the promise, for any thing I can answer to the contrary. I fear in spite of whatever can be done to exclude it, there must always be a tacit condition implied in these kind of promises, and that he who professes absolutely he will always be loyal, can mean not more than that he will be loyal, unless, or till it appear, that he aught not to be so. Which to me seems but slender security.  
Again, What appearance of security is there in a promissory Oath, which the promiser acknowledges may be dispensed with? Though he should swear not to accept of a Dispensation, the matter, I doubt, would not be much mended. For if there be a power to dispense, and that power have exercised itself, and dispensed, whether the Dispensation be accepted or not, the Oath is truly dispensed with, and cannot oblige him who acknowledges it is so, as he must, who acknowledges a power of validly dispensing. Wherhfore if he accept not the Dispensation, 'tis not in virtue of the bond, of his Oath, for that is cancelled, even in his own judgement, but in virtue of something else: for which if he can offer other security, well and good; but his former security is voided. There is no obligation from the nature of the thing: For Loyalty to Princes deposed, is not to be preserved, if the Pope truly can depose. There is no obligation from the Oath: For that may be dispensed with, and though it were not, as soon as it is seen that the Pope has power to depose, to obey a deposed Prince is unlawful, and the obligation of the Oath ceases.  
The truth is, the case is hard. What is promised is unlawful, if the Pope can depose. Not man's conscience can be obliged to a thing unlawful, and his conscience will not allow him to think the Pope cannot depose. But yet because he does not absolutely see the Pope can depose, though he shrewdly suspect it, and hopes he never shall, his conscience will suffer him to promise' absolutely that he will always be loyal; though every body sees, it may hap to be his duty, according to his principles, not to be Loyal. And so upon the matter he desires you to accept of his good will, for the deed, and to believe he will never do otherwise than he promises, since his conscience is incompatible with any obligation, that this will shall be constant. And when a man does all that he can do, why should not people be satisfied? Now he whose conscience is persuaded that the Pope cannot depose, when he promises to be always loyal, is doubly obliged to performance; by his Oath, and by the nature of the thing promised, which obliges whether he promise' or not, and therefore cannot be dispensed with.  
In the last place he brings what he calls, A conjectural proof, or rather mere affirmative presumption of the Author concerning our Ancestors. But he was a little out, when he took it for a proof. It is the Answer to an Objection, which the Author had framed against himself. Nor do I see any great presumption, in thinking our Ancestors would have changed their judgements, if they had seen reason so to do. And I think the Reasons alleged by the Author, and this Gentleman out of him, would have gone near to have persuaded them, not only that the opinion denying the deposing power is bore opinion, but also that it is true. In which if I be guilty of presumption too, I hope the sin is not unpardonable: For I must presume again, that He, and the Author were both mistaken, if they thought our Ancestors generally refused the Oath of Allegiance. I am much mistaken if they did not generally take it, though I foresee there will be a fit place, to say why I think so.  
There remains only to conclude a little differently from him, That since it is the Voice and Law of Nature, that Protection claims Allegiance, and that perfect Subjection to Civil Powers, under which we live, is the strict Injunction, not lesle than dictate of Reason (he might have said Religion too) there can be no danger to our Souls in complying with what Nature, Reason, and Religion require; nor danger of Perjury by giving security, that we will, as we aught comply; and that Tenets inconsistent with such security, are inconsistent with all three, and can have no better warrant than scruple. Wherhfore I wish and pray, That rendering to God the things that are Gods, be not made a pretence of robbing Caesar of the things that are Caesar's, nor our Allegiance to our King forfeited under a show of Loyalty to God.   
FINIS.   

AN ANSWER TO THE Third Treatise.  
THe Third Treatise: goes another way to the wood. Declining the Question of the Deposing Power, with the wariness of the second Author, and with more liberality allowing every one to hold and defend the contrary, It yet finds fault with the Oath of Allegiance, upon an extrinsical and accidental account, viz. the Pope's prohibition of it. So that had the Pope either not writ, or not sent the Breves alleged, there had been no place for this Gentleman's Argument. It is this: Whoever takes the Oath, denies an exterior obedience to the Pope's prohibition, in matters appertaining unto him, and no farther than they appertain unto him. But it is unlawful to deny an exterior obedience to the Pope's prohibitions in matters appertaining unto him, and no farther than they appertain unto him: Therefore it is unlawful to take the Oath.  
From this Argument the Author of the Preface takes occasion to tempt us into their example of throwing the Pope quite of, seeking with this pleasant smartness to fright us into an apprehension that we shall have a hard task of it, to justify the Pope's Authority, and disobey it at the same time. I must beg his pardon for that matter, believing that to cut of the Head is but a bad way to cure the Headache. All sorts of Superiors, Ecclesiastical and Civil, Supreme and Inferior, exceed sometimes, and found their Commands unperformed, not only without blame, but with praise. None but Tyrants expect their Word should pass for Law; All just Powers have their bounds. And I, for my part, think him much a better Subject, and more a friend, and support of Authority, who, preserving a due respect, refuses to comply with the failings of his Superiors, than who with a dangerous flattery soothes his Errors, perhaps into ruin. Besides, while he himself has showed us how to avoid the precipice, he has made it something the more inexcusable to leap into it. Wherhfore acknowledging the Pope's superiority, I must try how hard it is to answer the Argument drawn from it.  
Yet before I begin, I have something to say to the Topick, which disrelishes with me for more reasons than one. First, I have some difficulty to understand it, as plain English as it is. Exterior Obedience is due to the Pope's Prohibition in matters appertaining to him, and so far as they appertain to him. What means this, so far as they appertain to him? This should signify, because Spirituals belong to the Ecclesiastical Magistrate, and Temporals to the Civil, that Spirituals may in some respect become Temporals, and in that respect belong to the Civil Magistrate, the Ecclesiastical meddling with them not farther than as they are Spirituals. But than in that respect they are no longer Spirituals, and so appertain not to the Ecclesiastical Magistrate, and are excluded from his cognizance by the first Branch. So that what remains for the second Branch to exclude or signify, I cannot tell. Or may it mean, because Magistrates are to exercise righteous judgement, that it does not appertain to them to judge wrong, and so they are to be obeyed only so far as they are in the right? If this be his meaning, his Argument, I doubt, will do him but little service. The thing is not always true; for unjust Commands are sometimes to be obeyed for the good of the community; and if they were not, he knows it is conceived that the Command in question is not just.  
But which is of more import, according to the Argument, the Unlawfulness of taking the Oath of Allegiance consists in Disobedience to the Pope's commands. And yet he says a little after N. 7. That the Popes Breves do not make the Oath unlawful, but only declare it to be so Which if it be true, than the Unlawfulness does not consist in Disobedience, but in the intrinsic Unlawfulness of the matter sworn, and the Oath had been unlawful whether the Pope had forbidden it or no. But if the Argument be true, and the Unlawfulness do indeed consist in Disobedience, than plainly there was no Unlawfulness antecedent to the Prohibition, which the Pope would declare, and the Breves make the Oath unlawful and nothing else. How these two can hung together, is very difficult to comprehend. One says the Oath is unlawful, because forbidden; the other, forbidden, because unlawful. In the first case Prohibition is the Cause, and Unlawfulness the Effect: in the second, Unlawfulness is the Cause, and Prohibition the Effect. To say both, is to make the same thing a Cause of that of which you make it an Effect, that is, both Cause and Effect of itself. As unintelligible, and as impossible as this is, I cannot blame the Author for desiring two strings to his bow, and the liberty to shoot now one Unlawfulness, now another, as occasion serves: but I foresee 'twill be difficult dealing with such a man. Show the command obliges not, and the obligation of the thing commanded will be insisted on: show there is no obligation in the thing, and the command will be obtruded. And who can speak to more than one thing at once?  
Now for the Argument, which only presses the Command, I conceive it quite changes the nature of the Question, turning it from the thing sworn, to the swearing, from the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the Oath, to the lawfulness or unlawfulness of taking it. As it is plainly one thing to ask whether Flesh be a lawful food, and another, whether I may eat it on Fridays: so to ask whether the Oath be a lawful Oath, is very different from ask, whether I, in such and such circumstances, may take it. Who inquires whether the Oath be lawful or not, desires to know whether it contain any thing contrary to the Laws of God or Man, or no. Who answers of an External Prohibition, speaks of a thing not contained in the Oath, and says nothing at all to the Question. If I refuse an Oath, who have bound myself not to swear (supposing I can validly do so) or a Quaker refuses one, whose conscience permits him not to take any, I think it is strange Logic which can from thence conclude that Oath unlawful. And I think it not lesle strange to conclude this Oath unlawful, because it happens to be forbidden. For the Prohibition is as extrinsical to the Oath, as the Quakers, or my Conscience; and the Unlawfulness of an Oath is understood to be an Intrinsical Denomination.  
The Justice required for one of the three conditions of an Oath, the want whereof he says N. 1. makes an Oath intrinsically evil, must, I think, be meant of a Justice intrinsical to the Oath. For an extrinsical injustice, sure, can make it no more than extrinsically evil. And since, as he says, in the same place, an unjust Oath cannot be justified in any case possible, this unjustifiable injustice cannot be an extrinsical Injustice by prohibition. Because if that were all, the same Oath remaining the same, now might, now might not be justifiably taken, as it has the luck to be forbidden, or not forbidden; and might be taken by some, and not by others, as some might be forbidden, others not forbidden to take it. As in this case, the Breves being addressed only to the English, there is nothing in the Argument which can hinder the Scotch, or Irish, or any other of the King's Subjects from taking the Oath of Allegiance. But an Oath truly unjust cannot be taken by any body at any time.  
Again, The justest Oath in the World may hap to be forbidden, as well as the most unjust; nor is it possible to frame an Oath, which may not become unjust this way. As in this very case, I believe it were hard to contrive a renunciation of the Deposing Power, (without which renunciation there are who will not be satisfied of our fidelity) into terms, which should scape censure or prohibition. We have seen the experience in the Irish Remonstrance, and in the Three Propositions, (and I could instance farther if it were to purpose) which as free as they are from the Exceptions commonly made against the Oath of Allegiance, yet have not met with much better luck. So that I fear there is no fence for their flail, and should we refuse to give assurance of our fidelity (if that renunciation be indeed necessary to assurance) till we could found out terms which should displease no body, I doubt it will be long before we pass for faithful Subjects. However it be, this external casual injustice, I conceive, is not that which people seek, and are obliged to avoid in Oaths. Not that disobedience to obliging commands is not sin, and aught not be avoided: But I conceive it is a sin of another nature than Perjury, if that be the name of swearing injustly. For though the Command hap to be about an Oath, yet it is but a Command, and the breach of it disobedience, not that irreverence to God, which is committed by swearing false or unjust things.  
For this reason I suspect the Topick will not prove very satisfactory to those for whose sake he professes to writ. Few are ignorant of the Breves he mentions; but they have a scruple concerning them, and desire to know whether what they forbidden, as contrary to Faith and Salvation, be truly so or no. Who would satisfy them, should show it is; For if it be not, in stead of quieting their former scruples, they will be apt to entertain new ones, and desire to know farther, what necessity there is of obeying a command, manifestly grounded on a supposition which is not true. This Author undertakes to lay these storms of doubts, and allow them N. 80. the same liberty with the French, to hold, and maintain the Pope has no power to Depose Kings, which is the substance of the Assertory part of the Oath, and N. 50. offers a promissory form, equivalent, I suppose, in his meaning, to what is promised in it. This is manifestly to allow them to hold all, which they profess in the Oath to hold, and do all they promise' to do. And yet, to satisfy them, He will not allow them to take the Oath, because it is forbidden. Now their difficulty is, How they can be forbidden to profess by Oath, when legally required, that they hold what they do, and according to this Gentleman, lawfully may hold, and promise' what, according to him, they lawfully may, and aught do. And his satisfaction to this difficulty is to tell them of a Prohibition, which Prohibition is the very thing in which they are dissatisfied. It is plain the Oath was, or was not unlawful, before the Pope forbidden it. Who believes it was, needs not the Pope's Breves for his satisfaction. Who believes otherwise will be more apt to be dissatisfied with the Breves, than the Oath, for all this Gentleman's Argument. For let the Pope have what power he will, why should he use it to forbidden things, which otherwise might irreprehensibly be done, and this to the manifest and great prejudice of the obeyers? Till the World be a little better disposed to blind obedience, such Arguments, I doubt, will not be very satisfactory.  
Besides, in my opinion this Topick intrenches a little too much on the Reverence we own the Pope. If no Unlawfulness can be shown in the Oath, independent of his Breves, he is manifestly exposed to the aspersion of forbidding us lawful things. And that, not upon the score of Unfitness, on which things otherwise lawful may rationally and profitably be forbidden; but of an Unlawfulness which this Gentleman allows us to believe there is not. I conceive, in a Country where all he does is so apt to be misinterpreted, it would have become the respect due to him, to have been more chary of his credit. If any can, it had been much more to purpose for this Author to have let his Breves alone, and produced that which would have done the business much better without them. Though Catholics should be satisfied with them, Protestants, he knows, look upon what they forbidden, as a duty required by the Law of God and Nature, besides that of our Country. By this Gentleman's Argument, the Pope and we are both left in the lurch, and unable either to justify him from the aspersion of forbidding us to do our duty, or ourselves from owning a power which can do so.  
Were there nothing else but bringing the Pope's Authority into dispute, I conceive, he had deserved much better of him, if he had chosen another Topick. I, for my part, have a great aversion even from discoursing of Supreme Powers, whether Ecclesiastical or Civil; and doubt it is making more bold with them, than becomes private men. The Authors of the Second Treatise, and Controversials, in my opinion, are in the right. To preserve the Majesty of both Powers in an awful distance, is not only respectful, but necessary. And for the Pope's Authority in particular, I must declare I think it of infinite benefit to the World, and believe it may thank the preposterous zeal of inconsiderate friends, if lesser be of my mind than should be. For indeed to strain Authority beyond its bounds, is the worst office which can be done to it. In stead of getting what is not due, it often loses what is; as who would shoot farther than his bow will carry, by drawing up his Arrow too high, breaks his bow. I am very sorry he has, by pressing obedience, drove me to the necessity either of obeying against my conscience, or giving a reason why I think I aught not, against my humour. Who is at the Oar, cannot but row; yet I shall endeavour to strike not deeper, than is just necessary to keep the Boat steady.  
To enter upon the merits of the Cause at last, The Mayor of his Argument is this: Whoever takes the Oath, denys an Exterior Obedience to the Pope's Prohibition, in matters appertaining unto him, and no farther than they appertain unto him. Pray why so? How comes the Oath of Allegiance to appertain to the Pope? which if we may believe a King, and a King who had the principal hand in making it, 
K. James his Apology for the Oath of Alleg. p. 47. and elsewhere often.  meddles only with the civil Obedience of Subjects to their Sovereign, in mere temporal causes. Because, says he, N. 2. Several things are contained, or involved in this Oath, the decision whereof appertains only to the Spiritual, and Ecclesiastical Court. If I am not misinformed by Lawyers (for I have no skill in these matters) when there is question to which Court a Cause belongs, the decision of that Question, by the old Catholic Laws of England, belongs to the Temporal Court. I know he is of another Opinion, for Reasons which we shall see when we come at them. In the mean time I think the practice of our Ancestors, in which the Spiritual Power has acquiesced, aught to overrule his Reasons. But this by the by; for I intent not to insist upon it. What are these several things, which appertain only to the Spiritual Court?  
He reckons up these: How far the Spiritual Power extends itself? What Authority Christ left to the supreme Spiritual Pastor as such? What are the effects of an Excommunication? What Propositions are Heretical? and, which he says is the main debate, Whether this Oath be sinful or not? It is, I perceive, of main importance by which handle we take a thing. All this, as Ecclesiastically as it sounds, has a pure temporal meaning. For what Spiritual Power, and Spiritual Pastor, and Spiritual Censure can do (which by the way are but three several expressions of one thing; 'Tis in short Spiritual Power exercised by the Spiritual Governor) means nothing by its extent, and authority, and effects, but whether Subjects are to obey their Prince, when the Pope says they are not. And certainly the Question of the Civil Obedience of Subjects, in civil matters, is a temporal matter belonging to the Temporal Court, and does not become Spiritual, because a Spiritual Power interposes in it. It is what it is, whatever that be which medles with it; nor have I heard, nor can I imagine that Spirituality has the force to assimilate things into its own nature, like him who turned all he touched to Gold.  
But the Oath says, the Pope cannot Depose, and that is to determine the extent of his Power. I cannot tell whether it be or no. He who says the Thames does not run over Salisbury-Plain, I think does not determine the bounds of the Thames. But not to dispute of words, if you will have it a confinement of his Power, it is such a confinement as belongs to the Civil Power. For he who has it, as he is to be supposed ignorant in Spirituals, does not exercise any authority, or pretend to any skill in them: but out of the nature of Civil government, which belongs to him, and in which he alone is to be supposed knowing, sees what is consistent or inconsistent with it: and out of that sight determins what may indeed by accident concern the Spiritual, either power, or pretences, but which proceeds from his own skill in matters in which he alone has it. Barely by knowing what twenty shillings is, I can certainly tell, that if you add Gold, or take away Brass, it is not twenty shillings; and yet I determine nothing of the value of either, nor perhaps know so much as what they are. So it is in this case. The Civil Governor knows what Civil government is, and by that knowledge can with certainty judge what is necessary for it. He judges, and all the World sees he judges right, that it cannot subsist without the obedience of those who are subject to it, in those things in which they are subject; and certainly concludes, that what takes away that obedience, destroys the government. Whether it be Spiritual, or Temporal Power, or any thing else, which pretends to do this, is all one to him. For whatsoever it be, he evidently sees it aught not be done, and that the pretence is vain. Wherhfore if you will call the denying of that pretence to the Spiritual Power, a confinement of the Spiritual Power, it is plain he exceeds not the sphere of his own activity, nor does more than conclude out of the Principles of his own Art. And this manifestly belongs to him, and so to him as not to any body else; since every body else is supposed ignorant in them. Neither does he entrench upon the Spiritual Power, by securing the subsistence of the Temporal Commonwealth.  
Let me add, that 'tis as much for the interest of the Church, as of the Commonwealth, that he do so. A Commonwealth can be without a Church, but a Church cannot be without a Commonwealth. 'Tis true, the Church is the principal and more noble, as raising man to a higher and better state, viz. a disposition to true and lasting happiness; whereas from the Commonwealth he can only receive these perishable conveniencies which are found in a peaceful society. But yet the Commonwealth is to the Church as the Foundation to a House. The House is without doubt the principal part, by which those of a Family have shelter from the weather, conveniencies to repose, and converse, and what else they aim at in buildings. Yet nothing of all this can be without a firm Foundation; whereas the Foundation, however useless, would yet remain though the House were gone. So it is between the Commonwealth and the Church. The Commonwealth is the Foundation, without which there can be no such thing as a Church. For the Church is a body of men to be raised by Christian Discipline to the uttermost perfection of which human nature is capable. And 'tis evident there can be no Body of men to be raised, where there is no Body of men. Civil Government preserves this Body: Take that away, and there is nothing on which the Church can work, and no where she can be. The Commonwealth, however useless to the perfection of nature, would remain, though there were no Church; but Church can not more stand without Commonwealth, than the Chambers when the Foundation fails. So that manifestly the preservation of the Church, and all the goods we hope from her, require the Commonwealth be kept up.  
Thus much I thought it not amiss to say by the by, that those, who I doubt reflect not on it as it deserves, may see there is nothing more ruinous to the Church, than that Zeal not according to knowledge, which seeks to exalt the Spiritual Power to the unsettling of the Temporal. As fondness is a very dangerous, and often ruinous, kindness, These by their over-friendship become in truth Enemies to the Church. In the mean time, I think, I may warrantably deny the Major of the Argument, since the wording of the Instances, which would prove there is something in the Oath which appertains to the Pope, in spiritual Terms, does not hinder the matter of it from being a pure temporal matter, appertaining wholly and only to the Temporal Power, and not at all to the Pope.  
I say nothing of the other two Instances, because I conceive them more for show than substance. The Oath determins not what is, or what is not Heresy; but barely calls that Heretical, which is already determined, and known, and confessed by all the World to be so, as is already discoursed in answer to the Second Treatise. It is a very strange pretence, that the Temporal Power exceeds it bounds, because it calls things by their own names. Neither do I think this Author, or any body else, would think the Civil Power determined of Heresy, or passed its limits, or did any thing reprehensible, if it ordered for example, that he should be punished, who maintained this Heretical Proposition, That Theft is lawful, or commanded it to be renounced. And this is as much as the Oath of Allegiance does.  
Than for the pretence of sinful, or not sinful, if this would draw the Oath under the cognizance of the Spiritual Tribunal, it would draw every action, and leave the Temporal nothing to do, absolutely idle and useless. For there is no action which is not either sinful or not sinful. Our Bargains, our choice of Life, of Company, of Clotheses; every thing we do, by this account would all crowd into the spiritnal Court, because, as I said, in all we do well or ill. I think it unnecessary to dilate upon this point, though I know th● pretence has been made use of before, and by a Pope too. But I conceive it finds no very good reception in the World, and believe every body may easily see why it does not. Suppose there were nothing of all this, where there is no Question of sinful or not sinful, there is no place for the cognizance of the Spiritual Court: And whether Allegiance be lawful, and may be professed, I hope is no Qustion which needs, or can come under Cognizance. Wherhfore the Mayor, I am persuaded, aught not be admitted without better proof.  
Yet though it were, I do not think any thing would come of it. In rigour I need say not more, the Argument being sufficiently answered, when one of the Premises is denied. But yet I cannot but ingenuously declare my thoughts, and say, that to my apprehension the Minor will not hold water neither. 'Tis this: But it is unlawful to deny an exterior obedience to the Pope's Prohibitions, in matters appertaining unto him, and no farther than they appertain unto him. This Proposition, I conceive, is not true, because I think there goes more to obedience, than barely to consider to whom the Matter of the Command appertains. The Manner of Commanding, or applying the Command, is to be thought of as well as the Matter commanded; and the Use of the Power, as well as the Power. For to begin with the later, What if the Commander abuse his Power, and command things prejudicial, or possibly destructive? What if he command Vice, and forbidden Virtue? If you say the Pope is still to be obeyed, because Virtue and Vice are matters properly appertaining to him; you open a gap to all the abuses to which the frailty of human nature is subject, and plainly put it into the Power of one man (and who shall secure us, there shall never be found one wicked enough, to have the Will too?) to bring all into confusion and ruin. In short, You oblige us to what cannot be done, and which we are forewarned not to do, not not by the Authority of an Angel from Heaven. I forbear to dilate this Topick, and give it that frightful face which it would have, if the number and weight of inconveniences were particularly insisted on. Appeals as from Abuse are things so common, and so notorious, that I think this short hint is as much as needs to my purpose.  
But yet it will not be amiss to look upon it with reference to our present case. The Pope has declared the Oath of Allegiance cannot be taken, as containing many things contrary to Faith and Salvation, and upon that score forbidden it. Suppose he had done quite contrary, declared the refusal of it contrary to Faith and Salvation, and therefore allowed, or commanded it. I would ask this Gentleman, Whether he, who upon the warrant of that supposed declaration should take the Oath, would not do a thing contrary to Faith and Salvation, if the Oath indeed be, according to the real declaration, contrary to them? As likewise, whether he, who upon the warrant of the real declaration refuses the Oath, does not act contrary to both, if the refusal truly be, according to the supposed declaration, contrary to them? I think neither of these can be denied, since matters evidently are what they are, whatsoever be declared concerning them. Wherhfore I see not but a case may possibly hap in which our Salvation may be prejudiced even by Obedience; and if it may, sure care aught to be taken that it be not. For to have so much care of Obedience, as to have none of Salvation, is what I cannot believe God expects at our hands. I conceive therefore it imports as much, in this power of the Keys, that they be turned the right way, as put into the right Lock. Otherwise instead of opening the Gates of Heaven, they may chance to double lock them.  
I hope the Reader expects not I should digress into the examination of circumstances required to justify Disobedience. That Question concerns me not at present. For having only to do with the general Proposition, that Disobedience is unlawful, whenever the Matter appertains to the Commander, I conceive it is enough to show the Proposition is not true, if it may hap that Obedience is not due; And 'tis plain, that Obedience is not due, if the Power of commanding be abused to the prejudice of Salvation. Who shall be Judge, whether it be or no? and the like matters concern me not, and require more exact treating than can be expected in a digression. I should think the Case must not need a Judge: Particulars certainly not being at liberty to obey or disobey, on pretence of their private Judgements.  
Again, The Manner I said was to be considered as well as the Matter. For the Obedience due from Catholics to the Pope, is not altogether of the same nature with that which Religious perform to their Superiors. These inquire not farther than whether the thing commanded be truly commanded or not, and when they know their Superiors will, which way soever they come to know it, obey without more ado. 'Tis not so betwixt Catholics and the Pope. They obey him as a Magistrate, whose Commands, unless they come to them in a legal way, they neither do, nor are bound to take notice of. 'Tis not a bore knowledge of his will, how unquestionable and how undeniable soever it may be, which obliges to Obedience. People may, and often do, know very certainly of Decrees made by him; and know too, that he intends, and declares by these Decrees to bind the whole Church, and yet regard them not; and this unblamably, till they be proposed in that manner, in which the custom of Christendom requires they should be proposed.  
This consideration of the Manner, I suspect will seem slight enough to some who have not thought of it, and who perhaps will be apt to imagine, that, provided the Pope have commanded any thing, and we know he has done so, it matters not much which way we come by that knowledge. And yet all Christendom thinks it, and really it is a matter of great importance; so great, that, except in cases where Salvation is manifestly concerned, and which a body would think are known enough, not to need new Commands, The Pope can hardly make a Command, the good of obeying which can answer for the harm of obeying it, when unduly proposed. For what counterfeiting of Bulls, and Letters, what cheats might not be put upon us at a distance, where people would rather choose to accept of any thing at a venture, than run to Rome for more certain information?  
But not to insist on this; it is a plain case, that what is to Edification in one place, may be to Destruction in another. Different Countries have, and cannot but have different Exigencies. If the same Laws should oblige every where, some must of necessity be obliged to what is harmful for them. Wherhfore we see the Providence of God has so ordered his Hierarchy, that particular Countries have particular Ecclesiastical Governors of their own, who living upon the place know best what is convenient for it, and are obliged to a care of their charges by the account which they are to make to God for them. The Pope has power over the whole; but so that he exercises it not (except where he is both▪ Bishop and Prince) but by means of this subordinate Ecclesiastical Authority. When he order any thing, the Order is first brought to them. If they see fit they propose it to the people under their care; if they found it otherwise, they let it alone. Private men are guided by their determination; and what knowledge, or certainty soever they may otherwise have of the Pope's Decrees, neither need, nor do take notice of them, till they be proposed in a legal way by their own immediate Superiors. Thus has the Church been governed from the beginning of Christianity, and thus it is governed at this day. Who would go about to altar this course, would absolutely destroy the Hierarchy, introduce an Arbitrary Power, and set up an Universal Bishop in that heretical sense which St. Gregory, in his contests with the Patriarch of Constantinople, so much abhorred, and so strongly opposed.  
Besides, the intermediate Ecclesiastical Authority, without whose concurrence, and much lesle against it, the Pope's Commands have no obliging force, there is also in Catholic Countries required the concurrence of the Civil. And this with great reason, and for the good even of the Church. For as ecclesiastics are supposed ignorant in the Art of Temporal Government, and what is necessary for the good of the Commonwealth, and besides are not exempt from human frailties; They may hap, on both accounts, to order something prejudicial to Civil Government, without which nevertheless, as has been said before, the Church cannot stand. For this reason Ecclesiastical Decrees are communicated to the secular Magistrates, and till they get the Placet▪ or Exequatur, or Verification, or in whatever phrase they use to express their allowance, from them, no Decree of the Pope can be proposed, and bind the people. I cannot answer my information of the state of Christendom is so exact, that there is no place wherein it is not otherwise; but sure I am, it is so in many. Our unhappy differences in Religion indeed make this impossible to be practised in England; yet these differences hinder none from owing as much subjection to the Civil Power, as if there were none, and as much duty, and solicitude for the good of the Kingdom. Since we are not fortunate enough to be guided in these matters by open declarations of the pleasure of the Civil Power, as we otherwise would▪ and aught to be, our Consciences, I conceive, stand charged, to admit of no Ecclesiastical Commands which those Consciences tell us are against the good of the Kingdom. For whereas we have not the public Judgement to direct us, there is no remedy, that I know, but to supply the defect as well as we can by our private one. And most evidently the Civil Government must be preserved entire▪ nor can any Ecclesiastical Authority oblige a man to any thing contrary to it.  
To apply what has been said to our case: The Pope has declared the Oath of Allegiance contains things contrary to Faith and Salvation. In this we are firmly persuaded he is mistaken. Indeed while he declares not what these things are, we are left in the dark, and cannot tell whether the mistake be of Fact, or Right. If he thought his Supremacy, his power of Excommunication, or any other point of Faith is denied by the Oath, as was apprehended by the first writers against the Oath, and those at Rome too, who in likelihood best knew the Pope's thoughts, 'tis a mistake of Fact: For not only no such thing is denied by the Oath, but particular care was taken there should not. If he thought his Deposing Power, the disbelief whereof is sworn by the Oath, a point of Faith, the mistake is in Right: That Doctrine being so far from Faith, that it has openly been declared erroneous, and contrary to the Word of God, by those whom all the World, and the Pope himself acknowledges for good Catholics. But though it appear not which way he understood it, 'tis clear he was mistaken either way.  
Now, when the Pope uses his Power to propagate a mistake, and a mistake of this consequence, which would make us take for contrary to Faith that which is not so, I think there is a plain abuse of his Power, and which aught not be obeyed. We are taught by a Master, in whom we are sure there was no mistake, that the Church has no power to Destruction, let the matter be what it will, none against Truth, but for it. What the Pope has declared is against Truth, and is to Destruction. For since Faith is the foundation of all Christian building, there can be no greater, nor more palpable destruction, than alteration of Faith. And to accept as contrary to Faith, what is not so, is plainly to altar Faith. It will not serve turn to say, that so we obey, we may believe what we william. For though in Metaphysical rigour, there be a difference betwixt Obeying, and Believing, and that difference be in some cases material enough; yet here, where we are therefore commanded to refuse the Oath, because it contains things contrary to Faith, to obey that Command is, in moral estimation, to acknowledge that in truth it does so. And this is plainly to acknowledge, that our Faith is other than it is. Scholastical distinctions will not carry it against common sense, which will undoubtedly judge those, who refuse the Oath on this account, do believe the Pope has power to Depose, and as Faith too, if not-deposing Doctrine be contrary to Faith. For as the World is now, there lies the whole stress. The other Question of Fact, which at first made some noise, being, since it has been better looked into, quite silenced, and upon the matter yielded.  
This being so, They would do well to consider what they do, who urge Obedience upon these terms: Go about to bring a new Faith into the Church, and which is more intolerable, a false one: Leave Catholics exposed to the inexcusable shame of being blindly obliged to all commands, whether consistent, not only with civil Government, but even with Christianity, or no: Give the Adversaries of the Church a manifest and easy victory over her Advocates, unable to defend either Her or Themselves. Without more ado, it is to ruin the Church, to set open the Gates of Hell, and assist them to, what shall never be, their prevailing against her. And these are the consequences of an undiscerning Obedience to all the Pope's commands, even in matters appertaining to him. When people are gravely and emphatically exhorted to be humble and obedient, not to trust to their deceitful Judgements, to sacrifice the noblest of their faculties, their Will, to harken to the voice of their supreme Pastor, with the rest of those specious Topics which may easily be assembled, it works wonderfully with pious souls. But if these fine pretences lead us at last to destroy Faith and the Church, God preserve me from so mistaken a piety. I think all the World agrees there is no obedience due to Clavae erranté, and I am sure the same Apostle who has taught us there is no power in the Church against Truth, and to Destruction, has pronounced an Anathema even to an Angel from Heaven, if he should teach otherwise.  
The next thing to be considered is, How the Breves in question have ●ome to our knowledge. And it is plain they have not been so proposed, as according to the practice of Christendom, they should, to become binding. All has passed in a private way, by private intelligence, private discourses and letters of private men, without the interposition of any public Authority to apply the Pope's Authority to us. Who thinks this sufficient to oblige us to obedience, should do well to reflect on the ruinous confusion such an obligation would bring into the Church, which I have briefly touched before. If you say this cannot be done, because since our unhappy differences in Religion, we have no public Ecclesiastical Authority among us, and therefore we must be content with such knowledge as we can have. This, instead of concluding we aught to obey these Breves, concludes rather we cannot be obliged to obey any. For which way soever it happens that the Pope's commands are not legally intimated, whether by misfortune, or fault, or what accident you will, still it remains, no legal intimation, no necessity of Obedience.  
That those who are not of our Communion should fancy strange things of our subjection to the Pope, and think his word passes for Law among us without more ado, I wonder not; Few live in Catholic Countries, and lesser mind what passes there. Their mistakes, almost in all that concerns us, are so frequent, that there is no room for marvel. But that those who have lived perhaps a good part of their time amongst Catholics, and cannot but take notice of what is daily presented to their eyes, should have the like conceits, is very strange. It seems as if they fancied the World a Monastery, and the Pope Father▪ Prior, and no more in the business, but Say and Do. Alas! there is no such matter. Our obedience to the Pope is very different from Monastical. A Canonical obedience we owe him, a submission to his commands legally intimated. This legal intimation implys the concurrence of the intermediate, subordinate, Ecclesiastical Authority, and the Civil too, where that is concerned; and where it can be had, which because here it cannot, we must of necessity take upon us a little more than would be fit in other circumstances; and remembering we are accountable to God for any harm which befalls our Country by our means, use our best judgements to keep our accounts clear. Moore obedience than this I do not think any Catholic owes, nor any Country, out of his own Territories, pays.  
It would be somewhat a surprising thing, if the Pope's Authority should become greater in England, by the change of Religion. People, I hope, will have some more love to their Country than to make that unhappiness the step to another, by bringing it into an Arbitrary subjection, such as was not acknowledged in Catholic times, and is not acknowledged in any Catholic Country besides, and which, if it were, would be the ruin of the Hierarchy. For my part I do not see how the Pope's Commands can oblige those who have no immediate Ecclesiastical Superiors, otherwise than in virtue of the good of the thing commanded, of which those deprive themselves who refuse to obey the command. Otherwise, when the frame of Government is taken away, 'tis, I think, as 'twas before it was settled. Things are in a kind of state of Nature, where Reason is the only guide. This indeed will teach them to obey any thing beneficial to themselves, and not prejudicial to their Country, and the Civil Government. That being safe, which no Ecclesiastical Authority can violate, whatever contributes to a conformity of manners, and discipline, as much as the state of things will bear, with the rest of Christendom, with whom they hold communion in Faith, is undoubtedly to be desired and embraced. But how he can govern by way of Authority, where that Authority cannot be duly applied, I can not more understand, than how fire can burn the wood which it never comes near. Where He would govern in that manner, He should provide subordinate Pastors, by whose means and assistance He may govern. Difference of Religion is no bar to this. For Ecclesiastical Discipline has been preserved, and as good, if not better, Laws made under Persecution, as since; Persecution much more severe than, thanks be to God, has been, or is likely to be in so merciful a Climate as England. To go about it otherwise, is, I think, to go to work without Tools.  
But to let this pass, and return to the necessity of Publication; who thinks the Pope's commands oblige to obedience without it, when it cannot be had, let him tell me, why the Venetians pleaded against the Popes Interdict, that it was not published, when themselves had hindered the Publishing? Let him tell me, why the Enactive part, as he calls it, of the Council of Trent obliges not us, or the French who will not publish it. For the difference between Enactive and Declarative, of which he afterwards speaks, hinders not the matter enacted from appertaining to the Council. I hope a Pope and a General Council are something more than a Pope alone. What they have enacted is known with as much certainty at lest, as that the Pope has forbidden the Oath of Allegiance. And yet because that knowledge is not come in a legal way, by which way it is impossible it should come when people will not, or cannot publish what is enacted, no body thinks their Decrees obliging, not not this Gentleman himself, who makes this Argument. How we should come to be obliged by the unpublisht Breves of a Pope, who are not obliged by the unpublisht Decrees of a General Council confirmed by the Pope, requires, I think, a very strong passion against the Oath of Allegiance to unriddle.  
And yet, though this be abundantly sufficient, there is something more in the case. Bore want of due publication for want of due Authority is not all. There was plain refusal of publication by such Authority 
Blackwel's answers upon sundry Examinations. Exam. 5. July 2. 1607.  as was. At that time there was an Archpriest here, one Blackwel; To whom the first Breve which forbade the Oath was sent. Blackwel would not publish it, and though challenged both at home and from abroad, and greatly blamed for his pains, yet persisted in his resolution, and could not be brought to it. Letters were contrived and sent abroad in his name to that purpose, (For the importance of publication it seems was well enough understood▪) But he disowned, and declared them counterfeit. On the contrary, he both took the Oath himself, and by Letters to his Assistants, persuaded them to follow his example, and also to instruct the Laity to do so too. The second Breve came a while after, but not to him. This made no change in him. For he writ again both to the Clergy and Laity, repeating his former Admonitions. And this is what was done at that time. Nothing has been done since, that I know, by any who have had any pretence of Authority here.  
Wherhfore it is plain these Breves have not the force which they might have had even in the present state of things. Had those, who have that superiority which is among us, concurred with the Pope, and required obedience to his Breves, the Topick would have appeared a little more specious. But while that is wanting, it is very unreasonable to exact obedience upon the score of Authority, when there is not so much as Ecclesiastical Authority enough to require it. And when there is, it will be as unreasonable to follow Ecclesiastical Authority Clave errante, against the commands, and to the prejudice of the Civil Power. However, we aught at lest be let alone till that day come, there being no colour to insist upon Ecclesiastical Authority, when it is not applied to us as it aught, and might be even in our unhappy circumstances, and as actually it is applied when it does any thing with us. We observe Holy days according to a Constitution not long since made at Rome, of which had it not been as authoritatively, as it could be, recommended at home, no body needed, and I believe few would have taken notice. In short, to persuade us that a Bull, or Breve from Rome, not otherwise intimated to us than by the private assurance which private men give of them, oblige us to observe whatever they order, is, under the specious pretext of obedience, to put a yoke upon our necks, which neither our Fathers have been, nor we are able to bear; to altar the Government of the Church continued from the beginning of Christianity to this day; and which I see not how he can be either good Patriot, or good Christian▪ who obstinately insists on.  
