ROGER widdrington's Last REJOINDER TO Mr. THOMAS FITZHERBERTS REPLY CONCERNING THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE, And the POPE'S power to depose PRINCES: Wherein all his arguments, taken from the Laws of God, in the old and new Testament, of Nature, of Nations, from the Canon and Civil Law, and from the Pope's Breves, condemning the Oath, and the cardinals Decree, forbidding two of widdrington's Books are answered: Also many Replies and Instances of Cardinal Bellarmine in his Schulckenius, and of Leonard Lessius in his Singleton are confuted, and divers cunning shifts of Cardinal Peron are discovered. PROVERBS 12. The lip of truth shall be stable for ever; but he that is an hasty witness frameth a tongue of lying. IHS Permissu Superiorum. 1619. ❧ The CONTENTS of this TREATISE. THE Preface to the Reader: wherein it is showed first, how dangerous and pernicious a thing it is, under pretence of zeal to Catholic Religion, and to the Sea Apostolic, to coin, teach, and publish by fraud and violence false articles of Catholic faith, especially in things, which do greatly derogate from the temporal Sovereignty of absolute Princes. Secondly, how exceedingly widdrington's Adversaries do prejudice themselves and their cause, by handling this controversy concerning the Oath of Allegiance, and the Pope's power to depose Princes, in such a fraudulent, uncharitable, and slanderous manner; and in not permitting learned Catholics, to whom the charge of souls is committed, and who ought always to be ready to satisfy every one, that asketh them a reason of their Catholic faith, to try and examine by the true touchstone of Catholic faith, and the undoubted principles of Catholic Religion, whether the faith, which they pretend to be Catholic, be a false and forged Catholic faith, or no: Thirdly, what is widdrington's chief drift in making this Rejoinder, and in continuing still to handle this controversy. CHAP. I. Widdrington freeth himself of two frauds, whereof he is wrongfully accused, and returneth them back again up- his Adversary. Secondly, he discovereth the fraud and falsehood of his adversaries reasons, which he yieldeth for the supposition of his Discourse, and that therein he contradicteth his own grounds. Thirdly, he plainly showeth, that he hath answered probably, and like a good Catholic. CHAP II. widdrington's answer to an argument of his Adversary, taken from the rule of the law, [The accessary followeth the principal,] is confirmed. Secondly, Two Instances which he brought against that rule, are proved to be sound and sufficient. Thirdly, that place of S. Paul, 1. Cor. 6. If you have Secular judgements, etc. is at large examined. CHAP. III. widdrington's answer to Fa. Lessius argument taken from that maxim, [He that can do the greater, can do the less,] is confirmed. Secondly, the four Instances, which he brought to confute the said argument and maxim, are examined, and proved to be neither frivolous nor impertinent, but sound, sufficient, and to the purpose. Thirdly, Cardinal Bellarmine's example touching the translation of the Roman Empire, and the argument which D. Schulckenius bringeth to confirm the same, with two other examples of Clodoveus King of France, and of Boleslaus King of Polony, are confuted. CHAP. FOUR widdrington's interpretation of that clause of the Oath, wherein the doctrine [that Princes who are excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed, or murdered by their subjects, or any other whatsoever,] is abjured as impious and heretical, is proved to be sound and sufficient, and is cleared from all absurdity and contradiction, even by M. Fitzherbert's own examples, and that it may without perjury be sworn by any Catholic. CHAP. V. widdrington's answers to all M. fitzherbert's arguments, taken from the law of God, both in the old and new Testament, are proved to be truly probable and sincere, and no way fraudulent, or contrary to his own doctrine. SEC. 1. First, all the authorities, which are brought out of the old law, are confuted in general, by the doctrine of Cardinal Bellarmine and other learned Divines. Secondly, the arguments taken from that place of Deuteron. 17. Si difficile & ambiguum, etc. and the examples of Eleazar and joshua, and from the difference of the sacrifices to be offered for Priests and Princes, together with the testimonies of Philo, Theodoret, and Procopius, are answered in particular. SEC. 2. All M. fitzherbert's arguments taken from the old law, since the institution of Kings, are at large examined: and first his argument, taken from the authority of Priests and Prophets, to create, anoint, chastise and depose Kings, is disproved. Secondly, widdrington's answers to the examples of Queen Athalia, deposed by joiada the high Priest, and of King Ozias deposed by Azarias the high Priest, are confirmed, and whatsoever D. Schulckenius objecteth against the said answers is related, and answered. Thirdly, it is showed, that the authority of S. chrysostom brought by M. Fitzherbert to confirm the example of King Ozias, maketh nothing for him, but against him, and that in urging this authority he dealeth fraudulenty, perverteth Saint Chrysostom's meaning, and also contradicteth Card. Bellarmine. SEC. 3. All M. fitzherbert's arguments taken from the new Testament, are examined: and first, his comparison between the old law, and the new, the figure and the verity is proved to make against himself. Secondly, those words of our Saviour, Whatsoever thou shalt lose, etc. and Feed my sheep, are declared, and the arguments drawn from thence, and from the nature of a well instituted Commonwealth are satisfied; and Doctor Schulckenius Reply is proved to be fraudulent and insufficient. Thirdly, the authority of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 10. affirming, that he and the rest were ready to revenge all disobedience, is answered: M. fitzherbert's fraud in alleging the authority of S. Augustine is plainly discovered, and the Conclusion of his Chapter showed to be false and fraudulent. CHAP. VI M. fitzherbert's arguments taken from the law of Nature are confuted: and first it is showed, in what manner temporal things are by the law of Nature subordinate to spiritual, and the temporal Commonwealth to the Church of Christ. Secondly, that Religious Priests cannot by the law of Nature punish temporal Princes temporally; and that in the law of Nature the civil society was supreme, and disposed of all things, as well concerning religion, as State, and that therefore the new Oath, denying the Pope's power to depose Princes, is not repugnant to the law of Nature. Thirdly, the difference betwixt the directive and coercive power, and how temporal things become spiritual, is declared, and from thence proved, that the Church may command, but not inflict temporal punishments; and divers Replies of M. Fitzherbert and D. Schulckenius are confuted. CHAP. VII. 1. Certain places of the old and new Testament are explained: 2. D. Schulckenius Reply to the answer Widdrington made to those words, Whatsoever thou shalt lose, etc. and thirdly, Cardinal Bellarmine's second reason, and Fa. Parson's answer to the Earl of Salisbury grounded thereon; and four other arguments brought by M. Fitzherbert, from the examples of Ananias and Saphyra, and of others, and from the practice of the Church, and the person of man, are clearly confuted. CHAP. VIII. M. fitzherbert's arguments taken from the law of Nations and the Civil law are answered: and first the difference betwixt the Priests of the old and new Testament, and the Priests of other Nations, and also betwixt the law of Nations and of Nature, is declared. Secondly, from thence it is proved, that among all Nations the civil commonwealth was supreme, and disposed of all things both spiritual and temporal, and punished all persons both Priests and others with temporal punishments, and consequently that the new Oath cannot be impugned by the law of Nations. Thirdly, what M. Fitzherbert objecteth from the Civil Law, is confuted. CHAP IX. First, the difficulties which some make concerning the authority of the Lateran Council are propounded. Secondly, the decree of the Council, which is commonly urged to prove the Pope's power to depose Princes, is related. Thirdly, widdrington's first answer to the said decree is proved to be sound and sufficient, and M. fitzherbert's replies against the same are confuted. CHAP. X. widdrington's second answer to the decree of the Lateran Council (affirming that absolute Princes are not comprehended therein, because they are not mentioned by their proper names, but by inferior titles) is proved to be neither improbable nor absurd, but conform to the doctrine of learned Divines and Lawyers; and M. fitzherbert's exceptions against the said answer are showed to be very insufficient and fraudulent. CHAP. XI. widdrington's first answer to an objection propounded by himself is proved to be sufficient, and that the consent of temporal Princes is necessary to the validity of Ecclesiastical constitutions, which inflict temporal punishments, and consequently are not made by true spiritual authority. Secondly, the doctrine of the Lord Cardinal Peron, in his speech to the Lower house of Parliament against the Oath propounded by them, is examined. Thirdly, M. fitzherbert's objections grounded upon the decrees of Pope Callixtus, Vrbanus, the Council of Eliberis in Spain, and the constitution of the Apostles are clearly confuted. CHAP. XII. another answer of Widdrington grounded upon certain Glossers, or Expositors of the Canon Law is confirmed, and M. fitzherbert's exceptions against the same are proved to be fraudulent and insufficient. Secondly, it is showed, that from no Canon of the Church it can be proved, that the custom of the Church is, or hath been to inflict by her spiritual authority temporal penalties. Thirdly, the true difference betwixt the Divines and Canonists, concerning the Pope's power in temporals is declared. CHAP. XIII. widdrington's third answer to the decree of the Lateran Council is confirmed. Secondly, it is showed, how certain it is, according to the doctrine of learned Catholics, that the Church cannot err in decrees or precepts of manners; from whence it is clearly deduced, that from the Decree, or rather Act of the Lateran Council it cannot with any colour of probability be proved, that it is a point of faith, that the Pope hath authority to depose temporal Princes. thirdly, all M. fitzherbert's arguments to show the contrary, are most plainly confuted. CHAP. XIIII. Three Instances grounded upon three examples of Pope's Decrees and sentences brought by Widdrington, to confute three arguments of Fa. Lessius, whereby he laboureth in vain to demonstrate, that the foundations of the Decrees and sentences of Popes and councils, must be certain and of faith, are proved to be sound and sufficient. Secondly, the first example brought by Widdrington is confirmed, and M. fitzherbert's exceptions against the same are confuted, and he himself in setting down widdrington's. Instances, and applying them to the decree of the Lateran Council, is convinced of manifest fraud and falsehood. Thirdly, that proposition, Many things may be certain to the Sea Apostolic, and yet seem uncertain to other learned men, is examined. CHAP. XV. widdrington's second example and his Instances grounded thereon, are confirmed, and M. Fitzherbert in impugning the same is convinced of manifest fraud and ignorance, in taxing therein of fondness the learnedst Divines of his own Society. Also widdrington's third example, and his Instances grounded thereon, are proved to be sound and sufficient, and M. fitzherbert's fraud in relating the said Instances, and applying them to the Lateran Council, is plainly discovered. CHAP. XVI. Another argument, or rather answer of Widdrington is confirmed, and M. Fitzherbert in labouring to prove that Widdrington by his own grant is fallen into heresy or error, is convinced of palpable ignorance. The Conclusion of all widdrington's discourse in his Preface to his Apologetical answer, is confirmed; and what M. Fitzherbert excepteth against the same, and also his brief Recapitulation of all his Discourse in this his Treatise, are confuted. CHAP. XVII. M. Fitzherbert's uncharitable Admonition to the Catholic Reader, that Widdrington is no other than an heretic, disguised and masked under the vizard of a Catholic, and that his submission to the Catholic Roman Church, proceedeth from no other ground, but from a deep dissimulation, or rather artificial and execrable hypocrisy to delude and deceive Catholics, is clearly confuted, and proved to be void of charity, learning, and sincerity: and what reasons the King and State may have to permit such submissions, is there declared. widdrington's answer to the Pope's Breves, forbidding the Oath, is confirmed, and he freed from all disobedience and irreverence for not admitting them. The decree of the Cardinals forbidding two of widdrington's Books, and commanding him to purge himself forthwith, is fully answered by his Purgation, and humble Supplication, which he made forthwith to his Holiness. THE PREFACE TO THE READER. HOw dangerous and pernicious a thing it is (dear countrymen) in any temporal Kingdom or Commonwealth to coin, or willingly to utter, and much more by fraud or violence to force the people to accept of counterfeit money, any man of mean understanding may easily perceive. And truly no less dangerous and pernicious is it in the spiritual Kingdom and Church of Christ, 1 Tim. 3. which is the pillar and firmament of truth, to invent, forge, or divulge, and which is far worse, to thrust upon the faithful by fraud and violence false articles and positions for true and infallible Catholic faith, but especially in things which are greatly prejudicial to the temporal Sovereignty of Christian Princes, whom Christ our Saviour, hath appointed to be nursing Fathers and Protectors of his Church: Isay 19 Concil. Trid. sess. 25. cap. 20. de Reform. for that thereby not only Christian Princes are extremely wronged, but also the Christian Religion is greatly scandalised, and the souls both of Princes and subjects are much endangered: and therefore no less thanks do they deserve at the hands of the Church of God, who should discover a false and forged Catholic faith, and the first inventors or publishers thereof, then do they at the hands of the temporal Kingdom, who should disclose false and counterfeit money, and the first coiners or utterers of the same. 2 And this is the very case between me and my Adversaries in this controversy concerning the Pope's pretended authority to depose temporal Princes, and to dispose of all their temporals. For I accuse them, and also in my judgement clearly convince them, that they have, if not coined and forged, yet at leastwise not only taught and divulged, and, which is worse, endeavoured by fraud and violence to thrust upon Catholics a false and forged Catholic faith, but also that they have wrongfully defamed and slandered those Catholics, and myself in particular, who do plainly discover their falsehoods, and that they seek both by deceitful and violent means to hinder aswell the learned as the unlearned people, that they shall not by the true touchstone and undoubted rules of the Catholic faith, & by reading those books which do exactly and sincerely debate this question, examine in what a fraudulent manner they seek to colour this their false and newly forged Catholic faith: wherein they do most egregiously abuse all Christian Princes and people, most exceedingly scandalise Catholic Religion, and as much as lieth in them, they make the Sea Apostolic odious and dreadful both to Princes and people, and give occasion of perpetual discord betwixt the Kingdom and the Priesthood, whereby they prepare the way to Antichrist, and lay open a wide gap to Schism, heresy, Atheism, and infidelity. 3 For if under the pretence of advancing the Pope's authority in so great prejudice of Regal Sovereignty, we once forsake the ancient and approved rules, by which as by an assured touchstone the true Christian and Catholic faith, hath always been discerned from the false and counterfeit, what undoubted grounds, shall we have to build our Catholic faith upon, which c In the Creed of S. Athanasius. unless every one shall keep entire, and inviolate, without doubt he shall perish eternally? If Christian Princes & people once perceive, that the supreme Pastors of God's Church do both permit and applaud some learned men, who are otherwise potent in the Court of Rome, to impose by fraud and violence upon the Church of Christ, in favour of that authority which they pretend to have over all temporals, a false and forged Catholic faith for true, and to disgrace and slander all those who shall detect their forgeries, why may not the said Princes and people justly suspect, as Fa. Lessius argueth d In his Singleton part. 3. num. 74. , that the Catholic faith and Religion is for a great part thereof a mere invention of men, devised of set purpose by Popes, Bishops, and Clergy men in policy, that they may more securely domineer, and under a show of piety and Religion, dispose of all temporals at their pleasure? And therefore how much these men are to answer at the day of judgement, for so greatly wronging Christian Princes, for so mightily scandalising Catholic Religion, for so much endangering the souls of all sorts of people, and for so unjustly oppressing and slandering innocent and zealous Catholics, who do plainly discover their fraud and falsehoods, I cannot but tremble, when I seriously consider the same. 4. And if perhaps my adversaries will in their own defence allege, that one may be excused from all fault before God and man, who in zeal should teach any doctrine to be Catholic, which he sincerely in his conscience thinketh to be truly Catholic, albeit perchance in very deed it is not so; as also he that uttereth counterfeit money not knowing it to be counterfeit, but sincerely thinking that it is good and lawful coin, is not to be condemned before God or man: I answer, that all things done in zeal are not free from sin, when the zeal is blind, and grounded upon an erroneous conscience, and culpable ignorance: Otherwise we might excuse from all fault the jews, for crucifying our Saviour, and putting to death his Disciples, Luke 23. for that they did it through ignorance, and thought thereby to do service to God; john 16. and S. Paul for blaspheming and persecuting the Christians, before his conversion, Acts 1. because he did it being ignorant in incredulity. 5 And therefore first I wish them to remember that admonition, Bell. lib 2. de gemitu columbae cap 9 which Cardinal Bellarmine my chiefest Adversary giveth to the Pastors and Prelates of the Church upon occasion of relating the fearful death of Pope Innocent the third, who greatly busied himself with the deposing of temporal Princes, and with the disposing of temporal kingdoms, whereby great wars, and much effusion of innocent blood, were caused in the Church of God (which perchance was one of the three causes for which the said Pope, as Cardinal Bellarmine rehearseth, had been damned eternally, if he had not repent at the hour of his death.) For first he deposed Philip, and set up Otho, Matth. Paris in vita joannis ad annum. 1210. Page 220. than he deposed Otho, for seeking to recover certain towns and forts belonging to the Empire, which the said Pope in the time of frederic's minority had taken into his own possession: afterward he sought to thrust out of Italy the said Fredrick the second, Blondus decad. 2. l b. 6. Abbas Vrsperg. ad annum 1212. who before at Aquisgrave was crowned Emperor by the said Pope Innocent his authority. I omit now to relate how here in England he carried himself, first in taking part with the Barons, and deposing King john, Matth Paris in vita joannis ad annum. 1212. pag. 223. And Stow in the life of King john. and (which neither Car. Bellarmine, nor Suarez dare justify, who will not admit that the Pope may lawfully depose a King, and give his Kingdom from the next heir; who is free from all fault, to another) in giving the Kingdom to the King of France, and his posterity for ever, whereby he deprived the next lawful heir Henry the 3. being a child, of his right, without any fault committed by him: But after the Pope's Legate had cunningly persuaded King john, to resign up his Crown and Kingdom to the Pope, than he took King john's part against the King of France, and the Barons, and commanded them not molest him, for that he was now become the Pope's Vassal. But mark, I pray you, what Card. Bellarmine writeth of this Pope Innocent. 6 About this time, saith he, Surius ad 16. Junii. relating Surius words in the life of S. Ludgard, Pope Innocent the third, after the celebrating of the Lateran Council, departed this life, and forthwith he appeared visibly to Ludgard. But she seeing him compassed about with a great flame of fire, demanded who he was: He answered, that he was Pope Innocent: And what is this, saith she with a pitiful groan, that the common Father of us all is so cruelly tormented? He answered, For three causes am I so tormented, which also had most justly adjudged me to everlasting torments, if by the intercession of the most pious Mother of God, to whom I built a Monastery, I had not repent at the last hour. And truly I have escaped eternal death, but I shall be tormented with most grievous punishments until the day of judgement: But the Mother of mercy obtained for me of her Son, that I might come to thee to desire prayers: which when he had said, he presently vanished away. And Ludgard told his necessities to her Sisters, that they might relieve him: but she greatly pitying his case did afflict herself for his cause, with wonderful punishment. Let the Reader know, saith Thomas Cantipratensis the writer of her life, (from whom Surius took the same) that those three causes are, by the revealing of Ludgard, not unknown to us, but for the reverence of so great a Pope, we would not relate them. 7 Which example, saith Card. Bellarmine, is wont oftentimes to terrify me exceedingly, and to cause me to tremble. For if so commendable a Pope, and who in the eyes of men was accounted not only honest and prudent, but also a Saint, and worthy to be imitated, did scape so narrowly hell fire, and is to be punished until the day of judgement, with the most grievous fire of Purgatory, what Prelate would not tremble? who would not examine most exactly the secrets of his conscience? For I do easily persuade myself, that so great a Pope could not commit deadly sins, but being deceived under the show of good, by flatterrs, and those of his own household, of whom it is said in the Gospel, Matth. 10 A man's enemies are they of his own household. Therefore let us all learn by this so great an example, to examine carefully our conscience, lest perchance it be erroneous, albeit to us it seem to be right and sound. Thus Cardinal Bellarmine, whose counsel in this point, I think it necessary, that all my Adversaries with Cardinal Bellarmine the chiefest of them, and myself should duly consider, lest that the zeal, which all of us pretend to have, be blind, and not according to knowledge, and that our conscience, albeit to us it seem to be right and sound, be erroneous, and grounded upon culpable ignorance. For my own part, I have examined my conscience very carefully, and cannot find myself guilty of any fault, for examining this controversy touching the lawfulness of the Oath, and the Pope's power to depose Princes, and that I was not moved thereunto for fear, flattery, hope of gain, or any other worldly respect, but truly and sincerely, God is my witness, for the love, I bear to God, Religion, my Prince and Country, to find out the Catholic truth, and being found, to embrace, profess, and follow it, and thereby according to our saviours commandment, to render to God and Caesar that obedience, which doth belong to them. 8 Secondly, therefore I wish my Adversaries to consider, what may in the judgement of any prudent man, be thought of those men, who by fraud or violence should seek to force upon any one a great sum of gold, which he greatly suspecteth to be false and counterfeit, and therefore refuseth to accept thereof, before he hath fully tried whether it be true or forged coin: and whether any fault be to be found in him, both for desiring to have the gold examined by the touchstone, and those ways by which true gold is discerned from counterfeit, before he be compelled to take it for good and currant; and also for giving his reasons why he thinketh the same to be false and forged: And if they will not suffer him to make trial, whether it be good or no, but will needs have him to take it for good gold, when not only himself, but also divers other skilful goldsmiths do greatly suspect, yea and are fully persuaded, that it is nought and counterfeit, and if he refuse to accept thereof in that manner, they should seek to disgrace him with the Prince and people, and to accuse him of disobedience to the State, and who wilfully refuseth to accept and acknowledge the King's coin for lawful, whether these men do not great wrong to that party, and whether it may not be prudently thought, that they have a guilty conscience, and that they themselves suspect the said gold, not to be indeed so good and currant, as in words they would pretend. 9 Now the case between me and my Adversaries is far worse than this. For they have sought by false and fraudulent means, not only to impose upon the whole Christian world, a false and counterfeit Catholic faith, for truly Catholic, but to slander and defame all those Catholics, and myself in particular, who, for the reasons we have often propounded, refuse to accept thereof for Catholic, until it be better proved so to be, and to condemn us of temerity, and disobedience to the Sea Apostolic, yea and of flat heresy; and they would make the world believe, that we are not true Catholics, but heretics disguised and masked under the vizard of Catholics. For so saith M. Fitzherbert c. 17. nu. 19 And albeit we do publicly profess ourselves to be true Catholics, and do submit all our writings to the judgement and censure of the Catholic Roman Church, and do sincerely and solemnly protest to recall and recant forthwith our error, if we have committed any, as soon as it shall be made known unto us, that we have written any thing amiss, yet they fear not to affirm, contrary to all justice and charity, that all this our profession, submission, and protestation, is but a false lustre and gloss, So saith Fitzherbert c. 17 nu. 1. & 26. to cast upon our counterfeit ware of purpose to deceive, and that it proceedeth from no other ground, but from a deep dissimulation, or rather an artificial and execrable hypocrisy to delude and deceive Catholics. 10 Neither will they suffer us to examine by the true grounds of Catholic Religion their newly invented Catholic faith, and to yield our reasons, which do fully persuade us, that their faith, which they pretend to be Catholic, is not ancient and true, but a newly invented, and a false and forged Catholic faith, but they have caused his Holiness to condemn our books, which in our judgement do plainly discover their forgeries, and to forbid all Catholics, as well learned as unlearned to read them, without signifying unto us any one thing in particular which we have written amiss, although we have often and earnestly requested to know the same: but all that they say or write, we must, forsooth, without any further examination approve for good and currant doctrine, albeit we have most plainly convinced them of manifest fraud and falsehood, in almost every one of their arguments and answers, which they have brought to prove their doctrine, in this point of the Pope's spiritual authority to depose Princes, and to inflict temporal punishments, to be truly Catholic. All which being duly considered, what infinite wrong they have done us, it is too too manifest, and albeit they pretend true zeal to Catholic Religion, and to the Sea Apostolic, yet for my own part I cannot see, but that any prudent man may justly suppose their zeal to be blind, and not according to knowledge, but grounded upon culpable or wilful ignorance, and that they themselves suspect their own conscience to be eroneous, and their cause to be nought, and therefore would not have it to be further sifted and examined. 11 For seeing that the nature of truth, being like to pure and perfect gold, is such, that the more it is examined, the more clear and perspicuous it doth still appear, and contrariwise falsehood the more it is sifted, the absurdity thereof still showeth itself more manifest; if my Adversaries are in their consciences persuaded, as in words they profess, that they have truth on their side, and that the authority of spiritual Pastors to excommunicate upon just cause Christian Princes, to bind and lose, and to dispense in Oaths in general, which all Catholics acknowledge to be included in their spiritual power, be denied in the late Oath of allegiance, as they pretend, or that their authority to depose Princes, which all men confess to be denied in the Oath, be certain, out of controversy, and a clear point of Catholic faith (for which two causes chief they cry out against the Oath, and condemn it for unlawful, as containing in it more than temporal allegiance, to wit, a manifest denial of Ecclesiastical authority,) why are they so much afraid to have the matter charitably and sincerely debated by learned men? Why will they not suffer those Catholics, especially who are learned, and to whom the charge of souls is committed, and are able to discern betwixt truth and falsehood, betwixt Catholic faith and opinion, 1. Pet. 3. and who ought to be always ready and prepared, to satisfy every one that asketh them a reason of that faith which is in them, to read such books as do sincerely and exactly handle this controversy, and all the difficulties on both sides, and do plainly declare, in what particular manner all Christians are bound by the law of Christ, according to the true and approved grounds of Catholic Religion, Matth. 22. to render to God and Caesar that which is their due? 12 Why do they so shamefully abuse his Holiness, by misinforming him, that his power to excommunicate, to bind and lose, and to absolve from Oaths in general, is denied in the Oath, and that his power to depose Princes, which indeed the Oath denieth, is a point of faith, and thereupon by urging him to condemn the Oath, as containing in it many things flat contrary to faith and salvation, and to forbid those books of Catholic Writers, that do plainly discover their forgeries, and evidently convince, that no such spiritual power, as they pretend, is denied in the Oath, and that his power to depose Princes, which the Oath denieth, is not a point of faith, but hath ever since the time of Pope Gregory the seventh (for before his age the practice thereof was not heard of, Onuphrius. l. 4. de varia create. Romani Pont. as Onuphrius witnesseth) it hath ever been a great controversy betwixt Popes, and Christian Princes, and those Catholics who have favoured either part: and, which is more extravagant, by urging him to command under pain of Censures the Author of those books to purge himself forthwith, and yet not to signify unto him any one crime either in general, or in particular of which he should purge himself, although he hath very often most humbly and instantly requested to know the same? 13 Why doth not Cardinal Bellarmine, my chiefest Adversary, being accused by me to his Holiness, in public writings of manifest frauds, falsehoods, corruptions, and calumnies, clear himself all this time of such fowl imputations, which cannot but greatly blemish his honour, and quite discredit his cause in the understanding of any judicious man? if in his conscience he think himself to be guiltless, and that I have falsely accused him, why doth he not answer and justify himself, and show to the world that I have belied him, that also thereby I may see my error, and ask him public forgiveness, and be penitent for the same? If he see that I am innocent, why doth he not restore my credit, which he hath wrongfully taken away, and in plain terms confess, that he was deceived and mistaken in this controversy, and imitating the example of famous Saint Augustine, retract all that he hath written amiss, especially to the hurt and disgrace of innocent men? Can any man of judgement imagine, that he being now so near his grave, would take such pains to write every year some one or other little Treatise of devotion (which nevertheless will not excuse him before God, from restoring the good name of them whom he hath falsely defamed) and that he would be so careless to purge himself of such shameless crimes, which cannot but leave his memory tainted with perpetual infamy, if with his credit he could clear himself? And therefore, if he did sincerely consider the admonition he gave to other Prelates, upon occasion of Pope Innocents' examples, to examine their conscience carefully, whether it be sound or erroneous, he might truly have just cause to be sore afraid, and greatly to suspect, that howsoever he maketh an outward show of zeal, sanctity, and devotion, he hath within an erroneous and seared conscience, for which he must shortly, before the tribunal of God render a strict account. 14 All which their proceed being duly considered, whether they are not manifest signs, that in their own consciences they suspect the justice of their cause, and do plainly see, that they are not able to make good their newly invented Catholic faith, and yet will still go on to maintain by fraud and violence, what they cannot by reason and argument, wherein also how much they discredit themselves & their cause, how mightily they scandalise Catholic Religion, and make the Sea Apostolic odious to Princes and subjects, how egregiously they wrong and slander innocent Catholics, and how greatly they endanger their own souls and others, I leave to the judgement of any prudent and pious man. 15 Wherefore my chief drift, good Reader, in this my answer to M. Fitzherbert is first, to keep and maintain entire and inviolate the purity of true Catholic faith and Religion, which is greatly defiled, not only by impugning true and undoubted articles of faith, but also by forging and defending false articles for true. Secondly, to defend my innocency (which as long as I have a pen to write, or a tongue to speak, I will, God willing, not be afraid to maintain against any man whatsoever, that shall falsely accuse me and my doctrine of heresy) and to make known my sincere proceeding in handling this great and dangerous controversy, which concerneth our obedience due to God and Caesar, and the fraudulent and corrupt dealing of my Adversaries, who by fraud and violence seek to afflict, entangle, and disturb the consciences of scrupulous and unlearned Catholics, and to nourish in their hearts such dangerous speculations, which without manifest treason can never be put in practice. Thirdly, to make manifest to all men that the doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes is not certain, unquestionable, and a point of faith, but very doubtful, uncertain, and at the most only probable: and consequently, that it cannot be practised by the Pope, or any other whatsoever, without manifest injury to the Prince, who is in lawful possession of his Kingdom, of which the Pope under pretence only of a probable power or title seeketh by his sentence to deprive him; for that according to the approved rule of the law, and grounded upon natural reason, In causa dubia, De regulis juris in 6. & ff. de regulis juris regula, In pari causa. sive incerta melior & potior est conditio possidentis. In a doubtful or disputable case the condition of the possessor is to be preferred. And therefore, as well observeth Fa. Lessius in his Singleton a Par. 2. nu. 38. , potestas, quae non omnino certa, sed probabilis, non potest esse fundamentum, etc. A power, which is not altogether certain, but probable, cannot be a ground or foundation, whereby immediately one may be punished, and be deprived of his right and dominion, but such a power must be most certain, and not doubtful, or disputable, etc. 16 So that there is a great difference to be made, for as much as concerneth practise, betwixt a power only probable, which tendeth to favour, and is hurtful to none, and which is penal and prejudicial to a third person, who is deprived thereby of some thing which he lawfully possesseth. For it is most certain, and approved by all Divines, that one may practise a probable power, to use Lessius words, Quando agitur de favore & beneficio, & nemo cogitur, nemo iure propinquo seu in re obtento spoliatur, sed potestas quae non omnino certa sed probabilis, non potest esse fundamentum, etc. When it is treated of a favour and benefit, and no man is forced, or compelled, no man is spoiled of his next right, or which he possesseth indeed, but a power which is not altogether certain, but probable, cannot be a ground or foundation, whereby immediately one may be punished, or deprived of his right and dominion, etc. And for this cause my Adversaries, knowing right well that if they should once admit that this power of the Pope is only probable, they must con-consequently grant, that it is merus titulus sine re, and can never be lawfully put in practice by any Pope, Prince, or subject whatsoever, have so much laboured to convince out of all laws human and divine, that this power is not only probable, but most certain, and a clear point of faith. But how shamefully they have spent their labour in vain, and what frivolous and fallacious arguments they have brought under pretence of spiritual good, to make Sovereign Princes (whom all the ancient Fathers with uniform consent acknowledge to be supreme on earth, and next under God in temporals) to be in temporals subject to the Pope, and that the more they strive to make their doctrine in this point to be certain, and of faith, the more they show it still to be less probable, and to be invented and maintained only in favour of the Pope without sufficient grounds, thou shalt see it, good Reader, in this Treatise made as clear and manifest, as the light at noonday. 17 Only I must desire thy patience and pardon, for my often repeating the self same things, which may seem to some to be both superfluous and tedious, but to me for satisfaction chief of the unlearned Reader, it seemed very necessary, especially, for that the chief state of the controversy depends thereon, and yet my Adversaries will scarce take notice thereof, yea, and are not ashamed to affirm, that I do not teach any such things, although they have been by me very often inculcated. As among other things, for example sake, albeit I have in all my books so often repeated that distinction betwixt the directive and coercive power, betwixt commanding, enjoining, or imposing, and inflicting, punishing, or disposing, and that I do so often and so expressly affirm, that spiritual Pastors have by the institution of Christ authority to command, enjoin, and impose temporal and coporall penalties, but to inflict them, to punish temporally, and to dispose of temporal things, only by the consent and grant of temporal Princes, Page 258. yet Cardinal Bellarmine in his Schulckenius is not ashamed to aver, that Widdrington denieth the Pope to have authority to command temporal Princes in temporals in order to spiritual good, and thereupon taxeth him of teaching flat heresy; and the most that M. Fitzherbert proveth in this his Reply, is, as you shall see, that spiritual Pastors may, for the necessity of the Church, and the good of souls, command, enjoin, and impose temporal and corporal afflictions, as fasting, alms deeds, using of haircloth, and the like, whereof no Catholic maketh doubt: And therefore I thought it necessary to inculcate, as often as occasion should require the aforesaid distinction, it being the main mark to which the greatest part of all my adversaries arguments, and of my answers do principally tend, and whereon the whole state of the Controversy betwixt me and them, concerning the Pope's power to depose Princes, and to dispose of all temporals, doth chief depend. CHAP. I. Wherein Widdrington freeth himself from two frauds, whereof he is wrongfully accused, and returneth them back upon his Adversary; secondly he discovereth the fraud, and falsehood of his adversaries reasons, which he yieldeth for the supposition of his Discourse, and that therein he contradicteth his own grounds; and thirdly he plainly showeth, that he hath answered probably, and like a good Catholic. 1. THere be three things (Good Reader) which my Adversary Mr. Fitzherbert in the first chapter of his Reply doth wrongfully lay to my charge. The first is, that I have lamely, and fraudulently set down the sum and substance of his discourse in the two first Chapters of his Supplement; the second, that in relating a supposition of his, I have used two frauds, the one in the relation of his words, and the other in the use and application of them: the third is, that I have neither answered probably, nor like a good Catholic. And because the Reader may the better judge of the sufficiency, and truth of both our answers, (for my only desire is that the truth in this difficult controversy may be clearly known) I will observe the same method, order, and number of Chapters, which he doth; and therefore my answer to his first accusation, for that he remitteth his Reader for proof thereof to his fift, sixth, and seventh Chapters, I will also refer to those places, and only his two accusations I will examine with him in this Chapter. 2 To begin therefore with his second accusation, whereas in the beginning of my answer to the substance of M. fitzherbert's discourse, I affirmed, a Dis●●●●ol. in 〈…〉 ●ect 〈◊〉 that first of all he supposeth, that the Pope's power to excommunicate and depose Princes, (if they deserve it, and the good of the Church, and the salvation of souls do necessarily require it) is denied in this oath, whereupon he concludeth afterwards, that although the oath doth not expressly affirm, that the King's Majesty is supreme head of the English Church nor in plain words deny the Pope so to be; yet it supposeth, and implieth both the one, and the other, and thereupon denieth the Pope's authority to excommunicate and depose a temporal Prince: and howsoever the matter may be otherwise coloured, it is evident, that the true reason, why the said authority of the Pope is impugned by the oath, is no other, but because the King's Majesty is held to be no way subject to the Pope, yea and to be himself supreme head of the Church of God in England. This being presupposed, he goeth about to prove, that this oath is repugnant to the law of God, of Nature of Nations, Canon, and Civil, etc. 3 Now Mr. Fitzherbert doth boldly, but untruly affirm, that I have used herein two frauds, the one in the relation of his words, the other in the use and application of them. For albeit, saith he, b Chap. 1. nu. 7 Widdrington allegeth them truly, and doth not falsify my text, yet he relateth them in such sort, that his Reader must needs conceive, that I lay them down in the very beginning of my Discourse for the only foundation, and ground of all my building; and therefore as soon as he hath cited them, he saith, hoc posito probare contendit, etc. this being supposed, he laboureth to prove, that this oath is repugnant to the Divine, and Natural law, to the law of Nations, Civil, and Canon. So he, and then he proceedeth to the abridgement of all my Discourse, beginning with the law of God in the old Testament, and so goeth on with the rest, and impugneth my supposition, as the only foundation of all my Discourse and arguments. 4. But the truth is, he findeth those words of mine in the 66. page of my Supplement, (as it may appear by his own quotation thereof) after I have discoursed of the law of God in the old, and new Testament, and of the laws of Nature, and Nations, and of the Civil law, in the conclusion whereof I have those words, referring them to the Civil law only: for having proved, that the said law confirmeth and establisheth the Pope's supremacy, I inferred, that it cannot favour, and much less enjoin, and justify the oath for two reasons; the one, because the said oath is in part grounded upon the belief, that the King's Majesty is supreme head of the Church of God in England, and no way subject to the Pope (which is repugnant to the Civil law) and the other, because the Civil law acknowledging the subjection of temporal Princes to the Pope in matters belonging to their souls, and to the good of the Church, doth by a necessary consequent acknowledge, that they may be punished by him temporally in their persons and states, where the good of souls and the service of God doth require it, according to the rule of the law, Accossorium sequitur principal, the accessory followeth the principal. Then, I say, I argued in the place, which he citeth, and I remitted my Reader for the confirmation of this second reason to a more ample Discourse thereof before in the same chapter. c Nurse 66. & 56. Now than it appeareth (as I have said) that he hath dealt fraudulently with me two ways, the one in referring my supposition to all the laws, whereof I treated, whereas I referred the same expressly, and only to the Civil law: the other, etc. Thus Mr. Fitzherbert. 5 But truly I cannot but wonder, that this my Adversary should at the very first beginning of his Reply be so inconsiderate, as in wrongfully accusing me of fraud, to deal so untruly and fraudulently himself, which could not but greatly impair his credit with the ●udicious Reader, and cause him to be jealous of his sincerity in the rest of his Replies, when at the very first entrance he should find in him such fraudulent proceeding. For that which I affirmed is very true, and I marvel, that Mr. Fitzherbert doth not blush to deny the same, to wit, that he did first of all, that is, at the very first beginning of his Discourse in the sixth page of his Supplement, before he began to prove the oath to be repugnant to any law Divine, or human, suppose that the Pope's power to excommunicate and depose Princes (if they deserve it, and the good of the Church, and the salvation of souls do necessarily require it) is denied in this oath. For these be his express words in the sixth page, and ninth number of his Supplement. 6 Therefore I think good to let him understand here, that my meaning is not to contradict any article of the oath, that concerneth merely Civil obedience to our Sovereign, but such clauses only, as do either directly, or indirectly prejudice the authority of our spiritual supreme Pastor, and namely those which do exempt temporal Princes from excommunication and deposition by the Pope, when just occasion shall be given by them, and the necessity of the Church, and the good of souls require it: to which purpose I will prove (mark well these words) that this new oath in respect of such clauses is repugnant to all laws human, and Divine, and therefore justly condemned by his Holiness, and refused by Catholics. First then I will speak of the law of God, etc. So he. 7 Wherefore it is apparent, that Mr. Fitzherbert in the very beginning of his Discourse referreth his aforesaid supposition to all laws both human, and Divine, and yet now to tax me of fraud, he doth not blush to say, that I have dealt fraudulently with him in referring his aforesaid supposition to all the laws whereof he treateth, whereas, saith he, he referred the same expressly and only to the Civil law: Which error of his I would not willingly have construed in the worse sense but attribute it only to his oblivion, and forgetfulness of what he himself had written in the beginning of his Discourse, and not to any fraud in him, but that my words which he himself doth relate, are so plain, that he cannot be excused either from manifest fraud, or from so palpable an error, which no man of understanding can scarcely commit. For mark my words, which he himself setteth down. First of all he [M. Fitz.] supposeth that the Pope's power to excommunicate, and depose Princes, is denied in this oath; whereupon afterwards (to wit, in the 66. page, as it is evident by my quotation) he concludeth, that although the oath doth not expressly affirm, that the King's Majesty is supreme head of the English Church, nor in plain words deny the Pope so to be, yet it supposeth, and implieth both the one, and the other, and thereupon denieth the Pope's authority to excommunicate and depose a temporal Prince, etc. 8 Now who seethe not, that I did clearly distinguish betwixt first of all, and afterwards, betwixt his supposition, which I referred to first of all, and to the beginning of his discourse in the sixth page, before he began to treat of any of the laws, as also it may evidently appear by those words of mine, This being supposed he laboureth to prove, etc., and betwixt his conclusion, which I referred to afterwards, and quoted the 66. page, where he treateth in particular of the Civil law. But because I quoted only the place, where my Adversary maketh the aforesaid conclusion, for that the Reader could otherwise hardly find it out, unless he should read 66. pages together, and did not quote the place, where he made his supposition, for that by those words of mine, first of all he supposeth, and those other, This being supposed he laboureth to prove, that this oath is repugnant to the law of God, of Nature, of Nations, Civil and Canon, the Reader might easily perceive, that this supposition of his was in the beginning of his discourse, before he began to treat of any of the laws; Belike my Adversary thought, that he might easily from hence have some colour to tax me of fraudulent proceeding at the very first beginning, little imagining that my words should be so narrowly scanned, and that the Reader would easily conceive the difference betwixt first of all, and afterwards, betwixt his supposition in the beginning of his discourse, page 6. and his conclusion, page 66. but guile hath herein beguiled itself, and whilst my Adversary by taxing me of fraud, thought to discredit me at the very first entrance, he hath clearly proved himself to be guilty both of fraud and falsehood. 9 The second fraud, which my Adversary Widdrington hath used, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, d Nu. 6. is, for that he laboureth, as it seemeth, to persuade his Reader, that all my arguments and reasons are grounded upon a false supposition of my own, which he saith, I do not any way prove, but suppose as known of itself, and this he seemeth to gather out of my own words alleged by him, as you have heard, wherein I affirm, that the new oath supposeth and implieth a denial of the Pope's supremacy, although it be not expressly denied therein (he should have said, wherein I affirm, that the oath denieth the Pope's authority to excommunicate and depose a temporal Prince, for this is that, which I said, he did suppose, and no way prove) When nevertheless e Nu. 9 he could not but see, even in the very same place, from whence he took my words, that I did not prove the oath to be unlawful by that supposition only, but also by the subordination, and subjection of temporal things to spiritual, when the good of souls, and the service of God requireth it: Besides that, it is most evident in my discourse concerning divers of those laws, that I deduced the unlawfulness of the oath, from the very substance of them, as it will manifestly appear hereafter, when I shall come to touch them in particular. Thus Mr. Fitzherbert. 10 But that I have used no fraud at all in my words, as my Adversary untruly affirmeth, and that rather that imputation of fraud may be retorted back upon himself, it is very apparent. For in the beginning of his discourse, to wit, in the sixth page of his Supplement, he supposeth, as you have seen, that the Pope's power to excommunicate and to depose Princes is denied in this oath, which also afterwards in the 66. page he confirmeth, and in regard only of these two clauses, he taketh upon him to prove, that the Pope's spiritual authority is denied therein: Which his supposition, for as much as concerneth his power to excommunicate, and consequently his spiritual Supremacy, for that the former is according to the doctrine of all Catholics included in this latter, as a particular in the universal, I showed in my Theological Disputation against Cardinal Bellarmine, Fa. Gretzer, Disputatio Theol. c. 4. sect. ● and Lessius to be clearly false, and withal, in my answer to the substance of this my adversaries discourse, I affirmed, that he doth not prove it with any one argument at all, but supposeth it as known of itself: which any man that will but slightly run over his discourse, may presently perceive to be true. 11 For albeit he doth boldly affirm, and suppose, that the Pope's power to excommunicate, and to depose Princes is denied in this oath, and consequently, if the Pope's power to excommunicate Princes be not denied therein, his position, or copulative proposition is false, for that to the truth of a copulative proposition it is required, that both parts of the copulation be true, and to make it false, it sufficeth that one only part of the copulation be false, yet he bringeth no one argument in his whole Discourse to prove, that the Pope's power to excommunicate Princes is denied in the oath, but cunningly passeth over to his power to depose, which all men confess to be expressly denied therein. Neither can any man, who is not desirous of set purpose to misconstrue my words, and meaning, imagine that I intended either to deny that the Pope's power to depose Princes is impugned in the oath, for that my whole Disputation, and also my answer to this my adversaries Discourse, doth plainly show the contrary, or to affirm, that my Adversary doth suppose as known of itself, and by no reason at all endeavour to prove, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, and that therefore the oath in regard of this clause, which is expressly denied therein, is unlawful, for that I have briefly related and answered many of his arguments to this purpose, and those words of mine, which he himself relateth, This being supposed, he goeth about to prove, that the oath is repugnant to the law of God, etc. do clearly convince the same. 12. But my only intention and meaning was to affirm, as the Reader may plainly gather from my words, that my Adversary at the very first entrance of his Discourse supposeth, that the oath doth contain in it a denial of the Pope's power to excommunicate and to depose Princes, and that to these two general heads he promised to reduce all the arguments and exceptions, which he should bring against the oath; And that although he hath endeavoured by the subordination of temporal things to spiritual, and by many other arguments drawn from divine and human laws, to prove, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, yet concerning his power to excommunicate, which all Catholics do believe to be granted to him by Christ, that he bringeth no one argument, or show of an argument, to prove, that it is denied in this oath, but supposeth it, as being granted, or known of itself. 13 Whereby it is apparent that I am free from all fraud in this point, and that my Adversary cannot be excused from fraudulent proceeding, both for wrongfully accusing me of fraud, and also for taking upon him in the beginning of his Discourse to impugn the oath, as being repugnant to all laws human and divine, for that it containeth a denial of the Pope's power to excommunicate and to depose Princes, and yet not bringing any one argument to prove that his power to excommunicate is denied therein, but supposing it as known or granted, and cunningly passing over to his power to depose: which considering It hath ever been a great controversy, saith Fa. Azor, f Tom. 2. l. 11. cap. 5. q. 8. betwixt Emperors and Kings on the one part, and the Bishops of Rome on the other, and the Schoolmen, saith Trithemius, g In Chronico Monast. Hirsaug. ad annum. 1106. do contend about the same, it is no hard matter for a man of mean Theological learning to scrape together, as Mr. Fitzherbert hath done, out of so many Authors, who have written in favour of the Pope's power to depose Princes, some colourable arguments to prove the same; all which nevertheless have been heretofore by me, and others very clearly answered. 14 Considering therefore, that neither his Majesty did intend to deny in this oath the Pope's power to excommunicate him, although the lower house of Parliament, as his Majesty himself affirmeth, h In his Premonition. p. 9 at the first framing thereof, made it to contain as much, which he forced them to reform, neither is there any one clause in the oath, from which it may be gathered, that the said power to excommunicate is denied therein, neither did my Adversary bring any one argument, or show of an argument to prove the same, although in the very beginning of his Discourse he promiseth to prove, that the oath in respect of this clause is repugnant to all laws human and divine: for this cause I used these words, which now my Adversary carpeth at, That it is a wonder that learned men do not blush to affirm with so great confidence, that to be his majesties meaning, which he himself in public writings doth expressly profess not to be his meaning, and to inculcate so often and so coldly without any proof, that very argument (concerning the denial of the Pope's power to excommunicate) which both by his Majesty, and many others hath been so often very sound confuted. 15 Now Mr. Fitzherbert taketh great exceptions against these words, and groundeth upon them his third accusation, that I have neither answered probably, nor like a good Catholic. Whereto I answer first, saith he, i Nu. 14. concerning his vain brag of the sound confutation of our argument, that seeing the same hath no other ground or proof here, but his own word, and idle affirmation, it deserveth no other answer for this place, but a flat denial. But I might likewise return his own answer of his vain brag and idle affirmation, to those words of his, k Nu. 10. 11. 12. That the oath implieth the denial of the Pope's Supremacy, and that he and others have amply proved, that whosoever abjureth the Pope's power to depose Princes, doth consequently abjure his spiritual authority: yet I will abstain from such bitter terms, and whether it be a vain brag of my own, and an idle affirmation, or rather a very true assertion, that their argument concerning the denial of the Pope's power to excommunicate, whereof in that place I did only speak, hath been sufficiently confuted or no, the Reader by my answers may easily perceive. 16 For Cardinal Bellarmine, Fa. Lessius, Gretzer, and this my Adversary do affirm the oath to be unlawful, and to deny the Pope's spiritual authority, for that it denieth his power to excommunicate, which all Catholics grant to be included in his spiritual Primacy. That his power to excommunicate is denied in this oath, Fa. Gretzer, and my Adversary do suppose as manifest, neither do they bring any one argument for the proof thereof, and therefore their assertion, or rather supposition may with a mere denial be as easily confuted. Cardinal Bellarmine also at the first did barely, & without any proof, but only by the way of an interrogation affirm, or rather suppose the same. And being taxed by his Majesty of falsehood, for affirming so boldly, That the Pope's power to excommunicate are heretical Kings, is plainly denied in the oath, seeing that this point converning the Pope's power to excommunicate, was in this oath purposely declined by his Majesty, yet Cardinal Bellarmine afterwards in his Apology, l Cap. 15. bringeth no other proof for cleared himself of that imputation, than which in effect he had brought before. 17 That I did truly affirm, saith he, that the Pope's power to excommunicate even heretical Kings is denied in that form of oath, it is manifest by those words of the oath. Also I do swear from my heart, that notwithstanding any declaration, or sentence of Excommunication or deprivation made or granted, or to be made or granted by the Pope or his Successors, etc. I will bear faith, and true allegiance to his Majesty, his Heirs, and Successors. But whosoever sweareth that he will obey an heretical King, notwithstanding the Pope's excommunication, doth not he together swear, that he acknowledgeth not in the Pope power to excommunicate heretical Kings? for otherwise it were not an oath, but sacrilege, to swear, that he will not obey the sentence of Excommunication made by the Pope against an heretical King, if he should believe, that the Pope hath power to excommunicate heretical Kings. 18 To this argument I gave two answers. m In Disput. Theol. cap. 4. sect. 1. The first was, that a Catholic man either terrified with fear, or moved for hope of gain, may swear, that he will not obey a just Excommunication, and by so swearing commit sacrilege, who nevertheless doth believe, that the Pope hath power to excommunicate: And therefore from those words of the oath [notwithstanding any sentence of Excommunication, etc. I will bear true allegiance to his Majesty, etc.] or to speak more plainly from these words [notwithstanding a iust Excommunication I will not obey it] it cannot be rightly inferred, that I therefore deny the Pope's power to excommunicate. But whosoever sweareth in that manner, saith Cardinal Bellarmine, either denieth the power to excommunicate, or committeth sacrilege. Be it so. But if this second were freely granted him, this nevertheless being granted, I cannot in any wise perceive that to be true, which he before did absolutely, and without any disjunction affirm; In this branch of the oath the Pope's power to excommunicate heretical Kings is plainly denied. 19 My second and principal answer was the very same in effect, which his Majesty before had given, to wit, that by swearing the foresaid branch, neither the Pope's power to Excommunicate is abjured, nor any sacrilege committed. For he who sweareth, that notwithstanding any sentence of Excommunication to be denounced against the King, he will bear faith, and true allegiance to his Majesty, although he doth swear, that he will obey the King being excommunicated, because Excommunication hath not power to deprive Kings of their temporal dominions and jurisdiction, Apol. nu. 346. as Becanus with many other learned Divines, whom I cited in my Apology, doth affirm, yet he doth not swear, that he will not obey a just Excommunication, as Cardinal Bellarmine doth ill conclude. For albeit he believeth, that the Pope hath authority to excommunicate heretical Kings, yet he doth not believe, that Excommunication, being a spiritual Censure, worketh this temporal effect, to deprive heretical Kings of their Royal authority, to make Kings no Kings, or to take away from subjects their natural and civil obedience, which by the law of God, according to Cardinal Bellarmine's own doctrine, n In tract. contra Barcl. cap. 21. pag. 202. is due to all Kings, although they be heretics, so long as they remain Kings. 20 Now Fa. Lessius argued in this manner. You will say, saith he that the power to excommunicate is not here denied, but only a certain effect of Excommunication, which is, that notwithstanding a Prince be excommunicated, yet shall not the subjects be released from the bond of their allegiance. But this effect doth necessarily follow the sentence of Excommunication, as the practice of the Church for the space of more than twelve hundred years doth show. To this argument I answered, that by no practice at all of the Church it can be proved, that the absolving of subjects from the bond of their allegiance, which by the law of God is due to all absolute Princes, is an effect of Excommunication, but at the most another punishment, although sometimes imposed together with Excommunication, as Becanus with many other learned Catholics do acknowledge: concerning which punishment, whether it may for any crime be imposed by the Pope's authority upon absolute Princes, or only upon inferior Princes by the consent of absolute Princes, to whom they are subject in temporals, it hath even been and is also now a controversy among learned Catholics, as by the testimony of those two Authors, whom I cited a little before, o Nu. 13. and also of many others cited by me else where, p in Apolog. nu. 4 & seq. and in this Treatise, part. 1. per totum. Becanus in q. de fide haereticis servanda cap. 8. nu. 16. Becan. in Controu. Angl. cap. 3. q. 2. Suarez tom. 5. disp. 15. sec. 6. nu. 3. it doth clearly appear. 21 From hence it is very apparent, saith Becanus, that heretics by this precisely that they are excommunicated, are not deprived of their dominion or jurisdiction either over their subjects, or over their temporal goods, but this deprivation is a distinct punishment, and inflicted by a distinct law. And again, It is one thing, saith he, to excommunicate a King, and another thing to depose him, or to deprive him of his kingdom, neither is the one necessarily, connected with the other. Many Kings and Emperors have been excommunicated, and yet not therefore deposed, and contrariwise many deposed and yet not therefore excommunicated. 22 Excommunication saith Suarez, can not have this effect (to take away the dominion of a kingdom, or of a people, and the paying of tributes, and doing services which are answerable thereunto) concerning such subjects, unless an other thing be first supposed, which is, that the Lords be deprived of their dominion, or the use thereof, because the dominion remaining still in it force, it can not be, but that the subjects are bound to obey and consequently to communicate at leastwise as much as is necessary to fulfil their obligation, according to the chapter Inter alia desentent. excommun. But Excommunication of itself hath not this effect, because as it doth not deprive of the dominion of other temporal things, nor of the use of them, so it doth not deprive of this dominion, because there is no more reason of that, neither is there any law, wherein this is specially ordained of Excommunication; I say of Excommunication, because this is sometimes ordained in the law concerning some excommunicated persons, as heretics, yet by this special ordination we may understand, that Excommunication of itself hath not this effect; for when this effect is to follow, it is necessary, that it be specially expressed in the law or sentence. And therefore when this effect is adjoined, I do not call it an effect of Excommunication, but a peculiar punishment imposed together with Excommunication, as when an heretic is excommunicated, and deprived of the dominion of his goods, this deprivation is not an effect of Excommunication, but a certain punishment joined together with Excommunication. Thus Suarez. 23 We have therefore out of Becanus, and Suarez, that the depriving Princes of their dominion, or jurisdiction is not an effect of Excommunication, contrary to that which Fa. Lessius said; We have also out of Cardinal Bellarmine, Bellar. in. trac. contra Barcl. cap. 21. Pag. 202. and the same Suarez, that subjects are not released from the bond of their obedience, unless the Prince be deprived of his dominion, or jurisdiction, for that to deny obedience to a Prince, saith Cardinal Bellarmine, so long as he remaineth Prince, is repugnant to the law of God; and the dominion or jurisdiction of a Prince, saith Suarez, Suarez in Defence. fidei Cath. lib. 6. cap. 3. nu. 6. remaining in its force, and not being taken away, it can not be, but that the subjects are bound to obey, because the obligation of obedience, saith he, in any degree or state whatsoever doth so long endure in the subject, as the dignity, or power, and jurisdiction doth endure in the Superior, for these are correlatives, and the one dependeth upon the other. So that you see how well these learned Divines of the Society of jesus do agree among themselves in assigning the reason, for which this oath of allegiance doth contain in it a manifest denial of the Pope's power to excommunicate, and of his spiritual Supremacy. And whether English Catholics for so weak and slender arguments, and wherein our learned Adversaries do not agree among themselves, are bound to hazard their perpetual liberty, In Append. part. 2. sect. 4. and whole estate, with the utter ruin of their posterity, I remit to the judgement of the pious and prudent Reader.; Thus I answered in my Theological Disputation, which afterwards in my Appendix to Suarez I did more fully explain. Now let the Reader judge, whether this my answer to their argument be a vain brag, and an idle affirmation of my own, or a solid confutation thereof, and whether I had not reason to affirm, that learned men do not blush to inculcate so often and secoldly without any solid proof that very argument, which both by his Majesty, and many others hath been very sound confuted, considering that my Adversary doth so boldly affirm, that the oath is unlawful and repugnant to all laws human and divine, for that it denieth the Pope's power to excommunicate, and yet he bringeth no argument at all to prove the same, but it must, forsooth, be supposed as certain, and beside he concealeth what I before at large had answered to the aforesaid argument. And thus much concerning his first answer and exception. 24 Secondly, saith my Adversary, q Nu. 14 touching the declaration of his majesties mind in this point; I cannot but marvel, that such a learned man, as this Author is held to be, cannot distinguish betwixt the contents of the oath, and the end or intention of him that ordained it. For I will not deny, but that his Majesty might intend nothing else by ordaining this oath, but to exact of his subjects a profession of their obedience unto him, and yet nevertheless he that should take the oath should thereby abjure the Pope's Supremacy (for the reasons before declared) notwithstanding his majesties protestation of his intention. This will be evident, See these reasons beneath, nu 33. & seq. if we turn the case to a like oath of the Pope's part, as for example; if the Pope should exact an oath of Catholics to swear, that the King cannot deprive a lawful Bishop of Canterbury, and should withal protest, that he meaneth not thereby to make them abjure, or deny the King's authority, but only to profess their duty and obedience to the Sea Apostolic, I make no doubt, but that the Protestants would say according to their grounds, that this protestation and declaration of the Pope's mind, could not excuse the takers of such an oath from the denial of the King's Royal authority, because his Ecclesiastical Supremacy is (according to the Protestants opinion) so necessarily included in his Regal, or Kingly power, that whosoever denieth the one, doth consequently deny the other. In which respect, I say, the Pope's protestation of his meaning, or intention could not in the Protestants opinion, warrant the swearers from perjury. 25 And so say we in this case of his majesties public profession, and declaration of his intention, that it cannot alter the nature of the oath, or derogate any thing from the contents thereof, or from the Pope's Supremacy, or from his majesties belief concerning the same, and much less can it make any thing in the oath lawful, which is otherways unlawful: and therefore I say, that seeing the Pope's power to depose Princes, is necessarily included (according to our doctrine and belief) in the Pope's Ecclesiastical Supremacy, that the takers of the new oath cannot be excused from the denial of the Pope's supreme authority, nor consequently from perjury, notwithstanding any protestation of his Majesty to the contrary: for if he should protest, that he doth not force the takers of the oath to abjure the Pope's supremacy, it were Protestatio contraria factis, a protestation contrary to his deeds, which the Lawyers hold to be nothing worth. 26 But first my Adversary could not but clearly see, howsoever here he is pleased to babble, that I, who as he scoffingly saith, am held to be so learned a man, not only could distinguish, it being no such difficult point of wit, or learning, but also did oftentimes in my Apology, Apologetical answer, Theological Disputation, and in my Appendix to Suarez in express words distinguish betwixt the end of the work and of the worker, of the Art, and Artificer, of the law and precepts therein contained, and of the Lawmaker: and showed, that when the words of any law are ambiguous, they are to be understood according to the intention and meaning of the Lawmaker, and that neither the intention of his Majesty was to deny in this oath the Pope's power to excommunicate, or any other his spiritual authority, but only to require of his Catholic subjects a profession of that temporal and civil obedience, which all subjects by the law of God and nature do owe to their lawful Prince, neither in the oath is contained any clause, which by learned Catholics is not thought to belong to temporal, & civil obedience. 27 Wherefore there is a great disparity betwixt the oath, which the Pope should exact concerning his majesties power not to deprive a lawful Bishop of Canterbury, and this new oath of allegiance concerning the Pope's authority not to depose his Majesties: because that Ecclesiastical Supremacy, which his Majesty doth challenge, is, according to the opinion of all Protestants, necessarily included in his Regal or Kingly power, insomuch that whosoever denieth the one, doth consequently, in the opinion of all Protestants, deny the other: but the Pope's authority to depose Princes is not, according to the opinion of all Catholics, necessarily included in the Pope's spiritual Supremacy, for that many learned Catholics do hold, that the Pope hath no such power to depose Princes, and therefore he that denieth his power to depose, doth not consequently, according to the opinion of all Catholics, deny his spiritual Supremacy. And albeit Mr. Fitzherbert doth boldly affirm, that, according to his belief, the Pope's power to depose Princes is necessarily included in the Pope's Ecclesiastical Supremacy, yet I will be bold to say, that his belief herein is not Catholic, or Universal, but a particular belief or rather an opinion of his own and of some other Catholics, the contrary doctrine being, as I said, even to this day maintained by many learned and virtuous Catholics. And therefore until he bring some better ground for his belief, than his bare I say, I will also be bold to say, that the takers of the new oath are according to the doctrine of learned Catholics excused from the denial of the Pope's supreme authority, seeing that, according to the opinion of many learned Catholics, the Pope hath no such power to depose, and so neither is his majesties protestation repugnant to his deeds, nor his intention disagreeable to the contents of the oath. 28. Secondly, although my Adversary to prove the oath unlawful, and to contain a denial of the Pope's Supremacy, doth seem now to fly from his majesties intention to the contents of the oath, and expressly saith, That he will not deny, but that his Majesty by ordaining this oath, might intend nothing else but to exact of his subjects a profession of their obedience, and temporal allegiance, and not of his Ecclesiastical Supremacy; nevertheless he seemeth before to affirm, that his majesties intention, opinion, and understanding is, that the Pope's spiritual authority is abjured in this oath, and his Ecclesiastical Supremacy is acknowledged therein, which the judicious Reader may plainly gather both by those words in his Supplement before related, wherein he avoucheth r See his words beneath, Nu. seq. 29. That it is evident enough that the true reason why the Pope's authority to excommunicate and depose a temporal Prince is impugned by the oath, is no other, but because the King's Majesty is held (both by himself and other Protestants) to be no way subject to the Pope, yea and to be himself supreme head of the Church of God in England, and also by the first of these two reasons, which he bringeth here in his Reply, why he suppoposed, that the oath implieth a denial of the Pope's Supremacy. 29 And as for my supposition, saith he, s Nu. 10. that the Oath implieth the denial of the Pope's Supremacy (he should have said of the Pope's authority to excommunicate and depose a temporal Prince, for this was his supposition, as I clearly showed before) Thou shalt understand, good Reader, that I was moved thereto by two reasons, which are manifest enough in the very place, which Widdrington citeth: The one was, because it is evident, that the faith and belief of all English Protestant's , that the King's Majesty is no way subject to the Pope, but that he is himself supreme head of the Church of God, in England. Whereupon it may with great reason be inferred, that the denial of the Pope's power to depose his Majesty, which is expressly contained in the oath, is supposed and implied therein, as a necessary consequent of their belief, who ordained it. 30 For it is great reason to interpret all assertions, positions, laws, or decrees (especially such as touch Religion) according to the doctrine and belief of the Authors thereof, for it is to be presumed, that every one speaketh, writeth, and decreeth, according to the grounds and principles of his belief and Religion, as every Artisan worketh according to the grounds and principles of his Art. And therefore, as the positions, assertions, and decrees of known and professed Catholics are to be interpreted according to the grounds of the Catholic faith, so also the positions of all Sectaries whatsoever are to be understood according to the different doctrines of their Sects: In so much, that if a Catholic and a Protestant should affirm both of them one thing (which might be controversed in respect of Religion) the sense and meaning of either of them is to be interpreted according to their different Religions, and their different grounds, and sense thereof. And upon this consideration I made no doubt to affirm, that the new oath, denying the Pope's power to depose his Majesty implieth the denial of the Pope's Supremacy; for that not only his Majesty, but also all they of the Parliament which decreed it, do hold and believe, that the Pope can not depose his Majesty, because he hath no authority at all in England, and especially over his Majesty. 31 My other reason was the same that I touched before, concerning the necessary deduction of the Pope's power to depose Princes from his Ecclesiastical Supremacy: for albeit the Supremacy of the Pope be not expressly abjured, or denied by this oath, yet it is denied covertly by a necessary consequent, because his authority to depose Princes (which is necessarily deduced from the supreme power that Christ gave him) is denied thereby: as in like case, if we should deny that his Majesty hath any lawful power to suspend, or deprive the Archbishop of Canterbury, all Protestants would say, that we deny not only his Ecclesiastical Supremacy, but also his temporal and Kingly authority, because the power to suspend and deprive Bishops within his Realm, is included therein, and necessarily deduced from it in the opinion of all Protestants. And in like manner we say with much more reason, that whosoever abjureth the Pope's power to depose Princes, he doth consequently abjure his spiritual authority, because the former is included in the later, and doth necessarily follow of it, as it hath been amply proved by divers, and namely by me in my Supplement, t Chap. 5.6 & 7 whereof I shall have further occasion to lay down the particulars hereafter. Thus Mr. Fitzherbert. 32 But first of all, good Reader, I wish thee to consider, how cunningly this my Adversary concealeth the first part of his supposition concerning the denial of the Pope's power to excommunicate, whereof only I understood those words whereon he groundeth his third accusation. In the beginning of his Discourse he supposed, as you have seen, that the Pope's spiritual Supremacy is denied in this oath, for that his power to excommunicate and depose Princes is denied therein. And because his Majesty had in express words publicly affirmed, that his intention was not to deny in this oath the Pope's power to excommunicate, answering also the argument, which Cardinal Bellarmine out of those words of the oath (notwithstanding any sentence of Excommunication etc.) brought to prove the contrary: and because my Adversary did also without any proof at all, suppose, as Fa. Gretzer had done before him, that the Pope's power to excommunicate, and consequently his spiritual Supremacy is denied therein, for this cause I used those words, that truly it is a wonder, that learned men do not blush etc. which my Adversary a little before carped at. Now, forsooth, he pretending to yield a reason of his supposition, yet yieldeth none at all concerning this part thereof touching the Pope's power to excommunicate, for which only I used the aforesaid words, and which if he could sufficiently prove to be denied in this oath, all Catholics would forthwith grant him, that the oath containeth a denial of the Pope's spiritual Supremacy, which includeth as a general the particular authority to inflict spiritual Censures, but he cunningly passeth over to the Pope's power to depose Princes, which no man doubteth, but is denied in this oath, & yieldeth two reasons, such one's as they be, why he supposed the oath to contain a denial of the Pope's Supremacy, for that the Pope's power to depose Princes is denied therein. 33 His second reason (for thereof I will speak in the first place) which he took from the contents of the oath, is the same, which he touched before concerning the necessary deduction, according to his belief and doctrine, of the Pope's power to depose Princes from his Ecclesiastical Supremacy: But his belief and doctrine herein, as also I touched before, is not Catholic, but a particular belief, or rather opinion of himself and some other, and not general of all Catholics, for that many learned Catholics, as I showed before, are of opinion, that Christ hath not given to S. Peter or to the Church, authority to depose Princes, or to inflict temporal punishments, as death, exile, privation of goods, or imprisonment, but only Ecclesiastical or spiritual Censures. And therefore there is a great disparity in the similitude, which my Adversary bringeth betwixt his majesties authority to suspend, or deprive the Archbishop of Canterbury in the opinion of Protestants, and the Pope's power to depose Princes in the opinion of Catholics, for that all Protestants do believe, that his majesties power to suspend or deprive an Archbishop (taking suspension in that sense, wherein the Protestants do hold, that his Majesty hath power to suspend and deprive) is necessarily included in his Regal authority, but all Catholics do not believe, (whatsoever my Adversary and some few others do) that the power to depose Princes is necessarily included in that spiritual Supremacy, which Christ hath given to S. Peter and his Successors, as hath been amply proved by me and divers others, and what particulars Mr. Fitzherbert hath laid here, or in his Supplement concerning this point, we will beneath in their due places examine. 34 His first reason he deduced from the grounds and principles of the Protestants Religion, and from the doctrine and belief of his Majesty, and those of the Parliament, who made the oath. But how silly and insufficient this reason is, yea and repugnant to his own grounds, and also of Fa. Parsons, in whose defence he wrote his Supplement, any man of judgement may quickly perceive. For behold his reason: It is great reason, saith he, to interpret all assertions, positions, laws or decrees (especially such as touch Religion) according to the doctrine, and belief of the Authors thereof, for it is to be presumed, that every one speaketh 〈◊〉 and decreeth according to the grounds and principles of his belief and Religion, but it is an assertion, position, and the belief, not only of his Majesty, but also of the Parliament, which decreed the oath, that the Pope cannot depose his Majesty, because he hath no authority at all in England, and especially, over his Majesty, therefore it is great reason to affirm, that the new oath denying the Pope's power to depose his Majesty, implieth a denial of the Pope's Supremacy. 35 But first his Minor proposition is very untrue: For neither his Majesty, nor the Protestants do hold, that the Pope can not depose his Majesty, because he hath no authority at all in England, and especially over his Majesty. This indeed is the reason, why they hold, that the Pope cannot excommunicate his Majesty, because he hath no authority at all in England, and especially over his Majesty. But the reason, why they hold that the Pope hath no authority to depose his Majesty, is, for that deposition, being not an Ecclesiastical or spiritual, but a civil and temporal censure or punishment, for what crime soever it be imposed, can not be inflicted by any Ecclesiastical or spiritual authority. For which reason the Protestants do hold, that although the Protestant Bishops of this Realm have Ecclesiastical and Episcopal authority herein England, yet they have no authority by virtue of their Episcopal power to depose or deprive his Majesty of his temporal dominions, for that they take deposition, or any such temporal violence, as his Majesty affirmeth, u In his Premonition. pag. 9 to be far without the limits of such a spiritual Censure, as Excommunication is. 36 And although this be sufficient to show the insufficiency of this my adversaries reason, yet granting him only for Disputation sake, which he in his Minor proposition untruly affirmeth, that his Majesty, and the Parliament should hold, that the Pope can not depose his Majesty, because he hath no authority at all in England, his reason nevertheless is both insufficient, and also repugnant to that, which Fa. Parsons, and he himself suppose to be true. For albeit Fa. Parsons doth confidently affirm, x In his book entitled, The judgement of a Catholic English man etc. part. 1. nu. 22. pag. 13. and 16. that there is no man who sticketh or maketh difficulty to acknowledge our Sovereign to be true King, and rightful Lord over all his Dominions, for that every English Catholic will swear and acknowledge most willingly all those parts and clauses of the oath, that do any way appertain to the civil and temporal obedience due to his Majesty, whom he acknowledgeth to be his true and lawful King, and Sovereign over all his Dominions, and the same in effect doth my Adversary in his supposition affirm, as you have seen before, y Nu. 6. yet, according to this his reason, neither he, nor any other Catholic can acknowledge King james to be our true and lawful Sovereign, nor can promise to yield him all temporal allegiance, nor to defend him from all treasons, and traitorous conspiracies, nor to disclose them, when they shall come to their knowledge, when any such acknowledgement shall be demanded at their hands by the Protestant Magistrate: for that in the opinion of all Protestants, the Ecclesiastical Supremacy of his Majesty, as my Adversary himself confesseth, is included, and necessarily deduced from his temporal and Kingly authority: and all reconcilements to the Pope, and all returnings of Priests into this land made by the Pope's authority, are by the laws of this Realm made treasons, and traitorous conspiracies. 37 Seeing therefore, to use my adversaries words, It is great reason to interpret all assertions, positions, laws or decrees (especially such as touch Religion) according to the doctrine, and belief of the Authors thereof, for it is to be presumed, that every one speaketh, writeth, and decreeth according to the principles and grounds of his belief and Religion, it is clear, that if my adversaries argument be good, neither he, nor any other Catholic can acknowledge King james to be their true and lawful Sovereign, and that they will yield him all temporal allegiance, and defend him from all treasons, and disclose them when they shall come to their knowledge, for that, in the opinion of all Protestants, his Ecclesiastical Supremacy, as my Adversary himself confesseth, is included in his Regal and Kingly authority, and according to the laws of this Realm all reconcilements to the Pope, and all returnings of Priests into this land, made by the Pope's authority, are treasons and traitorous conspiracies. So that you see what contradiction there is in my adversaries sayings, and what a pretty argument he hath made to prove himself a traitor, seeing that according to his own grounds, he can not acknowledge King james to be his true and lawful Sovereign, nor promise to yield him all temporal allegiance, if it should be exacted by the Protestant Magistrate, for that in the opinion of all Protestants his Majesties spiritual Supremacy is included in his Regal and Kingly authority. 38 But secondly, if Mr. Fitzherbert had been pleased out of the desire of truth to handle this question between him and me sincerely, and not with a flourish of words to obscure the difficulty, and blind the understanding of simple and scrupulous Catholics, he might either out of his own judgement, or at lest wise from of that, which I in my Theological Disputation did answer to the arguments of Gretzer, Disputatio Theol. c. 2. sect. 1 who thought it unlawful to acknowledge King james to be our Sovereign Lord in temporals, and of Capellus, z Ibid. c. 6. sect. 5. who also thought it unlawful for any Catholic to promise, that he will disclose all treasons and traitorous conspiracies for the reasons aforesaid, and also from that, which out of the doctrine of Suarez, a Ibid. c. 1. I declared in what manner we ought to interpret the words of any law, he might, I say, have quickly perceived the weakness of his reason, and in what sense his Mayor proposition, and the proof, which he bringeth thereof to make it true are to be understood. 39 For to repeat again his words, It is indeed great reason to interpret all assertions, positions, laws, and decrees (especially such as touch Religion) according to the doctrine and belief of the Authors thereof, whensoever the words are doubtful, and unless the Author do in express words declare his meaning to be the contrary. For it is to be presumed, that every one, unless he declare the contrary, doth commonly speak, writ, and decree according to the grounds and principles of his belief and Religion, as every Artisan doth usually work according to the grounds and principles of his Art, unless he will take upon him to do some work belonging to another Art; as if a Physician will take upon him to measure land, than he must work according to the grounds of Geometry, and not of Physic: And if a Protestant will speak, writ, or decree like a Catholic, and upon Catholic grounds, he must observe the principles of Catholic Religion, and likewise a Catholic, if he will speak, writ, or decree like a Protestant, and upon Protestant grounds, must observe the principles of the Protestant Religion. And therefore, as the positions, assertions, and decrees of known, and professed Catholics, are to be interpreted according to the grounds of the Catholic faith, unless they declare to have a contrary meaning; so also the positions of all Sectaries are to be understood according to the different doctrines of their Sects, unless they declare their meaning to be otherwise: in so much that if a Catholic, and a Protestant should affirm both of them one thing, which might be controversed in respect of Religion, the sense and meaning of either of them is to be interpreted according to their different Religions, unless they declare the contrary. And in this sense my adversaries Mayor proposition is true, otherwise it is false; for doubtful, and ambiguous words are ever to be understood according to the declaration of the speaker, and the words of every law, whensoever they are doubtful, are to be taken in that sense, which the Lawmaker shall declare his meaning to be. 40 Now his Majesty, who with the Parliament devised this new oath, not for the Protestants, but to make a trial how his Catholic subjects stand affected towards him in point of their loyalty and due obedience, hath oftentimes, as my Adversary could not but see in my Theological Disputation, publicly declared his meaning, b In an Act of Parliament anno septimo ca 6. and in his Premonition pag. 9 and in his Apology pag. 2. nu. 2. & pag. 246. and that he intended in this oath to exact of his Catholic subjects nothing else, than the profession of that temporal allegiance and civil obedience, which all subjects (what religion soever they profess) by the law of God do owe to their lawful Prince, with a promise to disclose all contrary uncivil violence, and to make a distinction, not betwixt Catholics and Protestants, but betwixt civilly obedient Catholics, and such Catholics, as are the disciples of the Powder-treason: And therefore his Majesty caused the lower house of Parliament to reform that clause, which contained the denial of the Pope's power to excommunicate him. So careful was he that nothing should be contained in this Oath, except the profession of natural allegiance, and civil and temporal obedience. He said [in this oath] for as the oath of Supremacy, saith his Majesty, was devised for putting a difference between Papists, and them of our profession, so was this oath ordained for making a difference between the civilly obedient Papists, and the perverse disciples of the Powder-Treason. And again, This oath, saith his Majesty, was ordained only for making of a true distinction between Papists of quiet disposition, and in all other things good Subjects and such other Papists, as in their hearts maintained the like violent bloody maxims, that the Powder-Traitors did. The same also but in more ample words affirmeth his Majesty in his Apology for the oath. 41 Seeing therefore that his Majesty hath so often, and so publicly declared, that he intended by this oath nothing else, but to make a true distinction, not betwixt Catholics and Protestants, but betwixt Catholics and Catholics, and to urge them only to make a profession of that natural and civil obedience, which all Subjects, of what Religion soever they be, do by the law of God own to their lawful Prince, there is no reason to draw an argument from his majesties intention or belief, and from the grounds and principles of the Protestants Religion, but only from the contents of the oath itself, to prove it to be unlawful, and to contain in it any thing which is repugnant to Catholic faith and Religion. And that this is a probable answer, and not a vain brag, and idle affirmation of my own, it is so evident, that I dare adventure to remit it to the judgement of my Adversary himself, albeit he sticketh not at this time to affirm, that I have neither answered probably, nor like a good Catholic. 42 Concerning which last accusation he writeth thus: c Nu. 17. Now then to conclude this point, whereas Widdrington saith, as you have heard, that it is marvel, that learned men blush not to affirm the King's mind to be that, which his Majesty hath declared to be no part of his meaning, I may well say, that it is a far greater wonder, that he professing to be a Catholic, and knowing and confessing as he doth in his Epistle Dedicatory, d In Principio. and after in his Theological Disputation, e Cap 10 sec. 2. nu. 1. & 2. that his Holiness in two Breves hath declared his mind concerning this oath, palam & ex professo, openly and expressly (to wit, that it containeth many things which are manifestly repugnant to the Catholic faith and salvation of souls) it is, I say, an extreme wonder that he blusheth not extremely to defend the said oath contrary to the express & strict commandment of his spiritual Pastor, whose voi●e he is bound to hear and obey if he be a sheep of Christ's fold, and child of the Catholic Church. And therefore I conclude, that he showeth himself not only impudent, but also impious in preferring the declaration of a temporal Prince (which nevertheless being well weighed, doth nothing help his cause, or prejudice ours) before an Apostolical decree of S. Peter's Successor, whose obedient child he professeth and aught to be, wherein he showeth sufficiently how good a Catholic he is, and whom he holdeth for his Supreme head in Ecclesiastical causes, as also what probability we may expect of him hereafter for the confirmation of the rest of his assertions, seeing that we have found him at the very first so fraudulent, frivolous, and contrary to his own profession, as you have heard in this Chapter. Thus you see with what bitterness Mr. Fitzherbert concludeth his first Chapter. 43 But if he had been pleased to have dealt uprightly, and as he hath in a most spiteful manner urged against me this objection, which is taken from his Holiness Breves, so also he had set down the answer which in the tenth Chapter of my Theological Disputation I gave thereunto, the Reader would presently have perceived, that my Adversary hath passed the bounds of Christian charity and justice in wrongfully accusing me of impudency, impiety, and disobedience to the Apostolical decree of S. Peter's Successor, whose obedient child I did there, and also I do here profess myself to be, and am ready to obey in all those things, wherein, according to the grounds of Catholic Religion, he hath authority to command: Neither can my Adversary without blushing affirm, either that the Pope's Holiness, albeit he be Saint Peter's Successor, cannot err in his particular commands and decrees, which are not propounded to the whole Church, but to particular Churches or Kingdoms, or that any Catholic is bound to obey him in those things, wherein, according to the doctrine of learned and virtuous Catholics, he hath no authority to command. 44 First therefore I showed in that place out of the doctrine of Fa. Suarez, that there are two sorts of human precepts, as well Ecclesiastical, as Civil. The one is called a constitutive precept, which of itself maketh that thing, which it forbiddeth to be unlawful, which otherwise if that precept were not, would not be unlawful: as the eating of flesh in Lent, and the doing of servile works upon Sundays, and Holidays, which if they were not forbidden by human laws, would not be unlawful. And although a constitutive precept of human power may sometimes bind with danger of some great temporal loss, as of goods, liberty, yea also of life, yet the Ecclesiastical law, setting aside scandal and contempt, which are forbidden by the law of God, and nature, do seldom or never bind with very great temporal harm: and therefore we are not bound to abstain from flesh in Lent, or from doing servile works upon Sundays and holidays, when we are like to incur thereby any probable danger of some great temporal hurt. 45 The other is called a declarative precept, which doth not of itself make, but suppose and declare the thing, which it forbiddeth to be unlawful, as being before prohibited by some other former law, as theft, murder, drunkenness and such like, which are otherwise forbidden by the law of God and nature. And this kind of precept, as well observeth Suarex, dependeth only upon the reason, for which the act is commanded, or forbidden, or, which is all one, upon the precedent law, from whence all the obligation of the declarative precept doth proceed. Insomuch that if the reason be not true, and that there is no such precedent law, or obligation, as the declarative precept affirmeth to be, the declarative precept hath no force to bind at all: and with the same certainty, or probability we are bound, or not bound to obey a declarative precept, as it is certain or probable, that there is, or is not any other former bond and obligation. 46 As for example, his Holiness doth by his Breves forbid all English Catholics to take the new oath of allegiance, for that therein are contained many things, which are clearly repugnant to faith and salvation. If therefore it be certain, or probable, that nothing is contained in this oath which is repugnant to faith, or salvation, it is also certain or probable, that this declarative precept of his Holiness, which is grounded upon this reason, that something is contained therein contrary to faith and salvation, is, according to the doctrine of Suarez, of no force to bind, neither are English Catholics by virtue of this declarative prohibition bound to refuse the said oath. 47 Secondly, I also showed in that place, that this declarative command of his Holiness forbidding Catholics to take the oath, for that it containeth many things flat contrary to faith and salvation, is such a declarative precept, which is not grounded upon any infallible reason, or definition of the Church, but only upon his opinative judgement, that his reason is true, and that either his power to excommunicate, and consequently his spiritual Supremacy is denied in this oath, which is very untrue, or that his power to depose Princes, which is denied in the oath, is a clear point of faith, and necessarily included in his spiritual Supremacy, and consequently the denial thereof is plainly repugnant to Catholic faith. Which being so, it is manifest, that we are no further bound to obey this declarative prohibition of his Holiness, than we are bound to follow his opinion, and to believe, that either his power to excommunicate, or some such like is denied in the oath, or that whosoever denieth his power to depose Princes, denieth the Catholic faith. 48 Whereupon I concluded, that considering neither his power to excommunicate, or any such like is denied in this oath, as I have proved at large against Card. Bellarmine, and others, nor that his power to depose Princes, which is expressly denied in the oath, is certain and of faith, the contrary doctrine being probable and also maintained by many learned Catholics, as partly also I have already proved by the testimony of learned Catholics before alleged, and here beneath by answering all my adversaries objections I will make it more manifest, Part. 1. per. t●tum. there can be made no doubt, but that any English Catholic may with a safe conscience, or without any crime of disobedience to his supreme spiritual Pastor, or any prejudice to Catholic faith, refuse to obey his Holiness declarative command which is only grounded upon such an opinion, which, considering the contrary is probable, and defended by many learned Catholics, may without any note of impudency, impiety or disobedience be rejected by Catholics. 49 Thirdly, I also affirmed in that place, that no Catholic doth only for this cause take the oath, or think it to be lawful, because the King's Majesty, being of a contrary Religion doth command it, or think it to be lawful, as though those Catholics, who take the oath, do it only upon the King's bare word affirming the oath to be lawful, and seem thereby to prefer the opinion of a Protestant Prince in things, which in some sort do belong to Religion, before the opinion of our supreme spiritual Pastor, but because the King's Majesty being our lawful Prince, and Sovereign Lord in temporals, what religion soever he professeth, hath established an oath of allegiance to make a trial how his Catholic subjects stand affected towards him in point of their loyalty and due obedience, and commanded all Catholics to take the same, which oath learned Catholics for probable reasons do think to be truly in oath of temporal allegiance, and to contain nothing which is repugnant to faith and salvation, therefore English Catholics to obey the just command of their Prince do take the oath, and think it to be lawful, both for that they having duly examined all the clauses of the oath, do find nothing therein contrary to faith and salvation, and also for that many learned Catholics, whose opinion they may lawfully follow, albeit other Divines with the Pope's Holiness do think otherwise, do constantly maintain the same. 50 Neither do I give more credit to his Majesty, then to his Holiness, but both of them with all dutiful respect I do honour, and also believe in those things, which they of their certain knowledge do affirm to be true: And therefore, as I believe his majesties Royal word affirming, that his intention was not by this new oath of allegiance to deny the Pope's power to excommunicate; so also I believe, that first Breve of his Holiness was not surreptitious and written without his knowledge or privity, for that in his second Breve he doth aver as much. But as for the first Breve, wherein English Catholics are commanded not to take the oath, for that it containeth many things flat contrary to faith and salvation, it being, as I said, only a declarative precept, and grounded upon a fallible, and in my judgement, a very false opinion, that either the Pope's power to excommunicate is denied in the oath, or that it is a point of faith, that the Pope hath power so depose Princes, it is evident, according to Suarez doctrine, that no Catholic is bound to obey this his declarative precept, unless he be also bound either to believe, that the Pope's power to excommunicate is denied in the oath, which is apparently untrue, or to follow his opinion concerning the certainty of his power to depose, which being in controversy among Schoolmen, and learned Doctors, and as yet not decided by the judge, as no man is bound according to the common doctrine of Vasquez, and many others, to follow it, so also no man is bound, according to the approved doctrine of Suarez, to obey his declarative precept, which is grounded thereon. 51 Lastly, I observed in that place, that if his Majesty should by Act of Parliament command all his Catholic subjects to acknowledge by oath, that the Pope is not by the institution of Christ the direct temporal Lord of this Kingdom, or of any other, and that he hath no direct power to depose his Majesty, and that they will bear faith and true allegiance only to his Majesty, as to their direct Lord, and Sovereign, etc. and his Holiness following the Canonists opinion who hold it heretical to affirm, that the Pope hath not direct dominion over the whole Christian world, should by his Apostolical Breves, forbidden all English Catholics to take such an oath, for that it containeth (as the Canonists imagine) many things contrary to faith and salvation, (as Pope Sixtus the fifth, if any credit may be given to the jesuits themselves did intend to condemn, if he had lived, Cardinal Bellarmine his first tome of controversies for impugning the Pope's direct dominion in temporals) the very same invective, which Mr. Fitzherbert maketh against me, accusing me of impudency, impiety, disobedience, and of being no good Catholic, for not obeying the Pope's declarative precept, which is only grounded upon such an opinion, which no Catholic is bound to follow, for that the contrary is maintained by many learned Divines, he might also make against all those Catholics, who following herein Cardinal Bellarmine, and the common doctrine of Divines, should take that oath, and think it to be lawful, notwithstanding the Pope's declarative precept to the contrary. And doubtless Cardinal Bellarmine who vehemently impugneth the Canonists opinion, would easily in the like manner as I have cleared myself, defend those Catholics from all imputation of impudence, impiety, disobedience, or any other crime, notwithstanding the Pope's declarative precept to the contrary. 52 Thus did I answer to this objection taken from his Holiness Breves, but more amply in my Theological Disputation, showing also by sundry examples, that divers Popes have in their Apostolical Breves, or decretal letters registered in the Canon law, maintained false opinions, and which now are flat heretical, and that therefore their opinions, and consequently their declarative precepts grounded thereon, are not always to be followed by Catholics, and withal, that many learned Divines have impugned divers decrees of Pope's concerning the licences, which they have given to Priests to minister the Sacrament of Confirmation, and their dispensations in the solemn vow of religious chastity, and in marriage not consummate, who were not therefore accounted impudent, impious, or disobedient children of the Catholic Church, for that such decrees were not grounded upon any infallible definition, but only upon the Pope's fallible opinion, which they of set purpose did impugn, Sot. in. 4. dist. 27. q. 1. ar. 4. insomuch that learned Sotus feareth not to confess, that the Popes, who have dispensed in marriage not consummate, did err, following therein the Canonists opinion, and which he boldly affirmeth to have no show or colour of probability, notwithstanding so many practices of sundry Popes who have dispensed therein. 53 But this my answer my Adversary doth here altogether conceal, compelling me for cleared myself, to repeat a great part thereof, which if he had been pleased sincerely to have set down, the Reader would presently have perceived, that the voice of our supreme Pastor is not always to be followed, & that it is no great wonder for a sheep of Christ's fold, and child of the Catholic Church to disobey without blushing, the declarative command of his supreme Pastor, when it is only grounded upon such an opinion, which no Catholic is bound to follow, for that the contrary is maintained by learned and virtuous Catholics, as is this, which denieth the Pope's power to depose Princes to be a point of faith, and the contrary improbable, and that the Pope's power to excommunicate is impugned in the oath. By which it is evident, how injuriously Mr. Fitzherbert to disgrace me with his Reader, hath accused me of the aforesaid ignominious crimes, which rather may be retorted upon himself. And so I will conclude with him this chapter, remitting to the consideration of the judicious Reader, what probability and sincerity we may expect of him hereafter for the confirmation of the rest of his Replies and answers, seeing that we have found him at the very first so fraudulent, frivolous, and repugnant to himself, as you have heard in this Chapter. CHAP. II. widdrington's answer to an argument of his Adversary taken from that rule of the law, The accessory followeth the principal, is confirmed, and two instances, which he brought against that rule, are proved to be sound and sufficient, and that place of S. Paul. 1. Cor. 6. If you have secular judgements, etc. is at large examined. 1. MY Adversary in this Chapter goeth on with the like bitterness as he did in the former, and as before he taxed me of fraud, impudency, impiety, and of being no good Catholic, but how wrongfully you have already seen, so now he boldly affirmeth, that my arguments, and answers are partly repugnant to my own doctrine, and partly malicious, improbable, impertinent, foolish and ridiculous, but how undeservedly you shall presently perceive. He took upon him, as you have seen, to prove in his Supplement, that the oath is unlawful, and repugnant to all laws human and divine, in respect of two clauses, to wit, that it doth exempt temporal Princes from Excommunication, and deposition by the Pope, and that therefore it was justly condemned by his Holiness, and refused by Catholics, although for this later he could not be ignorant, that where one Catholic hath refused it, a hundred have taken it. And as for the first clause concerning excommunication he passeth it over altogether with silence, neither doth he bring any one argument, or show of argument to prove that the Pope's power to excommunicate is denied in the oath, for which cause I affirmed in my Admonition to the Reader, that Mr. fitzherbert's supposition, for so much as concerneth the Pope's power to excommunicate Princes, and consequently his Primacy in spirituals, which he doth not prove with any one reason to be denied in the oath, but supposeth it as manifest, is very untrue. 2 But as for the second clause concerning the Pope's power to depose Princes, which is expressly denied in the oath, he maketh a long Rhetorical discourse, labouring in vain to prove, that according to all laws human and divine the Pope hath power to depose Princes and to dispose of all their temporals. And because the brevity of that Admonition, which was made after my Theological Disputation was in the press, would not permit to examine in particular all the arguments, which he brought to prove the same, I thought good to answer briefly such arguments, as seemed most plausible, and withal to insinuate a certain distinction, which I had oftentimes in my former books declared more at large, between the Pope's power to command temporals, and to dispose of temporals, to command or impose temporal penalties, and to inflict temporal penalties, or to punish temporally by way of coercion, which distinction doth plainly declare the true state of the question, which he seeketh to obscure, and quite overthroweth all his chiefest grounds. 3 Among the rest of his proofs he brought one from this vulgar rule of the law, Accessorium sequitur principale, The accessory followeth the principal, from whence he inferred, a Cap. 1. Suppl. nu. 67. that seeing not only the body, but also temporal goods and states are inferior to the soul, and ordained for the service thereof, it must needs follow, that the Church having power and authority over the body for the benefit of the soul, hath also power over temporal goods and states, when it is necessary for the good of the soul, and for the glory of God, for the which our souls, bodies, goods, states, and all things else were created, and ordained, according to that rule of the law, The accessory followeth the principal. b In Ad. nu. 15 4 To this inference I answered briefly in this manner. Secondly, every learned man may perceive, how vain that consequence is, which this Author deduceth, The accessory followeth the principal, therefore the Church having power over the soul, hath consequently power over the body and goods, except it be understood of the power to command corporal things so far forth as they serve to spiritual things: For we might also from that principle argue thus: The accessory followeth the principal, therefore he that is Lord of all horses, is Lord of all bridles, The Pope hath power over the soul of the Prince, therefore also over his life. Let this Author explicate, what the Lawyers understand by the name of accessory, and what by the name of principal, in that axiom of theirs, which suffereth many exceptions, and is limited by them divers ways, In the mean time we deny his consequence, [not consequent,] as Mr. Fitzherbert translateth. So that it is manifest, that I did not deny that consequence, if it had been understood of the power to command temporals in order to spiritual good, but because the words are general, and so may comprehend both, and Mr. Fitzherbert also meant of both, therefore I did absolutely deny his consequence. 5 Now my Adversary will needs have me forsooth both to contradict myself in this answer, and also to overthrow my own arguments. For having set down my answer, he replieth thus c Nu. 2. Wherein I wish it to be noted, first what Widdrington granteth, and after what he denieth, and I doubt not but it will easily appear, that he overthroweth his own arguments, and contradicteth himself. He granteth, as you see, that my consequence is not vain, if it be understood of a power in the Pope to command corporal things, so far forth as they are to serve spiritual things, & yet he denieth my consequence, albeit I do not thereby suppose in the Pope any other power over bodies, and goods, than such as followeth of their subordination to the soul, which is in effect the same relation, and limitation that he maketh thereof, to wit, so far forth as corporal & temporal things are to serve spiritual things, as it may evidently appear by the discourse, which I make concerning the same in my Supplement, from whence he taketh my argument: and therefore I think good to repeat here, what I have said there touching this point, whereby I hope I shall not only fortify, and prove my consequence, which he denieth, but also explicate fully, what I mean by the name of accessory, and principal, as you see he commanded me to do; he should rather have said, as I wished him to do. Thus Mr. Fitzherbert. 6 And I also wish the Reader to observe first, what my Adversary pretendeth to prove, and after what he proveth, and I doubt not, but it will easily appear, that I do neither overthrow my own arguments, nor any way contradict myself. He pretendeth to prove, that the Pope, as Pope, hath power in order to spiritual good to depose temporal Princes, to punish them by depriving them of their kingdoms, and by disposing of all their temporals, and not only to command or enjoin, but also to inflict temporal punishments, as it appeareth by the whole scope of his Discourse, both in his Supplement, and also in this Treatise, whereupon a little beneath in this chapter c Nu. 10. he calleth that distinction, which I made betwixt the power to command corporal things, and to punish corporally by way of coercion, a frivolous distinction, and afterward especially in the sixth chapter, d nu. 14. 15. 16. 17. he laboureth to impugn the same, and to prove, that if the Pope may command corporal and temporal things, as they serve the spiritual, and are reduced thereto, he may also punish his subjects in their bodies or temporal goods, and dispose of all their temporals for the same respect. 7 And nevertheless neither out of holy Scriptures, nor from this rule of the law, the Accessory followeth the principal, nor from the subjection of temporal things to spiritual, nor by any other argument doth my Adversary sufficiently prove, that the Pope hath power to dispose of temporals, or to punish temporally by way of coercion, which he pretended, and would seem to his Reader to prove, but only that the Pope as Pope hath power in order to spiritual good to command temporal things, and to punish by way of coercion Christian Princes and people with spiritual or Ecclesiastical Censures. By which it will easily appear, whether I do contradict myself in my answer, and overthrow my own arguments or no: For I granted, that the consequence was not vain, if it were understood of a power in the Pope to command corporal things in order to spiritual good, but because he pretended to prove, that the Pope as Pope, can not only command or impose, but also dispose of temporals, not only enjoin temporal penalties, but also inflict them, or punish temporally by way of temporal constraint, therefore I did absolutely deny his consequence, or the consequence as it was understood by him. 8 And if it had pleased my Adversary, after he saw, that I granted the consequence, if it were understood of the power to command temporal things, as they are to serve spiritual, to have set down plainly, what he intended to prove by that consequence, and whether he meant of the power only to command temporal things, or also to dispose of temporals, as to dispose is distinguished from to command, the Reader would quickly have perceived his fraud, and that I do neither contradict myself, nor overthrow my arguments: but to blind the eyes of his Reader, he doth neither affirm the one, nor the other in this place, but he useth, as you have heard, such general Words, which may be applied to both. For whereas to clear the understanding of his Reader, he should have declared of what power he meant, for that I granted the consequence, if it were understood of the power to command temporals, but if it were understood of the power to dispose of temporals, in which sense he must needs understood it, if be will speak to purpose, than I denied his consequence, yet he only affirmeth, that he doth not thereby suppose in the Pope any other power over bodies, or goods, then such as followeth from the subordination to the soul, which is in effect the same relation and limitation that Widdrington maketh thereof, to wit, so far forth, as corporal and temporal things are to serve spiritual. But if he had expressed, that according to his doctrine and not mine, from the subordination and relation of the soul to the body, and of temporal things to spiritual, it necessarily followeth, that the Pope hath power not only to command or impose temporal things, but also to dispose of temporal things, not only to enjoin temporal penalties, but also to punish temporally by depriving men of their temporals, the Reader would presently have perceived both the weakness of his argument, and the sufficiency of my answer. 9 For it is very apparent, and my Adversary knoweth it right well, that I always denied, that either from the subordination, subjection, or relation of temporal things to spiritual things, of temporal ends to spiritual ends, of temporal power to spiritual power, of temporal Princes to spiritual Pastors, or from any other ground, rule, or principle, it doth necessarily follow, that the Pope as Pope, and by his Pastoral office, hath power to dispose of temporal things, to depose temporal Princes, to inflict temporal punishments, or which is all one, to punish temporally by way of temporal constraint, as by depriving any man of his goods, liberty, or life, although I ever granted, that the Pope as Pope hath power to command or impose temporal things, and to enjoin corporal or temporal punishments in order to spiritual good, or, which is all one, so far forth as temporal things are to serve spiritual things, that is, are to be used to the honour of God, and the good of souls: and to compel, by the inflicting of spiritual censures or punishments, all Christians to obey his just command. And therefore with good reason, and conformably to my own doctrine I granted the consequence, if it were understood of the power to command temporals, and also denied it, if it were understood, as my Adversary must needs understand it, of the power to dispose of temporals, and to punish temporally by way of temporal constraint. Neither doth my Adversary by that Discourse, which he made in his Supplement, and now repeateth again, prove any other thing, then that the Pope by the ordinary power of his Pastoral office, may command temporal things, and enjoin temporal penalties in order to spiritual good: And therefore it had been needless to set down here his words, but that the Reader shall see that I am not willing to conceal any one of his arguments. Thus therefore he writeth f Nu. 3. : 10 Having discoursed in my Supplement, g Supplem. c. 1 nu. 65. of the written Law of God delivered to us in the New Testament, and proved thereby, that our Saviour made Saint Peter the supreme Pastor and Governor of his Church, I proved also the extension of his spiritual power to temporal things thus: The spiritual Pastor, said I, having power over the soul, must needs have authority over the body, and temporal goods or states so far forth, at , as it shall be convenient for the good of the soul, according to the rule of the Law, to wit, he that hath the greater power hath the less: By the which reason the Apostle justified his dealing with temporal affairs, yea with such as appertained to political government, when he advised the Corinthians to constitute and appoint judges among themselves, to decide their controversies, rather than to have recourse to the tribunals of Infidels. Nescitis, etc. Know you not, saith he, h 1. Cor. 6. that we shall judge Angels, how much more secular things? as who would say, Seeing we have the greater and more eminent authority, have we not also the less? if we have power over spiritual things, shall we not have power over temporal and secular things? Thus argueth the Apostle, and thereupon doubted not to intermeddle in the temporal and political government, which then belonged to the Pagan Emperors. 11 But how weak, and altogether insufficient is this Discourse of his, to prove the Pope's power to depose temporal Princes, to dispose of all their temporals, and to punish temporally by way of coercion, which is the main mark, at which my Adversary aimeth, any man of indifferent understanding and learning may easily perceive. For first, although it be true, that the spiritual Pastor hath that spiritual power, over the soul and body, which for as much as appertaineth to the power itself, and not in regard of all other things, which are requisite, that the power shall have effect, is sufficient and necessary to the eternal salvation of souls, yet that he must needs have even over the soul, and much less over the body, and temporal goods, and states all that power, which is convenient for the good of soul, as my Adversary here affirmeth, is very untrue: for this were a too too large extension of the Pope's pastoral power over the soul and body, and would clearly prove, that the Pope should have power to do miracles, as the Apostles had, and by miraculous operations to bring actually all Christians to the kingdom of heaven. For no man, as I think, can make doubt, but that the Pope to have all that power, whereby all Christians shall be actually saved, is very convenient for the good of souls. Neither will my Adversary be ever able to prove, that it is necessary to the salvation of souls, or to the government of the Church, as it was instituted by Christ to be a spiritual, and not a temporal Commonwealth, to have power to dispose of temporals, and to deprive temporal Princes of their kingdoms and lives. 12 Secondly, that proposition, he that hath the greater power hath the less, which my Adversary untruly saith to be a rule of the Law, for that it is not to be found among the rules either of the Canon, or Civil Law, is very untrue, if it be taken in those general words, and without due limitations, which my Adversary doth not declare, as might be convinced by infinite examples, whereof some may be seen in the next Chapter, where we shall treat of this Maxim more at large: and for the present this only shall suffice, that if it were universally true, it would clearly convince, that the Pope, who by the institution of Christ hath spiritual power, which is the greater power, should also have temporal power, which is the less, which my Adversary, as I think, will hardly grant, unless he will now become a Canonist, and affirm, that the Pope as Pope hath both temporal and spiritual power, and is both a temporal and spiritual Prince, which is repugnant to the common doctrine of the Divines of his own Society. 13 True it is, that if the less be taken for that, which is contained in the greater either actually and formally, or virtually, he that hath the greater power hath formally, or virtually, also the less, as because a hundred crowns is actually contained in a hundred pounds, and four degrees of heat is actually contained in eight, and heat is virtually contained in light, therefore from those rules of the law, (which rather may be called rules of natural reason for that they are grounded upon the light of nature) i De regulis juris in 6. regula 35. & 80. Plus semper continet in se quod est minus, & into to partem non est dubium contineri, The greater doth always contain in it the less, and there is no doubt but that a part is contained in the whole, we may rightly infer, that he, who can give a hundred pounds, can give a hundred crowns, and the fire, which can produce eight degrees of heat, can produce four, and the Sun, that hath power to produce light, hath also power to produce heat. But temporal power is neither formally, nor virtually contained in the spiritual power of the Pope, although it be virtually and supereminently, contained in the spiritual power of God almighty, in whom all create powers are virtually in an infinite and superexcellent manner contained. That which is objected, saith joannes Parisiensis, he that hath power to do the greater, joan. Paris. de potest. Regia & Papali cap. 17. ad 17. hath power to do the less therefore the Pope, who hath power in spirituals, hath also power in temporals, it is true in the greater and lesser which are per se subordained, as because a Bishop hath power to ordain a Priest, therefore he hath also power to ordain a Deacon: but it doth not hold in those things which are of a diverse order or kind; as because my father could beget a man, therefore he can also beget a dog: or because a Priest can absolve from sin, therefore he can also absolve from the debt of money. 14 Thirdly, neither is that true, which my Adversary affirmeth, that S. Paul by that proposition, he that hath the greater power hath the less, did justify his dealing with temporal affairs, when he advised the Corinthians to constitute and appoint judges amongst themselves to decide their controversies, rather than to have recourse to the tribunals of Infidels, which judges S. chrysostom upon this place calleth Arbiters, and accorders, or reconcilers. For S. Paul foreseeing, that some might easily object, as S. chrysostom observeth, that those Corinthians, who were newly become Christians, were for the most part rude, ignorant, and unnoble, and therefore might seem to be men unfit and unworthy to intermeddle in secular controversies, therefore to prevent this objection, he useth an argument which the Logicians call a maiori ad minus, from the greater to the less, which argument is not grounded in that maxim, he that hath the greater power hath the less, but in this, he that is worthy to have the greater power, is not unworthy to have the less. To prevent therefore that objection S. Paul argueth in this manner: Know you not that the Saints shall judge of the world? and if the world shall be judged by you, are you unworthy to judge (especially as Arbitratours) of the least things? Know you not that we shall judge Angels, how much more secular things? 15 This therefore is the force of the Apostles argument, as Benedictus justinianus a learned jesuite upon this place doth well declare. The Apostle, saith he, argueth a maiori from the greater: Bewed. justin: in 1. Cor. 6. For if the Saints are accounted worthy to be appointed judges of the whole world, who can think them unworthy to be over the meanest and least judgements? If to your judgement the world shall be subject, are you to be accounted unworthy to decide and compose the least controversies and strifes of your brethren? If we shall judge the Angels (these be the words of Photius related by justinian) how much more shall we be fit to compose the strifes and controversies which arise concerning things necessary to man's life? whereupon the Apostles argument doth well conclude saith justinian, that those who are appointed judges of the world, cannot be accounted unworthy to have charge of human judgements, if they be appointed by them who have this authority, or who may by right subject themselves to their judgements, as those, who are in suit may to Arbitratours. Neither is this repugnant, saith justinian, to the public authority of judges and Magistrates, for no man is compelled to go to the Magistrate, if by other ways he may peaceably maintain his own right. 16 Neither were those judges, whom the Apostle commanded, or advised the Corinthians to appoint any other than Arbiters, or Arbitratours in power, although we should grant, that they were to be chosen by common consent, and not by the parties only, who were in suit, which nevertheless cannot be convinced by the Apostles words. For albeit the Apostle doth not say (which is the only reason that D. Schulckenius bringeth to prove, D. Schulck. in Apol. ad nu. 269 pag. 445. that they were to be chosen by common consent) that every man must choose to himself an Arbiter, for Arbiters are not to be chosen by the consent of one only party, but by the consent of both, yet the Apostle doth not say, that the whole Church of the Corinthians is by common consent of all to choose the judges of such causes, as D. Schulckenius without any sufficient ground affirmeth, but rather Saint Paul saith the clean contrary. For these be his words: If therefore you shall have secular judgements, the contemptible that are in the Church set them to judge; wherefore the Apostle speaketh only to those Corinthians who shall have secular judgements, that is, as justinian well expoundeth, who shall have controversies & strifes to be debated, and not to the whole Church, unless we suppose that the whole Church shall be at strife among themselves, and also he speaketh with a condition, that if the Corinthians shall be at strife, they shall appoint men to decide their controversy, so that the parties, who shall be at strife, and not the whole Church, unless the whole Church shall be at strife, are, according to the Apostles command or advise, to appoint men to judge or decide their controversy. 17 But be it so, that the Apostle should not say, if you shall have secular judgements, appoint contemptible persons to judge and decide your controversies, but he should say, because it may be, and it is very like to fall out, that you shall have now and then secular judgements, therefore I will have you to choose before hand by common consent same contemptible persons to judge and decide those controversies, which shall hereafter arise among you, which nevertheless were to wrest the words of the Apostle, which of themselves are very plain, yet it is clear, that these judges were in power mere Arbiters, or Arbitratours, and had no public and lawful authority of themselves to give judgement, to which the parties were in justice bound to stand, but they received their power and authority to give judgement, and to make a final end of controversies from the parties, who were at strife, and who for the avoiding of scandal, which the infidels might take, seeing their strifes and contentions, submitted themselves to their decision and arbitrement. 18 That they were Arbiters, or Arbitratours, S. chrysostom, Chrysost. in 1. Cor. 6 Almain. de potest. Eccle. & Laica. q. 1. cap. 10. Abulens. q 96. in cap. 20. Mat. Salmeron tom. 14. disp. 9 jacobus Almainus, Abulensis, and Salmeron, a learned jesuite do in express words affirm. And also that they had no public power, but only private, and, if we may so call it, compromissorie, which they received from those private persons, who werein suit, and by their mutual promise and consent gave power to those Arbiters to judge, and make a final end of their controversies, k in Apol. nu. 271. I proved by the authority of S. Thomas, and the gloss of Nicolaus de Lyra upon that place, for that, according to their doctrine, the appointing of those arbitrary judges did nothing derogate from the subjection and obedience, which the Christians did owe to Heathen Princes, and that they were bound to appear before the Heathen Magistrate, and consequently to stand to his judgement, when they should be called to his tribunal, and that the Apostle doth only forbid the faithful Corinthians to go willingly, and have recourse to Heathen judges in those causes, which may be determined by the faithful. 19 From whence it evidently followeth, that the power of these judges was only private, arbitrary, or compromissorie, and not public, for if they had public authority to decide Secular causes without the express or consent of the Secular Prince, it must needs derogate from the subjection, which they did owe to the Secular Prince, neither could the Heathen jugdes have lawful power to reverse that sentence, which was given by those Christian judges, if the cause had b●ne before decided by sufficient and public authority of a more eminent power and tribunal: which must also be a derogation to their authority, and to the subjection which in Secular causes is due to Secular Princes. And this also Benedictus justinian doth very plainly insinuate, when he affirmeth, that by this any man may easily understand, that the Apostle doth not speak of lawful judgements, which are exercised by Magistrates, and public judges by public authority, but of those, who by the common consent (to wit of those who are at strife) are appointed deba●●rs of civil controversies: and that this right and authority of the Apostle to command human and civil things doth not repugn to the public authority of judges and Magistrates, for that no man is compelled to go to the Magistrate, if by other ways he may peaceably maintain his own right. 20 By which it is evident, that this manner of judging, which the Apostle commands, was not legal, or done by public authority, and that these judges were not Magistrates, and who had public authority. And therefore although these arbitrary judges were appointed by the declarative commandment of the Apostle for the avoiding of scandal, yet their power was only private and compromissorie, and was given them by the mutual consent of both parties, in so much, that if either of the parties who were in suit, would not have obeyed the Apostles commandment, & admitted of those Arbiters, but would have had recourse to the tribunal of the Heathen Magistrate, although by disobeying the Apostles commandment, and by scandalising Christian Religion he should have greatly offended, yet he should not have offended against justice, in wronging either of those Christian judges, or the other party that would not willingly go to the Heathen Magistrate, against which without doubt he should have offended, if he had refused to obey the sentence of his lawful and legal judge, and who had full power and authority, to decide and end the cause. 21 And by this it is very clear, that my adversaries conclusion is very untrue, to wit, that the Apostle did intermeddle in the temporal and politic government, which then belonged to the Pagan Emperor, for this had been to derogate from the civil subjection due to temporal Princes, but he did only intermeddle with the private and peaceable composition of secular controversies among the faithful Corinthians, which every Christian without any public authority, or any prejudice to the same might do, and which the Apostle by his Apostolical and spiritual power might command the Christians to do, and by spiritual Censures compel them so to do, when otherwise they should scandalise the Christian faith and religion. And this very answer did I give in my Apology to this text of holy Scripture, which was urged by Card. Bellarmine to prove, that the Pope had power to depose and put down Secular Princes, as the Apostle had power to appoint and set up new judges in Secular causes: for I denied his consequence, because the appointing and setting up of those judges did nothing derogate from the subjection due to Secular Princes, for that they were only Arbiters, or peaceable composers of secular causes with the consent of the parties who were at strife, but the putting down of Princes, or depriving them of their Royal authority, doth greatly derogate, or rather quite overthrow and abolish their temporal sovereignty. 22 To which answer of mine, D. Schulckenius only replieth, l In Apolog. pag. 444. That although these judges whom the Apostle commanded the Corinthians to appoint, had not indeed vim coactivam in foro externo, a coactive power in the external Court, and that if either party would not obey the Apostle, and go to the judges appointed by the Church, but would bring his cause to the public tribunals of the heathen Magistrates, the other party was bound there to appear, and there to debate his cause, yet they were not mere Arbiters or voluntary judges: For Arbiters are chosen by the parties, but these were chosen by the common consent of the Church, and were appointed by public authority, by the command of the Apostle, who was a spiritual Prince. Besides, none are bound to admit Arbiters, unless they will, but Christians were bound to admit these judges, and were forbidden to go to the tribunals of Infidel Princes. Moreover the Saints are not to judge the world and Angels, as Arbiters chosen by them, but as true judges, and as sitting with Christ the supreme judge. 23 But all this is easily satisfied by that which I said before: For although the faithful Corinthians were by the public spiritual authority of the Apostle commanded to choose those judges, or Arbiters, yet it doth not from thence follow, either that those arbitrary judges were to be chosen by the whole Church, and not only by the parties that were at strife, or that the Apostle, for that he was a spiritual Prince, had either himself public authority to decide secular causes, or could give the same to any other. But because the Christians were bound by the Law of God to compound their controversies among themselves, by way of arbitrament, and not to bring their causes to the hearing of Heathen judges, in case they should thereby scandalise the Christian Religion, therefore the Apostle might by his public spiritual and Pastoral power command them, and also with spiritual Censures compel them so to do. 24 And although these arbitrary judges, were to be chosen by the whole Church, and by the common consent of all the faithful Corinthians, which nevertheless can not be sufficiently gathered from the Apostles words, yet it doth not therefore follow, that they were not mere Arbiters, or voluntary judges in power, or, which is all one that they had more than arbitrary, private or compromissorie power. For it is not material by whom a public, or legal judge, or else an arbitrator, or compromissorie judge be chosen, but from whom they receive their authority to judge: as a true, proper, and public judge may sometimes be chosen by the people, as is the Recorder of London by the City, and the Chancellors of Oxford and Cambridge by the Universities, but it is the King's Majesty that giveth them public authority to judge: And Achiters, or voluntary judges may be chosen by the common consent of the people to decide by way of arbitrement, or voluntary submission all civil controversies, which shall arise among them, yet seeing that they are only Arbiters, or have only arbitrary, voluntary, private, or compromissorie power, the parties only who are at strife do give power to judge, and to make a final end of their controversies. And although abstracting from scandal none are bound to admit Arbiters, unless they will, yet if by not admitting them they should scandalise the Christian Religion, as the Corinthians did, they are bound to admit them, or which is all one, to give them arbitrary, voluntary, or compromissorie power to decide and determine their controversies. 25 True also it is, that the Saints are not to judge the world, or the bad Angels, as Arbiters, yet in what manner they are to judge, whether by only assisting our Saviour, and approving or applauding his sentence, or by being Assessores supremi judicis Christi, by sitting in seats of honour with Christ the supreme judge, as Noble men, and justices of peace do sit upon the bench, with the chief judge of Assizes, or in any other more peculiar manner, it is a controversy among Catholic Divines, although it be certain, that the Saints shall not be true and proper judges, as judges are properly taken, howsoever D. Schulckenius doth seem here to affirm the same, for that to judge, and to give judgement, doth properly signify an act of jurisdiction, and superiority of power to give the definitive sentence pro, or contra, which jurisdiction in respect of the last judgement of souls, is only communicated to Christ. m Se●. Suarez tom. 2. disp. 57 sect. 4. But howsoever it be, the argument of Saint Paul, whereby he intended to prove, that Christians were not unworthy to judge Secular causes, which he calleth the least things, is of force, as I declared before, for if they be not unworthy to judge the world and Angels, much less are they to be accounted unworthy to decide by way of arbitrement Secular causes, or the least things. 26 And whereas D. Schulckenius affirmeth, that those judges had no coactive power in the external Court, and that if one of the parties should call the other to the tribunal of the Infidel Magistrate, he were bound to appear, and debate his cause before the Heathen judge, this doth make nothing against that which I have said, but is rather a confirmation, that these judges were only Arbitratours, and voluntary judges in power to decide Secular causes. For if they had been true and proper judges, and had not only private and arbitrary power, but also public authority to judge, why should they not have (as all other true and proper judges have) both a commanding and also a coactive power either temporal or spiritual, according as D. Schulckenius will have them to be temporal or spiritual judges? And if they were true judges, and not only Arbitratours, how could the faithful Corinthians be bound in conscience to leave their tribunals, and go to a Heathen judge to have their cause decided by him, if they should be called thither although against then wills, seeing that they should thereby offend, not only by reason of scandal, but also against obedience, and against legal and moral justice, by declining the judgement of their lawful Superiors and judges, and by wronging their Adversary in drawing him against his will from the tribunal of his lawful judge, and who had good and sufficient authority to make a small end of his suit? 27 But considering that these judges, whom the Apostle commanded the Corinthians to appoint, were not lawful and proper Superiors and judges, but only Arbaratours, and consequently to whose judgement they were not bound to stand by virtue of any subjection and obedience due to them, but only by reason of scandal, whereon the declarative precept of the Apostle was only grounded, and which scandal being taken away the commandment of the Apostle doth also cease, this difficulty is easily cleared. For albeit it was very scandalous, and therefore justly reprehended by the Apostle, that the faithful Corinthians should of their own accord without any necessity (for in that case, Disp. Theol. c. 10. s. 3. nu. 10. Salmer. tom. 8. tract. 29. in evang. as I observed in my Theological Disputation out of Alphonsus Salmeron the active scandal doth cease, and if it be any scandal it is not given, but taken) go to the tribunals of Heathen Magistrates, yet it is not scandalous to appear before them when they are called, for in this case they must of necessity by virtue of their subjection appear, and so the scandal ceaseth, which would still remain by their appearing, if those judges, whom the Apostle commanded the Corinthians to appoint, had been true and lawful Superiors and judges, for than they had also been bound by virtue of their subjection, not to forego the judgement of their lawful Superiors and judges, and consequently not to appear before the tribunal of the Heathen Magistrate in derogation of the authority of their Christian Superior and judge. And this may suffice for this point. 28 Moreover we read in the old Testament, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, n Nu. 4. pa. 31 3 Reg. 18. that Elias the Prophet had power to inflict temporal punishment, yea death upon the false Prophets of Achab, whom he commanded the people to kill in his presence: as also he caused fire to fall from heaven, and consume the two Captains of King Ochozias and their troops. 4 Reg. 1. In like manner we read in the new Testament, that the Apostles S. Peter and S. Paul extended their spiritual authority to the temporal punishment of the body, when it seemed to them convenient for the glory of God, and good of souls: and therefore S. Peter stro●ke Ananias and Saphyra with sudden death, Act. 6. and S. Paul deprived Elymas the Magician of his sight, Act. 13. 1. Cor. 5. and delivered the incestuous Corinthian to the devil to be bodily 〈◊〉 and tormented for the example and terror of others, ut spiritus saluus fiat, that his soul might be saved: and the same judgements, and corporal punishments these Apostles might (no doubt) as lawfully have executed upon any Prince in the world, if he had then been a Christian, and given the like occasion. 29 But who would not wonder, that any man of ordinary judgement should from an extraordinary, and miraculous power of the Apostles, yea and of the Prophets who were no Priests, or from a special command or inspiration of God to kill men, and to do other miracles, infer that the Pope hath an ordinary Pastoral and Episcopal power to do the like: as are those examples, which my Adversary bringeth of Elias the Prophet, who was no Priest and by the commandment of God, o 3. Reg. 18. ver. 36. Abul. in 3. Reg. 18. q. 35 and not by any ordinary authority or jurisdiction caused the false prophets of Ashab to be slain, and by miracle caused fire to fall from heaven to consume the two captains of King Ochozias and their troops; and of S. Peter, who by miracle either killed Ananias and Saphyra, or foretold their death, and of S. Paul, who also by miracle deprived Elymas of his sight, or foretold his blindness, and delivered the incestuous Corinthian to the devil to be bodily vexed, and tormented, which manner of delivering men to Satan did proceed from an extraordinary and miraculous power given to the Apostles, and not from any ordinary power which was to descend to all their Successors: But of these examples I shall have occasion to speak again beneath p Cap. 6. 30 And the same judgements and corporal punishments saith Mr. Fitzherbert, might (no doubt) these Apostles as lawfully have executed upon any Prince in the world, if he had been a Christian, and given the like occasion. But first, I marvel, why he addeth that condition [if he had then been a Christian] for the example of Elymas, who was no Christian, doth prove, that the same judgements and corporal punishments they might have executed not only upon Christians, but also upon infidels. Besides, if any one will reduce those examples to a dialectical form of arguing, he will easily perceive, that they are very weak, and insufficient, not to use those his foul and unseemly words of absurd, impertinent, foolish and ridiculous, to prove, that the Pope by his ordinary Pastoral power can do the like. As that because Elias, who was no Priest, had an extraordinary commission and power given him by God to kill the false Prophets, and to cause fire to fall from heaven to consume those two Captains, and their troops therefore the Pope by his ordinary Episcopal and Pastoral office hath power to do the same in the like cases, and so of the rest, that because S. Peter and S. Paul had an extraordinary power given them, etc. 31 And all this, saith my Adversary, q Nu. 5. may be confirmed by the common custom, and practise of the Primitive Church to enjoin bodily penance to public penitents, as to attend to continual fasting and prayer, Tertull. de penitent. Ambros. ad virg. lap. sam. cap. 28. and to lie upon sackcloth and ashes (as it may be seen in Tertullian, S. Ambrose and others) whereupon it followeth, that if the Church may chastise a man in his body for the good of his soul, much more may she chastise him in his goods, and temporal state, which are ordained by the law of nature to serve both the body and the soul, as the Philosopher's touch, & namely Plato, Plato epist. 8. ad Dionys. who therefore advised a Lawmaker to procure by his laws, that the three kinds of goods (to wit, of the mind) the body, and fortune) be sought and possessed in due and ordinate manner, that is to say, that the goods of the mind be preferred before the other two, and the goods of the body esteemed only so far forth, as they may serve the mind, and lastly that the goods of fortune (which are honour, dignity, wealth and temporal states) be accounted no better than ministers and servants of both the other. 32 But first I do willingly grant, that it may be confirmed by the common custom and practice of the Primitive Church, that not only the Pope, but also inferior Bishops, yea and Priests had power to command, or enjoin bodily penances to their penitents, as fasting, prayer, lying upon sackcloth and ashes, yea and giving of alms in satisfaction of their sins, as the building of Churches, Colleges, Hospitals or Religious Houses, according to the greatness of their offence, and the quality, condition, and ability of the penitent, or to use the term of Divines, cla●e non errant, the key not erring: For if such penances should be enjoined without discretion and due regard of the greatness of the offence, or of the state and condition of the penitent, the key should err, and would not have force to bind. Secondly, I do also grant, that there is an order and subordination in worth and dignity betwixt spiritual, corporal and temporal goods, or of the soul, of the body and of fortune, and that, according to the light of nature, the goods of the soul being most worthy are to be preferred and esteemed before the other two, and that the goods of the body, bodily life, health, liberty, and such like bodily contentments are to be preferred before the goods of fortune, which are honour, dignity, wealth and temporal states, and that all of them are with due order to be referred to the service and glory of God, and to the eternal salvation both of body and soul. But what followeth from all this? 33 Whereupon I infer, saith my Adversary, r pag. 33. nu. 5.6. (according to the axiom of the law, accessorium sequitur principale) that seeing not only the body, but also temporal good, and states are inferior to the soul, and ordained for the service thereof; a must needs follow, that the Church having power and authority over the body for the benefit of the soul, hath also power over temporal goods and states, when it is necessary for the good of the soul, and for the glory of God, for the which 〈…〉 bodies, goods; states and all things else were created and ordained. And this me thinks our adversaries should not deny, seeing that their Ecclesiastical discipline admitteth not only corporal chastisements by imprisonment, but also pecuniaris mulcto and penalties. Therefore upon this I infer, that Christian Princes being sheep of Christ's flock, and consequently to be fed and governed by the supreme Pastor of the Church, may also be chastised by him in their temporal states, when it shall be necessary for the glory and service of God, the benefit of souls, and good of the whole Church, whereto all Christian Kingdoms, Isa 60. and empires are subordinate, and subject, as I have proved before out of the holy Scripture, and will prove also after a while by the very law of nature, and light of reason. 34 But first touching the consequent, or conclusion of his inference or argument, to wit, that the Pope having power over the soul, hath power also over the body and goods, when it is necessary for the good of the soul and glory of God, I do willingly grant the same, if it be understood of a power not to dispose of corporal and temporal goods, but to command and enjoin them in order to spiritual good, albeit my Adversary did understand it of both, as I showed before. But as concerning the consequence, inference or argument, which he draweth from that rule of the law, De Regulis juris in 6. regula. 42. The accessory followeth the principal, or as it is in the Canon law, Accessorium naturam sequi congruit principalis: It is fit, or convenient that the accessory follow the nature of the principal: which rule, as the Gloss there affirmeth, is taken from that rule of the Civil law, ff. de Regulis juris regula 138. Cum principalis causa etc. When the principal cause is not consisting, for the most part neither those things that follow have place, there can be no convincing, or demonstrative argument (as all my adversaries arguments must be, if he will prove by them, that the oath cannot with a safe and probable conscience be taken by any Catholic, and that the doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes is a point of faith) be drawn from that general rule of the law, which hath so many exceptions, restrictions, and limitations, and which are not as yet made sufficiently known by the Lawyers, as neither what is universally meant by Accessory, and what by Principal, and what is to follow the nature of the principal. 35 And therefore not without cause doth the rule of the Civil law, from which this rule of the Canon law is taken, adjoin that word [plaerunque, for the most part] and the rule itself of the Canon law, doth not absolutely say, that the Accessory must follow, or doth follow the nature of the principal, but it is fit or convenient, that the accessory do follow the nature of the principal, to signify, that it doth not always, and of necessity but for the most part, and of congruity follow the principal, and that judges ought for the most part follow this rule in their judgements, if they have no special reasoned meaning 〈…〉 to the contraries And therefore, as the marginal Gloss upon the Civil law doth well observe, s Leg. Et si is quem Cod. de praedijs & alijs. etc. The accessory doth not follow his principal, when in the accessory there is not the same reason, which is in the principal. 36 Secondly therefore, I would gladly know of my Adversary, whether he will have this rule to be grounded only in human law, and hath it force and strength only from thence, so that if the Civil, or Canon law had not made and ordained that rule, it would not be of force and validity, or else it is grounded also in the law of God, or nature. If he grant the first, as commonly the Lawyers do, and therefore some things, which seem of their own nature to be accessory, as a saddle, and bridle are to a horse, are not accessory according to human law, and therefore he that selleth a horse, doth not consequently sell the bridle and saddle, and somethings, which are not accessory of their own nature, as a dowry is not necessarily annexed to marriage; are made accessory according to human law, and therefore he that marrieth a woman with the consent of her parents, hath right to a dowry, and the parents are bound by the Civil Law to give a dowry, if they be able: wherefore the Gloss upon the aforesaid rule of the Civil law doth observe, that the word [plaerunque, for the most part] was purposely added to that rule of the law, for that sometimes that rule doth fail, to which purpose he allegeth many texts of the Civil law. If my Adversary, I say, will grant the first, he can not but easily perceive, that there can no forcible argument be drawn from the aforesaid rule to prove, that the Pope by the institution of Christ hath a disposing power over the body, and over corporal and temporal goods, because he hath power over the soul; both for that the aforesaid rule is not generally true, and especially, as I observed out of the Gloss, when in the accessory there is not the same reason which is in the principal, as there is not the same reason, that a spiritual Pastor can dispose of the body, and of corporal or temporal goods, because he can dispose of the soul and of spiritual goods, but chief for that our Saviour Christ gave to S. Peter and his Apostles all their spiritual and Pastoral power long before that rule of human law was ordained, and whether it were ordained before or after, it is manifest, that our Saviour was not tied to give any power to S. Peter and the Apostles by force and virtue of any human law, neither can the institution of Christ depend upon any rule, which is grounded only in human law. 37 But if my adversaries meaning be, that the aforesaid rule, The accessary followeth the principal, is grounded in the Law of God, or nature, so that abstracting from all human laws, yet either by the institution of Christ, or by a necessary sequel or consequence drawn from the light of natural reason, it is always true (I say always true, for otherwise if the rule be not generally true, there can no invincible argument be concluded from that rule to prove, that he who hath the principal, must of necessity have the accessary, or who hath power over the principal, must of necessity have power over the accessary) then this rule may rather be called a rule, or Maxim of Logic, than a rule of Law, and it is taken from that Topike place, which the Logicians call, The place of Antecedents, and in sense it is all one with this dialectical axiom, Posito antecedenti necesse est poni consequens, the Antecedent being put, the consequent must of necessity be put, or follow; or if we call the antecedent the principal, and the consequent, the accessary, the principal being put, the accessary must of necessity follow, or which is all one, the accessory doth necessarily follow the principal. 38 But in this sense neither can bridles be said to be accessary to horses, for that horses, can consist without bridles, neither can any separable accident (to use the Logicians term) be said to be accessary to the substance, and so neither music, physic, or any other Art can be said to be accessary to the soul, for that the soul can consist without any of these Arts, neither can the mortal body itself be said to be accessory to the immortal soul, for the soul can consist without the body, neither can the goods of fortune, as honour, dignity, riches, earthly kingdoms, etc. nor the goods of the body, as health, liberty, and other bodily contentments be said, as my Adversary would have them, to be accessary in any man to the good of his soul and his eternal salvation, which is the last end, to which he ought to refer all his corporal and temporal goods and miseries, for that any man may attain to eternal salvation, and have spiritual and justifying grace, which is the only means to attain thereunto, without any worldly riches or preferments, and without any bodily comforts, and contentments, albeit in another sense all the former inferior things may be called accessary, for that they are ordained and referred to the other more worthy, noble, and principal things. 39 Nevertheless I do not deny, as I have often said, that Christ our Saviour hath given to Saint Peter and his Successors sufficient power to govern his Church by spiritual means, and consequently power to command both spiritual and temporal things in order to spiritual good, and to chastise the transgressors of his just command with spiritual and Ecclesiastical Censures, for that all these are spiritual means, and comprehended in spiritual government: And because the commanding of spiritual and temporal things in order to spiritual good is by the institution of Christ annexed to spiritual government, or the power to command temporal things, which is the less noble, and therefore may be called accessory, is by the institution of Christ annexed to the power of commanding spiritual things, which being the more noble, may be called the principal: therefore from that maxim of the Logicians there may be drawn a good argument, supposing the institution of Christ, that if the Pope hath power to command spiritual things in order to spiritual good, he hath power also to command temporal things in order to the same spiritual good, not for that temporal things are per se, and of their own nature subject and subordained to spiritual things, except only in worth and nobility, or that temporal things are the accessory, and spiritual things the principal, taking accessory, and principal, as I have before declared, but for that the power to command spiritual things is the principal, or antecedent, and the power to command temporal things in order to spiritual good is the accessory or consequent, and by the institution of Christ annexed to the power of commanding spiritual things. 40 But for all this I utterly deny, that the power to dispose of temporal goods is by the institution of Christ annexed to spiritual government, or to the Pope's power of commanding either spiritual or temporal things, for that the disposing of temporal things, for what end soever it be, is not a spiritual but a temporal action, and doth belong to a temporal or civil power, which by the institution of Christ hath it acts, offices, dignities, means, and ends distinguished from the spiritual power: both which, as they are supreme in their degree and order, and consequently independent one of the other in those things, which are proper to either of them, so they cannot intermeddle with the actions of each either: and as the supreme spiritual power doth reside in spiritual Pastors, so the supreme temporal power doth reside in temporal Princes: and as spiritual Pastors are by spiritual power, spiritual laws, spiritual actions, and spiritual means and punishments bound to bring all men, as much as lieth in them, to everlasting happiness, so also Christian Princes, are bound, as much as lieth in them, by temporal power, temporal laws, temporal actions, and temporal means and punishments to bring their subjects to the kingdom of heaven, which is the last end, to which all Christians ought to refer all that they have, or are. 41 Wherefore if that, which Mr. Fitzherbert doth lastly infer, that Christian Princes being sheep of Christ's flock may be chastised by the supreme Pastor of the Church in their temporal states, be so understood, that he may by way of direction or command enjoin them temporal penalties or punishments, as to fast, to pray, to give alms or the like in satisfaction of their sins, or for some other great spiritual good, this is very true, and I have affirmed the same too too often; and this only he hath proved by this Discourse which he hath here repeated out of his Supplement, albeit this be not the mark, at which he aimeth, and which he pretended to prove: for as I have showed before, Nu. 6. his chief drift and purpose was to prove, that the Pope hath power not only to command temporals in order to spiritual good, but also to dispose of temporals, not only to command christians, that in satisfaction of their sins or in defence of the Church they will dispose of their temporal goods according to the quality of their offence, and the necessity of the Church shall require, and their ability doth extend, but also to deprive them of the right, power, and dominion, which they have over their temporal goods and states, if they shall refuse to obey his just command, which my Adversary by this Discourse in his Supplement hath not, as you have seen, so much, as probably confirmed, and nevertheless, as I have often said, not only probable arguments, but convincing authorities, or demonstrations are required to prove his doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes, and to dispose of their temporals, to be certain, and a point of faith, and that the oath cannot lawfully, and with a safe conscience be taken by any Catholic. And thus much concerning the Discourse which Mr. Fitzherbert hath made in his Supplement. Now you shall see what from thence he doth infer. 42 Thus did I discourse, saith he, u Pag. 34. nu 7 and argue in my Supplement, whereby my Adversary Widdrington may perceive first, what I mean by the accessory, and by the principal; as that the soul of man, and the service, and glory of God are the principal, and that the accessary is the body, goods, and all temporal states whatsoever, because they are subordinate to the soul, and ordained for the service thereof, and for God's glory. 43 And my Adversary also by that, which I have here answered to his Discourse may perceive, that although the soul of man, and the spiritual good thereof, and the service and glory of God may in some sense be called the principal, and bodily and temporal goods the accessory, for that they are the less worthy, and less noble, and therefore though not of their own nature referred, yet by the intention and will of man ought to be referred to the eternal good and salvation of the soul, as to the last end of man, in which sense temporal good may be said to be subject and ordained to the supernatural good of the soul, whereof I have treated more at large above in the second part: Yet in that sense, as antecedent and consequent, principal and accessory are taken in that maxim, the spiritual good of the soul, eternal salvation, and the supernatural service and glory of God cannot be called the principal or antecedent, nor corporal goods and temporal states, as health, wealth, honour, etc. the accessory or consequent, for that God may be served and glorified, and the soul saved, without having any such corporal, or temporal contentments, yea rather they do hinder then promote the good of the soul, for that according to our saviours own words, x Matth. 19 A rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of heaven: For they y 1. Tim. 6. that will be made rich, fall into tentation and the snare of the Devil, and many desires unprofitable and hurtful, which drown men into destruction and perdition; and By many tribulations z Act. 14. we must enter into the kingdom of God. 44 Neither did I desire my Adversary to declare, what he understood in particular by the names of principal and accessary, for I knew right well, that he took the good of the soul for principal, and the goods of the body and of fortune to be the accessary, for that they are referred and ordained to the good of the soul, in which sense the words principal and accessary are not taken in that maxim, as I showed before, and it will more clearly appear beneath, but I desired him to declare, what the Lawyers understood in general by the names of principal and accessary in that rule of the Law, for that the nature and definition of principal and accessary being once known, we might the better descend to particulars, and more easily perceive whether the good of the soul was to be taken for principal, and all other corporal and temporal goods for accessary in that rule of the Law, and withal he should also have explained, if he had meant to clear and satisfy the understanding of his Reader, what the Lawyers understood by those words, [to follow the nature of the principal] all which my Adversary hath, as you have seen, neglected to declare. 45 Secondly, Widdrington may see, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, a Pag. 34. nu. 8 the force and validity of my consequence, to wit, because the Church hath power over the soul, (which is the principal) therefore it hath power also over the accessory, that is to say, over the body, temporal goods, and states, when it is necessary for the good of the soul, and the glory of God, for which our souls, bodies, goods, states, and all things else were ordained. 46 And he also may see, in what manner his consequence is of force, if it be only understood of a power to command temporal things in order to spiritual good, to wit, not for that the Church having power over the soul (which he calleth the principal) must also have power over the body and temporal goods, (which he calleth the accessory) when it is necessary for the good of the soul, and the glory of God, because temporal goods and states are not necessary for the good of the soul, and the glory of God, but rather lets, and hindrances thereof, seeing that souls may be saved, and God glorified without the enjoying of such corporal or temporal goods, and therefore temporal goods, and states can not rightly be called the accessary or consequent, as accessary or consequent aught to be taken in that maxim: But the force of his consequence can only consist in this, that because Christ our Saviour hath given to Saint Peter and his Successors, sufficient authority to govern the Church by spiritual means, and in order to spiritual good to command not only spiritual things, which is the more noble and principal, but also temporal things, which power is the less noble, and so by the institution of Christ annexed to the spiritual power of governing the Church, and of commanding spiritual things, for which cause it may well be called the accessary or consequent, therefore from that rule, or maxim not of the law, but of the Logicians, The accessary, or consequent doth necessarily follow the principal or antecedent, it may be well inferred, that the Pope having power to command spiritual things, hath also power to command temporal things in order to spiritual good, for that this power to command temporal things, is by the institution of Christ annexed and adjoined to the spiritual power of governing the Church and of commanding spiritual things: I say, by the institution of Christ, for that there is no absolute, necessary, or natural connexion betwixt the power to command spiritual things and temporal things: and therefore it was in our saviours absolute power and choice to have granted to Saint Peter and his Successors a power to command only spiritual things and not temporal, even in order to spiritual good, as he hath granted him a power to dispose only of spiritual things and not of temporal, but the disposing of temporal things for what end soever it be, he hath left to the temporal power of Secular Princes, who in temporals acknowledge no Superior on earth. 47 Thirdly, Widdrington may note his absurdity, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, b Nu. 9 pag. 34 in denying the consequence, and yet granting it in effect. For granting, as he doth, that the body, and temporal goods are ordained to serve spiritual things, Supra nu. 1. and that therefore the Pope hath authority to command corporal and temporal things in order to spiritual, he granteth consequently, as much as I require, to wit, that the Pope hath power to punish corporally and temporally, when it shall be convenient for the good of souls, and God's glory: for he can give no sufficient nor probable reason why the Pope can do the one, and not the other, seeing that it can not be denied, but that the Church hath always used to enjoin bodily penance to her penitents, as fasting prayer, and lying upon sackcloth and ashes, which was usually imposed even in the primitive Church, Supra. nu. 5. as I showed in the place alleged a little before out of my Supplement. 48 Whereupon I infer, saith he, c nu. 10. that if the Church may punish a man in his body for the good of his soul, it may punish him in his goods to the same end, seeing that temporal goods are inferior to the body, and ordained for the service of the body and soul, Supra. nu. 5. as I have before declared by the opinion of the Philosophers themselves. But because he will give me a better occasion hereafter d infra cap. 5. nu. 1. 2. etc. 39 Item cap. 6. nu. 13. 14. 15. 16. & seq. to treat more amply of this point, and to confute a frivolous distinction of his, of the power to command corporal things, and to punish corporally, I will now say somewhat to the instances, that he bringeth against my consequence which he impugneth, by drawing two other consequences from the same principle, and confronting them with mine to show some absurdity therein. 49 But Mr. Fitzherbert may also note, that I have committed no absurdity in denying absolutely the consequence, and also granting it with a condition, for so I do not grant it in that sense wherein I do deny it. I grant that the consequence is not in vain if it be understood of the Pope's power to command temporals in order to spiritual good, but because my Adversary did understand it not only of the Pope's power to command temporals, but also to dispose of temporals, and to inflict temporal punishments, or punish temporally, not only by the way of command, but also by the way of temporal constraint, therefore I did absolutely deny his consequence. And therefore albeit I did grant this consequence, The accessory or consequent followeth the principal or antecedent, (being so understood, as I declared before) therefore the Pope having power to govern the Church by spiritual means, and to command spiritual things in order to spiritual good, hath consequently (supposing the institution of Christ) power also to command corporal, and temporal things in order to the same spiritual good, yet I did not grant these consequences; The accessary or consequent followeth the principal or antecedent, therefore the Pope having, by the institution of Christ, power to command spiritual things in order to spiritual good, hath consequently power to dispose of temporal things in order to the same spiritual good, nor this: The accessory or consequent followeth the principal or antecedent, therefore the Pope having power to dispose of spiritual things in order to spiritual good hath consequently power to dispose of temporal things in order to the same spiritual good. 50 Observe therefore, good Reader, how cunningly Mr. Fitzherbert, to make thee imagine, that my answer is absurd & repugnant to myself, endeavoureth to delude thee, and to cast a mist before thine eyes, whilst he affirmeth, that I granting, that the body and temporal goods are ordained to serve spiritual things, and that therefore the Pope hath authority to command corporal and temporal things in order to spiritual good, do consequently grant so much, as he requireth, to wit, that the Pope hath power to punish corporally and temporal when it shallbe convenient (a large extension of the Pope's spiritual power to deprive Princes of their kingdoms) for the good of souls, and God's glory: as though, forsooth, he requireth nothing else, but that the Pope may only command temporal things and not dispose of temporal things, may punish corporally and temporally by way only of commanding or enjoining temporal and corporal penalties, and not also by inflicting them, or by way of temporal coercion, and by depriving Christian Princes and subjects of their temporal states and corporal lives, whereas the whole scope of his Discourse, as I showed before, and concerning depriving them of their lives you shall see beneath, e Nu. 65. tendeth to prove the clean contrary: and in this very place he plainly signifieth as much, in promising to confute beneath a frivolous distinction of mine, as he termeth it, of the power to command corporal things, and consequently corporal punishments, and of the power to punish corporally, not by the way of command, for this power I have granted above an hundred times, but by way of corporal coercion and constraint: Which distinction doth break the neck of a great part of his Discourse, and also declareth the true state of the main question betwixt him and me, and therefore he might have done well having so fit an occasion offered him to have confuted in this place that distinction, and not to leave his Reader in suspense touching this point, which is the main controversy betwixt him and me, and which distinction being once overthrown, and proved to be frivolous, this whole question concerning the Pope's power to depose Princes and to inflict temporal and corporal punishments would presently be ended. 51 But the plain truth is, that neither in the fift chapter (for there he barely repeateth what he said here concerning this distinction) nor in the sixth chapter doth he bring any one probable proof to confute this distinction, as I will clearly show in that place. In the mean time without interrupting the order, which he observeth in his Chapters, and withal not to leave thee, good Reader, altogether in suspense, thou mayest easily gather some ground and reason of this distinction, partly from that, which hath been said a little before, partly from the words which I related out of S. Bernard, See above, part. 2. cap. 8. that the Pope may command, but not use the material sword, and partly by the comparison, which Cardinal Bellarmine out of f See above, part. cap. 9 S. Gregory Nazianzene did make betwixt the soul and body, and betwixt the spiritual and temporal power or common wealth. For as the soul hath power to command coporall actions for the good both of the body and soul, but she hath not power of herself without the concurrence of the body to do or exercise corporal actions even for the good of the soul, so also the spiritual power or common wealth may command temporal actions in order to spiritual good, but she cannot of herself without the concurrence of the temporal power exercise any temporal action belonging to temporal government, although it be never so much with order or reference to spiritual good: neither doth the reference of a temporal or bodily action to a spiritual end alter, or change the nature of the action, for as a bodily action, although it be done for the good of the soul, is still a bodily action, and doth not by that reference become a spiritual action, so a temporal action, although it be done for a spiritual end, doth still remain a temporal ●●tion, and virtue and vice may be found as well in temporal, as in spiritual actions. 52 Now you shall see, how sound Mr. Fitzherbert impugneth the two instances I brought against his consequence, which were these: The accessory followeth the principal, therefore he who is Lord of all horses is Lord of all bridles: The Pope hath power over the soul of a Prince, and therefore over his life. To which he replieth in this manner. g Pag. 35. nu. 11.12. But of these two instances I must needs say, that the former is ridiculous, and the later malicious; for by the former he impugneth himself, and not me: You have heard him before admit my consequence, so that it be understood of power to command corporal things in order to spiritual; for he saith that my consequence is vain except it be understood in this manner, and therefore being understood so, he alloweth it for good. And if we understand it so then it must needs follow according to his own ground, that he who is Lord of all horses (which are the principal) may command all bridles, because they are the accessory. 53 Now then he must either grant his own argument or deny it; if be grant it, he proveth nothing thereby against me, but rather fortifieth my consequence (which is, as he himself relateth it, that the Church having power over the soul, hath power also over the body and goods, because the accessory followeth the principal) If he deny it, he denieth his former grant, which was, as you have heard, that whosoever hath power to command the principal, may command the accessory, for seeing that all horses are the principal, and all bridles the accessory (according to his own supposition in his argument) he that denieth the Lord of all horses to be the Lord of all bridles, denieth that he who hath power to command the principal may command the accessory, which is the same that he hath granted already, as you have heard; so as I see not to what purpose this his argument serveth, but to discover his own folly, and yet forsooth he will have us to believe in any case, that all his arguments are probable at least. 54 But I must needs say, good Reader, that my Adversary hath small reason, for these two instances, which I brought against that rule, or maxim, The accessory followeth the principal, as it was understood by him, to use such undecent terms, for whose folly is discovered, and who is the ridiculous and malicious, you shall forth with perceive. It is true, that I granted the consequence not to be vain, if it were only understood of a power in the Pope to command spiritual things, and to punish temporally by way of command in order to spiritual good: but from hence it doth not follow according to my ground, but according to his own, that he who is Lord of all horses, may consequently command all bridles, yea and it followeth according to his ground, that he who can dispose of all horses, can dispose of all bridles, and that he who buyeth all horses, doth consequently buy all bridles: For first, by his consequence he doth intent not only to prove, that the Pope hath power to command temporal things, or to punish temporally by way of command, but also to dispose of temporals, to depose temporal Princes, and to inflict temporal punishments, as I showed before h Nurse 6. and he in the next paragraphes doth expressly affirm i Nu. 13.14.15.16. . Secondly, according also to his own ground, and not mine, a bridle is accessory to a horse, for that it is ordained to serve a horse, for which cause he affirmeth, that temporal things are accessory to spiritual things, for that they are ordained to serve spiritual things. And therefore according to his own ground these consequences are good: The accessory followeth the principal, therefore he who is Lord of all horses is Lord of all bridles, therefore he who can command all horses can command all bridles, therefore he who can dispose of all horses can dispose of all bridles, therefore he who buyeth all horses, which are the principal, must consequently buy all bridles, which are the accessory. 55 But I do not grant, that a bridle is accessory, or consequent to a horse, or that corporal and temporal goods are accessory or consequent to the spiritual good of the soul, in that sense as accessory is and aught to be taken in that maxim, The accessory or consequent must follow the principal or antecedent, or which is all one, if the principal or antecedent be supposed or granted, the accessory or consequent must of necessity follow: and my reason is, for that a horse can be without a bridle, and the spiritual good or life of the soul can be without corporal goods, or temporal honour and riches, yea and better without them, then with them. Nevertheless I do grant, that the power to command temporal things in order to spiritual good is, according to the institution of Christ, accessory or consequent to the power to command spiritual things in order to spiritual good, for that both of them are, by the institution of Christ, connected and conjoined in the spiritual Pastor of the Church: and because the power to command spiritual things is the more noble and worthy, and the power to command temporal things the less noble and worthy, as spiritual things are more noble than temporal, therefore the power to command spiritual things may be well called the principal, and the power to command temporal things the accessory, and which, by the institution of Christ, doth follow the first and more noble power as the principal. 56 And by this, that Dilemma, which he maketh, is easily answered. For I grant the consequence in that form of words, as he setteth it down, in one sense, and I deny it in an other. I grant it, if it be understood of the Pope's power to command temporals, and to enjoin temporal penalties in order to spiritual good, and if he had intended nothing else then this, I should indeed have proved nothing against him, but should have fortified his consequence; But because in his consequence he spoke of a power in the Church in general over the soul, body and goods, therefore the Church, saith he, having power over the soul, hath power consequently over the body and goods, which power may be understood not only of a power to command, but also to dispose, not only to enjoin spiritual and temporal punishments, but also to inflict them, and because the Pope in order to spiritual good hath a power not only to command spiritual punishments, but also to inflict them, and by a juridical sentence to deprive men of certain spiritual goods and benefits, therefore by his consequence it might seem to be rightly inferred, that the Pope hath also in order to spiritual good a power to dispose of the body and of temporal goods, even as temporal Princes have in order to temporal good a power not only to command, but also to dispose thereof, and to deprive by a juridical sentence their subjects of their temporal goods, and also of their corporal lives, and because my adversaries drift and meaning was to prove thus much by his consequence, therefore in this sense, which his words did bear, and he also intent, I did absolutely deny his consequence. Now what repugnance or contradiction, trow you, can all his skill in Logic (although it were far greater then most men that know him suppose it to be) find in granting his consequence in one sense, and denying it in an other, and whose folly is discovered, and whether my instance or his Reply be ridiculous I dare adventure to remit even to his own judgement. 57 But my Adversary perceiving, as it seems, that according to the vulgar axiom, ducere ad inconueniens non est solvere argumentum, to draw one to an inconvenience is not to solve the argument, endeavoureth to answer my instance, abstracting from my grant: But let us set aside, saith he, k nu, 13. pag. 36. widdrington's grant, and consider how probable is the instance that he maketh against me by this argument considered in itself, and compared with mine. The accessory, saith he, followeth the principal, and therefore he who is Lord of all horses is Lord of all bridles, which no doubt is true, if he speak of such a one, as hath a supreme dominion, or power, as I do in my argument, when I speak of the Pope, who being supreme head of the Church, and in that respect having the direct charge of men's souls, hath also indirectly the care and charge of whatsoever is accessory to the soul, and subordinate thereto, so far forth, I mean as is requisite for the good of souls: as also in like manner a supreme temporal Prince, albeit he be not directly the Lord of all horses and bridles in his kingdom or State, yet having directly the charge and care of the whole common wealth, he may dispose not only of all the horses, but also of all the bridles in the commonwealth, when it shall undoubtedly be convenient, and necessary for the public good thereof. 58 True it is, that this consequence, The accessory, or consequent doth necessarily follow the principal or antecedent, therefore a supreme temporal Prince, who is Lord of all horses is also Lord of all bridles, or which is all one, who may for the common good dispose of all the horses in his kingdom, may also for the same good dispose of all the bridles, is a true and good consequence, but not for that a bridle is accessory or necessarily annexed, and consequent to a horse, as my Adversary affirmeth; for than it must be true not only in a Prince, but also in all other men, who have power to dispose of the principal: and moreover this consequence would also be good, The accessory followeth the principal, therefore a supreme temporal Prince, who buyeth all horses, which according to my adversaries doctrine are the principal, must consequently buy all bridles, which are the accessory: But the aforesaid consequence is therefore good, for that to be a supreme temporal Lord of all bridles is accessory or consequent to be a supreme temporal Lord of all horses, which is the more noble, principal, or antecedent, and so the power in a temporal Prince to dispose of all horses is necessarily connected with his power to dispose of all bridles. 59 Wherefore, according to my opinion, who do not make bridles to be accessary to horses in that sense, as accessary is taken in that maxim, but a supreme power to dispose of all bridles to be accessary, or consequent to a supreme power to dispose of all horses, for that a supreme power to dispose both of horses and bridles, is necessarily included in a supreme power to dispose of all temporal things, as a part in the whole, the aforesaid argument, speaking of a supreme temporal Prince is good, not only vi consequentis (to use the terms of Logicians) by virtue of the consequent, but also vi consequentiae, by virtue of the consequence, or, which is all one, not only the consequent is true, but also the consequence is good. But he that will grant the argument to be good in regard that bridles are accessory to horses, as my Adversary doth, he can not maintain that argument to be good in a supreme temporal Prince by virtue of the consequence, or, which is all one, by virtue of that maxim, The accessory followeth the principal, but by virtue of an other maxim, which is, that every part is contained in the whole, and therefore a temporal Prince, who for the common temporal good hath power to dispose of all temporal things, hath power to dispose of all horses, bridles, and all other temporal things. 60 Now although I did grant this consequence in the Pope, that because the accessary or consequent doth follow the principal or antecedent, therefore the Pope having power to command spirituals, hath also power to command temporals in order to spiritual good, not for that temporals are accessary, or consequent to spirituals, in that sense as accessary and consequent are taken in that maxim, but for that a power in the Pope to command temporals in order to spiritual good, is, by the institution of Christ, accessary and consequent to his power of commanding spirituals, yet I utterly denied this consequence, The accessary followeth the principal, therefore the Pope having power to command, and to dispose of spirituals, or to inflict spiritual punishments, hath also power to dispose of temporals, and not only to command or enjoin, but also to inflict temporal punishments, or to punish temporally by way of constraint. For although temporals are ordained to spirituals in that sense, as I have often declared, and for that cause may be called accessary to spirituals, yet as accessary is taken in that maxim, they are neither accessary to spirituals, for that spiritual good may in any man be very well without them, neither is the Pope's pretended power to dispose of temporals in order to spiritual good, and to punish with temporal punishments by way of constraint, accessary or consequent to his power to dispose of spirituals, or to punish with spiritual punishments, or Ecclesiastical censures. 