Licenced, Jan. 5. 1693/ 4. A DISCOURSE OF Government, As Examined by Reason, Scripture, AND Law of the Land. OR True Weights and Measures BETWEEN Sovereignty and Liberty. Written in the Year 1678. By Sir PHILIP WARWICK Knight. LONDON, Printed for Samuel Lowndes, over against Exeter-Exchange in the Strand. 1694. THE Publisher TO THE READER. AFter so many pamphlets of false and impious Politics, which have poisoned the minds of people with evil notions of government, tending to the overthrow of all established rules and orders of justice, equity, and common honesty, in the acknowledgement and practice of which the happiness of a nation doth consist, the heat and violence of passion being now somewhat abated, and persons more at leisure to attend to the sober counsels and dictates of reason, it will not, I hope, be judged an ill grounded presumption, to suppose, that this discourse written with great strength of reason and argument, after long and serious deliberation, and a deep research into the fundamental and essential laws of humane nature, and the constitution of the English government, and done several years since, without any prejudice, or partiality, or design to gratify a private passion or interest, will meet with a reception and entertainment, suitable to the great name of the Author, and the excellency of the performance among all such, as have learning and skill to judge, and candour and honesty to submit to the power and convictions of truth. For as to the disciples and followers of Buchanan, Hobbs, and Milton, who have exceeded their Masters in downright impudence, scurrility, and lying, and the new modellers of Commonwealths, who under a zealous pretence of securing the rights of a fancied original contract against the encroachments of Monarches, are sowing the seeds of eternal disagreements, confusions, and bloody wars throughout the world (for the influence of evil principles hath no bounds, but like infectious air spreads every where) the peaceable, sober, truly Christian, and Church-of, contained in this book, being so directly contrary to their furious, mad, unchristian, and fanatical maxims, it cannot otherwise be expected, but that they will soon be alarmed, and betake themselves to their usual arts of slander and reviling, and grow very fierce and clamorous upon it. Whatever shall happen, it is not out of a design to caress and flatter one Party, or to provoke and exasperate another, that this book is at this time published, but to do service unto truth, and to restore it to its native beauty, by taking off those masks and disguises, with which it has of late been disfigured, and to settle men's minds with true notions of the original of government. For discourses of this nature, founded upon law and reason, will hold at all times, and will never be unseasonable. I shall not run out into any unnecessary or excessive commendation and praise of the Author, nor do I now pretend to write his just and full character; it may suffice to say in short, that he was a Gentleman of sincere piety, of strict morals, of a great and vast understanding, and of a very solid judgement; a true Son of the Church of England, and consequently a zealous asserter and defender of the truly Christian and Apostolical doctrine of non-resistence; always loyal and faithful to the King, his Master, in the worst of times, whose fortunes he steadily followed, and upon whom he had the honour to attend in several places, during the course of the wars, particularly at Edge-hill, Oxford, and at the treaty in the isle of Wight; and who by his wise conduct, and faithful advice and behaviour, gained a good esteem in his royal judgement: and yet at the same time he was a true hearted Englishman; a great lover of his Country; and one, who wished as well to the constitution, and to the established religion and laws, as any of those demure Pretenders, who sat in the same Parliament of forty one with him, and raised that rebellion against their rightful Sovereign, as he openly called it in the House of Commons after the restoration, when some were making excuses for it, from which we are to date all the miseries and confusions, which we have undergone, and do still labour under. A reflection upon those sad times, and the villainous principles, upon which they then acted, put him upon writing this compendious discourse, in which he has marked out a plain and certain way to preserve, and, when lost by fatal miscarriages, to recover our peace and happiness together with the honour, the strength, the riches, the trade of the Nation. The notions here laid down, are true and just, and tend to the quiet and advantage of mankind in general, and have their weight and use in all Countries, where the laws of natural and civil justice prevail. It is an exact Scheme or Idea of government, derived from its first principles, in which he sets forth the necessary and essential powers of Sovereignty, the virtues of a Prince, the indispensable duty of Subjects, the qualifications of a Counsellor of State, and the method of a wise administration and conduct in all emergencies, whether in relation to domestic or foreign affairs, or to the various conditions and professions of men in a well constituted kingdom. This great Man, after his retiring into the Country, where he seemed to live above the world, and to be no way affected with the glittering pomp and glory of it, which he with a true greatness of mind despised, addicted himself to reading, study, and meditation: and that so many serious and wise thoughts, as his certainly were, might not be wholly lost, he put them down in writing, for his own private satisfaction, in a due method and order, one depending upon another, to give them greater strength and beauty: and being very assiduous in his contemplations (if not diverted by the necessary business of life, by visits of friends, by journeys to town, for two or three months in the year, to attend upon a place, which was his first preferment in the Court, and by the exercises of an undissembled piety and devotion) he had an opportunity of writing several quires of paper upon various subjects, (for his admirable and inquisitive genius was not confined to any one particular study and learning) as Divinity, Philosophy, History, especially that of England, Practical Devotion, and the like. This I now publish, was written in the year 1678, (and designed as an appendix to his Memoires of the reign of King Charles the first, of most blessed memory, which hereafter may see the light, when more auspicious times shall encourage and favour the publication) which he, being very exact and curious in his compositions, did often refine upon. Yet notwithstanding this care, there seems to be a defect, page 13, which he designed to fill up, and questionless did it, as I find by a reference made there to some lose paper, which I could never meet with. But however as it is, I doubt not, but that this discourse will be highly instructive and useful to the young Sons of the Nobility and Gentry, the growing hopes of their Country, and who one day by their virtue, courage, loyalty, wisdom, and learning, befitting their birth and quality, will make a great figure in it: for the seasoning of whose minds, capable of the highest and noblest impressions, with virtuous and true notions of Policy, and for their direction and service, it is chief published, and to whom therefore it is humbly dedicated. The Reader is desired to correct the following errata, which have escaped the diligence of the Corrector. PAg. 29. l. 29. Person. p. 89. l. 29. make, is p. 80. l. 23. were. p. 121. l. 13. reckoned. 139. l. 21. recommend. 149. l. 12. justice is. 146. l. ult. prescribe. 154. l. 7. condition: for. 164. l. 1. prompter. 172. l. that is a. in the margin there for civil read single. 193. l. 13. take. 206. l. 20. for too read two. OF Government; As examined by Reason, Scripture, AND Law of the Land. GOD and nature made men sociable creatures, Government as examined by reason. which appears by this, that every man affects a companion; which arises from this, that every single man stands in need of another's help. Men could not have lived together in a body politic, if God had not disposed the natural inclinations of their minds for such a society; and the same reason, that leads them to cohabit together, exacted from them the preferring public good before private interest, or the whole before any part; so as government is an ordinance of God, and not an invention of man, and arises not, as Mr. Hobbs would make it, from the passion of fear, which one man had of another, but from the moral virtue of justice, to do as one would be done unto. This makes the politic body so much to resemble the natural. The brain must be distinguished from the heart, and the heart from the liver. If one part give life, another must sense, and a third nutrition. The understanding, or Prince, (or sovereign power) must give the law, and the animal spirits (or Nobility) must influence the nerves or instruments of motion through the whole body or subordinate Officers, to set on work the muscles or organical members, or Commonalty, to perform the several offices, which belong to the several faculties of the soul of government. But we will not follow affectedly metaphors or resemblances, which only serve for illustration, but not for proof. The Object of Government stands in. Persons Ruling, are Either Supreme, Whether supremacy lies in one or more persons. Here rule or government is absolute, arbitrary, and , yet with an eye and duty to publick-weal, or salus populi, and an accountableness to God. Or Subordinate, Magistrates, under him or them, in whom the supremacy is lodged. These do rule by the Sovereign's commission, the powers whereof they are not to exceed, and they are accountable for the execution thereof, not to God only, but man likewise. Ruled, are the People in general, viz. 1. Nobility, Ecclesiastical, Civil. 2. Gentry, 3. Commons. The three states of men, which among us make up a Parliament, and are united to the King or Supreme, as members with their head. They represent the whole body of that people unto the King, but the King is the true representative of the people to all the world. The Sovereign the Virtual, Body of the Nation. The three Estates the Representative Body of the Nation. The People themselves the Essential Body of the Nation. Things Prerogatives are in defence of the Government itself, and of the Sovereign Person, and to be made use of in both cases. Laws, Civil or Municipal, for securing the Lives, Liberties, Properties, etc. of the Subject. Matters Thus, Ad Caesarem potestas omnium pertiner, ad singulos proprietas. Divine, Civil, as 1 Religion. 2 Justice. 3 Council. 4 Commerce. 5 Confederation. 6 Treasure. 7 Arms by Sea & Land. The seven great sinews, or pillars, or nerves of Government. Military, Government and Governors. Government and Governors are both God's ordinances: for though He himself was the sole Legislator in all those matters, which concerned man's ultimate happiness; yet he left men by the light of their own natural reason, to make such laws, as concerned their civil interests, or their concerns of this life, as natural reason dictated unto them. And because no society could be form and kept together, but by equal and just laws, nor those laws executed but by some Persons, therefore both laws and Governors were made sacred; the one to be observed, and the other to be reverenced; and therefore God owns both, and puts an impression of part of his own honour, both on humane laws and Sovereign Persons, though both these may be infirm and failing; for Princes or Sovereigns may err, as well in making laws, (or in their judgements about them) as in the execution of them, or in their own manners. And therefore God obliged Princes to be well advised about making laws, and as nigh as they could, to follow sound reason, and the best precedents, and to do all with deliberation and good advice, and with an eye to public utility. Nevertheless, because these concerns were but about matters of an indifferent nature, and that coming under so many divers circumstances, it often puzzled a sincere and a wise Governor what to ordain, and the narrowness of men's understandings often making that (whilst the business was in council or agitation) appear best, which as soon as perfected, was often discerned not to be so, and so wisdom and sincerity (though not likely so grossly, or so often) might fail in council, as well as folly and negligence: therefore he stamped his own authority both upon human laws and Governors, The reverence due unto authority. thereby to keep them both from being disputed. And upon this ground it was, that laws were by the same authority that made them, to be revoked or repealed. Thus the human authority, from whence these laws flowed, silenced all private judgement, and became indisputable, there being nothing to be put in the balance with it: it being only the prerogative of God's Laws to be entertained for their own excellency, mens for the authority or station they were in. Otherwise all Government had been precarious, or subjected so to change, as to be unsteady or endless, and so useless. This every master of a family shall find, if he give way to his wife, children, and servants to dispute his commands, much more than a Lord or Sovereign over a whole nation. And this should make every master of a family as careful to keep up the honour of his Prince in his great family, as he would his own in his little family. Sovereignty must be absolute and arbitrary. Sovereignty therefore was by divine ordinance made both arbitrary and unquestionable; else it could never have answered the true ends of government. Divine wisdom therefore necessarily armed (even in behalf of the governed) the supreme Governors with these powers following. The powers of sovereignty, or the prerogatives of it. First, A power, though not to prescribe a religion, (for God had done that) yet to protect it, and to look unto the good administration of it: so as natural piety were cherished, and God's word or revelations (such as every nation esteemed so at least) were reverenced, and by public authority maintained: and thus far every state or government, as well Gentile as Jew, have interested themselves in matters of religion. Secondly, A power to make laws, or such as related to the civil concerns, or good and safety of that people. Thirdly, A power to maintain all sovereign prerogatives, which were necessarily lodged in the Sovereign, in maintenance of his own authority: for in vain had been the first two, if there had been no provision made for the last. For if Innovators and Conspirators might act securely, and Government be undermined, and Governors exposed, private men's peace would soon be overthrown, and new laws, and new governors frequently obtruded upon them: therefore every one was bound with life and fortune, to defend the prerogatives of the Government he lived under, as much as the municipal laws, by which he was maintained in his life, liberty, and property. Fourthly, A power to pardon the breach of laws; since mercy adorns the throne as well as justice, and no hand is to hold forth this sceptre, but his, who holds the sword, that so the Sovereign might be as well loved as feared. Fifthly, A power to execute the penalties of the laws: that thus authority might be feared for its power, as it was to be beloved for its clemency. And the forfeiture or advantage, that accrued by the penalty, (if pecuniary) was answerable to the Exchequer, since the offence was against the Government. Sixthly, A power to dispense with laws: for circumstances often make this power equitable, in relation to times as well as persons, who may stand in need of, or merit such dispensations. Seventhly, A power of equity was necessarily entrusted with Sovereigns, because there would be often occasion to abate the severity of laws; for if extremities in contracts and penalties in laws should be always taken, laws would often be snares, and often too burdensome to be born. Eighthly, A power to stamp moneys, or to appoint some one thing, which should be the standard unto all Commodities, or which should equal the value of them. Which is a great evidence of Sovereignty; since here is a power, that in a Prince's own dominions (and upon such conjunctures of times, as may be, when such a power, even for want of treasure, and for common safety, may require it) he can appoint this standard to be of an inferior value to the thing it is changed for; the authority of the Prince making that valuable among buyers and sellers at home, (though not abroad) which answers not to the intrinsic value of the thing bought. Ninthly, A power to raise tribute, customs, and taxes for the support of the government, viz. the expenses and splendour of a Court, the guards of a Prince, the fortifications by land, and navies by sea, and expenses of Ambassadors etc. For all these must be maintained by a public treasure, which must arise from single men's private wealth, which proves property; for if single men had no property, there could be no such distinction, as private wealth and public treasure. Tenthly, A power to call together Assemblies and Synods, and to dissolve them; so as no men in numbers (because danger may arise to the peace thereby) have in any well ordered State liberty to meet together, but as warranted thereunto by authority, least multitudes should tumultuate or innovate, and bring petitions on their spears head, or make private judgement stand in competition with public authority. Eleventhly, A power to create a Nobility, the Prince being the fountain of all honour; as likewise to make all Ministers of State at home, as great Officers, Judges, Councillors, and all subordinate Magistrates; for supreme power must be the root of all other powers and of all titles. And it must be but one in itself; for power, that is to preserve peace, is capable of no rivalship or co-ordination; for that would distract obedience at home and abroad; for no foreign nation can entertain treaties with any other nation, whole sovereignty or singleness of power appears with uncertainty, where it is lodged. So as co-ordination is inconsistent with all kinds of Government; for two of equal powers, since they may be of divers minds, must distract, cannot settle, or make peaceable any government. Twelfthly, A power of sending Ambassadors unto foreign Princes; the Ambassadors office being to represent the Prince, as the Prince doth his whole nation. And by this means commerce about trade, leagues offensive and defensive are made with other nations. Lastly, A power of making war and peace; for it is fit, that none judge of the proper reasons and seasons for these great engagements, but that Person, (or those persons) in whom the supremacy and sovereignty is lodged. Princes are prudent, when they observe the bent and inclination of their people, in affairs even of this great consequence: but subjects invade the Prince's right, when they intermingle herein more than humbly showing their sentiment of it. These are the necessary qualifications of all kind of Sovereignty, and these are called prerogatives, or regal powers; for no Kingdom, Common-weal, or State can want these; and these powers must be lodged in one, or select persons, and so the Government and the Governors stand both by the order of God, or by his divine institution. Now to acknowledge supreme Governors, and yet to undermine them in these rights, is a subtle part of disloyalty; for give them a great title, and no power to determine the most important concerns of it, or not to dispense rewards and punishments, and they will soon be reputed but as idols, be first despised, and then dethroned. How they may herein be limited, unto the end, that he or they may the more deliberately execute these powers, shall be showed hereafter. These powers the Prince or State (nay the people) if they understood their own concern, are as much bound to defend, as they are the municipal laws of the land, made in behalf of themselves: for prerogatives are to be kept as sacred as laws. One is to defend the government, the other the subjects under the government. One ought to be as truly made use of for the safety and utility of the whole body of the people, as the other for particular men; for true public safety was the mother of all royal prerogative, and Salus populi suprema lex. Thus we see these powers, to the end they may be executed, Sovereign persons. must be lodged in persons; and no Government can want these powers or persons: so as whoever invades either of them, overthrows all government, or disables it to provide for the safety of the people, or body politic. If the powers be lodged in one person, than the form of Government is called Monarchy. If in a few chief or choice men Aristocracy. If in all the people, it is a Democracy. Deviations from these are termed Tyranny. Oligarchy. Ochlocracy. For my own part, I cannot believe that there can be any such kind of government as pure Democracy; for if the supreme power be lodged in the whole people, than they are both governors and governed, and many absurdities will follow, as will be showed hereafter. † † † † † † Hence it is, Paternal power. that God made paternal power the foundation of all civil government. And hence it is, that most reasoning men agree, that Monarchical government is best suiting with God's ordinance, and the benefit of society; for even Aristotle, bred in and amongst Republics, allows Monarchy, Monarchy the best form of government. as the fittest organ for the soul of government to work by, as through its unity less subject to divisions, and as fittest for secrecy and expedition: and being hereditary, not elective, it is agreed freest from faction, or laying wait for changes, or bribing for voices, which are unavoidable and dangerous in all popular elections; so as it may be said, by all these natural advantages, God instituted Monarchy, and permits only the other forms. When paternal government ceased, How paternal government ceased, and the people to have a hand in the election. that is to say, when the Communis stirps, or first parent, was grown through collateral lines not to be readily known, or to be come at; and that genealogies and relations were not exactly kept, and that mixed Families were numerously joined together, and when large Colonies were sent ro plant void countries, than choice was made of some eminent man to be a Leader, or Duke, or Guide, or Prince, or whatever they would call him; (or of some Optimates, or chief men, or Sanhedrim, or what form best pleased) to go in and out before this people, or to exercise sovereign power. Thus the people, who had no hand in the government (for that was purely God's ordinance) came at last, when paternal government ceased, to have a power of consent in the disposing and lodging the Government by one or more persons. Hence it is, that government is called by one Apostle, the ordinance of God, and by another, the ordinance of man; for power is originally from God in the abstract and substance of it; though in the concrete or specification, or in respect of circumstances thereunto belonging, (as whether the title be King or common-weal, the jurisdiction limited or absolute) from men; which in effect is the true exposition or reconciliation of the two great Apostles. But be the form what it will, the last appeal must be sovereign, and must have power to exercise all the beforementioned marks of sovereignty: or else the government must be imperfect; for government must be absolute, and the quality of absolute rule is such, says Tacitus, that it can stand but in one alone. However, though he, that assumed this power without consent, was an Usurper, yet when the power was once lodged or disposed by consent or submission, it could not be reassumed; for tho' the people submitted their own necks, yet they gave not the government: for the government by an undiscernible providence, when the form is agreed on, is to be assigned to God. And it appears to belong to him, Why Princes were not questionable. since the essential part of it, viz. the power of life and death belongs singly to him; for no man hath power over his own life, and therefore he cannot give it to another. His wisdom therefore thought not fit to trust the giddiness of the people in general, with a matter of such concern, even unto their own peace and welfare; for often changes, which they would have affected, would have been more pernicious to the good of society than moderate, nay, immoderate pressures. Hence it was even in order to publick-weal, that sovereign authority, and his, or their Persons, that execute it, was set above all private judgement to avoid disputes. The sovereign power, by consent once lodged in one or many, for the same reason is not reassumable; for we see originally, that power was never, or could ever be, lodged in the diffusive body of the people, who had not a power over their own lives, and so could less have it over others; for government was no humane invention, but God's ordinance. When people first elected their Governor, we may say it answered unto God's providence; when by rebellion or defection they changed him, it was his permission; for when a people demerit of him, he withstands not their intangling themselves, and scratching themselves with their own briers. So as when the form of government is once settled, the posterity or successors of that People are bound by the consent and choice of their Forefathers, because they are reputed to live in their Predecessors, and their Predecessors are said to be alive in them. And thus, when providence, in the place of natural governors or parents, introduced civil, A people under government are in the state of Wives Wards. the whole diffusive body of the governed were to be (in this respect of change of their form of government) reputed in the state of wives or of children, or minors; for though the one might have chosen, whether she would have disposed herself to such a man to be her husband, yet having done it, she was always under his Subjection, as the Heir is during his minority to his Guardian. Yet both husband and guardian, aught to do all right to their charge, and Courts there are to relieve both, as God's throne or court is to relieve Subjects. Hence likewise it is, that Princes are not to be resisted by Subjects, and both Philosophical light and Politic serve to discern this as well as Divine light; for says moral Epictetus, We are not tied to Parents and Governors, as they are good, but as they are Parents ana Governors; and deep sighted Tacitus says, good Princes are to be wished and prayed for, bad (or whatever they proved) to be endured; and he gives the reason for it; for ill Princes are to be endured as we do storms and tempests, which are showered down upon us from above, or from Providence which hath an hand in giving, and an eye to observe, how we entertain his providences. Thus God required nonresistance in order to Subjects own good; for anarchy was worse than tyranny; and yet at the same time, if the Prince's command was immoral, he enjoined nonobedience, that men might prefer the eternal law, which flowed from God's goodness before the positive or temporary command, which flowed from man's unreasonableness. Whose trusties Sovereigns are. Hence likewise it appears, that men are not to think, because Princes or States are trusted for them, or appointed for their good, therefore they are conditional trusties to them: for those, in whom the Sovereign power is lodged, are God's trusties, and therefore to God only they are to answer for their trust. Nor is a Prince less than his people, because he was trusted either by or for them, and even by God's appointment is to minister to them for their good; for the same reason would make Angels lesser than men, because Angels are Gods Ministers for the good of men. However, primarily the Prince or State are trusted for the good of Subjects; for they are set over men, as the Sun is over the world, to enlighten and influence it, and they shall be accountable for it; but secondarily, they are entrusted to maintain the dignity and rights of their own Regal power, and not to let every humour of the people disable them to govern, by pulling from them the feathers of their prerogatives. This subjection, which God requires, is no unreasonable thing; for we perceive, it is but a suffering in matters of men's external concerns; for as hath been said, Governor's authorities extend but unto matters of an indifferent nature, and it is often pride and impatience, which produce complaints. Which may appear by this, that most commonly, when the times are most plentiful, and the grievances very tolerable, than delicacy of sense renders men most querulous, and their sufferings are begot more from their inferences and reasonings of what may follow, than what they feel; so as they must be beholding to their wit, before they can justify their complaints. Reflect on the reign of Charles the First, as I have impartially made some Memoires upon it, and this will be found true. Thus much for the singleness of Government, and the nonresistance of Governors. But it is objected, Is it not more reasonable to have a power joined with that of the Prince? No sure; for no Government can admit a distinct equal power within itself; for this is but like the doctrine of Polytheism; for making many Gods and many Sovereigns, are equally absurd. Co-ordination considered. Co-ordination is like to prove the mother of a civil War. However, limitation of Sovereignty is agreed on by all Politicians and Civilians, to be consistent even with Sovereignty itself; Limitation of Sovereignty expounded. for hereby Sovereignty is not taken from the Person or Persons governing, tho' to him or them the absoluteness of the execution for some time, or in some part of their Sovereign power (as not to make Laws without their three States or Orders of Subjects, viz. Nobility, Clergy, and Commons consent) be suspended; for hereby the power is not transferred unto any other. So he or they remain absolute, tho' limited; for thus as he or they cannot make laws without another, so no other body can make them without him or them. And when a law is made, it is made singly by the Prince, if it be in a Monarchy; or by the State, if it be in an Aristocracy; for a limited (which we call a mixed) Monarchy, or a mixed common-weal, is, in such cases, but like a man, that is bound, or a man that is sleeping; he hath temporarily lost his motion, but not his strength; for as soon as he hath the concurrence of those, whose consent he stipulated to take, than he is unbound or awakened, and then he or they, not the Concurrers, are said to act solely and sovereignly; for the power is virtually in his or their persons in whom the sovereignty lies; for it is the Monarches or the States affirmative voice, that makes the law or sanction, though it is his or their negative voice, that rejects it. Thus the Sovereign Person or Persons, is the single soul of the law, and all this to avoid the ill consequences of co-ordination. And hence it is, that the true Representative of any people is the Prince in a Monarchy, or the States in a Common-weal; and from him or them there is no appeal but unto God, and wherever the last appeal is, there is the Sovereignty. And therefore the people abate of their own greatness, when they think any represent them, but their Prince or State. Others may represent them, in order to represent their condition good or bad to the Prince, as a looking-glass doth represent the body to the heads view; but as bearing their image both at home and abroad, the Prince only represents the State of that people. An unequal league with the Foreigner takes not off supreme power. Thucydides says, Colonies were as free as Mother cities, tho' not so reverently mentioned, because of their dependence. The same may be said of paying tribute, because that may be for redeeming an injury, or for some acknowledgement of a deliverance, but that paid, it is all that can be demanded. Neither is feudal obligation any deprivation of Sovereignty, since that is but a personal obligation or service, but gives no right to his Government who is bound to this observance. Thus careful Civilians and Politicians are to keep Sovereignty sacred, tho' by such ties, as these, it may appear restrained. But least some should grumble at God for giving these great powers unto Princes and States, who are but frail men, in God's behalf we will sum up the reasons usually given for it. 1. God requires the Princes to rule for the good of their Subjects. 2. If they do not, he denounces himself a Revenger. 3. He requires obedience and nonresistance, to prevent Civil dissensions, which are usually worse than tyranny; for Tyrants usually extend not their oppression upon a whole Nation, but upon some particular persons they are displeased with, whilst Civil war, or popular commotions, spread over the whole land, and amongst nigh Relations. And if Subjects may resist for any one reason, from a parity of reason, which they will allege, they will never want a reason. 4. That God often experiments, whether Subjects will depend upon his promises, to restrain the fierceness of Princes, or on their own impatient humours and violences; or whether by an humble patience, they will wait his time for redress; since what men cannot resist at one time, they find they may divert at another. 