The Controversial Letters, OR THE Grand Controversy, Concerning The pretended Temporal Authority of POPES over the whole Earth, and the true Sovereign of KINGS within their own respective Kingdoms.  
Between two English Gentlemen, 

The one of the Church of England:  
The other of the Church of Rome.    
The first two Letters.  
The Second Edition.  
LONDON, Printed for Henry Brome, and Benjamin Took, at the Gun, and at the Ship in St. Paul's Churchyard. MDCLXXIV.   


E. Libris Beblioth. Eccles. Cathedr. Petribur    


SIR,  
I Fear the heat of our last Encounter may have done me some prejudice in your good opinion, and would justify to you, if I can, both my zeal and my friendship. Permit me therefore with a more settled calmness to give you the Reasons which swayed with me then, but which the promptness of my nature possibly might so disguise, that they might not then appear reason to you. As this is my only, so I hope 'twill be my full justification; for though we owe much to friendship, we owe more to Truth, and that Friend who bars the use of reason in his Friend, does, in my judgement, ill deserve that Name. Notwithstanding let me add what I think you are already sufficiently persuaded of, that I am far from the blind zeal of those who think Popery an imputation so scandalous and contagious, that it destroys all correspondence with those who own it. I have met with several, besides yourself, of your judgement in Religion, accomplished men, and so qualified, that I cannot but wish either that all such men were Protestants, or all Protestants such men. I think so well of some parts of your Religion, that there are who think the worse of me. I read your books always without hatred, and sometimes with pity at the unequal combat betwixt the Knight and the Giant, though I make no doubt you are even with us in this particular, and are all Knights in your own Countries When I hear People cry out Papists, and Popery, I have sometimes the bluntness to ask what they mean; for having heard them applied both to Prelatics and Fanatics, they must needs be words of a strangely large size, and magical comprehension, if they can fit parties so different, and what know I but they may be so explained, that you may own them no more than other folks? In fine, I look upon my reason as one of the greatest gifts I have received from God, and am persuaded 'tis a duty I owe him to use it as well as I can. Wherefore I as little approve the passionate zeal of our side, as I understand the sublime perfection of blind obedience on yours; but where I see you have reason, I am content to allow you have so. Yet after all, Friend, I must continue constant to what I maintained at our last meeting. I love my King and my Country as I ought, and can neither believe that can be a true Religion which teaches doctrines inconsistent with Government, nor believe otherwise but that yours does teach such doctrines. And though I know their pestilent influence does not always work, for you have in the late times of trial approved yourselves honest men, yet I cannot think that Commonwealth safe in which they are either tolerated or connived at. Of this I will make yourself Judge, and in this Paper produce my evidence, which shall be the very words of the most famous Authors amongst you, who if they be sufficient for number, and considerable for learning, and plain in expression, and owned for yours, I see not what more can be expected from me, nor what at all can be replied by you or any else.  
To begin then, there are I must confess some modest men amongst you, 
Bellarm. de Rom. Pon. l. 5. c. 2.  who speak sparingly of the Pope, and affirm Princes are not the Pope's Vicars. These exempt from his Sovereignty the greatest part of the World, for they make Infidel Princes true and supreme Princes of their own Kingdoms, and say, the Pope is not Lord of those possessions which Infidels hold. Nay they go so far as to dare say, He is not, JURE DIVINO, Lord so much as of the whole Christian world. 
Id. c. 3.  And that all his power to depose Princes, and dispose of their Kingdoms is only indirectly, and in ordine ad spiritualia, which alas! is a matter of nothing, and he must needs be a very scrupulous man who boggles at it. For this opinion are cited besides two Cardinals, Bellarmine and Cajetan, abundance of other famous men with hard names, Henricus and Joannes Driedo, Turrecremata, Pighius, Waldensis, Petrus de Palude, Franc. Victoria, Dominicus Soto, Sanderus, Aspileveta, Covarruvias, and so many others, that Bellarmine affirms it is communis sententia Catholicorum Theologorum, though in that particular, as you will presently see, he was a little out. But these, as many and as learned as they are, are but dow-baked men, and scent strongly of wicked carnal policy, and heresy too, as an honest Gentleman fairly insinuates by the title of his Book, 
Alex. Carrerius.  adversus impios Politicos, & nostri temporis Haereticos, design principally against this opinion. And so Bellarmine scap't fairly; for Sixtus Quintus, if the information I had from a very good hand deceive me not, had a great mind to have burnt his book: Though he scaped more narrowly at Paris for giving too much to the Pope, than at Rome for giving too little. His fellow Suarez had his book burned there by the common Hangman, and he was found guilty of the same fault: but he was a Cardinal, for which respect I suppose they dealt more mercifully, and only condemned and forbid him. But this by the by. Your hearty men, whom the bugbears of carnal policy cannot fright from the defence of truth, tell us another story▪ and say plainly what we must trust too. Unless, says Franciscus Bozius, 
Fr. Bozius de Temp. Eccl. Monarchia praef. ad Clem. 8.  there be one supreme Monarch in the Church in all things, the unity of the Church cannot be preserved: for seeing the Church by divine institution doth consist of a Kingdom and a Priesthood, if it were otherwise, there should be in the same absolutely one Monarch of the Kingdom, and another of the Priesthood: That if for avoiding dissensions about sacred causes, one supreme Head is appointed; why not in the same manner of the Kingdom, that there should be one and the same Head both of the Kingdom and Priesthood, lest in like sort there should happen dissension betwixt them? that therefore it is the rather to be held that Peter doth supply Christ's place, not only in the Priesthood, but in the Kingdom, that he might be a King, and likewise a Priest according to the order of Melchisedech, who was both a King and Priest. The famous Cardinal Baronius says the same: 
Baron. Ann. Tom. 1. An. 57 p. 432, 433.  That David did foretell that the Priesthood of Christ should be according to the order of Melchisedech: That when Christ being a King and a Priest received all judgement of the Father, that is, most full, judicial power; He joining the same with his Priesthood did institute in the Church a regal Priesthood, translating in suos (I conceive he means St. Peter and his Successors) all the power he had of his Father. This new coronation of King Peter so long after his death, and the mystery of King and Priest meeting in Melchisedech, which St. Paul never dreamt of, though he treat the subject particularly, and something to better purpose, and the admirable expedient to avoid dissensions by taking away Regal power are pleasant matters, and deserve to be reflected on, but that I have so much of this divertive stuff to produce that I cannot stay every where. Thomas Bozius tells us, 
Tho. ●ozias de jure stat. praefat. ad Aldobrand.  that if Christ be King of Kings, and Lord of Lords; in like sort the Church must be Queen and Lady; that all temporal Regal power doth reside first in the soul of Christ, and then in the Church his Spouse, the Queen of the World, and from her is derived to others (Faithful or Infidels) as out of a fountain. 
Isid: Moscon. de Majest. militant. Eccles. P. 96.  Isidorus Mosconius says to the same purpose, That not only all faithful people, but likewise Infidels, and every natural creature is subject to the commandment of the Pope; he is to be worshipped of all men; and for this cause he receiveth of all the faithful, adorations, prostrations, and kissing of his feet. What pretty truths there are in the World which negligent men overslip by inadvertence? who would have thought the Mogul, and King of Pegu, and Chinese Tartar had derived their little streams of power from the great Channel of the Church? Ungrateful men, who so little acknowledge their Benefactors! But since all natural creatures are subject to his commands, I wish some body that has credit would prevail with him that Lions, and Bears, and Adders, and such naughty natural creatures might be forbidden to do us any harm for the future. For as simple as he seems to sit at Rome, and though he is pleased to make but little show of any such power, he can stop the mouths of Lions, and quench the violence of Fire. So that had we not been Heretics, he might have done us a greater kindness here at London in the time of the fate dismal Fire than we are ware of. I warrant you he could have whispered down the wind, and with one grave Nod have cooled the courage of the Fire. But let us return to Mosconius, 
P. 91,  teaching us farther, that the Pontifical and Regal power, and all other powers are most plentiful in the Pope, and do reside in the Pontifical dignity. That all dominions whatsoever depend upon the Church, 
P. 656.  and upon the Pope as Head of the Church. That in the Pope Authority is considered, in Emperors and King's power, 
P. 670.  and thence it is that power doth depend upon Authority. 
P. 27.  That the Pope is called universal Judge, King of Kings, and Lord of Lords. 
P. 677.  That Emperors and Kings may be compelled to keep their oaths taken in their Coronation and Confirmation, in that by virtue of such oath they are made the Pope's Subjects. 
P. 80.  That all temporal Jurisdiction must be exercised, not at the Pope's command, but at his Beck. Prince's will charge, command; God who is Lord of all doth by his beck command, according to that, Dixerat & nutu totum tremefecit Olympum. That Christ had full Jurisdiction over all the world and all creatures, 
P. 85.  and therefore the Pope his Vicar hath so. In truth these Authors of yours are considerative men, and as careful as they are able. They reflect that Popes are generally old men, and have often weak lungs; and 'twas charitable to exempt them from the painful trouble of commanding, and make a nod serve the turn. Carrerius in his zeal against impious Politicians and Heretics, teaches us, That true, just, ordained by God, 
Alex. Carrer. de Potest. Rom. Pont. p. 9  and mere dominion, as well in spiritual things as in temporal, was brought forth by Christ, and the same was committed to St. Peter and his Successors: That Christ was Lord over all Inferiors, 
P. 111.  not only as God, but likewise as man, having even then Dominion in the earth, and that therefore as the dominion of the world was in Christ both divine and humane, so it must be confessed that it was in the Pope his Vicar. That the mystery of Redemption being accomplished, Christ as a King gave unto Peter the administration of his Kingdom, and St. Peter did execute that his power against Ananias and Saphira. That Ghrist as he is man is directly Lord over all the world in Temporalities, 
P. 124.  and that therefore the Pope is so likewise, in that he is Vicar: That the supreme power of judging all, and the top of dignities, 
P. 126.  and the height of both powers are found in Christ's Vicar: That as the divine and humane dominion were in Christ, 
P. 150.  so in Christ's stead the dominion of the world in the Pope is both spiritual and temporal, 
P. 151.  divine and humane. That the unremovable Truth doth design, by Peter's only coming by water to Christ, that the whole dominion, which is signified by the Sea, is committed to St. Peter and his Successors. ('Tis acquaint that and surprising; but yet this water me thinks is something an unstedy foundation) That as the Pope cannot say he is not Christ's Vicar, so he cannot deny but that he is Lord over all things, because the earth is the Lords and the fullness thereof, whereby all things, heavenly, earthly, and infernal are subject unto Christ the Lord; and thence it is that he did commit unto the Pope, who doth supply his place upon earth, the right of the Heavenly and Terrene Empire. That he should forget the infernal Empire, the famous Purgatory power! which for all it be under ground, time has been when no glebe above ground has been more fruitful. Elsewhere he teaches that there are divers Powers of men given by God, 
P. 142.  and divers Authorities, all which do depend upon the highest Authority (meaning I suppose the Popes) and thence as the stars from the sun receive their light. That the Imperial power concerning the administration of temporal matters doth proceed from the Pontifical power, 
P. 145.  as the light of the Moon from the light of the Sun: 
P. 161.  That the Empire of Rome before it was converted to Christ, was a dominion usurped and tyrannical, because the true dominion was in the line of Christ: That the Emperor is the Pope's Minister; for God did appoint him tanquam summi Sacerdotis Ministrum. That no King or Emperor hath jurisdiction or dominion but from Christ, and by consequence can have none at all but from his Vicar. I understand now the reason St. Peter commands Christians to be obedient to the Authority of Heathen Princes and Governors, because he knew very well how they came by it: For though all their power before was usurped and tyrannical, yet after they had derived it from him it became a lawful Authority. If our wicked Politicians be not confounded with this I know not what will do it; I am sure I am to meet with such stuff in a Church which boasts of purity of her doctrine; and which cherishes the Authors not only as good Christians, but learned men and Masters of Christianity. 
Lael. Zecch. Tract. Theol. P. 81.  Laelius Zecchius tells us, that the Pope by the Law of God hath power and temporal dominion over the whole world: That the same is proved by the words, Luk. 22. Behold here are two swords, which signify the power, spiritual and temporal: and because Christ, whose Vicar the Pope is, hath both powers according to the words Matt. ult. All power is given me in heaven and in earth; that thence it may be deduced that the Pope is absolutely Lord of all the Christian world; and Kings and Christian Princes are to acknowledge that they hold of him their Empires and Kingdoms, and all, that are faithful, aught to be subject unto him: and that as oft as such Princes do any great hurt in the Church, the Pope may deprive them of their Kingdoms, and transfer their right to others. Franciscus Bozius, 
Fran. Boz. de temp. Eccle. Monarch. l. 1. c. 3. p. 52. C. 7. p. 98.  That the supreme temporal Jurisdiction throughout all the world doth belong to S. Peter's Successors: so as one and the same is the Hierarch and Monarch in all things. That Christ left the Church to be governed by the best form of government, but the best form of government is absolute Monarchy, even in all temporal things, therefore Christ left his Church to be so governed. That the Keys of Heaven were given to Peter, 
L. 2. c. 14. L. 3. c. 1. p. 894.  therefore of all the earth. That the right of dominion and relation of Infidels may justly, by the sentence and ordination of the Church, be taken away; because Infidels by reason of their infidelity deserve to lose their power over the faithful. 
C. 14. p. 530.  
c. 14. p. 530.  That the Church hath received that power over Nations, which Christ according to his humane nature received of his Father: but Christ received absolutely of his Father all power in temporalibus, therefore the Church likewise received it by participation of his fullness. 
c. 16. p. 537.  That the supreme coactive power in all temporal things belongeth to Ecclesiastical persons by divine Law, revealed and expressed in the Scriptures. That Kings, 
P. 676.  anointed with holy Oil, are called as Vassals of the Church. That by reason of the supreme Monarchy in all things, 
L. 5. p. 823.  temporal laws may be made, and Kingdoms taken away for just causes. Henricus Gandavensis, if Carrerius cite him truly, 
Car. p. 28.  That by the Law of God and nature the Priesthood doth over-top the Empire, and both Jurisdiction over Spiritualties and Temporalties, and the immediate execution likewise of them both, depend upon the Priesthood both by the Law of God and Nature. 
Carr. p. 130.  Antoninus, That they who say the Pope hath dominion over all the world in Spirituals, but not in Temporals, are like the Counsellors of the King of Syria, who said, the Gods of the Mountains are their Gods, and therefore they have overcome 〈◊〉: let us fight with them in the Plains and Valleys where their Gods dwell not, and we shall prevail against them, 
Carr. p. 130.  3 Reg. 20. Augustinus Triumphus, That the Son of God hath declared the altitude of the Ecclesiastical power, being as it were founded upon a Rock, to be above all principality and power; that unto it all knees should bend, of things in heaven, in earth, and under the earth, or in hell. 'Tis come at last, this infernal power, 'twas only long of a bad memory we had it not before. 
P. 131.  That Secular Powers were not necessary, but that Princes might perform that through terror of discipline, which the Priest cannot effect by power of doctrine: and that therefore if the Church could punish evil men, Imperial and Secular principality were not necessary, the same being included potentially in the principality Apostolical. And why cannot the Church punish evil men, if both Jurisdictions, and the immediate execution of both be in her? But we understand him well enough; when time serves the conclusion shall be, that Princes are unnecessary, because the Church by her double power can do the business of the world without them; And so farewell useless Princes. 
Aug. de Anc. de Potest. Ecc. Q. 39 a. 2.  Farther he tells us that Imperial or Regal power is borrowed from the Papal or Sacerdotal, for as much as concerneth the formality of dignity, and recieving the authority. Pretty formalities those. 
Q. 45. a. 2.  That the Pope hath Jurisdiction over all things, as will temporal as spiritual through the world. That he may absolve Subjects from the Oath of Allegiance: 
Q. 46. a. 3.  That upon just cause he may set up a King in every Kingdom; 
L. Conr. in templ. om. judic. l. 2 c. 1. S 4.  for he is the Overseer of all Kingdoms, in God's stead, as God is the Supervisor and maker of all Kingdoms. Lancecelot Conradus. That He may appoint Guardians and Assistants to Kings and Emperors when they are insufficient, and unfit for government. That he may depose them, and transfer their Empires and Dominions from one line to another. Celsus Mancinus, 
Cel. Manc l c. 1.  That in the highest Bishop both the Powers and Jurisdictions are spiritual and temporal; and that as he is the most eminent person of all men in spiritual power, 
Th. Boz. de jur. stat. l. 1. c. 6. p. 37. P. 52.  so he is in temporal. Thomas Bozius, That Kings and principal Seculars are not immediately of God but by the Interposition of Holy Church, and her chief Bishops. That warlike and military compulsive power is given to the Church over Kings and Princes. That if it be found sometimes that certain Emperors have given some temporalities to the highest Bishops, as Constantine gave to Silvester, this is not to be understood that they gave any thing which was their own, but restored that which was unjustly and tyrannically taken from the said Bishops. 
Ap. Carrer. P. 132.  Rodoricus Sancius, That there is one Principlity and one supreme-Prince over all the world, who is Christ's Vicar, according to that of Dan. c, 8. He hath given him power, and honour, and rule, and all people and tongues shall serve him: and that in him therefore is the fountain and spring of all principality, and from him all other powers do flow. 
P. 131. & 132  That the Bishop of Rome in place of Christ is set as a Prince over the whole world in spirituals and temporals, and that it is naturally, morally, and by the Law of God to be held with a right faith, that the Principality of the Bishop of Rome is the true and only immediate Principality of the whole world, not only as touching things spiritual, but likewise temporal, and the Imperial Principality is depending upon it, as being mediate ministerial and instrumental, ministering and serving it; and that it is ordained and instituted by it, and at the commandment of the Papal Principality is movable, revocable, corrigible, and punishable. I marry! Here's a man speaks to purpose. Hang this squeamish faint-heartedness, which serves for nothing but to cover an ugly face with a vizor as ugly. We know well enough what the mincing indirect in ordine ad spiritualia power would be at, and 'tis a great deal better to speak plainly, for Orthodox truths, such as concern the Law of God and right faith, should be spoken so that people may understand them and know their duty; As for Kings they are likely to boggle as much at the mask as the face. If they be turned out of their Kingdoms and reduced to beggary, the beggary will be direct beggary whatever the power is which brought them to it, and this fine distinction but uncomfortable alms. One would think this fellow were not to be matched: and what think you of him who says in downright terms, 
Alvar. Pelagius de planctu Eccl. l. 1. a 37.  That the Pope hath the propriety of the Western Empire, and the rest of the world in protection and tuition. He bids fair this man; but of all commend me to Jacobus de Terano, who, explicating that scurvy text, 
Tract. Monarch·  Give unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, tells us, It was spoken but for a time, not for ever; that it was to hold only till the Ascension of Christ; and afterwards that should come to pass which was spoken, when I shall be lifted up from the earth I will draw all things after me; that is, I will recover all the Empires and Kingdoms of the world, and will take them from Caesar, from Kings and Princes, to give them to the Pope. I have not met with any who bids fairer for the purple than this man; And so I leave him and the rest of your learned Authors; for though more men might be alleged▪ and more from these men, yet in truth I am weary, and must pass over sundry passages of profound learning, and useful knowledge, as that Papa is derived from the Interjection Pape! 
Moscon. p. 22.  because his dignity and power is admirable to all men, and is, as it were, the amazement of the World, according to the Gloss in the Proem of the Clementines, Papa, stupor mundi, non Deus, non homo, sed utrumque. That he is God, best defined by negation, 
Manch. l. 3. c. 1. Carrer. p. 132.  so that if one ask whether the highest Bishop be a Duke, a King, an Emperor, to answer warily we should, by denying, affirm the Pope to be quid praestantius, quidve eminentius. So that we may hope one day to see a mystical Theology made for the Pope, and the inaccessible mystery of his power declared by negations. 
Moscon. p. 92.  That unto the Pope, as Pastor of the Church, 
Lanc. Conrade. l. 2. c. 1. S. 4.  and Bishop of that holy Sea, and by reason of his dominion and excellence is given Adoratio Duliae, such worship as belongs to Saints and Relics. Besides, I have seen cited, That he is holden to be Christ's Vicar not only in respect of things in earth, 
August. Trump. q. 18. a. 2.  in Heaven and in Hell, but even over Angels both good and bad. That he is greater than Angels as touching dominion, not in respect of himself merely, but by Authority from God; and may be superior to any Angels concerning recompense of reward, 
art. 5.  and may excommunicate them. That he is equal to God, and can make something of nothing, and wrong to be right, and such pretty matters, which if the ears of you Catholics were not as much hardened as the hearts of us Heretics, would sound a little oddly. But to our purpose. The method of discourse requires now that I should apply these say to the matter in hand, but the application is so easy and obvious, that to spend time in it must needs be equally tedious and needless. For pray tell me, can any Commonwealth be safe, or subsist at all, if Princes have no dominion but what they receive from the Pope? If they hold their Empires and Kingdoms of him? if they may absolve their subjects from allegiance, and transfer their rights from one line to another? If they be his Ministers, his Vassals, his Subjects? If their power be ministerial and subservient to the Papal, to be exercised at his beck, and be at his command both corrigible and revocable? If any thing be plain in the world, this is, that either Princes must be taken out of the world, or these Maxims. For without more ado he that makes a Prince be a Subject, makes him no Prince, speaking as I do of absolute Princes. Wherefore leaving these things, and their application to your consideration, I turn myself to reflect on what I concieve you may reply.  
Two things there are which I have heard alleged in your behalf with some appearance, but not much substance. First, that notwithstanding all this, Catholic Princes do live safely, and govern quietly, and therefore to conclude these doctrines are inconsistent with government, is to conclude that cannot be done, which we plainly see is done. Next, that while men are men there will be quot capita tot sententiae; that nature is not furnished with means to confine the fancies of private men to the limits of strict reason; that these are problematical Questions which particular men dispute into probabilities, but for which the Church is not responsible, having never either defined, or otherwise engaged her authority for them. To the first I reply that a certain King took poison so long that it became food to him, and yet I think poison for all that a very dangerous thing, and very inconsistent with health. The Princes you mention have Antidotes undoubtedly with which I am not acquainted; but let the Antidote be never so good, poison will be poison still. And truly I think Sir Thomas Moor did honestly, when finding some passages in the book which Henry the 8th. writ against Luther, of which by the King's command he had the perusal, and in which he thought the Pope was complemented a little too far, he represented to the King that one day possibly they might fall out, as afterwards they did, and that then He might wish some things unsaid. While those Princes and the Pope continue friends, they need not much apprehend, and possibly are not much acquainted with what passes amongst Scholars, for they are sure enough that, for his own sake, He will not use his power against those who maintain his interest. It may be too with Princes as with other men, who to compass some end upon which they are passionately set at present, value not a mischief, much more considerable than the loss of their present pretences, which is farther of. If the Pope can assist either French or Spaniard, the Divines of that King whose part he takes may say any thing freely; and Stasemen who have little esteem of Shoolmen, will think the Pope sufficiently overreached, when for a few pleasing words they have got peradventure a Town or Province. So that your Princes seem to be always playing with the Pope at Vy Politics; in which game they think their steel to his quills advantage enough; though I should think the advantage is clearly on the Pope's side: for as he cannot make stakes, he hazards nothing; but if Trump ever turn of his suit he bids fair for all. Defend me gladio, & ego te defendam calamo, peradventure was no such unequal offer. Besides, they may possibly have the art to turn his credit to their advantage, and make use of it to keep their Subjects more obedient and more in awe. It may be they have some of them no better original Title to all, or part of their dominions than his Authority, and then a blind man may see what reason they have to uphold it. It may be these, it may be other reason's sway with them; but whatever they are or may be, I think 'tis plainly hatching a serpent in their bosoms. For let us suppose the Pope and a Catholic Prince at odds, a thing so far from impossible, that 'tis not unusual. 'Tis in his power, you'll say, to continue Catholic whether the Pope will or no, and then He's safe, for he gives the Pope no hold, it being only Heresy upon which he can fasten. But is this true, that nothing will do it but plain Heresy? Has not Zecchius taught us that the Pope may deprive Princes of their Kingdoms as oft as they do any great hurt in the Church? And will not the bad example of contrasting stubbornly with the supreme Pastor be interpreted a great hurt in the Church? Has not Fransciscus Bozius informed us, that by reason of the supreme Monarchy in all things, temporal Laws may be made by the Church, and Kingdoms taken away for just causes? If we ask what these just causes are! Santarellus answers, That Princes may be punished and deposed, not only for Heresy, but for other causes; for their faults, if it be expedient; 
Ant. Sant. in Her. Schis. Apostas. etc. c. 30. & 31.  if Princes be negligent, if their persons be insufficient, if unuseful. How few Princes are there who fall not under some of these qualifications, or at least may not be judged to do so, when the Pope, and He their Enemy, is to be Judge? As certainly it were a crime greater than the greatest of these, to seek the determination of these things from any else. This negligence, though, stumbles me a little, for it seems a general, and something a captious word; and I think it would be to the satisfaction of those who are concerned, if it were defined as soon as might be, how many hours a day a King is to give audience, that he may not pass for negligent. But the man for my money is Thomas Bozius, who tells us plainly, That the Church the Spouse of Christ, 
De Jure Stat. l. 1. c. 6. p. 6.  and Queen of the world, may as often as the order of the whole doth require, etc. transfer the proper rights of one to another, as a secular Prince may cast down private men's houses for the beautifying the City, or impose tribute for the weal public; That he may thus justly do, although he hath not erred from whom such rights are transferred to another; so the Pope gave the Indians to the Spaniards. 'Tis an honest fellow this Bozius, and cares not for mincing matters. Give me the man that speaks out. But what think you, is Heresy the only unkinging crime, when you see any great harm; negligence, insufficiency, unusefulness will do it? When innocence itself is no security, and the best King of the world may be turned out of his Kingdom, and that justly, if another be thought able to govern more handsomely? What handsome work will these Maxims one day make in the world, if they be suffered to take deep root? For my part I cannot see but Catholic Princes, as secure as you make them, are no less concerned than Protestants to beware of them, and weed them up quickly and effectually. But is it so easy to scape the crime even of Heresy? I doubt not, and am filthily mistaken if this word Heresy have not as comprehensive a sense, and be not of a nature as pliable as Popery amongst us; and if managed with equal dexterity may not prove equally serviceable. The late King was the honour of Protestant Religion, and certainly had never a Subject more unmovably fixed in it than himself: And yet malice made him pass for a Papist, at least inclined to Popery, do what he could, and by that imputation principally undid both him and the Kingdom. Henry the third of France was possibly as hearty a Catholic; yet all his industriously affected bigotteries, his great beads, and Friars weeds could never clear him from the stain of Heresy maliciously fixed upon him, till he fell with a fate different from that of our glorious King, in this, that his Kingdom suffered more no longer, his own end was more private, being execrably murdered by a private Parricide, whereas the barbarous injustice done to our King was heightened by the formalities of public justice. So that as far I see Heresy is as dangerous as Popery with us, and as hard to be avoided. But let us consider a little. Sancius has told us that it is to be held with a right Faith, that the Principality of the Bishop of Rome is the true and only immediate Principality of the whole World, etc. If this be right, 
L. 4. c. 1. p, 319.  the contrary sure is wrong Faith, and wrong Faith I think is Heresy. Thomas Bozius, who never fails, will tell us that Christ committed to St. Peter (the Carrier of the keys of eternal life) the right both of the Terrene and Celestial Empire, as Pope Nicholas saith; from whom we have it, that he is without doubt an Heretic who taketh away the rights of the Terrene and Celestial Empire, committed by Christ to the Church of Rome, and saith it is lawful so to do; and for that he shall be an Heretic in such his assertions. 
P. 152.  And Carrerius, that the Bishop of Rome is the highest Father and Man of the world. and the universal Vicar, and Lord of the world, and that all others depend upon him as their builder, and that otherwise if one should place the Emperor by himself in respect of his temporalities he should grant two beginnings, which were Heresy. In good Faith Sir, I cannot think otherwise, but if these men say true, your Catholic Princes, let them keep as fair as they will with the Pope, are all Heretics in their hearts. And than what follows? Hark what a Cardinal, and, which I grieve, an English man hath published to the World: 
Card. Allen against the execution of justice p. 87.  The Cannon Laws, says he, being authentical in the lawful Tribunals of the Christian World, do make all Heretics (not only after they be namely and particularly denounced, but by the Law itself ipso facto, as soon as they be Heretics, are de jure excommunicated for the same) to be deprived of their Dominions. 
Philopater p. 154.  Another tells us, The whole School of Divines and Canonists do hold, and that 'tis certain and of Faith, that any Christian Prince whatsoever, if he shall manifestly deflect from the Catholic Religion, and endeavour to draw others from the same, does presently fall from all power and dignity by the very force of human and divine Law, and that also before any Sentence of the supreme Pastor or Judge denounced against him, and that his Subjects whatsoever are free from all Obligation of that Oath which they had taken for their Allegiance to him as their lawful Prince: and that they may, and aught (if they have forces) drive out such a man, as an Apostate, or Heretic, and a Backslider, from the Lord and Christ, and an enemy to the Commonwealth, from all Dominion over Christians, lest he infect others, or by his example or command avert others from the faith, and that this certain definite, and undoubted opinion of the best learned men is wholly agreeable and consonant to the Apostolical doctrine. Upon these grounds it was publicly maintained that Henry the third of France was lawfully murdered before any sentence of excommunication passed against him, because, though in hidden crimes formalities be required, yet evidens notitia facti sententiae locum tenet, & non percipit formam publicus dolour. And that he had long lived as an excommunicate person de facto, 
de justa abdic. Hen. 3. l 4. c. 2  though the law had not past sentence upon him, for favouring Heretics, for Simony, for entering into league with Heretics (the Queen of England, and King of Navarre) for seizing the goods of the Church without the Pope's privity, and other offences against the Bulla Caenae. Upon these grounds I have seen that execrable Villain Chastel, who attempted upon Henry the Fourth what Ravillac after performed, defended by a public Apology; and I see no attempt can be so barbarous and inhuman which may not be defended by them So that, by your favour, your Catholic Princes are not secure; Quiet they may be, but never safe, and for their quietness they may thank the lucky conjuncture of those stars which have influence upon the times of their government, and restrain the malignity of these Doctrines; Otherwise if they be not very cunning in school subtleties, they may chance forfeit their Kingdoms, and all their power per triccum de lege without ever knowing when or how, live all their life time in the erroneous belief that they are very Kings, and those who obey them their very Subjects and be deceived all the while. But be it as it will, this answer which would justify the innocence of these doctrines, by the security of Catholic Princes comes pitifully off; when instead of securing it takes them quite away, which is a fine kind of security; for it is plainly a much easier task to maintain by these doctrines that there is never a true Prince in the Christian world, no not in those whom you call Catholics, than it is to maintain the doctrines. And yet when all is done, 'tis nothing to purpose neither. For our Prince and People are of the number of those whom your Church takes for Heretics, and can expect no other treatment from you, than what you maintain belongs to Heresy. Wherefore however your Catholic Princes satisfy themselves, I neither see how he can be satisfied of the fidelity of such of his Subjects, as approve of these opinions, nor with what face they can pretend security and protection from him, Pray think of this, while I pass to what I put for a second answer, and what I have sometimes heard alleged.  
These opinions, will you say, are moot-cases probably disputed amongst private men, in which the Church is neither engaged nor concerned. Pray God this Church be not as slippery a word as either Heresy or Popery, These men who thus magnify the Pope certainly are not of our Church: and I believe Presbyterians and fanatics of all sorts will disown them too, so that even for pity, and not to make Infidels of them, you must needs take them into yours. But they who speak so kindly of the Pope need not fear disowning. We see they are both acknowledged and esteemed, and are all Capita alta ferentes. Now 'tis strange your Church should be unconcerned in men whom you account Orthodox and learned, and whose books come out with the approbation, of those whom your Church commissionates for that purpose. Methings the Act of her Officers, acting by her Authority, should be taken for the Act of the Church; Unless you will have the Pope pass for one of those careless Princes who deserve to be deposed for negligence, and be ignorant that his Officers abuse their trust, and licence unsound doctrines, and this at Rome itself, where a body would think sufficient care is taken that nothing pass which is not esteemed Orthodox. Bring me a Book printed at Rome, wherein the contrary doctrine is maintained, and I will acknowledge there is some sense in this answer. In the mean time let me give you a few instances, and those at home, by which it may appear the Pope is so far from ignorant and unconcerned in these positions, that he approves and countenances them, and that both shortly and constantly.  
In the reign of King James, upon the occasion of the execrable Powder Treason, the Oath of Allegiance was enacted by the pious wisdom of the Parliament, to secure his Majesty and Successors from the like attempts for the future. The Superior of the Catholic Clergy, at that time was one Blackwell. He, after much and long debate of the matter with his fellow Priests, at last resolved the Oath according to the plain and common sense of the words, might with a safe conscience be taken by the Catholics; and afterwards both took it himself, and, by his admonitions to Clergy and Laity recommended it to them as a thing both lawful and fitting. The greatest part of the Clergy, who repaired to London upon that occasion, followed the resolution of their Superior; and had the Pope been either a little more ignorant, or a little more negligent, I think it had been better for you. But he was more vigilant than stood with your profit. Cardinal Bellarmine was then alive, and he writes a letter to Blackwell, persuading him to make amends for his fault, which he compares to the falls of St. Peter and Marcellinus, whereof one denied Christ, the other committed Idolatry. The Pope himself sends a Breve to the English Catholics, and forbids the Oath; and when they remained yet unsatisfied, and made some exceptions of some wrong information, and the like, usual in such cases, justifies the first Breve by a second, and so utterly dashes the Oath, that ever since the generality of Catholics have refused it; and those few, who continued constant in defence of the lawfulness of it, were looked upon little better than Apostates The great maintainer of it Withrington, a learned and honest man, was so briskly prosecuted, that he was fain to take sanctuary in a Prison, and glad he scap't so. If after this these things must still pass for probabilities, probabilities are things in which I have been much mistaken; for I thought a man had been at liberty to take which side he pleased; but I see a man may as safely maintain Heresy, as that side of these probabilities which displeases the Pope. Neither can I see how the blame can be taken from him, and cast upon private men. For private men would have gone right enough, if He would have let them alone, and had not overswayed them by his authority, and an authority so absolute and merely such, that neither He alleges, nor I could ever see any reason to conclude that Oath unlawful even in your own grounds.  
In the year 47, when upon the interposing of the Army, under the command of the then Sir Thomas Fairfax, it was hoped the difference betwixt King and Parliament, and disorders of the Kingdom might have been composed, and Catholics comprehended in the general settlement, in case they could vindicate their principles from inconsistency with civil government. Three Propositions were framed by the Catholics to that purpose, importing that the Pope or Church had no power to absolve from obedience to civil Government, or dispense with word or oath made to Heretics, or authorize any to injure other men upon pretence of their being excommunicated, etc. The Priests were consulted about the lawfulness of these Propositions. They met some of most orders amongst them, and all agreed they were lawful. The Laity rested in their judgement, and the most considerable of those who were at hand subscribed them. This was not very public, and at a pretty distance; and if it were known a body would think there was no great harm in it, unless it be made prejudicial to Christianity for men to live with their neighbours as honest men and good subjects should do. But they thought otherwise at Rome. The vigilant old Gentleman there, who must be pretended ignorant of what passes in Italy and at Rome, got an inkling, condemned, whether the proceed or propositions I know not (for he was so wise as to keep his censure to himself, and never let it see light) and punished such of the Actors as were willing to be punished. I know of one, a principal one too, who was sent beyond sea, and there did penance in a house of his own Order for the grievous fault of having been honester than the Pope would have had him, and I presume made good resolutions of amendment; and becoming a new man and a pious knave for the future: And I suppose the rest did the same, unless chance, or peradventure stubbornness excused them. Unhappy Catholics! amongst whom 'tis punishable even to be honest. How truly has a learned man observed, that you have the choice of being thought either bad subjects at home, or bad Christians at Rome; But you must feed upon the fruit of your own ways. In the mean time pray lay the blame of these things no more upon private men, when the Pope so manifestly and industriously takes it upon himself, and He may reserve you know what he pleases.  
But take yet another instance, and that even at this time upon the Stage. Upon the restauration of his Sacred Majesty, the Catholic Irish Clergy hoping to obtain the effect of some agreements made in the time of the troubles which the then Lord of Ormond the King's Lieutenaut there, commissionated a certain person now living, and sent him over into England to solicit those pretensions in their behalf. And finding a profession of Allegiance necessary to their business, they framed one which they sent to their Procurator to be made use of in their names, and is now in every body's hands, and generally known by the name of the Irish Remonstrance. This Profession not appearing sufficiently authentic, the Procurator causes a meeting of such of the Irish Clergy as were then at London, and informs them of the necessity of a general subscription to it. One Bishop, and three and twenty other very considerable men subscribed it, some seven or eight held back, professing yet the thing both Catholic as to the doctrine, and lawful as to the action; but ask what they should get by it? But the game being once a foot it was presently and hotly followed by the Pope's Ministers, Cardinal Francis Barbarin at Rome, the Nuntio at Paris, and Internunce at Brussels interpose with all concern imaginable. They speak, they writ against it, pretend it condemned before hand by two Popes (meaning the Brief of Paulus V about the Oath of Allegiance, and the censure of the three Propositions by Innocent X. which never saw light) and prevail with the Divines of Louvain to censure it. They countenance, they encourage, they promote he Dissenters, and brand the Subscribers with the odious names of Seditious, and Schismatic, and Heretic, and Apostate. One, and he a venerable man, was told to his face, He had better have died than subscribed. But the greatest bustle was about the Procurator himself. Him they set upon with all Arts they tempt him with fair offers, and the promise of very considerable preferments: That failing, they persecute him all they can; they make his Superiors (for he is a Religious man) cite and excommunicate him, all diffame him, and at last have brought things to that pass, that few believe him a Catholic, and those few keep their charitable thoughts to themselves for fear of being infected with the dangerous Contagion. So that so far as I can perceive, if the Subscribers were the honester men, the Dissenters were the wiser. If these opinions must still pass for probable, about which Divines may busy themselves without interresting the Church, you have a strange and unintelligible way of government amongst you. Methinks probabilities should have equal dealing, and Divines left to scuffle about them, as well as they can, without partiality on either side. So I think 'tis with your other Probabilities in the hot disputes betwixt the Jesuists and Dominicans, Scotists and Thomists and the rest. Let them beat the Pulpits as hard as they will, the Pope looks quietly on, lets them cool and take breath, and too't again, and this is fair play. But to depress one side, and cherish the other, and this vigorously and constantly, is something odd for probabilities. In the name of wonder are Schism and Heresy probable amongst you, into which one side of your probabilities always runs? Or is it an approved custom amongst you to excommunicate for probabilities? In fine, say what you will, I cannot think otherwise but that these probabilities of yours are as improbable as any thing in the world. Then for your other pretence, that the Church all this while interposes not: either all words universally have conspired together to abuse us, and make us understand nothing, even of the plainest, or there is no sense in it. One would think that Church in Spirituals, is as state in Temporals. Now if two Princes fall out, and the King of France for example, assist the one with council, and forces, and the endeavours of his Ministers, we say usually, and I think pertinently, that the State of France is engaged on that side, and he who should deny it, would be thought deficient either in his language or his wits. For can a more pleasant paradox be invented, than that an Army marching by commission of the King of France, owning his orders, and He their actions, were all the while but a company of particular men in whose do the King and State are unconcerned? Now for King say Pope, and for State say Church, and where is the difference? Notwithstanding as I am not much acquainted with quirks, and fear the subtle Distinguo, and the triccum de schold as much as the triccum de lege, I will not undertake but that amongst so many school Physicians as you have, some Logical plaster may be found out, which you may apply to this sore: But this I see that whatever effect a distinction may have in the Schools, it will do no manner of good in the world. For if the men of your Church persecute other men, they will be no less persecuted whether your Church do this as a Church, or under some other formality. The world is a material thing, and formalities altar not its settled course. Discredit, and want, and pain are material things, and when they fall upon a man, he will be ill at ease in spite of all the belief formalities can afford him: And if material Subjects rebel against a material King, and drive him out of his material Kingdom, I think it matters not much what formalities there were in the case. I suppose he will be little the better by learning his Subjects did not act as Subjects, nor treat him as a King, and his new acquaintance with those subtle empty forms I fear will yield him small comfort. If your formalities can preserve or restore Kingdoms, if they can make honest men of Traitors, if they can restore the credit of private men, and relieve their wants, and ease their distresses, I shall acknowledge they are worth harkening after: But if they can do none of these things, the Schools that invented them, had even best keep them to themselves, and much good may they do them. The world has neither need nor use of them, for real mischiefs are not cured by verbal distinctions. We complain that the material Governor of your Church arrogates to himself a power dangerous to Princes, and that the material men of your Church maintain him in it, and both together hotly prosecute All who are not as hot as themselves. Tell not me the Church indeed does this, but not as a Church; for as a Church, or not as a Church, she does it; and if the mischief be done, what matter is it how? Withrington ended his uncomfortable days in prison; Walsh is in a fair way to the same preferment: Thousands of people were ruined, thousands destroyed in Italy and Germany upon the contests betwixt the Pope and Emperor, in France upon the Holy League, and what happened in those places may happen every where. 'Tis a remedy for these mischiefs which I look after, and security that they shall not one day happen here, not the formality by which they were done: For in fine a formal plaster to a material wound, is but good words to him who is hungry. We had our formalities too, and our distinctions in the late war, and heard enough of the politic capacity, and the personal capacity; but they neither abated any thing of the public misery, nor the deserved punishment inflicted on the witty Authors. Our Pagan Juries found them guilty for all their acuteness, and their sophistry had no effect with the illiterate Hangman and undistinguishing Halter. We had the formalities of Justice to boot, but they served for nothing but to render a fact execrable in itself more barbarous and more inhuman. You may have more and other formalities, but after all they will be but formalities, and not a jot more useful than ours. You shall permit me to conclude with a Dilemma, which I would recommend to your serious thoughts. Either your Church it engaged in these Positions, or she is not; if she be, she is unexcusable for holding them; if not you are unexcusable for not renouncing them, when without injury to her authority or your own consciences you may.  
I would gladly receive an answer to this Paper, or rather a return, for I do not think any answer can be made. However I entreat you by all our friendship to let me know what you can say. Having found you both rational and ingenious in other points, you must needs satisfy the curiosity I have to know whether you will disclaim your Church or your reason: for certainly you must make bold with one, and the best I suppose will be but a bad choice. As you are all brought up in a wonderful reverence to your Church, I know it will be hard for you to acknowledge any thing amiss in Her; and yet on the other side I think it will go against the hair of your temper to part with your reason, and, that you may be thought a good Son of your Church, be content to be thought no good man, as certainly he is not, whose actions are not warranted by his reason. Pray think not the worse of my friendship that I put you to so hard a choice. Reason is the measure of friendship as of other virtues, and we cannot sin against friendship by acting according to reason. Besides, Friend, you live in a Communion disapproved by Law, and unmaintainable by Reason; and I think 'tis the part of a friend to tell you so. Wherefore once again pray think not the worse of me, and be assured that whatever you think I truly am  
Your Faithful Friend and Servant.   

SIR,  
I Received your long Letter, with the obligation you lay upon me to answer it, and hearty wish you had made use of the power you have over me in some other occasion. This subject is a kind of Candle to Flies, with which if they happen to play, they have great luck if they do not burn their wings. You are at your ease, and may freely talk at pleasure, secured by the Laws, and at defiance with the Pope. The case is otherwise with us, who believing of the Pope as we do, and subject to the Laws as we are, can neither be without respect for him, nor apprehension of them, and though we could speak even clearness itself, 'tis all to nothing but we fall foul on one of the Rocks. Notwithstanding, since I owe much to your friendship, I would gladly preserve, if I can, your good opinion both to myself, and Religion, of which you speak so charitably, and nothing like an enemy, and besides, would not be guilty of her shame by confessing she has nothing to answer, nor of my own by continuing in an unjustifiable communion; I obey you with this request, that you will take care to preserve me from the hazard I run by serving you, and let this Paper be seen by none but such as mean as well as you and I. First then I am so far from thinking our friendship shockt by your free proceeding, that I take myself and Religion both obliged to your candour, and wish from my heart I may as well justify her, as you have your friendship. And for my Church, there are so few who look upon her with equal eyes, that this pity of yours, as just and charitable as it is, is yet more rare, and I cannot see it without as much acknowledgement as satisfaction. And yet, as strongly as you discourse every where, I think you have reason no where more than in this particular. For so it is: if we say nothing, and, when we are often and loudly provoked to speak, still hold our tongues, we have a bad cause, and such, for which nothing can be said; if we speak, we are insolent, and cannot keep ourselves quiet when we are well. And after all, 'tis the Combat betwixt the Knight and the Giant still, as you have rightly observed. But the world is the world, where Reason, as much our nature as it is, cannot hinder, but Chance, and Interest, and Passion, and several humours to which men are subject will have their share in the conduct of things. Wherefore without complaining farther of what complaints are not likely to remedy; I think it best to address myself to my defence.  
And the first point of it shall be to declare I mean not to defend any of those opinions which you have alleged with so much sharpness, for in truth I think them not defensible, and that there is not more sharpness than justice in what you say. Not but that to own, who would take the pains to peruse the Authors you have cited, some of those Say possibly might not appear so ugly as they do in your Paper. For there is a great difference betwixt words taken as they lie in the whole Context, and singled out from their fellows, who might peradventure to some of them afford some tolerable explication. But besides that I conceive that labour not necessary for my purpose, I have no kindness at all for the Doctrines, and not enough for the Authors to prevail with me to undertake it. I have heard from those who meddle with Controversy, that their greatest difficulty often is to preserve the credit of private men, whom, because they are of the same Communion, they are so unwilling to affront, that they have much ado to preserve the Church from the contagion of their Errors. As my nature is a little more blunt, I have no such difference for them, and think it but just, that Qui pergit quae volt dicere, ea quae non volt audiat. Let them shift for themselves on God's name, or let those defend them who approve their Maxims. For my part I hate them hearty, and think it but a preposterous Charity to be so tender for the credit of those who betray the credit of the Church. Allowing then for reason all you say against those opinions; of which I think as ill as you can do, I yet conceive your reason fails in the inference you draw from them. That true Religion cannot teach Doctrines inconsistent with Government; That a Commonwealth is not safe in which such Doctrines are either tolerated or connived at; (that is, when they come to be instilled and get credit with the People; otherwise while they remain in the Schools, I should think the danger not very great, for Kingdoms are not overturned by Syllogisms:) Farther if you please, that the Doctrines you have produced are such Doctrines, I freely grant you: But that our Church does teach such Doctrines I deny, and notwithstanding all you have said, if you still preserve your unbyass'd candour, hope to make the contrary very evident.  
And first, because with you I think my authority may signify something, for you know I will not tell you a lie, you shall permit me to say something of my own knowledge. I was born you know of Catholic Parents, bred up in Catholic Religion, and have lived some part of my time in Catholic Countries. I have been at their Schools, heard their Catechisms, their Sermons, their Discourses; and by the care of my Friends, and some pains of my own, think few of my condition more fully instructed in that Religion. I assure you faithfully I was never taught any such Doctrine, nor ever heard the Church taught it. On the contrary, I have been bred up in this belief, that obedience to my King is not only truly a duty, but, a duty truly required by Religion, and this persuasion was so well settled in my heart, that I yet remember how great and surprising a horror the late Rebellion caused in me, when I was too young to judge otherwise of it, or any thing else, but as I found it contrary to the sentiments which had been instilled into me. I have heard indeed of the opinions you cite, but as of extravagancies of bold men, and when I came to the age of judging of things myself, found, that though they were held by men living in Communion with the Church, they had yet no warrant from the Church to hold them, nor any better ground than their own mistaking reasonings, and so continued to detest them by judgement as I did before by Education. Now this answer, which it seems you foresaw, you have endeavoured to prevent, making use yourself of an Artifice of Rhetoric, to bar me the assistance of Logic; for you would persuade me, that to distinguish the material Church from the formal, or the man from the Churchman, is an idle airy nicety, which is of no use in the World. But truly one of us is much mistaken, for I think on the contrary, that nothing is more obvious, nothing more familiar, let me add, nor more necessary, and that even to your material world as you call it, which without such distinctions would quickly run into confusion. The World is made up of men, and men of several qualities. The same person is both a man, and a Rich and Proud man, a Powerful and an Angry man, and we see Wit and Ambition, Goodness and Ignorance, Learning and Fantasticalness often coupled together, and a hundred several mixtures of several qualities united all in one material Man. Now consider what fine work there would quickly be, if every one of these useless formalities, as you call them, must be chargeable with all actions; if Riches must be taken away because the Rich Proud man has scorned, and Power because the Powerful Angry man has wronged his Neighbour: if Wit must bear the blame of Ambition, and Goodness the miscarriages of Ignorance; and Learning the Errors of Fantasticalness. Reason is our very Nature, and yet I think there are few to whom Nature has not given Logic enough to see that we do not always act as reasonable, and who are not learned enough to separate the Animal from the Man. To speak yet plainer, a severe Father, a harsh Master, do they not sometimes use their Children and Scholars unreasonably, and so as utterly to spoil them? A corrupt Judge, does he not pervert Justice, and render those Tribunals, from whence men expect the relief of Injuries, the seats of Oppression? What then? Must the Father, and the Master, and the Judge be condemned for the faults of the Man, and none of these powers left in the world because they have been, and daily are abused? I think you and every body will confess that this were unreasonable, and yet your Argument spares none of them. For 'tis all one to Children and Pleaders, if they be materially oppressed and misused, whether this be done by the fault of the Office or the Officer; and small comfort it is to tell them that their Judges and Masters acted in their case as passionate men, not as Judges and Masters, for they remain oppressed still, and the formality relieves them not. Kings themselves are men too, and not exempt from the failings of Mortality. Our Country indeed has this, amongst other things, to thank God for, that she has been extraordinarily blest with good Kings: but History affords examples of such elsewhere, as have been unjust, and cruel, and tyrannical; And if you will not allow the King, and his sacred Function to be free from the aspersions to which the Man is sometimes liable; let me tell you, Friend, your Doctrine will be more dangerous and more inconsistent with Government than the Papal pretensions. Now as in all these cases, and a hundred more which happen every day, and every where Nature teaches us to examine the formality from whence the mischief proceeds, and endeavour to provide against that, and let the rest alone, so I think it ought to be in the case of the Church. We condemn not Learning, because some learned men are fantastical, nor Riches for the pride of rich men, why must the Church be condemned for the fault of Churchmen? Authority, and Goodness, and Wit are not blemished by the errors of those who have them; the Power of Fathers, and Masters, and Judges is, and must be preserved in the world, however Severity and Covetise daily abuse it: and if this be so in all the rest of the world, can you think it reasonable the Church alone should be exempted from the general rule, and be more answerable for the faults of those who live in her communion, than Authority for the faults of bad men in Authority? The faults indeed should be taken away, but the Church let alone. And truly had your Reformation as you call it, gone no farther than to retrench abuses, such as these you mention (and who knows but there may be other?) I might peradventure have called it so too: But instead of abuses to take away Office and all, and defy the supreme Pastor of the Church, and alter the whole face of Religion, there by your favour you reform a little too far. For the same Logic which makes the Church responsible for the errors of Churchmen, makes the Office responsible for the faults of the Officer, and that is to take all Offices out of the world, where men will be men, and liable to be reduced from the path of virtue in spite of all preventions possible in such a nature as ours. I hope by this time that distinction does not appear so airy, and useless as you imagined: you shall permit me to add, that possibly you are no less concerned in it than We. For we are not the only men; amongst whom Principles inconsistent with Government may be found. Remember who they were that ruin'd England by the late War, and were guilty of things, which to dilate were as unsavoury as needless. They were so far from Popery these men, that fear of Popery was a chief Engine employed in the mischief. Sad fate, by the way, and preposterous wisdom! to destroy ourselves for fear of being destroyed, and run into Fire and the Sword for fear of Ink and Paper. Neither is England the only example: Scotland, and the Netherlands, and Germany, and France have felt lamentable effects from the Doctrines of men who would take it for an imputation to have learned any thing of the Pope. So that it is very plain, that the Papal is neither the only, nor the only dangerous King-deposing power in the world. 'Tis as plain that these men are neither Infidels, nor of our Church, so that you must even exercise your Pity too, and take them into yours. Or if pity will not prevail, I hope at least you will take care so to defend your Allegiance, a not to overthrow your Church; And unless you make your Creed consist but of Eleven Articles, I see not how you can disown the Communion of these men; for 'twill be a strange Catholic Church which communicates neither with the Church of Rome, nor her Adversaries. Wherefore if your Argument be good, and Religion must answer for the faults of those who profess it, there is no remedy, but Princes to be secure must banish all Religion, and People turn Atheists to be honest men and good Subjects. Now whatever answer you would give to one who should charge such wicked principles upon your Church, because they are maintained by numerous, and learned, and famous men amongst you, the same I give for mine. I believe for all your Pique to formalities, you would go near to distinguish your Church, or Believing men from the Erring men, and say you communicate with the Men but not with the Errors: So you shall permit me to say for mine, and this farther, that whatever you say, you must of necessity either condemn yourselves, or absolve us.  
'Tis not that the force of your Argument drives me to that way of answer which I have chosen; it being easy to show the Church's innocence even in your own way, and without the help of your disliked formalities. Your Argument in short is this: Learned men in the Church hold wicked Doctrines, therefore the Church holds them▪ If that Argument be good, this likewise of necessity must be good: Learned men in the Church hold those Doctrines false and wicked▪ therefore the Church does so too, for the same authority cannot but have the same force either way, and the Deniers have as much power to remove the imputation from the Church, as the affirmers to fix it upon her. You have cited, if not all, yet, the most considerable of those who maintain them, and they make some ten or twelve. 'Tis pretty odd that the judgement of ten or twelve men must needs be taken for the judgement of the Church: But let that pass; by the same rule, the judgement of ten or twelve of the contrary must conclude the judgement of the Church for the contrary. Wherefore if I produce as many and as famous men for the Negative, as you have done for the affirmative, 'tis without more a do a drawn match, and nothing being proved either way the Church is absolved by the Law of nature, by which every one is innocent who is not proved nocent. But what will become of your Argument if for one of your side I produce two, if ten, peradventure twenty on the contrary? Either you must confess the Argument has no force, or the Church innocence efficaciously proved by it, unless peradventure you can find some subtle formalities by which you will maintain your single man is stronger than my ten or twenty. Now all this is not only possible, but already done to my hand by Charon the learned defender of the Irish Remonstrance, who in his Loyalty asserted. what betwixt Canonists and Divines, Schoolmen and Fathers, Popes, Councils, Universities, Kingdoms, & c ' has made a Catalogue of more than two hundred and fifty Defenders of the contrary Doctrine. You see then I had no necessity of flying to Formalities to answer your Argument: For by your own Rule and Method the Church is proved not to hold the Doctrines you mention, and not only so, but plainly to hold the contrary; nothing being more unreasonable in the world than to give it with the ten against the two hundred; or to think that ten is a sufficient number to engage the Church one way, and two hundred not sufficient to engage her the other. But looking a little nearer unto it, me thinks it is of kin to Boccalin's Age, pargeted four fingers thick with appearances. Strip off the gay Jacket of pretty smartness in which you have dressed it, and there will remain as little substance, and less soundness. Learned men, say you, say such things, therefore the Chureh says them. What if you be as much mistaken in your Antecedent as Inference, and that they prove not learned who say them? Words, you know, are slippery things and you have well exemplified in divers. I fear this term, Learned men, and Learning, is no less slippery, nor less abused than those which are most so. But not to be too severe, a Divine is a Learned Man, can he therefore prescribe Physic? The Metaphysician, the Natural, the Moral Philosopher, the Mathematician, the Physician, the Lawyer, are all esteemed learned men, but their learning is confined every one to his proper profession; out of that, their authority is of no moment, and they may with all their learning be very ignorant in matters which belong not to them. Now consider a little, The men whom you have cited are, excepting one or two, all Canonists, and esteemed able men in that profession, but every one knows their profession consists in declaring what the meaning of the law is, and what the intention of the Lawmaker, and if they go beyond this, they exceed the bounds of their profession. Our Question now, whether the Pope have, or have not, such a power, to what skill does it belong? To the Law? Plainly nothing less. What the Pope has Commanded, and what he meant by the words in which he has expressed his commands, is as far as the Lawyer can go; but what power he has to command, and how far that reaches, is quite out of his Sphere. If I mistake not, for 'tis a study in which I have no skill, the power of the Lawmaker is a Principle supposed, not proved in the Law; for if a Lawyer go about to prove it, keeping without the limits of his own Art, he argues a posteriori thus, He has commanded, such and such things, therefore he has power to command them. And this is a proper, and good law proof, where the first Maxim is, that the Law is just, and the power of the Lawmaker still supposed. If the Lawyer venture upon other proof, he intrenches upon another's skill, in which possibly he may be very ignorant. And he that will not be satisfied with this, nor admit his other Maxim, Lex non facit injuriam, but excepts against Law and Power, and all, has no remedy but to seek satisfaction elsewhere. In fine, what the Pope claims from Christ, belongs to the Divine; what from Reason and the force of Nature to the Philosopher: only what he claims to the agreement of men belongs to the Lawyer, and in this he ought to be heard, in other things he is Suitor ultra crepidam. Your discourse therefore, which appears so trim and gay in the dress you have given it, has no more strength than the authority of a few men in a matter wherein they have no authority, and if they had, is overpowred by a greater, and this methinks you needed not have thought so unanswerable.  
Were you now an Adversary with whom I should think fit to use the Right established by the Laws of disputation, I should say no more; for an Answerer has fully discharged his part, who has shown his Opponents Argument concluding. But since we are Friends, and write, not to convince, but inform one another, I shall return to my old way, which I take to be the way of Nature, and endeavour to show you more minutely how unreasonable it is the Church should be charged with those errors. Church signifies a Congregation of Faithful, and Faithful Men who have Faith, And since Men, cannot be without Reason, nor Reason without working in them, 'tis unavoidable that besides the persuasions lodged in them by Faith, men will have others which proceed from their Reasons; to say nothing of Passion, and the Animal Nature. which has its efficacy upon the Faithful as well as all the rest of mankind. Now as in the rest of the actions of men, Nature forces us to look into the Principles from whence they proceed, and attribute every one to his proper cause, which if we did not, all would presently turn into confusion: So we must here, and consider in the actions of the Faithful. Whether they act as Faithful, or as Men. And those Actions which proceed, not from Faith, but Reason or Passion, are no more to be charged upon the Church, than the Covetise, or Cruelty, or whatever faults of men in office upon their Offices. And in all this there is so little subtlety, that every body does the like almost in every occasion. There remains only to examine upon what Principle those who assert these errors proceed, whether upon Faith, or some other: Faith is a reliance upon some Authority, and in our case, the Authority of Christ, who alone is acknowledged the Author and Revealer of all which we are to believe. Wherefore of any point in question, it must either be pretended that it was revealed by Christ or it cannot be pretended that it belongs to Faith; and if any maintain it upon other grounds, so far he acts, not as a believer, but as otherwise qualified. Now there are in the world two principal ways, by which claim is made to the Authority of Christ; for that which we maintain is Faith, and that wherein we do not engage his Authority, neither of us say is Faith, or that they act as faithful, who upon reason, or experiment, for example, maintain any thing. The World hopes from the learned industry of the Royal Society the sight of many truths yet hidden from her: but all their endeavours can never make Faith of them, nor concern your Church in them, as considerable members of it as some of them are. For they go not your Churchway of Faith; They look, not into Scripture, but Experiments, and act as Learned, not as Churchmen. What they shall discover to the World will be revealed not by Christ, but by them; and if any believe them, they will have no Christian, but Society-Faith. Such is the case of our Church. Tradition in her known method, by which she pretends to the Authority of Christ. If any will run upon their own heads, and discourse and maintain things, and never look into her Rule; She can be no more concerned in their proceed than the Church of England in those of Gresham College. For since Faith is that by which she is a Church, and Tradition that by which she comes to Faith, people must engage Faith if they will engage the Church, and Tradition if they will engage her Faith. Wherefore whoever goes about to prove any thing otherwise than by Tradition, uses not the method to come to Faith I mean, the method approved by our Church, and this conclusion, whether true or false, neither reaches Faith, nor aims at it, and by consequence cannot belong to the Church or Congregation of the Faithful. Now reflect a little upon your Authors, and see if they go this way to work, and the first thing is the consent of the present Age; for Tradition signifying the consent of all Ages, 'tis a madness to pretend it for that which is not believed so much as by the present. Do they, or can they even offer at this while they see themselves contradicted, by men as learned, and far more numerous? While all the Universities of a great Kingdom disapprove and condemn their Doctrine, and their Books are burnt in the face of the World by public Justice, and the men who do this acknowledged good Catholics all the while? Do they, or can they pretend the consent of former Ages, while they know all Antiquity agrees, that for many Ages Popes were so Supreme in Spirituals, that in Temporals they were Subjects? Such they acknowledged themselves, and as such the Emperors treated them. When and how, and upon what occasion they came to be temporal Princes is known to all who are, knowing in History: A condition, by the way, which he who envies them, little understands, or little loves the good of the Church, with which 'twas much worse when Popes were hindered from doing their duty by the unjust violence and oppression of powerful men amongst whom they lived, Do they allege the undoubted Testimonies of the Fathers of the Church assembled in a general Council? Nothing of this appears in what you have produced. The men themselves are most of yesterday, All, many Ages since Christ; and there needs no second Argument to prove any thing that it is not Faith, if it can be proved that it began in any Age since the first, as these opinions plainly did. But consider their Arguments. They are either grounded upon some odd interpretation of Scripture, as the order of Melchesedech, the two Swords, St Peter's walking on the water, and the like; or else upon some deduction and reasoning as weak as the water which they mention. And this methodt though per impossibile, it could prove the thing true, yet could never prove it to be Faith, There are many things in the world which are so acknowledged to be true, that they are withal acknowledged not to be Faith. Was it taught by Christ; Was it believed by Christians, Semper, & ubique, & ab omnibus? Till this appear, it neither is, nor can be Catholic Faith: But that which I insist upon is, that this method is plainly resolved into Reason, and can no more engage the Church of Rome, than the experimental learning of the Royal Society the Church of England. The Authors you produce rely not upon the Authority of Christ, testified by an uninterrupted conveyance down to us, but upon the strength of their own discourses, which if they be weak and fail, the Church never undertook that all in her Communion should discourse strongly; Neither can she herself do more than testify of the truths delivered to her, and they are such, and were so delivered. This testimony is all which can be expected from her as a Church, (speaking of what concerns us to speak of; her power to make Ecclesiastical Laws, and the like, are no part of our case.) if she fail in this, and either testify that to be delivered which was not so, or suppress any thing which was delivered blame her; but for this, that some Members in her Communion have weak Reasons, or strong Passions, if you blame her, consider the confusion you will bring into the World, which I have so much dilated before, that to repeat it would be tedious here.  
But will you have a taste of the Church's sense of these things? Consider the Hymn made in the first Ages of the Church, inserted since by public Authority into her solemn Office, received by all the Faithful, and used on the Feast of the Epiphany. Non eripit mortalia qui Regna dat coelestia. Can the Church, which prays thus, be thought to favour the deposing power? Or can her sense appear more plainly, than in the consent of an universal practice? But let us look upon her in a Council. Wickleff amongst other errors had advanced this Proposition: Populares, &c, The people may at their pleasure correct their offending Lords, 
Con. Const. Sess. 8.  And this amongst the rest was condemned by the Council of Constance. To the same Council was offered another Article worded in this manner: Quilibet Tyrannus, etc. Every Tyrant may and ought lawfully and meritoriously be killed by any of his Vassals or Subjects, even by secret plots and subtle insinuations or flatteries, notwithstanding any Oath or League made with him, not expecting the Sentence or command of any Judge whatsoever. This they condemned too, and hear if you please in what terms: The Holy Synod, desirous to rise up against this Error, 
Sess. 15.  and to take it wholly away, declares and defines this Doctrine to be erroneous in Faith and Manners, and rejects and condemns it as Heretical, Scandalous, and giving way to Frauds, Deceits, and Lies, Treasons, and Perjuries; Moreover it declares, and decrees that those who pertinaciously assert this most pernicious Doctrine are Heretics, and as such to be punished, according to the Canonical Decrees. Behold the most exorbitant of your Doctrines directly and authentically condemned: And though I am not ignorant that some of them may find in the expressions as they lie in the Council, wherewith to evade her Censure, yet I conceive her sense so clear, that those evasions can appear no better than evasions. For 'tis a plain case, She taketh Duty to Princes to be a direct point of Faith, since she condemns the contrary of Heresy; and since she allows not even Tyrants to be killed, I conceive she declares plainly enough against the deposing power, whose chief ground is, that deposed Princes are no longer Princes but Tyrants; for without doubt of all sorts of Tyrants, those are the least such, and have most title to the protection of the Council. (I beseech you mistake me not, as if I thought myself, such Princes indeed were Tyrants, but I speak in the Language of those who think so, and I maintain they are Condemned by the Council, even though their impossible ground were supposed true.) And if her expressions are not so direct and formal as to avoid all cavil; The reason is obvious: Councils do not make Propositions to be condemned, but condemn such condemnable ones as they find made to their hands. She condemned that Doctrine in the terms in which is was proposed to her, and by her carriage shows what it is to expect from the Church in whatever terms it be proposed. People may talk at random in the Schools, where 'tis proposterously thought a piece of learning to be able in the morning to defend one thing, and in the afternoon the quite contrary: but let these men and their learning appear in a Council, and they will go near to be asked, since they know that to give obedience Prepositis etiam discolis, and that not only for fear, but for Conscience, was taught by the first Masters of Christianity, and evidently believed, and practised ever since, and ab omnibus, and ubique, and semper, by what warrant they bring in an exception to a Rule established by Christ, and tell us 'tis to be understood if the Pope command not the contrary? They will be urged to produce their authority for this exception of theirs, to name the Father, that taught it, and Children that believed it: to make out its Universality both in Time and Place; and if they can do none of all this, as plainly they cannot, 'tis well if they scape the censure of Heresy themselves, who are so forward to fix it upon others. Subtleties, and the knack of talking, and the opinion of learning will avail them little where the constant Rule is Tradition, and not delivered, and not to be believed is all one. But I go too far, it being neither my business nor intention to dispute the Question. Thus much, when I was once in, I could not choose but say, and I cannot but add, that if the contrary to your doctrine be not sufficiently defined already, it may be when Princes please, and in such terms as they please, when ever they think fit to use their interest for the calling of another General Council. In the mean time I conceive there is never a King in Christendom, who has not credit enough with the Clergy of his own Dominions to cause them to condemn those opinions. All the Universities of France have done it already, and I presume no Catholic Churchmen, if they were required by their Prince would refuse to follow their example. Mean time what belongs to me is, that those opinions are not Doctrines of the Church, since they do not so much as pretend to the only Rule by which she judges of Doctrines, and their only grounds are private deductions of private men, with which if the Church should be charged, and Faith made responsible for the miscarriges of Reason, it would be an injustice whose consequence would quite invert the order of the World, and leave neither Church, nor Prince, nor Magistrate, nor Policy, nor Oeconomy on Earth.  
But if this be so, how come so many men esteemed learned to assert such extravagances, the Pope to allow them, private men to endure them? I answer, how can it be otherwise, while men are men, and the World the World? Pope's are men, and have long time both been, and lived in the State and splendour of Princes. Can it be thought strange, if Flattery have found access to a Court, and amongst so many, if some have given ear to it? They are generally very good men, but of late better versed in Polities, that Divinity. For the most part they are well skilled in the Law, especially the Canon, an useful knowledge for Church Government, but for Divinity they use or rely on others. And if men who pass for able Scholars, and great Divines flatter them with an addition and power, and tell them it truly belongs to them▪ and that they can and will maintain it; Can you, who think Miracles are ceased, wonder they should be content it be thought true? They see many who oppose it, are their professed enemies, and if it be perpetually incultated to them, that the rest have got a tang of that enmity by conversing with them, how can it be but they will be persuaded of it at last? We see the often repetition, even of known lies, cheats the teller at last into a belief of them. And if once they come to be persuaded the thing is true, it were wonder they should not discountenance those who oppose it, and cherish those who maintain it. Then if one Pope declare any way, the rest will all go on the same road, unless some very extraordinary action stop their journey. They understand the Art of Governning very well, and see that if one Pope should undo what his Predecessor has done things would soon fall into disorder. So that they are slow, but very tenacious in their resolves, and 'tis the hardest thing in the world to get them to alter their course, And all this is so far from strange, that it were strange it should be otherwise. Then for learned men; consider how much Ecclesiastical Promotions depend upon the Pope, and what plenty of means he has to gratify all who appear for his interest. While one hopes for a Canonry, another a Bishopric, another has the dazzling purple glittering in his eyes; They will all be apt to say what they think will please him in whose power it is to  them all. And as the Schools go now it is not hard to say almost any thing, As men are of several tempers, I will not deny but some may be truly persuaded of your Doctrines and defend them with an upright conscience, thinking that to exalt the Pope is truly advantageous to Religion, and beneficial to the World: But I believe you will not find many so qualified. Those you have named, are some the Popes own Subjects, most Italians or Spaniards, upon whom He is known to have particular influence, and if we judge that in this exalting the Pope, they might have an eye to the preferment of themselves, I think it will be no rash judgement. Of latter times those have appeared the chief sticklers in this quarrel, who are thought to have the greatest dependence upon Rome, So that of all produced and produceable in behalf of those opinions, I deceive myself if the number be not shamefully inconsiderable, against whom there lies not a just suspicion of interest, and of whom it may not reasonably be judged that Hopes or Fears, or something besides pure Conscience swayed their judgements: And Interest, you know, is a just exception against a Witness in all Courts. As for private men, what would you have them do? Consider that all Catholics look upon the Pope as the chief Bishop in God's Church, and supreme Pastor of the whole Flock. If they hear any thing said overlashingly of him, can it be expected they should be forward to speak what they think, till a due occasion urges them? Or have less respect for him, than common civility uses to every body? For when any thing is said advantageous to a person with whom we converse, if we believe it not, we keep our thoughts to ourselves, and think it rudeness to oppose it to their faces. Besides, as I said at first, this meddling of private men with the concern of Princes, is the Flies playing with the Candle. Withrington quite burnt his wings; Walsh has fairly singed them; and if people learn wariness by the harms of other men, I conceive they are not . As frightful and threatening as the Idea is, which you have made of this danger, no Prince, that I know, thinks it great enough to deserve that they should interpose, and I think the man very foolishly wise who will pretend to understand their concerns better than themselves, or better know what is fit to be done. People of our private Sphere, see but one thing; Princes see that one thing in likelihood better than we, and a hundred more of which we never dream, and till they stir themselves, for private men to obtrude their politic Ignorance upon them is so far from laudable, that it is well if it be pardonable; neither will their forwardness signify more than an over busy diligence, and peradventure saucy unquietness. The old Monks wise counsel, Sinere res vadere ut vadunt, is as necesiary in the world as a Cloister. Besides, for English Catholics in particular, they have somewhat more reason to keep silence, while their speaking is sure to be discountenanced on the one side, and not sure to be protected on the other. You may perceive by Caron's Collection that Catholics are, so much mealy mouthed men towards the Pope when there is fit occasion to speak what they think, and God forbidden that Foreigners should be better Subjects than English men. I am sure they were Catholics who declared in Parliament, that the imperial Crown of England is, and, at all times, has been free from all subjection to the Pope. And provided the Statute of Praemunire against such abuses as were then found inconvenient, And they were Catholics who refused to repeal this Statute in the days of Queen Mary, when other Laws made against the Pope's Authority were taken away. But if you will have a touchstone of the fidelity of English Catholics, look a little upon the year 88 The Pope had stretched his Authority as far as it would go, and proceeded to Excommunication, Deposition and Absolution of his Subjects from Obedience to her, down right Commands to assist her Enemies; and this Authority was backed by the Power of a great Prince, in their thought and language, invincible. Besides, the Title of the Queen born in time of a Marriage declared lawful by the Pope was not free from dispute, which carried the inclination of Catholics to the Title of Scotland, since happily introduced, and which I hope will long happily continue; and this was, if I mistake not, the true reason of the jealousy and severity of those times against them. Notwithstanding the unusual concurrence of so many and so great temptations, They stood firm in their Allegiance; and both our own and foreign Writers testify, that neither the subtle Arts of the Politic Spaniard, or the enforcement of the Pope's Authority could prevail to make any Party here; but that the most learned and esteemed of the Priests, by a solemn and authentic Writing, acknowledged the Queen, notwithstanding she was excommunicated and deposed by name, to have still the same Authority and power as before, and as much as any of her Predecessors; and the Laity cheerfully and universally offered to hazard their lives in defence of their Prince and Country, and that as private Soldiers, there being too much suspicion in the jealousy of those times to pretend to commands. In fine the Spaniards were so ill satisfied with them that the Duke of Medina, Admiral in that expedition, at his return, plainly told the Duchess of Feria, an English Woman of the Family of the Dormirs, that had he prevailed, no difference had been made betwixt Catholics and others more than what the Sword could have found. Of later times the whole Nation is obliged to bless God for the happy fidelity of some of them, and we had still been groaning under our late miseries, if this traitorous Religion had not principled, even poor men into a fidelity stronger than the temptation of Gold. And 'tis not like the men, who act thus, would refuse to speak in fit occasion. Things have been written, even since the return of his Sacred Majesty which have been peradventure more zealous than seasonable, but however which sufficiently discover the inclination of Catholics to say all that can be expected with reason from them, when the conjuncture is proper. In the mean time to consider the Dilemma you so earnestly recommend to me, I must tell you it concludes not. We are inexcusable, say you, if we renounce not those Positions, when without injury to the Church's Authority, or our own conscience we may. Why so F A! is there no excuse for an action but this, that 'tis unlawful? People before they do any thing use to consider the Why as well as the What, and examine not only whether the action be allowable, but whether it be convenient. But not to insist on this, I will offer you a fair bargain. Do you your part, and I will do mine, make it reasonable, make it fitting to do what you desire, and I will do it. And that you may be satisfied I am in earnest, I promise you faithfully to renounce these Positions as fully and solemnly as you can desire, whenever you shall make it come to pass that so to do is my duty, and not only a bare gratification of your curiosity; and, in the mean time, assure you I hearty abhor them and always did. The Child lies now at your door F. A! If you truly desire the thing should be done, provide a good Why we should do it. For my own part I tell you truly, I shall take it very unkindly if after this I pas● still undistinguished among those whom you think deserve suspicion and distrust; and since you have urged me to this Declaration, conceiving you are obliged to take care that it be not wholly useless. Pray let me put another Dilemma to you. Either your credit is great enough to preserve us from the inconvenience of speaking plainly, or it is not: If not, we are blameless, who are not forward to run into inconveniences to no purpose; if it be, 'tis you are , who urge us to an inconvenience which you can, but will not, remedy. Mean while to be ill looked upon and ill treated, if we make ourselves appear honest Catholics, and not so much as have protection for being Catholics, is to be acquitted of Burglary, and found guilty of Felony. Methinks it is something unreasonoble to make the maintenance of pernicious Doctrines the ground why we should be liable to punishment, and keep us every jot as liable if we disclaim them. Not but that we are very sensible of our present quiet, and bless and pray for the merciful Authors of it: But yet the Law is the Law still; And it is very uneasy to have no better security either of Estate or Life than a bare stop to the course of the Law, which may be removed at pleasure. For my own part, as I am but John Porter, so I hope 'tis a modest and pardonable ambition, if I wish to continue so with security. And since an extravagance in others, which I cannot help, may make you jealous even of my Frock and Cords, I shall gladly Endeavour to cure that jealousy by any remedies which Reason can prescribe, or Honesty take. But till you can procure thus much favour, to urge a testimony of honesty so ungrateful to him, to whom we own, and must pay a fitting respect, and when we have given it, to continue us still in the condition of Knaves, is hard in itself, and harder from you who have professed so often that you punish not for Religion, but Treason. Religion indeed is the most comfortable cause of suffering, and that which if I must suffer, I would choose; But yet suffering is suffering still, let the cause be what it will; And though I esteem Patience very much, and desire the Virtue with all my heart, I know not why I should desire the occasions to exercise it, and believe it is better not to need live Pigeons than to have them.  
Coming to review what I have writ, I find the hasty course of my pen, intent upon the main body of the discourse has passed over several branches, which deserve to be particularly taken notice of. As when you say, that so the mischievous Doctrines be allowed, it is all one whether they be allowed by the material Church, or the formal. To which I reply, the difference is very great. For were the Church truly engaged for them, there were no remedy, but either to own the Doctrines, or disown the Church. But if she be not engaged for them, as she is not, one may detest the Doctrines, as I do, and yet remain in the Church. Again, when you make Church and State equivalent, I conceive the difference appears sufficiently in what has been said. State signifies a body of men united under such a Government and such Laws; and what the Governors do, the State is said to do, for to the Governor it belongs to command in public concerns, to the rest to obey. Church signifies a body of men living according to Doctrines and Laws established by Christ; and because, as men, they cannot but have an act upon other Principles too, those actions only and Principles which are derived from Christ, can properly belong to the Church, in the rest they are to be looked upon as men, not as faithful, Besides, you have produced some few who have the boldness to entitle those Errors, as gross as they are, to Faith and make the contrary Heresy: To which I answer, There are a great many strange things in the world, and peradventure few stranger than that men should get the reputation of learning, and yet not know so much as what Faith is, or at least the means by which it has come to us. The Regia Via, as Councils call it, of Faith, is both plain in itself, and plainly recorded in the Monuments of the Church, and that people should think to come to it by their own little byways, and make Faith of that which is publicly and unreprovably contradicted by the far greatest part of the present Church, and has no footsteps at all in Antiquity, and yet pass for learned men, is a thing I have more disposition to admire than unriddle, farther than in the short hint I gave of the abuse of that term by a wrong application. If aught else have scaped my observation, by what I have said, I presume you will easily guests what I would say to it. Give me Leave to end with reflecting a little upon the difference there is betwixt these opinions maintained by the Adversaries of the Church of Rome, and maintained by her Members, For to flatter neither side, Iliacoes intra muros peccatur & extra. You communicate with deposing-principled men, as well as we; though, thanks be to God, neither true Protestant, nor understanding Catholic communicate with the Principles. Now for our Church I have shown why this extravagance of some of her members is not imputable to her, and hope you perceive how unreasonable it is that she would answer for the deviations of those who will not walk in her way, nor make use of her Rule. Some Popes indeed have behaved themselves otherwise than I wish they had: But since they are Princes as well as Bishops, I conceive it will not be thought strange if all great men are not Saints, and if Humane Policy, and a desire to increase their greatness sway with them as with other Princes. If they attempt upon the rights of others, Kings I hope know well enough that they bear not the Sword in vain, and can as well tell how to defend themselves, and their Subjects from wrongs incident from them, as from other men; and sure I am that Catholics are so far from being restrained by their Religion, that it obliges them to stand by their respective Sovereings, in defence of his just Rights against the Pope as effectually as against any other. I could allege that of those Popes who have gone farthest, none has defined any thing concerning these matters in those circumstances, which even those Divines, who attribute most to them, require as necessary to make it believed, or ex Cathedra, as they call it. But I conceive it needless, it seeming to me sufficiently evident by what has been alleged already that our Faith and Church are not to suffer by these exorbitancies; and commonwealths can secure themselves by their own power. But Friend! the case is otherwise with you. Your men allege Scripture for these errors, and engage your Rule of Faith, and how the honest Protestant (who in this case undoubtedly has the true sense of Scripture on his side) can handsomely disengage his Church from a scandal to which is pretended the authority of her Rule, is difficult to apprehend. If people come not to their journey's end who refuse to take the right road, it is no wonder to any, nor blame to the Guide, whose office it is to show men the right way, but cannot make them follow it. But your men pretend they keep the way your Church shows them to Truth, and yet arrive at Error. And when Error and Truth pretend both to the same Rule, and that the Rule of your Church, I should think your Church deeply concerned to consider by what means it may be decided which is Heresy, and which Faith. In short our erring men, since they pretend not our Church's Rule, can never fix their errors upon the Church, nor advance them to Faith, nor beyond the degree of opinions: Yours, since they pretend to the very Rule owned by you, must needs, till a certain way of proceeding upon that Rule, or interpreting Scripture be settled, render it doubtful to those, who truly desire to be guided by your Rule, which of the two is the doctrine of Christ and are therefore wonderfully more dangerous to the Church than ours. Farther, abstracting from Passion or Interest which may be equal in both; ours, because they have no firmer ground than their own deductions, are more reclaimeable, and may at any time relinquish their errors, without offering violence to their Faith and Religion: Yours, because they pretend to your Rule of Faith, are apt to mistake their misguided Fancies for Religion (as we have seen in the late confusions the title of Saints appropriated to wicked men) and so become fixed and unalterable in them? for which reason they are also much more dangerous to the State, as they were before to the Church. In this inequality of cases, I do not know the Church of England has proceeded so far as ours in the Council of Constance, or condemned these Errors by any Authentic Censure, though in my opinion it were proper for her to consider how much her Rule, upon which depends her own stability, is concerned in them. Mean time, instead of reproaching our several Churches with the errors of their several Members; It were I think more to purpose. I am sure more charitable, to endeavour that all Errors might be taken away on both sides, that by one Faith and one Baptism we may all serve our one Lord and God, and reunite into one Holy, and Immaculate, and Glorious Church, free from those spots and wrinkles which our unhappy Divisions have too too much, and too long brought upon her. This is what the desire to obey your commands has suggested to me in answer to your Letter: You will pardon the length of it, which, as it is beyond my expectation, so 'tis beyond my power to remedy, and give me leave to hope it may prevail with you not to abate either your Charity to my Religion, or kindness to.  
Your very humble Servant.    

THE THIRD and FORTH OF THE CONTROVERSIAL LETTERS: OR THE GRAND Controversy Concerning The pretended Temporal Authority of POPES over the whole Earth, and the true Sovereign of KINGS within their own respective Kingdoms, Between two English Gentlemen, 

The one of the Church of ENGLAND,  
The other of the Church of ROME.    
LONDON: Printed for Henry Brome and Benjamin took, at the Gun and Ship in St. Paul's Churchyard. MDCLXXIII.   


FRIEND,  
FOR all the thanks I own you, and all the Compliments 'twere fit I made you, take this acknowledgement, that you have answered beyond my expectation; and this assurance, that I will consider very seriously what you say, and make such use of it, that you shall have cause to think your labour not unprofitably spent. But yet I cannot but complain of the secrecy which you enjoin me. I for my part am so well satisfied of your way of writing, that I cannot but think others will be so too, and that this shiness of yours is injurious both to yourself and the World; and because unjust commands are not to be obeyed, let me tell you frankly I mean not to confine your Papers to my closet. They shall be seen if it please God, by more Eyes than mine; but yet not to fall absolutely out with you, I will divide stakes, and so communicate what you writ, that there shall be no suspicion of the Writer. This I promise you very faithfully, and to do it with more exactness, lest your name should be discovered, I engage myself to conceal my own. Then if John a nokes get all the praise from you, the fault be upon your own Head. For the rest to deal plainly with you, I find myself I know not how. Things will not settle with me, and though out of the mouth of a good Protestant, I believe what you say would have passed good reason; yet when I reflect you are a Papist, that is, if you will pardon my Freedom, of a crafty insinuating Generation, I have still a kind of grumbling.  
This Papist mars all; and though I think myself as free from prejudice as other men, I find 'twill not do. I can not but fear being trapan'd. You have I must confess said many things very well, and more than I thought you had been allowed to say, but you are reserved still. 'Tis true you give Reasons for your reservedness, which I can not answer; but whether it be that my plain nature would have every thing as plain as myself, or that curiosity be like Love where too much reason is thought . I could wish in this occasion you had used less Reason and more Freedom. Speak out the whole truth, man, and be a good Protestant; otherwise own the whole Falsehood, and be a Papist of the first magnitude. I fear your half Catholics are in as bad a Case as Montaltos half Sinners, who shall be damned for not sinning enough. For my part if I would be a Papist, I would be a Papist to purpose. Hang this motley Religion, this half Rome, half Geneva Faith, which gets a man neither credit nor security. I would be as good a Catholic as Bellarmin for his heart if I would be one; and if I thought your Catholic Faith would save me, I would take order mine should be Catholic enough sure, and never boggle at any thing should be offered me. But to leave Jeasting, let me tell you, though I know not how you will relish the Compliment, you writ so well that you must needs write again. I may possibly hereafter give you more trouble upon this Subject, when these fluttering Fancies of mine are settled into a steady Judgement. I know not how satisfactory your Answer may prove when I have fully examined it: If it do not, I reserve myself the liberty to tell you so; and in the mean time conceive you could not choose a more useful Argument, than this of the Pope's power. He was a man famous for wisdom who, 
E. Salisbury Treatise of mitigation, p. 20.  as I find cited in one of your own Authors, was long troubled that some clear explication of the Papal Authority had not hitherto been made by some public or definitive Sentente; and this both that those Princes, who acknowledge it, may be secure from the fear and suspicions of continual Treasons and Attempts of Assasins; and those Princes who do not acknowledge it, and yet desire to think favourably of their Subjects, may certainly know how far they may rely upon their fidelity in temporal matters, who differ from them in what concerns their Conscience. Consider besides what confusion, what Wars and Bloodshed we find in History upon the contests betwixt the Spiritual and Temporal Power. People distracted betwixt the fear of making Shipwreck of their Faith or their Fortunes, know not how to avoid either Heresy on the one side, or Rebellion on the other. If the World were once well informed of the just bounds of those two Powers, and knew wherein they consisted, and how far they extended, such contests would either not happen, or if they did People would readily know which part to take. However it be, pray satisfy me at least in this particulars. The s●●●stance of your Answer consists in this, that the Doctrines I objected belong not to your Faith or Church. But does not this belong to your Faith, That the Pope is the Vicar of Christ upon Earth? I think you would not take him for a Catholic who should deny it. Now if Christ gave to the Pope the Power he had himself, since He without doubt had all both Spiritual and Temporal Power, how can you avoid being obliged, and that by an Article of your Faith, to acknowledge that the Pope likewise has all manner of Power, and may justly and lawfully do all those things which your Letter calls the exorbitant fancies of private men. This Friend exceeds the bounds of probable opinions, and intrenches strongly on your Faith. Wherefore you shall not deny either my friendship or importunity an Answer to it. But answer so, if possibly you can, that these doubts or umbrages, or what you perhaps may find a better name for, than I can give a reason of, may trouble me no longer. Will you permit me to deal plainly with you? I suspect you have said more than you are allowed to say, and more than I should be allowed to hold if I were of your Communion. The Jews beware not more zealous to make Proselytes than you are; and what know I but you may have a design upon me, and say more what you think may induce me to think favourably of your Religion, than what your Religion gives you warrant to say. Let me therefore entreat you to say nothing but what a good Catholic may unreprovably say, and what I may be secure shall not be he disallowed by your Church. And since I can promise you no other fruit of your labour, for I do not think you hope in earnest to make a Proselyte of me, accept the assurance I give you, that you shall at least firmly bind to your Service,  
Yours, etc.   