61 And by this is easily answered that, which Mr. Fitzherbert saith in the next Paragraph concerning private men. And if we consider, saith he, l Nu. 14. p. 3●. also widdrington's argument even in particular and private men, it may have a very true sense, and will fortify mine; for whosoever is Lord of any horse, is Lord also of the bridles that belong to that horse, because (according to widdrington's supposition) they are accessary of the said horse, and therefore according to my axiom, do follow their principal: and the same must needs be granted in this our case, seeing that the Pope doth no otherwise dispose of temporal goods then the same do belong to particular men, whom he hath occasion to chastise for the benefit of their souls, and the public good of the Church; and therefore when he punisheth any Prince temporally, he neither doth, nor can do it in other men's goods, but only in those goods, or states, which belong to that Prince, as a Lord of a horse disposeth not of other men's bridles, but of the bridles that belong to his own horse; for as other men's bridles are not accessary of that horse, so neither are other men's goods accessary to the Prince, who is to be punished, but such goods or states only as belong to him, and may consequently be disposed of by his supreme Pastor, when his and the public good of the Church shall necessarily require it: So as you see how well Widdrington argueth for me, and therefore the probability that I see in this his argument, is no other, but that he playeth, as I may say, booty with me, and helpeth under hand to defend my cause. Thus much for the first argument. 62 But first it is untrue, that I according to my own doctrine do suppose that bridles are accessary to horses, as accessary is taken in the aforesaid maxim, but I do suppose, and that truly, according to my adversaries doctrine, that bridles are accessary to horses, for that they are made and ordained for horses, in which sense he taketh accessory in that maxim, and therefore he affirmeth, that corporal and temporal goods are accessary to the spiritual good of the soul, for that they are ordained and referred to the said spiritual good. 63 Secondly, it is also untrue, that the argument, which I made against his consequence, if it be considered in particular and private men, can have a very true sense, as it is grounded in that rule or maxim, the accessary followeth the principal, and that it doth fortify his consequence. For whosoever, saith he, is Lord of any horse, is Lord also of the bridles that belong to that horse, because (according to his own supposition, and not mine) they are the accessary of the said horse. Observe now, good Reader, how cunningly this man would shift off the argument, or instance, which I made against his consequence, and delude thee with ambiguous words. For what can any man imagine my Adversary to understand by these words [the bridles that belong to that horse] for surely no man can be so simple, as to think, that any bridle can be said to belong to a horse, as to the true owner thereof, or so proper to a horse, that the horse can not be without that bridle, for so indeed it would very well follow from that maxim, that he, who is Lord of that horse, is also Lord of that bridle, and he that should buy that horse, should also buy that bridle which belongeth to that horse. And therefore either it must be said, that such a bridle doth belong to such a horse for that the bridlemaker did make it serve such a horse, and for this respect it can not be truly said, that he, who is Lord of that horse, is Lord also of that bridle, for the bridlemaker, and not he who is owner of that horse, may be Lord and owner of the bridle: or else for that such a bridle is, for the most part, or always used for such a horse; neither for this respect, or any such like can it be truly said, that he who is Lord of that horse is consequently Lord of that bridle, and can dispose thereof, because that bridle may be lent for the use of that horse by some other man, who is the true Lord and owner of that bridle, and consequently may dispose thereof, and not of the horse. 64 It remaineth therefore, that for this cause only, as my Adversary himself here insinuateth, such a bridle can be said to belong to such a horse, for that the same man, who is the true Lord, and owner both of the horse and bridle, and consequently hath power to dispose of them both, doth appoint that bridle to serve that horse; and although in this sense that consequent be true, to wit, that he who is Lord of any horse, is also Lord, and can dispose of the bridles, which belong to such a horse, or to speak more properly, which belong to the Lord of such a horse, for that the same man is Lord of them both, yet it is not true by virtue of the consequence, or by virtue of that maxim, The accessary followeth the principal, or for that the horse is the principal, and the bridle the accessory, in that sense as principal and accessory aught to be taken in that maxim, for than it must also follow, that he who buyeth that horse, and consequently can dispose thereof, as being the true owner of that horse, hath also power to dispose of that bridle, for that the accessory must follow the principal, which consequence is false, but the consequent is true not by virtue of that maxim, The accessory followeth the principal, but by virtue of another maxim, which is, that he who is the true Lord, or owner of any horse, bridle, or of any such like temporal thing hath power to dispose thereof. 65 Wherefore it is apparent, that my aforesaid instance, argument, or consequence, The accessory followeth the principal, therefore he who is Lord of all horses, is consequently Lord, and can dispose of all bridles, is neither true in Sovereign Princes, nor in private men, understanding, as my Adversary doth, that bridles are accessory to horses, neither doth that consequent, although it be true, not by virtue of that maxim, The accessory followeth the principal, but by virtue of this, that he who is Lord of any bridle hath power to dispose thereof, or he that is Lord and can dispose of all temporal things, hath consequently power to dispose both of all horses, and all bridles, fortify my adversaries argument concerning the Pope's power to dispose of all temporal things, unless it be first proved, as hitherto it hath not been, that the Pope is Lord both in temporals and spirituals, in such sort, that for the common spiritual good he may dispose of all temporal things, as it is certain, that absolute Princes may for the common temporal good dispose of all temporals, and private men may dispose of those goods, which are their own. And therefore the comparison, which my Adversary here maketh, betwixt the Lord of a horse, who only disposeth of his own bridles, and not of another man's, and the Pope, who to punish a Prince disposeth only of the Prince's goods and states, and not of other men's, is to little purpose, for that it doth suppose that which is in question, and which hitherto he hath not proved, to wit, that the Pope hath power to dispose of the temporal goods, states, and bodies of all Christians, and that the public good of the Church doth necessarily require, that the Pope have power to dispose of all temporals. And thus much concerning my first instance, wherein whether I have played booty with them, and helped underhand to defend his cause, and whether it be foolish, ridiculous, and repugnant to my own doctrine, I remit to the judgement of any learned man. 66 Now you shall see, how well Mr. Fitzherbert replieth to my second instance: His other argument, or instance saith he, m Pag. 38. nu. 15. 16. 17. is, as I have said no less malicious than his last was foolish and ridiculous. The Pope, saith he, hath power over the Prince's soul, ergo, over his life, because the accessory followeth the principal: wherein you see he seeketh to draw us to an odious question touching the lives of Princes. Nevertheless to say somewhat unto his argument, and yet not to enter into such an odious matter, let him make the case his own, and I will not deny, but that the Pope having power over his soul, and being withal supreme Governor of the whole Church, hath power also over his life, so far forth as it may be convenient for the good of the Church, I mean not, that the Pope hath power to take his life without just cause, or by unjust, or unlawful means (which neither the temporal Prince, who hath direct power over his body can do) but upon just occasion given by him, and according to the ordinary manner prescribed by the Ecclesiastical Canons, that is to say, by delivering him over to the secular justice, S. Leo epist. ad Turbium Ast●ricens. Episc. because the Church, as S. Leo saith, refugit cruentas ultiones, doth fly bloody punishment, and therefore the Church useth not by her own ministers to give, and much less to execute the sentence of death upon any, though she might do it, if she would; for seeing there is nothing that hindereth it, but Ecclesiastical Canons, the Pope being head of the Church, might dispense therewith, and make it lawful, if just occasion required. 67 And how true it is, that the Pope hath power over the life of any Christian (with the circumstances and limitations before mentioned) I fear me my Adversary Widdrington might find to his cost, if he were here, and would not recant his doctrine, even in this point, to wit, that the Church cannot inflict temporal and corporal punishments, whereby he impugneth not only the ancient, and universal practice and custom of the Church, but also the Ecclesiastical Canons, n Cap. ab abolendam cap. vergentis. cap. excommunicamus extra de heretic. & cap. licet de voto, & cap. 1. de homicidio in 6. & Concil. Trid. sess. 24. c. 8. & 25. cap. 3. and decrees of many councils and Popes, and finally of the Council of Trent, as I shall have good occasion to show more particularly hereafter o Inf. c. 11. nu. 3. & 9 item c. 12. nu. 6. 7. & s. . 68 In the mean time he is to understand, that granting as he doth, that the body is subordinate and subject to the soul, and that all corporal and temporal things are to serve spiritual things, yea and to be commanded by the supreme spiritual Pastor to that end (and consequently that they are accessory in the respect of the soul and good of the Church) he cannot with reason deny the consequence of my argument, to wit, that forasmuch as the accessory followeth the principal, therefore he that hath power over the soul, and all other spiritual things, hath power also over all things that are accessory thereto, namely the temporal goods, states, and bodies of all Christians, when the good of souls, and of the whole Church doth necessarily require it, as shall be further declared after a while p Cap. 5. nu. 37. & 38. item c. 6. nu. 12. 13. 14. & seq. upon further occasion given by my Adversary. 69 Hear you see, that Mr. Fitzherbert doth not deny my consequence, but alloweth it for good in those his words. And how true it is, that the Pope hath power over the life of any Christian, (and consequently of Christian Kings) with the circumstances and limitations before mentioned, to wit, so far forth as it may be convenient for the good of the Church (a large and intolerable extension of the Pope's spiritual power to take away the lives of Christian Princes and subjects) and upon just occasion given by him: and again, that the Pope hath power over the temporal goods, states and bodies of all Christians, (and consequently of Christian Princes) when the good of souls, and of the whole Church doth necessarily require it. So that you see he granteth my argument to be good, but yet to be malicious, that I speak the truth, but of malice. But truly it is strange to what virulent and slanderous speeches some intemperate spirit hath drawn the liberty of this man's pen. If he imagine, that with any colourable reply he can except against my answer, than it is frivolous, impertinent, foolish and ridiculous: if he can not, than it is malicious. God almighty, who is the only searcher of all men's hearts, knoweth herein my innocency, and that zeal to the Catholic religion, desire to know the truth, love to my Prince and country, and not any spleen or malice hath moved me to write both this, and all the rest: and therefore I humbly beseech his Divine Majesty to forgive him, and to grant him true repentance for that which is past, and that hereafter he may have a more mild and temperate spirit. 70 But wherefore, trow you, is my argument malicious? because it draweth him, saith he, to an odious question: as though, forsooth, the propounding of every odious argument, although it be never so good and convincing, must needs proceed from malice. I confess indeed, that this doctrine concerning the kill of Christian Princes is odious, abominable, false, scandalous, never taught in the Church of God before these later years; and which all good subjects ought with all their hearts to detest and abhor, and Princes more narrowly to look unto, and whether this doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Christian Princes be a point of faith, from whence such an odious, scandalous and detestable doctrine doth necessarily follow, I hope all good Catholics, and true hearted subjects will hereafter more diligently consider. 71 And how true it is, saith my Adversary, that the Pope hath power over the life of any Christian (with the circumstances and limitations before mentioned) I fear me, my Adversary Widdrington might find to his cost, if he were here at Rome, and would not recant his doctrine even in this point, to wit, that the Church can not inflict corporal and temporal punishment, whereby he impugneth etc. But first, that the Pope hath power at Rome over the lives of those who are his temporal subjects, no man calleth in question, for that he is now the temporal Prince of Rome. But this proveth not, that the Pope as he is Pope, and by virtue of his spiritual power hath authority to put any man to death. If my Adversary could bring but one example, that the Pope before he was a temporal Prince, and when the City of Rome was subject in temporals to the Roman, Grecian, French or Germane Emperors did by virtue of his spiritual power put any man to death, than he should say something to the purpose, if the facts and examples of Popes were a sufficient argument to prove their right and authority. 72 Secondly, although it be true, that the Church by virtue of her spiritual power hath authority to command, impose or enjoin corporal and temporal punishments, as I have often said, and the ancient and general practice of the Church doth confirm the same, yet that Ecclesiastical authority is, by the institution of Christ, extended to the disposing of temporals, or to the inflicting of corporal and temporal punishments, as death, exile, privation of goods, imprisonment, very many Doctors with jacobus Almain, Almainus in libro de Dominio naturali, civili & Ecclesiastico in probatione secundae conclusionis. as I have often said, do expressly deny; neither hath the contrary as yet by any approved practice and custom of the Church, or by any other convincing argument been sufficiently proved, and what my Adversary doth particularly bring to that purpose from the Ecclesiastical Canons, and decrees of any Council or Pope, and from the late Council of Trent, you shall see in those places, where he promiseth to show it more particularly. 73 In the mean time to conclude this Chapter with my Adversary, he is also to understand, that albeit I do grant, the body to be subordinate and subject to the soul, and that all corporal and temporal things are to serve spiritual things in that manner, as I have at large declared in the second part, and in the beginning of the next chapter will briefly insinuate again, and therefore to be commanded by the supreme spiritual Pastor in order to spiritual good, yet with good reason I did deny the consequence of his argument, to wit, that for as much as the accessory followeth the principal, therefore he that hath power over the soul and all other spiritual things, hath power also over the temporal goods, states, and bodies of all Christians, when the good of souls and of the whole Church doth necessarily require it, if he understand, as it is clear he doth, of a power not only to command, enjoin, or impose, but also to dispose of temporals, and to inflict temporal punishments: for that temporal states and bodily goods are not accessory to the spiritual good of the soul, and of the Church, as accessory is and aught to be taken in that maxim, because the spiritual good of souls and of the Church may be without such temporal goods and states, yea and in every particular man perchance better without them, then with them: Neither is it necessarily required to the good of souls or of the whole Church, that the Pope have power to dispose of the temporal goods, states or bodies either of Christian Princes or subjects; and therefore the Reader may also well conjecture, what he is to expect from my Adversary in the rest of his Replies, when in this, where he maketh a show to have so great advantage against my answer, that he feareth not to call it frivolous, impertinent, foolish, ridiculous, and contrary to my own doctrine, yet all his exceptions are so improbable, that his virulent speeches might very truly, if Christian modesty, and charity would permit, be retorted back upon himself. CHAP. III. Wherein widdrington's answer to Fa. Lessius argument taken from that maxim, he that can do the greater can do the less, is confirmed; and the four instances, which he brought to confute the said argument and maxim, are examined, and proved to be neither frivolous, nor impertinent, but sound, sufficient, and to the purpose: Also Cardinal Bellarmine's example touching the translation of the Roman Empire, and the argument, which D. Schulckenius bringeth to confirm the same, with two other examples of Clodoveus King of France, and of Boleslaus King of Polony, are confuted. Mr. Fitzherbert in his third Chapter proceedeth with the like bitterness, and yet with as little probability as he did in the former; For after I had made two instances against his argument, drawn from that rule of the Law, The accessary followeth the principal, I brought four instances against another like consequence of Fa. L●ssius, taken from another maxim. The like argument, said I, a In Admonia. nu. 15. Fa. Lessius doth urge. The Pope, saith he, hath power to excommunicate Kings, and therefore he hath also power to depose them, because he that hath power to inflict a greater punishment, hath also power to inflict a less. We might also conclude thus, if it were lawful to transcend from one thing to another of a divers kind and nature, The Pope hath power to excommunicate Kings, therefore also to kill them, because he that can do the greater, can do the less. A man hath power to understand, therefore also to fly. A private Priest hath power to absolve from sins, therefore also from debts. He hath power by force of the Sacraments to give the kingdom of heaven, therefore also to give an earthly kingdom. Are not these and such like goodly arguments to persuade English Catholics to cast away prodigally all their goods, and to deny their allegiance to their Prince? Thus I argued in that place. 2 Now my Adversary, after he had repeated my words, replieth against these instances in this manner. b Nu. 1. 2. & seq. Thus saith Widdrington, scoffing and cogging, as you see, and showing his malicene less than before. But how sincerely and truly he allegeth the argument of Lessius, I know not, for I have not his book, neither did I ever read it, and I make no doubt, but if it had been laid down, together with the circumstances thereof, it would have been clear enough of itself, and not have needed any defence or explication of mine: And truly although it were as bare, and naked as he makes it, yet the consequence would be good and sound for aught he saith against it, seeing he saith nothing in effect, but that which may be urged in like manner against the Apostle Saint Paul for the like argument, in his Epistle to the Corinthians, where commanding them to constitute, and appoint judges amongst themselves to decide their controversies, he said, Nescitis quoniam angelos iudicabimus, quanto magis secularia? Do you not know, that we shall judge Angels, and much more secular things? as who would say, seeing we have the greater and more eminent power, have we not also the less? if we have power over spiritual things, have we not also power over temporal or secular things? Thus argued the Apostle upon the same ground that Lessius doth, to wit, upon this principle, qui potest maius, potestetiam minus. 3 And now will this grave Sophister scoff at the Apostles argument, and say, that he might as well have concluded, that Qui potest intelligere, potest volare, He which can understand can fly? for what can be more different in kind and nature, than Angels, and secular things? and yet nevertheless the Apostle proved sound by an argument a maiori ad minus, that the Church might ordain, and dispose of secular judgements, because it had a greater power to judge of Angels: and the reason, that moved him thereto, was the same that moved Lessius, to wit, the subordination of secular and temporal things to spiritual: for albeit spiritual and temporal things are of different kind and order, being considered in their own natures, yet if they be respected and conjoined in one Ecclesiastical, or mystical body, and referred to one last end (which is God's service and glory) they are subordinate the one to the other, and therefore are not of divers orders in that respect. 4 And if he grant not this, how will he make good his own former grant, that the Pope hath power to command corporal and temporal things, quatenus spiritualibus deseruiunt, so far forth as they serve spiritual things? doth he not therein acknowledge this subordination, and thereupon grant that power in the Pope, as a consequent of his spiritual power? why then doth he deny the argument of Lessius, grounded upon the same consideration, seeing he argueth a maiori ad minus, concerning things subordinate one to another? as who would say, that for as much as spiritual things are superior in order and dignity to temporal things, and all of them principally ordained and referred to God's glory and service, therefore he that hath supreme power over the spiritual (which is the greater and higher) hath power also over the temporal (which is the less and inferior) to dispose thereof, as shall be requisite for God's glory and service, where to both spiritual and temporal things are ordained. 5 Whereupon it also followeth, that the Pope having power to excommunicate Kings, may depose them, as well because the power to excommunicate is greater than the power to depose, as also because the temporal state, whereof the Pope depriveth the Prince, is ordained to serve the spiritual, and therefore to be disposed by the supreme spiritual Pastor, so far forth as shall be necessary for God's service, and the good of the Church. So that you see the argument of Lessius (if he made any such) hath a good consequence. Thus Mr. Fitzherbert. 6 But to omit his bitter and slanderous words, the main substance of his reply in this chapter is, as it was also in the former chapter, grounded upon the subordination of the temporal power to the spiritual, and of temporal things to the eternal salvation of souls, whereof I treated at large above in the second part, which if the Reader will be pleased to peruse, he will easily perceive, that all my adversaries reply in this chapter is of little worth, and that from this subordination no sound argument can be drawn to prove, that the Pope hath power to dispose of temporal things. For albeit the temporal power may be said to be subject to the spiritual, or rather temporal Princes are in spirituals, and in temporals as they are reduced to spirituals, subject to the direction or command, and to the spiritual coercion, or correction of the supreme spiritual Pastor: And albeit temporal goods and states both of the body, and of fortune may be said to be subordained, or rather ordained to the eternal salvation of souls, although not of their own nature, as I declared in that place, but in this sense, that all Christians, as well Laikes, as Clerks, Kings, as Popes, are bound to refer all their powers and actions to the eternal salvation of their souls, in so much that as spiritual Pastors are bound to refer and ordain their spiritual power, and the use thereof to the eternal salvation of their own souls, & of those who are subject to them, so Christian Princes are bound to refer their temporal power, & the use thereof to the eternal salvation of their own souls & of their subjects: Nevertheless, considering that Christ hath left in the Christian world, or commonwealth, as it containeth both temporal & spiritual power, earthly kingdoms, & the spiritual kingdom, or Church of Christ, two distinct & supreme powers, & consequently independent one upon the other, and therefore neither subordained, or subject one to the other in those things which are proper to each other, as the disposing of spiritual things, and spiritual coercion or correction are proper & do belong to the spiritual power, so the disposing of temporal things, and temporal coercion or correction are proper, and do only belong to the temporal power. 7 So that although it belongeth to the supreme spiritual Pastor to direct and instruct a temporal Prince in his temporal power, as it is Christian, that is, to instruct him in what manner he ought to use his temporal power according to the grounds of Christian Religion, and to command him to use his temporal power, and to dispose of temporals in that manner as Christ hath ordained, to the benefit of his own soul, and of his Subjects, and also to command him that he do compel his Subjects by means of his temporal power, or with temporal punishments to the observing of the laws of Christ, and of his Church, and if the Prince refuse to obey the just commandment of his spiritual Pastor, it belongeth also to the spiritual Pastor, to compel him thereunto by means of his spiritual power, or with spiritual punishments and Ecclesiastical Censures, in that manner as the inflicting of Ecclesiastical Censures may be called a compulsion, yet the using of temporal power, the disposing of temporal things, the compelling with temporal punishments, or the inflicting of temporal punishments, and punishing temporally by way of constraint, are only proper, and do belong to the temporal power, for which cause S. Bernard, as I showed before, did affirm, that the material sword is, according to our saviours command, to be used for the Church, but not by the Church, with the hand of the Soldier, not of the Priest, at the book, or direction of the Pope, but at the command of the Emperor. 8 Now to come to my Adversary; although he hath not, as he saith, Lessius book, nor ever read it, yet I have both seen it, and read it, and I have alleged truly his express words as they lie, and I doubt not but that my Adversary may easily get a sight thereof. But howsoever, that which he saith, is very untrue, that I say nothing in effect against Lessius argument, but that which may be urged in like manner against the Apostle Saint Paul: for that Saint Paul's argument, as I showed before in the former chapter, was not grounded upon this maxim, he that can do the greater can do the less, whereon Lessius groundeth his argument, for this maxim is very untrue, unless the greater doth actually, or virtually include and imply the less, or which I take for all one, unless the greater and the less be of the same kind or order. But S. Paul's argument was grounded upon this maxim, he that is not unworthy to do the greater, is not unworthy to do the less. For S. Paul intended only to prove, as I showed before, that Christians were not unworthy to judge of secular things, because they were to judge the world, and the Angels, and therefore by the argument a maiori ad minus they were not to be accounted unworthy to decide secular causes. Neither hath every man that power, whereof he is not unworthy, but he hath only that power, which he, who hath authority to give that power, hath granted, although perchance he be not unworthy to have a greater power; as to be Lord Chancellor is a more great and eminent authority, then to be Lord Chamberlain, and yet it is not lawful thus to argue from that maxim, he that hath the greater authority hath the less, therefore he who is Lord Chancellor is also Lord Chamberlain, albeit we might rightly thus conclude, as the Apostle did, a maiori ad minus, he that is not unworthy to be Lord Chancellor is not unworthy to be Lord Chamberlain, for that he, who is not unworthy to have the greater authority, is not unworthy to have the less. 9 If therefore I had denied the Pope to have authority to dispose of temporal things, because he had been unworthy to have that authority, than I had indeed disproved the Apostles argument, but seeing that I do only for this cause deny the Pope to have authority to dispose of temporal things, for that Christ our Saviour hath not granted this authority to him, but only to temporal Princes, I do not go against the Apostles argument. Neither did the Apostle go about to prove, that the Church might ordain and dispose of secular judgements, taking secular judgements for such, as do proceed from public authority, and can not be done by private power, but he only commanded the Corinthians for avoiding of scandal to appoint arbitrary judges among themselves, which they might do by their own private power, and without any derogation to the temporal Magistrate, and in case of scandal they ought also so to do, and he only intended to prove, that because they were not unworthy to judge the Angels and the world, much more were they not unworthy to be arbitrary judges in secular causes. Wherefore Saint Paul did not intend to prove, either by the subordination of the temporal power to the spiritual, or by any other argument, that the Church might ordain or dispose of those secular judgements, which belong to temporal authority, neither can there be drawn any good argument from this subordination to prove the same, as I have showed more amply in the second part. 10 Neither did I grant, that the spiritual Pastor hath power to command corporal and temporal things, quatenus spiritualibus deseruiunt, so far forth as they serve spiritual things, for that corporal and temporal things are ordained to spiritual things, and to the eternal salvation of souls, as my Adversary untruly affirmeth, for then indeed I must also have granted, that the Pope having power to dispose of spiritual things, hath consequently power to dispose of temporal things, so far soorth as they are to serve spiritual things, but my reason was, as you have seen in the former chapter, because the power to command temporal things in order to spiritual good is a spiritual power, and agreeable to a spiritual Pastor and Governor, as he is instituted by Christ, but the power to dispose of temporal things, whether it be in order to temporal, or to spiritual good, is a temporal power, and therefore not agreeable to a spiritual Pastor, according at our Saviour hath in the Christian world or common wealth instituted, ordained, and distinguished these two supreme powers temporal and spiritual by their proper acts, functions and dignities. 11 And albeit both spiritual and temporal things are referred to one last end (which is God's honour and glory) as to the centre, to which both of them ought to tend, yet from hence it can not be rightly concluded, that the temporal power is subordained to the spiritual, or that temporal things, as temporal laws, temporal actions, temporal punishments and the like, are subordained to spiritual things, as to spiritual laws, spiritual actions, spiritual punishments and the like, but that both of them are, I do not say, subordained one to the other, but ordained to one and the self same end, which is the glory and service of God, and the salvation of souls, which is as it were the centre, to which the temporal power by temporal laws, and by disposing of temporals, and the spiritual power by spiritual laws, and by disposing, or dispensing of spiritual things ought to tend. By which it is apparent, that although it were supposed, that the disposing of temporal things, and the using of temporal power, were in some cases necessary to the honour and service of God, to the good of the Church, and to the salvation of souls, yet it can not be performed but by the temporal power, for that our Saviour Christ hath given to spiritual Pastors only spiritual power to promote and maintain by spiritual means the good of the Church, and to bring souls to heaven, and temporal means, and temporal power he hath left to the disposition of temporal Princes, whom he foresaw, and preordained to be Nurses, Patrons and Protectors of his Church. 12 Wherefore although my Adversary did endeavour, as you have seen in the former chapter, to prove by the subordination of temporal things to spiritual, that the Pope, because he hath power to command, and to dispose of spiritual things (which as he said are the principal and to which temporal things are subordained) hath power also to dispose of temporals, and thereupon grounded his argument upon that rule of the law, The accessory followeth the principal, which argument nevertheless how weak and insufficient it is, I have showed in that place, yet Lessius doth not ground his argument upon that rule, The accessory followeth the principal, but upon this maxim, He that can do the greater can do the less, from whence he concludeth, that the Pope, because he can excommunicate a King, which is the greater punishment, can also depose a King, which is the less. But this argument also is very insufficient, for that the aforesaid maxim is not generally true, as I proved by four instances, except the less be actually or virtually included in the greater, as deposition, or the power to depose a King, is neither actually nor virtually included in excommunication, or in the power to excommunicate. Therefore unless it be first proved, as hitherto it hath not been, that deposition is actually or virtually included in excommunication, or the power to depose in the power to excommunicate, it is evident, that no good argument can be drawn from that maxim, He that can do the greater can do the less, to prove that the Pope, because he hath power to excommunicate a King, which is the greater, hath power also to depose him, which is the less. 13 Now you shall see, how well Mr. Fitz. confuteth the four instances I brought against Lessius argument. This being so, saith he, c Nu. 67. pag. pag. 33. let us examine a little what goodly arguments Widdring. hath made to confront with the former, to discover the absurdity, which he supposeth therein. The first is; Potest Papa Reges excommunicare, ergo occidere, The Pope may excommunicate Kings, and therefore he may kill them: whereto I answer, as I did in the like before, that he bewrayeth herein his malice, seeking to draw us to a most odious question supposing, as it seemeth, and maliciously insinuating, that we hold and teach that the Pope having excommunicated, and deposed a King, may murder him or cause him to be murdered and that some Popes have practised the same (as some shameless Sectaries have impudently affirmed) wherein he showeth his good affection to Catholic Religion, and the reverend respect he beareth to the Sea Apostolic. 14 But if he understand nothing else by the word, occidere, but to take away the life of a delinquent by lawful means, I have answered him already, that if he make the case his own (for with Princes lives I will not meddle) I make no doubt but the Pope hath power over his life: and therefore I also say further now concerning the argument whereof we treat, that the consequence thereof is good in him and such a he: for seeing that it is a greater power to take away the life of the soul by excommunication, then of the body by temporal death, it followeth that the supreme Pastor having the greater power, hath the less, by reason of the subordination of the body to the soul, and his supreme power to dispose of the body for the good of the soul, and the public benefit of the Church. And thus much for this point. 15 But to this Reply I will at this time answer no otherwise then I did before, that in very deed it is a most odious question, and the doctrine is worthy to be hated and detested by all good Catholics, and whether such an odious & detestable doctrine can be a most plain & necessary cosequence of an undoubted point of the Catholic faith, as my Adversaries will needs have the doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes, and consequently to kill them, which by an evident, and necessary consequence followeth from the former, to be an infallible point of Catholic faith, I remit to the consideration of any judicious man. Neither is it true, that I did urge this argument of malice, God is my witness and therefore in this my Adversary doth greatly wrong me, neither do I suppose, or maliciously insinuate, that some Popes have practised the murdering of Kings, as this uncharitable man untruly affirmeth, thinking thereby to persuade his Reader, that I bear no good affection to Catholic Religion, nor any reverend respect to the Sea Apostolic; but that, which I suppose and insinuate is, that he, & the rest of his Society, who hold that the Pope hath power to dispose of all the temporals both of Princes and subjects in order to spiritual good, in as ample a manner as temporal Princes have power to dispose of all the temporals of their subjects in order to temporal good, must consequently hold, that the Pope having excommunicated & deposed by his sentence an heretical King, yea also without excommunication or deposition, if the Pope shall think that neither of them will prevail, but cause the said King to be more watchful, may, which I speak with horror, murder him, or cause him to be murdered, that is, may kill him, or cause him to be slain by all those means public or secret, by which a temporal Prince hath power to murder, or cause to be murdered, that is, to kill, or cause to be slain any traitorous subject, or manifest rebel, that cannot easily be apprehended 16 And this I did demonstrate in my d Nu. 43 & s. Apology against Cardinal Bellarmine, to which my demonstration D. Schulckenius e In Apol ad nu. 43 p. 144. answereth no otherwise then with a transeat, let it pass. For whither all this doth tend, saith he, every man seethe: neither is it hard to solve the arguments: Let them pass, as making nothing to the matter: and then he maketh a long discourse to show, that never any Pope hath been the cause of the death of any King, which is nothing to the purpose: so that in effect he granteth my argument, and Suarez f In Defence. etc. l. 9 c. 4. n. 10 See my Appen. against Suarez part. 1. sec. 9 hath now more expressly taught the same, and my Adversary also doth here plainly confirm as much: for although, forsooth, with the lives of Princes he will not intermeddle, because it is an odious question, yet he maketh no doubt, but that the Pope hath power over my life, and over the life of any Christian (mark these general words) for that he hath power to take away the life of my soul by excommunication, and consequently the life of my body by corporal death; which his reason proveth also the same of Christian Princes, who, according to his own grounds, can be excommunicated by the Pope: But I'meruaile where this man hath learned this new divinity, that the Pope hath power to take away the life of the soul by excommunication. The ancient, and true Catholic doctrine is, that excommunication doth not take away the life of the soul, but supposeth, that it is before taken away, and therefore it cannot be inflicted but for a mortal sin, and it is applied as a wholesome medicine to restore the life of the soul again, neither is it in the Pope's power to take away the life of the soul from any Christian; concerning which life, that vulgar saying of S. Chrysost. Is most true, nemo laeditur nisi a semetipso, no man is hurt but by himself. S. Chrysost. tom. 5. in libro, Quod qui seipsum non laedit, nemo laedere possit. If I should have uttered so gross and palpable an error, which no heretic, for aught I know, ever taught, what outcries would my Adversary have made against me, what nicknames would he have given me? 17 To my second instance, which was this: whosoever hath power to do the greater, hath power to do the less, therefore a man who hath power to understand, hath power also to fly; Mr. Fitzherbert replieth thus g Nu. 8. pag. 44. . But who seethe not the disparity, and widdrington's absurdity therein? for what dependence, subordination, or connexion can be imagined betwixt understanding, and flying? whereas he himself granteth a subordination of temporal things to spiritual, and therefore is also forced, as you have heard, to acknowledge a power in the Pope to command temporal things in order to spiritual whereby he convinceth himself of extreme folly in framing this argument, which hath no affinity with the other. 18 But who seethe not, that there is no formal disparity, nor any absurdity committed by me in this argument? For first, what dependence, subordination, & connexion is betwixt excommunication, & deposition. It is one thing, saith Becanus, h In Controversia Anglicana cap. 3. q. 2. nu. 1. to excommunicate a King, and an other thing to depose him, or deprive him of his kingdom; neither is the one necessarily connected with the other. But mark the fraudulent dealing of this man: Widdrington granteth, saith he, a subordination of temporal things to spiritual, and therefore is forced to acknowledge a power in the Pope to command temporal things in order to spiritual. It is true, that I do grant an ordination both of temporal, and of spiritual things to the honour of God, and the salvation of souls, in that manner as I have before declared, but it is not true, that I do either grant a subordination, or ordination of deposition to excommunication, or that by reason of the ordination of temporal things to the honour & service of God, & the salvation of souls, I do grant a power in the Pope to command temporal things in order to spiritual, (as my Adversary saith I do) but for that reason, which I have more at large declared in the former chapter. 19 Seeing therefore that there is no dependence, subordination, or connexion betwixt excommunication, and deposition, what connexion, or affinity can my Adversary require betwixt understanding and flying, to show a formal disparity betwixt Lessius argument, and the instance, which I made against it? And if he say, that, albeit excommunication and deposition, temporal things and spiritual are of a distinct kind and order being considered in their own natures, yet if they be respected as they are referred to one last end (which is God's service and glory) they are not of divers orders, but are connected in that respect: it may also be replied, that understanding and flying, and all things whatsoever are referred to God's service and glory, as to the last end, and therefore in this respect they are not of divers orders, but they have herein a coherence and connexion. If therefore by reason of the ordination and reference of excommunication and deposition to God's service and glory, it may be rightly inferred, that because the Pope for God's service, and glory, can excommunicate, which is the greater, he can also for the same end depose which is the less, for the same ordination and reference of understanding and flying to God's service and glory, it may also be rightly inferred, that because the Pope for God's service and glory hath power to understand, which is the greater, he hath also for the same end, power to fly, which is the less. 20 But secondly and principally, observe, good Reader, how cunningly Mr. Fitzherbert would shun the difficulty, and change the state of the question, & the force of Lessius his argument: For the question between me & Lessius only is, whether this consequence, The Pope can excommunicate, therefore he can depose, be good by virtue of that maxim, he that can do the greater can do the less, for this is Lessius argument: Now my Adversary altereth this question, and would make Lessius argument to be, that the Pope can excommunicate, therefore he can depose, because temporal things are subordained to spiritual things, whereas this is not Lessius argument, which I did there impugn, but it is an other framed by my Adversary and taken from an other medium, to wit, the subordination of tempotall things to spiritual, & grounded in that maxim, the accessory followeth the principal, whereof I have spoken enough in the former chapter. For Lessius his argument hath an other medium, to wit, that maxim, he that can do the greater can do the less, which I contend to be no good argument, for that it would likewise follow from that maxim, that the Pope, because he can understand, which is the greater, can also she which is the less. For as excommunication, & deposition, although they do materially disagree, for that they are of a diverse kind & order, yet they do formally agree in that maxim, he that can do the greater can do the less, because excommunication is the greater & deposition is the less, so also although there be a material disparity betwixt understanding & flying, for that they are of a diverse kind & order, yet they do formally agree in that maxim of Lessius, because understanding is the greater, and flying is the less. And therefore the extreme folly, wherewith my Adversary chargeth me, may more truly, if it were decent for me to use such undecent words, be returned upon himself, in that he taking upon him to defend Lessius argument, clean changeth the argument, & frameth an another out of his own brain, which hath a distinct medium, & is grounded upon another maxim from that which Lessius used. 21 To my third instance, which was this: He that can do the greater can do the less, therefore a private Priest, who can absolve from sins, can also absolve from debts, Mr. Fitzherbert replieth i Nu. 9 10. 11. pag. 45. that Widdrington altereth the case in making his instance in private Priests, whose power is much limited, when the argument, which he impugneth speaketh of the Pope, who is the supreme spiritual Pastor, and hath plenitudinem potestatis, a plenitude, or fullness of power; and therefore albeit we teach, that the Pope may excommunicate and depose a Prince, yet no man holdeth, that a private Priest can do either of them both, yea and we see, that in the great Council of Lateran (where the deposition of Princes was ordained to be practised in some cases) the sentence of their deposition was reserved to the Pope himself, though the Metropolitan might excommunicate him. 22 Besides that, it is to be considered concerning the absolution of sins, and debts, that as neither Priest, nor Pope can absolve from sins in all cases (as when the sinner is not penitent, or will not make restitution of fame, or goods, when he may conveniently do it) so may the Pope absolve from debts in some cases for the very same reason, and in the very same case that he may depose a Prince, to wit for the just punishment of an offender, when the same shall be very necessary for the benefit of the whole Church; for in such a case all private respects of temporal good or harm ought to yield to the common good of souls, and the public weal of the Church; as in like manner all civil obligations cease, when they are encountered, and overweighed with the consideration of some great benefit, or inconvenience to the whole common wealth, for which respect the temporal Prince might in such a case justly ordain, that a debtor should be discharged in law from the payment of his debt, whereby the said debtor should be also discharged in conscience. 23 And much more may the supreme spiritual Pastor of the Church discharge a man from all obligation in conscience to pay a debt, when the same shall be necessary for the spiritual good, and public benefit of the Church, whereto all temporal things ought to yield; so as the Pope may in some cases absolve from debts, as well as from sins; and when he cannot, the reason is such, as doth nothing derogate from his supreme authority, and power to depose Princes; and therefore this argument of my Adversary is as impertinent as the former. 24 But it is too too apparent, that I have not any way altered the case or question. For the case and question between me and Lessius is not at this present, whether the Pope can excommunicate, or whether he can depose, or whether this consequence; The Pope can excommunicate, therefore he can depose, be good by reason of the Pope's plenitude of power, but whether it be good by virtue of that maxim, He that can do the greater can do the less: and I affirm his consequence not to be good, because that maxim is not true in those general words, as it is set down. So that the only case and question between me and Lessius now is, whether that maxim, He that can do the greater can do the less, be true, and that therefore he doth from thence rightly infer, that because the Pope can excommunicate, which is the greater, he can also depose, which is the less. And that this general maxim of Lessius is not true, I proved by the two former instances, and also by this, for that if it be true, that whosoever can do the greater can do the less, as Lessius affirmeth, it doth consequently follow, that a private Priest, who can absolve from sins, which is the greater, can also absolve from debts, which is the less. If Lessius maxim had been, every Pope that can do the greater can do the less, and I would have impugned this maxim by private Priests, for that private Priests who can do the greater, as to absolve from sins, cannot do the less, as to absolve from debts, than indeed I should have altered the case, in transferring the question from Popes to private Priests, who are not contained in the subject of that maxim, every Pope, etc. but seeing that Lessius maxim is general, qui potest maius, potest minus, he that can (which includeth Clerks, and Laikes, Kings, and Subjects, Pope and Priests, and all other men whatsoever) do the greater can do the less, it is sufficient to prove this maxim to be false, without altering the case, if I can bring but one particular instance, whether it be of Pope or Priest, King or subject, wherein this maxim is not true. 25 And if I should have argued in this manner, he that can do the greater can do the less, therefore a private Priest who can build a Church can build a Chapel, would my Adversary, trow you have said, that I had altered the case, for that he speaketh of the Pope, and I speak of private Priests? and I would wish also my Adversary to call to mind, what he said a little before, that S. Paul argued from that maxim, which Lessius did, he that can do the greater can do the less, and yet I think he will not say that either S. Paul, or Lessius altered the case, although Lessius spoke only of the Pope in his consequent, and S. Paul of private men. Also I would gladly learn of my Adversary in what manner the mayor proposition, or antecedent of any argument, and consequently the argument or consequence itself may, according to his skill in Logic, be impugned without altering the case, as whether to impugn the mayor proposition of this syllogism he that was never taught Logic, cannot be a good Logician, but F. T. was never taught Logic, therefore F. T. cannot be a good Logician, it be not sufficient, without altering the case to bring this instance, Mr. T. F. was never taught Logic, and yet he is a good Logician, and therefore that Mayor proposition, he that was never taught Logic cannot be a good Logician, is not true, and so the consequence deduced from it cannot be good, which Mayor proposition whether it be sufficiently impugned or no, without altering the case, albeit I transfer the subject of the minor proposition from F. T. to T. F. Mr. Thomas Fitzherbert knoweth full well. 26 Wherefore it is sufficient without altering the case to impugn any universal proposition, which is the antecedent of any consequence, and thereby to impugn the consequence itself, which is grounded upon that antecedent, by bringing any one instance, wherein that antecedent proposition is not found to be true, although that instance be different either in subject, or in predicate, or in both from the consequent of the former argument or consequence, so that the instance be contained in that antecedent proposition as a particular in the universal. And herein Mr. Fitzherbert doth bewray his want of of Logic, as before he bewrayed his want of Divinity, in affirming, that the Pope by Excommunication doth take away the life of the soul. For if his skill in Logic had been but mean, he would quickly have perceived, that if one impugn the antecedent proposition of any consequence, or argument, by altering the consequent, he doth not alter the case, so that the predicate and subject of the consequent, which is brought to impugn the antecedent, be contained in the predicate and subject of the antecedent, as a particular in the universal. 27 And therefore I have sufficiently without altering the case confuted that maxim, he that can do the greater can do the less, by this instance of a private Priest, who is contained in that subject (he that can) as a particular in the universal, for that a private Priest can do the greater, to wit, can absolve from sins, and yet he can not do the less, to wit, absolve from debts: from whence it followeth, that the aforesaid general maxim is not true, and therefore neither the consequence of that argument concerning the Pope's power to excommunicate, and consequently to depose, which consequence is grounded upon that general maxim, can be good. By which it is apparent, that from that maxim it can not be rightly concluded, that because the Pope hath power to excommunicate, which is the greater, he hath power either to deprive Princes of their kingdoms, or to absolve subjects from their debts, which are the less. 28 Neither is the deposing of Princes, or the discharging of subjects from paying their debts necessary for the spiritual good, and public benefit of the Church, or which is all one to the salvation of souls; & although they were necessary yet seeing they are temporal, and not spiritual actions, they must be performed for the same spiritual end by temporal and not spiritual power: And therefore that argument, which my Adversary useth a maiori ad minus, that because a temporal Prince may absolve his subject from the payment of his debt, therefore much more the supreme spiritual Pastor of the Church may do the same, is of little worth, for that the disposing of temporal things, and the inflicting of temporal punishments, as is the discharging of subjects from paying their debts, do belong only to the temporal power of Secular Princes, and not to Ecclesiastical authority, which, by the institution of Christ, is not extended to the inflicting of temporal punishments, as death, exile, privation of goods, etc. but only of Ecclesiastical or spiritual censures, as I have showed more at large in the first part. 29 To my fourth and last instance, which was this, He that can do the greater can do the less, therefore a private Priest who hath power to give the kingdom of heaven, to wit, by virtue of the Sacraments, hath power to give an earthly kingdom, Mr. Fitzherbert answereth as before, k Nu. 12. 13. pag. 46. that Widdrington changeth the state of the question, transferring it from the Pope to a private Priest; for albeit this argument holdeth not in private Priests, yet it is good in the Pope, if we change the consideration of the force of the Sacraments (whereto my Adversary Widdrington ascribeth the Pope's power) to the plenitude of power, by the virtue whereof the Pope hath a supreme authority; and therefore the argument would be good thus: Potest Papa per plenitudinem potestatis, &c: The Pope may by the plenitude of his power give the heavenly kingdom, and therefore he may give an earthly, for the later being a necessary consequent of the former, is necessarily comprehended in it, because the Pope by the plenitude of his power hath as much authority and jurisdiction, as is necessary for the government and good of the Church. Whereupon it followeth, that whensoever it shall be absolutely necessary and behoveful for the Church, that he change or transfer a kingdom or Empire, he may do it, and give not only the Kingly or Imperial title, but also the right to the crown, as Leo the third, etc. 30 But Mr Fitzherbert doth also in this answer bewray his ignorance and want of Logic, as he did in the former: for it is clear, that he himself, and not I, doth alter the case, and change the state of the question. For the question is not concerning the consequent of Lessius argument, but concerning the consequence, or that antecedent proposition, and maxim, he that can do the greater can do the less, whereon his consequence or argument is grounded: and therefore by changing the consequent, the case or state of the question is not altered, when the consequent is included in the antecedent proposition as a particular in the universal: as in the former part of this argument, a Priest can give the kingdom of heaven, is included in the former part of that maxim, he that can do the greater, and the second part, therefore he can give an earthly kingdom, is included in the second part of that maxim, therefore he can do the less; for that to give the kingdom of heaven is greater than to give an earthly kingdom. And to make the case more plain to the vulgar sort, put the case that I should argue thus, Every white thing is pleasant to the taste, therefore sugar is pleasant to the taste, the consequent you see is true, yet the consequence is not good, for that the antecedent proposition is false: And if my Adversary should impugn my consequence, and prove my antecedent proposition to be false by this instance, Every white thing is pleasant to the taste, therefore chalk is pleasant to the taste, and I should reply to this instance, and say, that he altereth the case, & changeth the state of the question, in transferring it from sugar, which is sweet, to chalk, which is unsavoury, would not my Adversary, trow you, according to his accustomed manner affirm, that my reply is impertinent, absurd, foolish, and ridiculous, and send me back to learn Logic again? 32 Now you shall see, how plainly Mr. Fitzherbert, whiles he untruly chargeth me, as you have seen, with altering the case, and changing the state of the question, he doth alter, and change it himself. For albeit, saith he, this argument holdeth not in private Priests, yet it is good in the Pope, if we change the consideration of the force of the Sacraments (whereto Widdrington ascribeth the Pope's power) to the plenitude of power, by the virtue whereof the Pope hath a supreme authority, etc. But first it is untrue, and I wonder that Mr. Fitzherbert blusheth not to say, that I ascribe the Pope's power to the force of the Sacraments, seeing that I speak not one word in my instance of the Pope, but only of private Priests. And if I had ascribed the Pope's power to remit sins, and to give justifying grace, whereby we are made children of God, and heirs to the kingdom of heaven, to the force and virtue of the Sacraments, had this been, forsooth, any unsound or bad doctrine? Will my Adversary ascribe the Pope's power to remit sins, and to give justifying grace not to the force and virtue of the Sacraments, but to the plenitude of his power, as though the Pope by the plenitude of his power could without the Sacraments remit sins, and give justifying grace? If this be his meaning, all Catholics know, what Censure this doctrine deserveth, and it is in some sort agreeable to that, which he said a little before, that the Pope by excommunication doth take away the life of the soul, which is justifying grace. 32 Secondly, observe, good Reader, how my Adversary himself altereth the case, and changeth the state of the question, and the reason, or principle, whereon Lessius consequence or argument which I did impugn, was grounded. For Lessius his argument was this: The Pope can excommunicate Kings, therefore he can depose them, because he that can inflict the greater punishment can inflict the less, which proposition supposeth that general maxim, he that can do the greater, can do the less, and this maxim was the reason and ground of his consequence or argument. Now my Adversary changeth this reason and ground, and flieth to another. The Pope, saith he, may give the heavenly kingdom, and therefore he may give an earthly, but for what reason think you? I expected, that he would have yielded Lessius reason, because he that can do the greater can do the less, which reason by those four instances I did impugn, but he flieth from this reason to another, because the Pope, saith he, hath a plenitude of power, by which he may give the heavenly, and consequently an earthly kingdom. Before he affirmed, as you have seen, that the Pope having power to excommunicate Kings may depose them, as well because the power to excommunicate is greater than the power to depose, and this was Lessius his reason, which I impugned in this Chapter, as also because the temporal state, whereof the Pope depriveth the Prince, is ordained to serve the spiritual, and therefore to be disposed by the supreme spiritual Pastor, so far soorth as shall be necessary for God's service, and the good of the Church, and this is the reason, which my Adversary brought in the former Chapter, and was grounded in that rule of the Law, The accessary followeth the principal, which I impugned in that place: Now he yieldeth another reason, which is taken from the plenitude of power, which the supreme spiritual Pastor hath. 33 So that you see how he himself now changeth the state of the question, and flieth from Lessius reason, which I impugned, to wit, that he that can do the greater can do the less, to the plenitude of the Pope's power, which reason nevertheless is of small force, and it is rather petitio principij, or, a giving that for a reason, which is the question: For albeit I do not deny, that the supreme spiritual Pastor hath in spirituals a plenitude of power, that is, a full spiritual power to govern the Church, which is the spiritual kingdom of Christ, as likewise all Sovereign Princes have in temporals a plenitude of power, that is, a full temporal power to govern their temporal kingdoms, yet how far this plenitude, or fullness of spiritual power is extended, whether to the disposing of temporal things, and to the giving, or depriving of temporal kingdoms in order to spiritual good, as my Adversaries imagine, or only to the disposing or dispensing of spiritual things, as many other learned Catholics are of opinion, this is that, which is now in controversy betwixt me, and Mr. Fitzherbert, and which he taketh upon him by all laws human, and divine clearly to convince, and therefore to give that for a reason, which is the question, is to commit that fault, which the Logicians call petitio principij. 34 If Mr. Fitzherbert had argued in that manner, as Lessius did, to wit, that the Pope by the plenitude of his power may give the heavenly kingdom, and therefore he may give an earthly, because he that can do the greater can do the less, than he had not altered the state of the question, or changed Lessius medium or reason, but then I would also have denied his consequence, and have impugned that reason of maxim, by those four instances, and infinite other, which might be brought, which do clearly & directly confute and overthrow that maxim. But seeing that he flieth from that maxim, which Lessius brought for his medium or reason, to the plenitude of the Pope's power, he both altereth the state of the question, and also giveth that for a reason, which is the question: For I utterly deny, that the Pope by that plenitude of power, which Christ hath granted to his Church, can, I do not say command, impose, or enjoin temporal things, as temporal penalties, but dispose of temporal things, or inflict temporal punishments, although it be imagined, that they are necessary, as they are not, to the good of the Church and the salvation of souls, it belonging only to the temporal power of Secular Princes, whom Christ hath appointed to be Protectors of his Church, to use the temporal sword, to inflict temporal punishments, and to dispose of temporal things. 35 Wherefore, neither the plenitude of spiritual power in the supreme spiritual Pastor to give the heavenly kingdom doth necessarily infer a power in him to give an earthly kingdom, as a necessary consequent of the former, as my Adversary here affirmeth, although the supreme spiritual Pastor by the plenitude of his spiritual power hath as much spiritual authority, and jurisdiction, as is necessary for the government and good of the Church, as it is instituted by Christ our Saviour, neither is the changing, transferring, or giving of an earthly kingdom, and the disposing of all temporal things absolutely necessary for the spiritual good of the Church, or, which is all one, for the saving of souls, as also my Adversary here supposeth, from which necessity, for the most part, he draweth an argument to prove, the aforesaid power to dispose of all temporal things to be in the Pope, (although sometimes he granteth, l cap. 2. nu. 3. that the Pope hath the aforesaid power over temporal goods and States, yea and of the bodies of all Christians, so far forth, at least, as it shall be convenient for the good of the soul, and of the Church, which is a too too large and exorbitant extension of the Pope's plenitude of power to take away the kingdoms and lives of Christian Princes, and to dispose of all temporals) for that, as Card. Bellarmine himself confesseth, it is not absolutely necessary, for the good of the Church to resist the common enemy, as is the Turk. For if the Church, saith he, m lib. 1. de. Concil. cap. 10 could converse * conversari. under the most cruel persecutions of Nero, Domitian, Decius and Diocletian, why may it not also under the persecution of the Turks? And although the disposing of temporal things, the changing, transferring, giving and taking away of temporal kingdoms were necessary for the spiritual good of souls, or of the Church, yet they being temporal actions, and proper to the temporal power, as God almighty hath distinguished in the Christian world, or commonwealth, the temporal and spiritual power by their proper actions, functions and dignities, they can not be performed by the spiritual, but only by the temporal and civil power, which Christian Princes are by the law of Christ bound to use in defence of the Church, and for the necessary good of their own souls, and of their subjects. 36 Neither do those examples, or facts or Popes, which my Adversary here bringeth, or any such like, sufficiently prove a power in the Pope, as he is a spiritual Pastor, to change, transfer, give, or take away earthly kingdoms, for that it is one thing, saith Card. Bellarmine, n in Resp. ad Apolog. pag. 157. Edit. Colon. to relate the facts of Kings, (and so likewise of Popes) and an other thing to prove their power, right and authority. As Leo the third Pope of that name, o pag. 47. nu 13 Egmarth. in vita Caroli. annal Francof. anno 801. Paul. Diacon. lib. 23. Zonara's tom. 3. Annal. Cedrenus in vita Constant. & Irene. saith my Adversary, gave to Charles the great the Empire of the West, which was acknowledged by the Greek Emperors themselves to be the Pope's gift, etc. 37 But to this example I did fully and clecrely answer in my Apology, p nu. 414. & seq. to wit, that the Roman Empire was not translated from the Grecians to the Germans by the only authority of the Pope, but also by the common consent, suffrages, ordinance, decree, and authority of the Senate, and people of Rome, both Clerks, and Laikes, with the consent at least wise of all others, to whom it did belong, amongst whom the chiefest of all was the Bishop of Rome, who did not by his spiritual or Pontifical authority, which he as Pope received from Christ, cause that translation, but as he being the principal member, and citizen of Rome, and of the Roman Empire, did by his advise, consent, soliciting, procurement, suffrage and authority chief set forward that translation, and as he was Pope did by his Pontifical authority approve it to be lawful, and no way repugnant to the law of God or nature, for which causes he is said by many writers to have transferred that Empire, as the chief and principal Author, procurer, and approover thereof. 38 And this I did sufficiently prove in that place both by the grounds of Card. Bellarmine himself, and also by the testimonies of those Authors, whom he alleged. For nothing can be concluded, saith he, q lib. 2. de Rom. Pont. cap. 8. by arguments taken from authority negatively. For it doth not follow, Luke, Paul and Seneca do not say, that S. Peter was at Rome, therefore S. Peter was not at Rome; For these three were not bound to say all things, and more credit is to be given to three witnesses affirming, then to a thousand saying nothing, so that these do not deny, what the others do affirm. Seeing therefore that none at all of those thirty two Authors, whom Card. Bellarmine brought for witnesses of the translation of the Empire made by the Pope, doth deny, that the aforesaid translation was done by the authority of the Senate and people of Rome, and not only three of Card. Bellarmine's Authors, but also many more whom I cited there, do most plainly affirm, that both the authority of the Pope, and also the consent, decree, ordinance, suffrage and authority of the Senate and people of Rome did concur to that translation, more credit is to be given to them, who do affirm, that the Empire was translated by the Pope, Senate, & people of Rome, then to all the rest, although they were a thousand, who albeit they say that this translation was done by the Pope, yet they do not deny, that it was also done by the Senate, and people of Rome. Thus and much more to the same purpose did I answer in my Apology r See apology 427. & seq. . 39 Now you shall see how cunningly and insufficiently D. Schulckenius doth shift of this my answer. For whereas he is very diligent for the most part to set down my words, and text in particular, when he imagineth, that with any colourable Reply he can confute them, yet here he relateth Cardinal Bellarmine's argument drawn from the translation of the Roman Empire to the French men, but he altogether concealeth my answer thereunto, and so passeth over twenty pages of my Apology, wherein both by his own grounds, & by his own Authors, and many others I clearly proved, that this translation was done not only by the authority of the Pope, but also of the Senate, and people of Rome: and only with a flourish of words he endeavoureth to prove by a Dilemma, which, as you shall see, is neither to the question betwixt me, and Cardinal Bellarmine, and which I also answered in that place, That I must either approve Card. Bellarmine's opinion, or else clearly contradict myself in my answer. Wherefore although D. Schulckenius maketh this title of his fourteenth Chapter, The answer of Widdrington to the rest of the examples, which are taken from the facts of Leo the third etc. is examined, yet he neither examineth my answer to that fact of Leo, nor setteth it down at all, albeit he confesseth, that I have at large disputed thereof: But this is all that he replieth r Schulck. in Apol. cap. ● pag. 597. 598. . 40 And of the translation of the Empire, Cardinal Bellarmine hath exactly, sound, and diligently written three books of a just bigness, in so much that nothing doth seem can be added thereunto. Only at this time I do make this argument against my Adversary Widdrington. Either that translation was true, or feigned: If he say it was feigned, he will be overwhelmed with the voices of all Historiographers, and he will take away all human faith out of the world. But if he say it was truly done, I ask again, whether it was done justly, or unjustly? if he say it was done unjustly, first he will contradict almost all Catholic Writers: for only the Magdeburgian Heretics do blame it as one of the miracles of Antichrist: Besides that he will wrong all the Latin Emperors, who from that time have been, & shall be, as though their Empire is not grounded upon a sound foundation: Lastly, he will reprehend all the people of the West, yea all the world, who have hitherto honoured the Latin Emperor, as a true and lawful possessor of the Empire. For also the Grecians themselves with their Emperor, and the Persians, as we have related out of Bellarmine in the former Chapter, s Ad nu. 390. have acknowledged the Latin Emperors, as true and lawful Emperors. 41 But if Widdrington say that it was done justly, I demand whether it was done by the authority of the Roman Bishop, the Citizens of Rome assenting, or also requesting it, or whether it was done by the authority of the people of Rome, the Pope assenting, and crowning, and blessing the Emperor chosen by the people, or whether it was done by the authority of the Pope and of the people of Rome together. If he will say that it was done by the authority of the Bishop of Rome, the Citizens of Rome assenting and requesting it, he will agree both with the truth of the fact, and with Bellarmine, and with almost all Historiographers, and he will confirm the argument drawn from this example, which he endeavoureth to weaken. For Bellarmine doth not reject the Authors which my Adversary citeth, who do adjoin the people of Rome to the Pope of Rome in the work of the translation of the Empire, so that the true power, and authority of transferring the Empire be given to the Pope alone, and assent, desire, request, and acclamation be given to the people. But if he will say, that it was done by the authority only of the people, the Pope only assenting, and crowning the Emperor chosen by the people, or also by the authority of the people, and of the Pope together, he will most manifestly contradict himself, for that in this whole book he hath repeated a thousand times, that the people are bound by the Law of God to obey their Prince, and that neither in the case of Heresy, nor in any other case, civil obedience can by the people be devied to the Prince, whom once th●y have had and therefore that the people, who by the Law of God are subject, cannot depose their Prince. Let my Adversary Widdrington choose what part he will, and he will be compelled either to agree with us, or to contradict himself. 42 Thus you see, what a brave flourish D. Schulckenius hath made, especially to those who have not read my Apology, as though forsooth he had said something to the question which was betwixt me, and Cardinal Bellarmine, or had brought some new argument, which was not answered by me in that place, whereas it is as clear as the Sun, that this his Dilemma is a mere evasion, and shift, and altogether impertinent to the question, and that I did fully satisfy it in that very place, both by the grounds of Cardinal Bellarmine, and also by those authorities, which he alleged without contradicting myself at all. For the main question between me and Cardinal Bellarmine was, whether this translation of the Empire was done by the authority only of the Pope, or by the authority both of the Pope, and also of the people, and I proved clearly by Cardinal Bellarmine's own grounds, and also by his own Authors, that it was done both by the Pope, and also by the Senate and people of Rome. Now D. Schulckenius saith little or nothing to this question, but flieth to another by-question, to wit, whether it was done justly or unjustly, whereas the principal question was only of the fact, to wit, by whom the fact was done, whether by the Pope alone, or also by the people, and not whether the fact was just or unjust. So that you see here be two questions, the first is of the fact, to wit, whether there was any such fact, and by whom, and in what manner it was done, with all other circumstances, which belong to that particular fact: the second is of the justice or injustice of the fact, to wit, whether that particular fact considered with all particular circumstances belonging thereunto was justly or unjustly done. 43 The first question, as D. Schulckenius himself affirmeth, t Pag. 591. is to be decided by the testimonies of Historiographers, to whom it appertaineth to write barely, simply and truly the facts of men; and the second, which doth necessarily suppose the first, by Divines or Lawyers, to whom it appertaineth to decide what is right or wrong. Mark now how cunningly D. Schulckenius to confound his Readers understanding inverteth the order of these questions, and putting, as it were, the Cart before the horse, demandeth that first, which he should do last, and that last, which he should first. For first he demandeth, whether that fact, to wit, the translation of the Roman Empire from the Grecians to the French, was justly or unjustly done; and secondly he demandeth, whether it was done by the authority of the Pope alone, or of the people alone, or of the Pope and people together; as though one should decide a case of conscience before it be known and agreed upon what the case is, and what be all the praticular circumstances, which do alter the case, belonging thereunto. For it is one case or question, to put the translation of the Empire to be done by the Pope alone, an other by the people alone, a third by the Pope and people together. Also it is one case, if it be done by the Pope and people together, when the Empire is forsaken and abandoned by the Emperor, or which is all one, with the express or consent of the Emperor, for that he refuseth to rule or reign over the people any longer, and an other case, when the Empire is not forsaken by the Emperor, or which is all one, against the emperors will and consent, for that he will still remain to be their Emperor. Now if D. Schulckenius had either put down the case or question plainly with all particular circumstances belonging thereunto, it would easily have been answered, or else if it had pleased him to have set down my words, and the case as I did put it, and prove it to be lawful, the Reader would presently have seen, that D. Schulckenius might well have spared to make his aforesaid argument, or Dilemma, for that I did fully answer it in that place, and that neither I contradicted myself, nor that he did answer at all my argument, but that rather by his silence, he did sufficiently acknowledge, that he could not answer it at all. 44 For first I did affirm, that the Roman Empire was translated from the Grecians to the French by the authority, decree, ordinance, consent and suffrage both of the Pope, and also of the people, and not of the Pope alone; and this I proved by Card. Bellarmine's own grounds, and also by his own Authors and divers others; to whom also may be added u Lib. 1. hist. Guylielmus Malmesburiensis, x In vita Leonis tertij. A●astasius Bibliothecarius, y lib. ad annum 781. Siffridus, z In libro Augustali anno 801. Benewtus de Rambaldis, a Ennead. 8. lib. 8. in fine. Sabellicus b In Annalibus Galliae. Nicolaus Gillius, c Lib. 4. de regno Italiae. Carolus Sigonius, and many more. Secondly, I affirmed, that the Emperors of Greece had the Roman Empire as forsaken and abandoned by them, and that they refused to rule, govern and protect them any longer, and consequently that the translation done with those circumstances was just, and without any wrong done to the Grecian Emperors; Neither in affirming this did I contradict myself. For albeit I did oftentimes affirm, that subjects are bound by the law of God, to obey in civil causes their temporal Prince, and that in no case they have power to judge him, or to withdraw their temporal allegiance from him, for that in no case an inferior can judge his Superior, as Card. Bellarmine himself confesseth, d lib. 2. de Concil. cap. 18. for which cause he affirmeth, that the Church in no case can judge an undoubted Pope, so long as he is Pope, Nevertheless I never affirmed, that when the Emperor doth abandon and forsake his Empire and people, and refuseth to be their Emperor any longer, but leaveth them to themselves, it is not in their power to choose them an other Emperor, or to change the Imperial Monarchy into aristocraty or Democraty, for that then the supreme temporal power and authority is immediately in the people, and this also I proved in that place out of Card. Bellarmine's own principles. 45 Wherefore when D. Schulckenius a little above affirmed, that I do oftentimes grant, that the people cannot in any case deny civil obedience to that Prince whom once they have had, if his meaning be, that I do grant, that he who is once a Prince, can not of his own accord leave to be a Prince, and can not resign his kingdom to the next heir, and that the people are bound to yield civil obedience to him, who was once their Prince, but now of his own accord, hath resigned his kingdom to the next heir, he doth greatly wrong me, and abuse his Reader; for to affirm this were foolish and ridiculous, and contrary to all reason and practise: but that which I affirmed was, that it is very probable, and defended by many grave and learned Catholics, that the people, who are subject, can in no case, nor for any cause judge or depose their Sovereign Prince against his will, and my reason was the same, which Card. Bellarmine oftentimes useth, to prove that the Church, or a General Council can not judge or depose the Pope, for that it is contrary to all reason for an inferior or subject to judge his Superior, and therefore those Catholics that hold a General Council may in some cases judge the Pope, do also hold that it is superior, and above the Pope. 46 That the Grecian Emperors had the Roman Empire as forsaken and abandoned by them, I affirmed in these words: Seeing therefore that (as Lupoldus, or Ludolphus writeth, and divers other Authors, as Nauclerus, Aeneas silvius, and Michael Coccinius do insinuate) the Emperors of Greece in the time of Charles the great, and also before his time, to wit, in the time of his father Pipine and of his grandfather Charles Martellus, did reign in the West Empire only in name, neither could the Church of Rome, nor other Churches of Christ, or also any others, being by the Longobards unjustly oppressed in the same Empire have justice by them, or by their authority, and so the aforesaid Emperors had the West-Empire in a manner forsaken, by governing therein only in name, as it appeareth by divers Chronicles, the Pope, Senate, and people of Rome, at leastwise by the consent of all other Western men, who were subject to the Empire, had even according to the doctrine of Cardinal Bellarmine but now related, full right and power (which they could lose by no custom or translation of the Imperial Seat, as being to them connatural, and due by the law of nature) to choose themselves a new Emperor, and consequently to transfer the Empire, which the Grecians kept in the Western parts only in name, to Charles the great, and his Successors, the Imperial Seat being in those parts at that time, as it were vacant, or without an Emperor. Thus I wrote in my Apology e Nu. 438. . 47 And moreover, that the Greek Emperors had the Western Empire and people for forsaken, and abandoned, and gave, at leastwise, their consent, according to that rule of the law, qui tacet consentire videtur, that they might choose to themselves another emperor, at leastwise in power and authority, it is apparent, for that they did never repugn, contradict, or gainsay, that Charles the great should rule over them, although perchance it displeased them that he should have the name of Emperor. Yea, and as Cardinal Bellarmine himself writeth, when the Empress Irene heard, that Charles was called, and crowed Emperor by Pope Leo, she did not only gainsay, but also she would have married Charles, and had done, if certain perfidious eunuchs had not hindered her, as Zonaras and Cedrenus do write in the life of the said Irene. Afterwards, Irene being dead, Nicephorus the Emperor, who did succeed her, sent Ambassadors to Charles as to an Emperor, as writeth Ado in this Chronicle of the year 803. And a little after Nicephorus being dead, Michael succeeding him sent Ambassadors to Charles, who likewise did publicly honour him as an Emperor, as writeth Ado in his Chronicle of the year 810. All which do sufficiently confirm, that the Greek Emperors did not gainsay this translation, nor conceive it to be a wrong done to them, and in prejudice of their Imperial right and Sovereignty. 48 By all which it is manifest first, that I do not any wrong at all to the Latin Emperors, who have been, and shall be from the time of that translation, as though their Empire were not grounded upon any sound title or foundation; for that all writers, and Cardinal Bellarmine himself do agree in this, that the Pope together with the rest of the people have power to choose them another Emperor, in case the Emperor will no longer reign over them, because in that case the supreme temporal power and authority is only in the people, or whole multitude, but rather Card. Bellarmine as also I observed in that place, f Nu. 462. doth call in question, and make doubtful the right and title, which the Latin Emperors have to the Empire, in that he affirmeth, that they have all their right and title from the Pope alone, seeing that there be many learned and grave Authors, who make a great doubt, whether the Pope alone hath, by the institution of Christ, any such power and authority to transfer Empires, but no Author, not so much as Card. Bellarmine himself according to his doctrine, which I related in that place, doth deny, that the whole multitude hath full power, and authority to transfer the Empire in the aforesaid case, to wit, when the Emperor doth abandon the Empire, and will no longer reign over the people. 49 Secondly, it is also manifest, that I have not any way contradicted myself in my answer, and that I have clearly proved by Card. Bellarmine's own grounds, and by his own Authors, that the aforesaid translation was done by the authority, decree, ordinance, and suffrages both of the Pope and of the people, and consequently that the people did more than only request, applaud, and assent to that translation: to which D. Schulckenius maketh no answer at all: and therefore his silence herein is both an evident sign, that he was not able to impugn my answer, and that although he doth so highly commend his own book of the translation of the Empire, as exactly, sound, and diligently written, yet his own conscience, for as much as concerneth this question, seethe now the contrary, for that he being so plainly convinced both by his own principles, and also by his own Authors, and divers others, that this translation was not done by the authority only of the Pope, as he pretended to prove in that his book of the translation, but also of the people, he was engaged for the saving of his credit to have in some sort confuted my answer, but to pass it over cunningly with a Dilemma not belonging to the principal question, and which was also fully satisfied by me in that place, without setting down any one word of my answer, and so omitting contrary to his accustomed manner above twenty pages of my text together, doth argue no good and sincere proceeding. And lastly it is also manifest what the Reader may think of my adversaries sincerity, who in this place doth so barely, and nakedly repeat again this argument, without taking any notice of the answer, which in my Apology I gave to the same. 50 But the Empire of the West, saith Mr. Fitzherbert g Nu. 13. p. 47 was acknowledged by the Greek Emperors themselves to be the Pope's gift; and therefore Emanuel Commenus h Blond. dec. 2. l. 5. Platina in Alex. 3. Nauclerus generat. 39 pag. 848. Emperor of Constantinople in the time of Fridereke the first, understanding of the dissension betwixt him, and Pope Alexander the third, sent Ambassadors to the Pope, and offered him not only a great army with great sums of money, but also to reunite the Greek Church with the Latin, if he would restore that Empire of the West to the Emperors of Constantinople. 51 But neither Emanuel Commenus, nor any other Greek Emperor (although from the particular fact of some one Emperor, especially who was desirous to enlarge his Empire, no good argument can be drawn to prove a right) did acknowledge the Empire of the West to be the Pope's gift, in any other manner, than they had read, or heard from Historiographers, to wit, that the Pope was indeed the chief and principal, but not the only Author of that translation. And therefore Blondus one of Cardinal Bellarmine's own Authors doth well affirm it to be manifest, Blond decad. 1. l. 3. in principle. that the first translation of the Roman Empire from the Constantinopolitans to the French Princes was done by the authority and consent, not only of the Pope, Clergy, & people of Rome, but also by the suffrages of the people, and principal men of all Italy. Neither did Emanuel Commenus desire of Pope Alexander the third, that he alone without the consent, and suffrages of the Princes and people would restore the Empire of the West to the Emperors of Constantinople, but that he would be a means that it might be restored, or translated to them again, as he was a chief means, and principal Author that it was translated from the Grecians to the French. 52 In like manner, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, i Nu. 13. p. 47. the second translation of the West Empire from the French (that is to say from the family of Charles the great unto the Germans) was made especially by the authority of the Sea Apostolic, Bell. l. 2. c. 2. & 3. as Card. Bellarmine proveth clearly in his Treatise of the translation of the Empire. If my Adversary had said, only by the authority of the Sea Apostolic, he had spoken to the purpose, but that word [especially] clean overthroweth his argument: For I will not contend with him at this present, whether it was done especially by the authority of the Sea Apostolic, in that manner as I granted before, that the first translation from the Grecians to the French was done especially, chief, or principally by the Pope's authority, but that either the first, or second translation was done only by the authority of the Sea Apostolic, and not also of the people, this I utterly deny: neither hath Card. Bellarmine in the aforesaid Treatise by any one sufficient argument proved, or is able to prove the same. 53 We read also, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, that Clodoveus, k Papyrius Maso in vita Henrici primi See Bozius de signis Ecclesiae lib. 10. cap. 12. the first Christian King of France, being desirous after his Baptism, to make good, and establish his right and title to that kingdom, professed to receive the same from the hands of the Archbishop of Rheims by authority and commission of the Sea Apostolic. But truly it is strange, to see what strange arguments, and void of all probability my Adversaries dare bring for proof of so great a matter, as is the giving, taking away, translating of Kingdoms and Empires. For what Historiographer ever wrote, that Clodoveus, the first Christian King of France, had no good right and title to his kingdom before he became Christian; or that he received his title, right, and authority to reign from S. Remigius by commission of the Sea Apostolic, and that he himself professed as much, or that it belongeth to the Archbishop of Rheims to choose the King of France, if we will speak properly of choosing, as though the Kings of France, were Kings by election, and not by hereditatie succession, or that the right and title which the Kings of France have to their kingdom depended upon the election of the Archbishop of Rheims, or the Sea Apostolic? If my Adversary were in France, and would affirm thus much, I fear me, he would be glad to recant his doctrine in this point, or to interpret his words in a better sense, or else he might perchance, to use his own words, find it to his cost. 54 Neither doth Papirius Maso affirm, as my Adversary and Bozius say, that King Clodoveus, or Lewis the first, did profess to receive his kingdom, or his right and title thereunto from the hands of S. Remigius Archbishop of Rheims by authority and commission of the Sea Apostolic, neither could he with truth profess the same, for that he was long before King of France, and had true right, and lawful title to that kingdom, before he was baptised by S. Remigius; neither doth baptism make good rights and titles to temporal kingdoms, but as it depriveth no man of his temporal right and dominion, so it giveth no man any temporal right or dominion, but giveth him only a spiritual right, and maketh him heir to the kingdom of heaven. But all that Papirius Maso doth affirm is, that when Philip the first of that name being but seven years old was by the Archbishop of Rheims consecrated and elected future King of France, and to succeed his Father Henry then living, and present at his consecration, the Archbishop, after he had declared the Catholic faith unto him, and Philip had professed the same, and taken his oath to defend the Church, and his kingdom, taking S. Remigius staff into his hands, did quietly and peaceably discourse, how the election and consecration of the King did belong chiefly to him, from the time, that S. Remigius did Baptize and consecrate King Lewis. He did also discourse, how by that staff Pope Hormisda gave to S. Remigius this power consecrating, and the whole principality, or Primacy of France, and how Pope Victor did grant it to him, and his Church. Then his Father Henry beckoning he chose him to be King after him. 55 This is all that Papirius Maso writeth: So that all the difficulty of these words consisteth in that word [election] which cannot be understood properly, and for that election, whereby one is made King, or heir apparent to the crown, who was not King, or heir apparent before the election: For the Kings of France before that time, and ever since have their right, and title to the crown not by election, but by hereditary succession, but it is taken for the religious ceremony of consecration, and a solemn declaration of the Archbishop, that the person, whom he consecrateth, is chosen, or rather acknowledged, and accepted by the whole kingdom for King, or heir apparent to the crown. Neither doth the consecration and declaration, or if we will improperly call it election of the Archbishop, give any more right, authority, or sovereignty to the King of France, than he had before, neither if he were not consecrated, elected, or declared to be King by the Archbishop, should he want any temporal right, authority, or sovereignty, for that the King's authority & sovereignty doth not necessarily depend on the Archbishop's consecration, election, or declaration, although some of the vulgar sort of people may perchance imagine, that he is not a perfect King, before he be consecrated and anointed. 56 As likewise the Pope, after he is chosen by the Cardinals, is true Pope, and hath all Papal power, and jurisdiction, before he is consecrated or crowned Pope: neither doth his Papal authority necessarily depend upon his coronation, which belongs only to a religious ceremony, and a complemental, but not needful, solemnity. But this I understand for this present only of those Kings, who have their right, and title by hereditary succession, and not of those, who are Kings by election, as is the Roman Emperor, and the King of Polonia. For it is a question among the Lawyers, whether the Emperor before he be crowned by the Pope, or by his commission is truly Emperor, and hath full Imperial power, or no, whereof and from whence this may proceed I will not now dispute, and so it may perchance be a custom among the Polonians, that the King elect, is not accounted a complete and perfect King, before he be crowned, and consecrated by the Metropolitan; but this may proceed originally, and chiefly from the people or Kingdom, in whom the supreme. Regal authority doth reside, until they have chosen a King, in which time of vacancy they may extend, or limit his authority, or make him with what conditions they please, yea and if they will change the Monarchy into aristocraty, or Democraty, which cannot be likewise said of those Kingdoms, which have their Kings not by election, but by hereditary succession, of whom that vulgar saying is verified, that the King doth never die. 57 Also when Boleslaus King of Polonia, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, had killed the holy Bishop Stanislaus, Pope Gregory the seventh did not only excommunicate and depose him, but also commanded the Bishops of that Realm, that they should not anoint and crown any King of Polonia without his express leave, and order, whereby he that succeeded Boleslaus had but the title of Duke, which remained also to his Successors for the space of two hundred and fifty years. So as this matter is clear not only in reason, but also in practice and so hath been for many ages, whereby it appeareth, that the Pope may give as well the earthly, as the heavenly kingdom for the good of the Church, by the same reason, and power, that he may deprive Princes of their states, when they deserve it, and the good of the Church requireth it. 58 And thus thou seest, good Reader, how probably this man Widdrington hath impugned the argument of Lessius, seeing that of four arguments that he hath scoffingly framed to counterfeit the same, and to prove a bad consequence therein, there is not any one to his purpose, and some of them being truly understood, and urged according to the true state of the question (which he hath changed in them) do make directly for us; so that his scoffs do fall upon one but himself, and his own ridiculous arguments; and therefore whereas he concludeth them with a gibing demand, ask, whether these, and the like are not goodly arguments to persuade the English Catholics to cast away prodigally their goods, and to deny their fidelity to their Prince? I may with much more reason demand of him, whether these and such other answers and arguments of his, are not goodly ones to move the English Catholics to be so prodigal of their souls as to cast them away upon his word, by denying fidelity, and obedience to their spiritual Pastor, who hath the charge of their souls. 59 But it seemeth that his mind and hand is altogether upon his half penny (as the proverb speaketh) seeing that he hath so great care of the Catholics goods, and so little of their souls, that he would have them venture and hazard their eternal salvation to save their temporal goods: but I hope God will inspire them to be wiser, and always to remember the golden sentence of our Saviour, Marc. 8. Luc. 9 quid prodest homini, etc. What doth it profit a man to gain all the world if he lose his soul? Thus Mr. Fitzherbert endeth this chapter. 60 But as for the example and practice of Pope Gregory the seventh, I do freely acknowledge, that he was the first Author and Writer that did in express words teach, that the Pope hath authority to depose temporal Princes, & also that he was the first Pope, who contrary to the custom of his Ancestors, as Onuphrius witnesseth, b Li. 4. de varsa create. Rom. Pont. did practise the same, but first he did practise it, and then he endeavoured to prove, that he might lawfully do it: since which time it hath indeed been practised by many Popes: Nevertheless both the doctrine, and the practice was not known to the ancient Fathers, and also it hath ever been resisted, and contradicted by Catholic Princes, and people both Divines and Lawyers, and therefore it cannot rightly be called the practice of the Church. And although the Pope might for sufficient cause command the Bishops of Polonia, that they should not consecrate any King without his express leave, and order, it being only a religious ceremony, yet it cannot be sufficiently proved, either that the Pope hath authority to deprive by way of sentence, (for of his power to deprive by way of command I do not now dispute) any Country of the title and name of a Kingdom, without the consent of the Country, or of him to whom the Country is subject in temporals, it being no spiritual, but a mere temporal title, and therefore belonging to temporal, and not to spiritual power; or that the Successors of Boleslaus had only the title of Dukes, for that the Pope deprived them by way of a juridical sentence of the title of Kings; but this might proceed either from the people themselves, who by reason of that heinous fact of Boleslaus (in killing that holy Bishop Stanislaus with his own hands in the Church whiles he was saying Mass, and after he had miraculously cleared himself, by raising a man from death in open Parliament to give testimony, whether he had iniutiously taken from that dead man certain lands, or no, whereof he was falsely accused by the King in a public assembly of the Realm) would not give any longer that title of Kings; or for that the Emperor, to whom that kingdom was perchance m Dubranius l. 5. & Aeneas silvius, cap. 19 Bohemiaes, who relateth that in the time of Otho the first Emperor, the kingdom of Polonia was subject to the Roman Empire. then feudary, would not suffer them by reason of the execrable crime, to have any longer that title of Kings, but only of Dukes. 61 Wherefore neither by any sufficient reason, or approved practice it can be proved, that the Pope as Pope hath power to give earthly kingdoms for the good of the Church, or to deprive Princes of their states, although they should deserve it, and the good also of the Church should require it, which last supposition nevertheless is untrue, for that to deprive Princes of their temporal States is not necessary for the good of the Church, and the salvation of souls, as I have showed before; and although it were necessary, yet considering that it is a temporal or civil, and not a spiritual action, for what end soever we suppose it to be done, it cannot be performed by a spiritual, or Ecclesiastical, but by temporal, or civil power. 62 And thus thou seest, good Reader, (to conclude this Chapter with my Adversary) how sound, and without any scoffing I have confuted Lessius argument, and that general maxim, whereon his consequence was grounded, by those four instances, which I have here examined, and clearly proved that they are all to the purpose, and do not any whit alter the state of the question, but that my Adversary himself in impugning them doth alter the case, and change the state of the question, or medius terminus, which Lessius used, and flieth from his argument to others of his own inventing, wherein he discovereth his great ignorance in Logic, and that therefore all those unseemly nickenames of absurd, impertinent, foolish, ridiculous, and malicious, agree to none so much as to himself. All which being duly considered, I refer to the judgement of any indifferent man, whether I had not reason, without any cogging, scoffing, gibing, or malice, (as my Adversary is pleased to unburden his fowl and bitter stomach) but with a sincere compassion of the miserable state of poor English Catholics in soul, body, goods, and credit, (into which this man seeketh to draw them headlong) and with an earnest desire, that they should, according to our saviours commandment, Render to God and Caesar that which is their due, to affirm by way of interrogation, that these and such like reasons are no good arguments to move the English Catholics prodigally to cast away their goods, and to deny their allegiance to his Majesty. 63 Neither is it my desire, that Catholics should be prodigal of their souls, or should deny their fidelity and due obedience to their spiritual Pastor: neither is it true, that I have greater care of their goods, then of their souls, or that I would have them vente● and hazard their eternal salvation to save their temporal goods, as Mr. Fitzherbert (little caring what he saith, so that by his saying he may any way disgrace me) very untruly, God forgive him, affirmeth; For I do chief respect, God is my witness, their eternal salvation, and I would have them to render all due obedience both to their spiritual Pastor, and also to their temporal Prince, but my desire is, that they will sincerely consider, that not only in denying spiritual obedience to their spiritual Pastor, but also in denying temporal allegiance to their temporal Prince, they do venture and hazard their eternal salvation, for that they are bound by the express commandment of our Saviour, and under pain of eternal damnation, to render both to God and Caesar that which is their due. But it seemeth that my adversaries mind is all upon the Pope, and little upon his Prince, seeing that he hath so great care to enlarge the Pope's Monarchy, and so little to maintain his King's Sovereignty, but I hope God will inspire English Catholics to be wiser, and not to run headlong on either side, but to examine and weigh their temporal and spiritual fidelity with an equal balance, and to consider, that they may as well offend and hazard their salvation in giving too much as too little to their spiritual Pastor, as also in giving too little, as too much to their temporal Prince. 64 Wherefore my humble request to English Catholics is, that seeing this controversy of their temporal and spiritual obedience between their temporal Prince, and spiritual Pastor doth so nearly concern their eternal salvation, they will not venture their souls upon any man's bare word, nor give credit either to my sayings, or the sayings of my Adversaries without examining sincerely the reasons on both sides, and the substance and manner of both our writings, and diligently considering how far forth they are bound to obey the command of their spiritual Pastor, when it is only declarative and grounded upon no sure definition, against the commandment of their temporal Prince, who is in lawful possession of his kingdom, from which the Pope, the matter being as yet in controversy, and not decided, pretendeth to have power to exclude him. For neither ignorance, nor pretence of zeal to the Sea Apostolic, can now in my opinion excuse them from not examining what duty they own both to their spiritual Pastor, and also to their temporal Prince, and to what things both their temporal and also spiritual obedience doth extend; for now they having so many and so sufficient causes prudently to doubt (both in regard of so many books that have been written, and also of the strange carriage of my Adversaries in commanding me to purge myself under pain of Censures, and not telling of what, and forbidding my books, and not declaring for why, although I have often desired to know some one particular thing whereof I should purge myself, or which is blame worthy in my books, faithfully promising to purge whatsoever is to be purged, and to recall whatsoever I have written amiss) they are bound according to the doctrine of all Divines to examine the truth, so far forth as the learning and capacity of every man will permit, otherwise their ignorance will be wilful and damnable, and their zeal, albeit they shall think to do God good service, will be Pharisaical, sinful, and inexcusable; and therefore I hope they will be wiser, and not suffer themselves to be carried away hoodwinked with blind obedience, which is most dangerous, when their obedience to man may be a disobedience to God, but that they will always remember that golden sentence of our Saviour, Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and the things that are Gods, to God. CHAP. FOUR Wherein widdrington's Interpretation of that clause of the oath, wherein the doctrine [that Princes who are excommunicated or deprived by the Pope may be deposed, or murdered by their subjects, or any other whatsoever] is abjured as impious and heretical, is proved to be sound and sufficient, and is cleared from all absurdity and contradiction even by Mr. Fitzherbert's own examples, and that it may without perjury be sworn by any Catholic. ALl that Mr Fitzherbert objecteth in this Chapter I have above in the end of the second part of this Treatise fully, and verbatim already confuted, and therefore I think it superfluous to repeat here the same again. CHAP. V. Wherein widdrington's answers to all Mr. fitzherbert's arguments taken from the law of God, both in the old Testament, and also in the new are proved to be truly probable and sincere, and no way fraudulent, or contrary to his own doctrine. BEcause this Chapter will be somewhat longer than the rest, for that my Adversary hath scraped here together many authorities out of the law of God, especially in the old Testament to prove, that the spiritual power not only in the new law, but also in the old hath ever been the supreme power on earth and might chastise Princes temporally, and not only command, impose and enjoin temporal penalties, but also dispose of temporals, and inflict temporal punishments, I think it not amiss to divide it into three parts or sections. In the first I will treat especially of those authorities, which he hath brought out of the old law before the institution of the Kings of Israel; In the second I will confute those examples, which he allegeth out of the said old Testament since the institution of those Kings; and in the third I will examine those texts of holy Scripture, which he hath taken out of the new Testament. SECT. I. Wherein all the authorities which are brought out of the old law are confuted in general by the doctrine of Card. Bellarmine and other learned Divines, also the arguments taken from that place of Deuteron. 17. Si difficile & ambiguum etc. and the examples of Eleazar and joshua, and from the difference of the sacrifices to be offered for Priests and Princes, together with the testimonies of Philo, Theodoret and Procopius are answered in particular. FIrst therefore Mr. Fitzherbert in his fift chapter pretendeth to prove, that widdrington's answer to his arguments deduced from the law of God is confuted by the express words, and text of the Supplement, and proved to be not only improbable, but also fraudulent, in that he dissembleth the whole substance, and pith of Mr. fitzherbert's discourse, for so is the title of his fift Chapter, and then he proceedeth thus: My Adversary Widdrington having trifled, as you have heard, in the precedent Chapters, goeth forward no less impertinently in these words, Quarto si quis etc. Fourthly, if a man do attentively read over Mr. fitzherbert's discourse, he shall most clearly see, that he hath effectually proved nothing else out of the Law either of God, or of Nature, but that the temporal power in spiritual things, and in temporal (as they are reduced to spiritual) is subject to the spiritual power, so far forth as concerneth commandment, and a spiritual manner of correction, and not temporal. So Widdrington. 2 Wherein he seemeth to acknowledge, as you see, that I have effectually proved by the law of God and Nature, that the temporal power is subject to the spiritual, so far forth as concerneth the authority to command, though not to punish temporally; meaning, that the spiritual power may command temporal and corporal things so far forth as they are to serve the spiritual (for so you have heard him also confess before a S●e before chap. 2. nu. 1. & 2. ) and that it may punish spiritually (that is to say, by the way of spiritual censures) but no way temporally; wherein I wish to be observed what he granteth, and what he denieth, for of his grant will easily follow the confutation of his denial, as I have partly signified before b Chap. 2. nu. 1.2.9. & 10. , and will show more amply c Chap. 6. nu. 14 15 & seq. See Supplem. chap. 1. nu. 10. , when I shall have first examined how true it is, that I have proved effectually nothing else, but that which he mentioneth. For to this purpose it is to be considered what I have debated concerning the law of God in my Supplement, where I said thus. 3 First, I will speak of the law of God, which if it be considered, as it is a written law, is divided into the law of Moses, and the law of Grace delivered by our Saviour jesus Christ; and albeit the law of Moses (for so much as concerneth the judicial and ceremonial part thereof) doth not bind us Christians, yet I will make it manifest, even by that law, that the spiritual power was then the supreme power on earth, and commanded all temporal authority, yea and that it might and did chastise Princes temporally when it was necessary for the glory of God, and the good of the Church. This appeareth by the law of God set down in Deuteronomy, etc. Thus Mr. Fitzherbert. 4 But whether he or I have trifled in the precedent Chapters, you have already seen, and how improbably he hath proved my answer to his arguments to be improbable or fraudulent, and hath confuted it by my own doctrine, as he vainly braggeth, you shall presently perceive. And first Mr. Fitzherbert endeavoureth to confute my answer as improbable, wherein I said, that he hath proved effectually nothing else by the law of God, but that the temporal power in spiritual things, and in temporal, as they are reduced to spiritual, is subject to the spiritual power, so far forth as concerneth commandment, and a spiritual manner of correction, and not temporal: to which purpose he maketh a long and tedious repetition of that discourse, which he made in his Supplement concerning the law of God, especially in the old Testament, pretending, forsooth, to make it manifest even by that law, that the spiritual power was then the supreme power on earth, and commanded all temporal authority, yea and that it might and did chastise Princes temporally, when it was necessary for the glory of God, and the good of the Church. 5 First therefore to all the arguments, which either my Adversary here hath brought, or any other can bring to convince, demonstrate, or prove effectually, that the spiritual power in the old law was the supreme power on earth, and might and did chastise Princes temporally in order to spiritual good, it is sufficient to answer in general, that the contrary doctrine, to wit, that in the old law the temporal power and not the spiritual was supreme, and that the spiritual power was subject to the temporal, is maintained by many famous, and most learned Catholic Divines, S. Bonaventura lib. 2. de Eccles. hierarch. cap. 1. & in 4. dist. 24. in litera. S. Thom. lib. 1. de Regim. Prin. cap. 14. whose opinion in this point Mr. Fitzherbert dare not presume to condemn as temeratious and improbable, albeit my answer, which is agreeable to their doctrine, he sticketh not to call improbable. For so teacheth S. Bonaventure, a man otherwise addicted to the Pope's temporal Monarchy, In the old Testament, saith he, the Priesthood was subject to the kingdom, and therefore Kings then had power to remove the high Priests from their office, as Solomon removed Abiathar. The same teacheth S. Thomas, or whosoever is the Author of that book de regimine Principum. Whereupon Card. Bellarmine himself writeth thus, It is not improbable, Bell. l. i c. 14. in Tract. de potest. Sum. Pont. contra Barcla. that in the old Testament the King was absolutely greater than the high Priest, both for that so teacheth S. Thomas in his first book de Regimine Principum cap. 14. and also for that in the old Testament the promises were temporal, and the sacrifices carnal. 6 The same also do teach Alphonsus Tostatus Abulensis, Card. Bellar. de Script. Eccles. pag. 410. d q. 28 in c. 2. l. 3. Regum & q. 48. c. 27. num. a man most renowned, saith Card. Bellarmine for holiness and learning, joannes de Turrecremata e In sum. de Eccles l. 2. c. 96. ad 4 etc. obedientiam. dost. 93. q. 2. ad. 2 Franciscus Victoria; f Relect. 1. de potest. Eccles. cited by Corduba & Sal s. Antonius Corduba, g l. 4 quaest. q. 5 ar. 2 ss. ad Vlti. joannes Salas, h q 95. de. leg. sec 21. and Burgensis i In Addit lid Nic. de Lyra in 1. Pet. cap. 2. all of them most famous Divines. You must also know, saith Abulensis, that Solomon had power to kill Abiathar, although he was the High Priest, for that in the old Testament the Ecclesiastical power was not distinct from the Secular power (to wit in punishments for great crimes) but Priests were directly subjects to the King as Lay men. Also there was not a distinction of punishments for Priests and Lay men, but in enormous crimes the sentence of death was common to all: and because Abiathar had committed treason, he was to be put to death, unless Solomon would pardon him. And that Priests were subject to Lay men it appeareth Numer. 27. where God said that Eleazar, who was the high Priest, and the rest of the Israelites were subject to joshua, as it hath been more declared joshua 3. but joshua was a secular Prince, to wit, of the tribe of Ephraim. Thus Abu●ensis. 7 And by this the Reader may easily perceive, how ignorantly my unlearned Adversary taxeth my answer of improbabi●itie, and impertinency, which nevertheless is most conformable to the doctrine of so many famous and learned Catholic Divines, and which Cardinal Bellarmine himself holdeth for not improbable, and how vainly he braggeth, that he will make it manifest even by the law of Moses, that the spiritual power was then the supreme power on earth, and commanded all temporal authority, yea and that it might and did chastise Princes temporally, whereas so many famous, and learned Divines, whose doctrine this ignorant man feareth not to call improbable, do resolutely hold, that in the old Testament the high Priests were subject to Kings, and that the temporal power was superior to the spiritual, and might remove the high Priests from their office, and punish them temporally, if they should deserve it. 8 But let us examine in particular the manifest proofs, which this man deduceth from the Law of God in the old Testament. His first, and principal proof is taken from that which is written in the 17. chapter of Deuteronomie. This appeareth, saith he, k Pag. 70. nu 3.4.5. by the law set down in Deuteronomie, wherein it is ordained expressly, that the highest tribunal for judgement, not only for spiritual, but also for political, and temporal causes, should be in the hands of the high Priest. The words of the law are these. Si defficile, & ambiguum apud te judicium esse perspexeris, etc. If thou perceive that the judgement with thee be hard, and doubtful, between blood, and blood, cause and cause, leprosy, and not leprosy, and thou seest that the words of the judges within the gates do vary, arise and go up to the place, which the Lord thy God shall choose, and thou shalt come up to the Priests of the Levitical stock, & to the judges that shall be at that time, and thou shalt ask of them, who shall show thee the truth of the judgement, and thou shalt do whatsoever they that are Precedents of the place which our Lord shall choose, shall say, and teach thee according to his Law; and thou shalt follow their sentence, neither shalt thou decline to the right, nor to the left; but he that shall be proud refusing to obey the commandment of the Priest, which at time ministereth to our Lord thy God, that man shall die by the decree of the judge, and thou shalt take away the evil out of Israel, and the whole people shall fear, that none after swell with pride. 9 These are the words of the Law of God in Deuteronomie, wherein it is to be noted, that albeit there be here mention made of the judge to be consulted together with the Priests (which some of the Adversaries take to be a temporal judge, though he may very well be understood to be the high Priest, who was supreme judge in the Council of Priests) nevertheless I say, that albeit he were a temporal judge, yet it is evident, that the final decision of the doubts, and controversies in that Consistory, and consequently the supreme authority resided in the high Priest; seeing that the said judge, if he were a different person, was no other than Minister, either to see the high Priests commandment executed, or to ordain, and decree the punishment of those, who should disobey him, it being ordained in the Law, that he who should be so proud, as to disobey the commandment of the high Priest, should die by the decree of the judge. So that it belonged to the high Priest absolutely to command, and to the judge to give sentence of death against the transgressors of his commandment; besides that, etc. 10 But first observe, good Reader, the corrupt proceeding of this man, who to prove his purpose doth falsely, and otherwise then they are in the vulgate Edition allege the words of holy Scripture. For although the Council of Trent hath denounced anathema l Sess. 4. against all them, who shall not receive for sacred and canonical the entire books of holy Scripture with all their parts, as they are accustomed to be read in the Catholic Church, and are extant in the ancient vulgate Latin edition, and hath ordained and declared, that this ancient and vulgate Edition, which by long custom of so many ages hath been approved in the Church shall be received for Canonical in public lessons, disputations, sermons, and expositions, and that no man shall dare, or presume to reject it under any pretence: for which cause the said Council hath moreover ordained, that hereafter the holy Scripture, and especially this ancient and vulgar Edition shall be printed very correctly; which Decree of the Council Pope Sixtus the fifth undertook to execute, printing that vulgate Edition in the Vatican, and by a special Bull prefixed to the beginning thereof, commanded that all men should take that and none other for holy Scripture, which Edition, because sundry errors were found therein, Pope Clement the eight printed more correctly: Nevertheless Mr. Fitzherbert is not afraid to cite contrary to the said decrees this place of holy Scripture otherwise than it is found in the vulgate Edition. 11 For whereas in the vulgate Edition we read thus; and thou shalt come to the Priests of the levitical stock, and to the judge that shall be at that time, Mr. Fitzherbert translateth it, and to the judges in the plural number. But which importeth more, whereas the words following a little after are thus in the vulgate Edition: But he that shall be proud refusing to obey the commandment of the Priest, which at that time ministereth to our Lord thy God, and the decree of the judge, that man shall die, and thou shalt take away, etc. Mr. Fitzherbert with small respect to the aforesaid Decrees, citeth the words thus: But he that shall be proud, refusing to obey the commandment of the Priest, which at time ministereth to our Lord thy God, that man shall die by the decree of the judge, and thou shalt take away, etc. So that the sentence of death is in this place denounced by the express appointment of God, not only against him, who shall not obey the commandment of the Priest, but also against him, that shall not obey the decree of the judge. 12 Now whether this judge was a temporal, or a spiritual judge, and if he was a temporal judge, whether he was subordinate to the High Priest, or no, it is a controversy among Catholic Divines, Mr. Fitzherbert affirmeth, that this judge may very well be understood to be the High Priest himself, who was the supreme judge in the Council of Priests; and albeit he were a temporal judge, nevertheless, I say, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, it is evident that the final decision of doubts and controversies in that consistory, and consequently the supreme authority resided in the High Priest, seeing that the said judge, if he were a different person, was no other than a Minister, etc. 13 But albeit this judge may be understood to be an inferior spiritual judge subordinate to the high Priest, as Abulensis affirmeth upon that place, and not the high Priest himself, by reason of the conjunction copulative [and] but he that is proud refusing to obey the commandment of the high Priest, and the decree of the judge, which conjunction [and] saith Abulensis denoteth the judge to be a different person from the high Priest, nevertheless this judge may also be very well understood to be a temporal judge, and in temporal causes independent on the high Priest. And truly the reason, which Mr. Fitzherbert bringeth to prove that this judge if he were a temporal judge, was only a Minister of the high Priest, is of small force, for that to prove the same, he allegeth, as you have seen, the words of the holy Scripture otherwise then they are in the vulgate Edition, seeing that it is only ordained in the law, that he who should be so proud as to disobey the commandment of the high Priest, and the decree of the judge, should die, those words [by the decree of the judge] are neither in the Hebrew, nor in the vulgate Edition declared so to be by Pope Sixtus and Clement: And therefore Mr. Fitzherbert must not take it ill, if I give no credit to his bare, I say, and that I do prefer the exposition of the Gloss of Nicolaus de Lyra upon that place, who affirmeth, that this tribunal, to which in doubtful cases the jews were bound to have recourse, did consist both of spiritual, & of temporal power, and that the one was independent on the other, before his bare I say which is only grounded upon a false allegation of the words of the holy Scripture. 14 The words of the Gloss upon that place are these: Hîc agitur etc. Here it is treated, saith he, of superior judges, to whom there ought to be made recourse in doubtful and difficult matters: and some things are put for example: when it is said, between blood and blood, that is, when one part of the judges do say that the shedding of blood of such a man is to be punished with death, because it is reduced to wilful murder, an other part saith no, because it is to be reduced to chance-medley: Cause and cause, to wit, when one part of the judges saith, that the cause of the plaintiff is just, and an other, the cause of the defendant: Leprosy and not leprosy, to wit when one part saith, that the disease of such a man is leprosy, and an other saith it is not. Arise and go up etc. In these cases and such like there must be had recourse to superior judges, to wit, to the high Priest, and to the judge of the people of Israel. And sometimes it happened, that both offices did concur in one person, as it is manifest in Holy, who was judge, and high Priest of the people. 1. Reg. 4. but more commonly they were distinct persons, as also offices. Therefore this recourse may be understood to both jointly; and this was in causes, which could not be decided by one without the other, as in the building of the temple, which could not be performed without Kingly authority, nor ordered without the direction of the Priest; or severally to both, that in spiritual causes there should be recourse to the high Priest, and in temporals to the judge. And from this grew the custom, that from inferior Ecclesiastical judges there is made appeal to the chiefest Bishop, and from inferior Princes, and Secular judges to the King, or Emperor. Thus writeth the Gloss, whose doctrine in this point Mr. Fitzherbert will never be able to prove to be improbable. 15 But secondly, although I should for Disputation sake grant Mr. Fitzherbert, which he is never able to convince, that this tribunal, Consistory, or Council, to which in doubts and difficulties of the law, when the judges within the gates do not agree, the jews ought to have recourse, did consist only of Priests, and not of temporal, but of spiritual judges, and that the judge mentioned in this place they ought obey, was either the high Priest himself, or rather some other inferior Priest subordinate to him, nevertheless he cannot prove from hence, as he pretendeth, that the highest tribunal for judgement, not only for spiritual, but also for political and temporal causes, was in the hands of the high Priest. For all that is ordained for the Priests, and judges to do in this place of Deuteronomie, is only to decide, determine, and declare the doubts and difficulties of the law, to whose commandment and decree every man was bound by the express law of God under pain of death to stand; but to decide and declare what is the law of God, & to instruct the people therein, and to command the people to obey their declaration, instruction & commandment, is not a temporal, but a pure spiritual cause, as well observeth Abulensis in cap. 11. Num. q. 23. & 24. & in cap. 18. Exodi. q. 5.8. & 11. 16 And what Catholic man will deny, that the spiritual Pastors of the Church of Christ have also authority to declare and determine what is the law of God, when any doubt or difficulty shall arise, and to command all Christians, even temporal Princes, who are subject to them in spirituals, to obey their decree and determination: and yet from hence it can not be rightly inferred, in that manner as my Adversary from those words of Deuteronomie would conclude, that the highest tribunal for judgement in the new law, not only for spiritual, but also for political, and temporal causes is in the hands of the chief spiritual Pastor; for that to decide, and determine, what is the law of Christ, and to command Christian Princes to obey their decision and determination is not a temporal, but a mere spiritual cause. 17 But if my Adversary had proved, as he hath not, that the Priests of the old law had authority, not only to interpret the law, and to command the people to follow their interpretation, but also to pronounce the sentence of death, and to execute the same against those who should not obey their declaration and decree, than he had said something to the purpose, for to inflict temporal punishments, and to pronounce the sentence of death, and to execute or inflict the same for what crime soever it be either temporal or spiritual, is a temporal & not a spiritual action: I say to inflict temporal punishments, etc. For, as I have often said, to impose, or enjoin temporal punishments, and to command temporal judges to do justice according to the law, by punishing malefactors with corporal death, if it be so ordained by the law, may, if it be done for a spiritual end, be a spiritualaction, & belonging to the authority of spiritual Pastors. Neither can my Adversary prove, that the judge, who was to give sentence of death against those, who either did not obey the commandment of the Priest and the decree of the judge, or committed any other crime worthy of death by the law, as blasphemy, adultery, Sodomy, etc. was either a Priest, or a temporal judge who had his authority derived from the high Priest, as he was a Priest; I say, as he was a Priest, for that sometimes the chief temporal judge, as I observed before out of the Gloss, was also a Priest, as in the time of Holy, Moses, and the Maccabees; and then he had authority to give sentence of death, not as he was a Priest, but as he was a temporal Prince, or judge. 18 Wherefore to little purpose is that which Mr. Fitzherbert immediately addeth; Besides that, saith he, m Pap. 71. nu. 6. afterwards God commanded the people exactly to obey the Priests, Deut. 24. without mention of any other judge threatening to punish them himself, in case they should transgress the same, saying, Obserua diligenter, etc. Observe diligently, that thou incur not the plague of Leprosy, but shalt do whatsoever the Priests of the Levitical stock shall teach thee, according to that which I commanded them, and do thou fulfil it carefully. So said Almighty God. And to move them the rather to this exact obedience, which he commanded, he added presently; Remember, what our Lord God did to Mary in the way, when you came out of Egypt, that is to say, how severely God punished Mary the Prophetess, & sister to Moses for her disobedience to him, & was strooken with leprosy for the same; by which example Almighty God did notably inculcate unto the people the necessity of their obedience to the Priest, and the danger of his indignation, and severe punishment, which they should incur by neglecting their duty therein. Thus said I in my Supplement, and having proved afterwards most n Nu. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. amply, that God gave also to the high Priest not only a sovereignty of authority, but also an infallibility of doctrine & judgement in causes of doubts and controversies, even of temporal matters, and having also showed the great privileges of the Levites and Priests, who were separated wholly, etc. 19 But what followeth from all this? No man maketh any doubt, but that the Priests of the old law were to be obeyed in those things, wherein they had authority to command, as likewise neither Mr. Fitz. can make any doubt, but that the commandment of the temporal Prince, or judge was exactly to be followed in those things, wherein they had authority to command. True it is, that the Priests were the chief interpreters of the law of God in the old Testament, according to those words of the Prophet Malachi, The lips of the Priest shall keep knowledge, Malach. cap. 2. and the law they shall require of his mouth, because he is the Angel, or Messenger of the Lord of Hosts; and that it belonged to the Priests to declare whether one was infected with leprosy or no; But from hence it can not rightly be concluded, that it belonged to the Priests, as they were Priests, but to the temporal judges of the people, or to the children of Israel, that is, the whole multitude, from whom the temporarall judges had commonly their election and authority, to give sentence of death, and to inflict any temporal punishment appointed by the law: And therefore, although God ordained Leuit. 13. that Aaron, or any one of his sons should declare and judge, who was infected with leprosy; and after his declaration and judgement that he was a leper, he should be separated, yet it belonged to the children of Israel not as they were ministers of the Priests, but of God, who was their King, and ordained that punishment, to separate him, and cast him out of the camp according to that of Num. 5. And the Lord spoke to Moses, saying, Command the children of Israel that they cast out of the camp every leper, and whosoever hath a flux of seed, and is polluted upon the dead, as well man as woman, cast ye out of the camp. 20 So likewise it belongeth to the Priests of the new Law, to declare what is the Law of Christ, and to judge what is heresy, usury, or any other crime forbidden by the law of Christ, and to command temporal Princes to root out heretics, usurers, and such like malefactors, by the means of temporal punishments, for all this doth not exceed the bounds of spiritual authority: but it doth not belong to the Priests of the new law, as they are Priests, to give sentence of death, or to punish temporally heretics, usurers, or any other malefactors by inflicting temporal punishments, but only to temporal Princes, who have in their hands and power the sword of life and death, and who therefore, as I observed o Disputat. Theolog. ca 7. sec. 2. nu. 17. Bannes' 2.2. q. 11. are 4. q. 1. in fine. out of Bannes, may pardon sometimes the punishment of death, and punish heretics in some other manner. 21 And therefore to as little purpose also is that, which Mr. Fitzherbert next adjoineth, that God gave also to the high Priest an infallibility of doctrine, and judgement in causes of doubts, and controversies even of temporal matters. For I willingly grant, that the high Priests of the old Testament had an infallibility of doctrine, and judgement at least wise for many years together in doubts, and controversies even of temporal matters, which could not be determined by the law, yea and a greater infallibility of doctrine and judgement, then is now in the new law, in doubts and controversies of particular facts, as whether they should overcome in such a war how such an inheritance of particular men was to be divided, etc. Either because, as well observeth Abulensis, Abulensis q. 3. in 17. Deut. in fine. Abulensis q. i9 in cap. 22. lib. 1. Reg. & in Defensor. part. ● cap. 41. the high Priest did judge in the presence of some Prophet to whom the truth was revealed by God, or because they did know the secrets of things by the places of the Priest's vestment, which was called the rationale, wherein was contained doctrine, and truth, whereof we have treated saith Abulensis Exod. 28. 22 Or thirdly, as the same Abulensis observeth, when the high Priest consulted our Lord about any thing by entering into the Sanctuary in the day of Expiation, which happened but once a year; for on that day the Priest did speak unto our Lord within the Sanctuary, and did hear him speak in the Propitiatory, as hath been declared, Leuit. 16. For therefore it was commanded, that at what time the high Priest did enter into the Sanctuary, no man should be in the Tabernacle, to wit, lest he should hear those things, which were spoken in the Sanctuary. Thus Abulensis; none of which ways to find out the truth infallibly in any doubtful matter is ordinarily granted to the Priests of the new Law. Nevertheless it can not from hence be sufficiently concluded, that the high Priests of the old Law had a sovereignty of temporal authority, or in temporal things, but only in spiritual, for that, as well observeth the said Abulensis, p Q. 23. in cap. 11. Num. to instruct in the questions of the Law, and to consult almighty God, was a spiritual thing. 23 But that, which Mr. Fitzherbert immediately addeth, that the Levites, and Priests were separated wholly from temporal and civil state in such sort, that they had no dependence thereon, is very untrue, and Cardinal Bellarmine himself acknowledgeth the contrary to be probable q Supra. nu. 6. . For, as I above observed out of S. Bonaventure, S. Thomas, Abulensis, and many other learned Divines, in the Old Testament the Priesthood was subject to the Kingdom, and Priests were directly subject to the King, as Laymen were, to wit, in temporals, as it appeareth, saith Abulensis, Num. 17. where God said, that Eleezar, who was the high Priest, and the rest of the Israelites were subject to joshua, who was a Secular Prince, to wit, of the tribe of Ephraim, yea and in the time of Moses, Aaron, who was the high Priest, was in temporals subject to Moses, and for that cause called him his Lord, Exod. 32. although in spirituals Aaron was greater than Moses, Q. 10. in 9 Leuit. Moses, saith Abulensis (expounding those words of Leuit. 9 and Aaron stretching forth his hands to the people he blessed them) was in temporals greater than Aaron, because he judged the whole people, as it is contained, Exod. 18. Chap. and he commanded the people those things, which they ought to do. But in spirituals Aaron was simply greater than Moses. For Aaron was the high Priest, but Moses one of the simple Levites. Also because Aaron had directly a right to minister, but Moses had only this for want of Priests, but this he had not by any order, or ordination. And if thou say, that Moses was greater than Aaron, because he commanded him to do these sacrifices, and whatsoever he did, I answer, saith Abulensis, that it is not inferred from this, because Moses did not therefore command these things, as having authority to command by some Prelacy, or Order, but because he was the messenger of God, relating those things, which God had commanded; whereupon it is not properly said that Moses did command, but that he did declare the things to be done. 24 But if thou yet object, that Moses was greater than Aaron, because Moses did consecrate Aaron. It is answered, saith Abulensis, that it is not deduced from this: for therefore Moses did consecrate Aaron, because there was no high Priest that could consecrate him, nor also then any inferior Priests, for that as well the high Priest, as the inferior Priests were consecrated: and yet nevertheless this consequence is not of force, this man doth consecrate that man, therefore he is greater than he. For the Pope is consecrated by a Cardinal Bishop of Hostia, who is inferior to the Pope, and after his consecration the Pope doth command him that consecrated him. So also it happened among the high Priests in the Old Testament. For except the consecration of Aaron, which was done by Moses, who was no Priest (to wit by ordination, but only by the special privilege of God, as the same Abulensis declareth q. 7. in cap. 17. Exodi) and except the consecration of Eleazar, which was done without any ceremonies, as we showed at large, Exod. 19 all the later consecrations of the high Priests were done by inferior Priests: therefore Moses was not greater, for that he consecrated Aaron, but Aaron was greater; and because, as the Apostle writeth, Hebr. cap. 7. always the lesser is blessed by the greater, it was fit that the blessing over the people should be done by Aaron. Thus Abulensis. See him also q. 2. in cap. 2. Num. 25 Now Mr. Fitzherbert's next argument is as insufficient as the former. I added further, saith he, r Pag. 72. nu. 7 concerning the power and authority of the high Priest in temporal things, that whereas both the dignities, spiritual, and temporal, were sometimes in one person, as in Moses, Heli, and the Maccabees, and sometimes disjoined in distinct, and several persons, as in the time of joshua, the judges, and the Kings, it is manifest, that when they were severed, the spiritual was always superior, as it may appear by the commandment of almighty God to Moses, when he bade him take joshua, Num. 17. and lay his hands upon him before Eleazar the Priest, and all the multitude, and give him part of his glory, and that Eleazar should consult with God all the affairs of joshua, concluding Ad verbum illius egredietur, etc. according to his word (that is to say, the word of Eleazar) joshua shall go out, and shall go in, and all the children of Israel with him, and the rest of the multitude. Wherein Theodoret observeth, Theodoret. q 48. in Num. that God commanded Moses to distribute his honour, or dignity betwixt Eleazar, and joshua, yet so, that joshua should always learn of Eleazar, what he was to do; whereby it appeareth, that joshua was to be directed by Eleazar in all affairs touching the civil government, which is sufficiently expressed by those words, Ad verbum illius egredietur, & ingredietur, joshua shall go out, and in at the word of Eleazar. 26 But truly I am ashamed to see the extreme boldness of this my unlearned Adversary, when I call to mind what silly arguments he hath scraped together to make it, forsooth, manifest by the Law of God in the Old Testament, that the spiritual power was then the supreme power on earth, and might and did chastise Princes temporally. For this very text of holy Scripture, which Mr. Fitzherbert bringeth to prove, that Eleazar was Superior to joshua, learned Abulensis doth interpret clean contrary, Abulensis q. ●6. in c. 3. joshua. and bringeth it not once or twice, but many times to prove, that in the old Testament the Priests were subject to the temporal Princes, for that Eleazar was inferior & subject to joshua; joshua saith Abulensis, expounding those words, and do thou command the Priests, etc. was not only the Captain of the people, but also of the Priests, although he was neither a Priest, nor a Levite, but of the Tribe of Ephraim, as it appeareth, Num. cap. 13. and he did command not only the inferior Priests, of whom it is spoken in this place, but also the high Priest, as it appeareth, Num. 27. where it is said, for him if any thing be to be done, Eleazar the Priest shall consult the Lord: At his word (to wit at the word of joshua) shall he (to wit Eleazar) and all the children of Israel go out, and shall go in. And the cause hereof is this, for that in the Old Testament the Secular and Ecclesiastical, or the Priestly, and Regal jurisdictions were not distinct, as they are now, although the offices of the Priests and Levites were altogether distinct from the actions s Aboperibus. of the Lay men: whereupon the Priests, when they offended, might be put to death by the King, as the Lay men might, etc. 27 But some will say (saith the same Abulensis) t Q. 2. in cap. 14. joshua. that the state of Eleazar was more honourable, because he was the high Priest, and joshua was the Prince of the people, but the state of Priests was greater than the state of Lay men, as the Pope is more excellent than the Emperor, or Kings. But it is to be answered, that this is false. For the state of Priests in the Old Testament was not more excellent, than the state of Kings, but the Priests were judged by Kings, and not only concerning Kings, but also joshua, who was no King, was greater than the high Priest, as it appeareth, Num. cap. 27. where it is said, that Eleazar the high Priest, and every one shall at the commandment of joshua go in and go out, that is shall do whatsoever they ought to do: Therefore joshua was Superior, because to command is an act of a Superior. 28 And again the said Abulensis u Q. 48. in cap. 27. Num. writeth thus, At his word he shall go in, and shall go out, that is, Eleazar the Priest shall serve at the commandment of joshua, by doing whatsoever he shall command. For to go out, Num. 27. vers. 17. and go in, is by the manner of speech taken for every work. So it was taken above, that God would put in authority over the Israelites a man, who should go out and go in before them, that is, should do whatsoever ought to be done before his people, and in all things to be before them commanding and instructing. But some may take to go in, and to go out, for to go into the Sanctuary to consult the Lord for joshua; because it was said above, that whatsoever was to be done, Eleazar should consult the Lord for joshua. And in this place it is added, that at his commandment he ought to do this, to wit, that whensoever Eleazar should be commanded to consult the Lord for joshua, he must be subject to do it. But this sense cannot stand, because Eleazar did not go into the Sanctuary to consult the Lord within the Sanctuary putting on his Priestly vestments, but by the rationale, and Ephod he did consult the Lord, as it hath been declared. Also it can not stand, because it is not spoken only of Eleazar, that he shall go in and go out at the commandment of joshua, but also of all the children of Israel; but they did not go in to consult the Lord for joshua, therefore the first sense must stand. Yet it is to be considered that joshua, because he was the Secular Prince, is preferred here directly before the high Priest, so that Eleazar was bound to obey joshua in all things, which he should command, as likewise all the rest of the people; and so it was in the time of Moses, who was not a Priest, (to wit, by ordination and Prelacy) yet Aaron, who was the high Priest, did obey him, who was the Prince of the people. And so it was in all the old Testament, that the high Priests were subject to the Kings etc. Thus Abulensis. 29 And thus you see, that this learned man understandeth those words of holy Scripture, Ad verbum eius etc. At his word he shall go out and shall go in, in the clean contrary sense, then wherein Mr. Fitzherbert doth expound them, and yet forsooth it is manifest out of this place, saith he, that when the dignities spiritual and temporal were disjoined in distinct and several persons, as in the time of joshua, the spiritual was always superior. But secondly I will go farther with Mr. Fitzherbert, and grant him only for Disputations sake, that those words are so to be understood, that at the word of Eleazar, joshua shall go out, and go in, and not, that Eleazar at the word of joshua shall go out, and go in, yet from thence it can not rightly be concluded, that joshua was subject to Eleazar in temporals, but only in spirituals: for that to consult the Lord, and declare to joshua and the people the commandment of God, when any difficulty should arise, yea and to command joshua, and the people to obey his declaration, and to follow that, which God had revealed, which Theodoret doth only affirm, was not a temporal, but a mere spiritual thing as before I declared out of Abulensis. Abulens. q. 11. in cap. 33. Exodi. Neither can my Adversary deny, but that joshua did succeed Moses in the temporal government, and therefore unless he will deny, as I think he dare not, that Aaron the high Priest was subject to Moses in temporals, and might be punished by him temporally, if he should transgress the law of God, he can not with any probability deny, but that Eleazar the high Priest was also in temporals subject to joshua, who succeeded Moses in the temporal government, and that he might be punished by him temporally, if he should offend against the law of God. 30 The next argument of Mr. Fitzherbert is also as weak as the former. Also the holy Scripture, saith he, x Nu. 8. pag. 7● joshua 19 declaring how the Land of Promise was divided, setteth it down in this manner: Hae sunt possessiones etc. These are the possessions, which Eleazar the Priest, and joshua the son of Nun, and the Princes of the families and of the tribes of the children of Israel divided by lot in Silo etc. Thus saith the Scripture giving the pre-eminence in the division of the land to the high Priest before the temporal Prince. 31 But this argument proveth at the most, that the spiritual Priesthood is in worth, dignity and nobility more excellent, than the temporal Sovereignty, but it doth not prove, that Priests are in temporal Sovereignty greater than temporal Princes. As likewise Cardinal Bishops have the precedence and pre-eminence before Cardinal Priests, and Cardinal Priests before Cardinal Deacons, and a Cardinal who is first created hath the precedence and pre-eminence before an other Cardinal, who is afterwards created, yet from hence it cannot be concluded, that one Cardinal is greater in authority then another, or that one Cardinal hath power to command and punish another. 32 Also learned Abulensis expounding those words of holy Scripture, y joshua 14. This is it which the children of Israel possessed in the land of Canaan, which Eleazar the Priest, and joshua the son of Nun, and the princes of the families by the tribes of Israel gave to them etc. answereth this argument at large. Here, saith he, are related the persons dividing the land of the nine tribes, Abulens. q. 1. & 2. in cap. 14. joshua. and a half, to wit, Eleazar, joshua, and the ancients or elders of Israel. Wherein it is to be considered that Moses' alone before the passage of jordan, divided the land of two tribes and a half, although Eleazar the Priest, and the multitude of the Israelites, to wit, the Princes of the multitude, did assist him, as it appeareth Num. 32. and if he had lived, none other had divided the land. But when he was dead, there did succeed other dividers: and it was not given to joshua, as the only divider, because God would not give to any one after the death of Moses all this power, as he had given to Moses, for that he would not appoint any one equal to him. Therefore before the death of Moses he caused, that there should be assigned dividers of the land of Canaan, whereof the principal power he gave to joshua, as it appeareth Deuter. cap. 3. & 31. to wit, that joshua should take the land from the hands of the enemies, and he should divide it by lots. But there were given other coadjutors of every tribe, and Eleazar was given. For Eleazar the high Priest is put as a helper of joshua in all things, as it appeareth Num. 27. And Eleazar is put here in the first place, not for that he was the more worthy either for state, or holiness. joshua did sufficiently excel, seeing that he was greatly beloved of God, and God did speak unto him very often, which is not apparent of Eleazar. 33 Neither was the state of Priests in the old Testament more excellent, than the state of Kings, but Priests were judged by Kings, and this not only concerning Kings, but also joshua, who was not a King, was greater than the high Priest, as it appeareth Num. cap. 27. where it is said, that Eleazar the high Priest, and every one shall at the commandment of joshua go in, and go out, that is, shall do whatsoever they ought to do. Therefore joshua was the greater, because to command is an act of the greater. Yet Eleazar is here put before, because Samuel the writer of this book would observe the order of the writing of Moses, But when Moses described the dividers of the land of Canaan, he put Eleazar before joshua, and all the Israelites, as it appeareth Num. 34. and therefore he did here keep the same order. Thus Abulensis. And the cause why Moses did prefer Eleazar before joshua may be easily gathered out of the same Abulensis z q. 1. in cap. 27. Num. & q. 42. , for that Eleazar was then the high Priest, and in that respect most honoured among the people next to Moses. Whereupon both Moses and Eleazar did sit to judge great causes, both of them also did number the people, Cap. 26. Num. as it appeareth in the former chapter, and this honour did appertain to all the high Priests etc. But joshua was then a minister and servant of Moses, and was not the chief temporal Prince of the people, but after Moses' death, although Moses in his life time did by God's commandment appoint him to be his successor in the temporal government of the people. 34 The next argument of Mr. Fitzherbert is all one with the former. And when the daughters of Salphaad, saith he, a joshua 17. demanded their inheritance, venerunt, saith the Scripture in conspectu etc. they came into the presence of Eleazar, and of joshua the son of Nun, and of the Princes, wherein you see also that as joshua, who was the chief temporal Prince, is preferred before the other Princes, so is also the chief Priest preferred before joshua. Thus far in my Supplement etc. But why Eleazar the high Priest was named in the first place before joshua the temporal Prince, I have showed before out of Abulensis, and from hence it doth only follow that the state or office of the high Priest, which was to consult the Lord in doubtful matters, and to be the chief minister in the sacrifices and worship of God, was in worth, dignity or nobility more excellent than the temporal state, or Princedom, albeit Abulensis, as you have seen, doth deny, that the state of the Priesthood, in the old law, was more honourable and excellent then of the temporal Princedom, about which I will not contend with Abulensis, for that I think he differeth from me only in words, yet from hence it can not be concluded, that the temporal Prince in the old law was in temporal affairs inferior or subject to the high Priest, but only in spiritual causes, which is not at this time the question betwixt Mr. Fitzherbert and me. 35 The last argument also, which Mr. Fitzherbert bringeth out of the old law before the institution of the Kings of Israel, is as silly as any of the former, b nu. 9 pag. 73. and the most that it proveth also is that the authority and office of the high Priest is more noble, than the authority and office of the temporal Prince. Thus far, saith he, in my Supplement; where having also c Nu. 23. Leu. 4. Philo. l. de victimis Theod. in Leu. Procop. in Leu. Magdeb. cent. 1 l. 1. c. 7. col. 257. Calu Instit. l. 4. c. 6 ss. 12. proved the pre-eminence of the Priest above the Prince by the difference of their Sacrifices (according to the opinion of Philo the Iew. Theodoret and Procopius Gazaeus, and confirmed it by the testimony and confession even of the Magdeburgenses, and Caluin himself, I proceeded to the consideration of the Kings in the old Testament, and whether there was any change, or diminution of the authority of the high Priest by their institution, to which purpose I said thus. This being so by the ordinance of almighty God himself, and this law being continued in full force without any alteration or change, during the government of Moses, joshua and the judges, it is to be considered, whether the same was changed, or any way altered afterwards, at the institution of the Kings; I mean, whether the Kings were any way exempted from this law, and had Superiority over the high Priest and Clergy, as our Adversaries do absurdly affirm, that they had etc. 36 But first what is this to the purpose? The spiritual Pastor hath pre-eminence in dignity and nobility over the temporal Prince, will he therefore from hence infer, that the spiritual Pastor hath power and authority over the temporal Prince even in temporal affairs? as though because the Goldsmith hath in nobility and excellency pre-eminence above the Cobbler, therefore we may conclude, that the Goldsmith hath power and authority over the Cobbler. Secondly, neither from the difference of the Sacrifices can there sufficiently be gathered any pre-eminence, especially in authority above the temporal Prince in temporal affairs. For although it be ordained Leuit. 4. that a calf should be offered for the Priest, and a goat for the Prince, who should offend through ignorance, yet this difference of sacrifices may be appointed, not for that the Priest hath any pre-eminence either in dignity, or authority in temporal affairs above the temporal Prince, but for that, as well observeth Mr. john Barclay, d Cap. 15. § 4. the offence of the Priest sinning through ignorance, is either greater than of the Prince, and therefore to be purged by a more worthy Sacrifice, or that the Priest in Ecclesiastical affairs hath pre-eminence above the Prince, which no man denieth. And what man of learning would now conclude, that the Priests the new law have any temporal power over Kings, for that a greater pen●● is enjoined to them, if they offend through ignorance, then to temporal Kings, or that in Churches and Ecclesiastical rites they are the first, and do first communicate? 37 Wherefore Abulensis upon this place doth refer the difference of these sacrifices not to any pre-eminence of the high Priest above the temporal Prince; but to the greatness of the offence committed by them both. Abul. q. 12. in cap. 4. Leuit. You must know, saith he, that these sacrifices are appointed greater, according as the sins for which they were offered were greater: but the sin of the high Priest, taking it in the same kind of sin is always greater than the sin of the Prince of the people, or then the sin of all the people; therefore the sin of the high Priest did require the greatest Sacrifice, excelling all other Sacrifices for sins, or at leastwise equal to the greatest Sacrifices. Now in what manner and for what causes the sin of the high Priest was greater both in extension and intention than the sin of the temporal Prince, or of all the people, Abulensis doth declare at large in that place. 38 Thirdly, if Mr. Fitzherbert had examined that place of holy Scripture himself, and not barely taken that argument from Card. Bellarmine, he might easily have seen, that the same sacrifice of a calf with the same ceremonies was appointed to be offered also for the sin of all the people; So that if this argument taken from the difference of the Sacrifices were good to prove a pre-eminence of the high Priest above the Prince, because for the high Priest, if he should offend through ignorance, a calf was to be offered, and for the Prince only a goat, it would also prove, that the people were equal in pre-eminence to the high Priest, and that they had pre-eminence above their King, or Prince, for that for the offence also of the people was to be offered the same sacrifice of a calf, and for the offence of the Prince only a goat. 39 Fourthly, here is no mention made in this place of Kings, but only of Princes: If a Prince, saith the Scripture, doth sin, and by ignorance do of many things one, that by the law of our Lord is forbidden, and afterwards understandeth his sin he shall offer an host to our Lord a buck of the goats without spot. Now at this time the Israelites had no King, but 400. years after. For the better understanding whereof, you must observe, as well declareth Abulensis, e q. 8. in c. 21. Levit. that Moses was the first Prince of the people, under whom all the people of Israel did departed out of Egypt, yet Moses was not a King, but a Captain or a Leader of the people. Yea he was not Dominus, a Lord, or ruler saith Abulensis, f q. 19 in cap. 8. judic. but only, as making laws to the jews on the behalf of GOD, and he commanded nothing to the Israelites, as from his own will, but as from GOD: whereupon he was not called a Lord, but a Doctor of the Israelites. And it is apparent, that if he had been a Lord of the Israelites, or as it were a King, it had belonged to him to bestow dignities, by instituting and deposing, and none of the people could resist him, or accuse him of this, at leastwise, de iure, by right, and if he were accused de facto, he was not bound to answer, but he might repress those who opposed against him by answering nothing: and yet Core with a hundred and fifty men did oppose against him: And also the three Princes of the tribe of Reuben, to wit, Dathan, Abiron, and Hon for the high Priesthood, saying that he gave it unjustly to Aaron, to wit, in giving all things to his kindred; and he purged himself, saying, in this you shall know, that our Lord hath sent me to do all things that you see, Num. 16. and that I have not forged them of my own mind, if they shall die the accustomed death of men, our Lord hath not sent me: Also before in the same Chapter Core said to Moses and Aaron, Let it suffice you, that all the multitude consisteth of holy ones, and our Lord is among them, why lift you up yourselves above the people of our Lord? But if Moses had been a Lord, or a King, no man could have said this unto him, for that he who was a Lord, might have lifted himself up; yea there is no greater lifting up, then to be a Lord. Thus Abulensis. 40 And although Moses alone did judge the people without the help of any other judges who were subordained to him, until jethro father in law to Moses came unto him into the desert of Sin near to the mount Sinai (which happened either in the end of the first year, or in the beginning of the second since their departure out of Egypt, after that the law was given to Moses in the mount Sinai) yet afterwards by the advise of jethro, who perceiving that Moses could not long sustain so great a burden as to judge himself alone the whole people of Israel, sitting in judgement from morning until night, he was persuaded to impart the burden thereof to others, and so choosing substantial men out of all Israel he appointed them Princes of the people, Tribunes, and Centurians, and Quinquagenarians and Deans, who judged the people at all times, and whatsoever was of greater difficulty, they referred to Moses, they themselves judging only the easier causes. 41 But because these judges, who were all subordinate to Moses, judged only of smaller causes, and all matters of difficulty were referred to Moses, he was nevertheless overmuch troubled, and therefore not long after at the sepulchre of Concupiscence, Num. 11. almighty God at the request of Moses appointed seventy men of the ancients of Israel, whom Moses had chosen, to assist him, to whom he gave also the spirit of prophecy, and to them were committed those things, which did peculiarly belong to Moses, to wit, that they should judge of great matters as Moses did (for the jurisdiction of the 70. judges appointed by the advise of jethro, who judged the smaller matters, did still remain) and also that they should consult our Lord, and give answers concerning the questions of the law, as Moses did, g Abul. q. 24. in c. 11. nu. and so that jurisdiction, which before by the advise of jethro did only belong to Moses, was now by the commandment of God given to seventy ancients, or Elders, who also were not Priests or Levites, but Laymen chosen out of the ancients of Israel, h Abul q. 61. and yet they had jurisdiction both in spiritual and temporal causes: i Abul. q. 24. And after these seventy men were appointed to help Moses he never complained in all the forty years that the Israelites were in the wilderness, that he was burdened with the multitude of so many causes of the people. k Abul. q. 23. Num. 27. 42 Now to succeed Moses, and to be the Captain, and Prince of all the people God appointed joshua the son of Nun, Moses yet living. And he was truly a Prince of the people, for at his commandment, not only the people, but also Eleazar the high Priest were moved: yet he was not a King, but a Prince, or Captain; neither also had he authority to judge, saith Abulensis, but judges were appointed otherwise. Neither is this against that, which God commanded Numer. 27. Abulensis q. 19 in cap. 8. judic. that as well Eleazar, as all Israel, were moved at the commandment of joshua, because this is to be understood concerning those things, which appertained to war, and because all, or the chief time of joshua was in making war by subduing the people of Chanaan, therefore the power of joshua was great, Yet he was never called Lord, or King. 43 After the death of joshua, God raised other Princes of the people, who were called judges, or saviours, judic. 2. and 3. neither were they Kings, but their Princedom, or principality was lesser, neither were they called Lords, as it appeareth judic. 8. when all the men of Israel said to Gedeon, have thou dominion over us, and thy son, and thy sons son, because thou hast delivered us from the hand of Madian. To whom he said, I will not domineer, or have dominion over you, neither shall my son have dominion over you, but the Lord shall have dominion over you: and yet Gedeon was a Captain in the wars, and a judge of the people of Israel: and this principality, or government of the judges did continue for a long time together, to wit, for above 340. years, to the time of Samuel, who was the last of the judges, in whose time the Israelites desired a King, as other nations had. 44 After the judges the Kingly government, or principality did succeed. For the people desired of Samuel a King, and God commanded, that he should appoint Saul to be a King over them: and this principality or Kingly government, did endure a long time, to wit, to the captivity of Babylon, when Sedechias was King. 4. Reg. 45. After the return of the jews from Babylon they had no King, but the high Priests, as Abulensis saith, were the Princes of the people: and this principality continued until the birth of Christ. Abulensis q. 91 in cap. ●. Math. Nevertheless for a certain time before the Nativity of Christ the high Priests, who were Princes of the people did take the Kingly name, and diadem, and they did continue so until the time of Herod the stranger, who killed his father in law Hircanus, who was the high Priest, and King, and by the power of the Romans was made himself the King of the jews, and at this time Christ our Saviour was borne: and how the authority of Kings was greater than of the judges, See beneath. nu. 52. & seq. 46 Lastly, the jews not only in the time of their Kings, but also of Moses, joshua, and the judges had other Princes, who had great authority and privileges among the people of Israel, Q 5, in cap. 5. 1. Paralip. See Abulensis q. 6. & 7. in c. 5. 2. Paralip. of which their rights, and privileges Abulensis treateth at large. For all the people of Israel were divided into tribes, families, and houses, all which are names of companies, or congregations, and they differ in this, that one company is greater, an other less, and one doth contain, or is contained in the other. And first all the company or congregation of the Israelites is divided into twelve parts, which are called twelve tribes, for that all the company of the Israelites doth descend from the twelve sons of jacob or Israel: and in every one of these twelve tribes there was always one Prince; So that in all Israel there were always twelve men, who were greater and more noble than the rest, who were called the twelve Princes of the tribes. Neither were these made Princes by election, or lot, but by birth, for always the eldest son, that descended from the head or first Prince of the tribe by the right line of the eldest sons, was called the Prince of all that tribe; So that if he who was Prince or head of any tribe, as judas, or Zabulon, had many sons, the first borne, or eldest son of them was the Prince of all that tribe: and so it always continued afterwards, that always the eldest son of the Prince of any tribe, was Prince of that tribe after his Father's death. 47 Now in every tribe there were divers families: for as every one of the twelve sons of jacob or Israel with all their progeny made a tribe so every son of his twelve sons with all their progeny made a family. So that among all the Israelites there were as many families, as every one of the sons of jacob had sons. As for example, because Reuben the eldest son of jacob had four sons, there were four families in the tribe of Reuben, and because Simeon the second son of jacob had six sons, there were six families in the tribe of Simeon, and so proportionally of the rest: and every one of these families had a Prince, who was always the eldest son of jacob his second sons, for he always descended from the first heads or Princes of the families by the direct line of the eldest sons, and he was subject to the Prince or head of the tribe, whereof he was: so that as the families were under the tribes, so also the Princes of the families were under the Princes of the tribes, and as many families as were in every tribe, so many Princes of families the Prince of the tribe had under him. Abulensis q. 51 in c. 2. joshua. 48 Thirdly, a house was taken for a peculiar congregation of company of many kinsmen under the same family, and it comprehendeth all the persons that descend from the same father yet living, to wit, the sons, daughters and grandchilds, although they have divers economies, or dwell in houses a part from their parents: and yet sometimes a house is taken for the congregation of all the tribes of Israel, and sometimes for one only tribe or family, as Psal. 113. Psal. 113. verse 1. & 13. Arist. 1. Poli●. cap. 2. he blessed the house of Israel, he blessed the house of Aaron: but most strictly it is taken for a peculiar economy consisting of husband, wife, children, servants. And of these Princes of the tribes and families of Israel the holy Scripture maketh mention very often, especially in the books of Numbers and of joshua, 3. Reg. 8.1. Paralip. 5.7.15.26.27. and 2. Paralip. 1. and 5.: and their dignity and privileges Abulensis declareth q. 5. in cap. 5.1. Paral. and in cap. 5.2. Paralip. q 6. and 7. And of these Princes also, who nevertheless were subject not only to the Kings of Israel, but also to Moses, joshua, and the judges, may this place of holy Scripture be understood, to wit, that a he goat should be offered for every such Prince offending through ignorance. 49 Lastly, concerning those three Authors, which Mr. Fitzherbert hath taken from Card. Bellarmine, l lib. 2 de Rom Pont. cap. 29. & in tract. contra Guiliel. Barcl. cap. 15. he might have seen their testimonies long before he wrote against me, fully answered by Mr. john Barclay * Aduersus Card. Bell. cap. 15. §. 4. . For Philo in that place doth not speak of Kings, but of a Prince, and, which is more, he affirmeth, that this honour of offering a greater sacrifice, to wit, a calf, was given to the high Priest not in regard of himself, but because he was a minister of the people, doing public sacrifices in the name of all the people. Besides, this authority of Philo only proveth, that the Priestly dignity was more noble, and excellent, than the Princely dignity, whereof I do not now dispute. Neither doth Theodoret speak of Kings, nor of the power of the high Priest, but only of his dignity and excellency. God commanded, saith he, that the Priest who shall transgress the law shall sacrifice a calf without spot, but if all the people shall commit the like crime, he appointeth the like sacrifice to be offered, teaching how great the dignity of the Priest is, whom he hath made like, or equal to all the people: but he commandeth a Prince that shall transgress the law, to offer not a calf, but a he goat; so far inferior to Priestly dignity is he to whom corporal command is committed: But this is nothing else, but that, which S. Gregory Nazianzen, S. chrysostom, S. Ambrose, and other Fathers do often say, that the spiritual power is more noble, excellent, and worthy, than the temporal, which no man now calleth in question. But the authority of Procopius Gazaeus is of far lesser force, both for that this Procopius, as Card. Bellarmine, m lib. 1. de Christo. cap 6. and Antonius Posseuine n In verbo Pr●copius. do affirm, was a better Rhetorician, than a Divine, and also for that he speaketh not of Kings, but of a Prince, nor of authority, but of honour, dignity, or reverence, which is due to Priests, but especially, although we should grant him to speak of authority and also of Kings, for that he preferreth the people before the Prince, and also yieldeth a reason thereof, which is now flat heretical. For he doth not say, that a Prince offending shall offer a lesser sacrifice than a Priest, for that a Prince is inferior to a Priest, in honour, dignity, or authority, although from hence he gathereth that the Priest and also the people are more honourable than the Prince, but, for that a Prince, as soon as he shall pollute himself with sin doth desist to be a Prince, and falleth from his dignity, which assertion is now condemned in the Council of Constance among the articles of john Wicleffe, whereof the 15. article is this: n Sess. 45. He is no civil Lord, He is no Prelate, He is no Bishop, whilst he is in mortal sin. The words of Procopius are these: It is to be noted, that the Priest and the people do offer the same sacrifice, if they shall burden themselves with sin, but a Prince doth purge his sin with a distinct sacrifice, because a Prince as soon as he shall pollute himself with sin, doth desist to be a Prince, and falleth from his dignity. Therefore from hence we may gather, that the Priest is more honourable than the Prince, also that the people do excel in dignity the Prince. 50 But as touching his second inference, for of the first I have spoken before, it is very untrue, that the people are superior to their absolute Prince in dignity or authority: but contrariwise it is manifest, that a King is superior and above the people, and the people inferior to their King: This shall be the right of the King that shall reign over you saith the holy Scripture 1. Reg. 8. and in the same place the people said, there shall be a King over us, and we will be as all nations; and blessed be the Lord my God, said King David, o Psal. 143. who subdueth my people under me: wherefore there is no doubt to be made, but that the jews were bound to obey the high Priest in spiritual matters, but that all men were bound to obey the high Priest in temporal affairs, or that the spiritual power was in the old law the supreme power not only in excellency, nobility, or dignity, but also in authority, and chastised Princes temporally, which Mr. Fitzherbert pretendeth here to make manifest, this he neither hath, nor ever will be able with any manifest proof to convince. And thus you have seen, how insufficient are all the arguments, which Mr. Fitzherbert hath brought out of the old law before the institution of the Kings of Israel, now you shall see how weak the rest of his arguments are, which he bringeth out of the old law, since that the Israelites demanded of Samuel to have a King over them, as other nations had. 51 But first of all Mr. Fitzherbert laboureth in vain to prove, that which no man calleth in question, to wit, that the authority of the high Priest in the old Testament was neither changed, nor diminished by the institution of Kings, but that as the Law of God delivered to the jews by Moses did continue in full force without any alteration, or change during the time of Moses, of joshua, and the judges, so the same was not altered or changed afterwards by the institution of Kings, and that God did not change the form and course of the Law in favour of Kings, or turned the same upside down contrary to the course of nature, as Mr. Fitzherbert avoucheth some of his Adversaries absurdly to affirm. For it is a mere fiction, that by the institution of Kings, the Law of Moses was altered, or the authority of the high Priest changed, or diminished, or that the same superiority, which the high Priest, as he was high Priest, had above the temporal state, to wit, in spiritual affairs, before the institution of Kings, did not continue in the high Priest, after that the Kings of Israel were instituted. And therefore Mr. Fitzherbert feigneth absurd opinions to have occasion to impugn them. For the institution of Kings did not alter, or diminish at all the spiritual authority of the high Priests, but it did only change the manner of the temporal government, and it caused, that the supreme temporal authority, or dominion, was only in one man, and the temporal government to be simply Regal, or Monarchical, whereas before the institution of Kings it was not always so. 52 For albeit Moses and joshua were appointed by God to be judges, and Leaders, or Captains of the people of Israel, and they had greater authority, than the other judges had, yet they were not properly Kings, neither had they, speaking properly, true Regal dominion, and authority, as Abulensis y Q. 19 in ca 8. judic. doth well observe. And as for the other judges of Israel, their authority was far inferior to Regal authority, or dominion. For as the same Abulensis z Q. 5. in prolog. D. Hicron. in librum joshua & q. 7. & 12. in Prologue. lib. judic. doth also well observe, there was a great difference betwixt Kings, and judges both in power and jurisdiction. For the power of Kings was most ample: But the judges had over the people no authority to command as due to them by jurisdiction, but they were only industrious men for wars, and for giving counsel, and by their advice the people were directed in all things, yet they had over the people no other authority than the people would give them, and the people did obey them, as it were freely, when they did see, that they commanded, or counseled nothing but that which was just: whereupon they were not called Lords, or did they rule, reign, or had proper dominion over the people, but they did only govern or judge: because Lords, or they that reign, and have proper dominion, or Signiory, are those, who do whatsoever they will if it be not against law, or reason, and the subjects are bound to obey them in all things, such are Kings: but the power of the judges did extend to no other thing, then to that which was written in the law, in so much that Kings might do whatsoever the law doth not forbid; but judges might only do that, which the law commanded: So that the power of those judges was but little. 53 First, because it was given them freely by the people, neither had they more authority than the people gave them, and they were chief chosen to make war against the enemies, for which cause they were called saviours. And although after they had overcome their enemies, the people had no great need of them, yet by the consent of the people they remained afterwards as long as they lived in their authority to judge. And if any one object, that the power of the judges was not given them by man but by God, for as is written judic. 3. God raised them a Saviour called Aod: I answer, saith Abulensis, that the judges were made by the election of the people, and from the people they received a limited power, but they were not chosen by the people always after one manner. For some were made judges, because God commanded them, that they should fight for the people; so was Barac: For the prophetess Debbora told him on the behalf of God, that he should fight against Sisera judic. 4. and yet after he had won the battle, he was not yet a judge, or Prince of the Israelites, but because the people saw, that God would deliver them by the means of Barac, they chose him for their judge. So also it happened concerning Gedeon. For the Angel of our Lord did appear unto him, and commanded him, that he should go to deliver Israel from the hand of Madian judic. 6. And when he victoriously finished the war, the Israelites took him for their judge; neither would they only have made him their judge, but also their Lord and King, as it appeareth, judic. 8. 54 Others were taken for judges not by the commandment, but by the instigation of God, to wit, because when the Israelites were oppressed with these calamities, and wanted a Saviour, God gave his spirit to certain men, by which they were courageous, wise, and most fit for wars, whom the Israelites seeing did take for their judges, and then God was said to have raised to them saviours: So it is to be understood of Hothoniel, and Aod judic. 3. Other judges were made only by the will of the people, to wit, because when they were in distress, they inquired who was a fit man among them to be Captain in their wars; And sometimes they took not those that were virtuous, but only who were exercised in war. So jephte was chosen judic. 11. who was a Prince of thieves, whom the Israelites, because they saw him fit for war, desired to be their Captain and judge. And sometimes the judges were made only by favour, and as it were by violence of the people, as was Abimelech the son of Gedeon, judic. 9 to whom also by the sedition of the Sichimites was given the title of a King. And when it is objected, that God raised a Saviour, I answer saith Abulensis, that it is not to be understood, that God commanded any one to be judge, by creating him, and giving him a certain manner of authority, but that God did incite the Israelites by some one of the ways aforesaid to make some their judges, and yet afterwards it depended upon the will of the people to receive them, or reject them, and to give them so much authority, as they pleased. 55 Secondly, the authority of the judges was not derived by succession to their posterity, but it remained in the power of the people, one judge being dead, to choose another, or to choose none at all: But to the greatness of authority it appertaineth to have power to derive it to their posterity; as those things are properly ours, concerning which we may appoint others to inherit, for in other things we are rather Administrators, or procurators, than Lords, or having dominion, and Signiory. And the difference of this power to be a judge from that, which by succession is transferred to posterity, is manifest by the example of Gedeon; for when Gedeon was a judge in Israel, the Israelites being desirous to exalt him to greater honour, for the great victory he had against the Madianites, said's unto him, have thou dominion, or signory over us, and thy son, and thy sons son, that is, all of thy posterity, but he being contented with the principality, or pre-eminence of a judge, would not accept thereof, saying, I will not have dominion, or Seignory over you, to wit, by exercising the power of a Lord, or King, neither shall my son have dominion, or Seignory over you, but the Lord shall have dominion, or Seignory over you, and nevertheless he kept the principality of a judge, so long as he lived. Thirdly, the judges could not impose tributes, or other taxations upon the people, but they lived upon their own proper revenues, as other private persons, except those things which by right appertained to them in war: because it was a custom among all nations, that in war a certain peculiar part of the spoil should belong to the Prince, or chief Captain, as it appeareth by the decrees, dis. 1. cap. ius militare, etc. 56 Fourthly, the judges were not Lords, neither had they any power, dominion or Signiory over the people, but they were only Captains or Leaders, for as much as concerned those things, which belonged to their office, whereof I will speak beneath. And in this there was a difference betwixt Kings and judges: for Kings were Lords of the people of Israel, and they had power to do whatsoever they would, which was not against the law; therefore they called the Israelites their servants, as Saul called David his servant, 1. Reg. 22. and David called the Israelites his servants, 2. Reg. 20. but the judges were not called Lords, as it appeareth by those former words of Gedeon, refusing to have that degree of principality, according to which Princes are called Lords, and said to have dominion or Signiory over the people. Neither were these called judges of judging, a Abulens. q. 11. in Praefat. lib. judic. but as a judge is taken for a name of a certain little principality. For there is this difference betwixt a Lord and a judge; for a Lord signifieth one, who hath simply power, dominion or Signiory, and he hath power to do what he will, although it be not ordained by the law: But a judge is he, who hath not a liberty to command, but he can only command that, which the laws command, and he hath a power given him to define according to the law, and therefore he who is subject to a judge, is not subject to the man, but to the law, but he that is subject to a Lord, is subject to the man. And because the principality of these judges or saviours, was such, that they could do nothing according to their own wills, as Kings and Lords could do, but that only, which reason, and the law did dictate, they were called judges, because judges have the like principality. 57 Fiftly & lastly the office to which the judges were assumed, was to fight for the people against their enemies, as it is manifest by the institution of the judges. For judic. 2. it is said, that whensoever the Israelites were in the hands of their enemies, God raised up judges, that should deliver them. And the same also is evident by the peculiar institutions of the judges: for it is said of Hothoniel, who was the first judge, that when the Israelites were oppressed by the King of Mesopotamia, God raised them up a Saviour called Hothoniel judic. 3. and the like is said of Aod in the same chapter; and of Barac chap. 4. and of Gedeon chap. 6. and of jephte chap. 11. and so of the rest: and concerning the wars these judges had full power, for all things whatsoever belonged to warfare were at their dispose, and in this all the Israelites did obey them, as in all wars the chief Captains have this full power concerning military discipline. But the wars being ended, these men remained as it were private persons, to wit, that they had not any Dominion or authority: but yet they were always very much honoured by the people, and sometimes the government of Cities was committed to their charge, that they might dispose of them as Princes. So jair had thirty sonnet, who were Princes of thirty Cities judic. 10. But to judge of causes was not directly the office of these, albeit sometimes it was committed to them, especially when they were Prophets, and prudent men. So was Samuel, who was the last judge of Israel, and every year he went about all Israel, and judged the people in three places, to wit, in Bethel, Galgatha and Masphath. Thus writeth Abulensis, who also affirmeth, that although Moses and joshua were greater than these judges, for that they were chosen and appointed by God, not only to bc Captains of the Israelites in the time of war, but also to be their judges and Governors, yet he denieth, that Moses himself was properly a Lord or King of the Israelites, but rather that he was chosen to be their Lawmaker and Prince, not by manner of reigning, or having properly dominion, but rather b Abulensis q. 8. in cap. 6.2. Paralip. per modum iudicantis, by manner of judging. 58 And by this you may plainly see, in what manner the temporal government of the jews, and not the spiritual, was altered by the institution of Kings: for that the supreme temporal power or dominion, which before their institution did reside in the whole multitude, or people of Israel, was after their institution wholly translated to the King: But that the course of the law was changed, and turned upside down in favour of Kings, or that the spiritual government of the high Priests was altered by the institution of Kings, is a mere fiction. For the same spiritual authority and superiority that the Priests had before the institution of Kings, they kept also after their institution, and as all the people of Israel, in whom the supreme spiritual power did before reside, were nevertheless subject in spirituals to the high Priests; so also were Kings afterwards subject also in spirituals to the same high Priests, although in temporals they were supreme, and the high Priests subject and inferior to them. 59 And therefore to avoid tediousness I will omit to relate Mr. fitzherbert's text, which he setteth down, in the three next pages to prove, that the law of God was not altered and turned upside down by the institution of Kings, and that the institution of Regal authority did not work any alteration of the divine law touching the authority of the high Priest, and matters belonging to Religion, nor brought any prejudice to the Ecclesiastical dignity, nor did derogate from the obedience due to the high Priest in matters mere spiritual, nor from the Sovereignty of the spiritual power and function in things spiritual: for of this there is no controversy for aught I know, albeit Mr. Fitzherbert saith, that his Adversaries, but who they are I know not, neither doth he express who they be, do make question about the same. And therefore supposing that the high Priest retained the same spiritual power, authority and dignity after the institution of Kings, which he had before their institution, I will proceed to the examining of Mr. fitzherbert's arguments, which he bringeth to prove, that in the old law the high Priests were superior not only in dignity and nobility, but also in power and authority to the Kings, as well in temporal as spiritual causes, and that the Kings might be chastised temporally by the high Priest. SECT. II. Wherein all Mr. fitzherbert's arguments taken from the old law since the institution of Kings are at large examined; and first his argument taken from the authority of Priests and Prophets to create, anoint, chastise and depose Kings is disproved; secondly, widdrington's answers to the examples of Queen Athalia deposed by joiada the high Priest, and of King Ozias deposed by Azarias the high Priest, are confirmed, and whatsoever D. Schulckenius objecteth against the said answers is related and answered, and thirdly, it is showed, that the authority of S. chrysostom brought by my Adversary, to confirm the example of King Ozias maketh nothing for him, but against him, and that in urging this authority he dealeth fraudulenty, perverteth S. Chrysostom's meaning, and also contradicteth Card. Bellarmine. THe first argument, which Mr. Fitzherbert bringeth out of the old law since the institution of the Kings of Israel, is taken from their institution creation, and unction. For almighty God, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, a nu. 14.15. pag 76. ordained that the Kings should receive their very institution, creation and unction from the high Priests and Prophets. Whereupon it followeth from the undoubted maxim of the Apostle, Hebr. 7. that the said Priests and Prophets were superior to Kings: for sine ulla contradictione, saith the Apostle, quod minus est a meliore benedicitur; without any contradiction the less is blessed by the better: which argument S. chrysostom useth in like manner saying, Chrysost. de verbis Isa. hom. Deus ipsum regal caput etc. God hath subjecteth the very head of the King to the hands of the Priest, teaching us, that this Prince (to wit, the Priest) is greater than the other, for that which is less receiveth benediction from that which is more worthy. So he, who urgeth also to the same end, that the Kings in the old Testament were anointed by Priests, and inferreth thereupon, that maior hic principatus, the principality of the Priest is greater than the Kings. Ibid. hom. 4. Whereby he also acknowledgeth, that the Priests of the old Testament were superior to Kings. And what marvel, seeing that the said Kings were not only created and anointed, but also chastised, yea deposed sometimes by Prophets and Priests? 