5. He subjects People to those pressures, because they deserve such a scourge, as an ill Prince, for being themselves so disobedient to himself; or, 6thly, because very often they force a well natured Prince to be an ill one: as Boccalini says, the sheep getting into their own mouths to the danger of the Shepherd the dog's teeth, or because like the Neapolitan horse, if they be well dressed and fed, they will endure no Rider. Lastly, because a Prince's tyranny can but reach unto the outward man, and to the outward things of the man, which Gods wise Providence in this world often exposes to wean men from it, and to draw them to expect their ultimate happiness or rest in another World. Thus tho' a bad as well as a good Prince be thus secured by God, To whose tribunal he stands bound. God hath not assured him, but he will punish him, even by permitting an ill Spirit to rise betwixt him and his People, and so it is God's sentence on the Prince, tho' a judgement or punishment on them both; on him, for violating the natural rights of his subjects, Why God often permits subjects to be rebellious. and for breach of his obligation or oath unto them, that he would govern them by their laws, and be careful of them both in their lives and liberties. For, says Boccalini, God made not Princes and Subjects as he did cats and mice, one to catch the other, and for a time to play with them, and then to eat them up; for natural, civil, and divine right, teaches the head to consult for the good of the body, and the body readily to obey the head. In a word, tho' oppression makes a wise man mad, yet no provocation can warrant a Christian subject to be a rebel. Thus far we may say, this Question about Government and the nature and end of Sovereignty, is examined singly by natural reason or reasoning. Next, let us inquire after it by the word of God, and after that particularly by our own National laws. The same things examined by Scripture or God's word, and as expounded by our own Church. NO constitution of Government can be so happily framed, Sovereignty and Nonresistance proved by Scripture. as by its single fabric, to secure the peace of a Nation; else surely God's Theocracy among the Jews, and paternal Government among the Patriarches, and Kings of Judah, would have prevented all complaints. When divine as well as profane History shall be consulted, it will be found, Policy is like Morality, and may be much improved by these two words and precepts, Sustinc & abstine. For the Prince must abstain from violence and rapine, and neither for his pleasures nor ambition, may he suffer himself to prey on his people. And often he must bear with, or sustain their perverse or froward humours, lest unseasonably stirring them, he make a fermentation he cannot quiet. And subjects will find, that the blessing of Government flows more from their passive obedience, than from any over nice care of their liberties; for impatience of Subjects has overthrown more States than the Tyranny of Princes, as will be touched on hereafter; and most commonly God will not send a people good Governors, when they will not fit themselves to bear ill ones. It was therefore not only the wisdom, but the goodness of God towards Subjects, that he made Sovereign Persons only answerable to himself. All other ways are (as Hosea says) setting up of Kings, but not by him; or his Oeconomy pleases them not; and therefore they eat sour grapes (or frame to themselves false principles) and their teeth are set on edge, or they destroy the peace they hunt after; for the Politic body like the Natural, that will endure no ail, but have recourse to physic, will soon purge itself out of the world. But nothing of this, that is said, infers, that men should not defend the rights of free born Subjects, but that they defend them in their proper place or judicatures of the land, and not by the sword. But he that gave a law to every species of creatures, gave one to mankind, which man less exactly observes, by reason of the freedom of his will, and by reason of his lapsed nature. But from the law of his nature, or from the Moral law, the best Judicial law is framed, which may be found by observing, how this law among Gods own people, the Israelites, suits with the Moral law, given to, or for all Mankind; but at present we will extend this no further, than to persons ruling or Legislators, and observe, what characters God in his Word puts upon them, and how he fences them from resistance, and how he ties all Commonalties to them by obedience; for throughout all Scripture, Kings are said not to reign over persons but Nations; therefore called King of Israel, Judah, etc. and Head of the Tribes of Israel, so of all States under him. Scripture sets forth, Paternal Government. how the first man was born under Government as God's Subject; how all his posterity were under him, and consequently how Paternal Government was the original of all Government, and so all Mankind born under Government; and therefore the precept of honouring Fathers (or Parents) being a Moral precept, it is a proof, that Government is founded in nature, and was by extraction, and not consent. How paternal Government ceased, hath been already set forth. Nimrod by Sir Water Raleigh is esteemed a Hunter or Usurper, because he took upon him the Government over others without their consent or voluntary submission or choice; not that he was an ill Prince. And in Scripture the sanction or reward, that is proposed for performing this duty, shows the benefit of obedience; for it is, that thy days may be long in the land, which the Lord thy God shall give thee; for obedience of inferiors (as hath been likewise observed) is the most probable way to peace, and peace unto a Societies welfare. Hence it is, that men are so strictly charged to reverence their Governors, and Governors to look upon themselves as Ministers of God for good, and as Revengers to execute wrath upon him that doth evil; so as his power must be no terror to good works, but employed for the good and praise (or encouragement) of those that do well. When the Governor was not a natural Father, to the end that he might not want natural affection unto his people, if the people wanted one, they were not to choose a Stranger; but such a one, as Moses and Joshua, Samuel and Saul, and David, or whom God appointed. See Deut. 17. where the promise of a Prince and virtues of a Prince are set forth, and so Kingly rule a blessing, and promise of God to his People from the beginning. The Prince must have humility, Scripture directions for a King. that his heart be not lifted up above his brethren. He must not multiply to himself horses, lest power incline him to be oppressive. He must not give his strength to women; for effeminacy abates courage and industry, and softens and destroys him. And Solomon adds another caution, Let him not drink wine, (i. e. to excess) lest he forget God's law, or neglect Religion, and pervert judgement; for both these make him lither or wretchless, and unfit for the hardships and difficulties of Government. Nor must he increase Riches, i. e. for his own private treasure, or by the making his People miserable and poor, make himself opulent, that he may the more securely tyrannize. But rich he must be, since the ambition of Neighbours is at one time or another likely to disturb his Peace; and since the constant charge, and contingent expenses of Governors is like to be so great, therefore a full Exchequer becomes a good, as well as a wise and a politic Prince. Lastly, Though human Policy must be used in human affairs, and that it appears too too hard, to expect the same strictness of morality in a King's Office, which belongs to his persons, as a man, (which is too hard a task for one no better versed in both these two Sciences than myself, to give the limits unto) this may be said, that the Prince is obliged, since Politics flow from Ethics, as nigh as possibly he can, to suit his Policies with good Morals, or rather, that he frame them out of (at least never contrary unto) the Word of God; for this will make him truly worship his God, and best teach him how to demean himself with men, or how to govern himself, either in relation to his foreign or home Affairs. Not that there are such rules given in God's Word, but that a Prince's Policies should not warrant any thing that Word forbids, but rather cast himself on Providence. Such delineations of a Prince, as these are, will convince men, that not only Government, but Governors are the ordinance of God; for by me, says God, King's reign, which Nabuchadnezzar acknowledges, when he says to Daniel, Your God is a God of Gods, and a Lord of Kings, and he rules in the Kingdoms of the earth, and gives it to whomsoever he will, and sets up over it (i. e. whenever a people provoke him to send them that curse) the basest of men; or as Hosea may seem to explain it, they cast off his Government for Governments that men have framed, for, say they, give us a King like the other Nations, or let us cast off King Charles the first for a Cromwell, or Christ for a Barrabbas. Thus people will sometimes set up a King, but not by God; yea, and pull down a King to their own confusion: which God divert them from doing any more. But that they may not thus mischief themselves, God's Word describes a King's power by his character. A King, against whom there is no rising. And what is said of a King, is said of all Sovereign Persons, be they one or more, a Monarchy, or an Aristocracy, a Kingdom or a Common-weal; for if Subjects, upon discontents and dissatisfactions, might change their settled form of Government, the politic Body, like his Natural, that is always giving Physic to himself, would be surely purged out of its settled peace, and probably into its grave: so as Solomon was very wise, and spoke as well to the States of a Land, as unto particular persons, when he said, Meddle not with those, who are given to change, etc. Fear God therefore, and honour the King, and curse not the King, i. e. speak not evil of him, or in discourse revile him. Remember, he is thy Politic Parent; go backward therefore, and cover his nakedness. Shimei's cursing was but revile. Cut not off so much as the lap of his garment, or approach him not with a profane tongue, or hand, as if he were not the Lord's Anointed, for he cannot be innocent, that lessens his dignity, or clouds his Majesty. No, do not this in thine heart, or in thy bedchamber; no, nor mingle with those, that are given to changes; for their calamities shall rise suddenly, or a Bird, some small or unlooked-for accident, shall betray thy conspiracy, or, who knows the ruin of them? or it shall fall upon them by some providential accident, and their ruin shall be as swift, as their plots were secret: for if God's Word, in case of oppression, direct men to cry unto him for relief, and not to cry, unto your Tents, O Israel; what is our resistance, but to cast off our dependence on God's providence, and to have recourse unto the Witch of Endor, or our own impatience: or like an injured man, that will not let the Judge give sentence, nor the Hangman execute him, that robbed him, but he will do both offices himself? Rebellion therefore is like the sin of Witchcraft: it removes its dependence on God's Providence, and flies, as has been said, to an ill Spirit, or its own disobedient and vindicative humour. There is no distinction between the King's person and his power. Nor must men subtilise by distinguishing betwixt the power and the person; for that Apostle, who says, Be not afraid of the Power, expounds it by the Person, for he is appointed by God, etc. Thus a King's Person and his Power cannot be separate, though they may be distinguished; or his authority may be, where his Person is not, but never his authority can be wanting, where his Person is. Whoever therefore will not do the law of God, (written in God's book, nor of the King, written in his statutes) let Judgement be executed upon him, whither it be unto death, or banishment, or confiscation, or imprisonment. And if this command comes from Artaxerxes by Ezra, he would not have set it down, but as it was warrantable to execute. Nay, the people of Israel themselves say as much to Joshuah, Whosoever resists thy commandments, and will not hearken to thy word, (or Legislative power) he shall be put to death; for whatever thou commandest, we will do, and wherever thou sendest us, we will go. Only the Lord thy God be with thee, as he was with Moses; or be careful to rule thyself by God's law, as we will be to rule ourselves by thine, or contrary not thou thy will established by a law, by some sudden or passionate resolve. Yet, as hath been observed before, God, who is the single punisher of Prince's faults, yet permits as a scourge of his Subjects, and Subjects sometimes to be a scourge to their Prince. though God hath reserved Princes for his own Tribunal, yet he hath shown by several instances in Scripture, very particularly in that of Abimelech, and the men of Shechem, that he often makes Subjects (by permitting it, for it is ever evil in the Subject) to become scourges to their Princes, and both to work each others ruin. As a scourge to David, he lets the greatest part of Israel rise against him, and follow his rebellious son Absalon; and it was of the Lord, (by his permission) that nine Tribes and a half forsook Rehoboam, and followed Jeroboam for Solomon's idolatry. However, our great Master, born King of the world, acknowledgeth himself in his humanity, born a Subject to Augustus and Tiberius, and doth a miracle to pay a tribute, and gives to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, (outward obedience and observance in matters of a secular and indifferent nature) and acknowledges the power of Pontius Pilate over his life, and will not call for the Legions of Angels, as he could, to defend him: nor doth his Apostles tread in other steps, or teach other doctrine. Yet doth not all this security authorise a Prince to be arbitrary or tyrannous; for God proclaims himself an Avenger; nor doth his Word afford such Princes any other appellation, than that of a Bear, or of a Lion. When Nabuchadnezzar would have had his golden Image worshipped, what is the answer, Not, let us resist, but, Pardon us in this, O king. Non est nostri juris peccare, pati est. Tyrannus cum titulo is, or may be God's Anointed; Tyrannus sine titulo is an Usurper, and is to be looked on so, by all those, who were born under, or had taken oaths of allegiance to a dethroned Prince. Thus Athaliah was destroyed to restore Joash, and personally Joash proved afterwards not much better than she was; however, in him was preserved the seed of David. Now Princes in their state of Sovereignty (as our Prince in Parliament) are said to be above the laws, because they may change, abrogate, and dispense with them, not, because when it pleases them, they may violate them. If they judge the change conduces unto public good, they are superior to their laws: but if they remove a law to satisfy a passion, or take off a restraint from themselves, or like Nabuchadnezzar, will be deifying themselves, they may punish their Subjects for not obeying those laws, but God will punish them, for abuse of their office; and other remedy the Subjects, by the law of God, have none; but by the false reasonings of a Junius Brutus, and a Buchanan, they have many. So as Subjects adventure not only their peace, but their salvation for their rebellion. Rebellion is not a single sin, but complicates them. It disquiets a whole Nation, makes great thoughts of heart; no man sits under his own vine. It involves the innocent in the misery, tho' not in the guilt, and tyrannises over Fellow-subjects, over whom they have no just power or right. The Ship-money, determined by law, (though probably with all its circumstances not warranted so) was far from a justification of arms; but rather than endure a Monopoly or a Loan, a Civil War must give licence for plunder unto the Soldiers of both parties. With so Christian a King, as Charles the first was, had his two Houses been of the same temper; or had they not had a malicious and policy to alter the whole frame of Government; how easily, both before the war was begun, and after the sword was blooded, might they have composed all things suitable to God's laws, and the laws of the Nation? But these men made themselves Slaves to their Slaves, because they would not be loyal Subjects to their Prince. It is one thing for a Senate (and certainly an honest one, and a dutiful one) to represent grievances, and to withhold Supplies upon no redress of grievances, (but there is nothing a grievance properly, which violates no law in being) but it is rebellion to take up Arms upon such pretences. As Moses and Christ taught this subjection, How ruinous to a people affecting new forms of Government is. so we see both their doctrines differed not from what right reason makes true Policy; for observe, whether the Grecians casting off the tyranny of Monarchy, or undermining an Aristocracy to set up a Democracy, or supplanting that with an Oligarchy, or casting off all these for a select 400, or an usurping 30 Tyrants, bettered their condition, or whether it was not more fatal to them, than the arbitrariness of any one, or any few select persons. Hence Moses, Christ, and reason, must needs have prevailed with the Apostles, rather to endure the tyranny of the worst of Princes, under whom they lived, (even Nero) than have quitted their sound doctrine, Let every soul be subject to the higher Powers. And as the Apostles did, How loyal the primitive Christians were. so did their Successors, the primitive Bishops, who willingly became Martyrs rather than rebels He that would satisfy himself herein, let him but read Tertullian's Apology, and he will find, it was not weakness, or want of courage, but strength of faith, that kept the primitive Christians quiet under the persecution of the most bloody Heathen Emperors. But we have lived to read false Teachers, that make the doctrine of resistance a new light; which light, is a light that leads to darkness, setting up the passions of the multitude to be their own guides, and their own ruin. The Romish doctrine of subjection. Our great Adversary, the present Church of Rome, contrary to St. Paul's doctrine to the same, Romans the thirteenth, makes Princes hold their sceptres of, and Subjects their allegiance to her. And the Scotch Presbytery, with their Lay-interpreter Buchanan, De Jure regni apud Scotos, and Junius Brutus subject Princes to the People; (for which there is as much warrant in Scripture, for Presbyters to Lord it over Princes, as for the Pope.) And so these serpents, casting their tails into their mouths, make extremes meet. calvin's. But judicious Calvin, however biased, was convinced of the unwarrantableness by Scripture of such doctrines; therefore about the latter end of his Institutions, determines against resistance of Sovereign Princes: though he leaves a gap in his strong hedge, limiting what he had laid down, rather to every single man in a State, than to such orders of men, as are called the States of a Kingdom; for unto these he will neither give warrant (because in no Christian State now is there such a constitution as were those of the Ephori, Demarchi, or Tribunes of the People in Athens, Sparta, and Rome) nor yet doth he make a resolution against them. Luther, Luther. who when the Boors or Peasants in Germany were tumultuously reforming themselves, and casting off their Prince's authority, disclaims their proceed; I have ever, says he, from the beginning, taught subjection, Sleidans Commentaries. and abhorred all sedition, exhorted to obedience to the higher Powers. Yea, even to bear with tyranny and wicked government; though I perceive, that the war is managed on both sides with an evil conscience, as Governors to settle tyranny, and People to gain their desires by sedition. Yet even this happy Instrument of Reformation made this faint reply to some Lawyers, who pressed upon him, that the laws of the Nation in some cases permitted of resistance, that he would not say, that the Gospel did impugn or dissolve, or abolish the politic laws of the Land. Which certainly it doth not; for the Gospel at the same time obliges the King, when it restrains the Subjects from resistance, but still it warrants not resistance. Whilst the Church of England, The Church of England. with Moses, Christ, the Apostles, and the primitive Church, countenances no tyranny in the Prince, nor allows any resistance in the Subject; nor recommends any stupid insensibility to them; for she allows their orderly and not terrifying way of petitioning; nay, in the Courts, and before the Judges appointed for it, she bids them defend themselves; she bids them not give up their right, but she forbids them to maintain it by force. She secures not the Prince, the subject will not rise against him, since God, being singly and properly his Revenger, may, and often doth make the subjects disloyalty his rod for tyranny; and so as both offend, he will punish both, viz. the one by the other. This Church with what sound reason doth, (on which all sound Politics are built) and what our own Laws assert, resolves, all single persons are forbid resistance; and then farther resolves all Orders or States of men in a Politic body, be the Government Monarchical or Aristocratical, etc. are but as single men in respect of the Head or Sovereign power, for even these in respect of him or them are to be reputed, even in their Politic Body, but as single or private men, so can no more resist the sovereign person or persons than a private man. This I believe to be Apostolic doctrine. And this the Recognitions made to our own Kings in Acts of Parliament warrant us to say. Now a Prince, that is thus secured in his Temporals by his own Church, or by the Christian faith in relation to this doctrine, had need give some very good account of the advantage he makes in his Spirituals by removing from this communion: but I am assured his loss is equal in both. Government examined by the Law of the Land. IF this be the nature of Government in general, and of Sovereign Persons, What the law of England requires about subjection. to whom Government is entrusted, let us in the next place examine, how the Laws of this our own Nation determine the cases. We all know, that our Government is a mixed Monarchy, and yet by all Foreigners (as Bodin, Grotius, and others) is reputed an absolute Monarchy; for limitations, which transfer not the power unto any other, but require only the consent of some other, divest it not of the title of Monarchy, or of the Kings being an absolute, tho' not an arbitrary Monarch, as hath been endeavoured to be proved in the foregoing sheets. Our Laws say then, that Axioms of Law. All Persons are under the King, and the King under none; or omnis sub Rege, & ipse sub nullo. He hath no Peer in his Kingdom, nor any Superior but God; or, Satis ei erit, quod Dominum habet ultorem; then no Judge over him. Allegiance sworn to him, not only by single men, but by the three Estates. Allegiance is to be sworn to him, and homage paid, not only by every single person through the Kingdom, but by every single member of his two Houses of Parliament; for not one of them can sit there, before he hath taken the oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy; and he that reads either of these oaths, needs not seek, where the Sovereignty is lodged. And tho' these oaths were form principally to disclaim Papal jurisdiction, yet that abated, they are but the old Legal oath of obedience. Nay, the three States of Subjects in the Kingdom, viz. Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, as a politic body, make the same recognition. See the recognitions made to the ancient Kings; even the Saxons, and those to Edward 4. Henry 7. and Henry 8. Q. Elisabeth, and especially to King James. Great (say they to him in an Act of Parliament) are our blessings by uniting the two ancient Kingdoms, or rather the two Imperial crowns, etc. and upon the knees of our hearts we agnize our most constant faith, obedience, and loyalty, to your Majesty and your Royal Progeny. And in this high Court of Parliament, where all the whole body of the Realm, and every particular member thereof, either in person or by representation, (upon their own elections) are by the laws of this Realm deemed to be personally present. Sir Edward Coke observes by the laws of King Alfred, as well as by those of the Conqueror, the ancient Kings, who were Saxons, had all the lands of England in demesnes; (Inst. fol. 58.) and the Barons and Lords of Manors were by the Conqueror enfeoft with all, which the King held not, but they held it for defence of the Realm under the King, and consequently, they were to support it in time of danger. This evidenced the Conqueror had seized the whole land by way of conquest. So as the King was the grand Lord, or Lord paramount, and the Nobility and Gentry but the mean Lords, and all the rest held in vassalage under the King or them. Freeholders came in by the Nobilities ill husbandry, and by their selling part of their land, and enfranchizing of it. But still the land was held by some tenure, which obliged the Owner, Lord, or Commoner, more or less, (as in Capite or free Soccage after the conquest) for the defence of the land; for indeed that is the groundwork of all society. For every man is naturally bound with his All to defend the body Politic, and the constitution of the Government; tho' the quotum, and the manner of the raising it, had the Subjects consent, that it might be the more equally laid, and the more cheerfully paid, and the more orderly levied, and as an evidence, the Government was not despotical, but the people free, and yet thus under subjection. The limitations of the King's prerogative. The raising of money or taxes is one of those particulars, wherein our Monarch is limited, for he cannot raise money upon the Subject, but by his Commons, and with the consent of the Lords, or by concurrence of them both; yet the Commons can raise no money but to give unto the King, or as the King accepts it for such a use. Which is conviction enough, that all the taxes of the long Parliament were illegal, and their power an usurpation. Many other instances there are of the King's single Supremacy; but without mentioning more, (for all are embowelled in these few) we will conclude with Sir H. spelman's assertion in his Glossarium, Omnis Regni justitia solius Regis est. In the next place, The Monarchy absolute in Parliament. we will consider him in a Parliament, and here his prerogative is unlimited, or he is in his Zenith, or he is entirely Sovereign; for here the purse and the sword are joined together. Here, or with consent of his Lords and Commons, he makes what laws he finds necessary for public weal; which are the two great cases, wherein Monarchical prerogative is limited; for lives and liberties are secured to Subjects by the Common and Statute Laws of the Realm; for we are a free People, or we know the Law we walk by. And yet in Parliament, (in matters wherein the public safety is concerned, or the Prince's Person) a new Law may declare, that a treason, which before that new law was not so. But complication of Acts, which were known before, and acknowledged of an inferior species to treason, before the making such a law, cannot be made treason by that law, tho' the person for them may suffer as a Traitor. The great Act of Treason says, nothing should be accounted treason, which was not therein particularly named; yet all this caution was to exclude inferior Courts from so denominating it, but not the King in Parliament. Indeed here prerogative is unlimited, because here whatever is determined, may justly be supposed well weighed, and so provided, as it may not entrench upon liberty in general; tho' for example sake, it fall severe on an individual Person. But if a Prince be here importuned, nay violated, or his Houses advices be pressed upon him by rabble's or multitudes of Plebeians, this is as great a crime in that Body towards him, as any fault could be in the person thus brought to judgement, because of the danger in its precedent; since a Prince may as well force the consent of his two Houses by an Army, to declare whom he pleases a Traitor, as they can him by multitudes and numbers of the meanest Tradesmen, to make laws of any kind. This was a case, which God grant may never be drawn into example; for our judicious Historian Daniel says, Where the Prince and States of a Kingdom watch the necessities of each other, that they may obtain their several ends, and make advantages, the true interest of the Nation is lost; and as this proceeding is unjust, and not sincere, so it is ever unsuccessful. The Praetor's edict says, Quod vi factum est, ratum non habebo. And Bartolus hereupon says, Spiritus Sanctus posuit hec verba in ore Praetoris. Parliaments are called by the King's Writ, and are adjourned, prorogued, or dissolved at the King's pleasure: and his death dissolves them without any further signification. Which shows, how entirely they depend on his Sovereignty, and on his Person. No Member of it hath privilege of Parliament for treason, felony, or breach of peace. The two Houses are to act suitable to the call of his Writ. The Commons are called ad faciendum or cons●ntiendum, or to perform and consent; the Nobles to treat and give counsel, or colloquium & tractatum habere; and they are called, not for all, but for some (or such as he shall please to communicate to them) of his affairs; tho' when they meet, they have liberty to represent any grievance, which properly is a violation of any law; for that cannot properly be called a grievance, which is no breach of a law in being. And here they may represent, what they suppose would tend to public utility, submitting it to the Royal pleasure. In a word, the Houses may propose, but it is the King, that determines; for he accepts or rejects, and what he accepts is only a law, and his law only; for his Houses pray a law, but he enacts it; for authority must be single, and therefore our laws call him the beginning, head, and end of a Parliament, which surely excludes all pretence to co-ordination. It is never called the high Court of Parliament, but with reference to his Royal presence. It is true, it is the highest Court of Judicature, because hither men may appeal from all inferior Courts of Westminster-Hall; but whether they may here begin original process, is inquirable. In this sense it is called the Court of Parliament, but not the high Court of Parliament; for the Lords House is a Court of Record, and can administer oaths and fine, etc. And it is called the Court of Parliament, when the Lords and Commons join in an order; but thus never to the House of Commons singly, for they can administer no oath, nor fine, nor imprison, but their own Members, or they may for violation of their own privileges, commit to their own Sergeant a Foreigner, who hath violated their privileges. This is said not to diminish their ancient and just jurisdiction, nor to lessen the great use of them, but to keep each Court within its bounds, which is truly to preserve the general peace and welfare of the Nation. In this high Court of Parliament the King meets with his three States of the Realm. viz. Lords Spiritual, Temporal, and Commons. To have a good intelligence with this Body of men, The necessity of a good intelligence betwixt the King and his two houses of Parliament. surely is one of the greatest policies a Prince can show; for by them he is best represented unto his people. The supplies they give Him, are best paid, when granted by them. Here appears the good constitution of Government, or that harmonious Justice (as Bodin calls it) of a State, where every order of men see themselves represented, as members of the Politic Body, or have a value put on them; or thus, they are not excluded from having an interest in the State. These are the men who walk the perambulations of the Government, and part of whose charge is to keep the true and old boundaries and landmarks of the State, and not to set up new; or who are to guard prerogative, privilege, and liberty; so as none of them entrench upon the other; for Subjects wound themselves as much as they do their Prince, when they invade his prerogatives. And if the people were capable of judging, they would find, as the Government cannot want in some measure, and in some things an arbitrary Power, so when this for some time hath been wrested out of the Prince's hand, it hath been more oppressive upon them in their hands than His. The usefulness and unavoidableness of arbitrary prerogative. It is a piece of ignorance to think, because a decision is arbitrary, therefore it is unjust; for cases, that cannot be foreseen, or that come seldom, and clothed with divers circumstances, or fall under no certain rule, or are of great import or danger, and can stay for no formal council (all these) must have an expedite determination, but still as just a one, and as conform to right reason as may be; for reason of State is to warrant no injustice. Nor can it be limited unto strict forms or process of Law; therefore say the Civilians, Jus privatum vocatur, quia reddendo cuique quod suum est versatur, & eo quod normae aequalitatis & justitiae congruat. This therefore must be steady and unalterable, and where it is so preserved, Subjects are happy; for the known laws preserve their own lives, liberties and properties; Wherein prerogative is exercised. and the written and known laws are the Standards of all these. But to prevent attempts against the Government