THE ELEMENTS OF LOGIC By PETER DV MOULIN.  
Translated out of the French Copy by NATHANAEL DELAWNE, Bachelor of Arts in Cambridge.  
With the Author's approbation.  
LONDON, Printed by I. D. for Nicholas Bourne, at the Royal Exchange. 1624.   

TO THE RIGHT Worshipful, Robert Debney, Esquire, Mayor of the City of Norwich, S it Thomas Hyrne, Knight, S it Peter Glean, Knight, and the rest of the Worshipful justices of Peace, with the Sheriffs and Aldermen of the City of Norwich.  
Right Worshipful and right Worthy SENATORS;  
SOme ignorant People imagining Logic to be nothing else but a kind of Sophistry to deceive the simple, have not spared to cast aspersions upon this noble Art, and also upon the public Schools where it is taught; affirming that such as were sent thither did but learn to turn white into black, & black into white, to serve their own purposes, and to make people believe what they list. I wish that such men would take the pains to read over this Book, or at least consider but the definition and nature of Logic here set down in the very first lines of the same, and then I suppose they will easily perceive that they have but small reason to speak against the rule of reason. The best things may be abused; and so may Logic by a contentious caviling spirit: but the fault is not to be imputed to the thing, no more than drunkenness to good Wine; but to the person, as good meats are corrupted by a bad stomach, or sweet oil by a stinking vessel For Logic teacheth not to practise quirks and deceits, but to discover and avoid them; as the last lines of this book do show. All judicious Authors both sacred and profane have ever honoured this Art, and endowed it with right noble Titles. They have styled it the Art of Arts, the science of sciences, 
Dounhami Orat: ad auditores.  the learning of learnings, the chief of all knowledges, the instrument of instruments, the hand of Philosophy, an Art sent from God, yea and said that God himself is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the best Logician: for indeed He is the best and truest Rule of all reason and understanding. Which being that faculty that Logic laboureth to perfect, this Art is so much more excellent than all other Arts and Sciences, by how much the understanding surpasseth other faculties and powers of soul and body. It is the mould and frame into the which all other Arts and Professions must be cast, and without which they are no arts. It frames itself and them, and trieth them all by the infallible Rules of Truth, justice, and Prudence, termed by the Greeks' 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. It is the lively spring of invention, the tribunal of judgement, and the best Art of memory. And say that a man be of the soundest brain and best natural parts that can be, yet he may be bettered by this Art of Logic. For Art perfects Nature. And indeed without this help, nothing can be so wittily and readily invented, nor so truly and confidently affirmed, nor so methodically and orderly disposed, nor so well and safely remembered. This is the only Art which diving into the depth of man's understanding, teacheth how to teach, and how to learn, and makes a man know that he knoweth; as the eye seethe that it doth see, by reflection upon a looking Glass.  
Now considering that every man hath a special interest in the use of natural reason, why should any man envy another the sight and knowledge of this Art, which should direct it. The learned Author having long since published a very excellent Logic in Latin for the Schools, hath notwithstanding thought it not amiss to give his Countrymen this other in their vulgar Language. I hope therefore that sheltering myself under the Shield of so judicious a Precedent, I shall easily escape the darts of such as would carp at this my Translation of it out of the French into English; seeing it may as well profit the English as the French. And howsoever our Country wanted not this Art already in English, yet the more Candles the better light. I will not here enter upon the commendation of this learned man, or of his Work: I should but lessen his worth by the meaness of my person and skill, and as it were light a Candle to the Sun.  
I had rather turn my speech unto You, (worthy Senators,) unto whom I have emboldened myself to Dedicate these first fruits of my Studies, humbly entreating your Worships to accept of this my poor labour, as a public testimony of my desire to be thankful unto you all, for that it pleased your worthy Senate-house to choose me out of your Grammar Free-school, & to send me as your poor Scholar to Corpus Christi College in Cambridge in the year 1618. Thus craving pardon for my boldness, hoping your kind acceptance, I shall still pray for your Worship's long lives, and happy government of this famous City, resting  
Your Worships in all Christian duty to be commanded, NATHANAEL DELAWNE.   

The Author's Epistle. TO MY LORD FREDERICK MAURICE de la Tour, Prince of Sedan; Son and heir of the high and mighty Prince HENRY de de Tour, Duke of Bovillon, first Marshal of FRANCE, etc.  
MY LORD,  
That which the hand is among Instruments, the same is Logic among other Arts and Sciences. For as the hand is a general Instrument that handleth all other instruments: So Logic is a general Instrument, the knowledge whereof serveth to handle all other knowledges, and to make a skilful use of them. And as it is the property of Art to polish and perfect Nature: So it is the property of this Art to polish and direct natural reason. For there is a certain natural Logic, which man useth naturally, without any art; even the unlearned sort will sometimes make a Syllogism unawares. But Philosophy, having searched out all the secrets of natural reason, hath observed the causes of a good Discourse, and hath set down rules to that purpose,  
Wherein appeareth the excellency of this Art above the rest. For seeing that man is discerned from a beast by the use of reason: other Arts and Sciences frame man as he is a Citizen, or a Magistrate, or a Lawyer, or a Physician; but Logic frameth man as he is man, and maketh him after a sort a more reasonable creature by the right use of reason.  
But this Art hath chanced to fall into bad hands, that have rob it of her natural ornaments, and by a strange Metamorphosis have turned it into a faggot of dry thorns, which pricketh on every side; and in stead of drawing the rules thereof from natural reason, and fitting them for the use of man; they have entangled it with Metaphysical questions, which are like unto Crabs, where there is much pickling, but little meat, and are for no use, neither civil, nor religious.  
This inveterate evil, which by custom is turned into nature, would require a skilfuller Physician, and a quieter mind than mine is now, and a calmer season than this wherein we are. Notwithstanding being cast upon this place by the tempest, as a plank of the general shipwreck, and brought to a sorrowful rest, I have bestowed certain hours upon this Work, and have endeavoured to give a milder look and countenance to this Art, plucking those thorns from it, which it had gotten in the Schools; and clothing it with a French habit, that it might no longer walk in France like a stranger. For these many Ages past it hath been commonly taught in a most barbarous and thorny Latin, as if sweetness and elegancy could not stand together with solidity.  
If the public receive any benefit out of this my labour, it shall be wholly beholding to my Lord the Duke your Father for it. Who having received me into his house, and given me a favourable entertainment, with all kind of respect and benefits, hath exhorted me to undertake this task, and to teach you the Precepts thereof; wherein I have taken a singular delight. For, beside that it was a great honour to me to do you any service, it hath also given me the occasion to try your wit; which I have observed to be endowed with a strong imagination, and a  judgement, and which is not discouraged through difficulties: and by a laudable curiosity will not be satisfied but with reason, and where the same is not evident enough, moveth doubts of itself. Whence it is easy to conceive how great the dexterity of your wit will be, when time and necessity shall give you occasion to make use of it in things of a higher and more important nature.  
The fear of God being joined to this so quick and judicious a spirit, which hath planted in your heart a hatred of vice, and moved it with a holy ambition, to consecrate your life to the service of God, what may we not hope of such a disposition, which God hath so greatly favoured? especially considering that you are brought up in a family, whence all bad examples, and all idle words are banished, and where the service of God is carefully maintained: and have before your eyes the example of my Lord your Father, who among Princes is a notable pattern of wisdom, of great experience, of singular understanding, and of wise government: whose courage rouseth itself against adversity, and whose mind is not daunted through affliction. To whom nature hath given more than others have gotten by study and industry, having a natural facility to compass that, which others by long meditation cannot attain unto. Whose words are to you as dai●y lessons, and his wise actions as a continual pattern.  
He it is from whom you have received, that Learning is a goodly ornament to a Prince. Because he that guides others must have the clearer sight; and that he must have most knowledge, that hath most employment. There being nothing more unbeseeming a Prince, then, to be inferior to the most part of his Subjects in understanding and good knowledge, and to owe all the preferment he hath to his birth, and nothing to his virtue; and who to judge aright of things, must search into another man's brain for that which he should find in his own. This happeneth unto such Princes as have spent all their younger years in learning how to manage horses, rather than to govern the minds of men, who are creatures a thousand times more unruly and untamed. Whose outword behaviour is taught, whilst their souls are left untaught: who employ months and years in hunting after wild beasts, whilst they themselves are caught by domestical beasts, that is to say, by flatterers, that entangle them in vices. Who are taught to live, as if their Subjects were made for them, whereas they are made for the good of their Subjects; and to remember that they are Princes, but not to call to mind, that they are men subject to the same infirmities: and that having received of God more graces than others, they have the greater account to give up unto him; and that being the image of God upon earth, they ought to strive to be like unto him, not only in justice, clemency, liberality, and foresight; but chief in that GOD reigneth over his Subjects, not for his own good, but for theirs.  
Now when I speak of Learning, I do not mean a laborious knowledge, busying itself about words or swelling Discourses, or about heaping up of much Latin. But I am of opinion that the true learning of a Prince consisteth in the knowledge of God, and of the world, and of himself, and of the affairs of his own Estate and of his neighbours; and to be a Scholar of the dead, I mean, to search in Histories the examples of wisdom; and to learn the trade of a Prince, which is the hardest of all. Because it is a hard matter to walk steadily upon the top of a very high place, the brain of him easily turning that is very high mounted. And also because the actions of Princes are most controlled, and their life most crossed, and their faults most exposed to view, and that they authorise vices by their example.  
These instructions, my Lord, are familiar unto you, and you want no domestical helps. Notwithstanding I have thought that you would not take it amiss, if I endeavoured to contribute somewhat thereunto: and that by this my labour, as by a small evidence, I should testify my acknowledgement of the honour which I have received of my Lord your Father, and how earnestly I pray unto GOD for the prosperity of your most illustrious house, and more particularly for yourself, my Lord, as being  
Your most humble and most obedient servant, DV MOULIN.   

A Table of the Chapters.  

The first Book, which treateth of SIMPLE NOTIONS.  
Chapter. 1. WHat Logic is. How many sorts of Notions there be in the mind of man. Page. 1.  
Chapter. 2. How many sorts of Simple Notions. Of Singulars and universals. Also of Substance & Accident. Page. 2.  
Chapter. 3. The names of the ten Categories. Page. 6.  
Chapter. 4. Of Substance. Page. 7.  
Chapter. 5. Of Quantity. Page. 9  
Chapter. 6. Of Quality. Page. 13.  
Chapter. 7. Of Relation and Relatives. Page. 18.  
Chapter. 8. Of Acting or Action. Page. 22.  
Chapter. 9 Of Suffering or Passion. Page. 25.  
Chapter. 10. Of Where. Page. 26.  
Chapter. 11. Of When. Page. 28.  
Chapter. 12. Of Situation. Page. 29.  
Chapter. 13. Of Habit. Page. 29.   

The second Book. Of the places of Invention.  
Chapter. 1. HOw these Simple Notions are of use for an argument. Page. 31.  
Chapter. 2. Of the Genus. Page. 33.  
Chapter. 3. Of the Species. Page. 36.  
Chapter. 4. Of the difference. Page. 38.  
Chapter. 5. Of Proper. Page. 39  
Chapter. 6. Of the Accident. Page. 41.  
Chapter. 7. Of the Whole and Parts. Page. 43.  
Chapter. 8. Of Definition. Page. 48.  
Chapter. 9 Of Division. Page. 52.  
Chapter. 10. Of things coupled, called in Latin Coniugata. Page. 55.  
Chapter. 11. Of Cau●es and Effects. Page. 57  
Chapter. 12. Of Etymology. Page. 69.  
Chapter. 13. Of things Alike or unlike. Page. 71.  
Chapter. 14. Of things Opposite. Page. 75.  
Chapter. 15. Comparison of things. Page. 82.  
Chapter. 16. Comparison of the Probability, or Likelihood. Page. 85.  
Chapter. 17. Of testimony. Page. 88  
Chapter. 18. Of the Use or Practice of the Precedent Doctrine. Page. 91.   

The third Book. Of Enuntiations.  
Chapter. ●. What an Enuntiation is, and the parts thereof. Page. 105.  
Chapter. ●. Of the kinds of Enuntiation. Page. 109.  
Chapter. ●. Of the Opposition of Enuntiations. Page. 113.  
Chapter. 4. Of the Conversion of Enuntiations. Page. 117.   

The fourth Book. Of a Syllogism.  
Chapter. 1. WHat a Syllogism is. Also what a Conclusion is, and a Question or Problem, and of the parts thereof. Page. 121.  
Chapter. 2. How to make a Syllogism, and of the parts of it. Page. 123.  
Chapter. 3. The natural reason upon which a Syllogism is grounded. Page. 126.  
Chapter. 4. Of the Figures of a Syllogism. Page. 127.  
Chapter. 5. General Rules common to all Figures. Page. 128.  
Chapter. 6. Particular Rules to each Figure. Page. 134.  
Chapter. 7. Certain Artificial words, which serve to show how many ways we may argue in each Figure, and the means to convert the second and third figure into the first. Page. 142.  
Chapter. 8. Of an Enthymeme. Page. 146.  
Chapter. 9 Of Induction and Example. Page. 148.  
Chapter. 10. Of the Enumeration of parts. Page. 150.  
Chapter. 11. Of a Dilemma. Page. 152.  
Chapter. 12. Of a Sorites or heaping Syllogism. Page. 154.  
Chapter. 13. Of Conditional or hypothetical Syllogisms. Page. 155.  
Chapter. 14. Of Disjunctive Syllogisms. Page. 157.   

The fift Book. Of the Masterpiece of Logic called DEMONSTRATION.  
Chapter. 1. What Science is. Page. 161.  
Chapter. 2. What a Demonstration, or a Demonstrative Syllogism is. Pages. 163.  
Chapters. 3. What questions are demonstrable. Pages. 164.  
Chapter. 4. What the propositions of a demonstrative Syllogism ought to be. Page. 166.  
Chapters. 5. A special note how to know a perfect demonstration. Pages. 169.  
Chapters. 6. Of an Imperfect demonstration. Pages. 170.   

The sixth Book. Of Sophisms or Fallacies.  
Chapters. 1. OF Fallacies in words. Pages. 175.  
Chapters. 2. Of fallacies in the matter. Pages. 181.  
Chapters. 3. The fallacy by Accident. Pages. 182.  
Chapters. 4. The fallacy which taketh a thing as simply true which is not so, but only in some respect. Pages. 183.  
Chapters. 5. The fallacy supposing that which is questioned. Pages. 184.  
Chapters. 6. The fallacy of Inconsequence. Pages. 184.  
Chapters. 7. The fallacy whereby a thing is taken for a cause, which is not. Pages. 186.  
Chapters. 8. The fallacy which mingleth many Interrogations, as if they were but one. Pages. 187.  
Chapters. 9 The fallacy which is committed through the Ignorance of that, which contradicteth the question. Pages. 188.  
Chapters. 10. Of the faults in Syllogisms. Pages. 190.    

ERRATA.  
PAge 42. line 19 for by blunt horns, read by the blunt horns. p. 49. l. 23. for Now, r. None. p. 50. l. 13. for ana xe, read an axe. page 55. between line 10. and 11. put Accidents into other Accidents. p. 80. l. 7. for certain, r. contrary.   

THE ELEMENTS OF LOGIC.  

The first Book, which treateth OF SIMPLE NOTIONS.  

The first Chapter. What Logic is. How many sorts of Notions there be in the mind of man.  
LOGIC is an Art which giveth rules to argue well, and to discern truth from falsehood.  
To be able to form an argument, and to frame a good reason, we must know, that all the Notions or Conceptions in man's understanding are, either Simple, or Compound.  
Simple Notions are such, as are expressed by one word only; As, horse, man, whiteness, to see, to run, etc.  
Compound Notions are such, as are expressed by an Enuntiation or Proposition, which affirmeth or denieth something; As, Man is reasonable. God is no liar.  
Of many Propositions knit together, an Argument or Syllogism is: made, by those means and rules, which shall be set down hereafter.   

The second Chapter. How many sorts of simple Notions there are. Of Things singular and universal. Also of Substance and Accident.  
THere are as many simple Notions as there be things in the world.  
Of Things some be singular, and some universal.  
Singular things are those, which are one in Number; As, Frederick, Peter, this horse, this tree.  
Universal things comprehend and contain the Singulars. For an universal is a gathering together of many Singulars under one nature common to all. As, horse, man, tree, under which words considered in general, we comprehend all horses, men, trees.  
Singulars are known by sense, but universals are comprehended by the understanding. Therefore bruit beasts know only Singular things. Singulars in Philosophy are called Individuals, because they cannot be divided into two parts, keeping the same name. As, Alexander cannot be divided into two Alexanders, nor one horse into two horses.  
A whole compounded of parts alike; As, water, blood, wood, are not called Individuals, because they may be divided into parts, which may keep the name of the whole. For every drop of water is water, and of a great piece of wood every parcel is wood. But if you will turn these things into Individuals, you must add the name of the measure. For one pint of water cannot be divided into two pints, nor one acre of ground into two acres.  
All things, whether Singular or Universal, are either Substances, or Accidents.  
A Substance is that which subsisteth of itself; as, man, water, earth, etc.  
An Accident is that which cannot subsist by itself, but must have a subject or substance to uphold it, and unto which it must adhere; as, whiteness, swiftness, wisdom, heat. For whiteness can have no being, if it subsisteth not in some subject; as, in snow, or in the skin: so heat is an accident to fire; swiftness is an accident to an horse; wisdom is an accident to the understanding.  
Accidents are sometimes expressed by a Substantive; as, justice, beauty; and sometimes by an Adjective; as, just, fair. In the first manner, accidents are called Abstracts, or Separated; In the second, they are called Concretes, or Conjoined. For he that names justice, or beauty, considers justice or beauty without any certain Subject. But he that names just or ●●ire, considers justice and beauty, as adhering to a certain Subject that is clothed therewith.  
Common custom oft confounds ●hese things, saying, the true, the ●lack the sweet; in stead of saying, the ●ruth, the blackness, the sweetness.  
Now because there are diverse and ●undry kinds of accidents, the Philosopher's have ranked them into ●ine Orders or Classes of things; vn●o which Substance being added, ●here are ten Classes, which the Philosopher's call Categories or Predicaments. So that there is nothing in ●he world which is done either by Nature, or by Art, by Council or Chance, which may not be referred ●o, and contained in some one of ●hese Categories.   

