In Effgiem & librum D rs Charlton portrait Imago pulcra Est picta sculptoris manu At pulcriorem dat libris Autor suis▪ Hic Corpas▪ Illis ipsa Mens depingitur Imo universi Mens & Ipsius simul C B. THE DARKNESS of ATHEISM Dispelled by the LIGHT of NATURE. A PHYSICO-THEOLOGICALL TREATISE, Written by WALTER CHARLETON Dr. in Physic, and Physician to the late KING. Heu primae Scelerum caussae Mortalibus agris, Naturam nescire DEUM.— Sil. Italic 4. p. 56. DEUS aliquis jussit & primum scribere, & declarationem ejus, ille ipse novit, me scire. Galen. 10. de usu part. LONDON, Printed by J. F. for William Lee, and are to be sold at the sign of the Great Turk's Head over against Fetter-Lane in Fleetstreet. 1652. Epistola Dedicatoria. CLARISSIMO, QUIA ORNATISSIMO VIRO, Inclytissimi Medicorum Londinensium Collegii Praesidi longè dignissimo, FAUTORI SUO, Omni officiorum genere aeternùm Colendissimo, D. D. FRANC. PRUJEAN, GUALT. CHARLETON S. P. D. DEcretum fuisse olim, accepi, à Consultissimis aequè ac Amplissimis celeberrimi nostri Collegii (quod omnes, quibus cum Literis ac Humanitate aliquod commercium, summa, uti decet, veneratione colunt) Fundatoribus; quòd nullus, tantae familiae adscitus, Librum quemlibet in dias luminis oras effundere audeat, quem Praeses, adplaudentibus fimul Censoribus, indignum prius non judicaverit, qui diutiùs in Vestae penetralibus abditus lateret. Et gravissimo sanè consilio; tametsi enim paucorum admodum, nullorum rectiùs dixerim, nomina vestris adscribi Tabulis solent, qui solennia & Eruditionis & ingenii sui specimina, vel scriptis, vel consiliis medicis, vel disputationibus, abstrusiora circa Physices Theoremata, in Comitiis publicè habitis, priùs non exhibuerint; ideóque sit sperandum, neminem ex iis aut meditaturum, aut in publicum daturum aliquid, quod aut Philosophum recta ratione utentem, aut pium at que Christianismo imbutum non deceat: veruntamen, cum quisque fermè infatuantibus pessimae istius Sirenum, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, blanditiis sit nimium obnoxius, Scriptorúmque plurimis innatum sit istiusmodi vitium, quòd sui cerebri Minervas flagrantiùs, quàm modestia ferat, ament; quid magis videatur consultum, quàm ut uniuscujusque Collegarum scripta, quàm praelo Typographico, priùs subjiciantur examini eorum, quibus id muneris sociorum suffragiis demandatum; quo sit perspectum magis, an ex iis utilitatis aliquid Artium scientiarúmque latifundiis succrescat, & genti Hippocraticae honoris? Huic proinde majorum Senatus-consulto, nedum Philosophiae, ejúsve sobolis Medicinae, ast etiam sacris Religionis Principiis quadantenus sartis tectisque conservandis (saltem quoad vestrae Ditionis extensionem) utilissimo, liberrima voluntatis meae 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ipsemet obtemperans; En, in manus tuas, Apollineae Artis insigne Deus ac Columen, hasce meas Philosophiae Primitias trado: eo duntaxat nomine, quòd si oculatiori tuo, quod mihi sit instar omnium, judicio lucis hujus usura videantur dignae; & majori, adversus virulenta Semicriticorum Zoilorúm que 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Auctoritate for as prodeant praemunitae, & Bonorum favori, pleniori cum gratia, commendentur. Caeteroqui, si vel verbulum in eis aut saniori Physiologiae, aut Fidei Christianae, aut bonis denique moribus dissonum & incongruum reperiatur: vel Tineis Blattisque perrodendae mox exponantur; vel fato illi subjaceant acerbissimo, quod exuscitatum impiis Artibus ab Erichthone cadaver olim, ad rogum quàm citissime reduxit, de quo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ ille Poeta Lucanus, Vadit defunctus ad ignes. Non est verò, quamobrem tam infaustè ominer. Omnes etenim, dum huncce Atheismi Tumulum essem meditatus, ingenioli mei nervos, mediusfidius, eò semper intendebam; ut recto, & suis genuinis filiis ab Matre Sancta Ecclesia in Canonicis praescripto, Veritatis tramiti insisterem: ne ab opinione quavis insana, splendidissinia tametsi verisimilitudinis specie larvata, aut Mens, aut Calamus unquam ullibi deflecteretur, salebrosa versùs Haereseôs, Errorisve diverticula; quae omnia (Cardiognosten humillimè contestor) ab incunabulis usque ex animo fastidivi. Nec meo, ad lapsus, nimis prono, unicè super hac re, confisus sum arbitrio: sed & labili minùs quorundam etiam Theologorum, ingenio supra vulgus literatorum multùm perspicaci, & queis nihil sit magis cordi quàm ipsamet veritas; quibus singulas hujusce Tractatus Physico-theologici schedulas, dum atramento scriptorio adhuc diffluerent, tradidi, seriò & severè examinandas, imò ubicunque iis opus visum fuerit castigandas. Horum itaque aequabili judicio si tuum etiam, Eruditorum Dictator, omni ex parte consenserit; Librum huncce, ter sacrosanctissimae Divini Numinis, ab execranda Atheorum impietate (tremendum cogitatu) palàm impetitae, Majestatis vindicem, magno tuo Nomini à me inscribi consecrarique patiatur, Candorem tuum, caeteras tuas virtutes undiquaque illustrantem, obnixè ac cum debita Dignitati tuae observantia rogo. Fabrica est, cujus Fundamenta praeclarum istud Matheseôs lumen, CARTESIUM dico (cui▪ si Fata diuturniorem in terris indulsissent incolatum; dubio procul, tam diu anxiéque ab omnibus Sophiae cultoribus exoptatum, Physiologiae sanioris compendium Resp. Literaria ab illo solo expectasset, imò forsan excepisset) non ita pridem in Metaphysicis suis Meditationibus posuisse; certè vix me deceret pluribus tibi insinuare: qui omnia ejus & perlustrasti volumina, &, quod solertissimi pathognomonicon est ingenii, perlucidè jamdudum intellexisti Aenigmata. Fabrica est, cujus stamina LUDOVICUS VIVES, PHILIPPUS MORNAEUS, MARINUS MERSENNUS, & PETRUS GASSENDUS (Heroe▪ s publico Humanae gentis commodo, & nobiliorum Disciplinarum incremento nati) ex densissimis consertissimisque suis sapientiae sylvis profluentèr nobis contulêre. Fabrica, ut ●● omnia absolvam, cujus constructionem 〈◊〉 micus fermè sceleratissimi hujus seculi Atheismus ab omni Erudito efflagitasse videatur, omnes apud rectos rerum aestimatores: & quam nulli, nisi sacrilegi Libertini nostri, quos apud Dei, & Religionis causa Assertore prorsus indigna habetur, inutilem censebunt vel supervacaneam. Memini, Vir Excellentissime, te esse illum, qui me, post praematuram serenissimi mei quondam Domini, CAROLI, ferae hujus Britanniae nostrae Monarchae, Apotheosin, non limis & invidiae viperco veneno turgentibus, ast ipsiiusmet instar Charitatis benignè ridentibus oculis aspexisti; in illustrem Collegii vestri societatem invitasti saepius; tandemque, quum inaugurali meo munere defunctus essem, candidè exporrectaque (quod aiunt) fronte excepisti. Deinceps verò, toties quoties Te, tanquam Aesculapium redivivum, aegrorum levandorum ergô, adivi; me, circa stochasmum, prognôsin, medendi methodum, praesidiorumque materiam, sat prolixè, de more meo, disserentem patienter & sine maligno isto medicastris innato Contradicendi cacoëthe audivisti; & aut meam, ubi rationi assentiret, comprobasti sententiam, aut rectiorem commonstrasti. Memini etiam (& magnum Hippocratis nostri Genium semper habeam mihi iratum, si tanti benesicii fuero unquam oblitus) quàm paterno amore me, epidemica superioris anni Dysenteria gravissimè & tantùm non lethaliter infectum, visitasti; quanta industria saluti meae invigilasti; quàm admiranda tandem Arte (favente Archiatro Coelesti) animam meam abusque Charontis cymbula reduxisti: ita ut dignè canam, Auxiliis PRUIAN, anima haec moribunda revixit; Ut vigil, infusâ Pallade, flamma solet. Haec omnia manent alta ment reposta, nec in Mortis etiam erit tyrannide, viva insignis tuae me erga Humanitatis Charagmata, cordis mei meditullio profundissimè insculpta, penitus deradere. Quid verò retribuam tibi Fautor Amplissime, pro tot tantisque favoribus, praeter Animum Gratitudinis & Amoris plenissimum, ignoro prorsus: quem tibi 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 addictum, pro consueta tua Benignitate agnoscere digneris, etiam atque etiam te obtestor. Caeterum ut mundo etiam universo clariùs innotescat haec mea 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; En, in ipsius testimonium levidense hoc 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 tibi offero: tot inter volumina, quibus instructissimos habes Bibliothecae tuae forulos, infima verò classe reponendum. Restant adhuc mihi complurima, in gratae mentis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, insuper dicenda: sed Amphora jam exiit, currente rota. DEUM OPT. MAX. tibi longos, & benefico syderum aspectu prosperos indulgeat annos, in Morborum foecunda nimis sobole, in Humani generis excidiun, quotidie nascentium exantlationem foelicem, simul ac Artis nostrae compendium; ex animo precor. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Praeses. Ex musaeo meo Londini, Kal. August. anno 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 1641. ¶. A PREPARATORY Advertisement TO THE READER. READER, BEfore you set foot within the door of this our Physico-theologicall Labyrinth (so the seemingly intricate and obscure method, wherein the Rows of our own and others Cogitations are here set, may warrant you to call it) providence enjoyn's, that we tender you a Praeparatory Advertisement of some things, whose praecognition is requisite, as well to your calm, unpraejudiciall and satisfactory Lecture, as to the Praemunition of this well-intended Enterprise of our Pen, against both those implacable, though always foiled Enemies to learned Industry, impertinent and parcel Contradiction, and malevolent Censure. The Cardinal points, or Heads, under whose comprehension, All, whereof we hope a praevious consideration, as your homely, but wholesome Entertainment, during your short Detention in this Portall, doth genuinely and regularly fall; are only these Four: viz. (1.) The Occasion and Incitements to this Exercise, (2.) The Necessity and Justification of Natural Theology, in general; and of this in particular, and therein principally of the Demonstration of the Existence of God, by beams universally deradiated from that Catholic Criterion, the Light of Nature: (3.) The grateful commemoration of those venerable Authors, from whose replenished Treasuries, the richest Contributions toward this Hospital for the cure of miserable Infidels, were derived: (4.) Our due Confession of those Defects and Impediments, which rendered us insufficient to the worthy Administration of a Province so difficult, so sublime, so sacred, so diffusive. As for the First Praeconsiderable, viz. the Occasion; it is a Truth, not more deplorable, then manifest, that this our Island, which may justly contend with most parts of the Earth, for the Priority of Conversion to Christianisme, and might (Ah! that the righteous Anger, of Divinity hath left us no other Tense to speak in!) not many years since, have challenged the Garland from the whole, for the orthodox, zealous, and sincere Profession thereof: hath of late produced, and doth at this unhappy day foster more swarms of Atheistical monsters (such at least, whose licentious Practices, and insolent Discourses in Public, do equally declare their wild Ambition to be so accounted; as if the only way to acquire the reputation of being Transcendent Wits, were to seem able, with bold and specious Arguments, to impugn the greatest and most sacred Verities; nay such, upon whose Admission, the Certitude of all other Notions doth individually depend) then any Age, than any Nation hath been infested withal. Nor, indeed, can this Assertion sound harsh in the ears of any aequitable person, who shall but have observed, that Religion (the vital spirits of all Commonweals, and the Sanction of all Human Laws) and the sacred Authority of the Church (the only Brazen Wall of defence against those Legions of Errors, and Illusions, which the common Adversary of mankind, by his subtle workings upon the Deceptibility of our frail Nature, hath advanced) are both so shattered and undermined by our Fatal Civil War; that there yet remain many and wide Breaches, at which whole Hosts of the most execrable Heresies, blasphemous Enthusiasms, nay even profesed Atheism have entered upon us, without any considerable Opposition from those, who are, by the duty of their Place and Function, obliged to be the public Champions of all sacred Truths. This when we had frequently, and not without due sorrow considered, and upon a profound and reiterated Examen of all those bloody Sophisms, which are usually urged by Atheists, to indubitate either the Existence of God, or those his Two Cardinal Attributes, the Creation of the Universe, and the constant Conservation and Moderation of the same, by his Providence; found them to be derived from one of those two poisonous Fountains; either that Human Affections are imagined to be in God, or that man doth vainly arrogate so great Sagacity and perfection of Prudence to his own Mind, as he thereupon praesumes to be able to comprehend what God can, and determine what he ought to do: we immediately discovered, that the direct way to a full and durable Solution of them all, was only to advertise men in the general, that they ought to speculate their own Minds, as Finite substances, and the Supreme Essence, as an Infinite, and therefore Incomprehensible one. For, this immense Disproportion being once abstractedly cogitated, and in the closest pressures of Infidelity always reflected upon: all those Mountainous Difficulties, which seem to eclipse the Light of Nature, when converted toward Divinity, will soon lessen, and vanish, like rorid Clouds before the Orient Sun. The way toward the facile Redargution of all, either downright, or obliqne and inferrible Atheistical Misapprehensions, appearing thus plain; the resentment of our Duty, both to God, and our Fellows in Humanity; to God in the vindication of his injured Majesty, to Man, in the Rectification of perverted Judgements, according to the capacity of our Talon; engaged us to attempt a short progress therein. And to the incitement of this forcible Motive we the more readily conformed our Assent, because, having not long before proposed to ourselves to erect an entire Fabric of Physical Science upon Principles which seem to our judgement to be the most solid and permanent, because most Demonstrable, at least, most Verisimilous, as to the Solution of all Nature's Phaenomena; and firmly enabraced that Axiom of the Schoolmen, Nulla res, qualiscunque est, intelligi potest, nisi Deus priùs intelligatur, that no one thing in Nature can be known, unless the Author of Nature be first known: we conceived it not only no Apostasy from our First Resolutions, but a more opportune and advantageous prosecution of them, to begin at the Demonstration of the Existence of the only Perfect Ens, and so many of his Proprieties, or Attributes, as relate to the Universe in general, and Humane nature in special; and this, as a Foundation, that must not only support, but ennoble and facilitate our future superstructions. Nor could our often and pensive reflections upon the vast Distance betwixt the utmost Extensibility of our Understanding, and the lowest part of this the most sublime and excellent Subject, altar or refract this our Determination: for, to counterpoise that Discouragement, we remembered, that to offend of Zeal, is more venial then to offend of Neglect. Now, albeit this was the Series, or subalternate syntax of our Thoughts, to which our Designation of this Work, as the lowest link, was connected; yet dare we not say, that this Argument was wholly of our own Election: for we have long inclined to that opinion of Socrates * In Oration. ad Philip. , Eam mentem Dii singulis daunt, ut communes utilitates in medium afferant; That every man's Province is imposed upon him by the tacit consignation of Providence Divine, and that it is the soft and secret Touch of that Universal Spirit, which maintains the common Harmony of the World, that Tunes the thoughts of every Individual to this or that particular key: and therefore apprehended it as criminal, to stifle or extinguish those sparks, which we could not but perceive to be kindled, and glow within our breast. Concerning the Second, viz. the Necessity of Natural Theology, we are not singular in our persuasion, that these two Positions, That there is a God, and that the Soul of man is a substance perfectly distinct from his body, and endowed with Immortality, by the Charter of its Essence; are the Principal among those Verities, which are to be demonstrated by Philosophers, rather than Divines. For, though to us whose Minds are deeply imbued with the sacred tincture of Christianisme, it sufficeth to assume upon the evidence of mere Faith, that God is, and that the Human Soul, being constituted superior to Corruptibility, doth eternally survive the Funeral of the Body: yet, assuredly can the mere Natural man, persisting in the state of Infidelity, never be adduced to embrace either any Religion, or any Moral Virtue, unless both those Propositions fundamental be first evicted to him, by Reasons Apodictical, desumed from that infallible Criterion, the Light of Nature; from whose Judicature there can be no appeal. And, since in this life of Sensuality, the Encouragements and Invitations to vice, are both more and stronger, than those to virtue: most certain it is, that very few men would prefer the harsh dictates of Honesty and Right, to those more complacent one's of Pleasure and Profit; if they neither feared the just vindiction of an All-observant Deity, nor expected a future Subsistence after Death. Now, however it be indubitable, that the Existence of God ought firmly to be believed, because it is commonstrated in Sacred Writ; And, by conversion, that Sacred Writ ought to be believed, because it is desumed from God: for, since Faith is the Gift of God, he that gives Grace sufficient for the stable Apprehension of other things contained therein, can also give Grace sufficient to the admission of his Existence. yet cannot this kind of Argumentation, with probable hopes of his Conviction, be proposed to an Infidel; who looks upon Reason only, as the chief inducement of Belief: because it is a manifest Circle, whose parts reciprocally depend upon each other for probation, and therefore he may lawfully except against it. Again, as it is indispensably Necessary, in respect of Insidels; so is it not Unnecessary, in respect to Believers, to prove the Certitude of these two main Pillars of all Religion, and Morality: since the Evidence of Reason, superannexed to that of Faith, must of necessity if not augment, yet Corroborate it: and that happy soul must, doubtless, have much a clearer perception of the verity of supernatural Objects, who speculates them both by the Light of Nature, and of Grace. And therefore, though we should be so largely Charitable, as to grant, that there are no Atheists to be found among Christians: which is more than the observation of the good Justin Martyr would give him leave to allow, when he said, dici quidem nonnullos Christianos, esse verò nullius Numinis cultores * In Dialog. cum T●yphon. : and that the Principles of Religion are steadily believed by All, who make an external Profession of them: yet notwithstanding would it not genuinely follow, that therefore it is a Pleonasm, or Parergy to ratify those Principles to Believers, by the concurrent Testimony of that Oracle, Reason, to whose Dictates all Nations, all Ages, all Interests have unanimously submitted their Assent. For, as it must conduce to the Information of Unbelievers: So also, proportionately, to the Confirmation of Believers. Thirdly, as it hath been the positive and settled judgement of most Divines, both Ancient and Recent, not only that the Existence of God may be demonstrated, or irresistibly enforced upon the most prevaricate understanding, by the pressure of Reasons purely Natural; but also, that the Cognition of the Non-principiate and Self-dependent Being, is fare more easily acquired, than the Cognition of any Created Nature whatsoever: insomuch as every man brings into the world with him a certain Proleptical, or anticipated Notion of the Deity, indelebly impressed upon the very substance of his mind; but the Science of all other Entities doth emerge from the Ideas of their natures, Extradvenient or Adventitious to the Cognoscent Faculty, by the mediation of the Senses: So also was it the express Assertion of the wisest of men (Wisdom 13. v. 8, 9) and of the greatest of Apostles (Rom. 1. v. 20.) that the Creator was so visibly represented in the mirror of the Creature, as no excuse could remain to those unhappy Ethnics, who making more than superficial inspection into the one, did yet praetend an Indiscovery of the other. Quid enim aliud conspicuum hujus mundi theatrum, quàm 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉? As that not long since Vital Library, Bishop Prideaux (whose memory, next that of our Royal Master, is and shall ever be the most precious of all others, in our esteem: not only in respect of his insatiable native Capacity, stupendious Acquisitions, and inestimable Benefits to the Republic of Learning; but also of his singular Favours to us in particular) hath in a magnificent elegance expressed, in concione ad Artium Baccalaureos, in die Cinerum, de scala visibilium ad invisibilia. To which accomplished Paraphrase upon that freshly quoted Text of St. Paul, we refer our Reader; in order to his own more ample satisfaction, and our Justification, concerning the possibility, nay facility of the minds mounting up to a graduable Intellection of the Supreme Ens, by the roundles, or steps in the Scale of subordinate and Created Natures. And Fourthly, lest this our charitable Design, to subvert the chief Citadel of Atheism, by a Countermine of Arguments purely Physical (entrusting the managery of that sacred Engine, the Testimony of Canonical Scripture, to the more expert hands of those, whose Function entitleth them to the proper use thereof) should want any one of the inducements of persuasion, requisite to the accompletion of of its Defence; to the Reasons, and Praecedents now introduced, we may superadd also the Authority of no less than the Lateran Council, held under Pope Leo the tenth. Which, having with exceeding prudence decreed the Anathematization of all such Atheists, who dare question either the Being of God, or any of his Attributes (whether Absolute and Incommunicable; such as his Eternity, Immensity, Simplicity, Immutability, Independence, etc. perfections concentred in his most glorious Essence: or Respective, such as his Omnipraesence, Omnipotence, Omniscience, Justice, Mercy, Goodness, Verity, Liberality, etc. which by effusion relate to the Creature) or the other Basis of Religion, the Immortality of the Humane soul: doth, in the close of the Canon, not only adhort, but expressly command all Christian Philosophers, that they sharpen their Styles for the total Erasion of their circumventing Sophisms, and the deep Engravement of those Magisteriall Truths. To conclude therefore, insomuch as not only multiplied Reasons, but also Authority both Divine and Human conjunctively, both warrant and enjoin this kind of Natural process for the conviction of Atheism: as we can perceive no weight in their opinion, who think any Principle of Religion either profanely disparaged and debased, or implicitly convelled and staggered, when brought to the Test of Natural Reason, though only for Confirmation; so neither have we any cause to fear, that the upper Form of Theologists will contract their brows, and frown upon this our Benevolent and opportune, though imperfect Treatise. ¶ Concerning our Third Postulate, viz. the Nomination of those venerable Writers, from whose large magazines of Knowledge, no small part of our Ammunition for the Battery of the strongest hold of the Common Adversary to Humanity, hath been furnished; to this yourself will acknowledge us adliged as well by the bond of Gratitude, as Honour: the first advising us to return them the due tribute of Commemoration, and an open profession of our beholdingness to them; the other impelling us thereupon, in order to the praevention of being reputed Plagiary. Be pleased, then, Candid Reader, to know from us, first that the Demonstration of the Existence of God (being the argument of the second Section in the 1. chap.) together with the ensuing Explanation of the sundry Scholastic Terms, therein unavoidably used, and the Responses to the several Objections (whereof some were made by the glorious Marinus Mersennus, and others by our eminent, Mr. Hobbs) was wholly collected out of the incomparable Metaphysics of that heroical Wit, Renatus De's Chartes. Whose Meditations on that as necessary as excellent subject, having both frequently and with the most abstracted attention of our mind, read over; and with all possible equity of judgement put them into the scales against the Cogitations of Cornelius ab Hogelande, the Arguments of Philippus Mornaeus du Plessis, Hugo Grotius, and Petrus Gassendus, concerning the same Theorem: we found them, by vast excesses, to overbalance all the others, in the points of comprehension, perspicuity, profundity, conviction. (1.) Comprehension; because their importance is of so great extent, as to take in the substance of whatever hath, or can be said by the whole world, on that particular. (Consul ipsum Cartesium, in Epist. dedicat. ad Doct. Sorbon.) (2.) Perspicuity; because, though they are not accommodated to junior or illiterate Capacities; as himself prudently intimateth (in praefat. ad medit. de prima philosoph.) yet to those Heads, which study and contemplation have prepared for the entertainment of Notions supernatural, must they appear as distinct, clear, and bright, as all the Light of Nature could make them; not can he, who doth not, after serious lecture, apprehend their Extraction, mutual Connexion, and genuine, nay indeclinable Illation, justly pretend to any considerable reflections upon his own Nature. (3.) Profundity; because they are their own Criterion, being desumed from the very Essence of the mind, and proleptical Impresses, which are the radix, or Foot of all Cognition. (4.) Conviction; because they are of the number, and perhaps the principal of those Verities, which, like Geometrical Demonstrations, storm the most obstinate judgements, enforce them to a plenary assent, and having once gained possession of the mind, for ever after exclude all Dubitation, and Apostasy. So that what Cicero (5. de Finibus.) said of the Stoics Philosophy; mirabilis est apud Stoicos rerum contextus, respondent extrema primis, media utrisque, omnia omnibus; quid sequatur, quid repugnet, vident, & ut in Geometria, prima si dederis, danda sunt omnia: we may worthily transfer upon the Metaphysical meditations of Cartesius; nay more worthily, for no one Principle of his, there proposed, is precarious, but Necessary. This prepended, we perceived ourselves not only encouraged, but straightly concerned, to transcribe and accommodate to our present scope, the summary of his 3d. Meditation. And, Secondly, that many of our Apodictical Reasons, alleged for the comprobation of Providence Divine, both General and Special, were gleaned from those more fertile Fields of Lactantius (de opific. Dei) Raymundus de Sabunde (Theologia Natural.) Aquinas (contra Gentes) Ludovicus Vives (de verit. fidei Christianae) Bradwardinus (de causa Dei) Valesius (de sacra Philosophia) and chief of Gassendus (in Animadvers. in phys. Epicuri:) the leaves of whose most learned Works, we blush not to confess ourselves to have been so conversant in, that we have sullied them by often revolution. Nor can we expect the Perversion of this our ingenuous Acknowledgement, by any, but the Malevolent, or Illiterate, to a Diminution of the credit due to this our industrious Spicilegium; while those Bookmen, whose vigilant nostrils are acquainted with the odour of the Lamp, need not be informed, how many anxious hours have been spent on the sedulous Extraction of this Vial of precious Truths, from the choicest Flowers of so many excellent Gardens (wherein only to have had some recreative and private Walks, to many hath been justly accounted no obscure Specimen of both Literature, and Ingenuity.) especially when we are not destitute of grounds for our hopes, that they will soon find those Flowers, not to have lost much of their native Fragrancy and Virtue, by passing the Alembic of our Pen; as also, that it hath been no small part of our care, to Refuse, as well as Elect. Besides, there are many Stars, and those of the greatest magnitude, now shining with full splendour, in the sphere of Learned Authors, whose beams were in great part derived from others, whom the revolution of Time had made less vertical, and declined toward the West of Oblivion. Who can blast the verdant Laurel on Virgil's front, by saying, though truly, that He converted more than 1000▪ of Homer's verses to his own use? Who lessen the sound of Homer's Fame, by exclaiming, that his Muse was a Drone, and lived upon the Honey she so largely sucked from the elder Hives of Theocritus, Apollonius, and Hesiod? Who detract from the full glory of Cicero, by objecting that most of his strong and limpid streams of Eloquence flowed from those two noblest springs of Greece, Plato and Demosthenes? Or, who will diminish one grain of incense, in his sacrifice to the memory of that Alcides (for the conquest of monstrous Difficulties) the mighty Stagirite; because Clearchus hath a tradition, that he saw and discoursed with that knowing Jew, from whose oraculous mouth all his Philosophical Maxims were delivered to him? To come nearer home; who hath thought the less of Grotius his Tract of the verity of Christian Religion; because it seems a Compendium of Mornaeus, of the same Subject and Inscription? Or, who undervalved Mornaeus, in regard of the abundant Contributions he received from Lactantius, Raymundus de Sabunde, Aquinas, & Ludovicus Vives? And therefore, though we we are sufficiently conscious of the great disparity betwixt those Giant Wits, and our pygmy Acquisitions; and therefore gladly place ourselves more than one sphere below them: yet shall we conceive ourselves not a little injured, if any shall deny our Book a room in their Libraries, only because it praesents, in Epitome, and entire, what many months reading of the Schoolmen would have exhibited at large, and in fractures. Aphranius, an eminent Poet, for answer to those Semi-Criticks, who accused him of stealing many remarkable passages from Menander, returns thus; Fateor, accepi non modò ab illo, sed ut quisque habuit quod conveniret mihi, & à Latino quoque quodcunque me non posse facere melius credidi. Moreover, every Brain is not constellated for new Discoveries; nor can every Age boast the production of a Copernicus, Gilbert, Galileo, Mersennus, Cartesius, or a Harvy: Providence introducing such, as Time doth New Stars, single and seldom. ¶. And as concerning our last Requisite, viz. an aequitable consideration of our Defects and Impediments; to this also are we constrained to court our Reader, in order to our refraction of the Rigour of Censure. For though we need not advertise, that the Nerves of our Intellect are too slender and feeble to sustain so great a weight; and our Pencil too rude and gross, to express such fine Metaphysical and Theosophical Notions, in draughts respondent to the life of their Importance; in regard the frequent stooping of our Cogitations below the dignity and due height of the subject, must soon discover the one, and the Roughness of our Style through the whole Piece, as soon confess the other: yet can it not be supervacaneous for us here to intimate, that we had more than one Disadvantage to encounter. First, the often Fermentations and Ebullitions of our Melancholy; to the tyranny of which feculent and Saturnine humour both our native Temperament, and sedentary contemplative condition of life have equally subjected us; could not but as often obnubilate the region of our Mind, and darken the prospect of our soul, by infecting the requisite purity and lucidity of our spirits, with thick clouds of opac and fuliginous Exhalations. Secondly, the course of our Profession, rendering us obnoxious to many more Distractions, Interturbations, and Avocations, by the intrusion and importunity of the Sick, than we could obtain minutes of retirement for Lecture and Meditation; will, we hope, be confessed to have had more than a finger in the causation of those Chasms, Inaequalities, Omissions, etc. Lapses, which occur to the observation of the Austeres and Curious. And, Thirdly, it cannot but deserve some favour, to give notice; that the Clue of our studies was broken off in the midst, by the rough hand of the late Epidemic Dysentery, which arresting us even then, when the contexture of this Web required the most confirmed vigour of body, and serenity of mind; confined us to the dungeon of a sick bed so long and closely, that it hath left sensible impressions of its Malignity, not only upon our Constitution, but also upon more than half of these our Lucrubrations. To these Mitigatory Arguments, may rightly be added, the Narrowness of our present Fortunes, the Thinness of our Library, our tedious attendance on Committees (all the sad effects of our late Intestine Wars) together with some other private Remora's, the least whereof may serve to the Judicious and Benign, as a sufficient incitement to look upon our Imperfections, through the diminishing Telescope of Charity. Now, this humble Apology we address only to the Erudite and Candid, experience having confirmed, that none the strongest Charm of Reason, can bind the virulent tongue of that livid Viper, Envy, the spirit of whose venom doth wholly consist in Detraction. UPON DOCTOR CHARLTON'S NATURAL THEOLOGY. So, our poor Cotsall Springs, that have no names, Render their Tribute to your mighty Thames. But your Book's perfect in itself. We do Only acknowledge, not increase, what You Have sent forth, streaming through the Land again, Out of your Generous, purely-stowing Pen. To give more Elegy, with my soft Quill, To Yours from Eagles' wing, were even as ill, As threaden lace on cloth of Gold to pin, Or o'rlay Gold itself with base Tin. Yet may I venture thus: though not to praise: To answer OB's, Envy perhaps will raise. 'tis fit that Censure wait on All that's done; " Wits are made great by Emulation. Some places are obscure. The Book's not Good, By every vulgar Head is understood. What you don't understand, read o'er again; Compare, Confer, and Meditate: 'Tis plain. Th' English is Latin. Know, that th' English Tongue Hath from each Language Consummation: And He, that will our Learnedest Writers scan, Must be both Latinist and Grecian. The style's too High. Fear not the Critics Rod: " High Phrase is born of your High Thoughts of GOD. Forward, Dear Brother: " GIFTS for use are lent: " To do most good, brings in the most * p. 120. Content. Your Physic has done Miracles: But sure, TH' ATHEIST CONVERTED's, your Divinest Cure. ALIUD. IN EJUSDEM OPERA. CHarltonus is, qui Helmontium pridem dedit, Nuperque nobis reddidit Helmontium; Hunc pulveris miranda sympathetici, Hunc cruditis exprimentem paginis Medentium, De Fluxibus, Lapsus graves; Nuperriméque Calculum, foetum Suum, (O abdita praeclarior Gemniâ Liber!) Donasse luce publicum gaudet bonum; Jam nunc ad altiora surgit. Numinis Assertor est, Vindexque providentiae. Fortuna, Fati vis, Voluntas Libera, Summi docentur obsequi Dictis Dei. Deo favente, Cuncta. Vocum Copiam Lectissimarum mirer, an Rerum magis? Utramque miror, pariter atque exosculor: Utramque pronus veneror, & longè sequor. O Autor annumerande Charltonis Tuis! Gassende, Chartes, Magne Sennerte Angliae! Et ipse vivas, & Libri vivant diu! Et Artium, de Te, optimae certent diu! Homines priori Opere devinctos habes; Nunc Maximum Tibi obligavisti DEUM. Clemens Barksdallus. THE CONTENTS, SERIES, AND ORDER OF THE WHOLE BOOK. CHAP. I. The Existence of God demonstrated. page 1. SECT. I. ARTIC. 1. ARistotle, the most Knowing and curious Ethnic, did yet, by his silence in the cardinal point of Theology, proclaim the impossibility of man's full understanding the simple and perfect Essence of God. p. 1. 2. The Hebrews intimated so much, in the immoderate Veneration enjoined towards his Name Jehovah. p. 3. 3. The clearer sighted Christian also can perceive no more of the Divine Nature, than what is shadowed in its Attributes. ibid. 4. And therefore the Author restrains the Readers expectation only to a Demonstration of the Existence of God, in this chap. subnecting a short scheme of his present Design and Method. p. 4. SECT. II. ARTIC. 1. THe Mind of man can have no cognition of the Nature of its Objects, but by the mediation of their proper Ideas. p. 5. 2. Those Ideas are (1) Innate (2) Adventitious (3) Imaginary. p. 6. 3. A strict enquiry, whether the Ideas of objects existent without ourselves, hold an exact simlitude to their Natures. ibid. 4. A second Disquisition, whether any of those things, whose Ideas are found in the mind of man, have any existence without it? p. 8. 5. A firm induction, that its impossible for any Idea to import or comprehend more of perfection, than its prototype, or Cause. p. 10. 6. And therefore, if any Idea contain more of perfection, then can be sound in our minds ● certainly our minds cannot be the Efficient of that Idea. ibid. 7. The diversity of Ideas, respective to the diversity of Entities. ibid. 8. The possible originals of each sort severely examined, and all sound desumable from ourselves; the Idea of God only excepted. p. 11. 9 The Idea of God, here described, cannot be either formally, or materially false, but the most clear, distinct and true of all others. p. 13. 10. A declarement of the impossibility of the divine Ideas desumption either from ourselves. p. 15. 11. Or from some other cause less perfect than God. p. 18. 12. Or from our Parents. p. 19 13. The concernment of all; or a conclusion that the Idea of the divine nature is innate and congenial to the mind of man. p. 20. 14. An abstract, or Anacephalaeosis of the whole demonstration. p. 21. SECT. III. ARTIC. 1. THe importance of the term, Cogitation. p. 21. 2. Of an Idea. ibid. 3. Of the objective reality of an Idea. p. 22. 4. Of the ●o●mal, and eminent being of Attributes in the objects of Ideas. ibid. ●. Of a substance. ibid. 6. Of the word, Mind. ibid. 7. Of a Body. p. 23. 8. Of the real distinction of two substances. ibid. 9 Of the substance supremely perfect. ibid. SECT. iv ARTIC. 1. OBject. 1. That the mind of man, being sinite, cannot extend to the clear and distinct intellection of an Infinite, quatenus an infinite: and the Solution thereof by three distinctions. p. 23. 2. Object. 2. That the Idea of the divine nature, resident in the mind os man is a mere Ens rationis: and the Solut: p. 27. 3. Object. 3. That an effect may have more os reality, or pers●ction th●n its Cause: and the Solut: p. 27. 4. Object. 4. That the existence of such an excellent Idea, as hath been described of the Divine Nature doth not necessitate the existence of an Entity, in all points respondent, or superior thereto: because of the possible composing such an Idea, out of our collections from sensible objects: p. 29. And the ample Solut: p. 31. 5. Object. 5. That the Idea conceived of God, is capable of Augmentation and diminution: and the clear Solut: p. 32. 6. Many scruples, concerning the finality, manner, and form of the Idea imprcst; as also concernining the seeming Heterogeneity, or Alterily between the essence of the mind and that of the Idea: particularly satisfied. p. 33. CHAP. II. That God created the world ex nihilo, proved by Arguments Apodictical. page 39 SECT. I. ARTIC. 1. THe inseparability, or (rather) identity of God, and Creator. b. 39 2. The two respects, which inclined the Author to amore a m●le comprobation of the first Article of our Christian creed; together with a dielenchical explosion of that antiquatated delusion, that the Universe was autocthenous in its original, or constructed merely by Chance. ibid. 3. The summary of Empedocles, Leucippus, Epicurns, Democritus, & c. doctrines of the world's spontaneous result from a Chaos of Atoms. p. 40. 4. A Digression, winnowing the Chaff from the Wheat concealed in the former theory of Epicurns, and by the Corollary of some castigations, restrictions and additions, declaring the great advantages, that this Hypothesis of Atoms hath beyond any other concerning the Material Principle of all Bodies, as yet excogitated. p. 43. SECT II. ARTIC. 1. THe conceit of the World's fortuitous production, disparaged by a praepollency even of Pagan Authority, that profoundly asserted the contrary, viz. of 2. Thales Milesius. p. 47, 48. 3. Anaxagoras. ibid. 4. Pythagoras and Plato. ibid. 5. The Stoics. p. 49. 6. Aristotle. ibid. SECT. III. ARTIC. 1. THe pretext of Fortune destroyed, by the constancy of Nature in her act of specification, (i. e.) the restraint and determination of the semnalties of Animals to the procreation of their like in specie: and the Atheists objection, of fiequent Anomalous and Heteroplasmical, or monstrous Productions, dissolved. p. 53. 2. The necessity of the World's Creation by an Agent infinite in Science and Power, proclaimed by the constant Uniformity of Nature, in her perpectuation of Vegetables. p. 56. 3. The Sun convincively demonstrates the infinite wisdom of its Creator, by 3. Arguments: viz. 1. The universal convenience of its situation in its proper orb. p. 57 2. The appointment of its continual Circ umgyration. p. 58. 3. The contrivement of its obliqne motion along the line Ecliptic. p. 59 4. The impresses of an infinite Intelligence, plainly legible in the fronts even of Subterraneous Inanimates. p. 60. 5. The impossibility of the world's Creation by any Agent but God, illustrated both by the Magnitude, and Pulchritude thereof: and the Epicureans dream, of a motive faculty eternally inherent in Atoms, derided. p. 61. 6. The Epicureans grand Argument, of the possibility of the consiguration of the Universe by a casual and spontaneous disposition of Atoms, from the frequent actual production of an jusect by the same means or principles; countermined by an inversion or Argument à majori ad minus. p. 65. 7. An exception against the seeming disparity betwixt their inserence and ours, prevented: and the invalidity of theirs, though their own hypothesis were conceded in terminis, declared by an adequate similitude. p. 67. 8. The conclusion of this section; or, the aequipondium of the praecedent reasons, if prepended in the mass and conjunctively, to the most perfect demonstration. p. 68 SECT. iv ARTIC. 1. THat Antique absurd expostulation, who● Instruments Auxiliants, materials predisposed, God made use of, in his act of Fabrication of the Universe, copiously satisfied: and the energy of the Divine Will commonstrated superior to the indigence of either. p. 69. 2. A second immodest interrogation, wherefore God so long deferred the creation, resolved: with a detection of the unreasonableness of undecent curiosity. p. 73. CHAP. III. Why God Created the World. Page 77. SECT. I. ARTIC. 1. THe improbability of the world's creation by God, insinuated, by the Atheists, from his defect of any possible Motive, scope, or final cause. p. 71. 2. Their first Argument, that the divine Nature is above the capacity of either emolument or delectation, from the Universe. p 78. 3. The satisfactory resutation thereof; and Gods glory manifested to have been his prime and principal end. p. 79. SECT. II. ARTIC. 1. THeir second Argument; that God had no especial regard to the benefit of Man: and the Fortification thereof by 8 reasons. p. 82. 2. The total redargution thereof by a commonstrance that the benefit and felicity of man, was Gods secondary end: and the impossibility of satisfaction to the first end, by any creature but man, concluded, from his 1. Rationality. p. 86. 2. Sermocination. p. 88 3. Lucretius his 8. reasons subverted, particularly. p. 90. CHAP. IU. The General Providence of God Demonstrated. page 94. SECT. I. ARTIC. 1. THe Author's reasons for his present adherence to the common discrimination of Providence from Creation. p. 94. 2. The Definition and received Division of divine Providence. p. 95. 3. A short list of the principal ethnic Physiologists, who, in order to their propagation of Atheism, have attempted the eradication of this magisterial verity of divine Providence: and a gentle cure of S. Hieroms wound, caused by his venial lapse from the same. ibid. 4. The Atheists first Argument against universal Providence, with the absurd and malicious comment of Lucretius thereupon. p. 97. 5. Their second Argument: and its convenient dissection into two parts, viz. 1. The irregularity of contingencies: p. 99 2. The unequal or unjust distribution of good and evil. p. 101. SECT. II. ARTIC. 1. That the Notion of General Providence is Proleptical; inferred from the umversality of its recepeption. p. 102. 2. From the misplaced devotion of Idolaters. ibid. 3. From the confession of most Philosophers of the highest form; as of 1. Ecphantus. p. 103 2. Plato. ibid. 3. Aristotle. ibid. 4. The Stoics. p. 104. 5. The Academics and Sceptics. ibid. 4. A review of the induction: and the Argument found to be Apodictical on one side; and on the other only persuasive. p. 105. SECT. III. ARTIC. 1. GOds General Providence demonstrated by the Idea of his Nature reflected on our thoughts. p. 107. 2. The same particularly supported by that trinity of Attributes, viz. his 1. Infinite Wisdom. p. 109. 2. Infinite Power. ibid. 3. Infinite Goodness. p. 110. 3. The necessity of the world's gubernation, by the indefinent influence of God's general Providence, demonstrated from the consideration of the absolute and total dependence of all Second Causes upon the First. p. 111. 4. The vastity of the world: the infinite variety of its parts: and the irreconcilable discord of many natures, demonstrate as much. p. 113. 5. Under what restriction we are to understand that tropology of some Hermetical Philosophers, Deum esse Animam Mundi. p. 114. 6. The Atheists subterfuges of Nature and Fortune praecluded. p. 116. SECT. iv ARTIC. 1. THe Atheists first Antiprovidential Argument refuted, by the Perfection of the Divine Nature: and their absurdity, in commensurating the excellencies of God, by the infinitely inferior Faculties of man, detected. ibid. 2. Divinity demonstrated superior to the circumscription both of Time and Place. p. 118. 3. That the procuration of all the infinitely various actions of second causes, in the World, cannot be any interturbation of God's serene felicity, proved by an Argument à minori. p. 119. 4. The same illustrated by a second comparison. p. 120. 5. That the administration of petty occurrences can be no indignity or disparagement to the sacred Majesty of God; but, on the Contrary, absolutely essential to him, firmly evicted, from the universality of his Cognition and Presence. p. 121. SECT. V ARTIC. 1. THe first division of the Atheists second objection; viz. that the apparent irregularity of events doth justify their non-praedestination or mere Contingency; strongly convelled: and that to the praeordination of Divinity nothing can be casual; clearly commonstrated. p. 124. 2. The Authors Antithesis, that all Natural Agents are under the strict laws of their distinct species. p. 129. 3. A second Counterposition, that those laws were instituted and sancited by an infinite wisdom. ibid. 4. A third, that the legislator hath reserved to himself a prerogative power to alter, transcend, invert, or repeal the laws of Nature. ibid. 5. The verity of the first and second Positions, amply demonstrated. p. 130. 6. The verity of the third Position demonstrated. p. 136. 7. A farther confirmation of the same by an Argument, from the miraculous operations of God in praeterito. p. 137. 8. That there was an universal Deluge. p. 138. 9 The Cessation of Satan's Oracles, after the advent of the Word of Truth, proved authentiquely. ibid. 10. That there was a prodigious Eclipse of the Sun, at the passion of our Saviour. p. 140. 11. A Demonstration of the impossibility of the Catholic Deluges proceeding from Causes Natural. p. 141. 12. That the Cessation of Pagan Oracles, upon the incarnation of God, was an effect merely fupernatural; comprobated uncontrollably. p. 146. 13. That the Eclipse of the Sun, at the death of Christ, was purely Metaphysical, irrefutably demonstrated. p. 149. 14. The Adaequatien of all to the verification of the Authors third Position. p. 152. SECT. VI ARTIC. 1. Lucretius' his blasphemy, that man's ignorance of the energy of Natural Causes, is the sole basis of the opinion of an Universal Providence. p. 152. 2. The redargution thereof. p. 153. 3. Magnanimity the proper effect of Religion. p. 154. 4. The opinion, of a General Providence, consistent with Physiology. p. 155. 5. Lucretius his scruples concerning the seemingly temerarious effects of the Thunderbolt; singularly resolved. ibid. CHAP. V The especial Providence of God Demonstrated. page 157. SECT I. ARTIC. 1. THe introduction, intimating the near cognation betwixt this present, and the precedent Theme: and the necessity of the Author's beginning at the Atheists Objections. p. 157. 2. The first objection, desumed from the Apathy of the Divine Nature. p. 158. 3. The same excogitated by Epicurus: and promoted by Lucretius. ibid. 4. The second objection, extorted from man's being obnoxious to the hostility of many other Natures. p. 159. 5. The last objection, of the Adversity of the Pious and Prosperity of the Impious, in this life. p. 160. 6. The sporadical diffusion thereof upon Ethnics, Hebrews and Christians: and the probability of their opinion, who hold the book of Job, to be a Treatise concerning the same subject, insinuated. p. 16●. SECT. II. ARTIC. 1. THat man is the sole object of God's special Providence, argued from hence; that he is the principal object of his (extrinsical) love: and that inferred from hence, (1) that God hath impressed upon the mind of man a greater knowledge of his Divinity, then upon any other Creature, Angels only excluded: (2) that man is only qualified to speculate, admire, and laud the pulchritude of Nature. p. 166. 2. That the soul of man contains a proleptical notion of God's special Providence. p. 170. 3. That this proleptical notion is the basis of Religion. ibid. 4. That Man brings into the world with him, an irresistible propension to Religion. p. 172. 5. An objection, that the Calaici were absolute Atheists, refuted. p. 173. 6. A second objection, that the Massagetae and Scythians were devoid of all Religion, prevented. ibid. 7. That it is not in the power of man, totally to cradicate this plant of Religion, or notion of special Providence Divine, out of his mind; evinced from hence, that the most contumatious Atheists have, at some time or other, acknowledged it: as, p. 174. 8. Pharaoh. ibid. 9 Herod Agrippa. p. 175. 10. Antiochus Epiphanes. ibid. 11. Maximinus. p. 176. 12. Julian Apostata. p. 177. 13. Tullus Hostilius. ibid. 14. Bion Borysthenites. p. 178. 15. The possibility of the obscuration of the impress of special Providence Divine, pro tempore, conceded: and the impossibility of the total Deletion thereof, briefly proved. p. 179. 16. The reduction of all, to a concise and memorable demonstration; that the occurrences of every man's life are the consignations of special Providence. p. 180. SECT. III. ARTIC. 1. THe Atheists first objection, confuted: and the Divine Nature demonstrated both irascible and placable, (anthropopathically.) p. 180. 2. The Atheists scruple, of God's inaudition of the prayers of good men, or not concession of their petitions; satisfied. p. 183. 3. The Atheists second Argument against Special Providence divine, dissolved: and the necessity of Objects hostile, and deleterious to the life of man, demonstrated. p. 184. 4. The same illustrated, by a correspondent simile. p. 185. 5. The Atheists last and grand objection, of the prosperity of the Vicious, and adversity of the Virtuous, redargued: and the nature of the Goods of Fortune profounded. p. 186. 6. The Reason, wherefore Divine Providence confers Good things on Evil men. p. 189. 7. Those apparent Evils, which Providence Divine consignes to Virtuous men, anatomised; and found to be real Goods intrinsically. p. 190 8. The Author's Sanctuary wherein he secured his mind from discontent, in all those storms of Calamities, which our late Civil war showered upon him. p. 191. 9 Virtue, a mere Chimaera, without the occursion of those things, which Sensuality calls Evil. p. 192. 10. The Sense, no competent Criterion of the Good or Evil of the mind. ibid. 11. The Atheists objection, that God aught, in justice, always to preserve Good men from suffering Evil; expunged. p. 195. 12. The Summum bonum of this life, consistent in a full conformity of our wills to the Divine will. p. 196. 13. An excellent meditation of Marcus Antoninus concerning the Good and Evil occurrent to man in this life. ibid. CHAP. VI The Mobility of the Term of man's Life asserted. page 199. SECT. I. ARTIC. 1. THe Assinity of this Theorem to the precedent, intimated: and the necessary division thereof into a specifical and individual consideration. p. 199. 2. The reasons of the Author's concise tractation of the first part. p. 200. 3. The moderation of Death by Special Providence Divine, argued from the impossibility of the moderation thereof by any other power. ibid. 4. The same demonstrated, from the necessary dependence of all natural motion in its beginning, continuation, and period, on the will of the First Mover. p. 202. SECT. II. ARTIC. 1. A Transient discovery of the almost insuperable Difficulties to be encountered in the worthy and satisfactory solution of this problem, whether the Term of man's life be Movable, or Fatal; premised by way of Apology for the Author's unequal judgement: and his purpose of taking a middle way between the absolute Fatality of the Soick, and the mere Fortune of the Epicurean. p. 204. 2. Two praevious considerables, necessary to the right understanding and consequent discussion of the question. p. 207. 3. The necessary relation of all Causes both of life and death, to three General heads, viz. Necessary, Fortuitous, Supernatural; supports the discrimination of the Term of life into Supernatural, Natural and Accidentary: and the impertinency of the consideration of the Supernatural Term, to the present scope. p. 207. 4. The proper import of the Natural Term o● man's life, and also of the Accidental. p. 209. 5. The result of our acceptation of the Term of life, in the first signification. ibid. 6. The consequence of our understanding the Term of life, in the second signification. p. 210. 7. The Fixation of the Term of life, acceptable in a double interest; viz. (1) in respect to some Absolute Divine Decree, precedent even to God's Prescience of all Secondary or instrumental Causes: (2) to some Hypothetical Divine Decree, whose mutability is suspended on the liberty of man's Will. And the indifferency of either branch of the distinction to our instant design. p. 211. 8. Three different opinions vulgarly extracted from the precedent Distinction. p. 212. 9 The convenient reduction of them to two only. ibid. 10. The First opinion declared: and the principal Abettors thereof mentioned. p. 213 11. The Stoical Fate; and the Calvinists Predestination, fully defined. p. 215. 12. A full and clear discrimination of the Stoical, from the Theological Fate. ibid. 13. A list of the execrable Absurdities impendent on the opinion of Absolute Fatality; so accepted as the Stoic proposeth it. p. 217. SECT. III. ARTIC. 1. THe Author's adhaesion to the Second opinion, justified by two important reasons. p. 219. 2. The great obscurity, and small validity of some Texts of holy writ, alleged by the Defendants of Fatality to warrant their opinion, detected. p. 220. 3. The Natural Causes (proxime) of the Longitude and Brevity of man's life: and the Author's private conjecture of the cause of Longevity in the first age of the world. p. 221. 4. The injustice of our Adversaries title of patronage from the forementioned text of Job, further manifested. p. 222. 5. Seven testimonies, out of holy writ, supporting the mobility of the Term of man's life, in individuo. p. 223. 6. A full vindication of the Fourth Testimony, from the several Exceptions made against the appropriation thereof to our scope, by the patrons of Fatality. p. 227 7. The second Testimony vindicated from several Exceptions. p. 233. 8. The sixth Testimony cleared, from 4. Exceptions. p. 237. SECT. iv ARTIC. 1. THe necessity of our enquiry into the mystery of Praedestination, in order to the solution of the present difficulty: and the Fatists grand Argument. p. 240. 2. The refutation thereof, by the conciliation of the infallibility of God's Praenotion, to the indetermination of man's free will to the actual election of Good or Evil. p. 241. 3. The diametral Disparity between that Divine Praenotion which is antecedent to Divine Praeordination; and that which is subsequent; amply declared. p. 243. 4. A second illustration of the same difference by a pertinent Instance, or exemplification. p. 244. 5. A third illustration of the same Difference, by conceiving the Divine Decrees, in the same subordinate series, which the Fatists have imagmed. p. 247. 6. The first Absurdity impendent on the opinion of a Decretory Prescience of God, as to the Actions of man. p. 249. 7. A Second Absurdity connected to the same. p. 251. 8. Two Subterfuges of the Fatist, praecluded. p. 252. 9 A third Absurdity inseparable from the hypothesis of a Decretory Prescience Divine. p. 253. 10. the reduction of the whole dissertation to 4. Conclusions, genuinely extracted from the Premises. p. 254. CHAM VII. Of the Liberty Elective of Man's Will. page 257. SECT. I. ARTIC. 1. THe Parity of Absurdities resulting from those two Antagonistical Hypotheses, of Absolute Fatality, and mere Contingency, as to the Actions of man. p. 257. 2. Those 2 contrary streems found to have been derived from one and the same poisonous Fountain; viz. a subterfuge of man to evade Culpability. p. 258. 3. The Author's Incitements, here to inquire profoundly into the Natures of freewill, Fortune, and Fate. p. 259. 4. What is intended properly by the Liberty of man's Will. ibid. 5. The several subordinate Actions of the Mind, exercised about its objects: and the respective scholastic Terms, by which Philosophers have adaequately expressed them. p. 260. SECT. II. ARTIC. 1. THe Essence of man's Liberty Elective, consistent primarily in the Indifferency of the Intellect; and in the Will only dependently. p. 263. 2. An egregious Error of some Divines, that the Liberty of the Will doth consummately consist in its immovable Fixation on real Good. p. 264. 3. Their inadvertency of the real Difference between a Spontaneous, and Arbitrary action; the occasion of that Error. ibid. 4. That a Spontaneous action, and an indeliberate Impulse of Nature, are homologous or identical. ibid. 5. The Divines objection, that the Tendency of of the Will is Volent, and therefore Free; prevented, by a distinction of Libency and Liberty. p. 265. 6. Their Superstructure, that the Perfection of the Wills Liberty is its constant Adhaesion to, and inseparability from real Good, dedemolished by two reasons: (1) that this Perfection imagined is not of the Liberty, but the Will itself; (2) that it belongs only to separated Souls, in the state of Glorification. p. 266. 7. What kind of Indifferency that is, wherein the Liberty Elective is Essenced. p. 267. 8. That to every judgement of the Intellect, is immediately and necessarily conjoined an Appetition or Aversation of the Will; respective to the Good, or Evil nunciated. p. 268. 9 The Instability of the Will, in its Appetitions, necessarily caused by the Instability of the Intellect in its Judgements. p. 269. 10. The Delusion of the Intellect in its Judgements, necessitateth the Delusion of the Will in its dependent Appetitions. p. 270. 11. That the Indifferency of the Will is but the shadow, or representative of that Indifferency in the Intellect; and the Determination of this necessitates the Determination of that. ibid. 12. The Analogy betwixt the Intellect, and a Balance. p. 271. 13. That the Intellect doth naturally conform to the attraction of the greater Verisimility: and the reason of its Fluctuation. p. 272. 14. That the Determination of the Intellect to one or two objects, is caused either by the more ponderous Appearance of Verity therein, or the minds greater Attention to the moments of reason apparent on that side, then to those on the other. ibid. 15. That the Appearance of Truth is always the cause of the Intellects inclination. p. 273. 16. Three considerable Inferences from the praemises. ibid. 17. Cartesiu▪ his General Preservative against the excesses of Passions. p. 274. 18. General Rules praes●●ibed by the Author, how to prevent the Delusion of the Understanding, and dependent seduction of the Will by Evil disguised under the similitude of Good. p. 275. SECT. III. ARTIC. 1. AN objection, that Ignorance is the mother of sin. p. 277 2. The same expeded, by a Distinction of Science into Habitual, and Actual. ibid. 3. A reply, that the reluctancy of every Delinquents Conscience, doth evidence the possibility of man's doing an Act repugnant to his Actual Science. p. 278. 4. The rejoinder, that the Habitual Science of every Delinquent, is perturbed and obnub●lated by some Passion, excited in him: and that the Remors of Conscience proceeds from the sense of the Loss of Good. p. 279 5. What kind of Ignorance that is, which may, in some degree, excuse a Delinquent. p. 280. 6. Four weighty Reasons, convincing, that man hath an Absolute Power in himself to control the temptations of Evil. p. 282. 7. What those First Motions are, which objects inevitably excite in the Mind: and that the Consequences of those motions are praeventible. p. 283. 8. Necessity and Fear conceded to be, in some measure, Excuses: and what are the objects of Excusing Fear. p. 286. CHAP. VIII. Of Fortune. page 289. ARTIC. 1. THe Antiquity and Genealogy of Fortune. p. 289. 2. Plato and Arist. their Descriptions of Fortune examined, and illustrated: and 3. Conclusions inferred thereupon. p. 291. 3. Their Anatomy of her Nature, deficient: and a more perfect one presented. p. 293. 4. Fortune, nothing but a mere Negation of all Praenotion i● a Concourse of Natural Causes, respective to a Fortuitous Event. p. 295. 5. Epicurus commended, for illustrating the instability and uncertainty of Fortune. ibid. 6. Her Indivinity manifested: and how she came by her Deification. p. 296. 7. All sober Philosophers vindicated from the guilt of ascribing Divinity to Fortune. p. 297. 8. The Necessity and use of Allegorical, Symbolical, and Emblematical Traditions, invented by the Ancients. p. 298. 9 Their Descriptions of Fortune, only Emblematical. p. 299. 10. As also the Images of Fortune framed by Painters, and Statuaries. p. 300. 11. The review, tolerating the name of Fortune, in respect to man: but detesting it, in respect to God. p. 301. CHAP. IX. Of Fate. page 302. SECT I. ARTIC. 1. THe convenient reduction of all opinions, concerning the Essence of Fate, to 2. General Heads. p. 302. 2. What the Platonist and Stoic meant by Fate, considered (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) as a substance. p. 303. 3. And, what (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) as an Energy or Act: together with the etymological reasons of those sundry Appellations, the Stoics have imposed upon it. p. 304. SECT II. ARTIC. 1. THe second Classis of Philosophers, who understood Fate to be a Constitution merely Natural subdivided into 2 distinct Sects: viz. (1) those who assert the Immutability and Inevitability of Fate; (2) those who defend the possibility of its Alteration and Evasion. p. 305. 2. The Leaders of the First Sect, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Leucippus, Pa●menides, and chief Democritus. p. 306. 3. Democritus justly cha●ged with the patronage of Inevitable Fate: and his doctrine concerning it concisely rehearsed. ibid. SECT. III. ARTIC. 1. THe Principal of the Second Sect, Aristotle and Epicurus. p. 312. 2. The Grounds of the Authors in putting the opinion both of Fates Identity with Nature, and the possibility of its Mutation and Declination, by either Fortuitous or Arbitrary Antagonists, to Aristotle. ibid. 3. Epicurus unanimous to Aristotle, in the point of Physical and Eluctable Necessity. p. 314. 4. The scope of Epicurus his Figment of the Declination of Atoms in the human Soul: and his Accommodation thereof to the tuition of man's Liberty epitomised. ibid. 5. An Exception, in the name of Democritus, against Epicurus Inference. p. 316. 6. The justification thereof, by a Respons conform to the Physiology of Epicurus p. 317. 7. The most weighty rejoinder, (of the connexion of those Causes, which Avert the Mind from, so well as of those, which Attract it to an object, to the eternal Series▪ of Fate) found too light to overbalance Epicurus his defence of man's Liberty. p. 319. SECT. iv ARTIC. 1. MAthematical Fate briefly described p. 321. 2. The gross Vanity thereof concealed from many Philosophers, only by the cloud of Transcriptive Adhaesion to Antique Traditions. ibid. 3. The Absurdity of sidereal Necessity evicted (1) by an Argument desumed from the Hypothetical Necessity of the Matter on which Celestial Impressions are to operate. 323 4. (2) By the common Experiment of the unaequal Fortunes of Twins. p. 324. 5. (3) By the double Impiety, inseparable from the belief thereof. p. 325. CHAP. X. The Liberty of Man's Will, Fortune, and Fate conciliated to Providence Divine. page 328. SECT. I. ARTIC. 1. THE intent of the chapter. p. 328. 2. Democritus Fate, inconsistent both to the Fundamentals of Religion, and the Liberty of man's Will: and therefore detested. ibid. 3. Aristotle and Epicurus their Fate admitted, in that it is Identical to Nature: but abominated, in that it clasheth with the Certitude of Divine Prescience. p. 329. 4. The Platonic and Stoic Fate embraced, so far as it is conceded to be a Constitution of the Divine Wisdom: but abandoned, in that it detracts from Divine Omnipotence. ibid. 5. In what qualified sense Christianisme may tolerate the use of the term, Fate. ibid. SECT. II. ARTIC. 1. FAte and Fortune conciliated, in the point of Providence Divine. p. 330. 2. Plutarch's ingenious Assimilation of Fate to the Civil Law: and his design therein. p. 331. SCET. III. ARTIC. 1. FAte concentrical to man's Elective Liberty, in the point of Praedestination. p. 332. 2. The Concord betwixt Theology and Philosophy, in their admission of 2. orders of Causes natural, viz. Necessary, and Free; the ground of the Affinity both betwixt the Difficulties, and Solutions, on either part: as to the Abolition of the seeming Repugnancy between Fate and man's freewill. p. 333. 3. The First capital Difficulty, desumed from Divine Prescience; as stated by Divines. p. 334. 4. The same, as stated by Philosophers. ibid. 5. The full solution of the same by virtue of the Divines Discrimination of Necessity into Absolute and Hypothetical. p. 335. 6. The Solution of the same by the Philosophers proving that the definite Praenotion of future Contingents, is no Cause of their definite Contingency: but, è contrà, the definity of their Futurition, the cause of their definite Praenotion. p. 338. 7. The Disparity betwixt Divine and Human Praenotion. p. 339. 8. The same exemplified. ibid. SECT. iv ARTIC. 1. THe Second Capital Difficulty, erected upon a sophism called Ignava Ratio; as it respecteth both Theology, and Philosophy. p. 340. 2. Two eminent Opinions of Divines touchant the Solution of this Difficulty, recognized: and their judicious Modelly, in duly acknowledging the mystery of Praedestination, to be Arcanum Divini imperii commended. p. 34●. 3. The First opinion found totally uncapable of Expedition from the Sophism, Ignava Ratio. 343. 4. The Second Opinion, to a great part, extricated from the same Labyrinth. p. 345. 5. The Fatists' Subtersuge, of the Infallibility of Divine Praenotion, praecluded. p. 346. 6. A second subtersuge of the Fatist, viz. that the Subsequence of the Decree to Praenotion, doth implicate the possibility of its Elusion and Mutability; prevented. ibid. 7. A third Conclusion, viz. that the posteriority of the Decree of Election to God's praevision of man's future good actions, doth make man the Author of his own Discretion; detected and redargued. p. 347. 8. Two Extracts from the praemises; (1) that the Cooperation of man's Will to sufficient Grace, may be conceived a Cause of his Election: (2) that to render a reason, why God did not constitute All men such as that All should cooperate to sufficient Grace, and so be Elect; is an impossibility to man's understanding; other than this, that such was his eternal will. p. 347. 9 The former Sophism, (ignava Ratio) in part dissolved, by Plutarch's Distinction; that though All effects are comprehended in, yet all are not caused by Fate. p. 348. 10. The insufficiency of that Distinction, to the total solution of the Difficulty, duly acknowledged. p. 349. 11. The most promising Responses of some Philosophers, concisely presented: viz. of 1. Of Plato. ibid. 2. Seneca. p. 350. 3. Chrysippus. p. 351. 4. Aquinas. p. 352. 12. These acute Responses aequitably audited, and their import sound to be no more than this; that man hath a Freedom of Assent, but not of Dissent to the Will of God. p. 352. 13. The Dehortation from immoderate Curiosity, in Divine Mysteries: and concise Adhortation to conform unto, and calmly acquiesce in the Revealed Will of God. 353. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD DEMONSTRATED. CHAP. I. SECT. I. ARistotle, though an Ethnic, poisoned Section 1. Article 1. Aristotle, the most knowing and curious Ethnic, did yet by his silence in the cardinal point of Theology, proclaim the impossibility of man's full understanding the simple and perfect Essence of God. with the Macedonian and Grecian Idolatry, nay so given over to that sottish impiety, Polytheisme, that he could be content to make a Goddess of his Wench, and offer solemn sacrifices to her as a Deity, whom his own obscene luxury had degraded from the native dignity of Humanity, to devote his orisons to her for good, whom his own temptations had frequently subdued to evil, as Gassendus (Exercitat 3.) out of Diogenes Laert. hath accused him; had yet a strong and noble sense of the supreme Being, as may, even by his adversaries, be collected from hence, that he never durst adventure on a Desinition, nay not so much as a Description of its Nature. For though he spun out his speculations of Immaterial substances, (the only and proper theme of a Metaphysitian) into a long (but knotty and unequal) thread of 14 Books: yet in the 13 first of all those, he seems little better than wholly silent in all things that immediately concern Theology; and in some few Chapters only of the last affords us a sparing and timorous discourse of the Proprieties, or Attributes of the First Mover. Now the pride and ambition of his wit would never have suffered his pen to have skip't over that subject, which being the most abstruse, sublime, and excellent, must by consequence, have adferred the most of glory and renown unto his memory: had he not been fully convicted, from within, of the immense chasm or gulf, that lay between the utmost extent of his own finite reason, and the incomprehensibility of the Essence of God. This his evasion, or rather supersession, some have been pleased to urge against his honour, as an argument of his Ignorance in nations supernatural: but, in my construction, 'tis the clearest demonstration of the Modesty and strength of his Judgement. For whoever shall duly consider, how impossible it must be for humanity, dull, gross, and narrow humanity, to behold Invisibility, derive Independency, calculate Eternity, circumscribe Incircumscription, limit Omnipotence, understand Omniscience, etc. and how dangerous a frenzy that brain must be disordered withal, that attempts to describe what he doth not, cannot know: will soon be satisfied, that Amazement, and pious silence is the best Lecture man can read on that immense subject, of which when we have said all we can, we have said nothing, if we look forward upon that inexhaustible abyss of excellencies, which must remain unspoken of, and indeed uncomptehended; that a professed Nescience in this particular, is the compliment, or zenith of all other Science, which the mind of man is capable of in this life; and that Aristotle may better pretend to the title of the divine Philosopher, for writing so little of the Deity, than Plato for writing so much to no purpose, the latter speaking little in much, the former all that can be thought in saying nothing. And how far the ancient Hebrews (whose frequent visions Article 3. The Hebrews Intimated so much, in the immoderate veneration enjoined toward his Name, Jchovah. of Gods reflexive glories, transmitted to them in the necessary allay of sensible natures; as of the pillar of a Cloud, by day, the pillar of Fire, by night, of Smoke, Thunder and Lightning on mount Sinai, at the promulgation of the decalogue, etc. might have encouraged them to pretend a nearer acquaintance with Divinity, than any other nation of the World) were from daring to conceive any positive Adumbration of his Essence: sufficiently appears from that high veneration their law enjoined towards his very Name, Jehovah. Which was never to be pronounced by any, but the High Priest; in any place, but the Sanctum Sanctorum; at any time, but on the Festival of annual expiation; and in any case, but that of general benediction, when the Mercy and goodness of God were to be derived down upon the people by the holy mediation of the anointed successors of Aaron; under penalty of no less than death, and particularly that cruel kind of death appointed for the punishment of Blasphemy: as stands recorded in their Talmud, in the sad case of Teradions' son. Nor can the more illuminated Christian, though the superexcellence Article 3. The clearer sighted Christian also can perceive no more of the Divine nature then what is shadowed in its Attributes. of his faith justly entitle him to this dignity, above all other darker Religions; that he hath the true knowledge of God, (i. e.) that he apprehends him under that Idea, which he hath been pleased to afford of himself, in the sacred mysteries of the Gospel, as of a Trinity of Persons in an Unity of Substance, etc. most judiciously and piously collected and knit together in that admirable Anacephalaeosis or summary of the Christian doctrine, called the Creed of Athanasius; raise the eye of his understanding so high, as to look directly upon the Quiddity, or pure Essence of him whose dwelling is in light inaccessible, and invisible: but must think it happiness great enough for the entrancement of his soul, humbly and awefully to speculate him in the shadow of his Attributes, and those only which mortality is qualified to understand. This being duly prepended, our Reader needs no other advertisement, Article 4. And therefore the Author restrains the reader's expectation only to a demonstration of the Existence of God, in this Chapter subnecting a short scheme of his present design and Method. that in this Demonstration of the existence of God, from the Idea of him engraven by his own hand on the mind of man, he is not to expect any bold and vain attempt of the description of the Formality or simple Quiddity of that supreme Being, (which is the Fountain of all other Essences, and Soul of all other Causes:) and it remains only on our part, that we tender him an account both of our design, or scope, and of the method our pen observes in the pursuance thereof. Though we are fully persuaded, with Plato (Lib. 10. the l●gib. p. 871.) upon the conviction of those innate dictates, which the reason of every man whispers in the ●ares of his conscience (which proved the louder thunder of the two, and spoke more terror to the miscreant Emperor) that time never produced such a prodigy, as an Absolute Atheist, i. e. such a fool as durst indubitate the existence of a Grandfather Principle, or first Intelligence, from whom, as from the main spring in a Watch, or other Automatous Engine, all motion is derived▪ and which constantly animates the great machine of the World: yet have we too much ground to suspect, that the accursed sperm of the Giants is not yet extinct, that every age can furnish us with a precedent of Theomachy, nor need we look beyond our own Annals for a second to Caligula, or want a parallel for Epiourus. Who, though they professed the necessity of a Deity, yet sottishly ran into delusions equivalent to the downright denial thereof, and sinned as high as blasphemy, in their endeavours to cut off those two cardinal and inseparable Attributes of the supreme Essence, viz. Omnipotence, and Omniscient-omnipresence, or Active-ubiquity; not allowing the Creation of the World, out of nothing, to the one, nor the conservation, or Government of the same to the other. And having made reflexious upon the unsuccesful progress many have made, in their enterprises of confuting this sort of implicit Atheism, by the persuasion of Scripture only; we became of opinion that to enter the lists with a Lucian, or Lucretius, and there contend with him concerning the extent of God's Providence even to every single and individual nature, urging no other proof of the Affirmative but the bare authority of Canonical Writ (though to us Christians of undoubted truth and more fiduciary than demonstration) is the ready way to confirm him in his impiety, and stiffen his infidelity, in regard a plain and just exception lies against the Circle. Nor have we any probable way left to break his objections, but a sober reception of them in the shield of reason, and a smart retort of arguments desumed from the proper magazine of all temporal knowledge, the Light of Nature. Hereupon, when we had determined with ourselves to erect a building of Physical science, upon those pillars, or principles, which to our judgement appear most solid, firm and permanent, because most sensible in all the operations or effects of Nature, that can any way occur to the disquisition of Philosophy; as shall be amply commonstrated in the future application of them to particulars: and submitted our assent to that excellent Rule of the Schoolmen, Nulla res qualiscunque est, intelligi potest, nisi Deus intelligatur prius, revived into an Axiom by the incomparable Des Cartes, in these words; Omnem omnis scientiae certitudinem & veritatem, ab una veri Dei cognitione pendere; adeo ut dum ignoramus Deum esse, & verum esse, nihil omnino de ulla alia re perfecte scire possimus: we conceived it necessary to begin as high as the First Cause, God; and endeavour the demonstration first of his Existence, and consequently (for strict reason will never endure their separation) of those two general operations of his Wisdom, Power, and Goodness, viz. (1.) the Creation of the world ex nihilo, and and (2.) the continual Conservation of the same, in its primitive harmony, by his Providence; and this by Arguments so purely extracted from the chief inducements of belief, that no Atheist, how acute, or refractory soever, can justly except against them. SECT. II. 'tIs an Assertion, which bids defiance to a whole host of Sceptics; Article 1. The mind of man can have no cognition of the nature of its objects, but by the mediation of their proper Ideas. that the Soul of man, while she animates this admirable engine, the Body, can apprehend no more of the Forms of Entities, than what she reads in those reflex. Characters, Images or Ideas, which she finds represented to her in the mirror of Cogitation. Now of those Ideas, or Representations exhibited to the understanding there are three distinct orders 1. Some are Innate, Article 2. Those Ideas are 1 Innate. 2. Adventitious. or Congenial; for that I may understand, what a Thing is, what Truth is, what the act of Cogitation is: I need the assistance, or information of no other nature, but my own. 2. Others are Adventitious, or emergent from external objects; for that I actually hear sounds, see the light of the Sun, feel the heat of fire and become sensible of all other qualities of bodies: I have ever hitherto adjudged these acts of sensation to belong to my essence only at second hand, as being derivative from other causes, foreign and alien to my nature. 3. And finally others are Created, 3 Imaginary. modelled, or coined in the mint of the Imagination; for the Fancy of the most stupid Idiot is naturally empowerd to forge, or paint to itself, and represent to the mind what images it please; as Chimeras, Sirens, Harpies, Goblins, etc. As for those Ideas, on which I look as proceeding from things existent without the circle of myself; I make this enquiry: whether Article 3. A strict enquiry, whether the Ideas of objects existent without ourselves, hold an exact similitude to their natures. there be any reason sufficient to persuade me to conceive, that such Ideas are exactly like to those things; whether these Copies or transcripts are drawn to the life, so as in all particulars to resemble their originals? And the determination, wherewithal I satisfy myself, is this; that the Affirmative is taught me by nature, as being hitherto instructed, that those Ideas have no dependence at all on my Will: and so, by consequence, proceed not from myself, but are obtruded upon my cognition even against my Will. For instance, whether I will, or nill, I am sensible of the heat of Fire: and therefore think this perception or Idea of heat, to proceed from something distinct from myself, viz. from the heat of that fire, by which I stand, and obvious it is, beyond all hesitancy, that I may judge that this fire doth immit into me rather the similitude of itself, than any thing else. The stability of which reasons, I shall now strictly examine. When I here say, I am thus instructed by Nature; I intent only that I am rapt on, by a certain spontaneous violence, or native propensity, to submit my assent thereunto: not that this declared unto me to be a firm and uncontrollable truth, by the light of Nature. For I discover a vast and irreconcilable disparity between the Dictates of these two Informers: and the Difference may be stated thus. Whatever things are declared unto me, by the light of Nature; as this, that I am, because I doubt, that 2 and 3 make 5, etc. can never, on any pretence, be doubted of, in regard there can be no other faculty, or Criterion, to whose judgement or decision, I can afford so ample and firm credit, as to that of the light of Nature, which only can teach me, whether those things are true or false. But as for those Inclinations, or Propensions natural; I have long since found, by deplorable experience, that by them I have been frequently hurried unto, and in a sort impelled upon this evil, in my solitary disputes with myself concerning my judicature and election of the Good: and therefore am not in any measure convinced, why I should depend upon their information, pursue their conduct, or resign my assent to their testimony, in other cases. Again, though these Extradvenient Ideas depend not on my Will; yet is that no valid Argument, that therefore of necessity they must proceed from things without myself: for as those strong Propensities, though seated in me, and as it were annexed to my very being, do yet seem clearly distinct from my Will; so also perchance there may be another third Faculty within me, which I do not yet sufficiently understand, that coins those Ideas, as hitherto my conceptions have ever been, that in my dreams such Ideas are created in my brain, without the assistance of any foreign Objects invading my senses. And, lastly, should I grant those Counterfeit, or Ideas, to be desumed from things distinct from myself; yet could it be no justifiable inference, that therefore they must in all points resemble those things, or prototypes, from which they were transmitted: yea, in many particulars, I apprehend them to be disproportionate and dissimilar, toto coelo, by inequalities never to be parallels. To instance; I find within myself two divers Ideas of the Sun, the one taken from my sense, (which I therefore think fit to refer to that classis of Ideas, called Adventitious) representing the Sun in a very small round, of less diameter than a Coach wheel: the other from the reasons or maxims of Astronomy, i. e. extracted by way of induction, from certain Notions implantate in me, or by any other way whatever composed or modelled; which represents the Sun in a vast circumference, much larger than the Terraqueous Globe. Now both these cannot exactly respond in magnitude to their Original, the Sun, existent without me: and reason offers me invincible evidence to assure that image to be the most unlike, which seems to have most nearly streamed from the Sun itself. All which considerations to ample satisfaction evince; that hitherto I have, not upon any scientifical and authentic judgement, but only upon a certain obscure and blind impulse from within, believed, that there are a sort of Entities existent without the sphere of my nature, which, by subtle transfusion through the organs of my senses, convey the Ideas, or Idols of themselves into my mind. But I have found out another certain way, for the more happy progress of my enquiry, Whether any of those entities whose Article 4. A second disquisition, whether any of those things whose Ideas are sound in the mind of man, have any real existence without it? Ideas sojurn within me, have any real existence without me; and this is it. These Ideas, considered in this relation, that they are certain modi cogitandi, or means which the soul makes use of, in order to her act of Cogitation; have indeed no dissimilitude, Alogy, or inequality amongst themselves, and all seem to slow from me, in one and the same channel, after one and the same manner: but considered in this interest, that one represents one thing, a second another, a third another quite different from both; manifest it is, that they hugely differ each from other, as to the degrees of more or less objective reality. For doubtless, those Ideas, which represent substances, are more something, or (to speak more intelligibly, though more scholastically) contain in them more of objective reality; then those which represent only certain modifications of substances, or mere Accidents: and again, that Idea, by which I speculate some supreme Essence, or Deity eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, creator and conservator of this great All, etc. seems in severe truth, to comprehend more of objective Reality, or Formal Verity, than such poor Ideas that carry only the shadows of some subordinate, dependent and finite substances. Now evident it is, by the light of Nature, that there must be so much at least, (if not more) in the Cause efficient and Total, as is in the effect of the same Cause. For, I demand, from what can the effect derive its reality, but from the Cause? and how can the Cause bequeath that to the effect, which itself is destitute of? Out of which root spring two branches of ever flourishing truth. (1.) Nihil à nihilo fieri, nothing can be made by nothing. (2.) Id quod magis perfectum est, hoc est, quod plus realitatis in se continet, fieri non posse ab eo, quod minus perfectum est, A more perfect something, i e. which imports more of objective reality, cannot be produced by a less perfect something. So that I may safely infer, that this position hath not its verity restrained to those effects only, whose Reality is Actual, or Formal; but extended also to those Ideas, in which is considered only their Reality objective. For example; a stone, that never was before, cannot only not now begin to be, unless it be produced by some other thing, which in itself hath formally and eminently what ever is included in the perfect or full nature of the stone; nor can heat be introduced into any subject, that was not formerly hot, unless by something of equal perfection, or at least equivalent to heat: but, besides all this, there cannot be in me the Idea of a stone, unless that Idea be first inserted into me by some cause, wherein there is so much, at least, of reality, as I conceive to be in the stone, or in the heat. For though that Cause transfuse nothing of its Actual, or Formal reality into my Idea; yet am not I therefore to apprehend my Idea to be the less real, but that the nature of it is such, that it can require no more reality formal ex se, than what it borrows from my cogitation, whose manner of apprehension it is. But that this my Idea, comprehends this or that objective reality, rather than another: this must of necessity inevitable arise unto it from some other Cause, wherein is so much at least of reality Formal, as the Idea contains of objective. For if I grant any thing to be found in the Idea, which was not in the Cause thereof▪ that something it must derive from nothing: but how imperfect soever that Modus essendi, or manner of being, whereby a thing is objectively in the Intellect, by an Idea, or representative, be; yet is it not wholly nothing, and cannot therefore proceed from nothing. Nor have I any cause to suspect, that since the reality, which I consider in my Ideas, is only objective; that therefore the same reality cannot be formally inherent in the causes of them: but that it is sufficient to their nature, that it be in them only objectively. For as that Modus essendi objectivus belongs to those Ideas, by the charter of their own peculiar nature; so doth that Modus essendi sormalis properly belong to their causes, (at least to the principal and grand cause) by the law of their essence. Further though I allow it possible for one Idea to produce Article 5. A firm induction, that its impossible for any Idea to import or comprehend more of perfection, than its prototype, or cause. another; yet I can never here admit a possibility of a progress in infinitum, of unravelling the pedigree to a length so immense, as never to go so high as the Adam, or Grandfather Idea, but must at length arrive at the Ne ultra, or first Idea, whose cause is the Archtype or Protoplast, wherein all that reality is inherent Formally, which is in the Idea only objectively. So that by the light of Nature, I read this unalterable Axiom; that those Ideas or Images of other natures, or entities, which are in my understanding, are certain Counterparts, or resemblances, which, in truth, come short of the perfection of those objects, from which they were desumed, and cannot be conceived to contain any thing greater, or of more perfection than their Causes. From hence my thoughts advance to this conclusion. If the Article 6. And therefore, if any Idea contain more of perfection than can be found in our minds: certainly our minds cannot ●e the efficient of that transcendent Idea. reality objective of any Idea be so great and excellent, that I may be assured the same cannot be in me, either Formaliter, or Eminenter; and therefore I cannot be the Cause of that Idea: by direct and genuine inference I determine, that I am not alone in the World, but that there is existent in the universe some other Being, which is the father of this Idea. For if I find no such Idea occur to my mind, in earnest I know no argument, that may make me confident of the existence of any one thing distinct from myself. Now among these Ideas (that I may range them into distinct Article 7. The diversity of Ideas, respective to the diversity of Entities. orders respective to the several Degrees of Entities from which they result, or are derived) there is one which holds forth me to myself (concerning which no difficulty can be started, as to the concernment of the present Demonstration) another which represents God; others which portray things merely Corporeal and Inanimate; others which describe Angels; others resemble Animals; and finally others that show me other men like myself. As for those Ideas, which represent Men, Animals, or Angels; I easily understand, that such may be composed and made up Article 8. The possible originals of each sort severely examined, and all found to be desumable from ourselves; the Idea of God only excepted. of other Ideas, which I usually conceive of myself, and other corporeal Entities, and of God: though there were neither Men, nor Animals, nor Angels, in the whole World beside myself. And as for those of Corporeal Entities; in them I meet with nothing so great, noble, or excellent, which seems not to have its fountain or origin in myself. For when I make a deep and strict inquisition into them, I discover, that of those things, which they comprehend, there are only very few, which I clearly and distinctly understand; such are Magnitude, or Quantity extended into its three dimensions of Longitude, Latitude, Profundity; Figure arising from the termination of that extension; Situation of parts, or that position, which parts variously figurated obtain and hold among themselves; and Motion, or the change of situation in the whole, or parts composing the whole: to which may be superadded Substance, Duration, and Number. But as for other things, as Light, Sounds, Odours, Sapours, Heat, Cold, and other tactile qualities; these fall not under the comprehension of my thoughts, but darkly and with as much obscurity as confusion: insomuch that when I have summed up all I know of them, it amounts to no more than this; that I am even ignorant whether they be true or false, (i. e.) whether such Ideas, as I conceive of them, be the Ideas of things really existent, or of Nonentities. For though I have faithfully observed, that Falsity, properly and most emphatically so called, or Formal falsity, can be no where found in the world, but in our judgements, or determinations: yet is there another Material falsity in our Ideas, when they represent a Nonentity for a real Entity, a nothing in stead of a something. Thus, to exemplify, the representations which I have of Heat and Cold appear so narrow, dim, and confused; that my most intense and acute speculations cannot acquire from them any plenary and stable satisfaction, Whether could be only a privation of Heat, or Heat no more but the privation of Cold; Whether both be real and positive qualities, or neither? and since there can be no Ideas, but as of real entities; in regard it is a truth apparent, that cold is nothing else but a privation of heat, that same Idea, which exhibi●s cold as something real and positive, may justly be reputed false: and so likewise may others of the same series. To such Ideas therefore it is not necessary, that I assign any other original besides myself; for since they may be materially false, (i. e.) represent nothing under the disguise of something: it is declared unto me by the Light of Nature, that they proceed from nothing, (i. e.) that no other reason can be given, why they are in me, but only this; that something is wanting to my nature, which is requisite to make it absolutely perfect and complete: and if they were true, yet in respect they exhibit so little of reality, that I cannot, in the most abstracted contemplation, clearly distinguish that little from nothing; I see no reason, why they may not worthily be counted the Minerva's of my own brain, or the productions of my own thoughts. Now as concerning those things, which are clear and distinct in the Ideas of Corporeal Natures; I have discovered, that some of them also be derived from the Idea of myself: such are Substance, Duration, Number, etc. of the same classis. For when I consider a stone to be a substance, or an entity constituted in a capacity of subsisting per se; and at the same time consider myself also to be a substance (although I conceive myself to be Res cogitans, a thinking ens, and look not upon myself as Res extensa, a quantative or extensive; but upon a stone, as Res extensa, and not cogitans, and that therefore there must be a great dissimilitude between these two conceptions: yet they seem to be reconciled and shake hands in termino substantialitatis) and also when I consider, that I now am, and formerly have been; and when I have various cogitations, whose number I comprehend: I then acquire the Ideas of Duration and Number, which I can after transfer and apply to what other things I please. But for the residue of particular things, whereof the Ideas of Corporeal Natures are composed: as Extension, Figure, Situation, and Motion: these have not their residence in me (since I am nothing else, in propriety of essence, but Res cogitans) formaliter: and yet, in relation that they are only certain Modi substantiae, modificated substance, and I also am a substance; they seem to be comprehended in me eminenter, by way of transcendency. And so there remains unexamined only the Idea of God; in which I am to consider, whether it include any thing, which cannot be derivative from myself. By the name God, I understand a certain substance, infinite, Article 9 The Idea of God, here described, cannot be either formally, or materially false, but the most clear, distinct and true of all others. independent, omnipotent, omniscient, from which as well my own, as all other dependent natures were derived; by whose incomprehensible Wisdom, Power, and Goodness, the universe was created, according to the admirable Idea form in his own eternal intellect; and is constantly conserved in the same perfect order, and exquisite harmony, which in the beginning he was pleased to institute. Now so divine, excellent, and perfect are all these Attributes, that when with deep, yet humble and reverential thoughts I contemplate them, either conjunctively, or distinctly, I become fully informed, that they are too great and noble, to be derived from so mean, frail, and imperfect a being as myself: and upon this firm foundation I erect to myself this verity; That God doth exist. For though the Idea of a substance be included in me for this cause, that I am a substance: yet it doth not necessarily follow, that therefore I can have the Idea of an infinite substance, since I am myself but finite, unless that Idea first proceed from some substance really infinite. Nor am I obliged to think, that I do not conceive an infinite, by a true Idea, ●ut, as most schoolmen will have it, by the Negation of a finite, as I understand Rest and Darkness by the negation of Motion and Light: for, on the contrary, I perspicuously understand, that there is more of Reality in an infinite substance, then in a finite; and by consequence that the perception of an infinite essence, the Deity, is elder then, and so precedent unto the perception of a finite essence, myself. For I demand of the whole world, by what means possible I should come to understand, that I doubt, desire, etc. (i. e.) that something is wanting to my nature, which I find requisite to make it perfect; if there were in me no Idea of a more perfect being, by comparing whose perfections to my own deficiencies, I am brought to an assured knowledge of the imperfection, and so the subordination and dependence of my own being. Nor can it be objected that the Idea which I conceive of God is materially false, and therefore possible to be desumed from nothing, as those Ideas of Heat and Cold formerly examined: for on the contrary, in this interest, that 'tis transcendently clear and distinct, and comprehends more of objective reality, than any other Idea, which the mind of man can either conceive, or create; no one is more true per se, nor in which less suspicion of falsehood can be detected. This Idea, I say, of the supreme Being, perfect and infinite, is most true; for though it might be imagined possible, that there is no such entity existent, as my Idea represents: yet cannot it be imagined, that the Idea of this Ens summum can exhibit unto me nothing real, as may the Ideas of Heat, Cold, etc. Moreover, I am confirmed, that this Idea of God, is of all others the most clear and distinct; for whatever of reality, verity and perfection, I clearly and distinctly perceive in all other Ideas, is radically concentred in this one, as in the Archtype, or universal fountain. Nor can this my belief be staggered by this weak objection, that I cannot comprehend an infinite, or that, besides these Attributes mentioned in the description of this superexcellent Idea, there are myriads of other Excellencies in God, which are too resplendent and remote to be gazed upon by the weak and purblind eye of man's understanding, and too numerous to fall under the short Arithmetic of reason, much less to be epitomised or deciphered in the unequal landscape of my cogitations: for I know full well, that it is of the nature of an Infinite, not to be comprehended by me, that am finite; that it is sufficient for me to understand only so much, and to judge all those things, which I perceive to contain, or import any perfection, and perchance innumerable other dignities, of which I am yet ignorant, to be in God either formally, or eminently. So the Idea, which I conceive of him, is of all others, to which my intellect can extend its power of apprehension, the most perspicuous and distinct. Notwithstanding, that I may leave no doubt to eclipse the splendour of Article 10. A declarement of the impossibility of the divine Ideas desumption either from ourselves: this assertion, I permit my thoughts to run into this expostulation. Perhaps I have not the just dimensions of my own essence; that I am a far greater and more perfect something, then hitherto I have perceived myself to be; and that all those excellencies, which I speculate in the Idea of God, are in some measure potentially in my nature, though hitherto they have lain dormant, in Capacity only, and have not been deduced into act: for I already find my Cognition much increased, nor can I discover any impediment, wherefore it may not be every day more and more enlarged even to infinity; nor also, my cognition being so advanced, why I may not at length, by the benefit and advantage thereof, aspire and arise to all those perfections of God; nor, finally, why this capacity of arriving at all those perfections, may not suffice, upon the stock of its own single power, to the production of their true and adequate Idea. And I am answered from my domestic oracle, the Light of Nature; that not one of those illations can stand. For, first, though it be true, that my knowledge may by degrees be very much multiplied; and that many things are in potentia in me, which are not yet awaked into their proper operations: yet not one of all those properly belong to the Idea of God, in which there is nothing at all Potential; for this very condition, to be capable of augmentation by degrees, is an undeniable argument of imperfection. Secondly, though my cognition should be more and more augmented; nevertheless I understand, that it could never be actually infinite, because it could never be raised to such an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or zenith, as to be above all possibility of farther access: but my Idea of the divine nature represents him actually infinite, so that nothing is wanting, nothing can be added to the perfection of his nature. And lastly, I perceive that the objective esse of an Idea cannot be produced by a bare potential esse, which (to speak like a metaphysician, and properly) is a mere nothing: but only by an Actual, or Formal. Now albeit there is not one among all these notions, which to my retired and circumspect consideration, doth nor appear a most serene, noble, and illustrious truth, demonstrable by the light of Nature: yet since, when with more lose and unattentive thoughts I examine them, and when the grosser images of corporeal and sensible natures benight the optics of my reason; I cannot so easily make it out, why the Idea of a being more noble and perfect then my own, must of necessity proceed from some such other being, which is really more perfect; for this respect, I say, I lead on my mind to a further enquiry, viz. Whether or no I, who have this Idea, could have an existence, if there were no such Ens as my Idea adumbrates, really existent? To particular; from what original should my being descend? either from myself, or my Parents, or some other essences of perfection infinitely inferior to that of God; for no fancy can be so wild, as to feign any thing more perfect then, nay not equally perfect with him. Now had I received my being from myself, undoubtedly I should not then have been subject to those frailties of Dubitation and Desideration, nor would any thing have been wanting to my nature: for at the same instant, when I gave to myself a being, assuredly I should have given unto myself also all those perfections, whereof I have the Idea in my mind, and so I myself should have been God. Nor am I bound to conceive, that those excellencies, wanting to the accomplishment of my nature, can be more difficult to acquire, than those gradual abilities, of which I am already master: for on the contrary, 'tis manifest, that it must import infinitely more of difficulty for me to have had a being, (i. e.) for a Cogitant something to be deduced from nothing, then for me being once constituted in a Capacity, to attain to the cognition of many things, whereof I am now actually ignorant, which can be esteemed no more but the Accidents of that substance. And assuredly, had I borrowed the greater, my substantiality, from my own stock of power; I should not have denied unto myself the less, those Accumulations, or accidental additions, nor any other of those divine accomplishments, which I understand to be included in the Idea of God: why? because no one of those seem more difficult to be acquired; and if any were more difficult for me to aspire unto, 'tis more than probable I should understand that difficulty, if I had those Faculties, of which my nature stands possessed, from my own donation, in respect I should find my power to be terminated in them. Nor do I evade the convictive rigour of these reasons, if I adventure on this supposition; that I have been ever heretofore, as I now am: as if the induction of this hypothesis would be, that therefore I am to trace the genealogy of my essence no higher than myself, or seek out no other cause of my Existence; for in respect that all time may be divided into innumerable parts, each whereof hath no necessary dependence on the rest, either precedent, or subsequent; from hence, that I have formerly been, is no valid consequence that therefore I must now be, unless some other cause be admitted, which dothfreshly create me in each of those particles, or atoms of time, and particularly in this instant moment, (i. e.) doth constantly conserve me in being. For manifest it must be to any that looks attentively into the nature of Duration; that to the Conservation of any thing through all those several minutes, in which its existence endureth, is required no less than the same power and act, which is necessary to the Creation of the same thing anew, if it were not already existent: and consequently, that the act of Conservation doth not at all, but in the cloudy reason of man, differ from the act of Creation. These things thus stated, I am concerned to propose to myself this interrogation; Whether there be any power inherent in my nature, whereby I may be enabled to conserve myself the same in the future that I am now in the present? for since I am nothing but a mere res cogitans (for here I precisely regard only that part of myself, which is properly and distinctly a Cogitant substance) if there were any such power conservatory radicated in my essence, doubtless I should be conscious of it; but I am convicted, there is none such, and therefore from this one evidence, that I cannot maintain or perpetuate my own being, for the shortest moment imaginable: I judge, that I am subordinate unto, and dependent upon some other Entity distinct from myself. But (to tolerate any doubt in this my meditation, in order to the exclusion of all doubts from the intended result or conclusion) put the case, that this Entity, to whose sufficiency I own my Conservation (pardon ò! thou incomprehensible Essence, thou great and sole Preserver of men, pardon this supposition, that modestly intends only the clearer demonstration of thy Supremacy) is not God; and that I deduce my production from my Parents, or some other cause less perfect than God. For determination; 'tis an Axiom, to which every Sceptic will readily condescend, Tantundem ad minimum esse debere in causa, quantum est in effectu, there must be so much at least in the cause, as is found in the effect: and therefore since I am res cogitans, a substance thinking, and having a certain Idea of God in me, what cause soever be at length assigned for the principle or fountain of my being, that cause also must be Ens cogitans, and must possess the Idea of all those perfections, which I ascribe unto God. Now of that cause it may be again enquired, whether it were derived from itself, or from some other Cause; for if from itself, then may it be naturally collected, from what hath preceded in this disquisition, that such a Cause is God. For as it hath the power (or act) of self-existence, or self-conservation: so also, undoubtedly hath it the ability of actually possessing all such perfections, the Idea whereof it comprehends in itself, (i. e.) all such accomplishments, as I conceive to be concentred in God. But if from some other cause; then I repeat my question again Article 11. O● from some other cause le●s perfect then God. concerning this other cause, whether that had its being from itself, or from another, until I arrive successively at the first Cause, or highest link in the chain: which also will be God. For no melancholy can be so absurd, as to dream of a progress in infinitum in the series of Causes; especially, since I do not here intent that Cause only, which did in time past produce me, but principally that, which doth conserve me in the present. Nor can it be imagined, that a plurality of Causes met, concurred, and conspired to the making up of my nature, and that from one cause I inherited the Idea of one of the perfections which I attribute to God; from a second the Idea of another; from a third, the Idea of another, etc. so that all those perfections may▪ indeed▪ be found severally in the distinct and scattered pieces of the Universe, but no where conjoined and amassed together in one single Essence, which might be God. For on the contrary, the Unity, Simplicity, Inseparability, or Identity of all those excellencies in God, is one of the chiefest of those perfections, which I understand to be in him: nor, assuredly, could the Idea of the Unity of all those his Perfections be placed in me by any other cause, from whom I could not acquire the Ideas of other perfections also; nor could he have effected, that I should understand them conjoined and married together by an indissoluble union: unless he had also effected, that I should know what they are, in their distinction. To expunge the last scruple, and so render this demonstration of the Existence of God, fair and immaculate; have not my Article 12▪ Or from our Pa●ents. Progenitors devolved a being to my Parents, and they devolved the like to me? and may not this Idea of those perfections, which I attribute to God, be implanted radically in this my being so derived down to me by propagation, without the necessary insertion of it, by the immediate hand of any such Supreme nature really existent, in which all those Attributes are Formally inherent, and coessential? By no means. For though I may, in some latitude, allow my Parents to be the causes of my generation; yet cannot I think them to be the cause of my Conservation, since they cannot conserve themselves: nor have they made me what I am, (i. e.) constituted me to be Res cogitans, an Entity whose nature is to think; but only as subordinate and instrumental causes, have contributed certain requisite dispositions, or qualifications to that matter, in which I understand myself, (i. e.) my mind or rational soul (which in this discourse, I constantly take for the whole of myself) to be enshrined. And upon the credit of this consideration, there can be no difficulty taken up to countermand the certitude of my assertion; but I may safely conclude: that from this position, I am existent, and my mind contains a certain Idea of a most perfect being, (i. e.) of God; it is most genuinly and most evidently demonstrated, that God is also Existent. Having sufficiently assured myself, that this Idea, which I have of the Supreme Being, or most and only perfect Ens, is too excellent Article 13. The concernment of all; or a conclusion that the Idea of the divine nature is innate and congenial to the mind of man. to be desumed from myself, from my Parents, or from other Causes, which import not so much of Reality Formal and Eminent, as the Idea imports of objective: it remains only, that I explore how and when I received this Idea from God. For I never drew it in through the windows of my senses; nor was it ever obtruded upon me without either my expectation, or notice, as frequently the Ideas of sensible objects are, when those objects offer themselves to the external organs of the senses; nor was it ever modelled, or coined by me, in the laboratory of my Imagination, since it is not in my power either to detract any thing from, or superadd any thing unto it: Wherefore it must be primitively implanted in, and congenial to my very Essence, no otherwise then as the Idea of myself is implanted, or essentially impressed upon myself. And surely, to a sober and well ordered consideration, it can seem no wonder, that God, when he was pleased to create me, hath imprinted this Idea of himself upon my Soul, that it might remain as an indelible Mark or Signature; whereupon when I reflect my cogitations, I should instantly know and acknowledge myself to be the work of his almighty hand. Nor is it necessary, that this Mark or Impress should be a thing plainly distinct from the work itself, from my Essence; but upon this one ground, that God hath created me; 'tis very credible; that he created me, in some degree, or respect, after the Similitude and image of himself, and that this Similitude, wherein the Idea of God is included, may be understood by me, by the operation or information of the same Faculty, by which I am impower'd to understand myself: (i. e.) that when I convert the eye of my Soul, my reason, inwards upon myself; I do not only clearly perceive myself to be an Entity incomplete, dependent on some Superior principle, and indefinitely aspiring ●o greater and better things: but at the same instant, I understand also that Superior Principle, upon which I depend, to possess all those greater accomplishments, not indefinitely and in potentia only, but even infinitely and actually, and so to be God. And so all the nerves of the Argument may be twisted together Article 14. An abstract, or Anacephalaeosis of the whole demonstration. into this short (though never-to-be-b●oken) Cord; that I cannot but acknowledge it an absolute impossibility that I should exist, being of such a nature as I am, (i. e.) having the Idea of God imprinted upon my mind, unless God also did really exist: that very God, I mean, whose Idea is in me, (i. e.) an infinite essence actually possessing all perfections, which though I cannot comprehend, yet in some degree I can, with humility and veneration, speculate, through the perspective of profound and abstracted Cogitation. SECT. III. NOw in consideration that many of those Metaphysical Terms, and singular expressions, which I have been forced to make use of in the precedent demonstration of the Existence of God, may be conceived either too difficult for the unriper sort of heads, or at least ambiguous, and therefore subject to perversion, as not being sufficiently adequate and restrained to those notions, to which I have applied them; I have thought it requisite to subjoin the particular Explanation, or proper definition of each, that I could believe subject to obscurity, or exception. In the word Cogitation, I comprehend whatsoever is so contained in us, that we are immediately conscious thereof. Thus all Article 1. The importance of the term, Cogitation. the operations of the Will, Intellect, Imagination, and Senses fall under this one notion of Cogitations: and the particle immediately, I have annexed to exclude all those things, that are consequent to these operations, as motion voluntary hath Cogitation for its original, but is itself plainly distinct from cogitation. ●y an Idea, I understand that form of any Cogitation, by the immediate perception whereof I come to be fully conscious Article 2. Of an Idea. of that particular cogitation; so that I can express no one thing in words, when I understand what I speak, but from thence it is made evident unto me, that I have in me the particular Idea of that thing, which I signify by those words. And so I do not call only those Images depicted or engraven on my Pharisee, Ideas: yea, in this discourse, I do not allow them to be Ideas as they are depicted in my Fancy corporeal, i. e. in any parcel of my brain; but only as they serve, as certain characters, to inform my mind, when converted upon that part of my brain, where my fancy is seated. By the objective reality of an Idea, I intent the Entity of that thing represented by that Idea. And according to the same intention, Article 3. Of the objective reality of an Idea. we may say, the Perfection objective, or Artisice objective, etc. For whatever things we perceive as in the objects of Ideas, the same things in every particular are objectively included in the Ideas of those objects. The same things are said to be Formally in the objects of Ideas, Article 4. Of the Formal, and eminent being of Attributes in the objects of of Ideas. when they are truly such in them, as we perceive them to be, or when our Ideas expressly respond to their nature: and Eminently, when they are not indeed Talia, but Tanta, equivalent, insomuch that they may be their convenient substitutes, or serve in their rooms. A Substance signifies any thing wherein, as in subjecto, is immediately Article 5. Of a substance. inherent any Quality, or Attribute, whose Idea is in us; or upon which any thing, that we perceive, immediately depends for its existence. For we can have no other Idea of a substance, precisely so taken, more than this; that it is a thing, wherein either Formally, or Eminently that something which we perceive, or which is objectively in any of our Ideas, hath its necessary existence: why? because the light of Nature makes authentic that Axiom, Nullum esse nihili reale attributum; or, as Aristotle, Non-ent is none sunt Accidentia. By the term men's, the Mind, I import a substance, whose prime Attribute is Cogitation; for in this place I speak rather of Article 6. Of the word, Mind. the Mind, then of the Soul, in regard the word Soul is equivocal, and frequently used to express something corporeal. By a Body is implied that Substance which is the immediate Article 7. Of a Body. subject of extension local, and other accidents, which presuppose extension, as Figure, Situation, local Motion, etc. Two substances are said to be really distinguished, when each Article 8. Of the real distinction of two substances. of them can realy subsist without the assistance of the other. That substance, which we understand to be supremely perfect, and wherein we perceive no defect, or limitation of perfection Article 9 Of the substance supremely perfect. to be involved, is that we call God. SECT. iv THe Achilles, or most potent objection, which not only the Article 1. Object. 