FRIEND,  
YOU know the power of your friendship over me, and you make use of it. For aught I see mine is just the case of handsome-handed Tom Fool, whom that praise betrayed to so much labour, that he complained his dexterity had almost crippled him. Pray God my easiness, or your importunity give me not one day more cause of complaint than he had. But since you will not be denied, 'tis best to obey you without more a do. For your unquietness I could laugh at it, if its deeper root did not give me too much cause of grief. As sincere as you are you are prejudiced Friend, and this unquitness of yours is the struggling betwixt reason, which you plainly see, and a passion so secret that 'tis hid even from yourself, which hinders you from entertaining freely what you see. Not but that I know your candour well, and am enough persuaded you are not conscious of opposing reason wilfully, and would be your Compurgator of sin against the Holy Ghost. But thus it happens: Ever since the change of Religion, and the bad attempts of some Catholics in the days of Queen Elizabeth, heightened by the horrid Powder Treason, it has been perhaps the direction of the State, however the employment of Pulpits, to give bad impressions of Catholics and their Religion. And this has been done so long, and so universally, and so vehemently, that since you find the effect of it, I may reasonably judge there is none who has not his share, and who has not found an Idea of Catholics more according to what they have been represented then what they are. As the Nature and circumstances of men are different, and some are framed to a sweet uprightness, others to an unwayward crossness. Again some converse much with good Catholics, some with bad ones, some with none, and who have no other knowledge of them, but as they hear of strange animals in Afric or the Indies, so men are differently affected towards them: But I believe there is none who has not more or less of the bad Idea so much endeavoured to be fixed upon them, and that no hearty Protestant can hear things said to the advantage of Catholics or their Religion without that unquietness at lest which you find in yourself. It were to be wished, and perhaps expected from the Charity of Pulpits, that the example of that wise and merciful King, against whom that Treason was plotted might have been followed, and the Innocent distinguished from the Guilty. But whatever might or should have been, we see what is done, and you find the effect in yourself, whereof that you may not think reason the cause, consider a little that while we pass generally for ignorant stupid people, led blindly into all the follies to which our blinder Guides our Priests conduct us, you object craft and subtlety to me. Reason, Friend, is more uniform and more of a piece, and objects not so crossly. For what you say of our Jewish zeal of gaining Proselytes, I must avow to you I am of St. Paul's mind, and wish non tantum se, sed etiam omnes qui audiunt hodie fieri tales qualis ego sum, exceptis vinculis his. I am taught to love my neighbour as myself, & because I am satisfied the way in which I am is the way to Heavean, I wish every body would choose it. But if you think me a dangerous person for this, you must think Reason a dangerous thing, which he that fears to be trapand, let me tell you is more trapan'd by his own fears. You talk pleasantly of half Catholics, and motley Religion, but I think you expect no answer, and need not be put in mind, that Religion as sacred as it is cannot hinder men from using their weak apprehensions, and disorderly fancies, and irregular deductions as well upon it as every thing else; and he that shall take all that for Faith, which every even faithful man offers him, may too truly say inopem me copia fecit, and find perhaps at last that too much Religion has left him none at all. For the new trouble with which you threaten me, I hope the more you examine my answer, the less cause of exception you will find against it. Nevertheless if you do prove dissatisfied, I will endeavour, when I know why, to satisfy you as well as I can.  
The noble Person cite was unquestionably a wise man, and his saying is a wise saying, and I am of his mind, and wish such an Authentic definition made in this matter with all my heart. But Friend, I am no Pope to make one, and though I am persuaded an Authentic definition of truth might produce very good effects, I fear an unseasonable dispute might do as much harm. Those two Powers like two boundless Seas, have sometimes struggled together, and in their unresistable Waves buried multititudes of unhappy People. We may bless God we live in a calm; disputes might raise the billows again, and who knows when they would be laid. I could speak with Freedom to you, but since you talk of communicating what I say to others, consider that one will mistake ignorantly, another pervert wilfully, a third deduce rashly, and in a matter of this consequence where our duty required by the Law of God is concerned, all interpose eagerly, and the most ignorant being still the most forward and full of noise; the great good you fancy by setting bounds to the two Powers, would prove clamour, and bustle, and inextricable confusion, and if any miscarriage-happen all will be imputed to the Author, who as innocent as he may otherwise be, can never yet acquit himself of meddling with what he has nothing to do. No Friend, let us preserve the Majesty of Supreme Powers in an awful distance, and submit to them with the reverence of a quiet obedience, and not make them cheap by unseasonable disputes. Princes and Bishops are both sacred, let what belongs to them be so too, and not touched without the excuse of necessity or obligation of duty. But People should know how to behave themselves when the two Powers are at odds. For my part I conceive this is a Case which may safely be left to God's providence, and that those who do amiss, sin more by Passion then Ignorance. Let a man truly mean to do well, and bring an upright Conscience to he Action, and I believe he will not want as much knowledge as is necessary for him. This I see, that God being Author of both Powers, it is not possible they should interfere, but by an abuse of the one, and that abuse will be visible enough; and when the case happens those who do not want honesty will not miscarry for want of knowledge. In the mean time I should be very sorry to see the case happen, I will not contribute towards it so much as even to mention it. Obedience is the duty which God and my condition require from me, and in the performance of that I will endeavour to be found unblamable, and leave disputing to those who value the praise of a witty or subtle man, above that of a faithful and quiet subject. Besides though I might possibly hit of something more than is usually said on the argument, which in my Opinion uses to be treated lamely enough, yet I take it much to exceed the sphere of my ability. In two words it is a question which I neither could sufficiently handle if I would, nor would if I could. But for your second question, since it trenches as you say upon Faith, and we are taught to be ready to give satisfaction to any who demands an account of the hope in us, I shall obey the Apostle and you to my power. You tie me nevertheless to pretty severe conditions, for what is there, or can there be so plain which mistaking zeal will not reprove? or what other remedy can I bring to settle your quietness then Reason, which yet I conceive to be be the very thing which causes it? The only expedient I can find to speak as you would have me is to say nothing at all, I mean of myself, farther than to deliver, upon occasion, may sense of what others say, but answer your objection in the words of such men of whom you may be secure they will run no hazard of reproof from our Church; and if your Reason can as well rectify yourself as their Authority will justify them, I hope you may at last be satisfied. Remember then if you please that I take not upon me to determine dogmatically what is true, and what false, but only to acquaint you what may by a Catholicek unreprovably be said. Peradventure I have no reason to be displeased with the bargain, for dogmatising being so much out of Fashion in this age, it is a great deal more easy as well as more fashionable to deliver what other men say to the point, then to handle and conclude the point itself.  
But to your difficulty. The Pope, say you, is acknowledged by Catholics to be the Vicar of Christ on Earth; and I acknowledge that he is so. From this you frame such an Argument; What power Christ had, the Pope has; Christ had all power, therefore the Pope has so too, and this by an Article of our Faith. Before I answer, let me entreat you to consider what work 'twould make if it were applied to Princes instead of Popes, which I think it may as well be. For if the Pope be the Vicar of Christ on Earth, Princes are the Vicars of God on Earth; and that I think is as good and reaches as far: And if his Vicarship import a power to dispose of Kingdoms, why will not their Vicarship import the power of the Keys? and why may not he, who purely upon the score of Vicarship, comes to the Pope for a Title to a Kingdom, as well go to his King for Remission of his sins? If the Pope must be said to have the temporal Power as well as spiritual, because Vicar includes both, I see not how Princes can be denied to have the spiritual, since they have the temporal, and are Vicars as well as he. This Doctrine would make brave work, and introduce a very pleasant Reformation into the World. But I forget that I am to say nothing of myself. I must therefore undertake a needless labour, and show from other men that Princes are the Vicars of God; and though the unanimous consent of every body might well excuse me, for none that I ever heard of either doubts they are so, or boggles to call them so when the phrase comes in their way, yet I must not break my bargain. Let us then consider what this word Vicar signifies, and in such plenty, or rather such a multitude, for I wish the plenty were as great as the number as we have amongst us, we cannot sure be ignorant what a Vicar is. We see he is one who supplies the place of another, who not able for other respects to attend to his proper employment, delivers it over to be executed by him whom we call his Vicar. Kings we see govern the World, and the Government of the World being the proper work of Providence, they do the business which properly belongs to God. But the nature of God being of that unsociable excellence, that we are not able to bear the immediate Rays of divine brightness, and converse with him whose Face none can see and live, our nature requires he should do this by such substitutes to whom we may address ourselves, and have recourse for what we need. Since Kings then supply the place of God, or do that which he should do, and which he truly does by them, they want nothing to the perfect notion of his Vicars but this, that they be appointed and empowered by God for that end: With this difference notwithstanding, that Vicars are necessary for other men, from the imperfection of their natures who make them, because they cannot attend to two employments at once; but are necessary for God from the superexcelling perfection of his nature, and imperfection of ours, which cannot bear an immediate converse with him. Now that they are immediately substituted by God to govern the World under him or in his place, since 'tis not likewise to be denied, I hope a few Authorities will serve to prove. And yet I cannot tell whether that hasty word Immediately will down with all. For some Divines put this difference betwixt the Spiritual and Temporal Power, that the first is immediately from God, the second by mediation of the People, subjecting themselves by way of Election, Succession, or such other means by which Governments are either introduced or established. And for my part, though I were not tied from dogmatizing, irritare crabrones is a thing from which I have much aversion, especially in a question which I conceive of an extraordinary importance. For whether the power be from God immediately or mediately, so it be from God, I conceive it extends as far and is as much to be obeyed. Saul and David were immediately appointed by God, and yet I think as much obedience was due to Solomon as either of them, and that St. Peter's Successor, whether Clemens or whoever else, was as much Pope as he. And if election made the power mediate, we see Popes are not Popes till they be elected. There are indeed who by this mediation understand a reserve in the people to reassume in certain cases the power which they have given: But this I must needs think very abominable, and shall not stick to say whoever reproves me for it, is himself more reprovable. St. Paul has taught there is no power but from God; so I believe: and if any think they have found better Masters of Faith, I for my part mean to stick to those which Christ has given me. But let us see what is said by those whom no Catholic I suppose will reprove. The Council of Paris speaks methinks to purpose, when it says: 
L. 2. c. 5.  No King must think his Kingdom left him by his Progenitors, but truly and humbly believe 'twas given him by God: And that earthly Kingdoms are not given by men, but God, the Prophet Daniel testifies, Dan. 4.14. & 5.25. & Hierom. 27.5. But to them who think their Kingdoms given them by Succession from their Ancestors, and not rather by God, agrees that which God reproves by the Prophet, They have reigned, but not by me; 
Osee 8.4.  they have been Princes, and I knew them not.— Wherefore whoever Reigns temporally over other men, 
L. 5. l. 21.  let him believe his Kingdom was given him not by men, but by God. St. Austin de Civit. Dei; Let us not attribute the power of giving Kingdoms and Empires to any but the true God. Tertullian; They (Empeperours) know who gave them the Empire; 
Apoleget. adv. Gent. c. 30.  They know 'twas he who made them men, and gave them souls. They are sensible 'twas God alone, under whose power alone they are, second to him, and after him first before all men. Again; From thence is the Emperor from whence the man before he was Emperor, from thence the power from whence the spirit or breath. I am not good at subtleties, but methinks 'tis hard to make that power mediate, which is not from Ancestors and Succession, not from men, but from God alone. More refined wits perhaps may make it hang together that Kings have their power from God alone, and from something else too, and that their power is mediate, in which none interposes but himself; and prove a gift from the people of that which God himself gives, as if his power were under Age, and could not make a valid donation without them: and when they have done such fine things, we are still just where we were; for 'tis acknowledged of all hands, even by those who least favour the temporal power, that it is from God; and if it be so, those who have it from him are his Vicars. But yet you shall not take my word even for so much. He was a Vicar of Christ himself, who speaks thus to the Emperor: 
Anast. 2. Ep. un.  The breast of your clemency is Sacrarium, the sacred depository of public felicity; that by you whom God has commanded to preside as his Vicar on Earth. And before him Eleutherius in an Epistle to King Lucius our, and I think the World's first Christian King, preserved in our Antiquities, tells him 'twas needless to send him the Roman Laws, which the King desired, but wishes him to take the Law of God, and the advice of his own Nation, and frame such as were proper for his Country, as being himself the Vicar of God. After him another uses these terms to the Emperor: 
Steph. 6. ap. Baron. an. 885. n. 11.  Although you similitudinem geras, which I know not how otherwise to English then represent the person, or are the Vicar of the Emperor Christ himself. The same phrase is found in Pope Hermisda. 
In Ep. ad Rom. c. 13.  St. Ambrose speaks plainly; Let them know they are not free, but under the power which is from God, for they are subject to their Prince, qui vicem Dei agit, who is the Vicar of God, as to God himself. S. Tho. of Aquin. If he be Author of the work attributed to him, 
De Regim. Princ. l. 2.  says a King is obliged with all care and diligence to look after Religion, not only because he is a man, but because he is a Lord and a King, and Dei vices gerit, is the Vicar of God, on whom he chief depends. To omit Nicolaus de Lyra, Fevardentius, and more than a Letter would hold, or you have patience to read (for I think you are furnished with a sufficient stock of that virtue, if you can forgive the folly of saying so much as I have done, which seems to me not much wiser than to go about seriously to prove there is such a place as Jamaica, or has been such a Man as Harry the 8th.) I shall only add the Authority of the Roman Pontifical Printed at Rome 1595. where the Prayer appointed for the Consecration of King's ends thus, That you may glory without end with our Redeemer Jesus Christ, cujus nomen vicemque gestare crederis, whose name you bear, and whose Vicar you are. This being so, consider now what a pleasant Argument you have light upon, by which Kings may as well absolve Penitents, and confer Sacraments, as the Pope dispose of Kingdoms. Notwithstanding let us look a little nearer upon it. Christ, say you, gave all the power he had; He had all, both Spiritual and Temporal, therefore the Pope must have it too. If you will not be too hasty in your censure, but delay it till I have time to explain my meaning, I will answer you a Catholic may be a very good Catholic, and believe all a Catholic is bound to believe, and yet believe never a one of those two Propositions. Not that I mean to be guilty of the blasphemy of denying to the Son of God all power in Heaven and Earth, but that Son of God being man too, I do not know a Catholic is bound to believe that man, purely as man, was a temporal King. But of this more by and by when your second Proposition comes into play; in the mean time let us consider the first, viz. That Christ gave to the Pope in St. Peter all the power he had himself. Pray how does this appear? 'tis included say you in this, that he is his Vicar. I beseech you consider again, for I cannot readily think of an inference which seems to me more wild, and more palpably contradicted by the open course of things with which we daily converse. A Judge represents the King's Person, a Constable does it, all Officers both Civil and Military supply his place in their several employments. Can every one of these therefore do as much as the King? Can a General coin money, or a Judge call a Parliament, or a Constable make War and Peace? We see their several Powers are bounded by their several Commissions, and the privilege of representing his person gives them no more power than he is pleased to confer upon them. How can it be otherwise with the Pope? He indeed is the Vicar of Christ, and represents his person, and so the Judge does the Kings, but what power he has we are to learn from his Commission, not his Title.  
Let us now consider what a good Catholic may say to this point. And first I believe no man can reprove him if he say he finds no temporal power included in any Commission recorded in Scripture, Tradition or the Fathers; and if he refuse to believe more than he finds there, I think none will reprove him for that neither. In Scripture we find Saint Peter commissionated to teach, to baptise, to feed the Flock, to confirm his Brethren; we find the Keys of Heaven promised and given him, and what those Keys signify we find there declared to be this, that what he should bind or lose on Earth should be bound or loosed in Heaven. But of deposing Kings, or disposing of Kingdoms, we read no word. That his Commission extends only to Spirituals, is a thing so notoriously known, and universally received amongst Catholics; none denying it but some Canonists who meddle ultra crepidam, and a few Divines who handle their crepida unskilfully and follow them, that to be serious and earnest in the proof of it, is a labour as little needful and perhaps less pardonable than that which I have newly ended, of showing Princes to be Vicars of God. However because I am to say nothing of myself, hear what others say. 
De Anath. Vinc.  Gelasias speaks very clearly: Fuerant haec ante adventum Christi, etc. Before the coming of Christ, figuratively, and remaining yet in carnal actions, some were both Kings and Priests, as the H. History delivers of Melchizedeck. Which thing too, the Devil, striving always with a Tyrannical Pride, to usurp to himself those things which belong to divine Worship, has imitated amongst his Followers; so that amongst Pagans the same men have been Emperors and chief Bishops; but when we were once come to the true King and Bishop (Christ) neither has the Emperor any longer assumed the name of a Bishop, nor the Bishop the regal dignity. For although his Members, that is of a true King and Bishop, are magnificently said according to the participation of his nature, to have assumed both in a sacred generosity, that the Regality and Priesthood may subsist together; yet Christ mindful of the frailty of humane nature, tempering with a glorious Dispensation what might conduce to the salvation of his People, has so distinguished the Offices of both Powers by proper Actions and distinct Dignities, desirous his Followers should be saved by wholesome Humility, and not again betrayed by humane Pride, both that Christian Emperors should need Bishops for eternal life, and Bishops in the conduct of the temporal things should use the Imperial Laws, that the spiritual action might be distant from carnal assaults, and he who militat Deo is a Soldier of Gods, should not embroil himself with secular business; and on the other side, he who is entangled in secular business should not preside over divine matters; both that the modesty of both degrees might be provided for, lest he who had both should be puffed up, and a convenient profession be particularly fitted to the qualities of the Actions. This man was a Vicar of Christ himself, and you see he is so far from thinking his Commission extends to temporal things, that he plainly teaches Christ distinguished them, and left the spiritual Power so alone to him, that for temporal Laws he was to be beholding to the Emperor. I might peradventure have run the hazard of reproof, if I had said that to join those two Powers is an Artifice of the Devil, but I suppose that saying will not be reproved in so ancient and so holy a Pope. Symmachus succeeded as to his Chair, being the next Pope but one after him, so to his Doctrine. You, says he to the Emperor, receive Baptism from the Bishop, the Sacraments, Penance, desire their Prayers, their Benediction; lastly you administer humane, he dispenses divine things to you. Greg. the 2d. Ep. 13. to the Emperor Leo; As the Bishop has no power to look into the Palace, and meddle with regal dignity, dignitates regales deferendi; so neither has the Emperor to look into the Church, etc.— Bishops are therefore set over Churches, abstaining from the business of the Comwonwealth, that Princes in like manner may abstain from Ecclesiastical matters, Leo 4. 2. q. 7. c. Nos si incompetenter. It is to be noted that there are two Persons by which the World is governed, the Royal and the Sacerdotal. As King's preside in the affairs of the World, so Priests in what belongs to God. It belongs to Kings to inflict corporal, to Priests to inflict spiritual punishment.— He (Judex) carries the Sword for punishment of the bad and praise of the good: these (Priests) have the Keys to exclude the excommunicate, and reconcile the penitent. Nicolas 3d. C. Inter haec 32. q. 2. The holy Church of God is not governed by worldly Laws, she has no Sword but the Spiritual, with which she doth not kill but quicken. Adrian the first in the Council of Franckfort seems to me with one little word to explain very well the Commission given to St. Peter: Peter, said he, in reward of his confession was made Porter of Heaven, and had power to bind and lose; so much we already know, 'tis recorded in Scripture, but what was it he could bind and lose? Souls says the Pope. These Popes understood and used their power as well as most of their Successors, and they knew nothing of Temporal power, but confined what was given them to spiritual and divine things, and care of the Soul. And that this too is the sense of the Church, I think will appear by the Prayer used on the Feast of St. Peter's Chair, which anciently ran thus; O God, who by giving the Keys of Heaven, hast delivered to Peter the Pontifical dignity of binding and losing Souls. This last word Souls is left out of the latter Editions, I suppose to render the Prayer more conformable to the expressions of Scripture, and peradventure to keep more close to antiquity, of which they are very tenacious at Rome: for Platina in the Life of Leo 4th. delivers the rude draught of this Prayer, whence 'tis likely the Prayer was taken, without that word: But the meaning with the word and without is the same; Words may alter, but the Church's sense altars not. But let us hear some other of the Fathers. Hosius Bishop of Corduba, who presided in the Council of Nice, and was counted in his time the Father of Bishops, writes thus to the Emperor Constantius: God has committed the Empire to you, 
Vid. Athan. Ep. ad Solicitarios.  and entrusted us with what belongs to the Church: And as he who looks upon your Empire with envious Eyes contradicts the divine Ordination; so do you take heed that by drawing affairs of the Church to you, you incur a great crime. It is written, give what is Caesar's to Caesar, and what is Gods to God. Wherefore neither is it lawful for us to take an Empire on Earth, neither does the Power of Sacrifices and holy things belong to you. S. Jo. Chrysost. hom 4. in verb. Isaiae; Bodies are committed to Kings, Souls to Priests.— He has material, those spiritual Arms. S. Hierom. in cap. 16. Mat. The Spiritual Key extends not itself to Temporals without Arrogance. Theophylac. upon John 21. Our Lord makes Peter not a Prince, not a King, but commands him to be a Pastor.— Feed, says he, not Kill, etc. S. Anselm. upon Mat. 26. There are secular Officers by whom Temporal things, and Spiritual Officers by whom Spiritual things are managed. Wherefore the material Sword is given to carnal, and the Spiritual to Spiritual Officers; and as what belongs to the Church is not proper for Kings, so neither aught the Bishop to meddle with what belongs to Kings. Which because Peter (who represents spiritual men) did, when he used the material Sword, and cut off our Servants Ears, he deserved to be reprehended by our Lord. Hugo de san. Victor. de sacr. fid. l. 2. p. 3. c. 4. Earthly Power has the King for Heads: Spiritual Power the Pope. Earthly things, and all ordained for earthly Life, belong to the power of the King; Spiritual things, and all belonging to Spiritual life, to the Pope. Again l. 2. p. 2. c. 3. It is given to the faithful Christian Laity to possess Temporals, to the Clergy only Spirituals are committed. St. Bernard speaks thus to the Pope: 
De consid. l. 1. c. 6.  Your Power is not in Possessions, but in Crimes; and for these, not for them, you have received the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven. Consider Hugoes only Spirituals, and St. Bernard's not for Possessions or Temporals, and judge whether a Catholic is like to be reproved for not extending the Pope's power beyond Spirituals. And in his 2d. Book speaking of Temporals; Be it, says he, that you may some other way challenge these things, but not by the right of Apostleship, for he (Peter) could not give what he had not himself, what he had that he gave: the care, as I said, over Churches. Rupertus Abbas upon these words nor a Rod, Mat. 10. speaks thus; But now there are two Rods, one of the Kings of Gentiles, another of the Disciples of Christ: The Rod of of the Kings of Gentiles is the Rod of Dominion, the Rod of the Disciples of Christ is the Rod of Direction, the Rod of Pastoral duty solicitously watching over the cure of Souls: The Rod which is of Dominion, is not granted to the Ministers of the Gospel of Peace, and that is forbidden here, nor a Rod, etc. Cardinal Damianus L. 4. Ep. 9 ad Olderic. Episc. Firman. Between the Kingdom and Priesthood the proper Offices of each are distinguished, that the King may make use of the Arms of the World, and the Priest be girt with the Sword of the Spirit, which is the Word of God.— If any Object that Pope Leo engaged himself often in War, who nevertheless is a Saint; I say what I think, that neither Peter obtained the Apostolical Principality because he denied Christ, nor David deserved the Oracle of Prophecy because defiled another man's Bed. Schoolmen as they speak more plainly, are a little more severe. Almain de Authorit. Eccles. c. 2. puts this difference betwixt Ecclesiastical and Lay power, that by this only corporeal punishment is inflicted, by other Spiritual precisely. Joan. de Parisiis c. 10. de potest. Reg. & Pap. Granting that Christ had temporal authority and plwer, yet gave it not to Peter. c. 15. Answering the Objection from Quodcunque solveritis, etc. I answer with Chrysostom and Ravanus, by this is not understood any power given but Spiritual to absolve from the bond of Sins: and it were foolish to understand a power given to absolve from the Bond of Debt. Again c. 14. To Peter was given spiritual power only to remit sins, nor can be do any thing in temporals, but in foro conscientiae. Aegid. Rom. Q. de utraque potestat. art. 3. It is to be understood that Christ had a threefold power over bodies, souls, and temporal goods. The first he used by curing infirmities, etc. The second, viz. Spiritual, he both used and delegated as much as is necessary and expedient for the good of Souls. The third He neither used nor gave, but rather forbade both to Peter and the other Apostles as is said: And concludes; In the Commission given to Peter his Vicar, we read not temporal, but only spiritual power committed to him. I will give Thee the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven, he said not, and Dominion over worldly things: Wherefore he presently adds, as explicating himself to mean only spiritual power, Whatever you shall bind, etc. Ambros. Catharin. upon Rom. 13. That the pope is Vicar of Christ, is nothing to purpose to make us believe he has power given him to rule all the World in temporals. It rather persuades us such power was not given him, because Christ refused it, and as he was man had it not in the World; for after the Resurrection 'twas said all power is given me, etc. But in this World he was subject to secular powers. Wherefore he left the Pope Vicar of that Kingdom which was given him by his Father while he lived on Earth; namely, the spiritual Kingdom over his Sheep, etc. Otherwise if he be the Vicar of Christ absolutely according to all the power which Christ had, he should have power over Angels and the Blessed, which is ridiculous. And again, These powers are different from one another, and no man can usurp either at his pleasure; and to think and teach otherwise is most seditious and most horrible. Anton. de Rosell. de Protestat. Imp. & Pap. p. 1. c. 38. Whence I conclude 'tis Heresy and Madness, to say that the universal Administration of Temporals is or can be in the Pope. Greg. Haimbarg. de prim. Pap. Whence it appears 'tis a fable, and invention that is writ in the Decretals, that Popes have the plenitude of power givem them, and such a Dominion that they are over Kings and Princes in Temporals. They are smart fellows, these Schoolmen, and speak home, and yet are good Catholics for all that, and acknowledged to be so; neither are they otherwise reproved or reprovable, then as Scholars take the freedom to censure one another. Mean time since a Catholic may unreprovably hold that the two powers were distinguished by Christ, and joined by the Devil, the temporal committed to Princes, and the spiritual to Bishops, who if they be Soldiers of God are not to meddle with secular business; that while Bishops dispense divine, Princes are to administer humane things; that to the Clergy belong only spirituals, and the Pope's power has nothing to do with possessions; that dominion is forbidden him, and only the Rod of direction granted, etc. I hope you may quiet your fears, and not suspect I shall either be disowned or reproved by my Church, if upon the security of so much Authority I deny your first Proposition, and affirm the Pope's Vicarship is confined to spirituals, and that it hinders not Princes from being God's Vicars as well as himself; who, if they manage all their trust, are accountable only to him, second to whom they are, and except whom they have none above them, I mean in their own kind. Only I would not have you boggle at this, that the Pope is not every where expressly named. For though the Order of Government require that the Head should have more power than an inferior Member, as the Commission of a General must be larger than that of a private Captain; yet I think none will doubt but the power of the Pope and the rest of the Clergy is all of the same kind, and the more which belongs to him as Head of the Church, signifies more of the same sort of actions, not power of another nature. But because I am to say nothing of myself, let St. Leo tell you this and more in a Sermon inserted into the Church's Office on the Feast of St. Peter's Chair at Antioch, where speaking of the Confession of St. Peter, and the promise made him upon it: The force indeed, says he, of this power passed into the other Apostles, and the Constitution of this Decree (of the keys) descended to all the Princes of the Church; but 'tis not without cause that what is intimated to all is commanded to one. For this is therefore particularly entrusted to Peter, because the example of Peter is proposed to all the Governors of the Church. And so much to the first Proposition, which though I have abstained from treating dogmatially, yet I have said, or rather showed you that others say what may abundantly quiet your fears, and that a Catholic who confines the Pope's power only to spirituals, is so far from contradicting my principle received amongst Catholics, that he has the warrant of great, I had almost said all Authority on this side, at least so much that is not well consistent with Catholic principles to oppose it. But I pray mistake me not, for though I have said nothing of myself, yet I would not be misinterpreted so much as to have alleged aught which might be thought to question any, not only spiritual, but even temporal power which may justly belong to the Church, and which when it does, she may without doubt justly use. But 'tis one thing to have power by agreement of men, and another by Commission from Christ, and I would say no more then St. Bernard has said before me, that however such things may belong to the Church, yet not by right of Apostleship. Your Argument assumed that a Vicar had the same power with him whose Vicar he is; what I have alleged was only to answer that, and as I am not obliged, so I meant not to go farther.  
What I shall add in examination of your second Proposition you will perceive is more to satisfy your Friendship then your Argument; for whether Christ had temporal Dominion or no, if he gave it not to the Pope, the Pope is never the near, and your Argument sufficiently cleared. Notwithstanding since I would not give you cause to complain I neglect any thing you proposed, let us consider how far this is true, that Christ had all temporal as well as spiritual power. But, Friend, I hope your feud to formalities is abated, for I must tell you beforehand, there is no discoursing on this subject without distinguishing the God from the Man. You know in Christ the distinct properties of both Natures were so united, that they both made but one Sacred Person, to which person nothing can be denied which can with truth be affirmed of God, and none I think will be so madly blasphemous to question the absolute Sovereignty and Omnipotent power of God over all things. But the same person was man too, and 'tis from that formality the Pope claims; for suppose 'tis no less impiety to affirm, that what belongs to the Divine Nature is not communicable to any to whom that Nature is not communicated, then 'tis to deny of the Divine Nature that which truly belongs to it. And this Bellarmin well understood when he argues thus: 
De Rom. Pont. l. 5. l. 4.  Christ as man while he lived on Earth neither had nor would have Dominion merely temporal over any Province or Town: But the Pope is the Vicar of Christ, and represents Christ to us as he was while he lived amongst men; Wherefore the Pope as Christ's Vicar, and consequently as Pope, has not Dominion merely temporal over any Province or Town. Speaking now of Christ precisely as Man, those who attribute temporal power to him, and make him a secular King, go one of these two ways. They either allege right of Succession by descent from David, or a particular grant from God the Father, in whose power it being to dispose of all Kingdoms, they affirm he has transferred this Right upon his Son as Man. Of these two the first is hard to prove, and in my opinion signifies nothing when 'tis proved. The descent indeed of Christ from, and that by two several beanches is recorded in the Gospel; but descent gives a tittle to none but the nearest of the descent, and that Christ was the nearest, is so far from appearing, that I know not how it possibly should. 'Tis true, that Solomon and his Posterity Reigned to Jeconias, but of him the Prophet, Hier. 22.30. Foretold there should not be of his seed a man who should sit upon the Throne of David, and have power longer in Juda: So that the Succession of that Regal Line of David seems ended in him. 'Tis true Zedechias or Mathanias Reigned 11 years after him, who was not of his seed, for he was his Uncle; but from him to Aristobulus of the Race of the Maccabees, who first reassumed the Regal Diadem, there was not any King at all amongst the Jews. That Nathan or any of his Posterity either Reigned or had right to Reign nothing appears, and much less that Christ was the nearest of the descendants from either that or the other branch. In so much darkness I think 'tis evident there can be no clear title. However I conceive another thing is clear, which, even supposing that Christ were next in descent to David, would quite take away all Title to his Kingdom, and that is, that in his time the Kingdom was legally and justly translated from the Family of David, to the Asmoneans. For certainly to affirm that the Maccabees, and their Successors, who with excellent virtue recovered the lost Sceptre, and settled it in their own Family, were all Intruders and Usurpers and Tyrants, would be a wild and preposterous assertion, and such an one as would unsettle all the translations of Empires which concur in the course of History, whereof few perhaps have been made with greater virtue or more justice. What King can be secure of his Title if the Asmoneans were no Rightful King? And if they were, descent from David gives Christ no more title to the Throne of David, than Signior Paleologo (far be all irreverence from the comparison) has to the Empire of Greece, or Goodman Plantagenet to the Crown of England. A title therefore by descent seems very hard to prove, but though it were proved, I think there is so little got by the bargain, that it might have been even as well let alone. For right to the Kingdom of David is but right to the Kingdom of David, and I suppose the Pope will not agree to have his Authority confined to the Guetto at Rome and be put to the trouble of Assembling the dispersed Jews, that he may have over whom to Reign, and wring out the ancient Kingdom of David from the present Possessors, that he may have where to Reign. He knows well enough the strength and stability of long possession, and I dare say will not change his spiritual title at Rome for the best and fairest temporal title which can be made him to Jerusalem, and where else the right of David can give him any interest, 'tis hard to imagine.  
The other Plea is a Grant from his Father, who may undoubtedly dispose of Kingdoms, and every thing else as he pleases. But his usual way of giving Kingdoms is to put those to whom he gives them into actual possession by Election, Succession, the Sword or other secondary means. To give bare titles without other fruit is a course not suitable to the method of his proceeding. Lawyer's indeed have invented a distinction betwixt the Dominion and usus fructus of a thing, and the distinction is useful here below, but I suspect distinctions are strangers in Heaven, and that plain dealing providence deals little in Chican. However it be, being resolved not to penerrate into the depth of the question myself, I shall only observe to you what people say on both sides, and leave you to judge. This short reflection by the way I suppose I may irreprovably make, that if the Father made any such grant, the Son was not ignorant of it. And if he knew such power was given him, and yet refused to use it, I perceive not how he will be excused from the blame of not doing what belonged to him to do. A King certainly is as much obliged to govern, as a Subject to obey: and since 'tis manifest blasphemy to say Christ was deficient in any point of duty, this in reference to my dulness is unavoidable, Christ did not perform the duty of a temporal King, therefore he was no temporal King. But these are only my thoughts by the by, what people say on both sides is this. Those who would have Christ a temporal King, allege in proof these places of Scripture which speak of his power in general, and expressly apply the name of King to him in particular. Such as Heb. 1.2. Whom he made Heir of all things, by whom also he made the Worlds, Heb. 2.7. Thou hast Crowned him with honour and glory, and set him over all the works of thy hands. For in that he subjected all things, he left nothing not subject to him, 1 Cor. 5.24. When he shall have evacuated all Principality and Power and Virtue, Mat. 28.18. All power is given me in Heaven and in Earth, Jo. 23.3. Knowing that the Father had given all things into his hands, Jo. 5.22. For the Father judges no man, but has given all judgement to the Son; he has given him power to judge, because he is the son of man, Apoc. 17.14. They shall fight with the Lamb, and the Lamb shall overcome them, because he is Lord of Lords, and King of Kings. And again 19.16. And he has written in his garment and on his high, King of Kings and Lord of Lords. Isa. 33.22. The Lord is our King, he will save us. Psal. 2.6. I am made by him a King over Zion his holy hill, and a great many more of the same nature. These say they and the like places, are both plain in themselves, and plainly expounded of a temporal regal power by the Fathers. To which purpose they bring Theophylact expounding that to the Heb. whom he made Heir of all things; that is, made Lord of the whole World; but how did he make him Lord? Namely as man, in the second Psalm he speaks to him, Ask of me and I will give thee the Gentiles for thy Inheritance. And St. Anselm upon the same place; Whom the Father appointed according to the humanity the immutable Heir of all things; that is, possessor of all creatures. And Haymo upon the same place too; God the Father appointed his Son Heir of all things, that is of the whole World or all creatures, not only according to the Divinity in which he is coeternal to his Father, and coequal in the Omnipotence of the Deity, and in which he eternally possesses all things with his Father; but rather according to the humanity assumed by the word he is appointed Lord and Heir over all creatures, as God the Father promised him saying, Ask of me, etc. And the Son himself rising from the dead speaks thus in the person of the humanity; All power is given me in Heaven and in Earth. Eusebius Emissenus; He who according to his Divinity had always with the Father and Holy Ghost power over all things; now also according to his humanity has received power over all things as Man. He who lately suffered let him Rule both in Heaven and in Earth, and be believed the God and Lord, not of the Jews only but of all Nations. 
L. 2. Cont. Parmen.  Optatus against the Donatists: Why do you break such a promise, and confine to a kind of Prison the vast extent of Kingdoms? why do you strive to hinder so much goodness? why are you against our Saviour's merits? Permit the Son to enjoy what was granted, permit the Father to perform what he promised. Why do you set bounds, and fix Limits, when the whole Earth was promised by the Father? There is not any thing in any part of the Earth which seems exempt from his Possession. The whole Earth with its Nations were given him. These and the the like places are the chief supports of the affirmative opinion; for I omit their Reasons, not only because a man who were strongly bend upon it, may invent specious pretexts almost for any thing, and they seem to me no other, but because I take questions of Faith not properly to belong to the decision of mere Reason. I mean in this manner, that People should rashly determine by their ill grounded reasonings, what is fitting or not fitting for God to do. We are to learn of our Fathers and the Church what he has done, and not by Airy speculations determine what he should do. If this Doctrine hath been delivered to our Forefathers, we shall sure enough receive it from them; but if we do not, it will hardly belong to Faith, even though it could be proved true. In the mean time, those who maintain the negative, bring particular Answers to all these places, the substance whereof devolves to this, that the Kingdom and Regal power attributed to Christ in the Scripture, is to be understood of his Spiritual Kingdom the Church, unless where his person is spoken of as comprehending the divine as well as humane nature, in which Cases, Regal power, and all that can be attributed to God, may justly be affirmed of him. 'Twere to write a Book instead of a Letter to dilate them all particularly, and when all is done, this is the substance: But then on their side they allege Scripture and Fathers, in my opinion much more convincing. And first they affirm the question is expressly and plainly decided by Christ himself, Joh. 18.36. When being asked by Pilate if he were a King, he denies it not, but withal affirms his Kingdom is not of this World: And methinks people might take his word, and cease to dispute of what he so plainly determined, for I cannot think otherwise but this Answer meets the difficulty in the Face, and so reserves whether the right of omnipotence or spiritaal Regality, as very positively to exclude Temporal power. They allege again Luke 12.14. Who has made me Judge or Divider betwixt you? Our blessed Saviour was moved by one who heard him, and perhaps believed in him, to cause one Brother to divide an inheritance with the other. And he not only refuses the motion, but says in a phrase usual in Scripture of denying by interrogation, it was a matter in which he had nothing to do. Now if Christ were truly a Temporal King, 'tis hard to imagine how rendering Justice to his Subjects, who demanded it at his hands, and determining emergent Controversies, in which the very Office of a King does in a great measure consist, should not belong to him. I have nothing to do with Possessions, and I am no Temporal King, to seem equivalent. They allege besides, Jo. 6.15. where Christ perceiving the multitude were resolved to make him King, fled from them and hid himself. Put him to have received temporal Dominion over all the World from his Father, and 'twill be hard to unriddle why he used it not in this occasion. His Subjects more disposed to obey him, they were willing, they were forward to do their parts; what can be said why he did not do his, and govern them? I said before, and I cannot but repear it, 'Tis as much the duty of a King to govern, as of Subjects to be governed; and I cannot for my life imagine any other reason, why he should refuse to govern, than this, that he was no temporal King. If it may be permitted me to speak freely, this position of temporal regal Power in Christ seems to me to include both nonsense and blasphemy. For Nonsense it is to put a Power in him to no purpose, an useless Metaphysical potentia never reduced into Act; and blasphemy it is to say he was deficient in his duty: and how that position will get clear of either of these absurdities, I can by no means understand. Other places of Scripture they bring, but these are the most material. Now because a Catholic cannot be a Catholic, who maintains a position directly contrary to Scripture, for neither he nor his position would be endured, those of the other side have invented several Senses which they give to the places alleged; and though those Senses seem to me full of Nonsense, yet I cannot but commend in the Authors that they choose rather to contradict common Sense than Scripture. But do you Judge; My Kingdom is not of this World, that is, say they, 'tis not by way of Election or Succession, nor governed as Worldly Kingdoms are by Treasuries, and Officers, and Armies. To omit that a Kingdom of this World, though received and governed another way then usually Kingdoms are, is still a Kingdom of this World, for the World is the World let it be governed how 'twil; this seems to me to say that the Kingdom of Christ is no Temporal Kingdom. For temporal Kingdoms can not subsist nor go on without such things; and he that says his Kingdom had them not, says plainly his Kingdom was such a Kingdom which needed none of those things. Which in other words I think is to say it was not a Temporal Kingdom. Again, say they, the Kingdom of Christ is therefore said not to be of this world, because at that time most worldly Kingdoms were got by injustice, and governed by wicked and idolatrous Laws, and such the Kingdom of Christ was not. But pray, the Kingdoms now a days established with Justice and governed with equity, are they not Kingdoms of this World? Or did Constantine forfeit his worldly Empire, by abolishing those Idolatrous Laws, and making better in their places? Strange Interpreters of Scripture! Who would make worldly Kingdoms inconsistent with virtue, and Kings cease to be Kings when they turn good men and most deserve to be so. Besides, if the world were divided into Kingdoms, however unjustly got and wickedly governed, 'twas yet divided into Kingdoms, and what Room was then left for Christ? Would they have him a King, and give him no Kingdom, or a Kingdom no where? Farther what can be said why he did not establish his just Kingdom in the place of those wicked ones, and take so much injustice out of the World? I think nothing but only this, that his Kingdom was of another nature, made to take away injustice from all, Dominion from none. I say nothing of the impertinence of alleging injustice in the beginning of Empires, a position which would shake the Foundations of the most settled Governments, and leave few Princes secure of their Titles. A third answer is, that his Kingdom is not of this World, because not only of this World, but of Heaven and Earth and all Creatures, as if this World and more were not this World. Besides it mistakes the question too, which is not of the extent of his Power, to which every Body knows that every thing is subject, but of the manner, whether besides the omnipotence of his divine nature, and the spiritual Regality of his humane, there were in him a Temporal power, and he were appointed by his Father as Saul to judge the People, and go before them, 
1 Reg. 21.8.  and fight their battles. This is what the Scripture tells us People expect from their Kings, and who speaks not to this speaks not to the question. Farther they say that Christ's Kingdom is not of this world, because worldly Kingdoms are over Bodies, his over Souls; worldly Kingdoms require obedience to a Temporal Prince, his knowledge of, and obedience to the Prince of Heaven: worldly Kingdoms are extinguished by death, or War etc. his is perpetual and immortal, etc. And this is to say as plain as can be said, that 'tis spiritual and not temporal. For Temporal Kingdoms are over Bodies, and if Christ's Kingdom be only over Souls, 'tis not temporal; again 'tis not temporal if it can not be extinguished, for no temporal thing is immortal. Farther to contra-distinguish the temporal Prince from the Prince of Heaven is directly to yield the question and change sides. That prejudice should be so strange a blindness, and men think to answer by saying the very same with their Adversaries! To that of the division of the Inheritance, they answer that what Christ refused was to be made Arbitrator betwixt the two Brethren. But besides that, to understand the place of Arbitration seems a little violent; for Arbitration requires the Consent of both Parties, and there appears nothing but the complaint of one against the injustice of the other. His answer imports, that meddling with Inheritances was a thing with which he had nothing to do, and that, whether he thought fit or not to become an Arbitrator, temporal Matters belonged not to him. Again they say, his signified he was no Ordinary Judge, whose Duty and Obligation it was to determine civil Controversies, but that his Jurisdiction was Voluntary and Arbitrary: And if this be not to say he was not a temporal King I understand nothing; for a temporal King, is obliged by his Office to do Justice and determine civil Controversies, and his power is not Voluntary and Arbitrary, but Coactive and Obligatory.  
Thirdly, They answer, that Christ meant his judicial power was not by humane concession; as if he could not have done the business as well by Authority from Heaven as from Earth, and had not been that way more empowered, and more obliged to perform his duty.  
Fourthly, That Christ came not into the World to judge temporal things, though he had full power so to do; which is just what the other side says, that he was not sent, or empowered by his Father for that purpose, though as God he might do what he pleased. What a pleasant folly this unresolvedness to maintain a thing is, which makes people bring for answer the very position they oppose.  
Lastly, He is said to have refused dividing the Inheritance, because Division is the work of the Devil. Division of hearts indeed is so, but division of possessions is a work of peace, and a necessary means to Union of hearts; 'tis a command from God, and a duty in Kings.  
This is chief what is said on both sides; you will judge as you see cause. I for my part believe none better acquainted with the truth than Christ himself, and I mean to take his word and believe his Kingdom is not of this World, and I care not who knows it. If I mistake his meaning, and that the Kingdom which he says is not of this World, prove yet to be a worldly Kingdom, I shall at least have the comfort to err in very good Company, and good Company you know is a thing I love sufficiently. St. Cyril of Alexan. speaking of the Hyacinth in the mitre of Aaron; The Hyacinth says he, 
De ador. in spir. l. 11.  signifies Heaven; remember therefore Christ saying my Kingdom is not of this World, for Christ is not an Earthly, but a Heavenly King, and has all creatures under his feet, St. John Chrysostom; Christ, says he, 
Hom. 87. in Mat.  acknowledges himself a King, but a Heavenly King '; which elsewhere answering Pilate, he says more clearly, my Kingdom is not of this World. And in another place, 
Hom. 39 in 1 Cor. 15.  Stripture knows two Kingdoms, one of Adoption and Familiarity, another of Creation by the Law of Making and Creating he is King of all, Jews, Pagans, Devils, Adversaries; by familiarity and care (he is King) of the Faithful, and those who willingly commit and subject themselves to him. This Kingdom too is said to have a beginning; for of this in the second Psalm, Ask, says he, of me and I will give thee the Gentiles for thy Inheritance: and to his Disciples, all power is given me by my Father. St. Hierom. 
In Hierom. c. 22.  shows the prophecy concerning Jeconias was not contrary to the promise of the Angel, because, says he, Jeremy speaks of a temporal and carnal Kingdom, Gabriel of a spiritual and eternal one. St. Austin; Hear you Jews and Gentiles, hear Circumcision, 
Tr. 115. in Joan.  Prepuce hear, hear all you Earthly Kingdoms, I hinder not your Dominion in this World, my Kingdom is not of this World. And again, What would you more? Come to the Kingdom which is not of this World; come by believing, and be not cruel by fearing. The prophecy says of God the Father, but I am appointed by him a King over Zion his holy hill: But that Zion, and that Hill is not of this World. For what is his Kingdom, but those who believe in him? To whom he says, you are not of this World, as I am not of this World, etc. Again, It is plainly said of the Kingdom of Christ, not according to that in the beginning, where God the Word was with God, for there none ever doubted but he is King for all Ages, but according to the Assumption of Humanity, and Sacrament of Mediator, and Incarnation of a Virgin, that it shall have no end; where the Angel speaking to Mary says, and he will give him the Kingdom of David his Father, and he shall Reign in the House of Jacob for ever.— But this Kingdom in the House of Jacob, and on the Throne of David, can it be understood otherwise then in the Church, and that People which is his Kingdom? of which dlso the Apostle says, when he shall have delivered up his Kingdom to God the Father, that is; brought his Saints to tne Contemplation of his Father. And L. 17. de Civit. Dei C. 7. Speaking of the passage betwixt Saul and Samuel, when Saul tore the Cloak of Samuel: He represented figuratively the people of Israel, which people were to lose their Kingdom, our Lord Jesus Christ by the New Testament being to Reign, not carnally, but spiritually. And what says he, was not he a King who feared to be made a King? plainly he was, 
Tracked. 25. in Joan.  but not such a King as could be made by men, but such a King as could give Kingdoms to men.— He came now not to Reign now, as he will in that Kingdom of which we say, let thy Kingdom come. He always Reigns with his Father, according as he is the Son of God, the Word of God, the Word by which all things are made. But the Prophets foretold his Kingdom also according to this, that he was made Man, and made those who believe Christians. For there shall be a Kingdom of Christians, which is now a gathering, now making, is now burying with the blood of Christ. This Kingdom will one day be manifest, when the brightness of the Saints will be manifested after the judgement by him made, which judgement he said before that the Son of Man should make: Of which Kingdom also the Apostle saith, when he shall have delivered up his Kingdom to God his Father: Whence also he says himself, Come you blessed of my Father, possess the Kingdom prepared for you from the beginning of the World. But his Disciples and the multitude believing in him, thought he came now to Reign. This is for them to take and make him King, to prevent the time which he kept secret to himself to declare seasonably at the end of the World. St. Hilary; 
In Psal. 2.  This therefore is the King set over Zion the holy hill of God, declaring the Command of the Lord, not over that hill of the Earthly City, that deplored, and homicide, and parricide Jerusalem but that Jerusalem, which is in Heaven; that which is our Mother, the City of the great King, whose Inhabitants, as I conceive, those at this day are who risen in the Passion of our Lord. St. Bernard; That our Lord Jesus was descended from David, no man doubts: 
Hom. 4. sup. Mis.  But I ask how God gave him the Throne of his Father David when he Reigned not in Jerusalem; nay, consented not to the multitude which would have made him King; besides protested to the face of Pilate, my Kingdom is not of this world.— But we know a Jerusalem was signified different from that which is now, and in which David Reigned, much more Noble and more Rich, and this I conceive was meant here, by a manner of speech usual in Scripture, where the Sign is often put for the thing signified. God did then give him the Seat of David his Father, when he was by him made King over Zion his holy hill. And he seems more plainly to declare what Kingdom it is of which he speaks, by this that he says, not in Zion, but over Zion. For peradventure it was therefore said above, that David Reigned in Zion, but his Kingdom is over Zion, of whom it was said to David, of your seed I will place upon your Seat. Of whom it was said by another Prophet, He shall sit upon the Throne of David, and over his Kingdom. You see 'tis every where over, or upon. Over Zion, upon his Seat, upon his Throne, over his Kingdom. Our Lord God therefore will give him not the typical, but the true Seat of David, not a temporal, but an eternal, not an earthly, but an heavenly one.— Farther, And he shall Reign in the House of Jacob for ever, and of his Kingdom there shall be no end. Here too, if we understand the temporal House of Jacob, how shall he Reign for ever in that which is not for ever? We must therefore seek an eternal House of Jacob, in which he may Reign for ever, of whose Kingdom there shall be no end. St. Anselm, according to this that the Word was made Flesh, he began to Reign in Believers by Faith in his Incarnation.  
These in my Opinion (for I intent here to end, and think I have done pretty fair for a Letter) speak much more to purpose then those alleged on the other side, who talk of Christ's power in general, and at most according to his humanity; but what kind of power he had they express not; the extent of his power, which no body denies, they assert very plainly, but are silent as to the quality of it, which is the thing in question: Whereas these positively declare it not to be carnal, and temporal, and earthly, but Spiritual and Divine. They tell us plainly besides what his Kingdom is: namely, the Faithful, his Church, and the plenitude of Saints now a gathering, and to be completed in the Resurrection when he shall deliver his Kingdom to his Father. For myself, though I have enough declared my Opinion; yet I declare withal I mean not to tie you or any man to it. Neither do I believe those who are of a contrary judgement will be convinced by what I have said, neither did I go about to convince them. My business was to satisfy you, not to dogmatise. And I hope you will perceive your Argument so answered, that if those unquiet Spirits of fear and diffidence continue still to haunt you, the blame is not to be imputed to me. Of two propositions which you assumed to fix a power Paramount in the Pope upon our Faith; I have showed a Catholic may safely deny either of both. 'Tis at his choice to take either way, and any one does his business. If he will deny a temporal Regality in Christ, the difficulty is cut up by the root, since a Vicar can not with any shadow of pretence challenge more than was in the Principal himself. If not willing to meddle with that question, he will take the other way, and affirm that whatever power Chrit had, he left only Spiritual to Peter and his Successors, the difficulty is as fully cleared. A Catholic, take my word, may unreprovably hold either or both, and that you may have better security against your fears then my word can give you, I have showed you both maintained by those whom Catholics are not permitted to reprove. If all this be not enough to quiet your suspicious, let me add, that if you consider well, you will find that of all men the Principles of Catholciks can least endure the contrary Doctrine. Ask of your Forefathers, walk in the ancient Paths, avoid novelties and the like, are Maxims so known and universally receieved amongst them, that who is known to contradict them, is known so far to swerve from the acknowledged grounds of Catholic Religion. Now when the authority of unquestionable antiquity is of the one side, and on the other, that of Authors both late and few, and of no extraordinary credit, a Catholic who knows what he does, can so little doubt which part to take, that I think he is not excusable if he so much as doubt, or at least not otherwise, then as zeal is excused by blindness. None have that veneration for antiquity, and Fathers, which Catholics pretend, for they look upon them as the men who have begot them in the Gospel; from whence they give them the name of Fathers, as the most considerable Pillars of the Church, as the principal Persons on whose attestation the Rule of Faith and Stability of Religion depends. After the sacred Books of Scripture written by Divine Inspiration, to which no writing of Man can be equalled, nor so much as compared, we Reverence in the next place the Writings of the Fathers, which we think useful too, and the most useful of any to the understanding of the Scripture, of which we hold them the best Interpreters. We universally blame those of other Communions for preferring the obscurity of private interpretations before the clear light of Tradition. And all these things are known and acknowledged by every body: Wherefore since the great Lights of the Church St. Agustin, and St. Hierom, and St. Cyril, and St John Chrysostom, and St. Bernard, and the rest shine clearly out, and with a joint consent unanimously conspire into the same Doctrine, none are so blamable as Catholics if they oppose it. And such men as Comitolus and Sermarinus and the like put into the contrary balance weigh so little, that 'tis shameful even that they should enter in. The truth is, the world goes otherwise then sharp-sighted men would think it should or could; else 'tis not easy to conceive how it should be possible there should be found amongst those of our principles, who should stand in opposition to the Fathers. All that can be said is that worldly policy sometimes makes a little too bold with Christian simplicity, and that preposterous zeal is very blind, and therefore a very dangerous Guide. And I shall take the liberty to tell you that understanding Catholics, who consider the way they take, see, if it were followed in other things, it would mine Catholic Religion; and that the men indeed, perhaps by the privilege of well meaning ignorance are Catholics, but the way is not a Catholic way. Thanks be to God there are not many who walk in it, and those who do, I believe consider not what they do. For sure I am that knowingly to slight the Reverence due to Sacred Antiquity, and set up new Masters in opposition to the Fathers of Christianity and Doctors of the Church, agrees very ill with a Catholiek Spirit. In fine, as men will be men, and God must make the World another thing than it is, if we expect that all should do as they ought, you will find among Catholics some who hold the contrary Opinion, but none who hold this reprovable. And this I say the more confidently, because I mistake very much if it be reprovable even amongst the Jesuits themselves; who yet are thought the greatest Favourers of the Papal power. At least I know they cannot reprove it, without reproving their own best and most famous Authors. Read Bellarmin. de Rom. Pontif. the fourth Chapter of the fifth Book, and Maldonat. upon 27 Mat. and see if they do not both expressly hold and strongly prove the Doctrine of the Fathers, and so far that the latter says people would make Christ a temporal King whether he will or no, etc. against his express declaration, and that before a Court of Justice. They are too long to be transcribed. But if you take the pains to read them, since that is safe enough from being reproved which there is no body to reprove; I hope your suspicions will be at quiet. However I think it but seasonable that I should, and be permitted after so long a journey to rest  
Yours, etc.   
FINIS.   

ERRATA.  
PAge 3. line 13. read particular. l. 36. r. were. p. 7. l. 5. r. you cite. p. 8. l. 1. for he. r. his. l. 5. r. enterfere. l. 32. may, r. my. p. 10. l. 37. r. no extraordinary. p. 17. l. 29. r. the Servants ear. p. 18. l. 26. r. because he defiled. l. 33. r. yet he gave. l. 35. r. Rabanus. p. 21. l. 6. r. dogmatically. l. 9 r. any principle. l. 11. r. his side. p. 22. l. 8. r. suppose. l. 28. r. branches. p. 23. l. 22. r. Kings. p. 24. l. 16. r. penetrate. p. 27. l. 22. deal to. l. 28. r. were disposed. p. 30. l. 18. r. his answer signified. l. ult. r. resolvedness. p. 31. l. 28. r. Creation. By.   

The Fifth and Sixth OF THE Controversial LETTERS: OR THE Grand Controversy, Concerning The pretended Temporal Authority of POPES over the whole Earth, And the True Sovereign of KINGS within their own respective Kingdoms.  
Between two English Gentlemen, 

The one of the Church of England:  
The other of the Church of Rome.    
LONDON, Printed for Henry Brome and Benjamin took, at the Gun; and at the Ship in St. Paul's Churchyard. 1673.   


FRIEND,  
I Must confess I am something better at ease, at least I know not where to fix my jealousy. I cannot say but the cause you assign may have had some influence upon me; for to hear men spoken against perpetually and universally, and not to think there is some fire to all that smoke, is hardly possible. Yet let me tell you, I think you have no great reason to complain; for, if I mistake not, you own a good number of your Proselytes to this very cause, and believe, that of those who come over to you, far the greatest part have been wrought upon by this persuasion, That you are ill represented. When you truly are so, as I cannot deny but sometimes you are, 'tis no hard matter for you to show it to candid people, whom nature has so disposed to favour persons wrongfully traduced, that this bad Idea, where of you complain, makes you at last sufficient amends. There is such a charm in injured Innocence, that I am very confident it brings you in more Converts than all your Arguments. If some be hardened, others are gained; and peradventure fair play were more for the Interest of both sides. However it be, I acknowledge I was myself something mistaken in you, and not so well acquainted as I thought with your Religion, where things I perceive go otherwise than I apprehended. I thought there had been an Oraculous kind of lustre in this power of the Popes, which had either dazzled you into a blindness of not seeing ought against it, or awed you into a fear of saying what you saw, if you saw any thing, and for aught I perceive you are as clear sighted as other men, and speak bold truths as freely. I must confess we are a little out when we impute blindness to you, at least I'm sure you saw more in this particular than I But hark you Friend! while you discourse of one thing, my thoughts insensibly carry me to another. I begin to conceit this Tradition of yours which makes such a noise, and passes for such a bugbear, may prove less frightful than our apprehensions make it. And I cannot tell whether the Pope has not as much reason to be jealous of it as Protestants. For methinks, if that be made the Test of Doctrines, and nothing imposed upon our belief but upon the warrant of the constantly conspiring attestation of all Ages; This deposing power of the Popes, which from its inconsistency with Civil government I so much abhorred, must needs be excluded from the Articles of belief, and Protestans eased of a great deal of pains in pulling down that which your own beloved Principle pulls down to their hands. For aught I know, it may do as good service upon other occasions; however I avow to you, I am more friends with it than ever I was, and think Protestants have no reason to look unkindly upon a Principle which takes their part so much in a question of such importance. I wish with all my heart it were looked into more throughly, for I mistake extremely if it would not cut off a number of those things of which we complain, and though peradventure it be no discretion to speak so freely to you, reduce things to that pass, that while you labour to bring us over to you, That very instrument which you use to that purpose, may force you over to us. But rather than such a thing should happen, I presume the Pope would disown it, and after he has used it as long as it would serve his turn, turn enemy to It as soon as he finds It turn enemy to him. But to tell you truly, I am something in a better humour for Tradition, because you speak of Scripture with that reverence which is fit, and which pleases me so much the more by how much the less I expected it from you. For you know how ill you hear (pardon the pedantry of the phrase) for failing in the respect due to that sacred pledge of the Divine Love, which the fear, or rather consciousness how clearly those undimmable lights would discover the abundance of tares you have sown amongst the wheat of the Gospel, makes you shut up from the Vulgar, and exclude from the Test and Judge of Controversies. And after this, to profess they are divinely inspired, and that no other writings can be compared to them, is a thing which pleases indeed, but surprises me too. Do you forget, or have you a mind to condemn yourself? For the Spirit of God must certainly be God's best Interpreter, and where that is to be had (as in books divinely inspired, the Divine Spirit must certainly be,) to seek another Judge is to refuse him now by whom we must one day be judged whether we will or no, and should do well not to provoke in the mean time by contempt. To tell you my thoughts freely, If you would give a little more to Scripture than you do, and we to Tradition, I think things might be better betwixt us. For you pretend to hate Novelties, as I am sure we do; All our whole Reformation being nothing else but the rejecting what you have introduced. Let us have but God's Law pure as he gave it, and free from the mixture of erroneous additions or diminutions, and we have no more to desire. And if I understand Tradition rightly, and that it signify what Vincentius Lirinensis has long since delivered for the test of Sound doctrine, viz. what has been held ever, and every where, and by all, methinks you should like Novelties no more than We: for novelty and this cannot consist together, and there needs no farther confutation of novelty, but only to show that 'tis a Novelty. Which if it be so, in the name of God how fell we out? We all know that Christ was our only Lawgiver, and that upon the observation of the Law he gave us, all our hopes of Salvation depend; that since him there has been no new Lawmaker, and whoever teaches any doctrine contrary to what was taught by him is long since declared Anathema by the Apostle: that profane Novelties are to be avoided, and those who broach or abett them are in the words of the Psalmist, wicked men who tell us stories, but not as thy Law, O God: And while we both agree in this, how is it possible we should disagree in aught? and what magic is it which thus sets up Altar against Altar, and divides the seamless coat of Christ? In the darkness of Barbarism and Ignorance, things might more easily be obtruded upon us, but in an age shining with so much wit and learning, and so clear sighted in Antiquity, methinks it is no such hard matter to find out at lest which is the Novelty, and then if Vincentius say true, we know without more ado which is the Truth. Seriously Friend, I am at a strange loss and cannot possibly unriddle this Mystery. But my zeal transports me, and I have almost forgot what we were talking of. To return to your Letter: It is I must confess long enough, yet I wish it had been longer, and that you had insisted a little more upon some Points there. Particularly that of the Prince's power, Whether it be immediately from God, or only mediately? 'Tis true, you say what those who hold it mediate I conceive will have much ado to answer; but yet you say it shortly, and determine not the point. I confess it was not necessary you should; mediate or immediate was enough for your design, but not for my curiosity. And because I judge the point of importance enough to deserve a little more pains, I beseech you resume it, and show me a little more at large that the Tenet of immediate power is unreprovable amongst you, if it be so. Another is the Spiritual power, which you say was only committed to the Pope; but what that Spiritual power is, you say not, and by that forgetfulness or reservedness, or haste of yours, leave me much at a loss. This Spiritual power of yours, for aught I know, may do all that Temporal power can do; and then we are never the near, and Princes as unsafe as ever. If their work be taken out of their hands, and they peradventure out of their kingdoms by this which you call Spiritual power, you might even as well have kept the Temporal power too for any kindness you have done us. For 'tis the Power of which we complain, and whether you call it temporal or spiritual, if it be a power to do mischief, 'tis alike grievous to us. I am the more solicitous of this for Bellarmin's sake, and the strange descant he runs upon that plain ground Feed my sheep; a place he handles almost as oddly, as he that on the word Confirmavit, made this gloss (i.e.) Abrogavit; This Feeding, as he order matters, amounting to little less than Destroying. A Shepherd, says he, has to do with Wolves and Rams, and Sheep; and Princes, as he contrives it, are all Three. If they leave your Communion, or in his language, turn Heretics, they are Wolves, and to prevent the mischief they may do the flock, your Shepherd at Rome is empowered to drive them away by excommunication, and command the flock not to follow them, for sheep you know naturally run after wolves; but yet I perceive no great necessity of excommunicating those who have refused communion before. Then if retaining your Communion, They govern wickedly and wrong the Church by unjust Laws or actions, they are Rams, and your Shepherd is again empowered to shut them up, and reduce them to the condition of Sheep: Weathers methinks he should have said, for Rams seem to be a kind of Sheep, and Deposing is his way of Gelding. Lastly, all Christians being Sheep, and Princes amongst the rest, your Shepherd may command and force them to do their duty; and the duty of Kings being to defend the Church and punish Heretics, if they fail in this, he may punish and force them by excommunication and other convenient means; which convenient means is to depose them, and turn the Commonwealth topsy turvy, and fill the Country with rapine and blood, and such conveniences as War, and the worst of wars, the Civil useth to produce. And all this is to feed the sheep still. In truth Friend, a little more would incline me to believe too, that the Bible is of too keen an edge for every body to manage; but I am not for all that of your Church's mind, for methinks 'twere better to keep it shut from the learned, and leave it to the simple, who at worst would but cut their own fingers, and not their Neighbour's throats. A plain man would never have found out, that feeding should signify putting folks into a condition of starving. Fight certainly is a new way of feeding and sure Christ did not mean his Sheep should be fed with knocks. But to leave Bellarmin to his speculations, if this be what you understand by your Spiritual power, your Doctrine is inexcusable. Carerius, or whoever flies highest can give the Pope no more than all, and I see not that Bellarmin goes less. For if the Pope can command, and force Princes to obedience, and take them away, and set up others by his Spiritual power, I understand not what all the Temporal power in the world can do more. Wherefore either show me a real difference betwixt these two Powers, and such an one as leaves them at peace one with another, and each quiet in his own sphere, or confess your Church teaches Doctrine incompatible with the security of Princes and quiet of the world; and that all you can do for her credit, is to raise a mist of words, which may serve to hid her shame a while, and steal yourself from the difficulty, but when it breaks up, every body sees plain enough how things go.  
Your very humble Servant.   

FRIEND,  
THIS is and ever will be the fate of Disputers. While they are intent upon one thing, some casual expression which they heed not, occasions a new difficulty, and that many times diverts, sometimes loses the former inquiry. You have now started new game by your reflections upon Scripture and Tradition, which, though the Quarry peradventure be as good as that we had before us, yet is not the same; And as they require as much labour and diligence, twenty to one, we shall meet with fresh game in the pursuit of them, and tyre ourselves with variety of change and catch nothing. Permit me therefore to refer you for those points to those Writers of ours who have handled them professedly and exactly. The Objections are so ordinary and so often answered that truly I expected them not from you, and doubt while you so much lay to heart what is said against us, you consider little what we reply, which methinks is not so agreeable to your candour. Otherwise 'tis easy to meet with information of what we say to those things. But for your fears the Pope will not suffer us to stand to Tradition, let me briefly assure you they are vain. The Church has stood almost seventeen ages by it, and we shall not leave it till we have a mind to leave the Church. Pope's are not the men you take them to be. 'Tis true they are men, and that a mixture of worldly considerations should not sometimes enter into their counsels, cannot be expected: but for all that they are good men, and so good, that you will not often find Princes more virtuous. It is so far from entering into their thoughts to assume to themselves things prejudicial to the Church, that on the contrary 'tis the good of the Church which has been pretended to gain admittance for these things which indeed are prejudicial, but which if they had not been thought otherwise had never gained admittance. And if you think He who owns himself Father of the Church will not rather cast off these pleasing flatteries, when he discerns them to be so, than hazard the good of the Church, allow him yet to understand Policy, and have wit enough to perceive that his well-being depends upon the well-being of the Church, and the constancy of his power, and greatness, and whatever you envy him for. Take away the Church, and He is no body. O Friend! could that clear sight of yours look upon things without the Spectacles of prejudice, and consider the office without the impossible to be avoided faults of some persons, you would peradventure wonder at the aversion you have to a thing, so beneficial to Mankind, that the Divine Providence has left us few more signal testimonies of his constant care over us. At least for my part, I cannot but find myself obliged to a grateful acknowledgement of His love to the Church, as often as I consider he has appointed one whose office and duty it is to take care of her good, and placed him in such circumstances that to the efficacy of virtue and a good Conscience, Interest and the preservation of his own Concerns, and those great ones, and all the considerations which sway with men, are added to make him execute this Office well. A Common Father of Christendom obliged by Conscience and interest to procure the good of the whole, and disabled by want of the Material Sword which is committed to Princes from doing any great harm, (Power disarmed you know, cannot be much mischievous) is so great a good, that if the wisdom and goodness of God had not provided it for us, I am confident those who love Christianity would have wished, and perhaps, fruitlessly endeavoured to have set it up themselves.  
But let us suppose the Popes as bad men as you will, suppose them to design the destruction of the flock they have undertaken to feed, to be careless of the place they hold in this world, and the account they are to give in the next, suppose them wicked, senseless and mad, To make the Church abandon Tradition is a thing beyond all the plenitude of His power. Hopes of happiness, and Fear of misery; Love to posterity, and the Force of Nature, and Inclinations of Mankind, are things too deeply imprinted to be subject to any Awes or violence. But I have no intention to meddle with Controversy, wherefore pray take it well that I refer you for more satisfaction, if you desire it, to those who do.  
Then for the Reverence, which from the natural dictate of my thoughts, you find in my unheeded expressions concerning Scripture you wonder at it, and I more wonder at your wonder; Yours I say, who, if I mistake not, use not to give yourself blindly up to the conduct of other mens Prejudices; but desire first to see Reason, and then to follow it. In the name of God what have Catholics ever said or done, that you should fancy them to have less respect for Scripture than is due to it, or than other men have. We hear ill indeed as you say; but alas! 'tis because other men speak ill. Sure I am, 'tis we preserved the Scriptures for fifteen hundred years, and if we had not, you had not had them to have reproached us withal. You received them from us, and 'tis by our Attestation you know there are Books of Divine Inspiration, and which they are; otherwise I know not where you would have had them, nor how have known them. If you think we read them not, and take no care to understand them; examine well the several Expositors, and see if the Protestants equal the Catholics either in Number or Learning. But we keep them sealed up from the Vulgar; and this for fear those clear lights should too plainly discover the bracks of our Doctrine. I know not how charitable you think that Comment, but I am sure I find it very irrational. If they be against us in Latin 'tis a wise piece of policy, a deep reach of subtle craft to keep people from reading them in English; as if you had not learning enough to urge them against us in Latin, or we to understand you unless you spoke English. But thus stands the Case, whoever understands Latin needs no permission to read the Scripture, and who does not may have it for ask, provided he be not of the number of the unlearned and unstable, who deprave them to their own perdition. Such there were in St. Peter's days, and we have but too much cause to fear the number is greater now; and if you think that to hinder the Perdition of men be to want Respect for Scripture, you may think as your Charity and Judgement serves you; but I think we shall endeavour to show ours by procuring their Salvation. The truth is, we do little more in that particular than the Law, I think still in force, obliges you to do. Look into the Statute, Hen. 8. and see with what limitations the Reading of the Bible is permitted. If you observe them not; we indeed are more obedient to our Laws, than you to yours; but the Laws of both are much alike: for all this while numbers of you read the Scriptures, and show your respect to them in contempt of the Law, which is a fine kind of respect. But we refuse them for the Judge of Controversies, Conscious, say you, that they would give sentence against us. Methinks men who impute want of Charity to us, should be a little more wary in making such Constructions of things. But I beseech you, What do you mean by Judge of Controversies? If no more but this, that whatsoever is contained in those Sacred Books is Truth, and Truth divinely inspired, and such as ought to be received by all with a submission so absolute and entire, that no Authority on Earth is permitted to oppose or question the least title of it; and that, when of any point in Controversy, or not in Controversy, the verdict of Scripture appears, there is no more to do, but immediately leave off disputing, and receive it with the reverence and submission due to Divine Oracles. If this be all you mean, as I think it is, What Catholic ever denied, or questioned, or doubted of it? We hold him neither Catholic nor Christian that does. And as little as you think our Vulgar people acquainted with the Scriptures, I believe you will find few, who knows not thus much of them. Whether all this makes the title of Judge belong with propriety to Scripture, you may, if you please dispute with our Controvertists. But for the substance of what we hold, if this which I have expressed be that which you hold, Catholics hold the same, and as fully and as firmly. I conceive, when you affirm, and we deny Scripture to be the Judge (peradventure it might have been more proper to have said, Rule) of Controversy, we mean not the same thing. For since all the excellent Prerogatives belonging to that Book, hinder it not from being a Book; and a Book must be made up of Words, and Words, and what is signified by the Words, are different things; we think it may be permitted us, without contempt of Scripture, to think that difference is found in the Words of Scripture, as well as in all others. For certainly to forfeit our Reason is a very preposterous kind of respect. Now as far as I am acquainted with Controversy, I conceive that when we deny it to be the Judge or Rule of Controversy, we mean the Words abstracting from the Sense; and when you affirm it is, you mean the Sense abstracting from the Words: For methinks, you should not hold yourselves, or pretend to persuade us, that material Sounds, or strokes of the Air, or Lines drawn by a Pen, are that very Word of God to which so much Respect is due: especially when after so long a course of time, we have not the Original Words neither, at least that we know to be such, which the first Penmen used; but Translation upon Translation, and such variety of Copies, that there is no small difficulty in the choice. Pray inquire, and satisfy yourself, whether this be not the truth of the business; for if it be, I see not that you give more to the Words than we, and that we give as much to the Sense as you. For nothing can be plainer than that this Position, The Sense is the Rule, is no contradiction to ours, The Words are not the Rule; which two are so far from irreconcilable, that they have no opposition, and may, for aught appears in the Terms, be both true. The Terms in which the Controversy is stated, Scripture is, Scripture is not the Rule, are indeed contradictory; but what we mean by these Terms has no opposition. For you mean that the Truth contained in Scripture, is without exception, to be indisputably believed by all; so that no Authority, whatever it be, on Earth, whether Pope or Church, can pretend any way to be exempted from entire submission to it; and this no Catholic denies. We mean the Words of Scripture, because we see them daily wrested to several Senses, are not alone able to give us certainty which the true Sense is. And this I conceive no Protestant bound to affirm. For you consult the Fathers in difficulties where you are unsatisfied, and by their Authority either find, or justify the Sense in which you understand the Words. Wherefore 'tis very evident, that we deny not what you affirm, and you affirm not what we deny, and that our only contradiction in this Point, is the Contradiction of Words which we both so understand, that there is no contradiction in what we mean by them. For you say, We must believe what Scripture says; and we say so too, We say, we cannot sufficiently know by the bare Words alone, what Scripture says, and we must believe; and you, I think, say not the contrary. Rule then with you, signifies Rule of Belief; or that which is to be believed; with us, the Means by which we must know what we are to believe. Which two are as different as may be, yet both being confounded in the same word Rule, make a shift with the assistance of the peevish animosity, and stiff crossness of our unhappy times, to keep us still at odds, and expose us to the reproach of being disrespectful to Scripture, for denying it to be the Judge or Rule of Controversy, when all the while we agree to what you mean by Judge of Controversy. Heu quantum est in rebus inane! In short, give us the true Sense of Scripture, and if we submit not to it, with all the ready Obedience due to it, you shall not need to condemn us: Our public Professions, besides the self conviction of Conscience, will condemn us to your hands: but if we refuse, to accept for God's Word, a wrong Sense of those words in which 'tis expressed, I think, we show more respect to the Word by desiring a true one, than those who would impose a false one. For 'tis only the True sense which is indeed God's Word; and there is nothing farther from respect to it, than to accept a False one instead of it. Pray, when a Presbyterian Interprets Scripture to the destruction of Episcopacy, or an Arian to the overthrow of Christ's Deity, or a Socinian of the Trinity; Are you disrespectful to Scripture for rejecting their Interpretations, or they for making them? This we take to be the Case betwixt you and us, and that you offer us wrong Senses of Scripture, and then blame us for want of Respect to Scripture for not accepting them. Whereof, whatever be the truth, which I will not meddle with, this is plain, that we do no more to you, than you to Sectaries; and therefore cannot be thought to have less respect for Scripture than yourselves. I have read somewhere, and I cannot but think it true, that for all these scandalous imputations, there are none who show that true respect to Scripture, which Catholics do. For besides the Reverence we bear to the Sense, we have also an Authentic Copy of the words, to which we tie ourselves, and cannot refuse in Disputation's; whereas others take the liberty to fly from one Copy, and one Language to another, as best serves their turn: which a body would think, were a proceeding savoured more of a desire to justify themselves, than Reverence to those Sacred Oracles. The truth is, the Controversy betwixt us concerning Scripture, is not about the Word of God; in which we both agree; but of the Means to know it, and that plainly shows the true Word of God is submitted to of all hands. For otherwise, we need not much trouble ourselves to find it out, or care what it said, if we did not acknowledge it obliged us to Belief. And since you will not, I presume, say, that a wrong Sense of the material words, is the true Word of God, or Divinely inspired; all this hideous contempt, wherewith we are reproached, amounts to no more, than that we will not wilfully contradict our eyesight, but think the words both may, and are too often wrested to wrong meanings; that is, that the Material words are not what they signify: which is just to say, A man must needs despise the Grape if he think the Bush is not the Wine. 'Tis strange an Objection of so little substance should be, or so obstinately pressed, or so universally entertained. You too talk gravely for Company, and admonish us of refusing a Judge, to whom we must one day submit ourselves weather we will or no; as if true desire to know his Sentence, and true submission to it when we do know it, were to refuse it. I do not know we refuse any thing of Scripture, but your Interpretation, where we think you are in the wrong; and I trust you will not say, your Interpretation is the Judge, who at the last day shall sit upon the quick and the dead. But the Spirit of God is God's best Interpreter, say you, and since that is to be had in Books Divinely inspired, we should seek no farther. How prettily does this sound? and yet, how little does it signify? To have the Spirit which is in those Holy Books can mean nothing, that I know, but to know and believe the Truth contained there. And then consider what work your zeal makes of it. This Meaning is the thing about which we differ, you understand it one way, and we another. That then, which is to be Interpreted is the Meaning of Scripture; that which you assign for Interpreter, is the Spirit, and this Spirit is the very Meaning. Is it possible you should not see, that this is to make the Interpreter, and the thing Interpreted all one? That it supposes the same thing, both understood, and not understood at once? Understood as Interpreter, not understood as Interpreted. Nay, that it makes one thing the same, and not the same with itself. For to Interpret, is to declare another thing, and yet this, which to be Interpreted must be another, you make the Interpreter itself. Pray persist not with your fine Language to persuade us, that is to be the Interpreter, which when we once have, there is nothing to be Interpreted: for when we once have the Meaning, which you call to have the Spirit, there needs no more any to tell us what we know already. Again, make us not despair of an end of our differences, by assigning such a method to end them, as supposes them first ended before it can be applied. For the meaning being once known, there is no difference for your Interpreter to end. Besides, since while we differ, one of us has not the true meaning of Scripture, 'tis a strange method to reconcile us, to refer us to what one of us has not, nor can have while we differ. I examine not with what propriety you speak, though to be the Spirit, and to be dictated by the Spirit, seem different enough. But this is plain, that since the Spirit in the Books is to be interpreted, the Spirit interpreting must be out of the Books. And this our Controvertists will tell you is to be sought for in the Church, to whom was promised the assistance of the same Spirit with which the Books were written. And to them I refer you, if you desire to dispute the Point farther, for I intent not to meddle with Controversy. For the rest of what you say of the mystery of our disagreement, who both agree in what we would be at, both condemn novelties, and desire the Doctrine taught by Christ and his Apostles, 'tis a thing I must confess I wonder at as much as you, and can as little unriddle. Inimicus homo hoc fecit, is all I can say to it, and think our best remedy is to fall hearty to our prayers, and solicit the powerful goodness of God, to throw down at last that wall of division, whose foundation we are so far from being able to overthrow, that we cannot find where 'tis laid, nor upon what ground so mischievous a building stands.  
To come then at last to our purpose; I did I confess speak but little of the first point, the Power of Princes immediately from God, and the little I said I thought was more than needed, and must think so still, it seeming to me a question of so little importance either way, that what I shall add is only in obedience to your commands, which in my opinion might have employed me in something more useful. But since your curiosity will not otherwise be satisfied, let me tell you there are in this matter several opinions of learned men, and all opinions only, and only of learned men, for the Church has not at all interposed, and I believe either the same or at least as great variety is to be found amongst you. Some hold that the Civil Power is given by God to the Community first, which afterwards chooses the form of Government most pleasing or most proper, and the persons to manage it. So that they make it derived from God immediately to the whole, and by their mediation to the Magistrates. There are who affirm as much of the Church, and say, that as God and Nature intent first and more immediately the whole than any part thereof, as sight is given principally to the man, and to the eye as the instrument by which the man exercises it, so Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction is given principally and properly to the Church, to the Pope and Bishops as instruments, and those who are to execute it. Again, When a Prince is said to have his Power immediately from God, some distinguish this word immediately, and granting that the Power to command their Subjects is immediately from God, which they say none denies, they affirm that to have these, and these Subjects, for example, the King of France, the French, of Spain, the Spaniards, etc. is not immediately from God, but by one of the four humane ways by which Governments are introduced, Election. Inheritance, Gift or just Conquest. In which, say they, the case of the Pope and Secular Princes is different, for to St. Peter, and in him to his Successors, all Christians of whatever Nation or quality were immediately subjected by Christ, but for other Prince's obedience to them when they are Princes, is immediately commanded by God, but where and over whom they shall be Princes, depends upon humane means. Others think this acuteness altars not the case, and say, that the Power of a Prince is one thing, and the Title which he has to this Power is another: that the Power is as immediately given Princes as to the Pope, and that the Title to it is by humane means in both. For he has no Power but by the means of humane Election, more the Princes by Election, Inheritance, or the rest. And so they make the designation of the person to be by humane means, but the collation of Power immediately from God in both. And thus every one speaks freely as his humour or learning serves, and I for my part see not that this freedom is prejudicial any way, for while we all agree we are to obey our Princes, and if we do not, we disobey God, these subtleties, I conceive, are not much material. One thing there is, and but one that I can perceive which is of moment, and which I hinted in my former Letter, and that is, that Position, which makes the Power of the Prince derived from the People, seems liable to this pressing inconvenience, that they seem not to part so wholly with it, but in some cases they reserve a right to reassume it again, as when Princes prove tyrannical, when the line fails, and the like. And this is a mischief of which great care is to be taken, for one cannot easily find a greater. For if the People retain any Power, they must retain Judgement when to use it, and if they be Judges, when 'tis lawful to oppose the Prince, when not, there is a gap opened to all manner of Sedition and Rebellion, or rather there can be no such thing as Sedition or Rebellion in the world, at least of the People. For when they oppose the Prince, 'tis a plain case by doing so they judge he is to be opposed, and if they be the Judges, they are no longer Rebels, but exercise a Power due to them; than which nothing can be more pestiferous, and destructive of Government, and ruinous of the advantages mankind receives by it. Of which people may think as they please, but I believe the private men are they who reap the greatest benefit by it, and are more happy than Princes whom many crossly envy, and might peradventure more justly pity. For certainly to be tied to perpetual labour and care, and un-intermitted solicitude for the benefit of others, is a condition not much to be envied; and he, who secure of his life and fortune by the pains of other men, has nothing to do, but freely to pursue that course to which his inclination or advantage leads him, is in a condition much more desirable. Wherefore not only Princes, and all honest men with them, but all who are not stark fools, ought seriously to join to the preventing a mischief so ruinous. Now as it is obvious and easily foreseen, so there are several remedies which men have provided against it. Some affirm that when the People have once parted with their Power, and chosen to themselves a Form of Government and Governors, they part with it for ever, and have no more to do but obey for the future, without any right of intermeddling in any case with commanding; and this is pretty well, and renders the Government stable, and the Governors secure. Others think that they make all safe, by excluding the People from a capacity of being their own Judges, and reserving that Prerogative to the common Father of Christendom, who, they think, will take that care to which he is obliged for the good of his Children. But this is a little more, and in truth too much suspicious, and does not take away the harm, but transfer the power of doing it into other hands. For the same Inconveniences may be feared from the Pope, as from the People; especially where Princes are his enemies, as many professedly are, and all may be, even those of his own Communion: And comes so near that universal Temporal Monarchy which some have attributed to him, that I do not think, that any of his Adversaries will admit it, or that his Friends will know how to maintain it. At least for my part I do not. Others, and I think the most, both in number and Authority, take away all interposing of the People farther than to design the person as in Elections, or however they concur, but make the Prince's power flow immediately from God, and so make it Sacred, and exclude both Pope and People, and all, but God himself from meddling with it. And because, this is the thing of which you desire I should discourse, to those Authorities already mentioned in my former Letter, I shall add as many more as I think may serve for your satisfaction.  
In the first place, those words of S. Paul seem decisive of the question, Rom. 13.1. There is no power but from God. For certainly it cannot consist with them, that Power should be from the People, or any else, but him. That exclusive word Nisi excludes all besides. Conformably speak the Fathers. Some I have mentioned before. I add Epiphanius Haeres. 40. You see that this Worldly power is by God; or rather ordinata ex Deo, orderly and from God, and has the power of the Sword, and not, etc. from any other but God to revenge. S. Greg. Naz. de Beatid. Absolute Empire, and highest, full power subject to no other pleasure or dominion, belongs to Kingdoms. Optatus L. 3. cont. Parmen. Above the Emperor is only God who made the Emperor, etc. Bruno Carthus. in Rom. 13. There is no power, whether good or bad, but from God. Hincmarus Ap. Bochel. in Decret. Eccl. Gall. speaking of King Lotharius, He ought to be subject to the principality of God alone, from whom alone he could be placed in his own principality. These more ancient Authors speak all, as the Apostle with a phrase of exclusion, plain enough; yet later speak plainer. Card. Cusanus L. 3. Concord. C. 5. First, I presuppose what is known even to the Vulgar, that the Imperial Cessitude is independent of the Sacerdotal power, having an immediate dependence on God. Dantes Aligh. de Monarch. has a whole Book to prove this position, and concludes, Wherefore 'tis plain, that the Temporal Authority of a Monarch, is derived to him without any mediation from the fountain of Universal Authority. Joan. de Parisiis de Potest. Regal. & Papal. Both Powers proceed from one Supreme power, viz. the Divine immediately. Anton. de Rosell. Monar. part 1. p. 37. Whence is inferred, that Caesar depends of God immediately. Theodoric à Niem. de Schism. L. 3. c. 7. That Empire depends principally and immediately of God, appears by evident reasons. de Offic. Princ. c 5. If the People were obliged to Obedience only in virtue of the consent to the Prince, their Disobedience would be said to be a breach of their agreement and promise; but not properly and directly of the Divine Ordinance, which, according to S. Paul, by Resistance is properly and immediately broken. For the Power which is resisted is ordained by God; so that now Rebellion ought not to be looked upon as against Man, but against God. Tho. Waldensis Tom. 1. l. 2. ar. 3. c. 78. after a whole Chapter to this purpose concludes thus. This we say that the Power of a King is only of God, given him immediately by God. Victoria Relect. de potest. Civ. n. 8. King's have Power by Divine and natural Right, and not from the Commonwealth. Those who writ in behalf of the Venetians, in the Quarrel betwixt them and Paul the Fifth, laid this Doctrine for a groundwork, That the Power of temporal Princes, the Pope too amongst the rest, as he is a Temporal Prince, is given them by God immediately, and without exception. Bellarmin Answers, and reprehends that word immediately, but is pretty severely reprehended himself for his pains, and the expression justified by the Authority of divers Catholic Doctors; as, Navarre, Durandus, Joan, Paris, Almain, Gerson, etc. In fine he was so Answered, that he thought it better to have recourse to the Inquisition than to more Arguments, and so caused the Authors to be cited to Rome. But his Patrons deserted him not, and the Inquisition of Venice protected him against that of Rome, and the Doctrine remained not only unblemished, but countenanced by the Protection of a very wise Commonwealth. Permit me to conclude this Point with an Authority, which with an English man may peradventure sway more than all the rest, It being a Declaration of Parliament, and that in Catholic times, That the Crown of England is, and always has been, free and subject immediately to God and no other, in all that concerns the Regality thereof. 16. Ric. 2. Foreigners may talk as their fancy or Interest leads them, but I suppose a true English man will not easily be induced, to swerve from a Doctrine delivered him so Authentically by his famous Ancestors.  
I hope by this time your Curiosity is at an end, I am sure my patience is, for I am quite tired with talking so long of a matter, which seems to me to afford little more advantage than to know, which of those Authors who treat this Subject, is the best Scholar, and talks most rationally. For as I said before, the Church has no ways interposed in the business, and possibly it is a thing not very proper for her to meddle with. She has received from Christ, and delivers to us, That Obedience to our Princes is commanded by God, and to be performed, not only for Fear, but for Conscience. And this being agreed by all, and acknowledged for unquestioned and unquestionable Truth; The rest of the speculations may serve for entertainment of those who delight in them, and for the rest seem of little concern, till people speculate themselves into opposition to that so certain, and so certainly known Doctrine; and then they turn not only bad Scholars but bad men, if they see what they do, however dangerous and as such are to be treated.  
For my part, I cannot guests what use you would make of this Immediate Power of which you are so curious, unless perhaps, you think the security of Kings not sufficiently provided for without it, and that they may otherwise be obliged to render an account of their actions, not only to God, but to those by whose mediation they have received their Power, and so a principal and necessary Prerogative taken from them. But this is so positively and expressly settled by unquestionable Authority, that 'tis very needless, and rather prejudicial, to have recourse to a ground which some question, when the thing itself is so unanimously agreed that none questions it. Witness S. Cyril Alex. in Joan. L. 12. C. 56. None offend the laws of Kings without punishment but Kings themselves, in whom this crime of prevarication has no place: for it was wisely said, that he is an impious man who says to the King, You do wickedly. S. Ambrose Apolog. David. c. 10. To Thee only have I sinned; for he was a King subject himself to no Laws, because Kings are free from the bonds of delinquency. For no Laws punish them who are safe by the power of their Empire, and he sinned not to Man, to whom he was not accountable. And Cap. 4. They who are subject to Laws dare to deny their sin, and scorn to ask pardon, which he asked who was subject to no humane Laws. Again, L. 2. Ep. 7. For supported by his regal dignity, as Lord of the Laws, he was not guilty to the Law; he was accountable to God alone, because he is Lord of Power. Again, upon Psal. 118. Serm. 16. He who had not man to fear, says, I have sinned to Thee alone, etc. A King, though he have Laws in his power, and may sin without punishment, is nevertheless subject to God. S. Hierom, Ep. 46. ad Rustic. I was a King and feared no other man; for he had no other above him. V Bede upon Psal. 50. To Thee alone have I sinned. For a King if he sin, sins only to God, for none else shall punish him for his sin. Agapet. ad Justinian. in Paraenet. Impose upon yourself a necessity to keep the Laws, since you have not on earth who may correct you. Isidor. Hispal. Sent. L. 3. C. 50. People that sin fear the Judge, and are by the Laws restrained from their own harm. Kings, unless they be restrained by the only fear of God and Hell, run headlong on, and from the precipice of Licentious liberty fall into all sorts of Vice. Arnob. in Psal. 50. Whoever lives under the Law, when he offends, sins against God, and also against the Laws of the World. But this King being under none but God alone, and only fearing him above his own power, sinned to God alone. Didymus Cat. Aurea in Psal. 50. As he was a King he was not subject to humane Laws, wherefore he sinned not against them who made the Laws, nor committed this evil against any of them: but as to his Regal dignity, if he would be Virtuous he was subject to the Divine Law, and therefore sinned to God alone. Lactantius de Justit. L. 5. C. 24. Let not bad Princes, and unjust Persecutors, who scorn and scoff at the Name of God, think they shall scape without Punishment— for they shall be punished by the Judgement of God— He commands us patiently to expect that day of Divine Judgement, in which he will honour or punish every one according to his deserts. Gregory of Tours. L. 5. Hist. c. 17. If any of us, O King, will stray from the path of Justice, he may be punished by you. But if you leave it yourself, who shall reprehend you? We speak to you, and if you please you hear us: if you will not, who shall condemn you, but He who has declared himself to be Justice? Hincmarus apud Bochell. Decret. Eccles. Gallic. L. 2. Tit. 16. c. 2. goes farther, and I know not, whether not too far. Wise men, say this Prince, is subject to the Laws and Judgement of none but God, who made him King in that Kingdom which his Father allotted him: And if he will for this or any other cause, he may at his pleasure go to the Synod, and if he will not, he may freely dismiss it. And as he ought not, whatever he do, be excommunicated by his own Bishops; so by other Bishops he cannot be judged, since he ought be subject to the principality of God alone, by whom alone he could be placed in his own principality. For my part I cannot agree to the denial of the power of Excommunicating in Bishops: and yet St. Austin is cited, Gloss. in 13. Math. to say, That the multitude is not to be Excommunicated, nor the Prince of the people. Euthimius in Psal. 50. Being a King, and having you alone for Judge of the sins I commit, I seem to have sinned to you alone; that is, I am subject to you alone as my Judge; of all the rest I myself am Lord, and in respect of my power, it seems, I may do whatever I list. Haymo in Psal. 50. I have sinned to Thee alone: because being a King, none is to punish my sin but you alone. St. Thomas 1, 2. Q. 96. Art. 5. making this Conclusion, That all are subject to the Laws; and this Objection from the Law, That the Prince is free from the Law, Answers, That the Prince is free from the Law, for as much as concerns the Co-active power— because none can pronounce sentence of Condemnation against him. Wherefore the Gloss upon Psal. 50. says, That the King has no man who can judge his actions— But is subject to the Law, as to the directive power, by his own proper will, etc. And so without doubt, good Princes are, and will observe what themselves command. But if they will not, and become bad, there is none according to S. Thomas who has power to condemn them. Alex. Alensis in Psal. 50. I have sinned to Thee alone: because there is no other above me who can punish me. For I am a King, and none is above me but you alone. And Part. 3. A King is above all, and therefore to be judged by God alone, since he has not any man who can judge his actions, nor is to be punished by man. But if any of the People sin, they sin both against God and the King. Nicholaus de Lyra. I have sinned to Thee alone as my Judge, and who has power to punish: for he had sinned against Urias, and others slain upon this occasion. Yet because he was a King he had no superior Judge to punish him but God. Otho frisingen's Ep. ad Frederic. before his Chronic. Whilst no person is found in the world who is not subject to the Laws of the world, and by that subjection kept in awe; Kings alone, as being above Laws, and reserved to the Divine Judgement, are not awed by the Laws of the world. Witness that both King and Prophet, I have sinned to Thee alone. Joan. de Turrenm. in Psal. 50. I have sinned to Thee alone as my Judge, and who has power to punish me, because Thou alone art above me who canst judge my Crimes. Dio Vega in conc. Vespert. super Psal. 50. con. 2. Wherefore leaving them, we must go the common way with the Fathers of the Church, Hierom, Austin, Ambrose, chrysostom, and Cassiodorus, who say, that David therefore used these words, because, being a Sovereign King, he was subject to none but God, accountable to the Laws of none, and none but God could punish his sin. For a King though he be subject to the Directive power of the Law, yet is not to the Coactive. Joan. de Pineda upon 34. Job. For if a King or Prince will not willingly obey the Law, who can oblige, or by force constrain him?— Yet let Princes understand at last, that if they do not of their own will keep the Law, they shall render an account to the Supreme King, and be punished for the Violation of Justice. I conclude with a Jesuit, Lorinus upon Psal. 50. I have sinned to Thee alone, viz. as alone knowing, or having power to punish his sin who was a King, and had no Superior—. None can say Apostate to a King, or call Judges wicked, unless he will be thought wicked himself, as Chrysostom and Nicetas, and Cyril in this place note.  
I hope by this time you will acknowledge it was a superfluous care of yours for the security of Princes, if that were your reason, which made you so solicitous for the immediate power. For, whatever become of that, this is universally fixed, That Kings are accountable to none but God. And I think you need not much care what people say in a question disputed amongst Learned men, when that for whose sake you desire it should be resolved, is itself so fully resolved to your hand.  
To deal with sincerity, I should acquaint you, what shifts they make to escape the weight of this Authority, who undertake to abett a Power paramount in the Pope. But they are such plain shifts, that in truth, I have not patience to insist upon them. Some say this held among the Jewish Kings who were above the Priesthood, but holds not among Christians who are subject to it; as if Christian Princes were less absolute than those of the Jews, or Christianity took away the Right of any body, much less Princes. I always thought, that much good had come to the world by Christian Religion, and the concerns of Mankind went on more sweetly and more strongly; but that it should be guilty of so great a mischief as to shake the foundations of Government, so beneficial and necessary to humane Nature is a scandal, which methinks, a Christian ear should not hear with patience. And Bellarmin, give him his due, as much a favourer of the Pope as he is; in this yet is more a friend to Truth, and tells us, De Rom. Pont. L. 1. c. 29. That the Gospel deprives no man of his Right and Dominion, but gets him a new right to an eternal Kingdom: Nor have Kings less power in the New Testament, than they had in the old. And yet He, with his distinctions betwixt Fact and Right, Power direct and indirect; with one whereof he still endeavours to ward all blows, makes as mad work, and reduces things to as much confusion. I shall say nothing to them more than to entreat you to be Judge yourself, and consider whether, in what I have alleged, there be any room for those Inventions, and whether the Doctrine be not delivered too plainly to be put off with such evasions.  
And so I come to your Second Point; and for the fear you have of Bellarmin's Argument, peradventure it were Answer enough to say, That S. Bernard understood what was meant by the word Feed, as well at least as Bellarmin, and he, notwithstanding all the Cardinal's acuteness, tells Pope Eugenius, L. 4. c. 3. that to Feed is to Evangelize. Perform, says he, the work of an Evangelist, and you have fulfilled the duty of a Pastor. Again, Serm. de Resurrect. Feed with your Mind, with your Mouth, with your Actions; feed with prayer of the Mind, exhortation of the Word, proposal of Example. I suppose no good Catholic, but will side with S. Bernard rather than Bellarmin; for as great a Scholar as Bellarmin was, he is not yet thought a match for S. Bernard. But neither is he alone of this mind. Petrus Blesensis says almost in the same words, Ep. 148. What is to Feed the Sheep, but to Evangelize, to render the People acceptable to God by Word, by Work, by Example. And thus Innocent III. and a great many more are cited by Charon, to interpret this word Feed; so that all the Cardinal's subtle speculations upon the metaphor used in the Gospel, hinder not the Argument from being as insignificant as you, and more besides you to my knowledge think it. And if I have not yet said enough to it, harken a little to S. Chrysost. de Sacerd. L. 2. It is not lawful for a man, to cure a Man with the same Authority with which a Shepherd cures his Sheep. For here it is free to bind and restrain from pasture, and burn and cut; There the Medicine and power of the cure is not in him who Administers, but in him who is Sick. But we shall hear more of him anon.  
Mean time, since the Point you have proposed, besides your recommendation, deserves in itself more consideration than this Argument. Let me tell you for your satisfaction, That those who treat these things put many differences betwixt the Spiritual and Civil power, from the manner of Institution, the ends at which they aim, the means they use to their several ends, etc. That which I conceive most to your purpose, is either grounded upon, or warranted by the Instruction left by S. Peter to his fellow Pastors, in these words, 1 Pet. 5. Feed the flock, of God which is among you, providing not by constraint, but willingly according to God, neither for filthy lucre sake but voluntarily, neither as overruling the Clergy, but made Examples of the flock from the heart. From these words some gather this difference betwixt the Spiritual and Temporal Power, that the one is accompanied with the power of Constraint, the other not; I know the word Coacte is sometimes expounded otherwise; and that some, and in particular V Bede, understand by it the exclusion of that Mercenary interest, which in service some propose to themselves, while others serve for Love. And this sense is without doubt a good and a true one; but I know not whether the Apostle meant it, though peradventure he, or rather his Inspirer might, according to S. Austin's Rule, That all the Truth was meant by God which is contained in the words he Inspired. Otherwise, that seems to be the import of the Second Branch, Not for lucre but voluntarily; and this Interpretation, with a needless tautology, makes the two branches signify but one thing, which the Apostle seems nevertheless to distinguish. However it be, considering that before S. Peter Christ himself puts Dominion and non-dominion, for the difference betwixt Secular and Spiritual Power. The Kings of the Gentiles have dominion over them— but you not so. Luke 22.25. And that S. Paul tells the Corinthians, The arms of his warfare are not carnal. Cor. 10. I conceive that whatever S. Peter meant, this doctrine is very true, that Force and Constraint belong only to the Civil Magistrate, and not to the Spiritual: I mean in virtue of his being a Spiritual Magistrate; for these Formalities, of which you professed so much dislike, return again in spite of my teeth, and there is no discoursing without them. Otherwise, the man who is a Spiritual Magistrate may upon other accounts justly have, and justly use Constraint; nay, it may be his due in consideration of his Spiritual Magistracy, but not originally deduced from thence, but annexed to it, or accrued by other means. According to S. Bernard, mentioned in my last: Not by right of Apostleship. Now if I can make out to you, that it may irreprovably be held in our Church, that this Spiritual Power, of which you are so jealous, cannot use Force or Constraint upon any man, I hope you will have no cause of complaint against it, nor fuel for those fears which still disquiet you. For certainly, a Power which cannot use Force is a little dangerous. If it can persuade you to what it would, you then act by your Inclination or Choice; but if it cannot, you are free to do what you will: And I think, you would not wish to be more safe. Consider then, what men they are whom they must reprove, who will reprove this Doctrine. And first, S. Hierom delivers it very plainly, Epitaph. Nepot. Ep. 3. We must obey the Bishop as the King, nay the Bishop less than the King, for he is over the unwilling, the Bishop over the willing. One subjects by Fear, the other is given to Service; One imprisons the Body to death, the other preserves the Soul to life. S. Greg. Nazian. Apologet. We ought not to constrain by Force or Necessity, but persuade by Reason and Example of our lives. Again, Our Law and Lawmaker have especially provided, that the flock be fed not by constraint, but freely and willingly. And, Orat. 1. cont. Jul. Apost. These things Julian had in his mind, as those who were privy to his secrets discovered; but he was restrained by the clemency of God, and the tears of the Christians, whereof many, and by many had, now been shed, since this was their only remedy against a Persecutor. S. Jo. Chrysost. in Act. Hom. 3. comparing the care of a Bishop with the care of a Father, makes that of a Bishop much more heavy, as having more Children and less Power. What, says he, will not the Bishop endure who has so many not of his household Family, but whose Obedience is in their own power. Again: The Emperor has command over the whole world, the Bishop is Bishop only of one City, and yet he has as much more care as there is difference betwixt a River stirred with the wind, and the Sea swelling and raging. Why so? because there are there more helps, since all things are performed by Laws and Commands, here is no such thing; for it is not lawful to command by Authority. Hom. 10. in 1. Thessalon. A Father both by Natural and Civil Laws, uses his Child with much freedom. If he instruct him against his will, if he strike him none hinders him, nor dares the Son himself look up. A Priest has much difficulty: for first he must rule those that are willing to be ruled, and whom by his government he is to please. Again, We domineer not over your Faith, Beloved, nor order these things by the right of command and dominion. To us is commended the speech of Doctrine, not the Authority of Power and Principality. We hold the place of Counsellors and Exhortors: He who counsels when he delivers his opinion, forces not the hearer to accept it, but leaves in his power the free choice of what is to be done. And Hom. 1. in Ep. ad Tit. I omit to say that a Bishop cannot with truth be called a Prince. Why? Because it is in the Power of their Subjects to obey, or not. Again, De Sacerdot. L. 2. External Judges when they find wicked men who have transgressed the Laws, show themselves endued with great Power and Authority, and force them to change their manners whether they will or no. But here we must not use force but only persuade, and by that means make him become better whose cure we have undertaken. For neither have we any Power given by Law to force Delinquents, and if we had, we have not whereon to exercise this force and Power, since Christ gives an eternal Kingdom to those, who not by force but by a firm resolution of the soul abstain from sin. Wherefore there is need of much art, that Christians who are illaffected will persuade themselves that they ought submit to the cure of Priests. Again, upon these words in the last to the Heb. Hom. Ult. Obey your Prelates, that they may do this with joy, not lamenting, etc. You see that when an Ecclesiastical Prince is contemned, he ought not return revenge, but all his revenge is to weep and sigh. And upon Isa. 6. Hom. 4. The King forces, the Priest exhorts; He with necessity, this by counsel; He has sensible, this spiritual arms, etc. S. Aust. de fide & oper. C. 2. says, The material sword used in the Old Testament by Moses and Phinees, was a figure of the degradations and excommunications to be exercised in the New, when in the discipline of the Church, the visible sword should cease. Origen Tract. 12. in Mat. Jesus taking occasion from the two Brothers, who sought to be advanced above the other Apostles with indignation of the rest, settles the Rule of justice to the faithful, how a man may obtain the first place with God. The Princes of the Gentiles not content only to Rule their Subjects, seek violently to Command them. But with you who are mine, this shall not be. Lest they perhaps who seem to have Principality in the Church, should domineer over their Brethren, or exercise power upon them. For as all Carnal things are by necessity not willingness, and Spiritual by willingness not necessity; so the principality of Spiritual Princes ought to be placed in the Love, not Corporal fear of their Subjects. And after he had spoken much of the Humility befitting Prelates, lest he should be thought an enemy to their true Power, he so Answers that Objection that withal he explicates wherein that Power consists, Adding, This I say not to debase the Ecclesiastical Principality. For it is sometimes fit, according to the Apostolical Instruction, publicly to rebuke sinners that the rest may be afraid. It is sometimes fit he should use his Power (What is that?) and deliver the Sinner over to Satan to the destruction of the flesh, that his spirit may be saved in the day of our Lord Jesus Christ. Yet this is seldom to be done. For the Unquiet are to be reprehended, the Pusillanimous to be comforted, the Weak to be sustained, Magnanimity showed to all. Reprehension then, and Excommunication, are the things in which Origen thought the Spiritual Power consisted. S. Ambrose Orat. in Auxent. Against Weapons and Soldiers of the Goths I may grieve, I may weep, I may sigh. My Weapons are my Fears: for such are the defence of a Priest. To resist in any other manner I neither aught, nor can. S. Bernard. de Consid. L. 2. S. Peter could not give what he had not, what he had that he gave the care, as I said, over the Churches. Did he give Dominion too? Hear himself; Not domineering, says he, in the Clergy, but being made the Example of the flock. And that you may not think this was said only for humility, not for truth: it is the saying of our Lord in the Gospel, The Kings of Gentiles have dominion over them, and who have Power upon them are called beneficial, and infers, but you not so. 'Tis plain Dominion is forbid to Apostles, Go you now and dare to usurp either with Dominion the Apostleship, or with the Apostleship Dominion. Aut Dominans Apostolatum, aut Apostolicus Dominatum. You are plainly forbidden the one. If you will have both together, you will lose both. Otherwise think not yourself exempted from the number of those of whom God complains; so they have reigned but not by me. They have been Princes, and I knew them not. Now if you will reign without God, you have glory but not with God. Dominion is forbidden, Ministry is commanded. Again, Girt your sword to you, the sword of the Spirit, which is the Word of God. And L.4. Set upon them with the Word, not the sword. S. Anselm in 26 Mat. Note that there are two swords in the Church, one material, the other spiritual, but the spiritual constrains only the willing, the material the unwilling too. And note withal, that the Saint by Church means materially not formally, that is, that amongst Christians and the faithful, as well as Infidels, there is the power of life and death, and they are of the Church who have it, not that it belongs to them as they are of the Church. Pet. de Aliaco de Resumpt. Concl. 1. answering some Arguments brought to prove, that the spiritual Power extends itself to Temporals: To all these things may be said, that they are to be understood not of the judgement of Coaction, but the judgement of Discretion; nor that they belong to the Clergy, not by natural and divine Right, but humane Laws, and concession of Kings or Emperors. And Concl. 4. To those who teach the Clergy may make Laws in Civil matters and Rules, according to which Princes are obliged to judge and govern, I insist not upon it, because they say it purely, voluntarily, and without alleging Authentical Scripture. Again, C. de Reform. Laic. & Princ. Consi. 6. The Church cannot temporally constrain Princes to reform these things. Gul. O●hum. Dial. Par. 1. L. 6. C. 9 The Pope as Vicar of Christ has Power of Excommunication, but not to inflict any greater punishment. Joan. Ferus L. 3. Comment. in Mat. 16. I will give Thee the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven: These are not material Keys, but signify metaphorically Power. Peter therefore received Power, not any earthly Power that he could give or take away, or alienate Kingdoms, etc. but the Power to bind and lose, to remit and retain sins, to open and shut, and this not arbitrarily neither, but as a Minister to execute the will of God. This Ferus by the way is in the Index of prohibited Books; but these Commentaries printed at Rome are excepted out of the prohibition, which because I have not, I thought convenient to tell you so. Anton. de Rosell. de Potest. Imp. & Pap. Par. 1. C. 38. Whence is gathered that Secular Power never was in Christ nor his Successors; which is confirmed by the Authority of Bede, when upon that of St. Mat. he says, Amongst you who are mine, violent dominion shall not be. For as all carnal things are placed in necessity, spirituals in voluntariness, so spiritual Princes have their principalities in love not fear: But those who have carnal Coercion should fear that of the Apostle, Rom. 13. If you do ill, fear, namely, the Secular Power, because their weapons are wars. The sword therefore is not permitted to the Pope. This Rosellis is got into the Index too, Donec expurgetur; of which if I had reflected when I writ my last, I had told you so much: But because he citys V. Bede, who it seems had learned his Doctrine from Origen and St. Ambrose, I put him in. I see these Authors freely cited by Catholics, and while they speak conformably to the Fathers and Popes themselves, know not why they should be rejected. You have in the former Letter from Leo 4, that corporal punishments belong to Kings, spiritual to Priests. From Nicol. 2. That the Church of God hath no sword but the spiritual. I add Joan. 8. Cap. Porro 16. Q. 3. The Church unacquainted with corporal Arms, patiently expects mercy from her only Lord and Defender when he pleases. And Calestin. 3. C. cum ab homine. Extrav. de Judiciis teaches us, that if a Clergyman remain after Deposition and Excommunication still incorrigible, since the Church has not Power to do more, he is to be restrained by the Secular Power, and banishment or some other lawful punishment inflicted. And this seems to me very evident from the Custom of the Church even at this day, when if a Clergyman be found guilty of a crime which deserves death, they deliver him degraded over to the Secular Magistrate to receive him. I know that some would have this to proceed only from the prohibition of the Canons, which for decency forbidden the Clergy to meddle with blood. But by their favour, considering the unanimous Doctrine of the Fathers before delivered, I cannot think but the true indecency is the want of power, or in St. Bernard's language, their thrusting their Sickle into other men's Harvest. Otherwise an action truly virtuous seems far from indecent, and to purge the Commonwealth of a bad Member is not only a virtue, but a necessary one too, and such as the Commonwealth cannot subsist without. Not only the Judge, but the Executioner too may be Saints for all the severity of their Offices, and I should think that things which consist with virtue ought not be thought mis-becoming, and what are necessary cannot, So that I must needs believe this Custom of the Church implies her sense, that her Power is at an end when she has used her spiritual rod, Excommunication; and if any more be fit to be done, she must have recourse to temporal Power, which if it think not fit to proceed, I know not why they are not at their liberty.  
This is what occurs to me in Answer to the point you proposed. I hope it will prove satisfactory, and fully quiet the jealousy you have of the spiritual Power. For certainly there cannot be a more unreasonable fear in the world, then to fear that which you know can do you no harm. That men should be in the world empowered to declare to us the commands of God, and way to Heaven, and press them by efficacious persuasion upon us, and take all opportunities in season and out of season to that purpose, is so far from prejudicial to mankind, that we cannot fancy a greater nor more needed Good. And if you will take it away, you must take mankind away too. For if our nature require we be governed by reason, it requires too that men be permitted to show it us when we see it not of ourselves. If persuasion and exhortation be thought harmful to men, our nature is framed very ill upon which those harmful things are in proper means to work, all commerce and all society must end when these things are forbidden. For what use is there of conversation, if it become unlawful for me to persuade another man to his own or my good? If it were not folly to dilate a point so plain, what might not be said of it? Farther, if men become obstinate, and will not hear reason, it is very natural and very fit they should be reclaimed if it may be, by openly showing them their fault, and making them sensible they are in the wrong, which if they be, 'tis fit they should amend, if they be not, the company before whom the reprehension is made, will see it, and take their parts. And he who reprehends them wrongfully will incur the shame intended for them. So that by this Power none will run the hazard, so much as of shame, but those whose obstinacy in sin truly deserves it. Indeed, I have not known this Power put in practice, whether we own the discontinuance of it to the Laws or Confession; but 'tis plain 'tis in the Church, and good for Mankind, it should be so. After this, if the Sinner remain yet obstinate what remains, but that virtuous men and the Church should have no more to do with him, who will not do good to himself, and may do harm to others; but look upon him, in our Saviour's language, as an Ethnic and Publican, and have no Commerce and Communication with him, till Repentance restore him to his former condition? In which I take the substance of Excommunication to consist. And this I conceive is so far from harm, that, I suppose, you will make no difficulty to allow it all; not only ours, but all who pretend to the title of a Church, claiming thus much Power at least. For, that which you only do, and only can fear, that this Spiritual Power should go too far, and look upon the disposing of Kingdoms and altering Commonwealths, as things within her reach; I hope I have brought you sufficient evidence to make you see, that the All foreseeing Providence of our Wise Lawmaker has provided abundantly for your security, in distinguishing the two Powers, and putting them into several hands; and committing the Spiritual Sword to the Church, the Material to the Prince. For if the Spiritual Power cannot use Force, and be only over the Willing, and such as may choose whether they will obey or no; which you see the Fathers plainly affirm, there is no possible fear from it. If any encroachments be made to the prejudice of other men's Rights, we have the same security against them as against all Injuries, the Protection of our Prince obliged to defend us, and armed with Power to do it. We are taught, He bears not the Sword in vain. And we see by experience he does not. For, notwithstanding these flattering Positions, which you make so terrible, Princes know well enough how to preserve themselves and their Subjects from receiving any harm from them. So Catholics have done in all times, and so they do still. 'Tis true, they are generally willing enough to gratify the Pope, with permitting any thing to be said in his favour; and show that respect to the Common Father of Christendom, as to let him, and those who are addicted to him, say even what they please. But yet they do as they think fit: And make no difficulty to Assemble National Counsels, and settle even Ecclesiastical Affairs with their own Bishops; nay, to make War upon the Pope himself. And while they use the Sword, are justified still by the Pens of Learned men who take their parts. For all this, they leave not off their respect to their Church, but so prosecute their Civil concerns, that they leave the Rights of the Church untouched; and make Peace with so much reputation to the Pope, that they refuse not sometimes to ask pardon, even when they are the persons wronged. But while they give this respect to the Vicar of Christ, they leave not for all that to do their business, and preserve their own Rights. And while they keep the Sword in their own hands, let the Pope talk as he pleases, think themselves secure enough, They apprehend no great danger from Solligisms, which they can use at any time, as Alexander did the Gordian knot. Notwithstanding, since it may be dangerous to a Prince, that the minds of his Subjects be possessed with false Doctrines, especially in matters concerning Religion, which men generally prefer before Allegiance, according to that, Aequum est Deo magis obedire quam Regi (though in truth, Religion and Allegiance can never interfare,) it might concern the prudence of Princes to take that care in these matters which is fitting. But I am no Counsellor, and my condition obliges me to think they do. I have showed you what the Sentiments of the Fathers, and the Church are; for the rest it belongs not to me. This which I have done, being only to obey your Commands, and testify the power you have over  
Your, etc.    