and Governors, and in order to the safety of the people, prerogatives or extraordinary powers were never wanting, and for these reasons only, laws were subjected to prerogative; and no wise people ever grudged it: for treasonable attempts are often perfected, or a Prince assassinated, or a State everted, before formalities of law can be pursued or satisfied; the Government therefore and the Governors must have their security, as well as private men. And better men be terrified from coming nigh the bounds of this mount, than admitted with safety to approach it so nigh, that they may project a hope to perfect that, which they would venture lives, and all they had, if they saw but a fair possibility to effect. Hence it is, that we say, Jus publicum legum convenientiam & aptitudinem semper expedit, sed non semper aquitatem; but this is not to be wrested, or made a patronage for any tyrannical action. Prince's ought to be as morally just as private men, but under another law; for what will protect one, will not the other; reason of State should never be made a pretence. Thus we see private Law moves by a standing and formal rule of strict justice, public by a rule of reason and equity: neither by injustice, oppression, or passion, or ill design, or revenge against any particular man. In Subjects therefore, especially in those Representatives of the Subjects in general, there ought not to be an indifferency to uphold the State and the chief Governor: for attempts upon these are like some diseases in the natural body, they must be early suspected, and soon taken in hand; for if deferred until an ordinary judgement can discern them, the wisest Physician will not be able to cure them. Suetonius, in the life of Domitian bewails Prince's condition, Quibus de conjuratione comperta, non creditur nisi occisis. A State may die of an apoplexy as well as a private man. Government, like a tortoise, must keep its constituent parts under its hard shell, or every child's foot (or the most inconsiderable body) will hurt its tender limbs. The choice of Parliament men. Persons therefore sent as the People's Representatives, aught to be chosen out of that number of men, which understand and love the Government settled, or as Aristotle says, Ut ea pars sit potior, quae rempublicam sanam esse vellet, quam ea, quae nollet, or who affect not changes, or who are not popular Orators, with ambitious hearts, designing brains, and smooth tongues, and who would be Ephori, Curators, or Tridunes, or King-Controulers: who are apt to propose violent remedies, or make physic more pernicious than the disease; of whom it may be said, as was said of Sylla, Patriam durioribus remediis quam pericula erant sanavit. Such men as these are apt to make remonstrances to the People, than reasonable representations to a Prince. And our late History of Charles the first will show their temper; for they, even after they were victorious over the King, upon the stairs of their own Senate-house, wounded and bruised their Soldiers, many of their fellow Subjects, and those who lived in their own quarters, for no other reason, than that they petitioned them to make a peace with him. Examine their own Records, what prerogatives these men used over their fellow Subjects, and there will be little occasion to complain of the cruelty, even of a Henry 8. They that teach a multitude to resort to their own strength against their Prince, will live (as London did) to see their own cannon or ordnance by their own Army, turned upon themselves, which they mounted to keep out their Prince. But this sad example terrifies neither side, not the one, from occasions of jealousy about religion or property, nor the other, from entertaining again the the spirit of schism and rebellion. But arise, O Lord, and compose our distractions. Thus if you ask what is a wise man (or a people) without liberty, or quid Cato sine libertate? You may live to answer, What is liberty without a Cato, or quid libertas sine Catone. Tacitus makes mention of a Sect, who brought forth the Tuberones and the Favonians, unpleasing names to the ancient Common-weal, who to overthrow the State (says he) pretended Liberty; but if they had overthrown it, they would have given an assault to have overthrown liberty likewise. And he commends in another place the good counsel of Sanguinius Maximus, a Consul, who desired the Senators not to increase the Emperor's cares, by hunting after matters of dislike. The wisdom of our Government makes it an axiom, The King can do no injury, therefore no provocation justifies force against him. His Ministers are answerable to the laws; He is exempt, and all this for the Subjects peace. The states of a land should never represent the grievances of the land by Microscopes; for such magnifying glasses do but exasperate the humours of the whole body, and discourage the Prince from giving remedies; for when a Prince discerns a willingness in such a body not to misunderstand him, it is the best way to procure a good understanding with him. Wise men should reflect on the unavoidable errors or disorders in their own families, before they should aggravate or lay too naked (especially to those that cannot cure them) the failures of a Government. Nor is it excuse for these Zealot-Statesmen to say, they act with good intentions to the public; for mistakes of judgement may plead both with God and man for a mitigation of the punishment of the offence, but never for a justification of an evil or illegal act. Thus Nations are often overthrown by impatience; so dangerous is an overdoing Reformation: but a wise Senate makes a happy people, and a glorious Prince, by considering States, like as they do men, or that they are best, not who have no failures, but who have fewest. There are times, when men are more willing to cast off the form of Government, than the Governor: and such designs are with most difficulty withstood. Thus we see Government (or rather the justice of it) is founded upon the law of Nature, secured by the Word of God, Government how founded. and defended by the Laws of the land. But we have a great Apostle of this Age, Mr. Hobbs considered. or a learned and strong presumptuous brained Leviathan, who not founding it upon nature, makes it arise from necessity and fear: thus making the Government and the Governor rather the brat of a miserable and frighted people, than the ordinance of God; so weakening the nature or original of Government, and yet one while making the Governor such a Leviathan, that no single Person, or body of men, is to resist him; for he so exalts him, that he may set up what Idol or vain opinions he will for a Religion, and all his Subjects are bound to entertain it, and no other: and no man upon any occasion to rise against him. And yet at last if they do, and prevail, he finds means to justify them. Thus he can blow hot and cold, and we must all submit to his dogmas, or be a foolish generation But many good pens have made remarks upon him, that were it not to frame a little Scheme, principally for myself, I would not meddle with him at all. How Mr. Hobbs makes the passions, and not the moral virtues the foundation of Government. His Arguments run thus. Government arose upon necessity, and upon the fear one man had of another's power, every man by birth having an equal right unto every thing. So the natural condition of mankind was a State of war or hostility with one another. Now this is very strange, that this learned man should not consider, if wolves and vultures (the fiercest beasts and birds of prey) will not act thus upon their own kind; if nature, (which we may believe is this Gentleman's God) framed these wild creatures calm to one another; how she should come to be such a Stepdame to mankind. And if this Gentleman perceives man's soul endued with moral virtues, as well as natural passions, why should he make Government arise from the concupiscible passion of desire, and the irascible of fear, and not from the cardinal virtues of prudence, temperance, justice and fortitude, with humanity and veracity? Do not these moral virtues evidence, that men were created not only for a harmless, but a beneficial Society? And doth not the necessity, which man hath of help, in relation to his body, show he was not framed to live alone? And in relation to his mind, doth not temperance restrain desire, and fortitude repress fear? How doth temperance fit him to be contented with a little, and so make needless the invading the rights of others? How doth justice regulate his actions towards other men, and so secure them from any violence from Him? How doth humanity make him apt to relieve another's necessities, as justice did to preserve his rights? How doth his veracity secure another in his conversation with him? Nor did art or policy beget these virtues in mankind or nature, but a God of nature implanted it in humane nature. And can this Gentleman believe, that the disorders that flowed from injustice, were the mother of justice? though it was often the mother of good civil laws against particularised acts of injustice. Injustice would not have been perceived, but as it was a deflection from natural justice; or why doth he say, every man naturally, upon the fear he had of every other man, was against every other man? which made it reasonable for every man to secure himself by way of anticipation (i. e. as I conceive, without any other provocation or injury, but his own fear) by force and wiles to master all others, till he saw no other power great enough to endanger him. His Master Thucydides sets forth much of this, but allows not the practice. If this be not prodigy, I know not what is; for if this be true, we will repeat it again. What a stepmother is Nature, (for we will not now talk of a God, or intelligent mind distinct from, and antecedent to all visible beings, or of invisible powers, which seem to him but as scarr-crows set up to fright fearful and ignorant men) who made this kind of creature, Man, miserable, by its, premier designation and yet by or upon experience of his own misery, If Mr. Hobbs way of stating this question be true, the creature is wiser than the Creator. how came a man reasonable enough by law and penalties to find a means lodged in himself to divert the evil, which nature had subjected him unto. Thus the effect seems superior to the cause; for if man can thus excel his own nature, how comes it about, that other creatures cannot do the like? or how comes man to be wiser by submitting his own understanding and strength to a Governors, to provide better for himself than Nature did? Did Nature produce him to a state of war, and he find out the benefit of Society in peace? Pray then, why should not a horse do the like, and find he was turned out of the orchyard, where was long grass, into the barren Common, for cropping the trees? Or why should not bees and wasps make leagues together, and one give some of their honey to avoid hostility? By all this we see how fatal it is for men of strong natural parts and good literature, to entertain false principles; and how false principles about Nature produce falser about policy. Judge Hales hath convinced this Gentleman in his Origination of Mankind in point of natural Philosophy; and the Lord Chancellor Hyde hath done it as well about his Politics; and Dr. Parker in his Ecclesiastical Policy, hath showed the absurdity of this Gentleman's opinion about Religion and Civil Policy; and therefore I will rather give men warning of him than enter farther the lists; or I would not farther fall upon one, whom so many others have attacked so masterfully, and with success. God made Government his own ordinance, and made Governors own their Authority to him; for it is by him that Prince's reign; for Promotion neither comes from the East, nor from the West, for it is God that sets up one, and pulls down another. He clothed them with power and majesty, God vested Government with power and majesty. as the necessary supports of all Government; for without these no personal virtues of the Prince would be able to support him, or with a heady and mistaking multitude to gain that obedience, which Government cannot be without. Power. Power therefore is singly lodged in him, (or them,) in whom the Sovereignty is lodged. And if there be no Sovereignty, or a power, from which there is no appeal, there is no Government; for the rights of Sovereignty must be . If God himself were not omnipotent, men would not be guided by his wisdom; for we see men questioning his decrees every day, not content with his justice; for how many disrelish his determination of not resisting evil Governors, tho' it were made in behalf of themselves, as the best means to secure their common peace and public interest? A great part of the office of a Governor is to reward and punish; yet herein, if power fenced it not, every one would share with his Prince, or dispense these themselves, and become Judges, or give sentence (nay be Executioners too) in their own cases. Where rewards and punishments are not well dispensed, loyalty and faithfulness will both quit a Court. And Boccalini makes those virtues rather to retire to a Dog-kennel, than return thither; for that creature, says he, hath some gratitude and sense of being well used; and therefore these virtues quitted the Court, and went thither. Thus the dispensing rewards and punishments being so eminent a branch of a Prince's power, he should trust it in no hand to distribute but his own. All natures, (but Gods) wanting somewhat, are moved or attracted by rewards, and deterred by punishments; for punishments were added unto laws, that whom conscience would not restrain, present pain and loss might. Multitude of subjects in some one, or some nigh Countries, is a foundation of greater greatness than largeness of dispersed dominion. This hath enabled France to ruin Spain. Majesty. Majesty is but the glory of power reflected, or it is a result of the amplitude of greatness, directed to bring awe and reverence towards authority; for Majesty is but a seeming pageantry, when power upholds it not, and where every one can approach it without respect; for, says the Politicians, Majestas major é longinquo; for when a Prince by some unseeming familiarity of some Favourite abates or lets fall his own Majesty, every one that thinks as well of himself, as the Prince doth of the Favourite, forgets duty and becomes saucy. And thus when a Prince abates of the reverence, which ought to be paid to his person, he seldom finds it paid unto his affairs. It is good for a Prince, by a reputation of mildness lodged in him, rather by his discretion, than natural temper, to abate in his subjects in general the fear of his power; for that will be thought the juster, when he is sharp upon a particular man, that demerits; but to let fall his Majesty, warrants low thoughts of him among the generality. Thus Princes, tho' as men, they must live as men; yet by reason of the dignity of their office, they must either abstain from, or use these familiarities in private, or be prejudiced in their regal station. And the person, to whom the Prince communicates these favours, if he be either vain or insolent upon them, (which is a hard task not to be) he draws upon himself an insupportable envy, and on his Master's reputation a great diminution. The full glory of a Nation (or its majesty) is drawn, as in a burning glass, The Prince the true representative of a Nation. into one point, in the person of the King; and therefore if he let it fall himself, or any subject by abuse of his favour darken it, it is an offence against the public. The office of a King or supreme Governor is to govern multitudes of people; and they are heady, refractory, and unsteady, like horses, apt to be resty, without they find their Rider fast in the saddle, and themselves commanded by the bit and spur, or under a power; How his power and majesty are necessary. and thus power is necessary. And common people like children, are delighted with glorious and gay things; and thus Majesty is necessary; so as the reverence of civil Government is upheld much by the splendour of Majesty; for without this popular fancy will not be pleased nor satisfied; for which reason greatness ever stands in need of some sensible lustre. Thus, as there is a real necessity of power, so considering how strong fancy is in multitudes, there is a necessity, that Majesty be as little neglected as Power. The personal virtues of a Prince. Power and Majesty are the two great supports of Sovereignty, but they are best upheld by two personal virtues, viz. that of Piety, and that of Justice. Piety. Piety leads a Prince to believe, that he is accountable unto God for the administration of his high office, and it leads the subject to believe, that that prince, who acknowledges a greater power than his own, and that a divine power, is like to use his own unto good ends. It bows his own heart unto God, and his subjects unto himself; or it disposes him to live well, and his subjects to obey willingly. It makes him watchful in the discharge of his own office, and resolute against those, who invade him in it. It is the best directress both of his Power and Majesty; for it keeps power from cruelty, and majesty from disdaining of others. It makes a Prince value the divine Providence, that watches over him more than his Guards; knowing, without this, civil wisdom or military power very often miscarry. Indeed, the vices of Princes always turn unto their own punishment; for they, that imitate them in their vice, are aptest to disquiet them in their Government; and thus they dishearten good subjects to uphold them, and encourage ill to rebel against themselves. Justice, as it flows from piety, Justice. so it is upheld by power. Justice must appear, or be known to be armed; or it is too like to be disputed in its execution. Men entered into Society, that they might enjoy the benefit of it; and when it is obstructed a Common-weal is sick, if generally not administered, the band of Society is dissolved: the execution of it is the life of the laws. No arbitrary power, or decision, or reason of state must want justice, for the standing laws, and the arbitrary determinations of Sovereignty must both be reasonable and just; the one may want the formalities or forms of process, which the other is tied unto; but justice must be the life and spirit of them both. And therefore they are narrow thoughts, that think, what is arbitrary is unjust; for when it is the determination of a good and a wise man, it is very often more perfect than the law itself, because made a rule after the inconvenience of the law is perceived; or wise men would make it a law, or give it a sanction as soon as proposed. So as I ever thought the binding the Judges, or their binding themselves too strictly unto the letter of the law, and formality of words, and spellings, in plead, was like straight ligatures, which hinder just circulation of humours; for it is one thing to leave the Judge too lose, but it is another (more nocent) to tie him up too straight. This sets up distinct Courts of Equity, and that multiplies suits, and many other inconveniencies. Keep an ill or corrupt man from being a Judge, soon remove him, when it is perceived; nay, severely punish him, but pinion him not so, as he must sit and see the craft of a Solicitor, or an Attorney, evade the true meaning of the law; in such a case let him (as well as the party pinched by the subtlety of the plea) have the liberty to put the case to a summary decision of all the Benches, which he finds not fit to determine in his own Court. Faithfulness. Faithfulness in a Prince is but a part of his justice. Lying lips, says Solomon, become not a Prince; and the reason is, that he that hath a generous heart, will not stand in need of a false mouth. A Prince ought to be clothed with reputation, which no man inwardly can render to him, on whom he cannot depend; or whose word he cannot rely on. But because necessarily there must be granted unto men in civil affairs, and in Kingly Policies a greater latitude, than aught to be allowed in common conversation, not of dealing falsely, but of demeaning a man's self sagaciously, therefore Princes and Ambassadors, who know what weights are used, seldom expect other coin, than that which is mixed with an alloy, which though it debaseth the metal, yet makes it work the better. Chancellor Bacon distinguishes well betwixt dissimulation and simulation (indeed the distinction is Cicero's in his Offices l. 3.) making the first but an art of State, or an art of life, as Tacitus calls it, i. e. an art of living among men, that dissemble: the other a false profession, by which (I think) he means falsity, when he professes sincerity; which surely is a false Policy, and no ways allowable; the first he assigns unto Augustus, the second unto Tiberius. The first is but the art of a well managed horse, who observing the hand, knows how to stop on a sudden. Undoubtedly where a Prince believes he is clearly dealt with, he should be as clear in his dealing: for though their condition exempts them from that openness and round dealing, which is the honour of a private man's nature: yet the importance of their obligations reaching unto the good or harm of so many private men, they are admitted to have more of the serpentine wind than would become a private man. Equivocations must necessarily be disallowed by all men in Treaties; but reservedness in speech, or diversion in discourse, which otherwise would disclose a meaning too soon, a speaking that for his own opinion, which he avers not to be his Master's instruction, a subtlety of extracting the others thoughts, and yet concealing his own, to be cautious in the beginning of a Treaty, so he be sincere and open in the conclusion of it; all these are seemly in an Ambassador, which would be very among private men, especially Friends. The best composition, says a great man, is openness in fame, secrecy in habit; for nakedness, says he, as little becomes a mind, as a body. Histories and Civilians give greater latitude unto Princes to discharge themselves of the obligation of their Treaties than exact Morality will allow of. I remember several instances in Dr. Zouch's writings, and particularly of Queen Elisabeth, who said plainly, she meant sincerely, when she treated; but having promised an assistance, further than would stand with her own treasure and her People's safety, she could not bind herself unto the extremity of her Articles. She was ready to show, she meant not in her Treaty to deceive, nor did she then, to bear the ill consequences, which she now discerned. This I relate, this I justify not; but if frequent examples do justify it, than we may say, Princes are not deceived, because they expect not the exactness of private men, whose damages reach further than their Persons or private concern. And in Treaties it is now sometimes made an article to make a retreat upon such discoveries. Clemency is a chief part of humanity, Clemency. and should ever be found in a Prince, because most men at one time or other stand in need of a Prince's goodness. But to make it valuable, this virtue should proceed from generosity, not facility of his nature. And he must be careful, that his natural good temper, no, nor his moral clemency, appear to take off the terror of his politic justice. His clemency will sufficiently appear, if it restrain him from frequent severities: for it is neither for the honour of the Prince, nor the Physician, when their Patients are sent in numbers to the burial-places. Clemency withstands not severity, though she endeavours to use it seldom; for a Prince may be very clement in his disposition, nay, in his judgement and usual practice, and yet be very severe upon provocations, that warrant the same; for such a well used severity the better illustrates his clemency. But it is much better for a Prince to pardon an offence against his Person, than against his Government, or against a private Subject's interest or right And nothing can worse become a Prince's bounty or clemency than to grant pardons to offenders, as donatives or rewards to Servants. It is much better to give them the forfeiture of an Offender's estate, for that is an Escheat to himself, than a pardon to the Offender, for that is a selling of justice. A pardon is fit not to be given at all, or to be done freely, that so it may be a real act of clemency, and make the Offender grateful, or upon a second fault more guilty. Modesty. Modesty is a virtue of so mean a sound, that it may seem derogatory to attribute it unto a Prince, but if well interpreted, it is a flower in his Crown; for it is a high spirited virtue, tempering greatness or power towards men of inferior condition, or it is a generous disposition in a Prince, not to dazzle a private man with the glory of his Majesty, nor to create in him fear by the terror of his power. So it must needs be attractive both of love and reverence, rendering the Prince accessible, and making him unapt to put a neglect or affront upon the meanest man; since the meanest may do the greatest a shrewd turn; for nihil tam firmum est, cui periculum non sit etiam ab invalido. Besides, Modesty is a great antidote against flattery, the common bane of Princes, and the flattery, that is made unto their business and affairs, is often greater and more pernicious than that which is made unto their Persons; for the one is but scratching an itch of a prurient temper or blood, but the other is endangering the public peace or security. Flattery of a Prince's Person is but like a painted flower, that pleases the eye, but offends the smell; but flattery of his business is like a chemical vapour, that stupifies the brain. But in both kinds Princes love to draw it upon themselves; for such as seem to admire their persons, and applaud or concur in their counsels, they take to be their friends; and the reason of it is, they love rather to have their hopes fortified, than their dangers awaked; for they affect to cherish hope, and stifle fear, and are not patiented of deliberating or examining a matter by contrary judgements, or of men of several conceptions, or divers tempers and educations or interests; for opposite opinions are like the teeth of a file, it must scrape off, before it can smooth an affair, whilst several concording judgements too often make an affair pleasant and hopeful in the beginning, though more commonly irksome and shameful are the latter end of it. Xerxes never knew the value of his Councillor Demaratus, until he had made his shameful retreat out of Greece: then he found what the other had told him, that there was much difference between a great multitude and a well disciplined army, whether it were to sight or to subsist; and then he knew the accidents, that attended upon the one, in marching through straits, and finding provision, and the usefulness and services of the other. And for the honour of this great King it is, that he valued this single man, more than he did all his other Councillors, when he returned home. But when observations of this kind are never so much multiplied, Princes Courts will never be cured of this King's-evil, but will favour those, who counsel towards what they love, and never have in esteem those, who by projecting the worst, and by foreseeing ill consequences, or cautioning against dangers, evidence, that they love their Master's honour and success in affairs, better than they do their own preferments. For flattery is the best Court-picklock, and plainness of speech the surest bar against a man's own preferment. Modesty hath this farther good operation upon a Prince, that it minds him of the incertainty of events in the best laid and prosecuted designs; there being a common vicissitude or change of fortune, which wise men, like Porus, will discern and laugh at even in their captivity, because thereby they discern, quam caduca sit felicitas humana, as Curtius expresses it, or how fading and falling a leaf prosperity is. Liberality or bounty is much cried up in a Prince, Liberality and is very becoming greatness or Majesty; for men would not love the sun or heavenly bodies for their own glory and heat, if they conveyed not unto them and other creatures cheering light and benign influence. But it requires prudence in a high measure to guide it; for if it run into the intrinsic estate of a Prince, or make him poor, that others may be vainly rich, it discredits him more, than it honours him, and loses its name, for 'tis termed prodigality. Even he, that is benefitted by it, despises him for it, looking rather on it as a weakness of mind than a greatness. And it obliges unto no thankfulness, if what is loosely or inconsiderately given, obliges to such expenses or splendid course of life, (which some Princes affect from those they are thus bountiful unto) that they can lay up nothing for themselves and children. Money being like meat; if a man must eat or swallow till he regorge it, he will find a Philosopher's supper better than a Prince's feast. If Favourites of pleasure be the objects of bounty, than the Subjects shut their purse from supplying him, who feeds so many vermin, and on whom such vermin hang. Let their food be never so good, their mein or countenance never is florid; or if excessive bounty unto some few make Servants lose their small pensions, wages, or diets, it aliens the affections, and chills the duty of those other many attendants towards their Master. Indeed bounty unto such men should be only waste water; when the Exchequer can supply the ordinary expenses, bounty is then and not until then seemly. Nor should bounty unto Favourites, or expenses of pleasure deprive deserving Servants or Subjects of rewards, such as have merited of the State in home or foreign affairs; for for these a Prince may laudably appear rather poor than not bountiful. Yet for these he must not weaken the public revenue, which in all Nations is reputed Sacred. But the casual revenue, and the offices in the gift of the Crown, the leases even of the Demesnes, and things of this nature are wisely here disposed: but giving honours and estates in perpetuity, if any one made his reflections, how many Noble families owed both to the Crown, and yet in this last age have contributed much to pull it down, one would put no great price upon gratitude, or Princes might well think it fit, to put some new rules unto their bounties. Rewards unto some persons, which far exceed the merit of the person, makes others much undervalue what they receive, though they receive with an overmeasure. And if their reward come unto them more from the interposition of a great man, than the Prince's own disposition, the former will have the thanks: and thus a Prince buys but a Servant for a great man. Sir Dudley Digges in his Preface to Secretary Walsingham's Letters observes, that Queen Elisabeth was better served for a Pension of forty pounds per annum, than King James for an annuity of four hundred pounds. Frugality in a Prince is an universal bounty to all his People; Frugality. for it enables a Prince to live without, or at least to crave less aids, and a Prince's care to promote trade, manufactures, husbandry, etc. or prevent confederacy among men of a trade, as Graziers, Butchers, etc. or Monopolizers, who set the price or dice, as we call it, upon all buyers, is to be numbered among bounties, which reach unto the whole body of the People. So as the Kingly Office is an instrument of bounty and of frugality both; for by one and the same means he inriches his People, and saves his own treasure. Men of this temper are least pressed upon, for no man judges better, when, and unto whom it is fit to give, than that Prince, that seeks to make his People rich rather by his providence, and by their own industries and frugalities, than by his coffers; for it is a very ill symptom in a State, when every broken fortune hopes to make itself up from a King's Exchequer. Thus frugality is a key unto the Subject's treasure; for the people willingly lend the key of theirs unto a Prince, that keeps the lock of his own: and as unwillingly to one, who spends upon his Favourites what is his own, or what his Subjects supply him with; since the humour of such times and expenses infects the Country, as well as the Court, and so they will rail against the vices, that are so costly unto them, though they imitate them. And if such an expensiveness lead towards a general poverty, it will in a short time draw on a general defection. Yet Courts must not want their splendour: for that is a part of the Prince's majesty, and the very silks and fine linen of it, the back and the board of a few Courtiers feed the belly, and set on work the hands of many Vulgars'. It was observed to be impolitic in the Emperor Julian (and accordingly complained of) that he affected to appear in his Court more a Philosopher than a Prince, banishing the Officers of shows and vanity, and of Cooks and Barbers and Tailors, etc. Love of fame was implanted in men unto the end they might love virtue; Love of Fame. since there is no greater evidence than that where the one is despised, the other is neglected; for though the person of the man in a short time will be forgot, his deeds with reflection on him will be remembered. Hence it is too many men had rather wound their consciences than their fame; yet many make it the cheapest thing they are concerned in. Neglect of fame begets remissness in Government; for he that cares little, how men look upon him, cares less what he doth: says that witty and pleasant, and yet often serious Spaniard, Quevedo; if