The Natural FANATIC, OR, Reason Considered In its Extravagancy in RELIGION, and (in some late Treatises) Usurping the Authority of the Church and Councils,  
By JOHN WARLY B.D. late Fellow of Clare-Hall in Cambridg.  
Sic si homines rationem bono consilio a Diis immortalibus datam, in fraud m malitiamque Convertunt, non dari illam, quam dari humano generi melius fuit: Cicer. de nat. Deor. lib. 3. Satius fuerit nullam omnino nobis a Dijs immortalibus datam esse rationem, quam tantam cum pernicie datam, ibidem.  
London Printed, and are to be sold by Thomas Basset at the George in Fleetstreet, 1676.   

IMPRIMATUR.  
2. Novemb. 1675. Geo. Hooper R more. D no. Arch. Cant. à Sacr. Domesticis.   

TO THE Right Honourable HENEAGE Lord FINCH, Baron of DAVENTRY AND Lord High Chancellor of England.  
May it please your Lordship  
THough Dedications as much as Prefaces may seem formal impertinencies; yet they cease to be such when the Patronage it as the Broad Seal of England, to Authorise and licence the Examination of the Libertine; though in such method as may seem unkind and unnatural to Humanity in the discovery of Reason's defect, and exposing it to the public vieu naked and intoxicated. This way of arguing is so far justifiable as it is more necessary at some times to declare that men are mad, sools, and bewitched in their search for Religion, than to flatter them with soft compellations of men of sober minds, disposed for reasonable service, and critically wise to Salvation. This method is also commended by Christ's practice, who disputing with the Pharisees and Opinionative formalists of the Jewish Church, answers their questions with questions, and at the same time confounded them whilst he informed them by retorting their folly, and turning the edge of their own troublesome queries on themselves; which was the most proper way to silence a Pragmatical Jew. The present state of Religion as it is to be found in factions minds makes this method seasonable for this age, which is full of Rea: soning Zelots (the secular fanatics) who must be Catechised in the first Elements of their natural Religion, though in a stile as rough as that by which Arnobius discovered the folly of the Gentiles.  
These considerations, I hope, may render this bold address more pardonable, and the Tract less liable to censure, which being presumed I cannot but think it necessary, that I declare which were the first motives which conmended the task to my thoughts, and what directed it to your most Honourable Patronage Libertinism exalting itself above Sacred Authority, and Usurping its power, pleading Reasons claim and right to the spiritual Judicature; and it being seasonably checked by that Oration which made England (in its Representatives) its Auditor, when it captivated both ear and mind with sweetness and vigour, and (as it is the property of Eloquence) commanded whilst it persuaded: I thought it would not appear an impertinent piece of curiosity in a private person to inquire into, and examine the composition of that Leaven with which Faction swells, and turbulently serments.  
I was also more confident in this address to your Lordship, whilst I considered that some of the matter of these papers, when spoken, as duty called me, as well as written, found encouragement from the Right Honourable Heneage Earl of Winchilsea my very good Lord; presuming they might find the same favourable entertainment whilst they apply themselves to the same name, which is now famous both for Foreign and Domestic administration of the affairs of the Kingdom; For it is no contradiction in my hopes to conclude that Souls may be allied as well as bodies, and that there may be Affinity of Opinions as well as Persons: and the same singular Candour and Humanity may run in the same blood as Hereditary to the Family.  
This Task was also encouraged as necessary, whilst I considered that several interested persons cloaked their practice under the thin film of a pretended Religion, which might exempt them from the imputation of being Atheists (which is a name so odious as would effectually stifle their designs and make their practice nauseous) and seemed careless whether Christian Religion, as it is said of Astraea, returned again to heaven; so that the world was possessed with a belief that they acknowledged the Deity which they would have proved and worshipped by their rational Method.  
Now that such might not impose upon credulous minds, by persuading them they are truly Religious. I thought it proper to unmask them, by showing that they are so far from being so, that by that method they cannot entitle themselves to the names of Theists.  
These men also pleased themselves, or at least others (with an empty name of a new kind of faith, which they did no more understand than the Exorcist doth the Sacred words abused in his Charm) making it natural Reason with an object brought nigher by Revelation, and to supply its defect have impudently meddled with the object God himself representing him as a Proteus to be adored in several shapes, or as a Picture to be seen and worshipped in divers forms according to the various situation of the Spectators, by which arbitrary Transsiguration of Christ in each man's brain he will be as much abused in men's fancies as the Deity was in the Heathens Idolatrous way of worship. It need not be called to your Lordship's mind that such extravagant liberty will exceed all former Her esie and schism, which seem more modest, for they were never contracted into a more narrow compass than an Assembly, or congregation, but this makes (in its Ecclesiastical Anarchy) each Zealot an independent-Church  
But I was not only led to this Task by the wild projects of Extravagant brains, but by the practice of men of more sober minds, who (perhaps) observing the predominant humour and prevailing prejudices of some against Ecclesiastical Authority, as Tyrannical over Consciences, out of their great zeal for the Church, and Christian resolution (like Commanders disarmed in sight snatch a Sword from their Enemy's hand, when ill success deprived them of their own) dispute with the Atheist upon his own principles and fight against him with his arguments, which way hath been little successful. And it is no great wonder, for Divine Authority (which is excluded in such disputes) sets the edge on the spiritual sword, & is the strength of that arm which wields it. All natural arguments so managed are as some vicious Syllogisms which have all the propositions, but concluded nothing. But this being not so easily believed as said in This Treatise, Reason and Religion dispute their rights to be judge in spiritual matters. This method is altogether necessary: for the Reasoner will never believe he is lawfully condemned, if he have not liberty to bring in all natural evidence in the Trial, which large concession will make him know the vanity of liberty falsely so called, and subjugate his unruly mind, playing like a fish which is wearied with the line of his vain imaginations, who scorned all ties of Laws and Religion. As subjection to Governors is never more effectually recommended by any mere rational argument than that which comes with this consideration of the necessity of bring obedient to Magistrates, because humane nature is not so able to provide for itself in solitude as in Societies; So the extravagant Reasoners in Religion are not any way better reduced to obedience to Ecclesiastical Authority, than by contemplating the vanity of their own imaginations. For that prospect of their own ignorance will make Reason so obsequious and tame, that though Ecclesiastical Laws (as the Greek Lawgiver says of Laws in general) are looked on as Cobwebs; yet they will not think it their interest to break them.  
This considered, I hope may supplant all censure which might condemn this way of arguing as prejudicial to Religion by rendering arguments, which were designed to fortify it, weakened by too severe an inquisition, for this method doth no more violence to Religion, than a Chirurgeon doth to his Patient whilst he stretches the Sinews in order to set a bone which was out of its place. Neither shall I fear that these Papers will be looked upon as vainly speculative, seeing the Dedication directs the Reader to so eminent an Example, which alone (though the Church was not protected by civil power and truth naked in that sense which the factious Adversary would have it) is able to win practice and engage all Christian obedience, which is desired and designed, (so far as these Papers can promote it) by  
My L d.  Your Lordship's most humble and obedient Servant John Warly.  

An Advertisement.  
SO often as the word Reasoner occurrs in this Tract, it is to be understood of the Author of the Treatise of Humane Reason or of any other who is conducted by his principles, and so often as the word Reconciler is used, it is to be understood of the Author of the considerations of the Reconcileableness of Reason and Religion, other Author's ancient and Modern are either plainly cited or so discoverable by their matter, that nothing more need be said by way of Explanation.   

ERRATA.  
REad as straight an Union page 16. for who read which p. 34. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 35. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 65. deal they 73. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 83. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 85 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 90. r. terminated p. 92. r. & p. 104 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 108 r. Minucius Felix 112. deal that 115. r. as much p. 116. deal lest r. or p. 118. r. Erroneous p. 139. deal not and r. are not p. 153. r. scales p. 162. for which r. when 170 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 173. for that r. what 178. fornor r. now, p. 180. Deal not 184.   

REASON in some late Treatises being set up Umpire in Religion, challenging Appeals to be made to it, as the highest Tribunal, and being asserted with privileges, which are exalted above Pelagian invention, or what any other Heresy could project. And one Article of the Church of England being threatened by some positions which directly oppose it, by saying; That a man may be saved by the Law or Sect which he professeth, so that he diligently frame his life according to that Law, and the light of nature. I thought myself obliged to examine the foundation on which this natural infallibility was built, which is supported by these positions, which say; That faith is an assent given to Religious matters, the understanding and will being no otherwise assisted, than they are in drawing other Conclusions.  
And that Reason requires no other assistance in the act of faith, than the proposal of that which is to be believed, which the Reasoner calls the near approach of the object being brought nigher by Revelation.  
The former account of faith is imperfect, and attended with many false conclusions, which are deductions from it; amongst many, let this be considered; That no man (according to that description of faith) can be an Infidel, who hath readholy Scripture, or its contents or matter proposed to his understanding; And as it is an impossibility that Euclid should not render the intelligent Reader a Mathematician, so it is equally impossible, that the contents of holy Scriptures proposed to the Infidel, should not make him a Convert: This is necessarily inferred from the former position, and shall be more illustrated by a supposition; suppose therefore an Ethnic made so much a Proselyte to the true Religion by reading holy Scriptures, that he gives assent to matters of Religion no further, than upon Examination he shall find them agreeable or congenial to his Reason, or (to speak another Phrase,) Reason can confess them to be true: and let him be supposed to speak like the Samaritan-Woman in another case; saying, I do not believe the Creation of the World, the incarnation of Christ, and other matters of faith, because of the evidence of the Divine Records, but because I presume my belief will be ratified and approved by my reason, which is naturally bound to confess them, when they are proposed, it will appear upon experiment, that he is a wavering and weak Convert, not far removed from infidelity. This supposition is agreeable to the Reasoners account of faith, and that term of art which expresseth it, calling under standing and will the Elements of which faith is compounded. In examining which I intent not to be so critical as he, in interpretation of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 will equally admit of such critical exercise, but rather take it in the common acceptation. That out of which bodies are made, and into which is their last Return or Resolution; which, being accommodated to the Reasoners sense, will conclude, that Religious knowledge was not otherwise in man's mind than Idaea's: or some dormantknowledg to be excited by proposal of holy Scriptures, or as letters to make words to be framed by the Divine Pedagogy, the Law and Gospel too being in his sense but as a Schoolmaster (not according to the Apostles meaning) to prompt the understanding. This is so false, that it may be confuted by History, which says, many perused the Mosaical-Scripture, and some past critical judgements on them. Longinus, and others, with the Greek Lawgivers (though some of their knowledge seems borrowed from them) who must be in the Catalogue of Infidels. And later ages give examples of this kind, many men who must be acknowledged to be Masters of reason, being not able to reduce themselves to belief, according to the former method, which wanting the Divine Testimony to bias their wills and to command assent, left them in desperate Scepticism; for though the contents of Religion are such as may be presumed sufficient to command, or at least win assent; yet the medium which begets this persuasion is taken of holy Scriptures, which saith, Reason in some sense must be laid aside, (which shall be more proved in its proper place) whilst it resigns itself to a more insallible conduct.  
Let it be also considered, if the will and understanding are the Elements of Faith, that an Ethnic laying aside the Divine Testimony and retiring to his reason, would be more confirmed in his persuasion; As a Chemist asserts his principles and practical knowledge above that which Theory teacheth, whilst he Analyses or dissolves a body, by which he makes sense a witness of his reason, and gives evidence of the truth by both: or as the Mathematical knowledge challenges greater certainty, than that in other Sciences, which taking a Scheme asunder by demonstration and rebuilding it on the same principles, confidently and justly calls it true; but the success is different in Religious cases, as in some curious contexture, which is defective by its too fine threads, and not far removed from nothing when most tenderly unwoven.  
To this, another consideration may be added, how it can be imagined that the Heathens should be ignorant of the contents of Religion, at least, so far as practical, seeing Reason is allowed a Judge naturally qualified for decision of Religious controversies; and consequently able to comprehend matters of Faith, and in capacity to frame Religious precepts or notions without any assistance from without, but only furnished with its own innate faculty. For that as well as he who is set up as judge in all controversies must be supposed to understand the whole Law, though particular cases determine the sentence to some parts of it. Let this be illustrated by that famed instance of a Theorem revealed to Pythagoras by a Daemon, which although acknowledged to be borrowed from Revelation, yet the principles, by which judgement was passed on it, were not derived from that kind Spirit, and it may be though possible that the Sophy might have made the discovery without that Monitor, and himself proclaim the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. This instance applied to the present case will force the Reasoner to confess: that it was possible that the Ethnic might have luckily discovered the matter which Religion proposes to be believed, by his own saculties following their natural conduct, which cannot be granted.  
If it is objected that a great part of Religion is to be found in Heathens writings. It may find an answer from this consideration, that no arguments taken from Pagan's Books for the proof of the truth of Religion, can be said to prevail otherwise than by being probable and persuasive (and they borrowing their force from Christian Interpretations) and those which have influence on practice, notwithstanding the seeming affinity between Reason and Religion, are like Towers or Buildings, which at a great distance seem contiguous, which the eye by a nearer approach finds removed from their fallacious neighbourhood.  
That which is said may find another check from the Reasoner's fundamental position; which concludes, that it is a sufficient assistance to reason in act of faith, if the object be brought nigher by Revelation; which if true, he may impute Heathenish ignorance in matters of Religion, to no other cause but the want of holy Scriptures; and retort the force of the former considerations by proposal of this question; whether it is possible that the curious and secret Mechanism of nature in Animals and other Bodies, could be discerned without a Microscope, which being denied may make it applicable to the former case? Revelation being as necessary for the begetting of faith in the Heathen, as a Glass for discerning the small parts of matter. This must not be denied, but if by Revelation, the bare proposal of holy Scripture is understood, as sufficient to command assent; this will be a necessary consequence, That the true Religion was not embraced, or believed in several Ages, for no other reason than the Sporades (which were confusedly discerned in the Viá lacteá) were not discerned till Galilaeus made the discovery. For as a Telescope was necessary for the discerning of the one, so the holy Scriptures for believing of the other, the want of which cannot be thought the sole cause of infidelity, the contrary being demonstrable from the practice of the Jews (who must not altogether by one peremptory sentence be deprived of their Reason) who have not, and perhaps could not be reduced to belief, though conversant with holy writings, this makes way for this Disquisition.  