1. That the mind of man, being finite, cannot extend to the clear and distinct intellection of an Infinite, quatenus an Infinite: and the fierce Militia of the Pulpit; but even such more temperate heads, as have not been refined to a height sufficient to admit the tincture of abstracted and immaterial notions, may send to encounter my Assertion, That I have a clear, distinct, and true Idea of God in my mind, is this: Infinitum, quà infinitum, est ignotum, that God being infinite, and therefore incomprehensible, 'tis impossible for man, while his intellect is muffled up in flesh, to have a clear and distinct Idea of his Being. To instance in a thing, betwixt which and the infinity of God is a vast disparity; let the most Geometrical wit in the World think with the most serious, midnight and fixed attention, upon a Chiliagon, or figure with a 1000 Angles: yet shall he acquire in his mind, but a dark and confused representation or model thereof, and cannot distinctly either adumbrate or conceive that chiliagonicall figure; because he doth not particularly and totally speculate each one of the 1000 sides, or lateral lines, of which it doth consist. And if so, well may it be doubted, how I can conceive the Idea of an Infinite, distinctly and without confusion; when I cannot exalt my thoughts to survey all those innumerable perfections, which meet together to the constitution of its infinity. This doubt I must welcome, and honour, as the laudable Solution thereof by three distinctions. effect of that due veneration, or noble zeal, which ought to be kindled in every breast, upon the sense of that immense disproportion betwixt the invisibility, infinity, and incomprehensibility of the Creator; and the narrow extent, or, indeed, the comparative nothing of the Creature; nor can I think the debasement of our own limited nature, other than a pious and worthy cognizance of the majesty and incircumscription of his: yet to satisfy, that none can have a more lively apprehension of his own frailties, infirmities and defects, nor a greater esteem of the excellencies and accomplishments of God, than myself; and that I more than once looked upon, and throughly examined the weight of this scruple, long before I thought it safe to acquiesce in the Affirmative, I thus answer. An Infinite, quatenus an infinite, can, in troth, by no means 1. be comprehended; and yet nevertheless it may be understood: insomuch as clearly and distinctly to understand the nature of any thing to be such, as that no limits, terminations, or circumscriptions can be found therein; is clearly and distinctly to understand the same to be infinite. And here I distinguish betwixt Indefinitum and Infinitum; calling, properly and precisely, that an infinite, in which no limits, terms, or ends can be, on any part, discovered; in which acceptation, God is only infinite: but such things, wherein, under some latitude of reason only, I acknowledge no end or termination; such are the extensions of the imaginary space without Trismegistus his circle, or on the outside of the world; the multitude of Numbers; the divisibility of the parts of quantity, etc. such I call Indefinite, and not infinite, because on some part they must confess a finality, or termination. Again, I put a difference between the Formal Reason, or Insinity ●. of an infinite; and the subject of that infinity, or thing which is infinite. Now, as for the Infinity; though we understand that to be most Positive; yet we cannot understand it but only by a kind of Negation, viz. from hence, that we can discover no limitation in the thing: but as for the subject of this infinity, or infinite thing, we understand it Positively, but not adequately (i. e.) we do not comprehend all that is intelligible in that thing. Thus when we cast our eyes upon the Sea, though our sight cannot extend to all and every part thereof, nor measure every inch of its immense vastity; yet may we be properly said to behold the sea. And if we look upon it at a great distance, so that our eyes seem to take it in all at once, we do not see it but dimly and confusedly, as it were in a thin, blue landscape; as also we do not imagine a Chiliagon but obscurely and in fractures, when we comprehend all the lateral lines thereof at once: yet if we approach the sea at a very vicine distance, and earnestly fix our eyes upon any one part thereof, such a vision may be clear and distinct, as also may the imagination of a Chiliagon, if our Fancy extend to no more, than one or two of the sides thereof at once. By the same reason, that God cannot be comprehended by the narrow mind of man, I willingly grant with all the schoolmen; nor can he be distinctly understood by those, who unadvisedly endeavour to comprehend him all at once, and as it were to gaze upon him a far off; in which laudable sense, the most subtle Dr Thom. Aquin. affirmed, Cognoscere Deum esse in aliquo communi, sub quadam confusione, in quantum scilicet Deus est hominis beatitudo, id naturaliter nobis insertum est, that the cognition of the Being of God, is implanted in our minds, under a certain confusion, or cloudy representation▪ but whoever, with a praevious awe, and becoming reverence, shall endeavour to single out his perfections, contemplate each successively, not so much to comprehend them, as to be comprehended by them, and employ all the nerves of their intellect (sequestered from the contagion of sensibility and Corporeity) in the long and wary speculation of them: such happy persons shall assuredly find in him more satisfactory, ample, and easy matter of clear and distinct cognition, then in all the world beside. Thirdly, I discriminate an Intellection Adequate, from an Intellection Gradual, or conform to the slender capacity of man. 3. For the First, 'ttwere madness beyond the power of Hellebor for any man to dream, that he could understand an Infinite, Conceptu adaequato, by a comprehension fully as large, and exactly proportionate unto that Infinite; nay it may be a very hard question, whether the arms of our understanding be long enough to commensurate the full nature of any Finite object, though ne'er so small, by an Idea exactly respondent, and equal in all points: for the other, every sober man is able to find within himself, that the wings of his mind are not so clipped, as that it cannot aspire to the Gradual cognition of an Infinite, finita & ad modulum humani ingenii accommodata cognition. If any shall pervert this Distinction to so sinister a latitude, as to retort; that when I confess my understanding too shallow and dark to comprehend an infinite, Conceptu adaequato, I do at the same time implicitly concede, that I can know no more than a part of an infinite, and indeed the least part which can be said to carry the representation of an infinite no more than the effigies of one single hair to represent the whole body of a man: I shall smoothly rejoin, that to affirm, that if we fully comprehend any thing, that thing must be infinite, is a plain and obvious contradiction in terminis; since the Idea of an infinite, if true, cannot be comprehended, Incomprehensibility being the formal attribute of an infinite; and yet nevertheless it is evident, that the Idea, which we have of an infinite, doth resemble not only some one particular part, but even really and truly the whole thereof, eo modo, quo repraesentari debet per humanam ideam, though doubtless a far more accurate and distinct, (i. e.) perfect Idea may be allowed to be in the more luminous and clear intellect of God, of Angels, or other nature's more intelligent then man. Thus we doubt not, but a Clown, who never heard of Euclid, or learned one Axiom in Geometry, may notwithstanding have in his mind the Idea of a whole Triangle, when he is once instructed, that a Triangle is a Figure comprehended in three lines, though he remain ignorant of many other things, which a learned Geometrician knows intelligible in that Figure, and insatiately speculates in the Idea thereof: for, as to understand a figure included in three lines, is sufficient to acquire the Idea of a whole Triangle; so also to understand a thing not to be comprehended or terminated by any limits or ends, is sufficient to the acquisition of a true and entire Idea of the whole infinite. This Idea you have of God, is no more than Ens rationis, a Article 2. Object. 2. That the Idea of the divine nature, resident in the mind of man, is a mere Ens rationis: and the Solut. mere figment, or Chimaera, that hath no existence at all but in your intellect; and therefore hath no more of perfection, or reality objective than your own mind that framed it. Ens rationis hath a double signification; (1.) it imports a mere abstracted Notion, devoid of all reality, or a pure Nonentity; (2.) it signifies every operation of the intellect, or, more plainly, Ens a ratione profectum: in which acceptation, the whole World may be properly styled Ens rationis divinae, or an entity created by a simple and pure act of the divine intellect. Now in this last sense only can I allow that transcendent Idea of God to be Ens rationis, a clear and distinct representation of the most perfect Being, engraven by his own finger upon my understanding: and to that unprevaricate judgement, that shall maturely perpend the contents, and logical connexion of our precedent meditation, it will plainly appear, that we intent such a Perfection, or reality objective in this Idea, which (no less than that Artifice objective, which is in the Idea of any engine most ingeniously fabricated) requires a Cause, wherein all that is really and formally contained, which is included in the Idea only objectively, and at second hand, or by reflection. Though we grant your Thesis, that this Idea hath more of Perfection, or objective reality, than your Mind: yet cannot Article 3. Object. 3. That an effect may have more of reality, or perfection than its Cause: and the your Assumption stand, that therefore your Mind cannot be the Author of this Idea; since an Effect may have a degree of Perfection, or reality, which neither is, nor ever was in the Cause thereof. To instance, common observation teacheth, that Flies, Frogs, etc. infects, as also some Plants are generated by the Sun, rain, and earth mutually cooperating by a kind of seminal confermentation, or fertile putrefaction; and yet in neither of those causes will any man allow so high a Perfection, as that of Vitality: Ergo, etc. My Inference is founded on the rock of reason, and therefore Solut. too impregnable to be demolished by so feeble a battery. For first, it is indubitate, that there can be no Perfection in Animals devoid of reason, which is not also in bodies devoid of Animation; or if there were, that Perfection must be extradvenient, or derived unto them from some foreign principle: nor are the Sun, rain, and earth the Adequate Causes of Infects, or Animals whose production is spontaneous and without other seminalitie, than that analogous' sperm of corruption; and it sounds discordant in the harmonious ears of logic for any man, only because he is ignorant of any other Cause that may conduce to the genera●ion of an insect, (i. e.) hath so many degrees of perfection, as as an Insect hath, therefore to stagger the truth of an Axiom ratified by the Light of Nature. For, Quod nihil sit in effectu, quod non vel simili, vel eminentiori aliquo modo praeextiterit in causa, is a First notion, at which no man can quarrel▪ but he must implicitly abjure his own reason: nor doth the ancient and vulgar maxim, à nihilo nihil sieri, differ from it, but only in terminis; because if it be conceded, that any thing is found in the effect, which cannot be found in its cause, it must also be conceded, that this something was made by nothing; nor am I convinced why nothing may not be the cause of something, but only from this evidence to the contrary, that in such a cause there would not be the same, nor any thing equivalent unto that, which is in the effect. Secondly, that my Mind cannot be the Efficient cause of this transcendent Idea, needs neither declarement, nor support, other than this canonical position; that whatsoever reality or perfection is only objectively in our Ideas, must be either formally, or at least eminently in their prototypes, or originals: and upon this one pin hangs all the certification, or assurance, that any man can have of the real existence of any other thing in the world (the supreme Being only excepted) besides himself; for from what hint could we have suspected, that such or such things are existent, without the orb of our own nature, but only from this: that their Idea, or representations have been conveyed into our minds, by the organs of our senses? And that we have a certain Idea, or umbrage of the most potent and most perfect Being; as also, that the Reality objective of this Idea is so excellent, as that it cannot be discovered to be in us either Formally, or Eminently: will be so clear, serene, and orthodox a truth, as to be sworn to by any, who with thoughts sufficiently constant and attentive (for it is a chief Postulate, or requisite condition on the behalf of any man, that intends his own satisfaction in this abstruse particular, ut diu multumque in natura Ent is sum perfecti contemplanda immoretur) shall be pleased to consort their meditations with mine upon this excellent and most necessary subject. For 'tis not in the power of my pen to obtrude that notion upon any man, the admission and retention whereof immediately depend upon his own cogitation; I mean an assurance of the certitude of this demonstration, when he is resolved not to be divorced from that uncomely grandmother of Error, Prejudice; nor to open the ears of his belief to the most prevalent charms of argument, or taste those limpid streams, which slow from the fount of all our knowledge, the Light of Nature. Whereas, upon a profound and calm consideration of all, and Article 4. Object. 4. That the existence of such an excellent Idea, as hath been described of the Divine Nature, doth not necessitate the existence of an Entity, in all points respondent, or superior thereto: because of the possible composing such an Idea, out of our collections from sensible objects: and the ample each of those Attributes enumerated in your description of that excellent Idea, which you pretend to have of God; as that he is a substance, infinite, independent, superlatively both intelligent and potent by which yourself and all the world was created, etc. we find it not demonstratively necessary, that the Idea of such an Ens, wherein all those perfections are concentred and united, should be implanted in your mind immediately by that Ens: we conclude that it may be framed and composed of your several Collections from other external objects. To descend to particulars. (1.) When by the word God, you understand a Substance; Reason, not any Idea, assures you, that God doth exist: Substance and Existence being twins, that cannot live but conjoined hand in hand. (2.) From the notion Infinite, (i. e.) something that you cannot comprehend nor imagine any limits, or extremes therein, so as that your thoughts can ever arrive at a Ne ul●ra: there ariseth unto your mind an Idea not of an Infinity divine; but of the termination or circumscription of your finite nature. (3.) Independent sounds no more than this, that you cannot conceive, or imagine any cause or original of God: from whence 'tis manifest, that from the term Independent, you can collect no other Idea, but the memory of your own Ideas, which had their several originations at such and such times, and therefore are dependent▪ Wherefore, to say that God is independent, is nothing more than that God is in the number of those things, of which you can imagine no original, or Cause: as also, to say that God is infinite, is all one, in the import, with this, that God is in the catalogue of those things, wherein your thoughts can discover no end limitation, or circumscription. And thus every Idea of God is excluded; for what Idea can there be, without either original, or termination? (4.) Superlatively Intelligent; here we desire to be informed, by what kind of Idea you understand the Intellection of God? (5.) Most potent; here also we require by what Idea you can understand potency, which imports things in futuro only, and therefore not existent? undoubtedly we ascend to the cognition of power, by the steps of Memory, and reflection upon former actions, progressing by the conduct of Ratiocination, thus; thus he hath done, ergo he had power thus to do, ergo being still the same, he hath power to do the like again in the future. Now all these are Ideas, which may be extracted from external objects. (6.) Creator of all things; we can portray to ourselves a certain resemblance of a Creation, by drawing the reflections of those things we have seen with our eyes; as when we imagine a man beginning and growing as it were from a point to that figure and magnitude, which he hath in his full stature or virility: nor are we persuaded that any man can have other Idea than this, at the word Creator; but yet that we can imagine the world to be created, is no obliging argument to prove the creation. And therefore, though it had been demonstrated by you, that something Infinite, Independent, etc. doth exist; yet could it be no genuine inference, that therefore a Creator doth exist; unless you shall adventure to undertake the justification of this argument; something is existent, which we believe to have created all things beside itself; ergo the world was once created by that something. In fine, when you affirm that the Idea of God, as also of your own Soul, is implantate in and congenial to your Essence, we desire to be instructed, whether the souls of men, when they sleep most profoundly and without dreams, exercise their faculty of Cogitation; or more plainly, whether they think? if no, then at such times they have no Ideas: and therefore no Idea can be innate, or congenial, for what ever is innate, is always present. To the first part of this objection I answer in general; that no one of those Attributes, which belong to my Idea of the supreme Solut. Being, can possibly be desumed from External objects, as from an original, or primitive exemplar: because in God we can find nothing which holds any analogy, or similitude to those things that are in Corporeal Entities; but whatsoever we contemplate in our Ideas that is dissimilar or disproportionate to corporeal natures, that must proceed not from them but from the cause of that diversity in our cogitation. And here I demand, how any man can deduce the Idea of the Intellection of God from corporeal objects? but what kind of Idea I have thereof, I fully explain, when I say, that by an Idea I intimate all that, which is the form of any perception: and who is there, that doth not perceive (the Philosopher calls it a reflex act of the intellect) that he doth understand the nature of this or that object, upon which his cogitations is acting; and by consequence, who hath not an Idea of his own Intellection, which by indefinite extending of it, he forms to an Idea of the divine Intellection, and so of all other of his Attributes? To the other part I return, in brief; that whereas I have made use of the Idea of God, which is impressed upon the mind of man, as an invincible argument to demonstrate the existence of God; and that in this Idea so immense a Potency is included, that we may understand it to be repugnant to reason, if God doth exist, that any thing besides him in the world can exist unless it be created by him, and dependent upon him: it cannot but appear a direct and just induction, that the whole world, or all things else which are in being besides God, were created by him. To untie the last knot concerning the eclipse of this Idea of God, in our midnight sleeps, when all our Faculties disappear; it is required only that I advertise the Reader, that when I affirm that there is a certain Idea of God innate and congenial to us, I do not mean that this Idea is always obversant, or constantly held forth to the eyes of our mind; for in that sense no Idea can be innate: but only that we have within us a certain Faculty or Power istam ideam eliciendi, of extracting it; or that by the dignity of our Essence, we are empowered to speculate that Impress or Signature of the Deity, when we convert our cogitations attentively upon it. Though we should applaud your superstructure, that the Idea of God is not to be desumed from any other cause but himself; Article 5. Object. 5. That the Idea conceived of God, is capable of Augmentation and diminution: and the clear yet can we not but suspect the stability of your Cornerstone, or capital reason thereof, viz. that nothing can be superadded unto, nothing detracted from that Idea. And toward the subversion of it, we need adferre no greater an engine, than our friendly advice, that you would consider how small a garden-plot of science, well manured, may in process of time be enlarged into a spacious campania; that 'tis not impossible for you to be informed, either by men more learned than yourself, or by the extraordinary revelation of Angels, or some other communication from other natures more intelligent than man, of many more perfections or Attributes in God, than you have hitherto discovered: that God himself may be pleased, by the irradiations of his sacred Spirit, so to illuminate your intellect even in this life of ignorance, as to afford you a brightet reflex of his glories, and so augment your knowledge of his excellencies: that your Soul, when she shall have the dark curtain of flesh withdrawn by the rough hand of death, and be advanced to the Beatifical vision; shall know so much more of Divinity, than what you can apprehend now, that in comparison thereof your present Idea of it, may well be accounted imperfect, and therefore capable of addition: that in your infancy you perceived no such Idea at all; at least it was not so accurate and perfect as at this day, when it hath received the accesses of your more learned speculations: in short, that as you have not attained a full cognition of the perfections of inferior essences, nor can ever hope for it, at once, but must ascend by the successive gradations of new discoveries; so can you not acquire a full cognition of the Perfections of the supreme Ens, at once, but may have your Idea of him made more and more perfect every day, by new additions. When you reprehend this tenant of mine, that the Idea of God engraven on the mind of man, is uncapable either of Addition, Solut. or Substraction, you seem to have no regard to that Rule amongst Philosophers, Essentias rerum esse indivisibiles. For an Idea represents the Essence of a thing; to which, if ought be added, or from which, if ought be substracted, instantly it becomes the Idea of another thing. And by reason of their ignorance of this truth, the Heathen, not conceiving aright of the true God, fell into the woeful delusion of framing to themselves the Ideas of false ones, and chief that of Pandora, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in whom all the endowments, or excellencies of all other gods were concentred. But when once we have conceived the Idea of the true God, however more and more perfections may be revealed unto us, which were not formerly known to be in him, yet nevertheless is not the Idea of him therefore Augmented, but only made more distinct and express: in regard all those Accomplishments ought to be comprised in the same Idea first conceived, insomuch as it is supposed to have been true from the very first conception. Thus the Idea of a Triangle receives no enlargement, when several proprieties are discovered to be therein, which were at first unknown. Nor is our Idea of the Divine Nature form by us in parcels, or by sensible additions, out of the various perfections or endowments of the Creatures, amassed together, and multiplied up to the rate of supernatural: but springs up to us in a moment, perfect and entire, from this one root; that we understand him to be an infinite Ens, so perfect as to be above all amplification, or access of more perfection. Article 6. Many scruples, concerning the finality, manner, and form of the Idea impressed; as also concerning the seeming He●erogencity, or Alterity between the essence of the mind and that of the Idea: particularly satisfied. Hitherto you have well calmed all those tumults of Doubts, which arose within us upon the Lecture of your Demonstration of the Existence of God: but yet there remain some few, though considerable scruples, the full and clear solution whereof is required from you, before you can with reason expect to bring us over to your side. If the Idea of God be impressed upon you, as a mark or signature set by an Artificer upon the work of his hands; what is the Modus of that impression? What the Form of that mark? by what means can you discern it? if it be not a thing distinct from the work itself, from your rational Soul, or Mind; is your Soul then the Idea? is your Mind nought else, but Modus cogitandi, a certain manner of thinking? can your mind be both the signature impressed, and the subjectum impressionis, or matter upon which it is impre'st? Credible it is, say you, that you are made after the similitude of God: True, by a religious Faith elemented in us by the doctrine of Holy Writ; but how can you make it out from Natural Reason, unless you adventure to make God Hominiforme, like to man? And wherein can that similitude, or typical analogy consist? Dare you, being a gross Corporeal Ens, poor despicable Dust and Ashes, presume to resemble yourself to that Eternal, Incorporeal, Immense, most Perfect, most Glorious, and (what is of most weight in this particular) Invisible and Incomprehensible Essence? Have you beheld him face to face? Nay, with Moses in the cloven of the rock, have you seen so much as his back parts; so that you are able to describe his aspect, and make good the Comparison? But you aver, that 'tis credible for this reason, Quia creavit; now we retort upon you, that 'tis therefore incredible: since there is no necessity that the Work should be like its Maker, unless in the point of Generation, where the Production receives a communication of the same nature, that is in the Productor: but you were not Generated by God, nor because he was your Efficient, can you safely infer, that therefore you are participant of his Nature; but you were only created, fashioned by him, according to the exemplar or Idea, which was in the Divine Intellect from all eternity. So it remains, that you have no more justifiable pretence, to affirm that you are like him; then an Engine hath to be thought to bear the image of the Engineer, than a house hath to be conceived like to the Mason, or Carpenter that built it. Further, (not to supersede a jot of your own sense, which may conduce to the illustration of your Position) you subjoin, that you plainly perceive the similitude twixt God and Man, when you understand yourself to be an Ens incomplete, dependent upon some superior Principle, and indefinitely aspiring to greater and better things: now in our judgement, this is an undeniable argument of a vast disparity and Dissimilitude, since God, on the contrary is most complete, most independent, most self-sufficient, as being Maximus & Optimus. In very sooth, a Comparison 'twixt Light and Darkness, 'twixt Heaven and Hell, 'twixt Good and Evil, 'twixt a Spirit and a Body, 'twixt Something and Nothing, may be better endured; as importing infinitely less of Absurdity, infinitely less of Impossibility. In fine, it cannot sound less than a Miracle, that other men should not understand the same that you do; and chief when there is no reason alleged, why we may not believe, that God hath impressed the Effigies of his Essence upon others, as well as upon you. We profess, this one argument convinceth us, that the Idea of God is not impressed upon the mind of man, immediately by himself, as a signature, or Characterism to confess our Creation; viz. that if it were, the Impress would be one and the same in all men; that all men would then conceive God under the same Form and Idea; would allow him the same Attributes; would have the same thoughts of him in all points. But that all Nations, Ages, Religions, nay and Persons have had various and distinct Ideas of the Divine Nature: is so manifest upon the oath of Experience, that we may well here be silent, as to any other attestation. When you require me to prove, that the Idea of God is impressed upon the mind of man, as a Mark or Signature set by the Maker upon the Work of his hands; and what is the Manner of that Impression; or what the Form of that Mark: I appeal to the decision of any sober Arbiter, whether it be not the same thing, as if, when I had surveyed an excellent Picture, and deprehended so much rare art and exquisite skill therein, that I could not judge it to be drawn by any hand but that incomparable one of Apelles; I should affirm that this inimitable Artifice, or perfection never to be paralleled, was a certain Mark, or note of Distinction, set by Apelles to all his pieces, whereby they may be discerned from the ruder draughts of other pencils: and you should notwithstanding press me to tell you, what's the Form of that Mark, or Manner of that Signal? Doubtless, such a Question deserves no other answer but a smile. Again, to pursue the same adequate Simile, put the case, that I should aver, that the singular Art, and unrivald skill, whereby as an infallible sign, the Pictures of Apelles are distinct from the courser paintings of all others in the World; is nothing really distinct from the Pictures themselves; and that you should cavil at my assertion, and by irregular Logic infer, that therefore those Pictures are nought else but the Artifice or Skill, in an abstracted acception, and so are composed of no matter: Ergo they are only Modi pingendi, certain manners of painting, etc. Would not your argument be equally both as just and acute, as when you shall thus reason; If there be no distinction between the Idea of God engraven on your Mind, and your mind the subject, to recipient of this engravement; then is your Mind the Idea, and yourself nothing but Modus cogitandi, then are you both the Mark impressed, and the subject of the Impression? I profess sincerely, after a due perpension, I cannot determine, which of the two Inductions carries the greater weight in the impartial balance of right reason: sure I am, that the Analogy stands fair and even in all points. Nor can your Contradiction of that vetust and almost Catholic Article, Hominem esse Dei Charagma, that man is made after the Image of God, founded upon a collection of those various particulars, whereby the Humane Nature is discrepant from the Divine, be found more dialectical, or perswasory, than this feeble, because preposterous Enunciation. If any Picture drawn by Apelles did ever exactly resemble Alexander, then was Alexander in all parts exactly like that Picture: but the Picture was made up of several different ingredients or materials, as divers Colours, oil, wood, varnish, etc. and Alexander composed of skin, flesh, bones, hair, etc. Ergo, no picture was ever like Alexander, the Disparity between his nature, and the nature of a Picture, being so great, as never to be reconciled in a full analogy. For every temperate brain knows full well, that it is not required to the Formality of an Image, or Pourtracture, to be the same in all points with the Antitype, or Original; but only that it resemble in some: and we all submit to this Manifest, that that most perfect Faculty (so I speak as not being ignorant, that all the Attributes of God are in him Actually; but wanting a word more significant and convenient to this notion) of cogitation, which we understand to be in God, is in some sort fitly represented by that imperfect one, which is in Man. Further, I cannot but point obliquely at your imprudence, in choosing rather to compare the Creation of Man by God, with the Mechanic operation of a Mason, or Carpenter, then with the Generation of a Parent; since no pretext of reason can justify that unmannerly Conserence. For though those three manners of acting, Creation, Generation, Fabrefaction, stand a whole Genus wide of each from other, and can never be brought nearer than the swords point: yet to argue from a Production Natural to a Divine, is, by a whole climate, a nearer way, then from an Artificial. Again, (to leave no point of a scruple unresolved) though I have long since assented, that the resemblance betwixt God and Man, is not so great as that betwixt a Parent and his issue; yet cannot I be brought to hold it impossible, that an operation should ever be enriched with the Effigies of the operator; since Experience whispers me, that I have seen a statuary carve his own statue, out of white Marble, aswell in the proportion and symmetry, as lineaments of each part, so tightly resembling, that every common-eye knew him aswell by his Statue, as his statue by him. Nor is your Memory more faithful, than your judgement profound; for when you accuse me to have said, that I evidently perceive the similitude betwixt God and Man, from hence, that I understand myself to be an Ens incomplete, dependent, etc. You make but a confused and perverse rehearsal of my words, which placed in their proper order express the Antitheton, or quite contrary, viz. that from the Imperfection, Subordination, and depending of my own nature, I deduced the highest Perfection, Supremacy, and Indopedency of Gods; that whereas it was essential to me uncessantly to aspire to greater and better things, and that those greater and better things are actually inherent in God: therefore had I in me something of Assinity to those greater and better things, by the incitement whereof I become ambitious and aspiring to them. And truly, this I inserted as an unquestionable remonstrance of the infinite Dissimilitude, which I understood to be betwixt Divinity and Humanity; with design to prevent both misapprehension and scandal, to both which, otherwise I had some reason to conceive myself obnoxious. Finally, whereas you make it no less than a wonder, why all men in general should not understand the same Attributes in God, that I do; since if the Idea of his Divinity be impressed universally and equally, upon the Minds of men, every one hath as great a privilege, by the Charter of his Essence, to speculate the same, as myself: in sober truth you may with equal reason wonder, that since all men know the Idea of a Triangle, why all men do not yet perceive as many Proprieties and Perfections in that figure, as learned Geometricians do; and why some reason truly, others falsely upon that Idea. CHAP. II. That God created the world ex nihilo, proved by Arguments Apodictical. SECT. I. THe Existence of God being amply Demonstrated, 'tis a natural consequence, that the whole World, Article 1. The inseparability, or (rather) identity of God, and Creator. and all things existent therein besides himself, were Created by him. For those Attributes, Omnipotence, Omniscience, and Independence, which are particularly, and in association required to that great Act of Creation, are all (together with all other Perfections, that lie in the ken of man's Cogitation) comprised under the Idea, which we hold of his Essence. Nor can any man deny, that every single Entity in the vast ark of the Universe, was created by, and holds its existence by dependence upon God; unless he shall have first denied, that God doth exist: which our precedent Demonstration hath made appear to be impossible. For at the same time he denies, that God doth exist, he unavoidably precipitates himself into an Absurdity, implicitly denying that himself doth exist: which his very act of denial contradicts; since, had he no existence, he could not deny; all men embracing that Axiom, Non-entis non sunt Actus. Article 2. The two respects, which inclined the Author to a more ample comprobation of the first Article of our Christian breed; together with a d●elenchical explosion of that antiquated delusion, that the Universe was autoctbonous in its original, or constructed merely by Chance. Upon a serious perpension of the irresistible pressure or weight of this plain and genuine Inference, I once resolved to supersede all other Arguments of the Creation of the World out of nothing, by the sole and immediate Goodness, Wisdom, and Power of the Supreme, because most perfect Being; especllialy when I converted my thoughts upon the almost Catholic belief of this truth, every man, at least, every Christian, receiving and retaining it as an Article of Faith: but when my second and more advised meditations had whispered me, that most heads are so indurate by the frost of ignorance, as not to feel the soft touches of a Collateral and enthymematicall Demonstration; as also, that my proper business was to evince by the testimony of mere Reason, what is commonly embraced upon the single authority of Moses pen: I could not but conceive it necessary, in order to the plenary confutation of that as impious, as ridiculous Error of some ancient Naturalists, that the World was made by Chance, or Fortune; to endeavour the probation of the same, by other more direct and express means of persuasion, deduced from the Magna Charta of all temporal knowledge, the Light of Nature. Now that I may perform this, with that exactness, and satisfaction, which is due to so excellent a subject; I am necessitated to bespeak my Readers Patience to endure the recital, explanation, and examen of those specious reasons, which deluded the uncircumspect and easy judgements of those unhappy Pagans, who sitting in the Philosopher's chair, either founded, or supported, or repaired that detestable opinion, that Fortune was the Author and Architect of this admirable fabric the Universe. Epicurus (for him have I singled out, as the most notorious Article 3. The summary of Empedocles, Leucippus, Epicurus, Democritus, etc. doctrine of the world's spontaneous result from a Chaos of Atoms. Patron, though not the Father of this execrable delusion; since the monuments of time assure the invention hereof upon his great Master, Leucippus) being great with a monstrous design to expunge those Characters of Piety and reverence towards the Deity, which the observation of prodigious Meteors, of frequent Eclipses of the two great Lamps of heaven, of Thunder, and Coruscations, of Earthquakes, of the regular and constant motions of the Spheres, etc. had impressed upon the minds of men; as also to eradicate all conceit of the somuch talked of Compensation of good and evil actions after death openly breaks forth into the insolent assertion of these three horrid positions; (1) Quod mundus non sit à Deo constitutus, that the World was not constituted by God; (2.) Quod mundus à Deo non gubernetur, that the World was not governed by God; (3.) Quod animus noster non supersit à funere, that the soul of man doth not survive the funeral of his body. The First he essays to declare thus; Existimare oportet mundos, uti & sinitam omnem concretionem in immenso inani factam, quidpiam simile cum iis, quas passim observamus, habentem, ortum ex infinita rerum universitate habuisse; & alios quidem majores, alios minores, per proprios quosdam Atomorum quasi Vortices (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) seu convolutiones, seorsim procreatos, etc. (in Epist. ad Herodotum apud Diogen. Laert. lib. 10.) The substance of all which, and much more to the same intent, may be rendered more plainly thus. That the Celestial orbs, and all their radiant Furniture the stars, are wheeled about, by a constant and even circumgyration; that they veer perpetually towards that point of the World, unto which they first inclined, and never change either the way, or tenor of their Circumvolutions; that they observe the same distance each from other, which they obtained at the instant of their Formation, nor sink down upon, and so crowd or enterfeire each the other; that the Eclipses of the two great Luminaries necessarily succeed upon the conjunction of the same Causes, in our days, as in the infancy of Nature, and may therefore with so much facility, as certainty, be prognosticated and predicted by the rules of Astronomy; in brief, that such and such determinate effects arise from the Concurrence and coefficiencies of such and such particular Causes, etc. all these we are not to refer to any other Principle, or Efficient, but that Fortune, whereby they were so and so disposed in the first Casual Emergency of the World; nor are those constant and settled operations produced by any other necessity, than what fell to their Efficients, at the primitive segregation, concourse, disposition, coadunation of those Atoms, whereof their bodies are compacted. That before the constitution of the Universe, there was an infinite Chaos of Atoms, of various figures and magnitudes, in an infinite space, floating hither and thither, hurried up and down, on all sides crowding, impelling, and justling each other, by reason of the Tendency resulting from their own innate Gravity. That after a long, long afflux, reflux, conflux, elevation, depression, coagmentation and other various and successive agitations and molitions of these Atoms, when each order had chanced to confront and meet with others most consimilar and convenient; then at last they all conspired, acquiesced, and fixed in this regular position and situation, which constitutes the Form of the Universe; as Lucretius (who was deplorably infected with this accursed contagion of Epicurus) hath briesly expressed it; Quae quia multa modis multis vexata per omne Ex infinito vexantur percita plagis, Omne genus motus, & coetus experiundo, Tandem deveniunt in tales disposituras, Qualibus haec rebus consist it summa creata, etc. The World's Materials having first been tossed, An infinite Time, within an infinite Room, From this to that uncircumscribed coast, And made by their own Tendency to roam In various Motions; did at last quiesce In these Positions, which they now possess. That upon the Diacrisis, or segregation of heterogeneal Atoms▪ succeeding upon a circumvolution, gyration, or vertiginous eddy of them, in the confusion of their eternal Chaos; the more gross and ponderous tended towards the Centre, or downwards, and in their descent expressed the more gracile and lighter, and impelled them upwards, which convening all together in the circumference of the immense vortex, wedged in each other into the form of an integument or cortex, called Coelum or heaven; but the more gross and weighty, crowding to the centrals, were there compacted and coagmentated into a solid mass the Earth: and the remaining matter of a middle nature, upon the concourse of its insensible particles assumed to itself the form of a Humid substance, and part thereof being afterward circumagitated uncessantly, and so both tornated and calefacted, was graduated into many orbs of Light, the Sun, Moon and Stars: the residue being reserved for the compaction of other bodies; etc. And this, if my memory hath proved a faithful Steward of my readings, is the marrow of Leucippus, Empedocles, Epicurus, and Democritus their doctrine concerning the spontaneous configuration of the Universe. 'tis proverbial amongst Scholars, and long since applied by an Author of good repute (Aneponymus, in lib. de substant. physic.) Article 4. A Digression, winnowing the Chasse from the Wheat concealed in the former theory of Epicurus, & by the corollary of some castigations, restrictions and additions, declaring the great advantages, that this Hypothesis of Atoms hath beyond any other concerning the Material Principle of all Bodies, as yet excogitated. to this particular Case; Nullam esse tam falsam opinionem, quae non habeat aliquid veri admistum; sed tamen illud admistione cujusdam falsi ●bscurari: that no opinion hath so much of falsehood, as not to contain some sprinkling of truth; though that spark of truth be so obscured by the cloud of prejudice arising from the discovery of the falsity admixed, that it may require the subtle and decisive judgement of an Oedipus for its discernment and sequestration. And in this heap of dross lies raked up so much pure and rich metal, as▪ if by the chemistry of an industrious hand extracted, may more than fully compensate the patiented Lecture of a short Digression. In this old Romance of the spontaneous result of the World from a Casual segregation and disposition of that Abyss of Atoms, which rolled up and down, to and fro, by an impetuous and continual inquietude, estuation, or civil war, caused by their ingenite propensity to motion, in the range of the infinite space; some things sound so harsh and discordant to mere Reason, as they are justly to be abominated; others carry the smooth face of so much Verisimility, as they deserve to be admitted, at least diligently and impartially examined. The Positions we are to reject, are these; (1.) that the Chaos of Atoms was non-principiate, or as ancient as Eternity: (2.) that they were not created ex nihilo, ab aliqua beata simul ac immortali Causa, by God: (3.) that they were not becalmd, separated, ranged, and disposed into their proper stations, in that serene order and figure, which they are now of inevitable necessity bound to observe, in every single concretion, or individual Entity, by the artifice of any other Cause, but the blind Ordination, or improvident disposure of Fortune. All which smells so strong of the Fable, and strikes the nosethrills as well of the mere Natural man, as the Pious, with such infectious stench, that nothing but the opportunity of confutation can excuse my coming so near it. And yet notwithstanding, I have never yet found out any justifiable ground, why Atoms may not be reputed Mundi materies, the Material Principle of the Universe, provided that we allow, that God created that first Matter out of Nothing; that his Wisdom modelled and cast them into that excellent composure or figure, which the visible World now holds; and that ever since, by reason of the impulsion of their native Tendency, or primitive impression, they strictly conform to the laws of his beneplacuits, and punctually execute those several functions, which his almighty Will then charged upon their determinate and specifical Concretions. For, with the advantage of these restrictions, the Atoms of Epicurus have more of probability, and hold rational through most of those operations, which occur to the curiosity of the Philosopher, with more familiarity to our conceptions, and less variation or apostasy from the first Hypothesis, than the impossible Materia Prima of Aristotle, than the Substantial Principle of Plato, the Hyle of the Stoics, or, indeed, than any other imaginable Preaexistent in the immense space. And after a mature confronting, collation, and comparative perpension, of the most general conveniences and congruities of all; we have found that, from the groundwork of Atoms, we are able to make out what is Material, what Corporeal, what Great, what Little, what Rare, Dense, etc. but from the others we could never deduce the formal attributes of a body, or substance, while the original of all things is determined absolutely devoid both of Quantity and Quality Actual, and amounts to no higher a degree of reality, than a mere Privation; which a righteous enquiry will soon reduce to nothing. Nor is that affrighting Dissiculty in the Theory of Atoms, which the eye of every Pedantic Sophister first glances upon, at the very mention thereof, more than this shadow of a scruple; viz. how so vast a mass, as this Giant the Universe, could be made up of such minute particles, as Atoms, which every man understands to be much below the perception of sense, and never to be fathomed but by the subtle arms of the Intellect? For I dare entrust the solution of it to any moderate judgement, that shall take the pleasure to conceive this Analytick Scale, or degradation of Magnitude. Let us grant the globe of Earth, which seems to contain most of corporeity, to be but one part of the Universe composed of many such masses congested, and the law of consequence will compel us to concede, that the globe of the earth may be coagmentated of many smaller masses piled one upon another, or of mountains, as Atlas, Caucasus etc. cemented together; that those Mountains may result from an aggregation of rocks, those rocks from an accumulation of stones, those stones from a conflux, and ferrumination of grains of sand, that sand from a lesser assembly of dust, that dust from a minor collection of Atoms. This granted, let us have recourse to that famous Demonstration of the glorious Archimed (in Aren.) whereby it is evicted, that twenty five Ciphers, or Arithmetical notes set in successive order, 100000 etc. do exhibit the full number of those Granules of sand, which suffice to make up the vast bulk of the World, according to the vulgarly received magnitude thereof, though each of those granules be determined so exiguous, that one grain of Popie seed may contain ten thousand of them. I say, according to the Magnitude vulgarly received; for if, with Aristarchus (whose opinion Copernicus, in the last age, revived) you shall go higher, and enlarge the extension of the world: yet according to the Algebra of Archimed, will no more than sixty four Ciphers be required to calculate the number of grains of sand, of the same dimensions with the former, which equal the almost incredible vastity of the Universe. Now, if you please to go lower in the quantity of those minute grains, and sink them down even to the tenuity of an Atom; imagine that each of those small particles is composed of ten hundred thousand Atoms, and advance this number by multiplying it into 64, and even then will the number of those particles be expressed by no more than 70. Lower yet, if you think your last division went not so far as insectility, dichotomize those minute particles each into ten hundred millions; and then, upon a just Multiplication made, the number provenient shall not exceed the reach of 76 Ciphers. Nay drive the matter so far, that your thoughts may even lose themselves in the pursuit; and you shall still deprehend how easily you may be supplied with Ciphers enough to fulfil the number of all those Atoms, which are necessary to the amassment of a bulk▪ equal to this of the World. There is yet a fourth incongruity in this doctrine of Epicurus, worthy our explosion; viz. That Atoms had, from all eternity, a faculty of Motion, or impetuous tendency, inherent in them, and received not the same from any foreign principle, or impression extradvenient. But yet can I meet with no impediment, that may hinder me from conceiving, that Atoms are perpetually active and movable, by the agitation of that internal tendency, or virtual impression, which the Father of Nature conferred upon them, in the first moment of their miraculous production ex nihilo. And truly, thus refined, the Hypothesis of Atoms is less guilty of either inconvenience or incertitude, than any other concerning the f●rst material principle; nay, it hath thus much more of congruity and satisfaction than all the rest, that it fitly declares the radical Cause of all Motion, activity or energy in second Causes, or natures once removed from the Primus Motor, God: which can by no means be commonstrated from any other supposition, with the like constancy, correspondence, and perspicuity; especially if we look upon that Form, which the Schools commonly conclude on, as the main spring in all motion, or efficient of all activity. For whatever of real Entity they allow to be therein, they desume from no other origine, but the simple and naked Matter: and yet, by unpardonable incircumspection, or forgetfulness, they make that Matter absolutely idle, and devoid of all Motive or active virtue. Nor did Plato himself miss this consideration, but seems to have held the lamp to posterity, in this particular; for though he restrains not his notion to the word, Atoms, yet from his description of an Exiguity, Quam intellectus, non sensus capiat, and from the immediate subjunction of De multitudine illarum, déque motionibus, alii▪ sque facultatibus, congruum prorsus erat Deum providere, quatenus natura necessitati obediens ultrò obsecundaret, etc. (in Timaeo) 'tis a lawful conjecture, that he pointed directly upon the sense. These short Animadversions premised, that we may as well supply the Defects, as correct the depravities of this opinion of Epicurus; suppose we, in short, that God in the first act of his Wisdom and Power, out of the Tohu, or nothing, created such a proportionate congeries, or just mass of Atoms, as was necessary to the constitution of the Universe: suppose we also, that all those Atoms, in the instant of their creation received immediately from God a faculty of selfmotion, and consequently of concurring, crowding, justling, repelling, resilition, exsilition, and reciprocal complectence, concatenation revinction, etc. according to the respective preordination in the Divine Intellect: and then will all the subsequent operations of nature remain so clear and easy, that a mere Ethnic by the guidance of those two lamps, Sense and Ratiocination, may progress to a physical theory of them, and thereby salve all the Phaenomena's with less apostasy from first Principles proposed, then by any other hypothesis yet excogitated. A mere Ethnic, I say; for we, who have devolved unto us the inestimable blessing of Moses history of the Creation, have far other thoughts of that method or order, wherein the World was founded, and finished by God: but the pure Natural man, who wants the illumination of sacred Writ, can follow no other conduct, but what, by the light of nature, appears most consonant to truth. My Digression is now ended, and I return to the discharge of my Assumption, the redargution of that blasphemous opinion, which ascribes the honour of the World's composure to Fortune. SECT. II. ANd first I oppose to the Patron of this error, the more noble Article 1. The conceit of the World's fortuitous production, disparaged by a prepollency even of Pagan Authority, that profoundly asserted the contrary, viz. of▪ Authority of many ancient and eminent Philosophers; who, though unhappily born and educated in the midnight of Paganism, had yet their intellectuals, so irradiated by the refulgent Light of Nature, which their Vigilancy and assiduous Contemplation always kept, like the Vestal tapours, shining and uneclipsed by the Cimmerian fogs of Tradition and Prejudice, that they discovered more than a glimpse of Divinity in the original of the World. For Thales Milesius, being introduced by Diogenes Laertius (in vita ejusdem) as rendering a reason, Cur mundus sit pulcherrimus, Article 2. Thales Milesius. of the extreme glory, comeliness, and decency of the World, and exact symmetry observed in all and every part thereof; most wisely sets up his rest, and silences all further dispute, in this full solution, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 'tis the Artifice of God. That Anaxagoras had found out the same truth, by his retrograde tracing of nature up to her first head, or fountain; can be Article 3. Anaxagoras. obscure to none, that shall do his meditations so much right, as to interpret his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, men's, or supreme Intelligence, to be the same with that, which we call God: for even our Schoolmen do as much, frequently using those appellatives, Summa Intelligentia, and Deus, indifferently and as Synonomas. Of Pythagoras and Plato we need no other record, than the single testimony of Timaeus Locrus, who, being a famous Pythagorean, Article 4. Pythagoras and Plato. and therefore prudently deputed by Plato to deliver his own sense, in that golden Dialogue concerning Nature, (which in the Commentary of Marsilius Ficinus, signifies no more than Divinitatis instrumentum) in many passages of the debate, or investigation, takes occasion to declare, Deum esse Parentem ac opisicem mundi. Nor can it cost the study of many hours to collect from Plato's other inquest into Divinity called Parmenides (who also was a disciple of Pythagoras) or De uno omnium principio, and the now mentioned description of Nature, Timaeus, conferred together; that both Pythagoras and Plato shook hands in that opinion, that the world had its beginning, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, not in Time, in regard, as they conceived, it never had beginning, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but in Cogitation, i. e. though it be Non-principiate, yet may our thoughts have the licence to assume that there was some preaexistent matter, out of which it was form. For they both apprehended so absolute a dependence of the world upon God; that God being existent in the World, must of necessity be reputed the Efficient thereof, insomuch as the World could have no other Cause of its Matter, Distinction, Disposition, Beauty and ornament. And is not this the same, that our Doctors now admit, while they defend, that the World might have been created by God, had his Wisdom thought fit, from all Eternity; and if so, yet notwithstanding he must still have been the Cause of it, in regard of that necessary dependence of the World upon him, for if there were no God, there could be no World: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by the same reason, as though we grant the Sun together with its light, or a Seal together with its signature, to have been from all Eternity; yet must we grant the Sun to be the Cause of his light, and the Seal to be the Cause of its impression. For they condescend to this, that an Effect may be coevous to its Cause; and that, though the Cause be not prior Tempore, it sufficeth that it be only prior Natura, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is the very expression of Timaeus Locrus. However this may be disputed, yet sure I am, that as well these two Patriarches of Learning, as all their Sectators and Interpreters were unanimous in this point, That God was Author of the Universe. What the Stoics thoughts were, concerning this grand particular; Article 5. The Stoics. is public, and cannot escape the cognizance of any, who have looked into the lives of the Scholiarches, or Heads of that numerous Sect, amply registered by the even pen of Diogen. Laert. or read Cicero's second Book, De natura Deorum, where he elegantly personates Balbus smartly and profoundly disputing against Velleius and Epicurus; whither I remit the unsatisfied Reader, in avoidance of Prolixity. For the grand signieur of the Schools, Aristotle; truth is, I Article 6. Aristotle. cannot conceal, that when he maintains (in 8. Physic. & prioribus de Coelo) the Universe to be ingenitum, without origination, and contemns that forementioned distinction of Priority, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as excogitated by Pythagoras, and continued by Plato, rather 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for the convenience of Doctrine, than the interest of Truth: he is positive, that he could not admit the World to have had any Author at all; and therefore Simplicius (in 8. Physic. digress. 3.) chiding Philoponus for daring to assert, that the World had its origin and production from God, according to the testimony of Moses Chronicle, cries out that his doctrine was repugnant to the Fundamentals of his oracle, Arist. and in some sort highly derogatory to the majesty of the assigned Productor; since it tacitly rendered him subject to that imperfection, Mutability, which is incompatible with the constant simplicity of an Essence sufficiently accomplished for so mighty an action, and implies that he was not the same from all Eternity, and but lately became Parens, Conditórque mundi. But yet have I ground enough to stand upon, that Arist. grew wiser, as he grew elder, and that the flame of his reason shined brighter when that of his life burned dim; for in the last exercise of his pen, his book De mundo, which most Antiquaries conclude written in the close of his studies, (cap. 5. & 6.) he sings a palinodia, and makes open profession, that the universal harmony, consonance, and pulchritude of this great machine were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ab universorum Conditore: Confirming the verity of that pious A dage confessed and pronounced by all men, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, All from God. That he hinted this from that oraculous Motto, fathered upon Zoroaster, that King and Magus of the ancient Ba●trians, and contemporary to Ninus and Semiramis, as Eusebius (lib. 10. the praep. Evangel. cap. 3.) accounts; Factor, qui per se operans, fabrifecit mundum doth not want its share of probability, insomuch as the monuments of the Chaldean Learning were ransacked by the Platonics, and so came to the view of Aristotle, is manifest as well from the circumstance of Time, his life falling not much below the plunder of the Oriental Libraries, as from the Rhapsodies or Excerptions, which the Pythagoreans had made out of the relics of Zoroaster and Trismegistus, and transmitted down to the hands of Plato and his Scholars, who frequently inspersed them upon their own writings, a copious series of which sentential transcriptions hath been not long since bequeathed to posterity by the bounty of Caesar Longinus. But however, I am inclined to believe rather, that his second thoughts, and more advanced Contemplations on the excellency and glory of the structure, lighted him to this recantation, and enforced him to confess, that the fabric of the world was too full of Wisdom and Providence, to have been performed by any thing below the Highest: for 'tis warrantable for me to conjecture, that since he had his erudition, at least his education, at the feet of Plato, and so could not be ignorant of any Tradition of moment, which his Master knew; had his judgement been imbued with that lesson in his greener years, he could not well have stifled it till immediately before his death, especially when the knowledge of this great truth might have preserved him from that swarm of Difficulties, which he endured in maintaining his Thesis of the Non-production, or Eternity of the World. There are, I confess, who stiffly question the propriety of legitimation of this book, De Mundo, owning it upon some younger Composer; who ambitious to have the Minerva of his own colder brain, long lived in estimation, gave it the glorious name of Aristotle, and under the defence of that prosperous title, committed it to the encounter of Censure. To the satisfaction of these, I shall allege a place or two out of those pieces, which have ever escaped the imputation of spurious; whereby the former sentence is so ratified, that Aristotle may appear to have had great indignation against their incogitancy and stupidity, who could believe the world to be once produced, and yet ascribe the production thereof to Fortune. Dignum est, saith he, (in 2. Physic. cap. 4.) admiratione asserert istos, Animalia quidem & Plantas à Fortuna neque esse, neque fieri, sed aut naturam aut quandam mentem, aut quampiam aliam Causam habere (viz. non ex cujusvis semine quidvis nascitur, sed ex hoc quidem olea, ex illo vero homo) coelum autem, & quae sunt sensibilium divinissima, sponte nata fuisse, nec causam ullam, qualem animalia plantaeque sortiuntur, habuisse. 'tis well worthy our admiration, how these men can affirm, that Animals and Plants neither proceed from, nor can be made by Fortune; but must have either Nature, or some Intelligence or other efficient (for the seminalities of things do not fly out into promiscuous and indifferent Generations, but every distinct species hath its seed restrained and determined to the procreation of its like: nor can the fructifying principle of an Olive deviate into the production of a Vine; or the sperm of man produce any thing but man) but as for the Heavens, and other pieces of the world, which seem of fare greater alliance to Divinity: that these are spontaneous and casual in their originals, and have not obtained any Efficient to their Formations, equal to that of Animals or Plants. And (in 1. de Anim. Part. c. 1.) he speaks expressly to the same purpose, though in other words; which, to prevent the further trouble of the Reader, I shall faithfully transcribe. Quamobrem verisimilius dixerim coelum & factum esse ab ejusmodi causa; si factum est; & magis esse ob eam causam, quam Animalia caduca at que mortalia: ordo enim, certúsque status-longe magis in ipsis rebus coelestibus, quam in nobis patet; incerta enim, et inconstans, fortuitáque conditio in genere mortali est potius. At illi genus Animalium quódque natura constare, extitisséque censont; coelum autem ipsum Fortuna, spontéque ejusmodi constitisse volunt; in quo tamen nihil Fortunoe ac temeritatis deprehendi potest. Again, Caelius Rhodiginus (lib. 17. cap. 34. pag. 814) reports of him, that, though during the greatest part of his life he had ascribed all effects solely to secondary and inferior Causes, yet immediately before his death, when his soul began to be weaned from sensibility, and feel her wings, he most earnestly implored the compassion and forgiveness of the First and Supreme Cause, Primae causae misericordiam intentius implorabat, etc. To these I might have annexed a third text of Aristotle, selected by the Master of Roman Eloquence, and adaequately engrafted into his second discourse De Natura Deorum: but I conceived the two former to be testimony sufficient to the stability of my assertion, that he abhorred the absurd usurpation of Fortune. Now if the mere Natural Explorator shall but perpend both the Number and Dignity of these more venerable Professors of Science, wholly abating the weight of their Reasons; I cannot doubt, but he will find them infinitely to overbalance the single School of Epicurus, and of reputation great enough to excuse the conformity of his judgement to theirs: if he look no higher than the point of Authority. SECT. III. 'tIs no easy wonder, how any man, whose Faculties are not in Article 1. The pretext of Fortune destroyed, by the constancy of Nature in her act of specification, (i. c.) the restraint and determination of the seminalties of Animals to the procreation of their like in specie: and the Atheists objection, of frequent Anomalous and Heteroplasmicil, or monstrous Productions, dissolved. disorder, nor the Oeconomie of his head subverted into a Wildness beyond the absurdities of Melancholy adust, can be infatuated into a conceit, that so great, so unform, so durable, so magnificent, and therefore so glorious a work, as this of the World, could be performed by the less than feeble, and ignorant hands of Nothing, of Fortune. For however it may be allowed, that this imaginary Deity, may produce some effects extraordinary or miraculous: yet how petite and inconsiderable are those achievements of Chance, if put in the scale against those more admirable performances of Reason and Wisdom? Suppose we, that Prodigies may arise from the unequal concurrence of dissimilar and disproportionate Actives and Passives; and Monsters be generated by the casual confusion of distinct seminalities, as well amongst Animals, as Plants: yet how incomparably more prodigious are those ordinary propagations in each Classis; which by the certain and invariable law of their peculiar species, are restrained to their determinate Forms, and whose Constancy excludes all pretence of Fortune, or the accidental Efficiency of Chance? I leave to the decision of every sober man, which hath most of the Miracle; that the seed of every Animal should be consigned to the procreation of its like in specie, for the most part; and that the Plastic Spirit thereof punctually observe the model, or pattern of that Fabric of the body, from whence it came: or that, upon a preposterous commixture of various and unequal seeds, once in an age; there should succeed the production of some new Heteroclite, or unpatternd Monster, whose Composition is only contingent, and difform to the Idea of either its Active, or Passive Principle, in the simplicity of their divided Figures. And are not the exquisite Delineations of every Embryon, woven out by the subtle fingers of Archaeus, or the Formative spirit; the multiplicity, distinction, elaboration of organs both external, and internal; the several Functions, and Offices assigned to those organs, and so artificially contrived, that every one is distinct, yet none independent; every one single, yet all conspiring to the same end, all operative, yet none (per se) locomotive: are not these certain and praeordinate effects, with innumerable others, the meanest whereof we cannot seriously think upon, without a rapture of amazement, more worthy our admiration, than a single irregularity, a spontaneous Monster of Nilus, a bipartite Centaur, a prodigious Insect, etc. whose generations are accounted accidental, and their configurations not preordained, but the inconsiderate and extemporary results of Fortune? Perhaps these stupid Idolaters of Chance will refer these constant and settled operations to Nature; but whatever they mean by Nature, how immense a stock of Wisdom must it necessarily be endowed withal, which in all its works so cunningly contrives so great variety of organs, observes such exact Symmetry in all parts, so providently disposeth every member, and fits them to the easy execution of their predestinate functions? If they go farther, and affirm, that Nature is nothing but the primitive Constitution of the World, which resulted from the casual separation, conflux, and disposition of its material principle, Atoms; and that it doth constantly persist in the same Method, which it first obtained from Fortune: the answer is easy, that though Nature be constant to that order, in all her productions, which the World obtained in its first composure; yet how ridiculously stupid must he be, who can admit a serious persuasion, that the bodies of Animals, in the beginning could be so tightly configurated by mere Chance, and without the direction and indeed the designment of an infinite Wisdom; in whose eternal intellect the prototypes of each species were first adumbrated? Let them object again, that every day affords examples of the skill of Fortune, in the production of Frogs, Toads, Flies, and other spontaneous Infects: and I shall soon return, that those Infects or spontaneous Animals have their Causes certain, and by reason of that energy once conferred upon their Efficients, must arise to animation in such or such a Figure, according to the magnitude, number, situation, complexion, quiet, motion, or, in a word, the Temperament of those particles, out of which their bodies are amassed; and according to the activity of that domestic Heat, which ferments and actuates the matter: Secondly, that our debate is about the original of Nature itself, and of that precise Virtue radically implanted in the seeds of things; or more emphatically, what hand inoculated that procreative power in each seminality, and endowed it with a capacity requisite to the conformation of bodies so admirable in their structure: if there were not some principle in the nonage of the Universe, who infused that Prolifical or fertile Tincture, ordained that scheme of members, and gave it rules to act by; from which it never fwerves, but upon a disobedience and nonconformity of matter. If we looked no farther than the Cortex or Exteriors of Animals; and there speculated as well the amiable comeliness of their Figures in the whole (for there is no real Deformity in Nature) as the geometrical Analogy, or convenience betwixt the Members and their Actions, each being respectively configurated to the performance of its peculiar office: 'twere more than sufficient to discover to us the impossibility of their primitive institution by Fortune. But when we dissect them, pry into their Entrails, and there survey the almost infinite multitude of organs, principal and subordinate; the variety of their uses, some being official to Nutrition, some to Vitality, some to Generation, others to Sense, others to Locomotion, none impeding the activity of another, but all unanimously conspiring to conserve the oeconomy of that Form, which, like the main spring in an Automaton, invigorates, and actuates the whole fabric: either we must bid dehance to the chief inducement of belief, and drown the loud clamours of our Conscience, or else fall down, transported with an ecstasy of pious Wonder, and humbly confess, that these are the Impresses of the infinite power and wisdom of an omniscient, and omnipotent Creator; but not the Contingencies, or temerarious effects of Chance. Thoughts like these had the prudent Gassendus, when, in his detestation of the interest of that Pretendress, Fortune (cap. de exortu mundi.) his golden pen dropped this rhetorical logic; Id quod stuporem generat, dispositio interna est in corporibus Animalium. Nam si foret quidem duntaxat multitudo aliqua partium, forte fortuna commistarum, tum ea posset Fortunae tribui: at in multitudine illa pene innumerabili nullam esse partem, non tantam, non talem, non ubi, non quomodo, non cum ea functione, qua congruum est, ut neque inutilis sit, neque esse commodior valeat: rationem prorsus omnem sugit, ut ita fieri non sapientia, sed Fortuna sit constitutum. Nor do Animals alone, but Vegetables also, though of an inferior Classis, amply and sensibly testify the Divinity of their Article 2. The necessity of the World's Greation by an Agent infinite in Science and Power, proclaimed by the constant Uniformity of Nature, in her perpetuation of Vegetables. Founder, and confute the Apotheosis of Fortune. Thus, when the Aliment of a Plant, being the aqueous irrigation of the earth insensibly prolected, ascends from the lowest filament of the shaggy root up to the Trunk, and thence works up to the extremities of every branch and twig; can we imagine, that this thin, insipid juice can be so inspissated, and so ingeniously moulded into a Bud; that bud discriminated and variegated into a larger particoloured Blossom; that Blossom gradually expanded into a determinate flower, which gratifies our eyes with the beauty of its embroidery, and our nostrils with the fragrancy of its odour; that Flower lost in the richer emergency of a Fruit, which hath its figure, colour, magnitude, odour, sapour, maturity, duration, all certain and constant; and the abridgement, or Epitome of this included in the seed of that fruit, which being insperst upon the earth, is impregnate with a Faculty to expand itself into a second Plant, in all things rival to the former, and empowered to act all those several Metamorphoses over again, to a perpetual rejuvenescence of that peculiar species: can we, I say, imagine, that all this could arise from a spontaneous range of Atoms, or that Necessity which ensued upon the casual disposition of the First matter; and not rather with devout hymns proclaim the Efficiency of a Glorious and Eternal Cause, whose Essence being incomprehensible, and Attributes infinite Intelligence, Goodness, Power, Beatitude, Glory, etc. must therefore be the Ordainer, Creater, and Consecrator of all things? Let us sink our meditations yet one degree lower on the scale of Article 3. The Sun convincively demonstrates the infinite wisdom of its Creator, by 3 Arguments: viz. Creatures, and consider how convincively even Inanimates argue for the wisdom of their Maker. Doth not the Sun (to omit the speculation of its glorious Light, and comfortable Influence; the former whereof is so excellent, the other so necessary, that they challenge as due the Admiration of all, and have drawn the Adoration of many ingenious nations) by three prevalent arguments. viz. the Commodiousness of its situation, the Designment of its motion, and the Line or tract of its revolution, sufficiently illustrate the forecast and artifice of its Creator? First by the universal Convenience of its situation. For had it been placed in any other orb, either inferior, or superior to its 1. The universal convenience of its situation in its proper orb. own; such horrid incommodities, as are inconsistent with its use and intention, and destructive to the two principal designs of Nature, Conservation and Generation, must unavoidably have followed; nor had the whole fabric of the Universe been more than one degree removed from the confusion of its originary Chaos. To particular; had the Sun been settled in the lowest sphere, and obtained that place, which the Moon now possesseth: the year had been no longer than a month; for in that account of time, it must have fulfilled its course through every part of the Ecliptic, and so the intervals of seasons had suffered such a contraction, that must have been repugnant to their institution, i. e. must have prevented the production of all things; For the Antipraxis, or Counter-activity of contrary seasons, immaturely succeeding one upon the neck of another, destroys the principles of Vegetation, and checks the promotion of seminalities. Again, by this unsafe vicinity, or too near approach to the globe of the earth, its intenser beams had verified the Conflagration of Phaeton; at least proved so intolerable, as that all things must have had the icy and glutinous temper of the Salamander, or else been torrified into cinders; and to have had no Sun at all, had been the easier misery. For if there be (and some are positive there must be) an intention and remission of heat, respective to the different points, or access and recess of the Sun, in its proper orb; and that in its Apogaeum, or mountee to the highest point in Cancer, the heat is not so scorching under that Tropic on this side the Aequator, as on the other side, in its Perigaeum or stoop to the lowest point of its excentricity in Capricorn: we cannot with any pretext of reason doubt, that, had the Sun been lodged in the bed of the Moon, it had long since anticipated the general combustion of the last day, and calcined all things to the exiguity of their primitive Atoms. And on the other extreme, had the Sun been appointed to the eight or highest sphere; then must it have been, by reason of the exceeding slow motion assigned to that sphere, so manythousand years in the absolution of its course, as that it must have extended one year to the compute of Plato's Jubilee; nor could the world (if learned men guess aright concerning its duration) have attained to the period of one revolution. Besides that Hemisphere, which first faced the Sun in the beginning of its tedious gyre, must have enjoyed the curse of a long long day, and consequently have missed the fertile blessing of a vicissitude, or reciprocal succession of distinct seasons; but the opposite Hemisphere must have, for many myriads of ages, continued as cold, dark and barren as the grave, and so half of the earth had been made to no purpose. And the like discommodities, though more moderate, would have succeeded to the earth, had the Sun obtained a situation in any one of the other six orbs, between the two former extremes. Secondly, by the appointment of its Circumrotation. For had 2. The appointment of its continual Circumgyration. it remained fixed and not moved at all; then must the world have wanted that necessary division of times and seasons, of Spring and Autumn, Summer and Winter, day and night: and by consequence, the generation and conservation of things dependent on those vicissitudes of Heat and Cold; it being necessary, that the fixation of this Luminary must have caused a perpetual summer in one hemisphere, and as lasting and disconsolate a Winter in the other; or driven nature upon the exigent of making another Sun to irradiate and cherish the opposite half of the earth, it being experimentally true (and therefore advanced to the dignity of an Axiom by Galileo, Philolaus, Niceron, Kircherus, and other junior Masters in the Optics) that no spherical luminous body, of what diameter soever, can project its light upon the whole sphere of another at once, or in a fixed position; though it illuminate more than the half of a lesser placed at convenient distance. Lastly, by the contrivement of its obliqne motion along the line 3. The contrivement of its obliqne motion along the line Eclipitick. Ecliptic. For had its revolution been assigned to any other circle; discommodities no less fatal than the former had unavoidably ensued. First, had it sailed along on either side the Aequator, some parts of the earth could have known no Sun at all, but should have groaned under the oppression of perpetual frigidity and opacity; while others had suffered the contrary extreme of an everlasting noon, and been parched by the violence of its too constant and perpendicular beams: and so the whole had been inhabitable; an Alternation of Heat and Gold being indispensably requisite aswell to the Conservation and growth of all things in their Individuals, as to their Propagation in Specie. Secondly, had it been confined to the conduct of the Aequator; first unto a parallel sphere, or such who have the Pole for their Zenith, its revolution could have made neither perfect day, nor perfect night; for being in the Aequator, it would intersect their horizon, and be half above, and half below it: and to those, who inhabit under the Aequator, though it made a distinction of day and night, yet would it not make any considerable distinction of seasons; for the Sun being always vertical to them, in that situation, would have introduced a constant Summer, and the perpendicularity of its unremitted heat have exhausted the fructifying humidity of the earth, and so left the womb of our common mother, squalid and barren as the desert Sarra in Africa. Lastly, had it moved directly upon the Aequator, unto what position soever; well might it have described a day, but never measured out a year: for the progression of it from West to East (by the compass of which motion the circle of the year is constituted) had been wanting; in regard that 'tis impossible that on one and the same circle, observing the same Poles, the Sun should have performed its two contrary motions, one from East to West, which defines the day, the other from West to East, which measures out the year, both at once▪ Now all these palpable inconveniences (with many other first observed and enumerated to us by a Spanish, and lately most elegantly explained by an English Physician; both which selected this choice subject, as an impregnable argument of the Wisdom of the Creator) were artisicially prevented by the device of the Sun's motion along the Ecliptic, and the obliquity of its annual progress upon the Poles of the Zodiac, full 23 degrees, and an half from the Poles of the World. Now this meditation naturally applies itself, and so clearly demonstrates the forecast and artifice of an infinite Intelligence; that I have nothing left to say, but this; that 'tis a wonder, which nothing but the delusion of the Father of lies can make out to belief, how Epicurus, being a Philosopher, in many abstrusities of nature acute enough, nay beyond most of his Tutors, as Diogenes Laertius testifies of him; and one that pretended to so much insight in the problems of Astronomy, as to be able to salve all the Phaenomena, or Apparitions above the Terraqueous orb, (in Epist. ad Pythoelem) could yet be so infatuated, as to ascribe the composure, and location of the Sun, and the invention of its regular, and to all parts convenient motion, to the Temerity and Incogitancy of Fortune. Nor could I have conceived it possible that so much of the Scholar, and so much of the Fool could have at once met in one and the same brain; had not I been persuaded thereto, by the agreeing testimonies of many credible Authors, high both in Antiquity and Fame. If these Arguments reach not, we may descend yet lower (if there be any thing low in Nature) and from the entrails of our Article 4. The impresses of an infinite Intelligence, plainly legible in the fronts even of Subterraneous Inanlmates. Grandmother fetch Stones and Mineral Concretions, to give in evidence against the insolent arrogance of Fortune. For who dares contract the suspicion of madness so meritoriously, as once to dream that the Magnet obtained its rich endowments of Verticity and Attraction; the Adamant its radiant tralucency and conical angularity; Alum its octohedrical or eight-faced Figure; Salt its Sexangular; Nitre its stiriate or ycicle-resembling; Vitriol its multangular, etc. from a mere accidental and undetermined conflux and coalition of their minute and insensible particles: and not from the provident and artificial disposition of them into such and such situations, as are requisite to the causation of those particular qualities and Figures, by the discreet and methodical influence of an infinite wisdom? If any such there be (and I have reason for more than my fears, that such there are, in these accursed days, when all the Errors of the elder world are revived, desperate Heresies belched out even by those, who profess to be the Patriots of truth, and horrid Blasphemies applauded as commendable strains of high devotion) who tremble not to deny the Creation of all things by God: these I shall pity, and leave to ponder that exclamation of Gassendus, (de exortu mundi) O quam hebetem esse oportet, aut quam reclamantem habere conscientiam, si dum adista attenditur, sola interim Fortuna laudatur! O how insensible must that man be either of the advisoes of reason, or the convulsions of Conscience; who can consider these things, and yet ascribe the honour of their (reation to Fortune! And if the Characters of an Infinite Wisdom be so plainly Article 5. The impossibility of the world's Creation by any Agent but God, illustrated both by the Magnitude, and Pulchrltude thereof: and the Epicureans dream, of a motive faculty eternally inherent in Atoms, derided. visible in the single and divided pieces of the Universe; how incomparably more legible must they be in the Whole, wherein Amplitude holds an emulous contention with Pulchritude? True it is, the Epicureans were not staggered at the consideration of so vast a mass, instantly addressing themselves for refuge, to an infinite stock of Atoms congested in an infinite space. But this Sanctuary is rotten, and cannot protect the credulity of any, unless it be supported by this additional base; that there was some first Active principle, which by its infinite power first created out of nothing, and then congested this mass of Atoms into a Chaos, and after by its infinite wisdom digested the same into that exquisite order which doth now constitute the form of the world. Is it possible for any thing that dares pretend to Humanity, to imagine, or by any specious argument to hope to persuade, that so many minute bodies, or Atoms, by the rash and undeterminate conduct of their own innate propensity to motion, indifferently hurried up and down, hither and thither, and by reason of the discord arising from their different quantities, and Figures, apt to maintain an everlasting civil war and confusion; could notwithstanding by a spontaneous direction meet and unite in that just number, which was sufficient to make up the Globe of the Earth, requisite to compose the body of the Sun, proportioned to the dimensions of the Moon, equal to the several orbs of those radiant Sentinels of night, the Stars, whose multitude exceeds the figures of Arithmetic, and their magnitude never yet rightly explored; in fine, exactly accommodate to the great body of the World, whose bounds we know not, and whose dimensions are immense? The conviction of this impossibility they have endeavoured (though by running into as great a one) thus to evade, As he (say they) must have been deceived, who having observed the generation of nothing greater than a Flea, could not therefore believe the generation of an Elephant, as if there could not be found matter enough to arise to so gigantic a body: so are we deceived, while regarding the generation of only small things we believe that the great body of the universe could not be made up by the same means, and after the same manner; as if so vast a proportion of matter could not concur and unite into one Form; nay by so much the more are we deceived, by how much the more proportion the matter of a Flea holds to that of an Elephant, and the matter of an Elephant holds to that of the World; then the matter of the World holds to that mass of Atoms, which is infinite in the infinite space. But I may with good reason demand, how they can be assured, that in the imaginary space, without the circumferrence of the world, there is such an inexhaustible abyss of matter, as sufficeth to the generation not only of this world, but of an infinite multitude of others, fully as large as this: so, well as we are assured, that in this world is contained matter sufficient to the composition of an Elephant, as well as of a Flea? Sure I am, no man ever saw the outside of the world; and if so, is it not a mere Rhodomontado of fancy, or (as Pliny calls it) a high madness, to imagine such an infinite abyss of matter? Let us, however, deal with these, as wise Physicians with Hypochondriacks, that they may the more easily cure them, allow them their absurdities; and grant that from eternity there was such an infinity of Atoms, confusedly hurried to and fro, in an infinite space: yet the difficulty will always remain, how in so great a laxity and infinite liberty of range, so many Atoms could so convene and combine together, as to terminate and settle each other, by reciprocal coherence and mutual concatenation; how so orderly marshal and dispose their several divisions into such elegant Figures: how adapt those figures to such genuine and constant operations; and all this without the counsel, disposition, and revinction of any other cause, but their own rude and giddy propensity to motion, and the casual result of their cessation from discord? That Animals have obtained such exquisite forms, respective to their several destinations; this we can refer to the artifice of their peculiar Seminalities, or the cunning of that Formative virtue, which lying ambuscadoed in the spumous consistence of their genital emissions, and being once awakened into Activity by the excitement of a convenient Matrix, or Receptarie, immediately designs this or that parcel of matter for such or such a part, another for another, and so spins it out into an uniform labyrinth of members, at last weaving all those into an ingenious Figure, in all points resembling the Protoplast or first genitor of that species; who received this Seminal Tincture, or faculty prolifical from the immediate bounty of its Creator. But that Atoms, as they are in their naked and incomplex nature, should be allowed to have a Plastic or fabrefactive virtue equal to that conferred upon the seeds of Animals; is a sigment as worthy our spleen, as that ridiculous branch of the same root the Autocthonous, or spontaneous eruption of our first Parents from the confermentation of Water and Earth, and the production of mankind like that of Mushrooms: which whimsy is also entitled to Epicurus, by no meaner a tradition then that of Censorinus (de Di. Nat. cap. 2.) whose words, for the more clear and credible transmission of the Fable, I thought it not altogether impertinent here to insert. Nec longe secus Epicurus credidit, limo calefactos uteros nescio quos, radicibus terrae cohaerenteis primum increvisse, & infantibus ex se editis ingenitum lactis humorem, natura ministrante praebuisse; quos ita educatos, & adultos genus hominum propagasse. To this we may add (for a single testimony is not strong enough to oblige any man to believe so unpardonable a dotage in a grave Philosopher) the concurrent Auctorities of Lactantius (lib. 2. cap. 7.) Plutarch (5. Placit. 19) Diogenes Laertius (lib. 2. in vita Archelai athenians.) Diodorus Siculus (lib. 1.) and Macrobius (3. Saturn. 