What I have alleged is, I think, no news to any body. Yet perhaps it may not be amiss, by a fresh Example or two, to show, that Catholics actually do proceed, as I have said. And I will choose them from those very Popes whom this Gentleman has alleged. The first is Paul V, who when he sent his first Breve hither, was in the height of his famous contest with the Venetians. That Quarrel in short was this. The Venetians had made, or renewed certain Laws, 
Historia particolare delle Cousin passate tra'l S P. Paclo V e la Seren. Rep. di Venetia.  which the Pope judged contrary to Ecclesiastical immunity, and proceeded by way of Justice against two of the Clergy, whom he pretended not subject to the Civil Power, and only accountable to the Ecclesiastical. The Pope sent Breves to them, as he did to us, in which he declared, according to the stile used with us, that the matters aforesaid, as being to the damnation of their Souls, scandal of many, and contrary to Ecclesiastical liberty, were null and invalid; Admonishes them to consider the danger of their Souls, and under Excommunication commands the Laws to be recalled, and canceled, and the Prisoners delivered up to his Nuncio, threatening also to proceed farther in case of disobedience.  
This, upon the matter, is our very case; save that with the Venetians The Pope proceeded something more severely, joining actual Excommunication, and farther threats to the disobeying his commands. Otherwise there are Breves in both cases, and from the same Pope, and those Declaratory, and in matters, which according to this Gentleman, appertain to him, the salvation of Souls, and Ecclesiastical liberty. Notwithstanding the Venetians did not obey them, and, the Pope proceeding to Interdict their Country, suffered not that Sentence to be published, and continued the usual public exercises of Religion. It was feared the business might have come to Arms; but ended in a Treaty; by which the Venetians delivering up the Prisoners to the French Ambassador, in gratification of his King, and with a protestation of preserving their right to judge Ecclesiastical persons, were without more ado readmitted to their usual good correspondence with the Pope, though positively refusing to accept of Absolution, or so much as a solemn Apostolical Benediction, for fear it might show like one. Here, I think, was plain denial of External Obedience to the Commands of the Pope, in matters, according to this Gentleman, appertaining to him, and no farther than they appertained to him; and this in the face of Christendom, and by persons, who, when the heat was a little over, were by the same Pope, who commanded both them and us, acknowledged for very good Catholics, and by all the World besides.  
Urban VIII, the other Pope mentioned by this Gentleman, had a 
Mercurio di D. Victorio Siri Tom. 2.  difference with the Duke of Parma, a feudatory of the See of Rome, which, after some monitories not obeyed, came to an Excommunication, and 'twas expected an Interdict would follow. The Duke, jealous what the Regulars might do in such an occasion, sent the Foreigners out of his Countries; and signified to his own Subjects, that such a Sentence being feared, those who were persuaded they were obliged to obey it, should have free liberty to departed, before the Sentence were issued; but if they stayed till it came out, They should be punished if they obeyed it. They all promised, and that in writing, he not being content with bore words, to stand faithfully by him. Only the Jesuits, for the example they had given at Venice, were not called with the rest. They apprehending the consequence of this singularity, made an address of themselves, and expressing much trouble for having been past by, made● voluntary protestation of continuing firm to the Interest of the Duke. And were afterwards observed to be the most eager of all in persuading the people not to value the Decrees of Rome.  
It is true, this case is not altogether of the same nature with the former, the Quarrel being about temporal matters, and betwixt a Vassal and the supreme Lord. Notwithstanding when it came to Excommunication, it was taken out of the hands of Temporal cognizance, and the Pope proceeded not as Lord, but as Pope, punishing the Sinner with the Spiritual sword, not the Vassal with the Temporal. And he, I suppose, in this Gentleman's opinion is to judge with which sword he aught to strike. However, the matter appertained to him one way or other; and here again was a denial of external obedience to his commands, abetted by all the Clergy of his Dominions, and the Jesuits most of all. It were easy to heap up multitudes of the like Instances; but I confine myself to the two Popes which were concerned in the Oath of Allegiance. This Gentleman shall, if he please, tie us to no stricter rules of obedience, than are acknowledged in other places, and permit his native Country to enjoy a freedom unblamable even in Italy itself. In the mean time, upon the warrant of the Jesuits of Parma, and all Christendom besides, I likewise deny the Minor of his Argument, conceiving it appears very plainly that it is not always, nor particularly in our case, unlawful to deny an exterior obedience to the Pope's Prohibitions in matters appertaining unto him, and no farther than they appertain unto him. Sure he must have a strange pique to the Oath of Allegiance, with whom an Argument against it will relish, where nothing assumed is true. For neither does the matter of it appertain to the Pope, nor if it did, were obedience due to the Breves insisted on.  
I fear I shall be thought to have dwelled too long upon this Argument; and yet in the variety of matter, which the subject offered to my thoughts, I have left more than I have taken, and perhaps better.  
We next meet with Answers to such Objections as the Author thought fit to make against himself; with which to meddle at all perhaps is more than needs. For since the Argument, by which he undertook to prove the Oath unlawful, is answered, there is no necessity to examine how he has behaved himself in answering the Arguments of others. Nevertheless, because divers things are woven into his discourse, which seem to have some force, and may be thought to have more, if they be balked, I will not, to save a little pains, give occasion of saying, that any thing which is considerable is dissembled.  
Numb. 5. He objects against the Breves, That they are of no force in England, without the King's approbation, according to Statutes made in Catholic times. This Objection reaches not the case. The Breves want not only Civil, but Ecclesiastical approbation too, and would be of no force though they had it, since they are prejudicial to Civil Government, which no Ecclesiastical Authority can infringe. Besides, the liberty of Nations does not depend on Laws. They have it from Nature, before and without Laws. Every Nation united into a Government, has power to preserve that Government. Neither are the Laws alone to be considered, which they make upon occasion to secure their Liberties, but the power they have to make such Laws, and add, and altar as they see fit. I conceive therefore the Freedom of England is not to be determined barely by the words of Statutes. While it remains a Nation united into a Politic Government, it is, and must be free from all obligation of submitting to any thing contrary to the good of the Commonwealth. Those Statutes did not created the freedom of England. They were only an exercise of it, and the same freedom which was used in making those Statutes, may be used in making others. Though none at all had been made, the Liberties of a free Nation cannot be denied her. I think it than very little to purpose, to amuse ourselves with examining whether the words of Statutes be express to the point or not, while▪ he is neither good Englishman, nor▪ good man, who receives any thing prejudicial to the good of his Country, or acknowledges a Power which can oblige him to do so▪  
Wherhfore leaving him the satisfaction of expounding the Statutes as he pleases, in which yet I suspect few of those, whose trade it is to expound them, will agreed with him; and reserving the slight account he makes of forbearing the Oath, (as if it were a matter of nothing to refuse to give assurance of Allegiance) to the place in which he promises it shall appear: I shall only stop at the Second Answer which N. 7. he gives to the Statutes, viz. That they are to be understood of Breves Enactive, but not of Breves Declarative. Enactive Breves he calls those, whereby some new thing is ordained, relating to the external Government of the Church: Declarative, whereby a Doctrine is declared false, or action sinful.  
This, as I formerly hinted, unsays all that was said before. For since the Breves do not make, but only declare the Oath unlawful, the Unlawfulness of the Oath is not to be taken from the Breves, but from that unlawful thing, whatever it be, which is declared by the Breves, and the Argument is out of doors. The truth is, we run round. People ask, Why the Oath of Allegiance may not be taken? This Gentleman undertakes their satisfaction, and answers, because it is unlawful. Why unlawful? because forbidden. But why is it unlawful not to observe that Prohibition? because the thing forbidden is unlawful, and only declared to be so by the prohibition. And thus we dance in a circle. All this might have been said plainer, and shorter, The Oath is unlawful, because it is unlawful. For if it be unlawful, because forbidden, and forbidden because unlawful, as evidently as can be, 'Tis unlawful, because 'tis unlawful. However, because this Allegation, as ill as it agrees with its fellows, may yet be thought to have some force in itself, it will not be amiss to spend a little time upon it.  
In the first place I would gladly know, what unlawfulness that is, which there was in the Oath for the Breves to declare, and which they have declared. This Author when he was upon the point, and had made it his business to show it, either could not found, or at lest thought not fit to mention any other Unlawfulness, than that of Disobedience. Now it seems that's not the thing; there is an unlawfulness antecedent to the Prohibition, which the Breves only have declared. Why than, in behalf of those for whose satisfaction he professes to writ, I entreat him to show us this Unlawfulness, because This, and This alone will be to our satisfaction. For every body is satisfied that unlawful things are not to be done; but every body is not satisfied, that all Breves are to be obeyed. On the contrary, the World is generally agreed, that Breves are not to be obeyed, but in circumstances which want in our case. But till this be done, people will always remain unsatisfied, because if after so much time, and so much earnestness used in this business, no such thing do appear, there will be reason to believe there is no such thing which can appear, and that there was a mistake in the Breves, and the Declaration not warranted by Truth. As the temper of the World is, I doubt people will not be overmuch satisfied with these, who would enforce obedience to such Declarations. Had this Gentleman thought he could have discovered this secret, I see no reason in the World he had to keep it a secret, and amuse himself and us with topics more subject to dispute than the matter which he would clear by them, and in which too he has the consent of Christendom against him. At lest, methinks, he has no reason to say there is something unlawful in the Oath, which is not only declared by the Breves, unless he could tell us what this something is.  
In the next place I would feign understand what privilege Declarative Breves have beyond Enactive, and what greater necessity of obedience they carry with them. Either this Gentleman, or Withrington are much out. For Withrington tells us these Breves are not to be obeyed, for this very reason, because they are Declarative, and pretends to gather his conclusion from the Doctrine of Suarez. It should seem by this Gentleman, that they are to be obeyed for the same reason, because they are Declarative. It is something odd that the I, and the Not, should both be pretended from the same single Term, Declarative. But, I think, this is not the only thing in which these two Authors disagree. We shall see what Withrington has to say for himself by and by. In the mean time I would weigh the reason which this Gentleman has, for what he says, if I could found any. For he barely tells us, that the Statutes are not to be understood of Declarative Breves, and that these Breves are Declarative, and than leaves us to imagine there is something of importance in this Declarative, which we may found out of ourselves if we can; for we have no assistance from him.  
For my part, if a Declarative Breve signify barely, as he says it does, a Breve which declares concerning a Doctrine or Action, I cannot imagine what other obedience can be given to it, than submission of the Understanding, and believing the Doctrine or Action to be as it is declared. Now Obedience, I had thought, belongs to Action, and relates to the Will, not Understanding. Or if he will have Obedience in the Understanding, it is certainly an interior Obedience, which if he require, I know not wherefore he talks of exterior Obedience all along. And yet his Instance from the Council of Trent, shows as if he expected we should believe the Pope, as we do the Council. But I had thought, the case had been something different betwixt a Canon of a general Council, and a Breve of a Pope, even Declarative. We receive the declarative part of the Council of Trent, because the Faith written in our hearts before the Council, bears witness to it, and because there needs no new Authority to oblige us to hold and profess our Faith, which is commanded by an Authority superior to all other, the Authority of Christ himself. And because general Councils cannot be supposed to swerve from this Faith, we have the same obligation to receive what they declare concerning Faith, which we have to profess our Faith. Otherwise in matters which have no necessary connexion with it, we make as bold with a Council as the Pope, as this Gentleman acknowledges in the Instance. Wherhfore unless he will maintain Inerrability in the Pope as well as Councils, I see not how our receiving the Declarative part of the Council of Trent, infers Obedience to Declarative Breves.  
The more I reflect, the lesle I understand how Declarative Breves come to be more efficacious than Enactive. Since Declaration imports a clearing of something, these Breves, to deserve the name of Declarative, should clear something, which Enactive do not, by which clearing they come to have more force. What may it be which these. Breves have cleared? If you say the Pope's judgement; you make no difference betwixt them and Enactive. For in these too the Pope's judgement is clear, and so all Breves would be Declarative. But the Pope's judgement being one thing, that of which he judges another, one would expect by a Declaration, that the thing of which he judges, and which he declares, should be made clear. That which he has declared here is, That there are many things in the Oath contrary to▪ Faith and Salvation. Many is plainly a multitude of Ones, so that some One must be contrary, if many be. Notwithstanding this Declaration, and the Pope's Judgement, it is so far from clear, that any one is contrary, that there is no Proposition in the whole Oath, which we may not, according to this Gentleman, unblamably hold and maintain. This I gather from his permission, Num. 80. to hold and maintain the French Doctrine, that the Pope has no power to depos● Kings: because the reason he gives for this fits all the rest; and because the Author of the first Treatise says, That if this be not one, there are not Multa in the Oath, to which the Pope's censure is possibly applicable. Now would I feign know how it can be clear that the whole is naught, when it is not clear but every part of that whole is good. This is rather inextricable confusion than clearing, and I should think the direct contrary follows from what this Gentleman pretends. For since, according to his second thoughts (for his Argument went quite another way) our obligation of obedience depends upon the Declarative virtue of the Breves, and we are bound to obey only where there is clearing; where there is no clearing, as here there is not, we are not bound to obey. If he will say we are bound, because the Pope's judgement is clear, than we are always bound, in Enactives as well as Declaratives, and the distinction between them is frivolous, as to the obligation of obedience. Only it seems to follow from mere Power in Enactives, and from Infallibility in Declaratives.  
For the truth is, the Pope's Infallibility lies at the bottom of all these kind of discourses. People are sometimes shy to acknowledge it, because it relishes not well, as being a point unmaintainable in itself, and pernicious and destructive to the Church, by bringing in a new Rule of Faith, and that even to the abetters, Incertain; in the judgement of others, False. But yet there is nothing to be done without it. For if the Pope may be mistaken, there is no necessity that every body should be obliged to be mistaken for company. However, I conceive it unnecessary to speak to that point, while this Gentleman expressly waves it by insisting only on exterior obedience; and besides by allowing us to hold and maintain the contrary of what we conceive is declared. When he thinks it fit to put it upon that Issue, we shall see what proofs he will bring; in the mean time there is no reason, that I perceive, for the efficacy which he would persuade us there is in Declarative Breves, but that, (which whether he will insist on hereafter▪, I know not) at present he thought it better to give none at all.  
Withrington, for his part, discourses in this manner: He borrows from Suarez the notions of Constitutive and Declarative Precepts, understanding by the former, such which created a new Right, or Rule of action, and making what they forbidden unlawful in virtue of that Prohibition, and which before was lawful: by the latter, such which do not make, but suppose the thing forbidden unlawful in virtue of a former. Law, confirmed and declared by the new Precept. Wherhfore unless there were a former Law, and an obligation in virtue of it, He gathers there can be none from the new; it being the nature of a Declarative Precept, not to endure a new Right, or Rule of action, but purely to declare the old. Now the Pope declaring there are many things in the Oath contrary to Faith and Salvation, and for that reason forbidding the Oath, the obligation to obey this Prohibition, depends on the truth of the declaration. If the Oath be indeed contrary to Salvation, people are obliged to refuse it, in virtue of that contrariety, though no Declaration, or new Prohibition had been made. If it be not, the Declaration is null, and no body obliged by it. Thus does Withrington endeavour to show the Breves are not obliging, for the very reason for which this Gentleman would make us believe they are, because they are Declarative; with this advantage in the contest, that at lest he gives a reason for what he says.  
In what he says N. 8. That it cannot prudently be thought the Statutes, he mentions, were intended by the Catholics who made them, for such times as ours; I conceive, he is in the right, because, I conceive, they never thought of such times; or if they did, had more prudence than to think their Laws would signify much in them. But I see not what 'tis to purpose, since the liberty of Nations depends not on Statutes, but on that Power which makes Statutes. Neither can I apprehended what service he will draw from the case he puts. For since Obedience in circumstances is, by his supposition, not required by Law, there can be nothing but Reason which obliges the Subject to it, and shows him it is his duty in that case to proceed without Law. And so we may and do obey the Pope in what Reason shows us is our good; but can have no legally authoritative obligation, or necessity of implicit obedience put upon us, where the frame of legal Government is broken.  
This consideration unriddles what follows in the two next Numbers. We may undoubtedly receive from the Pope any thing to our advantage, and no disadvantage of any body else, nor can any Laws hinder us from doing ourselves all the good we can. So we preserve that intercourse with him which is necessary for our Spiritual concerns, not purely in virtue of a necessary obedience to what comes from him, but because what comes is beneficial, and we should deprive ourselves. of that benefit, by rejecting all things. But because out of the force of Reason we accept what is advantageous to ourselves, and not prejudicial to our Country, it follows not we can have things put upon us disadvantageous to ourselves, and prejudicial to our Country; or that by the loss of Religion we have lost the freedom of a Nation, and all power of judging whether what comes from him be for our good or no.  
For what is said N. 11. of the difference betwixt a Prince in, and out of communion with the Pope: It is true, we have the misfortune to want that public rule of our Actions, which those have, who live under Princes of the same communion. For the judgement of those who are entrusted with the care of the common good, aught to guide those Subjects who can have notice of it, and who are to examine not farther whether the Pope's Orders be fit or unfit, than that they are approved or disapproved by them. But where that cannot be had, there remains nothing, that I know, but to supply that misfortune by a greater diligence, and when any thing comes which is against the good of our Country, to remember we must answer to God if we contribute to the harm of our Country; and that our fault is the more unexcusable, since there is no obligatory Authority on which we can discharge our Consciences. For my part, I think, the going about to subject our Country to an unexamining necessity of Obedience to whatever Commands come from Rome, a very great inconvenience to it, and such a one as, however others may satisfy their Consciences, I should be sorry should be found in my Accounts at the last day.  
I would not meddle with what he says in the last place about Excommunication, since he confesses himself, that care was taken it should be no part of the case, and content myself with praising the Acuteness with which he concludes, if it did not embroil the matter, and go about to persuade us, as if submission of the offendor to Excommunication either were, or at lest were thought necessary by somebody to the validity of it. That I believe is a conceit which has not entered into many heads, and the truth of the business, I take, to be this: The Pope may Excommunicate any Christian, even a King, since the condescendence of K. James suffered not the Law to forbidden us to say so▪ If he Excommunicate a Subject for discharge 
Ne peut aussy (le Pape▪) excommunier les Officiers du Roy, pour ce qui concern l'exercise de leurs charges & Offices, etc. Libertez de l'Eglise Gallicane, par. M. Patiss●●.  of his duty in cases mentioned by the Statute, this Excommunication is by the Statute said to be against the rights of the Crown. In which it speaks with more reserve than the French, who bluntly say, the Pope cannot Excommunicate the King's Officers, for what concerns their charges. Wherhfore if an Excommunication come against a Subject, I conceive this Statute warrants the examination of it, and if it be found against it, the suppression. If it be against the King himself, 'tis to be considered, whether he deserve it, or no. If He do, I conceive it will have its Spiritual effect 
This too is said by the French: Quelques monitions, Excommunications ou Interdictions qu'il puisse fair, les Sujets du Roy ne doivent laisser de rendre au Roy l'Obeisance due pour le Temporel, & n'en peuvent estre dispensez ny absous par le Pape. Ibid.  independent of his submission to it, but it will have no Temporal effect to the prejudice of his Temporal rights, and the duty of his Subjects. They may indeed, and aught consider what place there is for the observance of the Rules laid down in Scripture in such cases, and contribute as much as they can to the end aimed at by the Scripture, ut spiritus salvus fiat in die Domini, but failing in any part of Allegiance is no Way to this, nor any way allowable. If He deserve it not, it will have no effect, nor aught be regarded by himself or any body else. Whether he do or not, in the extraordinary case of difference betwixt the two Supreme Powers, I know no rule to judge by but Truth, which people must come by as well as they can, when the ordinary way is stopped up.  
N. 13. He blends several matters into one Objection, some to purpose, and some not. I know not what our Question has to do with the superiority of Popes, or General Councils. Only where he would have us, N. 14. bound to submit to the Pope's Ordinances till the contrary be defined by a General Council, it is true only where those Ordinances are so proposed as is necessary to bind us. No Council, nor Father recommend Obedience otherwise, nor does the Christian World practise or acknowledge any other. Again, when he says, N. 15. That the Reasons one may seem to have against the Pope's Decrees out of Council, cannot justify refusing exterior compliance with them, but only may give ground to make addresses, I conceive he indulges a little too much to his fancy, speaking more according to what he apprehends 
Alex. 3. ad Archiep. Raven. c. 5. Extra. de Rescripti●.  should be, than what is. For people use not to obey, as long as they think they have reason on their sides; and to expect they should do otherwise, is to expect they should act against their Reason. And this is both a judged case by the practice of the Christian World, and has the warrant of an express Text in the Canon Law. Aut mandatum nostrum reverenter adimpleas, aut per literas tuas, quare adimplere non possis, rationabilem causam praetendas. So that even the pretence of a reason is an éxcuse for disobedience by the very letter of the Law.  
I conceive also, the Questions of the Fallibility of the Pope, and Infallibility of Councils, concern us not much. He is in the right, when he denies Infallibility is necessary in Superiors to bind their Subjects to Obedience; nor is it want of that, but want of due circumstances in which the Pope can exercise his superiority, which renders his Breves efficacious. Infallibility indeed is necessary to oblige us to inward assent, and when he strains upon the Declarative virtue of his Breves, and makes them purely Declarative without insisting on, or mentioning the annexed Command, he drives it to inward assent, how much soever he disclaim it elsewhere. Otherwise, when we see Laws changed every day, and sometimes with no change of circumstances, I cannot perceive any ground to require Infallibility in Lawmakers.  
Concerning the Pope's capacity of being misinformed, and the pretended mistakes in this matter, he says, N. 8. That if after so much time, and so much diligence as the Pope assures us he has used, such pretences be allowable, all Decrees whether Ecclesiastical or Civil might be rejected upon the like. To deal ingenuously, I should be of his mind, if there were nothing but pretence of misinformation in the case; I mean of what was said or done on both sides. But, I conceive, whether his information in these matters were right or wrong, he is not to be obeyed, for reasons which I have mentioned too often to need repeating.  
I conceive also, that the Pope was not rightly informed of the merits of the cause, and that we are not bound to take his word, though he say he was, which I do not know he has. As much and as materially as this Gentleman says Withrington has writ, I do not think he will become surety for the Pope, that he ever read any of his Books. At lest, for my part, I do not think he has leisure to read one Book of a hundred even of those which are dedicated to him. Those who did read Withrington, in all likelihood informed the Pope, according to the Ideas which they framed themselves. What these are we see in their Writings; if I could think them true, I had not now been answering this Treatise. If he was informed by them, and by whom else he should be informed, I know not, I must needs think he was misinformed, and persuaded to take that for Truth, which was not. And so must every body think, whose judgement cannot acquiesce in his Declaration; nor is there any possible way to take this flea out of our ears, but to show us which those many things are, which according to his Declaration, are contrary to Faith and Salvation. For while we are persuaded there are neither many, nor one, it is not possible but we must be persuaded he was misinformed, who says there are. This, if this Gentleman please to do, he may prevail to have it thought there was no misinformation or mistake in the case: but to leave this plain and easy way (for what can be easier than to assign one of many) and think to awe people out of their judgements by a reverend shadow of Authority, is to show a great deal of good will to have the work done, and bring no tools to do it. It is in short to say; My Masters! pray do as I would have you, though I cannot, or will not, tell you why you should.  
The substance of the 19 Consideration belongs to the Mayor of his Argument, and has already been spoken to. In this place it will be enough to observe, that as it does belong to the Pope to determine of matters concerning Faith and Salvation, so it belongs to him also to determine rightly, and does not belong to him to oblige all the World, purely in virtue of his determinations, to accept of them whether right or wrong. In two words, this exterior compliance (the soft gentle phrase into which he has shifted the more rugged term Obedience) which he requires, must either be due upon the same score of Authority, or Reason, or Infallibility. If Obedience be urged to Authority, as to a Magistrate whose Commands, even, though unfit, are often to be obeyed for the good of Government: This plainly requires the circumstances of a Magistrate, that there be a settled frame of Government, for whose sake we should obey. All the Pope does in the Church is by moving the several wheels which make up the great Machine; where there are no wheels, how he can turn them, is for this Gentleman to make out. The Government of the Church requires subordinate, not only Ministers, but Governors, by whom the Pope may govern, and who so derive his Orders to the several parts, that they judge themselves whether they be to Edification hic & nunc, and refuse such as are not. Without this the Church would not longer be a Hierarchy, but a Despotical arbitrary disorder. If the pretence be from Reason, we shall gladly hearken to any body who brings it; but hitherto our Reason tells us, that what is required, is against the rights of our Prince, and good of our Country, and aught not be obeyed, though both Ecclesiastical Powers should join to urge it. And for Infallibility, that requires more than exterior compliance, more than this Gentleman thinks to ask, and more than he would yet if he should.  
The following Consideration justifies the contrivance of the Prohibition in gross, without descending to particulars, and this both by Reason and Example. The Reason, methinks, is pleasant. It would not, he says, be Prudence to design always the particular Propositions for which a Pamphlet is forbidden, when they are scandalous and offensive. If Prudence be not always so severe, why might it not have been a little indulgent in this particular, and treated the solemn Act of a Nation with some more condescendence than a Pamplet? But to let this pass, what necessary point of Prudence obliged the Pope to leave us in the dark, and at liberty to hold and maintain a scandalous and offensive Proposition, not to be scandalous and offensive? For this we may do, according to this Gentleman, of every Proposition in the Oath. The worse the Proposition is, the more need, one would think, people have to be warned particularly of it, and the more care taken, that they mistake it not for a good one. Sure this might have been done without any great note of Impudence. Besides, how will this be applied to our case? Is there any thing so scandalous and offensive in the Oath, that Christian ears will not bear it out of the Oath? Every body sees all that is there, and more scandal than they have by that sight, they will not easily take by a new one. Some scandal, perhaps, might be avoided, if any body hap to mistake some Proposition for scandalous which is not; but how any should be given by being informed which in particular is scandalous, is passed my imagination.  
Nevertheless, He is in the right, that such Prohibitions are ordinary enough, and the custom is reasonable enough in many cases. A Book may be so bad, that to design all, would be to transcribe the whole Book. Particulars may otherwise be so known, that they need not be mentioned. But besides what may be alleged in this kind, where the Authority which forbids any thing is such, that Obedience is absolutely due to it, whether it assign any reason or not, bore signification of its pleasure serves turn without more ado. But the case is not so with the Pope out of his own Territories. In other places he can enforce nothing without their consent. And if they be pressed to consent, and no body will tell them why they should, Obedience cannot well be expected, at lest will be ill performed. For, I think, no Nation in Christendom obeys upon other terms. So that where the obligation of Obedience depends on the sight of what is scandalous and offensive, as in this it seems to do, to refuse to show it, is to leave them at liberty to disobey.  
Besides, when a Book is condemned in gross, the particulars for which it is condemned, are known to those who condemn it, unless they do they know not what; and so may be shown if there be occaon. Unless, perhaps, it be condemned for treating of a forbidden subject, or coming out contrary to order, or such like respects not pertinent to our purpose. A body would think here is occasion enough: the importance of the thing, our duty to God and Caesar, the satisfaction of so many consciences in so important a matter, and what else would readily occur to one who would stay to consider of it. In so long time, and after so earnest endeavours, as have been used to this purpose, nothing does appear. What can be thought but that there is nothing, and that there are no particulars worthy of condemnation, which make up this condemnation in gross.  
By his 21 Consideration, it should seem the point of Excommunication is that which sticks with this Gentleman. If it be so, I wish he had made the most of it, and stood to it, that we might have seen the utmost, and either received or given satisfaction. By the short hints he gives, we may rather guests there is something which troubles him, than well understand what it is. But since it is not for me to manage his difficulty, I can only observe what he says. First he asks, Whether to take the Oath, be not implicitly to deny the Pope has Power to Excommunicate an Heretical King, and than presently waves the point, remembering, I suppose, that he had said a little before, that K. James would not suffer it to be put into the Oath. This, I think, is to put a scruple into our heads, and leave it there to work if it william. For barely to mention a thing of such importance, is enough to make us suspect there is some reason for it; else why should it be mentioned? And than to fly of, and say nothing to it, is not to show much care of our satisfaction. All I can say, is, That there is no manner of ground for this surmise, and that, as he acknowledges, particular care was taken there should not. Can any thing be made of it, I suppose, he would not have left it so.  
But he seems to stand to it, that the Oath denys an Excommunication of such a King would have those effects which are assigned in Scripture, viz. to deprive him of all Civil communication with others, etc. And it is true, that the Oath does deny Excommunication would have any effect, with relation to our King, prejudicial to his Sovereignty, or the duty of his Subjects. But I did not expect this knot should be found in the Rush by him, who, if I mistake him not, offers as much to the full in this point, as the Oath requires. For he freely offers, Num. 50. to bear true Allegiance to his Majesty, etc. by whomsoever any thing be attempted against him, and under what pretence soever. I understand, and so, I think, does every body who reads this, since the Pope is one person who may attempt against the King, and Excommunication one pretence which may be made use of to such an attempt, that by this clause, Allegiance is secured against both. Which if it be, I see not how he can quarrel with the Oath for requiring that which he freely offers to do of himself.  
As for what he argues from Scripture, I doubt all is to be understood of our own communion, where when any one falls into scandalous offences, and will not be reclaimed by fraternal Admonitions, we are taught to avoid his conversation, and by all our carriage, testify an aversion for his sin. And this for two reasons: That we be not infected ourselves; and that the Offender may be mended, and shamed into repentance. Yet this seems to be restrained to our own communion, The Apostle, 1 Cor. 5. taking care they should not understand his Doctrine generally. I mean not, says he, the Fornicators of this World: or the Covetous, etc. otherwise you should have gone out of this World: But if He that is named a Brother be guilty, than not so much as to Eat with him. The World is by Interpreters understood in contradistinction to the Church. And so Estius gathers, that in Heretical Countries the conversation of Heretics is not to be avoided, farther than as the Law of Nature obliges us to preserve ourselves as much as we can from hazard. And so I believe this Gentleman understands it: For sure he often says Ave, and eats with some who come under the heads mentioned in Scripture, and evidently he must, as the Apostle says, go out of the World to do otherwise.  
If this be so, as, with submission to better Judgements, I conceive it is, there is no Use for this Doctrine in a communion settled into a steady opposition of the Church, nor has it any thing to do with our case. But whether such a Communion be to be understood by the word Mundus or not, I see plainly, that carrying ourselves towards sinners, as the Scripture directs, is quite a different thing from denying them what is their due. The Actions mentioned in Scripture are such as are otherwise at our own choice. We may Salute, and Converse, and Eat with whom we please, and we may let any of them alone when and where we please. In Actions only of this nature we are directed to behave ourselves as our own and our neighbours good requires; but that this Carriage should despense with Justice, there is no ground to imagine. For can we think the Apostle meant, if a Creditor of ours become a sinner, we must not therefore pay our debts, because he is not an honest man, turn dishonest for company, and make his sin a pretence to sin ourselves? We are taught elsewhere, to tender all men their due, Tribute to whom Tribute, Custom to whom Custom, Fear to whom Fear, Honour to whom Honor. Shall we believe all this is unsaid again in the places mentioned by this Gentleman? This too is spoken with relation to Princes, as certainly nothing can be more, nor so much, due to private men as Allegiance to them, because no private good can hold comparison with the good of the whole. Now a Prince is a Prince, whatever the man be: whether in, or out of communion of the Church, he is still Prince. And since 'tis to the Prince we owe Allegiance, I shall not be persuaded the Scripture warrants us to bate any thing of that debt, till I am persuaded that Scripture does or can contradict itself.  
The truth is, I take the whole Objection for a slip of fancy, catching at any thing which seemed to make against the Oath of Allegiance, and not much minding what would come of it. Otherwise this Gentleman sure does not mean all he says. For who believes indeed, that Excommunication deprives a Prince of all civil communication, even that which is necessary to exercise his Office of Prince, and will stand to it, that this is a kind of Deposing, (as is said here, and, as in truth it is, since a Prince cannot govern without civil communication, governing being a communicating his Orders) must also stand to it, that the Pope can Depose. Nothing is more evident than, that if Excommunicating and Deposing be all one, who can Excommunicate can Depose. Who believes this has indeed reason to check at the Oath of Allegiance; nor can I see, how he can satisfy his conscience, to profess Allegiance to such Princes, or which way hope to perform it. For some communication is certainly necessary for that purpose. If, perhaps, a formal sentence be thought necessary in his judgement, and so he can do well enough with his conscience while that is wanting; an Allegiance grounded on such a persuasion can last not longer than till the Sentence comes. And how soon he may be declared to be out of communion, who already is so, who can tell? Neither, perhaps, is the formality of a sentence so very necessary. For what great need is there that a man who himself professes, and all the World knows, is not of such a Church, should with ceremony be declared not to be of it?  
Yet I shall not press these consequences upon this Gentleman, because whatever be in his words, I hope there is no such thing in his meaning. Else sure he would not permit us to hold, that the Pope cannot Depose; and 'tis very certain he will not permit us to hold, that the Pope cannot Excommunicate. I shall only entreat him to suffer me to take the meaning of the Scripture from the Example of a great Saint, rather than his conjecture. Saint Ambrose had occasion to practise this Doctrine with the Emperor Theodosius, and he did practise it so as to obtain the end, confounded him into Repentance, without disturbing his Authority or any exercise of it. I am of opinion, that who would hope for the same success, would do well to go the same ways; other, I think, were neither meant by the Apostle, nor likely to do any good.  
After all, when this Gentleman confesses, that some Excommunicate persons are excepted from these effects, either by the Pope's indulgence, or otherwise, He says, I think, enough to answer the difficulty. Not to meddle with the Pope's Indulgence, a head which affords matter enough of discourse to one who loved talking; Who can be meant by his Otherwise, if not Princes, on whom, if Excommunication should have the effects he mentions, there would remain no Subject to which the Pope could do good by Excommunication, or any thing else. For the Temporal Government preserves the matter, on which the Church can work, and Princes preserve Temporal Government. Put Excommunication to have effects destructive to the necessary Authority of Princes, and by it you destroy all the good the Church can do, by taking away the subject to which she should do good. For evidently to nothing, no good can be done. And so we see in Wars, and those confusions which attend the ruin of Commonwealths, there is no place for Ecclesiastical discipline, and the benefit to be had by it, the people by disjointing the frame of secular Government, being rendered uncapable of the spiritual. Wherhfore, who ever else be meant by Otherwise, Princes are certainly excepted from these effects of Excommunication which this Gentleman, I conceive, rather fancies, than believes: And this by the exigence of Nature, and the good▪ of Mankind, and the necessity of a subject for the Church to work upon, besides the express commands of God, without standing in need of the Pope's Indulgence.  
I pass by the 22 Consideration of the Pope's being party in the debate, as an Objection which, leaving others to the liberty of their Judgements, I, for my part, think of little value. What he says in the next, of the Popes not proceeding according to the Canons, I do not well understand. If he mean of Canons prescribing what the Pope is to observe in order to his own resolution, He may have proceeded according to the Canons for aught I know. And because I know nothing to the contrary, I aught and do suppose he has, seeing that whether he have, or not, is little material. If he mean of Canons which prescribe what is necessary, that the World be obliged to obey what he has resolved, the proceeding in our case is not according to the Canons. For if the meaning of these Canons may be known by the practice of Christendom, which, I think, can neither be supposed universally ignorant of them, nor universally to contradict them, something is required by them to Obedience, which whether it can or not, most certainly is not found in our case. How much soever the Pope must be his own Judge, if he judge contrary to what all the World sees, all the World will see he is mistaken in his judgement. But pray where is this sufficient declaration he talks of, that the Pope has proceeded according to the Canons? I mean as is before explained. There is not a word in either Breve to that purpose, that I see. As far as I can understand, the Breves are not sufficient for that of which they do speak. How they should be sufficient for that of which they do not speak, is something harder to understand, unless a Declaratory Breve be all-sufficient, and can do every thing.  
The 24. Consideration lays disturbance of the Church to the charge of the Defenders of the Oath, because if they would be quiet, we might live in peace. As if we should not live as much in peace if the Oppugners would be quiet. Why are not the Oppugners as great Disturbers as the Defenders? Because the Oppugners have not printed any thing for a long time. Is the Printer the only Disturber? 'Tis Opposition, I think, which makes, or is the Disturbance; and there needs no printing to make Opposition, as long as we can speak and writ. Disturbances are something more ancient than Presses, in the World; could I hope they would ce●se together, I wish with all my heart the Trade were lost. In the mean time, I have not printed, I have only writ what is printed, seems an odd ward to put by the thrust of Disturbance. These things which disturb me to answer, had never been printed sure, if they had never been written; nor can I think the hands which carried them to the Press, were the very first into which they came. I know not what more they can do, now they are printed, than they did before in Manuscript. If he who prints must be condemned, who writes will hardly scape altogether free.  
I know not, but methinks the case is this: The Shower falls. Those who have Cloaks put them on, and keep themselves dry. Those who have none, and will get none, not to be out of fashion, would persuade the former to throw of their Cloaks, and be wet for company. And because they found them not altogether so great Courtiers, a little resty in that point, blame them for disturbance. As if another must needs be disturbed, because I wear such  as I have. And yet peradventure he has more reason, than who is disturbed because I follow my conscience. For this will never be out of fashion:  may.  
But to leave Metaphors, and look upon things as they are; The Oath of Allegiance is cause of all. For I will go not higher, to search into the cause of the Oath, though I have no reason to fear an Inquisition. But to begin there: This Oath is not to be charged either upon the Oppugners or Defenders, as being Antecedent to both, and an Act of others, in which neither of us had any share. I, whose conscience is persuaded I lawfully may, go and take this Oath. Do I disturb any body by so doing? I do not perceive how any man can rationally be disturbed, because I obey the Law, when my conscience tells me, I may and aught. You call me Heretic for my pains, or Schismatic, or Disobedient. Truly I cannot help being disturbed at this, and believe there are few honest men who can bear the imputation of a Knave without disturbance. I endeavour to free myself from this imputation, and make it appear I am not an Heretic, nor a Schismatic, nor Disobedient. And because I do so, you say I disturb the Church. This is just, The Child is beaten, and cries, and disturbs the House; and this disturbance must be imputed to the Child, because, if he would hold his peace, all would be quiet. And that is true; but who can expect a Child should not cry when he is beaten? Truly we Defenders are in a sad case, if we must be Heretics if we hold our tongues, and Disturbers if we speak. But I shall never believe the Church is or can be disturbed by an unoffensive Defence. On the contrary, I have a very wrong Idea of her, if she do not take it well, and is glad when any one can make out his Innocence: nay, though he could not, Endeavour to appear not-criminal will never pass with her for a crime. For the Oppugners, if their peaceable stars will not permit any disturbance should be attributed to them, I will not go about to cross their lucky influence. Let them satisfy their own consciences as well as they can. All I ask is, that they would leave us quiet in the satisfaction of ours.  