1. Reg. 9 Ibid. cap. 16. 4. Reg. 9 3. Reg. 19 4. Reg. 11. Samuel first created and anointed Saul, King of the jews, and after deposed him for his offences, and anointed David to reign in his place. In like manner the kingdom of Israel was translated from the children of Achab to jehu by the Prophet Elizaeus; and the kingdom of Syria from Benhadab to a subject and servant of his called Hazael, by the Prophet Elias. Also in the kingdom of juda the wicked Queen Athalia etc. 2 But this argument only proveth that, which is not in controversy betwixt me, and my Adversaries, to wit, that the Priests, and Prophets were superior to Kings in spiritual affairs, and also that the spiritual power is more noble, excellent, and worthy than the temporal, as spiritual things do in worth, dignity, and nobility excel temporal things, For to anoint, create, institute, and depose Kings, in that manner as Kings in the old law were anointed, created, and deposed by Priests, or Prophets were spiritual, and not temporal actions. b Qu. 38. in c. 1. lib. 3. Reg. For the anointing of Kings was a religious ceremony and appertained to the office of a Priest, especially when it was done with solemnity, and as well observeth Abulensis, it did directly belong to Priests, seeing that it was a sacred thing, and sacred oil was powered upon them, the making and handling whereof did belong only to Priests; yet sometimes it was done by Prophets for want of Priests; to wit, when by no means it could be done by Priests, as when it was secret, and unknown whom God would have to be anointed for King, for if it were manifest, who was to be anointed, he was anointed by Priests; so was Solomon, and afterwards joas, and so it is to be thought of all others, who were anointed, for that the kingdom did belong to them by hereditary succession: but sometimes it was unknown, who was to be anointed, to wit, when one was anointed, to whom it did not appertain by right of succession, and this was done by the commandment of God, for seeing that the will of God was not made manifest but to the Prophets, it could only be known by them who ought to be anointed, and that it might be done more secretly, it was done by them: and so it was in all the aforesaid examples: for Saul was anointed not by succession, seeing that he was the first King of Israel: David also was not anointed by succession, for the children of Saul ought to succeed; jehu also who was not of the race of the Kings of Israel, and he was anointed to overthrow the house of Achab: 4. Reg. cap. 9 3. Reg. cap. 19 and Asael was not of the issue of the Kings of Damascus, and he was anointed by Elias to persecute the Israelites. Thus Abulensis. 3 So likewise the creation, institution, and deposition of Kings in that manner as the aforesaid Kings were created, instituted and deposed, were spiritual, not temporal actions. For the Prophets did not create, institute, or depose Kings by their own proper authority, or by any ordinary power of theirs, but only by an extraordinary power, as they were mere messengers, and sent by God with a peculiar and extraordinary message, or embassage, to create, institute, or depose the aforesaid Kings, whereupon they did not speak in their own names, but in the person of almighty God, saying, this saith the Lord I have anointed thee to be King, or the Lord hath sent me to anoint thee to be King, or, the Lord hath rejected thee that thou shalt not be King, and hath delivered it to thy neighbour better than thyself: So that the aforesaid creations, institutions, and depositions were only declarations of the will of God, which without all doubt are spiritual actions. Neither from hence can it be rightly concluded, that therefore the Priests of the old law had authority to create, depose, or chastise Kings temporally, or that Kings were subject to Priests in temporals, because sometimes Prophets were sent by God, as his messengers, to declare his will and to tell them, that God would create, depose, or chastise them with temporal punishments. 4 And who would not blush to hear a man, who taketh upon him to be learned, and to be a teacher of others in such difficult and dangerous points of Divinity, urge such pitiful arguments to prove matters of so great moment, as is the dethroning of Kings, and absolute Princes, and the subjecting of them to Priests in temporal affairs. A Priest hath power to bless the King and all the people, as it is usual at the end of Mass, therefore the King, and all the people are subject to the Priest in temporal things, for without any contradiction, saith the Apostle, the less is blessed by the better. The father hath authority to bless his son, who is a King, and consequently supreme in temporals, therefore without doubt he is greater than his son in temporals. One of the King's privy chamber is sent by the King's express order to declare to one, that it is his majesties pleasure to make him Lord Chancellor, therefore without doubt one of the King's privy chamber hath authority to make one Lord Chancellor. If God almighty had given to the Priests, and Prophets of the old testament, authority to denounce to the King or people concerning temporal affairs, as is the creation, or deposition of King, and Princes, not only what God himself had revealed unto them, and commanded them to denounce, but also what according to their own will and judgement they thought fit, and convenient, then there might be drawn from thence a good argument, to prove, that Kings were subject to the Prophets in temporal affairs, but seeing that it was not lawful for the Prophets of the old law in such cases to command, or denounce to the King, or people, but that which by some clear and assured revelation God had commanded them to declare and signify concerning such temporal affairs, it is manifest that no colourable argument can be drawn from thence to prove, that the Priests or, Prophets of the old law had authority to create, institute, depose, or punish Kings temporally. 5 Neither doth S. chrysostom cited by my Adversary teach any other thing, than that Kings are subject to Priests in spirituals, and that the office of a Priests is in worth, dignity, and nobility greater, and more excellent than the office of a King, for that a King hath power only over earthly things, but a Priest over heavenly, to the Priest are committed souls, to the King bodies, the King taketh away the spots of the body, the Priest the spots of sins, etc. But St. chrysostom never meant, that Kings▪ were subject to Priessts and Prophets in temporals, or were to be punished by them temporally, but he affirmeth the clean contrary, to wit, that Priests and Prophets are subject to temporal Princes: Omnis anima, etc. Let every soul, saith he, c Hom. 23. in c. 13. ad Rom. be subject to higher powers, albeit thou be an Apostle, albeit an Evangelist, albeit a Prophet, or lastly whosoever thou be; for this subjection doth not overthrow piety, and he doth not say simply, let him obey, but let him be subject. And again S. chrysostom affirmeth, d In that place above cited by my Adversary, & l. 2. de Sacer. ●nto med. that a Priest hath not so great power granted him to punish delinquents, and to compel a man to change his evil manners, as a temporal judge hath, to wit, by forcing him with temporal punishments, but only, by reproving, and giving a free admonition, not by raising arms, by using targets, by shaking a lance by shooting arrows, by casting darts, but only saith he again, by reproving and giving a free admonition. 6 Neither also can Mr. Fitzherbert sufficiently convince, that when David was first anointed by Samuel, Saul was forthwith deprived of his Regal authority, or right to reign, but only that David was instituted the future King and heir apparent to the Crown, and to succeed him after his death; as likewise when Solomon was anointed King, David was not thereby deprived of his Regal authority, but only Solomon was declared to be the future King, and to succeed David in the kingdom. But howsoever it be, it is little to the present controversy, whether Saul, after David was anointed by Samuel, was true King de facto, & de iure, or David King de iure, & Solomon de facto, for that Samuel in that business was only a messenger of GOD, and did nothing by his own proper authority, but only what GOD by a peculiar revelation did command him to do. And so if almighty GOD should now in the new Testament by any undoubted revelation command a Priest to deliver this message to such a King, that for the sins he had committed, he would deprive him of his kingdom, and give it to another mor virtuous than he, no man will deny, but that this Priest hat good and full power and authority to do that message, but from hence to argue an ordinary power to be in Priest, to give and take away kingdoms were ridiculous, and unbeseeming a man but meanly learned. 7 The second argument, which M. Fitzherbert maketh, is taken from the example of Queen Athalia. Also in the kingdom of juda, saith he, c P. 77. nu. 15. 4 Reg. 11. the wicked Queen Athalia was deposed by joiada the high Priest, and joas set up in her place. But now our Adversaries to answer this example foe Athalia do say etc. But before I come to examine, what M. Fitzherbert objecteth and answereth concerning this example, I think it not amiss to set down, what I answered to the said example in my Apology f Apol. nu. 364 & seq. and theological Disputation, g Disp. Theol● in Admon. nu. 6. and what Doctor Schulckenius, of whom M. Fitzherbert hath been bold to borrow his answers without acknowledging so much, hath replied to the same. Thus therefore Card. Bellarmine argued from this example h L. 5. de Rom. Pont. cap. 8. . 8 The second example, saith he, is 2. Paralip. 23. Where when Athalia had tyrannically usurped the kingdom, and did maintain the worship of Baal, joiada the high Priest called the Centurions and soldiers, and commanded them to kill Athalia, which also they did, and for her he created joas King. For that the high Priest did not counsel, but command, it is apparent by those word 4. Reg. 11. And the Centurions did according to all things that joaida the Priest had commanded them. Also by those words 2. Paralip. 23. And joiada the high Priest going forth to the Centurions, and captains of the army, said to them, Bring her (Queen Athalia) forth without the precinct of the temple, and let her be killed with the sword without. And that the cause of this deposition and killing of Athalia was not only her tyranny, but also for that she did maintain the worship of Baal, it is manifest by those words, which are set down immediately after her kill, Therefore all the people, saith the Scripture, entered into the house of Baal, and destroyed it, and they broke his altars, and his images, * Simulachra. Mathan also the Priest of Baal they slew before the Altars. 9 To this example I answered first, that if this argument of Card. Bellarmine were of any force, as in very deed it is not, it would also demonstrate, that the Pope hath power to deprive Sovereign Princes both for heresy, Idolatry, and also tyranny, not only of their dominions, but also of their lives, which, although I have before i Num 43. & seq. & num. 329. evidently deduced to follow manifestly from his doctrine, yet he now bringing this example of Athalia (who by the commandment of joiada the high Priest was deposed and also slain) for proof of his opinion, doth clearly insinuate the same. That this is clearly deduced from his doctrine, I proved principally by this argument: for that, according to Card. Bellarmine's doctrine, the Pope is the supreme Prince of all Christians, yea and of Sovereign Princes, not only in spirituals, but also in temporals in order to spiritual good, and that in order to the same spiritual good he hath a most ample power in temporals, and so great, that greater there cannot be, and consequently he hath as great, and ample authority over temporal Princes in temporals in order to the same spiritual good, as temporal Princes have in temporals over their subjects in order to temporal good, but temporal Princes have in order to the common temporal good, not only authority to deprive them of their lives, but also, if the crime be public, and notorious, or if the known, and manifest perturbers of the common temporal good be so potent, that they cannot without danger of rebellion, and great manslaughter be apprehended, the Prince may without citation, defence, or process, condemn them in their absence, and without their privity, (as there I proved out of Navarre, k Navar. in Manual. cap. 25. num 10. and Sayrus) l Sayrus' lib. 7. Thesauri cap. ●1. num. 11. and also he may give leave to private men to kill such notorious malefactors by poison, or in any other public, or secret manner, therefore the Pope may in order to spiritual good proceed in the same manner with temporal Princes, who in order to spiritual good are according to Card. Bellarmine's doctrine subject to the Pope in all temporals. 10 Which doctrine of Card. Bellarmine, and others of his Society, whose books have been therefore condemned, and some of them burned by a public decree of the Parliament of Paris, how dangerous, and prejudicial it is, not only to the supreme authority of absolute Princes, who in temporals are supreme, and subject to none but God alone, by whom only with temporal punishments they can be punished, as I have proved in other places by the common consent of all the holy Fathers, and ancient Divines, but also to their persons and lives, I have insinuated else where, and leave it to the consideration of any judicious man, especially considering that Popes are also now temporal Princes, and subject to human infirmities as other men are, who with the passions of ire, envy, covetousness, and desire to augment and enlarge their temporal States and Dominions, may not only be moved, but under pretence also of advancing, or defending the common spiritual good, may be sometimes overcome; and moreover, that, according to the doctrine of Card. Bellarmine, it belongeth to the Pope to judge what hindereth, hurteth, or advanceth the spiritual good, neither must his judgement, or sentence be contradicted by any man, as it is declared in can. Patet, and can. Aliorum 9 q. 3. 11 Now you shall see, D. Schulcke. in Apolog. ad num. 363. pag. 556. in what a shuffling manner D. Schulckenius would shift of this argument. And first here he remitteth himself to the numbers 43. and 329. before cited, where he saith that he hath clearly answered the argument; but how clearly, or rather obscurely he hath answered the same, you shall presently perceive. For as touching the principal argument, which I did set down at large in the 43. number and seq. and have briefly signified the same above, first he concealeth the whole proof of my consequence for six entire numbers together, and he only answereth thus: I answer, saith he, m Pag. 144. that so prolix a discourse is needless: for there is none but seethe to what all this doth tend; neither is it a hard matter to solve the arguments; let them pass as not making to the purpose. For I have above not once only commended that not able sentence of Pope Leo the great, and received by the Church in use, and practise, Ecclesiastica lenitas refugit cruentas ultiones; Ecclesiastical Lenity doth shun bloody revenging, or punishments: And afterwards he maketh a long discourse, that no Pope hath over commanded the kill of Princes, or caused them to be slain by privy murderers: and that Princes need not to fear, that any Pope will plot the death of any Prince. Wherefore let Widdrington cease by vain words to put Secular Princes in fear, and to make the Pontifical power to be odious. The Pontifical power is instituted by the Saviour of mankind for the salvation, and not for the destruction of Princes. These arguments do tend to no other end, then to provoke the hatred of Princes against the Pope; for otherwise Widdrington was not ignorant, that Ecclesiastical, especially Pontifical lenity doth shun bloody punishments. 12 But first whether D. Schulckenius by this his answered doth intend to acknowledge, that the Pope in order to spiritual good hath authority to take away the lives of wicked Princes, by all those ways public, or private, by which temporal Princes have authority in order to temporal good to take away the lives of their wicked and rebellious subjects, which I intended by that argument to convince, in this place he speaketh doubtfully, and in express words doth neither say I, nor no, yet afterwards he doth plainly enough affirm the same, saying, n Cap 9 ad nu. 229. pag. 413. that Ecclesiastical lenity, for as much as concerneth the punishment of death, doth shun bloody punishments, not for that it doth by the law of God want power to do the same, but because it doth not beseem the Ministers of Christ: and again, It doth not belong, saith he, o Cap. 10. ad num. 318. pag. 490. to the Ecclesiastical Court to give sentence of death, not because the Church cannot absolutely give this sentence, but because it is not decent. And the Pope himself might, if he should judge it expedient, both give this sentence, and also grant by a dispensation, that other Priests might do the same. For we have nothing, whereby it is forbidden, but the positive Ecclesiastical law, wherein the Pope by the consent of all men may dispense. 13 Secondly, this Doctor doth egregiously, and against Christian charity, and justice abuse my innocency, in misconstruing my good intentions, which, God is my witness, are most pure and sincere. For it was never my meaning, to make the Sea Apostolic odious, or dreadful to Christian Kings, and Princes, but only to find out the Catholic truth plainly and sincerely in a matter of such great importance, which doth so nearly concern the supreme authority of all temporal Princes, and the due obedience, which all subjects, of what religion soever they be, do by the law of Christ own to them in temporal matters▪ It is rather this Doctor, and such as embrace his desperate principles, who by this their false, seditious, scandalous, and new broached damnable doctrine, and unknown to the ancient Fathers, and the primitive Church do seek, as much as lieth in them, to make the Sea Apostolic odious and dreadful to all Christian Princes, and subjects. And if it be so easy a matter to answer my aforesaid arguments, as this Doctor affirmeth, why then doth he not answer them, but shifteth them over, with a let them pass as not pertaining to the purpose? Is it not to the purpose, that Card. Bellarmine, and his followers should force upon the Christian world the doctrine touching the Pope's spiritual power to depose temporal Princes, as a point of Catholic belief, from which such absurd, dangerous, desperate, scandalous, seditious consequents, and not heard of before these miserable times, do evidently follow? 14 But such strange novelties must with shufflings, and shift be cunningly covered, and must not be clearly known to Sovereign Princes, and their subjects, lest forsooth they make the Sea Apostolic odious and dreadful to Christian Princes. As thought it were likely that Christ our Saviour would give to S. Peter, and his Successors any spiritual power, which should be a sufficient cause to make the Sea Apostolic odious to Christian Princes, or that the knowledge of true Catholic faith either concerning the Pope's spiritual power to take away the crowns or lives of Christian Princes, or concerning any other thing could be a sufficient cause to make the Sea Apostolic odious to Christian Princes, more than the knowledge of true Catholic faith concerning the power of temporal Princes to take away the temporal goods, and lives of their subjects can be a sufficient cause to make temporal authority odious to Christian subjects. Hostis Herodis impie Christum venire quid times, said Sedulius, who flourished about the year 430. Non eripit mortalia, qui regna dat caelestia, which is Englished thus. That Christ is come why dost thou dread, O Herode, thou ungodly foe, He doth not earthly Kingdoms reave, that heavenly Kingdoms doth bestow: But Herode might justly have replied, if this new broached doctrine were true, yes I have great cause to fear, for that not only Christ, but S. Peter also, and his Successors have by their ordinary commission authority to bereave me not only of my kingdom, but also of my life. 15 And the same answer, which is also conform to the doctrine of all the ancient Fathers, would Sedulius have made to any Christian King, who should have feared, that the Pope by his spiritual power might deprive him of his kingdom and life: to wit, that he need not to fear the Pope's power in that respect, for that Christ our Saviour hath given to the Apostles and their Successors the keys of the kingdom of heaven and not of earthly kingdoms, to absolve from sins, not from debts, to bind the soul with the bond of anathema and not with chains of Iron. 16 But although the Pope should have power over the lives of Princes in order to spiritual good, yet Princes, saith this Doctor, need not to fear, that the Pope will plot the death of any Prince, for that no Pope hath ever commanded the kill of Princes, or caused them to be slain by privy murderers, and it is well known, that Ecclesiastical lenity shuneth bloody punishments. But first, if the Pope have such a power, it is evident, that it is in his free choice and courtesy, to take away the life of any wicked Prince in order to spiritual good, as it is in the courtesy of a temporal Prince to take away the life of any wicked subject in order to temporal good. Secondly, that the Pope is also bound, as I proved against Suarez, to proceed against a Christian Prince, See Apendix to Suarez part. 1. sec. 9 nu. 6. & seq. who is a known heretic, or persecutor of the Church, or public enemy to spiritual good, in that manner, and by all those ways, public or secret, by which a temporal Prince is bound to proceed against a public traitor, a notorious robber and murderer by the high way side, and a known enemy to the common temporal good. 17 Thirdly, if no Pope hath ever plotted the death of any Christian Prince the reason hereof I think to be, for that there was never any Pope that held this newly invented, and never before heard of bloody doctrine, that the Pope as Pope, or by virtue of his spiritual power, which by the law of Christ shuneth bloody punishments, might in order to spiritual good deprive any man of corporal life, or concur to the effusion of blood: And therefore if those Popes, who have been so vehement to maintain their pretended power to deprive Princes of their kingdoms, had duly considered, what odious, detestable and bloody conclusions do evidently follow from that doctrine and position, I make no doubt, but that they would likewise from their heart have detested, abhorred and utterly forsaken, and caused to have been hissed out of Christian schools the doctrine and premises, from whence such horrible, hateful and abominable conclusion is are so clearly and certainly deduced. Fourthly therefore, although it be most true, that Ecclesiastical lenity doth shun bloobie punishments, yet it is not for that the law of Christ doth forbid Ecclesiastical persons to concur in any case to the effusion of blood, nor only for that Ecclesiastical persons are by the Pope's laws, which by force of the laws do not bind the Popes themselves, commanded not to inflict in any case bloody punishments, or not to use the material sword, but also for that it is not lawful, according to the law of Christ, for Ecclesiastical men, as they are Ecclesiastical men, or for Popes, as they are Popes, or by virtue of their Ecclesiastical power, to inflict temporal punishments, or which is all one, as I observed before p Part. 2. ca 9 out of S. Bernard, to use the material sword. 18 Now you shall see how fraudulently, and insufficiently D. Sculckenius answereth this my argument at the number 335. where briefly I did only touch the same, for at the number 43 & seq. where at large I proved the same, he cunningly, as you have seen, passeth it over, only with, It is not a hard matter to solve the argument, let it pass as not belonging to the matter. That which Widdrington doth adjoin in the end, saith he q pag. 510. , that from the doctrine of deposing Princes it doth manifestly follow, that the spiritual Pastor may give leave to private men to kill by any art, or stratagem an heretical Prince, as a certain wolf, is a most horrible slander, like unto which I know not, that the breast of man hath at any time so despitefully uttered. Act. 8. I see plainly, that Widdrington is in the gall of bitterness, and the obligation of iniquity. For seeing that the opinion of Bellarmine is commonly received by the Catholic Church, and also confirmed by most frequent practice, whilst my Adversary Widdrington doth propound and debate it as spitefully as possibly he can, he seemeth to have no other purpose, then to bring the Vicar of Christ his Father and Pastor, whether he will or nill, into the hatred, and that most great of Princes, and to make all Catholic Divines and Lawyers to be odious, yea and plainly, and of set purpose to sound the alarm, to call Princes to arms against the Church of God, but iniquity will belie itself. 19 For it is one thing to depose one for a just cause; and another thing to kill him by privy murderers. For it is oftentimes lawful for one to depose, who may not lawfully kill, and oftentimes that is a cause of a just deposing, which would not be a cause of a just kill: wherefore whatsoever it be concerning the truth of the consequent, which is not called in question, neither doth it make to the purpose, the consequence, which my Adversary Widdrington doth infer, is denied whilst he argueth thus: The Pope hath power to depose Princes, therefore also to kill them, etc. for from the power to depose doth not follow the power to kill. And to confirm it by examples: A Father may for some cause depose his son from the right due to the first begotten son, yet he may not kill him, or give leave to kill him. A Master may depose a servant from his office, yet he may not kill him. A King may depose a Magistrate from his government for some offence, for which he may not justly kill him. A Biship may depose a Clerk, and yet he may not forthwith kill him. The Pope may sometimes depose a Bishop, and yet he may not for the same cause justly bereave him of his life. 20 But▪ to omit the railing and slanderous speeches of this uncharitable Doctor, whereof I have spoken somewhat above, and which more plainly will be discovered by laying open his manifest fraud, and fallacious dealing in answering my argument, mark, good Reader, I beseech thee, how foully and shamefully he seeketh to delude thee, in proving the consequence of my argument not to be good, but to be false, and a most horrible slander, and whether of himself, or me that saying of the Prophet is verified, mentita est iniquitas sibi, Psal. 26. iniquity hath belied herself. For it is one thing, saith this Doctor, to depose one for a just cause, and another thing to kill him by privy murderers. Who maketh any doubt of this? and oftentimes, saith he, one may lawfully depose, who may not lawfully kill, and oftentimes that may be a cause of a just deposition, which is not a cause of a just kill: And of this also speaking in general, and abstracting from a supreme power to depose and kill, and from the crimes for which one may lawfully be deposed or killed there can be made no question. But what of all this? how can it from hence be concluded, that from the doctrine of the Pope's power to depose heretical or wicked Princes in order to the public spiritual good, which was the antecedent proposition of my argument, it doth not manifestly follow, that the Pope in order to the same spiritual good hath not also power to kill heretical and wicked Princes and known perturbers of the common spiritual good, by all those ways public or private, and by all those Arts and Stratagems, by which temporal Princes in order to the public temporal good may kill public malefactors and perturbers of the public temporal peace. 21 Wherefore, whatsoever it be, saith he, concerning the truth of the consequent, which is not called in question, nor maketh to the purpose, the consequence, which Widdrington inferreth, whilst he concludeth thus, The Pope hath power to depose Princes, therefore also to kill them, etc. is denied. But first, I would gladly know, wherefore this Doctor saith, that the truth of my consequent, which is, that the Pope hath power to kill Princes, is not called in question, nor maketh to the purpose. For if his meaning be, as it seemeth to be, that no Catholic affirmeth, that the Pope hath power to kill Christian Kings, for otherwise he would not so boldly have said, that I, by urging this argument, did impose upon the Vicar of Christ a most horrible slander, like unto which the breast of man hath never so despitefully uttered, then, I say, the consequence of my argument is good, and to the purpose, and it proveth, that my Adversaries, by teaching, that the Pope hath power to depose Christian Princes, and not I, who do not maintain that doctrine, do consequently impose that most horrible slander upon the Vicar of Christ, our common Father, and Pastor. 22 For wherefore, think you, doth this Doctor deny the consequence of my argument? Mark, I pray you, his fallacious reason, and how he fraudulently altereth my argument, and cunningly changeth both the subject and predicate of my antecedent proposition, upon which my consequence, and consequent do wholly depend. For it doth not follow, saith he, from a power to depose a power to kill. I never said, that from a power to depose in general, doth follow a power to kill, abstracting both from the persons, who are to depose and kill, and from the crimes, for which the persons that may be deposed, may be killed: but my argument did specify in particular, as well the persons, who were to depose and kill, as the causes and crimes for which one may by them be deposed or killed. And I affirmed, that from the doctrine, that maintaineth the Pope's power to depose heretical Princes, and public enemies to the common spiritual good, it doth evidently follow, that the Pope in order to the same public spiritual good hath also power to kill such Princes: and that therefore this argument was good; The Pope in order to the common spiritual good hath power to depose absolute Princes, if the crime deserve deposition, therefore in order to the same spiritual good he hath power also to kill them, if the crime deserve corporal death. 23 And the reason, or ground of my consequence was, for that, according to the doctrine of Card. Bellarmine, and those that maintain the Pope's power to depose Sovereign Princes, for this cause and reason they grant unto the Pope a power to depose Princes in order to spiritual good, for that they grant the Pope to have in order to spiritual good ●●otestatem summam in temporalibus, so great a power in temporals, that none can be greater, and therefore as great a power in temporals, as temporal Princes have. Whereupon they are not afraid to affirm, ●hat all Christian Princes, Kings, Emperors and monarchs are the Pope's subjects in temporals in order to spiritual good, as other inferior persons are subject to temporal Princes in temporals in order to temporal good: But a temporal Prince hath in order to temporal good authority not only to take away the lands and lives of their subjects, if the crime deserve that punishment, and the common temporal good doth require the same, but also, if the crime be public and notorious, and the malefactors, or perturbers of the public temporal good be so potent, that without rebellion, or great temporal harm ●hey can not be apprehended, he hath authority to condemn them privately, and in their absence, without any process, citation or de●ence, and afterwards to give licence to any private man to bereave ●hem of their lives by any art or stratagem, and by any public or privy way: therefore the Pope according to these desperate grounds ●nd principles, which grant him potestatem summam in temporalibus, ●ath the like authority over temporal Princes in order to spiritual good, who, according to this false and scandalous doctrine, are in order to spiritual good subject to the Pope in temporals. This was my argument. 24 wherefore, my consequence was only concerning the Pope, ●o whom is therefore granted by my Adversaries a power to depose Princes, for that he hath in order to spiritual good potestatem summam ●n temporalibus, so great a power in temporals that none can be greater: for ● supreme power in temporals doth necessarily include a power both to depose and kill, if the crime deserve the same. And therefore who would not admire, or rather pity, that so learned a man, as is he, who ● reputed to be the true Author of this book, should bring such unlearned instances from those, who have not a supreme power in tempo●als, or if they have from a crime, which doth not deserve death, to impugn my consequence, which speaketh both of one, who is supposed ●o have a supreme power in temporals, and also of a crime, which is so heinous, that according to the law it deserveth death, if it were committed by subjects or private men. 25 For the consequences of those five examples, which this Dortour hath brought to impugn my arugment, are all defective, either ●or that the persons, who are to depose, and therefore to kill, are not supposed to have supreme power in temporals, to wit, every Father, Ma●ter or Bishop; or else, because the crime, for which the persons there specified may be deposed, doth not deserve so great a punishment, as is death. But if we once suppose a Father, Master and Bishop to have a supreme power in temporals over their sons, servants and Clerks, as the Pope is supposed by my Adversaries to have over all Christian Princes, and also the crime to deserve death, then, I say, it doth evidently follow, that if such a Father hath power to deprive his son of his inheritance, he hath also power to deprive him of his life, not for that a power to kill is necessarily annexed to every power to depose, but to such a power to depose, which is a supreme power over all temporals, or rather for that a power to depose and to kill, to take away goods, and life are necessarily included in every supreme power to dispose of all temporals. And therefore all the shuffling shifting and cunning of this Doctor will never be able to weaken the force of my consequence, but this consequence will ever remain good and strong, that if the Pope hath power to deprive temporal Princes of their kingdoms, for that he is their supreme Lord in temporals in order to spiritual good, it doth necessarily follow, that he hath power also to deprive them of their lives, if the necessity of the common spiritual good require the same. And therefore, although the opinion of Card, Bellarmine be received, not by the Catholic Church, as this Doctor untruly affirmeth, but by many Catholic Doctors, and confirmed by the often practise of many later Popes, yet always contradicted by Catholic Kings and subjects, nevertheless, if these Catholic Doctors and Popes had duly considered, what odious and detestable consequences do follow from that opinion, they would forthwith in my judgement have detested the premises from which such hateful conclusions, (and which this Doctor seemeth here so greatly to abhor, that he feareth not therefore to accuse me of imposing a most horrible slander upon Christ's Vicar) are most clearly and certainly deduced. 26 Wherefore to conclude this point, that which this Doctor answereth secondly, concerning Athalia, who was slain by the commandment of joiada the high Priest, is nothing to the purpose. To this argument, saith he, r Pag. 556. I answer now, that examples are to be taken according to the convenience of the matter and persons. In the old Testament Priests did make war, and fight with the rest of the Israelites against their enemies, but in the new Testament Priests do abstain from the shedding of blood, and if they find any to be worthy of death, they deliver them over to the Secular power to be punished. But this, I say, is nothing at all to the purpose: For my argument was not concerning inferior Priests, but only concerning the Pope, neither also what Popes in practice, and de facto do, but what according to the institution of Christ they have authority to do. Now it is evident and approved by the common consent of Catholic Divines, that the shedding of blood is not by the institution of Christ forbidden either the Pope, or inferior Bishops and Priests, who therefore with the Pope's licence make war, and concur directly to the effusion of blood, as oftentimes they have done, yea now at Rome all effusion of blood by a juridical sentence, and condemning malefactors to death, and all making of wars by the Pope's subjects are derived from the Pope's authority, not as he is Pope, but as he is a temporal Prince; for that which I contend is, that Priests neither in the old law, nor in the new, as they are Priests, or by their Priestly power, have authority to condemn any man to death, or to inflict any temporal punishment, as death, exile, privation of goods, imprisonment, or the like. 27 Secondly and principally to this example of Athalia I answered, s Apolog. nu. 366. & seq. that it is untrue, that joiada the high Priest, did, as Card. Bellarmine of. firmeth in this place, create joas King, that is, did give him a right, or true title to reign, which before he had not, seeing that the true dominion and right to the kingdom, did by hereditary right belong to joas, presently after the death of his brethren, whom wicked Athalia had treacherously slain, although Athalia did tyrannically usurp the possession thereof: For it is not unusual for one to possess sometimes either with a good, or bad conscience, that thing whereof another man is the true lord or owner; And therefore betwixt right and possession a great difference is commonly made by all Divines and Lawyers. Wherefore joiada in killing Athalia did no other thing, than what every faithful subject aught to do in such a case. For seeing that for his innocent life, opinion of sanctity, and the dignity of his office, he was in great veneration among the people and Peers of the kingdom, his authority, or favour did prevail so much with them, that all men with uniform consent would very easily be drawn, especially by his persuasion to kill the treacherous usurpresse, and to seat the lawful King, who was unjustly detained from the possession of his kingdom, in the possession thereof. But this did only argue the strength and power of joiada, and his great favour with the people and Peers, and not any authority in him to create a King, who by right was not a lawful King before. 28 Wherefore from this example of Athalia nothing at all can by any true, or probable consequence be concluded in favour of Cardinal Bellarmine: because from the holy Scripture it cannot sufficiently be gathered, either that Athalia was by the commandment of joiada slain for Idolatry, but only for manifest tyranny, for that she had cruelly murdered the Royal issue, and had unjustly usurped the kingdom, the true heir being alive, and therefore she could not be the lawful Queen, or that joiada the high Priest did command her to be slain by his own proper authority, but by the consent of the King, Peers, and people. And therefore this example doth nothing avail to prove, that true Kings, and Princes (albeit heretics, and Idolaters) who are in lawful possession of their kingdoms, may be deprived of their kingdoms, or lives by the Pope's authority. 29 This second, to wit, that joiada the high Priest did only by his aid and counsel solicit, and not by his own proper authority, but with the consent of the States command in the King's name Athalia to be slain, 2. Paral. 23. is manifest by those words; And in the seventh year joiada taking courage took the Centurions, etc. and made a covenant with them (to wit, to kill Athalia, and to seat joas the King's son, and lawful King in the possession of his kingdom, which she had unjustly usurped) who going about juda, saith the Scripture, gathered together the Levites out of all the cities of juda, and the Princes of the families of Israel, and they came into Jerusalem. Therefore all the multitude made a covenant with the King in the house of GOD: And joiada said to them, Behold the King's son shall reign, as the Lord hath spoken, upon the sons of David: which words the Gloss expounding, 4. Reg. 11. writeth thus. Hear is described the institution of the true heir, (whom also he calleth the due King) through the carefulness of joiada the high Priest, seeking thereunto the assent, and aid of the Princes, and Nobles of the kingdom, when it is said, And he made a covenant with them. Wherefore that commandment, which joiada gave to the Centurions to kill Athalia, did proceed from that former covenant, which before he had made with them, and the King. And therefore as every private subject may, and aught to command any man in the King's name to aid him for the apprehending of a traitor to his Prince, and Country without having any authority proper, or peculiar to him to do the same, so it is not necessary, that any peculiar authority to command be given to joiada, only for that he with the consent of the King, and the common wealth commanded Athalia unjustly usurping the kingdom to be slain: although we should understand that commandment of joiada, of a commandment being taken strictly, and not largely, or commonly, in which sense to command doth little differ from to counsel, or persuade. 30 But the first, which is affirmed by Cardinal Bellarmine, to wit, that Athalia was slain not only for tyranny, but also for idolatry (albeit if this were true, it nothing availeth to prove, that a true, and lawful Prince although an Idolater may lawfully be slain, seeing that it is manifest, that Athalia was not a true and lawful Queen, but an usurper of the kingdom, the true heir being alive) he very insufficiently concludeth from they holy Scripture, seeing that he relateth not truly those words, which do immediately follow the kill of Athalia. For those words, Therefore all the people entered into the house of Baal, and destroyed it, and they broke his Altars and his Images, do not immediately follow either 4. Reg. 11. or 2. Paralip. 23. the kill of Athalia, as Cardinal Bellarmine untruly affirmeth (intending to prove from thence that she was slain for idolatry) but these words do immediately follow her kill: And joiada made a covenant between himself and all the people, and the King, that they would be the people of the Lord: and after them do immediately follow those words related by Cardinal Bellarmine; Therefore all the people entered into the house of Baal, and destroyed it, etc. Wherefore these last words, which he bringeth for his only ground, are not so much to be referred to the kill of Athalia, as to the covenant made after Athalia was slain betwixt joiada, the people, and the King, that they would be the people of God; through which covenant made with God, that they would be his people, they were moved to destroy the house of Baal, and his Images. Therefore Cardinal Bellarmine doth not well conclude from this place, that Queen Athalia was slain either by the proper authority of the high Priest, (as he was high Priest) or for Idolatry in doing worship to Baal. And although we should also grant him both, yet how vicious it is to draw an argument from the kill of an unlawful Queen and unjustly usurping the kingdom to prove that a true King, who is an Idolater, may lawfully be slain, any man that is not void of natural reason may presently perceive. Thus I answered to this example of Athalia in my Apology. 31 Now you shall see what a weak, fallacious, and slanderous Reply D. Schulckenius hath made to this my answer. I answer, saith he, r Pag. 558. that Athalia without doubt did tyrannically invade the kingdom, but seeing that she ruled peaceably for six years, it is credible, that by little and little by the consent of the people she did get a lawful right to the kingdom. For so many Kings, who are Tyrants in the beginning, are afterwards by the consent of the people made lawful Princes. Surely Octavian Augustus himself, who is numbered among the best Princes did oppress the common wealth by force, and arms, and spoiled her of her liberty, yet afterwards by the consent of the people he began to be accounted a lawful Prince, and did lawfully transfer the Empire to his posterity. Otho killed Galba, Vitellius killed Otho, Vespasian killed Vitellius, Philip killed Gordian, and yet they were all saluted Emperors by the Senate, and people of Rome. How did the Ostrogoths invade and possess Italy, the Visigothe Spain, the Francs France, the English Brittany? and yet afterwards by the consent of the people they were accounted lawful Kings of those Dominions. 32 But any man though of mean understanding may easily perceive the weakness of this his first Reply. For first the main controversy betwixt me, and Cardinal Bellarmine, as I have often signified in other places, at this present only is, whether it be certain, and a point of faith, and by demonstrative arguments it can be convinced, that the Pope hath power to depose temporal Princes, and he pretendeth to demonstrate the same, and therefore he calleth the contrary opinion, not so much an opinion, as an heresy, and his doctrine to be the doctrine and voice of the Catholic Church which every Christian is bound to hear and follow, otherwise he is to be accounted as a Heathen, and a Publican, and now this Doctor for proof of this his new Catholic faith bringeth a bare credibile est, it is credible, or which in sense is all one, it is not incredible, that although Athalia was without doubt an usurpresse in the beginning, yet afterwards by the consent of the people she was lawful Queen, or did get a lawful right to the kingdom, as though a bare credibile est, and slight conjectures of his own invention are sufficient proofs to demonstrate a matter of so great moment, as is the Pope's authority to take away the kingdoms, and lives of Sovereign Princes, who in temporals are subject to none, but to GOD alone. 33 Observe now, good Reader, the reason, for which this Doctor affirmeth, that it is credible, that Athalia did by little and little by the consent of the people get a lawful right to the kingdom: Because, forsooth, she reigned peaceably six years together: as though either six years prescription, or peaceable possession is sufficient to give to a most cruel Tyrant and Usurper, a true and lawful right to the kingdom, which he hath tyrannically usurped, especially the true and lawful heir being alive, or that six years peaceable possession can be a credible presumption, that the whole commonwealth hath given their free, hearty and altogether willing consent, that the said usurper should be their true, and rightful King: or thirdly, that the common wealth can deprive the true heir, and rightful King of his right to the kingdom without any fault, or negligence committed by him, and give it to another, who hath no right thereunto. For it is the common doctrine of the Lawyers, Molina de Inst. trac. 2. disp. 69. & 74. as Molina well observeth, that ten years, at the least, are required, that a private man may against another private man get by prescription a lawful right to any immovable thing, as lands, houses, or the like, which he bona fide, with a good conscience possesseth: and to get a lawful right by prescription, to those lands, or houses, which belong to the Crown, and yet may be prescribed by a private man, are required a hundred years: for those things, which are intrinsically due, and proper to the Prince in sign of subjection due to him by his subjects, as is the paying of tributes, and which do belong intrinsically to his supreme temporal power, as to punish offenders, to be subject to the laws, to appeal to him from inferior judges, cannot by any subject, by continual possession of never so long a time be prescribed: besides that, it is a common and approved rule of the law, s Regula possessor de Reg. juris in 60. and all Divines that writ de Iust. & jure. as Sotus, Salon. Aragona etc. that whosoever possesseth any thing with a bad conscience can never prescribe, or get a lawful right to the thing which he possesseth. See Molina tract. 2. de justitia disput. 72. 73. 74. and Lessius disp. 2. cap. 6. dub. 8. & 12. 34 And therefore can any man be so senseless as to imagine, that only six years possession are sufficient for a notorious tyrant, and manifest usurper, who therefore can not with any probable presumption be thought to possess with a good conscience the kingdom, to get by prescription a lawful right to a whole Realm, against the true and rightful heir, who is living? There is this deceit, Gregor. Tholos. lib. 26. de Repub. cap. 7. num. 4. saith Gregorius Tholosanus, of Tyrants, or Usurpers, that after they have invaded the kingdom, they would be partakers of the titles, or rights of the true Princes, whom they have dethroned, by using the general Assemblies of the people, or by forcing the authority of some Superior: which nevertheless doth not make them not to be true Tyrants, and not to be contained in the laws of Tyrants; unless, as some are of opinion, after they have usurped the kingdom, they wholly resign that authority, and submit their forces with their person to the judgement of those, who may lawfully give the kingdom; or unless after they have by tyranny obtained the kingdom, they with their progeny do by prescription get a lawful right to the Sovereignty by possessing it a hundred years or more. 35 Secondly, there is no likelihood, that if Athalia had demanded the consent of the people, or common wealth, whereof nevertheless there is no mention made in the holy Scripture, they would have given their free, hearty, and willing consent thereunto. And first, as noteth Abulensis, t Q. 4 i cap. 11. lib. 4. reg. for that she was a woman, and it was a disgrace to them to have a woman, who especially had no title to the kingdom, to rule over them by their own free and voluntary consent. Secondly, for that she was greatly hated by the people, both because she had most barbarously murdered her own sons children, and all of the blood Royal, and also for that she was daughter to Achab, whom the people of juda did grievously hate, because by the means of his issue many mischiefs happened to them, to wit, for that the house of Achab had instructed the Kings of juda in evil; and for this the people of juda suffered many evils for the sins of their Kings, as it fell out in the time of joram, who was a most wicked man by reason of the alliance he had made with the house of Achab, for this joram married this wicked Athalia, who was daughter to Achab: and for this God sent enemies into the land of juda who destroyed a great part thereof, and they spoiled all the substance that was found in the King's house, as it may be seen 2. Paralip. 21. 36 Moreover seeing that there had been so long strife, and contention betwixt the tribe of juda and the people of Israel about the sovereignty (for there was never true and constant amity betwixt them, and the ten Tribes from the time of King jeroboam to Achab the father of Athalia) it is not credible, that the people of juda would now yield up the bucklers, and freely without fear and compulsion give there consent, that Athalia, a woman, and not of their tribe, an Idolater, an Usurper, and who barbarously massacred all the Royal issue of the lineage of King David, should now reign over them, and sit in the throne of King David, to whom they knew God had promised, that his seed should reign over the people of Israel for ever. 37 Besides, that the people did not give their consent hearty, willingly and freely, that Athalia should reign over them, or at the most that can be imagined, only upon supposition that there was none of the blood Royal left alive, it is manifest by the great joy, which all the people took at her death, 4. Reg. 11. & 2. Paral. 23. and at the crowning of King joas, Laetatusque est omnis populus terrae, saith the Scripture, & civitas conquieu●t, And all the people of the land rejoiced, and the City was quiet: for that they saw their King, saith Abulensis, v In fine cap. 11. sit peaceably in his throne, and because whilst Athalia lived the people were greatly troubled, but now she being slain all were quiet. I said hearty, willingly and freely, because the consent of the common wealth in the approbation of such a King ought to be most free; for if it be enforced from them by any fear or violence it is not be accounted a suffiicient consent, but a constraint or compulsion, as may easily be gathered from the doctrine of Gregorius Tholosanus before related: and also because the contract betwixt the King, and the Common wealth is a certain kind of marriage, wherein as in carnal, and also in religious matrimony by making a solemn vow to GOD in an approved Religion, if the consent be not most free, it can not be called a sufficient consent, but a constraint, and the contract is not of force before GOD, as all Divines, and Lawyers do affirm; but the people of juda had just cause to fear the cruelty of so barbarous a woman, who feared not to murder her own grandchilds, and all the blood Royal, and therefore by all likelihood would not spare any other, that should resist her tyranny. 38 Lastly, it is not credible, that the people, and Princes of juda would freely, and willingly consent to such a new, and exorbitant action, as to make an Idolatress their rightful Queen, without the consent of the Priests, and Levites, and that the Priests, and Levites would give their free consent, without the privity and approbation of the high Priest, whose office was to instruct, and direct the people in all difficult matters concerning the law of GOD: But it is evident, that the high Priest neither did, nor would his free consent, if it had been demanded, to such a wicked action, both for that he should have been a traitor to his lawful King, whom he kept secret in the house of GOD for fear of Athalia, and also for that he should have transgressed the law of GOD, in honouring an Idolatress with the true title of a lawful Queen, who was to be put to death according to the law; which is not to be presumed of so holy a man, as joiada was, whose advise so long as King joas followed, he did not fall from GOD, according to that of 4. Reg. 12. And joas did right before our Lord, so long as joiada the high Priest taught him. And therefore this consent of the people, which this Doctor feigneth, is altogether incredible, and is neither grounded in the holy Scripture, nor in any other probable reason. Nevertheless I will not deny, but that Athalia being the King's mother, and having in his absence the custody of his Palace, treasure, and forces, and also having cruelly slain all her grand children, (as she, and the people also thought) might have many favourers, either for fear, or gain, but that the people, Princes, and Priests, did either in any public assembly, which representeth the body of the common wealth, or also in their hearts without any such assembly, give their free consent to make that wicked Athalia their rightful Queen, it is altogether improbable, and hath no colour at all of credibility. 39 But be it so for Disputation sake, that the people, imagining upon a false ground, that none of the blood Royal, and who by inheritance had a lawful right to the Kingdom of juda, were alive, were content, that Athalia should be their rightful Queen, yet that this consent of the people did give her a true lawful right to the Kingdom, the true King, and rightful heir being alive, as this Doctor affirmeth, is a very false, and seditious doctrine, and injurious to the true rights of all Sovereign Princes, who have right to their Kingdoms by inheritance, but especially of those of the Kingdom of juda, which by a peculiar, and special promise of GOD, was given to King David, and his seed for ever, from whom Queen Athalia did not descend. And therefore Fa. Becanus, who in the former edition of his Controversia Anglicana taught this pestiferous doctrine, fearing belike lest it would have been censured by the University of Paris, as in very deed it had been, x As it may appear by the Acts of the Faculty of Paris held in their ordinary Congregation the first day of February in the year 1613. if some had not cunningly prevented the same, by procuring it to be first condemned at Rome y By apeculiar decree against his book dated at Rome the third day of januarie 1613. by a special command of his Holiness (as containing in it somethings, which are false, temerarious, scandalous, and seditious respectively) until it should be corrected, was careful, that in the later Edition of his book, which was forthwith published, this dangerous position should be quite blotted out: And yet this Doctor following therein Card. Bellarmine in his book against D. Barclay, is not afraid most desperately, and seditiously to renew the same. But with what strange paradoxes, and seditious doctrines these vehement manitainers of the Pope's authority to depose Princes, and to dispose of all temporals, being so famous for their learning, so reverent for their Order, so great in authority, so potent by friends, and so violent in maintaining their novelties, will in the end infect a great part of the Church of Christ, whereof these men are accounted to be the chief pillars, unless God by his infinite mercy prevent their exorbitant courses, I tremble to consider, and how little beholding are Sovereign Princes to such extravagant Writers, who will also have their people, who are subject to them, to have authority over them in temporals, and to take away their lawful right, which they have to their Crowns, and to give it to another, who by inheritance hath no true right thereunto, and that without any fault, or negligence committed by them, any prudent man may easily perceive. 40 To conclude therefore this point, that which this Doctor addeth concerning those Emperors and Kings, who although in the beginning were Tyrants, and Usurpers, yet afterwards by the consent of the people, and of those, who had true right to those kingdoms, were made lawful Princes, are nothing like to this example of Queen Athalia: and all those examples are particularly answered by Mr. john Barclay z Cap. 38. paragraph 2. against Cardinal Bellarmine, who also in the very like words urged the same: Neither can they be rightly applied to the kingdom of juda, which by the express promise, and appointment of almighty God was due to the posterity of King David: neither was it in the power of the high Priests, Princes, and people without violating the ordinance of almighty God to transfer the kingdom of juda from the race of King David to another tribe, and especially to an Idolatress, as was wicked Athalia, who by the Law of God, as being a subject, was commanded to be put to death. 41 Wherefore this, which this Doctor in the end adjoineth [to wit, that the Scripture doth manifestly teach, that joiada together with the people did make joas King, and they made him King, 4. Reg. 11. & 2. Paralip. 23. & cap. 24. joas was seven years old when he began to reign, where the beginning of his kingdom is put from the death of Athalia, and his institution to be King: and although before his coronation the Scripture called him King, 2. Paralip. 23. this was only by anticipation as a designed King, and therefore he was first called King, and afterwards it is said, he shall reign, because he was a King not present but future] this I say is either a manifest equivocation, or a plain untruth; for if he mean, that they did make him King, that is, did put him in possession of his kingdom, which was wrongfully, and tyrannically kept from him by Athalia, or which is all one, they did make him King, de facto, or to reign, de facto, this is most true, and the Scripture doth plainly show the same; but if he mean, that they did make him King, de iure, and give him his right to the kingdom, as though before their making him King he had not right to the kingdom, and was not King, de iure, it is most false, and also implieth a very seditious doctrine, to wit, either that those, who are Kings by hereditary succession, do not, as other heirs, albeit they be in minority, succeed in all their Father's rights presently after he is departed the world, or else that the people may deprive them of their lawful right to the kingdom, without any fault, or negligence committed by them. 42 And to this I plainly answered before, as you have seen, in my Apology, by declaring the sense of those equivocal words, they created, or made joas King: sort I said in express words, [that it is untrue, that joiada the high Priest, did create joas King, as Cardinal Bellarmine affirmeth, that is, did give him a right to reign, which he had not before, seeing that presently after the death of his brethren, whom wicked Athalia had treacherously murdered, the true dominion, and right to the kingdom did by inheritance belong to joas, although Athalia did tyrannically keep the possession.] For as soon as a King is dead, the next heir apparent to the Crown is forthwith the lawful King, neither doth his anointing, crowning, or acceptance of the people give, but only confirm his former Kingly right. And this is so clear, that neither Cardinal Bellarmine, nor this Doctor, if they be not the same person, dare deny the same: but such false and seditious positions cannot but by equivocations with any show of credibility be maintained. If this Doctor had declared the ambiguity of those words [they did make him King] as I did, the Reader would quickly have perceived, that out of those words of holy Scripture it cannot be proved, that joiada with the people did make joas King, that is, did give him a lawful right to the kingdom, which before he had not, but only, that they did make him King de facto, and put him in possession of his kingdom, whereof before he was King de iure, although the possession was tyrannically kept from him by Athalia. And thus much concerning the incredibility of this Doctors credibile est. 43 Now you shall see, how weak, fallacious, and slanderous are the other Replies of this Doctor to the rest of my answer. For whereas I affirmed, as you have seen, that joiada in killing Athalia did no other thing, than which every faithful subject aught to do in such a case, this Doctor very falsely, and slanderously affirmeth, that Widdrington doth here in plain words give occasion to subjects to rebel against their Kings, and to kill them, and if they think, that any man hath by an ill title usurped the kingdom, they may, and not only may, but also are a bound to kill such a King, etc. But mark his words, I answer, saith he, a Pag. 560. that my Adversary Widdrington hath sometimes falsely and slanderously objected to Bellarmine, that he should give occasion to subjects to rise up against their Kings and to kill them: and nor he in plain words doth teach the same. For Athalia a Kings wife, a King's mother, and now herself a Queen reigned peaceably the seventh year, she was accused by no man, condemned by no judge, and yet Widdrington doth contend, that it was lawful for the high Priest (who according to his opinion, and words was a subject) to exhort the people to rebellion, and with the Peers and people to conspire against the Queen, and to kill her. 44 But, saith Widdrington, she had usurped the kingdom tyrannically, I answer, Be it so; but now the people assenting, she reigned the seventh year. Who gave to subjects authority over their Prince peaceably reigning? Who judged at that time Athalia to be a Tyrant, not a Queen, if she did not acknowledge a Superior to her? Let my Adversary Widdrington diligently consider, whether it be not by far more dangerous to the life of Kings and Princes, and to the safety of Kingdoms and Commonwealths, to give power to the people, and to subjects, to rebel and conspire, and at the last to kill Kings, whom they (rashly oftentimes and falsely) account Tyrants, then to say, that in the Pope, as head of the universal Church, and Christ's Vicar, is a judicial power to judge Kings, and if the deserve it to depose them b Why doth he not add also to kill them, as joiada did Athalia. : For who maketh any doubt, that Kings are safer, if they be subject to the Pope's equity, and gravity, to which Christ hath subjecteth them, then if they be subject to the rash levity the people, to which my Adversary Widdrington doth subject them? 45 Every faithful subject, saith Widdrington, aught to do in the like case, that joiada did by kill Athalia. What did joiada? Athalia a Kings wife, a King's mother, having killed all the Royal issue (as it was thought) had usurped the kingdom of juda, possessed the same peaceably now the seventh year: joiada the seventh year commanded her to be slain, she suspecting no such thing: and declared joas to be King. The same saith my Adversary Widdrington, every faithful subject in the like case ought to do: that is, every faithful subject, if he think, that one hath by an ill title usurped the kingdom, may and not only may, but also altogether ought to kill such a Prince, notwithstanding that he hath possessed the kingdom peaceably now many years, that all the people have obeyed him many years, that this Prince acknowledgeth no Superior, that he is not rightly, or as it should be, accused, heard, condemned to have usurped the kingdom by an ill title. 46 I declare it by an example. Let us suppose, that Elizabeth did by an ill title usurp the kingdom of England, and that the same by all right was fallen to the most excellent, and most holy Mary Queen of Scotland, and after her to her son now the most excellent, and most potent King of great Britain. In the mean time Elizabeth possessed the kingdom peaceably for many years; and did govern all things belonging to Kingly function no man contradicting, that she was condemned by no man, what do I say condemned? that she was accused by no man to usurp the kingdom tyrannically; what ought the subjects here to do? Every faithful Subject, saith my Adversary Widdrington, aught in the like case to do that joiada did by kill Athalia, that is, he ought to kill Queen Elizabeth, and to transfer the kingdom to Mary and her son. 47 Behold O Kings and Princes, you have one, who is careful of your security. So observant of your Royal Majesty are they, who do violate and calumniate the Pontifical authority. Every subject, saith Widdrington, not only may, but also aught to do in the like case that joiada did. O miserable state of Princes, whose kingdom and life is subject to the judgement of every private man? If Card. Bellarmine had written the like thing, what tumults would not my Adversary Widdrington make? what clamours would he not raise? Thus writeth this Doctor. 48 But how false, fraudulent and unconscionable is this Doctors Reply, I have most clearly convinced heretofore. c Disp. Theolog. in Admonit. nu. 6. For I never affirmed, as this Doctor most slanderously and shamefully imposeth upon me, that every faithful subject, if he think any one to have by an ill title usurped the kingdom, not only may, but also aught to kill such a King. I only said, that joiada in killing Athalia did no other thing then that every faithful subject aught to do in the like case. Now this Doctor clean altereth the case, and turneth it from the case of joiada in killing Athalia, which was this: Athalia daughter to Achab king of Israel, and wife to joram King of juda, and mother to Ochozias King Iorams son, who then reigned, hearing that her son King Ochozias was slain by jehu, did cruelly murder all the King's stock of the house was joram, as she thought, thereby to usurp the kingdom herself. But josabeth King Iorams daughter, the sister of Ochozias, and the wife of joiada the high Priest, taking joas the son of Ochozias, stole him out of the midst of the King's children, that were slain, and his nurse out of the bedchamber, and hide them in the temple, where they lived with joiada, and josabeth six years, in the which Athalia reigned over the land. But in the seventh year joiada taking courage (for all the time before both joas was very young, and now began to have some understanding, and he also feared the power of Arthalia, and by little and little procured the favour of the people and soldiers to take his part in so just a cause) sent for the Centurions, and communicating the whole matter with them, made with them a covenant adjuring them in the house of our Lord, to wit, that they would constantly take his part in putting down Athalia, and setting up joas the lawful heir and rightful King, from whom Athalia had now six years tyrannically kept the kingdom, who going about juda gathered together the Levites out of all juda, and the Princes of the families of Israel, and they came into jerusalem. 49 And then Ioida brought them into the temple, and showed them the King's son, saying to them, Behold the King's son shall reign, as our Lord hath spoken upon the sons of David: and all the multitude made a covenant with the King in the house of God. Then joiada gave order and commandment to the Centurions, in what manner they should stand in the temple with their soldiers to guard the King's person, which the Centurions performed according to all things that joiada had commanded them: and after he had given them the spears and weapons of King David, which were in the temple, with commandment, that if any person should enter into the temple to disturb them, he should be slain, he brought forth the King's son, and put the crown upon him, and the testimony, and they made him King, and anointed him, and clapping with their hands said, God save the King. Which noise when Athalia being in the King's Palace near to the temple heard, she went into the temple, and seeing the King standing upon the tribunal seat according to the manner, and the Princes and the companies about him, and the singers, and trumpets near him, and all the people rejoicing, and sounding the trumpets, she rend her garments, and cried, A Conspiracy, a Conspiracy; Treason, Treason. But joiada the high Priest commanded the Centurions that were over the army not to kill her in the Temple, but that she should be slain with the sword without, and that whosoever should follow her should be strooken with the sword: And they laid hands upon her, and when she was entered within the gate of the horses of the King's house they killed her there. Thus it its written 4. Reg. 11. 2. Paralip. 23. 50 This therefore, as you see, was the case of joiada in commanding Athalia to be slain. joiada, not only being the high Priest, and therefore next in authority to the King (for that next to the King there was none greater among the people than the high Priest) d Abul. q. 15. in c. 11. l. 4. Reg. but also being the King's uncle by his wife, and the King's Protector and Guardian, did put in possession of the kingdom of juda, joas the King's son being but seven years old, to whom the kingdom by the right of inheritance did appertain, whom he kept secretly in the temple for six years together, and therefore did not only by probable conjectures think, but he did certainly know, that he was the lawful King: and nevertheless before he would accomplish the same, he communicated the matter with the Centurions, and Princes of the people, and made a covenant with them: and he also caused Athalia to be slain, not only for that she had most tyrannically and barbarously usurped the kingdom, by killing all, as she thought, of the King's issue, but also for that she sought to make an open rebellion against the anointed King, crying out in the Temple in the presence of the new crowned King, of the high Priest, being the King Uncle and Protector, of all the Peers and people, a Conspiracy, a Conspiracy, Treason, Treason. And this, I say, joiada, and every faithful subject in such a case, that is, having the protection of the true, and whom for certainty he knew to be the rightful King, not only might, but also, if it were in his power, was bound to do: neither dare this Doctor unless he will rashly and seditiously teach a most false and pernicious doctrine, deny the same. 51 But mark, I pray you, how learned Abulensis answereth to this question, whether joiada was bound to make joas King, that is, put him in possession of the Kingdom, to which he had right by hereditary succession. It was, saith he, e Q. 15. in cap. 11. lib. 4. Reg. a manifest sin, that Athalia should usurp to herself the kingdom, joas being alive, to whom it did by lawful right appertain, therefore joiada was bound to do as much as lied in his power, that joas should not by Athalia be deprived of his right to the kingdom, therefore he was bound, when it did lie in his power to make joas King. Secondly, this is manifest, because joiada was in a certain manner by his office to make joas King, because after the King there was none greater among the people, than was the high Priest, and then there was no King, therefore it belonged to joiada, as to the high Priest, to redress the agreevances, which happened among the people: and this was the greatest agreevance, that the King should be deprived of his right, and therefore joiada was in this bound, as much of lied in his power, to procure a remedy by anointing joas King, to whom the kingdom did of right belong. Thirdly, this is manifest, because every man is bound to execute the known will of God, forasmuch as it doth prejudice charity, or some commandment of God, but God had said, that of the seed of David there should be Kings for ever, and it was not against charity, or any other commandment of God, always to anoint Kings of that tribe: therefore joiada was bound as much as lied in his power, to accomplish that will of God, to wit, that he should anoint joas King: And this was that, whereon joiada grounded himself, when he anointed joas King, saying to the people, Behold the King's son shall reign, as our Lord hath spoken, over the sons of David: 2. Paralip. 23●. as though he should say, because God commanded, that the sons of David should always reign, therefore we ought to anoint this for King, who was of the stock of David. 52 And as concerning the kill of Athalia, the said Abulensis f Ibidem ●▪ 20. writeth thus: I answer, that it was lawful for joiada to command Athalia to be slain. For the cause was just, to wit, for that she intended to kill the King, seeing that she had usurped the Kingdom; and also she was guilty of death for many other causes; or she had slain all the King's sons, and she was a disturber of the people, and a corrupter of the worship of GOD, seeing that she brought in the worship of Baal into jerusalem, and had made there a temple, and had Priests; Therefore any one of these things were sufficient, that she might be slain. Also it was lawful for joiada in regard of the power. For that now (that is, the King being in his minority) he was the Prince of the people as being the high Priest, who was always the greatest judge in Israel, from whose sentence it was not lawful for any man to appeal under pain of death, or to contemn in any wise his commandment. Deut. 17. (Nevertheless the high Priest was subject to the King in temporals, and might be judged by him, as the said Abulensis before affirmed, where he assigned the difference betwixt a judge, and a King.) Also, it was lawful for joiada in regard he now represented the King's person. For he made a covenant in the place, or person of the King with all the people, and with GOD, and he represented the King's person in all things, for that he had hitherto kept him hidden, and now he anointed him King, but it was lawful for the King to command Athalia to be slain, who had usurped the kingdom, therefore it was lawful also for joiada, who represented the King's person in all things. 53 Now I remit to the judgement of any understanding man, although he be never so partial, whether every faithful subject, having great power, and favour with the people, and being the King's Protector, and Guardian, and presenting the King's person in all things, ought not to defend the true and known King, against a manifestly surper, and to command that usurper to be slain, who in a manifest rebellion seeketh the crown and life of the true, and anointed King, which was the case of joiada in commanding Athalia to be slain. How unconscionably therefore, and shamefully doth this Doctor both abuse me, and also delude his Reader in misinterpreting so grossly those words of mine, Therefore joiada in killing Athalia did no other thing, than which every faithful subject aught to do in the like case: that is, saith this Doctor, every faithful subject, if he think one to have by an ill title usurped the kingdom, not only may, but also aught to kill such a King, etc. As though this were the case of joiada, whereas it is manifest, that joiada did not only think, but also certainly know that Athalia was an usurper, and that joas was the rightful King: Besides, he was the King's Uncle, his Protector and Guardian, and represented the King's person in all things; and also he proceeded orderly by procuring first the consent of the Princes and people, in putting joas in the possession of his kingdom, and afterwards commanding Athalia to be slain, for making a manifest rebellion in presence of the King, sitting in his Royal throne, & of all the Princes and people, crying a Conspiracy, a Conspiracy; Treason, Treason; for proof whereof there needed no accuser, or witness, the fact being so public and notorious, but it was sufficient to use martial Law in this case, especially seeing that there might have been danger in delay. 54. Neither doth this give occasion to subject to rebel against their lawful Kings, or to kill them, but rather to defend the right of their true Kind, and who is evidently known so to be, and too put down a known and manifest Usurper. Neither do I contend, as this Doctor without shame offirmeth me to do, that it was lawful for the high Priest (whom indeed I granted with S. Thomas. S. Bonaventure, Abulensis, and other Catholic Divines before g Sec. 1. nu. 5. 6. cited, to be subject to the King in temporals) to exhort the people to rebellion, and to conspire with the Peers and people against the lawful Queen, and to kill her, but I only contend, that it was lawful for joiada the high Priest, and for every faithful subject to defend the rightful title of the true and known King against a manifest Usurper, especially if such a subject be the King's Uncle, Protector, and Guardian, and hath the true, and known King in his protection, and custody, and representeth the King's person in all things, as joiada was. 55 Neither is that example of Queen Elizabeth, which this Doctor urgeth to disgrace me with our Countrymen, to the present purpose; Seeing that it was not manifest, that Queen Elizabeth was an Usurper, as was Athalia, but rather it is manifest, that she was the lawful Queen, considering that the Kingdom was left unto her by the last Will, and Testament of her Father King Henry, and also that she was accepted for lawful Queen by a public decree of the Parliament without any contradiction, or claim of Queen Mary our now Sovereign's mother, or of any other, who might pretend a right to the kingdom. And although her title to the Crown had been doubtful, yet I think my Adversary will hardly deny, that in case of doubtful titles, it chief belongeth to the Commonwealth, or kingdom, which the Parliament doth represent, to declare, and determine whose title is the best. As in the time of Schism, when two pretend to be the true Pope, this Doctor will not deny, that it belongeth to the Church, whom he maketh inferior, and subject to the true, and undoubted Pope, to declare and determine whether of their titles to the Popedom is the best, neither doth this expose the Crowns of Popes or Kings to the rash levity of private men. 56 But rather this Doctor seemeth here to insinuate divers very false and seditious positions: As first, that the people may deprive a lawful King, and who by a special promise, and appointment of God hath right to the kingdom, of his Princely right, and lawful inheritance without any fault committed by him, and give it to a manifest Usurper, and who also, as being a subject, is by the express law of God for many crimes to be put to death. Secondly, that if a manifest Usurper possess the kingdom peaceably for six years together, the true, and rightful King then living, so that the people fearing his cruelty do not rise up in arms against him, the true heir is thereby deprived of his Royal right, and the Usurper hath now gotten a lawful right to the kingdom. Thirdly, that an Usurper making an open rebellion against the true, and anointed King in presence of the King himself sitting in his throne, of the Peers, people, and all his army, the King's Protector, and who representeth the King's person in all things, may not by the law of arms, or martial law (the King being in his minority) command such a manifest traitor presently to be slain, the fact being so public and notorious, that it needeth no accuser, witness, or other proof, and especially when by delay there may be danger of Conspiracy, and tumults among the people. All these do evidently follow, as you have seen, from Doctors Reply against my answer to this example of Athalia. And therefore to retort his bitter invective against me to Kings, and Princes back upon himself: 57 Behold, O Kings, and Princes, you have here one, who is careful of the security of your Royal issue, or rather of those, who shall tyrannically usurp their kingdoms. So observant are they of your Princely Majesty, and of your Royal posterity who so immoderately advance the Pope's temporal authority. Every faithful subject, say they, ought not to do in the like case, that which joiada did in killing Athalia; that is, if a manifest Usurper shall cruelly murder your innocent children, and so tyrannically invade the kingdom, every faithful subject, who hath preserved one of your Royal issue from cruel death, and who is the chief Peer of the Realm, his Uncle, Protector, and Guardian, and representeth his Royal person in all things, and hath great power and favour among the people, ought not to put your son in the possession of his Crown, and command the Usurper to be slain by the law of arms, if he seek to make a public and manifest rebellion in presence of the anointed King, Princes and people, for this was the case of joiada in commanmanding Athalia to be slain. O miserable state of Prince's children, whose kingdom and life, is by the desperate writings of these men exposed to eminent danger? If Widdrington had written such a thing, what tumults would not this Doctor make? what clamours would he not raise? 58 Another slander not much unlike to the former doth this Doctor unconscionably impose upon me in his words immediately following. near also, or adjoining to his, saith this Doctor, h pag. 563. is that, which Widdrington teacheth in the number 460. that the Pope in his opinion then subject to the Emperor, and as subject, might and really did with the ere express consent of the people of Rome lawfully and with validity take away the Empire of the West from the Emperor of Constantinople, and transfer it to Charles the great. For how little a part of the Empire was then the people of Rome? or what power had they in the election of the Emperor? From this therefore it doth evidently and necessarily follow, that every subject with the or express consent of one City, that also, which hath no voice, or suffrage in the election of the King, may deprive his true, lawful, and natural Prince either of all his dominion, or of part, whereby truly is opened a most broad way to seditions, conspiracies, rebellions, and revoltings. 59 But truly I cannot but greatly marvel how this my Adversary, by his Degree a Doctor, and by his function a Priest, is not ashamed to teach, contrary to his profession, such palpable untruths, and so foully, grossly, and shamefully to corrupt my words and meaning: And therefore, whereas in most places he is very careful to set down my express words, or in some sort the sense of them, here, lest the Reader should presently perceive his corrupt dealing, he clean omitteth to set them down for almost 40. pages together, to wit, from the number 413. to 463. wherein I amply declared, in what manner the Pope, and people of Rome translated the Roman Empire to Charles the great, with other observations concerning the facts of Popes in deposing Emperors, and Princes, and why there are so many Authors, whose books are extant, that favour the doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes, all which this Doctor passeth over with silence. For as I have showed above, i Cap. 3. nu. 37. & seq. I proved there most clearly by the testimonies of many learned Authors, first that the translation of the Roman Empire from the Grecians to Charles the great was done not only by the authority of the Pope, but also of the Senate, and people of Rome, with the express or consent of all the people of the West, and that none of the Authors brought by Cardinal Bellarmine do contradict the same: And secondly, that the Pope and people of Rome, and of the Western Empire, were not at that time subject to the Grecian Emperor, for that he had then the Roman Empire as forsaken, and abandoned, and that therefore the Roman, and Western Provinces, being left to themselves, might choose what Emperor they pleased according to Card. Bellarmine's express doctrine, which I there related. 60 Consider therefore, good Reader, with what conscience this Doctor affirmeth me to say, that the Pope in my opinion then subject to the Emperor, and as subject, with the consent of the people of Rome might lawfully deprive the Grecian Emperor of the Western Empire, and transfer it to Charles the great, from whence it evidently folleweth, saith he, that every subject with the consent of one City, yea and of that City, which hath no suffrage in the choosing of the King, may deprive their true, lawful and natural Prince either of his whole dominion, or of part thereof. For I never affirmed, either that he Pope, or people of Rome were then really, and in very deed subject to the Emperor of Greece, who had the Roman Empire for abandoned and forsaken: or that the whole common wealth being subject, and as subject, much less one City, or Province had authority over their Prince to judge him, depose him, or to change the manner of government. That which I affirmed is, that the common wealth itself, in case it hath no Prince, and consequently is then supreme itself, and not subject to any Prince, and not that people subject, as this Doctor feigneth, have power, I do not say, to judge, or depose their King, as he also shamefully affirmeth me to say, for that the Common wealth in that case hath no King, but to choose to them a King, or to change the manner or government from a Monarchy, to Democratic, Aristocratic, or mixed. And this I affirmed Cardinal Bellarmine to avouch, when he teacheth, that the supreme temporal power is by the law of nature in the whole multitude or common wealth, when they have no King, or Superior over them, and that by the same law of nature they man transfer it from the whole multitude to one only, or to more, and that therefore they may change the Monarchy into Aristosratic, or Democratic, and contrariwise, as we see it was done at Rome. 61 Neither can it with any probability be denied, that the City of Rome, which was the chief Imperial City, and Metropolis of the Roman Empire, that is, the Pope, Senate, and people of Rome, had by right a great sway in the election of their own Emperor, albeit the army did de facto commonly choose him, to which election the Senate and people of Rome did either willingly, or for fear give their consent: and that therefore the Pope, Senate, and people of Rome with the consent either express, or of the rest of the Western Provinces had fell power and authority to choose to them an Emperor, supposing they were left to themselves, and forsaken and abandoned by the Emperor of Greece: and this is agreeable to Card. Bellarmine's doctrine: But that one only Subject, or one City, which is a small part of the kingdom, yea or that the whole kingdom itself may lawfully and rightly deprive of the whole kingdom, or of any part thereof their lawful King being neither condemned, nor heard, nor accused, yea may lawfully condemn him, although he be heard, or accused, I never affirmed, neither doth it follow from my doctrine; nevertheless, that every faithful subject is bound to do in the like case that which joiada did, either in deposing or killing Athalia, this I do constantly affirm, neither can any Catholic deny the same without note of teaching a most false, a most scandalous, and a most seditious doctrine. 62 And therefore I remit to the judgement of Christian Kings, ●nd subjects, what censure those last words of this Doctor do deserve: Also that every faithful subject is bound to do that which joiada did in kil●ing Athalia, Bellarmlne never taught, it doth not follow from Bellarmine's doctrine, all Catholics do abhor, and detest it, and among them without doubt Bellarmine. I omit to examine at this present, what title Charles ●he great had, either by hereditary succession, or by the right of conquest to the Western Empire, before this translation; and what real ●ower, authority and dominion this translation gave to Charles the great: for that he, and his Father Pipin had before conquered all Italy, ●and before this translation his son Pipin was created King of Italy, k Sigebert ad ann. 774. and others. ●nd he himself Patritius Romanorum, which, l Otho frisingen's. lib. 5. cap. 28. Sigebert. ad ann. 781. and others. as Card. Bellarmine him●elfe confesseth, m Lib. 1. de Translat. Imper. cap. 9 Lupold. Babeng. lib. de juribus Regn & Imperij Rom. cap. 12. is the next dignity to the Emperor. Neither will I now dispute, what real difference there is betwixt the Emperor, and an absolute King concerning their supreme power, and authority over their subjects. This only is sufficient for me at this present, that supposing with Card. Bellarmine this translation to have not only a titular, but also ● real effect, whereof Lupoldus of Bamberbeg doth particularly treat, if Card. Bellarmine will needs have this translation to have all it force ●nd validity from the Pope's authority alone, and not also of the roman ●eople or common wealth, he calleth in question the right and title, which the Latin Emperors have to the Roman Empire, in making it ●o be grounded upon no so sound title or foundation, as I signified be●ore cap. 3. num. 48. See also that Chapter num. 37. & seq. where I treated more amply of this translation. 63 But now to return to that fact of joiada, from whence with ●his Doctor I have made this digression, joiada, saith this Doctor, n Pag. 565. to ●aue done that which he did through the opinion only of his sanctity, and without any true and lawful power, Widdrington affirmeth, we deny: He speaks of his own head, we follow the words of the Scripture: joiada, saith ●he Scripture 4. Reg. 11. commanded them, the Centurions and soldiers, ●aying, This is the thing, which you must do etc. And a little beneath, And if any man shall enter the precinct of the temple, let him be slain: And forthwith, And the Centurions did according to all things that joiada the Priest had commanded them. And again, joiada commanded the Centurions that were over the army, and said to them, Led ●er [Athalia] forth without the precinct of the temple, and whosoever shall follow her, let him be stricken with the sword. See also 2. Paralip. cap. 23. 64 But still this Doctor persisteth in corrupting my words, and meaning. For I never said, or meant, that joiada did that which he did, without any true, or lawful power; this is a mere fiction of his own brain. That which I said was, that all that joiada did either concerning the putting the true heir, and rightful King into the possession of his inheritance and kingdom, or concerning the putting Athalia to death, did not argue in joiada, either any true authority to create a king denovo, that is to give him a right to the kingdom, which right he had not before, or any proper authority due only to the high Priest, and which might not also be common to every faithful subject in the like case: but that which joiada did concerning the kill of Athalia, he did by the authority and consent of the King, Princes and people; and what he did concerning her deposing, he was bound to do by the law of God, of nature, and nations. For joiada was the King's uncle, the King's Protector, his tutor, and keeper, and represented his person in all things, and was the chief Captain, and Author of all this covenant, which he made with the Centurions, Princes, and people, to put king joas in possession, and to defend him from Athalia, and therefore no marvel, that he, as representing the King's person, gave commandment to the centurions, and soldiers, how they should carry themselves either towards Athalia, or any other in the king's defence. 65 True it is, that joiada might by his own proper authority, as he was high Priest, command the Soldiers, that Athalia should not be slain in the temple, lest the temple, whereof the high Priest had the chief charge, should not be polluted by her blood, but absolutely to command her to be slain, none could do by his own proper authority, but he only, upon whom the weal public, common justice, and the temporal sword doth principally depend, who only is the King in a kingdom, from whom, as from the head of civil power, all temporal authority and command in his kingdom is derived: Wherefore I never meant, that joiada did that which he did without any true, lawful, and proper authority, as proper is opposed to improper, or metaphorical, but he did that which he did not by any proper authority of his own, which was peculiar to him, as he was high Priest, in which sense proper is distinguished from common, but he did that which he did concerning joas, and Athalia, by that true, and lawful authority, which might also be common to other subjects in the like case, to wit, to such subjects, as are the chief Peers of the Realm, the King's Protectors, and Guardians, and who represent the King's person in all things. 66 For two principal things joiada did: the one was, that he preserved the true, and rightful King, and whom he knew certainly so to be, from being murdered by wicked Athalia, and to that end he kept him secretly in the Temple for six years together, and in the seventh year by the aid of the Princes, and people he did put him in possession of his kingdom, which Aathalia had tyrannically kept from him. And this every faithful subject in the like case is bound to do, and by the Law of nature and nations hath authority so to do: and the consent of all kingdoms, and the authority of the rightful King doth give sufficient warrant to the same. So that this authority was not proper to the function of the high Priest, as he was high Priest, but is common to every faithful subject, who is the King's Protector, and Guardian, and representeth the King's person in all things. The second was, that joiada commanded Athalia to be slain, who endeavoured to make a public rebellion, against the true, lawful, and now crowned, and anointed King, crying out in the presence of the King himself, the Princes and the people, A conspiracy, A conspiracy, Treason, Treason: And the authority also to command this was not proper to the function of the high Priest, as he was high Priest, but is common also to every faithful subject, who is the King's Protector, and Guardian, and representeth the King's person in all things. And to teach the contrary to any of these two things, is to teach a most false, scandalous, and seditious doctrine. 67 This second, to wit, that the commandment of joiada to kill Athalia was done in the King's name, and by his authority, this Doctor affirmeth o Pag. 567. not to be incredible, because it happened after the creation of the new King, neither would this, saith he, hurt Bellarmine's opinion. For Bellarmine doth not contend, that heretical Kings ought to be slain by the Pope's commandment, but only to be deposed. But this is very untrue: For although Card. Bellarmine doth not in express words, yet by a clear, and necessary consequence he doth contend, that the Pope hath power to deprive heretical Kings not only of their kingdoms, but also of their lives, seeing that he contendeth, that the Pope hath authority in oder to spiritual good to dispose of all temporals, and I hope, that the lives of Princes are not to be excluded from temporal things. See above nu. 9 & seq. And although joas was made King de facto, by the procurement of joiada, yet it cannot with any credibility be denied, but that all the time that Athalia reigned de facto, and unjustly usurped the kingdom, joas was King, de iure, and that the kingdom, and all Kingly authority did by right belong to him. 68 But Widdrington doth not well prove, saith this Doctor, that all those things were done only by the counsel, and not by the authority of joiada. For as the Scripture testifieth both 4. Reg. 11. & 2. Paralip. 23. joiada called the Centurions together; joiada armed the Soldiers; joiada commanded that if any one should enter within the precinct of the Temple he should be slain, if any one should follow the Queen he should likewise be slain; joiada, as saith the Gloss cited by Widdrington, did institute the King; joiada crowned the King; joiada commanded the Queen to be slain; joiada made a covenant betwixt himself, the King, and the people, that they should be the people of our Lord; joiada commanded the Temple of Baal to be overthrown; the Altars of the Idols to be destroyed; the Priest of Baal to be slain; joiada set the watch in the house of our Lord, etc. All these things joiada the high Priest did: but because he alone could not accomplish the whole matter, he adjured the Centurions, that they would help valiantly, and faithfully, and therefore he made a covenant with them for the execution: Wherefore nothing is given to the Centurions but obeying, and executing at the commandment of joiada; The Centurions, saith the Scripture, did according to all things that joiada the high Priest had commanded them. 69 But why doth this Doctor still corrupt my words, and meaning? why doth he omit that word propria authoritate, by his own proper authority, which of set purpose, to express plainly my meaning, I did set down. I never affirmed, that all those things here mentioned by this Doctor, were done by joiada without true, and lawful authority, but I always added, that they were not done propria authoritate, by his own proper authority, to wit, which was proper and peculiar to him, as he was high Priest, but by the authority and consent of the King, Princes, and people, and which things every faithful subject might do, and was bound to do in the like case, that is, if he were the King's Protector, and Guardian, and represented in all things the King's person, and such a King, whom he did not only probably imagine, but also certainly knew to be the rightful, and undoubted King, and heir of the kingdom. 70 Nevertheless I do willingly grant, as I have said before, and oftentimes in all my books I have freely confessed, that joiada by his own proper authority, that is, by his Priestly power had authority to declare to the people the Law of God, and to command them to observe the same, but not to constrain them by temporal punishment to the observation thereof: and that therefore he might command them in general to put joas in possession of his kingdom, knowing that it did by the Law of God, and by the right of his inheritance belong to him, as being descended by a direct line from the stock of King David, according as God almighty had promised to David, and Solomon. But concerning the particular manner how Athalia was to be deposed, and joas was to be put in possession of his kingdom, which was not contained in the Law of God, this, I said, joiada could only do by his advice and counsel, if we respect him only as he was high Priest, but if we respect him, as he was the King's Protector, Keeper, and Guardian, and represented the King's person in all things, this I said, he did by authority, but not by his own proper authority, as he was high Priest, and which could not be common also to all other subjects in the like case, but by the authority of the King, and commonwealth, and as he, being the King's Protector, and Guardian, represented the King's person in all things. And therefore I do not deny, that joiada did all those things mentioned by this Doctor by authority, but not by his own proper authority, which this Doctor hath not as yet any way impugned, nor will be ever able to impugn. 71 That joiada did not those things, by his own proper authority, but in the name, and by the authority of the King with the consent of the Princes, and people, I proved by the words of the holy Scripture, and of the Gloss upon that place, Therefore all the multitude, saith the Scripture, made a covenant with the King in the house of God, and joiada said to them, Behold the Kings sone shall reign, as our Lord hath spoken upon the sons of David. The words of the Gloss are these: Hear is described the institution of the true heir, the due heir, and which ought to be the due King, and which ought to be (for all these names, veri haeredis, haeredis debiti, Regis debiti the Gloss useth) by the procurement of joiada the high Priest, seeking thereunto the assent of the Princes, and Nobles of the Realm, when it is said, And he made a covenant with them. 72 Mark now how cunningly this Doctor would shift of these testimonies. That which is added, saith he, p Pag. 568. concerning the covenant with the King, is understood of the future King, to wit, with him, who a little after was to be instituted King, as it is manifest by the same place; for presently it is added, And joiada said to them, Behold, the King's son shall reign. And the Gloss is against Widdrington; for if here be described the institution of the true King, and to this is required the assent of the Princes, assuredly joas was not King before, albeit he was the King's son: For he that is King by succession ought not to be instituted, but declared, neither doth he need the assent of the Princes. Therefore joiada did constitute the King, and depose the Queen, but the Princes aiding and assisting him, without whom he could not have accomplished the matter. 73 But if this Doctor had been pleased to declare plainly the true state of the present question betwixt me, and Cardinal Bellarmine, as I did, and not delude his Reader with ambiguous and equivocal words, the plain truth of this controversy would presently have appeared. For this word, King, is equivocal and may be taken either for a King de iure, and who hath true, and lawful right to the kingdom, albeit he be not in possession thereof; or for a King de facto, and who doth actually reign, abstracting from that he doth reign de iure by right and lawfully, or by usurpation. Now I granted, that Athalia was Queen de facto, and in possession of the kingdom for six years together, but I denied, that she was Queen de iure, and that the kingdom did belong to her by right, but to joas the rightful heir, as being the only son then living of Ochozias, King of juda; and that therefore joiada did not create or institute joas King, that is, give him a true right to reign, which he had not before, for that the true dominion, and right to the kingdom did reside in joas by right of inheritance and succession instantly upon the death of his eldest brethren, and this much the aforesaid words of the holy Scripture, and of the Gloss do evidently convince. Wherefore that, which this Doctor saith concerning the covenant of the people with the King, is understood of the future King, which a little after was to be instituted, is also equivocal: for if he understand, that joas was not then King de facto, but a little after by the procurement of joiada was made and instituted King de facto, that is, was put in possession of the kingdom, and did actually reign, this was not the controversy betwixt me, and Card. Bellarmine; for I never denied, but did always in express words grant, that joiada with the assent of the Princes and people did put joas in possession of his kingdom, which Athalia had unjustly kept from him, and in this sense joas, who before was King de iure, was afterwards by joiada created and instituted King de facto. But if he mean, that joas was not then King de iure, and that the kingdom did not by right of inheritance, and by the ordinance of almighty God belong to him, this, I say, is plainly against the words of the holy Scripture, and of the Gloss. Ecce filius Regis etc. Behold the King's son shall reign, as our Lord hath spoken over the sons of David: that is, behold the King's son, to whom therefore the right to the kingdom by inheritance doth belong, although he doth not actually reign, for that Athalia contrary to the commandment of God, who gave the kingdom to the sons of David, hath tyrannically kept it from him, shall reign, that is, shall be King de facto, and actually reign, according as our Lord hath spoken upon the sons of David. 75 But the words of the Gloss are more plain: for he calleth joas not only the true, due or rightful King, but also the true, due or rightful heir: Neither can this Doctor deny, that joas was presently after the death of all his brethren the only son of King Ochozias, and consequently the true and only heir to the kingdom of juda, and therefore the true King de iure or by right: For he can not be so ignorant, as not to know, that the heir to a kingdom, hath presently after the death of his father all the right, which his father deceased had to the kingdom: It is manifest, saith the rule of the law, q ff. de regulis juris regula. 59 approved by all lawyers, that an heir hath the same power and right, which the deceased had; and again, r Ibidem regula 62. Inheritance is no other thing, than a succeeding to all the right which the deceased had. Wherefore the words and sense of the Gloss are plain: for the words are not, Here is described the institution of the true King, but of the true heir, whom he called before the due or rightful heir: Now it is manifest, that joiada did not make or institute joas the true and rightful heir to the kingdom of juda, but he was made and instituted the rightful heir by succession, and by the ordinance of almighty God, for that he was the only son and heir surviving of the deceased King Ochozias. And therefore those words of this Doctor, Assuredly joas was not King before, although he was the King's son, if he mean that he was not King de iure before, are very untrue; but rather contrariwise, I infer, that assuredly joas was King de iure before, because he was the King's son, to whom by succession and inheritance the kingdom of juda did by right, and by the ordinance of almighty God belong, and those words of holy Scripture, Behold the King's son etc. do convince as much. 76 But he that is King by succession, saith this Doctor, ought not to be instituted or made, but to be declared, neither doth he need the assent of the Princes. It is true that he who is King de iure, and by succession, ought not to be instituted or made King de iure, neither needeth he the consent of the Princes to make him King de iure. But he that is King only de iure and by succession, but not King de facto and by possession, aught to be instituted or made King de facto, and to this is necessary the assent and aid of the Princes and people. Wherefore as this word [to depose] is equivocal, and may be taken either for to deprive one of his right, or to put him out of possession of the thing he holdeth, so also to institute, create or make a King or heir is equivocal, and may be taken either for to give one a right to a kingdom or inheritance, which right he had not before, or to put him in possession of the kingdom or inheritance, whether he hath right thereunto or no. And therefore, as well observeth Gregorius Tholosanus, s In Syntagin. Iu●is lib. 17. cap. 16. nu. 4. because the instituting or giving of a benefice (and the like may be said of a Dukedom, Princedom, Kingdom or inheritance) is sometimes effected by giving the possession, or as it is commonly said by installing or investing, therefore to institute is sometimes taken for to install or invest as by delivering some corporal thing, as a ring, a crown, a sceptre etc. by which the real and actual possession is given, apprehended or induced. cap. ad haec de officio Archidiaconi, & §. 1ᵒ. de consuetudine recti feudi lib. 2. de feudis tit. 33. And in this sense the Gloss did understand the word, institution, to wit, for investing, installing or putting joas into possession of his kingdom, or, which is all one, making him King de facto. For it is too too manifest, that he was before the rightful heir, and King by succession, and not then made or instituted the rightful heir by the election of joiada, and of Princes. 77 Wherefore the last inference, which this Doctor maketh in these words, Therefore joiada did institute the King, and deposed the Queen etc. is very true if he mean that he did constitute the King de facto, or put him in possession of his kingdom, and deposed the Queen de facto, that is, thrust her out of the possession of the kingdom; For joiada in this sense did make or constitute the King, and deposed the Queen by the aid and assistance of the Princes, without whom he could not have accomplished the matter: but to make or constitute him King de iure, or the rightful heir to the kingdom, only succession without the aid and assent of joiada, or the Princes was sufficient. Neither dare this Doctor absolutely aver, as you have seen, that joas was not before this, King de iure, but Athalia, but he affirmeth it with a credibile est, which nevertheless I have proved to be incredible, and to contain a very false, scandalous and seditious doctrine. 78 Lastly, although that question betwixt me and Card. Bellarmine, to wit, whether Athalia was slain only for treason, or also for idolatry, be not much material to the present controversy between us, which is, by what authority it was done: seeing that, whether she was slain only for treason, or also for idolatry it was done by the authority of the King, who then was crowned and confirmed by the Princes and people, as this Doctor here is not also unwilling to grant: Nevertheless I still affirm, that it can not be proved from the holy Scripture, that she was slain for idolatry: albeit I do not deny, that she deserved death therefore. Whereupon the Scripture only mentioneth, that upon her endeavouring to make a rebellion against the true, and now anointed King, crying out in the presence of the King, Princes and people, A conspiracy, A conspiracy, Treason, Treason, she was commanded to be slain. Neither can this Doctor sufficiently conclude from those words of holy Scripture, Therefore all the people entered into the house of Baal, and destroyed it etc. as Card. Bellarmine pretended to prove, or from those words immediately going before, And joiada made a covenant between himself, and all the people, and the King, that they would be the people of the Lord, that Athalia was actually slain for idolatry, although I do willingly grant, that she was an Idolatress, and therefore deserved death according to the law. 79 Neither did I, as this Doctor untruly saith g pag. 570. either slander Card. Bellarmine, or else knew not what I said myself, when I affirmed, that Card. Bellarmine did not sincerely relate the words of holy Scripture, to wit, Therefore all the people entered into the house of Baal, and destroyed it etc. which words, as he saith, do immediately follow the kill of Athalia. For after the kill of Athalia these words, And joiada made a covenant between himself, and all the people and the King, etc. which as the Gloss affirmeth, were a confirmation of the King newly anointed, and crowned, do immediately follow, and after them do follow those words, Therefore all the people entered into the house of Baal, and destroyed it, etc. And whereas this Doctor affirmeth, that Bellarmine did not mean, that those words precisely; Therefore all the people entered into the house of Baal, etc. do immediately follow after the words, wherein the kill of Athalia was commanded, but his meaning was, that the overthrowing of the temple of Baal was done immediately after the kill of the Queen, and therefore he did not properly speak of words, but of things done; This is plainly both against the text of holy Scripture, for that betwixt the kill of Athalia, and the destruction of the temple of Baal, was the confirmation of King joas newly crowned, and anointed, and of the covenant, which joiada made between himself, and all the people, and the King, that they would be the people of our Lord, and it is also against Cardinal Bellarmine's own words: Those words, saith Cardinal Bellarmine, Therefore all the people entered into the house of Baal, and destroyed it, etc. do immediately follow the kill of Athalia: And yet this Doctor, forsooth, will have Cardinal Bellarmine not to speak properly of words, but of things done, contrary to Card. Bellarmine's express words. But truth, and plain dealing cannot colourably be impugned, but by such pitiful shifts, and fraudulent evasions. 71 And thus thou seest, good Reader, how insufficiently this Doctor hath confuted my answer to Cardinal Bellarmine's argument taken from the example of Athalia, who was not deposed by joiada, that is, deprived of her right to reign, seeing that she was never a lawful Queen, nor ever had any true right to reign, but she was by the procurement of joiada, and by the aid, and assistance of the Princes, and people, thrust out of the possession of the kingdom, which she tyrannically had for six years usurped, and wrongfully detained from joas the true and rightful King by hereditary succession, as being the only son and heir surviving to King Ochozias; and that joiada that which he did both in putting joas in possession, and in killing Athalia, not by his own proper authority, and which was peculiar to him, as he was high Priest, but by that authority, which might be common to every faithful subject in the like case. Now you shall see, how boldly, and barely Mr. Fitzherbert repateth again this example of Athalia, without taking any notice of the answer, which I made thereunto before in my Apology, and Theological Disputation. 72 But now our Adversaries, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, u Nu. 16. p 77. to answer this example of Athalia, do say, that she was no lawful Queen, but a Tyrant, and usurped the state in prejudice of joas the right heir, whom joiada set up, and that therefore the example of her deposition cannot be of consequence to prove, that the high Priest in the old law had authority to depose a lawful Prince: But they are to understand, that it little importeth for the matter in hand, whether she were a true Queen, or a Tyrant; for though she had been a lawful Queen, yet he should have been her lawful Superior, it being evident, that otherwise he could not have been her judge to determine of her right, and depose her as unlawful, especially after she had been received for Queen, and obeyed by the State for six years: to which purpose it is to be considered, that no man can lawfully condemn an offender, over whom he should not also have power in case he were innocent; for as well, and justly doth the judge absolve a man when he is innocent, as condemn him when he is nocent, having equal authority, and the same judicial power over him in both cases. 73 Yes, good Sir, it much importeth to the matter in hand, whether she was a true Queen, or a Tyrant: for if she had been a lawful Queen, than he should not have been her lawful Superior in temporals, neither could he have been her lawful judge to determine of her temporal right, for that, as I showed before out of many learned Catholics, and which also Card. Bellarmine himself holdeth to be probable, in the old law the high Priest was subject to the king in temporals, and might by him be judged, and punished with temporal punishments. But if she were no lawful Queen, but an Usurper, as in deed she was, than it is evident, that joas was the true, and rightful King, and that all civil authority did reside in him, and was derived from him, as from the head of all civil power, whereof the King is head, as D. Schulckenius himself confesseth; x Pag. 339. ad num. 169. and that therefore joiada, who was the King's Protector, and Guardian now in his minority, and represented the King's person in all things, might be her judge both to depose her, and also to kill her, as a manifest traitor, and usurper. 74 But those words, which Mr. Fitzherbert addeth, especially after she had been received for Queen, and obeyed by the whole state for six years, do savour of that false, scandalous, and seditious doctrine, which D. Schulckenius taught before, as though either six years prescription were sufficient to deprive a lawful King of his Princely right, and give it to a wicked usurper, or that the kingdom of juda either did deprive, or had authority to deprive the true, rightful, and certainly known King of his lawful inheritance, and Princely right, and that without any offence at all committed by him. 75 Neither is that to the purpose which Mr. Fitzherbert would have his Reader believe, to wit, that no man can lawfully condemn an offender, over whom he should not also have power in case he were innocent, for as well and justly doth a judge absolve a man, when he is innocent, as condemn him when he is nocent, having equal authority, and the same judicial, power in both cases: For I do not deny, that joiada being the King's Protector, and Guardian, and therefore representing the King's person in all things, was the lawful Superior, and judge of Athalia, and of every other subject in the kingdom; but that, which I contend is, that although joiada was in spirituals her Superior, and judge, as he was high Priest, yet in temporals he was neither her Superior or judge, nor of any other subject in the kingdom, as he was high Priest, or by his Priestly authority, but as having his authority derived from the true and lawful King, in whom only all supreme civil authority, as in the head of all civil power doth reside. And therefore this his consideration is not to the purpose, as also it is not generally true. For all Catholics, yea Cardinal Bellarmine himself, y Lib. 2. de Concil. cap. 19 do grant, that in time of Schism, when two contend to be the lawful Pope, the Church is the lawful Superior, and judge of both Popes, and that it belongeth to her to determine of their right: & neither yet Cardinal Bellarmine, nor my Adversary will affirm, that the Church hath the same authority, and judicial power over the true, and undoubted Pope. Likewise what will Mr. Fitzherbert say to Cardinal Caietaine, and others of his opinion, that the Church is Superior to an heretical Pope, and hath authority to judge him, and depose him; who nevertheless will not admit, that the Church is Superior to a Pope, who is no heretic. Moreover, no learned man can deny, that when two contend to have right, or a title to any kingdom, if they be members of that kingdom, the whole kingdom, or Commonwealth is Superior to them, and hath authority to judge and determine of their right, and yet we may not therefore conclude, that the whole kingdom, or Commonwealth is Superior to a known, and undoubted King. 76 No less idle also is that which followeth. z Nu. 17. p. 78. Besides that, saith Mr. Fitherbert, our Adversaries must needs grant, either that joiada deposed her as her lawful judge, being high Priest, or else that any peculiar man many of his own authority take upon him to depose, and kill a Tyrant, and usurper, which opinion was worthily condemned by the Council of Constance as heretical, and with great reason, for that no particular man can make himself another man's judge, and much less the judge of a Prince. Neither can there be any doctrine more dangerous to Commonwealths, or pernicious to Prince's states, then that every subject may take upon him to judge, when his Prince is a Tyrant, and proceeds against him to his deposition, or death. 77 True it is, that joiada deposed Athalia, that is, put her from the possession of the kingdom, which she unjustly usurped, as her lawful judge, being Highpriest, but it is not true, that he deposed her, as being Highpriest, or by his Priestly authority, nor as a private man, or by private authority, but he both deposed her, and commanded her to be slain, as her lawful judge, being the King's Protector, and Guardian in his nonage, and as representing the King's person in all things, and also with the assent of the Princes and people. Neither from hence doth it follow, that every particular and private subject may by his own authority take upon him to kill a manifest usurper, although S. Thomas a In 2. dist. ultima q. 2. ar. 2. ad. 5. Caietan 2. 2. q. 64. ar. 3. Sotus l. 5. de. justit q. 1. ar. 3 Solon 2 2. q. 64 ar. 3. controvers. 1. Arragon ibidem. Lessius l. 2. de justit. c. 9 dub. 4 and many other Divines are of opinion, that every particular subject and citizen hath authority to kill, not a manifest Tyrant in the abuse of government, but a manifest usurper, for in this case, say they, every private Citizen hath sufficient authority given him by the consent of the rightful King, and also of the Commonwealth, against whom this manifest usurper doth continually make a manifest unjust war, and therefore it can not be called properly private, but public authority. Neither, say they, is this doctrine against the decree of the Council of Constance which doth not speak particularly of those, who are manifest Tyrants by usurpation, but of Tyrants in general, comprehending also those who are true and lawful Kings, and only Tyrants in government. For the proposition, which is in that Council condemned as heretical scandalous and giving way to frauds, deceits, treasons and perjuries, is this: Every Tyrant, (and consequently also a Tyrant only in government, although otherwise a true and rightful King) may and ought lawfully, and meritoriously to be slain by any his vassal or subject even by secret wiles and crafty deceits, or flatteries, notwithstanding any oath, or confideracie made by them with him, not expecting the sentence or commandment of any judge whatsoever, which is in very truth a most damnable and traitorous doctrine: But that a manifest Tyrant by usurpation may not be lawfully slain by any private man, having authority thereunto from the true, rightful and undoubted King, or from him, who is the King's Protector and Guardian in his minority, and representeth the King's person in all things; this is not condemned in the Council of Constance, but the contrary doctrine is damnable, scandalous and seditious. 78 Mark now, what a trim consequence Mr. Fitzherbert gathereth from the premises. Whereupon, saith he b nu. 18. pag. 78 , it followeth, that seeing joiada did lawfully depose Athalia (being a holy man, Matth. 23. Hieron. lib. 4. in. Num. cap. 23. and therefore called by our Saviour Barachias, that is to say, Blessed of our Lord) he did it not as a particular and private man, but as a public person. All this is true, as you have seen. But that which he addeth, to wit, as Highpriest, to whom it belonged to judge of her cause, is very untrue, neither doth it follow from his premises. For his antecedent proposition was this, joiada being high Priest deposed Athalia, as her lawful judge, and not as a particular, and private man, but as a public person, this I granted; now he inferreth that joiada as high-Priest did depose her, which I ever denied, and he brought no show of argument to prove the same: only here in the next words following he adjoineth some colour of an argument for proof thereof: especially, saith he, c pag. 79. seeing that she was not only a cruel tyrant, but also an abominable Idolairesse, having drawn her husband joram, her son Ochozias, and the people to Idolatry, and transferred the riches of God's temple to the temples of Idols, which being matter of Religion belonged directly to the tribunal of the high Priest, and therefore I conclude, that joiada deposed her, as her Superior, and lawful judge according to the supreme authority that God gave to the High Priest in the old Testament over the temporal State. So I in my Supplement. 79 But how insufficient this conclusion is, it will presently appear, only by laying open the ambiguity of those words, Idolatry being a matter of Religion belonged directly to the tribunal of the high Priest. For it belonged indeed to the tribunal of the high Priest of the old Law, and his consistory to judge what was Idolatry, as likewise now in the new Law it belongeth to the Pope, and Church to judge, what is heresy, or idolatry, and so to declare, and determine what is heresy or Idolatry is a matter of Religion both in the old Law, and in the new: but it did not belong to the tribunal of the high Priest in the old law, but of the King, and temporal state to punish Idolaters with corporal death, as likewise in the new law to punish heretics with corporal death, being not a spiritual, but a temporal matter, doth not belong to the spiritual power of Priests, but to the temporal authority of temporal Princes, Sot. in 4. dist. 29 q. 1. ar. 4. Bannes' secunda secundae q. 11. ar. 4. q. 1. in fine. as I proved also out of Sotus, and Bannes in my Theological Disputation d C. 7. s. 2. nu 17 . And therefore in the old Law the temporal power was supreme, and the spiritual was subject to it, for as much as concerned the power to constrain with temporal punishments, and as well Priest, as Laymen, were subject to the coercive, or punishing power of the temporal State, as I proved before e Sec. 1 nu. 5. 6. out of St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Abulensis, and others, whose doctrine also Cardinal Bellarmine doth not account improbable. 80 Wherefore, although it belonged to the Highpriest to declare the law of GOD, yet to execute the law, and to punish the transgressors thereof, whether they were Priests, or Laymen, with temporal punishments, belonged to the supreme temporal power of the King, and not to the supreme spiritual authority of the Highpriest. Seeing that Ozias, saith Abulensis, because he was King, Abul. q. 4. in c. 15. l. 4. Reg. was the executor of the law of GOD against offenders, it belonged to him by his office to destroy all Altars, which were without the temple of our Lord, and to take away such a worship, and consequently all Idolatry, under the penalty of death. And therefore I conclude, that joiada did depose Athalia being a manifest Usurper, as her Superior and lawful judge, but not according to the supreme coercive authority, that GOD gave to the Highpriest in the old Testament over the temporal state, which as I proved before, was in temporals supreme, and not subject, but superior to the spiritual power, but according to the supreme coercive authority, that GOD gave to the King, to whom both Priests, and Laymen were subject in temporals, and by whom they were to be punished with temporal punishments, whose place, and person joiada being the King's Protector, and Guardian while the King was in his minority, did in all things represent. Neither hath Mr. Fitzherbert either in his Supplement, or in this his Reply, as you have clearly seen, brought any probable argument, much less convincing, as he pretended, to impugn the same. 81 Now let us proceed to the example of King Ozias, which is the last Mr. Fitzherbert bringeth out of the old Testament, to which nevertheless I did abundantly answer in my Apology, which my answer he passeth over altogether with silence. But before I set down what he saith here concerning this example, I think it not amiss to repeat my said answer, and what D. Schulckenius replieth to the same; for thereby the weakness of Mr. fitzherbert's objection will presently appear, and so also he shall not take occasion after his usual manner to remit his English Reader to D. Schulckenius to seek out a Reply, to that which I answered before in my Apology concerning this example of King Ozias. Bell. lib. 5. de. Rom. Pont. c. 8 82 In this manner therefore Cardinal Bellarmine argued from this example. A Priest of the old law had authority to judge a King, and to deprive him of his kingdom for corporal leprosy, therefore in the new law the Pope hath authority to deprive a King of his kingdom for spiritual leprosy, that is, for heresy, which was figured by leprosy. The Antecedent proposition he proved thus, for that we read 2. Paralip. 26. that King Ozias, when he would usurp the office of a Priest, was by the High Priest cast out of the temple, and when he was for the same sin stricken by GOD with leprosy, he was also enforced to departed out of the City, and to renounce his kingdom to his son. And that he was deprived of the City, and of the administration of the kingdom not of his own accord, but by the sentence of the Priest, it is apparent: For we read Leuit. 13. whosoever, saith the law, shall be defiled with leprosy, and is separated at the abitrement of the Priest, shall dwell alone without the Campe. Seeing therefore that this was a law in Israel, and withal we read, 2. Paralip. 26. that the King did dwell without the City in a solitary house, and that his son did in the City judge the people of the land, we are compelled to say, that he was separated at the arbitrement of the Priest, and consequently deprived of his authority to reign. S. Aug. in q. evan. l. 2. q. 40. The Consequence Cardinal Bellarmine proveth out of Saint Austin, who teacheth, that heresy was figured by leprosy, and Saint Paul 1. Corinth. 10. who sayeth, that all things chanced to the jews in a figure. 83 Thus argued Cardinal Bellarmine from the example of King Ozias, which if, good Reader, thou duly consider, doth only prove, that it belonged to the Priests of the old Law, to declare the Law of God, when any difficulty should arise, and that they were the supreme judges in spiritual matters, as was to declare, and judge whether any one was infected with leprosy or no. For leprosy was not only in the old Law a natural disease, and a contagious uncleanness in the body, whereupon the leper was by the law commanded to remain out of the camp apart, lest others should be infected by him, but it was also a legal uncleanness, Abul. q. 2. in c. 13. Leuit. and as well observeth Abulensis, it did principally debar men from entering into the Sanctuary, and from touching sacred things, and because to judge whether any one was to be debarred from entering into the Sanctuary, and from touching sacred things, did belong principally to the Priests, who were the ministers of sacred things, God appointed them to judge, whether any one was infected with leprosy, and gave them rules, and directions whereby to know the same. So that the principal thing, which the Priest was to do in the case of leprosy, was to judge according to the signs, and tokens prescribed by the law of God, whether any one was infected with leprosy or no: and if he found him infected to declare him so to be, and to condemn him of the said uncleanness; after which declaration the leper was by the law itself forthwith debarred both from sacred, and also civil conversation: for that he was not only deprived of all sacred rites, but also he was to be severed from the rest of the people, who were not defiled with such uncleanness, and commanded to live apart out of the Camp, or City. 84 Now the execution of this law, forasmuch as concerned the spiritual penalty, did belong principally to the High Priest, who was the chief minister of sacred things; but concerning the temporal or civil penalty, which was to be debarred from civil conversation, the execution thereof, if the leper would not of his own accord undergo the penalty, did belong to the Civil Magistrate, who was the minister of civil, or temporal things: As also, when any temporal punishment, as death, whipping, or such like was prescribed by the law against malefactors, although the crime was spiritual, as Idolatry, usurping the office of a Priest, etc. the execution belonged to the temporal judge, who in temporals had authority over them. Whereupon we never read in the holy Scripture, that any true, and lawful King, although he had committed any crime worthy of death according to the law, as many Kings of the Israelites were Idolaters, and King Ozias here usurped the office of a Priest, which were crimes that deserved death according to the law, were for such crimes put to death by the ordinary authority of any man whatsoever, for that Kings had no Superior over them in temporals, who had authority to execute the law, which did chief belong to themselves, as I a little above d Nu. 80. observed out of Abulensis, or to punish them with temporal punishments, in which sense King David did truly say, that he had sinned only to God, saying, Tibisolipeccavi, for that God alone, to whom only he was subject in temporals, had power to punish him with temporal punishments, as all the ancient Fathers do expound that place. So likewise in the new law it belongeth to spiritual Pastors to declare and determine what is heresy, and whether one befallen into heresy, or no; but to punish heretics with temporal punishments doth not belong to the authority of spiritual Pastors, but of temporal Princes, who in temporals are supreme, and to whom only the using of the temporal sword doth principally belong. 85 Wherefore from this example of King Ozias nothing else can forcibly be proved, but that in the old law it belonged to the Priests to declare the law of God, and that only Priests, and not Laymen were to intermeddle in sacred things. For observe, good Reader, what did the Priests, 2. Paralip. 26. and what was done by King Ozias. First therefore King Ozias, saith the Scripture, entering into the temple of our Lord would burn incense upon the Altar of incense. And incontinently Azarias the Priest going in after him, and with him the Priests of our Lord, eighty, most valiant men, they resisted the King, and said, It is not thy office, Ozias, to burn incense to our Lord, but of the Priests, that is, of the children of Aaron, which are consecrated to this kind of ministery, go out of the Sanctuary, contemn not, because this thing shall not be reputed to thee for glory by our Lord. Here is nothing done, as you see, by the Priests, which is not spiritual. And who maketh any doubt, but that the Priests also of the new law may resist Kings, if they attempt to intermeddle in sacred things, which belong only to Priests, and tell them, that it is not their office, but of the Priests, which are consecrated to this kind of ministery, and command them to go out of the Church, and not to contemn the law of God, because it will not be reputed to them for glory by our Lord God. 86 But secondly, King Ozias being angry and holding in his hand the Censar to burn incense threatened the Priests. And forthwith there arose a leprosy in his forehead before the Priests. And when Azarias the high Priest had beheld him, and all the rest of the Priests, they saw the leprosy in his forehead, and in haste they thrust him out; yea and himself being sore afraid made haste to go out, because he felt by and by the plague of our Lord. And here also is nothing, which the Priests might not do by their spiritual authority. For I do not deny, but that it belongeth to the office of Priests to exclude excommunicated persons, as in some sort lepers were in the old law, from the temple of God, and from participation in sacred rites, as S. Ambrose excluded Theodosius the Emperor. Nevertheless it cannot be proved by the words of holy Scripture, that they thrust him out of the temple by corporal violence, and by laying their hands upon his sacred person, but only by denouncing with vehement words God's indignation against him, for fear of which he now being stricken by God miraculously with the plague of leprosy did of his own accord departed in haste out of the temple, which also S. chrysostom doth sufficiently confirm, saying, Chrys. hom. 4. de verbis Isae. vidi Dominum. That they thrust him out, no man enforcing him, and the words of holy Scripture, yea and himself being sore afraid made haste to go out, do clearly insinuate the same. 87 And thirdly, King Ozias, saith the Scripture, was a leper until the day of his death, and he dwelled in a house apart, full of the leprosy, for the which he had been cast out of the house of our Lord. Moreover joathan his son governed the King's house, and judged the people of the Land. Neither from this can it be gathered, that the Priests of the old law did intermeddle in any temporal action, or did deprive King Ozias of his kingdom, or the administration thereof; but the most that from hence can be concluded is, that the plague of leprosy did deprive him of the administration of his kingdom, by ordaining that a leper should dwell apart out of the camp or City, and the Priest did only declare the law of God, and denounce him according to the signs and tokens prescribed by the law to be infected with leprosy, which is no temporal, but a mere spiritual action. 88 As likewise spiritual Pastors now in the new law have authority to declare, that the goods of the faithful are to be exposed, if the necessity of the Church do require the same, but not to dispose of them, or to take them away by force from the faithful, and also to declare, when Princes are to use the material sword, for the good of the Church, but not to use it themselves, as before e part. 1. cap. 3. & part. 2. cap. 9 I declared out of joannes Parisiensis and 8. Bernard. And if we should suppose a case which is not, to wit, that heresy, idolatie or any other mortal crime, doth ipso facto deprive Princes and Prelates of their dominion and jurisdiction, which was the doctrine of john Wicleffe condemned in the Council of Constance (and therefore those words of the Ordinary Gloss f in cap. 13. lib. 1. Reg. , that a wicked King during the time of his wickedness is not according to truth to be called a King, but only equivocally, as a stony or painted eye, and the same much more is to be said of a wicked Prelate, are to be read warily, and expounded favourably to excuse them from error) then, I say, that spiritual Pastors may be said to have authority, not properly to depose an heretical King, but to declare him to be infected with heresy, and consequently, according to this false supposition, deprived ipso facto: But all this is nothing else, but to declare authentically the law of God, which no man denieth to be within the limits of spiritual jurisdiction. And this might abundantly suffice for an answer to this example of King Ozias: But because Mr. Fitzherbert shall not, as I said, take occasion to say, that all this hath been confuted already by D. Schulckenius, I am enforced, good Reader, to entreat thy patience in laying down before thine eyes, what I answered in my Apology to this objection of Cardinal Bellarmine, and what D. Schulckenius hath replied to the same. 89 First therefore I answered, that if this argument of Card. Bellarmine taken from the example of King Ozias were of force, it would prove more, than perchance Card. Bellarmine would willingly grant, to wit, that not only the Pope but also inferior Bishops, yea and Priests, have power by the law of God to deprive Princes of their kingdoms for spiritual leprosy, seeing that in the old law not only the high Priest, but also inferior Priests had power to judge of leprosy. The man, saith the law g Levit. 13. , in whose skin and flesh shall arise a divers colour, or a blisters, or any thing, as it were, shining, that is to say, the plague of the leprosy, shall be brought to Aaron the Priest, or any one of his sons, and at his arbitrement he shall be separated. Besides, this example doth also prove, that Prince not only for heresy, but also for all other mortal sins whatsoever, may be deposed by Bishops and Priests, for that not only the sin of heresy, but also other sins were figured by leprosy, Bellar. lib. 3. de Paenit. cap. 3. as Card. Bellarmine himself confesseth, who speaking of the confessing of sins saith, that the knowledge of sin, which was figured by leprosy, and is most aptly named a spiritual leprosy, appertaineth to Christian Priests. This was my first answer. 90 To which D. Schulckenius replieth thus: h pag. 542. ad num. 355. I answer. It is credible, that is the old Testament according to the diversity of the leprosy, and the diversity of the persons there were also divers judgements, greater and lesser, and that it was not lawful for every Priest to judge a King. But for this his credibile est, it is credible, he produceth neither Scripture, reason, nor any other authority, and therefore we are rather to believe the words of holy Scripture, which absolutely affirm, that either Aaron the Highpriest, or any one of his sons, might judge of leprosy, without distinguishing either this kind, or that kind of leprosy, or this kind, or that kind of person, than the bare credibile est of this Doctor, grounded upon his own bare word, and not upon any text of holy Scripture, Abul. q. 1. in cap. 13. Leuit. reason or authority. Other Priests, saith Abulensis, had power to judge in the plague of leprosy, as Aaron, and therefore to whom soever of them that person, who had such signs, should be showed, it was sufficient. Therefore when Christ had cured the ten lepers, he did not send them specially to the Highpriest, but to any one of the Priests, saying, Go, show yourselves to the Priests. 91 But howsoever it be, saith this Doctor, concerning the custom of that nation, assuredly in the Church of Christ greater causes are reserved to the See Apostolic, as we read cap. Maiores de Baptismo & eius effectu in the Decret all Epistles. Therefore every Priest may indeed judge of the leprosy of sin, and absolve, or bind his Subjects, but some more heinous crimes are reserved to Bishops, others also to the Pope, as first of all is the crime of heresy, to which the name of leprosy doth autonomasticè agree. Therefore it is no marvel, that every Priest cannot judge Kings even for the crime of heresy. Add, that in the old Testament itself we have not an example, wherein Princes were judged for leprosy, then by the high Priest. 92 But this Reply doth not answer my argument. For my argument did only proceed of the power of Priests standing in the law of God, and abstracting from the positive laws of the Church: It would follow, said I, that not only the Pope, but also inferior Bishops,) yea also and Priests have power by the law of God, etc. Now who knoweth not, that cases are reserved only by the law of the Church, and that by the law of God there is no reservation of cases; but that every Bishop, and Priest, to whom the charge of souls is committed, have by the law of God sufficient authority, and jurisdiction to absolve from all cases. I said, to whom the charge of souls is committed, for I do not intend now to dispute, whether every Priest by his ordination receiveth authority, and jurisdiction to bind and lose. For I am not ignorant, that divers Catholic Doctors, as Paludanus, i In 4. di st. 17. q. 3. ar. 3. Abulensis, k In Defensor. part. 2. c. 62. & seq. , Sylvester, l In verbo Confessor. 1. q. 2. & learned Navarre m In Sum. c. 27. nu. 259. & 260. & in cap. Placuit de penitent. dist. 6. nu. 48. do affirm, that standing in the law of God every Priest hath by virtue of his ordination sufficient jurisdiction to absolve from sins, which jurisdiction is not hindered but by the prohibition of the Church: And therefore I did not speak of all Priests, as this Doctor imposeth upon me, but of Priests indefinitely, signifying thereby, that if Cardinal Bellarmine's argument were good, it would also prove, that standing in the law of God, not only the Pope, but also some inferior Priests should have authority to judge Kings and Princes for spiritual leprosy, considering that in the old law not only the high Priest, but also inferior Priests had authority to judge them for corporal leprosy. 93 Neither is it to be marveled, if there be no example in the old Testament, wherein we read, that Kings were judged for leprosy by any other then by the High Priest: for that in the old Testament we have but one only example of any King, to wit, of this Ozias, who was infected with leprosy, yet the words of the holy Scripture, wherein is given authority to Priests to judge of leprosy, are common, as well to inferior Priests, as to the High Priest, neither is there any exception made of the persons that are to be judged to be infected, or not infected with leprosy. Yea and in this very example not only Azarias the High Priest, but also all the other eighty inferior Priests judged King Ozias, and resisted him, saying, It is not thy office Ozias, etc. And therefore Ozias being angry, saith the Scripture, threatened the Priests, and forthwith there arose a leprosy in his forehead before the Priests: And when Azarias the high Priest had beheld him, and all the rest of the Priests, they saw the leprosy in his forehead, and in hast they thrust him out. And therefore this Doctor doth not well affirm, that in the old law we have not an example, wherein Princes were judged for leprosy by any other, then by the High Priest, seeing that in this example of King Ozias the High Priest did not any thing, which the test also of the Priests did not, and which if the High Priest had not been present at that time, the other Priests might not according to the law have done without him. 94 Wherefore that also, which this Doctor answereth to my second consequence, which was, that if Card. Bellarmine's argument were of force, it would prove, that Bishops, and also Priests might depose Princes not only for heresy, but also for all other mortal crimes, is nothing to the purpose. I answer, saith he; n Pag. 543. It is true, that all sins are signified by leprosy, but not therefore Princes may be judged for all sins whatsoever by every Priest. Because as we now have said, greater sins are reserved to greater Prelates, and some to the Pope alone, especially when we speak of persons, that are placed in the highest degree of dignity. 95 But what is this to my argument? For first I spoke of Bishops and Priests indefinitely, and also standing in the law of God, now this Doctor apply my words to every Priest, and flieth from the law of God, by which there is no reservation of cases, to the law of the Church and of Popes, by which law only cases are reserved. But secondly, and principally he cunningly concealeth the force and drift of my argument. For in this second consequence my principal drift was to speak not so much of the persons, who according to Cardinal Bellarmine's argument should have authority to depose Princes (for of them I spoke in the first consequence, as the Reader may plainly see) as of the crimes, for which Princes might according to Cardinal Bellarmine's argument be deposed: And I affirmed, that if Cardinal Bellarmine's argument were of force, it would prove, that Princes might for every mortal sin be deposed, at least wise by the Pope, if not by inferior Bishops, and Priests: Now this Doctor speaketh not one word concerning the force of this consequence, for as much as concerneth the crime, for which Princes may according to Cardinal Bellarmine's argument be deposed, whereof I chief treated in this second consequence, but he cunningly flieth to the persons, who may depose Princes, of whom I spoke principally in the first consequence, and he answereth, that indeed all sins are signified by leprosy, but not therefore Princes may be judged by every Priest for all sins, insinuating thereby that Princes may be deposed (for of that judgement I only spoke) at least wise by the Pope for all sins, which are mortal, and may infect others, which doctrine how dangerous and pernicious it is to the Sovereignty, and also security of Princes, I leave to the consideration of any prudent man. 96 But because, as the vulgar maxim saith, ducere ad inconueniens non est solvere argumentum, to draw one to an inconvenience is not to solve the argument, I did secondly and principally answer, that this argument of Cardinal Bellarmine taken from the foresaid example of King Ozias, is also most weak, seeing, that the antecedent proposition is very uncertain, not to say false, and the consequence no less doubtful. And forasmuch as concerneth the antecedent proposition, and the proof thereof, albeit he doth rightly gather from Levit. 13. & 2. Paralip. 26. that the Priest of the levitical stock might judge Kings infected with leprosy, and pronounce sentence against them, by declaring the law of God, that they ought to dwell apart out of the camp, which is the first part of the antecedent proposition, seeing that this separation was imposed by God upon lepers, at the arbitrement, or declarative sentence of the Priest; yet he doth not therefore well conclude, that the Priest of the stock of Levi had authority to deprive Kings being infected with leprosy, of their kingdoms, even by accident, and consequently, unless the depriving them of their kingdom should necessarily follow their dwelling in a place apart from the rest of the people, which nevertheless cannot be forcibly proved from the holy Scripture.; 97 For as Fa. Suarez doth well observe, o Disp. 15. de. Excommunnicat. sec. 6. nu. 3. the deprivation of dominion doth ever last, after it once be done: but that dwelling apart of lepers, to be imposed at the arbitrement of the Priest, did only continue for the time they were infected with leprosy, for which time nevertheless they remained true Kings, although others did administer their kingdom. For unableness to govern the kingdom doth not deprive Kings of their right and authority to reign; as it is manifest in a King, who is under age, in whom there is true dominion, power, and right to reign, although until he come to years of discretion, there is appointed him a Protector and Guardian, who doth in the King's name, and by the King's authority adminster all the affairs of the kingdom. And that King Ozias for all the time of his infirmity, which continued until the day of his death, did remain true King, the Gloss doth most plainly teach 2. Paralip. 26. who writeth thus. The Hebrews are of opinion, that this (the miraculous striking of Ozias with leprosy) happened in the 25th year of Ozias, the rest of whose years are twenty seven, and he reigned fifty one years. And the same is gathered not obscurely from the Scripture itself in that place. Whereupon although we read in the 21. vers. that for the time Ozias was a leper, joathan his son governed the King's house, yet we do not read that joathan his son reigned for him, but after that Ozias was dead, vers. 23. 98 To this my answer D. Schulckenius replieth thus: p Pag. ●. I answer first, although Ozias should have been deprived only of the administration of the kingdom, and constrained to give it over to his sin, yet had kept the right, and authority to reign, as my Adversary Widdrington will have it, nevertheless Card. Bellarmine's argument would be strong, and unshaken. For from hence also by the grant of my Adversary is we do gather, that King Ozias was by the Priest of Aaron, deprived, not only of the communion of sacred things, but also of the administration of his kingdom, and punished not only with a spiritual but also with a temporal punishment. But my Adversary denieth, that an heretical King can be deprived of the administration of his Kingdom, and he saith that he can only be deprived of the receiving of Sacraments. 99 But first it is untrue, that I ever granted, as this Doctor saith, that the Priest of the old law deprived King Ozias of the administration of his kingdom, but, as you shall beneath, q Num. I affirmed the flat contrary. Secondly, it is strange, how Card. Bellarmine's argument can stand firm, and unshaken, if the antecedent proposition, for as much as concerneth the principal part thereof, be not true, as this Doctor in this his answer doth suppose. For the antecedent proposition of Card. Bellarmine's argument contained two parts; the one was, that King Ozias was for leprosy deprived of his kingdom, and authority to reign and from hence he concluded, as you have seen, If therefore the Priest of the old law had power to judge a King, and to deprive him of his kingdom for corporal leprosy, why may not a Priest now do the same for spiritual leprosy? and of this part, to wit, of depriving Princes of their kingdoms, and of their right, or authority to reign I did only speak in this part of my answer: And if this part, which was the principal point of Card. Bellarmine's argument be supposed to be false, as this Doctor doth suppose, how can his argument, for as much, as concerneth this point, stand strong, and unshaken. 100 The second part of Card. Bellarmine's agrument was, that King Ozias was for leprosy deprived by the High Priest of the administration of his kingdom; and of this second part I did not speak one word in this part of my answer, but only of the depriving him of his kingdom, dominion, or right to reign: And I affirmed, that although the Priests of the old law had authority to judge a leper, and by a declarative sentence, or commandment to denounce, that he was to be severed from the rest of the people, which was only to declare the commandment and law of God, considering that this separation was ordained by the express commandment of God after the Priest had judged him to be infected with leprosy, yet from hence it cannot be well inferred, that the Priests of the old law had authority to deprive Kings, that were infected with leprosy, of their kingdoms even per accidens, and consequently, unless their dwelling apart from the rest of the people doth necessarily infer, as it doth not, that they were consequently deprived also of their kingdoms. But their dwelling apart from the rest of the people doth necessarily infer, saith this Doctor, that they were deprived at least of the administration of their kingdom, and therefore from hence it may be well inferred, that the Priests of the old law had authority to deprive per accidens, and consequently Princes that were infected with leprosy at least wise of the administration of their kingdom. But of this I will treat a little beneath, after I have examined the second Reply, which this Doctor maketh to this first part of my answer to his antecedent proposition. 101 I answer secondly, saith D. Schulckenius. r Pag. 546. King Ozias did indeed retain the name of a King for the residue of his life, but a bare and naked name. For his son did govern the kingdom with full power, although without the name of a King. For so the Scripture speaketh 2. Paralip. 26. King Ozias was a leper until the day of his death, and he dwelled in a house a part full of leprosy, for the which he had been cast out of the house of our Lord; Moreover joathan his son governed the King's house, and judged the people of the land. The same is said 4. Reg. 15. Therefore we have not from the Scripture, that any part of the government did any way appertain to Ozias, which josephus doth more clearly explicate lib. 9 Antiq. cap. 11. While he saith, that the son of Ozias did take upon him the kingdom, and that Ozias▪ lived a private life until his death. But howsoever it be, this is manifest, that Ozias was deprived of the administration of the kingdom, and therefore punished with a temporal punishment. 102 But thou wilt say, that Ozias retained the name of a King, and as it was said in the first answer perchance a right to reign. Therefore from hence it cannot be proved, that heretical Kings may altogether be deprived of their kingdoms by the Pope. I answer. First from hence it is proved, that the Pope may for a just cause inflict upon a King a temporal punishment, as is the depriving of the administration of the kingdom. Secondly it is consequently gathered, that for a most weighty cause, and for a very heinous crime, and very pernicious to the Church, as for example is heresy, he may inflict a more grievous punishment, as is the depriving him altogether of his kingdom. For both Innocentius the fourth did remove Sanctius the second King of Portugal from the administration of the kingdom, because he was unfit, and gave him his brother Alphonsus the third for a coadjutor, and also he deprived of the Empire Friderike the second in the Council of Lions being declared an enemy to the Church. 103 But first, that King Ozias retained only the bare name of a King without any Royal right, authority, or dominion, it is very false, and affirmed by this Doctor without any colourable ground at all. For the Scripture doth not only call Ozias a King, after he was infected with leprosy, and recounteth the years of his reign in the same manner, as he recounteth the years of the reign of other Kings, who had not only the bare name, but also the true authority of other Kings, but it doth also affirm, that the reigned all the rest of his life, and that joathan began to reign only after his Father's death. Sixteen years old, saith the Scripture s 2. Paralip. 26. & 4. Reg. 15. , was Ozias, who also was called Azarias' 4. Reg. 15. When he began to reign, and he reigned two and fifty years in jerusalem. And again, t 2. Paralip. 26. 27. And Ozias slept with his Fathers, and they buried him in the King's sepulchers field, because he was a leper; and joathan his son reigned for him. Five and twenty years old was joathan when he began to reign (and therefore he did not reign in his Father's time) and he reigned sixteen years in jerusalem. 104 joathan, saith Abulensis, v 4 Reg. 15. ●●. was not called King, neither did he sit in the King's seat of estate, but Ozias was called King all the time he lived and under him is reckoned the time of the kingdom, and the power, or authority concerning those things, which were done in the kingdom did depend on him, although they were administered by joathan his son: and beneath, This joathan, saith Abulensis, was the only or at least wise the eldest son of Ozias, therefore he did succeed in the Kingdom, his Father being dead; for his Father being alive, he did govern the Palace, and sustained the whole weight of the Kingly labour. Also x lib. 26▪ de Repub. cap. 5. num. ● Gregorius Tholosanus among other reasons, which he brought to prove, that a Prince ought not to be deprived of his kingdom, for that he is, or seemeth to be unfit to govern the same, he produceth this example of King Ozias. Seeing that saith he, also Azarias, or Ozias (for he was called by both these names) King of juda, was stricken by God with leprosy for this sin, that he did not destroy the Altars of the Idols, after he was become a leper, he lived indeed until the day of his death in a free house apart: yet he was not deprived of his kingdom, but joathan his son governed the King's Palace, and did judge the people of the Land, at his coadjutor: And another cause of his leprosy is alleged, for that he presumed to burn incense upon the Altar of incense, which was only the office of a Priest, yet in both places it is said, that joathan reigned for him only after his death, but that before his death he only administered the kingdom in his Father's name. 105 Wherefore that, which this Doctor affirmeth, that the King's son administered the kingdom with full power, is equivocal, although the Scripture maketh no mention, that he administered the kingdom with full power, but only, that he governed the King's Palace, and judged the people of the Land: for if he mean, that he administered the kingdom with a full absolute and supreme authority, this is very untrue; for this authority did belong only to the King, in whose name, and by whose authority he governed the King's Palace, and judged the people; but if his meaning be▪ that he administered the kingdom with a full delegate power, and which in some cases the King may communicate to a subject, who is only an administrator, and governor, but not a King, this I will easily grant. Belike this Doctor will have the King's Protector, and Guardian in the time of his minority, or who administereth the kingdom, when the King is absent in some foreign country, or when he is taken prisoner by his enemy, or when by reason of some great infirmity, he cannot govern by himself, to have full, absolute, and supreme power, and consequently to be in very deed the Sovereign King, and to have Kingly authority to govern the kingdom which how absurd it is, any man but of mean capacity may easily perceive. 106 Neither from josephus can any other thing be gathered, than which the Scripture itself affirmeth, to wit, that King Ozias lived in a house apart, and his son joathan governed the King's house, and judged the people of the Land. For the words of josephus, as they are related by this Doctor, are not so be understood, that joathan took upon him the kingdom, and to reign; for Ozias all the time of his life was King, and did reign, as josephus affirmeth in the same place: but that he took upon him to administer, or govern the kingdom in his Father's name, who by reason of his infirmity, for which he was bound by the law of God to live in a house a part from the rest of the people, could not conveniently govern the same: But the words of josephus according to the Edition which I have, and which also Cardinal Bellarmine in his book against Barclay followeth, are these. After the Priests had perceived the leprosy in the King's face, they told him, (or if the word be iudicaverunt, and not indicaverunt) they judged, that he was stricken by God with the plague of leprosy; and they admonished him, that he would departed the City, as one polluted▪ and unclean. And he with the shame of his calamity obeyed, being so miserably punished for his pride joined with impiety; and when for a time he lived private out of the City, his son joathan administering the kingdom, at length being consumed with sorrow he died the sixty eight year of his age, and the fifty second of his kingdom or reign. 107 From which words this only can be gathered, that joathan administered the kingdom, and governed the King's Palace, and judged the people, as the Scripture saith, yet that Ozias was still King, and reigned, although he lived private, that is, not deprived of his kingdom, for he still remained King, and did reign until his death, as josephus confesseth, but privately, to wit, he did not meddle with the public affairs of the kingdom, but lived in a free house apart, as the Scripture saith, which words Abulensis expoundeth thus: y 〈…〉 And he dwelled in a free house apart, that is, he did not dwell in the King's Palace, for he being a leper ought not to give himself to businesses, neither did he dispose of the kingdom, but joathan his son; and it is called a free house, that is, sequestered from all business, and frequentation of people: for none did resort to him but those, who served him; but the rest which belonged to the Kingly affairs joathan did; and perchance it is called a free house, because it was out of the City. Therefore that the Kingly estate, provision, pomp, should not cease, joathan Ozias his son governed the King's Palace, to wit, he remained in the King's house, and all the Nobles, and mightiest men of the Land had recourse to him as they were wont to have recourse to Ozias, and he kept all the servants, and all the other provision, which his Father kept, that the Regal state should not seem to be diminished, and yet he was not called King, neither did he sit in the King's seat of estate, and the rest as follow before nu. 104. 108 Wherefore D. Schulckenius perceiving this his assertion not to be grounded either in Scripture, reason, or any other authority flieth back again to his former answer, that Ozias was at least wise deprived of the administration of the kingdom, from whence first it is proved, saith he, that the Pope may inflict upon a King for a just cause a temporal punishment, as is the depriving of the administration of the kingdom; and secondly from thence consequently it is gathered, that for a most important cause, and a very heinous crime, as is heresy, he may inflict a greater punishment, as is the depriving him altogether of his kingdom. 109 But although I should grant to this Doctor, that the Highpriest did deprive King Ozias per accidens, and consequently not only of the administration of the kingdom, but also of the kingdom itself, and right to reign, that is, by declaring him to be a leper, which disease did by the law of God, as we now suppose, but do not grant, deprive him ipso facto of his right to reign, yet from thence it cannot be proved, that the Pope hath the like authority to deprive an heretical King of his Kingdom, or the administration thereof per accidens or consequently, for that no punishment is appointed by the law of Christ to heresy, as it was in the old law to leprosy: but to punish heretics with this or that kind of spiritual punishment Christ hath left to the discretion of spiritual Pastors, and to punish them with temporal punishments to the discretion of temporal Princes, who therefore, as well said Dominicus Bannes, may put heretics to death, or punish them in some other manner. But if Christ our Saviour had in the new law assigned particularly any temporal punishment, as death, banishment, privation of goods, or the like, for those who should be infected with heresy, as God in the old law did ordain, that lepers should dwell out of the Camp in a house apart, than the Pope might indeed punish heretics temporally per accidens and consequently, to wit, only by declaring the law of Christ, and that they were infected with heresy, to which crime such punishments are according to this supposition appointed by the law of Christ; Neither should he herein transcend his spiritual authority: But to execute this law by putting heretics to death, or by inflicting upon them temporal punishments, and punishing them actually with the same, doth exceed the limits of that spiritual authority, which hath been given to the Priests either of the new law, or of the old. 110 And albeit Pope Innocent the fourth, and also other Popes have deprived Sovereign Princes very few times for heresy, but often for other crimes, not only of their administration, but also of the kingdom itself, yet this is no sufficient ground to prove, that they had any true and rightful power so to do, as it is manifest of itself, and in my Apology I have declared more at large, z Nu. 444. 445. for that it is one thing, saith Cardinal Bellarmine, a In Respons. ad Apolog. pag. 157. Edit. Colon. to relate the facts of Kings, and so of Popes, and other persons, and another thing to prove their authority, and power. And thus much concerning the first part of my answer to the antecedent proposition of Cardinal Bellarmine's argument. The second part of my answer was contained in these words. 111 Neither also doth Cardinal Bellarmine sufficiently confirm, that the levitical Priests had authority to deprive Kings that were infected with leprosy only of the administration of their Kingdoms, for that time only that they were infected with leprosy. For albeit Ozias, after he was stricken by God with the plague of leprosy did not administer the kingdom, the cause thereof might be, for that he being not fit to govern the kingdom during the time of his infirmity, did commit the government to joathan his son, and did appoint him the administrator of the kingdom, until he should be restored to his former health. But that a Priest of the old law had authority to deprive Kings being infected with leprosy either of their kingdoms, or of the administration thereof, it cannot be sufficiently gathered from the holy Scripture. As also we cannot sufficiently collect from the holy Scripture, that a Priest of the old law had authority to deprive householders being infected with leprosy either of their goods, or of the administration thereof, although it be very like, that seeing such householders ought at the judgement of the Priest, declaring them to be lepers, to dwell out of the camp, they themselves did commit to others the authority to be administrators of their goods for the time they were infected with leprosy; And so the weakness of the antecedent proposition is manifest. 112 Now you shall see in what a shuffling manner D. Schulckenius replieth to this my answer. I answer, saith he, b Pag 5●●. These make nothing to the matter. It is enough for us, that King Ozias did by the commandment of the High Priest dwell in a house apart from the time of his leprosy until his death; and that seeing he could not converse with the people he was enforced to permit the administration of the kingdom to his son, so that nothing at all concerning the affairs of the kingdom was referred to him. But if he had not been subject to the power of the High Priest, he might have contemned the high Priest, and against his will dwell in the King's City, and govern the kingdom either by himself, or by his Ministers. For leprosy doth not take away the judgement of the mind, and wisdom necessary to govern. Truly Naaman Syrus was a leeper, and because he was not subject to the high Priest of the Hebrews, he did n●t dwell in a house apart, but he was the General of Warfare, and he went wheresoever he would. See 4. Reg. 5. And in the same manner the High Priest might deprive householders of the administration of their goods, especially if they had any in Cities, because he did separate them from the people, or the conversation of men, and did exclude them from Cities▪ and consequently deprived them of the administration of those goods, which they had in Cities, albeit they might administer them by others. Thus D Schulckenius. 113 But truly it is a shame to see with what face this Doctor can so boldly affirm, that the principal question, which is now betwixt Card. Bellarmine, and me, to wit whether King Ozias was deprived either of his kingdom, or of the administration thereof by the High Priest, is nothing to the matter. Before as you have seen, both Card. Bellarmine, and also this Doctor, if they be two different men, have laboured to prove, that King Ozias was for corporal leprosy deprived by the high Priest not only of the administration of his kingdom, but also of the kingdom itself, and of his right or authority to reign; from whence they inferred, that therefore the Pope might for spiritual leprosy deprive temporal Princes not only of the administration of their kingdoms, but also of their kingdoms, and all Regal authority, or right to reign. And the second part of this antecedent proposition I did confute above, and proved clearly, that Ozias did still remain true King de iure until his death, and was not deprived of his Royal authority, or right to reign, although his son joathan did de facto in his father's name, and by his Father's authority administer the kingdom. To the first part of the antecedent proposition, which this Doctor affirmed to be manifest, [but howsoever it be, saith he, to wit, whether Ozias remained King only in name, or also with Regal authority, it is manifest, that he was deprived of the administration of the kingdom and therefore punished with a temporal punishment] I did now answer, affirming that Card. Bellarmine had not sufficiently proved the same; for that it might be, that he perceiving himself to be unfit by reason of leprosy, for which he was by the law to dwell in a house apart, to govern the kingdom by himself, did willingly and of his own accord commit the government thereof to his son joathan, from whence it cannot be gathered, that he was deprived of the government by the high Priest. And now this Doctor being pressed with this answer blusheth not to say, That this is nothing to the matter, as though to confute that which he himself affirmetn to be manifest, to wit, that King Ozias was by the high Priest deprived of his Kingly government for corporal leprosy is nothing to the matter. But to such shameful windings, turnings, and shift are sometime brought men, otherwise learned, rather than they will plainly and sincerely confess themselves to have grossly erred, in coining their false, or fallible opinions, for true and undoubted points of Catholic faith. 114 Observe now, good Reader, in what a fraudulent manner this Doctor would seem to prove, that my aforesaid answer is nothing to the matter. It is enough for us, saith he, that King Ozias did by the high Priests commandment dwell in a house apart all the time of his leprosy until his death, etc. If this be enough for this Doctor, I shall easily agree with him herein, for that I do willingly grant, that the high Priest might command King Ozias being infected with leprosy to dwell in a house apart; Only this I must admonish him, that Ozias was bound to dwell in a house apart, not so much by the commandment of the high Priest, if we will speak properly, as by the commandment of almighty God, who by his law did expressly ordain, that all lepers should dwell apart from the rest of the people; and the Priest's office only was to judge according to the signs and tokens prescribed by the law whether they were infected with leprosy or no, and to declare the law of GOD, which are spiritual not temporal actions; abstracting from which law the high Priest had no authority to command King Ozias, or any other leper to live in a house apart from the rest of the people. Wherefore this commandment of the high Priest was not any constitutive commandment of his own, imposing a new obligation upon King Ozias, to which he was not tied before, although the high Priest had not commanded him, but it was only a declarative commandment, or a declaration of God's law and commandment, whereby all lepers were long before commanded to dwell in a place apart from the rest of the people: But from hence this Doctor cannot gather, that the Priests of the new law may for spiritual leprosy deprive Kings of their kingdoms, or the administration thereof, or of their right and freedom to dwell in their Cities, or Palaces, and separate them by way of temporal constraint from all civil conversation of men, unless he will grant with john Wicklefe, that these punishments are by the law of Christ annexed to spiritual leprosy, as in the old law the dwelling in a place apart from the rest of the people was annexed to corporal leprosy. Nevertheless I do not deny, that the Priests all of the new law have authority to declare what is spiritual leprosy, and what crimes do notably infect the soul, and what punishments are by the law of Christ annexed to such maladies, and also to separate heretics and other spiritual lepers from the sacred, religious, or spiritual conversation of the faithful, for these are spiritual, not temporal actions, and punishments. 115 But Ozias, living in a house apart, could not, saith this Doctor, converse with the people, and so he was enforced to permit absolutely to to his son the administration of the kingdom, that nothing at all should be referred to him, concerning the affairs of the kingdom. But first, it is not true, that King Ozias speaking properly was coactus, that is, enforced or compelled by corporal force, and violence; or by the coactive force of the law, which consisteth in the inflicting of temporal punishments, to live in a house apart from the rest of the people, but only he was bound thereunto by the directive, or commanding force of the law of God, which ordained, that all lepers should be separated from the rest of the people, and dwell alone by themselves out of the Camp; for seeing that the King was supreme in temporals, and subject therein to none but God alone, and the High Priests were subject to him therein, and might be punished by him with temporal punishments, as I showed before, he could not be subject to the coactive, or enforcing power of the law, which ordained the inflicting of any temporal punishment; And therefore we never read in the holy Scripture, that the High Priest of the old law, whom my Adversaries affirm to have authority to inflict upon a King a temporal punishment, did ever attempt to put any King to death, who had committed any crime that deserved death according to the law, as you find many Kings to have committed such crimes, as David committed adultery, which according to the law of God was to be punished with death, and most of the Kings of Israel were Idolaters, whom God commanded to be put to death, and this crime also of King Ozias, for usurping the office of a Priest deserved death according to the Law. 116 Secondly therefore, although he was in some sort, speaking improperly, enforced, or compelled, that is, he was bound by the law under pain of sin to live in a house apart; from the rest of the people by reason of his leprosy, yet it was the law of God, and not the high Priest, but only as judging him to be a leper, and declaring the law of God, and his indignation against those who should transgress his law, that compelled him thereunto, which declaration being a mere spiritual action, without doubt did, according to the law of God in the old law, belong to the function of the high Priest; and therefore the most that from hence can be inferred is this, that the Priests of the new law have also authority to declare the law of Christ, and to judge what is spiritual leprosy, and what punishments are by the law of Christ appointed against heresy, and other crimes which may infect the soul; but that spiritual Pastors have now authority to inflict temporal punishments upon heretics, or any other spiritual lepers, it cannot from hence be gathered by any probable reason. 117 Thirdly, it is very untrue, that because King Ozias was by the law commanded to live in a house apart, so long as he remained a leper, it doth consequently follow from thence, that he was also enforced, bound, or compelled to permit absolutely the administration of the kingdom to his son, so that nothing concerning the affairs of the kingdom should be referred to him: for that a King may live in a house apart, not only out of the City, but also out of the kingdom, and yet he may govern his kingdom by his Ministers in such sort, that the chiefest things he may reserve to himself, as divers Kings by their viceroys do govern foreign kingdoms, reserving divers things, as the placing or displacing of the chiefest Officers, the making of war against their neighbour Princes, or such like important affairs to themselves: and therefore from the dwelling of Ozias in a house apart, either in the City, or out of the City, it cannot be sufficiently gathered, that he was therefore enforced to permit absolutely the administration of the kingdom to his son, so that nothing concerning the affairs of the kingdom should be referred to him; especially seeing that, as this Doctor sayeth, leprosy doth not take away the judgement of the mind, and wisdom necessary to govern. 118 Neither also is it true, that King Ozias could not converse with the people, as this Doctor so boldly affirmeth. For although it was ordained by the law, that lepers should dwell alone out of the camp, and be separated from the rest of the people, yet the law did not forbid any man to speak, or talk with them, or than with others: yea which is more, it was not forbidden by the law, as well observeth Abulensis, c In ca 8. Mat. q. 12. & 13. to touch a leper; for although the touching of a leper d●d cause a legal uncleanness, yet it was not any sin, or imperfection to incur a legal uncleanness, but sometimes it was meritorious to be legally polluted: for to touch dead bodies, and graves was a legal uncleanness Num. 19 and yet to bury, the dead was a meritorious work, for which Tobias is greatly commended; and sometimes also a man was bound to incur a legal uncleanness, as children were bound to bury their parents, and yet by this they were legally polluted Leuit. 10. & 21. and not only in profane things, but also in divine mysteries Priests were sometimes bound by the law to be legally polluted: as the Priest who offered a red cow in a sacrifice was polluted, and yet this was done by the commandment of God. Num. 19 See also the like Leuit. 16. Wherefore to incur a legal uncleanness was not forbidden by the law, but it was only forbidden to enter into the Sanctuary, or to touch sacred things before he should be cleansed. Levit. 15. and therefore it was not a sin according to the law to touch a leper after what manner soever, unless he that was so polluted, would before his purification enter into the Tabernacle, or participate in sacred things. Levit. 15. So that it is manifest, that King Ozias was so debarred rom all civil conversation, but that he might sufficiently declare to his Deputies and ministers, what he would have done concerning any important business in the kingdom. 119 Wherefore it can not be proved, that King Ozias was deprived for his leprosy of the administration of his kingdom, and enforced to permit absolutely to his son the government thereof, that nothing at all should be referred to him concerning the affairs of the kingdom, although it might very well be, that he seeing himself for his great pride, and arrogancy stricken by God with the plague of leprosy, and that he could not so conveniently, and in such Royal manner, and remaining in his own Palace govern the kingdom, as he did before, did freely, and of his own accord, and not upon any constraint or absolute necessity appoint his son the sole administrator of the kingdom, and that he being now humbled by the potent hand of God would not for the time of his infirmity meddle at all with the government, which is more to be attributed to his humility, then to any necessity, for that he might, if he had been pleased, have reserved some affairs of greatest moment to his own judgement, and referred the rest to those ministers, whom he should appoint; and as his son joathan was made administrator of the kingdom by his appointment, and governed in his name, and by his authority, so also if joathan had carried himself partially and tyrannically in the government, he might by the authority of his father, who still remained the true and rightful King, have been displaced, and another put in his room. 120 But if King Ozias had not been subject (saith this Doctor) to the power of the high Priest, he might have contemned the high Priest, and against his will have dwelled in the Regal City, and also have governed the kingdom. But first no man maketh any doubt, but that King Ozias was subject to the high Priest in spirituals, as was every sentence or judgement, wherein he declared the law of God: And therefore the King was bound not to contemn in such things the commandment of the high Priest; neither could he being now declared a leper, either with the leave, or against the leave of the high Priest dwell in the kingly City among the rest of the people, for that by the law of God, and not by any constitutive commandment of the high Priest, he was to dwell apart from the rest of the people. Wherefore that clause [and against his will he might have dwelled in the Regal City] is added by this Doctor to no purpose, unless he would signify thereby, that the law concerning the dwelling of lepers apart from the rest of the people, was not the law of God, but only the law and commandment of the high Priest, and that therefore King Ozias, and other lepers might with the leave and licence of the high Priest dwell in the City among the rest of the people. 121 Secondly, if King Ozias had contemned the high Priest, and had against his will dwelled in the Regal City, although he had geatly offended therein by transgressing the law of God which the high Priest ought by his Office to declare to all the people, yet he could not therefore be punished by the high Priest with any temporal punishment, for that he himself was supreme in temporals, and subject to none but God, and the high Priest was, as I showed before, subject to him therein, and might be punished by him with temporal punishments. But as for the administration of the kingdom, he should no way have transgressed the law of God, albeit he had governed the same against the high Priests will, for that he was not by his leprosy deprived of any jot of his Regal authority. Neither can this Doctor well declare, how King Ozias being a man of judgement and wisdom notwithstanding his corporal leprosy, could be deprived of the administration of his kingdom, or which is all one, of his right and authority to govern the same for the time of his leprosy, if he once suppose, that he still remained true King, and had true Regal authority: seeing that to deny obedience to a Prince so long as he remaineth Prince, is plainly repugnant to the law of God, saith Card. Bellarmine; d in Tract contra Barcla. cap. 21. pag. 202. and, as Suarez doth well affirm, e in Defence. fidei Cathol. etc. lib. 6. cap. 3. nu. 6. the obligation of obedience in any degree, or state doth so long endure in the subject, as the dignity, or power and jurisdiction doth endure in the Superior, for these are correlatives, and the one dependeth on the other. 122 And in the same manner, saith this Doctor, might the high Priest deprive householders of the administration of their goods, especially which they had in City, because he did separate them from the people or conversation of men, and did exclude them from Cities, and consequently did deprive them of the administration of those goods, which they had in Cities, although they might administer them by others. But this also is apparently untrue. For although the high Priest had authority to declare, that householders being infected with leprosy were to dwell apart out of the camp or City, but yet so that they might talk and speak a far of to others that should come to visit them, as I signified before; and in this sense the high Priest may be said to have authority to separate them from the rest of the people, to wit, by declaring the law of God, and not by any constitutive commandment of his own, yet from hence it doth not follow, as this Doctor affirmeth, that the high Priest did consequently deprive them of the administration of their goods, which they had in the City. For he that is deprived of the administration of his goods, can neither set, let, sell or give away his goods, or make any other contract concerning them, which is valid and of force by law, as it is apparent in all those who are deprived of the administration of their goods, as are orphans under age, madmen, and many times also unthrifts, or over prodigal persons are by the law deprived of the administration of their goods, and can make no bargain, which is valid by law, and therefore they have Overseers, Guardians or administrators appointed them. 123 Now what man of learning will affirm, that he who either by sickness, imprisonment, confinement or banishment, is separated from the places where his goods do remain, is consequently deprived of the administration of his goods? Is an Englishman, who for some crime or cause is banished his Country, consequently deprived of the administration of his goods, which he hath in England? and can not he by authentical writings, set them, sell them, or give them away? Must he that is rightfully detained in prison, be consequently deprived of the administration of his goods, which he hath out of prison, can he not set, or sell his lands, or goods, which he hath in the City, or Country? What an unsound consequence is therefore this, which this Doctor maketh. The high Priest did exclude lepers out of the City, therefore he did consequently deprive them of the administration of those goods, which they had in the City? But they can not come to the City to set or sell their goods. Who doubteth of this, if they be banished the Cities? as neither he that is detained in prison, or banished the kingdom, can go out of prison into the City, or return into the kingdom to administer his goods, and to set them, sell them, or give them away without incurring the danger of the law. But will any man of learning from thence conclude, that therefore he is consequently deprived of the administration of his goods, which he hath in the City or kingdom? Or that if he should against the law adventure to go out of prison, or the place of his confinement to administer, or make away his goods, the contract should be unjust, and of no effect for want of right and authority to administer the same? And thus you see that both parts of the antecedent proposition of Card. Bellarmine's argument are very untrue. 124 But although we should grant only for Disputation sake, both parts of the antecedent proposition, to wit, that the Priests of the old law had authority to deprive in that manner, as I declared, that is, not by any constitutive commandment of the high Priest, but only by the declaring the law of God, the Kings of juda being infected with leprosy not only of the administration, of their kingdoms, but also of their kingdoms, or, which is all one, of their Regal authority and right to reign, yet how weak and insufficient is also the consequence of his argument, and so the whole argument, and every part thereof altogether defective, I showed in these words. 125 As concerning the consequence, albeit we should grant the antecedent proposition, to wit, that the Priests of the old law had authority to deprive Kings being infected with leprosy, at least wise of the administration of their kingdoms, not per se, but consequently as Card. Bellarmine deduceth, to wit, for that the had authority to separate them from the company of the rest of the people, and consequently, as he saith, to deprive them of their kingdom, yet we deny his consequence. For that figure of the lepers doth consist in this, that as in the old law they that were infected with corporal leprosy, ought to be separated at the arbitrement of the high Priest from the company of the rest of the people, so long as they were infected with leprosy, so in the evangelical law they that are infected with spiritual leprosy may by Bishops be excluded from the Ecclesiastical communion of the faithful, until they shall return to their former health. And therefore if from this that lepers ought upon the sentence of the Priest to remain in a house apart out of the camp, until they were healed, it doth necessarily follow, that they had not power for that time to govern their temporal kingdom, no marvel, that consequently also the were for that time deprived of the administration of the kingdom: But it is manifest enough among the learneder Divines and of better note, as we have seen above, f Nu. 346. Apolog. that the depriving either of a temporal kingdom, or of the administration thereof doth not necessarily follow Ecclesiastical excommunication. And therefore this similitude of Card. Bellarmine doth also fail in this, and therefore his whole argument is not forcible. 126 Yea also if Card. Bellarmine in his Treatise of the Eucharist doth argue well from the figure to the thing figured, where from the figures of the old Testanment he proveth, that Christ our Lord is truly and really present in the Eucharist, albeit we should grant, that the Priests of Levi had power to deprive Kings being infected with leprosy of their kingdoms, not only consequently, but also per se, and principally, yet it would not therefore follow, that the Priests of the new law had also that power to deprive heretical Kings of their kingdoms. For by this very same that corporal leprosy, and the punishment annexed to it by the law of God was a figure of heresy or spiritual leprosy, and of the punishment which is agreeable to it by the law of Christ, heresy ought not by the evangelical law to be punished with the loss of temporal kingdom in regard of the signification of the figure, for that this punishment was in the old law ordained for corporal leprosy, but with a punishment of a higher degree, to wit, spiritual, and the loss of an everlasting kingdom; because the figure is always less perfect, and of an inferior degree than is the thing figured, as the shadow in respect of the body, as Card. Bellarmine doth in that place affirm. And by this reason some Divines do not unaptly gather, that Christ our Lord was an eternal King, and of a higher degree, because he was figured by Melchisedech, who was a temporal King. 127. But that which Card. Bellarmine addeth in the end out of the first to the Corinthians chap. 10. that all things chanced to the jews in figure to prove from thence, that corporal leprosy in the old Testament was a figure of heresy, and spiritual leprosy, he doth not well deduce out of Saint Paul, neither doth he entirely and faithfully produce his words: For Saint Paul doth only say in that place, All these things (to wit, those few things, before he had rehearsed) did chance to them in figure, but he maketh no mention at all in that place of this figure of leprosy. Thus I answered in my Apology. 