Christ himself thought fit to ask his Disciples, what say men of me? nay, unto his Apostle St. Peter, what say you of me? it may become the wisdom of the greatest Prince to make the same inquiries. It is disagreeable unto nature to be unconcerned in fame; since the God of nature made it a restraint upon a vicious course of life, or a means to keep men out of bad company, out of those courses, which expose him to be undervalved; for not only looseness of life, but remissness in affairs, or rash entering upon important actions, and faintly prosecuting them, or uncertainty of mind and unevenness of counsels (all which usually are attended with unsuccessfulness) draw down infamy upon a great man. And when a Prince hath lost the inward reverence, which is due unto the generosity of his mind, the outward, which is paid unto his person, will soon appear a shadow, which forsakes the dyal with the sunshine. It is unloosing the girdle of Government (solvere cingulum regum) to withdraw an inward esteem from a Prince. Shall jealousy of a Subject's reputation awaken a Prince? Shall he think it his concern, that this man be not overprized, and yet be unconcerned, that he himself is reputed no way valuable? Since no men are concerned for a Prince they value not, how insecure doth contempt of Fame render him? Yet Princes or Great men are not to think a lasting fame is a good fame; since the word Famous is an equivocal word, and men may be famous for bad as well as good actions. Judas is as well recorded as St. Peter, and Herostratus, who burned Diana's Temple only to keep up his name, lost his esteem among men, and had almost lost his name likewise, Alexander the great, and Julius Caesar, and the great and prosperous neighbour Prince of our times affected fame, but they understood it not; for her Trumpet sounds and recommends heroic, noble, and virtuous actions, or actions, that benefited mankind, not such, whose effects and prosperity, were only like a storm at sea, or a plaguy year, which are registered in the Calendar, for the destruction they made and the harm they did. How much more hath a private man to thank God for, that he made him an instrument of a little good unto a few men, than the greatest Prince in the world hath, that he was an universal Pest, and that upon his own choice. The folly of such a conceit appears in this, that he thinks he shall preserve the memory of his person (unto which he is fond indulgent) by it; when fame reaches (as that great Boethius says) no farther than unto his actions: so as if they be not beautiful and shapely, though he were another Absalon, fame will but set him out as a Traitor. Boccalini hath a good representation of the shame and infamy of black successful deeds, when he represents Duke Sforza of Milan demanding a triumph of Apollo, and it being granted him upon the condition, that the families he had unjustly betrayed and tyrannically ruined, should be placed about the wheels of his Chariot, the shame thereof cured this itch of vanity, and he declined his triumph, that he might conceal the way or means, that enabled him to pretend unto it. This may be a true reason, why God removed the representations of men's persons from fame, and by it engraved only their actions; for it was the virtues of the mind, which he took care to recommend to posterity, and he designed nothing to be memorable and renowned, but what was fit to be imitated. So as fame, by God's appointment, was to preserve the memory of his great and good deeds, unto whose person God designed a reward from himself in another world, if not in this likewise. And yet a good fame makes a man live after his death; for the honour other men pay unto his memory, whose person they have no notion of, renders him to them, as if he was still a living example of virtue. The appetite of honour is rooted even in nature itself, and therefore if men be careful, how they get it, they may be solicitous to get it; because alive and dead it benefits others as well as themselves, and because it is observable, that those men, who care not what others think of them, care as little what they do themselves. Prudence is a Prince's Master-virtue, Prudence. indeed it is a private man's chief honour. In all Civil, Military, and Ecclesiastical affairs it is the great directress. It weighs all circumstances, and foresees the most probable events; for where there is the most of prudence, there is the least of chance: for summa ratione gesta fortuna sequitur. It is the distraction of a man's mind, that he hath so many several representations of one and the same thing, like a picture if he look upon it by one light, it seems one thing unto him, if by another light, it seems to vary its figure. In its self an affair may be one thing, but clothed in its various circumstances it is another: so as many ways seem to lead unto it, and yet really there is but one: and this path Prudence only can walk in; for the prudent man, like the Chemist, can separate bodies, that are mixed and incorporate together, and which are indiscernible unto a vulgar eye. In Civil affairs, he is the best Chemist, who hath most experience; for though men may be ingenious without it, yet seldom solid or expedite, and yet all the sciences serve him much; for the prudent Prince will stand in need of natural Philosophy, to judge of the natural constitutions and tempers of men, as well as moral, to know how to improve, govern, or restrain the tempers of those, whom he trusts with his affairs; else an impetuosity of temper will blind reason, and transport him, who discerns his own infirmities, and yet hath not been accustomed to bridle them. An eloquent and designing man will be followed by multitudes, when a sober and well weighing judgement will too often want a companion. A prudent man is apt to suspect his own advice, than another man's, of whose integrity he is satisfied; since he may with reason suspect his own judgement, because every one needs to see his own thoughts through some other medium, than his own way of reasoning; the fancy and the judgement being too nigh of kin to be severe upon each other. Which made Balsac determine, that it was too often the shame and reproach of human wisdom, that the greatest minds, being wholly left unto themselves, in the greatest affairs were likeliest to commit the greatest errors. And therefore the prudent man is far from being an overweening or overcautious man, and thus prudence recommends modesty. Choice of Officers. Nothing therefore more manifests the prudence of a Prince than the choice of his Councillors and subordinate Ministers of State, and Domestic Servants and Favourites; for the office of the Prince is well performed in his Person, when he hath chosen good Ministers and Servants; for as hath been said already, He is not the worst Prince, who is the worst man, but he that hath the worst instruments to work by; for the tools usually show the artist. For a Prince for money or favour to bring undeserving men into offices of great trust, is to gratify the desire of his enemies; for they wish nothing more. It is a great evidence of a Prince's own abilities to be able to choose a good Councillor, and of his virtue, Of choice of Counsellors about a Prince. not to render such a Counsellor useless unto himself; for he that will receive Counsel, must have no pretincture or preingagement, or no bias, which may draw him off from judging what is said unto him. He must have no petty Counsellors or Favourites of pleasure, to stagger his resolutions by whispers. He must shut his ears unto flatterers; for if he once believe that sort of men in what they say in commendation of himself, he will soon believe them in what they say against others. So as julian's reply to a man, that highly commended him, was very remarkable, When, Sir, says he, you have told me as freely of my faults, as you have of the excellencies you pretend to see in me, than I will give belief to what you say now. And Aristotle's epistle unto Alexander is most remarkable, wherein he told him, he was most glad to understand, that he was not, as too many Princes were, so scornful and so unreasonable, as to make good advice ridiculous. This was worthy of so great a man's taking notice of; for nothing makes serious men sooner desert a Prince's interest, than to be under a slighted character; for Cicero in his Offices observes, many men will lose their lives for a Prince, who will not lose their reputations. I once heard these Buffoons, that thus pleased a Prince, called by a serious Gentleman, the Petards of a Court; for, said he, by representing any man in a disguise or masquerade, they will blow up his credit presently. If a Prince have a known bias, he will too soon be observed, and a common understanding at Court will make that appear wisdom, which really is but flattery; for there is scarce any one maxim in Policy, which is not combated by some other; therefore they that study their own preferment or security, not their Prince's establishment or honour, will soon find, that the weaker reason, that gratifies the stronger passion of a Prince, is ever acceptable and rewarded; whilst the stronger reason is misinterpreted as a disaffection. Prince's therefore must discountenance no man's advice: for a wife Prince, like a good Huntsman, must encourage the dog, that hunts for the scents, as well as he that hits it. And Counsel, that is sincere, must be grateful, and the Counsellor if he speak in private, his Counsel must be kept private: for if the Prince expose him unto a contrary faction, it will create that caution, that he will want freedom of advice, when the other wants his security in advising. Thus Princes must not call their Counsellors to advise, as Xerxes did, and then tell them, he called them to bring obedient minds, not troublesome debates. And if a Prince would be well advised, he must advise early; for there is no comfort to say, Sir, the time is past, or it is too late now to think on it. A Prince should have no Councillor to be so mean, as to be a reproach unto him, nor so lofty, as to reproach him; for the very errors of a Prince are to be concealed, or respectfully laid open before him, and to be, as much as may be, concealed from others. My Lord Bacon says, a Prince should have but few, and those well chosen Counsellors, that they may carry on his business with one spirit of direction; therefore he observes wise Henry the seventh made use only of Bishop Morton and Bishop Fox. Over greatness in one, or over strict combination in a few, may be both dangerous to him. He may keep his ear open unto many, but he must not let them run into factions against one another, if he hope to be served by any; for they will reek their spite against one another at the price of his disservice. If both concur not in his business, he deceives himself, if he thinks he hath use of either. If he carry himself with indifference unto their particular concerns, he may make use both of their advices and interest unto his own service. And any other way of managing factions, or keeping them at odds, unto my observation, was never useful unto any Prince. If either of them have a predominancy with him, at least so by turns, as one checks the other, both disserve him. The best way of a Prince to know the nature of him he would make a Counsellor of, is to know him by domestics, and neighbours, and general vogue; for from these no man can long conceal himself or his natural inclinations. Enemy's will traduce him, friends over value him; but these (if what they say flow naturally from themselves) best discover him. And the Counsellor's nature is as much to be considered, as his abilities: for though Princes most commonly best esteem of subtle men, it is moral good men, who best advance their service; for a mind not seasoned with morality, like the delicatest wines, will best please the taste for a time, but soon grow pricked or sour, or some trick they will play at last, harms more than any of their services do good. When piety therefore is joined unto natural abilities, ripeness of age, Characters of a Councillor. and good experience, (as early having entered into business) than a Prince may expect not only an able, but a faithful Councillor. If piety be wanting, abilities will turn but unto compliances, and self-ends, or serving some faction rather than the Prince; for moral virtue is the only restraint upon self-interest. Abilities destitute of piety, seldom advance a Prince's service, and he is likeliest best to serve his Prince on earth, who serves his God in heaven; for piety only can restrain the ill effects of ambition or covetousness, or lead a man to prefer his master's service, more than any provision for wise or children. It is the honour of Cardinal Toledo, that he refused to be of the King's Council, without he might declare God's will in opposition unto the impiety of modern policies. Without natural abilities in a Councillor, men expect a harvest, without having sowed the field; or if it were sowed, and the seed corn not good, (viz. sowed with principles Epicurean, Machiavilian, or Hobbian they will never serve to govern a free people; they may to render men slaves. If Councillors be not grave and aged persons, they that are to obey their counsels will not reverence them, or cheerfully submit; for young men must necessarily want experience, and without experience the best abilities will be subject unto gross errors. A Statesman, or indeed, any man in any course of life, must be broken unto business (rompu aux affairs) before any other man can confidently depend on him; for he is not to be depended on to guide an affair, that hath not seen both sides of fortune, or met with disasters as well as good successes, or observed them carefully in History. When young men give the counsel, the matter of it is most commonly violent; for their temper leads either unto rash and daring things, such as may endanger the settlement of the present state, (which no wise Prince for increase of jurisdiction or prerogative should ever adventure) or unto wit and repartees, which are proper for discourses at a table, but not for the gravity of a Council-board: for commonly they gain their esteem by judgements they make on things past, or by reflections on an affair in general, not by councils or determinations on somewhat that is present and particular. Indeed, it is a great mistake to think men of wit, with some mixture of Latin and Greek, or foreign languages, make the properest persons for business. A great man both of wit and learning, Thucydides, determines against it, Hebetiores, quam viri acutiores, melius Rempubl. administrant. Young and witty men have too much fancy to examine their own judgements, and their warm temper makes them prosecute an affair with eagerness at first, and remissness towards the end, acribus initiis, sed incurioso fine, and they are too likely rashly to run into errors, and by unseasonable remedies to endeavour their cure, or intempestivis remediis delicta accendunt. I use the Author's words, (tho' the method of writing be out of fashion) because I would strengthen myself with their authorities. Besides, young and witty men value themselves much by being not restrained by ancient forms of business; for usually they find some way more expedite, and seemingly more reasonable, which usually upon trial is found otherwise; for they argue their own change, or what they make it is a state of melioration, but they foresee not the inconveniences, which attend upon their own project: whilst Thucydides observes, the Nations, which were less prone to change their customs, were most commonly esteemed the wisest. Besides, men of this age and temper, as they are most inclined to be vain glorious, so less capable of secrecy, whilst age and experience render men apt to give wholesome than complying counsel; and as not to be too strictly tied unto old forms and customs, so not to part with them but upon great examination. All which is the evidence of a judicious mind. Nothing therefore characters a Councillor better, than that it may be truly said of him, He is a sincere man, or, as we say of a good Commonwealth's man, he is one that prefers the Publicks concern before his own private interest; so a good Councillor will in affairs, that are important, rather consider his Master's service than his Master's inclination. And that I may set down all the extremities of integrity at once, (but I am afraid I am describing rara avis in terris) a man that will lose his place, or fortune, or favour, rather than not plainly, and without artifice, tell his Master betwixt them two, what is his opinion. Afterwards, tho' his Master's judgement be like to be his Master's prejudice, (because Councillors are not Preceptors) that will as industriously obey his Master's commands, as he would have done, if his Master's commands had been grounded upon his own counsel; for he ought to think, that his Master's opinion or inclination may be better than his own. When the Prince cannot admit this freedom, nor the Councillor (in case there be nothing immoral in it) make this submission, neither of them is fit for the other. If the Princes own counsels cast what is settled into danger, or make it to be obtained by extremities (tho' not illegalities) upon his own Subjects, a good man would rather make his retreat, and die obscurely, than see his Master or his Country run a great risque; for it was calisthenes great honour, not that he is said never to have betrayed his Prince unto others, but because he would never condescend to betray him to himself, as most Flatterers do, or concur with him when his opinion differed. Thus it's one thing to obey a Prince, another to counsel him. This imaginary sincerity (for we may rather describe it than hope to meet with it) in a Prince's Councillor will incline him, that thus values simplicity of mind, to avoid all subtle and underhand ways; for a man of this temper is a judging or thinking person, and he knows humane actions are best managed by familiar and easy means; for the plain hearted man, who resolves singly to have his eye upon the nature of the business he is to act in, (and he cannot understand well the nature of an affair, if he totally forgot the conjuncture of the times and persons engaged about it) he will discard subtlety, and not super-refine upon that, which may end well, if he make not new adventures, that it might conclude better; since, as Cardinal Mazarine observed, the faisons mieux spoiled more business than ever it advanced; for subtlety commonly fews thorns, and often is forced to walk over them. Machiavels Borgia thus pricked his own feet, and so did Pope Clement VII. And d'Avila observes, Henry the 3d grew weary of the intrigues his Secretary Villeroy had entangled him in; and Bentivoglio shows Cardinal Granvils dexterities proved Philip the Seconds entanglements. A Prince or Councillor therefore must not consider the advantages the end he proposes will get him, and forget, that the complexion of the times, and the humours of Subjects may be indomitable, or superable with so much hazard, that it will be no wisdom to put a Prince's fortune upon the chance of a die. A Prince's greatness should rise like a vegetable, indiscernibly; for hasting to be rich, and hasting to be great or absolute, are both alike dangerous. No man will be long thus sincere or honest, who hath not courage; for it is an act of bravery to seek his Master's advantage before his own; for courage frees him from the solicitude of diving into his Master's inclinations, or scrutining abditos sensus Principis, or being concerned what party stands in opposition unto him, or what harm they can do him; which thoughts take up the whole time of a timorous Councillor, who prostitutes both his Masters and his own honour for a little security. This temper is ever reclaiming rebellions by caresses, or expedients, and they, who are of it, spend most of their advice in shoring up the house they plainly see will fall, but hope it will last their time. Their trade is how to observe, which party in a Court prevail, and to be officious towards it, and they care not in what languishing condition their Master's affairs are, so their own post be safe. With the Amsterdam dog, they will at best defend their shoulder of mutton for a time, but when they see the other dogs have pulled it out of the basket, they will go in for their share. It was faintness in council, that lost both Rome and Constantinople, and I may say England or the Monarchy in King Charles the first's time; his army's discipline rendered them not formidable unto the Rebels, and yet the Councillors were afraid of their too great prosperity. A good Councillor should be steady in his advice, but steadiness differs much from inflexibility. He that adheres to principles is reckoned steady; yet when the conjuncture of affairs requires it, he must strike sail, and he can own it; for says Cicero, as affairs submit themselves often to me, so must I sometimes unto them; Ut mihi res, sic me rebus submittere cogor. And Cato, had he been less positive, had preserved Rome's or the Senate's freedom longer. Cato optime sentit, sed saepe Reipubls. nocebat. Probity may be impetuous, and so consequently nocent. Flexibility may suit with judgement, because forced by necessity, but instability can no way be justified, because it is a natural inconstancy of mind, or weakness of reasoning. A wise Councillor will not engross too many affairs into his own hands, nor encroach upon other men's offices; nor be apt to undervalue them in it; or be apt to raise his own credit by the loss of other men's; for he that doth good offices unto others, is in the best way to make hearty friends for himself. And he must be patiented to hear other men's advices; nay, with some respectfulness bear their follies; and he must be unconcerned, even when his own counsels are not complied with, or are laid aside. Above all, a Privy Councillor should be secret, for without secrecy neither arms nor council are like to be successful. Augustus' valued Maecenas for his secrecy; Agrippa for his laborious patience; and Virgil for his pleasurable and learned conversation. If there be a chink in a Council-Chamber, it discovers, or gives as much light, as a window doth in another room. Our great Chancellor Bacon recommends it unto Princes, to beware that they themselves unsecret not their own affairs; for crafty men will lay trains by discourses of one kind, to find the secret resolutions of another kind; so it is dangerous for Princes personally to treat with foreign Ambassadors. But lest this should seem a Platonic Republic, or rather a speculation, How much it is in the power of a Prince to make good Councillors for himself. than any thing, that was probably practical, or might dishearten Princes from looking after such men to make Councillors of; we will only say, if custom and habits can change nature, Princes can do as much; for if the Prince will chief favour men of good natural endowments, and of a moral honesty, (which will soon turn into piety) and if he encourage industry, and let young men perceive, that they must walk up unto preferment by stairs and degrees, and begin with the lower offices, before they can hopefully pretend unto the highest; if he find not good men to serve him, he will make men fit to serve him. So as it is much the Princes own fault, when he thinks a Favourite of pleasure or sports, conversation and divertisement, must presently be fit to be made a guide in business; (for he can give the place, but he hath not omnipotency to give the abilities) or when he will look upon no man himself, but through the glass, or as the image of a man is reflected unto him from a Favourite, or some great Officer; for this is to strengthen their root, and to weaken his own. For here, tho' the gift is his, the obligation is another's; this makes him have many attendants but few servants; for servants placed about him by great men, are rather their spies than his servants. Such an unconcernedness as this, who is about him, makes him appear like a town blocked up, he can freely receive no provisions he stands in need of; and his own servants are disheartened, by perceiving great men's friends and servants every day preferred or gratified before them. This course chills all public spiritedness, for men introduced by Favourites think, they shall last no longer than their Patrons, who are often changed or in the wain; and so they come unto a Court like harvest men, who serve only in a short time to reap that which others ploughed, sowed, and harrowed for; or they work only in fair weather, and when the corn is carrying into the barn. If a Prince therefore have ill servants, he owes much of it unto his own negligence, or not valuing that which he stands most in need of. And thus from his great Councillors and Ministers of State, A Princes menial Servants or small family. we will come to reflect upon his menial Servants, and say a little of his little Family or Court, and then of his great Family or Common-Weal, or the several orders of men in the Common-Weal, each of them being to be a part of his Regal study, for by them he may be served, or he may be endangered; and neither Servant nor Subject will be long useful, when he observes there is no observation of what he doth. And nothing may show a Prince more his declension, than when both these sorts of men are unconcerned, whether he be pleased or displeased with their service. And very often the irreverence, that is paid him in his own Court, is the mother of the neglect of his commands out of it, or that the discontents of the one breed the malevolence of the other; yet it is a great evidence, that a Government is off its hinges, when a few forward and daring men openly oppose his affairs, and many cautious ill willers are pleased at it, and scarce any ready to assert his rights; or rather, as Tacitus expresses it in his terms, Is habitus animorum fuit, ut pessimum facinus auderent pauci, plures vellent, omnes paterentur. Libels and licentious discourses are ill Symptoms, and false news easily spread; and when men in place speak fearfully, and those that invade the Government boldly, it is a sign reverence is lost. Tacitus expresses it, when they speak, liberius quam ut Imperantium meminissent; or, quando mallent mandata Imperantium interpretari quam exequi. Discontents among the Vulgars', and broken estates among the great ones, or if there be other combustible matter, no man knows how small a spark, or from whence it may come, that will set all on fire. When fear is greater than feeling, jealousies will admit of no reasoning. And when there is a general dissolution of manners, there is seldom found authority enough to reclaim that people; but some notable change follows; for there is in a State in some conjuncture of time as discernible a public madness, as there is in private men; and perchance I have lived to see it abroad, or at home, I think more than once. A Prince's Court is a little Republic, and it is a great sign, that the Prince is in the affection of his people, when his servants are respected through his whole Kingdom for the reverence they bear him. Which if it be paid by some few great men of the place, where they come, it is soon imitated by all the rest of the Country; therefore his Servants usually called Courtiers, must be as courteous and civil in their sphere, as they are willing to be kindly treated, when they are in other men's. So as a Prince's family ought to be of persons well chosen, and of good reputation and behaviour; and the nigher in relation or service the person is unto the King, the more humanity and kindness he should show to those who come to Court; especially those who come rather to pay a duty, than make a suit; for this last sort are to be answered friendly, but still according unto the nature of their request. Access ought to be easy, and answers made with gentleness as well as reasonableness; for the hand of haughtiness is not to reach even a courtesy; for where the receiver is discontented in the manner of it, the favour conferred is never half acknowledged. A Prince should not admit about his Person men of bold tempers, and who dare openly avow immoral tenants or principles, for these men will soon call that which is good indifferent, and then they will not be long before they will call that which is vicious reasonable; and artificially insinuating into his favour by keeping intelligence with his passions, they will endeavour to lead him from vanity unto vice; and the fouler the latter is, if they be but an instrument or companion in it, the securer they are in his grace; for there is at a Court not so ready way unto gain and preferment, as that which is got by some shameful service; and such men being privy unto a Princes clandestine vices, they will never be quiet until they be admitted unto his public concerns. Scire volunt secreta domus indeque timeri. Such trivial Servants, or smaller sort of Favourites as these, have politics sitted to secure themselves. There is nothing (say they) so safe for a Prince, as to make new creatures of his own. A Prince must be constant, and adhere even unto his errors, rather than be lightly carried over unto other men's Judgements, lest he seem to live upon a borrowed reason. Hence it is, or from such small Favourites as these it is, that some Historians have observed, that when the spring-heads of some Prince's councils have been discovered, they are small even to contempt. Darius' expedition into Greece, arose either from a Physician unto himself, who told him, what excellent figs grew there, or from his Wife's maid, who told her, if the King made a war upon that land, she would have the great Ladies of Greece her slaves. Varro hath the like observation, and Monsieur de Plessis assigns much of the miseries that befell the French Nation upon the Catholic League, unto the Duke of Guise's cheating Monsieur d'Espernon of a Miss. And thus often a Favourites passion gins a war, as well as a Princes public interest. On the smaller sort of smaller Favourites Boccalini puts a high contempt, when he says, all the money in a Prince's treasure will not buy sugar enough to candy or sweeten them. The Abbot D'Escallie, I remember, long since at Brussels told me a very pleasant story, how his wise Master, the Duke of Savoy, (Le viel Renard des montaignes) took from him an elegant Barber that he had, who grew so great a Favourite, that he trusted him in some of his most important Services; in which miscarrying, he complained unto the Abbot; Sir, (says the Abbot) concern not me herein, for I put him unto the outside of your head, you put him into the inside. A Prince therefore must be very careful in the choice of his Servants, that they be men equal unto their business, and not above it, or under it, and honest minded as well as strong brained; for to serve faithfully is as necessary as to serve ably; since abilities seldom make recompenses for frauds, and since honest men in favour will seldom want the parts of able men, not yet admitted thereunto. Balzac says truly, the greatness of a Prince must not rob him of the pleasantest part of human passion, i. e. the free and kind conversation of some person, A Favourite of pleasure allowable, but not to be made a Favourite of business. whom by some secret and unaccountable motion he likes in conversarion; for neither moral virtue nor policy puts any such restraint upon nature; these correct the imperfections of sensual appetites, but gratify both great and small inclinations in natural and not immoral contentments. But public Ministers, or such as privately are employed about public affairs, are to be chosen by reason, not affection. Such choices, as hath been already observed, Augustus made, when he drew into his affection and service Maecenas, Horace, and Virgil, who were qualified as well to be Councillors as Companions. Besides, an ill Favourite is often a necessary instrument or screen unto a worse Prince; for Tacitus observes, Tiberius was worse without Sejanus than with him. Tiberius (says he) vixit obtectis libidinibus, dum Sejanum dilexit & timuit, sed in scelera simul & dedecora prorupit, postquam remoto pudore & metu, suo tantum ingenio utebatur. And people reak their ill will rather upon these than on their Prince. Nothing is meant more here, than that a Favourite of pleasure should not be made a Favourite of business. A Prince should be the Master of the springhead himself, that he may water whom he pleases; for if he suffer himself to be engrossed, and passes his influences by another unto all his Dependants, he may have outward reverence but never inward esteem; for such Favourites for the most part, as they are very expensive in themselves, so they are very insolent unto others, and therefore upright and able men will not serve under them, Thus they are like Beacons or Lighthouses at sea, which old Sailors know are to be avoided; but young make towards them in the night, and endanger a shipwreck. A Princes great family, or orders of men in his nation. These and many more troublesome considerations a Prince hath about his Domestics or little Family. Many more than he must have about his great Family or Common-weal. For as individuals or single men are to be considered, so every rank or profession of men are to be weighed by him, since his security or his danger hath in several periods of times arisen, as his Nobility or Commons, nay, as his Clergy have been affected and predominant. Nay, he is to observe even the natural and constant clime of his Country, for that will learn him much of the temper of his Subjects in general; for as Barclay says, Haeret quaedam vis inconcussa hominibus pro conditione terrarum. And some ages run unto arms, others unto learning; some unto trade, some unto superstition in their Religion, A spirit of government necessary to a Governor. or Phanaticism. With all these difficulties his spirit of Government must grapple, and without a spirit of Government he will miscarry; or if he please not himself in the affairs of his Government; or if it be his task, not part of his pleasure. A Prince's Politics will be as improsperous as his Economics are, who loves to spend freely, and yet never to look upon an account; but every one meets not with a Richelieu, and a Mazarine, or Colbert; nor with a Master, who will so treat them. Come we now unto his great Family, which consists of the Orders or Tribes among his Subjects, viz. 1. Clergy. 