But in reality, All depends on the Truth of the Question betwixt us, and the sight of that Truth. If the Oath be indeed unlawful, They are to blame who defend it: if lawful, They who oppugn it. If I be not an Heretic, he wrongs me who calls me so; nay, though I were, if he know not so much, he offends by laying to my charge what he cannot justify; and I too for being guilty of what might be justified, by one that did know it. He that has right on his side, is only blameless. And that in truth is the only Question which is material. The rest is insignificant noise; All depends on, and stands or falls, with it. 'Tis neither the Oppugners I, nor the Defenders Not, which will or aught carry it. Those who can judge of what is alleged on both sides, and will take the pains, will decide the difference. And with them I leave it, peradventure more a Difference, than Disturbance, while things are managed as they may and aught. War is often necessary to Peace, among Scholars as well as Soldiers. As long as we truly aim at Peace, and make fair Wars, Scholars possibly may as unblamably talk, talk, as Soldiers fight on both sides. But there are ununlawful Arms in both Wars; a tongue may carry poison as well as a bullet. Let the quarrel be never so good, this way of maintaing it is naught. If the Defenders be guilty of this kind of Disturbance, I have nothing to say in their defence; only I hope the World will not think they are. Neither shall I charge the Oppugners: on the contrary I must acknowledge these Gentlemen are fair Enemies. Let him who is guilty on either side bear his own sin, and till our differences can be ended, let both endeavour to manage them without disturbance.  
The 25. Consideration tells us, the Pope aught not to refuse declaring an Action unlawful, when it is so, for fear of disturbance. Which is to say, that the Pope makes the disturbance, such as is, but has reason for it. Now, if he think it lies at the Pope's door, methinks he. should not have laid it at the Defenders. Whether the Pope had reason or not, depends on what has been said already; by which, I hope, appears, there is no Unlawfulness in the Oath, the declaring against which can be a visible pretence for causing disturbance in the Church. For the rest, his Parallelling the Pope's Breves, with the defining of Consubstantiality, and preaching of Christian Doctrine, show as if he thought the Oath contained something like Arianism, or Judaisme, or Heathenism. Which if he do, he has reason to dislike the Oath: but there was no reason to beaten the bush for Disobedience, when there was more and better game afoot. If Heresy and Idolatry be in the case, or as bad, I wish he would speak out, that we may know, and avoid such hideous things. But I love not to be a Chapman where there are but half lights.  
The 26th talks of an Intention to dispense in some cases, and not in others, in which though they would dispense, they cannot. Which, he says, is the Case of Declarative Decrees. And this is very true, if the Declarations be according to Truth. But if they be not, I do not know there needs any Dispensation to stick to Truth. As for this matter of Intentions, this Gentleman and I, have, I perceive, sentiments something different. As much as I thought necessary I have declared upon occasion. The rest concerns not our business, and needs not be mentioned.  
The next Consideration undertakes to show, That what the Pope enjoins in his Breves, cannot be prejudicial to the Duty and Loyalty due to Sovereign Princes. This is a Consideration of importance, and therefore, as long as it is, deserves to be fully weighed. And because it puts the business upon this Issue, whether prejudicial, or not prejudicial, I conceive it agrees, that if the Breves be found prejudicial, we aught not to take notice of them▪ as is said in the Objection.  
He says than, That the Popes, though as jealous of their Prerogatives as Kings, do not enjoin us in these Breves to swear, that they have Authority to Depose Kings: nor forbidden us to take other Oaths of Allegiance, as expressive as this, or more: nor to take the Clauses of this Oath, which manifestly contain not more than mere Civil Allegiance: nor so much as to give an interior Assent to the Reasons why they prohibit this Oath. I would gladly know what all this is to purpose, and what it concerns us, who are enquiring whether what the Pope has done be projudicial to our Sovereign or not, to be amused with ●hat he has not done.  
It is plain, the Pope and King may fall out. It is plain, the Pope in such a case may exercise a power which he thinks he has, and issue out a Sentence of Deposition against the King; nay, 'tis undeniable He has done so more than once since the days of Henry 7. It is possible also He may recur to the Brachium saeculare for execution of that Sentence, and prosecute it both with foreign Arms, and as much Intestine force as he can get to join with him. If any of the King's Subjects do join with him, (And they whose conscience cheats them into a persuasion, that they aught in such a case stand by the Pope, must fight either against their King or their Conscience) I should think they do the King some prejudice, unless it be none to be deserted by his Subjects in time of need. And if the Breves do contribute to this, all the Pope has not done, will not hinder what he has done from being very prejudicial.  
Now the Breves which forbidden the Oath of Allegiance, manifestly hinder the King's Subjects from owning an obligation to stand by him in such a case; and that is manifestly to leave them at liberty to entertain a persuasion, if they please, that it is their obligation to stand by the Pope. But in reality they do much more; 'Cause a persuasion in them, that they aught to side with the Pope against the King. For whatever fancies may work on men of speculation, and how nicely soever they may distinguish betwixt inward assent and outward compliance, the plaindealing World goes otherwise to work. Persuade them once, it is not lawful to swear the Pope has not power to Depose, and they will persuade themselves he has power to Depose. And when they have got this by the end, all the School subtleties in the World shall never make them believe otherwise, but that true obedience is due to true power; and therefore if the Pope have deposed, the King is not to be obeyed. They must needs than be perpetually solicited by their mistaken conscience, to withdraw their assistance from the King in such a case, and perhaps carry it to his Enemies. And this Conscience they own to the Breves, and those who bear them in hand they aught be obeyed. Now a body would think it is prejudicial to a Prince to have Principles fostered in his Subjects, which dispose them to refuse their service, when he has use of it, and take part against him, if they take any.  
Were there no more than bore ignorance of the inclinations of his Subjects, it would be prejudice sufficient, and such as would leave a King but few quiet hours. For with what satisfaction can He either govern, or live, who knows not in whom he may confided, and of whom he aught beware? I do not see how this inconvenience can be avoided, if the Breves must be obeyed. For if no body must swear that the Pope cannot Depose, for aught he can know, every body may think he can. At lest, He cannot be secure of any one, that he shall be faithful when time is, because, for any thing He can tell, That one may be persuaded it is his duty to be otherwise. And so the King must of necessity live in a perpetual suspicion and diffidence of every body. Which if this Gentleman think no prejudice to a King, I suspect people will think him better versed in the Schools than World: If he do, he would have done well to have cleared the Breves from contributing to these prejudices, and left the consideration of what is not, till there be occasion to speak of it.  
This will not be shifted of by the Common Place of the security in which Catholic Princes live without such Oaths of Allegiance. For to say nothing of the difference betwixt Princes of the same, and a different communion from the Pope; and again of the same, and a different communion with their Subjects; it is plainly one thing for people to have no Oaths offered, and another to refuse them when they are. It is to be supposed those Princes understand their own business; and if they judge such Oaths needless, have reason to judge so. Whether they have or not, concerns not us. Our Princes are to be supposed to understand their own business too, and since they have judged such an Oath needful, it imports us nothing that others judge otherwise. Talking in general is only to make a show. Who has the Art of managing Common Places to advantage, may speak plausibly of any thing. Rhetoric teaches it every body. What is only material, is, whether these Inconveniences do, or do not follow from an obligation to obey the Breves. For if they do, no example of foreign Princes can make that they do not.  
But to leave this, perhaps, impertinent digression: The Pope, he says, does not enjoin us in these Breves to swear that he has power to Depose Kings. What than, if he may enjoin it in others? And why may He not as well and as rationally declare Deposing power lawful, as not-Deposing power unlawful (indeed one Declaration serves turn for both) and command us to swear the one, as forbidden us to swear the other? Should the Pope do this, I would feign know whether he were to be obeyed or no? This Gentleman's Argument seems to bid fair for Obedience. For Popes are Superiors; Lawful and Unlawful are matters appertaining to them; and Superiors, he says, are to be obeyed in matters appertaining to them. The Command would be Declaratory too, and admit of no dispensation. But yet by his treating this Question, I should guests that once in his life he should be for disobedience as well as his neighbours. Because to take advantage of what the Pope has not done, seems to allow, that it had been prejudicial if he had done it; otherwise it is no such praise to forbear things unprejudicial. And than by choosing to insist upon this point, that the Breves are not prejudicial, he seems to allow the Objection, which says, that prejudicial Breves are not to be obeyed. However, He may please to take his choice. If he say the Pope is to be obeyed in that case; to what purpose does he tell us the Pope has not done what he may do every day in the week if he please, and when he has done it, is to be obeyed? What is this either to the justification of the Breves, or our satisfaction? If he say the Pope is not to be obeyed, I see no reason in the World why we may not as justifiably disobey a prejudicial prohibition, as a prejudicial command. For whatever this Gentleman would persuade us, few, I believe, will think the prohibition in question is not prejudicial, but those who think the Pope has power to Depose. And than indeed he does no prejudice, or at lest wrong, to any body by preserving his own Right. But That, I doubt, is the only Rock in our way. Can we once weather it, all the rest of our passage would be safe enough.  
The truth is, we are either absolutely obliged to obey the Pope in all things, and than prejudicial or not prejudicial are idle considerations; or we may justifiably disobey him in some. If we may disobey at all, we must begin somewhere. Where we should begin, if we may not begin at the Breves, I cannot understand▪ For these, our conscience tells us, are prejudicial, besides other things. Such a conscience, I conceive, this Gentleman allows for a justifiable excuse of disobedience; because I gather by his discourse, he would take it for himself to disobey the Pope, in case he should command such an Oath, which not to have commanded, is made his justification. For I cannot think he would obey in that case, though the Pope should command never so positively, and deliberately, and declaratively, and exclusively of all these pretences which this Gentleman by and by calls frivolous. If he would obey, that action and this discourse, in my opinion, would agreed but ill. But if such a conscience would be an excuse for him; we are absolved from disobedience, even in his own judgement, for we have that very conscience.  
But after all, if we will not take National Coin, but stand upon▪ what is current in the World, peradventure there is no such great odds betwixt forbidding us to swear the Pope cannot Depose, and obliging us to swear he can. For why may I not swear he cannot Depose? Because, says the Pope, 'tis contrary to Faith. Why than I must of necessity think either that the Pope is mistaken, or that 'tis agreeable to Faith, that he can depose. Who is truly persuaded that deposing Doctrine is agreeable to Faith, I conceive, is fairly disposed to swear it, if it be commanded by lawful Authority. And I should think the difference betwixt actually swearing, and being disposed to swear when required, not so extraordinarily material. Scruples indeed might be laid in the way, but I believe none such which might not be easily enough removed.  
I, But we are not obliged by the Breves to think that the Pope can Depose. Should this Gentleman tell the Pope so, perhaps he would have small thanks for his pains, and possibly be thought not more obedient, than he thinks other folks. But what difference, as to what concerns the World, is there betwixt inward holding, and outward acting as if we did. The Conscience may found a difference considerable enough, when the thoughts and actions agreed not. But the World minds only what we do, and cares not a pin what we think, farther than as that thinking has influence upon our acting. Take now two men, whereof one thinks the Pope cannot Depose, and that there are not many things in the Oath contrary to Faith, and that the Pope was in the wrong when he made that Declaration; the other thinks quite contrary, that the Pope was every where in the right. If these two act alike, they are, in reference to the World, both in the same case.  
The second, if he follow the dictates of his conscience, plainly must obey whatever the Pope commands in these matters; and the first must do the same▪ if notwithstanding the contrary dictates of his conscience, he be obliged to obey too. And if he be obliged to obey these Breves, which his conscience tells him are prejudicial to his Prince, and grounded on mistake in the Pope, whatever prejudice and mistake he may think in others, he must obey them for aught I perceive. For could his conscience excuse him than, it might do so now. If this be true, he seems obliged to every ●ot as much, as He who should swear, that the Pope has power to Depose. For that Man by that Oath could only be obliged to obey the Pope in all he should command concerning Deposition; and this man, by this account, would be obliged to do just the same without taking that Oath. And than indeed that Oath may well be spared, since all that can be got by it, is had without it. But, I think, to mention that it was spared, might have been spared too; what the Pope has done by forbidding us to swear, amounting to little lesle, than what he has not done, commanding us to swear the contrary.  
He says farther, That I cannot lawfully take possession of a thing under debate, but may lawfully hinder my Adversary from taking it. I must confess I wondered to see this from one who seems an Advocate for the Pope. For what? Will he say the Pope did unlawfully, when he took possession of the Deposing power? For he did so, as often as he exercised it, there being not more palpable, nor perhaps other, way of taking possession of a power, than by using it. And that it is, and ever since its first origin has been a thing under debate, the Author of the former Treatise will inform him, though, I suppose, he needs no information in the case. This very prohibition enjoined by the Breves, is a keeping possession of deposing power; To take it, the Pope thinks, is not now to do. For every body knows the Pope claims it, and every body thinks he has therefore forbidden the Oath, because it should not prejudice that claim. And to prevent being dispossessed, is manifestly to keep possession. But if it were unlawful to take it, I understand not how it is lawful to keep it, unless in circumstances which can make a good Title of that which was originally bad, and which, I think, will not be pretended in this case. I cannot tell how well the Pope may relish this discourse. We, for our parts, have reason to thank him for another justification of our obedience. For since the Command in other terms is, keep possession for me, and this possession is acknowledged unlawful; to say we must obey, is to say, we lawfully may, and aught do an unlawful thing. And this puts another scruple into my head. If the Pope cannot lawfully take possession of Deposing, (since Deposing is manifestly taking possession of Deposing) that two and three make five is not more evident than that he cannot Depose. And than why may not this Gentleman swear the Pope cannot Depose, as well as his Neighbours? I mean, as they swear, according to the persuasion of his conscience. For undoubtedly he is persuaded that this which he says is true.  
He tells us also, That the Breves forbidden us not to take other Oaths of Allegiance wherein all civil Allegiance is contained in as, or more, expressive Terms, than in the present Oath. I conceive it no great wonder if these Breves do not forbidden other Oaths, when there are no other Oaths to forbidden. But I cannot easily persuade myself that any other Oath will be allowed, whose Terms, to bate the more, are but as expressive as those of this Oath. Who can bring me the hand of the Magister sacri Palatij to an Oath, wherein shall be inserted, That the Pope cannot by any means Depose the King, may convince me. But till than, he must pardon me if I be something slow of belief.  
He tells besides, That we are not forbidden to take these clauses of this Oath, which do manifestly contain not more than mere Civil Allegiance. Peradventure who would press him to make this good, might put him to some trouble. For since the Prohibition is indefinite, it may as well be applied to every, as to any clause. But let this pass. I only desire to know, since the clauses which contain civil Allegiance are safe, what clauses there are in the Oath, which contain not-civil, that is spiritual Allegiance? I have not heard of any spiritual Allegiance claimed by it; and I see it declared by him, who best knew the meaning of it, that he was even careful that nothing should be contained 
K. James▪ Preface to the Apology. Pag. 9  in it, except the profession of natural Allegiance, and civil, and temporal obedience, with a promise to resist all contrary uncivil violence. And he charges them with impudence, and wilful malice, who affirm it was devised to entrap Papists in points of conscience. Neither do I know that the Defenders of the Oath acknowledge any spirituality vested in the King by this Oath. As far as I see, all this ado about Disobedience to the Pope, devolves at last to this: We must take this Gentleman's word, or his who next finds fault, that this or that clause which displeases them, belongs to spirituals, and cannot be taken. For more than their words we have not, while the Breves remain in generals. And so if we say not as they do, This is Civil, This Spiritual, we are disobedient, or what they please.  
Since we can do not better, let us guests which clauses he means by these which do not contain mere civil Allegiance. Till he assign them particularly, I conceive these seem as likely to be meant as any: I acknowledge the Pope cannot Depose; I believe the Pope cannot absolve me of this Oath. The Question is, whether these contain more than civil Allegiance. I conceive they do not; because all they say is but this: I believe the Bond of duty in which I stand bound to my Prince, cannot be cancelled by Deposition, or Absolution. This duty, I conceive, is only what is due from a Subject, or from a member of a civil Society to the Head, and that, sure, is Civil, and merely Civil Allegiance. If there were any difficulty, the Oath itself would resolve it plain enough; which for all the Allegiance it requires, mentions only, not to stand against the King on Deposing pretences, and to stand for him, notwithstanding them. This Civil Allegiance if I preserve, notwithstanding the claim of a spiritual power, I understand not that I preserve more than Civil Allegiance. And what contains no more than preservation of mere Civil Allegiance, contains no more than mere Civil Allegiance I think. It neither makes nor mars, that the Power which would exempt me from this civil duty, is called, or is spiritual. For let it be what it will, that which I keep for the service of my Prince, is not spiritual. I, and my Estate are temporal things, and remain temporal, let the power be never so spiritual which would dispose of them. And since all I do by the Oath, is to preserve these Temporal things, to be disposed of by my Temporal Superiors, as the necessity of Temporal concerns requires they should, All I do, and all the Oath expects I should do, concerns pure Temporals, mere Civil Allegiance, and no more. Wherhfore if what this Gentleman says be true, that we are not forbidden to take those clauses of the Oath which manifestly contain not more than mere Civil Allegiance, there is no clause which we are forbidden to take. For manifestly there is none which contains anything else. And so we may without scruple take the whole Oath, notwithstanding the Breves, and have this Gentleman to abet us.  
I doubt all this will be thought superfluous, and the Reader found but little satisfaction in detailing ware, which altogether is nothing worth, as I said at first. The next thing he tells us is, That since we are not in rigour obliged to give an interior assent to the reasons for which the Oath is forbidden, who refuses the Oath in compliance with the Pope's commands, may think the Oath in itself, and speculatively speaking, lawful. Say you so? Why than methinks in reverence to the Pope, and justification of his proceed, you should produce some reason, why he should make the Oath practically unlawful, which we may, notwithstanding all he has done, think is unlawful of itself, and speculatively. Besides, Obedience to his Breves can not longer be pressed on the account of their Declarative virtue. For Those, which make a thing unlawful, are not Declarative. And than all depends on their Enactive virtue, to which this Gentleman, by flying to the Declarative, seems not willing to trust. However, what he says, I conceive, is true; though, I doubt, neither of us will have any thanks from the Pope, for standing upon rigorous terms with him. And, I conceive, that more is true, and that one may think the Oath practically lawful too. Yet if he who does not give an interior Assent, must act as he who does, 'tis no great matter what passes within them. In the mean time this is plain, that whoever refuses the Oath, may think it not so much as speculatively lawful, and refuse it for that reason, and not out of pure compliance with the Pope. And 'tis likely he does do so, because that is indeed a good reason, whereas Compliment is not. For to compliment away our duty, is to compliment too far, even with a Pope. Wherhfore as long as all must refuse the Oath, I comprehend not what it will avail, towards clearing the Breves from prejudice, that some may think the reasons of them not true. For all too may think them otherwise, and who does, and who does not, can never be known.  
Yes, says he. These some who think the Acts contained in the Oath do▪ concern mere civil Allegiance, are bound, as long as they remain in such a persuasion, to comply with those Acts, whether they have taken this Oath or not. Truly these some are beholding to him, for justifying to the World, what they have always professed for themselves, that it is their obligation to practise their Allegiance, whatever the Pope say or do to the contrary, and that they aught follow their own persuasions in these matters. I have only one request to make in their behalves, That, since They are obliged to all the Acts of Allegiance required by the Oath, notwithstanding the Pope's Breves, They may have his good leave to profess that obligation by taking the Oath, notwithstanding the Pope's Breves. I cannot think the Pope would take it worse of those who should act contrary to his expectation in the case of these Breves, than of those who should act contrary to his expectation in case of Deposition; who yet, this Gentleman says, are obliged to act as they are persuaded themselves, which is plainly contrary to what the Pope is persuaded: neither will he think a greater disobedience committed by disobeying his Breves, than by disobeying such Commands as he only made the Breves that he might, when he saw cause, give. And since this Gentleman says it is their obligation to act according to their own persuasions in that case, never so little▪ indulgence for them should, methinks, prevail with him to allow them to follow their persuasions about the Breves too.  
But how his discourse will relish with his own party, I cannot tell. I doubt he is as bad an Advocate for them, as he was even now for the Pope. To say that those are bound to comply with the Acts required by the Oath, who think they concern mere civil Allegiance, seems to say, that those who do not think so, are not bound. Now the last thing he said would persuade us, that there are clauses in the Oath which do not concern mere Civil Allegiance. Those who think so, should think, in consequence of his discourse, that they are not obliged to comply with the Acts contained in those clauses. Those Acts are, standing by the King, in case of Deposition, or Absolution, which if only those can comply with, who think they concern not Spirituals, for aught I see all must come over to the Defenders, who have a mind to pass for good Subjects. For they will hardly do so, who will not comply with those Acts, or think it not their duty so to do. I am ware of the distinction which may be cast in my way, betwixt renouncing the power, and obedience to it. But I have spoken of that Argument already, and think it deserves not to be brought into play again. The difference betwixt those two is only in words. Who renounces one, in truth renounces both. Only who says, I will not renounce the power, but I will act as if I did, and never obey it; if he can satisfy his conscience in making so bold with his obedienc●, will hardly satisfy any rational man besides, or make out how it can in reason be expected he will do as he says. For 'tis nonsense to say there may be power, and yet can be no obligation to obey it. Nor will he who acknowledges the power, and refuses obedience to it, be thought an honest man, so much as by those who think that Honesty requires he should renounce the power.  
Finally, he tells us, the Popes do not forbidden us in these Breves an Act of Loyalty or Civil Allegiance. This sounds something like, and, if it be well proved, may be to purpose. Profession of Allegiance though shows, methinks, very like an Act of Allegiance, and 'tis plain the Breves do forbidden that profession of Allegiance; which the Law has appointed. Why do they not forbidden an Act of Allegiance? Because the taking of this Oath is not (properly speaking) any Act of Civil Allegiance, but only a security thereof, and how little trust is to be put in such a security, does appear by the sad experience of the late Wars. Sure he will not persuade us that Oaths are matters of small consequence, and which may be spared in the World, because some have broken them. There are who have done as much with their Bonds, and cheated their Creditors, notwithstanding all the Caution they could use for their security. Must people therefore lend money barely on other folk's words, and trouble themselves not farther? This Dotrin, I suspect, will relish but untowardly: For 'tis as much as to say, since you have been cheated by relying on Oaths, rely hereafter on lesle than Oaths, and take people's words. For sure enough they will stand to their words who break their Oaths.  
But why is not the taking of the Oath an Act of Allegiance? For this he gives us his word, that properly speaking it is not. I am apt enough to believe he is well skilled in the propriety of speech; but for all that, some reason why he says so, I conceive, would not have been amiss. I think it is an usual custom for Vassals, when they are invested in what they hold of their supreme Lords to make a ceremonious profession of Fealty, and that they are Liege men to that Lord. And I should think an Act by which a man professes himself a Liege man may properly enough be called an Act of Allegiance. It rather seems the most proper Act of all, as that on which all the rest depend, and without which there could be no such thing as an Act of Allegiance. For supplying a Prince with Money, or Arms, or whatever you will pitch on for an Act of Allegiance, is Assistance, not Allegiance, unless it be from a Liege man, and upon the score of Fealty. And this being the Act by which he professes himself a Liege man, and bound to do those things which this Gentleman calls Acts of Allegiance, I see no shocking of propriety, if it be called an Act of Allegiance too. And so the Oath being a profession of the Allegiance we owe our Sovereign, and our resolution and obligation to perform it, may pass for an Act of Allegiance if this Gentleman please, and no injury be done to speech. However, as I love not to dispute of words, if he will have it but an improper Act of Allegiance, I cannot but think it equivalent to the most proper Act that is. And suspect a Prince, whose Subjects are hindered from professing their Allegiance, will think himself as much prejudiced, as if they were hindered from performing that Act which can with most propriety claim the name. For indeed if they will not so much as profess they owe him any thing, with what security can he expect they will give any thing when time is?  
Yet suppose it were as this Gentleman would have it, not an Act, but only a Security. Is it no prejudice to a Prince to have that Security taken away? How much lesle is he a Thief who tears the Bond, than he who steals the Money? Or if you will give him another name, you diminish nothing of his injustice. What this subtle distinguishing betwixt Act and Security serves for, I cannot imagine while the injury, give it what name you will, is equal at lest, and if I mistake not much, greater by making the Oath a Security than an Act. For who hinders an Act, deprives the Prince of no more than was to be had by that Act, so much money, or so much service. But who takes away his Security, deprives him of all he can expect from all Acts. For nothing can be claimed but in virtue of Allegiance, and who refuses to profess Allegiance, refuses to be bound to any thing. So that the discourse in short is this: The Pope has done the King no prejudice, because he hinders no Act of Allegiance in his Subjects, He only takes away more than an Act, only hinders him from being secure his Subjects shall ever act for him at all.  
But a Subject may be obliged, says he, to his Civil Allegiance, and equally punished for his not complying therewith, or for being a Traitor, whether he has taken the Oath or not. This is something to those who think the Oath contains nothing but Civil Allegiance; For They, by this account, are good Subjects, as being obliged to all which the wisdom of the Nation thinks necessary to Civil Allegiance. And since taking the Oath is but openly professing that obligation, which they otherwise have, I see not why they should be obliged to make a secret of it. But what is it to the rest, and what is it to the Breves? For that another may be obliged to that duty, which the Law and Prince call Civil Allegiance, is nothing to him who thinks it is not Civil Allegiance, nor his duty. This seems little better than to delude his Prince with a Term: bear him in hand He owes and will pay Civil Allegiance, and when the Prince's necessities, in case of Deposition, call for succour, tell him the case is not a case of Civil Allegiance, and he will do nothing for him. 'Tis true, he may, as this Gentleman says, and undoubtedly will be punished for a Traitor, if the Prince be strong enough. But sure no Traitor will be so hastily mad, as not to stay till that danger be over, and till the Prince be not longer in a condition to treat him like a Traitor; and than what the Prince calls Treason he will maintain is not Treason, and have this to say for himself, that he never by Oath acknowledged That to be a Duty the failing in which the Prince calls Treason. Than for what concerns the Breves, are they no way prejudicial, because some may be, as indeed all are, obliged to their duty, notwithstanding them, and because they know they are so, think themselves obliged also not to obey the Breves? Others may think themselves not obliged, and may be induced by the Breves to think so. These, if they act agreably to their thoughts, may act to the prejudice of their Prince's Interest, and for this prejudice, for any thing said here, the Breves may be thanked.  
Yet from hence he concludes at last, it is manifest, That Compliance with the Breves cannot be inconsistent with the Duty and Loyalty due to Sovereign Princes, because that reaches no farther than to all Acts of Allegiance, and the Breves forbidden us not Act. This is to say, Allow me all I ask, and I will prove all I undertook. He had made use of his credit before, to recommend one Proposition purely on his word: viz. That taking an Oath of Allegiance is no Act of Allegiance, and now recommends another upon die same score, That Loyalty reaches no farther than to Acts. Truly I dare not entertain this so suddenly, for fear I should be the only man of the World, besides himself, of this opinion. Unless he would show some reason to the contrary, people will hardly think that security of Allegiance is a matter of nothing, in which Loyalty is unconcerned. To beg both the Premises is a little too much for one who pretends to prove, when any man may prove any thing who can have but one allowed him. Besides, why does he conclude with inconsistent, when unprejudicial was what he undertook to prove? These two are sufficiently different. For there is no inconsistence betwixt complying with the Breves, and complying with Loyalty. He who obeys them may be dutiful enough, if he will always do what Loyalty requires. But because a Prince can have no security that he will do so, he is prejudiced by the want of that security.  
Wherhfore I must needs think he has said nothing, by which, what he would persuade us follows, appears either manifest or true. What he says first, that the Pope has not done this or that, is as much as to say that who untiles the house, and leaves it open to the wind and rain, does no prejudice as long as be pulls it not quite down. What he urges next, that those who think the Acts contained in the Oath do concern mere Civil Allegiance, are bound to comply with these Acts, as long as they think so, (to say nothing of the prejudice it is to a Prince to have his security depend on the good pleasure, and changeable thoughts of his Subjects, as by his expression it should seem they are,) plainly supposes there are others who think otherwise, and so are not bound, and those prejudicial thoughts, for any thing he says, are left to be imputed to the Breves. The Distinction he brings in the last place betwixt Security, and Act, though it were true, is so far from clearing the Breves, that it makes the prejudice greater. It being plainly lesle to have a part of my Estate taken away, than my Writings cancelled, in which appears my Title to the whole. So that, I conceive, I may conclude a great deal more rationally, that because compliance with the Breves is prejudicial to our Sovereign, we aught not comply with them, and conceive too, that he himself allows so much, by the method he has taken to answer the Objection.  
The 28 Consideration is a pretty one. It happens sometimes between married people, that Jealousy is pretended on that side, which gives the greatest cause. This discourse seems to have a tang of that Artifice. Of the two parties in the present debate, one is for the Pope, the other for the King, and he would persuade us they are against the King, even by being for him. His Topick is, That Exceptions grounded on such frivolous pretences, may be made use of as well against the King as the Pope, and so open a gap for Subjects to disobey him, and tender his Authority very weak and insignificant, as in effect they do the Popes. Methinks it suits not well with the sudden zeal he pretends for the Authority of Kings, to say the Pope's Authority is rendered insignificant by Exceptions which endeavour to exempt us from obedience to him when he commands what is to the prejudice of Kings. But to let this pass: It were, perhaps, enough to say in answer to him, that the Exceptions are not frivolous, and that his Objections are. For why should not the Not deserve as much regard as the I? especially when the exceptions are justified by the consent and practise of all Christendom.  
But to use this Argument with more respect, I conceive, he states the case wrong, and that his apprehension is wrong even of the wrong case he puts. For should it be represented to a King, that there was not sufficient consideration of the Laws, in this or that command of his, or that He was misinformed concerning them, or mistook them, I believe there are few Kings who would think such a representation frivolous, and who, if things be carried so as becomes Subjects to treat with their Prince, would not take it well, and be glad, if any slip of inadvertence hap to fall into the ground, to keep it from taking root, and growing. Nothing is more ordinary in divers Kingdoms, than to have the King's grants, or commands pleaded on the one side, and the Law on the other. And when the Law carries it, as it often does, neither Judge nor Client is thought a jot the worse Subject, though one have pleaded, and the other given it, against the King.  
But this in truth is not altogether the Case. He speaks only of such Commands of Kings as relate to matters wholly within their sphere, whereas the Breves in question relate to matters which concern not only the spiritual sphere of the Pope, but the temporal too of the King. Now if any King command in a matter belonging to the Pope, I suppose he will say, that command is for that reason, not to be obeyed. If he demur to this, I would ask him why he refuses the Oath of Allegiance? Is it not because he thinks the Law which requires it, exceeds its bounds, and requires more than belongs to the Civil Power to require? And so, because he is persuaded some parts of the Oath entrench upon Spirituals, and Spirituals appertain to the Pope, and the Pope has forbidden the Oath, he thinks himself obliged rather to obey the Pope than the King. By what he says in his Book, I take this to be his reason why he refuses to obey the King in this particular. Which if it be, 'tis plain he judges a command of the Kings is not to be obeyed, when it extends to matters without his sphere, and is prejudicial to an Authority over which he has no power. If this be so, I see no reason why the case should not be equal betwixt Popes and Kings, and that as Kings are not to be obeyed to the prejudice of Spirituals, so neither are Popes to be obeyed to the prejudice of Temporals. So that there is little ground to fear, that disobedience to the Pope in matters which concern Kings, will introduce disobedience to Kings in matters which do not concern the Pope. In such things the Defenders prefer their conscience before the King's commands, as well as the Oppugners. And there is lesle ground for him, who actually disobeys the King, to asperse those who obey him, because they disobey the Pope, when they have the very same reason not to obey the Pope, which He himself thinks a good and warrantable reason not to obey the King.  
When he says, the exceptions are to be decided by the Sovereign's themselves, 'tis as he means by the word Sovereigns. For some, even Sovereign Princes, use the concurrence of their Subjects in the decision of such things. But if he mean the Sovereign Temporal power, however exercised, undoubtedly there is no farther decision to be expected, and if there were, the power were not Sovereign. But than, to make his Argument look any thing like, he must put such a Sovereign powe● in the Pope in respect of the Church, as there is in the Sovereign Temporal power, in respect of the Commonwealth. And this, out of his own Territories, I suspect will trouble this Gentleman to make good. For sure the inferior Ecclesiastical Hierarchy will expect some regard should be had of them, and the Temporal Government will expect to be regarded in what concerns them. Wherhfore though the Temporal Supremacy require, and when it is denied can force, an absolute obedience, to what it determins within itself, concerning itself; the Ecclesiastical Supremacy, as it is vested in the Pope, seems not altogether so absolute. Peradventure others may expect satisfaction in his decisions, before they be fully obeyed, and 'tis plain he can force nothing till all parties be agreed.  
For the rest, if the exceptions be so frivolous as he pretends, be had the easier task of it to show them so, and need not have given them credit by answers, at lest, as weak as they. In the Consideration of Prejudice, there is not one word which lessens, there is which heightens it. In that of Disturbance, whereas the Objection was, that we aught not take notice of the Commands of the Pope, when the compliance with them may be a cause of great disturbance in the Church▪ He answers first; That the Defenders 'cause the disturbance. As if it were any thing to purpose, while the Objection talks of disturbance ensuing upon compliance, to talk of disturbance which comes from not-compliance. Let the Defenders be as great disturbers as they will, they are not to be charged with disturbance in not complying with the Breves, if compliance be not due, which brings disturbance, and this compliance will bring it. These are the only Questions, and there is not one word said to them. He answers secondly, That the Pope is not to forbear declaring what he sees fit for fear of Disturbance. And yet the Objection speaks not of what he may, or may not do, but whether we aught to comply with what he does, in case of Disturbance. Whether the Pope do well or ill is nothing to whether we are to obey him with disturbance of the Church. Lastly, he answers, that the Pope intends to oblige in some cases, not in other. When we are not a jot concerned in his intentions, while we are looking after our own duty, and whether that obliges us to comply with his intentions, when that compliance will 'cause disturbance. So that there is not one word to the Question in all his three Answers. I will recapitulate not farther, because I have been too long already. 'Tis not good to spend much time in frivolous things. But yet before people quit them altogether, I suppose, they will be glad to know what they shall have more material in their room.  
The 29 Consideration offers a new Objection, too long to be transcribed: and besides, the great Lake is sure to remain dry, if all the little streams be stopped which feed it: and those we shall meet with as they run. The first is the Question of Sinfulness, which the Objection imputes to Refusal of the Oath. He undertakes to wipe of this imputation, and Num. 30. says first, That the Objection is against all or most of those Catholics who defend the Oath. I would entreat him not to trouble himself about them. Let them conform themselves to Truth, if they will, where ever it be, and if they will not, at their own peril be it. Truth will be Truth, whether they like it or not, neither is it any matter for, or against whom the Objection is. Let us see what there is in the Thing: and for Persons, let them take their fortune. But yet why is it against them? Because their Aim only is to show, not that it is a sin to refuse this Oath, but that it is no sin to take it. He has a mind, sure, to compliment these Gentlemen, and let the World know they aim only at the justification of their own proceed, and disturb not other men in theirs. But what is this to the Question in hand? Is a thing the lesle sinful, because others have no mind to say it is? Or does he who says it is no sin to take the Oath, say therefore it is no sin to refuse it? I am of opinion, if they let this matter alone, it had been more to his purpose to have followed good example, and let it alone too. For what if the Devil prove surly, and will not be laid again, when he is once conjured up? Truly now he has put a scruple into our heads, unless he satisfy it well when he has done, He has furnished us with the strongest Motive that can be, not to refuse the Oath. For I am very sure he himself will justify it to be our duty, not to do a sinful thing for any bodies sake. How than does he provide for the quiet of our Consciences in this matter?  
In order to this he considers secondly, Whether the refusal can be sinful, unless the taking be obligatory. I conceive not. This being agreed, he denys, in his way of Questions, there is any obligation to take the Oath, since the taking thereof is no part of Civil Allegiance, as has been already shown. All that has been already shown is, that he assumed what he pleased without proof, and made the business worse when he had done. The matter being discoursed so lately, I have no more to do, but refer the Reader to the place as he does. I only observe he now calls a Part what before he called an Act of Allegiance, in which if he lay any stress, as I do not perceive he does, I think, the change of names altars nothing in the thing. He may well enough say that security that I will pay, is no part of the money which I am to pay, as a Mason is no part of the House which he builds. Notwithstanding he is as necessary to it, as Mortar and Bricks, and so is security to Payment. I will dive not farther into a matter which has no intricacy, unless of our own making: conceiving it enough to say, That as plainly he is no honest man, who refuses to give security for what he owes, so how he should be a dutiful Subject, who refuses to give security for his Allegiance, we scrupulous men, now he has made us so, cannot comprehend.  
Next he tells us, his Majesty does not absolutely require of us the taking of the Oath, but only conditionally, if we will enjoy such and such Employments or Privileges which we are not bound to accept of. Till now I thought the Absolute which he joins to Obligation before, had been a word of redundance, for which reason I left it out as unnecessary, when I quoted his words, conceiving that Obligation was obligation, what Epithet soever you join with it. But now, I perceive, he meant something by it, which, I suppose, is, that some are, and some are not obliged to take the Oath. For when he says his Majesty requires it conditionally, if we will enjoy such and such Privileges, I conceive he means, his Majesty does not require it of those who pretend not to those Privileges, and does require it of those who do. For if he require it of all, Privileges have nothing to do with the case. And so conditional obligation, signifies not-obligation. Those who will have their Privileges being absolutely obliged, and those who will bate them not at all. This truly is to purpose. For if none be obliged to take the Oath but those who will enjoy Privileges, Those who will be content to pass without them, are free. Wherhfore 'tis but dissuading people from being concerned in Privileges, and the business is done.  