128 Now to this my answer D. Schulckenius g Pag. 550. replieth thus. I answer. First, when Bellarmine said, that Ozia was enforced to resign up the kingdom to his son (for my Adversary Widdrington seemeth to wrest this awry) by the kingdom he understood not the name of King, but the administration at the kingdom with full power, or Regal authority. But I did not wrest awry, or misinterpret that word kingdom, for I proved, as you have seen, that Ozias did not resign up to his son his Kingly authority, but he still remained King, not only in name but elso and right, and in very deed; and that his son had indeed full authority to govern, or administer the kingdom, as an administrator, Protector, Guardian, or if we may say so, Viceroy, but no: supreme, or Regal authority. 129 Besides that, saith this Doctor, good Divines cited above h Nu. 346. by my Adversary Widdrington, as Paludanus, Richardus, S. Antoninus, Sot●s, Medina, Richeomus, and two (they are my Adversary widdrington's words) most famous Divines of this age, and of the same Religious Order with Card. Bellarmine, Franciscus, Suarez, and Martinus Becanus, d●e teach that which is true, and denied by no man, to wit, that excommucation precisely, and per se men are not deprived of the dominion of their temporal goods, and thereby not deprived of their Kingdoms, and Seignories: But that which my Adversary Widdrington doth impose upon them, to wit, that they are not deprived of the administration of their kingdom, this they do not teach. For it is the common opinion of Divines, and Cannists, that by excommunication men are deprived of their power to judge, and of other acts belonging to the external Court, Forensibus actibus. wherein the administraton of civil jurisdiction doth consist. 130 For Suarez doth say and prove three things against my Adversary Widdrington, in the place cited by my Adversary, Tom. 5. disput. 15. sec. 6. First, that by excommunication external jurisdiction doth cease in the person excommunicated, and all acts, which do appertain thereunto. Secondly, that in subjects doth cease the obligation of fidelity, being also sworn, after the sentence is given by an Ecclesiastical judge, and he proveth it by the chap. Nos sanctorum, & cap. juratos 15. q. 6. Thirdly, that dominion, and temporal goods do not cease, unless there be mention made of them, as truly it is made in the excommunication of heretics, who are deprived of all goods, and of all dignity. Wherefore, seeing that our principal question is concerning the leprosy of heresy, it is plain, that my Adversary Widdrington hath imposed upon Catholke Doctors a false doctrine for true. 131 But truly it is plain, that this Doctor cannot with any colourable Reply impugn my answers, but either by equivocating, chopping, or changing, corrupting, or misinterpreting my words or meaning. For my words in this place, which this Doctor after his usual manner doth misinterpret, are, as you have seen, that according to learned Divines, the depriving either of a temporal kingdom, or of the administration of a temporal kingdom, doth not necessarily follow Ecclesiastical excommunication, mark that word necessarily fellow. And in the number 346, to which also I referred the Reader, I affirmed, that Excommunication ex se, of itself, or of it own nature, hath not sufficient force to deprive a Prince of his dominion, or of the use thereof. Suarez tom. 5. desp. 8. sec. 1. And this I proved by the definition of Excommunication assigned by Suarez, to wit, that it is an Ecclesiastical Censure, whereby one is separated from the Ecclesiastical communion of the faithful, which definition is taken from Saint Augustine as he is cited in the Canon law i 11. q. 3. omnis Christianus. who saith, that every Christian who is excommunicated, is removed from Ecclesiastical communion. 132 From whence it necessarily followeth, that Excommunication ex se, of itself, of it own nature, or by any intrinsical, and necessary consequence doth only exclude from Ecclesiastical communion, and from that which by a necessary consequence doth follow the excluding from Ecclesiastical communion, and consequently it doth not ex se, and of it own nature deprive one of any civil dominion, or jurisdiction: For the excluding from Ecclesiastical communion, or, which is all one, from communicating in Ecclesiastical, spiritual, or sacred things, doth only make him to be as a Heathen, or a Publican, according to that saying of our Saviour, k Matth. 18. But if he shall not hear the Church, let him be to thee as the Heathen, or the Publican; But although Heathens, and Publicans, cannot participate with the faithful in Ecclesiastical, sacred, or spiritual affairs, yet they are not therefore excluded from any civil conversation, dominion, or jurisdiction. Wherefore it is manifest, that when I said, that the depriving a Prince of a temporal kingdom, or of the administration thereof, doth not, (according to very learned Divines, among whom I numbered Suarez, and Becanus) necessarily follow Ecclesiastical excommunication, and that Excommunication ex se, of itself, or of it own nature, hath not sufficient force to deprive a Prince of his dominion, or of the use thereof, my meaning was, that these effects do not necessarily follow the nature, and definition of Excommunication, and that Excommunication ex se, of itself, or, which is all one, of it own nature, or according to those properties, which do necessarily follow the nature of Excommunication, and which are founded in those words of our Saviour, If he shall not hear the Church, let him be to thee as the Heathen, and the Publican, that is, as Suarez expoundeth, l Vbi supra. separated from the Church, doth not work the said civil effects. And therefore I did not impose upon Suarez, and Becanus a false doctrine for true. Becan. de fide heretic servanda cap. 8. num. 16. For Becanus doth in express words affirm, that heretics by that precisely that they are excommunicated, are not deprived of dominion, or jurisdiction either over their subjects, or over their temporal all goods, but that this deprivation is a distinct punishment, and imposed by a distinct law. And Suarez holding, as this Doctor confesseth him to hold, that Excommunication precisely, and per se doth not deprive a man of the dominion of temper all goods, of kingdoms, and signiories, and teaching also, that the nature and definition of Excommunication is to separate one from the Ecclesiastical communion of the faithful, must consequently according to his own principles hold, and teach that Excommunication doth not per se, and of it own nature deprive one of any civil communion, administration, or jurisdiction, but only of Ecclesiastical conversation, which is directly opposite to civil: neither can there be alleged any sufficient reason, why the Censure of Excommunication precisely and per se should deprive of civil jurisdiction or administration, and not of temporal dominion. 134 But Suarez, saith this Doctor, doth in the very place cited by Widdrington, teach and prove against him, that by Excommunication doth cease all external jurisdiction, and all acts belonging thereunto in the persons excommunicated; and in subjects the obligation of fidelity although it be confirmed by oath; and that also the dominion of all temporal goods may cease, if there be particular mention made thereof, as it is in the excommunication of heretics, who are deprived of all goods, and of all dignity. 135 But Suarez doth not teach, or prove against me, neither can he, according to his own grounds, affirm, as I showed before, that any civil jurisdiction, administration, act, obligation, or communion doth cease by Excommunication precisely, per se, and of it own nature, or by any intrinsical property following by any necessary consequence the nature, and definition of Excommunication. For although Suarez, Becanus, and many other Divines, and Canonists do teach, that now de facto since the time especially of Pope Gregory the seventh, some Popes have annexed to Excommunication this civil effect, to wit, to deprive not only inferior Magistrates, but also Sovereign Princes of their civil dominion, and jurisdiction, being persuaded, but without sufficient ground, as I have showed both in this Treatise and else where, that they had authority so to do, yet they do not teach contrary to that, which I here contend, to wit, that this effect doth per se, or by any nacessarie consequence follow the nature and definition of Excommunication, which according to Suarez, and the truth itself, is an Ecclesiastical Censure, by which one is separated from the Ecclesiastical communion, or conversation of the faithful, and consequently not deprived of any civil jurisdiction, administration, or conversation, which is directly opposite to Ecclesiastical, as I declared more amply in my Latin Appendix to Suarez, m Par. 2. sec. 4 where I discoursed more at large of the effects of Excommunication, which it hath per se, and of it own nature, and which it hath per accedens, by the positive laws of the Church, which, for the better satisfaction of the English Reader, I think it not amiss to repeat here again. 136 And first I showed in that place, that Excommunication per se, of it own nature, and according to the true definition thereof set down also by Suarez, and grounded in those words of our Saviour, If he shall not hear the Church, let him be to thee as the Heathen and the Publican, hath only this effect to debar the person excommunicated from the Ecclesiastical communion of the faithful, and consequently from no civil dominion, administration, jurisdiction or conversation, which is directly opposite to Ecclesiastical: And therefore that Mayor, and Minor Excommunication are not per se, of their own nature, and according to their intrinsical definition distinguished in this, that Minor Excommunication doth exclude only from Ecclesiastical communion, and Mayor both from Ecclesiastical, and also civil communion: but it is therefore called Minor Excommunication, or a lesser Excommunication, for that it debarreth from a lesser Ecclesiastical communion, to with from Sacraments only, and it is called Mayor Excommunication, or a greater Excommunication, for that it debarreth from a greater Ecclesiastical communion, to wit, from Sacraments, Suffrages, and other Ecclesiastical graces, benefits, and privileges, whereof a man is partaker by being a Christian: For seeing that both Excommunications do participate the nature and definition of Ecclesiastical Excommunication, they ought, according to their nature, and definition, debar the faithful only from this or that Ecclesiastical communion in particular (because every species, or particular must be contained sub genere, or under the general, as it is evident to every Logician) and not from civil communion, which is directly and ex diametro opposite to Ecclesiastical. 137 And this is signified sufficiently by the very name of Excommunication, as Suarez affirmeth: For a man is therefore called excommunicated, because he is separated, or excluded from communion. And it is grounded in the words of our Saviour Matth. 18. But if he will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as the Heathen and the Publican, that is separated from the Church. Thus Suarez. n Vbi supra. Neither is it forbidden by the law of Christ, that the faithful shall not civilly converse with Heathens, publicans, or notorious sinners, unless some spiritual danger as of scandal, or of infection, which by the law of Christ and nature they are otherwise bound to eschew, shall arise from such civil conversation, as also Becanus doth expressly affirm. o In opusc. de fide Haereticis servanda. cap. 8. num. 3. See also Abulensis q. 50. in cap. 9 Matth. 138 Moreover, this also is gathered from the very light of natural reason: For as in the whole Christian world there be two only common wealths, kingdoms, or Societies distinguished by their proper acts, functions, and dignities, add not depending one on the other in those things, which are proper and peculiar to each one of them, to wit, the spiritual kingdom, or Church of Christ, by which precisely and per se we receive only spiritual graces, and benefits, and temporal common wealths, Societies, and kingdoms, by which precisely we are made partaker only of temporal goods, Greg. Tholos. in Syntagmat juris lib. 31. cap. 8. num. 3. and benefits: So also there be two only communions, the one in spiritual, the other in temporal, and civil affairs; and two only Excommunications in general, as Gregorius Tholosanus, and I also observed above; p Part. 2. cap. 2. num. 7. the one Ecclesiastical, which excludeth from Ecclesiastical communion, as from Sacraments, Suffrages, or other sacred things, the other civil, which excludeth from civil communion, which punishments the Civil lawyers account imprisonments, confinings, relegations, deportations, and banishments, by which the person excommunicated is debarred from the communion of some certain company, town, City, Country, or kingdom: and as civil Excommunication precisely, and of it own nature doth not debar a man from any spiritual good, grace, or communion●, so neither spiritual Excommunication precisely, and of it own nature doth debar a man from any temporal good, benefit, or communion. 139 Nevertheless, albeit the intrinsical, per se, and necessary effects of Ecclesiastical Excommunication are only to debar one from Ecclesiastical, or spiritual communion, yet because our Saviour Christ hath given to the spiritual Pastors of the Church authority to impose, but not to inflict certain temporal punishments upon persons excommunicated, all those temporal punishments, which the spiritual Pastors of the Church, have according to different times, and occasions adjoined by way of commandment to the Censure of Excommunication, may be called extrinsical, or accidental effects of Ecclesiastical Excommunication, or rather temporal effects and punishments annexed by way of command to Excommunication. But this with all ought greatly to be considered, as Suarez doth well observe, Suarez tom. 5. disp. 8. sec. 1. in fine & sec. 2. in principio. that when Excommunication is said to exclude from Ecclesiastical communion, it is necessarily to be understood of that communion, which dependeth upon the power, and will of the Church, and over which she hath right, power, or authority. Whereupon those temporal punishments, which spiritual Pastors may annect to Excommunication, must be such as by the institution of Christ they have authority to impose. And therefore if it be a controversy among learned Catholics, as in very deed it is, whether spiritual Pastors have authority to absolve subjects from the temporal allegiance, which they own to their temporal Princes, and to deprive temporal Princes of their temporal dominion, administration, or jurisdiction, these temporal punishments can never, so long as this controversy remaineth undecided, be truly said to be necessary effects annexed to Excommunication by the spiritual Pastors of the Church. 140 Secondly, I showed also in that place, that the spiritual Pastors of the Church have authority in order to spiritual good to command, and impose certain temporal punishments, and so also to annex them to Ecclesiastical Excommunication as not to eat, or drink with excommunicated persons, or notorious malefactors, not to salute them, or to converse civilly with them, except in such cases, wherein they are bound by the law of God, or nature civilly to converse. And so the spiritual Pastors of the Church have power to command us in order to spiritual good to abstain from certain meats upon certain days, to give alms to the poor, not to converse civilly with excommunicated persons, or notorious sinners, if otherwise by the law of God, or nature we are not bound to converse civilly with them, and the aforesaid, and such like temporal things to annex by way of commandment to Excommunication, whensoever they shall prudently judge it to be necessary to the salvation of souls. And this only is confirmed by the institution, and custom of the Church approved by perpetual tradition, and grounded in the holy Scripture, 1. Cor. 5. With such a one not so much as to take meat, and 2. joh. 1. Nor say to him, God save you. Neither is there any difficulty among Catholics concerning the power of spiritual Pastors to command, and impose temporal things, when it shall be necessary to the spiritual good of the Church, for that to command and impose a temporal thing in order to the spiritual good, is not a temporal, but a spiritual action, as I have often said: But all the controversy among Catholics is concerning the coercive power of spiritual Pastors, and their authority to punish temporally by way of temporal constraint, or, which is all one, to inflict temporal punishments. For if, contrary to the commandment of our spiritual Pastors, we will neither fast, nor give alms, nor abstain from civil conversation with excommunicated persons, the question is how far than the Ecclesiastical power can by the institution of Christ proceed against us, by way of temporal constraint, to the inflicting of temporal punishments. For in this power to punish temporally, or to inflict temporal punishments, doth consist the whole controversy betwixt me and my Adversaries. For I contend, that the doctrine, which Almain and very many Doctors, as he affirmeth, do maintain, is not repugnant to Catholic faith, or the approved grounds of true Divinity, to wit, that the spiritual power of the Church can not inflict any temporal punishment, as death, exile, privation of goods etc. nay, nor so much as to imprison, but that her power doth only extend to the inflicting of spiritual punishments, as Excommunication, or some such like spiritual Censure, and that all other temporal punishments, which she useth to inflict, do proceed from the pure positive law, or, to use Gersons words, from the grant of Princes. 142 And therefore thirdly I showed also in that place, that because Secular Princes have granted many temporal privileges to the spiritual Pastors of the Church, as to imprison, to confine, to impose or inflict pecuniary mulcts and such like all those temporal punishments, which to inflict the spiritual Pastors of the Church have received authority from the grant and consent of temporal Princes, may by the Pastors of the Church be adjoined to Ecclesiastical Excommunication, and in this sense be called accidental effects of Excommunication, or rather punishments accidentally or per accidens annexed to the Censure of Excommunication. And so the Pope, being now by the grant and consent of Secular Princes, and Christian people, become also a temporal Prince, may annex to Excommunication all temporal punishments, which he, as a temporal Prince, hath power to inflict. 143 Whereupon albeit I do utterly deny, that Excommunication either of it own nature, or by any necessary consequence deduced from thence, abstracting from the grant and consent of temporal Princes, hath sufficient force to deprive one of any civil dominion, jurisdiction, or conversation, yet I do willingly grant, that an inferior Magisrate, who by the sentence of a spiritual judge is declared to have incurred the Censure of Excommunication, is by the express civil laws of some kingdoms, and in some others by the consent of the Prince deprived of civil jurisdiction, and their acts reputed to be of no force in law; yea and that by the Imperial law, q In nova Constit. Frederici. if for a whole year he remain excommunicated, he is in the nature of a proclaimed outlaw, or Bandit. But to command subjects not to obey their lawful and Sovereign Prince in temporals, and to absolute subjects from that civil and natural allegiance, which by the law of God, and nature they own to their rightful Prince (seeing that according to Suarez, r Above nu. 121 the power to command in the Prince, and the bond of obedience in the subjects are correlatives, and one dependeth on the other, and that to deny obedience to a Prince, so long as he remaineth Prince, is plainly repugnant, saith Card. Bellarmine, to the law of God) it is not in the power of spiritual Pastors, unless they have authority to depose Princes, and to make Kings no Kings, which whether it be in their power to do, or no, is the very question, about which I with all my Adversaries do now contend, and concerning which the Schoolmen are now at variance, and as yet the controversy is not decided by the judge, saith john Trithemius s In Chron. Monast. Hirsang▪ add an. 1106. . 144 To those Canons, Nos sanctorum, juratos, & Absolutos, which Suarez brought for his chief ground to prove, that the absolving of Subjects from the temporal allegiance, which by the law of God▪ and nature they own to their Sovereign Princes, is now a punishment annexed to the Censure of Excommunication, I have heretofore answered, and among other answers this was one, that those Canons are not to be understood of Sovereign Princes, but only of inferior persons, who indeed by the consent of their temporal Sovereigns do lose their temporal jurisdiction, after the sentence is publicly declared, yea and in the territories of the Empire, if for a year they persist excommunicated, are, as I said, in the nature of persons prescribed out laws, or Bandites. 145 This in effect, and much more to the same purpose did I answer heretofore, by all which the force of my answer to Card. Bellarmine's argument, taken from the example of King Ozias, and the reason why I denied his consequence, supposing for Disputation sake the antecedent to be true, as it is not, may evidently appear. For in the old law the dwelling of lepers, after they were declared so to be by the Priest, in a house apart from the rest of the people, was expressly ordained by the law of God, and therefore supposing now with Card. Bellarmine, that the dwelling of a King being infected with leprosy in a house apart from the rest of the people should by any necessary consequence infer, that he is consequently deprived of his kingdom, or the administration thereof, it is no marvel, that the Priests of the old law had authority to deprive such Kings per accidens and consequently, that is, to declare them deprived by the law of GOD, of their kingdoms, or of the administration thereof. But in the new law neither the deprivation of a temporal kingdom, or of the administration thereof, nor the loss of any temporal jurisdiction doth by the law of GOD, or by any other necessary consequence follow spiritual leprosy, or any intrinsical property of Ecclesiastical Excommunication, neither is it in power of spiritual Pastors, as Almainus said, to inflict any temporal punishment, as death, banishment, privation of goods, etc. nay nor so much as to imprison, as very many Doctors, saith he, do affirm, but only to inflict spiritual Censures, or punishments: And therefore the similitude of Cardinal Bellarmine betwixt corporal and spiritual leprosy in the old and new law, is this defective, and so the consequence of his argument is altogether insufficient. Thus much touching my first answer to the consequence of his argument. 146 Mark now how slightly this Doctor would shuffle over my second answer and reason, which did clean overthrow Card. Bellarmine's consequence grounded upon the nature of a figure, and the thing figured, even according to his own grounds. For whereas I answered, as you have seen, that because a figure, as Card. Bellarmine saith, is always less perfect, and of an inferior degree than the thing which is figured, it doth not follow, that heresy, which is figured by corporal leprosy; must be punished with a temporal punishment, because corporal leprosy was punished therewith, but with a punishment of a higher degree, to wit, with a spiritual punishment, D. Schulckenius replieth thus: I answer, saith he t pag. 552. , As heresy, which is a spiritual leprosy, is far more pernicious, then corporal leprosy, so Excommunication is a punishment of a higher degree, than the separating of lepers. For Excommunication doth not only deprive of the company, and living together of men in one house, but also of participation of Sacraments, and Suffrages of the Church. But that Excommunication beside doth deprive of civil administration, and sometimes hath annexed the deprivation of temporal goods, and also of the kingdom itself, doth not diminish, but increase the greatness and excellency of the punishment of spiritual leprosy above the punishment of corporal leprosy. Wherefore it is most true, that the thing figured is of an higher degree than the figure. And in this manner the Eucharist is of an higher degree than manna, or the Paschall lamb, because these do nourish the body, that nourisheth the soul, although also those accidents of the Eucharist are profitable to the nourishment of the body. 147 But observe the egrigious fraud of this Doctor. For that proposition of Card. Bellarmine, Figures must of necessity be of an inferior order and excellency, than the things figured, is to be understood of figures formally, as they are figures, for it little importeth, that those things, that are figures, be materially of an equal, or not inferior order and excellency, than the things figured, so that formally as they are figures, or in that they are figures, they are less perfect, and excellent, then are the things figured. Now this Doctor doth craftily take here figures, and the things figured not formally, and according to that, wherein they are figures, but materially: for otherwise, as you shall see, he saith nothing to the purpose, and to the confuting of my answer. For neither Manna, nor the Paschall lamb are figures of the Eucharist, as the accidents of the Eucharist do concur to the nourishing of the body, but only as they are profitable to the nourishing of the soul: Neither was corporal leprosy, or the separation of lepers from civil conversation a figure of spiritual leprosy, and of Ecclesiastical separation, or Excommunication, as corporal leprosy doth infect the body, and Excommunication doth separate from civil conversation, but only as spiritual leprosy doth infect the soul, and Ecclesiastical Excommunication doth separate from Ecclesiastical, or Spiritual communion: for that a figure must in all those things, wherein it is a figure, be more noble, and excellent, then is the thing which is figured. And therefore as Cardinal Bellarmine very well observeth, q Lib. 1. de Missa cap. 7. to fulfil a figure is not to do that very thing, which the law prescribeth to be done, but to put in place thereof some thing more excellent, which to signify that figure did go before, as Christ did not fulfil the figure of Circumcision, when he himself was circumcised, but when he ordained Baptism in the place thereof. Thus Card. Bellarmine. 148 From whence it evidently followeth, that the separation of corporal lepers in the old law from civil conversation could not be a figure of the separation of spiritual lepers, also from civil conversation: for that civil conversation is one, and the self same thing, and not another thing more excellent, which according to Cardinal Bellarmine's doctrine must succeed in place of the figure, but the fulfilling of this figure must be the separating of spiritual lepers from spiritual, or Ecclesiastical conversation. And therefore although Ecclesiastical Excommunication hath by the laws of the Church annexed unto it, in that manner, as I have before declared, the excluding by way of commandment from civil conversation, if otherwise by the law of GOD, and nature, we are not bound civilly to converse, yea and also according to Cardinal Bellarmine the depriving of temporal kingdoms, or at leastwise of the administration thereof, yet the separating of lepers in the old law from civil conversation, or the depriving them of temporal kingdoms, or administration could not, according to Cardinal Bellarmine's grounds, be a figure of Ecclesiastical Excommunication in the new law, as Excommunication is pretended to work the same effects, but only as it worketh more excellent effects, to wit, the separating of the faithful from spiritual conversation, and excluding them from the kingdom of heaven. 149 Wherefore, if we do respect only the nature and property of a figure, it is evident that Cardinal Bellarmine according to his own principles hath not any way proved, that because corporal leprosy and the punishments annexed thereunto in the old law, to wit, the depriving of temporal kingdoms, jurisdiction, or administration, as Cardinal Bellarmine contendeth, was a figure of spiritual leprosy, and of the punishments annexed thereunto in the new law, therefore the same punishments, to wit, the depriving of temporal dominion, jurisdiction, or administration were figured by them, and consequently may now by virtue of the figure be ordained against spiritual lepers: for this were not according to Cardinal Bellarmine's doctrine, to fulfil the figure, and to put in place thereof something more excellent, but to put that very same thing, which the law in that figure prescribed to be done. And therefore Cardinal Bellarmine must bring better arguments, unless he will quite discredit himself and his cause, drawn from other heads, then from the figure of leprosy, and of separating lepers from civil conversation, which, according to his own principles, doth, as you have seen, make clear against him, to prove that spiritual Pastors either by virtue of Excommunication, or in any other manner, have authority to deprive temporal Princes of their kingdoms and dominions, or of any temporal administration or jurisdiction. 150 Lastly, whereas in the end of this my answer I affirmed, as you have seen, that Cardinal Bellarmine did not truly, and entirely set down the words of the Apostle 1. Cor. 10. And all these things chanced to them in figure, for that he left out that word [these] which is a relative, and hath relation only to those things whereof the Apostle spoke before, among which corporal leprosy is none, and he affirmeth him to say, And all things chanced to the jews in figure, this Doctor maketh much ado, and laboureth in vain to excuse Card. Bellarmine: And first he answereth, u pag. 553. that Cardinal Bellarmine did not produce the words, but the sense of St. Paul, but it is certain that the Apostle did not intend to say, that those things only which he mentioned in that Chapter did chance to the jews in figure, but those, and other like to them. 151 But first this answer is not agreeable to Card. Bellarmine's own words: The Apostle saith 1. Cor. 10. (saith Cardinal Bellarmine) that all things did chance to the jews in figure, and what I pray you is to say, that the Apostle saith so, then to produce the Apostles words? Secondly, although it be certain that the Apostle did not intend to say, that those things only, which he mentioned in that chapter did chance to the jews in figure, yet it is certain, that the Apostle in that chapter did only say, that all these things, and not all things absolutely, as Cardinal Bellarmine affirmeth him to say, did chance to the jews in figure. Thirdly, albeit S. Paul knew right well that not only all those altogether mentioned, but many other such like dio●ce to the jews in figure, yet it was sufficient for his purpose in that place only to affirm, that all those things there mentioned, and not that all things absolutely did chance to the jews in figure: neither was it necessary, that the Apostle should in that chapter say all he knew, it was sufficient for him to say in that chapter, only that which did suffice for his present purpose. Wherefore this Doctor must distinguish betwixt knowledge, which is in the understanding, and meaning which is in the will, and so he may see, that the Apostle knew right well, that not only those things there mentioned, but those and other such like did chance to the jews in figure, and yet only meant to say, in that place, that all those things there mentioned, and not all those, and other such like did chance to the jews in figure. Neither did St. Paul mean otherwise then the words, which he spoke, did signify, but it is manifest, that those words of the Apostle, And all these things chanced to them in figure, do not signify the same that these words do, And all things chanced to them in figure. 152 His second answer is, that the ancient Fathers, and especially S. chrysostom lib. 3. de Sacerdotio do teach, that the judgement of the Priests in the old law concerning corporal leprosy was a figure of the judgement of the Priests in the new Testament concerning sins. But no man denieth this; for I make no doubt, but that corporal leprosy and the judgement thereof in the old law, was a figure of spiritual leprosy and of the judgement belonging thereunto in the new law. That which I contend is, that Cardinal Bellarmine did not truly, entirely, and faithfully set down those words of Saint Paul 1. Corinth. 10. And all these things chanced to them in figure, for that he left out that word [these] and that the Apostle did not say in that place, that corporal leprosy, and the judgement thereof in the old law was a figure of spiritual leprosy, and of the judgement belonging thereunto in the new Testament: and of this there needeth no other proof, then to peruse the words, and text of the Apostle in that Chapter. 153 Thirdly, this Doctor answereth, that S. Thomas, x Prima secundae q. 104 ar. 1. and S. Aug. y In lib viginti & unius sentent. l. 16. contra Faustum cap. 28. & l. 18. c. 6. & l. 22. c. 24. in many places do cite those words of S. Paul in that manner, as Card. Bell. doth: & therefore C. Bell, cannot be reprehended for citing the words of the Apostle not entirely, and sincerely, unless they also with him be reprehended. But first, this is not to take away the aforesaid imputation from Card. Bellarmine, but to lay it upon others. Secondly, it is not true, that St. Augustine citeth those words in that manner, as Cardinal Bellarmine doth, but he expressly setteth down in all the later places [All these things] as it is in Saint Paul. Only in that book Viginti, & unius sententiarum he citeth indeed those words of the Apostle as Cardinal Bellarmine doth, leaving out that word [these] yet D. Shulckenius being so well acquainted with Cardinal Bellarmine, and his doctrine could hardly forget, that Card. Bellarmine himself expressly denieth z De Scriptoribus Ecclesiast. ab anno 400. ad 500 in observat. ad ●om. 4. S. Augustini pag. 187. that book viginti & unius sententiarum to be S. Augustius work, or to have in it any grave thing, or worthy S. Augustine. 154 Nevertheless I do not deny, but that S. Austin, S. Thomas, or any other might by an other consequence gather from that saying of S. Paul, that all things for the greater part did chance to the jews in figure. For although S. Paul doth only say, That all these things did chance to the jews in figure yet seeing that there is no more reason, why those things mentioned there, and not also many other things not mentioned in that place, as the Sabbath, Circumcision etc. which are named by S. Augustine, should chance to the jews in figure, we may from those words of S. Paul rightly infer by an other consequence, that all things for the greatest part did chance to the jews in figure. But, as I said, that only which I contend, is, that Card. Bellarmine did not truly entirely and faithfully relate those words of S. Paul, neither hath this Doctor, as you have seen, brought any colourable argument to confute the same. 155 Thus thou seest, good Reader, that Card. Bellarmine's argument taken from the example of King Ozias is most weak and insufficient, and my answer thereunto to be sound, and irreprooveable, and D. Schulckenius Reply to be very fraudulent, and in all points to be shaken and quite overthrown, and to have wrapped in sentences with unskilful and ambiguous words. Now you shall see, how weakly and nakedly, my unlearned Adversary Mr. Fitzherbert, notwithstanding he had seen my aforesaid answer to this example, urgeth again the same. But he bringeth nothing in confirmation thereof but what I answered before in my Apology, except the authority of S. chrysostom, whose words and meaning nevertheless he doth most foully corrupt, and to which also in my English Theological Disputation, a in the Admonition. nu. 23. & seq. which was published long before his Treatise against me came forth, I did most clearly answer. 156 Ozias was so far, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, b Cap. 5. nu 19 pag. 79. & Suppl. pag. 19 from being supreme head over Priests in spiritual matters, that he was subject to them therein, and bound to obey them no less than was the meanest subject he had. This is manifest by the plaine-words of the Scripture in this place; where the high Priest having rebuked Ozias for his presumption, did not only command him to departed, saying, Egredere de Sanctuario etc. Go out of the Sanctuary etc. 2. Paralip. 26. but also thrust him out of the same, as soon as the leprosy was discovered in his forehead; Festinato, saith the Scripture, expulerunt cum, They thrust him out in all haste: beside that it is manifest in the same place, that God punished him as well for his disobedience in resisting, and threatening the Priests, as for presuming to Sacrifice; and therefore though he had the Censar in his hand to burn the incense, yet he was not strooken with leprosy until he had threatened the Priests; Minabatur Sicerdotibus, saith the Scripture, statimque orta est lepra in front eius etc. He threatened the Priests, and forthwith there arose a leprosy in his forehead: wherein was fulfilled the menacing admonition that God gave to the people in the 24. of Deuteronomie, as I have declared before, when he commanded them exactly to obey the Priests of the levitical stock, bidding them remember how Mary was punished with leprosy for murmuring against Moses. Moreover whereas there was a general law given to the people in Leviticus whereby all men without exception were bound in case of leprosy, to under go and obey the judgement of the Priests, and at their arbitrement to be separated from the company and conversation of other men, it is manifest by this example, that the Kings were no less subject to this law, and bound to obey the Priests, than every other man; in which respect Ozias was forced by the sentence of the Priests (according to the prescript of the law) to live in a house apart so long as he lived. And I can not omit etc. Thus Mr. Fitzherbert. 157 But what is all this to the purpose, or how from hence doth it follow, that the Priests of the old law had authority to depose temporal Princes, and had a Sovereignty over them not only in spiritual, but also in temporal causes, as this man pretendeth. For all that Mr. Fitzherbert here hath said, is briefly this? First, that the Kings in the old law were in spiritual matters subject to the Priests and bound to obey them in spirituals; and that the Priests might rebuke Kings, and command them to departed out of the temple, if contrary to the law they should presume to offer Sacrifice: and that it belonged to the Priests to declare the law of God, and to judge according to the signs and tokens prescribed by the law, whether one were infected with leprosy or no, and if he were infected, to declare or judge him to be separated from the rest of the people according as the law of God ordained: All which were spiritual actions, and therefore not exceeding the limits of Priestly function. 158 But secondly he seemeth to make some force in those words of the Scripture, And they thrust him out in all haste etc. as though he would signify thereby, that they thrust him out by head, and shoulders, as the proverb is, or by laying violent hands upon his sacred person, which can not sufficiently be proved to be so, but only that they thrust him out, not by violence, for he himself made haste to go out, but only by their commandment or admonition, and by denouncing God's wrath against him, and by crying against him, and perchance with clapping of hands, as against an unclean and polluted person, who by the law of God was forbidden to enter, or remain in the Sanctuary; in that manner as before they did endeavour to resist and under him from burning of incense, not by force of arms and violently taking the Censar out of his hands, but by their words and admonition, commanding him to go out of the Sanctuary, and not to contemn the law of God. 2. Paralip. 26. And they resisted the King, saith the Scripture, and said, It is not thy office Ozias, to burn incense to our Lord, but to the Priests; go out of the Sanctuary, contemn not, because this thing will not be reputed to thee for glory by our Lord. But Ozias contemned their words, and bring angry, and holding in his hands the Censar to burn incense, be threatened the Priests. And forthwith there arose a leprosy in his forehead before the Priests in the house of our Lord before the altar of incense. And when Azarias the high Priest had beheld him, and all the rest of the Priests, they saw the leprosy in his forehead, and in haste they thrust him out, to wit, by their admonitions, outcries and exclamations, whose words and admonitions he himself, being now sore afraid, did willingly obey. Yea and himself being sore afraid, saith the Scripture, made haste to go out, because he felt forthwith the plague of our Lord. 159 And that only by their words and admonitions, and not by force and violence they thrust him out, josephus. lib. 9 Antiquit. cap. 11. josephus in the words cited above c nu. 106. doth plainly signify; The Priests, saith he, after they perceived the leprosy in the King's face etc. they admonished him, that as a polluted, and unclean person he would go out the City; And he with the shame of his calamity obeyed etc. or, as the Scripture saith, he being sore afraid made haste to go out. And what need had they to thrust him out by force and violence, when he himself made haste to go out? The same also S. chrysostom in the place here cited by Mr. Fitzherbert, Chrysostom. hom. 4. de verbis Isaia, vidi Dominum. doth most clearly signify in these words: Et egrossus est Rex etc. And the King went forth being made an example to all, and the temple was purged, and he was cast forth no man thrusting him forth, * Nemine propellente. and whereas he would arrogate to himself the Priesthood, he lost that which he had (to wit, his corporal health and liberty to come and remain in the Temple and City) and he departed out of the temple. 160 And the reason why the Priests ought not to lay violent hands on the King's person, and to compel him by force of arms, S. chrysostom did give a little before in those words: But King Ozias did not obey his admonisher, but puffed up with arrogancis he opened the temple, and entered into the Sanctuary with intention to offer incense. But what did God? After the Priest was contemned, and the Priestly dignity trodden under foot (mark the words following) nec quicquam prateras potuit Sacerdos, (Nam Sacerdotis tantum est arguere etc. Neither could the Priest do anything more, For it is the office of a Priest only to reprove, and to give a free admonition, not to raise arms, not to use targets, not to shake a lance, not to shoot arrows, not to cast darts, but only to reprove and to give a free admonition) After therefore the Priest had reproved, and yet the King did not yield, but took weapons, shields, and s●, and used his power, thou the Priests said to God, I have done that which belonged to my office, I can do no more, help thou the Priesthood, which is trodden under foot, etc. Thus S. chrysostom. And a little above, The King, saith he, doth compel, or force, the Priest exhort, the King by necessity, the Priest by counsel, the King hath sensible armour, the Priest spiritual, the King maketh war against Barbarians, the Priest against Devils. So you see that according to S. chrysostom it belongeth not to the Priest to use sensible weapons, and to force by corporal violence, but by counsel, admonition, or commandment. 161 Thirdly, although a leper was by the law of God bound to live apart out of the Camp, or City from the rest of the people, yet as I observed in my said Theological Disputation, d In Admonit nu. 28. it cannot be sufficiently proved, that is belonged to the Priests of the old law to thrust lepers by force and violence out of the Camp or City, but only by judging them to be lepers, and by declaring that by the law of God they were to be separated, seeing that the Kings, and not the Priests were the executors of the law against offenders, and by force and corporal violence to punish them, who did not observe the law, as I declared above e Nu. 80. out of Abulensis. But that the Priests after they had declared one to be infected with leprosy, and had charged him to departed, and commanded them who were to execute the law to perform their duty and what the law did prescribe, had any farther authority (as they were Priests) to thrust him out by violence, it cannot be proved out of the old law. Even as now in the new law it belongeth to spiritual Pastors, to declare whether one be infected with spiritual leprosy, but after they have declared one to be infected with heresy, and have excluded him from the Ecclesiastical conversation of the faithful, leaving him now to the Secular Court, they have no further power by the law of Christ (as they are spiritual Pastors) to use any corporal violence against him, and if it shall please the temporal Prince to pardon his life, the spiritual Pastors, have no authority to take it away, as out of Dominicus Bannes I showed in that Disputation f Cap. 7. sec. 2. in fine. . 162 But what if I should grant to Mr. Fitzherbert, that the Priests of the old law might lawfully thrust by violence an unclean person out of the Temple, if he will not otherwise departed, or that they might lawfully have taken by force the Censar out of the King's hands, or have held his hands, that he should not have offered incense, as also that in the new law it is lawful for Priests to thrust an excommunicated person out of the Church in the time of Divine service, or if in case a King would in his rage and fury run his sword through the body of any innocent man, should grant that his Chaplain, or any other of his subjects attending upon his Royal person, may lawfully hold his hands, and so keep him from committing so wilful a murder, could Mr. Fitzherbert, trow you, gather from hence, that either Priests or subjects had any authority or superiority over the King's person to hold his hands, or to force him by corporal violence? No. But from hence it only can be gathered, that every private man may, and aught by the law of God and nature, and by the bond of charity, to keep as much as lieth in him his neighbour from doing evil, which argueth no authority or superiority, but only a bond of charity. 163 Now you shall see in what fraudulent manner Mr. Fitzherbert urgeth the authority of S. chrysostom: And I cannot omit also, saith he, g Pag. 80. & seq. to touch here by the way, what S. chrysostom observeth further in this example, to wit, that whereas Ozias being leprous did not only dwell in the City (though in a house apart) but also reign still for some years until he died, he ought to be cast both out of the City, and also out of the kingdom; and that almighty God was so highly offended because the same was not performed, that he withdrew the spirit of Prophecy from Esay and other Prophets, during the life and reign of Ozias. 164 Exivit, Hom. 4. de verbis Isai. vidi Dominum. saith S. chrysostom, cum lepra, etc. The King went out of the Temple with a leprosy, and yet they did not cast him out of the City for the respect they bore to the Kingly diadem, but he still sat in his throne breaking again the law of God. What then? God being angry with the jews interrupted the Prophecy. So he. And again a little after, speaking in the person of God, Ego, saith he, quod mei muneris feci, etc., I have done my part (that is to say, I have strucken Ozias with leprosy) and you are afraid to cast him being unclean out of the City. You bear reverence to his Kingly dignity, violating the law of God, etc. I do therefore speak no longer to the Prophets, neither do I give any more the grace of the spirit, etc. Silet spiritus gratia, & non est ostensus Deus, eo quod sub impure illo non erat gratis; The grace of prophetical spirit was silent, or ceased, and God did not show himself, because that under that unclean man there was grace. Thus saith S. chrysostom upon occasion of these words of the Prophet Esay, Et factum est anno quo mortuus est Ozias Rex, vidi Dominum, etc. For whereas all the Prophets used to declare the time, and year of the King's reign when they prophesied, S. chrysostom noteth, that Esay here omitted that custom and did not speak of the life, and reign joathan, in whose time he had his vision, but of the death of King Ozias, during whose reign the spirit of prophecy had ceased for the causes before declared. 165 Well then hereby it appeareth that God was offended, not only because Ozias was not cast out of the City, but because he was suffered still to reign, Consedit in throno, saith the holy Father, legem Dei rursus transgrediens; He sat still his throne transgressing again the law of God, that is to say, as he had broken the law of God before in presuming to Sacrifice, and threatening the Priests: so also did he again transgress, and violate the same, in retaining his kingdom, being leprous; and because the same was permitted, and more respect borne to his Kingly dignity, then to the execution of God's law, therefore saith S. chrysostom, God punished the whole state, not permitting his Prophets to prophecy, as they were want. 166 Whereupon I infer, that seeing the express law of God ordained, that the cause of leprosy should be judged and determined wholly by the Priests, and that Ozias was subject to this law, it followeth, that as he was expelled out of the Temple by the Priests, and forced by their sentence to live in a house apart (though within the City) so ought he also to have been, by their sentence, cast out both of the City, and his Kingdom. And if we consider, but only that, which was done by the Priests in this case of Ozias, it cannot be denied, but that they had a judicial power over his person, seeing that they both commanded him to go out of the Temple before he was leprous, and afterwards thrust him out, yea and confined him to live in a house apart: for though the Scripture doth not express that this confining, and separation was ordained by them, yet it could not be otherwise, seeing that the law had ordained expressly, Levit. 13. Matth. 18. Mark 1. Luke 17. that every leprous man should be brought unto the Priest, and that Ad arbitrium eius separabitur, He shall be separated by his judgement, or arbittement, which our Saviour himself acknowledged, when he remitted the leprous (whom he cured) to the Priests. 167 Therefore I will conclude upon the premises, that forasmuch the law of God assigned a sovereignty in judgement to the high Priests, and their consistory, as well in temporal, as spiritual causes, and to that end honoured them with a particular, and most excellent privilege of infallibility in their doctrine, and judicial sentences (as I have h See before nu. 10. 11. 12. 13. etc. amply proved) and seeing that the Kings of the old Testament were not any way exempt from the law (as appeareth no less by divers reasons alleged by me before, i Num. 24.25. & 26. then by these two last examples of Athalia, k Num. 29. & 30. and Ozias l Num. 31.32.33. & seq. ) it followeth evidently, that they were not supreme heads of the Priests, but subject to them, and to their tribunal; and consequently, that if an Oath had been proposed by any of these Kings to his subjects, whereby they should have sworn, that he was free from all subjection, and temporal chastisement of the high Priest, this oath must needs have been repugnant to the law of God in the old Testament. Thus far I have thought good to lay down the words of my Supplement touching the law of God in the old Testament, etc. 168 To this authority of S. chrysostom, I did answer in my English Disputation of the oath long before Mr. Fitzherbert Reply come forth: And all the force of his argument taken from this authority seemeth to consist in those words of S. chrysostom, Consedit in throno legem. Dei ri●sus transgrediens, He sat in his throne transgressing again the law of God. From whence this man inferreth, that God was offended, not only because Ozias was not cast out of the City, but also because he was suffered still to reign: whereas this only can be gathered from those words, and these other, and you are afraid to cast him being unclean out of the City, you bear reverence to his Kingly dignity violating the law of God etc. I do therefore speak no longer to the Prophets etc. That God was offended and speak no longer to the Prophets, for that Ozias being a leper, and unclean was not cast out of the City, as it was ordained by the law, which also S. chrysostom in the next homily doth more plainly declare. 169 Ego vero, saith this holy Father, si unum quiddam adhuc addidero etc. But if I shall add yet one other thing, I will make an end of my speech. And what is this? That which not long ago from the beginning we did demand. What is the cruse that seeing in external things, and in prophecies all are went to set down the time, wherein the Kings did live, this Prophet Esay ommiting that, expresseth the time wherein King Ozias died, speaking in this manner: And it came to pass in the year, wherein King Ozias died. And yet he might have expressed the time of the King then reigning, as all Prophets usually did. But he did not so. For what cause did he not so? It was an ancient custom to expel a leprous out of the City, both to the end that those who lived in the City, might be in better health, and that the leprous should not give to men, prone to use reproachful words, an occasion of scoffing and derision, but that he abiding out of the City, might have solitariness in steed of a vail, or cover against reproachful calamity. And this aught this King to have suffered after his leprosy, but he did not suffer it, those that were in the City reverencing him for his sovereignty, but he remained at his house secretly. This (to wit, that he remained at his house secretly, and went not forth of the City) provoked GOD to wrath, this hindered the prophecy etc. Thus saith S. chrysostom: whereby it is manifest, that S. chrysostom doth not affirm, that God was offended, because Ozias was not thrust out of his kingdom, or deprived of his right to reign, but because he lived secretly at his house in the City, and did not departed out of the City, according as the law in Leviticus did ordain. 170 Wherefore the meaning of those words of S. chrysostom, He sat in his throne breaking again the law of God, is made more plain by these later words, which I did now relate. For as before he being no Priest trangressed the law of God by presuming to offer Sacrifice upon the Altar of incense contrary to the law, so now again he being for his former offence stricken by GOD with leprosy transgressed the law by presuming to remain in the City, which the law did forbid. Allo Mr. Fitzherbert may perchance use some cunning translating those words of S. chrysostom, Sedebat to thr●●● etc. He sat still in his throne breaking again the law of God, as though Ozias had offended again by, remaining still in his throne, or, which I take for all one, by continuing still to reign, and by keeping still his Royal dignity, and authority, or right to reign, and not resigning it over wholly and fully to his son joathan. Wherefore taking those words, He sat still in his throne, in this sense, that word [still] may be equivocal, and of purpose thrust in by Mr. Fitzherbert to signify, that he offended for keeping still his Royal authority, and right to reign, whereas the words of S. chrysostom only are, that he sat in his throne, breaking again the law of God, not for that he broke again the law of God, because he sat in his throne, or, which I take for all one, kept still his Royal authority, and right to reign although his son joathan did govern the kingdom in his name and by his authority, and as his Deputy, Lieutenant, or Viceroy, but for that he departed not our of the City, as S. chrysostom himself expressly declareth. But if Mr. Fitzherbert will have S. chrysostom to take that word [throne] for the material Royal seat, or chair of estate, which remained in the City, for so also the Latin word may be Englished, than this sense is in effect all one with the first, which I contended to be Chrysostom's meaning, to wit, that Ozias transgressed the law again for remaining in the City: for leprosy did not debar him by the law from sitting in a chair of estate out of the City, or from any jot of his Kingly right, power, or authority, as I showed before. 171 But lastly it is worth the noting to observe, how well, forsooth, Mr. Fitzherbert agreeth with Card. Bellarmine in urging this example of King Ozias. For Card. Bellarmine contendeth, that Ozias was thrust out both of the City, and also of his kingdom; but this man laboureth to prove, that according to S. chrysostom, he was neither cast out of his kingdom, nor out of the City. Others with josephus affirm, that he lived in deed out of the City, but withal that he still reigned, or remained King, although joathan in his name and authority, or as his Deputy, Lieutenant, or Viceroy administered the kingdom. Nevertheless Abulensis, Abulens. q. 29 in Cap. 25. Exodi. although he greatly commendeth josephus, as a most skilful Historiographer of the jews, of whom also he writeth, m Q 9 in cap. 15. lib. 4. Reg. that it is likely he know all the particular facts of those Kings, yet he leaveth the opinion of josephus in this point: Sometimes, saith Abulensis, n Q. 10 in cap 13. ●euit the plague of leprosy was perpetual, and then the leper remained until his. death out of the Camp separated from the rest, and this was, unless perchance he was a man of great excellency, as the King, who if he fell into leprosy, did not go out of the camp, but remained therein, but he was in a certain separate house, as we read 4. Reg. 15. Of King Ozias, who there is called Azarias; for he fell into leprosy being stiken by GOD in the forehead, because he would burn incense to our Lord as Priests, where it is said, And our Lord struck the King, and he was a leper until the day of his death, and he dwelled in a free house apart, but joathan the King's son governed the Palace and judged the people of the Land. But from hence it cannot be convinced, that this free house a part was in the City, but rather apart out of the City, and therefore the opinion of josephus seemeth to be more agreeable to the words of holy Scripture Num. 5. And our Lord spoke to Moses' saying, Command the children of Israel, that they cast out of the camp every leper. 172 Therefore, I will conclude upon the premises, clean contrary to Mr. fitzherbert's inference, that for as much as the law of GOD assigned no Sovereignty in judgement to the High Priests, and their consistory in temporal causes, but only in mere spiritual, as was to declare the law of God, and to judge one to be infected, or not infected with leprosy according to the signs and tokens prescribed by the law, and to declare them that were infected, to be separated and cast out of the camp according to the Prescript of the law, which is the plain meaning of those words, [& ad arbitrium illius separabitur, and he shall be separated at his arbitrement, or judgement] that is, if the Priest do declare or judge him a leper, he shall be separated, and cast out of the camp, and seeing that the executing of the law concerning temporal punishments, and the separating of lepers by force and temporal constraint, did not belong to the Priests, but to the supreme temporal authority, which did reside in the Kings, and not in the Priests who were subject to the Kings in temporals, and might be punished by them with temporal punishments, as I have amply proved in these two Sections, and the aforesaid words Num. 5. Command the children of Israel, [he doth not say, command the Priests although then the Israelites had no King, neither did the supreme temporal authority reside in the Priests but rather in the people] that they cast out of the Camp every leper: it followeth evidently, that the Priests were not the supreme heads of the Kings in temporals, nor Kings therein subject to them, and their tribunal, nor to be punished by them with temporal punishments, but contrariwise; and consequently that if an Oath had been proposed by any of these Kings to his subjects, whereby they should have sworn, that he was free from all subjection in temporals, and from all temporal chastisement of the high Priest by way of temporal constraint [I say by way of temporal constraint, and putting in execution the law of God wherein temporal punishment were ordained, and not by way only of declaring the law of God, which, as it have sufficiently proved, was a spiritual, and not a temporal action] the said Oath must needs have been conform, and not repugnant to the law of God in the old Testament. And thus much concerning the arguments taken from the old Testament. SECT. III. Wherein all M. fitzherbert's arguments taken from the new Testament are examined: and first his comparison between the old law, and the new, the figure and the verity is proved to make against himself: 2. Those words of our Saviour whatsoever thou shalt lose etc. And feed my sheep are declared, and the arguments drawn from thence, and from the nature of a well instituted commonwealth are satisfied, and D. Schulckenius Reply proved to be fraudulent, and insufficient. 3. the authority of the Apostle 1. Cor. 10. affirming that he and the rest were ready to revenge all disobedience, is answered, Mr. fitzherbert's fraud in alleging the authority of S. Austin is plainly discovered, and the conclusion of his Chapter showed to be both false, and fraudulent. NOw from: the old Testament Mr. Fitzherbert descendeth to the new, and upon a false supposal as I have already convinced, to wit, that he hath effectually proved, that the Priesthood of the old Testament had a supreme and sovereign authority to create, punish, and depose Kings, he laboureth in vain, from the number 25 to 32. to prove, that the like authority must needs be acknowledged in the Priesthood of the new law, not for that he think th', that we are now bound to retain the ceremonial or judicial part thereof, but to deduce, as he saith, a Num. 25. pag 83. a potent argument from thence, as from the figure to the verity, to prove that the like authority must needs be acknowledged in the Priesthood, and especially in the chief Priest in the law of Christ. And for proof hereof he setteth down two positions, as the only grounds of this his potent argument. 2 The first is, that the old law, and Testament being but a figure, b Num. 26. pag 84. and a shadow of the new, was no less inferior there to in authority, dignity, and perfection, than Moses to Christ, the dead, and kill letter to the quickening spirit, or the Priesthood of Aaron to the Priesthood of Melchisedech, which was Christ's Priesthood, he should rather have said, which prefigured the excellency of Christ's Priesthood. c See S. Thomas and the Schoolmen. 3. part. q. 22. are 6. This position, to wit, Hebr. 10. that the old Testament was a figure and shadow, and not inferior to the new he proveth by the authority of S. Augustine, d In Psal. 119. who affirmeth, that vetus Testamentum promissiones habet terrenas etc. The old Testament hath earthly promises, an earthly Palestine, an earthly Jerusalem, an earthly salvation, to wit, conquest of enemies, abundance of children, fertility of soil, and plenty of fruits; all these things are earthly promises, and it is to be understood spiritually in figure, how the earthly Jerusalem was a shadow of the heavenly Jerusalem, and the earthly kingdom of the heavenly kingdom. So S. Austin.; and thereupon concludeth, that if the old Testament was a shadow of the new, non mirum quia ibi tenebrae, it is no marvel though there were darkness there, pinguior●s enim umbrae sunt tenebrae, for thicker shadows are darkness. Thus argueth S. Augustine proving the imperfection of the old law in respect of the new, which the Apostle also proveth amply in the Epistle to the Hebrews, Hebr. 7. saying, that the old law was abolished propter infirmitatem eius, & inutilitatem, for the infirmity, and inutilitie of it. Nihil enim ad perfectum adduxit lex, for the law brought nothing to perfection. 3 His second position is, e nu. 26.28. that the defects of the old law, and Synagogue of the jews can not serve for a precedent to the new law, and the Church of Christ, and therefore though the Kings in the old Testament should have had authority over Priests, yet it would not follow, that Christian Kings should have the like, for that the defects and imperfections of the Synagogue, (which S. Austin calleth terrenum regnum, an earthly kingdom) were not to be transferred to the Church of Christ, which is called every where in the Scripture Regnum Caelorum, the kingdom of heaven, though on the other side the consequent must needs be good, that what excellency, dignity or perfection soever was in the Synagogue, the same must needs be far more eminent and excellent in the Church of Christ, as the Apostle taught expressly, 2. Cor. 3. arguing thus: Si ministratio damnationis etc. If the ministration of death with letters figured in stones was in glory, that the children of Israel could not behold the face of Moses for the glory of his countenance, which is evacuated; how shall not the ministration of the spirit be more in glory? For if the ministration of damnation be in glory, much more the ministery of justice aboundeth in glory. Thus argueth S. Paul, proving à fortiori the supereminent dignity and glory of Christ's law, by the great and eminent glory of the Mosaical law; Hebr. 6.7.8. & 9 whereto tendeth also his argument to the Hebrews concerning the imperfection and infirmity of the levitical Priesthood, in regard of the most excellent and high perfection of the Priesthood of Christ. 4 Whereupon it followeth evidently, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, f nu. 29. 30 31. 32. that seeing the Priesthood of the old Testament had such a supreme and sovereign authority to create, anoint, punish and depose Kings (as appeareth in the former examples) the Priesthood in the new Testament can not have less power and authority, for it can not be with reason imagined, that God having taken upon him our humanity, and honoured the same with a peculiar and mere excellent Priesthood then that of Aaron, yea ordained a visible succession of Pastors and Priests for the government of his Church to continue (as the Apostle witnesseth) g 1. Cor. 11. Ephes. 4. Matth. 28. Luk. 10. Matth. 18. Heb. 13. until the end of the world, commanding also, that they should be heard and obeyed as himself; it were, I say against reason to think, that he would give less honour and privilege to these his own substitute in his own kingdom, than he gave to the successors of Aaron in the old law, whereby the shadow would be more worthy and perfect, than the body, the figure then the verity, the levitical or aaronical Priesthood, than the Priesthood of Christ, and finally the jewish Synagogue than Christ's own spouse, and mystical body, which is his Church, of the glory & majesty whereof the Prophet I say foretold speaking in the person of God thus, Ponam te, saith he, in superbiam seculorum, etc. Isay 60. I will place thee as the pride of all worlds or ages, a joy to generation and generation, and thou shalt suck the milk of nations, and shalt be fed with the paps of Kings; and the children of those who have humbled thee, shall come crouching to thee, and shall adore the footsteps of thy feet, and thy gates shall be open continually, and they shall not be shut day nor night, that the strength of all nations, and their Kings may be brought unto thee. For the Nation and the Kingdom, which shall not serve thee shall perish, etc. 5 Thus promised almighty God by his Prophet, to raise and advance the Church of Christ above the power of all Nations, and kingdoms, insomuch that he threatened ruin and destruction unto them, Matth. 18. if they did not serve her; whereby it may easily be judged, what an excellent, and eminent power our Saviour gave to S. Peter and his Successors, when he not only promised to build his Church upon him, as upon a rock, and that the gates of hell should not prevail against it, but also gave him such ample authority to bind and lose, that whatsoever he should bind, or lose on earth, should be bound and loosed in heaven, yea and finally made him supreme Pastor of his flock, commanding him thrice to feed his sheep, and lambs, that is to say, to govern those, that should any way pertain to his fold the Catholic Church. Thus said I in my Supplement. Whereby it may appear, that the Pope's power to chastise Princes temporally, is most conform to the law of God, not only in the old Testament, but also in the new, according to Saint Paul's argument a fortiori before mentioned, drawn from the figure to the verity. And therefore now to declare how I proved the same further by the new law, etc. Thus argeth Mr. Fitzherbert. 6 Mark now, good Reader, what a trim disourse this man hath made agains himself, and what grounds he hath laid to overthrow his own argument he groundeth thereon. For first I do willingly grant his first position, to wit, that the old Testament was a figure of the new, the earthly Jerusalem a shadow of the heavenly Jerusalem, and the earthly kingdom of the jews a figure of the heavenly and spiritual kingdom of Christ the eminent glory of the Mosaical law a figure of the supereminent dignity and glory of the law of Christ, the Priesthood in the old law far inferior in authority, excellency, and perfection to the Priesthood in the new law, yea and that all things for the most part chanced to the jews in figure, for that nihil as perfectum adduxit lex, The law brought nothing to perfection. But secondly, concerning his second position, it followeth evidently from hence, that not only the defects of the old law cannot serve for a precedent to the new law, and the Church of Christ, but also that all things in the old law being compared to the law of Christ were defective, and imperfect, for that the law brought nothing to perfection, and that all the authority, excellency, and perfection of the old law was a figure and shadow of the authority, excellency, and perfection of the law of Christ. 7 Whereupon it followeth evidently, that although we should suppose only for Disputation sake, because the contrary we have sufficiently proved before, that the Priesthood of the old Testament had a supreme, and sovereign authority to create, anoint, punish, or depose Kings yet we cannot from thence, as from the figure to prove the verity, conclude, that therefore the Priesthood in the new Testament must have the same authority, for this were not to fulfil the figure, as Cardinal Bellarmine before affirmed, but that it must have a far more noble and excellent authority over Princes to create, anoint, punish, and depose Kings in another more excellent degree: to wit, that considering the promises of the old law were earthly, and of the new law heavenly, the kingdom of the jews was temporal, and the kingdom or Church of Christ eternal and spiritual, from hence as from the figure to the verity we may deduce a good argument to prove, that as the Priests of the old law had authority to cleanse corporal uncleanness, which did bar men from entering the earthly tabernacle made by the hands of men, so the Priests of the new law have authority to cleanse the soul of spiritual uncleanness, which doth bar men from entering the Celestial tabernacle created by God alone, and as the Priests the old law had authority, according to my adversaries false Doctrine, to create, anoint, punish, and depose earthly Kings, so the Priests of the new law have authority to create, anoint, punish, and depose spiritual Kings, to create, institute, and make them heirs to the kingdom of heaven by the Sacrament of Baptism, to anoint them with the oil of grace by the sacrament of Confirmation, to punish them with spiritual and Ecclesiastical Censures, to depose, or exclude them in some sort from the kingdom of heaven by denying them sacramental absolution. 8 In this manner should Mr. Fitzherbert have argued from the figure to the verity, by which we can only prove, that the Priests of the new law can create, anoint, punish, and depose Kings in a more higher, Bell. lib. 1. de Missa cap. 7. and not in the same degree; for as Cardinal Bellarmine well observed, to fulfil the figure is not to do that very thing which the law prescribeth to be done, but to put in place thereof some thing more excellent, which to signify that figure did go before, as Christ did not fulfil the figure of Circumcision, when he was circumcised himself, but when he ordained Baptism in place thereof; and so the Priests of the new law do not fulfil the figure of the levitical Priesthood by creating, anointing, punishing, and deposing earthly Kings in the same material manner, as the Priests of Levi did, but when they create, anoint, punish, and depose spiritual Kings, to wit, Christians, who by Baptism are made heirs to the kingdom of heaven, with spiritual creation, unction, chastisement, and deposition, as I have declared before. And by this the Reader may clearly perceive, that Mr. Fitzherbert hath not sufficiently proved, either that the Priests of the old Testament had authority to create, depose, or punish temporally their Kings by way of temporal constraint, (for no man maketh doubt, but that the Priests both of the old, and new law have authority to anoint Kings, it being only a sacred, and religious ceremony, and to punish temporally by way of command, and by declaring the law of GOD, as to enjoin fastings, almsdeeds, and other corporal afflictions, etc. and to declare that this, or that King shall be deposed, if GOD shall so reveal, because all these are mere spiritual actions) or else, that albeit we should grant as my Adversaries untruly suppose, that the Priests of the old law had the aforesaid authority, to create, depose and punish Kings temporally, yet therefore from thence any probable, and much less a potent argument, as this man pretendeth, can be drawn, as from the figure to the verity, to prove, that the Priests of the new law must have authority to do the same things, but only to do things more excellent, and of an higher degree, and order, as the body is more excellent, and more perfect than the shadow, the verity than the figure, Christ then Moses, the new Law then the old, heavenly kingdoms then earthly, and Ecclesiastical or spiritual Censures are of another nature, order, and degree then temporal or civil punishments. 9 Now Mr. Fitzherbert goeth on to prove also out of the new Testament, that the Priests of the new law, especially the chief Pastor of the Church of Christ, have authority to punish Princes not only with spiritual, but also with temporal, and corporal punishments. And therefore now to declare, saith he, g nu. 32. p. 87. how I proved the same further by the new law, it is to be understood, Psal. 77. Isa. 44. Psal. 2. Matth. 2. Apoc. 19 Aug. in joan. Bel. l. 1. de Rom. Pont c. 12. ad 6. object. that I urged h Suppl. ubi supra nu. 59 to that end the commission given by our Saviour to St. Peter not only to bind, and lose, but also to feed his sheep, showing by many texts of Scripture, as also by the authority of S. Augustine that Pascere, to feed, is taken for Regere▪ to govern, whereupon I drew certain necessary consequents in those words, etc. 10 But concerning the authority given by Christ our Saviour to S. Peter to bind and lose, or, which, even according to Card. Bellarmine's doctrine, is all one in substance, with to feed his sheep (for that by those words, I will give thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt bind, etc. was only promised to S. Peter, saith Cardinal Bellarmine, not given the power to bind, and lose, and the keys of the kingdom, which keys he as the principal, and ordinary Perfect, Prelate, or Governor then only received when he heard, Pasce oves meas, Feed my sheep) I answer first, that not only S. Peter, but also all the Apostles, received the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and power to bind, and lose, and to feed the sheep of Christ's flock, seeing that, as Christ said to Saint Peter whatsoever thou shalt bind, etc. so he said to the rest of the Apostles, what things soever you shall bind, etc. albeit I will not deny, that Saint Peter was the first of the Apostles, but in what consisteth this priority, principality, primacy, or superiority of S. Peter over the rest of the Apostles, as likewise of the Pope over all other Patriarches, Primates, Archbishops, and Bishops of Christ's Church, there is yet a great controversy betwixt the Divines of Rome, and of Paris, and perchance hereafter I shall have occasion to treat thereof more at large. But that which for this present I intent to affirm is this▪ that considering in those words of our Saviour Tibi dabo claves, etc. I will give thee the keys, etc. Saint Peter represented the whole Church, and not only to him, but also to the rest of the Apostles, and to the whole Church and Priesthood, which Saint Peter did represent, were promised the keys, and power to bind and lose, as the holy Fathers, and ancient Divines do commonly expound, i As (to omit Origen tract. 1. in Matth. 16. Euseb. Emis.. hom in Natali S. Petri. Theophylac. in 1. Mat. 16.) S. Ambr. in psa. 38. & lib. 1. de Paenit. c. 2. Hieron. lib. 1. contra jovinian. Aug. troth. 50. & 124. in joan. & tract. 10. in Epi. joan. & in psal. 108. Leo serm. 3. in Anniu. assumpt. Fulgentius de fide ad Petr. & l. 1. de remis. pec. c. 24. Beda, & Ansel. in Mat. 16. Euthym. c. 33. in Matth. Haymo hom. in fest. Petri, & Pauli. Hugo de S. vic. l. 1. de Sacram. c. 26. & alibi. Durand. in 4. dist. 18. q. 2. ●yra in Mat. 16 Walden. tom. 2. doct. fid. c. 138. Cusanus. l. 2. de Concord. Cat. c. 13. & 34. and commonly all the ancient Doctors of Paris. if from the power to bind and lose promised to Saint Peter it doth necessarily follow, that S. Peter, and his Successors have authority to create, depose, and punish Princes temporally, it doth likewise follow, that the rest of the Apostles, and their Successors have the same authority over Kings and Princes, who are subject to them spiritually. 11 Secondly, those words of our Saviour, whatsoever thou shalt bind, etc. are to be understood, as I answered in my Apology nu. 36. of spiritual, not temporal bindings, and loosings, to absolve from sins, not from debts, to unloose the bonds of the soul, not of the body, to open, or shut the gates of the kingdom of heaven, not of earthly kingdoms, to give, or take away spiritual goods, graces, and benefits, not temporal goods, lands, kingdoms, or lives. When it was said to S. Peter, saith S. Augustine, I will give thee the keys, and whatsoever thou shalt bind, etc. he signified the universal Church. The rock is not from Peter, but Peter from the rock: upon this rock, which thou hast confessed, Aug. trac. 124. in joan. I will build my Church. The Church therefore, which is founded on Christ, receiveth from Christ the keys of the kingdom of heaven, that is power to bind, and lose sins. And again beneath saith S. Augustine, Peter the first of the Apostles received the keys of the kingdom of heaven to bind, and lose sins. So also S. Ambrose, S. chrysostom, S. Fulgentius, Ambr. lib. 1. de paenit. c. 2. Chrysost. & Theoph. in Mat. 16. Fulgent. & Eus. Emiss. ubi supra. Bernard. l. 2. c. 6 the considerate. Hug. Vict. tom. 2. serm. 64. Iust. Monast. Laurent. Iust. de casto connub. verbi, & animae. c. 10. Eusebius Emissen. Theophylact, S. Bernard, Hugo de S. Victore, Laurentius justinanus, and infinite others understand those words of our Saviour of binding, and losing souls, and sins. Neither is there any one of the ancient Fathers, or Doctors before Pope Gregory the seventh, that wrested them to the giving, or taking away from any man whatsoever according to their deserts, Empires, Kingdoms, Princedoms, Dukedoms, Earldoms, and the possessions of all men; Quia si potestis, saith he, k In the Excommunication of Henry the 4. in the eight Roman Council held by him in the year 1080. jansenius c. 148. Concord. Theophy. in c. 21. joan. Basil. in l. de vita solitar. c. 23. in caelo ligare, & solvere, potestis in terra, Imperia, Regna, Principatus, Ducatus, Marchias, Comitatus, & omnium hominum possessiones pro meritis tollere unicuique, & concedere. 12 I grant likewise▪ that Pascere, to feed is taken also for Regere, to govern, but not as a King governeth his kingdom, but as a Shepherd governeth his flock, as well observeth jansenius upon this place of S. john. Christ, saith Theophylact, doth not make Peter a Lord, nor a King, nor a Prince, but commandeth him to be a Shepherd. Wherefore, as those words, whatsoever thou shalt bind, etc. are to be understood of spiritual, not temporal bindings, and loosings, and were spoken not only to Saint Peter, but also to the rest of the Apostles, so also these words, Feed my sheep, are to be understood of spiritual feeding, or government, and do belong not only to S. Peter, but also to the rest of the Apostles, whom S. Peter did represent. Atque hoc ab ipso Christo docemur, etc. saith S. Basill, And this we are taught by Christ himself, who appointed Peter the Pastor of his Church after him. For Peter, saith he, dost thou love me more than these? Feed my sheep: and consequently he giveth to all Pastors, and Doctors the same power, whereof this is a sign, that all do equally bind, and lose, after that manner as he. Feed my sheep, saith S. Ambrose, which sheep, and which flock, Amb. de dignit. sacerd. c. 2. not only blessed Peter did then take to his charge, but he did take charge of them with us, and all we took charge of them with him. For not without cause, Aug. de agone Christiano c. 30. saith S. Augustine, among all the Apostles Peter sustained the person of this Catholic Church; for to this Church the keys of the kingdom of heaven were given, when they were given to Peter, and when it is said to him, it is said to all, Dost thou love, Feed my sheep. Let Bishops, and Preachers of the word hear, saith Theophylact, what is commended to them, Theoph. in c. 21. joan. Bell. lib. 2. de Rom. Pont. c. 12. in fine. Edit. Ingolstad. anno 1580. Feed saith Christ, my sheep, etc. Certain things, saith Cardinal Bellarmine, are said to Peter in regard of the Pastoral office, which therefore are understood to be said to all Pastors, as Feed my sheep, and confirm thy brethren, and whatsoever thou shalt bind, etc. But of this my second answer more beneath, l nu. 21. & seq. where you shall see in what fraudulent manner D. Schulckenius replieth to the same. 13 Now you shall see, what necessary consequents Mr. Fitzherbert hath drawn from those words of our Saviour, spoken to S. Peter, Whatsoever thou shalt bind etc. and Feed my sheep. For as much, saith he, m nu. 33. p 87 Suppl. nu. 61. at there can be no good government of men without chastisement (when just occasion requireth) it followeth that Christ giving the government of his Church to S. Peter (and so consequently to his Successors) gave them also power to chastise, and punish such as should deserve it; Whereupon it followeth, that seeing all Christian Princes are sheep of Christ's fold, and to be governed and guided by their supreme Pastor, they cannot exempt themselves from his just chastisement, when their own demerits, and the public good of the Church shall require it. And this, I say, not only of spiritual, but also of temporal and corporal correction. 14 But first, I willingly grant, that Christ giving the government of his Church to S. Peter, and also to the rest of his Apostles (and also consequently to their Successors) gave them also power to chastise and punish all those that are sheep of Christ's fold, and consequently also all Christian Princes, when their demerits, and the public good of the Church shall require it. But I utterly deny, that this chastisement is to be understood, as Mr. Fitzherbert saith, not only of spiritual, but also of temporal and corporal correction. For as Christ our Saviour hath instituted his Church a spiritual, and not a temporal Commmon-wealth, and consequently granted her power to give only spiritual goods, graces and benefits, not temporal goods, lands or kingdoms, so also the spiritual Pastors or Governors thereof have authority by the institution of Christ to chastise and punish spiritually, not temporally, or, which is all one to inflict spiritual, not temporal punishments, and to deprive their spiritual sheep, and subjects of those spiritual goods, which they have received from the Church, and by being Christians, and not of those temporal goods, which they had before they became Christians, and which they receive not from the Church, but from the temporal kingdom, or Commonwealth. And therefore small credit is to be given to Mr. Fitzherbert's bare, I say, unless he could more sufficiently prove and make good what he saith. 15 Mark now secondly, how well he confirmeth this his, I say; For if bad Princes, saith he, could not be temporally chastised by their Pastor, when they contemn the spiritual rod of Ecclesiastical Censures (as wicked Princes commonly do) Christ had not sufficiently provided for the government of the Church. But this consequence, which is so barely, and without any proof at all affirmed by him, I utterly deny. For to the good government of a spiritual kingdom or Commonwealth, as is the Church of Christ, 'tis sufficient for the Pastors and Governors thereof to have authority to punish spiritually, not temporally, or to inflict spiritual, no● temporal punishments; as also to the good government of temporal kingdoms or Commonwealths it is sufficient, that their Kings, Princes and other Governors have authority to punish temporally, or to inflict temporal, not spiritual punishments. But of this consequence more beneath, m nu. 21. & seq. for in effect it is all one with Card. Bellarmine's second reason, which D. Schulckenius, as you shall see, laboureth in vain to make good, against the answer, which in my Apology I brought thereunto. 16 But this may yet be more evident, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, if we consider, that the greatest inconvenience and harm that can happen to the Church of God, groweth commonly by the negligence, opposition, rebellion or apostasy of Christian Princes; who so long as they remain obedient and dutiful to the Church, are (as the Prophet calleth them) her Nutritij, that is to say, Isay. 59 her Foster-fathers', or, as it were, her Arms, not only to defend her against all foreign enemies, but also to retain all her subjects in their due obedience, executing her laws and decrees, and confirming the same with her own constitutions; and therefore we see that in a Christian Country, where the Prince is Catholic, if any subject do contemn or resist an Excommunication, or other Censure of the Church, he is even by the temporal and public laws, and by the authority of the Prince forced presently to do his duty, or else is severely punished; so that while the Prince remaineth obedient to the Church there is no doubt or danger of disobedience in his subjects, or of any other great inconvenience to ensue on their parts. But if he become disobedient himself, and fall into heresy, Schism or Apostasy, what remedy hath the Church against him by a bare Ecclesiastical Censure? doth he not contemn it? and by his authority and example, draw his subjects for the most part to a general revolt from the Church? shall we then say, that Christ left not to his Church sufficient authority to remedy this? 17 If a Christian Prince become disobedient to the Pastors of the Church, and shall contemn all Ecclesiastical Censures, fearing not to be declared, as a Heathen and Publican, and to be delivered over to Satan by Excommunication, which is a greater punishment, saith S. Augustine, then to be stricken with the sword, to be consumed by fire, Augustin. lib. 1 contra Aduersar. leg. & prophet. cap. 17. or to be exposed to the devouring of wild beasts, the Church hath no other punishment to inflict upon him; and therefore in this case she, having performed her office, and inflicted her last punishment, hath no other remedy, then to leave him to the judgement and punishment of almighty God, who will ever protect his Church, and to fly to prayer, fasting, almsdeeds, patience and such kind of spiritual armour or weapons, which are proper, saith the Gloss, n ad Ephes. 4. to the soldiers of Christ; neither must she therefore usurp temporal and civil weapons, or armour (as are the depriving of temporal and corporal goods) which do not belong to spiritual Pastors, but to temporal Princes, Kingdoms and Commonwealth▪ Thus I answered in my Apology: o nu. 184. and the reason hereof I gave a little before; for that Excommunication, or such like spiritual Censure, is the last and only punishment which the Ecclesiastical or spiritual power, by the institution of Christ, can inflict, joan. Paris. de potest. Reg. & Pap. cap. 14. Almain. in lib. de dominio nat. ciu. & Eccles. conclus. 2. Bell. lib. 2. de Concil. cap. 19 ad secundum. as joannes Parisiensis, jacobus Almain, and very many Doctors, saith Almain, do affirm. 18 And what if a wicked Pope shall afflict the Church, and seek to overthrow the spiritual good thereof, and to draw souls into perdition, what authority, think you, hath Christ our Saviour, the spouse, Protector and King of the Church, according to Card. Bellarmine's doctrine, left to his Church to remedy this? I answer, saith he, that it is no marvel that the Church in this case remaineth without any effectual human remedy seeing that her safety doth not chief rely upon the industry of m●n, but upon the protection of God, who is her King. Therefore although the Church hath not power to depose the Pope, yet she may and aught to pray humbly to God, that he will bring some remedy. And it is certain, that God will have a care of her safety, who will either convert such a Pope, or else take him out of the way, before he destroy the Church. And yet against this answer, which may in like manner be applied to wicked Princes persecuting the Church, and contemning Ecclesiastical Censures, Mr. Fitzherbert dare not conclude, that therefore Christ our Saviour hath not sufficiently provided for the government of his Church. 19 But what think you, doth D. Schulckenius reply to that which I answered, that if wicked Princes shall contemn all Ecclesiastical censures, the Church, having used her last punishment, cannot proceed against them by inflicting temporal punishments? Even as he usually doth throughout his whole book, by cunningly shifting of the difficulty, and flying from one argument to an other, and in the end to his accustomed railing, Schulcken. pag. 359. ad nu. 184. and slanderous speeches. I answer, saith he; The temerity of this man, who will have himself to be accounted a Catholic, is wonderful. A general Council of the Christian world saith, that Princes favouring heretics, and contemning Excommunication, are to be deprived of their dominions by the Sea Apostolic: and one man doth freely contradict and affirm, that the Church hath no other thing to do, but hath performed her office, after she hath thrown the dart of Excommunication. To whom ought Catholic men give credit, whether to the universal Church giving testimony of her authority received from God, unto one, I know not whom, who lying hid under another man's name lasheth out words? 20 But first to return him back his bitter invective, truly I cannot but admire the fraudulent, and uncharitable dealing of this Doctor, who would have himself to be accounted so good, sincere, and zealous a Catholic, and yet lieth lurking, and schulking under another man's name, of purpose as it seemeth, to lash out more freely contumelious words, which in his own name he would blush to utter: for otherwise he needed not to disguise himself for fear of incurring the displeasure of Princes, for the doctrine he teacheth so prejudicial to their temporal Sovereignty, which also he will needs have, to be, forsooth, an undoubted point of Catholic faith; both for that he being a man of so high a rank, and place, and living out of their dominions, and subjection, can by their indignation taken against him receive but little harm, and also for that he teacheth here little or nothing in prejudice of their Sovereign authority, which he did not long before in his own shape, and name, without putting on any mask, or vizard in very plain words maintain: But in what an exorbitant manner the Court of Rome doth proceed against those Catholics, who, for desire to know the truth in matters of greatest moment, speak, or write any thing (be it with never so great submission) which seemeth in their opinion to derogate from that authority, which some Popes of late years have claimed as due to them, although it is, and ever hath been contradicted by learned Catholics, it is too too manifest, and their proceed against me, and my books, in commanding me under pain of Censures to purge myself forthwith, and yet giving me no notice of any crime, which I have committed, or any bad doctrine, which I have taught, albeit I have oftentimes with great instance desired to know the same, protesting to purge, and recall whatsoever I ought to purge, and recall, doth sufficiently confirm the same. But now secondly to the matter, from whence the virulent speeches of this Doctor hath caused me to make this digression. 21 Card. Bellarmine in his Controversies laboured to prove from the nature of every perfect, and well instituted Commonwealth, Bell. lib. 5. de Rom. Pont. cap. 7. which ought to have all sufficient, and necessary authority to the attaining of her end, that the Church of Christ must have authority to use, and dispose of temporals, and consequently to inflict temporal punishments, and to depose temporal Princes, for that this authority is necessary to her spiritual end, which is the salvation of souls, because otherwise wicked Princes might without punishment nourish heretics, and overthrow Religion. To this argument I answered in my Apology, Apolog. 176. & seq. granting to Card. Bellarmine, that every perfect, and well instituted Commonwealth ought to have always sufficient authority, for as much as concerneth the authority itself, to the attaining of her end, although she hath not always sufficient power▪ force, means, or ability actually to obtain the same, and to remove all impediments, which may hinder the same. And so the Church of Christ, being a perfect, and well instituted spiritual Commonwealth, hath all sufficient spiritual authority, forasmuch as concerneth the authority itself, to the attaining of her spiritual and, which is the saving of souls albeit she hath not always sufficient power, means, or ability actually to bring all men to salvation, & to take away all the lets, that may hinder the obtaining thereof. But withal I denied, that the authority to use, and dispose of temporal things, or to inflict temporal punishments is necessary in spiritual Pastors to the saving of souls, but that the authority to use, and dispose of spiritual things, and to inflict spiritual Censures, or punishments is sufficient in spiritual Pastors to bring souls to salvation, forasmuch as concerneth the authority, and punishment themselves. 22 Neither doth it therefore follow, as Card. Bellarmine pretended to conclude, that if the Church hath not authority to use and dispose of temporals, and consequently to depose temporal Princes, wicked Princes might without punishment nourish heretics, and overthrow religion. For the Church by her spiritual authority may punish them grievously with Ecclesiastical Censures, which punishments are so great and dreadful, that of themselves they are able to terrify any Christian Prince, and to withdraw him from evil. But if some Christian Prince, for want of due consideration be not terrified with Ecclesiastical Censures, the spiritual authority of the Church cannot inflict upon him any temporal, or civil punishment, for that the only and last punishment, which the Church, or, which is all one, the spiritual Pastors thereof by the institution of Christ can inflict, is Excommunication, or some such like spiritual Censure or punishment. Thus I answered in my Apology. 23 Now D. Schulckenius to confute this my answer, flieth from Card. Bellarmine's reason grounded upon the nature of every perfect, and well instituted Commonwealth, which reason I took upon me in that place to confute, to the Decree of the Council of Lateran, which is his common scar crow. For when he cannot confute the answer, which I give to any reason, or authority brought by Card. Bellarmine, to prove the Pope's power to depose Princes, than his custom is to fly from that reason, or authority to the Decree of the Council of Lateran, as though that only Decree of the Council of Lateran, of which Card. Bellarmine in his Controversies made no account at all, were now a sufficient proof to make good all his other reasons and authorities: which Decree nevertheless he expoundeth according to his private spirit, contrary to the words and true meaning of the same Council: and in stead of the Lateran Council, which I do not impugn, he would thrust upon Catholics his own opinion, which he violently wresteth from the words of the Council. 24 For as I have often told him, I am a true and sincere Catholic, yea and a far truer, than he himself is, if he build his Catholic faith upon such weak, and fallible grounds, which some Catholics understand in one sense, and some in another: it being well known to all learned Catholics, that the Catholic faith, which is infallible, cannot be built upon uncertain, and fallible grounds, and which are in controversy among Catholics, but upon undoubted grounds, and so acknowledged by all true and learned Catholics. So likewise I have often told him, that I do give all dutiful honour and respect to all the Decrees of any approved Council either touching faith, or manners, and I do reverence every one of them in their due place and order, but every exposition, which either Card. Bellarmine, or any other private Doctor, who may both deceive, and be deceived, maketh of any Decree of the Council of Lateran, or of any other Council, especially when other Doctors expound that Decree otherwise. I do not account to be any good ground, or rule of a true Catholic faith. And therefore it is not true, that I do freely contradict the Decree of the Council of Lateran, but I do freely contradict his private exposition of the Decree of that Council, it being contrary to the true sense and meaning of the words thereof, and no sufficient proof to confirm his new invented Catholic faith touching the Pope's power to depose Princes, as I will at large make plain beneath p Chap. 9 & seq. 25 Secondly, it is also untrue, that I only am the man, who denieth the spiritual Pastors of the Church, to have authority by the institution of Christ to inflict temporal punishments, and consequently to proceed to no other temporal chastisement, after they have cast the dart of Excommunication. Many other learned Catholics, as I have showed above q Part. 2. per totum. do also deny the same, and Almain affirmeth, that it is the doctrine of most Doctors, that the Ecclesiastical power cannot by the institution of Christ inflict any temporal or civil punishment, as death, exile, privation of goods, etc. Yea nor so much as to imprison. With what face therefore dare this Doctor, to terrify simple Catholics, cry out so often, Only Widdrington, or ely Widdrington, as Card. Bellarmine did only Barclay, only Barclay, do oppose themselves against all Catholics. But God be praised, that my Adversaries themselves have lived to see, what little credit is given by Catholics to their vaunting words, and with what disgrace their books have been handled by the State of France. For Card. Bellarmine's book against D. Barclay was condemned and forbidden by the Parliament of Paris under pain of treason, this Doctors book against me was disgacefully burnt by the hangman before the great stairs of the Palace, and the same fire, but by a more public sentence and in a more solemn manner, Fa. Suarez book also hat passed. 26 Thirdly, this Doctor very learnedly, forsooth, carpeth at me for abusing words in calling deposition, and killing, temporal armour, or weapons. My Adversary Widdrington, saith he, r Cap. 8. pag. 375. abuseth words, when he affirmeth deposition and killing to be temporal armour, or weapons. F. who ever heard, that deposition or kill are armour, or weapons? They are effects of armour or weapons, but they themselves are not armour, or weapons. But first this Doctor hath so vigilant on eye over my words and writings to carp at them, that he quite forgetteth what words he himself doth use. For he himself here confesseth, that Ecclesiastical Censures are spiritual armour, or weapons, whereupon in this very Chapter he callet s Cap. 8. pag. 360. Excommunication a dart; and Card. Bellarmine in his book against Barclay t Cap. 19 pag. 185. calleth Ecclesiastical Censures the spiritual sword: and yet Excommunication, and other Ecclesiastical Censures are according to his own doctrine effects of spiritual armour, or weapons, to wit, of the Ecclesiastical power, which he calleth v Pag. 386. 387. & in tract contra Barclai. cap. 19 pag. ●88. the spiritual sword. And if spiritual Censures, or punishments may be called spiritual armour, or weapons, although they be an effect of the spiritual power or sword, why may not, I pray you, temporal censures or punishments, as are deposition, and killing, be called temporal weapons, or armour although they be effects of the temporal power, or sword? If therefore I abuse words in calling temporal Censures, or punishments, temporal armour, or weapons, how can he excuse himself from abusing words in calling spiritual Censures, or punishments, spiritual armour, or weapons? 27 Secondly, it is usual among Philosophers to nominate, and describe a thing by the name of the cause, whereupon they divide a definition into a formal, and causal definition, or description: as the Eclipse of the Moon is commonly described to be, an interposition of the earth betwixt the body of they Sun, and of the Moon, not for that the Eclipse of the Moon is formally that interposition, for it is formally nothing else, than a want of light in the Moon, but for that it is caused by that interposition: and Thunder, according to the opinion of Empedocles and Anaxagoras, is defined to be a quenching of fire enclosed in a cloud, See Aristotle lib. 2. Meoteor. sum. 3. cap. 1. & 2. but according to the doctrine of Aristotle a violent breaking out of a fiery exhalation enclosed in a cloud, not for that Thunder is formally the aforesaid quenching, or breaking forth, for it is formally a sound, or noise, but for that this sound is caused from thence: so likewise spiritual and temporal Censures may be called spiritual and temporal armour or weapons, not for that formally they are so, but for that they are effects caused from thence. But lastly what man is so ignorant, who knoweth not, that the same thing may be both an effect, and also a cause being considered divers ways: and so the same spiritual or temporal Censure and punishment, as it proceedeth from the spiritual, or temporal power, which is rightly called the spiritual, or temporal sword is an effect, and not to be called a sword, weapon, or armour, yet as it is a cause to bring great grief to the person so punished, or to redress great evil, it may well be called armour offensive, or defensive: yea and grief itself may without abusing of words be called a sword, according to that of the holy Scripture Luc. 2. And thy own soul a sword shall pierce. And thus you see how weakly, and fraudulently this Doctor hath impugned my answer. 28 Now to return to Mr. Fitzherbert: He, forsooth, bringeth an other reason but as insufficient as his former, to prove that the Pastors of the Church have authority to inflict temporal, or corporal punishments, upon heretical, or schismatical Princes, if they shall contemn Ecclesiastical Censures. For otherwise, how is that, saith he, x Num. 35. pag. 89. 2. Cor. 10. fulfilled, which the Apostle said of the most ample power, that he, and other Apostles had to destroy Munitions & Counsels, and all Altitude, or Lostinesse, extolling itself against the knowledge of God; yea and to revenge, (or punish) omnem inobedientiam, all disobedience; Which words S. Augustine, August. ad Bonifac. Com. epist. 50. understandeth of the authority left by our Saviour to his Church, to compel her rebellious, and disobedient children to perform their duties: and the same is also acknowledged by some of our principal Adversaries, namely Caluin, Caluin upon this place. who not only expoundeth this place of the coercitive, and coactive power that is in the Church, but also groundeth the same upon the words of our Saviour to his Apostles. Quicquid ligaveritis super terram, Matth. 18. erit ligatum & in caelis etc. Whatsoever you shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever you shall lose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven. 29 Whereupon I infer, that if the Ecclesiastical authority d●d not extend itself to the chastisement of disobedient Princes in their temporal states, the Church should not have the power whereof S. Paul speaketh, that is, to revenge all disobedience, seeing that the disobedience of absolute Princes to Ecclesiastical Censures should be incorrigible, and remediless. Whereupon it would also follow, that the authority, and power of the Church should be no better in effect then a cobweb, which holdeth only the little flies, and serveth to no purpose against the great ones, sufficing to correct all inferior persons, and to prevent, and remedy all the inconveniences that may grow from them, but not to redress the most dangerous, and pernicious disobedience, that may be; to wit, the rebellion of Princes against the Church from whence the greatest danger, and damage to souls may, and commonly doth arise; if this than should be without remedy, it must needs follow (as I have said) that Christ hath not sufficiently provided for the government of his Church, yea much worse than temporal Kings are wont to provide for the administration of the Provinces, or States subject to them; who when they appoint Lieutenants, or Deputies any where, do give them authority over all sorts of subjects, and so much power as may suffice for the remedy of all inconveniences (and specially of the greatest) which may occur in the States where they govern. 30 Therefore it must needs be granted, that our Saviour Christ, ordaining a government in his Church, gave to the Governors thereof sufficient power and jurisdiction to redress all kind of inconveniences in all sorts of subjects, as well the highest, as the lowest, and when spiritual correction will not suffice, then to chastise them also in their temporalities, so far forth, as shall be necessary for the public good of the Church, and for the due execution of their office, and charge. For as the Lawler saith, Cui iurisdictio data est, javolen. leg 2. ●. de Iurisdict. ei quoque concessa esse videntur, sine quibus iurisdictio explica●i non potuit; To whomsoever jurisdiction is given, those things do seem to be granted withal, without the which the jurisdiction could not be explicated: and this is also conform to the axiom of the Philosophers, qui dat esse, dat consequentia ad esse, he which giveth being, giveth also those things, that are consequents thereof, or necessarily required thereto. 31 But first I would demand of Mr. Fitzherbert, what remedy the Church hath against a most potent Christian Prince, who shall contemn, not only an Ecclesiastical Censure, but also every sentence of deprivation, or of any of other temporal or corporal chastisement denounced against him by the Pope? doth he not contemn this Censure, and sentence? and by his authority, and example draw his subjects, for the most part, to a general revolt from the Church? shall we then say that Christ left not to his Church sufficient authority to remedy this? How then is that fulfilled, which the Apostle said of the most ample power of the Church to revenge, or punish all disobedience, seeing that the disobedience of absolute Princes to this sentence of deprivation should be incorrigible, and remediless? Whereupon it would also follow, that the authority and power of the Church should be in effect no better than a cobweb etc. Let Mr. Fitzherbert satisfy this demand, and he will forthwith see, that in the like manner his own argument may be answered. 32 Secondly, as every well instituted temporal common wealth, and the chief governors thereof have always sufficient temporal power, taking temporal power for authority to punish with temporal punishments all treasons, rebellions, and contempts whatsoever, although they have not always sufficient power, taking power, for might, force, or effectual means to redress actually all disorders that shall arise in the common wealth, for that if the perturbers of the common wealth be more potent, and strong than the rulers, and governors thereof, they will little regard any sentence or declaration either of exile, loss of goods, and liberty, or also of life that the Governors of the common wealth shall denounce against them, and yet no man will deny, that the chief Governors of the common wealth have sufficient authority, forasmuch as concerneth ●he authority itself, to punish with temporal punishments every particular contempt of these seditious, and wicked subjects, and to redress all inconveniences that possibly may arise: So likewise the chief Pastors, or Governors of the Church, or spiritual kingdom of Christ, have always sufficient spiritual power, taking spiritual power for authority, to punish with spiritual punishments all heresies, schisms, and other crimes whatsoever, although they have not always sufficient spiritual power, taking power for force, might, or effectual means to redress actually by spiritual punishments all inconveniences, and disorders that shall arise in the Church of Christ: For if the disturbers of the Church be perverse, obstinate, and wilful they will little regard and Censure sentence, or declaration that the Pastors of the Church can possibly denounce against them; and yet no man will deny, that the chief Pastors or Governors of the Church of Christ, have sufficient authority, for as much as concerneth the authority itself, to punish with spiritual Censures every particular contempt of these disobedient persons, and that these spiritual Censures, are of themselves sufficient to terrify any Christian whatsoever, and to withdraw him from sin, seeing that they are far more grievous and dreadful as S. Augustine affirmeth, than any temporal punishment whatsoever. 33 Thirdly, I answer, that S. Paul had indeed through the gift of miracles, which Christ our Saviour gave to him, and to the rest of the Apostles, not only a most ample and extraordinary authority, but also power, might, force, and effectual means, to punish or revenge all disobedience, even with temporal and corporal punishments. Whereupon, as S. chrysostom observeth upon this place, Chrysost. in 2. Cor 10. Act. 14. Act. 2●. Act. 13. Auselni. in 2. Cor. 10. he did one time cure a lame man, an other time he raised one from death to life; and an other time he punished Elymas the Magician with depriving him of his sight. And S. Anselme numbereth among this spiritual armour, whereof the Apostle here speaketh, the doing of miracles. For we, saith S. Anselme speaking in the person of S. Paul, do not war, or fight according to the flesh. For the weapons of our warfare are not carnal but spiritual and mighty to God our King, for whom we war, or fight. For we do not bear a material lance, or sword, but we do more mightily overthrow our enemies with the word, than others do with carnal weapons. For our weapons are the word of preaching, wisdom, miracles, charity, and other virtues etc. 34 Wherefore S. Paul speaketh not only of authority to fight, or punish, but also of might, force, or effectual means to overcome his enemies. Our weapons, saith he, are mighty to God to destroy munitions, that is, saith S. Anselme, secular doctrines, arguments, and subtleties, by which perverse men do strengthen their hearts, that the word of truth may not be able to touch them, because the art of Apostolical preaching doth mightily pierce, and overthrow through the virtue of spiritual grace these kind of munitions. And we have also in readiness, that is in manifest, and speedy effect, to revenge all disobedience, that is, to punish the offences of them, who would not obey us, that they might correct themselves: Which we will do, when your obedience shall be fulfilled, that is, when all the rest of you shall by love be obedient in all things. Thus S. Anselme. Now what learned man will thus conclude, that because S. Paul and the Apostles had a most ample, extraordinary and miraculous authority, power, might, and effectual means to convert men to the faith of Christ, and to revenge or punish all that were disobedient with temporal punishments even by death, as S. Peter did Ananias and Saphyra, or by depriving them of their sight, as S. Paul did Elimas' the Magician, or by delivering them to Satan to be visibly tormented by him, as S. Paul did the incestuous Corinthian, that therefore the ordinary Pastors of the Church have now either an extraordinary, or ordinary authority, power, might and effectual means to do the like. 35 I omit that S. Ambrose or whosoever is the Author of those Commentaries, expoundeth those words, to revenge all disobedience, when your obedience shall be fulfilled, of the Corinthians themselves, who being perfectly converted shall punish in themselves their former disobedience. It is manifest, saith S. Ambrose, that he revengeth disobedience, when he condemneth it by obedience, then destroying it, when he bringeth to the faith those, who do resist, or disobey, that infidelity may be condemned by them, by whom it was defended. The same also doth S. Anselme insinuate, as you have seen above. 36 But S. Augustine, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, understandeth those words of the Apostle [having in a readiness to revenge all disobedience] of the authority left by our Saviour to his Church to compel her rebellious and disobedient children to perform their duties. True it is, that S. Augustine applieth those words of the Apostle to the authority of the Church to compel heretics by temporal punishments to return to the faith of Christ, taking the Church, as it containeth all the faithful, and consisteth both of temporal and spiritual power, but it is not true, that he understandeth them of the authority of the Church, as the Church is taken for Churchmen, or the spiritual Pastors of the Church. Wherefore Mr. Fitzherbert doth herein egregiously abuse his Reader. For S. Augustine's main drift both in that 50. epistle, & in the former 48. epistle is only to prove against the Donatists, that heretics may lawfully be compelled with temporal punishments by the laws of Christian Emperors to return to the Catholic faith, and that the Pastors of the Church did well in requesting Christian Emperors to make such laws. Wherefore the argument of the 48. epistle to Vincentius is, that S. Austin was once of opinion, that we must not deal with heretics by violence, but only with the word of God, but afterwards being overcome with the doctrine and example of others he changed his opinion, and taught that it is lawful to implore the laws of Princes against the enemies of the faith, so that it be done with an intention to correct, and not with a desire to revenge: And the argument of this 50. Epistle is, that S. Augustine showeth with what moderation heretics may through fear of Imperial laws be reduced to the communion of the Church. And in his second book of Retractations, Cap. 48. mentioning this Epistle to Bonifacius he writeth thus: At the same time I wrote also a book (meaning this 50. Epistle) concerning the correction of the Donatists by reason of those, who would not have them to be corrected by the Imperial laws. This book beginneth thus: Laudo, & gratulor, & admiror fili dilectissime Bonifaci. 37 judge now, good Reader, what a shameful fraud is this of Mr. Fitzherbert to make ignorant Catholics believe, that S. Augustine bringeth those words of the Apostle to prove the authority left by our Saviour to his Church, that is, to Churchmen, or to the spiritual Pastors of the Church (for so he understandeth the word Church in all this his Discourse) to compel her rebellious, & disobedient children by force of temporal punishments to perform their duties, whereas S. Augustine's intent only is to prove the lawfulness of the Imperial laws compelling heretics by temporal punishments to return back to the faith, and that Churchmen, or the spiritual Pastors of the Church may lawfully implore the Imperial laws, and desire Christian Princes to compel heretics to forsake their heresy by force of temporal punishments, so that they desire it with intent to correct them, and not with a desire of revenge. 38 But if the Ecclesiastical authority, saith Mr. Fitzherbert y Pag. 90. , did not extend itself to the chastisement of disobedient Princes in their temporal states, it must needs follow that Christ had not sufficiently provided for the government of his Church, yea much worse than temporal Kings are went to provide for the administration of the Provinces, or states subject to them, who when they appoint lieutenants, or deputies any where, do give them authority over all sorts of subjects, & so much power as may suffice for the remedy of all inconveniences (and specially of the greatest) which may occur in the States where they govern, etc. But this consequence I have ever denied. For, as I have often said, to the good government of the Church of Christ, which is a spiritual, & not a temporal kingdom, or commonwealth, it is only required, that the Pastors, or Governors thereof have authority to inflict spiritual, and not temporal punishments, and this authority, forasmuch as concerneth the authority, and punishments themselves, is sufficient to redress all inconveniences, neither is it necessary either in a spiritual, or a temporal kingdom, that the chief Governors thereof should have that power, might, or effectual means whereby all inconveniences must actually at all times be redressed. 39 And therefore, as temporal Kings do give to their Lieutetenants, Deputies, or Viceroys sufficient temporal authority over all sorts of subjects in the Provinces, or States where they govern, but not always so much power, (taking power not for authority or jurisdiction, but for might, force, or effectual means) as may suffice for the remedy of all inconveniences, for this power the Kings themselves do often times want in those Dominions, where they themselves do personally govern; so Christ our Saviour ordaining in his Church a spiritual, and not a temporal Government, gave to the spiritual Governors thereof sufficient spiritual authority and jurisdiction, to redress all kind of inconveniences in all sorts of subjects, as well the highest, as the lowest, but not sufficient power, might, or effectual means actually to redress the same: And as the Lieutenants, Deputies, or Viceroys of temporal Kings, if they offend, cannot be punished with temporal punishments by any subject in the States where they govern, but by the King alone, to whom only they are subject in temporals: So likewise if temporal Kings themselves do offend, they cannot be punished with temporal punishments but by God alone, to whom only they are subject in temporals. Now to give to temporal Commonwealths the use of the spiritual power, sword, weapon's, or armour, and authority to inflict spiritual Censures or punishments, or to the Church of Christ, as it is a spiritual commonwealth, the use of the temporal power, sword, weapon's, or armour, and authority to inflict temporal Censures, or punishments, it were both to confound the acts, functions, authority, sword, weapon's, and armour of the spiritual and temporal commonwealths, which Christ our Saviour hath distinguished, and it is also repugnant to the express words of the holy Scripture, 2. Cor. 10. nam arma militiae nostrae non carnalia sunt, for the weapons or armour of our warfare are not carnal, etc. to the doctrine of the ancient Fathers, who affirm, that Emperors and Kings are in temporals next to God in authority, and consequently to be temporally punished by God alone, and to the general practice of the primitive Church. 40 Wherefore that comparison, which Mr. Fitzherbert bringeth here of the cobweb, which holdeth only the little flies, and serveth to no purpose against the great ones, etc. is idle, and to no purpose. For Ecclesiastical Censures, which are the punishments belonging to the Church of Christ, are common both to Princes, and Subjects, and of themselves they are so dreadful, that they are able, and sufficient of their own nature to hold and keep in awe all Christians whatsoever, and to correct, amend, and bring all sinners, as they did the Emperor Theodosius, to true repentance. But if some persons do not fear these Censures, and be not amended by them, this is not to be attributed to the weakness, defect, or imperfection of the Censure, which of itself is most dreadful, yea and more horrible, saith S. Augustine, than any corporal death, but to the indisposition of the offender, who doth not duly consider the greatness, and dreadfulness of that Ecclesiastical Censure. As likewise temporal punishments, as is the sentence of death, exile, imprisonment, whipping, confiscation of goods, etc. are of themselves able, and sufficient to withdraw any man from sinful life, yet they do not actually correct, and amend all malefactors, but this is not to be attributed to the weakness, or insufficiency of the temporal sword, but the rashness, passion, malice, or inconsideration of such malefactors, who for want of due consideration, are not afraid of that temporal punishment, which of itself is able to terrify any prudent man, and to redress all kind of inconveniences in all sorts of subjects, as well the highest, as the lowest. 41 Neither is it necessary for the public good of the Church, as this man supposeth, or for the due execution of the office, and charge of spiritual Pastors, that they should have authority to chastise temporally, or, which is all one, to inflict temporal punishments, and to use the temporal sword, which is only proper to temporal Princes, or commonwealths, and by the law of Christ forbidden spiritual Pastors, as they are spiritual Pastors, who have only spiritual, and not temporal authority, as I proved above by the authority of S. Bernard. Wherefore that axiom of the Lawyer, Cui iurisdictio data est, etc. To whom jurisdiction is given those things also do seem to be granted without which the jurisdiction could not be explicated; and that other of the Philosophers, Qui dat esse, etc. He that giveth being, giveth also those things that are consequent to being, or necessarily required thereunto, are unaptly applied to this purpose: For spiritual jurisdiction can very well be exercised without using temporal weapons, or inflicting temporal punishments; and to use temporal weapons, or to inflict temporal punishments, is not a consequent, or necessarily required to the spiritual authority or jurisdiction of spiritual Pastors, as Mr. Fitzherbert untruly supposeth. 42 Now you shall see in what manner he concludeth this Chapter. Thus then, saith he, z pag. 91. nu. 38.39. thou seest, good Reader, how I proved in my Supplement by the law of GOD, that the Pope hath power to chastise Princes in their temporal states, and dignities, when the necessity of the Church shall require it; which I also prosecuted further there, inferring the Pope's power over the bodies, and temporal goods of Christians by the power he hath over the soul, according to the two axioms, Qui potest maius, potest minus, He which may do the more, may do the less, and Accessorium sequitur principalis naturam, The accessory followeth the nature of the principal, which I have amply debated before with my Adversary Widdrington, in the second, and third chapters, having also laid down there the words of my Supplement touching the same, and therefore I think it needless to repeat them here. 43 Now then I remit it, good Reader, to thy judgement, whether my Adversary Widdrington hath not notably abused me in two things, the one in affirming (as you have heard before in the first Chapter) that I grounded all my discourse against the Oath in my Supplement, See Chapter 1. nu. 3. 7. & 9 upon a bare supposition, that the Pope's spiritual authority is abjured therein; and the other that I have effectually proved nothing else by the law of GOD, but that the temporal power in spiritual things, & in temporal (as they are reduced to spiritual) is subject to the spiritual power, so far forth as concerneth the authority to command & a spiritual manner of correction, not temporal (for so you have heard him say in the beginning of this chap.) though it be evident by the premises, Supra nu. 1. that I have grounded my arguments against the oath (not upon any such supposition, as he mentioneth) but upon the very substance of the law of God in the old, and new Testament, and that I have deduced from thence by most pregnant reasons, and necessary consequents, that the Pope hath power to proceed to the temporal correction of Princes, when the spiritual will not suffice and the necessity of the Church doth require it. 44 Whereupon it followeth evidently, that the new Oath, which impugneth this power of the Pope, is repugnant to the law of GOD. So that, you see, how probable my Adversary widdrington's answers are, or rather how fraudulent seeing that he dissembleth all the substance, and pith of my arguments, abusing therein his Reader, no less than me, seeking to breed in him a false conceit of the substance, and effect of my discourse, and then framing his answer, according to his own forgery. So as, in fine, he answereth nothing of mine, but his own vain conceits, as it will also further appear by that, which resteth to be debated betwixt us, concerning the Laws of Nature, and Nations. 45 But contrariwise thou seest, good Reader, that Mr. Fitzherbert in his Supplement neither hath sufficiently proved by the law of GOD, as he here untruly affirmeth, either that the Pope hath power to chastise Princes in their temporal States, and dignities except by way only of direction, or commandment, or that the necessity of the Church doth require, that spiritual Pastors should by their spiritual authority have power to use the temporal sword, and to inflict temporal punishments; nor hath rightly concluded the Pope's power over the bodies, and temporal goods of Christians from the power he hath over their souls, by those two axioms, He that may do the greater, may do the less, and The accessory followeth the nature of the principal, the true sense and meaning whereof I have amply declared before in the second, and third Chapters, and have laid open Mr. fitzherbert's fraud, and ignorance in urging those axioms. 46 Wherefore to conclude with him this Chapter, I remit it good Reader, to thy judgement, whether I have any way abused Mr. Fitzherbert in two things, as he saith I have done, the one in affirming (as thou hast heard before in the first Chapter) that he in his Supplement doth first of all suppose, that the Pope's power to excommunicate Princes is abjured in this Oath; and the other, that he hath effectually proved nothing else by the law of God, but that the temporal power is in spiritual things, and in temporal, as they are reduced to spiritual, subject to the spiritual power, so far forth as concerneth the authority to command, and a spiritual manner of punishing by way of coercion, and not temporal. For, as I have most amply showed in this Chapter, he hath not brought any one pregnant reason, or necessary consequent, grounded upon the law of GOD either in the old Testament, or in the new, to prove, that the Pope hath power to proceed by way of temporal coercion, or which is all one, by inflicting temporal punishments, to the temporal correction or punishment of any Prince. Neither also hath he brought any one pregnant reason, or argument to prove, either that spiritual punishments are not of themselves sufficient, (although by reason of the indisposition of the person so punished not always effectual) to redress all inconveniences, and to correct, or amend all the disobedient children of the Church; or, that the necessity of the Church, as it is instituted by Christ to be a spiritual, and not a temporal commonwealth, doth at any time require, that the spiritual Pastors, or Governors thereof must have authority to use temporal weapons, or, which is all one, to inflict temporal punishments: whereupon it evidently followeth, that this new Oath, which denieth this authority of the Pope is not repugnant to the law of God. 47 Thus then thou seest, that I have sound answered all Mr. fitzherbert's arguments without dissembling the substance, or pith of any one of them, and have most clearly showed, that I have neither abused him, nor the Reader in those two things, which here he mentioneth, but that he hath notably abused me, and bewrayed his manifest fraud and dissimulation, in falsely relating the supposition, whereon he groundeth his whole Discourse, as I have at large declared in the first Chapter, and therefore I think it needless to repeat here the same again. CHAP. VI Wherein Mr. fitzherbert's arguments taken from the Law of Nature are confuted: and first it is showed, in what manner temporal things are by the Law of Nature subordinate to spiritual, and the temporal Commonwealth to the Church of Christ. Secondly, that Religious Priests by the Law of Nature cannot punish temporal Princes temporally, and that in the Law of Nature the civil Society was supreme and disposed of all things as well concerning Religion as State, and that therefore the new Oath, denying the Pope's power to depose Princes, is not repugnant to the Law of Nature. Thirdly, the difference betwixt the directive and coercive power, and how temporal things become spiritual is declared, and from thence proved, that the Church may command, but not inflict temporal punishments, and divers replies of Mr. Fitzherbert and D. Schulckenius are confuted. MY Adversary, T. F. a man, as most of our Countrymen know, unskilful in Philosophy, and Schoole-divinitie, as being sciences, which he hath little studied, hath in this sixth Chapter taken a hard task upon him, and which few men, except such as are like to himself, would adventure; but, as our English proverb saith, who is so bold, as is blind Bayard. For he will, forsooth, show in this Chapter, that he hath effectually proved in his Supplement by the law of Nature, that the Pope hath power to chastise Princes temporally, and consequently that the new Oath of Allegiance, which denieth the Pope's power to depose Princes, is repugnant to the law of Nature. But how unsoundly he hath proved this, and that by the law of Nature it may rather be convinced, that Religious Priests were subject to temporal Princes, and might be deposed by them, and that all things both concerning State and Religion, and the public service of God did in the law of Nature depend upon the authority of the temporal commonwealth, you shall anon most clearly perceive. 2 First therefore Mr. Fitzherbert a Pag. 94. nu. 2 setteth down the words, which he wrote in his Supplement in this manner. It is evident by the light of natural reason, that in all things, wherein there is any natural composition or combination, there is a due subordination and subjection of that which is less perfect to the more perfect, and of the inferior to the Superior, as of the means to the end, which is evident in the Hierarchies of Angels, in the Orbs or Spheres, in the Elements, in the Powers of the soul, in the Sciences; and (to omit other examples in all natural Societies of Families, Commonwealths and Kingdoms, in which there is a superiority, and subjection, the less perfect being inferior and subordinate to the more perfect, whereby nature giveth to every thing the perfection, which is convenient for it, according to the kind, degree and quality thereof, wherein we see, nature tendeth still to greater perfection, passing, and, as it were, moving by degrees from the lowest, and and most imperfect creature to man, from man to Angels, and from them to Almighty God, who, as he is the Creator of all, so also he is the end, consummation and perfection of all, yea perfection itself, by whom and in whom all natural things are consummated and perfected. 3 Here, you see, this man hath brought divers examples; wherein one thing is subject and subordinate to another, but to what purpose he hath brought them, and how from any one of them he can well deduce, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes by the law of Nature, which is the principal subject of this Chapter, I cannot any way conceive. If he had declared in particular, after what manner, and with what kind of subjection these things are subordained one to the other, every man of mean understanding would presently have perceived the non sequitur of all the consequences which can be gathered from those examples. Means are subject, and ordained to the end, for that the end cannot be obtained without them; will he therefore infer from hence, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes? The nine Orders of Angels have a subjection, and subordination of the inferior to the superior, for that one is more noble, more potent and more perfect than another, by reason whereof the superior can illuminate, and move locally the inferior, but will he therefore from hence conclude, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes? 4 The celestial Orbs are inferior one to another in place magnitude and perfection, as the Sphere of the Moon is the least and lowest of all: and the Planet of the Sun, although it be placed in the middle Orb, is the chief, and, as it were, the King of all the seven Planets, and exceedeth them all in magnitude, splendour and activity. The four Elements also are inferior one to an other in place, magnitude and perfection. Also the powers of the soul have a kind of subjection one to another, the understanding doth guide and direct, as a teacher or instructor, but the will, as the Mistress doth command. Likewise all sciences have some subordination among themselves, and Metaphysic is in some sort the Mistress of them all: but will my Adversary infer from any of these, that therefore the Pope hath power to depose Princes? Families also are subject to Incorporations, Incorporations to Cities, Cities to Kingdoms, for that one is included in the other, as a part in the whole; and therefore he that is Superior or chief Governor of the whole, and can dispose thereof, is also Superior and Governor of every part thereof: But the temporal kingdom, speaking formally and in abstracto, is not a part of the spiritual kingdom, or Church of Christ, nor included therein as a part in the whole, wherefore from hence it cannot be gathered, that spiritual Pastors, who are the Superiors and Governors of this spiritual kingdom, have authority to depose absolute Princes who are the Superiors and Governors of temporal kingdoms, and in temporals are subject to none but God. Lastly, man, Angels and all other creatures are subject to Almighty God, who, as he is the Creator and conservator of all, so he is the end, consummation & perfection of all, but how from hence Mr. Fitzherbert can gather, that therefore the Pope hath power to depose Princes, truly it passeth my understanding to conceive. 5 Wherefore all that from this Rhetorical Discourse of my Adversary can be rightly concluded is this, at the most, that in this world there is nothing to be found, which is not subject and subordinate to some other thing: and that every thing, which is subject to another, must be subject only in that degree of subjection, wherein the other is Superior: and therefore that temporal kingdoms, whether they be Heathen or Christian, are in dignity inferior & subject to the spiritual kingdom or Church of Christ, for that spiritual things are in dignity superior to temporal: and that Christian Princes being parts and members of the Church of Christ, are subject to the spiritual Pastors and Governors thereof in spirituals, but not in temporals, for in temporals, Christian Princes themselves are the supreme Governors, and subject to God alone. 6 But let us go on with Mr. fitzherbert's discourse: This being so, saith he, b pag. 94. n. 3. it is to be considered, that seeing in all commonwealths (I speak of such as are Christian) there is a composition and combination of divers Societies, all tending to the perfection of man's nature, as of husband and wife, master and servant, Prince and subject (of all which resulteth the civil Society:) and again, seeing that in this civil Society or Commonwealth there is an Ecclesiastical Society evident and distinct in itself, by different Magistrates and laws, whereby the civil Society is united with the Celestial and heavenly Hierarchies, and the members thereof made cives Sanctorum, & domestici Dei, the citizens of Saints, and the household servants of God; Ephes. 2. yea united with God himself, and consequently made as perfect and happy as man can be in this life, it must needs follow that as the Society of the husband and the wife, and of the master and the servant are ordained for the family, and again the family for the town and city, and the city for the whole commonwealth, every one of them tending to a superior and more perfect Society; so in like manner the commonwealth itself with all her inferior Societies are naturally ordained for the religious, and Ecclesiastical Society, that is to say, the Church, tending thereto as to the supreme, and most perfect Society that is on earth, whereby it, and all other Societies are perfected, and human nature finally advanced to that supernatural end, and felicity, whereto God hath ordained it. And this I suppose is so evident in reason, that no man will deny it; Whereupon it is also further to be inferred, etc. 7 But fair and softly, Good Sir, be not too hasty to make more inferences, before you can make good what you have said already. For your comparison betwixt particular Civil Societies, as families, or economies, Cities, and temporal commonwealths, or kingdoms, and between temporal commonwealths or kingdoms, and the spiritual kingdom, or Church of Christ, and also that your consequence and similitude (which you make in these words, It must need follow, that as the Society of the husband, and the wife, and of the master, and the servant are ordained for the family, and again the family for the Town, and City; and the City for the whole Commonwealth: So in like manner the Commonwealth itself with all her inferior Societies, are naturally ordained for the Religious, or Ecclesiastical Society, that is to say, the Church) are so far from reason, that no man with reason can approve the said comparison, similitude, and consequence. For the reason, why the Society of the husband and wife, and of the master, and servant are ordained for the family, and again the family for the Town, and City, and the City for the whole Commonwealth, is, for that the Society of man and wife, of master and servant, are parts and members of the Family, and the Family is a part and member of the Town and City, and the City is a part, and member of the whole Commonwealth, or Kingdom, and therefore it must needs follow, that all these particular Civil Societies are naturally ordained for the whole Civil Commonwealth, or Kingdom, which they compose, as all parts and members are naturally ordained for the whole body, which is compounded of them. But no man with reason can affirm, that in like manner the whole Civil Commonwealth itself, with all the inferior Societies, or parts thereof, are parts and members of the religious, or Ecclesiastical Society, which is the spiritual Kingdom, or Church of Christ, and therefore naturally ordained thereunto. For it is evident that Christ our Saviour, by instituting his spiritual Kingdom, or Church, hath not changed the nature of temporal kingdoms, or civil commonwealths, from whence it clearly followeth that all temporal kingdoms or commonwealths, whether they consist of Christians, or Pagans, have the same nature, and are naturally ordained to one and the self same and, which is a peaceable living in human Society. 8 True it is, that the same Christian man, as well Prince, as subject, is a part and member of the true civil commonwealth, and also of the true spiritual, or Ecclesiastical kingdom, or Church of Christ; as also the same Paynim is a part and member of the true civil commonwealth, and of a false Religious, or Ecclesiastical Society: and the reason hereof I declared more at large above in the second part, because either temporal authority, & spiritual authority, or temporal authority, and spiritual subjection, or temporal subjection, & spiritual subjection (to omit spiritual authority, and temporal subjection) are united & conjoined in one, & the self same Christian man; by reason of which union and conjunction, the same Christian man is either a temporal Prince, and also a spiritual Prince, or a temporal Prince, and a spiritual subject, or a temporal subject, and also a spiritual subject (to omit now whether the same man may be a spiritual Prince, and a temporal subject, for this dependeth upon that question, whether, and in what manner our Saviour Christ hath exempted Clergy men, and especially the supreme spiritual Pastor from subjection to temporal Princes:) As likewise the same man may be of divers trades, as a Musician, and a Physician, the same man may be Citizen of divers cities, as of London, and York, the same man may be a King of divers kingdoms, as of England and Scotland. But from hence it doth not follow, that the temporal kingdom, or commonwealth itself, although the less noble, and perfect, must be subject, or naturally ordained to the spiritual Kingdom or Church of Christ, which is the more noble, and perfect Society. As likewise it doth not follow, that because a man hath two trades, the one more worthy, the other less worthy, or a citizen of two cities, the one more noble, the other less noble, or a King of two Kingdoms, the one more excellent, the other less excellent, that therefore the less worthy, noble, and excellent trade, city, or kingdom itself, must be subject, and subordained to the more worthy, noble, and excellent trade, city, or kingdom. 9 But this only doth follow from the light of true reason, that as the same man, who hath two trades or arts, to wit, of Music and Physic, or a citizen of two cities, as of London and York, or a King of two kingdoms, as of England and Scotland, must prefer, cateris paribus, the more noble and excellent, before the less noble, and excellent trade, city, or kingdom; and that as he is a Musician, he is to be guided and directed by the rules of Music, and not of Physic, and as he is a citizen of London to be subject to, and governed by the laws, and customs of London, and not of York, and as he is King of England to rule and govern according to the laws, and customs of England, and not of Scotland, but that therefore Music must be subject to Physic, York to London, or Scotland to England, except in worth, dignity, or nobility, or contrariwise, it doth not follow from the light of true reason: So in like manner it doth follow from the light of true reason, that the same man, who is a citizen of the temporal kingdom or commonwealth, by his natural birth, or civil conversation, and also of the spiritual kingdom, or Church of Christ, by Baptism, or spiritual regeneration, must in temporals be subject only to the temporal Prince, and be directed and governed by temporal authority, which doth only reside in the temporal Prince; and in spirituals must be subject only to spiritual Pastors, and be directed, and governed by spiritual authority, which doth only reside in the spiritual Pastors or Governors of the Church. But that the temporal kingdom itself, or, which is all one, the temporal Prince, as he hath temporal authority, or as he is a temporal Prince, must be subject to the spiritual kingdom, or, which is all one, to spiritual Pastors, as they have spiritual authority, but only, as the temporal Prince hath spiritual subjection, this cannot be inferred from the light of true reason. But Mr. Fitzherbert, forsooth, supposeth this to be so evident in reason, that no man will deny it, to wit, that the temporal commonwealth itself is subject and subordained to the Ecclesiastical Society, and naturally ordained to her, whereas in the Second part of this Treatise I have at large against Card. Bellarmine, and D. Schulckenius confuted the same, and out of their own grounds clearly proved, that there is no such union, subjection, or natural ordination of temporal commonwealths to the spiritual kingdom, or Church of Christ, as they pretend, but that temporal kingdoms, and the spiritual kingdom of Christ do make two total bodies or commonwealths, supreme, and independent one upon the other in those things which are proper to either of them, to wit, that temporal kingdoms are supreme in temporals, and consequently not subject therein to the Church of Christ, or the Pastors thereof, and the Church supreme in spirituals, and not subject to temporal kingdoms, or the supreme Governors thereof. 10 Now let us see, what Mr. Fitzherbert inferreth from the premises. Whereupon, saith he, c Pag. 75. nu. 4 it is also further to be inferred, that as all Commonwealths are subordinate, and subject to the Church: so also the heads of them all (I mean the temporal Princes that govern them) are subordinate, and subject to the head of the Church. For, although they be absolute heads of the States which they govern in things pertaining only to their temporal States, yet they are but members of the mystical body of Christ, which is the Church, and therefore no less subject to the visible head thereof, in matters belonging thereto, than their own proper Vassals are subject to them: and therefore as the King, or Civil Magistrate justly correcteth the head of any family, when he passeth the limits, and bounds of true Oeconomie, to the h●rt of the Commonwealth (though nevertheless a family is a distinct Society from a Commonwealth, having a peculiar end, with different laws, and manner of government) so the head of the Church may correct any King, or Civil Magistrate, when he doth any thing to the prejudice of the Church. pag. 96. num. 5. 11 For although the spiritual Prince, or Magistrate have no dominion over temporal States, and the Governors thereof in matters appertaining only, and merely to State (no more than the temporal Prince hath to do with private families in matters that belong only thereto) yet as the temporal Prince may give laws to a family, or to the head thereof, when the necessity of the Commonwealth shall require it; so also the Ecclesiastical Prince, or head of the Church, may give laws to temporal Commonwealths, and the Governor thereof, according to the urgent necessity of the Church; the public good whereof is to be preferred before the particular good of any temporal Prince, or Commonwealth, by the same reason, and law of Nature, that the good of the soul is to be preferred before the good of the body, spiritual good before temporal, heaven before earth, and the service of GOD before the service of any man, or of all the men in the world. 12 But first although it be true, that Christian Princes, who are the absolute heads of the temporal States, or kingdoms, which they govern, being also parts, and members of the mystical body, or spiritual kingdom of Christ, which is the Church, are consequently subject in things belonging to the Church, to wit in spiritual matters to the visible Pastors, Governors, or heads thereof, yet it is not true, that temporal kingdoms, or commonwealths themselves, being taken properly, formally, and in abstracto, are either parts, and members of the spiritual kingdom, or Church of Christ, or subject, and subordained to the Church, or the visible heads thereof; for than it must needs follow, that temporal Princes, not only as they are Christians, & in spiritual matters, but also as they are temporal Princes, and in temporal things are subject to the visible heads, or Governors of the Church, which is clearly repugnant to Mr. Fitzherbert's own words in that place, pag. 95. num. 4. who affirmeth, that temporal Princes are absolute heads of the States which they govern in things pertaining only to their temporal States, and consequently in them they cannot be subordinate and subject to the visible heads of the Church. 13 Wherefore that comparison, which he maketh here, and is the chief ground of his Discourse, betwixt families, cities, and kingdoms, or civil commonwealths, and betwixt civil commonwealths, or kingdoms, and the spiritual kingdom, or Church of Christ, is no fit comparison, and therefore neither can the Discourse, which is grounded thereon, be sound and sufficient: For families, and cities, being taken properly, formally, and in abstracto, are parts, and members of the whole kingdom, or commonwealth, and consequently subordinate, and subject to the kingdom, and absolute heads thereof, seeing that they are particular civil Societies, and consequently subject to the whole civil Society, or commonwealth, as every part is to the whole body, and to the chief head thereof: but temporal kingdoms or commonwealths, being taken formally, and in abstracto, are not parts and members of the spiritual kingdom, or Church of Christ, unless we will hold with the Canonists, that the Church of Christ is compounded both of spiritual, and civil power, and that the Pope is both a temporal, and spiritual Monarch of the whole Christian world. And therefore although it be true, that spiritual Pastors have nothing to do in matters merely temporal, and which belong to civil government, yet it is not true, that temporal Princes have not to do with private families, and cities in matters that belong to the civil government of them; for that private families, and cities are true parts, and members of the whole civil commonwealth, or kingdom, and I hope that the Prince, who hath to do with the whole kingdom, and government thereof, hath also to do with the government of every part thereof. 14 Secondly, no man maketh any doubt, but that the spiritual Pastors, and Governors of the Church may correct any King, or civil Magistrate, when he doth any thing to the prejudice of the Church: and that they may give laws to the Governors of temporal commonwealths according to the urgent necessity of the Church; and also that, the public good of the Church is to be preferred before the particular good of any temporal Prince, or commonwealth; But all the difficulty consisteth in these points: first, whether authority to correct malefactors by the inflicting of temporal punishments, as death, exile, imprisonment, privation of goods &c. hath by the institution of Christ been communicated to the spiritual Pastors of the Church, or was left only to temporal Princes, and the supreme Governors of temporal commonwealths: Secondly, whether spiritual Pastors may give laws to temporal Princes, I do not say, as they are Christians, and have spiritual subjection, and are parts and members of the spiritual kingdom, or Church of Christ, for of this no Catholic maketh doubt, but to temporal kingdoms, or commonwealths, being taken formally, and in abstracto, or, which is all one, to temporal Princes, not as they are Christians, and have spiritual subjection, but as they are temporal Princes, and have supreme temporal power, which doth only reside in them, and not in spiritual Pastors. 15 Thirdly, whether the particular, or public good of temporal Princes, or commonwealths, is to be preferred before the particular, or public good of the Church, for that the temporal, and spiritual power do make one total body, or commonwealth, which is the Church, as Card. Bellarmine contendeth, in which total body, the temporal commonwealth is per se, and naturally subordained, and subject to the Church, or spiritual kingdom of Christ; or whether the spiritual good is to be preferred before the temporal by all Christians both Princes, and subjects, for that every man, who is a part, and member of two cities, or commonwealths, the one more noble, and excellent than the other, is by the order of charity bound to prefer caeteris paribus the more noble, and excellent city, or commonwealth, and the good thereof, before the less noble and excellent city, or commonwealth, and the good of it. These be the chief heads of this controversy concerning the union and subordination of temporal kingdoms, or commonwealths among Christians, and the spiritual kingdom or Church of Christ, whereof I have at large debated in the second part, where the Reader may see all these points distinctly handled against Card. Bellarmine, and D. Schulckenius, and also touching all that which Mr. Fitzherbert doth confusedly discourse in this Chapter concerning the union, and subordination of temporal kingdoms, and the Church of Christ. And therefore remitting the Reader to my former Treatise, where he may clearly see, in what manner the temporal, and spiritual power, or the temporal and spiritual commonwealth are united, and subordained, let us see, what Mr. Fitzherbert would at length conclude: 16 Whereupon I conclude, saith he, d Pag. 96. nu. 6 that seeing this Oath now in question is (as I have proved by the law of God) prejudicial to the power, and jurisdiction of the head of the Church, to whom all Christian Princes are subject (even by the law of Nature) it followeth, that the said Oath is no less unlawful, unjust, and repugnant to nature, then if a husband should exact the like Oath of his wife, or a Master of his servant, or the father of his children (I mean an Oath which should derogate from the power, and authority of their temporal Prince.) As for example, if a head of a family should bind his wife and children to defend him from the correction of his lawful Prince, when occasion should require, I think no man will be so absurd to say, that it is a lawful Oath, and correspondent to nature, though the same should be coloured, and shadowed never so much with pretence of Economical, and filial discipline, and duty. And no more can the other Oath be lawful, and agreeable to Nature, though it be never so much coloured with respect of temporal allegiance. 17 But first observe, I pray you, the egregious shuffling of this man. For he pretended to prove in this Chapter, by the law of Nature, that the Pope hath power to inflict temporal punishments, and to punish temporal Princes temporally, and that therefore the new Oath, which denieth this power to be in the Pope, is repugnant to the law of nature: And therefore I expected, that he would have brought some effectual argument taken from the law of nature, abstracting from the positive law of God, to confirm this power of the Pope, to inflict temporal punishments, and to punish temporal Princes temporally; and consequently that this Oath is by the law of Nature prejudicial to the coercive authority of spiritual Pastors. But now he flieth from the law of Nature to the law of God to prove, that the Oath is prejudicial to the power and jurisdiction of the head of the Church: and supposing, that he hath proved this by the law of GOD, than it followeth, saith he, that the said Oath is no less unlawful, unjust, and repugnant to Nature, then if a husband should exact of his wife, a maiester of his servant, a father of his children an Oath, which should derogate from the power, and authority of their temporal Prince. So that Mr. Fitzherbert doth only conclude here, that the Oath is unlawful, unjust, and repugnant to Nature, supposing that it is by the law of God prejudicial to the power, and jurisdiction of the head of the Church. 18 Secondly therefore, although we should suppose here with Mr. Fitzherbert, that this new Oath is repugnant to the law of God, as in very deed it is not, yet he cannot therefore rightly conclude; that it is also repugnant to the law of Nature, which he in this Chapter pretendeth to prove, for that every transgression of the positive law, or institution of almighty God is unlawful, and yet not repugnant to the law of Nature: whereupon the Divines do divide the law of God into the divine natural and the divine positive law: and he that should deny, that the spiritual Pastors of the Church of Christ have authority to remit sins, should contradict the law of God in the new Testament, and so this denial of Priestly authority to forgive sins is repugnant to the law of God, and prejudicial to the power, and jurisdiction of spiritual Pastors, and yet it doth not from thence follow, that it is repugnant to the law of Nature, which is naturally grafted in the hearts of every man, whether he be jew, or Gentile, infidel, or Christian, as the law of Nature, is by my Adversaries taken here? Wherefore Mr. Fitzherbert concluding here, that the Oath is repugnant to the law of Nature, for that it is prejudicial to the power, and iuridiction given by the law of Christ to the head of the Church, seemeth not to understand himself, what is the law of Nature, and how the law of Nature is distinguished from the positive law of God. But of this law of Nature more beneath, e Num. 90. ●. seq. and in the next chap. where also you shall see the reason, wherefore the obedience in general, which a wife oweth to her husband, a servant to his Master, and children to their parents is not properly natural, but civil, and yet the obedience in general, which subjects own to their temporal Prince, is not only called civil, but also natural allegiance. 19 But thirdly it is not true, that this Oath now in question is repugnant to the law of God, and prejudicial to the power and jurisdiction of the head of the Church, for that it denieth the Pope's power to depose Sovereign Princes, and to inflict temporal punishments: neither hath Mr. Fitzherbert proved by the law of God, that the Pope hath any such power, as you have seen at large in the former Chapter: and to say, that this Oath is repugnant to the law of nature (taking the law of nature, as it is distinguished from the positive law of God, or man, and is nothing else, than the dictamen or prescript of true reason concerning things to be done, which either supposeth divine revelation, and the supernatural light of faith, and is proper only to true believers, and it is called by the Divines the supernatural law of nature, supernatural, I say, to man, but connatural to grace and faith which it supposeth; or else supposeth only natural knowledge, and is common to all men endued with natural reason, and is called properly, and absolutely the natural law, for that it is connatural to every reasonable man) is very untrue, as partly I have showed in the former Chapter, where I have answered all my adversaries arguments grounded upon divine revelation; and partly in this, and the two next ensuing Chapters I will more clearly convince. Now let us go on with the rest of his Discourse. 20 For as no reason, saith he, f Pag. 97. nu. 7. 8. of Oeconomie, or filial, or conjugal duty, holdeth, when it is encountered with the respect of the weal public, or of due obedience to a lawful Sovereign; So neither can any reason of commonwealth, or allegiance to temporal Princes overweigh, when the same is balanced with the public good of the Church of Christ, whereto all temporal Princes do owe more respect, duty and subjection (even by the law of Nature) than their Vassals and subjects own to them, because the Religion, or Ecclesiastical Society, which is the Church, is (as I have said) the supreme and most worthy Society of all other on earth. In which respect also all Societies inferior to the Commonwealth, yea every member thereof, have more obligation, & own more duty to the Church, which is the highest Society, then to the Commonwealth, or any other, whereto they are immediately subordinate, as it may also be observed in human actions, which tend finally to Religion, as to their last end; for every human action ought to be more specially directed to Religion, that is to say, to the worship and service of God, then to any other inferior action, whereto it may have a more immediate relation. 21 In which respect the Philosophers themselves, being guided by the law of Nature, and light of reason, placed the end, not only of men's actions, but also of every man, and of the Commonwealth itself in Religion; because (as Plato, Plato in Timaeo & in Epinomide. and all the Platonists reach) man being made to the Image of God, and capable of the knowledge of him, was principally ordained to worship and serve him; and therefore for as much, as neither one man alone can sufficiently perform the worship of God (which is due to him from all mankind) neither yet many men together, if they should live without Laws, See Marsil. Ficin in argun. Dial. 1. Plat. de Rep. and Magistrates (for multitude without order would breed confusion) therefore Nature hath inclined men to civil Society, that is to say, to live in commonwealths, to the end that many men living together in community, may the better discharge their duty to God, in yielding him the due worship and service that all mankind oweth him. Whereby the Philosophers evidently saw, that the commonwealth was not only necessary to the perfection of Religion, but also naturally ordained, and referred thereto, as to the end thereof (I mean not the next, and immediate end of the commonwealth which is temporal tranquility, commodity and sufficiency, but the last end whereto all temporal commodities are referred. Whereupon two consequents follow directly, etc.) 22 But what is all this, I pray you, to the purpose? Who maketh any doubt, that the public spiritual good of the Church is to be preferred before the public temporal good of any temporal commonwealth; and that the Church of Christ is the highest Society in worth, dignity, and excellency of all other on earth; and that every Christian man oweth more duty to the Church of Christ, as being the highest and most excellent Society, to which he is immediately subject in spirituals, then unto any other civil commonwealth to which he is immediately subject in temporals? and that every human action ought to be more specially directed, and referred to the worship and service of God, then to any other inferior action, whereto it may have a more immediate relation: and finally, that the Philosophers themselves, as Plato, and the Platonists, guided by the law of Nature, or light of natural reason, thought that man was principally ordained to worship and serve God, and therefore placed the end not only of men's actions, but also of every man, and of the commonwealth itself, in Religion or the service and worship of God: and that Nature hath inclined men to live in civil Society to the end that many men living together orderly, and guided by Laws, and Magistrates, may the better discharge their duty to God, in yielding him due worship and service, that all mankind oweth him? All this is conform to the doctrine which I maintain, and proveth, that the Religious Society is more noble, excellent, and worthy, than the civil or temporal Society, and that in spirituals, it hath supreme authority, but it doth not prove, that the Religious Society is superior in temporal authority to the temporal commonwealth, or that it hath authority to depose temporal Princes, or to inflict temporal, but only spiritual punishments. 23 Nevertheless I would desire the Reader to observe some things concerning this Discourse of my Adversary, The first is concerning filial duty, and the same may be proportionally applied to conjugal. For, as I observed else where, g In Append. contra Suar. part. 1. sec. 8. num. 12. there be two bonds or obligations, wherein children stand bound to their parents; the one is natural, and proceedeth from the law of Nature, whereby children are bound to honour, and reverence their parents: and this bond no human power can take away, or release, neither can this dutiful respect which children by the law of Nature own to their parents at any time encounter with any obedience, which is due to temporal Princes: The other Civil, which dependeth upon the positive laws of temporal Princes, whereby Parents are made Tutors guardians, and governors of their children: and this power, which Parents have over their children, is greater, or lesser according to the laws and customs of every kingdom: and as it dependeth wholly upon the civil power, so it may be increased, diminished, or quite taken away by the supreme civil power: and this civil duty, or obedience, which children own to their Parents, doth not hold, when it encountereth with the respect, duty, or obedience, which they own to their supreme temporal Prince. 24 The second is, that temporal allegiance, or obedience, which is due to temporal Princes, if we will speak properly, can never encounter with that spiritual obedience, which is due to spiritual Pastors. For if a temporal Prince doth command any thing, which is against the service, or worship due to God, and consequently against Religion, to obey him in this case is not temporal allegiance, for that the Prince hath not authority to command any such thing; and where there is no authority to command, there is no obedience due, because, according to the doctrine of all Divines, obligation to obey, and authority to command are correlatives, and do depend one upon the other: and therefore true temporal allegiance can never encounter with true spiritual obedience, and be prejudicial thereto, nor contrariwise. 25 The third is, that although some Heathen Philosophers by the light of natural reason did evidently see, that the worship, and service of God, as he is the Author, and end of Nature, and of all natural things, is to be preferred before any temporal tranquility, of commodity, and that therefore every man both Prince, and subject by the light of natural reason ought to refer all their actions to the honour, and service of God, and to that happiness, which according to natural reason doth follow the worship, and service of God, and is the last end of man, although not the last end of all human actions, yet no Heathen Philosopher by the light of natural reason did or could see, that the temporal commonwealth itself, formally and in abstracto, as it consisteth of temporal power, is per se intrinsically, or naturally ordained, or referred, but only per accidens, and by the intention of man, to that happiness, which is the end of Religion, and followeth the worship and service of God, although man himself, in whom temporal power doth reside, ought by the light of nature ordain, and refer the use of his temporal power, and all his other actions to that bliss, happiness, and felicity, which is the last end of man, and the immediate end of the worship, and service of God. But of this I have treated more at large above in the Second part, where I have answered all the arguments, which Cardinal Bellarmine, and D. Schulckenius have brought to prove, that the temporal power itself among Christians is per se, and intrinsically, and not only by the intention of man ordained, and referred to everlasting happiness. 26 Now you shall see, what Mr. Fitzherbert concludeth from his former Discourse: Whereupon saith he, h pag. 99 nu. 9 & seq. two consequents follow directly, according to Philosophy, the one, that Religion is far more noble, and worthy, than the Commonwealth (because the end doth far excel the means that tend thereto) and the other, that the Ecclesiastical Society, (which of all Societies doth next approach to GOD, and unite them with him) is the most excellent, and worthy of all: Arist. l. 1. Meta. and therefore as Aristotle worthily called metaphysic the Mistress, and Goddess (because it immediately considereth the sciences of all things, which is God) so may we call the Religious, or Ecclesiastical Society, the Mistress, Lady, Empress, and Goddess of all Commonwealths, and all other Societies, because it is properly, and immediately dedicated to the service of GOD, as also because Commonwealths, and other Societies cannot perform their duty to GOD, nor arrive to perfect felicity, but by the means of the Ecclesiastical Society. 27 And this is so certain, and evident, that no Philosopher, or learned Paynim would deny it as it may appear by the institution, and customs of the best Commonwealths among the Paynims; in the which the Religious Society had the pre-eminence above the Commonwealth, in all things that any way appertained to Religion, as I will make it manifest hereafter when I shall speak of the law of Nations: and now only for the present I wish to be observed, that in the Roman Commonwealth, the chief Bishop, who was called Pontifex Maximus, had supreme authority in matters pertaining not only to Religion, but also to State, when the same was mixed with Religion, in which case he commanded the Consuls themselves, who were the Sovereign temporal Magistrates. Valeri. l. 1. c. 1. This appeareth in Valerius Maximus, who testifieth, that Posthumus the Consul being a Priest of the God Mars, and intending to go to Africa with his army, was forced by Metellus the chief Bishop to stay his journey, to attend to his Priestly function: and therefore Cicero saith, that it was most notably, Cicero pro domo sua. and divinely ordained by the ancient Romans, that the Bishops should have the chief command in matters that pertained as well to the Commonwealth, as to the Religion of the Gods. And no marvel, seeing that the Augurs, who were inferior to the Bishops, had such absolute authority, that they might hinder the election of Officers, deprive the Magistrates of their Offices, and forbidden the Senate to treat with the people; Cicero de legib. lib. 1. 2. in so much that nothing lawfully done by any Magistrate at home, or abroad, if he were contradicted by them; Cicero de Diviuat. lib. 2. and which is more the two Consuls, P. Claudius, and Lucius junius were condemned to death for disobeying them. 28 Whereby it appeareth, that although the Augurs, and Pontifices Maximi had no authority over the temporal Magistrates in matters merely temporal, yet when consideration of Religion entered together with temporal affairs, the temporal Magistrate was corrected, and commanded by the spiritual, as occasion required. And this I say, was the custom of the Romans, because, no doubt, they held it to be most conform to the law of Nature: in which respect I may boldly say, that if an Oath had been propounded amongst them, to have exempted their Consuls, and other temporal Magistrates from the command, and correction of the chief Bishop (notwithstanding any occasion of religion, which might occur) they would not have admitted it as lawful. And this is our very case. Thus I said in my Supplement, and then I concluded concerning the pretended Oath of allegiance, speaking to M. Barlow in these words. And thus you see M. Barlow, that the Law of Nature is so far from enjoining, and justifying the Oath (as you say it doth) that it utterly rejecteth, and condemneth it, except you can turn the world upside down, and pervert the whole course of nature, and prove, that things less perfect are to be preferred before the more perfect the body before the soul, sense before reason, temporal things before spiritual, policy before religion, earth before heaven, and the world before God, whereto in very truth your doctrine in this point directly tendeth. 29 But these two consequents, which Mr. Fitzherbert deduceth from his last Discourse, are neither against my doctrine, nor do they any way prove the new Oath of Allegiance to be repugnant to the Law of Nature. For, as I said before, I do willingly grant, that Religion, and the service of GOD, and perfect felicity, which is the immediate end thereof, is far more noble, and more worthy, than the temporal good, or immediate end of any temporal Commonwealth, which is his first consequent; and also, which is his second, that the Religious, or Ecclesiastical Society, is the most excellent, and worthy of all, and may in some sort be called the Mistress, Lady, Empress, and Goddess of all Commonwealths, and Societies, because it is properly, and immediately dedicated to the service of GOD, as also because temporal Commonwealths, and other Societies cannot perform their duty to GOD, nor arrive to perfect felicity, but by the means of the Ecclesiastical Society: But she is not called the Mistress, Lady, Empress, and Goddess of temporal Commonwealths, for that she can do all the actions, functions, and offices of them, and inflict the same temporal punishments, that temporal Commonwealths can inflict, but only for that she can do more noble, and more worthy actions, functions, and offices, and inflict more grievous, and more dreadful punishments, to wit, spiritual, agreeable to the nature, and conditions of a spiritual Commonwealth, and a Religious, or Ecclesiastical Society. 30 Secondly, I do also willingly grant, that amongst the Paynims, and ancient Romans, not only the chief Bishop, who was called Pontifex Maximus, and had the supreme authority in matters belonging to Religion or to the service of their Gods, but also the Augurs, or Soothsayers, who were Priests inferior to the chief Bishop had great authority, and command in matters belonging to temporal affairs, in so much, that the young chickens of certain birds, called pulli Melici, and Chalcidici, were held in such honour, and estimation among them, that they would keep no assemblies, they would promote none to any office, or dignity, they would neither make war, nor truce, and finally neither at home, nor abroad would they undertake any enterprise, unless they were foretold by those young birds, whose prediction they did regard as an oracle, and message sent from jupiter, whose messengers, and interpreters they accounted those birds to be. The particular manner whereof you may see in Alexander ab Alexandro lib. 1. cap. 29. But from hence it doth not follow, that those chief Bishops, as they were religious Priests, had authority given them by the law of Nature, but only by the free grant of the temporal Commonwealth, to punish temporally any man that should transgress their command, or otherwise violate the religion of their Gods. 31 Thirdly therefore although it be true, that the ancient Romans, and other Paynims did prefer Religion, and the worship of their Gods before any other temporal thing, and in regard thereof, when any thing was to be handled in the Senate, that which corcerned Religion was first of all dispatched, whereupon also they gave great temporal authority, honour, privileges, and exemptions especially to their chief Priest, or Bishop, to whom all other inferior Priests, as the Flamines, the Salij, the Augurs, the Epulones, the Aruales, the Vestales, yea and he, that was called Rex sacrorum, the King of sacred things, were subject; in so much that the dignity of the chief Bishop was accounted the second in the Commonwealth, and the next to Kingly dignity; and many times the same man was both a Religious Priest, and also a temporal Magistrate, as Q. Fabius Maximus was an Augur, and a Consul M. Aemilius Lepidus was Proconsul, and chief Bishop: Nevertheless it is not true, that the chief Bishop had any temporal authority even over the inferior Priests, as necessarily due to him by the law of nature, but only from the free grant of the temporal Commonwealth, or the supreme Governors thereof. And therefore at sometimes the chief Bishops had greater temporal authority, as in the beginning when the Romans were governed by Kings, in whom both Regal and Pontifical authority were conjoined, and by whom as being both Kings and chief Bishops, all matters as well concerning State, as Religion were determined and executed: at some times they had less, as afterwards, Alexand. lib. 3. genial. dier. cap. 3. & Sabellicus lib. 2. Ennead. 4. Alexand. ibidem & lib. 1. cap. 27. Alexand. lib. 3. cap. 27. when they had put down their Kings, for that they began to tyrannize over them, and were governed by the Senate, and two Consuls, who at the first were chosen out of the Nobility, but afterwards at the instance of the people, the Senate was forced to grant, that they might be chosen also out of the commmunaltie; which Consuls lest they should challenge to themselves Kingly authority could put no Citizen to death without the consent of the people. 32 For to the end that the Kingly name, which was by the Romans fortunately begun, and for many years happily continued, should still remain, and also that the Priestly authority, which the Kings had, should not be abolished, they did create a King, whom they called Rex sacrorum, a King of sacred things, who had only the name of a King without Regal authority, and should perform the sacred rites and ceremonies belonging to Religion, which the former Kings did perform. Which King of sacred things by reason of the odious and suspected name and authority of a King, could have no authority or command over the army and legions, nor bear any office, or have any temporal government over the people: but his power and authority was limited to Religion, and contained only within the temples of the Gods. And this King of sacred things was subject to the chief Bishop, as all other Priests were, who as they were Priests, had only to intermeddle in sacred things, but afterwards they had also great temporal authority granted them by the Senate and people. For the chief Priests or Bishops had not only power given them to punish with pecuniary mulcts the inferior Priests, who should disobey their command, but also they were made Consuls, Captains and chief Magistrates in the Commonwealth. But all this temporal authority of the religious Priests did proceed from the free grant of the temporal Commonwealth, and not as necessarily due to them by the law of Nature, which those words of Cicero cited by my Adversary do only confirm, to wit, that it was notably and divinely ordained, that the Bishops should have a chief command in matters that appertained as well to the Commonwealth, as to the religion of the Gods. 33 But that the temporal Magistrate, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, was commanded and corrected, he meaneth with temporal punishments, as occasion required, by the spiritual, was the custom of the Romans, because, no doubt, they held it to be most conform to the law of Nature. But first, those words [to be most conform to the law of Nature] are equivocal, and may have a double signification. For as every law, for as much as concerneth the directive power or force thereof (for the coercive power or force of every law consisteth merely in punishing) hath one of these three effects, to command, to forbid, to permit or grant some thing, so the law of Nature, as it is directive, may be taken, either as it commandeth, or as it forbiddeth, or as it permitteth or granteth some thing. If therefore my adversaries meaning be to signify by those words, that the law of Nature commandeth the spiritual Magistrate, or giveth him authority, as he is a spiritual person, to punish the temporal Magistrate transgressing his commandment with temporal punishments, & that in this sense the custom of the Romans was conform to the law of Nature, this, I say, is very untrue, neither can he bring any colour of a probable proof to confirm the same. Nay which is more, he can not prove, as you shall see beneath, that the law of Nature gave to Religious Priests, as they were such, authority to command in spirituals, or to punish with spiritual punishments the supreme temporal Magistrate, for that standing in the law of nature, there is no public spiritual authority, which is not subject and subordinate to the temporal Commonwealth, and the supreme Governors thereof. 34 But if he mean, that the law of nature, or the light and dictamen of natural reason doth not forbid, but doth permit that temporal Princes or Commonwealths may give authority to those Religious Priests, whom they shall appoint to be in their steed public Ministers of sacred rites, to punish with temporal punishments those that shall contemn their just command, and that in this sense the custom of the Romans giving authority to their Religious Priests to inflict temporal punishments was conform, that is, was not repugnant to the law of nature, but agreeable thereunto as a laudable and decent custom, but not as necessarily enjoined by the law of nature, this is very true, but not to the purpose; for that, which my Adversary pretendeth to prove, is that Religious Priests have by the law of nature, and not only by the free grant of temporal Princes or commonwealths authority to inflict temporal punishments, which nevertheless he will never be able to prove by any probable argument, or any probable show thereof. 35 Thirdly therefore for the better cleared of the whole matter, the Reader may observe out of learned Abulensis, Abulens. in cap. 13. Gen. q. 8. 9 & seq. that there is a great difference betwixt the Priests of the old law, & of the new, & the Priests, that were in the law of nature. For in the law of nature, before the law of God was published by Moses, we may consider every man either by himself, or as he was a part of some community: If he be considered by himself, and as dwelling alone in no Society, it was lawful for every man to offer sacrifice to God of whatsoever was his own, in what manner he would, and in what place he would because it was not by any law forbidden any man to do these things: For to offer sacrifice in the honour of God was of itself a good and commendable act, and it was forbidden no man, and therefore it was lawful for every man. So that in the law of nature every man being considered by himself was a Priest in this sense, that he might lawfully offer sacrifice in the honour of God, of what thing, in what manner, and in what place he would. But if man be considered, as he was a part of some community, and as living in civil Society it was far otherwise. For every civil Community had certain rites and ceremonies for the worshipping either of the true, or of false Gods; and in the name, and by the authority of the whole community there were done religious rites and ceremonies in honour of that God, which that community professed to be God. And because one particular act could not be done by the whole community, the community appointed certain Ministers, who in the name and place of the whole community should do that act. And these Ministers, for as much as concerned the doing of holy rites, were commonly called Priests: and so some certain men only were appointed Priests, and all men were not Priests; and to these Priests only it belonged to do those Sacrifices in the name, and by the authority of the whole community. And this custom was among all Nations, both jews and Gentiles before the law of God was given to Moses, and so among all Nations there were some persons specially appointed Priests by the community, and all men were not Priests.; 36 But after the law was written, and delivered by Moses to the Israelites, both the place where sacrifices were to be offered, and the Ministers which were to offer, and also the sacrifices which were to be offered, and the manner of offering them were limited, and determined by God himself. Concerning the place there were two limitations. The first was, that Sacrifices should not be offered in many places; the second, that they should not be offered in many Altars. Of the first we may see in Deuteron. Chap. 12. & 16. where it is said, that the Israelites should not offer sacrifice in every place, but only in that place, which God should choose to put his name there. And this was only one City, although it was not always the same. For the Israelites had a Sanctuary, which by God's commandment Moses made in the desert, and this was placed in one City, and this City was that which God did choose to place there his Sanctuary, as it was first in Sile, then in Nobe, afterwards in Gabaon, and lastly in Jerusalem: and only in that City it was lawful for the jews to offer sacrifices, and not in other places, nor in the fields, because than they should be accounted Idolaters, Levit. Chap. 17. 37 The second limitation was, that they should not do sacrifices in many Altars. For albeit there was but one only City, where Sacrifices could be offered, yet it might be thought, that there were many Altars upon which they might be offered, especially for that all Israel came sometimes to that place to offer sacrifices; and yet it was not so. For there was one only Altar, upon which all things were burned, and blood was offered. And this Altar was not made by any of them that did offer sacrifice, but it was that Altar, which Moses made in the desert after the manner and form that God himself did describe unto him, Exod. 27. and it was called the Altar of Holocaust, Exod. 38. Besides, it was not lawful to offer sacrifice in every part of the City, but only within the Sanctuary, which remained firm in one part of the City; and moreover within the Sanctuary Sacrifice was not offered in every place, but only upon the Altar of Holocaust, which was placed without the door of the Tabernacle, and to offer Sacrifice in another place it was unlawful, Leuit. 17. and joshua 22. Nevertheless in the same Sanctuary there were two Altars, The one was called of Holocausts, which had five cubits in length, and as many in breadth, and three in height, The other of Incense, which was only one cubit in length, and another in breadth, and two Cubits in height, upon the first all Sacrifices were offered, Exod. 27. & Leuit. 17. upon the second Sacrifice was never offered, but only Incense was burned every day twice, morning, and evening Exod. 30. But after that Solomon had built the Temple, the Tabernacle of Moses, and that Altar ceased, and then was made a greater Altar of Holocausts, which was of brass, and it had twenty cubits in length, and as many in breadth, 2. Paralip. 4. which according to the rules of Arithmetic containeth four hundred cubits square, and was able to comprehend many sacrifices together: but how great was the Altar of Incense made by Solomon the Scripture doth not mention. The Altar of Incense was within the Temple, but the Altar of Holocausts was without in the Court of the Temple, which was called the Court of the Priests. 38 Concerning the persons, who were to offer sacrifice, it is to be considered, that almighty God to take away occasion of Idolatry, as he limited the places, wherein sacrifices were to be offered, so also he would have the Ministers thereof to be limited: for if every man had been permitted to offer sacrifice, either Idolatry itself, or the rites and ceremonies of Idolaters might the more easily have crept in; and therefore he ordained, that only Aaron, and his sons, and they that should descend from them, should be consecrated Priests in Israel, to whom he gave authority to do all rites and ceremonies, as well of Sacrifices, as of other things, which ought to be done within the Sanctuary, Num. 3.17.18. And he appointed the rest of the Tribe of Levi, whom, as by a proper name we call Levites, to serve Aaron, and his sons, Num. 3. For these could do nothing concerning those four things, which did peculiarly belong to the Priests, to wit, to offer Sacrifice, to burn Incense, to put upon the Table holy breads, which were called loaves of proposition, Exod. 25. whereof the Priests only could eat, and to put the seven lamps upon the golden candlestick, and to have care of them, that they should give light: for these four offices, or ministries did belong only to the Priests: but the office, and ministery of the Levites was to serve the Priests in their office, and to do those things which are ordained, Num. Chap. 1.3. & 8. as to have a care and custody of the Tabernacle and all the furniture thereof, of the Ark, Table, Candlestick, Altars, vessels of the Sanctuary, veil, etc. and to take down, and carry the Tabernacle, when the camp was to go forward, and to set it up, when the people were to camp again, etc. 39 Concerning the ceremonies, which were to be used, and the sacrifices which were to be offered, albeit in the law of Nature, when there was no law of God, which did restrain, or limit any man to any kind of ceremony or Sacrifice, it was lawful for every man to do what he would, unless it were evil of itself, and therefore every man, as being considered by himself, might offer what sacrifice, or use what kind of ceremony he pleased, but as he was a part and member of some Community, he could use no other sacrifice or ceremony, then that which the Community, or the supreme Governors thereof, whose Minister he was, did appoint; yet in the law written it was otherwise. For as God himself did limit and determine the places, and ministers to do sacrifice, so also he determined all the rites, and ceremonies belonging to the worshipping of him, whereof the whole book of Leviticus doth treat. But concerning the Sacrifices, God appointed in general three kinds, to wit, Holocausts, a sacrifice for sin, and a Pacificke host Num. 6. and under these three were comprehended all other particular kinds of sacrifices, of all which, and of the ceremonies belonging to them it is treated from the first Chapter of Leviticus to the eight. What other authority the Priests of the old Testament had in expounding and interpreting the law of God, when any doubt or difficulty should arise, I declared above in the former Chapter, when I examined that place of Deuteron. 17. Si difficile, & ambiguum, etc. If thou perceive, that the judgement with thee be hard, and doubtful, etc. 40 Now last concerning the law of Christ, wherein all the ceremonial, and judicial laws of the old Testament do cease, insomuch that no Christian now is bound to observe any one of those laws, by virtue and force of the law, it is to be considered, that our Saviour Christ hath now instituted a new Priesthood, and a new Sacrifice. And albeit he hath determined, and limited the persons, who are to offer Sacrifice, and the Sacrifice, which is to be offered; for the persons, or Priests to offer Sacrifice he hath appointed only his twelve Apostles, and those, who are duly consecrated and ordained by them, or their Successors, and the Sacrifice, which they ought to offer, is one only, to wit, the unbloody offering of his immaculate body and blood under the visible forms of bread and wine, by using those words, which he himself in his last Supper did use and institute, yet he did neither limit the place, where this Sacrifice should be offered, nor the ceremonies, which were to be used in the offering thereof, but he left these to the disposition of the Church, and to the supreme Pastors or Governors thereof, to determine them as they should think convenient. Besides this authority, which Christ gave to the Priests of the new law over his true body, he gave them also authority, and jurisdiction over his mystical body, which are the faithful, which authority and jurisdiction is signified by the keys of the kingdom of heaven, which our Saviour promised to S. Peter, and in his person to the rest of the Apostles, whom he did represent, of which authority I have spoken somewhat in the former chapter, and also in my Apology, Theological Disputation, and Appendix thereunto. 