The third Chapter. The Names of the ten Categories.  
The ten Categories are these.  

1. Substance; as, man, horse.  
2. Quantity; as, length, breadth.  
3. Quality; as, swiftness, whiteness, roundness.  
4. Relation or Respect; as, to be a Father, or a Son, a Master, or a Servant, etc.  
5. To Act, or Action; as, to run, to speak.  
6. To Suffer, or Passion; as to be driven, to be burned.  
7. Where; as, here, there.  
8. When; as, yesterday, to day.  
9 Situation; as, to sit, to stand, to kneel.  
10. Habit; as, to have a cap on, to have hose on, to have a cloak on.    

The fourth Chapter. Of Substance.  
SVbstance is that which subsisteth of itself, and is the subject of all Accidents.  
Singular Substances, are called, Primary Substances.  
Universal Substances, are called Secondary Substances. Because that ●ingular substances are first known. So children that have no knowledge but by sense, wanting yet the use of reason, know nothing but singular ●hings. This knowledge is common unto us with bruit beasts. But afterward reason gathering diverse Singulars together, comprehendeth them under Universal things.  
The Sun, the World, the Moon, are primary and singular Substances; yet in regard that they have a nature and essence, which might agree with many, if it so pleased God, they are also secondary substances.  
All substances are either uncreated or created: the uncreated substance i● God, all other are created.  
Created substances are clothed with accidents: but God hath no accident. For he is simple, and not compounded: his Attributes being his own proper essence, which we● distinguish in regard of their diverse effects; but in truth they are but one and the self same thing.  
Of created substances, some are Immaterial, as, Angels and Spirits; others are Material, namely, Such as have bodies, whereof here is a more exact Division.  

The Table of Substances.  
Substance is either 

Uncreated, as God.  
Created 

Immaterial 

Angels.  
Separated souls.    
Material, called bodies 

Simple, as 

Heaven.  
The four elements. 

Fire.  
Aire.  
Water.  
Earth.      
Compound 

Perfectly 

Living 

Plants, as 

Herbs.  
Shrubs.  
Trees.    
Animals 

Man.  
Beast 

Perfect, which have five senses, and are either 

Airy 

Birds.  
Insecta, as Flies.    
Earthy 

Creeping things.  
Four footed beasts.    
Watery.  
Amphybia, that is, of a doubtful kind.    
Imperfect, are such as want some of the senses, as, 

Oysters.  
Zoophyta, or Plant-Animals.          
Not living as 

Stones.  
Minerals.      
Imperfectly, which are called Meteors, as, Comets, Winds, Snow, Ice, etc.           
Place this Table of Substances between Page 8 and 9 at this hand ☞  
There can be nothing contrary to substance. Also, no substance is more substance than another, as, one horse is not more a horse then another, although it be a better horse. True it is that God and the Devil are substances, and that there is a contrariety between them. As also fire is contrary to water; but this contrariety is not in the substance, but in the will of the devil's, and in the quality of fire and water.   

The fift Chapter. Of Quantity.  
QVantitie is that by which Substances are numbered, measured, or divided; and by which they are equal, or unequal.  
There be two sorts of Quantity.  
The one is compounded of severed and disjoined parts, and therefore is called disjoined Quantity.  
The other is compounded of continued parts, and therefore is called continued Quantity.  
Quantity disjoined or severed is called Number, because the parts have between them no continuity. This Quantity cannot be measured, but must be numbered.  
Number is of two sorts; either numbering, or numbered.  
Numbers numbering are the numbers of Arithmetic, as, one, three, six, etc. Numbers numbered are the things that are numbered, as, six men, ten horses, etc.  
Sometimes the number numbered stands in stead of the number numbering, as, Counters.  
Unity is no number, but the beginning of number.  
The greatest number of all cannot be found or imagined. For a man may still add to the greatest number that can be given.  
Continued Quantity is that whose parts are joined together with a continued sequel, and which may be measured. This Quantity is either, a Line, or a Superficies, or a Mathematical body, or Time.  
A Line is a length without breadth, as, a mile, a meating wand.  
Superficies is a length with breadth, as, the surface of the water, or of an acre of Land.  
Under the Superficies we comprehend also the Place, which is nothing else but the interior Superficies of a body, containing another, as, the inward Superficies of a Hogshead of Wine, is the place of the Wine.  
A Mathematical body is length, breadth, and depth; this body differs from a Physical or natural body, which is a material substance, and not a quantity. Notwithstanding every natural body hath these three dimensions, and cannot be without quantity.  
Time is the measure of the continuance of things. This measure is taken from the motion of the heavens, which maketh days and years.  
Time hath two parts, namely, past, and to come: as for the present it is not time, but it is the instant or running moment, which coupleth together the time past, with the time to come.  
The continuance of God is not called time, but Eternity, which consisteth in two things. First to have neither beginning nor ending. Secondly, not to pass away, nor to have succession of parts. For the life of God consists in rest: because that if the life of God had a flux, or succession of parts, his life were partly past, and partly to come.  
As Unity is neither number nor quantity, so a Prick is neither quantity, nor part of a line: as also a moment is no part of time, but the end or extremity of time past.  
Number is ancienter than continued quantity, as it appeareth by the number of the Persons in the Trinity, which is eternal and without beginning of time. But continued quantity had a beginning with the creation of bodies.  
Again, number may be counted by itself, and without any other help, but continued quantity cannot be measured but by the help of the discontinued quantity. For every length or breadth is measured by the numbering of the feet, or inches, or metingwands, or miles, or degrees.  
Nothing is contrary unto quantity. For great and little are not contraries, but Relatives or Respectives; and one contains the other, which cannot be in contraries. The less number is contained under the greater, ●nd is part of it: But heat is no part of ●olde.  

The Table of Quantity.  
Quantity is either 

Discontinued, which is called Number 

Numbering  
Numbered.    
Continued 

A Line.  
A Superficies.  
A Body.  
Time.        

The sixth Chapter. Of Quality.  
QValitie is that whereby substances are qualified, and made like or unlike one to another. For as things are said to be the same things, whe● they have oneself same substance and equal when they agree in quantity: so they are said to be alike, when they agree in quality.  
There are four sorts of Qualities. 1. For they are either Active qualities, which be in the objects of our outward or inward senses, and bring unto us some alteration or change in our bodies, or minds, as, sweetness in honey, coldness in snow, beauty in a face, hardness or roughness in a stone, or in a body, which hurteth the sense of touching, delight in a Comedy. The effects which these qualities do work in us are called Passion, whilst it is received. For when the smart of burning is over, the mark or blackness that remaineth, is no longer called Passion.  
2. Or else they be natural qualities or faculties, as, the virtue of herbs, the faculties of the soul, heaviness in lead, heat in fire, and coldness in water.  
3. Or else they be habits, or qualities gotten by study and exercise, as all Arts are, whether mechanical or liberal; and all Sciences. Which when ● man hath attained unto, and gotten ● habit of them, he is thereby made the fit for any action or exercise.  
Bruit beasts that have hearing, as, dogs, horses, apes, etc. are capable to get a habit, if fear do not hinder them. For such creatures as are excessively dimerous cannot be taught, as, mice, etc.  
The instruments by which the habit is put into practice may be lost, and yet the habit remain still, as, the skill of playing on the Lute, when the hand is cut off.  
The preparation to a habit is called Disposition, which is when a man hath not as yet gotten a habit, but is in the way to it, and hath besides his inclination some little knowledge.  
Natural faculties are great helps to get and form a habit. For he that by nature is unfit to any Art or study, can never attain unto a perfection, whatsoever pains he takes in it. 4. Or else they are Figures and outward forms, as, to be square, round, sharp, crooked, wrong, strait.  
Qualities are contrary one to another, as, heat, and coldness. And natural powers are contrary to impotency, as, sight to blindness, hearing to deafness. Only Figures & outward forms have no contraries. For roundness differeth from squareness, but is not contrary unto it.  
To judge aright of any quality, it must be considered in the abstract, and as not being tied to any certain subject: So justice or whiteness are to be considered in themselves, and not the just or the white. Because the consideration of the subject in the which justice or whiteness are inherent, do but trouble & divert man's thought. Therefore if you will consider a thing aright, you must consider it apart and separated.  
One substance can have but one quantity, but it may have a great number of diverse qualities.  
Qualities do act, but quantities do not, only they do help the action of the quality, as, the greatness of a stone increaseth the weight of it.  
A Spirit hath qualities, but no quantities.  
The excellency of quality above quantity, consists principally in that the quantity proceeds from the matter, but the quality from the form. Now the form is ever more excellent than the matter. For by the form things are made fit to act; but matter is that which makes them apt to suffer.  
Form and Figure act not, but they help and facilitate the action of him that acteth, as, the roundness of a stone makes it to roll the easier.  

The Table of Quality.  
Qualities are 

1. Such as act against the senses 

Outward.  
Inward.    
2. Natural power or impotency.  
3. Habits, whose beginning is called Disposition.  
4. Outward forms and figures.      

The seventh Chapter. Of Relation and Relatives.  
Relatives are two things which have a mutual respect one to another, so as the one cannot be without the other, and the one is defined by the other, neither can the one be thought upon without thinking upon the other, as, the Father and the Son, the Prince and the Subjects, the master and the servant, the double and the half, the equal and the equal.  
The mutual respect between these two things is called Relation. There be many Relatives which have the self same name, as, friend and friend, like and like, equal and equal.  
The relation between two friends is called friendship; the relation between two things alike, is called resemblance or likeness.  
There be relatives whose relation is imperfect, namely, when one of the two relatives dependeth on the other, and cannot be without it, but the other may well be alone, and dependeth not on his relative, as, the Pastor and the flock, the Prince and the people, the sight and the thing visible. For there may be people without a Prince, but no Prince without people.  
There be also relatives, which are not relatives in their own nature, but only in regard of us, and because we make them so to be by our conceiving of them: as, the right and the left between two walls, or two trees: but if we turn ourselves, then that which was left, is right. For in a tree there is neither right nor left by nature.  
If a Father have many sons, there are as many sundry relations, as there be sons; because the Father is taken diverse times as is the centre of a Circle, which is taken as often as the lines are drawn from the said centre to the circumference.  
One and the same thing may have the name of two relatives; as, to be Father and Son, to be high and low; but in diverse respects. For the same may be Father to one, and Son to another.  
There be relations which spring from quantity, as, the relation which is between the double and the half; Others that proceed from Quality, as, the relation between two friends. Others which come from Action, as, the relation between the mother and the son, the Creator and the creature. Others that spring from Situation, as, the right and left, the high and low, the foremost, and the hindermost; between which Relatives the relation hath no name.  
We call that foremost in living things, towards which the natural motion is made; we call right that part which naturally is fittest for service. In a living creature we call that part high, by which the nourishment is drawn; as, in Plants, the root is the highest part, not in regard of the universe, but in regard of the Plant.  
Such relations as are grounded upon quality, admit of contrariety, as, friendship, likeness: other relations admit of none.  
In relations grounded upon action, as between that which heateth, and that which is heated, there is no contrariety. For that which heateth, and that which cooleth are contraries; but this contrariety proceeds from the quality, namely, heat, which is the ground of this relation.  
Friendship, as it is an affection moving the lover, is a quality; but as it is a mutual respect between two friends, it is a Relation.  
Although God, as he is Master and Creator, be a relative to his servants and creatures, there is not for all that any accident in God: because the relation is not in the two relatives, but between the two relatives. And therefore it bringeth in no composition, nor to the substance any natural change.  
It is to be noted that two relatives are commonly called the two terms of the relation.  

The Table of Relatives.  
Relatives are 

Either of their own nature 

Perfect having 

the same names.  
diverse names.    
Imperfect.    
Or only in regard of us.  
All these relatives are grounded upon 

Quantity.  
Quality.  
Action.  
Situation.        

The eight Chapter. Of Acting or Action.  
TO Act is to move itself against the patiented, and to make it receive the power of the Agent.  
Of Actions some be natural, as, the panting of the heart, the motion of a stone downward. Others are voluntary, as, to buy, to sell, to paint, to fence; which notwithstanding are not done without the help of nature. Others are mixed, that is to say, partly natural, partly voluntary: as, to eat, to walk, to run; which indeed are natural actions, but are guided by the will.  
Violent actions and against nature, are such as are contrary to natural actions, as, the throwing of a stone upward. But those are contrary to voluntary actions, which are called forced or constrained, as, to be pulled or haled into prison. There be certain actions that are partly voluntary, partly forced, as, when a Merchant casteth his merchandise into the Sea to ease the ship; or when a Patient causeth his arm to be cut off.  
The natural actions and motions are swiftest in the end; as, the falling of a stone downward. The voluntary actions are swiftest in the midst; as, running. The violent are swiftest in the beginning; as, the casting of a stone; or, shooting of an arrow.  
Every action importeth a certain motion. If the motion be in the substance, it is called Generation, or Corruption. If in the Quantity, it is called Augmentation or Diminution. If in the Quality, it is called Alteration. If in the place, it is called Local motion, or Transportation.  
There is no generation without corruption, nor no corruption without generation. But we call it generation, when the matter takes a better form; and corruption, when it passeth into a worse.  
The local motion is the chiefest of all motions, without which the rest move not at all. And beside there is no other motion belonging to the heavens; where motion is the cause of all other motions, as well in Substance, as in Quantity, and Quality.  
The heavens in regard of the whole do rest, but in regard of the parts, do change place, even as a Top that sleepeth turning.  

The Table of Actions.  
Actions are 

Natural.  
Voluntary.  
Mixt.  
Violent.     

The Table of Motion.  
Motion is on the 

Substance, and is called 

Generation.  
Corruption.    
Quantity, and is called 

Augmentation.  
Diminution.    
Quality, and is called Alteration.  
Place, and is called Transporting or Local-motion.      

The ninth Chapter. Of Suffering or Passion.  
TO Suffer is to receive the power of the Agent.  
There are as many kinds of Suffering, as of doing.  
Oftentimes the Agent doth suffer in acting, as, when a man rolling a weighty stone tireth himself, and sweateth: or when a man hurteth his teeth in cracking a Nut. The Agent doth not suffer, when it is out of the compass of the Activity of the Patient, as, the Sun shining on the water, receiveth not the brightness which the water send's back: because it is out of the extent, which limiteth the reflection of the beams sent back again by the water.  
God acteth always, and every where, but never suffereth.  
There are Verbs Actives in Grammar, which are Passives in Philosophy, as, to love, to hear, to learn: for all these are Passions, and are done by receiving. On the contrary, he which is loved or heard, is he that acteth & moveth the lover and the hearer.  
There are some Passions perfecting, and others which are corrupting, as, the enlightening in the air, the receiving of learning in the understanding, or of the images of things in the sight, are Passions, which bring some perfection to the air, to the understanding, and to the sight.  
The corrupting Passions are such as would destroy the Patient, if they did continue their increase, or did increase above measure, as, heating, cooling, wearisomeness.  
The perfecting Passions are those which perfect a faculty or natural power, and give it that perfection for the which God did create it.   

The tenth Chapter. Of Where.  
WHERE is not the place itself, but it is a designation, or a note of some certain place. For place is a quantity, and a space that may be measured: But the Where cannot be measured. When a man putteth forth a question touching the Place, the demand is, by how much, as for example, how much place doth such a body take up? But here the question is by where or whither, as, where is the King? and, whither go you?  
Concerning Bodies the question may be asked, how much place they take up: but concerning Angels and souls, that question cannot be asked, but only this, where they are. This is it which the Philosophers mean when they say, that Bodies are in a place Circumscriptively, and Souls definitively; because Souls are not limited or circumscribed by place, and yet a man may say of them, that they are here, or there, and not elsewhere.  
We cannot say that God is in a place any of these ways. For he is infinite, and so present in all places, as he is neither limited, nor defined by any place. It may be truly said, GOD is here; but it cannot be said, GOD is here, and not there.   

The eleventh Chapter. Of When.  
WHEN is not the time itself, but it is a designation, or a note of a certain time, as, yesterday, to day, to morrow, etc.  
When we speak of time, and of the continuance of it, the question is, by how long? as, how long lived Noah? how long did the Roman Empire continue? But here we ask by When, as, When shall we have the Equinoxe? When was julius Caesar slain?  
Some things are done in time, which notwithstanding are not measured by time; namely, such as are done in a moment, as, the impression of a Seal; the enlightening of a chamber by the air at the opening of the windows; the receiving of the images of things in the eye. Concerning these things, we ask not in how long time, but when they were done.   

The twelfth Chapter. Of Situation.  
SItuation is a Position or placing of parts in their whole, whether the situation be natural; as, the situation of the arm at the shoulders end; or voluntary, as when we sit, or kneel.   

The thirteenth Chapter. Of Habit.  
BY Habit we do not understand garments, for they belong to substance; but we mean the applying of garments and other ornaments about the body, as, to be clothed, to be shod, to have a Cassock or a Cloak on.  
Under these ten Classes or ranks of things, are contained all things in the world, and all simple Notions. And of these are framed Enuntiations and Arguments or Syllogisms, whereof we shall speak hereafter. For there is nothing in the world out of which a man may not draw some Argument or Discourse.    

The second Book, Which is OF THE PLACES OF INVENTION.  