6.) Though, for my part, I conceive this frenzy to have possessed many heads, upon whose skulls corruption had planted growing Perewikes of Moss, many hundreds of years before Epicurus his was warm; in regard many ancient Nations, in particular the Egyptians and Phoenicians, contending for the honour of seniority, have gloried in the title of Autocthonae, and thought their Eschutcheons sufficiently noble, if charged only with this impress, Terrae silii. But I return from this my Excursion. If the World, indeed, were as Ovid's Chaos, rudis indigestaque moles, a deformed and promiscuous miscellany, or mass of Heterogeneities, and the several parts of it variously blended together without either discrimination or order: then might the pretence of Fortune be more plausible. For should we take a man, who had been born and bred up to maturity of years in some obscure cavern of the earth, and never looked abroad upon the World, nor heard of more than what immediately concerned his aliment and other natural necessities; on a sudden educe him from his dungeon, and show him an Animal cut in pieces, and all its dissimilar parts, as skin, muscles, fat, veins, arteries, nerves, tendons, ligaments, cartilages, bones, marrow, etc. laid together in a promiscuous heap: doubtless we could not quarrel at his incredulity, if he would not be persuaded, that any thing but Chance had a hand in that confusion. But should we instantly present him another Animal, feeding, walking, and performing all the comely functions of vitality; instruct him in the several uses and actions of all those parts, which he had formerly surveyed in the disorder of an heap; then kill that Animal also, and for his farther information, anatomzie its carcase; and exhibit to him the several parts, in all things respondent to the former: 'tis conjectural that we should find, that the rudeness of his education would not so totally have extinguished the Light of Nature in him, as not to have left some spark, by the glimmering whereof he might discover some more noble Principle than Fortune, to have been the Efficient of that more than ingenious machine. Now we cannot but observe, that in the great engine of the universe, nothing is with less order, decency, beauty, uniformity, symmetry, constancy, in a word, with less wisdom, either designed, or finished; then in the smaller organ of an Animal, in the perfection of its integrality. And if so, how near comes it to an absolute contradiction, that we should acknowledge some noble and prudent Cause, that moulded and compacted all those different parts into one most elegant and accomplished body, and exactly accommodated that body to the easy execution of its predestinate operations: and yet not acknowledge the same, in the ordination and construction of the more admirable, because more difficult fabric of the Universe? I say, a Contradiction; for if the easier Artifice of an Animal be conceded too hard; assuredly the more difficult machination of the innumerably organed World must needs be granted impossible, to be wrought by the impotent and ignorant fingers of Fortune. Quanto enim major operis moles, tanto erit ut sapientiae, ita & potentiae majus argumentum; non quod aliunde elaboratio minutorum corpusculorum non commendet artificem: sed quod in opere ingenti & symmetriam servare industrium, & materiam regere operosum esse videatur. Lastly, as the Votaries of Fortune have argued à minori ad Article 6. The Epicureans grand Argument, of the possibility of the configuration of the Universe by a casual and spontaneous disposition of Atoms, from the frequent actual production of an Infect by the same means or principles; countermined by an inversion or Argument à majoriad minus. majus, thus; if the smaller machine of a Hand-worm, wherein the almost invisible (without an engyscope, or magnifying glass) exiguity of the whole frame, the multiplicity of organs, and the variety of respective functions assigned thereunto, may worthily contend, concerning elegance of composure, with the large captain of the watery regiments, the Whale, may be configured by Chance, or the casual concourse of convenient particles of the First matter: why may not the grosser movement of the Universe be also wrought by the like contingent segregation of disagreeing, and convention of consimilar Atoms; whose tumultuation and conslict growing from the antipathy of different magnitude and Figure, made the Chaos; and their working themselves into peculiar orders, by the accidental conflux and mutual coherence of Homogeneities, made the form of the World. So we, by counter-demonstration, may argue à majori ad minus, thus; if Fortune had the power and skill to make the World, why can she not make the more rude and facile movement of a Watch? If Atoms could spontaneously range and combine themselves into the immense batlements of the World: why not also into the narrower structure of a Castle? If they met into the mighty bulwarks of an Island: why not into the thinner and more fragil rampiers of a Fort? If they could dispose themselves into wide campanias of Herbs and variegated Flowers: why not into a piece of Landscape Tapestry? All which require, as infinitely less of Power, so also of Science. Should they endeavour a subterfuge, by replying; that these are the Effects of Art, and not of Nature: we may prevent their evasion by rejoining, that since they allow Chance to have an interest even in the operations of Art; why do they not aswell make her the Founderess of a City, as of the edifice of a spontaneous Animal, whose structure is more difficult? We are not backward to confess, what we lately supposed concerning the dissected and disordered parts of an Animal, that if the World were but a promiscuous heap of different materials, such as stones▪ Timber, Sand, Lime, Clay, Nailes, Tiles, &c. confusedly congested: then could not our choler swell to so high a tide of indignation against the arrogance of Fortune; nor should we be so well provided of arms to fight in defence of a divine contrivement. But since the building of the same is, by infinite transcendency, more durable, more distinct, more symmetrical, and more gorgeous in all its parts, than the most elaborate and magnificent Palace: since the Heart of a Pismire hath more of magisterial artifice, than the Eschurial; the proboscis or trunk of a Flea more industry in its delicate and sinuous perforation, than all the costly Aqueducts of Nero's Rome, the Arsenal at Venice, or the two Spanish Engines, one for the traduction and elevation of Water, at Toledo, the other for the automatous coining of money, at Segovia, both admired by a Person for the most part above admiration, Sr. Kenelm Digby; since the breast or laboratory of a Bee contains more anfractuous convolutions than the Labyrinth of Daedalus, and more Cellules than the famous monastery of St. Laurence, in Spain, for bravery and amplitude of architecture reputed the eighth wonder of the World: and since the skull of a Louse hath more ventrieles or receptaries for the numerous swarms of Animal spirits, than the spacious Amphitheatre of Rome had seats for the spectators: in sine, since the meanest piece of Nature throws disparagement and contempt upon the greatest masterpeice of Art; how can it be, that man, noble and ingenious man, should fall so much lower than his incircumspect Father Adam, as to confess the visible influence of Prudence in the easier, and yet, at the same time, deny any cause, but Ignorance to have been exercised in the harder; to admit the managery of an Architect, or knowing principle, in the structure of a house, and yet determine the more magnificent Creation of the Universe upon the blind disposal of Fortune? To conclude this unworthy vindication of the injured wisdom Article 7. An exception against the seeming disparity betwixt their inference and ours, prevented: and the invalidity os theirs, though their own hypothesis were conceded in terminis, declared, by an adequate similitude. of our Maker, by leaving no possible objection unanswered, let us suppose that our opponents should recurre to their old starting hole, or sally port, the Spontaneous motion of Atoms, and urge, that if the materials of a house, or other artificial structure, were endowed with an innate propensity to motion, as the materials of the World were; then might they also, without the direction of any external Agent, only by reciprocal convention, complication and revinction, acquire settled and orderly situations, and so dispose themselves into a regular Fabric: but since they are devoid of all domestic Activity, the disparity betwixt the operations of chance, and those of Art, is so great, that an argument drawn from the impossibility of a performance by one, is not conclusive against the possibility of an atcheivement by the other. And when we have supposed this retort, let us also suppose what they would have, viz. that the materials of a house were radically impregnated with a perpetual tendency to motion; and that by the drift of this internal activity, they should from different quarters meet together in one heap, there crowd, compress, express, impel, repel, detrude, elevate, circumgyrate, fix each other, and at last by reciprocal combination acquiesce: yet can it never be supposed, by a sober imagination, that the result of all this hurly burly betwixt those unequal parts, and the peace ensuing upon the casual acquisition of situations proper and convenient to each, would be a well ordered edifice; nay any thing half so near allied to architecture as a ruin. I conceive the wit of Balbus wound up to a very happy strain, when disputing against Velleius (one that blushed not to wear the infamous badge of Epicurus) concerning this monstrous sigment of the world's Projection from the dissolution of the Chaos, and a fortuitous concursion of the universal matter; he invented this apposite similitude: Hoc qui existimat fieri potuisse, non intelligo cur idem non putet, si innumerabiles, unius & viginti formae literarum vel aureae, vel quales-libet aliquo conjiciantur, posse ex his in terram excussis Annales Ennij, ut deinceps legi possint ●ssici; quod nescio anne in uno quidem versu possit tantum valere Fortuna. Upon which we may briefly thus descant; if that congruous series of letters, which is necessary to the lecture of one page, line, or word, can never result from a careless congestion of prints; but must be the settled effect of great industry and diligence in the Compositor: undoubtedly, with no less violence to reason, can any man opinion, that the innumerable parts of the World, that observe a far more distinct and elegant order then the characters of any Typographer disposed into words, lines, pages, sheets, should attain to that admirable Form, which they now hold; by a mere fortuitous assembly; and not by the certain and predestinate ordination of some supremely-intelligent Cause. These reasons, though not woven into that strict method, which Article 8. The conclusion of this section; or, the aequipondium of the precedent reasons, if prepended in the mass and conjunctively, to the most perfect demonstration. is required to fulfil the web of perfect demonstrations; do yet seem strong enough in their single inferences undeniably to conclude the Creation of the Universe out of no praeexistence, by the sole and immediate Fiat of the same Essence, and if judiciously twisted together into one Syndrome, or complex Argument, must oblige as firmly; since they clearly evince the first Article of the Christians Creed, as an uncontrollable verity, which none, but such degenerate miscreants, in whom the Light of Nature is wholly extinct, or such as are desperately resolved to shut the eye of their mind against the splendour of that infallible Criterion, can longer doubt of. And therefore, having determined neither to scandal the intellectuals of my Reader, either by indubitating his facile perception of the force of those proofs already urged, or multiplying others in order to the illustration of that truth, to which he hath formerly submitted his plenary assent; nor unfruitfully to spend that time and paper, which I have devoted to the explanation and ratification of other necessary points, on a work of supererogation: I shall only fringe this exercise with that pertinent and emphatical passage of Lactantius (De Opif. Dei cap. 6.) Tanta ergo qui videat & talia, potest existimare nulla effecta esse consilio, nulla providentia, nulla ratione divina; sed ex Atomis subtilibus, exiguis concreta esse tanta miracula? nun prodigio simile est, aut natum esse hominem qui haec diceret, ut Leucippum; aut extitisse qui crederet, ut Democritum, qui auditor ejus fuit; vel Epicurum, in quem vanitas omnis de Leucippi sonte prostuxit? and so proceed to the satisfaction of two collateral Scruples. SECT. iv Scruple 1. THe Curiosity of some, (whether more insolent or vain, is Article 1. That Antique absurd expostulation, what Instruments Auxiliants, materials predisposd, God made use of, in his act of Fabrication of the Universe, copiously satisfied: and the energy of the divine Will commonstrated superior to the indigence of either. hard to determine,) hath been so audacious, as to adventure upon this Quere; If God made the world, pray what instruments, tools, mechanic engines, what assistants did he make use of in the work? The Satisfaction. This is no green impiety (unless it hath lately budded forth again amongst those Human-devils, the Ranters; the report of whose prodigious blasphemies hath sometimes transported me to a hatred, at least a contempt of myself, for being in the same rank of (reatures; and made me wish for a second deluge) but almost half as old as Time, and may be traced as high as the Epoch of the Grecian learning; witness those many secret convulsions of it by Plato (both in his Parmenides and T●m●us) while he frequently affirms the divine Nature to be Inorganical, and the immediate operations of the universal cause to be above the necessity of Corporeal means: witness also Cicero (most of whose streams came out of the Grecian fountain) who (in 1. De Nat. Deor.) introducing the Atheist, Vellejus disputing against Plato and the Stoics, who held the divine essence to be the Author of the Universe; proposeth the scruple at large, in these Words: Quibus enim oculis intueri potuit vester Plato fabr●cam illam tanti operis, qua construi à Deo at que aedificari mu●dum facit? quae molitio? quae ferramenta? qui vectes? quae machinae? qui ministri tanti muneris fuerunt? etc. That boldness is the daughter of ignorance, is herein plainly verified; for had these unhappy Pagans understood any thing of the majestic essence of divinity, or but apprehended the vast disparity between the efficiency of the Highest, and that of all other Subordinate causes; 'tis more than probable, they had not been so saucy with his imperial Attribute, Omnipotence, nor run into that common mistake of flesh and blood, of measuring the ways of God by the ways of man. True 'tis, that man hath need of instruments to the performance of any piece of Art, nor can the Geometrician draw his lines without a rule, or describe a circle without the help of his compass; the Carpenter work without his Axe, Saw, and other tools; the Smith without his fire, hammer, anvil, etc. all which the wit of man, sharpened by necessity, hath invented to compensate the insufficiency of his naked hands, made by nature either too soft, too weak, or too obtuse for those difficult uses: But yet what can impede our assurance of the eternal existence of a more Noble Essicient; whose Will is infinite Power, and that Power infinite Activity; whose single Let it be done, is both Cause and Means; and whose simple act of Volition not only the Efficient, but also the Instrument? Do not we observe (that I may extract an Argument from the evidence of sense) how, in the twinkling of a lover's eye, that comely Arch of colours, the Rainbow, is painted on the clouds; and yet without either hand, compass, or pencil? do we not behold whole mountains of ponderous Clouds piled one upon another; and yet neither vessels to lave up, nor engines to sustain that sea of water? And cannot these familiar observations instruct us with more knowledge, then to doubt the fabrication of the world without corporeal organs? Why is our reason so immodest, as to inquire into the ability of the First cause; when alas! it is not large enough to comprehend the efficacy of the weakest Secondary? if the meanest and most ordinary effect of Nature imports so much stupendious industry, as transcends the narrow capacity of man; what audacious ignorance is it in him, to question the energy of that Principle, that made Nature herself, and prescribed her rules to act by: from which she cannot vary, without a miraculous dispensation? We are willing forsooth, to profess, that we cannot understand by what artifice the delicate body of a Pismire is configurated▪ animated, and impowered for the noble actions of sense and voluntary motion, nay (for aught we know to the contrary) for that more noble and elaborate office of discourse also: and yet, when we come to contemplate the more magnificent form of the Universe, shall we degenerate into such impertinent Idiots, as to debate the Mathematic energy of its Creator, and demand how he could operate without Engines to transport, adfer, and wind up the materials, with scaffolds to advance the roof, or servants to assist in several offices requisite? Assuredly, as the frame of that slender Animal doth confess a certain Faculty, by which it was modelled, delineated, and compacted; though the reason and manner of its contexture remain in the dark to us: so also doth the huge machine of this visible World proclaim a certain energetical principle, of infinitely more potency and perfection, by which it was composed; though the manner and way of its composure be too abstruse and sublime for the discernment of our weak-sighted intellectuals. Now, whether you shall denominate that Energy, a Power divine, or God; it is indifferent: but indispensably necessary, that you acknowledge it to be so great, as by incomputable intervals to exceed the comprehension of the mind of man; nor is it safe for us to attempt the commensuration of it by the unequal module, or scale of particular finite Causes, since even from these our reason stands so remote, as to be able at most only to conjecture their dimensions. Upon this consideration, if a Pilot, while he only sits in the steerage and hands the helm, doth direct the ship in its course, by a far more excellent industry, than all the rude officers inservient thereunto, that stretch their tougher sinews to hoist and tack about her sails, and toil their tawny bodies in other inferior labours: if a Prince, who sits calmly in his throne, doth by a single nod of his sceptre awe millions of his subjects to obedience, and by the magic of a smile or frown conjure whole nations into joy or terror; if he, I say, doth govern his people, by a more mysterious and noble influence, than all his subordinate ministers of state, with all their tumultuous pains and travel, either in the transmission, or execution of his mandates: if an Architect, or masterbuilder, who in his closet only draws the platform, and designs the figure of the structure; doth by his mere designation, operate more tightly, and by a more excellent artifice contribute to the perfection of the work, than all the swarm of bus●ling mechanics employed in squaring, or placing the materials: why should we not allow that mighty Pilot, Prince, and Architect of the World to be empowerd with a certain kind of Efficacy so eminent, that whatever can be thought most absolute and puissant in all other natures, must be infinitely inferior to it? And therefore when we, who have learned our lesson outof the sacred leaves of Moses, say that he made the universe solo nutu, at que simplici volitione, by one simple and entire act of his Will, expressed in that word, Fiat; we speak all that can be understood by us of that miracle. As for the last part of the Atheists indecent expostulation; viz. What coadyutors or ministers had God to attend him, and wha● materials preaexistent and prepared to conform to his disposure? that may be soon resolved, by offering that supereminence, whereby he is, by infinite excesses, above all other Efficients. For what were the Prerogative of Divinity, if it were subject to the want of the same means, or cooperating Causes, with us despicable and impotent men? To conclude, it will not only suppress all dangerous Curiosities of this kind, but also highly commend our judgements; that we draw a large line of distinction betwixt the Almightiness of the Creator, and the restrained activity, or rather pure imbecility of the Creature; ascribe to him a superlative and pancratical energy, or virtue paramount; and on our devout knees proclaim him more able to create, then want either ministers, or matter, whereby, whereon to accomplish his Will. Scruple 2. The other profane Scruple objected by the Atheist, is this; Curio Article 2? A second immodest interrogation, wherefore God so long deferred the creation, resolved: with a detection of the unreasonableness of undecent curiosity's. Deus tamdiu à fabricatione mundi abstinuerit? If God were elder than Time, and the world made in the beginning of time; why did he so long suspend the Fabrication of it? The Response. This is also a poison spit from the accursed jaws of that black Viper, Velleius, against the Stoics (apud Ciceron. 1. the nat. Deor.) in this squalid stream; isto igitur tam immenso spatio, quaero, cur Pronoea vestra (so according to their own phrase he calls that Mind, or supreme Intelligence, to whom that sober sect of Philosophers justly ascribed the origination of all things except the material Principle, which they erroneously affirmed to have been the Ashes, or cinders of a former World, whose production also they conceived to have been, like that fabulous one of the Phoenix, out of the urn of its predecessor) cessaverit? laborémne fugiebat? and not lately wiped clean off, and its contagious venom cured by the generous antidote of E●sebius, who (in 1. the praep. Evang. 1.) most expressly, amply, and judiciously opposed it. However, lest this poison ferment afresh, and again exulcerate the impure Libertines of this Age (not more for its extraordinary Calamities, then unpatterned Impieties, as well the wonder, as grief of our posterity) and since it cannot but be thought most pertinent to my present scope: I shall endeavour the total extinction of it, by applying a smart Alexiterion of reason. From an Agent infinite in Wisdom, Power, and Liberty, such as we must allow God to be, no account either of Motives, Means, or Time, aught to be required. It was, according to their measure of time, about six thousand years from the nativity of the Universe, when the unhappy disciples of Epicurus disseminated this uncivil interrogation: but had it been created many myriads of myriads of thousands sooner than it was, 'tis open to conjecture, that they would have insisted on the same sawey demand; since eternity compared to more myriads of years, than all the figures of Arithmetic can amount to the computation of, must yet import a vast tract or slux of Time (for other idiom to express this notion, I could not either recognize, or excogitate) below the foot of that account; and that precedent space might have afforded room enough for the intrusion of the same frivolous quaere. And therefore it becomes us, either not to inquire, why the world was produced, rather than not produced; or allowing its production, to esteem it all one, whether it were produced then, before, or after, in this so great a latitude of Eternity. For the same question now proposed, why God did not determine in himself to create the World, ten millions of years sooner than he did; may also be revived hereafter, concerning these times of ours, if another rend of ten millions more should be unravelled. From whence this modest and truly humane lesson fairly infers itself; that it is oraculous in the greatest wisdom to say, God Created the World in that article of eternity (we may now call it Time) which seemed most opportune to his Wisdom. For, that he had some important reasons so long to defer the creation, and then only to contrive and finish it, when he did; though those reasons be cryptick and ignote to us: we may more than conjecture, from the consideration of his inexhaustible and ever moving abyss of his Prudence, which is the rule to all other his actions. And truly, if Prince's ground many of their designe● upon profound reasons of State, the knowledge whereof is never diffused among their subjects, but locked up in the cabinet of their own heart: why may not God, who is all Counsel and Prudence, be afforded the prerogative of having some weighty respects, that moved him to create the World, then when he did, rather than either sooner or later? Which respects, for aught we can explore, is Mercy in him to conceal from us: sure I am, 'tis a pride not much beneath, if not equal to that of Lucifer, in us to dare to inquire. 'tis a confessed truth, that no man can know the thoughts of another, who is constant to his resolve to reserve them sealed up within his own breast; and can any man be so incurably overrun with the itch of vanity, when he despairs of pretending certainly to divine the cogitations of his familiar friend, whose inclinations he hath so frequently read in the book of his conversation: yet to arrogate to himself an ability of searching into the abscondite counsels of him, whom neither Mind nor Sense can touch? Wherefore 'tis our duty to reclaim our wild curiosities, to set bounds to our inquisitions, and gratefully sat our boulimie of science with this wholesome morsel; that from hence, that the World was once created, we may safely infer, that the Creator was pleased to declare himself so Potent, that no impediment could intervene betwixt his eternal decree, and the opportune execution thereof: so Free, as to be above the impulsion or constraint of any necessity: so Wise, as to prevent all temerity and collusion of Fortune: so Good, that the prescience of man's future ingratitude, and so the infertility of his masterpeice, could not dehort him from fulfilling his purpose of conferring that inestimable blessing of Existence both upon him, and all things else for his sake. As for the last clause of this foolish demand, An vigilarit tanto aeternitatis spatio, an verò dormierit mundi opifex? Whether God continued vigilant, or dormant from eternity, until he set about the fabric of this vast All? This includes a manifest incongruity, and speaks a contradiction loud enough to answer and refute itself. For those two terms, Sleep and Divinity, stand at open defiance, and placed in one notion reciprocally deny each other; the one importing an Affection of a Body, or the effect of the Concidence, or Augustation of the ventricles of the brain, and slender conduits of the nerves in an Animal, caused either by a deficiency, or quiet of the spirits inservient to the Animal Faculties, and causing a temporary and periodical cessation from the offices of sense and Arbitrary motion: the other expressing an Eternal simple Essence, neither oppressed with corporeity, nor (therefore) subject to defatigation upon any exolution or waist of spirits; and consequently not capable of sleep. However, to manifest the extreme stupidity of their reply; viz. that if he were perpetually awake, yet we must grant him to have been constantly idle, before he began his work of Creation: I shall vouchsafe them that judicious rejoinder of many Fathers (whose studies were also not rarely infested with these vermin) that in all that precedent tract of eternity (mortality will excuse the necessary solecism) he was fully employed in the most blissful contemplation of himself. Which is an operation most easy, most quiet, most pleasant; as all Philosophers, who ever have, by the steps of abstracted meditation, advanced their minds so high as token that perfection of beatitude, have observed. CHAP. III. Why God Created the World. SECT. I. THat every Action presupposeth an end, or scope; is Canonical: and hence is it customary amongst Article 1. The improbability of the world's creation by God, insinuated, by the Atheists, from his defect of any possible Motive, scope or final cause. men, by so much the more hardly to believe that such or such a considerable Action was done by such or such a Person; by how much the less either of probable Pleasure, or Emolument may appear to have invited him to that enterprise. Nor was Velleius a stranger to this rule; for fight the unjust quarrel of that usurpress, Fortune, and having at first invaded Providence Divine with direct and downright blows, unsuccessfully: he at last contrives to wound it with obliqne thrusts, and attempts to stab the opinion of the World's Creation by God, by striking at the End, or more plainly by cutting off all possibility of either Pleasure or Profit to accrue to him thereby. And in pursuance of this stratagem, he endeavours to prove (1.) Conditum non fuisse mundum Dei causa; that the World was not created for God's sake, (i. e.) that he is no more concerned in the construction of it, then if it had never been altered from its Chaos: (2) neque hominum gratia, nor for the behoof of man, (i. e.) that man hath no juster plea to the Royalty of the World, than the meanest Animal; nor did Nature look with a more amorous and indulgent aspect upon him, then upon any other of her productions. The First position he essays to illustrate and infer by a Socratical Article 2. Their first Argument, that the divine Nature is above the capacity of either emolument, or del●ctation, from the Universe. way of argumentation, or by circumventing our judgements with a chain of Interogatories, all whose links are dependent each upon other, though by a connexion so subtle, as to be imperceptible to the incircumspect; the Abstract whereof, as taken by Cicero (1. De Natur. Deorum) lies in these words. Quid autem erat, quod concupisceret Deus, mundum signis & luminibus, tanquam Aedilis, ornare? Si ut Deus melius habitaret; antea, videlicet tempore infinito, in tenebris, tanquam in gurgustio habitaverat? post autem; varietaté ne eum delectari putamus, qua Coelum & Terras exornatas videmus? quae ista potest esse oblectatio Deo, quae si esset, non ea tamdiu carere potuisset? What politic respect put God upon the servile office of an Aedile? What motive prevailed with him to trim the Universe with gaudy Asterisms, and embellish the azure roof thereof with variety of refulgent studs? if to better his habitation; 'tis a sign that forever before he was but ill accommodated with a dark and narrow mansion: But afterwards, can we conceive that he entertained and solaced himself with that variety of beauteous forms, wherewith we observe both stories of this great Palace to be adorned? What delight is that, wherewith divinity can be affected? if any such there be, why would he so long deny himself the fruition of it? Nor did Velleius want a second to join with him in this bloody design for the assassination of that sacred Truth, That God made the World chief for his own Glory; for that witty villain Lucretius (and the finest wits, if not maturely pruned and kept under by the severe hand of Prudence, are the rankest Plants and most apt to run up to the highest impieties) hath digested the challenge into verse, thus: Quidve novi potuit tanto post ante quietos Inlicere, ut cuperent vitam mut are priorem? Nam gaudere novis rebus debere videtur, Quoi veteres obsunt; sed quoi nil accidit aegri, Tempore in anteacto, cum pulchre degeret aevum, Quid potuit novitatis amorem accendere tai? a, credo, in tenebris vita, ac moerore jacebat, Donec diluxit rerum genitalis origo? etc. in lib. 5. After so long Content, what new delight Can th'happy Gods to this great change invite? To affect Innovation, doth confess The present state obnoxious to distress. He only can t'enjoy new things desire, Whom the deficience of the old doth tyre. What therefore could Divinity persuade, To leave his ancient quiet, for a trade Of Architecture? Can I think, till then Him cloistered in a dark and narrow Den? etc. The Refutation. 'tis an Apophthegm fathered (and that not unjustly) upon Epicurus; Facere sapientem omnia sui caussa, that a wiseman Article 3. The satisfactory refutation thereof; and Gods glory manifested to have been his prime and principal end. in all his actions doth principally regard himself. And could not this learn his Scholars more discretion, then to doubt, whether or no God the Elixir of wisdom, in this weighty operation had an eye upon himself, or reflected upon his own concernment? The Word, God, to a metaphysical consideration, contains reasons more than enough to decide this idle controversy, excited only by a predominion of sensuality. For when there was nothing existent besides himself; 'tis plain, that he could gratify nothing besides himself: and as he not only derived the power of operating from himself alone, but also was the exemplar to himself; so also must he be the principal End of his operation. The End I say, non utilitatis; as if his Essence were capable of melioration, his Beatitude so remiss, as to admit of Augmentation, his Condition so imperfect, as to be improved by Alteration: sed gloriae, which as he could not want, so was there no reason why he should want. Such was the Freedom of his Will, that no necessity could constrain him to the production of any thing; such the Bounty, that none could restrain him from the voluntary profusion of his goodness. When 'twas indifferent to him, or to constitute a World, or to continue alone; he yet was pleased to follow the propensity of his own infinity Benignity, and to create: insomuch as he judged it better that there should be other natures beside his own, to which he might impart the overflowings of his goodness; than not. Better, I say, not for himself; for as the perpetual Emanation or diffusion of his Goodness upon the creature, since time (the Image of eternity, as Plato (in Timaeo) describes it) began, hath not diminished: so could not the Concentration, or Confinement of it to the orb of his own essence, have lessened his Felicity; which hath Plenitude and Constancy for its supporters, and is therefore raised above the imperfections of Access or Change. And upon this persuasion (I cannot forget to speak after the manner of men) he vouchsafed to constitute all other natures that are besides his own; and more especially Man: not that he might receive any emolument from them, since himself is all goodness, and by consequence all glory; but that, conferring respective endowments upon them, he might have convenient subjects, whereon to exercise his immense liberality and make known his magnificence. That since the creation he expects from man the retribution of Reverence, Adoration, and Obedience; ariseth not ex indigentia, from any need he stands in of, or benefit that redounds to him by the unfruitful homage of man: but▪ ne homines sint erga ipsum ingrati, from his own free Love to prevent man's being hurried into that misery of Ingratitude. I say, Misery of Ingratitude; for that forlorn hope of hell having once taken possession of the mind of man, instantly brings in a whole host of perturbations, subverts its government, destroys its tranquillity, and so lays it open to the devastation of Infelicity. And whereas they demand, Why God, if he take any delight in these experiments of his wisdom, Power, and munificence, would so long endure the privation, or rather defect of that delight? The solution is obvious, that this kind of delectation is no more than Accidentary to him, and can adfer infinitely less of addition to that fullness of Beatitude, formally radicated in his Essence; then one small drop of water superaffused to the immensity of a million of Oceans. For sibi sufficientissimus, All to himself, is his peculiar Motto; since he hath the source of all that's Amiable and Delectable, arising from, and perpetually flowing round his own most perfect nature, nor can he be affected with the unequal oblation of humane Doxology, otherwise then by reflecting upon his own Goodness, which freely ordained, form, and disposed man to that honourable and beatifical duty: and therefore that sentence of the School Divine, Quicquid agit praeter scipsum, ad alterius commodum spectat, deserves our grateful assent; for all his Extrinsecall or Emanative operations look directly upon the benefit of that Creature, whom he hath adopted to be the object of his Love, which is Man; obliquely upon the convenience or accommodation of all other Creatures, necessary or adjuvant to the well being of that Favourite; and by reflection, upon his own munificence. And hence is it manifest, that he adorned the Universe with asterisms, and beautified the heavens with radiant lamps; not that he might better his own habitation, which is impossible, he being a mansion to himself, and his eternal condition being extreme felicity: but provide a more commodious place of residence for men, for whose sake principally (after that of his own Glory) he intended the Creation, He, doubtless, could want the illumination of neither Sun, nor Moon, whose dwelling is in light inaccessible; nor be enriched by the faint splendour of the Stars, whose glory is so refulgent, that we hyperbolise the lustre of the Meridian Sun, when we define it to be the shadow of its Creator; and since those shining orbs are but pale tapours kindled at his more splendid abyss of light, how infinitely more lucent must his essence be, who is described by some to be Supersubstantialis Lux? (Athanas Kircher in metaphysic. Lucis & umbrae, Epichiremate 5.) Nor can we say less of that admirable variety of forms, wherewith we observe both stories of the World to be adorned; for if they appear so full of Elegance and beauty; how incomparably more fair and amiable must their Maker be, who is the Soul of Pulchritude, and by the Analogy which they hold to the comely ideas in his intellect, all things are determined to perfection? For that mighty Cause, which can give being to so many various perfections, must of necessity possess all those perfections, modo eminentiori, in a transcendent manner. Wherefore the excellencies of his own nature did, before he was pleased to create others, so amply suffice to the Accompletion of his beatitude; that they now at this day wholly suffice to the same; nor is he capable of having his Felicity increased by the contributions of any thing without himself. And since all things created, are nought but certain Emissions, or as it were deradiations, which he pleased to diffuse from himself; 'tis perspicuous, that before that Diffusion he comprehended all natures in his own, as in their Fountain, and therefore could not have his being meliorated by their production; as also, that he may at pleasure, adnihilate all again, with no more detriment to his glory, than the Sun can want those beams, which yesterday it emitted upon my hand. SECT. II. Neque Hominum gratiâ. THis second Position he likewise insinuates, by the fame imposture of ensnaring the mind in a complex series of Quaestions, Article 1. Their second Argument; that God had no especial regard to the benefit of Man: and the after this manner; If all things were constituted by God for the sake of Man only, as you affirm, then either for the peculiar interest of Wise men or Fools? if for the sole behoof of Wise men; then a far less provision might have served the turn: for no age could ever glory in the production of many such at once; and if all that ever were, or shall be, met together into one colony, a very small Island might be both large and rich enough to accommodate them with necessaries: and so the greatest part of the creation must be confessed supersluous, as to the principal destination thereof? But if for Fools only; than you entangle yourselves in a two fold Incongruity. First, you entrench upon the Justice of the Creator, since thereby you implicitly confess, that he was partial in conferring so great a benefit upon those, who must so ill deserve, as not to know rightly how to use it: Secondly, you insringe his Providence, by making him not to have had a foresight of the unfruitfulness of his chief design, which must miscarry and be quite lost in a contrary event: Fools being without any dispute, most miserable in that they are Fools; for what can be reputed a more absolute misery, than Fatuity? And if for the conjunctive interest, or promiscuous concernment of both; then do you offer violence to the goodness of the Archietect; in regard, that during life there unavoidably occur so many bitter discommodities, that wise men cannot sweeten them with the compensation of Commodities: and Fools neither avoid them as they approach, nor endure them when they come, etc. Nor was Velleius singular in this error; for Lactantius (Lib. 7. cap. 5.) hath accused Epicurus also of words to the same effect; which according to the record of his indictment run thus: Quid enim Deo cultus hominis confert beato, & nulla re indigenti? vel si tantum honoris homini habuit, ut ipsius causâ mundum fabricaret, ut instrueret cum sapientia, ut dominum viventium faceret, eúmque diligeret tanquam filium; cur mortalem fragilemque constituit? cur omnibus malis, quem diligebat, objecit? Cum oprteret & beatum esse hominem, tanquam conjunctum & proximum Deo; & perpetuum, sicut est ipse, ad qu●m colendum & contemplandum figuratus est. What advantage can the barren veneration of man yield to God, who is perfectly happy, and knows no indigency? or, if he deigned to bestow so high honour upon man, as to create the whole world for his use, to endue him with wisdom, to inagurate him Lord royal of all living creatures, and love him with as much affection and indulgence as a Son; why did he yet make him mortal, and so fatally subject to fragility? why expose him whom he adopted to a filial love, to the invasion of all kinds of evil? when on the contrary, in all reason, man also aught to have been both completely happy, as being allied to God, by a very near assinity; and immortal as God himself, to the worship and contemplation of whom he was configurated. Lucretius also would not be exempted from acting a part in this tragical scene; but scorning to come behind the most adventurous Fortification thereof by 8 reasons. Bravo, that had bid defiance to Divinity, or be outdone by any in the fea●s of Atheism: he not only sucks all the venom in the former Arguments, but adds much of his own also, and distils it together through his quill into 8 reasons. 1. That God reaps no benefit by the fealty and doxologies of man: Quid enim immortalibus at que beatis gratia nostra queat largirier emolumenti, ut nostra quidquam causa gerere aggrederentur? 2. That in case man had never had existence, it could not have been unpleasant not to have been at all. Qui nunqam blandum vitae gustavit amorem, nec fuit in numero; quid obest non esse beatum? What never knew existence, can ne'er know the want of bliss: Nothing can feel no woe. 3. That the greatest moiety of the Earth is wholly barren and unprofitable to man. Principio, quantum Coeli tegit impetus ingens, Ind avidam partem montes, sylvaeque ferarum Possedère: tonent rupes, vastaeque paludes, Et mare, quod late terrarum distinet oras; Ind duas porro prope partes fervidus ardour, Assiduusque geli casus mortalibus aufert, etc. 4. That even from those narrow cantons of the earth, which are inhabited, men reap no other harvest, but what themselves have sown, with uncessant toil; nor do they find any ground fruitful, but what they have manured with their own industry, and enriched with the salt dew of their own laborious brows: Quod superest arvi, tamen id natura sua vi Sentibus obducat, ni vis humana resistat, etc. 5. That even those fruits of the earth, which they have so dearly earned, with the profusion of so many showers of sweat, frequently miscarry, and become abortive; the hopes of the husbandman being often frustrated by the unexpected intervention of cross seasons, Ustilagos or Blites, Mildews, Sulphureous Meteor's, late Frosts, high Winds, etc. 6. That if neither the world, nor men, had ever been existent; their Ideas had never fall'n under the conception of the divine intellect. 7 That poor, weak, and fragil man is obnoxious to destruction by a thousand divers contingencies; the ravenous appetite of wild Beasts, the deleterious punctures of Serpents, the conflagration of Lightning, the contusion of Thunderbolts, the eruption of Earthquakes, the arsenical eructations of Minerals, the epidemic contagion of Pestilential Diseases, kindled either by Anomalous seasons, Tempests, or malignant impressions in the a●r; the invasion of intestine infirmities, upon the civil war often breaking out between the Heterogeneities of his blood, or a mutiny of his Elements; and though he escape all these, yet doth the Palsic hand of Time soon shake down his ounce of sand, and then turn him over to be devoured by oblivion. 8. Tum porro puer, ut saevis projectus ab undis Navita, nudus humi jacet infans, indigus omni Vitai auxilio, cum primum in luminis oras Nixibus ex a●vo matris natura profudit, Vagituque locum lugubri complete, ut aequum' st, Quoi tantum in vita restet transire malorum. etc. That Nature seems more a stepmother to man, than any other Animal; having cast him into the world naked, ●eeble, unarmed, unprovided for in all but want, and by his early tears portending that deluge of calamities, which in case he be so miserable to survive his birth, must drown all the comforts of his life, and wash him into earth again after a short slight of time; in brief, she exposeth him, as a bastard, to be taken up and nursed by the charity of that giddy headed gossip, Fortune: who hath no sooner smiled him into strength enough to suffer, but she contracts her brows, disinherits and abandons the desolate wretch to all the hardship and afflictions, that the witty malice of Fate (to whom our tortures are pleasures, and the hoarse groans of the rack sound perfect melody) can either invent or inflict. And thus have we heard, in Summary, the plea of those three eminent Levellers, who endeavoured to supplant man of his birthright, to take away the prerogative of his nature, and reduce him to no greater a share in the favour of his Maker, than the meanest of his fellow Animals. It comes now to our turn to examine, whether their Arguments are strong enough to carry the Cause. The Refutation. That God, in his atcheivem of the Universe, had a principal regard to Man, above all other the works of his hands; and Article 2. The total redargution thereof by a come nonst●āce that t●e benefit and felicity of man, was Gods secondary end: and the impossibility of satisfaction to the first end, by any creature but man, concluded, from his considered him, tanquam sinem interjectum, as the Mediate or Secondary End, his own Glory being the Immediate or Primary, or, more plainly, the end of that end: is clearly deduceable even from this; that man only among that infinite variety of natures listed in the inventory of the Creation, is constituted in a capacity to satisfy that first end; his intellectuals, or cogitative essence being, by a genial verticity, or spontaneous propension, qualified to admire, in admiration to speculate, in speculation to acknowledge, in acknowledgement to laud the Goodness, Wisdom, and Power of the World's Creator; while the ignoble Faculties of all other Animals are terminated in the inferior offices of sense, nor ever attain above the inconsiderate operations of their brutal appetites. And this one reason, if duly prepended, will be found of weight enough to counterpoise all those empty frothy sophisms 1. Rationality. alleged to the contrary: nor can any aequitable consideration (if I rightly understand its value) allow it to be much less than Apodictical. I say if duly prepended: for we are not rashly to understand this peculiar Adaequation or Praeeminence of man to consist in the bare Uprightness of his Figure, which accommodates him Coelum intueri, & erectos ad sidera tollere vultus. For, according to the vulgar acceptation of Erectness, and as it is considered to be a position opposite to Proneness, or the horizontal situation of the Spina dorsi, or rack bones in Animals progredient with their bellies toward the earth: man hath no reason to boast a singularity therein. Since many other Animals, as the Penguin, a kind of water fowl frequent upon the straits of Magellan; the devout insect of Province, or Prega Dio, the praying Grasshopper, so called because for the most part found in an upright posture answerable to that of man, when his hands are elevated at his devotions; the Bitour, which myself hath sometimes observed standing upright as an arrow fall'n perpendicular, and his eyes so advanced, as to shoot their visual beams point blank at the zenith, or vertical point of heaven; all Plane Fishes, that have the apophyses or processes of their spin carried laterally, or made like the teeth of a Comb, as the Thornback, Plaice, Flounder, Soles, etc. and their eyes placed in the upper side of their head, and so pointing directly upward; and divers others attaining an erectness beyond his, and by reason of the sublimimity of their faces taking a far larger prospect of the firmament. For man cannot look so high as the A●quinoctial circle, unless he either recline the spondils of his neck and loins, or place himself in a supine position. And therefore Lactantius, though he conceived his argument impregnable, when he said (Lib. 7. cap. 5.) Quod planius argumentum proferri potest, & mundum hominis, & hominem suâ caussa Deum fecisse, quam quod ex omnibus Animantibus solus ita formatus est, ut oculi ejus ad coelum directi, facies ad Deum spectans, vultus cum suo parente communis sit? to him that shall literally interpret the same, cannot appear to have stopped the mouth of contradiction: unless perhaps we shall afford him so much favour, as to restrain the erectnes of man to that precise definition of our Master Galen (De usu part. lib. 1.) which allows those Animals only to have an erect figure whose spines and thigh bones are situate in right lines. For in this strict signification, no Animal (for aught Zoographers, or those that writ the Natural Histories of living Creatures have discovered, or ourselves observed) can exactly fulfil that figure, but man; all others having their thighs pitched at angles, either right, or obtuse, or acute, to their spines. And for this respect was it, that having premised, that Man only was constituted in a capacity to satisfy that prime end of the Creation, the glory of God; I thought necessary to subjoin, his intellectual or Cogitative soul being naturally disposed to admire, etc. thereby importing, that the basis of my Argument was fixed upon the very root of his Essence, or better Nature, as Plato calls it, whose propriety is sursum aspicere, to look up to his original, and speculate the excellencies of his Maker. And thus understood, I prefer Plato's etymology of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and am persuaded that the primitive Grecian so denominated man, quasi 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Contemplantem quae videt: nor can I conceive that Anaxagoras spoke other then tropologically, when being asked, cur natus esset, he smartly and pathetically returned, ut videret coelum & terras; by that figurative expression intending, that man was made not to gape about or gaze upon the external beauties of heaven and earth, with the dull eye of his body: but to have his thoughts sublime, and with the acies of his mind to speculate the Wisdom, etc. of him that made them. Now by virtue of this divine Prerogative is it, that man is of undoubted right entitled to the especial care, and declared to be the Secondary end, or scope of the Creator. But farther to expatiate upon this manifest truth; were to light a candle to show the Sun in the Meridian. Nor by the title of Cogitation only, doth man lay claim to this dignity; but he inherits a second endowment also more noble 2. Sermocination. than any other Animal, whereby he is empowerd to fulfil the principal destination of the World, the glory of God: and that is Sermocination or Locution. For the tongue of man only can own that character, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, inserviens sermocinationi instrumentum, and can modulate the inspired aër into articulate sounds, and so intelligibly proclaim the majesty of his Efficient. This Lactantius wisely urged against Epicurus his objective expostulation, Quae utilitas Deo in Homine, ut eum propter se faceret? appositely opposing, scilicet ut esset, qui opera ejus intelligeret, qui providentiam disponendi, rationem faciendi, virtutem consummandi & sonsu admirari, & voce proloqui posset, etc. and (in lib. de Ira Dei cap. 13.) more plainly he says, Num & mutorum caussâ Deus laboravit? minimè, quia sunt & rationis & loquelae expertia: sed intelligimus & ipsa eodem modo ad usum hominis à Deo facta, etc. As for that couchant Dilemma of Velleius, whether the World was intended for the use of wise men, or Fools: 'tis soon extricated, by distinguishing the purpose of the Creator into General and Particular: and so returning, that the Goodness of God had a respect to the benefit of all, in general; but of wise men in especial. Now, if by Wise men, he mean such, whose minds are imbued with the maxims of Virtue, and their lives conform to the upright rules of morality (who only, in the judgement of Philosophy, can challenge that Attribute) then is it not easy to doubt, that the beneficence of God was lost to them, or unadvisedly placed upon them: since their opportune, moderate, and grateful husbandry of these blessings, though it cannot be extended so high as absolute merit; may yet reach so far as to justify the prudence of their donation, and manifest the provident collocation of them upon convenient subjects, i. e. upon such as make it the constant business of their lives to learn how rightly to use them, and practise that excellent lesson, of employing all things to the temporal supportation, comfort, and improvement of themselves, and themselves to magnify the bounty of that hand, that so freely bestowed them. And on the other side, if by Fools he intent such as are degenerated from the nobility of their nature, degraded below mere Humanity, that know no good beyond the present blandishments of sensuality, and have sworn themselves voluntary captives to their own luxurious Appetites, (and such was the wise man's fool) then can neither the Justice of God be taxed for conferring such rich favours upon those, that know only how to abuse them; nor his Praevision disparaged, as not foreseeing the miscarriage or unfruitfulness of his charity: since he left it in the arbitrary power of their Wills to make an election of Good or Evil, to turn to the right hand, and pursue the real and true delights of virtue, or deflect on the left, and be lost in the deviations of the only apparent and false pleasures of vice: having set before them the means both of Sapience and Resipiscence, and furnished them with advantages and opportunities either to acquire more knowledge, or at least recant and disclaim their ignorance. Or, if by Fools, he design such as our common Idiots, in whom the light of Nature is totally eclipsed, by some native distemper, or non-symmetrical configuration, or contingent concussion of the brain, or Presence-Chamber of the Intellect: then also is the case the same with divine Prudence, siquidem ex ipsorum desipientia, caeterorum sapientia efflorescit & collucet magis, since the stolidity of an ignorant hath this use, that it serves as a foil to set off the ingenuity of the knowing, and by the incompatible disparity which appears at the conference of those two contraries, infinitely enhanceth the value of wisdom. The satisfactory force of this solution maturely prepended, it can be reputed neither incogitancy nor precipitation in me to omit the prolix appropriation of those pertinent similitudes; that the wary husbandman doth cultivate and prepare his field, as well for the fertility of Pulse, as Wheat; that the most skilful Gardiner provides room in his nursery for the sprouting of wild, degenerous, and barren plants, as well as for the geniculation of wholesome, generous and fruitful; that Prince's account Plebeians, as well as Nobles, members of their Commonwealth; and that Apelles prepared his Tables as well to receive the black of shadowing, as the finer touches of his Pencil, and the brighter gradualities of Colours, in emulation of the life. And this, not only because I conceive the objection already more than refuted, and therefore all that can be superadded may sound as nothing to the purpose: but chief because I understand, that the Logic of similes, or the way of probation by Comparatives, is at best but Analogisme; and therefore inconsistent with my assumption of declining all but Demonstrations, or Reasons equally convictive. As for that demand, Why God did not endow his favourite with immortality, but exposed him to the stroke of death; it is manifest that the soul of man is constituted immortal, and shall enjoy a being to all eternity, by the Charter of its Essence, and not ex gratia only, as Mr. Hobbs endeavours to assert (in Leviathan) But the demonstration of this grand truth, being too large to be circumscribed by a Parenthesis, or foisted in by way of digression; I have reserved for a singular Chapter in the future. For those remaining difficulties contained in the Arguments of Article 3. Lucretius his 8 reasons subverted, particularly. Lucretius; they are easily salved, by answering succinctly to the First, that the motive which inclined the divine Will to create the World, was not any possibility of emolument accruable to God from the veneration and gratitude of man: but the voluntary 1. distusion of his own communicative goodness, in chief; and the benefit of man, as subservient thereto. Second, that though that Axiom be undeniable, Non entis non sunt accidentia, and therefore it could have been no trouble to 2. us, not to have been at all; yet that invincible reluctancy against Adnihilation, radicated in every vital entity, is demonstration enough, that to be, is far better than not to be, and we ourselves experimentally find, that 'tis one degree of happiness to have obtained existence; because to be nothing, is a mere Privation; to be something, attains to the perfection of Reality. Upon which ground many have erected a conjecture, the the devil himself would not consent to his own Adnihilation, though he might evade his torments by the bargain: with advantage preferring the miserable condition of something, to the horrid opacity of nothing. Third, that God made such abundant provision conductive to the utility of men, that both from the Amplitude and Variety of 3. his work, they might collect matter sufficient to incite them to the constant contemplation of his Wisdom, and grateful acknowledgement of his Munificence: as also, that having observed what of the Creatures were less commodious, they might be directed in their election of the more commodious and beneficial, as well for their Conservation as Delight. Fourth, that the labours of Agriculture are superfluous, and voluntarily undergon by man, more for the maintenance of his 4. delicacy and inordinate luxury, than the provision of Necessaries to his livelihood. Since the same liberal earth, which is Mother, Nurse, and Purveyor to all other Animals, cannot be thought inhospitable to man only, nor so cruelly penurious as to exclude her best guest from participating the inexhaustible bounty of her table. And though we grant some moderate labour necessary in order to the comfortable sustentation of our prodigal bodies, always upon the expense; yet have we good cause to esteem that more a blessing then a curse, since the sweat of industry is sweet. Not only because the active genius of man is constellated for business, and therefore never more oppressed then with the burden of idleness; but also because the sprightly hopes of a wealthy harvest sweeten and compensate the labour of semination. Nor is the contentment which grows from ingenious Husbandry much below any other solace of the mind, in this life; if we may credit the experience of many Princes, who having surfeited on the distractions of royalty, have voluntarily quitted the magnified pleasures of the Court (magnified only by such ambitious Novices, who never discovered the gall that lies at the bottom of those guilded sweets) and with inestimable advantage exchanged the tumult of their palaces for the privacy of Granges; have found it a greater delight to cultivate the obedient and grateful earth, then rule that giddy beast, the multitude; a happier entertainment of the mind, and more wholesome exercise of the body, to hold the easy plough, then sway an unwieldy Sceptre, and revel in the infatuating pomp of greatness. Fifth, that those preposterous seasons, Blights, Mildews, Combustions, etc. putrefactive accidents, that make the preguant earth 5. suffer abortion, and so nip the forward hopes of the laborious swain; do neither intervene so frequently, nor invade so generally, as to introduce an universal famine, or so cut off all provision, as not to leave a sufficient stock of Aliment for the sustentation of mankind. Sixth, that the divine Intellect was the universal exemplar 6. to itself, framing the types or ideas both of the world and of man▪ within itself, and accordingly configurating them. This may be evinced by an argument à minori; since even ourselves have a power to design and model some artificial engine, whose pattern or idea we never borrowed from any thing existent without the circle of ourselves, but coined in the solitary recesses of our mind. Seventh, concerning man's being obnoxious to the injury of many Contingencies, as the voracity of wild beasts, the venom of 7. Serpents, the conflagration of Lightning, the contagion of the Pestilence, the corruption of swarms of other diseases both epidemic and sporadick, etc. that all these are the regular effects of God's General Providence, and have their causes, times, and finalities preordained, and inscribed in the diary of Fate, to whose prescience nothing is contingent. But of this more satisfactorily in our subsequent consideration of universal Providence; whither in strictness of method, it refers itself. Eight, that this complaint against the unkindness of Nature, 8. for producing man, tender, naked, unarmed, etc. is grossly unjust. For the imbecility of our Infancy is necessary to the perfection and maturity of those noble organs, contrived for the administration of the mandates of that Empress, the Cogitant Soul; and is amply compensated either by the vigour and acuteness of the senses, or by diuturnity of life. It being observed by Naturalists, that those Animals which live long, have a long gestation in the womb, a long infancy, and attain but slowly to their maturity and standard of growth; the four general motions of life, Inception, Augmentation, State, and Declination, carrying set and proportional intervals each to other, as that truly noble Philosopher, Scaliger hath hinted, in his correction of that fabulous tradition of the extreme lo●gaevity of Deer in these words: De ejus vitae longitudine fabulantur, neque enim aut gestatio aut incrementum hinnulorum ejusmodi sunt, ut praestent argumentum longaevi Animalis. As for his being born naked; 'tis no disfavour, nor neglect in her, for that cumbersome wardrobe of rags, which man hath gotten upon his back, is become necessary only by the delicacy of his education and custom, not so intended by nature in the primitive simplicity and eucrasy of his constitution; when there needed nothing but the skin either to warm, or adorn the body. Lastly, those Arms, which Nature hath denied him; either he wants not at all, or his own ingenious hands can provide at pleasure. CHAP. IU. The General Providence of God, DEMONSTRATED. S●CT. I. THe Synopsis of my method, exhibited in the hem of the first Section of the first Chapter, was designed Article 1. The Author's reasons for his present adherence to the common discrimination of Providence from Creation. as a clue to conduct the thoughts of my Reader along the series of those Attributes of the supreme Ens, which (as being of most general concernment, and such as may be clearly demonstrated by the Light of Nature, even to those, who either never heard of, or except against the testimony of Holy Writ) I have promised to illustrate, by the conviction of Arguments deduced from that catholic Criterion, Reason; to whose Judicature all Nations and Ages have readily submitted their assent: and therefore I am not necessitated here to insert any farther explanation of the connexion and dependence of this Theme upon the precedent; but only, in avoidance of misconception, to advertise, that when I say, the Creation of the World ex nihilo, and the constant Conservation of the same in its primitive order and harmonious Coefficiency of causes subordinate, are the general operations of the Wisdom and Power of the First cause; I do not intent, that those are Acts really distinct each from other (for in the demonstration of the Existence of God 'tis plainly, though succinctly evinced, that the Conservation of the Universe is nothing but the Act of Creation prolonged or continued) but only conform my theory to the customary notions and terms of the Schools, and yield to the necessity of a division in the gross capacity of man's understanding, in order to the more gentle enforcement of a stable beleif. The Act of Conservation of all things in their originary stations, and the perpetual obedience of all second Causes, in their several Article 2. The Definition and received Division of divine Prouldence. motions, to the laws of his will, that elemented them; hath ever been called Providence divine: which derived high enough, seems to import, the constant operation of an infinite Wisdom, and infinite Power, combined in the effusion of an infinite Goodness. This Providence (for to that Appellation, as most ancient, most common, and therefore most familiar, I shall adhere) most Clerks have branched into General, whereby the government of the whole Universe is administered: and Particular, or special, whereby God doth take special care of mankind, and regulate the affairs of his masterpiece. Now according to this necessary Division, must I range my forces into two Files, and draw up one to defeat those Atheists, who have proclaimed open hostility against the First; and the other to subdue those, that have declared against the Second. The Colonel to that black regiment, that fought against the Article 3. A short list of the principal ethnic Physiologists, who, in order to thei● propagation of Atheism, have attempted the eradication of this magisterial verity of divine Providence: & a gentle cure of S. Hieroms wound, caused by his venial lapse from the same. opinion of the government of the World by the Sceptre of Divine Monarchy, is generally accounted Epicurus; but in the authentic records of Stobaeus (Ecl. Phys. 25.) we may find him to have been no more then Captain-lieutenant to Leucippus, who of all the Grecian Philosophers, whose doctrines have escaped the sponge of oblivion, was the first that appeared in the field against universal Providence, and not long after surrendered the staff to Democritus the elder, whose immediate successor was Heraclitus, as we are told by Nemesius (De nat. Homin. 13.) But whoever led up the van, was closely followed by many both of the same and succeeding ages; the most eminent whereof were Dicaearchus (Cicero 4. Academic.) Strato (Idem de Divinat. 2.) Ennius (Idem de Nat. Deor. 3.) Lucretius (Libro ejus 2.) Velleius (Cicero de Nat. Deor. 1.) Lucian (in bis Accus.) who like a facetious villain, personates Jupiter complaining of the oppression of overmuch business; nay the devout Father S. Hieron. (in Comment. in Abac.) seems to have espoused the quarrel, though doubtless upon another interest. His words I shall faithfully transcribe for two important reasons. First because I would not appear to have fixed a scandal upon so venerable a Pillar of our Church, who otherwise hath deserved so amply of the Christian faith; that the consideration of the transcendent merits of his pious labours had once almost persuaded me to believe the possibility of justification by works. Secondly, to deliver his memory from the imputation of impiety; for it may be naturally collected from the syntax and scope of his discourse, that it was a noble esteem which he had of the majesty of the Divine Nature, whom he thought too fully taken up with the blissful contemplation of his own perfections (in truth, the only Felicity God can be capable of) to be concerned in ordering the trifling occurrences of the world; and not any conceit of the insufficiency of omnipotence, that cast him upon this rock. Caeterum absurdum est (says he) ad hoc Dei deducere majestatem ut sciat per momenta singula, quot nascantur culices, quotve moriantur: quot cimicum & pulicum & muscarum sit in terra multitudo: quanti pisces in aqua natent, & qui de minoribus major●m praedae cedere debeant. Non simus tam fatui Adulatores Dei, ut dum potentiam ejus ad ima detrahimus, in nosipsos injuriosi simus, eandem rationabilium, quam irationabilium Providentiam esse dicentes. So that his diminution of the universality of Providence, may seem the pardonable effect of immoderate devotion, and but a high strained description of the glory of that essence, which in strict truth, can be concerned in nothing but itself; and must then appear to be undervalved, when most magnified by the extension of its influence to petty and trivial mutations, and conceived to act a part in the interludes of Flies, order the militia of Pismires, and decree what, and how many Gnats shall be devoured by swallows in a summer's day. But as for Epicurus, and the rest of that miscreant crew; 'tis more than probable, that a quite different interest inveigled them into this dangerous error. For, first, their own writings bare record, that they made it the grand scope of their studies to promote Atheism, by plotting how to undermine the received belief of an omnipotent eternal Being, to murder the immortality of the Soul (the basis of all religion) and deride the Compensation of good and evil actions after death. In particular, Epicurus did not blush to profess that the chief end at which his Physiology was collineated, was this; ut mens ex perspectis causis conquiescat, neque aliam eamque divinam subesse causam suspicando, felicitatem interturbet. And Secondly, the grounds upon which they erected this detestable negation of universal Providence, may sufficiently satisfy a heedful enquirer; that not any intense honour or veneration of the most perfect and happy nature, transported their minds to this height of delusion: but rather a confirmed infidelity of the infinity of his Wisdom and Power, which is affirmed by us, that maintain the diffusion of Providence over all, and descry the finger of Divinity in the smallest actions of inferior causes, though ne'er so contemptible in the eyes of Humane reason. But a more ample knowledge of this doth offer itself to our thoughts, in the particular examination of their Arguments: to which we therefore immediately address. The First Argument they drew from the apparent incompatibility of business and happiness; or more plainly, from the vast Article 4. The Atheists first Argument against universal Providence, with the absurd and malicious comment of Lucretius thereupon. disparity between the blissful condition or contemplative quiet of the supreme Nature, and the trouble, or disturbance (for so their ignorance unfitly apprehended it) that must arise from the oversight and managery of such infinite variety of Actions, as are every minute performed within the immense Amphitheatre of the World. For Epicurus, indiscreetly attempting to take the altitude of the Divine Intellect, by the unequal Jacobs-staffe of the Humane; rashly inferred, that it could not be extended below the sphere of its own mansion, and that no Intelligence could be so large, as not to be overwhelmed by that Ocean of Cares, that must flow from the multitude and diversity of continual emergencies here below. This he contracted into that sentence; Quod est beatum & immortal, neque sibi habet, neque alteri exhibet negotium; which so pleased him, that he reputed it a Cornerstone in the fabric of science, and enacted it to stand in the front of those Sententiae ratae, which he dared Scepticity withal. Nor did his sedulous Commentator Lucretius, recede an inch from the same text; but fond commensurating the power of an Infinite wisdom, by the narrow capacity of his own finite reason, preached to the world; that to ascribe the government of sublunary affairs to the Gods, was impiety in the inference, and must implicitly destroy the fundamentals of their Divinity, which is made up of Beatitude and Immortality, neither of which can consist with the perpetual disquiet, and impetuous anxiety of mind, which the Administration of so vast and tumultuous a Commonwealth, as this of the World, must introduce. For when he would impose, that the shoulders of Divinity, though a real Atlas, are too weak to sustain so great a weight, as that of Rector General; under a pretext of tender zeal (forsooth) he insimulates those of profanation, Qui summum illud, quicquid est, tam tristi, atque multiplici ministerio polluunt, as Pliny expresses it: and therefore exclaims. Name (proh! Sancta Deûm tranquilla pectora pace, Quae placidum degunt aevum, vitamque serenam) Quis regere immensi summam? Quis habere profundi Indu-manu validas potis est moderanter habenas? Quis pariter Coelos omneis convertere? & omneis Ignibus aethereis terras suffire feraceis? Omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore praestò, Nubibus ut faciat tenebras, coelique serena Concutiat sonitu? tum fulmina mittat, & aedeis Saepe suas disturbet? & in diversa recedens Saeviat, exercens telum; quod saepe nocenteis Praeterit, exanimatque indignos, inque merenteis? etc. lib. 2. Ah! since the happy and immortal Powers In c●lme content melt their eternal hours, Feasting on self-enjoyment; who can keep The rains of Nature? Who command the Deep? To wind about the ponderous Spheres, what arm Hath strength enough? what Influence can warm The fruitful earth with Fires aetherial? who Can fill all places, and all actions do? To veil the face of Light with sable clouds, And wrap the lucid sky in sulphury shrouds: Whose Coruscations split the fluid aer, convel the feet of Rocks, and with despair Affect poor Mortals into Quick silver: then turn, And with Granades his own Temples burn: Then dart his flames at Innocence, and wound Virtue, while guilty Vice continues sound? Their other Argument is extracted from the conceived Uncertainty and irregularity of Contingencies, and the unaequal Article 5. Their second Argument: and its convenient dissection into two parts, viz. dispensation of good and evil; all things seeming to fall out according to the giddy lottery of Chance, and as confusedly as if there were no Providence at all. This may be collected as well from that speech of Epicurus, charged upon him by that heroic Champion of Divine Monarchy, Lactantius; Nulla dispositio est, 1. The irregularity of contingencies: and multa enim facta sunt aliter, quàm fieri debuerunt: as from the context of his Physiology, wherein having made it his Hypothesis, that all bodies both celestial and sublunary were at first configurated by Fortune, i. e. arose to such and such particular figures, by the casual segregation, convention and complexion of the General matter, divided into several masses; and that, by the inclination of their convenient Figures, they were adliged to such and such peculiar Motions, and accommodated to the necessary causation of determinate viciffitudes: he proceeds to reduce all succeeding events in the World to that primitive series of Causes, which made their own spontaneous eruption out of the Chaos, and attained to the certain rules of their future activity, at the same time they attained to their distinctions and single essences; denominating that chain of causalities, Nature, and holding her to be her own Directress, and by the law of innate tendency obliged to a perpetual continuation of the same motions begun in the first minute of the world's composure; according to that exclamation of Pontanus (Lib. 1. de Stellis.) Quid vexare Deos frustr à juvat? ordine certo Fert Natura vices; labuntur & ordine certo Sydera; tam varios rerum patientia casus. Illa suos peragunt motus, servant que tenorem Sorte datum, etc. What boot it man with fruitless prayers to fret The Ears o'th' Gods; when Nature's Laws are set, Beyond Repeal or Alteration? The radiant Lamps of heaven still move on In their old tracks: nor can the Planets stray, In all their wander, from their native way; Or change that Tenor, which at first they got Consigned unto them, by their proper Lot. The result of all which is, that Epicurus would persuade, that the Universe is a Commonwealth, wherein every single member is, by the signature and necessity of its particular constitution, instructed in, and impelled upon the praecise performance of its peculiar office; so as not to want the direction of any Superintendent, or to conform to the directions of a General Council: and seems to allow this only difference between the universal Polity of the World, and the particular Republic of mankind; that in this, men frequently make deflexions from the general scope, by reason of the seductions of their unstable and irregular judgements; but in that, all individuals punctually keep to their primitive assignations, and so conspire to the satisfaction of the common interest, by reason of the constancy of their natures, and unalterable necessity of their forms. And this Abridgement of his doctrine, Plutarch (de Fato) hath prepared to our hands, when personating Epicurus, he thus argues; Nulla est opus sapientia ordinis instruendi in exercitu, si militum quivis sua sponte noverit locum, ordinem, stationem, quam accipere debet & tueri: neque etiam opus olitoribus, Fabrisve murariis, si aqua illeic ultrò afsluat indigentibus irratione plantis; heic lateres, ligna, lapidesque eas, natura duce, motiones at que inclinationes subeant, quibus in sua loca, inque expetitam concinnitatem coeant, etc. Now for the other part of the Argument, viz. the unequal 2. The unequal or injust distribution of good and evil. distribution of Good and Evil, and the ordinary intervention of many effects inconsistent with the justice and righteous administration of Divinity: this is clearly hinted by Lucretius, who makes it the main scope of his sixth Canto, to alienate men's minds from the belief of an Universal moderator, by several instances of events, that seem to hold too visible an affinity to Temerity and Inconsideration, to have any relation at all to the judicious method requisite to Providence; and particularly tower's himself over that one example of the Thunderbolt, as if his reason had slown to a pitch above all possibility of contradiction, when yet the summary of all that bold discourse, abstracted by an impartial hand, amounts to no more than this. Since we observe the Thunderbolt (1.) To be, for the most part, discharged on the heads of the Innocent, and not the Guilty: (2.) To batter Sancta Deûm delubra, the Temples of the Gods themselves, more frequently then common buildings: (3.) To be idly spent at random, upon the sea and void Campanias; and so seems not to have been the Artillery of Divine Vengeance, prepared for the punishment of impious mortals: (4.) To be generated, like other meteors, by natural Causes, being a fulphureous exhalation compacted in the clouds, and thence darted ala volec, or at a venture, on whatever is situate in the level of its projection: it appears an absurdity of timorous superstition to believe, that every single occurrence is praeordained by Wisdom, or that all extemporary Accidents have their praescripts in the book of Fate. And these are the Goliath objections, or nerves of the Atheists Remonstrance against Universal Providence; which though many of the Fathers, and particularly S. Clement (in 5. Strom.) have decreed to be filled amongst those impious questions, that deserve no answer but a whip, like the doubts of a Mahometan in point of faith: yet since promise hath made it my duty, to endeavour the demonstration of the Attributes of the divine nature (such at least as occur to the contemplation of a mere Philosopher, who hath wholly referred himself to the Testimonies of the Light of Nature) by the conviction of Reason alone; I am confident so clearly and fully to confute, that no man, who hath not stubbornly put out the eye of his soul, shall in the future remain a Sceptic, as to this particular. SECT. II. The Vindication. FIrst I plead the general consent of all Nations and Ages in Article 1. That the Notion of general Providence is Proleptical; inferred from the universality of its reception. the acknowledgement of Providence; for, according to the Logical Canons even of Epicurus (apud Gassend. in Animadvers. in Canonic. Epicuri) any motion, that is held in common, and by long prescription grown into 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Anticipation, ought not to be doubted of; as being its own Criterion, and from which there lies no farther Appeal. Now that all Nations have met in one Chorus to proclaim the Article 2. From the misplaced devotion of Idolaters. universal and absolute soveraign●y of Providence, cannot be obscure to any, that have, but with half an eye, glanced on the Records of Ancient and Customs of Present; or but considered, that even the Idolatry of the most stupid and barbarous people that ever lived, doth plainly commonstrate, that they paid both their sacrifices and orisons, as homage to some Power, which held the rains of second Causes, and could dispose them to the production of good or evil events, according to his own beneplacets; and therefore not only in public Calamities, as War, Pestilence, Famine, etc. but also in the private distresses of each Family and Person, they immediately addressed themselves to the Sanctuary of their devotions, hoping by that means to appease the anger of that slexible hand, that had the arbitrary donation of happiness and misery. That all Philosophers also (who being generally reputed wise Article 3. From the confession of most Philosophers of the bighest form; as of men, and all their very Tenets exemplary; could not but draw whole shoals of under-heads into the stream of their opinions) gave in their votes on the side of Providence; cannot cost much oil to illustrate: it being obvious, first, that Ecphantus, with most of that elder sect, who gave in their names 1. Ecphantus. to the doctrine of Atoms, did yet establish the necessary concession of some universal Moderator, and unanimously referred the ordination of all contingents, as well frequent as rare, auspicious and inauspicious, popular and domestic, to the arbitrary disposal of one common P●lot, who sat at the helm of this great vessel, the Universe. (Leg. Stobaeum in Ecl. Phys.) Secondly, that those also, who held the World to be Non-principiate, or to have been so old, as never to have been young, 2. Plato. did yet notwithstanding condemn the delirium of Fortune, and concluded the gubernation of all upon the supreme Intelligence. For Plato seems so strongly convicted, and his reason so violently ravished into the arms of Divine Providence; that, though he inclined to the eternity of the World, he yet conceded the production thereof in time, as a necessary Hypothesis, or foundation, whereon he might the more firmly erect his superstructure of that magisterial Truth, which otherwise would have been impossible to be made out, viz. The universal Administration of Providence. And thus much he frequently declared, in Lib. de Legibus: in Epinomide, & in Timaeo more expressly; out of which meditation Plutarch (De procreate. Anim. ex Timaeo, & de Fato) collected his tripartite distinction of Providence. Prima enim (says he) & suprema, est Primi Dei intelligentia, sive mavis, voluntas benefica erga res omnes; qua primum singulae divinae res omninò optimè ac pulcherrimò ordinatae sunt: secunda secundorum deorum per coelum incedentium qua res mortales ordinatè siunt, & singulorum generum constantia atque salus procuratur: Tertia non ineptè dieitur Providentia, & Procuratio Geniorum, qui circa terram collocati, humanarum actionum custodes atque inspectores sunt. And Aristotle, who was much more bold and plain in his assertion of the World's eternity, though (in Metaphys. 12. 3. Aristotle. cap. 9) he pretends an unwillingness to have the majestic sanctity of the supreme Nature disparaged, by being debased to the oversight of petit and inconsiderable affairs transacted here below; and therefore limited his jurisdiction to the celestial orbs: yet was he forced to confess the impossibility of the world's subsistence in the due harmony and requisite order of all its motions, without the constant regulation thereof by Providence, as Laertius, Theodoretus, Stobaeus, and other of his most judicious Expositors have assured us. And upon this consideration was it, that the good Father, Origen allowed him to have been one degree less impious than Epicurus. Nay Cicero (2. de Natur. deorum) makes him upon second thoughts, to have professed a recantation, by allowing the ubiquity of the divine Wisdom, and extending the arm of Providence, which he had formerly shortened and terminated in the lowest sphere, even to the meanest of sublunary passages, introducing him disguised (doubtless to prevent the dishonour of unconstancy to his own principles) under a third person telling a story of some, Qui post aevum transactum in locis subterraneis, & repent emersi, intuitique hunc ordinem rerum, ipsum sine numine esse non posse arbitrarentur. Thirdly, that the Stoics, albeit upon that vulgar presumption that to assign the procuration of all minute and trivial occurences, 4. The Stoics. to that Nature, which is all Felicity and Quiet, was implicitly to infringe the right hand of its divinity; they abridged its empire, and limited its influence to the more weighty and popular actions of mankind only; were howsoever zealous assertors of Providence; is manifest from that saying of Cotta reproving Balbus, an eminent Stoic (apud Cicer. de nature. Deor. 3.) At enim minora dii neque agellos singulorum, nec viticulas prosequuntur; nec si uredo, aut grando quidpiam nocuit, id jovi animadvertendum fuit; nec in regnis quidem reges omnia minima curant: sic enim dicitis, etc. And lastly, that the Academics and Sceptics were of the 5. The Academics and Sceptics. same persuasion; however being carried against the stream of all Affirmative learning, by the contrary tide of their own Negative humour, and obliged to fall foul upon all truths, in defence of their own affected Nescience; they have been observed to have had some light skirmishes with the Champions of Providence. Nor need we acquiesce in the bare affirmation hereof, while to any man, that shall with equanimity and attention compare their tender arguments against the opinion of general Providence, with those more sinewy and vehement reasons of their professed neutrality in many other notions; there will offer itself a fair ground for more than conjecture, that they purposely contrived them soft, gentle, and dissoluble, that so they might seem neither to quit their habit of contradiction, nor yet to dare the subversion of that catholic position, to which all men (those few of the black guard of Hell, whom we lately nominated, excepted) had subscribed, and which the dictates of their own domestic oracle, Reason, had confirmed as sacred and uncontrollable. To which we may annex the testimony of Gassendus, who (in Animadvers. in lib. 10. Diogen. Laert. de Physiologia Epicuri pag. 731.) speaking conjunctively of both those sects, says thus: ut argument atisunt adversus Providentiam, sic opinioni de providentia suam probabilitatem fecerunt, neque saltem ea fronte fuerunt, ut esse providentiam absolutè inficiarentur. Now to take the just dimensions of this Argument, let us allow it, like Janus, to have two faces; and then survey the aspect Article 4. A review of the induction: and the Argument found to be Apodictical on one side; and on the other only persuasive. of each a part. On one hand it looks Absolute and Apodictical: on the other only Persuasive. Apodictical; since the universality of any belief (such especially, as hath ever been attested even by those, who have made the profoundest search into its fundamentals, and strained every nerve in the whole body of reason to demolish it,) is no obscure proof, that it must be one of those 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or Implantate Notions, which the same hand, that made our nature, hath engraven on the table of our minds, and lest it not in the power of our depraved Wills totally to obliterate. That there are some Implantate Notions, no man, who hath but learned the Alphabet of his own Nature, will dispute. Nor is it less certain, that all Philosophers have decreed Anticipation (which Aristotle (in 1. Poster. 1.) calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, praeexistentem cognitionem; and Cicero hath interpreted (1 de Nat. Deor.) notionem menti insitam, & anteceptam quandam in animo informationem) to be the Touchstone of verity: nay Empiricus himself forgot his custom of Scepticism, when he came to this point, and grew positive (advers. Gramm. & advers▪: Ethic.) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that no man could so much as inquire, or doubt of any thing without Praenotion. And that the Notion of the world's regiment by universal Providence, is one of those propositions, Quae sunt in nobis adeo antiquae, ut iis, ex quo esse & sentire coepimus, evaserimus informati: which, like letters carved on the bark of a young plant, are impressed upon our very Intellect, and grow up together with us; is already proved collaterally and upon induction, in our Demonstration of the Existence of God: for therein it is cleared, that the excellent Idea, which we have of the Supreme Being, contains all Perfections whatever, and among the rest, that noble Attribute, Creator; which to him that shall attentively consider the nature of Duration, must sound one and the same thing, with Conservator, or Governor. Only persuasive; since humane Authority, considered pierce, is but an inartificial Argument, and binds not, but when consorted with others more rational, into one syndrome or multiplex demonstration: not is the concentration of all men's minds in one and the same assertion, an infallible Criterion of its verity. For the judgement of man in general lies open to the encroachments of Error, and the common infirmity of humane nature is not only discoverable in the gross and visible delusions of vulgar heads (whose business is to believe, not examine) but hath frequently broken out upon the soundest brains, and confessed itself Epidemical in the absurd mistakes of the greatest Critics of Truth, especially in the promotion and transmission of opinions haereditary and traditional. SECT. III. LEt us not, therefore, entrust the supportation of so weighty a Truth to that fragile reed of Authority; but give ourselves Article 1. God's General Providence demonstrated by the Idea of his Nature reflected on our thoughts. liberty to imagine, that no man ever believed or asserted an universal Providence: and having thus devested our minds of all Presumption, or Anticipation, expose them as tables newly derased to receive the pure impressions or sincere documents of the Light of Nature; converting our contemplations, First upon the Nature of God, and thence upon the most exact order and confederacy of all secondary causes in the world. First, I say, let us set our reason a work upon the nature of the First Cause, or Eternal Being; and order our cogitations thus. The same demonstration, whereby the mind of man is convicted of the Existence of God, doth also at the same time violently, but naturally, conclude his nature to be so accomplished in all Perfections, as to be above all Access or Addition. For manifest it is, that by the term, God, every man doth understand something to which no perfection is wanting: and should it be granted possible, that the mind of man could conceive any perfection more than what is comprehended in the idea, which it holds of the nature of God; yet still would that thing, to which it could ascribe that perfection, be God. Since 'tis impossible to cogitate any perfection, which is not the essential propriety of some Nature: and to think any Nature more perfect than the Divine, plainly absurd; because we conceive that to be most perfect, or else we do not conceive it to be God; God, and Absolute Perfection being one and the same thing, and ordinarily conceived as one notion. Now, to be so infinitely Wise, Potent, and Good, as to order all things in the world to the best, to regulate and predetermine the operations of all second Causes, to keep Nature herself sober and in tune▪ and so prevent those discords, which otherwise would in a moment succeed to the reduction of all to a greater confusion then that of the Chaos; in a word, to conserve all things in existence: this no man will deny to be a Perfection, since we define the perfection of man, by his abilities for dominion (i. e.) in the judgement of our reason, every man is esteemed by so much the more perfect, by how much the more generous, august, liberal, prudent and benign mind he is endued withal, and by inference, by how much the more digne he is to bear rule over others. Therefore is this Perfection, Mundo providere, seu singulis rebus consulere, to take care of the world, and provide for the subsistence of every single entity; of necessity to be ascribed to God. For though that obsolet fallacy, that business imports disquiet, and disquiet contradicts s●licity, be retrived upon us; and our reason seem captived in the snare of this conclusion; That this Perfection, as it stands in relation to Divinity, must be an imperfection, as being point blank repugnant to its nature, which cannot at once be superlatively happy, and yet subject to multiplicity of business: yet we may soon redeem it to the liberty of truth, by conceiving some nature, wherein these two seeming contraries may be reconciled, (i. e.) the Procuration of affairs may shake hands with extreme beatitude. Nor do we conceive an impossibility herein; because even among men we daily find, that those Negotiations, which are an oppression to a low, narrow and unpractised Wit, are but the pleasant diversions and familiar recreations of a sublime, capacious, and polypragmatical: and by consequence that Nature which is able to sustain the administration of affairs infinite in number and variety, without detriment to its complete happiness; must be conceded, by incomputable degrees of transcendency more perfect, then that whose quiet must suffer diminution by the distraction of cares. Wherefore let us not suffer our cogitations to acquiesce in this imperfect, but vigorously advance to that most perfect Nature, whose propriety it is to be at once both supremely Provident, and supremely Beat. And since we conceive God to be such, it is of necessity inevitable, that we grant Universal Providence to be his proper Attribute. For Confirmation, or (more properly) requisite Explanation (for sure no man, whose intellectuals are not suppressed by that intolerable tyrant, professed Incredulity, can longer doubt) of this; let us reflect upon our Idea of the Deity, and therein we shall discover, that 'tis impossible for the mind of man to conceive the import of this word, God; and not in the same numerical notion to understand him to be most Wise, most Potent, most Good, or in abstracto, infinite Wisdom, infinite Power, infinite Goodness, assimilated, or rather identified into one simple eternal essence. For undoubtedly our minds would speculate the Idea of a poor inconsiderable and imperfect Divinity; if they conceived it subject to circumscription, and apprehended his Intellection so narrow as not actually to comprehend all things; his Power so restrained, as to know Impossibility; his Goodness so scant and shallow, as to be exhausted in a partial diffusion, or limited by the admixture of Envy, (i. e.) withdrawn from, or denied unto any of the works of his hand, out of a design to delight, or glory in their infelicity. Now if God be infinitely wise, he must be Omniscient; and Article 2. The same particularly supported by that trinity of Attributes, viz. his consequently, must understand not only the simple and naked Forms of all natures in the Universe, but hold also a full and clear theory of their Essential proprieties, how and by what kind of activities they operate toward the satisfaction of their praedestinate ends, and in what method they may be most conveniently disposed to maintain the order and harmony of the whole; and so 1. Infinite Wisdom. must know and exercise the due administration of all things in this vast Commonwealth. I say, must know and exercise; for if he understood the polity or method of the world's Gubernation, only Contemplatively: then would not his Intellection be complete and absolute in all points, and we should have been compelled to recurre to our former device of cogitating some other nature more perfect, which might be actually possessed of both the Theorical and Practical Intelligence. Again, since Sapience doth consist in, and manifest itself chief by Action, and the real administration of difficult and important affairs; with what shadow of reason can we argue God to be most Sapient, if we conceive him to be Idle, devoid of all action, and taking care of nothing? Secondly, if God be infinitely Potent, then must he be Omnipotent: and so to his power there is no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or impossibility. 