41 And from hence the Reader may easily gather two things; the one is, the difference betwixt the Priests in the law of Nature, and in the law written: for that both in the law of Moses, and of Christ, the Priests had not their authority from men, but from GOD, neither was it in the power of the temporal commonwealth to extend, or diminish their Priestly authority: but in the law of Nature the Priests had their authority from the civil Community, or commonwealth, whereof they were parts, and members, and in whose name, and by whose authority they were made Priests, and had power to offer sacrifice; and it was in the power of the commonwealth to extend, or diminish, or to take quite away their Priestly authority, and to appoint and ordain, in what manner, and with what ceremonies, and what things they should Sacrifice to God, and to determine of all things concerning Religion; yea and the commonwealth did also determine what Gods they were to worship; and therefore it was decreed by the Senate of Rome, that no Emperor should be canonised or made God, Alexand. l ●6. cap. 4. but by the decree of the Senate. 42 The second, which followeth from the former, is, that considering in the law of nature the Priesthood was wholly subject and dependent upon the civil Commonwealth, in so much that the Priests in the law of nature were subject and subordinate, not only in temporals, but also in spirituals, and in all things, which concerned Religion, and the public service of God to the supreme Governors of the temporal Commonwealth, from whom they received all their Priestly authority, Mr. Fitzherbert very unlearnedly concludeth, that according to the law of nature the temporal State and power is subject and subordinate to the spiritual, and that the supreme temporal Magistrate was commanded and corrected with temporal punishments, as occasion required by the spiritual seeing that the quite contrary I have most clearly convinced out of Abulensis, and the same may very plainly be gathered from the doctrine of Sotus, Valentia, Suarez, Vasquer, and other Divines treating either of Sacrifices in general, or of the Sacrifice of the Mass, or of the Priesthood of Christ. And therefore I may boldly say, that if in the law of nature an Oath had been propounded by the civil Commonwealth, wherein the Religious Priests should have acknowledged, that they might not only for temporal crimes, but also for spiritual, and which merely concerned Religion be punished by the supreme temporal Governor with temporal punishments, and also be deprived of their Priestly function, and authority, the Priests would have admitted it as lawful; And if an Oath had been propounded by the Priests to have themselves exempted from the authority of the supreme temporal Governor even in spiritual or religious affairs, much less in temporal, the Civil Commonwealth, or supreme Governors thereof would not have admitted it as lawful, but would have punished the Priests for presuming to usurp such an authority. 43 Wherefore those last words of my Adversary to Mr. Barlow are a most vain, frivolous, and idle flourish: For albeit the ancient Philosophers, and learned Paynims being guided by the law of Nature, and light of natural reason, whose doctrine also in this point our modern Divines do follow, did clearly see, that in the law of Nature, when no positive law of God was published, the Civil commonwealth, or supreme governors thereof had the chief command, and authority in all matters as well concerning Religion, as State, to whom the Religious Priests were wholly subject as well in spiritual, or religious, as in temporal affairs, yet they did not turn the word upside down, or perverted the course of Nature, but knew right well, that things less perfect are not to be preferred before the more perfect, the body before the soul, sense before reason, temporal things before spiritual, policy before Religion, earth before heaven, and the world before God. And therefore there is none, but such ignorant men as my Adversary is, that can, or will affirm the new Oath of allegiance to be repugnant to the law of Nature, or to the light of nature reason, for that it denieth the authority of spiritual Pastors to punish temporally ablute Princes, or to deprive them of their kingdoms, or dominions. 44 And by this the insufficiency of the rest of Mr. fitzherbert's Discourse will easily appear. This was some part, saith he, i Pag. 101. num. 12. of my Discourse in my Supplement concerning the law of Nature, whereby thou seest, good Reader, that I have sufficiently showed two things: the one that according to the law of Nature the temporal state, and power is subordinate, and subject to the spiritual, when they are conjoined in one body, no less than the family is subordinate and subject to the Commonwealth in like case, because the end of the temporal power is subordinate to the end of the spiritual power, which overthroweth my adversaries false principle, to wit that the Ecclesiastical, and civil Society are so distinct in nature, and office, that though they be joined together, yet they have no dependence the one of the other, upon which false ground, and vain supposition often affirmed by Barclay, and him, and never proved by either of them, they found all their false doctrine. 45 But how untrue this is I have already showed. For in the law of Nature the temporal state, and power was not subject and subordinate to the spiritual, or Religious, except only in excellency, and nobility, whereof there is no question, but contrariwise the Priests of the law of Nature were subject in spiritual and religious affairs to the supreme civil Governor, when they were distinct persons, neither did they make two distinct Commonwealths, as they do in the law written, but the civil Commonwealth had authority to dispose of all matters as well concerning Religion as state, and not only to make Priests, and to give them Priestly power, but also to increase, diminish, altar, or to take away from them their Priestly authority, and to determine of all things both temporal and spiritual, which is not so in the law written, wherein Priests have their authority from the positive institution and law of God himself. 46 True it is, that the Heathen Commonwealths gave great authority, privileges, and exemptions to those persons, whom they chose and appointed to be their Priests, especially to the chief Priest, or Bishop (whereof read Alexander lib. 2. cap. 8. and lib. 3. cap. 27.) to whom the Romans gave such great honour, that they did esteem him next to the King, or supreme temporal Prince, and gave him authority to command, and also to punish the King of sacred rites, and all the other inferior Priests. Yea even to Vestal Virgins, who were Priests of the Goddess Vesta such honour was given by the Romans, that if by chance they should meet any malefactor, that was led to death, he should not for that time be put to death, Plutarch. in Numa Alex. lib. 5. cap. 12. upon condition that the Virgin must swear, that her meeting of him was casual, and not of purpose. But from hence it cannot be gathered, that the religious Priests had by the law of Nature such authority, privileges, and prerogatives, but only that the Commonwealth in honour of Religion did grant them such temporal honour, and authority, and would have them to be obeyed in some matters of great moment under pain of death. 47 Now in the new law in what manner the temporal Commonwealth, or rather those persons, who are parts, and members thereof, are subject to spiritual Pastors I have at large declared above in the second part, where I have sufficiently proved out of Card. Bellarmine's own grounds, that the conjunction of temporal power, and of spiritual subjection in the same Christian man is not sufficient to make the temporal, and spiritual Commonwealth among Christians one total body, or Commonwealth, whereof the Pope is the supreme visible head for then the Pope must be both a temporal, and spiritual Monarch of all Christendom, and Christians; and that although they should make one total body, or Commonwealth, whereof Christ only is the head in that manner, as I there declared, yet from thence it could not be concluded, that the temporal power, or Commonwealth is per se, and naturally subject, and subordinate to the spiritual power, or Commonwealth, but only that Christian Princes, not as they have temporal power, but as being members of the Church of Christ they have spiritual subjection, and consequently in spirituals, and not in temporals are subject to the spiritual power, or commonwealth, and the spiritual Pastors thereof: And there also I answered all the arguments, which D. Schulckenius brought to prove the contrary. Let Mr. Fitzherbert impugn that Treatise, and then he may have some cause to brag, that this doctrine of mine, and Barclaies is a false, and vain supposition of our own; In the mean time the Reader may clearly see, how vainly, and frivolously he hath proved by the law of Nature, that the temporal power is subject, and subordinate to the spiritual, and that in the law of Nature Religious Priests, as they were such, might command, and correct temporally the temporal Commonwealth, or supreme temporal Prince, whereas the quite contrary is manifest by the law of nature. 48 The other thing, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, that I have showed, is, that by reason of this natural subordination, and subjection of the laws, and less perfect Societies to the higher, and more perfect, it is most conform to nature, that the head of the Church, who is the supreme spiritual Magistrate, may command, and correct all inferior Magistrates, as well temporal as spiritual, when the necessity either of the whole body, or of the Church only (which is the most perfect, and supreme Society) doth require it, as in like case the supreme civil Magistrate (who is Prince, and head of the Commonwealth) justly commandeth, and punisheth the heads of Families, or Cities, notwithstanding that the said Families, and Cities are distinct Societies, and bodies, and have their laws, and Magistrates apart, no less than the Commonwealth, and Church have theirs. 49 But first it is untrue, that there is any natural subordination, and subjection of the temporal power, or Commonwealth to the spiritual, except in dignity and perfection, which is nothing to the purpose, and whereof no man maketh doubt; neither doth the dignity and perfection of the more noble, and excellent Society infer a superiority in command, and authority over the less worthy, and less noble Society, unless we will have the company of Goldsmiths to have authority and command over the Pewterers: and I have showed a little before most evidently, that in the law of Nature the Civil commonwealth had the whole charge, and command of all things, as well belonging to Religion, as to State, and that the Priests, or public Ministers of religious rites, were instituted, ordained, changed, deprived, commanded, and punished by the civil Commonwealth, upon whom even in all matters belonging to Religion, and the public worship of God they wholly depended: and therefore no marvel, that from this vain, and frivolous supposition of the natural subordination, and subjection of the temporal Commonwealth to the spiritual often affirmed by Mr. Fitzherbert, but never proved by him by any one probable argument, none but vain, and frivolous collections can be gathered. 50 Secondly, I have also sufficiently showed, that there is not the like case betwixt the supreme civil Magistrate and the heads of Families, and Cities, and betwixt the head of the Church, and the supreme Magistrate of the civil Commonwealth, as my Adversary here untruly affirmeth, for that not only those persons, who are the heads of Families, and Cities, but also the Families, and Cities themselves are parts, and members of the whole civil Commonwealth, and therefore in all civil matters to be directed, commanded, and temporally corrected by the supreme civil Magistrate: but the temporal Commonwealth itself, or the temporal Prince, as he hath temporal power, or in mere temporal matters, is not a part, & member of the Church, or spiritual kingdom of Christ, but only as he hath spiritual subjection, and therefore only in spirituals, and in such which are reduced to the nature of spirituals, he is to be directed, and commanded, and to be spiritually, not temporally corrected by the supreme spiritual Pastor. And so indeed it is conform to the law of nature, that is, it is not repugnant to natural reason, but it is fit, decent, and convenient, although not necessary, that the chief Religious Priest should have authority granted him, either by the civil commonwealth, as it was in the law of nature, or by the positive institution and law of God, as it was in the law written, to punish the transgressors of religious rites with some kind of punishments, but that the law of nature did give no authority at all to those who were appointed to be public Ministers of religious rites, to command or punish at all, the civil commonwealth, or Sovereign Prince thereof, upon whom both in spiritual and civil matters they wholly depended, is altogether repugnant to natural reason. 51 But Widdrington himself, saith Mr. Fitzherbert k Pag. 102. nu. 14. doth not deny, but that I have proved thus much effectually, so far forth, as concerneth a power to command, and a spiritual manner of punishment, seeing that he saith (as you have heard in the beginning of the last Chapter) that I have effectually proved nothing else by the divine, or natural law, but that the temporal power is subject to the spiritual in spiritual things, and in temporal, as they are reduced to spiritual, so far forth as concerneth commandment, and a spiritual, not a temporal manner of punishment. So he. 52 But although I do willingly grant, that he hath sufficiently proved by the law of God, that the Church of Christ, and the spiritual Pastors thereof have authority granted them by the positive institution and law of God to command in spiritual things, and in temporal, as they are reduced to spiritual, all Christians both Princes, and subjects being parts and members of the Church, and to punish them with spiritual punishments, if they shall contemn his just command; yet my meaning was never to affirm, that he hath effectually proved, either that there is any natural subjection, and subordination of the temporal commonwealth to the head of the Church of Christ, except only in dignity and perfection, or that the law of nature, abstracting from the positive institution and law of Christ, hath granted to spiritual pastors authority to punish, or command absolute Princes; for that all the authority, which spiritual Pastors now have, doth either proceed from the positive institution and law of Christ, or from the grant of Christian Princes, and not from the law of nature. Wherefore from these words of mine, which he hath related, this only can be concluded, that he hath effectually proved by the law of God, or nature, that the temporal power is subject to the spiritual in spiritual things, and spiritual punishments; and that he hath proved nothing else. For by what rules of Logic can my Adversary infer, that because I grant, that he hath effectually proved by the law of God, or nature, that the temporal power is subject to the spiritual, etc. Therefore I must grant that he hath effectually proved by the law of God and nature, that the temporal power is subject to the spiritual, etc. sith that every Logician knoweth, that to make an absolute disjunctive proposition to be true, it sufficeth that one part of the disjunction be true, and therefore to make that proposition of mine to be true, that he hath effectually proved by the law of God, or nature, that the temporal power is subject to the spiritual, etc. it is sufficient that he hath proved by the law of God, that the temporal power is subject to the spiritual in spiritual things, and in temporal, as they are reduced to spiritual, so far forth as concerneth commandment, and a spiritual, not temporal manner of punishment: for by the law of nature he hath proved no such thing, nor brought any one probable argument to prove the same. 53 But let us go on with his Discourse: Whereby it appeareth, saith he, l Pag. 102. nu. 15. that the only question now betwixt us is, whether the supreme spiritual Superior may punish temporally according to the law of nature, whereof truly there can be no doubt, if we consider the ground and substance of my former Discourse, proving a subordination of all Societies, and communities to the Church, for thereupon it followeth, that the head thereof may by way either of commandment, or punishment, dispose of whatsoever belongeth to all the inferior Societies, when it shall be absolutely necessary for the conservation of the Church, by the same reason, that the Superior, Magistrate, or Prince of the civil Society, or common wealth, may dispose in like case, and to like purpose of whatsoever belongeth to all the Societies, which are inferior to the commonwealth, or as the soul commandeth, Chap 2. per totum. or punisheth the body in whatsoever is dependent thereon, or accessory thereto, as I have proved before in the second Chapter. 54 But this, as you see, is only a repetition of his former idle Discourse; and therefore it needeth no other answer, then that which I gave before, where first I have showed, that the supreme spiritual superior of the Church of Christ cannot punish temporally according to the law of Nature, and that there is no natural subordination of any Civil Society to the Church of Christ, except only in dignity, and perfection, which is nothing to the purpose; and that in the law of Nature it belonged to the Civil Commonwealth itself to dispose and order all things as well concerning Religion, as Civil matters, as to ordain Priests, to appoint with what kind of Sacrifices, and in what manner, and place God should be publicly worshipped, to give, or take away, to extend, or diminish the authority, dignity, and privileges of Religious Priests, as the Commonwealth, whose Ministers they were, and to whom they were subject not only in temporals, but also in spirituals, should think expedient; and therefore to make a natural subordination & subjection not only in dignity, and perfection, but also in power, and authority of the civil commonwealth to the Church of Christ is clearly repugnant to nature, & to all natural reason. 55 Secondly, I also showed the manifest difference betwixt families, cities, and all such like inferior Civil Societies being compared to the whole Civil Commonwealth, and betwixt the whole Civil Commonwealth being compared to the Church, or spiritual kingdom of Christ, for that not only the persons of all inferior civil Societies, but also the Societies themselves, which are only compounded of civil power, are true parts, & members of the whole civil Society, or commonwealth; and that therefore the supreme civil Magistrate, or Prince, who hath power to dispose of the whole civil body, or commonwealth, hath power also to dispose of every part, and member thereof: But the temporal Commonwealth itself, which is compounded only of civil power, is not a part and member of the Church of Christ, which is compounded only of spiritual, and not civil, or temporal authority, as Cardinal Bellarmine himself confesseth: m Contra Barc. c. 12. p. 137 & in Schulck. pag. 203. And therefore it doth not follow by the same reason, as my Adversary here affirmeth, that the supreme head of the Church of Christ may dispose of whatsoever belongeth to the civil commonwealth because the supreme Prince of the civil commonwealth may dispose of whatsoever belongeth to all other inferior civil Societies, And whereas he supposeth, that to dispose of whatsoever belongeth to the civil commonwealth may be absolutely necessary for the conservation of the Church is a mere fiction, and idle supposition of his own brain: and although it were so necessary, yet it should not belong to spiritual Pastors, who have no civil power, but to Christian Princes to dispose thereof, as I have showed above. And as for the comparison of the soul and body, which all my Adversaries do so often inculcate, I have also showed before n Part. 2. c. 8. most clearly, that it is no fit similitude to prove their purpose, but maketh flat against them; both because the temporal, and spiritual commonwealth do not make one total body, or compound, in that manner as the body and soul do make one man, and also because albeit the soul may command the body to punish itself, yet she herself cannot punish the body without the help, and concurrence of the body itself; and therefore neither can the Church of Christ inflict temporal punishments without the help, and concurrence of the temporal commonwealth. 56 But now Mr. Fitzherbert will make, forsooth, all the matter more clear. And all this, saith he, o p. 103. nu. 16 will be yet more clear if we consider the weak reason that Widdrington giveth of his conceit to prove, that the supreme spiritual power cannot punish temporally. Wid. in Admon. ad Lect. nu. 17. For thus he saith; Atque ita recta ratio dictat, ut superior quicunque, etc. And so right, or true reason teacheth, that every Superior may punish his inferior with some penalty that is proportionate to his authority, but that any other besides him, that is supreme Governor of the civil commonwealth may punish his inferior with the pain or punishment of death or maiming, or of the deprivation of all his goods, this cannot be deduced from the rule, or prescript of true reason. Thus saith he: But to omit to speak of bloody punishments by death, or maiming, (which are never used by the Church, and therefore are idly mentioned here by my Adversary) it is to be noted, that in the rest he contradicteth not only the ancient, and common practice of the Church, yea the holy Scriptures, as I shall show p jufra nu. 18.19.20. Item cap. 7.9.10.11. & 12. per totum. after a while, but also his own grant, and concession. 57 If the prudent Reader had not sufficiently seen before the extreme vanity, palpable ignorance, and irreligious conscience of this my Adversary, he might easily conceive me to be a very bad, ignorant, and inconsiderate man for contradicting, as he saith, not only the ancient, and common practice of the Church, yea and the holy Scriptures, but also my own grant, and concession: but such bragging, and slanderous words are, as you have often seen, frequent in this man's mouth. First therefore those words of mine, Atque ita recta ratio dictat, etc. And so true reason teacheth, etc. were not brought by me as a reason, but as a conclusion of that I said before concerning the authority of Superiors to punish their subjects, or inferiors with some kind of punishments proportionate to their Coercive power. 58 Secondly, it is untrue, that bloody punishments by death, or maiming are idly mentioned here by me: seeing that he himself in the former paragraph did affirm, that the head of the Church may by way not only of commandment, but also of punishment, dispose of whatsoever belongeth to the Civil Commonwealth, and consequently both of goods, and bodies, whereof no doubt the civil commonwealth may dispose: and in the second Chapter also he expressly taught, that the Pope having power over my soul, and being withal the supreme Governor of the whole Church hath also power over my life, albeit with the lives of Princes, it being an odious question, he will not meddle, and a little after he affirmeth, that the Pope hath power over the temporal goods, states, and bodies of all Christians, and consequently, according to his doctrine, also of all Christian Kings, and Princes. Why then doth he now say, that bloody punishments by death, or maiming are idly mentioned here by me, when I affirm, that none but the supreme civil Superior hath power to punish his subject, or inferior with the punishment of death, maiming, or deprivation of goods? But mark I pray you, his goodly reason; because, forsooth, bloody punishments by death, or maiming are never used by the Church: whereas the question betwixt us was not, whether the Church doth actually use bloody punishments, for of this I spoke not one word in this place, albeit Pope Adrian did ordain in the Canon law, q In cap. Delatori 5. q. 6. that the tongues of some malefactors should be pulled out, and the heads of others strooken off: but the question was, whether the Pope hath power and authority to use bloody punishments, and he himself, as you have seen, expressly teacheth, that the Pope hath such a power, and yet now, forsooth, I in denying it, do mention idly bloody punishments by death, or maiming. 59 Thirdly, that he may not take occasion hereafter to cavil at my words, when I affirmed that true reason teacheth, that every Superior hath power to punish his inferior with some punishment proportionate to his authority, my meaning was, as also my words do sufficiently signify, to speak only of supreme Superiors, who have both directive, and coercive authority, that is power both to command, and punish: for a delegate Superior hath no other authority than is granted him by his supreme Superior: And therefore it is not against the law of Nature, or the prescript of true natural reason, that such a delegate Superior may have power given him only to command, and not to punish, or to punish one man, and not another, or to inflict one punishment and not another, according as his supreme Superior shall think it fit, and convenient. 60 Now you shall see in what manner Mr. Fitzherbert proveth, that I contradict my own grant, the holy Scriptures, and the ancient, and common practice of the Church. You have heard Widdrington grant, r Supra c. 5. nu 1. Wid. in Admon. ad Lect. nu. 17. saith he, s Pag. 104. nu. 17. that the spiritual Superior may command corporal, and temporal things, as they serve the spiritual, and are reduced thereto. Why then may he not punish his subject in his body, or temporal goods for the same respect? But first what contradiction, I pray you, is it, to affirm that the spiritual Superior may for a spiritual end command, or enjoin temporal penalties, and to deny, that he may not for a spiritual end inflict temporal penalties? Contradiction, as all Philosophers know, is an affirming, and denying of the self same thing, and in the self same manner, but to affirm one thing, and to deny another is no contradiction at all. Wherefore to prove, that I contradict my own grant, Mr. Fitzherbert must prove, which he can never do, that I affirm, and deny the self same thing, as to affirm, and deny, that the spiritual Superior hath power to command temporal penalties, to affirm, and also to deny that he hath power to inflict temporal penalties, for otherwise to accuse me of contradiction for affirming one thing, to wit, that the spiritual Superior hath power to command temporal penalties, and for denying another thing, to wit, that he hath not power to inflict temporal penalties, is to accuse himself of most gross, and palpable ignorance. 61 Secondly, I answer his demand with other like demands. Cardinal Bellarmine, as you have seen above, t Part. 2. cap. 8. affirmeth, that the soul may command bodily actions, when they are necessary for the good of the soul, and I also added, which he cunningly concealed, when they are necessary for the good also of the body; why then may not the soul herself also exercise bodily actions for the same respect, without the help or active concurrence of the body itself? Also the soul may command one corporal member to punish another, if it be necessary for the good either of the soul, or of the body, as the hands to whip the shoulders, or to cut off some contagious member, as the fingers, the toes, the feet, or legs if they be poisoned, why then hath not the soul herself for the same respect power to do the same? Moreover a ghostly father may enjoin his penitent for satisfaction of his sins, and to avoid the danger of falling back into sin, to give Alms, to build Hospitals, to afflict his body with fasting, watching, disciplining, hair cloth, and such like to shun this, or that company, etc. Why then, if the Penitent refuse to do these things, may not his ghostly father for the same respect take away his money from him, and give Alms, and build Hospitals therewith, and afflict his penitents body whether he will, or no & c? Why did S. Bernard affirm, that the material sword is by Christ's commandment to be drawn forth for the Church, but not by the Church, with the hands of the Soldier, but at the beck, or declarative commandment of the Priest? 62 But the true, and proper reason why spiritual Pastors have authority to command temporal punishments, and not to inflict temporal punishments, or to punish temporally, must be taken not from any natural subordination, or which is all one, from any necessary subjection, which according to the law of Nature the civil commonwealth, or temporal Princes have to the Religious Society, or to the Ministers of sacred rites, for that in the law of Nature it belonged to the civil commonwealth to dispose of all matters as well concerning Religion, as state, as I have showed before; but it must be taken from the positive institution of Christ our Saviour, and from the nature, and conditions of the laws, weapons, armour, and punishments, which according to the institution of Christ are due to the Church, as he hath distinguished them from the nature and conditions of the laws, weapons, armour, and punishments, which are proper to the temporal Commonwealth. For there is no doubt to be made, but that our Saviour if it had pleased him, might have ordained, that the chief visible head of the Church should be both a temporal, and spiritual Monarch, as the Canonists will have him to be, and might have given him authority to inflict not only spiritual but also temporal punishments, and not only to command, but also to use the material, temporal, or civil sword, as also if it had pleased him, he might have given him no power to command at all, but only to preach the word of God, and to declare his law, and to minister Sacraments to them that should voluntarily, and of their own accord demand them; wherefore what power the Pope and other spiritual Pastors have, we cannot gather from the law of Nature, or the necessary prescript of natural reason, but only from the positive institution and law of Christ. 63 But this difference betwixt the power to command, and to inflict temporal punishments will be made more plain and perspicuous, by examining his next Discourse, and by declaring morefully the true sense and meaning of those former words of mine. [The spiritual Superior may command corporal and temporal things, as they serve spiritual, and are reduced thereto:] Which my Adversary either doth not, or would seem not to understand. For seeing that, saith he u Pag. 104. number. 17. , the spiritual power to command temporal things in that case, resulteth (as Widdrington seemeth to grant) upon their reduction to the spiritual (that is to say, because they are used and applied to the service of the spiritual whereby they are reduced to a kind of spiritual nature or quality) why shall not the same reason hold for the spiritual Superiors power to punish in temporal things, which are no less used and applied to the service of the spiritual, in punishment, then in commandment? as when delinquents are enjoined for the punishment of their sins to give Alms, to build Hospitals, or Monasteries, to go in Pilgrimage, and to afflict their bodies by fasting, watching, discipline, haircloth, and such like, it is clear, that as well the corporal labours, as the temporal expenses are referred to a spiritual end, (to wit, to God's glory, and the benefit of the Soul) no less than if the same were employed otherways for God's service, by the direction or commandment of the spiritual Superior. Also, when heretics are deprived of their honour, fame, goods, or lives for the just punishment of their heresy, See Silvester verb. Haeres. nu. 12. 13. & 14. according to the custom and Canons of the Church, who knoweth not that the same to done for the glory of God, and the great benefit of the Church? So as there is no less relation or reduction of corporal and temporal goods to the spiritual in punishing, then in commanding, and therefore Widdrington cannot with any probability admit the one, and reject the other. 64 The reason why the spiritual Pastors of the Church may command temporal punishments, and yet may not inflict them, or punish temporally; or, which is all one, why the directive power of spiritual Pastors is extended to temporal punishments for a spiritual end, and yet their coercive power is not for the same respect extended also to temporal punishments, but restrained and limited to spiritual, or Ecclesiastical Censures, I fully declared in my Appendyx to Fa. Suarez, which Mr. Fitzherbert might well have seen, seeing that it was published the year before this his Reply came forth. See Appendix part. 1. sec. 4. For Fa. Suarez argued in this manner: The Ecclesiastical power of the Church, as it is directive, or commanding is not by those words of our Saviour, Quodcunque ligaveris etc. Whatsoever thou shalt bind &c. determined to this or that manner of directing or commanding, but doth without limitation comprehend all convenient directing or commanding, therefore the same is to be understood of the coercive, or punishing power. For we do now suppose as a thing manifest, and known to every man of mean learning, that in every law there is contained the commandment, which the Divines call, vis dirigens, the directive or commanding force or power, and the punishment, for fear of which we are in some sort compelled and constrained to perform the thing commanded, which therefore the Divines call vis cogens, or coercens, the compelling, enforcing or punishing force, or power of the law. 65 This therefore was a part of my answer to the aforesaid argument of Fa. Suarez, which my Adversaries concealing thereof urgeth me to repeat here again, that the Reader may in some sort thereby perceive, that he still urgeth the same arguments, which have before beenefully satisfied. Secondly, if that assertion or argument of Suarez be so understood, that as the Ecclesiastical power to command is not limited to any certain manner of commanding, so that it be convenient, and beseeming the nature and condition of an Ecclesiastical or spiritual body, or Society (as it is by the institution of Christ distinguished from the civil body or Commonwealth) so the Ecclesiastical power to punish is not limited to any certain manner of punishing, so that it be convenient, and beseeming the nature and condition of an Ecclesiastical or spiritual body, and society (as it is instituted by Christ and distinguished from the civil Commonwealth than we grant also his comparison, or the consequence of his argument. But then we affirm, that as only temporal correction or punishing is convenient and proper to the temporal body, or Commonwealth; so also only spiritual censures or punishments are by the institution of Christ convenient and beseeming the spiritual kingdom, or Church of Christ, as out of many Catholic Authors we have showed a little before. 66 Wherefore there is a great difference to be observed betwixt the power to command, and to punish. For the Ecclesiastical power to command is as it were unlimited, and may be extended to all things both spiritual and also temporal, not as they are temporal, but as in regard of the virtue or sin therein contained, they become spiritual; because the object of the Ecclesiastical directive or commanding power is virtue, or vice, which may be found in all things whatsoever, aswell temporal, as spiritual: And so the Ecclesiastical power forbidding a temporal thing as it is a sin, or hurtful to spiritual good, doth nothing which is unbeseeming the nature and condition of a spiritual body, or Society, but the depriving one of temporal lands, goods, liberty, or life, are always temporal punishments for what crime soever either spiritual or temporal they be inflicted, and therefore are not convenient or beseeming the nature or condition of a spiritual Commonwealth, as I have showed before. 67 And this distinction or difference betwixt the commanding and chastising power doth evidently appear in the civil Commonwealth, which having for the object of her directive or commanding power, public peace, or public disquietness, as the Ecclesiastical hath virtue or vice, may forbid all things even Ecclesiastical matters, as they are truly manifest wrongs to the civil society, and unjust hindrances to the public peace; for that these unjust oppressions, although principally, and of themselves are spiritual, yet secondarily and by accident they are temporal wrongs, and in that regard may be punished by the civil Magistrate, not with spiritual but with temporal punishments, as before in this Disputation x Cap. 7. sec. 2 nu. 17. I have showed out of those two famous and learned Dominikes, Sotus, and Bannes. Whereby we may perceive that this manner of arguing, which Suarez useth in comparing the commanding or directive power, with the punishing or coercive, is not allowable; for otherwise we might in like manner conclude, that as the Civil power to command is not so limited, but that it may sometimes be extended to Ecclesiastical or spiritual matters; so also the Civil power to punish is not so limited, but that it may sometimes be extended to punish with Ecclesiastical or spiritual punishment. Thus I answered in that place. 68 By which the Reader may clearly see, that the difference betwixt the directive or commanding, and the coercive, compelling, or punishing power must be taken (as the natures and differences of all powers ought to be taken) from their proper acts, and objects; for the acts and objects of the Ecclesiastical power, as it is directive, or commanding, are the commanding of virtuous, and the forbidding of vicious acts, whereby the spiritual health of souls, and everlasting happiness, which is the last end of the spiritual power, is obtained: So that what thing soever, be it temporal or spiritual, that may be virtue or vice, that may be necessary or hurtful to the spiritual good of souls, may also be commanded, or forbidden by the Ecclesiastical or spiritual power, as it is directive. And this is the reason why the spiritual power as it is directive, may be extended to temporal punishments, that is, may command or forbid temporal penalties or afflictions, for that virtue and vice, which are the object of the spiritual power, as it is directive, may be found in them. 69 So likewise the object of the civil power, as it is directive, is the obtaining and conserving of temporal peace and quietness in the temporal commonwealth, and her acts are the commanding or forbidding of those things which are necessary, or hurtful to the public peace, which is the last end of the temporal power itself, although it be not the last end of the temporal Christian Prince, as I showed above in the second part; So that what thing soever, be it spiritual or temporal, that doth injuriously disturb the public peace, may be forbidden by the temporal power, as it is directive. And this is the reason why the temporal power, as it is directive, may be extended sometimes to spiritual actions, not as they are spiritual, but as they are reduced to temporal actions, for that the injurious disturbance of the public temporal peace, which is the object of the temporal power, as it is directive, may sometimes be found in them. As the baptizing of one with poisoned water, or the ministering of the B. Sacrament, which is also poisoned, as they are spiritual actions, to wit the ministering of Sacraments, which work a spiritual effect, are not subject to the directive power of the temporal Prince, but as they work a temporal effect, which is injurious to the temporal peace, they are subject to the temporal power, as it is directive. And so a temporal Prince may forbid a spiritual Pastor, who is subject to him in temporals, to minister hic, & nunc the Sacrament of Baptism, whereby the party baptised shall be poisoned. So also unjust Excommunications, if they cause tumults, and perturbations in the commonwealth, or unfit conventicles by night, with armour and weapons, whereby probable danger of seditions, or of other temporal wrongs may arise, although these assemblies be made to preach the Gospel, or instruct the people in the faith of Christ, may be forbidden by the temporal power, not as they are temporal actions, but as they are temporal wrongs, and truly injurious to the public temporal peace. 70 And this doctrine is of itself so manifest and perspicuous, that no man of any learning can deny it: and to affirm, that it is a doctrine altogether intolerable and which cannot be uttered, but by one who is given to a reprobate sense, for that it maketh the temporal Prince to be judge of spiritual things, and thereby maketh him truly the head of the Church, as D. Schulckenius most rashly affirmeth y Pag. 7. & 208. , is an intolerable slander, and which could not be uttered by any learned man, unless with some vehement passion of ire he had been altogether transported, and his understanding therewith had been wholly blinded, as I have showed more amply in the Discovery of his slanders z In Appendice ad Supplicationem § 11. calumnia 11. . For this doctrine doth not make the temporal Prince to be judge of spiritual matters, but of temporal, nor to be the head of the Church, that is of the mystical body of Christ, and his spiritual kingdom, or of Ecclesiastical and spiritual causes, but only of the politic body, and temporal commonwealth, and of civil matters, or which, by reason of some true temporal wrong, are reduced to civil matters. 71 But the Ecclesiastical or spiritual power, as it is coercive, compelling or punishing, doth not consist in commanding, but in punishing, and her proper act and object is the inflicting of spiritual Censures or punishments. For as Christ our Saviour hath instituted his Church a spiritual and not a temporal kingdom, so he hath given her correspondent weapons, armour, and punishments which she is to use, to wit Ecclesiastical Censures, as Excommunication, Suspension, Interdict, and not civil punishments, as death, exile, privation of goods, etc. as I have showed before a Part. 1. per totum. out of Almain and many others, both ancient Fathers and modern Catholic Divines, and Lawyers: which also is sufficiently grounded in the holy Scriptures, And if he will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as a Heathen, and Publican b Matth. 18 : and I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven c Matth. 16 , not of earthly kingdoms; and the weapons of our warfare are not carnal d 2. Cor. 10. . 72 So likewise the Civil power, as it is coercive, doth not consist in commanding, but in punishing, and her proper act, and object is the inflicting, or using of temporal punishments, as death, exile, privation of goods etc. Which S. Bernard f Lib. the considerate. ad Eugenium. called the drawing forth, or using, and exercising the material, or temporal sword: for although he affirmed the material, or temporal sword to belong in some sort to the Church, for that it was to be drawn forth, or used for the Church, but not by the Church, yet he also affirmed, that Christ our Saviour did forbid spiritual Pastors, to wit, as they were such, to draw forth, or use the material, or temporal sword. And therefore well said Petrus Damianus, g In Epist. ad Firnim. that the kingdom and Priesthood are by their proper offices, and functions so distinguished, that the King should use Secular weapons, and the Priests be girded with the spiritual sword; which in sense is all one with that saying of Gratian, h 2. q. 7. cap. Nos si. the Compiler of the Canon law, called the Decree, It belongeth to Kings to inflict corporal, and to Priests to inflict spiritual punishments. Now as the end both of the directive, and also of the coercive power is temporal peace, so the end both of the directive, or commanding, and also of the coercive, or punishing spiritual power is the spiritual health of souls, and everlasting happiness, which, as I have showed above in the second part, is also the last end of every Christian man, to which spiritual Pastors by Ecclesiastical laws, and spiritual Censures, and Christian Princes by civil laws, and temporal punishments, are by the law of Christ bound, as much as lieth in them, to bring their Subjects. 73 And by this the Reader may easily perceive both the true meaning of those words of mine, The spiritual Superior may command corporal and temporal things as they serve spiritual, and are reduced thereto, but not inflict temporal punishments; and also what Mr. Fitzherbert can rightly conclude from that assertion of his, All temporal things, and temporal punishments may be referred to a spiritual end (to wit, to God's glory, and the benefit of souls) and this no less in commanding then in punishing. For corporal or temporal things to become spiritual things, or to be reduced thereto, is nothing else, then that in corporal and temporal things there may be found virtue, or vice, which are the object of the spiritual directive power, and that therefore all temporal things, and also all temporal punishments, as they may become spiritual things, or reduced thereto, that is, as by the rela●ion of them to God's gloty, and the health of souls, there may reside in them virtue, or vice, may be commanded or forbidden by the spiritual directive or commanding power, which hath for her acts and objects the commanding of virtue, and the forbidding of vice: but the act and object of the spiritual coercive power is the inflicting, and not the commanding of spiritual punishments; and no relation of temporal punishments to God's glory, or to the health of souls can make them to be spiritual punishments; for that death, exile, privation of goods, etc. although by the reference of them to God's glory, and the health of souls they may become spiritual actions, that is, in them may reside virtue, or vice, yet they can never become spiritual punishments: and therefore although they may be commanded, or forbidden by the spiritual power, for that the object of the spiritual commanding power are all things wherein virtue or vice may be found, yet they cannot be inflicted by the spiritual coercive power, which hath for her object the inflicting only of spiritual, and not of temporal punishments, unless the reference of temporal punishments to the glory of God, and the health of souls can make temporal punishments to become, I do not say spiritual things, but spiritual and not temporal punishments, which is impossible. And therefore with great reason I did admit the one, to wit, that the spiritual Superior may command temporal punishments, as they become spiritual things, or are reduced thereunto, that is, to things, wherein virtue or vice may be found, and did reject the other, to wit, that the Spiritual Superior may in regard of the same reference, or reduction inflict also temporal punishments; for that no reference, or reduction of the inflicting of temporal punishments to God's glory, and the health of souls can make temporal punishments to become spiritual punishments, or the inflicting of temporal punishments to be the inflicting of spiritual punishments. And therefore you may see, I will not say, with what probability, but with what palpable ignorance Mr. Fitzherbert i Suprat. 2. nu. 10. accuseth me of contradiction in this point, and calleth it before a frivolous distinction of mine. 74 And from this also which I have said, two other things may easily be gathered. The one is, that to know what punishments are the object of the spiritual coercive, or punishing power, we have no other way a priori, than the holy Scriptures, wherein the institution and law of Christ is contained: and the reason is, because there is no natural necessity, that spiritual Pastors must have authority to inflict temporal punishments, and by the law of nature, and the ancient Romans, and other Heathen commonwealths, who were guided by the light of natural reason, I have sufficiently proved before, that this natural subordination, and subjection (especially in coercive, or punishing temporal authority, or authority to punish temporally) of the civil commonwealth to religious Priests (which my Adversary supposeth) is a very vain and idle fiction, or chimera, & feigned without any colour or show of true natural reason. Wherefore seeing that Christ our Saviour might by his absolute power have given to the spiritual Pastors of his Church a greater or lesser coercive, or punishing authority, than he hath given them, yea and might have given them no coercive authority, or power to punish at all so much as with spiritual Censures, to know what coercive or punishing power, he hath actually given them, cannot be proved by the law of Nature, or by natural reason, but only by the holy Scripture, and the ancient Fathers, who are the sincere Expositors thereof, and lived before this controversy concerning the Pope's temporal authority over temporal Princes arose, and therefore could neither favour the one side, nor the other. 75 The second is, that there is but little difference except in words betwixt the doctrine of the Divines, and Canonists concerning the spiritual coercive, or punishing power. For although the Canonists do suppose, that all the power as well coercive, as directive, which Christ hath given to the Pastors of his Church, is in ordine ad bonum spirituale, in order to spiritual good, or for the saving of souls, which the Divines call indirectly, yet because the Canonists hold, that the Pope by the institution of Christ hath supreme authority to inflict as well temporal as spiritual punishments, and consequently to punish all Christians even temporal Princes as well temporally, as spiritually, therefore they fear not to affirm conformably to their grounds, that the Pope is the supreme temporal, and spiritual Monarch of the whole Christian world, and hath true temporal coercive authority. But the Divines although in effect grant as much, yet they differ in words, and that coercive authority of spiritual Pastors, which the Canonists call temporal, for that it worketh the same temporal effect, and hath the self same object, which the temporal, or civil coercive authority hath, will not, forsooth, call it temporal authority, but spiritual authority in temporals, and that not directly, but indirectly, or in order to spiritual good, whereas the Canonists do also hold, that the Pope's temporal coercive authority, or his coercive authority in temporals is also in order to spiritual good. But this distinction of directly, and indirectly was purposely invented by the later Divines to make their doctrine concerning the Pope's authority to dispose of all temporals, and to inflict temporal punishments to be more plausible to the vulgar sort, and to be less odious to Christian Princes, and their loyal subjects, who can not brook to hear any man say, that absolute and Sovereign Princes are not supreme, but subject in temporals to spiritual Pastors, whereas in effect, and very deed the Divines, notwithstanding this their distinction, do make absolute Princes, whom the ancient Fathers with uniform consent have ever accounted to be next under GOD in temporals, and not to be temporally punished but by GOD alone, to be as much subject in temporals to spiritual Pastors, and to be no less temporally punished by them, than the Canonists do. So that the difference betwixt their opinions concerning the coercive power of spiritual Pastors is rather verbal, and only about words, them real, and in very deed. 76 Seeing therefore that to have power, and authority directly in temporals is nothing else then to have power in temporals, as they are temporal, and to have power indirectly in temporals is to have power in temporals, not as they are temporal, but, as the Divines say, in order to spiritual good, or, which is all one with that I said before, as by the order and reference to spiritual good, that is, to the glory of God, and the health of souls they become spiritual, that is virtuous, and vicious actions, it is manifest, that although this distinction of directly, and indirectly may be applied to the spiritural directiue●, or commanding power, as I declared before, for that spiritual Pastors have no power to command temporal actions but in order to spiritual good, and by that reference become spiritual, and capable of virtue, or vice, which is the health or hurt of souls, yet it cannot be applied to the spiritual coercive, or punishing power, unless it be first proved, that Christ hath given to spiritual Pastors for the health of soul's authority to inflict as well temporal, as spiritual punishments, and that the objects of the spiritual coercive power are by the institution of Christ both temporal and spiritual punishments, which my Adversaries will never be able to prove from the holy Scriptures, or the ancient Fathers, and unpartial expositors thereof; for to prove the coercive authority of spiritual Pastors, and Priests by the law of Nature, or natural reason, who, as I have showed before, were in the law of Nature subject to the coercive power of the civil Commonwealth, is most idle, and frivolous. 77 Now you shall see, how frivolous the second reason is, which Mr. Fitzherbert bringeth to prove that I contradict myself, in granting, that the spiritual Superior may command temporal punishments, and yet in denying, that he may inflict temporal punishments. Furthermore Widdrington granteth, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, k Pag. 105. num. 18. that the spiritual Superior may punish spiritually (that is to say by Censures of Excommunication, Interdict, and Suspension) but who seethe not that he granteth consequently, that the said spiritual Superior may also punish temporally? For Excommunication doth not only deprive a man of the use of the Sacraments, but also of the communication, and conversation of Christian men, and of many temporal commodities even according to our saviours own commandment, who ordained a temporal penalty of Excommunication, Matth. 18. when he commanded, that he which will not hear the Church, shall be taken for an Ethnic, and a Publican, that is to say, shall be excluded not only from the participation of the spiritual benefits of the Church, but also from the temporal company, 1. Cor. 4.2. Thess 3. and conversation of the faithful; which was also ordained by the Apostle, when he commanded the Corinthians, and Thessalonians not to eat with notorious sinners, and disobedient persons; and by S. john, when he commanded that the Christians should not receive heretics into their houses, nor so much as salute them; in all which it cannot be denied, but that the offenders were punished temporally. 78 But all this, and the rest also, which Mr. Fitzherbert bringeth in the two next Paragraphes was before objected by Fa. Suarez, and fully answered by me in my Appendix: but this man is pleased to repeat still the same objections, which by me, and others have been before often answered. Wherefore it is true, that I do grant, that the spiritual Superior may punish spiritually by Ecclesiastical Censures, but it is not true, that I must consequently grant, that he may also punish temporally, for this I ever denied, and therefore it is a mere fiction of his own brain, that I contradict myself in affirming, and denying the self same thing. For First Excommunication, as I showed before, l In my Appendix against Suarez. part. 2. sec. 4. See also above chap. 1. nu. 16. and seq. and chap. 5. sec. 2. num. 131. & seq. doth not of it own nature, and by any institution of Christ deprive of civil conversation, but only of the Ecclesiastical or spiritual participation of the faithful: and therefore all civil contracts with excommunicated persons, as buying, selling, changing, lending etc. are valid, and of force, if we respect only the law of Christ. Secondly, it is also true, that by the law of the Church some temporal punishments may be annexed to Excommunication by way of command, and so the Church hath power to command, that we shall not civilly converse with excommunicated persons, except in those cases, wherein by the law of Nature, and Nations we are bound civilly to converse with them: So also spiritual Pastors, as I have showed before, may annex to Excommunication the inflicting of those temporal punishments, which from the grant, and privileges of temporal Princes they have authority to inflict: But this is nothing to that, which Mr. Fitzherbert intended to prove; For I never denied, that the spiritual Superior may punish temporally by way of command, or to speak more properly, may command and enjoin temporal penalties, and also inflict them by that civil authority, which he hath received from the grant of temporal Princes, but that which I denied, is that the spiritual Superior hath by the institution of Christ authority to inflict temporal punishments. 79 Thirdly, Mr. Fitzherbert affirming so boldly, that our Saviour by his own commandment ordained a temporal penalty of Excommunication, doth err most grossly, seeing that he cannot prove, that our Saviour ordained any penalty at all, much less a temporal penalty of Excommunication. For if he had but slightly run over Schoole-divinitie, and especially the Treatise of Ecclesiastical Censures, he could not but have seen, that although the power to excommunicate is de iure divine, and instituted by the law of Christ, yet that according to the more common doctrine of Divines neither Excommunication, or any other Ecclesiastical Censure, or penalty is de iure divino, and ordained by the commandment of Christ, but de iure humano, and instituted by the Church: and that to no sin is annexed any Censure by the law, and commandment of Christ, who did never by himself immediately ordain, that the Church should use such, or such a determinate punishment, but he left to the prudent judgement, and arbitrement of the Church to determine in particular this or that punishment, according to the authority she hath received. Suarez. tom. 5. dis. 2. sec. 1. For thus writeth Fa. Suarez affirming it to be the more common opinion of Doctors, and withal he answereth all the authorities, which Mr. Fitzherbert hath brought here out of the holy Scriptures. 80 But the contrary doctrine, saith Suarez, may seem to have some ground in those word; Matth. 18. If he will not hear the Church let him be to thee as a Heathen, and a Publican. For by those words our Saviour Christ doth seem to have sufficiently showed, and instituted the Censure of Excommunication, and that the Pastors of the Church are here virtually commanded to excommunicate disobedient, and obstinate Christians: because by no other reason the faithful can be bound to avoid such kind of men. But from this place, saith Suarez, nothing can be gathered. For otherwise one might also gather from thence, that whosoever disobeyeth the Church, is excommunicated by the law of God. Also, for that otherways the Church doth excommunicate no man, but declare him to be excommunicated by the law of God, because he doth not obey the Church, which how absurd this is, it is manifest of itself, etc. First, therefore by those words is signified this general maxim, that those who do not hear the Church, do grievously sin, and especially if they be obstinate, and that therefore they are to be accounted, and shunned as grievous sinners, as are Heathens and Publicans. Secondly, It is signified that Christ our Lord will give to his Church power to bind and lose. And so in those words is contained the power to inflict the Censure of Excommunication, but not the institution of the Censure itself, or a commandment in particular, but only in general of avoiding sinners, who are disobedient to the Church, under which general law is comprehended an accommodate distribution to say so, to wit, a commandment to shun every one that is disobedient to the Church, according to the degree and manner of the prohibition and separation which is made by the Church herself. And this is the common exposition of Interpreters upon that place, and of Divines handling this matter. Thus Suarez. Whereby it is apparent how disagreeably to Suarez doctrine Mr. Fitzherbert here affirmeth, that Christ our Saviour by his own commandment ordained a temporal penalty of Excommunication, when he commanded, that he who will not hear the Church shall be taken for an Ethnic, and a Publican, seeing that according to Suarez, he ordained here no penalty or Censure at all of Excommunication. 81 But because some Catholic Doctors, as Almain, Eckius, Clicthoveus and Driedo do affirm, whose doctrine in this point both Suarez, and the more common opinion of Divines do reject, that at leastwise to the sin of heresy, if it be joined with obstinacy, there is annexed some Censure or punishment by the law of God and their opinion may seem to have some ground in those authorities of holy Scripture, whereof some are here urged by Mr. Fitzherbert: Suarez also answereth to these authorities, and affirmeth, that they are not forcible. And first, that those words of S. Paul ad Tit. 3. A man that is an heretic after the first and second admonition avoid, etc. may be understood of the natural obligation, by which every man is bound to avoid danger of being infected, and consequently to avoid the person, which is an occasion to him of sinning; and such is an heretic whose speech spreadeth as a Canker, 2. Tim. 2. So also it is said. 1. Cor. 5. But now I wrote to you not to keep company; if he that is named a brother, be a fornicator, or a covetous person, or a server of Idols, or a railer, or a drunkard, or an extortioner, with such an one not so much as to take meat: and Galat. 5. Know you not that a little leaven corrupteth the whole paste? Secondly, although we should grant, that the Apostle in that place ad Tit. 3. spoke of a proper Censure, it doth not follow, that this institution is divine, but at the most an institution of the Apostle, because it is the commandment of S. Paul etc. and especially for that it may be expounded, Avoid, that is, Excommunicate; for the Apostle spoke to Titus, who was a Bishop, and had power to excommunicate. 82 And according to this sense may be understood those words of S. john Epist. 2. If any man come to you, and bring not this doctrine, receive him not into your house, nor say to him, God save you, although they rather seem to be understood of a natural commandment not to cooperate with such men, and not to give them any signs, whereby either we should seem to consent to them, or that they should be confirmed in their error. And this S. john did signify in the next words. For he that saith to him, God save you, communicateth with his wicked works. As also S. Paul, 2. Thess. 3. said; And if any obey not our word note him by an Epistle, and do not company with him, that he may be confounded. In which last word also the Apostle insinuateth, that not only to avoid communication in sin, but also to rebuke our neighbour charitably, it is sometimes counseled, or also commanded to abstain from his company, that he may be confounded: of this sort also are those words, 1. Cor. 5. which words do admit almost all the aforesaid interpretations: And if they be extended to a proper Censure, they are to be understood, at what time, and in what manner the Pastors of the Church shall judge, that these kind of sinners are to be avoided. And so by all these testimonies conferred together it is evidently gathered, that there is no ground in Scripture for us to say, that any Censure is by the law of God annexed to heresy, rather than to other sins: And therefore the contrary opinion is far more probable, and it is the common opinion of other Doctors. Thus Suarez. And yet, forsooth, Mr. Fitzherbert maketh no doubt, but that Christ our Saviour by his own commandment hath ordained a temporal penalty of Excommunication, whereas Suarez, and the common opinion of Doctors do resolutely affirm, that no penalty at all of Excommunication is by the commandment of Christ ordained against those that shall disobey the commandment of the Church. 83 Wherefore last, and principally, all that Mr. Fitzherbert, or any other can conclude from the former places of holy Scripture, or such like is, that the Church hath power in order to the spiritual good of souls to enjoin temporal punishments, and to command the faithful not to converse civilly with Heathens, Publicans, or notorious sinners, when otherwise by the law of nature they are not bound to converse civilly with them, whereof I never made any doubt. And therefore observe, good Reader, the fraud and ignorance of this man, who pretended to prove, that I contradicted myself in granting that the spiritual Superior could command temporal punishments, but not inflict them, seeing that neither from the reduction of temporal things to spiritual, nor from the nature & effects of Excommunication, nor from those places of holy Scripture, which he here hath brought, he concludeth any other thing, than that Christians are commanded to account him an Heathen, and a Publican, who will not hear the Church: that the Apostle commanded the Corinthians, and Thessalonians not to eat with notorious sinners and disobedient persons: that S. john commanded the faithful not to receive heretics into their houses nor so much as to salute them, all which I willingly granted, but of the other part of the contradiction, which was the principal thing he should have proved, that I must consequently grant, that the spiritual Superior can also inflict temporal punishments, he speaketh not one word. 84 For if a Christian should not observe the aforesaid commandments, and will not account them for Heathens and Publicans, who shall not hear the Church, if he will eat and drink with notorious sinners, and receive heretics into his house, and salute them, what punishments then can the spiritual Superior inflict upon such a person? can he deprive him of his temporal life) liberty, dignities, or goods? can he by temporal force whip him, send him into banishment or such like, or only exclude him from the spiritual conversation of the faithful, deprive him of spiritual graces, dignities, and privileges, and command other Christians to account him as a Heathen, Publican, and notorious sinner? This is the main difficulty betwixt us, which Mr. Fitzherbert cunningly passeth over with silence, and yet he would make his Reader believe, that he hath sufficiently convinced me of contradiction, in granting that the spiritual Superior may command temporal punishments, but not inflict them, whereas of this second, which was the main point, and only question betwixt us, he speaketh not one word in this place. And therefore consider, I pray you, Dear Countrymen, what small reason you have in a matter, which doth so nearly concern your conscience, your temporal overthrow, and the allegiance, which by the express commandment of Christ, you are bound to give to God and Caesar, to rely upon so ignorant, and unsincere a man who so palpably, and wilfully seeketh to delude you. 85 Now you shall see the rest of his goodly Discourse, wherein he also setteth aside the law of Nature, as he did in the former paragraph, which nevertheless was the main subject, whereof he pretended to treat in this Chapter, and flieth to the holy Scriptures, and the practice of the Church, but as fraudulently, and ignorantly as he hath done before. Moreover it is evident, saith he, m Pa. 106. nu. 19 in the holy Scripture, that our Saviour himself n joan. 2. drove the buyers and sellers out of the temple with whips, and Saint Peter inflicted the punishment of death o Act. 5. upon Ananias, and Saphyra (whereof I shall have occasion to speak more amply in the next Chapter) p Cap. 7. nu. 23 & seq. and that S. Paul stroke Elymas the Magician blind, q Act. 13. and delivered the incestuous Corinthian r 1. Cor. 5. to the Devil to be corporally afflicted in interitum carnis, saith he, ut spiritus saluus fiat, for the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit may be saved: All which were corporal, and temporal punishments. 1. Cor. 7. Besides that the said Apostle permitted the separation of man, and wife, when the same should be necessary for the salvation of the soul of either of them; and the Church also doth, and may in like case permit, and ordain the same, not only for the benefit of the party innocent, but also for the just punishment of the offender. 86 But truly it is an intolerable shame, that any Christian subject to advance so immoderately the Papal authority in so great prejudice of Regal Majesty should under the cloak of Religion, and of zeal to the Sea Apostolic use such frivolous, not to say, ridiculous arguments, and from the miraculous facts not only of the Apostles, but also of Christ himself conclude in ordinary power in the Pope to do the like. For the only propounding of these arguments will sufficiently show to any sensible man, how frivolous, and ridiculous they are. Our Saviour Christ, saith my Adversary, drove the buyers, and sellers out of the Temple with whips, Hieronom. epist. 8. ad Demetriad. Abul. q. 97. in c. 18. Mat. & q. 96. in cap. 20. and S. Peter inflicted the punishment of death upon Ananias, and Saphyra, or rather foretold, and prophesied their death, as S. Hierome, and Abulensis do affirm, and S. Paul stroke Elymas the Magician blind, or at leastwise foretold his blindness, and delivered the incestuous Corinthian to the Devil to be corporally tormented by him; therefore the Pope hath power to do the like; as though because Christ, and the Apostles had an extraordinary and miraculous power to inflict or foretell corporal punishments, we may rightly infer, that the Pope hath an ordinary power to inflict, or foretell the same. See Abul. q. 96 in cap. 20. Mat. That these facts of S. Peter and S. Paul were miraculous no man can make any doubt, and that the driving of the buyers, and sellers out of the temple was also miraculous S. Hierome doth expressly affirm, and the reason, which he bringeth, doth evidently convince the same: for mark his words. 87 Many men, saith S. Hierome are of opinion, S. Hieronyme in Matth. 21. that the greatest signs our Saviour did, was that Lazarus was raised from death to life, that he that was blind from his mother's womb received his sight, that at jordan the voice of the Father was heard, that he being transfigured in the mountain showed the glory of a Triumpher. Among all the signs, which he did this seemeth to me more wonderful, that one only man, and at that time contemptible, and so abject that afterwards he was crucified, the Scribes and Pharises being in a rage against him, and seeing their commodities destroyed, he could with the strokes of one only whip thrust out so great a multitude, and overthrow the tables, and break the chairs, and do other things, which an infinite army had not done. For some certain fiery, Abul. q. 79. in cap. 21. Matth. and starry thing did glister out of his eyes, and the majesty of Deity did shine in his face. Besides, not only his countenance, saith Abulensis, but also his voice might be terrible to them, as it was to those armed men, whom the jews sent to apprehend our Saviour, who hearing only those words, Ego sum, I am he, joan. 18. fell backward. Origen also attributeth this casting out of the buyers and sellers to a great miracle. Let us consider, saith he, Origin c. 2. I●. lest that perchance it should seem to be out of square, that the son of GOD taking little cords doth make a whip to cast them out; yet one refuge is left, the divine power of jesus, that when he would he could stop the anger of his enemies, although they were innumerable. And again, This present history, saith Origen, doth in nothing show less power, than did those things, which were done by him more miraculously: yea it is manifest, that this doth show a greater power, than the miracle, wherein water was turned into wine, for that there a matter without life doth subsist, but here the wits of so many thousand men are made tame, or overruled. 88 Also no less impertinent is that argument, which Mr. Fitzherbert bringeth from the separation of man, and wife: Besides that, saith he, the said Apostle permitted the separation of man, and wife, when the same should be necessary for the salvation of the soul of either of them. And what then? I grant also, that spiritual Pastors may do the like. For S. Paul did only permit, that if the wife, or husband being converted to the faith cannot remain with the other consort who is not converted, without offence, or injury to GOD, or if the party, who is not converted, will needs departed from the Christian, it is lawful also for the Christian to departed, and marry another: and the Church also may in the like case permit, and ordain the same; for this is only to declare the law of GOD. But that which Fitzherbert addeth, that in the like case the Church may ordain the same, not only for the benefit of the party innocent, but also for the just punishment of the offender, is repugnant to the common doctrine of Divines; for the offender in S. Paul's case was an infidel, and not a Christian, who only, according to the common opinion of Divines, can be punished by the Church; for what is it to me, saith S. Paul, s 1. Cor. 5. to judge of them that are without, for them that are without GOD will judge. But if Mr. Fitzherb. meaning be, that the Church may permit, and ordain the same concerning the separation of man, and wife, who both are Christians, which the Apostle did permit, and ordain concerning the separation of man and wife, whereof the one is become a Christian, and the other remaineth still an infidel, this also is most untrue. For the Apostle did not only permit, that the converted wife might departed from the company of her husband, who still remained an infidel, and would not converse with her without injury to the Creator, but also that she might dissolve the bond of matrimony, although by carnal copulation it were consummated, and might marry another husband, but the Church cannot dissolve the bond of matrimony, if it be once consummated, betwixt man, and wife, who both are Christians, either for the punishment of the offender, or for the benefit of the party innocent. 89 Nevertheless I do not deny, that when both the man, and wife are Christians, and the one cannot live with the other without danger of being drawn into heresy, or some other grievous sin, the Church hath authority to command the party that is in danger of being perverted to leave the company of the other consort, and so by way of command to punish the offender, but this is nothing to that, which Mr. Fitzherbert pretended to prove, to wit, that the Church hath power to inflict temporal punishments, and that I contradicted myself in granting that the spiritual Superior might command temporal punishments, but not inflict them. For if the wife, or husband in this case of spiritual danger will still remain with the other consort against the commandment of the Church, or rather against the law of GOD, and Nature, which do forbid all spiritual danger, can the Church in this case either dissolve the bond of matrimony, or deprive them of the right, which either of them have to perform the acts of matrimony, or else deprive the offender of his life, liberty, or goods, or only punish him by inflicting spiritual, or Ecclesiastical censures? This is the main difficulty, which is not so much as mentioned in all the arguments, and authorities, which Mr. Fitzherbert here hath brought. 90 But now in the next paragraph it may seem, that he cometh somewhat near to the point of the difficulty. And in like manner, saith he, t pag. 106. nu. 20. there is no doubt, but that the Church may punish an heretic by discharging his children from their filial, and natural obligation to him, exempting them from his authority, when it shall be necessary for their spiritual good, Concil. Tolet. 4. can. 59 as it may appear by a Canon of the fourth Council of Toledo, which ordaineth, that the baptised children of jews shall be separated from their parents, lest they may be infected with their error. See Molina de Instit. tract. 2. disp. 229. And the like is to be said of the discharge of slaves, and bondmen from the power, and authority of their Lords, when the said slaves are Catholics, and their Lords Heretics: for in that case the Church may not only provide for the soul of the Catholic, but also justly punish the heretical Lord, by granting freedom to the slave. And for the same reason the Church hath power to discharge subjects from their bond of obedience, and allegiance to an heretical Prince, when there is evident danger of their souls, and great detriment to the Church; for the bond of allegiance to the Prince is not greater than the obligation of the Son to the Father, the Wife to the Husband, and the slave to his Lord. 91 But all this I did fully answer in my Appendix u Part. 1. sec. 9 to Suarez, of whom my Adversary hath borrowed these arguments. For albeit there be a natural obligation, whereby children are bound to honour, and reverence their Parents, and from which without doubt the Church hath not authority to discharge the children of an heretic, Sot. l. 2. the Iust. q. 3. ar. 8. Valentia tom. 2. disp. 7. q. 4. punct. 6. Vasq. in 1am secundae tom. 2. disp. 179 cap. 2. Suarez lib. 2. de Leg. cap. 14. Salas q. 94. s●. 9 unless my unlearned Adversary will grant, that the Church hath power to discharge one from that, to which he is otherwise bound by the law of Nature, which is a Paradox in Divinity, as you may see in Sotus, Valentia, Vasquez, Suarez, Salas, and others who treat of laws; in so much that S. Thomas and his followers, (whose opinion Vasquez and many others do approve for the more probable) do affirm, that God himself cannot dispense in the law of Nature, or in any natural precept contained in the Decalogue, or ten Commandments, as is this, to honour Father and Mother. Nevertheless, what other natural obligation there is beside this, by which children are by the law of nature bound to honour and reverence their Parents, and from which the Church as Mr. Fitzherbert saith, hath authority to discharge the children of an heretic, I think he himself doth not well understand, but it seemeth he taketh honour, or reverence, & obedience, which is due to Parents for all one, which nevertheless are very much different. 92 For all the power and authority, which Parents have now de facto, to command their children (considering that both Parents and children are now de facto, even in things belonging to the particular Family, or Oeconomie, parts and members of the Civil Commonwealth) is civil, and proceedeth from civil authority, and may be enlarged, diminished, altered, yea, and quite taken away by the temporal Commonwealth, or the supreme governor thereof: and all obedience, which children now de facto, being parts and members of the Civil Commonwealth do owe to their Parents, is civil and dependeth upon the laws and ordinances of temporal Princes, by whom it may be enlarged, or restrained, or quite taken away: And therefore as Molina cited by my Adversary, Molina tract. 2. de Instit. disp. 237. Glossa § ius autem Instit. de patr. potest. Glossa ibidem. Moli. disp. 228. and the Gloss upon the Civil law do well observe, the authority, which Parents have over their children was introduced by the Civil law of the Romans, from the time, as the Gloss saith, of Romulus; the effects of which fatherly power, authority, or command the Gloss doth in brief, but Molina more at large set down. 93 Wherefore the Reader may by the way observe, that there is a great difference to be made betwixt the power and authority, which Parents now living in civil Society have over their Children, & consequently the obedience of Children answerable thereunto, and the power and authority which the Civil Commonwealth, or the supreme temporal Prince have over subjects, because all the authority and command, which Parents have over their children, proceedeth from the Civil Commonwealth, and is wholly depending thereon, and not from the law of nature, and therefore the obedience which children own to their Parents, supposing them to be Parents, cannot properly be called natural, but civil obedience, but the supreme authority, that the temporal Commonwealth hath over her subjects, supposing the aduniting of men in Civil Society, Bellar. lib. 3. de Laicis cap. 6. is even according to Card. Bellarmine's doctrine, derived from the law of nature. Yea, also it is very probable, and affirmed by divers learned men, as I have showed heretofore, x In Append. contra D. Schulcken. calumnia 16. nu. 8. that the supreme power and authority, which temporal Princes have over their subjects, doth also proceed from the law of nature, and prescript of natural reason, although their title, or the designing of their persons to be Princes is not derived from the law of nature, but from the Commonwealth itself: for which cause we may truly and properly call that obedience which subjects own to the civil Commonwealth, or the Sovereign Prince thereof, not only civil, but also natural obedience, or allegiance, & consequently the bond thereof to be greater, than the obligation of the Son to his Father, the wife to the Husband, and the slave to his Lord. 94 Now to Mr fitzherbert's argument, I answered in the said Appendix to Suarez, that as the power and authority which Parents have over their children, is granted to them by the civil Commonwealth, so also it cannot be taken away from them but by Civil authority. And therefore those Canons either of Popes or Counsels, wherein children are exempted from the power, and authority, which by the Civil law their Parents have over them, do either confirm that which was first decreed by the Imperial law, or they are made with the express or consent of temporal Princes; or they do only declare the law of God and nature, to wit, that children are to forsake the company of their Parents, when by conversing with them they are in danger to offend their Creator. As when the Father is accounted to be dead civilly (either by some great sin committed by him, as heresy, and treason, or otherwise, or if he make profession in an approved Religion, whereby he is accounted dead to the world) his Children are discharged by the Civil law from the power which he had over them, as you may see in Molina, in the place whereto my Adversary remitteth his reader. For it is a rule of the Civil law that natural and civil death are equivalent concerning civil acts, as noteth the Gloss upon Leg. si decesserit. ff. qui satisdare. So likewise, if one be ordained a Bishop, he is discharged thereby from the power and authority which his Father hath over him, Authent. de Sanct. Episcopis, cap. 3. §. Si vero contigerit. And in this particular case which Mr. Fitzherbert here urgeth, that decree of the fourth Council of Toledo was made by the authority and consent of King Sisennandus, as I have showed more at large in that Appendix against Suarez. Besides the decree of that Council, if it be understood of Children which have discretion, is only a declaration, as I there observed, of the law of God and Nature, whereby the baptised children of jews are freed not from the power or right which Parents have over their Children, but only from their company, for that the law of God and Nature forbiddeth all conversation, whereby one may incur probable danger of revolting from the faith, or falling into any other sin. 95 And the like is to be said of the discharge of slaves and bondmen from the company of their Lords, when the said slaves are Catholics, and their Lords heretics. For although these slaves, if they be in danger to be perverted, may by the law of God & Nature absent themselves from the company of their Lords, until the danger be passed: as likewise a catholic wife may departed from the company of her husband who is an heretic, if she be in danger of being perverted by his company, & this the Church hath power to declare, and command them under pain of spiritual Censures to perform: Nevertheless the Church hath no authority to dissolve the bond of Matrimony, or to take away the right or fatherly power, which heretical Parents have over their Children, or to release the bond of slavery, by which Lords have a right or dominion over their slaves. And therefore when the danger of being perverted is past, the wife is bound to return to her Husband, the Child to his Father, and the bondman to his Lord, unless, by the authority of the temporal Prince, the Child be freed, from the right and power which his Father had over him, and the slave from his bondage. And therefore à fortiori, and by a stronger reason the Church hath not authority to discharge subjects from the bond of obedience, and allegiance to an heretical Prince, both for that thisis a temporal and civil punishment, which therefore to inflict doth not belong to spiritual power, and also for that temporal Princes being in temporals next under God, cannot be temporally punished but by God alone, and also because this bond of allegiance is natural, whereas the other obligations, by which a wife, a child, a slave, are bound to obey her husband, his Father, his Lord, is civil, and derived from the Civil Commonwealth. Nevertheless, I do not deny that the Church by a declarative precept may command the subject to forsake the company of his Prince, yea, and perchance to departed the land, if by such staying he be in probable danger to be perverted, yet still he remaineth subject to his Prince, and when this danger is past, he is bound by virtue of his allegiance to return again at the commandment of his Prince. 96 And by this it is manifest how grossly Mr. Fitzherbert is deceived in affirming so boldly, That the bond of allegiance to the Prince is not greater than the obligation of the Son to the Father, the Wife to the Husband, and the Slave to his Lord, Seeing that all the obedience which a Child oweth to his Father, a Wife to her Husband, and a Slave to his Lord, they now living in civil Society, and being parts and members of the civil Commonwealth, is civil, and dependeth upon the authority of the temporal Prince, who may therefore extend, diminish, or quite dissolve the bond of obedience, although not of honour, and reverence, which the Child oweth to his Father, and likewise the bond of obedience, although not of matrimony, by which the Wife is bound to her Husband, and finally, the bond both of obedience, and of servitude, by which a slave is bound to his Lord: But the bond of allegiance, whereby subjects are bound to obey the civil commonwealth, as Cardinal Bellarmine himself doth not deny, is natural, and is due by the law of nature, as the power and authority of the civil commonwealth over every part and member thereof, is in his opinion de lege natura, due by the law of nature: And therefore I do not well understand, how Cardinal Bellarmine can according to his own grounds affirm, that the power, and authority of the civil commonwealth over every particular member thereof, is the l●ge natura, due by the law of nature, and consequently the obedience and allegiance of the subject answerable thereunto, must also be de lege natura, commanded by the law of nature, and withal maintain, that the Church can deprive an heretical commonwealth of her civil power and authority and absolve the subjects from their natural allegiance, unless he will grant, that the Church may absolve from the law of nature. 97 Now by this which hath been said, you may easily perceive the insufficiency of all the rest, which Mr. Fitzherbert addeth in this Chapter. Now then, saith he y Pag. 107. nu. 11. , in all these examples it is evident, that the Church disposeth of that, which is temporal to spiritual ends, and therefore my Adversary Widdrington hath no probability in the world to deny, that a spiritual Superior may punish temporally, especially granting as he doth, that he may command corporal, and temporal things, so far forth as they serve the spiritual. But contrariwise, as you have seen, it is evident, that by none of all those examples he hath proved that the Church, I do not say, commandeth, but disposeth of that which is temporal to spiritual ends, o● hath authority to inflict any temporal punishment, or to deprive any man of any temporal right, power, or authority for what end soever: And therefore Mr. Fitzherbert doth evidently discover his ignorance in affirming, that I have no probability in the world to deny that a spiritual Superior may inflict temporal punishments, or which is all one, may punish temporally, and to grant, as I do, that he may command corporal, and temporal things so far forth, as they serve the spiritual. For this distinction, which I have sufficiently declared before, betwixt the directive or commanding, and the coercive, or punishing power both of the spiritual and also of the temporal commonwealth, and the reason thereof a priori, which is taken from their proper acts and objects (from which, according to the known principles of Philosophy, the essence, unity, and distinction of every power is to be taken) doth make plain the whole difficulty, and quite overthroweth the comparison which Mr. Fitzherbert maketh betwixt the spiritual directive, and the coercive power, or which is all one, betwixt the power of spiritual Pastors to command temporal punishments for spiritual ends, and to inflict them: and which in natural reason is so clear and perspicuous, that it cannot with any show of probability be impugned, but the more it is sifted and impugned, the more it appeareth plain and manifest, as all true doctrine doth, as contrariwise falsehood, the more it is examined, the more absurd it doth still appear. 98 Besides that, saith Mr. Fitzherbert z Pag. 107. nu. 21. , Widdrington himself teacheth also in his Apology a Nurse, 153.154. & 15●. , that spiritual things may come to have the nature of temporal things, and temporal things of spiritual, by accident, that is to say (as he himself doth explicate) Ratione peccati annexi. By reason of some sin annexed, whereof he also giveth this example, when Ecclesiastical persons do apply their spiritual power to the hurt of the temporal state, or temporal men abuse their power to the prejudice of the spiritual; in these cases he saith, the temporal power and state becometh subject to the spiritual, and the spiritual to the temporal by reason of the injury done, and offence committed, because temporal things do thereby come to have the quality of spiritual things, and the spiritual also of temporal. Thus teacheth he in his Apology, and affirmeth the same in effect in his Theological Disputation. b Cap. 3. sec. 1. nu. 19 99 That doctrine, which I taught in my Apology, is very true, and cannot with any probability in the world be denied; neither hath D. Schulckenius brought any one probable proof to impugn the same, but with railing speeches, slanderous imputations, and fraudulent cavils seeketh to overbear it, as I have most clearly showed c Calumnia 10.11.12. in the Discovery of his Calumnies. For whereas I affirmed, that as the spiritual power is not subject to the temporal per se but only per accidens, by reason of virtue, or vice, which are the objects of the spiritual directive power, and are oftentimes found in temporal actions, so the temporal power is not subject per se to the spiritual, but only per accidens by reason of the conserving, or disturbing of temporal peace, which are the acts and objects of the temporal directive power, and are sometimes found in spiritual actions, as in unjust Excommunications, and Interdicts, when by them great tumults and perturbations do in the commonwealth arise, and in the evil administration of Sacraments, whereby death, or great corporal harm doth ensue: And as the spiritual Superior may for the evil administration of temporal things, as they redound to the hurt of souls, punish all his subjects that shall offend therein, with spiritual punishments, which only are the object of the spiritual coercive power, so the temporal Superior (abstracting from the privileges of Princes, and the Canons of the Church, which do exempt Clergy men from the coercive power of Secular Magistrates) may for the evil administration of spiritual things, as they redound to the perturbation of temporal peace, punish all his Subjects that shall offend therein, with temporal punishments, which only are the object of the temporal coercive power. 100 Now D. Schulckenius first affirmeth d Pag. 208. & 292. , that this doctrine is altogether intolerable, and cannot be affirmed but by one who is given to a reprobate sense; But how false and intolerable a slander this is, unconscionable, void of all learning, and which could not be uttered but by one, who was wholly transported with some vehement passion, I have sufficiently showed heretofore e In Append. calumnia 11. . Secondly, he cavilleth at the similitude; for that, saith he, as there is not the same reason of the flesh and spirit, of the body and soul, of sense and reason, of earth and heaven, of Beasts and Angels, of the sheep and the Pastor, especially in the comparing of the subjection and dominion, so truly there is not the same reason of the temporal and spiritual power. 101 But who seethe not what a frivolous cavil this is? Who knoweth not, that the body, and the soul, sense and reason, earth and heaven, Beasts and Angels, Kings, and Popes do agree, and are like in somethings, and that in those things wherein they agree, they may be compared together? What man of judgement would disprove him, that should say, that as the body is an imperfect substance, and is referred to the soul, so the soul is an imperfect substance, and is referred to the body: as sense is sometimes subject to reason, so reason is sometimes subject, and captivated by sense; as the Pope is head of the Church, and of spiritual power, so the King is head of the civil commonwealth, and of civil power: and to omit that saying of the ancient Gloss f Patricius est Pater Papae in temporalibus sicut Papa est Pater Patricij in spiritualibus. which Cardinal Bellarmine with small reverence to antiquity affirmeth g Bell. contra Barcla. c. 13. 16. to be razed out of the Canon law for doting old age, who can justly mislike the like assertion of the Gloss upon the twelfth Chapter of S. Mark, As the King of France is subject to the Bishop of Paris in spirituals, and his Lord in temporals, so Christ is the son of David according to the flesh, and his Lord according to his Deity? What man of learning can deny, that although there be not the same reason of Christ, and David, of the Bishop of Paris and the King of France, of the temporal commonwealth, and the spiritual concerning the particular manner of subjection and dominion, yet in general they may agree in this, that the one is superior and subject to the other, in a diverse kind of superiority and subjection; and that although the King of France be a sheep, and the Bishop of Paris a spiritual Pastor, and David be a man, and Christ be God, and the spiritual commonwealth be more excellent than the temporal, yet they may be compared one with the other in divers kinds of superiority and subjection. But in such childish arguments, and which are not worth the answering, for want of better D. Schulckenius maketh great force. 102 Secondly, how untrue it is which this Doctor so boldly affirmeth, and which is one of the chief pillars, whereon his doctrine concerning the Pope's power to depose Princes is supported, that the temporal power is per so subject to the spiritual, and that the spiritual power, or spiritual Pastors are not per accident, and by reason of unjust perturbing the public peace subject to the temporal power, I have showed at large in the second part, where I have convinced, that this natural subjection and subordination of the temporal power to the spiritual, except only in perfection, and excellency, is a mere fiction, and that to affirm, as this Doctor doth, h Pag. 201. that Bishops are exempted omni iure from the civil power is a most false, and intolerable doctrine, and generally repugnant both to the doctrine of the ancient Fathers expounding that place of the Apostle, Omnis anima etc. Let every soul be subject to higher powers, and to the common opinion of the Divines, and also the jesuits, who affirm, that Clergy men are not de facto exempted from the directive power of temporal Princes, and that they are bound to observe their laws, not only by force of reason, but also by force, and virtue of the law. 103 Now Mr. Fitzherbert in like manner being not able to prove, as you have seen, this his feigned natural subordination of the temporal commonwealth to the spiritual, except only in perfection, worth, and excellency, as spiritual things are more excellent than temporal, which is nothing to the purpose, and denied by no man, and having brought not so much as one proof, that the temporal power, and spiritual do make one body, but barely, and briefly supposeth the same, whereas above in the second part I have evidently convinced the contrary, even according to Card. Bellarmine's own grounds, yet he feareth not to impeach of absurdity and impiety this doctrine, which denieth the aforesaid subordination and union, thinking belike, silly man, that his bare, I say, is sufficient to satisfy the understanding of the judicious Reader. But I let pass, saith he, i Pag. 108. nu. 22. widdrington's absurd, and impious doctrine, destroying the natural subordination of temporal things to spiritual, when they are joined in one body, (which I have amply k Supra. num. 2. 3. & seq. proved even by the law of Nature) and I only wish to be observed, that albeit we should grant it to be true (as it is most false) that spiritual, and temporal things may take the nature, the one of the other equally, by reason of some sin annexed, yet it would follow thereon, that the spiritual Superior may punish even in temporal things, because according to this doctrine, temporal things do become spiritual, when the consideration of sin entereth, whereby also they are made proper to the spiritual community, and consequently may be used, and applied by the spiritual Superior to the punishment of his subjects. 104 But first, to let pass, that Mr. Fitzherbert throughout this whole Treatise hath showed himself to be a very vain, absurd, ignorant, and fowlemouthed man, and that here he hath proved nothing else by the law of Nature, than that spiritual things are to be preferred before temporal things, as the more perfect before the less perfect, the soul before the body, religion before policy, heaven before earth, and God before the world, and consequently that the temporal commonwealth is in perfection, worth, and excellency, but not in authority subject to the spiritual, which no man calleth in question, why doth he add out of his own brain that word [equally] except only to cavil, and to persuade his Reader, that I affirmed that spiritual and temporal things may be compared together not only in general, but also in every point in particular, and that betwixt them there is no disparity at all: seeing that I did not use that word [equally] but the doctrine which I taught was this, that not only temporal things by reason of some sin annexed may oftentimes take the nature of spiritual things, and therefore may be forbidden by the spiritual power of the Church, which hath for the object of her directive power, virtue and vice in what actions so ever either temporal, or spiritual they are to be found, and consequently may be punished also by the Church with Ecclesiastical Censures, which only are the object of her coercive, or punishing power: but also spiritual things, by reason of some unlawful disturbance of the public temporal peace annexed unto them, may sometimes take the nature of temporal things, and therefore may be forbidden by the temporal power of the Civil commonwealth, which hath for the object of her directive power the procuring, and maintaining of public peace, and the shunning of all unlawful disturbance of this temporal peace, in what actions soever either temporal or spiritual they are to be found; and consequently may be also punished (if we abstract from the privileges of Princes, and Ecclesiastical Canons) with temporal punishments, which only are the object of the temporal coercive power. For what sensible man can deny, that temporal Princes have authority, if we regard the nature and objects of temporal power, to forbid all men whatsoever, that are subject to their directive power, as also, according to the common doctrine of Divines, are Clergy men, not to disturb wrongfully the public temporal peace by any actions whatsoever, and to punish all them, that shall transgress their just command, and are subject to their coercive power, with temporal punishments: and that when the temporal Prince forbiddeth all unlawful poisonings, the unlawful poisoning of men by spiritual actions, as by baptizing with poisoned water is not contained under this command? 105 Secondly, it is not true, that granting once as I often do, that temporal things may take the nature of spiritual things by reason of sin annexed, it must follow thereon, as Mr. Fitzherbert concludeth, that the spiritual Superior may punish in temporal things, or, which he taketh for all one, may inflict temporal punishments: and the perspicuous reason hereof I alleged before: for although temporal punishments do become spiritual things, when the consideration of sin entereth, for which they may be subject to the directive power of the Church, which hath for her object virtue, or vice, and consequently they may be commanded, or forbidden by the spiritual power of the Church, as it is directive, yet still they remain temporal punishments which are only subject to the coercive, or punishing power of temporal Princes; and therefore cannot be used, or inflicted by the coercive, or punishing power of the Church, which hath for her object spiritual, or Ecclesiastical Censures, and not temporal punishments. Wherefore unless the consideration of sin can make, which is impossible, temporal punishments to be, I do not say, spiritual things, but spiritual punishments, it can never make temporal punishments to be the object of the spiritual power, as it is coercive, although it maketh them to be the object of the spiritual power, as it is directive. But my Adversary by not distinguishing these two powers, and their proper acts, and objects would blind the understanding of his unlearned Reader with a confused reduction of temporal things to spiritual, which this distinction of the directive, and coercive power, and the proper acts, and objects of either of them doth make most plain, and manifest. 106 Also if temporal things, saith Mr. Fitzherbert l Pag. 1. 8. nu 23. 24. may be come spiritual by reason of sin annexed, why shall they not also have a spiritual nature, and quality by the connexion of some virtue, and specially when they are applied, as I have said before, to a spiritual end as to the service and glory of God, which is the end of all things spiritual, and temporal: to which purpose it may be observed, Rom. 12. that S. Paul exhorted the Romans' to exhibit their bodies, hostiam viventem, sanctam, Deo placentem, etc. a living sacrifice, holy, and pleasing God; giving to understand, that our bodies, goods, and what temporal thing soever is subject to our soul (being dedicated and applied to God's service, and the good of the soul) is sanctified thereby, and becometh spiritual: Whereupon it followeth that whensoever a spiritual Superior punisheth his temporal subjects in their bodies, or goods for satisfaction of their sins, and for the service of God, and the Church, and the good of souls, their corporal and temporal punishments becometh spiritual by reason of the end, and the virtue annexed, and consequently is most lawful and just even according to my Adversary widdrington's own doctrine. 107 Whereto I also add, that whereas Widdrington saith, that every Superior may punish his subjects with penalties proportionate to his authority, he must needs grant the same in this case: for albeit temporal goods have no natural proportion with spiritual things, yet they have a moral proportion therewith, because they are not able instruments of good works, ●. Pet. 2. in which respect S. Peter calleth Alms, and other good works spirituales Hostias, spiritual Sacrifices, albeit they consist in the use and employment of temporal things; and therefore when temporal things are necessary to a spiritual end, they may be disposed of by the Church, as proportionate to the end whereto they are necessary. 108 No man maketh any doubt, but that temporal things may become spiritual not only by reason of sin, but also of virtue annexed, especially when they are applied to a spiritual end, as to the service and glory of God, who is the end of all things spiritual, and temporal: and therefore when one doth punish his body by fasting, discipline, haircloth, or such like for the satisfaction of his sins, and for the service of God, although they be corporal punishments, yet they are virtuous actions, and in that regard spiritual things, and consequently subject to the spiritual power of the Church as it is directive: But from hence it doth not follow, that these temporal punishments by reason of virtue annexed do become spiritual punishments, but only virtuous actions, and in that regard spiritual things; for still they remain temporal punishments, and therefore not subject to the spiritual power of the Church as it is coercive, which hath for her object only the using and inflicting of Ecclesiastical, or spiritual, not temporal, or Civil punishments. Wherefore a spiritual Superior hath no authority by the institution of Christ to punish in body or goods, for any end whatsoever by way of constraint, his spiritual subjects, whether they be clerk, or Laymen (whom Mr. Fitzherbert improperly calleth his temporal Subjects, for although they be temporal men, yet comparing them to spiritual Superiors, they are spiritual, not temporal Subjects) for that the object of the spiritual coercive power are not temporal, or corporal, but only spiritual Censures, or punishments: although he may, as I said, command such corporal punishments, when they are necessary for the good of the soul, in which case they become spiritual things, to wit, virtuous actions, which are the object of the spiritual directive power. But the cause of Mr. fitzherbert's error is, for that he doth not distinguish betwixt spiritual or temporal things, and spiritual or temporal punishments, and betwixt the acts, and objects of the spiritual directive, and of the spiritual coercive power: for although temporal punishments by reason of virtue annexed do become spiritual things, that is, virtuous actions, and therefore subject to the spiritual directive power, yet they do not become spiritual Censures, and therefore not subject to the spiritual power, as it is coercive, but they still remain temporal punishments, which are the object only of the temporal coercive power. 109 Wherefore that also, which he addeth, that every Superior may, according to my doctrine, punish his Subject with penalties proportionate to his authority, is very true; but he must still distinguish betwixt the directive, and coercive power, or authority, and in what manner temporal punishments are proportionate to either of them. For because as well temporal as spiritual punishments may be virtuous, or vicious actions, therefore they are proportionate to the spiritual directive power, whose proper acts, and objects are the commanding of virtue, and the forbidding of vice, but because not the commanding either of temporal or spiritual punishments, but only the actual punishing with Ecclesiastical censures, or the inflicting of spiritual punishments, is the proper act, and object of the spiritual coercive power, therefore the inflicting only of spiritual punishments, and not of temporal is proportionate to the spiritual coercive power. From whence it evidently followeth, that the Church for a spiritual end may command temporal things, but not dispose of temporal things: may command one to give Alms for the satisfaction of his sins, but may not take away his purse from him to give Alms for that end, may command one to punish and macerate his body, when it rebelleth against the soul, but not inflict upon him corporal punishments for the same end. 110 And by this also all the rest, which Mr. Fitzherbert addeth in this Chapter is clearly answered, and the manifest absurdity, which he would put upon me, doth manifestly fall upon himself. But now (saith he) m Pag. 109. nu. 25.26.27. if together with all this we consider the natural subordination of temporal things to spiritual (whereof I have sufficiently treated before n Supra num. 2 3.4. & seq. ) widdrington's absurdity will be most manifest, as well in denying, that the spiritual Superior may punish his subject in his person, or temporal goods for a spiritual end, as in affirming that the spiritual power may become subject to the temporal, no less than the temporal to the spiritual, as though there were no subordination or subjection of the one to the other; wherein he perverteth the whole course of Nature, no less then if he should say that in some cases the soul may be subject to the body, heaven to earth, religion to policy, Angels to men, and God to the world; whereby you may still see what probable arguments, and answers he affordeth his Reader, for the assurance and security of their consciences, See Preface num. 9 See also the answer thereto, nu. 9 & seq. and that he had great reason to protest (as you may remember I have signified in the Preface) that his meaning is not to lay down any demonstrations or infallible arguments for the proof or defence of his opinion. 111 For truly all that he saith, doth demonstrate nothing else, but the weakness of his cause, and his own wilfulness, if not of malice, in defending such an improbable and extravagant Paradox as this is, which he holdeth and defendeth contrary to the universal and continual custom of the Church, grounded upon the holy Scriptures, the practice of the Apostles, and the decrees of Popes, and Counsels, and finally contrary to the whole course of the Canon law; as it will evidently appear in the ensuing Chapters: and as Cardinal Bellarmine against Barclay, and Doctor Schulckenius in his late Apology for the Cardinal, and divers others have sufficiently showed: and amongst our learned Countrymen Mr. Doctor Weston hath clearly & sound proved it in his book entitled juris Pontificij Sanctuarium, wherein he battereth all the foundations of my Adversary widdrington's doctrine, and fully confuteth him, as well in all other points, as in this, touching the Pope's power to punish temporally, which he o Quest. 17.18.19.20.21. & 22. doth learnedly and amply demonstrate, as well by the holy Scriptures, as by many examples of the Church's practice, to wit, by divers kind of divorces, by the relaxation of debts, exemption of children from the power of their parents, the abrogation of temporal and Civil laws, the dissolution of contracts, and bargains, and finally, by the imposition of temporal penalties, almost usual, and ordinary in the practice of the Church, as he showeth very particularly by the Ecclesiastical Canons. I forbear for brevities sake to prosecute these points in particular; only I shall have just occasion to treat now and then of the infliction of temporal penalties, in answer of my adversaries pertinent objections out of the Canons, and Canonists, which I hope may suffice, for as much as I have undertaken to perform in this brief Reply. 112 But all that my Adversary here objecteth I have already sufficiently confuted. And first I have clearly convinced, that there is no natural subordination of the temporal power to the spiritual, except in nobility, and therefore that neither the spiritual power, speaking properly, and in abstracto, is subject to the temporal, nor the temporal to the spiritual, except, as I said, in worth, excellency and nobility, wherein the spiritual doth excel, but not in authority, wherein they are both supreme, unless my Adversaries will grant, that temporal Princes are not supreme, and absolute in temporal matters, and spiritual Pastors are not supreme and absolute in spiritual causes, which is a Paradox in true Divinity. Secondly, I have proved also most plainly, that not only temporal Princes, being parts and members of the spiritual kingdom, or Church of Christ, are subject to spiritual Pastors in spiritual things, but also spiritual Pastors, being parts and members of the temporal commonwealth, are subject to temporal Princes in all temporal things, except wherein the law of God, or man hath exempted them: and to affirm the contrary were to pervert the whole course of Nature, no less then if one should say, that members are not subject to the whole body, and to the head thereof, the body and soul to man, heaven and earth to the whole world, religion, policy, men, Angels, and the whole world to God. Whereby you still see what improbable arguments & answers my Adversary affordeth his Readers for the assurance and security of their consciences in a matter belonging to their obedience due to God, and Caesar, and which, forsooth, he will needs have to be a point of faith, to the proof whereof it is not sufficient to bring probable arguments, but convincing demonstrations, as contrariwise it sufficeth to bring probable arguments, and probable answers to prove any doctrine not to be certain, and of faith, as I have showed more amply in the answer to his Preface, whereto here he remitteth his Reader. 113 For truly all the effectual proofs, and clear demonstrations, which hitherto he hath brought, are only to demonstrate both the weakness of his cause, and also his fraud and ignorance, in dissembling the true state of the question in almost every particular difficulty, and confounding his Readers understanding with ambiguous words, and sentences, which being once explained, and the ambiguity of them laid open, do forthwith discover either his want of learning, or sincerity, as you may see almost in every Chapter. Neither is this his new coined Catholic faith concerning the Pope's power to depose Princes, agreeable to the universal, and continual custom of the Catholic Church; both for that this custom, I do not say, of the Church, but of some Popes to depose Princes, began first by Pope Gregory the seventh, Onuphr. lib. 4. de varia create. Rom. Pont. who was the first Pope, saith Onuphrius, that contrary to the custom of his Ancestors deposed the Emperor: A thing unheard of before that age: and also for that it hath been ever even unto this day contradicted by learned Catholics; and therefore neither in regard of time, or persons can it be called universal: neither can it be convinced either by the holy Scriptures, the practice of the Apostles, the decrees of Popes, or councils, or any one constitution of the Canon law. What Cardinal Bellarmine hath proved against D. Barclay, hath been answered by Mr. john Barclay, to whose book neither Card. Bellarmine, not any other for him can in my judgement make a sufficient Reply; and what D. Schulckenius hath proved against me, you have seen partly in this Treatise, and partly in the Discovery of his calumnies, wherein I have clearly showed, all the arguments he bringeth to accuse me, and my doctrine of heresy, to be slanderous, and himself to be void of all Christian sincerity, modesty, justice, and charity. 114 And as for D. Weston, because his zeal is so furious, his railing so intemperate, and his arguments of so little force, and for that very few of our Countrymen, for aught I can learn, are greatly moved, but most men much scandalised with his uncharitable, unlearned, and immodest Reply, howsoever Mr. Fitzherbert expecting be like the same from him doth so exceedingly extol it, I think it neither needful, nor expedient, (unless I should answer him in his railing humour, according to the advice of the wise man, respondea● stulto iuxto stultitiam suam, which some uncharitable spirits, who seek all means to disgrace me, would quickly reprehend in me) to make him any formal answer, especially seeing that all the arguments he hath scraped together, (the chief heads whereof are here in general mentioned by my Adversary, to wit, the holy Scriptures, and many examples of the Church's practice, as divers kind of divorces, relaxation of debts, exemption of children from the power of their Parents, the abrogation of temporal, and Civil laws, the dissolution of contracts, and bargains the imposition of temporal penalties, and the right which spiritual Pastors have, to have corporal maintenance, and to take water to baptise children) have been by me already either in particular, or in general sufficiently answered. 115 For first his arguments taken from the authority of the holy Scriptures I have answered in particular: and secondly all his other proofs, and examples, which are grounded upon the practice of the Church, and the Canons of Popes, or councils, are to be understood either of the disposing of spiritual things (as of the conditions, and impediments of Matrimony, which is not a mere civil contract, but also a Sacrament, and spiritual contract representing the union and conjunction of Christ our Saviour with the mystical body of his Church: and therefore because it is both a Sacrament, and also a civil contract, it is now the more common opinion of Divines, p See Zanche. lib. 7. de matrim. disp. 3. that Secular Princes, if we regard the nature of civil power, have also authority to ordain the conditions, and impediments of Matrimony as it is a civil contract: And although the Popes have now reserved to themselves all causes belonging to Matrimony, in so much that Christian Princes cannot now lawfully dispose of the conditions, and impediments of Matrimony, yet Petrus a Soto is of opinion, Petr. Sot. lec. 4 de matrim versus finem. that the Pope cannot deprive Princes of this their civil authority, but that they of their own accord, and moved by piety have yielded to this reservation of the Pope, in regard that marriage is not only a Civil contract, but also a Sacrament of the Church) or else they are so to be understood, that they did confirm the Imperial, and Civil laws, or that they were made by the authority and express, or consent of temporal Princes, or that they did declare the law of GOD, and nature, by which we are commanded to avoid all probable danger of sin; or that they did only command, and enjoin, not inflict temporal penalties; or finally, that they did only argue a private right to some temporal thing, but not by way of authority, or superiority to dispose of the same, as not only Priests, but also private lay men may lawfully take another man's water to baptise a child in extreme necessity, and spiritual Pastors have a right to be corporally relieved by them, to whom they minister spiritual things, as Saint Paul proveth, 1. Corinth. 9 and in the end concludeth, So also our Lord ordained for them that preach the Gospel to live of the Gospel. 116 And can any judicious man persuade himself, that if Mr. Fitzherbert had thought in very deed these arguments of D. Weston, to be such convincing proofs, and demonstrations, as in words he boasteth, he would for brevities sake have forborn to urge some of them in particular, seeing that he did not forbear for brevities sake to take the greatest part of six or seven chapters of this his Reply, which containeth only seventeen Chapters in all, out of Fa Lessius, masked under D. Singletons' name, concerning the Canon of the Council of Lateran; and by that decree touching the exemption of Children, which he hath singled out of the rest (for that, as I imagine, it was also greatly urged by Fa. Suarez) to which above I have fully answered, you may easily conjecture, what kind of demonstrations are contained in the rest. Wherefore to conclude this Chapter, if the Reader will but briefly reduce to some syllogistical form, or method, all the Rhetorical flourish, which Mr. Fitzherbert hath here made concerning the law of Nature, it will presently appear, that he hath proved nothing else by the law of Nature, than that spiritual things are more perfect, excellent, and worthy then temporal, and that the temporal commonwealth is in perfection, worth, and nobility subject, and subordinate to the spiritual, but that Religious Priests have authority to punish the Civil Commonwealth or supreme governors thereof, especially with temporal punishments, he hath no way proved by the law of Nature, but the flat contrary I have most clearly convinced, for that in the law of Nature the Civil Commonwealth itself had the supreme authority to dispose of all things, not only concerning State, but also Religion. CHAP. VII. Wherein certain places of the old and New Testament are explained: D. Schulckenius Reply to the answer I made to those words, Whatsoever thou shalt lose, etc. and Cardinal Bellarmine's second reason, and Fa. Parson's answer to the Earl of Salisbury grounded thereon, and other arguments brought by M. Fitzherbert from the examples of Ananias and Saphyra, and of others, and from the practice of the Church, and from the person of man, are clearly confuted. 1. THE seventh Chapter Mr. Fitzherbert beginneth in this manner. Now let us see, saith he, a Pag. 112. how my Adversary Widdrington proceedeth, who having given his reason (though so weak as you have heard) why he thinketh it to be against reason, that a spiritual Superior should punish temporally, undertaketh to answer one place only alleged by me out of the old law, and four out of the new, omitting to say any thing else in particular to all the other places, and arguments, which I urged out of the law of God, and Nature. 2 But first it is not true, as Mr. Fitzherbert saith, that I gave any reason at all, why I thought it to be against reason, that a spiritual Superior should punish temporally, for I never thought this to be against natural reason. That which I affirmed only was, that true reason doth teach, that every Superior hath power to punish his subject with some punishment proportionate to his authority, to wit, by depriving him of those goods, which are proper to that Community, whereof he is Superior; but that any other Superior besides the supreme Governor of the civil commonwealth hath power to punish his subjects with death, maiming, or deprivation of temporal goods, it cannot be deduced from the necessary rule, or prescript of true reason; This was that I said: Now what man of learning that knoweth the difference betwixt contra naturam, secundum naturam, praeter and supra naturam, that is, against nature, according to nature, beside and above nature, would affirm, that because I think, it cannot be deduced from the law of Nature, or the prescript of true natural reason, as Mr. Fitzherbert pretended to prove, that a spiritual Superior may punish temporally, therefore I must think, that it is against Nature that a spiritual Superior may punish temporally; as though this proposition, It cannot be proved by the law of Nature, that a spiritual Superior may punish temporally, doth according to his logic necessarily infer, that therefore it is against the law of Nature that a spiritual Superior may punish temporally. For I make no doubt, but that Christ our Saviour might if it had pleased him, have given authority, as I am fully persuaded he hath not, to spiritual Pastors to punish temporally, and so in this case he had granted nothing against the law of Nature, or against the prescript of true natural reason, but only above Nature, and the light of natural reason, yet in this case it could not be proved by the law of Nature, but only by the positive institution, and law of Christ, that spiritual Pastors have authority to punish temporally. Wherefore the law of Nature hath neither commanded, nor forbidden, hath neither given, nor denied to spiritual pastors authority to punish temporally, but if they have any such authority, it must be given them by the positive grant of GOD, or man, and consequently it is neither against, nor according, but above, or besides the law of Nature, that spiritual Pastors should have any such authority to punish temporally. 3 Secondly, the reason why I omitted to say something in particular to every part of his idle Discourse in this Reply of his, but answered only some certain arguments drawn from those six general heads, to wit, from the old law, and the new, the law of Nature, and nations, the Canon, and the Civil law, was not for that I could not answer particularly every one of them, as the Reader may see by this Treatise, wherein I have answered his whole Reply, and every part thereof; but the reason was, for that neither the brevity of such a short Admonition, nor the Printer, who had then finished the whole Disputation, would hardly permit me to make so long a Discourse, as there I made, and therefore I chose out of purpose certain arguments drawn from each one of those six several heads, which I thought to be the strongest, and which being answered, the judicious Reader might easily perceive how all the rest might in the like manner be fully satisfied. 4 Now you shall see what he objecteth against that which I there did answer. And first he setteth down my words, which are these: Fiftly, he that will diligently consider the under written sentences of S. Augustine, and Cardinal Bellarmine will presently perceive what a forcible proof can be deduced from that of Deuteronomie the 17. and such like places of the Old Testament, which is a figure of the new. Excommunication, Bellar. lib. 2. de Ecclesia cap. 6. S. August. q. 39 in Deut. saith Cardinal Bellarmine, hath that place in the Church which the punishment of death had in the Old Testament, and which the Commonwealth hath in temporals. And Saint Augustine saith, that Excommunication doth this now in the Church, which killing or death did then in the Old Testament. In which place he compareth that which was said in the 24. of Deuteronomy, He shall be slain, and thou shalt take away the evil from amidst thee, with that which the Apostle saith 1 Corinth. 5. Auferte malum ex vobis ipsis, Take away evil from among yourselves. S. August. lib. 2. de fide, & operibus cap. 2. And Saint Augustine teacheth in another place, That the material sword which Moses and Phinees used in the Old Testament, was a figure of the degradations and excommunications which are to be used in the new law, seeing that in the discipline of the Church, saith S. Augustine, the visible sword shall cease. 5 To this my answer Mr. Fitzherbert replieth b Pag. 113. nu. 2. , in this manner. Thus saith my Adversary Widdrington, wherein he rather fortifieth and strengtheneth our cause, then weakeneth or hurteth it any way. For if you note well what Widdrington saith, and inferreth, he proveth nothing else, but that the penalty of temporal or corporal death is not now inflicted in the new Testament, as it was in the old, and that the same is now turned to the spiritual death of the soul by Excommunication, which we deny not. But will he infer hereupon, that therefore the Church cannot now inflict other temporal penalties? So should he make a very absurd inference, especially seeing that the penalty of Excommunication, which, as he himself granted, supplieth the place of corporal death, includeth a temporal punishment by the separation of the delinquent from the conversation of men, and from divers other temporal commodities, as I have showed in the last Chapter c Num. 18. . 6 But truly I cannot but smile to see the vanity of this man, who though he see himself altogether vanquished, yet he boasteth that he is victorious, and although he clearly perceiveth, yea, and almost expressly confesseth, that his argument taken from the words of Deuteronomie the 17. Chapter to be quite overthrown, yet he braggeth that his cause is not thereby weakened or hurt any way, but rather fortified, and strengthened. For if you note well what he granteth, to wit, That the penalty of corporal death is not now inflicted in the new Testament as it was in the old, and that the same is now turned to the spiritual death of the soul by excommunication, you cannot but clearly see that his argument taken from Deuteronomy the 17. Chapter, which only text in particular I undertook to answer, and which speaketh only of corporal death, is quite overthrown: and yet, forsooth, I do hereby rather fortify and strengthen, then weaken or hurt any way his cause: By which you may plainly perceive what credit is to be given to the rest of his vainglorious brags, seeing that in this so manifest an overthrow of his argument, taken from the words of Deuteronomie the 17. he is not ashamed to boast that I have rather fortified and strengthened then weakened or hurt any way his cause. But will Widdrington, saith he, infer hereupon, that therefore the Church cannot now inflict other temporal penalties? So should he make a very absurd inference, especially, seeing that the penalty of Excommunication includeth a temporal punishment, etc. The inference that Widdrington maketh is, that from the words of Deuteronomy the 17. which speak only of corporal death, Mr. Fitzherbert hath brought no good argument; for that according to the doctrine of Saint Augustine, and Cardinal Bellarmine, which he himself also will not deny, The penalty of corporal death is now in the new law turned to the death of the soul by Excommunication. Neither is it true, that Excommunication, being of it own nature a separation from the Ecclesiastical conversation of the faithful, doth of it own nature include any temporal punishment at all, as also I have showed in the last Chapter, albeit I do not deny that the Church hath now by way of command, annexed to Excommunication some temporal penalties, but not by way of inflicting them, as I declared in that place, for I ever granted that the Church hath power to command, enjoin, or impose temporal punishments, but not to inflict them: yet these to command, and to inflict, to impose, and to dispose, my Adversary doth commonly confound. 7 Besides that, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, d Pag. 114. number. 4.5. it is evident, that in the old Testament even the temporal Princes themselves were punished by deprivation of their right to their temporal states, and dominions as e 1 Reg. 16. Saul by Samuel, Athalia f 4 Reg. 11. by joiada, joram g 4 Reg. 9 by one of the children of the Prophets, who being sent by Elizeus anointed jehu King of Israel, to the end he might destroy jesabel, & all the house of Achab. Also Ozias was not only corporally expelled out of the temple by the Priests, & confined by their sentence to live privately is his own house but (according to the opinion & doctrine of S. chrysostom) he ought also to have been wholly deprived of the government, as I have signified before h Cap. 5. nu. 21. & 22. at large. And therefore seeing he telleth us how the penalty of corporal death (which was ordained in the old Testament) is now fulfilled spiritually in the new; let him also tell us, to what spiritual punishment the deprivation of Princes right to their states, and other temporal penalties then usual, are now converted, to the end that we may see the correspondence of the figure to the verity in matters of punishment and in the mean time let him acknowledge, according to his own doctrine, and instance here produced, that the Church may punish temporally, seeing it may excommunicate and consequently deprive men of many temporal commodities. 8 But this also is very untrue, that the Priests of the old Testament had authority to punish temporal Princes, by depriving them of their right to their temporal states, and dominions, as I amply proved above in the 5. Chapter. Neither do these examples, brought here by Mr. Fitzherbert, prove any such thing. For to the examples of King Ozias and Athalia, I have answered above at large. And as for the other two, besides that Samuel, Elias, and Elizeus, were not Priests, it is manifest, that what they did concerning the anointing, or deposing of any King, they did it not by their own authority, but only as Prophets, and special messengers sent by God to that purpose. How long (saith God to Samuel) i 1 Reg. 16. dost thou mourn Saul, whom I have rejected, that he rule not over Israel? Fill thy horn with oil, and come, that I may send thee to Isai the Bethleemite, for I have provided me a King among his Sons. And again, Go, (saith God to k 3 Reg. 19 Elias) and return into thy way by the desert of Damascus, and when thou art come thither, thou shalt anoint Hazael King over Syria, and jehu the Son of Namsi thou shalt anoint King over Israel, and Elizeus the Son of Saphat, thou shalt anoint Prophet for thee. And therefore he that was sent by Elizeus to anoint jehu, was commanded to speak in the person of God, & not of Elizeus; And holding (saith l 4 Reg. 9 Elizeus to him that was sent) the little box of oil, thou shalt power upon his head, and shalt say, Thus saith our Lord, I have anointed thee King over Israel. Now, what man of judgement would make this inference, that because in the old law some Prophets, who were no Priests, did by the express commandment of God, make, anoint, or depose Kings, therefore the Priests in the new law have ordinary power and authority to do the same. Belike Mr. Fitzherbert, will approve also this argument, that because Elias was commanded by God to anoint not only jehu King over Israel, but also Hazael King over Syria, therefore the Pope hath authority to make, and depose, not only Christian, but also Pagan Kings. 9 Wherefore that demand, which is here made by my Adversary, to what spiritual punishment the deprivation of Princes right to their States, and other temporal penalties then usual, are now converted, to the end we may see the correspondence of the figure to the verity in matters of punishment, is frivolous; both for that the Priests of the old law had no authority to deprive Kings of their temporal States, and Dominions, or to inflict temporal punishments; and also albeit they had such an authority, nevertheless it could not be proved from thence, by deducing an argument from the figure to the verity, that therefore the Priests of the new law must have authority to do the like, but things far more noble, and excellent, for that the verity must be of a more high and excellent order, than the figure, as in the fifth Chapter I proved more at large. And therefore as in the old law all the figures, promises, and punishments were temporal, so in the new law the verity, promises, and punishments, which correspond thereunto, must be spiritual, not temporal, for otherwise the figure should be the same with the verity, and not of an higher nature, and order then the verity: So that temporal life, must correspond to spiritual life, temporal kingdoms to spiritual kingdoms, temporal goods to spiritual goods, temporal promises, and rewards to spiritual promises, and rewards, and temporal punishments to spiritual punishments; all which spiritual punishments are contained in Excommunication Maior, and Minor, and in other Ecclesiastical Censures and punishments. And to that, which he addeth in the end, that I must acknowledge according to my own doctrine, that the Church may punish temporally, seeing that she may excommunicate, I have already fully m Cap. answered, and denied his consequence, for that the Church of Christ neither by Excommunication, nor by any other way, hath by the institution of Christ authority to inflict temporal punishments, but only to punish temporally by way of command, which no man denieth. And thus much concerning the old law. 10 Now to the authorities, which Mr. Fitzherbert brought out of the new Testament, I answered thus: Sixtly, those places of the new Testament, Quodcunque solueris super terram, etc. n Matth. 16. Whatsoever thou shalt lose upon earth, etc. and Pasce oves meas, o joan. 21. Feed my sheep, as also the reason which Fa. Parsons bringeth, to wit, that otherwise the Ecclesiastical commonwealth should be imperfect, and not sufficient for itself, are explicated by me elsewhere. And that corporal kill of Ananias, and Saphira, and the visible delivering of the fornicator to Satan, are to be referred to the grace of miracles. Neither will this Author say, as I imagine, that the Pope hath power to kill wicked men, and malefactors with the word of his mouth. 11 To this my answer Mr. Fitzherbert replieth in the same order: And first to my answer to those two places, Whatsoever thou shalt lose, etc. and Feed my sheep, which I made in my Apology p Apolog. nu. 35. & seq. & nu. 203. & seq. , whereunto I remitted the Reader, he replieth thus: q Pag. 115. nu. 6.7.8. That which Widdrington saith in his Apology concerning these two texts alleged out of the Gospel, is no other but to prove, that Christ gave thereby to S. Peter a spiritual authority only, which we willingly grant, as D. Adolphus Schulckenius r Adolph. Schulck. in Apolog. c. 4. § Respondeo p. 136 in his answer for Cardinal Bellarmine hath declared sufficiently, and told my Adversary Widdrington withal, how vainly he hath laboured with a long discourse, and many idle words to prove that, which neither the Cardinal, nor any other Catholic will deny. 12 For we willingly grant, saith Schulckenius, that the Pope's power is formally spiritual, though virtually it is also temporal, extending itself to temporal things so far forth, as they are subordinate to the spiritual, and the necessity of the Church shall require. So he. s Ibidem. and afterwards he also explicateth the same in these words; Nam & animus noster spiritus est, etc. For our soul, saith he, is a spirit, and hath a spiritual power, and yet it doth not only thereby govern the body which is subject unto it, but doth also chastise it with corporal punishments, as watching, haircloth, fasting, and whipping. And therefore if Bellarmine did say, that the Pope doth judge the faults of Princes, and upon their desert deprive them sometimes of their government by a temporal power, his Adversary Widdrington should say somewhat to the purpose; but now seeing that Bellarmine saith, that the Pope useth a spiritual power, when he depriveth Princes of their States, for spiritual and Ecclesiastical crimes (such as heresies and Schisms are) his Adversary Widdrington doth idly beat the air, etc. for he should have proved, that a supreme spiritual power cannot extend itself to dispose of temporal things, as they are referred to spiritual things. Thus saith Schulckenius. 13 And thereof my Adversary Widdrington might have taken notice, if it had pleased him, when he referred me, and his Readers to his Apology for answer to those places. For albeit he may perhaps pretend that he had not seen Schulckenius his Apology for the Cardinal, before he had ended his Theological Disputation; yet it is evident, that he had seen, and read it before he wrote his Admonition to the Reader, wherein he writeth against me. For he not only maketh mention therein of the Apology of Schulckenius, but also carpeth at him for some things that he handleth; and therefore if he had meant sincerely, he would not have remitted us to his own Apology for this point, without some confutation of Schulckenius his Answer thereto; I mean of so much as concerneth this matter. For otherwise he may multiply books, and write of this controversy as long as he liveth, and all to no purpose, if he will still stand upon his first grounds, and dissemble the answers that are made thereto: and therefore as he remitteth me to his Apology, so I remit him also to the answer of Schulckenius, which I have partly laid down here, and may be seen more at large in him. And this shall suffice for this point. 14 But truly it is intolerable, that these men should so shamefully both abuse me, and delude their Reader, I do not say, only in dissembling the answer I made to their argument, but in plainly corrupting the words, and manifest sense thereof, in which manner they may multiply books, and make Replies with ease, but with shame enough. For it is too too apparently untrue, that I laboured in that place to prove nothing else, as those men falsely affirm, but that which neither Cardinal Bellarmine, nor any other Catholic will deny, to wit, that Christ gave to S. Peter a spiritual authority only; (although it be well known, that the common opinion of the Canonists doth deny the same, who contend that Christ gave thereby to S. Peter not only spiritual, but also temporal authority, and made him thereby not only a spiritual, but also a temporal Monarch, and therefore Mr. Fitzherbert is grossly mistaken, in saying so boldly, that neither Cardinal Bellarmine, nor any other Catholic will deny that Christ gave thereby to S. Peter a spiritual authority only.) For I did not contend in that place about the authority which was given to Saint Peter, to bind and lose (which Cardinal Bellarmine taketh to be all one, with to feed his sheep) whether it was temporal, or spiritual, or both, as the Canonists will have it, but about the acts and effects of that power and authority, and I affirm that the effects of that power which was given to S. Peter to bind, and lose, to wit, the bindings, and loosings themselves, were spiritual, and not temporal bindings and loosings. For this was my answer in that place t Apolog. ● 35.36. . 15 And although it be generally said by Christ our Saviour, whatsoever thou shalt bind, etc. yet without doubt neither is that word [whatsoever] to be taken in it whole latitude or generality, or, as the Logicians say, with a complete distribution, but with some limitation, or accommodate distribution, neither did Christ our Saviour speak of every binding, but only of a certain, & determinate binding. And by the words that go before, to wit [the keys of the kingdom of heaven] and by those that follow [& in caelis, also in heaven] it is plain enough, that this bond, which the Ecclesiastical power may by the institution of Christ, bind and lose, is not a temporal ●●nd, but that it appertaineth to a heavenly and spiritual binding. Whereupon the Interlineall Gloss, expounding those words Matth. 18. What things soever you shall bind, with the bond, saith he, of Anathema. Which also Franciscus Suarez, a most famous Divine, of the Society of jesus doth expressly affirm: But that, which is added, saith he, u Tom. ●. disp. 1. sec. 2. nu. 5. Erit ligatum & in caelo, Shall be bound also in heaven, doth sufficiently declare, this power not to be natural, but supernatural, and that bond (mark this word, bond) to be spiritual, and of a superior, or higher order. And joannes Parisiensis, To that, saith he, x In Tract. de potest. Regia, & Papa● c. 15. which is secondly objected. Whatsoever you shall lose, etc. I answer according to chrysostom, and Rabanus, that by this no other power is understood to be given, but spiritual, to wit, (observe that which followeth) to absolve from the bond of sins. For it were foolish to understand, that by this is given authority to absolve from the bond of debts. Thus I answered in my Apology. 16 Consider now. Good Reader, with what face, or conscience these men can affirm, that I have laboured hour even with sweat, and vainly spent many words only to prove by those two authorities of holy Scripture, that the Pontifical power is spiritually which neither Card. Bellarmine, nor they do deny, but willingly grant: whereas I do not contend that the power to bind, and lose, which was given to S. Peter, and to the rest of the Apostles, is spiritual and not temporal, but that the bond, which the Ecclesiastical power is to bind, and lose, is a spiritual, and not a temporal bond: which if my Adversary hence will grant, it must needs follow, that corporal, and temporal punishments, as watching, haircloth; fasting, whipping, imprisonment, depriving of corporal life, or temporal goods, all which are corporal and temporal bonds, and punishments, cannot be inflicted by that Ecclesiastical power, which Christ gave to S. Peter, and the other Apostles. And therefore with what safety our English Catholics can adventure their souls, and whole estates upon these men, 1. Tim. 4. who have, according to the Apostles saying, such wounded, seared, or canteriate consciences, and in their public writings do so grossly, and shamefully corrupt the words, and meaning of their Adversary in a matter of such importance, as is their obedience due to God, and Caesar, I remit to the consideration of any prudent man. 17 The soul is a spirit, saith D. Schulckenius related here by my Adversary, and hath a spiritual power, yet it doth also chastise the body (but in that manner as I declared in the second part) with corporal punishments, as watching, haircloth, fasting, and whipping. And what then? will they therefore infer, that because watching, wearing of haircloth, fasting, and whipping are commanded by the spiritual power of the foul, therefore they are spiritual, and not corporal actions and punishments? No man maketh any doubt, but that the power, whereby God created the world, the Angel moved the water, y joan. 5. Ananias, and Saphira were stricken dead, z Acts 5. was a spiritual power, yet no man can deny, that the creation of the world, and the moving of the water were corporal actions, and the sudden putting to death of Ananias, and Saphira were also corporal actions, and punishments. So likewise it cannot be denied, that the binding of men with fetters, be it done by God, Angels, or men, that is, by a spiritual, or temporal power is a corporal binding, and the depriving of any man of his temporal goods, liberty, or life, let it be done by a spiritual, or temporal power, is still a temporal, and not a spiritual punishment. 18 If therefore these men, as they make a show in words, will in very deed and sincerely grant what I affirmed, and proved in that place, they must needs confess, that the Pope, by virtue of that commission, which Christ gave to Saint Peter, and the other Apostles to bind and lose, hath no authority to imprison men, to bind them with corporal chains, to absolve, or lose them from their temporal bonds, debts, or allegiance, for that these are temporal, and not spiritual bindings, and loosings, for what end, or by what power soever they be done. Neither did I contend in that place, that the power and authority of the Apostles to bind and lose was not temporal, but spiritual, but only that the bindings, and loosings, which were the effects of that power, were only spiritual, and not temporal bindings, and loosings. See above a Cap. 5 sec. 3. nu. 10. & sec. more of these bonds, to which the Ecclesiastical power to bind, and lose, is by the ancient Fathers limited and restrained. And hereby the Reader may easily perceive, that I had no great reason to confute in that brief Admonition D. Schulckenius his Reply, for as much as concerneth this point, but it was sufficient to remit the Reader to my aforesaid answer, seeing that D. Schulckenius said nothing at all against it, but cunningly flyed from the effects of the Apostles power to bind, and lose, which I there proved to be only spiritual, and not temporal bonds, to the power itself to bind and lose, whereof I did not intend to dispute in that place, knowing well, that although the effects of that power had been, as they were not, temporal bindings, and loosings, yet the power itself to bind, and lose might for divers reasons be called, as Divines do call it, a spiritual, and not formally, a temporal, or civil power, although, as I said above, b Cap. nu. 7●. See also beneath cap. 12. nu. 61. & seq. I think this question betwixt the Divines and Canonists, whether it be a spiritual, or a temporal power, to be more verbal and of words, then real, and of the thing itself. And this may suffice for this point. 19 Now before we come to examine Fa. Parson's reason, it will not be amiss to set down the substance of that I answered to Cardinal Bellarmine's second argument, which is the same in effect with that of Fa. Parsons, and also to examine what D. Schulckenius replieth to the same. To prove therefore, that the Church hath power to dispose of temporal things, and to inflict temporal punishments, Cardinal Bellarmine bringeth this argument. Bel. l. 5. de Rom. Pont. c. 7. The Ecclesiastical commonwealth ought to be perfect, and sufficient for itself in order to her end, for such are all well established Commonwealths, therefore she ought to have all power necessary to the attaining of her end, but power to use, and to dispose of temporals is necessary to the spiritual end, because otherwise wicked Princes might without punishment favour heretics, and overthrow religion, therefore she hath also this power. 20 To this argument I answered in my Apology, a Nu. 176. 177. & seq. first by, distinguishing that equivocal proposition, The Ecclesiastical Commonwealth ought to be perfect, and to have all power sufficient and necessary to the attaining of her end, which is the eternal salvation of souls. For first the sense of that proposition may be, that the Church hath such a sufficient power to obtain her end, which is the salvation of souls, that she can actually bring all souls to Paradise, and can take away all the obstacles, and lets, which can any wise hinder the salvation of souls, which sense those words of Cardinal Bellarmine b In Resp. ad Tract. Gersonii de valid. Excom. in consid. 11. may have, which affirm, that the Pope can effect all that, which is necessary to bring souls to Paradise, and that he can remove all the impedements, which the world, or the Devil withal their forces and sleights can oppose: And this sense is plainly false, and very well impugned by Paulus Venetus in his Italian Apology, c Fol. 57 col●●n. 2. both for that the Pope hath no sufficient means to save an infant in the mother's womb, whom she cannot bring forth alive (because it is not lawful to cut the mother's womb, that the child may be baptised) or to save him, who being in mortal sin, is fallen mad, until he return to his wits again, which nevertheless is not in the Pope's power: Also the Pope hath no power over the internal motions of the mind, which are very necessary to salvation: Also for that there should neither be Turks, nor Infidels, nor Heretics, nor so much as evil Christians without the Pope's great fault, if he could effect all that, which is necessary to bring souls to Paradise, and could remove all those things, which do hinder the obtaining of eternal salvation. 21 Now concerning this first part of the distinction, D. Schulckenius doth not deny, that the aforesaid proposition, The Ecclesiastical commonwealth ought to be perfect, etc. is in this sense false, but he denieth, that Cardinal Bellarmine understood it in this sense, and he only reprehendeth me for omitting to set down what Cardinal Bellarmine answered to the objections of Paulus Venetus. I answer, saith he, d Cap. 8. ad nu. 177. p. 350. My Adversary Widdrington had done well, if when he related Paulus Venetus his arguments and unnecessary subtleties, he had also adjoined Cardinal Bellarmine's answer: For so both he had done the Reader a pleasure, and also had eased us of the pains to answer. But it is well, that Paulus Venetus his arguments are not such, that we must labour much to answer them. For that which Bellarmine said, that the Pope can effect all that, which is necessary to bring souls to Paradise, and can remove all the impediments, etc. is to be understood in this sense, that the Pope's power is not limited, or restrained, as it is in men of inferior Orders, but it is most ample, and most great, and therefore the whole and full Ecclesiastical power to give Sacraments, Indulgences, Benefices, to make laws, Decrees, Canons, to dispense in Oaths, laws, vows, to examine, judge, punish, and that in every Diocese, Province, Kingdom: It is to be added that these things are to be understood, for as much as concerneth the Pope's part, and in a matter fit to receive his action. And therefore no marvel if the Pope cannot bring to salvation souls obstinate in heresy, or in sins especially internal. For it is their own fault, not the Popes, seeing that he doth apply remedies of themselves effectual, if they themselves would admit them. So also it is no marvel if the Pope cannot apply a remedy to an infant being in danger in the mother's womb, because such an infant is not capable of the Pope's help. And the same reason is of a man, who when he hath committed a mortal sin falleth mad, etc. 22 But first, although when I published my Apology, I had seen Cardinal Bellarmine's Reply to Paulus Venetus, as I did not, and therefore could not set down what the Cardinal answered to his objection, yet I must then also have affirmed, as also I do now, that whatsoever Cardinal Bellarmine's meaning was, yet his words are so general and without any limitation, or declaration, that they may very well be understood in the aforesaid sense. The Pope, saith he, can effect all that, which is necessary to bring souls to Paradise, and can remove all the impediments, which the world, and the Devil with all their forces and sleights can oppose. Seeing therefore that the Devil can by his power cast a man being in mortal sin into phrencie, by which he is hindered from attaining to eternal salvation, and can hinder an infant from being baptised by causing the mother not to deliver it alive, and also can cause sundry inward motions in the soul of man: and because Cardinal Bellarmine's words are so general, and without any limitation, or declaration, The Pope, saith he, can remove all the impediments to salvation which the Devil with all his force and sleight can oppose, it is plain, that they may very well be so understood, that the Pope can also remove the aforesaid impediments, for that those impediments are included in all impediments, as a particular in a universal, and therefore to take away all occasion of error it was not unnecessary to declare in what sense those words being so general might be true, or false. 23 Besides, although the Pope's power be not so limited and restrained, as it is in men of inferior Orders, but it is most ample, most great, and full in a certain measure and degree, yet this Doctor cannot be ignorant, that, there is a great controversy among learned Catholics concerning the amplitude, greatness, and fullness of the Pope's power as well in spirituals, as in temporals. For the Canonists do hold, that he hath formally, properly and directly both temporal and spiritual power, and that he is not only a supreme spiritual Pastor, but also a temporal Monarch: but this Doctor with some other Divines do maintain, that he hath formally, properly, and directly no temporal power, but only spiritual, yet by this spiritual power of his, they say he can dispose of all things, and inflict all kind of punishments, as well temporal as spiritual, as if he had formally, and directly temporal power, and therefore they will not call this power of the Pope to dispose of all temporals formally and directly, but virtually and indirectly temporal power, or a supreme power to dispose of all temporals in order to spiritual good. Other Divines, and Lawyers, whom I cited above in the first part, do contend, that the Pope by the institution of Christ hath neither formally, nor virtually, neither directly, nor indirectly any temporal power, or authority to dispose of temporal things, or to inflict temporal punishments, but only spiritual power, by which he may dispose, or dispense in spiritual things, and inflict spiritual punishments, and also command, enjoin, or impose temporal things, as in them may be found virtue or vice, which are the object of the spiritual directive power, but no way dispose of temporal things, or inflict temporal or civil punishments, for that these are the acts and objects only of civil power. 24 Neither also can this Doctor be ignorant, that there is a great controversy betwixt the Divines of Rome, and of Paris, about the amplitude, greatness, and fullness of the Pope's spiritual power: insomuch that jacobus Almainus, a famous Doctor of Paris doth affirm, e Almain de author. Eccles. cap. 3. that there is so great a controversy among Doctors concerning the plenitude, or fullness of Ecclesiastical power, and to what things it is extended, that in this matter there are few things secure, or without doubt: so that, as, William Occam saith, it would be very necessary in these times, that wise men being compelled by Oaths, and horrible threatenings to speak the truth should declare, what things do belong to the plenitude of Ecclesiastical power, and much more of Papal authority, which Almain with the other Divines of Paris do make inferior to the power of the Church, or of a General Council, Gerson de potest Eccles. consid. 12. which doth represent the Church: for as john Gerson, and the said Almain do affirm, deceitful flattery hath now overmuch extended and amplified the greatness, and fullness of Papal authority. 25 Moreover, although I will not deny that the Pope hath authority to make laws and Canons, yet it is not certain that he hath authority to make laws, and Canons to bind a general Council, for that the Doctors of Paris do affirm, that a general Council hath authority to make laws & Canons to bind the Pope according to the express definitions of the Counsels of Constance and Basill. Conc. Const. sess. 5. The Council doth ordain, define, decree, and determine, saith the Council of Constance, as followeth. And first it doth declare that the said Council being gathered in the holy Ghost, making a general Council, and representing the Catholic Church, hath immediately from Christ authority, which every man of what state or dignity soever, although it be papal, is bound to obey in those things which belong to faith, and to the rooting out of the said Schism, and to the reforming of the said Church in the head and members. Also it doth declare that every man of whatsoever condition, state or dignity he be, although it be Papal, that shall obstinately contemn to obey the commands, statutes, decrees, or precepts of this sacred Synod, being lawfully gathered concerning the aforesaid, or appertaining to any of them, made, or to be made, unless he shall repent, let him be subject to condign penance, and be deservedly punished, by having also recourse (if it shall be needful) to other helps of law: Which decrees of the Council of Constance, the Council also of Basill, which was lawfully called by Pope Eugenius the 4. and which at that time when these decrees were made, Concil. Basil. sess. 2. was not accounted a Schismatical, but a lawful and Ecumenical Council, doth in the same express words confirm. 26 Also, although I will not deny that the Pope hath authority to dispense in vows, and oaths, yet it is not certain that he hath authority to dispense in all vows, and in all oaths: for that many Divines do with S. Thomas maintain that he hath not power to dispense in the solemn vow of religious chastity, or in those oaths which are made to confirm any thing, which we are otherwise bound to perform by the law of God, or nature: because the opinion of the Thomists is, that the Pope doth dispense in oaths only by declaring that the thing which is confirmed by oath, is not now a sufficient matter of an oath, as I have declared more at large elsewhere. f Disputat. Theolog. c. 6. sec. 6. nu. 8. & in Resp Apol. nu. 148. 149. Lastly, although I do willingly grant that the Pope hath authority to punish, yet it is not certain that he hath authority to punish with all kind of punishments, for that many learned Catholics do hold, as you may see more at large above in the first part, that Ecclesiastical power is by the institution of Christ restrained only to Ecclesiastical Censures, and cannot inflict temporal or civil punishments, as death, banishment, imprisonment, depriving of temporal goods, etc. And thus much concerning the first part of the aforesaid distinction; now touching the second part. 27 Secondly therefore, the meaning of Cardinal Bellarmine's aforesaid proposition [The Ecclesiastical commonwealth ought to be perfect, and to have all power sufficient and necessary, etc.] may be, that the Church hath all power sufficient, and necessary in order to her end, which is the salvation of souls, in respect of the power itself and not in respect also of all those things which are in any wise necessary, that the power may actually work her effect. As the power, for example of the Sun to give light, may be understood sufficient, either in respect of the power itself to give light, or in respect also of those things, which do any way concur to the actual giving of light and which things, if they be wanting, will hinder the giving of light, of which sort are a proportionate distance, a capable, and well disposed subject. And although the Sun hath not sufficient, power to remove all those impediments, which may hinder her actual giving of light, for so it should draw the body that is to be enlightened within a sufficient distance, and make it also diaphanum, clear, or perspicuous, which to do is not is the power of the Sun nevertheless what man can therefore deny, that the Sun hath a perfect power, and of itself sufficient to enlighten? 28 And in this sense the aforesaid antecedent proposition is true; For the Christian commonwealth, or the Church of Christ hath a perfect, and sufficient power for itself to bring souls to the kingdom of heaven, for as much as belongeth to the power itself, which nevertheless doth suppose the subject to be otherwise apt, and well disposed. For she hath power granted her by Christ to give grace, whereby we may come to the kingdom of heaven, to Infants by the Sacrament of Baptism, and to men of discretion also by other Sacraments, but especially of Penance, by which the Priest, as a Minister of Christ by virtue of the keys, which he hath received from Christ absolveth from sins, and giveth grace, nevertheless this power to work actually her effect, supposeth certain necessary dispositions on the behalf of the persons who are to receive the Sacraments, as well in Infants, as in men of discretion, which dispositions the Church hath not always power to procure. Also, besides this power, which the Divines call of Order, the Church hath also power of jurisdiction; for she hath authority to preach the word of GOD, to correct sinners, to make laws, and to punish the transgressors with Ecclesiastical, or spiritual punishments: For as the Church, and the Ecclesiastical power is spiritual, so also she ought to have means proportionate to such an end. We grant therefore the antecedent proposition in this sense, which we have now declared, but we deny, etc.; 29 Now this Doctor although he granteth all this, which I have said to be true, yet he cannot forbear to take certain idle exceptions against the same. I answer, saith he, g Pag. 353. ad nu. 179. & seq. although all this do make little or nothing to the solving of Cardinal Bellarmine's argument, but to the enlarging of the volume of his book they make much, yet I would relate what he hath said, for that I saw certain things to be noted therein. But whether they make little or nothing to solve Cardinal Bellarmine's argument, you shall see anon; this is a usual trick of this Doctor, especially when my answer, or argument is of greatest force, that he knoweth not well what to reply thereunto, then with some idle, or despiteful words to shift it of, as that it is spoken either to disgrace Cardinal Bellarmine, or to make the Sea Apostolic odious, and dreadful to Christian Princes, or that it is nothing to the purpose, but to enlarge my book, and to make it seem to be of a competent volume, and such like trifling toys, which do argue rather want of matter, and a spirit of contradiction, than a true desire to examine sincerely this important, and difficult controversy; and which with as great facility, and far greater reason may be retorted back upon himself, for his often repeating of the same sentences, and which are nothing to the purpose, as that of S. Leo, Ecclesiastica lenitas refugit cruentas ultiones, Ecclesiastical lenity doth shun cruel punishments, which is nothing to the solving of my argument, and spending many words to prove that the Pope hath power to command, and enjoin temporal penalties, whereof I made no question, and consuming twenty eight whole pages to prove, that S. Peter, and his Successors are the heads of the Church, which no Catholic doth deny, and which make little, or nothing to the impugning of my doctrine, but to the enlarging the volume of his book they make much. 30 Now you shall see what goodly observations this Doctor hath found out in this part of my answer. First, saith he, h Pag. 353. it is to be observed, that my Adversary Widdrington, I know not with what cunning hath transferred the question from the Ecclesiastical commonwealth, as it is distinguished from the Commonwealth of Christian Laikes, to the Christian Commonwealth, or the Church of Christ, as it is distinguished from the company of Pagans, and infidels. For in Bellarmine's argument the Ecclesiastical Commonwealth is taken in the first, and not in the later sense: But Widdrington answereth of the Christian commonwealth, as it comprehendeth Churchmen, and Laymen. Let he himself see with what simplicity he did it, who otherwise doth seem so scrupulously to shun equivocations. 31 But first it is to be observed, with what cunning, or ignorance this Doctor affirmeth, that I have transferred the question from the Ecclesiastical commonwealth, as it is distinguished from the Commonwealth of Christian Laikes, to the Christian commonwealth, or Church of Christ, as it is distinguished from the company of Pagans, and infidels: See Apolog. nu. 176. 180. & seq. seeing that I expressly spoke of the Ecclesiastical Commonwealth, as it is a spiritual commonwealth, and as it hath spiritual power; Now with what colour of probability can this Doctor infer from any one word of mine, that I ever said, that Ecclesiastical or spiritual power doth reside in Laymen? or that when I treat of the spiritual power of the Church, or of the Ecclesiastical commonwealth, I take the Church, as it comprehendeth Churchmen, and Laymen? True it is, that the Ecclesiastical, or spiritual Commonwealth, kingdom, or Church of Christ, when we speak properly, and generally, is taken both by Cardinal Bellarmine, and myself, as it comprehendeth Cleargie-men, and Laymen, that is, as it containeth both spiritual power, and spiritual subjection, spiritual Pastors, and spiritual subjects; and therefore Cardinal Bellarmine before in his first reason affirmed, that Kings, and Bishops, Cleargie-men, and Laymen do not make two commonwealths, but one only, that is, one Church. As likewise a temporal commonwealth, or kingdom, when we speak properly, and generally, is taken as it comprehendeth both temporal Kings, and temporal subjects, that is, as it containeth both civil power, and civil subjection; For what man of judgement, speaking generally of a temporal kingdom, by the name of the kingdom understandeth only the King himself, but when he speaketh of the temporal power of a kingdom, as I expressly spoke here of the spiritual power of the Ecclesiastical Commonwealth, no judicious man can understand, that he speaketh of subjects, wherein no temporal power doth reside. Let this Doctor therefore see himself with what simplicity he said, that I comprehended here in this answer under the name of the Ecclesiastical commonwealth Cleargie-men, and Laymen, when I treated of the Ecclesiastical, or spiritual power of the Church. 32 Secondly, it is to be observed, saith this Doctor, i Pag. 354. that which Widdrington here disputeth of an apt, and well disposed subject, that the Ecclesiastical power may therein work her effect, to be true, and that Cardinal Bellarmine hath the same in his answer to the objections of Paulus Venetus: and yet that Widdrington after his accustomed uprightness commended the argument of Paulus Venetus, and dissembled Card. Bellarmine's answer. Hear you see, that this Doctor granteth the distinction which I made to be true, and that Card. Bellarmine approveth the same: but that which he addeth, that I dissembled Cardinal Bellarmine's answer is very untrue; for I never saw his answer; and although I had seen it, and so might have commended his meaning, and his declaration, yet truly I should not have commended his words being spoken so generally, and without any limitation, or declaration, seeing that they may imply, that the Pope can remove all impediments whatsoever, which either the world, or the Devil with all their forces, and sleights can oppose, which proposition may at the first sight be taken, as I have known divers learned men understand it, in that first sense, which before I showed to be false, and therefore what great fault, trow you, could it be for me to declare the meaning of those words more plainly? seeing that a proposition may without doubt sometimes be false, yea, and as learned Divines are of opinion, may be also heretical, according to that vulgar maxim, S. Tho. secunda secundae q. 11. ar. 2. Magister in 4. dist. 13. which Saint Thomas, and the Master of the sentences attribute to Saint Hierome, ex verbis inordinate prolatis incurritur haeresis, heresy is incurred by words inordinately uttered, although he, by whom they were spoken, had no bad meaning. 33 Thirdly, saith this Doctor, k Ibid. it is to be observed, that Widdrington, whiles he declareth what punishments the Church can inflict upon her subjects that shall offend, maketh mention only of spiritual punishments, as though the Church cannot inflict also temporal punishments, whereof see what we have said above cap. 4. upon the 40.41. and 42. numbers. True it is, that the main scope of my Apology was no other, then to prove it to be probable, that the spiritual power of the Church, or Ecclesiastical Commonwealth doth not extend to the inflicting of temporal, or civil punishments, but only of Ecclesiastical, or spiritual Censures. Neither hath this Doctor in those places, to which he remitteth his Reader, proved any other thing, then that the Church by virtue of her spiritual power may command, enjoin, and impose temporal punishments, and by the temporal authority given her by the grant, and consent of temporal Princes may also inflict them upon inferior persons, which I never denied. And so in this kingdom we see by experience, that albeit Bishops have ever had authority to excommunicate disobedient persons, and to enjoin temporal penalties, as a thing proper to their spiritual power, yet to imprison them they procure a Writ out of the temporal Court de excommunicato capiendo, for apprehending an excommunicated person. 34 Lastly, saith this Doctor, l Ibid. pag. 354 it is to be observed, that whiles Widdrington declareth the power of jurisdiction, not without mystery, he hath said nothing of the power to absolve from oaths, and vows, and other things of that kind. True it is, that although I did not in that place expressly affirm, as also I did not deny, that the Ecclesiastical power doth not extend to the absolving from oaths, and vows, yet of set purpose, and for some mystery I did then omit to make mention of them: and the mystery was this, for that there is a great controversy among learned Divines, especially betwixt the Thomists, and their opposites; (wherewith I thought it neither necessary, nor expedient at that time to intermeddle) not only in what manner the spiritual power of the Church may absolve from oaths, & vows, but also whether the Church hath any authority at all to absolve from all Oaths, and all vows, seeing that, as afterwards m Praefat. ad Resp. Apolog. nu. 58. & in Resp. nu. 148. I declared, S. Thomas, and his followers do contend, that the Pope hath no authority to absolve from the solemn vow of religious chastity, and also that he cannot absolve from any vow, or oath by releasing the bond, and obligation to perform that, which is once sworn or vowed, for this were to absolve from the law of Nature, which commandeth us to perform that which we have once lawfully sworn, or vowed, but only by declaring and interpreting, that the matter, which was sworn or vowed, is not now in this particular case a sufficient matter to be sworn, or vowed: From which doctrine it clearly followeth, that the Pope hath no authority to absolve from the oath of true temporal allegiance, unless he also have authority, as he hath not, to declare that true temporal allegiance is not in that particular case lawful, or necessary, and consequently, not a sufficient matter to be sworn, whereas true temporal allegiance is always not only lawful, but also necessary, and commanded by the law of God and nature. And thus much concerning this Doctors observations. 35 Now you shall see how well he confuteth the answer, which I gave to Cardinal Bellarmine's argument, supposing the aforesaid distinction. Thus therefore I began to answer it: Wherefore we grant the antecedent proposition in the sense, which we have now declared. But we deny that the power to use & to dispose of the temporals of all Christians is necessary to the spiritual end: for such a power is not proportionate to that end, & therefore there is no likelihood, that for the spiritual end such a temporal power, or, which is all one, such a power to dispose of temporals, was by Christ our Saviour given to his Church, which is a spiritual and not temporal commonwealth. I answer, saith this Doctor n Num. 355. , whether the power to use and to dispose of the temporals of all Christians be necessary to the Church for her end, is the principal question, which is in controversy, Cardinal Bellarmine affirmeth, Widdrington denieth. But whiles he denieth, he is so destitute of Patrons and Doctors, that also joannes Parisiensis, whom in his book he more often citeth for his opinion, than any other, is flat against him, etc. 36 But first, it is not true, that the principal question which is in controversy, is whether the power to dispose of the temporals of all christians be necessary to the Church for her end, which is the salvation of souls; but the principal question & controversy is whether Christ our Saviour gave authority to his Church, as it is a spiritual Kingdom, & consisteth only of spiritual power to dispose of all temporals: And Cardinal Bellarmine to prove that Christ gave unto his Church this power, bringeth this for a reason, because this power to dispose of all temporals is necessary to her spiritual end, to wit, the salvation of souls, which reason, I say, is not true, and from thence it would clearly follow, that our Saviour was of necessity tied to give to spiritual pastors authority to depose temporal Princes, and to dispose of all temporals, which no man, I think that hath his wits about him, will affirm. And how did the Church of Christ, think you, dispose of temporals by way of authority, when she was persecuted by the Pagan, and Arrian Emperors? for then, if at any time, a power to dispose of temporals, should have been necessary to the salvation of souls. Whereupon Cardinal Bellarmine himself affirmeth, That it is not absolutely necessary to resist the common enemy, Bel. l. 1. de Con●l. ca 10. as is the Turk. For if the Church could be conversant under the most cruel persecutions of Nero, Domitian, Decius, Diocletian, why can she not also under the persecution of the Turks? 37 Secondly, neither is it true, that I am destitute of Patrons and Doctors, who maintain that the Pope by his spiritual power cannot dispose of temporals, or inflict temporal punishments, as I have showed above in the first part: where also I proved that joannes Parisiensis doth no way favour, but flatly contradict Card. Bellarmine's doctrine: and also the very ashes of this Doctors book, if they could speak, would give sufficient testimony against him, that this my doctrine is not altogether destitute of Patrons and Doctors. But whereas this Doctor should have proved that the power to dispose of all temporals is necessary to the salvation of souls, which Cardinal Bellarmine affirmed, and I denied, he flieth from this reason to the authority of Doctors, who affirm that the Pope hath power to dispose of temporals, which is to run up and down in a circle from intrinsical grounds to extrinsical, from reason to authority, and contrariwise, and never to persist in any one medium, or argument. Wherefore, whensoever any Author, or myself do seem to affirm, or suppose, that temporal things, & the disposing of them, are in some cases necessary to the general good of the Church, and to the salvation of souls; it is not to be understood of any absolute necessity, but only of some great convenience, or utility, for which in common speech we oftentimes take necessity, as it is well known to every Logician, who hath but read the beginning of Porphyries Introduction, Cùm necessarium sit Chysaori, etc. Whereas it is necessary o Chysaori, etc. In which case of necessity, or great utility, temporal things are by the institution of Christ, to be disposed of to a spiritual end by the temporal and civil power of Christian Princes, and not by the spiritual power, as he hath distinguished the acts, offices and functions thereof from civil authority. 38 But thou wilt say, saith this Doctor, o Pag. 355. that this power to dispose of temporals, is not proportionate to the end of the ecclesiastical power, which is spiritual. I answer first, saith he, that this power to dispose of temporals in the Pope is not formally temporal, but formally spiritual, and eminently temporal; and therefore it is very well proportionate to a spiritual end. But this is to declare the self same thing by itself; for to have virtually or eminently a temporal power, is nothing else then to have a power to dispose of temporal things, or to do all that which the temporal power can do, which is the main point which I utterly deny, and consequently affirm, that (according to the institution of Christ, who hath left distinguished, the acts, functions, and properties of the temporal power or Common-weath, from them of the spiritual power or Church of Christ) to dispose of temporal things, and to inflict temporal punishments, which are temporal and civil acts and punishments, are not by the institution of Christ proportionate to the spiritual power, and to the end thereof, as it is by him distinguished from the civil power, and the end, objects, and acts thereof. For, as Christ our Saviour hath instituted his Church a spiritual Kingdom, or Commonwealth, and distinguished her directive and coercive power, and the acts, and objects thereof, from the acts and objects of the civil power, or Commonwealth; so also hath he assigned spiritual punishments, as means proportionate to her coercive or punishing power, as temporal punishments are proportionate to the temporal coercive power. 39 Wherefore this Doctor, knowing right well, that I have always denied the Church of Christ, to have either formally or eminently temporal power giveth a second answer. I answer secondly, saith he, p Pag. 356. that temporal goods, and the power itself over temporal goods, have indeed no natural proportion with spiritual, but they have a very great moral proportion, which for the present is sufficient. For temporal goods are spiritual instruments of good works, in which respect S. Peter calleth Alms, & other good works, 1 Pet. 2. although corporal, spirituales hostias, spiritual sacrifices. Wherefore as the spirit in man disposeth of corporal actions, as Alms, fastings, chastising of the flesh, and such like as they are necessary to the health of the soul, (he might add also to the health of the body) so the Prince of the Church may in order to a spiritual end (and if his similitude were good, may likewise in order to a temporal end) dispose of temporal goods, which for the same reason that they are necessary to the obtaining of that end, for the same reason they are said to be proportionate to the same end. 40 But this answer I have confuted above partly in the second part, q Par. 2. cap. 8. where I have showed that this similitude of the soul and body doth manifestly impugn their doctrine, and that the soul doth not dispose of any temporal action▪ as Alms, fasting, whipping, and such like, but only by way of command, and also not without the active concurrence of some corporal organ, and besides that if the similitude were good, the Pope should have power, not only for spiritual good, but also for temporal, to depose temporal Princes, to dispose of temporals, and to inflict temporal punishments; and partly above in the former Chapter, r Num. 108. where Mr. Fitzherbert hath taken this answer verbatim from this Doctor. For temporal goods to have a moral proportion with spiritual, and to be spiritual instruments of good or bad works, is nothing else then that they may concur to virtuous or vicious actions, and be the object of virtue, or vice, which therefore may be commanded or forbidden by the spiritual power as it is directive, which hath for her object virtue and vice: But no moral proportion, reference, or relation can alter the nature of temporal goods, or puishments, or make temporal goods to become spiritual goods, and temporal punishments to become spiritual punishments: and therefore no such moral proportion is sufficient to cause temporal goods to be disposed, or temporal punishments to be inflicted by the spiritual power as it is coercive, whose acts and objects are only the disposing of spiritual goods, and the inflicting of spiritual punishments for a spiritual end. 41 Lastly, to the consequence of Cardinal Bellarmine's argument, whereby he laboured to prove, that the power to use, and dispose of temporals is necessary to the spiritual end, I answered thus s Apolog. nu. 183. by denying his consequence. Neither doth it follow from thence, as Cardinal Bellarmine doth ill, and contrary to himself infer, that otherwise wicked Princes may without punishment nourish heretics, and overthrow religion. For the Church hath, as we said, power to punish them not indeed with civil or temporal, but with Ecclesiastical or spiritual punishments, unless perhaps Ecclesiastical Censures are not worthy to be reckoned among punishments, whereas they are accounted by all men to be most sharp and dreadful punishments. Wherefore Cardinal Bellarmine himself doth in express words affirm, t Lib. 3. de Eccles. c. 6. that there is no greater punishment, which can be inflicted by the Church, then is Excommunition: and again, u Lib. 3. de Laic. c. 22. Aug. l. 1. contra Aduersar. leg. & proph. c. 17. that Excommunication is a greater punishment then corporal death: and to this purpose he citeth Saint Augustine, affirming, that it is more horrible to be delivered over to Satan by Excommunication, then to be strucken with the sword, to be consumed by fire, or to be devoured by wild beasts. 42 Now to this answer, D. Schulckenius replieth in this manner. x Pag. 357. I do not see, saith he, in what thing Cardinal Bellarmine doth according to widdrington's judgement contradict himself. That Excommunication is greater than all temporal punishments Bellarmine did write, which is most true, and no man unless he be impious, or mad can deny it: but not therefore did he ill, or contrary to himself write, that it is necessary for the Church to have power to dispose of temporals, lest that the Prince may without punishment nourish heretics, and overthrow religion. For many are more afraid of temporal punishments, then of Excommunication, although this be without comparison the greater; as boys are more afraid of the rod, then of losing their inheritance. And this is the cause why the Council of Lateran cap. 3. did command, that Princes who nourish heretics should first be excommunicated; and afterwards, if this remedy doth not avail, that the subjects be absolved from their oath of allegiance, and their territories be delivered over to others to be possessed by them. What will Widdrington say here? that a Council of the whole world was ignorant of the greatness of Excommunication, or that she did contradict herself, when she wrote those things. Truly prudent men will condemn Widdrington of temerity, and ignorance, and will not in any wise reprehend the Council. Besides, as the Council of Lateran, against those who are ignorant of the greatness of Excommunication doth command, that the favourers of heretics be first excommunicated, and afterwards deprived of their temporal dominions: so contrariwise the Council of Trent. sess. 25. cap. 3. against those, who do know the greatness of Excommunication commandeth first, that malefactors be punished with temporal punishments, with imprisonment, exile, pecuniary mulcts, and at last, if these do not avail, to be strucken with the dart of Excommunication. Neither doth the Council of Trent contradict the Council of Lateran, or contradicteth herself, or knoweth not the force of Excommunication; But my Adversary Widdrington, who contemneth the decrees of so great Counsels, and yet professeth himself to be a Catholic, is by his words repugnant to his profession. 43 Observe now, good Reader, the fraud and falsehood of this man. And first he doth not see, forsooth, how Cardinal Bellarmine contradicteth himself in yielding the reason, why it is necessary, that the Church have power to dispose of temporals, to wit, for that otherwise wicked Princes might without punishment nourish heretics, and overthrow religion, as though he were so blind, that he cannot see light at-noone days. For what a more manifest contradiction can there be, than this: that Excommunication is the greatest punishment that may be, and yet that a Prince, who is excommunicated for favouring heretics, doth favour heretics without being punished? But many men, saith this Doctor, are more afraid of lesser punishments then of greater, as of corporal punishments more than of Excommunication, as children are more afraid to be whipped, then to be disinherited. And what then? Can any man of understanding infer from hence, that therefore a Prince, who is excommunicated for favouring heretics, is not most grievously punished, or that a boy, who is disinherited for his misdemeanour, is not more grievously punished, then if he had been only whipped for the same? 44 And by this the Reader may easily perceive, how true that is, which this Doctor said above, that the dictinction, which I made there (concerning the sufficiency of Ecclesiastical power, and of Ecclesiastical Censures to bring souls to eternal salvation, in regard of the power, and of the Censures themselves, and in regard of all other things, which on the behalf of the subject, or otherwise are required, that the Ecclesiastical power, and Ecclesiastical Censures do actually work their effect, that is, actually withdraw wicked Christians from sin, and so actually save their souls) doth little or nothing make to the saluing of Cardinal Bellarmine's argument. Seeing that you now thereby see most plainly, that the spiritual power is of itself so great, and Ecclesiastical or spiritual punishments are of themselves so dreadful, and terrible, that they are of themselves sufficient to withdraw any man from his wicked life: And that therefore if this spiritual coercive power, and these spiritual Censures or punishments be of themselves sufficient for the spiritual end, no other power of the Church to inflict temporal punishments is necessary to obtain the same end; for if spiritual punishments be sufficient, temporal punishments are not necessary, as any man of mean understanding, who knoweth the difference betwixt sufficient, and necessary may easily perceive. And if any man be so wilful, that he is not terrified with Ecclesiastical Censures, it is not by reason of their insufficiency, but by reason of the malice of the person, and the indisposition of the subject, for to use this Doctors own words above, it is their fault, and not the Popes, seeing that he apply remedies, and punishments, which are effectual of themselves, if they themselves will admit them. And what if the Prince, whom this Doctor saith the Pope hath power to depose, doth not regard his sentence of deposition, what other remedy, trow you, will this Doctor feign, that the Pope hath authority afterwards to apply? unless he will say, that he must then have sufficient force, and might to thrust him by head and shoulders, as the proverb saith, out of his kingdom. 45 Secondly, neither did the Council of Lateran, nor of Trent inflict, or impose temporal punishments, for that reason, which Cardinal Bellarmine here giveth, to wit, because they thought that Christians who were excommunicated for favouring heretics, or other crimes, were not most grievously punished, and consequently that they might therefore by their spiritual power dispose of temporals, and inflict temporal punishments, because otherwise they might favour heretics, and commit other crimes without being punished, as Cardinal Bellarmine did argue in his aforesaid reason, for then the said councils must also have granted, that Excommunication is not a most grievous punishment, yea and no punishment at all, and so they must have contradicted themselves, and the received doctrine of the Church, for that no man, unless he be impious or mad, as this Doctor here affirmeth, can deny, that Excommunication is more grievous than any temporal punishment: but the reason is, because both the Council of Trent, and also of Lateran, or at least wise Pope Innocent in the Council of Lateran, perceiving, that many sensual men are more afraid of sensible, and temporal punishments, then of spiritual, therefore to withdraw them more easily from sin, they commanded, enjoined, and imposed by their spiritual authority, as it is directive, corporal and temporal punishments, which sensual men do most abhor, and also they inflicted the same punishments, not by their spiritual authority, as it is coercive, which is extended only, as I have often said, to Ecclesiastical Censures, but by the temporal authority, which they have received from the express, or consent, grant, and privileges of temporal Princes, seeing that it is well known, as I have related elsewhere out of john Gerson, Gerson. de potest. Eccles. considerate. 4. that Princes out of their devotion have given to the Clergy great authority of temporal jurisdiction. 46 Thirdly, observe the goodly reason that this man bringeth, why the Council of Lateran began first with spiritual punishments, and the Council of Trent with temporal. For that, saith he, the decree of the Council of Lateran was made against those, who knew not the greatness of Excommunication, and the decree of the Council of Trent was made against those that knew the greatness thereof: as though either Christian Princes, or people knew not the greatness of Excommunication at the time of the Council of Lateran, or that either in very truth, or according to the Doctrine of Cardinal Bellarmine, Suarez, and other vehement maintainers of the Pope's power to depose Princes, or in the judgement of this Doctor himself, it be commendable, or lawful first to depose Princes, and to thrust them out of their kingdoms, and afterwards to excommunicate them, and to declare them to be accounted as Heathens, and Publicans. Be like this Doctor is persuaded, that all his idle conceits must go for an undoubted oracle. But he is deceived: for howsoever his favourites will applaud all his sayings, esteeming him as an other Pythagoras, yet other men will require of him a more sufficient reason, than a bare ipse dixit. 