AN ESSAY OF A KING, WITH An explanation what manner of persons those should be that are to execute the power or ordinance of the King's Prerogative. WRITTEN By the Right honourable Francis, Lord Verulam Viscount Saint Alban.  
Decemb. 2. LONDON, Printed for Richard Best, 1642.   

An Essay of a King written by Sir Francis Bacon.  
A King is a mortal God on Earth, unto whom the living God hath lent his own name as a great honour: But withal told him he should die like a man, lest he should be proud and flatter himself, that God hath with his name imparted unto him his nature also.  
2 Of all kinds of men, God is least beholding unto them, for he doth most for them, and they do ordinarily lest for him.  
3 A King that would not feel his Crown too heavy for him, must wear it every day, but if he think it too light, he knoweth not of what mettle it is made of.  
4 He must make Religion the Rule of government, and not the Scale; for he that casteth in Religion only to make the scales even, his own weight is contained in these Characters Tekel uphrasin, he is found too light, his Kingdom shall be taken from him.  
5 And that King that holds not Religion the best reason of state, is void of all piety and justice, the Supporters of a King.  
6 He must be able to give counsel himself, but not to rely thereupon: for though happy events justify their counsels, yet it is better that the evil event of good advice be rather imputed to a Subject then a sovereign.  
7 He is the Fountain of Honour, which should not run with a wast pipe, lest the Courtiers ●ell the waters, and then (as Papists say of their holy wells) to lose the virtue.  
8 He is the life of the Law, not only as he is lex loquens himself, but because he animateth the dead letter, making it active towards all his Subjects praemio & poena.  
9 A wise King must do less in altering his Laws, than he may; for new government is ever dangerous, it being true in the body politic, as in the corporal, that omnis subita mutatio est periculosa, and though it be for the better, yet it is not without a fearful apprehension; For he that changeth the fundamental Laws of a kingdom, thinketh that there is no good title to a Crown but by conquest.  
10 A King that setteth to sale Seats of Justice, oppresseth the People, for he teacheth his Judges to fell Justice, and praecio parata, praecio vincitur Justicia.  
Bounty and Magnificence are virtues, verae Regiae, but a prodigal King is nearer a Tyrant, than a parsimonious: for store at home draweth his contemplations abroad, but want supplieth itself of what is next, and many times the next way, and herein he must be wise and know, wh●t he may justly do.  
12 That King which is not feared, is not loved, and he that is well seen in his craft, must as well study to be feared as loved, yet not loved for fear, but feared for love.  
13 Therefore as he must always resemble him whose great name he beareth, and that in manifesting the sweet influence of his mercy over the severe stroke of his Justice sometimes, so in this not to suffer a man of death to live, for besides that the Land doth mou●n, the restraint of Justice towards sin doth more retard the affection of love, than the extent of mercy doth inflame it, and sure where love is bestowed, fear is quite lost.  
14 His greatest Enemies are his Flatterers, for though they ever speak on his side, yet their words still make against them.  
15 The love which a King oweth to the weal-public, should not be restrained to any one particular, yet that his more special favour do reflect upon some worthy ones, is somewhat necessary, because there are so few of that capacity.  
He must have a special care of five things, if he would not have his Crown to be put upon him.  
First, that simulata sanctitas, be not in the Church, for that is duplex iniquitas.  
Secondly, that inutilis aequitas, sit not in the Chancecery, for that is inepta misericordia.  
Thirdly, that utilis iniquitas, keep not the Exchequer, for it is crudele latrocinium.  
Fourthly, that fidelis temeritas be not his general, for that will bring but seram poenitentiam.  
Fiftly, that infidelis prudentia, be not his Secretary, for that he is Anguis sub viridi herba.  
To conclude, as he is of the greatest power, so he is subject to the greatest cares, made the servant of his people, or else he were without a calling at all.  
He then that honoureth him not, is next an Atheist wanting the fear of God in his heart.  

An explanation what manner of persons those should be, that are to execute the power or Ordinance of the King's Prerogative, written by the said Sir Francis Bacon late Lord chancellor, and Lord St. Albans.  
THat absolute Prerogative according to the King's pleasure revealed by his laws, may be exercised and executed by any Subject, to whom power may be given by the King, in any place of Judgement or Commission, which the King by his Law hath ordained, in which the Judge subordinate cannot wrong the people, the Law laying down a measure by which every Judge should govern or execute; Against which Law if any Judge proceed, he is by the Law questionable and punishable for his transgression.  