The first Chapter. How these simple Notions are of use for an Argument.  
TO show how these simple Notions enter into an Argument, or Syllogism, and how they are of use for Reasoning & discourse, they must be clothed with other names. For if we should consider them no otherwise then as they are handled in the Categories, they would never serve to open a discourse, and to frame a reason. For as it is one thing to consider Leather or wood in themselves, & another thing to consider them as they are a fit matter to make a  or a bench: So it is another thing to consider things as they are in themselves, and another thing to consider them as they are means or instruments of reasoning. We have considered in the Categories things as they are in themselves, now we are to consider them as they may serve to argue and discourse.  
And therefore when a man will search out the truth of any question, (as for example, Whether voluptuousness be a good thing) and desires to gather proofs to prove or to impugn the question propounded; all that can be brought, is either, 

1. The Genus of that which we desire to prove.  
2. Or the Species.  
3. Or the Difference.  
4. Or the Proper.  
5. Or some Accident.  
6. Or the Whole or some part of the Whole.  
7. Or the Definition.  
8. Or the Division.  
9 Or some thing coupled unto it.  
10. Or the Cause or Effect.  
11. Or the Etymology.  
12. Or something Like or Unlike.  
13. Or the Opposite.  
14. Or a Comparison in the things.  
15. Or a Comparison in the Probability.  
16. Or some Testimony.    
Of all which heads we are now to treat of in particular, that we may know what they are, and how to make use of them.   

The second Chapter. Of the Genus.  
THe Genus is a nature which belongeth unto many things differing in Species. As this word, Animal, is a Genus signifying a nature common both to man and beast: Animal is the Genus; man and beast are the Species. So Plant is the Genus of Trees and of Herbs; and virtue is a Genus whose Species are justice, Temperance, etc.  
There is a Supreme and most General Genus; and an Inferior and Subalternal Genus. As Substance is a supreme Genus, which can never be a Species: but Animal is an inferior Genus. For though it be a Genus to man and beast, yet it is a Species to Body: as also Body is a Species to Substance. As in this Table; 

Substance 

without body.  
with body 

living 

Plants.  
Animals 

man.  
beast.      
not living.        
Such Genuses are equally attributed to their Species, and upon the same ground. But there are some aequivocal Genuses, which are attributed to diverse Species upon diverse grounds. As this word, Wolf, is attributed to a terrestrial devouring creature, and to a Fish, and to a certain disease.  
A Genus Analogical is that which is attributed to diverse Speci●ses, though not altogether in regard of the same cause, yet for some respect or similitude. As this word, Foot, is attributed to the foot of a living creature, and to the foot of a Table, and of a Verse, and of a mountain, and of a drinking glass. So the word healthful is attributed to the body, and to the Air, and to exercise, and to urine in diverse senses, and yet with some agreement too. Commonly such a Genus agreeth primarily to some one of the Species, and then secondarily to the rest, by reason of some relation which it hath with them, as may appear by the forenamed examples. For the word Foot, first and properly is said of the foot of a living creature, and afterward of the foot of a mountain or of a Table by a certain resemblance or proportion. So likewise to be healthful is said first of the body, and then of exercise, and of urine, because they are helps or marks of bodily health.  

The Table of Genus.  
Genus 

Supreme  
Inferior 

Vnivocall, as, Animal, Plant.  
aequivocal in 

whole, as Wolf.  
part when there is some relation or agreement among the Species, As, foot, healthful.          

The third Chapter. Of the Species.  
SPecies is a nature comprehended under the Genus, which being joined with a difference maketh a Species. So man is a reasonable creature: creature is the Genus of man, and the word reasonable is the difference which distinguisheth man from other sorts of creatures.  
There be two sorts of Species. The one most special, which can never be a Genus, as, man, lion, elephant, gold: For such Specieses cannot be divided into other Specieses: but only into singular Substances or Individuals.  
The other is a Subalternal Species, which being compared with an inferior Species is a Genus. As, the word, Animal, is a Species in regard of a Body: but a Genus in regard of man.  
From the Genus and Species are drawn Arguments for Discourse; and such arguments are grounded upon these Maxims following.  
1. Whatsoever agreeth with the Genus, 
Maxims.  agreeth also with the Species. For whatsoever may be said of a tree in general, may be said also of the Laurel, etc. Excepting that which is attributed to the Genus, as it is a Genus. As to be more general than the Specieses, and to contain them.  
2. That which agrees not with the Genus, agrees not with the Species. For that which cannot be said of animal, cannot be said of man.  
3. It is not necessary that the Species be wheresoever the Genus is. For if such a thing be an animal, it followeth not that it must therefore be a man.  
4. But on the other side. Where the Species is, there the Genus must needs be also. For whosoever is a man, is also an animal. And whosoever saith, that this is a lettuce, doth by consequent affirm, that it is an herb.   

The fourth Chapter. Of Difference.  
DIfference is that, whereby one thing differeth from another.  
Of differences some are greater than others. For there are things which differ only in number; as Peter and john. There be others which differ in the Species, as, man and beast. There be others also which differ in the Genus, as, a man and a stone. But the greatest difference is, when two things are in two diverse Categories, as, a horse and whiteness.  
There be also essential differences, and accidental differences. As, a man differeth from a horse in essence, and definition. But a French man differs from a Moor only in colour and complexion, which are accidents, and not things which make man to be man.  
Among the essential differences, the principal and most considerable is that, which is called Superficial, by which the Specieses of the same Genus differ essentially. This difference hath these two properties. That it constitutes the Specieses; And divides the Genuses. Thus the life sensitive, is the difference which constitutes the animal, and maketh the animal to be Animal. The self same difference divideth the Genus; namely, Living. So likewise to be reasonable, is the difference which divideth animal, and constitutes man. And the same perfection which maketh man to be man, is that which maketh him differ from other Animals.   

The fift Chapter. Of Proper.  
PRoper is of two sorts. For there be some properties most-proper, and others lesse-proper to a thing.  
The properties most-proper, are such as are attributed to the singulars of the same Specieses, and with them only, and that always. As, it is the property of the Loadstone to draw Iron. And it is the property of man, to be able to laugh, and speak: and of a horse to neigh: and of an ox to bellow.  
The properties lesse-proper, are such as agree only to the singulars of a Species, but neither always, nor to all. As it is proper to a man to be a Philosopher, or a Musician: but neither to every man, nor at all times. So it is the property of the Moon to be Eclipsed, but not at all times. And the property of Plants to lose their leaves in Winter; but that agrees not with all, nor always: for there be some that are always green.  

Maxim.  Wheresoever a difference is, there also is the Species, and the property most-proper. For these ever go all together.   

The sixth Chapter. Of the Accident.  
BY Accident in this place, we do not understand whatsoever is in the world, Substance excepted. For Accident so taken at large comprehendeth also the Proper, and is of no use to frame a Discourse or Argument.  
But by Accident we understand the mutable, or separable circumstances of a Subject, which may be, or not be in a Subject, without destroying the said Subject. As, whiteness in a wall, and valour in a man are accidents, which may be or may not be in a wall, or in a man, and that without destroying either man or wall, or causing them to be more or less man or wall.  
Of these Accidents compared together, some go before, and precede by order of nature the thing which we intent to prove. Others do accompany the same. And others do follow it. The first are called Antecedents. As, wearisomeness, and shaking before an Ague; the foaming of the Sea before a tempest; the dawning of the day before the day: The second are called Concomitants, that is to say, accompanying, because they go together, As, Pride and folly; The Eclipse of the Moon, and the full Moon: The third are called Consequents. As, rain, after a red morning; an ague after distaste and wearisomeness without former labour.  
Antecedents and Concomitants are used to prove probably that a thing is, or shall be. As, by paleness we argue fear●: and by blushing shamefastness, or the touch of conscience: and by blunt horns of the Moon, we conclude that we shall have rain: and by the redness of the same, that we shall have wind.  
But those proofs are most forcible that are drawn from subsequent accidents, which cannot be unless some other thing hath gone before. As, we know there hath been a battle by many slain bodies lying in a field; and shipwreck by sundry planks s●o●●●ng on the S●a.  
The Maxims 
Maxims.  are.  
1. The Antecedent being granted, the Consequent ●●th probably follow.  
2. The Consequent being granted, the Antecedent must needs have gone before. E●pecia lie when it is such an Effect as cannot be produced, but by one cause: A● we prove, that because it is day, the Sun is ris●n. But if it be ●n Effect, which may arise from diverse Causes (As, the corruptions of an Estate; and Agues) the proof is not necessary.   

The seventh Chapter. Of the Whole and Parts.  
THe Whole is that which hath all the Parts joined together in a convenient order and situation. As, the whole and entire of a house is not only when all the parts are there, but when every part is conveniently placed.  
There be two sorts of Whole: the one which may be divided into formal parts; the other into material parts.  
The Formal parts are those whereof the Definition is compounded. As, the Genus and the Difference are the parts of a Definition. So animal and reason be the two formal parts of a man. So the formal parts of a house, or of an image of stone, are their matter and their external forms or figures. Such parts may easily be discerned and distinguished by our understanding, but cannot be really separated.  
The Material parts are those which differ in Situation, and which for the most part may really be separated. As the material parts of the world are the heavens and the four Elements: the material parts of a house are the foundation, the walls, and the roof.  
Every material part hath a situation by itself, except there be a mingling or commixtion of the said parts. As when wine is mingled with water, or when the four Elements are mingled in a Body. Material parts are either alike among themselves (As, the parts of water, Blood, Butter, Oil:) or else are unlike, as, the parts of a man's body, or of a house. The parts alike among themselves have no certain number; because they may be infinitely divided.  
The parts unlike are either Integrals, or not Integrals.  
The integral parts are those whereof the whole is immediately compounded. As, a Kingdom is immedidiately compounded of a King & the three estates. The world is compounded of the heavens and the four Elements. An animal is compounded of a body and a soul.  
But under one of these parts are oftentimes contained other little parts which are not Integrals: that is to say, whereof the Whole or the Entire is not immediately compounded. Among which there are some that are not necessary, serving rather for ornament and conveniency, then for necessity. As, in a Commonwealth, hunters, perfumers, musicians, and Poets. In a house, shuts to windows, gutters, and weathercockes.  
Sometimes in a Commonwealth the more necessary parts are such as appear least, and are less in account then such as are for ornament or pleasure. A● Bakers are less in account then Cooks, and Plowmen less than Goldsmiths.  
There are little p●rts and not integral, which are notwithstanding principals, and altogether necessary. As, the heart and brain in man. A vault hath that prope●●ie, that all the parts how little soever they be, are principals; because if one of them be taken away, the rest fall to the ground.  
There are certain parts which are not necessary for the being, and yet are necessary for the well and commodious being. As, the eye in a man's body, locks in a house, Merchantdrapers in a town.  
The Nails are part of man's body, as also the teeth: but hair is not. For it is an excrement.  
A small quantity of our blood is not accounted a part of the bodi●; because though it be taken away, the body remains complete, and oftentimes is the more healthful. But the who●e mass of blood is part of the body.  
Now to argue and seek the truth by the help of the Whole and Parts, these Maxims are to be understood.  
1. Wheresoever the Whole is, 
Maxims.  there also all the integral parts requisite to being, must necessarily be. As, where man is, there necessarily is the body and soul. 2. Take away any of the integral and necessary parts, and you destroy the Whole. As, take away the foundation or walls, and you destroy the house.  
3. Whatsoever is said of the Whole compounded of parts alike, may be said also of every several part. Except that which is said of the Whole, as it is Whole, namely, to contain all the parts. For example, to be salt is said of the whole Sea, and of every part of it: but to encompass the earth, is attributed only to the Sea, as it is a Whole: and therefore it is not attributed to any part of the Sea.  

The Table of the Whole and Parts.  
The Whole is composed of parts 

Formal.  
Material which are among themselves. 

alike.  
unlike 

integral.  
not integral 

necessary for 

being.  
well-being.    
not necessary.            

The eight Chapter. Of Definition.  
DEfinition is a speech which expresseth the essence of the thing. The perfect definition of a Substance is that, which is compounded of the next Genus and the specifical difference. As, the definition of a Plant is, to be a body living a vegetative life: of man, to be a reasonable creature. There are but few such Definitions; because the forms and essential differences of substances are not so well known unto us. God only who made them, doth exactly know them.  
The perfect definition of an Accident is compounded of three parts, namely, of the next Genus, of the proper Subject, and of the next Efficient or Final cause. As for example, death is an accident, whereof the Genus is, the end or destruction of life, the Subject is, a living body, and the next Efficient cause is, the extinguishing of vital heat.  
This therefore is the perfect definition of death, namely, that it is the destruction of the life of a living body by extinguishing the vital heat. Thus are defined anger, grief, sickness, thunder, earthquake, the Eclipse of the Moon, and that of the Sun, Civil-warre, respiration, and diverse other things, whereof we shall produce some examples in the end of this Chapter.  
Now but Proper Accidents can be thus defined. For mutable and casual Accidents, or such as have no certain known cause, or that depend upon the will of man, cannot be exactly defined. And therefore in stead of a Definition, we describe them, as well as we may, expressing their Genus, and some certain property. So whiteness is defined, when we say, that it is a most simple and most clear colour. And light is defined to be the chief of all whitenesses; or, the whiteness of the body of the Sun sending forth his likeness through transparent bodies.  
Natural instruments, as, the eye, and the hand; or, artificial, as, a hammer, or ana xe, are defined by their Genus, and by their fitness for that use for which they are ordained. So the Eye is the instrument of seeing, and a Hammer is an instrument to knock withal.  
Definition serveth to discourse and to argue by the means of this Maxim. 
Maxim.   
To whatsoever thing the definition agreeth, unto that same also the thing defined doth agree. And reciprocally, to whatsoever the defined thing agreeth, to the same the definition agreeth also.  

The Table of Definition.  
Definition is either of a 

Substance which is composed of the 

Next Genus.  
Difference.    
Accident which is 

Proper defined by the 

Next Genus.  
Proper subject.  
Next cause 

Efficient.  
Final.      
Improper or casual, defined as the Substance, so far as may be.       

Certain examples of the definition of a Proper Accident.  
THunder is a sound in the cloud, by the breaking out of a flaming exhalation.  
Death is the destruction of a living creature by extinguishing the vital heat.  
The Eclipse of the Moon is the darkening of the Moon by the interposition of the earth.  
Anger is a perturbation of the mind arising from the opinion of a sustained wrong.  
Civil war is the trouble of an Estate arising from the discord of the parties.  
Baldness is the loss of the hair of the head through the want of radical humour.  
Respiration is the drawing in of air into the lungs to refresh the heart.  
Sickness is an Indisposition of the body caused by the distemperature of the Humours.  
The Earthquake is the stirring or moving of a part of the earth through the violence of winds therein enclosed.  
Blindness is a privation of light in the eye by the corruption of the instruments of seeing.  
Sorrow is a grief in the irascible faculty, through the grief of some evil.  
The Eclipse of the Sun is the darkening of the air by the interposition of the Moon.    

The ninth Chapter. Of Division.  
THere are diverse sorts of Divisions. For either we divide the Genus into the Species, or the Whole into the Parts, or the Substance into diverse Accidents, or an Accident into diverse Subjects, or a Word into diverse significations.  
1. First we divide a Genus into the Species. As, a living creature into man and beast. Actions into natural and voluntary.  
2. Or else we divide the Whole into Par●s. So man is divided into Soul and body. A house into the foundations, walls and roof. Which division is made either in thought or in deed.  
3. Or else we divide the Subject into diverse Accidents. As, when we divide men into free and bond, into males or females, into fools or wisemen.  
4. Or else we divide an Accident into other Accidents. As, when we divide Physicians into rich and poor ones: soldiers into great or little ones, strong or weak.  
5. Or else we divide Accidents into diverse Subjects, As, sickness, into the sickness of the body, and sickness of the soul. So we may divide corruption into the corruption of simple bodies, or into the corruption of mixed or compounded bodies.  
6. Or we divide an aequivocal word into diverse significations, As the word, link, which signifieth a Sausage, a Torch, and a link of a chain.  

Rules for Division.  1. A good division must have but few parts, and those opposite, if it may be. As, animal is divided into reasonable and unreasonable; Number into even and odd; A line into strait and crocked. But that is not always possible. As when we divide the external senses into five. And France into seventeen governements.  
2. In a Division nothing must be either superfluous, or wanting. As, if a man should say, that the senses are, hearing, seeing, smelling, and the two eyes; there were in such a Division something wanting and something superfluous.  
3. The parts of a Division must not overreach one another. As, who should say that all clothing of the body is either garments, or habiliments, or gowns. Or that justice consisteth in three things, to live honestly, to hurt no body, to give every man his own. In these divisions the parts are but little or not at all differing, and are in a manner the same thing.  

The Table of Division.  
Division is of the 

Genus into the Species.  
Whole into the Parts.  
Subject into Accidents.  
Accidents into diverse Subjects.  
aequivocal word into diverse significations.      

The tenth Chapter. Of things Coupled, called in Latin Conjugata.  
COupling is considered either in Words or in Things.  
Words coupled or conjoined are such, as come from the same beginning, and differ in termination, As, just, justice, justly: white, whiting, to white, whiteness. The link and affinity of which words is grounded upon some affinity which is in the nature of the things signified by these words.  
But there are certain things coupled in Nature which are not coupled in Words. As the sleep, and to slumber.  
There are also certain words coupled, which notwithstanding for matter are not of neces●●tie linked together. As, buckle and a buckler.  
Now for argument and discourse, the coupling and affinity which is in words is of no use, except there be also affinity in the thing: but where the affinity of words proceeds from the affinity in the thing, we use this Maxim.  