The Seventh and Eighth OF THE Controversial LETTERS, OR Grand Controversy, Concerning The pretended Temporal Authority of POPES over the whole Earth, And the True Sovereign of KINGS within their own respective Kingdoms.  
Between two English Gentlemen, 

The one of the Church of England:  
The other of the Church of Rome.    
LONDON, Printed for Henry Brome and Benjamin took, at the Gun; & at the Ship in St. Paul's Churchyard, 1673.   


FRIEND,  
I Know not how it happens; but the more you show me, methinks the less I see. While I read your Letters I find not what to except against; yet when I look off I remain still unsatisfied. That there should be a Spiritual Power distinct from the Temporal, is plainly necessary in itself, and owned by us. We go not to Westminster Hall for remission of our sins, or to hear the Word of God preached, or receive the Sacraments. These things belong to Spiritual Magistrates, amongst whom the Chief with us is the Bishop of Canterbury, as with you the Bishop of Rome. And since for Orders sake, and the nature of Government, a Chief there must be, It matters not much whether, as one wittily said, the top link of the Spiritual Chain be fastened to the Chair of Canterbury, or of Rome. So the Temporal Primacy be undisturbed, and undisturbable by the Spiritual, it seems all one whether have it; I mean in point of Safety, for true or false is another question. And truly, I neither see how your Spiritual Primacy should disturb it, if all be true you say, nor why I should doubt of the truth of what you say, while I consider you say nothing of your own head; but bring such Vouchers for every thing, that I think your Church cannot say otherwise, unless she throw off that Reverence which, with so much ostentation, she professes to have for Antiquity. And yet of necessity there must be more in it. The mischiefs, against which I would be secured, have actually happened▪ Princes have been deposed, and the world has been too much concerned in the effects of this Power to be ignorant of it. Our own Princes have not been exempt from attempts of this nature, and the hazard the nation ran in 88 is not yet out of our memory. So that manifestly, either you believe one thing and do another, or you have not informed me truly, but covered an ugly face with a handsome vizard. Truly I believe better of your candour, than to suspect you deceive me by design; yet certainly things are not so clear and smooth of your side, as you would make me believe. To read your Papers, one would think nothing could be more innocent than your doctrine in this Point; yet the world is witness of do far from Innocent. I must confess, I was sometime sufficiently perplexed to unriddle this mystery. But at last I remembered Bellarmin, and when I reflected on his Indirect and in ordine ad Spiritualia Power, methought I had found the clew to guide me out of this Labyrinth. That distinction does it Friend, and in truth, I never so well understood the virtue of Distinctions before; for by the help of this, I perceive you may say enough to pass for honest men, and in the mean time reserve as much liberty as heart can wish to play the knave. Pardon my bluntness, 'tis without malice I assure you; but I am too much intent upon the Question to be choice of my words, especially to you: and consider a little. You have told me the Spiritual and Civil Power are distinct; that the Pope's Power is Spiritual, and is not Coactive. Why Bellarmin, and any that follows him, will grant all this. But, if we conclude thence, That the Pope has nothing to do with Temporals, they will not suffer us, but say, His Power is indeed of its own nature Spiritual, and directly regards only the good of Souls, but if Temporals concern that good, His Power is extended to them too; not directly, as if they were its proper object: but indirectly, as they collaterally fall in, and are joined to that which is its proper object. So that they intent not, that any part of that Authority, which I conceive prejudicial to Princes, and inconsistent with Government, should be taken from him, but plainly seek to establish it, though another way; and whereas, Others go plainly to work and tell us, without more ado, That the Pope is the only Supreme Monarch of the Earth; These go a little about the bush, and say indeed, He is not directly Lord of Temporals, but come at last to the same, and tell us, He may as uncontrollably dispose of them as if he were. If this be true, all you have said is to no purpose, and all you can say, while you stick to this, will not absolve you from inconsistency with Civil Government. For 'tis a plain case, If the Pope may interpose in the disposition of Temporals as often as they have relation to Spirituals, that He may interpose always: Since of necessity they must, and cannot but, be always ordered either well, or ill; and both cases belong to the concern of the Soul. And then 'tis all one, as some body in this case handsomely said, whether my eyes be put out by a direct stroke of a Tennis Ball, or by Bricol. William Rufus was as mortally wounded by the Arrow which glanced, as if it had been shot directly at him. If Princes may lawfully be deposed, and their Subjects absolved from their Allegiance, and obliged to obey the commands of another; and that in Temporals, they are no longer Sovereign, nor absolute even in Temporals; and whether the Power above them be Direct or Indirect, Spiritual or not Spiritual, so it be a Power and can act, they are always unsafe. Pray Friend let me have no dodging. Tell me plainly, Is this the Doctrine of your Church, or is it not? If it be, unless you can show me, That those can be good Subjects, and true to their Prince who acknowledge another Power, which they are to obey against their Prince; and how that Prince is Supreme in Temporals, who has another above him, whose Commands he is to obey in the disposition of those Temporals; or if he do not, his Subjects are not to obey him, I must, for all you have said, continue in my first thoughts, and not believe you tolerable in any Commonwealth. If it be not true, I think you would deserve very well of your Church, to free her from the scandal which the credit of those who hold this, and the countenance she gives them, brings upon her. In all events, I beseech you, speak plainly, for else I must needs think, either that your Church teaches you to hold what you are ashamed to own, or, which is worse, obliges you to conceal the Mischief she teaches, that by the reputation of a fair Outside you may preserve yourselves in a condition to appear to purpose, when time and opportunity make it seasonable for her to discover her injust designs. If this happen, I must needs profess I shall have a worse opinion of your Church than ever I had. For to maintain a false or bad Doctrine, which you think to be true or good, is but Error, a fault, which, unless other Circumstances aggravate the case, is very pardonable, because very natural. Men were not men, if they were not subject to it. But to teach Wickedness, and keep this wickedness concealed from those who are not as wicked as themselves; to pretend a sound Outside, and carry a rotten heart, has so much Malice joined to the Error, that 'tis abominable in a private man, and I have not a name abominable enough to say what 'tis in a Church. After all your brags of Sanctity, I hope you will not fall into the woe, which the Gospel pronounces against Whited Sepulchers, beautiful without, but within full of dead men's bones and filthiness. In fine, if you think Beauties Doctrine true, you have the liberty to make it consistent with Civil Government if you can. I'll promise you to consider what you can allege as fully and impartially as you can desire, and give every Argument its full weight. But if you say nothing, or dodge it off, which is as good as saying nothing, being well enough acquainted with your nature, to know you are not backward to communicate any thing you can to the satisfaction of your Friends, especially when it tends to the justification of yourselves, I shall know how to set the saddle upon the right horse, and without putting you to the confusion of revealing the shame of your Mother, conclude you are forbidden to speak; and, though you were not, allow you do wisely to say nothing, where nothing is to be said that can make for your justification. The Jesuit Fisher was commanded by King James, to deliver his Sense of this amongst other Points proposed to him: And he Answered the rest, but past this over with this plain Confession for his excuse, That he was forbidden to speak of that Subject. If you follow his Example, I shall believe you have one Religion which you publish for your Reputation, and another which you conceal for your Interest. I shall expect your Answer with impatience, and in the mean time remain  
Your, etc.   

FRIEND,  
I Must confess I should have thought myself obliged to you, if you had dispensed with me in the Question you now propose so pressingly. Hitherto I have said nothing but what the Fathers have said for me, and hope if any man dislike any thing, he will consider before he condemn it, what it is to slight and oppose an Authority so venerable. But now I am not only without the support of Authority (for 'tis not to be expected a peremptory decision should be found in the Fathers, of a Question which entered not into the world till a good while after they had left it) but the face of Authority is on the other side: not, but that I conceive the Question fully decided to those who mind Sense, not Words. For it appears very plainly in what I have already produced, That the Temporal Power moves in its own sphere, both Supremely and Independently; which is in truth the whole business. But yet, because this word Indirect is not found in the Fathers, 'tis still pretended that the Question is not decided by them, and those who have appeared against that Power are for the most part discredited by Censures, and rendered so unfit to support others, that they have not been able to uphold themselves: In my judgement not without partiality. For they were Men of Learning and Virtue, nor is any thing, that I know, laid to their charge, more than that they thought otherwise in this Point than they think at Rome. And yet they at Rome at the same time freely communicate with some, who think the same, and publish their thoughts, and own them in the face of the world. However it be, I so much value the content of thinking my thought quietly to myself, and letting others think as they please; of going unregarded on my own road, and let others stray as much as they will, without thinking myself bound to set them right, that I know not any task you could enjoin me, to which I have a greater aversion. And I must tell you frankly, that were there no more in the case than the bare satisfaction of your curious humour, I would entreat you to satisfy it at some other rate than the quiet of your Friend, and putting him out of his easy road, and setting him to strive against the stream. But, since with a kind of malicious importunity you profess to interpret my Silence to the disadvantage of the Church, I must run the hazard of being perhaps traduced myself, rather than suffer her to be so, and think myself obliged to sacrifice my Humour and inconsiderable Concerns to Her honour and service. Wherefore, since there is no remedy, but I must swallow this ungrateful Pill; I pray God make it as wholesome, as I find it bitter.  
To begin then, 'Tis too much known that there is a Power attributed to the Pope by some, more than is thought due by others, and more than some Popes themselves believe; for 'tis written of Pius Vth. that he blamed the groundless flattery. These Favourers of the Pope are divided into two branches, Some giving him an absolute Direct Power over all, both Spirituals and Temporals: Others restraining his Direct Power to Spirituals, but extending it to Temporals too, in as much as they have reference to Spirituals. The former is called the opinion of the Canonists, they being most of that Opinion who hold it: the later is the opinion of Divines who generally go this way. Now if there were nothing in the case, but the Authority of the Maintainers, and strength of the Reasons by which they maintain it, People might dispute with freedom, and let the strongest Argument carry it. But Popes have taken part, and owned this Power; and though they have not determined either the way or the thing, yet they take it for granted they have it some way, and proceed upon it. By this means it has got the face of Authority, and the universal Reverence we bear our Chief Pastor; as it inclines many to think well of all that is favourable to him, so it awes the rest, who do not, into a shiness of contradicting it. So that of Learned Men, those who writ of this Subject write generally in favour of it, those who think otherwise, choose other Subjects to write of; as in truth, there is but little reason to disgust Higher Powers merely to show there Learning. But this reservedness has been so much taken notice of, that long since it has been thought necessary, Learned Men should be constrained by Oaths and fear of Penalties, terribilibus comminationibus, to declare their thoughts of this matter. Possibly Interest may have had some share in this backwardness. Men of this sort of Learning belong most to the Church, and may peradventure consider, that, If they displease him who carries the Keys, he may perhaps make use of them to shut the Gates of Ecclesiastical preferment. Besides, they have been diligent to discountenance and suppress all Books written against the Pope's Power, so that a Private man cannot write without the hazard of a Censure on his Book, and possibly on his Person. These I think are the true Reasons, I am sure they are good ones, of the backwardness which you fancy proceeds from a prohibition of the Church, and with a great deal of injustice; and no truth, heighten into malice, and the execrable hypocrisy of teaching two Religions, one to be published, the other concealed, and I know not what; when all this while, I assure you, there is no such thing as a Prohibition of the Church, at least that I know of, for any man to speak what he thinks (what Fisher mentions was a private Order made amongst the Jesuits, and concerns only themselves,) but wise men are not forward to speak what may turn to their prejudice, nor quiet men to interpose in the concerns of higher and the Highest Powers, as I conceive, they are not therefore . However it be, He, who from the Sense of those who have writ, would infer the Sense of all Learned Men, concludes, in my opinion, very fallaciously: Those who Writ not, and whose Sense we know not, being much more Numerous, and every jot as Learned as those who Writ.  
But to let that pass: this Doctrine has found a different reception in the world. The French, as their natures are frank and open, without more ado plainly deny it; and besides, a great many reiterated Arrest of Parliament, have solemnly condemned it in all their Universities. In other Countries they are more reserved, and rather oppose, the Execution of the Power; than, the Power itself. They let the Pope, and any for him, talk as they please, but when it comes to Practice, it always proves unjust in that particular, and, I believe, always shall do. In Brabant the Custom is, That all Bulls are understood of course to be Subreptitious, till they be approved by the Prince: In other places; they have other expedients: but as far as I see, by several means they all compass the same end, and admit no more than they think stands with their Profit: Only the French bluntly tell the Pope, You cannot; others use softer words, but their Actions say, You shall not, farther than we think fit. Now for the Opinion of the Canonists, since Divines universally reject it, I may without more ado reject it with them. Of the other it may be enquired, Whether it be of Faith; and, Whether it be True, which are very different Questions. And for Faith, I positively and freely disclaim it, both because the Maintainers of it themselves confess it is not, and though some are unwary enough to heighten it to that degree, yet they are but few, and their rashness is generally condemned as ill grounded, and carried too far. And besides, I see the contrary is openly maintained by as numerous and considerable a Member as any belongs to the Catholic Church; and while at Rome they condemn Withrington and Barklay, at Paris they condemn Bellarmin and Suarez, The Pope and the rest of the world knows and sees this, and yet Communicate freely with them, and account them all the while good Catholics. Which is plainly to acknowledge, it is no point of Faith in which they differ, for if it were, they could no more Communicate with them, than with Arrius or Pelagius; neither is any consideration of their Power, or concern of Policy, able to justify or dispense with acknowledging him a Catholic, who persists to maintain an Heresy. All the difficulty is, Whether it be true or no. And who am I, that I should undertake to dogmatise in an Age so Antidogmatical, and where no vanity is thought greater than that of Dogmatizing: and this in a Question which has exercised the Wit and Learning of Men esteemed so great, that to oppose them may chance be counted Arrogance? The most I can do is to tell you what I think▪ and what I think is, even in my own judgement, so inconsiderable, that I think it a great deal better to play the Historian, than the Disputer; and hope you will be satisfied, if I inform you as much as I know of this Question, and relate the Arguments hitherto produced on both sides; at least, as far as I am acquainted with them, and leave you to judge as you see cause. By this means, as you will have all the Information I can give you, so none can rationally blame me for barely relating what every body either knows already, or may know, that will take the pains to look upon what is publicly and every where extant.  
But before I begin the Arguments, it will not be amiss to look a little into the Origin of this Dispute, and consider when, and how it came into the world. Gregory the VIIth. was the first that brought it on the Stage. Till his time the Independent Power of Princes was never questioned. They not only quietly disposed of Civil matters without control, except where any notorious Injustice happened (and then both Popes, and other zealous Prelates took the liberty to reprehend, and sometimes Excommunicate them) but had no small share in Ecclesiastical matters, so far as to make Laws concerning them, to invest the Persons duly chosen to Benefices, and confirm the Election even of Popes themselves, which was not held valid without their approbation. Take it in the words of Onuphrius, no enemy to this Pope. 
Onuph. de var. Create. Rom. Pont. L. 4.  Though formerly the Bishops of Rome were respected as the Heads of Christian Religion, the Vicars of Christ, and Successors of Peter, yet their Authority extended no farther, than either to assert, or maintain the Doctrines of Faith. For the rest, they were subject to the Emperors, all things were done by Their appointment; Themselves were Created by them; neither did the Pope dare to judge, or determine any thing concerning them. Gregory the VIIth was the First of all the Bishops of Rome, who relying on the Arms of the Normans, and Wealth of the Countess Mathildis, a Woman of great Power in Italy, and inflamed by the discord of the Princes of Germany oppressed with Civil Wars, contemning, contrary to the Custom of his Predecessors, the Imperial Power and Authority, after he had obtained the Pontificate, durst, not only Excommunicate, but deprive the Emperor (by whom he had been if not Elected, at least Confirmed) of his Kingdom and Empire. A thing to that Age unheard of; for, as for the Fables which go about of Arcadius, and Anastius, and Leo the Iconoclast, I value them not. Thus then stood things in the world when Hildebrand, Archdeacon of the Church of Rome, was chosen to the Papacy in the year 1083, and called Gregory the VIIth. The Contests, which in his days began betwixt the Spiritual and Civil Power, are the reason, I suppose, why he is so differently represented by those who write of him. His Enemies give him the Character of an Imperious, Tyrannical, and several ways Wicked Man: his Friends on the other side praise him as much, and affirm he was a man of great Prudence and Virtue, and so far, that it hath been attested by several Miracles. And for my own part, I must confess, I incline to believe well of him. For he had been the support of the Papacy during the time of several Popes, his Parts and Industry having drawn upon him the greatest weight of all business, and was so far from aspiring to that dignity, that, if Baronius say true, He treated with the Emperor not to consent to his Election, assuring him before hand, that if he did, He would be very severe against the Abuses practised in his Court. Besides, if Sigonius may be believed, and the passages he relates, which can hardly be read without horror, the Emperor was a very Wicked Man: but that which concerns this matter was, That all Benefices were, with all the Licentiousness of a depraved Court exposed to sale, and He that could Fee a Courtier was without Merit, or even Capacity, possessed of the most considerable Preferments of the Church. As this was a mischief palpably destructive to all Goodness, so 'tis not incredible from the irregularity of a debauched Court. And if the Pope desired to have it remedied, the end he proposed was but what became him, if the means had been so too. I am the more inclined to believe this true, because the Germans in a great measure took part with the Pope, forced the Emperor to comply, and after several Traverses, at last took the Crown from him, and placed it on his Son. However it were, the Emperor, notwithstanding the Pope's Remonstrances, gives consent to the Election and confirms him; and the Pope was as good as his word. And first Excommunicates those who should receive Investitures of Benefices from Laymen, afterwards the Laymen who should grant them, and lastly, provoked by the Emperor, who in a Synod at Worms had forbidden Obedience to him, Excommunicates and deposes the Emperor himself. And this i● the first unquestionable Example of this kind, which has appeared in the Christian World. Bellarmin indeed, and his Followers, would make us believe there are Examples more Ancient; but in my opinion he proves them not well, and you see Onuphrius counts them but Fables: and those of that Age, at least those who favoured the Emperor, exclaimed against it as a Novelty unheard of; not to call it Heresy as one fays. But though the thing were now done, it appears not yet in virtue of what Power 'twas done. As that Age was not, I think, extraordinary subtle, the distinctions of Direct and Indirect Power were not yet found out, and the Pope himself speaks in common, That the care of the Christian World, and Authority to bind and lose was committed to him; confiding in the Judgement and Mercy of God, and Patronage of the B. Virgin, and supported by the Authority (of SS. Peter and Paul) etc. but descends not to particulars. So that it appears not whether he acted in virtue of a Spiritual or Temporal Power, Directly or Indirectly, and 'tis likely he speculated not so far. One thing is pretty remarkable in his second Sentence, for he made two, which ends in this manner: After he had commanded all concerned, to withdraw their Obedience from Henry, and yield it to Rudolphus, speaking as he does all along to the Apostles SS. Peter and Paul: You then, 
See the words in Platina.  says he, most holy Princes of the Apostles confirm what I have said by your Authority, that all men at last may understand, if you can bind and lose in Heaven, we likewise on Earth may give and take away Empires, Kingdoms, Principalities, and whatever mortals can have.— Let Kings, and all Princes of the World understand by his Example what you can do in Heaven, and what power you have with God, and hereafter fear to contemn the commands of the Holy Church. And show this Judgement upon Henry quickly, that all Sons of Iniquity may perceive that he falls from his Kingdom, not by chance, but by your means. This nevertheless I desire from you, that by Repentance he may, at your request, find favour of our Lord at the day of Judgement. For my part I cannot imagine, but a man who speaks thus must needs mean uprightly, and think at least he does well. Notwithstanding the Apostles did not do as he desired them. For this Rudulphus, after he had fought twice upon equal terms with the Emperor, was overthrown in the third Battle, and so wounded in the right hand that he died of it, and died full of Repentance and acknowledgement of his own fault, and the Justice of God, who had deservedly punished him in that hand with which he had formerly sworn Fealty and Service to his Lord. So, that though I believe the Pope thought himself much in the right; yet the Court of Heaven thought not fit to grant his Request, but ordered things quite contrary to his expectation and desire.  
The next famous Example is of Frederic the IId. a Prince of great Power and Parts, who falling out with several Popes as resolute as himself, after several breaches at several times made up, and several Sentences published, and recalled, and renewed again, was at last, with the astonishment and horror of all present, says M. Paris, solemnly Excommunicated and deposed in the Council of Lions. And this made both Princes and Prelates begin to look about them, foreseeing, that if this deposing Power should go on, a slight Pretence might at last serve turn to unthrone perhaps an Innocent Man, and bring the world into confusion; which possibly was the cause, the Pope's Sentence was not executed. For this Frederic, notwithstanding those proceed, kept the Empire till his death, which happened long after. But still I see not any ground to judge, whether the Power were yet thought Direct or Indirect; and in likelihood, People had in common a great Veneration for the Supreme Pastor, and his Decrees, and thought them wicked men who submitted not to them, but what kind of Power he had, and how far it extended, as far as I can perceive they little considered. 'Tis observable both in this Sentence, and the former of Gregory VII. that the Emperor is first Deposed, and afterwards Excommunicated, in aggravation as it were of the former Penalty.  
The business was a little more discussed in the Contests betwixt Boniface the VIIIth. and Philip the Fair of France. As this Pope is Recorded for a man of more mettle than Virtue, his proceed were Violent; but having to do with a Prince both Resolute and Prudent, he found but bad success. The Pope persuades the King to an expedition into the Holy Land: to promote which business, He exacts the Tithes of Church Live in France, and reserves the Collation of all Benefices there to himself. The King excuses the one, and plainly denies the other. The hot Pope sends the Bishop of Apamea to threaten him with Censures, and Deposition, unless he yielded to him. The King calls the States, and upon Consultation with them, resolves the Legate deserved to be imprisoned; but for reverence to the See Apostolic, banishes him, and for his Threats contemns them. The Legate not content to scape , falls a new to Threats, which the King resenting commits him to custody to the Metropolitan. The Pope complains of the breach of Ecclesiastical Immunity, and commands his Legate should be immediately returned. These Letters being read in an Assembly of the States, the Count of Arras, as hot every jot as the Pope, throws them into the fire. This put the Pope quite out of patience. Wherefore he Cites both King and Bishops to Rome, where he had appointed a Synod, and in the mean time declares the Kingdom of France, for Contumacy, Felony, and Violating the Law of Nations devolved to the Apostolic See, writing thus peremptorily to the King; We would have you to know, that you are subject to us both in Spirituals and Temporals— and who thinks otherwise we repute Heretics. The King, upon the receipt of these Letters, calls the States again, and by their Advice frames an Answer every jot as smart, and something more homely. We would have your foolishness know, we are subject to none in Temporals— and who thinks otherwise we take for mad men: And withal appeals to a future General Council, and objects several Crimes to the Pope, to be made good when the Council should sit, and in the mean time forbids all intercourse with Rome. This Answer being brought to Rome by three Bishops deputed for that purpose, the Pope began to be startled, and at last confesses, That to usurp the King's Jurisdiction belonged not to him; nevertheless that in respect of Sin, the King could not deny but he was subject to the Pope. This put them to examine, how far, and in what manner he was subject to him; and one of the Cardinals in a Consistory, in which the French Ambassadors were present, resolves the case in this manner: That Supreme Dominion belonged properly to the Pope, but the Administration to Kings; and therefore all Christian Kings were subject to the judgement of the Pope even in Temporals, in regard of his Supreme Dominion. But this satisfied not the Ambassadors at Rome; and the States in France, resuming the Debate, declared positively the King in Temporals was subject to God alone, and owed his Crown and Power only to him. Nevertheless, this Subjection on the account of Sin, seems to be the ground of the distinction betwixt Direct and Indirect Power, though I conceive it borrowed from Innocent the IVth. some time before, upon occasion of a Contest betwixt John King of England, and Philip Augustus of France; who prosecuting the King of England for default of Homage for some Dukedoms in France, etc. King John appeals to the Pope; Philip maintained, that being a Temporal business he had nothing to do with it. The Pope was willing to favour the English, and therefore assumes cognisance of the Cause, upon pretence that there was an Oath in the case, the violation of which, being Sin, belonged properly to his Tribunal. And this Resolution having been put into a Decree, and that Decree into the Canon-Law seems the principal foundation of Indirect Power.  
I must confess, I do not well understand how either this Canon which is in the Decretals, C. Novit Ille. de Judiciis; or the other, C. per Venerabilem. Qui filii sint legitimi, which are the two usually cited both of Innocent III. make to the purpose. The former was made upon the occasion now mentioned, and in it the Pope speaks thus: We intent not to Judge of the Fee, whereof the cognisance belongs to him (the King)— but to decree of the Sin, whereof the Censure without doubt pertains to us, which we may and aught to exercise on every one.— None of sound Judgement is ignorant that it belongs to our Office, to correct every Christian for any mortal Sin, and, if he despise Correction, to constrain him by Ecclesiastical punishment, etc. Where the Pope says Correct, the Gloss adds Indirectly, which single word, and that not explicated, is the main Authority for the distinction of Direct and Indirect Power now in question. The other Canon per Venerabilem was made upon this occasion. Philip Augustus of France had put away his Wife, and taken, as I remember, the Countess of Anjou, and had Children by her. These Children, at his request, the Pope Legitimates, while the suit yet depended of the validity of his former Marriage; For the King alleged it was invalid. But as the Example of Kings is apt to be followed, Some body leaves his Wife too, and has Children by another Woman, and then solicits the Pope to Legitimate them as he had done the King's, The Pope refuses to yield his Request, but withal owns a Power to have granted it, if he had found it reasonable, and proves it by several Arguments; and amongst other passages has these words: We exercise temporal Jurisdiction, not only in the Patrimony of the Church (where we have full power in Temporals) but in other Countries also, casually upon inspection of certain Causes. These certain Causes the Gloss interprets to be when He is required. Now both these Cases seem to me far enough from the inferring the Deposing Power, which was not at all in question, but Legitimation in the one, and Cognisance of a Temporal business in the other: And though the Pope assume both, yet he is very solicitous to prove they are within his Sphere, as both may be, and yet nothing follow in behalf of his Indirect disposing. For he may Legitimate Children, in order to Spiritual capacities, and leave them in the same condition in which they were before as to Inheritance, and other Temporal concerns. Again, He may Judge of Sin, and punish it in his own Court with Spiritual punishments, and let Temporal punishments alone to whom they belong, the Temporal Magistrate. And since he expressly limits himself to Ecclesiastical punishments, methinks it is to strain Logic a little to far to infer out of them, a right to Punish by Deposition.  
However, in my opinion, this difference in the manner of Explicating this Power sometimes Casualiter, sometimes Indirecte, sometimes Ratione peccati, which differ sufficiently, though they Cite the Authorities indifferently as if they were all one, is a sign they were at first not very clear in this business, in Explicating which they hit it no better. Notwithstanding, the Indirect Power has at last got the Vogue, and most of the Learned Men who Writ in favour of the Pope stick to that way. As Bellarmin is the most famous amongst them, and most at hand, I choose his Arguments, believing as he was a Man of great Reading, he failed not to make use of all that was considerable in those who Writ before him, and seeing, those who Writ since borrow most from him. He has Five in his Book, De Rom. Pont. and Four in his Answer to Barklay. The First are Answered by Barklay, and better by Withrington, and every one who Writes of this Subject takes notice of them. In Answering I make use chief of Withrington, inserting only upon occasion what I find in others. Only to indulge something to my fancy, and ease it of the grievous pain of Transcribing, I neither tie myself to the order, nor preciseness of the Arguments, but make entire Arguments of themselves, what the Author meant sometimes a proof of some part of an Argument going before. While you have the Substance I hope you will allow me a little Variety for my own ease.  
Bellarmin then, After he had taught against the Canonists, That the Spiritual and Civil Power are in themselves distinct, and have different Offices, different Ends, etc. yet when these two meet together, than he affirms they make but one Commonwealth, in which the Spiritual Power is superior to the Temporal: For, says he, there cannot be two Heads, and therefore one Power must of necessity be subject to the other, when they both Club into one Commonwealth. But this they do where the Law of Christ is received, For we being many are one Body in Christ, Rom. 12. And in one Spirit we were all baptised into one Body. 1 Cor. 12. And because the Members of the same Body must depend one of another, and Spirituals cannot be said to depend on Temporals, Temporals must depend on Spirituals, and be subject to them.  
To this they Answer differently. Some granting the Spiritual and Temporal Power make but one Commonwealth, affirm the Members independent one of another; as the Hand depends not on the Foot, nor the Foot on the hand, but each free and absolute in their proper Functions, are subject only to the Supreme Head Christ. Others, in my opinion more rationally, deny the Two Powers club into one Commonwealth, and say, The Spiritual makes one, and the Temporal another, and to many others as there are Independent Heads of this Power: That the same men in different respects make both these Bodies; and that as Clergy, and Laity, and all, not excepting the Prince himself, in as much as they are Faithful, are subject to the Spiritual Power, according to the nature of Spiritual Subjection; so the same Laity and Clergy, not excepting the Pope himself, in as much as they are Citizens and parts of the Temporal Commonwealth, are subject to the Temporal Power; that is, for as much as concerns the Law of God purely, and abstracting from Humane Constitutions, and such Changes as time has brought into the World. For now the Pope is himself an absolute Prince, and other Clergy Men have Privileges and Immunities justly belonging to them. When therefore 'tis assumed that the Church is one Body, they distinguish this word Church, and say if it be taken Formally, that is, the Faithful under the notion of Faithful, then indeed they make but one Body; but neither doth this Body include both Powers, for 'tis only the Spiritual to which they are subject as Faithful; as Citizens, they belong to the Temporal. But if the word Church be taken Materially, for the Men which make up the Church (an Acception something improper, but yet such as comprehends both Powers) then say they, In this sense the Church is not one Body but two, or if you will twenty, as many as there are several Supreme Temporal Powers in Christendom; One Spiritual in relation to the Spiritual Power, and which is properly the Church; The rest Temporal in relation to their several Temporal Heads. And this Answer, as it seems fair in itself, and justified by the sense and apprehension of Mankind (for France and Spain, for example, both acknowledge the Pope, and are both parts of the Church, and that one Body of which the Apostle speaks; but he that should therefore think them not to be Two distinct Bodies, and Independent Commonwealths, would be thought something extravagant.) so 'tis a little more strongly enforced against Bellarmin by other parts of his own Doctrine. For he teaches elsewhere, That Churchmen, besides that they are Churchmen, are also Citizens and parts of the Civil Commonwealth, and that all Members of every Body must be subject to their respective Head: That the Civil and Spiritual Power are in their nature distinct Powers, and have distinct Offices and Ends, etc. and that Christ did distinguish the Dignities and Offices of Pope and Emperor, that one should not presume upon the Rights of the other; That Christian Princes, as well as Infidels, acknowledge no Superior in Temporals, since Christ took not away the Rights of any, and a King by becoming a Christian loses no Right he had before, and the like. Besides, this Answer seems wonderfully strengthened by some Authorities mentioned in the former Letters. Such as Gelasius to the Emperor Anastasius▪ The Prelates of the Church own you all Obedience. And again: The Bishops themselves are to obey your Laws, and that, because there are Two principal Powers by which the World is Governed, the Sacred Authority of Bishops, and Regal Power. Likewise Pope Anastasius to the same Emperor. Bishops are subject to the Laws of the Prince in what concerns Public Discipline, and Princes to Bishops in the dispensation of the Mysteries and Sacraments, according to the famous Canon of Leo the iv Nos si incompetenter. It is to be noted that there are Two Persons by which this world is governed, The Regal, and Sacerdotal: as Kings are Chief in Worldly, so Priests in Divine matters.— Therefore David, though by his Regal Unction he were over Priests and Prophets in affairs of the World, yet was under them in those of God. Much more might be alleged on this Subject, but this I conceive is enough to show the Answer given to Bellarmin, has the support of Authority as well as Reason.  
A Second Argument is from the ends of both Powers, whereof one being Eternal, the other Temporal happiness; because the Eternal happiness is the Supreme and Last end of all things, Temporal happiness must be subordinate to it: And because, according to Aristotle, where the Ends are subordinate, the Faculties likewise are subordinate, the Civil Power which aims only at Temporal happiness must be subordinate, and subject to the Spiritual, which looks after Eternal. This Argument they Answer likewise two ways; First by granting the whole, which they say concludes nothing against them. For admitting the Temporal Power to be subordinate to the Spiritual, nothing follows more than than 'tis under the other according to the Order which the other has over it, which is by the way of Instruction, and Persuasion, and Direction, not by way of Compulsion; For that belongs not to Spiritual Power. Let the Prince, say they, in God's name, be Instructed by the Prelate to do well, and Admonished, and if it be seasonable, even with Spiritual Censures be Corrected if he do amiss: all this may be, and is done by zealous Prelates without prejudicing the Authority of the Prince. But if they proceed to Authorize his Subjects to throw off their Obedience, than they exceed, say they, the bounds of their Spiritual Power, and entrench upon another which belongs, not to them, but the Prince, and in which he is subject neither to them, nor any body, but God. Another way they Answer, by denying the Ends of those Two Powers to be subordinate one to the other. For the Last end of every Power is its proper act, as Sight is the last end of the power to see, and Relish of the power to taste, and so Temporal Happiness of Temporal Power. Indeed he who has Temporal Power, aught to have, and has if he be a Christian, a farther end and aim at Eternal happiness, both in the use of his Temporal power, and all the Actions he does. But the end of the Power is one thing, and the end of Him that has the power another. Wherefore though the Man be subject, his Power is not. Eternal happiness is indeed his own last end, but the last end of Power is Peace, and the quiet security of his Subjects, nor is there any other end to which his Power is ordained. Bellarmin against Barklay endeavours to make this Argument good, by the Subjection which all Arts in a Commonwealth have to the great Art of Governing; where the Painter, the Musician, the Mariner, and the rest, are all directed, so to use their several Arts, as is most fitting for the end of the Prince, and good Government, which is Superior to them all: And as these are subject to the King, and must obey what he prescribes even in the Use of their Arts, so King and all, says he, is subject to the Pope as He who professes the highest of Arts, the bringing Souls to Heaven, by which all inferior Arts, and their Use, is to be regulated. They Reply, that this rather confirms than opposes what they say. Those Artists are indeed all subject to the Supreme Artist the Prince, but as Citizens, not as Artists. The Men are subject to him, and obliged to obey his Commands even in the Use of their Arts, but their Arts have not therefore any subordination to his Art. The Ends of Arts or Faculties, say they, are then subordinate when one is designed for the service of another. As the Brick-maker to the Mason, the Saddler to the Horseman, and the like. For if there were no Houses, nor Riding, Bricks and Saddles would be useless. In these cases the Faculties are subordinate because the Ends are so, and the Brick-maker must receive directions from the Mason how to make his Bricks, and the Saddler from the Rider, what kind of Saddle to make. But that a Painter should be instructed by the Governor how to manage his Colours, or a Musician his Proportions, or that these things have any dependence on the Art of Governing, they think a fancy a little unsuitable to Beauties' Learning. Aristotle's Rule then, say they, is very true; And Faculties are subordinate, where the Ends of them are ordained one for another: but where the Ends are Ends of the Men, and not of the Faculties, there is no colour to allege it. And so it happens in this case, For though Eternal happiness be the Last end of all men, yet 'tis no more the end of Temporal Power, than Taste is the end of seeing, or Sight of tasting, both which the man makes use of to his own good, but they are independent and unsubordinate one to the other. So as the Painter and Musician are subject to the King as Citizens, not as Artists; so the King is subject to the Pope, not as King, but as Christian, and no otherwise subject than as Christianity obliges him, with which it may very well stand, That while He is subject to the Pope in Spirituals, the Pope may be subject to him in Temporals.  
Another Argument is, from the Perfection of Commonwealths, and consequently the Church in as much as it is a Commonwealth. Every Commonwealth, says Bellarmin, must have Means sufficient to attain its end, and the End of this Spiritual Commonwealth, which we call the Church, being the Salvation of Souls, the Church were not perfect in her kind if She wanted sufficient Means to bring men to Salvation. And because Wicked Princes may be a great obstacle to the Salvation of Souls, the Church would want sufficient Means to attain her End, if She had not Power to remedy this inconveniency, and Depose them when they are Incorrigibly obstinate. This Argument, to say the truth, they handle a little severely. And first they make Bellarmin himself answer it, putting instead of Wicked Princes, Wicked Popes, and then making use of it with as much efficacy to conclude that the Church has a Power to Depose Wicked Popes. But this he will by no means admit, and can therefore tell us, 
L. 2. de Concil. c. 19  It is no wonder if in that case there be no efficacious Humane remedy in the Church, since its safety principally depends, not on Humane industry, but the Divine protection, Its King being GOD; Wherefore, though the Church cannot Depose the Pope, yet it can, and aught, pray that God will provide a remedy. And 'tis certain that God will take care of her safety, and either Convert, or take away, such a Pope before he have ruined the Church. Now, they conceive People may as well have recourse to God for remedy against a Wicked King, as a Wicked Pope, and that He can as well hear them. However, want of efficacious Humane remedies in some eases, is acknowledged by Bellarmin to be no Argument of Imperfection in the Church, and therefore they think he might well have spared his pains in this particular. And, since the safety of the Church depends on the Protection of God, they conceive it in very good hands, and that there is no great danger the Wickedness of any Prince will prove more powerful than his Goodness, to which the safety of the Church may very securely be trusted, without any necessity of a Remedy worse than the Disease. But they go farther, and ask, if this Power of the Church be so fully sufficient to bring men to Salvation, how it happens that there is so much Ambition, and so much Covetousness, and so much Gluttony, and so much Concupiscence of the Flesh, and of the Eyes, so much Pride of life still left in the world? For these things are great hindrances to Salvation, and the Church seems deficient in her Duty if She take them not away when she can: Again, Why does not the Church, with her sufficient Power, clear the World from Mahumetism, and Infidelity, and Idolatry, which likewise are main obstacles to Salvation, and provide for the safety of so many Millions as are lost by them. Farther, Amongst Christians, A man commits a mortal Sin, and runs mad upon it. Has the Church sufficient Power to restore this man to his Wits, that he may Repent and be saved? Can She hinder Abortions, and bring all Children alive to Baptism? And twenty other such Cross Questions they put. But to Answer the Argument more precisely: They consider this sufficient Power in the Church, either in order to itself, or in order to all things necessary to the Effect. Considering the Power in itself, it is abundantly sufficient for as much as is required on that side; but, because to the Effect many things are required besides sufficient Power, or Efficacy in the Cause, as that the Subject be fitly disposed, the Cause duly applied, etc. they say, a Defect in these things argues no insufficiency in the Power, and the Power may be very sufficient for as much as belongs to the Nature of Power, and yet the Effect not follow for want of some disposition in the Subject. For Example, The Sun has sufficient Power to enlighten the whole World, the Fire has sufficient power to burn that stack of Wood, though the Sun cannot levelly a Mountain, which intercepts the course of his beams, nor the Fire has hands to bring the Wood to it, or legs to carry it to the Wood Wherefore, they say, The Church has Power abundantly sufficient to bring Men to Salvation, for as much as is requisite on the part of Power, but 'tis a wild conceit to think She can remove all obstacles which Nature or Chance casts in her way to hinder the exercise of that Power. And if one of those Obstacles happen to be the Wickedness of a Prince, the Churches sufficient Power to Save men can no more take Him away, than the Sun's sufficient power to shine levelly a Mountain. What her sufficient Power, or Means to Save men are, we may learn from those who certainly best know the end of the Church, and Means to attain it, the first Planters of Christianity; who by there Example have instructed us, That efficacious Preaching, and more efficacious Living according to the Holy Doctrine they Preached, Charity, and Patience, and humble Zeal are the sufficient Means which have prevailed upon the Converted world, and when they are in God's fit time duly applied, will be as sufficient for the rest. In the mean time we may learn of Bellarmin, that God will have a care of his Church; and, whatever he think, must think ourselves, That Prayer is as good a remedy against a Bad Prince as a Wicked Popes: And therefore that Proposition, which assumes that a Deposing Power is necessary, or that the Church's Power would be Insufficient without it, they flatly deny.  
From the same Head Bellarmin Argues again. Every Commonwealth, because it has Power sufficient to preserve itself, and bring its Subjects to Temporal happiness, may command another Commonwealth, which is not subject to it, to cease from doing injury to her, and hinder her from the prosecution of her just Ends, and if it refuse to Obey, may Depose the Prince of it, and set up another who will be more Just, in case there be no other way to avoid wrong from it. Therefore much more may the Spiritual Commonwealth command the Temporal, which is subject to it, and Depose the Prince, in case She cannot otherwise compass Her End, the Salvation of Souls. And this Argument they treat not more favourably than the former: For they say first, It assumes plain Contradiction, when it puts two Commonwealths both independent and free, and yet puts a Power in the one to command the other, which is to make that other Subject, and not Free. Again, It assumes without any reason, and against all Truth, That the Temporal Commonwealth is subject to the Spiritual, which they will by no means admit, unless perhaps of a Spiritual Subjection, and that too of the persons as Faithful, not as a commonwealth, in which respect every absolute Commonwealth is absolutely free from all Subjection to any but God. Farther, they retort it as the former, and say, It concludes as well a Power in the Temporal Commonwealth over the Spiritual as in the Spiritual over the Temporal. For, say they, The Temporal is a perfect Commonwealth too, and has Power sufficient to attain its End. Wherefore, if the Spiritual hinder her in the prosecution of Her ends, She may command the Spiritual Commonwealth to surcease; and if the Spiritual Prince prove Disobedient, depose him and set up another, since the Spiritual Commonwealth is as subject to the Temporal in Temporals, as the Temporal to the Spiritual in Spirituals. But, to Answer the Argument more directly, they deny that this forcible proceeding, of one Independent Commonwealth with another, argues any Superiority or Subjection in either. What they do in this kind, if it be well done, being justified by the force of Nature, and light of Reason, and lawless Law of Necessity, which teaches Force to be then fitly used, when nothing but Force will compass an End, otherwise necessary. Otherwise this kind of Power, is no other than a Strong man has to take away the Purse of a Weak one: and there is no doubt but whoever has it, may, if he will, make use of it, and so the Pope, if he be strong enough, may certainly Depose a Prince, as a Prince may a Pope. But, they wonder Bellarmin should be so little considerative, as instead of a Power of just Authority, to talk of a power of Strength, in which they think he has done the Church but little service; for if She come to vie with Princes in this kind of Power; the Material Sword, which belongs to them, will, in all likelihood, wound the Spiritual Outward-man more sensibly, than the Spiritual Sword will the Carnal man. Mean time, they conceive he take a bad Method to conclude an Authoritative Power in the Church, by the example of a Power in Commonwealths, which is not Authority but Strength.  
Another Argument Bellarmin makes from the obligation of Christianity, in this manner. It is not lawful for Christians to endure an Infidel or Heretic Prince, of that Prince endeavour to draw his Subjects to Heresy or Infidelity. But it belongs to the Pope to judge whether he be guilty of so drawing them or no, wherefore to the Pope it belongs to Judge whether he ought to be Deposed or no. Because he could not but foresee his first Proposition would be denied him, he provided Proofs, which before I meddle with I must inform you what they say to thus much of the Argument, for they are no where smarter. This, say they, is without more ado, to put all Kingdoms into the Pope's hands, and make him as Absolute as the most extravagant of Canonists can fancy him. For since there are but two things considerable in the case, Whether an Opinion imputed to a Prince be Heresy or no? and, Whether he hold it or no, and would introduce it among his Subjects? If both these depend on the Pope's Judgement, and his Judgement be irrafragable, the safety of all Princes lies in his breast, and no Prince can be longer secure of his Crown, than he is of the Pope's favour? For the Pope may proceed to Judgement when he pleases, and if he be to be obeyed let him Judge how he pleases, No Prince can be a Prince longer than he pleases. For put the case, say they. To deny in the Pope a Power to Depose Princes is an opinion, which may, by this Rule, be declared Heresy, whenever the Pope thinks convenient. The King of France, for Example, himself holds that Opinion, and endeavours his Subjects should do so to. This King therefore, and I believe it will go as hard with all the rest, is Deposable if for no other reason, yet for thinking himself not Deposable. And so, all Kings are without more ado at the Mercy of the Pope. If they acknowledge themselves Deposable, they grant the Power, and are beholding to him that he puts it not in Execution, if they deny it, for that very reason they are to be Deposed, and are again more to thank him that he does not Depose them, when they deserve it. To this particular then of the Pope's Judgement, If it be understood of a Natural Judgement, others, say they, may Judge as well as the Pope whether the Prince deserve to be Deposed or no, and those who live upon the place better, as having better information from their Eyes and Ears, than he can have from the Report of others. But if it be understood of an Authoritative Judgement, such whose Sentence obliges People to the Execution of it, they deny the Pope, or any else, has any Authority to Judge, in that manner, of the Behaviour of Princes. For, say they, the Authority of every Judge, is confined to his proper Tribunal; a Judge of Assize is no Judge in the Spiritual Court, nor is a Bishop a Judge of Assize. Now the Pope's is a Spiritual Tribunal, and in that he may, in fit circumstances, judge even of Princes, and condemn them, if they be faulty, and award Spiritual Penalties against them. But if he proceed to Temporal Punishments, he passes to a Tribunal in which he is no Judge, nor his Sentence so given more to be obeyed than that of a Court Marshal in the Common Pleas: And to say otherwise, were to take all Judges, and all Tribunals out of the world, besides his own. For there is no Action but if well done belongs to Virtue, if ill, to Vice; And He being as much Judge of Virtue as Vice, as of Heresy and Faith, there is no Action nor can be, which by this account does not belong to his Tribunal, and so all other Judges are useless. For the rest, they flatly deny the first Proposition, and affirm, Subjects are so far from being obliged not to endure an Infidel, or Heretic Prince, that they are obliged to Endure and Obey him too, not so far indeed as to turn Infidels or Heretics for his sake, nor so far as not to represent his Errors or Miscarriages to him in that dutiful manner which is allowed by the Law, and their Allegiance; but, for the rest, let him be never so much an Infidel or Heretic, He is still their Prince, and as such to be obeyed.  
Bellarmin proves he may not from Deuteron. where the Jews are forbid to choose a King who is not a Jew: And this seems a little far off. For if in Poland, for Example, the Law were to choose only a Polander, or in Germany a Germane; this might very well be true, and withal be little to purpose. But yet he brings it nearer. The Reason of this Law, says he, was, least by choosing a Stranger, they might be brought into Idolatry. But there is the same danger, and the same mischief in choosing a Prince who is not a Christian, and remaining subject to one who becomes no Christian, therefore Christians are bound to Depose a Prince who deserts Christianity, and endeavours to pervert his Subjects after him. This Argument, says the other side, makes nothing for the Pope: It may seem to countenance the pretensions which Rebellious People make to a Power over their Kings; for those are they who Choose, and by Consequence are to Depose, if this Argument hold; but the Pope has no more to do with the one than the other, or if he have he has as much right to Choose as Depose. For the Law then, they acknowledge the Reason, assigned by Bellarmin, is in likelihood true: but when he assumes that the case of not Choosing, and not Obeying a Prince already chosen, or otherwise in Lawful possession of the Principality, is equally mischievous, they think him wonderfully out. Before he is Chosen, he is no Prince, nor have the People any tye to him, and while they are at their Liberty they will not do well to Choose ill, and subject themselves to a Bad Man. But when he is once Chosen, or otherwise established, they are no longer Free, but Subject, and that for Conscience, neither have they any other part in the disposition of the Commonwealth but Obedience. This Prince, though Election were the means by which he got his Principality, yet has it now, and that by Divine Right, and is truly the Vicar of God, whose particular Commission for his Deposition unless it can be produced, those who resist him resist the Ordinance of God, and acquire Damnation to themselves. A Man does ill who chooses a Bad Wife, and is bound by the law of Reason to choose a Good one: But can he therefore cast her off when he has her, and because he did amiss in taking a Scold, do worse in leaving her? The Cardinals are bound to Choose a Good Man for Pope; if they choose a Bad one, or he become Bad after his Election, Bellarmin will not therefore allow them to Choose another. And yet his Argument is every jot as efficacious in that case, as in that of Bad Princes. A Bad Pope may do as much mischief as a Bad Prince, and if the danger and mischief be equal to Choose him, and Obey him, the Pope is as fully confuted as the Prince. But that Bellarmin should impose upon them that the mischief of Choosing, and not Deposing is equal, and make it a kind of known Principle too, and such as needs no proof, they take very unkindly at his hands. For if they refuse to choose a Bad Man, there is no mischief at all, nor injury so much as to him who is refused. But if a Prince once lawfully Established be afterwards cast out, there follows Bloodshed, and War, the Hazard, perhaps the Ruin of the Commonwealth. So that his equal Cases put the greatest mischiefs that can be on one side, and none at all on the other, which is a very partial, and something unequal equality: or else, they make the Disturbance and Hazard of the Commonwealth no mischief, which, that Bellarmin should go about to persuade them, argues, he had more confidence in his Logic, than they have Opinion of his Judgement. 'Tis great pity this Doctrine, if it be true, was not in fashion a little sooner, the Ignorance of it cost the life of many a good Christian, and the Blood of abundance of Innocent Men, shed in Ten Persecutions, might have been saved, if the first Masters of Christianity had Instructed People a little better, and made them understand the convenient use of their Power. For it had been but Antidating a little the course of Providence, and setting up a Christian Emperor in the place of Nero or Dioclesian, and all had been well: And 'tis a little strange those Primitive Christians, whom none suspects of want of Zeal, either understood, or practised their duty no better.  
Neither the one nor the other says Bellarmin: but the Reason why they Deposed not Nero and Dioclesian, and the Apostate Julian, and Valens the Arian, was, because they wanted Force. For that they wanted not Right nor the Knowledge of it, is apparent by the Apostle, who, 1 Cor. 16. bids the Christians appoint New Judges, and if they could make New Judges, they might as well have made New Kings if their Force had been equal to their Justice. But certainly some body is extremely out, Bellarmin or his Adversaries; for they affirm very confidently, that the Primitive Christians were not so weak and helpless as he pretends. S. Peter himself lived in Nero's time, and he had power to restore the dead to life, and cast the living into sudden death. A body would think this was Power enough in conscience, and that Nero with all his Guards and Legions was not more secure of his Empire against this miraculous and unresistable Force, than Ananias of his life. It was not then for want of Power that he taught Christians to be subject to the King as most excelling, etc. and choose to lay down his own life amongst the rest, rather than practise an expedient which Bellarmin thinks so necessary, and which to him had been easy enough if he had been of Beauties' mind. But to speak only of Humane Power, Tertullian lived in those days, and Writ what he saw and knew; He affirms the contrary to what Bellarmin thinks very plainly, Apologet. C. 37. Should we want Numbers or Forces if we had a mind to be open Enemies, not secret Revengers? Are the Moors, and Marcomans, and Parthians, and whatever Nations of one place, and confined to their own Limits, more than those of the whole World? We are but Men of yesterday, and yet have filled all the places you have, your Cities, Islands, Castles, Burroughs, Counsels, and Camp itself, your Tribes, Courts, Palaces, the Senate and the Market. We have left you only the Temples. For what War are not we fit and ready, even though we were Inferior in Number, who endure death so willingly, if in this Discipline it were as lawful to Kill as to be killed, & c? Eusebius, 
L. 8 c. 1.  Writing of the times before Dioclesian: Who shall describe, says he, the numerous Congregations and multitudes of meetings in every City, and the open concourse to Oratories, for which not content with the Ancient Buildings, they in every City set up spacious and Large Churches from the very Foundations. A thing testified by Maximinus himself, who says to Sabinus, that Dioclesian and Maximinian commanded Christians to be proceeded against because they saw Omnes ferè mortales, All men generally, leaving the Worship of the gods, 
Euseb. L. 9 C 9  unite themselves to the Christians. The Army of Julian too was almost all Christian, say Historians, in so much that when Jovinian chosen Emperor after his death, showed a backwardness to his Election, as being himself a Christian, and unwilling to take the Command of Men accustomed to Wickedness under Julian, 
Theodor. L. 4. C. 1.  they all cried out, He should not doubt, and refuse a Command not Wicked. That he should be an Emperor of Christians, and Men brought up in Discipline and Piety, which the Elder of them learned of Constantine, and the Younger of Constantius, and that if Julian had circumvented some, he lived not long enough to settle the Mischief. S. Austin too testifies of them, 
In Psal. 124.  that They could at their pleasure have deposed Julian, but would not, because they were subject for Necessity, not only to avoid Anger, but for Conscience and Love, and because our Lord so commanded. And abundance more they allege in this kind.  
To the Proof which Bellarmin brings from 1 Cor. they Reply, That since the Christians had Force enough to Create New Judges, they see not why they had not Force enough to Create New Kings too. And the truth is, if the Judges meant by the Apostle, were such as could claim and exercise the Authority, invested in those who were appointed by the Prince, it was little less than to set up New Kings, or at least deprive their Old of a good part of the Subjection due to them. For he that refuses to submit to a Magistrate Commissionated by a Prince, makes more bold with the Prince himself than is consistent with the duty of a Subject. For since the Inferior Judge has his Authority from the Prince, to refuse it is in plain terms to refuse the Authority of the Prince. Which the Apostle, they think, was far enough from Authorising, or even persuading, Christians to do. They conceive then, that what the Apostle did in this case, is no more than what Good Judges ought to do at this day, it being no unusual thing for them to wish the parties not to expect the Rigour of the Law, but compound their Differences fairly amongst themselves, to which purpose they either Assign, or leave them to choose Umpires themselves. Yet, all this while never intent, by their Charitable Compassion, to forfeit their own Right, or debar the Parties from having recourse to them again, if the other Method proves not to their satisfaction. Such, say they, was the Apostles meaning in that place. He desired to prevent, as much as might be, all Contentions among the Faithful, at least the Scandal of their breaking out, and being taken notice of in the Courts of Heathens. To this purpose he wishes them to keep their Frailties from becoming public, and if they could not avoid Contentions, at least to end them by the Judgement of Men chosen amongst themselves; but never intended to invest the Men so chosen, with an Authority any way prejudicial to that of the lawful Magistrate. Even now, say they, the Apostles whether Counsel or Command is still in force, and People do ill who expose their Frailties to the knowledge of Public Courts; notwithstanding, if they will needs go to Law, Courts have their full Power now as they had then, and as much as if S. Paul had never written any such thing. By the Judges then mentioned by the Apostle, they understand umpires chosen among themselves to prevent the Scandal of Public Suits, but without any Authority derogatory to the Public Magistrate, and allege from S. Thomas, That if the Faithful had been forbidden to appear upon Summons before the Tribunals of Infidels, it had been against the subjection due to Princes, and contrary to the Command of S. Peter, Be subject to every humane Creature, to the King as precelling, and to the Rulers as sent by him. Bellarmin cannot digest this umpirage, but persists against Barklay to maintain they were True Judges, yet withal confesses they had no Coactive Power as to the External Court, and that Christians were obliged, when ever Cited at the Suit, either of Infidel or Christian, to answer before the Legal Magistrate; because, says he, they were not Chosen by consent of the Contending Parties alone, but appointed by the Church. But this, I think, makes them no other than bare Umpires; for such they are, and are so esteemed among us who are often appointed by our Court; to decide particular Differences. And all the obligation to stand to their Award, was, for aught appears, the obligation of doing what became Christians, whom S. Paul in that place, and our Saviour before him had instructed Not to contend in Judgement, but part with the Cloak too to him who would take away the Coat. And this Obligation, for aught I know, continues still, and Law Suits are a blemish to the perfection of Christianity even at this day, where men should do a great deal better to decide their differences by a Friendly Composition, than lose so much time, and undergo so much Trouble as is required to follow the Law. But if either We now, or They then, are not so perfect as we ought, but will have recourse to Magistrates, there is nothing in S. Paul which hinders their Jurisdiction. Mean time I conceive, the difference betwixt a Judge and an Umpire, is, that one has Power to execute his Sentence, the other not; wherefore Bellarmin may call them what he pleases, but if they had no Coactive Power, as he confesses they had not, they were not what our, and I think all Languages, properly call Judges. This Argument than seems to come off lamely enough, while it supposes the Primitive Christians wanted Force, against the plain testimony of Primitive Christians themselves; and would prove a right to set up New Kings, by setting up New Judges, which Judges had not that Power which is necessary to a Judge, and makes his proper distinction from an Umpire; however, which did not prejudice the Authority of the Legal Magistrate. In short, it amounts to this, Christians are now free from Subjection to their Princes, because S. Paul advised them heretofore to do something which did not take away their Subjection to Inferior Magistrates:  
Peradventure a second Proof may be more lucky, which Bellarmin makes in this manner. To tolerate an Heretical Prince, is to expose Religion to most evident danger. For such as the Ruler of a City is, such will be the Inhabitants. Ecclesiastic. 10. But Christians ought not to tolerate an Infidel Prince with evident peril of Religion, because where Divine and Human Laws are opposite, we must obey the Divine Law. And the Divine Law obliges us to preserve the true Religion, Human Law only to have this, or that Man for King. And to say truth, Bellarmin is a little more lucky than ordinary; for his Adversaries, besides what he Cites from Scripture, grant him at least one Proposition, namely, That the Law of God is to be preferred before the Law of Man, and they hit it so seldom, that 'tis well they agree in any thing. But then they deny all the rest, and affirm, that to tolerate an Infidel King, is not to expose Religion to evident danger; That Christians ought be subject to the Prince God has set over him, whatever he be; That there is no Contrariety betwixt the Law of God, and the Law of Man in this case; and lastly, That our Subjection to Princes is not only by Human Law. And while they are in such an humour of Contradicting, 'twas great luck that Bellarmin could get any thing granted. For the first, they say, Bellarmin forgets himself and his Doctrine elsewhere. When 'twas for his purpose he could acknowledge, that The safety of the Church depends, not on Human Industry, but, the Divine Protection, and that he will be sure to take care of her, and provide Remedies against all mischances which may befall her. And they think, if Bellarmin be forgetful, there is no great fear that God will be so too, or danger that any Wickedness will prevail against the Power of Omnipotent Goodness. For what greater danger is there in these later days, more than in the former, when for Three hundred years together Princes, not only were Infidels, but employed all their Power and all their Industry to root out Springing Christianity out of the World. Notwithstanding which, the Church continued, and increased, and prevailed at last. So that, if a King happen to persecute the Church, to think, as Bellarmin seems to do, that all is presently lost, is to rely on the Arm of Flesh a little more than becomes a good Christian, and to distrust either the Power or Goodness of God, and besides, manifestly to contradict the Evidence of History. And for the second, That People may not tolerate an Infidel Prince, because that would expose Religion to evident Danger. This Tolerating of a Prince seems something an unmannerly phrase for Subjects. A Prince may, when he sees fit, Tolerate the unwaywardness of his Subjects, and not punish all the faults he sees. But for Subjects to Tolerate their Prince is an expression hardly tolerable. They are to obey him, not in his Infidelity, which 'tis permitted them even to oppose by all the dutiful means consistent with the Fidelity of good Subjects, but in the rest to refuse Subjection, is no less than to acquire damnation. However, Tolerating, say they, signifies not Acting, Exposing signifies Acting; and that not-doing should be thought Doing, they apprehend very strange. Yet, if any Inconvenience follow from not Acting, it is then only imputable to him who Acts not, when He is otherwise obliged to Act. And no man can be obliged to Act, but where the Action is Just and Lawful. Now Rebellion, and Tumults, and Murder, and such Actions as those of necessity must be, by which a Lawful Prince is resisted by his Subjects, till Bellarmin have proved Just and Lawful Actions, they think, they may safely deny, any apprehended danger of Religion will justify those who do them. If any harm come, they are all accountable to God who do it; the People who do Nothing have nothing to Answer for, unless it be blamable to trust God's Providence, and not to intermeddle without sufficient Cause, a sufficient cause of Condemnation. If the Laws of God did warrant the Interposing of the People, something might be said for them; but since they do not; their part is to do their Duty in what concerns them to do, and rely upon God for the rest. Then for the Contradiction between the two Laws: The Divine Law, says Bellarmin, obliges us to preserve the True Religion, Human only to have this or that Man for King. Where is the Contradiction, say they? Cannot I keep this Man for my King, and keep my Religion too? A body would skink that this is very possible to be done. The contrary to that Divine Law is, You shall not preserve the True Religion; and if any Human Law command this, Disobey freely in God's name, for Aequum est obedire Deo magis quam Hominibus. But while you disobey this Law, which you cannot without offending God obey, do not refuse to acknowledge your Prince, and obey him there, where you offend God if you do not obey. Again, the contrary to what he calls the Human Law is, You shall not have this or that Man for Prince, or, which is all one, You shall not obey him in just Commands. Bellarmin has not yet produced any Command of the Divine Law which says this, nor will, till Rebellion become a part of Gods Law. In fine, Whoever persists to put a contradiction betwixt Fearing God and Honouring the King, will be Confuted by all the Bells in the Parish. Lastly, Whereas he makes it only by Human Law that this or that Man is King, they Reply, what you have more at large in a former Letter, That He becomes King, as the Pope becomes Pope, by Human means; but when he once is so, Obedience to him is by Divine Right, and so; if there be any contradiction betwixt Preserving our Religion and Obeying our Prince, the Divine Law contradicts itself. For as Preservation of Religion is Divine Law, so Obedience to Princes is Divine Law too. If Bellarmin be not pleased with these Answers they leave him to make better himself, retorting, as they are very good at Reparty, his Argument against a scandalous Pope; for he, say they, exposes Virtue to evident danger; For such as the Ruler, such will be the Inhabitants. And God's Law is to be observed when 'tis contrary to Human Law, and God's Law obliges us to preserve Virtue, and 'tis by Human Law only that this or that Man is Pope, etc.  
And so we come to another Argument from the parity betwixt an Infidel Prince and an Infidel Husband, whom the Apostle allows the Faithful Wife to leave, and therefore, Why are not the Faithful People as free in respect of an Infidel Prince? In Answer to this they Dispute several things with exactness enough, and examining the particular Cases where, and how far, and why Divorce is lawful, find several Disparities, and several Reasons why the Argument concludes not. But to leave those Considerations, which are not without their perplexity, this Reply of theirs seems very plain. Bring, say they, a Permission from the Apostle for a Subject to desert his Prince, as plain as this is for a Woman to leave her Husband, and we will acknowledge the case is equal. The Apostle plainly derogates from the general Rule, and brings an Exception wherein the Law of Marriage binds not. He that was so careful of Private concerns, cannot be imagined unmindful of Public and greater. Had he known any Exception from the general Rule of Obeying Princes, it is not to be suspected he would conceal it, and testify more care for Private Families than Commonwealths. So that the Argument amounts to this: We are free from the Law in cases where the Law is dispensed with, therefore we are free likewise where 'tis not dispensed with. Again, say they, the Woman is only then free when the Man refuses to live with her, for if he stay S. Paul wishes her to stay with him. Now if any Prince refuses to Govern his People, unless they will become Infidels like himself, I think they will allow the People are not obliged to turn Infidels for his sake, but may get them another in case he leave them. But if the King will stay with his People, since the Woman is to stay with her Husband who will be with her, they think the very parity concludes the People obliged to stay with their Prince. Otherwise the parity stands in this manner: Even as the Faithful Woman is not to leave her Unbelieving Husband who will continue with her; even so, the Believing People are to leave their Unbelieving King who will stay with them. Or, even as the Believing Woman is free from an Unbelieving Husband who casts her off, even so the Believing People are free from an Unbelieving King who does not cast them off. Which methinks are something unlike for Parities.  
The next Argument is of great esteem with Bellarmin. He made it in his Book De Rom. Pont. and repeats it in Tortus, and urges it largely against Barklay. This it is: Princes are received into the Church with this either express or tacit bargain, to submit their Sceptres to Christ, and preserve and defend their Religion, and this under penalty of forfeiting their Kingdoms if they fail. Wherefore, if they become Heretics, or an obstacle to Religion, they may without injury be Judged and Deposed by the Church. For he is not fit to receive the Sacrament of Baptism, who is not disposed to serve Christ, and lose all he has for his sake, according to S. Luke 14. If any one comes to me, and hates not Father and Mother, etc. he cannot be my Disciple. And the Church would err too grievously if She admitted a King who without Control would cherish Heresy, and overthrow Religion. 
C. 24.  Thus Argues Bellarmin in Rom. Pont. But against Barklay more largely. Let us imagine, says he, an Infidel Prince, desirous to be received into the Church, should speak in this manner: I desire to become a fellow Citizen with the Saints by Baptism, and promise to submit my Sceptre to Christ, and defend his Church to my power, and never to break my holy purpose. Nevertheless, If I happen to break my Word, and become an Heretic, or Apostate, or Pagan, I will not be punished with Temporal Punishments, either by the Church, or its Precedent, or any but Christ; and if the Chief Governor of the Church separate me from the Communion of the Faithful, I will nevertheless that the Faithful Sons of the Church continue Faithful Subjects to me, and may not be absolved from the bond of their Obedience by any. Such a King, says he, if Barklay think fit for Baptism, wise men would laugh at him. For if a man should desire to be incorporated into any City, and should protest that if he had a mind to betray that City, he would not be judged by the Magistrates of it, but by the King who dwells far off, every body would laugh at him. And truly He that, according to the Gospel, ought be prepared to lose his life for the Faith of Christ, aught more to be prepared to lose an Earthly Kingdom. But 'tis ridiculous to say, I am ready to be deprived of my Kingdom, if I renounce my Faith, but not by any Sentence of Man, but will have Sentence pronounced against me by the Angels in Heaven. The Church would be very imprudent to receive into her bosom a Man who would, without control, afflict the Members of the Church, and not suffer the Faithful to be freed from his Tyranny by any Authority on Earth. Thus Bellarmin; more zealously than wisely say his Adversaries. Such fine discourses never were, nor are ever likely to be made but by the King of Utopia. Kings who receive Christianity think not of such subtleties, nor imagine they are to treat with their Spiritual Instructors with those nice Cautions, which they use in making Leagues, and Treaties of War and Peace with their fellow Kings. To make Protestations, and other provisions of Security, against Chances they never do, and none but a man cunning in Chican ever would think of, as if Baptism were a bargain made in Law, wherein, if by misfortune the Writings be not exactly drawn a man forfeits his Title to his Purchase, or a man becomes liable to Eternal damnation for the fault of a Scrivener, is a conceit of a more subtle reach than is like to proceed from the simplicity with which men deal in the concerns of Eternity. However, if Bellarmin do put such thoughts into the head of a Pagan, he may very justly protest: I desire to be made a Christian, and intent to live like one, and submit to the Discipline of that Law which I am going to embrace: but I mean to keep my Regal dignity and Prorogatives inviolate, and do not intent to be put by Baptism into a worse condition than now I am in. My Subjects are now my Subjects, and I intent they always shall be so. For myself, if I deserve it, I refuse not to be expelled from that Society of which I shall have made myself unworthy; But as I had my Subjects before Baptism, I will not that Baptism shall take them from me. I am a King while I am no Christian, and if I cease to be a Christian, will not therefore cease to be a King. God, not Baptism gave me a Crown, and none but God shall take it away. A Pagan, say they, may warrantably declare thus much, and warrantably even according to Bellarmin himself, who teaches that the Law of Christ deprives no man of any right, and when a King becomes Christian he loses no Right or Dominion, but gets a new right to the Kingdom of Heaven, for else the Benefit of Christ would be a prejudice to Kings, and Grace destroy Nature. As for the Comparison betwixt him who pretends to the Freedom of a City, and him who pretends to Baptism, the Protest which Bellarmin enters in his behalf is indeed ridiculous, and overthrown by his very pretence; for a Member of a City must, by his very being a Member, be subject to the Laws and Magistrates of that City; And so a King, if he become a Member of the Spiritual Commonwealth, becomes subject to the Laws, and Magistrates, and Punishments of that Commonwealth, which are Spiritual, and may be inflicted on a King as well as other men (considering their own Natures purely, and abstracting from Circumstances, which in the case of Kings are generally such, that, if it be lawful, it is seldom expedient to use them) but for Temporal punishments, He is himself the Head of that Commonwealth which should inflict them, and must either punish himself, or cannot be punished but by God; So that to say, by his becoming a Member of the Spiritual Commonwealth he makes Himself liable to Temporal punishments, is to say, in the Case of him who pretends to be made a Citizen, That by making himself a Member of that Corporation he subjects himself to the Laws of another.  
But to leave these speculations to them who Writ of New Atlantis and the Isle of Pines; The Argument, say they, is doubly faulty, for it assumes what is not true, and concludes what does not follow though the Antecedent were true. First, they deny any such bargains are made in Baptism. There is indeed an express, whether Promise, or Purpose to Renounce Satan and his Pomps, but of Renouncing the Right of Kings, there is not any expression which sounds like it; and for secret bargains, they are so secret, if there be any, that they are known to none but Bellarmin. They have lain hid for many Ages, and do so still, for any credit they give this Argument. He would infer it out of the disposition which our Saviour, in S. Luke, requires in him, who will be his Disciple. And this disposition of preferring his Love and Service before all things, they acknowledge is necessary in Baptism, and that Man unfit for it, who does not firmly purpose so to do. But the Question is, If the King chance to break his good Purpose, is He therefore liable to this particular punishment of being Deposed? This particular Condition must enter into the bargain, or nothing will come of it. Otherwise our Godfathers and Godmothers have undertaken for all of us, that we shall do all that the greatest King Promises in Baptism. And we all forfeit the Surety they have given, and break the Promise solemnly made in our behalf, and sin daily and grievously. Can we therefore without injury be turned out of our Estates? We must be prepared as well as any King, to lay down our lives for the Faith of Christ; if for Fear, or other frailty, we fall even to Idolatry, is it therefore lawful to knock us on the head, or if it were, Can the Church or Priest, before whom we made this Promise which we have broken, give Sentence of blood against us? How justly soever we deserve to be punished, yet this punishment is not just, because we never submitted to it in Baptism, or any other way; and if we did, the Church, of all the world, can the least inflict it. But the truth is, no such punishment was ever thought of, either by the Givers or Receivers of Baptism. If we do not continue constant to our Renouncing of Satan, Satan will take possession of us again, to whom the Church may, when there is just occasion, by her Power deliver us. And, if Satan be not punishment enough even for a King, and the Wickedest King that ever was or will be, I am mightily mistaken. Bellarmin therefore was less considerative than would be expected, when he talks every where as if Kings, unless they were liable to be Deposed, would be without punishment. Methinks Excommunication might serve turn, Excommunication which as himself says, 
L. 3. de Laic. C. 2.  is a punishment greater than Temporal death. It being more horrible, as himself Cites S. Austin to be delivered to Satan by Excommunication, than to endure the Sword, or Fire, or be devoured by Wild Beasts. Death is the last of punishments with us of the Temporal form, and if a Wicked Prince may be punished by the Church with a punishment worse than Death, I know not why the charitable Anger of a Churchman may not be satisfied with it. However it be, according to Bellarmin himself, 
De Eccles. C. 6.  Excommunication is the most grievous punishment which the Church can inflict: when she has proceeded so far, She has no more to do, says Coelestin. 3. Wherefore if Deposition be a thing with which the Church has nothing to do, Bellarmin may be content, if that be not done which cannot be done, and even subscribe to Pet. Gregorius, teaching as learnedly as honestly, 
L. 26. de Repub. C. 5.  that Rebellion against Princes, upon pretence of their Vices, cannot scape the Crime of Treason and Indignation of God, and those who reign wickedly are rather to be left to the Judgement of God, than the hands of Subjects be polluted with Sacrilege and Parricide. God wants not Means when he pleases either to amend, or take away such Bad Princes. But to return to the Argument, They positively deny any bargain at all made in Baptism, unless you will call the Purpose they make to live Virtuously an express bargain, and a submission to the Law which the Baptised embrace, and consequently to the punishments of it, an implicit one; as indeed, who is once Baptised, whether Prince or Private man, may upon occasion be Admonished, and Reprehended, and Censured by the Church, but if Human frailty, and the Temptations to which our Nature is subject, make a Prince break either this Bargain or Purpose, that he should therefore be content to be Deposed, or that he Bargains to submit to any such Penalty, they flatly deny, and say, that by the same Reason, since every Private man makes the same Bargain in Baptism which any King does, every Man that Sins might presently without injury Done him, have his Estate Confiscated, or be sent to the Galleys or the Gallows: Which would make strange work in a World so frail as ours. And for this Reason they deny the Consequence, as well as the Antecedent of this Argument. For, say they, although a Prince should bargain to forfeit or Crown or Life, if he forfeit his Faith, unless he bargain expressly that the Church or Pope be Garranty of this Treaty, and give them power to proceed to Deposition in case of Failer on his part, nothing is done, and they have otherwise no power to do it. For all the Power they received from God is Spiritual, and is not to meddle with matters so Temporal. So that a King must not only submit to the Church's Power, but create in her a Power which God gave her not, or nothing will come of it.  
Upon the whole they say two things which seem remarkable enough. First, that this claim from Bargain or Promise, whether express or tacit, plainly evinces there is no Internal proper Power in the Church to Depose Princes, for then there were no need of this External Right by bargain; besides, that if such Power accrue to her, as it cannot be other than according to the express Terms of the Contract, so it would not be Indirect, as Bellarmin pretends, but as Direct as can be imagined; there being in the World no Power more Direct than I have over those things for which I have bargained. Next, they say, that Bellarmin manifestly contradicts what other Divines, and himself with them, teach of the Nature of the Promise made in Baptism. Suarez observes, that this Promise is not to be understood a proper Promise or Vow made to God, but only an Obligation which the very Profession of Christian Religion made in Baptism induces, by reason of the Divine Law, and Power granted by Christ to his Church. Which I take to signify, Whereas in things in which we are otherwise free, we can oblige ourselves by Vow or Promise (as when I Vow to give Alms, or do any other good Work) and this Vow induces an Obligation which otherwise I had not; but in things where we are otherwise obliged, if I Vow to perform them, I am obliged to no more by my Vow than I was before; that the Promise made in Baptism is of this second sort, and People were obliged to the performance of the Christian Law then received, although they made no promise so to do. 
De Monach. C. 19  So Bellarmin elsewhere teaches, That the promise, made in Baptism, is nothing but a testification, or acceptation of the Obligation, which the Law of God brings with it— Neither are the Baptised bound to any, either Explicite or Implicit intention of obliging themselves farther, than as they are obliged by the Law of God. And farther, That Baptised Christians are forced by the Church to keep the Laws of Christ, not so much in virtue of their Promise, as out of this that they are become Members and Children of the Church, and every Member is subject to the Head, and every Child by the Law of Nature to his Parent. Wherefore manifestly, either the Law of God obliges Princes to submit to Deposition without any bargain of theirs, or this Bargain he talks of leaves them as free as they were before. If the Law obliges them, 'tis to no purpose to mention Bargains; if it do not, 'tis to no purpose neither, since their Bargain signifies nothing, for they bargain no farther than to observe the Law. And the Argument amounts to this; They bargain to be Deposed, because they bargain to observe the Law which obliges them to no such thing. Besides, if we examine a little more narrowly, and ask by what Law of God Princes become liable to Deposition, Bellarmin Answers 'tis by Bargain, which is not to be liable by the Law of God: And if we ask again where any such Bargain appears, He tells us, 'tis not an Express, but a Tacit Bargain, employed in the Law of God; which is plainly to prove the Bargain by the Law, and the Law by the Bargain; and, that is such a kind of Argument as, I think they call a Circle, but sure 'tis none of the best, nor needed have been so much esteemed by Bellarmin.  
There follows an Argument which you had light upon, and proposed to me with so much smart Raillery in a former Letter, from the Comparison of the Chief Postour in the Church to a Shepherd. Which in short is this. When it was said to S. Peter Feed my Sheep, all Power was given him which is necessary to a Shepherd in regard of his Flock. But a Shepherd must have Power against Wolves and Rams that they hurt not the Sheep, and Power to provide, as is convenient, for the Sheep themselves. Then applying the Notions of all Three by similitude to Princes, as you have formerly observed, he concludes The Pope has Power over them in respect of every one. They Answer, there is more wit than solidity in this discourse, Similitudes of all other being the worst Topies, and which affords the weakest Arguments, as seldom running, in the School Phrase, of all Four. The Metaphor is generally, and more fitly understood, so that by Wolves are meant Persecutors, by Rams the Prelates of the Church, and by Sheep the rest of the Faithful. But allowing him to use the Similitude as he pleases, and apply it after his own fashion; to talk with him in his own language, they observe many differences betwixt a figurative and real Wolf, a figurative and real Sheep, and many defects in the Similitude, and Reasons why the Argument concludes not, even keeping within the terms of the Metaphor. But to consider the Thing; Here, say they, the Church is compared to a Flock, as it was before to a Commonwealth, and may to be a City, or Family, or Ship, or Army, or twenty things more. All these several Comparisons make no difference in the things compared: For, whether you consider the Pope as Prince of a Spiritual Commonwealth, or Shepherd of a Spiritual Flock, his Power as Prince is not different from his Power as Shepherd, but the same, and if you consider it according to all the Comparisons, of which it is capable, 'tis still one and the same, and that a Spiritual Power. Wherefore all the Similitudes, that are or can be, will never make it other than it is; and the Pope, whether he be looked upon as a Prince, or a Shepherd, or a Pilot, or however he be considered, can do no more than a Spiritual Prince, and a Spiritual Shepherd, etc. Now when Bellarmin Argues, the Pope is a Shepherd, and a Shepherd may drive away or kill a Wolf, and an Infidel Prince is a Wolf, all this, say they, even allowing the Comparison, is to be understood of Spiritual driving away, and Spiritual kill. But when he infers, Therefore he may Depose him, he passes from Spirituals to Temporals, and leaves his Allegory and the truth too. The Pope may Admonish and Command the Flock not to follow the Wolf in what he is a Wolf, but in what he is not a Wolf, but a Shepherd himself, what ever the Pope say to the contrary, they are bound to obey the Power which God has set over them. It is by Divine Law that Subjects obey their Prince, and Princes cease not to be Princes by turning Infidels, nor Subjects to be Subjects by becoming or remaining Faithful: And that all the Similitudes in the World should dispense with the Law of God, Bellarmin may talk as long as he will, but they will not believe him.  
For the rest these kind of Arguments, if too much credit were given to them, would make mad work. Every Bishop, and every Curate is as truly a Shepherd as the Pope. Their Flocks indeed are not so large, but they are truly Flocks, and suffice to denominate their Governors with propriety Shepherds, If this quality enable him who has it to Depose a Prince, there is no remedy but every Bishop has Power to Depose the King who is of his Diocese, and every Curate him who belongs to his Parish. And since Private men have something less Title to their Estates than the King to his Kingdom, if Kings be subject to this Power, Private men are much more; and so, because the Argument with a little more stretching would reach to every Sin, within a little while every Sinner might be dispossessed of his Estate at the pleasure of his Bishop or Curate; which in time would make such work, that People would go near to hate all Arguments, and all Scholars for Beauties' sake, and as the Turks do, Forbidden all Learning that they may live in Peace and Security. Besides, if the fancy should take a man to apply this very Allegory to Princes; for if it were said to S. Peter, Feed my Sheep, it was of Cyrus, I say to Cyrus, Thou art my Shepherd. Isay 44. and of David, Thou shalt feed my People Israel, 1 Paral. 11. and then apply this Notion of the Wolf, and furious Ram, to a wicked scandalous Pope, over whom he must have Power if he cannot otherwise preserve his own Flock; Bellarmin must either unravel all he has weaved here, or Princes will have more Power over Bad Popes than he will think fit to allow them. In the mean time, of the two ways by which he says in Rom. Pont. his Doctrine may be proved, Reasons and Examples, These are all he produces of the first kind. You will judge of them, while I pass to the other.  
He brings in all Twelve, Two in the Old Law, and Ten in the New. Those of the Old are Ozias deposed for Leprosy by Azarias, and Athalia by Joiada for Idolatry. Of these two, one was never Deposed, and the other never a Queen, but by Usurpation. Ozias for his Presumption was miraculously struck with Leprosy, and by the Priests according to their duty, and the command of the Law, put out of the Temple, and separated from the People: but, for the rest, continued King till his dying day, his Son supplying his place in what his Disease permitted him not to interpose himself. Athalia endeavoured to settle herself in the Kingdom by the Murder of all the Children of Ochozias, but was mistaken. Joas was saved by his Aunt Jeboseth, and, by the honesty and credit of her Husband Joiada, put in Possession of the Regal Dignity, whereof the Right had been in him all the while. So that the Argument from this Instance stands thus. The High Priest amongst the Jews was instrumental in placing his true Sovereign in his Throne, therefore the High Priest among the Christians may tumble a lawful Sovereign out of his Throne, which for a man of Beauties Vogue is something oddly Argued.  
His Third Example, and First from the New Law, is, the dealing of S. Ambrose with the Emperor Theodosius, whom, after a Cruelty commanded by him in a transport of Anger, he admitted not into the Church, till he had Repent, and make satisfaction. I know not, but methinks he makes the most unpromising entry into his business that may be. In the former Instances, one had not Deposition, the other, no Lawful Prince to be Deposed, and in this there is neither Deposition, nor Pope to make it. S. Ambrose was Bishop of Milan, not of Rome, and I hope he will not extend this Deposing Power to every Bishop. However, what he did, not only every Bishop, but every Ghostly Father, may do both lawfully and laudably. It is the Office of Churchmen to induce Sinners to Repentance if they can, and persuade them to those Remedies which may hinder them from relapsing into the same faults; And they have here the Zeal of an excellent Prelate, successful with an excellent Emperor, for their encouragement; and this is all I can perceive in this passage. The Fourth is a Privilege of S. Gregory the Great to a certain Monastery in which there is this Clause; If any King, Bishop, Judge, etc. violate this Decree, of what Dignity or Degree soever he be, let him be deprived of his Honour. This they take to be a form of Imprecation, not a Legal Decree, as when he says a little after, And let him be damned in the lower Hell with Judas the Traitor, etc. or as the stile of Bulls now is, Let him know he shall incur the Indignation of God, etc. For they think, that for the Pope directly to command People should be damned, is not very commendable in him, nor very wise in any who should think he does so. Wherefore to look upon these kind of expressions as other than Threats, by which men may be frighted from Wickedness, they conceive is both against S. Gregory's Sense, and Common Sense too. The next is the Example of Gregory the Second, who forbade Tribute to be paid to Leo the Iconoclast; and this is one of those Stories which Onuphrius reckons amongst Fables, and Platina expressly denies, for he says the Italians were so exasperated against the Emperor, that the Pope was feign to interpose his Authority to keep them from choosing another Emperor. So that till the matter of Fact be agreed, 'tis an uncomfortable and useless Employment to busy ourselves with thinking what will follow out of it. There follows the Deposition of Childeric King of France by Pope Zachary, with which they make quick work, and positively deny it; not that the King was Deposed, but that he was Deposed by the Pope. The French indeed consulted him (as they might have done any other, whose Credit they had thought useful to their purpose) whether were more truly King, He who managed all the Affairs of the Kingdom, or he who had the bare Title, but meddled with nothing: And He answered the former. And this was all he did, for the rest, what was done, was done by the French themselves. Not but that 'tis likely, he understood well enough the meaning of the Question, and was inclined to favour Pepin all he could, but he did no more; and those who did, have long since given account to God of their action. I know not of what humour the French were in those times, but he that should at this day maintain in France, The Pope has Power to Depose their King, would go near to be confuted with a Halter. The Seventh and Eighth Examples are, The Translation of the Empire to the Germans, and settling the Electours who are to choose the Emperor. This is a Question of which Bellarmin has written Three entire Books, and is of more both importance and labour than to be treated with any exactness in a Letter. That which Withrington Answers is in short, That the Pope concurred to the Translation of the Empire, and Nomination of the Electours, not as acting by his own sole Power, but as one who, for the place he held, had much, and perhaps more Interest in the business than any other. To which purpose he Cites Mich. Coccinius, saying, that The People of Rome, and the rest of the Nations of Italy oppressed by barbarous People, and not only not protected by the Grecians, but ill used too, and afflicted by their Avarice and Imperious humour, transferred the Empire from the Grecians to the Germans in the person of Charles the Great. And 'tis not to be doubted, says he, that this Translation was made, and had its force and efficacy from the Consent and Authority of the People of Rome and the rest of Italy. And whereas Innocent the Third Writes to Bertoldus, That the Apostolic See transferred the Roman Empire from the Grecians to the Germans; We do not grant the Apostolic See transferred it otherwise, than by Consenting to those who did, or by declaring it ought be transferred, but the Translation had its force and strength from the Consent of the People. To which purpose he alleges also Card. Cusanus, speaking in this manner: Whence the Electours ordained in the time of Henry the Second by common Consent of all Germans, and Others subject to the Empire, have their Radical Power from this common Consent of all, who by the Law of Nature could choose themselves an Emperor not from the Pope, in whose Power it is not to give a King or Emperor to any Country in the World, without its Consent. But to this concurred the Consent of Greg. the Fifth as of the single Bishop of Rome, who for the Degree in which he is, has an interest in Consenting to the Common Emperor. And rightly; as in General Counsels His Authority concurs in the first place by Consent with all the rest who make the Council; the force nevertheless of the Definition depends, not on the first of all Bishops, but on the common consent of all, both of him and the rest. This is what they say, How far it is to be allowed is another Question. The Origin of Empires, and Rights of Princes, are things I have more disposition to admire and reverence, then Dispute. In the mean time here are Eight of his Twelve Examples, which you see are all Contested, how rationally you will judge. Those which follow are of Gegory the Seventh, who Deposed the Emperor Henry, and Three Popes more who followed his Example; to which he might have added several other, it being acknowledged that after Gregory the Seventh had once begun, many have imitated him, and almost all claimed a Power to do so. But as He was the first unquestionable Author of that till then unknown Fact, so they maintain, that Fact was unjust in him, and not allowable in any of his Successors. They Answer then first with Jo. Paris. That Arguments are not to be drawn from such singular Facts, which proceed sometimes from Devotion to the Church, or from some other Cause, and not from Order of Law: And with Greg. Tholos. From hence I gather only, that 'tis a difficult Question, Whether Popes can Depose Emperors or Kings, who formerly had Power to make Popes? Besides, there are found divers Depositions of Popes by Emperors, as well as of Emperors by Popes, so that there has been a great Vicissitude in these things. Whence 'tis a bad way of Disputing to argue from Fact, and the Examples of Deposition.— Out of all which, Ambitious disturbers of the Commonwealth, Usurpers of Kingdoms, and Rebels to their Lawful Princes may gather first, That every Deposition of Princes is not therefore Just, because it has been done, for all Facts are not Just; and secondly, That no such Consequence ought to be made, there is an Example of such a thing, therefore the like may be attempted again. And in the words of Bellarmin himself, De Rom. Pont. L 2. C. 29. speaking to the Instances in which Popes have been Deposed by Emperors. Such things, says he, have been done, but how justly let them look to it.— 'Tis plain that Otho the First Deposed John the Twelfth with a good Zeal, though not according to knowledge, for this John was one of the worst Popes that ever was. And therefore no wonder if a Pious Emperor, as this Otho was, but not so skilful in Ecclesiastical Affairs conceived he might be Deposed, especially since many Doctors thought so as well as he. For 'tis one thing, says he in Tortus, to bring Examples of Kings (says he, of Popes, say they) and another to prove their Power and Authority. Secondly, They Answer, that if it be a good Proof that a thing may lawfully be done, which has been done before, the Wickedest things in the world may be proved Lawful. People may lawfully Rebel, Public and Private Faith may be broken, Commonwealths may be overturned, etc. for all these things have been done. And without more ado Popes may be Deposed by Emperors, as well as they by Popes, for that has been done too. Lastly, and with a little more smartness, They say this way of Proof plainly begs the Question, and assumes the very Point in Dispute. Bellarmin affirms, and his Adversaries deny, the Pope may justly Depose Princes; now to Argue, He has Deposed them therefore He justly may, assumes, That what he has done is Just, which is the very Point they Contest with him; and therefore think it had been something shorter, and altogether as much to purpose, to have said, 'Tis Just because 'tis Iust Every body knows Popes have both challenged and used a Deposing Power, but every body is not satisfied that this Power is justly due to him. Bellarmin undertakes to prove it is, and brings for an Argument, That he has used it, which no body denies, and would have that conclude, That therefore he justly may, which if his Adversaries had thought a good consequence they had not put him to the trouble of making it. For they knew and acknowledged the Antecedent enough before. But they think the Popes did amiss who did so, and if barely saying that they did the thing, be proving they had right to do it, they confess they are in the wrong; but if it be not, Bellarmin is so, and should have considered that barely to say his Tenet over is a kind of Proof which takes with none but very good natured People, and as far as I see his Adversaries are a little more stubborn.  
I am so weary with long Writing, that I must entreat your permission to refer what remains to another opportunity. I will hope I have said enough to quiet your suspicions, and am sure I have said so much that I need some quiet myself, and must take leave, after so long a Journey, to rest a while.  
Your, etc.    