Whether in the act of faith, the understanding is enlightened, and consequently the will determined in such manner as it cannot be by a mere natural conduct.  
The affirmative of this may be proved, according to the method of the Schools from this Topick of God's concourse with man, which always leaves goodness as its effect, which must be called perfection, according to the meaning of the Character which was given of the whole Creation, that all that was made, was good, viz. Every Creature perfect in its kind, seeing therefore faith is the work of God on the understanding; 'tis past doubt, that it is improved, and the sight more perfect.  
How it is perfected, shall be declared in another disquisition (in this place 'tis enough, if I remove prejudices, which the former assertion may create) by saying that the perfection which the Soul hath in the act of faith, is not such as advances its nature to an Angelical degree of knowledge; yet it hath more than could be the result of mere natural powers, guided by their own methods. Neither must this perfection be restrained to simple apprehensions or notions, but complex, which would be as Ropes of Sand without any true connexion; which must be such, because matters of Religion transcend reasons highest pitch, which knows not how to compound its notions or thoughts, so as to make true propositions, as may appear from an instance in one fundamental. If this question be proposed to reason, whether God and Man could be in straight an union as they are in Christ's person, it must remain undetermined. And God and Man must stand in the proposition, as Subject and Predicate, till Divine testimony comes as a Copula. To prevent such misprisions, this explanation may be added, viz. That by the perfection attributed to the Soul in the act of faith, no new faculties are to be supposed, that could transform its nature, and remove humanity to another kind. However that which is said, may make way for an objection; if the mind is thus perfected or enlightened to discern the truth of proposition, of which it must be ignorant, whilst guided or informed by its own natural evidence and conduct, all believers are Enthusiasts.  
This is no necessary consequence of the former assertion: For Enthusiasin derives not its name from the Divine concourse with the Soul in some particular acts, but when it comes at times, when it is not expected, and out of the common course and method, or when knowledge which seems extraordinary, such as a man could not attain to by use of his reason; and which he doth not understand when spoken. Now the improvement of the pious man's knowledge, which is acquired by regular means, which Religion commands to be used, deserves not the name of Enthusiasm. Neither can that extraordinary assistance promised to holy Councils and Synods, denominate them Enthusiastic in their definitions. But I will not urge this argument, seeing the Reasonner concludes Councils no otherwise assisted than by Reason, and no better qualified for finding truth than a Senate or Parliament; but further, examine the Reasoners positions, which allows no more Divine assistance to Reason, but the near approach of the object represented in holy Scripture; or to speak in his Metaphor, that the eye of the Soul can discern all spirituals objects, external impediments being removed, and brought within the Sphere of Vision. This discerning faculty is such, that the Soul can no more pretend to be furnished with it, than the Bat or Owl can be said to have an eye as quick and as piercing as the Eagle, and as well disposed for vision, if nature had not placed its proper objects at too great a distance. Some parts of Matter are so small, that it is impossible they should be discerned; he deserves to Chronicled a fool, who observing the discoveries made by Microscopes of small bodies (which nature could not see whilst unassisted by art, and she looked with her own eyes,) would attempt an invention of making discoveries of the parts and figures of them, of which the Air or Wind consist. Some objects are not visible, though as near as it is possible they can be. Not to speak much of Atoms and Mathematical points, the one not to be discerned by the eye of the body, the other not distinctly seen by that of the mind, as appears from numerous Controversies which arise from them, which are not so trivial or useless, but, that prudence can had hath made them subservient (as the strange Phaenomena's of the Loadstone suggested by the Reconciler) to facilitate the belief of the existence of a spiritual being; by showing that there are beings in nature, as well as those which Religion discovers, whose existence must be confessed, though the object are invisible, and confound both sense and reason in their search.  
This defect of natural sight proceeds not from the want of the near approach of the object, as is demonstrable from the first prospect Religion takes, viz. The being and nature of God (who being brought as near as imagination can wish or propose; for what object can be so near to the Soul, as an Idea, which is connate with it, and inseparable from it?) is but confusedly discerned: besides the ubiquity of this object implies, it is near to every faculty which is able to discern it; the World also being as a Theatre in every part of which of God is to be seen, yet the notions of God, which natural men frame in their brains, are as ill Representations of him, as Pagan's Idols, whose monstrous Pageantry owes its beginning to man's imperfect knowledge of the nature of Spirits, which is so far from comprehending the Supreme, that it cannot conclude the being, or understand the manner of the existence of the inferior, (the Angels) who are above mere humane knowledge.  
But if this may be retorted, by saying, the natural ignorance of the existence and nature of Angels (whose being, reason cannot necessary conclude) doth not imply the ignorance of the Deity, whose existence is more evident, which must be granted; (for as he who cannot discern an Atom, or the smallest visible part of matter, may see a Mountain, or greater object, so humane Reason ignorant of finite, may discern an infinite spirit) yet it argues the imperfection of the sight, for he who cannot discern a Mote in a Sunbeam, cannot so distinctly discern the vast body of the Sun, and he who knows not the ratio formalis, or essence of the least part of matter, knows it not as it lies in the great Bulk of the Universe. Let this be concluded, by saying, That as he who cannot distinctly see the small Sands, cannot so distinctly see the vast Seashore; so he who knows not the nature of finite, doth not distinctly discern that of an infinite spirit.  
To what degree of knowledge, Reason, only following its own conduct, can lead its follower; and how he can be said to be a THEIST?  
Satisfaction will be given to all doubts, which can arise out of this inquiry, if these positions be proved. That Reason in its quest concerning the being of God, and the manner of his worship, cannot arrive to a higher pitch of certainty than that of opinion. And that such knowledge is so uncertain, that it cannot be consistent with that firm assent which Religion commands.  
For proof of the former, 'tis enough to direct the Reader to the precedent Disquisition, which shows how the Reasoner puts himself in the condition or quality of an Ethnic. For though Revelation is allowed, as necessary for the setting out his Rational guide, yet, whilst Reason is set up Judge of revealed propositions, which must be ratified by appeals made to it, nothing is left of Revelation but the name, and reason Consecrated by a Heavenly Title.  
These premised, will make a more easy digression to the examination of the particular method and Rules, which the Reasoner prescribes his guide, viz. Not to assent to any Conclusion, which cannot be proved by natural evidence.  
This direction observed by the guide, will give no better assurance of safe-conduct, than that which opinion affords, and in strictness of Language cannot entitle him to the name of Theist, which shall be more largely proved. But before I speak to that part of this inquiry, I cannot but suggest my fear, that by this harsh conclusion I might be thought to condemn the great part of the world as Atheists, and to call God's goodness in question, in not indowing man with such faculties, as could discern the Creator and trace a way to happiness, and by this position to take away the satisfactory method of solving doubts in Religion, viz. That there is as much evidence of the Truth of Religion, as the matter of it is capable, which would be insignificant, if Reason were not able to discern it. These prejudices shall be removed by the following discourse; I only name them here, lest the Reader might think I was not sensible how many obstacles were in the way, before I could attempt the proof of the former proposition, and to desire him to pass over them, with a swift touch, as the Traveller tenderly goes over a Quag-mire or Quicksand, till he can find a more sure bottom, to which he may be conducted by weighing the several arguments Reason hath for the proof of the being of a Deity.  
Amongst many, let that of the French Philosopher (who bid defiance to the Sceptic) take place, whose force consists in these particular positions. That the Idea of God, which is in man's mind, could not be framed by his invention; because the Soul cannot contrive the Model of a being, which is more perfect than itself. This being granted, that there is an Idea of God in man's mind, the truth of it is proved from the goodness of God, which cannot be imagined to have deluded his Creature with a false draught of himself. This argument is of so great force, that I know none so cogent, if it meet with a mind praedisposed for the Reception of truth, but is not strong enough to beat the Sceptic off his ground, because the very sinews of this argument borrow their strength from a supposition; one attribute of God being necessarily supposed, viz. His goodness, before the Reasoner can put himself in a capacity of arguing. However it must be granted, that supposition doth not destroy the certainty of finding truth: for to suppose Falsity in some cases, is a sure way to find Truth; as in the Rule of false in Arithmetic. But this method fails in this case, for in those Operations the suppositions are razed out, and laid by, when the work is perfected; but in this argument the supposition can never be laid aside, for the truth of the Conclusion depends on the goodness of God, as known to be such as would not impose on his Creature, which the Sceptic will look on as but supposed. If it be urged in favour of the former argument, That Reason concludes the being or existence of the Deity, and understands the attributes of God by rules equally certain, with those in the Arithmatical instance, seeing the Souls faculties are as a Standard, by which it can measure the Divine perfections, and find what is goodness or wisdom in God by measuring them with the notion or footsteps of them left in the mind.  
The argument thus managed, must be acknowledged to be of great value, and serviceable to the casuist in solution of doubts, but the defect of Reason being necessarily supplied with a supposition (in this way of arguing) without which man's faculties may be suspected as false, it is not probable the Sceptic will be persuaded out of his affected ignorance.  
After this new Method let old arguments be considered, which seem more Catholic and easy, being drawn from the common appearance or Phaenomena's of Nature, and observation of Providence, with those from other Topics, by which the Soul is fettered, so that it cannot evade an assent to the existence of God; yet it will appear, that the strength and evidence of this argument cannot command that assent without confusion of Thoughts, which implies ignorance, and extravagancy, which are not tolerable in a Guide.  
That argument which is most obvious, is drawn from the admirable Fabric of the World, which must be allowed to have its due force, when it meets with a ductile mind (far removed from Sceptical stiffness, made so by a Divine disposition for receiving Truth) without which it is so far from conducting men to the knowledge of God, that it will rather incline the mind to Idolatry: Heathens practice is an undeniable evidence of this Truth. For it may be a reasonable conjecture, that Idolatry took its rise from the gross consideration of Wisdom and Power, which appeared in the lovely frame of the World, and afterward this power was divided and subdivided into several ranks of Gods and Semigods. That the whole World was but as one great Idol, may appear from Poetical say (which Authority may pass in this case, Poets being the only Divines in the Heathenish ages who wrapped Religion and that Secular wisdom in verse) who Deified the World under that great name Pan. If it be said that Shepherds had this name given them by Poets, yet it is plain, that the mystery was terminated in higher beings (as Plutarch allows Pan to have influence on the Oracles as Superintendent, and some have applied the story of his death to Christ's suffering) which is enough to show he was more than a Shepherd, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. For that age, as others before, considered the World and its Creator in one gross notion which they expressed by Pan, as may be proved from the account which Orpheus gives of that Idolised name in another place further to be considered: But seeing this way of argument from Practice, may not appear so convincing as that of Theory, because all do not tread the same steps with equal success, and the question is not, what knowledge of God hath been, but what may be learned from the Creation.  
To this demand a short answer may be returned. When a man takes a serious prospect of the World, one of these thoughts will arise, either that it had a beginning of itself, or that it was the work of some Architect: if he is inclinable to allow the former, all that Reason can do in order to his conviction, is, to show the impossibility of the World's being its own cause or maker. This proved, can only remove him from Atheism, or at least dispose him for a belief of the existence and knowledge of God. He therefore who arrives to this degree of knowledge in strictness and propriety of speech, deserves not the name Theist, any more than a man coming out of a Cell or Wilderness, seeing a Diamond or Jewel, hath only so much knowledge to pass sentence, that it is not of the same kind of stones which he treads on, deserves the name of a Jeweller, or seeing a stately Palace, hath only skill to conclude, that the stones did not meet by mutual consent (as the fabulous story says of the building of Thebes for erecting that Fabric, neither did grow so uniformly out of the Earth), may be said to know an Architect or a Builder.  
If in defence of this argument it is said, that he who denies that a Fabric can raise itself, tacitly implies the necessity of the being of some Builder. This granted, will not relieve the Idiot, for the Builder can be no otherwise said to be known by him, than under the general notion of a Cause. Now who will be so ridiculous as to say, that a man understands what an Architect is, and what kind and degree of knowledge gives him that name, who hath only a general notion of him, by which he calls him the cause of a House, which description is so rude, that it cannot be allowed, except Logic can justify it by terms of Art unknown to the Idiot, however it cannot acquit him from the imputation of gross ignorance, which will appear greater when he considers the nice operations of nature. For if Creatures are looked upon which are most exposed to common view, nature sitting in them as on the stage, it is but little (and that conjectural) knowledge, he can pretend to; let the Heavenly bodies be an instance to prove man's ignorance of their nature and influence; who will pretend to know (except from ginger as ignorant as bold) for what design the Heavens so regularly muster their forces, till the event shows it, or to determine what dependence the World hath on some of the Stars, and positively conclude, that they are not Worlds; though not of the same frame with this, of which Men are Inhabitants? Now if man is ignorant of the dependence of one part of the Creation or another (as he must be except nature were supplied with greater assistance than that of Telescopes, or of any device which invention hath yet found) his knowledge must be said to be so imperfect, that it is not probable the argument drawn from the World's Harmony, should be prevalent, when it meets with so much ignorance. To speak all; the little and uncertain knowledge of nature's works, rather disposeth man for admiration, than full satisfaction of all doubts. But that I may not seem to detract from humanity, suppose the harmonious subordination of causes was understood, this only implies, that there is a power which restrains them from destroying or falling foul one on the other, or makes them subservient to some end, of which the Reasoner is and must be ignorant.  
If this assertion seem too rigid, which supposes man in the World as in Cimmercan darkness, let it be granted that the mere Reasoner hath a partial knowledge of God, if he will be content with the name of a partial Theist.  
Let it be also considered, that it is possible, that the same contrivance may seem harmonious to one, and appear not to be so to another. The Inhabitants of the Northern Climates may admire and adore the Sun for its warm influence, whilst those between the Tropics breathe imprecations, because it scorches by more direct rays. Let more be granted by saying that the Fabric of the world is such (if understood) that it must be concluded to be a Divine work; yet seeing there is a possibility that matter and motion (as the French Philosophy teacheth) might work itself into that order which is to be admired in the world, the natural Reasoner will have little satisfaction to his doubts from the consideration of the world's Harmony; especially seeing the French Hypothesis is consistent with itself, and solveth doubts on its own principles, which will abate the force of the usual arguments against Chance and the Epicurean Philosophy. It also appears that some have been sensible of the weakness of an argument drawn from this Topick of Harmony, rather proving God's existence from the gross consideration of matter moved, than as it is modelized into forms. This way of arguing seems to press the conclusion with greater necessity than the other, but nearly looked into can make a man no more a Theist, than the Idiot in the former instance. The examination of this argument might end by the citation of a Poetical saying, cited by St. Paul. By him we live, we move and have our being, (which motion (I presume) intended to be confined to the motion of the parts of man's body) is equally, if not more valid to prove the existence of God, than that argument which is drawn from a more distant Topick, viz. The first impress on matter.  