2. Infinite Power. But how can we apprehend this aright, unless we first grant, that having produced all things, and endowed them with faculties respectively inservient to their conducement to the satisfaction of the general end; he doth, through all the independent subdivisions of time, (i. e.) constantly, moderate their activities, in full conformity to the prudent rules of his own Will: and how can this be done, unless we allow him to have a hand in all operations, and that both Causes and effects do so fully and wholly depend upon him, that they can have neither Existence, nor Motion, without the assent and coefficiency of his Beneplacet. Again, Action is the Pathognomonick, or proper manifest of Power; nay, in precise and orthodox logic, they are Correlatives, or twins that are ●orn, live and die together; and we are not now to learn, that God's prime scope in the Creation, was to have an opportunity for the manifestation of his excellencies: if so, can Inactivity declare Supreme Power, or a cessation from acting not induce a suspicion of Lassitude and imbecility? Lastly, if God be infinitely good; it necessarily follows, Goodness being Communicative, that all natures must be sensible 3. Infinite Goodness. of, by participating that his inexhaustible goodness. And with what unpardonable incogitancy can that be asserted, while we opinion that he doth concentre his goodness, and when he hath created so many excellent natures, take no care or make no provision for their wellbeing, but abandon them to the impendent misery of confusion? Might we not justly censure him of Malevolence or Envy, if he should withhold the communication of his perpetual Providence from the works of his own hands; which must avoidable perish by the Antipathies of their Constitutions, and relapse into their primitive nothing in that moment, when he should intermit his act of Conservation? Nay, so essential is the constant oversight and tuition of the Creator to the subsistence of the Creature; that some contemplative heads have hereupon hinted a conjecture, that nothing shall go to the dissolution of all, at the period of time, but the mere Cessation of Providence, or the dereliction of Nature to the necessary discord of her several pieces. And thus hath the clue of God's chief Attributes (chief in his relation to the World) in a direct line conducted our single reason to the demonstration of his General Providence; which indeed, is the clearest mirror of his superexcellent Nature, and to the optics of mortality doth afford a lively reflection of his infinite Wisdom, Power, and Goodness. It succeeds that we endeavour to look at Providence through the Telescope or Perspective of the World. Since God made the World, as hath been already proved; it cannot but be absurd to imagine, that he instantly deserted it, or Article 3. The necessity of the world's gubernation, by the indesinent influence of God's general Providence, demonstrated from the consideration of the absolute and total dependence of all Second Causes upon the First. having once impressed a virtue of motion upon the greater wheels of this vast machine▪ immediately withdrew his hand from action, leaving them to be carried on by their own rapt or swinge; and all the lesser and subordinate wheels of particular natures to conform to the impulsion of those greater. For though he made all things Perfect, (i. e.) omitted nothing requirable to the integral accomplishment of each Creature, in suo genere: yet since himself is the Universal Soul, that both Materiald and Informed each particle of this great body; in strictness of consequence, nothing can have existence longer than he shall please, in every minute of its duration, freshly to create it, or (to speak the interest of Providence) to conserve it in being, by a continual communication of itself; all the Actions of Divinity, being real Divinity at second hand, or nothing but Dissusions, or Emanations of its own essence. Again, who ever reared a magnificent structure a purpose to ruin it? and since there is no Artificer so unnatural or stupid, as not to desire rather that his Artifice should prosper and continue long by careful looking to, then be exposed to ruin by neglect or violence: 'tis infinitely more improbable, that the great Exemplar of all Mechanics (for no age ever produced a piece of Art, whose pattern was not first in Nature) should so far grow out of love with his own operation, and despise those perfections, which were but the extracts of himself; as to disclaim it, commit it to the imminent disorder and demolition of Fortune, and not make provision of all things conducible to its preservation: especially, when no Intellect but his own could be large enough to comprehend the Idea of the work, no Prudence but his own absolute enough to project the convenient model of its due gubernation, no Power but his own almighty enough to furnish him with requisites thereto. Nor can it, with safety, or honour to our judgements, be imagined, that God might, had he so pleased, have constituted the World in such absolute perfection, as that from the minute of its complete existence it might have continued independent, and to all eternity have subsisted by itself, and all its appointed motions have constantly, without intermission, or variation, succeeded by the direction of their bequeathed impressions, without the assiduous moderation of his care, or the minutely supply of his providence, since the Universe, according to the Grammar of sound Philosophy, is no Noun Substantive, and enjoys reality only by a distinction: i. e. is something by dependence upon him, who was eternally contrary to nothing; and being, at that instant, when Omniety informed Nullity into existence, educed out of nothing, by the single Fiat of God, and thence forward continued to be something by the continued Power of the Creator: must unavoidably revert to nothing again, if the perseverance of that identical power be substracted, from which it once obtained to be something. And as Light cannot subsist, if separated from a lucid body; but instantly vanishes into opacity: so cannot the World (which is but a reflexive deradiation from that Light, which is invisible) continue, if the perpetual source of that miraculous Virtue, which upholds its existence, be withdrawn, but must immediately vanish into nothing. For the Analogy holds in all points, and the dependence of the Creature upon the Creator, is as highly absolute, as that of Light upon the Sun, or other lucid body. And though there are some things, which being once assisted into determinate essences by their causes, do afterwards subsist without them, and keep possession of those Forms by their own native force: yet are they such as were still something before their specification to this or that nature by their causes; since all that natural Causes can do, is to mould an old matter into a new figure, and so dispose the faculties existent therein, that a new something may start out of the ruins of an old something. But the World which was nothing before the fruitful voice of Elohim called it into something, hath nothing from itself to subsist upon; but must therefore, in the twinkling of an eye, become nothing again, unless its existence be supported and maintained by the constant recruit of the same miraculous Power, which first created it. I say, the same miraculous Power; for the Creation doubtless was the greatest miracle, that ever was wrought: it being more difficult to turn Nothing into all things, by the bare nutus or vote of the First Cause, then to produce an extraordinary effect by inverting the usual method of Secondary Causes; a harder wonder to make Nature herself, then to praeposter, or transcend her customary rules of acting, to the causation of an effect either against, or above herself. Though to speak rationally, and as men that understand something of Theosophy; nothing can be a miracle to him, to whom all things are not only of equal possibility, but of equal facility also. When therefore we say, that God is the Cause of the world; we are to understand him to be so in the same relation, that the Sun is the Cause of Light: and by consequence, as the Light disappears in the Aer, when the Sun discontinues its Actinobolisme or deradiation in our hemisphere, by visiting the lower; so also must the World disappear and be lost in adnihilation, when God shall please to discontinue his influx of minutely Creation, or (to speak more conform to our present scope, though it signify the same thing in height of truth) to intermit his Providence. Moreover, so immense are the bounds of this vast Empire, the Article 4. The vastity of the world: the infinite variety of its parts: and the irreconcilable discord of many natures: domonstrate as much. World, so numerous and various its subdivisions, and those again dichotomized into so many myriads of Cantons, or Provinces, and each of those peopled with so many millions of different and discordant natures; that no reason can admit it so much as probable, that a constant correspondence could be maintained, and a general amity observed though all, without the conserving influence of a Rector General, or Supervisor, whose Will receives laws from his Wisdom, and gives them to all besides himself. And therefore their thoughts miss not much of the white of truth, who conceived God to hold the same place in the world, as a Pilot in a ship, a Charioteer in his Chariot, a Chantor in a Chorus, a Father in a family, a Monarch in a Kingdom, or a General in an Army. For, as the first preserves from shipwreck, the second from deviation and subversion, the third from discord, the fourth from poverty and desolation, the fifth from divisions, and the last from confusion: so doth the wise oversight of God regulate the efficiencies of all Natural Agents, with such admirable polity, that the whole is preserved in safety, in the direct road that leadeth to the general end, in harmony, in prosperity, in union, in perfect order. To draw a line yet more parallel; we every day observe in the sad experiments of death, what a leaden and unweildly mass of clay the body becomes, so soon as its sprightly Tenant, the Soul, hath surrendered to corruption; and it needs not much proof, that the Soul of this gigantik body, the Universe, is God: therefore when this soul shall withdraw and cease its Animation, must that body fall by its own weight, and suffer dissolution. Not that therefore, in strictness of sense, or without the latitude of a metaphor, God is a Soul, and the World his Body; but because the informing and actuating Presence of God is as absolutely necessary to the vitality of the World, and the moderation of all its parts in the due execution of their distinct offices, as the Presence of a soul to the animation of a body, and the regulation of all its members in the requisite administrations of their several functions. And upon this ground, our zeal ought not to distaste that Figurative Article 5. U●d●r what restriction we are to understand that tropology of some Hermetical Philosopher's, Deum esse Animam Mund●. expression of those mystical and symbolical Philosopher's, who call God, the Soul of the World; nor be captious at that rhetoric, which hath comparatively styled him, the Pilot, Emperor, and General of Nature: since 'tis the most mannerly language mortality can invent, for the explanation of his Government; nor is it probable, that those profound speculators, who first adopted those modest metaphors, to shadow the unutterable infinity of his Wisdom and Power, were ignorant that there ought still this difference to be allowed, that though a Pilot is not ubiquitary in all parts of his ship, nor an Emperor actually omnipresent in all places of his dominions, nor a General locally present in all quarters and stations of his Army; yet God is intimately omnipresent in every particle of the world. So that what is uncertainly said of the Soul, Tota in toto, & tota in qualibet parte: may be most certainly said of God, Totus in toto, and totus in qualibet parte. In fine, as the inspection and consideration of the World, hath formerly replenished us with irrefutable Arguments of its Creation by God: so also may it evince the constant Conservation of it, by the influence of his Providence. For whoever (though a mere Pagan, whose brain never received the impression of either of those two notions, Creator and Providence) shall speculate the world in an Engyscope or magnifying Glass, i. e. shall look upon it in the distinction of its several orders of natures observe the commodious disposition of parts so vast in quantity, so infinite in diversity, so symmetrical in proportions, so exquisite in pulchritude: shall contemplate the comeliness, splendour, constancy, conversions, revolutions, vicissitudes, and harmony of celestial bodies: shall thence descend to sublunary, and with sober admiration consider the necessary difference of seasons, the certain-uncertain succession of contrary tempests, the inexhaustible treasury of Jewels, Metals, and other wealthy Minerals concreted in the fertile womb of the earth; the numerous, useful and elegant stock of vegetables; the swarms of various Animals, and in each of these, the multitude, symmetry, connexion, and destination of organs: I say, whoever shall with attentive thoughts perpend the excellencies of these unimitable Artifices (for all things are Artificial, Nature being the Art of God) cannot, unless he contradict the testimony of his own Conscience, and invalidate the evidence of that authentic Criterion, the Light of Nature, but be satisfied; that as nothing less than an infinite Power and Wisdom could contrive and finish, so nothing less than the uncessant vigilancy and moderation of an infinite Providence can conserve and regulate them, in order to the mutual benefit each of other, and all conspiring, though in their contentions, to the promotion of the common interest. If any shall yet stand out and object, that what I call Providence, Article 6. The Atheists subterfuges of Nature and Fortune, praecluded. is no other but Nature nicknamed, all those settled motions and regular effects in the world being but the necessary products of its established laws, and unalterable method: yet since they all declare an Infinite intelligence in that Nature, which could decree those perfect constitutions, and so strictly oblige all things to observe them in order to a general and particular good; he must at last by compulsion discover Divinity disguised under the vizard of Nature, by whose counsel and directions all things operate. Nor can any man with more hopes of safety recurre to Fortune; or affirm, that there is no Praeordination of contingencies, but that all events are the inconsiderate and extemporary results of Chance: since we have lately beheld the ruins of that Sanctuary, nor dare I be so uncharitable, as to presume that the reason of any thing praetending to humanity, can be so infatuted with the stupid idolatry of that Fairy Queen, as to expect a farther resutation of that delirium. SECT. iv HAving, with perspicuity equal to the highest expectation, demonstrated the necessity of Universal Providence, from the nature both of the Agent and Patient; God and the World; it remains only that we withdraw that curtain of objections, wherewith the Impiety of its adversaries hath darkened the prospect of less ocular discerners, and terminated the vision of those whose optics have not been strong enough to transfix it. The first, we may remember, was that vanity of Epicurus, that the condition of a blissful and immortal Nature (such was his Article 1. The Atheists first Antiprovidential Argument refuted, by the Perfection of the Divine Nature: and their absurdity, in commensurating the excellenties of God, by the infinitely inferlor Faculties of man, detected. character of Divinity) is inconsistent with the necessary perturbations and perplexities of business. But alas! how grossly must he delude himself, who fathoms the extent of an Infinite, by the unequal geometry of a Finite, and limits incomprehensible Omniety to the narrow circumscriptions of Humanity; which in comparison is but one remove from Nullity? Had God, indeed, been, as he conceived him, of Humane figure; it had been no error in the Court of Reason to have concluded him not much superior in the capacity of his Intellect: but when the Divine Nature, as himself acknowledged, must transcend all other in perfection and excellencies; how palpable a contradiction did he fall upon, in commensurating the latitude of its Power and Wisdom, by the span of an imperfect and caduce nature, betwixt which and Omnipotent-omniscience are so many degrees of difference, as all the figures and cyphers of Arithmetic cannot amount to their compute, nor is mortality qualified to conceive. To paint a Sound, is a far easier task, then to describe the impervestigable manner of God's operations: and to deny the possibility of that, whose reason we cannot explore, is to proclaim our ignorance of any nature more perfect than our own; and that upon consequence, is to make our nature more imperfect then really it is, by rendering it uncapable of the greatest Truth; nay, of that truth, upon whose certitude, the assurance of all possible cognition doth necessarily depend. This had the rash Epicurus considered, doubtless he never had disparaged the nature of man, by equalizing it to Gods. I say, disparaged; because to conceive a Finite essence, as perfect as an Infinite, is openly to confess that nature, which can conceive so horrid and sensible an Absurdity, to be far more frail and contemptible, than all other of its actions declare it to be: not but, in direct verity, 'tis the greatest disparagement, and no less than blasphemy to the infinitely sacred majesty of God, to be put in the scales against vile, ignorant, and impotent Man. And while his thoughts flagged so many spheres below the Empyreum of all perfection, 'twas no wonder that he was staggered at Universal Providence; that being a notion impossible to be instilled into any mind, that is not first prepared with the belief of an Universal Intelligence. Again, to draw into a sharper angle, and render the absurdity of this Comparison more ridiculous; the Reasons why a man, though of the strongest brain▪ and greatest abilities for business, must of necessity suffer disquiet, distractions and wearisome solicitude from the multiplicity of cares, are (1.) the narrowness of his Understanding, which cannot he expansed to take in all the remote, proxime, and confederate Causes, events, dependencies, connexion's, circumstances, etc. of occurrences: (2.) the shortness of his Power, which cannot stretch to furnish him with all things necessary as well to the prevention and remove of all incident impediments, as to the molition, promotion, and accompletion of his designs: and (3.) the restraint of his Person to Time, Place and distance. But, on the other side, God is Omniscient, Omnipotent, Omnipraesent; and therefore in the praeordination, direction and compulsion of all things to the causation of those effects, which his Will hath decreed, he knows infinitely less of labour or disquiet, than the healthiest man doth in the motions of respiration, in his soundest sleep. That God is not subject to the restraint of Time, is manifest Article 2. Divinity demonstrated superior to the circumscription both of Time and Place. from his Eternity; for that is indivisible, and knows no distinction of tenses: and therefore what we (whose imperfect reason cannot compute the duration of things, but by the successive instances, or concatenated moments of time) call Praedestination, is really no praedetermination of what's to come, in respect to God, but an act of his will already accomplished, and as soon fulfilled as decreed; and so we may truly say, that in relation to himself, there is no Foreknowledge in God, all things which to our inferior Capacities seem either past, or to come, being actually present to him, whose whole duration is altogether, or but one constant and permanent point, one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, entire in unity, and uncapable of division into successive minutes, or articles. That he is not subject to the restraint of Place, is evident from his Omniety, his being all in all; ubiquity being the proper and inseparable Attribute of his nature. His being All in All. not only ratione Praesentiae, but ratione Essentiae also; he being the chief Soul not only of all Bodies, but of all Spirits also. And for this reason we cannot offend Theology, if we affirm, that God is as fully Present in Hell among the accursed, as in Heaven among the blessed natures though not so comfortably; and that the Devils would rejoice if they could conceive it possible for him to be absent thence: since their existence, and so their Torments would then cease, his presence being the original and support of all existence. Now if all this be amassed into one demonstration, and that duly prepended; I demand as well of the most contumacious infidelity, as the rankest ignorance, what can remain desirable, in order to the full information of our reason; that if there were a million of Worlds, nay as many as there are individuals in this, and in each a 1000000 times more business then in this: yet could the oversight and gubernation of them all, and the regular managery of every the smallest occurrence in them, put Divinity to no more trouble, disquiet, or interruption of felicity, than the simple Act of Volition doth induce upon the soul of man. However, for further illustration, I cannot think it unnecessary to superadd this; that since Man himself doth ordinarily perform Article 3. That the procuration of all the infinitely various actions of second causes, in the World, cannot be any interturbation of God● serene felicity, proved by an Argument à minori. some actions, particularly those, which he is not only qualified and impowered, but also inclined to do, by the native virtue, or congenial propensity of his Essence, as to Cogitate, Desire, Love, Rejoice in the manifestation of his good parts or endowments, etc. not only without labour and inquietude, but even with superlative delight and content: it cannot but be concordant to reason to assert, that God is so far from sustaining any difficulty, molestation, or diminution of felicity, in the constant act of Universal Providence; which is the natural effect of his Infinite Intelligence and Indefatigable Activity, that 'tis rather a part of his Beatitude so to exercise and manifest his Divinity. Not that the abyss of his Happiness was not full before the World was; but because, being moved by his own immense Goodness to create a convenient subject, whereon to actuate his Munificence, he is pleased still to delight himself in the continued diffusion and communication of his excellencies, by the conservation and regulation of the same, according to the most prudent laws of his Will. I have often consulted the most knowing and best ordered minds, with whom I could attain the blessing of a free conversation (and such, doubtless, are the only competent judges of delight) wherein lay the Philosopher's stone of Content in this life, and in what actions of their lives they discovered the highest and most permanent pleasure: and they all concurred in this determination, Aliis prodesse, & quám licet plurimis bene facere. And this upon no slender ground, since the Beatitude of Man doth radically and totally consist in his appropinquation to God, and we never come so near him, in this remote vale of tears, as when we go out of ourselves to relieve the necessities, lighten the oppressions, and prevent or repair the ruins of others. For Charity is the only excellence, wherein we may, in some sort, rival our maker: and were but our Wills constantly fixed upon the practice of this virtue, and our Abilities of doing good but half so infinite as our Wills (for the wings of our Understanding are, indeed, but short; but those of our Will are long, and have a liberty to sly at all, as shall be singularly proved in convenient place) we might anticipate no small part of the joys of heaven, while we sojourn upon earth, and should need no other Heraldry to testify ourselves the offspring of Divinity. Now if it be so intense a delight to the mind of man, which is but a beam deradiated from that immense Sun of Charity, to do good: ought we to think it a trouble to God, who is most intelligent, and so best knows the necessities of all things; most beneficent, and so most ready to relieve them; most rich, and so not obnoxious to impoverishment by the continual profusion of his favours; to be a general benefactor by his Providence? To conclude; if the visible and perishable Sun can with uncessant Article 4. The same illustrated by a second comparison. liberality, diffuse his consolatory and all-impregnating streams of light, heat, and influence on all parts of the sensible or adspectable World; and so concur to the generation, vitality, growth, perfection and conservation of all sublunary Natures; and this without labour, lassation, or exhaustion: Why should not the Invisible, Vnperishable, and Infinite Sun (of which the other is but a dark and contracted shadow) be allowed to have his Wisdom, Power, and Goodness (which Trinity of Attributes make the unity of Providence, as I have formerly hinted) in all places, and at all times diffused, in their operations, over all his Works, with the same facility. And as it can be no Interturbation to the serene Felicity, so Article 5. Th●t the administration of petty occurrences can be no indignity or disparagement to the sacred Majesty of God; but, on the contrary absolutely essential to him, firmly evicted, from the universality of his Cognition and Presence. neither can it be a Dishonour or disparagement to the superexcellent Majesty of God, to transmit the rays of his Providence to the most minute, and seemingly most trivial and contemptible transactions on this great exchange of the world. And therefore Pliny, who said, necesse est ut Deus tam tristi, tamque multiplici ministerio polivatur; might with less absurdity have affirmed, that the Sun doth an action much below the dignity of so glorious a creature, and must have the purity of his light suffer diminution and contamination, when it projects its radiant beams upon sordid and putrid bodies; when it cooperates to the production of Toads, Serpents, worms and other the like base vermin; and when it promotes the fertility of noxious and deleterious weeds, as well as wholesome and medical plants. For those things which appear vile, despicable and ugly to the queasy judgement of man; are not so really to Nature: since she knows no deformity, and therefore all her pieces must be amiable: not really so to the eyes of the Author of Nature, since he hath thought good to configurate them according to the most exact ideas in his own wise intellect; and therefore Beauty is best defined by the confirmity every thing holds to its primitive exemplar in the Intellect of its Creator: not so to themselves, since they have obtained a perfection congruous to their species, and enjoy an absolute pulchritude respective to their distinct kind; and therefore no Animal is so insensible of the perfection of its Form, as to desire either to lose, or exchange it. Again, those Actions, which seem various, carry the face of multiplicity, and fill up whole sheets, in the diary of man; stand but for an unit in the Arithmetic of Nature and make but a monosyllable in the book of Fate: it being the natural prerogative of Ubiquitary Omnipotence, to do all things at once. Consider we, with what ease and quiet the pale and feeble Soul of a Tree can at once provide for the Vegetation as well of each leaf and blossom, as of the trunk and root, and cook the insipid juice of the earth into an Aliment convenient to the conservation and growth of each single fiber and filament both of the cortex or bark, and of the interior and medullary substance: in a word, transfuse a vital influence through each indivisible particle of that great mass, of which it is composed. Consider we, how easily the more luminous and energetical Soul of an Elephant can at one and the same time, in one and the same blast, or deradiation of virtue, administer its nourishing influx to each particle of that vast body; and omitts not to take care of every single hair among so many myriads as clothe the skin, in its common dole or distribution of Vitality. And when we have thus gently informed ourselves, that 'tis as easy to the weak and evanid soul of a Plant (which the best Physiology defines to be nothing, but a certain modification of matter volatilised, or a contexture of smooth, globular equal and so of calefactive Atoms, woven by the seminal virtue or plastic Faculty of that particular species, and soon dissolved again, upon a variation of figure and situation of those insensible particles, of which it is composed) to make provision for the livelihood & sustentation of all parts in that mass, as for any one of them: that 'tis as genuine and familiar to the Soul of an Animal (which is also a Corporeal substance, or the more spiritual part of the blood subtiliated by vital heat, traduced from its genitor) to animate and govern all parts of its body, as any one: we cannot but acknowledge, that the Procuration and Administration of all the affairs of the world, is as facile and natural to the Providence of God (who is the Soul of all Souls, and the life of Spirits) as to take the care of any one individual Nature. If the oversight and regency of but half so many different operations, as that immaterial Empress, which keeps her invisible Court somewhere within us, doth every minute, even when we are fast locked in the narcotick arms of Morpheus, and all our thoughts keep holy day, order and effect, while she maintains the oeconomy of the body; were charged upon the hands of our understanding, but for one hour: without question, the burden would prove insupportable, nor could either the skill or strength of our limited reason, in any measure responsible, suffice to the due administration of so large a Province. When, therefore, to fathom the depth of that immense natural prudence, and sovereign virtue, wherewith the soul of man is richly endowed, and which she constantly declares in the prosperous exercise of her Monarchy, with the short line of our intelligence; or to estimate her Providence according to the rate of our cheaper faculties; is both ignorance and unjustice: how infinitely more stupid and unwarrantable a course doth that wretch take, who adventures to commensurate the superexcellent knowledge and almighty virtue of God, whereby he procures and moderates the affairs of the World? That man is, for the most, incurious of small and trivial occurrences; is so far from being a wonder, that contrariwise those, who could tripartite their thoughts to the contrivement of but three different businesses, at once, as Caesar, have been looked upon as Prodigies: and he that can lay the grounds of but one popular design, so as to have it succeed without impediment, or the intervention of cross accidents; is reputed a profound Politician, and his head a whole sphere above the vulgar. This, I am not ignorant, the haughtiness of his spirit hath referred to the fixation of his thoughts upon objects either of his pleasure or ambition; when in modest truth, this pretention of sublimity is but a gloss, or specious varnish to conceal the imbecility and limitation of his intelligence. For that being two narrow, to be extended to the forecast and reguiation of many things at once; and his stomach too high to descend to a due acknowledgement of the imperfection of his nature: he guilds over the poverty with the pride of his mind, and endeavours to excuse his frailty, by insimulating, that to attend the study of trifles, and in the interim supersed the projection of matters of importance, is a disparagement to the nobility of his Intellectuals. When if his reason were so capacious, as to admit the care of petty affairs, without the confusion, or neglect of others of more concernment; nothing, though ne'er so mean and ordinary, could seem below the dignity of his Providence. But that God should be incurious of any action in the world, is absolutely impossible; since contrapugnant to the Universality of his Cognition and presence: for what is Omniscient and Ubiquitary, can be ignorant of nothing; and consequently it can be no more either of Profanation to the Sanctity, or dishonour to the glorious Majesty of the Deity, to extend his Providence to the meanest contingents in nature, than it can be to the Soul, to vegetate and inspire each single hair of that body she informs. SECT. V TO their Second objection, that all events in the World are either the non-praedestinate and extemporary results of Article 1. The first division of the Atheists second objection; viz. that the apparent irregularity of events doth justify their non-praedestination or mere contingency; strongly convelled: and that to the praeordination of divinity nothing can be casual; clearly commonstrated. Chan●e; or the necessary and settled effects of Nature, all Actives and Passives being, by the unalterable laws of their primitive constitutions, firmly adliged unto, and irresistibly impelled upon the causation of determinate effects respective to the energy of their particular consigurations: we as easily as uprightly answer, First, that to the praedestination of that Almighty Cause, which can and doth dispose the motions of all things according to the praescripts of his own Will, no event can be casual or unexpected; though indeed, if we have regard to the prescience and forecast of man, to whose dim optics all things are invisible, that stand in the dark of futurity, many events seem mere Accidents, and the most mature determinations of Fate may pass for the rash and inconsiderate hits of Fortune. And if so, how audacious a temerity is it in us, so to magnify our own slender perspicacity, as when we cannot discern why this or that particular concourse and encounter of natural causes should occur, rather than another, and such or such an issue of their confederate activities succeed, rather than another; instantly to conclude, that there can be no Superior Cause, or superintendent power, which hath thus or thus ordained and disposed those certain means to those certain ends, and whose counsels we are not privy unto? Look we no farther than the ordinary Providence of Princes, and in every Republic our observation shall meet with a thousand events, which in the judgements of their vulgar subjects, and such as stand aloof from the Council table, are deemed mere Contingents, as never at all designed upon any secret reasons of State; when yet to the Prince himself, and those to whom he hath communicated the mystery of his designations, they really are the intended effects of his Prudence, which had so politicly ordered his affairs, and so wisely prepared all Agents requisite to the bringing about of his purposes, that they could not but hit and be accomplished accordingly. And is there then, why we should not be confirmed, that in this immense Commonwealth, in whose government the most inobservant cannot but take notice of innumerable passages so admirable, both in respect of the weak Insturments that served to bring them to pass, and of the obscurity or impervestigability of the Ends, at which they were leveled; that nothing less than an infinite Wisdom could contrive, nothing less than an infinite Power effect them: there must of necessity be a Rector General or Precedent Paramont, by whose sovereign dictates all subordinate ministers are set on work, in order to the execution of his pleasure, and in their operations vary not a hairs-bredth from the rules prescribed by his Will; though neither the manner of their activities, nor the Ends to which they are destined fall under the discovery of our purblind reason? For the Polity of God is inscrutable, and may well delight our Piety with wonder, but must empuzle our insolent Curiosity: and the eye of our souls, being in this life far dimmer than that of Moses body, cannot survey so much as the back parts, or dark side of Divinity; much less pry into the maze of his Counsels, and read the invisible decrees of that mystical S●nate, wherein though there be a consult of three Persons, there is yet but one mind▪ which votes without contradiction, and his Volition, deliberation and Election, make but one simple act. For my part, that the ways of God in the World are past finding out; that there is a Sanctum Sanctorum in the Ark of Providence, into which blind mortality cannot look; and that the cryptick turn, doublings, and redoublings of that hand, which works all its rarities in the dark, and sometimes inverts, now and then transcends, and anon infringes the Axloms of Nature (to show, that as he made, so he can alter her, and tune all her strings to a concord with his will) make a labyrinth to intricate and lose the presumptuous reason of man, that dares hope to explore and trace it: this, I say, is demonstration enough to me, that there is one Universal Intelligence, which both moves and directs all individual Agents to act, in order to the accomplishment of some positive end, for the most part best, and many times only known to himself. Nor is it an illegal process of our reason, but the best logic, as to supernaturals; to conclude not only the excellencies, but even the necessary being of some things, merely from hence that we cannot fully comprehend them: since their very being above our capacity, is argument both clear and strong enough, that they are not only so as, but more perfect and far greater than we understand them to be; as he that sees but a small part of the sea with a Telescope at distance, may safely conclude that 'tis exceeding large; because the circumferrence thereof is, by infinite degrees of magnitude, wider than to be drawn into the aperture of his slender tube. Sure I am, at least, that the Antisyllogisme, or Counter-argument; the understanding of man cannot discover its abstruse and mysterious plots, resolve its multiplex aenigmas, nor analyze its method, or series of Causes subordinate, and so by a retrograde chase hunt out its first and chief intention: Ergo, there can be no Providence: is intolerable, and deserves a greater dose of Ellebor, than that absurdity of the blind man, who concluded there was not, nor could be any such thing as light, or Colours, only because he could not see them. When therefore we shall have run our eager contemplations to a stand, in the wilderness of Providence, and lost our busy thoughts in the maze of God's secret decrees; all the satisfaction our bold curiosity can return home with, will be only this: that all occurrences in the World are predetermined, have their Causes, Times, and Ends punctually set down in the Ephemerideses of Fate; and though in the incompetent judgement of man, some of them may seem the Peradventures, or temerarious Hits of Chance: yet are they the mature Designations of the supreme Wisdom: though in the ears of man, they may sound discords to the music of particular Natures, yet will they at last be found well composed Aers necessary both to sweeten, and fill up the common Harmony of the Universe. To instance; are there not many Monsters, Heteroclites, Equivocal and irregular births, on the earth: many prodigious and new-faced Meteors in the upper, and uncertain Anomalies or unseasonable Tempests in the lower division of the Aer: many new Phaenomena among the fixed; various encounters, divisions, and conspiracies among the erratic stars etc. and yet do not all these, as Chrotchets and Quavers in a grave and solemn lesson on a Lute, conduce to the advancement of the General Melody? Doth not irregularity render order the more conspicuous and amiable? and Deformity, like the Negro drawn at Cleopatra's elbow, serve as a foil to set off Beauty? Are not the Moles on the cheeks of Nature, as those on Venus' skin, placed there to illustrate or whiten the snow, and sweeten the feature of her face? Is it not exceeding graceful in a Comedian, to temper and endear the sage and weighty scenes of Princes, and Melancholy Statesmen, with the light interludes of Pantalons, Clowns, and Antics? Doth not the Painter then show the most of skill, when he refracts the glaring lustre of his lighter Colours, with a veil of Sables; and makes the beauty of his piece more visible by clouding it with a becoming shadom? And without doubt, every man will readily conjoin his vote to ours, that he is best able to adorn and embellish a piece of Art, who first contrived and wrought it: and therefore the Perfection and Condecoration of a work doth properly and solely bolong to his hand, that brought it to that height, as to want only ornament; nor is it his part to prescribe what's necessary to the conciliation of gracefulness and decorament to an engine, who is ignorant of the model, and holds not a perfect Idea of the Artifice thereof. Now the importance of all these similes being put together, who can be so ignorant in the Alphabet, or rudiments of ratiocination, as not, at first sight, to spell them into this short lesson, consisting only of two orthodox Positions. First, that those subitaneous Accidents, which the ignorance or carelessness of the vulgar doth usually refer to the blind sortilegies of Chance; are truly the mere hand of God, and the prudent designs of that Catholic Providence, which hath numbered the sands on the Sea shore, and weighed the dust of the earth in a balance: which feeds the young Ravens, when they cry, and while the old ones wander for meat: which thundereth marvellously with his voice; and doth great things, that we cannot comprehend: for he saith to the snow, Be thou on the earth; likewise to the small rain, and to the great rain of his strength: by whose breath frost is given; and the breadth of the waters is straightened: which turneth the bright clouds round about by his Counsels, that they may do what ever he commandeth them upon the earth: who made the ordinances of heaven, and hath set the dominions thereof in the earth: who can bind the sweet insluences of the Pleyades, and lose the bands of Orion: can bring forth Mazaroth in his season, and guide Arcturus with his sons, etc. Secondly, that those Monstrosities, or extraordinary and prodigious effects, which the nescience of the multitude calls Irregularities, Perversions, and Deformities of Nature; to wiser considerations, prove themselves to be no wanton excursions, or random shots of her hand, made without aim at any final cause; but praeordained, and collineated by that sure one of Divine Providence, point blank at some certain end, private or public. The former being known only to himself, à priori; and frequently mistaken by man, a▪ posteriori: the later, indeed, we have a liberty to conjecture, to be either that he leaves the strait, and chalks out this serpentine and crooked line, to satisfy the World of his Prerogative, that himself is the Agent, and Nature but his Instrument, and therefore to be turned, wrenched, altered, and perverted at his pleasure; or else, that his wisdom thinks those spots requisite to enhance the beauty of the whole, those private feuds and petty discords betwixt Individuals, necessary not only to endear, but conserve the peace of the whole. Both which durable Truths are, with so much piety, as judgement, contracted by that Emperor of the Stoics as well as of the Romans, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (of whom the smooth Herodian (initio historiae) gives this glorious Character, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: Solus imperatorum sapientiae studium non verbis aut decretorum scientia, sed gravitate morum, vitaeque continentia usurpavit) into one short meditation, in these words; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: Quae ad Deos ut auctores referuntur, ea Providentiae plena esse nemo dubitat. Quae Fortunae vulgò adscribuntur, ne illa quidem extra Naturae leges, fatalemque illum contextum, complexúmque rerum, quae à providentia administrantur. Ind omnia sluunt: add quod necessarium est, quicquid est, & toti universo (cujus tu pars es) conducibile. Porro autem quod natura Vniversi fert, quódque ad eam facit conservandam, id bonum est unicuivis Vniversi particulae. Conservant autem mundum, quemadmodum elementorum, ita & ex iis concretarum rerum mutationes. Libri 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 primi sect. ultima. Secondly, that no Natural Agent hath the rains in its own hands, or the liberty to act in a lose and arbitrary way; but all Article 2. The Authors Antithesis, that all Natural Agents are under the strict laws of their distinct species. things observe that immutable Tenor, or settled course, which they began to operate in at their first inauguration to essence: provided that we understand this assertion under a twofold restriction. First, that this Tenor or established method, was not instituted Article 3. A second Counterposition, that those laws were instituted and sancited by an infinite wisdom. by the improvidence of Fortune, as our Atheists would have it; but ordained, enroled and enacted by the counsel of an infinite Wisdom. Secondly, that this supernatural Nature, which excogitated Article 4. A third, that the legislator hath reserved to himself a prerogative power to alter, transcend, invert, or repeal the laws of Nature. and decreed this convenient law, and endowed each single entity with a Power or Faculty respective to its duty thereto, and observance or execution thereof; hath not thereby so tied up his own hands, or limited his Prerogative, as not to have reserved to himself an absolute superiority, or capacity, at pleasure to infringe, transcend, or pervert it, by giving special dispensation to any of his Creatures, to vary the manner of their Activities, in order to the Causation of any effect, which his own prudence shall think expedient. For the First and Second of these Positions; viz. that as well Article 5. The verity of the first and second Positions, amply demonstrated. the general Law of Nature, as those particular and oeconomical rules, which being engraven not only upon every distinct species, but also upon every single or individual entity, stand both for warrant and directions to them in their several operations; were made and established by the counsel of an infinite Wisdom: may (if we may assume the liberty to aggravate what we have formerly adferd toward the attestation of the same subject) be thus demonstrated. In the whole Scale of Creatures, we find but five Gradations or roundles, by which our contemplations may orderly ascend to the highest pinnacle, or summity of Nature, and thence take a full survey of all her Provinces at large: and those are Existence, Life, Sense, Locomotion voluntary, and Reason. To speak yet more perspicuously. First, there are some things, which have obtained a bare Existence, or mere Being only, and remain devoid of all the other four; such are all simple bodies, as the Heavens, and those four which common Physiology calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Elements; and all 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inanimate Concretions, or Compositions, as Stones, Metals, Minerals, etc. Secondly, some have not only Existence, but also Vitality or Vegetability allotted unto them, and yet want sense, and motion arbitrary, as all Vegetables. A Third Classis is endowed with Being, Life, and Sense; and yet hath not attained so high as Animal or voluntary motion: to which belong all Conchylia, as Oysters, Muscles, Cockles, etc. which Aristotle (3. De Gener. Animal. cap. 2.) for the same reason, facetiously calls Aquatiles Plantas, a kind of Water Plants; as by an inversion, he calls earthly Plants, Ostrea Terrena, a kind of Land Oysters: because they have not, as he opinioned, the power of translating themselves de loco in locum (though our Democritus Londinensis, that incomparable indagator of Nature's Arcana, Dr. Harvey, hath observed that Oysters protrude, or belch out on the conical extreme of their shells, a certain Film or natural sail, by the help whereof they remove, veer, tack about, and so, observing the Tides, conduct themselves to shores, rocks, and other places of advantage both for their feeding, and quiet) but are tumbled up and down by the impulse of the Current. Others of a fourth order are admitted to go higher, and to their Existence, Vitality, and Sensibility, is also superadded Locomotion arbitrary, or the Faculty of removing their stations at pleasure; but yet they are excluded from the perfection of Rationality, and know nothing good or evil, but by the discernment or discrimination of Sense: as all brute Animals, Quadrupeds, Birds, Fishes, Amphibions, and Infects. And Lastly, others there are, which being highest in the favour of their maker, possess all these accumulated endowments together, and have Existence, Life, Sense, Voluntary motion, and Ratiocination contorted together into one excellent Nature, which seems in an epitome or contraction to comprehend all the others: and these are ourselves. Some over pregnant Wits there have been, I well remember, who have added one round more to this Ladder of Corporeal Natures, making the Zoophytes or Plant-Animals an half-pace, or middle step betwixt the 2 and 3 degrees: but until either an autoptical experiment, or the observation of some, who are more curious of Truth, then exotique Rarities, shall remove those scruples which I have in me, concerning the fidelity of those large stories obtruded upon us by Travellers, of the Herba mimosa, or mimic Plant, described by Christopher Acosta, first, afterwards by Clusius, and since grown traditional amongst all Botanics; of the Boramez, or Vegetable Lamb of Tartary (not sparing relation whereof was first communicated to the world in the common language of Europe, by Sigismond Baron of Verbestein (in rerum Moscoviarum Commentariis) then countenanced by the glorious Pen of Jul. Caesar Scaliger (Exercit. 181. Sect. 29.) since made more passant by Fortunius Licetus (Lib. 3. the spont. vivent. ortu, cap. 4.) and Libavius (part 2. singul. exercitat. de Agno vegetabili Scythiae) and now taken for granted by all or most Herbarists of our age; of the Sponge, etc. I shall beg leave to suspend my belief, that there are any such Heteroclites▪ or middle Natures, half Vegetable, half sensible; or, at least, that both Faculties are so conspicuous and eminent in them, as that thence they should deserve really to be account a distinct order of Creatures. Now the Faculties, or essential proprieties of all things being thus incommunicable downward, and each distinct classis so confined to its proper orb of endowments, that it can never advanced upward, and usurp more perfection than what it already stands possessed of by the Charter of its particular specification; it follows, that we explore the reason or original of this Limitation, and why those Natures of the first degree, are limited to mere Existence, and cannot aspire to Vegetation: why those of the second are chained down to Existence and Vegetation, without possibility of being ever promoted to Sense; those of the third preferred to Sense, but denied the additional favour of Locomotion voluntary; those of the fourth admitted to Arbitrary motion, but excluded Reason; and those of the highest enriched with all. Either this Necessity must be imposed upon them by Fortune; or by themselves; or by some other principle, which hath the free donation, and so the limitation of all those privileges or Faculties. First, not by Fortune; for that she could not institute these assignations, draw this Helix, that still enlargeth into a wider capacity, nor make this law of Propriety inviolable: is amply manifest from the Perpetuity, or constant observation of the same by all corporeal entities, every one having their peculiar capacities so defined, circumscribed, and immured, that no one did ever, since the first hour of Time, exceed the bounds of its own species, nor climbeup to the state of its superior; for Constancy and Fortune are Antagonist never to be reconciled, but, like Castor and Pollux, when one peeps above, the other skulks below the horizon. Secondly, not by Themselves; for there is in every thing a kind of native Ambition to ennoble its nature, enlarge its power, nay (so much as in it lies) to mount even to infinity, according to that Axiom of Scaliger (Exercit. 9 pag. 52.) Vnicuique enti inest appetitio infinitatis. Thus simple Natures covet to become compounds; Compounds spur on to arrive at Vegetables; those affect the dignity of Sense; sensibles grow desirous of musculary Motion, etc. Can we conceive, that a Plant would continue fixed and nailed down by its own roots to the earth, and there live a cold, dull, unactive life; if it could give to its self motion and abilities for nobler actions? That a Beast would be constant to the gross and heavy operations of mere sense, submit to the burdens, and endure the tyrannous oppressions of man; if it could endow itself with the prerogative of Reason, and so become equal to his imperious Lord? Or that man would sit down quiet, and remain subject to the infirmities, calamities, and mortality of his nature; if he had any hopes to better it, to wind up himself to heaven, and there take the wall of Cherubins, nay rival the calm felicity and immortality of God? For so invincible a reluctancy have we against the necessity of our frailties, and so uncessant hormetick a desire to be above them, by the melioration of our state; that we may truly accommodate to our pride, what the eloquent Tertullian spoke to express that of some of the Roman Emperors; si ipsi se Deos facere potuissent, certè quidem homines nunquam fuissent, could they have made themselves Gods, doubtless they never would have been men. Seeing therefore, that 'tis repugnant to that insatiable Appetite of Melioration, even to infinity, radically inherent in every entity create, though (I confess) scarce perceptible in bodies devoid of Animation; to deny to itself any perfection, which is in its own power to give, or acquire: what clearer evidence can be expected, to ensure our reason, that the Ampliation, and Limitation of all Natural Faculties, or endowments, is not in the arbitrary disposition, or elective power of Finite essences; and, by consequence, that the Law of Propriety, or the restriction of every species to its own orb of activity, was not made by compact among themselves, but imposed upon them by an Infinite. This considered, it remains indisputable, that the Distribution and Assignation of those different Qualifications, being neither in the power of Fortune, nor of the Things that enjoy them: it must properly and solely belong to that supernatural Infinite, which is the fountain of Being, Life, Sense, Locomotion and Reason, and therefore had the power freely to give them; being induced to the Collocation of them by the mere invitement of his own Goodness, and directed in the convenient Distribution of them by the Counsel of his own Wisdom. This Truth, all Ages have held sacred, and the wiser Ethnics both of Greece and Rome ever engrafted it into their Creed, preaching it to the world, though blended under the Chaos of their symbolical or Hieroglyphical Idolatry. For Homer, courting the propitious aspect of his best Deity, Jupiter, in a panegyrical Hymn; ascribes to him, as a chief and peculiar Attribute, the power of Circumscribing and Bounding of all things, thus bespeaking him. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Jovem Deorum optimum canam, & maximum, Latesonantem, validissimum, Terminos afferentem, etc. And Aristotle likewise (de Mundo Tom. 2. pag. 1592.) calls his Infinitum divinum, or God, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Quod ab eo omnia terminata sunt, ac nihil in rerum natura sit infinitum, from his setting bounds to all things, and leaving nothing undefined. Nor was this unacknowledged by the elder Romans; for they had a set form of devotion, and a solemn sacrifice appointed particularly ad jovem terminalem, as Dionysius Halicarnass. (Antiquit. Roman. Lib. 2. p. 133.) hath transmitted to posterity. To this also seems the sweet tongued Ovid to allude, when in his description of the Creation, he saith, Limitibus discrevit omnia certis. Now the Faculties of all Natural Agents being immediately derived from, and strictly limited by God, so that no one can ever transcend its own, nor usurp upon another's confines: the Light of Nature will infer, that all their operations also are prescribed, and both the manner, and end of all their activities precisely predetermined, nay the very time and place with all other adjuncts and circumstances of their effects appointed by the Providence of his Infinite Wisdom. Hitherto have we confronted only Nature to Fortune; let us therefore now give her one charge more with an Argument desumed à minori, from Art. Did ever any man, that beheld the curious Mathematics of Archimedes his Sphere; the automatous flight of Regiomontanus his Eagle; the artificial wings of Architas Dove; or those inanimate Birds that the ingenious Mathematician, whom the glorious Charles the fifth selected for his companion in his retirement from Empire sent flying in at his window; or but observe the regular motions in a trochiliack Horodix, or Watched conceive that the motions of those engines were originally spontaneous, instituted by mere chance; or that each wheel assumed to itself, by Lot, its particular figure, situation, axis, number of teeth, and precise measure of circumrotation? Undoubtedly no; but on the contrary, instantly concluded, that they were the appointed effects of provident industry, and had their models grounded upon maxims of the highest and most learned reason. And yet is our Atheist so effronted with impudence, as to give check to his own Conscience, by daring to affirm; that the system of the Celestial orbs, the Laws of natural motions, and the Architecture of those admirable organs in the body of an Animal (which are engines, whose Artifice doth, by incomprehensible excesses, transcend our theory in the mathematics; insomuch that some of the strongest skulls of our age have ventured crazing to find out the Geometry of the Muscles, or the Mechanics of Voluntary motion: and yet are forced, by an host of difficulties, to retire and suspend their hopes of perfecting their design) were contrived by Fortune, and not by the skill of an Artist infinite in Science and Power. How familiar is this Logic to every man's understanding; the Figures of all things in the adspectable World, are exactly Geometrical, their actions and uses respectively accommodate, their motions constant and regular at all times, their effects certain, and the laws of every distinct species immutable (as to themselves) ergo those Figures, Actions, Uses, Motions, and Laws were delineated, appointed, assigned, begun, and enacted, by an Omniscient and omnipotent Providence? And this I conceive sufficient to demonstrate the truth of our First assertion; viz. that that constant Tenor, or established method, according to which all Natural causes operate, was instituted and is perpetuated by an Infinite Wisdom. For the support of our Third Thesis; that though the actions of all Second causes are impulsive and necessary▪ yet those of the First Article 6. The verity of the third Position demonstrated. Cause are Elective and Arbitrary; though God hath by the severe laws of Nature, bound up the hands of his Creatures, limited their activities, and punctually consigned them their several provinces: yet he hath reserved his own free, and as an absolute Monarch, can at pleasure alter, transcend, or pervert those Statutes, and give a new Commission to his Ministers to work by a new way, in order to the causation of any extraordinary effect, which his providence hath decreed, of universal, or particular benefit: we need erect no other pillar of argument, but that one firm and immovable basis, the importance of the word, Creator. For since to be able to produce all things out of nothing, by the single efficacy of his word, or the energetical blast of his will, to endow each distinct species with faculties exactly proportionate and meridional to their distinct destinations, and to entail upon them to the expiration of Times own lease, that estate, in which he enfcoffed them at their creation: doth necessarily imply a greater perfection of power, then merely to vary or innovate their efficiencies, according to the expedients, emergencies, or occasional designs of his Providence: it remains indisputable upon consequence, that to allow him the Greater, and yet deny him the less: to believe him to be the Author of that mighty and difficult miracle, the Creation, and yet doubt the supremacy of his Power, by conceiving that he cannot turn Natural Agents out of their common road, and order their digressions to the effecting of smaller and easier Rarities; must be a manifest Contradiction, and an Absurdity that stabs itself. However, that we may not seem to entrust so noble and sacred a Article 7. A farther confirmation of the same by an Argument, from the miraculous operations of God in praeterito. Truth, to the protection of one single Reason; it becomes our care to superadd, for the more security, this defence also. If God hath frequently manifested his Supremacy, by working effects as well above, as against the established and customary power of natural Agents, in times past; then, doubtless, is not his arm shortened, nor the fountain of his energy dried up, and he can do the like, in the future: but he frequently hath; ergo, etc. The Major, I am sure, no man will boggle at, who shall consider, that 'tis the proper privilege of Divinity, to be still the same, that that virtue, which is extreme, and so above all addition, must necessarily also be above all decay or diminution: and therefore he that conceives God subject to Mutability, A●●erity, or Deslux, blasphemes the Simplicity, Purity and Eternity of his Essence, and holds but a false Idea of his Nature. Nor can the Minor require more proof than its bare Prolation; unless the unbeleif of any man shall be so inslexible, as not to bow at the Convulsion of a truth, which the Records of all Nations, Times, and Religions, lie open to attest; For that there have been observed Prodigious and miraculous accidents, (such as the most obstinate Idolaters of Nature, and those who grew grey in the study of her laws, customs, and secret magnalias, and kept a list of her forces; were surprised with aftonishment at the consideration of: and after a vain and tedious scrutiny into their abstruse Causalities, were forced to refer to the immediate arm of a Supernatural efficient) the indisputable monuments of faithful Antiquity bear witness. And he, who hath not heard of those Three grand Examples (to omit the enumeration of any other, that are not universally believed by men of all interests and persuasions) of the superiority of God's power to that of his servant, Nature; viz. The Universal deluge, the Cessation of Oracles, and the total Eclipse of the Sun at the passion of our Redeemer: can give but weak testimony, that he is either jew, Mahometan, or Christian. The First being reputed not only true, but sacred, and thereforeheld Article 8. That there was an universal Deluge. as point of faith in common by all three Religions; nay countenanced even by Pagan stories, and more, their settled account of time; they computing the second space or interval of Time (the First being little better to them then Prolepticall, or as the Heathen called it, Adelon, immanifest and obscure, was dated from the beginning of the World to Ogyges' Flood, which was about 530 years after Noah's) from the Flood to the first Olympiad, which answers to the year of the World 3174. and comes within about 20 years before the foundation of Rome. The Second being embraced, and made authentical by the general consent of Christians, upon the forced acknowledgement of Article 9 The Cessation of Satan's Oracles, after the advent of the Word of Truth, proved anthentiquely. those, whose interest obliged them to invalidate it; and those not only Pagans surrounded with the horrid darkness of idolatry, and expecting no daybreak from the glorious Sun of Righteousness; but even of the Devil himself: who though the Father of lies, and his honour so highly concerned in the intercision of his impostures and delusions, could not yet dissemble this verity; but at four several times, and in as many several places publicly proclaimed it. First, when from his famous Oracle at Delphos he confessed himself to be tonguetied, his fallacious predictions countermanded, and his so solemnly pretended Divinity expired; being able to return no other answer to the great Augustus (whose errand was to have his fortune told him) but this: Me Puer Hebraeus, Divos Deus ipse gubernans, Cedere sede jubet, tristemque redire sub Orcum; Aris ergo dehinc tacitus discedito nostris. An Hebrew Child, that God, whose power's above All other Gods, commands me to remove Hence to the Court of sorrow; wherefore, go, My Altars quit in silence, and ne'er moe Of Future things from me expect to know. A second time, when Legion howled out the hideous dirge of their black Prince, and the shores were heard by Mariners far off at sea to echo their groans into this dismal note; Great Pan is dead: as Plutarch hath reported in his defect of Oracles. A third, about the time of Constantine, so affectionately magnified by Eusebius, in his sad complaint, that his lips were sealed up, his Prognostics suppressed, and his sophistry fooled, by the Righteous upon earth: as the same Eusebius hath related in Vita Constantini. And again, in his excuse to the Emperor julian; who being superstitiously curious to foreknow the success of his great expedition into Persia, and therefore addressing himself with exceeding solemnity to the temple of Apollo Daphne's, to anticipate the knowledge of his fortune, could notwithstanding worm out of him no other satisfaction but this; that he should first remove the bodies about him, before he could have the liberty to return him an answer: as Theodoret hath registered, who also tells us, that not long after that Temple was consumed by lightning. But I must here arrest my Reader with a civil and short Advertisement, that by the Cessation of Oracles, I may not intent a total and absolute expulsion of that grand Impostor from all his Fanes, Tripods, and other shops wherein he professed his delusions, at once; as if the Incarnation of Truth had struck him dumb at one blow: but an extermination of him from his metropolitan Temple at Delphos, and an Intercision, Diminution, or sensible Decay of his Amphibologies, Predictions and other Collusions in all other places. For, otherwise, I should not only steal a contradiction upon myself, that unsatisfactory response, which he stammered out to julian, being full 363 years after the nativity of him, that crushed the Serpent's head; but also incur the just censure either of being ignorant of, or undecently neglecting those solid reasons, which Plutarch, Suetonius, and our modern learned Wits, Montacutius, and D ●. Browne have adduced to attest the continuation of his ceremonious Legerdemain and solemn cheats practised upon gross and credulous Pagans, in the point of Vaticination, much beyond the rising, setting, and resurrection of the Sun of righteousness, who came down to dispel those fogs of Hell, and irradiate the poor benighted world with Light supernatural. And the Last is sworn to by all. For (1) the Christian hath it Article 10. That there was a prodigious Eclipse of the Sun, at the passion of our Saviour. ratified to him both by sacred and profane Authority: (2) the Jews, that deny Christ to have been the true Messiah, do yet acknowledge the prodigious Eclipse of the Sun, that renowned his passion: and (3) the Turks, who allow him to have been no more than a great and holy Prophet, as their Alcoran frequently intimateth; are yet so zealous of the honour of their ancient records, that they would confute him with a scimitar, who should dare to indubitate the preterition of so remarkable a wonder, which certified the half of the earth of its verity, by the sensible persuasion of a panic terror; insomuch that many of the Jews who beheld it, were so shattered with fear, that their hearts were rend aswell as the vail of the Temple, and themselves ready to sneak into the graves of those Saints, that were newly risen, to evidence his conquest over death, and give humanity a prelibation or taste of the benefit of his sufferings. Nor was this, as other Eclipses, only Partial and Vertical to Jerusalem; but the darkness was visible to the whole Hemisphere: else, how could the Egyptian Astronomer take notice of it, and being amazed at the unnatural Apparition, cry out, Aut Deus Naturae patitur, aut machina mundi dissolvitur; as the reverend Father, his namesake, Dionysius hath remembered in his Epistle to Polycarpus, and Apollophanes? else, how could the ancient Greeks, in their Annals, have filled up a monstrous Defection of the great Luminary, in the 4th. year of 202. Olympiad; as Phlegon Trallianus noteth●? Now the 4th. year of the 202. Olympiad jumps even with the 19th. of Tiberius, and the 33. of the Nativity, which was the 4745. of the Julian period; and therefore that exact synchronisme makes that monstrous Eclipse observed by the more mathematical eyes of the Greeks, to be the same which happened at the death of the Lord of life. That the Catholic Deluge was purely Supernatural, and the destruction of all Living Creatures upon the sublunary Glo●e Article 11. A Demonstration of the impossibility of the Catholic Deluges proceeding from Causes Natural. (those few that were shifted aboard the Ark, only preserved) by an Abyss of Waters, immediately caused by the revenging Will of that same Fruitful Spirit, that formerly brooding upon the same abyss of waters, had hatchtt him into being; though of some difficulty to him, that shall wave all testimonies deduceable from the sacred relation ascribed to Moses: can yet be no impossibility to prove, from Considerations merely Physical. For First, the vast Quantity of Waters requisite to overflow the whole earth, and prevail upon the high hills, nay exceed the heads of the most lofty mountains by 15 cubits (for mountains there were before the flood; else how could the waters by degrees increasing, ascend and cover them: and therefore those wanton Wits, which affirm the Antediluvian earth to have had her face a mere Plane or level, without those protuberancies and rugosities, undertake not only a Paradox, but a manifest Absurdity, point blank repugnant aswell to the Text, as to the natural Necessity of those Inaequalities) could not be poured out from the Receptaries or storehouses of the Ocean; the Earth having as great (if not a greater) share in the Terraqueous Globe, as the Waters, and the perpendicular Altitude of the mountains, by more than two parts of three, at least, transcending the profundity of the deepest Channel of the Sea, that ever the sounding line of any Mariner did profound, except of that Barathrum or Vorago Aquarum, in mari dulci, between Roest and Leoffelt, described by Olaus Magnus; which yet is but a kind of Sluice or sink, and therefore of no considerable latitude. For that the Eminency of the highest Hills hath scarcely the same proportion to the Semidiametre of the Earth, that there is betwixt 1. & 1000; hath been frequently demonstrated by many of our best Geographers: and though we descend to Eratosthenes his commensuration, who hath affirmed, that by instruments Dioptrick, and an exact measure of the distances of Places, he hath certainly found the Altitude of the highest mountains not to exceed ten stadia; we shall not however be provided of water enough in the bowels of the Sea to advance our inundation, the depth of the profoundest ocean seldom amounting to a 100 Fathom, as Scaliger (38 Exercit. contra Cardanum) hath upon justifiable grounds declared. Nor can this immane Collection of Waters be derived, as some have inconsiderately opinioned, from the Whole lower Region of the Aer condensed into clouds, and those compressed into waters. For (to take no strict notice of that large Tohu, Vacuum Coacervatum, or Nothing, which must then have been introduced, from the surface of the Waters up to the middle region; which Nature could never endure, nor had God any necessity to enforce,) if Aer condensed into Water shrinks into a space or Continent, 400. times less than what it possessed before condensation (for since Water weighs 400. times heavier than Aer, as the subtle Galileo (Dialog. 1. deal moviment. pag. 81.) examining the proportions of Gravity betwixt those two bodies, demonstratively discovered; it must necessarily carry the same proportion also to Space, or Locality,) then assuredly, when we shall have calculated the perpendicular height of the Atmosphere, or lower region of the Aer, and reduced it to the 400th. part: we shall soon be satisfied, that the Addition which the Aer Aquaefied could bring to the waters of the Sea effused upon the bosom of the earth, cannot suffice to swell the Deluge so high as the semialtitude of many lofty mountains, such as Slotus in Norway (which Franc. Patricius, out of Fr. Bacon and Scaliger, hath accounted the highest on the earth,) Athos in Macedonia, Tenariff, Caucasus, Atlas, etc. whose tops make large encroachments on the middle region, and seem to invade the Firmament. Again, to charge this immense Accumulation of Waters upon 40. days rain, though we should conced that rain to be neither Sea evaporated, nor Aer condensed; is not to undo, but entangle the miracle. For taking the Altitude of the mountains according to the calculation of the most moderate Geometry; and then soberly perpending what aggravation to the Waters of the Sea now converted upon the earth, the most violent natural rain of 40. days and nights could probably make, which the most hyperbolical conceit cannot advance higher than 40. fathom: we shall easily detect the difficulty. And secondly, as Nature could not afford the Material Cause of this general Inundation, the Waters; so neither the Mighty Essicient, or Impulsive, that should with such prodigious impetuosity hoist up so huge a mass of Sea, contrary to the strong renitency, or depressure of its Gravity, drive it from its native easy Currents in the declining veins and cavities of the earth, upon an absolute 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Acclivity on the elevated surface thereof, and make it fall in Cataracts up-hill. For (1) though the Waters desire to stand above the mountains, as the Divine Hebrew Poet hath pleased to phrase it (Psalm 104. vers. 9) yet they but desire it, and by their own inherent and essential Tendency are rendered uncapable to satisfy that elemental ambition; for water permitted to its own propensity or inclination, immediaiely tendeth downward: and therefore he that can conceive a river to desert its declive channel, and climb a precipice, without the violence of a Miracle; hath a strong Fancy, but a weak judgement: nor need any man despair to persuade his credulity, that helmont's ridiculous Romance of the Cause of Earthquaks (viz. that an Angel, or minister of Divine revenge, descends into the Centrals of the Earth, and there with a great Clapper or Sledge giving a mighty Thump against the feet of Rocks, makes a hoarse or grave kind of Bom, which enlarging its sound, rends the foundations thereof, and puts the percussed mass into a rigour, or shaking fit of an Ague.) is a solid and philosophical Verity. And thirdly, as the Waters could not elevate themselves, so neither could the Attractive Virtue of those Celestial Magnets, the Sun, Moon and Stars, work them out of their depths, by rarefying them into vapours, which mounted up to the middle region of the Aer, and there encountered by intense Cold, should be reduced to clouds, and those again dissolved in Cataracts. For should we grant, what the Arabian Astrologers returned in answer to the Egyptian Caliph, who had set them to untie this knot; viz. that there was a great Conjunction of ♄ and ♃ not long before the flood, and the malignant influence of that confederacy much aggravated by another fatal Convention of all the Planets, in the watery sign of Pisces, immediately preceding it, as Sepher Juchasin (fol. 148.) hath delivered; which the learned Mirandula hath sufficiently disproved, and smiled at yet must the greatness of the Effect manifestly confute the possibility of that for a Cause. First, because Nature hath frequently showed to the world the like Conjunctions, but never the like event: and again, because those Luminaries are not commissioned with so unlimited a power, and in their strongest conspiracies of insluence can at most but weakly incline or dispose, not at all compel or necessitare; nor are their destinations to ruin, but conserve the world. If therefore Nature, uniting all her divisions of Waters below the Moon, into one great heap, or Abyss, must yet fall very much short of that immane proportion requisite to furnish out the Deluge; and though her stock had been large enough, yet could she not, without apparent destruction of herself, i. e. infringing those fundamental Constitutions, or Elementary Laws, whose constant Tenor only defines her to be Nature, assist to their eruption out of their proper Receptaries, and their preposterous Ascension up hill: truly, I am yet to learn, what can be conceived to remain, but this, that those Decumani Fluctus, those immense Cataracts had both their supply and motion immediately from that high hand, to which nothing that he wills can be difficult. With this Problem, I confess, I have more than once impuzled my reason; yet doth the difficulty sometimes inflame my Curiosity to inquire out the pervestigable part of the miracle: viz. Whence Omnipotence summoned this mighty Syndrome, or Conflux of Waters to appear, at so short a warning, upon the face of the Earth, or in what part of the Universe they were quartered before, and by what ways and means they were drawn off again and voided after the Flood? That eminent Master of the Optics, and excellent Mathematician, Christoph. Scheinerus (in Rosa Vrsina, pag. 693.) discoursing against those who have asserted the Incorruptibility of the Heavens, & quoad parts, & totum, introduceth Ferdinand. Quirinus' de Salazar. a Jesuit, in his Comment upon 27. verse. of the 8. chap. of the Proverbs of Solomon, delivering his opinion derived from others, together with reasons to support it; that there must be a Tehom Rabath, or Abyss of Waters above the Firmament, or betwixt the 8th. sphere and the Shecinah, or dwelling place of God. The Texts of Scripture, upon which this opinion is supported, are (1) the 7. verse. of the 1. Chap. of Genes. where the Author of that book describing the several piles or stories of this great building, saith thus; and God made the Firmament, and divided the Waters which were under the Firmament, from the waters which were above the firmament, etc. (2) that of David (Psalm 33. vers. 7.) he laid up the depth in storehouses. (3) that of the Angel to Esdras (2. ch. 4. vers. 7.) proposing questions to puzzle weak but proud mortality; How many Springs are above the Firmament, or which are the outgoings of Paradise? (4) that expression of the greatest Naturalist, Solomon; and Wisdom saw him set his compass upon the face of the depth (which the Septuagint, plus de sententia, quam de singulis vocibus soliciti, have rendered, aderam cum secerneret sedem super ventos.) (5) that also of the Psalmist (Psal. 104. vers. 3.) who hath laid the beams of his chambers in the Waters. Upon these and the like persuasions many of the most learned Rabbins, and after them not a few of our modern Divines, have concluded; that at the Deluge the Floodgates of this Tehom Rabath, were unlocked, and the waters being showered down in Cataracts upon the earth, swelled the deluge above the mountains. This, indeed, seemed smooth and plausible to my first apprehensions, and promised not only to satisfy, but compensate my former anxious disquisition: but when I had a little recovered my thoughts out of the pleasant surprise of the novelty, and cast about, by what conveyances or Aqueducts the tides of this Supercelestial Ocean might be transmitted through so many Orbs (which not a few great Clerks have affirmed to be Solid) without dislocation of any one, at least without interrupting or confounding their regular Circumvolutions; which happened not, for the stars kept on their Courses, as the retrograde Calculations of their several Periods will soon evince: as also, if they were transfused, what became of them afterward, when the forty days were over? For either they must be returned from whence they came, to replenish that monstrous Vacuity, their absence had made betwixt the 8th. orb, and the Empyreum; or else continue here below, and so perpetuate the Inundation, and so put God to the exigent of making a new supply of Waters above the firmament. When, I say, I had abated the edge of my Credulity with these occurring difficulties, I sadly relapsed into my former incertitude. Not but that I am almost persuaded, from the literal sense of those Texts, that betwixt the Shecinah or paradise of God and his blessed retinue, and the 8th. orb, there is a Tehom Rabath; for I do not see how those places can be otherwise, if rightly, interpreted: but that I cannot yet drive my belief beyond those two objections, and find it more ready to incline to this Conjecture (for 'tis yet gone no farther) of my own; That God miraculously created a sussicient supply of Waters purposely for the Deluge, and afterwards annihilated them again. This I am sure, was as easy to him, as any other Course imaginable; less injurious to and inconsistent with the works of the former Creation; and renders the wonder most familiar to our Comprehension. If it be objected upon me, that God put a period to all Creation after the first Hexameron or six days; I shall defend myself, with the barrel of Meal, and cruse of Oil, that sustained the Widow and her son in the famine of Zarephath; wherein there was a fresh Creation of two several substances, with all their specisical Accidents about them every day; or a transmutation of Aer into Meal and Oil, which was equivalent. And as for the other harsh term of Adnihilation, I say 'tis equally facile to him to reduce any thing to, as to educe it from Nothing. But this might well have been spared, it being my proper business to prove that the Deluge was not Natural; not to digress into a disquisition how or by what cryptick means 'twas supernatural. That the Cessation, or (rather) Intercision of Oracles, was an Atcheivem too difficult for the single arm of Nature; I conceive Article 12. That the Cessation of Pagan Oracles, upon the incarnation of God, was an effect merely supernatural; comprobated uncontrollably, few will dispute, but such ridiculous Ignorants in the Metaphysics of Spirits, or Scale of Creatures, as endeavour to indubitate the very Existence of Evil, Angels, and refuse to be persuaded, that there is any such real Entity▪ as a Devil, without a Demonstration from Sense, and the conviction of an Apparition. But if any shall, the best advice my haste can at this time afford them, is this; that they would wove their long clue of thoughts into this short and plain Dilemma. We must grant, either that that black Prophet, Satan, made a voluntary or spontaneous resignation of his usurped Divinity, at the nativity of the Prince of Peace; and of his own accord grew silent, upon the Advent of the Word of Life: or else, that by a Power infinitely more absolute and sovereign than his own, he was compelled to confess the decay of his tyranny by an Exile from his Altars, and himself strucken with an Aphonia, or Palsy in his double tongue, so that all he could utter, was, that he could no longer speak; for one of these two Propositions must be true. The First cannot; since to make a Voluntary Confession of his Ignorance, Impotency, and subjection, in the face of the World, and especially in those places, where for so many Ages together he had solemnly pretended to Omniscience, Omnipotence, and Supremacy; is wholly repugnant to Satan's Pride: nor would that strong Ambition, which even in the purity of his nature spurred him beyond the ken of his Angelical wisdom, up to an Attempt of the highest impossibility, (viz. to make himself equal to that Essence, which made him what he was) suffer him to proclaim himself to be less, than what he had made himself appear to be in the esteem of his infatuated Votaries. For notwithstanding the hand of Divino Vengeance had hurled him, (like a prodigious Meteor that durst outface the brighter Sun, from which its splendour was desumed) from the highest heaven into the lowest hell; and degraded him from the most glorious order of Creatures to the most vile, accursed and despicable: yet is his stomach as great, as when he aspired to the throne of Unity; nor hath the ignis rotae, or reverberated flames of hell ever since, been able to consume that humour of Competition in him. Witness his several impudent invasions of the prerogative of God, by arrogating to himself the tribute of Divine Adoration from his superior, man; nay even from the Son of God, when yet he more than suspected his Divinity. Besides, as it seems a manifest Contradiction, that the Author of Pride should freely detect his own shame: so also, that the Father of lies should voluntarily broach a Truth, and such a one as once received must openly impeach him of Delusion, and discover his Indivinity; cannot but sound a very great improbability at least. For how unlikely is it, that that sophistical Spirit, whose Tyranny was founded, supported, and continued solely by his cunning promotion of Error, and his subtle workings upon the deceptible Condition of man; should willingly depose himself, dismantle his strongest holds, proclaim the impostures of his Amphibologies, and divulge his ruin, by rectifying the seduced judgements of his greatest Favourites, and declaring a Verity that must disprove all that ever he said before? How dissimilar to Reason, that he who durst adventure upon the highest falsehood in the world, to make himself God: should so far forget the maxims of his black Art, as of his own accord to confess himself to be the basest of Entities, a Devil? How remote from all the ways of persuasion, that he who had boasted himself Ubiquitary, usurped by a counterfeit title the Monarchy of the World, and given out, that the Prescience of Future Events was not only the natural annex of his Omniscience, but the Preordination and disposal of them the adjunct of his Providence: should, without the impulsion of a superior, betray himself chained to utter darkness, to be but a Slave, that there was a settled law of Fate above his control, as in his excuse to Croesus ruined by his amphibology, and that his Providence was at best but Praesagition from the concurrent inclinations of second Causes, nor his Predictions of things to come, other then artificial Conjectures? To conclude, no man, I suppose, will be able to remember any other Instance of the Devil's Fidelity and Veracity (those Confessions of Christ's Divinity, and that in the presence of Truth itself, that he came from compassing the earth in quest of whom he might devour, mentioned in holy Writ, excepted;) or produce one sentence of truth ever spoken by him to his own disadvantage, besides this one; that he was commanded to shut up his Oracles, by a Power, which he could never contradict: And therefore the Second Proposition must be true and evident: viz. that his Oracles were silenced by the immediate hand of that Cause, whose Activity is so far above the Power of either Satan or Nature, taken either singly, or combined together, (for the Former is but a languid Agent, if you deny him the auxiliatory concurrence of the Latter) as Infinitude is above Limitation, Almightiness above Impotency, or Omniscience above Ignorance. Now to me, this process of Argumentation seems so smooth, familiar and customary, and the whole series of Inductions so obvious to a dialectical consideration; that, when I reflect upon the facility of their occurrence to our thoughts, I cannot but extremely wonder, how so many profound and circumspect Philosophers, and those whose threads of life were unraveld in the eager pursuit of knowledge, could refer the cessation of Oracles to Natural necessities, and acquiesce in a confidence of those weak, remote, inconsistent, impertinent and so contemptible reasons, urged by Plutarch, etc. to salve the difficulty of this accident, and serve as a specious Asylum for their puzzled curiosities to retreat to. Lastly, that that generally confessed Eclipse of the Sun, (and, indeed, the only one this great Luminary did ever suffer; since Article 13. That the Eclipse of the Sun, at the death of Christ, was purely Metaphysical, irrefutably demonstrated. we may with more propriety call all others but Partial Interceptions of his light, by the lesser body of the Moon interposed in a strait line to some part of the Terrestrial Globe) which happened at the Death of Christ, was above, nay against the fundamental constitutions of Nature; is manifest from hence, that on the third of April, or Feria sexta, being the Passion day, in the year Aerae Christi nati 33. (which is synchronical to the 78. of the Julian account) the Sun and Moon were then in opposition diametrical, and the Moon herself totally eclipsed in Libra to the Antipodes of Jerusalem: as may be certified to any man that can read the Celestial Ephemerideses backward, i. e. recalculate the periodical Conjunctions and Oppositions of those two great Lights of heaven, by the Tables of Astronomy. For those Characters of time being punctually restrained to set & certain periods, the Astronomer may as easily attain to the minute of any eclipse in praeterito, as to the prescience of any in futuro; provided that his Hypothesis be sound, and his Schemes erected with exactness correspondent: nay such is the certitude of this rule, as to the strict decision of time, that though the Astronomer may chance to learn of the Historian, that there hath been an eclipse; yet for the determination of its precise time & place, history must go to school to Astronomy, as Scaliger (de Emendat. tempor.) hath observed to our hands. Thus when Eusebius and Dio had recorded an Eclipse of the Sun to have fall'n out a little before the death of Augustus, and so to have been a kind of prodigy portending the fall of so bright a Star; the Astronomers coming after to examine the synchronisme, by their retrograde calculations, found the Historians in a double error: that Eclipse being not of the Sun, but the Moon; and not preceding, but succeeding his funerals. To assure the miracle yet nearer, let us look back to the Elements of Astronomy. The Eclipse of the Moon is caused by the Intervention (for so 'tis according to the most probable Hypothesis of Copernicus) of the opac body of the earth, between her and the original of her light, the Sun; and the Eclipse of the Sun, by the interposition of the Moon betwixt him and the earth: and therefore the Sun cannot be eclipsed, but when he is in Conjunction with the Moon; nor the Moon, but when she is in opposition to the Sun. Yet notwithstanding doth not every monthly conjunction and opposition of these two lights produce an eclipse to one of the two; but only that Conjunction and Opposition which is Diametrical: i. e. when the Central point of the Sun faceth the Central point of the Moon, and that again confronteth the centre of the earth, so directly, that an arrow shot in a straight line from the circumference of the Sun through its Centre, would also perpendicularly transfix the Centres of the other two orbs. And this falls out only when the Moons Eccentrick transecteth the Suns, in that line, which is for that reason called the Ecliptic; nor this in more than two points, called by Ptolemy, the Nodi, or knots, and by the Arabians, the Head and Tail of the Dragon. Again, these Intersections are not constant to one certain point, or place, but circumgyrated by a slow motion, make a circle of 18 years complete; and therefore every 18th year the Moon must be eclipsed in the same degree of the same sign in the Zodiac, infallibly to the end of the world: which is the rule by which every common Almanac maker doth calculate his predictions of Lunar Eclipses. Now this being excogitated, and the eclipses retrived back as high as the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or foot of the Julian compute, by revolving the leaves of the Celestial Volume; we discover that the Moon indeed, was naturally eclipsed on the self same day, whereon the Sun prodigiously suffered together with its Author, in the 2 deg. of Libra, the opacity beginning to the horizon of Jerusalem some few minutes before six in the evening: so that the Sun was no sooner set in the West, but the Moon appeared in the East deprived of more than half her light; the Calculation and figure of which Lunar eclipse, are largely set down by Sethus Calvisius, to the 3 of April, in the 33 year of the Nativity, under Tiberius Caesar, and by Henricus Buntingius, in Chronologiae Catholic. fol. 337. And thereupon we may safely conclude, that the Defection of the Moon, on the Passion day, being merely Natural; that of the Sun on the same day must be Supernatural; it being impossible for the Moon to keep two different stations, or to possess those two opposite points of heaven, which define the Conjunction and Opposition, at one and the same time. This S. Aug. (3. de Civit. Dei cap. 15.) had respect unto, when he said; Quam solis obscurationem, non ex canonico syderum cursu accidisse ostenditur, quod tunc erat Pascha judaeorum. 'twas a Dismal day that same, though the King of Terrors was then vanquished; for Darkness was not only upon, but under the earth, the miraculous obscuration of the Sun in our Hemisphere, of necessity causing a defection of the Moon in the subterraneous one, and so making it more than midnight to the Antipodes: and a second natural eclipse of the Moon succeeding within six hours after; nay, more than all this, Saturn (the signifier of blackness) aggravated this horrid opacity, for at the same time rising from the Horoscope, he beheld both eclipfes in a square malignant aspect. But though this eclipse was Unnatural to the Sun, per 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: yet 'twas purely Natural per 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, it being requisite, nay necessary for a stream or reflex of Light to suffer a defection, when the Fountain of Light was under a cloud; proper for the Creature to sympathise with the Creator. And therefore, though 'twas a miracle, yet 'twas no wonder. The wonder was in the reverse part of the accident; that the most glorious Sun of Righteousness should suffer a dark and unnatural eclipse, to expiate our deeds of darkness. Nor was that a wonder neither, now I think on't; for 'twas the natural effect of his infinite love to mankind. And this, I presume, the most stubborn and prejudicated Atheist Article 14. The Adequation of all to the verification of the Authors third Position. will admit, as evidence both strong and clear enough, to evince the verity of our Minor Proposition; viz. that God hath, in times prelapsed, frequently manifested his prerogative of causing effects not only superior, but also contradictory to the ordinary and established Laws of Nature, his ordinary instrument, when such effects seemed either necessary, or expedient to his Providence: and therefore our Conclusion, viz. that his arm is not shortened, and he can do the like in the future, upon any occasional emergency designed by his secret counsel; comes not much short of perfectly Apodictical. SECT. VI WE have now brought ourselves to the last Objection urged Article 1. Lucretius his blasphemy, that man's ignorance of the energy of Natural Causes, is the sole basis of the opinion of an Universal Providence. against Universal Providence; namely, the unequal distribution of good and evil, or the frequent occurrence of events which carry too much appearance of Temerity, to be interpreted the mature designs of an infinite Wisdom; and seem too obliqne and deflecting towards Partiality, to stand in a right line with the hand of divine justice, which must be conceived to discriminate betwixt the Pious and Impious in the Consignation of Happiness and Misery, and accordingly to distribute its benefits in some proportion to the merits, at least the worthy susceptibility of the receivers: this is a member belonging to another head, and falls more properly under the contents of our next Chapter, of the Special or Particular Providence of God; and therefore we shall thither transfer the plenary refutation thereof, making it the subject of this last section, to blow off those light and cobweb scruples, that were spun by that Spider, Lucretius, when he composed these verses to alienate men's minds from the fear of an Universal Moderator. Caetera, quae fieri in terris, coeloque tuentur Mortales, pavidis quom pendent mentibu'saepe, Efficiunt animos humileis formidine diuûm, Depressosque premunt ad terram; proptereà quod Ignorantia caussarum conferre deorum Cogit ad imperium res, & concedere regnum, & Quorum operum causas nulla ratione videre Possunt; haec sieri divino Numine rentur, etc. lib. SIXPENCES. Those bugbear Meteors, which the timorous eyes Of pavid Mortals wonder at i'th' skies; And those unfrequent Prodigies, that appear, On earth (while their weak souls are fooled by Fear) Are the sole charms, that emasculate, And cheat men's minds to a belief of Fate, And some vindictive Numen. For, because Men understand not Nature's cryptick Laws, Nor her occult Efficiency; they fly, (To salve their ignorance) to Divinity: And idly rest in this; what ere befall, 'twas caused by Providence, that disposeth all. The Redargution. True it is, indeed, nor will any thing but ignorance deny that Article 2. The redargution thereof. Physiology, or the speculation of Natural Causes hath a power to raise the mind of man to a generous height, from whence it may securely, and without that vertigo or giddiness, which usually turns the brains of the multitude, behold the most prodigious meteors; and look in the threatening face of Lightning without growing pale, while those that stand below become convulst with needless horror, and are ready to be shaken to dust with superstitious fear. True it is also, as Lucretius would have it, that 'tis unworthy the constancy and settled courage of a Philosopher, when he sees a bearded comet, hears a loud crack of Thunder, or feels the earth unhinged (all which Natural events common eyes gaze upon as horrid Portents, and dangerous agonies of Nature) instantly to forget his Principles, and run to consult with the superstitious books of the Etrurians, and other pusillanimous Comments on those pageants, or necessary Phaenomenas', whose Causalities are established, and their precise contingencies presageable by the easy prognostics of meteorology. But however, though this aught to prevent our fears: yet it cannot be extended to the extinction of our devotion. Though it may commend our knowledge, to smile when the heaven's frown: yet it more commends it, if we look above them, and through those visible operations of Nature discover that invisible cause, that made, conserveses, and regulates her. Though it demonstrate our skill in Physics, to stand unmoved, when the ground trembles: yet will it detect our ignorance in the Metaphysics, not to fall prostrate in an humble reverence to that awful majesty, that stretched out the North over the empty place, and hanged the earth upon nothing. And though it be an honour to our Reason, to explore the Abstrusities of Nature, and readily refer her most admirable effects to their proper efficients: yet, at the same time, not to confess that omnipotent Agent, which is the soul of all energy; and the highest link in the Chain of Causes; dishonours it even to the most odious shame of Atheism, which is the greatest ignorance. Nor is it Religion that makes men Cowards; for the best way Article 3. Magnanimity the proper effect of Religion. to harden the Spirit of man, is first to soften it with the Fear of God: and the noblest Tincture of magnanimity is extracted out of an humble apprehension, and fiduciary acknowledgement of an all observant Deity. This the wise Father well understood, when refuting that impious error of the Poet, Primus in orbe Deos secit timor, he writ this golden Aphorism; Qui Deum non agnosci●, is non Dominum excutit superbum, sed aversatur optimum Parentem; cujus respectu Animus sit non formidine humilis; sed reverentia fiduci●e plenus. Again, when we ascribe the Monarchy of the World to one supreme Cause, we do not derogate a jot from the Power of second Article 4. The opinion of a General Providence, consistent with Physiology. Causes; but rather confirm and subscribe the Charter of their deputations: since we thereby infer an assurance, that those Causes are really such as he was pleased to constitute them, that their activities are but emavations of his omnipotence; and their effects the appointments of his Wisdom. And upon this meditation is it, that when we observe unfrequent wildfires in the Clouds, shaggy Meteors in the acr, Trepidations in the earth, and other the like admirable effects resulting from the concourse and conspiracy of potent Natural agents; we do not instantly quench our wonder and check our curiosity, by ascribing the production of them to God, so as if he were the sole and immediate Author of them, and that no other Natural Cause intervened betwixt his Volition and their Contingency: but by supposing him to be the First and General Cause aswell of that particular one, as of all others in the World; and that besides the First there is required a Second Particular one, whose indagation will fully compensate the sweat and oil of our study, and which we must not deny, though we cannot discover, but acknowledge it to be ae Natural one, however to obscure for the invention of our perspicacity. To conclude, out of this one Fountain may be derived streams Article 5. Lucretius his scruples concerning the seemingly temerarious effects of the Thunderbolt; singularly resolved. enough to rinse away all those feculent Scruples, which the polluted wit of Lucretius hath scraped off the Thunderbolt, to obstruct the current of Providence. For the Principles of that affrighting Meteor are comprehended under that series of Natural Causes which God permits to act their appointed parts, on the theatre of this sublunary Globe; nor doth he force them from the ordinary road of their essential and proper Activities, upon any extra ordinary or new way of violence: and therefore 'tis as natural an event if this Granado of the clouds fall on the head of an Innocent, as if it fell on the head of the most guilty person; as regular for it to strike the sacred batlements of a Temple, as to light upon an unhallowed roof; and as consonant to the rules of its projection or explosion, to be shot point blank at any mark on land, as to be discharged at random on the Sea. But here some have, by way of objection, enquired; Why did not God, that he might leave nothing to Chance, at his first institution of the Laws of Nature, ordain such a series of Causes, both for the Generation and Explosion of the Thunderbolt, and limit their operations to such a certainty of events, as that it should never come to pass, that this Fireball should destroy the Good, and miss the Impious? This itch of ignorant, and therefore bold, curiosity may easily be mortified by applying this euporiston or obvious solution; that the ends or designs of Particular Providence, in these or the like occurrences, are full of Prudence, as to the intention of God; though full of obscurity, as to the investigation of our unequal Understandings: and therefore for us, when we cannot find out these imperceptible ends, therefore to conclude that those Accidents, are mere accidents, and have no ends at all; is not to palliate, but aggravate our ignorance, since 'tis a rash and open delusion of the judgement of man, to presume that he is acquainted with the secret Counsels of God; a madness beyond the severity of Bethlem, for mortality to pretend ability to read those Arcana Imperii, or mystical decrees of Fate, written in invisible Hieroglyphics, which are to hard for the intuition of Angels. CHAP. V The especial Providence of God Demonstrated. SECT. I. HAving sailed over the immense Ocean of God's General Article 1. The introduction, intimating the near cognation betwixt this present, and the precedent Theme: and the necessity of the Author's beginning at the Atheists Objections. Providence, by the direction of our own congenial Cynosure, the Light of Nature; our next voyage ought to be up the channel of his Particular or Special: which being the golden River, that constantly environs the Microcosm, or Isle of Man, and imports all the advantages and mutations of Happiness and Misery, that occur to humanity during the trade of life; is that point we have thus long coasted about to discover. But before we put into the mouth of this Euphrates Ab 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, quod agrum laetum foecundumque reddat. , we conceive it necessary first to sound, and send out our Pilot Reason, to detect those Shelves and Rocks cast up by the common Adversary of mankind; upon which many weak vessels have foundered, sprung dangerous leaks of Atheism, and so sunk down right into that Barathrum of sorrow, which knows no exhaustion, and admits of no regression. The First of those, we find to be that contraprovidential Argument of that Secretary of Hell, Epicurus; Quod beatum est, Article 2. The first objection, desumed from the Apathy of the Divine Nature. ac immortal, id neque ira, neque gratia tangi: that those Passions of Anger and Love are inconsistent with the constant and immutable condition of that Nature, whose simple essence is compounded of Immortality and Beatitude; and therefore, as Business and Cares must destroy the Tranquillity, so the affections of Indignation and Placability must subvert the Constancy, or eternal Sameness of divinity; and upon inference, that neither our most servant Impieties can accend, nor our penitential Tears extinguish the Wrath of God. That this poisonous Grape grew upon that wild Vine, Epicurus Article 3. The same excogitated by Epicurus: and promoted by Lucretius. (that we may not seem to belie the Devil) is not only colligible from its stinking odour, and assinity of taste, that it bears to that detestable design of his (in Epist. ad Herodotum) to erase out of the mind of man all the impressions of Religion, by the induction of a belief, that God doth not observe the good and evil actions of men, in this life, and by consequence shall not compensate them with Felicity, or misery, after death: but manifest upon the asseveration of three judicious and conscientious witnesses, Seneca, Cicero, and Lactantius. For the First chargeth it upon him in these words; (4. de Benefic. 4.) Deus, inquit Epicurus, nihil agit, nec magis illum beneficia, quam injuriae tangunt: The Second in these; Dii, inquit Epicurus, neque propitii cuiquam esse solent, neque irati, (3. de Nat. Deor.) the Third, in these; De schola Epicuri est, sicut iram in Deo non esse, it a nec gratiam quidem; nam cum putat Epicurus, alienum esse à Deo malum facere, at que nocere, quod ex affectu iracundiae plerumque nascitur, ademit ei etiam beneficentiam, quoniam videbat consequens esse, ut si iram habeat Deus, habeat & gratiam. Itaque ne vitium concederet, etiam virtutis fecit expert●m. Which argument his disciple Lucretius (who, as Theseus, scorned to forsake his Master, though he led him into hell) hath contracted into this Tristich: Nam privata dolore omni, privata periclis, Ipsa suis pollens opibus, nihil indiga nostri, Nec bene promeritis capitur, neque tangitur ira. Th' Immortal Nature, placed above the sense Of sorrow, danger, and all indigence, Rich in its own Perfections; neither can Smile at the Good, nor frown att'h Ill of Man. The import of all which amounts to no higher a sum of reason, then only this; that the Supreme Nature, being wholly employed in a blissful vacancy, and entirely taken up with the superlatively-pleasant contemplation of its own excellencies, hath cast the rains upon our own necks, committed the managery of all our affairs to our own providence, and hears neither the clamours of our profane impieties, nor the sighs of our supplications, but stands as unconcerned in, so unregardant of all our actions. Sic enim sese res habet, ut ad prosperam, adversamve fort unam qualis sis, aut quemadmodum vixeris, nihil intersit; as Cotta, personated by Cicero (3. de Nat. Deor.) or as Caesar in Lucan, — Nunquam se cur a Deorum Sic premit, ut vestrae vitae, vestraeque saluti Fata vacent— The Gods are never subject to a Care; Nor do the Fates look how you Mortals far. The Second, objected frequently against the Stoics, by the Academics, as that incomparable Atheomastix, Lactantius, Article 4. The second objection, extorted from mant being obnoxious to the hostility of many other Nature. hath observed (de ira Dei, cap. 13.) is this; Cur, si Deus omnia hominum caussâ fecerit, etiam multa contraria, & inimica, & pestifera nobis reperiantur, tam in mari, quam in terra? If man be the chief object of God's love, and his welfare the grand intention of his Providence; why then did he create so many powerful and malicious enemies against him, in all elements, and still expose him to encounter more dangers than his days, nay then his hairs can number? If God be an indulgent Father, how dares Nature prove herself so cruel a Stepmother to man? If his Creator intended him for a Favourite, and made him the centre in which all the lines of his blessings should convene to make up a full and constant felicity; how comes it to pass, that the vilest of Creatures insult over him, and make him the point at which all their darts of hostility are leveled, so that his life is made a full and constant infelicity? The Last, and indeed the most dangerous rock, against which innumerable numbers not only of unhappy Ethnics, that wanted Article 5. The last objection, of the Adversity of the Pious and Prosperity of the Imptous, in this life. the Compass of true Religion, and so were forced to steer by the imperfect Chart of their own natural judgement; but also of Christians, who had the inestimable advantage of the Scriptures (the only Loadstone that never deflects from the point or unity of truth) have suffered shipwreck; is this: The calamitous condition of the Virtuous, and the prosperous estate of the Vicious, in this life. The most full and accurate description of this Scylla we can meet with amongst many of those venerable Fathers, who with as much profound learning, as strenuous industry, have attempted the remove of it; is given us by Lactantius (lib. 3. cap. 17.) in these words: Videbat Epicurus bonis adversa semper accidere, paupertatem, labores, exilia, carorum amissiones: malos contrà beatos esse, augeri potentia, honoribus affici. Videbat innocentiam minus tutam, scelera impune committi. Videbat sine delectu morum, sine ordine, ac discrimine annorum, saevire mortem: sed alios ad senectutem pervenire, alios infantes rapi, alios jam robustos interire, alios in primo adolescentiae flore immaturis funeribus extingui. In bellis potius meliores & vinci, & perire, maxim autem commovebat, homines imprimis religiosos malis affici; iis autem, qui aut Deos omninò negligerent, aut minus piè colerent, vel minora incommoda evenire, vel nulla. To the observation of Epicurus it appeared, that unjust Fortune, not the discriminating hand of Divine Providence, had the dispensation of Happiness and Misery: for Adversity is the common cognizance of Honesty, and poverty, uncessant and unsuccesful labours, banishment, loss of friends, and the like doleful accidents are always in the lots of Good men: but on the contrary, Prosperity is frequently the pathognomonick of Villainy, and increase of power, accumulation of honours, and other blandishments of fortune are the portion of Wicked men. That the ready way to danger, was to be innocent; and to be extremely nefarious the only hopeful means to attain impunity. That death, like an inconsiderate Tyrant, spares none upon the exceptions of age, sex, dignities, or merits; but, raging in an arbitrary way of cruelty, suffers some to unravel their clue of life to the last minute of old age, while he cuts off the threads of others more hopeful in the first rundle of infancy. That he extinguisheth the vital lamp of some, in their brightest and strongest lustre; of others before they are well and throughly kindled; and permits others to shine till they have consumed their last drop of oil. That the sword of war both conquers and cuts off the most noble and valiant heads: while the degenerous and cowardly escape unwounded. And, what with the greatest violence swayed him from the belief of Particular Providence, that the most religious had, for the most part, the most afflictions; but those, who either contemned, or neglected, or but coldly affected the worship of the Gods, had either less & lighter misfortunes, or none at all. Nor did the impiety of Epicurus rest here, but, as if this objection, though fine enough to entangle the fancies of vulgar slies, were yet too loosely woven to ensnare the judgements of more decisive and penetrating heads; proceeds to reduce it to more closeness and strength, by superadding these sophistical knots. Aut Deus vult tollere mala, & non potest; aut potest, & non vult; aut neque vult, neque potest; aut & vult, & potest. Si vult, & non potest, imbecillis est, ideoque non Deus; si potest, & non vult, invidus est, quod aeque alienum à Deo; si neque vult, neque potest, & invidus & imbecillis est, ideoque neque Deus; si vult & potest, quodsolum Deo convenit, unde ergo mala? aut cur illa non tollit? Either God is willing to amove those evils from good men, but cannot; or can, and will not; or neither can, nor will; or both will and can. If he hath a will, but not a power, then is he impotent, and so no God. If he hath a power, but not a will, then is he malevolent and envious, and so no God: for malice and weakness are equally incompetent to the divine Nature. If he want both will and Power, then is he both malevolent and impotent; and by consequence no God. If he want neither, as he must not if he be God: whence come those evils? or why doth he not amove them? And too far did this design of his succeed; for the contagion Article 6. The sporadical diffusion thereof upon Ethnics, Hebrews and Christians: and the probability of their opinion, who hold the book of Job, to be a Treatise concerning the same subject, insinuated, of this pestiferous error became so Epidemical, as that it diffused itself not only upon his school, and there corrupted the brains of Philosophers; but dilated even to the infection of the more remote and grosser minds of Women and Poets (both which Imitation makes easily subject to any impression of falsehood) that lived many ages after him. For Women, witness that relation, assured by the records of Atheneus (lib. 13.) of one Danae, daughter to Leontius of the Epicurean sect; who being on her way towards the place appointed for her execution, in the bitterness of her spirit, ejaculated this desperate blasphemy: Non injuriâ Deos à multis contemni; nam quodmeum maritum servavi, hanc mihi gratiam rependunt Dii; Laodice autem, quod maritum suum interfecerit, maximo in honore est. With very good reason are the Gods contemned by many; for that I have faithfully preserved my husband from an immature death, do the Gods thus ungratefully gratify me with this my own unjust and violent one: but Laodice, because she hath perfidiously destroyed hers, doth now live, slourish, and hath her guilty head encircled with a wreath of the most refulgent honours. Whether the crime, for which she was sentenced, might deserve so severe a doom, as death; I dare not determine, our Author being not positive, nor open in that particular: but this I am sure of, that she suffered justly; and therefore though I cannot acquit her judges, I may her Executioners. For Poets, witness that confession of Ovid. Cum rapiant mala Fata bonos, ignoscite fasso, Solicitor nullos esse putare Deos. When I see Good men by ill Fates to fall, (Forgiveed) I think there are no Gods at all. Nay the sober Claudian professeth, that the Felicity of the most impious and unjust, and the smart Afflictions of the Pious and just persons, here on earth, had often staggered his confidence of Divine Providence, and more than inclined him to become an Apostate from all Religion, and declare himself on the side of Epicurus. Saepe mihi dubiam traxit sententia mentem, Lib. 1. in Rufinum, subinit. Curarent superi terras; an nullus inesset Rector, & incerto fluerent mortalia casu? Sedcum res hominum tanta caligine volvi Adspicerem, laetosque diu florere nocentes, Vexarique pios: rursus labefacta cadebat Religio, causaeque viam non sponte sequebar Alterius vacuo quae currere semina motu Adsirmat, magnumque novas per I nane figuras Fortuna, non arte regi, quae Numina sensu Ambiguo vel nulla putat, vel nescia nostri. Oft hath my dubious mind seemed well assured, That Gods above th' affairs on earth procured; That one wise Rector all events did guide; Nor Good, nor Ill from Fortune's wheel could slide. But when I saw the Chaos of men's Fates, The Guilty slourish long in smooth estates, And Innocence afflicted; was the heart Of my Religion stabbed, forced to take part With the adverse opinion: which concludes That an immense Vacuity includes The Principles of all; in that vast range Fortune, not Art, doth their old Figures change; Gods there are none, or such as do not know What parts self-ruling Mortals act below. Concerning this eminent Poet, Claudian, there hath been old hacking and slashing among Antiquaries, whether he lived in the owl light of Paganism, or the illuminating day of Christianisme; St. Augustine, P. Orosius, and Paul the Diacon (the two former whereof flourished not long after he was withered) describing him to be à Christi nomine alienus, and paganus pervicacissimus; and Franc. Petrarcha and Landinus having adopted him for a Proselyte, and affirming himself to be not only Christianae pietati addictus, but also to have been the composer of this devout Epigram: Christ potens rerum, redeuntis conditor aevi, Vox summi, sensusque Dei: quem fundit ab alta Mente Pater, etc. But if he were a Christian, yet could he not want the excuse of very holy Precedents even of that profession, who had frequently stumbled at the same stone. For the Royal Hebrew, whose Muse was the Holy Ghost, though a man after Gods own heart, a Christian by the baptism of his prophetic faith, and one who had frequently instructed his harp to echo forth Panegyrics of the special Providence of the great preserver of men; had yet his confidence sometimes damned, and judgement eclipsed by the same fog of error, exhaled from his experience of the prosperity of Libertines. Nor was the shock of this temptation easily withstood by so strong a Champion; for it made him reel again, as he thus confesseth: My feet were almost gone, my steps had well-nigh slipped. For I was envious at the prosperity of the wicked. They are not in trouble, neither are they plagued like other men. Their eyes stand out with fatness: they have more than their heart could wish. They are corrupt, and speak wickedly concerning oppression: they speak loftily. They set their mouth against the heavens: and their tongue walketh through the earth. Behold, these are the ungodly, who prosper in the world: they increase in riches. Verily, I have cleansed my heart in vain: and washed my hands in innocency. For all the day long have I been plagued, and chastened every morning, etc. (Psalm. 