The Ninth and Tenth OF THE Controversial LETTERS, OR Grand Controversy, Concerning The pretended Temporal Authority of POPES over the whole Earth, And the True Sovereign of KINGS within their own respective Kingdoms.  
Between two English Gentlemen, 

The one of the Church of England:  
The other of the Church of Rome.    
LONDON, Printed for Henry Brome and Benjamin took, at the Gun; & at the Ship in St. Paul's Churchyard, 1674.   


FRIEND,  
I Expect that which you say remains with much impatience, and 'tis only to tell you so, that I now write; for I do not intent to give you my thoughts of your last, till I receive your next. Only let me tell you it wambles in my stomach I know not how, and works not kindly: but because your next possibly may fully settle me, I will not yet complain. But methinks this next opportunity of yours is long a coming. Have you been sick? or diverted with business of greater consequence than clearing yourself, and your Church from an aspersion, of which I take no joy to tell you, the suspicions are more pregnant than I wish they were. For 'tis undeniable that Tenets inconsistent with Government are maintained among you. You say they belong not to Religion; and that indeed is something, but not enough. This may serve in some measure to justify your Religion; but nothing at all to clear yourselves: For what matter is it whether your Religion be innocent, if all that profess it are guilty, though upon another account. If you think these Tenets true, you will be apt to practise them at one time or other, although they do not belong to Religion. Religion indeed is the strongest Principle of action, but not the only one. It is no part of Religion that two and three make five; but yet if you do think to pay a debt of five pounds, with twice forty shillings, no body will deal with you. And if all the Papists in England adhere to these Doctrines, whether this adhesion of theirs proceed from Religion, or any other motion, the men will be unsafe and irreconcilable to the security of their Country, let the Religion be what it will. But if there be any who think them false, it were convenient both for the satisfaction of their Prince and Fellow subjects, and the interest of the thinkers, People should know who those any are. We cannot know your thoughts unless you acquaint us with them. And because we have reason to believe, that some do hold them, and no reason to believe of any particular man; but he is of the number till he disclaim them, what can we do but involve you all, guilty and innocent, if there be any such, in the same condemnation of diffidence.  
You tell me the French plainly and openly condemn them: The honester men they; and the more shame for some body that there should be more honesty found in France then England. You should do as they do though 'twere but to be in the mode. In all their airy toys, their Feathers, their Perukes, their Pantaloons you can follow them fast enough. But when they play the men, and set you examples of prais-worthy actions, there you are content to be out of fashion; as if it were an honour to be as light as they, and a shame to be as wise. But pray what security is it to England, that they are good subjects in France? If they were knaves all over the rest of the world, and we all honest at home, it were a great deal better for us than that they should be honest abroad, and we knaves at home. I perceive indeed by what they do, that you tell me true when you say these Tenets are no points of your Faith: But then methinks you should have the less difficulty to disclaim them. Unless perhaps you think them true; which if you do, either make them out to be consistent with government, or you will not be consistent yourself. I tell you plainly I shall think ill of you, if you think well of these Doctrines, unless you can show them innocent and safe: which as far as I perceive you do not go about to do, and when you offer at it, may, I believe, with as much hope of success offer at the Philosopher's stone.  
In other Countries you tell me; They are more reserved, and will not say you can not, but you shall not. And I believe you have lived in those other Countries, and sucked their Polities with their Air. But for my part I must confess I am for the mode once in my life, and would be of the French fashion in this particular. 'Tis true as long as there is good intelligence betwixt Prince and subject, and the People's affections carry them to their Sovereign's interests, this shall not may do pretty well. For no effect can follow from a Power which is hindered to work, and 'twill be always easy enough to find a pretence for not doing what we are before hand resolved shall not be done. Neither did I ever think the Pope's Power so stung, that it was likely to prevail where Prince and People both join against it So that in this case your Can not and your Shall not are two lines which meet both in the same centre, no deposition. But what becomes of a King, if his subjects be not affected as they should? A mule is not more humorous than the Multitude, nor can boggle more extravagantly, and upon less occasion. And though they be well disposed, are subject to be wrought upon by the artifice of those who are not, and easily possessed with a thousand jealousies and fears, from which even those who possess them perhaps are free enough themselves. If upon any capricious toy of their own, or crafty suggestion from abroad they come to wish the Prince less Power than he has, and that he stood in awe of some body, 'twill be the easiest thing in the World to persuade them that what they desire should be true, is so, and that he is subjected to the Pope, whose claim is as fair as any, if they would have him subject at all. And where's your Shall not then? I fear he will go near to repent the modesty of his Polities, and find too late that by delaying to fix the Pope's Can not in the minds of his subjects, he has brought a worse Cannot upon himself, a Can not avoyed being turned out of his Throne. If in such a posture of things he would but go about to persuade the People of the Pope's Can not on all likelihood 'twould incense them more, and make them think it yet more just he should be deprived of his own right, who would invade the right of another For if it be not truly the Pope's right, why did he suffer it to pass uncontrolled so long, and now begin to question it when it makes against him? But let them do what they will in other Countries, and follow such Maxims as they conceive fittest for them. Plain dealing suits best with the English Natures, and will I believe prove the best Policy. If they think good elsewhere to let their security depend on tricks, much good may their Policies do them: I should be sorry it should be taken for good Policy here. However I recommend plain dealing to you; for why should you go beating about the bush when your mark is fair before you? But I forbear to press you now; If your next please me not you are like to hear more. I have nothing to do at present but to entreat you would dispatch it away by the first, and to assure you I am  
Yours, etc.   

FRIEND,  
I Have been neither busy nor sick, but only of the lazy disease, Idleness; which is sickness and business both, or as bad; and should perhaps do better to continue idle still, then be longer busy with this subject. Your silence made me hope my last might have served turn, and excused me from dealing farther in an argument to which I have no fancy. But it seems you are not satisfied. When I know what 'tis you stumble at, I will do the best I can to keep you upright. But when you talk of plain dealing, I know not what you would have. To acquaint you plainly with what People say, is plain dealing in my judgement; One can hardly dogmatise without some subtlety, but the Historian is a plain man. I hope you have no just cause of exception against my relation hitherto, and I shall endeavour to give you as little in the progress, which since you so much desire to know, take it without more ado; and take this consideration along with you, that we are now come to the Triarii. The Arguments which made up my last Letter were such as occurred to Bellarmin when he had no opposition to help his fancy, and expected none, at least from those of his own communion. Afterwards Barclay in France and Withrington in England writ both against him. And as opposition is the best whetstone of wit, the sight of what can be said against us on the one side enlarging wonderfully our prospect of things, and representing them in a clearer view, and on the other, the shame of being worsted, and pleasure of victory streining our abilities, and pressing from them all they will afford. We cannot but look upon these later productions of his as the uttermost he was able to do. For certainly, he omitted nothing which he thought could be said in his defence. You will therefore observe these Arguments with more attention, while I relate them with the same fidelity. They are principally four, all in his Book against Barclay. Schalkenius has the very same, sometimes a little differently worded, sometimes not all. So that I perceive they are what they finally bide upon.  
The first is this. That it is certain and manifest that the Pope upon just cause may judge of temporals, and sometimes depose temporal Princes, we prove first from the common consent o● Writers whose words I have related at the beginning of this disputation (where he had alleged no fewer than 70) For what Doctors teach with a common consent in different times and places, that the Universal Church is believed to hold and teach. For God therefore placed Pastors and Doctors in the Church. Eph. 4. that the people should follow them as their guides, and not reeede from them, unless perhaps they see some one bring in some novelty against the common doctrine, as Barclay at this time has done. This is the first Argument which speaks big, and makes a magnificent show, engaging no less than the Universal Church itself. But sure Bellarmin either forgot himself, or thought his Readers would, when he objects novelty to Barclay. Novelty was the very thing objected against his opinion when it first broke out in the world, in the time of Gregory VII.  
This Novelty (not to call it haeresy) was not yet crept into the World, 
Vin. B●ll.  etc. says one. That (the indepency of the two supreme Powers) was the true opinion of all the ancients, and if doubts be newly started by a sinister desire of pleasing in many, let the old be recalled says another. 
Cusan.  And does he now pretend antiquity? He who of all the men in the World, a body would think, has the least reason, when the most ancient Author himself can allege in prof of this old doctrine of his, is Greg. VII. the man who began this bustle, and was charged with novelty for doing so, and after all lived but in the 11th. age. Since Christ 's time what is once new in the Church is always new. For 'tis not with doctrines as with fashions. A new doctrine can never grow old, nor an old doctrine new. To fix antiquity on what was not heard of in the Church for ten ages, is with the confidentest, and he must trust much to his Rhetoric, who goes about to persuade it. In the mean time John Barclay, in defence of his Father, has reason to say that this leaving the common consent is not to be objected to him; but to those who spring up in later ages, teach against the torrent of the Ancient Church.  
But to his Argument. Of the 70 Authors which he produces out of Italy, France, Spain, Germany and Britain, and all since Greg. 7. with whom he gins, a great part are Canonists, many such Divines who go their way, and only use their Arguments; some are not for him, and others plainly against him. At lest John Barclay says so, who examines them all particularly. For my part I intent not to take so much pains. To read threescore and ten depositions and sift them one by one, is beyond my patience. A man would sooner lose an ordinary cause then carry it at the expense of so much toil. But if I mistake not, satisfaction may be had at a cheaper rate. The Topick is Authority, and that to my apprehension is efficacious but in two cases. One, when the point in question is beyond the reach of reason, as in Mysteries of Faith, which because the shortness of human understanding cannot comprehend, there is no means for men to lay hold of but by relying on such an understanding as can and does. Thus Religion is believed, because much of it cannot be seen, and our security is the Authority of our first Teacher God and Man, who we are sure saw himself what we could not, and brought good evidence that he did so. And so upon the matter we see with his eyes what we cannot with our own. The other case which requires Authority is from a contrary ground, not from the abstruseness of the points proposed, but weakness of the understanding to which they are proposed. As when I press something upon another, whereof I could bring proof good enough, but his dulness cannot take it. Here again Authority is all the Argument which can be used. If I have not credit enough to persuade him to believe me, there is nothing to be done. You may say, if you will, there is the same reason in both cases, viz. Weakness of Understanding; only in the first, the weakness is general, and extends to all mankind; in the second particular, and belongs but to some. But which soever you say, I do not remember that Authority is otherwise conclusive. Wherefore this point of the Pope's Power must either be of a Nature too sublime for any understanding to reach, or it cannot be pressed by Authority but only upon the weak and dull. I know not which of the two Bellarmin fancied, when he chose this Argument, but in my opinion they are wild fancies both. If he thought it so sublime, how came he by it himself? And to what purpose does he bring so many reasons to prove what is above reason, and not attainable by it? There is no way to climb to such a height but by immediate steps of one to another, whereof the first had it with the rest of the Mysteries of Religion, from Christ himself. But as this way is neither endeavoured nor pretended, so it would place the point in the same degree of obligation, with the belief of the Trinity, Incarnation, and the rest; which, to omit the known untruth and what else might be said, would leave no excuse for communicating with those who openly disavow it. Then to think all men weak and dull, and none able to look upon the dazzling lustre of those reasons by which the point may be proved, and upon that account descend to Authority, is as much on the bow hand on the other side, and a fancy which seems hardly credible in so modest a man as Bellarmin was. And yet one of the two must be said, or I know not what place there is for Authority. Of a thing which can itself be seen, and to those who can see it, it seems to as little purpose to talk what others say of it, as if, to persuade men that this ribond is green, and the other blue, I should spend time in numbering how many thought so, when 'tis but showing the ribonds and every body can tell what their colour is.  
To my apprehension therefore the whole Topic seems improper and ill chosen. Notwithstanding let us see what it will do. And in the first place methinks it were convenient to take along with us what Authority means, and how they ought be qualified who can pretend to it. And because I intent not to make a common place of it, and swell my Letter by delating farther than is necessary, I shall mention but one qualification; but such an one as in my opinion is very requisite, viz. That those by whose authority others are to be persuaded, do themselves know that to which others are to be persuaded. For I observe the world is a little resty and unwilling to be led by those whom they account weak and shallow. And then this Authority is an Argument, which does not render the truth apparent to the eyes of those who accept it upon Authority, but suppose it seen by Authority, and in virtue of that sight to be believed by other folks. But if it be not seen by those whose Authority is pressed upon me, I can not imagine what title they can pretend to Authority, nor in virtue of what I can be pressed to follow it. For certainly if I be blind myself it is very unreasonable I should take for a guide one who is as blind as I am. When one blind man leads another, we know what becomes of both. Now because a conclusion is not seen till it be rightly proved, among those seventy men of Authority whom Bellarmin alleadges, there must be some one or more, who has severely proved the point in question, or neither he nor any man else can say that any of them saw it. If there be no full proof among them all, there can be no Authority, nor reason why others should take them for Guides, who for any thing we know are themselves blind, as well as those whom they would lead. If there be, show the ribond without more ado, and never amuse us with what other people say of the colour. It is a much shorter and much easier way for him to produce, and us to see one good proof, then to stand sifting the depositions of 70 men whereof 69 perhaps speak little to the purpose. And after all too, this proof must needs appear at last; for till it do, as I come from saying, there is no reason we should believe those who, for aught appears, know no more than we who are required to believe them.  
But to make this matter as plain as I can, what is the reason, when a man affirms a thing without proof, there is so little obligation, that on the contrary 'tis lightness to believe him? I suppose, because bringing no proof (and by no proof I mean no sufficient proof) he may for aught appears be mistaken, and we with him. Why then instead of one put twenty that say it, or if you will a hundred, or as many as Arithmetic can number; and put them to bring no more proof than the single man, in what is their case different from his, or how am I excused from lightness or secured from error if I believe them? Wherefore, either produce the man who brings sufficient proof, and let us see that sufficient proof of his, and let alone the 69 Ciphers which stand before him; or if none can be produced, 'tis a clear case they are altogether so many insufficient proofs, and to think that number is sufficient, when every particular is insufficient, is to think that a great many nothings will make something.  
And this is the case of Bellarmin's Authority, which yet has something particular in it. Of his 70 Witnesses half are either Canonists, or such who professing other studies, rely in this point on the Arguments of the Canonists. These Arguments Bellarmin himself thinks faulty, and has taken successful pains to confute. Now would I fain know what great necessity there is of believing those, who I know before hand have themselves no reason to believe what they tell me? To offer me these, is plainly to offer me error for security against error, and to make me believe that I shall not be deceived if I follow those who are, and that the way to go right is to go after those who stray. I know Bellarmin thinks them right in the main though they mistake in a circumstance; for example, that they think well of the power, though they are out in thinking it Direct. But if they miss and mistake all in the circumstance, how can I know but they do so in the main? 'Tis plain they all mistake when they say 'tis direct; therefore their consent in saying a thing, does not make that thing to be true; wherefore neither can the other, in which he thinks they say true, be therefore true; because they say it, and this even in Bellarmin's Judgement. And that he should press that on another which he does not value himself, seems a little unreasonable. Then for the other half who go upon other grounds than the Canonists, I will take the liberty to suppose they go upon the same with Bellarmin, or worse. For he was too judicious a man, to back good arguments, and choose bad in their rooms. Now what his are, (besides what you will find here) you know by my last. If any man think them good, he may for me. But this is clear, that no number of men persuaded by these arguments can add more strength to the conclusion than those arguments give it. And so we are just where we were. If the Arguments be sufficient to prove the conclusion, the business is done, and Authority superfluous; if they be not, what he calls Authority is but a number of insufficient proofs, or of men led by them, which infufficiently proofs I am desired to take for sufficient proof. And this in plain English is to desire me, because those who are deceived are a great many, to believe they are not deceived; as if by adding black to black and laying on black enough the wall would become white. I know that number generally carries with it a fair persuasion (especially where the men are otherwise considerable) that they are not all mistaken. But of the one half of these, Bellarmin assures us they actually are mistaken, notwithstanding their number; and whoever does not approve Bellarmin's Arguments can not but think as much of the other half. Wherefore it must of necessity rest upon proof at last, and this Topic of Authority might, in my opinion, have very well been spared. For if any can see the conclusion proved, he needs no Authority, but is obliged in virtue of that sight to stand to what he sees, though there were none in the world of th● same judgement with him. But to those who cannot, this Authority is a bare saying without proof, that is no Authority.  
However Bellarmin tries to make it up, and entitle the Church itself to the say of his 70 men. What Doctors teach, says he, with a common consent in different times and places, that the universal Church is believed to hold and teach. For God therefore placed Pastors and Doctors in the Church. Eph. 4. that the People should follow them as their Guides, etc. I think, to make this Argument look any thing like, to his common he should have added universal consent. For if Doctors teach differently, many one way, and many the quite contrary, I hope the Church ought not to be believed to hold and teach what both teach; or if she do, she must plainly be believed to hold and teach contradictories. Now for Bellarmin's 70 Canon hath alleged more than twice 70 on the other side. How then is it possible to find the Church's doctrine by the consent of her Doctors, when they are so far from common consent that they teach direct contraries? Again, to universality of consent there goes universality both of time and place. Bellarmin either thought of no more, or could produce no more than out of the Western Church. I hope he does not think the Church confined to the West. In all controversies of Faith, others and he himself uses to produce testimonies from other places. We hear of S. Cyprian, and S. Austin, S. Basil, S. Cyril, S. Jo. Chrysostom, Origin, Tertullian, etc. whereof none belong to the West. Can that consent be universal to which there concur none of these once so famous parts of the Church? Then for time he gins with Greg. 7. and he lived but in the 11th. age. Are 10 whole ages so inconsiderable, that they make nothing to universal consent? These links can never hang well together that have such a gap in them, nor is it possible to be believed the Church should universally teach what none of all her Doctors in ten ages mentioned. Alas! how little substance there is in these great words common consent and the Church: But God therefore placed Pastors and Doctors that People should follow them, very true. But when God placed those Pastors and Doctors, he put into their mouths the Doctrine which they should preach and teach. So far as they deliver that doctrine, they have his Authority for their warrant, but no further. If they will teach any other truth, they may without doubt, provided they can make it appear to be Truth; in which case the evidence by which they can make it appear is their warrant, not the Authority of God; and provided farther that what they teach in this manner be neither pressed by them, or accepted by others as part of the Doctrine which they are commissionated by Christ to teach, but as found out by their own or other men's whether industry or luck. For these Pastors and Doctors cease not to be men by becoming Pastors and Doctors, and men cannot be hindered from doing like men, and using their reason, and discoursing as well as others, and now and then as ill. In which cases, though the material men be Pastors and Doctors, yet now they act not as Pastors and Doctors, but barely as men. Daily conversation furnishes us with a hundred examples of the like nature. A Judge for example is a Judge as long as his Commission lasts; but how few of the man's actions belong to the Judge? He governs his Children as a Father, his Servants as a Master, he discourses as a Scholar, he eats and drinks and sleeps as a mere man. 'Tis the Judge who does all these things. But certainly if he have a bad palate, for example, and choose unwholesome food for sophisticated wine, none will think he makes that choice in virtue of his Commission, or that the Prince or State are concerned in the errors of his Palate. So 'tis with Pastors and Doctors. In what they act by virtue of the Commission given them by Christ, so far they are Pastors and Doctors, in other things mere men; which men are indeed Pastors and Doctors; but extend not that Authority to things not included in their Commission. When they tell us this Doctrine we have received from our Predecessors, and they from Christ, and tell us this with an universality of consent both for time and place, we must hear and obey Christ in them whose commission they execute. But when they discourse, lay down their assertions, and bring their proofs, by Bellarmin's favour, we have no more obligation to be led by them then the strength of their proof lays upon us. For now they are no more Pastors and Doctors, than the Judge is a Judge when he tells a story, or delivers his opinion in a point of Law by way of discourse, and without giving sentence. For my part, I conceive the Church so far from being engaged by the opinion of 70 men, though they be all Pastors and Doctors, that I believe it very possible, that all the material Pastors and all the Doctors in the Church, and all the Sheep and Scholars too, may be persuaded of a thing which the Church taken as a Church, neither believes, nor has any thing to do with. And I think that such a case not only possibly may be, but actually has happened; as in the belief of the Antipodes, the motion of the earth, and perhaps twenty such things even at this present. The truth is, if any one should put me to it, I do not well know how to prove it. But let us for once suppose, there was a time when there was no man in the Church more knowing than S. Austin, and that the consent against the Antipodes was so common and universal, that there was not so much as any one who held otherwise. I conceive it would be a very false inference, if any should from thence conclude that the Church at that time held there were no Antipodes. For 'tis a plain case that Church imports Faith, and Faith a derivation from Christ; and since 'tis known that he taught nothing of the Antipodes, 'tis clear that no opinion concerning them can belong to Faith, or the Church. Whoever they be who hold for or against them, or however they may belong to the Church in other respects, in this particular she has nothing to do with him, nor they with her. For now they act not as believers, but as Scholars, and 'tis only as believers that they belong to the Church, for the Church is a Congregation of faithful. 'tis true these believers are many of them Scholars too, but when they play the Scholars have no privilege, nor security against error from Christ or the Church, but must look to their discourses, and stick to their Learning; in which if they fail, as they very well may and often do, 'tis at their own perils, for the Church is no farther engaged than in what they take from her, and she warrants to be received from Christ. But this point is already discoursed at large in my first letter, and the little I have said here peradventure is more than needs. For this Authority, which Bellarmin would pin upon the Church, is no more than the say of so many men, whereof one half he recites and disproves himself, the other half depend upon the strength of their Arguments, which are the only means by which other men can judge whether they deserve more credit than their fellows, and when all is done are contradicted by twice as many as learned and as famous. And this I should think so far from the Authority of the Church, that 'tis well if it be any Authority at all. And so much for the first Argument.  
The second is this. We prove it secondly by the Extrav. Vnam sanctam de Major. & Obed. Where we are taught, the sword is under the sword, and temporal authority subject to the spiritual power, and that if the earthly power deviate, it shall be judged by the spiritual, an inferor spiritual, by a superior; and the supreme spiritual only by God. Neither does it make against this, that the definition of this Decretal seems revoked by Clemen. 5. in the Extrav. Meruit. de Privileg. For Clement did not revoke the extravagant of Boniface, but informed us that it defined no new thing, but declared the ancient obligation, which men have to obey and be subject to the Apostolic Sea. Now I should think whether one Pope made a Decree, and another did not revoke it, matters not much, unless this Decree determine the point in question. And 'tis a clear case, there is not a word of deposition in this extravagant of Boniface 8, neither has Bellarmin remembered to tell us how 'tis employed, which yet seems a material circumstance. That which he says we are taught by it, is that temporal authority is subject to spiritual power, & may be judged by it if it do amiss, but the supreme spiritual Power by none but God. All this may be very true, and the Doctrine of deposition very false. When the temporal Sword is drawn by passion and strikes with in justice, as, to instance in an example used by himself, when Theodosius caused a number of innocent people to be slain at Thessalonica, a less man than the Pope had spiritual power enough to judge and punish this temporal power, or in plain English to shut the Church doors, and not admit the Emperor to a fellowship in Christian duties, till he had done what became a good Christian, repent and made satisfaction. Here the temporal Sword was under the spiritual Sword, judged and punished by it, and all this while no deposition nor thought of any such thing. Of all who had their share in that business, none was better satisfied then the guilty and punished Emperor himself, who more loved and honoured S. Ambrose ever after. And 'tis likely if all spiritual Princes would imitate the zeal of that excellent Prelate, and preserving the respect due to the dignity of secular powers, strive only to redress the errors of their frailty, that Temporal Princes would imitate the Piety of that excellent Emperor, and there would be never any clashing betwixt them. But this by the by. I have only to do with the Argument, and 'tis not the least I have to do to find the force of it. For 'tis plain the bare words themselves, without a comment will not do, and Bellarmin has here forgotten to give a comment. And so there remains nothing but to rove at random; and hope, if luck serve, to hit right. If Bellarmin understand this Decree in that manner in which he understood it who made it, Boniface the 8, as far as can be gathered by those who writ of him, was persuaded he was vested in a Power as unlimited and absolute as the wildest of Canonists ever fancied, that he was the only universal Monarch, and all Princes his subjects without more ado. You remember how he writes to the King of France: We would have you know, you are subject to us both in spirituals and temporals, and take for Heretics who think otherwise. Now there is one, in my opinion, very good reason why Bellarmin should not understand the Decree in this manner, and that is because he thinks that sense not true, and maintains the Pope has no such power, and the Canonists are out who give it him. If he will understand it as Clement 5 seems to understand it (you must pardon me if I entertain you with seem, we must rove where we can do no better) it will amount to no more than bare spiritual power, as indeed the words themselves carry no farther. We neither will nor intent, says he, that any prejudice be done to the King or Kingdom of France by the Decree in question, nor that the King, Kingdom, or Inhabitants be more subject to the Church of Rome than they were formerly, but that all things be in the same state in which they were before the said definition. Now one point of the state in which things were before, was, if we believe the King of France, as also Innocent 3, who had declared as much, that he was subject in temporals to no man. And so there remains only subjection in spirituals, in which Clement 5 understood the Decree, and challenged to the Church of Rome, and this will freely be allowed to Bellarmin by a great many who for all that will allow no deposition. Now because neither of these Comments will fit him, as far as I perceive he will hardly find one ready made, but must take the pains to make one for himself, if he will do any thing And yet when he has done, a Comment is one thing and a Text another. One is not altogether so current money as the other. Although in this particular his comment must be better metal than the Text itself, or will hardly pass. The whole Canon Law, the Decrees not only of particular Popes, but particular Councils, unless in circumstances which happen not in this case, are freely and openly denied the power to oblige to belief. But I will not meddle with this point, which would draw on a new, and that controversial dispute, and I am no man of Controversy. What I have said is answer enough to an Argument no better pressed. Yet I shall make one observation more, and so take leave of it.  
This Canon according to the declaration of Clement 5 defined nothing new, says Bellarmin, but only declared the ancient obligation of being subject to the Apostolic Sea. Now would I fain understand how we should know by this Canon what that ancient obligation was. The question is whether the ancient subjection were in temporals or spirituals. And the Canon is declared to define neither the one nor the other, but only the ancient obligation; (and if it define nothing in the question, it might very well have been let alone) of necessity we must know what this ancient obligation is, before we can know what this Canon has defined; and then 'tis a clear case we can know nothing by the Canon, but must depend on another knowledge, and by that find out what the Canon says. If things be left by this Canon, as the Pope says they are, in the state in which they were before, it is not possible to know how this Canon left them, but by knowing how they were before. See now how well this Canon proves in the Pope a power over temporals, which says no more but that he has a power he always had, but whether that power be temporal or spiritual is wholly silent. 'Tis something a new way of arguing, to bring us in proof, that things are as Bellarmin says they are, a Canon which says only they are as they were before, and force us to a new search to know how they were before, of which we have no intelligence from his Canon; but as far as we can have intelligence otherwise, have reason to think they were quite contrary to what Bellarmin pretends. For the French, who took themselves particularly concerned in this Canon, did neither then nor since believe any obligation to be subject in temporals, and were unsatisfied till they procured this Declaration from Clement 5 that things were as they were before; and because this satisfied them 'tis in my opinion a strong proof that it was then known there was no subjection in temporals due before. However it be, the proof from the Canon stands plainly thus: You must in virtue of this Canon believe the Pope has power over Temporals, because he has a power which by the Canon you cannot know whether it be over temporals or no; Or, you must know by the Canon the Pope has a temporal Power, which whether it be temporal or no you must know from something else than the Canon: That is, I must know in virtue of the Canon, what I cannot know in virtue of the Canon. Which proof being that in virtue whereof I know, signifies the Canon is a proof, which is not a proof.  
The third Argument is from Councils, and is thus proposed by Bellarmin. We prove it thirdly from the Councils before mentioned, whereof the two last were general For how can that be brought into doubt, or depend on the opinion of men, which general Catholic and lawful Councils approve? But these ten Councils, and especially the two last of Lateran and Lions do most evidently teach that temporal Princes may be deposed by the Pope, when the necessity of the Church requires it, and consequently that the temporal Power of Princes is subject, and subordinate to the spiritual power of Popes. In my opinion he might have spared that consequently. If lawful general Councils evidently teach Deposition, they teach enough of all conscience; we know well enough what will follow, without the help of his inferences, and know that twenty worse things will follow then subordination of powers. But is Bellarmin in earnest too? and will he reduce the Catholic Church to the narrow compass of those who believe his Doctrine? How! Lawful general Concils teach, and that evidently, that Princes may be deposed! Why, what a hand has he made on't? His Friends, Coton, Sonran, and the rest of the Jesuits, who by a public declaration disavowed and detested this doctrine, were not very honest men by his reckoning. The French are all direct Heretics without more ado, and I fear it will go hard with the Pope himself, who so freely and openly communicates with them. As for my small acquaintance, they are all in as bad a case as Falstaffs old Hosts, if sack be a sin. They'll be malled to my knowledge. If he do not make amends, with the weakness of his proofs, for the confidence of his assertions, we are all undone. But the comfort is that all Catholics are not of his mind. For this very Book had the luck to light into a certain Catholic Country where it was publicly condemned, and the men who did it, did not for all that think they contradicted any thing evidently taught by lawful general Councils. But let us see what those Councils say. The truth is, since of ten which he citys, 2 only are general, 8 might have been spared. For particular Councils, according to his own doctrine, are not so irrefragible, but what they determine may be brought into doubt. But we must take his Arguments as they are.  
His first Council is, 900 years old, under Greg. 2. wherein he would make us believe the Emperor Leo Isaurus was excommunicated, and deprived of the tributes which he used to receive out of Italy. And this is one of the stories which Onuphrius takes for fables. Bellarmin alleges for proof (for the Council is not extant) the testimony of Zonara's a Greek Historian, whose words are these: Gregory, who at that time ruled the Church of old Rome, involved them together with the Emperor in a synodical Anathema, and making a league with the French, forbade the tributes (which till that time were paid) from thence to the Empire. Barclay answers, that he mistook the meaning of Zonaras, thinking that those 2 several things, because they are joined in one period, happened therefore at the same time. 'Tis true that either this Pope, or his Successor Greg. 3 did in a Synod excommunicate, not the Emperor particularly, but Iconoclasts in general. 'Tis true that Gregory 3. made a league with the French, or rather fled to their protection from the injuries of the Lombard's, from which the Emperor either could, or perhaps would not defend him. And therefore Writers who say that after this league Italy▪ withheld their usual Tributes, though the matter of fact be not altogether so clear, but none say they withheld them by the authority of any Council. As far as can be gathered the exasperated people were willing to keep their money for their own defence, and not by sending it into Greece, expose themselves defenceless to those injuries which they either suffered or feared. And thus far there is mention of the Pope's consent, and even countenance at last; for he opposed the sway of the people a good while; and by his authority preserved them in their allegiance to the Emperor, yet sided with them at long run, in this keeping their money at home. But for deposing the Emperor much less in a Synod, neither he nor any body else thought of it, on the contrary to his dying day he acknowledged him his Emperor and Lord. Whether the People, or he did well in doing so much as they did, is another question which belongs not to me to determine. But I suppose it is no wonderful thing, that a remote Province of a great Empire should upon some dissatisfaction fail at some time in their duty, and the men of greatest Authority among them join with them. This is standing upon their terms more than becomes subjects; but 'tis not deposing, and much less deposing by the Authority of those great men who take their part. One might as well say the Prince of Orange by his Authority deposed the King of Spain from the Low Countries, because he was the Principal Actor, with those who fell from him. But to make short work with our case, there was in it, I think, no deposition at all. But if this Tribute matter must be called deposition, to that concurred no Council; and betwixt them both 'tis plain there is no Argument.  
There comes next in play the famous business of Greg. 7 which takes up 6 Councils more. These because they belong all to one subject, you shall give me leave to respite, till I have rid my hands of his next Council which belongs to another. 'Tis the Council of Clerment. where, he says, Vrban. 2. excommunicated and deposed Philip. 1. of France for casting off his lawful Wife, marrying an Adulteress, and refusing upon admonition to make satisfaction. For this he citys M. Paris, and Sigebert. I have not seen Sigebert; but M. Paris, who particularizes the Acts of the Council, and among the rest this excommunication, makes no mention of deposing. I, but, says Bellarmin, deposition must be understood to go along with excommunication. Marry I thank him hearty. Understood quotha! Is our evident teaching come to understanding, and understanding those things to be the same than which the world has none more different? Excommunication is a pure spiritual censure, and deprives a man of none but pure spiritual goods; deposition is quite contrary, and takes away only temporal. It passes my understanding how one of these must necessarily follow out of the other. Pray why must we understand it does? Because says he, Historians testify the Pope forbade the Crown should be set upon the King's head while he remained excommunicate, and in particular Ivo Bishop of Chartres writes to the Pope, that he would be threatened, unless he restored the Crown; and took off the excommunication, that the King and Kingdom would fall off from their obedience. Very well. Why then according to Ivo, there was a King still, and that King had a Kingdom, and so much credit in it that 'twas not impossible but he might cause it to revolt. These things do not hang together. A man may as soon understand how excommunication and deposition infer one another, as how a Crown can be restored to one who is a King, and has a Kingdom; or how the Pope should forbid the Crown to be set on his head, who had been crowned long before the Pope was Pope. 'Tis hard and not very wise to forbid things that are past. If this mystery had not been unridled for me, I had been quite at a loss. But if I may believe Barclay and Withrington, it was at that time the custom of France for the King to wear his Crown at solemn Festivals, and for some Bishop to put it on his head. The Pope forbade the Bishops to serve the King in this Ceremony, it seeming improper that persons of their dignity in the Church, should so far communicate with a man deservedly lying under the censures of the Church, as to contribute to his honour, at the sacred Offices. And this is all the Crown of which Ivo speaks and talks of restoring. 'Twas at most a matter of pure ceremony, in which the Pope was not obeyed neither. For Ivo himself writ's that, notwithstanding his commands to the contrary, Bishops were found, who performed that Office to the King. But for the rest, the King's reign was neither interrupted nor disquieted. France giving a very good example of the duty of subjects in that case, when in the words of Paulus Aemilius, they preserved inviolate the Majesty of a faulty Prince, and yet themselves degenerated not from the holiness of their Ancestors. I mention not his additional proof from Vignier, because he had better have let him alone, since Barclay has caught him tardy, and showed that what Vignier says related to another Philip who lived a hundred years after this Philip of whom Bellarmin speaks. And I conceive He might as well have let alone the Council of Clermont as Vignier, for there is no proof that the King was deposed by or in it.  
To return now to Greg. 7. He says, Bellarmin, in a Synod at Rome publicly and solemnly and ceremoniously, with the consent and applause of all present, deposed and excommunicated the Emperor Henry 4. And to this Synod must be added 5 more held by his Successors, at Beneventum by Victor 3 Piacenza by Vrban 2. Rome by Paschal 2. Colen by Gelasius 2. and Rheims by Calistus 2. in which the sentence of Gregory 7 was confirmed. Of these six, if Jo. Barclay say true, five are plainly nothing to the matter: For there is not a word of deposition in any of them. There is mention of Excommunication sometimes of the Emperor himself, sometimes of the Antipope set up by the Emperor and his complices; but deposition not so much as once named. Besides Henry 4. with whom Gregory 7. had to do, was dead before the times of Gelasius and Calistus; to make them renew the sentence of deposition given first by Greg. 7. is a great inadvertence. 'Tis true all his Successors kept up the quarrel about Lay-investitures, and that occasioned all the Decrees he mentions, and some more remembered by Schulkenius, till Calistus with a wise and successful piety composed the difference. And I think it cannot be imagined he should depose the Emperor with whom he treated and concluded Peace. There remains only the fact of Greg. 7. himself, and that indeed past in a Council; but what share the Council had in it, is something obscure. I suspect he was more beholding to his Rhetoric for those flourishing additions of the consent and applause of all present, than the warrant of any good authority. For Platina says expressly there were some present so far from being fully satisfied, that they urged, a King was not to be excommunicated so soon. And the Decree itself mentions neither consent, nor privity of any besides the Pope, whose act the stile makes it, and that so entirely, that were it not known by other means, it could never be discovered by the sentence, that there was any such thing as a Council then in being. The truth is, the Pope was smartly provoked. For, besides that he had been forcibly seized on, even at the Altar, and hurried into prison, from whence he was the next day rescued by the people, a Synod of Worms called by the Emperor, had little better than deposed him first. We denounce unto you, say they, that as we have promised no obedience to you, so from henceforth we mean to pay none. In consequence of this Decree one Roland a Clergyman of Parma was sent to Rome, and there publicly forbade the Pope to act as Pope for the future, and commanded the Cardinals to leave him, and repair to the Emperor, to receive another Pope. Whether he had not begun with the Emperor is another question. There are who think he had. But however to be so sharply dealt with would make a man look about him. And 'tis clear, this business at Worms happened before his sentence at Rome, where 'tis very likely they might think they had as much power to to depose the Emperor; as they in Germany to depose the Pope. If I may be permitted to speak with freedom I should think this counter-authority of Councils one against another (for it was not only Pope against Emperor, but Council against Council) is a more proper argument of human frailty, than Catholic doctrine. One may perceive that Princes never fall out, but there will be partakers on both sides, and that among those who are least liable to the suspicion of being swayed to injustice, the wisest and gravest and of greatest dignity. But how any thing should be efficaciously concluded from Councils, which are opposed by other Councils, as many, as full, consisting of persons, the Pope excepted, equal in dignity and reputation whether for learning or virtue, is hard to conceive. Tumult and Bitterness and Animosity are no very proper dispositions for the calm and gentle operations of the H. Spirit; and such there were at that time, or else the world was then a great deal more holy than now. There was among them that would have caused passion among us, and things were done by them which passionate people do with us; where we see the fruits we cannot but suspect the Tree. The Emperor for his part had the Pope to countenance the Saxons against him, and by his spiritual authority counterpoise the weight of his arms. This would vex a man of a high spirit, ambitious of glory, and impatient of contradiction unless he were a Saint, which is not written of that Emperor. On the other side, the Pope had the Emperor averse to the liberality then intended, and after brought to effect, of the Countess Mathildis, and unwilling so great an occasion should be made to the Church of lands, to which, if I mistake not, the Emperor pretended. He must be a very great Saint too if he could look upon the hopes of so great an advantage without passion, and not be tempted to weaken a man whom he saw would cross him as much as he could. These reasons for animosity, among others, there were and if they did not work, they were the holier men. But I think no man is bound to believe that the pretences used in matters of great consequence, are always the true causes: neither is it hard when people are resolved to fall out, and set the best face they can each on his several side, by some means or other to draw in the pretence of Religion, which as it carries the fairest show, is generally nearest at hand. But I rove too far with my fool's bolt. Those who were Actors in these matters, have long since given account to an Impartial Judge, nor have I to do with their intentions, but Bellarmin's argument; which in two words I conceive little efficacious, both because the concurrence of the Council seems questionable, farther than as it happens sometimes in consistories, where matters are proposed in some cases for forms sake, and shall be executed as they are preresolved, however the Cardinal's vote. And though it were not, the Council at most is but a particular Council, which according to Bellarmin himself is of no irrefragable and binding authority. For the rest 'twere strange, if the Pope should not find Bishops enough to join with the spiritual power, when the Emperor wanted not who stuck as fast to the temporal. And so much to 8 of the 10 Councils.  
We are now at— Paulo majora canamus. The two Councils which remain are proposed with more pomp, and in truth challenge a greater respect, as being general Councils both. The first is that of Lateran under Innocent 3. out of which is urged the famous Canon known by every one, and which for as much as concerns us, runs Thus— But if a temporal Lord required and admonished by the Church, neglect to purge his land from this Heretical filth, let him be excommunicated by his Metropolitan, and Com-provincial Bishops. And if he stand in contempt, and make not satisfaction within a year, let the Pope be made acquainted that he may from that time declare his Vassals absolved from their fealty to him, and expose his lands to be seized on by Catholics, who chasing away the Heretics may without contradiction possess, and preserve it in the purity of Faith, saving the right of the principal Lord, provided he bring no obstacle nor hindrance to the Premises, observing nevertheless the same rule with them who have no principal Lords. Bellarmin is wonderfully agog with this. What, says he, would Barclay say here? If this be not the voice of the Catholic Church where shall we find it? and if it be, as most truly it is, he that out of contempt, as Barclay hears it not, is he not to be esteemed a Heathen and a Publican, and in no manner a Christian and pious? If the Pope have not power on earth to dispose of temporals, even to the deposition of those Princes who either are Heretics themselves, or any way favour Heretics, why, at the setting out this Canon, did none of so great a number make opposition? Why of so many Ambassadors of Emperors and Kings not one who durst so much as mutter? These Parasites to temporal Princes were not yet sprung up, who under pretence of establishing temporal Kingdoms take away the eternal Kingdom from those whom they flatter. I marry! here's a fit of triumphant zeal. But I suppose if he had cast a little water on the flame, it would have been hot enough for the occasion. This Parasites and Flatterers, Heathens, Publicans and Impious are expressions a little too zealous. In what a case are they who condemned all this zeal, and had they not had more respect to his Purple then his argument, in all likelihood had burnt it too? and yet had as good ears in the opinion of the world; as Bellarmin, and could hear the voice of the Catholic Church as soon. But to be serious, what Barclay would have said here, I cannot tell; but I suppose if Death had not stopped his mouth, he would have said something: For this Canon is no such secret that he could be imagined ignorant of it, or unprovided against it. At least his son did find something to say for him, to which I can no more tell what Bellarmin would say, than he could what Barclay would say to the Council. I shall have occasion to mention part of what he says by and by. In the mean time as this Council never fails to be laid in the way of all who travel this road, people have several turns to avoid it.  
There are who question whether any thing at all was defined there, at least in a Conciliar way, or if any thing were defined that the world was duly made acquainted with the business. For which, besides that some Historians expressly say nothing was concluded, they have these presumptions. The Canons, which we have, discover by their stile that they were not made in the Council. They run some of them in this manner: It was piously provided in the Lateran Council— 'Tis known 'twas forbid in the Lateran Council, etc. which are phrases very unlikely to have been used by the Council, if that framed the Decrees. Again, the whole authority of this Council rests as far as I see upon one Cochlaeus The Councils had been set out, and this omitted, either not known, or not procurable by him, who managed the business. Against another Edition this Cochlaeus furnished the Press with the Copy which we now have. Whence he had it himself, I know not; but methinks the credit of a private man is a weak support for a matter of this consequence. Besides how much time ought in reason be allowed to a Conciliar discusion and determination of threescore Canons. Carenza has threescore and ten, and somewhere I have heard of another number, which disagreement by the way is a suspicious thing M. Paris tells us the Council was summoned for the first of Nou. and met, I suppose, at the day. The Pope first makes an exhortation, afterwards causes 60 Chapters to be read, and concludes with a second exhortation concerning the H. Land. All this, as far as can be gathered by him, passed in one day; which if it did, the Council could not possibly contribute more than the hearing to any thing. Besides he plainly says these 60 Chapters to some appeared easy, to others burdensome; which is very far from a Conciliar approbation. Now he says not precisely when the Council ended, but 'tis apparent by him that it lasted not long. The Pope in this Council at the King's instance suspends the Archbishop of Canterbury. This suspension bears date pridie nonas or 4th. Nou. Besides he vacats the election of his Brother Simon Langton to the Sea of York, and excommunicates the Barons of England. These sentences are not recorded as the other, but in liklyhood passed at the same time. M. Paris mentions immediately the end of the Council. Quo facto after which, says he, two of the three Agents which the King of England had there, returned to bring him the good news. They found him at Rochester, from whence he marched to St. Alban, and came thither time enough to have the suspension of the Archbishop attested by the seal of the Convent 13 Calend. Jan. or 20 Decemb. By this account how long could the Council last? Or how much time could be spent in duly weighing so many Canons, some of such importance, when men who had seen the conclusion of the Council which began not before Nou. were in England by the 20th. of December? He has besides a second sentence of the Popes against the Barons of England by name, wherein he speaks in this manner. We would have you know that lately in a General Council we did excommunicate and anathematise the Barons of England— moreover we do excommunicate and anathematise— We aggravate our hand more strongly against them, etc. This bears date 17 Calend. Jan. the 16 Decemb. of the same year, and 'tis clear by the Pope's expressions that before this time the Council was ended, and it may be had been a good while. If these 60 Canons were all examined with that maturity which becomes a Council, and so decreed, Councils at that time were much nimbler than now a days. If proceed then had one quarter of the phlegm we use now their suspicion is not altogether without ground, who think the consultations, then on foot were interrupted by the breaking out of sudden wars, and nothing brought to conclusion.  
Withrington takes another exception to this Canon, which he says comes not home to the purpose, nor can by the rules of Law be interpreted to extend to Sovereign Princes; because, as he says, in construction of Law such Princes, at least in penal, or as they call them odious matters, are never understood to be included in general words, as Lords, Magistrates and the like, no more than the Pope when only Bishop is named, or Abbot by the word Monk. If it had been meant of Sovereign Princes, it had been as easy to have named them expressly, as temporal Lords, and they were so named in other Decrees even of this Council. Besides this very Decree, in the very same words, changing only spiritual punishments into temporal, was published within 5 years by the Emperor, and it cannot be imagined he meant to make Sovereign Princes subject to his Laws, or had power so to do though he meant it.  
These and several other things may be said, but in my opinion they need not: for there is another answer free from the intricacies whether of Law or History, and which to my apprehension is both easy and plain. Every body knows that Decrees of Councils are of two sorts. Some declare what is to be believed, others prescribe something to be done. And every body knows that these two are of very different natures. To refuse Decrees of Faith, is to renounce the communion of that Church whose Representative the Council is, that is, the whole Church, if the Council be general, unless there be a just exception against their proceeding. For Faith is that by which a Church is a Church, and if you be of a different Faith, you cannot be of the same Church. But for the other sort of Decrees, when they concern civil matters, because those whose business it is to manage them are supposed to be better acquainted with them then spiritual men, whose business it is to attend to spirituals, neither reason nor custom allows them any force, till they be received by particular Countries, and by that reception made binding. For it were very unreasonable one Law should bind all Countries, when that which is convenient in one place may be and often is prejudicial in another. We in England acknowledge no Law but by consent of Parliament. In France they require Verification, as they call it, in their highest Courts of Justice. Every Country has its particular method; but what has not past this test is currant no where. And this is a notorious thing, for default of which, there is none who knows not that these kind of Decrees of the Council of Trent are not obliging in France to this day. Again, 'tis equally notorious that the Canon in question is of this second sort. Wherefore 'tis as plain as can be, that unless it can be made appear. It has been duly received, and by such reception become binding, of itself it is not binding any where, I mean where both powers are not united to command it For where the Pope has the Authority of a temporal Prince there both powers concur. I forbear to touch several things mentioned pertinently enough. As, how Bishops in Council should order temporal penalties, who out of Council (unless they have a share of temporal power communicated otherwise to them) cannot go beyond spiritual. A Congregation of Bishops is but so many Bishops, nor is it easy to conceive how their meeting together should invest them with an authority of another kind and such as is not proper to Bishops. To which purpose a famous Canonist upon occasion of temporal penalties, inflicted by a certain Canon, inquires what the Pope had to do with temporals, and answers, truly nothing; but he ordered that penalty in virtue of the Emperor's consent, who was present and approved it. So that when Councils make such kind of Decrees, 'twill be hard to make out any other Authority by which they make them, than the consent of Princes concerned. But these considerations, and several other I pass by, the former being plain in itself and plainly doing the business. The Decree in question is of that kind which all the world knows is not binding but where, and only where 'tis received. Either produce this reception, or 'tis to no more purpose to urg it, then to allege the authority of a Bill thrown out of one of the Houses, or not assented to by the King. Upon the whole, if there had gone a little more knowledge to Bellarmin's zeal, 'twould have been so much the better: He undertakes to prove that general Councils teach evidently that Princes may be deposed by the Pope, and brings in proof a Decree which teaches nothing, but orders that which none is bound to obey, unless he live in a Country who have made it a Law to themselves, if any such Country there be. And if this be his evident teaching, it will be concluded that his Doctrine in this point can be taught no otherwise then by a teaching, which evidently is no teaching.  
Bellarmin concludes with the Council of Lions under Innocent 4. in which there was published a sentence of deposition against the Emperor Frederick 2. This as Art requires at a close, he sets forth as gloriously as he can. Having related the later part of the sentence; This, says he, is the sentence of the Sovereign Bishop with approbation of the whole Council, that is with the consent and praise of the Universality of Christian Prelates. And yet one, I know not who, dares dispute against it, and publish his Book, and cast a mist before the eyes of the simple; and so goes on to the end of the Chapter, amplifying the boldness and rashness of standing in opposition to so many and so learned, and so holy men, whom for the greater solemnity he gathers all into one great Council, excommunicating and deposing by Apostolic Authority Heretical Princes, or Patrons of Heretics; And upon this fancy of making one Council of all ages he is so intent, that he quite forgets that Heretical Princes were no part of the case in any Age, nor ever thought of by any of his Councils, save only that of Lateran. To fancy them all into one Council is well enough: but to fancy them doing there what, when they are assembled in reality, they dreamt not of, has something too much of fancy. Then this favouring of Heretics is a term so general that I know not how far it extends, but I think Princes make alliances as they are guided by interest of State, and amuse not themselves with these speculations of Schoolmen. The French never bogled to make leagues with Princes of different Religions, which though it has been sometimes cast in their dish, they left not for all that to do what they thought fitting. 'Tis now come about, and the House of Austria does what heretofore they blamed in the French, and the Pope is much belied if he quarrel with them for it. It is not much more boldness and rashness to stand upon our terms with his Councils, being such as they are, then to condemn to excommunication and deposition such as are capable of it, all this part of the world. For sure Representatives are not so much more considerable than the Bodies themselves. But I rove as well as Bellarmin.  
Before I speak to the to the Council, it will not be amiss to observe that the case of the Germane Emperors has something not common with other absolute Princes, and the cases of Frederic 2 and Henry 4 something not common with other Emperors. For 'tis well observed by John Barclay that since the translation of the Empire to the West, at least since the devolution from the posterity of Charles the Great to the Germans, Popes have pretended a particular superiority over those Emperors. 
Clem. 5. Clementina Vinc. de Jurejur. Adrian Ep. ad Fred. 7.  One of them in a certain Canon will needs have the Oath which Emperors take at their Coronation to be properly an Oath of Fidelity. Another taxes the Emperor of insolence and arrogance for setting his name before the Popes, as being contrary to the fidelity promised and sworn to S. Peter himself. In consequence whereof there are who maintain the Pope may depose the Emperor, for this reason, because he acknowledges his Temporalties from the Pope, and in plain terms that the Empire and Emperor are subject to the Pope. I have nothing to do with the justice of this pretence, let the Germans look to that, who, I suppose, are not all of the same opinion: but 'tis manifest Popes have made this claim, and if they act in consequence of what they publicly maintain and treat as subjects those whom they took to be so, and deal with them as supreme Lords with their Inferiors and Vassals, as it is not to be wondered at, so the case is quite different from that of absolute Princes, over whom there is no pretence of superiority. Again, this Frederick had positively sworn by Ambassadors particularly authorised to stand to the Judgement of the Pope and Church. Henry 4. had done as much in person at Canossa, upon the recalling of his first sentence. How far this submission of theirs subjected those two Emperors to the censures of the Church, at least how far it might be thought to subject them, I cannot say. But certainly such an obligation makes their condition different from those who never entered into such bonds.  
It will not be amiss likewise to reflect a little upon the temper of those times. As far as I can get a Prospect of them, they were less critical than ours, and more led by nature than speculation. When a mischief happened they thought 'twas fit there should be a remedy, and as drowning men think not of the trespass, and whether the twig they catch at grow on their neighbour's ground, if the temporal Power wronged them, had recourse to the spiritual, and if the spiritual to the temporal. So the Emperor Otho was solicited to relieve them against John 12 and did so, causing him to be deposed, and a better chosen in his room. And every body thought he did well, even Bellarmin himself (though withal he thinks the action not so regular) because that Pope was a very wicked man. Besides, the Pope was believed the Father and Head of all Christians, and upon that account obedience due to him from all. How far and to what kind of actions this obedience extended, they seem to have so little considered that Greg. 7. himself answers, those who were not satisfied with his hasty sentence, 
Plat. in Greg. 7.  as if it were all one to have power over all and to have all Power. It was this Council of Lions which made men begin to look about them, and consider the matter more deeply. For then, says M. Paris both Princes and prelate's foreseeing the consequences were exceedingly troubled. For though Frederick himself did many ways deserve to be lessened and deprived of all honour, yet to be deposed by Papal authority, would raise the Church of Rome to that height and pride that abusing the Grace of God they might fall to deposing even innocent and good Princes, and sooner Prelates, and this for slight causes, or at least threaten to depose them, etc. But whatever they thought afterwards, when they reflected the Pope was a man as well as his Neighbours, and might abuse an unlimited power; at the Council of Lions I conceive they were more intent to consider who had right of his side, then with what kind of penalty they were impoured to chastise the wrong. The Emperor's Agents were heard, and notwithstanding all they could say in his behalf, and they spoke freely enough, He was in the opinion of the whole Council manifestly guilty. Even those who favoured him at first, confessed he deserved to be deposed. And if the rest thought no injustice done him, who had but what he deserved, I think the wonder is not great.  
However it be to answer more directly, divers things they say, They question the concurrence of the Council, and think Bellarmin a little more confident than became him, to talk of the approbation and consent and praise of the whole Council, when the Decree is so far from authorising his confidence, that on the contrary it affords just suspicion of the contrary. For whereas the usual stile of conciliar Acts, and elsewhere used even in this very Council, runs in this manner, sacro approbante Concilio, 'tis changed here into this, sacro praesente Concilio, which they think not done without a particular reason. Again, Historians mention the horror and astonishment of the bystanders at the pronouncing the sentence, effects not likely to proceed from an Act of their own. In fine, several exceptions they take. But the best answer in my opinion is afforded by Bellarmin himself. He teaches elsewhere, that in Councils the greatest part of the Acts belong not to Faith, 
Lib. 2. de Concil. c. 12.  neither Disputations, nor Reasons, nor Explications, but the bare Decrees themselves, and those not all, but only such as are proposed for Faith. This being admitted, as it is universally, the difficulty is plainly answered. For 'tis as plain as can be, that here is nothing proposed for Faith. The Emperor is deposed, his deposition is that which is decreed and that is proposed as a thing to be done, not believed. To depose is one thing, to define they have power to depose is another. Had they made such a Decree and obliged all Christians under Anathema to believe, it had been to purpose to allege it. But as far as I can learn, there was no thought of any such thing in the Council. Now for Acting, People may act, and sometimes very rationally upon probable grounds, and such as none are bound to believe. And they may have very good grounds for acting in one case, which themselves may not think sufficient in another. It is very unreasonable out of a particular action to conclude a power which shall extend to all cases, when from the bare action there is no necessity of believing a power even in that case. The most that can be made of it is, that the Council supposed, or took for granted they had power to do what they did. And it may be they had. For the Emperor had sworn particularly to stand to the Judgement of the Church: He pleaded in this Council by his Procurators, who when they saw things go against them, made no exception to the Jurisdiction of the Court, but appealed to a future Council more general, pretending all were not present who had right to sit there. But why may not a Council take for granted more than every body is obliged to grant? This supposition of theirs was undoubtedly one of the Reasons of their Decree. And Bellarmin assures us we are not bound to believe any of their reasons. So that for his particular, he had no reason to expect this Decree should cause belief in any. But whether he had or no, this is plain without him. That where there is nothing to be believed there can be no belief, and where there is nothing, in his languag, proposed for Faith, there is nothing to be believed. Here is something commanded, but nothing defined, and as sure as no Mass no hundred Mark, no Definition, no Article of Faith. Wherefore I cannot sufficiently wonder to see learned men lay so blindly about them, some with great formality citing the Council and heightening its authority by reckoning up the number and quality of those who met there; others striving to diminish it by consulting Historians, and carefully observing all exceptions they afford; when all this while the Authority of it neither applies itself, nor can be applied to the matter in hand. For 'tis evident they defined nothing, one way or other, and afford us no more than a bare matter of fact, passed indeed in, or by a Council, but whatever be true, or whether the Fact were just or unjust, our belief is not a jot concerned, and this even by the confession of those who most urg the Council. The Fate of eager Disputers is upon us, with much ado we are where we were again; and must either be taught this Doctrine by Decrees which teach nothing, or which neither are, nor were intended for teaching Decrees, or not to be taught it all, as far as I perceive For this is the sum total of his ten Councils.  
His fourth and last Argument is, He says, from Scripture; and if you will pardon a scurvy pun, 'tis indeed very far from it, so far that one would not readily perceive what Scripture has to do with it. As tedious as it is to transcribe, I must submit to the pains of setting down, and you to the patience of reading his whole Discourse; for fear I should be suspected of wronging it by contracting. Fourthly, says he, We prove it from the divine writings, as Greg. 7 proves it in 21 Epistle of the 8 Book. For we find the Ecclesiastical Primacy of the Bishop of Rome most manifestly founded on Scripture and Tradition, in which Primacy is contained most ample Power of governing, binding and losing whomsoever, even Kings and Emperors: and this neither Barclay, nor any Catholic denies. But out of this principle is gathered plainly enough, that there is in the Bishop of Rome a power to dispose of temporals, even to the deposition of those Kings and Emperors. For by that spiritual Power the Pope can bind secular Princes by the bond of excommunication; by the same he can lose the people from their Oath of Fidelity and Obedience; he can oblige the same People, under pain of Excommunication, not to obey the excommunicated King, and choose them another. Besides, since the end of spiritual government is the gaining eternal life, which is the supreme and last end to which all other ends are subordinate; of necessity all secular Power must be subject and subordinate to the spiritual power of the supreme Ecclesiastical Hierarch; which (secular power) he is to direct, and if it deviate, correct and judge, and in fine bring to pass that it hinder not the salvation of Christian people. And this is the reason why both Greg. 7 and Innocent 4. when they deposed Emperors, to show they did it justly, alleged the words of our Lord: Whatever you shall bind on Earth shall be bound in Heaven, and whatever you shall lose on Earth, shall be loosed in Heaven. Mat. 16. And feed my Sheep. Jo. 21. namely to signify that their power to dispose of temporals, when the salvation of souls, the safety of Religion, and preservation of the Church require it, depends not on the uncertain opinions of men, but the divine Ordination of Christ, the eternal King and highest Bishop, and who above all is God blessed for ever, according to the Apostle, Rom. 11.  
This is every word of what he calls proof from Scripture; if you or any else think it so, you shall find me reasonable. But indeed it sticks with me. Let us see, The Ecclesiastical Primacy of the Pope, says he, is founded in Scripture and Tradition, and this Primacy extends to Kings and Emperors, and contains most ample power, of governing, binding and losing, and this no Catholic denies. Very well; and because I must acknowledge myself a Catholic. I must acknowledge I think it all very true. Thus far we are right. Only I take this most ample Power to mean no more than most ample Ecclesiastical power, for that is all which Ecclesiastical Primacy imports; which Ecclesiastical Power, that it extends to Kings and Emperors, no King nor Emperor, who acknowledges the Ecclesiastical Primacy, scruples to admit. For they take themselves to be part of the flock of Christ, and claim their share in the benefit of the Keys, as well as others. But out of this Principle, says he, the deposing Power is plainly gathered. The Controversy sure will quickly be at an end now. Scripture is acknowledged on all hands, and what is plainly there, or may be plainly deduced from thence, will find a ready submission from every body. And though I suspect this Gathering will go near to take the business out of the hands of Scripture; yet, since it is no great matter who does it, so the Miracle be done, let us only observe at present how he gathers this plain inference of his, and how it follows, if the Pope be invested with the Power belonging to Ecclesiastical Primacy, he is invested likewise with the Power of deposing Kings. It is worth while to attend a little to a matter of this consequence, and a little attention will serve turn, where things are so plain. Pray, how does this follow so plainly? why thus says Bellarmin; Because the Pope by his spiritual Power can bind even Kings with the bond of Excommunication. Suppose he can; what then? And by the same he can lose people from their Oath of Fidelity and Obedience, and oblige them under excommunication not to obey the former excommunicated King, but choose them a new one. How! He can absolve subjects from the duty of Obedience, and oblige them to choose a new King. Why this is the very thing called Deposing, and if he can depose, undoubtedly he can depose. But whether he can do this, is the thing in question, and what he undertook to prove by a plain collection out of Scripture, and does he offer us for proof the very thing to be proved? This it neither proving nor gathering, but saying twice over, what they, who deny once, will deny as often as it is or can be repeated, till it be proved. 'tis in plain terms to say, he can lose the band of Allegiance, therefore he can lose the band of Allegiance, or he can Depose, therefore he can Depose. In good earnest I should not easily have believed that such a man as Bellarmin should have over-seen himself so much: But I perceive the greatest men that are, are men, and have their failings. And though I should not have run proud of my own wit, if I alone had observed a defect so palpable, yet I must needs confess I am not the first discoverer. Jo. Barclay has been before me, (and it may be as many as have considered the Argument) as the truth is I say, almost nothing which I have not from others. If you remember I engaged no farther than to acquaint you what others say, and I am as good as my word. But it is so tedious and hobbling a labour to be always going over and over again with This man says that, and t'other man the other, that I cannot endure always to cite my Authors. But to return to our matter; All we have here in proof of the deposing power, is that the Pope has it: which he that will take for a proof, may; but I fear that who belieus it for that reason, had as good believe it for no reason at all. And how much soever there may be of Reason, I verily think there is little of Scripture in it.  
There follows the subordination of the two Powers, from the subordination of their ends which is one of the 5 Arguments related in my former Letter, and which to repeat again I suppose would be as ungrateful to you, as tedious to me. But there Bellarmin alleged it as an Argument from Reason, and how he comes here to entitle it to Scripture I cannot guests. The truth is I am wholly to seek why these two together, and these two are all, which belong to this Head, should be called proof from Scripture, when no place of Scripture is so much as alleged. He assumes indeed that Ecclesiastical Primacy is founded in Scripture and Tradition. But this is part of the question. No Catholic disputes it with him. The question is whether the Scripture teach the deposing Power is joined to that Primacy. I would fain see that place of Scripture which teaches this. When Bellarmin undertook to prove his doctrine by Scripture, I expected, as I think any man would he should produce some place which teaches it either expressly, or so that it might plainly be gathered from it. And instead of this he brings us one reason, such as it is, and another which is not so much as a reason, but a bare saying over what he was to prove, and this he calls proof from Scripture.  
He citys indeed in the Process of his discourse. Mat. 16. and Jo. 21. but does not go about to show how they are to his purpose; only by way of History tells us that two Popes alleged them, to show that they dealt justly, and that the power they challenged, is not founded on uncertain opinions, but divine Authority. Undoubtedly these Popes had reason to desire it should be thought they dealt justly, and that this power of theirs was not founded on uncertain opinions. And every body knows they have alleged those places and more. But every body is not satisfied with those allegations, nor can perceive by them that divine Authority does indeed warrant their deposing claim, neither does Bellarmin contribute any thing to their satisfaction. They find in S. Hierom that the spiritual Key extends itself not to Temporals without arrogance; and some body else from S. Jo. Chrysostom has told them, that by the Keys is not understood any power given, but spiritual, to absolve from the bond of Sin, and that it were foolish to understand it of a Power to absolve from the bond of debt. And if they think it as wise to understand it so, as to understand it of a Power to absolve from the bond of Allegiance, they may do so for Bellarmin. But you have a great deal to this purpose cited formerly, and much more might be added if it were necessary; by which it may be gathered, something more plainly than Bellarmin gathers, that the Church understood not the power of the Keys as those Popes would have us understand the 16 of S. Matthew. The like is of the other place of Feeding: of which you observed unhappily that to understand it of Deposing, is to think Christ meant his Sheep should be fed with knocks. Upon that occasion you know I brought you S. Bernard, affirming that to feed is no more than to Evangelize. Fac opus Evangelistae, & Pastoris munus implesti. I could easily produce Authority enough for the right sense of this place: But another of the 5 Arguments mentioned in my last being drawn from hence, you see there are all that Bellarmin could make of it, which I have no mind to say again.  
Several other Arguments there are scattered up and down by several Authors. But I take these to be the principal. At least they are those which Bellarmin chose, and he being looked upon as the Principal Patron of this opinion, I think it needles to look after more, and in his judgement worse. It is now time to acquaint you with the arguments produced on the other side, and the answers to them. You shall permit me to contract them into as little room as I can: for my Letter swells, and I am weary both of writing and of the subject. I take them out of Withrington and Barclay, who being the latest writers, I suppose have seen what was said before, though the truth is I am forced to use them more by necessity then choice, my library not affording me those former Books whom I would gladly see.  
The first, says Withrington, is like that which Bellarmine makes against those who assert a direct Temporal Power in the Pope. If the Pope have, and that by Divine Right, power to depose Princes in order to spiritual good, this must appear either by Scripture or Tradition. Tradition is not pretended. Out of Scripture, the two chief places are those now mentioned, Mat. 16. and Joh. 21. both which he endeavours to show are meant only of spiritual power. To this Schulkenius for Bellarmin replies, He labours in vain to prove these places are meant of spiritual power for this they freely grant him. But, say they, this power which formally is spiritual, is virtually temporal, or his the virtue to extend itself to temporals, in as much as is requisite to spiritual good. And therefore Beauties' Argument is good, because he intended only to prove by it that the Pope's power was formally spiritual, which is true, and acknowledged by Withrington. But Withringtons naught, because he does not prove that the Power is not virtually Temporal, and cannot extend to deposition, etc. If I had a mind to answer for Withrington, I should not think myself silenced by this reply. For when he says the Arguments are unlike, the one good the other bad, I cannot perceive by what reason one should believe him. Beauties' Argument is good, says he, because his Conclusion (that the Pope's Power is spiritual) is true: as if the Argument were a jot the better because the Conclusion is true. The Argument is naught if the Conclusion follow not from the premises, though it be never so great a truth otherwise. But what was the Argument? No direct Power in Scripture, therefore no direct Power. This I take is Beauties' Argument; and by the favour of Schulkenius, no deposing Power in Scripture, therefore no deposing Power is so like it, that they must be both good or neither. That the Conclusion of the one is true, and the other false, is voluntarily said, and nothing to purpose: for the question is whether they have not the same dependence on their premises. If Bellarmin conclude well against the Canonists, because they cannot show their direct Power in Scripture, I see not why Withrington concludes not as well against Bellarmin, unless he can show his deposing Power in Scripture; which as far as I see Schulkenius does not go about to do. But I have nothing to do with Withrington, he has answered for himself, though by ill luck I have not the Book now by me. I am only to observe how the case stands betwixt the two parties; which in short is thus: Is the deposing Power in Scripture, says Withrington? 'Tis virtually, says Schulkenius. I fear this is no very direct answer, and suppose Withrington should ask again: Is this virtue apparent in Scripture? To which Schulk gives me no ground to judge what he would reply. And so I must leave them as I find them, and pass to the Second Argument. Coercitive Civil, and coercitive spiritual Power being different and independent Powers, must have distinct Courts and distinct penalties. Wherhfore as the Civil Power cannot inflict a spiritual punishment, so neither can the spiritual Power inflict a civil punishment. And this he strengthens by two Considerations. 1. That the distinction of the two Courts, since in the manner of proceeding, the persons and causes brought before them, and all other formalities they may agree, must be taken from the difference of the penalties, or nothing. 2. Because no Commonwealth, looking only into nature, can deprive a subject of other goods than such as are proper to that Commonwealth; the spiritual can only take away spiritual goods, as the temporal only temporal. They answer. The two Powers are distinct, but not wholly independent, when they club into one mystical Body, viz. the Church, in which case the temporal is subject to the spiritual, and therefore though the temporal cannot meddle with the spiritual, the spiritual may with the temporal And for his additional Considerations, they slight the first as being nothing but the conclusion of his argument repeated: yet say however that Temporal punishments are not so proper to Temporal power, but they may be inflicted by the spiritual. And to the second, that in Commonwealths subordinate, the superior may deprive the subject not only of the privileges proper to itself, but those also which belong to the inferior Commonwealth. This answer relishes much better with me then the former, for it plainly denies at least half of, what is assumed, namely that the powers are independent, which is a direct and allowable answer for so much. But for the other half, they deal not so cleverly. They allow the powers distinct even in their penalties, and yet maintain that one may award the penalties of the other, which looks as if they were not distinct in their penalties. Again, they say they are distinct, but assign not in what they are distinct. They deny not what Withrington assumes that they may use the same proceed, take cognizance of the same matters, convene the same persons; And if they may inflict the same penalties too, by what shall they be distinguished? So that I think they had no such great reason to slight his first consideration. For certainly distinct powers must be distinct in something. But you see where it rests. Withrington, since they deny it, is obliged to prove the Independence of the two Powers, which whether he have done or no, I cannot tell. Shall I tell you my thoughts freely. I suspect the old School-Proverb, An Ass may deny more more than Aristotle can prove, may have some place here, and that the Answerer has still the better end of the staff. When it was Beauties turn to prove the dependence and subordination of the two Powers, and Withringtons to answer, you may perceive by my last where you have the Argument, He could deal well enough with Bellarmin. Now they have changed sides, and Withrington is on the proving hand, how it will happen I know not.  
The third Argument is from the multitude of inconveniences which follow from the other opinion. As, that the Pope may as well take the life, as Kingdom of any Prince, and driving it a little higher, authorise any private man to turn Assassin, and kill the King by treachery, when he cannot be conveniently deposed. To this they say they can answer easily enough: but yet as easy as it is they do it not. All they reply is, let this pass as nothing to purpose: mere bugbears to render the Papacy odious, when of so many Princes who have been deposed, so many who have perished by violent deaths, what by the treachery of their subjects, what by the force of their Enemy's, not one has been killed by any Pope or his command. Even Antipopes themselves their greatest enemies, have found not only safety, but gentle and favourable usage from them when they have fallen into their hands. This they amplyfy, and dress as handsomely as they can; but methinks after all 'tis but a sorry dish. For sure 'tis not God-a-mercy to the opinion, that Popes have been better men, than It would have made them. On the contrary, since they were therefore good men because they did not do what the opinion allows, what must the opinion be, which if they had followed they had not been good men. That they did not do ill, they own to their own virtue, but that they might have done ill, makes the opinion naught. At least I conceive so, and had I been in their place, would rather have given no answer then such a one  
For another inconvenience he urges, that Princes may be deposed and murdered for any crime which in the judgement of the Pope deserves it; if he sell a Bishopric, plunder a Church, fall into any sort of wickedness, nay, if he live not according as his state and condition requires. To this last they except, as a wresting of Beauties' words beyond his intention; but for the rest, reply again, that 'tis another odious amplification, and that it may be understood for what causes Princes may be deposed by the sentences against Hen. 4. and Fred. 2. In general, that the causes must be very weighty, and such that the punishment be to edification not destruction. I must acknowledge my dulness, and that I comprehend not the force of this answer. To my apprehension by the sentences against these two Emperors can be known no more, than the reason why these two Emperors were deposed; from whence it may be gathered that for the same faults a Prince may become liable to the same punishment; but whether there be any other deposing faults, and which they be, cannot, I think, be understood by them. Then again these weighty, and to edification-causes may, for any thing they say to the contrary, be any which the Pope judges such; Now this is that which Withrington objects; and I had thought that to say the same with my Adversary, had not been to answer him.  
The third Inconvenience is, that, not only the Pope, but every Bishop may depose by this doctrine (and with a little more stretching, perhaps every Curate too) where the Prince belongs to their Diocese or Parish. And this he justifies by an argument of Beauties against the Canonists, which he puts thus, If the Pope be the supreme Lord of the whole Christian world, every Bishop is Lord of the Towns subject to his Bishopric; for what the Pope is in the universal Church, every Bishop is in his own Diocese. They reply, that by this argument it may perhaps be concluded, that a Bishop may excommunicate a Prince as well as the Pope, but not depose him; because though he be in his Diocese what the Pope is in the Church, as much as amounts to being truly a Pastor, and truly a spiritual Prince, not a Vicar or temporary Delegate; yet the Pope has more power over the whole, than a Bishop over his particular. For which reason deposition was reserved to the Pope in the Council of Lateran. Wherhfore Beauties Argument is good, and Withringtons naught. He who undertakes the defence of another must stand to it, that his man is still in the right: but otherwise I see not why one argument should be thought good and the other bad. If the Pope be a temporal Prince, the Bishop is a temporal Prince, says Bellarmin, because he is in his part what the Pope is in the whole: this is good, says Schulkenius. If the Pope be a virtually temporal Prince, the Bishop is a virtually temporal Prince, says Withrington, and for the same reason, how comes this to be bad? because says Schulkenius, the Pope has more power over the whole than the Bishop over his particular. This belongs to Bishop-craft, which I understand not; but if it be true, first Beauties argument is as bad as Withringtons; for it may be replied to it, that it does not follow the Bishop is a temporal Prince though the Pope be, because though the Bishop be no Vicar, yet he has not the power which the Pope has. And then again, though the Pope be a greater virtually temporal Prince than the Bishop, yet the Bishop is a virtually temporal Prince too, and may proceed beyond excommunication, and spiritual jurisdiction, and set his hand to temporals. For if spiritual power be virtually temporal, and the Bishop have it, and this in his own right as well as the Pope, not by way of delegation, I hope he may use what he has, and dispose of temporal things in order to spiritual good. And where shall this stop? To mention as he does reservations is to grant that it belongs to the nature of the power, though the extent of it were afterwards confined by consent. Besides reservations are temporary and changeable things, and what is reserved to day may not be so to morrow. However if the greater virtually temporal Prince may depose Kings, sure the lesser may depose private men: for this temporal virtue must be able to do something in Temporals. And thus much is inconvenience enough in conscience, though I see not well how he avoids the other. Were I to answer Sculkenius, I should except against his understanding the Samenes which Bellarmin puts in Pope and Bishop, of being both spiritual Princes not Vicars, which I verily think is to make Bellarmin say what he never dreamt of, or if he did, was quite from his purpose: But that is not my business. I am only to observe how matters stand, which are as you see.  
In the last place Withrington urges that this supreme power over temporals delivered in such general and unlimited terms, not determining how great, or what kind of spiritual good that must be, in order to which Deposition is lawful, seems a just occasion of perpetual suspicion and jealousy in Princes, and apt to disturb the public quiet, etc. They answer, Christ may as justly be reprehended for delivering the spiritual power in general terms; as Commonwealths for submitting in general to obedience of Princes whom they create. Whereof I take neither to be true: for Commonwealths have things called Laws and Customs by which doubts rising from general expressions are explained. And for the general expression in the Gospel, whatever you shall bind, etc. I hope he will not persuade us, but as general as it sounds to us, it was very particularly understood by the Apostles. And as they understood it, so they practised and so they taught, and among other things, subjection to Princes, notwithstanding the amplitude of that Commission. But if both were true, still the inconvenience remains, for aught I can see; since whatever be the reason of the general terms used in the Gospel and elsewhere, it abates nothing of the jealousy and suspicion rising from the unlimited expressions of this doctrine. Upon the whole, they seem plainly to grant all the inconveniences objected by Withrington; which is to confess that, as far as this Topick is effectual, They are confuted. They slight the place as nothing to purpose, notwithstanding, since 'tis the Gospel rule to judge of the Tree by the fruit and since Logic allows the Topick, I think they were obliged to show either that the inconveniences were not inconveniences, or else that they did not follow, and in fine have answered better if they could.  
The fourth Argument is from the practice of the Church, begun with the Church itself, and continued for many ages: no mention in Scripture or ancient Fathers of a power either in Pope or People to deprive, or kill even persecuting Princes; but all is unanimous and constant exhortation to patience and obedience. Now if there be any warrant in the Gospel for Christians, when they come to be strong enough, to cast off such Princes as are enemies to the Church, we must needs have heard of it, etc. Withrington dilates, but this is the substance. They answer two things: First, That the practice of the Church varies according to different times. That for the first 300 years she practised patience because she could do no other, there being no Prince disposed to protect her; afterwards it became the practice by means of Catholic Princes to resist Infidel or Heretic, or any way injurious to her, whether Princes or People. And for this they largely instance in the several expeditions made for the recovery of the Holy Land, all commanded, say they, by several Popes, and their commands obeyed by Christian Princes. I begin to suspect I do not understand what we are talking of: if I do, certainly this is nothing to it. I thought the question had been whether subjects may lawfully desert their own Prince, and refuse to perform the obedience due to them by Law and Oath, upon the Pope's command to the contrary, and Sculkenius talks of one Prince making war with another. No man doubts, or if any do, our business has nothing to do with his doubt, but that Catholic Princes may lawfully make war, and the Pope lawfully persuade them to it to protect innocence, and hinder oppression whether of Ecclesiastical or other right. But this is a case betwixt Prince and Prince; ours, if I understand it, is betwixt Prince and Subject. For my life I cannot understand what relation the holy war has to this matter: nor can I imagine what share the Pope had in it, more than a man of zeal and credit to persuade them, as any other might have done, to a good work. I do not believe any Prince who went thither thought himself obliged by the Pope's commands, or that he commanded any to go, except in the case of Vow, or the like engagement of his own. 'Twas zeal, not obedience which carried Princes thither. In short, if Schulkenius mean this practice, which he says was introduced of resisting force by force of Princes interposing for the relief of innocence as they saw occasion, he speaks of another matter: If he mean that when subjects get force enough they may use it against their own Sovereign, upon warrant of the Pope's authority, he teaches us a piece of Christiatity, which I would advise should by all means be kept carefully concealed from those Infidels whom in the Indies and elsewhere zealous men seek to convert. If ever they get any inkling, farewel all hopes of the progress of Christianity. 'Tis in truth a position extremely false, and extremely shameful. Their second Answer is, that Withrington is out, when he affirms there is no mention in Scripture or the ancient Fathers of deposing or killing Persecutors. For there is mention in both of Saul deposed by Samuel, and David placed in his room: Of Agag killed: Of ten Tribes taken by Ahias from the house of David and given to Jereboam: Of Kings set up and pulled down by Elias both in Israel and Syria: Of Jehu made King by a Prophet, and Joram both deposed and killed: Of thalia, and Ozias, one killed, the other deposed for Leprosy: Of Hieremy placed over Nations and Kingdoms, to pluck up, etc. Of the Macabees fight successfully against Antiochus. And it cannot be doubted but the High Priest among Christians has as great, or greater power than the High Priest among the Jews: where they repeat again the two places. Mat. 16. and Joh. 21. and that deposing power is necessary to the integrity of the commission given by them: and conclude with Lucifer Calaritanus, who says nothing to the purpose. Some think Bellarmin wrote this book, and borrowed the name of Schulkenius to disguise his own. Tenderdown Steeple had as much to do with Sandwich Haven, as this with the Deposing Power. It were easy to show as much of every one of these examples, if I would take the pains to run them over particularly: but since Bellarmin himself slights them, I may be permitted to do so too, and save that labour. I will only observe that the High Priest among the Jews intervened in few of these examples, and to conclude a power in the Christian High Priest by a parity with the Jewish High Priest from instances where there was no exercise of his Power, is a shortness of which Bellarmin was too sharp-sighted to be guilty. That which Lucifer Calaritanus says, is that Constantius was a wicked man, and deserved death: which is Tenderdown Steeple again. A Prince no doubt may be a wicked man, there have been more in the world besides Constantius, and more have taken notice of their wickedness besides Lucifer Calaritanus. But what then? Neither does he mention, nor do I know any tribunal, which can call them to account for their wickedness but that of the last day, from whose impartial Justice Princes shall be no more exempt than other men. And to that we must leave them.  
The last is rather a Transition then an Argument at least the force of it depends on what follows. Withrington makes it in this manner. To subject Princes to another power without sufficient reason, is plain injury to Princes, and plain treason. But Beauties' reasons, which are the best, are insufficient, etc. And so goes on to examine and disprove them, as I have already informed you. They reply by retorting the same Argument. As 'tis wicked to subject the Power of Princes, so 'tis both wicked and sacrilegious to diminish the Power given by Christ without sufficient reason; but the reasons of Withrington and Barclay are insufficient, etc. They farther deny either that he has, or can answer Bellarmin's reasons, or that he has done his business though he could, because another may have better. But unless they would inform us where those better reasons are to be found, there can be no more done, then to deal with those, which He who is most in vogue thought the best. For the rest, these are flourishes on both sides; The matter rests upon this issue, which of the two has the best reasons, and he that has will carry it. 'tis time for me to leave it with you to stand for the Plaintiff or Defendant as you see cause, and ease myself of this ungrateful labour.  
You see what is said on both sides To tell you what the world thinks of their say, is not so easy. The world is a politic world, they let the hot men write and wrangle, and for themselves hear all, and see all, and say nothing. The truth is, while one side talks of Treason, and the other of Sacrilege, 'tis good to be wary. 'tis not for private men to make an enemy either of Pope or Prince, and as the case stands you cannot say I, or No, without displeasing one. I must confess I am very sorry you would not let me play the Policitian for company. Your importunity has drawn me into the list of those fools, who disquiet themselves to please other folks, and take a great deal of pains to be talked on, twenty to one, very scurvily. The quarrel is betwixt supreme Powers, and they best know what to do in their own concerns. I fear 'tis little better than sauciness for men of our form to interpose in things so far above us, and perhaps madness, to thrust in betwixt two stones, and be crushed in pieces. I see this, yet cannot avoid whether the charms of your Friendship or violence of your importunity. 'tis true I have endeavoured to touch this tender matter as tenderly as I could. What I professed at first, I repeat again, I do not dogmatise but relate, and am sure you have no reason to be displeased, that I would displease as few as I could. This is the reason, since you will needs have it, why I beat about the bush, and do not shoot my fools-bolt directly at the mark, I do not take the satisfaction of your curiosity to import me so much as living quietly. 'tis for Princes to resolve on the Can not, or Shall not or what else they think fit▪ Private men till they be commanded to declare them do best to keep their thoughts to themselves. This I can assure you, that, though for these reasons I do not desire every body should know them, I have none in this matter which do not become a good Christian and a good subject, and  
Your faithful friend, etc.    