47. Lastly, it is not true, that the Council of Lateran did first command, that Princes, who favour heretics, should be excommunicated, and afterwards, if this remedy did not avail, their subjects should be absolved from their allegiance: because in that decree there is no mention made of Princes, but only of inferior Officers and Magistrates: But of this Decree we shall have occasion to treat anon more at large: As also it is a slander usual in this man's mouth, that I contemn the foresaid decrees of the Council of Lateran, and of Trent, which I do reverence with as much respect, as he, or any other Catholic ought to do, albeit I must needs confess, that although this Doctors interpretation of those decrees I do not contemn, for this is a word of arrogancy, yet truly I do not much regard, unless he shall bring better reasons to confirm the same, then hitherto he hath brought. And thus you see part of the answer I made to Cardinal Bellarmine's second reason, which afterwards I did prosecute more at large, and in the end I did briefly insinuate, how insufficiently Father Parsons grounding himself chief upon this second argument of Cardinal Bellarmine did satisfy the Earl of Salisburies' complaint. 48 For the Earl of Salisbury, saith Father Parsons, y In the Preface to the Treatise tending to Mitigation nu. 19 hath been a long time sorry, that some clear explication of the Papal authority hath not been made by some public and definitive sentence orthodoxal, etc. That not only those Princes, which acknowledge this superiority might be secured from fears, and jealousies of continual treasons, and bloody Assassinates against their persons, but those Kings also which do not approve the same, and yet would feign reserve a charitable opinion of their subjects, might know how far to repose themselves in their fidelity in civil obedience, howsoever they see them divided from them in point of conscience, etc. Now to this complaint, or desire of the Earl of Salisbury to have the matter defined, and declared, Father Parsons answereth, that among Catholic people the matter is clear, and sufficiently defined, and declared in all points, wherein there may be made any doubt concerning this affair. And for the clearing of the whole matter, he divideth it into three questions. 49 The first is, whether any authority were left by Christ in his Church, and Christian Commonwealth to restrain, or repress, censure or judge any exorbitant, and pernicious excess of great men, States, or Princes, or that he hath left them remediless wholly by any ordinary authority? And to this question the substance of his answer is this; that as in all other commonwealths that are not Christian, all Philosophers, and other men of soundest wisdom, prudence, and experience, either jew, or Gentile have from the beginning of the world concurred in this, that God and nature hath left some sufficient authority in every commonwealth for the lawful and orderly repressing of those evils even in the highest persons. So when Christ our Saviour came to found his Commonwealth of Christians in far more perfection than other states had been established before, subjecting temporal things to spiritual, according to the degree of their nature's ends, and eminencies, and appointing a supreme universal Governor in the one, with a general charge to look to all his sheep, without exception of great, or small, people or potentates: upon these suppositions (I say) all Catholic learned men do ground and have ever grounded, that in Christian commonwealths, not only the foresaid ordinary authority is left, which every other state, and kingdom had by God, and nature to preserve, and protect themselves in the cases before laid down; but further also for more sure, & orderly proceeding therein, that the supreme care, judgement, direction, and censure of this matter was left principally by Christ our Saviour unto the said supreme Governor, and Pastor of his Church and Commonwealth. And in this there is no difference in opinion, or belief between any sort of Catholics whatsoever (so they be Catholics) though in particular cases, diversity of persons, time, place, cause, and other circumstances, may move some diversity of opinions. And thus much of the first question. 50 The second question may be about the manner how this authority, or in what sort it was given by Christ to his said supreme Pastor, whether directly or indirectly, immediately, or by a certain consequence. And to this question he answereth: that albeit the Canonists do commonly defend the first part, and Catholic Divines for the most part the second; yet both parts fully agree, that there is such an authority left by Christ in his Church, for remedy of urgent cases, for that otherwise he should not have sufficiently provided for the necessity thereof. So as this difference in the manner maketh no difference at all in the thing itself. 51 The third question may be about the causes, for which this authority may be used, as also the form of proceeding to be observed therein: whereunto he answereth, that herein there are so many particularities to be considered, as are overlong for this place: only it is sufficient for Catholic men to know, that this may not be done without just cause, grave and urgent motives, and due form also of proceeding, by admonition, prevention, intercession, and other like preambles, prescribed by Ecclesiastical Canons to be observed, whereby my Lordship's doubts of fears, and jealousies of continual treasons, and bloody Assassinates may justly be removed. For that this authority doth not only not allow any such wicked or unlawful attempts, but doth also expressly, and publicly condemn the same, and the doctrine thereof, as may appear not only by the condemnation of Wickliff's wicked article in the Council of Constance, z Sess. 15. wherein he affirmed, That it was lawful for every private man to kill any Prince, whom he held to be a Tyrant, but also by like condemnation of Caluin, Beza, etc. 52 Thus you see that Father Parsons hath not answered to the Earl of Salisburies' complaint in particular, to wit, that some clear explication of the Papal authority (over the kingdoms, and lives of temporal Princes) hath not been made by some public, and definitive sentence orthodoxal, etc. But he supposeth it as certain, and granted by Catholics, and in stead of some clear and public definition orthodoxal etc. Which the Earl of Salisbury desired, he bringeth only certain reasons, which are in some sort grounded upon the Law of Nature, and the light of natural reason, to wit, that Christ hath in his Church subjecteth temporal things to spiritual, which also is true in the Law of Nature, and that otherwise he had not so sufficiently provided for the necessity of his Church, as God, and Nature have provided for other temporal commonwealths, which are not so perfect as is his Church: which reasons how weak and insufficient they are, the Reader may presently perceive by that which hath been said before concerning the Law of Nature, and against Cardinal Bellarmine's second reason, and also if he will but apply them to the Church and Synagogue in the old law, in which without doubt God Almighty did both subject temporal things to spiritual, and for the necessity whereof he did also sufficiently provide: and yet Cardinal Bellarmine himself affirmeth it to probable, that in the old Law the Priesthood was subject to the kingdom, and that Kings were not to be temporally by the High Priest, but contrariwise the High Priest was subject in temporals to the King, and to be punished by him with temporal punishments. Wherefore after I had clearly overthrown Cardinal Bellarmine's reason, concluding thus: And so it is manifest, by that which I have said, how weak this second reason of Cardinal Bellarmine is, even according to his own principles, I forthwith answered Father Parsons in this manner. a Apolog. nu. 203. 53 By which it is also apparent, how weakly the Author of the English Treatise tending to Mitigation, who groundeth his whole discourse for the Pope's power to depose Princes upon this second reason of Cardinal Bellarmine, doth satisfy the Earl of Salisburies' desire, whereof we made mention above. For although it betrue, that Christ our Saviour left in his Church (which is a spiritual commonwealth) as in all other well established commonwealths, sufficient authority, and power, for as much as concerneth the power itself, to defend herself from the injuries of all men whatsoever, & to correct, judge, & punish all wicked persons of what state, or condition soever they be, that are subject to the supreme Prince of this spiritual commonwealth, as members of the head, sheep to their Pastors, & children to their Father: Nevertheless that Christ left in his Church sufficient power, might, or force to repress at all times all excesses whatsoever of Christian Princes, or, that the punishments, wherewith such Princes may be punished by the Church, are temporal, which do pass the limits appointed by Christ to a spiritual commonwealth, this, besides that it seemeth to be supposed by this Author as certain without any reason at all, is also most clearly repugnant to the common doctrine of the ancient Fathers, who do teach, as I related above, b Nu. 5 & seq. that the armour, or weapons of the Church are spiritual, not temporal, and that Princes if they offend, are, for as much as concerneth temporal punishments, to be left to the examination, and judgement of God alone. 54 Wherefore there remaineth in the Church sufficient remedy, and spiritual authority (for temporal authority, or which now I take for all one, authority to dispose of temporals, is not agreeable to the condition of a spiritual commonwealth) to repress by spiritual punishments the exorbitant excesses of all her subjects whatsoever, and of this there is no controversy among Catholics, as also to every temporal commonwealth the law of God, and nature hath given full, and perfect temporal authority to punish all her subjects that shall offend with temporal punishments, but not with spiritual, which are not agreeable to a temporal commonwealth, and to defend herself with corporal weapons from the wrongs, and violence of all men though of foreign countries how strong, and potent soever they be, albeit she hath not always an effectual remedy, or sufficient force, might or power to free herself from the unjust oppressions, not only of foreign countries, but also of her own subjects by reason of their excessive power, and might. 55 And therefore it is not only a controversy among Catholics, about the manner how the Pope hath authority to dispose of temporals, and to depose temporal Princes, to wit, whether directly or indirectly, immediately, or by a certain consequence, as this Author without any proof at all doth ill suppose, as certain, and not doubted of by Catholics, but as I have often said out of Trithemius, It is a controversy among the Schoolmen about the thing itself, Trithem. in Chron. monast. Hirsang. ad ann. 1106. whether the Pope hath any such authority in any manner at all, and as yet it is not determined by the judge whether he hath any power to depose the Emperor, or no. 56 Lastly, if in every well established Common-weath there is left sufficient remedy, and authority by God and nature to repress, and punish the more heinous offences of their Sovereign Prince, whereon the Discourse of this Author in his first question, whereupon the other two questions do depend, is chief grounded, I do not see in what manner, and with what reason he can rid himself, but that consequently he must also grant, that the Pope himself may for all enormous crimes be corrected, judged, and punished by the Church; Bel. li. 2. de Concil. cap. 19 ad 2. nu. whereas Cardinal Bellarmine, as you have seen above c Nu. 188. Apolog. , doth teach, that the Church hath not any effectual remedy, or which in his opinion is all one, any sufficient authority to punish a known and undoubted Pope for any crime whatsoever, only heresy excepted. Therefore you see what a foundation this Author hath laid to subject Popes to the examination, censure, and correction of a general Council, which representeth the universal Church, and to quite overthrow Cardinal Bellarmine's doctrine, touching the Pope's authority over a general Council, which is also received by all the writers of his Society. Thus I answered Father Parsons discourse in my Apology.; 57 By which the Reader may easily perceive, what small satisfaction Fa. Parsons gave to the Earl of Salisburies' complaint, both for that he brought no clear definition orthodoxal, which the Earl required, to prove that the Pope hath authority to depose wicked Princes, and to dispose of all their temporals, but supposed it as granted by all Catholics for these silly reasons, which I before rehearsed; and also, that from the doctrine of the Pope's power to depose Princes, and to dispose of all temporals, it necessarily followeth, as I convinced in my Apology, d Nu. 43. & Seg. that he may also takeaway their lives, and give leave to others to kill them by all those ways public or secret, by which temporal Princes may take away the lives of their wicked subjects: and consequently his Lordship's doubts of fears and jealousies of continual treasons, and bloody Assassinates was not removed by Father Parson's answer: for that they who would attempt to kill such wicked and tyrannical Princes, and obstinate in their wickedness, might easily answer the decree of the Council of Constance, and affirm, that what they did was not done by private, but by public, and lawful authority, and that they had sufficient warrant from the virtual, at least wise, and interpretative consent of the Pope, who was bound by the law of God to give his consent thereunto, as in my Appendix against Suarez I did clearly deduce: e Part. 1. sec. 9 nu. 7. 8. and so those wicked miscreants that murdered the last two Kings of France, and attempted to have blown up with gunpowder our most noble King, & Queen with their Royal issue, and all the nobility with the Knights, and burgesses of the Parliament, did easily shift off the Decree of the Council of Constance, pretending that what they did, was done by lawful and public authority. 58 Now albeit Mr. Fitzherbert pretendeth to defend Fa. Parsons against that which I did answer, for the respect and reverence, which he beareth to the memory of so worthy a man, and his old friend, whereof I will say nothing at this time, because as he was respected and reverenced by many Catholics, so also he was by many not reputed worthy of such respect and reverence, the cause whereof I will omit now to relate, nevertheless he saith little or nothing, as you shall see, against that which I urged against him. For first the greatest part of his defence he spendeth f Pag. 120. nu. 16. & seq. in excusing him from that, whereof I did not accuse him, to wit, that Fa. Parsons did not say, that the Church hath not only sufficient power to work the effect, for which it was ordained, but also sufficientes vires, sufficient forces always to execute and perform the same, but only that the power of the Church being considered in itself is sufficient to work the effect, for which it was ordained, if it meet with a capable subject, and have no external impediment, which may be exemplified in the power to remit sins, to give holy Orders, to excommunicate, and such like. For albeit the Church have sufficient power to do all this, yet the same cannot be executed either at all times, or in all places, or upon all persons, by reason aswell of the in capacity of subjects, as of other external impediments, which may hinder the execution. So as it were extreme folly to say, that the Church hath not only sufficient power, but also sufficient forces always to execute and perform the same. And the like we say concerning the power left by our Saviour Christ to punish absolute Princes in their temporal states, to wit, that the power being considered in itself is sufficient, albeit the same cannot always be executed, and Fa. Parsons never taught, or thought otherwise: And therefore I must needs say, as I said before, that Widdrington hath either most grossly mistaken him (which truly I cannot see how he could do in this place) or else most maliciously abused, and belied him. 59 But truly I must needs say, that Mr. Fitzherbert, to return him back his own words, hath either most grossly mistaken me, or else most maliciously abused, and belied me. For I neither said, nor meant to say, that Fa. Parsons supposed as certain, and confessed by all Catholics, that Christ hath left to his Church sufficient force, power, or might to repress at all times all exorbitant excesses of Christian Princes, or people: but that he supposed as certain, and confessed by all Catholics, that the penalties, wherewith the Church may punish her spiritual Children, may be temporal punishments; which supposition also of Fa. Parsons I declared afterwards, as you have seen, in these words. And therefore it is not only a controversy among Catholics about the manner how the Pope hath power in temporals, to wit, directly, or indirectiy, as this Au. hour without any proof at all doth ill suppose, but about the thing itself, whether he hath in any manner at all such an authority, whereof the Schoolmen are at variance, and as yet it is not decided by the judge whether the Pope hath authority to depose the Emperor, as we have often said out of Trithemius. 60 Nevertheless, this also I must needs say, that both D. Schulekenius, and Mr. Fitzherbert, and also Fa. Parsons cannot make good Cardinal Bellarmine's second reason, and sufficiently confute the answer I made thereunto, but that they will be driven to suppose, that the Church must have, not only sufficient power, and authority, but also sufficient force, power, might, and effectual means to bring souls to paradise; as any man of learning by that which I have said before may easily perceive. For the substance of Cardinal Bellarmine's argument was this: The Church must have all necessary and sufficient power, or authority to save souls, for which the Ecclesiastical power is ordained, but the power to inflict Ecclesiastical Censures is not sufficient for this end, therefore another power, to wit, to inflict also temporal punishments is necessary. 61 To this argument I answered, that the power to inflict Ecclesiastical Censures, being considered in itself, is sufficient to save souls, and that Ecclesiastical Censures being so dreadful punishments, as I have showed, are of themselves sufficient, if they meet with a capable subject, to withdraw men from sin; neither is it necessary, that the Church must have, besides a power sufficient of itself, sufficient force, might, and effectual means to withdraw men actually from sin, for this were extreme folly to say as my Adversary himself confesseth; For the sufficiency, saith he, of the power, which Christ hath left to his Church in this point, or any other consisteth in this, that the power being considered in itself, is sufficient to work the effect, for which it was ordained, if it meet with a capable subject, and have no external impediment. Wherefore it is manifest, that he who will contend, that the Church must have a more sufficient power to save souls, than which of itself is sufficient if it meet with a capable subject, and have no external impediment, must needs suppose that the Church must also have sufficient force, might, and effectual means to save souls and a power to make the subject capable, and to remove all external, impediments, or, which is all one, must have such a sufficient power, which is not only sufficient in regard of the power being considered in itself, but also in regard of all other things, which are necessary that the power work the effect, for which it was ordained: for that these two are opposite parts or members of the distinction I made before, and no man that hath any skill in Logic can be ignorant, that in every division consisting only of two parts, or members, we may rightly argue from the affirming of the one part to the denial of the other, and from the denying of the one to the affirming of the other. If therefore the power of the Church to inflict Ecclesiastical Censures be of itself a sufficient coercive power to withdraw men from sin, which is the end of Ecclesiastical power, and if men be not thereby withdrawn from sin, it is not by reason of the insufficiency of the power, but of the indisposition of the subject, no other coercive power to inflict temporal punishments can be necessary: And therefore the aforesaid distinction of Ecclesiastical coercive power considered in itself; and in respect of the impediments, which may be in regard of the subject, did quite overthrow Cardinal Bellarmine's second argument, and the whole discourse of Fa. Parsons, which was grounded thereon. So that Mr. Fitzherbert might with more credit have left untouched the satisfaction which Fa. Parsons pretended to give to the Earl of Salisburies' desire, or complaint, for aught he hath been able to say in defence of the same. 62 And whereas Mr. Fitzherbert quarelleth with me for teaching in this my Discourse against Fa. Parsons, that the penalties, which the Church may, I do not say, impose, as he untruly imposeth upon me, for this power of the Church to impose, command, or enjoin temporal penalties I never denied, but to inflict, are not temporal punishments, and for remitting my Reader for this point to divers authorities even of the ancient Fathers related by me in my Apology, he wisheth me, g Pag. 122. nu. 21. and the Reader to see the answer to those authorities in D. Schulckenius, who giveth, as he saith, sufficient satisfaction to every one of them, and showeth evidently, that divers of those Authors do wholly impugn widdrington's opinion, and doctrine, and finally telleth him of his bad fortune in alleging such witnesses, as either make nothing for him, or quite overthrow him, and the like may be seen, saith he, in D. weston's Sanctuary, who also answereth the said places particularlay and fully: I also in like manner wish him, and the Reader to see how their answers have been confuted, partly by Mr. john Barclay, and partly by myself above in this Treatise, h Part. 1. per totum. where also I have showed the vanity of these men, that when they see their arguments and answers most of all to be shaken, than they make the greatest brags, to which silly shifts they have been driven by their bad fortune to undertake the defence of so bad a cause, and through a vehement desire not to seem to be vanquished, and to have any way erred in having coined a new Catholic faith. 63 Furthermore, the Reader may see, i Pag. 122. nu. 22. C. Bel. in Tract. de potest. Sum. Pont. contra Barcl. cap. 8. saith Mr. Fitzherbert many of them answered by the Cardinal himself in his book against Barclay, which Widdrington could not but have seen (no less than the former) before he wrote against my Supplement, and therefore reason would that he should have showed some insufficiency in those answers, before he so confidently remitted me, and his Readers to those places, and such like, which he knew were already answered: but perhaps he persuadeth himself, that all his writings, and assertions, are, (as I have said in the Preface) like to the laws of the Medes, See Preface nu. 15. and see also the answer thereunto. Dan. 6. and Persians, which are inviolable, and immutable. And this shall suffice touching Father Parsons, whom you see he might with more credit have left untouched for aught he hath been able to prove against him. 64 But as the Reader may see many of them answered by the Cardinal himself in his book against Barclay, so also he may see the cardinals answers confuted by Mr. john Barclay in his book against Cardinal Bellarmine, which Mr. Fitzherbert could not but have seen, before he wrote now his Reply against me, and therefore reason would, that he should have showed some insufficiency in Mr. john Barclayes answers, before he so confidently remitted me, and his Reader to Cardinal Bellarmine's book against Barclay, which he knew was already answered. And therefore that which he repeateth here again concerning the laws of the Medes, and Persians, may more aptly be applied to himself, and other such like vehement defenders of the Pope's power to depose Princes, who▪ for that they have unadvisedly begun to make their doctrine to be an infallible point of faith, which they will never be able to make good, will yet defend the same per fas, & ne fas, by right and wrong, and perceiving that they cannot prevail with reason, and arguments, endeavour to oversway their cause by force, and authority, clamours, and threatenings: as it is evident by the Breves, which his Holiness by their importunity, and sinistrous Information hath published to condemn the new Oath, wherein chief that doctrine is denied, as containing in it many things flat contrary to faith and salvation, which they will never be able to maintain, and by condemning some of my books in such general words, and commanding me under pain of Ecclesiastical Censures to purge myself forthwith in so strange a manner not declaring of what crime either in particular or in general I should purge myself, although I have often by divers Supplications to his Holiness most humbly, and earnestly requested, to be particularly informed, what one thing is contained in the Oath, which is so clearly repugnant to faith▪ and salvation, or what one thing I have written in those books, whereof I should purge myself, as being contrary to faith, or good manners. For what man can be so simple, as to imagine, that if those most Illustrious Cardinals of the Inquisition could plainly have showed any one thing, which either in the Oath, or in any of my books is repugnant to saith, or good manners, we should not have heard it proclaimed by my Adversaries with open mouth? And what else is this, I pray you, but to contend, that their assertions are like to the laws of the Medes, and Persians which are inviolable, and immutable? 65 And this may suffice touching Fa. Parsons discourse, which Mr. Fitzherbert might with more credit to himself, and with more respect, and reverence to his old friend, have left untouched, seeing that he hath brought nothing against that, which I objected against Fa. Parson's discourse to satisfy the Earl of Salisburies' desire, but cavilleth only about trifles, which make nothing to the defence of Fa. Parsons, as that I did not in that brief Admonition to the Reader confute D. Schulckenius book written against me, and Cardinal Bellarmine's book written against D. Barclay, and also the whole particular discourse, which he himself made in his Supplement to prove the Oath unlawful, and repugnant to all laws human and divine: but remitted the Reader to some things, which more at large I declared in my Apology, to the end that he duly considering my answers, and their Replies, and also what Mr. john Barclay had written in defence of his Father against Cardinal Bellarmine, might give his judgement accordingly, until I had time to make a more full answer to them all. And therefore seeing that now I have in this Treatise more fully confuted both Cardinal Bellarmine, and D. Schulckenius (if he be another man) and also Mr. Fitzherbert's whole Reply, which he hath patched together by the helps of Cardinal Bellarmine, or D. Schulckenius, Fa. Suarez, and Lessius, we shall see what a learned Reply he will make to this my Treatise being destitute now of those helps, which he had before of those men's writings, and being left only to his own wit, and learning, and to the aid which he can get from others of his Society, who are more expert in School points then is himself, whom all men know to have little skill either in Philosophy, or Schoole-divinitie. And for a conclusion I wish the Reader to call to mind, how he imposeth upon me here two manifest falsehoods, the one, that I affirm Fa. Parsons to suppose that Christ hath left to his Church not only sufficient power, and authority, but also sufficient force, might, or effectual means to repress at all times all excesses whatsoever of Christian Princes, and the other, that I quarrel with Father Parsons for teaching, that the Church may impose temporal penalties, which, as you have seen is very untrue. 66 Now let us proceed to the examining of the rest of his Discourse. After this, saith he, k Pag. 123. nu. 23.24.25. Acts 5. 1 Cor. 5. Widdring. in admoni. nu. 19 Widdrington taketh hold of two examples in my Supplement, to wit, the punishment of Ananias and Saphira, and of the incestuous Corinthian, which I alleged to prove the power of the Church to inflict temporal penalties. Whereof he saith thus: Illa corporalis Ananiae & Saphirae interfectio, etc. That corporal kill of Ananias and Saphira, and the visible delivery of the fornicator to Satan, are to be referred to the grace of miracles: neither will this Author say, as I think, that the Pope hath power to kill wicked men, and malefactors with the word of his mouth. So he. Whereto I answer, that he trifleth no less in this, then in his former answers: for, albeit I will not say that the Pope hath power to kill with the word of his mouth, that is to say, to do miracles; yet I say he hath power to do and ordain those things in the Church, which at their first institution were testified, and confirmed by miracles. 67 As for example, I will not say that the Pope can give the holy Ghost in some visible form in the Sacrament of Baptism, and Confirmation, as the holy Ghost was given in the Apostles time, Acts 8. & 10. yet I make no doubt but that the Pope may minister those Sacraments with the ivisible effect and fruit thereof, which was visibly showed and testified in the Apostles time by that miracle; neither will I say that the Pope can deliver a man to the visible possession of the Devil to be bodily tormented, as S. Paul did, when he excommunicated the Corinthian, 1 Cor. 5. and others; nevertheless, I say, that if Widdrington do not reform and retract his pernicious doctrine, the Pope both can, See cap. 17. nu. 23. & seq. Item Decretum Sacrae Cong. and see them also there answered. Chrys. hom. 15 in cap. 5. epist. 1. ad Corinth. Acts 5. Acts 12. 1 Cor. 5. Greg. hom. 10. in evang. and will, ere it be long, excommunicate him, and deliver him over to the invisible power of the Devil; which effect was at the first ordinarily testified by the visible torments of the bodies of excommunicated persons, ut castigaretur caro saith S. chrysostom, that their flesh might be chastised: So as Widdrington may if it please him, distinguish betwixt the miracles, and that which was in the primative Church signified, expressed, and testified thereby. 68 And therefore I say, that for as much as it pleased God to testify by the miraculous punishment of Ananias, and Saphira, and of Elymas the magician, (whom S. Paul stroke blind) and of the excommunicated Corinthian, and others, that the Church hath power as well over the body, as over the soul, it cannot with reason be denied, but ●hat the power remaineth, although the miraculous manner in the execution of it ceased, when the Christian faith was once propagated, and generally received, because, as S. Gregory saith, Signa data sunt fidelibus, etc. Signs, or miracles are given (or ordained) for infidels, and not for the faithful. 69 But it is Mr. Fitzherbert himself that trifleth no less in this then in his former answers. For the question here betwixt us is not now, whether the Pope hath an ordinary power granted him by Christ to inflict corporal and temporal punishments, and to deprive the faithful of their lives and dominions, but whether from this miraculous fact of killing of Ananias and S●phira at the word of S. Peter, or from the miraculous delivering of the incestuous Corinthian to Satan, to be coporally tormented by him, that his soul might be saved▪ or from any other miraculous and extraordinary power, which the Apostles had to inflict coporall punishments, it can be rightly concluded that the Pope hath an ordinary power to inflict also corporal punishments. And whatsoever Mr. Fitzherbert saith, I do confidently averro, that it is a most vicious kind of arguing from miraculous facts, and from an extraordinary power, which was granted to the Apostles as they were Apostles at the first instituting of the new law, and abrogating of the old, to inflict corporal punishments, to infer that the Pope and other inferior Bishops, who succeeded the Apostles not as they were Apostles, but as they were Bishops, had an ordinary power to do the like facts, and to inflict the like corporal punishments: But other arguments must be brought to prove that the Prelates of the Church may now by their ordinary power do those things, which the Apostles at the first institution of the Church did by a miraculous and extraordinary power. 70 For two powers were granted to the Apostles, the one ordinary; which should also descend to all their Successors▪ who in that power are equal to the Apostles; the other extraordinary, wherein they did excel all the Prophets of the old Testament. For the Apostles were also Prophets, as S. Peter proveth by the authority of the Prophet joel; against the jews, who said, that the Apostles were drunk, Acts 2. And as well observeth Abulensis, they did excel the Prophets in many things; Abulens. q. 6. in Praefat. Mat. first, in the manner of their prophesy; because God was ready to speak by the Apostles whensoever they would, insomuch that they ought not to think what they should speak, but the holy Ghost did immediately speak by them, Math. 10. Luke 21. But it was not so in any Prophet of the Old Testament. Secondly, they did excel the Prophets in regard of the things which were revealed, because more high things were revealed to the Apostles, than were revealed to the Prophets. Thirdly, they did also excel in regard of the miracles: for they did wonderful miracles, not only as great as Christ himself did, but also greater, as he said to Philip, john 14. Et maiora horum faciet, The works that I do, he also shall do, and greater than these shall he do. For it is read of S. Peter, Acts 5. that when he passed through the streets in jerusalem, they brought forth the sick into the streets, and laid them in beds, and couches that when Peter came his shadow at the least might overshadow any of them, and they all might be delivered from their infirmities, which nevertheless we do not read was ever done by Christ, etc. Fourthly, the Apostles also did excel the Prophets, for that they spoke with all languages, Acts 2. And this extraordinary power of the Apostles did not descend to all their Successors; And therefore it is no good argument from an extraordinary and miraculous power, which was granted to the Apostles to inflict corporal punishments, to infer an ordinary power in their Successors to inflict the same. 71 Neither do those examples which Mr. Fitzherbert bringeth of the miraculous manner of giving the holy Ghost, as it was given in the Apostles time in the Sacrament of Baptism, and Confirmation, make any thing at all for his purpose: for that these Sacraments had in the Apostles time commonly two effects annexed to them, the one was ordinary, to wit, the giving of invisible grace, which proceeded from their ordinary power, and which therefore was to descend to their Successors, the other Miraculous and extraordinary, to wit, the visible appearing of the holy Ghost in the persons baptised, or confirmed, and this proceeded from a miraculous and extraordinary power, and which therefore was not to descend to all their Successors: neither is it lawful to conclude that the Pope can work that visible effect by his ordinary power, which the Apostles did by their miraculous and extraordinary power. So likewise Excommunication had in the Apostles time commonly two effects; the one ordinary, which was, that the person excommunicated was deprived of spiritual graces and benefits, and of Ecclesiastical communion, and reputed as a Heathen, and a Publican, and this effect proceeded from ordinary power, and which therefore was to be derived to all their Successors; the other extraordinary and miraculous, which was to be corporally afflicted by Satan, and this proceeded from the extordinary and miraculous power granted to the Apostles over all Devils, Luc. 9 which therefore was not to descend to all their Successors. Wherefore we cannot well conclude that because the Apostles did inflict corporal punishments by their miraculous power, therefore their Successors may inflict corporal punishments, by an ordinary power, but other reasons must be brought to prove the same; for it is apparent to every Schoolboy that the former consequence is stark nought. 72 But these visible torments, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, did testify, that the excommunicated person was delivered over to the invisible power of the Devil, as Widdrington, if he do not reform his pernicious doctrine, both can, and will, ere it be long be excommunicated by the Pope, and delivered over to the invisible power of the Devil, which effect was at the first ordinarily testified by the visible torments of the bodies of excommunicated persons, so as Widdrington may, if it please him distinguish betwixt the miracles, and that which was in the primitive Church signified, expressed, and testified thereby. And Mr. Fitzherbert may, if it please him, clearly see, that I have distinguished betwixt these two, and have granted, that the invisible effect, which was signified, expressed and testified, because it proceeded from the ordinary power, which the Apostles had, might be done also by the ordinary power, which was granted to the Apostles Successors, but not the visible apparitions, torments, or punishments, which did testify the invisible effect, for that they proceeded not from the ordinary, but from the extraordinary power of the Apostles. And if his Holiness shall excommunicate me, as this man threateneth, without giving me any notice what pernicious doctrine I have taught, that I may reform and retract it, the excommunication will be more hurtful to their souls, that shall be cause thereof, then to mine, according to that saying which Gratian l 11 q. 3. Illud plane. doth attribute to Saint Augustine, Illud plane non temere dixerim, etc. This plainly will I speak without rashness, that if any of the faithful shall be excommunicated unjustly, it will rather hurt him that doth, than who suffereth this wrong: and I shall comfort myself with those words of our Saviour, Beati qui persecutionem patiuntur propter justitiam. But truly I am fully persuaded, that his Holiness hath had now so sufficient experience, to what exorbitant proceed these bad informers have drawn him, that he will hereafter be more wary to proceed against me, in that strange manner, as the most Illustrious Cardinals of the Inquisition have proceeded against me, and my books, at which all the world doth wonder. 73 Wherefore, when Mr. Fitzherbert saith, that by the miraculous punishment of Ananias and Saphira, and of Elymas, etc. it pleased God te testify; that the Church hath power as well over the body, as over the soul, and therefore it cannot with reason be denied, but that the power remaineth, although the miraculous manner in the execution of it ceased, when the Christian faith was generally received; if he mean, that those miraculous punishments did testify an ordinary power to be in the Church; that is in spiritual Pastors, to inflict punishments, as well upon the body, as upon the soul, this he must prove by some other reason, then by his bare I say, to which in very truth knowing his insufficiency in Theological learning I give but little, credit, & therefore with the same facility I deny it, as he saith it; for it is the main question betwixt us, whether the Church hath any such ordinary power, or no: But if he mean, that those miraculous punishments did signify, and testify a miraculous and extraordinary power to be in the spiritual Pastors of the Church in the Apostles time, to inflict in some sort temporal punishments, as well upon the body, as upon the soul, than I willingly grant his, I say, but withal dcny, that either the power itself, it being extraordinary and miraculous, or the effects and execution thereof, which also were miraculous should afterwards remain in the Church, when the faith was once propagated, and generally received, according to that saying of Saint Gregory, Signs or miracles were given for Infidels, not for the faithful. I said, to inflict in some sort temporal punishments, for, as well observeth Abulensis, Abul. q. 96. in c. 20. Matth. the punishment which Saint Peter inflicted upon Ananias, and Saphira, was only by the way of prediction; whereupon he was not as a judge, or executioner of Christ, but as a Prophet, and the punishment inflicted by Saint Paul was by way of prayer and intercession; whereupon it was not any use of jurisdiction, but of a miracle, because the Devils are not subject to the command of men, and so neither of them did exercise the use of coercive (temporal) power. 74 And by this also that which Mr. Fitzherbert immediately addeth, is easily answered. Besides that, saith he, it is to be considered for the further explication of this point, that although the punishments were miraculous and extraordinary for the manner of them, yet if we consider the punishments themselves, the Apostles exercised therein their ordinary and Apostolical jurisdiction, as being the ordinary judges, to whom the chastisement of spiritual offences appertained, which is evident in the punishment of the incestuous Corinthian by the formal, and judicial sentence pronounced by the Apostle saying; 1. Cor. 5. Ego quidem absens, etc. I indeed absent in body, but present in spirit, have already judged, as present, him that hath so done, in the name of our Lord jesus, you being gathered together, and my spirit, with the virtue of our Lord jesus, to deliver such a one to Satan, for the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit may be saved in the day of our Lord jesus Christ. Thus did the Apostle fulminate his terrible sentence of Excommunication, showing, and exercising his Apostolical authority. And the same is also to be understood concerning the corporal punishment of Ananias and Saphara, S. Chrysost. in hunc locum. in which respect Saint chrysostom saith; That Petrus faciebat terribile judicium, Peter executed a terrible judgement upon them; and Saint Hierome saith, that merûere sententiam Apostoli, S. Hieron. epist. 150. ad Hedibiani q. 2. in fine. Apud August. l. 3. c. 16. They deserved the sentence of the Apostle; and the Author of the book, De mirabilibus Scripturae, amongst Saint Augustine's works, saith, that Petrus ligavit, etc. Peter did bind Ananias, and his wife with the bond of death, ut authoritas Apostolica quanta esset ostenderetur, that it might appear how great was the Apostolical authority. Thus Mr. Fitzherbert. 75 But I never denied, that the Apostles were ordinary judges to whom the chastisement of spiritual offences appertained, but that which I deny is, that by these miraculous punishments of Ananias and Saphira, and the incestuous Corinthian, or such like it can be proved, that the Apostles were ordinary judges to inflict temporal punishments for spiritual offences, or that they exercised therein, I do not say their Apostolical, Bell. l. 1. de. Rom. Pont. c. 9 but their ordinary power and jurisdiction (for the Apostles had two powers, one ordinary, and which should descend to their Successors, the other extrordinary, or delegate, which therefore should not descend, neither is it lawful from the punishments, which they inflicted by their extraordinary power, to infer that they did, or might inflict the like punishments by their ordinary power) this I say cannot be proved by any miraculous fact or punishment, which the Apostles inflicted by their extraordinary and delegate power. And therefore, although the Apostle in pronouncing his terrible sentence of Excommunication against the incestuous Corinthian showed, and exercised his ordinary Apostolical power, forasmuch as concerned the delivering him over to the invisible power of Satan, yet forasmuch as concerned the delivering him over to the visible power of Satan, that is, to be visibly tormented by him, the Apostle did not use his ordinary Apostolical, but his extraordinary Apostolical power. And the same is also to be understood touching the corporal punishment of Ananias and Saphira, to wit, that Saint Peter used therein his extraordinary Apostolical power, as I observed above out of Abulensis. 76 Neither do S. chrysostom, S. Hierome, or S. Augustine say any thing contrary to this. For all that can be gathered from their words is only this, that the judgement of S. Peter was terrible, and that they deserved the sentence of the Apostle, and that the binding of Ananias and Saphira with the bond of death, did proceed from Apostolical authority: but that this their sentence & judgement, and the binding of them with the bond of death, did proceed from ordinary Apostolical authority, this cannot any way be gathered from the words of those holy Fathers, but rather the flat contrary. Chrys. hom. 12 in Act. For S. chrysostom doth attribute their punishment to a great miracle, both in regard Saint Peter knew their thoughts, and what they had done privily, and also for that he killed them by the commandment of his word. And Saint Hierome, Hieron. epist. 8 ad Demetriad. although he deny, that Saint Peter commanded or desired their death, yet he attributeth that sentence of the Apostle to a miracle, and to the spirit of Prophecy. The Apostle Saint Peter, saith he, doth not wish their death, as foolish Porphyry doth calumniate, but with a prophetical spirit he foretold the judgement of God, that the punishment of two might be a doctrine to many. So likewise the Author de mirabilibus S. Scripturae, doth attribute their punishment to a miracle, and to the Apostolical virtue of Christ, and to the same power whereby he raised Tabytha from death, which words Mr. Fitzherbert was willing to conceal. August. serm. 204. de tempore, qu●est sermo 3. in Dom. 4. post. Trinit. 4. Reg. 2. And Saint Augustine himself compareth this fact of Saint Peter, to that of Helizaeus, at whose prayer or curse two bears came forth of the forest, and tore forty two boys that mocked him, saying, Come up bald head, come up bald head. Wherefore Mr. Fitzherbert may distinguish, if it please him, betwixt the ordinary, and extraordinary power of the Apostles, and clearly see, that from the facts and punishments, which the Apostles exercised by their extraordinary, delegate, & miraculous power, which therefore doth not descend to their Successors, it is not lawful to argue, that the Apostles by their ordinary power might do the same, or that their successors have therefore power to inflict the like punishments. 77 But here, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, m Pag. 125. nu. 28. perhaps Widdrinton will say, that if Saint Peter exercied his Apostolical power, and jurisdiction therein it followeth that the Pope, or other Ecclesiastical judges, may also give sentence of death, yea execute upon such as deserve it, which is contrary to the custom, and Canons of the Church. Whereto I answer, that for as much as that time there were no Christian Princes, or Magistrates to do justice in that kind, and that it was necessary in the beginning to inflict such an exemplar punishment upon those two hypocrites for the terror of other, Saint Peter thought good to perform it himself, although afterwards when Christian Religion was further propagated, and Christian Princes held it for an honour to them to serve God, and his Church with their temporal laws and power, the Church thought it needless to inflict bloody penalties, not because it might not do it, if it would, but because it seemed more decent, and convenient for lenity of a pious Mother to abstain from the same, and to use more mild, and less rigorous punishments; in which respect the Church hath always retained the use of some temporal, and corporal chastisements, although she have restrained her Ministers by Canons, and constitutions from the effusion of blood, remitting the judgement, and execution thereof, wholly to the secular Magistrates, who have by their laws sufficiently provided for the execution of justice in that kind. 78 But first, without perhaps I do say, and have evidently convinced, not from those miraculous facts of the Apostles, but from the doctrine, and grounds of Cardinal Bellarmine, and others, who maintain the Pope's power to depose Princes, and to dispose of all their temporals, that the Pope by the institution of Christ, hath authority also to kill wicked Princes by all those ways public, or private, by which temporal Princes have authority to deprive their subjects of their lives, as I have insinuated above in this Treatise, n Cham 3: nu. 15 and 16. and chap. 5. sec. 2 nu. 9 & seq. and proved at large in my Apology, o Apolog nu. ●3. & seq. to which D. Schulkenius answereth only with a transcat, let it pass as not belonging to the matter: and Mr. Fitzherbert both in other places of this his Reply, and also here by these words, [not because it might not do it, if it would] doth expressly acknowledge as much, although forsooth he will not meddle with the lives of Princes to avoid envy, and yet he feareth not to say, p Chap 2. nu. 15.16. That the Pope can take away my life, and the lives of all Christians: Now what a scandalous doctrine this is, and what fears, and jealousies of continual treasons, inhuman gunpowder plots, and bloody Assassinates against their Royal persons, those Christian Princes especially, who descent from the Catholic Roman Religion, may justly conceive thereby, I have sufficiently proved in my Appendix against Fa. Suarez, q Part. 1. sec. 9 nu. 5. & seq. where also I have clearly convinced, that this pretence of Ecclesiastical lenity, and the clemency of a Pious mother, which only for mildness sake, as they pretend, and not by any obligation doth not use such rigorous punishments, is a mere shift, and cloak to dazzle the eyes of the simple, and unlearned Catholics. For as it is no clemency, but a plain cruelty for a mother not to cut off one member of her beloved child, when it is in danger to infect, and kill the whole body, so also the Pope should be cruel to the Church of God, not to cut off an heretical Prince that is in danger to infect the other members of the Church, if we once suppose this scandalous, & damnable doctrine, that the Pope hath power in order to spiritual good to dispose of all the temporals, both of Christian Princes, & subjects, as temporal Princes have in order to temporal good, authority to dispose of all the temporal, & corporal goods of their subjects. 79 Secondly, it is not true, that the Church hath always retained the use of some temporal and corporal chastisements, except only by way of command, whereof I never made doubt: As also that reason, which my Adversary here bringeth, why the Church now, since Christian Religion hath been further propagated, and Christian Princes have held it for an honour to them to serve God, and his Church with their temporal laws, thought it needless to inflict bloody punishments, especially upon wicked, and disobedient Princes for that by their laws they have sufficiently provided for the execution of justice in that kind, is very weak, and insufficient, because although Christian Princes have sufficiently proviued for the execution of justice with bloody punishments against their subjects, yet they have no way provided for the execution of justice in this kind against themselves; and therefore if Christian Princes themselves become heretics, and seek to draw their subjects to their heresy, neither Ecclesiastical lenity, nor the reason that my Adversary here hath brought, why the Church now thought it needless to inflict bloody penalties, can be any hindrance, why the Pope may not proceed against them with bloody punishments, if we once suppose, that he hath power and authority so to do. But the true, & ancient doctrine is, that a Priest, as he is a Priest, is forbidden by the law of Christ to use, See above part 2. cap. 9 and not only is counseled for decency sake not to use, the material, or temporal sword. 80 But now Mr. Fitzherbert, for the upshot and conclusion of this Chapter, will clearly prove by an argument, which no man forsooth of judgement can deny, that the supreme spiritual Pastor hath power to punish his sheep, or subjects, not only in their souls, but also in their bodies, and goods. And truly I cannot but wonder, saith he, r Pag. 126. nu. 29.30. that any man of judgement can think it unlawful for the supreme spiritual Pastor, to punish his sheep, or subjects in their bodies, or goods, seeing that it cannot be denied, but that he is their Pastor, and superior in regard not only of their souls, but also of their bodies, that is to say, of their whole persons wherein their body is necessarily included; and therefore for as much as every man is bound to serve God no less with his body, then with his soul, and that the body concurreth with the soul to the execution of all external works, good and bad, and shall be either glorified, or tormented eternally together with it, no man can with reason deny, but that he who hath the direction, and government of the whole person for the eternal good thereof, may punish the same as well in the one part, as in the other (as also in what else soever is accessory to the said person) when the same shall be requisite for the eternal good, and salvation thereof. So as reason itself may teach us, that the Apostolical power and authority extended itself to the punishment, not only of the soul, but also of the body, and goods, when occasion required. And this I hope, may suffice for the confutation of widdrington's answers concerning the law of God, and Nature; and therefore I will now briefly examine, what he saith concerning the law of Nations, and the Civil, or Imperial law, which shall be the subject of the next Chapter. 81 But truly I cannot but wonder, that Mr. Fitzherbert, who is taken, and commended by many for a man, although not of any great School-learning▪ yet of a deep, and rare natural judgement, should so palpably bewray both his want of learning, and also his weakness of judgement. For by his own argument any man of judgement may conclude, that a temporal Prince may punish his subjects not only in their bodies and goods, but also in their souls: seeing that it cannot be denied, but that he is their Superior in regard not only of their bodies, but also of their souls, that is to say, of their whole persons, wherein their soul is necessarily included; and therefore for as much as every Christian man is bound to serve his temporal Prince, and obey his just laws, no less with his soul and for conscience sake, then with his body, and that the soul concurreth with the body to the execution of all external works, good and bad▪ and shall be either glorified, or tormented eternally together with it, no man can with reason deny; but that he who hath the direction and government of the whole person for the temporal good thereof, and the public good of the whole commonwealth, may punish the same as well in the one part, as the other (as also in what else soever is accessory to the said person) when the same shall be requisite for the temporal good of the said person▪ and the public good of the whole common-weath. So as reason itself may teach us, that temporal authority extendeth itself to the punishment not only of the body, but also of the soul, when occasion requireth. 82 Now what will Mr. Fitzherbert in his judgement say to this argument? Can he deny, that a temporal Prince is not Superior to every person, that is subject to the laws of his kingdom? Or can he deny, that when a temporal Prince commandeth his subjects to do any thing, that part which is principally commanded, is the soul, which is capable of reason, and therefore chief subject to command, and not the body, which is not endued with reason? for which cause neither the soul, if it want the use of reason, is subject to command, as it appeareth in infants, and mad men, who although they should kill a man, do no more transgress the law made against murder, then if a wild beast should do the same: And therefore it cannot be denied, but that as well a temporal Prince in order to temporal good, as a spiritual Pastor in order to spiritual good is superior to the whole person of man, although the soul, which is capable of reason, and understanding, and not the body, is chief subject to the commandment as well of temporal Princes in order to temporal good, as of spiritual Pastors in order to the spiritual, and eternal good of their souls. Moreover a Christian Prince is to direct, and govern by temporal laws the persons committed to his charge, not only for their temporal good, but also for their spiritual, and eternal: for that the end of a Christian Prince is, also according to Card, Bellarmine's doctrine, s In Schulkenio pag. 334. not only temporal good, and external peace in the commonwealth, but also everlasting happiness, for which man was principally created, and to which every Christian Prince ought, as much as lieth in him, to bring the souls of his subjects; and therefore he may according to my adversaries argument punish them as well in their souls as in their bodies, when it shall be requsite to the eternal good, and salvation of the whole person. Whereby you may see, what little reason any man of judgement can have to repose his soul, and conscience upon the learning and judgement of this man, who here in a matter of such importance, hath so grossly discovered his great want of learning & judgement. 83 Secondly therefore●, the weakness of this argument will clearly appear, and the confused, and cloudy mist of the Pope's Superiority over the whole person of every Christian man, which Mr. Fitzherbert for want either of learning, and judgement, or of sincerity hath cast before the eyes of the unlearned Readers, will be easily dispersed, and their understandings cleared, if they distinguish betwixt the directive, or commanding, and the coercive, or punishing power both of temporal Princes, and also of spiritual Pastors. For to omit now Metaphysical questions (as in what consisteth essentially the person of man, and how the person of man is distinguished from his humanity, or which is all one, from the body and soul of man being united in one essential compound, and whether the subsistence, or personality of man be a simple, or compound entity, a spiritual, or corporal, or mixed of both, for if it be a simple entity, we cannot properly say the whole person of man, as though the personality of man were compounded of parts, which difficulties the vulgar sort cannot well comprehend) and to take the whole person of man in the common vulgar sense, as it is a particular, or individual substance, including both body and soul, it is evident, that the soul of man is, if not only, yet principally subject to the directive or commanding power, not only of spiritual Pastors, but also of temporal Princes, for that laws are not made but for reasonable creatures, and who have free will to observe or transgress the law. And therefore although a temporal Prince hath power to force or punish the bodies of his subjects, yet he cannot command their bodies, because they are not capable of reason or understanding. 84 But we must not argue in the like manner concerning the coercive, or punishing power. For, considering that not only the soul, but also the body are subject to punishments, according to their nature, to wit, the soul to spiritual, and the body to temporal punishments, therefore as well the body as the soul are subject to the coercive, or punishing power in general, according as it may inflict corporal or spiritual punishments. Wherefore, neither from the superiority, or authority, which spiritual Pastors have to direct or command the persons of their spiritual subjects, nor from the authority which temporal Princes have to direct or command the persons of their temporal subjects, can we rightly conclude, what authority either spiritual Pastors, or temporal Princes have to punish the soul, or the body, or, which is all one, to inflict spiritual or temporal punishments: for that the soul, and not the body is principally subject to the directive or commanding power. So that by this manner of arguing from the directive power to the coercive, it may rather be concluded, that temporal Princes may punish the soul, for that they have power to command the soul, rather than that spiritual Pastors may punish the body, for that they have not power to command the body, which being an unreasonable creature, is not subject to any external commandment. But what coercive authority either spiritual Pastors, or temporal Princes have to punish the body or soul, we must gather from the institution of Christ, to wit, whether Christ our Saviour hath given authority to spiritual Pastors to inflict only spiritual punishments, and consequently to punish only the soul, and to temporal Princes to inflict only corporal and temporal punishments, and consequently to punish only the body, and not the soul, but only by consequence as being grieved when the body either in itself, or in some temporal things annexed thereunto, is punished. So that the main question, notwithstanding Mr. fitzherbert's argument, still remaineth a foot to wit, whether Christ our Saviour hath given to spiritual pastors authority to inflict only spiritual, or also temporal punishments; neither can this question be decided by any argument grounded upon natural reason, but only upon the holy Scriptures, wherein the institution and law of Christ is contained. 85 And although the holy Scriptures do expressly testify, that the Apostles did in some sort punish, to wit, as Abulensis before t Nu. 73. declared, by way of prediction, or deprecation not only Christians, but also infidels in their bodies, as S. Paul foretold the blindness of Elymas the Magician, & S. Peter the death of Ananias and Saphira; yet because this was done by them miraculously, and by that extraordinary power which they had given them by Christ, which therefore was not of necessity to descend to their Successors, we cannot deduce a good argument from thence, that therefore spiritual Pastors have now an ordinary power to inflict the same punishments, but only that they may inflict them in that manner, and by that power wherewith the Apostles did, to wit, by miracle, in which case I will not deny, but that if perhaps any holy Pope or Bishop have the grace of miracles, he may by prophecy foretell, or by prayer obtain that such a wicked Prince, whether he be Christian or Heathen, shall by God, the Angels, or the Devil be deprived of his life and kingdom. Neither doth reason teach us, that because Saint Peter and the Apostles, had so ample and extraordinary Apostolical power to inflict corporal punishments, therefore the Pope and the Apostles Successors should have an ordinary power to inflict the same. For as Christ gave to the Apostles such an extraordinary, and transcendent power, so he gave them an extraordinary grace and understanding, that they should not either be puffed up with pride by reason of so great a power, or at any time abuse the same in prejudice of themselves or others: which extraordinary grace & understanding Christ gave not to all future Popes and Bishops: Wherefore seeing that this plenitude of Ecclesiastical power to depose Kings, and to dispose of all temporals, supposing the human fragility of Popes, who therein are like to other men, might be occasion, to use Almains words, u Almain de potest. ●cces. & L●●ca q. 1. c. 9 for the Popes to be puffed up with exceeding great pride, and might also be very hurtful to subjects, there is no likelihood that Christ gave him such a power. 86 Neither do I make any doubt, that either Christian Princes or people would be any way grieved, but rather very glad, that the Pope should have so ample a power and authority over their bodies and goods, if they were assured that he were so confirmed in grace, and enlightened with supernatural knowledge as the Apostles were, that he should always in very deed use it to the good of their souls, and never abuse it to the great prejudice of them and their subjects. But seeing that Popes are, as other men, subject to all human infirmities, and may not only be tempted, but also overcome with ire, envy, hatred, flattery, and a vehement desire to increase their temporal States and Dominions, no marvel that Sovereign Princes, who ever have been accounted supreme in temporals, and therein inferior only to God, cannot take it well, to be made now subject to the Pope in temporals, unless sufficient reason be brought to prove the same. And this I hope may suffice for the confutation of all that Mr. Fitzherbert hath replied concerning the law of GOD, and Nature; and therefore I will now briefly examine, what he saith concerning the law of Nations, and the Civil, or Imperial law, which shall be the subject of the next Chapter. CHAP. VIII. Wherein M. fitzherbert's arguments taken from the Law of Nations and the Civil Law are answered: and first the difference betwixt the Priests of the old and New Testament, and the Priests of other Nations, and also betwixt the Law of Nations, and of Nature is declared, and from thence proved that among all Nations the Civil Commonwealth was supreme, and disposed of all things both spiritual, and temporal, and punished all persons both Priests and others with temporal punishments: and consequently that the new Oath cannot be impugned by the Law of Nations: and lastly what Master Fitzherbert objecteth from the Civil Law is confuted. 1. IT is a usual trick of Mr. Fitzherbert, as you have seen in the former Chapters, and also shall see in this, and the rest, than most of all to brag, when he hath least cause, and when any answer of mine is most sound, and sufficient, then to cry out that it is improbable, impertinent absurd, frivolous, foolish, idle, or ridiculous. He pretended to prove in his Supplement by the law of Nations, that the new Oath is unlawful in regard it denieth the Pope's power to excommunicate, and depose temporal Princes, not for that he thought it otherwise needful, having, as he saith, proved already (but how insufficiently you have seen) that the Oath is contrary to the law of God, and Nature, but to satisfy the importunity of his Adversary, and to give his Reader an abundant satisfaction, because as the Lawyers say, abundans cautela non nocet, a proviso too much never hurteth. And to all the arguments he brought from the law of Nations, and the Civil law, I gave this brief answer as here he setteth it down. 2 Septimò, ex iure Gentium nihil aliud probat hic Author, etc. Seventhly, this Author proveth nothing else by the law of Nations, but that all people ever held Religion in the highest price, or esteem, and preferred it before policy; but that the Priests of the Gentiles had power, as they were Priests, to punish any man with death, or the deprivation of all his goods, it did not proceed from the law of Nature, granting them such an authority but from the municipal laws of the Gentiles, Pro domo sua. the which Cicero (whom this Author citeth) doth most manifestly confirm, saying, that it was divinely invented, and ordained by the ancient Romans, that their Bishops should have the chief command both in matters belonging to the Commonwealth, and to the religion of the immortal Gods. And as for the Civil law, this Author only confirmeth by it that the Bishop of Rome is the supreme Governor of the Church in spiritual things. Thus I answered in that brief Admonition. 3 Now Mr. Fitzherbert to this my Answer maketh as you shall see, no other Reply, then that, which I did fully satisfy above in the sixth Chapter, when I treated of the law of Nature: and therefore it were needless to set down here his words verbatim, but that otherwise he would take occasion to brag after his accustomed manner, that I have concealed, and dissembled his strongest arguments. Observe therefore well what he saith. But if thou hast, saith he, a ip. 129. nu. 2.3 well noted, good Reader, what was the effect, and substance of my discourse concerning the law of Nature thou wilt easily discover the weakness of this answer. For whereas he would prove by Cicero his words alleged by me, that the authority of the Pagan Priests to punish the supreme Secular Magistrates with death, or deprivation of goods, proceeded not from the law of Nature, but from the municipal laws of the Gentiles, I must desire him to call to mind what was my inference upon the words of Cicero, and the examples by me alleged; to wit, that this law, and custom amongst the Romans had no other ground in their opinion, but the Law of Nature, because they having no other light to guide them, but the light of reason, held it to be most conform to Nature, that religion should be preferred before policy, and temporal things subordinate to spiritual, by the same reason that things less perfect are inferior to the more perfect, the body to the soul, earthly things to heavenly, men to Angels, and the like. 4 So albeit I do not deny but that their custom proceeded from their municipal law, yet it doth not follow thereon, that it did not also proceed from the Law of Nature, but rather the contrary, because their municipal law in that point had no other ground, but the Law of Nature, which moved them to make that Law. For although the Law of Nature could not teach them the mysteries of Christian Religion. nor in what manner GOD was to be worshipped, and served, in which respect they both might, and did err in those things, which pertained to particular points of religion, (as also other Nations did which had not the light of grace) yet not only they, but also all other Nations, being enlightened by nature, agreed in certain general principles touching religion, as concerning the necessity, and dignity thereof, and that all human actions ought to be leveled, and referred thereto, as to their end; whereupon necessarily followed the subordination, and subjection of temporal things to spiritual, and of the Civil, or political Society to the Religious in matters that touch religion: and all this I explicated further in my Supplement, when I treated of the law of Nations in particular, in these words. Thus Mr. Fitzherbert. 5 Whereby first of all you may easily see, that all the proofs he bringeth from the law of Nations, he reduceth to the law of nature, and that therefore what I said in the sixth Chapter concerning the law of nature doth fully satisfy all that he saith here concerning the law of nations. And secondly you may see, what a pretty circle he maketh, and how cunningly he would prove the same by the same. For in his sixth Chapter he pretended to prove, that the authority of Pagan Priests to punish temporally the supreme Civil Magistrate did proceed from the law of nature, for that it proceeded from the custom and law of all Nations; and now here he proveth, that this their authority did proceed from the custom, and law of all Nations, for that it proceeded from the law of nature, by which kind of arguing he proveth in very deed idem per seipsum, the same thing by the very same. 6 Seeing therefore that all he saith here is a mere repetition of that he said in his sixth Chapter, I will also reduce into a brief compendium what I answered there, that the Reader may thereby clearly see, that he hath no way satisfied, albeit he pretend to have given an abundant satisfaction to that which I answered in my brief Admonition, as well concerning the law of Nations, as Nature. And to take away all equivocation and ambiguity of words, although the law of nature doth properly signify the light of natural reason teaching or prescribing some thing of necessity to be done, or omitted, or, which is all one, commanding some thing to be done, or not to be done, for that every law being taken properly doth intrinsically include some precept, or commandment, nevertheless we do not now take the law of nature in this proper, and strict sense, but more generally, for the light of natural reason, not only as it commandeth, or forbiddeth, but also as it giveth, granteth, teacheth or prescribeth any thing, abstracting from all positive laws, grants, and ordinances of God, or man. So that every right, power, or authority, which the light of natural reason, abstracting from the positive ordinances of God, or man, teacheth to be due, or belong to any man, is said to belong to him by the law of Nature, as the right which every man hath to defend himself and his goods, although it be with the death of the invader, is given him by the law of nature; Likewise the power, and authority, which the Civil commonwealth hath over every member thereof, supposing the union of men in one Civil Society, is granted by the law of nature, for that the light of natural reason, abstracting from all positive laws, or grants of GOD, or man, doth teach, and ordain the same. 7 Now to the point, and to the inference, which Mr. Fitzherbert made upon the words of Cicero, and the examples by him alleged; first, I did willingly grant, that the light of natural reason doth teach us, that Religion is to be preferred before policy, and temporal things are in perfection subordinate to spiritual, by the same reason that things less perfect are inferior to the more perfect, the body to the soul, earthly things to heavenly, men to Angels and the like; and that therefore when there are two things concurring, and commanded to be done, whereof the one concerneth religion, the oath policy, the one spiritual things, the other temporal, the one concerneth the soul, the other the body, we must prefer, caeteris paribus, that which concerneth religion before that which concerneth policy, and that which concerneth spiritual things before that which concerneth temporal, and that which concerneth the soul before that, which concerneth the body: and this the light of true natural reason doth teach us. 8 But what of all this? will he conclude from hence, that because Religious Priests are in perfection, and nobility superior to temporal Princes by the same reason that policy is in perfection inferior to Religion, therefore the light of natural reason doth teach us, that Religious Priests may punish temporally temporal Princes, and are superior to them in temporal authority? This is a very vicious consequence, and by the like argument we may conclude, that because Angels are superior to men in perfection, and excellency of substance, knowledge, and natural strength, therefore they are also superior to men in authority, and command, and that men are bound by force of obedience to do what the Angels shall prescribe, which no Divine will grant, unless they be sent by GOD as his messengers, and ministers. And likewise we may conclude, that he who hath one of the liberal sciences, is by the law of nature superior in authority to every trade's man, by the same reason that things less perfect are inferior to the more perfect, and every servile trade is subject, and inferior in perfection to every one of the liberal arts: and yet whosoever should argue from the law of nature in this manner, would be esteemed to be in this point no less than a very natural: for that from the law of nature, & the light of natural reason we can only conclude, that in what degree of superiority one thing is superior to another, in the like degree of subjection this is subject, and subordinate to that, and that therefore temporal things are subject to spiritual in dignity and perfection, because these are superior to them herein; but to transcend from one kind of superiority to another, and from superiority in perfection & dignity, to argue a superiority in command, and authority, or from a superiority in spirituals, to argue a superiority in mere temporal things, is contrary to the light and prescript of true natural reason. 9 Secondly, I did also grant that all Nations being enlightened by Nature, did agree in certain general principles touching Religion, as concerning the necessity and dignity thereof, and that all human actions ought to be leveled and directed by the square, and rule of Religion, and referred thereto, as to the end of man, although not to the intrinsical end of the actions themselves, as I declared above in the second part; whereupon doth necessarily follow a subordination and subjection of temporal things, to spiritual, & also of the civil Society to the religious in dignity and perfection: But it doth not follow from the law of nature, or the light of natural reason, that the religious Society, as it is distinguished from the civil, should have power and authority to command and much less to punish, especially with temporal punishments, the civil Society. And the reason hereof I alleged in that place out of the doctrine of Abulensis. b Cap. 6. nu. 35. 10 Because every man living according to the law of nature; and the light of natural reason may be considered, either as living by himself alone, or else as living with other men in civil Society. If he be considered as living by himself alone, what power soever he hath either concerning temporals or spirituals, concerning his body or soul, is in himself alone, so that he hath neither power to command or punish but himself alone; and in this manner every man is a Priest, and by the law of nature hath authority to worship God, and to sacrifice to him in all places, and at all times, and with all kind of Sacrifices, which the prescript of true reason doth not teach to be unlawful, for that the law of nature, or the light of natural reason doth not limit, or determine to a man as living by himself alone any certain time, place, or manner of worshipping God, and doing sacrifice to him. But if a man be considered, as he is a part and member of some civil Society, or Commonwealth, than no private man, but the Commonwealth itself, or the supreme Governor thereof, hath by the law of nature, and prescript of natural reason all authority to command, dispose, ordain, and punish as well concerning religious as civil affairs: So that in this manner the Commonwealth itself, or the supreme Governor thereof is the public Priest, and none hath authority to offer Sacrifice to God, or to worship him in any public manner, and as a public person, but the Commonwealth itself, or those, whom in her place she shall appoint; neither can any private or particular man have any public authority to command, ordain, or punish, for matters belonging to the worshipping of God, but that which the civil Commonwealth is pleased to grant him. 11 Wherefore there is a great difference, as I noted in that place, betwixt the Priests and the Religious Society in the law of nature, before any positive law of God was published, and the Priests and religious Society in the old and new Testament. For in the law of nature there were not two distinct and independent Societies, the one Religious, the other Civil, but the civil Society had all power and authority to command and dispose, as well concerning the public service of God, as concerning civil government; neither did the law of nature determine, or appoint any certain men who should be Priests, and should have full authority to command and dispose of those things which belonged to the public service of God, but this authority was in the Commonwealth itself, which appointed certain men to be the public ministers, as well concerning the public worshipping of God, with religious rites and ceremonies, as concerning the civil government of the Commonwealth; neither had these public ministers any more authority or command, than the Commonwealth did give them; so that it was in the power of the Commonwealth to extend, diminish, or quite take away the power, authority, command and privileges, which by her authority were granted unto them. But since the positive law of God was written, the religious and civil Society are two total and independent Commonwealths, neither hath the civil Commonwealth, or the supreme Governors thereof any authority to determine matters concerning religion, and the public service of Almighty God, for that he himself hath appointed those that shall be public Ministers in matters belonging to Religion, to wit, in the old Testament the sons of Aaron, and who by natural propagation should descend from him, and in the new Testament his Apostles, and who by lawful ordination shall descend from them, and what spiritual authority these Ministers have they do not receive from the civil Commonwealth, but from God himself. 12 Whereupon it is evident, that we cannot gather what authority and privileges the Priests either of the old Testament had, or of the new Testament have, from the law of nature, for that all the authority and privileges which the Priests in the law of nature had, did wholly depend upon the civil Commonwealth, by whose authority those Priests and Ministers of religious rites and ceremonies were made, but what authority either to command or to punish either Laymen, or Clergymen the Priests of the old Testament had, and of the new Testament have, we can only gather from the positive institution, and grant of God, who hath given and determined their authority, and not from the law of nature, wherein the Priests were subject to the civil Commonwealth, and had all their authority from the Commonwealth itself. And by this which I have now said here, and more at large declared in the sixth Chapter, is fully satisfied all that Mr. Fitzherbert hath said above, and repeateth here out of his Supplement concerning the law of nature, in these words: 13 First then, saith he; c Pag. 130. nu. 5. it is to be considered, that human law is commonly divided into Ius Gentium, Ius Civil, and Ius Ecclesiasticum vel Canonicum, the law of Nations, the Civil law, and the Canon or Ecclesiastical law. And as for the law of Nations (which is a human law, so easily and directly deduced from the very principles of Nature, that all Nations do receive and admit it) it is manifest; etc. But before we go any farther, it will not be amiss to observe the difference, which the learnedst Divines of this age do make betwixt the law of Nations and Nature, for unless we know and agree what the law of Nations is, we shall dispute thereof to little purpose. First therefore Mr. Fitzherbert by those words [which is a human law so easily and directly deduced from the very principles of Nature, that all Nations do receive and admit it] doth seem to signify, that only the known moral principles or general maxims of Nature, or natural reason do belong to the law of Nature, and the conclusions, which are easily and directly deduced from them, do belong to the law of Nations: which doctrine nevertheless all the Divines of this age, even of his own Society do commonly reject; Vasq. 1 a. 2 ae. disp. 154. cap. 3 Salas Disp. 5. de Leg. sec. 5. Suarez l. 2. de Leg. c. 7. as you may see in Vasquez, Salas, & Suarez, who do therefore affirm, that the law of Nature doth comprehend not only all moral principles but also all conclusions, which are easily and directly, or by an evident and necessary consequence deduced from those principles of Nature. 14 For all moral things, which are known by natural reason, are either the first general principles of manners, as virtue is to be embraced, vice to be shunned, Do not that to another, which thou wilt not have done to thyself; and these without all doubt do belong to the law of Nature; or else they are principles not so general, but yet evidently known of themselves, as justice is to be kept, God is to be worshipped; Parents are to be honoured, and such like, and these also without all question do appertain to the law of Nature: or thirdly they are conclusions, which are evidently deduced from the moral principles of nature, and cannot be known but by discourse, among which some are known more easily, as adultery, murder, perjury, and such like to be evil, some are not so easily known, but to know them there is required a greater discourse, as simple fornication to be of it own nature evil, usury to be unjust, an officious lie not to be lawful for any cause whatsoever, and such like. And all these, and other moral conclusions of what degree soever, so that they be deduced as conclusions from the moral principles of nature by a certain and evident consequence, do also according to the common doctrine of Divines, belong to the law of Nature. I said by a certain and evident consequence, for, as well observeth Salas, Salas tract. 14. disp. 5. sec. 5. as conclusions, which are evidently deduced from moral principles, and do bind without any positive law, do evidently contain the law of nature, so those conclusions which are probably deduced, do contain it porbably, and are laws of nature not certain, but probable, in which if in very deed falsehood be affirmed, they are not the laws of nature truly, and in very deed, but apparently, for that an erroneous conscience is not truly a law. 15 The reason, why not only moral principles, but also the conclusions, which are deduced from them, do belong to the law of nature, and not of nations, as the law of nations is a positive, and human law, is both for that all actions, which by the light of natural reason, abstracting from all positive precepts of God or man, are known to be evil, and for that cause are forbidden by the law of God, or man, because they are evil of themselves, although they had never been forbidden by any such positive law, do belong to the law of nature; and also for that otherwise the moral precepts of the Decalogue, and others contained in them, as the precept forbidding simple fornication, usury and to be revenged of one's enemy by his own private authority, and such like, should not belong to the law of nature, because none of those precepts are general principles, but conclusions deduced by discourse from them, nay nor to honour, and worship God should belong to the law of nature, for that it is not known but by discourse that there is a God. 16 And by this the Reader may easily perceive, that Mr. Fitzherbert in defining the law of nations to be a human law, which is so easily and directly deduced from the very principles of Nature, that all Natitions do receive and admit it, doth not only dissent from all the learned Divines, even of his own Society, but he must also, unless he will maintain strange paradoxes, plainly contradict himself. For first, if the law of nations be so easily and directly deduced from the very principles of nature, that all nations do receive and admit it, it cannot be a human law, which hath it force and obligation to bind only from the constitution of men, but it must have it force and obligation to bind from the very principles of nature, and consequently it must be reduced to the law of nature, and not of nations. Besides, every human law is therefore a positive and human law, not only for that it is received and admitted by men, but also for that it is made by men, and hath it force to bind only by the positive constitution of men; neither are those laws, which are only declared by all nations to be easily and directly deduced from the known principles of nature, to be numbered among human laws, but among the laws of nature. And if the law of nations is to be accounted a human law, for that it is so easily & directly deduced from the principles of nature, that all nations do receive and admit it, why may not many laws of nature be accounted human laws, seeing that they are so easily and directly deduced from the very principles of nature, that all nations do receive and admit them? Moreover, Mr. Fitzherbert will not, as I think, deny but that many things are forbidden by the law of nature, which nevertheless are not so easily and directly deduced from the very principles of nature, that all nations do receive and admit them, as simple fornication, usury, drunkenness, perpetuity of marriage, and plurality of wives, which according to the doctrine of all Divines are repugnant to the law of nature, and yet some nations have not thought these to be unlawful. Whereupon Vasquez boldly affirmeth, Vasq. 1 a. 2 ae. disp. 122. c. 2. tom. 1. that one may have invincible ignorance for his whole life time, of those conclusions of the law of Nature, which are more obscure, and more remote from the general principles of Nature, then are the moral precepts of the Decalogue. Wherefore, although Mr. Fitzherbert doth make here a long discourse about the law of nations, and nature, yet it seemeth, that he doth not hitherto understand, what is the law of nations, and how it is distinguished from the law of nature. 17 Wherefore to omit now the divers opinions of Doctors concerning the difference of the law of nature, and nations, it will be sufficient for this present to declare, how Vasquez differeth from the other Iesui●es and Divines in this point. Vasq. 1 a. 2 ae. disp. 157. c. 3. tom. 2. For Vasquez is of opinion, that the law of nations is comprehended under the law of nature, as a part and member thereof, and that it differeth from the law of nature only in this, that the law of nature is that, which is deduced by a very good discourse from the principles of nature, not only as permitting, but also as commanding some thing to be done, or not to be done, insomuch that it is a rule of virtue and vice, and this, whether we consider nature by itself, or, which is all one, as men live alone by themselves, or else as living in common and civil Society. But the law of nations is only a law of permission, utility, or conveniency. For some things are in this manner convenient and profitable to men, as living in Civil Society, which are not convenient for a man living by himself alone: therefore this permission of a thing convenient to the whole nature of man, as living in Civil Society, is called by Vasquez the law of nations that is, a licence or power of nations. Of this sort is the division of lands, for without it, Cities could very hardly be well governed; and also a right, or power to make war, and by the right of war to revenge injuries, for without this, Cities would be exposed to a thousand injuries: but a power to marry is not to be called the law of nations, but of nature; for that it was not introduced by natural reason, for this consideration, that men began to live in Cities, whereupon they were called Nations, but because it is convenient by permission to the nature of man, being absolutely considered by itself. So that according to Vasquez no law of nations is a rule of virtue, and vice, to wit, commanding something as necessary, or forbidding some thing as evil, but only granting, or permitting some thing as convenient and profitable, and also as honest, but not necessary: but the law of nature both commandeth, forbiddeth, and permitteth. Wherefore the law of nature as it doth permit only, and not command, or forbidden is by Vasquez called the law of nations. For all moral precepts do, according to him, belong either to the law of nature, or to the Civil law: for if any thing be commanded, or forbidden by force of natural reason, it belongeth to the law of nature; but if it be commanded, or forbidden by the will of man having authority thereunto, it belongeth to the Civil law. And of this opinion he thinketh Aristotle, and all the ancient Philosophers to have been, for that all Philosophers before the Civil lawyers, did divide every law in general into the law of nature, and the Civil law. 18 But this opinion of Vasquez doth not please Suarez, Salas, Suarez lib. 2. cap. 18. 19 Salas disp. 2. sec. 2. 3. & seq. D. sec. 3. and many other Divines, albeit Salas thinketh this question concerning the difference of the law of nature, and nations, is for the greatest part rather a verbal question, and of words, then real and of any great moment. For if it be once known, that any thing belongeth to the law of nature; it little importeth to say, that it belongeth also to the law of nations, for that all nations do commonly keep, or use that law. But it greatly importeth to know, whether any thing be commanded by the law of nature, or only by the positive law of man, & if it be commanded by positive law, whether that law be common to all nations, or no, and whether it be common to all nations, as it were per se, by itself, for that all nations, as being one total community of mankind have decreed it, or, as it were per accidens, by accident, for that every Nation decreeing it by itself, we may gather by Induction that all nations have decreed it, and so that it is a decree common to all nations.; 19 For the better understanding whereof Suarez, Suarez lib. 2. de Leg. pap. 19 Salas Tract. 14. q. 91. disp. 2. sec. 3. and Salas do observe, that a law may be said to be common to all, or many nations, either for that all, or many nations being taken severally by themselves, do agree in that law, or else for that it is observed by the use and custom of all, or many nations, as they have among themselves a certain society, and civil communication. For although every City, commonwealth, or Kingdom be in itself a perfect community, and composed of her parts, and members, yet every one of them is in some sort a member of this universal world, as it appertaineth to mankind; neither are those communities so sufficient severally for themselves, but that they want some help, society, and communication of others, sometime for greater utility, or conveniency, and sometime for moral necessity, and want, and in regard of this they want some law, whereby to be directed in this kind of communication, and society. And although for the most part this be done by natural reason, yet it cannot be done sufficiently, and immediately for all things, and therefore some special laws might be introduced by the custom of the said nations. For as in one City, or province a custom doth bring in a law, so also in the university of mankind the law of nations might by custom be introduced; and especially for that those things, which belong to this law, are both few, and also very near to the law of nature, and have from it a very easy inference, and are so profitable, and convenient to nature itself, that although it be not an evident inference, as of a thing altogether necessary to moral honesty, or virtue, yet it is very convenient to nature, and of itself acceptable to all men. 20 Wherefore the opinion of these Authors doth consist in these points. The first is, that the law of nations doth not only permit, or grant somethings, but also command, and forbidden by binding under sin: for that otherwise the law of nations would not properly be a law, neither should a law in general, being taken properly, and as it is a rule of reason, or of virtue, and vice, which intrinsically includeth some precept, be well divided into the law of nature, of nations, Vasque disp. 157. cap. 4. in fine Thom. prim. secun. q. 95. ar. 4. and the Civil Law: and yet Vasquez himself doth affirm, that the law of nations was by S. Thomas rightly numbered among human laws. Besides, the law of nature, and the Civil law, do permit and grant many things, and so the law of nature doth grant or permit, but not command a man to marry a wife, and to keep, and conserve his proper liberty, and therefore it is not proper to the law of nations to permit, or grant, neither ought it by this to be distinguished from other laws. Moreover, if a permissive or concessive law in respect of all mankind, as living in civil society, is called the law of nations, why may not also a preceptive or commanding law although it suppose civil society, in the same respect be called a law of nations? Neither can there be made any doubt, but that from civil society, and from the positive law of nations, yea and from the civil law, may arise a natural obligation; as for subjects to obey the positive laws of their princes, for children to honour their parents, for married persons to observe conjugal duty, for servants in general to serve their masters, e But see above cha. 6. nu. 23. & nu. 93. & seq. not to take away by private authority the goods of another man, which hath been given him by the positive laws, or grants of temporal Princes, and many such like, all which do suppose some civil society. 21 The second is, that the Civil Laws, and the Divines do not speak commonly of the law of nations after the same manner. For the Divines do commonly call the law of nations that law; which is, ordained, and made by nations, and the law of nature they call that which nature itself, or the prescript of natural reason without the will, and decree of man doth make, and ordained. But the Civil Lawyers do oftentimes call the law of nature, that law or right which is common also to brute beasts: & the law of nation, that law, which all men, and only men do use, although-otherwise it be grounded upon natural reason: as you may see in ff. de just. & iure, where the law of nature is described to be that, which Nature hath taught all sensible creatures, and is not only proper to men, but common also to beasts; fishes and birds, as carnal copulation, getting of children, and bringing of them up: and the law of nations is described to be that, which all Nations do use, and which is common only to men among themselves, as Religion towards God, to obey our Parents, and Country, to defend ourselves from wrong, and injury. And therefore as very well observeth Paradulphus. Prateius cited by Salas, Salas Disp. 2. seq. 4. unless one diligently observe (which hath given occasion to many men of error) that the law of nations is by the Lawyers sometimes taken for the true law of nature, and sometime it is taken for that law, which is made, and received by the greatest part of mankind, and do very well distinguish these two, he will never come to the true knowledge of the law. And therefore Bartholus; to avoid this confusion doth distinguish two laws of nations, the one he calleth Ius primarium; the first, or principal law, and this is the very law of nature, which he defineth to be that law, which from the very beginning of Nations was introduced by natural reason, without any decree, or constitution of Nations: and the other he calleth Ius secundarium, the less principal law of nations, which all Nations do use by their own decree, or constitution.;; 22 The third is, that the law of nations, being taken most properly, and rigorously is both a positive law, as many Doctors cited by Salas do hold, that is, it is a law made, and enacted by the positive constitution of men, and not by the prescript of natural reason, Salas disp. 2. sec. 3. and also that the law of nature which doth contain in it both the known principles of nature, or natural reason, and also the conclusions, which are clearly, easily, & directly deduced from those principles, is not properly the law of nations. And this also the Emperor justinian doth sufficiently confirm, f Institut. de jure not. Gent. & civil. who maketh this distinction betwixt the civil law, & the law of nations; that whatsoever every particular people, or nation, doth enact, or ordain, that is called the civil law, as being a law proper to that city: But the law of nations is common to all mankind, for that custom, and human necessities so requiring, the nations of men have made to themselves certain laws: and truly if those laws were natural, they could not be well said to be made by men, but by nature itself, or by God the Author of nature; Seeing therefore that the law of nature is not made by men, it cannot properly be called the law of nations. Whereupon it followeth, that it is not for this cause only called the law of nations, for that all nations do use it, observe it, receive, or admit it, as being easily and directly deduced from the very principles of nature, but for that they do use, observe, receive, and admit it, as being the Authors, and enacters thereof.; 23 So that, as the civil law, and the law of nature do take their name or denomination from the Authors, or makers thereof, so also the law of nations. Wherefore the law of nations is that, which nations made for themselves, and therefore it is a positive law. For all nations, as they make one Community of mankind, have power to bind every particular man to those things, which are convenient to all mankind, as every city hath power to bind every member thereof to those things, which are convenient for that City, and every kingdom to those things which are convenient for the whole kingdom. And that all nations had intention to bind men to some things, it is manifest by tradition, & they might sufficiently declare their intention by words, customs, or other signs, especially in the beginning of the world, when in regard of the few number of men, and of their mutual love, and concord it was an easy matter, for all, or the greater part of men to agree in the same will, or intention, and in some manner to publish, and declare the same: And this law is not the law of nature, for that it is grounded in human will, and not in any necessary prescript of natural reason; neither is it the Civil law, for that it is not proper, and peculiar to one City, or Kingdom, therefore it is to be called the law of nations, not only for that nations do use, receive, and admit it, and are bound to observe it, as Mr. Fitzherbert doth here insinuate, for that they are bound also to receive, admit, and observe the law of nature, but because it hath it force and obligation to bind themselves, as from the Authors, makers, and enacters thereof. 24 And by this the Reader may easily perceive, that the law of nations properly so called, is not, according to these Divines comprehended in the law of nature, as a part in the whole, but is distinct from it essentially, albeit they do agree in many things, Suarez lib. 2. cap. 19 20. as Suarez doth declare at large. For first they agree, that both of them are in some sort common to all men, in which respect both of them may be called the law of nations, or of men, if we only regard the word or name. Secondly, they agree, that as the matter of the law of nations hath regularly place only among men, so also the matter of the law of nature is proper to men, either altogether, or for the most part, for sometimes also the law of nations may dispose in a matter common to brute beasts, as in permitting fornication, or the carnal company with sundry persons, which is common also to beasts. And therefore many examples, which by the Civil Lawyers are contained under the law of nations only in regard of this condition, as Religion towards God, honour to Parents, piety towards our Country, and such like, do only in name belong to the law of nations properly so called, for in very truth they appertain to the law of nature. Thirdly, they agree, that in both of them are contained precepts and prohibitions, and also grants, concessions, and permissions. 25 But they differ first and principally; for the affirmative precepts of the law of nations do not infer any necessity of the thing commanded only of it own nature by some evident deduction from the principles of nature, for whatsoever is of this kind is natural; and therefore this necessity must only proceed from the consent, and positive constitution of men. And in like manner the negative precepts of the law of nations do not forbid any thing because it is evil of itself, for this also is merely natural. Wherefore in regard of human reason the law of nations doth not only declare the act to be evil, but doth also make it evil, neither doth it forbidden evil, for that it is evil, as the law of nature doth, but by forbidding the act it maketh it evil. Secondly, they differ in universality, and community to all Nations: for the law of nature is common to all, and only through error & ignorance it is not kept by some, but the law of nations is not always, but regularly common to all, or almost all nations, as S. Isidore writeth; Isidor. lib. 5. Etymolog. ca 5. whereupon without any error that law may in some places not be observed, which by others is thought to belong to the law of nations. 26 Thirdly, they differ in mutability. For the law of nations cannot be so immutable as the law of Nature, because immutability doth proceed from necessity, and therefore where there is not the like necessity, there cannot be the like immutability. Whereupon we may easily gather, that the precepts of the law of Nations are mutable, for as much as they depend upon the consent of men. And the reason is●, for that those things which are forbidden by the law of Nations, are not simply, absolutely, and intrinsically evil of themselves, because these precepts are not deduced from the principles of nature, by any necessary or evident deduction, but do only bind by virtue of human consent, which hath been introduced at leastwise by a general custom, and therefore in regard of the matter there is no repugnance, that in the law of Nations there may be made some alteration, so that it be done by sufficient authority. 27 Wherein it is to be observed, that this mutation doth happen otherwise in the law of Nations, which is only common, for that all, or many Nations do agree in such, or such a law, and otherwise in that law, which is common by the use and custom of Nations, as among themselves they have a certain Society, and communication. For the first law may be changed by a particular Kingdom, or Commonwealth, for as much as concerneth that kingdom, or Commonwealth, because that law as it is in that Kingdom, or Commonwealth, is intrinsically a Civil law, to speak so, and it is only called the law of Nations, either for that other Nations have the same law, or else for that it is so near to the law of Nature that from thence the universality of such a law doth arise: But this law, as it is per se, and of it own nature in every Commonwealth, doth depend upon their peculiar determination and authority, or custom of that Commonwealth in itself, and without respect to other Commonwealths, therefore it may be changed by that Commonwealth, for as much as concerneth that Commonwealth, although others do not consent thereunto, because every Commonwealth is not bound to conform herself to others. As for example, any Commonwealth may ordain, that within herself common harlots shall not be permitted, or that all unjust buy and sellings in every excess whatsoever shall be repealed, and made void, or that they shall not use money, but other kinds of exchanging; for although these things be not done de facto, because there is no cause or profit to do the same, yet in respect of moral honesty, and sufficient authority they do not repugn to be done. 28 But in the other law of Nations it is far more hard to make any alteration because it doth respect the common good of all nations, and it seemeth to be made by the authority of all, and therefore without the consent of all it cannot be abolished. Nevertheless in regard of the matter there is no repugnance, but that it may be altered, if all Nations should consent, or if the contrary custom should by little and little be brought in. But although this may be conceived as not repugnant, yet morally it is not possible, for that this law being so near to the law of nature, and so convenient according to natural reason, it is scarce possible that all Nations, or the greatest part should agree to the abrogation thereof. Nevertheless in another manner any one Community may command, that among themselves only such, or such a law of nations be not kept, and this manner is possible and moral. And so the law of nations concerning the bondage of captives taken in a just war, is changed among Christians by an ancient custom of christians, which is as it were a special law of Christian nations, and also by an express Imperial law of justinian the Emperor, Cod. de Episcopis & Clericis, leg. Deo auxilium. 29 Lastly, Suarez distinguisheth the law of nations from the Civil law, first in this, that the law of nations is not written, but is introduced by use and custom, wherein it differeth from the law of nature, which although it be not written, yet it is grounded in nature, and not only in custom; but the Civil law is both written, and not written. Secondly, that the law of nations is introduced by the use and custom of all nations or almost all; for it is sufficient to the law of nations, according to Saint Isidore, cited before, g Nu. 25. that all nations, or almost all nations well governed do use the same: but the Civil law, although it may also be introduced by custom, yet it is introduced by the custom of one, or few nations, and bindeth only them. Thirdly, that the Civil law may be altered wholly, but the law of nations, cannot, speaking morally be altered wholly, but only in part; which is not to be understood of the whole collection of all the precepts of both laws, for so neither of them can morally be wholly changed, because it is morally impossible to alter all the civil precepts in any one kingdom, but it is to be understood of every singular precept, which may easily be changed and abrogated throughout the whole kingdom, but no one precept of the law of nations can throughout all nations be abrogated, although some nation do not observe it. This is the opinion of Suarez concerning the difference betwixt the law of nature, of nations, and the Civil law. 30 But although as well observeth Salas, this question is for the greatest part rather verbal and of words then real, and of the thing itself, for that all do agree in this, that whatsoever is forbidden by the law of nature, is of itself evil, and what is forbidden by the positive law of men, whether it be of one nation, of many, or of all, is not evil of itself, but made evil by that positive law, and prohibition, Nevertheless concerning that distinction, which Suarez, and Salas do make of all nations, or the greatest part, as they are taken jointly, and make one Society, or Commonwealth of mankind, and of all nations, as they are taken severally each one by themselves, I have one chief difficulty: for in my opinion this distinction of theirs is merely imagined, and invented without any good, and sufficient ground: because although all Nations do make one Society, or commonwealth of mankind, as they are referred to GOD the invisible King, and Governor of all mankind, yet as they are referred to their visible Governors on earth, they do not make one, but divers total Civil Societies, Kingdoms, or Commonwealths; and consequently the laws made by them are really divers, and not one law; and so the law of nations is not truly, and formally one law, but divers laws observed, or by express, or virtual covenant agreed upon by all, or the greatest part of nations, and it cannot be called one law, except by aggregation, as all, or the greatest part of nations, as they are referred to their visible Governors on earth, cannot be properly, and formally, but only by aggregation, be called one Civil Society, kingdom, or Commonwealth, (as many stones laid together are by aggregation called one heap of stones,) no more than England, France, and Spain, be called one kingdom, or parts of one total kingdom compounded of them three, or the laws commanding, or forbidding the same thing, made, or by covenant agreed upon by these three kingdoms, be called one singular law. 31 From whence it followeth first, that the law of nations, as it is a positive human law, is not formally one singular law, but many Civil laws of divers nations together, although it may be called one law of nations, for that it commandeth, and forbiddeth one and the self same thing. Secondly, that the Christian nation, as it is referred to the visible Governors thereof is not properly, and formally, one Civil Society, Nation, Kingdom, or Commonwealth, but many temporal Kingdoms professing the same Christian Religion, although as it is referred to the supreme spiritual Pastor thereof, it be truly, properly, and formally one spiritual Society, Kingdom. Church, and mystical body of Christ. Thirdly, that the law of nations, as it is a positive law, may be changed, and wholly abrogated by any particular Kingdom or Commonwealth for as much as it concerneth only that kingdom, or Commonwealth because that law, as it is in that kingdom, or Commonwealth, is intrinsically, to speak so, a Civil law, and hath not force by virtue of the law to bind the subjects of that kingdom, or Commonwealth, but as it was enacted, and received by the Governors, and subjects of that kingdom, or commonwealth. Nevertheless by virtue of some express, or pact, covenant, or agreement (which properly is no law, for that a law requireth a superiority in the maker thereof over the persons who are bound to observe that law, which superiority a covenant doth not require) made betwixt divers kingdoms it may bind also the subjects of other kingdoms: in which respect the law of nations, for as much as it concerneth divers kingdoms, cannot be repealed and abrogated without the consent of both kingdoms, because pacts and covenants may not be broken without the consent of all parties; but if both parties do agree, it is lawful not to observe that covenant, for as much, as it concerneth only themselves. And so the custom of receiving Ambassadors in time of hostility, under the law or rather covenant of immunity, which is said to be brought in by the law of nations, may be abrogated by the mutual consent of two kingdoms, for as much as concerneth themselves, although other kingdoms will not for their parts agree thereunto. And for the same reason any other law of nations, as it is a pure positive law, may be repealed by the consent, and agreement of those kingdoms whom it doth concern, although other nations will still observe the same. And this may suffice concerning the difference betwixt the law of nature, of nations, and the Civil law. Now to Mr. fitzherbert's discourse. 32 And as for the law of Nations, saith he, h pa. 130. nu. 5. (which is a human law so easily, and directly deduced from the very principles of nature, that all nations do receive, and admit it) it is manifest, that it cannot dissent from those infallible grounds, which I have laid already, as well out of the law of Nature, as out of the law of GOD, especially seeing that there is nothing, wherein all Nations do more uniformly agree, by the very instinct of Nature, then that all temporal things are inferior to spiritual things, and subordinate thereto, whereupon it necessarily followeth, etc. But what grounds either infallible, or fallible Mr. Fitzherbert hath already laid as well out of the law of nature, as out of the law of GOD, you have already seen. Neither doth any man make any doubt, but that this is an infallible ground, wherein all nations by the very instinct of nature do uniformly agree, that as all spiritual things are superior to all temporal things in dignity, worth, and excellency in general, so all temporal things are inferior, and subordinate to spiritual things in the same degree of subjection, and subordination, wherein spiritual things are superior to them; for no man can be so foolish as to imagine, that temporal things must be subject to spiritual things in any other degree, or kind of subjection, or subordination, then wherein spiritual things are superior to them. 33 Mark now what Mr. Fitzherbert would conclude from this infallible ground: Whereupon it necessarily followeth, saith he, that all the temporal states of temporal Princes, are subordinate to the Church, and to the head thereof, and to be disposed by him, when the good of the Church shall so require, as I have amply declared. But fie for shame, that Mr. Fitzherbert, who is accounted a man of great judgement, though of small learning, should make so childish, and improbable a consequence, and withal to esteem it a necessary inference? For what man of judgement would argue thus: All temporal things are inferior, subject, and subordinate to spiritual things, to wit, in worth, dignity, and excellency, therefore the Pope hath power to dispose of all temporal things, when the good of the Church shall so require? But my adversaries usual custom is to darken, and confound the Readers understanding with a mist of cloudy, and ambiguous words, which being once dissolved, and taken away, the plain, and perspicuous truth will presently appear. For as concerning his antecedent proposition, which is, that all temporal things are inferior to spiritual things, and subordinate thereto, first, if his meaning be, that all temporal things are inferior and subordinate to all spiritual things in every kind of subjection, this is apparently false, for that all spiritual things are not capable of all kind of superiority, seeing that only spiritual persons, or substances, and not spiritual accidents are capable of spiritual authority, or jurisdiction, which consisteth in a power to command, to punish, or to dispose of something. 34 Secondly, if his meaning be, that all temporal things are inferior, and subordinate to all spiritual things in some kind of subjection, this is very true; for as all spiritual things, in that they are spiritual, are more excellent, and of a more noble, more perfect, and of a superior, and higher degree or order, then is any temporal thing, so all temporal things, as they are temporal, are inferior, and subordinate in nobility, perfection and excellency to all spiritual things: But from a superiority in perfection, worth, and nobility to conclude a superiority of another kind, to wit, in authority, jurisdiction, or power to dispose thereon, is transcendere de genere ad genus, to transcend from one kind to another, which manner of arguing every Schoolboy knoweth to be vicious: as thus, Angels both good, and bad are superior to men in substance, knowledge, might, and other natural perfections, but to conclude from hence, that therefore Angels are superior to men in authority, or jurisdiction, and that therefore men are inferior and subject therein to Angels, and are bound to obey them as their lawful Superiors, unless they be sent as messengers from God, which the Greek word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth import, and which, as Saint Gregory saith, S. Greg. hom. 34. in evang a. is a word of office, not of nature, were a very fallacious kind of arguing. Also all servile trades are inferior, subject, and subordinate to all liberal arts and sciences, to wit in worth, perfection, and nobility, and this all tradesmen will acknowledge, but they would smile at him that should conclude from thence, that therefore all they that are endued with any liberal art or science may command and punish all tradesmen, and dispose of what they have, when the good of the liberal arts or sciences shall so require. 35 But thirdly, if Mr. Fitzherbert in his antecedent proposition by spiritual things doth not understand all spiritual things, but only spiritual persons, who by their office have charge of Religion, and of all spiritual things appertaining to Religion, and that all temporal things are by the instinct of nature, and the light of natural reason subject, and subordinate to spiritual persons in such sort, that they may be disposed of by them, when the good of Religion shall so require, than indeed supposing this antecedant proposition to be true, it doth necessarily follow, that the Pope hath power to dispose of all temporal things in order to spiritual good; But than he supposeth that which he should prove, and which I ever denied: for, as I have amply showed before, by the law of nature the civil Commonwealth itself, and the supreme Governors thereof had supreme authority to dispose of all things, as well concerning Religion, as State, and policy. Neither did the Religious Society, and the civil Commonwealth in the law of nature make two total, and independent bodies, Societies, or Commonwealths, as they do now in the new Law, wherein the temporal Prince, or the Civil Commonwealth have not to dispose of spiritual, and religious affairs, as they did in the law of nature, and according to the custom of all nations: and therefore it cannot be proved either by the law of nature, or of nations, that the Pope hath power to dispose of the bodies, States, or temporal goods of temporal Princes, but contrariwise standing in the law of nature, the Civil Commonwealth had supreme power, and authority to dispose of the bodies, and goods of Religious Priests, and of all things belonging to Religion, and the public service of God. 36 Wherefore to little purpose are those words, which Mr. Fitzherbert next adjoineth. And therefore Ulpian the Lawyer, saith he, affirming that Ius Gentium, the Law of Nations, is that, which is common only to men, putteth for example, Religio erga Deum, Religion towards God, giving to understand, that all Nations, and people do agree in nothing more, than that due honour is to be given to Almighty GOD, which is not done, when any thing is preferred before his service, or when temporal things are not subordinate to spiritual, and due reverence, respect, and obedience given to his immediate Ministers. 37 But what is all this to the purpose? what will he conclude from hence? who maketh any doubt, but that all Nations and people do uniformly agree in this, that due honour is to be given to almighty God, and that nothing is to be preferred before his service, and that temporal things are subordinate to spiritual, to wit, in perfection, worth, and excellency, and that due reverence, respect, and obedience is to be given to his immediate Ministers? But from hence it only followeth according to the law of nature, and Nations, that because in the law of nature the chief Ministers of God in all things as well concerning his public service, as the civil government, was the civil Commonwealth itself, which because she could not by herself immediately exercise the said functions, she appointed certain Ministers to execute the same, therefore we must give due reverence, respect and obedience, first, to the Commonwealth itself, or the supreme Governors thereof, and secondly, to those immediate Ministers, whom the Commonwealth itself, or the supreme Governors thereof, have appointed, according to the honour, dignity, and authority, which is granted them. And therefore he that should make this argument, Due honour is to be given to almighty God, and nothing is to be preferred before his service, and due reverence, respect, and obedience, is to be given to his immediate Ministers, therefore the Pope hath authority by the law of Nature, and Nations, to depose temporal Princes, and to dispose of all their temporals, it is evident, that he shooteth far wide of the mark, and maketh a very vain and frivolous consequence, seeing that according to the law of nature, and Nations, the civil Common-weath hath full authority to dispose of all things both concerning state and Religion. 38 Wherefore with these general propositions, which all men understand and approve, he still joineth that ambiguous and equivocal proposition, that temporal things are inferior and subordinate to spiritual things, to make the unlearned Reader believe that some great mystery lieth hidden therein, whereas the plain meaning of it is, that spiritual things are superior to temporal things in worth, excellency, and dignity, and therefore caeteris paribus, to be preferred before them, so that in very deed the meaning thereof is nothing else, but that the service of God is to be preferred before all temporal things, which in the law of nature all civil Commonwealths which had supreme authority to dispose of all things both concerning State and Religion, did ever acknowledge. And therefore Mr. Fitzherbert labouring in his next Paragraph to prove this, spendeth his time and labour in vain, for that no man maketh doubt, but that all Nations ever preferred Religion, and the service of their Gods before all other things. 39 But before I come to set down his words, I think it not amiss to declare briefly in what sense Religion towards God, which Ulpian the Lawyer mentioned here by my Adversary reduceth to the law of Nations, may appertain both to the law of Nations and Nature. And that he may the more easily perceive his own error and ignorance in contending to prove by the law of Nature and Nations, the Pope's authority to depose temporal Princes, I will relate verbatim Suarez doctrine, against which he neither can, nor will, as I suppose, in this point take any exception. 40 Religion, or the worshipping of God, saith Suarez, Suarez. lib. 2. Leg. cap. 19 num. 10. which example the Lawyer used, doth absolutely belong to the law of nature, but the special and particular determination thereof doth belong to the positive law of God, and in the order of nature, (mark these words) it would belong to the civil or private Law: But the mean betwixt both seemeth in some sort to belong to the law of Nations, as the right to worship God by Sacrifices is not simply, or absolutely commanded by the law of nature, and yet all Nation's d● seem to have agreed therein. as we have said, treating of this matter, and therefore it may worthily be said to belong to the law of Nations. Likewise, that there should be in the Commonwealth a State of man appointed, specially to the service of God, doth not seem to belong to the absolute law of nature, yet it is so convenient and agreeable thereunto, that almost all Nations and Commonwealths have agreed in this institution, at least wise in the general, although in the particular manner there hath been great variety, and therefore concerning this institution in general, Religion may also be said to belong to the law of Nations. Thus Suarez. 41 Whereby Mr. Fitzherbert may clearly see, that although to worship God in general is commanded by the law of nature, yet both to worship him in this, or that particular manner is not ordained by the law of nature, but left to the determination of every private man, as he is considered to live by himself alone, or of the civil Commonwealth, as he liveth in civil Society; and also that there should be in the Commonwealth a State of men appointed, specially for the public service and worshipping of God, is not ordained by the law of nature, but only by the law of nations, and this also only in general, for as concerning the particular manner, to wit, what honour, dignity, authority, and prerogatives this State of men should have, it is not determined by the law of nations, because in this there hath always among nations been great variety, for that some nations gave to their religious Priests greater honour, authority, and prerogatives, and some gave less, as partly you have seen in the sixth Chapter, and partly you shall see anon by examining the rest of my adversaries discourse. So that you may manifestly perceive, that no good argument can be brought from the law of nature or nations to prove, that the Pope hath authority to punish temporally the supreme civil Magistrate, seeing that all the authority which the religious Priests had in the law of nature, either in temporals or spirituals, did only proceed from the grant of the civil Commonwealth itself, and not from the law of nature. 24 Now let us go on with Mr. fitzherbert's discourse; This, saith he, i Pag. 131. nu. 6 is manifest by the general consent and practise of all Nations, who have always preferred divine things before human, and spiritual things before temporal as in Aethiopia, etc. But this is only a continual repeating of that which he hath so often affirmed, and which no man calleth in question; for no man maketh doubt, but by the law of nature we are bound to prefer the service of God before any other thing, and to give due reverence, respect, and obedience to his immediate Ministers, but to honour or serve God in this, or that particular manner, and what particular honour, respect, or obedience is due to religious Priests, this doth not proceed from the law of nature or nations, but in the order of nature from the civil or private laws of every nation, as Suarez before affirmed, for that, as all histories acknowledge, in this there was a great variety among all nations, Baptist. Fulg. lib. 1. as in Aethiopia saith Mr. Fitzherbert, where the Priests determined of the life and death of Kings in such sort, that when the Priests signified to them that it was Gods will they should die, they presently killed themselves. 43 But he might have added, if it had pleased him, the next words following in Fulgosus, whom he citeth in the margin, that this custom of theirs did not always continue, Diod. Sicul. lib. 3. cap. 1. for it was abolished by King Erganes, who lived about the time of Ptolomey King of Egypt, who to the end his death should not be foretold him by the Priests, he slew them all, and was the first that took away that custom. Besides, neither was this custom observed among other nations, as among the Romans, the chief Priest or Bishop ought to keep his hands not only pure from all blood, but also he ought not to be partaker or privy to the death of any man, insomuch that if any condemned man did fly to him he was freed from death for that day k Alex. lib. 2. geralium dierum cap. 8. . Neither did those Priests of Aethiopia properly put their Kings to death by authority, but as interpreters of the will of GOD they did declare, that it was GOD'S pleasure they should kill themselves; and so this example is little to the purpose. 44 Also in Egypt, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, none could be a King except he were a Priest. True it is, that the custom of the Egyptians was, Stobaeus se. 42. as Stobaeus also affirmeth, to create either Priests, or warlike men their Kings, for honour and nobility was given to warlike men for their fortitude, and to Priests for their wisdom: But he that was chosen out of warlike men to be their King was forthwith made a Priest, and partaker of philosophy, or the study of wisdom. And no doubt, but that this was a laudable custom, and so much the more, for that the King of Egypt could not judge, Diodor. Sicul. l. 1. c. 6. but according to the laws, and the Kings themselves were subject to the laws of their kingdom; yet this custom of the Egyptians was not general among other nations. For although in times past, Plutarch. in quaest. Rom. as Plutarch writeth, Kings did the greatest and chiefest part of Sacrifices, and they with the other Priests did concur in sacred rites, yet after they became to wax insolent, arrogant, and cruel, the Grecians for the most part taking away from them their Empire, left them only authority to sacrifice to their Gods. 45 And the like custom, saith my Adversary, was also observed among the Goths, whiles they were Paynimes. That the Goths had this for a continual custom, that none should be their Kings, unless they were Priests, I have not read, and that it was among them a continual practice I can hardly believe, both for that their custom was, that their Kings should not be learned, but among all nations, Caelius l. 8. c. 6. the Priests were usually the most learned of all the people, & also for that the contrary is signified by joannes Magnus in his history of the Goths, who writeth, that their Priest's wer● of divers degrees, to wit, Pontifices, Archiflamines, Flamines, Salij, Augurs, and that to their chief Priests, See Procopius & joan. Magnus, in their history of the Goths. Olaus l. 3 c. 8. & l. 8. c. 15. who were called Pontifices, was granted by them equal power with their Kings, whose authority was so great, that whatsoever they should either counsel or command, both the King himself, and the people, did forthwith wllingly execute, as an oracle from heaven. And no marvel if it were so, seeing that the reverence which the Goths did bear to Priests, although they were of a contrary Religion to them, was exceeding great and to be admired; insomuch that when they conquered any City, they did neither violate Temple, nor Priests; and in the judgement of all men they were accounted so pious and religious that they would not hurt any one, that should fly to the Temples dedicated to God for succour or Sanctuary. And when Alaricus King of the Goths, otherwise a barbarous and cruel man, invaded Italy in the time of Honorius the Emperor, and had subdued Rome, before he would give leave to his soldiers to spoil the City, he proclaimed by sound of trumpet, that the bodies and goods of those persons, Fulgos. l. 1. c. 1. who flyed for refuge to the Apostles Church should not be touched, and which is more to be admired, the soldiers themselves in the very midst of the sack and spoil, meeting certain sacred Virgins carrying upon their heads plate of gold, after they were informed, that they were consecrated to the Apostles, did not extend their hands so much as to touch them. Fulosus in the same place. 46 And amongst the Gauls, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, the Druids, who were their Priests, had in their hands the chief manage of public affairs, deciding all controversies, and judging all civil, and criminal causes, Caesar l. 6. de Bello Gallico. excommunicating such as would not obey them, and those that were so excommunicated were abhorred and detested of all men. But this custom of the Gauls proceeded from the private and civil law of that nation, and was not common to all nations, as you may see above in the Grecians, who from their Priests took away the temporal government, and left them only authority to sacrifice to their Gods, and the great variety, which was among nations concerning the authority of their Priests, doth evidently convince the same. 47 I have also signified before l Cap. 6. nu. 10 saith Mr. Fitzherbert, m Pag. 132. nu. 6. what authority and command the chief Bishops, and Augurs had in the Roman Commonwealth above the Consuls, and temporal Magistrates, when consideration of Religion occurred in matters of State: Whereupon Valerius Maximus saith, Valer. Max. l. 1. c. 1. that the Roman Commonwealth always preferred Religion before all things, even in men of the highest degree, dignity, and Majesty, and that their Empire did willingly submit itself, and obey in matters of Religion, esteeming that it should in time arrive to the sovereignty of human government, if it did well and duly observe the divine power. Thus saith Valerius of the pre-eminence, and sovereignty of Religion in the Roman Commonwealth. And for the time of the Roman Emperors, most of them were extreme Tyrants, and did condemn as well all divine, as human laws, yet all of them seemed to acknowledge the Sovereignty of Religion, in that they took upon them the title and dignity of chief Bishops, because no man should have any authority over them, as the Bishops had over the Consuls in the Roman Commonwealth; Bapt. Fulgos. l. 1. c. 1. and yet nevertheless we read of Alexander Severus, that he suffered an appellation from himself to the Bishops, and that they reversed his sentence, when it seemed to them, that equity and justice required it. And hereto may be added; what great respect the Emperors of the Turks, and Persians bear at this day to the chief Bishop, who hath power to abrogate any law made by them, if it seem to him to be repugnant to the Alcoron. 48 But from these examples, or any other such like, this only can be gathered, that all nations have ever preferred Religion, and the worship of their Gods, before any other temporal thing, and that in respect chief of Religion, they gave to their Religious Priests, (whom they appointed to be their immediate Ministers to offer Sacrifice to their Gods, or as certain messengers, or prophets to declare their wills, as in Rome were the Augurs, and Soothsayers) certain temporal honour, authority, and pre-eminence greater, or lesser according to the custom of every Nation; but it cannot be gathered from hence, that this temporal authority, which these Religious Priests had to punish any man temporally, did proceed from the law of nature, or nations, as the law of nations is accounted one law, but from the municipal laws of every nation, kingdom, or commonwealth, as the divers custom of every nation touching the temporal authority of their Religious Priests doth clearly convince. 49 But mark, what Mr. Fitzherbert would gather from these examples; So that, saith he, n Pag. 133. nu. 7. by all this it appeareth, that howsoever all Nations have differed amongst themselves in particular rites and ceremonies of Religion, yet they have all agreed in this general principle of nature, that there ought to be in all Commonwealths a due subordination and subjection of human things to divine, of Policy to Religion, and of the temporal Magistrate to the spiritual, in matters that appertain any way to Religion: Whereupon it followeth, that Ius Gentium, the law of Nations being grounded upon the principles of nature, cannot patronise, or admit an Oath, whereby a temporal, and Secular Prince shall be exempted (in matters that concern Religion) from subjection to his spiritual Pastors, and special to the supreme Pastor of Christ's Church. Thus said I in my Supplement concerning the law of Nations, whereby it appeareth, etc. 50 No man maketh any doubt, but that all Nations have agreed in this, as a principle of nature, that there ought to be a due subordination, and subjection of human things to divine, of Policy to Religion, and of the temporal Magistrate to the spiritual, in matters that appertain to Religion: but in what this due subordination and subjection, according to the principles of nature consisteth, this is the whole difficulty. For if Mr. fitzherbert's meaning be, that spiritual things and Religion, are more excellent, then temporal things and policy, and therefore Religion, and things belonging thereunto, are caeteris paribus to be preferred before things appertaining to civil government, and that, according to the principles of nature, it is fit and convenient, that the civil commonwealth should for reverence to Religion, give to Religious Priests some temporal honour, authority, and prerogatives; and also, that Religious Priests should be honoured and obeyed by all men in those things, whereunto the authority, which is given them either by God himself, or by the positive grant of the civil commonwealth doth extend; this I willingly grant to be a principle grounded in nature, and natural reason: But if his meaning be that the civil commonwealth is according to the principles of nature, and natural reason subject and subordinate, not only in dignity and perfection, but also in coercive authority, and that the Religious Priests might in the law of nature, and according to the known principles of natural reason punish temporally either the supreme temporal Prince, or any one of the inferior people, this is very untrue, as I have convinced before o Cap. 6. nu. 35 & seq. &. c. 8. nu. 40. out of the doctrine of Abulensis, and Suarez. 51 Wherefore, as all the particular power, and authority, which was granted to Religious Priests in the order of nature before the law of God was written, as well in matters concerning Religion, as policy, did not proceed from the law of nature, or of nations, among whom there was so great variety in this point, but from the private, or Civil law of every particular commonwealth, to whom the chief manage and disposition of all things, as well concerning Religion, as Civil government did belong, so all the particular subordination, and subjection especially in coercive authority either of the people, or of the Civil Magistrate to the Religious Priests, as well in matters of Religion, as State, did wholly proceed from the free grant of the Civil commonwealth, or the supreme Prince, and governor thereof. Whereupon it evidently followeth, that both the law of nature, and nations would have patronized, and admitted an Oath, which had been made before the law of God was written, whereby the Civil commonwealth, or the supreme temporal Prince should have been exempted from the temporal punishment of any religious Priest, who in all matters as well concerning Religion, as policy, was subordinate and subject both to the coercive, and directive power of the Civil Society, or commonwealth; and that therefore this Oath now in question concerning the Pope's authority to depose temporal Princes, and to dispose of temporal kingdoms, cannot any way be impugned, but altogether patronized by the law of nature and nations. And by this all that Mr. Fitzherbert hath said in his Supplement concerning the law of nature, and nations, and that also, which here▪ he addeth for a conclusion, is most clearly satisfied. 52 Thus said I in my Supplement, saith he, p Pap. 133. nu. 8. concerning the law of nations, whereby it appeareth, that the said law (which is deduced directly from the law of nature) teacheth, and confirmeth not only the supreme dignity of Religion in the Commonwealth but also the subordination, and subjection of the temporal state to the Religious, even in temporal matters that touch Religion; and that the custom, and municipal law of the Romans ordaining the same in their Commonwealth, was most conform to the law of nature, being deduced directly from the known principles thereof, which by the light of natural reaso●n were manifest to the Philosophers, and wise lawmakers amongst the Paynims; and therefore whereas Widdrington ascribeth the pre-eminence of Religion in the Common wealth of the Romans to a municipal law, denying it withal to proceed from the law of nature, which was the ground of that law, he speaketh as problably, as if he should ascribe an effect wholly to the second cause, and deny it to proceed from the first. So as it is evident, that he hath answered as unprobably and imperfectly to my arguments drawn from the law of nations, as to the former grounded upon the law of nature. q Nu. 13. 53 But first, I have clearly showed, as you have seen, from the doctrine of Suarez, and the common opinion of Divines, that the law of nations, as it is distinguished from the law of nature, is not directly deduced from the principles of the law of nature, but it is a human law, having force to bind only by the positive constitution and decree of man. Secondly, that, although according to the principles of natural reason Religion is in dignity, perfection, and nobility superior to policy, and policy is therein subordinate, and subject to it, yet according to the law of nature, and nations, all the particular authority, which the Religious Society, as it was distinguished from the Civil, had to command, or punish any man, dependeth wholly upon the Civil commonwealth, not only in temporal, but also in religious affairs; and the particular customs, and municipal laws not only of the Romans, but also of all other nations, granting some temporal honour, authority, and prerogatives to Religious Priests did not proceed from the law of nature, nor was directly, or indirectly deduced from the principles thereof, but was derived merely from the positive constitutions, and grants of every particular Civil commonwealth, in whose power it was to create, depose, and punish their Religious Priests, and to extend, diminish change, and quite take away from them all their directive and coercive authority: and Mr. Fitzherbert affirming the contrary, speaketh not only improbably, and disagreeably to the doctrine of Suarez and all other learned Divines, but also discovereth herein his great want of judgement, learning, and reading. Nevertheless I will not deny, but that in this sense the particular customs, and municipal laws of nations granting to their Religious Priests, who were their immediate ministers for things belonging to the public service and worship of their Gods, some temporal honour, and authority, were most conform to the law of nature, and principles of natural reason, for that the law of nature, and light of natural reason doth approve and allow such laws and customs as fit, and convenient, but not command, and ordain them as necessary: in which sense also the exemption of Clergy men now in the new law from the coercive authority of Secular Magistrates ordained by human law, may be said to be conform to the law of nature, for that it doth approve such exemption as convenient, but not command it as necessary. And thus much concerning the law of nations, and nature. 54 Now touching the Civil law, r Pag. 134. nu. 9 10. Mr. Fitzherb. maketh a quick dispatch thereof in these words. And as for the Civil law, saith he, whereas Widdrington saith only, that I have proved nothing else thereby, but that the Pope is the supreme superior of the Church in spiritual matters, he is to understand, that albeit I have not directly proved any thing else by the Civil law, yet I have also thereupon inferred the extension of his power to temporal things by a necessary consequent. For having concluded, that the Imperial, or Civil law doth not only establish the Pope's Supremacy, but also acknowledge the subjection of temporal Princes to him in matters belonging to their souls, and the good of the Church I added this inference. 55 Whereupon it followeth directly, that it acknowledgeth also, See Supplement cap. 1. nu. 118. pag. 67. by a necessary consequent, that he may punish them temporally in their persons, and states, when the good of souls, and the service and glory of God, doth require it, according to the rule of the said law, which I have touched before to wit, that the accessory followeth the principal, and that he which hath the greater power, hath also the less. And therefore I conclude, that the Civil law doth no way favour, support, or justify the Oath, and much less enjoin it, Ibid. nu. 64, 65. but flatly impugn, and overthrow it. Thus said I in my Supplement, remitting my Reader for the more ample proof of this inference, to that which I had before handled concerning the same, when I treated of the law of God, See cap. nu. 3. & seq. which I have also repeated in the first Chapter; as also I have examined his answers thereto, and showed them to be very idle and frivolous, and therefore I may well conclude, that the arguments in my Supplement, grounded as well upon the laws of God, Nature, and Nations, as upon the Cuiill, or Imperial law, do stand sound, and good against the Oath, notwithstanding any thing, that my Adversary Widdrington hath been hitherto able to bring to the contrary. 56 But fie, Mr. Fitzherbert, that you in whose mouth are so frequent absurd, ridiculous, impertinent, frivolous, foolish, idle, fradulent, impious, malicious, (as though all your writings were so grave, wise, substantial, and sincere) should thus in every Chapter delude your Reader, and (not to use your own foul words) show so great want of learning, judgement, and sincerity. For what man of learning, or judgement can sincerely think, that the Civil law may be said sufficiently to patronise the Pope's power to depose Princes, and to impugn the new Oath, for that it acknowledgeth the Pope to be the supreme spiritual Pastor; or with what sincerity can you make your Reader believe, that you had no other meaning in spending fourteen whole Pages of your Supplement, to prove by the Civil law, that the Pope is the supreme spiritual Pastor, and hath authority to Excommunicate wicked Princes, then only to infer thereupon by your necessary, or rather improbable consequent, that he may therefore punish them temporally in their persons, and states? For first, who would not imagine, that when you boasted to prove the Oath, to be repugnant to the Civil law, because it denieth the Pope's power to depose Princes, you would have brought some text out of the Civil law, where it is written, that the Pope hath such a power to depose, and not to have made so much ado to prove by the Civil law, the Pope to be head of the Church, and to have authority to inflict spiritual Censures, which no Catholic denieth, and then forsooth in a word, or two to deduce from thence by a far fetched consequence of your own, and not of the Civil law, that therefore the Pope may also punish them temporally in their persons, and States? 57 And truly, if it be sufficient to condemn in this manner the Oath by the Civil law, you might in the like manner for a greater flourish have brought the authority of all the ancient Fathers, yea and of all Catholics, even of myself, and of all those, who maintain the Oath to be lawful, for a clear testimony to condemn the same; for that all the ancient Fathers, and all Catholics, even myself, and those who maintain the Oath to be lawful, and deny the Pope's power to depose Princes, do acknowledge the Pope to be the supreme spiritual Pastor, and to have authority to inflict spiritual Censures. And without doubt you would condemn me for a vainglorious Thraso, if I should take upon me to prove by the testimony, and grant of Cardinal Bellarmine, Gretzer, Lessius, Becanus, Suarez, and of yourself, who are so vehement for the Pope's power to depose Princes, that the Pope hath no such power; for that you and all the rest do grant the Pope to be the supreme spiritual Pastor; and then by a necessary consequence in my judgement, though not in yours, I should infer from thence, that because the Pope is by the institution of Christ according to the doctrine of the ancient Fathers a spiritual Pastor, and not a temporal Prince, he hath only authority to give, or take away heavenly, not earthly kingdoms, to absolve from the bond of sins, not of debts, to use spiritual, not temporal weapons, or, which is all one, to inflict Ecclesiastical, not Civil punishments: This consequence the ancient Fathers made. See above cha. 5· sec. 3. nu. 11. & seq. But besides that it is not sufficient to prove any conclusion by the authority of the Civil law, unless the Civil law granteth both the premises, or propositions from whence that conclusion is deduced, the insufficiency of this consequence grounded upon those rules, The accessory followeth the principal, and he that can do the greater, can do the less, See chap. 2. & 3. per totum. I have made manifest in the former Chapters. 58 Secondly, do not dissemble, Mr. Fitzherb. nor seek to delude your Reader, but deal sincerely, and be not ashamed to acknowledge your error, seeing that not only yourself, but also Card. B●ll. Gretzer, Lessius, Becanus, and also Suarez have herein grossly erred. For your meaning was not by making that long discourse out of the Civil law, to prove the Pope to be the supreme spiritual Pastor, and to have authority to Excommunicate wicked Princes, only to infer by a necessary consequent in your own understanding, that he may also punish them temporally in their persons, and states, but your meaning was to prove directly by the Civil law the Oath to be unlawful, for that in your opinion it denieth the Pope's power to Excommunicate Princes, which the Civil law doth expressly acknowledge: For in the beginning of your Supplement, you took upon you to prove the Oath to be repugnant to all laws human and divine, namely in respect of those clauses, which do exempt temporal Princes from excommunication, and deposition by the Pope: and then after you had made an end of your long discourse concerning the Pope's spiritual power acknowledged by the Civil law, you made this inference, that the Civil law cannot justify the Oath, but doth flatly impugn it, for that the Oath supposeth and implieth the King's Majesty to be supreme head of the English Church, and not the Pope, and thereupon denieth the Pope's authority to excommunicate, and depose a temporal Prince. So that the Oath in your opinion contained two clauses, the one a denial of the Pope's power to excommunicate Princes, and this was that which you intended to prove to be directly repugnant to the Civil law; the other was a denial of the Pope's power to depose Princes, and this in a word or two related before, you affirmed to be also repugnant to the civil law, for that in your judgement it followeth necessarily from the fromer, which how vain an assertion this is, you may see by that I have said before, for so you may make one to affirm any thing, if to make him to grant an argument or consequent, it be sufficient that he grant the antecedent, although he deny the consequence. But now it seemeth by your silence, as I signified before in the first Chapter, that you are ashamed to insist upon the former clause concerning the Pope's power to excommunicate Princes, for which you made that long discourse to prove by the Civil law the Pope's supremacy in spirituals, and yet rather than you will confess your error, you care not to delude your Reader, in dissembling the chief and principal cause, for which you affirmed the Oath to be repugnant to the Civil law, to wit, because it denied the Pope's power to excommunicate Princes, wherein with many others of your Society, you have most foully and shamefully erred. 59 Wherefore I may now very well conclude, that the arguments which Mr. Fitzherbert hath brought in his Supplement grounded as well upon the law of God, of nature, and nations, as upon the civil or imperial law, are very insufficient, and that the answers which in my Admonition. I did briefly make to them, do stand sound and good, notwithstanding any thing that Mr. Fitzherbert hath been hitherto able to bring to the contrary. Now you shall see what arguments he bringeth from the Canon law, and especially from that so often named decree of the famous Council of Lateran. CHAP. IX. Wherein the difficulties which some make concerning the authority of the Lateran Council are propounded, the decree of the Council, which is commonly urged to prove the Pope's power to depose Princes is related, and widdrington's first answer to the said Decree is proved to be sound and sufficient, and Mr. fitzherbert's replies against the same are confuted. 1 WE are come now at last, courteous Reader, to examine what convincing arguments can be brought for proof of this new pretended Catholic faith, touching the Pope's power to depose Princes out of the Canon law, and especially from the decree of the great and famous Council of Lateran, whereon my principal Adversaries, seeing belike all their other arguments and authorities to be clean shaken and battered, do now chief rely. Wherefore, albeit neither the more ancient of our modern Divines, who are vehement maintainers of the Pope's power to depose Princes, as Victoria, Corduba, D. Sanders, and others, nor Cardinal Bellarmine himself, who hath taken from these men all his chief arguments and authorities to confirm his new Catholic faith in this point, did in his Controversies make any great reckoning of the decree of this great Council, for otherwise without doubt, he being not ignorant of this decree, and also desirous to make his doctrine unquestionable, and therefore feareth not to brand the contrary opinion with the note of heresy, would not have been contented only with the fact of Pope Innocent the third in deposing Otho the Emperor, and have neglected to urge this decree of the Council of Lateran, which was called by the said Pope Innocent, yet now he flieth to the decree of the great Council of Lateran, as the chief pillar to support his new Catholic faith: & therefore in regard principally of this decree he doubteth not to affirm (but how rashly, and without sufficient ground you shall see beneath) that whosoever denieth the Pope's power to depose Princes, contemneth the voice of the Church in this so great and famous a Council, and is to be accounted a Heathen and Publican, and in no wise a Christian. 2 And Mr. Fitzherbert also maketh so great account of this decree, that whereas he spendeth only three Chapters concerning the law of God in the old and new Testament, the law of Nature, of Nations, and the Civil law, yet in examining this decree of the Council of Lateran, he consumeth seven whole Chapters, wherein he hath borrowed of Fa. Lessius masked under D. Singletons' name the greatest part of a whole Treatise, which he made in the defence of this Decree, and in the end he boldly affirmeth, a P. 204. 205. that I am fallen into flat heresy, yea, which is more, by my own grant, and confession, and why forsooth? for not understanding the Decree in that sense, wherein Cardinal Bellarmine, and some later Divines, specially jesuits do understand it, as though the authority of these men is so great, that we are bound to accept their private expositions concerning any text of holy Scriptures, or sacred Canons, for the voice of the Catholic Church. But how vain are the brags of this boasting man, and how palpable are his slanders, taxing me of ridiculous absurdity, folly, temerity, malice, impiety, impudency, and heresy, and then especially, when my answers are most strong, and his Replies most childish, and impertinent, you have partly seen in the former Chapters, and in the rest also you shall more clearly perceive. 3 But before I come to show what is the true sense, and meaning of this decree, it will not be amiss first to see, of what authority and credit among all Catholics this great and famous Council of Lateran is, and aught to be, for this is very material to know, whether any decree therein contained be of itself sufficient to make any matter of faith, which all Catholics are bound to believe to be of faith: as also, because some make doubt, Bel. lib. 2. de Concil. cap. 13. saith Cardinal Bellarmine, whether the last Council of Lateran under Pope Leo the tenth, which most expressly defined, that the Pope is above a General Council, was truly a General Council, therefore even to this day it remaineth a question also among Catholics, whether a General Council be above the Pope, or no. And although I do not intend to deny, or call in question the authority of this Council, but for my own part do willingly admit, and approve the same, yet for satisfaction of the Reader, and that the truth may the more easily be found out, and followed, I think it necessary to set down the doubts, and difficulties, which some have made against the authority of this so great, and famous a Council. 4 First therefore, it is certain, and out of controversy, that the aforesaid Council of Lateran was called by Pope Innocent the third, to which came all those Ambassadors, Bishops, and other inferior Prelates, mentioned here beneath by my Adversary, and in this all Histories do agree, in which respect it may truly be called the greatest, and most famous Council, that ever was assembled in the Church of God, albeit, if we respect only the number of the Bishops who were present thereat, and who only according to Card. Bellarmine's doctrine have authority to decide, determine, and define, as judges, matters belonging to Christian faith, and Religion, the Council, of Chalcedon was far greater, whereat were present 630. Bishops; and the Council of Lions under Pope Gregory the tenth was also far greater, whereat were present according to Genebrard, 500 Bishops, and according to Binnius more than 700. whereas at this Council of Lateran were only 412. Bishop's according to Matthew Paris, and Abbas Vspergensis, whom Binnius followeth, who comprehend the two Patriarches, and 70. Archbishops in the number of the 412. Bishops. But all the difficulty consisteth in this, whether this decree, which is now in question, and all the other Canons, which now are published, as decrees of the Council of Lateran, were confirmed by the general consent of all or the greatest part of all the Fathers, or were only propounded and rehearsed in the Council, but not approved by common consent. And one chief ground of this difficulty is taken from the testomonie of our countryman Matthew Paris, a Benedictive Monk of the Monastery of S. Alban, who both lived near the time of this Council, See his History of Henry the 3. in the year. 1248. and was also reputed a man probatae vitae & religionis expertae, of an approved life, and tried religion, as Pope Innocent the 4. doth testify, in regard whereof he was by the same Pope Innocent sent into the kingdom of Norway to reform the Monastery of Holme; although in regard of his freedom of speech, and upright dealing he is undeservedly taxed by the most Illustrious, and renowned Cardinal de Peron, as a great enemy to Popes, in which respect he might also tax him, as a great enemy to all, both Popes, and Kings, Clerks, and Laikes, yea and to those of his own Order, for that he freely, and without partiality rehearseth, and taxeth the vices of all: But the ancient proverb is by daily experience found true, Ohsequium amicos, veritas odium parit. Flattery causeth friends, truth enmity. 5 Thus therefore he writeth of that Council, b Mat. Paris upon the year 1215. in the life of King john. after he hath set down the time, and place where it was held, and the number of persons who were present thereat: All these being gathered together in the place aforesaid, and according to the manner of General councils every man being placed in his order, the Pope having made first an exhortation, 60. Chapters were rehearsed in the full Council, which to some did seem pleasing, or easy, to others burdensome. At length he beginning his speech concerning the business of the Crucifix, subjoined saying, etc. And the same Matthew Paris in his lesser Chronicle writeth thus: But that General Council, which after the Papal manner did pretend great things at the beginning, ended in scorn and mockery, whereby the Pope cunningly deluded the Archbishops, Bishops, Abbots, Deans, Archdeacon's, and all that came to the Council. For when they now perceived nothing to be done in so great a business, they being desirous to return home, desired leave one after another: which the Pope did not grant them, before they had promised him a great sum of money, which they were constrained first to borrow of Roman merchants, and pay it to the Pope before they were permitted to departed from Rome. The Pope now having received the money did freely dissolve this gainful Council, and all the Clergy departed sorrowful. 6 From which word of Matthew Paris it seemeth to follow, that neither all these 60. Chapters mentioned by him were made by the order of the whole Council, but rather by Pope Innocent himself, or by his direction before the Council began, both for that at the very beginning of the Council, after the Pope had made his sermon, it seemeth that they were rehearsed in the full Council, and also because they seemed to some pleasing, and to others burdensome, nor that they were approved by the common consent of the Fathers, because there is no likelihood that they would give their free consent to the publishing of such decrees, which seemed to them heavy, and burdensome. And therefore the most Illustrious Cardinal of Peron was greatly mistaken, when he affirmed Matthew Paris to say, that the Council of Lateran made 60. Chapters, for that Matthew Paris, as you have seen, only saith, that 60. Chapters, which seemed pleasing to some, and burdensome to others, were rehearsed, he doth not say, made, in the full Council. Platina in vita Innocentij 3● & Nauclerus generat. 41. ad annum. 1215. 7 Another ground, why the authority of this Council is by some called in question, is taken from the testimonies of Platina, and Nauclerus, and some other circumstances annexed thereunto. For both these Authors do expressly affirm, that nothing at all could be plainly decreed by the Council, by reason of the sudden departure of Pope Innocent from Rome, giving to understand thereby, that something was by the common consent of the Fathers decreed, but nothing plainly. The words of Nauclerus are these: In the year of our Lord 1215. Pope Innocent did celebrate at Rome in the Lateran Church a Council, or Synod, at which were present the patriarchs of jerusalem, and Constantinople, etc. Many things were then consulted of, but nothing could be plainly decreed, for that that those of Pisa, and Genoa made war one against the other by Sea, and those on this side the Alps by land (therefore the Pope going thither, saith Platina, to take away this discord, dieth at Perugia) Nevertheless some Constitutions, saith Nauclerus, are reported to be published, among which one is, that whensoever the Princes of the world shall offend one the other, it belongeth to the Pope to correct them. Many things in conclusion were treated of for the recovering of the holy Land. 8 Neither are those words, say they, of Nauclerus, [that nothing was plainly decreed in the Council] to be understood only concerning the recovering of the holy Land, both for that his words are general, and without limitation, and to be referred to those many things that were consulted of, which did not only concern the recovering of the holy Land, but also the reformation of the universal Church in faith, and manners, for both which causes the Council was called, as Pope Innocent himself, in his speech, which he made to the Council at the beginning thereof, and in his Bull of calling the Council related by Abbas Vspergensis, doth expressly affirm; Abbas Vesper. ad annu. 1212. and also those words of Nauclerus immediately following, yet some Constitutions are reported to be published, among which, etc. and his putting in the last place, that many things were treated of for the recovering of the holy land, do sufficiently show, that those first words of his [Many things were consulted of, yet nothing at all could be plainly decreed] he did not understand touching only the holy Land. 9 And although those very same words, that Platina hath, to wit, that many things were then consulted of, but nothing could be plainly decreed, may be wrested to the recovering only of the holy Land, if we only regard his words immediately going before, to wit, that the Pope seeing the power of the Sarracens to increase in Asia doth celebrate a very great Council at Lateran at which were present, etc. Many things were consulted of, etc. yet if we consider, say they, many other circumstances together also with that, which Matthew Paris said before, it is probable, that Platina his meaning was, that many things were consulted of, not only concerning the increase of the Sarracens power in Asia, but also touching the reformation of the Church in faith and manners contained in those 60. Chapters rehearsed in the full Council, and that nothing at all, especially concerning those Chapters, which seemed to some easy, to others burdensome, could be plainly, and manifestly decreed, for that the Pope did so suddenly departed from Rome to appease the discord betwixt the people of Pisa, and Genoa, that there was not time sufficient, duly and maturely to debate the same. 10 The first circumstance is, that although the increase of the Sarracens power in Asia was an occasion to hasten the calling of this Council, yet it was not called only for the recovering of the holy Land, but also for the reforming of the universal Church in faith, & manners, See Abbas Vsperg. ad annu. 1212. to wit, as Pope Innocent himself confesseth, to root out vices, and plant virtues, to correct excesses, & reform manners, to expel heresies, & strengthen faith, to appease discords, and establish peace, to suppress oppressions, and nourish liberty, to induce Christian Princes, and people to give aid, and secure to the holy Land, etc. whereof Platina could not be ignorant; and that therefore, according to Platina his meaning, many things were consulted of, concerning the things, for which the Council was called, but nothing was plainly, and manifestly decreed by any authentical and public approbation of the whole Council. And in this sense that, which writeth Godefridus, who lived at the same time, may be well understood; Godefridus monarchus ad annum. 1215. The same year 1215. saith he, the Pope held a Council at Rome, where Patriarches, Archbishops, Bishops, Abbots, Prelates of Churches, as well from the parts beyond the Sea, as from all the coasts of Christendom, were gathered together in the Church of Saint john Baptist, which began at the feast of S. Martin, and was prorogued until the feast of Saint Andrew, wherein nothing was there done worthy to be remembered, but that (which before was unheard of) the East Church did submit herself to the West. 11 The second circumstance is, that there was as much decreed in the Council concerning the recovery of the holy Land, and as plainly, as touching any other thing, as it is manifest by the last Chapter; Being moved, saith the Pope, with a vehement desire to deliver the Holy land from the hands of the wicked, by the advice of prudent men, who fully know the circumstances of times, Sabel. ennead. 9 lib. 6. and places, the sacred Council approving, we define, etc. Whereupon, as writeth Sabellicus, it was sufficiently agreed upon to make war against the wicked in Asia, but the discord betwixt those of Genoa, and Pisa hindered the preparation thereof. 12 The third circumstance is, that this so great and famous Council, which was celebrated in the year 1215. was not published to the view of the world, and placed among the other Counsels, but 300. years after it was celebrated, to wit, in the year 1538. and that by a Germane, who affirmeth, that he had these decrees out of an ancient Book, but from whence, or from whom he had this Book, or of what credit it was, he maketh no mention: and jacobus Merlin, who printed the Counsels but three years before; did clean omit this Council of Lateran. Now what prudent man, say they, can imagine, that if this Council, and all the decrees, which are now therein contained, had been approved by the general consent of the Fathers, who were present thereat, either Pope Innoncent himself, who would have caused the said decrees forthwith to be published, as other approved Counsels have ever been published, or that his Nephew, and next Successor but one, Pope Gregory the ninth, as he was careful to publish all his uncles decretal Epistles, and these decrees also, which were propounded by him in this Council of Lateran, whereof the greatest part of the Canon law, called the decretals of the Pope Gregory the ninth, is compounded, so also he would not have neglected to publish this so great and famous Council of Lateran, and the Canons therein decreed, if it had been certain, that they were approved and confirmed by the consent of the whole Council: or if there had been any authentical copy of this Council preserved in the Vatican, as by all likelihood there would have been, if the Council had been complete, and Ecumenical, and the decrees therein propounded, had been approved by the general consent of the Fathers) some one or other Roman Antiquary would in 300. years space have caused it to be published, and that we should not have needed a Germans help to seek out in Germany after 300. years a copy of this Council to publish as authentical. 13 But it seemeth, say they, that this ancient Book which this first publisher of the Council mentioneth, was by some one or other collected out of the Book of the Canon law, called the decretals of Pope Gregory the ninth, for that it containeth just as many Chapters, and no fewer than are in the Decretals, to wit, 72. Chapters: and they have the very same beginning, and ending, and also the very same notes and observations even in the middle of the Chapters, which is not so in other Counsels, as may be seen in the Council of Lateran held under Pope Alexander the third, whereas the Chapters propounded and rehearsed in this great Council os Lateran, were according to Matthew Paris only 60. And this will appear more clear, if we consider that the 40. and 41. Chapter, and the 60. 63. and 64. in the Edition of this Council set out by this Germane make 4. chapters, as they do in the Decretals, and not two only, as in the Counsels now published they are divided, that thereby they may make just 70. Chapt. & not 72. and so it might more credibly be answered (as the most illustrious Cardinal of Peron doth answer) that it was an error in Matthew Paris of the Writer, or Printer, to put 60. for 70. whereas to put 60. for 72. and so to change both the letters, had been an error too egregious, and hardly to be believed. 14 To these circumstances may be added, that there is no mention made of the approbation of the Council, but only of some few decrees, as of the 2. 4. 5. 18. 42. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 51. 66. 69. and the 72. or last decree concerning the holy land, whereof the third decree, which is now in controversy betwixt my Adversaries and me, is none: As also neither Pope Gregory the ninth doth in the decretals entitle any one of those Chapters, or decrees, as made by the Council of Lateran (howsoever the most Illustrious Cardinal of Peron doth untruly affirm the same) but only by Pope Innocent in the Council, which words do not properly, and in rigour of speech signify, that they were made or approved by the Council, but only by Pope Innocent in the Council, or, as Mat. Paris saith, rehearsed in the full Council by the commandment of Pope Innocent to be approved, and confirmed by the common suffrage and consent of the Fathers, which nevertheless seemed to be easy and pleasing to some, but burdensome to others: And therefore the Fathers did not agree about them; neither was there time sufficient to examine them more thoroughly, by reason of the great haste which Pope Innocent made to departed from Rome, to appease the stirs in Italy. For the Council began at S. Andrews tide, and the Pope died at Perugia the next july following; neither do any Histories that I have read make mention, when the Pope dissolved this great and famous Council; Only Blondus affirmeth that he departed from Rome primo vere, at the first beginning of the spring. Blond dec. 2. lib 6. in fine. So that the Council might continue only for a month or two, for aught by any History we can know to the contrary. Whereupon Platina, after he had said, that many things were consulted of, and nothing could be plainly decreed, for the reason before mentioned of the Pope's sudden departure from Rome, ascribeth the condemnation of Almaricus his errors, and of Abbot joachim his Book against the Master of the sentences, not to the Council, but only to Pope Innocent: Pope Innocent, saith he, did disprove a certain Book of Abbot joachim, and he condemned the errors of Almaricus. 15 All these things being considered, it is very probable, say they, that albeit many things were consulted of in the Council, yet nothing at all, especially concerning those decrees, which to some seemed easy, and to others burdensome, could be plainly decreed, that is, concluded and agreed upon by any public, and known authentical decree of the whole Council, or greatest part thereof, hitherto published to the view of the world: yet it may very well be, that most of those Fathers gave at least wise their private or consent to the publishing of many of those 60. Chapters or decrees, although also all those 13. decrees, wherein mention is made of the approbation, and consent of the Council might by the appointment of Pope Innocent be written in that form of words before the Council began, and also rehearsed in that manner in the very beginning thereof. Wherefore we have not, say they, any true authentical Copy of the Council of Lateran yet published, taking the Council, as it containeth only those decrees, which were made by the common consent and approbation of the whole Council but the Council of Lateran, which is now extant, is only a collection of those decrees registered in the Book of Decretals, which Pope Innocent propounded to the Council, and were rehearsed, as Matthew Paris saith, in the full Council at the very beginning thereof: Paul. Emilius lib. 6. in Philip. po 2. Sevebr. lib 4. ad annum 1215. Vignerius eod●m anno. especially seeing that the Earldom of Tholosa was by a peculiar decree of the Council of Lateran, with the consent no doubt of the King of France, given to Simon Earl of Montfort, which decree is not to be found in the Council of Lateran now extant, for that it was not by Pope Gregory the ninth, put among the Decretals. These be reasons, for which the authority of this great Council is by some called in question. 16 But on the contrary side the most Illustrious Cardinal of Peron, doth bring two principal arguments, which may seem to confirm the authority of this Council, and that the decrees now extant were made by the general consent and approbation of the whole Council. The first is, for that otherwise we may impugn the article of Transubstantiation, the article of the holy Ghost proceeding from the Father, and the Son, the precept of annual confession, the condemnation of the errors of Abbot joachim, etc. But to this argument they answer, that it doth not therefore follow, that we may impugn the aforesaid Decrees, because they are now received by the general consent of all Catholics, either by virtue of the Canon law, contained in the book of Decretals, which Pope Gregory the ninth commanded to be observed, and practised by all men, or because they are approved by common consent, but not by virtue of the authority of the Council, wherein nothing was decreed, and agreed upon by any known, and authentical approbation of the Fathers, although doubtless they did by their private, or consent approve many of those 60. or 70. Decrees. 17 The second argument is, for that both councils, Popes, and scholastical Doctors, do cite some of the aforesaid 60. or 70. Decrees, as of the Council of Lateran. But to this also they answer, that these Decrees are called Canons of the Council Lateran, for that they were propounded and rehearsed in the Council, but not confirmed or approved by the general acceptance, and consent of the Fathers, because they seemed to some to be easy and pleasing, but to others heavy and burdensome. To these may be added a third argument, that the Council of Constance in the 39 Session ordaining what profession the future Pope was to make, decreeth, that every future Pope hereafter to be chosen, must make this confession, and profession, before his election be published, that he doth firmly believe the holy Catholic faith, according to the traditions of the Apostles, of general councils, and of other holy Fathers, but especially of the eight Sacred general councils, to wit, of the first Nicene, of the second Constantinopolitan, of the third Ephesine, of the fourth Chalcedon, of the fifth and sixth Constantinopolitan, of the seventh Nicene, and the eight Constantinopolitan, and also of Lateran, Lions, and Vienna also general councils. But to this they also answer, that by the Council of Lateran is not understood this under Pope Innocent the third, but the former celebrated under Pope Alexander the third, in the year 1180. and if it be understood of this Council of Lateran, it is only, say they, forasmuch as concerneth those decrees wherein mention is made of the approbation of the Council, as is that 46. decree which the Council of Constance mentioneth in the Bull of the confirmation of the Emperor frederic's constitution. As also by the Council of Lions it doth not understand that under Pope Innocent the 4th. who in the presence thereof excommunicated the Emperor Fredricke, and whereat only 140. Bishops were present, but that under Pope Gregory the tenth, in the year 1274. whereat S. Bonaventura, and S. Thomas of Aquina, and more than 700. Bishops were present according to Binnius, and Ebarhardus, whom Binnius citeth. 18 These be the principal difficulties both against, and for the authority of this Council of Lateran, which, before I came to examine the sense & meaning of the decree which is now in question, I thought needful to set down, that the Reeder may thereby judge, whether if one for the reasons aforesaid should deny the authority of this Council, and affirm, that nothing was therein plainly concluded by any public and authentical decree, approved by the common consent of the greatest part of the Fathers there present, may be excused from all note of heresy, error, and temerity, in that manner as the Doctors of Paris may be excused from those aspersions, for still defending the authority of a General Council, above a true and undoubted Pope, and denying the authority of the Council of Lateran under Pope Leo the tenth, wherein the contrary doctrine, as Cardinal Bellarmine saith, is expressly defined; yet for my own part, as I said before, I do willingly embrace, and admit the authority of this great Council of Lateran, and of every Canon and Decree therein contained, and namely of this which is now in question, and do only contend about the true sense and meaning thereof, as is usual in the holy Scriptures themselves, which some expound one way, some another, not intending thereby to call in question the authority of God's word but only to examine and declare what is the true sense and meaning thereof. 19 Now let us see, what Mr. Fitzherbert saith in this Chapter against my answer, wherein I briefly declared the true sense and meaning of this Decree. Thus therefore he beginneth: It resteth now, saith he, that I examine the probability of widdrington's answers to my arguments grounded upon the Canon law, and specially upon a constitution and Canon of the great and famous Council of Lateran. And first of all he setteth down the answer I gave in my Admonition, which before I relate, it will not be amiss to put down the decree itself of the Council of Lateran, for thereby the sense and true meaning thereof will more easily appear. First▪ therefore the Council in the third Chapter doth excommunicate, and anathematize all heresy, and condemn all heretics, by what name soever they be called, and doth ordain, that they being condemned shall be left to secular potestaes, Magistrates, or their Bailiffs to be punished according to their deserts, but so that Clergy, men shall be first degraded from their Orders or Clergy, and if they be Laymen, that there goods shall be confiscated, but if they be Clergy men, that their goods shall be applied to the Churches, from whence they received stipends: And then it decreeth thus: 20 But let Secular Potestaes, what offices soever they bear, be admonished and induced, and if it shall be needful, be compelled by Ecclesiastical Censure, that as they desire to be reputed and accounted faithful, so for the defending of the faith, they do take publicly an Oath, that they will sincerely endeavour to their power to cast out of the territories subject to their jurisdiction all heretics declared by the Church: So that from hence forth when any man shall be chosen to a perpetual or temporal potesta, or office, he be bound to confirm this Chapter by Oath. Si vero Dominus temporalis, etc. But if the temporal Lord, Officer, or Landlord, For Dominus temporalis, signifieth also every Officer, Magistrate or Landlord. being required and admonished by the Church, shall neglect to purge his territory from heretical filth, let him be excommunicated by the Metropolitan, and other Bishops of the same Province. And if he shall contemn to give satisfaction within a year, let it be signified to the chief Bishop or Pope, that from thenceforth he may denounce his vassals absolved from his fealty, and expose his Land or territory to be taken by Catholics, who, when the heretics be rooted out, may possess the same without contradiction, and conserve it in the purity of faith, the right of the principal Landlord, or Lord being reserved, so that he give no obstacle to this, nor put any impediment thereto: The same nevertheless to be observed concerning those, who have no principal Landlords. This is the decree of the Council. 21 Now all the difficulty consisteth chief in this, what is to be understood by those words, dominus temporalis, & dominus principalis, a temporal, and principal Landlord, Officer, or, if we will needs translate it so, Lord: Mr. Fitzherbert in his Supplement pretended to prove, that those words did comprehend Kings, and absolute Princes, and that therefore the Pope hath authority to depose temporal Princes, and to absolve their subjects from their temporal allegiance. To which his argument I answered briefly in my aforesaid Admonition c Nu. 21. in this manner. 22 Lastly, to that decree of the Council of La●eran so often inculcated and urged, I gave elsewhere d Widdr. in Praefat. ad Resp. Apol. nu. 43. diverse answers, which this Author F.T. dissembleth. He insinuateth one of them, and confuteth it mostly coldly, to wit, that by the name of him that hath not a principal Landlord, (or if we will needs have him called Lord) Emperors, and absolute Kings are not to be understood, but other inferior Landlords, or Officers, who are subject to Kings; seeing that the Emperor Frederick five years after this Council was celebrated, made the same decree almost in the very same words, changing only spiritual penalties into temporal, who by the name of him that hath not a principal Landlord, or also Lord, could not understand himself, and other absolute Princes. Whereupon I probably gathered, that those words, Non habens Dominum principalem, Not having a principal Landlord, or also Lord, could not by force of the words comprehend Kings, and absolute Princes, who, unless they be namely expressed in penal laws, are not to be understood, to wit, by the general names of temporal and principal Landlords, or Lords. And to say, that the Emperor did not comprehend Kings in those words, and that the Pope did mean to comprehend them, is barely to say, not to demonstrate: considering that if the Synod (of Lateran) had meant to have comprehended Sovereign Princes in that decree, she might as easily have named them by their proper names of Princes, as by the general names of principal Landlords, Officers, or Lords, or who have no principal Landlords, Officers, or Lords, especially seeing that the same Council in other decrees hath used the peculiar names of Princes. Wherefore until some man shall clearly demonstrate, (I say not shall only show probably) that those answers, which I gave to the Council of Lateran, are altogether improbable, no effectual argument can be brought from that Council, whereby it may certainly, and evidently be proved, that it is so certain that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, that the contrary cannot without the note of heresy, error, or temerity be defended by Catholics.; 23 To this my answer Mr. Fitzherbert replieth thus: e Chap. 9 nu. 3 & seq. pa. 137. Now then, saith he, for as much as all our question here is concerning the Canon of the Council of Lateran, and that some of those, who may read this Reply, have never seen that Canon, or my Supplement, I think good to set down here, what I said in my Supplement concerning that Council, & Canon: Therefore having declared, that the Council of Lateran was gathered by the general consent as well of the Greek, as of the Latin Church, and of the Emperors of the East, and West Empire, I added, that there were present thereat, S. Antonin. tit. 19 §. 6. Paul. Aemil. lib. 6. Nauclar. generat. 41. Blond. dec. 2. lib. 6. in fine. Platina in Innoc. tert. Concil. Later. sub Innoc. tert. tom. 3. conc. Matth Paris, & Westmonast. ad annum. 1215. Can. 3. Supplem. cap. 6. nu. 2. the two Patriarches of Constantinople, and Jerusalem, and the substitutes of the two other Patriarches of Alexandria, and Antioch, 70. Archbishops, Greeks' and Latins: 412. Bishops, and 800. other Prelates, that is to say, above 1200. Besides that there assisted also the Ambassadors not only of the Roman, and Greek Emperors, but also of the Kings of Jerusalem, England, France, Spain, Hungary, and Cyprus, and of other absolute Princes. So as I conclude, that it was the greatest, and most general Council, that ever was assembled in the Church of God: and then I added further as followeth. 24 This was the great Council of Lateran held under Innocentius the third, in the year of our Lord 1215. wherein it was decreed thus: Si Dominus temporalis, etc. If a temporal Lord being required, and so forth, as you may see above. Thus far the Decree of this Ecumenical Council assembled by the consent of all Christendom; wherein you see not only the Pope's authority to depose Princes was avowed, and acknowledged, but also the practice thereof expressly ordained, and determined, when Princes shall neglect their duty to purge their states of heresies, and contemn with all the Ecclesiastical Censures. 25 Thus said I in my Supplement: and now to come to widdrington's answer, first, he chargeth me (as thou hast seen, good Reader) to have dissembled many answers, which he made else where concerning this Canon. Secondly, he saith, that I have nevertheless insinuate ●one of them, and answered it most coldly; and thirdly, he layeth down his said answer with some other reason's, why he thinketh it to be probable, that absolute Princes are not comprehended in that Canon. Whereto I answer, that I wonder upon what ground he could charge me with the dissimulation of his former answers, which I protest I never saw, until I chanced to have a view of this his last Treatise (I mean his Theological Disputation) whereto is annexed the other which he mentioneth; for truly if I had seen those answers whereof he speaketh, I would not have passed them over with silence, no more than I passed Mr. Dunnes and such other, as were then come to my knowledge. And as for my cold answer, I cannot see how it could be either cold or hot, to an argument, which I had never seen, but how hotly, and wisely he hath answered for his part, it may appear partly by the argument itself, and partly by my discourse in my Supplement, which he will n●edes take for an answer thereto. His argument you see, is, that for as much as the Emperor Frederick, etc. 26 But first, it is to be observed, that those words, Dominus temporalis, & Dominus Principalis, are not well translated into English, a temporal, or principal Lord, understanding the word [Lord] as it is taken by us for a title of honour; for those words do signify temporal Landlords, Governors, Magistrates, or Officers, as Mayors, judges, Sheriffs, Bailiffs, Constables, whether they be Lords, or no, as any man of judgement may plainly see, for that all these are Domini temporales, and many of them may be Domini principales, and I will more clearly show the same beneath. So also when the Council saith, that condemned heretics are to be left to the Secular Potestaes, or their Bailiffs to be deservedly punished, it did not understand absolute Princes, as Kings, and Emperors, but other inferior Officers and Magistrates, as Mayors, Consuls, chief justices, Captains, and Governors of Cities, to whom the execution of justice is committed, as both the Italian, and French word, Potesta, doth signify, and so in Italy the Governor of a City is called the Potesta, and also it may more clearly appear by the Breves, See Director. Inquisitor. circa finem. or Apostolical letters of Pope Innocent the fourth, Alexander the fourth, and Clement the fourth cited here beneath by my Adversary (for those of Honorius the third, and Vrbanus the fourth I have not seen, neither is there any mention made of them in the Directory of Inquisitors) who direct their letters to all Marcquesses, Earls, Barons, and Potestates, Governors, Consuls, and Communities of Cities and other places, etc. as Pope Innocent doth; or only to Potestaes, Counsels, and Communities of Cities, & other places of Italy, as Pope Alexander doth; or to Potestaes, or Governors, Consuls, Captains, A●tians, Counsels and Communities of Cities, as Pope Clement doth; where it is plain that by the word Potestaes are not understood so much as those Dukes of Italy, who are in some sort absolute Princes, as the Duke of Savoy, Florence, Mantua, Parma, etc. but only inferior Magistrates and Officers, Rectours, or Governors of Cities, and other places. 27 Secondly, the ground, and reason, for which I affirmed, that Mr. Fitzherbert dissembled divers of my answers to the decree of the Council of Lateran, was, for that I supposed he had seen the Preface to my Apologetical Answer, wherein I discoursed at large of this decree against F. Les●ius, and the reason why I supposed that he had seen that Answer, was, for that it was published to the view of the world a year before he wrote his Supplement; and whether I might not probably suppose the same, considering what particular intelligence the College of Rome, where then he lived, hath of all things that pass in this Kingdom, especially in things, that greatly touch the jesuits, as that Preface doth, I remit to the judgement of the prudent Reader. But because he now protesteth, that he never saw that Preface, before my Theological Disputation, whereunto it is annexed, came forth, I will believe him therein, and take his protestation for an answer; and I do willingly grant, that I was mistaken therein; as also I protest, that in any other thing, wherein I shall find myself to be mistaken, I will most willingly acknowledge the same: and if he, and the rest of my Adversaries, will as willingly acknowledge their errors in all those things, wherein they do clearly find themselves to be mistaken, I make no doubt, but that this controversy betwixt us will quickly be at an end. 28 Thirdly, observe good Reader, how fraudulently Mr. Fitzherbert hath concealed a principal clause, which of set purpose I put down in this my argument taken from the Constitution of the Emperor Frederick. For whereas I argued thus, as you have seen before, that because the Emperor Frederick enacting the self same law five years after, and using the very same words, which the Council did use, to wit, a temporal, & principal Landlord, Governor, or also Lord, and not having a principal Landlord, Governor, or Lords & changing only spiritual penalties into temporal, neither did, nor could by those words comprehend Kings, or absolute Princes, therefore from thence it may be probably collected, that those words in the Council could not ex vi sua, by force of the words comprehend Kings, and Sovereign Princes, who in penal laws are not to be understood under general words, unless they be expressed by name, Mr. Fitzherbert concealeth those words [ex vi sua, by force of the words [which nevertheless are very material to the force of my argument, as any man of judgement may clearly perceive. For as you shall see beneath, for the same reason, why Mr. Fitzherbert affirmeth, that frederic constitution did not by those General words comprehend Kings, and absolute Princes, I also affirm, that Kings, and absolute Princes are not under those general words comprehended in the Decree of the Council of Lateran. 