73.) To which we may annex that blunt and emphatical lesson of Jesus ben Syrach (Ecclesiastic. 2.) My son, if thou come to serve the Lord, prepare thy soul for temptation: the concernment of which every man understands to be this: The more righteous, the more afflicted. Here also is a convenient place for their opinion, who affirm the Book of Job to have been intended as no history (though they conced him to have been no feigned person, from Ezek. 14. 14. and James 5. 2. but a real example of both Fortunes, in an exceeding measure) but a grave Treatise concerning this subject, viz. the prosperity of the impious, and constant adversity of the pious, comprehending the arguments of both the Opponent and Defendant of Divine Providence. Which is grounded upon strong probability, since, as St. jerom hath observed and attested, in the original Hebrew, from the beginning of the book to the 3 verse of the 3 chapter, where the complaint of job gins, all is written in Prose, and thenceforward, during the whole dispute, to the 6th. verse of the last chapter all in Hexameter verse, where the composer again let lose his pen into prose, whereby it is manifest that the Prose was destined for a Prologue and an Epilogue to the contest in verse. Now every man knows the sorrows and sickness of job to have been too intense and urgent, to endure the calm and leisure requiring humour of Poetry either in himself or his friends: and therefore must the book be composed by some Person not molested with either of those two impediments, but of serene thoughts, and acquainted with the ancient custom of disposing their Moral Philosophy into verse. And there are instances enough to illustrate both the contumacy and large diffusion of this objection. I might have said more then enough; the strongest and most military Faith among us, though assisted by the most evident and firm reason, being hardly able justly to boast an absolute conquest of, and constant immunity from the sharp clandestine assaults of the same scruple: and so no man needing other example to evince the frequent prevalency of it, but what his retired meditations may find alleged in the inventory of his own frailties, lapses, and temptations; (all which are punctually and orderly registered by that recorder of his soul, which the Divine calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or Conscience) especially in these evil times, wherein Piety, Wisdom, justice, Temperance, Fortitude, Innocence, and all other Graces and Virtues are deposed, and only their Contrarics advanced; in a word, wherein nothing can make a man temporally miserable, but the severe profession of Goodness. SECT. II. THat God extends the right hand of his Providence upon the Article 1. That man is the sole object of God's special Providence, argued from hence; that he is the principal object of his (●xtrins●cal) 〈◊〉: and that inferred ●●om hence, (1) that God hath impressed upon the mind of man a greater knowledge of his Divinity, then upon any other Creature, Angels only excluded: (2) that man is only qualisied to speculate, admire, and laud the pulchritude of Nature. head of man (the Heir of all his blessings, though the youngest of his Creatures) ordering the occurrences of his life, nay the manner and moment of his death, by a paternal and special care, more excellent than that whereby he is pleased to regulate and dispose the operations of all other Entities in the Republic of the World; is amply manifest from hence, Quod majorem sui hominibus, quam caeteris rebus not itiam impressit, that he hath impressed upon the mind of man a knowledge of his Divinity more clear and distinct, then upon any created natures beside, Angelical and intuitively intellectual spirits only excepted. For though all the works of God carry, in the front of their distinct Forms, some certain Signatures or Characters, that undeniably attest their Creation by an Efficient infinite in Power and Wisdom; and in that respect may be properly enough said, to show forth the glory of their Maker: and though all Animals do, by a kind of tacit homage, confess their origination from, and constant dependence on one Eternal and Omnipotent Cause; yet are they induced, excited, or rather impelled thereunto, instinctu solum quodam caeco, only by a blind and confused instinct, of which themselves have no possible notion. But as for the Favourite, man, he holds a clear and distinct idea of the Nature of God, as hath formerly been demonstrated; and hath therefore a Logical, assured, and express cognition of his Creator and Conservator, and that so radically united, or identified to his essence, that it can be no Paradox to aver, that this science is part of his soul, though that be a simple, pure, homogeneal, and so indivisible substance: nay some modern Enquirers into the nature of the soul, have described it to be, Actus simplex Cognitionis omnium, quae cognosci possint, a simple Act, or present Cognition of all things intelligible, i. e. of God, and consequently, 'tis not in the power of the most desperate and obdurate Atheist, to erase this idea out of his mind, no more then to change, meliorate, or annihilate his essence, or prevent the stroke of Death. Now, what could be the Motive, that induced God to ennoble man by the prerogative of this excellent Idea, or representation of himself, other than the reflex act of his own infinite Goodness; which in the language of mortality, is Free Love, that flowed in a fuller and richer stream upon man, then upon all the World beside? And what can be the End of this implantate and coessential Knowledge in man, other than this; that he should constantly contemplate, admire, and laud the Perfections of the Donor thereof, and more particularly that concerned Attribute, which moved him to the free Donation, namely his immense Beneficence? This being conceded, it remains a plain and perpendicular Inference; that since between God and man there is a greater relation, or Communion (so the learned Gassendus calls it, in Animadvers. in lib. 10. Diogen. Laert: de physiolog. Epicuri. pag. 744.) then betwixt God and any other of his Creatures: therefore also must there be a greater measure of Providence in God for man, then for any other; it being necessary that the Providence of God should hold exact proportion, and be aequilibrated to his Love. This necessity of a parity or aequipondium betwixt Love and Providence Divine, may be conveniently exemplified in ourselves; for by how much the more we love our Friends, Wives or Children, by so much the more careful and provident are we for their conservation and welfare. Again, our own Experience is both argument and testimony sufficient, that the perscrutation of the mysteries of Nature, and the contemplation of sublime and celestial objects, is proper only to man; no other Animal being constituted in a capacity to rival him in those noble operations. And if so, undoubtedly he must violently stisle though conviction of his experience in this particular, who dares deny, that those heavenly beauties, and all the pieces of Nature beside were created principally for the use of man, insomuch as man was created principally to declare the Glory of the Creator. Ad quid enim tantus decor universi, nisi esset homo, qui consideraret, ips●que perspecto hymnum Authori caneret? 'tis an Axiom of constant Verity, that Nature makes nothing in vain; and this rule, doubtless, she learned from that Wisdom, which determineth all its actions to certain, adequate, and proper Ends: now we must grant, either that God adorned the Universe with such exquisite pulchritude, and admirable embellishment of Art, to no purpose at all; and so was more vain and improvident than his instrument, Nature: or else, that he conferred that elegancy and amiable decorament upon it, to this end, that the curious Cogitations of man might be entertained, exercised, and delighted in the speculation and admiration thereof, and through that maze of pleasant wonder be conducted to the true Elysium, the contemplation of the Fountain of Pulchritude, and entelechia of Excellencies, God. For there is no medium between these two Contraries, nor any hope of evading the rigour of this Dilemma, upon pretence of neutrality: since God had no other end, wherefore he beautified the World, but his own Glory in chief, and the excitement of the Admiration and Magnificat of man, as subservient thereunto; nor doth the World contain any other Nature, but Man, that is qualified with Faculties requisite to the satisfaction of that end. Quis enim aliquam aliam unquam invenit naturam, quae aedificium hoc tantum conspiciens, in Architecti sapientissimi admirationem perinde rapiatur? We well know, that Relatives (secundum esse) positively necessitate the existence each of other; and therefore to allow (what cannot be disallowed, but by incurring a more dangerous absurdity) that God made, and exhibited the Beauty of the World, tanquam admirandum spectaculum, as a spectacle that cannot but excite Admiration in the speculator; and yet to deny that he provided a fit and respective spectator, such whose Sense should transmit the idea of that Pulchritude to the judicature of a higher Faculty, and that again be thereby impregnated with Admiration (which is nothing but our Reasons being at a stand at the novelty or excellence of an object occurring to our sense; for what is either frequent, or manifest to our cognition, we never admire: and that's the cause, why this Affection of the mind as it is the first of Passions, so it is the only one that wants a Contrary, as the unimitable Des Cartes hath discovered to us, in lib. de passion. part. 1. articls. 54.) is not only an impious derogation to the wisdom of God, but also a manifest Contradiction to our own reason, which from the existence of the Relatum, a spectacle, immediately concludes the necessary existence of the Correlatnm, a spectator. And that this Spectator can be no other Animal, but man; is too bright a truth to need any other illustration, but what is reflected from itself. To which Argument, of the Creator's adopting man to be his Darling and intimate Favourite, the Logic of every man may superadd many others of equivalent importance, drawn from the consideration of those Praeeminences and Praerogatives, wherewith his Munificence hath been pleased to ennoble his nature, and exalt him to a nearer Cognation or Affinity to his own glorious Essence, than any other Creature in the Universe; as the excellent contexture and majestic Figure of his Body; the semidivine Faculties of his Soul; his Monarchy, domination, or royalty over all other sublunary natures, Omnia enim sibi submittit, dum omnia quae in mundo sunt, vel ad usus vitae necessarios refert, vel ad varia genera voluptatum; and lastly that inestimable propriety, the Immortality of his Soul. Now to direct all this to the mark; since God hath thus proclaimed Man to be, next to his own Glory (which is the last of Ends, as his Will is the first of Causes) the grand and principal scope of his mighty work of Creation; and that he made all things, in order to his accommodation and well-being in this life, and allurement, nay manuduction or conduct to immarcescible beatitude after Death: and since his Act of Providence, or the constant Conservation of all things, in the primitive perfection, distinction and order of their Natures, is nothing but his act of Creation prolonged, or spun out through all the independent Atoms, or successive particles of time, as hath been more than once intimated; beyond all dispute, the Product must be the same with our Thesis, viz. That Man is the object of God's special Providence, and by consequence, that all occurrences of his life are punctually predetermined, ordered, and brought to pass by the same. As every man brings into the World with him a certain Prolepticall, or Anticipated Cognition of a Deity, or First Cause Article 2. That the soul of man contains a proleptical notion of God's special Providence. of all things, deeply and indelebly stamped upon his mind; as hath been formerly demonstrated: so also holds he, as an Adjunct, or rather a part thereof, a coessential Prenotion, that this First Cause, or Supreme Nature, is the Fountain from whence those two different streams of Happiness and Misery, or Good and Evil, the former by Condonation, the other by Permission, are constantly derived: and upon consequence, that all Occurrences of his life, are the just and prudent Designations of its special Providence. That every man, in whom the Light of Nature is not damned by Fatuity, either native and temperamental, or casually supervenient, hath this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or impress of an especial Providence, decreeing and disposing all events, that have, do, or shall befall him; is manifest from hence, that no man, though educated in the wildest ignorance, or highest barbarism imaginable, but was naturally, and by the advisoes of his intestine Dictator, inclined either to conceive, or embrace some kind of Religion, as an homage or fealty due from him to that Supreme Power, in whose hands he apprehended the rains of Good and Evil to be held, and whose favour and benign aspect he thought procurable, and anger attoneable by the seasonable addresses of Invocation and Sacrifice. And in truth, to him, whose meditations shall sink deep enough, it will soon appear, that this Anticipation is the very root of Article 3. That this proleptical notion is the basis of Religion. Religion; for though man stood fully persuaded of the Existence of God, yet would not that alone be argument sufficient to convince him into the necessity of a devout Adoration of him, unless his mind were also possessed with a firm belief of this proper Attribute of his Nature, which so nearly concerns his felicity or infelicity, viz. his special Providence, which regulates all the affairs, and appoints all the Contingencies of every individual man's life. For 'tis the sense of our own Defects, Imperfections, and Dependency, that first leads us to the knowledge of his All sufficiency, Perfections, and Self-subsistence; the apprehension of our Necessities, is the school wherein we first learned our Orisons, and the hope of obtaining Blessings from his immense Bounty, is both the excitement and encouragement of our Devotion: and therefore the Devil spoke profoundly and to the purpose, in his expostulation with God concerning the cause of jobs integrity, Doth job serve God for nought? This being duly prepended, I hope I shall not offend Theology, if I affirm, that since to love God aright, is to love him purely and solely because he is God, i. e. all that's truly Good and Amiable; 'tis impossible for the soul of man, in this life, to love God as she ought to do: because impossible for her, before her refinement by Glorification, so to cast off all self-interest, as to love him without reflections upon herself, i. e. without the hopes of being made eternally happy by that love. If this reason bear not out my paradox, I dare any man to the bar of Experience, and boldly appeal to the Conscience of any the most mortified Christian, whether in his most pure, abstracted, and holy raptures of Divine love, he did not always perceive a considerable mixture, and weighty alloy of Ipseity or Selfness. That the Concession of an Especial Providence in the Supreme Being, whereby he constantly moderateth and disposeth the operations and products of Second Causes for the induction of Good on the heads of those, whose Virtuous inclinations may, in some latitude of Worthyness, seem to prepare and qualify them for the grateful Acceptance, and genuine use thereof; and of Evil on those whose Vitiosities and habitual Depravities seem, by the importunity or violence of demerit, to extort it from the justice of his Indignation: that this inbred persuasion, I say, is the spark, at which all the Tapors of Religion were first kindled, the very Ethnics themselves, while groping in the Chaos of Idolatry, have long since discovered. Witness their Magnificent Temples, costly Hecatombs, human Holocausts, and frequent solemn Invocations; all which kinds of addresses they generally made use of, and obliged themselves unto, as the only hopeful means as well to atone the displeasure, as conciliate the favour of that Power, in whose hands they conceived the book of Fate to be kept, and who had the Gardianship of Administration of the Fortunes not only of Cities, nations, and families, but even of every individual Person. Witness also, that Glorious Pagan, Cicero, who deriving the pedigree of Religion, fathers it immediately upon the persuasion of an Especial Providence, (1. de nat. Deor.) in these words; Sunt Philosophi, & fuerunt, qui omnino nullam habere censerent humanarum rerum procurationem Deos. Quorum si vera est sententia, quae potest esse Pietas? quae Religio? Haec enim omnia purè ac castè tribuenda Deorum numini ita sunt, si animadvertuntur ab his, & si est aliquid à Diis immortalibus hominum generi tributum. Sin autem Dii neque possunt, nec volunt nos juvare, ncc curant omnino, nec quid agamus animadvertant, nec est quod ab his ad hominum vitam permanare possit: quid est, quod ullos Diis immortalibus cultus, honores, preces adhibeamus? In specie autem sictae simulationis, sicut reliquae virtutes, it a pietas inesse non potest, cum qua simul & sanctitatem, & religionem rolli necesse est. Quibus sublatis, perturbatio vitae sequitur, & magna confusio. That no man ever entered upon the theatre of the World, but Article 4. That Man brings into the world with him, an irresistible propension to Religion. he acted some one Religious part, bringing along with him an irresistible propension to revere and adore that Nature, which he conceived superior to his own, and all others; cannot be obscure to any, whom either Peregrinations, or Books have acquainted with the religious Customs and practices of foreign Nations, either Ancient or Modern. For read we the voluminous monuments of Antiquity, erected by the noble industry of Herodotus, Diodorus, Strabo, Ptolemy, Mela, Pliny, Solinus, justine, and other signior Historiographers; read we Munster's Cosmography, Ortelius his Theatrum Orbis, the Histories of Brasile, written by the judicious pens of Guilelm. Piso, the Hollander and Physician to the State's Fleet, of Georg. Marcgravus the German, and johan. de Laet of Antwerp; and in our Mother tongue, Grimstones Estates and Empires, Purchas his Pilgrimage (a work that speaks its venerable Compiler, to have been a man of many Languages, indefatigable study, vast readings, large rhapsodies, and strong judgement,) Hackluits Collection of English Voyages, the several Descriptions of America, together with the manners of its various Inhabitants; and other Works of the neoterics (in all which we find not only the Chorography and Topography, but also the faithful Morography of all the known parts of the World) I say, read we all these, and we shall find them unanimously positive in this point, That there is no Nation but hath its Religion. And therefore, with Arnobius (lib. 1. contr. Gent. pag. 476.) I am bold to demand of the whole world; Quisquamne est hominum, qui non cum istius Principis notione, diem primae nativitatis intraverit? Cui non sit ingenitum, imo affixum, & pene in genitalibus matris non impressum, non insitum; esse Regem ac Dominum cunctorum, quaecunque sunt, Moderatorem? If any shall pull me by the ear, and here object out of Strabo (lib. 13. pag. 382.) that the Calaici, a rude and savage people Article 5. An objection, that the Cala●ci were absolute Atheists, resuted. of old Spain, were absolute Atheists, and worshipped no Gods at all; I answer, that Strabo wrote this particular with no more authentical a quill, but what he sound dropped from the wings of Fame, himself insinuating as much: for his words are, Calai●is Deum nullum esse, quidam ajunt; there is a certain rumour, or traditional report, raised, dispersed and authorized, where, when, upon what grounds, or by whom, I know not, that the Calaici had no religion among them. And if a quidam sic ajunt, be proof enough to ratify any historical position, or assertion; then may Fame aspire to the throne of Truth, Fables become Histories, and strangers may believe that we Christians are the most absolute Atheists. For Caecilius hath reported of us, that we do & templa despicere, & Deos despuere: both despise the temples, and despite the Gods; as Arnobius (lib. 8. cont. Gent. pag. 748.) hath informed us. Article 6. A second objection, that the Massagetae and Scytbions' were devoid of all Religion, prevented▪ Nor I have forgotten, that the two fierce Nations, the Massagetae and Scythians, (whose rudeness and want of Civility, the indiscretion or severity of some hath aggravated into an Atheistical Barbarism, and want of all Religion) have been stigmatised with the same infamous brand; and therefore to anticipate this exception, I refer the doubting Reader to the testimonies of Herodotus and Lucian▪ the former (lib. 4. pag. 278. & 279.) at large expunging that fabulous aspersion, and proving them strict, solemn, and ceremonious Votaries to all the Gods of Greece: the latter (lib. de sacrificiis. p. 57) deriding them for their superstition, nay such immoderate and frantic zeal, towards the honour of their principal Deity, Diana, as made them embrace the slames, and offer themselves as holocausts unto her. Moreover, as this inoppugnable propensity to Religion is a Article 7. That it is not in the power of man, totally to ●●dicate this plant of Religion, or notion of special Providence Divine, ●ut of his mind; evinced from hence, that the most contumacious Atheists have, at some time or other, acknowledged it: as Cyence of Gods own engraffing on the mind of man; so also is it not in the power of any man, though assisted by all the stratagems and legions of Hell, totally to eradicate it thence. This is a truth confirmed by the Experience of all Ages. For, notwithstanding the insolent pretences, and blasphemous Rhodomontadoes of many miscreants, who have gloried in the most execrable cognomen of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and studied to advance their names to the highest pinnacle of Fame, by being accounted men of such absolute and fearless Spirits, as that they scorned to own any Being superior to their own, to which they should be accountable for their actions: yet have they been compelled (so violent are the secret touches of that hand, which converts all things into demostrations of his own Glory) either by the scourge of some sharp calamity, or the rack of some excruciating disease, in their lives, to recant; or at the near approach of that King of terrors, Death, to confess this their horrid impiety. Thus the proud and Adamant-hearted Pharaoh, who deriding Article 8. Pharaoh. the Divine Embassy of Moses, in an imperious strain of Sc●rn, and expostulatory bravado, demanded of him; Quis est Jehovah, cujus voci auscultem, dimittendo Israelem? non novi Jehovam, etc. did yet, when the Violentum of Divine Vengeance by heavy judgements had convinced him; when the true and real Miracles of Moses had won the garland from those weak Delusions and prestigious impostures of his Magicians, and he beheld their black Art fooled in their vain attempts to imitate Moses in the visible transformation of Dust into Lice; when the tangible darkness that benegroed the horizon of Egypt, and so made it more than midnight to the eye of his body, had illuminated that of his Soul; and when the frozen Granades of the clouds had broke open the iron door of his Conscience; then sends he post for those, whom he had barbarously exiled from his presence, humbles himself before them, and howls out this Palinodia; Peccavi hac vice: Jehovah justissimus, ego vero & populus meus sumus improbissimi. Thus Herod Agrippa, who, in the morn, to enhance the estimate of majesty, and stroke that vertiginous and admiring Article 9 Herod Agrippa. beast, the multitude, had arrayed him in his brightest ornaments of State, thickly embroidered with plates of Oriental Gold, and studded with Diamonds and all other resplendent Gems, so that the incident Sun beams seemed to have acquired a greater lustre by reflection from him, and who by the blast of popular Euges had the wings of his Pride fanned up to so sublime a pitch, that he lost sight of his own Humanity, and vainly conceived the adulatory Hyperbole of his Auditors to be but their just acknowledgement of his Divinity: being wounded by the invisible sword of a revenging Angel, before Sun set, by a fatal experiment confuted both his own and his flatterer's blasphemy, and with the hoarse groans of a tortured wretch, cried out; En ille Ego, vestra appellatione Deus, vitam relinquere jubeor; fatali necessitate mendacium vestrum coarguente: & quem immortalem salutastis, ad mortem rapior. Sed ferenda est voluntas coelestis Numinis. (Joseph. 19 Antiquit. p. 565.) Thus that real Lycaon, Antiochus Epiphanes, who had not only denied, but being enraged by a malicious Frenzy beyond Article 10. Antiochus Epiphanes. that of Lucifer newly degraded, publicly despited and reviled the Almighty Patron of the Jews, blasphemed his most sacred name, demolished his temples, profaned his consecrated Utensils, violated his religious institutions, and persecuted his worshippers with all the most bloody cruelties, that the wit of an exalted malice could invent, or inflict: being put upon the rack of a sore and mortal disease (which some have conjectured, and not without good warrant from probability, to have been a Cancer in his bowels, introduced mediately by Divine Justice, immediately ●y a fixed melancholy generated by the uncessant stings and convulsions of his guilty Conscience, as by its procatarctick▪ Cause,) and despairing of any case or cure but from his injured enemy, God; he sighs out his Confession. The sleep is gone from my eyes, and my heart faileth for very Care. And I thought with myself, into what tribulation am I come, and how great a 'slud of misery is it, wherein I now am? But now I remember the evils that I did at Jerusalem, and that I took all the vessels of Gold and Silver that were therein, and sent to destroy the inhabitants without a Cause. I perceive therefore, that for this cause, these troubles are come upon me etc. It is meet to be subject unto God, and that a man who is mortal, should not think himself equal unto God through pride. (Maccab. 1. chap. 6. vers. 9, 10, 11.) Thus the Giant Emperor, Maximinus, as insatiate a Article 11. Maximinus. Bloodhound to the Christians, as Antiochus had been to the Jews, novorum suppliciorum inventione seize insolenter efferens, boasting the acuteness of his wit by the invention of new ways of tortures for those patiented martyrs, as Eusebius (lib. 1. de vita Constant. cap. 51.) hath described him; and advancing the Roman Eagle in desiance of those who fought under the sanguine standard of the Cross; nay so infatuated with the confidence of his own Greatness and personal strength, that he entertained a conceit, that Death durst not adventure to encounter him, for fear of having his javelin broke about his own crazy skull, and all his skeleton of bones rattled to dust, as Capitolinus tell us: notwithstanding when he felt himself invaded with a Verminous Ulcer, or Fistula, in mediis corporis arcanis, which did letificum foetorem exhalare, ut medicorum aliqui incredibilem foetorem ferre non valentes, occiderentur, evaporate so contagious and pestilential a stench, that some of his Physicians, not able to endure that mephitis or steam of intense corruption, fell down dead; and understood the same to be supplicium Divinitus illatum, ajudgement sent from God to retaliate upon him those tortures, which he had caused in the bowels and secret parts of many innocents'; then did his flinty heart melt within him, and tandem sentire coepit, quae contra pios Dei cultores impiè gesserat, & haec se propter insaniam contra Christum praesumptam, merito & ultionis vice, perpeti confessus est, and in the midst of these confessions of his own Gild, and God's justice, breathed out his execrable soul from a gangrenous and loathsome body. (Eusebius, lib. 8. Histor. Eccles. cap. 17.) Thus also that notorious Apostate, Julian, who had not only renounced the faith of Christ, but proclaimed open and implacable Article 12. Julian Apostata. hostility against him, and to quench the thirst of his diabolical malice, drank whole Tuns of the precious blood of his Members; being defeated and mortally wounded in a battle fought against the Persians: he instantly learned of his awaked Conscience, that the Cause of his present overthrow was his former impiety, and rightly ascribing the Victory to the revenging finger of that God, whose Divinity he had abjured, rather than to the arm of flesh, he threw up his blood into the aer, and together with his black Soul, gasped out this desperate ejaculation; Vicisti Galilaee, vicisti! Thou hast overcome me, oh! thou Jesus of Galilee, thou hast overcome me: simul confessus & victoriam, & blasphemiam, at once confessing both Christ's conquest and his own detestable blasphemy; as Theodoret (lib. 3. Histor. Eccles. cap. 20.) hath descanted upon those his last (but truest) words. And thus also Tullus Hostilius (a Cognomen exactly accommodated Article 13. Tullus Hostilius. to his fierce nature,) immediate successor to Numa Pompilius in his throne, though not in his mansuete and pious inclinations; being a man of so rough and martial a temper, that he held Religion to be but a kind of Emollient Cataplasm, prescribed by State Policy to soften and emasculate the minds of men, as Plutarch (in vita Numae pag. 158.) hath noted of him; and thereupon in his prosperity neither acknowledging, nor sacrificing unto any Deity, but his Ferreus Acinaces, or old sword: when cast upon the thorny bed of sickness, he soon discovered, retracted, and renounced his Atheism. (which remarkable mutation of his judgement, Livy (lib. 1. pag. 12.) hath both amply and elegantly described thus, Adeo fracti simul cum corpore sunt spiritus illi seroces, ut qui nihil antea ratus esset minus regium, quam sacris dedere animum; repent omnibus magnis parvisque superstitionibus obnoxius degeret, religionibusque populum impleret. I said Mutation of his judgement, not Rectification; nor can I properly allow him so much: since he that runs from one extreme of Atheism to the other of Polytheisme, shall find himself in the same point of Error, from whence he set forth. For to believe, that there are more Gods then one, in strictness of truth is to believe there is none at all; Unity being the essential and inseparable Attribute of the Deity. And therefore we may allow him to have been superstitious, but never truly religious. Nor did the Judge of all hearts accept of this Change for a Conversion; for the records both of Livy and Eutropius concur in this; Fulmine ictus, cum tota domo sua, conflagravit: he, his house, and family were consumed by Lightning. A punishment so proportionate to the rules of Divine Justice, that we may therein give a fair conjecture of his guilt: and that which all Atheists have stood convulst at. Hi sunt, qui trepidant, & ad omnia fulgura pallent, Cum tonat, exanimes, primo quoque murmure coeli. juvenal. satire 13. Such Villains quake at Thunder, and each flash Of Lightning doth their Souls with Terror quash. A like example of the impossibility of extinguishing this spark of Religion, which the Creator hath kindled in the breast of Article 14. Bion Borysthenites. every man, doth Diogenes Laertius afford us (in vit. Bionis) in the recantation of Bion of Borysthenes. Who continuing (or rather only pretending to continue) in professed Atheism, till he was arrested by sickness, that rough Sergeant of Death, and then affrighed into an acknowledgement of that truth, he had so long stisled: inductus est poenitentiam agere super iis, quae peccarat in Doum, was induced to become a penitentiary for those offences he had prepetrated against the sacred majesty of God. To conclude therefore; as Lucilius said of Homer, Nemo qui culpat Homerum, perpetuo culpat; so may we more truly say of God, Nemo qui Deum negat, perpetuo negat, no man who denys God, doth constantly deny him. For all men have confuted, disavowed, or repent that impiety at or before their death, which they seemed with so much impudence and pride, to cherish in their lives. This the sweet-tongued Tertullian (Apolog. cap. 17.) profoundly observed, when he distilled the quintessence or spirit of all we have said, concerning this assertion, into this short sentence: Anima, licet carcere corporis pressa, licet institutionibus pravis circumscripta, licet libidinibus & concupiscentiis evigorata, licet falsis Diis exancillata, cum tamen resipiscit, ut ex crapula, ut ex somno, ut ex aliqua valetudine, & sanitatem suam patitur, Deum nominat. I shall not gainsay, but that 'tis possible (I am sorry, I might Article 15. The possibility of the obscuration of the impress of special Providence Divine, pro tempore, conceded: and the impossibility of the total Deletion thereof, briefly proved. have said, too frequent) to have this ingravement of Divinity on the mind of man, obscured, and buried under the dust raised in the summer of Prosperity; for as Lactantius (lib. 2. cap. 1.) most solidly, tum maxime Deus ex hominum memoria elabitur, cum benesiciis ejus fruentes honorem dare Divinae indulgentiae deberent, men are then most prone to forget God, when being sated with the accumulations of his immense bounty, they have the greatest reason to remember him: yet I shall confidently affirm, that the least gust of Affliction, in the winter of Adversity, soon blows that dust off again, and renders the Characters fair and legible to the first reflexive or inward glance of the soul. Si qua enim necessitas gravis presserit, tum demum recordantur; si belli terror infremuerit, si alimenta frugibus longa siccitas denegaverit, si saeva tempestas, si grando ingruerit: ad Deum protinus confugiunt, à Deo petitur auxilium, Deus, ut subveniat, oratur; si quis in mari vento saeviente jactatur, hunc invocat; si quis aliqua vi afflictatur, hunc protinus implorat, etc. as the same Lactantius. Now to abstract all this to a smaller bulk, such as may be no Article 16. The reduction of all, to a concise and memorable demonstration; that the occurrences of every man's life are the consignations of special Providence burden to the weakest memory, and reduce our Argument into a sharper point, so that it may, with the greater facility, sink into the thickest skull; If Religion be a Plant radicated in the soul of man, so deeply and firmly, that though the damp of a barbarous education may for a while retard, or the rankness of those Weeds of Sensuality, the Honours and Delights of this World, conceal the germination of it: yet will it, at some time or other, early or late, and always in the Winter of Calamity, shoot up and bud forth into an absolute Demonstration of the dependence of our Happiness and Misery on the Will of the Supreme Being: and if the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or full Persuasion of an Especial Providence, as a relative Attribute of the Supreme Being, whereby all the various Occurrences of every individual man's life are predetermined and disposed, be the Seed from whence this Plant of Religion hath its root; both which Propositions we conceive sufficiently proved: then do not I see, how the subtlest Wit can evade the rigour of the Inference, or Conclusion, viz. That all the affairs of man are regulated by the Special Providence of God. SECT. III. THus far have we Demonstrated the Necessity of God's Special Article 1. The Atheists first objection, confuted: and the Divine Nature demonstrated both Irascible and placable, (anthropo pathically.) Providence; and our next business is to remove those Rocks cast up by the pioneers of Satan, to obstruct the Current of man's clear and full belief thereof. As for the First, Deum neque ira, neque gratia tangi; this may without much difficulty be dejected, by answering, that it can no way infringe the Immutability or constant Sameness of the Divine Nature, to affirm it to be capable of Anger and Placability: provided that we understand neither of these as a Passion, but (as the Schoolmen precisely speak) in effectu executionem, potius quàm in Affectu perturbationem, rather an execution in Effect, than a Perturbation in Affect. As for Anger; if a Wiseman can so conserve the serenity and tranquillity of his mind, as to chastise or severely punish his disobedient servant, without any passion or internal commotion at all: 'tis very hard, if God, the Fountain of Wisdom, cannot be admitted to conserve the constant and immutable peace or calm of his Beatitude, when he punisheth the improbous actions of men. For Justice is a virtue, which to speak strictly, cannot frown, which abhors the society of a Passion, and only actuates the mind into a noble and commendable Zeal, not an illiberal or rough Perturbation. And upon the consideration of this was it, that the first Preservers of Equity, knowing it not to be impossible for the breast of a Magistrate to be inflamed, beyond this moderate heat, into an excess of Indignation against a Malefactor; therefore wisely provided, that the Judge should square his Sentence by the direct and impartial rule of the Law; which some Civilians have therefore wittily defined to be Ira sedata, Anger without Choler, Indignation refracted, or the sword of Vengeance put in the hand of Mercy. As for the Contrary to Anger, viz. Grace, or Placability; why this also may not be ascribed to God, as fully consistent to the Eternal plenitude and immu tability of the Divine Beatitude, I cannot understand: provided that we accept it absque gestiente laetitia, and as an effect infinitely remote from that kind of Passionate Joy, which tickles the heart of man into a sudden paroxysm of delight, upon the apprehension of a grateful and pleasing Object, either in the anticipation of Hope, or actual fruition. The Reason is the immense Goodness of his Nature, which being in perpetual Effusion, without possibility of exhaustion, or an Ocean that replenisheth all things with Amability, yet suffers no diminution of its own fullness; doth more than incline him to be pleased with, or accept of as grateful, that in man, which is originally but an Extract of his own Delightfulness, or himself gratefully returned to himself by reflection from us. This the Schoolmen most judiciously pondered, when they established as Canonical, Deum exercere gratiam, ea naturae sinceritate, qua Bonus est. Nor are we to deny this Placency or Delight to God, since it is so far from infringing this constant and equal tenor of his essential Felicity, that in some sort it mainly conduceth to the Conservation thereof; insomuch as to be uncessantly exercised in a liberal Benefaction to other Natures, is to do what is most consentaneous and genuine to the swinge or Verticity of his own: and so to do, all men, doubtless, will allow to be the highest and most permanent Delight in the World. Nor is it a legal process in the common Pleas of Reason, to argue thus; God hath left us to act our own parts, in the world, therefore he takes no farther care of us, and therefore all the Occurrences of our lives are either the necessary subsequents, or collateral Adjuncts of our own either natural, or moral Actions: for though it be most true, that he hath endowed us with an absolute Freedom of our Wills (an evidence of his exceeding Grace and Benignity,) and that, indeed, which supports the necessity of our Rationality; for if our Wills were subject to compulsion, undoubtedly we should have little or no use at all of our Reason, since than our Objects would be both judged of and elected to our hands) and so permitted us the enjoyment of our own entire liberty: yet hath he, out of a compassionate prenotion of the Deceptibility of our judgement, prescribed us rules, whereby our Understanding may be directed in the selection of Good, and devitation of evil. To speak more expressly; he hath set on our right hand real and true Good, on our left only specious and apparent: the Election of either is dependent on our Will, our Will is guided by our judgement, and our judgement is the Determination or resolve of our Intellect (for, without dispute, though common Physiology hath founded this Liberty on the indifferency of the Will; yet is it radicated in the indifferency of the Intellect, or Cognoscent Faculty, primarily, and in the Will only secondarily, insomuch as that ever follows the manuduction of the Intellect,) but yet that he might in a manner direct us in our choice, he hath annexed Happiness as a reward to invite us to the one, and Misery as a punishment to deter us from the other: and therefore 'tis manifest, that God wills the felicity of all men, more than themselves can desire it. And hence comes it to be a truth, that on one side Fortune (respectu nostri) frequently puts in for a share in the playing of our Cards; but yet still the Special Providence of God supervises her hand, and manageth the whole game: and on the other, that our own Prudence doth many times conduce to our winning of the stake; but yet still 'twas the Goodness of God that gave us that Prudence, and takes great delight to see us use it, as we ought to do, to our own advantage. Doth he so, saith the Atheist, how comes it about then, that Article 2. The Atheists scruple, of God's inaudition of the prayers of good men, or not concession of their petitions; satisfied. he frequently turns a deaf ear to our most earnest Prayers, and but rarely grants our Petitions? For how few barren wombs have been cured of their sterility, by the fumes of sacrifices? and how few Mariners preserved from naufrage, by the appension of their Votive tables? or who hath observed such holy magic in the perishing Seaman's pious sighs, as to have hushed the dreadful scolding of the waves and winds? For answer let us return, That the most indulgent Father doth not always condescend to the importunate desires of his child: that as well Pious, as Impious men may be included in the same ship, that's banded up and down by the wanton Billows of the Sea; that the Good may be lost, and the Bad escape the fury of the tempest: and all this consist both with the Goodness and righteous Providence of God. The Reason in brief (for the full solution of this Parallaxis of justice doth more properly belong to our refutation of the last Objection, concerning the apparent Prosperity of the Vicious, and the calamitous condition of the Virtuous, in this life) is this; God in his Wisdom knows our real necessities, and understands what's most convenient for us. This the acute Satirist handsomely expresseth thus; — Si Consilium vis, juven. Sat. 10. Permits ipsis expendere Numinibus, quid Conveniat nobis rebusque sit utile nostris: Nam pro jucundis aptissima quaeque dabunt Dii. Carior est illis Homo, quàm sibi. Nos animorum Impulsu, & magna, caecaque cupidine ducti Conjugium petimus, partumque Vxoris, at illi Norunt qui Pueri, qualisque futura sit Vxor. etc. Wouldst be advised to choose the best? refer That choice unto the Gods, who cannot err. For better than ourselves our wants they know: And will true joys, for false delights, bestow. Their love to us transcends our own By blind Affections spurred, and fury of the mind, We Wife and Sons desire; the Gods above Know what that Wife, and how those Sons will prove. As for the second Rock, Curio si Deus omnia hominum caussa Article 3. The Atheists second Argument against Special Providence divine, dissolved: and the necessity of Objects hostile, and deleterious to the life of man, demonstrated. fecerit, etiam multa contraria, imò & pestisera nobis reperiantur, tam in mari quàm in terra? this also may easily be removed, by digesting our meditations into this short reply. The Creator, having form the machine of man's body into a Figure fit to receive the majestic charagme of Divinity, as the last act of his hand, and the accompletion of his most exquisite Artifice, breathed into him a Wise, intelligent, or cognoscent Soul; that by the transcendent operations thereof, man might justly entitle himself to the Empire of the Creatures, subjugate them to the dominion of his unconfined Will, and accommodate all things either to the relief of his Necessities, or the promotion of his Delights. This done, he set before him Good and Evil; and this upon the highest reason: because he had endowed him with Sapience, whose basis is founded in the actual discernement of those two Contraries For no man can make an election of the Better, and know what's really Good, unless at the same time he know also what's really Evil, and how to reject and avoid the Worse. Those two objects, though absolute Contraries, are yet perfect Relatives; though irreconcilable Enemies, are yet cosubsistent Twins, and live so connexed hand in hand, that the ablation of the one necessitates the ablation of the other. Good and Evil therefore being thus blended together, and in this miscellany proposed to man; then gins that Criterion, Wisdom to exercise its Faculties, display its discretive energy, and immediately exploring the difference, affects the Good for Utility, but rejects the Evil for Safety. As therefore there are innumerable Goods offered to the judgement of man, which he may with happiness enjoy; so also are there as many Evils, which he may with caution abhor. For if there were nothing evil, nothing dangerous, in short, nothing hurtful to man; pray, what stead could his Reason stand him in? And hence is it manifest, that whoever strikes at the necessity of Evil, at the same time cuts off the necessity of Wisdom, and downright adnulls the use of the Intellect: since if God had created nothing that might prove noxious to man, to what purpose would his Cogitation, Intellect, Science and Reason have served? For then to what object soever he had extended his hand, though at adventure; yet would that have been by nature fit and commodious for him. To illustrate this by a familiar, yet in all points respondent Article 4. The same illustrated, by a correspondent Simile. Example; if any man make a feast for a company of Infants, and prepare a liberal table of many both pleasant and wholesome meats for them; though they are not wise enough to make their own choice, by rational judgement, but pursue the inclination of their Sensual Appetite: yet can they not choose amiss, all things good and grateful being praeelected to their hands. And if so, of what disadvantage is their Ignorance, or of what advantage could their Intelligence, were they arrived at so much maturity, be unto them? Truly, none at all; for as they could know no want of the one, so could they receive no damage by the continuation of the other. But if among those many pleasant and nutritive dishes the master should mingle as many either bitter and distasteful, or poisonous; then doubtless must the greedy Wretches be deceived through their ignorance of Good and Evil, unless Wisdom step in to their protection, and inform them what is safe, and what destructive, and so direct them in the Delection of the one and Refusal of the other. Now clearly the Case is the same, in all particulars, twixt God and Man, as to the point of Good and Evil: and therefore we may conclude, with Lactantius; Propter mala opus nobis esse sapientia, quae nisi fuissent proposita, rationale Animal non essemus: had there been no evil for man to avoid, he never had been endowed with a rational Soul. The last, and greatest Rock, upon whose shelves Myriads Article 5. The Atheists last and grand objection, of the prosperity of the Vicious, and adversity of the Virtuous, red argued: and the nature of the Goods of Fortune profounded. have been split and shipwrackt in their judgements, our memory tells us is this; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Qua ratione, si curae Deo res humanae sunt, malis est benè, & bonis malè? This, I confess, to the first and supersicial survey of my meditations, appeared montainous and flinty, and such as might require both a larger Current of acuteness to dissolve it, than what runs in the shallow channel of my brains; and a greater strength of Argument to dislodge and crane it up piece aster piece, than the lax and feeble nerves of my Reason could afford: but to my second and penetrating thoughts, it discovered itself to be, like those objects we look upon through the magnifying glass of Fear, great only at a distance, and devoid of all Solidity, nay in reality no more than a heap of mud heaved up by the back of that subterraneous Mole, the Devil. For though Experience assures us, that this field of the World hath a strange and preposterous soil, wherein Weeds most commonly prosper, and useful Plants whither: yet a profound scrutiny into the business, shall soon detect, that there is an admirable Providence in the distribution of Good and Evil, or Prosperity and Adversity. First therefore, let us seriously examine the inside of those Good things, that are showered down on the laps of Evil men, and make their tides of Fortune high and smooth; while the streams of Good men's lives seem to run low, sink down to the lowest ebbs, and are constantly ruffled by the contrary gusts of Afflictions. Certain it is, that nothing can be affirmed to be really Good, but only Virtue, or at least that, which being contempered, impregnated and qualifyed by Virtue, doth positively conduce to our Wellbeing: and as certain it is, that Evil men want this Universal Ferment, or Elixir, Virtue, which only hath a power to convert all things into Good; and therefore cannot they either receive, or use those things called the Goods of Fortune, with that temper and moderation of mind, which is requisite to the perfect assimilation of them into their well-being; and upon consequence, those abused Goods instantly alter their Property, and degenerate into Evils, Vice, like a depraved stomach, having a power to corrupt the best things into the worst. And this the reason is, why those Blessings, which the bounty of Providence hath ordained for our refreshment and consolation in this tedious pilgrimage on earth, and furtherances or contributions towards our easier purchase of immarcescible Felicity in heaven, when Death shall have evacuated our Faith; such as Vigour, health, and beauty of Body, ingenuity of disposition, longevity, multitude of Friends, equality in marriage, fertility of issue, education in civility and learning, science, wealth, nobility of blood, absoluteness in power and government, etc. when they come into the polluting hands of Vicious men, they instantly suffer a total castration of their Goodness, a depravation of their benignity, and putrify into perfect Curses: the possession of them raising uncessant tempests and distracting storms of Passions in the obnubilated region of their minds; nor permitting that comfortable sun of true Content to shine clearly forth, and make one fair day, during their whole lives. For though the Mole-eyed multitude, whose sight is always terminated in the gaudy outsight, admire even to envy the lustre of splendid Vice, cry up the happiness of wealth, and believe that the Rich man, though ne'er so unjust and sinful, doth every moment surfeit with variety of Delights: yet if his Conscience were strictly examined, 'twould soon confess, that all his luxurious Viands are but Pills of Coloqyntida nearly gilded, or Apples of Sodom, whose Vermillion rind doth emulate the blushes of Aurora, but are within nothing but sulphureous dust; that his magnificent Buildings are but a more strong and spacious Prison; his numerous Attendants, but so many plummets superadded to that oppressing weight of cares, which keeps his mind in the perpetual motion of inquietude; his troop of Adulators, but a swarm of hungry Fleas that molest him by sucking, or a nest of Tarantula's, whose titillations prove venenate and poison his sobriety into a frenzy of deadly jollity; that his bed of down grows every night more full of thorns; that his bags of treasure, like the massy statue of Jupiter on the Asse's back, oppress and gall him; in short, that he never tasted any one sincere and limpid drop of pleasure in his life. And this one truth brancheth itself into the manifestation of two others; First, that those golden showers which Providence raineth into the bosoms of Vicious men, are no more than Bona fucata, real Evils couched under the specious hatchment of apparent Goods; fruit whose Cortex is sweet and beautiful, but Kernels full of amaritude and loathsome venom; and all the magnified presents of Fortune, like Pandora's Box, have glorious outsides, but contain millions of infections and pestilential Evils. Secondly, that the Possessors of them, by reason of the exorbitances, and habitual depravities of their minds, seem uncapable and therefore, in the judgement of the Supreme Wisdom, absolutely unworthy of more solid and substantial Goods; Providence dealing with these, as a Wise General with Cowards, who are assigned to the sordid offices of common Sutler's, and Baggage-Carriers, while the generous and heroical are appointed to Arms, difficulties, and encounters. Cum videris bonos acceptosque Diis viros, laborare, sudare, per arduum ascendere; malos autem lascivientes & voluptatibus fluere: Cogita, filiorum nos modestia delectari, Vernularum licentia; illos disciplina tristiori cotineri, horum ali audaciam. Idem tibi de Deo liqueat, bonuno virum in deliciis non habet; experitur, indurat, sibi illum praeparat. Seneca (de Providentia.) Nay, more than all this, should we grant that the Cornu Copia, or affluence of the Goods of Fortune makes one step, or gradation in the ascent to the Palace of Temporal Happiness: yet can we not infer, that Vicious men are therefore nearer to the top, than those indigent and tattered Lazarusse's, that lie grovelling below, because they are mounted thereon; since, as jamblicus (in Protrept.) hath most prudently observed, Malice ever drinks the greatest part of her own poison; since the continually excruciating torture, resulting from the sense of their own impiety, ten times more dejects them, towards the abyss of misery, than the fruition of those goods can advance them; since that sharpbeaked Vulture, an Evil Conscience, never ceaseth day nor night to dilacerate their hearts, but racks them into a most severe condemnation of themselves, which doubtless is the keenest arrow in the quiver of Divine Revenge, and that affliction which best defines the terrible essence of Hell. To all which we may justly superadd this, that the brightest and longest days of Fortune have ever closed in the blackest and most tragical nights of Sorrow; that the Plays of Libertines have always proved Come-tragedies, and their pompous Masks finished in dismal Catastrophes; nor can the records of the whole world produce one Example of Sinful Greatness, that hath not, either before, or at his eternal Adieu, by woeful experiment manifested the truth of this maxim; That none can ever arrive at the Elysium of true Felicity, who constantly pursue it through the gardens of Sensuality: that the Rose of happiness grows on the prickly stem of Virtue: and that the just discharge of our duties to God and Man, in all things, to the utmost of our abilities, is the only means of acquiring that Philosopher's stone, Content, the only Summum Bonum in nature. Lastly, as to that seeming 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the hand of God's Bounty is observed to be extended early and long on the heads Article 6. The Reason, wherefore Divine Providence consers Good things on Evil men. of Impious men; but, on the contrary, that of Justice either late, or not at all, in this life: though we grant the Question, yet shall we soon salve the scruple, by considering, that his Providence observes this method, for two important Reasons: First in respect of themselves, and Secondly in respect of the Virtuous. (1.) Of themselves; God, in order to the manifestation of his infinite Goodness, therefore conferr's a plentiful portion of his benefits upon them, that by the blandishments of their sense he might allure them to a desire of those delights, whose pleasantness consists in this, that they infinitely transcend the apprehension of Sense; and that the fragrant odor of his temporal Mercies might attract their minds to the affectation of Virtue, and thence lead their thoughts on to a grateful and reverential Contemplation of him, that both made them out of nothing, and bestowed them freely, upon no motive of worthiness in the receivers: and in order to the manifestation of his Longanimity, and Clemency, he therefore suspends their punishment, ut tempus habeant, quo in se descendant, atque resipiscant, as the holy Father expresseth it, that they may have both time enough to discover, and opportunities to repent and reform their heinous enormities. (2.) Of the Virtuous, in a threefold respect; first, that he might become an Exemplar of mansuetude, patience, and long-suffering to them; secondly, that the tyranny and oppression of Ungodly men might serve to actuate and exercise those Virtues in them which otherwise had wanted an opportunity to display their Sovereign and all-conquering efficacy: and thirdly, that they might extract to themselves a Cordial out of the poisonous Fate of others: i. e. when they shall observe those, who daily bathed themselves in rivers of Voluptuousness, to be by Divine revenge on a sudden precipitated into the black Sea of misery, they may recruite their Confidence, that the same Justice will, in his own appointed time, more than compensate their momentany objections, and convert their night of obscurity and trouble into a glorious day of interminable Delectation. Having thus precisely dissected the Apparent Good, which Divine Article 7. Those apparent Evils, which Providence Divine consignes to Virtuous men, anatomised; and found to be real Goods intrinsically. Providence allots to Evil men, as their portion to this life; and found it to be, as painted fire, bright but comfortless, or such at best, whose Abuse aggravates the Gild, and upon consequence, the misery of the receivers: it will no less conduce to the rectification of our distorted judgements, and so to the cure of our depraved Affections, to anatomize also the other Ventricle in the heart of the objection, viz. the Apparent Evil frequently assigned to Good men. If Felicity be the Daughter of Virtue, as the Philosopher most judiciously, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, perfectae virtutis actio est beatitudo (magn. Moral. lib. 1. cap. 4.) and Virtue the daughter of Wisdom, as the same, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Virtutes omnes, in Animae parte rationali sint, necesse est, (lib. ejusd. cap. 1.) and if the Wisdom of God be infinitely more perfect than the Wisdom of man, as all justly confess; then assuredly can they only be happy, who conform their Wills to the Will of the Highest Wisdom: now Good men, in all conditions of their lives, and all the changes of Fortune, still submit their desires and affections to the Will of Divine Providence; therefore are they constantly happy, and consequently those seeming Evils, which befall them, prove real Goods, that implicit resignation of themselves, and that equanimity wherewith they entertain those External Evils, instantly altering their malignity, dulcifying their amaritude, and converting them unto Intrinsic Blessings. This Argument (without ostentation, I profess it) was the ground Article 8. The Author's Sanctuary wherein he secured his mind from discontent, in all those storms of Calamities, which our late Civil war showered upon him. upon which I erected me a Sanctuary to secure my judgement in, when the multiplied storms of Adversity, raised by the impetuous winds of our Civil Wars, had beaten me from all other probability of shelter. For taking this for my Hypothesis, that man, in this life, wants only so much of Happiness, as he doth of Obedience, so much of Content, as he doth of absolute Conformity to the good will of Providence; I inferred, that no man can be truly miserable, but he that makes himself so, nor any man really happy, but he that hath pared off the bias of Affection from his mind, and fitted it to run smooth and even in the level of Indifferency, as to the Goods of Fortune, having no other mark, but Fiat Voluntas Dei. And, having first humbly implored the assistance of Divine Grace to enable me to reduce this excellent lesson into practice, I wore it as a sacred charm or Pentacle on my breast, and thereby become Shot-free from all the bullets of an angry Fortune: nor did I feel that to be a considerable loss, which the conquest and rapine of an insulting Enemy called my total ruin; but could with more constant and internal alacrity sing Paeans to Heaven, for this victory over my Pusillanimity, than did the triumphant Foe, for his, over my Royal Master and his loyal Armies. Let us take away those things, which the delusion of Sensuality calls Evils, and Virtue must then be, what the mistaken Article 9 V●●t●e, a mere chimaera, without the occu●ssion of those things, which Sensuality calls 〈◊〉. Libertine will have it, a bare Notion, or empty Term, as near of kin to a Chimaera, as one of Plato's Ideas: For what would become of Magnanimity, if there were no danger? what of Patience, if there were no sufferings, etc. Marcet sine adversario virtus, and every man knows that the Insignia, or Coat-arms of a gallant mind, is a Palm tree, that thrives by oppression, with an orient Pyropus, or Carbuncle suspended on its trunk, which deradiates the most refulgent splendour in the darkest night, as St Austin (lib. 2. de doctrina Christiana, cap. 16.) out of ancient Lapidaries hath affirmed, and Bernhard. Caesius (de mineral. p. 556.) on the testimonies of many modern Mineralogists, asserted. This the Orator glanced at, when in derision of their ignorant Malice, who had attempted to blast the Laurel on Cato's front; he smiles out this character of a well-ordered Mind: At etiam co negotio M. Catonis splendorem maculare voluer unt, ignari quid gravitas, quid integritas, quid magnitudo animi, quid denique Virtus valenet; quae in tempestate saevae quiet a est, & lucet in tenebris, & pulsa loco manet tamen, at que haeret in patria, splendet que per se semper, neque alienis unquam sordibus obsolescit. (or at. pro P. Sextio.) I said, those things which the delusion of Sensuality calls Article 10. The Sense, no competent Criterion of the Good or Evil of the mind. Evils; for 'tis no Kenodox or novelty of my own, that the palate of the body is no competent judge of the sweets of the Soul; that the bitterest Potions, are the most magisterial Julebs to extinguish the fevers of Lust; and the abstinence of Poverty, the surest prophylactick to prevent the Tumours and Instammations of the mind; that a wise man is sensible of more true delight▪ in one Affliction, than Nero or Lucullus ever felt in all the pompous and studied luxury of their lives; and that the tears of sorrow are not half so Salt, nor corroding, as those expressed by immoderate Laughter. This those Heroes well experimented, who even in the Calms of their state, have voluntarily cast all the Goods of Fortune over board; as unnecessary luggage, that might hazard sinking of their vessels, in a storm, but could never pass for currant merchandise on the exchange of Happiness. What a voluminous Legend could a good Collector make of those Princes, who have gladly resigned their imperial Sceptres, for a more portable and smother Shepherd's staff? of those Potentates, who have with smiles quitted the noise and tumult of their magnificent Palaces, for the soft murmurs of a Wilderness? of those Croesusses, who have cut off the ponderous bunches of Wealth from their own wearied backs, and reduced their spacious Treasuries to a scrip and bottle? of those holy Prelates, who have relinquished their Episcopia, or ample Sees, and retired themselves to some cool and silent Hermitage? How many victorious Generals have thrown down their leading staves, in the heads of their mighty and obedient Armies, and withdrawn into obscure Cottages, there to learn a nobler militia of conquering their rebellious Passions? How many Noble Persons, as high in Honour and Power, as Ambition itself could wish, have cheerfully torn off their venerable Purple, and disguised themselves in contemptible rags; changed their august and Dithyrambic Titles into a vulgar and easy Monosyllable; and left their native soil for a contemplative recess in some empty Island? in fine, of those Worthies, who in their spring of life, their canicular days of pleasure, the Jubilee of unphysicked Health, the Zenith of Riches and Honour; have contentedly shook hands with all this vexatious Vanity, and fervently courted not only the loathsome solitude of Prison, but even that affrighting Sceleton, Death: as those things which promised more real content, than all their former enjoyments? And since they did all this upon no necessity, but that compulsion of their own rectified Wills: what reason have we to account Poverty, Exile, Sorrow, obscurity, sickness, Imprisonment, nay Death itself, such absolute Evils of themselves, as never to be alienated from their malignity, and converted into Goods, by the Chemistry of a Virtuous mind? What reason have we to conceive, that those Generous Spirits would have complained of the injustice of God's Providence; if he had been pleased to have allotted them the same apparent Evils, and consigned them to the same sufferings? The Wiseman considers, that if the rapine of his Enemies, the oppression of Tyranny, the devouring jaws of Fire, or other sinister Accident deprive him of his estate; yet notwithstanding he loseth nothing, that was properly his own: if he be tormented in his body; that his rags of Flesh are torn off, his mud-walled Cottage shattered, but that impatible Tenant, his Soul, remains whole and invulnerable. In a word, as the tall Olympus advanceth his intemerated head above the clouds, and with a smooth front looks down upon the pageantry of Thunder, and other vaporing Meteors of the Aer: so doth the head of a Virtuous Person stand above the Clouds of Misfortunes, and with a magnanimous bravery bid defiance to Adversity, in all the Fogs of trouble still conserving the serenity of his mind imperturbed. Nihil accidere bono viro mali potest. Non miscentur Contraria. Quemadmodum tot amnes tantum supernè dejectorum imbrium, tanta medicatorum vis sontium, non mutant saporem maris, nec remittunt quidem: ita adversarum rerum impetus viri fortis non vertit animum, manet in statu, & quicquid evenit, in suum colorem trahit. Est enim omnibus externis potentior. Nec hoc dico, non sentit illa, sed vincit, & alioquin quietus placidusque contra incurrentia attollitur: Omnia adversa, exercitationes put at, etc. saith the grave Seneca (lib. de Providentia.) Who having tuned his meditations to this heigh Key, falls not only into a profuse Encomium of that saying of his admired Cynic, Demetrius; Nihil mihi videtur infelicius co, cui 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Bias. nil unquam evenit adversi, nothing in my judgement can be more unhappy, than he who never tasted of Adversity: but into this Parodox also, that the condition of Regulus, in his nailed barrel, was as far from real Infelicity, as that of the great Maecenas solacing his pampered limbs on a couch of down. For weighing the constant and invincible Patience of the one, against the perpetual Anxiety or civil war in the breast of the other, he concludes, quod dubium sit, an electione Fati data, plures Reguli nasci, quàm Mecaenates velint; that it may be disputed whether or no, if men might elect their own Fates, the greater number would not rather choose to be born under the angry stars of the former, than the slattering constellation of the latter: so indifferent are those things to a Wise man, which the judgement of the Sense hath denominated Good and Evil. This magnanimous temper of a Virtuous Mind, those Idiots Article 11. The Atheists objection, that God aught, in justice, always to preserve Good men from suffering Evil; expunged. never so much as heard of, who have objected; that it would have been more consistent with the justice of Divine Providence, rather constantly to have preserved Good men from affliction, then to subject them to the malice and oppression of Evil men, and afterward seem to vindicate their integrity, and compensate their sufferings, by a late remuneration of happiness, and the punishment of their Oppressors. For even Good men themselves esteem those acute Afflictions, as a Diploma or Testimonial of their genuine Education in the Academy of Virtue, and, like Veteran Soldiers, produce the scars of their wounds, as so many indelible characters of Valour, and consequently of Honour. They look upon their smartest stripes, as the fair impresses of Gods paternal Affection; and return him a patiented submission to his frequent chastisements, as the most grateful sacrifice of Gratitude, their frail and indigent condition can afford. They account their temporal Dejections, not only an undeniable symbol of his Special Favour, in this military state; since they manifest them to be elected by him, non ad mollitiem, sed ad tolerantiam, not to dull and inglorious effeminacy, but honourable hardship, and masculine achievements: but also as an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or Earnest of their eternal advancement, in the Jubilee, when he shall distribute his triumphant wreaths of Laurel, such whose Verdure shall know no decay, till the impossible period of Eternity. Thus the Valiant, with noble emulation, contend for priority in enterprises of the highest difficulty and most eminent danger; and then think themselves in most grace and reputation with their General, when he vouchsafes them the honour of the Forlorn Hope, and consignes them to encounter a whole Host of Deaths. Thus the Lacedaemonian youngsters measured the affection of their Parents, and Tutors, not by their indulgence; but the severity of their chastisements: and embraced their smartest flagellations as welcome opportunities to experiment their Constancy. And thus the Wives of Ruscia estimate their Husband's love, not by the frequency of their Conjugal Embraces, but of their Castigations: and then bewail themselves as more then half repudiated, when their matrimonial Lords neglect to afford them the benevolence of the Lash. And yet for all this shall man, noble man, who is the Soldier, Son, and spouse of Providence, so far forget his courage, constancy, and duty, as to repine against those things as Evil; which are, by the Supreme Wisdom, intended for his Good, nay which a mind, imbued with the sovereign Tincture of Virtue, hath a power, were they real Evils, to convert into inestimable Benefits? I do not only assent unto, but gratefully applaud their judgements, Article 12. The Summum bonum of this life, consistent in a full consormity of our wills to the Divine will. who have defined the essence of Good and Evil, in this life, by the Truth or Falsehood of Opinion; experience informing me, that the Sensual Appetite of some apprehendeth many things under the title of absolute and transcendent Goods, which the Rational Appetites of others abhor, as positive and detestable Evils. And therefore, when the soul sits in consult upon the Election of Good, she ought first to wipe her eyes from all the dust of Sensual Prejudice, and resolve that the Vote of Temporal interest shall go for nothing, but disturbance and seduction; fixing her Cogitations only upon that pathognomonick, or proper and inseparable, and therefore infallible sign, by which the Wisdom of God hath described what's really Good; and that is, an indifferency to all objects but himself, or a free and total resignation of our Wills to his, or more precisely, if he hath appointed it. This most excellent lesson, that Stoical Emperor, Marcus Article 13. An excellent meditation of Marcus Antoninus, concerning the Good and Evil occurrent to man in this life. Antoninus had often read by the mere light of Nature, and endeavouring to reduce it into practice, whispers this maxim to himself: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; opinioni autem mali aut boni adsentire mens non debet (lib. de seipso 5. number. 18.) and in one short meditation states the whole Controversy concerning the good and evil occurrences to man; which for that reason, I here present to the Reader. Dicit aliquis: infelicem me, cui hoc acciderit! quinimo, felicem me, qui hunc casum sine dolore perferam, & nec praesentibus frangar, nec futura extimescam! Nam unicuique tale quid potuit accidere: at non cujusvis erat, sine dolore cum casum excipere. Cur igitur illud potius infortunio, quàm hoc felicitati adscribts? Aut cur id infelicitatem hominis appellas, in quo nihil mali passa est hominis natura? An verò tibi humanae naturae damnum videri potest id, quod non est contra propositum naturae ejus? Quod ergo naturae propositum esse didicisti? Num casus iste efficere poterit, quo minus sis justus, magnanimus, temperans, prudens, circumspectus, tutus ab errore, verecundus, liber? aut adimere omninò quicquam eorum, quae hominis naturae sunt propria? Proinde quoties inciderit quicquam quod ad dolorem te provocet; recordare ●ujus praecepti: non illud quod accidit infortunium verè esse, sed quòd fortiter illud feras, id felicitati tribuendum esse. (lib. 4. numero 31.) Some man [perchance] says, that I am unhappy, to whom this infortune hath happened! Nay, rather may he say, that I am happy, who can endure this misfortune without grief; and am neither dejected with the present, nor afraid of future Accidents. For the like might have befallen any other man: but 'twas not in the power of every one to sustain that misfortune without grief. Why, therefore, do you ascribe that rather to misfortune, than this to Felicity? or why account that to be an infelicity of man, wherein the Nature of man hath suffered nothing of Evil? Can that seem to you to be an Injury to Humane Nature, which is not contrary to the intention thereof? What, therefore, hast thou learned the Intention of Nature to be? Can this misfortune effect, that thou mayest be less just, magnanimous, temperate, prudent, circumspect, superior to error, modest, free? Or can it take from thee any of those things, which are proper to the Nature of man? So often, therefore, as any Accident shall occur, which may provoke thee to grief; remember this Precept: that what happens, is not truly Misfortune; but that thou canst bear it nobly, is a Happiness. More than this, I can not, need not say, in order to the refutation of this Objection: and therefore I remit the unsatisfied to the more profound, elegant, and ample discourse of the learned Mornaeus Du Plessis (lib. de veritate Christianae Religionis, cap. 12.) on the same subject; and leave the satisfied to the calm enjoyment of their persuasion. CHAP. VI The Mobility of the Term of Man's Life, asserted. SECT. I. HAving thus by Apodictical and uncontrollable Reasons made it manifest, that all things in the Universe, Article 1. The Affinity of this Theorem to the precedent, intimated: and the necessary division thereof into a specifical and individual consideration. as well Generals, as Particulars, Contingents as Necessaries, are in the means, manner, opportunity and finality of their Operations, precisely predetermined, disposed, and procured by the General Providence of God; that all Occurrences of every individual man's life, are the prescripts and consignations or allotments of his Special and Paternal Providence; and by the mere Light of Nature dispelled all those clouds, which either ancient Ehtnicism, or modern Atheism hath exhaled from the abyss of Hell, to obscure the splendour of both those excellent truths: it remains only, that we deduce the influence of Divine Providence down to the Catastrophe, or Exit of life, or prove the extension of it to the point of Death; and endeavour a compendious and plain decision of that tedious and enigmatical Controversy, An terminus Vitae humanae sit immobilis? Whether the period of every individual man's life be so immovably fixed by the Special Providence of God, that it can be neither by any negligence, immoderate and inordinate use of those things Physicians call the Six Nonnaturals, or sudden Casualties, anticipated or abbreviated; nor by prudence, temperance, convenient Medicaments, or caution, prolated or prolonged? For the first; viz. That God is the sole Moderator▪ though not the Author of Article 2. The reasons of the Author's concise tractation of the first part. Death (for reason will not endure that we conceive him to have created a Privation;) or, more plainly, that the hand of his Providence guides the dart of that inevitable and victorious Enemy to life; this is a position so frequently and amply illustrated by the pens of many the most learned and judicious men of all ages, religions, and professions; and so genuinely and directly inferrible from the Context and importance of those Arguments formerly introduced, in order to the Demonstration of the interest of Providence, even in the smallest interludes of Nature, and most apparently fortuitous effects of all subordinate Causes: that, should we run out into any profuse probation thereof, in this place, the most patiented and candid Reader could not but frown at the attempt, and justly censure it, none only as unnecessary and supercrogatory, but also as scandalous and derogatory to his own Dialectical and Collective habilities. And therefore humbly referring him as well to his own easy recognition of notions formerly collected from the lecture of other more mature and nervous Discourses on the same Theorem; as his familiar Inductions upon many propositions inspersed upon the leaves of this our cold and dull December's Exercise: I shall, in avoidance of an undecent Chasm, or Vacuity, insert only two concise and obvious Arguments, as Corollaries, or annexes inservient to the same persuasion. Article 3. The moderation of Death by Special Providence Divine, argued from the impossibility of the moderation thereof by any other power. Argument I. The life, and consequently the Death of every man necessarily depends upon the absolute Will of the Creator, and so upon the Decrees or resolves of his Providence; or upon some other Principle extraneous, alien, and superior to the nature of man; or upon man himself. Not upon any Third or Neutral Principle; for that must be either the Epicureans Fortune; or the Stoics Anus Fatidica or Fate; or Homer's Lottery; or Pythagoras his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, mentioned by Plutarch (de placit. 1.) or the Jews Angelus mortis, or their terrible she Devil Zilith described by our many-tongued Gregory (in tract. de Episcopo puerorum, out of the Glossa Talmud, in Nidda, fol. 24) and erroneously conceived, by Gassarel (Unheard of Curiosities, pag. 317.) to be the same with Lucina of the Romans, for the one was thought propitious to parturient women, the other so hostile and malignant, that the Hebrew Wives, so soon as they fell in travel, caused this proscription to be written on the door of their bedchamber, Adim, Chavah, chouts Lilith; Adam, Eve, keep out Lilith; or the Astrologers Helec and Alcocoden, and the like 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the Planets called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Fridariae, derided by Archangelus a Burgo novo (in Comment. in dogmat. Cabalist.) and Scalger (in Comment. in Manilium) or the Numbers, Ideas, or grand Revolution of Plato; or the Malus Deus of the Manachees; or Helena, alias Selene, of Simon Magus; or Hesiods Pandora; or the great Beldame Mylitta, alias Alytta, of the Ethnics; or the Turks Nassub, alias Ctusura, which signifies the Goddess Fortune; or Paracelsus his Anima mundi Platonica, or rather the Macrocosmical Harmony of the Universe, and the Microcosmical Concordance with the invisible signatures of the Ascendent; or that Hermetico-magical Lamp of life and death, lately invented and cried up by Ernestus Burchgravius, but most judiciously extinguished by Sennertus (de Consensu Chymicorum cum Galen. cap. 18.) or that Internal man of Paracelsus, named Ens syderium, Olympicum, Gabalim, etc. by that vain admirer and promoter of Hermetical Follies, Oswaldus Crollius (in Basil. Chym. praefat. admonit. p. 6. 4. & 65.) or the implacable Strix, or Erinnys of the Gentiles; or, finally, some such fantastic Hobgoblin, that hath no more of reality, than what it borrows from the confused and obscure idea of itself, conceived in the luxuriant womb of a perturbed or deluded Imagination: but every sober man already knows, that all these are absolute Chimaeras, hatched in the adled brains of mad men, Poets, and idolatrous Pagans; and so below our laughter, much more our serious Confutation. Not upon Man himself, or any domestic Conservatory essentially inherent to his Nature. For that absurdity once conceded, entangles our reason in two the highest Impossibilities imaginable▪ (1) it confounds the Relative Maxims of Nature, breaks her chain of Dependence, and infers a second Self-existence beside Divinity; for, dreaming that a Principiate Entity actually existent, gave to itself existence; that a Future something derives its 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or Futurition immediately and solely from itself; and that nothing can, by its own power, attain to be something, i e. that which is neither Potentia, nor Actus, can endow itself with the perfection of both Power and Act; we must be carried upon this rock, that there is in the World a second something 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Non principiate, Causeless, and Self-sufficient, besides God; which is a falsehood far beyond the two Principles of all things imagined by the Manichees, and more ridiculous than the Devils promise to make our Saviour Monarch of the World. (2) It imports an absolute power in man to make himself immortal; a Delusion that never found entertainment in the brain of the most desperate Hypochondriack, nor durst the Father of lies ever suggest it to his most credulous vassals. It follows therefore of pure necessity, that as God is the Author of life; so also can he alone dispose of the issues of Death, and that the end, as well as the beginning and mutations of all things are subject to the moderation of his Providence. Article 4. The same demonstrated, from the necessary dependence of all natural motion in its beginning, continuation, and period, on the will of the First ●over. Argument 2. A confessed Verity it is, that all Natural Motion must proceed from one First Motor, which can be no other but God, until we can find out something coequal to him in Eternity; and a position never yet disputed, that the life of man is a Natural Motion, to which the Apostle seems to allude in his sacred axiom, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in God we live, move and have our being (Act. 17. ver. 28.) and of parallel certainty it is, that every motion hath its determinate beginning, duration, and period, dependent on the Will of the First Mover: therefore must the end as necessarily as the beginning and continuation of man's life, his Death as well as his conception, nativity, and maturity be certainly commensurated, defined, and limited by the Special Providence of God. Frequent glimpses of this Argument have I perceived in the mounments of the most Ethnical Philosophers; nor shall our thoughts want the patronage of great probability, if we conjecture, that our Patriarch, Galen (in most other things, but weakly armed against their censure, who have assaulted his memory with the detestable Epithet, ' 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an Atheist of the highest Classis) had his mind touched with the same Magnet, at that time, when he wheeled about from his old position of a mere Naturalist, and pointed directly at the pole of Divine Providence, in these words, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (2. de usu part.) God hath done all things, that he had formerly decreed to do. SECT. II. For the second; MOre than sufficient reason had I, to call it a Tedious and Article 1. A transient discovery of the almost insuperable Difficulties to be encountered in the worthy and satisfactory solution of this problem, whether the Term of man's life be Movable, or Fatal; premised by way of Apology for the Author's unequal judgement: and his purpose of taking a middle way between the absolute Fatality of the Stoic, and the mere Fortune of the ●picuream. Enigmatical Controversy. For, first, the obscurity of the Subject (being such whose clear imperceptibility hath worthily listed it among the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or secrets of God's Council, proposed rather to excite and entertain our reverential Wonder, then exercise our saucy Curiosity) hath unhinged the brains of most, who have essayd to explain it, and lost their judgements in a wilderness of various opinions, discrepant 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as far as heaven and earth each from other, and left future enquiry instructed rather what to avoid, than what to sollow: insomuch that the learned and profound Job. Beverovicius, whose flame of scrutiny had kindled the most erudite and heroical Wits, on this side the line, into a desire and attempt to afford him satisfaction in this particular; when he had received, perused and indifferently prepended their several Epistolical responses, found himself still perplexed with his former tremor of Scepticism, and therefore confessed; super hac re nuper plures consului, qui an sibi ipsis satisfecerint nescio, mihi certè penitùs satisfacere non potuerunt; in tanta it aque opinionum varietate equidem ferè dixerim cum Xenophonte apud Varronem, Hominis est hec opinari, Dei scire. And again, whosoever deserves the Laurel at this Olympic exercise, by deciding the quaestion on the side of Truth; must first reconcile those inveterate Antipathies between absolute Fate and man's Freewill: must clearly distinguish between the certain Prescience, and immutable Predestination, or Predetermination, of the Divine Intellect and Will, (a task not to be undertaken after dinner, nor performed upon one leg; as must soon appear to him, who sufficiently excogitates, how hardly the blunt edge of man's understanding can divide betwixt the Praevidence of God, and his positive Decrees settled from all eternity: since Cognition, Election, Volition, and Decretion make but one simple and entire act in his Intellect; nor can reason make out, how God can Foresee mere Contingents, while they are yet in the nothing of Futurity, unless because he hath preordained the means, place, time, and other circumstantial requisites to their respective Contingencies) must determine that troublesome Doubt of the Schoolmen, whether any of God's Decrees are Hypothetical or Conditionate, and so subject to mutation upon man's observation, or non-observation of the Condition, or proviso on his part to be performed? and, lastly, must solve that Scruple, An Scientia conditionata certam ponit futurorum scientiam, or, An condition at a Dei volunt as ullum faciat decretum de futurorum eventu? Whether the hypothetical or conditionate Will of God (if any such there be) doth import an absolute and immutable Decree, concerning the event of things to come? Problems, about which not only the gravest Philosophers have stretched the membranes of their brains, and with great anxiety hacked and slashed for many ages together; but even the Church herself hath disputed so hotly, that she hath rend her seamless coat of Faith into such numerous and wide Schisms, that we her sons may sooner expect the conversion of the Jews, than a full reconciliation and reunion of all her Sects. Nor am I subject to so uncurable a Frenzy of Vanity, as not to know how immense a disproportion lieth between the utmost extent of my short judgement, and the centre of the necrest of these Abstrusities; but acknowledging the decision of any one of them as far above my Presumption, as Capacity, I think it both honour and satisfaction enough for me, to have collected so much light from the beams of Mersennus, Episcopius and others, as may serve to conduct the mind of the ingenious Reader into a middle way betwixt the Absolute Fatality of the Stoics, on one extreme; and the absolute Fortune of the Epicureans, on the other. The First whereof strains the cord of Predestination up to the height of inevitable Necessity; and so leaves nothing in the power either of Man's freewill, or the conspiracies of Second Causes; nay chain's up the hands of the First Cause in fetters of Adamant, according to that of the Poet. Fatis agimur, cedite fatis. Non sollicitae possunt curae Mutare rati stamina fusi. Quicquid patimur mortale genus, Quicquid agimus, venit ex alto. Non illa Deo vertisse licet Quae nexa suis currunt Causis. By Fate we are impelled; submit To what the Destinies think fit. That thread, by ' th' Fatal Damsels spun, By our Cares can ne'er b' undone. What we act, what undergo, From their fixed Decrees doth slow. Jove himself cannot control What does from linked Causes roll. As also that of Sencca (de providentia, where he had the reason to speak it:) Quicquid est, quod nos sic vivere jussit, sic mori: eadem necessitate & Deos alligat. irrevocabilis humana pariter ac divina cursus vehit, ille ipse omnium Condiror ac Rector scripsit quidem Fata, sed sequitur. semper paret: semel jussit. The Others cut it quite asunder, and so relaxing the ligaments of Providence Divine, leave all Events to the lose and undetermined results or hits of mere Chance: but both concurring in the most bloody Error of Irreligion. But the concernment of our present Theme will lead us into a more particular, express, and ample enquiry, how that long Civil war betwixt these three different Notions of Fate, Fortune, and freewill, I may be conciliated and brought to a full Combination and Consistence with Divine Providence. In the mean time, that we may, both with more decent Method, and perspicuity, attain to some verisimilous (at least) Article 2. Two praevious considerable, necessary to the ●ight understanding and consequent discussion of the question. solution of our present Problem, viz. Whether the Term of man's life (in individuo) be so immovably prefixed by the Decrees of Divine Providence, as that neither temperance or care on man's part can extend, nor the violence of second Causes, situate without the orb of his moderation, accelerate it? Necessary it is, that we seriously examine and search into the marrow of two things conductive to the right stating, and consequently the right understanding of the Question: (1) What we are to understand by the Term of Life: (2) In what sense we are to understand this Term to be sixth, or movable. What we are to understand by the Term of Life. Concerning the First; obvious it is, that all things, or causes inservient both to the Conservation of life and the adduction of Article 3. The necessary relation of all Causes both of life and death, to three General heads, viz. Necessary, Fortuitous, Supernatural; supports the discrimination of the Term of life into Supernatural, Natural, & Accidentary: & the impertinency of the consideration of the Supernatural Term, to the present scope. its period, Death, fall under the contents of three General heads; for either they must refer to those that are Necessary, or such as, by the ordinary course of Nature, no man can subsist without, to which classis belong our Aliment, Aer, sleep, etc. or (2) Non necessary or Fortuitous, which no way conduce to the Fomentation or fuel of our Vital Flame, but point blank to the Extinction of it; and therefore the instinct of nature persuades every man to avoid them; such are Shipwrecks, stabbs, shots, precipices, halters, etc. causes of immature, sudden and violent deaths: or (3) Merely Supernatural, or the Will of God, which as it is impossible (without Special Divine Revelation) for us to foreknow, so also to alter, or prevent. Upon these three pillars was it, that Laurentius Joubertus erected his triple Difference of the Term of man's life; making one Supernatural, such as the Breath of our nostrils was pleased to assign to most of the Antediluvian Patriarches, or Seminaries of Humanity, either in order to the more expedite multiplication of mankind, to the more advantageous invention and propagation of Arts and Sciences, or for some other considerable respect, at which our ignorance can only squint by conjecture: which being long since canceled, Art sits down in a contented despair to renovate, nor can the records of the world afford us the story of any impudence, that durst rant so high, as to promise it, except that of a certain Mountebank Greek, derided by Galen, and our late Nugipolyloquides, Paracelsus; both which experimentally confuted their own unpardonable Arrogance, before their sands had run out 50 years. Another Natural, which physiology defines by that space of time, during which our radical Balsam, or the oleaginous Fuel of our vital Lamp, maintains the innate Heat, or Flame of life, until the total exhaustion of the one, causeth a total privation of the other; or, more plainly, that circle of time, which comprehends the seven Segments or Ages of man; which, though prestitute and limited, by the Governor of Nature, according to the compute of the Psalmist, to 80. years, of Plato to 81. of the Egyptians to 100 (Caelius Rodiginus, 19 antiq. Lect. cap. 21. & joh. Langius, lib. 1. Epist. Medicinal. 79.) of the best of the Sibylls to a 100 as is expressed in those 2. verses corrected by the incomparable Salmasius (Pliniarum observat. pag. 77.) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; And of the ancient Jews, to 120. (joseph. Antiq. judaic. lib. 1.) is yet left to some considerable latitude, and hath more or less of Duration, respective to the more or less durability of the Principles of life, i. e. the Eucrasy, or Dyscrasy of the body, in every individual; provided that neither the oil be inquinated by crude, or putrid Supplies, nor prodigally depredated by immoderate intention of its consumer, the Flame, nor that immaturely either suffocated, or wasted by Diseases, or suddenly extinguished by violent Accidents; which make the third Difference, or Accidentary Term of life. But as for the first branch of this Ternary, the Metaphysical, or Supernatural Term of man's life, dependent on the Divine Will immediately; since according to the doctrine of Nicholaus Florentinus (in Serm.) the Conciliator (in different. Medicis) and Joubertus (in Errorib. popular.) it concerns only the first Age of the World: this place may very conveniently want any farther consideration thereof; nor can it much avail to the achievement of our design, to insist upon more than the two last. By the Term of life, therefore, we ought to understand either Article 4. The proper import of the Natural Term of man's life: and also of the Accidental. (1) that period of every individual man's days, which is caused by a sensible decay, and total dissolution of the ligaments, which chain the Soul to the Body; or, more expressly, by an extinction of his Vital Flame, naturally succeeding upon a consumption of its Pabulum, or fuel, the Radical Moisture, when both those Principles of life are permitted to their natural and proper tenor, i. e. when no Preternatural Cause intervenes, and by Corruption anticipates the dissolution of that Disposition or Temperament of the Elements of the body, upon which the subsistence of life doth necessarily depend: or (2) the end of every man's life, in general, whensoever, and by what means soever, either Diseases, or violent and unexpected Accidents, introduced; without any respect to the gradual and successive declination, and consequent cessation of the Natural Temperament, in the marasmus of old age. Now from the acceptation of the Term of Life, in the First signification, there genuinly emerge Two Questions: First, Whether this Term of life, which is circumscribed, per Article 5. The result of our acceptation of the Term of life, in the first signification. ipsius temperamenti defluxum & decursum, by the natural Deflux., or wearing out of the requisite Temperament of the body, and which we may, without impropriety, call a kind of mature, easy and spontaneous falling asunder of the Ligaments of life; be absolutely and definitely fixed, so that God hath constituted to leave the nature of every Individual to its own moderation, nor by any means to interrupt or alter its course prescribed: i. e. not by any means to procure, that this Deflux of the Temperament should have more or less duration, then what may naturally be expected from the more or less durability thereof, dependent on the more or less perfect proportion, that the Passive and Active Principles hold each to other; or, more plainly, that the Renitency or Resistance of the Oil holds to the depredatory and consumptive Activity of the Flame. Secondly, if this Term of life be thus Fixed, and that God indeed hath decreed not to intent or prolong that Deflux of the Temperament, beyond the point of its natural Durability; whether yet notwithstanding, without alteration of his Decree of committing Nature to its own establish'● course, he may not, being thereunto moved by our repentance, prayers, and piety, correct those depravities, and repair those violent decays of that our temperamental Constitution, occasioned by intemperance, diseases, extraneous Accidents, or other means whatever; and so hinder the otherwise impendent immature Collabascence, and precipitous Dissolution thereof? In a word; Whether, though God hath predetermined, that no man shall exceed that Term of life, to which the Durability of his individual Temperament, or the strength of his particular Constitution may, in probability, be extended; his Special Providence doth not yet suffer, that, by reason of putrefactive and destructive Preternatural Causes occurrent, the temperament may be vitiated, impaired, and ruined: and so not hold out to that point of time, to which otherwise, in respect of its primigenious and native condition, it might have lasted? But if we understand the Term of life in the second signification; Article 6. The consequence of our understanding the Term of life, in the second signification. then the Question must be: Whether the immature or preternatural Period of every individual man's life, by what means soever, either disease, famine, war, wounds, nausrage, decollation, suspension, suffocation, luxury, drunkeness, solicitude, grief, etc. occasioned, be so precisely fixed by Destiny; that no prudence or caution on his part can transpose, nor danger of fortuitous Accidents invading, accelerate or prevert it? In short; Whether the Catastrophe of every man's life be prescribed in the book of Fate. In what sense we are to understand the Term of Man's Life to be Fixed or Movable. As for the Second Preconsiderable; the Term of life may be Article 7. The Fixation of the Term of life, acceptable in a double interest; viz. (1) in respect to some Absolute Divine Decree, precedent even to God's Prescience of all Secondary or instrumental Causes: (2) to some Hypothetical Divine Decree, whose mutability is suspended on the liberty of man's Will. And the indifferency of either branch of the distinction to our instant design. said to be Fixed in a twofold sense: (1) in respect to some positive Divine Decree, antegredient or precedent not only to all conspiracies, but also the Prescience of all Secondary or Instrumental Causes; whereby God hath so precisely fixed and limited a certain space, or time of life to every single man, together with all relative Circumstances, as place, manner, or kind, and cause of Death: that it is absolutely impossible to man, what means soever he shall use to the contrary, in order to his preservation, or what dangers soever he shall have formerly exposed himself unto, notwithstanding, either to prolong his life beyond, or to fall before that Fatal Term. (2) In respect not to some Absolute, but Hypothetical, or Conditionate Decree of God: i. e. such whose mutation or accomplishment is suspended on the liberty, or Free Election of man's Will, according as that, either being conducted by the manuduction of Light Supernatural, or Divine Grace, shall pursue the real and true Good; or being seduced by the delusion of its own sensual judgements, shall wander in the devious tracts of Error, and so hunt after only apparent and false Good. Now whether we understand this Conditionate Decree to be made and grounded upon a certain and infallible prenotion of all concomitant things, circumstances, manners, causes, and finally of man's election of and adherence unto Good, or Evil objects, and his consequent Virtuous or vicious course of life: or whether we understand it to be made without any such certain Prenotion, or Volition of Prenotion at all; but yet with a deliberate and positive Sentence certainly to be pronounced and executed in the fullness of time, or opportunity, when the right use, or abuse of this Prerogative or Freedom of the Will, shall be in actual determination, i. e. shall ripen the Suppositionality of the decree into Absoluteness, and reduce the Possibility thereof into actual Necessity: the distinction is not Material. For it can be of no considerable advantage to our present attempt, whether of these two Notions we prefer; and that the reason is, why we here omit to inquire, whether holds the nearest Cognation to truth. From these premises hath the judgement of man extracted three Article 8. Three different opinions vulgarly extracted from the precedent Distinction. different opinions. The First, of those, who hold it as point of faith, that the Term of every man's life, together with all means or Causes, immediate, mediate, remote, circumstantial and corollary, or in any relation whatever pertinent thereto, is absolutely immovable and Fatal; being precisely decreed by the immutable and irresistible law of the Divine Will. The Second, of those, who aver the absolute Fatality, or Fixation of every individual man's Term of life, à Posteriori: but decline it à Priori, i. e. they concede, that in truth the term of every man's life is appointed by the irrevocable decree of Fate, in this respect, that it can never be extended or spun out to the duration of one moment beyond that, to which the natural condition of his particular Temperament promises him to attain: but not in this respect, that it admits no possibility of Contraction or Abbreviation. The Third, of those, who allow the Term of life to be Fatal indeed; yet upon no higher a Necessity, then that of God's mere Prenotion, or hypothetical determination, respective to man's right use▪ or abuse of the Liberty of his Will: and therefore not so fixed, but that it may be not only abbreviated but also prolonged; non praesupposita ista aut praenotione, aut hypothesi citra praenotionem. And this is the most passant Division of men's dissenting opinions Article 9 The convenient reduction of them to 〈◊〉 only. concerning this intricate Subject; but if we come with naked minds to examine the state of the difference between the last and the second, we shall find them concentral in the point of Mutability or Mobility: and therefore both perspicuity and brevity persuade, that we gratefully adhere to that more convenient reduction of all opinions concerning this Theorem, to two only, offered by Joh. Beverovicius (Epist. ad Simon. Episcopium) in words of this importance: Some maintain the Term of man's life to be fixed by the eternal and immutable law of Destiny; and on the contrary, others contend that it is not so fixed, but that it remains movable as well forwards as backwards, not only obnoxious to Decurtation or Anticipation, by depravities and exorbitances of the Six Non-naturals, by Epidemical Diseases, or by a thousand unexpected Knocks of unconstant Fortune; but also capable of Production or Postposition by a temperate, anticachectical and cautious course of life. Now as for the First of these Opinions; 'tis generally known Article 10. The First opinion declared; and the principal Abettors thereof mentioned. to have been Canonical among the Stoics, who bond up the efficiency of all things in the Universe, in the iron chains of Fate; believing all events subject to so uncontrollable a necessity, that their prevention, suspension, or alteration is not only above the hopes of man (whose virtuous endeavours, piety, and prayers must therefore prove as fruitless and ineffectual towards the Aversion; as vitiosities, impiety and profaneness towards the Attraction or Acceleration of any misfortune predecreed) but even of God himself: whom though they allow to have been the Author of that sempiternal and irrepealable law of Destiny, yet they deny him to have reserved to himself the prerogative of exemption from the obligation thereof. This was the Creed of Philetas, when he said▪ ‛ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. — Mortales superat quodcunque necesse est, Vi solida; quia nec superos reveretur, in almis Qui Coeli spatiis degunt sine luctibus aevum. Of that old Poet, quoted by Cicero (de Fato) who said, quod fore paratum est, id summum exuperat Jovem: and of that renowned Captain, Hector, when being importuned by his wife not to hazard himself in a sally upon the Grecian trenches, he conjured her fond fears into a resolved confidenco, that no sword could reach his heart, but that of Fate, by this spell; Parce, precor, nimio misera indulgere dolori; Nam quis me, Fat is invitis, mittet ad Orcum? Nullum equidem vitasse hominum dico ultima Fata. Prithee, forbear thy needless grief; and know, No hand can send me to the shades below, Without the Fates assent. I hold it true, What Fate hath destined, no man can eschew. As also of those Military men, mentioned by P. Gregorius Tholosanus (lib. 21. the republs. cap. 8.) whose minds being seasoned with the same persuasion, that the manner and moment of every man's Death is appointed by the immutable law of Fate, and his lot inscribed in invisible Characters on his forehead; became of so hard a temper, as to be wholly insensible of the threats of that terrible Giant, Danger: nor did they account it other than a vanity, resulting from the cowardice of Ignorance, to provide against the blows of War either by caution, or defensive arms; urging the examples of many valiant Soldiers, who have been observed to have confronted whole showers of leveled bullets, shot from the near engines of the advancing Foe, without a wound; and yet at last have fallen by some petite and unexpected pebble thrown from the sure sling of Destiny, even then, when they seemed immured in the secure Citadel of Peace, and thought their triumphant Laurels armour of proof even against thunder. Occidis, Argivae quem non potuere phalanges Sternere, nec Priami regnorum eversor Achilles. Hic tibi mortis erant metae, etc. Virg. 12. Aeneid. But, alas! 'tis not the Academy of the Stoics alone, that affords patronage to this Error of Absolute Fatality; nor the Camp that only contends for the propagation thereof; nor the politic institutions of that Secretary of Hell, Mahomet, in his absurd Alcoran (cap. 6.) that only countenance the diffusion thereof in these our days: for even the Schools of Christianity, in some parts, have advanced the reputation thereof to so unreasonable and dangerous a height, as to make it an Article of Faith, if not absolutely necessary, yet at least collaterally conductive to Salvation; and this by Authority of the Council of Dort, which ratified the doctrine of their Apostle, Calvir, concerning Absolute Predestination, and enjoined the public Assertion thereof to most of their Divines of the last reformation. I said, the Doctrine of Calvin concerning Absolute Predestination; Article 11. The Stoical Fate; and the Calvinists Predestination, fully defined. thereby, though tacitly, intimating my knowledge of the no small Disparity between the Fate of the Stoics, and that propugned by many Christian Divines. The one being, as Chrysippus hath defined it, Sempiterna & indeclinabilis series rerum, & catena, quae seipsam velvit, & perpetuò implicat, per aeternos consequentiae ordines, ex quibus connexa est; A sempiternal and indeclinable series, syntax, or chain of Causes, whose turn, convolutions and perpetual implications are dependent on itself, by those eternal orders of consequence, of which it is made up and connected: the other, as the best of School men hath defined it, Pendens à Divino Consilio series, ordoque caussarum; a series, or successive complexion and order of Causes, dependent on the Will of God. From the just Collation of which two Definitions, our first thoughts may collect, that the Difference between the Stoical and Theological Fate, may be thus stated. The Former, in some things, excludes Divinity from that Article 12. A full and c●●ar discrimination of the Stoical, from the Theological Fate. round or Circle of Causes, referring all events, as well general, as particular, to the mere subsequence of Natural Actives operating upon capable Passives, subordinately connected unto, and so by successive influx necessarily disposing each other to the production of those particular Effects, to the Causation whereof their Natural Faculties were at first determinately accommodated: and, in others, includes Divinity within it, i. e. confines his Power and Will to that rigid and infringible Law of Necessity, excogitated by his Wisdom from all eternity, and established by his Decrce, at the inauguration of Nature to Existence. The Later makes the Will of God to be the first link in the cha●n of Causes, and so superior to the restriction of natural necessity dependent thereon. The Stoic, being a declared Enemy to the Arbitrary Prerogative of God, adligeth the Energy of the First and Infinite Cause to the capacity of Secondary and Finite; and, upon consequence, doth acknowledge neither the Liberty of his Will, nor the Absoluteness of his Power, or Omnipotency. But, on the Contrary, the Christian looks up to heaven, as the Council-house, where the Instruments, opportunity, place and success of every Action receive their Specification to this or that determinate purpose; to the Arbitrary Resolve of God, as the Definite Sentence or Injunction; and on all Second Causes, but as subordinate, and subalternally instrumental to the punctual execution and accomplishment of the same: and, upon legal consequence, concludes, that the Divine Will is absolutely Free, knowing no circumscription, but that of the Divine Wisdom; that the mere Fiat of that Council, is the Director, and Spring in the Engine of the World; and that the Author of Nature hath reserved to himself the Privilege of adding unto, detracting from, intending, remitting, inverting, transcending, or adnulling the fundamental Constitutions of Nature, and so breaking that Concatenation of Causalities, or the Chain of Fate, at pleasure. The Heathen absurdly dreamt that all effects are inevitably produced by the conspiracy and coefficiency of natural Causes, respectively qualified; or that all Accidents spring up from the proper tendency of their particular Efficients, without the influence, direction, or moderation of any other Virtue, besides their own native and Congenial Faculties. The more intelligent Christian proves, that all natural Causes do not produce their respective Effects 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ex inevitabili necessitate, by the absolute and neverfailing power of their Essential Qualities, or inherent endowments; but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, quatenus fieri licuit, or according to the possibility of their Concingency: and therefore, though he confesseth that all Events are foreknown and preordained in the eternal Council of God; yet he stands assured, as well upon the ground of Reason, as Faith, that the precise and opportune contingency of every individual Event proceeds from the insluence of this Providence, which disposeth and conjoineth some certain convenient Causes to the production of this or that determinate Effect, in some sort respecting the last of Ends, his own Glory. To conclude, the Stoic hath clipped the immense and towering wings of man's Will, and allows it no wider range, than what the line of Fate affords: while the sublimer Christian scorns to stoop to the Lure of any Necessity, besides the special Decrees of the Divine Council; not conceiving his will subject to the inclination, much less the compulsion, of any force below that of him, who conferred that infinite liberty upon it. For he, indeed, holds the reins of our Wills, and can bend them: yet non coactione violenta, sed leni suavique influxu, not by violent Coaction, but gentle and sweet Invitation, as the Schoolmen distinguish. Now if we consider Fate in the notion of the Stoics; 'twill Article 13. A list of the execrable Absurdities impendent on the opinion of Ablute Fatality; so accepted, as the Stoic proposeth it. be no easy wonder, if any man, though his reason be never so much hoodwinked with the veil of Prejudice, shall not at first glance discover it to be an opinion Blasphemous in respect to God; insomuch as it strikes at no less than the cardinal and inseparable Attribute of his Nature, Omnipotence, by coercing his infinite and arbitrary Activity with the definite laws of second Causes, and denying him the prerogative of absolute superiority to his mechanic Vicegerent, or (rather) Instrument, Nature: and, in respect of man, intolerably Absurd; since it subverts the Liberty of all humane actions, and leaves nothing in the power of man's Will either to elect, or avoid. For whoever conced's that the mind of man is subject to the compulsive regiment of Fatal Necessity, and so that all the actions of our lives are but the accomplishments of so many ineluctable, immovable, and inevitable Decrees, from the birth of time enroled in the Ephemerideses of Destiny; must also concede, upon clear inference, that our Creator endowed us with the Semidivine Faculty of Rationality, either to no purpose at all, or at best to facilitate our betraying ourselves into the snares of ruin and misery beyond possibility of reparation or redemption; Must induce, that the Will being deposed from her arbitrary throne, the judgement seat of Reason must fall to the ground; nor can there be any room left for Consultation to sit and determine the debates of the Soul concerning the good or Evil of her objects: since notwithstanding all our most profound, serious, and prudent Deliberation, the success of our actions, as well as the results of our counsels, would then be no other, but what hath been resolved on and predecreed by Fate; and then, to conceive ourselves obnoxious to punishment, for incurring those sins, which are imposed upon our wills by a necessity beyond our control, is an open derogation to the equity and Justice of the Divine Nature, and to ascribe our Evil to that, which is by essence superlatively Good. That Prudence, is miserable Folly; the study of Wisdom, laborious Vanity; and all our ancient Lawmakers, either ridiculous Fools, or detestable Tyrants: since they prescribe and enjoin those things, which either we must have done, had not they enjoined them, or are restrained from doing, in spite of our own conformable inclinations, by the contrary impulsion or seduction of Destiny. And, finally, that all Divine and Human Exhortation to Good, and Dehortation from evil, are unnecessary and supersluous. Thus shall Virtue and Vice vanish into mere and empty notions; and Religion become, what Libertines would have it, a mysterious and well contrived invention to support temporal Greatness, and fright vulgar minds into a tame submission to the arbitrary dictates of their imperious Lords: nor shall there be a Heaven to compensate suffering Piety, or a Hell for the punition of Villainy; because as the Good man could not but live honestly and religiously, whether he would or no; so must it not be in the power of the Wicked man, to abstain from doing Evil. Thus shall Love and Hatred, the two most useful Affections of our Souls, be rob of their proper Objects, Amiable and Detestable: nor shall Justice find convenient subjects, whereon to place Laudation and Vituperation; since Praise only belongs to those, who have chosen to do Good, when 'twas in their power to have done Evil and Dispraise is the due guerdon of those, who choose to do Evil, when 'twas in their power to have done Good. And thus shall all our Prayers be fruitless, our vows hopeless, our Sacrifices unprofitable, and all other acts of Devotion desperate Vanity. The least of which and of a myriad of other equivalent Absurdities, Incongruities, and obliqne, or appendent and inferrible Blasphemies, shooting up from this one poisonous root of Absolute Fatality; is more than enough inconsistent to the fundamentals both of Reason and Religion, to deter even Heathens from approaching, much more embracing and defending it. But as for Theological Fate, or Predestination; if accepted in the legitimate sense of the Primitive Church, and not in that rigorous and inflexible notion of the Germane Calvinist: I conceive it fully concordant not only to many Texts of Sacred writ, but even conciliable to man's Free will, notwithstanding the apparent repugnancy betwixt them; as I shall endeavour to prove singularly in an ensuing chapter. SECT. III. AS for the Second Opinion, viz. that the Term of man's Life Article 1. The Author's adhesion to the Second opinion, justified by two important reasons. is not fixed beyond possibility of either Anticipation, or Postposition; this, I profess, my judgement inclines me to prefer, as that which seems to be drawn in the directest line from the point of Truth; and that for two mighty Reasons. First, because there are very few places, or testimonies of Scripture, which may be thought to advantage the doctrine 1. of Absolute Fatality; but, on the contrary, very many allegable in defence of this. Secondly, because those Texts, which make for this, have 2. their importance so perpendicular, that nothing but a violent perversion can wrest, so perspicuous, that nothing but obscure interpretations can darken, so soft and easy, that nothing but over nice and unnatural Exceptions can harden it. And Justice will frown on that stupid partiality, that shall prefer paucity to multitude, obscurity to clarity, and difficult to genuine and familiar solutions. To explain and justify this by Instance; the Hercules, or Article 2. The great obscurity, & small validity of some Texts of holy writ, alleged by the Defendants of Fatality to warrant their opinion, detected. most▪ champion Text usually brought into the field to assert the opinion of Absolute Fatality, in the precise manner and time of every man's Dissolution into his first matter, is that of Job; Definiti sunt dies ejus, & numerus mensium ejus tecum est; statuta ejus fecisti, & non praeteribit: His days are determined, the number of his months are with thee; thou hast appointed his bounds, that he cannot pass. (chap. 14. vers. 5.) Now this place hath much of obscurity, and little of strength for the supportation of their opinion, more than ours. (1) Much of obscurity; since, though racked to the highest extension of its importance, no Logic can extort any other Conclusion from it, but this, that the Term of man's Life is fixed by God, so that impossible it is for man to remove it forwards to a greater longitude; the concession whereof no way infringeth our assertion. For hence it follows not, that 'tis impossible for man, by intempetance, by the temerarious obtrusion of himself upon the jaws of danger, or other means whatever, to Anticipate that Term, or remove it backwards to a greater Brevity. Again, I have yet met with no substantial reason, that may countermand our construction of these words, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or in the latitude of Generality; and therefore may safely understand them, as an expression of the brevity of man's life, in specie, not in individuo; their whole Mass weighing no more than this: that the life of man, being included within a certain Circle, or round of days and months, and circumscribed by a short succession of minutes flowing into a stream of Time, cannot possibly be extended to a longer duration than what our Creator hath prefixed to all mankind: i. e. then that moment to which he hath determined and adapted the durability of man's specisical Temperament, or Principles of Vitality. And thus interpreted, this place runs parallel to that of Moses (Psalm. 90. vers. 10.) Dies nostrae vitae septuaginta anni, & si in fortudinibus sit, octoginta anni, & fortitudo eorum molestia ac labour, quoniam recedit citò & avolamus: as also that of David (Psalm. 39 vers. 5.) Ecce, ut palmos posuisti dies meos, & aevum meum tanquam nihil coram te; profectò universae Vanitas est omnis homo stans; Behold, thou hast made my days as a hands breadth, and mine age is nothing before thee: every man, verily, at his best state is altogether Vanity. True it is (nor have I heard many, besides Helmont, and a Article 3. The Natural Causes (proxime) of the Longitude and Brevity of man's life: and the Author's private conjecture of the cause of Longevity in the first age of the world. Fanatique Brother or two of the mystical Order of the Rosy Cross, impugn it) that the Life of Man doth consist in a Peaceful Discord maintained between the 4 First Qualities (I understand them, according to the Physiology of Epicurus, and Cartesius, as certain Modifications of Matter, or Quantity) a rising from the commixture of them in a proportionate Dose, or commensurate symmetry, respective to the Activity of some and Patability of others; and proximly, in a requisite harmony, of the Primigenious Heat and Radical Moisture: which harmony being more or less durable according to the more or less exquisite temperament of body assigned to each single person, by the free dispensation of the Divine Will; it follows, unavoidably, that the Longitude or Brevity of every man's life must naturally depend upon the perfection, or imperfection of his Idiosyncrasy, or individual Constitution. Nor doth it carry less semblance of truth, that by the decrees of that Council, which is all Wisdom, and can therefore will nothing but what is superlatively Good, it was enacted, that the ordinary Duration of this Humane Temperament should be circumscribed and limited to some certain general, though not precisely adstrict, term or space of years, conceive of 70. 80. 90. or 100 over or under: and that our ingenerated Protogenitors, even before the depravation of their Vital Principles by their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or precipitous Fall, held their lives by the same common lease; for manifest it is, that the Tree of Life was planted in Paradise to this purpose, that the fruit thereof being frequently eaten might instaurate the vital Balsam of man as fast as it suffered exhaustion from the depredatory operation of his Implantate Spirit, and by a continual refocillation of impaired nature keep her up fresh and vigorous to longevity. To which I ask leave, with due submission to the correction of maturer judgements, to tender my private conception; that the like extraordinary means of making the sands of life run slowly and long in the glass of Time, was by the special indulgence of the great Preserver of men, permitted to Methusalem and other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the world's youth; whose registers amounted to more Centuries of years, then ours usually to Decades, and who outlived all the titles of Consanguinity. (2) Little of strength for the supportation of their opinion, Article 4. The Injustice of our Adversary, title of patronage from the forementioned text of Job, further manifested. more than of ours; for though we should concede, what these eager Patrons of Fatality principally insist upon, viz. that the sense of these words of Job is restrained only to that precise Term, or prestitute Date appointed by God to the life of every individual man: yet notwithstanding can they not from this concession extort more advantage to their plea, than what doth naturally result from thence towards the justification of ours. For Job doth not so much as tacitly insinuate, by what kind of Decree, manner of institution, or computation that Definition or Circumscription of days and months was made by God: nor is there ought to hinder us from affirming, that the tenor of his words remains sincere and inviolate, when we understand that kind of statute, concerning the circumscription of man's life to belong to that Classis of Decrees, which God, either upon his own infallible Previdence of the future demeanour of every man, or upon the Hypothesis of man's good or evil use of the liberty of his will, hath made, or may occasionally make. Besides all this our equitable conference of many other Texts of Scripture, which we shall have occasion, in the remaining dilucidation of this Theorem to allege, with this of Job; will plainly, and almost avoidable ascertain us, that his words are to be interpreted in our sense, de specie, and not the individuo. But, in the present, it is sufficient for us to have declared, that from that place of such reputed validity amongst the Defendants of Destiny, no firm Argument can be extracted to protect them, or impugn us. And therefore I find myself at liberty to discharge my proper Article 5. Seven testimonies, out of holy writ, supporting the mobility of the Term of man's life, in individuo. duty, viz. the Confession of those Reasons, which charmed my judgement to an adherence to their persuasion, who contend for the Mobility of the Term of man's Life. The First of those is desumed from the Testimonies of the Oracle of Truth, the Book of God; and in our list of those Testimonies, those deserve to stand in the front, which in ample, elegant, and express terms warrant our Assertion, that the life of man hath been, and may be, both Abbreviated and Prolonged. The Coryphaeus, or leading Text is that of the Wise King (Proverb. 10. vers. 27.) Timor Domini apponit (aut prolongat) dies; anni verò impiorum abbreviantur: the Fear of the Lord prolongeth days; but the years of the wicked shall be shortened. Then which nothing can be more express, perspicuous, and positive; and so nothing less subject to detorsion or altercation. The Lieutenant, or second to that, is the gracious encouragement to filial reverence and obedience annexed to the 5 th'. Precept in the Decalogue; Honora Patrem tuum, & matrem tuam, ut prolongentur dies tui super terram quam Jehov ah Deus tuus dat tibi: which the Apostle of the Gentiles (in Epist. ad Ephes. 6. ver. 2.) calls the first (understand it of the second table) Commandment with promise, viz. of a singular reward; or the first with a peculiar promise, and such as hath ever been held distinct from the promise made in the second Precept of the Decalogue, insomuch as that is common and universal, comprehending all kinds of Blessings, but this only peculiar and determined to that of diuturnous subsistence, or Longevity. In Exhod. 24. ver. 25. and many other places, the Penman of God earnestly inculcates the benefit of the Fear of God, by this forcible impulsive; that he would crown them with length, health, and serenity of days, who should revere his most sacred name and conscientiously observe his laws. Si colatis Deum vestrum, benedicet pani vestro, & aquis vestris, auferetque infirmitatem è medio vestri, non crit abortiens aut sterilis in terra vestra: numerum dierum in terra vestra complebo. Which importune incitement to piety, those Commentators have no way enlarged, who have extended it to this just height of intention; that to those happy Sons of Israel, who subjugated their Wills to the written Will of God, and cherished no desires so much, as those of cordial obedience to the rules of his Law, demeaning themselves reverently towards their Maker, and righteously toward their Neighbour; to these God would vouchsafe, not only that they should accomplish that lease of life, which they held by the grant of Nature, or the condition of each man's Idiosyncrasy; but even that their Temperament should be meliorated, made more symmetrical, compact, tenacious and consequently more durable, as well by the sovereign, balsamical, and restorative Faculties of their Aliment, impregnated or enriched by the tincture of his continual Benediction, as by the benign and salutiferous disposition of the Aer, and propitious influences of the Host of Heaven, which otherwise are wont to induce sensible Exorbitances and Anomalies upon the blood, spirits, and solid parts of man's body, and from those seeds of morbosities produce various both Acute and Chronique Diseases, which either consume, or corrupt the Vital Nectar, and accelerate the execution of that Sentence, Pulvis es, & Pulvis eris. So that of infirm, languid, and valetudinarious persons, they should be made robust, athletical, and longevous; no less than the Barren should be made Fertile: the one by the Conservatory, the other by the Prolifical virtue of God's special Grace. The same promise we read frequently repeated by God, in most of his Embassies delivered by his Secretary, Moses, to his People; and more particularly in Deuteron. 4. vers. 40. and chap. 30. vers. 20. And as he proposeth length of days for the desiderable reward of obedience: so, on the contrary, he makes Immaturity of Death, the affrighting penalty of Disobedience. For (Deuteron. 30. vers. 19 and 28. vers. 20.) contain a large Catalogue of infirmities, diseases, and corporal calamities fiercely comminated to the immorigerous and disobedient: and in vers. 62. 'tis emphatically said of Transgressor's, ye shall be left few in number, whereas you were as the stars of heaven for multitude; because thou wouldst not obey the voice of the Lord, thy God. A Third egregious text, is that where God, gratefully resenting salomon's Election of Wisdom before all other Accomplishments temporal set before him, supererogates to his vote, by the additional concession of long life (2 Kings 3. 14.) And if thou wilt walk in my ways, to keep my Statutes and commandments, as thy Father David did; then will I lengthen thy days. A fourth, is that definitive sentence of David (Psalm. 55. vers. ult.) Bloody and deceitful men shall not live out half their days. A Fifth, that of the same Author (Psalm. 102. vers. 25.) O my God take me not away in the midst of my days: and in like manner, (Psalm. 6. and 30. and 88 and 111.) he with fervent importunity supplicates, that God would be pleased not to cut off the thread of his life, while he was then in the spring and vigour of his age, but restore him from that languor and marcid Consumption, introduced by his grievous disease, to his pristine sanity, that he might thereby be enabled to chant his praises in the Sanctuary, and do good to the children of Zion. A Sixth, that remarkable Precedent of the prolongation of life beyond the term prefixed, King Ezechias (Esai. 38. vers. 10.) who being infested with the most mortiferous of diseases, the Plague, and convulst with the horror of death, denounced by the thundering Prophet; in the intervals betwixt the showers of heavy tears, he sighs out this lamentation: in the cutting off my days I shall go to the gates of death; I am deprived of the residue of my years. Mine age is departed, and is removed from me as a shepherds' tent: I have cut off like a weaver my life (vitam meam veluti textoris telam praecidi, as some read it) he will cut me off with pining sickness. Which signifies as much as this, that he was adjudged to die before his time. But this night of sorrow was dispelled by a comfortable morn, caused by the light of that Sun, which riseth with healing in his wings; for immediately after, his contrition, sincere resipiscence, and earnest supplications obtaining a repreive from the merciful hands of him, who desireth not the death of a sinner, the execution of that fatal sentence was suspended, and a paroll lease of 15. years' supernumerary annexed to that old one of his life, fully, to some few anxious minutes, expired. And can any Prejudice be so inslexible, as not to stoop to the conversion of this pregnant Example, which on one side, testifies the possibility of the Decurtation of the Term of man's Life, by any mortal disease; and, on the other, manifesteth the possibility of the Prolongation of the same, by the seasonable and right use of the means conductive thereunto, viz. remorse of Conscience, repentance, supplication, and medical remedies. For, prescribed it was by Isaiah, thus: Let them take a Bunch of Figgs, and lay it for a plaster upon the boil (or Carbuncle) and he shall recover. And, to bring up the rear of these Sacred Arguments, militant on our side, let us instance in the semblably pertinent story of the Ninivites; who, by the counterviolence of those holy spells, Penitence, severe Humiliation as well of the outward, as of the inward man, and Prayer distracted with nought but tears and groans, seem to have abrogated the Decree of Destiny. For the Bowels of Divinity yearning with paternal compassion towards so populous a City; wherein though all were guilty, yet many millions must have been blended in the chaos of common ruin, who were yet too young to share in the actual Depravities; smoothed the brow of his Justice, and prevailed with him to interpret their universal mortification of Impiety, as an Allegorical accompletion of his resolve concerning the general devastation and mortality denounced against their Persons and Habitations; to accept the slames of their thick sacrifices as Expiatory and preventive to the impendent Combustion of their City; and heighten the wholesome virtue of their Abstinence, observed in the strict Fast, to a generous Prophylactique or Preservative against the Pestilence now ready to be kindled by the breath of his Indignation. Nor are we destitute of Instances, in holy Chronicles, to teftify the Reverse part of our assertion, viz. That the Term of man's life hath been Abbreviated. For who can read the story of the General Deluge, and not observe, that the whole stock of Humanity (except 8. beleivers, who committed themselves prisoners to the Ark of Preservation) was immaturely extinguished, and by the most proper and expedite way of corruption, resolved into its Hyle, or Watery Principle? Who can rehearse Moses his relation of those many thousands of incredulous and murmuring Israelites, buried in the wilderness, to whom God had promised, nay sworn to give them possession of the land of Canaan; and not be satisfied, that their Rebellion and Infidelity anticipated their funerals? and who examine the fate of those Cowards, who being sent to explore the fertility of the promised Land, and the forces of the Amalekites, returned a discouraging answer to their brethren, and were therefore cut down by the revenging sword of the Lord of Hosts, in the noon of their lives; and not be convicted, that the Wages of Sin is Death, and may be paid as justly, though not so naturally, in the morn, or noon, as evening of life? Now so fiduciary are these Testimonies, that whoever shall justly compute their Number, perpend their Gravity, and clearly discern their Perspicuity; must confess it no less than open injustice to all the Inducements of belief, to debase them so much as to a Competition for the priority of persuasion, with those Few, Light, and Obscure Allegations, upon whose Credit the Factors of immovable Destiny have adventured to take up their opinion. However, that we may add a brighter polish to this our Gold, by scouring off the rust of all Exceptions made against it: it deserves our time, and sweat to dispossess our Article 6. A full vindication of the Fourth Testimony, from the several Exceptions made against the appropriation thereof to our scope, by the patrons of Fatality. Adversaries of all their pretended interest in the importance of Three the chiefest of our Testimonies. First they attempt to infirm our title to that definitive and emphatical sentence of the Psalmist, The bloody and deceitful men shall not live out half their days; and this under the pretext of several perverse Interpretations: as (1) by understanding the place thus; Impii & sanguinarii non dimidiabunt negotia sua, they shall not accomplish half their Designs, or, contrary to their expectation they shall fall before they have brought their evil Purposes to pass. To this unlawful Construction we reply, that this subterfuge was contrived by that professed Libertine of Christianity, Luther, to the end he might support his doctrine of Absolute Fate, which with so much Ardour and Pertinacy he had once maintained against that ornament not only of Germany, but of Europe also, Erasmus. But the Connexion of these with the former words, manifestly prohibit any such Comment. Thou, O God (saith David) shalt bring them down into the pit of destruction, i. e. thou shalt irretiate or ensnare them, and suddenly precipitate them into the same pit, which they have digged for me, thy servant; or thou shalt, according to the concernment of the Hebrew phrase, destroy them subita praematura morte, by a sudden premature death; that from the experiment of their unexpected ruin, the world may learn thy justice, and be satisfied of thy favour and indulgence to the pious, and thy hatred and indignation to the impious. For if we accommodate this text merely to the Natural expiration of the term of life, which is appointed as well to the Righteous as to the Reprobate, and generally to all men: pray, what Energy or Emphasis can remain to that saying of David, Tu facies eos descendere in puteum foveae; for than we shall reduce all the meaning only to this, illi morientur statuto suo tempore, sicut mortales alii omnes, they shall die in their appointed time, as all other mortal men: and if so, who might not have justly made this retort upon David; & te etiam tuo tempore, sive cum finis vitae tuae praestitutus aderit, Deus faciet descendere in puteum foveae, and thee also, when thy appointed time shall come, or when the temperamental lease of thy life shall be worn out, shall God bring inro the pit of destruction. Again, if we exchange Negotia for Dies; then must we renounce the appropriation of the sense to the Wicked, and make it common also to the Godly. For, who ever lived to accomplish all his purposes? But the expression sufficiently illustrates the intention; for it exactly responds to many other phrases used by the Holy Spirit to the same scope, as, They shall not fulfil the number of their days, their days shall be abbreviated etc. (2) By Translating the Text thus; Non dimidiabunt dies suos, (i. e.) peribunt antequàm sperent: they shall perish in the immaturity of their Hopes, not of their Lives. For the sensual Affections of their earthly minds having determined their judgements only to the expectation of enjoying blessings inservient to the satisfaction of their domineering Concupiscence, make them promise to themselves long subsistence in this their paradise; nay extend their vain projects as far as the impossible period of Eternity: so though they survive even life itself, by dwindling out their bedrid days, till the marasmus of extreme old age hath embalmed them beforehand, pined them into perfect Skeletons, and so defrauded their hungry Creditors, the Worms; yet since they drop away full of youthful and green hopes, their departure is premature and inopine; and so they may be said, not to dimidiate their days. We return that this illegitimate Desoant ought to be rejected for 4, considerable Causes. (1) Because it cannot be justly charged upon the words, no not in the greatest latitude of Construction. For 'tis not there said, the Wicked shall die sooner than they expect; but positively and expressly, they shall not dimidiate their days: now every Idiot can tell, that it is one thing, not to live out half their days, and another, not to believe they shall live out half their days. (2) because it argues the sacred Psalmist of a manifest Falsity. For when the ungodly expire, they do not only Dimidiate their days, but Accomplish them, Death being at any time the December of life. (3) Because it imports a double repugnancy to Truth. For first, now there are, and in all ages, since the first experiment of death, have been millions of Vicious men, who even in the wildest paroxysm of their Vanity, and highest orgasme of their Pride and Ambition, have still cooled themselves with E 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and felt a dejecting horror from within, at the remembrance of that Motto, Statutum est omnibus semel mori; so far is our Nature from entertaining any hopes of Immortality, though but in a dream, or melancholy depravation of Fancy. And, again, no Chronicle is barren in the stories of prosperous Libertines, who have wanted nothing but some Cross to endear the Felicity of their lives, have unravelled their vital web in the highest blandishments of Sense, attained to miraculous Longevity, and being sated with the profuse treatments of Fortune, have outlived their own large stock of Hopes; so that a Poet might take the Liberty to say of them, they died for grief, that they had nothing left to wish for, which they had not already surfeited in the fruition of. (4) Because the admission there of loseth the Singularity or Determination of David's speech to Sanguinary and Nefarious Persons. For, if to Dimidiate their days, import no more then to die by the same common kind of Death, and at the same period of their Temperamental Lease, when, by the ineluctable laws of Destiny, it is enacted that all men shall revert to Dust: certainly, there can remain no reason why Impious men, so dying, should be thought more unhappy, because they were Cruent and Unjust, than others. To conclude; of all those just Persons mentioned in the old Testament, who were translated from this Vale of tears to the Celestial Hills of permanent delight, by early and premature deaths (amongst whom the Apostle (Heb. 11. vers. 38.) hath accounted some so excellent above the common rate of humanity, that the world was not worthy of them) of such, I say, 'twas true, according to this erroneous paraphrase, that they did not Dimidiate their days, because they died sooner than they expected. For they did not only hope, but upon the faithful promise of God even assure themselves of a longer continuation here below to do him further service. And confidently to expect, nay by a lively hope to anticipate the fruition of a promised blessing; is a privilege peculiar only to those, to whom the promise doth properly and solely belong: but the blessing of Longevity was only then promised to the pious observers of the Divine laws; as is manifest from the places formerly cited. (3) By fixing the scope of the Text only upon that mature Term of life, to which many ordinarily attain, viz. to 60. 70. 80. 90. years, more or less, according to the respective Duration of every individual Constitution; and so concluding the verity of David's speech only in this respect. For (say they) the Annals of Impious men seldom arise to so large an account; because either the sword of war, or justice, or some Accident occasioned by their Villainies takes them off, before the completion of their natural Term of years. But this sinister Detorsion of the Text ought also to be repudiated for two Reasons. (1) In regard 'tis manifestly heterodox, and dissimilar to the express sense of the words; since they say not, Wicked men shall not live out half the days of Others, but their own. Now the days of their lives amount not to so many years, as are required to the commensuration of the natural space betwixt the Animation and Disanimation of the posterity of Adam, prefixed by the decree of him, who is the Breath of our nostrils: and therefore, when they fully and wholly accomplish that common compute, with what semblance of truth can they be said to Dimidiate their days? Moreover, if those Sanguinary Miscreants, against whom David directly denounceth this judgement of Premature Mortality, be said not to dimidiate their days, only in this respect, that they seldom arrive at that provect and silver-headed Age, wherein the Tapor of life, by the ordinary deflux of Nature, burns dim and languid, and at last, for want of oil, winks out into pepetual night: then with equal right may it be affirmed also of many Holy and Just persons, that they do not dimidiate theirs; nay 'tis a question not easily answered, whether the same may not be asserted of these, with more justice than of those. For, how rarely do we observe the pulse of Pious men to beat, till their Arteries grow hard from the Hectic distemper of old age? How small a manual would the Legends of all those Saints, whose names and stories yet survive, make, who have lived till the Almond tree hath budded and flourished: and how vast a volume would theirs make, who have been gathered green into the Granary of God, and never lived to see one revolution of Saturn about the solary Orb? and how frequently have we occasion to comfort ourselves, after the transplantation of Junior Virtue, with that adage, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉? Nor hath Piety always proved a Coat of mail against the danger of Malice; or the panoply of a Christian▪ defence against the sword of war; or perfect Charity, an Antidote to Poison; or Temperance, an Alexipharmacon against the Pestilence; or religious Abstinence, a Preservative against Famine; or Innocence awarded the stroke of the Executioner: in short, as to the time of Death, in this concernment, there is one event to the Righteous, and to the Wicked, to the clean, and to the unclean, to him that sacrificeth, and to him that sacrificeth not; as dies the Good, so dies the Sinner, and he that sweareth, as he that feareth an oath. (2) In respect it disarms the Text of all its Force and Purpose. For to what end could David say, they should not dimidiate their days, if thereby he intended no more than this, that they should not run over half their stage of life, or subsist until grey hairs; unless the ground or reason thereof be also subjoined, viz. because of their impious and bloody Inclinations and Practices: and so consequently our present opinion be admitted? For if he believed it constituted by the immutable law of Fate, that such should then, and at no other time be taken off; without any relation at all to the contracting and anticipating merit of their Impiety: what makes it to the principal scope, that he said, they shall not dimidiate their days? since, according to this inconvenient interpretation, they do not only not Dimidiate theirdays, but fully Accomplish them, as any the most mortified and conscientious observers of Gods sacred laws: and so neither Piety shall retain its attribute of having the power to prolong, nor its Contrary longer wear the just imputation of having the power to abbreviate the Term of Life. To which we may add, that David could not, without special Revelation from that omniscient Light, that penetrates the darkness of Futurity, deliver this certain Prognostic concerning the non-dimidiation of their days. For since he could not but have observed that many the most accursed Vassals of Satan, (the Providence of God so permitting, for considerations privy only to his Wisdom) attained to extreme old age: whence could he acquire that prophetic knowledge, that those particular Villains, whom he leveled at, should be taken in their own snares, and perish immaturely in the nonage of their lives? Undoubtedly, he could desume that prediction from no oracle less prescient, than that Spirit, whose Essence is Truth, and to whose cognition all things are actually present: but who can, though but with a specious or verisimilous argument, prove that David received any such special Revelation? Wherefore Reason adviseth that we acquiesce in the judgement of most of the Fathers, who unanimously resolve, that David reslected his thoughts upon that positive sentence in the Levitical Law, which (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) for the major part, comminates a short and calamtous life, and a repentine and miserable death to the Ungodly; but, on the contrary, promiseth longevous and peaceable days, to those, who should revere the sacred Majesty, and observe the wholesome ordinances of Jehovab: and upon the general infallibility of that Sentence, erected his particular prediction; that those Sanguinary traitors who had with so much detestable policy prepared stratagems to ensnare his feet walking in the ways of innocence and charity, should be entangled in their own mischievous wiles, and stumble into their graves in the middle of their race. To which we may accommodate that of Juvenal, Ad Generum Cereris, sine caede ac sanguine pauci Descendunt Reges, & sicca morte Tyranni. Few Tyrants go late to th' infernal 'slud; But sink betimes in Cataracts of blood. The second place they endeavour to betray out of our possession, is that promission of Longevity, whereby the Father of all things Article 7. The second Testimony vindicated from several Exceptions. was pleased to invite Children to a due Veneration of their Parents: which they corrupt with this dangerous gloss. This (say they) was spoken Anthropopathically, or ad captum hominis, by the Holy Spirit, who frequently hath descended to discourse in the stammering and imperfect dialect of mortality; so that the days of obsequious children are said to be prolonged, then when they are blessed with diuturnity, tranquillity and sanity of life, which as it immediately depends on the immutable decree of God, so cannot one moment be superadded thereunto beyond the term prefixed, unless we infer a manifest Inoonstancy upon that immutable Essence, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, with whom is no variableness nor shadow of turning. But that the Ancient of days had determined, that such should live to wear the honourable badge of Antiquity, who should constantly bear a venerable regard toward those, from whom, under God, they had derived their being: yet so, that if any obedient Child should chance to be snatched away by the talons of that sarcophagous' Vulture, Death, before time had reduced his hairs to the same colour with his skull; which is no rarity; yet notwithstanding doth God in no respect deflect from the point of his general determination, but persevere in the accomplishment of his promise, no less than a Prince, who bestows a million of crowns upon that servant, to whom he had promised only a hundred. For this life is no Mansion, but a narrow and incommodious Inn, standing in the way to a better, whose Term is Eternity: and therefore, ter felix ille, cui ante lassitudinem peractum est iter, thrice happy he, who arrives at his journey's end, before he is weary of travel. And our Grandfathers tell us, that old Age is but the magazine of sorrows, the sour dregs of life, the Portal to the Nosocomie or Hospital of Diseases, and indeed a kind of living-Death, wherein men only Breath and Dote; which though all men wish for, yet no man delights in when it comes: optima cum expectatur, cum advenit, onerosa sibi, aliis molesta; good only when expected, evil when enjoyed, because burdensome to itself, and troublesome to others. So that those Saturnine minds, which were most ambitious to wear the silver Crown of old Age; when they had obtained it, found it to gall their feeble temples, and enervate all their limbs: nor did they appear other then weatherbeaten and mouldering statues of their former selves, Human-Grashoppers, or Ghosts walking in Skeletons. In fine, that the whole concernment of this encouragement to Filial Duty, doth consist only in this; that Vivacity in this transitory World is promised unto morigerous Children, only in this capacity, that it is a Benediction of God: and a Benediction only in this respect, that it is a Document of Divine Grace, or an Evidence of God's singular love toward them; which he doth infinitely more testify unto them by a timous and early delivery of them from this calamitous prison of Mortality into the glorious Liberty of the Sons of God. We reply, that this plea of Exception against our lawful right to the place, is not only frivolous and dilute; but even derogatory as well to the Sanction, as Excellence of the Promise. For, to transmute the serious and faithful promise of him, whose words are yea and amen, into an Anthropopathical Sophism, or affected expression in the stammering Dialect of Humanity; is frivolous, and not only to stagger, but subvert the Fidelity thereof, and so demolish the comfortable hopes of Filial Piety, nay, what's a degree of Blasphemy, to insimulate Truth itself of Imposture. For, to promise Longevity to morigerous Children, when formerly and without any respect to their prevised obedience, God hath prefixed unto them an Intransible Term of life: what else can it be, but to make him promise that, which cannot be promised Hypothetically, or upon condition; unless that which was Absolutely decreed long before the promise was made, be violently canceled and altered. And so much the more intolerable indignity to the sacred majesty of God, doth this absurd Exception infer; by how much the more both of Imprudence and Inconstancy it must import, to play the uncircumspect Sophister with those, who (as our Adversaries themselves affirm) stood possessed with a full persuasion, that the Term of every man's life was absolutely, and without any respect to his future piety, or Impiety, predetermined. I profess sincerely, I am yet to be persuaded, that any Credulity can be so pedantic and slavish, as to entertain a belief; that even Man (I forbear to say, God) can thus openly and detectibly dissimulate with any the most stupid and indiscreet person alive; unless he be first resolved to expose himself to the just scorn and derision of all men, and by this lose and childish juggling forfeit that reputation, which he had acquired by his former grave and oraculous treaties, and the just performance of all Articles, to which he had subscribed. 'Tis one thing to admit, that the Holy Ghost doth sometimes descend to discourse in the stammering and amphibological Phrase of man, when he is pleased to hint unto us those 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or ineffable Mysteries, which are too fine to be spun into words by the gross fingers of flesh, and are notions reserved to entertain the Soul, when enfranchised from the bonds of Corporeity; such are those glances, whereby he affords us a dark landscape of the New Jerusalem, and allegorical description of the joys and glories of the Eternal Life, an idea of the majesty of his incomprehensible Essence, and three distinct Subsistences in one indivisible Existence, etc. and a far different, nay contrary, to say, that he doth speak Anthropopathically and conform to our unequal capacities, when he promiseth those things, which do not only not transcend our faculties of comprehension; but are familiar to our knowledge, nay such as the nearest concernment of our nature requires us fully and perspicuously to know. And such is the quality of those Blessings, which the Bounty of Providence hath by promise assured unto the Virtuous, in order to the demulsion and dulcification of the sharp condition of this life; and particularly that of longevous subsistence upon earth. To conclude; the Spirit or Form of a Promise doth consist in this, that they, to whom the promise is made, do understand the good therein specified, to be really, bona fide, & in specie, intended to be performed by him, who made the promise. Now, if there arise any doubt, whether or no that promise be repugnant to a verity formerly declared; then doth the force and sanction, together with the Dignity thereof, totally vanish and become void. Our Adversaries have rejoined, that God doth therefore promise Longevity to obsequious Children, because he hath formerly decreed to qualify their particular Constitutions with respective Durability. But, alas! this subterfuge neither dissolves the Difficulty, nor prevents the Doubt. For if his Decree, concerning their Longevity, be Absolute, devoid of all Suppositionality, and suspended upon no respect to his Prevision of their obedience: no reason can discover what Force or Energy the promise can pretend unto from the performance of the Condition required. Again, how can that Promise 〈◊〉 way of invitation or allurement, affect those, who are already confirmed, that what the promise imports, is formerly, by the positive and non-conditionate Will of God, made inevitable, and hath the Possibility of its Futurition determined to precise Necessity? In fine, the Postulation of that Condition can neither consist with the Eternal Identity of God that promises; nor effectually move those, to whom he makes the promise, to endeavour the Consecution of that ample reward of filial obedience: for his Decree, concerning the Term of their life, doth and shall forever stand firm and immote, whether the Condition be performed, or not. The last Testimony they have essayed to extort from us, is the Article 8. The sixth Testimony cleared from 4. Exceptions. Instance of Ezekiah; and this by a Fourfold Cavillation. (1) By this Excuse, Singular aliquod Exemplum non evertere regulam, that one single denormous Example is not sufficient to evert the general obligation of a law; or one swallow makes no summer. This Exception, I confess, might have had some colour, or slender pretext of Validity; had not our Opponents themselves totally excluded it, by asserting that the immutable law of Destiny was equally extended to all and every individual person from Adam down to us. For most certain it is, that God never limited his free Omnipotence, by any fixed law, or bound up his own hands with the same settled Constitutions, whereby he circumscribed the definite activity and duration of his Creatures: it being the Prerogative of his Nature, to know no Impossibility, but to be able to act either above, or against the statutes of his Deputy, whensoever, and upon what subject, and to what end soever he pleases. But I have no warrant to believe, that among the Propugnators of Fate, any one hath deviated inro so remote an Alogie, as to opinion, that the Lots of all men are not delivered out of one and the same common urn; but that the Decrees concerning the Destinies of some particular persons, are not so definitive, precise, and immovable, as those of all others in general. (2) By this Response, that under the seeming Absoluteness of the Prophet's Sentence, Morieris, Thou shalt die; there lay concealed a tacit Hypothesis, which was this: Nisi seria poenitudine te ad Deum convertas, unless by serious and profound repentance thou shalt mortify the old man of sin, and apply thyself wholly to the Mercies of God. Against this mistaken plea our defence shall be, that it wants the principal inducement to belief, and so can afford no satisfaction at all. For, (besides this, that it quadrates neither to their First Exception, nor their Thesis concerning the Immobility of Destiny) what Logic can tolerate the induction of an Hypothetical upon a Categorical Proposition? or, more expressly, how can any Condition be comprehended under that message, which by a definitive and peremptory decree, and such as carried no respect to the performance, or non-performance of any condition whatever, tells the K. in down right terms, that the date of his life was now expired, and that the severe Publican, Death, stood ready at the door of his chamber, within some few hours to exact from him the common tribute of Nature? Subordinata non pugnant, is an Axiom I well know, and am ready to receive a challenge from any singularity, that dares question the universality of its truth; but, that a condiiional Decree can be subordinate to an Absolute, I am bold to deny, nor need I go far for an Argument to prove the impossibility thereof; the very Antithesis of those notions, Absolute and Conditional sufficiently declaring as much. To take the just dimensions of this Cloud; every Condition is movable upon the hinge of Indefinity or Uncertainty, as being suspended upon an uncertain and mutable Cause, viz. the Arbitrary Election of man's Free will: insomuch, that the Event thereof cannot be known, nay not unto the Omniscience of God, who is the only Cardiognostes, and sees beyond our very Essences, so long as it hangs in suspense or indecision, by reason of the Indifferency, or non-determination of its Cause, i. e. while it is not determined to either part by the Actual Volition of man's will. But as for an Absolute decree; that cannot but be Certain and Immutable; as being constitute without, and antecedent to any Prevision of a Condition, that is to be, or hath been performed, or is not to be, or hath not been performed. (3) By insinuating, that God made use of this sharp Commination, in order to the more Expedite and effectual reduction of the K. to Penitence. But, alas! this also is a broken reed, and he shall fall into the ditch of Error, who relies thereon. For who can be persuaded, that this Commination could be serious and in earnest, that must not at the same time dissolve the rigour and immutability of God's decree concerning the fatal Term of the Ks. life? or how could it be serious, if it were fully constituted from all Eternity that the K. should not die, till full 15. years after the Sentence? This is a pure 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and something that no man can comprehend. For, to comminate sudden death to him, whom our Adversaries acknowledge reserved by the law of Destiny till the complete expiration of his prefixed Term of life: is not to comminate in earnest, but in jest, and argue the God of Truth, of Dissimulation. Again, what Efficacy or enforcing Virtue could that Commination have over the Affections of Ezekiah, if he firmly believed, that he should not, could not die before the precise term of his life constituted and made intransible from Eternity? Assuredly, if so; he had no just cause either to complain of, or fear the abscission of his days. (4) By recurring to this their last refuge, Deum hac ratione palam facere voluisse, quam Regi ab aeterno designarat 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that God was pleased to take this course for the promulgation of that Longevity, which he had from eternity designed to Ezekiah. This is more impertinent, and less satisfactory than any of the precedént Exceptions. For extremely ridiculous it is, to opinion, that God would by a Commination suspended on a condition, or by a hypothetical decree, make that known; which long before he had, by an Absolute Decree, without any condition, or prevision of any condition, constituted firm and immovable. Unworthy and disparaging thoughts both of the Wisdom and Justice of the Supreme Being doth that unhappy man entertain, who ascribes unto it the making of Decrees subordinate, disparate, and irreconcilable. That Sacred, omniscient, omnipotent Agent, as himself makes nothing in vain; so would he have us make him our Exemplar, and do no action, but what points at some certain end, and conduces both to our benefit, and the last of ends, his Glory. But in vain had he promised, in vain threatened, had he either promised or threatened those things, which his own irrevocable Decree had formerly made immutable, which must of necessity, had they never been promised or threatened, have come to pass in their predetermined opportunity: or such, to whose Existence it was wholly and absolutely necessary, that that very thing, under which the promise or commination was made, should be effected by such a power, to which no other power can resist. And this (we hope at least) is sufficient to the ample justification of our opinions right to those Three appropriate and Convincing Testimonies, of the Mobility of the Term of man's life, desumed from holy Writ. ¶. SECT. iv IT remains only that we endeavour to wind our reason out of Article 1. The necessity of our enquiry into the mystery of Predestination, in order to the solution of the present difficulty: and the Fatists grand Argument. that profound abyss of Predestination (of which the Apostle, though he had the advantage of all other men in this; that he had the eye of his Soul illuminated by beams deradiated immediately from the Soul of Light: did yet excuse himself for his non-comprehension, with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.) into which the solution of this grand difficulty hath unavoidably precipitated it: for the strongest hold, which the Defendants of Absolute Fatality have left them to retreat unto, is erected upon this Foundation. It makes no material difference (say they) whether the Prescience of God be conceived precedent to his Preordination of any future Event, and so Predestination be founded upon Prevision; or, on the contrary, this Praeordination precedent to his Prescience, and so Praedestination be the basis of Paervision: for, from the concession of either, it follows of absolute necessity that the Term of man's life (in individuo) must be fixed and intransible. We answer, Article 2. The refutation thereof, by the conciliation of the infallibility of God's Praenotion, to the indetermination of man's free will to the actual election of Good or Evil. That the Consequence, indeed, aught to be admitted as firm and impregnable. For this Prescience, whether it praeced, or succeed Divine Praedestination, is and must be ever certain, praecise, and infallible; or so supposed to be, at least: and therefore must the Term of man's life be constituted certain, precise, and immutable, ex necessitate si non consequentis, saltem consequentiae, by necessity if not of the Consequent, yet of the consequence; i. e. if not from the Virtue or Efficiency, yet from the Hypothesis, or Conditionality of that Prescience. For no Sceptic can disallow of this Consequence; if God doth infallibly foreknow, that this and no other shall be the Term of my life: ergo this and no other shall be the Term of my life. But this is not the point, at which our inquiry is leveled. Manifest it is, aswell from our precedent discourse, as from the Condition of the subject, that these two Propositions are not repugnant each to other; viz. The Term of man's life is fixed and immutable in respect to the infallibility of God's Prescience: and the Term of man's life is movable in respect to our right use, or abuse of the Liberty of our Will. Though, I confess, with the great Mersennus, that the apparent discord betwixt the infallibility of God's Prenotion, and the indetermination of man's Free Will to the actual election of good or evil; hath been the rock, against which many the greatest wits of all Ages and Religions have been shipwrackt, in their persuasions of the irresistible enforcement of Destiny. To extricate our judgements out of this maze, let us remember and adhaere unto that excellent Axiom of the most and most learned of the Schoolmen; Praevisionem Dei nihil influere i● nostras actiones, that the Praevision of God hath no influence upon the actions of man, nor upon the operation of the remedies applied by the Physician to the cure of diseases: but presupposeth both the one and the other. For, in truth, God cannot foreknow the future actions of man, or the effects of remedies administered, otherwise then because of their necessary Futurity. Since, if we take a way the Futurition of events, we necessarily destroy the Prenotion of God. Which Abstrusity that we may the better comprehend, let us beg the liberty, to suppose some Momenta rationis, or successive minutes in Eternity (which, though in reality impossible, Eternity being one permanent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or instance, as uncapable of division, as cessation; may yet serve, as an excellent Perspective to our weak-sighted reason in its inspection of many sublime Phaenomena in Theology,) and humbly conceive; that in the First Moment of Eternity, God saw, and only saw, without any relation at all to his future decrees, all things to come, as well' 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or such whose futurity is necessary from the condition of their Nature, or impuls of their proper Causes; as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or Futura Contingentia, which hang suspended in aequilibrio upon the Free Will of their Efficients; so that they may, or may not succeed, whether they be Absolute, or Conditionate: in which First moment had God acquiesced, and proceeded no farther, then only to foresee the Necessity and Possibility of their Futurition; then nothing should have been to come▪ That in the Second Moment, God saw, and only saw, that this or that event was in Possibility of Futurition, in the life of this or that particular man, if such or such things were done, in this or that time, with this or that Temperament of body, and other respective Circumstances: but yet did neither determine any thing to absolute Necessity of Futurition, and therefore nothing could be said to depend upon the Praeordination of God, though all things should come to pass in the same manner, as he foresaw them, whensoever the Fiat of his Will should bring them into actual existence, or educe them extra suas causas; nor did he see, that they would so and no otherwise come to pass, from hence that he would they should so and no otherwise come to pass; since this Praevision anteceds all Volition. That, therefore, in the Third Moment of Eternity, God decreed, that he would make Future not all those Possible Effects, whether Absolute or Conditionate, but only some particulars, as, for example, that he would make Alexander, or Plato, of this or that individual temperament of body, in this or that climate and country, of this or that particular course of life, with all conspiring Circumstances; to whom all things should happen according to the possibility of their Futurition, wherein God beheld them before the conception or pronunciation of his Decree; so that by this influence of God's definitive Will, those Events are no more then deduced into actual existence, which formerly were only in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or in the womb of their Causes. Now, upon this Hypothesis our understanding is advanced to this manifest Conclusion, That the Prescience of God doth nothing conduce adrem existentem, nor to the Actions or Passions thereof; since it is not the cause of their Inference: nor do his Decrees, that are subsequent unto, and in a manner grounded upon his Prevision, work any the least mutation at all in the natures of his Creatures, or by violence pervert their Virtues to the production of any Effects, to which, by their primitive Constitution and individuation, they were not precisely adapted and accommodated. Since, in so doing, he must take away from his Creatures those peculiar Faculties, which he at their creation freely conferred upon their several natures; and innovate the fundamental laws of Nature. Now this dark shadow of that darker mystery of Predestination, Article 3. The diametral Disparlty between that Divine Praenotion which is antecedent to Divine Praeordination; and that which is subsequent; amply declared. how obscurely soever presented, doth yet sufficiently commonstrate how vast and diametral a disparity is between that Divine Prenotion, which is Antecedent; and that which is subsequent to Divine Praeordination. For that Prescience, which hath for its object a thing to come, without any praevious and praedeterminant Decree; supposeth that particular thing to come, together with the whole series or concatenation of its proper Causes, and method or manner of its Futurition: the Modus Futuritionis being, as the Schoolmen well define, Id quod futurum est, sive quod ad rei, quae futura praescitur, futuritionem quolibet modo pertinet. This that Rabbin Isac bar Sesat, quoted by Menasseth Ben Israel (de termino vitae. pag. 226.) seems well to have understood, when he said; Deus ab aterno disposuit totius mundi negotia, & divina sua sapientia, ac perspicacia, vidit omnes effectus, qui in tempore futuri essent: qui licet pendeant (loquor enim de actionibus humanis) a libero hominis arbitrio, ut fiant aut non siant; nihilominus tamen Deus certò & infallibiliter eos praevidit, ac praescivit. Neque tamen ideoquicquam in tempore facit homo, quia Deus ca facturum praescivit: sed è contrà, quia homo in tempore hoc vel illud facit, aut operatur, ideo Deus ab aeterno illud scivit. But on the Contrary, that Prescience, which follows upon the Praedetermination of the Divine Will, hath, indeed, for its object a thing to come, and also presupposeth it as fully as the former; but so that it comprehends the order and manner of its futurition as sixth and immutable, being so constituted by virtue of the antecedent Praedestination. For the further inculcation of this Distinction, let us make use of an Example most familiar, and pertinent to the difficulty in hand. That Divine Prescience, which hath no dependence on a praedeterminant Article 4. A second illustration of the same difference by a pertinent Instance, or exemplification. decree, let us suppose it to be a Prescience of the life and death, of the health and sickness, of the good or evil use of the Free will, of Peter, John, and every individual man in the world: and is twofold. First Conditionate; if Peter, or John, being born of a sound and durable constitution, shall choose such a course of life, as that he shall observe the wholesome Aphorisms of Temperance in his use of the Six nonnaturals, shall opportunely, in all distempers introduced by the inclemency of the aer, the malignant impressions of the Stars, epidemic contagions, or other undeclinable Accidents, recur to the use of such convenient remedies, as both reason and experience prescribe for the preservation or restauration of health; then I foreknow that he shall live healthy and long: but if, on the contrary; then I foreknow, that he shall be infested with frequent diseases, and die immaturely. Second Absolute; I foreknow that Peter or John shall choose a prudent course of life, convenient both to his Genius, and temperament; shall sedulously endeavour the preservation of his health, by moderation in diet and other nonnaturals, and the restauration of the same, when impaired by any distemper, by rational and approved medicaments; and shall therefore enjoy health, and attain to longaevity. On the Contrary, I foreknow, that he shall lead a disorderly and luxurious course of life, accelerate the dissolution of his temperament, by the immoderate, praemature, or unseasonable use of Wine, Women, Passions etc. and when assaulted by any disease, chronique or acute, shall either omit to consult learned, judicious and experienced Physicians, or disobey their pharmaceutical or diaetetical praescripts, drink wine in a Fever, cold water in a Critical sweat, salt, sharp, acid or corroding liquors in a Dysentery, eat Astringents in obstructions, frigid, crude and dyspeptical fruits in an imbecility of the stomach, etc. and shall therefore ruin his health and drop into the grave before he's ripe. Now take which Prescience you please, and either hath for its object, the praecise Term of Peter or John's life, as a thing to come; and fully and punctually presupposeth the same: but so, that together with that fixed Term it comprehends also all the order and manner of its Futurition, or all the antecedent and conspiring causes; amongst which the principal and most energetical is the right use or abuse of his own Free will, in whose power it was to move that Term either forwards or backwards, (i. e.) either to adduce, or produce it. So far, therefore, is this Praevision of God from excluding the necessity of Medical Remedies, as the Defendants of Fate would impose, according to that of Solon in Stobaeus — Fato quaecunque manet sors; Non hanc avertet victima, sed nec aves, Nec qui Paeonias aegris mortalibus herbas Saepe erraturam ferre laborat opem. That it totally includes, nay presupposeth it so necessarily, that if we take away from man the Liberty of his Will, and the opportunity of using either prophylactical, or therapeutical means, in order to the prolongation of his life; we must also submove the Certainty of God's Prescience: since that determineth nothing, but only praesupposeth all things; nor doth God, by a decree subsequent to that Prescience, praeordain that this or that individual man shall recover of such or such a disease, unless by virtue of such or such appropriate remedies, which the Physician shall in the opportunity prescribe. Nor is it a more justifiable plea at the bar of reason, to argue thus; if the Term of man's life be certainly and precisely foreknown to God, then must it, together with the order and manner of its Futurition, be sixth and immutable: then to argue thus; if God hath a certain and precise cognition of any thing already past, as of the Creation of the world; therefore could that thing have come to pass no otherwise, nor at any other time, than it did; therefore was the world created by God, non liberé sed necessariò, not by an Arbitrary, but Necessary and restrained activity. For, as Science, having for its object a thing Praeterite, doth infer no necessity upon that thing praeterite, that it should have been so and no otherwise effected: so doth Prescience, having for its object a thing Future, infer no necessity upon its futurition; each being an Immanent Action in God, & extra rem, or having no compulsive influence at all upon that particular thing, or its Causes: and Futurum esse imports no other thing, but an object of Prescience; nor Praeteritum esse, any thing but an object of Science, or Memory. Science is the perfection of the Subject, or thing knowing; not of the object, or thing known: much less the destruction of the thing known. For necessary it is to perfect Science, that it agree in all points with the nature of its object. But wholly Antarctical to this, is that Prescience which is grounded upon Divine Praedestination, whereby not only the Term of every individuals' life, together with the whole order and manner of its Futurition, is prefixed; but also all those Causes, whose refractory or counter-activity might in any respect hinder the precise accompletion of that prefixed Term, are prevented or praedetermined to invalidity, lest the Prescience become uncertain or dubious: whether that Praedetermination dispose per modum Causae Efficientis, by a certain Physical and really effective action, or impression upon the will of man, enforcing it to the election of such a course of life, as may conduce to his punctual pervention to that praestitute Term; or per modum Causae Desicientis by nonconcurrent, but only permissive influence (by some called Permissio simplex, Simple Permission: by others, Permissio essicax, efficacious permission,) since that rule amongst Philosophers Causa Desiciens in necessariis reducitur ad Efficientem, doth warrant the Indifferency. For this Decretory Prescience, though it agree with the precedent simple Prescience in this, that it hath for its object rem futuram, includeth in its circle the whole order and manner of its Futurition, and presupposeth both the end, and respective means fully and absolutely; yet it clearly and irreconcilably differs from it in this, that the precedent Prescience presupposeth the liberty of man's Will, and the use thereof not only incoacted, and without irrefragable impuls, but absolutely free and arbitrary: but this wholly destroys the arbitrary monarchy of the Will, by importing that the influence of the Decree not only inclineth by soft and gentle flexure or persuasion, but by an irresistible violence forceth it upon the election and pursuit of those means, which in a direct and natural line lead to the accomplishment thereof; and this lest the Certitude or Infallibility of the Divine Prescience be infirmed and staggered. To discriminate this Later from that Former Prescience yet Article 5. A third illustration of the same Difference, by conceiving the Divine Decrees, in the same subordinate scries, which the Fatists have imagined. morefully: and so insinuate the result of the Distinction, by the most intelligible and concise way of argumentation: it will be necessaty for us to conceive the Decrees of God in the same method of subordination, wherein they, who found the infallibility of his Praevision upon the necessity of his Praedestination and Praedetermination, have been, by the obscurity of the Subject, compelled to range their thoughts, in the declarement of their opinion. The first Decree of God runs thus; I will, that Peter live till the expiration of the natural or temperamental lease of his life; conceive it to be till his glass hath run 50. 60. 70. or 80. year: but that John whither before he's ripe, and fall in the June of his age; conceive it to be in the 20. 30. or 40. year from his birth. The Second thus; I will praeserve Peter from this or that sickness, defend him from this or that knock of misfortune, conserve him in, or restore him from this or that dangerous disease; lest he expire before the praestitute Term of his life: but for John, he shall be invaded by such or such a mortal disease, receive such or such a wound incurable, or perish by this or that fatal Accident; so that he may verify my prognostic in dying at the hour appointed. The Third thus; lest Peter laps into such or such a mortal disease, I will that he be provided of an industrious and prudent Physician to prescribe unto him rational, generous, and effectual prophylactical means; or, if surprised therewith, that he use convenient and victorious therapeutical medicaments▪ in order to the expulsion of the same; that so the number of his days be not shortened: but, on the contrary, that John shall fall into such or such a dangerous sickness, and want Physicians, medicaments, and all other Conservatives whatever; lest he survive beyond the moment prefixed. The Fourth thus; that Peter may not, by the abuse of his Arbitrary prerogative, become insensible, incurious, or negligent of the means ordained to conserve health, and run into the perpetration of such sins, as may be injurious to the temperament of his body, as well as the peace of his mind; I will, by the powerful influence of my Special Grace, so prepare and dispose his Will, that he shall lead a temperate, circumspect and virtuous life, and so subsist till the period of his days prefixed. On the contrary, that John may not, by the right use of that Elective Liberty conferred upon his Will, and by a desire of attaining to longaevity, endeavour the conservation of his health, by diaetetical or pharmaceutical observations; I will, that he want that ingenuity, that prudence, that advice, and those prescripts, conducible to the prolongation of his life, and finally that assistance of Divine Grace, without which it is not only probable, but necessary, that he should resign up the rains of his Will to Sensuality, and so either by the prodigal effusion of his Vital oil in the immodest and destructive rites of Venus, or the extinction of his implantate heat by the frantic sacrifices of Bacchus, or other exorbitances, decurtate the temperamental lease of his life; and so confess Corruption in the moment prefixed. Or, in a higher key of Fatality, thus; though Peter, by the abuse of his Will, rashly expose himself to the fury of the most dangerous Enemies to life, and by gluttony, ebriosity, vindictive anger, salacity, etc. render himself both unfit, and unworthy longer to inspire the common aer; I will notwithstanding all this again repair the breaches of his constitution, protect him from the malice of danger, and conserve him till the moment predestined, nor shall he be taken off by any other means, but what my Will hath predetermined. Contrary; though John, by the right use of the liberty of his will, shall constantly and severely practise all the hard lessons of Virtue, subdue the impetuous and forcible Temptations of Sensuality, lead a life more impassionate than the most rigid of the Stoics ever professed, more chaste than aged Hermits, more abstinent than Lessius, more peaceable than Charity herself, and so deserve to become the greatest Example of Longevity: I will notwithstanding, that the appointed Term of his life remain fixed and intransible beyond that point, which my will hath from all Eternity decreed to be the Ne Vltra of his subsistence. On these, or the like Decrees, must the Certitude and infallibility of the Divine Prescience be erected by any; who subordinate God's Prescience to his Predestination of the end, and predetermination of the means. Now, to use all this; so many, so great, and so intolerable are the Incongruities, and Inconveniences, which necessarily depend on this Decretory Prescience; that we need no other argument to evince the weakness of their judgements, who have laboured in its defence▪ but only to select and consider the chiefest Article 6. The first Absurdity impendent on the opinion of a Decretory Prescience of God, as to the Actions of man. and most obvious of them. First, this opinion, that, all the actions of man, and their Events, are Fatally predetermined by the Decretory Prescience of God; doth not only enervate and scandal, nay destroy the sincerity of those many Divine Precepts, enjoining man to endeavour, to the utmost of his knowledge and power, the conservation of his health, and the prolongation of his life, by temperance and all other lawful means; of those many Promises made to encourage him to a strict observance; of those many Comminations annexed, to deter him from the neglect of those Precepts; but also, upon inference, dissolves the obligation to all serious study and solicitude to explore, procure, prepare, and use all convenient remedies, in order to the expulsion of diseases, and the revocation of health, on the part of the Sickman; and on the part of the Physician, to be industrious, careful, vigilant, and conscientious, in the exercise of his Profession. That the Patient is hereby disobliged from the duty of Self-conservation, may be thus manifested. If it be, ex Decreto Divino, fixed and immutable, that such a man shall lead a peaceable, healthful, and blissful life, and do all things that are either necessary or conductive to the procurement and continuation of that happy estate; or on the Contrary, that such a man shall eat the bread of sorrow, drink the bitter waters of Affliction, and unravel his tedious days in poverty, contention, valentude, or craziness of body, anxiety of mind, etc. and therefore take no care at all to do those actions, which might be necessary or conductive to the amendment of his miserable condition, by reason he wants the assistance, counsel, and manuduction of Divine Grace▪ then doth it unavoidably follow, that the labour and solicitude of the one is superfluous, and of the other unsuccesful, nay impossible. For whatever the one, or the other shall do, and however live; yet still the success shall be no other, but what God hath predestined, and though the intention of either be leveled at an end quite contrary to what is designed by the Volition of the Predestinant; yet shall the Force of the Decree either pervert, or render it ineffectual: and if we grant, that the Happy man did take care to conserve his health and life; we must also grant, that he could not but take that care; and that the Miserable man did take none to preserve either, because it was not in the power of his Will to determine on that care. And thus, what either shall do, can be neither Care, nor Negligence, strictly and properly so called: but a mere Necessity of Caring, or not Caring. On the part of the Physician, the Reason is the same; for, if this doctrine of Fatality be true, well may he be excused, nay thought the wiser man, if he shut up his books, forget his Aphorisms, deliver out his Prescripts per Sortilegium (a course, as I have been ascertained by the testimony of a judicious and faithful observer thereof, not long since taken up and constantly practised by a Devout Impostor, whose counterfeit zeal to the Cause had advanced him to the trust of a Physician in that Army, which gathered the first flowers of its triumphant wreath in Nase by Field) and supinely give Coloquyntida, or Scammony in a Dysentery, Antimony in the Iliaca Passio, Opium in a Crisis, Aqua Fortis for a Julep etc. since no Art can supersede, nor Poison accelerate his departure, whose time of transition to the invisible world Destiny hath limited to a moment; Et cum Fata volunt, bina Venena juvant. Nor can it be rightly esteemed a Virtue in the Physician, to be studious and solicitous; or a Vice to be debauched, ignorant, and negligent of the safety of his Client: if it be only the irresistible Impulse of Fate, which forceth his Will to the election of either, in order to the precise accomplishment of its Decree: or, more plainly, if the Care or Negligence of the Physician be but the Medium, whereby Fate brings about its end concerning the dissolution of the Patient. And if so, what Moral obligation remains upon the conscience of the Physician? Assuredly none at all. Which every moderate judgement will soon detect to import so manifest, dangerous, and detestable an Absurdity; that of itself 'tis able not only to discredit the opinion of Fatality, but also to accuse and convict the Abettors thereof of unpardonable Inconsideration, Stupidity, and Irreligion. The Second Inconvenience, or rather Absurdity, inseparably Article 7. A Second Absurdity connected to the same. conjoined to this opinion of a Decretory Prescience in God; is this: Whoever shall grant, that all the means or remedies, and so the sedulity or negligence as well of the Sick, as the Physician, are subordinately predetermined by the Decree of Fate; must also, by the necessity of natural consequence, be compelled to grant, that to allow the merit of Praise or Dispraise, Commendation or Reprehension unto either, is open Injustice. For by what pretext of Equity can a Sick man challenge to himself the honour of having done a praiseworthy action, in endeavouring to preserve himself both by observing a course of Diet contrary to his disease, and seasonable consulting with and strictly conforming unto the advice of a learned and judicious Physician; or the Physician for the full discharge of his duty in regulating the sick according to the most profound and salutiferous maxims of his Art: if the obedience of the one, and the care of the other be not Arbitrary, but coacted or necessitated by the Force of the complex Decree of Fate, as instrumental to the subsistence of the sick man till the predestined term of his life? Vbi mera necessitas locum habet, ibi laudem exulare necesse est: where mere Necessity is admitted, thence all Laudation is excluded. And with what justice can we reprehend the sick man, for being incurious in the disquisition, or irregular in, and averse from the use of the means prescribed for his restauration: if that his supinity▪ irregularity, and aversion be imposed upon his Will by the impuls of Destiny, and predetermined as a necessary Medium to accomplish the Decree of his immature death? or the Physician either for his neglect, or ignorant and inartificial tractation of his Client; if 'ttwere decreed he should be so, to the end the client might expire according to the decree? Persuasum est omnibus (saith Menasseh Ben Israel, de Termino Vitae. pag. 205.) nec laudandum, nec arguendum quemquam, nisi qui libero arbitrio & consulto benè agit, aut delinquit; adeo ut nullus suasioni, consiliis, redargutioni, praemio aut poenae locus sit, si homo non est liber in actionibus suis. Article 8. Two Subterfuges of the Fatists; Precluded. From this distress our Opponents have promised themselves an easy evasion, by replying; that both Patient and Physician are wholly ignorant of the Decree, the Optics of Mortality being too weak and remote to read the lines in the Book of Fate, without the perspicil of Divine Revelation. But this way of Subterfuge may be blocked up, by rejoining; that though the Decree be known to neither, yet 'tis sufficiently manifest to both, from the Hypothesis of this opinion, that not only their Actions, but also the Successes thereof are the prescripts and consignations of Fate; and so can be no other than what is included in, and necessitated by the Decree: and consequently that there can remain no just Cause of reprehension on either side. Should they insist yet further upon the same plea, and urge; that 'tis part of the Decree, that either the Physician, or Patient, or both should be negligent, and so become Culpable: we may soon exped this obstruction only by demanding, what reason or equity can be found to justify such an accusation and respective punition, where the Will of the delinquent is controlled, inflected, nay impelled upon the commission of a crime, or omission of a duty, by a power infinitely superior to his reluctancy; and not only the act, but time, place, instruments, means, etc. conspiring circumstances, precisely preordained by a decree of that Will, which is Omnipotence? Reprehension imports not only an Act of the Reprehendent, but also the Gild or Culpability of the Reprehended: otherwise it cannot be just. To the legality, therefore, of a reprehension it is undeniably necessary, that the ground or cause thereof be a real and proper Gild in the person reprehended. Now Gild can have no place, where that which is impeached cannot be a Voluntary Agent, but a Medium, or Instrument ordained, and actuated by an irresistible Power to the execution of an infallible Decree. The Third and last Absurdity imports no less than the subversion Article 9 A third Absuidity inseparable from the hypothesis of a Decretory Prescience Divine. of the very fundamental Principle, or basis of all Moral Virtues, and Christian Graces; by inferring a denial of Justice in the reward of Good, and punishment of Evil, either before, or after death. For, 'tis the Liberty of the Will only that supports the Equity of Compensation: and therefore he, who doth a good action, when 'twas not in the election of his Will to have omitted that good action, or to have done it otherwise then he did; hath but a weak claim to a reward; nor hath he, who commits a sin, which is not in his power to leave uncommitted, more reason to fear a punishment from the even hand of Divine Justice. To conclude, therefore; since these are the Absurdities, which every man's Logic may perceive necessarily and immediately to slow from the doctrine of Decretory Prescience, or such as is subsequent to Divine Predetermination; and since the same, nor any others of equal danger to the Principles of our Knowledge, and Articles of the Christian Faith, can ever be deduced from the hypothesis of that Simple Prevision or unactive Prescience, which we have allowed of as consistent to the justice of God, because consistent to the Arbitrary freedom of man's Will: 'tis no hard task to determine, in which opinion our judgements may with more safety and permanent satisfaction aquiesce. Now, that we may relieve the Memory of our patiented Reader, Article 10. The reduction of the whole dissertation to 4 Conclusions, genuinely extracted from the Premises. from the oppression of our (not well to be avoided) precedent prolixity; we conceive ourselves in gratitude obliged, to tender him a Recapitulation, or reducement of all this tedious discourse, concerning the Mobility of man's term of life, in Four Conclusions, naturally resulting from the Premises. The First Conclusion. That God hath circumscribed the duration of man's life, with a certain Circle or round of time, conceive it to be of 70. 80. 90. or 100 years, more or less: but yet hath reserved to himself, as jus supremoe Majestatis, the prerogative power of extending the term of any individual man's life beyond the limits of that sphere, so far as it shall seem convenient to the Wisdom of his Will. ¶. The Second Conclusion. That God, who loves justice more than man, and man only for Justice sake; and hates Injustice more than man, and man only for Injustice sake (for Sin, unravelled to the bottom, will be found to be nothing but Injustice) is willing, in respect of the object of his Love, or in consideration of man's justice, to prolong; or, on the contrary, in respect of the object of his Hate, or in consideration of man's Injustice, to abbreviate the term of man's life, included within that determinate Circle of time: reserving still to himself an arbitrary power of acting the quite contrary; (i. e.) of abbreviating the life of the just, and prolonging the life of the unjust, upon the persuasion of reasons either manifest to us, or private to himself. ¶ The Third Conclusion. That God, when he is pleased to condescend to the prolongation of the life of a Just person, doth procure the same, either by means conform to the ordinary and settled Constitutions, o, Canons of Nature; or by means Supernatural. The Former's when bearing a respect to the native Durability of his individua Temperament, he assists to the duration thereof until the natural Period, or last moment of this sphere of time; wherewith the life of man (in specie) is circumscribed: and this either by conserving his Temperament in its decent tenor, and requisite Vigour; or by prohibiting and preventing the invasion of those known Enemies to longevity, which might any way conduce to the denormation, and consequently the premature dissolution of its harmony. The Later, when bearing no respect to the native durability of his individual Temperament, he meliorateth, exalteth, and by the secret immission of some special Athanasia, or Antidote against early death, corroborateth the same, so that it doth last longer, than otherwise, pro vi sua nativa, it could possibly have lasted, had it never been impaired by any distemper. And this when God doth, then is he properly said, to prolong the life, or fulfil the number of the years of the Just. But the Contrary effect he procures by contrary Causes; (i. e.) he abbreviates the life of an unjust Person, either by an immature turbation and dissolution of his temperament, by its native disposition sufficiently tenacious and durable to extreme old age: or by not prohibiting, (i. e.) permitting and so procuring the violent and preternatural dissolution thereof by the destructive surprisal of any Accident whatever. And in this case properly are the Unjust said, not to Dimidiate their days. ¶. The Fourth Conclusion. That a just Person, who, so much as in him lies, fixeth all the Affections of his Soul upon the Fear of God, and the avoidance of Evil; if he chance, through the frailty of his nature, or the force of temptation, to fall into some Capital Sin, which according to the penalty annexed to its prohibition, deserves to be punished by the Abbreviation of his life: may notwithstanding sometimes, his remorse of Conscience, profound sorrow, fervent prayer, religious fasting, and other duties requisite to true and perfect repentance, effectually exciting the Mercies of God, obtain from him a full and absolute remission not only of the sin, but also of the temporal punishment due thereunto; and moreover a restauration of his Temperament to its native vigour, from which it was alienated by former infirmities, or corrupted by the dyscratical or distempering contagion of sin. And sometimes not; and this chief, when it hath seemed convenient to the most wise and just God to pronounce the fatal and irrepealable sentence of Death upon him: for in such a case, I believe the sin committed, to belong to that black order of Sins unto Death; by contradistinction thereof from that Sin, which is not unto Death, or upon which the irrevocable Sentence of Death is not yet pronounced; which no man can certainly know without special revelation. ¶. CHAP. VII. Of the Liberty Elective of Man's Will. SECT. I. IN our enumeration of the Venenate Absurdities, Article 1, The Parity of Absurdities resulting from those two Antagonistical Hypotheses, of Absolute Fatality, and mere Contingency; as to the Actions of man. which naturaly grow upon that inflexible stock of Absolute Fatality, or, more expressly, upon that execrable Hypothesis of the Stoics (that we may be charitable in forgetting there are any Christians of that irreligious persuasion) that all the Actions of every individual man are praedestined, and the whole order and manner of their Futurition praecisely praeordained by the invariable decrees of that Supreme Power, against which the coacted and limited Will of man can make no effectual resistance; we well remember, we specified the total sublation of all Virtue and Vice; the abnegation of Justice either Divine or Human, in the compensation of Piety and Impiety; the adnihilation of the use and efficacy of Laws to coerce from Evil, of Precepts and Adhortations to elect and prosecute good, in a word, the subversion of all Religion and Morality, and consequently the necessary resignation and rendition of the mind of man to receive all the destructive Impressions of Hell. And no less, nor fewer Absurdities may the reason of every man discover emergent from the Antithesis or contrary Assertion, that all the Actions of man, and their particular Events or Successes, are neither the praedeterminations of Fate, nor the occasional designations of Providence Divine, nor fully the arbitrary elections of man's will, but the mere unpraemeditate, and temerarious Hits of Chance: since, in pure Justice, those actions only are Laudable, or Vituperable, which are done D●libera●ò & liberè ratione Agentis, upon a deliberation of the Intellect, and an arbitrary election of the Will subsequent to that deliberation; and not those which are merely Fortuitous, and result from the indeliberate or blind activity of Fortune. When first I tasted the odious bitterness of these two streams, whereof most of the ancient Greeks, many of the noblest Romans, Article 2. Those 2 contrary streams found to have been derived from one and the same poisonous Fountain; viz. a subtersuge of man to evade Culpability. and (I fear at least) not a few of the professors of Christianity have drank too liberally, even to the infatuation of their reason; I must confess, I conceived them to have been derived from two different fountains, or interests as irreconcilable as Light to Darkness: but when I had, by the continued travail of my thoughts, traced them up to their original, I found them to be effused from one and the same vein; viz. the propensity of Human nature depraved, to attempt by all means imaginable the Excusation or Extenuation of the Gild of its defections from its proper object real good, by charging it wholly, or in part, upon some external influence praevalent over man's Will. For man, having from the Light of Nature learned this as an Axiom; that the Justice of Reprehension and Punition is radically consistent in the entire Freedom of the Delinquents Will; or, more plainly, in this, that the Delinquent chose to do ill, when 'twas absolutely in his power to have done well; not in this, that either his Will was enforced by a Necessity that admits of no repugnancy, first to the Volition and after to the actual prosecution of that ill; or that he was only a mere illiberal, incogitant, & fortuitous Agent: 'twas obvious for him to conclude, that if he could incriminate either upon an ineluctable Necessity, o● simple and mere Chance, than he might with equal facility, discharge himself of the Culpability, or Gild, and consequently of the punishment due thereunto. Now, though our pen hath dropped, on the praecedent leaves, Article 3. The Author's In●i●ments, here to inquire profoundly into the Natures of freewill, Fortune, and Fate frequent and cursary Detections of the gross and ruinous Absurdities of both these subterfuges, so that a rational consideration may, from those transient glances or hints, collect Arguments more then enough for the total Demolition of them: yet, since those notions of Fate, Fortune and freewill are subject to Aequivocation, some men understanding them as positive Causes, others as Modi agendi Causarum, certain manners of Causes operating, and others as Vana Nomina, mere Terms, which in Logical verity respond by way of adaequation to no real Entities; and since the difficulty of the subject encouraged us to promise a full Reconciliation of all their apparent Antipathies, or Inconsistencies, and also a perfect Accommodation of them all to the Special Providence of God (the only cause of their continuity and connexion to the present clue of our thoughts) we esteemed it not only a pardonable, but a laudable design to attempt by a singular discourse the manifestation of their particular Natures, or, more plainly, what we are to understand by Fate, what by Fortune, and what by Free Will. Which that we may achieve with the more familiarity to common Apprehension, both method and perspicuity command us to consider the last in the first place. By the Liberty or Freedom of man's Will (that we may maturely prevent all Logomachy or Sophistical contention Article 4. What is intended properly by the Liberty of man's Will. impendent from the ambiguous sense of that term) we intent not that Freedom, which being called by the Grecian 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, defined by Cicero, Potestas vivendi ut velit quilibet, and by the Civil Law 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Power of leading the life of a Freeman, is the contrary to Servitude; since that concerns only the Civil or Political state of Man; but that which by a proper elegancy the Grecian defines 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Latins Id quod in nobis seu penes nos, nostróve in arbitrio, potestatéque situm est, and the Divines commonly name Liberum Arbitrium an Absolute power of electing what objects we please, Good or Evil, whereon to fix our Affections; since that concerns only the natural state of man, and is that alone which can justify the Equity of the reward of Piety or Virtue, and the punishment of Impiety or Vice, by God, or Man. For morethen one respect did the Ancients select and fix on Article 5. The several subordinate Actions of the Mind, exercised about its objects: and the respective scholastic Terms, by which Philosophers have adaequately expressed them. this word Arbitrium; For, whether we would intimate that Action of the Rational Faculty, whereby man gives judgement in any matter that seemed dubious; as we use to say, that for the Decision of any case, whose obscure equity either our own imprudence, or interest makes us unfit to determine, we ought to refer ourselves to the Arbitration of some judicious and impartial person, who is thence most accommodately called an Arbiter: or the Rational Faculty itself existent within us, from which the action of Judication or Arbitration itself doth proceed, the word signifying the Action being transferred upon the Agent; we can hardly be furnished with a more adequate and significant Appellation. But, to trace the thoughts of the first Imponents up to the original, in respect the rational faculty, being the same with the Mind or Intellect, is conversant and exercised about not only things that belong merely to speculation, but also such as are reducible into Action or Practice; therefore doth the term Arbitrium seem to be appropriated to the Faculty, chief in respect of things to be done, inasmuch as it is occupied in the expension or dijudication of the consequent good of those actions, and sits as it were an absolute Arbiter to determine, whether they shall be done, or no. And hence is it that when the rational faculty having prepended the convenience and inconvenience, or good and evil of its objects, and ended its act of Deliberation, adhaeres unto, or fixes upon one as more convenient than the others; this second act or Adhaesion may be in the general (i. e. in respect of things both speculable and practical) called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an Assent or Approbation; but in particular (i. e. in respect only to those things that fall under action) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an Election or Choice: since it supposeth the praelation of that particular thing to be put in execution, to all others objected. And in this distinct relation was it that Aristotle (Ethicor. 