The Eleventh and Twelfth OF THE Controversial LETTERS, OR Grand Controversy, Concerning The pretended Temporal Authority of POPES over the whole Earth, And the True Sovereign of KINGS within their own respective Kingdoms.  
Between two English Gentlemen, 

The one of the Church of England:  
The other of the Church of Rome.    
LONDON, Printed for Henry Brome and Benjamin took, at the Gun; & at the Ship in St. Paul's Churchyard, 1674.   


FRIEND,  
OF all I have seen or heard you shall have it for Policy. Sir Wood-bee himself is no body to you. The sum of what I asked was in two words: Are you a good Subject? And the sum of your Answer is: Betwixt you and me I would have it thought so, but make no words on't; private men must not meddle with things above them. Here's Ragion di stato for you. Things above them? Why! is Honesty among you looked upon as a thing out of reach? Are you of kin to the Muscovite, who being asked of his Faith in God, and hopes of Salvation, replied They were things above him, which he should be glad were true, but could not think so great a Majesty could ever think of so poor a man. Is it above you to be a good Subject, and a thing which you dare not confess for modesty sake, and the imputation of sauciness? Are things carried so among you, that you must needs live unquietly, if your Neighbours know you deserve to live quietly? Is it become a piece of interest and policy to be ill thought of; and if there be an honest man among you, must he by all means make a secret on't, for fear of exasperating Supreme Powers, and thrusting in betwixt two stones? How have I been mistaken! I took you for a plain dealing man, and you are the very Pink of Policy. But for mere shame I could find in my heart to quarrel with you, and cannot for my life but tell you, you have taken a great deal of pains to little purpose. Pray permit me to revenge your nicety by unmannerly bluntness, and to carry it to the uttermost, ask you how far you are from Pedius in the satire? 
Fures ait ●edio. Pedius quid? crimina rasis  
Librat in Antithetis—.  The question being of robbing no less than Sovereigns, Are you a good Subject, is but in less homely Terms, Are you a Thief? And your Answers are as like as the Questions. Only Pedius was for Rhetoric, and you for History. Some say this, and some say that, which is all you tell me, is but Historical Antithesis.  
You tell me I may judge as I please. I know I may, and I do judge as all men of judgement do. But pray remember those that do not plead directly Guilty, or not Guilty, cast themselves. Had I only desired to know what people say, it had been no such hard matter to have got Books, and read them myself, and never troubled you. I know the Arguments well enough, and I know what to think of them; but I know not what to think of you, whom a man that were not, as I am, very favourably inclined, would be apt to suspect you think something which you are ashamed to own. No Friend! You scape not so. I would, and if you be not very obstinate, will know what you are, and whether those of your Religion may be trusted. If you believe what is publicly written, and owned by some among you, you are not; if you believe it not, but yet will not disown it; as honest as you are in your heart, since no body can tell but you are a knave, how can you expect but to pass for one among the rest? Either deal frankly with me, or I must with you, and tell you 'tis Gild that fears the light. If you continue still to make a secret, of what of all the world it most concerns those of your Persuasion to publish, both for your own interest, and honour of yourselves and Church, he must be a very good natured man who will think well of you, who make dainty to show why he should do so. You are charged with inconsistence with Civil Government: You faintly deny it, and say you are traduced, but are shy to justify your Innocence. your Church itself is called in question, where the Books are licenc't, the Authors cherished, and the Doctrines put in practice. You tamely hear all this, and would have us think your Church a good Church for all that, a pure unblemished Church: but, if we will not of ourselves kindly turn away our eyes and look off, you will not do so much for her as wipe off those blemishes.  
'Tis true you have told me, and 'tis the only thing to purpose you have told me, that That cannot be the Church's Doctrine, which is openly disclaimed by a great part of the Church, and that part acknowledged Orthodox by all the rest. But if your Church forbidden any to profess their minds as freely as others, it must needs be suspected She has more kindness for these Doctrines than is for Her honour: and, however sound she may be, is yet a very injurious Church, which obliges her Subjects to pass for suspicious and dangerous people, and be thought to hold what they are not obliged to do, and what perhaps they do not hold, but must not say so. Besides, I have already told you the Case is not much different, whether these Doctrines belong to your Faith or not, if they be thought true; for that is enough to make them practised upon occasion. And if your Church permit none to say they are false, who can think but she desires they should pass for true, and that they will do so at last if they do not already? And then truly we have great security from your Answer; as if, because these Doctrines do not belong to your Church, as Church, they might not be made use of by your Church as so many men.  
I told you this before, and you saw well enough how much your Church's reputation was concerned, notwithstanding what you say for her: and yet you continue cold, and will say no more. Never tell me. This Lethargy of yours is not for nothing. If you be grown careless of your own credit and interest, I thought nothing could have quenched the Zeal you all have of your Church. How! a Papist insensible when the Honour of his Church is in question? Deny it as long as you will, either you are forbidden to speak, and let people know what you harbour in your breasts, or you harbour something there which 'tis not for your interest people should know. In short, this constraint which is upon you must either be from abroad, or at home. You deny there is any from abroad: And I hope you say true; otherwise, I know not what to think of a Church which permits not her Subjects to approve their fidelity to their Prince. If it be at home, it can be nothing but Gild, and shame, and the Conscience of adhering to bad Tenets. For, I hope, you do not think in earnest the State should take it ill of any, who should profess as openly as he will, that he is an honest man and a good Subject. If you fear nothing from your own side, it goes very ill with you if you have to fear from ours. We know who they are to whom the Civil-sword is a Terror.  
Excuse not yourself upon my curiosity, and think it inconsiderable and unworthy of satisfaction. 'Tis true, I am curious, and if I were not, you would make me so. But let me tell you, my curiosity is more a friend to you then your squeamishness. For, pray consider, No Commonwealth, at lest none of a different Communion is safe, where those Doctrines are received, which are current among some of you. Who's the Friend? I, who give you occasion, and press you to clear yourselves? or you, who by your backwardness, will make it shortly be thought you cannot be cleared? I know well enough, there is no great Community, nor can be, whose Members are all free from fault. The nature of mortality bears not an absolute perfection. But do you think it a small point of friendship, that I offer you the means to make it appear, that whoever is faulty, you are not? Every body can tell, and were it put to yourself, I am fully persuaded, you would not deny it, that he is not very well principled for a Subject, who believes what some of you teach. While you make such a mystery of it, no body can say you are not of the number, and many will suspect you are. In fine, there is no choice; but either you do believe ill, and then I must change my good thoughts of you; or you do not, and then either say so plainly, or you are the most superlative Politic in the world, to take other men's faults upon you, and entitle yourself to a guilt which is none of your own.  
If you will give off the defence of your Church, and leave her to shift, as well as she can, for herself; why, with all my heart: I have no reason to woo you to a sense of your Church's reputation. If you will grow careless of your own fame, and be content to have it thought you deserve the harsh censures which some make of you, you may too, if you please, though, as a Friend, I would advise you to do otherwise. But let me tell you, if you become forgetful, we shall not. We remember, there was such a time as 88, and a thing called the Invincible Armada, and which might have been so indeed, if the Commanders had not been more careful to stick punctually to their Orders, then do their business. We remember, the cause of all this was, what Sixtus the Fifth calls Heresy of the Queen, which moved him to expose the Kingdom as a prey, and Philip the Second to seize it. We know this cause remains, and hope it will do so: If it have not wrought since, we may thank the want of opportunity, and prospect of another Armada. But when occasion serves, we cannot but think, the same cause will be apt to produce the same effect.  
Now, pray review your Politics, and see whether they will counsel you to settle this opinion among your fellow-Subjects, that in such a case, which may happen, because it hath happened, there are who would join with an enemy, and help to enslave their Country; and that you are the men. If your Politics do advise you to this, they are the worst natured, unkindest Politics in the world. I am sure, let who will be the Politician, I am the Friend: But however they advise you, we, who are no Politicians, should be glad to know there are none such among us, or if there be, who they are. We value our own safety, though you do not your credit.  
Notwithstanding, if you will persist in your Politic diffidence, and think, we Heretics are not to be trusted so far, as to be made acquainted that you are not errand Knaves, I cannot help it. But I will convince you, if I can, that there is something more than bare curiosity in the matter. Let me tell you, in confidence, since this business must needs be made a secret, that I am no such stranger to it, as you think: I 〈◊〉 thought of it a whole Month at least, and am deceived, if I do not see a little into the Millstone. At least, I am sure, my eyes have one advantage, which, I suspect, yours may want, that they are not dazzled with the lustre of great Names. Bellarmin, or Calvin, or if there be any of a more glorious sound is no more to me then his reason, and at the hazard of being thought blunt, or rash, or overweening. I must needs avow to you, I am for the what's said, and care little for who said it. If every body were of my humour, I mainly suspect, this Indirect Power, which makes so much ado, would have long since appeared neither better nor worse than direct nonsense. Pray let us consider it a little.  
The Question is, Whether there be in the Pope an Indirect Power to depose Kings. He that would know, whether this be true or no, should do well, in my opinion, to take along with him, what it means. 'Tis a Circumstance, I must confess, which is oft forgot, and that forgetfulness, I believe, is the cause we find so much blind man's Buff in Books: But yet for once, it will not be amiss to remember it. And because every body knows what Pope and Power means, likewise what 'tis to Depose, and what a King is, there is only this Indirect which needs unridling. Now we often hear of Indirect dealing, and Indirect courses in the world, and 'tis hard if people do not know what they mean. Indeed we are apt when we hear these words, to apprehend something shameful or bad, because there is generally something shameful joined with them, fair ends being ordinarily fairly pursued. But yet shameful is not the notion of Indirect: For a good and commendable thing may be brought to pass Indirectly, and if it be bad, the badness is one thing, and Indirectness another. The Merchant who met with Pirates in the dusk of the evening, when they could not discover his weakness, and frighted them off by a counterfeit confidence, hanging out his lights all night, saved his Ship indirectly, or by indirect means, when direct fight or flying had lost it: And the Owner, I suppose, did not think this Indirectness . A Nuncio of a certain place is reported to have published an Excommunication, thought unjust by the persons concerned; they had no power to take off this Excommunication themselves, or command the Nuncio to do it. Wherefore they took an indirect course, and set Guards upon the Nuncio's House, and suffered no Victuals to be brought in, till he thought it better to recall his Excommunication, then starve. These men too compassed their end indirectly, yet commendably, supposing the Excommunication was indeed unjust. When David caused Vriah to be slain, the action was both indirect and wicked, but yet for several respects: 'Twas wicked, because it was the death of an innocent man, but indirect, because he did not himself kill him, or command him to be killed, but ordered that out of which his death followed. Wherefore when we say, a thing is done indirectly, we mean, as I conceive, that something is done, which we would, or could not do, by immediately endeavouring the thing itself, but which follows from some other thing we do. And Indirect signifies, not directed immediately to that thing, in respect whereof 'tis called Indirect, but to some other, out of which what happens, whether by design or chance, we say, happens indirectly.  
Now if this be the meaning of Indirect, I am something at a loss, how it can with propriety be applied to Power. For Power seems as direct to every effect as to any: Neither do I perceive how it can be directed otherwise, than by being determined. When a man of the many things, he can do, resolves upon one, the power he has becomes, by that resolution, determined or directed to that one, which he chooses; what other direction there can be of power occurs not to me at present. But if Indirect applied to Power signify undetermined, there is plainly no room for the distinction of Direct and Indirect. For every Power is undetermined till it become determined; and when it is determined, it is direct, or directed, to that thing to which it is determined; neither can there be such a thing as Indirect Power from which any thing can follow; for nothing can follow from a power undetermined, and Power from which nothing can follow is not Power. And the truth is, we do not give the name of Power to that which goes indirectly to work. Not, but that the intended effect may follow, but we call it not Power in relation to such an effect. We do not, nor can with truth say, a King has power to take away the lives of innocent Subjects, although he may, as David did Vriah, command them something by which their Death may happen. The Merchant owed his safety not to power, but stratagem and luck: And those who starved the Nuncio, had no power to take off the Excommunication, on the contrary 'twas their want of power which made them act as they did. So that I suspect those who first joined these two words Indirect and Power together, did not much amuse themselves with considering the import of them: Indirect seeming a kind of Destroying, or, as they call it, Alienating Term, and making the Power to be not-Power. Wherefore I believe 'tis Action, or Effect which is with propriety called Indirect, not Power. But, yet because it matters not, so we understand one another, what words we use, Power to an Indirect effect may with sense be called Indirect power. So a Prince who, to recover or preserve his right, has direct power to make war, may be said to have indirect power over his Subjects lives, which must be hazarded in the war. In this manner Indirect Power is intelligible, and signifies Power to something out of which follows another thing, which would not follow immediately from the Power itself. This other thing may either be intended, as the Death of Vriah, or not intended, as when one is slain in war whom the Prince is sorry to lose. And from this Intention comes Wickedness or Innocence, not Indirectness, which proceeds only from this, that the effect flows not immediately from the power, but is joined to something which does.  
But now Indirect Power is become intelligible, let him make it intelligible that can, how the Deposing Power, said to be in the Pope, should be Indirect. If he can command Deposition, and must be obeyed when he commands, and the Prince deposed by force of that command, his Power is as direct as Power can be. For when the Pope says, I Depose: I pray what is it which he commands? I understand he commands Deposition itself, and not another thing out of which he expects Deposition should follow. Again, when his command, as the luck on't is, it seldom does, proves effectual, and a King is deposed: pray in virtue of what is he Deposed? I understand 'tis in virtue of that command. Now, because that Power is direct, which immediately commands an effect, which follows from that Command or Power, there neither is nor can be any Indirectness found here, but in the very notion of Direct. So that I told you 'twas a scurvy thing to jabber words, and never mind what they signify. For there is nothing in all this which Indirect power can mean, but Direct Power. In fine, there is no way to make this Power Indirect, but by saying either that the Pope, when he commands Deposition, does not command Deposition, which for my part I would not do, because I fear I should tell a lie: or else, that Deposition does not follow from that from which it follows; and if I should say this too, I fear I should tell two lies. But however, since Indirect sure must be some way opposite to Direct, The Pope's Power to be Indirect must be some way not directed to Deposition. Which way this should be, he must be wiser than I that can tell. If Determination or Intention would do it, sure it cannot be thought he is not determined, or does not intent to do that which he commands. And if the Directness be taken, as it ought, from the immediate influence of the power upon the effect, we see he precisely commands this particular effect, and 'tis maintained this effect must follow in virtue of that command. Now if any man can understand how a Power should be Indirect in respect of an Effect to which it is directed all the ways by which Power can be directed; I would gladly be directed to that man, to learn of him how nonsense may become sense. But till I do meet him, I must needs think that this distinction of Direct and Indirect in this case, is a mere sound of words which signify nothing, and by which the Authors speculate themselves into nonsense, and abuse themselves and their Readers.  
I am not ignorant that those who maintain this Indirect Power speak otherwise of it; but I think I speak as all men, besides themselves, speak, and know not by what right they force upon words meanings proper to their purpose, and contrary to what general custom has fixed upon them. To alter common and settled Notions, is to perplex and embroil things, and condemn the inquiries of men to hopeless and endless confusion. For Truth is discovered by seeing the connexion of Notions; and Notions are known by Words: and if the Notions belonging to words remain not steady and unchanged, our search after Truth must needs end in uncertain noise, and inextricable blunder. He who has the liberty to alter the notion of words, is empowered to maintain any thing. If he take a fancy to defend that Jet is white, 'tis but by white meaning black, and the business is done. Where I see Notions changed I am mighty suspicious there is a design upon some Truth or other in the Changers. And so I fear it happens in our case. For if Indirect Power mean, according to the apprehension of men, Power to an Indirect effect, Those who will maintain in the Pope an Indirect Power must, to speak sense, say, that, though he has not immediately and properly Power to Depose, yet he has power to do something out of which Deposition will follow. And this they would fain be at. For, give them their due, they are no enemies to sense, while sense is no enemy to them. They offer therefore sometimes at Excommunication, and would make us believe that from thence must follow Deposition. Excommunication is without doubt a proper effect of Spiritual Power, and so comes within the sphere of the Pope's activity, and if it would but follow, that an Excommunicated Person can have no Communication no way, and with none; An Excommunicated Prince would by that means be Deposed. For he could not govern those with whom he could have no intercourse, and if he could no longer govern, he were no longer King.  
This now is sense, and intelligible; but the mischief is, it will not do. They find Excommunication, when they consider it a little better, hinders indeed Communion in Spirituals, but if there be any temporal tye to the Excommunicated person, as of a Wife to a Husband, a Servant to his Master, all Subjects to their Prince, Excommunication leaves this as entire and strong as it was before. Any that has business with him, may deal with him notwithstanding his Excommunication. For it would be fine, if, when an Excommunicated person owes me money, I should not require my debt of him because he is Excommunicated. Wherefore no Excommunication will hinder a Prince from conversing freely with his Subjects, and his Subjects with him. Nay, they are obliged to all the acts of Duty to which they were before, and not to become faulty themselves, if perhaps their Prince be so. Wherefore because this will not hold water, they will not trust to it, but think it safer to make bold with a word and give it a new notion, than venture the cause upon a foundation which they are conscious will fail them. 'Tis a great deal better to talk a little nonsense, than by obstinately sticking to sense, hazard the loss of a good Cause. That the Pope shall have power to depose Kings, come what will, they are resolved. And because the Canonists do not thrive very well with their extravagance of making him sole and absolute Monarch of the World, they think fit to be a little more modest, and allay the bold heat with sprinkling this Indirect upon it. But then the notion of that word importing what they cannot make good, there is no remedy but they must give it another. If they could have kept the sense too, it would have been so much the better; but since that will not be, they think it at lest something, if their Tenet, let it signify what it will, sound not altogether so harshly as the Canonists, with which they perceive the World not very well pleased.  
Bellarmine therefore applies this lenitive, and says the Pope disposes of Temporals only Indirectly: but whether he forgot the impertinent Circumstance, or had any other reason, never tells us what that word means in his Rom. Pont. where he first uses it, but leaving it to shift for itself; and us to guests what it means, goes on to prove the power which he calls Indirect, never offering to show that 'tis Indirect. Neither is there any mention, or use made of the word, that I perceive, in the whole course of his Arguments. So that 'tis manifest, Power was the thing for which he was concerned: For the Indirect, he thought it no great matter what became of it, being perhaps in his own judgement but an insignificant sound, without influence upon the thing. Nevertheless against Barclay, when he had bethought himself, he kindly tells us what he means. The Pope's Power, says he, is per se, and properly spiritual, and therefore has reference Directly to spiritual matters as the primary object: but Indirectly, that is, in order to Spirituals, reductively, and by necessary consequence, to use that phrase, looks upon Temporals as a secundary object, to which it applies not itself but upon occasion, casu or casualiter, as the Canon speaks. This is, if you will, consequential, or reductive, or secondary, not Indirect Power. For I think all the world will say a King has very direct Power to make War, and yet he does it not but upon occasion, and in order to peace, and in consequence of his power to maintain peace, and establish plenty, and security, and convenience, which is his primary object, and to which making war is by necessary consequence reduced. But however 'tis a comfort to know what he means: And now we know what we talk of, let us a little consider the import of the Thing, and leave the Terms, which if he will use improperly, I have not so much as indirect power to help it. 'Tis likely that to deal with words as he pleases, is not the only Privilege of a Cardinal.  
In the first place then, I would fain know what real difference this word Indirect makes betwixt his opinion and the Canonists, which even he himself disproves. And we will take the Canonists opinion, as he states it himself: 
De Rom. Font. l. 5. c. 1.  That the Pope has by divine right most full power over the whole World, both in Ecclesiastical and Political matters. In this there are three particulars: That the Pope's Power is most full; That 'tis in Political and Civil, as well as Spiritual matters; And that 'tis by Divine right. In one of these three he must disagree with them, if he will disagree at all. Now his own opinion in his own Terms is: That the Pope, as Pope, 
Ibid.  has not directly and immediately any temporal, but only spiritual Power: but yet by reason of this spiritual Power, he has at least Indirectly, a certain, and that highest (summam) Power in Temporals. I am unsatisfied with more than one thing in this opinion, as you will perceive by and by. But for the present, I only desire an Oedipus, to unriddle to me the difference betwixt the two opinions. The Canonists say, the Pope's Power is Plenissima; Bellarmine says, Summa: They say, 'tis over Temporals as well as Spirituals; he says, 'tis Spiritual, or over Spirituals, and over Temporals too. They say, 'tis by divine Right, and in this you may be sure he will not quarrel with them; 'tis true, he forgot to express it here, but he says it often enough elsewhere. They say no more, and he says all this: Where is, or where can be the difference? Or shall we once in our lives find an example of things different, which differ in nothing? He puts indeed Direct and Immediate Power, as that which he would deny: But if he have rightly expressed them, they mean by their Direct and Immediate, if any where they use those terms no more than Plenissima, and he understood they meant no more: And if his Summa, do not say as much as their Plenissima, take in Direct and Immediate and all, I am much mistaken; neither can I think, but Summa will abundantly satisfy them, or if it do not, they are very unsatiable men. At least this is very clear, that all the difference he can pretend, must lie in this word, Indirectly: And this he tells us at last, imports respect to a secondary object. As if the Canonists ever denied Spirituals to be the primary object of the Pope's Power, or cared a jot which was primary, and which secondary, so he had full power over both.  
Because I do not love to see Friends fall out, I will answer for the Canonists for once, and engage they shall not quarrel with him for putting in a word more than they, as long as that word signifies but what they think as well as he. They are men who will hearken to reason, and not fall irreconcilably out with a man for expressing their mind in his own words. They have no quarrel to Secondarily, and will make none for calling this Secondarily by the name of Indirectly. Allow them but their Plenissima, and they shall keep the peace, I warrant them. Here is then no difference but only of a word, which they that use, and they that use not, both think the same. Sure Bellarmine was in a pleasant humour, when he would go about to persuade the world, that full Power in the Pope, is a great error, and contrary to Christian Doctrine, if you call this full Power Direct: But if you call it Indirect, then all's well, and Christian Doctrine safe. And all this while Direct full Power is no more than most full Power, and Indirect no less. My Masters! We had need have a care of our words. He that has the knack on't, may say unoffensively, and make good Doctrine of that, which, if it be less luckily worded, may chance destroy the Law of Christ, and undo the world. What difference betwixt this, and Montultoes Pouvoir prochain? And which of the two is the more serious trifler? And yet to see what a conceited world we live in! There are who make no difficulty to disclaim the Canonists freely, and call their opinion extravagant and naught, and what you will: But propose the very same opinion to them, with no other difference in the world than this insignificant sound, Indirectly; and as if there were charm in those four syllables, they become presently shy and mysterious, and will rather hazard to be ill thought of themselves, then say what they think. I know a certain Gentleman, who writ to me not long since of this very matter, who, I think, was charmed for company; but I name no body. Charms usually last but to a certain time, and when the term is past, the man perhaps may recover.  
But now I think on't better, 'tis good not to be too positive. These Reductives, and Secondaries, and Consequentials, are crabbed words, and I am a mere bungler at School-gibberish. I fear, it may be with that, as the Poet said pleasantly, of another sort of canting; People must be mad before they can understand it. Subtle men say, there is a difference betwixt five, and two and three: And some such difference, for aught I can answer, there may be here. The Pope may be said in one opinion to look strait forward, and in the other a squint upon Temporals, which is a difference, such as it is, but which hinders not, but the squint-eyed man may hit as surely and as strongly as the other. Now because I am not concerned in the airy speculations of your Ens-rationis-men, nor mean to be, I will not much stand with them for a Cobweb-difference or two, which may pass with such as are mad enough to understand it. But I look for a difference, which we dull men of the world may be able to conceive: A substantial and useful difference, by which it may appear, that whereas one opinion is naught and dangerous, the other is innocent and safe. I would see how your indirect men are better Subject than the other, and faster to their Prince and their Duty: how they are less guilty of wrong, to the Sovereignty and Independence of Princes: in short, how they are not as bad as those who are direct Knaves. These are the things, in which alone the world is concerned: if the two opinions agree in these, let them differ in inconsiderable niceties, as much as they will; they are the same in danger, the same in inconsistency with Civil Government, and that, if you remember, was the thing with which we began, and where, for aught I see, we still stick. Till I see such a difference, I must needs think all you have said, no better then pure illusion, and all you can say, till you say, where this difference is, will be but to talk learnedly from the purpose.  
For my part, I must profess, I can find none: But because I would be glad to learn of any body, I will entreat Bellarmine to tell me, what difference he finds, and what provision he makes, with his learned distinctions, for the Security of Princes, and Fidelity of Subjects. The first, which comes in my way, is in the state of the Question, That the Pope directly and immediately, hath not any temporal Power, but only spiritual; but indirectly at least, in virtue of this spiritual Power, hath highest or sovereign Power over Temporals. And because Directly's and Indirectly's should break no squares, he leaves them out against Barclay, 
Cap. 12.  when he had a mind to speak properly: When we speak properly, says he, we say, the Pope has Power in, or over Temporals, but not Temporal Power, as Pope. Now to acknowledge my ignorance, I must confess, I am quite gravelled at very first, and cannot for my life, imagine, what kind of thing this only Spiritual, and not Temporal Power, should be, which yet is highest or sovereign, even in Temporals. Without doubt, we men of the world are  ignorant things, and if we but offer to understand any thing, these Scholars say, 'tis odds we mar all. Who of our low form, but would have thought, that Power over Temporals had been Temporal Power? If I mistake not, I have heard from some body, that had some acquaintance with these Scholars, that Powers are specified by their Acts, which is indeed too high for me: It may be to purpose, and it may not. But I had verily thought, that who could do temporal things, had temporal power, and who could do spiritual things, spiritual. I was out it seems, and perceive now that properly speaking 'tis otherwise. For all that, I cannot but think there is such a thing as Temporal Power in the world, and if Power in Temporals be not It, there remains nothing that I know, which can be It, but Power in Spirituals; and for the same reason Power in Temporals must be Spiritual Power; and so Kings, because they have to do with Temporals, have in truth Spiritual Power; only we speak improperly in the world, and call it Temporal. But this does not fadge neither. For then the Pope should be said to have Temporal power, for this proper reason, because he has power in Spirituals.  
Now I remember me there is a certain Pope who says, Kings have no Superior in Temporals. 
Inno. 3. C. per Ven. Qui filii sint legit.  This Barclay objected to Bellarmin, and he answers that by Superior in Temporals, is meant a Temporal Superior. Now I consider not how well this answers Barclay. For let the Superior be a temporal, or a spiritual Superior, so he be Superior in Temporals, The King has a Superior in Temporals. But this is not to my purpose. I only observe that Bellarmin was of the mind, when he written this, that Superior in Temporals was all one with Temporal Superior. And then I see no reason in the world, why power in Temporals should not also be all one with Temporal power. Certainly, since Power makes the Superior, there is as much sympathy betwixt the Superior and the Power as this comes too.  
But in the name of wonder, what does Power in Temporals signify, and what Temporal Power? Bellarmin means the Pope may by his power in Temporals dispose of the temporal thing called a Kingdom. The Canonists mean some such thing by their Temporal Power. By this account both signify power to dispose of Temporals, and methinks 'tis no such mortal quarrel whether a dog must be said to be beaten with a stick or a staff. Or, are they perhaps mere sounds, to which belongs no sense, but what they give them as they find convenient for their purpose; and so when we are asked what Temporal, or what in Temporals signifies, we must answer with Montalto, What you please Father? Never believe me if I can make more of this in Temporals, than an Enchanted Castle which houses and entertains the Knight as long as he has use of it, and as soon as he is gone vanishes into a pure Temporal Inn. Which way soever I turn me, I am quite at a loss; so that I think 'tis best to give it over, and let Bellarmin alone with his power over Temporals, and no Temporal Power; and speak to you in a language which both of us understand.  
Do you in earnest believe there is any such difference betwixt these two, that the one makes a good, the other a bad Subject? And that a King is safe enough as long as his Subjects speak properly. Marry, if their language once become less exact, then let him look to himself. Good Schoolmasters are the only Guards if this be true. I am afraid to meddle with Bellarmin again; for whether I say I, or no, 'tis odds, but I shall be out still. But yet I guess he meant his Power in Temporals is truly Power. If it be true Power, sure there is true obedience due to it. And if all Christians are bound to obey him in Temporals, Kings can have no Subjects but Infidels, unless to be even with the Pope, they fall to commanding in Spirituals. For if they can command in nothing, I do not see how they are Kings. But this is but shifting sides, and leaves us still where we were. Let Bellarmin say what he will; He who has power to command is to be obeyed; if the Pope can command in Temporals, I must obey him in Temporals: And he whom I must obey in Temporals, is my King and no body else. So that the Pope is universal Monarch without more ado, and there is no King in the World besides himself. For 'tis not the proper name of Power, but Power which does the business. Call it how you will, properly or improperly, if there be a Power in the world which Kings themselves must acknowledge, and submit their Crowns, and leave their Kingdoms when this Power requires them, They are not Kings, I mean, Sovereigns of whom we only speak. And they were mightily out who said Princes were solo Deo minores, that they were accountable only to him, and had none else above them, and twenty other such untrue things. For Bellarmin has found one that is above them, and I fear above God too: at least he can take away what God gave, which is to make a little too bold with him.  
But I am out again, as I foresaw I should be. All this, says Bellarmin, follows from the wicked direct Temporal Power of the Canonists, not from my innocent Indirect power over Temporals. I told you there was no meddling with Scholars. While we keep within our own verge, we may happily light upon a little indirect sense, which may serve turn, and do well enough among ourselves: but if we go beyond our bounds, and tread the forbidden paths of Scholarship, it turns presently direct nonsense. I verily thought this had followed! But it seems it does not. Bellarmin has stopped the Carrier with a Distinction, which for fear of mistakes you shall have in his own words. If, 
Adver. Barc. c. 5.  says he, there were in the Pope Spiritual and Temporal power directly, and he were King of the World, as he is Bishop of the universal Church, and other Kings did but merely execute temporal Jurisdiction; truly the Pope might at his pleasure deprive whatsoever Kings of the administration and execution of temporal Jurisdiction, and by this means take away Civil government, or confound it with the Ecclesiastical; and would be greater than Christ, because he could take away Powers which he willed should be, and be distinct. These now to my apprehension are naughty things, and the opinion, out of which they follow, a naughty opinion. And I must needs commend Bellarmin for choosing another, out of which it may not follow, that Popes at their pleasure may deprive any King of the execution of temporal Jurisdiction, and take away Civil government, and be greater than Christ. This, you see, is what he says follows from the other opinion, and what he makes us expect does not follow from his. Let us hearken then to what he says of it, and understand it if we can. But, goes he on, if we put in the Pope only Spiritual power Directly, and Temporal Indirectly, that is only in order to Spirituals, it does not follow that the Pope can take away, or confound Civil government. Once in my life I was in the right. This is what I thought was not to follow. What is that which does then? Why, It follows only, says he, that the Pope by his Spiritual and Apostolic most eminent Power can direct and correct the Civil Power, and if it be needful, to the Spiritual end take it away from one Prince, and give it to another.  
Pray assist me a little, for I am in again as deep, as just now with in Temporals not Temporal. Was not this taking away Civil power the thing which he said did not follow from his opinion, and does he not now say it does? Or have I rendered him amiss? Let me see: his own words are; non sequitur posse tollere— sed solum sequitur posse adimere. O! 'tis tollere which does not follow, and only adimere which follows. And here's a plain difference, for one word has four syllables, and the other but three. The mischief is, those who understand not Latin will not presently find it, and I hardly know how to help them. For whether it be that Latin be the more proper language for distinctions, or that he be better at Latin, than I at English, I am puzzled to render it: And yet I have consulted my Dictionary, but there is but one English word, to take away, for both. But methinks it sounds scurvily to say, it does not follow he can take away, but it does follow he can take away. That looks like saying and unsaying, giving and taking, which is children's play. To make some difference then, we must say, It does not follow he can take away, but it follows he can away-take: which, though it be to force the language a little, yet 'tis better to make bold with that, then spoil the sense, and make no distinction at all. Princes than were in a sad case if the wicked doctrine of the Casuists were true, that their Kingdoms may be taken away, but as long as they may only be away-taken, all's well enough.  
But yet this is not well neither. Bellarmin loves to speak properly, and this away-take perhaps would not please him; as indeed it has but an odd sound. To be then both just to him, and not injurious to our language, we will put it thus: It does not follow he can take away Civil power with a word of three syllables, it only follows he can take it away with a word of four. This is true English, and a true difference. For one kills on Tierce, and the other en Quart, which though they may happen from the same hand, and the same sword, are yet distinct killings. And so thanks to Bellarmin, we have mastered a deep point of learning, and understand the Canonists opinion is a very wicked opinion, because it exposes a Prince to the villainous thrust en Tierce, but Bellarmin's very innocent, which lays him open only to the fair en Quart. Now you may judge with your infallible judgement as you please, but I must needs think that to take away, with a word of 4, or if you will 40 syllables, is to take away, and to hit en Quart is to hit; and if any judge these things may be practised upon our sacred Sovereign; I must farther think, and plainly tell you he deserves to be confuted by Judge and Executioner too.  
But stay! May not Bellarmin say perhaps, that to take away Civil Power from one Prince, and give it to another, is not absolutely to take away Civil Power, but only to translate it; since the Power remains, only put into other hands. Truly he may say this for aught I know, and twenty other things, of which I shall never dream. But I think he could not mean it in this place. For here he intends to speak contrary to the Canonists: and, as mad as they are, I believe there is none among them so senseless to say or think, that Civil power can absolutely be taken away out of the world, by the most direct and unlimited Power that is or can be. They know well enough there must be Civil Power as long as there is Civil Government, and there must be Civil government as long as there be Cities and Men. So that Civil Power can no more, nor sooner be taken out of the world than Mankind. For should the Pope take all Power into his own hands, and appoint Lieutenants here and there, where he could not be in person, these Lieutenants must of necessity have and exercise Civil Power, even though they were Churchmen; As the Pope himself actually does. For when in his own Territories he punishes Malefactors for civil Crimes, he does not do this in virtue of his Spiritual power, but as a Temporal Prince, as one that has Civil power as well as Ecclesiastical. Wherefore I conceive Bellarmin cannot say he meant his taking away Power, of taking it absolutely out of the world, taking from one and giving to another being not to take away Power itself, but to translate it; because there is no way by which Civil Power can be taken away, but only by translating; nevertheless, if he did, as this is not the first time he has said what he had no great reason to say, I must tell him, that this translating is every jot as unsatisfactory to us, because 'tis every jot as unsafe to our Sovereign, as plain taking away. For if it be taken away from him, whoever has it next, 'tis taken away from him. And whoever holds this may be done, let Bellarmin speak never so subtly, I must hold is no good Subject.  
There is another distinction or two, or explication, or what you will call them which stick in my stomach. To understand them the better, it will be convenient to mention the occasion he had to make them. Barclay in his 12th. Chapter objected against his opinion, that it makes Christian Princes Vassals to the Pope, and hold their Kingdoms only at pleasure, or precariously. And this he proves by this Argument: The Pope if it be necessary for the good of Souls may take away a Kingdom from one Prince, and give it to another; but to Judge and decree whether it be necessary or no, belongs to the Pope, and none must judge whether his Sentence be right or wrong; Therefore he may at pleasure Dethrone the one and Crown the other. Bellarmin Answers, that Christian Princes must by no means be called the Pope's Vassals, and much less be said to hold their Kingdoms at pleasure, But are true Kings, and true Princes. This goes well; but yet if his opinion make them Vassals, I hope they may without offence to it be called so. But however Princes are to thank him for this confession that they are true Kings and Princes, and may hope so much may, for his sake, pass for true doctrine: Which if it once do, there is so much true fidelity due to those true Kings, that what takes it but indirectly away, will be found directly false.  
Coming then to speak to Barclay's Argument, he says 'tis faulty every where, major and minor and all. Still there is no meddling with Scholars. These two premises of Barclay are two Propositions which he has borrowed from Bellarmin himself, and were very good Propositions, as long as he had the handling of them; but as soon as ever another but breaths on them, they fade and whither to nonsense; and yet I perceive no alteration in them, but that before they came out of Beauties' mouth, and now out of Barclays. However he tells us, This Proposition, The Pope may, if it be necessary for the good of Souls, take away a Kingdom from one, and give it to another; needs explication: for it may be well, and ill understood; it may be true, and it may be false. I make no question but it may be, and is false: but I would fain see the Explication by which it may be true. This it is: The Pope indeed may, if it be necessary for the good of Souls, take the Kingdom from one; but, if he admonish him before, if he give him time to repent, if he find him pernicious and incorrigible. May he so? Why then your opinion, for all your Butts, and Ifs, is pernicious, and you incorrigible, good Bellarmin. What's this to say, but that he cannot steal his Kingdom in the dark, but may rob him of it in broad day light? This Admonition and Space of Repentance is in other words: The Pope must first say to the King; look you, I deal fairly above-board, and give you notice before hand, that if you do not do as I would have you within such a time, it may be a month or two, it may be so many hours (for this space of Bellarmin's is for aught I see, at the Pope's appointing too) I will turn you a grazing, and provide my good people another King.  
I see no such matter of substance in these formalities, but that they might be well enough spared, if conveniently they could. But they are a sort of impudent things, which will thrust in whether the Pope will or no. For Kingdoms are no such inconsiderable trifles, that they can be passed away in private, and none know when or how. Except King Phys and King Usher, none ever yet stepped into another man's Throne without warning, and I believe, none ever will. Does Bellarmine think it can happen in the world, that there should be a King so tame, that without more knowledge of the matter, as soon as a sentence of Deposition is brought, should quietly submit, and turn private man, and inquire no farther. King's are more inquisitive than so, and stand more upon their terms, and look to be better satisfied. And though they did not, Subjects who have sworn Fealty, have a little curiosity in them, and will be ask why, and by what necessity they must change Lords, and obey Peter, who have sworn to Paul. There goes time to all this, for nothing will come of it till all parties be agreed. Now Bellarmine requires no more to make his sentence just, nor so much, as nature will force upon him, let it be never so unjust. Of necessity there must intervene more time in the change of Kings, than he requires to his admonition and space of repentance. So that his Explication amounts in short to this: The sentence were unjust, if it required things should pass in such a manner, in which 'tis impossible they should pass; but very just, if things be so done, as they must be done, in spite of sentence, or whatever else to the contrary; which is certainly a very trim Explication, and altars the Proposition wonderfully for the better. We cannot put so much as a Tenant out, without warning, and he would persuade us, we are much beholding to his Explication, for requiring as much Ceremony in the change of a Kingdom, as a Farm.  
And yet when all is done, I cannot tell whether he be in earnest or no, and think these Formalities so indispensably necessary, that a King cannot be deposed without them. It is hard to say, what Plenitude of Power may do, and I doubt, he would not be well looked on, who should go about to fix its bounds. But besides that, a Case may happen, where a King cannot repent, though he would, or at least, make amends by repentance: A Case may happen, where he will not repent, nor believe he hath reason so to do. Bellarmine would persuade us, Ozias in the Old Law was deposed for Leprosy. What! did the High Priest admonish him to repent of his Leprosy, and not proceed to Deposition, till after convenient patience with him, he found him incorrigible in his Leprosy? Ozias might, and 'tis likely did repent the fault for which he was struck with Leprosy, but unless his repentance could make him clean again, as to the matter of Deposition, he had as good ne'er repent at all; for he was, according to Bellarmine, deposed, for what no repentance could cure. Again, in the New Law, he would make us believe, Chilperick was deposed for insufficiency. Did the Pope admonish him to repent the grievous fault of having so little wit, and allow him time to provide himself of better brains, and better organs, and when he found him incorrigible, and all persuasion lost upon him, and that, say the Pope what he could, he would not do what he could not do, then at last after fruitless and long deluded patience cast him off? Wherefore though Bellarmine do require such Formalities as cannot conveniently be spared, yet possibly he may not think their necessity so absolute, as that the Deposition should be void if they concur not. But let him think what he pleases, while with all his insignificant Butts, he preserves this substance, that a King may be deposed, if instead of three, be require three hundred Ceremonies, the opinion is still inconsistent with Civil Government. And for our Case in particular, our Sovereign does not think fit to repent what Bellarmine calls Heresy and a deposing fault, for this reason, because he does not think it a fault, and is for that reason very like to be incorrigible in it too; and whoever thinks he may therefore be deposed, is himself pernicious, and not to be endured in his Dominions.  
And so much for the taking away But. For the giving But, he tells us, The Pope may also give the Kingdom to another, yet not at pleasure, to whom he thinks fit, for so indeed Kings were but precarious Kings. But He is tied to the order of Justice, whether Succession or Election take place, or if there be none can claim, then to him whom reason proffers. I fear the truth of this may be questioned. Sure I am that when Q. Elizabeth was deposed, and her Kingdom given to the Spaniard, there were better Titles afoot in the world, then K. Philips. Thanks be to God, the Throne of England has not been vacant, and the Pope's reason never troubled to fill it. When Kingdoms are exposed to prey, 'tis catch that catch can. I see no great order of Justice in that. But suppose it were true, what signifies this order of Justice? and what bar to the Pope's pleasure in Succession or Election? If the next Heir, or next Elect be a man, who pleases not the Pope, I suppose he must be passed by, and so as many as offer, till they come at last to some body who is rectus in Curiâ. For the first might stand as well as any of these, who, I conceive, are all in the number of those who cannot claim; and than what does Succession or Election hinder, but the Pope still gives at pleasure, since none shall succeed or be elected, but whom he pleases? Again, what difference betwixt giving a Kingdom to whom the Pope pleases, and to whom Reason, meaning the Pope's Reason, prefers? Preference of Reason is nothing in the world, but that the Pope pleases to think it fit this man should be preferred, than the other. So that Election and Succession and Reason, are nothing in truth but the Pope's Pleasure, and all that Bellarmine affords us, is a mere sound of words which signify nothing, and if they did, were nothing to purpose neither. For we are all this while beside the Cushion.  
It makes nothing, I think, to the justification of a Robbery, that the prey was equally shared; and when a King is dethroned, he is as much dethroned, if he be succeeded by the next heir as by a stranger, neither do I believe, he is much concerned who comes next upon the Stage, when his own part is ended. Our Question at Present is, whether Kings in Beauties' doctrine be only precarious Kings. By the way Precarious is not very currant English; I think we should call it holding at will, or pleasure, or if you will coin a new word, Tenure by Entreaty. But however let us keep our Author's word. Barclay objects that Bellarmin makes Kings precarious, because he allows the Pope to take away and give Kingdoms, and this whenever he has a mind, as being sole judge in the case. Bellarmin answers, that Kings were indeed Precarious, if their Kingdoms could be disposed of at pleasure, but because the Pope is tied to the order of Justice in that point, they are not precarious. As if Barclay insisted on that, or thought their being Precarious depended on that disposition. The Son in defence of his Father laughs at that notion of Precarious, and rightly observes that Precarious is not said with relation to him that gives, but him that takes away. 'Tis the power of revocation, if that word fit him who never gave, placed in the Pope, the power of deposing when the Pope thinks fit, which makes a King precarious, let the Kingdom be disposed how 'twill afterwards, the King is still precarious, purely Tenant at will.  
But pray tell me truly. Do you in earnest find any thing in these healing Butts of Bellarmin, which makes his opinion a jot sounder than the Canonists; a jot safer for Princes, or more dutiful for Subjects? For my part I profess seriously I find nothing, unless nonsense will do the feat. There is a little more nonsense in this opinion than the other, and if that be a security for Princes, it would do well if the world ran mad as fast as it could. While men are in their wits, they will go near to think never a Barrel better Herring.  
Just such work he makes with Barclays next Proposition, which was this: To judge, when 'tis necessary for the good of Souls, that a King be deposed, belongs only to the Pope, and none is to question his Judgement. This he says is like the former, and if it be ill understood, is false, but rightly understood is true, but then concludes not what Barclay would have it. Now am I terribly afraid that ill understood is as much in Beauties' language, as truly understood, or so as it truly signifies, and rightly understood means understood otherwise then as it signifies. For else I cannot for my heart see but if the Pope may depose when there is necessity, and judge when this necessity happens, and none must call his judgement in question, and these words mean as they sound, Kings are purely Tenants at will, and the Pope may depose them whenever he pleases to judge it necessary, which is what Barclay would conclude. What is the good meaning in which we must rightly understand it? Why, It does indeed belong to the Pope, says he, to judge whether it be necessary a King should be deprived of his Kingdom. Very well! So Barclay understood it, and so Bellarmin himself understands it. Why does it not conclude then, that Princes may be deposed at pleasure? Because of another But. But, says he, it does not belong to the Pope to feign necessities at pleasure, or serve his passions under pretence of necessity.  
Bellarmin is as unlucky it his Butts, as Distinctions. Whoever said it belonged to the Pope to feign necessities? and yet it may be said as truly as that Deposing belongs to him. If Bellarmin could give good security the Pope should never do more than belonged to him, there might be something in it: but if that were so, we should not have heard so much of this Deposing power, for that does not belong to him neither. But belong, or not belong, he may feign a necessity by passion, or he may judge that necessary which is not so by mistake; and if he does so, 'tis all one as if he did not feign, and not mistake, when neither Prince, nor any body else, is allowed to judge whether he feign or no. Unless the Pope be supposed infallible in sincerity too, and that he will always declare, This man I depose upon a true, and that upon a feigned necessity. But if we must take all he says is necessary, to be truly necessary, Kings may be deposed at pleasure, for he may say so when he pleases. Marry if other people must see this necessity as well as himself; all good subjects will tell him there neither is nor can be any necessity why a King should be deposed. I, but, says Bellarmin, because this is a matter of great importance, and the necessity must be manifest and seen, therefore Popes ordinarily do these things in Synods of Bishops, or Consistories of Cardinals, showing his reasons and taking their consents. Yes sure, 'tis a matter of great importance, too great to be thus trifled with. Manifest quotha! I beseech you to whom must this necessity be manifest? If to any besides himself; why 'tis manifest to all good Subjects, that there neither is, nor ever was, nor ever shall or can be any such necessity, and 'tis manifest they are not good Subjects who think otherwise. But if He alone be Judge of the manifest as well as the necessary, his command without more ado is evidence enough that 'tis manifest to Him, it ought be commanded. And I hope he can as easily and as soon say 'Tis manifest, as 'Tis necessary.  
Then for his Synods and Consistories, I wonder what they are for. Does he consult with them, tro, whether that be to be done of which there is a necessity, and this necessity seen and manifest? He may consult the How, but the Whether is a wise point of consultation, if it be already manifest. Or is it perhaps to be made manifest by the consultation? If so, the case is not so clear as Bellarmin pretends, and other persons, more concerned than his Synods and Consistories, have reason to expect it should be made manifest to them too, as well as the other. Besides, He who makes what Bishops and Cardinals he pleases, and of such as he makes consults with whom he pleases, has wit enough sure to choose such, of whom he may be certain beforehand, they will oppose nothing which he shall propose. Indeed if by his Synods he meant General Counsels, there might be more difficulty. The Bishops of The Prince concerned, and of those Princes who were leagued with him, would go near to speak in his behalf. Else Synod in his language imports no more than a company of Bishops, perhaps not so much, chosen according to the Pope's pleasure. And yet even thus much is more than he thinks necessary too. He says the Pope ordinarily does thus, but if he will do otherwise, He may for any thing Bellarmin says to the contrary. And the truth is 'tis not to be expected but he will. To depose a King is not every day's work. 'Tis an extraordinary case, and in extraordinary cases there may be extraordinary proceed. However the Pope is still Judge of this, as of all the rest, and so when all is done we are purely at the Pope's pleasure for all.  
There is a brace more of Volunteers, which though they be resolute enough, and venture on any thing, let it be never so desperate, and let them have never so little to do with it, yet Bellarmin spares them as much as he can, and keeps them in reserve for dead-lifts, and then, which often happens, they never fail him. One is De Facto, and De Jure. This is a distinction good enough in itself, but as he uses it only at a pinch, and when he has nothing else to say, it looks still like a piece of good stuff hung in a place which it will not fit. For example, Gregory the Great writing of a certain Law, which for his own part he disliked, and thought unjust, but yet published, as he was commanded by the Emperor; speaks thus: I being subject to your command, have caused the Law to be sent into several parts, and because the Law agrees not with God Omnipotent, I have by my Letter informed my Serene Lords. Wherefore I have in both done what I ought, obeyed the Emperor, and not concealed what I thought for God. Now I should think that to publish an unjust Law, and where the Injustice concerned the service of God and liberty of the Church, as was here the case, without the excuse which bears out a Subject, who is not to examine but obey the commands of his Superior, is to do an unjust thing, and for which now adays Force would hardly pass for an excuse. If any encroachment be thought made upon the Church in our times, the language is presently, I will die first, I will suffer Martyrdom, before the Cause of God, and Ecclesiastical immunity shall suffer by my means. I take this Pope to have been a man of as much zeal as those who use this language, and acknowledged to be so, and since he submitted to a bare command, he either thought that command had power to oblige him, or he acted against his Conscience without obligation. Wherefore plainly he thought himself De Jure subject, or De facto he did very ill.  
For all that, I, says Bellarmin, say this obedience was forced, de Facto, not de Jure. Why then I think you may say any thing. Pray consider again good Bellarmin. Does not he say, he did but what he ought? Vtrobique quod debui exolvi. Does not what I ought, signify, what is my duty? and does Duty signify Force with you? Sure as can be a Cardinal may do what he pleases. If he will have words signify otherwise then they do, there is no contesting. Otherwise, if the Pope were subject de Facto only, not the Jure, the Emperor had no Right to command him, and if the Emperor had no Right to command, the Pope had no obligation to obey, and then he ought have done quite the contrary (for Force is no excuse for injustice) and what I aught signifies what I ought not, which we dull men should never have suspected. Allow us but the same liberty though, and it shall be shamefully hard for which we will not make a shift to say some thing. That Chalk is blue, for example, which we will say is white only de Facto, but blew de Jure. That the Fire burns de Facto, but only warms de Jure. That Bellarmin is a great Scholar de Facto, but the Jure none at all. I know I speak impertinently, but I meant to do so, and yet think I speak as pertinently as he who says Duty is only duty de Facto, but the Jure not duty. He might e'en as well have made use of his Indirect here too, and said the Pope was subject only Indirectly, but was not subject Directly, or contrariwise, for 'tis all one. Young Sophisters sometimes when they are put to it, and, know not how to shift off an Argument, find something or other which sounds like a distinction, no matter what it signifies, and whether any thing or nothing, so it serve turn for the present, And I doubt he remembered the trick a little too long.  
But Subjection to Princes being proved by Examples, and Commands, This is the Reserve for Examples, when they are ill-natured, and will not be turned off otherwise. For Commands there is another common place, which now 'tis known is nothing, but he was a very subtle man lure that first discovered it. It consists in distinguishing the same man into a Prince, and a not-Prince, and then interpreting all obedience we find commanded, belongs to the Prince only, the not-Prince has no share in it. This distinction, because it is indeed a little hard, they attribute to the Omnipotent power of the Pope; and say that the Prince, till he be deposed, is a Prince, but afterwards no Prince; and because it still falls short, for the man governs and lives like a Prince still, they etch it out with its fellow distinction, and say he is no Prince de Jure, though he be de Facto. And now bring 'em as many and as plain places for obedience as you will, 'tis the easiest thing in the world to get clear of them; Bring Scripture, bring Fathers that a Prince is to be obeyed; True, say they, while he is a Prince, but now he is no longer a Prince.  
Princes in my opinion have hard luck to stand in the Pope's way, and become the first sad examples of his Omnipotence: otherwise there is no Law of God or Man which may not be overturned as easily by the same engine. For he may as soon and as well declare, That Wife to be no Wife, That Man to be no Man, and make Adultery and Murder lawful, as that King to be no King, and make Rebellion innocent. There would not want as likely pretences for the one as the other, if people would but look after them. For Example, A Man is a rational Creature, who acts unreasonably disclaims his nature, and may be dispatched without contradicting the Divine Law, which forbids men to be killed while they are men, but he by the Pope's declaration is no man. As much may be found out for the Wife, as much for Estates, as much for every thing. For there neither is nor can be any stronger title to any thing then the Law of God, and that the King has to his Kingdom, and if that will not do, nothing will. This is just Montalto. Sin but enough and you trapan the Devil, and become virtuous even by being wicked. To refuse obedience to a King is with them a crime, and a crime which deserves damnation; marry to Un-king him, and deny there is any obedience due to him, is an innocent thing. As if taking his Power quite away, were not a greater disobedience then to resist it. A particular disobedience may have a particular, and sometimes excusable cause; but a general disobedience, such as leaves them no longer any Power to command, is of all disobedience the greatest, most inexcusable in itself, and most contrary to the Divine Law. And yet he would persuade us, we sin, if we obey not a particular, perhaps trifling Command, but if we take away Power and all, we are very honest men. Whereas in truth, when I disobey a Power which I acknowledge, perhaps I wrong myself most, for I do not my duty; but when I no longer acknowledge my Prince's Power, I do him as well as myself the greatest wrong I can; and yet this greatest wrong with Bellarmine is no wrong.  
These are the healing Distinctions which Bellarmine applies to his Doctrine, and by which the sound Deposing is to be distinguished from the unsound Deposing. If you find any such sovereign virtue in them, I shall be glad to learn it. But for our part, we think Deposing an uncurable disease, a poison for which there is no Antidote. Disguise it how you will, while it remains Deposing, 'tis alike intolerable, & alike inconsistent w●th the safety of Princes, and duty of Subjects. Call the Power indirect, call it in Temporals, not temporal, as long as 'tis Power, and can do the feat, no honest ear can hear it. Tell us of admonition, and space of repentance; tell us of Synods and Consistories; of disposing the prey according to Justice; of not feigning necessities; tell us what you will, while you tell us Deposing is good Doctrine, we cannot believe you good Subjects. Bring a thousand Schoolmen, and ten thousand subtleties, against them all we will stand by our honest Parliament Doctrine, That the Crown of England is and always has been free, and subject immediately to God, and none other, and who refuses his Fellowship in that Doctrine, I know not, with what face he can pretend to a Fellowship in any thing else.  
But the truth is, I do not see that Bellarmine with all his art does so much as gild the bitter Pill, or make it a jot less nauseous. For what is the very worst the Canonists say? Take their opinion in his own expressions, and he says all they say, and in terms as positive, and as comprehensive. Take Carerius, or whoever is the highest flyer among those I sent you at first, and the worst is but this: That the Pope has jurisdiction over all things both spiritual and temporal throughout the world; that he may absolve Subjects from the Oath of Allegiance; Depose Kings; and transfer their Dominions from one line to another. And which of this worst does Bellarmine with his proper Distinctions, and cautious Butts, deny? 'Tis true, they call his Power Direct, and Bellarmine Indirect, but what matter is it how they are called, if one can do as much as the other? And I would fain know, what they can do with their Direct, which be cannot with his Indirect. 'Tis true, they make but one absolute Monarch of the world, and all the rest but arbitrary Lieutenants; and Bellarmine calls them true Kings, but makes them as much subject as if they were but Lieutenants. Were Kings persuaded once it were their duty to resign at the Pope's command, they would themselves make no difficulty to call and think him their supreme Lord. 'Tis only in consideration of the scurvy consequence which would follow, viz. that being supreme and absolute Lord, he might dispose of his own as he thought fit, that they refuse to give him that Title. Now Bellarmine sticks to the consequence, which is all the mischief, and makes the Pope do all that a supreme Monarch could do, and thinks all is well if he do not call him so, when as if he could do what Bellarmine would have him, he truly were supreme Monarch, and Bellarmine might make no bones to call him by his proper name.  
The truth is, '●would anger any King at heart, to be put out of his Kingdom, and not so much as know why, nay, while on the contrary he is fully persuaded he cannot be dispossessed, even by those who dispossess him. If a Canonist come and tell him, Sir, you must descend, the Pope your supreme Lord has so commanded: If he believe the Canonist, he understands how a superior Power is to be obeyed, and submits as a Lieutenant, when his Commission is recalled. But if Bellarmine come and tell him, you are now a private man, the Pope has so declared: Without doubt, he will reply, what if he have? Have not you yourself told me that I am a true King, no Vassal of the Popes, but supreme in Temporals? Have not you told me, the Pope's Power is only spiritual; and do you tell me now, I must give up my temporal Crown, to the command of a spiritual Authority? All this is true, quoth Bellarmine, but yet you must obey. What! must I obey one who cannot command in such things? Yes; he can. 'Tis something hard for you to understand who are no Scholar; you can understand what 'tis to obey, and that is enough for you; the rest belongs to us of the Trade. In my conscience, this would sooner put a man out of his wits, than out of his Kingdom, and who kept his wits, I believe, would go near to keep his Kingdom too.  
In fine, the sum total of the Canonists account is but this: That the Pope by reason of his absolute supreme Authority in all things, is not to be questioned, but obeyed in whatever he commands. And if Bellarmine go less in substance, whatever he do in words, I am mistaken. Nay, how much short is he, even in words, when he tells Barclay, C. 17. That if the spiritual Prince happen to abuse his Power, by excommunicating a temporal Prince unjustly, or absolving his Subjects from their obedience without just cause, and so disturb the temporal Commonwealth: This were sin in the spiritual Prince, but yet that temporal Prince could not assume to himself the judgement of spiritual things, or judge the spiritual Prince, and much less depose him from his spiritual Seat. This is worded in opposition to Barclay, who by the same Argument which Bellarmine brings for the Deposition of Princes, proves that they may as well depose Popes. But if this do not signify, that right or wrong the Pope is always to be obeyed, I understand it not. For Deposition, according to him, is a spiritual thing, an act of spiritual Power; to judge of this, a Prince must not assume to himself, no not in case of Injustice. And if he must not question, what remains but to obey it, and this in all Cases, just or unjust? Let the boldest Canonist that is outgo this if he can.  
Upon the whole, I see no other difference betwixt the two opinions, but that one is abominable false, and the other abominable false, and abominable full of nonsense besides. They with one bold untruth subject all Princes to the Pope, and for the rest discourse at least consequently. Were their Principle true, all would follow which they say. He makes Princes as much subject as they, and when he has done, calls them true sovereign Princes, and discourses, so that no part hangs together. Every one falls together by the ears with his fellow, and makes such mad work, that a body can understand nothing of it, but that 'tis false. Consider a little what he teaches in his Rom. Pont. against these Canonists: That Christ or the Christian Law, deprives none of the Right and Dominion he had before; that otherwise Christianity would be injurious, and a wrong instead of a benefit, and therefore Christian Rings and Emperors acknowledge no Superior in Temporals, but are true and supreme Princes in their own Kingdoms. Again, That Christ our Lord has distinguished the Acts, Offices, and Dignities of Popes and Emperors, that one should not presume to meddle with the Rights of the other, and a great deal more to this purpose. But that strange things happen in the world now and then, one would not suspect that these things and Deposition should both be taught by one man, and that man a friend of the Popes. Sure if I were Pope, I should not think myself much obliged by him, who gives me a Power to do injuries.  
But with what Distinction-sodder shall we ever cement these things? Does a King lose nothing, when he loses his Kingdom? Is nothing taken away, when all is gone? Is he deprived of no Right, who is deprived of the Right to reign? Is it no injury to be turned out of a Throne, to be forced to change Purple for Rags, and languish out a despised life in helpless Beggary? Do Christian Princes acknowledge no Superior in Temporals; if they acknowledge one, at whose command they must quit their Temporals? By the way, we are at our Superior in Temporals again, with the meaning of which, for my late bad success, I dare not meddle. It signifies you know, e'en what you please. But let it signify what it will, I am sure no Distinction can hinder, but who has Power to command in Temporals, is Superior in Temporals. And he would make us believe at the same time, both that Christian Princes know none such, and yet do know a certain Person who can command away their Temporals from them. To make both these true at once, is, me thinks, a pretty confident undertaking.  
Then again, what means this, that the two Powers are distinct, and one not to meddle with the Rights of the other? I am sure, he does not mean, that the same Person cannot have and exercise both, because then the Bishop of Rome could not be a temporal Prince. Now I understand how in that case the Powers are distinct in themselves, notwithstanding they are united in one Person, because that one Person commands temporal things in virtue of one power, and Spiritual in virtue of another, which certainly he may do who has both. But when there is but one Power extended to both kind of actions, The powers certainly are then confounded, if they can be confounded at all. For what can confounding, or mixing in this case signify, but making one of two, which one shall have the virtue of both? So liquors, so every thing that I know in the world, are blended or confounded together. Wherefore 'tis Bellarmin, not the Canonists, who truly confounds these Powers. They make them two, but say the Pope has both. Bellarmin says, he has but one, and that the Spiritual only; but would have this one Spiritual Power command both in Spirituals and Temporals. Which is of two, to make one third Power, neither wholly Spiritual, be cause it extends to Temporals, nor wholly Temporal, because it acts in Spirituals, but equivalent to both. And if this be not to confound the two Powers, and make one of these two which he says Christ would have divided, I would be glad to learn what is, and what other way they can be confounded. And yet the jest is even while he does this, he presses the confusion of the Powers as a great inconvenience upon the Canonists, who are not altogether so faulty as himself, and can extricate their Doctrine a great deal better. In two words, either he confounds the Powers, and then he disobeys Christ, who, he says, would have them kept asunder; or he does not, and then he disobeys him in permitting one to meddle with the rights of the other. For certainly 'tis the right of the Temporal power to command the Subjects to that power, and require their allegiance and service: And to take away these Subjects and this Allegiance, is to meddle and that very far too, with what belongs to the right of another.  
The Truth is, these Tricks turn a question of as great importance as any in the world, into pure words and illusion. The world is in suspense about the decision of this great Question, concerning the independent Sovereignty of the two Powers, and how that command in the Gospel, Reddite quae sunt Caesaris Caesari, & quae sunt Dei Deo, should be obeyed. All the learning of ten Ages teach, the powers were distinguished by Christ, one given to the Bishop, the other to the Prince. The Canonists, and they but some, and all late men, teach they were given both to the Pope. This third indirect Party coming to settle a point of this importance, profess at first, that the Powers truly are, as Christ commanded they should be, distinct, and the Pope for his share has the Spiritual only. Would not any man think now the business decided, and that we had no more to do but obey our Prince in Temporals, and Bishop, or, if you will Pope (for I will not meddle with that question) in Spirituals, and there's an end?  
Why this 'tis to be illiterate, says Bellarmin, and not understand distinction. The Pope's power is only Spiritual, but yet this Spiritual power indirectly, and for the good of Souls, virtually, and by means of some other proprieties of speech, extends likewise to Temporals, and may dispose of Kingdoms as it sees fit. Why then call it Temporal in the name of God, if it can dispose of Temporals, and say the Pope is Universal Monarch if he be so, and stand to it. Yes we do stand to it, replies Bellarmin, but we love to speak properly, and do not call the Pope Universal Monarch, though he can dispose of all the Kingdoms of the World, because he does it not in virtue of a Temporal power, but by a spiritual working, and after an indirect manner. Hang the manner how he does it, if he can do it. What has the World to do with these mannerly tricks? A King is well holp up, who after he is dispossessed, comes to understand that this came about after another fashion, and in another manner than he was ware of.  
Well! but are you for the Canonists, or against them? why truly I am for them, and I am not for them. And our Question, What must be said to that? Must we obey our King or the Pope? This is what the world looks after. Why, according to one half of the resolution, which says Princes are supreme in Temporals, and have in them no Superior, we must obey our King: according to the other half, which says a power which is only Spiritual can dispose of Temporals too, we must obey the Pope. But how must I do with this Licet and non Licet? must I cut myself in two, and list a Leg and an Arm under one, a Thumb and a Shoulder under the other, and if I happen to meet in the battle fight my King-self against my Pope-self.  
Because this is something difficult, and they are men of reason, I imagine they would condescend a little in this point, and let me remain entire. As long as the answer is divided 'tis well enough. But then I must choose the right half. That's it I would be at. Pray tell me then, must whole I take the Spiritual, or the Temporal half. Why, the truth is you must take the Spiritual half. Parasites and Flatterers may tell you otherwise. But this is the truth of the story. Why then to what purpose all this illusion of my Prince's Sovereignty, and Independency, when after all he is neither Sovereign nor Independent? To what purpose this bustle against the Canonists, only to say the same thing at last, but with more ado. Can you not have plainly told me at first what I must trust to, and spared the trapan of so many useless disguises? The result of all your Spirituals, and Indirects, and good of Souls, and whatever else, is in short, I must obey the Pope against my Prince; only I must in spite of all sense believe my Prince is a true and Sovereign King, and has no Superior in Temporals, and the Pope no power but Spiritual, and so besides a Traitor and a Rebel, become senseless, and a block into the bargain.  
Here's your fine opinion, of which you make such a Mystery, and are so shy to discover your thoughts. Come; come; leave dodging, and deal above-board. Answer me these things, and show me that Bellarmin speaks sense, and sense not injurious to Government, and the safety of Princes; or disclaim him plainly as you have the Canonists. 'Tis at your choice to do what you will; but do one, and that effectually; or take notice I tell you I will believe for the future your Church is a wicked Church, absolutely inconsistent with Civil Government, and has not one sound member in her, no not one. Put me not off with formalities, and think to scape with telling me, this doctrine belongs not to your Church as a Church, and that only the Material men hold it. 'Tis the material men I only care for at present. We converse not with your formal Church, we hear and see, and deal with Material men. These are they can do us good or harm, and 'tis but reason we should know what to expect from them. Formalities are airy things, no rope can catch them: but Material men you know may be suspended, and when they are found guilty, and have no hopes of reprieve but in the innocence of their formalities, I doubt it goes hard with them.  
In two words, clear yourselves from an imputation, which you have brought upon yourselves, or confess you cannot be cleared; and remember that silence is a confession, and so I shall take it, as all Justice in the world does, and believe it was not the wickedness of the Canonists opinion which made you disclaim it, but because that wickedness came clad in sense, and people could understand it. But the same wickedness disguised in nonsense is a Darling. So that your Pique was not to the wicked, but the sense: make it but nonsensical enough, and let it be never so wicked you are for it. I bar Sophistry too, and unintelligible Subtleties. Let your Scholars keep their riddle me riddle me to themselves. I shall understand the Talmud as soon, as what you call Terms of Art, meaning, I suppose, the Art of keeping things from being understood; The Art of talking so that no body shall know whether you say I, or No. But I understand what 'tis to Command and Obey.  
And to bring the whole to a short plain Issue, I ask, If it should happen the Pope should command you to disobey your King, and the King command you to disobey the Pope, by whom will you stand? And I expect an Answer as plain as my Question. I declare too, because I will not turn our dispute into a controversy of Religion, nor meddle with the Pope's Spiritual power, that I mean only of Temporal commands, of such commands wherein you have no reason, nor doubt, but you ought obey the King, but only because the Pope commands the contrary. Give me a direct Answer to this, for I tell you I bar Indirects, and the business is done. If you will obey your King, you are an honest man, and have disclaimed Bellarmin as well as the Canonists: If the Pope, you must make out, if you can, how he is a good Subject who refuses to obey his Prince. The business being now in a very narrow compass, and perceptible by every body, there I leave it, with this Advertisement, that upon your Answer depend the thoughts I shall have of your Church, or, if you will, men of your Church. According as you Answer I, or No, I shall believe you consistent, or not consistent with Government. There I began, and there I end. I hope you will give me no occasion to change my thoughts of you; for truly 'twould grieve me if I could not, with as much satisfaction to my Judgement as Inclination, own the title of,  
Your, etc.   