But what are these Privileges, in which we need not be concerned? who refuses the Oath of Allegiance incurs a Praemunire, and that signifies loss of Estate and Liberty. Call you these Employments and Privileges, such of which we are not bound to accept? Is no man bound to accept of his Liberty, or not turn Beggar? Privileges, I thought had signified extraordinary Rights granted by favour to some above others. These are common to all; Nature teaches us to love, and our Need to seek them; and 'tis the end of Civil Society to preserve them. They are the things which make a life not only sweet, but useful. For who languishes out his days in Prison, and has nothing to maintain him there wants, the means of doing good to himself and his Neighbour, which if he had, might be very beneficial to both. I say no more of this point, because I think it needless to tell people that which Nature tells them a great deal more strongly, that they aught be concerned in these Privileges, if you will call them so. The hard task is that which belongs to this Gentleman to persuade them otherwise; and in which he had need employ more Rhetoric, than to tell us driely we are not bound to accept of them, if he expect to prevail much. Mean time, since there is as much obligation to take the Oath, as to preserve Goods and Liberty (For those who will enjoy them, I conceive, 'tis granted are obliged) All are obliged without more ado to take it, but those whom he can persuade they are unconcerning things, and that they have no account to make God for casting away such useful means of working out their Salvation.  
Though it be plain enough that none are exempted by this discourse, from obligation to take the Oath; yet to put the matter out of dispute, I must inform this Gentleman, if he know it not already, that there is an Act of Parliament purposely made to extend the obligation to all the King's Subjects. He will found it 7 Jac. c. 6. though with some difference of persons. Those of employments are directed where and when to take it, the rest let alone till they are called upon; which if they never be, he may well enough say, they are free till than. For the Law obliges them not to go and take it without summons. But there is no Subject who may not be called upon, and when he is, and refuses the Oath in open Sessions, incurs not Praemunire. And if requiring it of all, under such a penalty, do not put an obligation on all, I know not how Subjects can be obliged by Law.  
He says farther, That though those who refuse the Oath in many circumstances, are liable to some penalties enacted against Roman Catholics, yet they are punished even in that case, not so much for refusing the Oath, but because by refusing it they are suspected to be Popishly inclined. What this means I can hardly tell, unless, perhaps, that who is punished for refusing the Oath, suffers for Religion. This I must in plain terms say, is a scandal to Religion, and which, after so plain declarations as have been made to the contrary, cannot be said with any reason. Though it were as he says, that the Refusers are punished for inclination to Popery (which in one sense is true, the Oath having been framed to discover those who are so) it would not therefore follow there is any lesle obligation to take the Oath. For taking Popery as Protestants themselves take it, for an Undue adhaesion to the Pope in 
Considerations touching the true way to suppress Popery.  Principles or Practices falsely pretended to be Christian, he must show why this should not be punishable, even in Catholic Countries, before he can pretend we cannot be obliged to renounce it in ours. But I rather guests than know his meaning, being hardly able to make any thing of what he says. The Refusers, he says, are liable in many circumstances; as if there were any in which they were not liable, or as if circumstances made or marred. Than, Liable to some Penalties enacted against Roman Catholics, as if these Penalties were enacted against Roman Catholics for being Roman Catholics, and not-Roman Catholics were not as liable to them, as they, if they refuse as well as they. Again, Liable (for refusal, I suppose) and yet not punished for refusal, so much as for other suspicions. As if they were not punished for that reason for which they are liable; or as if the Punishments appointed for Refusal, would or could be inflicted but for refusal; unless, perhaps, the same punishments be appointed for other faults, which is not our case. Let there be, or not be other reasons why refusers are punished, sure they are punished for refusing the Oath, when by taking it they may scape those punishments. But indeed the whole to me is riddle. Circumstances, and Reasons, and what else he adds, make a noise, which a body would think had something in it. But that something is a secret into which I cannot dive. Yet he would have it follow, that no absolute obligation of taking the Oath can be proved: as if the Laws enjoining, and Magistrates requiring, did not put an absolute obligation upon the Subjects to those Laws and Magistrates. And actual loss of Goods and Liberty were not a proof, that they oblige those, from whom they take them, to do that for refusing which they take them.  
The 31 Consideration tells us, It cannot prudently be presumed, that the forbearance of the Oath is manifestly sinful. Methinks the resolution of such Questions as these should not depend on Presumptions. Many things hap to be true, which often cannot be very prudently presumed. As time was when he would hardly have been thought well in his wits, who should have presumed there had been convenient living under the Line, or that people walk feet to feet to us. And yet both are now manifestly true. 'Tis to spoil time and Paper to stick upon such collateral Topics, which may be multiplied World without end on any thing, and serve nothing to the clearing of Truth. But yet what are these presumptions. Grave, and Learned, and Conscientious Men (I forbear to speak of the Pope, having said so much of what concerns him already) maintain the forbearance of the Oath against their own Interest, and divers have suffered Imprisonment or Death. To their Gravity, and Conscience I have nothing to say; only I think it no miracle to see a grave and conscientious Man ignorant enough. As for their Learning, it matters not what it is in other things, if it fail them here: and that it does not, now he is on the proving hand, he should do something more than presume. Interest is an harsh string which I will not touch, but I think he knows there are who dare presume to think, that every body who speaks against the Oath of Allegiance, does not act against his Interest. As for the Authority of those who have suffered for refusing the Oath, it will signify something when he produces reasons sufficient to justify their so doing. For, Sect. 96. He tells us that no account is to be made of Authors, whose grounds are false, or inconclusive. If the Refusers of the Oath had no good reasons for their refusal, they are to be pitied, but not imitated: If they had, it would do well to bring them forth, that we may have wherewith to justify ourselves in following their example: otherwise it is no virtue to imitate the defects even of good Men. Neither shall we have that to say for ourselves which they had. For they had reasons, such as they were; which unless they appear to us, they may have done very well, and yet we shall do very ill in doing the same action without reason.  
It is no great wonder that people were imprisoned for refusing the Oath, it being the penalty appointed by Law. As for Death, it is an unjust aspersion to mention it, and an injury to the mercy of the Nation, in which none ever died purely for that matter. We see divers are persuaded the Oath is unlawful, and if they act as they think, the marvel is not great. The wonder is that it should be expected, that others, who are not so persuaded, should suffer for company. Among Sheep if one leap into the ditch, the rest will follow; but to say that Men must do so, is to make Men not better than Sheep. This is the finest way of doing the business that ever was thought of. Prevail but with some to suffer, by Sophism, or how you will, and than 'tis no▪ matter whether it were Sophism or not; the rest need not hear of it, but must suffer, because the first have suffered, and so all are in, without the trouble of giving a reason why. In short, their suffering is an Argument they were good Men; and not moved by any interest of the World, since they voluntarily quitted the more considerable of Temporal Goods. But it is no Argument of the goodness of the action, or truth of what they suffered for; while the worst of Heretics, and perhaps Atheists too, can name their sufferers. As good Men of all other, are the most apt to be imposed upon: they may thank such Arguments as these for what they have suffered. If others have no mind to be beholding to them for such obligations, I think they may be pardoned. Sure I am, it is a very preposterous imitation of their example, and justifiable neither to God nor Man; if what they did according to the dictates of their Consciences, we do contrary to the dictates of ours.  
Num. 32. The consideration of Schism comes into play; which I for my part, unless the word be taken improperly, conceive imputable to neither party. For it signifies a breach of Unity in the Church: and where both sides are united, both to the Head, and among themselves, I see no Schism. If either proceed so far, as to refuse communion to the other, let them answer for the Schism when it happens. For the present, those seem nearer the brink, who object Heresy to their fellows: because they object what, if it were made good, were a just cause of breach of Communion. But since they are not so severe in their actions as words: and communicate freely with those who, if they were such as they say, were not to be communicated withal: there is no more Schism between us, than betwixt Jesuits, and Jansenists, Thomists, and Scotists, and the rest. Though if there were, what he has said makes nothing to the justification of his party. For since both acknowledge the Head, the Schism must of necessity be between the Members. Now all he tells us is, that their side joins with the Head, as if the other did not do so too: and as if it were any thing to purpose, to say they are not Schismatics in respect of the Head, when the question is of Schism between the Members. Wherhfore, though in my opinion his discourse is none of the best, yet while it concerns not our question, I think I may let▪ it alone.  
Num. 33. He tells us, Union among Catholics in England in order to this point, may be had two ways; if All take, or All refuse the Oath. Union indeed in this point were to be desired; yet there is no fear of Schism, if we remain disunited in our judgements, while the unity of the Church is preserved. But this Union, I fear, is more to be wished than hoped. People have been divided about this Question, ever since it was first started: and I see no great likelihood it will be otherwise yet a while. Quiet we may be, if we please, if every one be content to follow his own conscience, and leave his Neighbour the liberty he takes himself. And he whose Zeal will needs fly out, is to answer for his transport, and the harm which comes of it. But united in this point, I doubt, we shall not be so soon, unless he would give us better reasons than he does, why All should refuse the Oath. It is more easy, he says, and more warrantable that the minor part should conform to the mayor, than the mayor to the minor. As if number signified any thing. It is not easy for him who has Truth on his side, to desert that Truth for any consideration, but by being persuaded that it is not Truth, nor warrantable if he do. Nor do I think he will found it so easy a matter to persuade the Takers they are not warranted by Truth. Again, he says, 'Tis more rational for the Members to submit to the Head, than the Head to the Members. This indeed is generally to be supposed. But yet it may hap, that the Head may slip into what is not rational sometimes. And than it is more rational for him to conform himself, not to the Members, but to Reason, than for the Members to conform themselves to what is not rational. Who has, and who has not Reason on his side, is the only point worth consideration: all else is but to talk plausibly from the purpose.  
The next two Paragraphs are employed in Reasons why Catholics should rather refuse than take the Oath. And they are all such as should neither be mentioned, nor so much as thought of. An honest man has no more to take care of, than to perform his duty, when 'tis required, and leave the success to Providence. Selling of duty, and bargaining before hand what I shall get by it, as if the joy which follows the discharge of a good conscience, were not reward enough▪ in this World, and God would forget us in the next, savers of a conduct not very creditable to Religion. Besides, indeed they belong more properly to those to whom it belongs to offer the Oath, than those to whom it is offered; and to their consideration I▪ leave them.  
Yet I cannot take leave of these Paragraphs, without wondering a● the confidence with which he so positively affirms, that the far greater part of English Catholics have hitherto been for refusing the Oath. He says indeed at last, that 'tis a confessed point, which if it be true, for I know not what adversaries he means, I think they with their confession, and he too are both out. Of the persuasion of the present Catholics we▪ have a little experience in what happened among the Catholic Lords. When the Oath was pressed upon them, my intelligence fails me, if the refusers were the far greater part. I am told they were the lesle. And I think there is reason to guests it would be among the Commons, as it was with them. For the influence of those of his Principles is thought to be as great on the Nobility as others.  
For the ancient Catholics we have the testimony of Withrington, one of them, and who knew what past. He in his Preface to his Disputatio Theologica tells the Pope, that very few (paucissimi) ●ay-Catholicks of any note refused the Oath: and in his Purgation, that the Oath was daily taken by almost all Catholics of the better sort, to whom it was tendered even by those who had Jesuits for their Directors. Possibly this Gentleman may not think very well of Withrington; but sure he does not think so ill, as that he would tell the Pope a lie to his face, in a matter of fact which every body could see were a lie, when he had so many Adversaries ready to catch at every advantage he gave. Or if he would lie to the Pope, I am sure it cannot with any prudence be presumed he would lie to an Adversary, who knew how things went as well as himself, and appeal to his knowledge for the matter. Fitzherbert had said the Oath was refused by Catholics. Withrington in his last rejoinder, Chap. 2. replies, He could not be ignorant that where one Catholic hath refused it, a hundred have taken it. And this was written in the year 1633, almost thirty years after the framing of the Oath, when in all likelihood it had been taken or refused by all the Catholics in England. So that, by this Gentleman's favour, the Ancient Catholics were of another mind than he fancies them. Nor can I think but he reckons without his Host, when he counts the Refusers far more numerous at present. We have little more, perhaps not so much, said to us as they had, and 'tis strange we should receive for current, what they thought adulterate.  
And so we are come to the head of scandal, in answer to that part of the Objection, which said, that to refuse the Oath is scandalous to Religion, as if the Principles thereof were inconsistent with Civil Allegiance due to Princes. I cannot imagine how this Objection can be answered otherwise, than by denying the Principles in question belong to our Religion; or are inconsistent with Allegiance, though they do; or are scandalous to Religion, though they be both inconsistent with Allegiance, and belong to Religion. This last way, I suppose, will be trod by few. For to say Religion teaches Principles inconsistent with Allegiance, is palpably to hinder people from embracing Religion, and that is palpable scandal. Wherhfore all depends on the other two, whereof I, for my part, should choose the first; and fear who does not, is no friend to Religion, otherwise than in wishes. Yet if it could be made out that those Principles do consist with Allegiance, Religion would be saved harmless. But this, I doubt, will never be done. However, let us hear what this Gentleman says to the point.  
He tells us, Num. 36. That the scandal, if any be, is rather Acceptum than Datum, because Catholics have been Loyal in the late Wars. I suppose he would have it thought by this, that the Principles in question have no inconsistency with Civil Allegiance; but I do not think he could have chosen a Topick lesle to purpose. For what had those Principles, and that Loyalty to do one with another? no body ever said or thought, but a man of these Principles might be loyal enough, in occasions where they have no influence. The Question is, whether they do not hinder a man from obeying a King deposed by the Pope, and whom the Pope commands not to be obeyed, and whether that hindrance be consistent with Allegiance, or no. What is it to this Question, to talk of what Catholics have done, when there was no deposition, and where the Pope never meddled? The Loyalty of those Irish, who stood by the King against the Pope's Nuncio and his Excommunications, has indeed some relation to the matter; and did he approve the Principles by which they acted, he had something to say. And than, I suppose, he would not writ against the Oath of Allegiance. But the Civil Wars of England have no more to do with the case, than the Wars of China.  
The next Consideration tells us, Protestants would think ne'er a whit the better of us, though we should all take the Oath, and, perhaps, the worse. Till he have Commission to speak for Protestants, I suppose, they will desire to speak for themselves, and conceive we aught not take their Sentiments barely on his word. But what matter is it what Protestants think, or not think? what they have reason to think, is all that concerns us. There are among Protestants, as in all multitudes, Reasonable, and Unreasonable. And because they will think, and speak, and act differently, I presume the Reasonable will not take it well, if the sentiments of the rest pass for the sentiments of all. As the letter he mentions, till it be owned by more than a single man, is, I think, unreasonably made the sense of Protestants. But let them think as they please. We, for our parts, are to look to our own duty, not other men's thoughts. When we have complied with that, we have no more to do. What others will think of it, is a matter out of our reach, for which God is to provide, and will; and to him they are to give account who think amiss of us for well doing. We are to satisfy those whom Reason will satisfy: for the rest, at their own peril be it.  
Our Question is of scandal; that scandal with which the Church may be aspersed if she teach Principles inconsistent with Allegiance; and which, I conceive, consists in this, that those who are not of her Communion will hardly be persuaded to embrace it, and those who are, easily be wrought upon to desert it, if that aspersion cannot be wiped of. It would be shown why both have not reason, when nothing is more manifest than that the Church whose Principles are inconsistent with Allegiance, is not the true Church. To this he should have spoken, if he would have spoken to purpose. Nothing can be wider of the mark, than to tell us there will be unreasonable constructions made of our actions; As if there were not unreasonable people every where, and those who are so would not act unreasonably.  
The taking of the Oath, he says, would be ineffectual to the End pretended. This End, I conceive, is to free our Religion from the scandal of Principles inconsistent with Allegiance. The Catholic now who takes the Oath, testifies his Religion is not guilty of such Principles, while he complies with his Allegiance, and still keeps his Religion. Why is not this effectual to that End? Because Protestants would not therefore have a better opinion of our Religion, but worse opinion of Catholics who take the Oath, as professing a Religion, to whose Principles, as by Protestants understood, they are ashamed to conform. If this were so, the scandal would be removed from Religion to the persons who profess it. For this imputation falls only on them. And if Protestants continued still to think amiss of Religion, those are to be thanked, who have given them occasion to think, that they swerve from the Principles of it, who profess their Allegiance. Their fault it is if taking the Oath be not effectual to the end pretended; and they should do well to consider what account they will make to God for the scandal.  
And why should it be thought that Protestants would have these opinions? I conceive he wrongs them with an unreasonable suspicion. They would plainly have reason to think, that those who they see stick to their Religion, after they have owned their Allegiance, are not ashamed of their Religion, or any Principles of it. Unless they believed all those Fools or Knaves who take the Oath, they would have reason too to judge, that their Religion has no Principles inconsistent with Allegiance. For they were Knaves who should profess Allegiance contrary to the Principles of their Religion, and Fools who did not know what their Religion teaches. And since there is Reason for Protestants to entertain other opinions than those he fancies, he may think of them as he pleases; I, for my part, cannot think but reason would sway with them.  
Besides, what means, as by Protestants understood? This, I suppose, that Protestants understand the Principles of our Religion consist not with Allegiance, to which Principles those are ashamed to conform, who are not ashamed to conform to their Allegiance. When Protestants understand things in this manner, I would entreat this Gentleman to tell us what he thinks of the matter, whether they understand things right, or no? If they do, and the Principles of our Religion have indeed an inconsistence with Allegiance, Protestants plainly do well to understand things as they are, and he must bethink himself of a reason to give them, why they should not think ill of a Religion of such Principles. If they understand wrong, and our Principles be truly consistent, he should do well to speak out, that we may understand one another, and in stead of hiding our Question in the Protestants thoughts, tell us how it happens that they are in the wrong. Whether because those Principles are not Principles of Religion, or consist with Allegiance though they be. One would guests he has a good mind to the latter, and would have it at last believed. But the difficulty lying in this, Whether it be agreeable to Allegiance to fight against the King, or at best not fight for him when the Pope deposes him, and puts a necessity of disobeying either the Pope for the King's sake, or the King for the Popes, and what influence the refusing Principles would have in that case, and only that case: there is not one word to the point in all his discourse, that I perceive, not so much as I, or No.  
For what he urges, Sect. 38. That we shall be accounted not Loyal for refusing the Oath of Supremacy. I know not what reason he has to fear such hard measure from Protestants. I do not hear they do, what he says they will do, and believe I can produce Protestant's who allow some Catholics loyal, though they know all refuse the Oath of Supremacy. When the time comes, we shall see what is to be said to them. I suppose if he had as much to say for refusal of the Oath of Allegiance, as of Supremacy, he would make better work of it. Yet he proves this conceit of his, because Protestants acknowledge the Supremacy in Spirituals is inherent in the Crown, and consequently that to refuse the Oath of Supremacy is to refuse the Supremacy of his Majesty in Temporals. What Protestants acknowledge, themselves declare. He may dispute that point with them if he pleases. But I do not think they acknowledge this consequence of his, who denys Supremacy in Spirituals (meaning as the word signifies, purely Spirituals) denys it in Temporals. They have no reason to thank him, in my opinion, for making them no better Logicians. If that be all they have to say for fixing disloyalty on the Refusers of the Oath of Supremacy, I believe we may rest secure. For they are too reasonable to say it. His proof of this, as indeed it needs proving, is, That who refuses to acknowledge any thing inherent to the Crown, refuses, at lest implicitly, to acknowledge the Crown and his Loyalty. Which is but to say the same more in general, leaving out the words which discover the fallacy. Otherwise, by any thing is meant any spiritual thing, and by Crown is meant power in Temporals. And so 'tis just the same again; who denys Spirituals, denys Temporals.  
Before I pass farther, I cannot but observe, That what he says here, is an Argument that Protestants are not likely to judge so crossly as he imagines. For if they cared for no more than a pretence to asperse Catholics with disloyalty, right or wrong, what needed they have made the Oath of Allegiance, when, according to him, the Oath of Supremacy would have served their turn as well? no Catholic could scape the imputation, if Refusal of the Oath of Supremacy would fix it on them; this way All may. If any be in love with an imputation so laudable, and will by no means part with it, the fault sure is not in the Protestants. It would, in my opinion, become our Reason to judge more rationally, and our Charity more favourably of our Neighbours.  
The last consideration, Sect. 39 That the Takers would created scandal in the Refusers, seeing how they slight the express order of the Pope; would make a Man suspect he has forgotten what he is talking of. He is answering this Objection; that inconsistence of its principles with Allegiance, is a scandal to Religion: And he talks of a scandal, not to Religion, but to particulars; and not for inconsistence of principles, but slighting of commands. Let the Takers be as scandalous as you will, and for what reasons you will, still the scandal remains upon Religion; unless its principles be cleared from inconsistence with Allegiance. To do this, I thought had been his business; to fall upon other things seems a strange way of doing it, and which argues, he gives it for desperate, and finds nothing will be done in it.  
As for the difficulty itself, it is the boiled Capon we have had all this while, of which I now grow weary. Who justly gives, who blameably takes the scandal he talks of, depends on what has been discoursed all along, who has right on his side. If any harm come by the ungrounded persuasions of weak people, I think they own it to those to whom they own those persuasions; and have nothing to say to those, who do what they can to ground them better. Sure I am there is no scandal in saying, our obedience to the Pope, or any body, aught not to carry us to any thing scandalous to Religion. There is no scandal in saying, there is nothing said by this Gentleman, which removes from Religion the scandal objected to it. For to talk of the Loyalty of Catholics, and thoughts of Protestants, (all the Meat he gives us with variety of Cookery) is to feed us with steam, instead of substance. There is no scandal in saying, he can see into the Millstone as far as another. Which if he do, and no body can clear the Objection better than he; the refusal is plainly scandalous for the reason objected. And because, if the Refusal be, the Taking cannot be scandalous; who fright weak Consciences into such apprehensions, have something, I doubt, to answer for their own.  
The Objection urged further: That should the Pope declare it sinful to bear His Majesty civil Allegiance (which is due unto him by the Law of God and Nature) we should not think ourselves bound to submit to such a Declaration. This I conceive he grants, Sect. 40. and than I see not why the dispute is not at an end. For the case of the Breves is the very case proposed. The Pope has declared something contained in the Oath of Allegiance is sinful. Besides the express Declarations of those who best knew what is in the Oath; it is manifest to eyesight, that nothing is contained there, but profession of civil Allegiance, due to His Majesty by the Law of God and Nature; and renouncing a power to take that civil Allegiance away. 'Tis manifest, that if there were any such Power, it might work, and take away that civil Allegiance, and deprive the King of what is due to him by the Law of God and Nature. But to deny unto him civil Allegiance, due by the Law of God and Nature, he says, is manifestly sinful; and than how can what he says next, that in matters manifestly sinful, we are not bound to obey the Ordinances of our Superiors, whether Spiritual or Temporal, be hindered from being applied to the Breves; and concluding that they are not to be obeyed. For they do deny him civil Allegiance in case of deposition, and declare 'tis sinful to hold it due; at lest as far as can be guest at the meaning of the indeterminate declaration, and as it is actually understood by those who are against the Oath, and every body else. There is no means of escaping, that I can imagine; but by saying, ●ither that civil Allegiance, is not civil Allegiance; or, that civil Allegiance is not taken away; when the duty of serving the King with our Fortunes and Persons is taken away: or, that such service is not due, when the Pope forbids it. The two first are manifest Nonsense; the last is the very case of the Objection, in which he acknowledges the Pope's declarations are not to be obeyed. Wherhfore I should think there is an end of the story; and the tedious troublesome question, which has vexed us so many years, fully resolved.  
Yet, I suspect he has reserved some Fence for this Flail in this bold manner of expressing himself, That supposing (as he does suppose) His Majesty is our Sovereign in civil concerns, and that not only in order to the civil Power, but also to the exercise thereof; Than to deny, etc. What this means, I cannot tell. But I think the King is not beholding to any Man's suppositions for his Sovereignty; and suspect 'tis plain Treason, to suppose otherwise. Again, what means Sovereign, not only in order to Power, but to the exercise too? Can one of these be supposed without the other; or can it be imagined, without Treason, that the Pope or any body can hinder the exercise of the King's Sovereignty in civil concerns? Till he explain himself better, and let us know what he means by them, and for what use he lays them up, I can say nothing to them, and should not be forward to meddle with such tender matters, though I could. What I said before, I think, is clear: That the King, independently of suppositions, is, by the Law of God and Nature, Sovereign in Civil concerns, both in order to power, and the exercise of it: That the obedience due to this Sovereign power in Civil concerns, is Civil Allegiance: That the Breves hinder the profession of this obedience, and the exercise of it in case of Deposition. And because 'tis acknowledged, that to deny Civil Allegiance is manifestly sinful, and that Obedience is not due to the Pope in matters manifestly sinful, the business, I think, is concluded, and All may take the Oath of Allegiance even with this Gentleman's good leave.  
The 41 Paragraph says, 'Tis not reasonable, because we may disobey in matters manifestly sinful, to disobey in matters manifestly or probably lawful. And the forbearance of the Oath is confessed to be so by his Adversaries. What they confess I cannot readily tell, nor am curious to examine, as caring more to know what is, than what is said. But, I conceive, 'tis not manifestly or probably lawful to forbear Allegiance, or the profession of it when lawfully required. And since I cannot see any thing else in the Oath, I cannot see how to forbear it, when lawfully required, should be manifestly or probably lawful. Unless in virtue of extrinsical probability, from the number of those who say the contrary, whom to take for guides, except they have reason for what they say, is to be guided without reason. In the following Section we have a new account of what the Pope has not done; which if he thought worth repeating again, methinks he should have chosen a fit place. For it suits but ill with our consideration, what would be, if the Pope should do as is objected, to tell us he has not done it. Having spoken so lately of this matter, I see no reason to stop at it again. Only, I humbly entreat him in behalf of the Catholics of England, to forbear such kind of Topics. For they seem to insinuate as if their Allegiance depended on the Pope's carriage to the King. T●●n which I know not how he could do them a greater, or more irrational injury. And so his performance upon this branch amounts to this; To grant the substance, and by that grant resolve the Question in favour of his Adversaries, and say over again a thing he had said a little before, nothing at all to the purpose.  
The Objection proceeds to urge, That the Oath contains only a mere Civil Allegiance, as our Kings have declared, and to them it belongs to declare what is mere Civil Allegiance, and not to the Pope, whose Jurisdiction extends only to Spirituals. To this he says, Sect. 43. That whatsoever a Prince is pleased to put into an Oath, which he terms an Oath of Allegiance, is not to be held as appertaining to mere Civil Allegiance. Undoubtedly; if he put in any thing which does not appertain to Civil Allegiance. But the business is, since he has declared he has done no such thing here, why we may not believe him, but must believe he declared he knew not what. Though he had made no declaration at all, it is clear enough of itself, that standing by the King with our Lives and Fortunes, even against the Pope as well as another, if they hap to fall out, and the Pope attempt on his Civil concerns, is mere Civil Allegiance. Pray why may we not believe the King said true, that he required mere Civil Allegiance, when we see there is nothing but this in the Oath?  
He goes on to tell us, Sect. 44. That because an Oath, styled an Oath of Allegiance, may contain things not appertaining to Civil Allegiance, the Pope may judge of such an Oath. Yes, if it do contain such things. But barely that it may, is no argument that it does. I would feign know by what Chemistry this potential may will be turned at lest to actual is. If so, says he, since this present Oath contains such things, as has been declared above, the Pope may judge of th●● Oath. I thank him kindly. This since it contains is the thing to be proved. If he had a mind to assume the point in question, he might have done it at first, as well as last, and made no such ado with his maybe's. Indeed he supposes this has been declared above. Thither by his Example I refer myself, where the Reader will found why I am not of his opinion, and judge as he sees cause between us. Lastly, he would have us stand to the Pope's judgement in order to such things, rather than the King's Declaration. As if all Catholics did not do so in order to such things. But that these are such things, there this Gentleman leaves us.  
Methinks a plain matter needed not be rendered obscure by learned handling. All that is in the case is, Whether the Oath contain Temporals only, or Spirituals also? The Pope has declared the one, the King the other. As for what concerns Jurisdiction, I think both may judge of the case, which in that respect seems equal betwixt them; one judging independently in Temporals, and the other in Spirituals. Now our concern is to know, which of the two judges right? For who goes with the side which judges wrong, as one of necessity must do, must needs go wrong. The Objection is for the King's judgement, this Gentleman for the Popes. His reason is, because there are Spirituals in the Oath, which is the thing in question. The Objection assigns no other reason but the King's jurisdiction, and in that point, I conceive, the case equal. But there is this reason, that the King who made the Oath, must needs know better than the Pope what is meant. We, who must resolve one way or other, can have no other guide but the judgement of Authority, or our own. 'Tis not easy to be guided by Authority, where the two Supreme authorities are directly contrary. But if we will put nothing else into the Scales, there is the better knowledge of the matter of fact to weigh on the King's side, which is not on the Popes. Neither do I think it would have been allowed in Catholic times, to submit the interpretation of English Laws to foreign Tribunals. The Statutes of Praemunire and Mortmain were heretofore judged to contain Spiritual matters, and long and strongly opposed by the Pope; but yet remained notwithstanding; our Catholic Ancestors preferring their own judgement before hi●  
But I doubt, whatever learned men say, people will do at last what their own judgements tell them is to be. At lest did they not carry a great stroke in the business, this Gentleman and I spend our time, methinks, but idly in informing their judgements.  
The Objection goes on, and so do his Considerations; but to what parts of it they are designed for answers, I am often at a loss. So that I can only observe what he says, without knowing whether he speak to the point. What the 45th Consideration says, is true, but what he will make of it, he neither says, nor can I imagine. The 46th tells us, because the King is to be obeyed only in Civil matters, and the Pope only in Spiritual, those of his way think themselves not bound to submit to the King's Orders, since the Oath contains things not appertaining to Civil Jurisdiction. And this last, he says, has been proved, and, I think, his proof has been disproved, and there it rests. This, it seems, was intended for answer to an Argument made by the Objection in behalf of the King, parallel to his own. In which he denys the Mayor, that the matter appertains to the King, for the reason mentioned. Whether it do or not, has, I conceive, already been sufficiently debated, and I love not repetitions. Civil Allegiance, I think, and security for mere Civil Allegiance, are matters very much appertaing to Kings. I am sure I see nothing else in the Oath, and till this Gentleman show me the Spiritual thing, which is there besides, cannot believe there is any such. And therefore, I for my part think myself obliged to obey the King.  
The next Consideration, Sect. 47. attempts to prove, that we aught in this case, submit rather to the Pope's commands than the Kings. His first reason is; because, though both be Supreme, yet in their several kinds, the Pope's Supremacy is of a higher Hierarchy, than the King's Supremacy. And certainly, when two Supreme Governors clash, we are bound, caeteris paribus, to submit to him whose Jurisdiction is of a higher Hierarchy, than to the other. This would have showed something more excusable, if he had kept it confined to this case. But when he gives a reason which extends to all cases, and by adding the Universal proposition, argues in this manner; we must obey here, because we must obey every where; he says, what I hear with extreme grief from a Catholic, and which I think becomes not the mouth of any good Subject. No King I believe will take him for such, who is disposed, in all contests with the Pope, to submit rather to the Pope's orders than His: And our King, for the difference of Communion, has more reason to be jealous than another. I beseech him to keep this Doctrine for himself, and those whom he can persuade into it; In behalf of the rest, I hearty protest against it. Yet Protestants, he says, will not deny it. I have already observed; that, in my opinion, he undertakes for Protestants farther than he has commission. But whatever they do, I am sure there are Catholics who think it very false, and very pernicious besides.  
But let us consider too in our turns. The Pope in this case is to be obeyed, not the King. Why so? Because his Supremacy is of a higher Hierarchy. What than? what necessity is there of obeying the higher Hierarchy? Because certainly we are bound, caeteris paribus, to submit to him, whose Jurisdiction is of a higher Hierarchy. That is, we must obey the Pope, because certainly we must obey the Pope. For highest Hierarch is Pope in other words, and unless it be shown how the notion of supreme Governor in holy things, (for that the word imports) make his commands carry it, against the commands of the supreme Governor in Temporals; He might have kept his usual name, and that notion never have been troubled. Besides, if the Pope's supremacy be of a higher Hierarchy, the King's, unless the comparison be Nonsense, is of a lower Hierarchy. And Hierarchy signifying government in sacred things; the King by this account is a Governor in sacred things, which who would have expected from this Gentleman?  
His second reason is, because according to the common sentiment of Divines and Canonists, when it is doubtful whether such a matter considered in itself does appertain to the Spiritual or Temporal Court, it belongs to the Spiritual Judge to decide to which of these two Courts it does appertain. I beseech you, what reason have these Divines and Canonists for this common sentiment of theirs? Because, says he, other circumstances being equal, the Spiritual Judge is to be preferred before the Temporal. This is the higher Hierarchy again. It belongs to the Spiritual Judge, because it belongs to the Spiritual Judge. Those Divines and Canonists who argue in this manner, will run a hazard of being thought themselves as common as their sentiments. I but, there is no other commodious way to decide the Question. Pray why is it not altogether as commodious, if the Temporal Judge decide it. To travel a thousand miles for a decision which may be had at home, methinks is no such commodious thing.  
Since he would needs meddle with this nice question of the Jurisdiction of Courts, I think it would have been well if he had advised with some besides his Divines and Canonists, before he had advanced their Doctrine in England. I am informed the Law of England is, that, in case of question, the Temporal Court is to judge whether the matter belong to the Ecclesiastical or not. And that this Law was made and practised by our Catholic Ancestors. If this be so, he should not expect the higher Hierarchy of his Divines and Canonists should carry it with English Catholics, against English, and those Catholic Laws. Whether it be or not, he may inform himself at leisure. For I think he will not take my word; nor will I pass it in a matter wherein I have no skill.  
But yet I can see that, if his Doctrine must every where pass uncontrolled, Temporal Judges will quickly be very useless things in the World. For since, virtuous or vicious, is a consideration appliable to all even possible cases, and the determination of that matter belongs to the Spiritual Judge, there is no case whereof he may not claim the cognizance. And if the Temporal Judge must always submit, within a while there will be nothing left for him to do. And yet I think, the World would not found it very commodious, to have Temporal Judges taken quite away. Again, if the matter be examined, I doubt, it will be found, that Spiritual Courts were set up by Temporal Authority. To Preach, to Bind and Lose, and what else was given by Christ, is indeed derived from a higher origin; but to hold Pleas, and act in the nature of Judges in Courts, I suspect proceeded from the piety of Princes. Which, if it be true, it seems more commodious, and more proper, that the Temporal Power should judge, whether a matter in debate be of the number of these which are by that Temporal Power committed to the Spiritual. He who gives, I think, can best tell what he gives, and what he meant to give.  
The 3d Reason is, Because the Pope requires lesle of us than the King. Suppose he do. Why aught we obey him who requires lesle? Because, when two Precepts contradict one another, we aught to submit to that Precept of the two caeteris partibus, wherein lest i● required of us. Very good, We aught, because we aught. These reasons, I see, are all of a piece; but, methinks, it had been more for the credit of his Divines and Ca●●●ists to have let them alone, than brought them upon the stage with such reasons in their mouths. But yet how much lesle does the Pope require of us than the King? Why▪ the Pope only requires we should not take this Oath: the King that we should positively take it as it lies; which is far more. Truly he is in the right there. Speaking is doing something, and keeping silence is doing nothing, and Something is plainly more than Nothing. But this is to be understood Metaphysically; for if we consider the matter morally, the Pope's Nothing may, perhaps, amount to more than the King's Something. Since refusal of the Oath is Praemunire▪ to require us to refuse it, is to require all our Goods, and our Liberty besides; and this, whatever notions they have in the Schools, is a very considerable Something in the World. The King now requires neither, but only security, when he needs them, of assistance both in our Goods▪ and personal Service, according to the proportion allotted by Law, and which we are bound to afford him, whether he take security or no. Now I should think security, and only for a part, and only when the time comes, and for that to which we are bound however, is not altogether so much as the whole itself, all at a clap. But the truth is, I fear, all this is but time lost. Duty or not Duty, True or False, Sin or Virtue, and the like considerations are worth examining; what More or Lesle have here to do, none but his Divines and Canonists, I think, can tell.  
The fourth and last Reason is, Because the Pope's Precept in this matter is negative, but the King's affirmative. And why must we obey the Negative, and not the Affirmative? Because when two Precepts oppose one another, we aught rather, all other circumstances being equal, to embrace the Negative Precept than the Affirmative, according to the common opinion of Divines. And this again is, we aught because we aught. And this is all we have from first to last, and which, I think, needed not have been branched out into so many particulars. For though we had never heard of the higher and lower Hierarchy, the Spiritual and Temporal Court, the Moore and the Lesle, the Affirmative and the Negative, we could well enough have understood in two words, We must because we must.  
What follows Sect. 48. has partly been touched before in behalf of the Pope; here 'tis pressed against the King. Since Withrington and the rest, says he, confess that whether the Pope has Authority to depose Kings is yet under debate between Popes and Kings, Certa●t Scholastici, & adhuc sub Judice lis est, Why should the King decide the Question in his own favour? Sure Withrington and the rest, how little soever they understood the Question, understood Latin better than to tender Scholastici certant there is a debate between Popes and Kings. Which side, of the question proposed, is true or false, is debated among Schoolmen alone; that point was never debated between Popes and Kings. Each were resolved of the truth of their own side beyond debate, and thought it, not to be disputed, but defended. You may call their Contests, Debates, if you please; but than the word has quite another sense, than when you apply it to Schoolmen. For there it signifies inquiry after Truth, here a defence, of what they are satisfied is Truth, by force. I am much mistaken if the King can be named, who thought there was any doubt to be made whether his Subjects were not to assist him, when he had use of their service, even against the Pope, and whatever the Pope would do to the contrary. Not but that divers have suffered Schoolmen to dispute this matter without check; For which, I suppose, they had their reasons. But when the occasion came, they expected the service of their Subjects, and they had it, even they in whose Territories there was most freedom for these disputes. Pray what harm is there, if our King decide the Question in his favour by words, which all Kings decide in their favours by Arms?  