Maxim.  To whomsoever one of the Coniugates or things coupled doth belong, the others also belong unto the same. As, he that lieth is a liar. And, to whomsoever it belongeth to do a just thing, to him also belongeth justice, and to live justly. And, seeing thou art a knave, thou must be given unto knavery.  
This Maxim is not without Exception. As, may appear by the example of Cambyses, who being very , did notwithstanding some just actions. As in that he covered the seat of justice with the skin of an  judge, whom he caused to be flayed, as a warning to all that should sit upon the said seat. And so there may be a Prince loving treason, who notwithstanding hateth the traitor.   

The eleventh Chapter. Of Causes and Effects.  
A Cause is that which bringeth forth an Effect: or that by which or for which any thing is.  
There be four kinds of Causes: the Material, the Formal, the Efficient, and the Final. For example, the matter of a house is stones, wood, and tiles: the form is the structure and manner of building, which ariseth from the placing or ordering of the parts: the efficient cause is the Masterbuilder: the final cause is for dwelling or habitation.  
The efficient and final causes are called Externall, because they are out of the thing, and are not parts of it. As the builder is no part of the house: for suppose the builder were shut up in the house, which he hath built, yet were he still an external cause, by reason that he is not of the essence or definition of the house, nor any part of it. But the matter and form are Internal causes, because the thing is composed of them.  

The cause Material.  Matter is that whereof the thing is composed. As, leather is the matter of a shoe, because a shoe is made of leather.  
Matter is of two sorts: the one is called matter of Generation, as, the seed is the matter of the Generation of a tree; slime is the matter of the Generation of frogs; so water is the matter of ice. The other is the matter of Composition. As, the four elements are the matter whereof a body is composed; wood and stone are the matter of a house.  
Sometimes matter is taken improperly for the subject whereof we speak or write. Thus battles and love are the matter of the book of Ariost. And sometimes for the occasion and subject whereabout man doth labour and occupy himself. As, numbers are the matter of an Arithmetician, and dangers and troubles are the matter of prowess and patience.  
Form is that which giveth being to a thing. 
Formal.   
Of Forms some are Natural. As the form of an Animal is the sensitive soul: and the form of the eye is the faculty of seeing: Others are Artificial. As the form of a statue, of a house, or of a clock.  
Natural forms are part of the substance, and are multiplied by generation. But Artificial forms are qualities, and no parts of the substance, neither are they multiplied by generation or propagation. If we engrave the image of Caesar upon a nut, that nut being planted will bring forth fruit and nuts, but not the image of Caesar. And thence it is that children are not heirs of the learning or piety of their father's.  
The Efficient 
Efficient.  cause is that by which a thing is. As the Sun is the efficient cause of the day: and the fire of burning: and sickness of death: and the interposition of the Moon, the cause of the eclipse of the Sun.  
Under the Efficient cause we comprehend the cause which is called Meritorious. As murder is the cause of punishment.  
Likewise under the Efficient cause we comprehend the cause which is called Defective. As the want of sight is the cause of going astray; and the absence of the Sun, is the cause of night, howsoever by nature it be the cause of day.  
All instruments, both natural, as, the eye and the hand; and artificial, as, an Axe and a sword, are in some sort Efficient causes. For though they act not by their own proper power, yet they help the action; and without them the natural action would either be weak or altogether hindered.  
The Final 
Final.  cause is that for the which a thing is done. So the end of Physic is to heal the sick, and the end of Study is to get learning.  
We must warily distinguish the scope from the end. As, the scope of walking is health, but the end is the last step; the one is the end of the intention; the other the end of progression.  
The final cause may also be the formal and efficient cause, but ●n diverse respects. As, the form of the house is the end of the builder: and the form of a horse engendered is the efficient cause of the operations of the same horse, and also the final cause of the horse engendering. And that which is the final cause, i● commonly an effect. As to see is the final cause, and also the effect of sight.  
Of causes the final is the best, and most excellent: because all the other tend unto it, and serve it.  
The final cause as it is the last in execution, so it is the first in the intention.  
Efficient and final causes bring forth their effects, 
Causes of themselves, or by accident.  either of themselves and of their own nature; or by accident. Thus the Sun giveth light of itself, and of his own nature; but by accident it blindeth Owls. And the neighing of Darius his horse was the accidental cause of his raise to the kingdom. And thirst may be an accidental cause to save a man out of the battle; if being thirsty and gone out of the army to drink, it so happened that whilst he was a drinking, the army was suddenly discomfited. So a Musician that buildeth a house, is not the cause of the building as he is a Musician, but as he is an architect or builder. It is the same of the final cause. For example, healing is the proper end of Physic, but the gain of the Physician is an accidental end: the one is the end of the Art, and the other of the person.  

Causes next or remote.  Again, there be some next, and some remote causes. For example, the next end of the art of a soldier is war, and the remote is victory, and the end more remote is a happy peace. So the next efficient cause of death is sickness, of sickness excess, and of excess bad company.  
The same may be said of forms and matters. The next matter of a Table is the wood, but the remote matter are the four Elements. The next form of any thing is that which we call Specifical; but the remote forms are those of the next or of the remote Genus. So the next form of a man is to be reasonable, but to have sense is the form of a living creature, which is the Genus of man, and by consequent also is the form of man, but remote.  
Moreover, there be causes, 
Causes sufficient, or not sufficient.  which are Sufficient of themselves to produce an effect. As, the Sun is of itself sufficient to give light, and fire to burn, and the favour of God to make a man happy. But there are some causes, which are not of themselves Sufficient, & must have many together. As, to make a fertile soil, the ground must be lusty, it must be well tilled, rain must moisten it, and the Sun must heat it in due season, and moderately. To attain unto learning, a man must have a good wit, good instructions, and be diligent and painful. So diverse things are the causes of victory, experience in the General, valour in the Soldiers, military Discipline, necessary weapons, etc. but above all the will of God.  
Now to argue from the causes and effects, these Maxims 
Maxims.  are of use.  
1. That which agreeth with the matter, agreeth also probably with the thing composed of that matter. As, the earth is heavy, and therefore terrestrial bodies are heavy. This Maxim is sometimes faulty. For example, Ice is hard, yet notwithstanding the matter of it is soft and liquid, namely, water.  
2. Where the matter is wanting, there also the thing composed is wanting. As, where there is no iron, a sword cannot be made.  
3. The next efficient and necessary cause being granted, or denied, the effect also must be granted, or denied. As, if the Sun shine, it is day, if it shines nor, it is not day. And this effect being granted, the efficient cause is also granted.  
4. When diverse causes are necessarily requisite to produce an effect, one of the same causes being wanting, the effect also is wanting.  
5. Such as is the efficient cause, such commonly are the effects. As of wicked Fathers, come wicked Sons: and strong things beget strong things; and Moores have black sons. This Maxim is often false, especially in remote and universal causes. As the Sun groweth not, and yet it causeth plants to grow, it hath no scent, and yet causeth flowers to smell sweet, and carrions to stink. And God moveth all, but yet is immoovable. Also in causes which act by accident. As a Whetsto●e is not sharp, yet causeth sharpness: the Sun is not hot, yet warmeth by accident, in clearing and purifying the air by the reflection of his beams.  
6. If the self same quality be attributed unto the agent and unto the patiented, it must much more be attributed unto the agent. As, the hand is warm by reason of the fire which acteth upon it, therefore the fire is hotter than the hand. And the Sun causeth the water to shine, therefore it is brighter than the water.  
This Maxim is false in the fourth species of quality, namely, in the form and figure; because this quality receives neither more nor less. As, if the Seal be round, it followeth not that the figure printed in the wax be less round, than the Seal.  
7. The end being granted, those means also without which the end cannot be attained unto, are likewise granted. As, if you grant that a man liveth, you grant also that he eats, drinks, and breaths. And happiness being granted, virtue, and the favour of God are likewise granted.  
8. The means to attain unto the end being granted, it followeth not that the end must therefore always be granted. For it is no good reason to say, Philip hath books, therefore he is learned: he hath horses and weapons, therefore he shall obtain the victory. So also, the end being taken away, the means are not always therefore taken away. For many, though they have the means in their hands, never attain unto the end.  
9 Causes by chance or hazard are not fit to argue withal.  
10. If necessary effects be taken away, the causes also are taken away. I say, necessary; For there are some causes which act not necessarily, and which do not always produce their effects. As, sickness brings not always death.  
11. Causes are more excellent than their effects, unless the effect be a final cause. And therefore, to see, and hear, are things more excellent, than the faculties of seeing, and hearing; because those faculties are ordained only for these effects, namely, to see, and to hear.  
12. The causes ever go before their effects in the order of nature, but not always in time. Thus the Sunbeams are as ancient as the Sun; and the flame is never without clearness or brightness.  

The Table of Causes.  
Causes are 

Internal 

Matter of 

Generation.  
Composition.    
Form 

Natural.  
Artificial.      
Externall 

Efficient 

Properly.  
Improperly, as the cause 

Meritorious.  
Instrumental 

natural.  
artificial.        
Final.      
All causes are either 

1. 

Next. or  
Remote.    
2. 

By themselves. or  
By accident.    
3. 

Sufficient. or  
Insufficient.        

The twelfth Chapter. Of Etymology.  
Etymology is the derivation of a word.  
Etymology in regard of the word, is as a Definition in regard of the thing; and serveth to argue and discourse. As when we say, Such a one is not a Counsellor, because he gives no Counsel. And Philip cannot be called a Philosopher, because he love's not wisdom.  
Thus by the Etymology of these names jesus and Christ, we gather what our Saviour's calling and office is. And we encourage such as have a name importing some virtue, in stirring them up to virtue by the Etymology of their names. So Eusebius and Pius may be exhorted to Piety, and Andrew to valour, and Celestinus to give himself to heavenly things, lest they belie their names by a contrary conversation. And so one gathereth probably, that all things in times past were common, the Robe excepted, because when a theft is committed, we use to say, Such a one hath been rob: and that the first Wars were against Beasts, because the Latin word Bellum, comes from Bellua. But these kind of proofs are very weak, because names are given unto men, before it can be known whether they will be virtuous or no; nay, sometimes names are given by contraries, and by way of derision. As, when a dwarf is called a Goliath.  
Good Etymologies in the English tongue, are for the most part taken from the Latin; but such as are drawn from the English tongue are commonly absurd and ridiculous. For example, if a man should say, that the woman is the woe of the man; and beer, quasi, be here.   

The thirteenth Chapter. Of things alike or unlike.  
THose things are called Alike which have between them some Analogy and correspondency or proportion.  
The analogy is known by the end and use. As the Shepherd in regard of his flock, and the Pastor in regard of his Church, are things Alike.  
There be certain things differing, which the vulgar take for the same things, and none but Philosophers do distinguish them. As, love and friendship; continency and temperance; the flatterer and the man-pleaser; memory and remembrance; chance and fortune; hate and envy; whose differences are learned by the Ethics and Physics.  
Similitudes are rather ornaments of a speech, than any proofs. As, when we say, Even as cracks in a vessel are known when the vessel is filled with liquor: So the secret vices of the heart are discovered by plenty and prosperity. And, that Hypocrites are like unto Bees which have honey in the mouth, and a sting in the tail. And that covetous persons are like unto Christmas-boxes, out of the which money cannot be gotten ●efore they be broken. And false friend's are l●ke unto Swallowe●, that departed from us in hard weather.  
Metaphors well drawn are similitudes reduced to one word. As when we say, to feed the flock, that is, to teach: and to stain one's reputation, that is to say, to backbite.  
Similitudes have two parts, the proposition and the reddition. The proposition, namely this, even as swallows, etc. The reddition as this; So false friends, etc.  
Examples are taken from things done, and from humane actions: but Similitudes are oftentimes drawn from things feigned, and from that which is observed in nature.  
Now to argue from the like, we use this probable Maxim. 
Maxim.  To things alike agree things alike.  

EXAMPLES OF ANALOGY.  

The Analogy between an Animal and a Plant.  In an Animal, 
In a Plant.  The skin 
The bark or rind.  The heart 
The pith or marrow.  The arms 
The branches  The mouth 
The root.  The excrements 
The leaves and gum.  The veins 
The grain of the wood.   

The Analogy between man's body, and a Commonwealth, or Estate.  In Man, 
In an Estate.  The head 
The Prince.  The eye 
The Council  The arms 
The soldiers and tradesmen.  The belly 
The idle persons.  The sinews 
The money.  The joints 
Concord and good order.   

The Analogy between a building and a man's body.  In a building, 
In Man's body.  The kitchen 
The belly.  The kitchen knives 
The teeth.  The study 
The brain.  The windows 
The eyes.  The five doors 
The five instruments of the senses.  The Master of the house 
The soul.  The sink 
The conduits of the excrements.   

The Analogy between the indispositions of the Body and of the Soul.  In the Body, 
In the Soul.  Blindness 
Ignorance.  Pain 
Grief  The dropsy 
Covetousness.  The itch 
Impatience.  Swelling 
Pride.  A fit of an ague 
Choler.  Shaking 
Fear.  Contagious air 
Bad examples.  Painting 
Hypocrisy.  colics 
Troubles of conscience.  Weakness 
Pusillanimity.     

The foureteenth Chapter. Of things Opposite.  
OPposites are such as cannot stand together in the same subject, at the same time, and in the same regard. As a man cannot be at the self same time both white and black in the same part of his body, and not compared to other things: though he may be black and white, in diverse parts of his body, either at diverse times, or comparatively, white in respect of a Moor, and black in respect of a Swan.  
There are four sorts of Opposites. 1. Relatives. 2. Contraries. 3. Privatives. 4. Contradictories.  
1. Of Relatives 
Relatives.  we have already spoken. lib. 1. cap. 7.  
2. Contraries 
Contraries.  are two qualities or two actions which being under the self same Genus, are most remote one from the other, and are incompatible. As black and white have the same Genus, namely, colour: Virtue and vice are specieses of habits, which being under the same Genus are of a contrary nature.  
Contraries are either Mediate or Immediate. Thus, there is a middle between black and white, namely, pale and brown: and between hot and cold there is lukewarm. But between the number even and odd, between the strait and crooked line, there is no third. The middle or mean doth usually participate of the two contrary extremes: the mean between good and bad actions excepted. For the mean is that which is called an Indifferent action, participating neither of good nor evil.  
Between two contrary vices, virtue is the mean. As between covetousness and prodigality, there is liberality, and good husbandry: between rashness and cowardness, there is valour.  
This mediocrity or mean participating of two extremes, is not in the virtue itself; for that hath no participation with vice; but it is in those actions and things about which virtue is occupied. As, to avoid danger, and to lay out money. For these actions partly imitate the covetous man, and partly the liberal. And it falls out oftentimes that to each of the extremes there is a contrary virtue: as to prodigality, good husbandry; to covetousness, liberality: so cowardness and rashness are two extremes; and to cowardness, valour is contrary; and to rashness, discretion.  
If two contraries happen to be under two next differing Genuses, (as, justice under virtue, and injustice under vice) these two Genuses must needs be contraries one to another, and Species of the same Genus. By this means all contraries, if they be not under the same next Genus, they are under the same remote Genus.  
Words are sometimes wanting to express one of the contraries. Thus we have no word to express the habit contrary to an ague, nor to a rheum, nor to the Physics, nor to Grammar.  
3. Privative 
Privatives.  opposites are a quality, and the absence and privation of that quality. As, light and darkness; sight and blindness.  
There can be no privation, when the subject is not capable of the contrary quality. Thus in a stone there is no blindness, because it is not capable of sight. And a child in the womb cannot be said to be blind, nor a whelp before it be nine days old, because they are not come to that time wherein they should see.  
The privation of Actions may be remedied and recovered. As the privation of the act of seeing is recovered, when he that sleepeth openeth his eyes to see. But the privation of the Faculty of seeing is irrecoverable.  
Knowledge and ignorance simple and childish or brutish, are opposites privatively. But wilful ignorance that arms itself with reasons against the truth, is opposed unto knowledge as a contrary, and not as a privation.  
4. Contradictories 
Contradictories.  are such between which there is no mean or middle. As, to be, and not to be; man and no man; horse and no horse. For there is nothing that is not either man or not man; horse or not horse.  
Now when we will argue and prove any thing, Opposites are of great use. The Maxims 
Maxims.  are these.  
1. Whosoever grants one of the relatives, doth necessarily grant the other. As he that calleth such a one a father, affirmeth that he hath a child.  
2. One and the same thing may be two relatives; As, to be a father and son, master and servant, right and left: but in diverse respects.  
3. Contrary things have a contrary consequence. As, vice makes a man wretched, therefore virtue maketh him happy. Here are excepted such things as do belong to the Genus of the two contraries. For if blackness be visible, it followeth not that whiteness be invisible; because to be visible, belongeth to the Genus of whiteness and blackness, namely, to colour. We must also except such causes as do act by accident. As, if a white man buildeth his own house; it followeth not, that a black man must pull down his; and if heat doth harden the ground, it followeth not that frost must soften it.  
4. The self same cause may bring forth certain effects, when the action of the cause dependeth from the disposition of the matter against which it acteth. So the Sun gives a sweet smell to flowers, but it makes a carrion stink: and fire hardens the earth, and softens wax.  
5. Every subject that is capable to receive the one of the contraries, is also capable to receive the other. Thus, whatsoever may be heated, may be cooled; and whatsoever may be hardened, may be softened.  
6. One of the contraries being granted, the other is overthrown. Thus, he that is not free is a bondman. But it followeth not that if one of the contraries be denied, the other must be granted; except they be such contraries, as have no mean between them. As, if the body be not white, it followeth not that it is black. But in contraries that are without mean, this consequent i● good. As, if this line be not strait, it is crooked.  
7. Of two good things whereof the one is lesser and the other greater, the contrary to the greatest good is the greater evil. As, virtue and health be two good things; if virtue therefore be a greater good than health, vice must be a greater evil than sickness.  
Except when one of the two good things is comprised in the other. As, to have the skill of reading, and the skill of Philosophy. For though the skill of Philosophy ●e a greater good, than the skill of reading, yet it followeth not, that not to be skilful in Philosophy is a greater evil, than not to be skilful in reading, because the skill of reading is comprehended under the skill of Philosophy.  
8. Contradictories cannot stand together, and one of them must of necessity be. As, there is nothing that is not either man or not man; and it is impossible to be both the one and the other, at the same time.   