FRIEND,  
ME thinks you deal roughly for a Friend. If I were as brisk as you, here would be brave do. What a bustle do you keep with me, with Bellarmine, and the Church? and all, because I desired to keep my thoughts to myself. Truly I thought silence no such heinous crime. I have known many repent of speaking, but few of holding their tongues. But for myself you may deal as you please; twenty to one but I may at some time or other find occasion to cry quittance with you, and then I expect you should allow me the liberty you take. But Bellarmine! what harm his he done you, to incur your indignation so highly? Is he the only man who maintains the Indirect Power? And if he were, can you not disprove him fairly, and let your bitterness alone? The Church too! Pray, what is she concerned whether I do as you would have me or no? Can no Member of her Communion displease you, but she presently must be brought in? She is this, and she is that, if I do not what I have no mind, and, for all your earnestness, I fear no reason to do. But you have got an eye of me, and you follow it. You know I value the Church above myself, and that I will never agree she should be ill thought of, if I can help it. Indeed I was in hope to have cut the Thread, and answered so, as might please you, and displease no body else: But since 'twill not be, and that there is no way to clear her from those blemishes, which your capricious Jealousy has cast upon her, but by forcing my own inclinations, I think myself obliged rather to expose myself to other men's censures, then leave her exposed to yours. If any man dislike my resolution, I entreat him for one moment to make my case his own, and consider what he would do, so loudly and so smartly challenged, and what duty requires he should do, when on the one side the Church's reputation is at stake, on the other the quiet, it may be credit of particulars. If he doubt which side to take, I must needs think, he has less respect for his mother then becomes a good child. For my part, I am persuaded otherwise.  
Well! But you will not be satisfied unless I speak plainly. Would I knew whether you will be satisfied if I do. For I tell you truly, I begin to be as jealous of your earnestness, as you of my reservedness. If reason would have satisfied you, I think you might have been satisfied before this time. However I will venture to make one experiment more, and try what I can do with you by and by. If you be in earnest, and that plain dealing will do it, I shall prevail at last. For I will tell you, and that very plainly, more than you ask. You shall know not only what I think, but why I have been thus backward to tell you what I think. I will frankly discover all my policy, which makes you so merry, peradventure to be as much laughed at for my simplicity: but however, you shall have no cause of jealousy of what I harbour in my breast, when you know all I harbour there. But do not think I mean to be so merry as you are. I am in no such pleasant humour, and think the matter a little too serious. If you had spared some of your mirth, I believe 'twould have been ne'er a whit the worse. The meat might have been altogether as good, if the sauce had been less tart. But to our business.  
You are still harping upon the Church. A worm of Jealousy is crept in, and will not out. You are still suspicious, she forbids people from dealing freely in these matters. I told you there was no such thing, and I tell you so again, at least that I know, and I tell you besides, That had there been such a thing, and I known it, I would have dealt as sincerely with you, as Fisher with King James, told you so at first, and never meddled so much as I have done. But if you will know the true cause of my reservedness, know that you yourself have a great share in it. You are all on fire, because I say not presently what pleases you. I suppose you do not imagine but there are men of tempers as hot as you, whom that will displease, which pleases you. Besides the Question is of a particular nature. It has been can vast heretofore with much animosity. The fire is not yet dead. It flames not indeed at present, because the fuel of occasion is taken away, but the heat lies rak't up in men's hearts, and would easily break out again. I would not for all the world be he, who should blow this heat into a new flame. But for that, I conceive, my breath too faint, and inconsiderable. However, as I love not to meddle with hot men at all, so I would gladly be guilty of so much policy, as not to provoke hot men upon a hot subject. Whether I say, I or No, one hot side will be apt to take offence. Wherefore I thought it the best way to hold my tongue. Now your fantastical curiosity is not satisfied with this, but is as hot upon my silence, as others may be upon my speaking: And would persuade me, you play the Friend all the while. I hope you will send me the next time to stir a nest of Wasps, and make me believe it a point of Friendship.  
However, I assure you, the Church has nothing to do with my silence, neither do I, or ever did apprehend any thing from her. The Church has other employment, then to look so low as I am, and besides, God forbidden, that Innocence should not be safety enough for any of her Communion. All that I apprehend is the heat of private men, of those with whom I am like to meet and converse, and from whom I may chance hear twenty cross Questions. 'Twould vex me to have a man come to me, and say: You Sir! Pray how long have you taught Divinity, or in what University taken degrees, who presume to handle so freely, men in reverence for their learning with all Divines, and all Universities? The world is at a fine pass, when a little pert confidence shall set up every piddler in learning, against those who have spent their lives in nothing else. Again, You pass for a Catholic, and acknowledge, at least in words, That the Pope is supreme Pastor. 'Tis done like a dutiful Child to go about to lessen your Father. The next time you writ I hope you will leave him no power at all. I fore see the next piece will be of Antichrist, and then there is hopes you may in time proceed to the three Impostors. 'Tis an Heretical spirit this, and beware of it. I may be in a froward humour when I hear this, and it may be return a froward answer; and then we fall out, and he tells every body he meets, I am in a dangerous condition, tottering upon the very brink of perdition, and 'tis great luck if I scape the precipice. Every body who hears this said, and that confidently, and gravely, will not hear what I can say for myself; or if they did, they are but few with whom the solemn outside will not carry it against a better reason than I shall be able to produce. And then I pass for dangerous, or busy, or foolish as they please to frame my character. My Friends begin to look askew at me, and all the sweetness of conversation, and innocent pleasure of hearty Friendship is lost. This would be wonderful uneasy to me, and if it should happen, as 'tis like enough, I should, whatever you do, think it a great inconvenience. In fine every man has his humour, and mine is not to make an enemy of so much as a Cobbler, if I could keep him my Friend.  
This is the reason why I so readily diclaimed the Canonists, because I meet with none who are like to give me any trouble about them. And this is the reason why I was more reserved in the other opinion, because I may meet with this trouble. I hope you will not think this a reflection upon my communion, as if they were more troublesome to their Neighbours then other folks. Men are men of all communions, and hot men are hot men, and such are impatient that any persuasion they have wedded should be contradicted. This is all the disquiet I foresaw and apprehended, and the great Policy with which you keep so much ado. And if it be Policy to think my thought quietly to myself, as I elsewhere told you, and not fall out with every man who thinks otherwise, nor give any man occasion to fall out with me; to think I have no commission to Reform every thing I dislike, but that there may and will be errors in the world, let me do what I can: I avow to you, I would have been a Politician, if you would have let me, and am very sorry you did not.  
But now we are upon Politics, let me tell you one thing by the way. You are a mere Mortal at Politics as well as your Neighbours. What work do you make with the business of 88, and how slily do you make it pass for an effect only of Heresy? If you do in earnest believe so, I can tell who's the Sir Pol. But sure you understand things better, than not to know, Pretence is one thing, and Cause another. 'Tis true Heresy was pretended, and it may be was a partial cause too, of as much as the Pope did. But do you think the King of Spain was at all that charge purely upon the account of Zeal? Sure you do not think him so great a Saint. Or if you do, all the world knows 'twas Interest of State, not Religion, which raised that Army, and set out that Armada. The Queen stood in the way of his great thoughts, and so crossed his designs upon other men's dominions, that she made him unable to recover his own. This obstacle to his ambition he had a mind to remove; and Religion was no bad pretence among his own Subjects, who were and still are exceeding Zealous; but he so little valued it himself, that he would not so much as own it. And this a better Politician than you or I, Grotius in his History of the Low Countries has observed: Some, says he, would have had the war proclaimed by a Herald, but others thought the right of claim from the Pope's sentence would make out but a lame Title. And these it seems were the wiser, and carried it. See now what conceit the Spaniards themselves had of your Politic Cause, and no better had we in England. For though Mendoza had vainly boasted of I know not what affection of some principal men here towards the Spaniard, in all likelihood to ingratiate his own diligence, yet whatever his thoughts were, says Grotius again, it appeared true afterwards that however English Catholics might differ in Religion, there was, none of them so imprudent as to trust their Lives and Fortunes to the undistinguishing sword of a Foreign Conqueror. And yet they were at that time as much affected to the Pope as any people in the world, and thought as highly of his power. And for all that they did not think he had power to dispossess their Sovereign, and distinguished rightly betwixt Pretence of Religion, and Reason of Interest. I can assure you we are of the same mind still, and know an Invader, let him be never so much a Catholic, is an Invader, and, let him pretend what he will, means to enslave those he Invades, and always will. He that comes with a Cross in his mouth, and a Sword in his hand, we know what he would be at, and shall never be so senseless to be diverted by what he says, from considering what he would do. I tell you once for all, we would fight as freely against the Pope as the Turk, if he come like a Turk in Arms; and you may easily believe me: for all Nations do it without difficulty when there is occasion; French, Spaniards, Italians themselves have all had their turns. Marry if he come like a Pope, to direct our feet in the ways of that peace, which Christ bequeathed as a legacy to his Church, I for my part will fall down at his feet, and kiss them too, laugh you as much as you will. In the mean time I would advise you, as you do me, to let Politics alone, and not go about to persuade the world, Heresy was the cause of all the danger of 88, when if there had been no such thing, there had not been one Ship, or one Soldier the less. Had Queen Elizabeth been Inquisition-proof as much as King Philip, he would have done just as he did: For 'twas the enemy of Spain, and friend to Holland, not the enemy to the Pope, with whom he had the quarrel. Had the Pope himself been in her place, the Pope had been invaded as she was. And this I say not altogether by guess, for both he and his Father actually did invade the Pope, and his Father take him prisoner too. But so much for your Politics, and my reservedness, of which I have now given you the very reason, and told you the Truth, the whole Truth, and nothing but the Truth.  
As for Bellarmin, I wish you had spared some of your smartness. He was a great man, and if you would undertake to answer all that he has writ, peradventure you would go near to find him so. Nay do but write on any, choose what you think the easiest, Subject, as much as he has done of intricate matters, and if you do not somewhere or other give occasion of as much sport as you have made with him, I shall much marvel. A great piece of Mastery it is, out of so many Volumes, where 'tis impossible the Author should always be equally attentive, to pick out a few lines, and turn them to Burlesque. If I had a mind to take his part against you, perhaps I could make it appear, He is not altogether such an Ass as you would make him, even in this question. For example, You quarrel with him because, as you say, he forgets to explain what he means by Indirect where he first uses the word. As if those against whom he then writ, did not understand it well enough, and need no explication. His notion pleases not you, and you say it is not the Notion of the world. Suppose it be not. He writ to that part of the World which understood it in his Notion. If they understand one another, what is't to you and me what words they use? Again; you say, He makes no use of that word in the whole course of his Arguments. What is it to purpose whether he did or no? It may be he had no occasion. But if you consider his Arguments, you will find they proceed all upon what he understands by Indirect Power, and that they are all along opposite to the Canonists, who maintain in the Pope a power properly Temporal, whereas he places in him only a Spiritual Power; and then endeavours by those Arguments to prove, that supreme Spiritual Power, may in virtue of its being so, extend also in some cases to Temporals: which is in his language to be Indirect, and was so understood by those against whom he intended his Arguments. So that he is so far from forgetting, as you imagine, his Indirect, that he makes use of it and nothing else. More I could say in his behalf if I had a mind. But I mean not to engage for him. He has friends a great deal more learned than I, who can speak for him, when they think convenient. As you have ordered the matter I have enough to do to quit myself However I mean now to endeavour it, and quit myself so, if I can, that I may hear no more of you. For I am very weary of being baited thus long at one stake, and will come no more there, if I can help it.  
I tell you then I will stand by your Parliament-Doctrine, as much as you or any of his Majesty's Subjects, and take it unkindly at your hands you should surmise I would do otherwise. That Parliament was a Catholick-Parliament, if you remember, and might have put you in mind, that Catholics may be both good Catholics and good Englishmen. 'Tis true, there may be Traitors of them, and those Traitors may disguise their Treason with the pretence of Religion, as who would not get as hand some a vizard as he could for so ugly a face? But 'tis plain, that their Religion has no inconsistency with their duty to their King and Country, when we see their Religion was no hindrance to them, for providing for the liberties of their Country, against the encroachments of pretended Religior. On the contrary, I conceive it more shameful, and more wicked for us, who persevere in the same Faith, to degenerate from the same Loyalty, then for men of other persuasions. But to go on: I disavow and detest the wicked and pernicious Doctrine, which teaches the deposition of Kings, whom I acknowledge to hold independently of God, and will be ready on all occasions to lay down my life in confirmation of this Truth; and when you please, will give under my hand, that 'tis new, false, erroneous, contrary to the Word of God, and several ways mischievous besides, and will never maintain any opinion to the contrary. I know not how you will relish this way of speaking, but I can assure you, 'tis a way in which wiser men than I, have walked before me. But to give a direct Answer to the Question to which you have reduced the whole, and which by the way, I am very glad you have confined to Temporals, (for I do not mean to be persuaded out of my Religion by your earnestness) I answer thus: That I will at all times, and in all occasions, stand by my King, against whatsoever Power, and under whatsoever pretences. And because you are particularly jealous of the Pope, I declare, I will stand by my Sovereign, and believe it my duty so to do, against the Pope, as firmly as against any other, as being fully persuaded, he has no Power Direct or Indirect, Virtual or Formal, or by whatever names it has or may be called, to depose or dispossess him of all or any part of his Dominions, or authorize his Subjects not to perform faithful obedience to him. And I absolutely disclaim all Doctrine to the contrary, by whomsoever maintained, and under whatsoever disguises. And if you distrust my word, I will pawn you my hopes of salvation, and swear all this in as ample manner as you can devise, provided, you keep within the bounds you have set, and entrench not upon Spirituals. For you desire I should deal plainly with you, and I must tell you plainly, I mean, by the Grace of God, to be as good a Catholic, as a Subject, and hope, I do you no harm by meaning to save my soul. Now if you be not satisfied, it is no fault of mine, and I must believe, say what I will or can, you are resolved not to be satisfied. Which if it be so, I am sorry with all my heart you have put me to so much fruitless trouble, for truly I could have spent my time something better than in washing the Brick.  
But now I am in the humour of telling you all I know, let me tell you farther, I am not alone of this persuasion. Whenever you make it as seasonable for other people to speak their thoughts freely, as you have made it necessary for me, I do not think you will find many Catholics, who will leave you much ground of jealousy. At least I am sure of this, That there is no Catholic, who may not remain as good a Catholic as the Pope himself, in the blunt phrase, and say as much as I do. Those who will not, if there be any such, are not hindered by any, either Doctrine, or Command of the Church, but by Principles, which whether by the credit of the maintainers, or whatever flash their eyes are dazzled, they mistake for more effectual than they are. Notwithstanding if you meet with any such, I freely consent, you make as much sport with them as you will, and bar you no part of the pleasure, I doubt, you take even in your jealousy, and which, I fear, you would be loath to part with. But, to my knowledge, there are who would gladly give you satisfaction in this Point, if you would receive it.  
Pray permit me a little liberty too, and let me ask you a Question or two in my turn. You know, as well as I, there are of us, who hold in this matter what displeases you, and there are who do not. You who talk so much of honesty and uprightness, pray where is the honesty and the uprightness to treat us both alike, and give the honestest man that is, the portion of a Knave? Do you think it a just thing, that one man should bear the burden of another man's faults, or that those Nations do well, who when any one offends, punish all his relations? You keep us all under the same discouragements, and yet know we do not all deserve it. You allow us no means to clear our innocence, such as you know are clear, and should we find a means ourselves, our case is still the same as if we were guilty. Honest or not honest, all is one with you. If you say, You know not which are which, why do you not know it? You may when you please. But since you do know that some, whoever they be, are innocent, those innocent men should rather bear out the guilty, than the guilty condemn the innocent. I think men of tender conscience would choose to let twenty guilty men scape, before they would let one innocent man suffer. At least in other cases, the Law does not condemn any man, because he is not known to be innocent, but frees him without more ado, unless upon sufficient proof he be in particular found guilty. With us 'tis otherwise: because some are perhaps but thought guilty, (for till it come to trial, that's all can be said) it takes hold of innocent and all. Nay, we are not admitted so much as to a trial, nor allowed to plead Not-guilty, with any plea which shall be any way beneficial, and free him, who is found so, from any thing to which he is liable who is cast. In fine, You pretend, and endlessly pretend dissatisfaction, yet no satisfaction will be received from those who could, and gladly would give it. Whatever men be, to look upon them still as guilty, and keep them so, in spite of all they can do, to make out their innocence, and not suffer them to pass for other: In two words, To make men liable to punishment whether they will or no, and then punish them, is in my opinion something hard dealing. I am persuaded, you are sensible enough that This might be pressed. But I forbear, and only wish you to clear things as well as I have done. You are so nice at receiving satisfaction, that I should be very sorry, you had this to object against me. I fear, I should have much ado to make your squeamishness believe otherwise, but we were in love with severity, and resolved not to part with any pretence of it.  
As for me I think I have done my part, and so cleared all who are persuaded as I am, that if you continue your jealousy against us, 'tis very plain, you are jealous for some other reason then demerit in us. And because you shall perceive I am in earnest, and speak, not only in force of your importunity, but according to the persuasion of my best little Judgement, I will go a little farther, and tell you why I am thus persuaded. For I would not have you think, your Arguments alone have done the feat, and that being formerly either unsettled, or wrong fixed, they have converted me: And yet I must frankly acknowledge, I cannot answer them in the main, though if I had a mind to keep up the wrangling Ball, I could perhaps here and there pick out enough to give you sufficient trouble. But I have always been of this Judgement, and you might perceive so much by the Relation I made of the Arguments; in which I did not play the Historian so impartially, as not to discover sufficiently with which part I sided. So much sharpness as I mingled with the Narrative, could not proceed from one who thought well of the Arguments. By the way, I now wish there had been less. For since you must know all, that heat was indeed but counterfeit, a disguise I put on, in hopes to excuse myself from plainly discovering my own face. Otherwise more modesty to learneder men than myself, had been more suitable both to manners and my humour, and 'ttwas with regret I showed no more respect to them. But I thought there was no great harm to speak a little freely of Books, whose Authors are by death exempt from all sense of wrong, and if they were alive, perhaps would not take much offence at any thing I should say. But I perceive I must give over Policy. 'Tis a Trade in which I am not skilled, and thrives accordingly.  
To acquaint you plainly then with what I harbour in my breast, I must profess that as far, as I can judge, This Deposing doctrine, in whatever garments of distinctions clad, as much as 'tis pinned upon our Religion, is more inconsistent with our principles, than those of any other persuasion: so inconsistent, that were it once established for Catholic doctrine, instead of being an advantage to the Church, as they who favour it suppose, it would be the ruin of it. One of our Principles is respect to the Ancient Fathers, which he that would take away, would do the Church very bad service. Every body knows what reverence we profess to those great lights, and what veneration we pay to their learning and virtues. What shall we say? that they were ignorant of a doctrine, which is pretended was taught by Christ, they who understood what Christ taught so well, and defended it so zealously Can it be imagined our new Schoolmen know more than these great men, who in defence of Christianity, against opposers as subtle as any that have since appeared, discovered a learning, which for aught I perceive After-ages have more reason to admire, than think they can equal. But if they knew as much as they do now, it can be less suspected from their Virtue; that they would conceal their knowledge, and suppress a truth of this importance. I cannot readily fancy any thing more incredible, not to say a harsher word, than that a point of no less concern than the performance of our duty to God, and his Vicegerents, Kings, should lie dormant in breasts inspired with so much zeal, and enlightened with so much knowledge, for Ten whole ages, and at last break out, and surprise the world with a new-light. Nor do I see how it can be thought possible, without imputing either Ignorance or Dishonesty to those, who of all men in the world are farthest from the suspicion of either. I should be sorry to be, or see the Catholic, who should in good earnest think either imputable. And yet if they knew this doctrine and did not conceal it, we must of necessity have heard of it long before we did. Gregory the 7th is the first unquestionable Author of it: For though a little more Antiquity be sometimes pretended, yet those pretences are in truth but weak, and little better than mere conjecture. All that I can imagine possible to be said in the case, is, that they had no occasion to declare their knowledge, but being busied with other controversies said not all they knew in this. But I fear this cannot be maintained. For they do often treat of both Powers, explain their natures, and settle their bounds. They tell us the one consists in constraint, the other in freedom; That one has to do with Sacrifice, and Sacraments, and Divine things; the other with Human: That one inflicts Corporal, the other Spiritual punishment, and the like. Was there no occasion all this while to have given one touch of this Direct and Indirect Power? one little hint at the distinction, if they had known it? Let them think so that please. For my part I conclude they knew it not; those who think otherwise may conclude if they please, that they would not teach what they knew, but concealed a point of Christian duty, and which they knew to be so: and so by seeking to justify they knew more than we can possibly tell they did, since they express it not themselves, call in question their virtue which we all know.  
But yet bare silence is not the case. They teach the direct contrary. They teach there are none who can punish Kings but only God; that we for our parts are to obey even unjust and wicked Princes, and this because God has so commanded, whose secret, but yet just, Providence, places over us, as well Nero's as constantin's: That the Church has no sword but the Spiritual, which to extend to Temporals is Arrogance. He that can reconcile these, and twenty other of their express doctrines with the deposing Power, may never stick at any thing, or fear that Impossibility will ever stand in his way. In fine, They allow us no other disobedience then in case of commands contrary to what God has commanded before, and no other resistance, even in this case, but of prayers, and tears. Put them to have known the efficacy of our distinction, and that it was lawful, while directly we are obliged, to pray like Christians, indirectly to fight like Turks, and they have direly cheated the world, and trapan'd the Church into many a severe Persecution, from which let them say what they will, she had force enough to have freed herself, if she had thought it lawful to use it. Primitive Christians themselves had the confidence to tell their Persecutors to their faces, they wanted not strength to revenge themselves, if they had thought the defence of their lives a just excuse for resisting their Prince, or the Sword a lawful instrument to introduce the Gospel. But they knew Religion was not to be established by fight, but preaching, and that Conquest is not the way to set up the Kingdom of Christ. If their Prince bade them fight against his Enemies, they did so: but if he himself became their Enemy, they chose, as was their duty, to die rather than fight against him.  
The truth is, people may say and think as their fancy guides them, but Force is not the way to preserve or introduce true Religion. Falshood may need it, but it we●kens Truth. Consider which way the wisdom of God went to work; As rain into a fleece of wool, as drops of dew distilling on the earth. He who had an unresistable power, would not use so much on this occasion as to break even a bruised reed. 'Tis evident by the choice of unerring wisdom that this is the proper way of Truth, and that 'tis a deceitful wisdom, and takes wrong measures, which goes otherwise. And indeed what can be more wild, then to think to force men into Heaven, and make Saints of them whether they will or no? We see what Christ, what his followers did, we know how we were taught by the great and best succeeding Masters of Christianity. I shall never be persuaded, that those who taught in this manner, were acquainted with these indirect subtleties; at least we should have been acquainted with them much sooner if they had. In fine, I cannot but think, there is very little of a Catholic spirit, in introducing a Doctrine, not only unknown to the ancient Fathers, but so opposite to their Maxims, that it cannot well be imagined how they should contradict it more plainly than they do, unless we fancy them Prophets too, and that they foresaw all the subtleties which should be brought in the world after they left it. Otherwise we cannot expect they should talk of Direct and Indirect who never thought of either. But they plainly say, There is no Power in the Church but spiritual, and that this spiritual Power does not extend to Temporals: Again, That Princes have none to call them to account but only God, and that just or unjust they must be obeyed, saving only in unjust commands. And if any disguise of words can hinder this from being a plain determination of the Thing, I must needs profess, I know not how it can be determined by them.  
But forgetfulness of the Fathers, I fear, is not the worst of the Case. It is pretended in the behalf of the deposing Doctrine, that it relies on divine Right, and the hot abetters of it will hardly suffer those to pass for good Catholics, who reject it. The truth is, they cannot well go less. For while it is acknowledged, as on all hands it is, That subjection to Princes is commanded by God's Law, that which takes away this subjection must be God's Law too, or nothing. And indeed considering the import of the Question, and the immediate influence it has upon a main Point of duty, it cannot well be doubted, but the Truth, on which side soever it be, dees belong to God's Law Certainly the Wisdom of God, who took flesh purposely to instruct the world in all necessary duty, did not leave out so considerable a part. Now that his Law teaches, we are to obey temporal Princes, is both plain in itself, and, as I come from saying, plainly confessed by every body. But 'tis evident, we cannot at the same time obey two Powers commanding contrary things. Wherefore I cannot see, but to require obedience in Temporals to the spiritual Power, by the same Law which commands obedience to the Temporal, is to make that Law contradictory, and impossible to be obeyed. Which as 'tis a Blasphemy intolerable in any Christian, so I fear, 'tis unavoidable in those who put a temporal virtue in the spiritual Power. For that virtue plainly obliges to obedience in Temporals, to which obedience we are obliged by another virtue, that of the temporal Power. And this is to require we should do what Christ himself has assured us is impossible to be done, serve two Masters.  
The way by which they seek to avoid this, is by saying, Kingly obedience as inferior, must yield to Papal obedience as superior. Which I think is, by striving to weather Scylla, to split upon Charybdis. We have assurance from those, whom we have more reason to credit, that Kings are inferior only to God, and have none above them but him alone. I suppose this is to be understood of the same kind of Superiority. For otherwise 'tis ordinary enough for the same man to be both Superior and Inferior to another, in several respects: as a Father to a Son, who is a Magistrate. But 'tis plain there is no reconciling this Doctrine, with that of a Papal Superiority in Temporals. We may as soon obey both when they command contraries, as believe one has no Superior besides God, to whom the Pope is Superior.  
And yet there is another thing which sticks more with me. This Papal Superiority in Temporals is not where to be found, but in their own fancies. There is no such thing in Scripture or Tradition, Councils or Fathers. To obtrude upon us an invention of their own heads, and this for a part of God's Law, is to add to the Law of God. Let them either show that place of God's Law, which teaches, Kingly Power is inferior, and Papal superior, and this in Temporals, or show how they do not give us for God's Law, that which is not, and entitle themselves to the maledictions of the Apocalypse. Feed my sheep, and, whatsoever you shall bind is not, Kings are inferior in Temporals, and their interpretation, which hooks in Temporals, is not Scripture. Besides the Council of Trent has forbid the Scripture to be Interpreted against the unanimous consent of the Fathers; And if any one Father can be brought, who Interprets those places as they do, or who does not Interpret them quite contrary, if he meddle with them at all, truly there is more to be said for them than I am ware of.  
But let us consider a little farther. In a Question which belongs to Christian duty, and the law of God, how does, or how should a Catholic proceed? I conceive who goes to work like a Catholic, should frame his belief according to his Rule of Belief. I think that is the use of a Rule. To my judgement they go not this way, who are for Deposing; as indeed they cannot. For if Tradition be, as I conceive it is, the Catholic Rule, there is no applying this Rule to Deposition. Look into all Beauties' Arguments. Those in his Rom. Pont. are all from Reason, deducing such inferences from Scripture, or acknowledged points of Catholic Doctrine, as make to his purpose. These deductions, till they be acknowledged rightly made, which hitherto is denied, and that upon very good grounds, have no force at all to induce belief, and though they were acknowledged, would make at most but a Theological conclusion. Those against Barclay are all from Authority, and this Authority is either of a single Pope Boniface 8, or a great many single men, or those men met together in Councils. For as for Scripture, which he pretends, and which indeed would do the business, if it declared itself, he makes nothing of it. Now there is no number, or quality of men, let them be Catholics never so much, which obliges to a belief of what they say, otherwise then when they witness, the point in question was received by them from their Ancestors as taught originally by Christ, which testimony of theirs hands it over, for such a point, to those who come after. In all other cases they speak their own private judgements, and this whether single, or assembled, and for that reason are not parts of Tradition, or the Catholic Rule, and make no necessity of Belief. And these being all the ways they have to the wood, I do not discern the Catholic way among them.  
But what is the consequence? There are but two things acknowledged by Catholics, to which we are obliged to submit our Judgements, Scripture and Tradition, if these be truly two and not one thing with two names. For as for Councils, They belong to Tradition, and are when duly qualified the most considerable parts of it. In Scripture we find Subjection and Obedience, and this for Conscience, possessing our Souls in patience, expecting our reward in the next world, and the like, no word of Deposition. Look into Tradition, and we find Ten whole Ages persuaded and practising according to the same Maxims, persevering in faithful obedience to just commands, and patiented refusal of unjust ones, and apprehending they were obliged by the law of God so to do. We find all the Fathers of all those Ages confirming them in this apprehension, and inculcating the duty of Obedience even to Tyrants and Persecutors. We find Popes themselves not only teaching but practising the same Doctrine, obeying commands sometimes thought unreasonable and unjust, and submitting with patience to the pleasures of their then acknowledged Lords, the Emperors. This is, if any thing can be, semper & Vbique, & ab omnibus. And this is the known Rule of the Catholic Church. The opposite Opinion began at such a time in such a place, and by such a Man; and when it began was cried out on as a novelty contrary to the ancient Doctrine, which in all other cases is a condemnation without more ado. Neither did they well know at first on what bottom to fix. This Indirect came in afterwards. As far as can be guest they thought, because the Pope was Superior over all Christians, he might therefore come and all Christians any thine. Since, the business coming to be debated, they cast about for ways to maintain it, and the Indirect way pleases most, though it be not yet well settled, some thinking it as much too little for the Pope, as others too much.  
But whatever they think, I fear both the one and the other is ruinous to the Church. For neither can pretend to be believed, but for some reason; and this reason, since it cannot be the same for which we believe other points of Faith, there being manifestly no such thing as uninterrupted delivery in the case, must be something else, which as well as It must pretend a virtue of inducing belief. And, that being a Rule of Faith, which has power to settle Faith, here is a new Rule of Faith brought into the Church, and with it all the Incertain●y, and all the confusion blamed in the most extravagant Sect, and this even by her own confession, who thinks her Rule is the only means to avoid that incertainly and that confusion. This Rule is manifestly discarded by a new one; For she cannot with any face pretend, all she teaches was delivered to her, if it be pined upon her, that she teaches what was not delivered; and if She lose the pretence to all, she will keep it to none, since it cannot appear; but if she have once deserted her Rule, she has done't oftener; And then farewell Church. Once take away the Rule, and the Church must of necessity go after. She has no solid ground of Authority but the stediness of her Faith; no stediness of Faith, but the stediness of her Rule; break that once, and there is neither Authority, nor Faith, nor will within a while be Church left.  
So that in good earnest, I do not think the malice of all her professed enemies could ●ver do the Church so much harm, as the zeal of her unwary Friends. At least for my part break but the Chain once, and I know no more any certain way to Heaven, than the veriest Enthusiast among all those Sectaries who rove blindly for want of a sure Guide, and should find myself as much at a loss. That any thing must be believed, but what was taught by Christ, or that any thing can be known to be taught by him, but by the constant belief and practice of intermediate ages, is what a Catholic should neither say, nor endure to hear; for it manifestly takes away Divine from Faith, and all the advantage we profess in our method above others to come to Faith leaving us as much benighted, and as much to seek, and as small hopes of success, as we object to those whom we think stray most, and are most in the dark. Wherefore, salvo meliori, as far as my short prospect reaches, To bring Deposing Faith into the Church, is a ready way to depose the Church.  
I cannot tell whether I should more wonder or grieve, but I am sure I do both, to see men so intent upon the maintenance of an Opinion, which they have espoused, that they forget the honour and safety of the Church: and to observe a certain supercilious gravity, with which they labour to discourse these things into Faith and Religion, should so far impose upon the world, that they do not discover th●y are quite contrary and destructive to both. But no doubt there are enough who see all that is to be seen, but if they be no more forward than I, to say all they think, they are in my conceit the wiser. By the favour of your earnestness, it is no commendable disposition in private men to turn Reformers on every occasion, and when they see any thing amiss, step presently in; and make a bustle in what concerns them not. Let those who Govern the world, and shall severely answer for those miscarriages of which They are the cause, look to their duty. Ours is to live quietly, and unoffensively, and trust God 's Providence.  
Your importunity has carried me farther than I intended. But you have now your will of me, and know I for my part think the not-deposing doctrine is the truly Catholic doctrine. Did I think otherwise, all your importunities, and all considerations in the world besides, should not persuade me to it. I hope you now find I said true, when I told you, my thoughts of this matter were such as become a good Christian, and a good Subject, and afford you no occasion to change yours, if you had any good of  
Your, etc.   
FINIS.   

The Thirteenth and Fourteenth OF THE Controversial LETTERS, OR Grand Controversy, Concerning The pretended Temporal Authority of POPES over the whole Earth, And the True Sovereign of KINGS within their own respective Kingdoms.  
Between two English Gentlemen, 

The one of the Church of England:  
The other of the Church of Rome.    
LONDON, Printed for Henry Brome and Benjamin took, at the Gun; and at the Ship in St. Paul's Churchyard, 1675.   


FRIEND,  
YOU had saved yourself and me some trouble, if your last had been your first. I almost despaired of doing any good upon you, and perceive that exsculpere verum out of one of your humour, is one of the hardest tasks in the world. But since 'tis come at last, I regret not my own pains, and for yours, it was in your power to have spared them. But yet I have not done with you. The Pope is a crafty Gentleman, and has more strings to his Bow then one. Shut the door never so fast, it is hard to keep him out. If St. Peter's Keys will not open the lock, He has St. Paul's sword to cut it off. Not that I apprehend any great danger from downright fight. 'Tis a Trick he shows as seldom as he can: And he has reason; for Kings overmatch him at that weapon. But Justice has a sword too, and that so sharp that I should be very sorry to see it in his hands. Now that there may be justice without deriving it from Pasce Oves, or Dabo Claves; and that it may belong to him as well as others, and by the same means; And that he actually has heretofore, and may, when he please, again set on foot pretensions, upon this Title, to part, perhaps all his Majesty's Dominions, is something too evident to be denied, and of too great importance to be neglected. It is a thing which has long disquieted me with uneasy thoughts; but I must freely avow to you I was never so sensible of the danger, as since I read the Considerations of present Concernment. You are so much concerned in that Book, that I must needs suppose you have seen it, and observed how much may be replied to what you have said to me. But I am for the present so intent upon what's before, that I cannot reflect on what's past. Hereafter possibly, when I am in a calmer disposition, and my settled spirits at more liberty to compare what he says to you, with what you have said to me, I may call you to a new account, and see whether you can maintain what you have written. But at present, taking all you have given me in payment for currant money, let us only see how far 'twill go.  
That in relation to you, and such as are principled like you, we are safe from all pretensions of Divine Right, which the Pope can have upon us, I fairly allow you. Are we therefore safe? Plainly No, if he have right over us any other way. Nay whether he have right or no, so he but pretend it, and you will own his pretence, we are as bad as ever. There is a thing called Human Right in the world, by which men enjoy their lands, and goods, and whatever they call with truth their own. It has not altogether so glorious a sound as the other, but is not much less efficacious; for the World could not subsist without it. Now although what the Pope claims by Divine Right, be enough, as he order matters, to satisfy a not very unreasonable man, yet his claim by that, is no bar from claiming by any other Title too, by which Right may be had. He may Purchase, as well as another man, or receive a Gift, or Legacy, etc. and what he gets by these, or any other ways, by which the property of things is transferred, is as truly his, as they would be of any other man by the same Titles. And who can blame him, for joining as much Silver as he can to his Gold?  
This being so, we have made a fine hand on't with all our wise speculations, and are much beholding to you, for furnishing us with Armour of proof against the sharp point of Divine Right, while the Human may chance knock out our brains with her clouterly club. If there be no fence for this flail, we are as much at his mercy as ever. Now Baronius has taken care that no man should be ignorant, that He may claim both England and Ireland, and this independently of Divine Right, and in virtue of such Titles as are allowed to create Right in other men. I must confess, though He speak plain enough, yet I was not so much startled by him, whom I took for a partial man, and who I see entitles him, to the better part of Christendom as well as England. This seemed a fancy too wild, to deserve much credit; and I thought while our case was not singular, but common to so many and so powerful States, and which engaged the strength of Christendom on our side, we were safe enough. I considered we were pretty well out of the way, and that he could not come at us, till he had possessed himself of some little countries which lie between us, and which I believed would find him work enough, to let us sleep in quiet, and need no better security then that of Ulysses, to be devoured last. But I perceive, by the Considerations, the case indifferent from what I fancied. The Pope I find has something to say to us, which he cannot say to every body, and which, to tell you truth, I am ill at ease to see can be said.  
I know you will spare me the labour of transcribing out of a book which I believe you have, at least may have, on every stall. Pray what say you to it? The Author is no Baronius, or Bellarmine, to be suspected of partiality to the Pope, and though he were, Reason is Reason whoever says it. Blind justice sees neither Friend nor Foe, and values not whether it be on the left or right hand the scale goes down. Truly I do not see we are a jot the better for all your hardly drawn out condescendencies. We are at the en Tierce and the en Quart again. While the Pope plays fair Play, we fear him not, but what ward for his foining tricks? Certainly he is no such fantastical man to insist more on the way then the end. He will be content without all doubt to drive the nail that will go, and, so he can get a Kingdom, be satisfied to take it as it comes, and like it ne'er the worse for bringing a bare Human title along with it. But whatever he would think, we cannot agree he may with justice do any thing to our prejudice. Nay a Human title would be so much worse than a Divine, by how much we must all acknowledge, that Human Right is a true Right, since we have no other to whatever we possess and hold dear in the world, whereas we are less acquainted with the other.  
'tis not but that I believe we may with our Author, rely securely on Prescription. But with such a Gamester, and for such a stage, 'tis good to play sure. Besides there is as much danger from what is apprehended as from what is. Bare Right alone will do no great feats; it must be acknowledged and abetted to become efficacious: And if that which truly is not Right, be taken for Right, and will be stood to, and maintained, it will do as much as if it were Right. Now Prescription which our Author says is, our only, but withal a very sufficient, plea, he says also the Pope will not allow. And we know how much influence he has upon those of his Communion, and how prone you are to be of his opinion. If you be of his mind in this particular, and admit no Prescription against him, then whether he have Right or no, you at least are persuaded he has, and will undoubtedly act according to your persuasions when time serves.  
I have a little too much reason to be concerned for this point. 
Disputatio Apologetica de Jure Regni Hiberniae Authore C. M. Hiberno.  There is a certain Friend of yours, at least he is of your Communion, who has the confidence to defend in the face of the world, that, of the conditions required to Prescription, there is not one which holds in the Prescriptions of the Kings of England to Ireland. When such things are said, 'tis time to look about us. Though England were unconcerned, Ireland is too considerable a branch to be turn away from the stock. 'Tis Treason in great abundance to imagine the dispossessing our Sovereign of any part of his Dominions: and here are plenty of men with hard names produced to prove, it is consonant to the doctrine of Catholic Authors, to dismember a great Kingdom at once, and this without any relation to Divine Right, though it be slightly touched by the by. And for aught I know, you may pick as many holes in our Prescription against the Pope, as this Author does in our prescription to Ireland.  
Twenty to one but Scotland will be hooked in too some way or other; or though it be not, it will go near to fall in of itself, either as part of England, or at least Britain, or by some other fetch. It would undoubtedly run the fate of its Neighbour Kingdoms, and it is not a pin matter for a Title to that, which must come in at last, and when it comes will bring Title enough with it. Nature and Necessity make perhaps as good Titles as Law, and I know not whether the Law have any better than possession. If the Pope get once possession, as when he has got England and Ireland, I see not what can keep him from it, 'twil be to no more purpose to be solicitous for a Title, then for a man to look after a horse, who is at his journey's end. For Titles serve but to obtain, or hold what they pretend to, which he that has already, and so, that it cannot be taken away, no longer needs them. But if the worst come to the worst, why may not the Pope dispense with a Title, as well as other things, altogether as hard, and not altogether so advantageous? Plenitude of power, set once on the tenterhooks, I believe will stretch as far as that, and what cannot he do, Who can do all which is necessary for the good of the Church, and who is alone to determine what is necessary? Who shall hinder him from calling the Bunch a Horn if he please?  
But these are no jesting matters. 
Baron. ad an. 1135. n. 21. 1173. n. 10. 1159. n. 21.  England and Ireland have both been challenged, and that before King John was born, though his resignation be in truth the most specious matter which can be alleged. Scotland, to put it out of doubt what would become of it, has been actually claimed as well as the rest. So that our Sovereign enjoys not one foot of land free from dispute. 
Ep. Bonif. 8. ad Edw. 1. ap. Mat. West. ad an. 1301▪  It is to much purpose to dispute of Divine Right, when, if there were no such thing in the world, we have as much to fear from Human. The worst Divine Right can do, is to make us dependent, and subject; and this they say we are, without relation to it. And 'tis this we fear, not caring much how the mischief happens, if it cannot be avoided. It imports not much whether I be a slave by the misfortune of War or Birth, if I must tug at the Oar.  
I tell you truly, thinking of these things has put me into a very bad humour. I distrust every thing, and am not satisfied where learneder men than myself are. I would be glad to have some better security than Prescription; 
pag. 19  for though our Author say, and I think it a sufficient Plea, I doubt, if you were Judges, his Authority would hardly keep us from being cast. Nay I am sure it would not; for he confesses the Pope allows it not, and his Judgement would overrule it at last. Besides though He slip over the business of Hen. 2. the Vatican Register, and Petrus Blesensis me thinks make too much noise to be slighted. What we think considerable may perhaps not prove so, when it comes to the Test, and however, no caution against you is too much. Again why may not Constantins' Donation one day rise up in Judgement against us? Britain was at that time one of the Western Provinces of the Roman Empire, 
Omnes Italiae seu Occidentalium Regionum Provincias, etc.  and, if this Deed be valid, undoubtedly passed with the rest. I know well enough there are among you who make bold with this evidence, and refuse to admit it for Authentic: But there are too who stand stiffly for it, and among these several Popes. Were there any likelihood it would bring Grist to the Mil, I do not think the Palea set before it, would hinder it from passing for good Wheat. 
Cap. Constantinus. Dist. 96.  In fine while Human Right, not only may, but actually is pretended at this day, we have reason to look about us. The Louvain Divines, if the History of the Irish Remonstrance say true, 
Hist. of the Irish Remonst. p. 117.  made it one of their four chief grounds, and the only ground of Right, for condemning that Remonstrance, and since they declare not in particular whence they derived the pretence of Human Right, make it necessary we should be secured against all.  
You see where the Shoe pinches; make it easy if you can, though when you have done your uttermost, I fear 'twill pinch still. For you are but a single man, and what a single man can do, is not considerable. Besides you conceal yourself, conscious it seems of being disowned by your fellows, who if they be otherwise persuaded, what will your single honesty do us good? A Traitor or two in a Nation can do no great harm, and one or two honest men as little good. As you carry matters you seem to confess the generality is not of your mind. Nay how do I know that so much as single you are as honest as you pretend, and truly mean as you say? You may with the liberty allowed in your Church, Prevaricate for aught I know, even though you should renounce Prevarication; or you may, according to your comfortable doctrine of Extrinsic Probability, embrace to morrow what you reject to day. You are questionless much beholding to your Church; which with her infallible guidance, has brought you to that pass, that if there be an honest man among you, He cannot make out that he is so, but must thank the good nature and Charity of his Neighbours for what reputation he has.  
I must confess I am sorry for the severities which are falling on you, but yet my pity does not so far blind my Reason, but that I see they cannot complain of being treated like knaves, who cannot produce any satisfactory evidence that they are otherwise, and though they could, are too few to be taken notice of. For the eye of all Laws looks only on Generals, and 'tis not possible that every man in a nation should have a particular Law made for him.  
Pray excuse me if I press too hard, and seem to add to your troubles, which I am so far from desiring to increase, that I would ease it if I could. For, truly, notwithstanding what I have said, I make no question but you are a very honest man, and take it upon your word that there are more as honest as yourself. And I declare freely, that I concur with the judgement of those, 
* 
and if they would perform that common duty, it is very probable, that, there appearing no more danger to threaten the Estate from them, than from other men, those Laws which the iniquity of their forefathers brought upon them by their conspiracies and Treasons, may be suspended towards their Innocent Children, until such time as their peaceable demeanour and good carriage shall make it appear just to be abolished. Animadvers. upon Fanaticism Fanatically imputed by a Person of Honour, p. 261. These things I yield to be reasonable. 1. That where there is a real difference in Principles, the Government should make a difference; because the reason of the Law is the danger of those Principles; which if some hearty renounce, there seems to be no ground that they should suffer equally with those who will not. Dr. Stillingfleet. Answer to S. C. Ep. Apologet. p. 476.  
By Protection I mean such an Exemption from the Rigour of our laws (which were never designed against Persons of their moderate Principles) as might encourage them to speak their minds freely, and to Proselyte others of their own Communion, and may make a manifest distinction betwixt the good and ill-principled persons of their Church. That it is Fit as well as Just and charitable; That it is as much for our Interest as it is Reasonable in itself to allow them this Protection; besides the considerations intimated in the beginning of this discourse § II. Several others might have been suggested, etc. Considerate. of pres. Concernment. p. 400. If these Seminaries, etc. would employ their travails in the works of light and Doctrine according to the usage of their Schools, and content themselves with their Profession and Devotion, etc. There is no doubt by God's grace, but all colour and occasion of shedding the blood of any more of her natural Subjects of this land, should utterly cease. Execution for Justice, p. 38.   not only the most moderate, but in my opinion the most learned and most wise among us, who wish some indulgence to such as you are. But these are but wishes, your fate depends upon a a greater and more efficacious wisdom. Whatsoever it be, my speaking plainly I conceive will do you no prejudice. For besides that it gives you the opportunity of clearing yourself if you can, every body thinks, and any body may say as much as I do. And I think you will not take it amiss if that be said, which you know may. At least I hope you will hear it with least offence from  
Your Friend and Servant.   