2. Nobility. 3. Gentry Or his three States made up of these three Orders. and Commons. Next of the Professions, viz. 1. Divines. 2. Lawyers. 3. Physicians. 4. Soldiers. 5. Merchants. 6. Seamen. 7. Tradesmen. 8. Artificers. 9 Husbandmen. And 10. Vulgars' or Multitudes. Wise States encourage not Bookmen in great numbers: for they oftener, both Divines and Lawyers, especially Attorneys, rather raise quarrels, than either prevent or compose them. Literas, says an Historian, ad usus saltem discebant, etc. reliqua omnis disciplina erat, ut pulchre parerent, ut labores perferrent, ut in pugna vincerent. A Government (says Bodin) is made up of an harmonick justice, i. e. of such a structure; that the meanest tribes or profession of men find, that they are considered, and in some measure considerable in the Government: even the Multitude or Vulgar, or lowest sort of men being very considerable, in respect of their very number. The Clergy are an order of men set apart among all Nations for the divine services of the God of the land; Clergy. for the Gentile and Barbarians never wanted their brahmin's or their Druids, and every where they were men of prime rank; for the natural reverence, that was due to their calling, gave such an authority to their persons, that most commonly they were conversant in the most important affairs of the Nation; (for here we mention them only in relation to the Civil society) none being fit to interpose betwixt Prince and People, than those that interceded with God for both. And the respect that is paid to them, is a reverence paid to God; for upon the same ground Princes Ambassadors are treated with those observances they meet with; upon the same are God's Ministers. In this order of men God becomes in a manner visible unto us; for when we find he hath Servants peculiar to himself, a Court, or Temple, and revenues appropriate for maintenance of both, we strait conclude, of a surety God is in this place, or he is the Lord of this people. So as there is no greater evidence, that piety decays in a Nation, than that they are apt to contest or disrespect their Priests or Ministers. Now as this is a valuation due to the Minister of God's word, so he himself is to pay a respect unto his own calling, and to appear worthy of it, and fitted for it; for duties are reciprocal, and he is God's husbandman, and therefore must cultivate his People; and if he truly discharge his office, in fitting them for another world, he fits them best for society in this world, and for subjection to the Prince: and there is no such way for him to procure the dignity, that is due to himself, as to exercise the proper virtues of his calling. Other ties or compliances with the humours and manners of a People: or becoming like them with them in common conversation begets familiarities, but not reverence. Piety in themselves, and endeavours to make their flock pious, or of orderly lives, discretion in being friendly and helpful, or ready to advise and do good offices, a private information or admonition at home, or a conversation, which recommends that unto particular men out of the pulpit, which is preached unto them in it; this attracts their good will, whilst being unconcerned with, or conforming their company to the irregular or negligent habit or custom of others, removeth the inward esteem they should labour for. This aught to be very sincerely Pursued; I will no be so uncharitable, as to say, it is artificially so done by some of the Romanists, and by some of the Presbyterians, (though I believe one gains much of his authority by his indulgences and easy absolutions, and the other by his assurances, that they carry God's brand to mark the elect with:) only I wish our Country Clergy would be more strict to follow the rules they receive, and I have often heard given them by their Bishops in their visitations: for when they influence their flock towards God's service, they lead them the easier to be subject cheerfully to their Prince's laws and commands. And if this Order of men will expect (as justly they may) the Prince's protection for themselves, they own it him as a duty, to keep themselves so in esteem and friendship with their congregations, as they may dispose them to his service; for if they fall into the envy or disesteem of their Parishioners, they who should be an ease and coadjutors of their Prince, make their protection a burden to him, or they become as an useless body. In this quarrelling and examining age the Governors of the Church should endeavour to make matters of faith treated on with plainness, and not mingled with too many distinctions: that matters of good life be taught as much by the example of the teachers, as his expositions or precepts: that their Visitations and Courts of Jurisdiction be not only formal, or in maintenance of Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction or gain, or rather for showing their Orders, and paying for it, (as I have heard no mean men among themselves say) than for keeping them in good order; especially that their excommunications be upon weighty matters, and somewhat that is purely Christian. For though contumacy to a Court be a great fault, and that this Ecclesiastic Court have no other penal or legal censure: yet when the subject matter, on which the excommunication is grounded, is some civil or mixed concern, than this being a spiritual punishment seems so remote, that it makes excommunication seem light, and draws neglect rather than respect or obedience to the Jurisdiction. These good Fathers should be known to be forward to divert a Prince from laying great or unnecessary burdens on their Subjects; which if it be perceived by the Subject, than this temper in the Clergy will get such a disposition in the Laity, as will lead them respectfully to hearken to such doctrines, as invite them patiently to bear grievances or pressures; since it is an eminent virtue in a Christian Subject to bear with the errors of a remiss Government. Thus a Clergy must make themselves as useful as they can in secular affairs both to Prince and People, if they would gain upon them in their spiritual concerns; and this we may say, is an incumbent duty upon them, as they are members of a Politic body. And in this sense it is, that nothing more concerns a Prince, in respect of the influence this order of men have on his Subjects, than that he provide, (as God hath done for him) that his Clergy depend on no body but himself; for if either in the Prince's Ecclesiastical affairs, they pretend a Superior authority to his, as making themselves depend on a Pope, and thereby exempting themselves from the Prince's jurisdiction, or that they can wrest themselves into his secular affairs, as they have some relation to Spiritual or Ecclesiastical concerns (which even Presbytery hath set up a claim unto) than this Prince's State, and his Subjects obedience will be very precarious and dangerous: and his condition not much bettered, if Junius Brutus and Buchanan, or the Schoolmen and Jesuits be the Interpreters of St. Paul's thirteenth Chapter to the Romans, or of St. Peter's 1. Ep. 2. ch. v. 13. And the like he may expect from an Enthusiastical Teacher, who will be but binding him in chains, and his Nobles in links of iron. He must not be ignorant therefore, that his office supervises theirs, and when he hath not encroached upon that spiritual part of their office, to which they are properly said to be set apart and consecrated, (as administering the public Offices of the Church, of praying for, and preaching unto, and administering the Sacraments) then to oversee these Overseers in the good or maladministration of their Offices is his duty and his security. And in this kind, how far an Episcopal Clergy (as acknowledged and settled here in England) exceeds all others through the whole world, as best agreeing with Christ's institution, and the Apostles practice, judicious, learned, and Christian Examiner's will best and soon find out. And we will conclude our remarks upon this Order of men with this experiment, that in the year 1640, nothing raised so much the Rabble, as did the Nonconformist Clergy, who from all parts of the Kingdom came most up to the City, and filled most of the pulpits, and the Lecturers residing there; and in this present year 1678, nothing so much secured the peace of that place (nay, we may say of the whole Nation, for Whitehall had one kind of Guards, and the Citizens, true it is, by the King's leave, were their own Guards) as did the Orthodoxy of the Clergy, and the satisfactions the better sort of Citizens took in their own Ministers, who so prudently preached down the then suspected designs against the Religion established and secured loyalty by Christian principles. Nobility is (or of old was) usually the offspring of virtue, or valour, or industry, Nobility. now it is more commonly the creature of the Prince; for he is the fountain of honour. Their order is like the lesser or planetary lights in the firmament, which attend upon the sun; they are to set forth the splendour or majesty of the sovereign throne, yet sometimes they eclipse it. If they withdraw their banks, they often let in an inundation of Populacy, and endanger the throne; if they interpose their bodies, they sometimes screen the Populacy from the scorching heat of Sovereignty; but they pray often upon both; for as they are sometimes a restraint upon the Tyrant-Prince, so they are often an encouragement to the giddy multitude, to be contumacious and refractory: and sometimes they have been so unnatural, as to draw over the fickle multitude, and to join themselves unto a foreign Prince, against their true Sovereign, as in the time of King John. Which evidences, that the body Politic like the Natural, when the humours and gall overflow, and the parts lose their temperament, the whole loses its health. If the Nobility be few and great, they too often turn the scale of Government, which they should keep upright; if they be many or necessitous, they first peel the Court, and then are Court instruments to peel the people. Nobility is a plant, that will degenerate; and though they often own their fortunes as well as their qualities unto the Crown; yet we have too many examples among us, that the Sons and posterity of those Families, which were wholly raised by the Prince, employed themselves most to pull down the cloth of State. Thus the noblest of men, if they may but gratify some violent passion, or compass some present advantage, they desert their station, and the meanest things will be done by the greatest men. When their numbers are many, they appear but like a more splendid Gentry. Henry the seventh did as it were undermine their greatness, which in so mixed a Monarchy as ours is, was not very compatible with Sovereignty in so few hands. From that time this order of men in our Government hath not only been in the wain, but may be supposed much to have degenerated; for the ancient Nobility have much lessened their Estates and have made way for the principles of Oceana; for cutting off the dependencies from themselves, they made the Yeomanry free, which bred our multitude of Freeholders, who (says Mr. Harrington) have now the balance of our land or land-rents, and consequently, in his opinion, of our wealth, and by his arguments, consequently of our power: but consult Mr. Wrenn, and Oceana is drowned. And our Reformation did as much for our Church-lands, which seemed a fifth or sixth of the Kingdom. All which contributed unto the late temporary subversion of our Government in our late good, but unfortunate Prince's reign, Charles the first. God did restore us from this captivity, but whether he be not drawing upon us, for the abuse of that mercy, the judgement we generally deserved as Regicides, he knows, whose ways are in the depth, and past finding out. This change had never been effected, had not the Nobility forsaken that cloth of State, they owed their dignity unto, and aught to have protected: but infirm must that palace be, whose main beams shrink from the walls; but down will those beams fall, which are withdrawn from what ought to support them. And when our Gentry do the like, our very Sovereignty will fall to be among Mechanics; and not long after, the vulgar Rabble will have a prospect for their ambition, and when paltry Players (both Clerical and Lay) have got the habits of King, and Priest, and Nobles, and Gentry, the mock Comedy for some time will pass for a good form of Government. But he that rules in heaven can only predict, whilst an honest and condoling, not upbraiding, spirit may inoffensively, because rationally, forewarn. Nobility in all nations, as they have had more honour deferred unto them than other ranks of men, so they have had more privileges and immunities. Boccalini, I am sure, hath the reflection: but I remember not whether I follow him step by step; he resembles (as I think) Princes unto shepherds, the Commonalty unto the sheep, and the Nobility (for Nobility were originally Soldiery) unto the dogs. (This is not a derogatory term, for it is but to follow a Metaphor.) So as, says he, if these be overawed, that they may not bark and fight for their charge (for they are to defend the shepherd as well as the sheep) or, if they be not armed with an iron collar of Generosity, (some extraordinary pre-eminence or privilege) but be awed and cowed by the shepherd's boys, or the rams of the flock, both shepherd and sheep in a time of need, or when some wolfish conquering King shall invade, or a Home. Usurper undermine both; I say then, such a sort of generous daring Spirits will be wanting, and a bold Fellow, that hath followed a loaden horse on foot, will think, he is as fit to ride on horseback, (and probably he may be so) as the greatest Lord: for a crab-wine is preferred to support the stomach before vinegar, that sprang from a generous grape, because turned. If Nobility degenerate, Princes should employ men, who have the virtues, not the titles of great men. But if Nobles have both, they are the sittest men to be employed for their extraction; and their already being masters of moderate fortunes makes them have great advantages over men of natural and acquired parts, though never so well exercised or experimented, if new men; for the tree is less envied, that grows from a root, and hath been long in growing, than the mushroom, that was not at night, and shows a head in the morning. Henry the seventh supposed he had strengthened the Crown, when he cut the wings of the Nobility; Henry the eighth vindicated the just rights of the Crown, from the usurpations of a foreign usurping Bishop; both which acts made great changes in the state of our Government. Queen Elisabeth both unto Bishop and Nobleman allowed a due honour: but in her time, a novel Schismatical Presbyterian humour crept into the veins of some of all orders; so as too many Presbyters designed to levelly the Bishops with themselves, and too many Nobles, Gentry, and Commons found fair hopes to set up a real Aristocracy with an insignificant or titular Monarchy. And thus was made an inundation in Charles the first's time, which swept away the sceptre, and the sword, and the mitre; and though the waters are fallen again into their banks, there is yet much slime left behind, and the ill vapour, that not long since gave the Common-weal a syncope, may turn into an apoplexy, if the three Estates be not apt to do right unto one another, and all unto their Prince. Soldiery. Soldiery may be accounted a lesser sort of Nobility; for arms raised in the first times private men into the rank of Nobles, as usually favour of Princes, and management of affairs, or the penny doth now; but honour lost its spirit, or lustre, or esteem among men, since flattery or a sum of money became the current price for it. No man can properly be accounted a Soldier: though he may be a stout and valiant man, who hath not been frequent in dangers, and served some time at the trade. Gentry are the lesser Nobility, Gentry. and did usually influence the Commons, as the Nobility did usually them: but as they emancipated themselves from dependence on the Lords, so among us the Freeholders have withdrawn much of their respect from them. For that last rank of men, since the sale of Church-lands since Henry the eighth's time, and of the Crowns parting with much of its desmeasnes, and the Nobility and Gentry both making great sales unto men of professions, of what was theirs, Lawyers, Merchants, and great Traders being now great purchasers, we may justly say the balance of the Kingdom in our age is much changed from what it was in former ages. And our young Nobles, both of the greater and lesser rank, having rather a forward and a sinical education, viz. rather hastening timely or early to appear superficially men, than ripely and throughly to be so, they often run out of their estates, before consideratively they know they are in them. And by these often changes, which the ancient Families of most Counties undergo in their estates, the public concerns or form of Government is less steady than it ought to be in a well constituted Common-weal. And if a Prince made this a part of the care of his Government, to preserve and countenance the ancient Families both of his Nobility and Gentry, and to discountenance such as neither took into arms, nor civil employments: if he obliged them sometimes with offices freely given, or disobliged them not, by conferring dignities upon some new Upstarts, who purchase in their Counties, and overtop them at first coming, which their wives cannot bear, being to lose their precedence, these sort of men keeping their residence among their neighbours would prove the best security both of a Prince's person and Government, and their loyalty in the last King's time was most exemplary: whilst the men of profession, the Lawyers, and the Merchants were as remiss (to say no more) in their duty. For from men of pleasure may be expected more loyalty, than from men of gain, who are ever apt to follow the tide, which usually turns into profit, whilst the other, content with their own estates, affect securing the present Government or state of things. Great Ministers of State heretofore were not ashamed to keep a good correspondence with the most considerable and judicious persons of this rank in every County; for they are not only valuable in their Country, but fill up many of those places, which serve in Parliament, and the Common-weal must be best advanced, when it is served by men, who are best affected unto the established Government. And it must needs be a general comfort unto the Subject, when a Prince desires to be served by Persons, that are neither mercenary nor factious. These are the men, that in their Countries keep up good order and industry; so as to have a good regard unto them, may not only be reckon among a Prince's policies, but among his virtues. If they find themselves neglected, whether the disorder arise from the great men, or the storm from the multitude, they are not like seasonably to interpose: for though duty oblige all men in the politic body, as in the natural, when a vein is opened, to endeavour to stop it, by running towards it, yet the wise Historian hath observed, too many men choose their own security, rather than with hazard to obviate the danger of the Common-weal. Tuta & presentia, quam vetera & periculosa mallent. But this I conceive is, when the State wants noble and generous Persons to depend on: for when men of eminency are not on the stage to defend laws, men of loyalty will not be much concerned under what laws they live, and thus most commonly innovations are admitted. Commonalty. Commonalty, if a man draw the lines of their picture from Scripture, or the best Historians, he will Scarce be able to give them a good epithet. Bishop Andrews observes, besides the word, My People, there was nothing but a crooked, a perverse, a stiffnecked, a gainsaying People; and Thucydides shows their rashness and temerity; says he, quicquid modestum, ignaviae speciem habet; quod circumspectum & providum, segnitiae, quicquid abruptum & praeceps, id fort & virile censetur; for they have no leisure or art to study or think, and therefore act as they are driven or prevailed on, or according unto example or custom. They therefore are resembled unto waters, which are still and quiet in themselves, if not agitated by winds or popular Orators; or if the Government be weak and declining, they fall from it as waters do, that fall from a descent, and by an irregular motion soon make a torrent, and sweep away all that should bond them, or is before them; the rage of the sea, and the noise of the waves, and the madness or irrationality of the people are joined together. And no character better fits them than the great Historians, i. e. They either humbly serve or proudly domineer; aut humiliter serviunt, aut superbè dominantur. They run among rocks, and over shelves and shallows, and therefore he need be a good and experienced Pilot, that conducts the ship of Government when they are raised into a storm. Their passions being strong, and their judgements weak, they are more seducible unto a false religion, than apt to be settled or fixed in a true, because the one is founded on reason, which they have no measures of, and the other is laid on principles, which relate unto fables and prodigies, or any crafty or obscure notions of some designing person. Now there is no way sooner discovers the nature of principles, than the end they serve unto. If they serve not unto the virtues of the mind, you may justly doubt them; If they advance the triumvirate of the world, pleasure, profit, and ambition, by other means than virtue, (for there is a virtuous pleasure, profit, and ambition, as they suit with reason, as well as they suit with sense) they are false. But this sort of men having not busied their understandings about such distinctions, they are too too often the unhappy instruments to beat down truth in all kinds, and set up error; for they are not more fickle in their Religion, than they are unto their Government, or rather Governors, from whom they are apt to be seduced. It is the wisdom of a State in these last ages of the world, not to trouble them with unrevealed niceties of Religion, or to oblige them unto many rites and ceremonies, the use whereof they cannot penetrate into; for this age, like the former will not take all on trust, but to keep them in employment, and out of necessity by securing their trades and manufactures, the most probable way to make them good Sons of the Church, and Subjects of the State. And let them find they are not despised, but that the Prince sometimes communicates himself unto them in splendid shows; (for panem & Circenses the Romans found great use of in pleasing, and by pleasing, in governing their multitudes) for as hath been said, multitudes are valuable for their number, and Princes ought to think them very valuable, because if the Prince hath their affection, he is surely safe. Neither great Nobles nor popular Commoners are able to effect any considerable thing without Briareus' hands. But says Cicero, as they have little judgement, so they seldom follow verity: and thus being too prone to suspect their Governors, they are too easily wrought on by popular Officers, or Tribunes, who represent them; and being of a mutinous disposition, they brutishly nourish factions in a State, for things they do not understand, till they pay the price of it, with their own blood and ruin: not knowing the Demarchi of Athens, and the Ephori of Sparta, and the Tribunes of Rome were set up as the Conservators of the people's liberty, but were truly the overthrow of them all. In a word, the worst men are aptest to dispute their Governors: for pessimus quisque asperrime Rectorem patitur: and moral and religious men make the best subjects, as being the best judges of the blessings men enjoy under a well ordered Government. Having said thus much of the before mentioned several ranks and orders of men, whereof their States are made up, it may not be amiss to mention the several professions and their ends, The several professions in a Nation. and how they are of advantage, and how they may be of danger unto a Government; that so the Prince's wisdom may make the true use of them all, and divert the ill consequences of their abuses in their callings. Of the Divine we have said much already, therefore shall only say here, that he manages the opinions about celestial and moral truths, or the state of men after this life. The Physician is to preserve the health of the body. The Lawyer the concerns of a man's estate. The Soldier is to see justice may be executed. The Merchant exports the staple, and imports the foreign commodities: and the Tradesman vents both by retail. The Artificer manufactures all, and the Husbandman provides food for all, for the King himself lives by the field. In no profession can any man be truly a good Citizen, that is transported either with pleasure or covetousness. It is a great sentence of Salust's, Nec quisquam extollere se, aut divina attingere potest, nisi omissis pecuniae aut corporis gaudiis; for with neither of these two taints or corruptions can the Divine ever be believed, that he means as he says. And with them the Physician and Lawyer will either neglect or beggar their Patients and Clients. The Soldier grows cruel and rapacious, if these vices seize on him, and will sooner lose or sell the place he is to defend and maintain, than keep it. And the Merchant, Trades-man, and Artificer trade unfairly, and not unto their own Country's advantage by covetousness; the one bringing in commodities, which serve only unto sensual appetites and vanity, or to please the fancy; the other either adulterating, or working so slightly his wares, that Foreigners decline the trade; so as all these inconveniences, and the prevention of them, fall under the Prince's care and policies, or art of Government. Indeed in the body politic, as in the natural, there not being the least thing done, but requires an influence of the Governors. He must inspirit every profession, or they stagnate. None of these professions are superfluous; for there must be a Divine, No profession superfluous. though every man were so knowing, as not to need instruction: since his Office is to be the mouth of the Congregation unto God. A Lawyer cannot be wanting, because two men may mean very justly and sincerely, and yet not know how to assure one another in legal terms. A Physician cannot be wanting, because health will impair, and sickness ought to be considered by a man, that is in a state of health: upon which reason a man safely cannot be his own Physician; for sickness often deprives a man of sense, and disables him to judge his own case. One man's necessaries must be supplied from various trades, and that makes necessary all the other distinct callings. And thus the wisdom of God, that designed men for society, ordered it, that men could not live with one another, if they had not likewise been to have lived by one another. True it is, the Soldier is but a necessary evil in a Common-weal; for would all men observe justice, there would need to be no force; for force is never to be used, but when reason and law are by violence withstood. It is depraved, not sincere, nature makes this profession necessary; but that necessity makes it very honourable and useful; and as it requires a great courage to execute it, and a great presence of mind: so this is hardly attained without a profession accustomed unto danger. It likewise requires great natural strength of body, and moral virtue of the mind; for no order of Theologues, no, nor of Penitents, undergo those hardships, which the fatigues of war bring with them; nor have they frequenter occasion of moral virtue, to restrain ferocity, and to exercise humanity. The great extent of government. If all this providence and care belongs unto the Regal office in relation to the choice of persons, and the administration of professions, how much further must this providence extend, when it is to weigh such numberless particulars of business, where every case differs almost from another; falling under various circumstances, which requires a particular act of prudence to determine, and which are too too numerous to prescribe rules for. It is no marvel then, that God, who hath made Princes provinces thus large, hath afforded them his own title of Gods among men: for their providence resembles his, in a shadow of the extent of it; and in the various affairs it provides for, they stand in need of an universal wisdom, like his, and of an ability of turning evil to good, i. e. that that which damnifies private men, may be made use of, or conduce unto public advantage. Wisdom therefore built her a house, and fixed it on seven firm pillars, or mankind, who found a natural disposition to live jam society, as well as a natural necessity, in respect of the mutual aid one man gives unto another, discerned, that the strongest tye to fasten them unto one another, was the same band or religion, which tied them unto their God. Some learned men make this house to be the body natural of man, and the five outward senses to be five pillars of it, and the two inward, fancy and memory, to make up the seven. I shall not presume to say, the Text warrants my application; but in relation unto this discourse I shall make the house to be a body politic, or civil Government, which may be said to be upheld by these seven underwritten pillars, viz. 1. Religion. 2. Justice. 3. Council. 4. Confederation. 5. Commerce. 6. Treasure. 