Because this is, as it were, to take possession of the part  unto him; and as long as it is under debate, neither can take possession till the Question be lawfully decided in his favour. I have already observed, that this peremptorily decides the Question in favour of Kings. For to Depose being manifestly to take possession of deposing, the Pope, by this account, cannot Depose; and than the Question, whether he can or not, is plainly at an end. But why cannot Kings decide Questions even in their favour, and take possession of what they judge belongs to them, while there are debates among Schoolmen? I do not think they owe so much deference to the Schools, and suspect the World would go on but oddly, if Kings were obliged to expect till Scholars be agreed, which will be never, before they proceed to what they found convenient for the good of the Commonwealth. I had thought it belongs properly to Kings to decide such Questions. Scholars may dispute, and decide as they please; no body needs take notice of their disputes or decisions, farther than as their reasons convince. To what Kings decide, all, even Scholars themselves are bound to submit. Besides that they understand such things better than all the Scholars in the World. The Authority to decide what is, or is not requisite for the safety of the Commonwealth, rests only in them; nor can there be any other, from which the lawful decision he speaks of, can be expected, if theirs be supreme. If another supreme Authority acquiesce not in their decision, it is like to be tried out by the Ratio ultima Regum, if both persist resolute. But their Subjects aught acquiesce in their decision, and for themselves, since their Authority is supreme, they have no body of whom to ask leave to make them.  
And for taking possession, that follows Decision of course; though in truth, Kings do not take, but keep possession. They were in possession of the Allegiance of their Subjects before Schoolmen, and before Popes were in the World. Pope's would put them out of this possession in certain cases, and some Schoolmen say they may. Cannot Kings keep their own, because others pretend a title? Were it this Gentleman's case, and that the Pope should claim the land he holds by inheritance from his Ancestors, quietly enjoyed by them time out of mind, I hardly believe he would part with it, for all the debates of all the Schoolmen in Christendom. And yet the King, sure, has a stronger title to his Kingdom, than he, or any private man to his Estate. In short, that Kings cannot decide while Schoolmen debate, nor take possession of what they, who are the supreme Judges of their own rights, judge to be their right, because those who have nothing to do with judging, make a moot case of it; nor keep possession, because it is called taking possession; seem to me very unreasonable assertions, and for which if any reason can be brought, this Gentleman at this time has forgot to bring it.  
The 49 Consideration talks of the Pope's Direct and Absolute Power, and says it is inconsistent with the Sovereignty of the King in Temporals. And 'tis very true, that 'tis indeed very inconsistent. But what he designs by avowing truth, I cannot guests. I hope he does not mean to obtrude upon us the Indirect Power in its stead, and persuade us the King's Sovereignty in Temporals is secured by shifting of names. For the Indirect Power is altogether as inconsistent as the other; and should the Pope declare himself Sovereign in Temporals, over any part of his Majesty's Dominions, with an Indirect, or occasional Power, or what name soever you would give it, he would declare a thing as destructive to the King's Sovereignty in Temporals, as if he declared what this Gentleman says is manifestly destructive. But 'tis not for me to enlarge on this point, while he leaves it only to be guest, whether he meant it or no.  
Yet, I think, I may gather out of his Discourse, that since the Direct Power cannot therefore belong to the Pope, or Spiritual Jurisdiction, because it is inconsistent with, and destructive of Temporal Sovereignty; no Power which is inconsistent, and destructive can belong to the Pope, or Spiritual Jurisdiction. Wherhfore, unless the Power of Deposing, which the Pope claims, call it by what name you will, be consistent and not destructive, neither can it belong to the Pope, or Spiritual Jurisdiction. Now who will undertake to show, that the Deposing Power is not inconsistent, nor destructive, undertakes a difficult, and, I think, impossible task. For to Depose a King, is plainly to take away his Authority in Temporals: and when Authority in Temporals is taken away, 'tis plain there remains no Authority in Temporals. Now, if the Negative destroy the Positive, not-Authority, I think, must needs destroy Authority: and unless contradictories can stand together, to have, and not to have Authority must needs be inconsistent. 'Tis not a Term which can shifted of this matter. Call the Deposing Power Indirect, or Casual, or Spiritual, or what you will, if it be a Power to Depose, 'tis a Power to take away Authority in Temporals, and Power to take away Authority in Temporals is irreconcilable with Authority in Temporals, and much more with Supreme Authority in Temporals. Neither is there any Argument which he has brought against the Oath of Allegiance, which may not be applied to an Oath renouncing the Direct Power; in case the Pope should forbidden it, in the same terms in which he has forbidden the Oath of Allegiance. For there would be taking possession, and deciding the Question, while the matter were in debate; there would be disobedience to the Supreme Pastor, in matters appertaining to him, at lest which he declares appertain to him; and we are to stand to his judgement, whether they do or not, and so of all the rest. But if we be not bound to stand to his judgement in that case, neither are we in this, and for the very same reasons; because this Power which he does claim by this declaration, is as inconsistent with, and as destructive of Temporal Sovereignty, as the Direct Power. Wherhfore I cannot see but the dispute is at an end again, and all Deposing Power confuted by this Gentleman's discourse as fully as may be.  
Again, when he says, It belongs to a Sovereign Temporal Prince to determine what is precisely necessary for the conservation of his Temporal Sovereignty in case he be unjustly attacked by another in his Temporals: This too seems to determine the Question. For the King does judge, that to renounce the Deposing Power is precisely necessary for the conservation of his Temporals; nor can he be said unjustly to attack the Pope in Spirituals by conserving his Temporals, but is himself unjustly attacked in his Temporals, if he be hindered from conserving his Temporals. Wherhfore he does no more than 'tis confessed belongs to him. But when the Pope declares him not longer Sovereign in Temporals, I doubt he exceeds the bounds prescribed him even by this Gentleman. For he says, It does not belong to the Pope, or Spiritual Court, to declare who is Temporal Sovereign of such a Kingdom, which, I think, is to say, that it does not belong to them neither to declare who is not Temporal Sovereign of such a Kingdom, which is the very thing called Deposing.  
The 50th Consideration, to show how willing English Catholics are to give any just security of their Loyalty, proposes another form of Oath, rather more expressive, as he thinks, of Civil Allegiance than the Oath in force. And I make no question but he truly thinks as he says, and, as good meaning is All in All, conceive his Expressions, as he means them, may do well enough. But yet, I doubt, he has no more commission from Catholics to offer such a form of Oath, than he had from Protestants to undertake for their sense of things. I should think it more becomes Subjects humbly to acquiesce, where with a safe conscience they can, in what lawful Authority thinks fit to require, than by their proposals direct that Authority what they should require, unless they be called to counsel. Yet had he spoken only for himself, I should not have meddled in his business, but left it entirely to the consideration of those to whom it belongs to judge of it. But since he talks as if what he said were the sense of English Catholics, I must needs say, that he has done them no good office in giving occasion to have it thought so. For his form is liable to so many exceptions, such as I for my part cannot answer, that I fear, instead of appearing the loyal Subjects he would have them, they may chance, by sticking to it, be aspersed with suspicio●s of seeking to delude their King and fellow Subjects. I thought it became me to prevent that mischief, and show why I conceive Catholics neither do, nor rationally can insist upon his Form; though if he can get it approved by those to whom it belongs, I should, and believe all would readily submit to their Wisdom and Authority.  
His first clause is for substance the same with the first clause of the Oath of Allegiance, though the expressions are not altogether free from exception. For Kingdoms' i● not so much as Dominions. But, that I think happened only by inadvertence, and might soon and easily be amended.  
The second is, That they renounce all power whatsoever, Ecclesiastical, or Civil, Domestic, or Foreign, repugna●● to the same. There being no word in the former clause, to which this same can handsomely relate, the sense would be expressed with more clea●ness. But what is more material, is, that by these general expressions, i●●●●not be understood, what it is which is renounced by this clause. Do●● it renounce the Ecclesiastical Foreign power of the Pope, in as much as it pretends to un-king the Kings of England, or does it not? If it do, why should the clear expressions of the Oath bewaved, and dark circumlocutions put in their stead? If it do not, but reserve the deposing power as not repugnant to the Kings, what security do the big words of this clause offer, when they renounce not that, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Wisdom▪ of England has judged repugnant to the King's power, and security too, and ordered to be renounced.  
Again, who shall be Judge of this Repugnancy? If the King, a● one would guests by his former Consideration; He has already judged▪ the deposing Doctrine repugnant. If any other, what security 〈◊〉 the King have, that the judgement shall be according to Truth, and that what he, who is the only proper Judge, Judges repugnant to his power, shall not be judged not-repugnant. And besides, because one may pretend of any thing, that it is not repugnant, till it be judged repugnant, nothing at all is renounced till Judgement be past. And when will that be?  
The next Clause is, That they confess themselves obliged in conscience to be as obedient to his Majesty in Civil Affairs, as true Allegiance can oblige any Subject to be to his Prince. And here again we are left in generals, and left in doubt what this true Allegiance means, and to what it obliges. Who should think that Allegiance to a Deposed King is not true Allegiance, because he is no true King; or that the Majesty, to which they were obliged, were taken away by Deposition, and their obligation with it; or that true Allegiance does not oblige any Subjects to obey a Deposed Prince; would not break his Oath, though he should not only disobey, but fight against his King, when the Pope had Deposed him. So that it may very well hap that this true Allegiance, as handsomely as it sounds, may yet signify no Allegiance at all.  
There follows a promise, to bear inviolably, during life, True Allegiance to his Majesty, His lawful Heirs and Successors, and to defend them against all attempts whatsoever, which shall be made against their Rights, the Rights of their Persons, Crown, or Dignity, by any person whatsoever, or under whatsoever pretence. This seems to bid fair, and yet the manifest change of the Expressions used by the Oath of Allegiance, is apt to alarm suspicious people. For why should attempts against the King's Person, Crown, or Dignity, as it runs in the Oath, be changed into attempts against their Rights, and the Rights of their Persons, Crown, or Dignity? By this alteration we are left to dispute whether an attempt against the King, be an attempt of his Right; and who thinks he has no right, after the Pope has Deposed him, plainly promises nothing, but remains at liberty even to attempt against him. There are, if I mistake not, who maintain that a King Deposed by the Pope is no longer King de Jure, but only de Facto; an Opinion which is thought, and is indeed, repugnant to the Authority of Kings. This Form affords it so much countenance (though, perhaps, but casually) that I cannot think he has befriended Catholics in using their name to an offer so little becoming them.  
In the next place they promise' to use their best endeavours to discover to his Majesty or Ministers all treacherous Conspiracies. And this is well, provided that by Treacherous he meant what the Law means. For if any should think these Conspiracies not treacherous, which are made by Authority of the Pope against a Deposed King, he might be an arrant▪ Traitor without breach of his Oath. Lastly, They renounce the Doctrine which maintains, That any private Subject may lawfully kill the anointed of God, his Prince, a Clause which, as bad words as it gives that Doctrine, is not very satisfactory. For a private Subject may be said changed into a public Minister, if he act by Authority. And than, to kill the Man, may be said, is not to kill the Prince, if he cease to be so by deposition. To these, and, perhaps, as many more Exceptions, the several Branches are liable.  
But now to look upon it in gross, nothing could be more improper for what he designs by it; which is to show that Catholics are Loyal, and ready to give security of their Loyalty. English Catholics were never suspected of Disloyalty by any body, but only in one case, when their credulity might be deluded by pretence of Religion; an abuse to which all Nations and all Times are subject as well as they. The powder Treason, to use almost the words of King James, plotted by Papists, out of a preposterous Zeal for the advancement of their Religion, and which had blinded some of them to that degree, that even at their death they refused to acknowledge and ask pardon for their fault, gave occasion to the Parliament to use all means of Trial, whether any more of that mind were yet left. They devised the Oath of Allegiance to make a distinction between Papists of quiet disposition, and in all other things good Subjects, and such other Papists as in their hearts maintained the like bloody Maxims, that the powder Traitors did. All the Disloyalty than, which is laid to our charge, is maintaining the Maxims of the Powder Traitors; in other things we are plainly acknowledged good Subjects.  
Now would I feign know, what this Form of his contributes towards clearing this only charge against us. There is not one word of the Pope; and if he, as I think he is, be always understood excepted, unless he be expressly named, as not comprehended in any how general expressions soever, one may believe of him all which those Traitors believed, and act all they acted, and have not check all the while from any thing sworn in this Form. There is not one word of the Deposing Power, the only cause of all the jealousy people have of us; which a man may hold, and practise all the Disloyalty which may proceed from it, and swear all the Loyalty contained in his Form, and never break his Oath. In short, there is not one word whereby it may appear that those, who swear Allegiance in this manner, do not maintain in their hearts, and may not practise upon occasion the same bloody Maxims, which the Powder Traitors did, and against which the wisdom of the Nation thought fit to require security. And, I think, none, but he that has lost his reason, can think they had not reason to do so. Wherhfore, as far as I can perceive, as well as he intended by his Form in behalf of Catholics, what he has done is to leave all the Disloyalty, ever charged upon us, still sticking: and expose those, who stand resolutely to it, to the suspicion of being as bad as the worst Powder man of them all, which is a great injury to them, and a greater to Religion: as if that did, or could hinder them from giving good evidence that they are not as bad as Traitors.  
The 51 Consideration has nothing which needs detain us. The Case which he supposes, when it happens, would be as he says. But when he applies what may be, to what is, he takes for granted that there is something doubtful, or false, or some glance at Religion in the Oath of Allegiance, and something more than Civil Allegiance. Which he must prove, if he would have those believe, who can found no such thing of themselves. To be perpetually stun'd with the noise of Civil Allegiance, and mere Civil Allegiance, and never be shown what there is besides in the Oath, will sooner deafen than convince us. Not Catholic, who has taken the Oath, ever thought of giving any Spiritual Prerogative to the King by it, or taking any from the Pope. Nor can any man else see any thing there, but a profession that Subjects are obliged to stand by their King with their Lives and Fortunes, as the Laws of God, and Nature, and the Land require, and this whatever is pretended for the Pope to the contrary. This necessarily implys, that the Pope cannot Depose; for if he could, he would take away the obligation which Subjects have to stand by their King, which is the only thing called Civil Allegiance. Wherhfore since he who professes the Pope cannot take away the obligation of Civil Allegiance, professes no Spiritual matter, but barely his tye to perform Civil Allegiance, and nothing else, and the Oath contains nothing but this substance branched into several particulars: I cannot perceive any colour of maintaining that the Oath contains more than mere Civil Allegiance. Who will say otherwise, must of necessity say that Civil Allegiance, in case of Deposition, is not Civil Allegiance: which, I think, is plain contradiction.  
Sect. 52. He objects against himself the Authority of France, which he takes a great deal of pains to show has never approved the English Oath of Allegiance. I know not why he would put himself to all that trouble, to confute no body. For he acknowledges that his Adversaries do not pretend any such thing, as indeed it were not reasonable they should: every body knowing that the French Nation never had authentically approved our Oath, and few expecting that ever they william.  
For one Nation does not use to meddle with the Acts of another, except with such as they found to their prejudice: and if they did, perhaps▪ would have but small thanks for their labour. The World is something jealous, and apt enough to suspect, where Neighbours thrust themselves unnecessarily into their Neighbours concerns, that they seek their own good more than theirs. Besides, who can tell whether the French, or any other Nation, may not be well enough content, to have the deposing Doctrine take root any where, but among themselves? It has afforded pretences, of which people have taken hold to their advantage. As long as they provide for themselves, I can hardly think they will be forward to renounce any opportunity of advantage, which others take. Whatever be their reason, 'tis certain, there is no National Act of that Kingdom, which has approved our Oath of Allegiance, nor was it ever pretended there was.  
What has been pretended, is, that within the body of the Catholic Church there are, and those considerable both for number and quality, who openly in the face of the World disown the deposing Doctrine: and that without reprehension, remaining good Catholics, and acknowledged for such by all other Catholics, even the Pope himself. And so much is evidently true. From hence, people upon occasion draw such consequences as they found to their purpose.  
These, I conceive, are undeniably plain: That the deposing Doctrine is not a point of Faith: That who denys it, does not stand alone: And that, who refuses the Oath of Allegiance only for denying that Doctrine, refuses it for a reason which many Learned Men judge to be no reason. It is like enough he may found it to be no reason himself, if their Authority move him to examine what they have to say for themselves. And he may also found that there is nothing as material objected against the Oath. And so their declaring against the deposing Doctrine may be, and is an approbation of the Oath, to him who sees there is not any thing besides, for which it can rationally be disapproved. But otherwise, standing purely to the force of the Terms; They have declared against deposing, therefore they have approved the Oath; is a consequence which no body makes, and whereof he needed not so often inculcate the weakness.  
There is enough to be said on every Consideration; but while none hits the mark, I think 'tis lost time to measure how far every shot is wide or short. Only whereas he insinuates as if the Authority of France might be alleged against the Oath: because in an Assembly of the Estates, an Article proposed by the third Order against deposing Power was rejected: I must entreat his good leave to believe, that in such Assemblies things are not carried altogether in the same manner as in Schools. True, or False, is not the only matter in which they are concerned. They look as much, perhaps more, upon Expedient, or not Expedient. That the Assembly judged it unfit to enact the Law proposed, appears by their rejecting it. And if there were nothing else, there was this to make them judge so, that they had lost a Friend of the Pope; with whom perhaps at that time it concerned them to hold good correspondence. But that they judged the Article false, we cannot know unless they had enacted the contrary. What Cardinal Peron said to them on that occasion, if he said what goes about in his Name, every body may easily see, and judge of. If this Gentleman think his Arguments efficacious, he may make use of them if he please; and show us, what we cannot see of ourselves, that they are so. In the mean time, who thinks they judged the Article, which they rejected, false, must of necessity think they judged the contradictory true. Let him who thinks so, make the experiment, and maintain the contradictory in France, viz. That there is some Power on Earth, which has right over the Dominions of the Kings of France, to dispose them, etc. and if he scape the Fate of Bellarmin, and Suarez, people will be more disposed to be of his mind. But I am much mistaken, if public Justice do not convince him, that they are for the Doctrine of the Oath of Allegiance, and neither rejected their own, nor forbear to approve ours, for any thing said in either, against Deposition.  
Of this, it seems, this Gentleman was ware, and therefore Num. 57 gins to found what other faults he can with the Oath. The first is the word Heretical, an Inn at which every body baits. He touches the sore wondrous gently, saying only, it seems hard to censure, etc. as if things did not often seem other than they are, and the greatest Truths were not hard enough sometimes. Since he does not give any reason so much as why it seems hard, I conceive it will be enough to refer the Reader to what I have said of this matter in the second Treatise: where he will found that Heretical, or not Heretical, is not the point, but Depose, or not Depose. Who allows the Pope cannot depose, cannot avoid allowing that the proposition, renounced by the Oath is undeniable and unexcusable Heresy, and that even in the principles of those who are against the Oath. There in truth it only pinches, the rest has no difficulty but what we make ourselves. What he adds of censuring the Defenders, is a consequence of his own making, with which the Oath meddles not, and which therefore need not be made, whatever it be when it is. And yet I see no great harm would come of it though it were. To censure Men of esteem, and that deservedly, for Heretics, or as bad, sounds indeed scurvily. And I suppose he meant to work upon the aversion which we naturally have from doing so. But when this Heresy with its frightful sound, signifies no more than material Heresy, it will hardly amount to a reproach. At lest many an honest Man is liable to it, such as it is, and peradventure few, even among the most Holy, and most Learned, entirely free.  
The next Sect. pretends it cannot be sworn with Truth, That neither the Pope nor any other ●an absolve from the Oath, when the King may absolve from it, by laying down the Government, or passing away, or losing all, or part of his Dominions. By the sincerity which is to be expected from one who writes for the satisfaction of people's Consciences, does he himself truly think this is the Absolution meant, and renounced by the Oath? Does he think Protestants so ignorant, as not to know such Cases may hap, and so wicked as, when they take the Oath themselves, to swear that what they know may be done, cannot be done? He knows as well as any body, that his Cases have nothing to do with what he himself, and all the World besides understands by Absolution. Not but that the Obligation of obedience to a Prince may cease by such ways, and a great many more. Death may take away, or sickness▪ tender him uncapable to govern: and I cannot obey him who is not, or who cannot command. But if this were Absolution, Ravillac, or any body as wicked as he might, absolve too. If he will by way of Metaphor apply the word Absolution to such cases, he may if he pleases. But when he knows the Oath does not mean so, he must needs know too, that his Absolution and the Oath's Absolution agreed no more than Absolution and not-Absolution, and that such difficulties are a great deal more likely to perplex than satisfy our Consciences.  
The 59 Consideration has a very surprising exception against the word Hearty. It seems he finds reluctance himself, and measures other folk's Corn by his own Bushel. Otherwise, that people should boggle at doing their Duty hearty, is very strange. Here again it pinches just where it did before; the Exception in truth being, not to the Hearty, but the Duty. For who believes the Oath contains nothing but Allegiance, must believe it his duty to take it, when legally required; since none can doubt but to profess and give security of his Allegiance, is as much his duty as to perform it. Who think otherwise, may indeed be startled at the word Hearty, but 'tis because by mistake they judge what does belong to their Duty, not to do so. Wherhfore they should set the Saddle on the right Horse, and instead of blaming the Oath, blame their own thoughts, and those delusions which have caused them. For sure they cannot expect a Prince should be well satisfied with those who obey his just Commands grudgingly and repiningly.  
But why must every body needs feel a reluctance in this business? Because, says he, they are forced to swear, to preserve advantages, or avoid penalties. As if all Laws, both of God and man, were not enforced upon us in the same manner. Heaven and Hell are set before our eyes to allure us to obey, and fright us from breaking the Commands of God. Temporal Rewards and Punishments are proposed with the same design in human Laws. According to him, neither One nor Other could be obeyed hearty. Than great Difficulties have been raised, and many Learned men are against the Oath. This we shall believe when we see it. If those which he calls great Difficulties be such as we meet with here, he must pardon us if we have not the same opinion of them. For to us they appear very slight. And for the Learned men he speaks of, 'tis true, that divers who have the reputation of Learning, and who in other matters may deserve it too, for aught I know are against the Oath. But we can see nothing in their Arguments answerable to that reputation, and suspect when they came to treat of this point they left some of their Learning behind them. However it be, sure I am that Reasons have force from themselves, not their Authors. A good one is a good one out of John Porter's mouth, and a bad one a bad one out of Aristotle's. I shall be easily brought to believe, he is a Learned man who proves what he says; but if he do not prove what he would, let him be as learned as he will, I conceive, he deserved not that name for what he has done in that point. As for the share which the Supreme Pastor has in the business, I hope enough has been said already to show he has done nothing which can hinder a man from taking the Oath very hearty.  
Unless the Proverb be false, and every Wood will serve to make a Mercury, one would not have suspected the Objection he has found, Sect. 60. The Title of the Act, wherein the Oath of Allegiance is inserted, being For the discovering and suppressing of Popish Recus●nts, it seems thereby, says he, to be insinuated that the taking this Oath is made a denial of the Roman Catholic Religion. 'Tis well for him this is not true; if it were, Catholics would be obliged to take it as fast as they can. For if to take the Oath be judged to renounce Catholic Religion, the Doctrine renounced by the Oath would certainly be judged to belong to Religion. And than to refuse the Oath would be to declare that the Deposing Doctrine is truly a part of Religion. This peradventure he may with a safe Conscience do, who believes that Doctrine to be an Article of Faith, if he can acquit himself for believing so. But for the rest, if they consent to it, they consent to have it thought their Religion teaches, not only what it does not teach, but what they judge in their Conscience is false, and pernicious. And that is to be manifestly guilty of scandal, and the greatest of scandals, to Religion; in which, I think, no Pretence, nor Authority, not not of an Angel from Heaven, can bear them out. Wherhfore either all must hold the Deposing Doctrine is a downright point of Faith, (as indeed it sticks only there all along) or what he has said to fright us from the Oath, is the strongest Motive that can be to take it. Not Catholic who thinks otherwise, being able to answer it at the great day, when it is made a distinctive sign of his Religion, to allow that his Religion teaches false and pernicious Doctrine, if he do not unmake that sign, by all the ways he can, and undeceive his Neighbours, and remove the scandal.  
But I must own the Truth, and say there is no such thing, as what to him seems to be insinuated. And it is the stranger he should miss it himself, when his next words acknowledge, that other things are contained in the Act, which do contribute to the discovery of Popish Recusants. For this methinks might have insinuated, that the Title may properly enough relate to those other things. Yet the Oath being inserted among the rest, he will needs have this complete the discovery of them. As if it were not usual for things of several natures to be inserted into the same Act, or one Title would comprehend All, without being as long as the Act itself. Besides, when a Bill is brought into Parliament, it is often so altered upon debate, that little remains of the first draught, besides the Title. But the matter is not left to our incertain guesses. The end designed by the Oath is expressly declared to be, not to discover Catholics; but, for the better Trial how his Majesty's Subjects stand affected in point of Loyalty, and due Obedience. And when an Act explains itself, there is no room for private Glosses; which if they say the same, are needless; the sense of the Act being plain before; and if they differ, must needs wrist and injure it, and aught not to be heard against public Authority.  
But he concludes, that 'tis not lawful to do any thing which is by public Authority made a denial of true Religion, or a distinctive sign of a false one. 'Tis strange he should think by dint of Argument to make that pass for a distinctive sign, which he himself, and all the World besides knows is not a distinctive sign. Can public Authority be thought to look upon those who take the Oath, as not-Catholicks, which treats them still as Catholics, and keeps them liable to all the penalties to which Catholics are liable? I must confess I wish it would think fit to do otherwise. For I think Laws would not be the worse obeyed, if people were encouraged in their obedience. But this▪ I humbly leave to their Wisdom. Does he or any Man think those Catholic Lords who took the Oath, denied their Religion, and are not Catholics still? Do not we found ourselves actually bred up Catholics by our Ancestors, who by taking the Oath in former times according to him, were all turned Protestants? It is very unexpected that insinuating, and that but seemingly, should improve at last into a confident assertion of what is so notoriously not true; and a very unlikely means, I think, for the satisfaction of those who desire information.  
The 61. Consideration, excepts against some ambiguous expressions in the Oath, but tells us not which they are. Now all my fear is, that the true exception is, that they are too plain. The exception which the Pope, and those who writ against the Oath in places where they may speak freely, take to the Oath, is not ambiguity. Here it is a lesle offensive pretence, than downright maintaining the deposing Doctrine: and because it carries some show of tenderness of Conscience, finds those who sincerely love Peace, disposed to gratify it. For which reason, I suppose, the Authors he citys, say what they did. But when this ambiguity comes to be examined, as far as I see, the substance of the Oath is meant by it; and, till the security which the Wisdom of the Nation has thought fit to require, be taken away, either that, or something else will always be pretended. If it truly stick with this Gentleman at ambiguity, let him, if he please, say more plainly what he knows, as ambiguous as it is, the Oath means; and than blame the Oath freely for me. But till than, 'tis an exception against I know not what; and of any should not be made by him, who, instead of this ambiguous Form, offers another more ambiguous a great deal.  
He closes this matter, Sect. 62. with a pair of exceptions more, whereof the first is easily compounded. For the Oath requires no more than what he stands upon, That what is sworn be true in the Conscience of the Swearer, and goes not farther. The point having been already discoursed in the second Treatise, it is needless to discourse it over again. The second is, That there is ●● necessity of Swearing, or any good to be got by it. As if any obligation imposed by Law, and required by the Magistrate, were not necessity enough to justify the taking of an Oath. And as if more good were to be expected from it, than the discharge of our duty. Though if there were, Liberty, I should think, and Estate may pass for Goods, among those who are not too scrupulously nice. But it becomes not Subjects to stand capitulating with their Superiors, what they shall get by their obedience before they obey. And this too has been touched before. Than he concludes, That the Authority of France does not clear nor touch the aforementioned difficulties. To which I shall only say, he much overrates his difficulties. There needs no Authority of France, nor any place else, to clear what has nothing to be cleared; as I think every body will see these, he calls difficulties, have not. Wherhfore he must permit me to conclude from these very difficulties of his, that there is no true difficulty against the Oath, but the persuasion that the Pope can depose. For since for our satisfaction he has made it his business to found other difficulties, and gathered together as many as he could think of, and produces none but these; we have reason to think there are no other; and these we can, without Spectacles from France, see, with our own eyes, are not difficulties.  
What follows in several Paragraphs, is but the same over again: That his difficulties have not been touched, nor the Oath in particular approved; and than the difference betwixt swearing positively, and Teaching or Exhorting. All which have been discoursed already. His Probabiliy, which, Sect. 66. he says, ceases by a sentence of the Supreme Judge, I leave him to dispute with the Curates of France. It is a point in which I am not versed, nor mean to be. All I swear in the Oath of Allegiance, is, to my best Judgement true, and so much serves my turn. What becomes of the Probable I am not concerned. The case he puts, Sect. 67. determined by Supreme Authority, is very true; but when he applies it, he supposes the Pope is the proper Judge of our question; which, to our apprehension, since it concerns the Authority, and Security of the King, belongs to the King. Methinks it would have done well if he had proved his supposition, before he had insulted over the Defenders for Losing Talkers. 'Tis well for them, that the Impugners were gainers by it. For our parts so we loose not the Testimony of a good Conscience,▪ we shall be contented with our lot. But 'tis strange to me this Topic should return so often. We never were condemned more authentically than the Jansenists in France, nor did the Oath of Allegiance ever make so much noise and bustle as the Five Propositions, and the Formulaire. And yet those Heretical Jansenists, have lived to see themselves thought and created as good Catholics again, without discarding any opinion they had. And when Providence pleases, we for all their big words may be on the right side, and think still as we do. In the mean time, if the Pope have given sentence for the Impugners, the King has done the same for the Defenders. If the Question belong to his Tribunal, the Defenders after all are the gainers, and the Impugners take the Losers leave to talk.  
And I should think, as much reason as they have had to forbear Printing, it may be worth the while to show it does not belong to his Tribunal. For otherwise whether a King can be unkinged or not, a body would think at first sight does something concern a King and his Tribunal. However, it would be a better reason for Printing than he gives, viz. to get the Oath condemned, which every body knows was condemned before Pen was set to Paper.  
I should be unconcerned in the 68 Consideration, if the Discourse did not seem to unravel what is weaved in answer to the Second Treatise. These two Oaths, he says, are very different: I judge the Pope has no Power, and He has no Power. This is true, and yet that difference hinders not the second from amounting to I judge he has no Power too. But in the former way of expression, the judgement may, and is understood to be slight, and unsettled, and conscious the object may be otherwise than as 'tis judged. And this they mean who say, I think such a thing is true, but will not swear it. In the second way, the judgement is firm, and for as much as the swearer is conscious, absolutely certain the object is as 'tis judged. And so, because what is seen, is, it is all one to say It is, or I see it. Yet even when I say It is so, I am not understood to say more than I judge it is so, with a firm, and to my conscience, certain judgement, because all the World knows I can say not more. For I cannot say It is, but in virtue of my sight that it is, and that sight is my judgement.  
'Tis not than, as I conceive, the matter alone, but the matter as seen, which is the object of positive Oaths; and the judgement always makes a part, and a principal part of the object. For the matter may be true, and I be perjured by swearing it, if I judge it not true; as likewise the matter may be false, and I not perjured by swearing it, if I judge it true on sufficient Motives. Whence, I think, 'tis plain, that the Judgement, not the matter, is the principal thing in Oaths however expressed. What he says to the contrary, That 'tis possible one should swear false, thinking he swears true, which could not be if the Judgement were the object, because every one certainly knows his own Judgement is true, or▪ not true, as he understands Judgement, and Swearing false. If by swearing false be meant, that the matter sworn may be false, undoubtedly he may swear false who thinks he swears true. But if by swearing false, be meant Perjury, than who thinks he swears true, provided the grounds of such thinking be warrantable, cannot swear false. Again, by Judgement may be meant such a one as he mentions, which so judges the matter sworn is true, as probably to know withal that it may be otherwise. Who swears in that manner that a thing is positively true, not only may, but is always in danger to swear false, and therefore I think, with him, cannot swear without an affront to God; though he knows we have grave Authors against us, who will have probability serve turn. But if the Judgement neither know, nor doubt any probability, or even possibility that the matter sworn may be otherwise, and be settled on Motives which tender his mistake, if he do mistake, unblamable before God and Man, I conceive he cannot be guilty of Perjury, or affronted to God, who swears even what after appears false. Much of this has been said already, and perhaps needed not be repeated now. For after all, what he assumes at last, That we are in the Oath of Allegiance bound to swear positively that the Pope has no such Power, is confuted by the express words of the Oath, which plainly relate to the Conscience, and Belief, or Judgement of the Swearer.  
The three following Considerations have little to do with the business; no body, that I know, making the Consequence which he says is weak. I can only wonder in passing, what Adversaries he means by those who seem to have an eye to the Articles of the Faculty of Paris. Withrington was dead, the Reflections, and Questions writ, before those Articles appeared. I suppose they were no Prophets to have an eye to future things, and which were not yet to be seen. The The Jesuits, too, are brought in, unreasonably enough in my opinion. Concerning whom I shall only say, that if what he tell us be true, That who among them should teach the Deposing Doctrine would be severely punished; They are wronged to be made the Authors of these Treatises.  
Sect. 72. He gins to speak of the condemnation of Santarellus, a subject which takes up several Sections. What he says here, is, that interpreting that Decree, as some do the Oath, as erroneous, etc. may signify as bad as erroneous, etc. and so the Doctor; who condemned Santarellus, cannot be concluded to have thought that Doctrine erroneous; nay may be concluded to have thought it not erroneous. I conceive those Doctors are to be asked what they meant by their As in their Censure, and the Parliament in the Oath, not knowing who else can tell. But whatever the Parliament meant, if it were put to his Conscience, I do not think he believes in earnest the Doctors thought the Doctrine, which they condemned as erroneous, was not erroneous. I conceive also, that since he dislikes this interpretation in his Adversaries, he might have forborn it himself, especially knowing that Withrington, though he borrowed that Answer from the Doctrine of Bellarmin, yet relys himself more on another.  
Sect. 73. He says the Censures and Propositions being several, it does not well appear which falls upon which. The Censure runs thus: The Faculty disapproves, and condemns the Doctrine contained in those Propositions. Which, since there is no Respective to tender the sense indeterminate, signifies, I think, that all the Censures fall upon the Doctrine of all the Propositions. Yet it seems incredible to him that those Learned men should so hardly censure this Proposition, which makes one among them: The Pope may with Temporal Punishments chastise Princes for the Crime of Heresy, seeing the Pope, or any Confessarius may impose some Corporal and Temporal Punishment; for example to give Alms, or build an Hospital, upon an Heretical Prince who should come to be reconciled. Truly he is something harder of belief than St. Thomas himself, if he cannot believe that may be done, which he sees is done. He may dispute it out with them if he please: To me his Reason seems as strange as his Incredulity. Those Penances which repentant Sinners receive from their Ghostly Fathers, and perform of their own good will, I think are not understood by the word Chastisements. If you will call them so, the penitent chastises himself, but is not chastised by another. And should he not be willing to do them, neither Ghostly Father nor Pope could take away his Money, to spend in Alms, or on an Hospital. I think there is no Defender of the Oath, nor any man in his wits, who denys the Pope may chastise, if you will needs call it so, any Prince with the loss of his Kingdom for Heresy, or any thing else, whom he can persuade voluntarily to part with it. But if he will keep it, how it should be taken from him in spite of his Teeth, by a Power of imposing Penances, by which not so much as a single penny can be taken from any man without his consent, is beyond our understanding. Besides, Chastising a Prince for Heresy, signifies proceeding against one actually guilty of the fault. When the Proposition speaks of such a one, who would have thought it had been to purpose to speak of one who comes to be reconciled, and by doing so declares he is not such a one? Because the one may be enjoined whatever is for the good of his Soul, will it follow, the other may be deprived of his Temporal Rights?  
The 74. Sect. tells us, Spondanus says, the Book of Santarellus was forbidden at Rome, before it was forbidden at Paris; as if it imported whether it were or no. I can say nothing of that Prohibition, having never seen it. The Author of the Preface to these Treatises it seems has. He is his Man, if he have a mind to make a business of it. He adds out of the same Author, that the Animosities of the University of Paris, arose from some hidden seeds of Schism: A story which does not tell well. For if they were hidden, how came Spondanus to see them? There appears nothing but the censure, and I hope he has not a mind to asperse the Court of Rome with seeds of Schism, by making the prohibition of Santarellus a sufficient cause for the suspicion. What he gathers from those promises, has been so often said, that I am quite weary of repeating. No body infers the University of Paris is for the Oath. But every body, that has eyes, sees they cannot be again the Oath, for renouncing the deposing power which they renounce themselves: And that other quarrels against it are too frivolous, to trouble so famous an University with them.  
The 75. Sect. would have the Paris censure understood of deposition for slighter causes, or at most for Heresy in the Princes themselves, without enforcing it on their Subjects. And this he says, is different from our present case, because we swear in the Oath of Allegiance, the Pope cannot depose a Prince for any cause, even though he persecute his Subjects into his own Heresy. Undoubtedly, whatever the Title say, he was no Jesuit who writ this. For to except against the Oath, because it renounces deposing Power in all cases, is to teach it in some; and that he has told us is punishable among them. I hope he does not expect a point of such consequence should be yielded on the credit of his word. When he brings his proofs, we shall see how far they will carry. In the mean time, the censure speaking so plainly as it does, I conceive it very needless to inquire, what it means, of Comments lesle clear than the Text. The 76. Sect. distinguishes betwixt Heretical, and contrary to the word of God; of which whatever be the Truth, it concerns not us. For what is in the Oath renounced as Heretical, is undeniable, and unexcusable Heresy, unless the deposing Doctrine be true. Who says it is not Heresy, must of necessity say his King is subject to a superior power, which may dethrone him: And that I conceive is a Doctrine not more currant among other Men than among the Jesuits.  
These are the Considerations he makes on the censure of Santarellus; not likely, as far as I see, to pull down the price which his Adversaries, he says, set upon it. For 'tis a plain case the Doctrine of the Impugners of the Oath is condemned by that censure; not in generals, as the Oath, and Writings of the Defenders, but particularly and expressly. As great as the cry is against it, I do not know that so much can be said of the Doctrine of the Defenders. Their Books indeed are some of them condemned, and people guests they are condemned for that Doctrine. But till I see it, I can hardly believe this Proposition, The Pope cannot depose, which is the sum of their Doctrine, has ever been authentically censured for erroneous, contrary to the word of God, etc. And yet in so many Universities as there are in Christendom, it is much if there be not some ready enough to gratify the Pope in such a business, if he should desire it. But at Rome, where they understand the World better, I durst wager they neither have, nor will in haste, be Authors of such a censure themselves.  