FRIEND,  
I did not expect to be importuned again at a time, when you may very well think I am but ill disposed to write. When I see the well meaning of such, as I am, interpreted for a piece of dangerous craft, dreams of bold undertakers and men of speculation; when any kindness or Indulgence to a Roman Votary, of whatever Principle or subdivision he pretend to be, is concluded to be stilling a Tempest by whispering to it, or reclaiming a Viper by receiving him into the bosom; while the unsheathed Sword of the Law hangs over my head, and may fall, for aught I know, even while I am at it: I suppose you will easily believe I have no more stomach to writing, than the flattering fool had to his meat. Truly did not the question concern the duty of a good Subject, from which I believe no cross accident a sufficient dispensation, silence, or excuse should have been all my answer. For as the world goes I foresee no fruit of my writing, but to make the Author pass for a scribbling Empiric, who makes the disease worse than it would be, by stirring humours unseasonably. I know not why it is not as wise to go on endlessly with Mercury and Coals, as continue to sow the seeds, as simple I think, of good intelligence and mutual love, and reap nothing but heightened jealousies and Animosities. To set me a writing, what purchases me the reputation of a Fool and a Knave to boot, and still to urge me to write, is to stretch the power you have over me with the farthest. Notwithstanding, the Subject being of the nature it is, I shall overcome the repugnance I have to meddle more, with the consideration of my duty, and let you and the world see, that Jealousy, and Scorn, and Severity, and whatever you please to lay on despicable Papists, shall not hinder them from being affected as they ought, to the Honour and security of their Prince and Country. Use me as you please, I shall continue to desire, and, as much as you will let me, contribute to the service of both. If the success be not answerable to all the hopes, with which my simplicity has sometimes flattered me, One better grounded, I am sure will not deceive me. I hope receive from the Grace of God a constancy in my duty, whatever the face of things be, and from his goodness a recompense above what man can give, and reposita est haec spes mea in sinu meo.  
To come to your Letter, I must acknowledge I have seen the Considerations to which you refer me. Whatever I think of the Book, I think very well of the Author. And that for more than one Reason. There is in him great Reading, and great Judgement, and great Candour, and care to speak strong sense in unoffensive language, so that he disobliges not, even when he confutes. In short He is one, such, as when I think myself able to hold up a side, I would wish for an Adversary. I wish him one as learned and as candid as himself, and then we may hope to see the Truth fairly tried out between them; and let her carry it on God's name on which side soever she be. For what concerns myself, I shall defend what I have said against his exceptions, as well as I can, when you require it; which I hope you will not do, till you find me something better disposed.  
Notwithstanding I wish he had spared his two first Topics, which I believe less digested than any thing he says besides. They are framed against the supposition of a forcible settlement of Popery. May they be hanged, without more ado, for grand Traitors as they are, who think such a thought, if there be any, which because I firmly believe there are not, I complain of a supposition too injurious. There needs no casting about for Topics to show the inconveniences of such a supposition, if it could be made. Force cannot be without mischiefs too obvious to need proof, but likewise too exorbitant to asperse people with them on suppositions, and those so unreasonable and impossible. The Papist is not the hundredth, I am confident not the thousandth man in this nation. When he does any thing by force, the old miracles must return, one chase a thousand, and two ten thousand. I say nothing to the first Topick, because it has nothing to do with my present argument, and for another reason, which I think not so convenient to express. Besides I doubt not but the Author's zeal for Religion, will move him to consider it over again, and give a solution to his own argument.  
The second is what you make the principal part of your letter, to which being to speak more at large hereafter, I only observe for the present, that it seems ill suited to his purpose. It is fear of the Pope's pretences on England upon Human Right, in case the return of Popery should give him opportunity to set them on foot. Now I conceive the return of Popery neither makes, nor mars, in the case. For if the pretences be good, Protestants cannot avoid them; if bad, Papists will not admit them. Right is Right to Protestants, as well as Papists, and no Right has the same no force on us as you. Popery would not hinder us from pleading Prescription, nor Prescription from having its efficacy. It sounds just as if he should say: Let us keep the Pope out right or wrong, for if he should come in, it may chance be sound he has a Right which we are resolved not to acknowledge, whether he have it or no. Such a discourse I take to be dishonourable to his own Religion, as if they cared not to do unjustly, and hinder other folks of their due; dangerous to the Commonwealth; and supposing a falsity too palpable to admit of supposition, namely, that the Pope may have a Right to England. But this by the by, and for an exception to the fitness, not substance of his discourse. For though I think it not proper to his purpose, and every jot as strong against themselves as us, yet the difficulty, as he has managed it, truly with more strength than I have seen it urged elsewhere, both deserves and requires an answer. I hope we shall no longer pass for men blindly addicted to the Pope and his Interest, when the world sees a Protestant take the Pope's part, and a Papist the Kings against him. As tenacious as we are of what we believe his due, I trust it will be acknowledged we believe nothing due, which may keep us from being true to the Interest of our Country, when all the discouragements we receive from our Country, hinder us not from standing faithfully by it, in opposition to his undue pretences, whensoever, and by whomsoever, and howsoever urged. And these are so urged, that no Arguments, with which I have had occasion to meddle, of his professed Champions, have given me so much to do.  
But respiting this matter a little while, I will take the liberty to alter your order, and begin at the latter end of your letter, because what you say there, is of another nature from what goes before, and things of a kind do best together. You object that I am a single, and, which is more, a concealed man, and all I say or do inconsiderable. And 'tis true that I am inconsiderable enough all ways, whether in learning or credit. Notwithstanding I thought myself able to answer your Objections. If you thought it not considerable, whether they were answered or no, you did ill to put me to so much fruitless pains. I thought you had sufficiently considered why you engaged me to write, and looked no farther than to answer as truly and plainly as I could. To tell me at last that all my pains are to no purpose, is a very unexpected objection, and to which all I can answer is to complain of you, for putting an inconsiderable employment upon me, who could have spent that inconsiderably taken up time with some more satisfaction, and it may be advantage to myself.  
As for being single, if it were so, I should hope there is no such urgent necessity, that a man should be punished, because he has no company. To say, as you do, that the Eye of the Law cannot look on particulars, is something surprising, when we see them found out and brought to punishment every day; and why particulars may not, with as much ease, be indemnified, as punished, I cannot comprehend. 'Tis a plain case that the care of the Law does extend to particulars, and in other cases, provides for the security of every single man, whose guilt excludes him not from their protection. Me thinks 'tis very hard that Peter must suffer because he is not Paul too, or because Paul will not think as Peter does, therefore Peter too must go to pot, and two be punished because one offends. But to give you satisfaction in this point, according to your own fancy, consider that Merit, and Demerit are general things, and proper objects of the care of Laws. Encouragement of the one, and Discouragement of the other, are the hinges on which Government turns. Lawmakers, without numbering heads, and counting how many come under one, or the other branch, frame their Laws in general, and proposing Hopes and Fears to make them choose right, leave Particulars to the choice of their own ways. Let the same Providence be extended to this case, which if it were not to others, Commonwealths would hardly subsist, and I have no more to desire of you. I hope 'twere no disgrace to the Law, if I were the only man who reaped benefit by it.  
But indeed I am not single. I have heretofore told you there are more of my mind, and I tell you again you shall find it so, if people once may freely say what they think. But while you involve us all, guilty or not guilty, in the same mass of perdition; while we are sure to be no jot better for speaking, and not sure but we may be much worse, by adding dissatisfactions among ourselves to the severities we fear from you; me thinks you should not complain of our silence. This is to tie up a man's tongue, and then blame him for saying nothing. Pray let us see some good likely to come of speaking, either to you, or ourselves, or some body, before you oblige us to expose ourselves to more harm than we are subject to already.  
No Friend! 'Tis not Fear of being disowned by my fellows, which conceals me, but Fear I shall be no better; Fear I may be worse looked on by you; and if you will permit me to say it, Grief, for having that cause of Fear. Not but that I know well enough that every one of my Communion, is not of my persuasion, in this point of the Pope's power. But you know I have often declared, I desire favour only for those who are. How many there be, truly I know not, nor will use any endeavours to know. For I fear you would not take it well, if any of us should go about to make an estimate of the strength of a party. There may be more, there may be fewer: But the fewer there be, the less reason, I should think, to exclude them from your protection, since evidently there can be no danger from a few. How I fear, if we should prove more than you imagine, you would then object number to us, with a little mroe speciousness, and a great deal more concern! Since every body desires to have as few Enemies as they can, while you will not let us be friends, I cannot believe you much in earnest, when you object fewness to us. You say this because it came in your way, but otherwise would be better pleased, if I mistake not, if we were fewer than we are. Indeed you urge not this fewness as dangerous, but as inconsiderable. But why should Innocence be thought so inconsiderable a thing? Innocence is Innocence in one man as well as a thousand, and should not be cast carelessly away. If the Laws would take into their protection such only as should give you the satisfaction, which yourselves should judge reasonable, perhaps their number may prove great enough to deserve their care, and then you would have what you desired; however it is not unworthy the care of Laws to provide that no man should suffer without demerit.  
Now I am upon this Subject, pardon a little freedom, and a little Tautology. You complain I am single, and concealed, and will not take notice that 'tis your dealing which makes me so. What reason has any body to join with me, what reason have I to discover myself, when doing so will make us worse than we are already, which I refer me to yourself if it be not bad enough? You will not be fatisfyed, but with what you know will cause dissatisfaction among ourselves. A man that had any jealousy in his nature would startle at this: but yet while your pretences for thus much are at least specious, those whose conscience will allow them, are willing to do as you would have them, satisfy you your own way, and upon your own Terms. When this is done you are as little satisfied as before. And out come harsh suspicions, of I know not what craft and danger covered under these specious Condescendencies: out come harsher things then bare suspicions, the Sword of the Law hanging naked over our heads, and threatening us with all the sharpness of its unavoidable edge. You will not let us pass for good Subjects, till we have done what no Nation in Christendom, besides yourselves, thinks necessary for the trial of good Subjects. Sure the English are not the only good Subjects, nor the only wise men of the world. However when a man has passed the test of your uttermost scrupulosity, and may be called a good Subject, even in your nice language, then has this good Subject to expect for his comfort, which will be taken, his twenty pound a month, or his two Thirds. Shall I venture to say, what has, by some less credulous, been long thought? As Princes resolved to make War, would yet be thought inclined to Peace, and seek to persuade the World they draw not their Swords but forced by Justice and necessity, so deal you with us: no answer that is or can be made to their Reasons, shall keep the Ratio ultima from thundering at last, nor no return we make to your Objections shall hinder you from what you have determined concerning us. Whether we stand on our justification, or yield to you, whether innocent or guilty, They are persuaded we shall with all our several Principles and subdivisions, Wheat and Tares indifferently be bound up together into one condemned bundle, and thrown into the fire at last. This they gather partly from your objections, which in truth are wonderful cross, urging now Danger, and then Craft, now Number, and presently after Fewness, and when one is taken taken off, you never fail of another, nor show any disposition that you ever will. They gather it more apparently from your Actions, more certain signs of the mind by far than words, and think it a foolish thing to guests at what you mean by what you say, when they see what you do. When a Prince fills the Frontiers with Magazines, and Soldiers, and Weapons, they think his intentions plain enough, and judge not of them by his manifests. If this be what we must trust to, which truly I shall be the last man who believes, if the good Subject must be condemned, that the Papist may not escape, and no hopes of living with comfort in this world, but by forfeiting our hopes of the next: It is not for us to think of any thing but the next World, and those comforts which will not fail us, of good Christians and a good Conscience. And I very earnestly entreat you to leave me in quiet, as long as the Law will let me, to study, what only becomes me, Patience. For to study longer how to satisfy those who will not be satisfied, and with a great deal of pains purchase the reputation of one more dangerous than those who will not, perhaps cannot, answer you, is not more uncomfortable than irrational.  
Is not your next Objection a kind of secret Declaration (to use the Figure called a Bull) of your mind in this point? You would have it impossible so much as for a single person to give you satisfaction, because one may prevaricate even while he renounces prevarication. I cannot tell how far you are in earnest; but this to my eye looks like a reserve in store, when other pretences fail, to maintain a resolution of admitting no satisfaction. Otherwise can you seriously believe there is no trusting, no taking one another's word, because the Doctrine of Aequivocation has been taught in the world? If this were true, Cities and Societies had been left off by this time, and we had in Deserts been experiencing the comforts of the returned Golden Age. For there is no living in society without mutual trust. Those doctrines do not hinder us from keeping up society still, and dealing together with security enough, and if we can give security to one another, such as serves the turn, and enables us to converse and treat with confidence, what should hinder but we may give it to you too?  
But let us look upon the Objection: Some of our Communion have thought Aequivocation lawful, therefore none may be trusted. Do you think this Inference concluding? Will you have every one of our Communion answerable for what is said by any one? Pray consider whether Positions have not been maintained, by some of your Communion, with which if others should be charged, they would think themselves not fairly dealt with; it is no more reasonable to impute these doctrines to our Communion, in which if there be who hold, there are too who contradict them. The Yea's and the No's should not be confounded, and which is more unjust, the No's condemned for the fault of the Yeas. For my own particular, I could produce, if that would satisfy you, sufficient Compurgators for my innocence in this particular, and sufficient witnesses, that I never believed Aequivocation lawful, nor was ever taught it was, nor ever heard of it without a scurvy character. But then if the fancy should take you to except against my Compurgators, you would leave me no means to make out my Innocence, and yet I am very sure I am innocent.  
Yet let me tell you, if you go this way to work, you may chance be caught in your own Trap. For this is no point of Religion. It belongs purely to Learning, and may be held by men of different Communions. You read our Authors as well as your own, and I suppose assent to as much as you think true in them. Pray who shall be your Compurgator, that you do not yourself hold this doctrine which you object to me? And why may not I as well suspect you of Prevarication, as you me? For 'tis nothing to purpose that it is not found in your Books: You may think it true by what you find in ours; and if you may, who shall secure me that you do not? And then there is no remedy, but we must all into the wilderness. But if you think yourself sufficiently justified, that no word or action of yours, has given a reasonable ground of suspicion, that you believe the doctrine true, truly I can say as much for myself, and if need be, bring good proof of what I say. If this will not do, I know not how either of us can clear ourselves, nor how we can deal with one another, or any body else with either of us.  
I conceive therefore this Topic of yours is manifestly deceitful, and as a Canon overcharged bursts itself instead of hitting the Enemy, becomes ineffectual by having too much force. For evidently if your Inference be true, viz. that none of us can be trusted, this is also true, that absolutely none can be trusted, whether of us or you; and if there can be no Trust, there can be no Society in the world; which is a Conclusion so destructive, that the Argument must of necessity be deceitful which infers it. To dive farther into the business belongs not to me. If you will not take this in payment, demand your debt where it is due. I for my part own you no more on this account, than you me. For I never held Aequivocation lawful no more than you, and am no more to answer for it. I shall only say, that were we indeed such Jugglers as you seem to fear, so dextrous at the Legerdemain of Aequivocation, nothing you could do would exclude us from any benefit which other Englishmen enjoy. You know well enough that words cannot be so contrived, but sophistry may work upon them, and if we thought it allowable to take advantage by it, we should long before this have taken all your Oaths, and it may be, by stretching our Conscience a little farther, dissembled in actions as well as words, and gone to Church, and taken your Sacraments, and continued Papists all the while. Alas! we need not trouble you for Physic, if we had such a Remedy of our own in store. But you know no discouragements, no apprehension, even of utter ruin, has prevailed with us to do, what yet you would persuade us we think we lawfully may, and which if we did, 
§. 54.  we were stark mad to refuse. The candid Author of the Considerations has truly observed, such a liberty would destroy us, and I hope you are sufficiently secured, if you cannot be undone by us but by undoing ourselves.  
In the next place you touch slightly upon Probable Opinions, more I suppose with the exuberancy of a flowing fancy, then check of a real concern. These Doctrines have been so treated by those of our Communion, that I believe you sufficiently persuaded there are not many of yours who have less kindness for them. I know not how you can use them worse than to place them, 
Aegidius Gabrielis specimina Moralis Christianae & Diabolicae. pag. 293.  as a late Author has done among the Devil's Morals. However it be, they are plainly laid open to the view of every body, and we have taken care you should not be ignorant of any thing we know concerning them. In my opinion it is needless for me to stay on a Subject so largely treated by better pens, guided by more acquaintance with them. All I shall return by way of answer is, that I can give you no more light than you have already, and that you may, if you truly apprehend any danger from them, provide for your own security, as you please, and treat those, who shall refuse to give it, as you please too. If this do not satisfy you, nothing that I can say, will.  
Having said thus much to your collateral exceptions, I come at last to the principal business of your Letter, those Pretences which the Pope may have by Human Right. Though you observe it not, 
Cap. Constantinus Dist. 96.  I conceive it best to follow the order of Time, and begin with the famous Donation of Constantin. Of this there is a very formal Charter extant in the Canon Law, and said by some to be preserved in the Vatican, by which Rome, Italy, and all the West are conveyed to the Pope, besides other particulars, which concern not our question. There is great disagreement among learned men who treat of this Argument. Some labour to make good the Charter, others the Donation only, and there are who reject both the one and the other. I speak only of our Authors, for as for yours they all agree with the latter. Now although I conceive that to overthrow either, is to overthrow both, (for if the Charter be forged; the Donation cannot be proved, of which this is the only Evidence produced or produceable; and again if the Donation be disproved, the Charter cannot be valid) yet to consult my own ease, I choose only to speak to the Donation, lest the nice scrupulosity of those who think the Donation may be true, though the Charter be false, should engage me in a new labour. For the Charter let it suffice that it is generally rejected by men of greatest Learning and Judgement, and among the rest by Baronius himself, 
Baron. ad an. 1191. n. 52.  one not likely to cast away slightly any thing that makes for the advantage of the Pope.  
As for the Donation, it seems the product of a fancy little acquainted with Nature, and the course of human action, or at least little minding them. Constantin was a Prince, who with great labour and fortune prevailed against his powerful Competitors, and established the Empire in himself, and his family. I cannot easily imagine a conceit more wild, than that he should so little value, what he had purchased with so much toil and danger, as to make a present of the best part of it, to one who never so much as asked him for it. Princes do not use to think so slightly of their Dominions. Sovereignty bears a greater rate than so, nor will they much sooner consent to forego a part, than the whole. Or if the suspicion might pass son not impossible in Princes, by long and quiet enjoyment of Power, grown weary, or perhaps insensible of what they enjoy, as men become cloyed with the same conditions as well as the same meats; yet 'tis hardly imaginable of such a man as Constantin. He had fought hard, and often, and dangerously for what he had; he had staked against it his Life and Honour, and all he had and hoped. He who struggles into Sovereignty through so many difficulties, must needs value it more, than to throw a great part of it away, as soon as he has got it. He might without any hazard or pains have quietly enjoyed, almost as much, as if his Donation were real, he reserved to himself. For certainly a composition might have taken up all differences with his Competitors, had he been careless of more than enjoying his own share with safety. But he was a man of another spirit, and into whose head it never came to dispossess himself of what he had obtained with so much dangerous pains. But if the motion came not from himself, it is more wild to fancy it should proceed from any body else. Who would dare to speak to him of dismembering the Empire? And what Christian (for Infidels sure cannot be suspected) would by so mad a zeal have exposed all Christianity to evident hazard? Had he once perceived it an interested Religion, and which entertained bold ambitious thoughts, even to share the Empire with him, and transfer to themselves the fruit of his labours and victories, nothing but miracle could have kept him from thinking better of his old.  
Again he he had Children whom he trained up as Princes, and entrusted with the care of several Provinces. Will any man of sense believe, that after he had with much care made them fit for government, he should leave them nothing to govern? and having bred them Princes in his life time, oblige them to turn private men after his death? Without all doubt if Nature would have allowed him causlessly to disinherit his Children, and give away their Birthright to Strangers, Prudence would have instructed him to dispose them to this change of their Fortunes by their Education, and excepting Him, whom he designed for Successor in the part reserved to himself, to enure the rest by custom to brook that private condition, in which he meant to place them. He was a good natured man, and loved his Children; he was a wise man, and his natural judgement wonderfully strengthened by experience of all sorts of affairs, could not be to seek how to lay means for the ends he purposed. This fancy leaves him neither natural affection nor wit: but supposes after he had rooted out those inclinations which nature plants so powerfully in every body, and this without any demerit on his Children side, or any show on his, who always testified the affections of a Father to them, He ordered the matter so crossly, as to dispose things quite contrary to what he intended to bring them.  
But let it pass for once: Let it be supposed, against nature and the course of his life, he would do such a thing: may it be supposed he could? And I speak with reference to Nature, not Law. Waving the many, and those not easily answerable, legal exceptions which some have taken to this Grant, I only inquire what was likely to follow while men were men, and acted as men use to do. His Children were Princes, who by their Birth expected, and by their Education were acquainted with power. Unless they consented to this Donation, and voluntarily yielded up their pretensions, I see not to what purpose it could be. Undoubtedly they would never be contented to sit tamely down, and see their Birthright given away against their wills. Or if they would, some of their Posterity would have had more ambitious spirits, and struggled with all their force to recover a height, to which they were once so near. 'Twas a very preposterous Piety to entail perpetual confusion on the Empire, and expose it to greater and more lasting troubles, than those from which the virtue and Fortune of Constantin had newly rescued it. He that can fancy so wise a Prince should entertain a Project of such a desperate consequence, and so impossible to succeed, has a fancy, in my opinion, fit for Romances than any thing else.  
And yet peradventure there is not much less difficulty on the side of the Taker, than the Giver. 'Twas yet the Age of wooden Chalices, and golden Priests. Popes in those days were holy men, and very free from the suspicion of Ambition. They were so far from looking after Worldly advancements, that they accepted not of Spiritual but by force. Silvester, to whom the Donation is pretended to be made, did no way degenerate from the holiness of his Predecessors, making himself one in the Catalogue of Popes who were saints. He was not a man to increase the heavy burden, of the care of Souls, with the weight of temporal government; and far from being tempted by the glittering appearances of worldly greatness, I believe would have fled from it, as a hindrance to a duty, which he took a great deal more to heart. Less distractions, than the Government of a good part of the World, were long after his days complained of by holy men, though perhaps not holier than himself.  
But let us suppose a man in veneration for sanctity even to this day, overcome by the temptations of greatness, so powerful with frail nature, what should he have done with this power, which Constantine is said to have given him? The World was like to be well governed, when from the Caves of Soracte, a man should suddenly be transplanted into an Imperial Throne, and He who had spent all his time in the meditation of Divine things, and treating with afflicted poor people, with whom he kept company in obscurity and perpetual fear, set to rule great nations, full of unquiet Martial spirits, and as much used to war as He to his Books, and perhaps as much in love with it? Without doubt whoever invented this story, was not used to check his a●ery fancies with consideration of what was likely or possible. Turn it which way you will, 'tis pure Romance on all sides.  
But I need not amuse myself with examining what was likely or not likely, when it appears, by the uniform consent of all Historians, that actually there was no such thing. The Empire was, as Nature and Reason required, governed, after the death of Constantine, by his Children, shared among them by himself, who is said to have given so much away before. Those very Provinces, said to be conveyed to the Pope, were by his Testament bequeathed to Constans and Constantine, and the East to Constantius. By virtue of this Testament they entered into Possession, and were themselves, and their successors after them acknowledged for the only Lords of the Countries under them by all the rest of the World, and by the contemporary Popes, as well as others, till at last the revolution of human things, rend the West from the East by the breaking in of barbarous Nations; set up a new Empire in the West, upon a new and independent Title; put a period to the Empire of the East by the Turks; raised the Pope to a temporal Principality, and brought the World into the condition it is in at present. The names and actions of these successors of Constantine, with the ways by which they came to their greatness, are recorded in History, the Pope not taken notice of all the while, nor any claim of his so much as remembered. He had no hand in the succession of the following Emperors, no voice in the election, no approbation of the Elect, no coronation, no acknowledgement, no sign of supreme Dominion, but as another Subject obeyed those, who by Election; or succession, or Force, came to be Emperors. I mean till the Empire was translated to the West, for as he had a great hand in that translation, he has ever since appeared more; but I speak of the times before. And all this is evident beyond all dispute.  
Reconcile this, who can, with Constantins' Donation. If he put the Pope in possession of the Western Provinces, how could he bequeath them to his Son? And if he put him not in possession, how could he be said to give them? It is a mockery, not a gift, to say these Provinces are yours, which I keep to myself during life, and dispose to others after my death. Livery and Seisin are pretty material circumstances in such conveyances, where nothing can be understood to pass without them. If Constantine gave them, the Pope must have had them, and that he had them not is as plain as History can make any thing, where it is particularly with uniform consent recorded in whose hands these Western Provinces were, what changes happened from time to time, and by what means from the death of Constantine, till the Arms and favour of France under Pipin and his son Charles put into the Pope's possession most of what he has. It is known, and by Bellarmine himself confessed, that Popes during those times were Subjects, at least the facto, which is enough for our present purpose, there needing no more to show they had not those Countries which Constantine is said to have given to them. Not but that both he, and divers others after, and before him too, were extremely munificent to the Church, by which munificence much Land in several places was settled on her by way of Alms, and actually in her possession. But she enjoyed the revenues only of those Lands; Administration of Justice, and all Regalities were reserved to the Temporal Lords. This has deceived some, who finding mention of Possessions belonging to the Church in former Ages, imagined they so belonged to her then as they do now, with entire and independent subjection. Whereas till Pope's were by the liberality and power of the French raised to the state of Temporal Princes, the Lands of the Church were in the same condition with the estates of other Subjects, the immediate owners receiving the Profits, and both their Lands and Themselves subject to the supreme Lord. They were given to other Churches as well as Rome, for maintenance of the Clergy and Poor, for the expenses of buildings and reparations, and Divine Service, and that so plentifully, that some refused offered Patrimonies, others restored what they once had, not willing to be burdened with more than was needful. These Lands paid public duties as other Lands did, till the Laws exempted them: But these things are besides the matter.  
To return to our Argument; if the successors of Constantin continued the only known Masters of those very Countries, which are said to be given away; if Popes acknowledged them for such as well as the rest of the World, and never so much as put in any claim, or pretended any thing to the contrary; And all this be so plain, that nothing can be plainer; no fiction can be more palpable, nor more wild, than this of Constantin's Donation. It is undeniably evident that neither Popes nor Emperors, nor any body else in those days knew any thing of it. And it is as evident that they must know of it, if it had been at all. At least if they did not, none else could, in after times. This Donation was not heard of in the World till long after. 
Baron. ad an. 1191. n. 52. Marca de Conc. Sacerd. & Imp. l. 3. c. 12.  Baronius thinks the pretended Charter forged by the Grecians after the tenth Age; Marca by the Latins in the time of Pippin, and by his consent, to stop the mouths of the Grecians, who made instance that the Lands recovered from the Lombard's, and by Him given to the Church, should be restored to the Empire. However it be for the Time or Author of the fiction, that the Charter is a mere and late forgery is acknowledged, both by Baronius, and by most of the learned men even of the Pope's Communion. That the Donation cannot be pretended with any show of Reason, but in force of the Charter is plain. For 'tis next to madness to say the West was given, and produce no Evidence of the Gift. Any man may claim any man's Estate with as much colour, and the Pope from such a claim can expect no more success than another man. But there is nothing which can be alleged in proof of this Donation, besides this Charter. Wherefore the whole business, of which you seem to be jealous, is in itself a pure Chimaera, absolutely contradicted by the course of Nature, and consent of History, and the only Evidence producible for it, acknowledged a forgery by ourselves. And if this give you much disquiet, I cannot but think you wonderful fearful. Let the worst come to the worst, 'tis not the case of England alone. France and Spain and Germany were Western Provinces as well as Britain, and as much concerned as we. While we have such Outworks we need not much fear our Fort. The truth is our safety depends in reality on them. For let his Right be never so good, till it have seized on them, it cannot fasten on us, and when it has, we cannot escape, let it be never so bad. Mean time I think you may sleep quietly on, the noise which will be made in the World, when any of these Countries leave their native Princes, and become subject to a Foreigner, and quit their long settled Customs, and Laws and Liberties, in reverence to Constantin's Donation, will wake you time enough. But if you sleep till then, you will go near to be the 8th. sleeper, and alone out-slumber all the seven.  
Thus far of our Journey we have good company with us, and the best part of Christendom being of the Caravan, travel with security enough. But now the Road parts, and we must shift for ourselves. Henry II. say you from Baronius, acknowledged the Kingdom of England Fendatory to the Pope in a Letter extant in Petrus Blesensis. You might have added the Cardinal's Comment upon the Pope's confirmation, or rather approbation of K. Stephen's election, which he says was therefore mentioned in the Coronation Oath, because the Kingdom was feudatory to the Pope, 
Baron. ad an. 1135. 21.  so that every new King received confirmation from him. Which also was acknowledged by Hen. II. in the Letter of Blesensis. 
Ad an. 1172. n. 5.  Besides he produces afterwards from the Acts of Alexander III. a clause of the Oath made at the conclusion of the difference, upon the death of S. Thomas of Canterbury, wherein the Kings both Father and Son are made to swear, That they will receive and hold the Kingdom of England from the Pope, and neither they nor their successors repute themselves Kings of England, till the Popes for the time being, acknowledge them Catholic Kings.  
We have here the Cardinal's word, the authority of his Acts, and the testimony of Petrus Blesensis. For the Cardinal's word, it had been more for his credit, if he had not engaged in it a manifest untruth. People would have been more apt to believe him in other things. It is not known more certainly that there have been Romans and Saxons, Danes and Normans in this Island, than that the supreme Government, is, and always has been, Independent on any but God. Truly I grieve, and am ashamed to see, Zeal to the Pope, carry it in such a man, above Zeal to Truth. For thus much of his saying, That England is feudatory, he does indeed bring proof, such as it is; but for the latter part, that every new King received Confirmation from the Pope, he does not so much as offer at any. And yet the business is of such a nature, that the proof must needs be evident and obvious, if the thing were true. But the contrary is notorious, every body, that knows any thing of our matters, knowing that no King of England ever received Confirmation from Rome, no not King Stephen himself.  
There was indeed this preamble, not to the Coronation Oath, as Baronius mistakes, but to the ratification of what King Stephen had promised, when he was Crowned at Westminster, in an Assembly at Oxford. Ego Stephanus D. G. assensu Cleri & Populi in Regem Angliae electus, & à Willielmo Cant. Archiepiscopo & S. Rom. Ecclesiae Legato consecratus, & ab Innocentio S. Rom. Sedis Pontifice confirmatus, etc. Upon this plain song the Cardinal descents in the manner before rehearsed, and might as well and as truly have concluded that the Kingdom was likewise elective. For 'tis at lest true that he was elected, but it is not true that he was confirmed. The Pope's Letter to the King is extant in Richardus Hagulstadensis. Confirmation is so far from appearing there, that the word is not so much as mentioned. He says only, that since for avoiding the mischiefs likely to ensue upon the death of Henry I. He had by unanimous consent been chosen to succeed; He (the Pope) was well pleased with what was done, and with paternal affection received him for a special son of the Rom. Church, and would treat him with the same honour and familiarity which he had used to his Predecessor of famous memory.  
This is far enough from Confirmation, and the language of a supreme Lord: No State in Christendom, or out of Christendom, but confirms Kings, as well as the Pope, if this be confirmation. When any Prince has a flaw in his Title, He seeks to be acknowledged by the Neighbour Princes, and when they acknowledge, They confirm him as much as the Pope did K. Stephen. And this was plainly the case. Maud the Empress, daughter to Henry I. was the true Heir of the Crown. King Stephen himself had by a solemn and late Oath acknowledged her right, and engaged to maintain it. He had reason to colour his proceed as well as he could, and provide something to say, that he might not pass for a manifestly perjured man. And so he reckons up Election, and Consecration, and Confirmation, which yet altogether were not sufficient to make him a good Title, in the judgement even of the Pope himself. For when K. Stephen, desirous to secure the succession to his son Eustace, required the Bishops to crown him in his own life time, they with the hazard of their lives constantly refused to do it, being forbidden by the Pope to crown the son of a man who had usurped the Kingdom contrary to his Oath.  
Had the Pope been thought supreme Lord, and his consent necessary, K. Stephen must have had recourse to him in the first place, and could not have taken the Crown till his ratification was come. But 'tis plain he was crowned before the Pope was made acquainted with the business, and before he knew how the Pope would take it, and however he had taken it, I believe would have kept the Crown which he had gotten. Indeed he thought it for the advantage of his affairs to call the Pope's acknowledgement a Confirmation; but neither is there any ground in the Letter on which to raise such a construction; and besides 'tis plain that 'twas not dependence of the Crown, but defect of Title in himself, to which that Confirmation, such as it was, can be applied. So that Baronius is quite out, and the worst Commenter that ever was; it being so far from true, that every new King received Confirmation from Rome, that no one ever did it, not the very King, out of whose fact he so vainly infers all the rest. But that the force of Prejudice is almost inconceivable, one would hardly believe so learned and judicious a man should falter in this manner. However it be, He must excuse us from taking his word in a case, where no body, that I know, would take the word of the Pope himself.  
For his Acts, they are a relation of no body knows who, and that me thinks is a pleasant Title to no less than a Kingdom. The Author is a nameless man, of whom it cannot be understood either that he was well informed of what he delivered, or faithfully delivered what he was informed of. Had the Cardinal reflected a little better on it, I believe he would have been more tender in exposing such proofs to a censorious World. These unauthentick Acts are plainly contradicted by such as are Authentic. Roger Hoveden in his Annals has preserved a Copy of the agreement made by the Pope's Legates with Henry II. upon the death of S. Thomas of Canterbury. There the Oath is set down, as it was taken, which was this, That They (Father and Son) would not recede from Pope Alexander and his Catholic Successors, as long as he should treat them like their Ancestors, and Catholic Kings. This was sealed by the Kings and Legates for an authentic memory of what was concluded, and this Baronius himself has set down at large out of Hoveden. With Hoveden agree the other Historians nearest those times, Bromton, and Gervasins Dorobornensis (for the rest mention not this particular at all) and with this agrees the relation, sent by the Legates themselves to the Archbishop of Ravenna, extant in Hoveden. Against so clear an evidence to bring a nameless Author, is more to weaken the credit of his own proofs than strengthen the Pope's claim. People will be wary how they trust Acts produced by Baronius, when he produces such as these, and be convinced, that, if the Pope himself be infallible, all who writ of him are not.  
There remains Blesensis of whom so much is known, that he might possibly be employed to write a letter for the King to the Pope. But that he did write this letter, and by order from the King, needs some better proof than that it was found among his papers. It might be a rough draught, never sent: In so many Copies as have been made, from the time in which he lived, till the time his works appeared in the world, it may have been altered. 
Vestrae Jurisdictiones est Reg. Angliae & quantum ad Feudatarii Juris obligationem vob●s dumtaxat obnexius teneor. Experiatur Anglia qui●d possit Rom. Pontifex, & quia materialibus armis non utitur, patrimonium B. Petri spirituali gladio tucatur. Pet. Bless. Ep. 136.  And indeed who considers what goes before, and what comes after, will see the two periods which concern this matter, do not well fit the place. The letter demands Counsel of the Pope, upon the undutiful carriage of his Children, whom though he could reduce by force to their duty, yet the affections of nature hindering him from that course, He prays the Pope to interpose, to whose arbitration he promises to stand. And this hangs pertinently together. But then to make the King say, that England is feudatory, and wish it may feel what the Pope can do, suits so ill with the rest, that it seems no part of the original piece, but patched in by some body else, and he but a botcher. For what is it to purpose, to mention Vassalage, where He only seeks advice? As if the Pope could give counsel to none but Vassals, and as if it were the custom of Vassals to have recourse to their Lords for counsel. It is Justice and Protection which Vassals expect from their Lords, and this the King would have demanded of the Pope, if he had been his Subject. And then He tells him, that He has no material Arms, which is as much as to say, that He is not supreme Lord. For Sovereignty without material Arms, is no very material thing, and indeed is not Sovereignty. So that the King is made very wisely to say, and unsay, with the same breath. Again, while He himself abstains from Rigour, to press the Pope to the utmost rigour he can use, agrees very ill-favouredly. Besides Blesensis dedicates his Letters to this very King. Whoever knows any thing of his humour, and how positive he always was in maintaining less rights of the Crown, than its independency, will not easily believe he would permit such a clause to pass, and much less become public. He was more jealous of his Authority than so. Farther, had such a Letter, as is now read in Blesensis, been ever sent by the King, Baronius sure would have met with the original somewhere or other. For certainly the Vassalage of England, and Patrimony of St. Peter here, are things of that importance, that it deserved some more than usual care to preserve an Evidence so extraordinary, and not to trust to chance, and the credit of an insignificant Copy, for so great, and so unknown an advantage of the Church. For if Blesensis had never been printed, the thing had never been heard of. If such proofs as these may be harkened to against Kingdoms, truly their Fate is very hard, and much worse than of the meanest Subject who lives in them. He that in a Suit but of 40 shillings should produce no better, were sure to be cast.  
I conceive there is no great necessity of saying more, because sentence will always be given for the Defendant, where the Proofs of the Plaintiff are insufficient: but yet let us look into the matter a little farther, and see whether, this fancy of the Cardinals can be reconciled to Nature and History. And I consider in the first place, that the Tenure of Kingdoms is no private thing, to be guest at by incertain testimonies, picked up and down among Authors of doubtful credit, but known as much as the Kingdoms themselves, and no more concealable than their forms of Government. It may as well be doubted whether they be Kingdoms or Commonwealths, as whether they be independent or no. At every death, at every change of a King, there must be in Vassals, recourse to the supreme Lord, his consent required, Homage performed, Duties paid, and all publicly in the face of the world, it concerning the supreme Lord, and he always taking care that these demonstrations be made with the greatest show that can be. In all Treaties, in all Letters, and whatever transactions, the stile betwixt Independent Princes is different from that betwixt Lords and Vassals. In Competitions for the Crown, one part would always fly to the supreme Lord, and he, by his influence, make his Superiority appear. A hundred things of this nature must of necessity be registered in authentic records, and read in the Histories which treat of our matters. Baronius little reflected on the nature of the business, when instead of producing Authentic Records, whereof there must have been many at Rome as well as here, if there had been any such thing, he alleges Blesensis. It cannot be said that the Records are lost by Time and Accidents. For their number, in a case so often happening, would preserve at least some of them, and he has found records both more ancient, and of less concern. Besides Histories remain still. Whoever among so many as have writ, ever mentioned any homage done by our Kings to the Pope, or any confirmation required? Many letters are still extant from the one to the other, and no hint of subjection in any of them. There have been many Competitions for the Crown, and none of the Pretenders ever dreamt of fortifying their claims by the Influence of his supreme Lordship, though for the Influence He had as supreme Pastor they desired to make him their friend. In fine, not to insist upon the silence of Histories and Records, and want of proof in Baronius, it is evident that the Vassalage of a Kingdom not evidently to appear, is evidently not to be, because it cannot be, without being notorious, and known to all who know the Kingdom.  
In the next place I would fain understand, when, and by whom the Kingdom could be, or rather was made, thus subject to the Pope. For I wave at present the want of power in Kings, to do such a thing, if they would, and only inquire which King it was, who can be supposed to have done it. If the suspicion fall on the times of the Heptarchy, which Age and want of Writers render more obscure, it is apparent that no Act of any King then, could be binding to the whole Nation. For no King, let him be never so absolute, can bind more than his own Kingdom. But besides, that He, who will recur to those times, may indeed hid himself in their darkness, but cannot strike out of them any light to his pretence, and must speak purely out of his own head, without any warrant or colour from any other Author, so I think 'tis a good argument that no such thing, was then done, because things of less moment, which were done then, are remembered. The grant of Peter-pences by Ina of the Westsaxons, and Offa of the Mercians, is recorded too plainly, to leave a suspicion that the grant of a Kingdom could be concealed. While there was exactness enough to take notice of single pence, the Crown sure could not pass by unregarded. If any man fancy want of fidelity in our Historians, might possibly suppress so ungrateful a Truth, let him produce those more faithful Foreigners, who have recorded it. But considering the Zeal of those times, and mighty opinion they had of Rome, when the greatest Kings frequently became Pilgrims, and sometimes left their Kingdoms wholly, and became Monks there, the suspicion lies on the other side, it being more rational to fancy an amplification than suppression of things to their advantage. However such an Alms as a Kingdom could not but make a noise, loud enough to reach even our ears, and had the Romescot charity been extended to the Regalities, we must have heard of it, as well as of private houses. By the way, I am not ignorant what Comments have been made on that Alms, but I think it not convenient to lose time in confuting them. 'Tis to give them more credit than they deserve; for he enhances the value of Trifles, who treats them like things of moment.  
The memory of passages since the Heptarchy is too fresh, and too minute to leave place for suspicion, that a matter of such moment should scape unobserved. And besides there is among the Works of Lanfranc, a Letter of William the Conqueror to Pope Gregory VII. which puts the matter out of doubt. That Pope had the confidence to demand of that King an acknowledgement of subjection, Fidelitatem or Fealty, as the phrase runs; I know not upon what ground. For though I have read somewhere, that the Conqueror, to gain the Pope to his side when he attempted the enterprise, promised, in case of success, to hold the Kingdom of the Pope, 
Ep. Lanfranc. VII.  yet it appears by the King's answer, that he was mistaken who said so. Fidelitatem facere nolui, nec volo, says the King, quia nec ego promisi, nec Antecessores meos, Antecessoribus tuis id fecisse comperio. So that till the Conquest England was free, and that it became subject since, sure no body will imagine. The first Kings of the Norman race were men of too great spirits, and contested with the Pope, about matters of less importance too warmly, to be suspected of giving away their Kingdoms. He that reflects what bustles there were about Investitures in the days of Henry I. and Immunities of the Church in the days of Henry II. will find it neither likely nor possible the greatest rights of the Crown should be thrown away, while Princes were so tenacious of the less. It is true that both these Kings yielded at last to the Pope, but with a condescendence so far from any sign of subjection, that there was more of appearance, than substance in the first case, and a great deal of caution in the second, no subjection nor show of any in either.  
The Contrast between Henry I. and the Pope was about Investitures, the King desirous to continue the custom of ratifying the election of Bishops and Abbots, by delivering a Ring and Staff to the Elect, and the Pope resolved to break it. The conclusion was that the Ceremony should no more be used, but so that the King should choose, or cause to be chosen the person, and receive homage from him that was chosen. Investituram Annuli & Baculi indulsit in perpetuum, retento tamen electionis & regalium privilegio, says Will. Malmsbury. Upon the same terms, 
In Hen. 1. lib. 5.  a few years after the same difference was compounded with the Emperor, in which, if I understand any thing, the same expedient was then used, which is generally observed since, To preserve reputation and Appearance to the Pope, and substance to Princes. For while They had the chief influence in elections, and none could be promoted but by their interposition, the rest was a Ceremony, which might without any great prejudice, be left off. Again, when the persons Elect were by homage to acknowledge themselves Subjects to their Princes, they had as much as they desired. Indeed till this point was yielded by the Pope (for it was a while stiffly stood upon) no agreement could be made. But after, Peace soon followed.  
The quarrel of Henry II. was about the Customs of Clarendon, in which the chief point was that of Appeals. This point the Pope gained of the King, yet with this caution, that the Appellant should give security to attempt nothing to the prejudice of King or Kingdom. It was now a time, if ever, for the Pope's supreme Lordship to appear. He was in the humour of asserting, at least, all that belonged to him. The World was incensed against the King for the foulness of the late murder, and ready to take the Pope's part. The King found it necessary to buy his peace, even at the rate of pretensions very dear to him, and for which he had long and earnestly contended. Had the Pope been supreme Lord, he would hardly have scaped so good cheap. Murder and Sacrilege might have cost him the whole Kingdom. For feudatory Lands are forfeited by great crimes. However this supreme Dominion must needs have appeared in the transaction. The King was not in case to refuse any thing due to the Pope, who yielded up what till then he thought not due; and besides the tenor of the agreement must have been quite different, and drawn in terms used betwixt Vassals and Lords. But instead of an acknowledgement of this nature, all the disadvantage the King had in treating, could not prevail with him to acknowledge the Pope so much as Pope, longer than the Pope should acknowledge and treat him as King. So that by the favour of the Cardinal's Acts, this King left the Crown as free as he found it, nor can the King be yet found out on whom the suspicion should fall, of having made it subject.  
If I am not much mistaken, the Popes in those days were of a judgement very different from that which Baronius has taken up in ours. For how can the conceit of a Vassalage in the time of this King consist with what happened a little after in the reign of K. John? Neither could K. John make England tributary, if it were so before, neither could the Pope desire he should. Besides disobedience in a Vassal, and, what is more stubborn contrasting with a supreme Lord, especially when that supreme Lord is the Pope, would sure have been thought as great a crime, as refusing an Archbishop made without his privity and against his will. Why was not this laid to the King's charge and called Rebellion? When the severity of the proceed against him, perhaps needed all the colour, which could be laid on. Without all doubt, the Pope when he had the King at his mercy, would never have been contented, with the bare acknowledgement of subjection, if he had known subjection was due before. He had prosecuted the King to the utmost extremity: Interdicted the Kingdom; excommunicated his Person; and at last deposed, and set the power of France upon him. It is not possible he should take for sufficient satisfaction for faults, which in his judgement deserved all this rigour, a confession that his own was his own, and a gift of what was his before. But the King's resignation made amends for all, and cleared scores so fully, that the Pope ever after was fast to him, and hearty took his part in all his necessities. Then and not before, Popes assumed the liberty to term the Kings of England their Vassals; which is a plain acknowledgement that they understood this submission, and nothing else, authorised them so to do. Agreeable to this were the outcries remembered by M. Paris, Heu Anglia, 
Ad an. 1216.  Anglia; hactenus Princeps Provinciarum facta es sub tributo— ut Terra tua ab antiquo libera ancillaret excogitasti— factus de Rege liberrimo Tributarius, firmarius, & Vassallus servitutis, etc. 'Tis evident the novelty of the King's submission put these complaints into the People's mouths, and that no such thing had formerly been heard of.  
To conclude, commend me to this fiction of Baronius for an example of zeal not according to knowledge. To speak without proof in a matter of this consequence, is pretty well of itself. But to want proof where the nature of the thing must needs afford a thousand; to fancy the Tenure of a Kingdom, could lie concealed I know not how long, and at last be discovered by his either pains or luck, to be quite contrary to what was apprehended by the rest of the world, which could no more be ignorant of the Tenure than of the Kingdom; to imagine England subject when no person can be imagined who should subject it, nor time in which it should become subject; to say nothing of the manifold inconsistency of his story, and contradiction to palpable evidence. These are strains which as I admire in him, so I hope not often to find elsewhere. And for Blesensis, either he knew not what he said, or, which is more likely, those two periods have by chance or fraud crept into his writings without his privity. In fine, he is no good Englishman, who does not acknowledge that the Kingdom of England is, and at all times has been, free, and subject to none but God. A Declaration made both with particular reference to the Pope, and by those who acknowledged his Authority in spirituals.  
And so we are come at last to the point of greatest difficulty, both of its own nature, and by the smartness with which 'tis pressed, the Fact of K. John. Our Author, not to leave the wound he makes without cure, assigns us Prescription for a remedy. You have not an entire confidence in this plaster, and I must confess I cannot blame you; not that I think it bad, but I like better to be sound, and need none. Most points of Law, and this of Prescription, as well as the rest, are full of learned Quibbles, and I do not love to trust our security to a moot case. The rights of Kingdoms are of too great consequence to depend on the Triccum de Lege. For what if some fiction of Law be pretended against our Prescription? What if the Pope, by some Act or other of which we never had intelligence, have continued a Legal, or Civil possession, all the time of our Natural possession, and so interrupted or voided our Prescription? It is not safe, in my opinion, to venture our whole stock in a bottom which possibly may prove leaky. Wherefore though Prescription may do well enough, yet while we have, in my judgement, a better game to play, I think it best, as you say, to play surer.  
Of the Considerations proposed in this matter with great sharpness by our Author, I take these to be the most material. That K. John past this grant when he had undoubted right to the Crown without any Competitor, his Nephew Arthur being dead before: That this right of his was then unconfined, Magna Charta not being yet framed, nor any power communicated to Barons, or People, or Parliaments, for intermeddling in the succession: And that however the Deed was confirmed by his Barons, who were they alone that then had any thing to do in the greater affairs of State. On these, because they will decide the Question, I shall insist more largely, and endeavour to show He is mistaken in all three.  
First for the consent of the Barons, although this clause Communi Consilio Baronum nostrorum be inserted in the Charter, yet nothing can be more apparent, than that in truth there was no such thing. It was so far from this, that there was an express dissent. 
Cui etiam manifeste contradictum fuit, & ex parte universitatis Regni reclamatum, quid talia nullo modo facere potuisset per os venerabilis Stephani Can. Archiepiscopi, quo non erat tunc major in Regno, etc. M. Westm. ad an. 1245. M. Paris add an. 1245.  For Stephen Langton Archbishop of Canterbury protested solemnly against it, and this publicly at the high Altar before all the company, and in the name of the whole Kingdom. This protestation of his was averred to the Pope's face, and that in full Council, by Will. Povick or Powevick, one of the Ambassadors at the Council of Lions, whither he was sent to complain in behalf of the Kingdom. I think it will not be denied, but the Clergy in those days had at least as much influence on public affairs, as the rest of the Nobility; and that there could be no common consent, where the Head of the Clergy publicly dissented. Especially considering that this protestation was not made for himself only, or his Order, but in the name of the whole Kingdom. For it can hardly be, that he should arrogate to himself to act in the name of the Kingdom, without the privity of the rest, and consent of so many at least as might keep his Act from appearing ridiculous. But that the rest of the Nobility were as far from consenting as the Clergy, is not left to guests. Their sense is manifest in the next words of Povick, In quod tributum nunquam Patres nostri consenserunt, nec aliquo tempore consentient, as Mat. Westm. relates them, or according to Mat. Paris, In quod nunquam Patres nobilium Regni, vel ipsi consenserunt, nec consentiunt, neque in futurum consentient, etc. This was said in circumstances uncapable of the suspicion of falsity. The man who spoke was an Ambassador, commissionated to speak for the Kingdom. He spoke to the Pope himself, in a full Council, and while the memory of things was yet fresh, and if he had not said true, might have been convinced by every body perhaps in the company. But neither the Pope himself, who certainly knew the truth, and was most concerned in it, nor any body else had anything to say against it. Besides even in the days of K. John, the K. of France, and his Son Lewis, when Walo the Pope's Legate would have diverted them from their design on England, by representing that the Kingdom held now of the Pope, maintained both to his face, 
M. Paris add an. 1216.  that K. John's grant was void, and this among other things, because there was no consent of the Barons. It is not possible they should so confidently avouch this to one who could not but know the truth, unless it had been notorious and undeniable even by Walo himself. Wherefore, it is manifest that the clause above mentioned was inserted for forms sake, without truth, it being not more known that there was a Charter, than that it was made without the consent of the Nobility. What the consequence of this is, will fall into consideration by and by, when we have discoursed of what remains.  
The next point is, that K. John had an undoubted right to the Crown when He passed this Deed. Suppose he had, what then? Right to wear the Crown, and Right to give it away, are very different things, and very far from inferring one another. He urges, that the Regal power in disposing of the Crown was the same then, as at the conquest. That the Conqueror both received the Crown by gift from K. Edward, and disposed of it by Testament. That although K. Edward's gift should pass for invalid, yet the very title of Conquest was sufficient for an Arbitrary power of disposing it, the very grant of Magna Charta from the Prince to the People being a plain Argument, that at least the power of our Norman Princes was originally arbitrary and unconfined, till themselves were pleased to restrain it by voluntary compacts, and concessions, which happened not till after the fact in question. Thus does our Author discourse, with a Tide of smartness, threaten Shipwreck to our liberties which way soever we steer. To deny an arbitrary right in the Conqueror, seems to question the right of his successors: To grant it, seems to confirm the Deed in question, and expose us to the mercy of the Pope.  
Before I answer particularly, I take leave to suppose, not because it cannot be proved, but because no body will require proof of what every body acknowledges, That rights questionable in their origin become unquestionable in tract of time. The Goths and Vandals broke into the Roman Empire, and mastered a great part of it with a known violence, but unknown Justice. Should ear be given to the exceptions which might be made against their Title, and the right of their posterity, and all who hold under them, questioned till the right of the first occupants were clearly made out, the world would be embroiled in inextricable confusion, and suffer little less from our disputes than their Arms. Few either Princes or private men, would enjoy their Estates with a safe Conscience. The bonds of Obedience would be broken, the security of Life and Fortunes taken away, and the Ligaments of human society dissolved. These things are so evidently contrary to the good of mankind, that speculations, which would infer them, are evidently contrary to reason. Speculate what you will of Justice, it is most certain that to ruin the world is a most unjust thing; or, if you will criticise upon the notion, at least irrational, and wicked, and intolerable. Wherefore whatever were the origin of established Powers, when they are established, and by long continuance become necessary to the quiet and security of mankind, they are most certainly just, and to question them is madness in all, and Treason in Subjects. To examine by what means this comes to pass, how true Right is acquired in Time, and even bad Titles become good at last, I conceive an Argument too high for me, and besides see it needless to meddle with it. For while the thing is universally acknowledged, and cannot be denied without extreme mischief to the world, the labour of enquiring more particularly into it, may be dispensed with. Two things I take to my present purpose, which I suppose none will deny me. 1. That the Right of succeeding Kings cannot be questioned on pretence of doubt, nay if you will, defect of right in the proceed of such as have reigned so long since as the Conquest. 2. That Power and Right being manifestly two very different things, it follows not, that because things were then done which ought not be questioned now, I mean with prejudice to Posterity, that they were therefore well done, and according to Right.  
To speak now particularly to what is alleged, It is true that the Conqueror had, or pretended a Gift from K. Edward, I suppose to have something to say. But 'tis apparent that, not K. Edward's gift, but his own sword gained him England. The Ratio ultima Regum was his only unanswerable Argument, and had Harold got the Victory, and preserved the Kingdom, he would have preserved Right enough to it, notwithstanding the Gift of K. Edward, and as much right been acknowledged in his Successors, as now in those of the Conqueror. It is true also that the Conqueror did dispose of the Kingdom to the prejudice of his eldest Son; but 'tis likewise true, that Duke Robert did claim, and put for the Crown, notwithstanding his Father's Testament, and had he prevailed, had transmitted a Right to his Posterity, which by this time had been unquestionable. These are matters purely of Fact, of which kind there are innumerable in History, but from which, according to the maxim that Fact does not infer Right, no Argument can be drawn. What the Conqueror did, He did by the power which his Conquest gave him; success and length of time has established, what depends on his actions, into a firmness which admits of no dispute. But this concludes not that all he did was just even in him, and much less that the same Actions are justifiable in his Successors.  
As for what is next urged, That Conquest sufficed for an arbitrary Power, it is undoubtedly true; for he did arbitrarily dispose of things as he pleased. But that his Conquest gave him Right so to do, or transmitted such a Right to his Posterity, is not to be admitted without very good proof. It is universally agreed that Conquest gives right only where the War is just; which I think signifies, that his Conquest gave him none at all. For the War is not just, unless he have a good Title who makes it, and if he have, Conquest only puts him into possession of what was wrongfully withheld, but his Right is antecedent to, and independent of his Conquest. Indeed where the revenge of some collateral wrong, or other cause, put just Arms into the hands of any Prince, there what he gains is thought justly his own, by virtue of his Conquest. But this is not our case. The only cause of this War, was because Harold withheld the Crown, to which if the Conqueror had a just Title, that which made it so gave him his Right; if he had not, the War was not just, and Conquest could give him none. Whether his Title were good or no, is a dispute in which I am not concerned, it not importing much to our times to know what was just in those. For whether his Title were just, that of his present Successors is not a jot the better, nor a jot the worse, if it were stark naught. Wherefore I positively deny the Inference employed in our Author's discourse, the Conqueror did arbitrarily dispose of the Kingdom, therefore K. John justly might, because that Arbitrariness of his does not conclude he had Right, so much as to the Crown, and much less to dispose as he pleased of it.  
'Tis farther urged, That the very granting of Magna Charta from the Prince to the People, is a plain Argument, that at least the power of our Norman Princes was originally arbitrary, and unconfined, till themselves were pleased to restrain it by voluntary compacts and concessions. And this, as the former, is true of Power, but I cannot grant it of Right. The Fact is interpretable both ways, and may as well argue Right in the People to the things granted, as in Princes to grant them. And if Justice required that such things should be granted, the Power, which till the grants were passed, hindered the People from what it was fit they should have, can hardly be thought just. The Truth is, this difficulty would ask rather a Treatise, than a Letter. The Notions of Power and Right would be explained and settled: It would be shown how Right is acquired, and how lost: How the Freedom of Nature is changed into subjection; why, and how far, some command, others obey, and in virtue of what, with twenty other Considerations, necessary enough to clear the difficulty, as it ought, but too long for a Packet.  
To say briefly as much as may serve turn; I observe that we use these words Just or Right, as all others, in different senses. We call him a Just man, who gives to every one what the Law makes his due, in which sense the Law is the Rule of Just and ; Just meaning as much as agreeable,  the same as contrary, to Law. But sometimes we apply the same Terms to Laws themselves, and say some are Just, others Unjust. As if Marriage, or the propagation of posterity, were universally forbidden, or every body commanded to cut off their Legs or Arms, such Laws would be thought, and called Unjust. In this case the notion of those words is very different, from what it was before; Unjustice now signifying opposition, not to Law, which cannot be opposite to itself, but to something else, which the Lawmakers had in their eye, when they made a just Law, and which was their Rule, and directed them to order what they did, and not the contrary. If we reflect what this is, we shall find that Just and  are said with reference to the nature of man. For other things being made for his use, are not always to be dealt with, as is most fitting for them, but as they may best serve him. But man must be used as his nature requires, and if he be not, we say he is wronged. I conceive therefore that the Root of Justice lies in the nature of man, and that the consideration of what is fitting, or unfit for it, is the original Rule of Just and Unjust. To descend to more particulars, and dispute how far one man may justly be hindered from his particular good, for the greater good of the society in which he lives, with the rest of the Considerations which belong to Lawmakers, is not to my purpose. It is enough if I observe that Just signifies radically Commensurate, or Fit, generally implies Agreement, which Agreement is supposed to be made on sight of what is fit for both parties agreeing. So that antecedently to Laws, which are, and aught to be in practice, at least betwixt members of the same commonwealth, looked on as the only Rules of Justice, there is a proportion or exigence of Nature, with respect to which some things are Just, others Unjust, and to which when Laws have not an eye, they themselves are thought not Just. And this explication I take to be, not only true, but universally acknowledged. For if positive agreements be thought absolutely necessary to the notion of Justice, I know not how that notion can be found in the Laws of Nature and Nations, which are the highest and most binding of all others, and yet are before, and manifestly without agreements.  
To apply this to our case, I consider that Government has been embraced for the good of the world, to avoid the mischief of lawless humours destructive to society, and that the Good of the Commonwealth is, or aught to be, the Prince's Rule, from which when he swerves, his Action is not Just, because unproportioned, and not suited to that exigence of Nature which is the root of Justice: yet it does not follow that a Prince every time he does unjustly, may be resisted. That is another, and at present, unconcerning Question.  
I consider farther that nothing can more import the good of the Commonwealth than the Governors themselves. For they are the main hinges on which the common good turns, and the Fountains from which all goods flow to particulars. If these be such as may endanger long settled Laws, and Customs, and render the properties of subjects uncertain, and unsecure, the Commonwealth always totters, and often falls. But all this will unavoidably follow, if the nomination of supreme Governors be left to arbitrary pleasure. They may be strangers, and through ignorance unable to preserve national Laws, They may be enemies, and through ill affection studious to break them. In fine, to fancy that any thing can be more against the common good, than to want known rules of succession, and that a Nation should be bound to obey whoever is named by chance or humour, is to fancy there may be some member more considerable to the Body than the Head.  
If this discourse be good, it may be understood how the Arbitrary power even of Conquerors, may be bounded, otherwise than by their voluntary Compacts and Concessions, namely by nature, and by the proportion of their Actions to the subject on which they Act. It is true that antecedently to compacts, their Actions cannot be called , as unjust signifies breach of agreements: but as  signifies breach of proportion, and the violation of what nature requires, They may be unjust, even before they bind themselves by compact to observe this proportion. This now I concieve is our Case, and that, since the good of the Commonwealth is the Rule of the Prince's Action, and that 'tis plainly against that good that their supreme Governors should be appointed arbitrarily, the arbitrary dispositions of the Crown, mentioned by our Author were effects more of Power than Right. I think himself will grant, if those Norman Princes were unconfined, till they voluntarily confined themselves, that 'twas at lest reasonable and fit they should be confined in this point; and sure, a Power to act unreasonably, and unfitly, is not what the world means by Right. Right to do ill, sounds very like Right to do wrong, and is in this case neither better nor worse. For if arbitrary placing of Governors be against the good of the Commonwealth, and Right or Just signify as much as Fit, or Good, and that, as at present it must, with respect to the Commonwealth, there is a Right in the Commonwealth which requires their Princes should not be set over them arbitrarily, and those arbitrary dispositions of the Crown were manifestly against Right. And yet perhaps it is enough that they were unreasonable, and unfit. For unreasonable Actions are no more to be drawn into consequence than unjust ones, and peradventure bind no more, where collateral considerations do not give them a strength, which they have not of themselves.  
I have alleged these considerations more to hint what may be said, than because I think nothing else can. For after all, it may with truth be maintained, that the power of the first Norman Princes, and of the Conqueror himself as well as the rest, was actually confined, and in the manner our Author would have it, by voluntary Concessions, long before Magna Charta, and the establishment of those liberties to the subject, which he supposes confine it now. They all took Oaths at their Coronation, and bound themselves to the observation of Justice. If an Oath do not bind a Prince, an Oath deliberately and solemnly made in the face of God and Man, in a matter too mainly concerning the good of the Commonwealth, for whose security he gives that Oath, and which she accepts as full security, there is no talking of Confinement upon him, of security to a Commonwealth, of Laws, and Obligations, and Compacts, but all must be left to the arbitrary unconfined pleasure of one man; a Position, which, is the Freedom of this part of the world, I suppose will not find much entertainment. However it is the strength even of Magna Charta itself, which cannot confine a Prince, if his Oath do not first confine him to observe it. Now who swears to render Justice, undoubtedly swears to render Justice to the Kingdom in the first place. For the concern of the whole, is the concern of all particulars, every one being as much, and perhaps more, interested in the Rights of the Kingdom, than in his private pretensions. If any man doubt of this, I suppose no Englishman at least will doubt but that he is to acquiesce to the Judgement of Parliament. And it is positively declared by Parliament, 
40 Ed. 3  that the Fact of K. John was contrary to his Coronation Oath, in which nevertheless for aught I can find, there is nothing more, than general expressions of rendering Justice. However it be, since it is a judged case, that K. John broke his Oath, in his arbitrary disposition of the Kingdom, it is a judged case, that his Power was confined in that particular, and this independently of Magna Charta, and all subsequent Compacts. And if his, then sure of all the rest, for they all swear as much as Herald  
But if any man will continue stiff in this opinion, and believe nothing able to confine the arbitrary power of Conquerors but their own Concessions, I would entreat him to direct me to that Concession which has confined their power in this point, besides their Coronation Oath. I do not find either in Mag. Charta, or any where else, any Article concerning the disposition of the Crown. Learneder men may know more, but my Ignorance persuades me, that if the Norman Princes had such a Right, and that Right can only be restrained by voluntary Concessions, and those direct to the point, their Successors have it still. And 'tis not easy to be persuaded otherwise, till the Concession appear. But this no Englishman can either say or think, nothing being more notorious than that it cannot be done now. Whoever will take the pains to examine how it comes to pass, that this original power is now restrained, will not easily be satisfied, if nothing else will satisfy him but a direct Concession. I believe he will be forced to confess at last, that such a Concession is neither extant, nor needful, and acknowledge that Power is bounded as truly and as strongly by Nature as Grants.  
Upon the whole I conceive there may in the first Norman Princes be considered the Power of Conquerors, and Right of Kings. That their Power was unconfined enough, but ought not be drawn into Precedent, although it be against all Reason and Justice to question now those effects of their Power, which remain among us even to this day. For these have strength, not from their Power, but from what is able to turn Unjust into Just, as Titles, originally bad, become good in process of Time. That even their Right was confined, the very notion of Right implying limitation. For right signifies proportion of the Action to the subject, so that an unconfined Right is not Right. That their Right was confined in this particular by the good of the Kingdom, as has been discoursed before; and though it had not Right to what they did is very far from inferring Right to what K. John did: the two remarkable precedents, mentioned by our Author, being so remarkably different from this case, that they can be no Precedents, nor warrant for it.  
William Rufus reigned after his Father, and excluded his Brother, in truth by the favour of the Kingdom, yet claiming by his Father's Testament. That claim may be allowed, without allowing King John's resignation. For in the Conqueror's fact there was no more, then of two sons, both fit, both equal to the Kingdom, to prefer whom he thought fittest. The Laws and Liberties, and condition of the Kingdom was the same under either; so that apprehending in likelihood no greater interest in the business than whether their King should be called William, or Robert, They approved the Father's choice, and willingly obeyed whom he appointed. But King John's Fact was quite of another strain, A Stranger, and such an one who could never become a denizen, one taken up with other cares, and dwelling too far off, to be ever able to act as was fitting, for the good of England, was made the supreme Lord; and which was worse, the Tenure of the Kingdom altered, and of free turned into subject. The Kingdom was sensible of their Interest in the business, and disclaimed the fact, both then and ever since. I am mistaken if Reception of Laws, be not generally held a very material consideration to their validity. But the cases are otherwise so apparently different, that a Right in the Conqueror, to dispose of the Crown as he did, may safely be granted, without any necessity, or colour, of allowing in consequence a Right to King John to dispose of it as he did.  
If Henry 1. succeeded in virtue of the same Testament, his case is the same with the former. But this Gentleman's information was better than mine if he had other Title than Election, at least till his Brother consented, as he soon did, the same title which K. Stephen, and after him K. John had to the Crown. I should think their Examples a very good Reason, that the proceed of those times are not to be drawn into consequence. For if they may, it will follow that the Kingdom of England perhaps is, at least has been Elective. Which I suppose no Englishman will admit: if they may not, I know not to what purpose they are alleged.  
For these reasons I am persuaded nothing can be drawn from the proceed of the first Norman Princes to justify the Resignation of King John, which is so far from being binding to our times, that it never had any validity at all. But not to leave the matter disputable betwixt my No, and the Yea of who will maintain the contrary, I will fairly put it to Judgement, and say, whatever was done, and by whatever right, about the times of the Conquest, that K. John in particular could not validly do what he did; and that this has already been decided, and in such manner, that there is nothing so firmly settled in the world, which may not admit of question as well as this. In the reign of Ed. III. the Pope demanded the long unpaid one thousand marks granted by K. John, and threatened by legal process to recover this rent. A Parliament was called chief for this business, and it was unanimously resolved, 
Rot. Parl. 40 Ed. 3.  That neither K. John, nor any other, could bring Himself, his Kingdom, or People into such subjection, without their consent, and against his Coronation Oath. And that in case the Pope should by process or otherwise, attempt to constrain the King or his Subjects to perform the premises, They would become Parties, and resist him with all their Power. This is plain and peremptory, and directly to the point. I cannot but muse to observe them speak doubtingly of the matter of Fact, 
Supplication of Souls.  and the more because Sr. Tho. More very positively denies the Church of Rome could in his, or any time, produce such an Evidence. When I consider He was a learned man, and no Enemy to the Pope, had great means of being well acquainted with Records, and passages of former times unknown to others, and speaks as if he had good ground for what he said, I hardly know what to think of it. I wish he had informed us what his grounds were; peradventure there is more to be said than we are ware of. But since he has not, and the Parliament does not directly deny the Fact, I for my part must be contented to take things at the worst, and not deny what I cannot disprove. I have this for my comfort, that if the Fact were true, it was in Sr. Tho. More's words, right naught worth, and the Authority of Parliament to bear me out. By the way our Author in alleging the consent of the Barons, at that time the only representative of the Kingdom, speaks against a solemn Declaration of Parliament, and this undeniable proof may be joined to what I produced before, to make good my denial of their consent. However the Question is positively decided, and by an Authority irrefragable to Englishmen.  
But lest we should be suspected of partiality in our own case; let us put it to the Judgement of Foreigners. When the differences betwixt this King and the Barons became irreconcilable, they sought protection from France. The Pope sent a Legate to dissuade the French King and his Son from meddling with a Kingdom, the Dominion whereof belonged now to the Church. The word was hardly out of the Legates mouth, when the King of France replied suddenly, 
M. Paris add an. 1216.  That England never had been, nor then was, nor ever should be the Patrimony of Peter. And this, besides what he else alleged, because no King could give away his Kingdom without consent of his Barons, an error which if the Pope would maintain; He would give a most pernicious example to all Kingdoms: The Nobility present with great heat justified this speech of their King, and declared they would stand for that point to death, viz. that it was not in the power of any King to transfer his Kingdom, or make it tributary at pleasure. You see I spoke not altogether out of my own head, when I refused to yield an arbitrary right of disposing Kingdoms even to Conquerors, and that I shall not want who will take my part. But to let that pass, it cannot be attributed to the partiality of our either Country or Times, that we hold this Deed of K. John null, when it was condemned for such by those who were contemporaries to it, and as much abroad as at home. Who desires more security is in my opinion a very scrupulous man.  
Notwithstanding let us put it to the Judgement of the very Contrivers of the Deed. I am much mistaken if Themselves had not the same sentiments with the rest of the world. If They did not understand well enough, that the consent of the Barons was necessary to the validity of the Deed, why did they insert that clause, Communi Consilio Baronum nostrorum? A thing of this consequence undoubtedly was not carelessly huddled up. Great deliberation was without question used, and they would never have put in, what they themselves and every body else knew was false, but that they were sensible All was to no purpose without it. So that, in the hard choice of framing a Draught, either without Truth, or without validity, They had an eye to the latter, and let the first shift as it could. The truth is, They had reason; it being obvious enough, that if they could carry things out at present, the Charter itself, as all Records are, would be a strong Presumption, for the truth of what it contains, to Posterity. But since it is as evident, as that there was a Charter, that this Clause was untrue, it is likewise evident, that Those who put it in, thought it necessary. Wherefore even in their Judgements the Grant was invalid, as wanting what themselves thought absolutely requisite.  
You now perceive of what importance this point is, of the Consent of the Barons, of which I forbore to speak, while I was examining whether they consented or no. Neither do I mean to dilate upon it now: it being enough to observe, that the want of it absolutely invalidates the Grant, and this in the Judgement, not only of the Framers, and of the King and Kingdom of France, but of Parliament. For you see They positively declare, that neither K. John, nor any other could bring the Kingdom into subjection, without consent of the People, who at that time had none, but the Barons, to consent for them. So that not to acquiesce in this point, is to refuse the highest Authority of the Nation; and who does so is not fit to live in the Nation.  
But shall I venture to join our Author himself to the rest of this good company, and say, that whatever out of the strength of his wit He alleges on the other side, yet this Charter is no more valid in his judgement, than in other folks? And I do not mean that 'tis become now invalid, by the force of Prescription, (for this he has sufficiently declared) but that it was originally and always invalid. Truly I am mistaken if this may not be concluded from what he says elsewhere, when dis-engaged from the desire of making good his Argument, he frankly discovers his true sentiments. Pag. 239. considering an observation made in a former Letter, on the particular Fact of the Emperor Frederick, he replies, That whether supreme Princes may put it into a Foreigners power to compel them (to session) by a direct deprivation of their Right of Government, is a case which he thinks none will easily grant to be either Just or Secure for the Commonwealth for which they were concerned. I conceive that when K. John resigned his Kingdom, and received it again to hold of the Pope, as principal Lord, to whom he became a Vassal, He put it into the power of a Foreigner to compel him, not only by Ecclesiastical Censures, but by a direct deprivation of his Right of Government. And this he declares to be Unjust, and Unsafe for the Commonwealth. King John then, even in his own opinion, did unjustly, and against the good of the Commonwealth, that is, had not Right to do what he did, and his Act was invalid from the beginning. I suppose therefore He will acknowledge on second thoughts, that there are other ways to bond the actions of supreme Princes, besides Compacts and Concessions, and that Justice and the Safety of the Commonwealth, are two of those ways, in which other Princes were obliged to walk as well as K. John, and if they did not, their Actions are not to be drawn into example.  
I will hope the Question is resolved to satisfaction. For I know no fairer, nor surer way to end a difference, than to put it to Judgement. And since 'tis judged on my side by an Authority from which there lies no appeal, and by those who one would expect should be most partial on the other, Those who contrived the Deed, and Him who urges it, 
Of the Pope's Temporal Monarchy.  I should think there is no more to be desired. If any man's curiosity reach further, he may find wherewith to satisfy it in those who have already handled this Subject; particularly the learned Crakanthrop.  
But to touch briefly what is more largely treated elsewhere, the Charter contradicts and destroys itself, reserving in one place, what it grants in another. There is in it an express saving of the Rights given away, by this clause, Salvis nobis & Haeredibus nostris Justitiis, Libertatibus, & Regalibus nostris. Nothing can be more manifest, than that the Independency of the Crown belongs to the Regalia; and again, that subjection is opposite to Liberty. And yet the Regalia, and Liberty are expressly reserved, at the same time, when the Crown is made Dependent, and Subject. This is just, I give you a hundred pound, which hundred pound I keep to myself. Which is an unvalid and self-destructive Act, and passes nothing, and is in truth a piece of Nonsense, not a Gift. Again, that the Regalia Imperii are Inalienabilia without consent of the Subjects, is a point settled by a consent so unanimous of all Nations, that there is no Maxim more known. 'Tis very troublesome, and more idle, to fill paper with Quotations, for a point better known than the Author to be quoted.  
This too is a received Maxim, that Metus cadens in virum constantem nuls the Act extorted by fear, of which, besides a hundred examples in all nations, some even of Popes themselves, who upon that ground have voided their own Acts, the Pope, to whom this Grant was made, has left a very pregnant instance in the case of this very King. The Barons a little after obtained the Magna Charta from him, confirmed by all the security they could devise. The Pope solemnly declares all proceed void, because extorted by fear. But it is most evident that K. John had no greater cause of fear, when he passed the Magna Charta, than he had, when he signed the Charter to the Pope. Pandulph brought him to it, by exaggerating his imminent danger, the French with a vast Army ready to land, backed with the Ecclesiastical power of the Clergy, and Arms of the Laity, whereof many of the principal were said to have obliged themselves by authentic Charters to assist the French. The King yielded, confusus valde, & ment nimis perturbatus, & videns undique sibi periculum imminere, in the words of M. Paris. Can there be more fear from the Barons alone, than from the same Barons, and French, and Pope too? Or could his fear in one case make his Act void, and signify nothing in the other? So that there is this very good reason to believe, that the Pope himself, to whom the Kingdom was granted, judged the Grant nul, because he declared an Act of the same King nul by a less fear, than that which extorted his Grant. This too was understood by those who drew the Charter, and inserted this other clause, Non vi inducti, nec Timore coacti, sed nostra bona, spontaneaque voluntate. By which it is apparent that there was more than one clause contrary to Truth, and that more was requisite to the validity of the Act, even in the judgement of the Contrivers, than could be had. Which is that the Act was invalid, as wanting what themselves thought necessary to make it valid.  
By this, and much more alleged by divers, the Nullity of that Grant of K. John appears, I think, very undeniably; supposing in him all the Right, which can be supposed in any King of England. But by our Author's favour, what he takes for granted, that K. John had undoubted Kite to the Crown, at the passing of this act, is very far from undoubted. A Sister of Arthur's was then living, and long after, in whom the Right of Arthur could not but be. When K. John by his success at Mirabel got Arthur into his hands, he made use of the opportunity of his victory to seize likewise upon his Sister Elinor, whom he brought into England, and confined to Bristol Castle. There was another, and I think an elder Sister, but what became of her I know not. In likelihood she died before these times. But this Lady survived her Uncle. The Pope mentions her, among those who had right to the Crown, to the Ambassadors of Lewis, 
M. Paris add an. 1216.  who sought to justify their Master's title to England, and the French objected against her, what, if it have any force in their Law, has none in ours. For it is a plain case that the elder line takes place of the younger, in the inheritance of the Crown, and no act, or forfeiture of K. John could bar the right of the Children of his elder Brother, who were Heirs, not to John, but Richard, and by John wrongfully excluded. This Lady never married, but lived to a good Age, 
M. Paris add an. 1241. Y podig. Neustriae p. 59  one example of many of the little comfort there is in unsupported greatness. She died in the year 1241, and was buried among the Nuns of Amesbury, to whom by permission of Henry III. She gave the Manor of Molsham. Her Right was buried with her, but while she lived, it cannot be said K. John had no Competitor. This being so, all pretence from K. John's Fact, is cut up by the roots, there being not so much to be said for it, as that himself had right to what he gave away. And yet for my part I think, if he had had a Right as unquestionable as our Author supposes, it is equally unquestionable that his gift was no more valid than if he had had none.  
Whether I have acquitted myself of what I undertook, and shown the three material points of our Author's discourse, viz, Consent of the Barons, undoubted Right, and unconfined power in K. John, are all mistakes, I am not to be my own Judge. It is the readers right, and to him I leave it. To pass farther, and examine what else is urged, seems needless. When the Root is digged up, the Branches may be let alone; and I am far from taking pleasure in contradicting, especially a man whose Learning and Candour I esteem. Yet, because peradventure to neglect what he says, may show more unhandsome than to descent from it, I shall briefly deliver my opinion of the rest.  
In the next point, viz. That the Pope's Title was the more confirmed by his uninterrupted Practice, I think He is mistaken too. 'Tis true, that Henry III did at his Coronation take an Oath of Fealty to the Pope, the same which his Father had taken before. And there was a very pressing necessity, which obliged him so to do. Lewis Son to the King of France was in the Bowels of the Kingdom with a strong Army, and many of the Nobility took his part. The King was a Child, unable to do any thing for himself, and forced to depend entirely on those who would assist him. Among these the Pope was the most considerable, whose Legate was with him, and with unwearied earnestness laboured for his Interest. It was not for him, in such a conjuncture, to break with the Pope. For it was evidently to ruin himself. So that 'twas wisely done of his Council to provide for the greater danger first, and leave the rest to time. It is true also that King John made use of this subjection, to annul his concession to the Barons. But it does not therefore follow there was no Interruption. The Archbishop of Canterbury protested at very first, and in the name of the whole Kingdom; the Barons refused to submit to the Pope's sentence, and stood to their obtained Concessions notwithstanding his Excommunications; the French rejected his claim with great ardour; solemn opposition was made in the Council of Lions, both by King and Kingdom, in the reign of Henry III succeeding Kings positively denied all marks of subjection, and were abetted by unanimous consent of Parliament. A Practice so much opposed I think cannot be called uninterrupted. Opposition sure is Interruption, or at least as good. For the the act of one part, can never confirm a practice. The Pope may do what he pleases, but unless the Kingdom do something too, his Title will never be confirmed. It may be said that the Tribute was paid by Henry III. suppose it were, what is this to the Kingdom? Henry III. could not be hindered from disposing of his own, and paying what, and to whom he pleased. But his Act cannot be thought binding to the Kingdom, unless the Kingdom consented; And the Kingdom was so far from consenting that it positively dissented. Wherefore the practice being urged as a Title to the Kingdom, it seems very plain, that this Title was so far from being more confirmed, that it was not confirmed at all, nor could be, by any practice of the Popes, unless the Kingdom had concurred to it.  
The next point that the Pope never solemnly devested himself, I conceive not to purpose. For if his Title were never good, 'tis no matter whether he ever disclaimed it or no. And yet, if the Author of the Eulogium, said to be in the Cotton Library, be of any credit, this too may be denied. For he expressly says, that in a Parliament at London 1214, where the Clergy cum tota laicali secta were present, the obligation was, by the Pope's command, wholly released. For my own part I must confess, I know not how far this Author may be trusted, not finding any mention of so remarkable a passage any where else. But though his credit be obscure, this is clear, that if K. John's Act were invalid of itself, there needed no Act of the Popes to make it so. And I take it to be no less clear, that it was invalid, and that we may spare the labour of enquiring, whether the Pope ever gave away, what he truly never had.  
The last thing urged is that the Pope admits of no Prescription, which if it be true, the less reason have we to put ourselves upon that trial. But I think it is not true. For the Canon Law allows Prescription, and that against the Church of Rome, as well as any other. Only by way of Privilege more time is required to bear her Plea, than others. But I have already declared, I like not to enter into that dispute. It depends on Law, a study which the Interests and Passions of men have embroiled with so many intricate perplexities, that 'tis little better than a labyrinth without a Clew. Nothing in my opinion is more fruitless, nor perhaps more dangerous than to submit the Rights of Princes to disputes, where there will be always something to say, and not half of what is said, understood, but by men of the Trade.  
Besides there is another Consideration, which to my Judgement, absolutely excludes this Topick. Prescription is a Plea established by the Civil, and Canon Laws, which appoint the cases, the persons, the times, and all conditions of it. Who has a Suit depending in a Court, where sentence is pronounced according to those Laws, may be concerned to study the nature of it: but with us, where neither Law is in force, it seems wonderfully from the purpose to amuse ourselves with it. What have we to do, to examine whether our Possession have all the conditions required to Prescription by those Laws, which themselves signify nothing? If they pronounce sentence for us, we are not a jot the better, and if against us, not a jot the worse. England is a Country Independent of Foreigners, and governed by Laws and Customs of her own. What Emperors and Popes think fit to establish among their Subjects, concerns us no more, than what we do concerns them. By our Laws the Grant of K. John is void, and has been positively declared so by the highest Tribunal among us, and from which there lies no appeal. After this to put ourselves upon the trial of Prescription, seems a kind of submission to foreign Laws, a kind of confessing the point, and acknowledgement of a superior Power.  
Again, the Law of Prescription is, as other Laws, made for avoiding confusion in the Commonwealth, and securing the properties of members belonging to it. That Commonwealths themselves are always subject to the same Laws with their members, I cannot easily understand. The case of John a Nokes and John a Styles, is different from the supreme Lord of John a Nokes and John a Styles. It is true that generally Crowns are inherited by the same Rules with private Estates. But sometimes it happens otherwise, and 'tis the Interest of the Commonwealth, that what is not allowed in one case, should be in another. The Crown of England has a privilege above all Estates which hold of it. For it takes away all defects; and this, whatever be in other places, is Law with us. I know not how idle time can be spent more idly than in unridling what is subtly proposed by the Sphinxes of Laws, with which we have nothing to do, while we have Laws of our own, whose meaning we know, and to whose authority we must and ought submit.  
Notwithstanding, if Issue were joined upon this point, I think there is no reason to doubt of the sentence. The Conditions required to a valid Prescription by those Laws, are Possession, continued all the time determined by Law; a Title probably presumed; and a prudent Persuasion that the thing in question belongs to the possessor, or at least to no body else, which they call Bona Fides. Now that the Crown of England has been in the possession of those who have worn it, neither is, nor can be doubted out of Bedlam. That this possession has lasted much longer, than any time required to Prescription, is as plain as the former. A hundred years is the longest time allowed in any case, and bars the claim even of the Church of Rome; 
Lessins' de Just. & Jure, ●●l. 2. cap. 6. Dub. 12.  And, which peradventure is more properly the case, forty prescribes against a supreme Prince, if there be a Title, but Time out of mind, whether there be or no. Farther, that the Title of our Princes is something more than probably presumed, and consequently that their possession has always been accompanied with bona Fides, is as undeniable as all the rest. So that I think our Author has reason to believe Prescription a very sufficient Plea against the Pope, though I am not of his mind, that 'tis our only one.  
But this by the by, and to show we need not fear fight in this quarrel, at any weapon. Otherwise, to my apprehension, it is as rational to talk of the Laws of China, or Japan, as of Emperors and Popes, with relation to England. Local Laws concern only those who live where they are in force; betwixt Nation and Nation there is no other Law, but that of Nations and Nature. And peradventure, if we look better into it, Prescription may itself be a Law of Nations. For though it be generally taken in the notion of Civil and Canon Lawyers, and go attended with the train of conditions placed about it by them, yet it may as properly signify the same with immemorial Possession. So I think our Law understands it, without any notice of Title or bona Fides, or any thing else but quiet Possession. And so it may be this learned Gentleman himself understood it, which if he did, it is undoubtedly, not only a sufficient, but the best and strongest Plea that can be. It is that whereon the firmness of most, perhaps all, Commonwealths in the world depends, and in which the consent of Nations acknowledges an unquestionable force, and which, for that reason must needs be grounded on Nature. Because Authors commonly take Prescription in the other sense, I thought it most convenient to go along with the cry, and speak in their language. So taken, I refuse it for a Judge, not that I fear it should give sentence against me, but because I think it not qualified to give sentence, our case belonging not to the cognisance of that Court. But taken in the other sense, as I cannot refuse to stand to that, on which the security of the world is established, so it is plainly of my side. It being not more known that we are a Nation, than that we are independent of foreign subjection, and have time out of mind continued in the possession of such independency, and in the sight, and with the acknowledgement of all the world about us.  
I know not how my pen runs on beyond my design, and without necessity, for much I think might be spared. To make an end, since this Fact of K. John was evidently giving away what he had no power to give, no not though his right to the Crown had been undoubted, which 'tis plain it was not; since this want of power in him was acknowledged by the very Contrivers of the Charter, who were forced to supply the Defects, of which they were sensible, by Clauses of Form, but evidently against Truth; since the Case is already a judged Case, both at home and abroad; since the judgement given at home is peremptorily conclusive, and unappealable; and has besides been confirmed by a Possession, which to question is to subvert the foundations of Government, and render all Commonwealth's unsecure and tottering; I think no man of sense can be moved by any thing, which can be said on the Pope's behalf in this point. But if so much scruple, and so little reason may be suspected in our Nation, of all men in it the suspicion should not fall on those of our Communion. We have given very good evidence of our sense in this point, by publicly declaring it. For they were of our Communion who made the Act of Parliament, mentioned before, and solemnly resolved this Fact in particular to be void and null. And they were of our Communion, who in another occasion, declared the Independency of the English Crown, and its freedom from all earthly subjection, and this with relation particularly to the Pope. If any one be found scrupulous enough, and mad enough, against all reason, and the judgement of his Ancestors of his own Communion, to refuse to give you all imaginable security in this point, I consent with all my heart you treat him as a man degenerated from the loyalty of his Ancestors, and no company for good Subjects.  
It is now time to make a step into Ireland, in which though the novelty of strange places be usually full of wonder, yet I do not think to find any thing more wonderful, than this Bull of Pope Adrian which you mention. That all Islands, which have received Christianity, should eo ipso belong to the Church of Rome, is a thing in which often consideration, as it happens in other cases, diminishes nothing of the surprise. The more I consider, the more I wonder, and as wondering people do, gaze, and stare, and hardly know what to say. I have a great mind bluntly to deny the thing; as I would an incredible story related without proof. Nothing that ever I heard, not the enchantment of O Brazile sounds more incredibly. But M. Paris and the rest, who record it, have never been taxed of feigning, and Baronius says he found it in the Vatican. 'Tis not for me to oppose my persuasion to their credit, though all their credit, cannot hinder it from sounding still incredibly. There are many Islands nearer Rome, Cyprus, and Candia, Sicily, Sardignia and the rest. If the Pope have a claim, as I think he has, to some of these, surely it is not purely because they are Islands. For to some I do not know that he ever pretended. The Coast of America has many very considerable, Hispaniola, Cuba, and our Jamaica, to say nothing of the rest, and nearer at hand the Canaries as little as they are, are yet worth having. It is as incredible a thing, as any can be, that Ireland alone should be claimed by a pretence common to innumerable others, there being no continent which has not many, and no claim made to any of the rest. England, at least Britain, is an Island too: How came it to scape, and all this bustle made with King John, to gain a litigious, and unmaintainable pretence, to what was clearly the Popes before? Again, why has this pretence never been set a foot before, nor since, in no case, by no body? Were it not for this Bull, it could not be known, there ever was such a conceit in the world, and notwithstanding the Bull, it never entered, for aught I can learn, 
Eccles. E B. Apost. Petri & Pauli pro continuatione Luminariorum p●ssessionum praed●a contulimus● tam in oriente quam in occidente— vel diversis Insulis, etc. Privileg. Constan. dist. 96.  into the head of any other man.  
But whence should this subjection of Islands come? From their receiving Christianity? If this were so, I perceive no difference betwixt Islands, and Continents, that Christianity should not work the same effects in both. For certainly what Christianity does, it does every where. But that Christianity has no such effect, that non eripit mortalia qui regna dat coelestia, is known and confessed, and has been discoursed enough formerly. If such a thing were once admitted of Islands, such another Bull might turn the whole world into one great Island, and all were the Popes without more ado. Or may the famous Donation of Constantin, because it has the word Islands, ground this pretence? The word indeed is used once, but nothing more is said of them, than that some revenues are granted out of some of them, as well as other places, towards maintaining lights at Rome. Besides the Donation itself signifies nothing, and if it did cannot be stretched to Ireland, which never was in the power of Constantin to dispose of. A claim to all Christian Islands can never have its origin from Constantin, who was not possess't of, nor so much as acquainted with the hundredth part of them, and yet before the end of the world we hope The sun of Justice will shine upon them all.  
Truly I am utterly at a loss, and which way soever I turn me, can make nothing of it, unless the Right, of which this Bull speaks, be understood of a Spiritual Right. Such an one the Pope may claim, and that in virtue of their receiving Christianity, and if he spoke only of Islands, I would think the reason was because, the question being only of Ireland, it was not to his purpose to speak of Continents. So that I would understand the Bull in this manner: You desire my favour and counsel, in your design upon Ireland, which you mean to undertake for the good of the Country in general, and the Church in particular; Islands belonging to my care, as well as the rest of the world: I am glad all the good be done there which can, and so approve your design, and wish you to go on. I know not whether I shall not pass for too bold an interpreter, but I will hope at least, that this is the sense; if it be not, I should be beholding to him who could instruct me what is.  
But be it what it will, I am sure a single line, inserted in an old writing, no body knows why, or upon what ground, and never insisted on before, nor since, no not by the most partial Abetters of the Pope's Prerogatives, is a sorry evidence by which to claim a Kingdom. The Kings of England have held that Country above 500 years, and all that time been acknowledged absolute Lords of it, by all the world, and Popes as well as the rest. No Homage, no Tribute, no Investiture, no sign of subjection to the Pope, has all this while appeared, save in the resignation of King John, nothing performed on our side, nothing so much as demanded on the other. The world would run into a fine confusion, if such a Title should be questioned, because some words are found in a writing 500 years ago, which no body can understand. Pope's have not been careless in their Rights: England in some of the intermediate times has been even scrupulously affected to them, and a great deal more ready to add to, than detract from their due. It is not possible but, if this Title had been any thing worth we should have heard of it at some time or other, elsewhere than in the Bull. At least in the transactions with King John, it must of necessity have appeared. That King was not in terms to refuse any thing the Pope should demand. Had he known of any right to Ireland, it had been but saying so: for it was upon the matter, Ask and Have, any pretence in that conjuncture would have served turn. And this Bull was not then so old, that it could be worn out of memory. But it is plain that England and Ireland are both on the same terms in the grant of King John, and no right pretended to either but in virtue of that grant. Neither indeed can such a pretence consist with the words of it. Instead of Offerimus & libere concedimus, it must have been said, we restore, or acknowledge, or something equivalent by which there might have appeared not creation of a new Right, but recognition of an old. For that cannot be granted, which is the Grantee's before the Grant, nor does a supreme Lord receive a Fee from a Vassal by way of gift; but obliges the Vassal to acknowledge by Homage, and customary duties that it is so; or if disuse have withheld his duties, and weakened his Title, to restore things again to their old condition. This, instead of granting, King John should, and the Pope would have made him, have done, had there been any knowledge of a claim to Ireland independently of this Grant. So that whatever Pope Adrian meant, it is evident his Successors never understood his meaning gave them any right to that Island. Nothing is more foolish, than to catch at words, and interpret the meaning by the sound, when we have Actions, immemorial practice, and custom to guide us securely, and assure us the meaning, whatever it be cannot be contrary to these. Allow that method once, and you leave no stability, even in what the good of mankind requires should be most stable, the settlement of Commonwealths.  
In short, if our King's Title to Ireland be not good, there is no good Title in the world. At least I know none established on a surer foundation. And were it the question, believe I could make it out. But we are not now enquiring what Title our Kings have, but whether the Pope have any. For which reason I forbear to meddle with the Book you mention, which seeks to overthrow the Title of England, not to establish that of the Pope. Only in short I must acknowledge I never read any thing with more grief, nor so much shame. The best is, the Cursed Cow has wondrous short horns. As ill as He means, in my opinion, he does more good than harm. For Truth is well proved, when 'tis perceived it cannot be disproved but weakly. And nothing is weaker than his discourse. What is most material, is directly contrary to History; but his chief business is to bring, as you say, hard names to prove, what is not a jot to purpose when 'tis proved. He casts away the greatest part of his pains upon the Punctilios required to Prescription by the Civil and Canon Laws, in Suits betwixt Subject and Subject, and never considers that those Punctilios, and those Laws have nothing to do with the case, and that the Rights of Princes are established upon a higher, and more steady Basis, than local and mutable constitutions. But I have discoursed of this point before, and mean not to trouble you with repetitions, and that in a Question which concerns me not. No better answer can, nor other need, 
Hist. of the Irish Remonst p. 739. & 742.  be given to this Book, than what was given in Ireland, where an. 1648. the supreme Council of the Confederate Catholics, caused it to be burnt at Kilkenny by the common Hangman, and the National Congregation too of the Irish Clergy (I mean Roman Catholic) at Dublin, an. 1666. condemned it to the same fate. And for the rest, whoever doubts of his Majesty's right, to all and every part of his Dominions, is a Traitor without more ado, and cannot complain if he be used like one, nor any body for him.  
This answer I conceive may serve for Scotland too, with which I shall make short work, believing your Jealousies in that particular are not very pressing. The only stumbling block that I know in this matter, is the letter you cite of Boniface VIII. to. Edward I. in which, 
Mat. Westm. ad an. 1301.  with a phrase as unintelligible, as that of Adrian's Bull, it is said, qualiter ab antiquis temporibus Regnum Scotiae pleno jure pertinuit, & adhuc pertinere dignoscitur ad Ecclesiam supradictam, meaning the Roman. And again, ex quibus nulli in dubium veniat Regnum Scotiae praelibatum ad praefatam Rom. Ecclesiam pertinere. While I read this Letter, and the King's answer, I was inclined to believe, the meaning of this was, that the Pope as a common Father of Christendom, had right to interpose in emergent differences in Scotland, as well as other places. I observed that he alleges Debitum Pastoralis Officii for the reason why he meddles, and respect to his seat and Person, for the motive why the King should yield to his request. Again, the Ex quibus whence he concludes this subjection, are because Scotland used not to admit a Legate, not particularly directed to that Kingdom; That the Arch Bishop of York could not obtain sentence at Rome in favour of the Primacy claimed by him over the Scottish Churches; and that the Kingdom was converted by the Relics of Saint Andrew. These have so little to do with Civil subjection to Rome (and what he mentions besides has a great deal less) that I could not imagine a Pope, from such Premises, could draw such a conclusion. Besides that the King in his answer does not take the least notice of such a sense. But coming to read the answer of the Nobility, to whom the King purposely left that point, I perceive they understood the words as they sounded. I shall therefore give their answer, and make an end. Your letters being read, say they, tam sensibus nostris admiranda, quam hactenus inaudita in jis audivimus contineri. Scimus enim— nec ullis temporibus ipsum regnum in temporalibus pertinuit, vel pertinet quovis jure ad Ecclesiam vestram supradictam, and again, nec etiam Reges Scoterum & Regnum aliis quam Regibus Angliae subfuerunt, vel subjici consueverunt. Pursuant hereunto, They would not consent the King should send Proctors, as the Pope desired, to Rome, to make out his Title there; nay they declare, They would not permit the King to do it, although he would, it being too great a prejudice to his known Rights to submit them to Trial. If this do not satisfy I know not what will. At least it did satisfy the Pope, who in Pol. Virgil's words, statim refrixit, 
Pol. Virgil lib. 1● in Ed. ●.  ut scilicet si pertinacius contenderet, ne inhoneste causa caderet, and never, that I know touched upon this string more. And It must satisfy all Englishmen. For it was a resolution of Parliament, or at least of a great Council of the Nobility, which in those days was equivalent.  
I Am come to the end of your Letter, and I think of writing too. Unless you do something on your side, besides ask questions, painful to resolve, and fruitless when they are resolved, you have my last, (it may be your full wish, my first too;) For I cannot answer it to reason, to continue sowing in barren ground, and believe, while so much trouble is coming on us all, yourself would counsel me not to run into more, that of breaking my brains to no purpose. There has been already said, what, I hoped, might have wrought more favourable inclinations towards us. Since the Physic works not, whether by your indisposition, or its own inefficacy, 'tis peradventure to play the foolish, as well as unskilful, Empiric, to go on administering. But yet since Losers have leave to talk, permit me to make use of that liberty, it may be the only one which I shall long enjoy.  
As much reason as I have to grieve, yet truly I cannot but wonder as much at your proceed. Can it possibly be your interest to keep a party always in fear of the Law, and by that fear prompted to wish a change in it? I mistake if it be not the Interest of every Commonwealth, that all the members be hearty concerned for the maintenance of Law, because it is the main security of Liberty, and Property, and all worldly goods. But in our case the Law, instead of securing, threatens our Liberties, and Properties, and Lives, nor can we be concerned in the preservation of it, without being unconcerned in the preservation of ourselves. For my life I cannot imagine by what Policy you are guided, to lay upon never so inconsiderable a party, a necessity so strong as that of self-preservation, to wish an alteration of Law. The sword of Justice should be the Protection, and comfort of Good men, and a terror only to the bad: and certainly you do not think us all such. I believe our greatest fault is that you apprehend us desirous of innovation. But pray can you with reason blame us, if we desire to live less uneasily? I am very certain, there are none in the Nation, more hearty affected to the liberty and all advantages of it, than we are by inclination, and should more appear by all justifiable actions, if you would let us live with any comfort in it.  
Again, can it be for your interest, to force part of the Subjects of England, always to depend on Foreigners, by their interposition to seek relief from their pressures, and in return be affected to them, and inclined by way of gratitude to promote their desires? Can it be your interest to oblige us to send our Children beyond Sea, to be bred up to foreign customs and inclinations, and suck in principles which you dislike? To have so much money as they, and so many religious of both sexes require, carried out of the Land, and spent in other countries'? To complain of Seminaries and increase their number? For if we cannot maintain our Children at home, we must send them abroad, and they are not now to begin to live on Alms, if we cannot send money with them, and that more plentifully than we perhaps should allow them.  
But to let these things alone, do you think it for your credit not to do as you would be done by? to gain the imputation of persecuters, persecuters of a Religion professed by most of your neighbours, and of a Church from which you derive yourselves? For I hope you do not think to avoid that imputation, because what you do, you do by Law. The primitive Christians suffered all by Law, and by Authority, and yet are thought persecuted, and Martyrs even by yourselves. Nor were Q. Mary's proceed without Law, and Law, not made by her for the present occasion, but in force before she came to the Crown. You have reason to reproach her times; but then sure you have the same reason not to bring the same reproach on your own: for burning is not much worse, than hanging and quartering. If you are persuaded Persecution, or if that word dislike you, Punishment for Religion advisable; at least consider that our case is different from that of other dissenters. We changed not from the Law, but the Law from us. We are to the Reformation as Judaisme and Paganism to the Gospel, before it. The Primitive Christians, when Authority came to be on their side, never made use of it to work upon the conscience of those, whose persuasions in Religion were more ancient than their own. They employed instruction, and example, and added the allurement of worldly preferment, disposing of places of Trust and Profit only to Christians. But they came not to force. Me thinks you should not condemn the practice of the Primitive times, and use us worse than they thought fit, and I think lawful, to use Pagans and Jews.  
You might too, in my opinion, consider whether it be for your advantage, to let fall the plea you have so long, and so universally maintained, that you punish, not for Religion, but Treason. When we ask where this Treason lies, the answer always is, that it lies in our persuasions concerning the Pope in whom we believe a power inconsistent with the safety of Princes or fidelity of Subjects. This the person of Honour against S. C. makes the only cause of jealousy, or suspicion of our Fidelity, which may prove dangerous to the Kingdom, and against which the laws are provided: This the Execution of Justice; This every body assigns for the Treason laid to our charge. When this is taken away, there remains nothing that I know, but Religion for which we are to be punished. I hope I have declared my mind sufficiently in this point, and cleared myself, and those of the same judgement with me, from all guilt of this Treason. If you will notwithstanding punish us, you may if you please, but I am sure you cannot say you punish us for Treason. The laws being as they are, it may show very strange to pretend favour from them: but yet confiding in the authority of this Honourable Person, who says they were provided against Opinions, which I have disclaimed, and considering the laws themselves mention withdrawing Subjects from their natural Obedience (23. Eliz. 3. Jac.) as the ground of their severity, I hope it will not misbecome me, to wish you would be more guided by their intention, than Letter. The intention of laws I think is acknowledged their best Interpreter; were the judgement of this Person of Honour of value with you, I should not doubt you would allow some equity in my wishes; for I am sure I am not within the compass of that intention.  
But I am not so vain as to appeal to any thing but mercy. As nothing more becomes me to ask, so nothing more becomes you to show, though truly I think it not more for your Honour than interest in this case. Certainly you would not have these Principles gain strength, against which you testify so much aversion. Why then do you do all you can, to make them pass for Principles of Religion? For while you treat equally those who disclaim, and those who hold them, and put no difference betwixt them and points of Faith, you bid fairly to persuade people that there is none, and that they ought to suffer as much for the one as the other. Methinks your own experience should instruct you, that 'tis no easy thing, to pluck up any persuasions, which are thought to spring from the root of Religion, let them be never so false or wicked, and that it concerns you sufficiently not to let more than are, be thought incorporated with it. If this import you not, can it at least be for your advantage, that those who would comply with you, should be in a much worse condition, than those who will not, and this purely for their compliance? The equality, which you show, hinders not the cases, of the one and the other, from being very unequal, and the disadvantage of the inequality lies on that side which is inclined to you. These are in the worst case of any of our communion. For the rest suffer only from you, these from you and us too.  
Pray reflect a little how the world has gone, and goes with those who gratify you in this matter. What was the event of that unwearied constancy which the learned Withrington showed in it? He lost his good name, his Friends, all comforts of life, all sweetness of society with those of his own communion, and had not so much as Liberty from you, but lived and died a Prisoner. Walsh succeeds him, in learning, in fidelity, in constancy, and in all likelihood fortune. He has appeared so far in this business, that I believe he thinks it not safe to appear in any part of the world where the Pope bears sway: and yet for aught I know has as little security at home as abroad. His Liberty and Life are at the mercy of every informer, it not being in the power of any Judge, before whom he shall be brought, to save him from the punishment appointed for Treason. Harold is another who has appeared in this cause with the same success. He lives confined in a convent of his own order, in or near Brussels, because he refuses to retract the Irish remonstrance, without an express saving of fidelity to his King. This by the Congregation de Propaganda at Rome was judged a captious exception, and the man is by the Internuncio of Brussels confined against his will, and notwithstanding the permission of his own Superiors to retire elsewhere. Coppinger and the rest of the regular Remonstrants in Ireland, to say nothing of other, and those many and grievous vexations, are either actually banished by the late Proclamation against Bishops and Regulars, or live in extreme danger, and fear of being discovered and exposed to the law by those, who hate them for their constancy to the Remonstrance. And this is the sat of all who gratify you with those testimonies of Loyalty which you are perpetually urging.  
Time was when you objected against me, that we had an unintelligible way of Government among us. Permit me to say I can as little understand yours. He was a wise Prince who caused the Oath of Allegiance to be made, with design to distinguish the dangerous Principles, which he thought concurred to the Powder Treason, from others which were innocent. Who can understand, why those, who by that Distinction are found on the right side, should always be in worse condition than those who are on the wrong? Did K. James or the Parliament, when they established a Distinction by Law, mean to find out the Innocent, by their distinction, that they might be the worse for their Innocence? To impute Danger and Treason to one part, and punish both, and the not-dangerous, and not-Traitors more? For so they are though not by you. This is the effect of your Distinction, though sure it was never the design. The Act seems made to distinguish the Treason, for which you say we suffer, from the Religion, for which you say we do not. And when all is done, they are not so much as exempt from the punishment of Traitors, who by this Act are exempted from the guilt of Treason. Withrington was no Traitor, his actions and writings clear him sufficiently. Walsh is no Traitor, on the contrary he has given proofs of Fidelity which few could, and fewer perhaps would. And yet the Law looks on him, and may to day or to morrow pass on him as a Traitor. Truly it is not intelligible, at least to my dulness, how it should be for your interest, that things should be carried in this manner. This I know, that while they are so, few will comply with you, I mean where with a safe conscience they may. For Hopes and Fears are the main motives, which carry human nature, and 'tis not to be expected people should gratify you, when they have nothing to hope, and more to fear, than when they do not. For my own part I think you very unreasonable to quarrel at me for being concealed, and single. At least I am not so unreasonable as to court any man, by joining with me, to run the fate of Walsh and Withrington, and will avoid it myself as long as I can. I relish not their uncomfortable condition, finding it uncomfortable enough to live in perpetual fear of the Laws: But I declare they shall not take hold on me for Treason; For I again disclaim those positions which you say are Treasonable. More I could and would say to you, if none saw my letters but yourself. But thus much I profess to all the world; and besides, that I am  
Your very humble Servant.    

This following Quotation out of Dr. H. Ferne, late Bishop of Chester, should have been inserted with those other Quotations taken out of Dr. Stillingfleet, etc. which you have before at the end of the Protestant Gentleman's Letter, pag. 7. But the Book (of the said Dr. Ferne) which has it, came not to hand soon enough to insert it there. And yet being so directly and fully to purpose, I would not omit giving it here.  
I Believe and do suppose there are some, [Popish Priests] who in the simplicity of their hearts, and out of mere Conscience of Religion, do labour the propagation of it, whilst others more directly are guilty of Seditious and Treasonable Practices. It is my wish there could be a distinction made between the one and the other, that the punishment (which the Law adjudges all Priests to, that are found within the Land) might only fall upon them, who are indeed guilty of such practices, which being so frequently found in their predecessors (and the State being not able to distinguish between them, who are all Missionaries of Rome) caused those Laws to be made for the security of Prince and State. And if they that come into the Land, without any Treasonable intent, do suffer for it, they must thank their fellows (as the  Seculars do the Jesuits) whose restless attempts forced the State to forbid them all entrance into the Land under pain of Treason.  
To conclude; it is not Religion, nor the Function, nor any Ministerial Act belonging to it, that is punished in Romish Priests, but Treason and Seditious practices, to which Religion, Sacraments, Ministry of Reconciliation, and all that is reputed Holy, are made to serve; and all this to advance and secure the Papal Usurpation. Dr. H. Ferne in his Book entitled, Certain Considerations of present Concernment; touching This Reformed Church of England. Printed in London, 1653. Chap. 5. Paragraph 9 Pag. 169.  
FINIS.   

The Fifteenth and Sixteenth OF THE CONTROVERSIAL LETTERS, OR Grand Controversy, Concerning The pretended Temporal Authority of POPES over the whole Earth.  
And the True Sovereign of KINGS within their own respective Kingdoms.  
Between two English Gentlemen, 

The one of the Church of England.  
The other of the Church of Rome.    
LONDON, Printed for Henry Brome at the Gun, and Benjamin took at the Ship in St. Paul's Churchyard. 1679.   


FRIEND,  
I Have got a new Flea in my Ear, which you must needs pull out. It is like enough my importunity may not be over-welcom, and you may think perhaps I grate on our Friendship, by pressing you against your humour: But truly, I have no mind to remain in the dark till you be in the humour of Writing. I may tarry long enough, for aught I see, if I stay till that day comes. In short, I think my curiosity more reasonable than your humour; and for our Friendship I have given enough to it, and more than I can justify to my reason, by forbearing you thus long; not but that your last complaints appeared to me as Just as Pathetical, and I truly wish I were able to contribute more to your ease than a fruitless compassion. But what? because the World goes not as we would have it, must we therefore whine away our lives, and mourn ourselves out of what we may have, because we cannot have all we would? Alas! we are but Passengers in the Ship of the World. Whatever our desires, whatever our concerns are, we must be carried as Winds and Tides drive the great Vessel. Consider what a fine kind of madness 'twould be, to grow sullen, and neglect ourselves, and fall out with our fellow Passengers, because the Winds do not blow as we would have them. You and I have nothing to do with the Helm, and 'tis well we have not, for with our unskilfulness we should quickly have more to complain of than cross Winds. But we know there is a Pilot whom the Seas and Winds obey, and who having the appointing of his Substitutes, we are sure has chosen the fittest. However we know he watches over them himself, and will certainly bring the Vessel safe into Harbour at last. The care of our passage is a business which belongs to him, and with him we may securely trust it. This being so, I cannot see it is other than plain folly to repine ourselves at matters which belong not to us, and are besides in safe hands, into a neglect of those which do. Our only business is to know as much as we can of our duty, and do as much as we know; and this you shall permit me to pursue. If you refuse to go along with me, I must tell you plainly I shall have more reason to complain of your resty humour, than you of any thing besides.  
Lighting by chance on Aitzema's Resolutions in the United Provinces, I observed an Address, from the Deputies of the Synods to the State's General, which shockt me strangely. The first Article of the means proposed by them for hindering the Pope's Hierarchy, etc. runs thus, That all of the Popish Clergy, Jesuits, Priests, Friars, etc. be kept out of the Land, they being no Subjects of any secular Princes or Magistrates, but only of the Court of Rome, according to their own Tenets, etc. Now I wonder not to see the Deputies of Synods willing to be rid of their Clergys' company. Every body knows there is no great kindness betwixt them: but that they should deny them to be subjects of Secular Princes, and bring even themselves for Vouchers, is a thing I know not what to make of.  
Pray Friend, do these men say true? If they do, the Pope is much a greater man than I took him for. 'Tis not the Patrimony of St. Peter, the Liberality of Pepin, or Mathildir which confines his Sovereignty: for 'tis plainly extended as far as his communion, and that not only upon the score of that Supremacy, which shares stakes with Princes, and leaving Temporals to them contents itself with Spirituals; but with a Superiority which admits no Co-partnership, and sweeps all for himself. Methinks it is a pretty trick this of the Pope to get his Subjects maintained at other folk's charges, and set up a Principality of his own in the Dominions of other Princes. But yet I wonder how he could contrive it: for should any man but the Pope come to any Prince, and say, I beseech you, Sir, let so many of your Subjects leave acknowledging you, and turn Subject to me; he had need of great power in Rhetoric to hope to prevail. What wise bustles have sometimes been made in the World, and peradventure still continue in some places! Princes think they do great matters when they suffer not the Pope to dispose of Benefices in their Territories to others than their own Subjects; when all the while they have it seems no Subjects to whom they can be disposed, unless they would have them disposed to the Laity, which every body knows cannot be: yet much ado they keep to have those only preferred, who are born in places Subject to them; as if it were any matter where they were born, if when they come to Benefices they are no longer Subject to any but the Pope; and all the dispute be, whether he shall promote a Subject of this or that Nation, but still equally his own Subject. By this account a Benefice is a strange thing; for it dissolves the Tie betwixt Prince and Subject. And I should think there is no worse nor more ruinous Simony in the World, than to purchase one at the price of Allegiance.  
I tell you truly, Friend, all this looks to me with a very odd face, and would almost tempt me to suspect animosity had transported the Holland Deputies to say more than perhaps they believed. Yet I thought it incredible, that persons chosen and Commissionated to represent their Churches, should come with a lie in their mouth to an Assembly of the State's General. Besides, the Assembly sitting long, the Churches made a second Address by new Deputies; and They again insisted on the same Article, and for the same reason. I could not believe this perseverance in a change of persons could be without ground. Nevertheless, as I love to hear both sides, I was desirous to know what your men say to the matter.  
I had none but Bellarmin at hand, with whom, to tell you the truth, I cared not to meddle; I have dealt with him, you know, formerly, and found not my account, and should have been glad of another Chapman. But I was overstockt with Curiosity, a fretting Ware, and which will not stay for a good Market. As much as my mind misgave me, in defect of another, I ventured on him, and read his 28 and 29 Chapters of his first Book de Clericis, where he treats of this matter; and 'tis just as I feared; for I know not how it happened, but I have always mighty ill luck with Bellarmin; for any satisfaction I have got, I might even as well have thrown Cross or Pile for the matter. To my thinking, he talks a good while on both sides, and so as to reserve the liberty of answering Subjects, or not Subjects, as happens to be most convenient when the Question is asked. On the one side he tells us that the Clergy, besides their Clerical capacity, are also Citizens and parts of the Politic Commonwealth, and in that respect obliged to keep the Civil Laws, consistent with the holy Canons and duty of a Clerical life; because otherwise much trouble and confusion would happen in the Commonwealth. On the other side, that the obligation, which the Clergy have to observe the Civil Laws, is directive only, not co-active, and that only in defect of an Ecclesiastical Law. For should an Ecclesiastical Law dispose otherwise even of the temporal things ordered by the Civil Law, the Clergy are to stick to the Ecclesiastical, and not observe the Civil so much as directively. Again, that they cannot be judged by the Civil Magistrate, if they do not keep the Civil Law; and that their Goods, whether Ecclesiastical or Secular are not liable to the Tributes of Secular Princes.  
To my apprehension now, the Clergy, according to one half of this Doctrine, are very good Subjects; according to the other, none at all. If they be parts of the Commonwealth, they must of necessity be Subjects, unless they be Princes; For a Commonwealth holds none but Prince and Subjects. If they be obliged to the observation of the Civil Laws, they are Subjects again, that obligation being the very thing we call subjection. But if their Actions, when they break the Laws, are not liable to the cognizance of the Civil Magistrate, nor their Goods in their share in the common burdens; if they obey the Laws only out of good nature, and to do as others do, and no longer than till they have order to the contrary, I should think they are not Subjects, unless in respect of him whose orders they are to obey. For there can be no Subjects without a Prince, nor Prince without Power, nor Power without something on which it may be exercised. If the Secular Prince can exercise no power over their persons, nor what they have, nor what they do; there remains nothing, that I see, on which his Power can work; and consequently neither Power, nor Prince, nor Subject. Wherefore to my apprehension all this is Handy Dandy: the Clergy are Subjects, or not Subjects, according to the hand you choose, or Bellarmin will open.  
I could be content to understand by the way, if I might hope to understand any thing of Bellarmin, what meaning there is in his distinction betwixt Directive and Co-active obligation. What Directive means, and what Co-active, I think, I understand. He who shows me a way I know not, is said to Direct; and who draws me along in it, whether I will or no, to Force me. So Laws are properly called Directive, because they inform us what we are to do; and Co-active, because they constrain us by fear of punishment to follow their direction. According to this, it may be said with sense, whether with Truth or no is another Question, That the Clergy are directed by the Laws to what is fit for them to do, but not obliged to do it. But it passes my capacity how Obligation should be divided into Directive and Co-active, or Co-active, and not Co-active, when all obligation to my thinking is Co-active. For since he who is obliged to any thing, is not at liberty to do, or leave it undone, but constrained to do it in force of the obligation upon him, methinks obligation imports Co-action in its Notion; and that to say, there can be an obligation which is not Co-active, is to say there can be an obligation which is not an obligation. I fancy Bellarmin took his hint from Princes, who being free from the Co-action of their Laws, yet observe their Direction because they will, and see it fit. But then for this very reason, because they are not subject to their co-action, we say Princes are absolutely not obliged by their Laws; and if Bellarmin had a mind to make the case equal betwixt them and the Clergy, he should put no obligation in the Clergy, as the Language of the World puts none in Princes. Yet to say the truth, I conceive by his not co-active obligation, he intended not to exempt the Clergy from constraint and punishment, so the Secular Magistrate have nothing to do with it; which whether he have or no, I inquire not now. Whoever has to do with it, if the thing be to be done, if the Clergy be punishable in the Ecclesiastical Court only if you will, co-action still is inseparable from obligation, and not co-active obligation pure riddle.  
Again, since the reason he gives of his Directive obligation of the Clergy, is to avoid confusion in the Commonwealth, I would gladly know how much less confusion there would be, if they broke the Laws, not by a restiness of their own, but by command from another. Both ways the Laws would be broken, and so the thing be done, it matters not much which way. If there be any difference, I should think disobedience from private Capricios less inconvenient than from public commands. Capricios are seldom either universal or lasting. Those who remained sober, would help to reclaim the rest, and a hundred remedies might be applied, with hopes of success. But where the disobedience is universal and countenanced by Authority, the disease is little better than desperate. One had as good say, the Clergy are bound to keep the Laws, as long as they can do but a little harm by breaking them, and to break them when they can do a great deal. Let us put the case in his own Examples. If the Secular Power impose such a rate on vendible things, or forbidden carrying of Arms in the night, or transportation of Corn out of the Country, or the like, the Clergy are to obey as well as the rest, till an Ecclesiastical Law dispose otherwise; very well. Let us suppose then that the Secular Power, by the Authority which it has in these things, has rated a pot of Ale at a penny; should the Clergy out of Thrift or stubbornness pay but a halfpenny, others would either grumble they should have their drink cheaper, or perhaps sell them none. To avoid this inconvenience, they are directively obliged to pay a whole penny, provided the Ecclesiastical Law interpose not; but let that come, and set another rate, a half penny for Example, than they are Co-actively obliged to pay no more. Now I would fain know of Bellarmin, how much less inconvenience there is, now the Clergy must pay but a half penny out of conscience, than before when they would pay no more out of stubbornness. Will other people grumble less at the inequality, or will they get any more drink? For my part I suspect the Ale-house-keepers will turn stubborn in their turns, and not afford them for their half penny what they can have a penny for of the Lay-good-fellows, who both directively and co-actively pay still according to the Secular rate. I doubt they will be forced to strain a point of Conscience, and for all the Ecclesiastical Law, and their obligation to stick to it, be even co-actively obliged to pay as others do, or remain thirsty. Go on if you please to the rest with the imagination, for I will stay no longer here, and when you have considered the difference betwixt breaking the Prohibitions of weapons, or Transporting Corn, etc. by private Capricios, and public and obligatory commands, tell me whether Bellarmin were not in a pleasant humour, and had great care of the Commonwealth, when he made a little inconvenience reason enough to oblige the Clergy to keep the Civil Laws, and permits and makes it their duty to break them with twenty times a greater. I say nothing of the greatest inconvenience of all, the acknowledging a Foreign Authority, which can oblige so great a number of persons living within the bounds, and taken for members of the Commonwealth, as belong to the Clergy, to break all Laws even in Temporal things, because at present I mind only how pat the reason is which he gives for his Directive obligation of the Clergy: Otherwise that Doctrine brings not only confusion and trouble, but ruin to the commonwealth, and is absolutely intolerable. But this is not a place for it.  
To return into our Road, Bellarmin tells us at last, that the Clergy and Laity have, even in Temporals, different Laws, a different Prince, and different Tribunals, and that the Commonwealth which holds them, is in truth and formally two Commonwealths, though because they all live in the same place, and under protection of the same Prince, it be materially one. Also that, in respect of the Clergy, Princes are not superior Powers, and therefore the Clergy are not bound to obey them neither by Divine, nor so much as Human right, unless Directively in certain cases, as was said before. This is full and home; for Bellarmin can speak plain enough when he has a mind to it. But the Question, and my Curiosity are now at an end. For I do not mean to be laughed at by persisting to inquire, whether the Clergy be subject to him who is not their Prince, nor in respect of them a superior power. It is something strange though. By this account the Clergy are no more subjects to the Prince, in whose Dominions they live, than Aliens, who live in his Country under his protection. They are as much a new and strange kind of Aliens, bred and born, and unmovably settled in a Commonwealth; and yet Aliens still. However it be, I have no more to say to the Holland Deputies. Bellarmin has acquitted them. It remains that he acquit himself: for as great a man as he is, so unexpected and so important a Doctrine will hardly pass upon his bare word.  
He proves it both from Human and Divine Right. And I commend him for leaving nothing out; but think nevertheless I may deduct the one half, and confine my inquiry to Divine Right. For Human Right being either by Civil or Ecclesiastical Laws, what the Clergy have by Civil Laws, is so far from prejudicing their subjection, that it rather confirms it. For Receiving is an acknowledgement of the power from which they receive. Besides Princes, whether they can or no, yet use not to grant any thing derogatory from their own Sovereignty: or if they do, recall it on better consideration. What in particular it is, which the Clergy have this way, we must inquire of those who know the Laws; whatever it be, much good may it do them. Were all men of my mind, peradventure it should be more than it is: for I am of opinion, they cannot be respected too much; and whatever serves, whether to preserve or increase that respect, is the Laitys good as much as theirs, and perhaps more.  
As for Ecclesiastical Laws, I conceive they need no place of their own at present, but may come in either with Civil or Divine. For if the stress be put only there, so that before the Ecclesiastical Laws were made, the Clergy were Subjects, and had been so still if those Laws had not exempted them from subjection, Princes I suppose will expect their consent should be asked; Ecclesiastical Laws of this nature not binding without the concurrence of the Civil Power. And then the Question will be, to what and how far the Civil power is engaged, which plainly belongs to Civil Right? But if the Ecclesiastical Law be supposed, not originally to give, but declare and press that exemption, as due to the Clergy by an antecedent Law of God or nature, the exemption is then refunded into that antecedent Law, and there, as I conceive, it only pinches. Wherefore leaving Bellarmin's proofs from Civil and Ecclesiastical Laws, to those who are skilled and concerned in them, I am only curious to know what kind of proofs he will bring from the Divine Law, which if it do command such things as he affirms of the Clergy, truly, I have hitherto been very ill instructed in it. He divides them into the two branches of Positive and Natural Divine Law; either of which would have served his turn; but he will needs undertake for both.  
Beginning with the Positive, he desires us first to observe, That by the Positive Law of God, he means not any command of God properly so called, which expressly appears in Holy Writ, but what may by some similitude be deduced from the Examples or Testimonies of the Old or New Testament. Now this seems to me a very inauspicious beginning, and as much as to say, that by the Positive Law of God, he means the not-Positive Law of God. For pray what does Positive signify? It is used in contradistinction to Natural, and Natural signifies the Law, or Rule of Actions, imprinted in us by Reason; which inasmuch as it is our nature, gives it the Title of Natural; inasmuch as that nature proceeds from God, the Title of Divine. But because it happens from the shortness, or corruption of nature, that what appears reasonable to one, appears unreasonable to another; this Rule becomes a kind of Lesbian Rule, bend by our passions several ways. To remedy which mischief, and not leave us altogether to the uncertain conduct of our erring Judgements, God in his mercy has expressly declared his pleasure, about what we are to do, or avoid, in the matters so declared. This express declaration is called his Positive Law, which supplies the defects of nature, and freeing us from groping blindly in the dark, and wrangling fruitlessly and endlessly about what is or is not our duty, sets it in a clear light before us, and leaves us nothing to do but perform it.  
This being so, I would fain learn of Bellarmin what pretence there can be for the Positive Law of God, where there is no express command of his, and we are left to our uncertain Deductions? What difference betwixt this, and the case of pure nature, and what shall hinder us from wrangling as long and to as little purpose, as if there were no such thing as his Positive Law in the World? Nay though we could come to an end, since this end is to be made at last by the force of prevailing Reason, which can satisfy us of the Truth of the deductions it makes, why is not that end to be refunded rather into Reason, than the Law of God? We may possibly have some assistance from it towards the direction of our Reason. But Positive Law is one thing; the operations even of assisted Reason another. And I cannot imagine how the operations of Reason should by one that loves to speak properly, as Bellarmin does, be called the Law of God. Though it be the Law of God on which Reason works, yet it's Reason still that works: and unless we have good security that our Reason is particularly directed in these operations, I know not why it may not fail us as well here as elsewhere. A body would think the sad distractions which perplex the World in matters that concern the Law of God, are too good an Argument, that our Reason fails us no where more.  
But that the World is a confident World, and the Cry always great whatever the Wool be, I should wonder people should not fear to make so bold at every turn with God and his Law. For whoever is mistaken in his reasoning, plainly pin's his own mistakes upon unerring Truth; and who is not, has at most but hit upon a true conclusion in Divinity, which if he will call the Positive Law of God, he must have a language by himself.  
Nevertheless, if Bellarmin once in his life be infallible in his Logic, and have rightly deduced his conclusion from his Premises, whether it may be called the Positive Law of God or no, I acknowledge it is to be embraced, as all Truth is whatever name it have, and however we come by it. But I must needs avow, his credit is not great enough with me to engage my laziness into the trouble of examining his Arguments. I see he citys Classical Authors, men of great names even among yourselves, who know as little of the positive Law, he talks of, as myself, and who positively deny there is any such thing in the case.  
By the way, one may perceive it was not Lightness, but Necessity which drew Bellarmin to entitle his reasonings to the Law of God. He had a mind to establish the exemptions of the Clergy on that Basis, which he was sure was firm and unmoveable. But because there was no such Law to be found, to put his own deductions in its stead, was a forced put. And if a second reason may be thought of, why he should leave undone what was impossible to be done, I suppose he might have some consideration of the Gentlemen his Adversaries. For it would have been a troublesome business to have made out, how there should be a positive Law of God, of which Masters in Israel, as well as himself, were ignorant, had he understood by it what others do.  
But to let this pass, till he and his Friends are agreed, I have no temptation to thrust myself into their quarrels. I do not think but they have something still to say for themselves, for all he has urged against them. Till he have stopped their mouths, and left them without reply, I think I may take the liberty to think them as likely to be in the right as he, and unblamably descent from him, as well as those of his own party.  
Again, People in this Age use not to perform altogether so much as they Promise: and Bellarmin does not promise more than some similitude between the cases he finds in the Scripture, and that of the Clergy now adays. Though he should perform to the uttermost, I suspect the result would be little more than to make hard shift to bring an Argument against himself. He mentions in all four places of Scripture, whereof three, according to his own reckoning, amount but to this: The Levites were exempted by the Positive Law, and therefore Priests, who are as good men as they, aught to be so too. I fear Bellarmin will hardly be contented, though a man should allow him all the exemptions which can be proved due to the Levites by the old Law. But I will not meddle with that matter. It is plain that God did expressly give the Levites the exemptions mentioned in the old Law; it is confessed by Bellarmin, that there is no express mention in the new Law of those exemptions to the Clergy for which he contends. I see not why this does not evidently conclude, that God was not of Bellarmin's mind, and intended not that the Clergy should owe their exemptions to his Law. For otherwise, why did he not exempt them expressly as he did the Levites? Unless we could swallow the Blasphemy of imagining God was less careful of Priests than Levites: or when he came to deliver us a new Law, forgot to insert all he intended, and left it to be supplied by our whimsies. These places, I think, prove the just contrary of what Bellarmin would have, and that which follows is, that as the exemptions of the Levites were by the positive Law of God, because they are expressly mentioned in it, so the Clergys' exemptions are not by the positive Law of God, because there is no mention of them in it.  
However it be, when I reflect that the Topick which, for want of a better, Bellarmin is fain to choose, is à Simili, and that Like, or Unlike is to be found or made every where: when I reflect, that even this too dwindles into a quandam similitudinem, a thing which may be found in the most contrary things that are, for there is some kind of likeness even betwixt Fire and Water, I cannot see but that to meddle with it, is to begin an Inquiry which never will have end. For I believe Doomsday will sooner come, than he shall have made his cases so like, that no difference can be found between them; and till he do, the Topick concludes not.  
I turn me therefore to observe what work he will make with his Divine natural Law, which he first distinguishes into three degrees. In the first, he places those commands of nature, which are so clearly imprinted in men's hearts, that they need no Discipline or Art, but by the bare light of Reason, even without the help of new discourse, are by all esteemed Just. As that Good is to be desired, Evil avoided, etc. The second degree, is of those which follow from those first principles as immediate conclusions, naturally flowing by an easy, evident and necessary consequence; and which, as the former, need not Discipline or Art, but only simple discourse, such as all men may have. Of this kind he reckons the commands of the Decalogue. Now the Exemptions of the Clergy belong not to either of these two, but to a third Degree of natural commands, which he says are indeed deduced from the Law of nature, but by a consequence neither absolutely necessary, nor altogether evident, and which therefore stand in need of Humane Constitution.  
I should be beholding to him who would tell me what this means. For I can make nothing of it, and am mightily afraid this unnecessary, and unevident consequence of his, has a third quality, and will prove unintelligible too. Deducing, I think, signifies discovering the connexion of two Terms between themselves, because they are both connected with one third. If that connexion be not seen, I should think 'tis all one as if it were not: and if it be seen, then to him who sees it, 'tis evident. I should think again, that where there is no necessary consequence, or connexion of Terms in the conclusion, there is no connexion of them with a Third in the Premises. For if there be, their connexion is as necessary, as the connexion of that Third with itself, or its being what it is; so that the consequence plainly is either necessary, or none. If this be so, a consequence neither evident nor necessary, is evidently and necessarily no consequence, and so far from communicating the force of the Law of nature to the conclusion, that it communicates none at all.  
Wherefore take away the learned Terms, and that which Bellarmin says, is in plain English this, I would have you believe that the Law of Nature commands the exemptions of the Clergy, which it may do for aught I know, though I neither see it does, nor any necessity why it should. But yet I would have you believe it, because I find it would be very convenient it should be so. Though this found not altogether so amusingly as in his language, yet I fancy it might be as efficacious. For plain dealing is a taking thing, and might perhaps work with many; but when you set upon them with dint of Argument, people stand upon their guard, and to attempt them with unnecessary and unseen consequences, is a desperate business, when the most evident necessary in the World often fails of success.  
The truth is, Bellarmin himself does not trust his Deductions at this time; For he says, they stand in need of Humane Constitution. And I pray for what is this Humane Constitution needful? Is it to make the not evident, and not necessary conclusion, evident and necessary, and make that follow from natural Principles, which does not follow from natural Principles? This indeed is what needs: but 'tis more than Humane Constitution can do. For Conclusions follow from the seen Identity of Premises, and all the Authority of all mankind put together, can never make that be seen, which is not to be seen, or an Identity where there is a difference. Or does he mean that Humane Constitution is needful to make the Conclusion, which cannot prevail by its own strength, be accepted in virtue of the constitutive Authority? This indeed Humane constitution can do; for it matters not whether the conclusion be well or ill deduced, if those who can command, will have it obeyed. But than what is established this way stands wholly upon Humane, and not at all on Natural Right, farther than as Nature or Reason is the ground of all Laws. For take away the Humane constitution, nature is so far from obliging any body to a consequence confessedly unconcluding, that on the contrary it obliges him not to accept it, he being not true to his Reason, which is his nature, who does. This being plain, to what purpose does Bellarmin keep such ado with the Law of nature, when he meant to resolve all into the pure Law of man at last?  
I should guests, by the hint he gives presently after, that he had a mind to make his Exemptions unalterable; for he infers, that what depends on the Law of Nations, which he makes equivalent to his third branch, cannot be abrogated or changed by Princes, because it is in some sort natural. This would have founded something like, if he had not told us what he meant. But the mischief is, we know beforehand, that his in some sort natural, means deduced from Nature neither evidently nor necessarily, and that signifying not deduced, the sort which he calls natural, signifies a sort of standing upon nature, so as not to stand upon nature, but upon the needful humane Authority, that is a not natural sort. And then, because his Exemptions can be no otherwise unchangeable than as they are natural, there is neither evidence nor necessity of their unchangeableness, and so the most that can be said of them, is that they are unchangeable in some sort likewise, namely in such sort as they are natural, that is, in a not unchangeable, or changeable sort.  
Wherefore when we come to cast up accounts with Bellarmin, and see what his Divine Right amounts to, we find that what he calls Divine Positive Law, is, even by his confession, no Law of God, but deductions from the worst and most hopeless of Topics. Which who will go about to examine, had need be a man of great leisure, and who can promise himself a great age; otherwise his attempt will be desperate: and what he calls Divine Natural Law, is likewise no Law of Nature, but Deductions like the former, as weak and as endless, and which to save us the fruitless trouble of examining, he fairly gives us warning are unconcluding, And this is Divine Right in Bellarmin's language.  
Notwithstanding, because Truth has influence on the actions of men, not as it is in itself, but as it appears to them, it imports not so much what is, as what is apprehended; wherefore let Bellarmin's proofs be never so bad, if you apprehend them good, 'tis all one as if they were perfect Demonstrations. Tell me then what you think of the matter; what you believe, and what you do in this point; whether Bellarmin and the Church be of the same mind, and all the immunities attributed by him to the Clergy, pass among you for unquestionably Divine and Unalterable Right. And remember our Question is not whether they have exemptions or no. Every body sees they are, and ought be free from divers burdens of the Commonwealth, since otherwise they could not live a Clerical life, as 'tis necessary, even for the good of the Laity they should. But the question is, what those Exemptions are, and how They come by them. For my part I should think that if any Exemption claimed or enjoyed by them, be discovered harmful to the Commonwealth, such an exemption is neither necessary to a Clerical life, nor commanded by God. In particular I see no necessity of their exemption from Secular Tribunals, and conceive they might be very good Clergy men without it. What prejudice can it be to the Dignity and perfection of their state, to be awed from doing ill by fear of punishment? To do ill is the greatest prejudice to both; how being restrained from prejudicing their state, should be a prejudice to their state, is beyond my understanding. They are but men, as much the best men as They ought to be, and to have their frailty exposed to one Temptation more than the rest of mankind, and that the strongest of Temptations, Impunity, is, in my opinion, far from a Benefit. I think he is not their Friend who exempts them from fear of punishment, unless he exempt them too from the possibility of deserving it.  
Again, would They do any thing misbecoming their condition, if They paid their shares in Public Taxes? They who are to wean the hearts of the Laity from affection to Riches, and the rest of perishable goods, should rather set them an example of their Doctrine: and are like to be heard but ill, when they Preach on that subject, if they be known to love Riches themselves, and refuse, in the necessities of the commonwealth, to part with what the wisdom of it judges they may spare. Either show me that a Clergy man cannot live as a Clergy man should, without such exemptions as these, or I shall never believe they are commanded by the Law of God or Nature.  
Then the Tenure, by which they hold what they have, is to be considered. Not but what they have purely from the Piety and Liberality of men is truly theirs, and to look upon it with regret, is Envy, and to take it causelessly away, Injustice. Notwithstanding though there were no more in the case, it is a point of Gratitude to acknowledge our Benefactors. But if we reflect, that Divine Right is an unmoveable Basis, on which whatever stands can never be stirred; Humane Right is subject to the contingency of Humane things; it will appear of considerable importance, on which of the two the exemptions of the Clergy be settled; for it may happen, that what is convenient in one time and place, may be inconvenient elsewhere, and in another season. Now 'tis in Human Authority to provide a remedy for whatever inconvenience change of circumstances shall produce in Exemptions derived from Human Authority. But if all be thought to flow from a Divine Spring, let the waters be never so troubled, or corrupt, never so rapid, or overflow with never so much prejudice, the mischief is without remedy, By the way, since no ill can proceed from the Fountain of Good, if any Exemption bring mischief along with it, that Exemption confutes itself, and needs no second Argument to evidence it has no warrant from God or Nature. Bellarmin now says, They are of Divine Right all: Reason says some, at least, are harmful to Princes, harmful to the Commonwealth, harmful to the Clergy themselves: what says the Church? Is she for Bellarmin, or Reason? You and I have kept a great coil to little purpose, if she stand fast to Bellarmin, and all our past labour is even much ado about nothing.  
For what avails it to shut up the great gate of Direct, and back door of Indirect Power, if there be still a way underground to get into the house? All hitherto said in behalf of Princes is, that the Pope cannot take away their Kingdoms for any cause. What is this better than a Cheat, if he can, even without any cause, take away their subjects? For what is a Kingdom good for, and indeed what is it but the subjects? Consider what a Prince he were, into whose Dominions strangers might enter in what numbers they pleased without his leave, and plant, and settle themselves, and live without subjection to him; And tell me what difference there is, whether those men be strangers or natives. This is at least a partial Deposition, a fair step to a total, and in some respect worse. For that may be avoided by a Prince, who will always do what the Pope pleases, and give him no hold, since it cannot be put in practice without Demerit. But from this no, even, Merit can preserve any Prince. The Pope not only may, but of necessity must depose him from all Sovereignty over as many as belong to the Clergy. And how far may that carry? Exemptions, if I mistake not, are extended to the Families of Clergymen too, and so as many servants as they take, so many subjects the Prince loses. What if they should stretch it a little farther to honorary servants too, and bring exemptions into fashion as well as Protections? I should wonder if all this, and twenty times as much, might not be deduced from the Law of Nature too, in Bellarmin's method, inevidently and unnecessarily. What if they should yield sometimes to the frailty of nature, and out of Avarice or Revenge, take their Neighbour's Goods or life? If they cannot be Indicted, but are exempt from that Fear, which is the great security men in community have of their Lives and Fortunes, I suspect 'twill not be good living too near a Clergyman.  
But to leave such unlikely Speculations, the Clergy, especially in their Countries, where Religious abound, are considerable even in number; and every where in quality, for the Influence they have over the people, more I believe than any other kind of those into which the people are divided. Consider what fine do there would be, if the most considerable part of a Nation own no subjection to the Prince, no contribution to the common necessities, no obedience to the Laws, in short, be a part of the Nation, and no part of the Commonwealth. What Title have they to the benefits of it, who bear no share in the burdens? What to the protection of Laws, who break them at pleasure? What pretence to security in the enjoyment of their Goods, from which they, who secure them, can promise themselves no assistance upon occasion? Other men's estates are so theirs, that they are more the Commonwealths, which can at any time take as much of them, as the public necessities require. With what comes to the Clergy, she has no more to do, more than to keep it safe to them, that they may keep it safe from her, and be a Guard for them against herself. Consider what this imports. I mistake, if I have not heard of times and places, in which a fourth part of the value of the whole has been in the Clergys' hands. Riches being the strength of a Nation, that Nation was plainly a fourth part weaker, than it would have been otherwise. But whatever be the proportion, what the Clergy gets the Commonwealth loses, and I suspect there are few which can with safety bate any part of their strength. I will say no more, believing that you see enough what I would be at. Either damn up the Spring, if you judge, as I do, the waters unwholesome, or show they are wholesome. Choose which you please, only let me not long bear the burden of the impatient curiosity which is now upon  
Yours, etc.   