29 Now you shall see, how well Mr. Fitzher. impugneth this my argument taken from the Constitution of the Emperor Frederick. widdrington's argument is, saith he, f Nu. 6. & seq. pag. 139. & seq. that for as much as the Emperor Fridericke made the same Constitution five years after the Council of Lateran, almost in the same words, changing only the spiritual penalties into temporal, therefore he did not mean to include therein either himself (who was free from the subjection of laws, or else other absolute Princes, who were not subject to him. Thus argueth he. But how doth it follow hereon, that the Canon of the Council of Lateran did not include him, and all other Princes? For albeit they were free from all temporal laws, yet being members of the Catholic Church, they were subject to the laws of that Council, and the rather for that their Ambassadors being present there, either ratified the Decrees thereof or at least did not contradict them. But to the end that this controversy betwixt my Adversary Widdrington and me, concerning the Emperor Friderickes law, may be the better understood, I think it not amiss to lay down, what I have already said concerning the same in my Supplement, where I proved against M. john Dunne, that the said law was so far from prejudicing any way the Canon of the Council, that it doth notably confirm it; to which purpose I said thus. 30 Thou shalt therefore understand, good Reader, that Frederick the second Emperor of that name, being in the beginning of his reign an obedient child of the Church, and willing to give public testimony thereof to the world, thought good to imitate the example of many of his predecessors, as well in the confirmation of the liberties, and privileges of the Clergy, as also in employing his Imperial authority in the extirpation of heresy. Concil. Lateran. sub Innoc. 3. can. 44. & 46. Com. 4. council. See constitut. Frider. §. Ad decus, & honorem. And forasmuch as this Council of Lateran had then lately before promulgated divers Canons to both those ends, he published also certain constitutions on his part, with manifest relations to the Canons of the Council. For whereas the Council complained of the small charity of some Secular Princes, g The Council did not complain of Secular Princes but of Consuls & Rectors of cities & such like Potestaes not Potentaes, as M. Fitzherbert saith. Ibid. §. Nos Fridericus Imperator. and Potentates, who had made laws, and constitutions in prejudice of the Ecclesiastical immunities, and privileges (which laws also the Council did wholly abrogate and disannul) the Emperor in like manner, in the Preface to his laws, lamenteth of the iniquity of such Potentates, and being desirous (as he testifieth) that the Church might enjoy plena quiet, & secura libertate, full quietness, and secure liberty, abrogated by his first decree all such constitutions, as any Cities, Places, Consuls, or other Potentates within the Empire had made against the liberties of the Church. 31 And this he ordained under great penalties of infamy, banishment, and confiscation of goods, Saluis nihilominus, saith he, alijs paenis contra tales in generali Concilio promulgatis; Reserving nevertheless the other penalties promulgated against such persons in the general Council. So he; meaning by the general Council that of Lateran, which was held but a few years before he made these Constitutions: and therefore for as much as that most famous general Council having been held so lately before, was then fresh in every man's memory, it was needless to name it more particularly, which had been requisite, if he had meant any other Council. Concil. Constan. in fine. Besides that the Council of Constance layeth down the substance of the 46. Canon of the said Council of Lateran made in favour of the liberties, and immunities of the Church, and also maketh mention of this law of Frederick, and in relating the same setteth down particularly the clause above mentioned, to wit, Saluis nihilominus alijs poenis, etc. Reserving nevertheless the other penalties promulgated against such in the general Council. Whereby it is evident, that those Imperial Constitutions of Frederick have a special relation unto the Canons of the Council of Lateran, and that they were made in confirmation thereof. 32 This also appeareth by the other decrees ensuing, wherein the Emperor either followed exactly the sense, meaning, and substance of some Canon of the Council, or else used the very words thereof, so far forth as they might stand with the style and form of an Imperial law, as it may be seen, not only in the fragment alleged by Mr. Dunne, but also in divers other parts of those Constitutions, as in that, which concerneth the receivers, abetters, and defenders of heretics, being alike in the Imperial Constitutions, and in the Canon of the Council, Concil. Lateran. can. 3. §. Credentes vero. Constit. Freder. §. Credentes praterea. to wit, Credentes praeterea, receptores, defensores, & fautores Haereticorum, etc. And the only difference betwixt the one, and the other is, that the Council saith, Excommunicationi decrevimus subiacere, We decree them to be subject to Excommunication, and the Emperor in his Constitutions saith, Bannimus, we do outlaw them, because it did not belong to him to excommunicate. And again, the Council in the end of that Canon imposeth a penalty upon Clergy men, which the Emperor doth not in his Constitution, because they were exempt from his jurisdiction, and in all other things the Canon and Constitution do agree word for word. Concil. Later. can. 3. Constitut. Freder. 33 The like also may be observed in the Constitution and Canon, concerning such as are only suspected of heresy, beginning both alike, to wit, Qui autem inventi fuerint sola suspicione notabiles, etc. and differing only in that the Canon exposeth them to Excommunication, if they do not clear themselves within a year, whereas the Imperial law inflicteth the penalty of infamy, and banishment. Also the same form and style is kept in another Constitution, touching an oath to be taken by all Magistrates, to do their best endeavour to exterminate heretics; And finally, to come to the Constitution whereof we now specially treat, it seemeth that the same is no other, then, as it were a transcript, or Copy of that Canon of the Council, concerning the deposition of Princes, mutatis mutandis, I mean, except only in such things as could not agree with the form of an Imperial law, or exceeded the power of a Secular Prince. Concil. Later. can. 3. §. Si vero Dominus. 34 Therefore whereas the Canon ordaineth, that the Metropolitan, and other Bishops should excommunicate such Princes, as would not purge their Countries of heresy, and afterwards also (if they remained obstinate) denounce them to the Pope, to the end he might absolve their subjects from their allegiance, and expose their States to be taken by Catholics, Constit. Freder. §. Si vero Dominus. the emperors Constitution maketh no mention of Excommunication, or Denunciation, as neither compatible with his temporal power, nor conform to the style of the Imperial laws, and therefore he saith only instead thereof, Post annum à tempore admonitionis elapsum, etc. After a year passed from the time of the admonition we do expose his land to be taken by Catholics, and in this only consisteth the difference of the Canon and Constitution, for in all other things they are all one. 35 Thus I said in my Supplement, and afterwards having accusion to satisfy an objection of Mr. Dunne, touching these words in the emperors law, Exponimus terras illius Catholicis occupandas, We expose his Lands to be taken by Catholics (which words Mr. Dunne urgeth to prove, that the Emperor took the authority out of the Pope's hands) upon this occasion, I say, I showed, that five several Popes, to wit, Honorius the third, Alexander the fourth, Innocentius the fourth, Vrbanus the fourth and Clement the fourth; knowing right well that the said Constitution of Fredricke might greatly avail, and help to purge the Empire of heresy (yea and ease them of the labour, envy and murmuration, which might be incident sometimes to the deposition of some Prince within the emperors Dominion) did ratify and confirm it no less, than his other laws made in favour of the Church, which they would never have done, if he had sought thereby to take any authority from the Sea Apostolic or to prejudice the Canon of the Council. Thus discoursed I in my Supplement. 36 Whereby it is clear, that this Law of the Emperor Frederick, was no way prejudicial to the Canon of the Council, but a notable confirmation of it, ordaining the like to be practised and executed in his Dominions in favour of the Church, to sh●w his obedience thereto, and to the Council of Lateran; and therefore whereas my Adversary Widdrington will needs persuade his Reader, that those general words, Dominus temporalis, Dominus principalis, & non habens Dominum principalem (which are used alike in the Canon, and in the emperors law) have like restriction in both, he showeth himself to be very absurd. For what can be more clear, then that all laws are limited, & c? 37 Hear you see Mr. Fitzherbert hath made a long discourse to prove, that this law of the Emperor Fredrick was no way preiuciall to the Canon of the Council of Lateran, but a notable confirmation thereof, which is nothing at all against me: For I never intended to deny, that this Constitution of Fredrick was against the Canon of the said Council, but I expressly affirmed, that it was the same law, and constitution containing the very same words with that of the Council, changing only spiritual punishments into temporal: and that therefore those words Dominus temporalis, Dominus principalis▪ a temporal and principal Landlord, Governor, or Lord, which are used alike in both Decrees, have though not equally, yet proportionally the like restriction, and limitation in both. For that which I affirm is, that this great, and famous Council of Lateran, where almost all the Ambassadors of Christian Kings, and Princes were present, did represent, as the Cardinal of Peron doth well observe, the whole Christian world, or Commonwealth, as well temporal as spiritual, and was, as it were a general Parliament of all Christendom, consisting both of temporal, and spiritual authority, of temporal Princes, and spiritual Pastors; and that all the laws and decrees, which were enacted therein concerning spiritual matters, as is the inflicting of spiritual Censures for what crime soever either spiritual, or temporal, did proceed merely from the authority of spiritual Pastors, and that all the laws, and decrees, which were enacted concerning temporal matters, as is this decree, whereof now we treat, concerning the inflicting of temporal punishments, for what cause, crime, or end soever they be inflicted, did proceed merely from the authority of Secular Princes, who are the head, and fountain of all temporal authority, and of all power to dispose of temporal matters: for that, as I have proved more at large in the first part of this Treatise by the testimony of many learned Catholics, the Ecclesiastical, or spiritual power, doth not by the institution of Christ extend to the inflicting of any temporal punishment, as death, exile, privation of goods, much less of Kingdoms, nay nor so much as imprisonment, but that when the Church, or spiritual Pastors do inflict such temporal punishments, it proceedeth from the positive grant, and privileges of temporal Princes. 38 And from this ground it evidently followeth, that not only in this Canon of the Council of Lateran concerning the temporal punishing of heretics, & their abetters, but also in all other Canons of Popes, or councils, when the inflicting of any temporal punishment is ordained, it is as probable that all the force, which they have to bind, doth proceed originally from the positive grant, consent, and authority of temporal Princes, as it is probable, that the spiritual power of the Church doth not by the institution of Christ extend to the inflicting of temporal, or civil punishments: and consequently, that temporal Princes are not by any general words included in such decrees, as being themselves supreme, and next under GOD in temporals, and not to be punished with temporal punishments, but by GOD alone. Wherefore, unless my Adversaries do first prove, (which in my judgement they will never be able to do) by some convincing argument, grounded upon the authority either of the Holy Scriptures, ancient Fathers, or some clear definition of the Church, that this doctrine, which denieth the Pope to have by the institution of Christ authority to depose Princes, and to inflict temporal punishments, is absurd, and not probable, they spend their time in vain, and beat about the bush to little purpose, whiles they bring never so many decrees, and canons of Popes or councils, wherein the inflicting of temporal punishments is ordained, for still the main question remaineth yet a foot, by what authority, to wit, temporal, or spiritual, those Canons, for as much as concerneth the inflicting of such temporal punishments, have force to bind; and the answer of Almain, and of many other Catholic Doctors will be still ready at hand, that the Pope by the institution of Christ hath only authority to inflict spiritual punishments, as Excommunication, Suspension, Interdict, and that the other punishments, which he useth, do proceed from the pure positive law, authority, grant, and privileges of temporal Princes, and that therefore the laws, or Canons of spiritual Pastors enacting them cannot bind, or comprehend temporal Princes themselves. 39 And by this the Reader may clearly see both the ground, and reason, from whence I deduced probably, that absolute Princes are not included under any general words whatsoever in penal laws, and canons of the Church, wherein temporal penalties are inflicted (for neither are they included, as you shall see beneath in the next Chap. in penal laws, wherein spiritual punishments are inflicted, under general words, or names, which denote titles of inferior degree, place, and dignity, as are Dominus temporalis, Dominus Principalis, a temporal, or principal Landlord, Governor, or also Lord, and such like) and also how weakly, not to use Mr. Fitzherbert's foul word, absurdly, he proveth, that I show myself to be very absurd in persuading the Reader, that those words, Dominus temporalis, Dominus principalis, a temporal, or principal Landlord, Governor, or Lord, which are used alike in the Canon, and in the emperors law, have like restriction, though not equally, yet proportionally in both. For what can be more clear, saith he, h p. 145. nu. 15 then that all Laws are limited according to the power of the Prince, who maketh them, and that therefore the obligation of every Prince's laws is extended only to his own subjects? whereupon it followeth necessarily, that albeit the Canons of General councils, being made in general terms, do comprehend all Christian men, as well absolute Princes as others (because they are all subject thereto) yet the Laws of temporal Princes being made in the like, or in the same general terms, can comprehend none but their own subjects: and this being so, what an absurd argument hath. Widdrington made, who because the words are all one in the Canon of the Council, and the Law of the Emperor, will restrain the sense of the Canon to the limits of the emperors temporal power, which could not exceed his own Dominion? 40 And therefore though the words, Dominus temporalis, or principalis, or non habens Dominum principalem, be general in his Law, yet they can be understood of none, but such as being his subjects, held their Lands, or states of him, or of some other in his Dominions (in which respect Kings, and other temporal Princes, which held not of the Empire, could not be comprehended therein) though the same general words in the Canon must needs comprehend, as well all Emperors, Kings, and absolute Princes, as other inferior Lords, because all of them being Domini temporales, are subject alike to the decrees of a general Council. 41 True it is, that nothing is more clear, then that all Laws are limited according to the power of the Prince that maketh them, and that therefore the obligation of every Prince's laws is extended only to his own subjects. Whereupon it followeth necessarily, that albeit the Canons of General councils, being made in general terms, may comprehend all Christian men, aswell absolute Princes, as others, forasmuch as concern spiritual matters, and the inflicting of spiritual punishments, because in these all Christians are subject thereto, yet considering that it is probable, that Christian Princes in temporal matters, and for as much as concerneth the inflicting of temporal punishments, are not subject to the spiritual power of the Church, it is also probable, that the Canons of Popes, or councils made in general terms concerning temporal affairs, as are the inflicting of temporal punishments, cannot comprehend temporal Princes, who in these are absolute, and supreme, and not subject to the spiritual power of the Church, which as I have showed before, doth extend to the inflicting only of spiritual punishments. Which being so, the Reader may clearly perceive, that the argument I brought from the emperors constitution is not absurd, but very probable, and that the absurdity, which his foul mouth so often casteth upon me, falleth upon himself. For that, which I in bringing that argument intended to affirm, was this, that for the same reason, for which those general words, Dominus temporalis, Dominus principalis, or non habeus Dominum principalem did not in the decree of Fredrick comprehend either himself, who was not subject to his own law at leastwise as it is coercive, or absolute Princes, for that they were not subject to him at all, the same general words in the Canon of the Council, for as much as concerneth the inflicting of temporal punishments, do not comprehend absolute Princes, for that they are subject to the authority of the Church only in Spiritual matters, and not in temporal, as are the inflicting of temporal punishments. 42 Wherefore I do not restrain the sense of the Canon to the limits of the emperors temporal power, as Mr. Fitzherbert very grossly imposeth upon me, but I restrain the sense of the Canon thus, that if all Christian Princes had made the like law, and in the same form of words, as Frederick did, than I say, that all these laws had been a clear confirmation of the sense and meaning of the Canon of the aforesaid Council, and that those general words, Dominus temporalis, Dominus principalis, and non habens Dominum principalem in all these laws together made by all Christian Princes, had signified the self same persons, and no others, than now they signify in the decree of the Council. For that, which I contend, is, that it is probable, that this Canon, forasmuch as concerneth the inflicting of temporal punishments, was made by the Council, not as it had spiritual, but only as it had temporal authority, or, which is all one, not by virtue of the spiritual power of the Church, but by the authority, and consent of all temporal Princes, whose Ambassadors were present thereat, because it is probable, as I have showed above out of many learned Catholics, that the spiritual power of the Church doth not extend to the inflicting of temporal punishments, but only of spiritual. Whereby it is evident, that albeit Emperors, Kings, and all other absolute Princes, and inferior Lords are subject alike to the decrees of General councils, yea and of Provincial councils held in their own kingdoms in matters spiritual, yet they are not subject alike to the Decrees of general councils, wherein temporal matters, as are the inflicting of temporal punishments, are decreed, for that these decrees are made by the authority, and consent of absolute Princes, to whom only all other inferior persons are subject in temporal affairs. And hereby all that, which Mr. Fitzherbert addeth in the rest of this Chapter is already satisfied. 43 So as you see, saith he, i p. 146. nu. 17. what probable arguments Widdrington giveth us, whiles nevertheless nothing will satisfy him from us, but demonstrations: and therefore whereas I signified all this in effect in my Supplement, he taketh no formal notice of it, but only as it were glanceth at it in a word, or two, saying, as you have heard before, Dicere Imperatorem, etc. To say, that the Emperor did not include Kings in those words of his law, and that the Pope did mean to do it in the Canon, is to say so, but not to demonstrate. So he; requiring, as you see, a demonstration of this point, and craftily concealing, and dissembling the reason that I gave for my assertion, in my Supplement, as if I had given none at all, but only had barely said, that Dominus temporalis in the emperors law, is not to be understood of Kings, as it is to be taken in the Canon; whereas, you see, the reasons, which I have given of the difference of the one, and the other (being grounded upon the different power of the General Council, and the Emperor) is so pregnant, and clear, that it may serve for a demonstration to any Catholic man of judgement. 44 For I think it is not more clear to any such, that two and two make four, then that Dominus temporalis is a general term, including absolute Princes, as well as other Lords, and that they are included in those words of the Canon, because they being members of Christ's Church, are as subject to a general Council, as the meanest temporal Lord in Christendom: As also it is no less clear, that Dominus temporalis, in the emperors constitution can be extended no further then to such temporal Lords as were some way subject to him, which my Adversary himself acknowledgeth, albeit he absurdly denieth, that the same words in the Canon are to be understood of Kings. 45 But first, whether my arguments and answers be probable or no, and whether that foul aspersion of absurdity, wherewith Mr. Fitzherbert so often chargeth me, doth fall upon his own arguments, and answers, or upon mine, I must remit to the judgement of the learned Reader. Secondly, no learned man can deny, but that to prove any doctrine to be certain, and of faith, it is necessary to bring demonstrations, and convincing proofs, and that to prove any doctrine to be probable, and the contrary not to be certain, nor of faith, it sufficeth to bring only probable arguments, and answers: and therefore it is no marvel, that I expect at my adversaries hands clear demonstrations, and invincible proofs, seeing that they take upon them to prove their doctrine to be certain, and of faith, whereas it sufficeth for me that only take upon me at this time to show their doctrine not to be certain, and of faith, to bring probable arguments, and answers. 46 Thirdly, it is not true, that I have craftily concealed and dissembled the reason, that he gave in his Supplement, why the words Dominus temporalis, should in the Canon of the Council comprehend absolute Princes, and not in the emperors constitution. For all that he laboureth, as you have seen, to prove in his Supplement, is that the emperors constitution is no way prejudicial to the Canon of the Council, but a clear confirmation thereof, which I never denied, and that the emperors law could extend no further then to his own subjects, and that the Emperor himself, and all Sovereign Princes, are under the jurisdiction of a general Council, and subject to her decrees, whereof also no man maketh doubt, if those decrees concern spiritual affairs, but if they concern mere temporal matters, wherein temporal Princes are supreme, and not subject to the jurisdiction of the Church, as are the inflicting of temporal punishments, for what cause, crime, or end soever they be inflicted, the whole drift of my apology was to prove it to be probable, that the spiritual authority and jurisdiction of the Church doth not extend to the inflicting of temporal punishments, for any cause, crime, or end whatsoever, and consequently that the inflicting of such temporal punishments, although it be for a spiritual end, is a mere temporal matter, wherein temporal Princes are supreme, and subject to none but God. Which being so, I had no reason to take any formal notice in that brief Admonition of all the idle discourses he made in his Supplement, and which either were nothing at all against me, or might easily be satisfied by that I had said before in my Apology. But Mr. Fitzherbert doth shamefully corrupt my words, and meaning, and foully abuse me, and his Reader, in affirming, as you have seen, that I do restrain the sense of the Canon to the limits of the emperors temporal power, which could not exceed his own dominion, whereas I made no such restraint, but extended the sense of the Canon, to the Dominions of all Christian Princes, by whose consent and authority that Canon, for as much as it concerneth the inflicting of temporal punishments, was made, and had force to bind. 47 Neither, as I said, doth the reason which Mr. Fitzherbert bringeth concerning the distinction of the Canon, and of the emperors decree in extension, any way impugn, but confirm the argument I brought from the emperors law, because or the same reason which Mr. Fitzherbert allegeth, why those general words Dominus temporalis, or principalis, cannot in the emperors decree comprehend absolute Princes, for that they are not subject to him in temporals, I also affirm, that the same general words cannot in the Canon comprehend absolute Princes, for that they are not subject to the Pope, or Church in temporals, as is the inflicting of temporal punishments, to which, as I have often said, the spiritual power of the Church doth not extend. And if my Adversary cannot bring more clear and pregnant demonstrations than these to confirm his new Catholic faith, he need not to waste any more time and labour, in producing such clear and pregnant demonstrations, which every Catholic man of judgement may clearly see to be apparent sophisms, and that notwithstanding all his vain brags of his clear and pregnant demonstrations, and of my absurd arguments and answers so often repeated by him, in the end the Reader will see, that Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus. 48 And although it be clear enough that Dominus temporalis is a general term including absolute Princes as well as other Lords, yea, and Masters; yet because it is clear that Dominus temporalis is not a proper term or title belonging to absolute Princes, but common to all others of inferior degree, if any man should speak of them, and give them only the titles of their Mastership's, Worships, or Lordships, he would both be accounted a rude and unmannerly companion, and also he should wrong those persons, in giving them only those titles of worship or honour, which are common to other persons of inferior rank; neither he that should only use such inferior titles, would be thought to speak of absolute Princes, unless some other circumstance should enforce us to think the same. And although it be also clear, that absolute Princes are subject no less than the meanest Lord in Christendom, to the decrees of a general Council, which concern spiritual matters, yet because in mere temporal matters they are supreme, and therein not subject to any decree of Pope, or Council & it is also probable, that the inflicting of temporal punishments is a mere temporal matter, and not belonging to the spiritual power of the Church, it is also probable, and no way absurd, to say that Dominus temporalis in the Canon of the Council, wherein the inflicting of temporal punishments is decreed, is not to be understood of absolute Princes, for the same reason that in the emperors constitution, it is not extended to them, but to such only as were subject to him in temporals. 49 But perhaps Widdrington will say, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, k Pag. 147. num. 19 that he hath added another reason to fortify the same, which was (as you have heard before) that Kings, and absolute Princes, are not included in penal laws, except they be specified therein by the names of Princes for so indeed he saith, inserting the same cunningly into his inference, to make his argument (grounded on the emperors law) to seem the more probable; and therefore having said that the Emperor could not understand either himself, or other absolute Princes, by the name of one who hath no principal Lord, he concludeth, ex quo probabiliter collegi, etc. Whereupon I gathered probably, that those words, Non habens Dominum principalem, not having a principal Landlord, or Lord, could not comprehend absolute Princes, who are not to be understood as included in penal laws, except they be namely expressed. Thus he sliding subtly as you see, from the emperors law, and the reason grounded thereon, to the privileges of Princes, which belongeth to another question, and shall be fully debated, and cleared, as I hope in the next Chapter: And in the mean time I conclude for the present, that in all this he hath showed himself very absurd, and that my cold answer, as he termeth it, would have been hot enough to dissolve his frozen and frivolous argument, if he had not wholly dissembled the force and substance of my discourse in my Supplement concerning this point. 50 It is very true, that I have in that brief Admonition also another reason, why absolute Princes are not included in the Canon of the Council under those general names, Dominus temporalis, Dominus principalis, or such like, to wit, for that in penal laws they are not comprehended under such general terms, which denote titles of inferior degree and dignity: and in bringing this reason I used no craft or cunning, but meant plainly and sincerely, neither did I intend to slide cunningly and subtilely, as Mr. Fitzherbert would guilefully persuade his Reader, from the emperors law, and reason grounded thereon, to this reason: for that the reason why in the emperors law absolute Princes are not comprehended under those general names of Dominus temporalis, Dominus principalis, is the chief and principal ground I stand upon, why they are not also included under those general words in the Canon of the Council, as you have seen before. Nevertheless there is this difference betwixt these two reasons, that this later reason, whereof we shall treat more at large in the next Chapter, only showeth, why absolute Princes are not in penal laws of the Church compreheded under such general words, which denote names, and titles of inferior place and dignity, but the first reason grounded upon the emperors law, doth also prove that absolute Princes cannot, under any general terms whatsoever, be included in any Canons of Popes or councils, wherein the inflicting of temporal punishments is decreed: For to deny, that absolute Princes are not under any general words comprehended in such Decrees, is no more absurd, then to deny, that the spiritual power of the Church doth not extend to the inflicting of temporal punishments, which doctrine for that my Adversary will never be able to prove absurd, he might well have spared to use such absurd terms, wherewith he doth so often defile his religious mouth, and which, as you have seen, do more fitly agree to his own arguments and answers, and to the whole discourse he hath made in his Supplement concerning this point, if he thereby intent to confute the aforesaid answer I gave to the decree of the Council, and the reason thereof grounded upon the like decree of the Emperor. CHAP. X. Wherein widdrington's second answer to the Decree of the Lateran Council, affirming that absolute Princes are not comprehended therein, because they are not mentioned by their proper names, but by inferior titles, is proved to be neither improbable nor absurd, but conform to the doctrine of learned Divines and Lawyers, and Mr. fitzherbert's exceptions against the said answer are showed to be very insufficient and fraudulent. 1 YOu have seen, Courteous Reader, how weakly Mr. Fitzherbert hath in the former Chapter impugned the answer I gave to the decree of the Lateran Council, and the reason thereof grounded upon the like Constitution of the Emperor Fredricke; now you shall see, how insufficiently also he impugneth in this Chapter the other reason, which I brought to prove, that those general words, Dominus temporalis, Dominus principalis, a temporal, or principal Landlord, Governor, or also Lord, do not in the Canon of the Council comprehend absolute Princes. Thus therefore he beginneth this Chapter. 2 You have heard in the last Chapter, how my Adversary Widdrington teacheth, that the Canon of the Council of Lateran concerning the deposition of temporal Lords, doth not comprehend Kings, and absolute Princes, because they are not namely specified therein, Qui, saith he, nisi nominatim exprimantur in legibus paenalibus intelligendi non sunt; Who are not to be understood as included in penal laws, except they be expressed by name. So he, which he also more amply affirmeth in the Preface to his Apologetical answer (whereto he remitteth me, and his Readers) for there he seemeth to ground his opinion in this point, Widdrington Apolog. Respons. Praefat. nu. 44. upon the rules of the laws, saying, that Secular Princes are not signified in penal Laws, under the general names of Lords, Magistrates, and temporal judges, juxta regulas jurisprudentium, according to the rules of the Lawyers: whereto he addeth also for examples sake, that an Abbot is not comprehended in the penal Laws under the name of a Monk, nor a Bishop under the name of a Priest, nor the Pope under the name of a Bishop, because, saith he, in paenis benignior pars est eligenda, & odia restringi, favours convenit ampliari, The more benign or mild part is to be chosen in penalties, and it is convenient that odious things be restrained, and favours amplified or enlarged, So he. 3 Whereto I answer, that whereas he saith, that Princes are not comprehended in penal Laws except they be specified by the name of Princes, I say first, that if this were true, this absurdity would follow thereof, that absolute Princes should be exempted from divers Laws and Canons, wherein all the world hath hitherto held them to be included, as from the Canon of the Council of Lateran, ordaining, that Omnis utriusque sexus fidelis, etc. Concil. Later. 4. can. 21. Every Christian of both sexes shall confess, and communicate at Easter, upon pain of Excommunication, and want of Christian burial; as also from the Bulla in caena Domini, and from the Canon, Si quis suadente, Cans. 17. q. 4. forbidding the laying of violent hands upon Cleargie-men, and divers other general constitutions, from the which they were never yet exempted in the opinion of any man. But if Mr. Fitzherbert had not meant to cavil, and to take every idle occasion to carp at my words without cause, he might easily have seen by those words of mine, which here he citeth out of my Apologetical Preface, and to which in my Admonition I remitted the Reader, that when I affirmed, that absolute Princes are not understood to be comprehended in penal laws, unless they be expressed by name, my meaning was, that they are not understood to be comprehended in penal laws under those general names of Dominus temporalis, Dominus principalis, of Lords, Magistrates, judges, Landlords, and such like general names, which denote some inferior office, dignity, or honour, but they must be expressed by the names of the honour and dignity, which are proper to them, as an Abbot is not comprehended under the name of a Monk, nor a Bishop under the name of a Priest, nor the Pope under the name of a Bishop. For to affirm that absolute Princes, as likewise Abbots and Bishops, are not comprehended in penal laws enacted by the Church, under no general names, although they denote no peculiar office, honour, dignity, or function, by which some persons are distinguished from others, had been indeed somewhat absurd. And so these Canons here alleged by Mr. Fitzherbert. Omnis utriusque sexus, etc. Si quis suadente diabolo, etc. and out of the Bull in caena Domini, or such like are nothing to the purpose, for that they are not such general names, which denote any peculiar office, honour, dignity or function, by which some men are distinguished from others, and therefore this my adversaries first Answer is nothing at all against my doctrine. 5 Secondly, I say, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, a Pag. 150. nu. 3. that Widdrington might have done well to have told us, or at least quoted in his margin (as he doth not) in what Lawyers we may find that privilege or exemption of Princes whereof he speaketh; for sure I am, that they who writ of Princes make no mention thereof, as may be seen in Restaurus Castaldus, Restaur. Castald. q. 110. de Imper. who setteth down above a hundred privileges of the Emperor, and yet doth not mention any such. 6 But first the Reader may easily perceive, that the reason which I brought, why absolute Princes are not in penal laws, and odious matters comprehended under the general names, of temporal Landlords, Governors, judges, Lords, or such like, was not grounded upon any peculiar privilege proper to absolute Princes, for the like I affirmed of a Bishop and an Abbot, but upon the known rules of the law which there I cited, and upon the authority of learned Lawyers: and therefore Mr. Fitzherbert might have saved his labour in seeking out of Restaurus Castaldus, or others any such privilege peculiar to absolute Princes. Neither also did I affirm, that all Lawyers are of opinion, that in penal laws, and odious matters an Abbot is not comprehended under the name of a Monk, nor a Bishop under the name of a Priest or Clerk, nor an absolute Prince under the name of a temporal Landlord, Governor, judge, or Lord, but that some Lawyers are of this opinion: and this is enough to prove it to be probable, that in the Canon of the Lateran Council, Emperors, Kings, and absolute Princes are not comprehended under those general words of a temporal or principal Landlord, Governor, judge, or Lord. Wherefore although the opinion of Hostiensis (of whom I will speak beneath) or of any other Lawyer, or Divine whatsoever be expressly against this doctrine, it is nothing to the purpose, except it be also against the opinion of all Lawyers and Divines. 7 Secondly therefore, that M. Fitzherbert may also see, that I have not invented this doctrine of my own head, I will now for proof of the same relate some Catholic Authors, whom then I omitted to rehearse, for that I thought it so manifest, that no man of any reading would make doubt thereof. An Abbot, saith Bartholomaeus Fumus in his Armilla aurea, Armilla verbo Abbas nu. 11. in an odious matter is not comprehended by the name of Monks, although he be in a favourable matter, according to the Doctors in cap. Armilla verbo Clericus. nu. 2. finali de Simonia. And again, by the name of clerk, saith he, in a favourable matter are understood all that have any Clearkely dignity, but in an odious matter under the name of a Clerk are not comprehended Bishops, no Canons, nor others placed in dignity, nor Monks, nor Religious men that are exempted. Vide Panormit. in cap. bonae memoriae de postulat. Praelatorum. Armilla verbo. Sacerdos. nu. 1 And again, by the name of a Priest, saith he, in a favourable matter are understood not only Prasbyters, but also Deacons and Subdeacons', but in an odious matter only Presbyters, and not therefore Bishops are to be understood; arg. cap. si quisque de cohab. Cleric. & mulierum, where Panormitan observeth the same. Thus writeth Armilla. Felinus cap. vlt. de Simonia. 8 The like hath Felinus cap. vlt. de Simonia §. prima conclusio. By the name of Monks, saith he, Abbots are understood in a favourable matter, but this conclusion is not true in an odious matter; and for the same he citeth Panormitan, Pope Innocent, and others. And a little before out of divers texts of the Canon Law he deduceth this general rule, Quoties species aliquid addit generi, nunquam appellatione generis venit species. Whensoever the particular doth add something to the general, the particular is not to be comprehended under the name of the general, which is the same in sense with that rule, which he afterwards relateth out of Antonius de Butrio, that in penal things the mixed, or compound, is not comprehended under the simple; which rules Felinus limiteth thus, unless the punishment, or odious matter doth tend principally to favour the soul, but how to know this for certain, it is very heard, as you shall see beneath. Sayrus tom. 1. lib. 3. cap. 33. 9 The like teacheth our learned Countryman, Gregorius Sayrus expounding the Canon, periculosa. Ne Clerici, vel Monachi lib. 6. Wherein are excommunicated all Religious men, who go to any Schools of learning, unless they have first licence granted them by their Prelate with the advise of the greater part of the Convent. An Abbot, saith he, going to Schools without the licence of his Superior, and Convent, doth not incur this punishment, according to Archidiaconus, Geminianus, Angelus, Antoninus, and Navarrus in the places above cited, because it is a penal constitution, and therefore rather to be restrained, then extended. The same hath Navarre upon cap. finali de Simonia. From the aforesaid it is also, saith he, inferred, that the disposition, Navar. tom. 2. Comment. in cap. finali. de Simonia nu. 5. or constitution, which speaketh of a Monk, doth not comprehend an Abbot if the matter be not favourable, as Doctors here upon this Canon do seem to be of opinion. 10 And Sylvester treating of the Canon in Clement. unica de usuris, wherein are excommunicated, quicunque communitatum ipsarum Potestates, Capitanei, Rectores, etc. All Potestaes of Communities themselves, Captains, Rectours, or Governors, Consuls, judges, Counsellors, or any other Official, or Officer, who do make, writ, or dictate Constitutions, that usurers are to be paid, or being paid are not to be restored, silvest verbo. Excommunicatio 19 nu. 82. §. quadragessima tertia. etc. affirmeth, that because this is a penal constitution, consequently it is not extended to persons, that are not expressed, or which is all one, expressly named therein; and he proveth this by that rule of the Law, in Sexto, In penalties the milder part is to be chosen. Moreover Pope Innocent the third himself, under whom this Council of Lateran was held, In can. Sedes Apostolica de Rescriptis. doth expressly decree, that when in his Commissions, persons of less worth, & more base are only signified, persons of greater worth, and dignity are not understood to be included in a general clause. Now what man of judgement can make any doubt, but that Dominus temporalis, is a person of less worth, honour, and dignity, then Dominus principalis, who in the Canon is distinguished from Dominus temporalis, and both of them are persons of less worth, honour, and authority, then are Domini supremi, as are Emperors, Kings, and absolute Princes. And therefore these general words, Dominus temporalis, Dominus principalis, being names of less worth and dignity, then are Domini supremi, must not according to Pope Innocent his own rule, comprehend Emperors, Kings, and absolute Princes, who are the most worthy, most noble, and most principal Lords, and persons upon earth. 11 But we will conclude this point with so plain and manifest an authority, that my Adversary both in respect of the Author, and also of his words being so clear, can take against it no colourable exception. Lastly therefore, Andreas Dwallius, a famous Doctor of Paris, and at this present the King's Public professor of Divinity, and also a man otherwise much favouring the Pope's temporal authority over absolute Princes, Andr. Dwal. de suprema Rom Pont. in Ecclesiam potestate. part. 2. q. 4. p. 264. and his spiritual authority over a general Council, contrary to the custom of that renowned University, writeth thus: Notum est nomine Clericorum, etc. It is manifest, that in an odious matter Bishops are not comprehended under the name of Clerks, nor sometimes in the same matter Religious men under the name of Monks, neque similiter nomine Dominorum Reges, nor likewise Kings under the name of Landlords, Governors, or Lords, in regard of the height, and Majesty of Kingly dignity. I will say more, that perchance in an odious matter the King of France in regard of the singular prerogatives, wherein he excelleth other Kings, is not comprehended under the name of Kings. Thus D. Dwal. 12 And by this the judicious Reader may clearly perceive both what censure my ignorant Adversary deserveth both in branding this doctrine with the temerarious note of absurdity, and also that from hence it followeth evidently, that the answer, which I gave to the decree of the Laeteran Council is not absurd or improbable; For all this may be not only a probable persuasion, but also a manifest demonstration to any Catholic man of judgement, that in the foresaid Canon, wherein temporal penalties are inflicted, Emperors, Kings, and absolute Princes, are not included in those general names of Dominus temporalis, and Dominus principalis, a temporal and principal Landlord, Governor, or Lord, which denote titles of honour, office, or dignity, far inferior to the height, and Majesty of Kingly Soveraingtie, and that therefore no convincing, or demonstrative argument can be brought from this Canon, to prove that the Pope hath authority to depose absolute Princes, who according to the doctrine of so many learned men, and also the decree of Pope Innocent himself, are not in penal laws, and odious matters comprehended under general words, which denote titles of inferior worth, honour, or dignity. Wherefore although it be needless, the premises considered, to make any further answer to the rest of my adversaries discourse in this Chapter, yet for better satisfaction of the studious Reader, I will set down, what weak objections he continueth still to urge. 13 Besides that, saith Mr. Fitzher. b Pag. 150. nu. 3. 4. I find the opinion of Lawyers expressly contrary thereto. For whereas the famous Canonist, and Card. Hostiensis (who wrote above 300. years ago) saith, that Deponitur haereticus, etc. Hostiens. in Sum. tit. de haereticis §. qua paena. nu. 9 an heretic is deposed from all dignity, whether he be a Clerk, or a Layman, Pope, Emperor, or any inferior: he allegeth for the same three Laws, whereof the second, and the third do directly prove our intent. For the second is an ancient Decree of Liberius the Pope, wherein he ordained, that, 24. q. 1. Qui contra Ecclesiae pacem. Qui contra Ecclesiae pacem sunt, etc. They who are against the peace of the Church, if they have any dignity, or the military girdle, let them be deprived of it; if they be private men, and yet nobly borne, let them forfeit all their substance, or goods, but if they be ignoble, or base people, let them be not only whipped, but also banished: which I wish my Adversary Widdrington well to note for two respects, the one, for albeit he seemeth to admit the authority of the Ecclesiastical Canons, yet he denieth often, as you have heard, that the Church can inflict any corporal and temporal punishment, which he may see was ordained by this ancient Decree, admitted, and set down in the body of the Canon law, besides many other clear Canons and Decrees to the same purpose. The other, because he saith that Princes are not included in penal laws, if they be not specified by the name of Princes, whereas nevertheless he may see, that this ancient Canonist Hostiensis includeth them in this Decree, though the terms thereof are very general, without any particular mention of Princes. 14 But first, what Cardinal Hostiensis, a man wholly addicted to the advancing of the Pope's temporal Monarchy, and his authority in temporals over absolute Princes, not only indirectly, but also directly, or any other Canonist, Civil Lawyer, or Divine affirmeth concerning this point, is little to our purpose, considering that other Divines and Lawyers are contrary to him herein. And therefore it is not sufficient for Mr. Fitzherbert to bring the testimony only of Hostiensis, or of many other Doctors joined together with him, to prove my aforesaid doctrine to be improbable, but it is necessary for him to bring convincing proofs, and he must also show, that no other approved Authors moved with probable grounds, do maintain the same. 15 Secondly, observe, good Reader, what kind of convincing proofs this man bringeth out of Hostiensis, and how grossly thou art abused through the manifest fraud, or ignorance of this my unlearned Adversary. For first this Decree of Pope Liberius, admitted, as he saith, and set down in the body of the Canon law, is not authentical, but of a suspected credit, whereof also Mr. Fitzherbert could not have been ignorant, if he had read in the councils set out by Binnius the whole Decree, which is taken out of a Decretal Epistle, which is pretended to have been written by Pope Liberius to S. Athanasius, which Epistle Binnius himself calleth in question. The Consuls, saith Binnius, Binnius tom. 1 Concil. pag 470 in fine Epistolae 13. Liberij. which are added to this Epistle, to wit, Asclepius, and Deodatus, do show it to be of a suspected credit, for I could never find their names to be in oath r places subscribed to deeds, writings, or Calendar books. 16 Secondly, if Mr. Fitzherbert had related the words immediately going before that, which here he citeth out of the Canon, and wisheth me to note well for two respects, the Reader would presently have perceived his fraud, or ignorance, and that from this Canon no argument at all can be brought to prove, that the Pope hath authority to inflict temporal penalties, but rather that temporal Kings have authority to inflict spiritual punishments. For the entire words of this Canon, as it is set down by Binnius, are these: Binnius ubi supra. Whosoever shall presume to transgress these things, first let them be subject to the terrible judgement of Almighty God, Deinde autem qualem cunque Regalem indignationem revereantur, per quam si Episcopi, etc. and afterwards let them reverence or fear all Regal indignation, by which if they be Bishops, or Clergy men let them fall, or be deprived, wholly from the order of their Priesthood, or Clergy, but if they be Monks, let them be separated from their places; but if they be in dignity, or have the military girdle, let them be deprived thereof, but if they be private men, yet noble, let them forfeit all their substance, or goods; but if they be ignoble, let them not only be whipped, but also perpetually banished, that all men being repressed by the fear of God, and fearing deserved punishments threatened against them, may keep immovable, and without perturbation the peace of the holy Churches of God. Given the eight Calends of june, Asclepius, and Deodatus most excellent men being Consuls. 17 Now what will Mr. Fitzherbert say to this ancient decree of Pope Liberius, which he wisheth me well to note, wherein it is decreed, that Bishops, if they perturb the peace of the Church, shall be deprived of their Priesthood by Regal or Kingly indignation? For that secular men being placed in dignity, may be deprived of their honour and dignity, and if they be private men, yet noble, may forfeit all their goods, and if they be ignoble, may be whipped, or perpetually banished by Regal or Kingly power, or indignation, which this Canon also, of what credit soever it be, doth ordain, is not any way repugnant to my doctrine. Thus thou seest, good Reader, how grossly thou art abused through the fraud or ignorance of this unlearned man, who nevertheless presumeth to direct thy soul, and conscience in this so high and dangerous a point of thy allegiance due to God and man, wherein he clearly showeth himself to have so little skill. 18 Thirdly, in what sense I affirmed that Kings and absolute Princes are not included in penal laws under general words, unless they be expressed by name; for which respect also Mr. Fitzherbert wisheth me to note well this Canon of Pope Liberius, I have declared before, to wit, that they are not in such laws comprehended under general words, which denote some inferior office or title of honour for I never intended to deny, as this man imposeth upon me, that they are not included in any general words, except they be specified by the name of Princes, if such general words denote no inferior office, or title of honour. So that neither Hostiensis, for as much as concerneth this Canon of Liberius, contradicteth my doctrine, because those general words, Qui contra pacem Ecclesiae, They who are against the peace of the Church, do denote no inferior office, or title of honour, and although he were against my doctrine, it is too little to the purpose, seeing that other Lawyers and Divines do contradict him herein, and moreover this Canon cited by Hostiensis, is neither authentical, and of sufficient credit, nor any way gaine-saith that, which I affirm concerning this point. Pag. 151. nu. 5. 19 Now you shall see the third testimony, which Mr. Fitzherbert bringeth out of Hostiensis. And this, saith he, ᶜ will be much more clear by the third testimony, cited out of the Canon law by Hostiensis, which he taketh out of the title de haereticia, Decret. lib. 5. tit. 7. de Haretices. wherein there is no particular mention of absolute Princes, by the name of Princes. neither is there in any other Decree concerning their deposition but only this Canon of the Council of Lateran now in question: so as Widdrington may see, not only that Kings, and absolute Princes have no such exemption from penal Laws, as he pretendeth, but also that they are included in the general terms oven of this Canon of the Council of Lateran, in the opinion of a famous Canonist, who wrote not passed fifty years after the said Council. And if he say that they have had this exemption, or privilege since that time, let him show us when, and where they had it, which I am sure he cannot do, as it may appear by the Canonists, who comprehend absolute Princes in other penal laws, wherein they are not otherwise mentioned then in general terms, as he may see in Simanca, in his Institutions, d Tit. 23. and Emericus in his third part of the Directory, e Q. 31. and Penna in his Annotations upon the f Annot. 96. same. 20 But first it is untrue, that in the whole title dehaereticis, there is not any other Canon, or decree concerning the deposition of Princes, except this Decree of the Lateran Council, if we once suppose, as Hostiensis doth suppose, that the Pope by the institution of Christ hath authority to depose temporal Princes, and to inflict temporal punishments: for this once supposed, they may very well be included in the last Canon of this title De haereticis, wherein Pope Gregory the ninth doth Decree and declare, that whosoever are bound, or obliged to manifest heretics by any covenant strengthened with never so great security are absolved from the bond of all allegiance, homage, and obedience: for in those words, whosoever, and manifest heretics, and such like general terms, which denote no title of office, honour or dignity inferior to Kingly majesty, all men whatsoever, even Kings and absolute Princes may be included, if it be once granted, that the Pope hath power to depose absolute Princes. But because it is probable, as I have proved at large above in this Treatise, that the Pope by the institution of Christ, hath no authority to depose temporal Princes, or to inflict temporal punishments, it consequently followeth, that it is also probable, that neither the aforesaid Canon Absolutos, nor any other Canon made in such general words, wherein temporal punishments are inflicted, can comprehend absolute Princes, but that all such like Canons are made either by the Pope, as he is a temporal Prince, and consequently are of force only in the territories of the Church, or the Pope's temporal dominions, or else that they are made by the consent of temporal Princes, and have their force to bind from their authority, and consequently do concern only inferior persons, or subjects, and not absolute Princes themselves, who are free from the coercive power of those laws, which are made by their own authority. 21 So that although I will not now contend, neither do I much regard of what opinion Hostiensis be concerning the sense and meaning of this Canon of the Lateran Council, yet it is plain, that Mr. Fitzherbert hath not hitherto proved out of Hostiensis, as he pretended to prove, that absolute Princes are comprehended in the penal laws of the Church, under such general names, which denote some office, honour, dignity, or title inferior to Kingly Majesty. Neither doth Simancas, Emericus, or Pegna in the places cited by my Adversary teach contrary to my doctrine in this point, to wit, that in penal laws, and odious matters Abbots are understood by the general name of Monks, Bishops, by the general name of Priests, and Emperors, Kings, and absolute Princes by the general name of Dominus temporalis, a temporal Landlord, Governor, or Lord. 22 For Simancas in the 23. title cited by my Adversary nu. 10. doth clearly distinguish betwixt Dominos temporales, and Reges, temporal Lords, and Kings: and nu. 11. he proveth, that heretical Kings and Princes are forthwith deposed, and their subjects absolved from their allegiance, by the aforesaid Canon Absolutos of Gregory the ninth, which, as I said, is a sufficient proof, supposing, as he doth, that the Pope hath authority to depose temporal Princes, and to absolve subjects from their temporal allegiance, but because this supposition of his is not certain, his proof grounded thereon cannot be certain. And Emericus in the 31. question cited by my Adversary, to prove, that the inquisitors have authority to proceed against Kings, bringeth only the authority of Pope Clement the 4. and Vrbanus the 4. and those general words contained in their Breves, of what condition, dignity, or degree soever they be; and the same only confirmeth Pegna in his Commentary upon that question, which doth not contradict my doctrine, for I never denied, that in penal laws, absolute Princes may not be comprehended under such general words, supposing, as they suppose, which I deny, that the Pope by his spiritual authority may inflict temporal punishments. 23 But secondly and principally, albeit these Doctors should, as in the places cited by my Adversary they do not, contradict my doctrine in this point concerning the not comprehending of Abbots under the general name of Monks, Bishops of Priests, and absolute Princes under general names of temporal Lords, Governors, Potestaes, and such like, yet it were little to the purpose, seeing that other learned Lawyers, and Divines, as I have showed before, do agree with me in this point. And therefore to prove my doctrine in this point to be absurd and improbable, as this man after his vain glorious bragging fashion boasteth it to be, it is not sufficient, (as I said, and this I wish him to note well) to bring the authority of one, two, twenty, yea a hundred Lawyers, or Divines, if other learned Lawyers, and Divines, although the far fewer in number, do contradict them therein. 24 Now let us proceed to the rest of Mr. fitzherbert's discourse. And whereas, saith he, g p. 151. nu. 6. Widdrington seemeth also to ground this his devise upon two rules of the law, to wit, that in penal Laws the milder, or more favourable part is to be chosen; and that odious things are to be restrained, and favours amplified, the same is commonly true, when the text of the Law is so obscure, or the case so doubtful, that two, or more opinions may be probably gathered thereof touching the quantity, or quality of the pain, and how far, and to whom the same is to be extended; for in these cases of debt, or such like, the more favourable, or less rigorous opinion is to be followed; but in this Canon, both the words, and sense are so clear, that hitherto no doubt hath been made amongst the Canonists, whether Kings, or absolute Princes are comprehended therein. 25 It is very true, that my aforesaid answer, to wit, that in penal laws, and odious matters, an Abbot is not included in the general name of a Monk, nor a Bishop in the general name of a Priest or Clerk, nor a King in the general name of a temporal Landlord, Governor, or Lord, or the like; I did partly ground upon those rules of the law, and partly upon the authority of learned Lawyers, and Divines, who, as you have seen, do confirm the same; and therefore the words, and sense of this Canon are not so clear, but that those Authors will consequently deny, that Emperors, Kings, and absolute Princes are not in this Canon comprehended, under those general words, of a temporal, or principal Landlord, Governor, or Lord, as neither an Abbot is, according to them, in penal laws, and odious matters comprehended under the general name of a Monk, nor a Bishop under the general name of a Priest, or Clerk, nor a King under the general name, of a Landlord, Governor, or also Lord. And if the words, and sense of this Canon be so clear, as this man would make it to be, I wonder, that neither Cardinal Bellarmine in his Controversies, nor Molina, nor Corduba, nor Victoria, nor D. Sanders, nor Azor, vehement defenders of the Pope's authority to depose absolute Princes, could not see the clear sense of this Canon, whereof they could not be ignorant, thereby to confirm their doctrine, by a manifest decree of a general Council, without flying to the particular facts of Popes oftentimes deposing Kings, and Emperors, which all learned men know to be no good argument to prove, that the Pope hath true right, and authority so to do. 26 Besides that, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, h pag. 152. these rules have many exceptions, which are very considerable, and have place in this case. For first, whereas all the obscurity that can be imagined in this Canon, and case, is in the general words, Dominus temporalis, and non habens Dominum principalem, the Lawyers teach us, that verba generalia non dicuntur obscura, general words are not said to be obscure. And the Lawyers also teach, that in penal laws, and odious matters, such general words, as denote some inferior dignity, order, title, office, or function, as a temporal, or principal Lord, Governor, judge; or Landlord, a Monk; a Clerk, and a Priest, are obscure, and are not understood to comprehend absolute Princes, Abbots, or Bishops. 27 Secondly, this rule of restriction, saith he, is not to be understood quantum ad vim verborum, of the force of the words, and therefore the Lawyers also teach, that penalties are to be extended as far, as the propriety of the words do permit. And the Lawyers also teach us, that in penal laws, and odious matters, such general words, as denote some inferior title, dignity, office, order, or function, are not to be extended as far as the priorietie of the words do permit: and that therefore an Abbot is not comprehended under the general name of a Monk, nor a Bishop under the general name of a Priest, nor a King under the general name of a Lord, Governor, or Landlord, albeit an Abbot be properly a Monk, and a Bishop be properly a Priest, and a King be properly a Lord, Governor, and Landlord. But Mr. Fitzherbert doth not distinguish betwixt proper, as it is distinguished from improper, or metaphorical, in which sense it is true, that the words of penal laws are to be understood in a proper sense, and not to be restrained to an improper, or metaphorical sense, and as proper is distinguished from common, or general, in which sense an Abbot is not properly a Monk, nor a Bishop is properly a Priest, nor a King is properly a temporal Lord, Governor, or Landlord, for that a Monk is not the proper name of an Abbot, nor a Priest the proper name of a Bishop, nor a temporal Lord the proper name of a King, but they are names, which are common also to inferior Monks, inferior Priests, and inferior Lords. 28 Thirdly, the rule, saith he, faileth, when the reason is expressed, as it is in this Canon. But Mr. Fitzherbert should have declared, what reason expressed in the law is required to have the aforesaid rule to fail. For in this Canon of the Lateran Council there is no reason expressed, why Dominus temporalis, a temporal Land lord, Governor, or Lord must comprehend absolute Princes. For the end, and reason of making this Canon was to put in execution the holy laws before enacted by Christian Princes for the rooting out of heretics, which laws were not put in practice by the negligence of inferior Governors, Magistrates, and Officers, to whose charge the execution of justice is immediately committed, for which reason it was sufficient to comprehend in that Canon only inferior Lords, Governors, Magistrates, and Landlords, who were negligent to put in execution the godly laws before enacted by pious Emperors, and Kings for the repressing of heretics; but of this reason more beneath. 29 Lastly, the rule, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, holdeth not, say the Lawyers, when there is question of the public good, or the favour of the Church, or of the faith, or of souls; for in thes●●ases penalties are to be extended, and the law interpreted in prejudice of the delinquent. So as these rules do help Widdrington nothing at all, seeing that these exceptions, which are admitted by the Law, do clearly exclude the restriction, which he requireth by virtue of the rules. 30 And the Lawyers also do absolutely, and without the aforesaid exceptions affirm the aforesaid rules to be true. Wherefore Sayrus, citing divers Lawyers for the same, doth by virtue of this rule, except Abbots from Excommunication, although Excommunication be rather medicinal, then penal, and ought not to be inflicted but for the good of the soul. And Andreas Dwallius did by virtue of this rule exempt the King of France from the Canon, unam sanctam, of Pope Boniface the eight, which nevertheless was made in favour of the Church. Neither is there any law either spiritual, or civil, which ought not to concern the public good, neither hath the Pope any authority either directive, or coercive granted him, but for the good of souls. So as these rules, according to the opinion of learned Lawyers, and Divines do help me greatly, and favour my doctrine concerning the not including in penal laws Abbots, Bishops, and Kings under the general names of Monks, Priests, and Lords, although they be enacted for the public good, the health of souls, and in favour of the Church. 31 But the main, and principal ground, whereon I stand, why absolute Princes are not comprehended in this Canon of the Lateran Council, under those general words, Dominus temporalis, Dominus principalis, is this, as you have seen before, for that, albeit I should grant my Adversary only for disputation sake, that in penal laws, and odious matters Abbots are included in the name of Monks, and Bishops in the name of Priests, and Kings in the name of temporal Lords, which nevertheless he will never be able to convince, yet seeing that it is most clear, as Mr. Fitzherbert also confesseth, that all laws are limited according to the power of the Lawmaker, and that therefore the obligation both of Princes, and Church laws is extended only to their own subjects, it necessarily followeth, that temporal Princes cannot be comprehended under any general words, in any Canon, or constitution of the Church, but only in those things, wherein they are subject to the spiritual power of the Church. From whence it clearly followeth, that if it be probable, as in very deed it is, that the spiritual Pastors of the Church have no authority by the institution of Christ to inflict temporal punishments, or to depose temporal Princes, it is also probable, that this Canon of the Lateran Council, as also all other such like decrees, wherein temporal punishments are in general words inflicted upon temporal Lords, Governors, or Landlords, was not made by spiritual, but by temporal authority, and therefore cannot comprehend absolute Princes, who in temporals, and for as much as concerneth the inflicting of temporal punishments, are supreme on the earth, and not subject to the spiritual power of the Church, but that it was either made by the authority, & consent of all temporal Princes, if we will needs have it to bind all Christian Kingdoms, or else that it hath force only to bind in the Pope's dominions, wherein he hath the place both of a spiritual Pastor, and also of a temporal Prince. 32 And whereas Widdrington giveth an instance, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, i Pag. 153. num. 8. without any quotation of Law or Author, that Bishops, and Abbots are not included in penal laws, except they be mentioned, it is true in Bishops in the case only of suspension, or interdict, from the which they are by an express Canon exempted, except they be named, as it appeareth in the Decretals lib. Tit. 11. cap. 4. §. Quia periculosum. Glossa ibidem in verbum, suspensionis. 5. de sententia excommunicationis, where also the Gloss saith expressly, that they are not privileged from a general penalty of Excommunication, because the Pope (who giveth them the aforesaid privilege) would not have them to be exmpted from the Canon, Si quis suadente, and such like, which inflict the penalty of Excommunication in general terms: and the same is to be said of Abbots, or any other persons of dignity, to wit, that they have no exemption from the general terms of penal laws, except they be privileged namely by some express Canon. And therefore, when my Adversary shall show me such a Canon, whereby Princes have the privilege that he pretendeth in their behalf, I will grant that he hath reason to exempt them from the Canon of the Council of Lateran. In the mean time he hath no more probability in this point, then in the former. 33 But first I never said, as Mr. Fitzherbert to make some colour of a probable answer falsely layeth to my charge, that Bishops or Abbots are not included in penal laws, except they be mentioned. For I make no doubt, but that they are included in penal laws under such general words, which denote no particular dignity, order, degree, or function of Christian men, and that therefore they are included in the Canon, Si quis suadente Diabolo, and in the Canon, Omnis utriusque sexus; but that which I said was, that in penal laws and odious matters, Bishops are not included in the general name of Priests, nor Abbots in the general name of Monks. And for the proof thereof I brought neither Canon, nor Author, for that I thought it so manifest, that no man of any reading would make doubt, but that learned Lawyers and Divines do affirm the same. But now finding my Adversary for want of reading, learning, or sincerity, to make doubt thereof, I have brought, as you have seen, to prove the same, both learned Lawyers, and Divines, and also a Canon of Pope Innocent himself, who called, and ended this Council of Lateran, wherein he declareth, that he doth not intend in his commissions to comprehend under a general clause greater and worthier persons, when less worthy, and less noble persons are expressed. And therefore, seeing that I have now showed him both learned Authors, and also a Canon of Pope Innocent himself, to prove that Bishops are not in penal laws comprehended under the general name of Priests, or clerk, nor Abbots, under the general name of Monks, nor Kings under the general name of Lords, Governors, or Landlords, he must according to his own confession grant, that I have reason to exempt Emperors, Kings, and absolute Princes, from the Canon of the Lateran Council. 34 Neither did I ground this my doctrine upon the Canon, Quia periculosum, wherein it is decreed, that in the case of Suspension, & Interdict, Bishops are not comprehended under any general words whatsoever, unless they be expressed by the name of Bishops, but upon the authorities aforesaid, & chief upon that reason which Mr. Fitzher. himself acknowledgeth to be most true, that all laws are to be understood according to the power of the Lawmaker, and that therefore the obligation of every Ecclesiastical Canon is extended only to those, who are subject to the spiritual authority of the Church, as absolute Princes are not in mere temporal matters, as is the inflicting of temporal punishments, for what cause, crime, or end soever they be inflicted, according to the probable doctrine of many learned Catholics, whom I have named above in the first part of this Treatise, and defended them from the frivolous exceptions, which D. Schulckenius hath made against them. 35 Finally, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, whereas Widdrington saith, that the Synod would have specified Princes by that name, as well in this Canon (if it had meant to include them therein) as it did in some other Canons and Decrees concerning other matters, who seethe not the vanity of this conjecture? For why should they be named more particularly than they are, seeing that they are sufficiently comprehended in the general term of Dominus temporalis, a temporal Lord, k He might as well have translated it a temporal Landlord. n To wit, no temporal Landlord above them, but the King. which is also sufficiently explicated in this very Canon, wherein we see that a temporal Lord, l He might as well have said a tempprall Landlord, for Dominus temporalis signifieth both. is divided into two sorts, the one of those who have principal Lords m And also Landlords. above them; and the other of such as have none, of which sort are all absolute Princes, that hold of none, p And also other principal Landlords, who have no principal Landlord above them, but the King, who is not comprehended in odious matters, under the name of a Landlord. and therefore seeing that such are declared by the Canon to be subject to the penalty, no less than those, who hold of others, it was needless to name them in other manner: But belike my Adversary will take upon him not only to interpret the Council, but also to teach it how to speak, and what words to use, or else it must be of no force. 36 No, Mr. Fitzherbert, God forbidden, that either I, who profess myself to be a Catholic, should be so arrogant, as to take upon me to teach the Council how to speak, or what words to use, or that you, who profess to be a teacher, and to instruct others in this difficult controversy, which you will needs make a point of faith, should be so ignorant, as not to know that the sense and meaning of the Council, is to be gathered from the sense and property of the words, and that by the words we are taught what is the sense & meaning of the Council: Now I have sufficiently showed before, both by the authority of learned Lawyers and Divines, and also by convincing reason, that absolute Princes are not sufficiently comprehended in this Canon, under the general name of a temporal, or principal Landlord, Governor, of Lord, both for that it is a penal law, wherein an Abbot is not comprehended under the general name of a Monk, nor a Bishop under the general name of a Priest, nor a King under the general name of a Landlord, Governor, or Lord, and ciefely for that it is such a penal law, which is probable to be a temporal, and not a spiritual law, for that it inflicteth temporal punishments, which, according to the probable doctrine of many learned Catholics, cannot be inflicted but by temporal or civil power, and that therefore those general words, Dominus temporalis, Dominus principalis, a temporal, or principal Landlord, Governor, or Lord, cannot comprehend absolute Princes, who in temporals are not subject to the spiritual power of the Church, for that the words of every law are to be limited according to the power of the Prince that maketh them, and that therefore the obligation of every Prince's law, whether he be a temporal or spiritual Prince, is extended only to his own subjects. 37 And if my Adversary fly to his ancient shift, that all Emperors, Kings, and other Christian Princes are children of the Church, & therefore subject to the spiritual Pastors thereof; It is true in spirituals, but not in temporals, as is the inflicting of temporal punishments, wherein they are not subject, but absolute and supreme. True also it is, that Dominus temporalis, a temporal Lord, is in this Canon divided into two sorts of Lords, taking a Lord, as the canon here doth take him, to wit, not only for a title of honour, which Knights, Gentlemen, & many inferior Magistrates, as sheriffs, Bailiffs, Constables have not; but for every person, who hath tenants, vassals, or other persons any way subject to him, in which sense every Landlord, & Magistrate is called Dominus temporalis, a temporal Lord, Governor or Landlord. The one sort is of those, who have principal and chief Governors or Landlords above them, as are all inferior Magistrates, and those who hold any land of others: The other is of those, who although they be subject to the King, yet they have no other principal Landlords or Governors above them; and of this sort are both those who let their lands to others, and yet hold their lands of none, nor perchance of the King, and also all principal Governors of the commonwealth, who are subject to no other than the King, as are all the Lords, or the body of the King's privy Council together, and in some sort the Lord Chancellor, the Lord chief justice, who have no one principal Lord or Governor above them, as all other subjects have, but the King alone: yet neither of these sorts do sufficiently express a King or a supreme and absolute Prince, for that they are titles belonging also to subjects and inferior persons. And therefore, the premises being considered, it is probable, that if the Council had meant to have comprehended Kings and absolute Princes in that Canon, she would have given them their proper titles of honour, as she did in other Decrees, and not include them in those common titles of honour, which are given to persons of inferior state and condition. 38 And by this which I have said in these two Chapters, the Reader may clearly see, that these answers, which I have given to the decree of the Lateran Council, are very probable and sufficient, and that therefore Mr. fitzherbert's conclusion of this Chapter (to use his own words) is no less vain, impertinent and insufficient, then of his former Chapters; for these be his words k Pag. 154 nu. 10. Thus thou seest, good Reader, that these few exceptions (being all that Widdrington hath taken) to the Council of Lateran in his answer to my Supplement, are no less vain and impertinent, than his former arguments and answers to the rest of my discourse: and this is as much as at the first I meant, and undertook to perform; nevertheless, forasmuch as he hath charged me to have dissembled his other answers and arguments touching the Council of Lateran in another work of his (which as I have signified before I never saw till now of late) I will take a little more pains, and crave thy further patience, whiles I examine the validity thereof, which I might forbear to do if I did write in Latin, because the same arguments and answers of my Adversary, are very learnedly and clearly confuted in Latin, as well by M. D. Weston l juris. Pontif. Sanctuar. q. 27. per totum. in his Sanctuary (whereof I have spoken before) as also by M. D. Singleton in an excellent Treatise concerning only the Decree of the Council of Lateran, to which two Authors I might, and would wholly remit my Reader, m Disscussio decreti etc. nu. 4. & seq. were it not that I desire to give satisfaction in this point, as well to such as do not understand the Latin tongue, as to those that have not the commodity and means to see the said Treatises; besides that, I shall now and then, upon some special occasions, touch some things which seem to me very considerable, and are not touched by them, or any other, for aught I know. 39 But on the contrary side thou seest, good Reader, that these answers, which I have given to the Council of Lateran, are sound, sufficient, and very probable, and that the exceptions which Mr. Fitzherbert hath taken against them, are no less vain and impertinent, then are his arguments and answers in the former Chapters; and that according to his own confession, who granteth, that all laws are limited according to the power of the Lawmaker, and therefore the obligation of Ecclesiastical Canons is extended only to them, who are subject to the authority of the Church, if it be probable that the spiritual Pastors of the Church have by the institution of Christ no authority to inflict temporal punishments, and that consequently absolute Princes are not subject to them therein, it clearly followeth that it is also probable, that the Council of Lateran did not intend to include absolute Princes in that penal law under the general names of Dominus temporalis, Dominus principalis, but that this decree inflicting temporal punishments, was made by the authority and consent of temporal Princes, and did therefore only include those inferior Landlords, Governors or Lords, that were subject to them. 40 Wherefore to conclude this point, unless, as I said before, my Adversaries do first prove out of the holy Scriptures, ancient Fathers, or some clear definition of a general Council, or a demonstrative reason grounded thereon, that it is certain, and of faith, that the Pope hath authority to depose temporal Princes, they cannot draw any convincing argument from this Canon of the Lateran Council, to prove that doctrine to be certain, and of faith, for still the aforesaid answer will be ready at hand, that it was made by the authority of temporal Princes, seeing all laws are limited according to the power of the Lawmaker, and it is probable, that the spiritual power of the Church doth not extend to the inflicting of temporal punishments, as Almain, and very many Doctors do affirm. So that unless in arguing from the Lateran Council they will manifestly petere principium, and suppose that, which they ought to prove, they can never bring any convincing argument from the aforesaid Canon, to prove that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, as any man of judgement may clearly see, but they must still suppose the same as certain, which is a great vice in the disputer, although the answerer, who taketh not upon to prove, but only to defend, may without any fault or note give such answers, which suppose that the Pope hath no such power, until by force of argument he be driven from that his supposition, and this I wish the Reader, and all my Adversaries well to note, for in most of their arguments they suppose that which is in question, which is a fault in the Disputant, but not in the Respondent, who doth always answer supposing his own grounds and doctrine, but the Disputer must not only suppose them, but also prove them. And as for the rest of Mr. fitzherbert's Replies, which he confesseth to have taken out of D. Weston, and D. Singleton, I will also examine with him in the ensuing Chapters, as also that which he hath now and then, as he saith, upon some special occasions touched, and which seem to him very considerable, and yet are not for aught he knoweth touched by them or any other. CHAP. XI. Wherein widdrington's first answer to an objection propounded by himself is proved to be sufficient, and that the consent of temporal Princes is necessary to the validity of Ecclesiastical Constitutions, which inflict temporal punishments, and consequently are not made by true spiritual authority; Also the doctrine of the Lord Cardinal Peron in his speech to the lower house of Parliament, against the Oath propounded by them is examined: And lastly Mr-Fitzherberts objections grounded upon the Decrees of Pope Callixtus, Vrbanus, the Council of Eliberis in Spain, and the Constitution of the Apostles are clearly confuted. 1 NOw Mr. Fitzherbert, with the help of D. Weston and Fa. Lessius masked under D. Singletons' name, taketh upon him in the three next ensuing Chapters to prove three answers, which I gave to an objection made in favour of this Decree of the Lateran Council, to be absurd. And thus he beginneth. My Adversary Widdrinton in his Preface to his Apologetical answer to an English Doctor, hath not only urged the arguments, Praefat. Ad. Resp. Apolog. nu. 46. which I have here already confuted, but undertaketh also to answer certain of ours against the same arguments; and therefore he objecteth in our behalf, that although it were true, that Kings, and absolute Princes are not included per se, and principally in that Decree of the Council, yet it seemeth to be manifest, that secondarily, and consequently they are; or at least may be comprehended therein. For if the Pope, saith he, have power to deprive the subjects of other Princes of their temporal states for heresy, without the consent of the said Princes, it seemeth that no sufficient reason can be assigned, why he may not also for the same cause deprive Sovereign Princes of their Dominions. 2 Thus argueth he for us, and not much amiss, and therefore let us see how he will answer it. He giveth to this objection three answers; The first is, that both Popes, and councils do oftentimes decree many things, which belong rather to the political or temporal, then to the spiritual, or Ecclesiastical power to decree, with the express, or consent of Princes, who are there present by themselves, or their Ambassadors, or at leastwise presuming, or hoping, that Princes will ratify the same. And this say some Expositors of the Canon law, saith joannes Parisiensis. For Hostiensis extra de haereticis cap. Ad abolendam, where the Pope commandeth the goods of heretics to be confiscated, demandeth what the Pope hath to do with temporals? And he answereth with his Lord, Pope Innocent, that in very deed he hath nothing to do therewith, but he made this Decree with the assent of the Emperor, who being then present at Padua gave his consent. 3 This is widdrington's first answer, wherein you see he relieth specially upon the authority of joannes Parisiensis, who grounding his opinion upon Hostiensis, allegeth him to no purpose at all, partly for that no such thing is to be found in Hostiensis in the place, which he quoteth (to wit, extra de haereticis cap. Hostiens. in cap. Quod super his de voto, & volt redempt. ad Abolendam) and partly because Hostiensis not only teacheth evidently elsewhere, that the Pope hath direct Dominion over all temporal States (whereupon it followeth that he may dispose thereof, and of temporal things, as he shall have just cause) but also affirmeth, and teacheth expressly, that absolute Princes may be deposed by the Pope, and their states exposed to be taken by other Catholics, Hostiensi. lib. 5 Rub. de haereticis § qua poena. if they be negligent to purge their states of heresy, and to this end he citeth this very Canon of the Council of Lateran, whereof we now treat, to wit, cap. Excommunicamus, Si vero Dominus temporalis; yea and addeth further, that the Pope may depose a Prince for his negligence in Government, alleging for the same, not only 17. q. 4. Si quis deinceps; but also the example of Zacharias the Pope, who, saith he, deposuit Childericum Regem Franciae, deposed Childericke King of France. How then can joannes Parisiensis, or any man else truly say, that Hostiensis was of opinion, that the Pope hath nothing to do with temporal things? 4 But first, where doth Mr. Fitzherbert find joannes Parisiensis to say, that Hostiensis was of opinion, that the Pope hath nothing to do with temporal things? For that which Parisiensis saith, is only this, that Hostiensis giveth this answer, that the Pope hath nothing to do with temporal things, and that it belongeth not to him to make general decrees concerning the confiscation of goods, and that this Decree was made with the assent of the Emperor, who was then present at Padua, and gave his consent thereto, but whether Hostiensis gave this answer according to his own opinion; or of other Lawyers, whom he doth not condemn, joannes Parisiensis neither affirmeth, nor denieth, but only saith, that Hostiensis gave this answer, which is very true. But these be usual tricks of Mr. Fitzherbert, as you have often seen above, to misconstrue the words, and meaning of his Adversary, thereby to make some colourable show of a probable answer. Wherefore although it be most true, that Hostiensis is of opinion, that the Pope may upon just cause dispose of the Dominions of all Christian Princes, and of all temporal things, for that he expressly teacheth, that the Pope is not only a spiritual, but also a temporal Monarch of the whole world, and hath direct dominion over all temporal States, yet I do not find Hostiensis to be so peremptory in his opinion, as to condemn the contrary doctrine of heresy or of absurd, and temerarious improbability, as all my Adversaries not without great temerity now usallly do. 5 Secondly, therefore it is also true, that Hostiensis upon the aforesaid Chapter, Ad abolendam, giveth also that answer, whereof joannes Parisiensis maketh mention, and doth not reject it as improbable, in which sense Parisiensis did call it Hostiensis his answer. And this answer Mr. Fitzherbert might have easily found in the foresaid place, if he had not relied upon Fa. Lessius word, who saith as much, but had read over the whole Chapter himself. For whereas Pope Lucius the third did in that Canon, Ad abolendam, ordain (from whom it is probable Pope Innocent the third took that decree of the Lateran Council, seeing that in substance they little differ) ut Comites, Barones, Rectores, etc. that Earls, Barons, Governors, and Consuls of Cities, and of other places (whom the Council of Lateran comprehendeth under the names of Dominus temporalis, Dominus principalis, & non habens Dominos principale) shall promise by making a corporal oath, according as they shall be admonished by the Bishops, that they will faithfully, and effectually, when they shall be required by them, help the Church against heretics, and their partakers, unfeignedly according to their office and power: and if they shall not observe the same, let them be deprived of the honour, which they have, and let them in no wise be assumed to other honours, etc. The Cardinal Hostiensis upon these words, ut Comites etc. to prove the validity of this Canon, among other answers he giveth also this, which he doth not confute, that some Doctors do say, that therefore this Canon was of force, because the Emperor was present, and gave his consent secundum D. N. according to Pope Innocent the fourth, whom he called Dominum nostrum. 6 The same answer also hath joannes Andreas, expounding that word, Comites; Note, saith he, that the Pope doth decree concerning laymen, but this is in regard of sin. Others say, that therefore these decrees were of force because the Prince gave his consent, and was present. And also the same answer maketh Pope Innocent the fourth expounding the same word, Comites; Note, saith he, that the Pope may ordain concerning Laymen, but this is in regard of sin. Others say, that these decrees are therefore of force, because the Prince was present. Wherefore it is very true, which joannes Parisiensis said, that Hostiensis with his Lord Pope Innocent, among other answers concerning the validity of this Canon gave also this, which they did not confute, that it was therefore valued, and of force, because the Prince was present, and gave his consent. And therefore I marvel, how Fa. Lessius, a man otherwise very learned, and as I ever supposed, of great reading, should be so ignorant in the study of the Canon law, as not to know, and much more so boldly to deny, that Hostiensis did write upon the Chapter Ad abolendam, or upon other texts; whereas there is no book more known, and more commonly cited by the Canon Lawyers, then is the Lecture of Hostiensis upon the decretals. And thus much concerning Hostiensis, and his answer alleged by Parisiensis to great purpose, whatsoever my Adversary, giving overmuch credit to Fa. Lessius, hath untruly said to the contrary. 7 Now concerning joannes Parisiensis Mr. Fitzherbert writeth thus: a Pag. 158. nu. 4. But it is no marvel if joannes Parisiensis showed himself partial towards Princes in some things concerning the Pope's authority, seeing that he lived and was a Reader in Paris in the time of the troubles betwixt Pope Boniface the eight, and Philip le Bel, King of France, who being excommunicated by the said Pope, and extremely incensed against him could not want learned men to second his humour; especially such as were his born subjects, and lived within his dominions; Nevertheless howsoever joannes Parisiensis may seem in the words alleged by my Adversary to affirm, that the Pope hath no power at all to dispose of temporal things; yet it is clear that he teacheth elsewhere, that in some cases the Pope may dispose of the temporal goods, not only of Ecclesiastical persons, but also of all the faithful. 8 And of this Widdrington might have taken notice, when he wrote against me, if it had pleased him, seeing that he was admonished thereof by Schulckenius b Shulck. pag. 64. , who showeth that joannes Parisiensis teacheth expressly, c joan. Paris. de potest. Reg. & Papali cap. 7. that the Pope being the supreme head of Priests, and of the faithful, may (as the general informer of faith and manners) dispose the goods of the faithful, and decree them to be exposed, so far forth as the common and extreme necessity of faith and manners shall require; and f Ibid. cap. 13. further, that if the King be an heretic, and incorrigible, the Pope may not only excommunicate him, but also force the people to depose him, Excommunicando omnes, qui ei ut Domino obedirent, Excommunicating all those, which should obey him as their Lord: and again afterwards he saith g Ibid. cap. 16. , that if the Prince be an heretic, his vassal is not bound to follow him, and that the Pope may deliver his subjects from the obligation of their oath of allegiance. 9 By all this it appeareth, that albeit joannes Parisiensis doth give less unto the Pope than he ought (as Schulckenius well noteth) yet he giveth him as much as sufficeth for our purpose, seeing that it little importeth to the substance of the main question betwixt our Adversary and us (which is, whether the Pope may depose a temporal Prince) I say it little importeth how, and in what manner he may do it (whether by a juridical sentence of deposition or otherwise) so as it is granted, that he hath authority to discharge the Prince's subjects of their Oath of allegiance, yea and to compel them to depose him, which joannes Parisiensis expressly teacheth; whereupon it may be inferred, that his meaning was in the place before objected, that the Pope may not dispose of temporal things directly, but only indirectly, and in some cases, which overthrow the foundation of our adversaries doctrine touching this question: and this may suffice for him and Hostiensis. 10 But first, besides that joannes Parisiensis was never taxed by any ancient Author for writing partially in favour of the King of France, the like words that Mr. Fitzherbert here useth against joannes Parisiensis, may be retorted back upon Hostiensis, and divers other Divines, and Canonists, to wit, that it is no marvel, that Cardinal Hostiensis, and divers other Roman Divines, and Canonists showed themselves partial towards Popes in some things concerning the Pope's authority, seeing that they lived and were Readers in Rome, or in the Pope's Dominions in the time of the troubles betwixt the Popes and Christian Princes, which Popes since the time of Pope Gregory the seventh took upon them to dispose of all temporals, and to depose temporal Princes, and therefore could not want learned men to second their humours, especially such as either were their born subjects, and lived in their Dominions, or else might expect spiritual preferment, and to be advanced to bishoprics, or other spiritual dignities by the Pope, and this also the said joannes Parisiensis in the same book doth well observe. But more probably, saith he, h joan. Paris. de potest. Reg. & Papali cap. 21. ad 41. arg. it may be said on the contrary side, that those Doctors, who so undutifully advance the Pope's authority, do speak for fear, or favour of him, seeing that they are Clergy men, who may rather be promoted by him: and especially seeing that they themselves do say, though not well, that the Pope doth graciously embrace those that do extend, or amplify his authority, and represseth those that speak against the same. 11 Secondly, joannes Parisiensis doth not teach that the Pope hath power to dispose of temporal things, and of the temporal goods, not only of Ecclesiastical persons, but also of all the faithful, except only by declaring the law of God, and by compelling the faithful by Ecclesiastical censures to observe the same, & haec Papae ordinatio non est nisi juris declaratio, & this ordaining, or disposing of the Pope, is nothing else, than a declaring of the Law of God, saith Parisiensis in that very place; i Cap. 7: and this I have declared and proved at large above in the first part against D. Schulckenus. And the same he teacheth concerning the absolving of vassals from their oath of fealty. To that, saith he, k Cap. 16. ad 11. which is objected that the Pope hath sometimes absolved soldiers from their oath of fealty. Besides that it is an argument De facto, which is only introduced concerning Frenchmen, I answer, that it was rather a declaring of the law, to wit, that the Oath did not bind in that case, than an absolving from the oath of fealty: Now what Catholic man maketh doubt, but that the Pope hath authority to declare the Law of God, it being a spiritual thing, and proceeding from spiritual power? 12 Wherefore, as I declared at large above in the first part, joannes Parisiensis teacheth three things; The one is, that the Pope hath no authority to depose, or deprive by way of sentence an heretical Prince of his Royal right, and authority, and this is the main question betwixt my Adversaries, and me: The second is, that the Pope hath power to declare and interpret the law of God, and to compel by Ecclesiastical Censures all the faithful to observe the same, and in this I agree with Parisiensis, saving that there is yet a great controversy betwixt the Divines of Rome, and Paris, what things are required to make the Pope's definition, declaration, or interpretation to be certain and infallible, as also inferior Bishops have authority to declare and interpret the law of God, and to compel their spiritual subjects to observe the same, yet their declaration and interpretation of the law of God, is not always certain and infallible. The third is, that the people or Commonwealth have authority in some cases, & are bound to depose their Prince, and consequently, that the Pope may by Ecclesiastical censures compel them thereunto: And with this question concerning the power of the Commonwealth, as I have often said, I will not intermeddle, before it be agreed upon betwixt my Adversaries and me, concerning the main and principal controversy, whether the Pope hath authority to deprive by way of sentence an heretical King of his right to reign, or, which is all one, to make by his juridical sentence a King to be a private man; for this is that, at which our King and Parliament, in making the new oath of allegiance, did only aim. 13 And by this it is apparent, how fraudulently, and perniciously Mr. Fitzherbert following therein D. Schulckenius, seeketh to abuse, and delude his Reader, in labouring to persuade him, that it little importeth to the substance of the main question betwixt my Adversaries and me, whether the Pope may depose a Prince by a juridical sentence of deposition, and deprive him of all his Regal authority and right, which before that sentence he had to reign, or whether the Commonwealth hath authority, and also is bound in some cases to depose their King, and consequently, whether the Pope, having authority to declare the law of God, and the duty which all Christians own to God, may by Ecclesiastical censures compel them thereunto, and absolve them from their oath of allegiance, by declaring that their oath in that case doth not bind, which absolving, as Parisiensis said above, is rather a declaring of the law, than an absolving from the oath of allegiance: And nevertheless there is nothing more clear, then that the main question betwixt my Adversaries and me, is not what authority the commonwealth hath over their Prince, which is rather a philosophical question, and grounded upon the principles of state and policy, then upon the positive law of God, but what authority the Pope hath to deprive by way of sentence heretical Princes of their Princely right, and authority: or which is all one in substance, whether the coercive, or punishing power of the Pope (for about his derective, declarative, and commanding power, to which his authority to declare the law of God, and what we are bound by the law of God to do, is reduced, I do not contend) doth by the institution of Christ extend to the inflicting of temporal punishments, as all my adversaries most vehemently contend, or only of Ecclesiastical Censures, as joannes Parisiensis doth most expressly affirm. Whereby the Reader may see, to what narrow shifts these men are brought, when they seek to fly from the true state and substance of the main question, and controversy to by-questions and difficulties altogether impertinent. 14 Wherefore, to retort back my adversaries words, albeit joannes Parisiensis giveth more power to subjects, then perchance he ought, yet concerning the Pope's power, he denieth him as much as sufficeth me, seeing that it little importeth to the substance of the main question betwixt my Adversaries and me, which is, whether the Pope may inflict temporal punishments and depose temporal Princes by way of iuridiall sentence, that is by depriving them of their right to reign, which joannes Parisiensis expressly denieth, I say, it little importeth, whether the Commonwealth hath authority, and sometimes is bound to depose their Prince, and consequently the Pope may indirectly, l joan Pari● taketh indirectly in an other sense, th●● the Divines do take it, when they say, that the Pope may depose Princes, not directly, but indirectly. or per accidens, to wit by declaring the law of God, and compelling faithful subjects by Ecclesiastical Censures to do their duty, may concur to the same, which indeed Parisiensis expressly affirmeth: Neither doth this manner of deposing Princes indirectly, and disposing of temporal things indirectly overthrow the foundations of my doctrine touching the main question of the Pope's power to depose, and dispose by a juridical sentence. And all this I answered before against D. Schulckenius; neither could I in that brief Admonition take particular notice of all that, which my Adversary wrote in his Supplement, or D. Schulckenius in his Apology: but seeing that I have now taken particular notice of both their answers and arguments, we will now expect, what a learned Reply Mr. Fitzherbert will make against the same. And this may suffice for joannes Parisiensis. 15 But before I go any further, I think it not amiss upon this occasion to admonish the Reader by the way of a brief digression, in what a cunning manner the most Illustrious Cardinal of Peron, in his oration to the third estates, confoundeth these two questions, and consequently saith little, or nothing against my doctrine touching the Pope's power to depose Princes, and the new Oath of Allegiance established here in England. Thus therefore he propoundeth the state of the question betwixt him, and the lower house of Parliament. m Pag. 13. according to the English edition. There remains the third point, which is this; whether if Princes having made an Oath to GOD, and their people, either themselves, o● their Predecessors, to live and die in the Christian and Catholic Religion, and do afterwards violate their Oath, rebel against Christ, bidding him open war, that is to say, fall not only to open profession of heresy, or Apostasy from Christian Religion, but with all pass to force their subjects consciences, and go about to plant Arrianisme, or Mahometism, or any such like infidelity within their states, and thereby to destroy, and root out Christianity: whether, I say, in this case, their subjects on the other side may not be declared absolved from their Oath of Loyalty, and Fidelity: And this coming to pass, to whom it appertaineth to pronounce this absolution. 16 This then is the point in controversy between us: For your article containeth the negative; that is to say, that in no case whatsoever the subjects may be absolved from the Oath of Allegiance made to their Princes. As on the contrary side all other parts of the Catholic Church, together with this of France, since the institution of Schools of Divinity, until the coming of Caluin, held the affirmative proposition, which is, that when the Prince breaks the Oath he hath made to GOD, and his subjects to live, and die in Catholic Religion, and doth not only become an Arrian, or a Mahometan, but manifestly wars against jesus Christ, in compelling his subjects in matters of conscience, and constraining them to embrace Arianism, or Mahometism, or any other detestable infidelity: That then this Prince may be declared fallen from his right, as culpable of felony towards him to whom he hath made the Oath of his Realm, that is to Christ; and his subjects may be absolved in conscience, both at the spiritual, and Ecclesiastical Tribunal, from the Oath of Allegiance they have made unto him. And that in this case, it belongs to the authority of the Church, resident either in her head the Pope, or in her body a Council, to publish this declaration. And not only all the other parts of the Catholic Church, but likewise all the Doctors who lived in Farance from the first setting up of Schools of Divinity amongst them, have held the affirmative opinion, that in the case of heretical, or infidel Princes, and such as persecute Christianity, or Catholic Religion, their subjects may be absolved from their Oath of Allegiance. By means whereof though the contrary doctrine were the truest, yet notwithstanding all the other parts of the Church being against it, you cannot hold it for more them problematical in matter of faith. I call that doctrine problematical in matter of faith, which we are not bound to believe, by necessity of faith, and the contradictory thereof doth not bind them that believe it with Excommunication, and disunion, or separation from the community. Otherwise you must acknowledge that the communion which you exercise with the other parts of the Church, holding the contrary doctrine, yea even that communion which you conserve with the memory of your predecessors, was unlawful, defiled with heresy and excommunication. 17 Thus you see, that the Cardinal of Peron doth altogether avoid the main question, which is betwixt my Adversaries and me, to wit, concerning the Pope's power to deprive a Prince of his Regal authority, wherewith before his sentence of deprivation he was endued, and joineth two questions together, which nothing belong to our new Oath. The first is, whether if a Prince, who either by himself, or by his Predecessors, hath made an oath to live and die in the Christian Catholic Religion, and afterwards becometh an heretic, or infidel, and laboureth to draw his subjects to the same, may not be declared fallen from his right, as culpable of felony towards Christ, to whom he hath made his Oath, and his subjects may not be declared absolved from their oath of allegiance. The second question is, whether the Pope or Church have not authority to publish this declaration. Now neither of these two questions appertain to our new Oath, nor are as yet called in question by me. For as concerning the later, supposing that a Prince by reason of heresy, or Apostasy either is actually deprived, and fallen from his right to reign, which the Cardinal of Peron following therein Philopater, seemeth here to maintain, or else may for the same be deprived thereof by the Commonwealth, no Catholic will make any doubt, but that this being supposed, the Pope, or Church, may declare him an heretic, or Apostata, and consequently to be fallen thereby from his Royal dignity according to philopater's doctrine, or to be deprived thereof by the Commonwealth, as others contend, and to declare that his subjects are either actually discharged, or to be discharged of the natural and civil bond of their temporal allegiance, and consequently of their Oath, or sacred bond, which was made to confirm the same: For no Catholic can make any doubt, that to declare the law of God, and who is an heretic, or infidel, is a spiritual action, and belongeth to the spiritual authority of the Church. 18 But with the former question, forasmuch as it may concern, what authority the Commonwealth hath to deprive her Sovereign Prince of his Royal right, in case that he should forsake the Catholic faith, which he hath once professed, although, as I have often said, I will not intermeddle, for not giving my adversaries occasion, to decline the principal question concerning the Pope's authority to deprive heretical Kings of their Regal power, which they had before his sentence of deprivation, nevertheless this scandalous, and desperate position of Philopater, against which I was somewhat vehement in my Apology, and yet is quite passed over with silence by D. Schulckenius (which may be some conjecture, that he also favoureth that doctrine, to wit, that a Prince, who maketh open profession of Arianism, or Mahometism or any such like infidelity and goeth about to plant the same within his dominions, doth fall thereby ipso facto from his Regal authority and right to reign, albeit either himself, or his predecessors, have made an oath to live and die in the Catholic faith, I account to be a very false, damnable, and seditious doctrine, tending to the perturbation and subversion of all temporal States, wherein there is not a perfect unity of Religion, giving occasion to heretical and infidel Princes not to become Catholics, favouring that damnable doctrine, which teacheth, that among heretics, and infidels there is no true civil dominion, authority, or jurisdiction: and what Roman Catholic soever he be that maintaineth and teacheth the same in this kingdom, I account him, to speak plainly, a manifest Archtraitor, for that he must consequently maintain, that our Sovereign Lord KING JAMES is not our true, and rightful King, because albeit not he himself, yet some of his predecessors, have solemnly sworn to live and die in the Catholic Roman faith. 19 For seeing that by God's permission heresies must be, according to that of Saint Paul, 1. Cor. 11. Oportet & haereses esse, what State can be secure from continual fears of tumults, and insurrections, when the subjects according to this doctrine must be persuaded, that their Prince, if he be of a contrary Religion to that which they in their hearts profess, and think to be Catholic, and seek to draw them to his Religion, as all Princes usually do, is not a true, and rightful Prince, but fallen from his right to reign, and by their Church (which they, as also all heretics think to be the true Catholic Church) may be declared so to be? With what security can any King, whether he be a Catholic, or no, permit in his dominions any Religion contrary to his own, when his subjects of the contrary Religion must be persuaded, that he is fallen from his right to reign, if he seek to draw them, as all Princes usually do, to his own Religion? With what security also can any heretical, or infidel Prince, whose kingdom is wholly, or for the greatest part infected with heresy, or infidelity, become a Catholic, and seek to draw his subjects to Catholic Religion, when his subjects, who are no Catholics, must according to the principles of this doctrine be persuaded, that he is a rebel to God, and an enemy to that Religion, which they think to be true, and hath broken the oath, which he, or some of his predecessors have made, to live and die in their faith and religion, and consequently is fallen from his right, as culpable of felony towards GOD, to whom he hath made the oath of this Realm? 20 Besides, this assertion favoureth that false, not to say, erroneous doctrine, which teacheth, that civil dominion is founded in grace, or faith, & that in heretics, or infidels, especially who seek to draw their subjects to their heresy, or infidelity, as all heretics, and infidels commonly do, there is no civil authority, dominion, and jurisdiction. From whence it followeth, that the jews persecuting Christ, and Christian Religion, lost thereby, ipso facto, their civil dominion, and all those Roman Emperors, who either being Pagans, or Arrians, did persecute the Church of Christ, were not true and rightful Emperors, but fallen from their right, as being culpable of felony towards Christ bidding him open war, and compelling their Christian subjects to rebel against Christ, and to embrace heresy, or infidelity, and seeking thereby to destroy, and root out Christianity. For this declaration of the Pope, or Church, which the Cardinal mentioneth, doth not deprive them of their right to reign, but supposeth them deprived thereof, and serveth only to make it certainly known, that they are not rightful Kings, but by their heresy, or infidelity to which they seek to draw their subjects, to be actually fallen from all Royal right and authority. From whence it followeth, that this declaration is not necessary in evident and manifest, but only in doubtful cases, as also in all vows, and oaths when it is evident, that one is not bound to observe the vow, or oath, there needeth no dispensation (which, according to the Thomists doctrine, is only a declaration concerning the matter of the vow, or oath) but only when it is doubtful, or not certain, whether the thing which is sworn or vowed, be now a sufficient matter of an oath, and vow, or no. Whereupon experience teacheth, that when a King either for age or infirmity doth publicly resign over to this son, and heir, not only the administration, but also all his Kingly authority, and right to reign, the subjects need not to procure any declaration, dispensation, or absolution of the Pope, or Church, from the oath of their temporal allegiance, for that it is now evident, that their temporal allegiance to their former King ceaseth, and is no sufficient matter of an oath, and consequently their oath is void, which was made to confirm the same. 21 And albeit the Cardinal in propounding the state of his question maketh mention of an Oath, which Princes, either themselves, or their predecessors have made to God, and their people to live and die in the Christian Catholic faith, as though the breach of this promise and oath were the chief, or only cause, why heretical, and Apostata Princes seeking to draw their subjects to their heresy or Apostasy, do fall from their Royal right, yet in my opinion this oath, which the Cardinal hath put down in the state of his question, is a mere cloak, and colour to cast over the eyes of the unlearned, and to make his doctrine, and position to seem the less improbable, and yet it doth not take away the improbability thereof. For first, if this oath, which Christian Princes, or their predecessors have made to God, and their people to live and die in the Catholic faith, be the only effectual cause, why Christian Princes do fall from their Royal right, and their subjects absolved from the bond of their temporal allegiance, and consequently from the oath, or sacred, and spiritual bond, which was made to confirm the same, then if a Prince become an Arian or Mahomitan, or profess any other heresy, or infidelity without drawing his subjects to the same, he doth neither fall from his Royal right, nor his subjects are thereby absolved from the bond of their natural and civil allegiance. 22 Secondly all Christians do in baptism according to the opinion of some Divines, & also ancient Fathers n See Suarez. in 3. par. q. 71. art. 1. make a certain vow and promise to live & die in the Christian Catholic faith; & yet I think neither the Cardinal, nor any other learned man will affirm, that if they break this vow or promise, & forsake the Catholic faith, they are fallen thereby ipso facto, from that civil dominion, right, power, & authority, which they did not receive by Baptism, or by making that vow or promise to live & die in the Christian Catholic faith. Thirdly, no promise, vow, or oath to do any thing, doth ipso facto deprive any man of any civil right, authority, dominion, or jurisdiction, unless that civil right or authority be given, or received with a condition, and covenant, that if he do not perform that oath, or promise, he shall forthwith fall ipso facto from his right dominion or jurisdiction: but no probable show, or colour of an argument can be brought to prove, that Christian Princes, although they, or their predecessors have made an oath to live and die in the Christian Catholic faith, have received their kingly power and authority, with this condition and covenant, that if they shall forsake the Catholic faith, they shall forthwith fall from their Royal dignity, seeing that this oath, which Christian Princes, who come to their Crown by inheritance, do make to live & die in the Christian Catholic faith, belongeth only to a certain ceremony used at the time of their coronation, whereas all their Kingly power & authority, they had before by the right of succession instantly upon the death of their Predecessor. 23 Fourthly, abstracting from all oaths, which Christian Princes or their Predecssours have made to live and die in the Catholic faith, yet if they sorsake the faith, which they have professed in Baptism, and do become Arians, or Mahometans, and seek to draw their subjects to the same, they do rebel against Christ, and bid him open war, and do force their subjects consciences, and go about to destroy and root out Christianity within their states, which are the chiefest causes which the Cardinal of Peron setteth down in propounding the state of his question, why such wicked Princes do fall from their Royal right, or, which is all one, are ipso facto, and actually deprived thereof: And therefore that Oath, which he mentioneth, to live, and die in the Catholic faith, is only a shift, and colour to make some show of a feigned contract and covenant betwixt the King and his subjects, that if he forsake the Catholic faith, he shall forthwith fall from his Royal dignity, seeing that the chiefest reasons of the Cardinal, why he doth fall from his Royal right, are of force, although no such oath or covenant be supposed. 24 Fiftly, albeit we should grant, which cannot in my judgement with any probable argument be proved, that Christian Princes, or their predecessors, do make an oath to God, and their people, with an express condition, pact, or covenant, that if they forsake the Catholic faith, they shall forthwith fall from their Royal dignity, and be ipso facto deprived thereof, yet supposing that in heretics and infidels, although they seek to draw others to their heresy, & infidelity, there is true civil power, dominion, and jurisdiction, no learned man can make any doubt, but that as it was in the power of that heretical or pagan Kingdom, or Commonwealth, to make, or admit, confirm, & approve this pact or covenant established by oath, so it may be released by the same Kingdom or Commonwealth, and also that it may be truly presumed, that they do release the same, if they choose, or admit; confirm, and allow likewise an infidel, or heretic to be their King. For if the heretical or infidel Kingdom, hath true civil power, dominion, and jurisdiction, why shall not likewise the heretical or infidel Prince, whom they shall choose, or confirm, be capable of the same civil power, dominion, and jurisdiction? So that this pact, covenant, and agreement, which is pretended to be made betwixt the predecessors of an heretical Prince, and his people, can be no sufficient cause, and ground, to make an heretical Prince, who is chosen, or confirmed by an heretical Kingdom, to fall from his Royal dignity, and be ipso facto deprived thereof, for the confirming and establishing of that heresy, which that Kingdom doth profess. 25 Wherefore concerning the deposition of heretical Princes, as the state of this question is propounded by the Cardinal of Peron, many particular questions are involved. The first may be, whether a Prince having either himself, or his predecessors made an oath to live, and die in the Catholic faith, and do afterwards fall to open profession of heresy, and seek to force his subjects consciences to do the same, is fallen thereby forthwith before any declaration of the Pope, or Church, from his Royal right, and dignity, and his subjects are absolved, or freed, ipso facto, from the civil and sacred bond of their temporal allegiance: and the affirmative part, which Philopater teacheth and affirmeth to be certain, and undoubted, I account to be a very false, scandalous, seditious yea, and flat traitorous doctrine. The second question may be, supposing this damnable doctrine to be true, touching the cause and ground why such an heretical Prince doth fall ipso facto from his Royal dignity, to wit, whether the breaking of the oath which he, or his predecessors made to live, and die in the Catholic faith, or his open profession of heresy, or forcing of his subjects to do the same, whether, I say, all these, or some of them together may be necessary, or else any one of them be sufficient that an heretical Prince be ipso facto deprived of his princely power and authority. 26 The third question may be, supposing still this false doctrine to be true, whether the Pope or Church have authority to declare such a Prince to be an heretic, a breaker of his oath, and promise, and a persecutor or enemy to Christ, and Christian Religion, and consequently to be fallen from all his Princely right: And of this no doubt can be made, supposing the former, seeing that to declare authentically what is heresy, & who is infected therwth, is a spiritual action, & consequently belonging to the authority of the Pope, or Church. The fourth question may be, what effect this declaration of the Pope or Church doth work, seeing that before this declaration the aforesaid heretical Prince hath lost, and is deprived of all his princely authority, and whether this declaration of the Pope, or Church, be necessary, when the fact is so notorious, and public, that no Subject in the Realm can make any doubt but that the Prince is become an heretic, hath broken his oath to live and die in the Catholic faith, and doth force his subjects consciences to follow his heresy: And of this question also no great doubt in my opinion can be made, supposing the former false doctrine to be true, seeing that this declaration doth not deprive the Prince of any right at all, but only serveth to make it known, and public, that he is deprived thereof, and therefore is not greatly necessary, when the fact is so public and manifest to the view of the whole Kingdom, that no man can make any doubt thereof. 24 The fift question may be, that supposing such a Prince doth not fall ipso facto from his Royal dignity, neither by his open profession of heresy, nor by breach of his oath, nor by forcing his subjects consciences to forsake their Religion, whether the whole Kingdom, or Commonwealth, which the Parliament doth represent, hath authority to deprive him of the same; or, which is all one, whether the whole Kingdom or the King be the supreme and absolute temporal judge, and Superior: And this question doth nothing appertain to the Oath of England, and it is grounded rather upon the principles of moral Philosophy, and Aristotle's politics, then of Divinity. The last and principal question is, whether the Pope, or Church, hath authority to deprive such a Prince for the aforesaid crimes of his right to reign, & really, & truly to absolve his subjects from the natural bond of their temporal allegiance, which being once dissolved, the sacred or spiritual bond of the oath of allegiance, which is grounded upon the former civil bond, and obligation, and was made only to corroborate the same, is forthwith unloosed, or whether the Pope, or Church, hath only authority to declare such a Prince to be an heretic, and an enemy to Catholic Religion, and a breaker of his oath and promise, and to command & compel by Ecclesiastical censures the Commonwealth, supposing they have such an authority to deprive him of his Regal power and authority, and consequently to discharge every subject from the natural and civil bond of his temporal allegiance, which being taken away, the sacred obligation of the oath, without any other absolution, dispensation, or declaration of the Pope, or Church, is forthwith dissolved. 28 All these questions the Lord Cardinal of Peron doth so cunningly involve in his question touching the oath of France, that, if we descend to particulars, I cannot see either what opinion he doth follow concerning the deposing of heretical Princes, or how his doctrine impugneth our English oath, (although he would seem to disprove the same) which only denieth the Pope's authority to deprive the King's Majesty of his Royal dignity, and to absolve his subjects from the civil bond of their temporal allegiance, and doth not meddle at all with the temporal authority, which a Kingdom or Commonwealth hath to depose their Prince. 29 Wherefore these words of the Cardinal of Peron, affirming, that not only all the other parts of the Catholic Church, Page 15. but likewise all the Doctors that lived in France, from the first setting up of Schools of Divinity amongst them, have held, that in the case of heretical or infidel Princes, and such as persecute Christianity, or Catholic Religion, their subjects may be absolved from their oath of allegiance. And again, Page 63. saith he (citing Widdrington in the margin) The English writers, who have put their hand to pen for the defence of the Oath made by the present King of England against the Pope, having used all their endeavour to find some Doctors, and in particular, French, who had held their opinion before these last troubles, could hitherto bring forth never any one, neither Divine, Page 65. nor Lawyer, who saith, that in case of heresy, or Apostasy from Christian Religion, the Subjects could not be absolved from the oath of allegiance, or from the obligation that they own to their Princes; these his words, I say, do neither contradict those English Catholics, who defend our English oath to be lawful, nor do show, or signify that Widdrington hath not brought any Divines or Lawyers, both Frenchmen, and of other Nations, who affirm, that the Pope hath no authority to depose Princes, and to absolve subjects from the bond of their temporal allegiance. For the Cardinal's words are to be understood secundum subiectam materiam, according to the matter which he treateth of, and which he would persuade his Reader, the three estates of France, endeavoured to establish by their oath, to wit, that the subjects of the King of France could not be absolved from the bond of their temporal allegiance by any authority whatsoever, either spiritual or temporal. 30 Now it is evident, that I neither produced, nor intended to produce any Authors, who in these general terms expressly affirm, that the Subjects of an heretical Prince, cannot be discharged of their allegiance, neither by the spiritual authority of the Pope, nor by the temporal power of the Commonwealth, for that it was not my meaning, as being a thing altogether impertinent to our Oath of England, to examine what authority the civil Commonwealth hath over their Prince in the case of heresy or Apostasy. For our oath only denieth the Pope's authority to depose our King, and to discharge his subjects from their temporal allegiance, and with the authority of the Commonwealth, it doth not intermeddle. But that the Pope hath no authority to depose temporal Princes, and that the spiritual power of the Church doth not extend to the inflicting of temporal punishments, as death, exile, imprisonment, deprivation of goods, and such like, but only to Ecclesiastical censures, I have brought many Authors both French, and others, to prove the same, among whom are joannes Parisiensis, and also jacobus Almainus cited here by the Cardinal in his Treatises, joan. Paris. de potest, Reg. & Pap. cap. 14. de Domino naturali, civili, & Ecclesiastico o Concls. 2. & in probat. 2. conclus. , and de authoritate Ecclesiae p Cap. 2. Maior. in 4. dist. 24. q. 3. , where he writeth according to his own opinion, though not in his Treatise, de potestate Ecclesiastica, which the Cardinal citeth, where he commenteth Occam, and speaketh according to occam's doctrine; albeit these Doctors do on the other side affirm, that the Commonwealth hath authority to depose a wicked and incorrigible King and so that the Pope may according to them depose him per accidens, as joan. Parisiensis writeth, or to use joannes Maior his words, applicando activa passivis, as he that apply fire to straw, is said to burn the straw, to wit, by persuading, advising, commanding, and also by spiritual censures compelling them, who have authority, to wit, the people, or Commonwealth, to depose him, and after he is deposed by the people, or kingdom, by declaring his subjects absolved and discharged from the natural, and consequently also spiritual bond of their allegiance, but this is impertinent to our oath of England, wherein only the Pope's authority to depose, & deprive our King of his Dominions by way of juridical sentence is denied. 31 Wherefore the English Translator of the cardinals oration, doth with as great boldness, as with little truth shamefully affirm, q In his Preface to the Reader. that this difference is found between these two oaths, that whereas the English oath in one of the clauses seems to exclude not only the authority of the Church over Kings, but even of the commonwealth also (yea though it should be accompanied with that of the Church) that of France shoots only at the abnegation of the Church's authority: For contrariwise, although the oath of France may, as you shall see, at the first sight seem to deny both the authority of the Church, and also of the Commonwealth, to depose the King of France, yet our Oath shoots only at the abnegation of the Pope's authority to depose our King, and to absolve his Subjects from the bond of their temporal allegiance. For as I have showed in my Theological disputation, our oath doth only affirm, r Cap. 3. sec. 4 that the Pope neither of himself, that is, by the spiritual authority which is granted him by the institution of Christ, nor by any authority of the Church or Sea of Rome, for that the Church, or Sea of Rome hath no such authority, nor by any other means with any other, that is, neither as a total or partial, as a principal or instrumental cause, hath any power or authority to depose the King, etc. which last words do only at the most import, that whether the temporal Commonwealth hath any authority over the King, for any cause or crime whatsoever, or no, with which question the King and Parliament did not intermeddle, yet the Commonwealth hath given no such authority to the Pope either by himself, or with any other to depose the King, etc. 32 But the oath of France doth expressly affirm, that there is no power on earth, whatsoever either spiritual or temporal, which hath any right over his majesties kingdom to deprive the sacred persons of our Kings, nor to dispense, or absolve their subjects from that loyalty, and obedience, which they own to them for any cause, or pretence whatsoever: for these be the express words of the oath of France, which our English Translator, as it seems, either hath not seen, or maliciously abuseth his Reader, in affirming so shamefully, that the oath of France shoots only at the abnegation of the Church's authority: which words of the oath of France also the Cardinal of Peron seemeth to understand generally of all temporal and spiritual power whatsoever either out of the kingdom, or of the kingdom itself, as both by the propounding the state of his question, and also by the whole drift of his oration any judicious man may gather: for which cause, as I imagine, he affirmeth, s Pag. 115. that our Oath of England is more sweet and modest, or moderate, then that of France. And truly although the words may seem to any man at the first sight to have that sense, which the Cardinal pretendeth, seeing that they expressly deny all power on earth, both temporal, and spiritual, yet both the Translator of his oration apply them only to the Pope's authority, and also if those words [which hath any authority over his majesties kingdom to deprive] be well observed, they may in my judgement have a very true sense, to wit, that the temporal power, which there is mentioned, is not to be referred to the authority of the kingdom itself, seeing that no kingdom hath truly and properly right power and authority over itself, neither hath the kingdom of France any right over the kingdom of France to deprive, etc. Which are the express words of the oath of France, and therefore they must be applied to the temporal power of some other foreign Prince, or Kingdom: and they seem chiefly to shoot at the abnegation of that doctrine and position, which john Tanquarell by a Decree of the Parliament of Paris t Anno 1561. in Tract. de juribus etc. p. 289 was enjoined to recall, and to ask pardon of the King for his offence in defending the same, to wit, that the Pope Christ's Vicar, and a Monarch, having spiritual and secular power, hath authority to deprive Princes, who rebel against his precepts of their kingdoms, and dignities. 33 But howsoever it be, whether in the oath of France, the authority of the temporal Commonwealth over the King be denied, or no, it is plain, that neither our King and Parliament, who established our oath, did intend thereby to meddle with the authority of the Commonwealth, but only of the Pope, nor I who disputed of our oath, did mean to treat of any other authority then of the Pope, which only in our oath is denied. And therefore the Lord Cardinal of Peron, to impugn the oath of France dealeth very cunningly, when he affirmeth, as you have seen before, that Widdrington hath not found out one Author, either Divine or Lawyer, who hath said, that in case of heresy or infidelity, the subjects cannot be absolved from the oath of fidelity, and the obligation, which they own to their Princes. 34 For albeit I have not brought any one Author, only D. Barclay excepted, who affirmeth these two things together, to wit, that in the case of heresy or infidelity, Princes can neither by the authority of the Pope, nor of the Commonwealth be deposed, and their subjects released of the bond and oath of their temporal allegiance, for that those Doctors of France, who absolutely deny the Pope's authority to depose Princes, and to inflict temporal punishments, do commonly maintain that the temporal Commonwealth may depose their Prince for heresy, or infidelity, and consequently discharge the subjects of their temporal allegiance, which being once released, the spiritual bond of the oath made to confirm the same is forthwith dissolved; nevertheless I have brought divers Authors, both Divines and Lawyers, who absolutely and without any exception of heresy, or infidelity do in express words affirm, though not jointly and together, yet severally and apart, that neither the Pope hath any authority to depose Princes, or to inflict temporal punishments, not that the kingdom, or commonwealth hath any power, or authority over their absolute Prince to depose him. 35 For among those Doctors, who affirm, that the commonwealth hath authority over their Prince in some cases to depose him, there are many, whom I cited in the former part of this Treatise, and also answered all the objections that D. Schulckenius hath made against some of them, who do absolutely, and without any exception affirm, that the Pope hath not authority to depose Princes, and that the power of the Church, doth not extend to the inflicting of temporal punishments, as death, exile, privation of goods, imprisonment, etc. which their general assertion would be false, if the Pope had authority to depose Princes, and to inflict temporal punishments for any cause, crime, or end whatsoever. For if the Pope hath power to inflict temporal punishments for heresy, than it would be true, that the power of the Church doth extend to the inflicting of temporal punishments, and if the Pope can depose temporal Princes for heresy, than it followeth that the Pope can depose temporal Princes, which those Doctors do absolutely deny. 36 And among those Doctors, who are vehement for the Pope's authority to depose Princes, and to inflict temporal punishments, I brought u In Apol. nu. 411. also divers, who deny that the people, or commonwealth hath authority to depose their Prince. The Pope only hath authority to deprive, or depose Emperors, Kings, and Princes, saith Bartholus, Baldus, and Petrus Andreas Gambara. And Gregorius, Tholosnus, Barth. in leg. si Imperator. Cod. de Legibus nu. 4. Bald. in proaemio ff. veteris. Gambara in tract. de officio & potest. legati l. 2. tit. de varijs ordinar. titulis nu. 220. Gregor. Thol. l 26. de Rep. c. 5 nu. 14. 24. 25 albeit a French Doctor, yet denieth that the people, or commonwealth hath authority to judge, punish, or depose their King. And therefore he doth not approve that fact of the Peers of France in depriving Childericke, and expressly affirmeth, that Pipin usurped the Kingdom, and he reprehendeth also the Pope, who called, saith he, Pippin into Italy to help him against the Longobards, and when he came he absolved him from the oath he had made to his King Childerike, being neither heard, nor called, nor defended, nor accused, as Abbess Vspergensis, and Entropius do affirm, and afterwards he saith, that the Pope might be deceived in his opinion, for that he would reward Pippin bringing an army in his defence, with the hurt of another. And this in my judgement is one of the chief causes that moved the other French Doctors to be commonly of this opinion, that the commonwealth may depose their King in some cases, to excuse that fact of the French Peers in deposing Childerike their true and rightful King. 37 Also Alexander Carerius a vehement defender of the Pope's direct power in temporals, Carer. l. 2. de Rom. Pont. c. 2. 3 in favour of the Canonists against Cardinal Bellarmine, is of the same opinion: He that hath no judge upon earth, saith he, Cap. 3. we must confess that many judges cannot judge. For in denying a singularity by a collective and general word, plurals are accounted to be denied. It is manifest therefore, as hath been said before, that the Barons, and people for want of coactive power, or authority, which Vassals have not over their Lord, cannot judge, nor depose their Prince. And in the former Chapter answering the authority of Aristotle, The Philosopher, saith he, speaketh of a King, who is instituted by the election of the Community, for such a one is punished and deposed by the Community, which doth principally institute him, as the Venetians, and people of Genoa, who choose to themselves a Duke, and if he offend against the commonwealth she may depose him: But it is otherwise in a King, who naturally, and by succession, and descending of a certain race doth reign. And this assertion of Carerius, and others seemeth agreeable to the common doctrine of the ancient Fathers cited by me elsewhere, y Apol. nu. 5. & seq. & in Append. ad Supplicat. calum. 17. nu. 14. who expressly affirm, that Kings and Emperors are inferior to none, but God, to wit, in temporals, and that they can be punished, to wit, with temporal punishments by God alone, to whom only they are subject in temporals. So that you see, how cunningly the Cardinal of Peron handleth this controversy touching the deposition of Princes, confounding and involving both questions concerning the authority of the Pope, and also of the commonwealth to depose Princes together in one, and then in affirming, that Widdrington hath not brought any one Author (only D. Barclay excepted) who saith, that Princes for heresy cannot be deposed, to wit, neither by the Pope nor the commonwealth, which is very true, but it is not true that he hath brought no Authors who absolutely affirm, that the Pope hath no power to depose Princes, and that the Ecclesiastical power of the Church doth not extend to the inflicting of temporal punishments. 38 An other cunning the Lord Cardinal of Peron may use in confounding the oath, or religious bond of temporal allegiance with the civil, or natural bond thereof, which perchance he did for this end, that his speech concerning the Pope's authority to absolve from the oath of allegiance might seem more plausible to his audience, for that an oath is a sacred, and spiritual thing, and therefore not exceeding the object of the Pope's spiritual power; and all Divines do hold, that the Pope hath authority to absolve from oaths, either by releasing directly the spiritual bond itself, or consequently by declaring the thing, which is sworn not to be hic & nunc, in this particular case a fit matter of an oath, but temporal allegiance, and temporal kingdoms are temporal things, and therefore that the Pope by his spiritual power should have authority to dispose of temporal things, and to absolve from temporal allegiance, and to give, take away, translate, and dispose of temporal kingdoms, would have seemed very harsh in the years of the greatest part of true Frenchmen. z In Apol. nu. 148. 149. 39 But, besides that, as I have showed elsewhere, the Pope cannot, according to the doctrine of S. Thomas, and his followers, absolve from the oath of temporal allegiance, but by declaring the natural, or civil bond itself of temporal allegiance to be void, and of no force, and consequently to be no fit matter to be sworn, it little importeth to the main question, which is betwixt my Adversaries and me touching the Pope's power to depose Princes, and to absolve subjects from their temporal allegiance, whether the Pope can release, or take away the spiritual bond, and obligation of the oath of allegiance, it being a sacred and spiritual thing, and made only to confirm and corrobarate the former natural bond of temporal allegiance. For it doth not follow, as well noteth joannes Parisiensis, joan. Paris. de potest Reg. & Pap. c. 16. ad. 11 and I also observed in my Theological Disputation, a Cap. 6. sec. 3. that because the Pope can release, or take away the sacred, and religious bond of temporal allegiance, he can also release and dissolve the natural and civil bond, wherein all subjects by the law of God and nature stand bound to their temporal Prince, before they make any oath of temporal allegiance; and very few subjects in comparison of others do usually make any such oath of allegiance. And therefore perchance the Cardinal would for the cause aforesaid, rather discourse of the Pope's power to absolve subjects from the oath, that is, the sacred and spiritual bond of temporal allegiance, then to depose Princes, and to take away their Crowns, and Regal authority, which being taken away, both their temporal allegiance, and also the sacred and spiritual bond thereof, is by a necessary consequent forthwith dissolved. 37 And to omit diverse other cunning shifts, which the Cardinal of Peron hath used in his discourse touching the deposition of heretical Princes, and which the King's Majesty in his answer to the cardinals oration, hath in my opinion, very clearly, and excellently discovered; two notable cunnings, or rather frauds he hath used in translating into French the decree of the Council of Lateran, whereof now we treat. The first is in translating into French those words, Si Dominus temporalis, if any Prince, whereas it is manifest, that those words, Dominus temporalis do signify every Landlord, Mayor, judge, Consul, Potesta, Governor, Sheriff, Bailiff, Constable, or any other inferior Officer, or Petty Lord: and although the Cardinal will perchance affirm, that in those general words, Dominus temporalis, all Emperors, Kings, and absolute Princes are included, which nevertheless I have above confuted, yet to translate those words Dominus temporalis, any Prince, as though the Council had named Princes expressly, and by the name of Princes, cannot in my opinion be excused from an egregious fraud and falsehood. The second is, in translating those words, ut ipse (Summus Pontifex. Vasallos ab eius fidelitate denunciet abfolutos, that he (the Pope) may absolve his subjects from their oath of fidelity, whereas the words of the Council only are that he may denounce, or declare his Vassals absolved from their fidelity which words of the Council do expressly signify, that the vassals were before absolved from their fidelity, either by the decrees of Popes, or of temporal Princes, and that the Pope doth only denounce, or declare them absolved; besides that the word, vassals, he translateth subjects, which have far different significations, and that word a fidelitate, from their fidelity, he translateth from their oath of fidelity, which in a Translator, who is to set down not only the sense, but also the words, cannot be excused from an egregious corruption. 38 Lastly, I would gladly be resolved of this question, either by the Cardinal of Peron, or any other learned Catholic, whether if the Doctors of Sorbon, who hold the doctrine of the councils superiority above the Pope, to be true and conform to the word of God, and to the definitions of the general Counsels of Constance, and Basil, and consequently the contrary doctrine to be false, impious, and detestable, and contrary to the word of God, should make a decree, that all of their University should in their public Readins, Disputations, and writings defend it as certain, that is, should not maintain or teach the contrary doctrine as probable or in any sort: Or if the Doctors of Mentz, who are of opinion, that the doctrine for the immaculate Conception of the B. Virgin is true, conform to the word of God, and to the decree of the Council of Basil, and that the contrary is false, and against the word of God, and consequently impious, and detestable, should also make a Decree, as Surius affirmeth b Upon the year 1501. they have done, imitating, saith he, the decree of the Council of Basil, that it should be altogether held, that the most blessed mother of God was conceived without the spot of original sin, and did strictly ordain, that none hereafter should in that University be promoted in sacred Divinity, unless he should before by oath make promise, that he would neither maintain in his mind, nor any wise approve the contrary opinion: and the same question may be made concerning the jesuits doctrine de auxilijs gratiae: whether I say it must from hence be necessarily inferred, that the aforesaid Doctors should thereby take upon them to determine an article of faith, to make a manifest and inevitable schism in the Church of God, yea and to precipitate men into a manifest heresy, and account the Pope, if he should not hold the same, not to be the head of the Church, and Christ's Vicar, but an heretic, and Antichrist, and all the other parts of the Church, who should maintain the contrary, not to be true parts of the Church, but members of Antichrist? Of this question I would gladly be resolved; for the resolution thereof would give no small light, whereby the judicious Reader may see, of what force are the chiefest objections and inferences, that the Cardinal of Peron urgeth against the oath of France, and the decree of the Parliament of Paris made the second of january 1615. 39 And thus much concerning the Lord Cardinal of Peron, whom in truth I was very loath to mention for the great reverence and respect, wherewith I honour his Grace in regard of the singular gifts of honour, and nature, wherewith he is adorned, but that the defence of truth in this important question, touching our duties to God and Caesar, and of my innocency, which the slanderous tongues of some have unjustly branded with the infamous note of error, and heresy, for impugning their new invented Catholic faith, touching the Pope's power to depose Princes; and also the publishing of his oration to the view of the world, whereby many unlearned Catholics, not being able to discern his artificial and cunning manner, both in propounding and handling this dangerous question touching the deposition of Princes, are pitifully deluded, and seduced, have urged me thereunto. Now to the matter from whence upon this occasion given me by my Adversary touching the doctrine of joannes Parisiensis, I have made this digression. 40 And as for the matter itself, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, c pag. 160. n. 7. for the which my Adversary Widdrington produceth their testimonies, (to wit, to prove, that many decrees of the Popes, and general councils touching temporal things have been always made with the express, Nu. 47. or secret consent of Princes) I cannot see what he could gain, or prove thereby for the question now in hand, if it should be granted him. For would he infer, that because many things have been decreed by Popes, and Counsels touching temporal matters, therefore no such thing could be decreed in the Council of Lateran without them? Who seethe not the weakness, and absurdity of this inference, seeing that nothing else can follow of those premises directly, but that, as divers other decrees concerning temporal matters, have been made with the consent of the Princes, so also it may be, that this Canon of the Council of Lateran was made in like manner with their consent; which no man will deny; yea we willingly grant not only that it might be so, but also that it was so and infer thereupon, that forasmuch as all Christian Princes gave their consent to this Canon in that famous general Council (which was, as I may say, the Parliament of all Christendom) therefore they are, and ever shall be subject thereto, except it be repealed by some other general Council of like authority. But how doth it follow, that because this, and divers other Canons concerning political matters, have been ratified by temporal Princes, therefore they could not be lawfully made without their consent? which is the point, that Widdrington must prove, if he will argue to the purpose. 41 But if Mr. Fitzherbert had been pleased to consider with an indifferent eye my answer, and the principal drift and scope thereof, he might easily have seen that my answer was good and strong, and the authority which I brought from joannes Parisiensis, and Hostiensis, sufficient to confirm the same. For my principal answer was this, that the decree of the Council of Lateran did not in those general words, Dominus temporalis, Dominus principalis, & non habens Dominos principales, comprehend absolute Princes, but only inferior Landlords, Magistrates, or Lords, it being made by the consent and authority of absolute Princes, as ordaining the inflicting of temporal punishments, which to ordain doth not belong to the spiritual, but only to the temporal power, and that therefore not only it did not, but also it could not in those general words comprehend absolute Princes themselves, by whose authority it was made. And to prevent an objection, which I foresaw some might make, to wit, that the decrees and Canons of Popes and Counsels, have their force to bind from the authority of the Church, and not from the consent, approbation, ratification, or authority of temporal Princes, I gave the aforesaid answer, that Popes and Counsels do oftentimes ordain many things, which to ordain belongeth rather to the civil, then to the Ecclesiastical power, by the express or consent of Princes, who are present by themselves, or their Ambassadors, or else presuming, or at leastwise hoping that temporal Princes will ratify the same: and for the confirmation hereof, I brought the authority of Hostiensis, who affirmeth that according to the opinion of some Doctors, which also Pope Innocent, & Io. Andreas do affirm, that the Canon Ad abolendam, de haereticis, wherein it is ordained, that if Counts and Barons, Rectours and Consuls of Cities, and of other places do refuse to take an oath to defend the Church against heretics, they shall be deprived of their honour, had therefore force to bind, because the Emperor gave his consent thereunto. And that therefore it is no marvel if this decree of the Lateran Council, for as much as concerneth the inflicting of temporal punishments, had therefore force to bind, for that temporal Princes consented thereunto. 42 And by this it is clear, that my meaning was not only to affirm, that the decree of the Lateran Council, for as much as concerneth the inflicting of temporal punishments, was made by the consent of absolute Princes, only in that manner as absolute Princes do give their consent to the making of Ecclesiastical laws, and Canons, which do merely proceed from Ecclesiastical or spiritual authority, but also that it was made by the consent and authority of absolute Princes, for that to ordain the inflicting of temporal punishments belongeth rather to the Civil, then to the Ecclesiastical power, and therefore it would not have had force to bind, unless absolute Princes had consented thereunto: As likewise the Canon, Ad abolendam, wherein temporal punishments were inflicted, was therefore of force, according to the opinion of some Canonists, as Hostiensis relateth, for that the Emperor consented thereunto, although the ordaining or inflicting of Excommunication, which in that Canon Ad abolendam, was joined together with the deprivation of temporal honour, as it is also joined in the decree of the Lateran Council, did proceed, and had force to bind, from the spiritual authority of the Church, to whom only it belongeth to inflict Ecclesiastical Censures. 43 Now Mr. Fitzherbert, is it possible, that you should be so ignorant, as not to understand the force of my answer, and that I brought the testimonies of joannes Parisiensis, and Hostiensis to great purpose? Do not you see what I gain for the question which is in hand, if you grant me that the decree of the Lateran Counsel, as also that Canon, Ad abolendam, according to those Doctors cited by Hostiensis, had their force to bind from the consent of temporal Princes? Can you be so blind as not to see, how this inference is not weak, and absurd, but strong and certain, that because this, and other decrees of Popes and Counsels, concerning the inflicting of temporal punishments were, I do not only say, ratified by temporal Princes, but had their force to bind from the consent of temporal Princes, therefore they could not be lawfully made without their ratification, and consent, which is the point you say I must prove if I will argue to the purpose? unless your weakness will admit that a law may lawfully or legally be made without that, by virtue whereof it hath force to bind, as those Canonists cited by Hostiensis, Pope Innocent, and joannes Andreas do affirm, that the Canon, Ad abolendam, ideo valuisse quia Imperator, aut Princeps consensit, Was therefore of force, because the Emperor or Prince gave his consent? 44 And as for that inference you make, that if that Canon of the Lateran Council (which was as it were a Parliament of all Christendom) was made by the consent, and I also add by the authority of all Christian Princes, therefore it cannot be repealed, but by some other general Council of like authority, although it nothing concerneth the deposition of absolute Princes; by whose authority it was made, but only of inferior Landlords, Magistrates, or Lords; yet of what force this inference is, you may for your better instruction see above d Ch. 8. nu. 27. by the doctrine of Suarez, who declareth in what manner the law of Nations may in this or that Nation be repealed, for that a law of a general Council made by the consent and authority of all Christian Princes, is, as I may say, a law of all Christian Nations. 45 But let us go on, and see how well you prove that it is absurd to say, that the Canon of the Lateran Council, and divers other Canons, concerning political matters, could not be lawfully made without the consent of temporal Princes. But how absurd is this, saith Mr. Fitzherbert e Pag. 161. num. 8. , it may appear even by widdrington's former grant, and express doctrine f Chap. 2. num. 1. & 2. , touching the Pope's power to command corporal and temporal things, as they serve, or are reduced to spiritual: for this power being spiritual (in respect of the spiritual end whereto it reduceth all temporal things) must needs be independent of temporal Princes, unless we shall also grant them a supreme spiritual authority. 46 But how vain this inference is I have clearly showed before, g Chap. 6. num. 66 & seq. by declaring the difference betwixt the directive and coercive power, and the proper acts and objects of them both, which my Adversary not distinguishing doth thereby confound the understanding of his unlearned Reader. For the object of the spiritual power as it is directive, or commanding, are all those things spiritual or temporal, which by the reference or reduction of them to a spiritual end, may become spiritual things, to wit, virtuous or vicious actions, which are the acts & objects of the spiritual power, as it is directive, & this spiritual power is independent of temporal Princes: but the object of the spiritual power, as it is coercive or punishing, are not all spiritual things, but only spiritual punishments; and because no reduction of temporal punishments to a spiritual end can make temporal punishments to become spiritual punishments, therefore temporal punishments, although by reducing them to a spiritual end, may become spiritual things, which are the object of the spiritual power, as it is directive, yet still they remain temporal punishments, and therefore cannot by any reduction become the object of the spiritual power, as it is coercive, or punishing; whereupon the inflicting of such punishments, for what end soever they be inflicted, must needs remain dependent upon the consent and authority of temporal Princes. Neither also can my Adversary be so ignorant, as to affirm that temporal Princes cannot use their supreme temporal power to a spiritual end, as to the rooting out of heresy, adultery, and all other crimes, unless we grant them a supreme spiritual authority. 47 Besides that this may be convinced, saith Mr. Fitzherbert h Pag. 161. num. 8. , by the practice of all the primitive Church in the time of the Pagan Emperors, when not only corporal, and temporal things were commanded by the Church, but temporal and comporall penalties ordained without the ratification, or consent of any temporal Prince. This indeed were somewhat to the purpose, if Mr. Fitzherbert could convince, that in the primitive Church, before Kings, and Emperor were Christians, temporal penalties were not only commanded, but also ordained as to ordain is distinguished from to command, for than it must needs follow that the primitive Church did not only command the inflicting of temporal punishments, without the consent and authority of temporal Princes, and that temporal punishments were then the object of the spiritual power, as it is directive, which I never denied, but also did inflict temporal punishments, and that temporal punishments were then the object of the spiritual power, as it is coercive, or punishing, which I utterly deny. Observe now what pitiful arguments this silly man bringeth for convincing proofs. 48 This may appear, saith he, by a decree of Pope Calixtus e Epist. 2. Callixt. tom. 1. Concil. , in the time of the Emperor Alexander Severus, whereby as well Laymen, as Priests, and Cleargie-men were forbidden upon pain of infamy to make conspiracies against their Bishops. 48 The words of Pope Calixtus to the Bishops of France, are these: We have heard that the crimes of conspiracies do reign in your parts; and it hath been made manifest unto us, that their people do conspire against their Bishops. The subtlety, or malice of which offence is abominable, not only among Christians, but also among Heathens, and is forbidden by external laws; And therefore not only Ecclesiastical, but also Secular laws do condemn them that are guilty of this crime, and not only those that do conspire, but those also who consent to them. And our predecessors with a great company of Bishops have commanded all them that are placed in Priestly dignity, or are Clergymen, to fall from the dignity, which they have, & have commanded, that the rest be deprived of Communion, and to be banished from the Church, and have thought, or judged all men together of either order to be infamous, & not only the doers, but those also that consent to them. And a little beneath, And these are not to be admitted to the accusing of any man, nor the word of them, or of excommunicated persons can hurt or accuse any man. 49 But this authority of Pope Calixtus, and all other such like, as of Pope Anacletus, Pope Pius, and others related by Gratian 3. q. 4. are easily answered. For as there are two sorts of Laws, Courts, or Tribunals, the spiritual & the temporal; so also there are two sorts of infamy, as infamy is taken for a penalty ordained by the law f Vide silvest verbo infamia. Greg. Tholo. in Syntag juris lib. 31. cap. 29. num. 7. and other Doctors, Cod. ex quibus causis infamia irrogatur, & ff. de ijs qui notantur infamiae. , the one is called infamia juris Canonica, infamy of the spiritual Court, by virtue whereof the person made infamous is deprived, and made incapable of spiritual dignities, and his word or testimony is of no force to hurt any man in this spiritual Court, and for as much as concerneth spiritual dignities, punishments, or Censures; and of this infamy, the aforesaid decree of Callixtus, and all other Ecclesiastical Canons made by spiritual authority, wherein the penalty of infamy is inflicted, are to be understood. The other infamy is ordained by the Civil law, and is called by the Lawyers, infamia juris Civilis, infamy of the Civil law, or Court, by virtue of which the person made infamous is deprived, or made incapable of Secular dignities, and his testimony is not admitted to hurt any man in the Civil, and criminal Court, and for as much as concerneth temporal dignities, and temporal punishments. And of this civil infamy, the words of Pope Calixtus are not to be understood. Neither can any man be so senseless as to conceive, that the Popes of the primitive Church, declaring those to be infamous, and not to be admitted to accuse or give testimony against any man, who did forsake the Christian Religion, & became Apostates, and made conspiracies against Bishops, and excommunicated persons, did intend to make them incapable of Secular dignities, and not to be admitted to accuse, or give testimony in the Secular Court, wherein the Popes themselves, and all Christians were punished, and persecuted for Christian Religion, and Apostates and accusers of Bishops were rewarded. 50 The second convincing proof that the Popes of the primitive Church, in the time of the Pagan Emperors, did not only command, but also ordain temporal punishments, Mr. Fitzherbert bringeth from the authority of Pope Vrbanus: g Epist. Vrbani tom. 1. Concil. & 17. q. 4. can. Attendendum est. And his Successor Vrbanus, saith he, h Pa. 161. nu. 9 ordained in like sort the penalty of infamy, adding also imprisonment, and perpetual banishment for such as should go about to vex and molest Churches, and to deprive them of their goods, and possessions. But this proof is as insufficient as the former: First, for that this Epistle of Vrbanus is not authentical, but counterfeit and falsely imposed upon Pope Vrbanus, as may evidently appear by the subscriptions of the Consuls, to wit, of Antoninus, and Alexander, whereas it is evident, as Baronius, i Adamun 224 and other Historiographers do witness, that Antoninus was slain in the fourth year of Pope Callixtus in the year of our Lord 224. two years before Vrbanus was created Pope. 51 Secondly, for that it is also evident, that the whole Canon, Attendendum, wherein the penalty of infamy, imprisonment, and of perpetual banishment is ordained, as it is set down, 17. q. 4. by Gratian, hath been thrust in by some one, or other to this Epistle, for that it hath no coherence at all with the words of the Epistle, which immediately follow, wherein the reason of this decree is given, whereas if the whole Canon Attendendum be left out, the sense is perfect, and the reason there alleged very apt and sufficient. For what coherence, I pray you, is there betwixt these words of this Canon, that if any man molest Churches, he shall be condemned of perpetual infamy, and he imprisoned, and banished for ever, with these words, which in the Epistle immediately follow, because we ought, according to the Apostle, to deliver such a man to Satan, that the spirit may be safe in the day of our Lord, etc. Which nevertheless is a very fit reason of that which immediately goeth before this whole Canon Attendendum; to wit, that church-good ought not to be taken away by any man, and applied to profane uses, lest they incur the punishment, and death of Ananias, and Saphira, and which is worse be made Anathema maranatha, and if they shall not fall dead in body, as Ananias, and Saphira did, yet there soul which is of more worth than the body doth fall dead, and be separated from the company of the faithful, and doth slide into the deep pit of hell, because, according to the Apostle, we ought to deliver such a man to Satan, etc. which words, as you see, have a perfect sense, and give a very fit reason of the former words, if the whole Canon Attendendum be left out, and with it there is no sense, and coherence of the words at all. 52 Thirdly, what man can be so simple as to imagine, that either Pope Vrbanus, or any other Pope of the primitive Church in the time of the Pagan Emperors, when not only the goods of the Church were profaned, taken away, and spoiled, but also the Christians themselves imprisoned, banished, and put to cruel death, would make a Decree, that whosoever did take away, or profane the goods of Churches should be committed to prison, or perpetually banished; even as if Mr. Archpriest should now make a decree, that whatsoever Catholic shall take the oath of allegiance, or repair to Protestant Churches shall be imprisoned, or perpetually banished: and yet these in my adversaries judgement, are, forsooth, convincing proofs. Nevertheless this punishment of infamy is to be understood, as I showed before, of spiritual infamy, to wit, forasmuch as concerneth the spiritual Court: and the penalty of perpetual banishment, is to be understood of spiritual banishment, or of banishment from the Church, as it is expressly affirmed in the decree of his Predecessor Pope Callixtus. And therefore Mr. Fitzherbert may use some fraud, in urging from the decree of Pope Vrbanus the penalty of banishment, and in concealing the said penalty, in the decree of his Predecessor Pope Callixtus, who in express words made mention of banishment from the Church. 53 The third convincing proof, Mr. Fitzherbert taketh from the authority of a Provincial Council k pag. 162. nu. 9 held at Eliberis l De Consecrat. dist. 1. can. Omnis homo. in Spain in the time of Constantius, father to Constantine the great, & Galerius, which enacted, that men should abstain from their wives, not only some days before they received the B. Sacrament, m Barchard. l. 19 c. 17. & Iuo p. 15. c. 88 vide Binium tom. 1. Concil. in notis in Concil. Eliber. & Baron tom. 2. Annal. anno 305. in fine. but also in time of Lent, and Easter, assigning for the later ayeeres' penance, or to pay five and twenty shillings to the Church, or to the poor: and in another Canon they ordained that Bishops, and their Ministers n Burchard. l. 11. c. 67. Iuo p. 14. c. 115. might whip husbandmen with rods, for great crimes, to make them do penance against their wills, lest they might perish eternally; in which Canons, as also in the former Decrees of the Pope's Callixtus, and Vrbanus, the penalties imposed were mere temporal, albeit there was not then, as I have said, any Christian Prince to ratify the same. 54 But this proof also is as insufficient as the former. First, for that many learned men, as the Reader may see in Binnius, to whom Mr. Fitzherbert remitteth him, do reject this Council, and account it erroneous for decreeing certain errors: so Melchior Canus, Canus l. 5. de locis c. 4. Bellar. l. 2. de Imaginib. c. 9 and Cardinal Bellarmine. And although Baronius cited also by Binnius, excuseth the Fathers of that Council, yet for that they seemed in divers of their decrees to favour the errors of Novatian, which were displeasing to their Successors, his opinion is, that there is no mention made by name of this Synod by ancient writers, and so it did remain almost abolished; and yet my Adversary will from this Council bring, forsooth, a convincing proof. 55 Secondly, for that these two decrees cited here by Mr. Fitzherbert, are not placed with the other Canons of the Council, but are adjoined as certain fragments belonging thereunto. Wherefore if some Authors, as Vasquez witnesseth, stick not to affirm, Vasq. 3. part. disp. 105 cap. 2 tom. 1. that divers decrees, which are placed among the Canons of this Council, were not made by the Council, but by some one, or other adjoined afterwards, with far greater reason it may be said, that these two decrees, which by Binnius are reputed only as fragments, and not placed among the rest of the Canons, were not made by the Council, but adjoined afterwards by some one or other, whom Burchardus, Iuo, & others following did attribute them to this Council, in that manner as divers books are attributed to S. Augustine, S. chrysostom, and other Fathers, & are printed among their works, & under their names, which were never made by them 56 Thirdly, for that some learned men, as Garsias Loaisa, o Whom Binnius in the place above cited calleth a most learned Interpreter. a collector of all the councils held in Spain, are of opinion, that this Council was not celebrated in the time of Constantius, and Galerius, but after the Council of Nice in the time of Constantine the great: and therefore no convincing proof can be brought from the authority of this Council, as my Adversary pretendeth, to show that in the time of the Pagan Emperors, temporal and corporal punishments, were not only commanded, but also ordained by the Church, without the ratification and consent of any temporal Prince: seeing that, according to the opinion of learned men, this Council was not held in the time of the Pagan Emperors, but after the Council of Nice, in the time of Constantine the great, who, as we may well suppose, would ratify whatsoever the Pastors of the Church should think expedient, and necessary for the spiritual good thereof, and the eternal salvation of souls. 57 But lastly, from these two Canons here cited by my Adversary, this only, at the most, can be forcibly deduced, that spiritual Pastors have authority to impose, command, and enjoin temporal and corporal penances, punishments, and afflictions, as to abstain for certain days from carnal copulation, and likewise to fast, to wear haircloth, to give alms, and such like, which was ordained in the first Canon, or to beat themselves, or else to suffer themselves for their penance to be beaten with rods, which was ordained in the second Canon: and of this I never made doubt, but I did ever grant, that the Church hath authority by the institution of Christ to impose, enjoin, or command temporal and corporal afflictions, penalties, or punishments, but all the difficulty betwixt my Adversaries and me, is concerning the coercive, compulsive, or punishing power of the Church, that is, if they should refuse to obey the commandment of their Pastors, and would not abstain from the acts of matrimony, nor beat themselves, nor suffer themselves to be beaten with rods, with what kind of punishments could the Church, by her spiritual authority, which she hath received from Christ, force and compel them thereunto; to wit, whether by inflicting upon them temporal and corporal punishments, as my Adversaries contend, or only spiritual Censures, by depriving them either wholly, or in part of spiritual, or Ecclesiastical communion, as many other Catholics do probably according to my doctrine affirm: this is the plain, and main controversy, as I have often said. 58 Neither can it be proved by any of these Canons, that the coercive, or compulsive spiritual power of spiritual Pastors, doth extend to the inflicting of corporal, or temporal punishments, but only of Ecclesiastical Censures, as it may sufficiently appear by the second Canon here cited, wherein is decreed, that Si seniores ipsorum colonorum, etc. If the more ancient of these husbandmen (giving thereby to understand, that the husbandmen, who were to be whipped by the Bishops, or their Ministers for penance, were boys or youths) shall take it in ill part, or will therefore use any revenge, or shall presume to defend them, that they be not beaten, they shall be punished with the sentence of Ecclesiastical Excommunication. Wherefore those words of this Canon, that they may do penance against their wills, are not to be understood, against their wills simply and absolutely, by corporal force and violence, which taketh away all willingness, for such kind of penance, or satisfaction is not acceptable before almighty God, or of any merit at all before God, but they are to be understood against their wills, secundum quid, in some sort, as Merchants against their wills, for fear of being drowned cast their goods into the Sea, to wit, that they shall be compelled to do penance, and suffer themselves to be beaten against their wills, for fear of being otherwise thrust out of the Church, and deprived of Ecclesiastical communion, which kind of compulsion being simply voluntary, p See Disputat. Theol. c. 9 sec. unit. and involuntary only secundum quid, may stand with that free will, which is the ground and root of meritorious, and willing satisfaction acceptable in the sight of God. Neither doth Mr. Fitzherbert by the rest of his examples grounded upon the authority of the Apostles, prove any other thing, but that spiritual Pastors may by their spiritual authority, without the consent and authority of temporal Princes impose, enjoin, or command, temporal and corporal penalties, afflictions and punishments, and in this sense ordain, and depose of them. For thus he writeth: 59 Hereto may be added, saith he, q Pag. 162. nu. 10. 11. the Constitution of the Apostles themselves in their Council held at Jerusalem, wherein they imposed upon the Christians a burden (as they called it) whereof part was merely temporal, to wit, to abstain from blood, and that which was strangled; Act. 15. Visum est, say they, Spiritui sancto, & nobis, etc. It hath seemed good to the holy Ghost, and us, to lay no further burden upon you, than these necessary things, that you abstain from things immolated to Idols, and blood, and that which is strangled, and fornication. Thus said they in their Canon, disposing, as you see, of a temporal thing by their own Apostolical authority, without any hope, or expectation of the consent, or ratification of any temporal Magistrate; as they also did the like in the institution of Lent, which, as all the Fathers do acknowledge, is an Apostolical tradition, and consisteth in a mere temporal affliction; and the like may be said, not only of all the examples alleged by me before, r See c. 2. nu. 2 3. & 4. concerning the practice of the Apostles (partly in s Act 5.6. & 13 corporal punishments, and partly in the disposition t 1. Cor. 6. of temporal things) but also of the custom of the primitive Church, to impose corporal penances u Cypr. epist. 10 ad Clerum. Tertul. de paenit. cap. 10. consisting in fasting, watching, wearing of haircloth, and such like, which albeit they were temporal things, yet were imposed by the Church upon her children, by her own authority, though always for a spiritual end, to wit, for the good of souls, and Gods greater glory and service. 60 Whereupon it followeth, that the Church may also now in like manner dispose of temporal things to the same end, by her own authority, without demanding the consent, or ratification of any temporal Prince: for no sufficient reason can be assigned, why the Church could do it then, and not now; neither yet why it may for a spiritual end punish a man temporally, in his body, by some corporal affliction, and in his honour by infamy, and not in his temporal goods, and state; especially seeing that all temporal goods are inferior to the body, and both body and goods, ordained for the service of the soul, and for spiritual ends; Whereupon, I say, it followeth evidently, that the consent of temporal Princes is altogether needless to the validity of Ecclesiastical Constitutions concerning temporal things, albeit the Church hath always used to avail herself of their authority and power, for the execution of all her Decrees, as well spiritual, as temporal matters and to that end admitteth, and requireth the assistance of temporal Princes, or their Ambassadors in general councils; so as by all this it appeareth evidently, that the Council of Lateran needed not the consent, or ratification of the Emperor, or other temporal Princes for the validity of the Canon now in question; and consequently that my adversaries first answer to the objection proposed by himself, is to no purpose. 61 Hear you see, how Mr. Fitzherbert rangeth up and down to no purpose, spending many words idly to prove that which no man denieth, to wit, that the Church by her spiritual authority may without the consent of Prince's command, enjoin, or impose temporal, and corporal penalties, which I have always granted, yet craftily confounding in his inferences ordaining with commanding, disposing with imposing, and punishing temporally with enjoining temporal punishments, which I have ever distinguished. He took upon him, as you heard, to convince by the practice of all the primitive Church in the time of the Pagan Emperors, that corporal and temporal things were not only commanded, but also ordained by the Church without the ratification, and consent of any temporal Prince, because a little before x See nu. 45. he doth acknowledge, that I do grant, and expressly teach, that the Pope hath power to command corporal, and temporal things, as they are reduced to spiritual, and yet here he proveth nothing else either by the Constitutions of the Apostles, or by the practice of the primitive Church, but that spiritual Pastors may by their ordinary power (for our question is not concerning the extraordinary power which the Apostles had to work miracles) command, impose, and enjoin temporal, and corporal things, as to abstain from blood, and that which is strangled, from the eating of flesh upon certain days, as in Lent, rather to suffer wrong, and to appoint arbitrary judges among themselves to compose quietly their strifes, then to have recourse to the tribunals of infidel judges, and to do corporal and temporal penances; and that the Church may now also do the same, and that therefore the consent of temporal Princes is altogether needless to the validity of such Ecclesiastical Canons, and constitutions, which do only command, impose, or enjoin corporal, and temporal penances and punishments; and of this no Catholic maketh doubt. 62 But that the primitive Church, did by her ordinary power (for of miraculous and extraordinary power, which is not to descend necessarily to Successors, I do not speak) not only command, and impose, but also did inflict temporal and corporal punishments without the consent of the party who was punished, and did dispose of temporal things, as to dispose is distinguished from to impose, or command, to wit, by depriving Christians of temporal right, power, and authority, or that the consent and authority of temporal Princes is not necessary to the validity of such Ecclesiastical Canons, and Constitutions, as is this decree of the Lateran Council which is now in question, wherein temporal punishments are not only commanded, or imposed, but also inflicted, or that the assistance of temporal Princes, or their Ambassadors is not only required in general councils for the execution, and not for the confirmation and validity of such decrees, wherein temporal punishments are inflicted, and temporal things not only commanded, or imposed, but also disposed of, Mr. Fitzherbert hath not brought here from the practice of the Primitive Church so much as any probable, or colourable, much less, as he vaunted, any convincing proof: and consequently my first answer to the objection which I propounded, standeth yet firm, and solid, and what he hath objected to the contrary is to no purpose at all. CHAP. XII. Wherein an other answer of Widdrington grounded upon certain Glossers, or Expositors of the Canon Law is confuted, and M. fitzherbert's exceptions against the same are proved to be fraudulent, and insufficient, and moreover it is showed, that from no Canon of the Church it can be proved, that the custom of the Church is to inflict by her spiritual power, I do not say, to command or impose temporal penalties: and the true difference between the Divines, and Canonists concerning the Pope's power in temporals, is declared. 1 MY second answer to the objection before mentioned was taken from an exposition of the Gloss upon the Canon Adrianus dist. 63. Where the Pope commandeth the goods of those who do violate his Decree to be confiscated, and upon the Canon, Delatori 5. q. 6. where he ordaineth the tongues of calumniatours, or false accusers, to be pulled out, or being convicted their heads to be strooken off. For to these Decrees the Gloss answereth thus, Hîc docere Ecclesiam quid facere debeat judex Secularis, The Church teacheth here, what a Secular judge ought to do. Which answer of the Gloss may be accommodated or applied to the like Decrees, wherein the sacred Canons do inflict temporal punishments. And this answer the words of Silvester do also favour etc. Thus I answered in the foresaid Preface. 2 Now to this my answer Mr. Fitzherbert replieth, a Pag. 166. nu. 1. 2. that it is as idle as the former. For although it were true, saith he, that this Gloss were to be understood, as Widdrington would have it, yet it would not follow thereon, that the same may be truly applied to all other Decrees of the Church, which concern the imposition of temporal punishments (especially to the Canon of the Council of Lateran, which ordaineth the deposition of Princes) for this Gloss doth treat only of such, as are subject to the jurisdiction of judges, and Secular Magistrates, whereas the Canon of the Lateran Council speaketh of absolute Princes, on whom no Secular judge, or Magistrate can execute any penalty, and therefore there is such disparity in these cases, that the Gloss objected by my Adversary Widdrington cannot be justly applied to both alike. 3 But this Reply of Mr. Fitzherbert is as idle, and insufficient as his former. For first, he supposeth as certain, that the Council of Lateran ordained the deposition of Emperors, Kings, and all absolute Princes, which, as you have seen, he hath not as yet, by all the helps he hath had from Fa. Lessius, sufficiently convinced. Secondly, if we respect the force, and propriety of the words, these two Canons, especially the former, are, according to Mr. Fitzherbert's own grounds, rather to be understood of absolute Princes than is the Decree of the Lateran Council, for that the words of these Canons, especially of the former, are general, and do not denote titles of inferior honour, or dignity: The Pope, saith the Canon Hadrianus, did excommunicate, and commanded, unless he should repent, his goods to be proclaimed, or confiscated, whosoever should infringe this Decree, whereas the Council of Lateran doth not speak in such general terms, but only it mentioneth persons of inferior state, dignity, and title, then are Emperors, Kings, and absolute Princes, to wit, temporal and principal Landlords, Governors, or Lords, or who have not any principal Landlords, Governors, or Lords above them, but only Emperors, Kings, or absolute Princes: But the truth is, that both the Decree of the Lateran Council, and these Canons do not comprehend absolute Princes, but only inferior persons, and subjects. 4 Thirdly, if this exposition of the Gloss is to be approved, my Adversaries can bring no sufficient reason, why the same may not also be applied to all other such like Canons of the Church, wherein the inflicting of temporal punishments is ordained, and especially to the Decree of the Lateran Council, to wit, that all such Canons do only teach, or declare, what hath been done, or is to be done by Secular Princes, or their Officers. For, beside that the reason, which here Mr. Fitzherbert bringeth, why the Decree of the Lateran Council cannot be expounded in this sense, (because saith he, the Canon of the Lateran Council speaketh of absolute Princes, is a mere prtitio principij, a giving that for a reason, which is the main question between us, and hath not as yet been sufficiently proved by him) the words of the Lateran Council, according to their proper signification do chief import this sense. For the Council doth not decree, that the Pope may absolve those vassal from their fidelity, but the words of the Council only are, that the Pope may denounce, that is, may declare, or teach, that those vassals are absolved from their fidelity, to wit, by the consent, and authority of absolute Princes. 5 And if the Gloss, and diverse other Doctors, whom I related elsewhere; expounding the Canon Alius, 15. q. 6. wherein Pope Gregory the 7th. in his Epistle to the Bishop of Mentz, affirmeth, b Xpolog. nu. 444. that an other Bishop of Rome called Zacharie deposed the King of France from his kingdom, and absolved all the Frenchmen from their oath of allegiance, do thus interpret those words, he deposed the King, and absolved the Frenchmen, that is, he consented to them that deposed him, and declared him to be lawfully deposed, and the Frenchmen to be lawfully absolved from their allegiance, why may not this Canon of the Lateran Council be understood in this sense, that from that time the Pope may denounce, that is declare, and teach, that the vassals of that temporal Landlord, Governor, or Lord, who, for neglecting to purge his territories from heresy, is for a whole year excommunicated, are absolved from their fealty, and their territories exposed to be taken by Catholics, especially seeing that the word, denounce, or declare is in this Canon expressly contained? 6 And if any one object, that the words of the Lateran Council cannot be well understood in this sense, that the Pope may denounce, that is, may declare, and teach, that the vassals are absolved from their fealty, to wit, by force of some temporal law, or constitution, made by the consent and authority of absolute Princes, for that before this Council of Lateran there was no such decree or constitution of temporal Princes, by virtue whereof the vassals of such a temporal Landlord, were absolved from their fealty, and therefore those words of the Council are so to be understood, that the Pope may not only declare and teach that they are absolved, but also really absolve such vassals from their fealty. To this objection I answer, that albeit I have not seen any such temporal law, or Constitution of any temporal Prince, before it is was enacted by Fredrick the second Emperor five years after this Lateran Council, by virtue whereof such Vassals are absolved from their fealty, yet we find, that Pope Gregory the seventh, long before in the Canon Nos Sanctorum 15. q. 6. did absolve them, who either by allegiance, or by oath were obliged to excommunicated persons, from their oath of fidelity, to which Canon those words of the Lateran Council, if they be understood in the aforesaid sense, may have reference, but then we must consequently to our doctrine say, that both this decree of the Lateran Council, forasmuch as it concerneth the inflicting of this temporal punishment, and also the Canon, Nos sanctorum have only force to bind in the territories of the Church, or the Pope's Dominions, wherein he being a temporal Prince hath authority to inflict temporal punishments, or that they have force to bind by the consent, and authority of temporal Princes. 7 Neither have I used any fraud in alleging and applying the words of the Gloss to my purpose, as Mr. Fitzherbert untruly affirmeth: Besides that, saith he, b pa. 166. nu. 3 my Adversary Widdrington hath used no small fraud in the allegation, and application of the Gloss to his purpose: for whereas he mentioneth the Gloss upon two several decretals, he setteth down only the later, as though the same might serve indifferently for both, and were so meant by the Glosser, or that the two Decrees were both of one substance, and nature, as they are not, but far different, and therefore do require a different consideration. 