The fifteenth Chapter. Comparison of things.  
THings are oft compared according to their goodness and excellency, and then the comparison is made by these Rules or Maxims. 
Maxims.   
1. Whatsoever is desired in regard of itself, is better than that which is desired only in regard of some other thing. As, life is better than money, and sight is more to be desired then spectacles, and health than Physic.  
2. That which is good to all, is better than that which is only good to some, and which is used but seldom, and for certain respects. Thus light is better than darkness, and to have two arms is better than to be maimed. For darkness is of use only for thiefs, and debauched persons; and to have but one arm is of use only to beggars, who thereby set forth their misery.  
3. That which is good of it own nature, is better than that which is good only by accident, or which is of use only to avoid a greater evil. Thus, health is better than Physic; and to have our wares in our ship, is better than to cast them into the Sea; and prudence is better than chance.  
4. One good which when we have, we need not the other, is better than that, which when we have, we have yet need of the other. Thus to be loved of God, is better than to be loved of men; and to have the perfect knowledge of an Art, is better than to have it written in a book.  
5. Of final causes, the last is ever the best. Thus happiness is better than virtue, and the skill of managing a horse, is better than the skill to make a spur.  
6. Permanent goods are better than the transitory. As, virtue is better than money.  
But in general without any respect to the goodness or excellency of things, they may be compared by these Maxims following.  
1. 
Other Maxims.  That which is such of it own nature, is more such than that which is only such by participation. Thus the Sun is clearer than a looking glass, when the Sun shineth on it.  
2. That which is such of itself, is more such than that which is such only by accident. As, exercise and good nourishment is more healthful, than the cutting off of an arm: and the death of the Son of God hath been more beneficial to salvation, than the treason of judas, howsoever God used it as a means for our good.  
3. That which is most remote from his contrary, is more such than that which is less remote. And therefore the cold in Norway is greater than that in Italy, because it is more remote from the South, from whence the heat cometh.  
4. That which acteth more forcibly, is commonly more such, then that which acteth more weakly. As, that which hurteth more is worse than that, which hurteth less, and that which pricketh more is sharper pointed, then that which pricketh less. This rule hath exceptions. Aire and water are equally moist, nay, Aristotle holds the air to be moister; yet water moistens more than air. So the flame is hot, or rather hotter than the hot iron, and yet a hot iron burneth more than the flame doth.   

The sixteenth Chapter. Comparison of Probability or Likelihood.  
THings are compared in probability, when we question whether of the two is the more credible. And this is done, when to prove some one thing, we bring in another equally, or more, or less probable, then that which is in question.  
This comparison may be made three manner of ways. 
1. Probable alike.  For  
First when we will prove a thing in question, we may bring in another thing as probable as it. For example, if a Prince hath granted something to one Citizen, another Citizen may pretend, that the like grant ought to be made unto him also; because he is a Citizen as well as the other, and nothing inferior to him. So a fault which is pardoned to some one in regard of his youth, must be pardoned to another as young as he. This reason is grounded upon this Maxim. 
Maxim.   
Of two things equally probable, or equally just, the one being granted, makes the other to be easily believed.  

2. More probable.  Secondly, to prove a thing in question, we may bring another thing more probable than it, arguing thus. If that which is more probable is not, much less shall that be, which is less probable. For example, if a Father will not have his children go richly apparelled, much less will he suffer it in his servants. And if the Apostles were not without sin, how much less are we; This is called arguing from a more probable to a less, and grounded upon this Maxim. 
Maxim.   
If that which is more possible, and more probable be not; much less shall that be which is less probable and possible.  
The conclusion of such arguments must always be negative.  
Lastly, 
3. Less probable.  we may prove a thing in question, by bringing in another thing that is less probable, saying thus: If a thing less probable, and harder to be believed, is notwithstanding, or hath been; much more ought we to believe, that which is more probable and easier to be done. So if one at twelve years of age can carry a weight of a hundred pound; by a stronger reason one may carry the same weight at the age of twenty years. And if Alexander took Tyre, much more easily might he have taken jerusalem, which was weaker than Tyre, if he had besieged it. This is called arguing from the less probable to the greater, grounded upon this Maxim. 
Maxim.   
If that which is less probable and less possible may be, much more shall that be, which is more probable and more possible. The conclusion of such arguments must always be affirmative.  
We must warily distinguish between the greatness of the thing, and the greatness of the probability. For greatest things are oft less probable, and more difficult. For it were no good argument to say thus. If birds can fly, how much more bulls. And if a thread can go through the eye of a needle, how much more a cable. And if Michael Angel could paint very excellently, how much more the Emperor Charles the fift.   

The seventeenth Chapter. Of Testimony.  
TEstimonies are often used to argue and prove a thing.  
Testimonies are of force and do persuade, when they be such as may not be denied, by reason of the quality, authority, sufficiency, or multitude of persons.  
Testimonies are either divine or humane.  
Divine testimonies are Oracles, and all that is called the Word of GOD: likewise dreams, visions, miracles, be they true or false, if they be delivered as true. Also rules to live well, derived from nature.  
Humane testimonies, if the question be about matter of right, are humane laws, customs, the testimonies of Ancestors, or such as are skilful in their own art, the consent of nations. But if the question be of fact, then are to be produced schedules, acquittances, confessions, eye or ear witnesses.  
Such witnesses, 
Maxim.  as do not affirm or deny a thing to be or not to be, are of no force. For there is a great difference between these two sayings; God saith not that such a thing is, and God saith that such a thing is not. The latter is a good proof, but the former hath no consequence or sequel. And likewise this proof is of no effect: Aristotle hath not said so, therefore it is not so. Or, the Word of God saith not that man is a reasonable creature, and therefore man is not a reasonable creature.  
Notwithstanding, if it be a thing which cannot be known, but by the testimony of one alone, than this kind of arguing is good and firm. Such a one said not ●o, and therefore you cannot maintain that it is so. For example, if we had no knowledge of China but by the report of one man only; whosoever would affirm any thing without the warrant of such a one, without question would be proved a liar; or i● he spoke the truth it were but by chance, and not knowing himself whether he spoke true or no. So likewise seeing that nothing that is necessary to salvation can be known without warrant from the Word of God; whosoever in things necessary to salvation, affirmeth any thing not contained in the said word of GOD, ought not to be believed, & affirms that which he knows not.   

The eighteenth Chapter. Of the use or Practice of the precedent Doctrine.  
THis Doctrine contained in the sixteen precedent Chapters is called the doctrine of Places; because it shows the places whence matter is drawn for argument and furniture for proofs. For example, if we undertake to prove, that, Death is not to be feared of a virtuous man, we must run over these sixteen places, and take notice of such as will best furnish us with matter. To make this plain we will run over the said places, and apply them to this example.  

The Genus of Death.  
Death is the end of man's life. Now the end is to be desired, when it is not only the end, but also the scope that we must aim at; such is death, unto which a wise man ought to prepare himself every day, as being the end of his hope.   

The difference.  
This death comes by the separation of the soul from the body, now we must not fear the separation of such things, as being joined do hurt one another: the soul consumeth the body with cares, like unto a knife that cuts its sheath; the body is to the soul as a burden or a prison; God separateth them to rejoin them again in a better estate and condition.   

The Species.  
There be two kinds of death; the one natural caused through age, the other violent, which happens by sickness, or when a man is killed. Philosophers say that death which comes through age is without pain, because it is without combat or resistance; and who would live when all his strength is spent? violent death is not also to be feared of a virtuous man, for what matter is it, whether I die of an ague, or by the sword? Whether by the distemper of humours, or by the distemper or commotion of people? Whether I yield up my soul by the mouth or by a wound, so it may go to God.   

The properties and accidents of Death.  
Death makes all alike, both great and small; It dismasketh and discovereth thoughts; then dissimulation hath no more place; The words of the dying are serious and of great weight, their prayers are fervent, their confession humble, their admonitions to their children are received with attention, the spirit of God comforteth them within, the Angel's guard and assist them without, and jesus Christ reacheth them out the crown.   

Of things conjoined with Death.  
If we must not bewail the dead, why should we then fear death?   

The causes of Death.  
The efficient cause of death is the will of God, which we were better to yield unto willingly then by compulsion; why should we resist God's will, seeing it is just and unevitable? Again, the law of nature under the which we are borne is the cause of death: plead not therefore against your own hand writing. Wouldst thou have the laws of the world changed for thee? The final cause of death in regard of the world, is that we may give place one to another; thy father hath given place to thee, give thou place to thy children. The final cause of death in regard of every virtuous man is to put an end to all his miseries, and to bring him home to God. For all these causes of death a virtuous man ought not to fear it.   

Causes wherefore a thing ought not to be fea●ed.  
A thing is not to be feared: first if it is unevitable; secondly, if it hurteth not; thirdly, if it be profitable. Death hath in it these three things. For it is unevitable; therefore as it is a folly to hope for things impossible, so it is a folly to fear things unevitable. Again, death 〈◊〉 not hurtful because our Saviour Christ hath taken away the curse thereof. Lastly, it is profitable, and that is known by the effects which follow.   

The Effects.  
Death is profitable before death, for it abateth pride. Thou seest now a triumphing Monarch, and ere long toads will breed in his skull, and worms in his entrails. The thought of death keeps a man in fear and sobriety, as also from sinning. Without it man would hardly be tamed. It makes us despise the world, and to acknowledge the vanity of all our toil. It makes us more earnest in prayer, and increaseth our faith through resistance. After death, it makes us fully know that which we here see but a fare of, and very obscurely. It joineth us with the Saints and placeth us with Christ jesus. To fear death is to offer wrong unto Christ, as if it were ill being with him. It maketh us to see the face of God, which changeth them that see it into his own likeness. It bringeth us into the possession of peace without end, of contentment without interruption, and felicity without measure.   

The Similitudes.  
If new borne babes had the use of reason, they would never cry, but rather much rejoice that they part from such an unclean and obscure place, to enter into the light of this world: So, if we had the right use of reason, we would not be sad when death comes, because our souls go out of an unclean, strait, and obscure place, or rather prison, to enter into the light of heaven. Death is like Samsons Lion, whereof it is written, that from bitterness came sweetness. Or like unto the harsh sound of a boult at the opening of a door, which notwithstanding is very pleasing, if it be to come out of a prison. Or as when Christ came to his Disciples walking on the waters, they said it was a spirit; but when they saw him nearer hand, they said of him, and so must we of death, it is the Lord that cometh unto us.   

The Opposites.  
Present life is opposed unto death, now if there be no cause to desire life, no more is there to fear death. Upon this occasion you may run through every age of man's life, as also through the d●vers conditions that are from the Prince to the beggar, and show that all is but misery. Besides those evils and accidents which are common to all.   

The Comparison in regard of Goodness.  
Mutable and transitory things are not so good as those that are eternal and permanent. Again, the good which sufficeth alone, is better than that good, which when we have, we have yet need of another. He that hath happily ended his life, needeth neither money nor apparel, nor honour, nor health, etc. but he that hath nothing but the present life, hath need of all these things; and besides them eternal good things.   

The Comparison in regard of Probability.  

Probable alike.  If Martyrs feared not to dye in the flames of fire, why should we fear to dye in sickness, seeing we have the same hope?  

Less probable.  If the Heathen went to their deaths with as joyful a countenance, as others that returned safe from thence; why should we fear it that have a better hope? Why should ambition have more force in them, than faith in us? If a soldier doth adventure himself upon the mouth of the Canonshot, and offereth himself the first upon a breach for the pay of  a day; what should we do for an everlasting kingdom.   

Testimonies.  
Here must be alleged the passages of the word of God, the sentences of Philosophers, the examples of such as have died constantly; As, of Regulus, of the two Decius, of the Gymnosophists, of the Indian Women, of the Tribals, of the Martyrs, etc.  
Finally, by these sixteen places, as by certain directions, we are furnished with abundance of matter for argument and discourse. And by these helps we are put in remembrance of all that we have read, heard, or seen, which may serve to amplify the matter propounded. But the Maxims which are added to every place, are of use to teach us how the argument may be well grounded, for they are as lights unto our reason. And note also, that these places furnish us with matter to argue, as well for Death, which is the Subject of this question, as for Not to be feared, which is the Attribute thereof, as we shall see hereafter. But the Arguments which are drawn from the attribute are the strongest and most forcible.   

ANOTHER EXAMPLE. The praise of Sobriety. The Species of Sobriety.  
WE speak not here of that Sobriety which the Physicians appoint by diet: nor of that which is through necessity, when we have nothing to eat: nor of that cold gravity of the Germans a● the beginning of their meals: nor of that of covetous persons, who grudge themselves things necessary: nor of that which is performed by a scrupulous abstinence. But of that which is a moral virtue.   

The Definition.  
Sobriety is a temperance, which prescribeth a moderation in eating and drinking.   

The Whole and the Parts.  
Neither do we speak of that Sobriety which consisteth in certain meats, and not in other, in eating and not in drinking, in his own h●use and not in company. For sobriety gives laws for all times, and all places, and for all sorts of meats and drinks.   

The Etymology.  

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  The Grecians have rightly derived sobriety from a word which signifieth to keep the understanding sound; because it preserveth the health, and the liberty of the understanding.   

The Genus.  
I say it is a species of Temperance. Now Temperance is the nurse of all other virtues, the guardian of bodily health, and of the light of the mind, making it not to be subject to the belly; it keepeth in brutal concupiscence, and teach●th how to eat to live, and not to live to eat.   

The causes.  
The cause why a thing is to be commended or desired is, if it be honest, delightful, and profitable. Now sobriety hath all these three; for it is a good and comely thing to have an upright body in old age, to have a fresh and lively countenance, not to be seen drunk nor croaking in an Alehouse among debauched persons etc.  
It is a delightful thing to be cheerful and affable, and to have peace at home; for drunkenness breedeth quarrels. Pleasure's seldom used are sweetest.  
It is a profitable thing to have a strong body, a free mind, fit to go about civil affairs, to have a good memory, not to waste goods, to provide for the necessity of the family; to husband the time well, not to reveal secrets; sobriety is of use for all these.   

The Effects.  
The causes for the which sobriety is commendable, are also effects of sobriety, and therefore we shall not need to repeat them.   

The Opposites.  
Here a drunkard must be set forth in all his colours, his speech, his gesture, his countenance, his troubled mind, the gout accompanying it, the red and bleared eyes, the memory overthrown, the understanding becometh more brutish, the leaness proceeding from excess is worse than that which cometh of want. Add unto these the shame and reproach, when as the diseases of old age are imputed to the excess of youth, by such as will be ready to say; 'tis well bestowed, he hath not left his vices, but his vices have left him. Again, the good of the family is wasted, time is misspent, the body and mind corrupted, quarrels are picked in drinking, and lascivious desires are stirred up, a man becomes a babbler disclosing his most hidden secrets. It is a bottomless gulf, for a little will content nature, but a greedy desire hath no end. Intemperance either kindles or discovers all manner of vices.   

The causes of drunkenness and gluttony.  
Bad company doth cause excess: so doth the opinion of a false pleasure. For what pleasure is there to drink without thirst, and to stir up an artificial hunger when the belly is full. Also vain glory causeth excess, when men will imagine it to be a thing praiseworthy to be able to hold more drink than another; and yet such a man shall never hold so much drink as a hogshead; and though he have a more capable body, he shall not therefore be accounted a man of greater capacity.   

Comparison in the Probability.  
Seeing the very beasts do not overdrinke themselves, why should a man by his drunkenness make himself worse than a beast? Shall the instinct in a beast be of greater force, than reason in a man?   

Similitudes.  
A man cannot study near a Kitchen; a drunkard is not fit for a Sentinel. God hath not made our bodies to be like Sponges, which are filled and then squeezed out. Excess in drink kindles concupiscence, as Oil poured on a fire.   

Testimonies.  
Add to those divine and humane testimonies. That God hath given man very long and revolved intestines, to the end that the meat being long in the passage, he should not need to feed again so soon. That God hath placed the brain fare from the belly, which is the Kitchen of the body. That the Lacedæmonians would sometimes make one of their slaves drunk, and point him to their children, to m●ke this vice odious unto them.  
All these things afford matter of argument: Of all these proofs some are more forcible than others. The force and solidity of the proofs, is known by the help of the Maxims, which we have added to every place.     

¶ The third Book. Of ENUNTIATION.  