Having already in the second Treatise met with the great mistake he talks of Sect. 77. I think I have said enough there to show it deserves not to be repeated. The rest has no difficulty. In the 78. he undertakes a business, with which if he can go through, he shall have it, by my consent, of all that ever writ against the Oath. 'Tis to show, That an Indirect, and conditional Power to depose Kings (which some ascribe to the Pope in certain cases) is not inconsistent with Prerogatives claimed by the French King, and confessed to be in the King of England. His reason is, because every King has an Indirect and conditional Power, or Right, to wage War against any other, and depose him, and absolve their Subjects from their Allegiance to him, if the War be just. And the Pope being a Temporal Prince as well as the rest, has the same Power, on Right which others have. I cannot tell which of the two is more surprising, the thing to be proved, or the proof. Those who have hitherto appeared for the Indirect Power, have derived it from the office of Supreme Pastor in the Pope; and the impossibility of executing it as it aught, without the power of deposing: and therefore, rejecting the Temporal Power of the Canonists, will needs persuade us it is Spiritual, even when it meddles with Temporals. This new Invention derives it from that rank which by time and accidents, outvie any Commission from Christ, Popes now a days hold on the World, and leaving the Pope, considers only the Temporal Prince. As if this were that, which the Defenders of Indirect Power ascribe to the Pope, or what he has in virtue of his Temporalties could be thought Spiritual. Poor St. Peter, and those Popes who were not Temporal Princes, are now quite out of doors; and methinks 'tis the oddest thing in the World, the Pope should claim as Successor to St. Peter, which has hitherto been the pretence, by an Argument which leaves St. Peter no claim at all. These variable Symptoms, in my opinion, make but a bad Prognostic for the Indirect Power. For sure it stands but totteringly, when people cannot tell on what bottom it stands, whether Spiritual or Temporal.  
The point itself has been discoursed before, and the equivocation is so obvious, that I wonder to see it return again. The power which Kings have over one another, signifies nothing but strength; and what he calls Right, is only Reason, which directs them when and how to use it. Such power and right as this every stronger man had over a weaker, when no man had power or right over another, in the state of Nature, before the foundations of Power and Right were settled. What is understood by that word, by those who are for the Indirect Power, implys a relation of Superior and Inferior, whereof one is to command, and the other obey in virtue of that command. So they say the Pope, as Supreme Pastor, has the relation of a Shepherd to his Sheep, and Kings belonging to the flock as well as private men, may command them as well as others. And thus much even Catholic Kings confess to be true, if his power be confined to that notion in which he is Pastor. But the Indirect-power-men extend it to Temporals, and say it belongs to the office of Supreme Pastor to dispose of his Sheep in things wherein they are not his Sheep. Whether they say well, or ill, which is not now our Question, they plainly maintain a relation of Superiority, and make the Pope's Power consist in it. That this Power is inconsistent with the Prerogatives of Sovereign Princes, he has saved me the labour of showing, by making the Power, which he says is not inconsistent, another thing: And though he had not, 'tis plain that Sovereignty is not compatible with a Superior. There remains only to be considered, in which of the two senses the word Power is understood in the Oath of Allegiance.  
And this, I conceive, so clear, that I should be content to put it to this Gentleman himself. For I cannot believe he thinks so extravagantly of the Framers of the Oath, that they ever dreamt of obliging us to swear, that the Pope cannot drive our, or any King, out of his Kingdom, if he be strong enough. He cannot think those who take it so wicked, as to swear that cannot be done, which they know as well as he, may be done, whenever the Pope comes to be stronger than the King, and will employ his strength that way. He cannot think the wisdom of a Nation, which for their own sake he should not think altogether foolish, should solemnly vote, and oblige all to swear, a Foreign Prince cannot assemble an Army strong enough to overpower us, and think of keeping it out by Oaths and Acts of Parliament. The Oath seems plainly enough to explicate the Power, which it renounces, of Authoritative Power, by the word Authority joined to it: but though it had not, I cannot see how it can be understood otherwise, without a very highly prejudiced animosity against the Oath, to say not more.  
I, but the Proposition is negative, and by consequence denies all Power whatsoever. As if the words were not always to be understood secundum subjectam materiam as they call it, according to the matter of which they speak, whether the Proposition be Negative or Affirmative. No man is immortal, is a Negative Proposition, and very true, though after the resurrection all men are immortal. He who should make this exception when every body knows of what men the Proposition speaks, would be thought a Caviller for his pains. Again, All men breath, is a true Affirmative; and yet Children in their Mother's womb, and painted men breathe not. And painted men (for of children there is no difficulty) are as truly men, as the power of Temporal Princes is the Deposing Power the Oath speaks of. But all this difference may be easily compounded. Let him but swear, and that only according to his Conscience and the best of his Judgement, that the Pope has no power to Depose, with a plain declaration that he means not by his Oath to exclude any power which the Pope has, as a Temporal Prince, but only that which some ascribe to him as Head of the Church, and I am much mistaken in Protestants, if they do not accept his Oath, and desire not more. But if he refuses this, people, I suspect, will be apt to think what he says here is not that which truly sticks, and that 'tis with the Oath, as Sir John Suckling's Watch, so it be wound up, no matter by what hand or trick.  
As to the Question he cannot but ask, Sect. 79. I must acknowledge my ignorance. I understand not Kingcraft, and the Laws of Peace and War enough, to be able to answer it, and resolve him whether Religion be a just cause of War. I think Divines are not agreed about it, and I have the lesle curiosity to study the point, because I apprehended it not a jot material. For that a King may be dispossessed by the Pope, either alone, or leagued with others, is, I conceive, as much as needs to his purpose. Whether the War be just, or unjust imports not; and if it did, it is plain there are other causes, besides Religion, which make a War just, and every body knows the Pope, being a Temporal Prince, may interpose in any War he pleases upon any just account, as any other Temporal Prince may interpose in a War for Religion as well as he. To gratify this Gentleman than, I will allow that Religion may be a just cause of War; That the Pope may interpose in it all the ways he has thought of; in short, I will grant all he asks, and take the Liberty to believe any man notwithstanding may safely swear, The Pope neither by himself, nor with any other, ha● any Power, or Authority to Depose our King, or Authorise any Foreign Prince to invade or annoyed Him or his Countries.  
I have already said why the Power, in virtue whereof Princes make War upon one another, and the Deposition ensuing, cannot be the Power and Deposition renounced by the Oath. There remains only to consider, whether Invoking be Authorising; which I cannot but wonder he would so far strain his credit with his Readers as to obtrude upon them. Many are Authorised themselves, and know by experience what the word means; the rest know it, as well as they, even by not being in Authority. All see that who is Authorised, is, by being so, enabled to do something which before he could not do, and which those cannot who are not authorised. A Justice can examine and commit men, a Judge try and condemn them; and so every Officer whether Civil or Military, can act as he is empowr'd by his Commission, as long as it lasts; and when it expires or is recalled, they can do those things not longer. Now 'tis plain, a Prince who is Invoked by the Pope, or any body else, (for others may Invoke as well as he) can do nothing which he could not do before he was Invoked, and which he might not have done, if he pleased, whether he had been Invoked or no. He gets neither Men, nor Money, nor Arms, nor any increase of Power to make War. Neither does Invocation make the quarrel just. There was either breach of Treaty, or Religion, if you will, or some other of the causes which makes War just, which Invocation does not put, but found, and urges the Prince to proceed upon. If there were not, he is plainly called to an unjust War; if there were, he might have justly undertaken it without any body's Invocation.  
Manifestly than, Authorising is giving another some power which he had not before: Invoking is only soliciting him to use the power he has of himself. Which being so, as every body sees it is, there is no shadow of reason, why the Liberty which the Pope has, and others have as well as he, of Invoking, should hinder us from swearing, he cannot Authorise a Foreign Prince to invade the King. And so if you will grant this Gentleman, that the power by which Temporal Princes proceed against one another, is the Power of the successor of St. Peter, and that to solicit one of them to use this power, is to give it him, he has than something to say against the Oath of Allegiance. But since we cannot but see they are as different as may be, and yet not more different from one another than from the meaning of the Oath, we cannot but wonder how he should light on such scruples himself, and more, how he should offer them to us for satisfaction.  
The 80 th'. consideration tells us, that every Church or Kingdom has not the same Privileges or Liberties which are granted to the Gallican Church by particular concessions of the Pope, or contract, or otherwise: as if the Rights in question were claimed by grant from the Pope, or Sovereigns held of any but God, or could, without ceasing to be Sovereigns. They may derive their Liberties from whence they please in France; the Crown of England is, and at all times has been free in all things touching the Regality of the same, and in no Earthly subjection to any but God, says the Law of England. But neither is it true, that the French look upon their Liberties, as Privileges for which they are beholding to the Pope. A little Treatise of the Liberties of the Gallican Church, Printed by Patisson, 1594. with Licence from the Parliament of Paris, lays for a foundation, that what their Father's ca●●● the Liberties of the Gallican Church, are not favours, or exorbitant Privileges, but rather natural Franchises, Freedoms, or common Rights, of which there needs be shown no other Title than Possession, and natural enjoyment. Again, Those which are commonly called the Liberties of the Church of France, says another, are not Privileges granted by the Pope, but in truth consist in this, That the Church of France has not received divers Papal constitutions made within Four hundred years, etc. So that it seems the French know the difference betwixt Privileges and Natural Liberties well enough. Whether they do or not, we know what we have received from our Catholic Ancestors, and which, by this Gentleman's favour, we mean to transmit to our posterity; let him and the French agreed about it as they can. Mean time I leave his Privileges to those whom they concern, as they do not us, even by his own confession.  
For he tells us at last, We have the same liberty which the French have, in relation to our present debate. And than to what purpose are the Liberties of other Nations brought into Question, or our own in other matters? But since liberty is given to the English to maintain that the Pope has no power to Depose Kings, I will take the liberty to say, they are also at liberty to maintain the Oath of Allegiance. For these Treatises have made it pretty manifest, that nothing material can be brought against it, but the renouncing that Power. And yet we shall hardly take the liberty to maintain Truth, for a Privilege.  
He proceeds to tell us, that though they might take such an Oath as ours in France, if they had it to take, yet we in England might not for several reasons. The first insisted on Sect. 81. is, because we may prudently suspect it made out of hatred and contempt of the Roman Church, the Papal Dignity, and the Pope's Supremacy in Spirituals; which because they could not so easily bring Catholics to deny explicitly, they intent to make them do implicitly, under a colour of Civil Loyalty. I never pretended much to Prudence, and doubt I never shall, if it be Prudence to give way to private suspicions, against the declarations of public Authority, and to fancy we know their meaning better than they themselves. Since the Framers of the Oath plainly tell us the end they had in it, I should never have thought it prudent to suspect it was not their end. Neither can I understand the cunning of that trick, by which he would make them go about to trepan us into an implicit denial of the Pope's Supremacy in Spirituals. For what would Protestants get by it? They know well enough, that though they should have inveigled us into an acknowledgement of something implicitly inconsistent with the Pope's Spiritual Supremacy, there would not be a Papist the lesle for all that. For when ever this implicit inconsistency should come to be unfolded, and we urged to renounce that Supremacy, we should desire them to excuse us; and tell them, whatever the words may import beyond our intentions, we meant no such matter, and stick to our Supremacy still. They know those who take the Oath do it, as well as those who refuse it: and while we all profess, and stand to it, to think they should fancy by a trick to make us all renounce it, and turn Protestants against our wills, and without our knowledge, is a suspicion which, if it have any prudence, I think has but little reason.  
But where lies the prudence of suspecting that the Oath was made in contempt of the Pope? The Framers, says he, specify no other Temporal Prince, though there be as much need of securing our Loyalty against them, as the Pope. As if every body did not know the Oath was framed upon occasion of a Treason proceeding from a misapprehension of the Pope's Power, not of other Princes. If those Powers were passed by, of which they stood in no fear, and provision made against that, from which they had newly scaped so imminent a danger, must the Papal dignity be therefore suspected to be contemned? Rather other Princes would be thought contemned, as unregarded and unmentioned; but to stand in fear of the Pope, is no sign of contempt. However it be, he despises not Watermens sure, who takes no care of Boats, and what may save from drowning, when the only danger is from Fire.  
I, but 'tis manifest, that this was the design of the Parliament: For they would have inserted in the Oath a Renunciation of the Pope's power to Excommunicate. That people should not agreed in manifest things! I cannot for my life but think the contrary manifest. For if having a will to insert such a Clause infer having such a Design, not having a will to insert it, infers not having that design. And, I think; nothing can be more manifest, than that they had not a will to insert it, when they left it out. By what means they came to be changed, whether by King James, or any other motive, imports not. It is enough that they were changed, when they perfected the Act, and had not the Will, which he says they had, and therefore had not the Design, which he infers from that William. Notwithstanding, he will needs have enough remaining to make us prudently suspect the Oath was contrived in contempt of the Papal dignity. Not so prudently, I doubt, unless he would tell us what this enough is. Otherwise I should think we may prudently suspect, there is no such thing at all, since he, who makes it his business, can found none. But than, it is a constant opinion among Divines, that we are bound to refuse a thing, though indifferent in itself, when 'tis required in contempt of a lawful Dignity. Suppose it be, where is the contempt of lawful dignity? He has not proved so much as that it can be prudently suspected. To assume at last confidently that it is, and than run away with it, is by his favour a little too much.  
I verily think, he might prudently enough have spared the whole Consideration. It proceeds all upon suspicions, no very good foundation at best. But to make them show a little more handsomely, he calls them Prudent; and this prudent in truth signifies ungrounded. For there is not one so much as likely reason of suspicion. And, when he had done, fairly takes for granted, more than he went about to prove, and knocks it on the head with Authority. And this in his Language is Particular Reasons, and Prudent. Suspicions.  
For a second Reason, the distinctive sign returns upon the Stage, Sect. 82. as far as I see only to act the same part over again, there being little added or altered. He will not have the Oath intended by the Framers, to distinguish Loyal Catholics from others; because, The Title makes no such distinction, and the Title he supposes was put in by those who framed the Act to declare their Intention. I should never have thought this matter had been worth repeating. By the Act was intended to discover and suppress Popish Recusants, and this intention is declared in the Title, and but too much pursued in the body of it. In the same Act is inserted an Oath to distinguish Catholics: and though this intention be as plainly expressed as the other, this Gentleman would hear us in hand there is no such matter, because it is not expressed in the same place. There needs great power in rhetoric to persuade us that Lawmakers may not explain themselves where they think fit; and more in Logic to conclude efficaciously that their meaning is not their meaning, only because it appears not just where he would have it.  
His second reason why the Oath cannot be intended to distinguish Catholics, is because we might say the same of distinctive signs instituted by Pagan Emperors, viz. That they likewise were to distinguish Loyal Christians. As if every thing could be said of every thing; and the Oath could not be intended to distinguish Catholics, because Pagans' intended to make Christians turn Pagans'. For the distinctive signs he speaks of were indeed such, and who complied with them, was, both by Pagans' and Christians, thought to renounce Christianity. For they were generally to worship, or sacrifice to Idols; which whoever consented to do, did in the opinion both of Pagans' and Christians, become a Pagan. And when they aspersed Christians with disloyalty, every body saw the aspersion was unjust, and that what they required, to make them pass for Loyal, was that they should cease to be Christians. Now every body sees that the Oath of Allegiance is not a distinctive sign, since every body sees that who takes it, is not thought lesle a Catholic, either by Protestants or Catholics, than he was before, or than he who refuses it. So that I cannot but wonder to see Catholics, who remain Catholics when they do what Protestants require, paralleled with Christians, who did not remain Christians when they yielded to what Pagans' required.  
His third reason is, because Protestants are persuaded that the very Principles of our Religion are inconsistent with civil Allegiance. Among intelligent Protestants I hope there are not many who are so persuaded. But be it as it will, this persuasion of theirs is it true or false? I hope he will not say it is true, for the scandal it is to Religion, which must of necessity be false, and need no second Argument to be proved so, if it be indeed inconsistent with Allegiance, which is manifestly a duty enjoined by Religion. If it be, as▪ undoubtedly it is, false, they should do well to lay their hands on their Hearts, and consider on the account they have to make to▪ God, who have contributed to a persuasion so scandalous. I wish the Authors of these Treatises be not concerned. To say nothing of the first, who makes the not-deposing Doctrine flatly erroneous in Faith; this last goes farther in this point, than he was perhaps ware of, at lest than I know how to answer to a good Conscience. For he would have the Pope obeyed in this matter before the King; and that, since Religion is the Sphere of the Pope's activity, is to say, that this matter belongs to Religion; which I fear contributes but too much to that persuasion. However it be, since Protestants cannot be so persuaded, but by being persuaded first, that deposing; Doctrine belongs to Religion, I conceive it is the duty of every good Catholic to unperswade them as fast as he can, and not suffer an aspersion so scandalous, and so unjust to lie upon his Religion.  
Peradventure, no Defender of the Oath has brought a stronger Argument for the taking of it, than this zeal against it. For 'tis plain, that no pretence of Authority, or any thing else can bear us out in any thing to the prejudice of Religion; and 'tis plain, that Religion is prejudiced, by being exposed to the scandal of teaching Doctrine inconsistent with Allegiance. If the deposing Doctrine be inconsistent with Allegiance, and taught by our Religion; 'tis also plain that our Religion teaches Doctrine inconsistent with Allegiance. Wherhfore, unless it can be made out that 'tis not inconsistent with Allegiance, 'tis plainly the duty of a good Catholic to renounce it, when he is legally required. And since it appears, by the unsuccessful endeavours of these Treatises, that there is no rational exception against the Oath but because it renounces that Doctrine, every good Catholic not only may, but aught take it. For to refuse it, being to refuse renouncing that Doctrine, exposes his Religion to the scandal mentioned, for which there neither is, nor can be any warrantable pretence.  
The two following Sections only repeat things formerly said; save that there is a little touch in the first concerning the Jansenists, who, I think, have not much to do with our Oath. Yet their case, and ours, may in one respect be like enough. We have seen them a good while traduced for Heretics, and a mighty bustle made about them, and people alarmed with fearful dangers hanging over the Church; and now we see the same men, persisting in the same sentiments, acknowledged and treated as very good Catholics. So it may very well hap with the Defenders of the Oath; who for all the past heats, and present Zeal against them, may one day, without any change in their judgements, be as good Catholics as the best. In the mean time this suspicion of his, of the Jansenists adhering to the five Propositions, methinks is pleasant, when they have often enough declared to the World what they hold in that matter, and put it passed guessing, and suspecting.  
In the 85 Section there are several matters scattered, most, in my opinion, not extraordinarily material. What he would be at, is, that whatever is produced out of France is of little or no force to justify the taking our Oath. As if it were nothing towards the justification of renouncing a Doctrine by the Oath, that the same Doctrine is irreprehensibly renounced by Catholics in the face of the World. His reason is, because it may prudently be thought that what the English do, may proceed from indignation against the Pope, and a design to bring of Catholics by little and little from his obedience, which cannot be suspected of the French. I have already said why I conceive those thoughts are not very prudent. But though they were, as long as this suspected indignation and design requires no more than may be done with a safe conscience, I cannot think our suspicions can warrant us to disobey our lawful Magistrate, when we may with a safe conscience obey. Besides, it is not for Subjects to pry into the Commands of their lawful Superiors, but guide themselves by what appears in public. The Intention legally declared, is all the Intention of which we are to take notice. If they secretly harbour any other in their breasts, it is between God and their own consciences, in which we are not concerned. Now the Intention legally declared, being to distinguish Loyal Catholics from others, we not only may, but aught comply with this Intention, since nothing can be more evidently unreasonable than that we should expose ourselves to a just suspicion of Disloyalty, and our Religion to the scandal of obliging us so to do. The only difficulty is, whether what they require to this end, be consistent with our duty to God. Who are satisfied it is, cannot but be satisfied it is their duty to give the testimony of Loyalty, which is legally required, and can never answer it to a good conscience to forbear it, for fear of groundlessly suspected, and not appearing intentions.  
For the rest, I understand neither Casuistry nor Law enough, to know whether the case he puts, of two holding by the same unjust Title, one legally condemned, the other not, be well resolved. But I am apt to suspect, that he holds with no very good conscience, who holds by a Title declared unjust. And for what he adds, that 'tis not reasonable the English should expect the same liberty with the French, I think it not worth the while to examine whether it be reasonable or no. But methinks it is something cross to tell us, a few Paragraphs before, that we have the same liberty with the French, and now, that 'tis unreasonable we should.  
The approbation of some Sorbon Doctors, which he mentions Sect. 86 and 87, is a secret to me, as well as him. And I have the lesle curiosity to inquire after it, because I suspect, by his niceness in stating the case, it is not likely to pass with him, whatever it be. Nor do I think any thing can be so clear, as to scape such exceptions as he has already taken. And so being come to an end of this matter, I must follow his example, and apologise for detaining the Reader so long about it. For whatever this Gentleman think, I conceive it not so very material, as valuing one good Argument, which discovers the truth of the thing, above twenty approbations, even of So●bon Doctors. But yet if I had said nothing, people might have been apt to suspect it had been for want of something to say.  
To my great comfort we are now at the last Objection, which strives first to put them out of credit who are for the Oath. Of these he says, Sect. 89. that the Pope gives them a bad character. He had spoken to purpose, if he had shown they deserve it; for if they do not, they have but the more wrong. The King gives as bad a character of those of the other side; and yet this Gentleman, I believe, thinks ne'er a whit the worse of them. Whatever is said of them, they were conscientious men who took the Oath, and that is all the Objection says.  
Sect. 90. He tells us, that actually the Superiors of the Clergy, and of the Religious Orders in England, unanimously judge the Oath aught not be taken, and publicly profess they are of this Judgement. If he have Commission to speak for those Gentlemen, he would do well to produce it. I have the lesle temptation to believe him on his word, because he formerly undertook for Protestants more than, I believe, they stand to, and because he tells us here their profession is public; which if it were, other people methinks might know it as well as himself; and I, for my part, never heard of any such matter. All I can say is, that if the Superiors of the Clergy judge as he says they do, they degenerate from their Predecessors. For the Superior in the time of King James, approved and took the Oath, and admonished both Clergy and Laity to follow his Example. And the Irish Remonstrance was approved by the Superior at that time, which is so near the Oath of Allegiance, that I cannot think he would have disapproved the Oath, if it had been put to him. Of the Superiors of Orders, unless I could meet with the public profession he talks of, I can say nothing. Only I think it no impossible thing, that they should approve something disapproved at Rome, because it actually happened in the three Propositions. But I think it but reasonable they should speak for themselves, and we not be put to learn their sense from others.  
The following Section remains in generals, without applying any thing to the particular case. Had he gone about to evince there is something doubtful in the Oath, which he says is so easy to do, there had been something to answer. Now I can only say, that people, unless they have scruples put in their heads, do not use to doubt of their own steadfast Persuasions, and those they swear in the Oath.  
The 92 Section confidently vouches all the Divines and Canonists for 500 years, as granted to be on his side by his Adversaries. And this is both disproven before, and manifestly false, even by the confession of our Adversaries. For the Author of the former Treatise builds his whole discourse on this ground, that Schoolmen have been wrangling about this matter 500 years ago, and may do so for aught he knows 500 years hence. And certainly they are not very well agreed who wrangle. Than he goes on descanting on his false ground, till he comes to ask why Bellarmin, and those of his side, may not as prudently be thought to have seen as far as Withrington and his Cabal. Comparisons, they say, are odious; and however, his prudent thoughts, I conceive, make little towards Truth or Falsehood. When he shows that Bellarmin and the rest have brought convincing proofs for what they say, we shall be all of his prudent persuasion. In the mean time we must beg his permission to think a bad Argument is a bad Argument, whoever makes it, and that the greatest men have their failings. Nor can we think it prudent, when we see those great men, once in their lives, are out of the story, for their sakes to take wrong for right.  
Sect. 93. He tells us, that Preston, as he is informed, never took the Oath, nor persuaded any man to take it. What than? no more have twenty others, nor indeed any man, to whom it has not been offered. He himself, I fancy, has never refused it; though I know not why he should, if he have no better reasons than he has put into his Treatise. What's all this to purpose? And for persuading others, Preston did his endeavour to satisfy all men that it might be taken, as he has, that it may not. Moore persuasion than this it is a praise to Preston that he used not. For who goes about by earnestness and pretended Zeal to work upon people farther than their Judgement leads them, discovers more addiction to the thing, than good will to them, and is a Counsellor of whom they aught beware.  
But the same Author grants the Pope has Authority to order and direct the Temporal Affairs of Princes, and says, the Controversy is only concerning Coercive Power. I mistake that Author if he do not grant the Pope a Coercive Power too, provided that Coercion be Spiritual. But this, he says, is contrary to the Article of Sorbon, which denys the Pope has any Authority over the Temporals of Princes. As if the Sorbon, or any body in his wits, ever dreamt of denying the Pope might command a sinner, though a Prince, to abstain from Wine, or Women, or restore Goods unjustly gotten, or relieve the extreme Necessity of his Neighbour with Alms, etc. Every Ghostly Father has such power over his Penitent. Can any man fancy it ever came into the head of the Sorbon, that the Pope could not do as much as a Ghostly Father? Now Wine, and Women, and Money being plainly Temporal things, 'tis plain the Authority of the Pope extends to Temporal things, and that not only by way of Direction, but Coercion too. For the sinner who refuses to obey his Directions, may be delivered over to Satan by him, and with Spiritual Punishments forced into repentance. So much, I think, not Catholic denys.  
Apply this now to our case, and stating it with all the advantage that can be to the Pope, the utmost which I apprehended can be said, is, That he may Judge a Prince abuses his Temporal Government to the ruin of his own Soul, and hazard of many others: and in care of those Souls command him to altar, or leave of his Government, which is incompatible with his Salvation: and in case of refusal, draw his Spiritual Sword, and use it against him. The Pope when he judges thus, may be in the right, and he may be in the wrong. If he be in the right, the Prince who refuses to obey him, hazards or ruins his Soul; for which he is to answer to Almighty God, from whose Justice no worldly greatness can free any man. But he is accountable to no body else, according to the Doctrine of the best Masters of Christianity. Nor can the Pope take his Kingdom, or any Temporal thing else from him against his will, not more than he can break open the Cellars, or Houses of the sinners before mentioned, and break their Vessels, and let out their Wine, and carry away their Money, unless in virtue of his Temporal Authority where he has it; or than the Ghostly Father, who enjoins his Penitent a Discipline which he will not take, can himself whip him by force. If the Pope be in the wrong, all he does is Clavae errante, and he is to answer to God for his mistaking proceed; and the Prince does well to refuse his Directions, and stand out his Coertions. Whether of the two be in the right, is all one to Subjects. For they are still to stand by their Prince, who whether virtuous or vicious is still their Prince, and by the Law of God still to be obeyed in matters belonging to Civil Government. How right soever the Pope may otherwise judge, when he would altar the frame of the Commonwealth, and disturb the public Peace, and dispossess their King by force, there they are sure he is in the wrong, and may, and must stand even by a vicious Prince against him, and cannot answer it to God and a good Conscience if they do otherwise.  
This, I think, is the Authority which Withrington and his Associates grant the Pope over the Temporals even of Princes; which what service it will do this Gentleman, we must expect to see. He tells us, Sect. 94. They will allow the Pope not more than may evidently be deduced out of Scripture. This is a close bob, as if they thought the Scripture alone, to be the Rule of Faith, when yet he knows they do not. Indeed they expect from him, who will have what is attributed to the Pope, pass for Faith, that he should prove it from Scripture, or Tradition; or some way by which Faith may be proved. Otherwise they are not so severe, and will be content with any proof, which is indeed a proof. But to let pass this gentle touch,  
If the Pope, says he, may justly in some cases, and in order to the Spiritual good of a Nation, command a King to desist from persecuting his Subjects upon the score of Religion, or otherwise lay down his Government. What this caution of some cases serves for, I cannot guests; while he speaks but of one case, that of Persecution. In this case, I will allow the Pope may command a King, and that justly, to desist from persecution, and if there be no other means to save his Soul, to lay down the Government too. All that will follow is, that the King who refuses to obey, sins against God and his own Soul, and shall one day accounted to the severe Justice of God for it. So I may very justly command my Son, who spends his Life in debauches, to desist from his debauches, and pass over his Estate, if he cannot abstain from abusing it to his own perdition, to his Brother. And I may disinherit him, if it lie in my power. But if the Estate be settled on him, I cannot take it away, neither can I knock him on the Head, but must endure the mischief, which I cannot remedy, as well as I can; and leave my unreclaimable Son to God and the Laws of the Land. Not more can our Spiritual Father the Pope, take any Temporal Estate away from an offending Spiritual Child, unless it be held by a Temporal Tenure of the Pope; but must content himself with the satisfaction of having done all in his power to reclaim him, and leave the rest to God's Providence and Justice. What will come of this?  
And if, says this Gentleman next, the Pope justly may prohibit his Subjects, in case he goes on in persecuting them upon that account, to bear him civil Allegiance: This by his favour the Pope may justly do in no case. He may justly, and laudably use all the power God has given him, to 'cause a persecuting Prince to desist from persecution. But God has given him no power to forbidden that Prince's Subjects from paying him what is his due. Subjects have nothing to do with the Conscience of their Prince, nor does it any way import them, whether the Pope be in the right when he commands their King, or the King when he refuses to obey. Till he quit his Throne, whether he do well or ill to keep it, he is still their King: and if the Pope forbidden them to bear him civil Allegiance, he forbids what is manifestly commanded by the Law of God: nor can they obey him without disobeying God. What if they be persecuted? That is no such novelty among Christians, that people should be to seek what is their duty, when the case happens. We have the instructions of our Divine Master, not to forbear Civil Allegiance, but, to rejoice and exult, and remember the plentiful reward prepared for those who suffer persecution for Justice. We have the example of our Holy Ancestors, who when they were commanded to stand to their Arms, to fight against this or that Nation, obeyed; when to worship, or offer Incense to Idols, preferred God before Man. The harm of persecution is truly to the persecutors; the persecuted are in a blessed condition, and assured they are so by the Oracle of Infallible Truth. If any thing turn them out of this way, and make them forfeit their great hopes, by refusing to obey God in Man, and possess their Souls in patience, that, and not persecution does them harm. However it be, that the Pope may forbidden Subjects to bear civil Allegiance, because he may forbidden Kings to persecute, is what I can by no means allow, and what I wonder to see assumed.  
And yet I wonder more at his conclusion. How than, says he, can they swear that notwithstanding any sentence made or granted, or to be made and granted, by the Pope or his Authority, against their Prince, they will bear him true Allegiance? This in a Catholic, the first I think that ever excepted against this branch of the Oath, I see not only with wonder, but with extreme grief. Will he have it thought the Allegiance of Catholics depends on sentences made or to be made by the Pope, and that they cannot swear the contrary? This clause says no more than what the most scrupulous voluntarily offer; no more than what himself offers in this very Treatise. For one branch of his Form professed to bear true Allegiance to the King, and defend him against all attempts by any person whatsoever, under whatsoever pretence. This I take to signify, notwithstanding any sentence made, or to be made. I will hope he meant to speak, not to the thing, but to his Adversaries; not to deny the clause might be sworn, but to show it could not be sworn by them according to their Principles. And this may be some excuse for him, but none for what he says. For if that Clause be inconsistent with the Principles even of the Defenders of the Oath, 'tis much more with those of the Impugners; since these allow the Pope more Authority over the Temporals of Princes than the other; and would stretch that Authority to authorising their Subjects against them, which the other plainly deny. Catholics by this account, would be at a fine pass with his Zeal for their satisfaction, unable either of one side or the other, to swear more Allegiance than pleases the Pope. As to the thing itself I have spoken already, and declared that Subjects are unconcerned in the contests betwixt the Pope and their Sovereigns, and obliged by the Law of God to stand by them, and defend the public peace and safety, whatever the quarrel be on which they fell out.  
The 95 Sect. tells us, That Bellarmin affirms no more of the Pope's Power than the Author of the Questions seems to grant. Why than the Author of the Questions was in the wrong as well as Bellarmin, and there is an end of the story. But yet they seem not to me to say altogether the same. Bellarmin, if I be rightly informed, puts a standing Power in the Pope, derived from Christ, and included in his Universal Pastorship, to Depose Princes as often as he judges the necessity of the Church requires it, and acting by the Authority of a Superior over an Inferior. The Author gives the Pope not more Power to Depose Princes, than Princes to Depose Popes, or any man to Depose either. In short, he would have it lawful for any man to do any good which he can do, and which is absolutely necessary to be done. The Power by which they act in such cases is, according to him, equivocally Power, importing no Authority, or Superiority, but only strength and reason to use it; such a power as I have over my Neighbour's life, over which I have and can swear I have no power. Whether what this Author says be true or not, which is another Question, 'tis plain enough, that 'tis not the same which Bellarmin says And though it should excuse a Pope, when in virtue of it he Deposes a Prince, (which if it do, it will also excuse a Prince, or any man else who Deposes a Pope;) yet it concerns not Subjects. They are still to defend their Prince to the uttermost of their power; let the necessity be what it will, which sets the Pope against him.  
To make way for some Arguments, by confuting of which he means to show the weakness of his Adversaries, the 96 Sect. assumes, That when the ground, whereon an Author proceeds, is manifestly false or inconclusive, no account is to be made of the Opinion or Judgement of such an Author. In this I think he is much in the right; though I suspect it will hardly please your Extrinsick-probability-men. For Extrinsic probability, if I mistake it not, consists in the number and reputation of Authors, as Intrinsic Probability in the weight of Reasons. If we must not longer value Names, but look after Arguments, I doubt it will go hard with Extrinsic Probability, and the Muster Roles of great Names be much shortened. But let what will come of it, as long as what he says is true, I cannot but be for him. Now this Plea of his, denys not what is alleged in the Objection, that there are many of Learning and Conscience who defend the lawfulness of the Oath, but contends the allegation is frivolous. And truly I never looked upon it as otherwise valuable, than for the satisfaction of those, who will not be content without Crutches, even though their own Legs be sound. I am very glad he will have it tried out by the Merits of the Cause, which I think much the better, and indeed only efficacious method.  
From hence he takes his rise to examine the Arguments of the Defenders of the Oath. But this pains, I think, might have been spared, because it belongs not to the Defenders to make Arguments. That task belongs to the Impugners; whose Arguments if the Defenders can show to be inconclusive, it imports not what they are which they make themselves, nor whether they make any or no. Kings were Kings, before there were Popes. They had right to the Allegiance of their Subjects from the Law of Nature and Reason, before Christ came into the World. When he came, he confirmed that right by his Law, and those who obeyed his Law by their practice; till in after Ages pretences were made, in behalf of the Pope, to control that right in certain emergencies. These pretences must be proved, if it be expected they should pass: nor have those who deny them, any more to do, than to show they are not proved. The right of Kings needs not more proof, than my right to my Estate, in which the Law will maintain me, till he who claims it, can make out a good Title. Wherhfore this Gentleman's labour in this particular is all useless; The Pope being never the better, if those who speak for King's discourse weakly, unless they discourse convincingly who speak for him: and it being nothing to purpose whether their Arguments be good, who do more than they need if they argue at all. Notwithstanding let us see what he says.  
For the common reason, and ground of his Adversaries, the 97. Sect. puts this position: That a mere Spiritual Power, such as is only granted the Pope over all Christendom, in no case possible, does extend itself to any Temporal thing. As common as he makes this reason, I suspect there are very few among his Adversaries who say it: neither is it true, when it is said. That Temporal punishments cannot be inflicted by a mere Spiritual power; by force, and against the will of him who is punished, some of them do say, and endeavour to prove: but that Spiritual power, does not at all extend itself to Temporals, should be put for their ground; whom before, and in the very next Sect. he acknowledges to confess the contrary, is a little surprising. I think it superfluous and tedious to speak again of this matter, of which I have so lately declared my sense, and so have only to observe what will come of it.  
This Reason, he says, does not show that the Pope, as Temporal Prince of Rome, has not an Indirect Right and Power to depose Kings in some cases, such a Power being inherent to every Sovereign Prince. He is in the right. This reason if he will call it so, indeed shows no such thing, and 'twere strange it should, and the Pope's Temporal power, or any Right belonging to it, be shockt by a reason which meddles only with the Spiritual. Neither does he deal very kindly with his Adversaries, to make them suspected of discoursing so extravagantly.  
But whatever that Reason do, it has been already shown that Sovereign Princes have no inherent right, or power over one another (meaning by those words what is ordinarily, and the Oath meant by them) though every body knows they can make War, upon, and dispossess one another when they are strong enough. Wherhfore, the Pope may keep his Temporal power, and do with it all that Temporal power can do; for any thing his Adversaries, or the Oath have to do with it. Which being a point sufficiently discoursed already, I see no reason to discourse it over again.  
In the following Sections he sets himself to prove, that mere Spiritual power may in some cases extend itself to Temporal things; I know not to what purpose, when he says his Adversaries confess it. They are not like to be in favour with him in haste, if saying just what he would have them, will not content him. Moore words about a point agreed on both sides, seems little better than chat; and yet the crossness of his Discourse will keep me a little longer than needs. I cannot but wonder to see, always in the same period, that Christ and his Apostles either had not, or at lest did not exercise Temporal power while they lived, and did use Temporal both of them: Christ against the buyers and sellers, and St. Peter against Ananias and Sapphira. For their Death too, I think he makes an effect of Temporal power. Again, that Excommunication takes away all civil Communication, though due by the Law of Nature. I cannot tell whether Civil, and Nature be well coupled, but 'tis the first time I have heard that bore Excommunication, abstracting from the Temporal Laws, deprives a Man of any thing due by the Law of Nature, or even of the Land. A Servant must pay him the service he owes, a Child the duty, a Debtor the debts, etc. only Spiritual goods, the Sacraments and the like are taken away, or rather suspended, till Repentance. And those who need not keep him company, unless they please, are admonished to abstain from it, for his sake and their own; to preserve themselves from the infection of his wickedness, and reclaim him by shame. What besides follows▪ Excommunication, is I think refunded into Temporal Laws and Temporal power.  