But before I pass to another natural evidence of the being of God, I cannot but confess that the harmonious Fabric of the world is used in holy Scripture, and by the ancient Fathers, as a confirmation of their doctrine and faith, which might be examined and confirmed by such contemplation; yet I presume I shall not be injurious to Scripture or Fathers, if I say, that Method was used, because it is more universal and agreeable to imagination and common reason, than other arguments which are more artificial; not that it was thought to be more cogent. Besides, it is an easy conjecture, which supposes that such arguments were intended for believers, or at least those who were disposed to entertain their Doctrine, not for sceptical Reasoners. If it be further urged that the holy Fathers have made Converts and confuted Atheism by this method; yet it is not sure to find success with all persons, especially such Reasoners as allow nothing to be certain which cannot recommend itself with an undoubted evidence, or impossibility of being otherwise. Suppose this pertinent question was proposed to the Atheistical Reasoner. If a man should find a Statue or an Altar with an inscription, whether he would conclude it was possible some liquid substance (like Aqua fortis corroding Iron) might casually effect that which art should do, and by the same reason pressed to give his answer, determining whether the World wrought itself into its lovely frame. If the affirmative is answered, 'tis true that his conclusion is enough to denominate him a Madman, but he will not value or think himself injured by such compellations who sceptically disputes; for he will be so bold as to say that as Religion and true Faith was once preserved by one Athanasius, so may truth be found only in one single person.  
To give the Reasoner a fair trial of his knowledge, let the former instance be reveiwed with a larger concession, viz. That the Idiot who acknowledgeth the building to have some cause (though the manner of expression is rude) yet implies the being of a builder, as the saying, the world was not its own cause, doth assert the existence of God. This being granted his ignorance will appear, for it is possible and commonly observed, that men may speak sentences and not understand what they imply, or what may be inferred from them. How many say which fall suddenly from some person, whose sense being measured by the bare interpretation of the words, is but trivial or ordinary, but by deduction will bear a higher meaning; whence it must be inferred, that those conclusions which are gathered as consequences of the words (which seemed not to import so much) cannot be properly called his, who spoke the words, but must be owned by him who advanced them to a higher sense. Idiot's sometimes are like Oracles and Prophets, whose high effusions are not understood by those who speak, such are the sentences of some Philosophers and Poetical Raptures, which according to the Author's words or sense savoured of a low and mean degree of wisdom, till some Christians reading their Books Consecrated them by Comments and Conclusions, of which they could never have thought. Hence it is, that the Books of some ancient Philosopher are now like the famed Ship, which was so oft repaired, till no old Plank remained. Many wise Conclusions appear in Heathenish writings, but are as mysterious Characters and Ciphers, which only the Religious by comparing them with Revelation can understand. These Effata, or say, are like signs which Deaf and dumb men make, who neither have advantage of nature to understand or speak, whose Interpreters are as Mouths and understanding too, whilst they stretch their Interpretations, beyond that which the Significators designed, or could declare. Hence it appears, that the Reasoner in this particular quest (whilst he utters divine sentences not understood by himself, but to be Consecrated by the Commentator,) may not be put in the Catalogue of Theists, except it can be imagined, implicit Reason, may be allowed as much as implicit Faith. Hitherto it being considered what degree of knowledge may be acquired by the Idiot (for in this Quest the Reasoner must be content to be so called) from the contemplation of the world, let a man of another apprehension (whose knowledge is more refin'd by industry and art) who apprehends the Cause, grossly conceived by the Idiot, as an Architect, be Catechised in this Article of his natural faith, he will be found ignorant. For although the world is a great Glass, in which its Maker may be seen; yet the Lineaments are so scattered and confused, that it is almost impossible to reduce them to a perfect form, as may appear from the consideration of the method used for the proof and knowledge of God, from a prospect of the world, which takes all the perfections which lie scattered in the Creatures, and then imagines them to be in one most perfect Being, (which implies a denial of all imperfections) and all those concentred in that Being, are modo infinito, as the Schools say. This argument bids fair for the discovery, but will fail, when strictly examined. For though it is granted that the perfections which are in the Creatures, are the same, though in an inferior degree, with those attributed to the Creator, yet the ignorance of the manner how they are in this Being, which is infinite, and consequently incomprehensible, will make him so far fall short of his designed knowledge (attempting vainly to measure Infinity by his finite Creatures) that he deserves no more to be called a Theist, than a man, who hath only seen the Sun's image in a drop, & as it is in every part of the Rainbow, or the Stars in a Pool, can own the name of an Astronomer. This method is as insignificant, as addition of numbers to numbers; so that is impossible that they can have any denomination, or as an attempt to measure two quantities (one by the other) which in their own nature are incommensurable, or without any known proportion. By these instances I give greater advantage to the cavilling Adversary, than he could reasonably expect, for there is greater disproportion between God and his Creatures, than can be between quantity and quantity, However let it not be thought an unnecessary crowding in instances, if it be said, this method is so far from being infallible, that it falls short of the certainty of operations in Decimals, which are not true, if examined by Rules of Demonstration, yet serve in practice, and the Error is not to be discerned. But he who attempts to know God by this way of Reasoning, will fail in practice as much as Thcory. The Heathens, who framed a notion of God by this method, and suited their Morals to it, were so notoriously erroneous, that some of their precepts and Conclusions are not reconcileable with Religious truth.  
Another branch of the Reasoners argument, is the subordination of Causes, which in this Quest need not be distinguished nicely from Harmony, one being the result of the other, both of which are so far from being Catholic arguments, which may convince all, that there are scarce any, who are able to pass judgement on that Harmonious subordination: for he who is a fit judge of the Harmony of the world, must be supposed to know all the parts of it and their use, or how they have dependence one on the other, as Causes and Effects. How imperfect this knowledge is, will appear from a view of natural Philosophy, in which most of the discoveries are but conjectures, though called Demonstrations. I do not design to start many old Errors, it will be sufficient to suggest this consideration. That the ancient Sophies who took this method to conduct them, had an imperfect prospect of the World's Harmony, as may be concluded from the Astronomy (which is conversant about the most glorious and harmonious part of the World) extant in their ages, the best and most valuable part of which was comprised in the famed Almagest. Now how monstrous and defective a Ptolomaic System is, is plain from late observations. But omitting these, let it be considered, as suiting with that age in which (some discoveries (which destroy it) were not made; yet it will appear to be, if compared with the Copernican, as an ill contrived Engine which moves with many Wheels, Cycles and Epicycles, when one or few would make it more perfect. This perhaps may be the reason of that saying fastened on Alphonsus, who considering the world's Fabric in ptolemy's Sphere, rashly said, that he could contrive the world in a better frame, had he power to Create. Here I may expect a Check from the Reasoner, who may demand, whether I thought any late, or more Harmonious System might more effectually improve this argument? To this question I only say, that late inventions may improve the argument by rendering it more preswasive, not much more demonstrative. For Harmony is a certain proportion between numbers or magnitudes, which is not called so only for this reason, that some quantities have a mutual alliance, and agree in some third, which is common to both; but as it hath respect to the mind which apprehends them; as Music is so called, because it kindly complies with the ear. 'Tis confessed, that so much may be concluded from this Topick, that the humane Soul and the world owes their original (because of the approbation which Reason gives concerning the admirable contrivance of the world's Fabric) to the same Being or Cause; but as to the nature of that cause, a man can conclude nothing, much more distinctly and certainly, than the Idiot in the former instance.  
The next natural evidence of the existence of God, is from the general consent of all Nations, of which none so barbarous as not to own it, (as it was well observed by that great Orator, who did not much improve it for his own information, as appears from his Books) yet this argument will find more Barbarism in the Sceptical Reasoner of this age, than the former was guilty of; For this knowledge of God as it is generally found, is not proved by the Reasoners method, which unravels and analysis all by reason before it is believed, but is rather a common notion, or natural impress, which is on the lowest degree of mankind, that there is a Being, able to Reward or Punish; yet this is not the conclusion of the discursive faculty; for those who cannot prove a God, give assent to this Conclusion of his existence; which proof considered, though in the gross notion of an Idiot is more valid, than the Reasoners arguments modelized into Syllogisms, and is more agreeable to the account, Revelation gives of God, which only expresses his existence, when he describes himself, by saying I am. Hence it follows, that the natural knowledge of God, so diffused over the whole World, is like that of an Idiot, who seeing a Circle can confess it to be so, although he cannot prove it by trial, whether each ray or line drawn from the Centre to the Circumference is equal.  
This argument thus managed, will not find any success with the Reasoner, whose Rules oblige him to admit nothing as true (though the will is so inclinable to assent, that it can be sooner confounded than diverted) except it have passed the exact Inquisition of the understanding by discourse. Besides, he may suppose or doubt, whether that general consent was the result of natural knowledge, or the Doctrine of some wise men, whose open profession of that truth occasioned the vulgar (in process of several ages) to conclude it natural knowledge. These thoughts in the Reasoner can be looked upon no otherwise than a mere cavil, he being not able to show, how, when or where this notion was framed (as it well observed by a late Author) yet the suggestion will not shake the sceptical mind, for he who will be so bold to conclude the whole World's Representatives in a Council may err, will not boggle in saying, the general consent of all Nations might be terminated in an Error.  
Thus far the World hath been considered, as to its Harmony of parts, from which it will be an easy digression to the Harmonious disposition of man's mind, which inclines him to a civil life. From this Topick no weak arguments are drawn for the proof of the existence of God, seeing man's regular, because civilised, life is as great a wonder in Policy, as the subordination of causes in nature, which prevents mutinies amongst the Elements, and hinders mutual destruction. Now this bond of civil Society borrows its strength from the supreme Lawgiver, who by his Divine Empire in man's mind, disposeth it, for mutual agreement with equals, and subjection to Superiors. This argument must have its allowance of validity, but it must be acknowledged, that this, as the former, wants its due force, except the existence of God is supposed, which the strict Reasoner will have proved, before he will own him, or any deductions which depend on it, For as it is confessed, that the distinction of Good and Evil is the foundation of humane Society; so it must be allowed, that actions are no otherwise called Good or Evil, but as they have relation to the natural Conscience, which supposeth the existence of God. Hence the defect of the argument appears, seeing he who proves God's existence by this method, necessarily supposeth a being, which endowed his mind with such knowledge, which could point out Good and Evil. Seeing therefore the truth of Conclusions drawn by this method, depends on a supposal of the existence of that being which should be proved, it cannot be imagined to have much force to convince the Sceptic, for he supposition makes him retire to his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, suspecting the whole argument as weak Suppositions and Hypotheses; being like flaccid Nerves, which want spirits to fortify them, only serving to knit Paralytical members together, but without strength. If it is said that some Heathens, who had little or no knowledge of God, or at least owned a false Deity, which is equivalent to none, did many Heroical and good Acts, which implies the notion of good and Evil. This may be granted, yet their actions could no further be called Good or Evil than they had respect to a Deity, of which they had only a confused notion. For the conformity of an action with the Law of nature (which is a Divine impress on the mind) makes it to be good, being the formal reason of it, as the disconformity makes it vicious. Hence it follows, that those actions which were good, were not known to be so, but as they were measured by the goodness of God, which implies the former supposition.  