The first Chapter. What an Enuntiation is, and the parts thereof.  
THE places or helps of invention contained in the sixteen precedent Chapters, afford unto us abundant 〈◊〉 ●●ter for proofs and arguments. I● n●w remaineth that we give a form unto these proofs or arguments, and show how to frame an argument, so as it may be of force to prove.  
An argument or reasoning is by the Philosophers called a Syllogism; which is a Grecke word signifying the making up of an account, or the collecting of a sum. For that which is the making up of an account, or the total sum of Addition or Multiplication in Arithmetic, the same is the conclusion in a Syllogism, namely, that which resulteth and followeth from the proof.  
Every Syllogism is composed of two Propositions or Enuntiations, and of a Conclusion.  
Enuntiation is a speech, wherein something is affirmed or denied.  
Every Enuntiation consists of two words at the least, which the Logicians call Terms: as, who would say, the two ends, or the two pieces. For example.  
The fire burneth.  
God is good.  
These Enuntiations are compounded of two parts, the one is called the Subject; the other, the Attribute. Fire is the Subject; and burneth is the Attribute; For burning is attributed to fire. God is the Subject; and this word good is the Attribute.  
This Verb, Is, is not reckoned as a part of the Enuntiation, but is only the link and bond of these two parts.  
Wheresoever there is an affirmation or negation, there is an Enuntiation, though it seemeth to be but one word. As when we say in Latin, Curro, we understand, ego curro, I run. And in English, It raineth, is an usual and common word, which is as much as this Enuntiation, the rain falleth. So when we say, It freezeth, It snoweth, etc.  
And when we ask any body, Sleep you? He that answereth No, maketh a kind of secret Enuntiation; for it is as much as if he should say, I sleep not.  
When we argue, the Enuntiations must be full and perfect, so as there may be no need of any supplying.  
All truth and falsehood is expressed by the Indicative mood; and therefore every Enuntiation must be couched in the Indicative; because we affirm or deny a thing only by that mood. And therefore Imperatives, Optatives and Subiunctives enter not into an E●●untiation, nor do any ●ervice to the Art of Logic, who●e end and scope is to search out and discern the truth. Now truth is only expressed ●y the Indicative. The other moods are left to Rhetoric, and serve only for ornament.  
Sometimes one of the●● terms or parts of the Enuntiation is expressed by many words; as, 
All the lines drawn from the centre to the circumference of the circle are equal.  
God is free from all infirmity.   
The Verb Substantive is thimmesch causeth the Subject to be ●●●●●ed from the Attribute; for 〈…〉 between both.  
An Enuntiation and a Proposition are the same thing; yet out of a Syllogism we● call it Enuntiation, but in a Syllogism we call it Proposition.   

The second Chapter. Of the kinds of Enuntiation.  
ENuntiations are either Simple or Compounded.  
The Simple Enuntiation, which also is called categorical, when a thing is affirmed or denied simply & without condition, and without adding a Whether, or an If; as, 
Man is reasonable.  
Heaven is round.  
Water is cold.  
God is no liar.   
Of these Enuntiations some are Universal, and some particular.  
Universal Enuntiations are such as have these words, All, or None, joined with them. As, 
All men are sinners.  
No man is perfect.   
Particular Enuntiations are such as do not affirm or deny generally of all, but only of some in particular. As, 
Some man is black.  
Some Kings have not been wise.  
Every horse is not white.   
Under particular Enuntiations, the Singulars are also comprehended: As, 
Peter is foolish.  
This man is a Philosopher.   
Enuntiations which have no note whereby they may be discerned to be universals or particulars, are called Indefinites, and in strict dealing must be taken for particulars. Notwithstanding, when the matter is Necessary, they are of as much force as universals. As when I say, Man is reasonable, it is as much as if I should say, All men are reasonable.  
But if the matter be contingent and and mutable: as, Man is white, they are but as particulars, and is no more than if I should say, Some man is white.  
Again, Enuntiations are either Affirmative or Negative: Affirmative; as, God is good. Negative; as, God is no liar.  
Thus we see there are four kind of Enuntiations. For they are either Universal Affirmatives. As, All men are white. Or Universal Negatives, as, No man is white. Or Particular Affirmatives, as, Some man is white. Or Particular Negatives, as, Some man is not white.  
The universality or particularity of an Enuntiation is called the quantity thereof. But to be Affirmative or Negative maketh the quality.  
Simple Enuntiations are sometimes modified by certain circumferences of Necessity, or Contingency, or Possibility, or Impossibility; as, 
It is necessary that man be reasonable.  
It falleth out that it thunders in Winter.  
It is possible that it raineth or hath reigned.  
It is impossible that the Soul should be mortal.   
An Enuntiation thus modified or qualified by such circumstances is Negative, when the negation is joined to the modification or circumstance. As when we say, It is not necessary that Caesar overcome. But this Enuntiation, It is necessary that Pompey overcome not, is affirmative.  
Compounded Enuntiations are either Conditional or Disjunctive.  
Conditional Enuntiations are such as neither affirm nor deny simply, but with an If; as, 
If it be day, the Sun is up.  
If God will, the troubles shall cease.   
These Enuntiations are compounded of two parts; the former is called the Antecedent: and the latter the Consequent. And both these may be affirmative; as, If it be day, the Sun is up.  
Sometimes the one is affirmative, and the other negative; as, If the Sun be not up, it is night. or, If the Sun be up, it is not night.  
And sometimes both negatives; as, If it be not a living creature, it is no man.  
Disjoined or Disjunctive Enuntiations are such as are compounded of opposed parts, whereof the one overthrows the other; as, either, 
It is day, or night.  
This man is alive, or dead.   
These Enuntiations are not true, except both parts be immediately contraries or opposites. For if I should say, This cloak is black, or white, I might speak against the truth; for the cloak may be grey or tawny, etc.   

The third Chapter. Of the Opposition of Enuntiations.  
OF Enuntiations some are necessary, and some probable or contingent. According to this difference Enuntiations are more or less opposite one to another. Necessary Enuntiations are either when the Genus is attributed to the Species; as, Man is a living creature. Or the difference; as, Man is reasonable. Or the property; as, All fire is hot. The Contingents are when some accident is attributed to the Subject; as, The horse is white. Man is a Physician.  
The Opposition of Enuntiations is done three manner of ways. Either as Contraries, or Subcontraries, or Contradictories. In all which Oppositions one of the two opposed Enuntiations must ever be affirmative, and the other Negative, and the same terms must still be kept.  
Contrary Enuntiations are an universal affirmative, and an universal negative; as, 
All men are just.  
No man is just.   
Which are both false, because the matter is Contingent. But if the matter be Necessary, than the one is true, and the other false; as, 
All men are living creatures.  
No man is a living creature.   
Subcontrarie Enuntiations are two particulars contained under two universals, whereof the one affirmeth, and the other denieth; as, 
Some man is just,  
Some man is not just.   
In a necessary matter the one is true, and the other false. But in a contingent matter they may both be true.  
Contradictory Enuntiations are an universal affirmative, and a particular negative. Or else an universal negative, and a particular affirmative; as, 
All men are white.  
Some man is not white.  Or else. 
No man is not white.  
Some man is white.   
Of these two Enuntiations it is necessary that the one be true, and the other false, in what matter soever it be.  
Contraries agree in quantity, but are opposite in quality; as also Sub-contraries: but Contradictories are both.  

The Opposition of Enuntiations in matters Necessary.  
The one true and the other false.  VNIV. AF. All men are living creatures. Contraries. VNIV. NEG. No man is a living creature. Subordinates'. 
Contradictories  
Contradictories  Subordinates'. 
The one true and the other false.  PART. AF. Some man is a living creature. Subcontraries. PART. NEG. Some man is no living creature. 
The Opposition of Enuntiations in a matter Contingent.  VNIV. AF. All men are white. 
Both false.  Contraries. VNIV. NEG. No man is white. Subordinates'. 
Contradictories  
Contradictories  Subordinates'. PART. AF. Some man is white. 
Both true.  Subcontraries. PAR. NEG. Some man is not white.  
Two singular Enuntiations cannot be opposed one to another, but Contradictorily; as, Peter is white. Peter is not white.  
And therefore of necessity the one must be true, and the other false.   

The fourth Chapter. Of the Conversion of Enuntiations.  
TO Convert an Enuntiation, is to change it so as that the subject is turned into the attribute, and the attribute into the subject, keeping still the truth. As, No man is a horse. Then if you will convert this Enuntiation, you must say, No horse is a man.  
This Conversion is done either Simply, or by Accident.  
The Simple Conversion is, when the Enuntiation is changed without altering the quantity. Thus are universal negatives converted; as in the example before mentioned.  
And so are particular affirmatives. As, Some man is learned, and, Some learned is a man.  
But universal affirmatives cannot be converted Simply. For in turning them so, their truth would be lost. Thus it is true, that, Every man is a living creature: but it is not true, that, Every living creature is a man.  
Therefore when we go about to convert such Propositions, we take away their universal quantity, and in stead of saying Every man is a living creature, we turn it into a particular Enuntiation, & say, Some living creature is a man. Except when the subject is the species, & the attribute the property or difference. For in this case the proposition may be converted simply. For example, All living creatures have sense; and, All, that hath sense is a living creature. All bodies have three dimensions: All that hath three dimensions is a body.  
Particular negatives are not converted: for example, this Enuntiation, Some man is not a Philosopher, is true. But if you would turn it, it would prove false: Some Philosopher is not a man.  
Universal affirmatives may be converted into universal negatives, composed of two negations. As, 
All men are living creatures.  
Whatsoever is not a living creature is no man.   
A singular affirmative may be converted into a particular affirmative. As, This horse is lame: Some lame thing is a horse.    

The fourth Book. Of a SYLLOGISM, and the form and kinds thereof.  

The first Chapter. What a Syllogism is. Also, what a Conclusion is, and a Question, or Problem, and the parts thereof.  
A Syllogism is a reason or argument in the which from two Enuntiations or propositions coupled together by certain laws, we draw and deduce a necessary Conclusion. For example, if we join these two Propositions together, 
All that liveth hath a soul.  
All plants live.  This conclusion will follow, Therefore all plants have a soul.  
As Propositions are called Enuntiations before they belong to a Syllogism; So the Conclusion before it be proved by a Syllogism, is not called a Conclusion, but a Question or Problem.  
Now every question or conclusion hath two parts, namely, the Subject, and the Attribute. As in the example above mentioned Plant is the Subject, and, to have a soul, is the Attribute. The Philosophers call them the two Terms, whereof the subject is called the lesser Term, and the attribute the greater Term: because the attribute commonly is more general than the subject. And that which in the Mathematics is said, to contain, in Logic is said, to be attributed.   

The second Chapter. How to make a Syllogism, and of the parts of it.  
A Syllogism is thus made. A question or problem is propounded: For example, let the question be, Whether Philip be a living creature or no? Now he that will prove by a Syllogism that Philip is a living creature, must dismember the said question into two parts; the one whereof is the subject, namely, Philip; and the other the attribute, namely, living creature. Then he must look out some third thing, which may be joined and fitted to each of these two parts. For example, the word Man; which he must first join with living creature, and say, Every man is a l●ving creature; and then he must join it with Philip, and say, Philip is a man; thence will follow this Conclusion, Therefore Philip is a living creature.   diagram 
If the Ring A be joined with the Ring B and the Ring B with the Ring C, it followeth that the Ring A is joined with the Ring C.  
This may also be illustrated by an example drawn from Numbers, reasoning thus. Twelve containeth six, and six containeth three, therefore twelve containeth three. For we said before, that that which is said to contain in Mathematics, the same is said to be attributed in Logic.  
Therefore every Syllogism is compounded of three parts or Terms, namely, the Subject of the conclusion, the Attribute of the conclusion, and the Mean or middle Term, which knitteth these two parts of the conclusion together.  
It is no hard matter so soon as a Syllogism is propounded, presently to perceive which is the Middle term. For it is all that which is not in the conclusion.  
The Mean or middle term joined with the attribute of the conclusion, maketh that proposition which is called the Major or Greater: because the attribute of the conclusion which is called the greater term is there. The same Mean being joined with the subject, maketh the other proposition, which is called the Minor or Lesser; so called because the subject of the conclusion which is called the lesser term is there. This Minor proposition is also called the Assumption. Now for more ease in this point, we will call the first proposition simply the proposition, and the second the assumption.   

The third Chapter. The natural reason upon which a Syllogism is grounded.  
THis structure of a Syllogism is grounded upon two natural Maxims, acknowledged to be true by those of the Meanest capacity. Whereof the first is. Whatsoever containeth any thing, containeth also that which is contained in that thing.  
Which Maxim conceived in Logical terms, is thus to be expressed. Whatsoever is generally attributed to any thing, must also be attributed to such things, as the said thing is attributed unto. As, seeing that to be a living creature is attributed to all men, it must also be attributed to Philip, because Philip is a man. This first Maxim is the foundation of all Syllogisms that conclude affirmatively.  
The second Maxim is, That which agreeth not to a thing and cannot be attributed unto it, agreeth not likewise to those things which are contained under that said thing. As, to be Almighty belongeth not to any creature; therefore it belongeth not to Angels, because they are creatures. This Maxim is the ground of all Negative Syllogisms, that is to say, such as conclude negatively.   

The fourth Chapter. Of the Figures of a Syllogism.  
BEcause the Mean is diversely joined with the two terms of the conclusion: hence it comes to pass that according to the diverse placing of the said Mean, sundry Figures and Forms of Syllogisms do arise. Now these Figures are three.  
The first figure is that wherein the mean is the subject in the proposition, and the attribute in the assumption. As, in the examples before named; and also in this, 
All MEN are sinners.  
Paul is a MAN.  
Therefore Paul is a sinner.   
The second figure is when the Mean is the attribute both in the proposition and in the assumption. As, 
All birds have FEATHERS.  
No Bat hath FEATHERS.  
Therefore no Bat is a bird.   
The third figure is when the Mean is the subject as well in the proposition, as in the assumption. As, 
The SOUL is immortal.  
The SOUL is a creature.  
Therefore some creature is immortal.    

The fifth Chapter. General Rules, common to all Figures.  
ALL Syllogisms that are faulty in any of the Rules following conclude nothing.  

The first Rule.  
A Syllogism must have three Terms, namely, the Subject, and Attribute of the conclusion, and the Mean; for where there be two Means the Syllogism is stark naught. The reason drawn from nature is this: If two rings be linked with two other several rings, it followeth not that therefore these two former rings be linked together. And likewise if you would know whether two pieces of ground agree in quantity, you must not take two sundry measures; but only one and the same. Now the two Terms are like unto these two pecces of ground, and the Mean is like unto the said measure.  
We use to say there be four terms, not only when we find in a Syllogism four differing terms in words; but also when one and the same word is taken in a double sense, and is equivocal; as, 
KING is but one syllable.  
Alexander is a KING.  
Therefore Alexander is but one syllable.   
King in the proposition is taken for th● word; in the assumption for the person. Likewise if I should say, 
Every NUMBER is an Accident.  
Ten men are a NUMBER.   
Therefore ten men are an Accident. I should make four terms, for in the proposition the word Number is taken for the number numbering, and in the Assumption for the number numbered. Thus, 
The END is good.  
Death is the END.  
Therefore death is good.   
In the proposition the word End is taken for the scope, & in the assumption for the extremity of a thing.   

The second Rule.  
Out of two negative propositions nothing can be concluded. As, 
No man is a beast.  
No horse is a man.   
Hence nothing is concluded. This may be known by the second fundamental reason or Maxim, set down in the third Chapter. And the reason is manifest: For conclusions are then Negative, when the Mean agreeth with one of the terms of the conclusion, and not with the other: whence it is inferred, that the terms of the conclusion agree not together. And therefore the Mean must needs agree with one of the two terms; and this is expressed by affirmation.  
Yet here is an exception, namely, when the proposition hath two negations equivalent to an affirmation. For example, 
Whatsoever is not a living creature is not a man.  
A Statue is not a living creature.  
Therefore a Statue is not a man.   
This Syllogism is good, for the proposition having two negations, importeth as much as this affirmative: Every man is a living creature.   

The third Rule.  
If both the propositions be particulars, the Syllogism is not good, and the form of it is naught, and can conclude nothing.  
This is likewise evident by the two fundamental Maxims set down in the third chapter, where these words, Whatsoever containeth any thing, presuppose an universal proposition.  
Nevertheless, from two singular propositions a particular conclusion may be well drawn in the third figure. As, 
NERO was a Minstrel.  
NERO was an Emperor.  
Therefore some Emperor was a Minstrel.   
Again.  
JUDAS is damned.  
JUDAS was an Apostle.  
Therefore some Apostle is damned.  
Or in the second figure.  
Thersites was DEFORMED.  
This man is not DEFORMED.  
Therefore this man is not Thersites.  
Whence it is easy to see, that singular propositions are of more force in reasoning then particulars.   

The fourth rule.  
The conclusion ever followeth the worse and the weaker of the two propositions: That is to say, if one of the propositions be Negative, the conclusion also must be negative, and if one of the propositions be particular, the conclusion also must be particular.  
Whence it followeth, that if the proposition be an universal negative, and the assumption a particular affirmative, the conclusion must be a particular negative. For affirmation is better than negation, & an universal proposition is better than a particular, because it teacheth more things. The reason of this Maxim is evident. For a thing of less worth cannot bring forth a thing more excellent, than itself.   

The fift Rule.  
There must not be more in the conclusion then there is in the propositions, As, 
All that is ordained of God is good.  
Marriage is ordained of God.  
Therefore marriage is good for an old man; or, with an Infidel.    

The sixth Rule.  
True propositions well coupled, cannot bring forth a false conclusion; but false propositions may by chance yield a true conclusion. Which is done, when we intent to prove a truth by a false reason; and a true conclusion by a Mean which agreeth with neither of the two terms, or only with the one. As, who would prove Philip to be a living creature, because he is a horse. Or that a diamond is a stone, because it is a man. As, 
All men are stones.  
All diamonds are men.  
Therefore all diamods are stones.   
This conclusion is true, howsoever the two propositions be false.    