7. Arms. Religion. Religion, as it is a pillar by itself to support Government, so it is the basis of all the six other pillars; for as the word imports, it is a tye or band betwixt the divine and the human nature; and no ligament would have held men together, but that which linked God and man together. Which commerce or intercourse is the great proof of an intellectual world, God's Spirit here influencing this intellectual world, as the sun doth the elementary. Natural. Instituted. It is usually divided into natural and instituted, or what God writ by creation, in the heart or understanding of man, and so natural religion was essential to man by creation, as instituted, was given by, or written in his Word for man, and principally designed for the manifestation of that revelation, which relates to redemption. Man naturally capable of immediate revelation from God. Man was naturally capable of revelation from or by an intercourse with God, by such means as his divine wisdom thought fit to communicate himself: for we see before man's fall he received a revelation in that positive prohibition of eating the forbidden fruit; for positive laws, relating only unto things of an indifferent nature, are every one of them so many immediate revelations from God. Hence may be observed, how extensive natural religion is; showing the human dependence on the divine nature, adoring that majesty and goodness, and evidencing its own gratitude by its obedience, expressed by the exercise of those moral virtues, viz. piety, justice, The extent of natural religion reaching unto that, which is usually accounted instituted religion. and sobriety engraven in its own nature; and evidenced by that natural conscience, which will disturb even the mightiest Princes, when all the world else flatters and secures their vices: which proves, that men have a prospect of comfort or fear beyond this world. The same natural re igion (or that reasonableness it is grounded upon) shows, why men, who thus admitted a God, thought, that God designed for himself peculiar and separate servants, temples, sacrifices, etc. and all these to be of the choicest persons and things, that were among the sons of men, because they were dedicated unto the supremest essence. Hence it is we may conceive, that all the religion of the Heathen world was natural; for it was so necessary for man to depend upon a superior nature, that otherwise (as the Lord Bacon says) he would not have been able to have supported the frailty of his own nature. The Heathens care of religion. Man admitted therefore many Gods, rather than he would be without one; and what were all the opinions of fate and destiny, and Elysium fields, but an acknowedgment of providence and immortality? and what were all the Philosophers grave precepts about morality, but a groping after the Decalogue, and the dispersed Ethics in Scripture? How careful was this blind world of their Diana's, and Palladium's, and topical Gods; for herein they thought lay their hope and their strength, and expected not a victory, till they could enchant or draw over to themselves the God of the place. Plutarch could say, depraved nature runs into superstition or atheism, and then sound reason led unto true religion, which is but an obedience unto God's laws written in man's heart, upon the ground of piety and gratitude. No nation would ever allow atheism among them, nor let the divinity of their Gods (though false ones) be invaded; for this among the Athenians cstl Socrates his life, and Diagoras was banished by them for but speaking doubtfully of them; and Marcus Tullius, one of the two Library-keepers of the Sibyls books, was sewn into a sack, and fling into the sea, but for making an imbezlement or a rasure. Lucius Albinus flying from the Galls, with his wife and children, seeing the Vestal Virgins on foot, descended from his chariot to save and ease them; and they all agreed in this, that sacrilege was much more heinous than theft, and that though Dionysius the Syracusian prided himself in his prosperity, even by this sin, yet the direful vengeances, which befell his son, were assigned to be judgements on the sacrilege of the father. It is well known, how erroneous the Heathen Divinity was; and yet we cannot but think, that these reverences to false Gods were acceptable to the true. It was the lapse of nature, and the seduction of the evil spirit, and inadvertence and habit in evil, that made men thus grossly mistake the object of their belief; but it was natural reason and religion, that made them determine, there was somewhat in this kind to be believed; and their immoral actions (especially as they were nocent to civil society) fell under the correction of those laws, which were framed to make society beneficial. This is enough to show us, how even by the light of nature men made civil society to be supported by religion: Religion a 〈◊〉 of civil society. for it is not only the cause of good order, but of good success or blessing. For in Vitellius' time, wh●n the Capitol, wherein was the Temple of their Gods, was burnt, they deplored themselves much more than they did, when the Galls took their city; for than they said, the seat of Jupiter was unshaken, and their Capitol preserved. All this considered, we, cannot wonder, why the wise men of those ages with Aristotle determined, that the first care of every State should be that of religion; and with Dion Cassius, that the religion of every country should be but one. The care of religion. Now the first reason for the first proposition is, that religion neglected or despised weakens all other parts of government. Religio neglecta aut spreta trahit secum rempublicam; for where there is but an indifferency to it, or a want of devotion and inward esteem of it, the soul of moral virtue is lost; for men will be rather temperate for health, than for the peace of society, or to have a fitness by piety to have an intercourse with their God; and justice will be observed rather as an outward compliance with laws, than an inward esteem of such a beneficial tye, in relation to society. For it is the love of justice, which flows from religion, not the fear of its punishments, that inspirits government; for this values the Legislators authority and wisdom, the other dreads only the Lictor's rods. Secondly, Government is never freely and cheerfully obeyed, but when it is supposed God's ordinance, and that it is accounted a part of religion so to esteem it; else obedience will be more precarious, than the nature of it will admit. The commission of government therefore issues out of God's Chancery, and directs the Prince to direct his government to the benefit of the subject; and yet when he fails therein, leaves no appeal to the subject, but unto his providence, who prescribes to both; for Nero's vices were not half so pernicious to the empire (no, nor to particular men) as were the revolts even from that monster, and from his Successors, Galba, Otho, and Vitellius, who were but pestilential breaths of the same ill vapour. When conspiracy had cast out Kings, the Consul's rule seemed so majestic and arbitrary, that the Commonalty must needs be tempering it by Tribunitial power; so as Livy observes, that the cord of government was so strongly haled at each end, (or extremity) that there was no strength left in the midst; and that strife was more for the management and rule, than for the safety and preservation of the State, and all these revolutions, because government was not supposed God's ordinance, but the people's choice. Thus we see it is religion, that only makes Sovereignty and liberty sociable, or sets such bounds to majesty in the Prince, as may advance concord among the Citizens. Cast off this temper, and every mistaken judgement will produce such angry humours, as will neither endure the ordinary evils or sores of government, nor the common remedies or salves for its cure. Thirdly, the highest throne, though never so wise, powerful, or sincere, depends upon Providence, which can either by natural or moral causes disappoint all its best laid designs. An earthquake, a storm, or a treachery frustrates all man can do, whilst nothing can withstand heavenly benedictions; and the very opinion men have, that the Gods are propitious to them, giveth diligence and courage in all attempts. These are the reasons, and many more, why government must be supported by religion. Next we will offer a few, why the religion of every Nation should be but one. Religion should be but one. First, Religion is the highest, as well as the strongest obligation upon the mind of man; so as if that admit any principles of liberty, or exemption from Civil authority, disobedience shelters itself, and replies, it is fit to serve God before man, and so grows incorrigible, because reasonably it may justify itself: (though that be an error as will be soon proved.) Secondly, Men of a superstitious temper either infect one another, or are misled by some subtle knaves, who make good gain of men, who are of a superstitious devotion, and who make conscience of every little thing, and are apt to believe vain and foolish prophecies, or interpret revelations. And thus says Livy in his fourth book, they became a public offence, insomuch as the Aediles had in charge, that no other Gods should be worshipped, but those of the Romans; nor after any other manner, than had been usual in their native Country, Indeed if it were rightly considered, the religion of all Nations should be but one, because all should serve but one God, and he by the tradition unto the Patriarches before the Law, and by his divine prescripts under the Law, and by the revelation of his will by the Messiah and his Apostles after the Mosaic-Law, made his will known in all necessary, natural, moral, and divine truths, tending unto salvation, whereof Kings and Priests were the guardians, but not the parents; for they were to deliver in matters, immediately relating to salvation, nothing but what they had received, though in matters relating to decency and order in his service, or in matters of civil concern, they were authorized to give the law suitable to their own best judgements, and all subordinate to them were thus to seek an unity in the faith, and a common utility in the State in the band of peace. Thus God is a God of order and not of confusion; and if he made religion a support to government, private men, by framing new axioms of their own, to exempt themselves from odedience, or to weaken the sinews of government, must not distract it. For if a Sovereign may command one thing, which God hath not forbidden, and a high Priest another, which God hath not revealed, or a private person contradict both in those things, which are both true and suitable to their distinct authorities, than the reins or girdle of all authority, divine, ecclesiastical or civil, is dissolved. Among the Gentile world instituted religion was no disturber of government, because it consisted principally in outward rites, ceremonies, and observances. But in the Christian religion, God being a jealous God of his honour and truth, it hath great influence on government, because the main end of it, Instituted Religion was to restore natural. as it was to make reconciliation, and clear the intercourse betwixt the divine and the intellectual nature; so it was to restore natural religion, and to cleanse that polluted stream. Therefore that Church, which upon false glosses on instituted religion introduces corruptions in natural, and weakens civil Sovereignty, that it may usurp Ecclesiastical, or dispenses with moral duties, that men may be the more observant of their ceremonial laws, makes the buttress, which was to support the wall, thrust it down. And those Princes, whom God bridled by his moral law, in the exercise of their Sovereignty, weaken but their own Governments, when they decline those laws, natural religion and common justice recommended unto them, as to be the basis of all their civil, municipal, and human laws. Nor doth any spirit more weaken government by pretence of religion, than those Enthusiastical persons, who upon pretence of particular impulses, respect neither human nor divine laws; The ill influences on Government by several fanatic principles. for these can fall in love with their own selves and their tribe, and broach doctrines, that we may say turn the world topsie turvy; for one says, 1. Dominion is founded in grace, and thereby is all Sovereignty overthrown; though the same men at the same time read, that Cyrus was Gods Anointed as well as David. Another sort of them say, 2. None have right unto the creature, but the godly; though God makes his sun to shine, and his rain to fall on the bad as well as the good: and they will judge likewise, who are those; and than what becomes of the property of their fellow subjects, whom they account usurpers thereof. 3. An impulse of a brainsick or vindicative spirit must be by a third sort a command from God, and who then is secure of life? Neither doth there want those, who would be as holy in other men's opinions, as they are are in their own: and therefore their words must be accepted as an oath, and so government lamed in a principal sinew, and the reverence and awe, which mankind hath ever expressed of God's name to extract truth, must be laid aside, that their sanctity might be justified. But such men as these by their superstitions may contradict sense, philosophy, natural and instituted religion, and fall so low in their very demeanours, (as are our Quakers and Seekers outward carriage) that that which is ridiculous and irrational must be accounted religious, or the government must be overthrown. 4. Nay, a soberer sort of men will so venerate their own interpretations and dogmas, that if Civil or Ecclesiastical authority restrained the divulging their opinions, though contrary to that of their national Church, their petty and small truths, if truths, must be justifications to them to disquiet the peace of the government. Upon this whole representation, (besides condolement) which might lead all these sorts of men unto some modesty, what have we to say, but that all this is contradictory unto that Gospel-spirit, most of these men pretend unto? for if Christ in his own person, and his Apostles in theirs, would not resist secular Governors, (for that great truth, on which all other Evangelical truths depend, i. e. that God was reconciled unto the world by his Son Jesus Christ) but cheerfully submit themselves unto authority, and undergo the punishment that was laid on them: then if Pope, Presbyter, or Fanatic would now think themselves bound to the same submission, it might be well thought, it would prove the best cure for the two first's usurpations, and the lasts delusion. But in order to a remedy, if we will hear a wise man's opinion, there is no better way to stop the rising of new Sects, than to reform (I have forgot his words) gross and known abuses, or troublesome niceties, and to compound smaller differences, and to proceed mildly, rather by gentleness than violence, and to convert or win over the principal Authors by some countenance or preferment, than to embitter them by scorns. But all this is to be meant towards modest Dissenters, and such as revile neither governments; for if God lead his people by the hand of Moses and Aaron, and have tied men to them by religion, or religious observances of them, and any sort of men in matters that are not immoral, may rise up against them, and say, ye take too much upon you, ye sons of Levy, or what have we to do with Moses? all government is at at end. And when the religion established in a land is rend by discords, and the holiness of the Professors of that religion is much abated and grown hypocritical, and so to honest minds scandalous (as it was about Mahomet's time, for then the Nestorian and Arian heresies much abounded both in Asia and Africa) then says this great Chancellor, you may look, not only for a new Sect, but possibly for a new religion. And no disobediences to government are so dangerous, as those that are grounded upon religion, nor no Sect so likely to prevail, as those, who complain of the present management of affairs, and promise great liberties and exemptions. I am far from believing, The mind cannot be forced, yet it may be restrained. there is any power in a Prince or a Church to force a man to believe; for no man can force himself but in civil or ceremonial concerns: if a Prince or a Priest require that, which another thinks not prudent, or is of an indifferent nature in itself, Subjects are bound to nothing, or they are bound in matter of this nature to submission; for such compliance can never truly wound conscience. A Prince may make a civil law about Husbandry, which an experienced Husbandman may know will not work its end; and yet he is bound to an obedience; and the Church may enjoin an imprudent rite, and Christian liberty may censure it so; and nevertheless it requires an outward conformity. And thus we see, how religion conduces to civil quiet, by admitting a liberty in judging the injunctions of authority, and yet making innocent the obedience thereunto. For if God, in things relating to his own honour, exempted not the subject from the civil authority, but submitted him to a passive obedience, than it is reasonable to judge, he doth it much more in all things, which concern only men's sociable and civil concerns. And this is enough to prove, how strong a pillar religion is unto the house of government. It is a great observation of Valerius Maximus', whatever the Augurs declared from the Gods, the Senate determined not against, Religionique summum imperium cessit; omnia namque post religionem nostra civitas duxit, etiam in quibus summae majestatis conspici decus voluit. And they took care religion should be truly taught amongst them: insomuch that they gave to the foreign cities under their government Sons of their Prophets to instruct them; says this good Author, Decem filii singulis Etruriae populis percipiendae sacrorum disciplinae gratia, etc. Scipio Africanus is said never to have gone about any business, but first he went to the temple. Governments or bodies politic are as subject to diseases, as bodies natural are; for a State may be free from violent convulsive fits, and yet may fall into a paralytic or hectic distemper, or an atrophy; for it is an ill sign in a State, when subjects dare not rebel, and yet grow sullen; for such mutinies make no noise, and yet loosen all the joints and ligaments of policy. Besides these hardly to be discerned sicknesses of State, there are periods of times and revolution of things, which have ripened a State for a death, even when it seems in a good condition of health, or whilst it hath marrow in its bones, or a good condition of plenty and peace; for so was the time of our late change begun in 1640, when we saw in few years after, that there was but one step betwixt the highest and the lowest condition. So as unless Providence keep the City, the Watchman waketh but in vain; and nothing keeps Subjects out of the way of rebellion, nor Princes in the way of justice, as doth religion. Justice the next pillar of Government; Justice. religion and justice both spring immediately from God; for it was the eternal wisdom that form the ligament or bond, which we call religion, which should tie, as by a law, every rational creature to perform the justice of his nature, which other creatures observe by instinction, man by choice. So as a law is but a rule what things the creature should follow, and what fly. Thus the eternal Wisdom wrote natural laws in the very essence or rationality of man, and by this rationality this creature was capacitated to receive from him positive laws. When man offends against the natural law, his conscience checks him, and when he offends against the positive, some known revelation, or unquestioned tradition, or written word of God, must be his accuser. Hence laws usually are divided into Moral, which are those, which flow from the law of nature, or ceremonial, which are those, which flow from some positive law of God, or judicial, which should imitate the justice of Natural laws, and were given to some men, as unto the Jews, by God himself, or from the law of Nature, and the rationality of man, unto all others, and are framed by men in order to the exercise of justice among themselves, and are made as conformable, as may be, unto the law natural and eternal, and have for their end the common good of that society, which is under the authority of the Head or Sovereign of that society. So as every such law ought to be honest, and possible to be kept; every such law containing in it two powers, viz. directive in what it prescribes, and coactive in punishing offenders against it. Justice, natural and civil. Now justice is but a performance of some act, which some law requires. And as we said on the former head, religion was either natural or instituted; so we must say on this, it is either natural or civil. Indeed, natural justice is an essential part of natural religion, and so is inbred in man; Why natural justice so far exceeds civil. and that is the reason natural justice so far exceeds civil, or what human laws prescribes. For human laws cannot extend their sanction, or rewards and punishments unto desires and concupiscences, out of which all civil injustices arise; and some offences or injustices seem unto Legislators so trivial, that there is no law or sanction against them. Yet natural justice prohibits even such offences, which made the great Naturalist and Statesman Cicero say, It was a narrow, or a mean thing, to be just only as far as civil law required; quam angusta est innocentia ad legem bonum esse; or quanto latius officiorum patet, quam juris regula; for humanity and liberality etc. are left out of the public Tables of the Romans. Indeed both Tables of the Decalogue are but parts of natural justice: so as a man may be a good Citizen, Vir bonus est is, qui consulta Patrum, etc. when he is not a good man, or when he narrows that justice, which he owes to men, unto civil sanctions. Justice is concerned in making, executing, obeying, laws. 1st. In making them; Justice in making. for the Legislator must sincerely be convinced, the law is beneficial for the Government and for the Governed; for if it serve only personal ends, as that the Prince and Governors by it singly reap the advantage, and that it conduce not to common good, it wants the best character of a law. The like it doth, if an unruly multitude force a law from him, in prejudice of the good constitution and strength of the Government or Royalty. Secondly, if laws be made unto good ends, Executing. and not executed, they become a snare; for usually the breach of a civil law carries with it some profit and advantage, and so one man to his loss observes that law, which another through his disobedience gains by. And non-execution of laws leads men to the neglect of the Government; for they think it a foolish thing to be tied by that cord, Obeying Laws. which others so easily break. Thirdly, therefore when laws are made, subjects must make a conscience to obey them; for it is a debt they own unto their Prince, and unto the whole society, and to every particular man of it. So as a Legislator must make a law no snare; a Magistrate must impartially execute it, and a Subject conscientiously obey it. The law of nature is the rule of all human and civil laws; Tully could say, Nos legem bonam a malà nullà aliâ ratione, nisi Natura norma dividere possumus. And Baldus, Imbecillitas est humani intellectus in quacunque causa legem quaerere, ubi rationem naturalem invenires. A law therefore must be suitable to religion, agreeable to the natural (not humorous) disposition of the people, and must tend unto public good. And thus civil and judicial laws made by men are manifest proofs of moral laws written by God in man; for they ever confirm those laws, and conform themselves thereunto, and are adapted to civil cases only. Laws therefore are made both in defence of the Government and Governors, Laws in defence of the Government and Subject. as well as of the Governed in their several concerns of life, liberty, property and good name, fame or reputation; and the breach of these laws falls under several penalties, higher or lower, Penalties. as the offence is; for it is treason and misprision of treason to offend against the Government or Prince; and it is excommunication to offend against Ecclesiastical authority; and it is murder and felony, or a capital punishment, to take away a man's life, or rob him of his goods; and he falls under a pecuniary or corporal punishment, that robs a man of his liberty or good name. Thus justice, whether it be political or private, is the defence of the Head and Body in society, How laws oblige the Prince, and how the Subject. and obliges the Prince by the directive part of the law, tho' not the coactive; (for therein he is subject only unto God) to be just unto, and tender of the subject; and by the directive and coactive part of it, obligeth the Subject uniformly and impartially to honour, aid, and obey him in his government. Nay, a man by it is defended from himself, as well as from others; for men by excesses and penury are often unjust unto themselves, and unto their relations. And this restrains a man from using even his own to his own private detriment, as well as unto the publicks; for the public has a right both in his person and private possessions, and all this, ne Respublica capiat aliquid detrimenti. This virtue guides men in peace, and regulates them in war, and frames all sound council. It is that in the Politic Body, which consent of parts makes in the Natural: for it gives amongst the members thereof a fellow-feeling of each others state. It makes the foot content to support the body, and the body the head, and the head to influence by its animal spirits all the members. It admonishes the stomach, not wilfully to send up fumes and jealousies to annoy the head, and supplicates the head, not to cast down rheums and catarrhs upon the lungs, lest the State be short breathed, and so short lived; whilst mutual justice and love, like the harmony and good temper of humours, begets peace, which we may call public health. Justice distributes rewards and punishments equally. And thus it becomes the best stay of a common weal, when it distributes justly rewards and punishments, chase partiality from the dispensation of rewards, and passion or severity from that of punishment. We may say of it, it was implanted by nature, and cultivated by natural religion, and revived by instituted. Christianity, being itself famous for making this a radical principle, that men should do to others as they would be done unto themselves; obliging men under any kind of government, and in any state, bond or free, to observe their own laws, and not to violate those, by which they held commerce with any foreigners: Princes even to be content with their own bounds, knowing the possession of a real virtue was much more than the possession of an usurped dominion; since no one person is able to influence the dominion of the whole earth, but he that made it. And even he as man refused it, probably because he would wean the most aspiring minds, and powerfullest Princes from affecting it. Thus making justice a guide to modesty, leaving sovereignty to him, who made the whole, and distributes it by parcels to whomsoever he pleases. Council. Council is a deliberate considering of a particular affair by a man's self, with the help of some other. Every council ought to arise from some knowledge of that affair, or of the nature of it, and be grounded on experience, and managed by prudence with an mind: so as truly an ignorant and unexperienced and injudicious person is not fit either to give or receive council. He that is to receive it, be he Prince or private man, must have weighed and deliberated the matter he takes council upon within himself, or else he will not be capacitated to judge of the advice given him. So as men must habituate themselves in their own affairs, that they may render themselves capable of council; What fits a Prince for Council. especially a Prince, whose education, and his own contemplation should have versed him in some general knowledges, before he can be fit to receive particular advices upon particular affairs. For unless he have considered or studied the nature of mankind, the constitution of his own Government, the genius and inclination of his own people, the power and interest of his neighbouring Princes, and such like general heads, (unto which all determinations of particular affairs should be squared) he himself cannot properly be said to be fit to take council. Besides, (as has been observed before upon the head of Councillors) if he have not judged of persons, as well as things, his policies will be weakened. Nor will any thing so probably render counsel useless to him, as a conversation with those, who being not able to give counsel, through the familiarity of their Prince, usually deride council. Prince's therefore (who need council most) ought to be most careful with whom they converse; for conversation insensibly insinuates itself, and a Favorite's folly either becomes a council, as given by him, or makes a Prince disrelish a sound council given by another; so as few Princes thrive by council, who are misled by conversation. Hence we see, that Princes should busy their minds about determining within themselves their own affairs, that from without themselves they might receive advice; for men most carefully advise them, whom they know to be habited to weigh their own affairs: for if the vessel be empty, they are less careful to consider, what liquor they pour into it. It is too hard a task for any man to give rules, how to give, or how to take council; since affairs are so various, and particulars depend so much upon their circumstances, no better rule can be given, than not to remove a present evil at the price of a future lasting inconvenience; for it never fares well with those Princes, who conceive, The difference between an Expedient and a Council. that an Expedient fills up the place of a council; for such palliate cures are but temporary satisfactions, and bring a State into a friable or crumbling condition for nothing, which wounds the constituent parts of a government, or shakes its foundation, or transfers power from a Prince to any other order of men, is rccompenced by any ingenious Expedients. Belluarum est (says Cicero) vivere in diem, nostra concilia ad sempiternitatem tendunt. Wise men foresee remote consequences, and weak men live from hand to mouth. Sallust, like a wise Physician of State, The declenfion of a State. discerned, how the Government fell into a hectic; Ego (says he) ita comperi omnia Regna, etc. or I never observed Kingdom, City, or Nation long prosper, whose councils were not sound; (or deep, or steady:) for when partiality or favour, fear or pleasure hath corrupted counsel, wealth first decays, than empire weakens, then follows change of Government, than servitude. Thus by the first step the Government is weakened by itself, afterwards it is fitted to be a prey unto a Foreigner. Great necessity therefore there is, that the pillars of Government be often surveyed; for it serves little to repair the penthouses, if the beams of the house shrink. Of the qualifications of a Councillor we have largely spoken already. The wise Chancellor Bacon makes the very modes of consultation advance much the consult, and so neglects not set times, place, as a Council-chamber, the figure of a council-board, whereby men may conveniently hear and be heard, that the state of the question or proposition debated be put up in writing; least Rhetorical speeches lose the question, and so the resolve differ from the matter first proposed. He seems therefore to disallow such figures of speech, as too popular, and unbecoming a Council-board, or looking upon eloquence and rhetoric, as too amusing and deceitful, and not allowing it, but in order to remove from the mind of the auditors some prejudice they are prepossessed off; for, says he, sometimes there is a necessity of a fomentation, or warm hand to chafe in the oil; yet he likewise allows, so they will hold to the question, that a matter may be debated, that is fit to be rejected, so it be in order to find out somewhat, that may be fit upon the first proposition to be agreed unto; and he gives an ingenious, philosophical, or chemical and logical illustration thereof, saying, a negative is more pregnant of direction than an indefinite; as ashes are more generative than dust. Thus council should neither be given nor taken in haste; deliberation being essential thereunto, if the affair will any ways permit it; otherwise courage must supply council; for no fruit requires more time for ripeness, than doth council. Precipitation like the warmth of a chimney, that hath a tree behind it, makes the fruit forward and soft, but not mellow and well tasted. And thus it fares with all other matters; for a forced ripeness prejudices both a good taste and nourishment. Council is no where better set forth than in Ecclesiasticus, ch. 22. v. 16. and 17. It settles the heart upon a thought of understanding, (or weighs consequences) for, says he, as timber girt and bound together in a building cannot be loosed with shaking, so the heart, that is established by advised council, shall fear at no time. Confederations. A principal work of Council is the deliberating about confederations, which are leagues made between several Sovereign Princes, independent one on the other. The law of human nature obliges all nations to be just and kind unto one another, so as when ever they have intercourse with one another, they are tied unto each other by natural justice, as being of one kind or species; so as though they never know one another, yet they are thus bound to one another, if ever they have intercourse or commerce. And then all their leagues are but political results of natural justice and wisdom: for justice examines the principles of their confederation, and wisdom the end of it▪ viz. that it be really for reciprocal and mutual good, or that it be just in the beginning, and wise in the end. And thus from home-affairs we must now transport ourselves unto foreign, and weigh those things, which concern peace and war between several Nations. On which subject Grotius has erected an everlasting monument: so as this small and fresh stream is but to lead a Novice unto the mouth of the arm of that sea. Nations stood in need of one another's help, Nations benefited thereby. and were benefited by one another's assistance, and interchange of native commodities, as much as private men of one and the same Nation and City do of one another's helps in their several trades and professions; for reciprocal advantages are the grounds of all common societies. Treaties of Peace and War. This is the root of all Treaties, viz. those of 1. peace or commerce. 