3. cap. 3. in fine) styles the object elected, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, id quod caeteris propositis, & postpositis, amplectendum nobis proponimus, or, id quod sub delectum cadit. This the Latines most frequently render. Consilium, as in those phrases, capere consilium, sequi rationis consilium, nescire quid sit alicujus consilium, etc. and Propositum, as in those, adhaerere, stare, manner in proposito, à proposito revocare, propositi esse tenacem, etc. and we translate into Resolution, or Determination. Again, so soon as the Mind, its act of Consultation or Deliberation being finished, hath praeferred one thing to all others, in the present, and determined it for the greater good, or more convenient; then immediately supervenoth the function of the Appetite, whereby the mind is carried on towards the Amplectence, or fruition of the Good apparent therein: and this third action the Greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Latins Voluntas and Volitio indifferently, and the English the Will or Act of Volition. Which we glance at per transennam, because vulgarly, by the word Voluntas, men understand rather the Appetite (rational and proper only to Man) itself, than the Function or operation thereof: for which consideration, we shall in all our subsequent discourse conform to custom, in using the terms Will and Appetit indiscriminatim, as Synonymas implying one and the same thing. Moreover, in regard, that upon the Appetition of the Will, which is properly the actual prosecution of the good apparent in the object, there immediately succeeds the action of the Motive Faculty, therefore is the action consequent to that appetition justly called Voluntary, as having been deliberated and undertaken ex consilio, upon consultation and election, and respondent to that which the Grecian calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. For that is it, whose beginning Aristotle hath decreed to be Election, in his Aphorism, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which was the ground of Cicero's Parados, non esse actionem in rebus inanimis, that there could be no action in Inanimate things, since they are devoid of the power of Election, Assent, or Approbation: and of Aristotle's also, when he contended that this kind of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or action, could not rightly, and in distinct truth, be attributed to Brute Animals, nay higher yet, not to children, for the same reason, though he willingly conceded to both 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, spontaneous motion. Not but that by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, he sometimes signifies motionem appetitus spontaneam, the spontaneous motion of the Appetite Rational, or the Will itself, as (in 3. Ethic. cap. 4.) where he constitutes this difference betwixt Volition and Election; that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or Voluntas, is chief the end, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Election of the means conducing to that end, as in this instance, We will health, and then elect the means which in probability may ossiciate either to the conservation or restitution thereof. But when he draws his thoughts into a sharper angle, and speaks more praecisely, he allows not every appetition, to be the Will, but only that which follows a serious deliberation, approbation and election, and is grounded upon reason, which therefore he most judiciously defines to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, boni cum ratione appetitio, an Appetition of Good with Reason. Nor doth he always restrain the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to that Action which proceeds from the Will, or election of the Rational Appetite: but many times lets it lose to the expression of those inconsiderate actions, which result from the impulse of the Sensual; as in these words (1. Rhetor. cap. 10.) Omnia quae homines agunt, aut per se agunt, aut non per se● ac per se quidem, aut consuetudine, aut appetitione, & ipsa quidem aut rationali, quae sit Voluntas, aut irrationali, quae sit Cupiditas & Ira; non verò per se trifariam, quatenus aut natura, aut vi, aut ex necessitate agunt. And thus much by way of Introduction concerning the several Terms, by which both ancient and modern Philosophers have most properly denoted the several successive or subordinate actions of the Mind exercised about its objects. We now convert our thoughts to explore the Quiddity or Essence of that we call Liberum Arbitrium, and wherein it doth radically and principally consist. SECT. II. FAmiliar it is to the Apprehension of every one, that Man Article 1. The Essence of man's Liberty Elective, consistent primarily in the Indifferency of the Intellect; and in the Will only dependently. is affirmed to possess a freewill, for this reason; that amongst many divers objects occurring to, and falling under the deliberation of the Cognoscent Faculty, or Intellect, he is not obliged to make his election of any one more than the others, nor doth he so elect any one, as that it doth not still remain in his power to refuse that again and elect the contrary. This Liberty of election some men have founded only in the Will, and others in the Rational Faculty; to whose opinion reason adviseth us to adhaere. For doubtless the Will, considered per se is a blind and undiscerning Faculty, or Power, which can make no progress, nor find the way towards convenient objects without the manuduction of the Intellect, which as it were lights the torch unto, and as a knowing guide conducts the Will: so that since it is the proper office of the Intellect to inform and conduct the Will, and the proper office of the Will to follow the direction and guidance of the Intellect; it is not only manifest, that the Will cannot deflect from the right way, towards the amplectence and fruition of Good, unless by the mistaking Intellect it be seduced into the devious paths of Evil; but also, that the Liberty of election is consistent in the Intellect primarily, and in the Will only at the second hand, or by way of dependence. To speak yet more expressly, the nature of this Liberty Elective seems radically to consist in that Indifferency, in respect whereof the Faculty called free, may or may not be carried on towards any particular object, which the Schoolmen call the Liberty of Contradiction; or be so carried on towards one object, as that it may at pleasure renege that Election, and make a new one of the quite contrary, which they call the Liberty of Contrariety. Assuredly, since no man can understand how there can be a Liberty, without a Faculty of Election; it is evident that the Election can be only there, where is the Indifferency: in regard that either where one single object is proposed, or the faculty restrained and determined to the election and prosecution of any one single object: there can be no free election, since election praesupposeth a variety of objects, and is nothing but the praeferring one to all the rest, or, if there be but two, the choice of one and the refusal of the other. Some there have been, and those no mean Clerks, who have Article 2. An egregious Error of some Divines, that the Liberty of the Will doth consummate lie consist in its immovable Fixation on real Good. affirmed the Will to be then most free, when it is so determined to, and fixed upon one object grant it to be the Summum bonum or chiefest Good, that it cannot be deflected to its contrary Evil; and the reason they give is this; that since the Dilection, prosecution and fruition of that Good is highly Voluntary, it ought therefore to be accounted highly free. But we have just ground to doubt, that the Authors of this Article 3. Their inadvertency of the real Difference between a Spontaneous, & Arbitrary action; the occasion of that Error. Paradox did not either clearly understand, or at least sufficiently consider though real difference betwixt a Spontaneous and an Arbitrary action; while they contended that because either may be said to be Voluntary, therefore they are one and the same originally▪ For indeed a Spontaneous action, though when men discourse at random and in the general, it may seem to comprehend an Arbitrary one, yet in praecise and distinct reasoning, it sounds no more than a certain blind impulse of nature grounded upon no praecedent ratiocination; when an Arbitrary action properly so called, depends upon a praevious ratiocination, examination, dijudication, and election. That a Spontaneous action is no more than an indiscreet impulse Article 4. That a Spontaneous action, and an indeliberate Impulse of Nature, are homologous or identical. of nature, devoid of all deliberation, is manifest from hence; that not only Infants and Brutes (to neither of which a Philosopher will allow either use of Reason, or Liberty of Will) may do many things spontaneously, but even Inanimates have their Spontaneous motions, as Fire ascends spontaneously, and all bodies endowed with gravity descend spontaneously: so that in truth, to act by the impulse of nature, and to act spontaneously appear to be one and the same thing diversely phrased. And this makes it the less wonder, if since every appetite be ex suâ naturâ by the tendency of its own nature, carried on towards Good, it may be said to be carried on towards Good of its own accord or spontaneously; and so indeed that as a stone because by natural tendency it falls downward, cannot again change that tendency and ascend upward, so likewise the Appetite because it is determined only to Good, wants an Indifferency of tending towards Evil: and as a stone by reason of its want of Indifferency to upward and downward, is said to be moved downward Spontaneously, but not Arbitrarily, so the Appetite by reason of its defect of Indifferency to Good and Evil may be said to tend towards Good in general Spontaneously, but not Arbitrarily. And hence comes it, that if you please to suppose the Will to be determined to any one particular Good, grant it to be the Summum Bonum, so that it cannot relinquish that, and with equal appetition prosecute any other Good, real, or only apparent, then indeed you may justly enough affirm the Will to tend towards that Summum Bonum spontaneously, since 'tis most natural to the Will to prosecute that which is the chiefest of Goods (for it would not prosecute the same above all others, if it were dimoved to the prosecution of less Good) but not Arbitrarily, since it wants an Indifferency of tending to another Good as well as that, or to speak more plainly, since it is not in its power at pleasure to desert that chiefest Good, and address itself to the pursuit of a less Good. Nor can this truth be staggered by that objection, that this Article 5. The Divines objection, that the Tendency of the Will is Volent, and therefore Free; prevented, by a distinction of Libency and Liberty. tendency of the Will is Volent, since that Volency (I ask leave to use that word until I can find another more adequate to my notion) imports not a Liberty but a mere Libency, that is a Complacency, or Collubescence, and so an exclusion of all coaction, violence, renitence, or imposition: and from hence that the Dilection, Prosecution, and Fruition of such a Good may be properly enough accounted Voluntary; no man can rightly infer that 'tis therefore highly Arbitrary, but only that 'tis highly Libent or Complacent; for there may be a Libency we confess, and yet no Liberty, because no Indifferency. Again, whereas they have added, that the Perfection of the Liberty of the Will doth consist in this, so to adhaere to Good as not to be capable of dimotion or diversion from it; we may not Article 6. Their Superstructure, that the Perfection of the Wills Liberty, is its constant Adhaesion to, and inseparability from real Good demolished by two reasons: (1) that this Perfection imagined is not of the Liberty, but the Will itself; (2) that it belongs only to separated Souls, in the state of Glorification. unjustly suspect them of inadvertency in that they did not discover this Perfection which they so much magnify to be not of the Liberty itself, but of the Will or Appetite, which being Imperfect only in this respect, that at pleasure it may desert and abandon real and true Good, and convert to the Affectation and prosecution of specious and counterfeit; must acquire its perfection from hence, that quitting that native Indifferency or Liberty, it so firmly and inseparably adhaere too real and true Good, that nothing can divorce it from thence and alienate it to the prosecution of counterfeit. Besides, we conceive such a perfection of the Will to be above the sober hopes of mortality, as being reserved to make no small part of the Souls Beatitude in her state of Glorification, when she shall have no other object but the real Summum Bonum, and no other Appetite but a fixed dilection thereof. For, had flesh and blood been capable of so great and divine an Excellency, as the divesting the Will of that Indifferency to Good and Evil, and the constant determination of it only to real Good; doubtless St Paul, a man of the most mortified affections to the specious Goods of this life, and of the most fervent desires towards the substantial and eternal of the next, had never with so many tears lamented his being subject to that inevitable and implacable Psychomachy and civil war betwixt his Rational and Sensual Appetites, nor in the height of despair to conquer those rebellious inclinations to evil, cried out, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Miserable man that I am! who shall deliver me out of this body of death? But this mistake hath proved of no small advantage to the Article 7. What kind of Indifferency that is, wherein the Liberty Elective is e●●●nced. investigation of the truth, for from this which they concede, viz. it is impossible for the Will, which is once fixed upon the dilection and fruition of the Chiefest Good, really and clearly so understood (which is the prerogative only of those Sainted Minds, which the kindness of Death hath made superior to the seducements of Sense) ever to revolt from it, and deslect to the quest of a less Good: we may receive some assistance to our meditations, and the more easily understand what kind of Indifferency that is, wherein the nature of this Liberty Elective doth consist, during our souls obligations to corporeity. In our praecedent lines we affirmed, that the Intellect is guide, and doth hold the torch, or give light to the Will; and manifest it is that this Light which the Intellect holds forth to the Will, is no other but that Judgement, which the Intellect delivers concerning the Good and evil of objects, i. e. that this object is good, and that evil; or among several different goods, that this is more, and that less good: so that when the Will is said to be averted from one object and converted to another, that mutation proceeds from hence, that the Judgement of the Intellect is now for one thing and anon for another, and the inslexion of the Will is dependent on the inflexion of the Intellect. Since, therefore, the Flexility of the Will is subsequent and conform to the Flexility of the Intellect, which consists in the mutability of its Judgements: we are upon that consideration to observe, that the Intellect makes use of certain Notions, or as common Physiology calls them, Simple Apprehensions of things, in order to its own information, and succeeding pronunciation of Judgement concerning their natures. For necessary it is, that the Mind have a Praenotion what the Sun is and what Light is, that so it may judge afterwards that Light is in the Sun, or that the Sun is a Lucid Body; as also what Honey and what Sweetness is, that it may afterwards pronounce Honey to be Sweet. But in respect that in objects which fall under Speculation, the Intellect doth acquiesce in such a simple Judgement, nor can infer anything further by necessity of consequence: therefore in objects reducible to action, it hath a certain compound Notion called a Proposition or Enunciation, which by reason of another common Notion congenial and implantate in the mind of every Man from its first existence, is immediately annexed to the former simple notion, and superadded thereunto as a Conclusion, which is really that which we call Judicium Practicum, Practical Judgement. For instance, the Intellect having judged that the Sun is a Lucid Body, may therein acquiesce and proceed to no further inference; but so soon as it judgeth honey to be sweet, because it holds as implantate a second complex notion, that what is sweet is to be tasted, therefore it instantly pronounceth this conclusion, that Honey is to be tasted. And because practicable objects are not Vniversals, but Singulars; and for instance, the Intellect doth not give judgement concerning Honey in general, but of this objected Honey that it is sweet; therefore to this judgement, this Honey is sweet, instantly coheres and is superadded that second judgement, this Honey is to be tasted. Nor that only, but such is the nature of this judgement, that without any delay, if nothing countermand, succeeds the Execution thereof, as in this case the actual Degustation of Hony. And upon the consideration of the immediate supervention of the Execution upon a practical judgement, was it that Aristotle (de Animalium motu cap. 7.) would allow no distinction between an Action and a Conclusion, for saith he, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that Conclusion which follows upon two propositions, is the very action itself: which he most conveniently illustrateth by several Examples, the present omission whereof we hope either the memory or lecture of our competent Reader will supply. And this Article 8. That to every Judgement of the Intellect, is immediately and necessarily conjoined an Appetition or Aversation of the Will; respective to the Good, or Evil nunciated. justifies their knowledge, who first denominated such a conclusion which is the Action itself (or to which at least the Execution doth individually cohaere) a Practical Judgement. We are moreover to observe, that since the action or Execution of a Judgement cannot succeed, unless the function of the Appetite or Will intervene between the Judgement and Execution; therefore must every Judgement or Notion of Good have adjoined unto it an Appetition of that Good, as every Judgement of Evil hath adjoined unto it an Aversion from that Evil: so that the Intellect cannot pronounce this judgement, that what is sweet is to be tasted, but instantly riseth up the Appetite and wills the tasting of the Sweet; nor (to descend to singulars) enunciate this sweet is to be tasted, but immediately the Will is on edge to taste this Sweet. And hence it comes, that no conclusion can be extracted, nor Execution thereof succeed; but only because together with the Judgement the function of the Appetite hath preceded. For the reason why the Conclusion of a Practical Syllogism hath always the Execution or action coherent to it, but the Conclusion of a Speculative hath not; is no other than this, that the function of the Will or Appetite is always associated to the praemises or judgements of the Intellect in one, and not in the other. And therefore so often as the Intellect gives Judgement of Good; which is the proper object of the Will; as often is the Will excited so necessarily, that its function or desire of fruition follows upon the heels of the Judgement▪ as closely as a shadow attends a body in Sunshine; so that if the Intellect judge any thing to be good, the Will immediately desires that good; as on the contrary, if the Intellect judge any thing to be evil, the Will immediately abhors that evil. This is an excellent Axiom, that one truth can never be clearly understood, but it leads on to the discovery of another; Article 9 The Instability of the Will, in its Appetitions; necessarily caused by the Instability of the Intellect, in its Judgements. and here we have experience of it: for from the praemises it results a perspicuous verity, that because the Intellect is for the most part fickle and inconstant in its judgements; therefore must the Will be as wavering and unstable in its Appetitions: and when the Intellect to day judges any object to be good, but to morrow judges it to be evil; then doth this Paedantique faculty the Will affect that object to day, and hate it again to morrow: and when the Intellect to day declares that such an object is to be affected and prosecuted because 'tis good, but to morrow faceth about to a second object, and apprehending it to be better than the first, judges that to be prosecuted rather of the two; then is the Will to day carried on to the first object, and to morrow averted from it to the Second. In a word, the Prosecution and Aversion of the Will is dependent on, and conform to those Notions and Judgements which the Intellect delivers concerning the more or less good, or good and evil of objects. Further, in respect that amongst good objects, one is really and truly good, another only apparent and counterfeit; and likewise Article 10. The Delusion of the Intellect, in its Judgements; necessitateth the Delusion of the Will in its dependent Appetitions. among evil objects (for too frequently good is disguised under the uncomely vizard of evil, and evil again guilded over with the specious and alluring hatchment of Good, and then what is realy good seems either to be absolute evil, or a less good comparatively, and what is really evil seems either to be absolute good, or a less evil comparatively) hence comes it we say, that as the Intellect is frequently deluded in its judgements, as being invited by the Appearance of Good, it judgeth a guilded evil to be a real good, or offended at the Appearance of evil, judgeth that disguised good to be a real evil; so must the Will of necessity be deluded in its dependent Appetitions, and prosecuting an apparent good, obtain a real evil, and avoiding a seeming evil, be frustrated of a real good; or certainly as the Intellect enunciates a less good to be a greater, or a less evil to be a greater; so must the Will, prosecuting a greater good, obtain a less, and avoiding a less evil, fall upon a greater. On the demonstration of this grandfather Truth, viz. that the Will is but the Needle, and the Intellect the Magnet, by Article 11. That the Indifferency of the Will, is but the shadow, or representative of that Indifferency in the Intellect: and the Determination of this, necessitates the Determination of that. whose verticity it is impregnated with an affectation of lying parallel to the point of good, real or apparent, (for evil as evil, i. e. presented naked and without disguise, is not the proper object of either) or, more consimilar, that the Will is the Mariner, and the Intellect the Compass by which he steers; depends also the discovery of another Abstrusity, viz. that the Indifferency found in the Will is but the Counterfeit or Representative of that Indifferency which is congenial to the Intellect, and consequently, that the determination of that Indifferency in the Mistress causeth the determination of the like Indifferency in the Handmaid, to this or that particular object. Now the Indifferency of the Intellect seems essentially to consist in this, that it is not so adliged to adhaerence, to its own judgement concerning the good of any thing objected, as that it may not alter its judgement, and if the appearance of good seems greater in another object, apostate from the first, and as vigorously, and confidently convert to the second. For the Intellect is not of the Number of those faculties, which by these fundamental constitutions of their Essence are determined only to one certain motion, as Gravity in bodies devoid of animation, the Generative virtue in Animals, etc. but is by nature so Flexile, that having truth or good for its object, it may one while judge this and another while that, and perhaps the quite contrary of one and the same, and now affect an object under the notion of true and good, and within an hour, nay possibly in a moment, revoke that judgement, and again dislike it under the notion of false or evil, or at least, of less true, or less good. This constant Inconstancy of the Intellect, the most happy Wit of Cicero descanting upon, most conveniently compares it Article 12. The Analogy betwixt the Intellect, and a Balance. to a Balance (4 Academic:) for, in troth, no simile in the world, at least, that ever passed our observation, can be more quadrant, or hold a nearer resemblance, in all points: since, as a Balance, if geometrically adjusted by dimidiation, is of itself indifferent to be depressed at either extreme, and is so forced from its aequipondium, or depressed at that end, on which the greater weight is suspended; as that the contrary end may be immediately depressed, if a greater weight than the former be suspended thereon: exactly so is the Intellect of its self indifferent, as to inclinations, and is so inflected to that object, whereto the greater appearance of truth or good (which is the weight that sways it down to determination from Indifferency) is adhaerent, that it can upon the appension of a greater appearance of good be reflected to a second object. For it is not much below Uncontrollable Necessity, that the Article 13. That the Intellect doth naturally conform to the attraction of the greater Verisimility: and the reason of its Fluctuation. Intellect should thither convert, and there fix, where is the greatest semblance of good: and therefore its native Indifferency is not such, as that abandoning an object, whose good is more perspicuous, it can affect another, whose good is less perspicuous; or, rejecting a judgement which appears more true, court and embrace another which appears less true: because, as the beam of a balance, being depressed on one extreme by a greater weight imposed, is never elevated by the imposition of a less weight on the contrary extreme, but of a greater; so likewise can it not be, that that assent of the Intellect, which is caused by the perspicuity of Experience, or some praevalent reason, should be removed to another object, unless by the attraction of an Experience of greater moment, or a reason whose validity and importance is more perspicuous. And, for the eviction of this natural conformity of the Intellect to the attraction of the more ponderous Verisimility of its objects, we need no other argument but this; that many times we find our minds aequilibrated betwixt two judgements, or wavering in suspense between two objects equally attractive; which Fluctuation or Doubting ariseth of necessity from hence, that the moments of verity, or weights of reason are equal on either side, and so exactly counterpoise each other, that the mind can acquiesce in the election of neither; Article 14. That the Determination of the Intellect to one or two objects, is caused either by the more ponderous Appearance of Verity therein, or the minds greater Attention to the moments of reason apparent on that side, then to those on the other. as a pair of scales charged with two equal weights cannot be swayed from an aequilibrium. Again, that it seems during this Fluctuation, one while to incline to the one part, and instantly to be counter-inclined to the other, and then again to revert to the former, and so to be agitated by the inquietude of suspense; hath no other reason but this, that one while it is more attentive to the perpension of reason in the first object, and anon more Attentive to that in the second; and so long doth it remain inclined to the invitement of the one, as it apprehends the good thereof more apparent then of the other, and no longer; after the same manner as if when a pair of scales are aequilibrated by two equal weights, you shall superadd to either end of the balance but a few grains more, that end must be depressed, and upon the shifting of those grains to the other end the former again elevated. So that when the Intellect doth at last deflect to one part, this Determination must proceed from hence; that either the Appearance of verity is somewhat more ponderous on that part, or at least that the more constant Attention to the Verisimility of that part, conjoined to the minds impatience, (which too frequently helps to turn the Scales, and therefore aught to be allowed for) supplying the defect of weight, makes it seem so. Most certain it is, we confess, that the Intellect frequently Article 15. That the Appearance of Truth is always the ca●se of the Intellects inclination. doth, retracting that judgement which of its self, i. e. in the simplicity of its nature, is either more good, or absolutely good, adhaere to a second judgement, which of its self is either less good, or absolutely evil: but yet notwithstanding that in the object, which affects and inclines the Intellect, is always ipsa veri species, the Appearance of Truth, which it observes and is attentive to. And because that species of Truth may be either real or counterfeit; therefore may that which is in its own nature really true, be presented under the disguise of an absolute falsehood or less Truth, and that which is in its own nature really false, be presented likewise under the disguise of an absolute truth, or less falsehood: and so the Intellect becoming subject to deception in the point of judicature, may be allected to the prosecution of an absolute falsehood, or less truth, while the object remains obvelated under the delusive vizard of an absolute truth or a less falsehood, & è contra. This seriously considered supports three excellent Consequences; (1) that as often as the Intellect, having adhaered to a true judgement, Article 16. Three considerable Inferences from the praemises. quits and pursues a false one, so often of necessity doth something intervene which detracts the genuine or natural Appearance from the good object, and imposes a counterfeit Appearance upon the evil one, and by that means causes a mutation of the Intellects assent, or judgement: and therefore (2) that the commutation of the species or Appearance of the object is the sole immediate cause of the Commutation of the Intellects judgement and assent: and therefore (3) that since the Will is obliged, by that necessity formerly declared, to conform to the conduct and directions of its Guide, the Intellect; it is in vain therefore to hope or attempt that the Will should change its Appetition, unless care be first taken, that the Intellect change its judgement, or, that the Will should be constant to its Appetition, unless we provide that the Intellect be constant to its judgement. And, therefore, that Mind, which having discovered the incomparable beauties of virtue is become enamoured on her, and stands resolved to court no other Mistress but her, aught to be exceeding circumspect and cautious in this particular, that it submit to the allurement of no object, until it hath profoundly examined whether that species of Good therein presented, be really true, or only superficial and counterfeit, that so it may render its self superior to the delusion of painted Vice. The admirable Des Cartes (in 3. part. passion. artic. 22.) praesenting a general preservative against all the excesses and Article 17. Cartesius his general Preservative against the excesses of Passions. exorbitancies of our passions, gives us this excellent advice, that having learned first to distinguish betwixt those motions or Affections which are terminated in the Soul, and those which are terminated only in the Body, we should, when we feel our blood and spirits agitated by any affection which concerns only the body, reflect upon this as a general Maxim; that all things which offer themselves to the imagination, do tend to no other purpose but to the deception of the Soul, and to persuade the rational and judicative Faculty, that those reasons inservient to the Commendation of the object of that passion, are far more solid, sirme and worthy our assent then really they are, and, on the contrary, that those reasons inservient to the Improbation or disallowance of the object, are far more trivial, infirm and less worthy our assent, then really they are. That when the passion persuades to those things, whose execution may admit suspension or delay; we abstain from passing our verdict too hastily upon them, and divert our cogitations to the serious examen of the inconveniences impendent on their pursuit and execution: or, at least, to some other object, till time and sleep shall have calmed the impetuous commotions of the blood and spirits, which the seeming good of the object hath excited. And that when the Passion incites to those actions, whose fleet occasion gives the soul little or no time to consult and deliberate; we always endeavour to convert our Understanding to the perpension, and our Will to the prosecution of those reasons, which are conttary to those inferred and urged by that passion; notwithstanding they shall, at the first view, appearless valid and ponderous; for thereby we shall mainly refract and abate the violence of the passion. Now, this may be our Exemplar in ordering our advice, how Article 18. General Rules prescribed by the Author, how to prevent the Delusion of the Understanding, and dependent seduction of the will by Evil disguifed under the similitude of Good. to prevent the Delusion of our Understanding, and the seduction of our Will by Evil disguised under the similitude of Good. First, we ought to learn the discrimination of the goods of the Mind, from those pertinent only to the Body: and then, when we meet with any object apparently good, abstractly to examine, whether that good concerns either the body alone, or the mind alone, or both body and mind equally, or more the body then the mind, or more the mind then the body. If only the body, we are to convert our cogitations upon the reasons which dissuade, more intently then upon the reasons which persuade the election of and adhaerence to it, that so we may, if there be any, detect the Evil couched under that varnish of good, and also conquer the Minds impatience, which too often bears a large share in our deceptions. If only the Mind, in that case we are to bring it to the touchstone of the Divine Will: i. e. examine whether those reasons whereby it persuades our Intellect to an Approbation, and consequently our Will to an affectation and prosecution of it, are correspondent to that inseparable or proper sign, or mark of true Good, Conformity to the Will of God, or not; for the very Soul, or quintessence of virtue doth radically consist▪ ●n this; that man without all haesitancy, murmur, diffidence, and reluctancy, conform his Will to the indeceptible Divine Will, as being ascertained, that he can will nothing more excellent in its self, nor convenient to him, than what God hath willed before. If both body, and mind equally, then to abstract those reasons which insinuate the interest of Sense, and insist only upon those which praefer it to the mind: for, if they shall be found worthy of assent, we need the Authority of no other to justify our election of that object. If more the body then the mind, than we ought to aestimate the convenience of it by that lesser relation it holds to the mind, and not by that greater it holds to the body. And finally, if more the mind then the body, since the interest of the mind is infinitely to be praeferred to that of the body, where the reasons are equal on each part: 'tis manifest, we may safely acquiesce in that judgement, and embrace the object. But, in case the object seem dubious, and such whose Verity or Falsity is not easily discoverable, than the only way of avoiding Error in our judgements, is cohibere assensum, to suspend our approbation of, and assent to the Apparences, or species on each part offered. And by this power of withholding our assent does Des Cartes endeavour to establish the Liberty of the Will. (Princip. Philosoph. part. 1. Sect. 6.) This in general, we conceive to be the Art of rectifying the Will by the praevious information of the Intellect; and that thrice happy Soul that hath learned it, hath anticipated one degree of that Perfection, which is one moiety of that State of immortal Beatitude, which we are confident that knowing Soul of Des Cartes once aimed at, and now enjoys, without that nothing of measure. But alas! while we dwell in the Courts of Vanity, walk amongst the snares of Satan, and carry in our very nature whole legions of frailties, the least of which too strongly inclines us to the delusions of Vice, if presented in the colours of Virtue; 'tis a Province above the power of mere Humanity to acquire such anhabitual Constancy of our Intellect to its judgement, and of our Will to its Appetition of real Good, as that neither can be divorced from it, and alienated to the embracements of specious or splendid Evils, and therefore we must indefatigably endeavour to conquer part of this inhaerent Indifferency upon our knees, humbly and fervently imploring the assistance and continual manuduction of divine Grace, that supernatural Light; whereby the Intellect may be illuminated to a clarity, that shall transfix and dispel all the thickest clouds of Error and falsehood, wherein the optics of Sense are usually terminated; and modestly suspend our hopes of a total and indissoluble union with Verity, until our Souls shall have abandoned this body of sin to corruption, and entered the new Jerusalem, where there is no Indifferency, but an eternal determination of the Mind and all its Faculties to the Supreme Good, where nothing shall occur to either Intellect, or Will, but that Supreme Good, and (in a word) where that Libency of the Will, which some Divines calls the Perfection of its Liberty, shall become a pure and ineluctable Necessity. SECT. III. HAving made it sufficiently manifest, that the Liberty of Article 1. An objection, that Ignorance is the mother of sin. man's Will doth radically consist in the Indifferency of the Intellect to its judicature; and amply explained the nature of that Indifferency: it remains only that we expede that proverbial objection, whereby the best of us are too prone to palliate our delinquency and excuse our offences; viz. Omnis peccans est ignorans, Ignorance is the mother of all Sin. This Aristotle doubtless alluded to when he said, Quî fieri possit, ut qui de rebus rectè aestimat, incontinens sit? and Socrates also when he said, Fieri non posse, ut in quo sit Scientia, in eo aliud quid dominetur, atque adeo ut qui de rebus rectè aestimat, non id quod est optimum agate; cum si id agate, necesse sit (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) ob ignorantiam id fieri. Out of this Labyrinth we may soon extricate our thoughts by Article 2. The same expeded, by a Distinction of Science Into Habitual, and Actual. making use of that Clue of a Distinction between Science in Habit, and Science in Act; For, a man may have a knowledge, and yet neglect to make use of it, as when he diverts his mind more intently to some thing, then to that which he doth know; or hath the clarity of his Understanding benighted with sleep, madness, wine, etc. and a man may have a knowledge and reduce it to practise, as when he converts his mind unto, and fixes it upon that only which he doth know. Now if a man Actually know, or hath not the acies of his mind leveled at any other thing but what he doth know; in this case, we confess it impossible, that he should do an action contrary to his knowledge: and consequently, that holding a clear and perfect knowledge of the decorum or pulchritude of Virtue, and contrariwise of the turpitude or deformity of Vice, he should forsake the former to court the later. But if he know only Habitually, or hath his cogitations more attended to another thing, then that of which he hath a clear and indubitate knowledge; since his neglect to use it is equivalent to the total want of that knowledge; we have no reason to deny, that he may do what is pointblank repugnant to his knowledge; and consequently, though he possess a clear theory of the loveliness of Virtue, and contrariwise of the ugliness of Vice, that he may notwithstanding abandon the former and embrace the later. To this some have inconsiderately replied; that a man may do a thing repugnant to his Actual knowledge; why? because Article 3. A reply, that the reluctancy of every Delinquents Conscience, doth evidence the possibility of man's doing an Act repugnant to his Actual Science. for the most part every Delinquent so soon as he hath acted amiss, and most commonly at the same instant, feels himself surprised with a certain horror, secret regret, reluctancy and conturbation of mind, called by Divines remorse of Conscience: which must of necessity proceed from his cognition of the amiableness of Virtue which he hath repudiated, and of the odiousness of Vice which he hath embraced; since if he wanted this, he must also have wanted that. Here Aristotle hath prevented our rejoinder by retorting; that every such Delinquent acts the same part with vinolent Article 4. The rejoinder, that the Habitual Science of every Delinquent, is perturbed and obnubilated by some Passion, excited in him: and that the Remors of Conscience proceeds from the sense of the Loss of Good. Rhapsodists, who, by the habitual exercise of their memory, use ex tempore to rehearse a whole sheet of Empedocles moral verses, of which they understand little, and practise less; or Schoolboys, who distinctly read what their understanding doth not comprehend; or Stage-players, who can gracefully personate the most magnanimous Heroes; but themselves still continue most abject and superlative Cowards. For in him who commits a vicious Act, there always is excited some Passion, either of Pleasure, or Anger, or Ambition, or Avarice, which raiseth a tempest in his mind, and so perturbeth, perverteth, and drowneth that habitual Science; insomuch, that what ever of good is in virtue, and what ever of evil is in vice, becomes thereby obnubilated, and darkened; and on the contrary, whatever of difficulty seems to be in virtue, and what ever of pleasantness in vice, becomes thereby more conspicuous and illustrated: i. e. Passion is a Perspective, which representeth as well the difficulty of virtue, as the complacence of vice, in magnified dimensions; and on the contrary diminisheth the good of the one, and the evil of the other. And hence comes it, that the real good of virtue attracteth the mind more weakly, and the seeming Good of vice more strongly; and on the contrary, the real evil of vice averteth or disgusteth the mind more weakly, and the seeming evil of good more strongly. So he that offends, may, we confess, with Ovid, say, Video meliora, probóque, deteriora sequor, that he knows those things which he rejecteth to be the better, and those things which he electeth to be the worse; but yet, this must be referred unto some other time, when he recognizes his habitual Science, and calls to mind, that once he had other judgements of those things: for he cannot justly say so of that time wherein he offended, since than he judged those things he pursued to be the better, and those he deserted to be the worse. Now as for that internal regret, contristation, and penitence, which invades the mind of every Delinquent immediately after, and most frequently in the same moment of the perpetration of his offence; this proceeds from his animadversion that he suffers some loss of good. But since this his apprehension of the loss of good, and that reluctancy of mind attendant thereupon is but dull and weak, in comparison of that complacency he is affected withal by the seeming good or pleasure of evil, which subdues his judgement to an approbation of it: hence it is manifest, that he considers and perpends the impendent omission of Good, and the incursion of evil, not seriously and profoundly as he ought, but only perfunctorily and slightly. For, were the punishment, sorrow, ignominy, and other evils, which he only lightly and confusedly apprehends, and fears, profoundly examined and looked into by him, not as absent, not as future, not as uncertain, and avoidable, but as impendent, present, certain, and inevitable; without all doubt the smallest glimpse of reason would be sufficient to let him see those forcible determents, nor could he be so mad as from the rock of knowledge to precipitate himself into the most horrid gulf of vice. And therefore albeit an offender may say that he saw and approved the Good, but embraced the Evil, yet is that Inconsideration or Non-advertency, by reason whereof he doth not sufficiently discover all the qualities and circumstances of the evil object, and what and how great mischiefs must necessarily ensue upon his actual prosecution thereof, a kind of Ignorance. And in this sense only can we allow Ignorance to be the mother of Sin; for had man sufficiently understood the evil thereof, he had never been vicious. To conclude therefore, this Ignorance must prove but an Article 5. What kind of Ignorance that is, which may, in some degree excuse a Delinquent. invalid and ridiculous plea at the judicious Tribunal of Justice, nor ought a Delinquent to slatter himself with the vain hopes of impunity by such an excuse; that he sinned for want of knowledge, that he prosecuted the apparent Good he saw in the object, that it was above his power to prevent the delusion of his understanding by Evil presented under the species of Good (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, we cannot countermand Apparences) that no man is vicious with his own consent, nor happy against his will, according to that Proverb, Nemo malus ultrò est, neque beatus non volens, and that he wanted an ability of J●udgement to do otherwise: this we say cannot extenuate his guilt, and consequently not avert the punishment due thereunto. For, that Ignorance which excuseth, is of another nature; such as we may more properly call Inscientia mera, mere Nescience, Ignorantia pura ac invincibilis, pure and invincible Ignorance; such as that of Shafalus, when mistaking her to have been a wild beast couchant in a brake he discharged his dart at his beloved wife Procris, and unfortunately slew her; and that of the constant Deianira when she poisoned Hercules with a shirt dipped in Nessus the Centaur's gore, which she intended for a Philtre to revoke his affections from jole; and that also of the fatal handed Gentleman, who shooting at a Deer in New-Forest, killed William Rufus: but that Ignorance, of which we here discourse, is in proper truth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Incuria, vel Negligentia mera, mere Negligence, Inadvertency, or Heedlessness, and is therefore for distinctions sake denominated Ignorantia crassa, affectata, supina, gross, affected, supine ignorance. To understand the nature of this Non-excusing Ignorance the more distinctly, let us observe, that every Delinquent must in justice charge the Ignorance he praetends, upon one of these two Causes; either that himself was to himself the cause of his ignorance: or that he neglected the means and advantages of acquiring knowledge, i. e. that he did not employ his Cognoscent Faculty on the examination and consideration of the real good or evil of his action, with that care, seriousness, and sedulity, which was requisite. To the First of these Causes belongs the ignorance of a Drunkard; for in being the Cause of his Ebriety, he is also the Cause of his Ignorance; and 'twas in his power to have prevented this, by the precaution of that: and therefore his Ignorance is so far short of extenuating, that it naturally aggravates his culpability; and he, if Aristotle may be judge, deserves a double punishment, one for making himself drunk, another for the crime committed in his Drunkenness. Hither also we are to refer his Ignorance, who resisteth not the force of a Passion or perturbation of his mind in the first motion or beginning thereof, while 'tis yet but weak, and to be suppressed by a small opposition of reason; but permits it to acquire more violence, and gain upon him by degrees, till its impulse grow impetuous, and more inoppugnable: as also his, who suffers a vicious Inclination, which he might without any considerable difficulty have at first refracted and totally extinguished, to grow into a settled Habit, which pleading praescription and possession, is hardly ejected, but plays the obsolute Tyrant o'er the mind, and holds the Sceptre of both Understanding and Will by the ineluctable title of Conquest. Thus if a man, who having a rare Bird in his hand, willingly lets it sly, should complain that he cannot recover it again; 'tis not to be expected that any rational person should pity him for his loss, but rather deride his folly, in that he manumitted it when 'twas in his power to have kept it: and if a man contract some dangerous disease by intemperance, who can afford him half so much compassion, since 'twas in his power not to have been intemperate, as if he had been invaded by some impartial Epidemic Contagion, against which none the greatest temperance is an infallible preservative? To this purpose were these words of Aristotle intended; Nemo enim caecitatem, quam natura, morbus, ictus fecerit, exprobret, sed caeci potius misereatur; at si illam aut ebriositas, aut intemperantia alia fecerit, non id opprobrio ducat? (in 3. Ethic. cap. 7.) To the other belongs his ignorance, who being hurried on to Article 6. ●●ur weighty Reasons, convincing, that man hath an Absolute Power in himself to control the temptations of Evil. the prosecution of Evil, by the impetuous rapt or swinge of Passion, can yet say Video meliora probóque: for in this case also was it in his power to have more seriously and sedulously examined, sifted, and praeconsidered the evils impendent on that action, and so to have avoided it; We say, absolutely in his power, for four weighty respects. (1) Because we frequently observe, that if in the same moment, when we are prepared to commit a sin, and already entered upon the execution, there chance to come in some grave and virtuous Person, whom we revere, or some Magistrate, whose revenging sword we sear, intervene: we instantly become conscious of our wicked intentions, and desist from the perpetration of it. (2) Because there are many Virtuous Persons, who having learned and practised that noblest militia of conquering themselves, can command themselves even in the highest orgasmus and fervour of their passions; holding it most base and unworthy the dignity of a generous mind, to be surprised with the subtlest Ambushes of Vice, and led captive by the pygmy armies of sensual Temptations. (3) Because 'tis not in vain that God, compassionating the frailties and deceptibility of humane nature, hath vouchsafed to accommodate our understanding with those faithful and powerful auxiliaries, Laws, Precepts, Exhortations and pious Praecedents, to which we may, in the hottest charges of vicious temptations, with safety and assured Conquest recurre; and upon which if with sufficient attention we reflect the eye of our mind, we shall become 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ejus domini, quod res esse apparet, Lords Comptrollers of Apparences, i. e. detect the frauds and impostures of Evil, though dressed in all the glorious ornaments of Good. (4) Because no man endevoring to excuse his offence, can truly say Video meliora probóque; but he doth manifestly grant the action he doth to be Deliberate, and Praecogitate; which is as much as this, 'twas absolutely in my power to have omitted the doing of it, and to have done the contrary good. For none can say so of an indeliberate action, as when he feels a commotion of his blood and spirits at the first touch of Anger; which is the reason of Seneca his affirmation (2 de Ira 3) quod primus motus non sit voluntarius, that the first motion which an object excites in the mind is involuntary, and the ground of that Maxim Primi motus non sunt in nostra potestate. What these First Motions, which objects, their species being Article 7. What those First Motions are, which objects inevitably excite in the Mind: and that the Consequences of those motions are praeventible. by the mediation of the nerves and spirits transmitted to the mind, excite therein, are in the general; though Epictetus hath furnished us with a convenient brief description of them, in these words, Primus motus est quem creant visa animi (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 appellant Philosophi) quibus mens hominis prima statim specie accidentis ad animum rei, pellitur, non voluntatis sunt, neque arbitrariae, sed vi quadam suâ sese inferunt hominibus nos●itandae: yet the most apposite and most familiar way of explaining their nature and extent, which our meditations could find out, is to exemplify them in some one particular beginning Passion, and chief in that of Anger, where these Impulses or motions are most sensible, because most forcible. Which that we may the more worthily perform, let us, with Des Cartes, concede two distinct species of Anger, (1) one caused in a moment, which invading with some violence, cannot be concealed; but discovers itself for the most part by colouring the face with a Vermilion, or Aurora tincture on a sudden; but performs little, and is easily and soon calmed. (2) Another, which invading with less violence, is not to be discovered, unless rarely by inducing paleness upon the Countenance, by any signs in the beginning; but being of a less diffusive condition, doth more corrode and gall the heart, and consequently produce more dangerous effects. To the first of these, they are most obnoxious, who have the most of Love, Nobleness or sweetness of disposition habited in them. For it ariseth not from any profound hatred, but from a sudden Aversation, repentinely surprising the Mind: and because loving, good, and Heroic minds are always propense to imagine, that all things ought to proceed in that manner or course which they judge to be the best, therefore so soon as they discover any thing to be carried on in a contrary course to Good, they instantly make a stand in their thoughts, become offended at it, and grow angry; yea many times when the matter concerns not them in special; for since they love much, they take to heart, (as the vulgar phrase it) resent, and appropriate the Cause of them they love, as nearly as if it were their own, insomuch as what would have been no more than matter of Indignation to others, proves matter of Anger to them. And because that Inclination, whereby they become possessed with a constant propensity to love, doth effect, that they have always much of heat, because much of blood in and about their Heart; therefore that repentine Aversion, which suddenly surpriseth them, cannot but propel some small quantity of Choler (the Tinder whereon the sparks of this Passion fix and foment) to the Heart; nor that little of Choler but be accended, and excite, in an instant, a great commotion, and effervescence of the blood thither propelled. But this Commotion lasteth but a small space of time, because the impulse or force of the unexpected Aversation is of no continuance; and so soon as they deprehend the matter for which they were angry, to be of no moment, and such as ought not to have commoved them to that height; they becalm themselves, conjure down their spirits, and become affected with a reluctancy against and a penitence for that Passion, and so destroy it in the Embryo or shell. With the other, weak, abject, and ingenerous minds are most transported. For though it seldom discover itself in the beginning, unless by some paleness in the face; yet is its force by degrees increased by reason of that agitation which the fervent desire of Revenge exciteth in the blood, which being permixed with that Choler propelled to the heart from the inferior part of the Liver and Spleen, kindles therein a sharp, pungent, and corroding Heat. And as those minds are most generous, and noble, which are most inclined to Gratitude; so are those the most proud, abject and base, which suffer themselves the most to be transported with this kind of ignoble Anger. For by so much the greater do Injuries appear to be, by how much the greater value Pride makes a man put upon himself, and by how much the greater estimation is set upon those Goods which are taken away by that Injury: and by so much a higher rate are those goods prized at, by how much the more weak, abject, and ignoble the mind of him is that aestimates them, because in truth they are dependent upon others pleasure; nor doth a well ordered mind lose any part of its happiness by being deprived of them. Now, having duly praeconsidered all things occurrent in this pregnant example, we may not only without difficulty understand what those first motions or incitements are, which objects exciting in the mind thereby obtrude themselves upon the Intellect, or rather compel the Intellect to apprehend them under that species in which they present themselves; but also that, though those motions are not in our power, yet the Consequents or Actions to which they provoke us, are subject to our Deliberation, Examination, and Arbitrary Election, or Rejection; since every Action, is the Conclusion of a Practical Syllogism, and every Conclusion praesupposeth two praecedent Propositions, and these again praesuppose Deliberation, and consequently that who ever committing an Evil Action, doth yet say Videóque meliora probóque, doth in that confess his Action to be Deliberate and Arbitrary, which is as much as to confess that 'twas absolutely in his own power not to have done it. And as for that proverbial subterfuge 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Nemo m●lus ultro est, neque beatus non volens; Aristotle hath long since subverted it by answering, That though it be true in the later part, insomuch as no man can be happy, because not virtuous, against his will, yet 'tis false in the former, insomuch as vice, whereby man becomes Evil, is voluntary (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) whereupon M. Anton. said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: qui verò sui ipsius animi motus certa ratione consilióque non gubernat, necessariò miser est. (lib. 2. num. 5.) And therefore though many have thought to palliate their vitiosities, by affirming that no man doth commit a sin voluntarily, but being compelled thereunto by the impulse of some perturbation: yet 'tis manifest, since every Delinquent gives either occasion or way to that perturbation, and suffers himself to be transported by the impulse thereof, beyond the sphere of reason, that no coaction can intevene. To conclude, we are ready to confess, that among those many excuses, which the Sophistry of the Advocates of vice hath Article 8. Necessity, and Fear conceded to be, in some measure, Excuses: and what are the objects of Excusing Fear. alleged for the extenuation of its Culpability, the most weighty and considerable is the violence of Necessity and Fear. But, all violence must proceed from an external Principle, and is not admitted without some Renitency in the thing that suffers it; and that Necessity, whereby any man is coacted, must proceed from an external and present Cause; and fear is an internal Passion, though excited by an external Cause, viz. a future Evil; and differeth from Cupidity in this, that this, though it be excited by an external cause also, viz. a future Good, yet it is joined always with a Libency or Willingness, but Fear with a Renitency or unwillingness. Upon which consideration was it, that Aristotle concluded him exceeding stupid and ridiculous, who, having vitiated his friend's wife, should for excuse pretend, that he was constrained to that perfidious and immodest action by the violent temptation of pleasure; burr holds him excusable who is compelled to omit an office of friendship by the praevention of some more considerable incommodity impendent upon himself, since the Necessity of the one is more violent and urgent, than the obligation of the other. For the more easy decision of all disputes concerning the more or less pressure of these kinds of Necessity, Cicero puts this Case. Si constitueris te cuipiam advocatum in rem praesentem esse venturum; atque interim graviter aegrotare filius coeperit, non sit contra officium non facere quod dixeris; magisque ille cui promissum sit, ab officio discedat si se destitutum queratur. This premised, we may safely conclude, that a small and light fear is not to be accounted sufficient to excuse a malefaction; because it cannot usurp upon and countermand the Liberty of the Mind; nay nor a great and strong fear (which is therefore allowed by some great Clerks for an excuse, because it may sometimes invade and stagger a mind in other things constant and generous) since it cannot so oppose the Liberty Elective, as not to leave the mind possessed with some Libency. And this is to be understood, not in respect to that Evil, which is sustained or undergone in the present, but to that far greater one, which is avoided, and in comparison of which the less Evil hath indeed the reason of Good; because it is as it were the means whereby the greater Evil is averted or prevented, as when Merchants throw their treasure overboard, for fear of drowning, and a Traveller delivers his purse to Robbers for fear of having his throat cut. Now, how far this kind of fear, which seems to necessitate the commission of a small Evil for the probable praevention of a greater, may be extended by way of Excusation; as also of what sorts those evils must be which justify this fear; the exactest and profoundest of Moralists have found it no easy matter praecisely to determine; chief because according to the variety of men's Temperaments, ages, sexes, Educations, Habits etc. what is but a weak and light fear to one, may be great and potent to another; but all consent that we are to understand it to be a fear of no less than Death, Mutilation, torment, servitude, long exile, tedious imprisonment, aeternal dishonour or ignominy, privation of all, or the greatest part of ones estate, or livelihood (and in this particular, not in respect of a man's self only, but also for those who depend upon him for temporal subsistence, as wife, children, parents &c.) as also that kind of fear which is a species of Reverence, and such as may be in a subject, in respect of his Prince, in a child in respect of his Father, in a wife in respect of her husband etc. We said that fear which seems to necessitate the commission of a small evil etc. thereby insinuating, that it only seems so to do. For, Truth its self hath taught us, that we ought not to do evil, though never so small, for prevention of another evil, though ne'er so great; and every man knows that Fear (unless of doing Evil) is wholly excluded the society of virtue. Which our late Solomon (whom we can hardly think upon, without a devout Adoration of his deified part) reflected upon, when he affirmed for a Maxim of general truth, That a Coward can hardly be an honest man. And this we desire our Reader candidly to accept, as a sufficient enquiry into the nature of man's freewill. CHAP. VIII. Of Fortune. THat this Phantsme, though of no great antiquity (comparatively) hath under the disguise of a Article 1. The Antiquity and Genealogy of Fortune. Reality, so long and so universally possessed the heads not only of the Vulgar (whose rank and muddy brains are ever more fertile in the production, and more favourable to the conservation of Monsters, than Nilus and all Africa) but even of some of those more cultivated Explorators of truth, who well knew the absurdity of Multiplying Entities, and pretended to examine every Idea occurring to the mind, whether it had an exemplar, or prototype in real Existence; that so, though they could not attain to a full cognition of the distinct Essences, or simple Forms of Objects, they might at list acquire an assurance of their Reality, or Being in rerum natura: this, we say, seems to us no contemptible Argument, that the Venom of the Forbidden Fruit hath a stronger and more infatuating operation upon the posterity of Adam, in the old age of the world, than it had in its youth and middle age; and that the sun in the Microcosm hath suffered a greater and more demonstrable decay of Splendour, Clarity, and Influence, than Bodin (method. Histor. cap. 8.) out of Copernicus, Reinaldus, and Stadius, hath affirmed that in the Macrocosm to have sustained, and confessed by its nearer approach to the Earth, and more Southerly inclination, since the days of Ptolemy. For (first) though Simplicius (2. physic. comment. 39) hath a certain obscure tradition, that Orpheus engaged in the expedition of the Argonauts, composed a votive Hymn to this Fairy Queen, which was afterward inserted into the idolatrous Liturgy of the Delphian Apollo, together with whom she was solemnly invocated: yet hath, Macrobius, much the better Antiquary of the two, faithfully observed (5. Saturn. ib.) that she was, if not unborn, yet unnamed in Homer's time; subjoyning as a reason thereof, quod priscis illis temporibus omnia, quae sierent, referri ad Deos Authores solerent; that more simple and intelligent Antiquity used to refer all events to the wise procuration of the Gods. Which is evidence sufficient, that Fortune could not mount up to an Apotheosis, till the world grew into its Dotage, and man sunk a whole sphere below that of his Ancestors simplicity and knowledge. And (2) that, whenever she was borne, and whoever was her Father, yet Ignorance was her Mother; besides the convincing Authority of our own Reason, we have that of the impartial Cicero, in these words: Stultitia, Error, Caecitas & Ignoratio rerum atque causarum, Fortunae nomen primò induxisse, certum est. And so much the more of weight may this Argument bear, by how much the more manifest a Contradiction they incur, who have either defended, or advanced her reputation; for though no one among those many Writers, who have professedly treated of her Nature and Power, hath denied her extraction from, and necessary dependence upon that accursed Beldame, Ignorance: yet have most agreed, that she is something more than Nomen inane, a mere and empty Name, or Chimaera; and some allowed her the dignity of a considerable Influence upon the actions of Man; nay, others have gone so far as to exalt her virtue to a competition with Providence Divine, and consigned her a throne among the Celestial Deities, as is intimated in that verse of Juvenal (satire 14.) — sed te Nos facimus Fortuna Deam, coeloque locamus. And this briefly concerning the Antiquity and Genealogy of this Nothing. As for the full description of her Nature, or more properly, what Kind of Activity the chiefest Philosophers have allowed Article 2. Plato and Arist. their Descriptions of fortune, examined, and illustrated: and 3 Conclusions inferred thereupon. her, and to what order of Causes referred her; this we cannot so satisfactorily present by any other way, as by a short Commemoration, and aequitable Collation of their several Desinitions of her. Plutarch (1. placit. 29.) makes Plato to have defined her thus; Fortuna est causa ex accidenti, & consequens inopinatò in iis, quae consilio fiunt, Fortune is a Cause by Accident, and unexpectedly supervenient in those actions, which are deliberately and upon consultation performed: and Aristotle thus; Fortuna est caussa per accidens in iis, quae rei alicujus gratiâ, appetitu movente, fiunt, eáque incerta & instabilis; Fortune is an Accidental (yea and an uncertain and instable) cause, interesting itself in those actions, which are done by an Agent, upon the incitement of its Appetite, in order to its consecution of an object. Which words, indeed, seem to comprehend, in Epitome, all that the Philosopher (in 2. physic. cap. 5.) intended in his more prolix description of Fortune; abating only this, that he there confines her concernment only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, rebus Contingentibus, to Effects purely Contingent, i. e. such as may, or may not come to pass, and are therefore of dubious or uncertain event. To explain this, they exemplify in him, who digging in the earth, with no other design, but to plant a tree, found a great Treasure, of which he never thought: for (say they) the Invention of the Treasure is an effect by Accident, i. e. evenient above the hopes and besides the intention of him that digged; and so the Digger insomuch as he is Causa per se of the digging, is also Causa per accidens of the invention of the Treasure. Such an Accidental Cause, therefore, do our Philosophers call Fortune: and the Event itself, viz. the invention of the treasure, they call Rem fortuitam, a Fortuitous Effect. But whereas Arist. hath frequently advertised, that Fortune (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) and Chance (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) are different each from other in this, that Fortune is proper only to things done by Causes, whose activity is Arbitrary; and Chance common both to such, and also Inanimate or mere Spontaneous Causes (as when a stool falls, and breaks a Glass.) & consequently that all Fortune is Chance, but not every Chance Fortune: hence may we observe, that he would have aswell Fortune, as Chance to belong to the classis of Contingents, and that all Contingents belong to the classis of Possibles. More expressly, that since among Possibles some are such, as that their Event cannot be interdicted, impeded, or countermanded, as this, the sun cannot be hindered from rising again to morrow morn; and others such, whose event is not necessary, as this, 'tis not necessary, though possible, that it should rain to morrow a● sun rising; therefore is it manifest, that a Possible of the first sort, is the same with that which is called Necessarium, absolutely Necessary, or such whose Contrary is purely Impossible; and of the second sort, the same with that which is called Contingens, merely Contingent, or of an uncertain event, such whose Contrary is equally possible. Further, in respect that the mere Contingency, or Ambiguity of any Event must be founded on this, that either some Liberty interveneth, by reason whereof that which otherwise would come to pass, doth not; or that which otherwise would not have come to pass, doth; or some other 'Cause interposeth, which besides its proper destination and the unpraemeditated concourse of certain other things, effecteth that some even●, which, otherwise would, doth not come to pass, or that some event, which otherwise would not, doth come to pass: hence is it manifest, that this Posterior kind of Contingency, is in the general that, which men call Chance; and if it be especially in Man, besides or beyond whose intention any Effect eveneth, then is it what they call Fortune: unless that sometimes they confound both these, and then 'tis indifferent whether the event be referred either to Fortune, or Chance. However, we perceive (reflecting upon the former Example) since the Double Effect, viz. the digging of the earth, and the invention of the treasure, had but one single Cause, viz. the man that digged: that, for this reason, the Digger may justly enough be said to be Causa per se, in respect of the one, and per accidens in respect of the other. To which we may add this, that since in Effects merely Natural, one and the same thing may be both Fortune and Nature, or a Natural Cause: therefore Gassendus had very good reason to justify Epicurus in this particular that he made Fortune and Nature no more than synonomas, signifying one and the same thing in Reality. Now though common Enquirie may go away satisfied with Article 3. Their Anatomy of her Nature, desicient: & a more perfect one presented. this pausible Adumbration of Fortune; yet cannot a profound and more ocular Scrutiny be terminated therein: for the Example introduced to explain it, comes largely short of a requisite Adaequation; insomuch as no rational man can appositely enough accept either him that digged, or his Action of digging, for all that's comprehended under that obscure notion of Fortune. Wherefore, omitting the consideration of Res Fortuita, or the Event, which is most frequently apprehended for Fortune itself, or the cause of that insperate event; let us understand Fortune to be, such a concourse of various Causes, made without all mutual consultation, or praecogitate conspiracy betwixt them, as that from thence doth follow an Event, or fortuitous Effect, which neither all the Causes concurrent, nor some of them, nor especially he to whom the Event happens, ever in the least measure intended, or could expect. Now, according to the tenor of this Defifinition, in regard to the fortuitous Invention of a treasure, is required not only the Person, who diggs and finds it; but also he, who first digged and hid it: it is no obscure nor controvertible truth, that Fortune, or the Cause by Accident of the invention of the treasure, is the Concourse both of the Occultation and Effossion thereof, in that particular place. We said, without mutual Consultation, and besides the intention of any or all the Causes concurrent; thereby intimating, that though one or more of the Causes may have haply intended that event: yet nevertheless 'tis properly and absolutely Fortune, in relation to that Cause, which intended it not. Thus if any man, who foreknows, or at least conjectures, that such a Person will come and dig in such a place, doth there hid treasure, to the end that the other may find it: in this case, in respect to him that hide it, the Invention of the treasure is not a Fortuitous Effect; but in respect to him, who unexpectedly finds it, it is. Thus was it not altogether Fortuitous in respect of Nitocris, what happened at the Violation of his Tomb; in regard he praesumed that, in process of time, there would be some King or other, who invited by this promising Inscription [If any of my Successors, the Kings of Babylon, shall want money, let him break open this Sepulchre, and thence take what may supply his wants; but on no condition, unless his wants be real, let him attempt it: for it shall redound to his no small detriment.] would open it: but yet, in respect to Darius, that instead of money he therein found this deriding Engravement [Hadst not thou been insatiable with riches, and covetous of sordid lucre; thou wouldst not have thus profaned the Ashes of thy Praedecessors, and ransacked the sacred Dormitory of the Dead,] this was merely Fortuitous. And thus also, though Democritus hath pleaded hard to free Fortune from having any hand in the incomparable Death of good old Aeschylus; why because his bald pate, being mistaken by a volant Eagle for a white stone in the field, was the cause why the Eagle dropped a Tortoise perpendicular thereupon: yet, had we been of the Jury, we should have found her guilty of the Murder; (1) in respect of the Poet, since that sad event was besides his intention, he at the same time having withdrawn himself from the Town, for fear of being destroyed (according to the tenor of the Astrologers predication) by the fall of an house, nor could he possibly foresee that prodigious mischance impendent: (2) in respect of the Eagle, who dropped not the Tortoise with purpose to brain the Poet, but to break its shell, that so he might come at his prey, the flesh thereof. However, we are willing, because, in truth, we ought to acknowledge, that if we regard the height or punctilio of her Propriety, Fortune is chief, when among all those several Causes, which concur, no one either principally, or collaterally intends or aims at that Event, which unexpectedly succeeds upon that their concourse: of which we have a most illustrious and competent Example in the Dilatation of the death of Socrates, a day beyond the time prefixed by his Judges, for the Execution of their Sentence upon him; as Plutarch (de Fato) hath praecisely observed. We have it from the pen of that oraculous Secretary of Nature, Article 4. Fortune, nothing but a mere Negation of all Praenotion in a Concourse of natural Causes, respective to a fortuitous Event. Dr Harvey, that he never dissected any Animal, but he always discovered something or other more than he expected, nay then ever he thought on before; so useful & infinite in variety is the Magna Charta of Nature: and perhaps some of our Readers may here have occasion to say as much of this our Dissection of Fortune; for while we have exercised our thoughts in the exploration of her Nature, we have unexpectedly found that, if considered per se & reverà, she hath no nature at all, i. e. that in Reality she is nothing. For, when we have abstracted all those Causes in the Concourse, which act per se, or by natural virtue; there remains no more but a mere Privation or Negation of all Praenotion in the concurrent Causes of that particular Concourse, and also of the intention and expectation of the subsequent Event: nor can that unpraemeditate Concourse of Causes be rightly accounted the Cause of the Fortuitous Event, by any nearer relation then that which Philosophers have termed Conditio sine qua non. Since, as the Admotion of any combustible body to Fire, may be said to be the Cause of its combustion, in this respect only, that it was Conditio sine qua non, or, if that Admotion had not preceded, the combustion had not succeeded: so also cannot that Concourse of Causes, from which any Fortuitous Event doth result unexpectedly, be said to be the Cause thereof, in any other respect but this, that it was Conditio sine qua non, i. e. if that Concourse of Causes had not preceded, that Event had not succeeded, though not one of those Causes in the single energy of its nature, nor all in confederacy ever any way intended it; the Analogy betwixt these two cases standing fair and full in all points. Again, forasmuch as this indeliberate Syndrome or Combination of Causes, is always uncertain and various, the Causes being Article 5. Epicurus commended, for illustrating the instability and uncertainty of Fortune. neither elected, nor connected, nor managed by any Providence of their own: we cannot in justice but applaud the wary judgement of Epicurus in this, that he called Fortune, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Cause instable in Persons, Times, and Manners; which is equivalent to this, that since she is a Cause of uncertain and indeterminate insluence, none but Fools can hope that this Chamaeleon should constantly appear in the same colours, or wear the same Countenance. Nor is he less to be commended for his, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Article 6. Her Indivinity manifested: & how she came by her Deification. Cave ne habeas Fortunam Deam (apud Diogen. Laert. Epist. 3. Epicuro conscripta.) endeavours to degrade Fortune from her imaginary Divinity, and deride the egregious folly of her solemn Worship; for so great is the imbecility of vulgar minds, that what they do not well comprehend, they not only immoderately admire, but superstitiously revere, as something wholly Divine, and as far above Nature, as it seems above their Capacity: and undoubtedly man's Ignorance of the praevious Conspiracy of Accidentaly concurrent Causes, from which any Event extraordinary and superintentional doth emerge; first praevailed upon him to invest Fortune in such a specious disguise, under which he might, with less dishonour to his own● Intellectuals, advance her to the reputation of a Deity, and adore her. 'tis more than probable, that men did not, at her first Canonization, either much care for, or inquire into the condition and extent of her Power; and evident, that when she began to be cried up for producing strange Effects in the transactions of the world, and by a kind of impervestigable superintendency to dispose the activity of Natural Causes to the induction of Events above or beside their proper and Customary Destinations: then began the Vulgar to think themselves concerned in the conciliation of her favour, and early atonement of her displeasure; and so by those, to whom she seemed friendly and prosperous, was she accounted a Good and Propitious Numen, and to those, to whom she appeared Inclement and Adverse, an Evil and Malevolent one. And hence (the Error, like Rivers, still enlarging) were stately and magnificent Temples erected for her popular and solemn Adoration, and several Inscriptions respective to that particular Attribute, which her fond Votaries conceived most eminent in her, or most advantageous to themselves, engraven in capital letters on their Porches; such as ' 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (one of which I have seen at the house of that ingenious Benefactor to Antiquaries, Mr Vernon, in Essex, with no small cost and difficulty digged up in a field near Smyrna, and together with many other very antique Monuments brought by him into England) Malae Fortunae, Averruncae, Blandae, Calvae, Vitreae, Equestri, Fallaci, Aureae, etc. a large catalogue of which Appellations we may read in Pliny (lib. 2 cap. 7.) Plutarch (lib. de Fortuna Romanorum.) and Natalis Comes (lib. 4. Mytholog. cap. 9) This Pliny, with some indignation at the ridiculous delirium of the world in the Deification of this Nonentity, takes ample notice of in these words: Toto mundo, & locis omnibus, omnibusque horis, omnium vocibus Fortuna sola invocatur, una nominatur, una accusatur, una cogitatur, sola laudatur, sola arguitur, & cum convitiis colitur; volubilis, à plerisque verò & caeca etiam existimata; vaga, inconstans, incerta, varia, indignorum fautrix: huic omnia expensa, huic omnia feruntur accepta; & in tota ratione mortalium, sola utramque paginam facit; adeoque obnoxiae sumus sortis, ut Sors ipsa pro Deo sit, qua Deus probatur incertus. We are not ignorant (nor, in duty to the preservation of their memories from ingrateful Detraction, ought we to conceal) Article 7. All sober Philosophers vindicated from the guilt of ascribing Divinity to Fortune. how difficult it is for any man to impeach any one Philosopher, among those many, whose Names or Writings have hitherto escaped the jaws of Oblivion, of this absurd Delusion of ascribing Divinity to Fortune. For though Plato (de legibus. lib. 4.) hath this saying; Deum omnia, ac secundum Deum Fortunam & Tempus omnia gubernare; & Aristotle (2 Phys. 4. affirms that some there were, who held, Fortunam esse causam quidem, sed humanae menti obscuram; & Stobaeus (Ecles. Physic.) tells us of others, Qui partem aliquam Fortunae, ex eo esse Divinam censerent, quo quidam temere agentes optatum finem consequerentur, caeteros verò prudentia utentes optata d●stituerent; who opinioned, that Fortune was in some part Divine, for this reason, that some men, who enterprised their designs rashly and inconsiderately, did not withstanding accomplish them successfully, and happily attain their ends, while others who grounded theirs upon the most apparent probability, and managed the means conducing to their procuration, with great prudence and circumspection, were however fooled in their attempts, crossed in their hopes, and frustrated of their purposes, by the sudden intervention of some occult impediment, which as no Forecast could discover, so no Caution prevent: yet cannot all this be justly interpreted any other than their wary and tacit Confession of their Ignorance of the cryptick ways, and imperceptible Ends of Providence Divine; nor did these great Bookmen speak other than the Dialect of the Illiterate, and conform their Expressions to the customary notion of the Multitude, when they referred to Fortune those Contingents, which to the jndgement of Reason seemed to want a Natural Series of Causes proper for their induction, being as it were obtruded upon man by a power Supernatural, i. e. so far above the precaution of his Prudence, as the investigation of his Sapience. And though some few perhaps, whose Curiosity was weak, but Superstition strong, may be found to have contributed toward the propagation of this Error; yet cannot that in reason be extended to the attainder of the major and more judicious number of Philosophers: who upon the strictest examination of their Relics, must be found guilty of no more than the continuation of that laudable custom of their Praedecessors, in transmitting the most abstruse and difficult mysteries of Science, in the more comprehensible Alloy of Symbolical and Emblematical traditions; and in this particular, what the Multitude could not well understand under the Metaphysical notion of Providence Divine, disposing the confederations of Natural Causes to the production of Events either above or besides their native and proper virtues, or, at least, above the investigation of Reason; this they accommodated to weaker Capacities, in the easy Representation of Fortune. We said the more comprehensible disguise of Symbolical & Emblematical Article 8. The Necessity and use of Allegorical, Symbolical, and Emblematical Traditions, invented by the Ancients. Traditions; because, though it be commonly conceived, that primaevous Antiquity used to invent Parables and Emblems rather to invellope the Arcana of Philosophy and so conceal them from the profaning eyes of Ignorance, then to render them more intelligible: yet Parabolical and Poetical Fictions conduce tam ad lumen & illustrationem, quàm ad involucrum & velum, as well to the illustration of darker, as the involution of more evident pieces of Truth; as the Oedipus of this last Century, the Lo. St. Alban (in praefat. ad lib. de Sapient. Veterum) hath acutely observed. Nor ought we to be so vainly credulous as to admit, that the Ancients, being better acquainted with Simplicity and Benevolence, than Fraud and Envy, would expose their names to infamy, and the just execration of succeeding Ages, by drawing a curtain of Allegories, Symbolisms, and Similitudes, betwixt the eyes of Posterity, and the naked glories of Verity; thereby to detain them in the most horrid darkness of Ignorance: especially while 'tis manifest, that such was the rudeness of the Illiterate in those blinder times, when Contemplation was accounted inglorious Idleness, and Action the only end of life, that most were either incapable of, or impatient of the study requisite to learn any thing, which was not reduced down to a familiarity with Sense; and consequently, that the professors of Science had no other way left to insinuate the Maxims, and secret Conclusions in physiology, into the narrow minds of their Scholars, but by the mediation of their Senses affected with Corporeal Representations. Which is also the reason, why Hieroglyphics were much more ancient than Letters; and Parables than Arguments. Now, that the Philosopher's Description of Fortune was only Article 9 Their Descriptions of Fortune, only Emblematical. Emblematical; needs no other remonstrance, but this of Pacuvius (apud Auth. lib. 3. ad Herennium) Fortunam insanam esse, & coecam, & brutam perhibent Philosophi; Saxoque illam instare globoso praedicant volubilem; Ideo, quò saxum impulerit for'rs, cadere ev Fortunam autumant. Coecam, ob eamrem esse iterant, quod nihil cernat, quò sese applicet: Insanam autem aiunt, quia atrox; incerta, instabilisque sit: Brutam, quia dignum atque indignum negat internosc●re. Philosophers paint Fortune, mad and blind, Fixed on a Globe revolved by every wind Of Casualty: importing her to fall, Where Chance converts her whirling pedestal. Her eyes valid over with the skarf of Night; 'Cause she doth ne'er distinguish wrong from right. Frantic, because Unconstant, Giddy, Cruel To him, at night, who was, at morn, her Jewel. Irrational, 'cause she doth ne'er elect, By merit, whom to grace, whom disrespect. Nor had those ingenious Painters and Statuarics, whose happy Fancies invented an Alphabet of Things, and composed Article 10. As also the Images of Fortune framed by Painters, and Statuaries. a silent language of Figures, intelligible by the eye, to express the several attributes of Fortune; any other design, then by a pleasant affectation of the Sense (the only Criterion of illiterate Heads) to offer a gentle violence to the mind, and by a most familiar way of information, conduct the captived thoughts through the labyrinth of the mystery, to an easy and durable perception of the Deuteroscope, or Mythological intention. Thus the Scythians, as Piccolomineus (in 8. gradu Philosoph. Moral.) relateth, had an Image of Fortune without feet; sensibly intimating, that the Goods of Fortune must be beholding to the legs of Virtue, to support them in the constant benignity of their nature; i. e. they fall to the ground, and perish in a depraved use, unless they be managed by Prudence. Thus the Smyrnoeans, as Pausanias (lib. 4. Messenicorum. pag. 178.) hath recorded, had a statue of Fortune, like Atlas, supporting the Pole with one hand, and holding in the other the Amalthaean Horn, or Copia Cornu: intuitively mporting the Universality of her Empire, and that Riches are rather showered down on the heads of Mortals, by the free bounty of Providence Divine, then collected by the hands of Human Industry; which had I beheld, I should instantly have reslected upon that observation of Solomon (Eccles. 9 vers. 11.) That the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of Understanding, nor yet favour to men of skill; but Time, and Chance happeneth alike to all. Thus others, pourtraying her bestriding a Serpent; would have the Spectator intuitively understand from the theory of that Express; that Fortune holds the bridle to Human Prudence, and can at pleasure countermand the profoundest Policy. And others, by representing her riding on a running Horse, lashed on by Fate, which treads upon his heelcs; tacitly instruct the beholder, that Fortune must at last be overtaken, and vanquished by Destiny. To conclude, a copious list of many the like Emblematical and Symbolical Idols of Fortune, together with their several Significations and Mythologies; the ranging pen of Bernhardus Coesius (de Mineral. lib. 2. cap. 5. Sect. 12.) hath collected, and exhibited together in one sheet: and theresore we should defraud the Curiosity of our Reader, not to remit him thither for more ample Satisfaction. Now, from a review of this disquisition into the nature of Fortune, Article 11. The review, tolerating the name of Fortune, in respect to man: but detesting it, in respect to God. 'tis obvious to the meanest capacity that if we respect only the Proenotion and Expectation of human Reason; then none the most praecise in Christianity can justly quarrel at the customary use of the Notion: but if we respect the inslucnce and disposition of Providence Divine extended to all occurences in the world; then none but the most barbarous, or Atheistical Ignorance dare defend it. Which distinction the learned Spondanus (in Comment, in Homeri Iliados libr. 7. pag. 123.) hath more fully and elegantly delivered thus; Minime audiendi sunt, qui sortium dispensationem fortuitam esse dicunt. Quod Ego tamen admitto, si Homines tantum spectaveris: sed illoe etiam ex Providentia Dei omninò pendent. Eo sensu etiam accipiendum est nomen Fortunoe; quoe enim consilio humano non fiunt, causam quoad nos non habent: sed illa omnino Deus regit & moderatur. CHAP. IX. Of Fate. SECT. I. 'tIS not unknown to the meanest in the Commonweal Article 1. The convenient reduction of all opinions, concerning the essence of Fate, to 2. General Heads. of Learning, that no less than an Age can suffice to the observant lecture of that Vatican of Books composed by Philosophers of all times, concerning this perplexing Theorem; there being more Discourses (abating those, which the kindness of Time hath substracted) now extant thereupon, than any other subject, that ever exercised the cogitations and pens of Scholars: as must be acknowledged by any, who hath surveyed the singular jatrophilological Treatise of that judicious Parisian, Gabriel Naudae●●, de Fato & Vitae Termino. But yet, such hath been the singular fortune of Fate, that it hath obtained an exemption from that general Experiment, Tot sententiae, quot Authores: there being found, upon a just audit of them all, fewer Opinions than Books concerning it; nay, what is one degree of wonder higher, a diligent scrutiny may soon explore, that they all fall under the comprehension of only Two Catholic Heads; some understanding Fate to be Aliquid Divinum; a certain power Divine, and the rest, Aliquid merè Naturale, a certain Constitution merely Natural. In the Classis of those, who have conceived Fate to be a Divine Power, the highest seat belongs to the Platonist and Stoic; according to whose doctrine, methodised and summaried by Plutarch (lib. de Fato) we may consider it in a twofold Notion. First, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ut Substantia, as a Substance. In which sense Article 2, What the Platonist and Stoic meant by Fate, considered (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) as a substance. it is accepted for God Himself, or that sempiternal Reason, or established method, according to whose tenor He hath praeordained and disposed All things in the World, and so connected Causes to Causes, that all Events whatever, Arbitrary and Fortuitous, individually depend upon, and indeclinably result from that subalternate Series, or Complication of Essicients. For thus Plato (in Timaeo) one while affirms that Fate is ipsa Anima Mundi, the very Soul of the Universe; and another while, Naturae Vniversi aeterna ratio ac lex, the eternal reason and law of Nature: and thus also both Zeno and Chrysippus are cited by Plutarch (in 1. placit. 28.) as defining Fate to be, Vis spiritualis, ac Ratio ordinis universa gubernans, a Spiritual Power, and constitution governing All things according to an order eternally praecogitate and praedecreed. And all the rest of the Stoical Family, as well generally quoted by Diogenes Laertius, as Panaetius and Possidonius (at least, if He be the true Father of that Book, de Mundo, vulgarly conscribed to Aristotle, out of which the text is extracted) quoted by Stobaeus (Ecl. Physic.) have unanimously held, that Fate was the same with God, Jupiter, and the Universal men's. To whom we may justly associate Seneca also, who, (in 4. the Benefic. & 2. Natural. Quaest. 45.) saith, in downright terms; si Fatum, Jovem dixeris, non mentieris: if you please to assert that Jupiter and Fate are one and the same thing, you shall speak the truth. Hence comes it, that though Poets sometimes refer all events to the procuration of Jupiter; and sometimes again to Fate: yet may not the nicest Critic impeach them of Inconstancy or Contradiction; since those Terms differ only in the sound, not in the notion; as signifying one and the same Eternal Principle, disposing the virtues and conspirations of all second Causes to the opportune effecting of Events, designed by itself, and so made indeclinable. Thus Homer, introducing Agamemnon as pleading his excuse for being instrumental to a misfortune, makes him incriminate upon Fate and Jupiter at once, in these words: — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,— Non Ego Causa, Verum Jupiter & Fatum. Secondly, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ut Actus, as an Act; according to Article 3. And, what (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) as an Energy or Act: together with the etymological reasons of those sundry Appellations, the Stoics have imposed upon it. which Acceptation, we may understand Fate, partly to be ipsum D●i decretum, the very Decree or absolute Command of God, whereby He hath determined all Events to Necessity of Futurition; from whence the Latin word, Fatum, importing a Decree pronounced, is by Grammarians derived: and partly, ipsum ordinem, seriem, vel concatenationem Causarum, in natura statutam; the order, series, or subalternate concatenation of Causes, according to whose praesctipt tenor all Events praedestined come to pass, in respect to the Decree pronounced. For thus much may be collected from that Definition of Fate ascribed to Plato by Plutarch (de Fato) viz. est lex Adrastaeae, the law of Divine Justice, consigning to every thing, what is convenient to its nature, and which no man can elude, or infringe: but more perspicuously from that notorious one of Chrysippus, Fatum est sempiterna quaedam ac indeclinabilis series rerum, & catena volvens semetipsam, & implicans per aeternos consequentiae ordines, ex quibus adapta, connexaque est; which we have formerly introduced, and interpreted, in our Chap. concerning the Mobility of the term of man's life. To which, for more assurance, we may annex the respective signification and importance of each of those various Appellatives, which the Stoics have accommodated to Fate. For they have named it (1) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because 'tis a connected series, or subalternately-dependent syntax of Causes and Effects: (2) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because it involves and contains All things in that definite and invariable concatenation: (3) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because all Events are the Necessary designations thereof; or, because itself is also under the same restraint of an immutable definition: (4) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because no attempt can praevail to an alteration infringement of its tenor: (5) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because it is a Constirution Eternal: (6) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because it is a distribution made to every Individual: (7) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because it comprehends whatever is, by Consignation, due to every man: (8) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because as the original, so also the Dissolution of all things is subject to its appointment: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Parca, because it is the peculiar Lot or Portion destined to every man. But as for this aequivocal Denominative, Parca; insomuch as it not only determineth the state of all other things in general, but also the Life of man in special, quasi Nendo, as it were by spinning out a thread of commensurate longitude: thereupon did Hesiod (in Theogn.) dichotomize it into three distinct species; viz. (1) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in respect to the Irrevocability of time past, which exactly resembleth a thread already spun, and wound upon the reel or fuze; (2) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in respect to the Decurrent, or Present time, which responds to a thread now in twisting, in the hand of the Spinster; (3) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in respect to the Future, or Let yet remaining behind to every man, which holds an analogy to Flax not yet spun off the distaff. Which is the summary of Possidonius (de mundo) and Apuleius (10. de repub.) their Mythology of the ingenious Figment of the Three Fatal Sisters. Article 1. The second Classis of Philosophers, who understood Fate to be a Constitution merely Natural subdivided into 2 distinct Sects: viz. (1) those who assert the Immutability & Inevitability of Fate; (2) those who defend the possibility of its Alteration & Evasion. SICT. II. IN the other Classis of Philosophers, who have apprehended Fate to be Res purè Naturalis, a Constitution merely Natural, devoid of all Divinity, nor dependent upon any eternal Decree; we find a subdivision of two different Sects. For, (1) Some have proposed to themselves a Series of Natural Causes, so harmoniously adapted and linked together by mutual revinction, that the posterior being continually suspended on and moved by the praecedent, perform their operations compulsively, i. e. they cannot but do, what they do: so that thereby is inferred a Necessity so absolute, that it admits of neither Evasion, nor opposition; such a necessity, as would be no whit inferior to the Stoics Lex Adamantina, or Adrastaea, formerly mentioned; if this only difference be allowed, that according to that, Fate would be a Chain of Causes constituted by God; but according to this, a subalternate series of Causes, whose Constitution, reciprocal concatenation, and eternal duration are made by, and dependent upon itself, and is therefore no less Necessary and Invariable than the other. And (2) Others have, indeed, likewise allowed a Series of natural Causes mutually complicated; but yet have they reputed, that the Inferior Causes in this chain are not so dependent upon, nor commoved by the Superior, but that they may be impeded from doing those things, which by the impulse of their inhaerent Essiciency, and without the intervention of any impediment, otherwise they would have done. Impeded, we say, by things purely Contingent, or Counter Agents endowed with, and using the Arbitrary Liberty of their Will. The Coryphaei, or Leaders of this Sect of Philosophers, were Heraclitus, Empedocles, Leucippus, Parmenides, and (who Article 2. The Leaders of the First S●ct, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Leucippus, Parmenides, and chief Demo●●itus. took the right hand of all the others) Democritus; as we have found upon the list of Cicero (de Fato.) For, albeit the Foundation of his physiology was the same with that of Epicurus, Fortuito factum esse mundum, that the Universe was made by Chance; which Hypothesis we have formerly explained, examined, and exploded: yet did He strenuously endeavour to impose thereupon this disagreeing superstructure, Fato omnia fieri, that all things are effected by Fate; confounding two most contrary Notions, mere Contingency, and incluctable Necessity. If any demand, how we can justify this our Accusation of Democritus; we answer, that it may be genuinely collected Article 3. Democritus justly charged with the patronage of Inevitable Fate: and his doctrine concerning it▪ concisely rehearsed. from hence: that it was his opinion, that Fortune is nothing else in reality but Nature, and that Nature is bound, by her own adamantine laws, to do what she doth, in all particulars. For the First of these positions, that Nature and Fortune are Identical; we cannot much dispute: since all the Attributes of Fortune are burr surreptitious▪ and usurped from Nature; nor doth Fortune, in a mere philosophical Sense, import more than Man's Ignorance in the Di hoti of many Effects, which Nature produceth, or are at least produced by natural means. For the Second, that Nature is its own Fate, or, more expressly, that Nature being only a constitution of Causalities resulting from Chance, or from a fortuitous disposition and setlement of the Universal Matter, in that Figure the adspectable World now beareth; doth necessitate herself to the causation of all things: this He hath conceived inferrible from this process of reason. Atoms (saith He, apud Magnenum) being the Catholic Principle, of which all things consist, have an ingenite or connatural Motive Faculty essentially inhaerent; by the uncessant activity whereof they are perpetually agitated or commoved: and all things, by coalescence composed of Atoms, cannot but conform to the same motions, by which their principles are commoved. And since some Atoms tending one way, are by the occurse and justling of others diverted to another course; both the Diverting and Diverted from the direct line of their native tendency, cannot but observe, continue and pursue those necessary motions. By the same reason, some bodies, composed of concreted Atoms, as they are precipitated one way, by the impulse of their own coessential Faculty, may, by the occursation and arietation of others steering a different course, be deflected from the perpendicular of their motion congenial, to some other transverse, obliqne, rectilinear, etc. so that both the Deflecting and Deflected cannot but observe, continue, and pursue those compulsive motions. And this, in General, is that Fate, or Necessity, whereby Democritus would have all things effected, and by which the World was at first composed, in the same Figure, we speculate at this day; for, as the Universal Principle, Atoms, concurring, crowding, rebounding reciprocally, in an infinite space, by the agitation of their own inexistent Faculty, could not but convene, coalesce, and cohaere into any other Form, but what they did: so now having acquired that form by Chance, can they not either change it, or not observe and execute those motions begun, and by the mediation or intercession whereof all Events are brought to pass. For, in Plutarch, (1. placit. 