The sixth Chapter. Special Rules for every Figure, and first for the first.  
IN the first figure the proposition must be universal, and the assumption affirmative: or else the Syllogism is naught. For example, 
Some body is a living creature.  
Every stone is a body.  
Therefore some stone is a living creature.   
This conclusion is false, and followeth not from the propositions: because the first proposition is particular. And if I argue thus, 
All men are living creatures,  
No horse is a man.  
Therefore no horse is a living creature.   
This conclusion is false, and followeth not from the propositions; because the assumption is negative. This rule is grounded upon the second Maxim set down in the third Chapter which saith, that in Syllogisms concluding negatively, one of the propositions must be affirmative. Except when the negation do make a part of the Mean. As if I say, 
All that is not right is crooked.  
This line is not right.  
Therefore this line is crooked.   
The evidence of this will appear, if you frame the assumption thus, This line is a line which is not right.  
For then the assumption is turned into an affirmative.  
The preeminences & prerogatives of the first figure are great above the two others. For the second figure cannot conclude affirmatively, and the third figure cannot conclude universally, but in the first figure we may conclude all manner of ways, and prove all manner of questions: whether universal affirmatives, or universal negatives, or particular affirmatives, or particular negatives.  
Universal affirmatives. As we may prove that all covetous persons are thiefs, because they withhold other men's goods.  
Again universal negatives. As we may prove that no covetous person is free, because he is a slave to his money.  
We may also prove in the first figure a particular affirmative conclusion. As we may prove that some fishes have lungs, because they breath.  
Lastly, we may prove in the first figure a question that is particular negative. As, that judas and Saul are not saved, because they were impenitent.  
Moreover, the excellency of the first figure appears in this, that the others are reduced unto it. For by changing something in them, they are reduced to the first figure; as we shall see hereafter.  
Rules for the second Figure.  
In the second Figure the Mean is the attribute in both the propositions.  
The first proposition in this figure must be universal, or else nothing can be concluded. As, 
Some living creatures have two feet.  
No horse hath two feet.  
Therefore some horse is not a living creature.   
The conclusion is false, and followeth not; because the proposition is particular.  
Again, in the second Figure one of the propositions must be negative, and consequently the conclusion. For this reason were not good to say, 
All hens have two feet.  
You have two feet.  
Therefore you are a hen.   
The natural reason hereof is apparent. For it followeth not, that if one thing be attributed to two other things, that these two things should be the same thing. As, if to be yellow belongs both to honey and to gall, it followeth not therefore that honey is gall: but it followeth well in the negative. As, 
Hony is sweet.  
Gall is not sweet.  
Therefore gall is not honey.   
The natural reason hereof is, because if one thing belongeth to one of the two terms of the question, and not to the other, it followeth that the two terms agree not together.  

How to reduce t●e Syllogisms of this second figure ●o the first.  In this figure when the proposition is negative, it is easy to convert and reduce the Syllogism unto the first figure. For than we must only convert the proposition simply. As.  
No terrestrial body moves upward.  
Smoke moves upward.  
Therefore smoke is no terrestrial body.  
You may convert this proposition, saying thus, Nothing that moves upward is a terrestrial body.  
And so you shall have it in the first figure.  
But if the assumption be negative, you must put it in the place of the proposition, and then convert simply the conclusion, as also the assumption, which is become the proposition. As in this Syllogism, 
All men are living creatures.  
No statue is a living creature.  
Therefore no statue is a man.   
You must change the assumption, and say, No living creature is a statue.  
And set it in the place of the proposition, thus, 
No living creature is a statue.  
All men are living creatures.   
Whence the conclusion followeth well, Therefore no man is a statue.  
Which is the same conclusion, but only converted simply.  
Rules for the third Figure.  
In the third figure the Mean is the subject in both propositions.  
The assumption must be affirmative, as in the first figure.  
The conclusion is always particular, and cannot be universal.  
The natural reason hereof is, because if two things are attributed to the same thing, it followeth not that these two things agree always together: but only it followeth that they agree sometimes and in certain subjects. As, if to be bright and round belongs to the Sun, it followeth not that whatsoever is round must be bright. So to be reasonable and to have two feet belongs to man; whence it followeth not, that whatsoever hath two feet must be reasonable: but only that something which hath two feet is reasonable.  
The Syllogisms of this figure are reduced to the first by converting the assumption. As, 
All horses neigh.  
All horses have four feet.  
Therefore something that hath four feet neigheth.   
If you convert the assumption, 
How to reduce the Syllogisms of the third figure to the first.  saying, Something that hath four feet is a horse,  
This Syllogism will be in the first figure.  
But if the proposition be particular, ac in this Syllogism, 
Some Apostle is damned.  
All Apostles are sent of God.  
Therefore some one that is sent of God is damned.   
Now to reduce this Syllogism to the first figure, you must convert the proposition, and say, Some damned persons is an Apostle.  
And then put it in the place of the assumption in this manner, 
All Apostles are sent of God.  
Some damned person is an Apostle.  
Therefore some damned person is sent of God.   
Which is the very same conclusion, but simply converted.   

The seventh Chapter. Certain artificial words which serve to show how many ways we may argue in each figure, and how the second and third figure may be converted into the first.  
TO help the memory Logicians have found out certain artificial words, which serve to show how many ways a man may argue in each figure. The words are these; 

1. BARBARA, CELARENT, DARII, FERIO.  
2. CESARE, CAMESTRES, FESTINO, BAROCO.  
3. DARAPTI, FELAPTON, DISAMIS, DATISI, BOCARDO, FERISON.   To understand the use of these words, you must note that every one of these words hath but three Syllables: the first whereof signifies the proposition, the second the assumption, and the third the conclusion.  
Again, note that in all these words there are but four Vowels, namely these, 
A. E. I. O.  
A signifieth an universal affirmative proposition.  
E signifieth an universal negative proposition.  
I signifieth a particular affirmative proposition.  
O signifieth a particular negative proposition.   
The Syllogisms which are made in the first figure are noted by these words, Barbara, Celarent, Darij, Ferio.  
The word BARBARA, intimates, that whensoever the two propositions in the first figure shall be A, that is, universal affirmative, the conclusion shall likewise be A, that is, an universal affirmative.  
So the word CELARENT signifieth that whensoever the proposition in the first figure shall be E, that is, an universal negative, and the assumption A, that is, an universal affirmative; the conclusion shall be E, that is, an universal negative. So likewise of all the other words.  
The Syllogisms of the second figure are noted by these words, Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco,  
The word FESTINO intimates, that whensoever the proposition in the second figure shall be E, that is, an universal negative, & the assumption I, that is, a particular affirmative; the conclusion shall be O, that is, a particular negative. As, 
FES— No compounded thing is eternal.  
TI— Some thing in man is eternal.  
NO— Therefore something in man is not compounded.   
Note that in these four words, the last syllables are always either E or O, to show that the conclusion must always be negative.  
The Syllogisms of the third figure are noted by these words, Darapti, Felapton, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison, and have the same use.  
For example, the word FELAPTON signifieth that if the proposition in the third figure be E, that is, an universal negative, and the assumption A, that is, an universal affirmative; the conclusion must be O, that is, a particular negative. As, 
FE— No Bat hath feathers.  
LAPET— All Bats fly.  
TUN— Therefore something that flies hath no feathers.   
Note that in all these six words, the last syllables have either I or O, to show that the conclusion in the third figure must always be particular.  
The Consonants of these same words are not without their special use. For they serve to know how the Syllogisms of the second and third figure may be reduced to the first. To this end serveth the first capital letter. For Cesare and Camestres are reduced to Celarent: Darapti, Disamis, Datisi are reduced to Darij: Festino, Felapton, Ferison are reduced to Ferio.  
Baroco and Bocardo cannot be reduced, because one of the propositions is a particular negative, which cannot enter into the first figure.  
S signifieth that the proposition which is noted with an S, must be simply converted. As in Cesare and Datisi.  
P signifieth that the proposition must be converted by Accident, that is to say, that the universal affirmative must be converted into a particular affirmative. As in Darapti and Felapton.  
M signifieth that the propositions must be transposed, and must change their place. As in Camestres and Disamis, whereof we have given examples.   

The eight Chapter. Of an Enthymeme.  
AN Enthymeme is nothing else but a Syllogism, whereof one of the propositions is suppressed, either for brevity's sake, or for some deceit. For brevity, as 
God sinneth not.  
Therefore God is no liar.   
Or 
Nothing that corrupteth man can be the chief good.  
Therefore Voluptuousness is not the chief good.   
For deceit, as, 
This Commonwealth is the greatest.  
Therefore it is the best.   
Or 
Whatsoever troubleth a Commonwealth must be banished.  
Therefore the Gospel must be banished.   
In these imperfect Syllogisms, that proposition is suppressed which is most odious, and wherein the falsehood lieth, namely, Every Commonwealth, that is, the greatest is the best. As also this, The Gospel troubleth a Commonwealth.  
Sometimes to make the speech more smooth and currant, we put the conclusion in the first place. As, 
The estate of Oligarchy is the worst of all.  
Because it is most subject to civil war.   
Rhetoricians call Enthymemes proofs grounded upon probable signs. As, 
Milo killed Claudius:  
For he hated him before.   
Or 
This man is learned:  
For he is pale and hath many books.   
These proofs are of no force, except they be in great number. For signs and conjectures which have no force being alone, become forcible when there are many of them together.   

The ninth Chapter. Of Induction, and of Example.  
INduction is a Syllogism wherein diverse singulars or particulars are as a Mean to prove an universal conclusion. As when I will prove that all living creatures have feeling; because birds, fishes, serpents, terrestrial beasts, and Amphibia have feeling.  
Or thus, the Stag, the Do, the Hare, the Coney, the Mouse have a great heart in proportion to their body: Now the fearful creatures are the Stag, the Do, etc. Therefore all fearful creatures have a great heart in proportion to their bodies.  
By this kind of discourse all Sciences have been invented. For example, Physicians having by the trial of many plants of Mercury or of parietary observed, that they are laxative, have thence gathered a general rule, that all plants of Mercury or parietary are laxative. Thus have men attained to the knowledge of the causes of Eclipses, of Apoplexies, and of Floods greater than ordinary about the Aequinoxes by sundry particular observations.  
An Example is an imperfect Induction. 
Of Example.  For in stead of many particulars we use but one.  
In natural causes Examples are more forcible then in civil and voluntary actions: because natural events are much more alike than civil and voluntary actions, which are subject to many changes and chances. As if I should say, Yesterday in the evening the sky being red, the day following proved fair: this example hath some likelihood to prove, that seeing the sky is red this evening, to morrow it will prove a fair day. But if I say, Philip digging his garden found a pot of gold, it followeth not that Alexander digging shall have the same hap.  
Orators notwithstanding do much enlarge themselves upon such examples. And by reason of the mischiefs which have happened to any one through drunkenness, or lying, or anger, they use to exhort others to shun the same vices.   

The tenth Chapter. Of the Enumeration of parts.  
THe Enumeration of parts is also a kind of Syllogism, serving to conclude both affirmatively and negatively.  
When we will conclude affirmatively, we make a rehearsal of all the parts: that so having remooved all the parts but one, that one which remaineth may be concluded or affirmed. As,  
What goods soever a man hath, he hath them either by inheritance, or by purchase, or by exchange, or by gift, or by labour, or by play, or because he hath found them, or stolen them. But the goods which you have, you have them neither by inheritance, nor by purchase, nor by exchange, nor by gift, nor by labour, nor by play, nor because you have found them. Therefore you have stole them.  
But when we will conclude negatively, we remove all the parts. As, All Frenchmen are either Normans, or Picards, or Champenois, etc. But the Lorrains are neither Normans, nor Picards, nor Champenois, etc. Therefore they are no Frenchmen.  
You must ever take heed that the Enumeration be not imperfect; as, when we say that all mankind is either male or female: Or that every action is either good or bad. For there are Hermaphrodites; and there be some actions that are indifferent. So if I should say that every quality is either a natural faculty, or a habit, or an active quality in the objects of the senses, this enumeration would prove imperfect. For besides these there are forms and figures.   

The eleventh Chapter. Of a Dilemma.  
A Dilemma is a forked or horned argument, wherein we give our adversary his choice of two things, to show him that whether of the two soever he chooseth, he is still overcome in both. As, to prove that a man should never marry, we may argue thus, If thou marriest, thy wife will be either fair or deformed; If fair thou wilt prove jealous; If deformed thou wilt not like her. Therefore it is better not to marry. Or, be not a lawyer, for if thou pleadest for injustice, thou shalt displease God; If thou pleadest for justice, thou shalt displease men. Our Saviour Christ made a Dilemma when he was buffeted, saying, If I have ill spoken show wherein; but if well, why smitest thou me? Thus a man may reason against one that hath dreamt that we must not believe dreams: Or that hath sworn that he will forswear himself. If thou forswear thyself, thou art a perjured person; If thou dost not forswear thyself, yet art thou still a perjured person; because thou hast sworn that thou wilt forswear thyself.  
Carneades gave twenty crowns to his Master Diogenes to teach him Logic. One day disputing with his Master according to the rules that he had taught him, his Master told him that he disputed not well; Whereupon his Scholar made him this Dilemma. I dispute either well or ill: If I dispute well, why blamest thou me? If I dispute ill, give me back my twenty crowns? Such was the disputation between Protagoras and his Scholar Evathlus, 
Gellius. l. 5. c. 10.  which example is well known, and the recital would be too too long. You may see it in A. Gellius. lib. 5. cap. 10.   

The twelfth Chapter. Of a Sorites, or heaping Syllogism.  
A Sorites is a kind of argume●● which knitteth many propositions together, to show that the subject of the first agreeth with the attribute of the last. As, 
Whatsoever acteth, moveth.  
Whatsoever moveth, is mutable.  
Whatsoever is mutable, is corruptible.  
Whatsoever is corruptible, is not God.  
Therefore it is inferred, if God acteth, he is not God.   
So many propositions, so many Syllogisms which have God for the subject of the conclusion.   

The thirteenth Chapter. Of Conditional or hypothetical Syllogisms.  
WE have said that Enuntiations are either simple or compound; and that of compounded Enuntiations, some are Conditional or hypothetical, and some Disjunctive.  
Hitherto we have treated of Syllogisms consisting of simple propositions, now we are to speak of Conditional and Disjunctive Syllogisms, whose propositions are conditional or disjunctive.  
A Conditional Syllogism is, whose proposition hath an If. As, 
If there be a God, he must be served.  
But there is a God.  
Therefore he must be served.   
The proposition hath two parts, the first whereof is called the Antecedent, If there be a God: the second is called the Consequent, He must be served.  
There are two Rules for these Syllogisms.  

I. Maxim.  The first is, that if the Antecedent be granted, the Consequent is also granted. As, 
If Paul be a man, he is a living creature.  
But he is a man.  
Therefore he is a living creature.   
But you cannot by over-throwing the Antecedent, overthrew the Consequent. As, 
If a fly be a bird, it is a living creature.  
But a fly is no bird.  
Therefore it is no living creature.   

II. Maxim  The second Maxim is, that if the consequent be overthrown, the antecedent is overthrown also. As, 
If a statue be a man, it is a living creature.  
But a statue is no living creature.  
Therefore it is no man.   
If the antecedent be the species, and the consequent be the difference or property, than you may overthrow the antecedent to overthrow the consequent. As, 
If a statue be a horse, it neigheth.  
But it is no horse.  
Therefore it neigheth not.   
But such conclusions follow by chance, and not by the force of the Syllogism.  
In these Syllogisms the assumption is part of the proposition, which proposition maketh an entire Syllogism. And it is probable that this word Assumption is borrowed from these Syllogisms, because that in them the second proposition is taken and assumed out of the first.   

The foureteenth Chapter. Of Disiunctive Syllogisms.  
Disjunctive Syllogisms are such, whose proposition is compounded of two disjunctive parts or pieces, or which are separated by this particle OR. As, It is day or night. This number is even or odd. As thus, 
This man is dead or alive.  
But he is dead.  
Therefore he is not alive.  Or else thus, 
But he is alive.  
Therefore he is not dead.  Or thus, 
But he is not alive.  
Therefore he is dead.   
For those propositions are compounded of such parts, the one whereof cannot be granted, without overthrowing the other; Nor can you overthrow the one without establishing or granting the other. And for this cause, these two parts must be immediately opposite, so as there may be no third. For example, this argument is not good.  
There is peace or war.  
But there is no war.  
Therefore there is peace.  
For there may be a truce.  
In these Syllogisms to the end that the truth may be evident and without exception, the two parts of the proposition must not be contradictory, but must be either contraries, or privatives, or relatives. For example, if I argue thus, 
This line is strait, or crooked.  
But it is strait.  
Therefore it is not crooked.   
This argument is clear and certain.  
But if I argue thus, 
Philip is wise or unwise.  
But he is unwise.   
From thence we can draw no conclusion that may have any likelihood of reason.    

¶ The fift Book. OF THE MASTERPIECE OF LOGIC called DEMONSRATION.  

The first Chapter. What Science is.  
THIS word Science is sometimes taken for the whole body of one kind of learning. Thus Ethics, Physics, Metaphysics, civil Law, are called Sciences. Sometimes the word Science signifieth only the knowledge of a conclusion proved by Demonstration. And this is it whereof we purpose to treat of in this place; which is thus defined.  
Science is a certain knowledge of a thing certain, whose proof is drawn from the cause.  
To have the Science of a thing, two certainties are required. The one is, that the thing be certain of itself and unchangeable. The second is, that the persuasion which we have of it be firm and clear. If either of these two certainties be wanting it is no Science, but opinion. For a man may have a doubtful opinion of a thing certain. As he that doubteth whether there be a God.  
And on the contrary, a man may have a firm and steadfast persuasion of that which is uncertain and false. As those that suffer death for the defence of a false Religion.  
And therefore it is not amiss to know the difference between Science, Faith, and Opinion. Science is a certain knowledge of a certain thing by the next cause. Opinion is a doubtful or false knowledge. Faith is a firm persuasion grounded upon the Testimony of some other.  
If a man know certainly a thing because he seethe it, or toucheth it, that is neither called Science, nor Faith, nor opinion; but sense, which knoweth only things singular: but Science is of things universal.   

The second Chapter. What a Demonstration or Demonstrative Syllogism is.  
A Demonstrative Syllogism is that which giveth or bringeth certain knowledge of the conclusion. If we will define it more exactly, we must define it thus. A demonstrative Syllogism is that which prooveth that the attribute of the conclusion is truly attributed unto the subject, by a Mean that must be the next efficient or final cause of the attribute of the said conclusion. These two sorts of causes were called external, in the Chapter of Causes above mentioned: because they are no parts of the effect, nor of the thing compounded, though sometimes the efficient cause be in the very same subject. As, the soul of man is the cause of the sense in man: and the thickness of gold is the cause of the weight of it. In these examples the efficient cause and the effect are in the same subject.   