2. war offensive, defensive, or both by land & Sea. 3. and of all other constitutions, and agreements. All Treaties depend on veracity and sincerity. If veracity and sincerity, and openness of dealing, and plain heartedness planted in man by his Creator, for the security of society, had not degenerated, and been vitiated by covetousness, ambition, envy, and self-love, the benefits of society had been the chief comforts of man's life, and the whole world had appeared, but as the Creator's great family. But now nighest relations being apt to deceive one another, it is no marvel, that foreign Treaties are for the most part deceitful; so as a modern, learned, and good Statesman, the Lord Cherbury gives it for a rule, that in foreign Treaties, where a present advantage is but little, and a future great, it is the wisest thing to take the less, because too probably, before the time come about, wherein the future and greater advantage is to be reaped, the face of affairs may be so changed, that the stipulated future advantage will be lost. I have forgot his words, but his sense I think I have not altered. Somewhat must be in the matter, when Marcus Aurelius (I may say the best moral heathen Prince) allows in such cases a Prince to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or semi-malus; The difficulty of making and keeping leagues and as Cicero says, Nec possunt aliter two, quibus commissa est tota Respublica. And yet this good man says in another place, Ne quid insidiosè, ne quid simulatè, ne quid fallaciter: so as treachery and fallacy, and simulation are absolutely rejected, whilst dissimulation or a concealing a matter, or using worldly prudence or disguise seems allowable, because unavoidable; for, says another, Non regent, qui non tegent. It is one thing, if a State be so foolish, like an Indian, to part with his gold for a bead, because he is pleased with it, and another, if the Merchant should aver, his bead was of an intrinsic value through the whole world with the others gold. Sure I am, injustice and breach of faith agrees not with humanity; less than will it square with Christianity; the root of man's misery is in not daring to trust himself unto the law of his own nature, and the providence of his Maker. Equivocal words in Treaties have been very pleasant to the palate of those, Equivocal words. that first gave them, but have been very bitter in the stomach afterwards. Charles the fifth for pressing upon the Landgrave of Hesse an exposition, which suited not with the Duke of Saxe's promise to his Father-in-law, the Landgrave, (though Saxe was made Elector by the same Emperor) yet made such a confederation against him, as drove the Emperor out of Germany. If a Prince ignorantly or passionately wave the true interest of his Nation, or too strongly stem the tide of his People's inclination, such Treaties never last long; and yet a wise Prince may rather give way unto the torrent of some prosperous Prince, and bow to his fortune, than put matters to the hazard of a doubtful war. Thus such as are drawn from their proper interest by an unavoidable necessity, are pardoned for making such abrupt changes, or giving such assistances, as Boccalini says, the smaller Princes of Italy were by Apollo; since men of their small interest in the world, though it be an indecent thing, (says he) must chew their meat on both sides their chaps. Thus Italy did betwixt Charles the eighth and Ferdinand, and Charles the fifth and Francis the first. But it is the dishonour of Christianity that Treaties are so solemnly made, nay, and sworn unto, and yet so easily broken, and so 〈◊〉 by that high Priest, who pretends to be the Vicar of the man (nay, of the God) of truth, dispensed with. And therefore after all these ceremonies, sometimes Princes are forced to give hostages, and 〈◊〉 giving hostages, sometimes we find a Prince rather abate of his natural affection, than prejudice his affairs of State. So as Francis the first chose rather to give his Sons for hostages, th●● twelve of his principal Ministers of State. Hence it is, The difficulties that attend upon Treaties. there is no profession hath more need of artifices, than that of an Ambassador or Secretary of State. The very preliminaries to a Treaty have oftentimes as much picking work and thorny circumstances, as the Treaty itself; for when two Princes in difference are both weary of their distances or contention, and so both affected towards a reconciliation, some punctilio arises, how they may have a right intelligence, and yet neither seem forwarder to a peace than the other. For then a third Prince must make that to be an act of his good affection, which is a strong desire of them both; and he must make way for some Minister to be admitted by either Party al' incognito, and a Cardinal de Riche●ieu will have a Pere Joseph, that shall turn the scale wherever he comes. And in these disguises the Popish Princes have more advantage than any Protestant, though they sometimes find out a Soldier or a Merchant, that usually frequented that Court, and so can personate a man of one profession, and act, as of another. By such clandestine means as these, a Treaty is often ended, before it's known to be begun; and then the real Ambassador is a man rather of pomp than of business. Nay, when Princes find the inconveniencies of former Treaties, as if it were by way of super-fetation, they are kindling of a new Treaty before they are delivered of an old. Thus our Henry the eighth found the French and Spaniard proclaiming a league against him, when at the same time his Ambassador entered ..... to demand the performance of a former Treaty then in being. And Philip Comines lay at Venice to make a league for Lewis the eleventh with that State, when, whilst he lay there, and perceived it not, the Venetians and Spaniards made a league against his Master. And so were the Venetians themselves served at Cambray, where most of the States of Christendom united against them, and they discovered it not, but it was like to have proved very fatal and ruinous to them; and yet it is observed, that this grave and wise Nation usually recover by Treaties of peace that which they often lose by misadventures of war; whilst the same Comines gives the reverse of this medal to us English men, when he says, We were never happy in our quill, when it was made into a pen; but when the feather was fixed to an arrow. The very manner of treating carries with it a great difficulty, and a Master of Ceremonies, who usually is, and aught to be a man of good literature, as well as languages, hath a large province, even in adjusting the ceremonies, that belong unto the Ambassadors, in relation to their Masters, and in relation to other Prince's Ambassadors, resient upon the place. He that inspects our Sir John Finett's observations or memorial, and Sir Charles Cotterell's explanations or additions thereunto, not published yet, and he that knew both the men, may justly say, they filled their places; and a late Hollander, Monsieur Wickefort, hath written a serious tract, and a necessary upon this subject, and of the privileges of Ambassadors, as there are many more, who have written large and wise Tracts upon their offices. When Princes begin Treaties themselves by interviews, they are seldom (and yet sometimes) prosperous; for one appears a comelier person than the other, or is prompt in discourse, more magnificent, less affable, or hath somewhat, which the other wants, which raises emulation or envy, or else their train disagree, and breed ill will betwixt the Masters: and yet Lewis the twelfth and Ferdinand of Arragon, and Charles the fifth and Pope Clement the seventh interviewed and parted fairly. Great caution is to be used, how Princes entertain motions of Treaties, even by themselves or by their Allies, whilst they are in the heat of action; for thus Pope Julio the second, under pretence of a Treaty with the Duke of Ferrara, chilled Lewis the twelfth, or diverted him from those assistances, which he meant to give that Duke, upon supposal they would not have been needful. Therefore in such conjunctures, it is more needful for Princes to strengthen, than lessen their forces. Arbitration is sometimes a useful, often a frivolous cement of peace; for after much time hath been spent therein, some pretty fetch will make the whole labour insignificant; as when the Venetians delivered up their sentence betwixt the Pope and Maximilian with a proviso, that if both parties would not ratify it, neither should be obliged by it. A Prince Arbitrator ought to be unbyast, and equal in judgement towards both; but to become a party, whilst he is an Arbitrator, darkens his honour and his justice very much. And a Northern Prince lately paid dear for it, being driven out of all those Countries, which his Predecessors had not long before by victories gained, and by Treaties had confirmed unto them, though the prosperity of the Prince, whose party they joined themselves unto, to his great honour (for there is nothing more honourable for a Prince, than expencefully and hazardously to be concerned for an Ally) procured them a restitution of all, and yet removed not a dependence upon himself. How it will far with that State, that in the apprehension they had of their own concerns, made and joined themselves to a declining Monarchy, (at least declining in their vicinity) and in that attempt lost almost all they had, and then upon the like politic consideration, drew in other great Princes to succour them, which entirely drew from them the whole power they lay subjugated unto; so as their overflown inland, like their seacoasts, had that tide of fortune drawn from their low grounds, which soon overflowed their higher countries; how these will far in necessitating the others, to make a very disadvantageous peace, time will manifest, not my spirit of prophecy foretell. Trade. Trade or commerce is the offspring of confederation, and flows from council, and is to be managed by justice, which is guided by religion. Thus religion is the foundation of all other pillars, and reaches to confederation and trade; for both confederation and trade require great care and judgement in making the articles concerning them, and religion in observing them: for Princes or States confederate for security, and trade for gain; so as trade is a most natural root for raising treasure, as treasure is a most natural food for arms. And this is the reason, why in erecting these pillars of Government, this order of placing them is observed. And indeed the pillars are but so many Professins' in a Common-weal, which have been touched on before, viz. The Divine, the Lawyer, Statesman, the Merchant, the Monnoier, and the Soldier. Trade is either Home or Foreign. Home trade is of things men buy, Home trade because they have need of them, or of things they sell, because they have plenty of them, and subsist by them. So as in Economics it's usually said, a Master of a family should endeavour to make himself a seller, not a buyer, for usually men buy to loss, sell to gain. Foreign trade is but the same thing in a market more remote, Foreign trade. and under the laws of another Sovereign. Every County at home and Country abroad abounds in some one commodity or other, which others want, for venting whereof they have proper markets and seasons, which must be observed, or the gain of the trade is usually lost. The want in one place in the ground of trading with another. The product and fruits of the earth are better in some places than in others; even by reason of the clime, or by reason of the husbandry; and may be assorded cheaper from one part than another, by reason of the multitude of labourers or artists, and the little wages is given in one part of a Country in proportion to another, or by reason of the conveniency of carriage. The King lives by the field, as was said before, therefore husbandry is to be as much cherished, as any trade, for it breeds healthy and strong men, and sit for arms, and so in an island Mariners ought to be a principal care of the State. Every Government hath an interest in the labours, and in the manner of labouring of their people, and therefore they are to be drawn off from ill customs; or from deceitful working, as the Irish were from fixing their plough to the horse tail, or the Clothiers from so working their , as they shrink too much, or over-tenter them, etc. Voiture or making carriage easy by cutting rivers, providing highways to be well kept and pastable, nay, providing they be secure against the thiefs, aught to be a care of the State, in relation even unto trade; for the industrious man must be secured by the State in his habitation, The things which secure trade. and in his passages from place to place with his commodity, lest the wasps and drones pray on the hive, and drive the be from her industry; therefore easy pardons to thiefs and highwaymen is a destruction to trade. Monopolers are another sort of thiefs, for they impose what rates they please upon a necessary commodity, and rob the buyer as well as the labourer, whom they force to work at their own rates, when they have engrossed a commodity into their own hands. A State must therefore secure the Subjects property, and endeavour to raise his industry, and to countenance his ingenuity in any thing, that promotes trade, as framing engines, or any thing that furthers it. It must provide against the rich oppressing the poor Tradesman, that too often must borrow, by not taking too great or biting usury, or such broakage as makes the poor laborious honest man or trader only work for the wealthy idle hard hearted person. It must give immunities, privileges, and encouragements to all kind of industry. It must in some sort force men to promote public good; as to prohibit men not to turn their tillage too much into pasturage, for that will depopulate. It may require them to plant woods, and hemp, and flax, or what else may become materials for a manufacture; for wherever there are most manufacturies, there will be most people; and a multitude of people is not only the honour of a Prince, and the security of his land, but his wealth. To look after confederacies of men of a trade, as the Grazier by combination not to impose prizes on the Butcher, nor the Butcher by arts and wiles, in taking most of the pasturage about a great market town, to cut the grass under the Grazier's foot, or becoming of two trades, (or both Grazier and Butchers) or by confederacy of these two, both to set the dice on the buyer. The same we may say of Colliers and Woodmen, and such other trade's the Common-weal cannot be without; for a confederation among Tradesmen must not enhance the prices on the Gentry and Nobility, as little as the Tradesman must confederate against the Handycraftsman or Manufacturer. Foreign trade. All the former considerations, and many more than I can think of, belong to home trade. But foreign trade is more nighly to be considered, because if that be not well balanced, the profit runs to another Nation. Deceits of home trade impoverish particular men, but the treasure remains in the Kingdom. These have their inconveniencies great enough; for when parts are unequally strong, the whole body is the weaker; for break the order of any thing, and you break its strength; for here is not the overflowing of an humour, but the cutting of a joint or limb. Most immediately belonging unto the Sovereign's care. Unto the Sovereign therefore belongs the consideration and regulation more immediately of this trade. He therefore makes leagues of commerce with foreign Princes; and Treaties of Maritime affairs, or how his subjects shall be used in trade, and on the sea, and reciprocally, how he shall use others: therefore the ports of the sea are his, that he may let in, and let out such commodities only, as he finds benefits his People. The customs, impositions, and rates of commodities are set by him, and are alterable, that trade in general and particular commodities may be balanced with those carried out; for if the subjects of one Prince have his gain in trading eaten out by the impositions of the other, or if one Nation furnishes commodities of necessity for the other, and the other for luxury for them, it's soon determined, who will gain by the trade, or who will eat out the other; and the subject is not to be trusted, though it be his own concern in this, but restrained, because few men will avoid those expenses, which gratify their lusts. Our French trade for wines, our Canary trade, which formerly was driven by commodities, and now by money, and so our trade to Zant for currants demonstrates this. It is not so with our India trade: though we carry out even gold and silver for it, because our revending those commodities in other parts brings us as much back in specie, or bills of exchange. What is a thriving trade to a nation. Trade therefore is not to be cherished, as it enriches the Merchant, or as it increases the Sovereign's revenue, but as it brings wealth (and a wealth that will remain and stay amongst us) unto the Nation, or as it passes into the habit of the body, not strengthens particularly the head or some member. The trade, that brings in more wealth to stay in the Kingdom, than it carries out, that which having repaid its charges, and leaves a surplusage, that is, a thriving trade to a Nation, or that which brings into it treasure, and no other; for neither Princes nor Merchant's gain can compensate the loss of the Nations stock; that is properly called the overbalance, which thus inriches the Nation. Neither the nation nor civil men should engross trade, or work deceitfully. There are few trades in any Nation, but some Foreigner is his rival in them; and therefore if one work his commodity deceitfully, and the other substantially (which the wearing will show) the market will assuredly run to them. Nothing better secures trade, than the true manufacturing of its commodities. It is part therefore of the care of a State, that no person or company employ ill or raw workmen: for a pound of wool, which may cost six or eight pence, if it be well wrought, may be worth two shillings or half a crown; but if ill wrought, not scarce one. Besides, when this is once discerned, the credit of the Nation, as well as of the manufacture decreases. He therefore rightly determined, that said, Better feed your poor, and let them be idle, than permit them slightly to work any manufacture. Neither must the Merchant be permitted to adulterate or sophisticate his commodity. Nor should any office be set up under pretence of visiting the commodity, and discovering the abuse, (as with us is the Aulnage) and exercises itself in tolerating it; for it is pernicious, unless the true end of it be preserved, and then it's of good use: for the public not only in the dishonour, but in the vent of the commodity pays dearly the price of such a Patent. There are too too many more instances to be found; but I fell upon this, because it wounds us in our chief staple commodity. Our State should be more careful of this than other States; for to our shame we must confess it, our Nation in its genius (at least in individual persons) is too much given to laziness, and to affect a sudden gain and return, and not to affect public works, or such as require time to ripen; or such as relate to posterity, or such as conduce to the honour of the Nation, and not present and personal profit. This humour the Physicians of our State, by laws and rules of Government, which should be obeyed, should purge out, and endeavour to raise a public mindedness in particular men. If Holland had had this humour, it had never been rich, but their public spirit, with their frugality and industry, hath made them valuable in the opinion of a Philosopher, as well as considerable in the eye of the whole world. Had they had our situation. many and safe harbours. shipping, of such timber, and so well built. such staple commodities, as , Stuffs, Bays, etc. Tin, Led, and Leather. Corn, Fishing, Saffron: or, such means to have made free ports or magazines for all Nations upon small customs to have waited for their markets: too too probably they would have eat us out of our Trade; as we, for these last two Kings (the Fathers and the Sons) great care and encouragement of Trade, and by many worthy, knowing, and wealthy Merchants, who have corrected much of our ill National genius, have born up with, and overborne them therein: The advantages of trade, manufacturies, and shipping. for the trade of England is great and highly valuable; for few rightly consider, how many live on the land by those few, who swim on the sea. How many Factories are employed about building but one ship? The Timber Merchant, the Ironmonger, the Carpenter, the Smith, the Ropemaker, etc. Navigation begets many manufacturies, and is not only a wealth but a security unto a Nation: for the plough or keel at sea breeds as many lusty Lads, and more daring, than those at land. It's a part of the care and wisdom of a State, that their subjects be bred laboriously; especially the poor Lads, that are put out to apprenticeships, by the charity of Parishes, that they be kept to the plough, or to the keel, and not made Footboys, or idle Tapsters, etc. or multiply small trades, etc. I believe the present great King of the world, who had never been considederable at sea, but as he fomented jealousies betwixt us and Holland, who like the acorn, covered his first growth under this shrub, till he thrust out his head above it, and then dropped so fast, that he by his own power and ours (craftily managed) endangered both of us: I say, Navigation too likely to set up the greatness of France. I believe he had never affected to have been an East and West Indian Merchant, but as he foresaw with old Rome, in vain it was to affect the universal European land (or Monarchy) without he became considerable at Sea. So as though he sails unto both Indies, yet thereby he hopes to fall upon Holland and England. Nor had he become considerable, but as the jealousies of Holland towards us shrouded him, till he thrust forth a top, that will shade us both, unless we hold a stricter correspondence and confidence in each other, than hitherto we have done: and we have sufficiently smarted for the deceitful assistance he gave us, and they, by the invasion he made upon them, may think, what he then regorged, he may hereafter retain. But he that sets bounds to the sea, can to his prosperity; otherwise, humanly speaking, and considering his policies to divide confederates, and the untempered mortar they have to hold themselves together, we may prophesy hard things without the spirit of prophecy. But upon this subject of Navigation, he came so strongly into my fancy, that I could not decline the folly of saying thus much, because of the future danger. But to revert to our proper subject matter, trade. No nation can be great or rich, that abounds not in some part of his dominions in shipping, or who neglects trade, and who hath not in his own dominions, or imports not materials for manufacturies. Yet it is no policy to think to engross it, or be monarches of it, as Holland hath for a time affected and pursued that sea-monarchy, as eagerly as Charles the fifth, or Francis the first did the land monarchy: but it is wisdom to divide the profit with neighbour Nations amicably. We throve not, when we could not content ourselves with the manufactory of our , but must prohibit the transporting white and undyed. Merchandizing, like the sea shore, is made smooth and even both among ourselves and Foreigners, Companies, or trade managed by them under a regulation. not by governing all parts of it by Companies, or wholly excluding Neighbours. Companies for home and nigh trades are not very advantageous. They are always of most use, when they exclude no private traders; and yet they cannot subsist, if all Interlopers be under no restraint; therefore it may be well thought, that no man should be permitted freely to trade, where Companies are erected, but under the regulation of that Company, nor that Company make such chargeable by-laws, as should discourage young and free traders; therefore Companies may by a Council of State or Parliaments be well countenanced, if regulated; so as they should admit private Traders upon such rules, as the Council of State, not themselves, should set down as equal betwixt both. Two Companies we have, viz. that of the East-Indies, and the Turkey, which trades would soon fall to irreparable disorder, if they were not supported by such pillars. The great covetous rapacious Statesmen in either of these Countries and places, would soon dash private Merchants against one another, and one Nations bribes would eat their Neighbours out, if the wisdom of such societies prevented it not. The East-India Company in Holland is a little monarchy, Amsterdam hath a half, Middlebrough and Zealand a fourth, Horn and Enchuysen a sixth, and the small remain we may say serves to gratify such interloping persons or places, as they will admit of. The sovereignty of this trade is in the State's General, who renew the Charter upon a considerable fine to this Company, usually once in— years. Had we not a trade in India, and a Company to govern that trade, the Pepper and Calicoes we bring home for nine pence would cost us two shillings or half a crown, if brought us by the Hollanders. And this is proved too clearly unto us, by the Spice trade they have engrossed, and cast us out of, at the price of so much infidelity and blood. And our East-India and Turkey Ships, besides the Mariners, wherewith they must be manned, are a great security to the Nation. The standard of Coin. A Prince never loses either in his revenue or trade, in keeping up the standard of his money; for flutter as much as they will, all trade is reduced to the intrinsic value of the coin. To cry it up in those conjunctures of ●●●e, when a Prince is to pay, and to decry it, when he is to receive, is a kind of robbing his own Bankers or Subjects; but it is a short lived policy, and Strangers will retort it upon himself. But nothing can be more fatal to a State, than to break assignments made on public faith. It must be the child of some such folly I would not describe. It looks like the despair of some young Gamester, that sets all he is worth upon one hazard. To get advantages by exchanges of money, Exchange of money or bills. and bills of credit is a politic prudence; for if France overbalance us in their particular trade, they will get by us likewise in their exchange of money. Which concerns Ambassadors and Gentlemen travelling as well as Merchants to observe. Government is upheld by treasure, Treasure. and therefore treasure hath many swollen titles given to it, as that it is the sinew both of war and peace, the ornament of the one, and the strength of the other: or the organ of motion and action unto both. Neither greatness, nor honour, nor security will be maintained without it. It is like food unto the body, when it fails, sttrength soon doth so, and weakness appears: for, says Tacitus, Diminutionem imperii doces, si fructus, quibus Respublica sustinetur, diminuantur. If neither family nor city can be maintained without it, much less sovereignty over a whole people. The father of every family, the chief Magistrate of every town must in his person, attendance, habitation, and diet, appear distinguishable from others by those sensible ensigns of honour, which beget awe and reverence. Prince's therefore were Lords paramount of the land they governed, which made the Kings of Israel so great Herdsmen, and to have occasion of so many men to reap their harvest. Not only William the Conqueror, but says Sir Edward Cook, by the laws of King Alfred, the ancient Kings, who were Saxons, Patrimonial. had all the Lands of England in demesnes. Prince's therefore never more wounded their government, nor lessened their reverence, than when they parted with their Patrimonial estates, and depended on subsidiary aids (even for their own subsistence) of their subjects; Subsidiary. for that lessened their honour, and raised the pride, and consequently begot contumacy in their people; for it is natural for men to think, whom they freely give unto, they oblige; not considering, that the same duty belongs unto the Politic Body, as unto the Natural, where every member must send somewhat unto that, which we call the habit of the body, (or the sovereignty) or else the members themselves will dwindle away. Prerogatives of Princes were a kind of treasure to them: Prerogatives a kind of treasure. for Tenors and Services, Wardships, Purveyances, and Carriages, etc. were in nature of a revenue, and set forth their honour, eased their charge, and preserved the dependencies of subjects on them. If we would look back into our own History, and consider how either the neglect, or some forced necessity, or some false policy have wrung these from our Princes, we may discern in a great measure our own present distempers. The Conqueror brought in with him great and independent Lords, Lord's assistant to the Conqueror. rather as assistants than subjects; or as men to divide the prey with him; and therefore unto many of these, he gave large territories, with that, which the French call Basse Justice; so as their Tenants depended in a manner as much on them, as they did on the King, as Lord paramount. This bred the Baron's wars; Baron's wars. for though the Barons would tyrannize over their vassals, yet they agreed, the sovereign Prince must be made as weak and limited, as possibly they could. Then to weaken this crown, unfortunately rises a dispute of Regal title, even in the Royal family, The dispute of title betwixt the two Royal families. and the red Rose and the white become ensigns of a long and bloody civil war. And as men took part with either of these, upon successes, they were to be rewarded, and by the various changes the crown, even by its prosperities, was rather weakened than strengthened. These Lay-quarrels begat a harvest for the then ambitious and gripple Clergy: so as the Crown both by its Lords Spiritual and Temporal was in a great measure lorded over. This made that deep sighted Prince, Henry 7. Henry the seventh, (brought to the crown by these Powers, who vindicated his Wife's title from an usurping and bloody Uncle, Richard the third) to dread even that power, that had set him up, and so as subtly as he could, by cherishing the Commons against them, to undermine it: and he foreseeing the necessity of treasure to strengthen the crown, grew a legal Tyrant. For he then shown the subject, what a severe rod the penalties of necessary and wholesome laws were in the hands of the Prince, if used without clemency. And could he have renewed his age, or that his long reign had been by time doubled, most probably he would have made the crown a substantive. Henry 8. His son Henry the eighth, though he was of as great understanding and greater literature, yet not being equal in Kingcraft, but transported with vanity and popular glory, whether by accident and passion (which abounded in him) or by design, it is unknown; he fell upon the State Spiritual, as his Father had done on the Temporal, and with more violence shook their greatness, and invaded their revenues in the Abbots or the Monasteries and Convents, which had he converted to the maintenance of the crown, as he did by profusely giving away their Lands, unto the maintenance of the acts he had done, or in casting off Papal supremacy: the Father and the Son, we may probably say, would have made the crown for ever stood less in need of the subjects extraordinary supplies, which are seldom free bounties, but often hard bargains through the diminution of prerogative. The succeeding Princes, Edward 6. Q. Marry. Q. Elisabeth. the one a Minor, the other two under disputable titles, because condemned even by the Father, and that in the height of his power, by the consent of his two Houses of Parliament; and the one of these Ladies being to restore the religion ejected, and the other to replant that, which was before so excellently reform, K. James. and the next Successor being a learned and pacific Prince, and withal addicted much to ease and pleasure, and not a native but a foreigner. All these concussions cast the crown, as we may say, chief into the hands of the Commons, the third State of this Realm; and the Lords, who were blinded with the hope of an Aristocracy, or at least some addition of power, which they seemed now to want, so joined with the Commons, as that the usual failures of Government in Charles the first's time became the overthrow both of King and Lords. Charles 1. Such is the destructive torrent of Populacy; and such are the sad consequences of Princes negligently parting with their own patrimonial revenues, and as unadvisedly, for a temporary supply, divesting themselves of those prerogatives, which serve both for their own and subject's security. And such is the degeneracy of Nobility, that when servilely they have served to pull down the crown, they have for their reward a vote of being an useless State. Thus we see a State loses its health and strength by affecting some unwholesome diet; but it is an irrational thing in a Subject to expect safety and protection, and yet to have an unwillingness in a Despotical Government, as France is almost now, arbitrarily to be taxed, (for that unwillingness or sullen murmuring doth but beget a sharper tyranny) or in a limited and mixed Monarchy, as England is, to be ever selling their aids; for that is but crumbling the power of Sovereignty, and often making it more severe to the Subject in the hand of some inferiors. For as no Government can want an arbitrary power, so this is most severely executed, where it is done by a numerous and inferior body. Witness the long Parliament of 1640. when taxes were so multiplied, and various charges laid on the Subject (which Tacitus observes and calls, varia praedandi vocabula) that we had monthly taxes, contributions, loans, fifth and twentieth parts, new ordinances for weekly taxes for the British army in Ireland, for reducing Oxford, (the Sanctuary and place of the King's residence) distinct taxes for an Eastern and Western Association, and for particular places, as Newark, etc. and for buying in and (as we may call it) selling, or sending out the Scotch army. I dare not look forward, but I pray unto Providence to divert real provocations, if imaginary or light could bring on us so much misery, and that those whom it concerns, may consider how much treasure they have spent of the Nations (besides other sad consequences) by their impatience, and not freely giving a little, when a little would have served, as all King Charles the first's time it would have done. What it cost afterwards, through the whole Parliamentary Reign or Protectorship, the taxes are proof enough. I that vent rather strong desires and wishes than writ Politics, would be glad that the Crowns desmeasnes were both plentiful and unalienable, further than for a lease of 40 or 50 years, to reward deserving Ministers of State, and good Servants; for though there must be an overflow for some Favourites, (for Princes are but men) yet those fall not under my thoughts to provide for, but that the magnificence