26.) He saith plainly, Necessitatem nihil esse aliud, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, quam lationem, percussionem, repercussionem Materiae; that Necessity is nothing else but the Lation, Percussion, Repercussion of the material Principle of all things, i. e. of Atoms. From hence we have an opportunity to interpret that passage in Simplicius (2. physic. comment. 59) that some of the Ancients held an opinion, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Material Necessity was the sole Causatrix of all Effects; in respect that the Matter of Bodies is not idle and unactive, as most have dreamt, but uncessantly operative; and that, not by impression, but Inhaerency, as being to itself the Principium à quo of all its motions. And this we here touch upon, opportunely to discriminate this Doctrine from that of others, who constituted a mere Formal, or Agent Necessity, distinct from the material principle of the world; whether that Agent be simply Natural, according to the Physiology of Aristotle; or Primus Opifex, the First Operator, according to the hypothesis of Plato, and the Stoics, who also sometimes radicated that Necessity, whereby Evils are continually existent in the world, in the Matter thereof, as Seneca (de Provide 5.) excusing the non ablation of Evil by the Creator, saith positively, Non potest Artifex mutare materiam, it was not in his power to Abstract it, because not to alter the Matter. But, not to leave our Explanation of Democritus Fatum Materiale imperfect; we may, from what hath preceded, perceive at what mark these words of his were directed; Necessitatem, quâ omnia fiunt, esse & Fatum, & justitiam, & Providentiam, & opisicem mundi (apud Plutarch. 1. placit. 45.) that the Necessity, whereby all things are effected, is both Fate, Justice, Providence, and Maker of the World: viz. this, that the Series of things, in which the reason or essence of Fate doth consist, could not have been otherwise constituted; that upon this Series it depends, why one thing is accounted Just, and another Unjust; why the world is governed thus, and all things proceed according to the present method, and no other; and why the adspectable form of the Universe was made in all points responsible to what it now holds, etc. For, He referred the Causation of all things to those newly explicated congenial motions of Atoms; and so conceived that even the Soul, or Mind of man (which He also fancied to be a certain Contexture of spherical or orbicular Atoms) is variously agitated, not only by those internal motions of its own insensible particles, which vary according to its individval Complexion (i. e. the Atoms composing the Soul of a Melancholy man, are of one sort, at least of one contexture; those of a Choleric, of another; those of a Phlegmatic▪ of a third, etc.) but also by those Extradvenient motions caused by Objects; by whose Species, or Images incurrent (which Atoms also constitute) the Mind cannot but be Attracted, if they be consentaneous and allective, or grateful; nor not be Averted, if they be dissentaneous and repulsive, or ingrateful. That, if the Mind be not always allected by Attractive Species; the reason is, because at the same instant there occur unto it the more potent solicitations of their Contrary, Averting Species: and if it be not always Averted by Repellent; the reason is equal, viz. because at the same instant it is more strongly solicited by their Contrary, Attractive Species. That therefore, the Mind cannot but be carried on toward Good, or that which is grateful and allective, so long as it discovers no Evil admixed thereto: nor not be averted from Evil, or what is ingrateful and aversant, so long as it perceives no Good to be commixed therewith. That therefore, the Mind cannot, when two Goods are objected, but pursue the greater Good; as that which attracteth more potently: nor, when two Evils are objected, but avoid the greater; as that whereby it is averted more potently. That, when two objects, the one Good, the other Evil, at the same time present their Species; it cannot but neglect the Good, so long as the Evil averts more potently than the Good attracts: nor not be carried towards the Good, while the Evil averts more weakly, and the Good attracts more strongly. Finally, that since, by reason of the Ignorance, or Dimness of the Mind, it doth frequently not perceive the Evil consequent upon its prosecution of some Good; therefore is it subject to Deception in some cases, and is often carried on to that, from which it ought to have been averted: nor perceive the Good that is consequent upon its prosecution of some Evil, and is therefore, as often averted from that object, to which it ought to have been converted. But notwithstanding, insomuch as all objects, by this and no other way, occur unto, and affect the Mind; still it cannot but Necessarily be carried whither it is carried; nor but be averted from that, from which it is averted: and consequently, that there remains to it only a Desire of Truth, i. e. that no Counterfeit Species may occur, but that all objects may appear such as in reality they are, nor Good be concealed under the disgusting vizard of Evil, nor Evil gilded o'er with the splendid semblance of Good. For this is the sum of what Empiricus (2. advers. Physic.) makes Democritus to have desiderated, when He said; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Exoptat rerum imagines consentaneas posse nancisci. Now, by this complex Argumentation, Democritus may be understood to have inferred; that though some Actions seem situate within the praecincts of our own jurisdiction, or that it is absolutely in our power to Elect, or Reject this or that object; insomuch as every man's experience doth demonstrate to him, that he doth and can consult and deliberate about the Good and Evil of Objects, and actually electing the one, refuseth the other; and that, not by Compulsion, but Freely: yet notwithstanding is nothing really in our power, because not only the occasion of our Consultation, but also the Consultation itself is imposed upon us by inevitable Necessity. First, that the Occasion of Consultation (or the Exhibition of many objects, which almost equally affecting the Mind, and by reason of the aequipondium of their Verisimility, or moments of Good, holding it suspended in aequilibrio, of necessity engage it to a Deliberation) cannot but be imposed upon us; we conceive it not obscure to him, who shall deduce the conducing Series of things from a due Epoch, or height, and analytically undo the chain of Causes: and Secondly, that also the act of Consultation is a Necessary Effect, is manifest from hence; that when two objects occur to the mind, so equally Attractive, that their Apparencies of Utility, or Praesentations of Good, are aequilibrated, and reciprocally counterpoise each other; the mind must of necessity be agitated by a kind of Fluctuation, and detained in the suspense of Indifferency, or Indetermination, or Consultation, until it acquiesce in its Election of that Object, whose praesentation of Utility seems to praeponderate the others. Which, aequitably audited, amounts to no more than this; that Election is nothing but the prosecution of an Object which either really is, or at lest seems more Good; and that a spontaneous one, without all coaction or renitency: in respect that man doth both spontaneously affect, and willingly prosecute Good. And that you may not admire this bold assertion, viz. that both the Occasion and Consultation, and free, or rather libent Election of Objects, are all links in the Chain of Fate, and so comprehended under this Natural Necessity, propugned by Democritus: the Stoics intercept your wonder, by obtruding another as strange, viz. that it depends on the same Concatenation of things, that you now read this our discourse of Fate; as Manilius (lib. 2.) Hoc quoque fatale est, sic ipsum expendere Fatum. And this, because whatever Action of any man you shall suppose; it can be no difficulty, according to this Hypothesis, to find out the proxime Cause exciting him thereunto, and to refer that Cause to the permotion of another remote one, and that third to the permotion of a fourth, that fourth, to the induction of a fifth, etc. unravelling the series of Causes, so that it must at length be inferred, that that supposed action could not but follow upon those other actions subalternately praecedent, and consequently, that it must be, as Democritus would have it, Fatal, or Necessary. Which opinion Aristotle ardently impugneth (in lib. de Interpre. cap. 8.) when discussing the verity and necessity of Propositions, He contends to evince; that though of two opposite singular propositions, which concern a thing either Praeterite, or Present, one must be true, the other false: yet the Canon holds not in two Contrary singular propositions, which concern a thing Future; the Verity of the one not necessitating the Falsity of the other. For, as He there argues, if every Affirmation, or Negation concerning a thing to come, were true or false, ex Necessitate: then would the Futurity of any thing include a Necessity of its Futurition, i. e. whatever is Future would be Necessary, and on the contrary, whatever is not Future, would be Not-necessary: and upon just inference, nothing could remain either Fortuitous, or Arbitrary; which to admit, is an Incongruity so manifest, that the repugnancy of every man's Experience detects it; an Incommodity so intolerable, that it not only disparageth, but confuteth itself. And this, if there be any Fidelity in the records of our Memory, is the Summary of their Theory, who have apprehended and asserted Fate to be a mere Natural Constitution of Causes, subalternately connected; as not dependent on any thing Divine, nor any Eternal Decree; so not capable of any mutation or interruption, by the intervention of any Impediment, purely Fortuitous, or Counter-activity of any Arbitrary Agent. SECT. III. Article 1. The Principal of the Second Sect, Aristotle and Epicurus. IN the other Division of Philosophers, who also conceded Fate to be a mere Natural Constitution of Causes subalternately dependent, etc. but yet denied the inevitable or necessary insecution of all Effects upon that concatenation; allowing the possibility of its mutation, or interruption by either Chance, or man's Free will: the Principal are Aristotle and Article 2. The Grounds of the Authors imputing the opinion both of Fates Identity with Nature, and the possibility of its Mutation & Declination, by either Fortuitous or Arbitrary Antagonists, to Aristotle. Epicurus. First, as for Aristotle; that He held Fate, or fatal Necessity to be nothing but very Nature, or (if you like it better) every particular Cause acting secundum suam naturam, naturalémve ductum, according to its proper or natural Virtue; is manifest from his own words, in sundry places of his Writings. To particular; (1) He saith (in 2. phys. cap. 6.) Eas generationes, acoretiones, & alterationes, quae violentae sunt (ut dum ex arte, & ob delicias, cogimus plantas aliquas praematurè pubescere, adolesceréque) esse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, non Fatales, hoc est non Naturales; making Fatal Effects to be mee●ly Natural. And (2) He saith (1 Meteorol. cap. ultim.) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Fatalibus temporibus magnas quasdam hyemes, imbriúmque excessus, quibus creentur diluvia, contingere; eo modo, quo & contingit hyems statis anni temporibus: which rightly paraphrased, imports thus much; that as Winter, the Sun receding from our climate, at some certain period of the year, according to the Ecliptic progress consigned unto it by Nature, is the regular effect of the Suns remove to larger distance; even so are hard Winters, and immoderate rains, the regular effects of some periodal Conjunctions of the Planets, proceeding in their motions according to the settled Constitutions of Nature. From whence we have an advantage to observe, that though Stobaeus (Ecl. Phys.) tells us; Aristotelem non tam existimasse Fatum esse Causam, quàm modum Causae advenientem rebus ex necessitate statutis; that Arist. conceived not Fate to be so much a Cause, as the manner of a Cause, advenient to things determined by Necessity: yet nevertheless are we so to comment upon this his nice descant, as that we understand, Fate not to be any new kind of Cause, but Nature herself, which, in respect to her Agency, is called a Cause, and in respect to the certain, proper, and necessary manner or way of her acting, is called Fate. And, that He impugned the former Error, viz. that all Agents, included in this Universal Subalternation, act ex inevitabili necessitate, or cannot but do, what they do; is not obscurely intimated in this, that He defined Fate to be pure Nature. Since the Works of Nature are not effected of inoppugnable necessity; as may be boldly concluded from the frequent Experiments not only in Generation, which is commonly impeded, by the intervention of any indisposition or impatibility of Matter, and other resisting Accidents; but also in Generous and virtuous Minds, which easily subdue and countermand those strong inclinations, or propensities to Avarice, Luxury, Audacity, Incontinency etc. which may not unjustly be esteemed the genuine Effects of their very constitutive Principles, and branches that shoot up from the root of their Corporeal Temperament. Upon which reason, we may conjecture, that Arist. reflected, when He said of Socrates, praeter naturam, ac fatum suum, continens evasit: He acquired an Habit of Continency, even in spite of the contrary solicitation of his individual Nature, and particular Fate. Secondly, as for Epicurus; that his thoughts made an Unison Article 3. Epicurus unanimous to Arist. in the point of Physical and Eluctable Necessity. with those of Aristotle, in the key of a Non-ineluctable Fate, is sufficiently constant from hence; that having admitted a certain Necessity Natural in this sentence, Naturam à rebus, ipsarúmve serie, (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) doceri, cogique, sive necessitate agi (in Epist. ad Herodotum:) He yet denied the Inevitability, or Absoluteness thereof, in another Fragment of his revived by Stobaetis (in Ecl. Phys.) where He delivers as a general Canon, Omnia sieri trium modorum aliquo, (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) Necessitate, Consilio, Fortuna. For, in that he makes Fortune, and Consultation, or man's Free will equal competitors in the empire of the world with Necessity Natural, He manifestly excludes it from being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, sole Despot or Monarch, and reserves to the two others an equal dominion. Which assurance may duly be augmented by the superaddition of this also; that Cicero (de Fato) introducing Epicurus disputing about the verity of Future Events, makes him deny, with Aristotle, that of two contrary singular Enunciations about a thing to come, the one must be true, and the other false: subnecting this reason; Nulla est in natura talis Necessitas. And, certainly, as He stood equal with Aristotle, in the denial; so hath He outdone him, by many degrees, in his endeavours Article 4. The scope of Epicurus his Figment of the Declination of Atoms in the human Soul: and his Accommodation thereof to the tuition of man's Liberty, epitomised. for the Refutation of this unsound opinion of an Absolute Necessity: insomuch as he excogitated his Hypothesis of the Declination of Atoms (illustrated in the incomparable Commentary of Gassendus) as a motion, which once conceded, doth totally infringe the indispensable rigour of Fate, and conserve an Evasory or Declining Liberty for the Mind of man. This Plutarch taught us, in two perspicuous texts: (1) when He saith (de Anim. Solert.) that the motion of the Declination of Atoms in the Human Soul, was subtly invented by Epicurus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that Fortune might be brought on the theatre of the world, there to act her part, and the Arbitrary power of man might not be abrogated: (2) when He declares (de Stoic. repub.) that the same Epicurus (seize in omnem partem versare, ingeniúmque contendere, in id incumbendo, ut quomodocunque à motione sempiterna liberum tueatur Arbitrium, ac pravitatem esse inculpabilem non patiatur;) racked all the nerves of his wit, to find out a way for the protection of man's Free will; and so that evil might not praetend to inculpability. Now, though we may not train along the thoughts of our Reader, out of the direct tract of our present Theme, into a wide Digression concerning Epicurus his whole Romance of the Declination of Atoms in the Soul; especially having lately remitted him to Gassendus his accomplished Comment thereupon: yet can we not impede his progress along the straight line of method, here to arrest him, while we inform him briefly, How he accommodated that fiction to the vindication of man's Liberty from the inexorable Coaction of Fate. We conceive, that Epicurus, having observed 3 kinds of Motion in Animals, but principally in Man, viz. Natural, Violent, and Voluntary; took it for granted, that the primary Cause of each was to be deduced from Atoms, the Principium à quo of all motion: and hereupon concluded, that the spring of all Natural motion, was the primary motion congenial or inhaerent to Atoms, viz. that whi●h physiology calls the motion of Gravity, whereby an Atom is precipitated ad lineam rectam, to a perpendicular; that the spring of all Violent motion, was the motion of Reflection, or that which ariseth from occursation, arietation, or repercussion of one Atom by another, whereby the Atom reflected, is carried ad lineam obliquam; and lastly, that the spring of all Voluntary motion was the motion of Declination, to which no region is determined, nor time prefixed. But might not Democritus, and other Defendants of Absolute Necessity natural, have excepted against this, as insufficient to Article 5. An Exception, in the name of Democritus, against Epicurus Inference. the protection of man's Evasory Freedom, by returning; that because this motion of Declination is no less Natural (for it is derived from no other principle, but Atoms themselves) then that of Gravity; therefore doth it still remain, that All things are effected by Fate, as well when Epicurus his Hypothesis is conceded, as before. Insomuch as all things, which were to come to pass, by reason of those various motions of Arietation, Repuls', Declination etc. by an eternal series, and kind of subalternate Concatenation, are consequent one upon the heels of another; and particularly that event of Cognition and Appetition, to which man's Liberty appertains; and so are brought to pass by an equal Necessity. For, that the Mind of man may display, or execute that Liberty Elective, whereby it affects and prosecutes any object, conceive it to be an Apple; necessary it is, that the Image or Species of that Apple be first emitted from it, and being transmitted through the mediatory organs of sight, invade, parcel, and commove the Mind to know, or apprehend it. Necessary to the Apple, before it can transfuse its visible Species to the eye, that it be put in some place convenient for adspect, by him, who gathered it from the tree or received it elsewhere. Necessary, that the Tree, which bore that apple, be first generated by a seed, and nourished by the moisture of the earth, concocted by the heat of the Sun. Necessary, that that Seed be derived from a former apple, and that from a former tree, planted in this or that determinate place, at this or that determinate time: and so by retrogression to the beginning of the world, when both the Earth, and all its Vegetable seeds had their origination from the Concursions and Complexions of Atoms; which could not (being agitated by the impulse of their own inhaerent Faculty Motive) but convene and coalesce, and acquiesce in those Figures, those situations, at that time. Again, if the Soul, or Mind be also a Contexture of orbicular Atoms; those Atoms must have been contained in the Sperm of the Parents; must have consluxed thither from certain meats and drinks, as also from the Aer and beams of the Sun; those me at's must have been such and no other: and so subalternately successive from eternity, the Event will be found to come to pass by the same Adamantine Necessity, whatever of the Causes, lateral or concurrent (which must run up to an account beyond all Logarithms) you shall please to begin at. Because from Eternity Causes have so cohaered to Causes, that the last causes could not but concur; which being deduced into act, the Mind could not but know, and knowing affect, or desire that particular object, viz. the Apple. And what is here said of Causes, the same in all points is to be understood also of Atoms, which constitute those causes, and from whose congenial motions the Causes derive those their Motions, by which they attain to be Causes. To this Exception, that we may compose some Response, such Article 6. The justification thereof, by a Respons conform to the Physiology of Epicurus. as may seem Consentaneous to the Doctrine of Epicurus, and to contain somewhat of Probability, at least; we must usurp the liberty to assume: that such is the Contexture of Atoms in the Soul, or Mind, its Declinant Atoms can break that Rigidity arising from other Atoms, and so make its nature Flexile to any part; in which Flexility, the root of Liberty doth consist. And therefore, the mind, being allected by the Species of any object, is indeed carried towards that object; but so, that if another object shall instantly occur, whose Attraction is equivalent, it may again be invited by, and carried towards that object also: so that, deflecting from the first, it may become aequilibrated or indifferent to either part; which, doubtless, is to be Free, or Arbitrary. And that the Mind, being thus constituted Flexile and Indifferent, doth at length determine itself rather to one than the other part; this ariseth from hence: that the impression of one Species is more violent then of the other; and consequently that the Election succeeds, upon the Apprehension of that object, whose species appears either positively good, or comparatively more good. Finally, that the Mind, when it electeth or willeth any object, is as it were the principal Machine, or main Spring, by whose motions all the Faculties, and the members destinate to execution are excited, and carried thither, whither the Mind tendeth: and this by mediation of the Spirits discurrent, or rather transmitted through all parts of the body. All which Lucretius fully expresseth in these Verses: Declinamus item motus, nec tempore certo, Necregione loci certa; sed ubi ipsa tulit Mens: Name dubio-procul his rebus sua quoique voluntas Principium dat; & hinc motus per membra vagantur. lib. 2. Again, perhaps Epicurus will not gainsay, but that the motion of Declination is as much Natural as the motion of Gravity; But yet will He by no persuasions yield, that the Mind, being contemperate of Declinatory Atoms, is so affected and attracted by Necessity toward one object, that it cannot instantly be deflected to another. For, as a mixed Nature is made, so is the Mobility of its insensible parts varied: and from various Natural motions retused or refracted, ariseth a Third Nature, according to which its motions may be said to be Voluntary and Natural both; insomuch as they proceed à Natura libera, from Nature free and uncoacted. Nor will He deny, supposing the Occursation and Arietation of Atoms, that it is pure Necessity, that Percussions, Repulses, and either Reflections or Cohaesions should succeed among them: but yet may He refuse to allow a Necessity of such Occursations, as if they could not be impeded, nor their Consequents be diverted. Hence, concerning that eternal series of the Causes of the Apple, and the Mind; Epicurus will grant, that when things are already effected, a kind of Necessity may be attributed thereunto, such in respect whereof those things cannot be uneffected; since, non datur jus in praeterita, there is no countermanding things Praeterite: but before those things were peracted, there was no such Necessity; since both Fortune, or Contingency, and the opposing Liberty of man's Will might have interrupted, inverted, and changed it. For few are ignorant of the wide disparity between these two Assirmations, viz. What is once done, cannot be not done: and what is done, might not have been done. Since, in the Former, a thing is considered as already past; and in the Later, as yet to come: and as according to the Former it is Necessary; so according to the Later, it, may be or Contingent, or Voluntary. By which reason, was it possible, that the Apple might not have been presented to the eye; possible, that the Tree which bore it might first have withered; that the Seed, of which that tree was generated, might either have proved abortive and sterile, or else have been sowed in some other place; that other of its Causes might have been divers ways praepeded: which also may be affirmed of the Mind, and its Causes; and consequently none of the many Causes, which did antecede the Appetition of the Apple, can be conceived to have been Necessary, as they might if the Causes were of themselves uncapable of Impediment, or if there were one Cause Paramont to all others in the Concatenation, which by an absolute sovereignty, or despotique power, had directed and coacted them. albeit we concede, that the Appetition of the Apple by the mind, is the Consequent of the Minds Cognition thereof, and that Cognition the consequent of its Occursation to the eye, and that the Consequent of its Position in a place convenient for sight, and that the consequent of its Existence, and so from link to link retrograde up to eternity: yet notwithstanding can no man justify this Inference, that therefore the Mind is Necessitated to that Appetition; because still there remains a Posse to the Mind of being Averted from the Affectation and Prosecution thereof, in case either the Species of a better object, or a suspicion of poison therein concealed, shall intervene, or a refrigeration of the Stomach by the dyspeptical and slatulent juice thereof be feared, or any other Cause of moment sufficient to persuade the mind to abstain from the use thereof, shall be interposed, Nor is this rejoinder dissuasive; that, when the Mind is averted Article 7. The most weighty rejoinder, (of the oonnexion of those Causes, which Avert the Mind from, so found too light. from the Appetition of the Apple, the Causes Antecedent were not such as might induce the mind to an Appetition, but such as induced it to an Aversation; and that these Averting, not those Attracting Causes were so connected to the series of Fate, that the mind could not but be averted from it. well as of those, which Attract it to an object, to the eternal Series of Fate to overbalance Epicurus his defence of man's Liberty. For, though the Mind be contemperate of such a Contexture of Atoms, as that it may be Commoved by the irruent Species of external Objects; yet is the nature of its contexture such also, as that it can derive from itself some motions distinct from, nay contrary to those motions excited by Extradvenient Images; which motions being instituted by no other Principle but itself, are manifestly Spontaneous and Voluntary, and by which it is empowered to resist External motions, and therefore may not so be carried to one Object, as not to be, upon advantage, deflected to another. And hence we may Conclude, that the Mind is not obliged to a necessity of any one Object; but stands Free to refuse that, and elect another: and that the Reason of a thing to come, is not a little different from that of a thing already past; since, in respect to a thing Future, there remains an Indifferency to the Mind of electing either of two Objects, but in respect to a thing Praeterite, there is a Necessity of its election of one. If this Solution be thought too light, we can superadd another of weight sufficient to counterpoise the Doubt; viz. that which Carneades in Cicero insinuated, when he taught, that the Epicureans might have defended the Liberty of man's Mind, without their commentitious Declination of Atoms. For having once declared, that the Mind hath Voluntary motions of its own institution, they needed no other Argument to confute Chrysippus: to whom when they had conceded, that no motion can be without a Cause Movent; there remained no reason why they should have granted, that all Effects have their Antecedent Causes; since to the will of man no Causes are Antecedent, it being to itself the Principium à quo of all its motions Voluntary. And this is the faithful Abridgement of Epicurus his Doctrine concerning Fate, as a Constitution merely Natural, and capable of interruption, alteration, opposition, by either of the Two other in his Triumvirate, viz. Fortune or pure Contingency, and the Liberty of man's mind, which He conceived Copartners in the Empire of the World. ¶. SECT. iv THere is yet another Species of Fate, retaining to our Second Article 1. Mathematical Fate briefly described. Genus (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) whose exceeding vanity and inconsiderableness had well-nigh occasioned our total Inconsideration thereof, in this place; and that is Fatum Mathematicum sive Astrologicum, the Mathematicians and Astrologers Fate; being a certain imaginary Necessity Natural, imposed upon all Sublunary Agents, and more especially upon Man, as the most analogous Recipient, by the inoppugnable Influence of Celestial Bodies, respective to their Motions, Positions, Connexion's, Aspects. 'tis no wonder, we confess, that the Chaldaeans, a Mercurial Article 2. The gross Vanity thereof concealed from many Philosophers, only by the cloud of Transcriptive Adbaesion to Antique Traditions. and volatile Nation generally infatuated with Astral Idolatry, were the Inventors of this Planetary Destiny; since they Deified all they understood not, and advanced their observations of the circumvolutions of the Spheres, together with their Orbs of light, to such a height of insolence, that they fancied the Hebrew Alphabet represented in the Figures of the Asterisms, and praetending to the skill of reading the Celestial Ephemerideses, by spelling those Characters, which the Planets in their Conjunctions, Oppositions, and other Apparitions seemed to make, into words and sentences perfectly signifying, to the exact and intelligent observer, the intent of God concerning not only the subversion of Monarchies, mutation of States, religions, etc. general Events, but also the prosperity or adversity, the health or sickness, life or death of particular persons: as Rabbiben Ezra, and out of him Gassarel (without the concealment of his strong inclination to the same superstitious Arrogance) hath observed, and by several experiments alleged endeavoured to patronise, in the 13. Chap. of his Unheard of Curiosities. Nor is it a wonder, that the Hebrew, and after them the Grecian Astrologers, with great ostentation of transcendent knowledge, and no less than privacy with the three Fatal Sisters, sedulously promoted the same splendid Error, of ascribing the Empire of the world to a Heptarchy of Erratic Stars: since, upon the testimony of the greatest Antiquaries, * Rabbi ben Ezra, in ductore dubiorum. we may justly assirme, that the Hebrews added to the vanities and absurdities of the Chaldaean, and the Grecians to the wild Romances of the Hebrew Astrology; the stream thereof, by long running in the channel of time, contracting more and greater Impurities. Which is a chief reason, why we inhaerite so dark and imperfect a knowledge of the great Astronomical Sagacity of the more simple and upright times of Abraham and Moses. Though this be no wonder, we say, yet 'tis a considerable one, that even many Physiologists, who pretended the indagation and tradition of nothing but Verity, of verisimility at least, have liberally contributed towards the diffusion and propagation of the same Delusion. Witness that peremptory speech of Pliny (1 nat. Histor.) singulis sydera tributa sunt, clara divitibus, minora pauperibus, obscura defunctis, & procujusque sorte lucentia ad munera mortalibus. Nor can we conjecture, what should occasion the Deception of so many and so great judgements, in this easy particular; unless that grand Cause of Popular mistakes, viz. Transcriptive Adhaerence to all, that seems presented in the reverend habit of Antiquity, especially if guilded over with the Estimation of Rare and Sublime: the Wit of man being naturally prone to Affect and Admire, rather than Indubitate and Examine those Transmissions, which concern the remotest Difficulties in Nature, and above all, the Energy and Configurations of Celestial Bodies. Prodigia cum narrantur, excipi solent favore mirantium, & quanquam non ad verum exacti sint, postquam semel Scriptorem invenerunt, pluribus placent, veneratione crescunt, vetustate commendantur; was Nicopompus his saying, in Joh. Barclaii Argenis, lib. 2. For, had they devested their minds of all traditional Praejudice, and but reflected their thoughts, either upon the Hypothetical Necessity of the Matter, or Subject, whereon the Stars are supposed to discharge and six their uncontrollable influence; or upon the extremely different Fortunes of Twins, conceived and borne under the same Constellation; or upon the double Impiety of ascribing to remote, weak, and perhaps unconcerned Causes, those Effects, which proclaim their designment by an Infinite Wisdom, and their Praeordination to Ends above the sagacity of Human Providence; and of charging all the most nefarious Villainies of sinful man upon the innocuous and exceeding both useful and comfortable Creatures of God: had they, we say, but pondered any one of these Reasons, that sufficiently demonstrate the Absurdity of Planetary Necessity; doubtless, they had soon reclaimed their belief from this dishonourable seduction, and would no longer have abused themselves with an opinion, that all the Occurrences of every Individual man's life, together with the time and manner of his death, are the inevitable Effects of those Stars, which were Lords of the Horoscope, either at his Conception, or Nativity, or both. The First Reason, whereby this Chaldaean Fate may be demonstratively Article 3. The Absurdity of sidereal Necessity evicted (1) by an Argument desumed from the Hypothetical Necessity of the Matter on which Celestial Impressions are to operate. redargued of extreme vanity, we desumed from the Hypothetical Necessity of the Matter, whereon the Planets exercise their power. For, according to their own Concession, Omnis receptio est ad modum recipientis, All bodies ought to be Analogous, i. e. praedisposed to admit either the benign, or malign influences of the Heavens; for Alteration is of necessity praevious to Production, and before a body be configurate, necessary it is that the Matter, whereof it is composed, be altered and variously praepared; and praepared it is by Second Causes, but perfected by First. Thus the Geniture of the Male, though perfect and prolisical in its self, must yet be frustrated of its end, unless it meet with convenient and patible Materials whereon to actuate its Plastic virtue, viz. the Blood and seminal infusion of the Female, proportioned both in quantity and quality to its Efficiency. Thus the Aer of Egypt, because Nilus (being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) doth yield no Evaporations sufficient to the generation of Clouds, continues still serene and unobnubilated; notwithstanding the potent Attraction of the Sun, Moon, and other sidereal Magnets: and though all the Planets should convene in the watery sign of Pisces, as before the catholic Deluge Respice pag. 143. , and threaten an Apertio portarum to that Climate; yet, because the material Cause of rain, Evaporations, is there wanting, must their conspiracies be defeated, and their Influences become languid and ineffectual. And theresore, by equal reason, unless the Planet, which is Lord of the Geniture, shall find a Subject qualified in all points for the admission and promotion of this Celestial Fate, which our effronted Genethliacks have conceived it to immit into Embryos and Births, all its magnified Influx must miscarry, and be lost in an invalidity as absolute, as the labour of that Statuary, who should attempt to melt Marble with Fire, or mould sand into an Image, without a convenient Cement. If this be, as it must be true; that the Praeparation of the Matter, on which the Impressions of Superlunary Bodies are to operate, doth depend upon Sublunary and determinate Causes: then may we, with more honour, recur to that excellent sentence of the Poet; Libera stat nobis mens, nulli subdita coelo. The Second pregnant Argument, wherewith the more sober Article 4. (2) By the common Experiment of the unaequal Fortunes of Twins. sort of Bookmen usually deride the Arrogance of our Genethliacks? (who blush not to promise to the world exact Copies of the Rolls of Destiny, and divine as confidently as if they had been of the Cabal with all the Asterisms) we derived from the common Experiment of Twins: who, though procreated of the same Seminalities, faecundate in the same Ovarie or bed of nature, and (for aught even our most perspicacious Harvey knows to the contrary) conceived in the same moment, and so under the same Ascendent; are notwithstanding many times observed to differ in Sex, physiognomy, genius, condition of life, and mostly in the manner and time of their death. Thus Esau and Jacob, who may, without the dispensation of a Figure, be said to have been but one and the same Birth, the younger Midwising himself into the world by holding fast his brother's heel, and so if not indubitating the right of Primogeniture, yet at least portending his future purchase and usurpation thereof; were yet so disparate n their Complexions, Dispositions, Fortunes, course of life, Age, and dissolution; that our Secretaries of Heaven must either demonstrate that the face of the Heavens was varied in that short moment that intervened betwixt near Nativities; or confess it to be the hand of Providence Divine, which distributed to each his peculiar Lot, not the irrational Stars that caused that vast disproportion. And thus Proclus and Euristhenes, Gemini not only in their production, but in the Crown of Lacedaemonia, and so equally disposed by their Fortunes also to the promotion of that Influence, which the then paramount Conjunction of the Pianets had impressed upon them: did neither live in equal glory, nor perish by equal and synchronical Fates. On the Reverse; how many Myriads have proved Twins, in their Decease, who were utter Aliens in their blood, nativity, constitutions, professions, inclinations, fortunes? Dare our Judicial Astrologers assirme, that All, who fall in battle at once, had one and the same sidereal Fate, which necessitated that their Copartnership in the grave? unsainedly, nothing acquainted with letters can be so contradictorily impudent. What excuse have they then left them, for stopping their ears against that grave Admonition of the oraculous Zoroaster; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Ne tu augeas fatum, Beware thou dost not aggravate thy Fate. which signifies no less than this; in thy power it is, either to promote, or frustrate the virtues of Celestial Influxes: to promote them by Cooperation, to infirm and defeat them by Counter-inclination or repugnancy. To which we may accommodate also that memorable Aphorism of the Prince of Astrologers, Ptolemy; Potest is, qui sciens est, multos stellarum effectus avertere, quando naturam earum noverit, ac seipsum ante illorum eventum praeparaveril. Our last Argument to confound Chaldaean Fate, is the Double Impiety inferrible thereupon. (1) If the Infelicity of Article 5. (3) By the dou●le Impiety, Inseparable from the belief thereof. every man be the indeclinable Effect of that malicious Tincture, which the unfriendly Complexion of the Heavens at his Nativity infused into his nature; as our aethereal Mercuries assirme: then must it follow, that those glorious orbs were created by God more for the harm and ruin, than benefit and comfort of mankind; for whose sake only, subordinate to his own Glory, the whole Creation was intended. And (2) if all the regicides, parricides, homicides, incests, rapes, rapines, blasphemies, sacrilegies, rebellions, proditions, etc. nefarious acts of Miscreants (the very naming whereof will blister the most innocent lips) be the executions of those designs, which the malevolent stars in their Confoederations have determined to accomplish by such and such unhappy Instruments: then must it be conceded, that no Malefactor ought to be accountable to justice, because he can plead, Non equidem vellem, sed me mea Fata trahebant; as also, that God is the Author of Evil, by giving to the stars such noxious power, and such unlimited Commissions, as do autorize them to operate to the Destruction of his Masterpiece. To these 3 Redargutions of Astrological Necessity, we might have annexed as many score, borrowed from Picus Mirandulanus, Bradwardine B. of Canterbury, Sixtus Senensis, Mersennus, Gassendus, All which heroical Champions of truth and Providence Divine, have drawn their victorious swords, in this quarrel, against the Host of Heaven: but, remembering that proverbial axiom, Frustra fit per plura, quod fieri possit per pauciora, we found ourselves obliged to decline supererogation, and refer the unsatisfied to these incomparable Authors. However, we ask leave to insert the memorable and not commonly quoted Confession of Hillarius Altobellus Senior (in praefatione ad Tabulas Regias Divisionum 12. partium Coeli) in these words. Cum igitur per tot secula fluctuarit Astronomia & mendax tanto tempore peragrarit totum orbem, quot modis, quot locis, quot viribus, quot cum temerariis vel ignavis auctoribus, inverecunda, front perfricta, fornicata est? nunquam, nullibi, nullis (ante Tychonem, & à Ptolemaeo post aliqua saecula) annuam veracem revolutionem dedit, neque eventuum verum tempus consignavit, non ipsa, non dilectissima silia Astrologia. Vtraque enim pavit curiosos mendaciis & adulationibus. Si autem interdummendaces non fuere, sors favit, vel casus, vel per accidens congruentia syderum ad illa puncta, & non docta ac naturalis conjectatio. By which ingenuous Confession of a Person, whose assiduous inquest into the most recondite mysteries of Astronomy, non only by indefatigate lecture of the choicest of Urania's Secretaries, but also by the most exact use of Instruments and Tables, and frequent tempestive Experiments, had enabled him to detect all those pernicious Frauds, which either the Ignorance, or ostentation of succeeding Ages had foisted in upon the simple and demonstrable Vranometrical observations and Axioms of Antiquity; not only to the Corruption, but eternal Defamation and contempt of that noble Science: how much of just Disparagement is inferred upon Judicial Astrology, which the Avarice of Divining Impostors, on one hand, and the superstitious Curiosity of abject minds, on the other, have exalted to the height of Destiny; we should rudely derogate from our Readers Capacity, not wholly to entrust to his own immediate judgement. To ratify and terminate this our reprobation of our Genethliacal Schematists, we have the like censure of them from S●. Ambrose (in Hexaemero) Nonnulli tentaverunt exprimere Nativitatum qualitates, qualis futurus unusquisque, qui natus sit, esset; cum hoc non solum vanum sit▪ & inutile quaerentibus, sed impossibile pollicentibus. CHAP. X. The Liberty of Man's Will, Fortune, and Fate conciliated to Providence Divine. SECT. I. THus long have we exercised the Candour and Patience of our Reader, with the prolix Recitation, Article 1. The intent of the chapter. and necessary Explanation of the Ancients opinions concerning Fate: and the residue of our province is to gratify him with the concise Declarement of our own, both concerning the legitimate Admission of this notion of Fate, and the Conciliation thereof to man's freewill, Fortune, and Providence Divine; which we have formerly invited him to expect, as the grand scope at which all our praevious Meditations were directed, and the point in which all these lines of this small matter of Book are concentred. First, we are to abominate the execrable Opinion of Democritus; Article 2. Democritus Fate, inconsistent both to the Fundamentals of Religion, and the Liberty of man's Will: and therefore detested. not only because it is uncapable of due Consistence with the sacred and indubitable Principles of Religious Faith, which ascertain that the Creation, Molition, Conservation, and constant Administration of all things, are impossible rightly to be ascribed to any Cause but the Supreme Being alone: but also because it is è diametro repugnant to the evidence of that infallible Criterion, the Light of Nature; which demonstrateth the Soul of man to be an Arbitrary and uncoacted Agent. For, that man hath in himself a power of inhibiting, or suspending his Assent unto, and Approbation of any object, the Verity of whose Species is not sufficiently clear and distinct, but Dubious; is a perfect Demonstration of the Indifferency, or Liberty of his Intellect, and so also of its charge, the Will, or Faculty Elective: as Cartesius excellently observes, in Princip. Philosoph. part. 1. sect. 6. Secondly, that opinion of Aristotle and Epicurus, may, indeed, Article 3. Aristotle and Epicurus their Fate admitted, in that it is Identical to Nature: but abominated, in that it clasheth with the Certitude of Divine Prescience. be defended so far forth as it makes Fate and Nature, or the Concatenation of natural Causes, to be one and the same thing in reality, though expressed by different Terms: but aught to be exploded, insomuch as it not only denies the Verity of Future Events, and so substracts from God the proper Attribute of his most perfect Essence, Omniscience, by not conceding to him an infallible Science of all things to come; but also supposeth no Creation of natural Causes, no disposition, no moderation of their Efficiencies by Providence Divine. And thirdly, as for that more specious opinion of the Platonist Article 4. The Platonic and Stoic Fate embraced, so far as it is conceded to be a Constitution of the Divine wisdom▪ but abandoned, in that it detracts from Divine Omnipotence. and Stoic; we can discover no danger in our adhaesion to it, so far as it affirms the primitive Constitution, and continual Gubernation of all things in the Universe by God; by defining Fate to be that Method, series, or systeme of Causes, which the Divine Nature at first constituted, and established, in order to the praecise, and opportune effecting all things praedecreed by his infinite Wisdom: But yet we must cautiously abandon it in this, that it not only blasphemously invades the cardinal Prerogative of Divinity, Omnipotence, by denying him a reserved power, of infringing, or altering any one of those Laws, which Himself ordained, and enacted, and chaining up his arms in the adamantine fetters of Destiny; but also, in great part, excludes the mind of man from acting any voluntary part on the theatre of the world, and leaves no room for the intervention of Contingents. Article 5. In what qualified sense Christianisme may tolerate the use of the term, Fate. Nor is there any substantial reason to deter the most scrupulous Christian from admitting the use of this term, Fate, in a rectified sense; i. e. provided that He thereby understand, not any blind and unpraemeditate Necessity; but a provident and well ordered Concatenation of Causes, which (like the Magnetic Chain, where all the inferior links are dependent on the impraegnating or invigorating Emanations of the First,) was constituted by the Fiat of the Eternal Wisdom, and may be varied, or inverted by the occasional Determinations of the same; and this without incurring the Imperfection either of Inconstancy or Improvision. For our warrant in this we have no less a Praecedent, than St. Austin; whose words are these: Qui omnium connexionem seriemque Causarum, quâ fit omne, quod fit, Fati nomine appellant; non multum cum iis de verbi controversia certandum est: quandoquidem ipsum causarum ordinem, & quandam connexionem summi Dei tribuunt Voluntati; ac proinde Fati voce qui voluerit uti, sententiam teneat, linguam corrigat. (in 5. de Civit. Dei. cap. 8.) ¶. SECT. II. NOw, as for the Abolition of the seeming Enmity between Article 1. Fate and Fortune conciliated, in the point of Providence Divine. Fate and Fortune; 'tis not obscure, that the Concession of the one is very far from adnihilating the other. For, if we admit Fate to be a Law, by the Divine Will imposed upon Natural Causes, according to the tenor whereof all things are done, that are done; and Fortune to be an Event resulting from a concourse of Natural Causes, besides, above, or contrary to the expectation, conjecture, and forecast of man, though praecisely praeordained by the Providence of God▪ and connexed to the series of Causes, or Chain of Fate: we cannot but soon perceive their Convention, Concentration, and Identity in the point of Providence Divine; nor is there any veil of Discrepancy betwixt them, in their naked and simple Realities, but that light and thin one, which either the Ignorance or Sophistry of man hath rudely, and perhaps profanely drawn. When a Prince dispatcheth two Posts to the same place, by several ways, neither knowing of the others mission; and they meet each other in one moment at their journey's end: though we may rightly call it Fortune, in respect to them, who nevet thought of that Convention; yet still is it providence, in respect to the Prince, who sent them; and limited their time of travel to such an hour. And undoubtedly, by the authority of no less reason are we bound to acknowledge, that though many Events hourly occurring to us, which the highest Human Prudence could never so much as suspect, may without derogation to the sacred Monarchy of God, be styled merely Fortuitous, in relation to our Improvision: yet still are they the wise and convenient Praedeterminations of his Special Providence. Our Memory may rehearse, that the Term, Fortune, hath a double importance; (1) a Concourse of Causes; (2) man's praevious Ignoration of the Event resulting from that Concourse: and our Reason cannot burr hence infer, that according to the First, Fortune may be admitted in respect to man, though not of God; and according to the Last, nothing can interdict our assertion, that Fortune is a part, not only of Fate, but also of Providence Divine, which, as hath been profusely demonstrated, comprehends all occurrences, as well those which are, as those which are not praevised by Man. And in this sense only are we to interpret that sentence of Plato (Epist. 6.) Deum apparare Fortunam; as also that other, (in 4. de Legibus) Deum, & cum Deo Fortunam humana omnia gubernare. This duly considered, we cannot but conclude; that Fortune is consistent with Fate, by the same interest, that a Species doth consist with its Genus: for that the Analogy is consimilar, is manifest from what immediately precedes. Plutarch, when descanting upon Plato his Distinction of Article 2. Flu●archs ingenious Assimilation of Fate to the Civil Law: and his design therein. Providence into Supreme, Planetary, and Sublunary; judiciously interpreteth the supreme, to be Intelligentia & benefica Dei voluntas, the Intelligence and benefical Will of God: and this for two respects; (1) that He might with greater reason enunciate, that Fate is to be reputed subordinate to the Divine Will; (2) that He might with greater authority contradict that proverbial error, Omnia Fato fieri; though he conceded, Omnia Fato complecti, that all things are comprehended in Fate. We say All things, not only merely Fortuitous, and more General Contingents; but also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, such whose Event is ambiguous, and suspended on the Election or Aversation of Man's freewill. And the scope at which He aimed this Distinction; was to insinuate and commend the Analogy betwixt Fate and the Civil Law. For (saith He) as all actions are not Legitimate, i. e. are not done according ●o the rule of the Law, which are under the comprehension of the Law (for the Law comprehends Prodition, Desertion, and many offences of the same kind, which yet no man can justify to be Legitimate: since that only is Legitimate, which is prescribed by the Law; and therefore He, who kills a Tyrant, doth not a Lawful, (though a Commendable, at least not a punishable Act) but only those, which are enjoined and expressly prescribed by the Law: even so, though Fate doth comprehend all Events, yet are not▪ all Events therein comprehended, Fatal, or the Designations and Effects of Fate; but only those, which follow upon Causes (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) in the Divine Disposition Antecedent, or Necessary; such as are the motions of the Planets, upon which their Rising and Setting follow of Necessity. SECT. III. ANd finally, concerning the Enodation of that more than Article 1. Fate concentrical to man's Elective Liberty, in the point of Praedestination. Gordian Knot, (about which many Ancient Philosophers have broken the teeth of their Reason, and as many Christian Theologists been driven to make use of the sword of Faith, to cut it asunder) viz. the Conciliation of Fate to its apparent Contrary, Man's freewill; we conceive the most hopeful way of dissolving the mighty Difficulty to be, with the most penetrating Thom. Aquinas, to understand Fate, in respect to man, to be no more but that part of Providence Divine, which Theologists intent by the Term, Praedestination. For the vulgarly conceived Antipraxis between Providence Divine and Liberty Human, being once removed: the Repugnancy between Fate and Liberty will also vanish of consequence. This that we have, in the 4. Sect. of our Chapter concerning the Mobility of the Term of man's life, to more than a small part performed; the Memory of our Reader is a sufficient record. However, that we may leave no stone unturned, under which any the most minute particle of Truth, to whose Explanation the concernment of our present Theme doth adlige us, may be thought to lie neglected: we shall, with permission from, and due submission unto the Censure of the Church (from whose Fundamentals we humbly beseech the God of Truth we may never recede in the least) make a second attempt to expound the mysterious Riddle of Praedestination; that so we may with more perspicuity evidence the Conciliability thereof to man's Arbitrary Agency. In order hereunto, we are to observe, that as Theology holds it for Article 2. The Concord betwixt Theology and Philosophy, in their admission of 2. orders of Causes natural, viz. Necessary, and Free; the ground of the Affinity both betwixt the Difficulties, and and Solutions, on either part: as to the Abolition of the seeming Repugnancy between Fate and man's freewill. a maxim, that God created two distinct orders of Causes, in the General, viz. Necessary, and Free; and that both of these constantly and faithfully execute the commission of their Natures, respectively, i. e. the Necessary operate by Necessity, and the Free by Liberty: so also doth Philosophy admit it for Canonical, that both the Necessary and Free equally acknowledge God for their Author, and are so comprehended in the episcopacy of Fate; that the Necessary operate Necessarily, or Fatally, and the Free not Fatally, but Freely. And from this Consent comes it to pass, that as the Difficulties, which perplex both Divines and Philosophers, are of great Affinity, if not Identical, in the main: so also are the Responses thereto of equal moment: Wherefore it must commend our studies, to select only those Two Cardinal Doubts, to which all others may, in some relation, either direct, or collateral, be referred: and, to the perspicuous solution of each, accommodate such pregnant Reasons, as may be of correspondent extent in their importance. The Former, being desumed from Divine Praenotion, is by the Theologist proposed thus. Either God knew definitely and Article 3. The First capital Difficulty, desumed from Divine Prescience; as stated by Divines. certainly, that Peter would deny Christ: or He did not know it. That he did not know it, cannot be affirmed; first, because He praecisely praedicted his Abnegation; secondly, because Truth itself cannot lie: and if He had not known it, He not been Omniscient, and consequently not God. Therefore He knew it definitely and certainly: and upon inference; it was impossible to Peter, not to deny. For had it been left to his Election, and he using that Liberty had not denied: then might the Praenotion of God have been argued of Fallacity, and his Predication of Falsity. But if it was not in Peter's power, not to have denied; 'tis manifest, that he wanted the Liberty of Election. And by the Philosophers thus. Either the Gods have a definite Article 4. The same, as stated by Philosophers. and infallible prescience of the future events of Contingents (i. e. whether of 2. contrary Events, in possibility, shall be deduced extra Causas, or actually succeed) or they have no knowledge at all of future things; or they have an indefinite, and only conjectural cognition, such as even Man may justly praetend to: but neither the 2. nor 3. proposition can be endured, without the joint toleration of most horrid Absurdities, and inevitable precipitation upon that dangerous rock, the Commensuration of the Infinite Science of the Gods, by the Finite extent of man's capacity; and therefore the First remains only to be asserted. If therefore the Gods have a certain Praenotion, which of 2. Contraries, whose Event is equally possible, as to the virtues of their Causes, shall come to be effected: manifest it is, that that particular Event, whose Ambiguity is determined to Certainty of Futurition, and is actually brought to pass, is Fatal or Necessary, i. e. could not but come to pass. For, otherwise, the Gods must be confessed subject to Mendacity. One of the two therefore, must be granted, viz. that all things come to pass, Necessarily, as they are foreknown and Praedicted by the Gods; and so that the word, Contingens, is excluded, as importing no Reality, but a mere Chimaera; or, that the Affairs or Occurrences of man, are neither praecognite, nor procured by the Gods; the Impossibility of which assertion, doth also fully exclude all Contingency. To the Solution of this Difficulty, 'tis well known, the Divines Article 5. The full solution of the same, by virtue of the Div●●s Discrimination of Necessity into Absolute and Hypothetical. have most judiciously accommodated their Distinction of Necessity into Absolute and Suppositional. For instance; that 2. and 3. make 5. or that yesterday is praeterlapsed, is Absolutely Necessary: but, that I should to morrow take a journey into the Country, or write a Consult for such or such a Patient, is not absolutely Necessary; yet if I suppose, that I shall travel; or writ; then there ariseth a Necessity of my travelling, or w●iting, ex Suppositione, from that my Supposition. Now, in respect 'tis manifest from this Distinction, that the Necessity Absolute of any Action doth destroy the Liberty of the Agent; but the Suppositional doth not (for though I journey, or write, according to my Supposition, yet was it possible to me to have done neither) thereupon do they most excellently reason thus: that Peter's Abnegation was foreseen and praedicted by God, as an Event to come of Necessity, not Absolute, but Suppositional, by which nothing was detracted from Peter's Liberty of not denying. For, as now in the present, if He be interrogated concerning his Master, he is entirely Free or to avouch, or disavow his knowledge of him; so also will He be in the Future, when He shall be interrogated. Wherefore, as, if He now determine himself rather to deny, then affirm, and according to that determination actually deny; He doth that Freely, notwithstanding from the moment he denied, his denial is Necessary, insomuch as it is supposed that he hath actually denied: so also in the Future; when He shall determine himself rather to deny, then affirm, and according to that determination shall actually deny, shall his denial be Free, or Arbitrary; however it cannot but be granted Necessary that He hath denied; because he hath already actually denied. Nor is it paradoxical, or difficult to affirm, that this Suppositional Necessity, and Peter's Liberty are not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Discordant, or Inconsistent, in any respect; because the Necessity is subsequent, not antecedent to the Determination of his Liberty; and because it doth not consist so much in Re, vel Actione, in the Thing or Action itself, as in Temporis Circumstantia, the Circumstance of Time when 'tis done. Since, when we say, 'tis Necessary that Peter hath denied; that Necessity is not understood to have been any thing Antecedently in him, which compelled him to deny: but that it is radicated now in Time itself, which as it is really passed, and cannot be not past; so the Action done in that past time, however it was done, cannot be not done. And hence it is evident, though no man can justly assert, that 'twas Necessary to Peter to deny, because according to that assertion, there must be understood some Antecedent Cause, by which he was coated to deny: yet justified it may be that Now 'tis Necessary that he hath denied; because the Action being once done, and so impossible to be not done, all the Necessity falls upon the Preterition of the Time. Now, in respect that God is Omniscient, He cannot but Foresee that Peter will deny; yet that Divine Praenotion of Peter's Abnegation, is subsequent to the Divine Praevision of Peter's Free Determination: and therefore God Foresees that Peter will deny, only because He Foresees, that Peter, abusing his Liberty, will freely determine himself to a denial. And hence comes it to be embraced amongst the most judicious Schoolmen, as a truth indisputable; That Peter will deny, not because God hath praevised and praedicted that he will deny: but that, because Peter will deny, when he shall be examined, therefore and for no other reason doth God Foresee and Foretell that he will deny. For, uti Scientia, praeteritam rem pro objecto habens, nullam rei praeteritae, ut ita & non alitèr fieret, necessitatem infert: ita Praescientia, rem suturam pro suo objecto habens, rei futurae, sive Futuritioni nullam potest inferre necessitatem: utraque enim est extra rem, & in Deo actio Immanens; that as Science having for its object a thing Praeterite, doth induce no necessity thereupon; that it should have been so, and no otherwise, so also doth Prescience, having for its object a thing Future, infer no necessity upon its Futerition, that it shall so and no otherwise come to pass; for both Science and Praecience are distinct from, and alien to their Objects, and Actions Immanent in God, i. e. not at all effluxed to the object, to the destruction, or alteration of its Nature: this, we say, is a Verity which demonstrateth itself, and which we have more praecisely insisted upon, in the 4. Articl. 4. Sect. of our discourse of the Mobility of the term of man's lifè. And that all Cognition is a thing really distinct from, and extraneous to its Object; and that a thing comes to be actually, what it is not from the Cognition thereof by an Idea in all points consimilar, but from itself, or its Efficient Cause: needs no other probation, but the conviction of this instance; that Snow is white, not because 'tis known to be white, but contrary, that it is known to be white, because really it is so. To speak a profound truth plainly, in few words; herein consists the Disparity between Divine and Human Cognition, viz. that Human can be extended only to Present and Praeterite: but Divine doth extend itself, with equal Certitude, to Future Contingents also. Now, insomuch as Praeterite Contingents were sometimes Future, and in the same condition with those, which are yet Future; and again, those which are yet Future may be understood to be praeterite in time to come, and in the same condition with those, which are already Praeterite: manifest it is, that as neither Divine, nor Human Cognition is the Cause, why Contingents already Praeterite, are praeterite; but, è contrà, they are known as Praeterite, because really they are so: in like manner, that those which are Future, are not therefore Future, because God holds an exact praenotion of them, as Future; but, è contrà, because they really are Future, therefore doth God hold an exact praenotion of their Futurition. And upon this Basis was it, that many Schooolmen erected that Axiom, Praevisionem Dei nihil influere in humanas actiones; that the Praevision of God hath no influence (coactive) upon the actions of man. Now, what hath been argued for the Praevision and Praenotion of God, is also to be extended to his Predication; especially because 'tis uncontrovertible, that Predication is posterior or subsequent to the Praenotion of any Contingent, yet in the womb of Futurity: since what is not exactly foreknown, can never be certainly foretold. For which respect, shall any urge upon us, that the Divine Praenotion and Predication cannot be Fallacious; we shall most willingly concede their position, as most indubitate, because nothing can be prognosticate by God, as Future, which is not really Future: but, when it shall be thence inferred, that if Peter had once the absolute power in his own hands to have not denied, and rightly using that arbitrary power, had actually not denied; in that case, the praenotion and predication of his denial by God had proved Fallacious; we must reject the Illation, as illegal and absurd, because had not Peter's denial been realy Future, God had neither praevised, nor praedicted the same. For, it is the Reality of its Futurition, that supports the Certitude of the Predication of any future Contingent. And therefore, in case Peter had been not to deny; God had as certainly praedicted, that He would not deny: since so the Supposition had been quite contrary, viz. that Peter, rightly using his Liberty of Election, would determine it, not to a Negation, but Affirmation. Whereupon we may safely conclude (1) that Peter's Abnegation was Future, and (2) that God both praevised and praedicted the same, upon no other Necessity but only this: that Peter, when it should be in his own power to determine himself to either part, would then actually determine himself rather to Disclaim and Abjure, than own and avow, his Master. Thus the Divines. And thus the Philosophers. Non quia Dii definitò norunt Article 6. The Solution of the same by the Philosophers proving that the definite Praenotion of future Contingents, is no Cause of their definite Contingency: but, è contrà, the definity of their Futurition, the c●use of their definite ●●anotion. Contingentia, ideo illa eventura sunt. Neque enim, quia Dii norunt, ideo necessariò eveniunt; sed quia, cum naturae sint an●ipitis, aut talem, aut talem exhibebunt exitum; norunt Dii necessariò qualem, seu utrum obtinebunt: adeo ut Contingens, ex sua quidem natura indefinitum sit, sed respectu tamen notitiae Deorum definitum. Quinetiam constat, nostra quoque notitia Contingens definitò cognosci; cum, viz. propriè Contingens deinceps non sit: sed necessariò consequitur antegressas, cur fiat, Causas: Saith Ammonius (in lib. de interpret.) The whole importance whereof is this. That the definite praenotion of Contingents by God, is in no relation the cause of their definite Contingency; but, their being of themselves definitely Future, or their Ambiguity being to be determined to Definity of Futurition, is the Cause of their praenotion by God. For, though a Contingent be Indefinite, in respect to its own nature, i. e. it is equally determinable, by the Liberty of its Causes, to either of two contrary Events: yet, in respect to the Praenotion of God, it is Definite; because God hath an infallible praenotion, to which of two contrary Events its Causes will determine it. All which may be confirmed à Minori, from the Praenotion of Man; experience assuring, that Physicians frequently prognosticate and predict the death of their deplored Patients, even to an hour. Not that their Prognostics have any influence upon the Disease, to determine it to Mortal, when yet 'tis Dubious: but that the determination of the disease from Dubious to definitely Mortal, by its causes, is the ground of their Prognostic. Here, lest we be misconceived to confound Divine and Human Article 7. The Disparity betwixt Divine and Human Praenotion. Praecognition, we advertise; that the Praenotion of God is Infallible, because à Priori, i. e. He foreknows Contingents, while they are yet only in Possibility, and in the womb of their Causes; nor to him, who demands, Why, or How God foreknows Events, while they are yet in the Dark, or Nothing of Futurity? can any other response be given, but this, that He is Omniscient, i. e. God: but the Praenotion, or (rather) Praesagitition of man, is Fallacious, because desumed à Posteriori, from Effects educed extra Causas, into actual Existence. Which vast Disparity may be most adaequately Exemplified Article 8. The same exemplified. thus. God certainly Foreknows that Peter shall fall sick, and die of such or such a disease, viz. a Pestilent Fever. How? because He foreknows, that those Causes, which in respect to the Ambiguity or Indifferency of their event may, or may not generate an intense putrefaction and malignity in the humours of Peter's body, shall lose that their Possibility, and determine themselves to the actual production of that particular malignant or pestilential inquinament in his blood, which constituteth the essence of that disease: and that the disease so generated will be so violent and inoppugnable by the force of Nature, that the Temperament of Peter's body, being too weak to sustain such a disproportionate Encounter, will thereby be dissolved, and so Death shall inevitably succeed. But the Physician can only conjecture, that Peter may fall sick of such a malignant Fever; why, because He discovers that Peter's praevious Intemperance hath prepared the continent Cause, or Fuel for a putrid Fever; and that the access of Malignity, either by Contagion communicated, or from an intense Corruption of humours internally kindled, may, according to the Aptitude of its nature, seize upon that praepared fuel, and Ferment it into a pestilential Fever: but Definitely He doth not know, that Peter shall fall sick of such a pestilential disease; in regard, it transcends the maxims of his Art, and the Capacity of his limited Reason, to foreknow, whether the Possibility of such an Effect from such Causes, shall be determined to Necessity. Nor can He predict, that Peter being invaded with that disease, shall certainly perish thereby; until the Dubiosity of the Fever be actually determined to Lethality: for then, from Symptoms, that signify the total Succumbency or yielding of Nature to the victorious fury of the disease, he may, with good warrant and honour, praesage the imminent death of Peter. ¶. SECT. iv THe other Capital Difficulty, being erected upon a certain circumventing Socraticisme, or Interrogatory Sophism Article 1. The Second Capital Difficulty, erected upon a sophism called Ignava Ratio; as it respecteth both Theology, and Philosophy. (most adaequately denominated by Cicero (de Fato) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Ignava Ratio, an unactive Argumentation; because, praevailing upon the mind, it stupefies the same to a perpetual Restiveness, or Supinity, by charging even the Thoughts of every man upon the absolute and inoppugnable praeordination of Destiny; and consequently adnihilating the use of Piety, Prudence, and Circumspection in all the actions of our lives) on that side which respecteth Theology, beareth this form. Either I am, from Eternity, praedestined and Elected to immarcescible Glory; or Reprobated to interminable misery. If the Former; then notwithstanding all my Impieties, I cannot be Damned: if the Later; then notwithstanding all my pious endeavours, I cannot be saved. But one of the two must be true: and therefore, since all my Good or Evil actions are of no avail, to what end shall I afflict myself with unnecessary, because fruitless care in any action of my life? Better is it for me, to grant a general Indulgence to my Genius, and provide for nought, but the satisfaction of all my Sensual desires; since that, nor ought else, can neither countermand my Election, nor promove or confirm my Reprobation. And on the otherside, which respecteth Philosophy, it is presented thus. If the Decree of Fate be, that I shall recover of such a sickness; then, whether I consult the Physician, or not, I shall however recover: but if the decree of Fate be, that I shall not recover; notwithstanding my use, or neglect of the Physician, I shall not recover. And one of the two is necessarily Future: therefore is it vain and needless for me to use the Physician. In order to our hoped Solution of this prodigious Problem, we beg leave to be our Readers Remembrancer, that among Article 2. Two eminent Opinions of Divines touchant the Solution of this Difficulty, recognized: and their judicious Modesty, in duly acknowledging the mystery of Praedestination, to be Arcanum Divini imperii, commended. Divines there are two eminent Opinions, concerning this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or almost incomprehensible mystery; in both which they have expressed so opportune and becoming a Modesty, as must extort from every ingenuous person not only a worthy Acknowledgement, but superlative Commendation. For, being reduced to an admission of some kind of Necessity, and considering how inconsistent any the weakest Necessity is with Liberty, wherein the Good and Evil, and so the Laudability and Culpability of all the Actions of man, must be confessed to be essentially radicated: they thought it the highest point of Wisdom to secure their routed judgements by a mature retreat to the Sanctuary of Ignorance; conceiving it a pitch sublime enough for the most aspiring thoughts of man to mount up to the Apostles o Altitudo! and soberly becalming the distractions of their Reason, by the Laudanum of Faith. If so, 'tis no shame for us to confess this Wonder of Praedestination to be Arcanum Divini Imperii, not only impervestiga●●le by the acutest and profoundest Speculation of Man, but also too abstruse for the clearer intelligence of Angels. The Former opinion states the Abstrusity thus. That God, from all eternity, did Praedestinate, or Elect, out of the whole stock, or mass of mankind a definite number of persons, to whom, sine ullis eorum menitis, operibusve bonis praevisis, & ex pura sui Bonitate, without any respect at all to his Praevision of their Good works, but merely of his own Favour and Benignity, He had decreed eternal Felicity: and the rest He decreed to Reprobate, or Damn to eternal Infelicity; yet, ex praevisis eorum malis operibus, in respect to his praevision of their Future Evilworks. The other thus. That God did as well praedestinate some men to Glory, from his praevision of their Good; as others to misery, from his praevision of their Evil actions. Or thus. God, from Eternity, decreed to create the World, and therein a certain number of men, who should be capable of deserving well, or ill at the hands of his Mercy, or Justice, according to the right use, or abuse of that Liberty of their Understanding and Will, which He was pleased to endow them withal. And, compassionating the Deceptibility of their Nature, He also decreed to diffuse upon the souls of all men, that Supernatural Assistance, which Divines call Sufficient Grace; that so they, who should, by the right use of their Elective Liberty, husband their stock or portion of sufficient Grace, to empower them to the performance of Good Actions, should be Elected to Glory: but they, who should abuse both their Liberty, and his Auxiliant Grace, to the doing of Evil Actions, should be Reprobated to misery. And finally, because He foresaw, that some would rightly use his Auxiliatory Grace, and constantly persevere in that state of Piety until death; and that others would neglect, condemn, and abuse it, and never repent perfectly, but die in that horrid state of Impiety: therefore did He decree everlasting Glory to those, and as lasting misery to these. And this we conceive to be the most intelligible Adumbration of this more than Enigmatical Subject. Now, of these two Opinions, the First seems as wholly incapable Article 3. The First opinion found totally uncapable of Expedition from the Sophism, Ignava Ratio. of Expedition from the intricate Entanglings of the praecedent Interrogatory Sophism; as the Absolute Decree of Reprobation is of a full Conciliation to the Liberty of man's Will. For what Liberty can remain to those men, who are, by a decree Antecedent to all praevision of their future Good actions, praedestinate to Glory? And were there any Contrapractical Liberty remaining to them, and should their Will, according to that liberty, elect evil, and they do such actions, whose guilt might deserve Damnation Eternal, at the tribunal of Justice Divine: in that case, would the Decree of their Election be eluded and countermanded. Nor is it less Contradictory, to reserve a Liberty to those, who are Reprobate; since, for this reason alone, that they are not Elected, it is impossible to them, notwithstanding all their Good inclinations, endeavours, and performances, to bring themselves into the number of the Elect. And yet damned they shall be, and justly too, for their Evil works: but how is it possible for them to do Good, and not Evil of Necessity, when the decree of their Reprobation is supposed Antecedent to God's Praevision of the future concourse, or conspiracy of their Will to the tenor of that Decree; and when they are left such deplorable wretches, to whom Damnation, and so the Patration of evil Actions only remain possible? To evade this Difficulty of Difficulties, many eminent Doctors of the Chair as well in Universities, as Synods, have fabricated for themselves as many Sanctuaries of Distinctions. Some adscribing to God a certain Science Conditionate, or Hypothetical (they unanimously phrase it, Scientia Media, and are so immoderately delighted with the Acuteness thereof, that, as the more than generally learned, Dr. Prideaux hath satirically observed (in praelect. de Scient. Media.) de genuino ejus parent, haud segnius ac de Puero vivo inter meretrices, 1. Reg. 3. est decertatum, there hath been as passionate and sharp a conslict between Fonseca, Molina, Leonhardus Lessius Lovaniensis, etc. Jesuits, for the honour of its Invention, as was betwixt the two Harlot's about the right to the Living Child) others requiring, if not to the justification of the Decree itself, yet at least to justify the Execution thereof, the concourse of Good Works, so necessarily, that no man can ever attain to Glory, but by the scale of Merits, at least those of our Saviour: and others mincing, or extenuating the Elective Liberty of man into a mere and simple Libency (which we have more than once specified, and as often described) and accordingly attempting to salve the Repugnancy thus; that the Elect are therefore Free, because they do their Good works Libently, or Willingly; and likewise, that the Reprobate are also Free, because they do their Evil works Libently. Hereupon, to him, who shall charge upon them with this unactive Argumentation, they instantly oppose; that there is very great reason, why every man, endowed with this Libency, should most strenuously endeavour the constant practice of Good, rather than Evil: because, though He be uncertain of the Decree concerning his Election or Reprobation; yet is He certain of this, that no man shall ever be assumed into Glory, unless he shall have done Good, nor any be excluded the Celestial Eden, unless He shall have done Evil. To which they add, that it is the main Duty of every man, to the utmost of his power, to ascertain himself rather of Election, by his perseverance in good; then of Reprobation, by a debauched and desperate resignation of the sceptre of his Will to all the temptations of Evil: that so he may prevent, or mitigate that Fear and Anxiety, which must otherwise uncessantly excruciate his mind, during his whole life, by acquiring a settled confidence, that from God, who is infinitely Good and Just, he hath no cause to expect evil, while the scope of all his endeavours is, to deserve well, at least to obtain Mercy at his hand. To conclude, lest man should in the interim either Glory in himself, as if He ought, according to justice, to be Elected, for his good works sake; or Complain of the rigour of the Decree of his Reprobation, murmuring that it was not his fault, why his name was not inscribed in the Book of life: they check his Glorying with this cooling card of the Apostle, O Homo! quis te discernit? and hush his Complaint with, Tu qui es, qui respondeas Deo? Nunquid dicet vas Figulo, quare me fecisti sic? Nunquid sacere illi licet aliud vas in honorem, aliud verò in contumeliam? (Roman. chap. 9 ver. 21.) And if this satisfy not; they here set bounds to Curiosity, and lime the wings of those Eagle Wits, who would soar higher than the lower region of the mystery, with that grave advice of the Canonised Doctor: Quare hunc trahat Deus, illum verò non trahat, noli judicare, si non vis errare; or that modest rule of Cornelius Tacitus, Sanctius & reverentius visum, de acts Deorum credere, quàm scire. But as for the Second Opinion; to our first inquisition, that Article 4. The Second Opinion, to a great part, extricated from the same Labyrinth. seems capable of extrication from the forementioned Labyrinth, without much difficulty thus. I am (says Adrastus, or the Fatist) either Elect to glory, or Reprobate to misery, by an eternal Decree of God. This we grant to be most true; but with this additional qualification: that Himself is Now the Cause, why He was from eternity Elect, or Reprobate. For, He is now in that very state, in which God foresaw that he would be, when educed into existence, endowed with reason, and assisted with sufficient Grace, for the clear discernment of Good from Evil; and it now depends upon the Liberty of his Will, that God hath praevised him operating good or evil: so that the Decree of his Election, or Reprobation, is subsequent or posterior to the Divine Praevision of his future good, or evil Demerits. To speak yet louder; God therefore Elected him to Glory, because He Foresaw that he would use both the Liberty of his Understanding and Will, and that Supernatural Light, or Divine Grace, which the Compassion of God vouchsafed for his Assistance, as he ought, to enable him to lead an honest and pious life: and therefore Reprobated him to misery, because He Foresaw that he would Abuse the Lights of Nature and Grace, in constantly and impenitently doing actions point-blank repugnant to their frequent and importune Advisoes. This being inferred, the Fatist cannot but perceive, that it lies on his part, now to do well, and with all the nerves of his Mind to Cooperate to Divine Grace: that so God, from eternity foreseeing that his Conformity to the dictates of his Grace, may have Elected him. For if he shall counterinflect his Will to the Inclinations of Divine Grace, and pursue Evil: those Evil works shall be very they, which God from eternity having respect unto, hath Damned him for the Gild of them, and impoenitence for them. Nor can He elude this truth, by pleading; that God doth Article 5. The Fatists' Subterfuge, of the Infallibility of Divine Praenotion, praecluded. from eternity Foreknow, whether He shall be Elect, or Reprobate: and that therefore of Necessity he shall be, what he Will be; since the Divine Science is uncapable of Elusion, or Mutability. Because, though God, indeed, had an infallible Praecognition, from Eternity, whether he would be Praedestinate, or Reprobate; yet is that Praecognition grounded upon his own eternal Decree, and that eternal Decree grounded upon his eternal Praevision of the Fatists Good or Evil life. So that the actual Determination of the Will of man to the constant prosecution of Good, is the Basis, or first Degree in this mysterious Climax of Praedestination; the Praevision thereof by God, the second; the respective Decree of God, the third; and his indeceptible Prescience the fourth and last. Not that these Antecessions and Consecutions are Temporany, i. e. not that the Prescience of God is posterior to his Decree; and his Decree posterior to his Praevision (for those 3. make but one simple and entire Act in the Divine Intellect and Will: and Eternity is but one permanent Now, incapable of Division, because of Cessation) really, but Anthropopathically: i. e. that narrow and remote Man, when he speculates the nature of his own freewill, and that of Divine Justice, as integrally Consistent; is necessitated, for comprehension sake, to suppose some Momenta Rationis, or Priority and Posteriority in Eternity, as we have singularly enunciated in the 2. Articl. 4. Sect. 6. chap. praecedent. Article 6. A second subterfuge of the Fatist, viz. that the Subsequence of the Decree to Praenotion, doth implicate the possibility of its Elusion and Mutability; prevented. Again, the Fatist can justly promise to himself no greater protection by this farther objection; that, if the Divine Decree be subquent to Divine Praevision: therefore is it in his power to stagger the Certitude of the Decree, and dissolve its rigour into an arbitrary Mutability. Why? because the Decree is not made, nisi supponendo, quide esset facturus, but upon a Supposition what the future Actions of his life would be: and the Immutability thereof is established upon the Necessity Suppositional, which Article 7. A third Conclusion, viz that the posteriority of the Decree of Election to God's praevision of man's future Good actions, doth make man the Author of his own Discretion▪ detected and redargued. can diminish nothing of the Liberty of man, as we have more than once professedly evinced. And as little solid reason hath He to argue thus. If God did therefore Elect me, only because He eternally praevised those Good works, which I now do: then (ipse ero, qui me discernam) shall I myself be to myself the Author of my Discretion. For, 'tis not man, who by his own single power can make this Discretion, but the very Grace of God alone; without which no man can ever attain so high as the foot of Goodness. Conclude we, therefore; though it be not difficult to man's Reason, Article 8. Two Extracts from the praemises; (1) that the Cooperation of man's Will to sufficient Grace, may be conceived a Cause of his Election▪ (2) that to render a reason, why God did not constitute All men such, as that All should cooperate to sufficient Grace and so be Elect; is an impossibility to man's understanding; other than this, that such was his eternal Will. to investigate the Cause, Why God was pleased to ordain this vessel for Honour, and that for Dishonour; why He, by the vigorous Magnet of his special Indulgence, doth Attract this, and not that man; still dispensing a sufficient portion of his illuminating Grace to all men: since it is not obscure, that the Concourse, Conspiracy, and Cooperation of this man's Will to that sufficient Grace, may inoffensively be conceived to be the Cause, at least a Cause, and so è contra. Yet is it (and the Acutest Wits have, from the Flaws made in them by the more than Adamantine Hardness of this Rock, had great reason to conjecture it will always continue) the most Desperate Difficulty, that ere perplexed the Cogitations of inquisitive Mortality, to explore the reason, why God made men of such a condition, as that some would be destinate to Honour, and others to Dishonour; and not All men such, as that they should willingly suffer themselves to be Allected by the Loadstone of his Love, or be willing to cooperate to his Grace diffused upon them: when, had it seemed convenient to his Wisdom, He might have made All men such, as that they would, with all ardency of Affection, and force of their Wills, have Cooperated to his Grace, and so have been Elected to Honor. And certainly, from hence alone, that our Delection of Virtue, or Vice (conform to which our Minds are carried on with a kind of infraenable Tendency; and to which the Praevision of God being extended, He hath either Elected, or Reprobated) is necessarily dependent upon the Notions, or Species of things objected to our Senses, and traductively to our Cognoscent Faculty: there remains to us more than a great occasion of applauding and admiring the Modesty and judgement of the Apostles Exclamation, o Altitudo! especially when the Exhibition, or Praesentation of those Notions, and Species doth depend upon that Concatenate Series, or subalternate syntax and Disposition of Causes and Effects, which God, when He Created the World, according to the Model of his own imperscrutable Wisdom, thought good to institute. And this we have judged to be a faithful summary of what the Divines Respons to this Circaean Charm, or Sophism of Adrastus containeth. The Remnant of our Assumption, is only to contract those voluminous Discourses of Philosophers, which perpendicularly point at the Solution of the same most bloody and impious Sophism, into a sew medullary or essential lines. Plutarch (de Fato) as Plato's Interpreter, insisting upon the praerecited Adaequation of Fate to the Civil Law; hopes to Article 9 The former Sophism, (ignava Ratio) in part dissolved, by Plutarch's Distinction; that though All effects are comprehended in, yet all are not caused by Fate. decide the mighty Controversy by distinguishing thus: Tametsi omnia, quae fiunt, Fato contineantur; non tamen Fato omnia fieri: ac ejusmodi esse ea, quae Contingenter, sive Liberè, ac Fortuito fiunt. That though all things, which come to pass, are contained in Fate; yet are not all things effected By Fate: and particularly those Events, which are merely Fortuitous, and those which are effected by Arbitrary Agents. Now, according to this eminent Distinction, we may concede; that it is, indeed, comprehended in Fate, not only that Thou, being cast upon the thorny bed of Sickness, shalt or recover, or perish, but also that thou shalt or Consult, or Neglect the Physician: But positively deny, that therefore either thy Convalescence, or Death is Fatal, since 'tis Contingent; as also, that thy use, or neglect of the Physician, is Fatal, since 'tis Arbitrary. Notwithstanding this nice and specious Distinction, we Article 10. The insufficiency of that Distinction, to the total solution of the Difficulty, duly acknowledged. confess, there remains a Difficulty, and such a one as the greatest Oedipuses of the World may, without dishonour to their Perspicacity, despair of its satisfactory Dissolution; viz. How it can be, since there is some Cause, which condueeth rather to thy Convalescence, than Destruction; or, è contrà, rather to thy Destruction, than Convalescence; and some Cause, which induceth, or inclineth thee rather to Consult, then Neglect the Physician, or, è contrà, rather to Neglect, then Consult him: and since those Causes had others Antecedent to them, and those were connected to others, and those to others, etc. retrograde along the chain of Fate: How it can be, we say, that these Effects, being admitted to be Contained in Fate, may not be also admitted to be Caused by Fate. Especially, when we cannot, without passion, quarrel at his Construction, who shall tell us; that to be Contained in Fate, is as much as to be connected to the Series of Causes, and that little less, then to be Effected by Fate. To palliate, not cure the Itch of Curiosity in this particular; we ask leave, with the sublimest and most daring Contemplators of the World, to recur to that General Asylum; Non debet Humana Sapientia supra Divinam illam gloriari, juxta quam vetamur scrupulosiùs inquirere, quamobrem Deus sic ordinarit. And this the reason was of our saying, that the second opinion of Divines, to our first inspection, seemed capable of Extrication from the Labyrinth of the Fatists unactive Argumentation: for our second and more profounding meditations have found it far otherwise. However, we judge it worthy our Readers Patience, here to acquaint himself with the subtle Evasions of some Philosophers; especially when He shall survey them in epitome. Article 11. The most promising Responses of some Philosophers, concisely presented: viz. of Plato (in 10. de Repub.) sagely discoursing about the future Infusion of Souls into Bodies, imagineth some certain Sorts, or Lots; which Lachesis distibuting to souls, as she pleases, thus inaugurates them: Non vos Daemon excipiet, sed vos Daemonem eligetis; your Genius shall not obtrude itself upon you, 1. Plato. but every one shall elect his own particular Genius. And soon after, as a Comment upon his former Parable, He superaddeth thus much; Virtus sola extra omnem servitutis noxam est; libera planè & servire nescia: quam prout quis vel honorabit, vel negliget; ita plus vel minus ex ea possidebit. Culpa omnis est penes eligentem; Deus est extra omnem culpam. Virtue is alone superior to all servitude and compulsion, being absolutely Free, and nescious of subjection: of which every man shall possess more or less, according to his estimation, or neglect thereof. All blame is lodged on the Electors side: and none can be on Gods. In both which parabolical praesentations collated, we need not the optics of Sphinx to discover a lively adumbration of the Later opinion of Divines, which is yet warm in our memory; for therein appears a shadow or pale description of Divine Praedestination, joined hand in hand with the future use of man's Liberty: and this becomes the more visible by Virtue, which is but the repraesentative, or succedaneum of Divine Grace. And as for the mythology of his imaginary Sorts, or Lots; Plotinus (Enn. 2. lib. 3. cap. 15.) unriddleths them to be, not only the Disposition of the Univers, at what time the Soul is immerfed into the body; nor only the individual Temperament of the Body, derived by traduction from the Parents; nor only the condition of the Climate, region and place; but also All other Extraneous Insluences, by which the Mind may be either Adjuvated, or Impeded, in its right Ratiocination, Judicature, Election, and Prosecution of Good, or Evil. Seneca (in 2. Nat. Quest. 35.) vindicating their Devotion, who fled to the Sanctuary of Prayers, Vows, and Expiations, 2. Seneca. as a more certain Preservative from the Combustion of Lightning, than a Chaplet of Laurel (whose case holds no remote Analogy to theirs, who in sickness address to the Physician) hath this observable and pertinent passage. Hoc habent commune nobiscum, quòd nos quoque existimamus vota proficere, salva vi, ac potestate Fatorum. Quaedam enim à Diis immortalibus ita suspensa relicta snnt, ut in bonum vertant, si admotae Diis preces fuerint, si vota suscepta. Ita non est hoc contra Fatum, sed ipsum quoque in Fato est. Aut futurum, inquit, est, aut non. Si futurum; etiam si non susceperis vota, fiet. Falsa est interrogatio; quia illam mediam inter ista exceptionem praeteris. Futurum, inquam, hoc est, si vota suscepta fuerint. Hoc quoque necesse est, inquit, Fato comprehensum sit; aut suscipiat vota, aut non. Puta me tibi manus dare, & fateri hoc quoque Fato esse comprehensum, ut utique fiant vota; ideo fient. Fatum est, ut Hic disertus sit; sed si literas didicerit. Ab eodem fato contin●tur, ut literas discat; ideo discet. Hic Dives erit: sed si navigaverit. An in illo fati ordine, quo patrimonium illi grande promittitur; hoc quoque protinus fatum est, ut naviget, ideo navigabit. Idem dieo tibi de Expiationibus; effugiet pericula, si expiaverit praedictas Divinitus minas; at hoc quoquo fato est, ut expiet; ideo expiabit, etc. And Chrysippus (apud Agellium, lib. 6. cap. 2.) being pressed hard by the same ponderous Argument of the necessary Exhibition 3. Chrysippus▪ of the Species of objects of the Mind; is driven to assimilate the Mobility of the Mind to that of a Cylindre, or Bowl, which in respect to both its Gravity and Figure, is naturally indifferent either to acquiesce, or be agitated, according as it is either permitted to its own quiet, in plano, or deturbed from it, by an external impuls. And this upon Design, by that familiar Comparison to illustrate the Liberty of the Mind to be of such a constitution; that though it cannot but be commoved by the Species of Objects irruent through the gates of the Senses: yet nevertheless is it still in its own power to afford, or deny its assent unto them, i. e. or to Elect, or Reject them. Which was our only scope, in our praecedent Discourse concerning the First Motions of the Mind, and their Consequences. The words of Chrysippus are these. Sicut (inquit) lapidem Cylindrum, si per spatia terrae prona atque deruta jacias; causam quidem ei, & initium praecipitantiae facis; mox tamen ille praeceps v●lvitur; non quia tu id jam facis; sed quoniam ita se modus ejus & formae volubilitas habet: sic ordo, & ratio Necessitatis Fati genera ipsa, & principia causarum movet; impetus verò consiliorum, mentiumque nostrarum, actionesque ipsas voluntas cujusque propria, & animorum ingenia moderantur. To which we may consarciate the most plausible and promising Respons of a School-man. Voluit Deus homines deliberare, 4. Aquinas. eligere? Deliberant sine ulla vi, & eligunt per voluntatem. Et tamen hoc ipsum, quod electuri fuerunt, vidit ipse ab aeterno: sed vidit, non coegit; scivit, non sanxit; praedixit, non praescripsit. Quid titubant hîc nostri Curiones? Miselli! non alius mihi locus videtur in clariori luce, nisi quod petulca mens ista identidem se scalpit, & exasperate, mala quidem scabie infecta litigandi, & disserendi. Quomodo enim (inquiunt) si Deus praevidit me peccaturum, & non potest falli ista praevisio; non peccem necessariò? Certè non necessariò, pro tua ment: liberâ voluntate hîc interveniente. Nempe hoc praevidit Deus, ut eo modo pecces, quo praevidit: providit autem ut liberè; igitur necessariò liberè peccas. Satin' hoc clarum? sed enim Deus ipse in nobis omnis motus Auctor. Communiter Auctor, fateor: sed non nisi boni Fautor. Ad virtutem accingeris? illo sciente & excitante sit. Ad vitium? Sciente, sinente, & sapienter moderante in bonum finem. But alas! All this is Aer: and Curiosity is no Chamaeleon. Article 12. These acute Responses aequitably audited, & their import found to be no more than this; that man hath a Freedom of Assent, but not of Dissent to the Will of God. For though we extend these ductile Distinctions to the extreme of their capacity, and rack their importance with all the nerves of the strongest reason: yet will they at length be found so far short of attaining so much as to the outside of the remote Mystery, as Impossibility is beyond Difficulty, Infinite beyond Finite, Omniscience beyond Nescience; in a word, as the inscrutable Counsels of Divinity are above the comprehension of narrow, crass, and frail Humanity. Had they said no more than He, who being assaulted with the same consternating Scruple, returned in short; Fata volentem ducunt, Nolentem trahunt: they had contracted (but increased the weight of) their Speculations. For that rich and emphatic Sentence comprehends the substance of all their larger Evasions; and yet for all that the sum there of ariseth to no more than this: Though man hath a power of Nonresistance, yet he hath no power of Resistance; i. e. though man hath such a Liberty, that he may be drawn Not-unwillingly, yet not such as that he may not be drawn Unwillingly; or, more plainly, that man hath a Freedom of Assent, but not of Dissent; for who hath resisted the Will of God? Nor could it have proved any Disparagement, but contrariwise, Article 13. A Dehortation from immoderate Curiosity, in Divine Mysteries: and concise Adhortation to conform unto, and calmly acquiesce in the Revealed Will of God. the highest Honour, to which the circumscribed Intellectuals of dark Mortality have any reason to aspire, here to have confessed a Ne ultra, and humbly acquiesced in a becoming despair of other satisfaction than this: Deus, ab aeterno, Fati syntaxin, causarúmve naturalium seriem subalternatim sic ordinavit, & sanxit; quia sic ordinavit & sanxit, i. e. quia imperscrutabili ejus sapientiae sic visum est. When the Wit of man, wanting the Ballast of Piety, bears too much sail, it cannot escape oversetting: especially when it adventures upon the immense, vertiginous, and bottomless ocean os Providence Divine; where All that is discoverable, is darkness and horror. What greater Prudence did the great Plato ever show, which might consecrate his Memory to the venerable esteem of inferior Ages, then that in his introduction of Socrates, praeparing his Auditors, when He was to dispute about some things which concerned the Attributes of the Divine Nature, with this excellent Alloy, or suppressive of immoderate scrutiny in such reserved mysteries: Aequum est, nos meminisse, & me qui disseram, & vos qui judicabitis, Homines esse; meet it is for us to remember, that both I who am to discourse, and you who are to judge, are but Men. The Arcana of God's Decrees are like the meridian Sun; on which the more we gaze, the less we perceive: and all we can gain by our audacious inspection, will be only Blindness and too late Repentance. When the most Learned and Acute, whose monuments of Perspicacity are the most refulgent Gems in the embroidered coat of Fame, have found their Disquisitions terminated in the sensible Mellifice of Bees, the contexture of Spiders, the spinstry of Silkworms (not to advance to those Giant Problems of the reciprocal Afflux and Reflux of the Sea; the sensible torrent of the Aer from West to East under the Tropics; the Cause of Earthquaks; the motions and distances of Celestial or Quintessential bodies; the Circumference and Diametre of the Globe Terraqueous, and its Libration or suspension upon Nothing; the verticity and Alliciency of the Loadstone; the nature of the Soul, etc.) we say, when the most Eagle-eyed Indagators have found themselves discouraged, and at a loss in these minute Mechanics of Nature: what a distracted Insolency is it for us to Attach those infinitely more inexplorable Abstrusities of the Divine Praeordination, which are too intense for the stronger Optics of Cherubins? What did grave and modest Antiquity design, by their erecting of the statue of that Monster, Sphinx, over the doors of their Temples? only this; by the commination of imminent Destruction, to deter the Curious from prying into the recluse and abscondite Sanctum Sanctorum of the Deity. This the profound Euclid more than glanced at, when, being interrogated by some Philopragmonist (who hoped to confound the Mathematics with the Metaphysics) concerning the Nature and Polity of the Gods, He made this incomparable answer: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; as for other things concerning the Gods, I know nought, but this I know full well, that they detest and abominate the profanely Curious. And this that reverend Father also reflected on, when He said; Vt multò faciliùs invenit syderum Conditorem humilis Pietas, quàm syderum ordinem superba Curiositas; ita firma stabilique fide sciamus omne Dei judicium justum esse, & ubi investigare non poteris quare ita judicaret, sufficiet scire quis judicaret. Since therefore it is impossible for us to make ourselves privy to the Concealed Will of our Creator; all that remains on our part, is to endeavour, with all humility and serenity, to conform and cooperate to his Revealed: assuring ourselves, that He, who is All Wisdom and Goodness, can will nothing but what is Good, nay infinitely better for us, than what our imperfect and deceptible understanding can instruct our Will to desire for ourselves. This was the noblest resolve of the noble Epictetus. Semper magis volo, quod Deus vult, quàm quod Ego: adjungar illi, velut minister & assecla; cum illo appeto, cum illo desidero, & quod Deus vult, volo. And in truth, this is the only true Halcyon, that can calm all the distracting tempests of our Cares; the imperturbed Haven, wherein the Weatherbeaten vessels of our Minds may safely Anchor, and bid defiance to all the impetuous Gusts of Adversity, and Temptations; the Magisterial Elixir of all virtue, and so of all real Delight; nay, Heaven anticipated; and the Term wherein both my Cogitations and Pen shall acquiesce. All Glory be to God on high, on earth Peace, and Good Will towards men. FINIS.