In this nature are all the Judges and Commissioners of the Land no otherwise then in their Courts, in which the King in person is supposed to sit who cannot work that trespass, Felony or treason which the Law hath not made so to be, neither can punish the guilty by other punishment than the Law hath appointed.  
This Prerogative or power as it is over all the Subjects so being known by the Subjects, they are without excuse if they offend; and suffer no wrong, if they be punished. And by this prerogative the King governeth all sorts of people according unto known will.  
The absolute prerogative which is in Kings according to their private will and judgement cannot be executed by any Subject, neither is it possible to give such power by Commission, or fit to subject the people to the same. For the King in that he is the substitute of God immediately the Father of his people, and head of the Common wealth by participation with God and his subjects, Discretion, judgement, and feeling love towards those over whom he reigneth only proper to himself, or to his places and person, who seeing he cannot in any others diffuse his wisdom, power, or gifts, which God in respect of his place and charge hath enabled him withal, can neither subordinate any other judge to govern by that knowledge, which the King can no otherwise then by his know will participate unto him. And if any subordinate judge shall obtain Commission according, of such judge to govern the people, that judge is bound to think that to be his sound discretion, in which the law in which the Kings known will showeth unto him to be that justice which he ought to administer: otherwise he might seem to esteem himself above the King's law, who will not govern by him, or to have a power derived from other then from the King, which in the kingdom will administer justice contrary to the justice of the Land. Neither can such a Judge or Commissioner under the name of his high authority shroud his own high affection, seeing the Conscience and discretion of every man is particular and private to himself; As the discretion of the Judge cannot be properly or possibly the discretion of the King, or conscience of the King; And if not his discretion, neither the Judgement that is ruled by another m●ns only. Therefore it may seem they rather desire to be Kings then to rule the people under the King, which will not administer Justice by law, but by their own wills.  
This Administration in a subject is derogative to the King's Prerogative, for he administereth Justice out of a private direction, being not capable of a general direction, how to use the King's pleasure in Causes of particular respect, which if another than the King himself can do, how can it be so, that any man should desire that which is unfit and impossible, but that it must p●oceed out of some exorbitant affection, the rather seeing such places to be full of trouble, and being altogether unnecessary, no man will seek to thrust himself into it, but for hope of gain. Then is not any prerogative oppugned but maintained, though it be desired that every subordinate Magistrate may not be made supreme, whereby he may seal up the hearts of the people, take from the King the respect due unto him only, or to judge the people otherwise then the King doth himself.  
And although the Prince be not bound to render any account to the Law, which in person administereth itself. Yet every subordinate Judge must render an account to the King by his laws how he hath administered Justice in his place where he is set. But if he hath power to rule by private direction, for which there is no law, how can he be questioned by a law, if in his private censure he offendeth.  
Therefore it seemeth that in giving such authority the King ordaineth not subordinate Magistrates, but absolute Kings; And what doth the King leave to himself, who giveth so much to others as he hath himself? neither is there a greater bond to tie the subject to his Prince in particular then when he shall have recourse unto him in his person or in his power for relief of the wrongs which from private men be offered, or for reformation of the oppressions which any subordinate Magistrate shall impose upon the people: there can be no offence in the Judge, who hath power to execute according to his discretion, when the discretion of any Judge shall be thought fit to be unlimited; And therefore there can be therein no reformation, whereby the King in this useth no prerogative to gain his Subjects right. Then the subject is bound to suffer helpless wrong, and the discontent of the people is cast upon the King, the laws being neglected, which with their equity in all other Causes and Judgements, saving this, interpose themselves and yield remedy.  
And to conclude, 
1. Custom. 2. Wisdom. 3. Justice. 4. Rule against it.  custom cannot confirm that which is any ways unreasonable of itself; wisdom will not allow that which is many ways dangerous, and no ways profitable; Justice will not approve that government where it cannot be, but wrong must be committed. Neither can there be any rule by which to try it, nor means for reformation of it.  
Therefore whosoever desireth Government, must seek such as he is capable of, not such as seemeth to himself most easy to execute; For it appeareth that it is easy to him that knoweth not law nor justice to rule as he listeth, his will never wanting a power to itself: but it is safe and blameless both for the Judge and People, and honour to the King, that Judges be appointed who know the Law, and that they be limited to govern according to the Law.   
FINIS.