and splendour of a Court, and the hospitality of a Household, and the ordinary and necessary expenses of Guards, Garrisons, and standing and usual Navies for the defence of the Channel, or conduct of the Merchant, should not be precarious, probably would conduce more unto the safety and peace of the Nation, and prosperity of the Subject, than unto the Princes; but this is not fit for me to descant upon. I would never rob the people by the plenty of a Princes constant revenue, of having the means of showing their good affection and loyalty by their bounty to their Prince; for it is an evidence they are under a free Government, that they are not necessitated to give, as it is an evidence that they are under an unsafe Government, that the Prince must be often forced, for the necessary expenses of the Government, to depend on the goodwill or humour of his People; for these have their vicissitudes. Res angusta domi will make a Prince often so jealous of his affairs at home, that he will not dare to seek occasion to promote them abroad. I shall harp too often upon that string; but I believe neither French nor Dutch had been able to have changed the balance of Christendom (as notoriously it is since) if such a good intelligence as I wish, had been kept betwixt the Prince and his three Estates. What 100000 l. per annum would have done in those days in respect of military expenses, 500000 l. will not do now; and I believe our Neighbours feel it as well as ourselves. Home taxes or subsidies, freely and voluntarily given in Parliament, are the fittest supports for all extraordinary expenses; but then these should be endeavoured to be laid equally; for Livy calls a Doomsday book (or equal tax) res saluberrima, magno futura imperio, and it is much better for a Prince, that his Nobles and Commons should give, or lay the tax, by virtue of their liberty, than he receive or take it by virtue of his own Prerogative. For, says Chancellor Bacon, there is a great difference betwixt a tax raised or given by the Representatives of the People, and one taken by the absoluteness of the Prince; for though it be all one in the purse, yet it is divers in the payment; or it works diversely on the courage and affections of the People. One needs Themistocles' two Goddesses to raise it, power and persuasion, the other disputes it, or would cast it off, by two as forcible Goddesses, necessity and poverty. Arms. Arms is as considerable and necessary a pillar of Government, as any of the former, and I have cast it in the last place, because if men would be just, it would be unnecessary; for the primary laws of justice are built or implanted in sincere nature, and are sufficient for the discharge of all public and reciprocal duties, if they were observed. But arms or force are but secondary instruments of justice, and are grounded upon depraved nature; for they are never to be used, but when the Government cannot reduce the Governed unto the obedience of justice, but by them. We usually therefore say, they are properly to determine the controversies of beasts, not men; so as among men there ought to be no recourse unto one, until the other is disobeyed; for force is rightly termed ultima ratio Regum, or the last thing a Prince should make use of. This is the irascible faculty in the soul of Government; or that which resists the ataxia or disorder in the politic Body, or in some member of it; or which gains that by fear, which ought to have been performed by love. This is that, At home. which fortifies justice at home, by seeing executed the penalties of the Laws, the process of the several Courts, and their sentences and judgements upon the cases before them, whether those sentences be capital, pecuniary, or corporal. This is that, which is to reduce the refractory to the common justice and laws of the land, to quell insurrections, and to suppress rebellions. And when disobedience comes to any of these heights, every Court of justice hath its proper officers to see its sentences and decrees executed; so in cases of riot, or contumacy backed by numbers, an obligation lies upon a whole County, by the Posse Comitatus or power of that County, which the Sheriff hath the conduct of, to subdue such persons. And in cases of rebellion or insurrections at home, or invasion of Foreigners from abroad, every subject is bound to repress the same at the hazard of his life. Rebellion, tho' it bring on a civil war, is not properly a war. Arms are the proper instruments of war, but insurrection or rebellion of Subjects is not properly to be called a war, tho' it be a use of force; for war must be made amongst equals, which no persons, nor order of subjects can be to their Sovereign, as hath been proved already. So as all well constituted Governments reject co-ordination as the distracter of all obedience, and the justification of a civil war; therefore the resistance of Subjects is rebellion, not war. Yet because sometimes the Rebels power is equal with the Princes, such contests have got the name of a civil war. Civil war. This, of all wars, is most detestable, and it must needs be hateful, where victory itself is odious, and where cruelty is exercised upon consanguinity and affinity, or nighest relations. So as Lucan expresses it well, when he says, Bella ..... nullos habitura triumphos. Remedies on the subjects part against a Civil war. It is much better to give remedies how to prevent it, than rules how to manage it. Remedies on the Subjects part are, to remember they are born under subjection, and are required of God to be subject, and to pay passive obedience, where they cannot active; therefore to be careful not to multiply grievances by inferences, or to think all will befall them that may, and to consider, that it is very often impatience under small grievances, that throws them into the sufferance of greater. Let the multitude or vulgars' consider, without their many hands no great changes or turmoils could be made; and let other well-meaning men reflect, how often they are made properties of by cunning Designers and Disturbers of a well settled Government, whose abilities serve only to create a misunderstanding between King and People, and to manage the discontent of the subject to their own advantage, and to set forth all the failures of a Prince only to cloud the ill consequences of their own innovations, knowing, The hope of Innovators. if they can disturb the settled Government, a People cannot be long without one, and then they, that have been acceptable for the service in pulling down a building, are like to be employed in that, which is to be set up. This might keep the silly fish from too greedily swallowing the bait, which will draw him out of his own proper element. The best Historian describes these disturbers very naturally, when he says, Honours, quos quietâ Republica desperant, perturbatâ consequi arbitrantur. And thus the name of Liberty hath very often through the affecting changes brought the subject in general into servitude. The soberest and wisest men therefore must not be beguiled herein by indifferency, as are the multitude through giddiness, and the well-meaning through not discerning consequences to hearken to changes. All these being often taken in the common snare of Innovators; for there being seldom such a happy conjuncture of a State, but that somewhat is to be justly condoled, tho' at the same time the condition of the Subject is in the general very much to be thanked God for. Neuters defer their appearance in behalf of the Government so long, that when they would recover it they cannot, for the malignity of this humour soon infects the mass of blood, and then these men either engage unseasonably, and so lose themselves and fortunes, or are looked upon by the Innovator as suspected persons, and so undergo an equal load with those, who worthily and stoutly from the beginning withstand the innovation. Cicero's letters to Pomponius Atticus, and Atticus' life, and Chancellor de Vaire (who lived in Paris in the time of the French league in Henry the thirds time, and Sir Walter Raleigh upon such a conjuncture, when the Romans and Carthaginians both striven for Sicily) are parts of Story fit to be consulted, to know how a man should demean himself in such times; which will resolve itself into this, that men should timely assist the settled Government, as obliged thereunto, and rather hope in a change of what is amiss from the erring legal Governors, than expect remedies in the state of the Public by such, who fly to arms to work reformation. The least any man can do in such a conjuncture, is with Pomponius Atticus, who took arms with neither side, yet owned Pompey, tho' not disobliging Caesar, or rather with Cato, tho' he suspected Pompey's greatness, yet engaged with him, who engaged for the present state of Government. But whoever takes offices or charge with the Innovators, and thereby promotes their affairs, as Sir Walter Raleigh concludes, may be reckoned partakers of their crime. It borders too nigh guilt, to let even the consideration of a man's own person (I mean an eminent man's) or family, to sway him so much, as to lead him dully to be passive in such a conjuncture; but it stains both, when the world knows his judgement is one thing, and his practice another; for there is a time, when a man may say, Providence calls to Civil martyrdom, which is often in defending the settled state, never by Civil war in changing it. Remedies on the Prince's part are, Remedies on the Prince's part. ever to be watchful, that his course of life and counsels be not such, as may make him unvaluable in the eyes of his subjects; that he be not found necessitous in his treasure: for if in time of civil sedition, he stand in need of money, in some sort he stands at the courtesy of the subject, whose purse and body both he should not want at one time; for it was Nero's folly, that he stood most in need of the Subject's supplies, when he had most need to have eased them therein; for he that hath had no foresight of contingencies, is the unreadilier aided. A Prince therefore should never want a fit force, to keep himself from a surprisal, and a fit subsistence for some time for such a body. And if he be but thus furnished, loyalty will keep them of his party, whom otherwise despair will drive from him; and false Brethren or Intelligencers will come over; especially if the Prince's Ministers be men of a good reputation, so as securely intelligence may be held with them. And by such means as these, discords may be raised among the rebellious, and they may be put upon such rash, or such cautious councils, as may ruin them. Arms in the Politics, is like fortitude in the Morals; it is the guard and security of all the other virtues. Civil justice grounded on, and managed by religion, is the soul of Government; but the inseparable prerogatives of it are treasure and arms; for these are properly the sinews, that make the members of Government move. As Government is the ordinance of God, these three are inseparable from sovereignty: therefore none can make laws, but with the Prince, nor raise treasure, but for the Prince; for common reason shows, men are bound unto the defence of Government with life and fortune; but experience shows, when a corrupt degenerate man, (or men) whom Providence hath given sovereignty unto, have both the soul and body (as we may call it) of Government in his (or their) hands, or arbitrarily at his (or their) dispose, unwholesome laws may be made, i. e. such as are partial, or ricketed, swelling the head too big, or a hectic or preternatural heat of the Sovereignty (be it Monarchy or State) may draw strength too fast from the habit of the body; therefore divers mixed Governments reserve a general consent to accompany sovereign authority, both in making laws and raising moneys: (though in neither of these nothing can be done by any but the sovereign persons thus assisted.) But arms or the Militia of the Nation (to show the danger of co-ordination) is every where singly in the Prince or State; since if any but the Sovereign hath the power of raising the arms, they will be soon supposed to have the power of using them; and therefore no man, how loyal soever, even for the safety of the Prince's person, can raise arms without his commission. These remarks may appear trivial and pedantic, yet for want of such a foresight, or some grains of such a powder, I have seen the affairs of a great King in convulsive sits. Thus much for arms, as they concern the civil administration of justice, and the repression of rebellion at home, or as these being opposed by subjects, arise unto a civil war. Foreign war. Now we will consider arms, as by them one equal (or who hath no authority over the other) endeavours to reduce the other unto justice, i. e. to observe those laws of Nations which are binding either by the law of Nature or Nations, or which are obligatory by reason of some league or treaty of commerce, made between two Nations. Thus by the law of nature, even when both persons are subjects, and under one and the same law, if one by a sudden assault invade the other, so as he is in danger of life by him, and cannot have recourse unto that law, by which both of them are to be judged, nature authorises the assailed to use a counter-force against the assailant, and to be his own justiciar: (but this is but accidental, and may be properly called a natural authority to repel force by force; or is a private war.) But that which Grotius calls a public war, O● public war. is betwixt two equals, who are both Sovereigns, neither having jurisdiction over the other. Now all Sovereigns are equals, though the one be never so much inferior unto the other in territories, wealth, or strength; for where Sovereignty is unequal in power, it is equal in right: and because these may injure one another, therefore they have a right to exact justice by arms from one another, and this is that which we call public war. The root of this war springs from injustice 〈…〉 The root of war thus springing from injustice, or the lusts of men, it is no marvel, that the fruit is so barbarous and inhuman; and yet even this monster, which is too often an offence against justice, cannot be managed but by justice; for Princes ought never to war one upon another, but upon a belief, that the ground of their war is just. Nay, Yet the ground of it must be just. they ought not to begin a war, until sincerely they have endeavoured to obtain a satisfaction by way of peace. Humanity then obliges to avoid it, and necessity only warrants the undertaking it. Says Moses therefore, When thou goest to war, inquire of the Lord, or go unto his Oracles or Word, or thine own conscience, and reflect, whether the occasion of the war be just and lawful. Consult not the pravity of human nature, which would lay land to land, or upon an unreasonable fear, that others will invade thee, (which hath been the common, but improsperous practice of mankind, (as Mr. Hobbs phrases it.) Anticipate not, or invade not fewer power, who hath not wronged thee, for fear by that power, he may wrong thee, which, as Thucydides sets forth, was such a justifying argument amongst the Athenians, who warranted themselves therein, because it was the practice of most men, as if it had been the wisdom and rectitude of the nature of mankind, though they found both the Lacedæmonians, and all their smaller Allies confederating against them, because they made this their boundless ambition to be a child of justice. Since that could not be the offspring of justice, which by more men than those that used it, was complained of, as an axiom of injustice. Neither use those modern Policies, which propose a foreign war, as a Scavingry of the surplus of the people. Nor let thy plenty arise out of others misery, by keeping two neighbours in the calamity of war, that thou may'st enjoy the plenty of peace. But above all, Several considerations relating unto a war. let not thy vanity or thy glory prevail to exercise thy strength upon thy Neighbours, since it is not power, but justice, that makes a Prince truly glorious. True it is, the luxury of one Prince and the covetousness of another State, may be scourged by the rapacity and vainglory of a third; but God permits what he allows not, and Princes are innocent in the acts they do, not from the suitableness of their deeds with his pleasure, but from the conformity of them to his law. Neither was one Prince to surprise another, but first to send his Herald, and denounce hostility, and to use those other ceremonies, which the uprightness of elder times observed, or condemned, when not observed. For since the lives and estates of so many innocent persons are involved in a war, humanity requires, that if possibly it can, it be declined. Since the villainous nature hereof could not avoid the allowing frauds, ambushes, false intelligences, and many more stratagems; nay, knew not, how to avoid cruelties and inhumanities', and conflagrations, which in all other cases would be abhorred; for the Soldier, like the Huntsman, was allowed his gin as well as his bow, and might corrupt his enemy's men, as well as employ his own. All which is to be understood, flagrante bello; for in times of truce and cessation of arms, there ought to be a great restraint upon the former liberty. Methinks, that God made it a great restraint upon the best and wisest Princes, and even upon the most injured, not rashly to run into a war; since conquest gave, or was the mother of a right even unto dominion; so hazardous it was even to vindicate an injury by this inhuman course; for success did not always attend upon the best cause. And it is a great evidence a Prince had just thoughts, when he began his war, if he appeared apt to end it upon moderate and reasonable conditions, or ne victis quidem praeter injuriae licentiam cripere. Neither doth he grant peace, that grants it not, till he hath ruined his enemy; for that is not, as the Historian says, pacem dare, but solitudinem facere. Among Christians sure I am, it ought to be begun upon great deliberation, and to be managed with tenderness and reluctance even upon the considerations of humanity. And since the event is so uncertain, Moses' council surely is very reasonable, When thou art to make a war, be sure to keep thyself from every wicked thing; for the Lord walketh in the midst of the camp; and keep it clean free from dung, that there may be salubrity of body and purity of mind. Princes are to reason with themselves, whether with 10000 they can meet with their enemy that hath 20000; or whether they be supplied by Confederates or Mercenaries; for both these are insecure to depend on. For Confederates have most commonly separate and single interests of their own, and Mercenaries are without any affection or good will to the cause, having their eye only upon the pay, and that is very often dazzled, when the enemy can give them a better. Besides, as they have mercenary bodies, they too often have mercenary minds; for this sort of men in any extremity (which is usual to befall men in a state of war) have not that virtue and generosity to undergo the toil and hazard of their present condition; Besides, this may give Prince's caution, how they engage in a war, since their very prosperity creates them new enemies, and some neuter Prince rises up in behalf of the conquered, and reduces all to some nighness of equality or state, which the war at first was begun upon. If choice or necessity lead them to undertake a war, they can have no wiser council, than that which the Delphic Oracle gave unto the Lacedæmonians, viz, carry it on with all their power, or rather to overdo than undergo it; for then there is no retreat without great loss or great dishonour; so as fitting preparations of all necessaries are not to be sought for, when they are to be used; for that war is sure to continue longest, that is least provided for, when it is first begun. Nor must the Prince forwardly run into it, upon a probability of his enemy's oversight, but upon a confidence of his own foresight. Nor should the confidence or forwardness of his councillors, (especially if they have perceived in himself a strong inclination to the engagement) lead him to think, he shall meet with a constancy of fervour; for difficulties and dangers (which are the constant companions of a war) in action change those tempers of mind, which first appeared in council. Safest therefore it is, and most commonly those Princes thrive best in war, who foresee, and are ablest to digest improsperities. The Germans never thought the Romans invincible, till they found no ill success or misfortune could daunt them. This spirit in the Athenians, after their great losses in Sicily, made the Lacedæmonians and their Confederates, as much apprehend their stomachfulness, as they had before at any time apprehended their power. Many considerations therefore attend upon preparation for a war: Viz. A well chosen experienced General. Constituent parts of an army. Officers, who have tasted adverse as well as good fortune. Commissaries, Providores, Quarter-masters, and Engineers, Surgeons; all expert in their Offices. Arms, Armour, Horses, Carriages, Tents, and Artillery, not inferior to the enemies. Treasure, as much as any thing, for all these are necessary to inspirit the Common Soldier: since his fight part is the least part of his duty; it is the fatigue, or the undergoing the necessary toil and labour, as much as the danger of his profession, that makes him valuable. To march all day and be weary, and then to quarter in open field, be the weather never so stormy, and no sooner in his quarters, but often finding an enemy to disquiet him, or lest he should do so, to be obliged unto a fresh labour, by raising up some works to secure the same; these are the difficulties of his condition, and the unavoidable contingences of it; and therefore, as he is to be chosen of an able body, so he is to be governed by a strict discipline, that he may know it his duty to undergo these labours and dangers often with scarceness of food, and with a patience and obedience, that would become a Philosopher. All which he usually with cheerfulness undergoes, when he hath a confidence in his General, as being an experienced Commander, well versed in stratagems; when he finds his care prevents his own Officers from preying upon him, and defrauding him of his pay; for than he is willing to use his hands, and not to use his tongue; or to be silent in action, that he may the better receive his orders or words of command, when he finds his belly and his back carefully provided for. When he is to fight, if he observes his arms are as good as his enemies, and his ground as well chosen to fight on, at least as well as the place will afford, and if his difficulties be great, if he perceive good reserves to second him, this begets that spirit of discipline, which is the true spirit of an army, and makes them willing to keep their just order and rank, and that with silence, that they may hearken to what orders are given them, which is the true strength of an army; and if their pay be not wanting, their duty is seldom. Men may vulgarly discourse, that a good army in an enemy's country will maintain itself, and so peradventure it may, if the General receive the spoils in order to distribute among the common Soldiers, or for raising their pay; or if by strong parties he brings in sufficient provision of food, or ammunition-bread into their camp; but it never fares worse with an army, than when by small parties (or stragglers) the common Soldier forages and provides for himself; for then the spirit of discipline, and consequently the strength of the army ceases, and all advantageous opportunities for the enemy seem to begin. Time's there are, when fate and destiny seem plainly to be setting up one Nation, and pulling down another, as when successes, and that in several places at one and the same time, and that under no promising circumstances, attend on one Prince, and fail another, insomuch as more is to be attributed unto Providence or good fortune, than unto conduct. Such conjunctures as a Prince cannot foresee, yet when he discerns, may fitly lead him to be less obstinate, for usually such prosperities are but like a torrent, which carry all before them, but e'er long have their ebb; for fortune usually lets no long leases, and the greatest potentates are but her Tenants at will. Martial-law. an Army marches, there is a necessity of Martial law; for this is a body of brush-wood, which one spark sets on fire, and therefore needs such an arbitrary power, we may say, rather to stifle by a sudden suppressing it, than to extinguish it by water, or any formal means. A veterane army; the use and the danger of it. Few kingdoms or places can be reckoned safe without some standing veterane army; but this will ever influence the Civil Government; for though armies should wait on laws, and execute upon disobedience the civil decrees, yet the robust servant often endangers the weak estate of the Master. Rome was in an ill case, when this secret was disclosed, that a Prince could be made elsewhere than within her walls, or that too common Soldiers even within her walls could transfer her empire, and give her an Otho for a Galba. Thus the sovereign Person and Government hath been changed and endangered by her own Guards. The conclusion. Having thus laid the foundation, that all civil power, and the Sovereign Persons that execute it, are of divine ordinance, and that the prerogatives belonging to both, are in intuition of the peace and safety of the whole society, and in honour and security of the head of that Politic Body; and therefore that they are not to be resisted, but both power and person to be held sacred, or so set apart, that the power in its prescript or laws be indisputable, and the person in the execution thereof unquestionable; we may say, here is firm ground to raise our pillars or vital principles of Government upon; and on these we may rear the roof of wisdom's house, and assert, that honesty is the best policy; since by the light of nature or common reason, it is agreed as Epictetus says, that the Gods justly and wisely administer all things, and that they have tied children and subjects unto Parents and Princes, not as they are good, but as they are Parents and Princes; and therefore for such blessings men are more to depend on their providence, than their own choice or wisdom. For remove Government and Governors from this divine ordinance, and the principles of Policy shall, like the atoms of Lucretius, make mankind of such an unquiet nature, that he shall be governed by his sensitive appetites and present advantages, rather than by those innate principles, which by the moral virtues of his mind, have fitted him to exercise his own goodness, and to bear with other men's (especially Governors) failures, or vices, and rather to pray for a good Prince, than resist a bad. And the same virtues will teach Princes, that there are no such policies, as those that are ethical; others being but like the pleasures of titillation, earnestly sought for or delightfully used, but soon repent of. Marcus Aurelius' fame will be by a thinking man, when Alexander's and Julius Caesar's will be esteemed worthless, and when Nero's and Caligula's will be found ignominious. And when the ambitions of Charles V and Philip II. and Francis I. and the great Henry's and Lewis' are considered, it may be feared, that Asia and Gentilism own more thereunto, than doth Christendom or Christianity. Macchiavilian principles of policy there can be none steady, and yet there may be many prosperous, because they look after the end and despise the means, and most unnaturally they do often make prosperous a vice, by the exercise of some seeming virtue, and thus by some immoral means, drive at some politic end; for quocunque modo rem is their axiom. Such sort of men as these think it no dishonour, if they can sweep the stake, tho' they be found playing with false dice. Nor have they any remorse, that by treachery they have deceived their friend or benefactor. Nothing of all this is said to make the Physicians of State so cautious, as not to know how in composition of a cordial to make use of the serpent's flesh; for a nice piety or a scrupulous policy (I think at least) is not expected, even by God himself, from men of this condition, without there were an assurance of a clear openness and integrity on the other part. Therefore Macchiavel and Tacitus, and men of that form, are excellent Authors to give caution, when they are dangerous Guides to follow. The honest man therefore is not the fool, for he can let live in his house the serpent, but not in his breast; and he can shake off animal policy, to entertain Ethical. He hath these mixed in his own compositum; for as in himself he is both animal and rational, so in his politic constitution he is made up of the serpent, or sensitive part, and the rational and dovelike. These are not to be kept apart in him, but he is to be compounded of; but the dove must be the soul of his policy. If we would seek another topic to prove all this, we would have recourse to the whole Histories of the world; and through all of them we shall find, that those carnal policies, which are to corrupt men's counsels, are very useful to be known, since it is as necessary for a Traveller to be well hatted, booted, and coated against foul weather and ways, as to be well horsed, to carry him his direct road. But observe all Histories, and they do as Comedies do, (or at least should do) discover many treacheries and vices, but in their conclusion they make them improsperous, and give the reward to virtue. And this further light we may borrow from them, that both Greek and Roman, (and if the subtle wit of the one, and the courage of the other could not, or did not prevent it, no succeeding nations or times ever did or will attain it) who most opposed Monarchical Power, never attained their Idol liberty, by manacling of Monarchy. Disastrous it was to Athens, and it cost more blood, and interrupted more the prosperity of Rome than any thing else; for both Livy and Tacitus set forth, how when Kings abused their sovereignty, that people sought to find their liberty in two Consuls, to whom sovereign authority was necessary to be entrusted; and these (as no men living ever did, or could make their affairs ever prosperous) became soon not only to be complained of in improsperous times, but to be envied, when they had the most success; for inferiors (especially when they think they create their Superiors) never want their passion. So as the Consuls fell soon into their displeasure and jealousy, and a short lived Decemviri must rectify (as they did disorder) this state of government, and the people, in whom the sovereign power was said to be lodged, must be protected by Tribunes, chosen from the Commons, and then by Tribunes Military, that might give check untô the Consulary authority. But all this was but a rolling of a sick man in his bed, and the best medicine they ever took was a Dictator, who silenced all other powers, and singly exercised all power; so as here was Monarchy in its height or achme; for the Dictator was a Prince bound by no law, nor clogged with any partnership, only it was temporary and short-lived; which is proof enough, (though extremity and necessity teach the doctrine) that all trust is safeliest lodged in one, and that failures in government will attend the best constitution of government, and that variety of changes are but so many infirmities of a state, and at last so dishearten all wise and good men, from depending on a populacy, that a Cinna or a Sylla, a Pompey, a Crassus, or a Caesar, will in a disguise, (or by a barefaced challenging it) at last so weary and weaken by civil discords the people, that they will rather choose the change of their condition with security, than endeavour to recover their old pretended liberty with danger. It is the want of good eyes, or the weakness of the Optic nerve, that makes men not perceive the usefulness of sovereign prerogatives, even in relation to the benefit and well governing of subjects. For the terror of power often keeps the State quiet and secure, when the belief of liberty breeds that irreverence unto the wisdom of Governors, that they kindle those sparks of contumacy, which set all into a flame. Few men have learned this lesson, but those, who have lived in times of civil distraction; and therefore the conclusion shall be, Government is an ordinance of God; whose wisdom having designed men to live in society, made politic, like natural, bodies, consist of a head and divers members, lodging life in the body, and sense and motion in the head; so as human laws, (grounded on sound reason and adapted to the genius of the people, and unto the various public and private concerns, and derived (as nigh as might be) from the moral virtues, or the equity of them by nature implanted in mankind) were like the salt in the natural body, which tied all parts together, by prudence promoting public before private good or interest, and by justice preserving the harmony of tenderness and beneficence communicated from the head, and of cheerful and ready obedience yielded from the body; and by patience, a most necessary and eminent virtue in this corrupted and lapsed state of man, (like mortification, on which even religion herself is now founded) each bearing the others infirmities; for without such a temper the public peace or health of state is lost. Unto which temper, O Lord, restore this poor giddy Nation. FINIS.