The Confessiarius whom he brings in Sect. 99 is one of whom his Adversaries make use to declare their sense of Spiritual power, viz. that it extends itself to directing and enjoining that Temporals be used according to the Law of God, and punishing the obstinate refuser by withholding Spiritual goods. Farther than, which 'tis plain, the Confessarius cannot go, nor as they conceive, the Popes. And this Gentleman says nothing to the contrary. Neither does he show what Service the Wife will do him, who cannot live with her Husband without eminent danger of Perdition. She is undoubtedly free by the express Law of God, and by the Law of Nature, which endures no tye absolutely inconsistent with the final and only good. But yet, if she will stay, and damn herself he does not go about to show that the Spiritual Power can take her away.  
The 100 Sect. tells us, That more Spiritual Crimes are punished with Temporal punishments in all Nations. Those Temporal punishments being plainly inflicted by Temporal Authority, is it possible that any thing should follow to the advantage of the Spiritual? And yet he concludes without more ado, That Protestants doubtless are not of opinion, that one cannot be Temporally punished, by a mere Spiritual Power, or upon a mere Spiritual account. Why but his case is of Spiritual crimes punished by Temporal Authority. Will he persuade us Protestants are of opinion that who is punished by the Temporal, is punished by mere Spiritual Power, and that there is no doubt to be made of it? Whatever he fancy of them, I must beg his good leave to believe, that Protestants are no such irrational people, and that neither they, nor any Man in his Wits can harbour an opinion so extravagant. Something I suppose he means by his, or upon ● mere Spiritual account, but what I cannot tell. Spiritual Power, and Spiritual Accounts, are plainly different things, which methinks it is not fair to tumble together. Let the account on which the Temporal power is exercised, be what it will, if it be Temporal Power which is exercised, I see not what mere Spiritual Power, of which he is talking, has to do in the case.  
Neither perhaps is so much true, that the Temporal Power, when it punishes what he calls merely Spiritual crimes, proceeds on a mere Spiritual Account. Heresy, and Apostasy, in which he instances, seldom become Universal without disturbance of the public peace, the preservation of which plainly belongs to the care of the Temporal Power, on a Temporal account. Blasphemy, his third instance, as plainly takes away the respect due to God, and with it the Aw of Divine Justice; and concern for the next Life. Who thinks the Temporal Power unconcerned in such things, had not reflected what ill living there would be, in a Commonwealth, where no Man's Oath, and much lesle his Word would be trusted. And manifestly there is no trust to be given to his Oath, who has no fear of God; and yet without Trust, civil Society, and Commerce, cannot be maintained. Generally, who considers that fear of Temporal punishments alone, is an unsafe, and no lasting support of Government (for those who have no other check will break the Laws as often as they can hope by Favour, or Power, or Artifice to scape those punishments) and that it is a great deal more easy, and more secure where people obey for Conscience, will found that, without relation to Spiritual accounts, the care of the public quiet, and safety, makes Governors concerned in the virtue of their Subjects, bad Men seldom proving good Members of the Commonwealth.  
The next Consideration is so crossly entangled, that I hardly know how to unravel it. He objects against himself, that Temporal Prince's enact such Laws against Spiritual Crimes as prejudicial to the Temporal good of their Subjects, or as empowered by several Titles allowed them to defend the Church, etc. The first of these is what I come from saying; what he means by the second, his several Titles, and by whom he would have them allowed I cannot guests, nor imagine what other Title there needs to provide against prejudice to the Temporal good of their Subjects, more than the Temporal power with which they are entrusted. But whatever he means, he would have it follow, that The Pope may deprive one of some Temporal thing (if nothing else do hinder it) when it is prejudicial to the Spiritual good of Christians: For he is invested also with several Titles, which enable him to direct the Temporals of Princes in order to their or their Subjects Spiritual, good. How many Titles he has I know not, and while one will serve turn, care not to inquire. By his Title of Universal Pastor, I conceive, he is empowered to direct the Temporals, even of Princes, to their Spiritual good; but I do not know that he is empowered by that Title, or any else to deprive them of their Temporals against their wills. To put Direction in the premises, and Deprivation in the conclusion is foul play.  
But he goes on: Because if a mere Temporal power can extend itself to the Temporal punishment of a mere Spiritual Crime (when it is prejudicial to the Temporal good, the Judgement of which Crime does not belong to the Temporal Court) why may not a mere Spiritual power enjoin in certain cases (if there be not some other obstacle) a Temporal punishment, or deprive of some Temporal thing, in order to a Spiritual end? The Execution of which punishment, and the Deprivation of which thing, belongs to the Temporal Prince. I, for my part, despair to unriddle how that Crime should be merely Spiritual, which is prejudicial to the Temporal good: and how the Temporal Court can be excluded from the cognizance of things prejudicial to Temporals. As also how a mere Spiritual power deprives one of a Temporal thing, when that deprivation is to be made, not by the Spiritual, but Temporal power. And more than all, how it will follow, that because a Temporal power can punish with a Temporal punishment, a Spiritual power can punish with a Temporal punishment too. I should have thought the direct contrary had followed, That as the Temporal power can punish even a Spiritual Crime with no other than a Temporal punishment, so the Spiritual can punish no crime with any other punishment than a Spiritual.  
The Case itself is plain enough if we could let it alone. Every body knows the same offence may, and most times does concern the care of both Powers: The Spiritual, as a breach of the Law of God; the Temporal, as harmful to the Commonwealth. Both may take cognizance of it, both proceed to sentence, and execution of that sentence, actual punishment. But than as the Powers are different, so are the Punishments: The Spiritual importing lesle, or suspension of Spiritual goods, and the Temporal of Temporal. This, I think, is in two intelligible words the whole business, and this his Adversaries not only grant but endeavour to prove. He may make his best on't when he thinks fit. In the mean time I see not what service the proceed of the Temporal power against what he calls mere Spiritual Crimes will do to the Spiritual power. And I doubt besides, his Zeal, and the heat of Argument has transported him a little beyond the bounds he had prescribed himself. He professes only to answer his Adversaries Arguments against deposition, but by no means to assert it himself; and yet makes an Argument, which, if it were true, would infer Deposition. For if mere Spiritual power can extend itself to the deprivation of Temporals, there will be no reason strong enough to confine it to this or that private case, and hinder it from extending this deprivation even to Kingdoms.  
To leave no stone unturned, Sect. 102. he tries what the Spiritual power will do, and what the Temporal again, but acting now not nothings but persons. Of the former he says, since the power of Excommunication (which is merely Spiritual) may punish mere Civil Crimes, why may not therefore, in like manner, a mere Spiritual power inflict Temporal punishment? This Question seems to answer itself. For Excommunication being a Spiritual punishment, and the power to inflict it Spiritual power: This is to ask in other terms, why a power to inflict Spiritual cannot inflict Temporal punishment? To which a body would think there needs no other Answer than the Question itself. Besides, I mightily suspect whether there be any mere Civil Crimes for Excommunication to punish, and if there be, whether mere Spiritual power have any thing to do with them. And yet if both were true, punishing a Civil Crime with a Spiritual punishment, is one thing, punishing the same Crime with a Temporal punishment, another; and these two things are so unlike, that I wonder what like manner he could fancy to infer one from the other.  
Of the second he says, since a mere Temporal power may punish Ecclesiastical Princes, why may not a mere Spiritual power punish Temporal persons. Truly I expected not he should subject Ecclesiastical Princes to the punishment of mere Temporal power in any case. To be as condescending as he, I will allow, that mere Spiritual power may punish Temporal persons: but when he adds, and with Temporal punishments, I must entreat him to excuse me, that addition being violently thrust in, without any pretence which can handsomely introduce it. Yet he does all he can, and is content, so he can but get it in, that it come in company of the Civil Magistrate. Now, I conceive, that what the Civil Magistrate does, is done by Civil Power. 'tis true, the Spiritual Magistrate may solicit the Civil to use his Civil Power; but 'tis plainly the Civil Power which is used by him, nor does the effect follow from Spiritual Power, but from him who has it; and who has it not may solicit the Civil Magistrate, and produce the effect as well as he. So that mere Spiritual Power does nothing at all in that case, how much soever he does who had it. And all the desire he has shown, and all the diligence he has used, to enable the Spiritual Power to inflict Temporal Punishments, serves but to show that False will not be True for any man's sake.  
The 103 Section tells us, the stoutest maintainers of the Oath cannot deny, but a Subject persecuted for Religion, and in imminent danger of persuasion may lawfully fly into a Foreign Country, according to the Gospel, Cum persecuti vos fuerint in una Civitate fugite in aliam. The maintainers of the Oath indeed are not so stout, as to deny an express Command of the Gospel, nor so irrational as to affirm, that what they see done every day for profit, and Temporal advantages, may not be done when it is necessary to Salvation. What than? His Spiritual directors may counsel, or enjoin him to fly. Very true, for the Law of God counsels and enjoins this before. And consequently such a man deprives his Prince, on a mere Spiritual account, of a natural born Subject, which belongs to the Temporalties of the Prince. The Prince is indeed deprived of a Subject, when that Subject, who has the warrant of God's Law for flying, will make use of the liberty he has. But what is this to the Spiritual Power? can the Spiritual Power spirit him away, if he will not go? or exempt him from the duty of a Subject, while he remains under the government of his Prince? If the Spiritual Power can do neither of these, I see not what pretence she can have to inflict Temporal punishments, from the liberty, and obligation a man has to obey the Law of God. It is also true, that Catholics, persuaded that the command of preferring God before Man, has place in their case, do venture to transgress several Laws of the Nation. But till he show how it is to purpose; an instance in which there is neither Spiritual, nor any Power Temporal, nor any Punishment, seems far enough from proving that the Spiritual Power can punish with Temporal Punishments.  
The 140 Section sums up the particulars, which his Instances, he says, evince. That Spiritual and Temporal things are not so vastly different that they cannot Interfare. This is the first News we have heard of Interfaring; of which, if he will have my Opinion, I conceive they are rather Spiritual and Temporal Persons, than Things, or Powers which Interfare. God who is the Author of both Powers never made them inconsistent. Wherhfore when any Interfaring happens, I think there is some fault, of one side or other, in the men who have the Powers; into which the Interfaring is to be refunded, not into any opposition in the nature of the Things. That it is not always unlawful to deprive one of a Temporal thing, on a mere Spiritual account. This indeed has been said before, but will not make to his purpose, though it be said over never so often. Whether that Temporal thing can be taken away by a mere Spiritual Power, is the question; what the account is, on which it is taken away, imports not. And the Spiritual Power has plainly nothing to do in the case, if it be the Temporal, which takes it away, though on a Spiritual account. That a mere Spiritual Power may in some cases extend itself to Temporal things. This being agreed before he began; why his Instances should be troubled about it, I cannot imagine. He knows, and confesses, the stout maintainers of the Oath are complaisant enough in this point. Where Temporals are abused contrary to the Law of God, They say the Spiritual Power may direct, and enjoin them to be used according to his Law, and punish the Transgressor's with punishments proper to that power; which is to say, that Spiritual Power does extend itself to Temporals. And sure there needs no rack of Arguments to make them confess, what they voluntarily avow. And consequently, that This (Viz. That Spiritual Power can in no case possible extend itself to Temporals) is no proof, that the Pope cannot Depose. He may please to tell them so, who say it is. The Maintainers of the Oath, who say it is not true, are far enough from making a proof on't.  
And so we are at an end of the first Objection; which I suspect will afford his Adversaries more cause of complaint, than satisfaction, or trouble to answer. If any one among them have made such an Argument, the rest have no reason to complain, if he and his Argument be baffled as much as this Gentleman pleases. But it seems not fair to obtrude upon them as the common reason of most of these Authors, what peradventure no one of them admits, and whereof he himself says they hold the contrary. Their Reasons and Arguments are no secrets. They may easily be taken, and how much soever they be confuted, cannot be disowned by the Authors. These which he makes for them to his knowledge they do disown, and to take pains to confute them, is little better than▪ to consult how he shall be punished who never committed the Fact. How well soever he can answer it them, for making them say what they do not say, I think it conduces little to his principal Design, the satisfaction of Catholics. For sure they will not receive much satisfaction by seeing a great deal of time spent in disproving what peradventure no body holds.  
The next Objection, Sect. 105. is a chip of the same block. He would have it common among his Advetsaries to infer, that because deposing Doctrine, or the unlawfulness of the Oath, is no Article of Faith, therefore one may lawfully take it. Such Arguments becoming only those who wear Fools Coats; he is a little too severe to pin them on his Adversaries. That the deposing Doctrine is no point of Faith; indeed they say, and they say also, that the Oath might be taken; but neither they nor any Man in his Wits, ever went about to infer one from tother.  
The 106. Sect. tells us what we know already, That the defenders of deposing Doctrine do not unanimously affirm, it is an Article of Faith. Truly 'tis bad enough that they do not unanimously affirm the contrary, and that those who do affirm it, should pretend to be Masters in Israel, and not know so much as what their Faith is. But some endeavour to prove it from Scripture as a mere Theological Truth; others from Prescription; others from Donation, or Agreement betwixt Catholic Princes. I thought they would not have gone lesle, than the Universal Pastor, and direct Commission from Christ. For those have been the Pleas perpetually insisted on in this suit. Now it seems they will be content to drive the nail that will go, and yield to any terms so they gain the point. It is some comfort yet to perceive that they themselves think not fit to trust the former Topics, when they fly to new ones, and such as are the most unlikely in the World to do them service. For there is little hope in Prescription where the point has always been contested, as this confessedly has, and that Princes should voluntarily give, or agreed away their Rights, is yet more desperate. He says the famous constitution of the Council of Lateran is alleged to this purpose; which is news to me. I think it is usually alleged to exalt the deposing Doctrine into Faith: to which purpose it is alleged by the Author of the first Treatise. If he think the back of the knife sharper than the edge, he may use it as he pleases. But in all appearance 'twil cut not better. That assent of the Ambassadors of Princes, which he mentions, seems to me a strong proof, that the Princes that sent them were not concerned in the Decree. For they were strange Ambassadors, if they assented to a Decree prejudicial to their Masters, without Commission; and they were stranger Princes, if they gave Commission to prejudice their own Rights. And though these strange things could be supposed, it yet remains to be considered whether such Commissions could validly be granted by those Princes, without the privity and consent of their Kingdoms, they having so much interest in the business. Wherhfore his unexpected allegation is a strong inducement to persuade one, that Sovereign Princes, as they are not expressed, so were never meant in the Constitution.  
It is not impossible, says he, Sect. 107. that Catholic Princes should make a League to attack him among them who should turn Heretic, etc. And what than? It is not impossible, therefore it is, is no better than 'Tis not Faith, therefore 'tis not true, as he would make his Adversaries argue. Tell us not what may be, but what is, if you will speak to purpose. And yet it were at lest something, if these Maybe's were a jot serviceable. But he tells us, that though such a League were made, and the Pope should declare upon it, and a Prince be deposed, this Prince would not be deposed in force of the Pope's Declaration, but of the Contract. Which is to say, that the Pope and the Oath have nothing to do with his not-impossible Case. And sure he might have spent his and our time more profitably, than to amuse us with such things which never were, and never will be, and which though they were, all would be just as if they were not. He concludes at last in the following Section, that the  Reason is manifestly false. Very right. And it is also manifestly false that any body ever took it for a Reason.  
And so he passes to what he calls another main Argument, and of which, he says, the Defenders of the Oath make great account. This Section 109 he proposes in this manner: That our Saviour came not into the World to deprive other men of their Temporal Dominions, much lesle Kings of their Kingdoms. For which he cries out of the Gospel, Regnum meum non est de hoc mundo, and out of a Hymn of the Church, Non eripit mortalia qui regna dat caelestia. Hence, says he, they infer that the Pope has no power, for his power must be immediately derived from Christ, whose Vicar he is. They do indeed make great account of the Gospel, and the Church; but I do not think they make any account of this Argument, or ever made it. They argue not from the end for which Christ came, but from the Power he thought fit to assume himself, and leave in the World after him to compass that end. This Power they have learned from him, and the Church, is not of this World, or such by which the things of this World are taken away; and this Power they deny the Pope, because Christ denied it of himself. Their Inference than is this; Christ had no such Power, therefore neither has the Pope. Christ came not to take away Kingdoms, therefore neither has the Pope cannot, or Christ could not, is an Inference of his own making, and he may do what he will with his own, save putting it on his Adversaries.  
Three things he has to say on this Subject. 1. That the Authority of Christ, and the Apostles, did in some cases extend itself to the deprivation of Temporals. Which, he says, has been proved. I wish he had said where. For as my memory is bad, I remember nothing but our Savior's casting the Buyers and Sellers out of the Temple, and the deaths of Ananias and Saphira, which were formerly mentioned to show that Christ and his Apostles used a Temporal Power, which, in the same place, he says, they did not use. If these passages be the proof he means, I must, before I can answer it, expect to see which way he will go about to contrive them into a proof. For of themselves they seem far enough from it.  
In the first case there was no deprivation of Temporals, that I perceive. The Money and Victims were not taken away, only the profanation of a holy place was hindered, and that miraculously. This, in the opinion of St. Hierom, being the greatest of Christ's Miracles. In the deaths of Ananias and Saphira I see not what share the Apostle had, more than a prophetical denouncing of a Judgement of God ready to fall upon their Avarice. Otherwise he did not cut their throats, or offer them any violence. Now 'tis passed my imagination, how Miracles, and no-deprivation, should do this Gentleman service.  
Secondly, that this consequence, Christ had no such Power, therefore the Pope has it not, is null, because since Christ's time, the Pope is become a Temporal Prince. Very true: but this consequence is good, Christ had no such Power, therefore the Pope has it not purely from Christ, which is all the consequence his Adversaries make. And so much he himself grants, by acknowledging this Temporal Sovereignty was granted by Temporal Princes, or otherwise acquired. And for the rest, I have often declared that the Oath meddles not with the Temporal Power either of the Pope, or any other Prince.  
Thirdly, That the Scripture and Hymn cited, do not prove, that our Saviour had no Authority in some extraordinary case, to deprive Kings of their Dominions. The Butter, it seems would not hold out to the Bread, it is so thin spread. Otherwise it needed not to have been made one Head, that 'tis manifestly false, and another, that 'tis not proved. Proofs are superfluous where things are manifest. Neither did any Man, that I know, ever deny that Christ had Authority in extraordinary, and ordinary, and all cases, to dispose of Kingdoms, and all Nature too, as he pleased. He was God, and might do what he would with his Creatures. But speaking of that ordinary power which he thought fit to assume as Man, and establish in the Church after him, what ails the Scripture and Hymn cited, that they may not pass for a proof?  
A body would expect this should be shown by what follows; but for aught I perceive, he may expect long enough, and get nothing at last. God, says this Gentleman, has not given me this life to kill my Neighbour; yet I may sometimes unblameable do it. The King was not made King to take away from other Princes their Dominions: yet may, if otherwise he cannot defend his own. What than? This is to say, one may use the power which he has, more ways than one. For who actually kills his Neighbour, has certainly power to kill him; and who dispossesses another Prince, power to dispossess him. But, whether Christ, in the forementioned respects, had power to deprive Kings of their Dominions, or not, is the question; to which nothing is said, by saying that if he had it, he might use it several ways. What else he adds, is of the same strain, altogether wide of the mark, and which I think the Reader will need not more than his own eyes, to see is so.  
In the 110. Sect. he objects against himself, that the cases alleged by him, may be attributed to an extraordinary power in Christ and his Apostles, not derived by succession to the Pope. To this he answers, that all the cases alleged are not such, instancing in the power of depriving a Man of civil conversation by Excommunation, and separating a Husband from his Wife, inherent in the Pope according to his ordinary Jurisdiction. This is surprising, nor can I imagine which way instances of ordinary power in the Pope, should prove the instances alleged did not proceed from extraordinary power in Christ. He is to show there intervened no extraordinary power in his instances of the buyers, and sellers, and Ananias, and Saphira; if he will speak to the purpose. No body denies the power of Excommunication was ordinary and derived from Christ. The question is, of the power of deposition. And that I should think will hardly be proved to be ordinary, by this, that the power of Excommunication is so.  
He adds that the forementioned Instances do show, that though Christ's Power upon Earth was merely Spiritual, and his Kingdom not of this World, yet he exercised sometimes his power over Temporals, which was the main intent for which they were brought. Truly he needed not have put himself to the trouble of bringing any for that intent. For that Spiritual power may be exercised over Temporals, no body denies. But 'tis denied that any instance he has, or can bring, proves that the mere Spiritual and ordinary power of Christ extended to deprive Kings of their Kingdoms. When he has proved this by his instances, he will indeed have done his business, and something more. For he will have proved too, that Christ's power on Earth was not merely Spiritual, and that his Kingdom was of this World.  
Finally, he says, that it is a very extraordinary case, for Popes to depose Kings, and even (which is much lesle) to Excommunicate them. And the deposing Men say, the Pope has received that power only for extraordinary cases. As if it were to purpose what the case is, when we are talking of the Power. If the Power be ordinary, it is to be feared the Case may prove but too ordinary one day. For it is no such extraordinary thing for a Prince to do, what some of the maintainers of deposing Doctrine say, is a just cause of deposition. But letting that pass, I would only know how this, which he says here, makes to his purpose. He was to show that there was no extraordinary power in the instances by him alleged. Whether the cases, in which some say the Pope may depose, be this or that, ordinary or extraordinary, to my apprehension contributes nothing towards showing, that the Power of Christ and his Apostles, in his instances, was not extraordinary.  
Sect. 111. He cannot but reflect upon his Adversaries. Reflections in my opinion, are not so very necessary towards the satisfaction of people's Consciences, but that they might be well enough spared. Yet 'tis not to be expected, his Adversaries should scape them, if they have deserved them. Let us see how rational they are. They require, says he, that the Kings dethroning Power be shown out of Scripture. This I have met with, and answered before. It is not true that they absolutely require Scripture proof. They require proof from Scripture, or some other Topick, by which Faith may be proved, from those who will have the dethroning power Faith: and from those who will have it True, they require such a proof as may make it appear True. And this I think is rational. But to impose upon them, that nothing will serve their turn but Scripture proof: to traduce them for making Scripture the only rule of Faith: and than cry them down for Heretics: is not fair play. And I must needs think their Conduct more rational than his Reflection.  
If, says he farther, the deposing Men produce out of Scripture several Instances to prove that Christ and his Apostles Power did extend itself sometimes to Temporals; than they answer, that such cases were extraordinary, and consequently aught not be brought as proofs of any such power in the Pope. This is in short, we can make no Argument, which our ill natured Adversaries will not make a shift to answer; a wondered rational complaint without doubt. Twist your Ropes stronger if you will have them hold, or if you cannot, complain of yourselves, and your rotten materials, and not of your Adversaries. Men are stubborn now a days, and will not be held by Threads which they can break. Yet he complains on, That though Christ had deposed never so many Kings, the same Answer, by flying▪ to extraordinary power, would put them all of. And this is just the Shepherd's quarrel, who fell to cuffs whose flock should first pass the Bridge, if there had been one, when all the while there was none. Christ never deposed a King in his Life: what have we to do to examine whether he had acted by an ordinary, or extraordinary power if he had?  
The truth is, all this is empty common place work. That Christ was God as well as Man, and had extraordinary and miraculous, as well as ordinary power, and might, and did use now the one, now the other, as he pleased; this Gentleman with all his reflections will not deny. People may be in the right, and they may be in the wrong, when they attribute effects to either power. But that right and wrong cannot be determined, but by descending to particulars. Since it is manifest that Christ did use extraordinary power; it is manifest his Adversaries may have reason to attribute an effect to extraordinary power, unless he show in particular that it proceeded from ordinary. To talk in generals, is to shoot at random, make a noise, and hit no body, unless by chance. The trick of enlarging on common places is sometimes used in Rhetoric, for Amplification; but if it stay in the may be, and come not to the Is, it is insipid, and and hardly passable even there. When people are in search of concerning truths, there is no place for it.  
The 112. Sect. mentions for another reason of his Adversaries, that, before the time of Gregory VII▪ there was no precedent of deposition. I fear this Gentleman, whom I cannot suspect of dissembling what he thinks makes against him, has not himself examined matters so carefully, as those whom he concludes destitute of all rational motives, and moved to stand out only by Ignorance, and Obstinacy. However it happens, no one of their reasons has hitherto been urged home. This is the fairest put of any; For 'tis at lest the Truth, but yet it is not the whole Truth. Want of Precedents is not the only thing alleged. They allege besides, that none of the Fathers taught deposition, and not only so, but that many of them taught Doctrine absolutely inconsistent with it. And they conceive that a Doctrine neither practised nor taught, for 10 whole Ages, in which too the contrary was irreprehensibly taught, cannot be a Doctrine of the Church. For this Topick reaches not farther. Who will notwithstanding stand up for the Truth of it, may do so, and be heard, and do wonders, if he can, with his Argument. In the mean time, what has this Gentleman to say to the Reason objected?  
He says, It is not solid. First, because those who ground the Deposing Power upon Prescription or Agreement made between Princes, can easily answer, that in the time of the Pagan Emperors there was no such Prescription or Argument made. And we can as easily reply, that there never was any since. Till Time, and Place, and Persons be specified; The Princes named who agreed away their Rights; The Commissions and Instructions produced, by which their Ambassadors were empowered to pass them away; The Nations shown, in which the Prescription had place, and the Agreement was observed; in fine▪ till all particulars be proved, which in a matter of this consequence aught be proved; I doubt the Reason will appear more solid than the Answer. This Prescription, and Agreement is a Fancy, which I do not remember to have met with any where but in these Papers, and which if I had not met with there, I should hardly have believed could have entered into a sober Head. I cannot look upon it otherwise tha● as a twig of a drowning man, and so I leave it with a flat denial.  
Secondly, because, since Deposition was to be put in execution by the help of some Christian Prince, there was not for a long time any Christian Prince at all, or any one so powerful that could put it in Execution. This Answer is not more solid than the other. For there were Christian Princes enough, and powerful enough, betwixt Constantin and Gregory VII, if their help were so absolutely necessary. But I see not what need there was of them, as long as there were Christian Subjects. For why might not they have served turn in case of necessity? Let but Subjects universally withdraw their Obedience, and their Prince shall be Deposed, though there be never another, besides himself, in the World. Now if the Pope could absolve them from their Allegiance, and oblige them to withdraw their Obedience, he might have put his Deposing Power in practice often enough, and never stayed for the help of a Christian Prince. For 'tis plain there were Christian Subjects enough in the World before Gregory VII.  
Thirdly, because 'tis no good Argument, such a Power was not exercised till such a time, therefore there was no such Power till such a time. Truly it is not very good, and while he has the making of his Adversaries Arguments, none ever shall, for aught I see. I suspect his Adversaries would hardly take that Conclusion, though he should willingly give it them, and much lesle take pains to settle it. For to say, There was no such Power till such a time, is almost to say, that at, or after such a time there was, which they are far enough from allowing. But though they would admit the conclusion, I can hardly think, as ignorant as he makes them, they would deduce it from an Antecedent which manifestly infers it not. The Exercise of a Power may several ways be superseded, without prejudice to the Power. The Case may not hap, in which it is to be exercised: or, if it do, it may be accompanied with Circumstances which tender the exercise improper, etc. But yet, I fancy, the Shop affords good Ware, if people would choose it.  
Put for the Antecedent, That such a Power was neither exercised nor taught in the Church, before such a time, and I conceive it follows, That such a Power was never taught by Christ. This Consequence, even bating that the contrary was taught in the Church, whoever will deny, must, I fear, be forced to grant, that the Church was no faithful Depositary of the Doctrine delivered to her by Christ. For if she did preserve the sacred Depositum entire, and Deposing Doctrine were not found in her store-house, 'tis manifest that Deposing was never put into it.  
Again, Suppose his Adversaries should desire to know of this Gentleman, whether in those times in which they neither exercised, nor taught any such Power, he thinks they knew of any such Power? If he thinks they did, it will be expected he should declare what Motives he has to think so, and from whence he can gather that knowledge in the Church, but from their Actions or Words. If he thinks they did not, it will be required he should show, how those in after Ages came to know what was not known in the former. 'Tis manifest they could not learn it, when there were no Masters who knew, and could teach it. And so there remains nothing to be said, that I can see, but that they found it out of themselves. Now let him take along with him, that the Power in question pretends to be derived from Christ, and than consider how he will answer it to Catholic Principles, to make a point pretended to be derived from Christ, known to be derived from him, otherwise than by the continued attestation of Ages succeeding one another.  
I forbear to urge farther, because it is not my part to Argue. But when to this is added, that Doctrine incompatible with Deposition was publicly, and irreprehensibly, and I had almost said universally taught by the Fathers; That the Case and Circumstances happened more than once before the time of Gregory VII, in which, if the Church had known of any such Power entrusted with her by Christ, she was hardly excusable for not using it; and what else the Topick affords, to those who would sift it, I think his Adversaries have reason to set a value upon it, and him no ill friend to his cause in touching it with tenderness. He talks besides of Excommunicating nominatim, as if there were mystery in it, and of calling General Councils, both which serving only to prove, that a Power need not always be exercised, I think I may leave untouched.  
The 115 Section closes up this point with what he calls another Reason; which is, that the Authors (he impugns) cannot understand the difference between the Direct, and the Indirect Power. I must confess I am as dull as those he speaks of. But I have so great a curiosity to understand something of this matter, that I will not delay my satisfaction, by staying to ask so much as, of what this is a Reason. Though otherwise, not to understand, seems but an odd Reason for any thing. He gins with acknowledging, that if a Prince be really Deposed, the Effect is the same, whether he was Deposed by a Direct or Indirect Power. Now methinks it bodes ill, that they confessedly agreed in the Effect. For that being the thing in which the Impugners are most concerned, 'tis to be feared that other differences will not prove to satisfaction; Airy Quelque choose being as little proper to satisfy the hunger of Truth, as of Food. However let us see them, such as they are.  
For, says he, certainly 'tis harder, more extraordinary, and more skill is required to strike a set mark by Bricol than by a direct stroke. This For comes in abruptly, and makes me suspect an Error in the Press. The meaning, I suppose, is, that Indirect Deposing Power is put in execution with more difficulty than Direct. And if he would show but so much, it were something, though but little to the security of Princes. For if they may be Deposed as often as difficulties may be overcome, their condition is but tottering. But why is there more difficulty in the practice of the one, than of the other? what more pains, or more skill, or more extraordinary cause goes to the Indirect, than the Direct? Till he show us where this greater difficulty lies, there appears no difference even as to the easiness; though when there does, it will not, as I said before, be much to purpose. For difficult things are brought to pass every day; nor can a Prince be Deposed even by the Direct Power, without great, and not ordinarily overcome Difficulty.  
But there is moreover a vast difference, and that so palpable, that sure these Authors could not choose but perceive it. I know not why he should think those Authors were blind, or kept their eyes shut. Some who read them I am sure think otherwise. But let them pass, and let us see, or feel this difference, if it be so palpable. Is there not a great difference between the Power his Majesty has to Depose, or recall a Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, and to Depose a Foreign Prince, when he cannot otherwise defend his Subjects? And so between several other Powers he mentions. Certainly such Powers are very different; and as different is a Direct or Absolute Power, from an Indirect or Conditional Power only to Depose Princes. How! Absolute and Conditional? why should they thrust in where they have nothing to do? Pray let them stand by, till they are called. Our business is with Direct and Indirect. And Bellarmin tells us, that Indirect (speaking of the matter in hand, the Pope's power to Depose) is per se, and properly Spiritual, and is referred Directly to Spirituals, as the primary Object; but Indirectly, that is, in order to Spirituals, reductively, etc. regards Temporals, as a secondary Object, etc. And than Direct must needs be a Power per se, and properly Temporal, and which is referred directly as to Temporals the primary Object. 'Tis betwixt these two we would gladly see a difference, and a difference (in the words of the Author from whom he borrowed the Bricol) as to some real effect of Government, and which has influence on Human Affairs. And he, when he comes to show us a vast and palpable difference betwixt these two, tells us of a difference betwixt two others, and being asked of Direct and Indirect, answers of Absolute and Conditional. They are blind indeed who cannot see a difference betwixt Absolute and Conditional: but they must be more than ordinarily quick-sighted, who can see the difference betwixt them, is a difference betwixt Powers which are not they.  
This is not to show, but to make a difference; and that by a method, by which any body may found, or make a difference any where. For allow the dullest man that is, the liberty to altar the notions of words, and I shall wonder much if sameness itself escape a difference. And yet when all is done, it had even as good have been let alone. By confounding Direct with Absolute, and Indirect with Conditional he makes but a hard shift to leap out of the Frying pan into the Fire. He may indeed avoid the importunity of being Duned for a difference, but people will be importance still. For Conditional Power to Depose, signifying Power to depose in certain conditions, or cases: We who think power to depose in any case, prejudicial to Princes and Civil Government, shall still be importune to know, how power to depose in some, and those peradventure many; and often happening cases, is not prejudicial.  
He tells us next, that Direct or Absolute Power is inconsistent with the Sovereignty of Princes, but not Indirect or Conditional. With the perplexing confusion of these Powers I am at a loss to which in particular I should direct my Answer, and could found in my heart to turn it of, with desiring him to prove what he says. For it is unreasonable, his bore word should carry a matter of this importance. But yet I will tell him, why I conceive he cannot prove it of any. A Sovereign signifies one who has no power on Earth above him, in those things in which he is Sovereign. Who puts a power on Earth, which can take away this Sovereign's power over those things, puts a power on Earth above him, and makes him not-Soveraign. Call this power how you will, if it be above him, it is inconsistent with Sovereignty. Let it be only Conditional, or such which operates only in certain cases, still it will be power above him in these cases, and in those cases he will not be Sovereign. Wherhfore Direct and Indirect, are equally inconsistent with Sovereignty, Absolute more, Conditional lesle, but all inconsistent. And it was not amiss in him, never to go about giving a reason for an assertion, for which no reason can be given.  
He goes on saying, That a direct and absolute Power is easily, often, and many times at the mere pleasure of him that is invested therewith, put in execution: whereas a pure Indirect Power is seldom reduced to practice, and in some extravagant case only. And 'tis true, that in other cases Direct and Absolute Powers are practised often enough. But speaking of the matter in hand, viz. deposing, neither Direct nor Indirect power is often practised. For which the World is beholding, not to any difference betwixt the powers, but to itself which acknowledges neither. Otherwise why may not the Indirect be practised as often, and as easily, and as much at pleasure as the Direct? For few of those who make the deposing power Direct, make it so Absolute, that there needs no cause to its exercise. And there needs but cause for the exercise of the Indirect. And when this cause, or extravagant case happens (which by the way is not so extravagant but that it occurs often) it may set the one a work as well, and every jot as easily, as the other.  
But Hence he deduces, That the Indirect Power is not inconsistent with the security of Princes, nor with the Duty, and Respect due unto them. Whence pray? from what follows I suppose. For I see nothing before, from whence he can induce it. For certainly, says he, one Prince may be secure of another; and yet every Prince has an Indirect Power to depose any other Sovereign, in case it be necessary for the defence of his own Subjects. Why Indirect, I beseech you? For I should think that every Prince, who has Justice on his side, has very Direct Power to make, and prosecute War against another Prince, as far as he sees needful. But letting that pass, what this Gentleman says, in other words, is this. One Prince may be secure of another, while that other has no power to depose him. For till it become necessary for the defence of his own Subjects, it is supposed he cannot, or has not power to do it. But than, if the first can depose him, the last certainly is not secure. Apply this now to the Pope, and 'tis to say, that Princes are secure of the Pope while the Pope has no power to depose them. Or if you will say, he has Power all the while, only he cannot Exercise it till than, I see not how ●he case is altered, otherwise than notionally, and therefore will not meddle with the subtlety. As to any real effect, Power which cannot be exercised, either is not Power, or equivalent. Still it remains, that Princes are not secure, when the Pope has a Power, which can be exercised. And this is an excellent proof of the consistence of Indirect Power wi●h the security of Princes, which as soon as it can operate, they are not secure.  
He mentions in the last place, the security with which people walk the streets, when yet every. Man has Indirect Power to kill any one, who unjustly attacks him. As if there were any Indirectness in the case, when I direct my Sword to another Man's breast, and run him directly through. 'Tis lawless power this Gentleman means. For indeed we could not walk the streets securely, if we might hap to meet a Man, who might freely kill any body in his way. But such kind of Power, I think, was never fancied in the Pope. Those who give him most, allow him not, with what they call Direct and Absolute Power, to depose a Prince for nothing. But, when the something which they require, happens it may set the Indirect Power a work as well as the Direct, nor has a Prince any more security against the one, than the other.  
Sect. 116. He undertakes to clear the Indirect Power, even from the imputation of want of Respect to Princes. Fond Parents sometimes look more after neatness, and manners in their Children than Health. I think it would have been time enough to have considered how mannerly his Doctrine is, when we had been agreed of the soundness. But he will needs tell us, That Catholic Divines (without being charged therefore with disrespect towards him) affirm more of the Pope in this point, than of mere Temporal Princes. For they openly defend, that should the Pope become an Heretic, he would, ipso facto, cease to be Pope. Which they do not affirm of a King, since even Bellarmin and Peron are not of opinion that a Prince can be deposed merely because he is an Heretic, unless moreover he does endeavour to pervert his Subjects. What Catholic Divines affirm or deny of the Pope, and whether they be respectful or disrespectful to him, is nothing to the question of respect due to mere Temporal Princes. But will he pass his word for the truth of what he says? will he permit us to vouch him, if we affirm that they are not Catholic Divines who say, that a King by Heresy ipso facto ceases to be King? Bellarmin and Peron, he says, are not of that opinion. What than, if others be? Those others may carry it against Bellarmin and Peron, for any thing he says to the contrary; nor can I imagine what respect, or service Princes can expect from their Subjects, by citing Bellarmin and Peron.  
Besides, what they say is purely gratis. Allow their Arguments conclude a Power to Depose in one Case, and they will conclude for a hundred. With Perversion, Heresy, and with Heresy all the rest will crowd in, in spite of all prevention. So that there is no way but to keep the Doors fast shut, and give entrance to none. But this concerns the Security of Princes, not the Respect due to them, of which alone I thought he would have spoken. For what concerns that matter, I see nothing but that, since Divines are not held disrespectful to the Pope, for saying he ceases ipso facto to be Pope by Heresy, they are not to be held disrespectful to Princes who say lesle of them. Since he speaks only of these, I forbear to observe that the Argument would justify, for this matter of respect, those too who say more. But I cannot understand, while this lesle, which is said of Princes, is enough to take their Kingdoms sometimes from them, how the Opinion is extraordinary respectful. For sure dispossessed Princes will not be much respected, or at lest not so much as they were before. In the close, he starts away to Swearing again; of which he repeats a little of what has been said before, and than gathers, in the next Section, what he would have, into a Conclusion. Which I leave to the Readers Judgement, being glad myself to come, on any Terms, to a Conclusion of so tedious a business.  