Then next part of this Disquisition shall be the examination of the force of that argument which is drawn from terrors of Conscience upon Evil committed, which is of so great force (with a due allowance of Heavenly assistance, Grace and Revelation) that it storms the Atheist's strongest holds, and so beats him off his ground, that he knows not where to secure himself, but without, it is as little forcible as those drawn from other Topics. For it being proved, that no action can be said to be Good or Evil, but as it hath relation to the Divine Goodness and Will, either as it is written in man's mind in the natural frame of his Soul, or by external conveyance by revelation; it is a preposterous proof from that Topick of fear, that God punisheth Evil, before it is granted (which cannot be) that reason knows what is Evil, without the Consideration of a Deity, without which, fear is so far from being a Medium to help the Reasoner in his Conclusions, that it is more probable to hinder him in his natural Quest. That which leads men to certainty, according to the Reasoners method, must inform the understanding, and consequently determine the will after such a free manner as must exclude compulsion, but fear or any argument taken from it (which cannot be so framed, but that passion will interpose itself) is so far from doing either, that it cannot determine the will without some kind of violence done to it, so he that acts out of fear, cannot so properly be said to be a free Agent. Neither is it less prejudicial to the understanding, casting a mist before the eye of the mind by its turbulence; The Philosopher was sensible of this, who concluded its removal necessary from the mind in the search of Truth. Si vis lumine claro cernere verum, gaudia pelle, pelle timorem. Boet. de Consol. Phil. Fear is placed in the Soul as tempests in the lowest Region, through which it is as difficult for the mind to have a free and clear prospect, as for the Sun to discover its lustre through a Cloud. Let it not be argued from Holy Scripture, that sear was a necessary introduction to the knowledge of God, as appears from the apprehension the People had of wonders on Mount-Sinai, and the Mosaical appeal to them, if ever they saw such astonishing wonders. This tends not so directly to justify the former argument: for it may be reasonably presumed, that this method was used rather to confirm them in the belief of a Deity before entertained, and to prevent Apostasy, than to be their first Tutor, to instruct them in the first Article of the Jewish, as well as Christian Creed. The most direct way to wisdom, as it respects speculation, is not by fear excited in the mind, although it hath great influence on practice, as the sense of that holy saying imports, which calls the fear of God the beginning of wisdom, for in that sentence, the existence of God is supposed, before fear takes its place in order to instruction. However it was a necessary defensative against Idolatry, to which the Jews were too inclinable. In such particular cases, such turbulent passions may usher in Devotion: but generally considered, rather confound than inform the mind. For it seems not designed for the Christian, but that part of the world which may be called the Devil's Province, in which he is adored by numerous votaries, led to that adoration by fear, which gives occasion of considering, how that turbulent passion rather disposeth man for Diabolical worship, than that of the true God. For seeing the Devils can inflict punishments, or rather vex men with Tortures which excite sear, they may possibly terminate man's Devotion in them as Deities. If it is said that this assertion implies impossibilities, whilst a power is allowed to the Devil of terrifying the Conscience with punishment, which the Reasoner may conclude Eternal, as well as Temporal. A short reply will show, that this objection cannot be the sense of a man in his pure naturals, except he was assured of the immortality of his Soul, of which some Heathens spoke doubtfully, though they confidently presumed its eternal duration, because they could not imagine, how it should perish by any known causes. Therefore their all-natural Divinity did not conclude eternal Rewards, or Punishments, suitable to the Souls duration. 'Tis true Hell is sometimes so shadowed by the Poets, as if their Poems had borrowed from Revelation, but their Poetical conclusions in this case can be no further credited, than they speak of the Souls immortality, of which there is as little satisfactorily said, as in Prose; besides they being the result of fancy, cannot effectually commend themselves as matters of natural faith: For if the Authors of such Poetical sentences, could they be imagined to rise again, and take a view of the Conclusions of Mythologists, and those who writ Comments on their Poems. I might reasonably doubt, whether several opinions fastened on them by deduction would be owned as their genuine sense. I need not add this, that some have openly declared in verse as much as others in Prose, that they were fabulous fictions, not much to be regarded by minds, not too much biased by passion, or superstitious fear. For not only the profane and Atheistical Poet concluded the future state as dubious, saying, Quid Styga, Quid Barathrum, Quid nomina vana timetis? but others, whose invention and fancy were more soberly bounded, and free from the extravagancy of more dangerous Raptures. Before I take one step further in this Disquisition, 'tis necessary, that an objection be removed, which may render what is said less credible, viz. That the Devil hath no power of himself, neither can act any thing by his own absolute Authority, but by Deputation, and it cannot be imagined, that he should punish sin with eternal punishment, seeing he is a finite Creature, and his business is to promote it. To the first part of this objection, the same answer must be returned, which was given to the former. That it is such as the mere Reasoner cannot start, for Revelation only informs man of the nature of Devils, and the limitation of their power, wherefore seeing reason could not suggest, that it is sufficiently answered by showing it is impertinent; the other part of it, which threatens the former assertion, cannot destroy it; for although the Devil cannot be thought inclinable to punish sin properly so called, yet practice shows, that he Tortures some as sinners against his Laws, by which he supports his Dominion in the World, which offenders deserve the name of actors of good, as by avoiding vice (according to the plain definition of virtue, virtus est vitium fugere) men become virtuous. The Indian concludes he that offended the supreme power, though but Diabolical, when mischief, or any extraordinary appearance, threatens his ruin. Hence appears the possibility of terminating Devotion in a finite being, for it being represented as dreadful, as any deduction from mere reason can make it, 'tis no great wonder if a man look on that power, as infinite (which is not so) seeing it bounds his thoughts, if not transcends all he can imagine, and consequently adore that power, as a God or the supreme Being, which is only deputed, and limited. This may be further proved from Sacred story, which says, the ignorant multitude declared the Apostles Gods in humane shape, and were hardly restrained from an Idolatrous Worship. This instance is a sufficient evidence of the truth of the former assertion, although it seems to fail, because of the difference between good Apostles and bad Angels; yet both agree in this, that they are Creatures, which shows it is possible, that finite beings may be mistaken for God. For this instance justifying the possibility of adoration given to finite beings, and the inclination of men who are too ready to worship them, when they show themselves able to do good in the highest degree (such as was wrought by the Apostles Miracles). It may be concluded by the same reason, that when any Being manifests itself with such power, which is able to inflict the greatest punishment, the Reasoner may own it as God.  
Before more is said to prove the former position, 'tis necessary, that some objections be removed, one of which may arise out of the instance, which said the ignorant multitude in that case were not to be esteemed as rational men, being without the due use of their reason, which could inform them of the impossibility of finite Creatures being Metamorphized to a Deity, or the perfections of it to be communicated to a Creature. To this a double answer must be given suitable to the parts of the objection, to the first of which it may be said, if the ignorant votaries were so much astonished with the Miracles that surprised reason knew not how to act; and those which have been conducted by this argument drawn from fear, which confounds the understanding, appear with such confused zeal, which savours more of distraction than sobriety of mind, (as it is evident from the Indians practice,) it may be concluded that the Topick from which they argued, viz. The Emergencies of some extraordinary power put them in that confusion. To the second, 'tis enough to say, that it is not necessary, that it should be determined in this case, whether the Daemons terrifying that part of the World with malicious prodigies, are finite, or infinite with a real respect to their natures, but the understanding, which makes esse & apparere, signify the same in matters of natural faith. This may be further confirmed from Heathens practice, who adored Oracles, which were Devils Resident in some parts of the World, but worshipped as the supreme powers. But perhaps it may be said, that the Heathen esteemed the Oracles only as Secretaries or mouths of the Deity as the Etymology of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Sibylla implies, yet practice did not make this distinction, for Monarches, who consulted them, thought they had taken Advice or Counsel from the supreme power (which was only distinguished by the names of several places where their sentences were uttered) which Supremacy was boldly written on their Altars, till by Christ's coming the glory was buried, and the proud inscription changed to an Epitaph, the Oracle being spiritually dead, in that forced return to Hell, which occasioned this sad complaint to a Votary, who came to consult of future events.  
Me puer Hebraeus divos Deus ipse gubernans  
Cedere sede jubet tristemq, redire sub Orcum.  
The Oracles were necessitated to make such confessions, it being one part of their penance to proclaim their own weakness, and necessary subjection to that supreme Being, of whom they so prophetically spoke, as if they had been the Oracles of God, as appears by the answer given by Apollo's Oracle, to one demanding what God was 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉   
Who could imagine that the Devil was the Author of this almost sacred verse, were it not considered that God lays a necessity on the evil Angels, that they shall proclaim his power, for the Devils in the Caves and Groves, as well as those amongst the Tombs did speak truth concerning Christ, though it added to their Torment? This is enough to demonstrate, that those true say when spoken by them were extorted, and they (as much as spiritual beings are capable of) put on the rack by such confessions. This Oracular cunning (which would not confess Christ but when forced) occasions a remark on the Devil's subtlety, who being necessitated to acknowledge him, insinuates this to his Votaries that Oracles are God's Nuncio's, and allied to a Deity as Ambassadors, whilst the lie is minced by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. If the Reasoner take advantage from this citation of refuting the former position, by saying that they seemed not to aim at adoration as infinite beings; neither were they esteemed by wise men as any other than Angels, as appears from Heathen compellations, which speak them Ministers; beside the Oracles more plain confession, who would have prayer directed to him in this language 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Yet it must be observed, though the Devil calls himself Daemon or Angel, yet he calls himself omniscient and owns universal wisdom, which cannot be allowed any Creature, and seeing he enjoins a form of Prayer to be directed to him; he tacitly insinuates to his Votaries that he is God, for he to whom Prayers are made must be God according to Heathens Religion, which owns no invocations of Creatures as Mediators.  
But let it be granted that the Oracles were Angels, and only Jupiter, Apollo, which some other were adored as Deities, this concession will be so far from destroying the former position, that it rather confirms it, by allowing adoration to finite beings, such as Jupiter and Apollo, and many other who must be in the Catalogue of men, who made use of Dreams and Oracles to promote their Apotheosis as Lactant. cap. 8. De origine erroris, argues, Eos ipsos quos docuimus Deos non esse, Majestatem suam ostendisse prodigijs, insomniis, auguriis & Oraculis, etc. More might be cited out of that Chapter as pertinent, the design of which (as well as of this Tract) being to show the use of Reason in Religion, and how much the natural man is guilty of folly, who entirely resigns himself to its conduct; but I am sensible that I must appear tedious in this first Disquisition, and inexcusable too, did not the Subject treated off exact the most strict examination, and starting all that can be said against the former position. Wherefore let the Reasoner object in another way of Heathens practice, in showing that they did not always terminate their Devotions in that Being in which they found a specimen of Divine power or knowledge, which may be proved from the Sibylls, who appeared no less Divine than the Oracles; yet were so far from being adored, that they scarce found civil Entertainment from the greatest Personages in the World; to this objection I will only suggest these considerations as an answer. That the disregard and little estimation they had in the World proceeded from the different manner and matter of predictions of the Sibylls and Oracles, the former were to come to pass after many Revolutions of Years and Ages, the latter as ex tempore Prophets spoke to every particular question, and their mouths open to each Votary. Now seeing the Sibylls prophecies were to be fulfilled not until some ages were passed, it may be easily imagined that active minds would be more prone to adore the Oracles who were as Tutelar Angels to advise in every particular case, than those who spoke more generally of what should come to pass at further distance. Another reason may be given why the Sibylls were not adored; because their Birth and Lineage was but humane, it was not probable they should purchase Adoration, for the known humanity was an obstacle which hindered worship due to him, to whom all Oracles and Angels submit with fear of that power which was able to silence them. If it is said, that this answer cannot remove the objection, for the same reason will destroy Heathenish Devotion to Jupiter, and other reputed Deities, who were only men Deified by opinion of some fond Votaries; It must be answered, that they were esteemed as eternal, though really they were mortals; which opinion was enough to denominate them Gods; for in Heathens devotion to be, and to be believed to be so, was the same. As Alexander thought it was enough to his purpose, that the Barbarians were persuaded he was a God, though he knew himself to be but mortal, as he glories in the delusion; whilst he says, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. The Idiots conquered themselves by their false zeal and persuasions: so it answers diabolical designs, if Devils are mistaken for Gods. Besides the Sibylls were so much like Apostl's, that they did not pretend to Worship, due to them, but another, of whom they Prophesied; neither did they, as the Devilish Oracles, require any form of Worship or Prayer to be directed to them; it was as much as they aimed at, if they were thought (according to the Etymology of their name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) to be of the Heavenly Counsel. If that age had been so zealously inclined to adore their wisdom, and could be imagined to have considered their Prophecies as fulfilled; yet the matter of what was foretold, would convince the World that they were not Gods, nor claimed Adoration. These circumstances considered will give satisfaction to the question, how it happened that Sibylls were not Adored as Oracles? and show that it is enough to confirm the former position, viz. That Devotion may be terminate in some finite Being, as supreme, though not in all appearances of extraordinary power. These obstacles being removed, the next argument for the proof of the being of a Deity shall be examined, which is taken from that prevailling Topick of paternal love and care which is presumed to be such as would not deceive his Son, by a successive Tradition of the being of God (which is so universal, that Barbarians are not without it) which if false, would be such an unnatural deceit, that Stage nor History can parallel. This argument hath more strength from this consideration, that as the Fathers would not be so unnatural to deceive their Sons, so would they not suffer themselves to be deceived in matters of great moment. This is so probable, that it scarce admits of any suspicion of its possibility of being otherwise; yet when it is examined by a Rigid and subtle inquiry, it will be doubted whether the Forefathers might not commit that out of weakness, which they would not have done out of choice, could their understanding have been better informed.  
How much reason fails in its general quest, appears from the consideration of these arguments. I pass now to a more particular Disquisition, how the unity of the Godhead is or can be known by principles of pure or uninlightned Reason.  
Although the supposal of Polytheism, according to the manner how man frames a notion of God (which is by summing up all perfections, and then concentring them in one Being after an infinite manner) implies a contradiction, and the plurality of God supposes the possibility of more than all, which is so palpable a contradiction, that the very naming of it is a sufficient confutation; yet in strictness of speech, seeing the Reasoner cannot attain to a clear and distinct knowledge of an infinite Being, how can he be said to know God as one God, and it may take place amongst the Theists, he must be seated in the Classis of the Athenian Votaries, and be esteemed no wiser than the inscription which St. Paul citys, makes them who worship an unknown God; in which the Epithet supposes they were ignorant of what they said, for if they had known him they could have distinguished him from other Being's in the universe, for it is so essential to Unity to be distinguished from other Being's, that if it be apprehended as it lies confused, it cannot properly be said to be known, no more than the nature of Gold can be said to be known when it meets with such an Idiot's Judgement, which is so far from being a Touchstone, that it can only distinguish the Ore from common Sand. Besides it is more than probable, that the Heathen had (neither can the Reasoner have more on such principles) only a confused notion of power and wisdom in the World, not able to comprehend one being distinct from the rest, so as to be pointed out by any certain and distinguishing Character, and an assurance of all power and wisdom summed up in one being.  
I might conclude this Disquisition without any further survey of Heathens opinions, did I not consider that authority, though in this case may appear insignificant to my purpose; yet may be urged against my position, if it be suggested, that the Heathens, Plato, with many others acknowledged but one God, and therefore by Christian writers both ancient and modern cited to confute Polytheism, which citations, I presume, were rather made use of, to dispose the minds of men for a belief of one God, than as convincing Demonstration, for it is plain that the Heathens in their most refined notions of a Deity have not framed such an exact Idea of one God, as to quit the thoughts of Polytheism; for when they spoke most Divinely, they oftentimes, as if they had forgot what they were speaking of, or at least sensible, that they could not comprehend it, instead of God, say Gods. I cannot but take notice of Socrates, so famous for natural Divinity, for opposing Heathenish Deities, when he speaks of the excellent goodness of the Deity, and how that men were so much the more good as their actions had Conformity to the Divine; which sentence Erasmus says deserved to be called Gospel, had there not been a mistake in the number, saying Gods for God.  
I might here detain the Reader by citation of opinions of Heathens (which is not pleasant to me but when necessary) who may as well spend time in considering such extravagant brain Idols, as viewing those in Pagans Temples, but I shall only refer him to Tully, Seneca, or other famous Heathen Sophists, and he will find, that although they speak of the providence, justice, and goodness of the Divine Being, as if they were Secretaries of Heaven; yet these by them are not attributed only to one God but Gods, and Dij in these high accounts of Divinity is as often used as Deus.  
To instance but in one cited by Tully, lib. 2. the legib. Thales, who speaks so Divinely, that he owns Providence, ubiquity and eminent power, with Wisdom, which knows our thoughts, to be in some Divine Being; yet at last fastens all these perfections in Dij, how much this favours of Polytheism or confusion of thoughts, the Reader will confess when he traces Tully himself (who citys others). All that can be said to exempt them from Polytheism is, that when they said Dij, they intended inferior Deities; This cannot rescue them from the former imputation, because it is a contradiction to imagine Providence, Omniscience, and other Attributes can be communicated to any Being which is not infinite. To conclude this part of the Paragraph, all the seeming Divine sentences of Heathens speak promiscuously of God or Gods, and make the Court of Heaven speak in the Language of a mortal Monarch (We) which though a plural expression without the help of a figure is known to represent a King; they were so unluckily ignorant, that although they had some notion of the Deity, they could not express what they had in confusion conceived, as it too plainly appears from their wild discourses of God, which if they had been on any other Subject, they would have never entitled the Authors to the names of wise men.  