The third Chapter. What questions are demonstrable.  
Such questions wherein the attribute is a substance, cannot be proved by demonstration: because substances have no certain efficient cause proper unto them. For the will of God is an universal cause common to all things, and by consequent it can be no Mean in a demonstrative Syllogism.  
Again, such questions or conclusions wherein the attribute is a mutable or casual accident, cannot be proved by demonstration: because these accidents have no certain and assured cause. As, Philip is rich. Bucephalus halteth.  
But those questions are demonstrable, whose attribute is a proper and immutable accident, whereof the next efficient or final cause may be given. For example, these questions may be proved by demonstration.  
A transparent body is without colour.  
Eunuches are never bald.  
Fixed Stars do twinkle.  
The Moon suffers obscurity.  
Of all estates oligarchy is the most subject to civil war.  
Lines parallel never meet.  
All bodies compounded of Elements are corruptible.  
Under the scorching Zone it is very hot.  
For the next efficient or final cause of the attribute of these questions may be given.   

The fourth Chapter. What the propositions of a demonstrative Syllogism ought to be.  
THe Demonstration must consist of necessary propositions; among which those are the most necessary, which are called Immediate.  
There be two sorts of immediate propositions, that is to say, such as are without any middle. For some are immediate in regard of the subject, and others are immediate in regard of the cause.  
Immediate propositions in regard of the subject are when the attribute agreeth next of all and immediately to the subject, so as a nearer subject cannot be given. In such propositions the attribute agreeth with the subject, because it is such a subject. For example, if I say that a horse hath sense, this attribute agrees not next and immediately to a horse; for there is a nearer subject, namely, an Animal, unto the which sense belongeth. But if I say that a horse neigheth, this agreeth next and immediately to a horse, as he is a horse, and not by reason of any other nearer subject.  
Immediate propositions in regard of the cause are, when an attribute is so nearly joined to the subject, as that the cause or reason cannot be yielded why it should be so. For example, here is a Demonstration: 
Whatsoever hath a sensitive soul hath touching.  
Every animal hath a sensitive soul.  
Therefore every animal hath touching.   
In this Syllogism the conclusion is immediate in regard of the subject, but not in regard of the cause. For in this Syllogism the Mean is the cause of the conclusion. But the two propositions are immediate, both in regard of the cause, as also of the subject, for nothing can be alleged as a cause of their truths.  
Sometimes the efficient and final causes are linked together with a long chain. As, Under the Aequator the air is very hot, because it is very subtle; The air is very subtle, because the Sun doth rarefie it very much; The Sun rarefies the air, because the beams fall in right angles; The beams fall in right angles, because the Sun is there in the Zenith. Thus it is in the final cause.  The Lungs draw in the air to refresh the heat of the heart: The heat of the heart is refreshed to keep the Temperature: The Temperature is kept to preserve life. 
So many causes, so many demonstrations. But the last where also the chiefest and last cause stands for the Mean, is the noblest of all: because it can no further be demonstrated: and the two propositions are immediate every manner of way.   

The fifth Chapter. A special note to know a perfect Demonstration.  
OF all the marks of a perfect Demonstration, this is the most evident, when it may be conver●ed or reduced to a definition. For we have said heretofore that the definition of a proper accident is compounded of three parts; namely, 
L. 2. c. 8.  of the Genus of that which is defined, and of the proper subject, and of the cause thereof. As the definition of Death is, the destruction of the life of the creature by the extinguishing of vital heat. Out of this definition a demonstration may be framed, making the Subject of this accident to be the subject of the conclusion, the Genus to be the attribute, and the cause the Mean. As thus, 
Whensoever the vital heat is extinguished, life is destroyed.  
But in a living creature the vital heat is extinguished.  
Therefore in a living creature life is destroyed.   
The same may be said of these definitions following. Sleep is the heaviness of a living creature, by the cessation of the common sense. Thunder is a noise in the clouds, by the breaking out of the fire.   

The sixth Chapter. Of an Imperfect Demonstration.  
WE have showed that a perfect demonstration is that, which proveth by the next efficient or final cause of the attribute; that the attribute of the conclusion agrees with the subject.  
If any of these perfections be wanting, the demonstration is the weaker, and less perfect.  
If the Mean be not the next cause of the attribute, but only a remote cause, then is the demonstration weaker, and more imperfect. And such demonstrations for the most part conclude negatively. For example.  
Where there is no opposition of contrary qualities, there is no death.  
But in the heavens there is no opposition of contrary qualities.  
Therefore in heaven there is no death.  
Or 
He that is of a cold temperature will never be bald.  
But Eunuches are of a cold temperature,  
Therefore Eunuches will never be bald.   
In these demonstrations the propositions are not immediate: For the Mean is not the next cause of the attribute. To have no contrary qualities is not the next cause of not dying, but a remote cause: for the next cause of not dying in man's body is the continual preservation of the humours in an equal temperature; and the cause hereof is to have no contrariety or combat between the elementary qualities in the body.  
Thus the cause why Eunuches become not bald is, become the radical humour of the hairs is not spent: and the remote cause is, because they have but little heat.  
In these demonstrations the propositions are not immediate, for the Mean is not the next cause of the attribute.  
And though the propositions be immediate, yet if the Mean be not the cause, but the effect of the attribute, than it shall be a less perfect demonstration; proving not the effect by the cause, but the cause by the effect. This kind of demonstration shows not why the conclusion is, but only that it is. As, 
All that love God are beloved of God.  
But all that have faith in Christ, love God.  
Therefore all that have faith in Christ are beloved of God.   
The Mean is to love God, which is not the cause, but the effect of the love which God beareth unto us; which love is the attribute of the conclusion in this demonstration, wherein the cause is proved by the effect: whereas in a perfect demonstration we prove effects by their causes. Therefore this imperfect demonstration proveth only that the thing is, but showeth not why it is. The effect may very well be the cause of knowing, but not of being. As the smoke which we see come out of a chimney may be a cause to make us know that there is fire in the house: but it is not the cause of the fire, but only the effect. And the unequal beating of the pulse is not the cause of the Ague, but it is a cause which makes us know that such a one hath an Ague.    

¶ The sixth Book. OF SOPHISMS OR FALLACIES.  

The first Chapter. Of Fallacies in words.  
ALL Fallacies or Sophisms committed in disputing are either in the Words, or in the Matter.  
Fallacies in words are of six kinds. 1. Aequivocation. 2. amphibology. 3. Deceit by Composition. 4. Deceit by Division. 5. Deceit in the Accent or Pronunciation. 6. And deceit in the Figure of the word.  

1. Of Aequivocation.  
Decipt by Aequivocation is, when the Mean is a doubtful word, taken in the proposition one way, and in the assumption another way. As, 
That which hath neither beginning nor ending, God created not.  
The roundness of the Heavens hath neither beginning nor ending.  
Therefore the roundness of the Heaven's God created not.   
In the proposition beginning and ending is taken for continuance of time: but in the assumption it is taken for the beginning and ending of a figure. Or thus, 
He that saith that thou livest, saith true.  
He that saith that thou art a goose, saith that thou livest.  
Therefore he that saith that thou art a goose, saith true.   
In the proposition it is meant of an express saying; but in the assumption of a saying by consequence.  
Thus a man of great capacity may be taken for a learned man, and sometimes for one whose stomach is able to contain much wine.  
The same fallacy may be committed also when a word is otherwise taken in the propositions, then in the conclusion.   

2. Of amphibology.  
amphibology is an ambiguous construction, making the sense doubtful. As, Faith alone justifieth.  
It cannot be known whether the meaning be, that faith being alone justifieth; or else that faith justifieth only. In the first sense it is false; for faith alone without good works is no true faith, and by consequent justifieth not. But in the second sense it is true that faith only justifieth, because it only hath the property to justify. So it is true in one sense, that the eye alone seethe, but it is false in another sense that the eye seethe alone. For an eye that is out of the head seethe not   

3. The fallacy in Composition.  
The fallacy in Composition is, when things are taken as conjoined, which cannot be true, but in a divided sense. As in this proposition: A man that is set may run.  
Which is true if it be meant at diverse times; but if it be meant at the same time it is false and impossible. For a man that is set cannot run whilst he is sitting. So, that men are male and female, is true of diverse persons; but false if it be meant of the same persons.   

4. Of the fallacy by Division.  
This fallacy of Division is contrary to the former. For this separateth things which cannot be true, except they be joined together. Thus, though it be true that two and three make five, yet it followeth not, that two or three are five. If a man should say, This wall is white, therefore this wall is; this consequence were good, because to be white is an accident which could not be, if the subject were not. But if one should say, Philip is dead, therefore Philip is; the consequence were not good: because that to be dead is not an accident, but a privation, which presupposeth that the subject, namely, Philip, was, but now is no more. Whosoever therefore argueth thus, divideth that which cannot be true except it be joined. This division may happen sometimes in one word only. As, Ingeniosus, being taken for one word is a commendation, but divided into two, as, Ingenio sus, it is a reproach.   

5. Of the fallacy in the Accent or Pronunciation.  
The fallacy in the Accent is, when a false thing is affirmed under colour of pronouncing it as another thing that is true. For example, 
Where no ache is, there needs no salve.  
In the Gout there is no H.  
Therefore in the Gout there needs no salve.   
Again, if a man should say, I am hot; are you as hot? Or, I am cold; are you as cold? A man cannot distinguish in fast speaking of it, whether he saith a sot, in stead of as hot; Or, a scold in stead of as cold. But being written a man shall easily perceive this fallacy.  
This fallacy is also committed when that which is spoken positively, is taken as if it were spoken by Interrogation. As if a man commanding say to another, Rest you, and he taking it Interrogatively should answer; No.   

6. Of the fallacy in the Figure of the word.  
The fallacy in the figure of the word is, when from the Gender or Number of the word, or because the Verb is Active or Passive, a man will infer that the nature of the thing is such. For example, if a man should argue, that Prudence, Temperance, or justice are only proper and peculiar unto women, because they are of the feminine gender, which no way followeth. So likewise, because to hear and to see be not Passives, it followeth not, that therefore hearing and seeing are no Passives. And although I say, that I have received letters from my brother, it followeth not, that I have received more than one, though the word be Plural.    

The second Chapter. Of Fallacies in the Matter.  
THere are seven fallacies in the Matter; that is to say, when the deceit lieth not in the words, but in the ignorance or disguising of the thing. These fallacies are, 1. The fallacy by Accident. 2. The fallacy which taketh a thing as spoken simply or absolutely, which is true only in some respect. 3. The Supposing of that which is in question. 4. The fallacy of Inconsequence. 5. The fallacy whereby a thing is taken for a cause which is not a cause. 6. The fallacy which mingleth diverse questions as if they were but one. 7. The Ignorance of that which contradicteth the question.   

The third Chapter. The fallacy by Accident.  
THe fallacy by Accident is, when from an assumption which is true only by accident a conclusion is drawn which is absolute, simple, and without restraint. As in this argument: 
That which stirs up troubles in a Commonwealth is pernicious.  
The Gospel stirs up troubles in a Commonwealth.   
Therefore the Gospel is pernicious. Thus the Sun darkeneth the eyesight: and the law of God hardeneth the sinner. Whence if a man would infer, that the Sun were the cause of darkness, or, that the Law were the c●use of sin, he should fall into the fallacy of the Accident. For the Gospel of it own nature stirreth up no troubles, seeing it preacheth peace: but men take occasion thereby to rise up against it. Neither doth the Sun blind the eyes by nature, but by accident, when it meeteth with a weak eyesight.   

The fourth Chapter. The fallacy which taketh a thing as simply true, which is not so, but only in some respect.  
THis fallacy is committed, when one of the propositions being true only in part, or in some respect, we labour to draw from thence a conclusion to make it true at all times, in all respects, and in every part. As, 
Every good thing is to be desired.  
Wealth is a good thing.  
Therefore wealth is to be desired.   
The assumption is true in some respect only, and to some men. For riches are not good, but to good men, and to such as can use them well. And so in this Syllogism: 
He that is borne of a woman had a beginning.  
Our Saviour Christ was borne of a woman.  
Therefore our Saviour Christ had a beginning.    

The fift Chapter. Of the Supposing of that which is in Question.  
WE suppose that which is in question, when we make a Syllogism, wherein one of the propositions is the same thing which is in question, though it be couched in other terms. As if I would prove tha● the world was not created, because God made it not. Or, if I would prove that men are just, because they are without sin; that were to prove a thing by itself.   

The sixth Chapter. Of the fallacy of Inconsequence.  
THe fallacy of Inconsequence is, when we break the rules which are set down in the Chapter of the conversion of Enuntiations, and in the Chapter of hypothetical Syllogisms. For ●●ample, we said in the fourth Chapt●● of the third Book, that an universal affirmative enuntiation cannot be converted into any other proposition, but into a particular affirmative, or into an universal, having two negatives. As, All men are living creatures, is thus converted; Some living creature is a man: Or into this, Whatsoever is not a living creature is not man.  
Again, we said that in hypothetical Syllogisms we may proceed from the establishing of the Antecedent, to the establishing of the Consequent: And that we may proceed from the over-throwing of the Consequent to the over-throwing of the Antecedent.  
Now if any would dispute contrary to these Rules, saying, All men are living creatures; therefore all living creatures are men. Or, All men are living creatures; therefore all that is not man is not a living creature, he should fall into the fallacy of a bad Consequence.  
The same fallacy is committed if you argue thus, 
If Bucephalus be a man, he is a living creature.  
But he is a living creature.  
Therefore he is a man.  Or thus, 
If Bucephalus be a man, he is a living creature.  
But he is not a man.  
Therefore he is not a living creature.   
For such arguments are against the rules of hypothetical Syllogisms, set down in the thirteenth Chapter of the fourth Book.   

The seaventh Chapter. The fallacy whereby a thing is taken for a cause, which is none.  
THe fift fallacy is, when you allege a Mean which seemeth to be the cause of the conclusion, but indeed is not. Such was the answer of a certain Pirate to Alexander the great: who having asked of him what had made him a Pirate; he answered, that he was a Pirate, because he had but one Fregat or small Bark; but if he had two hundred Galleys, as Alexander had, that then he should be a King. Such also are these proofs. The Church of Greece is the best, because it is the greatest. Or, This man is learned, because he hath many books. Or, that Charles hath a greybeard, because he was not hanged ten years ago. Here the ordinary fault is, when the occasion is taken for a cause. For causes do act, but occasions act not; but are only the subject and matter of acting. Thus truth breeds hatred, not of it own nature, but by occasion. So the Law of God hardeneth the hearts of wicked men that oppose themselues against it. It is not the cause of the hardness, but only the occasion.   

The eight Chapter. Of the fallacy which mingleth many Interrogations, as if they were but one.  
SOmetimes many Interrogations are cunningly intermingled, that an untruth may be crowded in amongst many truths. As, Cyrus, Alexander, Caesar were they not valiant Kings? Or, these qualities, to be bay, old, tall, one-eyde, are they not in this horse?  
Some will be ready to grant all this, not marking that Caesar was never King; and that to be one eyed is a privation, and not a quality; and that to be old is not a quality, but a quantity or length of time past. Therefore such Interrogations must be answered by distinction.   

The ninth Chapter. Of the fallacy which is committed by the Ignorance of that which contradicteth the Question.  
THe fallacy through the Ignorance of that which contradicteth, is, when he that argueth against me brings a conclusion which he allegeth as contrary or contradictory to my position, which notwithstanding is nothing prejudicial unto it, and may be granted. For example, if I say that God is no liar; a Sophister will go about to conclude, that God saith not all the truth: which notwithstanding agrees very well with that which I affirm; neither doth it from thence follow that God is a liar.  
To the end therefore that these be not taken for contradictory or contrary Enuntiations, which indeed are not: we must understand that if we will make two Enuntiations to be contradictory, the terms must be understood in the same sense in both, and without equivocation. Therefore these two Enuntiations, Every Cock is living, and, Every Cock is not living, are not contradictory: if the one be meant of a living creature, and the other taken for the cock of a Gun. Again, the attribute must agree with the subject in the same part, & according to the same time. Therefore these two Enuntiations, Man is mortal; and, Man is immortal, are not contradictory: if the one be understood of the body; and the other of the soul of man. And, The Grecians were valiant, contradicteth not this, The Grecians were not valiant, for both are true, if you consider them at several times.  
Again, the attribute of the Enuntiation must not be understood in diverse respects. For Cicero is of great stature; and, Cicero is not of great stature, may both be true, if Cicero be compared to diverse persons: little in comparison of a giant, and great in comparison of a dwarf.   

The tenth Chapter. Of the faults in Syllogisms.  
GEnerally all Syllogisms may be faulty, either in the form, or in the matter. They are faulty in the Form, when the rules of the figures are not observed, committing a fault, either in the quantity, or quality, or the propositions, or in the placing of the Mean, or if there be more than three terms.  
The Syllogism is faulty in the Matter, when one of the propositions, or both, are false, either in the whole, or in part. This faultiness happeneth sometimes through simplicity, and without cunning, bu● sometimes it is fraudulent and with cunning; such as are the fallacies above mentioned. If a Syllogism be faulty in the form, it must be brought to the true form. If it be faulty in the matter, that proposition which is false must be denied. And if it be doubtful or true in part only, it must be distinguished.  
But if the fault be neither in the form, nor in the matter, but only in the fallacy of the ignorance of that which contradicteth the question, by the which the adversary maintaineth a thing which doth not prejudice the question; in such a case we must grant all that the adversary saith, and show him, that in thinking to contradict us, be doth it not.  
The end and scope of these fallacies, is not to teach us how to deceive, but how to avoid deceit.    
FINIS.