What remains to the end of the Book is so little material, that I cannot but grudge the small pains I mean to take about it. Sect. 118. he objects the Example of such Catholics as have taken the Oath: a Topick on which I should not lay much stress. For since Ill aught not be done by Example, and Good aught to be done without it, Example seems either needless, or useless, and Good or Bad the only pertinent Considerations. Notwithstanding, it being a Comfort to travel these roads in the company of men of Learning and Conscience, that Comfort is afforded by the Example. For after he has said all he can, they were known to be learned and conscientious men who took the Oath. His Exceptions are a great deal weaker than the Topick. All amount to this, that the Takers may have proceeded on this, or that slight ground. Which, till he show that they did do so, is chatting, not disputing. All is pure groundless suspicion, to which I conceive it neither Charitable, nor Reasonable to harken. For any body may causelessly suspect every body. Besides, when they have themselves declared the Motives on which they proceeded, I know not what can be more vain than to fancy other Motives for them.  
As for the Tricks which Section 121. and in those which follow, he assigns for the Takers Motives, he may keep them if he please, for those who value or use them. The Takers are more plain dealing people. They are persuaded it is their Duty to take the Oath, and they are so persuaded, because they know Allegiance is commanded by the Law of God; and see nothing in the Oath but Profession of that Allegiance. Those subtleties of which he talks, suit not with the Candour of their Conduct. Yet I cannot but wonder, that distinguishing betwixt Malum per se and Malum quia Prohibitum, he makes it an imputation to proceed on supposal of the latter, when all his business is to fright people from the Oath, because it is forbidden. Sure he has forgot his own Argument. Were there any Malum in se in the Oath, as, he says, has been shown above, methinks I might have found it; for I looked for it as carefully as I could. Sure I am, his grounding the unlawfulness of the Oath upon the Prohibition, and his learned Syllogism to prove it, might have been spared. For Ill is not to be done, whether it be forbidden by the Pope or no. Than for the fear he is in Sect. 124. lest people should think that the Direct power only is excluded by the Oath, and the care he takes to show that the Indirect is excluded too, he may please not to trouble himself with that matter. For we readily acknowledge that All Deposing power is excluded by the Oath, by what name soever called, so it be truly Authoritative Deposing Power. For of strength, or the power of Temporal Princes, the Oath speaks not. And in that sense we understand and take the Oath.  
Sect. 126. He objects, That should the Oath be understood in the Latitude pretended, (viz. of the Power of Temporal Princes) the Protestants themselves, who take it, would be manifest Perjurers. For they would swear in taking this Oath, that the Pope is not Sovereign Temporal Prince of Rome. To this he answers, Sect. 127. That all Catholics must confess, that whoever takes the Oath of Supremacy does swear false; and consequently, that those Protestants, who framed and took it, were manifest Perjurers. And therefore Sect. 128. it is no wonder if Protestants, out of Indignation towards Catholics, should frame such an Oath of Allegiance, that even they themselves could not take it without being perjured.  
It is not for me to undertake the defence of Protestants, nor do I believe they would trust their concerns in my hands. But because this matter serves to clear the sense of the Oath, I am obliged to say something, and must needs say I never met with any thing more unreasonable. In places where an Heretic is as strange a Monster as a Papist here, if such extravagancies be sometimes blurted out, the wonder is not great. But that One who lives among them, and sees, with all their Errors and all their Faults, (as there is no Catholic Country in which there are not bad men too) there are many who fear God and his Judgements, and live in hopes of Salvation, should fancy such things of them, is what I never thought I should have found in a sober man.  
I, but they are manifest Perjurers by taking the Oath of Supremacy. Pray be a little more charitable, if you please, and content yourself with thinking, that what they swear is false. But conclude not they are therefore manifest Perjurers. For Perjury signifies a Lie sworn, and every Falsehood is not a Lye. What Protestants swear, they take to be True. Whatever he think of them, I shall never believe their Conscience will suffer them to swear what they know to be false. Nay, though they had no Conscience, mere worldly respects would preserve them from so foul a stain. For they would become the scorn of all their Neighbours: nor would any Treat, or Commerce with them, since none could confided in any Agreements, how strongly soever ratified, made with people who should solemnly swear, and by Law oblige their Subjects to swear what all knew to be false. Wherhfore this fancy of his, besides uncharitable, is as irrational as can be. And it remains evident, that the Oath cannot be understood in the Latitude pretended; viz. of the power of Temporal Princes: since Protestants know, as well as He, that the Pope is, and for some Ages has been, in possession of the Power of a Temporal Prince, and would swear what themselves knew to be false, if they swore according to the sense which he so groundlessly pins upon the Oath.  
At last he concludes, that the example of Catholics who have taken the Oath, as grounding themselves upon palpable mistakes and misinformations, cannot be a prudent motive for others to take it, etc. What work might he make, who had a mind to it, with promises, which have nothing, but may be they were mistaken and misinformed there, and a Conclusion which infers, (justly he says) that actually they were mistaken and misinformed, and that palpably. But I shall leave it untouched to the Reader. When all is done, they were honest men who took the Oath, and they were not Fools. By this Gentleman's favour, there were good grounds, on which they may have proceeded if they would. And I, for my part, think there is more Reason to believe they did proceed on good grounds, than Justice in suspecting they did the contrary.  
The next Consideration, Section 130. is concerning the Authority of the Ancient Fathers, of which he speaks of and on, and so as to leave it doubtful to what he would finally trust. Sometimes he would have it thought the Fathers are for him, because Bellarmin, and those of his side, cite Councils and Fathers, as well as Withrington, and his fellows. And there is as much reason to believe Bellarmin as Withrington. I think so too: but till they agreed on the matter, I think there is more reason to believe neither, but take the pains to look on the Fathers ourselves, and judge as we found. I suppose they intent we should do so, when they cite the Fathers. And I suppose too, that if he thought the Fathers were indeed on his side, he would stand to it, and never trouble himself with other Answers to the Objection.  
But he thought it not fit to put the matter upon this Issue, and after he had faintly insinuated thus much, proceeds to bear us in hand it is no great matter what the Father's thought, since the Judgement of ancient Lawyers will little avail a man in a suit at Law, which the moderns determine against them; and that the ancient Fathers are not to be alleged for an Opinion condemned by the Church or Pope. This is upon the matter to confess, or at lest much to fear, that the Authority of the Fathers, such as it is, is against him. Yet till that point be plainly agreed, I think it improper to spend time in examining how far it is to be valued. But, I conceive, that Children, as bad as the World is, have so much reverence to Parents, that they will be apt, say what he can, to be led by them. I am not very well satisfied to see him equal the Condemnation of the Church and Pope, betwixt whom, unless he be for Personal Infallibility, methinks he should allow some difference. Besides, the Doctrine of the Oath of Allegiance has not been condemned so much as by any Pope. The Oath indeed has in general Terms; but no Pope, that I know, ever has, nor, I believe, ever will condemn the not-Deposing Doctrine particularly. For, I think, he will not allege the Dictatus Papae. But let these matters pass.  
The main exception against the Fathers seems to be, that they speak not clear enough to silence all reply. If they be against deposing Power, they are not therefore for every part of the Oath, at lest to such a degree, that we may positively swear them all; If against deposing Power, in one sense, yet not in another; If against Direct, not against Indirect, etc. As if it could be expected, or were ever pretended, from the Fathers, that they should damn up every winding of a Meander, which was not so much as sprung in their days. While they lived, it never entered into the head of any Man, that there was such a thing as deposing Power in the World. If they must stand by unregarded, till they have unravelled every subtle intricacy, with which a question, woven since their death, is perplexed, they are like to have little to do with the business.  
That which is pretended from them is, that what they did teach, is irreconcilable with what has been taught since, of deposing, which way soever disguized. And this divers, and in particular Charon, think they have evidently shown. This Gentleman would make us believe he can do wonders against Charon if he pleased. Nevertheless, the Book remains unanswered; and till those gross mistakes, he talks of, be laid open, there is no great reason to believe Charon would delude his Readers with Forgeries, and yet direct them where they are to be found. For he quotes particularly enough. Not but that there may be very well more than one mistake in him: but could this Gentleman show he were out in the main, and did not prove as much as is necessary, I think it would have been worth his pains to have done it. If he be so scanted of Time, he might at lest more usefully have employed on that Subject, the Time he has spent on this Treatise. For let him say what he will, the Fathers are men of esteem in the World, and 'twould be for his advantage if he could draw them over to his party.  
Lastly, He asks if it be not the unanimous consent of the ancient Fathers, that we are bound to afford at lest an exterior obedience to the Pope's express Commands, in matters appertaining to him, if the compliance with them be not manifestly sinful. I suspect that Question was as little thought of by the Fathers, as Deposing. But I am confident, if it had been asked them, they would never, with unanimous consent, allow the Pope to forbidden a thing, which has a necessary connexion with what they, with unanimous consent, taught to be the Law of God. Or if he did, that his Command is to be obeyed. But this is the old dish, served up again with a new sauce of the Fathers, and I am now cloyed with it.  
Section 136. He gins to dispute the Probability of the Opinion which asserts the Lawfulness of the Oath, and says first, That an express Declaration or Prohibition of the Church or Pope, renders a thing practically improbable, which of itself, and prescinding from the Prohibition, is probably or certainly lawful. I conceive that more than this is true, and that such a Prohibition renders a thing, lawful before, not only practically improbable, but certainly unlawful. But than by Lawful is meant a thing left at liberty by the Law of God, or not contrary to it. Such things are rendered unlawful, when they are forbidden by human Laws. If you mean by Lawful, what the case requires should be meant, commanded by the Law of God, there is no Authority on Earth which can make such a thing unlawful. And though there were, according to this Gentleman, it has not been exercised in our case. For, he says, the Breves which make the Oath unlawful, are Declaratory. And Declaratory Precepts, he knows, do not make things unlawful, but only declare them to be so. But 'tis as I foresaw at first it would be. The unlawfulness varies, according to occasion. Here the Prohibition makes the Oath unlawful, and a few Paragraphs before, he quarrels at his Adversaries for thinking the Oath Malum quia prohibitum. I hope he will not quarrel too with me for making him say, that the Breves make the Oath unlawful, while he only says, they make it practically improbable, that 'tis lawful to take it. For I take these two be the same, since we cannot do what is not at lest probably lawful. And than practically improbable, and unlawful as to practise is all one.  
Section 137. He says, That it is not probable, nor credible, that the maintainers of the Oath would have made (as they did) their applications to the Pope, to the end he might give sentence of the Lawfulness thereof, and whether it did contain any thing contrary to Faith, or not, had they not been persuaded, that the Decision of these matters appertained to him. And that it was ridiculous to refer themselves to the Pope's judgement, if they were resolved not to submit, even exteriorly, to his judgement, in case he should give sentence against them, as he did. As if it were not a great deal lesle probable, and lesle credible, and more ridiculous, they should apply themselves to the Pope for a decision of matters, which he had decided already. For these applications were not made, till after the Breves were come out, by which they knew the Pope's sense of things well enough without needing to importune him for that matter. That for which they applied themselves to the Pope, was to entreat him to hear both sides, and not rely 
Supplic. Withring. ad Paul. V in his Disp. Theolog. de Jurament● Fidelitatis.  altogether on the Information of one: To instruct them, in pursuance of his Pastoral care, what those many things were, which the Oath contains contrary to Faith and Salvation, or at lest to let them know One of the Many; To receive the maintainers of the Oath into his favour, if after examination of their Reasons, he should perceive they had incurred his displeasure without cause. In short, to do them Justice, and either make known all, or some of the things, for 
Copy of Withringtons Purgation and Supplication in his last rejoinder to Fitzherbert.  which he condemned their Writings, or recall his Condemnation, etc. Whether these Petitions were reasonable, or not, I forbear to examine; but I would entreat this Gentleman, the next time he tells us what the maintainers of the Oath have done, to imform himself a little more exactly of matter of Fact. For if he trust, as now he seems to have done, altogether to his Fancy, he may easily be deceived.  
The 138 Section talks of what might hap, if the Pope had given sentence for the Maintainers against the Impugners. I, for my part, love not to talk in the Air, of things which never happened, and perhaps never will; nor can I imagine what this consideration serves for, but to provoke people to show, that others make as bold with the Pope and his Declarations, when they are against them, and with Exceptions as frivolous at lest, as the Maintainers of the Oath, which he knows very well may be done. But these are unsavoury matters, with which I will not meddle. The Maxim, In dubijs melior est Conditio Possidentis belongs to the Law, and to the Lawyers I leave it. Only I cannot but wonder he would make it  to the Pope, when the Possession of Kings is undeniably Just, and the Possession of the Pope, he confesses, is debated, whether Just, or Usurped.  
Section 140. He is at his Indirect Power again, a Spirit which 'tis strange should so often haunt us. For nothing is or can be more manifest than that, if Indirect Power to Depose, be Power to Depose, and to Depose, be to take away the Power of a King over his Kingdom, and who can take away the Power of a King over his Kingdom, has Power over that King and Kingdom: Indirect Power to Depose is absolutely inconsistent with Sovereignty. Since evidently Sovereignty is a Power over which there is no other Power on Earth, in those things in which the Sovereignty consists, and the Sovereignty of Kings consists in their Power over their Kingdoms.  
I see no reason to inquire farther into Probability, unless there were occasion for it; and, thanks be to God, this matter is not left to, It may be I, It may be No. 'Tis certain, that Allegiance is our Duty, and 'tis certain we may profess our Duty. While we have Certainty, I think I may leave Probability to those who need it, and pass to his 143 Consideration, of the Interest of those who impugn the Oath. Of this he says first, That there being a prospect of Interest on both sides, we aught not to harken to the Exception on either. He should have done well than, in my opinion, to have let it alone. Besides, what he says, I conceive a Doctrine is ne'er a whit the lesle true, nor an Action the lesle lawful, for happening to be according to our Interest. And where there are better motives, Charity should persuade us, that people do not proceed on worse. For this reason I should never have started the Question: but since he needs would, I fear it is not for nothing, that Sect. 119. he urges Interest, as a good Exception against the Takers of the Oath, and now it comes to be urged against the Impugners, will not suffer us to harken to it. This unequal dealing is a little suspicious.  
In the 144 Section he would have the Interest lie on the Maintainers side, because his Majesty's Roman Catholic Subjects more depend, and have more to hope, and more to fear from him than the Pope. This is true, and yet the Interest lies on the other side. For 'tis not what we may fear, and may hope, but what we actually do fear and hope. And actually there is nothing feared by the Impugners, nor hoped by the Maintainers. For we are both equally treated. I take the Oath, you refuse it: I writ for it, you against it: our condition is different in nothing, save only in this, that Praemunire precisely for refusal of the Oath, cannot be inflicted on me, which may indeed, but is not inflicted on you. Nor does the exemption from that particular penalty much better my condition, while notwithstanding I am not secure either of my Goods, or so much as Life. My Estate, on other accounts, may be taken away every day; and were it not for the Mercy we found, I could neither live with comfort, nor perhaps at all. For if I be a Priest, or harbour a Priest, (not to particularise farther) ●● Life is forfeited. And who refuses, or impugns the Oath, can fear not more.  
I must confess, I wonder it should be thus. But so we see it is; And while it is so, I conceive the difference of Interest is not to be determined with respect to the Civil Government, which treats us both alike, but to ourselves. And there the Impugners carry it clearly. While no body says of them so much as black is their Eye, they traduce us when they please, with suspicions of Heresy, or Schism, or Disobedience, or what else their Charity suggests. When this is gravely whispered up and down, and makes more or lesle impression, according to the different temper of the hearer, though something always stick, those who are concerned live so uneasily, that, I believe, they would gladly redeem the vexation with a good part of their fortunes, and possibly any thing but violence to their Conscience. Who has not tried it, may peradventure think the importance slight: who has, will go near to judge there is no Interest more considerable: For what is more to be valued than a comfortable life, to which other worldly goods are only so far good, as they contribute? How▪ ever it be, the Interest, such as it is, sides with the Impugners, not Maintainers; between whom there is no difference in respect of the Government, and a great difference in respect of themselves.  
But the consideration of what is the Interest of English Subjects, considered purely as English Subjects, I doubt is not all the case. For what if every body be not at liberty to act according to that Interest? What if some body have a greater Interest to act against it? 'Tis known that some, and most of the Impugners, are incorporated into other Bodies. Some who consider the influence those Bodies have on their Members, suspect those Members are not always free to follow what would be their Interest, if they were not of those Bodies, and apprehended that their own particular Interest is changed, and their greatest and strongest Interest now is to stick to that of their Bodies. Because they imagine he lives untowardly in a Body, who is at perpetual variance with it; and out of it perhaps he could not live at all. Truly therefore the consideration of the Interest of English Subjects, concerns only those who are not Members of other Bodies, unless those Bodies have no Interest which clashes with the Interest of English Subjects. And their Interest, in relation to the Civil Government, it is to maintain the Oath, and comply with the Laws in every thing, where with a safe Conscience they may. Because they have no Interest but the Interest of Subjects. If any of these impugn the Oath, because they act against their Interest, I know not what Motive they can have but Conscience. The rest may act out of Conscience too, and I hope, and suppose they do. But if it be the Interest of their Bodies to please the Pope, there is an Interest to impugn the Oath, which might tempt such as would act upon Interest.  
The 145 Section talks of considerable Pensions, and sums of Money given to the Maintainers to print their Books, and countenance showed them, and Caresses made them. Which that it has happened, ●e can, he says, make appear. Till he do, I know not what to say to it, more than that a Smile, or Hug seem hardly to deserve the name of Interest. 'Twere strange if they should not be smiled upon sometimes, who are frowned upon often. And as for Pensions, and Money, it is possible he may name a man or two who have got something, as Liberality will not be tied up from showing itself where 'tis deserved, and needed. But I have not heard so much as of a single man, who with all his Pensions, and all his Presents, has grown rich by maintaining the Oath. If all be true which is said, he is much mistaken in his calculation, and the Impugners of not-deposing Power have got more, much more, than the Maintainers. But I think it best to follow his example, and not descend to particulars till he does.  
He cannot but reflect, in the next Section, on what is related of countenance showed by Protestants to some Catholic Priests, to set them altogether by the Ears. If he cannot help it, there is no remedy; but the Reflection might well enough have been spared, by one who could have let it alone. For it is nothing at all to the purpose, and revives, besides, old differences, both unconcerning, and which 'twere more to his advantage, to keep, as they are, buried in the grave. Protestants, he says, countenanced some Priests, to ruin All. What than? What are their Intentions, to the question in hand of Interest? What they did, may be something, but people are neither richer, nor poorer, for the Ends for which things are done. Of the two he names Watson, and Preston, all the countenance of the one could not save him from the Gallows; the other indeed scap't hanging, but lived, and if I mistake not, died a Prisoner. Such countenance, I think, will not be envied, and needs not be mentioned. Excepting Preston, none of his countenanced Priests were concerned in the Oath.  
The Countenance showed to the Seculars against the Jesuits, of which he speaks, was in their Wisbich differences, before the Oath was made. The Protestants would not suffer the Seculars to be run totally down: but afforded them means to defend themselves, connived at their Appeal to Rome, and some say furthered it, by procuring them a fair Hearing there. For when they went of themselves, sinister Informations had so prevailed, that they were imprisoned without hearing. But having got the protection of the French Ambassador, to which the Protestants peradventure contributed, and by his means an equal Trial, they carried their Cause. What harm was there in all this, which must needs be reflected on? And who is it that must needs be blamed? Protestant's are not accountable to him for their Ends. From Catholics they were hidden; and they being only to look after the what, not the why, it was all one to them whether Protestants acted with a good, or bad Intention. They were to thank Protestants for their assistance in their distress, and more for their honourable dealing in that assistance. For they took no advantage of the distress in which they were, to grate upon their consciences, but only suffered, or perhaps encouraged them, to say and do freely▪ what they had a mind to themselves. If any thing be to be blamed, it is▪ the distress to which they were driven, and those who drove them. For 'tis indeed hard, and something shameful, that Catholics should by Catholics be reduced to stand in need of Protestants. But had they not been distressed, neither had Protestant's had occasion to assist them, nor Catholics occasion of their assistance. However it be, I know not why so unconcerning an occasion must needs be taken, to renew the memory of these things, which serve for nothing but to urge those, who are concerned, to fresh resentments, and engage them in fresh broils, which may drive them a second time to need the assistance of Protestants.  
Yet he cannot but note farther, That as concerning the present point (for what has been said hitherto it seems he is ware i● unconcerning) the Protestants countenanced the Priests who defended the Oath, and not those who opposed it. Great reason he has doubtless, to take it unkindly of Protestants, that they do not countenance those whose Principles they take to be inconsistent with Civil Government. But hence appears, that Protestants are of opinion, that the Defenders of the Oath are against the Church of Rome, but not the Opposers thereof, since they join with the former, and not with the later; and sure they would join with the Enemies of our Church, in their opinion, and not with her Friends.  
What may this mean? For notwithstanding the Appearing he talks of, he knows very well, that Protestants are not of opinion, that the Defenders of the Oath, are against the Church of Rome, and that they countenance the Loyal Subject only, not the Roman Catholic, the Friend to Civil Government, not the Enemy to our Church. For they punish the Friend of it, notwithstanding all their joining with him. When people make Arguments against their own knowledge, I know not what to think. But I perceive, that by making it an imputation, whether to Protestants, or Catholics, or both, that they join together in Principles of Loyalty, as if they joined in Religion too, the conduct of Protestants troubles him, and he would gladly have them forbear showing any countenance to those who are not of his way. By which means it may be hoped in time, that All will pass over to it, and the Impugners be the only men. As indeed, could he persuade Protestants too do as he would have them, and fright Catholics by the fear of being made pass for Enemies of the Church, the business would be in a fair way.  
His last Section is bestowed on the whether Defence or Praise of certain Gentlemen, and concerns only themselves. I will not meddle with it, because it were to bring their Credit into question, and I have a great aversion from meddling with the reputation of any body without absolute necessity. On the contrary, I wish them all manner of Good, and particularly, that to the rest of their Praises might be added the Defence of the Oath of Allegiance, and that when they need Apologies, they may found better than those alleged here, which to my thinking are not very good.  
And so we are come at last to his Conclusion, consisting of two parts, whereof the First believes, that conscientious Catholics will, on perusal of what he has written, have at lest some rational Reluctance to take the Oath, which is enough to make them forbear it, since they swear to take it Hearty, or without Reluctance. In my opinion Reluctance is an odd fruit for him to expect from all his pains, and a strange kind of satisfaction to offer to his Reader at last. Reluctance agrees as ill with Satisfaction, as with Hearty. This is upon the matter to say, I undertook to take away the scruples concerning the Oath, but so I can but 'cause one, I care for no more. For Reluctance is pure scruple; who feels it against Taking, will feel it also against Refusing the Oath, and remain dissatisfied either way. So that the Satisfaction he promises, resolves at last into Dissatisfaction. It does not mend the matter to call his Reluctance, as he does, Rational. For put those two together, and they signify Reasons which do not satisfy; since if they did, there could be no Reluctance in proceeding according to satisfactory reason, or with satisfaction. Methinks it needed not have been discovered so plainly, that after all the satisfactory reasons which he has brought against the Oath, what he finally trusts to, is, that his Reader will remain unsatisfied. For nothing can be plainer than that Reluctance imports not-satisfaction in its notion. The Objection itself, which I, for my part, thought not considerable enough to return a second time, has been spoken to before. And there it was said, that 'tis not Reluctance or not Reluctance, but Duty or not Duty which truly presses. If he can satisfy any man that 'tis his Duty to refuse the Oath, that man will refuse it for a better Reason than Reluctance. But who is satisfied that 'tis his Duty to take it, must be a strange man if he found Reluctance in doing his Duty.  
The second part of his Conclusion sums up the substance of the Treatise, and concludes his Adversaries destitute of all rational Motives, and that nothing but Ignorance or Obstinacy can move them to stand out. 'Tis not amiss to set a good face on the matter▪ however things go. But I suspect the true quarrel he has to his Adversaries is, that they are not ignorant enough. Were they a little more ignorant than they are, perhaps it might be hoped they might be a little more flexible too, and better disposed to be blindly led by those, whom, while they continued their obstinate humour of desiring to see with their own eyes, they cannot perceive to be clearer sighted than themselves. If he truly thought them Ignorant, or Obstinate, it was a hopeless piece of business he undertook, when he set himself to writ for their satisfaction; as sure he meant not to exclude them from the benefit of his labours. For satisfaction plainly imports seeing, and who cannot see for Ignorance, or will not for Obstinacy, are not like to be satisfied. But this matter is to be left to the Judgement of the Reader. I will take the liberty to believe in my turn, that he will found they would indeed be destitute of rational Motives, if they accepted those which are offered by this Gentleman; That they have no reason to change their Ignorance for his Knowledge; and since obstinacy signifies Adhesion without Reason (for with it, it is Constancy) that Obstinacy does not lie at their door.  
To stay at every Particular of his Sum Total, were to weary the Reader with the old story over again. Yet the first seems to have something new. He says, It is certain (neither do his Adversaries deny it) that it belongs to the Pope to decide whether this Oath be Unlawful or no. In this he reckons without his Host. His Adversaries think the Oath so certainly Lawful, that there is no place for Decision, since only difficult or doubtful things need Decision. They certainly know that the Doctrine of Christ was not made a secret, and entrusted only to one, or few men, to be by them upon occasion, and as they saw fit, communicated to the rest; but publicly and universally preached, without subtraction of any thing necessary, and by the public belief and practice of those who embraced it, preserved to our times, and to be preserved to the end of the World. They certainly know that Allegiance to Princes is part of this Doctrine. They certainly know that as the Law of God forbids Theft, or taking from another what is his; but what belongs to this, what to that man, is to be determined by the several Laws of several Countries: so the Law of God commands Allegiance to Princes; but who is, who is not Prince, depends on the different Laws and Customs of Nations, by which some succeed, others are elected, etc. But in general, he is always Prince, who by the Rules of his Country is Prince, and to refuse Allegiance to that Prince, is to break the Commands of God. They certainly know, that neither the Pope, nor any Power on Earth can authorise the breach of a Command of God. They certainly know, that if the Pope can authorise Subjects to refuse Allegiance to him who is Prince by the Laws of the Land, he can authorise the breach of a Command of God. And than they certainly know that the Pope cannot do this, or that he cannot Depose, since he whom the Pope pretends to Depose, is certainly Prince still by the Laws of the Land. And because they evidently see there is nothing in the Oath, but that the Pope cannot Depose our King, nor hinder his Subjects from bearing that Allegiance which they own and promise', they evidently see that the Oath is Lawful, and cannot be made Unlawful, till it become Unlawful to profess a Duty commanded by God.  
His Adversaries think there is no need, nor occasion of having recourse to Rome for this business; nor know what they should ask when they came thither. For should they ask, who is King of England by the Law of England? or whether Subjects are not obliged to Allegiance by the Law of God? or whether the Pope can make voided a Law of God? They were like enough to be laughed at for their pains. And yet there is no more to ask. For put these three together, and 'tis as certain that the Pope cannot take of the obligation which English Subjects have to bear Allegiance to their King, or in other words, cannot Depose their King, as that he cannot make voided a Command of God: and 'tis as certain that 'tis Lawful to take the Oath, as that 'tis Lawful to make profession of what we are obliged to by the Law of God.  
I forbear to urge, that to put the unlawfulness of the Oath to the Pope's decision, interfares with his Argument, which makes the unlawfulness consist in disobedience. For an unlawfulness to be decided, imports an unlawfulness in the nature of the Thing, which is there, however it be decided, and whether it be decided or not, whereas the unlawfulness of Disobedience cannot be without the Command. So that had there been no Command, there had been no Unlawfulness; neither did they do unlawfully, in that supposition, who took the Oath before the Breves were made. But enough has been said of this subject already.  
The rest of his particulars have been examined in their proper places, and found not allowable. The most material is Obedience, which as piously as it sounds, signifies intolerably both to Church, and State. For what would become of the Hierarchy? what of the Civil Government? if every Command of the Popes were to be obeyed, either without dispute, or if any happened, the Pope were finally and obligatorily to decide it. An unlimited Obedience, such as is discoursed in this Treatise, is a speculation which seems to measure the World by a Cloister, and imagine both governed alike; but irreconcilable with the nature of things, and the experience of what passes daily before our eyes. For it is not practised, I believe, in any part of Christendom, except the Pope's own Territories, nor can be, without unsettling the Commonwealth, and confounding the Hierarchy of the Church. To enforce it upon us, is to take advantage of our unhappy circumstances; to bring our Nation into a subjection which would not have been endured in Catholic times; to which who contributes, should bethink himself how he will answer it to God and his Country; and to his Conscience I leave it.  
Only there is a particularity in the case, which it is not amiss to observe. Who thinks Obedience will save him harmless, on which side soever the Truth lie, will found, as great and as necessary a virtue as it is, that he cannot practise it cleverly here, though he would never so feign. For 'tis not at his choice simply to Obey, or Disobey; but he must Disobey of necessity; only he can choose whether the Pope, or King. Obedience is manifestly due to both; yet 'tis manifest it cannot be paid to both, while what one forbids, the other commands. The security therefore which other cases afford, by submitting our private Judgements to public Authority, is not here to be had, since we must disobey public Authority which side soever we take. In such a straight, where even Obedience is inevitable Disobedience, I know no remedy, but to seek our security in the satisfaction of our consciences, and proceeding sincerely and faithfully in pursuit of that satisfaction, choose the side which our satisfied consciences tell us is in the right. If there be any other way, I should be glad to learn it. But when the great Road is barred up, I cannot imagine how we should go on our journey, but by such paths as we can either found or make.  
For my part, my Conscience tells me, it is my duty in this case to disobey the Pope, and obey the King. I see the Firmness of Civil Government, or the Politic Body, is absolutely necessary to Mankind, and to no portion of it more than to the Church itself. I see the Politic Body cannot be firm, if it depend on any thing out of itself, for what is necessary to its firmness. As often as it falls at variance with that other thing (and variance cannot be avoided in the difference of Interests and Humours to which Mortality is subject) it must of necessity shake and totter. I see a Head is necessary, not only to the Firmness, but even Subsistence, of the Politic, as of all Bodies. I see the Firmness of the whole Body depends on the Firmness of the Head, for the settling and alteration of which, should there be any other Rules, than those agreed on by the Body itself, by which Rules it may be Elective, or Successive as is found most convenient, the Body would depend on something without itself, as to what is necessary for its Firmness, and a gate be set open to all manner of Confusion. As we see by experience, that Deposition has seldom, perhaps never, been prosecuted in earnest, without deplorable Effects. I see that if the Pope could Depose, the Head would depend, even as to its Being, on something besides, and out of the Body, which being to dissolve the frame of the Body, and deprive Mankind of the goods received from it, I see as certainly that God has left no such Power, as that he has not, nor cannot leave a Power inconsistent with, and destructive of the good of Mankind. Wherhfore I conceive that it is within the sphere of the Civil Power, to command the renouncing of a pretence inconsistent with the firmness of the Civil Body, and that I am inexcusable to God and Man, if I refuse to obey it in that particular.  
Put case Deposing Power, and let it be restrained too to those cases only which are pretended for the Pope, were claimed by somebody besides the Pope, the King of France, for example, or Emperor. I am much mistaken if any Englishman would endure so much as to hear of it, or doubt whether it were not his duty, with his utmost force, the hazard of his Life and Fortunes, to oppose the pretence, as ruinous to the safety, and inconsistent with the Sovereignty and Independence of the English Government. What alteration does it make in the case, that it happens to be the Pope who claims it. It is the Sword which does the mischief, not the Scabbard in which it lies. If Deposing Power, in the hands of a foreign Temporal Prince, be inconsistent with the Security and Rights of a free Nation, it cannot be consistent in the Pope's hands. For Deposing Power is Deposing Power, and produces the very same effects, in whose hands soever it be. It matters not Who is said to have it; for 'tis the Thing which is insupportable, the Person is not considerable. A Temporal Prince can do no more than Depose with it, and a Spiritual can do as much. And yet while every body would be ready to stone him, who should say the King of France can Depose our King, we must, forsooth, endure it should be said, and believed that the Pope can, and hinder people from professing the contrary. As if the mischief of Deposition, which is the ruin of Civil Government, were not the same from both Depositions, and 'twere enough to fence the house on one side, and think it no prejudice if it were blown down by a wind which came from another quarter. Wherhfore, if I mistake not, all the shyness we found, comes from looking only on one side of the Meddal. Because it bears the Pope's impression, the reverence the Catholics have and aught to have for him, makes them fear they may shock his Authority. But turn it, and without minding the Who, which in truth imports not, look on the What; this What, I believe, would appear so intolerable, that, were the Pope unconcerned, I suspect it would prove not lesle than Treason every where.  
Not that I have forgot that this Gentleman allows every Prince power to Depose another, and makes it a Right inherent in Sovereignty. But than he understands by it, power to make War, and use the Victory, when the Prince gets it, as he pleases. And this is so far from the power of Deposition, understood by the rest of the World, that though every body knows that every Prince can do this, no body therefore thinks, or can endure to hear, that his Sovereign is a Subject, and deposable by another Prince. Were this Proposition, The King of France, for example, has Power, (meaning by Power, Right) to Depose the King of Spain, or any other King of Christendom, or the World, put to any Nation, I am much deceived if they would not all condemn it, as, not only false, but Treasonable. It is a sign they are hard put to it, for something to say against the Oath, who are forced to altar the notions of words, and understand by Deposing Power what no body understands but themselves. Besides, that nothing is, or can be so innocent, which may not by that Trick be rendered faulty, it is as plain a justification of the Oath as may be. For to pin upon it a sense, which every body knows it means not, and reprehend that sense, is evidently to confess, that the sense which is meant is not reprehensible.  
Whatever this Gentleman think, or would have us think to the contrary, I am persuaded the Oath is not liable to any material exception, save only Renouncing Deposing Power in the Pope. And I am so persuaded, because if there were, I see not how it could scape his Wit, and Diligence, and great Desire, even to partiality, to found it. For sure it is partiality, Sect. 31. to urge Authority, as considerable in the Refusers of the Oath, and Sect. 118. of no force in the Takers; To object Sect. 119. Interest against the Takers, and Sect. 143. not to suffer the Topick to be harkened unto, as soon as it touches the Refusers Copyhold. Now, who, being duly required, refuses to renounce Deposing Power in a foreign Prince, Temporal or Spiritual (for that imports not, as neither altering any thing in the Power, nor abating any of its bad consequences) should do well to consider what he does. It is neither better nor worse, than as much as in him lies, to bring his Country into subjection to a foreign Power, and that in Temporals, and the most concerning of Temporals, that on which the Quiet, and Security, and Firmness of Civil Government depends. However, it may be disguised, this is the naked Truth; and methinks he must be very fantastically scrupulous who can feel so much as Reluctance in not contributing to the subjection of his Country.  
Since the whole stress of the business lies on this point, I conceive it needless, in imitation of this Gentleman, to sum up the substance of what has been said. The Reader, I think, will found more tediousness than satisfaction, in hearing the same things over and over again: and peradventure I need his pardon for those Repetitions which he will have met with before. It is a fault which this Gentleman and I must share betwixt us. He thought fit to repeat sometimes, and I have yielded to the temptation of his Example, I fear too often. There is another thing also of which I think it convenient to give warning. The Objections which I was to answer, have sometimes forced me, much against my will, to touch a little on both the Supreme Powers. It is an Argument from meddling with which I have a great aversion, being more disposed to reverence, and obey, than dispute them. But as the Reader will see I could not avoid saying something, so I must declare, I speak not of either, otherwise than with relation to the present matter. If any Expression of mine show like extending, or confining either, which was far enough from my thoughts, I entreat it may be understood only of this present case, which I take to be clear and predetermined by the Laws of God and Nature. And to be guided by those Laws, I am sure intrenches on neither Power. Though I am not conscious I have given any just occasion of being understood otherwise; yet because no wariness seems enough in such matters, I thought it necessary to make this declaration, and desire the Reader, when he meets with any thing of this nature, to remember it.  
FINIS.   

ERRATA.  
INtroduct. pag. 2. lin. 15. would not. r. could not.  
Answ. to the First Treatise, p. 9 l. 25. hap. r. happened. l. 30. this is. r. thus it is. p. 20. l. 4. away. r. a way. p. 21. l. 19 a very groundless, is, r. is a very groundless. p. 34. l. 32. Christ, uninterrupted. r. Christ, by uninterrupted. p. 35. l. 31. will, r. well. l. 37. think. r. hint.  
Answ. to the Second Treatise, p. 1. l. 9 this. r. his. p. 7. l. 8. Gentleman innocent. Gentleman was innocent. p. 14. l. 36. imperious. r. impervious. p. 25. l. 2. and. r. or. l. 14. accepts. r. excepts. p. 26. l. 38. notion Sovereignty. r. notion of Sovereignty. p. 49. l. 22. talk. r. task.  
Answ. to the Third Treatise, p. 1. l. 19 this. r. his. p. 3. l. 4. would. r. could. p. 4. l. 24. their. r. this. p. 13. l. 4. Besides, del., p. 22. l. 14. del. not. p. 26. l. 4. endure. r. induce. l. 24. in circumstances. r. in those circumstances. p. 29. l. 9 efficacious. r. inefficacious. l. 18. N. 8. N. 18. l. 24. r. these. r. those. p. 30. l. 23. del. same. p. 31. l. 3. thinks to. r. thinks fit to. yet. r. get. p. 38. l. 27. maintaing. r. maintaining. p. 39 l. 3. visible. r. justifiable. p. 42. l. 4. should be. r. would be. p. 45. l. 12. tells besides. r. tells us besides. these r. those. l. 35. these. r. those. p. 46. l. 37. unlawful of. r. lawful, of. p. 77. l. 5. of. r. of. p. 82. l. 2. his. r. this. p. 118. l. 23▪ persuasion. r. perversion. p. 119. l. 8. 140. r. 104.