Let it not be objected, that the same may be argued against the Scripturist, which is against the Reasoner; because in holy Writings God is as well represented by an Elohim a plural number, as Jehovah which is singular. To this objection it is enough to suggest, that there is not the same reason in Pagan writings to justify such expressions, which seem to favour Polytheism, as in Holy Scripture. Moses (when he expresses one God by a plural number) his language is suitable to the Hebrew Idiom or way of expression, without the nice and mysterious Criticism to prove a Trinity; as it appears from Heathen Interpreters, as well as those of the Jews, it hath been translated as singular. So Longinus, Page 35. Sect. 7. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, citing Moses' words. Add to this another consideration, that he who wrote the History of Creation, wrote also the Law, in which man is confined to the worship of one God in the plainest terms, from which command there may be a reasonable conjecture, that man in his corrupt state is more prone to own plurality of Gods than profess one, else why was this command in the front and so early given? I know it is, and may be said, that the Preface as well as the Command was as an Antidote against the poison of the Egyptians Idolatrous customs; yet Idolatry being then so young (only a few Garden Deities, Leeks and Onions adored) it may be imagined that this Law was promulged to remove men's ignorance, which without Divine assistance is invincible, for the eye of the Soul in its decayed state is like one intoxicated, whose we knees multiplies a single object, wherefore it was necessary that Israel, even to improvement of Knowledge as well as Religion, should know there was but one God. Let this also be considered, that in Pagan Divinity we find no such distinguishing worship or character given to Jupiter, to show that he was God. Are the other Deities but Deputies? (as some learned men say) or so reputed, for they were all adored: now in Scripture, there is not the least favour or disspensation granted to adore any Being but God, no not so much as his Representators, Prophets and Apostles working wonders; This is enough to justify the expression of God by a plural number in Scripture, though not in Pagan writings; (besides the Grammatical help of a singular number with a plural without false Syntax or false sense) The Heathens did apprehend God in such a manner, as a plural number best suited with their thoughts, seeing the Universe was their God as appeared by their Deified Pan, of whom there is this account  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉—  
Orpheus in Hymn. This may be further proved by a Testimony of lactantius. lib. 9 De false Religione who when he brings in Trismegist speaking most Divinely concerning the Unity of the Godhead, saying 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which he translates or paraphrases on it, Ignitur Deo nomen non est, nec opus est proprio vocabulo nisi cum discrimen exigit multitudo.  
Whence it is plain, that the multitude sometimes apprehended God as the general power reigning in the World, though at other times they were more accurate in ask his name.  
But not to check inventions or methods, by which men frame the notion of one God, let the Metaphysician think of infinite power, wisdom, justice, etc. And according to art or rule, put them together, he will make such an Aggregate or Sum of perfections which man cannot naturally know, or by what one name to call it, beside that of infinite, now how properly Infinity in the natural man's sense can be said to be one, hath been said before, it being like Eternity, of which we can speak so little properly, that we can rather say what it is not, than what it is. Add to this, that the Reasoner who frames a notion of a God by summing up perfections, and knowing not how one Attribute poises another, how power, wisdom, justice and mercy bound one another, he seems as much a Polytheist as he who owned power in Jupiter, and wisdom in Apollo, etc. And can no more be said to be a Theist, than one whose education hath advanced him no further than the Alphabet, can be said to be a Philologer, or he who only knows Letters, an Interpreter of words, before they have taken their places to form them. This instance, if it seem not so apposite, yet I hope pardonable, seeing Christ himself disdains not to be called the Word, which without his own exposition would but imperfectly express his nature, and Amelius a Platonist admired by Eusebius. lib. 11. de prepar. Evang. cap. 19  
And called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Because he so much approved the compellation. Suppose a Novice who hath been only in the Porch of a Geometrical School, and learned all kind of Lines in their several varieties, of which the most accurate draught must consist, shall he be thought worthy of the name of a Painter who knows no proportions of the single lines? this instance I presume is so apposite, that it will need no comment on it, and it giving me occasion of a digression from the Metaphysical method of framing a notion of one God to one more suited to all apprehension by similitude, as Vives, Grotius, Morney, and others, who have illustrated the Unity of the Godhead by Analogy, viz. The Heavens, one Sun, one Primum mobile, and other instances of Monarchy, as it appears in the World. How little impression such instances are like to make on some, who in their Philosophical certainty conclude that there is no such primum mobile in the same Author's sense, neither dare affirm there are no more lights of like nature, and influences, may be guest at by the reception and entertainment which later Hypotheses have found.  
So he who endeavours to demonstrate the Unity and Trinity in the Godhead by the three powers which are in one Soul, may expect his argument should be as little prevalent; for that method which obligeth a Peripatetic to the belief of a Trinity, may persuade the Platonic to believe a Quaternion; for he as zealously contends for that, as accommodated to its several degrees of knowledge, as the other was for his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or three powers in the rational Soul: and surely the Platonics did admire the number 4. else it had not been so solemnly used in their Oaths. Let it be urged that God may be known by similitude, & although there be but imperfect and small footsteps of his Being to be traced by the Reasoner; yet according to proportion, by one Attribute there may be discovery of all, as the proverbial speech of an Herculean draught from a foot (and if I may stretch the letter of the Proverb) a little finger. If such objections appear to the Readers thoughts, I only desire him to recollect, or look back to the former part of the Disquisitions, in which it was never granted, that man by reasoning can have any such knowledge of any Attribute, so as it shall be a Rule to him infallibly to judge of the nature of God without Revelation, and the last appeals made to it. I am not ignorant that the primitive Fathers, (to instance in one, Minutius Foelix) made use of similitude to convince the World of the Unity of the Godhead, Dux unus Apibus, Dux unus in Gregibus; yet this was intended rather for illustration than strict proof; neither is there violence done to the Divine example, whilst the Reasoner disowns similitudes in case that demonstration is justly expected, for although God is pleased to discover himself by similitudes, he expects not that his Being should be proved by that method.  
The Reconciler who supposes the Being of God and Providence. Page 4. of his Preface, cautions us to beware of similitudes whilst we would have a true conception of him. page 12. Attributes which we cannot possibly know, except he tell us, and then says, we should not conclude or guests about them by Analogies, to things of a nature infinitely distant from his, or by maxims framed according to the nature of inferior being. Let not this argument which seem; to have its foundation in practice prejudice the Reasoner, for I shall no further make use of it than reason must allow, and the authority cited shall have another ratification of its strength, by an appeal to the Reasoner who helps his thoughts by art, and impartial and unbyass'd industry; who by the conduct of his own reason will scarce find out that narrow path which will lead him to the infallible knowledge of one God, for after the utmost perusal of his own arguments concerning him, he will be obliged to describe himself by a name suitable to his thoughts, which if he do, he will be in suspense whether he ought to be called Theist or Polytheist, this bold presumption is founded on the former position. Viz. That the Reasoner hath only a general knowledge of power undistinguished in the World. That a gross and imperfect knowledge in a lose and common way of speech is enough to justify the Language which calls a Being, one which in strictness is not so. As a late Author instances in Rome, which retains its name; although the City is not the same, which first took that name, and there are Protean bodies which each moment change; yet retain the same name. Such comparisons, or such expressions may serve to express things finite, words being as Coin, or rather the Stamp upon it (which oftentimes is so far from representing the person of a King, that there is much necessity of a Motto, to tell whose Image it is; as Painters in the infancy of their Art were forced to supply the defect of their Pencil by their Pens, and make men Readers, not Spectators of Pictures.) But the strict Reasoner as he is careful in frameing notions of things, so he will be careful in giving names, or saying any thing concerning number or nature of that Being which he cannot comprehend; Infinite, as infinite is beyond the reach of our understanding, whence it is apparent, that when any thing is affirmed of an object as infinite, so far the affirmation will be doubted of as uncertain, that assent which passes apprehension, must pass for ignorance, and can only be adjusted by an implicit faith. Infinite would not be infinite, could it be apprehended as an adequate object of humane knowledge; though it were as nigh as possible. The French Philosopher modestly took the liberty to make a term of Art, a gives the old World a name more suitable to man's apprehension, than that which it had been known by in several ages; for finite, calling it indefinite, which is something in its own nature which hath bounds, therefore its dimensions possible to be known; but no man can determine any thing concerning infinity either as to number or quality, seeing the object he judges of is beyond his reach. He who attributes any property to a Subject, is supposed to understand the nature or form of it: otherwise, he like the man in the gospel, who having not fully his sight recovered, may call men Trees, or fasten impossibilities on the Subject, lest qualify it by the notion he frames of it, with a power to make impossibilities not to be so; as the Reconciler of Reason and Religion instances in the French Virtuoso, who concludes the possibility of a Hill without a Valley, not considering that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Alex. Aphrodis. de fato, p. 135. To make such assertions appear plausible, all that can be said, is, that impossibilities cease to be such, when they have relation to God, as the vast bulk of the Earth appears as a point or as nothing, when considered in respect to the motion of some Stars. This assertion shows the Author's ingenuity and modesty, but gives little satisfaction to the Reasoner: for to conclude God can do impossibilities, because he is infinite, is to prove a proposition by a medium equally obscure. It is a difficult task to find truth in general, and he who is nice, will be cautious how he attributes any property to a Being, which he doth not understand, but more especially when he is to speak of one, whose attributes are so nearly united to his being, that they cannot be distinguished from it. This difficulty of frameing the notion of God, made some Heathens look on the Deity as an universal power, or an aggregat of all perfections in the World: for though they seem to speak Divinely of God as one, I am apt to think they speak in the Language of Jewellers who call one kind of Margarites unions (because first they were found single) when daily experience shows many are hatched in the same shell. Here I might make a stop and pity the Ethnic and the secular Reasoner, who like Apodes (Birds on the wing) hover in contemplation without feet to rest on (for whose support, though nature hath made provision; yet with greater difficulty and danger than for other familiar works of nature) for though it must be confessed as a father eminent both for Christian and Pagan Oratory, says in his Octavia that the Heathens did always own one God and providence but knew not how to point it out. This confessed, helps the Heathen or Reasoner very little; for as it was said in the beginning of this Disquisition, that he who hath such a Roving fancy as not to distinguish God from other beings deserved not the name of a Theist. If it be again objected that the unity of the Godhead hath been known to those who had no opportunity or abilities to read holy Scripture, yet spoke sentences which are matter of Christian faith To instance in one famous verse.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
This cannot help the Reasoner in this Article of belief, for it being the saying of a Sibyl it cannot be called the dictate of pure reason, for though we know not how, yet it must be acknowledged, that so much as they spoke truly of God and Christ came from Revelation in such a Way as none can determine. Thus far I have endeavoured to show Reason's defect in its first and chiefest discoveries, when it puts itself on the rack, stretching only to a Sceptical uncertainty. It now remains, that I meet with another objection, which may seem so considerable, that I may not pass it by without taking notice, that it may be retorted from the former part of the Disquisition, that I conclude the Gentiles or Ethnics had not the true knowledge of a Deity (neither could properly be called Theists), which assertion seems too cruel and unreasonable: for some eminent in learning allow, that the Heathens in their Theory and practice, (if not saved in some sense, may be exempt from Damnation, because they had a Law from God, and by that Law were to be judged. Add to this, that the Heathens are allowed to be Judges of actions morally good and evil, just and unjust, and justice in man is the same with that which is in God, though in an inferior degree. Let this be granted; It will not help the Reasoner in setting out his guide, for although the rules of Justice are the same in the Ethnic and the Christian (and some of the Commandments being Reasons dictates, promulged and made Law by another Legislation) yet they shall not be judged in the same way and manner, suppose the Heathen exactly observe his Legem Talionis, and demands an Eye for an Eye, or a Tooth for a Tooth, as the holy Scripture expresses it, or to speak in the poetical saying which Aristotle lays down as a rule approved by Rhadamanthus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Arist. lib. 5. Such observation of nature's Law will justify the Heathen, not the Christian. The Reasoner may also urge that Tully, Plato, Seneca, and other Sophies have been Authors of such sentences which have such a near alliance to Scripture, that only the Author's names can distinguish them from it. This granted, will not help the Reasoner, for he cannot prove them emanations of a Heathens mind, or convince the World of the certainty of their not being borrowed from Divine Revelation, mixing their own thoughts with some notions taken from Scripture, as some have endeavoured to prove, which will appear more probable, if the Ethnic be considered in his confused way of speaking of God, and different expressions of him, which will give way for a conclusion, That they certainly knew a Being above themselves, but what it was were uncertain, for had they as certainly known his nature as they seemed assured of his Being, there had not been such variety of opinions concerning him, for these notions in man's mind are unalterable, and although discourse or artificial ways may confound them, when conclusions are to be drawn, and so seem variable; yet in themselves considered cannot be changed. Wherefore it being granted, that God is known by pure Reason as to his Being, and some of his attributes; yet by this imperfect notion the Reasoner can be no more called a Theist, and said to know God, than he who seeing some few, or all the proportions of a man drawn or painted, can be said to know his Crasis or Constitution, or what humour is predominant. If a similitude may be admitted in this case, it may be said that he who passes judgement of the nature of the Deity by those lineaments of justice and mercy, power and knowledge, which are in man, he will be as ignorant of the nature of God as the other of the Crasis or Constitution of a man, for as the one cannot conclude by the draught what humour is predominant; neither can the other know in which attribute God takes most delight. Besides, if mere natural evidence is to be set up judge of just and unjust, without respect to the Divine will, a great part of Religion will be disputed, and the Christian Creed contracted into too narrow a compass, some of its Articles (according to the method of passing judgement) being in danger not to be believed; and Christianity would not be improved much above that height which King Agrippa arrived at, men being but almost persuaded to be Christians.  