I must needs add a word of what every body talks of. What work has their Religion made among us? Pray tell me what you think of the matter: for I will refer it to yourself, and make you Judge, whether it be for a rational man, to entertain a good thought of a Religion which has set a whole Nation in a flame. Excuse my Freedom, or if you will, bluntness. Reproaches, I know, ill become the mouth of a Friend at any time, and have something of inhuman in affliction. They are not meant to You, but to that restless Spirit which haunts your Religion, a Spirit which no moderation and good usage of others, no hazard and inconvenience of your own, can charm into quiet; a Frenzy which keeps you always talking and waking even when you are ready to die for want of silence and sleep. For yourself, to do you right, I think you well in your wits, and an honest man, the only honest man of your party.   

FRIEND,  
YOU have the pleasantest Fancies! To hear you talk, a man would think Princes could not Rule, nor People live in quiet, and the World in danger of being turned Topsy Turvy, and all for a Page or two in Bellarmin. The Book has been out a pretty while, and twenty more perhaps have since said as much, perhaps more than he, and yet we make a shift, thanks be to God, to live still, and the World staggers on the usual reeling pace. What is it alarms you thus? Your Clergy pretend to none of those things which disquiet you; and let ours pretend what they will, you know well enough how to deal with them. While you order them as you think fit, 'tis no great matter how they think of themselves. To see the different Judgements of men. This Question, which to you appears so important, and so necessary, to me seems not so much as seasonable. There is no time wherein people should not be wary what they say of those, whose office it is to keep alive the Sacred fire reigned down from Heaven on the day of Pentecost, and press upon us the concerns of the next life, without which all the advantages of this are not only useless, but harmful. But in an Age not at all favourable, and hardly just to them, when all the weight we can throw into their scale will scarce keep the balance even, methinks 'tis very improper to take any out. All your mighty concern, and all your importunity, should never move me to do it. But I consider that Falsehood weighs not; or if it do, 'tis on the contrary side. For the advantages sought from Untruth, turn to disadvantage at last. The Clergy have Prerogatives established by the wisdom and goodness of God, which raise them, as 'tis fit they should be, above the rest of mankind. Who seeks to increase them by ungrounded fancies, is not their Friend. 'Tis as if a man should go about to enlarge his houses with new buildings on a bad foundation, which will certainly fall themselves, and besides endanger to pull down part of the old with them. Who grasps at what is not his, hazards to lose what is. For such is the malice of the World, when we have once found a hole in our Neighbour's Coat, within a while he may chance to have never a whole piece. If reason warrant us to except against any one, our perverseness will tempt us to except against every thing: And so we actually see there is Confidence, I was about to say Impudence, enough in the World to make even Preaching, and the Administration of the Sacraments common to the Laity. I know not whether this be not the true, at least original, Reason of the complaints of this Age. However it be, I am persuaded that to discover what is unsound in the Prerogatives, whether pretended by, or obtruded upon, the Clergy, is to deserve well at their hands, and the best, and perhaps only way, to make what is sound more stable and lasting. This persuasion, more than your earnestness, prevails with me to do as you would have me, and tell you what I think of the business with all the sincerity and plainness I can.  
In the first place, I think, whatever be of the conclusion, Bellarmin's Arguments are not good, and prove not Divine Right, either Positive or Natural; in which, we being all agreed of Human Right, the only difficulty lies. It would save me some pains, if I shifted them off as you do, with quarrelling at the Topics. But I consider, that though an Argument à Simili be none of the surest, and often fail, yet it may hit, and the Topick is allowed among the rest in Logic. Besides, to reject an Argument, and not say particularly why, is not altogether so fair play. But pray expect not I should be as smart as you. Bellarmin never comes in your way, but you must have a Bout at sharps with him. I must confess he has given you some cause to bear him no great good will, but none to fall still into your Burlesque fits. For aught I perceive you would be as much at a loss for sport without Bellarmin, as some Pulpits for matter without the Pope. They are a pair of Gentlemen without whom, as hardly as you treat them, it seems you would not know what to do. Why cannot you follow the example of his sober stile, and my Lord Falkland's advice, to treat controversy with the softness of Love Letters? I have told you of this before, and cannot help it, if you will not out of your way. But you shall go alone for me. I like it not so well to keep you company in it.  
To come to the matter; in proof of Divine Positive Law, there are in all four places alleged by Bellarmin. The two first are Gen. 47. where Joseph exempted the Egyptian Priests, and 1 Esdr. 7. where Artaxerxes exempted the Priests of the Jews. These two indeed he touches but gently, and he has reason. The Egyptian Priests avoided the necessity of selling their Lands, by the allowances of Corn they had out of the Public Granaries: Artaxerxes took from his Officers the power of imposing Tributes upon the Jewish Priests and Ministers; and these things are recorded in Scripture. This is the whole matter of fact, which Bellarmin barely hints, but says nothing to apply it to his purpose. I for my part, see not how it can be applied, unless it be first supposed that every thing contained in Scripture, even in the Historical parts, is positively commanded by God. And that is so far from true, that we see there are  and vicious actions inserted in the Sacred History as well as good. Not to go out of our present matter, who will make these examples equivalent to a positive Law of God, must likewise say it is the positive Law of God, that care be taken for the subsistence and privileges of Idolatrous Priests (for so were the Egyptians) and that Ministers of state turn all Subjects into Slaves as soon as they get opportunity. These places are indeed against Bellarmin. For 'tis plain that both Egyptians and Jews, had what they had, from their several Princes. And this I think is not proof of Divine Right for Exemptions, but Divine Testimony that they proceeded from Human.  
To these two places borrowed from the Gloss upon the Canon Law, out of deference, I suppose, more than needed to the Authority of the Glossator, Bellarmin adds two more of his own. The first from Numb. 3. where the Levites are by God's appointment given to Aaron and his Successors; and God says several times expressly of them, They are mine. Were not body wiser than I, this place would prove no more than what need: no Scripture to prove it, it is so clear of itself: viz. That they belong to God in a special manner, whose whole business it is to attend to his service. But Bellarmin undertakes to prove out of it, a total exemption of the Clergy from the Tribunals of Princes. His discourse is this, For those whom God chose for himself, to the Ministry of the Temple, and Holy things, He would have Subjects to the High Priest alone, who represented the place of God on Earth, and by this freed them from the Jurisdiction of the Princes of the Earth. To see how differently the same things will appear to different men! Another in his place would have concluded quite contrary, and thought it plain enough, since the thing for which God chose the Levites is expressed to be the Ministry over which Aaron was appointed, that the subjection of the Levites to Aaron is restrained to the Ministry, leaving them in other respects as they were before.  
However this is plain, that the whole force of his discourse lies in the word Alone, and 'tis plain that he has put in that word purely of his own head, without any manner of warrant from the Text, and besides manifestly contrary to what daily passes before our eyes. For nothing is more ordinary in the World, than for the same man to owe subjection to several powers in several respects. At School we obey our Masters, at home our Parents; and yet Scholars and Children, Masters and Parents, and all are subject to the Magistrate. In what relates to our health, we obey the Physician; in Sea matters, the Pilot; in the concerns of our Fortune, the Lawyer; the Prince, as well as others, is guided by them in such things, and yet all remain his Subjects. The Laity, as well as Clergy are subject to the Spiritual power in Spirituals, without prejudicing their subjection to the Temporal in Temporals. But 'tis idle to dilate on a thing so known and so obvious. It is enough to say that This, whether Argument or Supposition of Bellarmin, The Levites were subject to Aaron, therefore they were subject to him alone, is wholly ungrounded.  
In what related to the Ministry, They were indeed to obey Aaron: in other things, for aught appears, they were still subject even to the Judges appointed by the advice of Jethro, and much more to Moses himself. Only he has set it off to the advantage, by saying, the High Priest represented the place of God on Earth: which sounds magnificently and awfully: otherwise, every Prince, and every Magistrate, and every Superior represent the place of God too, as far as his power goes. And for Aaron's, it is expressly confined by the Text to the service of the Ministry. When the Army rested, the Levites were to receive orders from him about officiating in the Tabernacle, and when it marched about carrying what belonged to the Tabernacle: yet none, I believe ever fancied, but that the orders to rest, and when, and which way, and how far to march, were given by some body besides Aaron.  
The other, and only place out of the New Testament, is Matth. 17. about the Tribute, which our Saviour paid, but with a declaration that the Children of Kings are free. To save the trouble of turning over more Books, let us even refer this matter to Bellarmin himself. He tells us there are two interpretations of this place: some understanding it of a payment made every year to the Temple, others of an imposition laid by the Romans. According to the first, the force of the Argument he says is this, The Kings of the Earth require not Tribute of their Children, therefore neither will the King of Heaven require Tribute of me, who am his true and natural Son. This he thinks the true sense of the place; but withal, that the Argument holds too in the other exposition, according to which it runs in this manner. The Princes of the Earth are but Ministers of the King of Heaven, and therefore ought not require Tribute of his Son. According to both, Bellarmin confesses that the force of our Saviour's discourse lies in this, that He was the natural Son of God. and that I think is to confess, that to apply it to any other, is to take away its force.  
Notwithstanding, He will needs extend it to all the Clergy. For, says he, when the Sons of Kings are exempted from Tribute, not their persons alone, but their Servants and Officers, and Families are exempted likewise. Whether this may be said or no, methinks it is not for Bellarmin to say it. For in his judgement what our Saviour said, related to a Tribute required by God. Wherefore if he apply it to Tributes imposed by Secular Princes, he acts against his judgement. However, it is Bellarmin who speaks now, not Christ. Christ spoke only of himself; we hear nothing from him of Servants and Families, but barely of the Sons of Kings; and because we do not, have reason to believe, he meant not they should be comprehended in his discourse; for if he had, he would undoubtedly have comprehended them himself: and if it had been his pleasure to have his Family exempted, as he was himself, he would have signified it. It is manifest therefore, that what Bellarmin says, is without any warrant from Scripture. Besides, which ill becomes his learning, it is assuming for proof the very point to be proved. For calling the Clergy the Family of Christ, as he does in the following words, it is all one to ask whether the Clergy, or whether Christ's Family be exempted. Wherefore to assume without proof, as he plainly does, that Christ's Family is exempt, is to assume without proof that the Clergy are exempt. The place than teaches the Divinity of Christ, and to recede even from our right, rather than scandalise our Neighbour; the rest is ungrounded fancy.  
As for what he adds, that our Saviour, by paying for Peter, seems to intimate, his Family too was free: I know not what may seem to Bellarmin, but am sure it does not seem so to every body. If that had been our Saviour's reason, it seems he should have paid for the rest of the Apostles as well as Peter, who were all of the Family as well as he. Since they were left to the ordinary course of things, it seems to be our Saviour's pleasure, that his Family should be left so, whatever were his reason to pay for Peter. I might pass over St. Hierom and St. Austin, whom he alleges; since they say nothing to his purpose. But to dissemble nothing, that which they say is this, That the Clergy do not pay Tribute, for the honour of God, and as being Children of the King of Heaven. And this is manifestly true, when Princes for the honour of God have exempted them. And it would be as true of the Laity, under a Pagan Prince, who should exempt them all, as Artaxerxes did the Jewish Priests. For even They are the Sons of God too, and Coheirs of Christ. But that the exemption, of which the Fathers speak, was by the positive Law of God, which is the only question, neither of them do so much as seem to intimate.  
He ends with some quotations out of Councils, with which I have no mind to meddle, it being to enter into the Question of the Authority of Councils. It will be enough to say briefly, that if his Councils be so circumstanced, as he himself requires they should be to engage our belief, and mean as he does, he has made a downright Article of Faith of his opinion, and cannot allow for Catholic Authors, those who he says think otherwise. But this is more than even himself pretends. The Councils he citys, all but that of Trent, are not free from exemption, I think in his own opinion. And the Council of Trent says, Ecclesiastical Immunities were instituted not Jure Divino, as some others speak, but Ordinatione Divina, & Ecclesiasticis Sanctionibus. He would persuade us the Council speaks in this manner, lest people by Divine Right, should understand Canon Law, which for all Panormitan, who he says confutes it, is a Tenet ordinary enough. But by his favour, considering how tender the Council was all along to meddle with points controverted among Catholics, it is a great deal more likely the Council made choice of that expression, to leave those who are for Jure Humano to their liberty. For even they cannot except against that expression, since whatever happens in the World, by whatever means, happens by Divine Ordination. Wherefore the Council, as far as I can see, is so far from settling Bellarmin's opinion, that it allows the contrary. However it be, Hic Rhodus, hic saltas. Bellarmin undertakes to show us the positive Law of God for exemptions. Let him do this, and not tell us what others think, or say of the matter, even in Council. For this is not the business now.  
This is all that Bellarmin says upon this Head. But that he lived in a place where the Doctrine of Exemptions ran with a strong Current, and so in likelihood was carried away with the stream, it is strange a man of his parts should engage for any thing, for which he had so little to say. He fairly confesses at first there is no express command for what he would persuade us is the positive Law of God: and every body may see there is as little in his Arguments, as in the Text. At least he saw so much himself. For the most he attributes to them is bare Probability. Which is to say in plain English, It may be 'tis so, it may be 'tis not so: I know not whether it be or no. 'Twere ill with the World if the Positive Law of God come once to May be's. Nor does it consist with his Providence to leave us groping in the dark to find out what his pleasure is with our uncertain guesses, and hit right and get to Heaven, if luck serve. For all our hopes of Heaven depend upon the observance of his Law, and if we have no better security of it than May be, 'tis pure chance whether we go to Heaven or Hell, and we may even throw Dice for our Salvation. In short, These are Arguments of the power of Prejudice and nothing else. Bellarmin, I doubt, was deep in when he made them. Who thinks them concluding, has a better opinion of them than He had, and must needs be in deeper.  
And so we are come to the Arguments, by which he would entitle his Exemptions to Divine Natural Law. The first is the Custom of Nations; which seems rather Instance than Argument. He had resolved the Divine Right which he pretends into the Law of Nations, and now goes about to show that several Nations have practised according to it. I must confess this substituting the Law of Nations for Divine Natural Law, will not down with me. It is promising one thing, and performing another. For all the World thinks them different, and he himself among the rest distinguishes them as Principles from Conclusions. 
In quantum derivatur à lege naturali per modum conclusionis quae non est multum remota à principijs, St. Thom. 1.2. q. 5. art. 4. ad. 4.  Which Conclusions, if you will believe St. Thomas, must not be far off neither. Put them as he does, at such a distance, that there is no evident, no necessary connexion between them, and no body but himself can imagine they have any thing to do with the Law of Nature. But there being no need to ravel into that matter, let it pass. Bellarmin quotes for the Jews Exod. 30. and Numb. 1. for the Gentiles, Aristotle, Caesar, and Plutarch: for Christians, a Law of Constantine, and another of Justinian: not forgetting the forementioned instances of Pharaoh, and Artaxerxes, which it seems he thinks prove both Positive and Natural Law too. To sift all these quotations minutely, would prove a business, and I love to spare my pains. I conceive we are to set aside what he alleges from Exodus and Numbers. For that the Levites paid not their half Sickle to the uses of the Tabernacle: and that the rest did, belongs not to the Natural but Positive Law of God. For the rest, all he says is, that something has been done for the Clergy in all the Nations he mentions. Now because he took care beforehand, lest we should mistake, to admonish us, that there is no evident nor necessary Light of Nature to guide Nations in this particular, it remains that the Clergy were beholding to the Civil power for what they had. And this every body will freely grant him without troubling his Quotations.  
Methinks this difference might be compounded. Rather than fall out, Bellarmin shall have it his own way for me. With all my heart let the Custom of Nations carry it. I am sure he is not so unreasonable, as to require that Artaxerxes should be bound by Pharaoh's Laws, or Pharaoh by the Gauls, or Constantine by any of them. Let the Clergy then be treated by every Nation according to their own Laws or Customs, and the business is at an end.  
But 'twere good we understood one another. A Clergy man is not only a necessary man in a Commonwealth, but one who spends his whole life in the service of it. For the good of particulars, is the good of the whole, and his whole business is to perfect particulars. Now because it is impossible, that who spends all his time in one employment, should follow another, it is plain, that nothing is to be required of a Clergyman, but the work of a Clergyman. Whatever callings others follow, whether by inclination, or for advantage, or perhaps by constraint, none can be put upon the Clergyman but his own. I except cases of necessity, where Clergymen too sometimes turn Soldiers. This is not to undertake a new calling, but to suspend their own, and that for a short time. As soon as the necessity is over, They are as they were before. Nay a Clergyman cannot live as a Clergyman, if he be forced to labour so much as for his living. 'Tis true, St. Paul upon occasion set his hand to Tentmaking after he was an Apostle. But to follow his example, I think one should be in his circumstances, extraordinarily and miraculously, and without his own labour, capacitated for his function. Otherwise, who must take the ordinary way of study, will find there goes so much time to get the knowledge, which is requisite for him; so much to preserve it; so much to exercise it: that there will be none to spare for any thing else. Regularly speaking 'tis necessary Provision be made for him out of our Saviour's stock, Dignus est operarius mercede suâ. The Clergyman is therefore, by the incompatibility of them with his function, exempted from the Duties of other employments, and has a good title from Nature to such exemptions. For Nature plainly teaches that who has his full load, ought not carry more. And this is common to all Vocations as well as the Clergy. Who is obliged to fight for the Commonwealth, is exempt from Tilling the Ground; who administers Justice, from fight: and so of the rest. No body I conceive would have any thing to say to Bellarmin, for deriving the Exemptions of the Clergy from Nature, if this were what he meant by Exemptions.  
But the Question is, Whether the Exemptions he pretends, In rebus politicis tum quoad personas, tum quod Bona, as he speaks, be taught by Nature? Truly, I am a very ill Scholar in Nature's School, if they be. Subjection in both seems so far from incompatible with their function, that I see not how it is prejudicial, and conceive They may pass very well without those exemptions, and better than with them. I perceive nothing in his Argument towards opening my eyes. That which he says is indeed true. Many Nations, all if he please, have given exemptions to the Clergy, such as they were: neither do we need Instances to prove a thing has happened, which we know beforehand by Reason must have happened. But it is nothing to the purpose: for we are not a jot the nearer knowing that his exemptions are due to the Clergy from Nature, by knowing that they have had exemption in all Nations. When he proves that his Exemptions are of the number of those, which the Clergy has enjoyed always, and every where, he will have spoken to the Question. But 'tis too much to expect we should believe no Nation has ever meddled with their Persons and Goods, when he goes not about to prove it so much as of any one. The truth is, the Argument is as plain a Sophism as can be. Exemptions have been used in all Nations, therefore these Exemptions have been in all Nations, is just the same as if he should Argue, Drink is used in all Nations, therefore Wine is used in all Nations. I conceive therefore I may let his Quotations alone, till they be applied to his purposes, and in the mean time content myself with seeing that the Argument is nothing to the Question.  
The second Argument compares the Ecclesiastical and Secular Powers to the Spirit and Flesh in man. The Spirit, says he, though it hinder not the actions of the Flesh, when they are as they should be, yet governs and moderates it, sometimes keeping it back, sometimes urging it forward, as it judges expedient for its own end. But the Flesh has no power over the Spirit, nor can direct, or judge, or restrain it in any thing. So the Ecclesiastical Power, which is Spiritual, and by that means naturally Superior to the Secular, may, when 'tis needful, direct, judge, and restrain it, but by no means be directed, judged, or restrained by it. This outruns the Constable. By this account the Laity are subject to the Clergy in all things, and the Clergy to the Laity in nothing. Which if it be true, Exemptions are a pitiful matter not worth talking of. For what need has an entire Superiority of Exemptions? Nay, with what good sense can they be applied to it? An Inferior indeed cannot command his Superior; but to say the Superior is exempt from the Inferior, is a new language. We say he is above him, not exempt from him. This Doctrine turns the scales strangely. Instead of enquiring whether the Clergy be exempt from the Laity, as far as I see, the Laity will be put to their shifts to get Exemptions from the Clergy. However it be, that which Bellarmin assumes, is a great deal more than that which he would prove by it, and more ado there will be to get it pass. For the Laity, who contest even Exemptions, will never be brought to acknowledge a total Superiority without unresistable conviction, unless that Superiority be restrained to Spirituals, which as it was never contested, so it hinders not the Superiority which they claim in Temporals.  
As for the Argument, it were an easy matter to get rid of it by a blunt denial. For how does it appear, that the two Powers are to one another, as the Spirit and the Flesh? St. Gregory Nazianzen, said so in a certain Sermon, and others have taken it upon his credit. Be it so. How does it appear that St. Gregory, and those who follow him are not all mistaken? 'Twere something harsh to say so; but yet who did, were at an end of the Argument. For there is no other proof, save a hint of what he has done in his Book de Pont. where he only tells the same story more at large.  
But to use St. Gregory with more respect, let us reflect that a Preacher is one thing, a Disputer another: and therefore what may be very proper for St. Gregory, may ill become Bellarmin. For many things are very plausible, and very pat in a Pulpit, which will not endure the Test of a severe examination elsewhere. And this happens no more ordinarily than in similitudes. For being generally used, not so much to prove, as to imprint lively in the minds of the Auditory what is proved otherwise, they lose both their beauty and force when they are racked into severe proofs. I have not St. Gregory by me, to speak with certainty of his meaning, or know how much he says of what is put upon him. But I see, as much similitude as he found to his purpose, the cases are unlike enough. The Flesh indeed is subject to the Spirit, or rather acted by it, because taken in contradistinction to it. It is a mere dead clod, which does nothing at all. And though it could: to govern, and direct, and judge, are Actions quite out of its sphere, and of which the Spirit alone is capable. Did St. Gregory, does Bellarmin himself, or any man in his senses, think in earnest it is so between the two Powers? Is not the Secular as active as the Spiritual? Nay, is not this all the complaint, that it is too active? Can it not govern, and direct, and judge as truly? On the one side therefore we have an Agent and no Agent, on the other two Agents: and yet he would persuade us that these cases are alike, and that St. Gregory thought so.  
But let the Similitude be what it will, what is it to us? What have we to do with Powers, who are talking of men? It will be time enough to inquire how the Powers are to one another, when it is our business. At present we have other work in hand. Bellarmin says, the Clergy are exempted from Punishment and Tribute. This Clergy are men, and we are examining whether what he says of them be true. Let him not amuse us with Powers. Powers do not pay Tribute, or appear at the Bar. Nor does the Secular Magistrate, or power, pretend to judge, or restrain the Spiritual power. Marry to the man who has it, when by criminal Actions he becomes unworthy of it, the Secular Magistrate does pretend he has something to say. And he may say what he will for Bellarmin. For he takes no further care than for the Power, which no body offers to touch, but leaves the poor man in the lurch. And so this similitude which so much pleases Bellarmin, that he has it up at every turn, is as bad an Argument as can be. It is neither proved, nor any thing to purpose if it were.  
The truth is, here is a plain business clouded with learned handling. Take away the Scholastical appearances of Authority of Fathers, similitudes and Arguments, and who can tell ten, can see all that is in it. Every body knows there are two powers in the World, the Spiritual and the Temporal, and every body knows men are subject to both. This is no news. Now we must needs be told that the Spiritual power is to the Temporal, as the Spirit to the Flesh. Which if it signify that the Spiritual power is, as Bellarmin phrases it, naturally superior to the Temporal, and so the Temporal acts with the leave and according to the pleasure of the Spiritual, it is manifestly false. For the Powers are both supreme, and independent of one another, as we have discoursed formerly. Nor can St. Gregory of all men, be thought to mean so, who if Charon cite him right, says, the Temporal power is supreme (Summa) and full, and liable to the pleasure or command of no other. Besides that elsewhere, he expressly includes himself in the number of those who are to obey the higher powers for conscience, and in force of a Law clearly promulgated by the Holy Ghost. But if it signify that all men, even those who have the greatest Temporal power are subject to the Spiritual, it is very true. The Sword which Kings bear exempts them not from the Keys. In this sense I guess St. Gregory meant it, because the similitude, though not altogether exact, yet is not amiss, nor misbecoming his learning. For the Secular man is, as the Flesh, ignorant in the ways of the Spirit, and though he were knowing, the power of the Keys is not given to him. Indeed he is not altogether guided as the Flesh by the Spirit; but similitudes must not be searched too near. All this goes well. But why so much cacling for this Egg? Balk them not with the crack of learning, and men will crowd into this toil of their own accord. This subjection to the Spirit is but in the ways of the Spirit. And all the story in two words of plain English is but this, In Spiritual things men are subject to the Spiritual power. And who needs St. Gregory, or Bellarmin to tell him that?  
With all this ado, we are but just where we were. The Secular man is indeed subject to the Spiritual power in Spirituals; but why is not the Spiritual man subject to his power in Temporals? Because, says Bellarmin, the Flesh never governs the Spirit, and the Secular man is as the Flesh. Yes in Spirituals: but in Temporals He, and He alone has the knowledge. The Spiritual man is as ignorant in them, as he in Spirituals. He too, and He alone has the power. For the same hand which gave the Keys to Bishops, gave t he Sword to Kings. Wherefore He is now the Spirit, and the Spiritual man the Flesh. And so the very similitude which was brought for exemption does in truth prove subjection.  
I have been the longer upon this point, because the same clew will guide us through all the Labyrinths. Here the Clergy are the Spirit; afterwards, Fathers, and Shepherds, and the Lot of God. And all this is but the same stuff cut into several fashions, which makes not the Web the stronger. He says then, for a third Argument, that 'tis against nature for Children to rule their Parents, or Sheep their Shepherd; and the Clergy are Fathers, and Shepherds. True; but as they were the Spirit before, in respect of Spirituals: in relation to Temporals the Magistrate is the Father and Shepherd. And so we ordinarily call good Princes the Fathers of their Country, 
Isay 44, & 45.  and a Temporal Prince is called by God himself his Shepherd, and his Christ too. Sure Bellarmin will not persuade many, that a man is a Father and a Pastor, when he breaks the Laws, and refuses to contribute to the necessities of his Country. To do so, is not to feed, and keep the Wolf away, but to starve, and let the Wolf in to devour the Flock. And that we should be obliged to look upon and treat a man as a Father and Pastor, when he is not so, but the quite contrary, whoever may teach, nature does not. This Argument, like the former, flies in his face who makes it. We need Spiritual food, and Spiritual direction, and to be preserved from the Spiritual Wolf the Devil. We need also Temporal food and direction, and safety from the Temporal Wolf, the Enemy. The Clergy needs all this as much as other folks: and therefore as they are Fathers and Pastors, in as much as they supply our Spiritual wants: so they are Children and Sheep, in as much as they receive Temporal things from others, and so by nature obliged to obey their Temporal Fathers and Pastors.  
Bellarmin Objects this very thing against himself, and Answers, That a Prince is indeed a Spiritual Child, and Sheep of the Priest, but the Priest can in no wise be called the Child or Sheep of the Prince. And that for a very strange reason; because Priests and all Clergymen have a Spiritual Prince of their own, by whom they are governed, not only in Spirituals, but in Temporals too. But can the Notion of Father and Shepherd be applied to that Spiritual Prince in respect of Temporals? Does he provide Temporal Pastures for the Clergy? Is it from him they have safety and quiet when they feed? Does he drive the Wolf away? We see with our eyes those things are done by the Temporal Prince; and these, and the like, being the things which ground the Notion of Father and Shepherd in Temporals, these Notions as evidently belong to the Prince, as the Actions. This which Bellarmin says, is extremely absurd and intolerably pernicious on other accounts. But I mind not the Position, but the Answer. Since the Prince breeds and nourishes, feeds and secures Priests, as well as others in the Politic life: it is plain he has in that respect the Notion of Father and Shepherd even to them: and Bellarmin has no manner of Reason to deny they may be called Children and Sheep, and obliged to do what nature teaches Children and Sheep ought to do.  
The fourth Argument is this, The Clergy are the Ministers of God, consecrated to his service alone, and offered by the whole people for that purpose, whence they have their name as belonging to the Lot of God. But the Princes of the World certainly can have no right over those things which are offered and consecrated to God, and made as it were his proper goods. If I had a mind to Dispute of Etymologys, or thought it worth while to maintain against him, that the Clergy have their name, rather because God is their Lot, than They Gods, there would be enough to take my part. But I love not to lose time; for which reason too I forbear to except against all that is exceptionable in the Argument. It will be sufficient to say, that it differs little in substance from its fellows, only it is set forth in another manner. The Service, and Lot of God, are but what he called Spirit and Pastors before. And the same Key will serve to the Lock. In as much as they are the Lot of God, and in respect of his Service, to which they are consecrated, the Clergy are unaccountable to the Secular Power: but when they divest themselves of the Clergyman, and wear only the man, that man, if he deserve to feel the Secular Sword, may, for any thing I see in the Argument. Wickedness is sure no part of God's Lot, nor can I imagine how the privilege of his service should be pretended where there is no service of his; nay, where the pretender acts directly contrary to it. Were it true, that Princes had nothing to do with things belonging to God, or men consecrated to his Service, all Christians, and all things seem in a fair way towards Exemptions, as well as Clergymen. For God has a very true property in all Things, and Christians are all, and that very solemnly, consecrated to his service. They serve him indeed in another way than the Clergy, but they truly serve him, and are by solemn consecration obliged to that service. Since we see that service is so far from exempting them from subjection to Princes, that obedience to them is part of it, it is plain there is no repugnance betwixt the service of God and subjection to Princes, unless they command things contrary to that service. And from such commands all men are exempt as well as the Clergy; with this difference, that the Clergy are exempt from all that is contrary to the service of Clergymen, the rest only from what is contrary to the service of Christians.  
Yet Bellarmin would bear us in hand, that what he says is certain, and tells us that the Light of Reason shows it, and God has not obscurely delivered it in the last of Leviticus. Whatsoever is once consecrated to God, shall be Holy of Holys to the Lord. The Light of Reason may indeed do much, when he makes it appear: but He, who is so much for Exemptions, should methinks allow us to be exempt from the Ceremonial Law. The Chapter he citys takes order about the offerings made to God, and appoints some to be redeemed, others not. But those commands are given to the Jews; we see nothing like them in the Christian Law. And no body knows better than himself, that we are to be guided by our own, not their Law, and that it lays no obligation on us purely as their Law, though the matter of it do sometimes bind us on the score of Reason. He says indeed, that 'tis so in this case, but barely to say so is not to prove. His word, if that were the business, would go far with me; but when he is making Arguments, I expect an Argument. I say no more at present, because this I conceive is as much as needs for an Answer, and I intent to discourse of the merits of this cause more at large hereafter.  
The fifth and last Argument is from signs and Prodigys, shown, as he says, by God on those who have presumed to violate Ecclesiastical Immunities. For proof of this, he sends us to one Bredembachius, an Author I have never seen, and therefore not knowing, nor having means to know particulars, can only answer in general. If the signs and Prodigys, he talks of, be true Miracles, and those express to the point, clearly wrought in confirmation of Immunities extended as far as Bellarmin stretches them, though I am slow of belief, yet if it be truly so, I will wash my hands of the business. God forbidden I should doubt of any thing, let it seem never so strange, and never so cross to my reason, which carries his seal to it uncounterfeited. But I am strongly persuaded there is no such matter. If there were, Bellarmin is a strange man to amuse us with his probabilities, and unnecessary consequences, when he had proof in store infinitely more convictive than even demonstration itself. A Miracle may, perhaps, have been done to show God's care of the Church, or Ministry. He is not less powerful now than heretofore in his Judgements upon Nadah and Abiu, Oza and Ozias. But Miracles are not lightly to be believed, and when they are manifest, Bellarmin's Doctrine may be ne'er the truer, unless they come home to it. In likelihood, who had Bredembachius to see what he says, would find no more than observations of signal, perhaps unusual and unhoped prosperities happening to some who favoured the Clergy, and crosses to those who did otherwise; which his, whether piety or bigottery enhances into Miracles. If this be all the Fire to the smoke, the Topick ill becomes Bellarmin's learning. Who had the Malice to collect all that History affords of adversity to the good, and prosperity to the bad, might perhaps make as big a Book as that of Bredembachius. For 'tis an old complaint, and that of a Wise man too, that all things happen alike to the Good and the Bad: as if God had no care of the World, while in truth he has the greater by letting things happen so, and by that Providence teaching us not to value the Goods of this World, but raise our hearts to better. I am the apt to think there is no more in it, because Bellarmin himself makes a famous business of what I should not have thought worth alleging. As for Prodigys and Signs, as many as there be in Bredembachius, he had no mind it seems to become Voucher so much as for one; for he cited not any. But he tells us, the Emperor Basilius Porphyrogenitus lays all the Calamities of that time to the charge of a certain Law made by Nicephorus Phocas against Ecclesiastical Immunity, and says that since that Law was in force, all things went to wrack. And this he calls a remarkable Testimony. As if that Emperor had been made acquainted with the Counsels of God, and seen the secret springs of Providence, which set the wheels of Prosperity and Adversity in motion; or as if worldly Prosperities were to be looked on by Christians as the reward of virtue. However a body would think it went not much better with the Greek Empire after that Law than before, when notwithstanding the abrogating that Law, it was finally swallowed up by the Turks. And now I have mentioned the Turks, I remember They Argue something after this manner, when from their success They urge, that God has declared in favour of Mahumetism against Christianity. And with them I leave the Argument, to whom it is a great deal more suitable than to Christians.  
So end Bellarmin's Arguments, and so might end my Letter, but that, not content with knowing how the waters relish, you expect to have the Spring damned up. It is a Task which asks a better Workman, and besides is not the work of a Letter. One half indeed, the claim he makes to the Positive Law of God, needs no more trouble: A plain denial is confutation in abundance; for unless he could show that Positive Law, which he pretends, the pretence is plainly groundless. To unriddle fully the other half, it would be fit to search into the Law of Nature; for how shall we understand what it commands, unless we first know what it is? Now that is a Question about which men are not agreed, and who would undertake to dispute it from the beginning, and separate the pure Oar of Truth from the Dross of several mistakes, would cut out Work for a Volume. That it is nothing but Reason is sufficiently known: but all Laws being grounded on Reason, they would all be natural, unless their differences were settled by a more particular account. Bellarmin, I conceive, does not afford us light enough to see our way. He puts three degrees: First principles; conclusions evidently following; and conclusions not evidently following, but which need human Constitution. The two first, he says, belong properly to the Law of Nature; the third is the Law of Nations, which according to the Doctrine of St. Thomas, he distinguishes from Civil Law, in that the one is derived from nature, as Conclusions from Premises, the other as a determination of Generals to Particulars. As if it be Natural, that who offends be punished, it is Civil, that he be punished with this or that punishment. I know not whether the Authority of St. Thomas himself will preserve even that distinction wholly from Question. Possibly among Laws confessedly Civil, there may be found proper deductions from Reason, and among those of Nations, determination of generals to particulars. But whatever be of that matter, St. Thomas is far enough from vouching what Bellarmin says. He, as I observed before, requires that the Conclusions, which he makes the Law of Nations, be not far removed from their principles. Wherefore Bellarmin's second branch of the Law of Nature is the Law of Nations to him. Of the third branch there is no news in him, nor could he make Law of Nature of it, if there were. He is not a man to take an inevident and unnecessary conclusion, for a conclusion; and therefore if he would allow it derived from nature at all, he could allow it only by way of Determination, not of conclusion; that is, for pure Civil, not Law of Nature or Nations. Put it then to St. Thomas, and our Exemptions, which are only the third way derived from Nature, own themselves to the Civil Law, and have no more title to the Law of nature than all Laws; for all are grounded on Reason.  
I am mistaken as well as you, if Bellarmin do not in effect say as much himself. For the Law of Nature is universally agreed to be imprinted in us without, and before Constitutions: wherefore to make us a Law of Nature which needs human Constitution, is to make us a Law of Nature, which is not a Law of Nature. Indeed Human Constitution is but another word for Civil Law; unless you restrain Civil Law to one City or Commonwealth. But there is no place for that restriction here. If we were distinguishing or not subject. It will perhaps be impertinent to add, that this obligation on the one side to obey, cannot be without power on the other to command. Nor can there be greater or more palpable nonsense, than that there should be a Head to order the Members, without power to order them, a Head being nothing but such a power lodged in one or more persons. But 'twill be fit to reflect a little upon this power.  
As the whole is evidently so many men, so the power of the Whole is plainly the power of so many men. And since every man has power over himself, and what he has, and the power of every one is transferred to the Head, the Head has plainly power over every man, and what every man has. So that whatever propriety men have by Law in their Goods, or liberty of their actions, 'tis all with subordination still to the supreme power, which has a greater and paramount authority over those very Goods and Actions, and may and ought dipose of them as the common good requires. Neither is any thing more reasonable, nor can it be otherwise. For 'tis only by conjunction with the whole, and as a part of it, that any man has any thing. That this Land, or House is mine, and not another man's, is only because it is come to me in such a manner as the Laws of that Society whereof I am a Member, have appointed to make it mine. 'Tis only by the same conjunction a man can keep what he has. Any one that is stronger than he might take it from him, but that the whole in which he lives takes his part, joined to which he is now stronger than the other, and fears him not. Wherefore since 'tis the whole which gives and secures to every man all he has, the good of the whole is more his good than his private goods can be, and he is wronged if when any thing he has is necessary for the good of the whole, it be not disposed that way. To grumble at parting with something, when otherwise we have nothing, is a pitch of folly at which fordidness itself I think is not yet arrived. Again, it cannot, as I said, be otherwise. No end can be compassed either without means, or with means out of our power. Wherefore to put a Head to look after the good of the Body, without power over the means necessary to compass that good is manifest nonsense. These means being evidently the Persons and Things within the Commonwealth, the Head must either have power to dispose of both for the good of the whole, or not be a Head.  
For which reason that power cannot be separated from it, no not by the Head itself, much less by any body else, and 'twould be ill with men if it could. You may as well separate Rational from man; for that is not more essential to man, than Power to Head. But were it possible, and the Head could strip itself of its power or Headship, it might also, and must by doing so, strip the man, whom he puts out of his power, of his Membership. For plainly no Head, no Member. And then, besides that he would be out of the care of the Head, which is confined to the Members, he might at pleasure or upon fancy, lose all the benefits he enjoys by being a Member; and those we have found are both the greatest and all the comforts and aids of life. But I spare this consideration, because I think it will return again. In the mean time, we have in a Commonwealth Power in the Head inseparable, and unconfined, and which both may and aught to dispose of all Persons and Things within the Commonwealth for the common good; and in the Members, obligation to concur to, or obey that disposition, and all this with a necessity so absolute, that that who takes either away, takes away the Commonwealth too. It remains to look now upon our Exemptions.  
Those, of which you are Solicitous, are Exemptions of the Persons of Clergymen from the Tribunals, and of their goods from the Taxes of Secular Princes. Peradventure there needs no more to confute both, than to assume without more ado, that the Clergy are Members of the Commonwealth. It is a proposition which one would think needs no proving, and yet the dispute is at an end, if it be granted. Members are subject; They are Members, therefore they are subject, is pretty evident; and that subjection goes to the very Notion of Member, is already discoursed. Notwithstanding since Bellarmin with an inconstancy, which shows he was at a loss, sometimes plainly grants, sometimes in effect denys it, let us cast away a little time upon it.  
The end of a Commonwealth being the good of those who compose it, If we stop at the goods of this life, a Clergyman perhaps is no necessary Ingredient to a Commonwealth. For Peace and Plenty, quiet and security, and whatever relates purely to this World, may be had without him. But take a Commonwealth, for a Society designing and providing for the whole good of man, and a Clergyman cannot be spared, because on him depends the chief, and in truth the only good of man, viz. advancing in the way to Final Bliss. For other things bear not that name with propriety, farther than as they contribute to this good: on the contrary they are harms when they hinder it, as they always do when they do not advance it. Pleasure, and Riches, and what the World calls Prosperity, as much as our vanity prizes them, are in reality wretched miseries, when they are loved for themselves, and not used for means to better ends; And the Cobbler and Beggar is much a happier man, than he that flourishes in Coaches, and Palaces, if he uses what God sends better. A Commonwealth therefore is not perfect, and in Aristotle's language, Nihil extra se desiderans, nor able to attain the end of a Commonwealth, the good of man, in which there are not means to compass This, as well as other Goods. It is the Good for which we are created, the care of which no man can put off, and much less a Society of men. This good 'tis plain we cannot have but by the Clergy. It is entrusted to them by God, from whom they received the knowledge of saving truths, and command to teach them to the end of the World. Wherefore whatever be of a Commonwealth, considered purely with relation to the good of this life, a Christian Commonwealth cannot be without a Clergyman. A Magistrate to end differences, a Soldier to fight, an Artificer, an Husbandmn, or who else is requisite for convenience or plenty, may as well and better be spared, than he who furnishes the Commonwealth with a greater and more necessary good, and without which the quiet, and security, and plenty, and whatever others contribute, is useless. And since 'tis evident that They are all Members, and necessary Members of the Commonwealth, because the end of a Commonwealth cannot be had without them, 'tis evident also the Clergyman is a necessary Member too, and more necessary than any of them, because he is a necessary means to a more necessary part of the end of a Commonwealth.  
'Tis tedious to lose words in a matter determinable almost by Eyesight. For do we not see They make in most places one, and the first of the three Orders or States, which represent the Body of the Commonwealth? With us indeed They do not make a distinct order, but yet They have their place in the Representatives of the Kingdom. Methinks 'tis something an extravagant business to be put to prove that they are Members, who are every where acknowledged for principal Members. Again, Do we not see they Inherit, and Purchase, and Convey, and do all which men are empowered by Birthright and Membership to do, and to which only Members are admitted with exclusion of Aliens? In case of wrong, do they not draw the waters of relief from the great source common to all the Members? And if their Prince deny them Justice, do they not think he breaks his Coronation Oath, to render it impartially to all his subjects? Do they not claim and receive their share in all the advantages and privileges of Members, and to which they could have no Title or Pretence if they were not Members? In short, there is no proving any man a Member, if they be not. For all the Topics which can be used for any, hold for them; nor is it more repugnant to nature, and incompatible with the Notion of a Commonwealth, that a Member is not subject to the Head, than it is to common sense that They are not Members.  
Lightly than one shall not meet with a wilder fancy than that of Bellarmin's, when he says, the Clergy are but material, not formal parts of the Commonwealth, and have a Prince and Tribunals of their own. I doubt, They have no great reason to thank him for his subtlety. For should they be sent to that Prince, and those Tribunals for Justice as often as they need it (and who but their own Prince is to take care of them?) their complaints perchance might oblige him to think of a second Recognition. But yet even so much is enough to spoil his Market. For bare material living in any Country, subjects a man's person to the Laws of that Country, and the Goods he has there to Taxes. Aliens are every where protected, while they break not the Laws; but if they do, it will not avail them to plead, they are not formal parts of the Commonwealth. They are punished as natives, according as the Law of the place in which they are, not their own, appoints. They pay Polls likewise, and their share in other Taxes, if they have any thing liable to the Tax. Wherefore though Bellarmin went as far as ever he could to find out this Formally, and cannot go farther though he would never so fain, unless he blind folks; (For people who have their eyes can see where the Clergy materially live) yet this Formality will do the Clergy no good, the material share which he cannot deny them, drawing along with it a share in punishments, when they deserve it, and Taxes too. And as the Clergy are no way advantaged, the Commonwealth I believe will be as little concerned in his subtlety. So they can punish the persons, and assess the goods, I suppose they will not mind much with what Formalities men of speculation amuse themselves.  
But let us look upon those Exemptions a little nearer. That Commonwealth I conceive is sickly, and not like to live long, where the members are not protected from injury, and provision made for their quiet; But where is no power to do it, there can be no Commonwealth. For a Commonwealth is the means to procure quiet and safety, for which men join and continue in Society. It can be no means to procure them, if it have no power to procure them, and so ceases to be a Commonwealth, and becomes an independent unsociated multitude, standing every one on his own guard, and at War with his Neighbour. I know not whether it may be called so much as a Herd of a kind of rational Beasts, preying as mere Beasts, the stronger upon the weaker. Now the power of the whole Body being, as has been discoursed, in the Head or Prince, the Prince must have power to right his subjects in case of wrong, or there can be neither Head nor Body. Neither is it material from whence the wrong comes. Whoever does it, whether Native or Alien, in or out of his Dominions, become subject to his Prince whom he has wronged, as far as concerns reparation. Relief is sought at his hands, and he gives it by forcing the offender to amends, if he be within his reach, or if he be not, 'tis just to pursue him where he is, and right his Subjects by War.  
This Reason indispensably subjects Clergymen to the power of the Prince, even though they had, according to Bellarmin's extravagant conceit, another Prince of their own. For 'tis not what they are, or to whom they belong, but what They may do. If they can do wrong, we need not look for more. And that they may do wrong, is something too plain. Whatever Exemptions they claim or have, they have none from the corruption of Nature. 'Twere to be wished they had. That one Exemption would be more worth than all the rest. But they may, and alas! do fall ometimes as well as others, and need as well as others the fear of punishment, to awe the crookedness of Nature into some straitness. It would sound harsh, and show perhaps invidious, to dilate this Head into all sorts of wickedness, and show what might be done, and must be suffered, if there were no help for it. Let it suffice that to deny the Prince a power over them, when they happen to break the Laws and fall into crimes, is to abandon private men to all the wrongs, which the Clergy may be tempted to do, and want virtue to resist the Temptation; to abandon the public to the remediless danger of machinations, if at any time they arrive at the height of wickedness, Treason. In short, 'tis to deny the Prince to be Prince; For he is plainly no Prince who has no power to right his Subjects. By the way, to avoid mistakes, let me declare once for all, by Prince I mean all along the subject of supreme power wheresoever lodged, in one or more persons, according to the different constitutions of different Commonwealths. That variety is nothing to me, and I will not embroil myself in unconcerning things.  
It may perhaps be thought that these are causeless surmizes, and that the goodness of Clergymen is wronged by being so much as suspected of doing wrong to others, and that however at worst right may upon complaint be had against as many as own him, whom Bellarmin makes their Prince. But I doubt there is more of Bigottery, than sense in those thoughts. Not that I question the goodness of the Clergy. But 'tis not for men to change the security of relief, when they need it, which they have from their Head as Members, into a faint, and possibly deceitful confidence of a private man's virtue. And then to seek relief from any but ones own Prince, to omit that 'tis unpracticable, and has a hundred insuperable inconveniences besides, 'tis plainly against the nature and end of a Commonwealth. For men live united to obtain redress of wrongs by their union, and would quickly break it, if they be forced to seek it elsewhere, and where the very pursuit of it may chance prove as great a wrong, as that whereof they pursue redress.  
As these things are too plain to be a secret any where, they are understood in Italy itself, and when time was, were actually pleaded. 'Twas urged in behalf of the Venetians, in their contests about this matter with Paul V, 
Consideratio sup. Cens. Stis. suae. P P. Pauli V.  That the power of punishing offences against the Laws, could not be separated from the supreme Power, and that to say a Prince had any body in his Dominions not subject to him in Temporal matters, or any other concerning the public good, was all one as to say he was not Prince. To make which discourse the more striking They brought it to his own door, and alleged, That the Pope exempted indeed from Bishops and Archbishops, but could not exempt from himself without ceasing to be Pope. They urged also, what peradventure is more sensible in a Country so impatient of injuries, but yet ruinous every where; That the Laity being wronged by the Clergy, and not revenged by the Magistrate, will revenge themselves; and which is worse, out of despair of being righted when they are once wronged, study to be beforehand, and prevent the wrongs they fear. Which what a gate it sets open to the disturbance and ruin of the Commonwealth, is needless to be mentioned.  
I have not been solicitous particularly of the Exemption from Taxes claimed by Bellarmin, because I think it will not be hard to get his consent, that the Goods of the Clergy go along with their Persons. Nevertheless we may briefly reflect, which I think was hinted before, that the Prince, or supreme power is to provide for the security of the whole; that provision cannot be made without means; that these means being in the hands of particulars, unless they may be taken out of those hands, to be employed for the public good, as occasion requires, no provision can be made, and the end of Society is lost. And since the Clergy have their share, oftentimes a very large one, in the goods of the Commonwealth, as they can hardly be spared at any time without envy of the rest, and grumbling at the inequality of public burdens, so the exigence may be such that They cannot be spared at all. For it may require the utmost of what the Commonwealth can do, and all be little enough. However That what They have may be necessary to the end of the Commonwealth, evidently subjects what They have to the power of the Commonwealth. And this a better Master than Bellarmin, St. Ambrose, has long since taught us in few, but very significant words: If Thou wilt not be subject (obnoxius) to Caesar, have no things of the World; but if thou hast Riches, Thou art subject to Caesar.  
These Considerations are but a few of many which the subject affords. Who would dissect the Notion of Commonwealth into all the parts which necessarily, and indispensably concur to the whole frame, would never have done. There is enough said for a Letter, and what is said I think is very clear.  
'Tis plain the World, which was made for the use of man, cannot be used to any tolerable convenience of life, without those Societies, which are called Commonwealths. 'Tis plain, a Commonwealth cannot be without a Head and Members, nor they without power to command, and obligation to obey, for the end of the Commonwealth. 'Tis plain, the Clergy are Members, at least in a Christian Commonwealth, and though they were not, would be ne'er a whit the less subject to the Power under which they live, barely by living under it. For which, though I contented myself with alleging the custom of Nations, yet who will may find it in Nature too. As a stranger cannot go into a Foreign Country with safety, unless the Laws there secure him from injury, so neither can that Country receive him with safety, unless the same Laws may hinder him from doing any. Again, those Laws are Rules appointed for the common good, and if the Stranger do not regulate his Actions, and Traffic, and whatever commerce he has with the Natives, by those Rules, the common good is prejudiced, and the Power to whose care it belongs, is to procure reparation from the Stanger. So that who Travels, does upon the matter leave, or rather suspend his Membership with the community to which Birth subjects him, and for the time of his stay unites himself to that in which he is, whereof he becomes a kind of Member, with that difference betwixt him and proper Members, which his case requires, and the Laws whether of Nations, or particular Countries have established. 'Tis farther plain, that Security, and Quiet, are some of the many goods for which men live united in Society. 'Tis plain, they cannot be attained, without power to hinder disquiet, and wrong; and that Power is plainly no Power, if it cannot act wherever 'tis needful it should for those ends. Wherefore whoever brings disturbance, and injury into the Commonwealth, must of necessity come under the Power which is to keep them out. I might have dilated farther; but I thought it superfluous, conceiving he must be very partial, or rather very blind, who needs more light to discover Bellarmin's Exemptions, not only groundless and unproved, but unprovable, and manifestly inconsistent with the great and most natural good of man, regulated Society. Wherefore 'tis as impossible they should be commanded by God, or Nature, as that either can command things harmful to man, or incompatible one with another. Neither can he, who will obstinately persist to maintain they are, avoid being driven at last to say, That Bad proceeds from the Author of Good.  
It may seem strange that Learned and Good men should be for things so false, and so pernicious. But whither will not mistaken Zeal transport us? It showed them, I suppose, but one side of the Meddal, and made them so hot upon the advantage of the Church, and Churchmen, that they minded not the harm they did the Common wealth. Which is the less to be wondered at, because it hindered them from seeing that They hurt even those they think to pleasure. For I am much mistaken if these Exemptions be not more prejudicial to the Clergy themselves, than any body else. And this not only for the dependence the Church has on the Commonwealth, without which it cannot well be, but on nearer and more obvious considerations. Let a King say to a Clergyman, as Bellarmin would have him, I have no power over you, He says at the same time, I am no Head in respect of you, nor you a Member in respect of me, or of that Body whereof I am Head. Thus much even Bellarmin himself says; for 'tis his distinction of material and formal Members, in other words; though I know he elsewhere speaks otherwise. Now This, if I understand English, is to say, If any body wrong you, you must not come to me for redress; for I have nothing to do with you. Or if good nature make me interpose, 'tis purely out of Charity; not Justice and the obligation a Head has to the Members.  
Pray how far is this from Out-lawry? An Outlaw is but one put out of the King's protection: and he who cannot claim his protection of right, seems not much, if at all, better than he who is formally put out of it. For a King may protect an Outlaw if he please; and unless he please, at this rate he need not protect a Clergyman. However barely to change the privilege a subject has to say to his Prince, I beseech you do me Justice, into I beseech you do me a kindness, is what the Clergy are strange men if they take for a Privilege, and they are stranger friends to them who will not be quiet without it.  
Again, will not the case be altered, if those among whom They live, cease to look upon them as fellow Members, and whose good, for the community of Society, is their own? The experience of strangers in all Nations, instructs us sufficiently how coldly people interest themselves in their wants, or afflictions, or whatever concerns. And what more than strangers are They, who by ceasing to be under the Prince's power, cease to be parts of the Commonwealth? save materially, as Bellarmin phrases it, and so are strangers. Till the World be made up of courtesy, and good Nature, and every body be sure to be their friend, whether he be obliged or no, the Clergy in my opinion should for their own sakes cease even to wish for such Exemptions. As men are now, 'twill be ill for them to have nothing but good Nature, and Courtesy to trust to.  
Besides, as the Clergy are of the same nature with other men, they need the same conveniences and supports of life; nor did those, who invented these Exemptions, mean, I suppose, to diminish those conveniences and those supports. Other men seek and find such things in Society: Can the Clergy hope for them otherwise? Can they get what they want, or keep what they get, or recover what they lose, but by means of the Commonwealth? It is plain, their case is the same with other men in this point. Whatever They enjoy, They hold by Commonwealth Tenure, and cannot possibly hold otherwise. Now I ask not how they can pretend from the Commonwealth, if they be not of the Commonwealth, nor any of the many obvious questions which the matter suggests, and whereof some are partly hinted before. I mind only the Privilege, and would know what Privilege, Exemption from Taxes is, save a Privilege of doing one's self a mischief. A man has a Penny: if he part with one-Farthing, he saves three; if he do not, he loses all four. Is it a Privilege to this man, to keep his Farthing, when it is plainly to keep nothing? So it is with the Commonwealth, to which if we contribute nothing, we can keep nothing. It preserves us all we have, and our contributions preserve it. It is the great Ship, which carries us safe through a Sea of miseries, which would otherwise swallow us up. Who desires to be exempted from pumping, and labouring in it, when it is needful, what privilege does he desire, but the privilege of drowning? It is plain, that the good of the whole is every private man's good, and more than any private good can be; for by it he has all other goods. It is plain, that Taxes are necessary to this good. Wherefore it is also plain, that a Privilege of not concurring to Taxes, is but a Privilege of not concurring to a man's own good, and his greatest good; a Privilege of letting the Commonwealth perish, and perishing with it for company. Clergymen must of necessity stand and fall with it, as well as others, even though they were but material parts of it, as Bellarmin fancies. When the Ship Sinks, the Passenger is lost as well as the Mariner.  
I cannot imagine how This should be thought a Privilege unless by that error, which has ruined many a Commonwealth, of thinking all lost which is given to the Public. Did people reflect, that what is given in that manner, is instead of being lost, put out to Interest for them, and to a greater advantage than they can possibly make themselves, They would change their thoughts and language. The true privilege lies on the other side, that by means of Society, what particular men have shall be employed more for their good, and in a better manner, than themselves can employ it; and that, when they have not wit enough to prefer a greater good before a less, there are who will take what they are resty to give, and do them good whether they will or no. Next to the Privilege of Nature, ability to pursue our own good ourselves, is the Privilege of Fortune, to fall into hands which will do it for us. In short, since Man is a Creature made and obliged to seek his own good, and the great good of man is Society, and the good of that Society, the great good of every particular in it, and Taxes are for the good of that Society, to desire to be exempted from Taxes and think it a Privilege, is to desire to be exempted from acting according to our Nature, and think that a Privilege which is a misery. For a man who acts not like a man, is a very wretched, and a very contemptible thing.  
I desire not to be mistaken, as if I thought a Commonwealth must needs be ruined, as often as a private man fails in his Quota, or that some, and as many as the Public pleases, may not be exempted from Taxes. On the contrary, I conceive it not only safe, but even fit to exempt those who have no more than can be spared from the necessities of the Commonwealth without prejudice, or employ what they have to as great, perhaps a greater advantage than Taxes. For the Commonwealth both needs it not for the end of Taxes, and enjoys the benefit of it in another, and it may be better way. And such at least should be the case of the Clergy, of which I intent to say something before I have done. I meant only to say, that not to concur to Taxes is in its nature ruinous to the Public, and therefore no Privilege, but a harm to the Refusers, who if the Commonwealth perish, must needs perish with it. And that it's in its nature ruinous is evident. For let every man refuse, the Commonwealth cannot stand. That this effect does not follow, when private men are either exempted, or exempt themselves by fraud, happens not for want of harm in the thing, but because a single man has no sensible proportion to the whole, and so the good or harm he does is imperceptible. Now if there were but one, or a few Clergymen in a Nation, or but one or a few Fields in their possession, as Little in moral things passes for nothing, They would not need to pretend Natural or Divine Law for Exemptions. Every body would be more forward to give to, than take from them. But where They have a considerable part of the Revenue of the Commonwealth in their hands, as in some places of the Venetian Territory P. Paulo says, they have a fourth, in some a third part, the Commonwealth can hardly be supported without their assistance. For besides that the rest would always grumble at the inequality of public burdens, They would not often bear them with any tolerable convenience, where so much more than their share is laid on their shoulders.  
I forbear to wove the Exemption from Justice into the same discourse, because every body I suppose will do it of himself. For every body must see that Justice is as great, and as indispensable a good as Taxes, as necessary to the whole, and to Particulars; and therefore that the Privilege of being exempted from it, is but a privilege of doing the Commonwealth as much harm, as depends on the Exemptee, and helping to ruin That with which he must needs be ruined too.  
Upon the whole I conceive I may with confidence conclude that these Exemptions, as being many ways harmful cannot proceed from God or Nature, and therefore what the Clergy have of this kind, They have from human Power, seeing, and by their wisdom providing, that what harm there is in their Nature, be overbalanced by a greater good. And in this persuasion I conceive too I shall be well abetted. Peradventure where things are clear by Reason, more light is as needless, as Torches to see at Noon. But the palate of the Age is queasy. Men refuse good meat sometimes, because they fancy not the dishes, and will not hearken to Truth but from a mouth they like. To gratify their humours, it will be necessary to take a little more pains, and produce Vouchers of greater credit.  
As for grave Authors of his own Form, Bellarmin has exempted me from the trouble of looking after them. For he brings them to the Bar himself, and opens their Evidence, and strives to answer it.  
I thought once to have Replied to his Answers. But besides that my Pitcher, contrary to the case in Horace, is already become a Jar, and 'twould be monstrous to work it into a Tun, I considered it is not our business at present. We are not now upon the What's said, but the Who said it. To examine who has most reason for what he says, is to turn back to the merits of the Cause, which if any one will do, I am well content to leave him to himself. For he must have either very bad eyes, or much turned away, who will not easily see through all that is said. In the mean time it is enough for my purpose that 'tis acknowledged, and by Bellarmin himself, that what he says is contradicted by Catholics, men of note as well as himself, and whose No has as much authority as his I▪  
But I conceive it fitting to produce some of a higher Form, and whose credit is unquestionable. To begin with one, against whom none can speak, or be heard without impiety, I vouch in the first place St. Paul, Rom. 13. Let every Soul be subject to the higher Powers. And here I might end as well as begin: For this is in truth alone decisive. He must have no Soul who can pretend this command comprehends him not. Yet let us hear his Interpreters. Theodoret upon this place has these words, Sive est Sacerdos, etc. whether one be a Priest, or Prelate, or have professed a Monastical life, let him obey those (ijs cedat) to whom Magistracy is committed. Theophylact, upon the same place, has almost the same words; Vniversos erudit, etc. He instructs All, whether a Priest, or Monk, or Apostle, that they be subject to Princes. St. Chrysostom, Hom. 23. upon the Epistle to the Romans, Sed eas Paulus, etc. But Paul makes use of such reasons as command obedience to the Powers by way of debt; showing those things are commanded All, as well Priests as Monks, not Seculars only. And this he declares in the very beginning, when he says, Let every Soul be subject to the higher Powers: Though you be an Apostle, though an Evangelist, though a Prophet; in fine, whatsoever you be. For this subjection is not against Piety.  
Let us next hear Popes themselves, Gelasius writing to the Emperor Anastasius, tells him, that The Prelates of the Church own him all obedience in Temporals: And again, Ep. 10. Antistites Religionis, Bishops also themselves are to obey thy Laws, and this because, forasmuch as concerns the Order of Public Discipline, that is, the Government of the Commonwealth, We know the power is by supernal disposition, given to Thee. Anastasius to the same Emperor acknowledges, that Bishops are subject to the Laws of the Prince in what concerns public Discipline: But Princes to Bishops in dispensing the Mysteries and Sacraments. Pelagius the first, Ep. 16. to Childebert King of France. With how much study and labour must we endeavour, for taking away the scandal of suspicion, to offer the duty of our confession to Kings, to whom the Holy Scriptures command us also to be subject. St. Gregory the Great speaks with a submission which offends Baronius, and makes him strain his wits to find a scurvy way to colour the business. But no Varnish will lie. That he was subject to the Emperor's command: That he did what he ought in obeying the Emperor on one side, and speaking for God on the other: That Power from Heaven is given to the Piety of his Lords, as he calls Emperors, over all men, over Priests as well as Soldiers, etc. have a blunt ill natured clearness, which no Art can practise upon.  
I cannot but take notice by the way how Bellarmin strives to weather those Rocks. He objects against himself the aforesaid place of St. Paul, with the other to the same purpose out of St. Pet. 2. and what St. chrysostom says of the matter: And answers, That those places are general, and mean no more than that every one be subject to his own Superior. But the subjection of the Clergy to Princes cannot be proved by them, till it be proved that Princes are lawful, Superiors and Judges of the Clergy, which cannot be proved, unless it be proved that Sheep have pre-eminence over Pastors, Children over Parents, and Temporals over Spirituals. And yet we do not contradict St. chrysostom neither. For though we say the Pope alone is the proper Judge of the Clergy, and Monks, yet we confess the King is King of them as well as the Laity. For Princes fight for them, and They must honour and pray for him, and obey him too, directively not co-actively, and with his former restrictions.  
That Prejudice should be thus powerful! Is it possible Bellarmin should in earnest persuade himself, the Apostles meant only in general, that every one should obey whom he ought obey, the Laity their Secular, the Clergy their Ecclesiastical Superior? Are not the Superiors, or higher Powers, whom All are commanded to obey, expressly named by St. Peter, Kings, and Dukes, or Governors, sent to punish evil doers; and by St. Paul, Magistrates who bear the Sword? Can he think this Command is complied with by obedience to Ecclesiastical Superiors? Are They Kings? Do they bear the Sword? Are They the Ministers of God to wrath, and vengeance? What better proof would he have, the Kings are lawful Superiors, even of the Clergy, than St. Paul gives, viz. that their powers are ordained by God, whom to resist is to acquire Damnation?  
In St. Peter we find the reason of his Doctrine expressed, when he admonishes Christians so to converse among the Gentiles, that They who speak ill of them, may be moved by their good Works to glorify God, and the ignorance of the foolish be silenced. By the Calumny which the Apostle means, all Interpreters understand a suspicion crept in among the Gentiles of disobedience to Temporal powers, and contempt of their Laws. For such a seditious Doctrine there was among the Jews, begun by Judas the Galilean, and tenaciously embraced by the Pharisees. It was too well known by the disorders it caused, and being mistaken for a point of the Jews Religion, Christians were aspersed with it as deriving their Religion from them. Both the Apostles took care to clear Christianity from the aspersion, and therefore instructed the Faithful to obey Secular powers, not by constraint or force, Propter Iram, as they phrase it, but for conscience, because such was the Will of God, who had given them the power they had.  
This was the matter of Fact. Consider now how Bellarmin handles it. There is indeed, saith he, express mention made of Kings, because at that time it was very necessary, lest they should have hindered the Preaching of the Gospel, but yet the Apostles meant no more, than that every one should be subject to his own lawful Superior.  
Is not this to say, that the Apostles were not men of that holy simplicity, which is believed? For 'tis plainly to go about to overreach Princes with fair words: to seek, by making them believe They should have obedience from All, to cajole them into the Church, there to be taught a new lesson, and find there was no such matter. Is it not to say, They did not dispense the Gospel with that Fidelity which they profess? For they included every one within the command of obedience, and yet meant a good part should not be included. They taught that Kings and Magistrates were Higher powers in respect of all, and that it is the Will of God, that all be subject to them, and know for all that it is not the Will of God, and that They are not higher Powers in respect of the Clergy. In short, it is to make them speak plain nonsense. For if this Comment pass, their discourse will be this: People have no reason to think any Christian disobedient to Civil Authority, For we tell you some must obey it, and the rest Ecclesiastical.  
Then for St chrysostom, he contradicts not him, he says, The Saint says, That All, the Clergy as well as the rest, and the highest degrees of them, are subject to those Higher Powers of which St. Paul speaks. Bellarmin says, Princes can meddle neither with their Persons, nor Goods. Is not this to say, They are not subject? and is not subject, and not-subject, contradiction? How can he avoid contradicting St. chrysostom, and the rest, who speak as he does? Why, though he make the Pope alone the proper Judge, yet he allows the Prince to be King of the Clergy, etc. What is this but a new contradiction? For how can a King be a King, and not a proper Judge? To determine differences is one, and an essential part of a King's Office! 'Tis true, between a Judge by Commission, and a King, there is a difference. And yet even such a one represents the King. But to be a proper Judge, without Commission, by an inherent right of his own, is inseparable from a King. The truth is, 'tis all contradiction from first to last. Secular Princes are not lawful Superiors, and yet Kings of the Clergy, is contradiction: They have Kingly, that is, Supreme Power, and yet the Ecclesiastical is to be obeyed in case of contrary commands, is contradiction: They are Kings in respect of those who are not Subjects, nor formally parts of the Commonwealth, is contradiction, etc. And yet this happens not by Bellarmin's fault. He has but one; fixing on the wrong side: which whoever does, let him be never so learned, can no more avoid contradiction, than He can falling, let him be never so dextrous, under whom the ground founder's.  
But to return to our Road, People may speculate themselves out of Common sense, if they will, and do, more often than every body thinks. The truth is, whoever takes a wrong Principle, and will pursue it, must come thither at last. Yet though he may so disguise the matter with learned subtleties, that he perceive not where he is himself, Nature will be too strong for Artifice, and show itself through all disguises. Arguments have been made against the possibility of Motion, and whiteness of Snow: but the World could never be persuaded they could not go about their business, or that Snow looked like Jet. We have found the point in question rooted in Nature, and cultivated by the great Labourers in the field of Grace, the Apostles. Either way it must needs grow, and appear in the hearts whether of men o● Faithful. And so it evidently does. Let a man go to a Bishop or Priest in any Country of Christendom, and ask him seriously, Do you belong to the Commonwealth in which you live? Are you a subject of the Prince? He would not be thought well in his wits. Such they own such they call and write themselves, for such the Prince, and People, and every body takes them, nor is it more known that there are Clergy very where, than that wherever they are, They are Subjects of the Prince of the place, both in the esteem of all besides, and their own constant profession.  
Take for a curiosity, (For the clearness of the thing does not endure proof) the Oath which the Bishops in France make to their King. I swear and promise to your Majesty, Sire, that as long & I live I will be to you a Faithful Subject and Servant; that with all my power I will procure the good of your Service and Estate; that I will never be present at any Council or Assembly held to the prejudice of them, and that if any thing come to my knowledge, I will presently give advice to your Majesty. So help me God and his Holy Gospels.  
It is so palpable a Truth, that Bellarmin, as contradictory as it is to his Doctrine, cannot but acknowledge it. For this reason he is forced to confess, that Kings are Kings in respect of the Clergy as well as Laity; that the Clergy, besides their Spiritual capacity, are also parts of the Commonwealth; and in that quality obliged to obedience, etc. For the light of Nature, however it may be obscured in particulars, cannot be put out generally, and we for our parts, you know, think as much of what is written in our hearts by the Apostles. But to let that pass, This is in truth the whole business. To your Question, whether the Clergy are Subjects or no, all Christendom answers they are. Now 'tis evident that Subjects remaining Subjects can have nothing inconsistent with subjection: And 'tis as evident, that the Exemptions in question, in the latitude in which Bellarmin propos●s, and you understand them, are inconsistent with subjection. 'Tis therefore evident. They belong not to the Clergy by Divine, or any Right. Neither can those, wh●ch they have, be Exemptions from subjection, but in the manner of subjection, as Privileges put a difference between Subjects, requiring either different duties, or the same duties in a different manner, from some and others. And since the difference betwixt them and the Laity, as to subjection, is not from their state, and where the Laws put no difference, all are alike subject, there can be no Title nor Pretence to the difference which is, but from the Laws, and the pleasure of the Power which made them.  
What Reason tells us must be, unquestionable Records assure us actually was. For the Laws are still extant among the rest, which make up the Body of the Civil Law, by which the Clergy obtained now one, now another Privilege, till the whole number was completed by many Emperors, and in a long time. I had once resolved to set them down; but my Letter being long, and that Book common, I thought it not convenient to increase it, with copying what, who has the curiosity may as well see in the Original. Besides, that our Country not being subject to the Imperial Laws, the privileges of the Clergy here are to be regulated, not by them, but our own. Yet 'tis not amiss to set what Bellarmin says to them. He objects them against himself, as a proof that the Clergy heretofore were of Right subject to Emperors: and answers that the Emperors sometimes meddle with what they have nothing to do: and therefore those Laws must needs be said to proceed De Facto, not De Jure, and to have been tolerated sometimes, but never approved by Popes.  
This to my ear sounds very strangely. What has the Pope's approbation to do with the Laws of Emperors? Cannot They make Laws without ask him leave? Cannot They do so much as a kindness to the Clergy, but by authority derived from him? Again, if his approbation were of any consideration, how could it appear more plainly than in that which Bellarmin calls his Toleration, in taking advantage of them, and taking care they should be every where kept, and the Clergy enjoy what They had by them? Of which there are instances enough to be produced, if there were need. For I cannot think that Bellarmin is of opinion in earnest, that the Pope did not like them, and was not hearty glad of them too. On the contrary I am apt to believe, that had the World remained in the same state, in which it was when those Laws were made, subject to the Roman Empire, He liked them so well, that he would never have looked for more, nor we heard any news of Divine Right. But the state of things altering, and municipal Laws prevailing over those Laws, in a great part of Christendom, it became necessary to preserve those privileges, to find out a Title to them which might do what those Laws no longer could, carry them through every where. Divine Right peradventure had otherwise never been thought of.  
But to let this pass, to say the Laws proceeded not the Jure, or were unjust, has so presumptuous a found, that he had need be very sure of what he says, who ventures to say it. Now Bellarmin when he was upon the point, and had undertaken the proof of Divine Right, could find nothing beyond probable even to himself. But because Probability makes a man sure of nothing, I doubt he was something too bold with Emperors and their Laws, to Tax them of Injustice. For if they have any, it is more than he knows, even by his own confession.  
But let us consider a little, and ask whether the Clergy of those times, when those Laws were made, did know that without and independently of them, They had right to the same privileges by other Laws, those of God and Nature? If they did not, They were manifestly ignorant in a point of God's Law (if it be as Bellarmin says God's Law.) Who can imagine this of those Lights, the greatest, since the Apostles days, that ever shined in the Church? And how comes Bellarmin to know that of which they were ignorant? If they did, They were manifestly deficient in their duty. For they ought to have instructed the Emperors in this point of God's Law as well as the rest; otherwise They were unfaithful dispensers of the Word, and subtracted part of what was entrusted to them.  
That They did not teach the Emperors any such Doctrine, is plain, because the Emperors learned it not, who yet learned all Christianity from them, and must have learned this if it had been any part of the Lesson. I hope it will not be put off upon their restiness, to admit a point derogatory to their Authority: Besides, that this conceit traduces Christianity, with holding Doctrines derogatory to the Authority of Princes, and justifies that calumny of the Pagans, which the Apostles were solicitous to take away, 'tis an aspersion unsufferably injurious to the piety of those Emperors, and manifestly impossible besides.  
For those Exemptions were not granted all at one time, or by one Emperor. Between the first grant by Constantine, and the last in the Law, there intervened several hundreds of years. During this time these Privileges (for so they are expressly termed) came forth, now one, now another; as the piety of the Prince, the solicitation of the Clergy, and reason of the thing, prevailed. Can it be imagined among so many Emperors, all Christian, there was no one of virtue enough to admit a Right established by God, and who favoured the Clergy enough not to keep from them what was their due? Were there but one such in all the number, as it cannot be denied but that there were many, and He made sensible that the Law of God was as Bellarmin says, of which it was both the duty and duty and interest of the Clergy to make him sensible, the business could not possibly pass as it did. For he would certainly have acknowledged this Right of theirs, and instead of so many grants one after another, once for all confirmed that right by his Authority, and this with reference to the Law of God, and as their right, not by way of Privilege, as the stile of their Laws runs. 'Tis therefore as plain as can be, that the Clergy, who were as Bellarmin says de Facto subject, thought they ought to be subject; 'Tis plain the Emperors thought so too, and were not otherwise instructed by the Masters of Christianity in those times. Wherefore 'tis plain, the sense of the Christian World then, was quite different from what is Bellarmin's now, and I think there needs something more than unconcluding Arguments to persuade a man, that the whole Christian World was in an Error.  
As for the quarrel he has to the Laws for disposing of things plainly Ecclesiastical and Spiritual, I know not what to say to it, unless he would explain himself a little more. Princes I think may make Laws in matters, plainly Ecclesiastical and Spiritual, without ask Bellarmin leave, or giving him cause of offence. When they enact Reverence to be born the Clergy, Tithes to be paid them, the Christian Law they teach to be observed, and a hundred things more, He does not sure believe They do the Clergy wrong, or exceed their own bounds. In general, let a thing be never so Spiritual, and never so much commanded by God, if you will have the Transgressor's awed by the fear of Temporal punishment, the concurrence of Temporal Authority is necessary to engage the Temporal Sword. Otherwise who is wicked enough to slight the Spiritual, and stand out an Excommunication, may break all the Laws of God at pleasure. Wherefore this Exception to the Justness of a Temporal Law, That it meddles with a matter plainly Spiritual, is plainly no just exception. What Bellarmin means by it, we shall know when he tells us what his meaning is. And yet though it were true, that those Princes had sometimes past their bounds, it is nothing to purpose unless it be proved, They did so in this particular. To take first for granted, that Princes did amiss elsewhere, and then require we should therefore believe They did amiss here too, is to impose upon us a little too grossly.  
After all, as learned a show as he makes of confuting some body, we think all parties are agreed. The Clergy were heretofore subject, and this appears by the Laws, says the objection. By the way, this can mean nothing but that, as to the matters indulged them by Privileges, They were subject in the same manner as the Laity, till those privileges put a difference between them. Otherwise that notwithstanding their privileges They always were, and still are, truly subjects, is the sense of all the World. To this, what says Bellarmin? That those Laws proceeded de Facto, not de Jure. This is to say, that de Facto They were subject as well as the Laity heretofore, and that this appears by these Laws which proceeded the Facto, to favour them in some things. And this is the very thing which the objection says. That they did not proceed de Jure, he perhaps may be allowed to say, because he would otherwise have nothing to say; but reason will not allow any man to believe him, unless he could prove it, which when he went about to do, we see how ill he succeeded.  
In the mean time I see these privileges were granted at several, and long distant times. I see that the Clergy when they had the former, had not the later, and before They had the first, had none at all. Wherefore I must needs think that as They were de Facto subject before the Laws, so they would be de Facto still but for the Laws. This way They have a clear undoubted right to their privileges, as much and as strong as any body has to any worldly thing. No other Right was ever thought of in those Ages; and yet in those Ages lived all the Doctors of the Church both Greek and Latin; men who had at least as much insight into the Laws of God and Nature as Bellarmin, and as much Zeal for the good and honour of the Church. He does not make out so much as plausibly the Right which he pretends from those Laws. I conceive therefore I may conclude upon the whole, the Exemptions, or privileges which the Clergy have, are all from Human, not Divine Law, which though it always guided the Church, and was peradventure better understood, and more reverenced in former times, was never pretended till lately: That They neither have nor can have any Exemptions, which free them absolutely from subjection, that being a thing which neither a Prince can grant, nor Nature bear: And that whatever Bellarmin says, this is acknowledged both by the Clergy themselves, and all the World besides, by the universal consent of all people and places that notwithstanding all their Exemptions, They are still truly Subjects, and by being so obliged to all that subjection obliges, with that difference betwixt them and others in the performance of their subjection, which their privileges import. Possibly out of this universality may be excepted some of those who live as Bellarmin did, in the Pope's Territories, and so have but one Prince both in Spirituals and Temporals. These are too apt to think it is, or aught to be, with the rest of the World as it is with them; And who knows whether that conceit be not the original source of the whole stream? But elsewhere I think the General Rule has no exception.  
And so I had done, but that I remember we live in times, in which notice is publicly taken of the contempt of the Clergy, and Reasons given for it. They indeed miss the mark, nor do I think it fit to give the true ones. But I would not have the bad humour of the Age fed by any thing of mine. As Bellarmin has gone too far on the one side, ill will may go much farther on the other, and possibly take occasion from what I have said against him to do so. I conceive it therefore fit, before I close my Letter, to resume some considerations, which I forbore to mention when they occurred, for fear of straying from the matter in hand.  
Bellarmin tells us, the Clergy and their Goods are Sacred things, and the pceuliar Lot of God. This, if rightly understood, is a great, and even to the Laity, beneficial Truth. Yet 'tis to be suspected He did not penetrate it enough, because he concludes wrong, that they are therefore both quite out of the reach of Secular power. One might take a fancy to argue them out of the reach of the Ecclesiastical too. For what has any man to do with what properly belongs to God? If you say the Ecclesiastical power is from God; so likewise is the Secular. And so people might with fruitless Conceits and Repartee's, go on in endless wrangling.  
Let us therefore reflect a little on what every body knows, that God neither stands in need of any created good, nor is capable of receiving either good or harm from Creatures. For that essential and overflowing fullness of his own perfection can neither get nor lose. That overflow of goodness has created man for the good of man, not God, and all material nature besides, not for its self, or for God, but purely for the use of man. Likewise what he commands, or requires of man, is only for the benefit of man, who by obeying or disobeying does himself good or harm, but none to God. Those Phrases therefore of serving God, being his, and the like, are expressions introduced by his mercy in condescendence to our weakness, to raise us up by the awe of his interposing, more steadily to perform those actions, which in truth are profitable only to ourselves. We have the whole benefit of the service we are said to do him; and in reality serve ourselves, when we are said to serve him. So likewise the things which are called his, are neither taken from us, nor spent in any use of his, to whom nothing can be useful, but ordered by him to be employed in a way most beneficial to us, in which they would either not at all, or not so well and readily be employed, if we were not assisted by an apprehension of a particular concern, or propriety of his in them. Applying this to the Clergy, when They, or their Goods are called the Lot of God, given or consecrated to him, peculiarly his, and what else is said of this kind, 'tis not that He is subject to the Meum and Tuum found in the World; nor can his property have the same Notion, which ours has in respect of our Goods or Servants, who are wronged when they are taken away, or disposed of, without our consent. But the meaning is, that They are established in a way of life in which by actions proper to it, they are to employ Themselves and their Goods, to the greatest advantage of themselves and their Neighbour. From which that they be not diverted by humour, or interest, or violence, to ends less beneficial to mankind, He is entitled to them, that who neither cares nor fears to wrong another man, may be checked by the fear of wronging God, against whose Anger there is no Shelter.  
And very requisite it is, it should be so. A Christian Commonwealth can no more be without Clergy, than Christianity. Because they are men, They cannot be without such things as the nature of men requires, Meat to feed, and  to cover them; and this not only what is barely sufficient to preserve them from Hunger and Cold; but, as the temper of the World is, where Poverty is always accompanied with abjection and scorn, in a proportion which may keep them in reputation with those among whom They live, and with whom in a condition of Contempt They would want credit to do them the good they ought. Besides, there must be Churches for people to Assemble in; The service there, must not be slovenly, and sordid, and apt to tempt those who come, to irreverence, or abstain from coming again for scorn. You I know blame our Church for excessive Pomp in the Sacred Service; I for my part, think no Pomp can be too much. Had you reflected as much as I have done on the nature of man, and how strong the Animal part is yet in the best of us, peradventure you would be of my mind. But letting that pass, there goes expense to all this, and who will be most thrifty in the Service of God, will find it cannot be performed in any tolerable way for a little.  
Christianity would quickly be in a lamentable case, if the Clergy had not wherewith to maintain themselves, as 'tis fit They should be maintained; or their maintenance depended on the Capriccios of often froward, and sometimes malicious men. They must of necessity either diminish into a number too small, or languish in a contempt unable to benefit the World. If there were no money to build Churches, no provision to keep them in repair, no allotments for the expenses of the Service in them; within a while there would be either no Churches, or no Service in them. If They were debarred the exercise of their Functions, or transplanted into other Callings, or so taken up with other employments, that they could not attend their own, whether by the humorous pleasure of other men, or their own irregular passions, mankind must needs lose the benefit it receives by them, and that is no less than the hopes, because the means, of a happy Eternity.  
That both the men therefore, and the Goods appropriated to these ends, be looked upon as Sacred, and appropriated in a peculiar manner to God, and wicked or inconsiderate men be awed by the fear of Sacrilege, from prejudicing Christianity, by meddling with either, is a great mercy of God, and great benefit to Man. But it follows not therefore, They may on no occasion be touched. A Clergyman may become wicked, and hardened, and obstinate in wickedness. The good of the Commonwealth may require, that the incorrigible offender be cut off, whether for Example, or to avoid perpetual Injuries and disturbances to particulars, or sometimes hazard to the whole. Can any man think, if this be a requisite and necessary good, that God would hinder it, and that He who neither has, nor can have other end in all he commands, then good to man, should command what is harmful to man? The injury to him, if any could be done him, would be to harbour so preposterous a conceit of him, and his commands, as if he would be displeased when we did ourselves good. But if the Temporal Sword must be used, 'tis evident it must be used by the Temporal Power, for the Spiritual has it not to use. And because it must not strike blindly, the Temporal Power must also take cognizance of the matter, and see why, and when, and how far it is fit to strike.  
For the rest, here is great reason They should be exempted from Magistracy, and Soldiery, from Trades, Offices, and whatever Services of the Commonwealth. For their own Function plainly requires a whole man, whether you look upon the qualities necessary for it, neither to be gained, nor preserved without long and constant pains; or the perpetual, and those necessary occasions of exercising, it. Between both, They have employment for every minute of time they have, and for more if they had it, and must of necessity neglect their own duty, if any considerable part of their time be taken with any other. Again, as a man of no esteem shall be but ill heard of, whatsoever he speaks, there will be small efficacy in their Exhortations to virtue and good life, if They be not in good reputation. Wherefore, if at any time They yield to the temptations of human frailty, it is but fit their faults be kept as much as may be from the eyes of the Vulgar, and rectified among themselves. And if they have Judges of their own quality, to end their differences, and correct their misdemeanours, and preserve their reputation unsoyled with the Laity, the benefit is not less, perhaps more to the Laity than to Them. In fine, 'tis for the advantage of the Commonwealth, that They have whatever is useful to perform in the best manner a Function, which is more advantageous to the Commonwealth, than any other is or can be. And if the Commonwealth grant Them not all such Exemptions or Privileges, or however you will call them, it plainly wrongs itself. But yet it is the Commonwealth which grants them. For as for Judges, unless they Act in the nature of Arbitrators, by voluntary consent and submission of the parties, They cannot proceed to force, but by virtue of the Temporal Sword; and however Ecclesiastical the Persons be, the Judges are pure Secular Judges, when they proceed in that manner. Again, since no person nor his Service can be taken from the Commonwealth without its good will, and consent, the other Exemptions are also from the Commonwealth; though peradventure in things apparently inconsistent with the Function, to allow the Function may be to grant the Exemption without more ado. That of particular Judges is more subject to the circumstances of Time and Place, and therefore more depends on the pleasure of Commonwealths, which also proceed differently, as every one finds most convenient for itself.  
As for their Goods, to note this briefly by the way, The Clergy were at first rather trusties, or Stewards than Proprietors. Being looked upon as men free from affections to the things of this World, the piety of rich men gave largely to them, to maintain Themselves, and the Poor, whence their Revenues got the name of the Patrimony of the Poor, besides to keep the Churches in repair, and furnish the expenses of the Service in it. The money thus given was put into the Bishop's hands, and by his appointment distributed to the several uses by the Deacons, who gave account of their distribution to the Bishop. Afterwards the passions of men giving occasion to complain of inequality in the distributions, this Arbitrary management was altered by Canons, and the Whole divided into four parts. One for the Poor; another for the Clergy; a third, for Repairs; the fourth for the Bishop and his Family, to exercise Hospitality. In process of time this too was changed. What became of the share of the Poor, and Churches I cannot tell; but the Bishop, and inferior Clergy disposed absolutely, and independently, without any account, of their own. An opinion being set on foot, which does not relish with every body, even at this day, that they are true Proprietors of their Goods.  
However it be, had They no more than is requisite to maintain them in the way in which 'tis fit they should be maintained; or the overplus were spent in the uses before mentioned, and for which at first 'twas given; there is great reason to look upon their Goods, as the Lot of God, and upon taking them away as Sacrilege. Neither could the Commonwealth require any thing of them, without employing it in uses less beneficial to It, than those in which it is employed already; neither could there be any pretence to do it. For a Commonwealth in her greatest exigencies, never takes from any so much as not to leave them wherewith to subsist. And 'twould be contrary to the end of Taxes if they should. For Taxes are to preserve what people have from Enemy's. And no Enemy could take away more than All. So that the Commonwealth by so unjust a Tax would become the Enemy. But it never does Tax those who have nothing to spare, and had the Clergy no overplus, They would be in the condition of poor men, untaxable.  
But when They have not only sufficient, but abundance, and excess, it is extravagant to fancy the Commonwealth cannot take what is not needed, to employ it where it is. We see their excess, instead of preserving, sometimes diminishes their reputation, and exposes them to the envy, and murmurs of people, who grumble to see the liberality, perhaps of their own Ancestors, abused it may be to vanity. To entitle God to goods so employed, is to entitle him to the abuse of things, and to Vanity. Nor can any thing be more ridiculous, than because what is necessary for his Service, ought be esteemed Sacred, and his, to think that must be so too which is employed not in his Service, sometimes against it, and his Laws too. In short, if the Commonwealth need it, and They can spare it, It is injurious to God to fancy he would have any thing employed less usefully for man than it might be.  
Upon the whole, I conceive They have from God the Prerogative of the Keys: They have Commission to go and teach, and Baptise all Nations: They have assurance of his perpetual assistance in the execution of their Commission, and of a Woe if they execute it not, and whatever else appears in the Sacred Books or Tradition. The Piety of Men superadded the rest, some more necessary, all convenient, and which, as many as they are, I wish were more. And so I take my leave both of Them and You, remaining  
Yours, etc.    

YOUR Postscript makes me a very strange Compliment. For why should you think me the only honest man? Had you addressed yourself to others, as you might to divers, who would have told you the same tale, They, it seems, would have been the honest men, and I for want of luck, in your black Roll. And yet I think it more possible for thousands of my Religion to get through the grace of God, an entire Mastery over the corruption of Nature in all particulars, than that any wisdom of Laws should make all the Subjects of a Nation honest men. In short, we inherit the Doctrines, and we inherit the Innocence of our Ancestors the Primitive Christians, and while you will have it foe, must inherit their hard fate too, and bear the burden of other Folks folly. But I should think, 
Gal. 6.5. Ezech. 18.4.  if you would let every one bear his own burden, and that Soul only die which sins, you would find by experience it were the best Policy as well as Piety. For God's Law is the best way both to prosperity in this World, and happiness in the next. For the rest, I assure you faithfully, I know nothing of the matter you mention. I know that bad effects are not incredible of bad causes, and I know those bad causes have nothing to do, at least, with my Religion. In every thing else, I am as ignorant as those in China.  
FINIS.