Hitherto Reason hath been considered in its quest, concerning the Unity of the Godhead, but before this disquisition is concluded, I cannot but take notice of that famed instance in Plato (cited by Eusebius, de praeparat. Evang. lib. undec. c. Dec. tert. who made the unity of the Godhead as a Characteristic or token, by which Dionysius should discern, whether his Letters or Epistles were jocular or serious. This seems to speak the Author naturally Orthodox, but doth not sufficiently justify him, and undoubtedly free him from the imputation of Polytheism, or a confused notion of the Deity, for it may be doubted whether he used that Beginning with one God as a mark of his more serious business, rather than to signify his settled opinion; because it would savour too much of a narrow and envious Spirit, not becoming a Philosopher, to have communicated that as a secret to Dionysius, and not so clearly and ingenuously declared it to the rest of the World in the whole series of his Discourses. It may be also a wonder that he could at any time writ Jocularly, and playing with the Deities, making the term Gods to be as a Signet to seal his more trivial secrecy, or less accurate writings, except it can be thought, that he, as a Socrates, derided and laughed at the Heathens Idolatry, being serious when Deus came into his mind, but laughing when he thought of Dij. This may be one plausible way to confirm the usual application of Plato's Epistolar Mark or Sign, but it is hard to be imagined, if his stile and manner of writing is considered.  
That which is said of Heathens ignorance, will not be easily refuted by citations taken from Porphyrius, Proclus or Plotinus, or other Platonists, seeing it may be presumed, that they entertained the same opinion of the Deity which their Master had. Now how far the Platonic Doctrine is to be embraced, may appear from the consideration of the Discourses 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which some have endeavoured to accommodate to Christ, the second Person in the Holy Trinity; For the second Principle in Plato's sense implies more, or rather is different from the personal distinction in the Trinity, as it is matter of Christian Belief. If it might be thought proper to vie Authority with Authority, I could instance in Heathens Eminent in Dignity, Morality and Learning, Antoninus and Severus who were not free from the thoughts of Polytheism, as may be conjectured from the Language of their public Professor of Philosophy, Alexand. Aphrod. in his book De fato, p. 135. which speaks of the Deity in a plural number, and attributes Omniscience and Prescience (which is the attribute of one and the only true God) to Dij, or God's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. This Language may be presumed to be suited to the Emperor's apprehension of the Deity. This also may be considered, Zenophon, who in a pleasant Discourse seems not altogether to speak his own sense or Language, but that which generally was received, says 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. which shows that the Unity of this supreme power, was not so apprehended to be infallibly denominated one as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 implies, which may not be translated is, but seems, Zenoph. in convivio. If this citation (as Table Discourse) may seem too familiar to bear the weight of Authority in strict ways of arguing, let the Author be considered, when he speaks most seriously, and when an extraordinary appearance of an Enemy obliged his thoughts to retirement, and engaged him to Devotion, it will appear doubtful, whether he was Theist or Polytheist, at the same breath confounding Deus and Dij, beginning with the one, and ending with the other, saying these words, concluding his Oration to the Soldiers. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Zen. de exped Cyri-pag. 296.  
Hitherto the Deity hath been considered, as it may be said to be known to the Reasoner, and the next disquisition is. What certain knowledge of the nature of the Soul and its immortality can be attained by mere Reason.  
As the Eye cannot see itself without a Mirror or Glass, so the Soul cannot know itself, at least as to its duration or immortality without Revelation. It is a difficult task to prove its existence, much more the eternal continuation of it, as appears by the French Philosopher, who seems to glory of his Invention, when he had (as he thought) found a way to convince the Sceptic of its distinct existence from the body. Wherefore (according to the former method) let his argument be examined, which concludes the existence of the Soul to be more demonstrable than that of the Body, because that which passes judgement on all other Being's, itself must exist. This consequence may not be denied, and it must be also concluded, that the Soul only passes judgement on objects, for the corporeal Organs are so far from discerning other objects, that without the Soul they cannot see themselves, the eyes can see no more than a pair of Spectacles, (if the Soul is not resident in them to judge of objects) or the Ear hear any more than an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the Nose smell any more than a Censer can the Incense which is burnt in it. This is enough to convince the Reasoner of the existence of a Spirit or Being in a human body which is distinct from it, did not the definition, which says the Soul is res cogitans, confound Reason itself whilst it considers it. For he who disputes nicely or sceptically, according to this definition may doubt whether Brutes may not be res cogitantes, and consequently have Souls of the same kind with the humane only differenced by gradual perfection; seeing some in former ages have not been so Dogmatical as to conclude positively that Brutes have no kind of cogitation or petty Reasonings, as appears from Platarch's Discourse with this Title, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; and perhaps some in this age would not deny them to be res cogitantes, did not this consequence attend the assertion, viz. The immortality of Brutish Souls which the Religious man cannot or may not imagine. Let this also be considered, that this argument for the proof of the Souls existence, as much as that above cited to prove the Being of God, will be thought defective, for this, as others, borrows its force from a supposition, which the Sceptic will not allow, neither will the more sober man ●ook upon that definition of a Soul as perfect, which may be accommodated to other Creatures, as it is above suggested. In the next place let an argument of a later Author, one eminent for Learning and Invention be considered, who says the nature of God is as intelligible as the nature of other Being's (which assertion in some ages of the Church would have been thought a just cause of putting the Author in the Catalogue of the Anomis or Anomaei, who by some of the Fathers were esteemed Erroneous in a high degree, if not Haeretical) and also attempts to make the nature of the Soul as intelligible and as easy to be discerned as the Sun (from which he borrows instances to express his more refined thoughts) whilst he defines a Spirit, a substance which hath self penetration, self contraction, and self dilatation in his book of the immortality of the Soul. This seems to help Reason in the conceiving the nature of a Spirit, but really the Author's notion of extension is not intelligible, for it supposes the possibility of many Spirits being so contracted, that they must appear to the apprehension as one, so that the mind cannot distinguish them, and it is impossible it can, whilst they are couched in a single superficies not divisible into another, not so much as in thought, therefore according to this method the mind must have false apprehensions whilst many Spirits are so contracted, that it must apprehend many Individuals as one Individual in a more confused conception than Genus and Species are conceived, with the numerous Being's which are comprehended in those terms of Art. Let this also be considered, that when Myriads of Spirits are confined to one extension, that being but one must be a substance common to all, so that the Spirits cannot decide Meum and Tuum, seeing by a kind of coalition they are united in substance. And it must be also imagined that the forms and faculties of those Spirits must be confused in one substance or extension, or at least for a time be separated from their proper substance, which is more difficult to be imagined, than the Souls taking a farewell from the Body for some short time, (which is very improbable) and then return again. It is confessed, the Author defends his definition of a Spirit in a plausible way, and perhaps will think these objections inconsiderable, however my design is answered, if it shows how Reason is confounded in framing a notion of a Spirit, which was declared so easy to be apprehended. If it is also said, that this is no new or monstrous assertion; for the Schools and ancient Fathers have determined that Thousands of Angels may be present in the least quantity, a point, or if there could be any less extension: let it be considered, that these positions were laid down to take off the gross apprehension of the vulgar, who could scarce stretch their imagination beyond material Being's, and frame notions of Spirits suitable to them, but did never undertake to explain the manner, or to determine whether Spirits were extended or not. Hitherto the two rational Assertors of the Souls immortality being considered, this Disquisition shall be concluded with this consideration, viz. The Souls eternal duration depends on the concourse of Divine Providence, which can conserve it or annihilate it, and this depends on God's pleasure or Will, of which the mere Reasoner must be ignorant; wherefore it is no great wonder, if some ancient Sophies spoke doubtfully of the Souls immortality. That which is said is enough to show the uncertainty of the Reasoners knowledge in this quest concerning the Soul; but perhaps it may be urged, that mere Reasoners, Plato and others have concluded its existence and immortality. This may be confessed, yet the Divine sentences in their writings, which speak this, seem rather Enthusiastic (or at least an innate or common notion) than the deduction of the discursive faculties. For if the Divine sentences which lie scattered in Plato's Books, and the media be weighed by which he made those conclusions, they will seem to be a building with a glorious superstructure without a foundation proportioned to its weight, or like an Arch which Mathematicians speak of, hanging in the Air, poised by its own proportions, without a Buttress or foundation. Plato's sentences may give him the title Divine, but his reasons, by which he proves them, speak him but a man.  
Hitherto I have discovered Reasons defect, or dim-sight in discerning the nature of God and the Soul, it will now be proper to enter on another disquisition, viz.  
Whether Grace in the Act of Faith altars the eyesight, and in what sense Reason is laid aside.  
The negative part of the first Clause of this disquisition is the Reasoners position, who concludes that Grace doth not alter the eyesight, but only brings the Object nigher, allowing the Believer no alteration, or better disposition of the eye of his Soul, by which he thinks he can the better effect what he designs, viz. To set up every private person as an Umpire, as infallible in defining matters of faith as a Council. For by the same Reason he will not allow the eyesight altered in a private person, he will deny any alteration of it (which is that which makes it infallible) in a Council. Thus making the private Reasoner, and rational members of a Council to discover truth no otherwise than by a mere natural sight (the object being brought nigher) he concludes them equally infallible. This project is built on a weak foundation, which will appear to be so, by considering the unaptness or indisposition in the Soul to discern truth from falsehood in Religious debates, which is plain from the vain attempts of Reason in the discovery of it. And the indisposition of the mind, which is not such as can be removed by frequent acts, which make a habit to facilitate knowledge in Arts and Sciences; for the Soul in this case, after the utmost of its endeavours to improve its understanding, must be beholding to, or dependent on some power besides its own, which must help it as well as bring the object nigher. For if we do but consider the several ways, by which the understanding is improved, we must conclude it is not by its own power. For the believers Soul must have Divine aid or assistance either mediate or immediate in the act of Faith which must be called Grace; which if it be only supposed to dispose the Organs, as there is a necessity of it in mad men, and those which are Fools only by a bodily defect, which renders those parts useless which were designed for the service of the Soul in the exercise of her Functions, it is more than bringing the object nigher. Logicians (which is only a hard name for rational men) say there is potentia prima, which renders a blind man as capable of seeing, if the Organs were well disposed, as he who hath a perfect sight. And those who say all Souls are equal, conclude the fault is in the Organs (if a man after the utmost of industry joined with advantage) is a Fool for this Reason, because his Soul is as capable of knowledge, as that of the greatest Sophies. This instance will agree with the Reasoner's case, who will allow no man to be a Spiritual Fool but on his own default, wherefore he stretches the interpretation of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to signify the sensual man, which cannot be allowed; for if he mean the debauched Epicure, than it would follow that every sober man would be assured of finding truth: for if there is not any fault in the eye of Reason (sensuality according to his assertion being removed) what can hinder? for if the eye is well disposed, and the object high, the the eye cannot but see. This is so certain, that there is a natural necessity of it, but the case is otherwise in discerning spiritual truth. For the most sober Heathens heave complained they were in darkness.  Quancum mortalia caecae Pectora noctis habent? 
The natural frame and indisposition of the mind occasioned this invincible ignorance, which may be so called, seeing it cannot be removed by humane Art or Industry, any more than a mad man can restore himself to a right mind.  
That God can improve the understanding is as evident as he can render it less perfect, which is plain from the punishment of our first forefather, who by his default forfeited much of his Reasoning faculty which was less perfect than in innocency; This cannot be denied, although the manner how the natural light was diminished, may puzzle those who will strictly examine it: For to diminish the understanding according to those who make cognitation the form of the Soul, is to make it to be less a Soul, which will not be allowed in Legick or Metaphysics, or according to that opinion which calls it a faculty or power of the mind to draw conclusions, it is hard to imagine how it should be disabled, except God uncreate or withdraw some perfection, or at least his Grace or Divine assistance, which is as much if not more necessary for preserving it in its due exercise of Reason in Religious debates, than the concourse of providence which hinders the World from turning to its first nothing. The former opinion cannot be allowed, the later if granted, will serve for the proof of the former assertion, for if it be (as it must be) allowed that God hath and can make the Soul less perfect by withdrawing his Grace, he can, and doth improve it by supplies of the same; also The truth of this cannot be denied, although it may seem obscure, if it meet with the Reasoner, who perhaps will be as much puzzled with the word Grace, as he is with the word Schism. Which demur will soon be removed if Grace be taken for Divine assistance, which perfects the understanding, although the manner how it is done, cannot be otherwise than conjecturally expressed; For the strict Reasoner says, if the matter of Fact be certain, what's and hows, not and not to hinder assent; wherefore it being proved that there is a necessity of Divine assistance, 'tis not so necessary to examine strictly the manner any more, than when we take it granted, that a Spirit can act on matter though the invention cannot imagine how, It is enough to conclude the truth of the former assertion, if God in the Act of faith do only excite notions in the mind, not only by proposal of objects nigher, but by direction of the will to give its assent, without which these notions or conclusions would have been dormant, or at least doubtfully entertained by mere Reason following its own conduct. Before I dispatch this part of the Disquisition, it is necessary to prevent what may be objected from the former instance, viz. If Adam in his pure naturals had a distinct knowledge of God, and consequently could have assented to all the Articles of Religion without any other assistance than the bare proposal of them with appeals to his own Reason, laying aside sensuality (which must be allowed to be the occasion of his fall without straining Cabalistical Divinity, which calls it forbidden fruit) so his posterity may be abstracting their thoughts from sensual objects arrive at the same degree of perfection: This granted (which cannot be) will not qualify the Reasoner for Christian belief; for could he suppose himself endowed with the same faculties with which innocency was invested, he will be but a Viator (as the Schools say) more imperfect than the Christian, not a Comprehensor of matters of faith. Some Scholasticks have been so far from concluding, that the knowledge which Adam had of God at least as Triunus, was purely natural, that they doubted not to call it infused, for this reason (as well as the Authority of St. Austin. lib. undec. de Genesi ad litter. because it is not probable that God would suffer the Protoplast to be ignorant of that which was matter of faith to all his posterity; And it may be safely concluded, that Adam's Christian posterity give assent to the whole Sacred Volume of Scripture by the same method and means by which Adam assented to, and believed that Synopsis of the whole Gospel, The seed of the Woman shall bruise the Serpent's head. If it is said that Adam's posterity have a measure of knowledge, as much greater than that of their first forefather, as the second Adam is justly exalted above the first; yet this advance of knowledge owes not its Original to mere natural powers. For though the Christian Believer (without breach of modesty) may be said to know more than his first Forefather; yet that higher degree of knowledge doth not only owe its improvement to a fuller declaration of God's Will in the latter, than in the first Gospel preached to Adam by God himself, but also to the Divine supplies, which are proportioned to the extent of the Revelation; otherwise the Christian could no more believe his large Creed, than it can be imagined, Adam could have comprehended the sum of it, declared to him in few words without Divine interpretation or assistance.  
If this instance seem not close to the question, let the will and the understanding be two eyes of faith, though by some one is called blind Caeca potestas, which error is corrected by later Philosophy) be examined, and they will in their pure naturals be found defective. For as in naturals 'tis not enough that the eye is well disposed, but a certain position of the object, and direction of the eye is necessary for some Discoveries, so although 'tis allowed that Reason is no more new Reason by Grace, than an eye is a new eye, which by skilful directions discerns that which it saw not before; yet this assistance though it do not frame sight, but direct the eye, 'tis enough to destroy that position which says in spiritual Vision only the object is brought nigher. Add to this the mere disposal of Media in order to perfect Vision and it will give way for this assertion, that Divine assistance is necessary, for we must acknowledge, that several conclusions have been passed as true which before were doubted of, when a quick and happy invention hath found a fit medium to prove them, or at least render them more easy to be understood. To instance in that which is nearest to man, his own Soul, its existence is better apprehended by being compared to some thin air, which hath power, though invisible. Besides it is beyond dispute, that some supernatural power infuseth notions in dreams, which the Soul itself could not excite. I dispute not whether there are any such in these days, 'tis enough to show, that the Divine method without violence to Reason hath made such discoveries in some ages of the Church, and may continue his assistance (though not in the same manner, for that would not appear consistent with the settled and more perfect state of the Church) to help Reason in giving its assent to Divine truth. I need add no more for the confutation of the Reasoners position than the proposal of the Discourse in the former disqusition, which shows that there is a Beam in the eye of Reason, which if not removed, renders it so dim-sighted that it cannot discern the Elements and first principles of Religion, which are rudely in man's mind, and need some assistance for the due composure of the thoughts concerning God and his worship; wherefore let the Reasoner consider Grace but as a Chirurgeons hand which couches a Pearl on the eye, or takes away the Gutta serena; Yet by this act the sight is better, and this cannot be without alteration. Add to this the proposal of objects and the disposition of the eye and media (which the eye itself cannot dispose) is enough to show that Grace by such acts may be said to have altered the sight, which might be rendered obscure and confused by default of the medium or Organ; for as the Soul looks through the eye as a Glass, which if sullied or discoloured by any Disease, the judgement is passed according to the tincture which is in the eye, not in the object, and consequently is as ill a Judge of colours, as he who views objects with coloured Prospectives or any Catoptrical device to deceive the eye; so in spiritual Vision the Soul looks with the eyes which have the disease, therefore 'tis not probable it should discern its own malady, much less discover truth. To conclude this part of the Disquisition, it may be confidently affirmed that Grace altars the sight, though it do but take off a film or scale, as from St. Paul's eyes, which the natural man by his own power is no more able to remove than the eye by dropping tears (a way to put out eyes rather than restore them) can do as much as any eye-water which the Oculist can prepare.  
From what is here said, there is an easy digression to the other part of the Disquisition (how Reason is laid aside in some acts of Faith (a question which much exercised the Reconciler) whilst it doth not follow the dictates of its own understanding, but gives itself up to the guidance of another, (the Divine knowledge) which advantageously supplies nature's defect, which makes way for this conclusion, viz. Reason in some cases is as much and may as properly be said to be laid aside, as a Judge who is limited by his Monarch, that he may not pass sentence in all cases on his own judgement, but in some must consult and follow the directions of the supreme Magistrate, by doing of which he is so far laid aside, that as to that particular case, he may not so properly be called Judge as a Proclaimer of Justice determined by his Superior. And for the illustration, I cannot but insert a story which I borrow from an Eminent Mathematician who says, a Judge puzzled with a Case of two persons who had made exchange of Fields which were Isoperimeters, or of equal sides but different figures, one a Rombus or obliqne Angled, the other a square or right Angled parallelogram, was necessitated to call a Geometrician to discover the Cheat, which discovery in strictness was enough to call the Mathematician Judge, though the sentence was pronounced by another. This is applicable to the Spiritual method of improving the understanding and determining the Will in matters of faith, if God be considered as the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to inform Reason which is defective, and as ignorant as the Judge in the former Case.  
From this instance 'tis plain and easy to imagine how advantageously Reason is laid aside, being diverted from its usual method in giving assent to propositions (which are true) yet in themselves not sufficiently evident, now evidence of the truth to the Soul in its pure naturals is so necessary, that there is no assent certain without it, but it is otherwise in the act of saith, when Divine Testimony supplies the place of natural evidence. If it be urged that Reason proceeds according to its own principles, and when it submits to the Divine Testimony, 'tis because Reason is informed by Revelation, That it is not a Competent Judge of Religious Mysteries; yet that assent being guided by the Divine Testimony instead of evidence, diverting the faculties of the Soul from their usual method, is enough to assert, Reasons being laid aside.  
Yet this will not make way for a cavilling complaint, that the Divine determination doth violence to the faculties whilst thus diverted from their usual method, for the Divine concourse which determines them, can no more be said to do violence, than the Mathematicians information of the Judge in the former case can be called compulsion when he prevailed with him to pass true sentence, which he without the Artist could not have pronounced.  
It is not necessary that matters of belief are clearly and distinctly understood, for faith takes its name from persuasion (which is not always begotten by demonstration,) and from assent more than from the manner how it is wrought; for the Divine method hath several ways to command belief, sometimes it makes an extempore Convert, grace working effectually in a moment, sometimes it operates through the whole course of man's life to perfect the work. It is enough that men are assured that their assent is terminated in truth, because of the Divine determination which makes the Will like the Loadstone (which instance is much used by the Reconciler) which will certainly conduct the Mariner, though he knows not how it is directed, whether by a materia subtilis, passing through the poles of this low vortex, or any other mysterious way of nature. To speak all, if Sailing had been laid aside till the Pilot could demonstrate its infallible direction from its causes, the greater part of the World would have been unknown, and the terra incognita would take more room in the Map than the known part of the World: The same may be concluded of faith, for if all belief was to be suspended until the manner how it was wrought was explained, a great part of the World would pass as Infidels.  
Thus far the infirmity of the mere natural sight hath been discovered, it now remains that I inquire in what sense the Reconciler, who urgeth belief as an Act of Prudence, by which if he only understand a rational choice excluding grace, the former discourse will equally conclude against him and the Reasoner. For if a man endued with natural Prudence, must necessarily embrace the Christian Religion, because its contents are such as will command assent from the Reasonable man, he shuts out Grace in the Act of Faith, and makes the Holy Scriptures more sufficient, and in another sense than ever they were said to be (for which they are said to be so (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by Athanasius, Cyril, and other holy Fathers) it is to show they are self-sufficient without the subsidies of Traditions not in any other sense; for although it must be granted that the proposal of Scripture is enough to condemn the Infidel as imprudent; yet this condemnation may not be justified only, because the evidence of Scripture was not allowed, for it is more than probable that the neglect of Petitioning for Grace, and opposing it when offered, to help unbelief, doth adjust the severity of that saying, He who believes not shall be damned. Natural Prudence is not a sufficient qualification for the embracing Christian Religion, if we take it in Aristotle's sense, who defines it an habitual knowledge which can discern what is good and what is evil as they have relation to practice. lib. Sexto Ethicor. ad Nicom. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Prudence thus defined can have no place as Antecedent to belief, because that mere Reason in several Cases cannot judge, what is good for man, and what evil, and therefore will demur at some duties absolutely necessary for the attaining of happiness, such as are self-denial and other injunctions which natural prudence will not choose, if left to its own evidence. And if it be considered as subsequent to belief, there is no need of it in discerning what is good in practice and what is evil, for duties in Religion are indispensably enjoined, which destroys consultation, which denominates a man Prudent. I shall conclude this particular with Christ's deciding the Controversy by ranking the Prudent man, in this sense not so wise as a Babe, without Divine assistance. And when it is taken in a better sense, Divine direction and concourse is supposed as necessary to supply the defect of the mind (and therefore may challenge the Etymology which Aristotle gives of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whilst he calls it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) which God alone is able to do, and make men wise unto Salvation. Add to this another consideration, that a Prudential choice of Religion, supposes it and its reward too, to be exposed as a prize, not in the Apostlical sense. So that he who hath the greatest stock of Prudence must pass as most Religious, when he who hath the least, be esteemed a Reprobate.  
From all that is said I shall only infer this conclusion, seeing our eyesight needs alteration and itself is indisposed, the Believer doth safely resign himself to the conduct of the All-seeing-eye, according to the Rule of a severe Philosopher (who would not admit any truth, but upon the evidence of Reason) who says, we may in some Cases as safely trust others as ourselves, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Arist. lib. Sext. Ethic. ad Nicom. So far as men follow an unerring conduct, so far they are infallible, though they are not their own Leaders.  
Hitherto Reason hath been considered as it is in a single person, but the following Disquisition considers it in a multitude, or an Assembly as it attends their Sacred Votes, by which it is made more infallible, than when as a Monarch, it asserts its seeming privileges by renouncing all manner of assistance in drawing conclusions, but only that, which were nature affords, relying on private evidence, which also is supposed in every particular Member of a Council. Therefore it is proper to examine whether Reason only, enlightened by apprehending the story and contents of the old and new Testaments, is capable of appeals made to it as Judge, and the last determiner of Controversies, so as it can pass infallible judgement on propositions offered as Revelation: And whether the fallibility of some Councils renders all so suspicious that the Christian cannot safely rely on Conciliary definitions.  
The first branch of this inquiry is affirmed by the Reasoner, and the other he will not have denied, because it makes way for the proof of the former, for by insinuating that all Councils are fallible, he presumes he may as well appeal to a fallible self, as a fallible multitude. But this assertion may be checked from this consideration; That there is much difference between these propositions; General Councils may err; And, All have been and are liable to Error. If the latter is granted, it will destroy the certainty of a visible Church at any time since it was founded, if not the being of any truly so called. For that principle which obligeth a man to believe, that all Councils have been fallible, will never put him out of doubt, whether the profession of the Church at any time was agreeable to the truth of Religion. For seeing the Reasoners rule admits of nothing as certain, further than it is knowable by some faculty of the Soul, independent form Divine assistance, it is impossible that he can have any more than conjectural knowledge, Reason being not able to inform him of a Criterion of a true Church by its own evidence, but by Revelation, which says the true faith shall not fail. Now that this true faith is in a doubtful case, must be determined by those who have power from God to make a certain discovery of it. That which is said, is so agreeable to the Apostolical rule, no Scripture is of private interpretation, (which must be confessed by the Reasoner, though there was no Sacred Authority to confirm that Canon) that it is only necessary that objections are removed. The first of which may be this, that by the delivery of Reason in private persons to be determined by that which prevails in a multitude, is to make or set up a Rational Papacy. For as each Member of the Roman Church is no further esteemed Orthodox than he delivers up his private reason either to the Pope alone, or as he is in juncto with a general Council, which is said to have such power to determine infallibly, though the interpretation make Scripture to be no Scripture; So every Christian is to be esteemed Orthodox or Haeretical according to the sense of the Council, which hath power to interpret and make his reason to be no reason.  
No such conclusion can follow, and if it did, it would not break the force of the arguments, which confirm the former positions. For suppose the Definitions of Councils as conclusions, which Reason draws from the premises, nor as none can be so rash as to say, Reason makes the conclusion true which was so before, (only it could not commend it to the will and understanding, as an object of natural faith, till the two propositions were brought as witnesses of the truth of the conclusion,) or that Logic creates truth, but only assists the invention in its search for it; so by the same reason none may say, that Councils make Articles of true Religion, though they are the means of their discovery.  
But let this objection be considered as it relates to Papal Decretals. The name Pope will never affright the sober man out of that reverence which is due to just Authority, Councils and holy Synods, or if it be found to be so in a single person. For if it could be proved (as some have affirmed) that the Pope was and is the Church Virtual, it would be beyond dispute, that infallibility did at some time since Christian Religion was in the World, sit in the Chair, or at least may do, when fundamental controversies arise, which threaten the Church's ruin without the imputation of making Scripture to be no Scripture by his Authority. It may be safely said by any Christian, that he would not give assent to several Doctrines which are urged as matters of faith necessarily to be believed for the attaining Salvation, did not the Church declare them to be so; yet the same person on the same principle is not obliged to think, that which is so defined by the Church is made true by its definition. Hitherto I have used this comparison (which makes the determinations of Councils as conclusions of a Syllogism made by the Heads of the World) to illustrate the answer to an objection; but it being so apposite to another design, it shall be used to show, that the Reasoner in a Council is not capable of making a Syllogism from mere natural Topics to demonstrate the truth of that which is debated. This will appear to be true from the consideration of the Structure of a Syllogism, which leads us to the knowledge of a proposition, which was less known, by others which are more evident, and easy to be understood. For the medium (which is an ingredient of both propositions) is as clear and as certain as a common notion, and the truth of the conclusion depends on it, which if mistaken, makes the Syllogism a fallacy. Suppose therefore the Members of a Council as so many Scholasticks arguing, they have no such common notions as Philosophers have, by which as media, they can draw conclusions. Although it must be confessed that the understanding by its own evidence can judge of the truth of some propositions (viz. It is impossible, God can do any act which implies a contradiction, etc. Yet Divine Revelation is the medium by which truth in propositions, which are more obscure, is determined. Hence it sollows that the Sanctions and Definitions of Councils must be said to be Hypothetically pronounced true, as this saying is, viz. If the Moon is Eclipsed, the Earth interposeth itself between it and the Sun. Not unlike this is the way of arguing in a Council, which proves Christ's humanity from his Passion; for if he suffereth, humane nature did interpose itself, else he could not suffer. Now as none will say, there is and always was anecessity not in the nature of the Moon, but in the manner of its motion, that it must be Eclipsed at some times (for to say so, is to confine the Almighty's wisdom to one System, and to take away the possibility of the World's being in such a frame in which neither Sun or Moon might be Eclipsed) but when it is seen to be so, it is evident, that the Earth's interposition is the cause of that seeming defect. So a Council cannot conclude the necessity of Christ's being Man but Hypothetically; For the Divine decrees (which reason cannot know but by Revelation) are as the condition or antecedent which makes Christ's humanity necessary. Let not this assertion seem strange, since it is impossible, but that reason must be defective as it appears from the former instance, as also from this consideration, that the mere Reasoner cannot conclude the necessity of Christ's incarnation, and will be more at a loss in other mysterious matters of faith. The definitions and conclusions of Councils thus hypothetically drawn are not less certain, because they are such, seeing the Antecedents of their propositions are matters of fact contained in holy Scriptures, and those who discourse, have Divine assistance in discerning the connexion and inferring the consequences; Now the connexion and sequel is true, because of the Divine direction, as is already proved, and the Antecedent, viz. matters of fact, is so, as it appears from the miracles which confirmed their truth, which were such as reason might discern to be Divine; for Reason may be allowed a Judge in this case, though not in all doubts which come under debate in a Council. The reason of which is this, Miracles being works which exceed mere natural power or ordinary course of nature, it is furnished with faculties which can discern what is natural, and what not, but is at a loss in higher mysteries.  
This assertion perhaps may be checked by an instance in conciliary proceed in discerning Canonical Books of Holy Scripture from Apocryphal, or any falsely so called, in which, judgement is passed by mere rational evidence, whilst it distinguisheth the one from the other by their Contents. This must not be granted; for though the contents of Holy Scriptures are a good argument of their truth; yet they are not the only Characteristics to distinguish them from others which are not Canonical. When there is any debate in a Council concerning any part of Scripture to be admitted into Canon, appeals are not made to mere Reason to judge of its contents, any further than by comparison of them with those of other Books, which are received without any controversy. It is the Councils business to argue as the Apostolical Canon says 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the Church of England concludes the definitions of Councils deductions of Reason (Artic. 21) which admits of this limitation or rather interpretation, that though Reason draws the conclussions; yet their truth is not measured by a bare congruity to it, but the reception of it in the primitive Church, or the most free and  Councils, and so much of its as belongs to the Old Testament by the Jewish Catalogue, and by several other Rules, which are as a Touchstone to discover Gold, and distinguish it from base Metals. To speak all, Conciliary Discussions in this case do not inquire how Revelation is agreeable to Reason, but what is to be admitted as Revelation, and what to be rejected, and when that is done, compare one Text with another till they agree, which consent is the most infallible evidence of truth. However it is scarce probable, that the Reasoner will be persuaded or argued out of his pretended private infallibility, whilst he concludes, every individual man may proceed on the same ground which Councils do, because each rational man being in some degree more or less able to draw conclusions by Analogy, or comparing the several contents of Holy Scriptures. Wherefore let it be supposed, that each reasonable man is naturally qualified to find truth; yet seeing the promise of Divine assistance (which is the most sure foundation on which infallibility can rest) is not to a single person, those natural qualifications cannot assure them of finding it.  
I am sensible that the Reasoner may take occasion from what is said of urging a question, whether the former assertion doth take the privilege from every private person, so that in any case he cannot interpret Scripture.  
The affirmative of this question may be safely maintained as it hath respect to private persons who are known Members of the Church, and have opportunity of being acquainted with, and to be informed, what is the interpretation and sense of the Church in general, which must be a direction to those who pass judgement in particular cases, for they may not appeal from Synods to their own private reason, and because truth is certainly to be found in Councils, and there are Rules of finding it.  
If it is further demanded, whether a private person who hath neither learning or opportunity to understand the sense of the Church, may not be a safe interpreter of Scripture in order to his own Satisfaction and Salvation?  
As this proposes an extraordinary case, so the answer may be dubiously returned. However it may be said to the first part of the question, that it cannot be well supposed, that any illiterate person should of necessity be ignorant of the sense of the Church, seeing he is a known Member of the same, and the pastors are as Mouths to declare it. To the other part of the question, which supposes a Christian so unfortunately (amongst the Infidels) placed, that he cannot have access to Pastors of the Church, it is enough to propose another question, viz. Whether the Thief on the Cross who may be supposed to want time (though nothingmore could be wanting whilst Christ was with him) did give assent to all fundamentals of Religion by faith as explicit as is required of other christians who have the advantage of more time and other circumstances? The answer given to this will help the solution of the other doubt.  
The manner of Conciliary proceed being considered, and the unfitness of the mere reasoner for such debates: in he next place the necessity of Councils shall be proved, by which the other part of the Disquisition will be better understood.  
Such Sacred Assemblies are necessary, though not at all times (for some ages passed without them) for the exigency of the Church requires such supplies. To imagine it could always be without them, is to conclude it exempt from all possibility of erring, and independent as to the Divine conduct, which is promised to lead it and continue it in the way of truth; The former cannot be granted, for Heresies must be, and then there is as great necessity of their condemnation. The latter cannot be allowed, for as it intrenches on the Divine Dominion, so it doth equalise the Church Militant with the Triumphant, whose greatest Trimuph is our Error.  
This necessity of Councils is confirmed from the consideration of different opinions concerning matters of faith, which equally commend themselves to the Christian, and render his Will so indifferent, that he knows not to which part to incline, till determined by Authority. It is no strange thing to meet with two opinions in other cases, which plead for themselves with such equal probability, that the most accurate judgement will rather suspend its belief, than give assent to either; neither let it appear a prodigy, if Religion afford such cases as would render its proselytes or professors sceptically puzzled without a more infallible guide than their own Reason.  
But it may be said, that in other cases the wise men do not give themselves up to a Sect or Council of Philosophers to be umpires in dubious matters. This is granted, for it is unreasonable that they should deliver up their Reason to the most famed Sophies, but the reason is not the same in Religious debates. For a single person may be qualified for finding truth in Philosophy, with such certainty as may vie with the numerous Sects; but no private member of the Church may pretend to that cretainty which must be allowed in Councils. It is possible that one man may be master of more reason and Philosophy than is to be found in all the World at that time, and one walking Library more valuable than a Vatican; but Religious knowledge is not designed to be so Monastical as to live in solitude or a single person. Besides, if it could be proved that the Philosophers had the same assurance of a true conduct in their doubts by reason, which the Councils have by Divine supplies, he would be unreasonable in a high degree who would not give up or resign his private reason to their determinations.  
The great assertor of the Roman Church (D. Stap.) was not altogether mistaken when he introduced Divine assistance to help the Church in making a Syllogism (though the manner of its conveyance seems inconsistent, whilst he makes the Members of it to be discursive in the premifes as mere Reasoners, but infallibly assisted in the conclusion) for Revelation must take place of pure natural invention in the whole matter of Religious debates.  
That there is a necessity of the Resignation of Reason to Authority must be granted, and it is urged by several methods. Two late Authors (who considered and examined humane Reason) endeavour to convince men of the necessity of giving up our private reason to the public judgement of other persons, who have better means of knowing of truth than we ourselves have, as one expresseth it, and both press it by an instance of an appeal in naturals from sense to reason. This way of arguing may be persuasive, but not cogent enough to evince men of the necessity of that which they designed to prove; for although it is safely concluded that the Members of Councils have better qualifications for discovery of truth than private persons; yet their learning and natural endowments are not that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the foundation on which faith is laid.  
Besides the similitude of appeals from Sense to Reason is not apposite, and implies a supposition of the senses being erroneous, which in strictness cannot be allowed, but let that be supposed, it cannot well be accommodated to the case, for sense and reason in man are not so much strangers as the public Representatives of the Church in Councils are to its particular Members. The same percipient is employed in reason and sense, and according to its different acts and objects hath distinct compellations, sensual or rational, as the same River takes several names from the Channels through which it runs. For when the Soul perceives material impresses on the Brain without any consideration or reflex act, it is called sensation (as when it perceives a body as it is figured in that part which nature designed for Fancy, to be Triangular or Globular, red or white, or as it is represented in other figures or colours) but when it deliberates and draws conclusions, such as cannot be the work or result of a naked representation of the object, it challengeth its just title rational. Now to suppose this similitude exactly apposite, is to conclude that every private person should have his Soul employed and acting (as junto which cannot be imagined) in every particular debate of a Council as the percipient is in sensation and Reasoning.  
More arguments might be urged to evince the necessity of Councils, but I do not intent to be so voluminous, but to pass to another inquiry concerning truth and its certainty of being so, as it is in lawful Councils. Satisfaction will be given to this inquiry, if it is considered that the true faith was once delivered to the Saints as St. Judas says, and what that true faith is may be found in some conciliary Definitions since Christ's coming into the World, and that it may be safely concluded, that it is found when there is a general consent, which is an infallible 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and as certain as any medium in Demonstration. Suppose one true opinion in Philosophy and a Thousand in which there is truth, but mixed with error; If they all agree in some positions it is an undoubted argument of the truth of those in which all agree. This way of passing judgement on Definitions of Councils upon examination will appear as certain as that which draws conclusions from this rule. Quoe in aliquo tertio conveniunt inter se conveniunt. That trite saying 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is more than a proverbial conclusion, for it is founded in reason, which must conclude error hath many Moeanders and distracting paths: but truth hath a narrow way, in which only itself can walk. And it must needs be so for this reason; truth being in some Conciliary Definitions, they must be as the Centre in which, all which are true, necessarily meet. If it is said, that it is possible that those Definitions, which are to be as a Standard to measure others, may not be found, the Church being defrauded or abused by misfortune or cunning, and consequently at a loss in the search for truth, as much as he who sails without a Compass.  
This cannot be supposed because of the Divine promise of the preservation of the truefaith, though not at all times discoverable. But let it be imagined that some true Conciliary Definitions may be wanting, than the supposition is destroyed, which implies a Catholic consent, which cannot be so called, if but one Definition is left out: Therefore it may be concluded that Truth is to be found by this Method; though with as much difficulty as Archimedes discovered the Gold, and the quantity of it in his Prince's Crown, which a Cheat had Adulterated with base Metals.  
Religion therefore being in its own frame and nature fitted for the severest Inquisition, it will not stand in fear of the boldest Adversary, Authority in its name bids the Reasoner be modest, and its matter which it enjoins further commands him to be so, whilst he speaks of that which transcends his understanding. It may now seem proper to suggest these Arguments which seem to invalidate Authority, and render it less valuable; This is done by objecting the errors of Councils, and the manner of their Process by Votes or Suffrages; the first of which seems to insinuate to the Christian, the posibility of the body of the Church being altogether disjointed, and its total Apostasy with the same reason that a man may conclude that mankind cannot be exempt from the possibility of being Cripples, because that some bones have been out of their proper place, and the other seems to render them more contemptible, by comparing them with Processes of Courts which are purely humane; both these are as easily confuted as named, and may be more effectually retorted on reason, as it is exercised in the several ways of Government in several ages. For the former objection is removed in the precedent Disquisition, and the other will appear to be weak and disabled, if it is considered that Votes and Suffrages in holy Councils are as Lots in the choice of an Apostle, which having infallible Direction from God may vie certainty with a Decree or any way of Election. Mathias was no less an Apostle, neither was his Authority more doubted, with which he was invested by Lots, than that of the other Apostles, who had an oral mission from Christ himself. I might further assert Ecclesiastical Authority, by showing the safety of relying on the Authority of Councils with a more firm assent than History or the humane Lawgiver can challenge; For the Historian (I mean the profane) commits not Annals to posterity upon peril of his own ruin, in case some cunning and political inventions be interwoven in them like some of the History which Zenophon wrote, which seems more like a Romance than an impartial Relation of Cyrus his Life and Education; and those who give precepts to other men, sometimes have a reserve of immunity, and exemption from them to themselves: But holy Councils have no such equivocation, which though it may seem pious deceit, cannot sit safely in Sacred Assemblies, neither may any Members of them as an Arian profess one, and carry another Creed in his Bosom: were it possible that any Member of a true Council might do this safely and without peril of his own ruin, Conciliary Definitions might be rendered more suspicious, but the case is otherwise in such Sacred debates, the Members of Councils as well as private persons of the Church are like St. Paul and his Company in the Ship which could not be secured from the Tempest, If all were not saved, or at least in a capacity of being so, for as the Apostle might not escape upon a Planck alone; neither may the public representatives of the universal Church promise themselves Salvation, it they willingly define any such matters of faith to the people as may endanger the making Shipwreck of a good Conscience relying on their Authority. For those who out of design define error as matters of faith, are in equal danger, if not more, with those who put their Definitions in practice.  
Hence appears the certainty of that knowledge which is the effect of faith, which as much exceeds that which is purely humane, as Science doth Opinion, which is such a low and fickle degree of knowledge as seems suited for trifling things below Heavenly objects; for God hath disposed of Religious matters in such manner, as that a man may know God, and be informed of his own duty with as great certainty, if not greater, than he can know the objects of natural Science. For the difference which the Schools make between Faith and Science consists not only in the certainty of the one being greater than the other, but in the manner of Evidence in the objects, which occasions the grand cavil against faith, as being an unreasonable piece of service imposed on man, and which is to give assent to that which cannot commend itself to the understanding with sufficient evidence.  
If this is urged, it may be retorted upon Science, for if nothing must command assent (as it is before said) but what is clearly and distinctly perceived, Euclid's Demonstrations must be less in number, and more maimed; and there will be only the name of Science of many things left in the world. Besides there is no reason of complaint of want of evidence in the act of faith, for it is evidence enough, that the mind is informed that it cannot comprehend its object, however it ought to give assent. Let this be made more plain by a supposition: Suppose a Terra incognita (I do not mean that which Geographers call so, for that in future ages may have a new name in the Map) or some part of the world was so designed and contrived by the Creator, that it is impossible it should be known: Or suppose there were Planetary Regions habitable, but not intended to be discovered clearly to man, 'tis enough in this feigned case, that men are informed that there are such places, and advised of the impossibility that they should be known. This fiction is applicable to more serious and Religious cases, and may stop the mouths of a querulous Generation of seekers, who are content with a low degree of knowledge, which doth not excel opinion in certainty, which kind of knowledge was so little esteemed amongst some of the Philosophers, that it was placed by them in the imagination, rather than the understanding, as better suiting with the condition of Brutes than men. 'Tis true the Schools have been more kind and courteous to Opinion, and give it a place in the Understanding, but being there according to their account of it, sits trembling and in fear it may be deceived, and that which it apprehends to be true may be false; This considered will exalt faith (which in a lose description, may be called Reason Divinely assisted and directed) above mere carnal Reasonings, and justify the challenge which St. Paul makes in his Christian Armour, where is the Disputer of the World?   
FINIS.