8 But it is not true, that in setting down the words of the later Gloss, to wit, upon the Canon, Delatori, I have omitted the words of the former Gloss upon the Canon Hadrianus, seeing that the words of both Glosses are in substance all one, and have the same sense, and signification. For the words of the later Gloss are these, Sed qualiter dat Papa etc. But how doth the Pope make laws concerning the punishment of blood, against that decree of the Council of Toledo 23. q. 8. his a quibus? But here the Pope teacheth what the Secular judge ought to do according to the Imperial law 27. q. 1. si quis rapuerit. And the words of the former Gloss upon the Canon Hadrianus, where the Pope commandeth the goods of all those who do violate his Decree to be confiscated, are these: Hîc Ecclesia publicat, etc. Hear the Church doth confiscate the goods of Laymen, and sometimes she deposeth Laymen from their dignities 3●. q. 5. praeceptum in fine. Or else say, that here the Church teacheth what ought to be done: so 24. q. 3. de illicita, and 5. q. 6. Delatori. Wherefore it is manifest that the words of both the Glosses have the self same sense, seeing that for the understanding of the former Gloss, he remitteth his Reader to the words of the later Gloss, upon the Canon Delatori, which I did set down. 9 Neither did I intend to set down all the expositions, which were brought by the former Gloss: It was sufficient for me to bring that exposition of the Gloss, which served to my purpose, to wit, that as the Pope in the Canon Delatori ordaining a temporal punishment, though criminal, did according to the Gloss teach, and declare what ought to be done by the Secular judge according to the Imperial law, so also the Pope in the Canon Hadrianus ordaining a temporal punishment, though civil, to wit, the confiscation of goods, did also according to one exposition of the Gloss teach and declare what ought to be done by the Secular Prince, or judge: and that therefore the same words, or answer of the Gloss upon the Canon Delatori, which I only set down, to which he remitteth his Reader upon the Canon Hadrianus, might serve indifferently for both And although civil, and bloody, or criminal punishments, as criminal is opposed to Civil, and the decrees which ordain, and inflict the same, are of a different substance, and nature in particular, yet in general they are of the same substance, and nature, for that both of them are temporal punishments, and cannot, according to the probable doctrine of many learned Catholics, be inflicted by the spiritual, or Ecclesiastical, but only by the civil, or temporal power; and that therefore when either of them are inflicted by spiritual Pastors, this proceedeth from the civil authority, privileges, or consent of temporal Princes, or if we will needs have such decrees to be made by true spiritual authority, the Church in making such decrees, as well concerning civil, as criminal, or bloody punishments, doth according to the expositions of the Gloss before rehearsed, teach, and declare, what a Secular Prince, or judge ought to do. 10 But to the end, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, c Pag. 166. num. 4. that the Reader may the better understand this matter, and the true sense, and meaning of these two Glosses, it is to be considered first, that the Glosses of the Law being commonly very brief (and therefore many times obscure) are to be understood according to the drift, sense, and circumstances, not only of the particular Canons glossed, but also of other Canons, and Glosses in other parts, and places of the Law. 11 True it is, that when the Glosses, or expositions of the law are obscure, as being commonly brief (although not so brief, and for this respect not so obscure, as the law itself, for to little purpose were that Gloss, or exposition, which is more obscure than the text itself) we must gather the sense, & meaning of such Glosses from the drift, sense, & circumstances not only of the particular Canons glossed, but also of other Canons and Glosses of the same expositor, or glosser, in other parts, and places of the law; but with this caveat and proviso, that if the same Glosser or expositor bring two divers or contrary Expositions of the same Canon, which are grounded upon two contrary opinions, we must have a regard to distinguish these two contrary opinions, and the Glosses grounded thereon, and for the understanding of the Gloss, or exposition, which supposeth one opinion, not to fly to that Gloss, which supposeth the contrary doctrine and opinion, for otherwise we shall make the sense and meaning of the Glosses to be more obscure, and intricate, then plain, and manifest. As for example, if the same Glosser or expositor give two divers expositions of the same Canon, whereof the one supposeth the Pope to have either direct, or indirect dominion in temporals, and to have authority either directly, or indirectly, to dispose of temporals, and to inflict temporal punishment, and the other Gloss supposeth that he hath no such dominion or authority in temporals, for the understanding of that Gloss, which supposeth the Pope to have such a dominion or authority in temporals, we must not fly to that other Gloss, which supposeth that he hath no such dominion or authority. d Page 167. num. 5. 12 Secondly, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, the penalties imposed in the two decrees here glossed, are of different nature and quality, the one concerning only the confiscation of goods, which is expressly ordained in divers places of the law; and the other touching only the effusion of blood by death, or mutilation, which is no where ordained, or permitted, but expressly forbidden to all Ecclesiastical judges. 13 But first, although it be true that the penalties imposed in these two Canons are of different nature, and quality in particular, for that the one ordaineth a civil punishment, to wit, the confiscation of goods, the other a criminal penalty, to wit, the effusion of blood by mutilation, and also death, yet both of them are, as I said before, of the same nature, and quality in general, for that both of them ordain temporal punishments, which cannot be inflicted by spiritual Pastors, by that authority which they have received from Christ, but only by the authority, privileges, and consent of temporal Princes, who only have authority to inflict temporal punishments, as death, exile, confiscation of goods, imprisonment, and such like. But with all this difference is to be observed betwixt these two punishments, that although some Ecclesiastical persons, as divers Bishops of Germany, being temporal Princes, have authority to inflict both kind of punishments, and to hang and draw, as our English proverb saith, within their temporal Dominions, yet Ecclesiastical levity, as Saint Leo saith, doth shun these bloody punishments, and the Canons of the Church do forbid Cleargie-men to use the same and to pronounce the sentence of death against any malefactor whatsoever, immediately by themselves, but only by their Officers. Nevertheless, seeing that these Ecclesiastical persons have by the grant of temporal Prince's authority, as we say, to hang and draw, and what their Officers, or Ministers do in this case, they do it by their authority, the aforesaid prohibition of the Church doth not take away, or deprive them of their authority and jurisdiction, but doth only forbid them to execute the same by themselves immediately, but only by their Ministers. So that if a Clergyman, who is a temporal Prince, as are the Bishops of Collen, and Ments should, notwithstanding the prohibition of the Church, pronounce the sentence of death against any malefactor, who deserveth the same, although he should offend against the prohibition of the Church, yet he should not offend against justice, usurping the power which he hath not, & by doing that which for want of temporal jurisdiction he hath no authority to do, in that manner as an other man, who having no temporal jurisdiction, and condemning one to death, should offend. 14 Secondly therefore, although I do not deny, that the confiscation of goods is expressly ordained in divers places of the Canon law, as also the effusion of blood by mutilation, and death is expressly ordained in this Canon, howsoever my Adversary very boldly saith, that the effusion of blood by mutilation, or death is no way ordained therein, yet if we distinguish ordaining from commanding or imposing (because I have ever granted, that spiritual Pastors have authority to command, impose, and enjoin, but not to inflict temporal punishments) all such Canons wherein temporal punishments are inflicted, are either an approbation of the Imperial law, or a teaching and declaring what ought to be done by the Secular Prince, or judge, as the Gloss expoundeth both this Canon, Delatori, wherein the effusion of blood by death and mutilation is decreed, and also the Canon Hadrianus, wherein only the confiscation of goods is ordained, or they were made and had force to bind by the consent of temporal Princes, as other Doctors, according to Hostiensis, joannes Andreas, and Pope Innocent interpret that so often urged Canon, Ad abolendam, wherein Earls, Barons, Governors, and Consuls of Cities, and other places, if they neglect to help the Church against heretics, are deprived of their honour. 15 Nevertheless these Canons, wherein temporal punishments are ordained, for that they are made by sacred, spiritual, or Ecclesiastical persons, though not by sacred, spiritual, or Ecclesiastical, but by temporal and civil authority, granted them by the privileges, gift, or consent of temporal Princes, may be called sacred, Ecclesiastical, and Apostolical Canons, Gerson de potest. Eccles. consider. 4. according to that which I. Gerson writeth that there are some of opinion that Excommunication is the last punishment which the Ecclesiastical power of jurisdiction by the first institution of Christ can inflict, so that it is not extended to imprisonment, nor that any man be adjudged to death, or corporal whipping, but when the Ecclesiastical judge doth this, he doth it by the grant of Princes, as the Clergy by the devotion of Princes, hath received great authority of temporal jurisdiction, which jurisdiction, or censure is nevertheless called spiritual, as also the temporal goods of Ecclesiastical persons are called spiritual, because they are dedicated and applied to them who serve the Church, as also the breads of proposition the first fruits, the tithes, also the vessels of the Temple, the Vestments and such like, were in the old law called sacred, or holy, so also the new law doth observe the same. Thus Gerson. 16 Thirdly, the Gloss itself doth teach, saith Mr. Fitzherbert e Pag. 167. num. 6. Glossa in verb. publicat. , that by the former decree the Church doth ordain the confiscation of goods, and deposition from dignities saying; Hìc Ecclesia publicat bona Laicorum, & quandoque deponit à dignitatibus: Here the Church doth confiscate the goods of Laymen, and sometimes deposeth from dignities. Thus saith the Gloss here, which Widdrington wholly dissembleth, because it maketh flatly against him, and he taketh hold, as it seemeth of the words immediately following, though he do not allege them; the words are, Vel dic, etc. Or say, that the Church teacheth here what ought to be done. Wherein it cannot be with reason imagined, that the Gloss contradicteth the former interpretation, seeing that it teacheth also in many other places that the Church may, and doth use to impose temporal penalties by confiscation of goods, imprisonment, infamy, and banishment, as it may be seen in the Glosses, Lib. Detret. cap. Licet. tit. de Paenis. upon 17. q. 4. Attendendum est, 16. q. 1. Statuimus, 27. q. 4. Quisquis, and upon the Decree, Licet. tit. de poenis, where the Gloss affirmeth expressly, that if the Law do ordain only a spiritual punishment, or a corporal, the judge cannot change it into another, except he can dispense in the crime committed; and that when the Law determineth nothing concerning the penalty of the crime, it is left to the will of the judge, whether he will impose a pecuniary penalty or any other; and lastly, when the judge can dispense touching the crime, he may inflict a penalty of, or some other. Thus saith the Gloss. 17 But first, it is not true, as you have seen above, that I either omitted to allege the second answer of the Gloss upon the Canon Hadrianus, seeing that it is all one with that, which I did allege upon the Canon Delatori, to which the Gloss remitteth himself for his second answer, or that I dissembled the first answer of the Gloss, which teacheth, that the Church doth ordain the confiscation of goods, seeing that I only intended to bring there, those answers of the Gloss which made for my doctrine, and not those which made against it, as if a man intent only to set down Authors, who favour any one opinion, may without any dissimulation omit to relate those Authors, who are against it. 18 Secondly, is it possible, that Mr. Fitzherbert can be so ignorant, as to conceive, that the Gloss doth then contradict itself, when it bringeth two diverse expositions of one text or Canon, which suppose two contrary opinions of Doctors, and whereof the one contradicteth the other? Will he say, Bell. l. 2. de Rom. ●ont. cap. 29. that Cardinal Bellarmine contradicteth himself when to that text of holy Scripture john 19 Thou shouldest not have any power against me, unless it were given thee from above, bringeth two answers, or expositions, whereof the one contradicteth the other; the first of Saint Cyrill, and Saint chrysostom, that our Saviour did not speak in that place of true power of jurisdiction, but only of divine permission, and the other of S. Augustine, and S. Bernard, that Christ spoke there of true power of jurisdiction: and likewise, when to that text, I appeal to Caesar Act. 25. he answereth first, that Saint Paul did appeal to Caesar de facto, but not de iure; and secondly that he did appeal to him both de facto, and de iure: or when in the same place to another objection he giveth two answers, whereof the one contradicteth the other, the first is, that in the old law the kingdom was above the Priesthood, and the second, that the Priesthood was above the kingdom. 19 For this is a most usual thing, for the same Author to bring to the same Canon, text, or objection two contrary answers, when they are grounded upon two contrary opinions, whereof both are taught, and maintained by learned men. Wherefore joannes Teutonicus the Glosser of this Canon, Hadrianus, may without any contradiction bring two contrary expositions of this Canon, when they are grounded upon the doctrine of learned men, whose opinions in that point are one contrary to the other: As the first gloss of this Canon, Hadrianus, seemeth to follow the doctrine of those, who hold, that the Ecclesiastical power can by the institution of Christ inflict temporal punishments; and the second of those, who hold the contrary, to wit, that it can only command, impose, or enjoin temporal penalties, and teach, or declare what a temporal Prince, or judge ought to do, and compel them also to do their duties, but not by inflicting temporal punishments but only spiritual, or Ecclesiastical Censures: and in like manner Hostiensis, joannes Andreas, and Pope Innocent before cited brought two contrary expositions of the same Canon, Ad abolendam, which were grounded upon these two contrary opinions touching the Pope's power to deprive Laymen of their temporal honour. 20 But the reason of Mr. fitzherbert's error is, for that he, silly man, seemeth to be ignorant, how according to the rules of Logic modal propositions are contradictory one to the other: for to make them contradictory, the contradiction must be in the modus, and not in the dictum: as these two propositions are not contradictory, for that both them may be together true, It is the opinion of learned men, that our saviours words to Pilate, Thou shouldest not, etc. are to be understood of true power of jurisdiction, for so teacheth Saint Augustine, and Saint Bernard: and, It is the opinion of learned men, that they are not to be understood of true power of jurisdiction, but only of divine permission, for so Saint Cyrill, and Saint chrysostom do affirm: but to make them contradictory, the contradiction must be in the modus, as thus; It is the opinion of learned men, that those words of our Saviour are to be understood of true power of jurisdiction, and, It is not the opinion of learned men, that they are to be understood of true power of jurisdiction, for these two propositions cannot be both true, but if the one be true, the other must of necessity be false, and contrariwise. Seeing therefore that the Gloss here upon the Canon Hadrianus did not intend to bring only those expositions of this Canon, which were certain and out of controversy, but which were agreeable to the doctrine, and opinions of learned men, although the first Gloss were contradictory to the second in the dictum, yet because they are not contradictory in the modus, for that both of them are approved by learned men, the Glosser cannot be truly said to contradict himself in bringing these two contrary Glosses of the same words, both which learned Authors do maintain. 21 But thirdly, neither can Mr. Fitzherbert sufficiently prove, that the former Gloss maketh flat against me, and contradicteth the second so much as in the dictum. For albeit the express words of the former Gloss are these, Hear the Church doth confiscate the goods of Laymen, and sometimes deposeth them from dignities: Yet these words, confiscate, and depose, may very well be understood as the same Gloss expoundeth the word depose, upon the Canon, Alius 15. q. 6. where it is written, that Pope Zacharie did depose the King of France; for after the Gloss had brought arguments pro, and contra, for, and against the Pope's power to depose the Emperor, at the last he answereth thus, He is said to have deposed the King, who consented to them that deposed him, or, which in sense is all one, as others expound, who taught, or declared, that he might be deposed: And according to this exposition the later Gloss doth not contradict the former, but is rather an explication thereof. For it is all one in sense, to say, that the Church doth confiscate the goods of Laymen, and sometimes deposeth them from dignities, to wit, by consenting to them who do depose, and confiscate, or, which is all one, by teaching and declaring, that they ought to be deposed, and their goods confiscated, which is the former Gloss, and to say, that the Church doth teach, or declare, what ought to be done by the Secular Prince, or judge concerning the deposing of Laymen, and confiscating their goods, which is the later Gloss, and, as you have seen, all one in sense with the former. 22 Besides, the former of these two glosses here doth only teach, that the Church doth confiscate the goods of Laymen, and sometimes deposeth them from dignities, which I never denied, but that the Church doth confiscate the goods of Lay men, and deposeth them from dignities, by that spiritual power which she hath received from Christ, and not only from that temporal authority, wherewith she is endued by the grant, and consent of temporal Princes, this the former Gloss, which my Adversary untruly saith to be flat against me, doth not teach in this place, but rather the flat contrary: seeing that for proof of the aforesaid assertion the Gloss allegeth the Canon, Praeceptum. 32. q. 5. which Canon is a decree of the 12. Council of Toledo in Spain, which was gathered by the command of King Eringius, who confirmed that Decree, and whereat not only the Bishops of Spain, but also the King, and the Officers of the King's Palace were present; and the King himself in his speech to the Council did conjure not only the Bishops, but also the Officers of his Palace to examine, and approve the things, which were there propounded; whereupon not only the Bishops, but also 15. Noblemen of the King's Palace do subscribe their names to the decrees of that Council. f See Binnius tom. ● Concil. in Conc. Tolet. 12 And the Gloss itself expounding those words of this Canon, Praeceptum, ipsi sesuis meritis & a Palatinae dignitatis officio separabunt It is an argument, saith the Gloss, that if any man contemn Excommunication, the Secular judge, or his Landlord hath power to deprive him of his feud, or farm. 23 Neither from any decree of the Canon law, or from any gloss, or exposition of joannes Teutonicus, who glossed these decrees collected by Gratian, can it be certainly gathered, that the Church by her spiritual power which she received from Christ, but only by the grant and authority of temporal Princes, may inflict temporal punishments, for of her power to inflict spiritual censures, and also to command, impose, or enjoin temporal penalties, there is no controversy between my Adversaries and me. Neither also from any of those four glosses here cited by Mr. Fitzherbert, to wit, either upon the Canon Attedendum, which Canon as I showed above, is falsely attributed to Pope Vrbanus the second, and by all probability the whole Canon Attendendun, is forged, and by some one or other inserted into that decretal Epistle, which goeth under the name of Pope Vrbanus, or upon the Canon, Statuimus, or Quisquis, or Licet, de poenis, (which last Canon, Licet, is not glossed by joannes Teutonicus, whose authority I brought upon the Canon, Hadrianus, who expounded only the Decrees collected by Gratian, and not the Decretals) can it be forcibly concluded, that the Church, that is, the spiritual Pastors of the Church may, without the authority and consent of temporal Princes, inflict temporal punishments: yea, the first Gloss upon the Canon Licet, de poenis, here cited by my Adversary, doth clearly favour my doctrine. For demanding why Archdeacon's do exact of Laymen, a pecuniary penalty, as it is mentioned in that Canon, he answereth, because perhaps they were under their temporal jurisdiction, or they have this by custom. 24 Neither from the practice of the Church which Mr. Fitzherbert doth so inculcate can any thing be convinced against this my doctrine; And hereof, saith he g Page 168. num 7. , the practice is, and hath always been most manifest in the Church, and acknowledged by the Canonists, to be grounded on the Canons, (as partly hath appeared already, and shall appear further h Infra nu. 12. 13. 14. 15. & seq. after a while) and therefore I say that those Glosses objected by Widdrington must either be so understood, that they may agree the one with the other, and with the Glosses of other Canons, yea with the general opinion and doctrine of the Canonists, and with the whole course and practise of the Canon Law, or else they are to be rejected as absurd, erroneous, and false. 25 But although it be true, that for many hundreds of years since that Christian Princes have endued the Church with great power of civil jurisdiction, the practice of the Church hath been to inflict pecuniary mulcts, yet it is not true that it was the practice of the primitive Church to inflict, but only to command, impose, or enjoin temporal penalties, and this only can be proved by any authentical Canon, as I have showed above by answering all the Canons which my Adversary hath alleged. And although also since the time of Pope Gregory the 7. who was the first Pope that began to challenge to himself authority as due to him by the institution of Christ, to inflict temporal punishments, to dispose of all temporals, and to depose temporal Princes, divers Popes, and other learned men have with might, and main by favours and threatenings laboured to maintain, and advance this doctrine, and practise, for which cause it is no marvel, as I have elsewhere observed, i Apol. nu. 449. that their opinion hath been the more common, and general in Schools, yet for that it hath been ever contradicted by Christian Princes, and learned Catholics, for which cause joannes Azorius a learned jesuite expressly saith, k Azor. tom. 2. lib. 12. ca 5. q. 8. that it hath ever been a great controversy betwixt Emperors, and Kings on the one side, and the Bishops of Rome on the other, whether the Pope in certain cases hath right and authority to deprive Kings of their Kingdoms, and about this the Schoolmen are at variance, and as yet the controversy, saith Trithemius l In Chro. monast. Hirsang. an. 1106. , is not decided by the judge, and very many Doctors, as Almain affirmeth, do deny that the Ecclesiastical power can by the institution of Christ inflict any temporal punishment, as death, exile, privation of goods, imprisonment, m De Dominio nature. civit. & Eccles. conclus. 2 & in probatione illius. but only spiritual censures: It cannot, I say, be truly called the general doctrine and practice of the Church, neither are those Glosses and expositions of those Canonists, who favour this doctrine, sufficient to decide the controversy, neither can the other Glosses, and expositions, which are grounded upon the contrary doctrine, and contradict the former glosses, without gross temerity be rejected as erroneous, absurd, and false. 26 And truly in my opinion it is greatly to be marveled, and worthy also the observation, that albeit for so many hundreds of years both Popes, and other Clergy men have so earnestly laboured to maintain and advance this doctrine and practice of Pope Gregory the seventh, touching the Pope's authority to depose Princes, and to dispose of temporals, which nevertheless Sigebert did not fear to call a novelty, Sigebert. ad annum 1088. not to say, an heresy, yet considering the great opposition, which this doctrine and practice hath ever had, by reason whereof it was behoving to have the matter made clear, and out of controversy, yet, I say, there cannot be found any one Canon, constitution, or definition either of Pope, or Council, general, or Provincial, wherein it is plainly decreed, that the Pope, or Church, hath by the institution of Christ, authority to depose temporal Princes, to dispose of temporals, or to inflict temporal punishments; but the certainty of this doctrine must chief be grounded upon the facts of Popes, which how weak a ground it is to prove a true right, and authority, any man of judgement may plainly see, and I have also showed elsewhere n Apol. nu. 444 & seq. . 27 Now then, saith Mr. Fitzherbert o Page 168. num. 8. , seeing that the Glosser acknowledgeth in his former gloss, that the Church doth by the Canon, ordain the confiscation of laymens goods, and deprivation of their dignities (which is also confirmed by divers other Canons and glosses, and the practice of the Church) it cannot, as I have said, be imagined, that he meant to contradict it, by that, which followeth either in the same gloss, or in the other upon the Canon, Delatori. 28 But this hath been at large already answered, and first, that albeit the former gloss doth acknowledge, that the Church doth by this Canon ordain the confiscation of laymens goods, and deprivation of their dignities, which is also confirmed by the practice of the Church, yet the former gloss doth not acknowledge, that the Church doth ordain this by that authority, which she hath received from Christ, and not from the grant, and privileges of Christian Princes, whereof only we now dispute. Secondly, that those words of the former gloss, confiscate, and depose, may well be understood in that sense, wherein the same Glosser expoundeth the word depose, in the Canon, Alius 15. q. 6. and so, as I showed before, the later gloss doth not contradict the former, but it is rather an explication thereof: and thirdly, that albeit we should grant, that the later gloss, or exposition is repugnant to the former, yet it is no absurdity for the same Glosser, or expositor to bring two contrary glosses, or expositions, when they are grounded upon the contrary opinions of learned Authors, which may without any error, or absurdity be followed, as I declared above by divers examples. 29 And therefore we must distinguish, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, p Pag. 169. nu. 8. betwixt the Canon, and the execution thereof, and say, that when he affirmeth in the former Gloss, that the Church teacheth there what ought to be done, and again in the later, that the Church teacheth what the Secular judge ought to do, he speaketh only (as the very words import) of the execution of these two Canons, giving also to understand, that the execution of penal laws doth belong sometimes to the Secular judge, and not to the Ecclesiastical, especially in cases touching life and death, or effusion of blood; albeit in many other cases the Ecclesiastical judge may not only ordain, but also execute pecuniary and other temporal penalties, in which respect the Council of Trent (which my Adversary Widdrington, if he be a Catholic, as he pretendeth to be, must needs admit for a lawful Council) decreeth, that Ecclesiastical judges shall abstain from Censures, when they may by their own authority proceed against the delinquents by real or personal execution. So as I will conclude, that these glosses, which Widdrington allegeth, either do make nothing against us, or if they do, they do manifestly contradict as well themselves, as other Glosses, and many express Canons, and the doctrine of all learned Canonists, yea the whole course and continual practice of the Canon law. 30 But first, as no man maketh doubt, but that we must distinguish betwixt Canons, or laws, and the execution thereof, so also no doubt can be made, but that the Prince, or Lawmaker either spiritual or temporal, who hath authority to make the Canon, or law, hath also authority to execute the same, for that the executioner of the law is a mere Minister, and Officer of the Prince, who enacted the law: and what he doth, he doth not by his own authority, but by the authority committed to him by the Prince: and therefore whatsoever a Prince either spiritual, or temporal hath authority to execute by his Minister, or Officer, he hath also authority to execute by himself. Wherefore seeing that the Glosser doth expound these Canons alike, as it may appear by this, that in the second Gloss upon the Canon, Hadrianus he remitteth the Reader to the Canon, Delatori, signifying thereby, that both the Canon, Hadrianus, which ordaineth the confiscation of goods, and also the Canon, Delatori, wherein the effusion of blood by mutilation and death is ordained, are to be understood in the same sense, if the meaning of the Gloss upon the Canon, Delatori, was only to teach, that an Ecclesiastical judge could not execute that Decree, which ordaineth the effusion of blood, but it must be executed by a Secular judge, his meaning also was in the Canon, Hadrianus to teach, that an Ecclesiastical judge cannot also execute that decree, which ordaineth the confiscation of goods, which no man of learning can affirm, for that Ecclesiastical persons are not by the Canons of the Church forbidden to execute decrees, which ordain the confiscation of goods, but only those decrees, which ordain the effusion of blood, albeit by the grant, and privileges of temporal Princes they may have authority to execute the one, and the other. 31 Whereby secondly it is apparent, that the Gloss affirming, that the Church in both those Canons doth teach what a Secular judge ought to do, did not intend to speak only of the execution of those Canons, for that also a Secular judge, whose office is to give sentence, and to declare the meaning of the law in this particular case, or crime, is not properly an Executioner of the law, because after his sentence, the law may still remain not executed, but also of the Decrees and Canons themselves, and of the authority, which the Church hath to make such Canons, and to teach, that the Church by her proper spiritual power, which she hath received from Christ, hath not authority to make Decrees, which ordain the inflicting of temporal punishments whatsoever, whether they be criminal, or only civil, for that the making of such Decrees belong only to the Civil, and not to the Ecclesiastical power, which according to the doctrine of very many Doctors, whom the Glosser in the aforesaid Glosses doth follow, is not extended to the inflicting of temporal punishments, but only of Ecclesiastical Censures, albeit by that civil power and jurisdiction, which spiritual Pastors have received by the grant of Secular Princes (which their civil power and jurisdiction may be also called sacred, Ecclesiastical, and their own power) they have authority to inflict as well criminal, as civil punishments, notwithstanding the Church hath forbid them to meddle with the effusion of blood. And this temporal and civil authority and jurisdiction of spiritual Pastors, which the prohibition of the Church, as I said before, doth not take away, the Council of Trent calleth their own authority, although they have received it not from the institution of Christ, but from the grant of Secular Princes, in that manner as the temporal goods of Churchmen are called sacred, Ecclesiastical, and their own proper goods, as I declared a little above out of Gerson. 32 So as I will conclude, that these two Glosses, which I have here alleged do greatly favour my doctrine, concerning the uncertainty of the Pope's power, to inflict by the institution of Christ temporal punishments, and do no way contradict the course and practise of the Church, or any Canon thereof, and that albeit they were repugnant to themselves, as also according to a probable exposition of the same Glosser, I have showed they are not, yet this were nothing to the purpose, seeing that they are grounded upon two contrary opinions taught, and maintained by learned Catholics: although I will not deny, that they are repugnant to many other Glosses, and to the more common opinion of the Canonists, who make the Pope a temporal Monarch of the whole Christian world, and to have dominion and authority in temporals not only directly, but also indirectly: And therefore the common doctrine of the Canonists (who, as Pope Pius the fifth q See Navar. in c. Non liceat 12. q. 2. §. tertio nu. 6 did freely acknowledge, do attribute more authority to the Pope than is fit) in points concerning the Pope's authority, especially when they are therein contradicted by other learned Catholics, is but a very weak ground to build any infallible doctrine, or point of faith thereon. 33 Besides that it is to be considered, r Pag. 169. nu. 9 10 saith Mr. Fitzherbert, that it little importeth for our question, whether the Church can execute temporal penalties, seeing it hath the power and authority not only to inflict them, but also to force the Secular Magistrate to execute them, which shall appear further s Infra nu 11 & 15. after a while, and is not contradicted by the Gloss objected by Widdrington, except only concerning the imposition of bloody penalties, which indeed the said Gloss doth exclude by an express Canon, as we also do in this question, affirming only, as I have said before, that the Church may in some cases both ordain and execute certain corporal, and temporal penalties, without the effusion of blood by mutilation or death. And this is so manifest in the Canon law, that truly a man may wonder with what face Widdrington can seek by some piece of an obscure Gloss to overthrow the clear, and manifest sense of the law itself, and the evident and ancient practice of the Church, which he knoweth in his conscience to be grounded upon the Ecclesiastical Canons; but hereby we may see, that his intent is no other, but to patch up his pretended probability with shifts and shows of whatsoever he can wring, and wrest to his purpose. 34 But truly I cannot but marvel, with what face this man dare so boldly affirm, that it little importeth for our question, whether the Church can execute temporal penalties, or no, yet granting, as you see he doth, that the Church hath power and authority to inflict them (for of the power of the Church to compel or force by Ecclesiastical Censures the Secular Magistrate we do not now dispute) seeing that authority to inflict temporal penalties, and to execute them, are either all one, or, if we will distinguish them by taking authority to inflict them, for authority to make laws to inflict them, the former doth necessarily infer the later. For what man even of mean learning, or understanding can be so ignorant, as to imagine, that every Prince either spiritual, or temporal, who hath supreme authority to inflict any penalties, hath not authority also to execute the same. Neither can it be denied, but that the Pope, and also other Bishops of Germany, who are both spiritual Pastors, and also temporal Princes, have authority to ordain, inflict, and execute, not only certain corporal, and temporal penalties, without the effusion of blood, as is the confiscation of goods, but all corporal and temporal penalties, even with effusion of blood by mutilation, and death. For although they are forbidden by express Canons of the Church, not to concur to the effusion of blood, yet this prohibition doth not deprive them of any jot of their temporal authority, which they did not receive from the Church, but from the grant of temporal Princes; insomuch that if contrary to the Canons of the Church they should pronounce the sentence of death, yea & execute the same upon any malefactor that deserveth death according to the law, they should not offend against justice, for usurping that civil authority, which they have not, in that manner as another private man, who hath no temporal authority should offend, but against Religion, for not obeying the just commandment of their supreme spiritual Superior. 35 And this is so manifest in the known principles of Moral Philosophy, of School Divinity, of the Canon, and Civil law, and in the practice of the whole Christian world, that no man of any learning can with any face deny the same. But this is the usual trick of my Adversary to blind his Readers understanding with the obscurity of general words, not distinguishing the true state of the question, and then crying out against me, that I deny the Decrees of General councils, the ecclesiastial Canuos, and the practice of the Church, which is a mere fiction of his own brain: For all the Canons of the holy Church I do embrace with all dutiful respect, but I do not understand them always in that sense, as he, and others of his opinion do expound them; and I do willingly grant, that the practice of the Church, since she hath been endued by Christian Princes with many temporal privileges of Civil jurisdiction, hath been to inflict, and execute certain temporal penalties without effusion of blood by death, or mutilation, but that which I contend is, that it cannot be sufficiently proved by any Canon, or practise of the Church, that spiritual Pastors do ordain, inflict, or execute such temporal penalties by their spiritual authority, which they have received from Christ, but only by their civil and temporal power, which hath been granted them by the free gift, and liberality of temporal Princes. And thus much concerning these two Glosses of joannes Teutonicus, upon the Canon, Hadrianus, & Delatori, which without any wring or wresting of their words, or meaning, I have showed to make clear for my purpose. 36 The second principal exception, which M. Fitzherbert taketh against me in this my second answer to the objection, which I propounded, is for adding immediately certain words out of Silvester, as favouring my aforesaid answer. Also Siluesters words, said I, do favour this answer, who writeth thus: joannes Andrea's following Hostiensis, is of opinion, that a Bishop cannot impose a pecuniary penalty upon a Layman, that is not temporally subject unto him but that he ought to make it to be inflicted by the Secular judge. 37 Against this Mr. Fitzherbert objecteth, t Pag. 170. nu. 12. & seq. that Widdrington hath dissembled that, which immediately followeth in Silvester, to the end that his Reader may suppose, that not only Hostiensis, and joannes Andreas, but also Silvester was of that opinion; whereas Silvester having said, that which Widdrington objecteth, addeth presently, sed hoc non placet Panormitano, but this doctrine doth not please Panormitan, because when the case is such, that the judge doth challenge jurisdiction over a Layman, there appeareth no reason, why he cannot in the foresaid cases impose upon him a pecuniary penalty, as it may be seen in cap. Statuimus 16. q. 1. and 27. q. 4. cap. Quisquis. Thus saith Silvester alleging Pànormitans words, and the Canons, by the which he proveth, that a Bishop may impose a pecuniary penalty upon a Layman, that is not temporally subject unto him; which Canons are indeed very clear for that point, especially cap. Quisquis 27. q. 4. Where it is ordained, that a sacrilegious person shall pay thirty pounds of silver to the Bishop, or Abbot, or any Ecclesiastical judge, to whom the knowledge of the cause shall appertain, as it may appear both by the Canon, and the Gloss. Besides that, Panormitan, Panorm. ubi supra. (whom Silvester citeth) teacheth expressly, that when the Bishop proceedeth juridically and no certain penalty is ordained by the Law, he may impose a penalty of money, though he cannot do it, when the Law ordaineth expressly an other, except it be for a crime, wherein he hath power to dispense for then he may inflict a pecuniary penalty, though some other be assigned by the Law, as I have also showed before u Supra. nu. 6. out of the Gloss in cap. Licet, tit. de poenis. 38 This being than Panomitans doctrine approved by Silvester (who followeth him altogether in this question) it appeareth that Widdrington might have easily seen, if it had pleased him, that Silvester doth not any way favour his opinion, nor impugn our doctrine concerning the Pope's power to dispose of temporal things in order to spiritual, which is the principal question controversed betwixt us. You have heard before, x Chap. 11. nu. 3. that Hostiensis expressly teacheth, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, and Silvester doth the like, being also both of them of the number of the Canonists, who teach, y Hostiens. in cap. Quod super his de voto, & voti redempt. silvest in Sum. verbo Papa nu. 1. 11. & 12. that the Pope hath a direct Dominion over temporal things, no less then over spiritual, and therefore it is evident, that they cannot any way make for my Adversary Widdrington. 39 But it is untrue, that I either dissembled, or omitted that which immediately followeth in Silvester, to the end that the Reader may suppose, that not only Hostiensis, and joannes Andreas, but also Silvester was of that opinion; but the reason why I omitted that, which immediately followeth in Silvester, to wit, Sed hoc non placet Panormitano, but this pleaseth not Panormitan, was, for that it did nothing import our question to know of what opinion either Panormitan, or also Silvester himself were concerning that point; for that which I intended to prove out of Siluesters words was this, that it is no undoubted point of faith, but only an opinion, according to Silvester, that Bishops can inflict a pecuniary penalty upon a Layman, that is not temporally subject unto them, and the words of Silvester do sufficiently show, that it is only an opinion among the Canonists: and therefore that either Panormitan, or Silvester, or any other Canonist be of the contrary opinion, it is nothing to the purpose. Neither doth the Canon, Statuimus, or Quisquis cited by Panormitan, and Silvester make against my doctrine, foc they do only show that a spiritual judge may inflict a pecuniary mulct, but that he may inflict it by his spiritual authority, and consequently upon Laymen that are not temporally subject unto him without the consent of their temporal Prince, they do not show: and the Canon, Quisquis, which Mr. Fitzherbert thinketh to be so clear in this point, is taken out of an Epistle of Pope john the eight, wherein he commanded, that the decrees of a Council called Trecense which was approved by authority of Lewis the Emperor, should be observed: and the first Gloss upon the Canon Licet, tit. de poenis, doth expressly favour my doctrine, as I have signified before. 40 And albeit both Hostiensis, and Silvester be themselves of opinion, that the Pope is by the institution of Christ a temporal Monarch of the whole Christian world, and hath direct dominion, not only in spirituals, but also in temporals, and consequently that he may inflict temporal punishments, dispose of all temporals, and depose temporal Princes, for that all Christians both Princes, and subjects are according to their opinion, subject to him directly in temporals, and so in this point they make nothing for my doctrine, yet they make greatly for my doctrine in this, that by their answers it may be plainly gathered, that they hold it only for an opinion, as at this present I contend it only to be, and that other Authors do not agree with them therein, as to the answer of Hostiensis to the Canon, Ad abolendam, I have showed before, and also by this answer of Silvester you may see more clearly beneath, in this, I say, it is evident, that they greatly make for my doctrine. 41 Besides that, it little importeth, saith Mr. Fitzher. z Pag. 172. nu. 15. 16. 17. whether the Bishop may according to the Canons impose a temporal penalty upon such Laymen, as are not his temporal subjects, seeing he may by the opinion of those three, whom my Adversary Widdrington allegeth make it to be inflicted by the Secular judge, or Magistrate, in which case it is done by the Bishop's authority, and the Secular Magistrate is but his instrument, and Minister to execute his will. Furthermore, put the case, that the Bishop could not impose a pecuniary penalty upon a Layman, that is not his temporal subject, will Widdrington conclude thereupon, that therefore the Pope may not do it? Will he be so absurd to restrain the supreme jurisdiction of the Pope to the inferior power of a Bishop? as well might he say, that a King can do no more in like case, than an inferior temporal Magistrate; and that because the judge cannot pardon a person condemned, therefore the King cannot do it; who knoweth not that the Church hath prescribed to her Magistrates certain limits for the exercise of their authority, and jurisdiction, allowing to some more, and to some less, which they cannot exceed? Therefore it were absurd to say, that a Bishop cannot excommunicate, because a Parish-Priest cannot do it; But much more absurd, and ridiculous it is to say, that the Pope (who hath plenitudinem potestatis) cannot dispose of temporal things in some cases, because a Bishop cannot impose a pecuniary penalty up- a Lay man, that is not his temporal subject, as Widdrinton seemeth to argue, for otherwise his objection concerning the Bishop's power is to no purpose. So as you see upon what probabilities he grounded his doctrine, being found to be either fraudulent, or impertinent in every thing that he undertaketh to answer or object as you shall also further see by that, which yet followeth for the confirmation of his pretended answer. 42 But Mr. Fitzherbert seeketh still to blind his Readers understanding with a confuse ambiguity of equivocal words. For although it little importeth, whether a Bishop may inflict a pecuniary penalty upon a Layman that is not his temporal subject, or make it to be inflicted by the Secular judge by forcing the judge thereunto, not only by spiritual, but also by temporal compulsion, or coercion, seeing that in this case it is done by the Bishop's authority, and the Secular judge is but his instrument, and Minister to execute his will, yet that a Bishop may only make a pecuniary penalty to be inflicted by a Secular judge by forcing him thereunto by Ecclesiastical Censures, and not by temporal compulsion, this doth very much import, and altogether favour my doctrine. For I do not now contend about the Ecclesiastical power, as by the institution of Christ it is directive, or, which is all one, commanding, imposing, or enjoining, for I do not deny, as I have often said, that spiritual Pastors may by their spiritual authority command, impose, and enjoin temporal Princes to make temporal laws, as Saint Ambrose did the Emperor Theodosius, and to inflict temporal punishments in order to spiritual good, in which case those laws are not made, nor those temporal penalties are inflicted by the authority of spiritual Pastors, as though temporal Princes were only their instruments, and Ministers to execute their wills, as inferior Magistrates are only instruments and Ministers to execute the will of the Prince, but I do now only contend about the Ecclesiastical power, as it is coercive, or punishing, and I utterly deny, that it is a certain, and undoubted point of faith, that the spiritual coercive power of the Church doth extend to the inflicting of temporal punishments, but only of Ecclesiastical Censures. 43 Secondly that fraud and impertinency, which Mr. Fitzherbert doth untruly attribute to my answers and objections, I have clearly showed to be found in every one of his Replies. And as touching that absurdity which he now objecteth against my answer, it is clear, that the main question betwixt my Adversaries and me, is not concerning the power, which either the Pope, or inferior Bishops have by the grant, consent and authority of temporal Princes, I do not say, to command, impose, or enjoin, but to inflict temporal penalties upon Laymen, who are not their temporal subjects, but whether any spiritual Pastor, whether he be an inferior Bishop, or also the Pope himself hath by the institution of Christ authority to inflict such temporal penalties. And indeed my purpose is to conclude, that because it is probable that an inferior Bishop hath no such authority by the institution of Christ & iure divino, therefore it is also probable, that the Pope iure divino, and by the institution of Christ hath no such authority: and upon what probability this my consequence is grounded, and how absurdly Mr. Fitzherbert condemneth it of ridiculous absurdity, you shall forthwith perceive. Bell. lib. 5. de Rom. Pont. ca 3 44 And first, according to Cardinal Bellarmine's grounds, that which the Pope is in the universal Church, is every Bishop in the particular, which assertion he brought to prove, that if the Pope be a direct Lord in temporals of the universal Church, than every Bishop is also a direct Lord in temporals of his own particular Church, or Diocese, which consequent he affirmeth to be manifestly false, and therefore he denieth also that the Pope is a direct Lord in temporals of the universal Church. Now from the same assertion I may as well conclude, that if the Pope be an indirect Lord in temporals of the universal Church, and may inflict temporal punishments upon all Christians in order to spiritual good, than every Bishop is also an indirect Lord in temporals in his own particular Diocese, and may in order to spiritual good inflict temporal punishments upon the Christians of his Diocese, because every Bishop in his particular Diocese is that which the Pope is in the universal Church: And therefore to argue according to the rules of Logic, a destructione consequentis ad destructionem antecedentis, from the overthrowing or denying of the consequent to the denying of the antecedent, If a Bishop in his own Diocese, cannot according to the institution of Christ inflict a pecuniary mulct, or temporal penalty of money upon those Laymen that are not his temporal subjects, neither can the Pope in the universal Church do the same. Victoria in relect. 2. de potest. Eccles. Castro lib. 2. de justa Haeres. punit. cap. 24. Vasques. 1. 2. disp. 152. cap. 3. num. 28. 45 Secondly, according to the doctrine of the Divines of Paris, which others also as Victoria, Castro, Vasquez, (although otherwise vehement maintainers of the Pope's power indirectly in temporals) do in this point follow, it is evident, that Bishops do not receive their authority and jurisdiction from the Pope, but immediately from Christ, by virtue of those words, which were spoken to all the Apostles, Whatsoever you shall bind, etc. Matth. 18. And, Whose sins you shall forgive, etc. john 19 And, Feed my sheep, john 20. Which words, according to the Exposition of the ancient Fathers, a See above cap. 5. num. 10. Bell. lib. 2. de Rom. Pont. cap. 12. in fine Edit. Ingolstad. 1586. which also Cardinal Bellar. did once approve, are understood to be spoken also to all the Apostles. Seeing therefore that S. Peter, and the rest of the Apostles, and consequently the Pope, and other Bishops, who succeed the Apostles, as they were ordinary Pastors, and had ordinary spiritual power to govern the Church, received their power and jurisdiction in the selfsame form of words, without any limitation or restriction, from hence it clearly followeth, that what Ecclesiastical power & jurisdiction soever the Pope receiveth over the whole Church, the same power and jurisdiction, if we regard merely the law of God, and the institution of Christ, other Bishops receive over those who are subject to their Bishopric * A Bishop (saith Ledesma 1. 4. ar. 11.) standing in the law of God hath as great power in his Province, as the Pope in the whole world. . So that standing in the law of God, and abstracting from the Canons of the Church, every Bishop may in his own Bishopric absolve from all cases, inflict all censures, dispense in oaths, and vows, make laws and Canons, no less than the Pope may in the Universal Church. And therefore it is no absurd argument to conclude, that because a Bishop cannot by virtue of that spiritual power, which he hath received from Christ, inflict a pecuniary penalty upon those, that in spirituals are subject to his Diocese, therefore neither can the Pope do the same in the Universal Church. 46 Whereby it is apparent, that the comparison, which M. Fitzherbert here maketh betwixt a King, and an inferior Magistrate, or judge, a Bishop, and a Parish Priest, and betwixt the Pope, and other Bishops is idle, and impertinent; for that no man can make any doubt, but that an inferior Magistrate, or judge hath all his authority, and jurisdiction from the King, but Bishops, according to the doctrine of many learned men, have not their authority and jurisdiction from the Pope, but immediately from Christ, as the Pope himself hath: and all Catholics confess, that Bishops are Peers, and Princes of the Church, and principal judges in the external spiritual Court, whereas none will acknowledge, that Parish Priests are such, and few will grant, that they have jurisdiction in the external spiritual Court, but only in the Court of conscience. Therefore although it were absurd to say, that because every Bishop can excommunicate in his own Diocese, therefore every Parish Priest can also excommunicate in his Parish, yet as it is not absurd to say, that because the Pope can excommunicate in the universal Church, therefore a Bishop, standing in the law of Christ, can also excommunicate in his own Diocese, so it is not absurd, and much less ridiculous, to say, that if the Pope can inflict a temporal penalty upon all Christians, every Bishop also, standing in the law of Christ, can inflict a temporal penalty upon those that are subject to his Bishopric, no more than it is absurd, or ridiculous for Cardinal Bellarmine to say, that if the Pope hath direct dominion in temporals, in the universal Church, every Bishop hath also direct dominion in temporals in his own particular Bishopric, for that, according to his doctrine, that which the Pope is in the universal Church, is every Bishop in his particular Diocese. 47 And as concerning that plenitude, or fullness of the Pope's Ecclesiastical power, which Mr. Fitzherbert with full mouth doth so often inculcate, little understanding, poor man, in what this fullness doth consist, there is a great controversy among Catholics, to what things this fullness of Ecclesiastical power doth extend. Almainus de authore. Eccles. cap. 3. For there is so great a controversy, saith Almain, concerning the fullness of Ecclesiastical power, and to what things it doth extend, that there are few things in this matter secure, or certain, insomuch that it were very necessary in these times (as William Occam in the end of the first part of his Dialogue observeth) that wise men being enforced by oaths, or horrible threatenings to speak the truth, should declare those things, which belong to the fullness of Ecclesiastical power. And how far some Authors, perchance for flattery to get privileges, and benefices, saith Almain, do strain it to the prejudice of Princes, so that they do quite overthrow the Sovereignty of Princes, you may see in that his Treatise, where he expoundeth only the doctrine of Occam, and how he not withstandeth the fullness thereof, in other his books, where he speaketh according to his own opinion, will not have it to extend to the inflicting of temporal punishments, as death, exile, privation of goods, or imprisonment; and this, saith he, a In lib. de dominio natu. Ciu. & Eccl. concl. 12. is the opinion of most Doctors. 48 And also the Doctors of Paris do make the power, and jurisdiction of Bishops, standing merely in the law of Christ, to be as full in intention, as is the Pope's power, that is, abstracting from his Primacy, and the fullness of his power in extension, for that the Pope's power is extended to the whole Church; and the power of Bishops is limited and restrained to their own bishoprics, albeit the Canons of the Church have limited, and restrained the fullness of Bishop's power also in intention, Bell. l. 5 de Rom. Pont. cap. 3. reserving many cases, and Censures to Papal authority: But standing in the law of Christ, Card. Bellarmine doth very well affirm, that every Bishop is that in his own Diocese, which the Pope is in the universal Church, which Mr. Fitzherbert must first prove to be impertinent, absurd, and ridiculous, and then let him put those imputations upon my answer, and the argument which he draweth from thence. 49 A third principal exception Mr. Fitzherbert taketh against that, which in confirmation of my aforesaid second answer I added in these words. Add hereunto, that whensoever the Pope by a general constitution decreeth any temporal thing (but it pleased my Adversary to leave out that word temporal) which is prejudicial to the right of another man, who is not subject to him in temporals, the same decree, as some not improbably do think doth only extend, unless the contrary be expressed (which last clause also Mr. Fitzherbert leaveth out) to the territories of the Roman Church or the patrimony of S. Peter, wherein, as Pope Innocent saith b Cap. per venerabil. the Pope doth exercise the authority of a chief Bishop, and doth execute the power of a Sovereign Prince. 50 Against this answer Mr. Fitzherbert objecteth in this manner. c pag. 173. nu. 18. 19 Thus Widdrington telleth us, but who these some men are of whom he speaketh or where they affirm this, he listeth not to tell us, neither in his text nor in his margin lest by the cases, which they propound, and the circumstances of their doctrine, we might discover his abuse of their testimony: but whosoever they be, (if there be any such) that give so general a rule as he mentioneth, it must be considered, whether they speak of constitutions touching matters merely temporal, or else of penal laws made against heresy, or other enormous crimes for the benefit of the whole Church. For no Catholic man, I am sure, hath ever said, or will say, that any general Constitution of the Pope made for the reformation of faith, or manners, and punishment of delinquents in spiritual matters, is to be understood to be restrained to the Popes own temporal patrimony: for seeing that he hath no less spiritual authority throughout all Christendom, then within his own temporal dominions, it were absurd, and heretical to say, that his general Decrees touching spiritual matters, such as is the extirpation, and punishment of heresy, cannot extend to the whole Church, if they inflict a temporal penalty to the prejudice of some man's temporal state; for so could not heretics be temporally punished, out of the Pope's temporal dominions by virtue of the Pope's decrees, which nevertheless are generally executed, Cap. vergentis. Tit. 7. de haer●●. in prejudice not only of the delinquents, but also of their children, and next heirs. And this, I say, is so universally practised by the Church, that he cannot be counted a Canonist, nor yet a Catholic that will deny it to be lawfully done. 51 But, to omit the egregious fraud, and falsehood of this man, in affirming me to say, that whensoever the Pope decreeth any thing, etc. and leaving out the word [temporal] and also that other clause [unless the contrary be expressed] which were the chief points, whereon I did ground that my answer, there is no man of any judgement, who may not clearly perceive, that all those Catholic Doctors alleged by me heretofore, d Apol. nu. 4. & seq and in the first part of this Treatise. and among the rest, those plerique Doctores, very many, or most Doctors, whom Almain citeth, and followeth, who affirm, that the Pope by the institution of Christ hath not authority to inflict temporal punishments, but only Ecclesiastical censures, must consequently hold, that when the Pope by a general constitution decreeth any temporal thing, as is the inflicting of temporal punishments, for what end soever they be inflicted, the said Decree can bind only those of necessity, that belong to the Pope's temporal Dominions. 52 For seeing that as Suarez, e Suarez l. 3. de Leg. c. 6. & cap. 8. nu. 3. and all other Divines affirm, all laws enacted by the Pope, as they are merely civil, and temporal, do bind only in the Pope's territories, and as Mr. Fitzherbert himself before f Cap. 9 nu. 15. acknowledged, there can be nothing more clear, then that all laws are limited according to the power of the Prince that maketh them, and that therefore the obligation of every Prince's laws is extended only to his own subjects, and whatsoever is decreed only by the Pope's temporal authority, and as he is a temporal Prince, is a mere temporal thing, and cannot extend beyond the Pope's temporal dominions; from hence it clearly followeth, that what Doctor soever affirmeth, that the Pope hath no authority by the institution of Christ to inflict temporal penalties, as death, exile, privation of goods, imprisonment, and consequently that the inflicting of them is a mere temporal thing, and that the decrees, which do inflict them, cannot be made by the Pope's spiritual, but only by his temporal authority, and that therefore they cannot of necessity bind but only those who are subject to his temporal authority, or as he is a temporal Prince, must also affirm, that whensoever the Pope by any general Constitution decreeth the inflicting of any such temporal penalty, the said Decree doth extend only to the Pope's temporal Dominions, and comprehendeth only those, who are subject to him, as he is a temporal Prince, and endued with temporal authority. 53 Wherefore it is neither heretical, nor absurd to say, as this foul-mouthed ignorant man affirmeth, that the Pope's general Decrees touching the extirpation, and punishment of heresy cannot extend to the whole Church, if they inflict a temporal penalty, and that no heretic can be temporally punished out of the Pope's temporal dominions by virtue of the Pope's Decrees without the consent and authority of temporal Princes, for that, according to the doctrine of very many Doctors, as I said before, the Pope's spiritual authority doth not by the institution of Christ extend to the inflicting of temporal punishments, but only of eccclesiastical Censures: and that therefore it belongeth only to temporal Princes to root out heresies, and punish heretics with temporal punishments, and to the Pope, as he is a spiritual Pastor, to root out heresies, and punish heretics with Ecclesiastical, or spiritual Censures. And this I will boldly say, and yet remain as good a Catholic, yea and a far better, than Mr. Fitzherbert is, notwithstanding all his big, and bitter words, if he build his Catholic faith upon such weak, doubtful, and uncertain principles. 54 Whereupon it followeth, that every Decree, Canon, or Constitution of the Pope, which ordaineth the inflicting of temporal penalties for any crime whatsoever, if my Adversary will needs have it to be of force out of the Pope's territories, is either an approbation of some former Imperial law, or is of force by virtue of the consent, and authority of temporal Princes, or is only a declaring, teaching, or commanding, what the temporal Prince, or judge ought to do. Neither doth the Canon, Vergentis, of Pope Innocent the third, which Mr. Fitzherbert citeth here in the margin, any way contradict, what I have said, but it doth rather confirm the same; for the words of the Canon are these, We ordain, that in the territories subject to our temporal jurisdiction the goods of heretics be confiscated, and in other territories we command the same to be done by Secular Potestaes, and Princes, which if perchance they shall be negligent to perform, we will, and command, that they be compelled thereunto by Ecclesiastical Censures. So that this Canon doth rather favour, then contradict what I said, seeing that it distinguisheth the Pope's territories from other kingdoms, and signifieth that the Pope in his own Dominions hath authority by his Decrees to confiscate the goods of heretics, but in other kingdoms he hath no such authority, but only to command Secular Princes to make such Decrees for the extirpation of heresy, and also, if they be negligent therein, to compel them by Ecclesiastical Censures thereunto. Neither can Mr. Fitzherbert prove by any one Canon of Pope, or Council, or by any general, or particular practice of the Church, that out of the Pope's temporal dominions any heretic is temporally punished by virtue of the Pope's decrees without the consent, and authority of temporal Princes: whereby the Reader may plainly see, what an ignorant, uncharitable, and rash headed man is this my Adversary, to tax so easily, and upon such uncertain grounds learned Catholics of heresy, which among all Christians is accounted so heinous, and execrable a crime. 53 But his fraud, and ignorance will the more clearly be discovered, if we observe the difference betwixt the directive, and coercive power, and the acts and objects of them both. For the same spiritual action, as heresy, blasphemy, sacrilege, may be forbidden, both by the spiritual, and temporal power, yea also for the same spiritual end, seeing that Christian Princes are bound by the law of Christ to refer all their actions, & the use of their temporal authority to God's honour, and glory, and to the good of their own souls, & of their subjects, and by their temporal laws to maintain and advance Christian Religion, and to root out heresy, blasphemy, and such like spiritual crimes out of their kingdoms, so that the directive, or commanding temporal power, as I have signified heretofore, g Cap. 6. nu. 66. & seq. may agree with the spiritual in the same acts, objects, and end: but the principal distinction betwixt the spiritual and temporal power is to be taken from both the powers, as they are coercive, or punishing, which always have distinct acts, and objects: for the acts, and object of the temporal power as it is coercive, or punishing, are always the inflicting of temporal punishments, and of the spiritual, the inflicting of spiritual, or Ecclesiastical Censures; so that the forbidding of heresy under pain of incurring Ecclesiastical Censures, for what end soever temporal or spiritual it be done, can proceed only from Ecclesiastical authority, and the forbidding of the same heresy under pain of incurring temporal punishments, as death, loss of goods, or of any other temporal thing for what end soever it be inflicted, can proceed only from temporal, and civil authority, because according to Almain, and those other many Doctors mentioned by him, who were as good Catholics, as M. Fitzherbert is, and far more learned than he is ever like to be, the Ecclesiastical power doth not by the institution of Christ extend to the inflicting of civil or temporal punishments, as death, exile, privation of goods, imprisonment, but only of Ecclesiastical Censures, and the other punishments, which she useth, do proceed from the pure positive law, or, to use Gersons words, from the grant of Princes. 56 Lastly, Mr. Fitzherbert excepteth against that which I brought from the words of the Gloss, upon the Canon Per venerabilem, to confirm the doctrine of those, who affirm, that the Pope hath not authority to make civil or temporal laws, or, which is all one, to ordain mere temporal things, out of his own temporal dominions. And these Authors the Gloss, said I, upon the same Canon, Per venerabilem, doth seem to favour: where it affirmeth, that the Pope cannot legitimate any man who is not subject to his temporal jurisdiction, to make him succeed in an inheritance as a lawful heir, for this were to put his sickle into another man's harvest, and to usurp another man's jurisdiction, and to deprive some man of his right to succeed, which he ought not to do; and therefore he cannot legitimate any man for the Secular Court, unless the Prince shall permit, or give him leave. But if the Pope cannot legitimate one, who is not legitimate, nor deprive one of his right to succeed, I see not by what authority he can make a lawful and legitimate heir, or Prince to be unlawful, and not legitimate, or deprive one of his inheritance, which he lawfully possesseth. 57 But to this Gloss, whose words, as you see, are most plain, and clear, Mr. Fitzherbert replieth h Page 174. num. 20. to the end. , that this my instance or example taken from the Gloss, is no less impertinent than the former, seeing that it concerneth only a temporal matter without relation to any spiritual end. And is it possible, saith he, that Widdrington cannot see the difference betwixt these two cases? seeing that the legitimation of bastards to a temporal end (that is, to make them capable of a temporal inheritance) is a mere temporal thing, and therefore requireth the temporal power, and direct dominion of a temporal Prince, whereas the deposition of Princes in this our case having a spiritual end (to wit, the extirpation of heresy, and punishment of sin, to the exceeding great good of souls, and the public benefit of the Church) is not merely temporal in respect of the spiritual end, and therefore may proceed from the spiritual power of him, that hath the supreme charge of souls, and the government of the whole Church, in whom it may suffice for that purpose to have an indirect dominion over temporal things, to be used and exercised in some cases, when the necessity of the Church shall require it. 58 Whereupon it also followeth, that if it were absolutely necessary for the good of the Church, that the Pope should legitimate a bastard to make him capable of succession to a temporal inheritance (as for example, if a kingdom should otherways fall into the hands or possession of God's enemies) in such a case, I say, he might do it by his spiritual power, and the indirect dominion he hath over temporal things, as both Lawyers i See Coverra. in 4 Decret. 2. par. §. 8. nu. 16 and Divines teach, and the Gloss alleged by Widdrington, doth not deny it, affirming only, that the Pope hath no power to legitimate a bastard out of his own temporal Dominions to a mere temporal end, which, as I have said, is a far different case from ours, and not denied by us: So as you see still how improbably Widdrington argueth, and how absurdly he hath answered to his own objection. And this I hope may suffice for the confutation of his second answer. Let us now hear the third. 59 But in this also Mr. Fitzherbert showeth as much fraud and ignorance, as he hath in the former. For first it is evident, that this assertion of the Gloss, denying the Pope to have authority out of his own temporal dominions, to make one capable of a temporal inheritance, unless the Prince give him leave, is general, and without any relation at all either to a temporal, or spiritual end, and the only exception, limitation, or restriction, which the Gloss maketh, is, unless the Prince permit, or give him leave so to do: which words being so general do plainly signify, that the Pope cannot out of his own temporal dominions make one capable, or incapable of a temporal inheritance, for any cause, crime, or end whatsoever, unless the Prince permit or give him leave. And whereas Mr. Fitzherbert affirmeth, that the Pope may for a spiritual end, to wit, for that the spiritual good of the Church, and the salvation of souls make one capable, or incapable of a temporal inheritance, this explication corrupteth the text, and is contrary to the plain words of the Gloss; for if the Pope, out of his own temporal Dominions may for a spiritual end make one capable of a temporal inheritance, or deprive one of his right to succeed, without the Prince's leave, or permission, than it clearly followeth, that the Pope may make one capable of a temporal inheritance, and legitimate him for the Secular Court, and deprive one of his right to succeed without the Prince's leave, or permission, which the Gloss in express words denieth. 60 But secondly, is it possible, that this man cannot see, how plainly he contradicteth himself, in granting first, that the legitimation of bastards to a temporal end, is to make him capable of a temporal inheritance, and that so it is a mere temporal thing, and therefore requireth the temporal power and direct dominion of a temporal Prince, and afterwards in acknowledging that the legitimation of a bastard to make him capable of succession to a temporal inheritance, if it were absolutely necessary for the good of the Church, may be done by the Pope's spiritual power, and indirect dominion, which he hath over temporals, which is plainly repugnant to his former assertion? seeing that no reference, or relation of the making bastards capable of a temporal inheritance, to the necessary good of the Church, can make, but that according to his former grant, it still remaineth a mere temporal thing, and is to a temporal end, that is, saith he, to make him capable of a temporal inheritance, and therefore requireth the temporal power, and direct dominion of a temporal Prince, & consequently it cannot be done by the spiritual power, and indirect dominion, which the Pope hath over temporal things. 61 Wherefore this indirect temporal power, authority, dominion, or jurisdiction, is in my opinion a mere fiction, purposely invented without sufficient ground by the later Divines, to put a more colourable cloak upon this pretended temporal authority of the Pope, because they saw the Canonists doctrine, making the Pope a temporal Monarch of the whole world, to be very false, absurd, scandalous, and odious both to Princes and subjects; and yet in effect or substance they differ little, or nothing at all: For whatsoever the Canonists grant, that the Pope may do in temporals directly, the Divines grant he may do indirectly, which doth in effect as much as the former derogate from the Sovereignty of absolute Princes: for it little importeth to the substance of the matter, whether the Pope may depose heretical, or wicked Princes by a power, or dominion over temporals, which must be called temporal, or by a power, which must be called spiritual, so that he may depose them; or whether the Pope be superior to absolute Princes in temporals, directly, or indirectly, so that they must acknowledge themselves not to be absolute, but subject to the Pope in temporals. But as I have signified heretofore, all the difficulty, and ambiguity of these words, directly, and indirectly will presently appear, and the whole mist, which the Divines by this distinction do cast over the eyes of the unlearned, will forthwith vanish away, if we will but duly consider the difference betwixt the directive, and coercive power, and the proper acts, and objects of either of them. 62 For as in all arts, sciences, faculties, and powers, whatsoever is directly contained under the formal object of that art, science, faculty, or power, is directly subject to that art, science, faculty or power, so what thing soever, whether it be temporal, or spiritual, is directly contained under the formal object of the directive or coercive power, is directly subject to that power. Seeing therefore that the proper acts, and formal objects (by which all powers are distinguished) of the spiritual directive, or commanding power, are the commanding of virtue, and the forbidding of vice, from hence it followeth, that all actions whatsoever, whether they be spiritual, or temporal, as they are virtuous, or vicious actions, and necessary, or hurtful to the spiritual, and eternal good of souls, are directly subject to the spiritual directive power. So that the reference, or relation of temporal actions, to the spiritual good of souls, doth nothing hinder, but rather is a cause, that, as they are virtuous, or vicious actions, they are directly subject to the spiritual directive power. 63 But if these Divines will further say, that the spiritual directive power, dominion, or jurisdiction over temporal things, is therefore said to be indirect, for that it doth not command, or forbidden temporal things, as they are temporal, but as in order to spiritual good they become spiritual, that is virtuous, or vicious actions, no man maketh doubt of the matter, or of the thing itself, it being too too manifest to every man of judgement, that temporal things are not subject to the spiritual directive power, as they are temporal things, but as in order to spiritual good they become spiritual, that is, virtuous, or vicious actions, but the speech is not so proper, and giveth occasion to the unlearned to be confounded, and deluded with a superfluous ambiguity, and multiplicity of words. For what Divine, or Philosopher can deny, that all those things whatsoever, which do truly participate the definition, or nature of the formal object of any art, science, faculty, or power, by what means, or consideration soever they do participate the same, are directly subject to that art, science, faculty, or power? And in the same proportionate manner, as these men say, that the Pope hath an indirect temporal directive power, or authority over temporal things, it may be said, that temporal Princes have an indirect spiritual directive power over spiritual things: for that as the Pope doth forbid temporal things, not as they are temporal, but as they are spiritual, and hurtful to the good of souls; so temporal Princes may forbid spiritual things, as Heresy, Schism, perjury, ministering of Sacraments with a poisoned matter, whereby danger of death doth ensue, not as they are spiritual, but as they are temporal wrongs, and hurtful to the public peace in the Commonwealth, which is the formal object of the temporal directive power. So that this distinction of directly, and indirectly, cannot be well applied to the spiritual directive power, but that in the like proportionate manner, it may be also applied to the temporal directive power, dominion, and jurisdiction. 64 And as concerning the Ecclesiastical coercive power, we must discourse in the same manner: and likewise consider, what are the proper acts, and formal objects of this power, as it is coercive, or punishing: for whatsoever doth participate the nature and definition of the acts, and objects of this power is directly subject thereunto. Now concerning this point, there are two principal opinions among Catholics; The first opinion, and which now adays is the more common, for the causes by me heretofore l Apol. nu. 449 alleged, is that the inflicting of all punishments whatsoever, being referred to spiritual good, are the acts and objects of the Ecclesiastical power, as it is coercive or punishing. But the Authors of this opinion, albeit they all agree in this, that whatsoever authority the Church hath by the institution of Christ, call it spiritual, or temporal, is in order to spiritual good, and is given her by Christ for the eternal salvation of souls, for which end Christ also himself descended from heaven, and took our flesh upon him, yet in this they differ: that the Canonists, that commonly follow this opinion, measuring the nature of the powers by their acts and objects, and granting, as they do, that Christ hath given to his Church authority to inflict both temporal, and spiritual punishments, do also affirm, that the Church hath by the institution of Christ truly, properly, directly, and formally, both temporal, and spiritual power. But the Divines commonly perceiving the absurdity of this doctrine, and that it confoundeth the acts and objects of the temporal, and spiritual power, and subiecteth the temporal Sovereignty of absolute Princes, who by the common doctrine of the ancient Fathers, are accounted to be supreme in temporals, and therein subject to none but to God alone, to the Pope's temporal authority, to give the more probable colour, as they think, to this pretended authority of the Church to dispose of all temporals, and to inflict temporal punishments in order to spiritual good, and to make it seem less odious to Christian Princes, and subjects, do differ from the Canonists at lest wise in words, and therefore they affirm, that the Church by the institution of Christ, hath no true, proper, direct, and formal temporal authority, but only virtual, or in effect, which they call, but very improperly in my opinion, indirect, as I have showed before: as the power of God, and of the Angels to work corporal effects, although it be truly and formally spiritual, as God, and the Angels are truly and formally spiritual substances, yet eminently, virtually, and in effect is corporal, for that by their spiritual power they can work corporal effects. So that the Canonists, and these Divines do not differ in effect, and these Divines do in effect no less derogate from the temporal Sovereignty of absolute Princes, subjecting them in temporals, who are supreme, than the Canonists do. 65 The second principal opinion, is of other m Apol. nu. 4 & seq. and above in the first part of this Treatise. learned Catholics, both Divines, and Canonists, whom I have heretofore related, that the acts and objects of the spiritual coercive power, are only the inflicting of spiritual punishments, or Ecclesiastical Censures, as Excommunication, Suspension, Interdict, and not of temporal, or civil penalties, as death, exile, privation of goods, imprisonment, and consequently that the inflicting of temporal punishments are neither directly, nor indirectly, formally, nor virtually subject to the spiritual coercive power of the Church, but only to the coercive temporal power of temporal Princes, for that no reference, relation, or reduction of the inflicting of temporal punishments to the glory of GOD, or the salvation of souls, can make temporal punishments to be Ecclesiastical Censures, or the inflicting of temporal, and civil punishments to be the inflicting of spiritual, and Ecclesiastical Censures. 66 And although this opinion be the less common among Catholics, for the reasons heretofore alleged, especially through the watchfulness of the contrary side, since the time that some Popes have challenged to themselves this temporal authority over Kings, call it direct or indirect, formal, or virtual, as you please, and the indiligence (to speak with all reverence) of Christian Princes in suffering their temporal Sovereignty, to be so greatly and cunningly depressed, and subjecteth, yet in my judgement it is more conform to the true sense and meaning of the holy Scriptures, to the practice of the primitive Church, to the doctrine of the ancient Fathers, and to the true grounds and principles of moral Philosophy, and Divinity: and therefore to affirm this opinion, which is embraced by so many Doctors, as Almain witnesseth, and which is grounded upon such plain and pregnant reasons, to be impious, absurd, improbable, erroneous, yea and heretical, as this foul mouthed, and rash headed ignorant man doth so often brand it, is clearly repugnant to the rules of Christian prudence, charity, and modesty, and to the known principles of Schoole-divinitie. 67 And according to this opinion, although we should suppose, which is altogether untrue, though often inculcated by my Adversary, that the inflicting of temporal punishments, and the disposing of temporal things were absolutely necessary for the good of the Church, and the salvation of souls, yet they should not therefore be subject to the spiritual power of the Church, but only to the temporal authority of Christian Princes, who, as the Prophet Isay foretold, Isa. c. 49. were by God's special providence appointed to be her nourcing Fathers, Nurses, and Protectors. In such cases of necessity, spiritual Pastors must implore the aid of Christian Princes, and the Brachium Seculare, or temporal power is bound by her laws and other means to help the spiritual, and both of them having need one of the other, being so united, linked, and conjoined, as I have showed before, m Pa●t. 2. c. 1. one with the other among Christians, aught to use all due means to help each other, yet without breaking the bounds, and limits prescribed by Christ to either of them. 68 But truly in my opinion the weakness of their cause, and of the grounds of this their doctrine touching the Pope's temporal Monarchy over absolute Princes, call it direct, or indirect, as you please, may to any man of judgement sufficiently appear, by their so often declining the true state of the question, and not standing upon any sure or certain ground, but flying from one argument to another, as from convenience to absolute necessity, sometimes affirming, that the Pope may depose Princes, and dispose of temporal things when it is convenient for the good of the Church, and the salvation of souls, other times when it is absolutely necessary thereunto. But, as I have showed before, o Cap. 7. nu. 36 & seq. this absolute necessity is a mere fiction, and only supposed, but never proved, and this pretended temporal authority of the Pope, Almain. de potest. Eccle. q. 1 cap. 9 as Almain said, is rather very hurtful, than any way necessary either for the good of the Pope, or of Christian people. And if by the practice of depositions, as of Henry the fourth by Pope Gregory the seventh, of Fredrike the second, by Innocent the fourth, of Philip the the fair by Boniface the eight, of our King Henry the eight by Paul the third, and Queen Elizabeth by Pope Pius the fifth, which are the most famous depositions of all, we may gather, whether this authority be necessary, or hurtful to the Church of God, all histories make mention what infinite harm, rather than any good at all came to the Church of God thereby. And this I hope may suffice for the confirmation of my second answer to the Decree of the Lateran Council, and for the confutation of my adversaries Reply. Now let us see the third answer. CHAP. XIII. Wherein widdrington's third answer to the Decree of the Lateran Council is confirmed: and also it is showed how certain it is according to the doctrine of learned Catholics, that the Church cannot err in Decrees, or precepts of manners: from whence it is clearly deduced, that from the Decree, or rather Act of the Lateran Council, it cannot with any colour of probability be proved, that it is a point of faith, that the Pope hath authority to depose temporal Princes, and all M. fitzherbert's arguments to show the contrary, are most plainly confuted. 1 BEcause my Adversaries did so much rely upon this Decree of the Lateran Council, that they thought it alone to be sufficient to make their doctrine certain, and of faith, and therefore feared not to brand the contrary with the note of heresy, my third answer to their argument grounded upon the authority of the Lateran Council was, that the Canon, or decree, (for so we call it yet) of the said Council touching the deposition of temporal Landlords, Governors, or Lords, was no matter of faith, but of fact only, wherein as well the Pope, as those Father's following their own opinions, might err, and that the Council did not determine, or define, that the future deposition, not of Princes, as Mr. Fitzherbert translateth it, but of temporal Landlords, Magistrates, or Lords, should proceed from an undoubted lawful power, or from the Ecclesiastical power alone without the consent of Princes. And therefore the opinion of those Fathers, yieldeth no more certainty for the Pope's power to depose Princes, then if they had declared their opinions forth of the Council; seeing that this only can be gathered from the certain, and undoubted doctrine of the Catholic Church, that the infallible assistance of the Holy Ghost is promised by our Saviour Christ, not to the facts, or probable opinions of Popes, or councils, but only to their definitions.; 2 Against this answer Mr. Fitzherbert taketh some idle and frivolous exceptions: And first, he carpeth at that distinction or Antithesis betwixt rem facti duntaxat, and rem fidei, a matter of fact only, and a matter of faith, which he would have me to reform, and to make it according to the usual manner rem facti, and rem juris: a matter of fact, & a matter of law, or right. But here, saith he, a Pag. 17. 8. nu. 2. I must desire Widdrington, first to reform his distinction, or rather Antithesis, which he maketh betwixt rem facti, and rem fidei, a matter of fact, and a matter of faith, Wherein there is no such opposition, as he seemeth to imagine, or would at least have to be conceived, for if by a matter of fact only, he means a matter that is not speculative, but consisteth only in action, or practise, than matters of fact, and faith may so well stand together, that they may be, and often are one, and the self same thing: I mean, that a matter of fact not only may, but aught also to be believed under pain of damnation; as it is evident in divers Articles of our faith, consisting in the belief of things done, or to be done, as in all the History of our saviours Incarnation, life, and death already past, and in his last judgement, our Resurrection, and everlasting reward, or punishment, which are yet to come, and being matters of fact, are nevertheless matters of faith: and therefore Widdrington may do well, as I have said, to reform his distinction, and to make it according to the usual manner, to wit, rem facti, and rem juris, a matter of fact, and a matter of law, or right, which are indeed always distinct. 3 But first, is it possible that this man should be so blind, or ignorant, as not to see, that a matter of faith is always a matter of law, for that it is commanded to be believed by the law of God, and so how childishly he carpeth at that distinction, or Antithesis, a matter of fact only, and not a matter of faith, desiring me to reform that distinction, and to make it according to the usual manner, to wit, rem facti, and rem juris, a matter of faith, and a matter of law, seeing that it is manifest to every Schoolboy, that a matter of faith is always a matter of law, as being a thing commanded to be believed by the law of God. But matters of fact, and of faith, saith Mr. Fitzherbert may well stand together etc. And therefore a matter of fact is not opposite to a matter of faith, as Widdrington seemeth to imagine, or would at least have to be conceived. 4 But in the like manner I may say, that matters of fact, and matters of law may well stand together, as it is evident in divers Articles of our faith, concerning our saviours Incarnation, Passion, Resurrection, etc. which are both matters of fact, and of law, seeing that they are things appertaining to the law of God, and therefore a matter of fact is not opposite to a matter of law, and always distinct, as Mr. Fitzherbert following therein Fa. Lessius, from whom he took this frivolous exception, not only seemeth to imagine, but also expressly affirmeth. So that these men have need first to reform their own distinction or Antithesis, which they make betwixt a matter of fact, and a matter of law, before they undertake to be reformers of other men. But the plain truth is, that I neither said, nor imagined, as these men untruly affirm, that I made an opposition, or Antithesis betwixt a matter of faith, and a matter of fact but betwixt a matter of faith and of fact only, which word [only] if they had well considered, they might easily have perceived, that it doth exclude a matter of faith, and that I did not make an opposition betwixt every matter of fact, and of faith, but betwixt a matter of faith, and of fact only, that is, of such facts, whic are only grounded upon a probable opinion, or at the most, not upon any undoubted doctrine of faith, and such matters of fact, and of faith, can never stand together. 5 For whereas Cardinal Bellarmine, and Fa. Lessius, against whom principally I wrote that Preface, wherein I answered this Decree of the Lateran Council, did so much insist upon this Decree, that, as I said before, they would make the world believe, that it alone were sufficient to make their doctrine to be of faith, and the contrary flat heretical, my meaning was in this third answer to show, that no such thing could be proved from this Council, as they pretended, for that this Decree, for as much as it concerneth the future deposition of temporal Landlords, or Lords, was no matter of faith, but of fact only, and that the Council did not declare, determine, or define, that this future deposition of them was therein decreed to proceed from the spiritual authority of the Church without the consent, licence, or authority of temporal Princes, which my Adversary must first prove, or else they will speak little to the purpose. Now Mr. Fitzherbert falsely supposing, as you have seen, that I make an opposition betwixt a matter of fact, and a matter of faith, as though a matter of fact, and a matter of faith cannot stand together, which every Schoolboy knoweth to be false, you shall see what an idle discourse he maketh throughout this whole Chapter, it being grounded upon this false supposal. 6 But because Mr. Fitzher. in his ensuing discourse giveth me occasion to enter into a question, which not a little concerneth our present controversy, I think it not amiss, before I go any further to speak something thereof; to wit, with what kind of certainty we are to believe, that the Church cannot err in making Decrees, or precepts of manners, that is, whether, as it is heretical to hold, that the Church can err in making matters of faith, so also it is heretical to hold, that she can err in making laws, Decrees, or precepts belonging to manners. And albeit my meaning is not at this time to set down, what is my own opinion concerning this matter, because I do not intend to rely much thereon for the answering of my adversaries objections, and so will not give him occasion to fly from the principal controversy to other by-questions, and of less importance, yet for the better instruction of the unlearned Reader, who may perchance imagine, that every Pope's Breve is sufficient to make a matter of faith, I will briefly relate, what is the opinion of learned Catholics, and namely of Melchior Canus in this point. 7 First therefore concerning matters of faith, or things to believed, Melchior Canus affirmeth, that a General Council being confirmed by the Pope's authority cannot err in the defining of Catholic doctrine, Canus lib. 1. de locis cap. 4. concl. 3. and this conclusion he taketh to be so certain, that the contrary he accounteth heretical. But as I observed in an other place, b In disp. Theol. cap 10. sec. 2. nu. 13. to make such definitions to be certain, infallible, and without error, he requireth two conditions, the one is, that the doctrine must be propounded to the whole Church, and not only to private or particular Churches, or Bishops, and the other, that it be propounded with an obligation to be believed as of faith, which also Cardinal Bellarmine confirmeth. For in councils, Bellar. lib. 2. de Conc. cap. 42. saith he, the greatest part of the Acts do not appertain to faith; for neither are of faith the disputations that go before, nor the reasons, which are added, nor those things which are brought to explicate, and illustrate, but only the bare decrees, and those not all, but those only which are propounded as of faith. And it is easy, say they, to know when the Council doth propound any thing with an obligation to be believed, as of faith, by the words of the Council itself. For they always use to say, that they declare the Catholic faith, or account them for heretics, or which is most common, denounce anathema, or excommunicate them who shall believe the contrary, but when none of these things are said, it is not certain saith Cardinal Bellarmine, that it is a point of faith. Whereby may be plainly seen the insolent temerity of some, especially this my Adversary, who fear not to call them heretics, that deny the Pope's power to depose Princes, seeing that neither from the Council of Lateran, nor from any other Council, either General, or Provincial, nor, which is more, from any one Canon of any particular Pope, they can bring so much as a colourable show of any such decree, which, according to the aforesaid rules of Cardinal Bellarmine and Canus, have the conditions required to make a point of faith. Canus lib. 5. de loc. cap. 5. q. 5. 8 Now concerning decrees, and precepts belonging to manners, or things commanded or forbidden to be done, the said Canus having first supposed, and distinguished, that the question may be either of such things as are necessary to salvation, as being commanded, or forbidden by the law of God, or Nature, or of such things that are not so necessary, he setteth down this conclusion; that the Church, cannot err in the doctrine of such manners, as are necessary to salvation; Therefore if the Church by a firm decree do define that any thing is to be done, or to be avoided, she cannot err therein, as for example, in commanding Laymen to receive the Sacrament under one only kind. From whence he inferreth this second conclusion, that when the Church in a matter of moment, and which is very profitable for the reforming of Christian manners, doth make laws to all Christian people, she cannot command any thing which is contrary to the Gospel, or natural reason, wherefore as a general Council cannot propound false things to be believed by the people, so it cannot propound evil things to be done, propound, saith he, by a firm and certain decree, by which all men are bound to believe and do under pain of eternal damnation. 9 But as concerning the certainty of this doctrine, especially touching things which are not so necessary to salvation, as not being repugnant to the Gospel, or natural reason, whether it be heretical to affirm that some custom of the Church is evil, or some law of the Church is unjust, I dare not, saith Canus, define, or determine. Whereupon he excuseth those from heresy, who should affirm, that the Church doth err in the custom of communicating the people under one kind only: and he answereth to the Council of Constance, which ordaineth, that those are to be condemned as heretics who affirm the Church to err therein, that the Council at that time was without a head, and that Pope Martin doth not simply or absolutely approve that article, but he only defineth, that those who shall teach that the Church doth err in that manner of custom are to be condemned as heretics, or as savouring heresy. Therefore that which Pope Martin, being Precedent of the Council, durst not condemn by the name of heresy, neither I, saith Canus, dare, nor aught to impeach of a greater censure. But if in a custom necessary to salvation, which that seemed to be, whereof there was a controversy in the Council of Constance, the modesty of Pope Martin was so great, how much more modest aught we to be in condemning other errors, which are repugnant to the custom of the Church, which is not necessary to salvation? Thus Canus, which doctrine I would desire my Adversary, and such other unlearned hoat-spurres, who have heresy, and heretical so frequent in their mouths, little knowing themselves what heresy is, diligently to consider. 10 Also the said Canus excuseth from heresy those, who disprove the custom of the Church, to carry about in solemn procession the B. Sacrament: For albeit, saith he, to reprehend this custom upon this ground, that Christ is not really, and truly present in the Eucharist, be heresy, yet if thou regard the error in itself, it savoureth heresy, it is rashness, and imprudence, and although it be to be censured for many respects, yet it is not heresy; seeing that albeit in this custom the Church should not err, yet her authority would not therefore be endangered in matters of greater moment. Neither doth the Council of Trent simply or absolutely say, anathema to those that shall reprehend this custom of the Church, but to those that therefore reprehend it, because they do not admit the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, and therefore neither the adoration, and worship thereof. 11 In like manner he excuseth from heresy those, who affirm, that the Church may err in the canonisation of Saints. For it is to be observed, saith he, that some manners, or customs of the Church are delivered to the Church by Christ, and the Apostles, wherein he that should say the Church to err, doth make Christ, and the Apostles to be Authors of that error: but other manners, or customs are brought in since the Apostles, wherein although the Church should err, yet faith would not therefore be endangered: Therefore without danger of heresy it may be held, that the Church may in some law and custom err. And he bringeth a reason wherefore it is not heretical to say, that the Church may err in the Canonization of Saints, by which he proved a little before, that in manners, customs, precepts, and laws, which are not common to the whole Church, but are referred to private men, or Churches, the Church may err through ignorance, not only in the judgement of things done, but also in the private precepts and laws themselves. And of this conclusion, saith he, Pope Innocent gave a true and fit reason, in cap. A nobis, descent. Excom. in these words: The judgement of God is always grounded upon truth, which neither deceiveth, nor is deceived, but the judgement of the Church doth sometimes follow opinion, which oftentimes deceiveth, and is deceived; whereupon it happeneth sometimes, that he who is bound before God, is loosed before the Church, & he that is free before God, is tied by an Ecclesiastical Censure. Thus Pope Innocent. 12 For from hence, saith Canus, it is manifest, which is most worthy the observation, that decrees of the Church cannot be certain, and firm, which are not grounded upon certain and firm principles, and foundations. Wherefore if but one of those things, whereon the judgement of the Church dependeth, be uncertain, the decree of the Church cannot be certain, whether the question be speculative, or practical. For the Conclusion according to the maxim of the Logicians followeth the weaker part, and if one of the principles, or premises be weak, it is necessary, that the conclusion in regard of that part be weakened. Whereby it is easily understood, that the judgements of the Church, which proceed from the uncertain testimonies of men, are weak to make a certain, and undoubted belief; of which sort is that, whereby she judgeth any one to be numbered in the Catalogue of Saints: yet it is not lawful to call in question such decrees without punishment; but it is temerarious, and irreligious not to give credit to the Church in the canonizing of Saints, which because he that doth, doth rashly, and inconsiderately, he shall indeed deservedly be punished by the Church. Thus Canus. Canus l. 12. c. 1. 13 Lastly, he excuseth from heresy those, who should affirm, that the B. Virgin is not corporally assumpted into heaven, which although, saith he, it be not contrary to faith, yet because it is repugnant to the common consent of the Church, it would be taxed of malapert temerity. And albeit Fa. Suarez also doth affirm, Suarez tom. 2. disp. 21. sec. 2. that now it is so received an opinion, that it cannot be called in question by any pious and Catholic man, yet he acknowledgeth, that it is not of faith, because it is neither defined by the Church, neither is there any testimony of Scripture, or sufficient tradition, Sot. in 4. dist. 43 q. 2. ar. 1. Caiet. tom. 2. opu. trac. 2. de Concept. cap. 1. which may cause infallible faith. But Sotus saith only, that it ought to be believed most piously, but yet it is not put among the articles of faith necessarily to be believed. And Caietane affirmeth, that it is not to be believed of necessity, but probably and piously. For there is two manner of ways, saith he, whereby a thing may be decreed to be believed. For some things are decreed to be believed in such sort, that he who thinks the contrary is an heretic: but some things as probably to be believed, as the common piety of the Church doth probably believe concerning the corporal Assumption of the B. Virgin, and her Sanctification in her mother's womb, Abul. in cap. 22. Matth. q. 230. and other such like. Abulensis also saith, that it is not necessary to hold this, because it is not among the articles of faith, neither also is there any thing defined by the Church, that it ought to be held, therefore it is lawful for every man to think as he will. And the reasons which are brought to prove her Resurrection, are certain persuasions, and do not convince, yet because it is commonly held, that she is risen, it is more reasonable to hold it; yet if any one do affirm the contrary, we do not contend. And nevertheless the aforesaid Authors knew right well, that this doctrine concerning the corporal Assumption of the B. Virgin was never denied by any Catholic, and was also the ground and foundation of an Ecclesiastical decree, and custom to celebrate the Feast of the B. Virgin's Assumption. 14 And by this the Reader may easily perceive, what things are required to make one an heretic, that should deny the decrees of the Church concerning manners to be infallible: and how rashly, and unchristianly my Adversaries do charge me with heresy, for denying the doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes to be a point of faith, seeing that they cannot bring any one decree either of Pope, or Council, whereby, according to the conditions before required by Cardinal Bellarmine and Canus to the infallibility of decrees either touching faith, or manners, it can with any probable colour be proved, that this doctrine is certain, and of faith, but we must forsooth take their own interpretations, or rather wrest of the Canons, and false suppositions to be sufficient decrees to determine matters of faith. Now to Mr. fitzherbert's discourse. 15 Secondly, saith he, c Pag. 178. nu. 3. I wish Widdrington to consider, that by this his distinction, and the argument, which he deduceth from it, he may in like manner impugn the decree of the Apostles themselves made in their Council at Jerusalem, wherein they ordained, and defined nothing else but matters of fact (to wit, that the Christians should abstain from meats offered to Idols, from things strangled, and blood, and fornication) in all which the Apostles might (according to this man's doctrine) follow their own private opinions, and err, because their Decree concerned only matters of fact. 16 But first, this man supposeth, that I impugn the Decree of the Lateran Council, which is very untrue: for I only expound, and declare the sense and meaning of the Decree, and disprove the exposition, which my Adversaries make thereof. Wherefore if we may suppose, that this Decree of the Apostles was concerning such a matter of fact, which is not grounded upon any doctrine of faith, but only upon opinions, which are exposed to error, as I contend this Decree, if we may truly call it so, of the Lateran Council concerning the future deposition of temporal Landlords, Magistrates, or Lords to be such a matter of fact, than I say we may in the like proportionate manner, I do not say, impugn, but expound this decree of the Apostles, as I have, and shall beneath expound the decree of the Lateran Council, in such sort that from thence no infallible doctrine of faith can be concluded to prove that, which some Authors from thence pretend to conclude, to wit, that the Church hath authority to make new laws, which shall have force to bind in conscience. 17 As for example, supposing only for Disputation sake but not affirming, that the Church hath not authority to make new laws and precepts, which shall have force to bind in conscience, which doctrine some Authors attribute to Gerson, but only to declare the laws and precepts of GOD, and Nature, and also to determine those laws and precepts, which GOD, and Nature have left undetermined, either concerning the time, place, or manner; as for example, we are commanded by the law of GOD, and Nature, to honour GOD, and his Saints, to fast, to receive the Eucharist, to confess our sins, etc. yet the time, place, and manner are not determined, but left to the determination of the Church, and so the Church appointeth Holidays, fasting-days, the time of Easter to receive, and confess our sins, and such like: which being supposed for probable, but not granted, we may, I do not say, impugn, but probably expound that decree of the Apostles, as some ancient Fathers do expound it, so that it doth not ordain, or command any new thing, but only declare the law of GOD, and Nature; and that by things strangled, and blood, is understood only manslaughter, Irenae. l. 3. c. 12 Cypr. l. 3. ad Quirimum c. vl. See Suarez lib. ●. de Leg. ca 20. either by strangling, or by the effusion of blood, as Irenaeus, S. Cyprian, and others do seem to understand those words, and likewise that meats offered to Idols are here only forbidden to be eaten either with a superstitious worship, as though some sacred thing were in those meats in regard of the Idol, or else with the scandal of others, both which are against the law of God, & nature, and both which senses may be gathered from the words of S. Paul 1. Cor. 8. vers. 4. and 7. and 1. Cor. 10. vers. 28. & 29. 18 And in the like proportionate manner I have answered to the Decree of the Lateran Council, not by impugning, but by expounding the same. For considering that it is truly a probable doctrine and maintained by very many Doctors, as Almain affirmeth, that the Ecclesiastical power of the Church doth not by the institution of Christ extend to the inflicting of temporal punishments, as death, exile, privation of goods, imprisonment, and when she useth these, she doth it by the pure positive law, and privileges of Princes, it is evident, that we may probably answer, that decree of the Lateran Council, if we may call it a decree, concerning the future fact of the deposition of temporal Landlords, or Magistrates, not to proceed from Ecclesiastical, or spiritual power but from that temporal authority, which was granted to the Council by the consent of temporal Princes, whose Ambassadors were present at the making of that act; or else to bind only in the Pope's temporal Dominions. 19 Secondly, I answer, that there is a great disparity betwixt the decree of the Apostles, and the decree, or act of the Lateran Council for as much as concerneth that future deposition of temporal Landlords. For the decree of the Apostles is a true and proper law, and decree, and includeth an express commandment to abstain from those things, which are there forbidden: but this Decree of the Lateran Council, for as much as concerneth the aforesaid deposition, is not a true, and proper law or Decree, neither doth it contain any special commandment, prohibition, grant, or privilege, which every true, and proper law, or decree aught to contain, as it will clearly appear according to my Adversaries own grounds, if we consider every part, and parcel of this Decree, or Canon. For first it is there ordained, that Secular Potestaes, or Magistrates shall by Ecclesiastical Censure, if need require, be compelled to take an Oath, that they will do their best endeavour to banish all heretics from the territories subject to their jurisdiction: and this no doubt is a true, and proper decree. Secondly, that if a temporal Landlord, Magistrate, or Lord shall neglect to purge his territories from heretical filth, he shall by the Metropolitan, and other Comprovinciall Bishops be excommunicated; and this also is a true and proper decree, and includeth a precept, and commandment. Tirdly, that if he shall contemn to give satisfaction within a year, the same shall be signified to the Pope, and this also is a proper decree, commanding the Metropolitan, and other Comprovinciall Bishops to signify the same to the Pope: Fourthly it is added, that then the Pope may denounce his Vassals absolved from their fealty, and his territories exposed to be taken by Catholics: and this, which is the main, and only point, from whence my Adversaries conclude, that the Pope by his spiritual power may depose temporal Princes, cannot according to their own grounds be a true, and proper decree, and contain any commandment, grant or privilege, unless they will grant the Council to be above the Pope, and that the Council hath power to impose commandments upon the Pope, or to give him any authority, or privilege, which nevertheless they utterly deny: and therefore these words, as of themselves it is plain, do only import, and signify the end, reason, or cause of the former Decree, to wit, wherefore it must be signified to the Pope, that such a temporal Landlord, hath been excommunicated for a whole year. 20 And by this it is evident first, that seeing that in general Counsels according to the express doctrine of Cardinal Bellarmine, the greatest part of the Acts do not appertain to faith, (For neither are of faith the disputations, which go before, nor the reasons which are added, nor those things which are brought to explicate, and illustrate, but only the bare decrees, and those not all, but which are propounded, as of faith,) and that this is no decree, and though it were, it is not propounded as of faith, as it is manifest by the rules assigned above by Cardinal Bellarmine, and Canus, to know when any thing is propounded, as of faith, but it only containeth the cause and reason of the former decree, which reason may be exposed to error (seeing that it is not greatly to be stood upon, saith Canus, Canus l. 6. c. 8. si Pontificum rationes necessariae non sunt, if the reasons of the Popes or Counsels be not necessary,) it is, I say, most evident, that from this Act no probable argument can be brought to prove, that the doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes, is certain and of faith. 21 Secondly, it is also evident, that I do not impugn, or call in question this Act of the Council but do only expound, and interpret it, and that my exposition is probable, to wit, that this Act was made not by spiritual authority, but by temporal, it is manifest, supposing, that is probable, as in very deed it is, and maintained by very many Doctors, both Divines, and Lawyers, that the Ecclesiastical or spiritual power by the institution of Christ, doth not extend to the inflicting of temporal punishments, but only of Ecclesiastical censures, and therefore it cannot without gross ignorance and manifest absurdity be said, that this my answer and exposition which is grounded upon the doctrine, not only of so many learned Authors, but also of my own Adversaries, and who otherwise defend the Pope's authority to depose Princes, is to be accounted improbable or absurd. I now let pass that the decrees of Popes and Counsels which are not referred to all the Church, but only to particular Bishops, Churches, or persons, and do not concern and bind all the Church, but only certain persons, may be exposed to error, Canus lib. 5. cap. 5. q. 4. as I declared before: For in that case only, saith Canus, the judges are to be understood to pronounce, or define of faith, when the decree or sentence belongeth to all the faithful, when it bindeth all: but this Act of the Lateran Council doth only concern temporal Land lords, and their Vassals, and those not all, but only the Vassals of such Land lords, Magistrates, or Lords, who remain excommunicated for a whole year, for neglecting to purge their territories of heretical filth. And thus much concerning the Apostles decree. 22 And the like also, saith Mr. Fitzherbert d Pag. 179. nu. 4. 5. , may be said concerning other decrees of Popes and Counsels, the impugners whereof have been held and condemned by the Church for heretics, as for example; it was decreed e Baron. an. 159 Euseb. lib. 23. cap. 22. 23. 24, & 25. Theod. lib. 1. c. 9 Athan. in epist. de Synod. Arimin. Ambros. epist. 83. by Pope Pius the first, and confirmed by Pope Victor, and after by the Council of Nice, that the feast of Easter should be celebrated, at the same time that now it is kept universally throughout Christendom, according to the tradition left to the Roman Church, by S. Peter, whereas the Churches of Asia did celebrate the said feast with the jews, (to wit, at the time prescribed in the law of Moses) following therein the tradition, or at least the practice of S. john the Evangelist. And albeit those decrees ordain only matter of fact, and practise, yet they which have heretofore contradicted the same, and adhered to the custom of the jews were, and are still held by the Church for heretics, Epiphan. haer. 50 S. Aug haer. 29. and registered for such by S. Epiphanius, and S. Augustine, in their Catalogues of heretics, under the name and title of Tessarescedecatitae, that is to say, Quartadecimani, who with this distinction of Widdrington, and his arguments, might far more probably defend their opinion, than he doth, or can defend his. For they might say as well as he, that those Decrees were not matters of faith, but matters of fact only, wherein both the Pope, and the Counsels might follow their own private opinions, and consequently err, which being added to that which they said in defence of their heresy, and might truly say, to wit, that they followed the practice of S. john the Evangelist, and of the Churches of Asia, Euseb. ubi supra Beda lib. 3. hist. cap. 23. (which received the same by tradition from him, and continued it without interruption for 150. years) this, I say, would give another manner of probability to their doctrine, than he can any way pretend for his; and yet nevertheless they are worthily held for heretics, because they did obstinately refuse to obey those decrees. 23 But this objection is as frivolous as the former; first, for that it supposeth that I oppose a matter of fact, to a matter of faith, and imagine that the one cannot stand with the other, which is untrue, as I showed before. Secondly, for that it supposeth also that I impugn the decree, or rather Act and reason of the Lateran Council, which is also untrue, seeing that I do not impugn it, but only as you have seen, expound it. Thirdly, for that there is a great disparity betwixt the decree concerning the celebrating of the Feast of Easter, and this Act of the Lateran Council, concerning the future deposition of temporal Landlords, or Magistrates, seeing that the former is a true and proper decree, implying an express precept, and commandment, but this Act is not a true & proper decree, containing in it any command, grant, or privilege, as I showed before and therefore we cannot rightly apply those arguments, which the Divines do bring to prove the Churches infallible authority to make decrees, and precepts concerning manners, to this Act of the Lateran Council, which is not grounded upon any doctrine appertaining to faith, but only upon opinion, which may be exposed to error. 24 Fourthly, the Quartadecimani, Castro lib. 12. contra haer. verbo Pascha. Bell. lib. 3. de Cultu. Sanct. cap. 12. as you may see in Alphonsus de Castro, and Cardinal Bellarmine, were not accounted heretics for celebrating the Feast of Easter, according to the custom of the jews, contrary to the decree of the Church, but for that they thought it necessary to celebrate that Feast, according to the custom of the jews, which is indeed heretical. And therefore that is very untrue, which Mr. Fitzherbert saith, that the Quartadecimani were worthily held for heretics, because they did obstinately refuse to obey those decrees, but because they refused to obey them upon an heretical ground. Neither is it heretical, as I have showed before out of Canus, to impugn, or disobey a decree of the Church, especially concerning facts and manners, which are not necessary to salvation, unless it be impugned, or disobeyed upon an heretical ground. But if the decree be grounded only upon an opinion, which is exposed to error, and not upon an infallible point of faith, it is not heretical to impugn that decree, and to say, that the Church may err in making that decree. Wherefore it is one thing to say, that the Church may err in making such, or such a law, and decree; and another thing to say, that the Church doth err, or hath erred in making that law and decree, Canus lib. 5. q. 5 conclu. 2. albeit Melchior Canus feareth not to say, that he doth not approve all Church-lawes, nor commend all punishments, Censures, Excommunications, Irregularities, Interdicts. I know, saith he, that there be some such laws, which if they want nothing else, yet doubtless they want prudence, and discretion. For in laws, precepts, decrees, and facts concerning manners, which are not necessary to salvation, and which are not grounded upon any doctrine of faith, it is not heretical to hold, that Christ hath not promised to the Church any infallible assistance; and that therefore she may err in making such decrees, yet I do not deny, but that it were temerarious, and irreligious for any private man to impugn any decree of a general Council, and to say, that the Church did err in making that decree. 25 As also it is no false doctrine, much less heretical, to affirm, that Kings, and temporal Commonwealths may err in making laws and decrees concerning civil government, for that Christ hath not promised them his infallible assistance therein; yet it were scandalous, and seditious for a private man to impugn any temporal law established by the Prince, and the Commonwealth, and to say, that they did err in making that temporal law. But, as I said before, I do not impugn, but only expound this Decree, or rather Act of the Lateran Council, according to the probable doctrine of very many Doctors, who affirm, that the Church by the institution of Christ, hath not power to inflict temporal punishments, but only Ecclesiastical Censures. But no marvel, that my Adversary discourseth here so unlearnedly, seeing that he hath so little insight in these Theological questions, and I accuse rather his temerity, than his ignorance, that he will take upon him with such confidence, to be a teacher in these difficult questions, wherein he himself hath never been a Scholar, or scarce understandeth the true state of the question. And by this, which hath been said, the judicious Reader may easily perceive, how vain and impertinent are the rest of Mr. fitzherbert's inferences, and objections in this Chapter, which therefore I might well omit, but that to give satisfaction to the unlearned Reader, I am in a sort compelled to set them down. 26 Whereupon, saith he, f Page. 180. num. 6. it followeth first, that widdrington's answer to the Canon of the Council of Lateran, grounded upon a distinction of a matter of fact, and a matter of faith, is very vain and frivolous, as well because the one doth not exclude the other, as also because by that distinction he may impugn the Decree of the Apostles themselves, of the Popes, Pius, and Victor, and of the Council of Nice, and such other touching matters of fact, no less probably, than he impugneth the Canon of the Council of Lateran. 27 But to this, as you have seen, I have answered before, and have clearly showed, that I did not impugn, but only expound the decree of the Lateran Council, and that I did not oppose a matter of faith, to every matter of fact, but to a matter of fact only, or, which is all one, to such a matter of fact, which is not grounded upon any doctrine of faith, and such a matter of fact doth exclude a matter of faith: & also that by this distinction I do not any wise impugn the decree of the Apostles, of Pope Pius, and Victor, of the Council of Nice, or of any other touching matters of fact. 28 Secondly, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, g Pa. 180. nu. 7 it appeareth, that, as the Quartadecimani were worthily condemned of heresy, because they obstinately contradicted the authority of those Decrees, so also those, who do with like obstinacy impugn the other Decree of the Council of Lateran, do much more deserve to be held for heretics, seeing that they have much less probability for their opinion, than the other had. 29 But this also hath been answered before; for neither were the quartadecimani condemned of heresy, because they obstinately contradicted the authority of those decrees, but because they contradicted them upon an heretical ground: Neither do I impugn the Decree of the Lateran Council, but do only expound it, according to the probable doctrine of very many learned Catholics, who since the Council of Lateran have affirmed, that the Ecclesiastical power, by the institution of Christ, doth not extend to the inflicting of temporal punishments, as death, exile, privation of goods, imprisonment, but that the Church, when she inflicteth such punishments, doth it by the pure positive law, and privileges of Princes, which learned Doctors cannot without gross temerity, and impudence be therefore condemned of heresy. And if this decree of the Lateran Council be so clear a proof to make this doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes to be a point of faith, and the contrary heretical, as these men pretend, I would gladly know, why Cardinal Bellarmine in his Controversies, Victoria, Corduba, Moliva, or D. Sanders did not urge it to make their doctrine in this point, certain, unquestionable, and of faith, and why Marsilius of Padua was not by some one of those, who writ of heresies, accounted an heretic for impugning this doctrine, and why it was not by Castro, Prateolus, Cardinal Bellarmine, or some other reckoned among one of his heresies, but it must now, forsooth, within these few years, without any new definition either of Pope, or Council be made an heresy, which for a 1600. years before was not by any ancient Father, or Catholic Divine accounted an heresy. 30 Thirdly, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, h Pa. 181. nu. ● whereas Widdrington concludeth this his third answer, with this reason, that the Fathers in the Council of Lateran had no more assurance, and certainty for this their Decree, then if they had declared their opinion forth of the Council, because Christ hath not promised the infallible assistance of his holy Spirit unto facts, and probable opinions of Popes, or councils, but to their definitions only, this his conclusion, I say, is most impertinent, not only because it impugneth the foresaid Decrees of the Apostles, of Pope Pius, and of the Nicene Council, no less than this other of the Council of Lateran, but also because he flatly overthroweth himself, seeing that this Decree of the Council of Lateran is a true definition concerning the means to extirpate heresy; and therefore seeing that our Saviour promised the infallible assistance of his holy Spirit to the definitions of Popes and Counsels (as Widdrington hath here expressly affirmed) it followeth, that the Pope, and Fathers in the Council of Lateran, neither did, nor could err in their definition, or Decree concerning the deposition of Princes, when it shall be necessary for the extirpation of heresy. 31 But all this also I have fully satisfied before, and showed a great disparity betwixt those decrees of the Apostles, of Pope Pius, and of the Council of Nice, and betwixt the Act of the Lateran Council, concerning the future deposition of temporal Potestaes, both for that this Act of the Lateran Council is no true, and proper Decree (according to my adversaries grounds) as those were, and also for that no Catholic Author affirmeth, that those Decrees were made by temporal, but only by spiritual authority, but very many Doctors affirm, that this Act was made by the authority and consent of temporal Princes, seeing that according to their doctrine the Church by the institution of Christ, hath not authority to inflict temporal punishments, but that when she useth, or inflicteth them, she doth it by the pure positive law, and privileges of Princes. 32 And whereas Mr. Fitzherbert saith, that this Decree of the Lateran Council, is a true definition concerning the means to extirpate heresy, if he mean by the Decree of the Lateran Council, this only Act concerning the absolving of Vassals from their fealty, whereof only we now dispute, and by a definition he understand a Decree containing some precept, or obligation either concerning faith, or manners, this is very untrue, for, as I showed before, this Act, according to his own grounds, containeth no precept, bond, or obligation, unless he will grant, that the Council hath authority to command or bind the Pope, and therefore it is not properly a true Decree, but only the reason, cause, and end of the former Decree: and although it were a true decree, and in that sense a definition, yet for that it was enacted, not by spiritual, but by temporal authority, it is evident, that no infallible assistance of the holy Ghost was promised by our Saviour Christ to the making thereof. But if by this Decree of the Lateran Council he understand the whole act, which containeth divers particular decrees concerning the rooting out of heresy by spiritual means (for to root out heresy by temporal means, and inflicting temporal punishments, as I have often said, doth not belong to spiritual, but to temporal authority) than I willingly grant, that this Decree is a true definition, taking a definition, as he doth, for a Decree, but, besides that this is nothing against me, he must withal remember, that, according to the doctrine of Cardinal Bellarmine, not all definitions or decrees do appertain to faith, but those Decrees only, which are propounded as of faith: Now if Mr. Fitzherbert will but call to mind the rules, which I have alleged before out of Cardinal Bellarmine, to know, when any Decree is propounded as of faith, he will evidently see, that this Act of the Lateran Council concerning the absolving of vassals from their fealty, is no such Decree, and will therefore be hereafter shamed to urge any longer the Council of Lateran, for the confirming of his new Catholke, or rather particular faith, and private spirit. 33 And if Widdrington say, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, i Pa. 191. nu. 9 that Decrees concerning matters of fact are not definitions, he showeth himself very absurd. For it cannot be denied, but that Popes and councils ordaining Decrees concerning matters of fact, do as well define what is to be done, or practised, as they define what is to be believed and taught, when they make Decrees concerning matters of faith; and the one is no less necessary for the good government of the Church, than the other; and therefore their Decrees of both sorts are definitions, the one of a thing to be believed, and the other of a thing to be done; for otherwise we must say, that the Apostles after all their consultation in their Council at Jerusalem defined nothing, which were absurd. 34 But because I will not contend of words, I do not say, Act. 15. that Decrees concerning matters of fact, and manners, which are true, and proper Decrees, are not definitions, or that such Decrees, or definitions are not necessary for the good government of the Church, but that, which I say, is, that this Act of the Lateran Council concerning the deposition, not of Princes, as this man supposeth, but of Landlords, Potestaes, or Lords, is not, according to my adversaries grounds, a true and proper Decree, or definition, including any precept, bond, or obligation, which all true, and proper decrees do include: and I also say, that, according to the express doctrine of Cardinal Bellarmine, not all the Decrees, or definitions of general councils do appertain to faith, but those only which are propounded as of faith; and that to know, when any Decree is propounded as of faith, he assigneth these rules, to wit, If the Council do excommunicate those, or account them for heretics, who shall believe the contrary, or if it declare by a firm decree, that what is defined, or decreed aught to be received as a doctrine of the Catholic faith, and to be firmly believed by all the faithful, or the contrary to be heretical, or repugnant to the holy Scriptures, and that when none of these things be affirmed, it is not certain, that it is a point of faith: Now that there is no such thing decreed, defined, or affirmed in this manner in the Lateran Council, touching the absolving of vassals from their fealty, it is too too apparent. 35 Wherein also, saith M. Fitzherbert, k Pag. 182. nu. 10. 11. it is to be considered, that the error which may be incident to a definition, or Decree concerning matters of fact, cannot fall upon the Decree, or definition itself (for so should the error redound to the holy Ghost, whose assistance our Saviour hath promised to the definitions of councils, and Popes, as Widdrington himself n See before u. 1. granteth) but it must fall upon the execution of the Decree, as if some Prince should be deposed upon wrong information, or without due circumstances required in the Decree. But the question is not here of error in matters of fact of this kind (I mean in the execution of Decrees) and therefore if Widdrington speak of such facts, when he saith, that Christ hath not promised the assistance of his spirit to facts, but to definitions, he changeth the question, and fighteth with his own shadow, affirming that, which we deny not, who speak only of the verity, justice, and equity of the Decree itself, from the which we exclude all error, and injustice, acknowledging the assistance of the holy Ghost in the making thereof, in which respect all Catholic Doctors that have ever written, have uniformly taught hitherto, that the Church being guided by the holy Ghost cannot err in her general Decrees made for the whole Church, touching either faith, or manners (as I will declare m See Cham 16. nu. 11. 12. further hereafter.) Whereupon I conclude that Widdrington admitting, as he doth the assistance of the holy Ghost in the definitions of councils, and Popes, and yet impugning the verity, or justice of the Decree, ascribeth error or injustice to the holy Ghost. 36 But first, whether a General Council can err or no in her definitions, or decrees, which are made by her spiritual authority concerning matters of fact, or manners (for that the Pope cannot err even in his definitions concerning faith, if he define without a General Council I never intended to affirm) it is altogether impertinent to the present Act of the Lateran Council concerning the absolving of vassals from their fealty, seeing that this Act, as I contend, was not made by her spiritual authority, but by the authority, licence, and consent of temporal Princes, to the making of which Decrees no Catholic Author affirmeth, that Christ hath promised his infallible assistance, or that the Church is guided therein by the holy Ghost. 37 Secondly, albeit at this present I do not say, that the Church, or a General Council can err in her general Decrees concerning matters of fact and manners, yet I say, as I said before, that Melchior Canus a man of such learning and piety, that Mr. Fitzherbert dare not, as I think, accuse him of heresy, doth confidently say, that without danger of heresy it may be held, that the Church in some such law, or custom may err, and that he dare not affirm it to be heretical, to say that some such law, or custom of the Church is unjust; and also that in manners not common to the whole Church, but which are referred to private persons, or Churches, the Church may err through ignorance, not only in her judgement of things done, but also in her private precepts, and laws; and generally he saith, that if any one of those things, whereon the judgement of the Church doth depend, be uncertain, the decree of the Church cannot be firm, and certain, whether the question be speculative, or practical, of which sort, saith he, is that decree, by which she doth canonize or judge holy men to be numbered in the Catalogue of Saints. By all which it is evident, that from the Act, or Decree, if we will needs call it so, of the Lateran Council concerning the absolving of vassals from their fealty, stretch it as far as may be, no colourable, much less convincing argument can be brought to make the doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes, to be a point of faith, and the contrary to be heretical. 38 Thirdly, when I affirmed, that from the undoubted doctrine of the Catholic Church this only can be gathered, that Christ hath promised the infallible assistance of the holy Ghost, not to facts, or probable opinions of Popes, and councils, but to definitions only, by facts I understand such acts, as are not grounded upon any doctrine of faith, and by definitions, I meant those Decrees, which are propounded as of faith: or, which without any doubt, or controversy are deduced evidently from such infallible definitions, or principles of faith, of which sort, this Act, or Decree of the Lateran Council is not, as it is evident for those many reasons before alleged. 39 And whereas Widdrington addeth, saith Mr. Fitzherbert n Pag. 133. nu. 12. Supra. nu. 1. an other circumstance, to wit, that the Council did not determine by this Decree, that the future deposition of Princes should proceed from an undoubted lawful authority, or from the Ecclesiastical power only without the consent of Princes, he is no less impertinent than in the former: for what need was there to determine that the Pope had an undoubted lawful authority to depose Princes, seeing that the same was not then any way called in question, but admitted for a known truth, as it is evident, for that the whole Council determined the practice of it, Naucler. go●erat. 41. ad ann. 12. which they would not have done, if they had doubted of the lawfulness of the Pope's authority in that behalf. But first, Mr. Fitzherbert doth egregiously abuse both me, and his Reader, in adding both here, and above the word [Princess] as though I had acknowledged that Act of the Lateran Council to concern the future deposition of Princes, whereas I ever affirmed, that it did only concern inferior Magistrates, Potestaes, Landlords, and Lords, and not Sovereign Princes; and therefore I said only [that future deposition] and my Adversary addeth of himself the word [Princes.] 40 Secondly, whether it was needful, or no, for the Council to declare, whether that Act concerning the future deposition of temporal Landlords, Magistrates, or Lords, or rather the denouncing of them ipso facto deposed, was made by spiritual, or temporal authority, it is nothing material to our question; this being sufficient for me, that seeing that very many Catholic Doctors do affirm, that the Ecclesiastical power by the institution of Christ doth not extend to the inflicting of temporal punishments, as is the absolving of Vassals from their temporal fealty, and the Council did not declare, by what authority that Act was made, any Catholic man may probably, and without any note of temerity, much less of heresy, affirm, that it was made not by any undoubted lawful Ecclesiastical authority, but only by the authority, licence, and consent of absolute Princes. But although it were not absolutely necessary, that the Council should have declared, whether that future deposition was to proceed from Ecclesiastical, or temporal authority, yet to make it a point of faith, (which all men are bound to believe) that the aforesaid deposition was to proceed from Ecclesiastical authority, and not temporal, it was necessary that the Council should have declared the same, especially supposing, that it is truly probable, that the Ecclesiastical power doth not extend to the inflicting of temporal punishments. As also if the Pope being now both a spiritual Pastor, and also a temporal Prince, should make a law, whereof there may be made a probable doubt, whether it was made by virtue of his spiritual, or of his temporal authority, it is necessary, to make this point certain, and out of controversy, that he declare, by what authority, temporal, or spiritual that law was enacted. 41 Thirdly, it is very untrue, that the Pope's power to depose Princes was not then any way called in question, but admitted for a known truth, for that from the very first broaching thereof, there always hath been a great controversy, saith Fa. Azor, betwixt Emperors and Kings on the one side, Azor. tom. 2. li. 11. ca 5. q. 8 and the Bishops of Rome on the other, whether in certain causes the Pope hath a right, and power to deprive Kings of their kingdom. And the evident reason, which Mr. Fitzherbert bringeth hereof, to wit, for that the whole Council determined the practice of it, is the main question which is now betwixt us, and so he bringeth for an evident reason, that which is the controversy, and to be proved, which is an evident petitio principij, and condemned as vicious by all Logicians. Neither doth Nauclerus, whom my Adversary citeth in the margin, as though he would make his Reader believe, that Nauclerus affirmeth, that the whole Council decreed the practice thereof, affirm any such thing. For Nauclerus words are only these: There were many things truly then consulted of, yet nothing could be plainly decreed, for that they of Pisa, and Genua made war one against the other by Sea, and those on this side the Alps by land. Yet some Constitutions are reported to be published, whereof one is, that whensoever the Princes of the world shall offend one the other, the correcting belongeth to the Bishop of Rome. Where you see first, that Nauclerus expressly saith, that albeit many things were consulted, yet nothing at all could be plainly decreed. Secondly, that it was only a report, that some constitutions were published. Thirdly, he doth not say, that these Constitutions were of the whole Council, or only of Pope Innocent and recited in the Council as Matthew Paris said. Fourthly, that this report was untrue, it is also plain, seeing that there is no such Constitution, as he mentioneth, to be found in the Lateran Council. And lastly, albeit there were such a Constitution, it is nothing to the purpose, seeing that it only saith, that when Princes are at variance, it belongeth to the Pope to correct them, to wit, by Ecclesiastical Censures, which is not the question, but that it belongeth to the Pope to correct Princes, by deposing them, and by inflicting temporal punishments, which is the main controversy, and whereof the practice, as Mr. Fitzherbert saith, citing Nauclerus, in the margin, was decreed by the whole Council, Nauclerus speaketh not any one word at all. 42 Also, Pope Innocent the third, saith Mr. Fitzherbert o Pag. 183. u. 13. Naucler. geverat. 42 ann. 1246. Matth. Paris. in Henrico. 3. See Adolp. Schulc. pro Card. Bell. ca 12 & 14 where he confuteth the answers of Widdrington to these examples. under whom the Council of Lateran was held, had not passed three or four years before deprived the Emperor Otho of his right to the Empire by a sentence of Excommunication, and deposition; by virtue whereof Fredrick the second (whose Ambassadors were present at the Lateran Council) was made Emperor, who also was afterwards deposed by Innocentius the fourth in the General Council held at Lions: as likewise Leo the Emperor was before deprived of his rents, and revenues in Italy for heresy by Pope Gregory the second. Also Childerike King of France, and Henry the fourth Emperor of that name had been deposed from their states, and dignities by the authority of the Sea Apostolic before the Council of Lateran. Therefore the said Council had reason to think it altogether needless to determine any thing concerning the lawfulness of a matter already admitted, and practised. 43 But truly any learned man would be ashamed to argue so unlearnedly, that because some Popes before the Council of Lateran deposed Christian Princes, wherein nevertheless they were greatly contradicted by Princes and subjects, therefore the Pope's authority to depose is undoubtedly lawful, or because a matter is already practised, and admitted by many, though contradicted, and not admitted by others there needeth no determination to make the lawfulness thereof certain, and manifest. It is true, that divers Popes since the time of Gregory the 7. who was the first, that contrary to the custom of his Ancestors challenged to himself authority to depose the Emperor, Onuphrius lib. 4 de varia create. Rom. Pont. saith Onuphrius, have put in practise this their pretended authority, but it was ever contradicted both by Christian Princes and subjects. And in particular concerning those examples, which Mr. Fitzherbert here bringeth, it is evident, that many Catholic Authors, whom I related elsewhere, p Apolog. num. 404. & seq. do deny, that Pope Zachary did depose Childerike, in any other manner, then by consenting to the Peers of France, who deposed him, and by declaring that he might be lawfully deposed by the Peers of France, and his subjects absolved from their oath of allegiance. That of P. Gregory the second, or the third, for my Adversaries do not agree which of them it was, Onuphrius ubi supra. Otho Frsingensis lib. 6 cap. 35. Sigebert. ad annum 1088. Godfridus viterb. par. 17. Trithem. in Chron. monast. Hirsang. ad adnum 1106. Onuphrius calleth a fable. Pope Gregory the 7. did indeed depose Henry the fourth Emperor, but how greatly he was contradicted therein, all Histories make mention, and how it was accounted a great novelty, it is manifest by Otho Frisingensis, Sigebert, Godfridus, Trithemius, & Onuphrius; and also by the Epistle of Hermanus Bishop of Metz to Pope Gregory q Vide epistol. Greg. 7. ad Herman. lib. 8. Epist. 21. concerning this point. 44 Also Pope Innocent the third did depose Otho, as before he deposed Philip, and hereof he wrote a Decretal Epistle, or Breve to the Duke of Zaringia, which is registered in the Canon Law, in Cap. Venerabilem de elect. & electi potestate, which decree or decretal Epistle Albericus a famous Lawyer r In Dictionar. in verbo electio. Abbas Vrsperg. ad annum 1198 affirmeth, to be made by Pope Innocent against the liberty and rights of the Empire: And Abbas Vrspergensis not only reprehendeth that decree, as containing in it against Philip many absurd things, and some falsehoods, but he also taxeth the Princes and Barons of perjury, who, saith he, being taught by diabolical art, did not regard to break their oaths, nor violate their faith, now forsaking Philip, and adhering to Otho, and contrariwise. And how this deposition of Otho was contradicted by him, Naucler. gener. 41. ad annum 1212. Nauclerus, whom my Adversary citeth, doth plainly testify, who writeth that Otho speaking to the Princes of Germany, affirmeth, that it belongeth to their right, and not the Popes, to create and depose the Emperor. But to see in what manner Otho was made Emperor, to the infinite wrong of Frederick the second being then a child, and without fault, and who in his cradle was by almost all the Princes of Germany in the time of his father Henry the sixth Emperor chosen to be their King, and to whom they made their oath of allegiance, and for what cause this Otho after he was made Emperor was deposed by the Pope, it would make even a stony heart to bleed; and truly my Adversaries in urging these examples, do in my judgement show great want of discretion, Naucler. generat. 41. ad ann. 1193. Matth. Paris in joanne Rege an. 1210. in giving thereby occasion to rip up many odious matters, and which for reverence to the Sea Apostolic, it were much better they were buried with perpetual silence, and oblivion. See Nauclerus, and Matthew Paris cited here by my Adversary. 45 Also Pope Innocentius the fourth, in the presence of the Council of Lions, but without the approbation of the whole Council did depose Frederick the second, but how greatly he was contradict therein, both by the Emperor himself, and also by the Princes of Germany, and others, it is manifest. The Pope, saith Abbess Stadensis, Abbas Stad. ad annum. 1245. did upon S. james his day renew in the said Council of Lions, the sentence of Excommunication against the Emperor, and by his own authority (therefore not of the Council) did depose him from his Imperial dignity, and this deposition he published throughout all the Church, commanding, under pain of Excommunication, that none should hereafter name him Emperor, which sentence flying throughout the world, certain of the Princes with many others did gainsay, affirming, that it doth not belong to the Pope to create, or depose the Emperor, but to crown him, that is chosen by the Princes. And Nauclerus, Naucler. generat. 42. ad ann. 1242. & seq. to whom Mr. Fitzherbert in the margin remitteth his Reader, affirmeth, that the Emperor Frederick in a letter to the King of France, contended to prove, that the Pope's sentence denounced against him was in law, and right invalid, and among other reasons of the Emperor he allegeth this, that although the Bishop of Rome hath full power in spirituals, that he may absolve and bind all sinners, yet it was never read, that by the grant of the law of God, or man, he hath power to transfer the Empire at his pleasure, or to judge temporally of Kings, and Princes in depriving them of their kingdoms. And also what contradiction Pope Innocent found by that practice, Trithemius relateth, affirming, Trithem. in Chron. Monast. Hirsang. ad ann. 1244. that Frederick after his deposition came into Italy, and did afflict the Pope, and the people subject to him with so great evils, that he was weary of his life, and wished that he had never thought of that deposition. judge now, good Reader, what Mr. Fitzherbert dare not avouch, affirming so boldly, and shamefully, that the authority of the Pope to depose Princes was not then doubted of, or any way called in question, but admitted for a known truth, and with what security thou mayst repose thy soul, and whole estate upon the learning, and conscience of this man, who with such gross fraud and ignorance seekth to delude thee. But to these examples I have heretofore, partly in my Apology, and partly in this Treatise sufficiently answered. 46 And whereas Mr. Fitzherbert in the margin, remitteth his Reader to D. Schulckenius, for the confutation of my answers to these examples, if the Reader will be pleased, after he hath read over this my Treatise, wherein I confute this Doctor, but only to confer my answers with his Replies, he will easily perceive, how egregiously he shuffleth, and that he hath much ado to excuse Cardinal Bellarmine from manifest improbability, and bringeth no one argument, which proveth any one of my answers to be improbable: and if he desire to see this Doctors Replies more particularly answered, I remit him likewise for this present to Master john Barclay, to whom as yet no answer hath been made, in his book against Cardinal Bellarmine's answer to his father, but especially to the Bishop of Rochester, who although a Protestant, yet out of Catholic Authors, and Catholic grounds, hath very clearly, and particularly confuted all these examples, and what Cardinal Bellarmine, and D. Schulckenius, if they be two sundry men, have brought to confirm the same. 47 Besides that, saith M. Fitzherbert s Pag. 184. nu. 14. neither the Church nor yet Secular Princes do use to declare in their laws from what authority the execution thereof shall proceed, but it sufficeth, that their authority to decree, ordain, and execute their Laws is sufficiently known, and acknowledged by their subjects; whereby it appeareth, that Widdrington doth very idly require, that the Council of Lateran should have declared, that the future deposition of Princes should proceed from an undoubted lawful authority, being a matter, which they held to be without all doubt, or Controversy. 48 But as for Secular Princes it is not needful for them to declare, by what authority they make temporal laws, and ordain, or inflict temporal punishments, for that no Catholic ever made doubt, but that they had full authority to do the same: but seeing that it hath ever been a Controversy among Catholics, and very many Doctors do affirm, that the Ecclesiastical power by the institution of Christ doth not extend to the inflicting of temporal punishments, whensoever the Church doth inflict such punishments without declaring by what authority she doth the same, we may probably answer, according to the grounds of these Doctors, that she doth it not by her spiritual authority, which can inflict no such punishments, but by the authority, licence, and consent of temporal Princes: and therefore that we must certainly believe, that the Council of Lateran did ordain the future deposition, not of temporal Princes, as this man feigneth, but of inferior Landlords, Magistrates, or Lords, by her undoubted Ecclesiastical, or spiritual authority, it was necessary, that the Council should have declared the same, seeing that both Catholic Princes, and subjects have ever made a great doubt, and controversy concerning this point; neither could the Fathers of that Council be ignorant hereof, who both saw, and felt what great contradiction, and opposition both Philip, and Otho, t Pag. 184. nu. 15. and the Princes of Germany, and their favourers made against this pretended authority of the Pope to depose the Emperor, and to dispose of temporal matters belonging to the Empire. 49 And as for the consent of Princes, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, which Widdrington also requireth to Decrees concerning temporal matters, I have already answered him touching that point, and showed, u See Chap. 11. nu. 7. 8. 9 & s. and see also my answer to the same. as well by the example of the Apostles themselves, as by the practice of the primitive Church, when there were no Christian Emperors, or Princes, that their consent is needless to the validity of Ecclesiastical Decrees; and that if the same were needful, all Christian Princes should stand bound to obey the Decrees of the Council, because being enacted by their general consent in a general Parliament of all Christendom, it cannot be repealed without another general Council of like authority: So as thou seest, good Reader, that widdrington's third answer is in every thing defective, and no less improbable than the former. Nevertheless he presumeth so much upon the probability thereof, that he undertaketh to answer also a Reply, which he imagineth, we will make to his last argument, (he should rather have said last answer) whereof I will examine the particulars in the next chap. 50 And I also in those places, cited here by my Adversary, have fully confuted his answers, and have clearly showed, that by no example of the Apostles, nor any one practice of the primitive Church, when there were no Christian Emperors, or Princes, it can be convinced, that the Apostles by their ordinary power (for of their extraordinary, and miraculous power I do not now dispute) or any Pope, or Council in the primitive Church did inflict temporal punishments. And whether a temporal law made in a general assembly, or Parliament of all Christian Princes, or confirmed by the general consent of them all, cannot be repealed, but by such another general Assembly, or by the general consent of them all, I have sufficiently declared above x Cap. 8. nu. 26. & seq. out of the doctrine of Fa. Suarez, when I treated of the law of Nations. Two things only may for this present be added thereunto. The first is, that no human law, either Ecclesiastical or Civil doth bind, unless it be approved by the acceptance of the people, as the common opinion of Divines, and Lawyers doth affirm: y See Disput. Theol. c. 6. sec. 3. nu. 25. and that many Decrees of this Lateran Council, and namely this Decree, which is now in question, that every temporal Officer, Landlord, or Lord, when they come first to their Office, or Lands must take an Oath to root out heretics from the territories subject to their jurisdiction, was never observed, or put in execution in this kingdom, and in many other Kingdoms, and Nations it is manifest, for aught we can gather by the relation of Histories. 51 The second is, that there is great difference to be observed, betwixt temporal kingdoms, and the spiritual kingdom, or Church of Christ, and consequently betwixt the general assemblies, or Parliaments of them both: for that all Christians do make one true, proper, and total mystical body, or Commonwealth, which is the Catholic Church, and spiritual kingdom of Christ, really united in spirituals, and subject to one supreme visible head, or spiritual Superior thereof: but all Christians do not make one true, and total Civil body, or Commonwealth, really united in temporals, and subject to one supreme visible head, or temporal Prince thereof: but they do make divers entire temporal kingdoms, or Commonwealths; so that throughout all the whole world there is but one true entire Catholic Church, or mystical body of Christ, but there are many true entire temporal kingdoms, and commonwealths. From whence the judicious Reader may easily gather the reason, why a Decree made by a General Council, or spiritual Parliament can not be repealed, but by another general Council of like authority, and why a Bishop for example of Spain, as he is a part of the general Council, which is a true formal body representing the whole Catholic Church, hath power, and jurisdiction over the Christians of another temporal kingdom, for example of France, and contrariwise, but a temporal or Civil law made by the consent of all Christian Princes, may be repealed by every Prince, for as much as concerneth his own kingdom, by whose only authority that law had force to bind in his kingdom, which in temporals is subject to no other Prince, but himself alone; and therefore as that law had not force to bind in his kingdom from the authority of any other Prince, so the authority, and consent of no other Prince is necessary for the repealing, and abrogating of the same. So as thou seest, good Reader, that my third answer is no way defective, but in every thing sound, and sufficient, and that Master Fitzherbert in the impugning thereof, hath very grossly bewrayed his egregious fraud, and ignorance. CHAP. XIIII. Wherein three Instances, grounded upon three examples of Pope's decrees and sentences brought by Widdrington to confute three arguments of Fa. Lessius whereby he laboured in vain to demonstrate that the foundations of the decrees and sentences of Popes and councils must be certain and of faith, are proved to be sound and sufficient, and the first example brought by Widdrington is confirmed, and M. fitzherbert's exceptions against the same are confuted, and he himself in setting down widdrington's instances and applying them to the decree of the Lateran Council is convinced of manifest fraud and falsehood. 1. AFter I had given the aforesaid third answer to that Act of the Lateran Council, as you have seen before, I insinuated another difficulty a In the aforesaid Preface nu. 51. concerning that Act in these words. I omit now, that those words [that from that time the Pope may denounce, or declare his Vassals absolved from his fealty] do contain in them some difficulty: for if we will regard the force, or propriety of the words, they seem only to signify, that it belongeth to the Pope not truly to absolve Vassals from their fealty, but only to declare them already absolved, which is not the question, which we have now in hand. But this difficulty Mr. Fitzherbert passeth over with silence, and skippeth to examine three instances, which I did not only imagine, or suppose, as he saith, would be made against my last answer, but which Fa. Lessius in those express words by me related in a book of his called Disputatio Apologetica pro potestate Summi Pontificis (which went here up and down for a while in hugger mugger, and whereof by chance I had then a view, but now it cannot be seen but by very special and secret friends, which is a manifest token of a great diffidence in his cause) did bring to demonstrate, and clearly convince, that it is a manifest point of faith, that the Pope hath power and authority to depose temporal Princes, and to absolve subjects from their temporal allegiance. 2 And because Mr. Fitzherbert doth over much and curtal those three instances, which I brought to confront and paralele with the three arguments, or objections urged by Fa. Lessius, I think it not amiss first of all to relate them word by word, as there they are set down by me. Wherefore the first argument or objection of Fa. Lesus is this. 1. Argument of Fa Lessius. That doctrine doth appertain to faith, which Popes, Counsels and Doctors do either propound, or suppose as a certain, and undoubted ground or foundation of their Decrees and sentences; but this doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes, and to absolve subjects from their allegiance, is either propounded, or supposed by Popes, Counsels, and Doctors, as a foundation of many Canons, and judicial sentences, therefore this doctrine doth appertain to faith. 2. Argument. 3 His second argument is this: If a General Council should expressly define, that the Church hath this authority, no Catholic could make any doubt, but that this matter should appertain to faith, but seeing that it doth suppose it as a sure, and certain foundation of her Decrees and Sentences, she is thought no less to affirm the same, therefore it ought to be accounted no less certain. 3. Argument. 4 His third argument is this: It is a point of Faith that the Church cannot err in doctrine, and precepts of manners, by teaching generally any thing to be lawful, which is unlawful, or unlawful which is lawful, or also by commanding any thing which is, per se, of itself unlawful: for such an error is no less pernicious to the faithful, then is an error in faith. But if the Pope should not have that authority to deprive temporal Princes of their dominions, the Church should err in doctrine of manners, and that in matters of very great moment: For she teacheth, that after a Prince is deposed by the Pope's authority, all his subjects are absolved from his obedience, and that his dominions may be taken by another, as it is manifest by the councils: Also, that after a Prince is publicly excommunicated, his subjects are absolved from their Oath of Allegiance, in so much that they are not bound to obey him until he he reconciled, yea and she doth forbid them to obey him, if the Censure be denounced. All which shall be false, and not only false, but also pernicious, for that the subjects shall thereby be incited to rebellions and perjuries, yea and against their will be compelled thereunto: Therefore the Church doth err in doctrine of manners, and commandeth rebellions, and perjuries, and by her Censures doth compel men thereunto, but to affirm this is heretical, therefore that also from whence this followeth, is heretical, to wit, that the Church hath not authority to absolve subjects from the bond of their oath, and from their obedience. 5 Thus argueth Fa. Lessius, to which his arguments I did not answer in form, but only propounded three other instances, or arguments to confront them with his, whereby the learned Reader might clearly see the weakness, and insufficiency of his objections, which my arguments I grounded in like manner upon the dispensations, decrees, and judicial sentences of certain Popes in these words. * Praefatio Apol. nu. 56. & seq. 6 And first of all, is not the due administration of Sacraments a matter of great moment, and chief belonging to the Pope's office, & is not an error concerning it to be accounted very pernicious? But the Pope hath oftentimes given leave to a Priest, who was no Bishop, to minister the Sacrament of Confirmation, b As it appeareth by S. Gregory lib. 3. epist. 26. and it is related in the Canon, pervenit, dist. 95. and many Abbots at this day have the same faculty. Concil. Flor. circa finem in Decreto Eugen. whereas it is a great controversy among Divines, whether the Pope can give leave to such a Priest to administer this Sacrament. Seeing therefore that to the Sacraments of the new Law, as the Council of Florence declareth, are required three things, the matter, the form, and the Minister, of which if any one be wanting, it is not a true, and perfect Sacrament; and that it is a very great sacrilege, that the due, and lawful matter, and form of a Sacrament should be seriously applied by an unlawful Minister, if the Pope, in whom only, according to these Divines, the whole ecclesiastial power, and authority to define infallibly matters of faith doth chief reside, cannot grant authority to a Priest, who is no Bishop, to administer this Sacrament, as very learned Divines c Adrianus Papa in 4. in q. de confess. ar. 3. Durand. in 4. dist. 7. q. 3. & 4 bonavent. ibid. Alphon. de Cast. in l. de haer. verbo confirmatio. Petrus Soto lec. 2. de confirm. and others. without any note of heresy, or error do hold, is it not a very great error to grant such licences, whereby there is danger, that most heinous sacrileges, to wit, the invalid administrations of Sacraments, should be committed?; 7 Moreover, Pope Sixtus the fourth did in honour of the immaculate conception of the blessed Virgin Mary make a Decree d It is to be seen in the 4. tome of the Counsels, after the life of Pope Sixtus. for celebrating the Feast of her Conception, to the end that all faithful Christians should give thanks, and praise to almighty God for her wonderful conception, which he also calls immaculate, e In the second decree. of the immaculate Virgin; and notwithstanding it is uncertain, and disputed by Divines on both sides, whether the B. Virgin was conceived in original sin, or by the special providence of God preserved from the same: Is it not therefore from hence manifest, that the doctrine which is propounded, or supposed as a foundation of an Apostolical constitution, and decree, and which belongeth to the religious service of God, is not so certain, and undoubted a truth, but that without danger of deadly sin it may be impugned.; 8 Lastly, some Popes have oftentimes dispensed with Princes, who have made a solemn vow of chastity in approved Religions, to contract matrimony, f See Azor. tom. 1. li. 12. c. 7. q. 1. as it is recorded by Historiographers of Constantia, daughter to Roger King of Sicily, of Casimirus King of Poland, and of Ramirus King of Arragon, and of Nicholas justinian a noble Venetian; but if the Pope hath no authority to dispense in the solemn vow of religious chastity whereof there is a great controversy among Catholic Doctors, g For S. Thomas. and all his followers, whom Zanchez a jesuite relateth, lib. 8 de Matrimon. disp. 8. do deny that the Pope hath such, a power, and Zanchez also saith that it is probable. doubtless such dispensations would cause very many heinous sins, and do also great wrong to other Princes, who by such dispensations should be unjustly deprived of their just title to reign, and to succeed in their inheritance. These be the examples whereon I grounded my three arguments or instances to confront them with the former three of Fa. Lessius in these words.; 1. Instance of Widdrington. 9 May we not therefore according to our adversaries principles argue in this manner: That doctrine doth appertain to faith, which the Pope (in whom only according to these Doctors, all authority to define infallibly matters of faith doth reside h For they grant that the Pope alone without a Council hath this infallibility, & the Council without the Pope hath it not. ) doth either propound, or suppose as a certain, and undoubted ground, or foundation of his Decrees and sentences (this is the Mayor proposition of Fa. Lessius first argument) But this doctrine, that the B. Virgin was not conceived in original sin, that the Pope can dispense in the solemn vow of chastity, and give leave to a Priest, who is no Bishop, to Minister the Sacrament of Confirmation, is propounded or supposed by Popes as a ground, or foundation of many their decrees, dispensations, and judicial sentences, therefore that doctrine doth appertain to faith; This is the substance of my first instance, but in form made like to Fa Lessius his first argument.; 2. Instance. 10 Secondly, if the Pope should expressly define that the Church hath such a power, (to wit, to dispense in the solemn vow of chastity, to give leave to an inferior Priest to administer the Sacrament of Confirmation, and to define that the blessed Virgin was not conceived in original sin) no Catholic (of those especially who hold that the Pope defining without a General Council cannot err) can make any doubt, but that this matter should appertain to faith, but seeing that Popes do suppose it as a sure and certain foundation of their Decrees, and sentences, they are thought no less to affirm the same, therefore it ought to be accounted no less certain. 3. Instance. 11 Thirdly, it is a point of faith, as our Adversaries suppose, that the Pope cannot err in doctrine, and precepts of manners, by teaching generally any thing to be lawful, which is unlawful, or to be unlawful, which is lawful, or also by commanding any thing, which, per se, of itself is unlawful: For such an error is no less pernicious to the faithful, than an error in faith: But if the Pope should not have that authority to dispense in the solemn vow of chastity, or to give leave to an inferior Priest to administer the Sacrament of Confirmation, the Pope should err in doctrine, and precepts of manners, and that, in matters of very great moment: For he teacheth, that the Sacrament of Confirmation ministered by an inferior Priest, who is no Bishop, is a true Sacrament. Also, that if a Prince by the Pope's dispensation do marry a professed Nun, that marriage to be lawful and valid, and that their children are lawfully begotten, and aught to succeed in the Kingdom: and notwithstanding that the next of the blood Royal should for want of the lawful issue of this Prince pretend a right to the Crown, yet the Pope may without doubt, according to our adversaries doctrine, command, and also by Censures compel the Subjects to acknowledge the issue begotten by that marriage, wherein the Pope did dispense, to be their true, undoubted and rightful Prince: All which shall be false, and not only false, but also pernicious, for that the Subjects shall be incited thereby to do injuries, and against their wills be compelled thereunto, and Princes shall obtain free liberty and licence from the Pope to commit incests and sacrileges: Therefore the Church doth err in doctrine of manners, and counseleth sacrilege, and commandeth injustice, and by Censures compelleth thereunto: But to affirm this it is heretical, therefore that also from whence followeth, is heretical, to wit, that the Pope hath not authority to dispense in the solemn vow of chastity, and to give leave to an inferior Priest, who is no Bishop, to minister the Sacrament of Confirmation. 12 Thus I argued in my Apologetical Preface, and then I concluded thus: Let my Adversaries solve these difficulties, and I will forthwith by their own solutions, untie the aforesaid knots, which they imagine cannot in any wise be solved, or loosed. Whereby it is apparent, that I did not oppose, or apply any one of these three instances either to the decree of the Lateran Council, or to any other Canon of Pope, or Council, which are usually brought by my Adversaries to prove, that the doctrine of the Pope's power to depose Princes is a point of faith: but as Fa. Lessius did not apply in particular those his three arguments, either to the Canon of the Lateran Council, or to any other Canon, or judicial sentence of the Pope or Council, but left them to be applied by others to this or that Canon, except only his second argument, which he seemeth to apply to the Lateran Council, so I thought it sufficient for that time, to propound only three other like instances in general, and not to compare or parellel any of them to any decree, Canon, or judicial sentence of Pope, or Council in particular, whereby my Adversaries contend to make manifest, that this their doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes is certain, and of faith, but left the application of them to this, or that Canon in particular, until such time that they themselves would either apply those three arguments to some particular Canon of Pope, or Council, or answer in form to the three instances, which I brought to confront with theirs. 13 Now Mr. Fitzherbert neither answereth in form to those three instances of mine, which I grounded upon those three examples of Popes, nor so much as setteth them down to be seen by his Reader, but cavilleth only, as you shall see, at those three examples, whereon my three instances were grounded, and pretendeth to show a great disparity between those three examples, and the Decree of the Lateran Council, and also he would seem to have played the man, and to have quite overthrown my three instances, whereas he hath not so much as touched, or mentioned them at all. Thus therefore he beginneth this Chapter: i Pag. 185. nu. 1 My Adversary Widdrington having hitherto showed great weakness in himself, and his cause by his answers to our arguments, Widdr. ubi supra nu. 52. pretendeth to confute a Reply, which he supposeth we will make to his last answer, dividing the said Reply into three points, whereof the first is, that the foundations, and grounds of the Ecclesiastical Canons, and Decrees of Popes and councils do belong to faith, whereupon Widdrington saith we infer, that seeing the Fathers in the Council of Lateran grounded their Decree upon this doctrine, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, therefore the said doctrine must needs be certain, and a matter of faith. Ibid. nu. 53. 14 The second point is, that seeing no Catholic man would doubt, but that all Christians were bound to believe, as a matter of faith, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, if a general Council should expressly define it, therefore we say, that forasmuch as the Council of Lateran doth suppose the same as a sure foundation of their foresaid Canon, and Decree, all Christians are no less bound to believe it, then if they had expressly determined, or defined it. Ibid. nu. 54. 15 The third point is, that it being a matter of faith, that the Church cannot err in general precepts, or Decrees concerning manners, it followeth, that the Council of Lateran, having ordained the deposition of Princes, neither hath erred, nor could err in it, especially seeing that the error would be most grievous, and pernicious to all Christians; for thereupon would follow tumults, seditions, and wars, by reason of the revolts, and rebellions of subjects against their Princes, and the breach of their Oaths of fidelity, which were no less than perjury, if the Pope had not authority to discharge subjects of their allegiance, and fidelity to their Princes. Thus in effect though somewhat more amply doth Widdrington argue for us. 16 But first, whether I, or my Adversary have showed great weakness in ourselves, and in our cause, neither he, nor I, but the judicious Reader must be the judge, for with the same facility I may retort his own words back upon himself. Secondly, I did not only suppose, that they would make those three arguments, but I related them word by word, as I found them in Fa. Lessius, which nevertheless Mr. Fitzherbert hath very lamely recited, especially the first, and last argument, leaving out many principal, and very important words, as you may see, if you will compare them together. Thirdly, I did not say, that hereupon they did infer, as this man untruly saith I did, that seeing the Fathers in the Council of Lateran grounded their Decree upon this doctrine, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, therefore this doctrine must be certain, and of faith. For albeit Fa. Lessius may seem to apply his second argument to the Decree of the Lateran Council, which nevertheless he may also apply to the Decree of the Council of Lions, yet his other arguments, especially his first, are so general, that they may be applied to many other Decrees, Canons, dispensations, and judicial sentences of Popes, or councils: and if Fa. Lessius had particularly applied them to the Lateran Council, I might without more ado have easily answered them by denying, as there I did, that the Council did suppose as a foundation of that Decree, or Act concerning the absolving of Vassals from their fealty, this doctrine, that the Pope hath power to depose absolute Princes, but only inferior Magistrates, Landlords, or Lords by the authority and consent of absolute Princes. 17 Now for the answer, and confutation, saith k Pag. 186. nu. 4. 5. Mr. Fitzherbert, of these three arguments Widdrington produceth three instances to prove, that the Pope doth sometimes exercise his power with danger of pernicious, & most grievous error, when nevertheless it is uncertain, whether he have such power, or no. His first instance is, that the Pope hath often given lilence to a Priest to minister, and confer the Sacrament of Confirmation, notwithstanding that divers great Doctors do deny that the Pope can give such licence, or commission; whereupon he concludeth, that it is not certain, Durand. bonavent. Adrian, & alij. whether the Pope hath the power, which he exercieth in giving such licenses, and addeth further, An non, saith he; gravissimus error est & c? Is it not a most grievous error to grant such licences, whereby there is danger to commit most grievous sacrileges, to wit, the invalide administration of Sacraments? So he, showing evidently, how unreverent an opinion he hath of the licences, dispensations, and other actions of Popes, seeing that he thinketh, or insinuateth at least, that they have most grievously, and perniciously erred therein many times, and yet one of the Popes, that did dispense in the case here mentioned (to wit, in the administration of the Sacrament of Confirmation) was the famous S. Gregory the great, who granted that licence to some Priests in Sardinia, by reason of the great want of Bishops in that Island. 18 But first, although the first instance, which I brought, be partly grounded upon this practice of Popes to give authority to Priests to confer the Sacrament of Confirmation, yet this is not my first instance, but my first instance is this, That doctrine doth appertain to faith, which is propounded, or supposed by Popes as a sure, and certain foundation of their Decrees, and sentences, (for so saith Fa. Lessius) But this doctrine that the B. Virgin was not conceived in original sin, that the Pope can dispense in the solemn vow of chastity, and give leave to a Priest to minister the Sacrament of Confirmation is propounded or supposed by Popes as a ground, and foundation of many their Decrees, dispensations, and judicial sentences. Therefore, etc. 19 Now I expected, that Mr. Fitzherbert would have answered this my instance in form, which if he had done, I would also by his answer have satisfied Fa. Lessius his first argument, but he neither answereth, nor propoundeth my first instance, but cunningly flieth to the Council of Lateran, affirming that there is a great disparity betwixt the decree of the Lateran Council, and the licences, which some Popes give to Priests to minister the Sacrament of Confirmation, whereas Fa. Lessius did not apply his first argument particularly to the Council of Lateran, but spoke generally of the grounds, and foundations of all Decrees, and sentences of councils, or Popes, affirming that doctrine to appertain to faith, which Popes, councils, and Doctors do propound, or suppose, as a sure foundation of their decrees and sentences, etc. which assertion may be applied not only to the decree of the Lateran Counell, but also to the decree, & sentence of Pope Innocent the fourth, in the presence of the Council of Lions, and it doth also prove, that the ground, and foundation of every sentence, whereby any Emperor, or King hath been deposed by the Pope, doth consequently belong to faith, which because it is repugnant to the common doctrine of all Divines, Mr. Fitzherbert would only apply to the decree of the Lateran Council, and thereupon he did fraudulently, as you have seen, both conceal my first instance, and also change, and curtal the first argument of Fa. Lessius, which doth plainly show, that he hath a great diffidence in his cause, and that his meaning is not to deal sincerely in the examining of this dangerous and difficult controversy. 20 Secondly, whereas Mr. Fitzherbert accuseth me of irreverence to the Sea Apostolic, seeing that I think, or insinuate at least, as he saith, that Popes have most grievously, and perniciously erred many times in their licences, dispensations, and other actions, he showeth evidently therein rather his want of Christian charity, than any solid learning, wisdom, or discretion; seeing that I never said, or insinuated, that Popes have most grievously erred many times in their licences, dispensations, and other actions, but I only related the opinions of learned, and virtuous Catholics, and who were also much devoted to the Sea Apostolic, and one of them also a Pope: from whose doctrine it clearly followeth, that if to err in the due administration of the Sacraments be a most grievous, and pernicious error, both in regard of the irreverence done to the Sacrament, and also the wrong done to the person who is defrauded of the benefit thereof, than those Popes, who have given authority to minister the Sacrament of Confirmation, whereby the administration thereof is invalid, and repugnant to the institution of Christ, have most grievously, and perniciously erred. 21 But if Mr. Fitzherbert will needs have us to approve all the licences, dispensations, decrees, and other actions of Popes, unless we must have an irreverent opinion of the Sea Apostolic, what will he say of Melchior Canus, a learned, & religious man, & much devoted to the Pope, who boldly saith, that he doth not approve all Church-lawes, Canus lib. 5. de locis cap. 5. q. ult concls. nor commend all punishments, Censures, Excommunications, Suspensions, Irregularities, interdicts; and a little beneath he affirmeth, l Cap. 5. propo finem. that those who rashly, and without election do defend every sentence, or judgement of the Pope concerning every thing, do weaken, not strengthen, do overthrow, not establish the authority of the Sea Apostolic? What will he say of Silvester, a man also no less addicted to the advancing of the Pope's temporal authority, who affirming that the Pope hath no authority to dispense in the solemn vow of religious chastity, and some objecting, that they have seen the Pope so to have dispensed de facto, answereth boldly, Siluist. in Sum. verbo votum 4. q. 5. in fine. See Aluarus pelag. lib. 2. de Planctu Eccles. ar. 5 in fine. See Bell lib. 4. de Rom. Pont. cap. 12. that he also hath seen the Pope done greater things with the scandal all Christianity. And to omit Aluarus Pelagius, & others, who tax freely the facts of many Popes, what will he say of Cardinal Bellarmine, who affirmeth, that Pope Nicolas, and Pope Celestine have in their Decrees, or Decretal Epistles expressly taught false doctrine concerning the Sacraments of Baptism, and Matrimony. But this is a usual trick of my Adversaries, when they are pressed with any argument, to fly to railing and disgraceful speeches, and which with the same facility, and upon the like grounds may be retorted back upon themselves. 22 But to answer widdrington's argument, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, Pag. 187. nu. 6. grounded upon this instance, or example, whereas he laboureth to prove thereby, that the foundation, or ground of the Decree of the Council of Lateran concerning the deposition of Princes may be uncertain, because the ground of some Pope's dispensations in the administration of a Sacrament is uncertain, he argueth most absurdly. For there is such an evident disparity, betwixt the particular facts, or dispensations of Pope's touching particular persons, Countries, or Churches, and the general Decrees of Popes, and General councils made for the direction, and government of the whole Church, that a man may wonder how he could forget himself so far, as by an instance of a supposed possibility of error in a particular fact of some Pope, to impugn a general Decree of a Pope, together with a general Council. 23 What a great distrust Mr. Fitzherbert hath of his cause, the Reader may easily perceive by this, that he seldom propoundeth any one argument, or answer of mine, but he useth therein some notable fraud, or falsehood. And first he would here make his Reader believe, that he hath fully answered my first instance, or argument, which was grounded not only upon this fact of Pope's giving licence to Priests to minister the Sacrament of Confirmation, but also upon the two other examples before propounded, whereas he hath not, as you have seen, so much as related my first Instance. 24 Secondly, besides that not only my first Instance, or argument, but also the other two Instances, which I brought to comfort them with Fa. Lessius his three arguments, were grounded upon the licences, which some Popes have given to inferior Priests to confer the Sacrament of Confirmation, it is very untrue, that I by any of my three instances laboured to prove, as this man affirmeth, that the Decree of the Lateran Council concerning the deposition of Princes might be uncertain; seeing that I always contended, that the Decree of the Lateran Council did not concern the deposition of Princes, but only of inferior Magistrates, and Landlords, and also that it was not made by Ecclesiastical, or spiritual authority, but only by the consent, and authority of temporal Princes. So that Mr. Fitzherbert to show that I argue most absurdly from the particular facts, and dispensations of Popes to the general Decrees of Popes, and general councils, betwixt which I do not deny, but that there is an evident disparity, showeth himself to be very false and fraudulent. For that which I contended by my first instance to prove, was that the Mayor proposition of Fa. Lessius first argument is not generally true, and consequently that his argument could not be good, That doctrine, saith he, doth appertain to faith which Popes, Counsels, and Doctors do either propound, or suppose as a certain foundation of their decrees, and sentences, which proposition being general may be applied not only to the decree of the Lateran Council, but also to all other particular decrees, and sentences of Popes, or councils, which the three aforesaid examples by me propounded, touching the particular sentences, dispensations, licences, and decrees of Popes, do evidently convince to be a very false proposition, and consequently his argument grounded thereon to be very insufficient. 25 And therefore to show the weakness of Fa. Lessius his first argument, I did oppose to it an other like instance; for if that doctrine doth appertain to faith, which Popes, & Doctors do propound, or suppose, as a certain foundation of their decrees, and sentences, which is the Mayor proposition of Fa. Lessius his first argument, than this doctrine that the B. Virgin was not conceived in original sin, that the Pope can dispense in the solemn vow of chastity, and give licence to inferior Priests to minister the Sacrament of confirmation must also appertain to faith, seeing that it is propounded and supposed by Popes and Doctors, as a certain foundation of many Canons, Decrees, and judicial sentences of Popes. Now by the answer, which my Adversaries will make to this instance, I will also satisfy Fa. Lessius his first argument. For all the force of that argument doth consist in the true sense, and meaning of that Mayor proposition, for absolutely, and in those general words, as it is spoken by him, without any limitation, it is, as I said, very untrue: but it must be limited both to those decrees, constitutions, judicial sentences, grants, and privileges, which are certainly known to proceed from Ecclesiastical & not Civil authority, and also to such Decrees, which are propounded as of Faith, or do ordain things clearly, and evidently deduced from some undoubted doctrine of Faith, as I showed above out of Card. Bellarmine, and Canus. 26 For although it be certain, and a point of faith, that the Church of Christ, as it includeth only Churchmen, or clergymen, hath a full Ecclesiastical or Spiritual power in general, and that the foundation of true and proper Ecclesiastical Laws, Decrees, or Canons is true Ecclesiastical power also in general, yet in particular to what things the fullness of Ecclesiastical power doth extend, there is such a great controversy among Doctors, that in this point few things are sure or certain, as I showed before out of Almain, as whether the Church hath power to give licence to inferior Priests to confer the Sacrament of Confirmation, to dispense in the solemn vow of Chastity, to dissolve the bond of Matrimony which is not consummate, and many such like, and to come near our matter, to dispose of temporals, to inflict temporal punishments, and to depose temporal Princes for any cause, crime, or end whatsoever. So that the foundation of such Decrees, Canons, constitutions, licences, dispensations and sentences, cannot be certain, and a point of faith, so long as it remaineth questionable, and controversed among Catholics: For it is manifest, and most worthy to be noted, as Canus said, Canus lib 5. de loc cap. 5. q. vlt. concl. 3. that those decrees of the Church can not be certain and firm, which are not grounded upon certain, and firm principles, and foundations. Wherefore if but one of those things, whereon the judgement of the Church dependeth, be uncertain, the decree of the Church cannot be uncertain, etc. And by this Fa. Lessius his first argument is plainly solved. For his Minor proposition is absolutely false, and also his Mayor is not true, if it be understood of Decrees, Canons, m Pag. 88 nu. 7. and sentences, which are not certainly known to proceed f●om spiritual authority. 27 But perhaps Widdrington will say, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, that he doth not argue against the Decree itself, but against the reason, whereupon it was grounded, saying that it may be uncertain, and subject to error, no less than the reason which moved some Popes to give licence to a Priest to administer the Sacrament of Confirmation; But if he say this, he is very absurd; for he argueth in effect no otherwise then thus: Gal. 2. Acts 15. Because S. Peter had no sufficient ground for his dissimulation at Antioch (which S. Paul reprehended in him) therefore the Apostles had no sufficient reason, or ground for their Decree in the Council at Jerusalem, which no man that hath his right wits will say, for that the Apostles had the infallible assistance of the holy Ghost in making their Decree, which S. Peter had not either in his particular fact, or in the foundation, whereupon he grounded it. 28 But first it is manifest, as you have seen before, that I never argued either against the Decree of the Lateran Council, or against the reason of that Decree, but I only impugned the exposition, which my Adversaries make of that Decree, and the reason whereby they pretend to prove from that Decree, that the doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes is certain, and of faith; considering that it is uncertain, whether that Decree was made by true Ecclesiastical, or civil authority, and also for that it is not a true, and proper Decree, containing in it any precept or obligation, and though it were, it is not propounded as of faith, nor grounded upon any clear and undoubted doctrine of faith, which nevertheless, according to the doctrine of Cardinal Bellarmine and Canus, are necessary to make any Decree of a general Council to appertain to faith. And secondly here in this place I did only argue against the first argument brought by Fa. Lessius, who in his Mayor proposition speaketh generally of all decrees, and sentences of Popes and Counsels. That doctrine, saith he, doth appertain to faith, which Popes, Counsels, and Doctors do either propound or suppose as a certain foundation of their decrees and sentences, etc. And against this argument I did oppose, as you have seen, another like instance grounded upon three examples of decrees, dispensations, and judicial sentences of divers Popes, which instance of mine Mr. Fitzherbert concealeth, and by the word foundation I did not only understand the reason, which moved those Popes to make such decrees, and to grant such dispensations, and licences, as for example, that S. Gregory, as my Adversary saith, granted licence to some Priests in Sardinia, to administer the Sacrament of confirmation, by reason of the great want of Bishops in that Island, but by the word [foundation] I understood the authority itself, which those Pope's pretended to have to make such decrees, and to grant such licences and dispensations, and the reasons and foundations, whereon that pretended authority of theirs was grounded, which authority of theirs I showed to be uncertain, and consequently not to belong to faith, and therefore the first argument of Fa. Lessius to be defective. 29 And although there be an evident disparity betwixt the Decrees of Popes, and the Decrees of general Counsels, yet it is apparent, that according to my adversaries principles, who affirm, that all the infallibility of the Decrees of General Counsels doth wholly depend upon the Pope, we may, according to their grounds, proportionally argue of the infallibility of the Decrees of Popes, and of General Counsels, and that if the Pope may err in his private judgement, particular facts, and decrees concerning manners, which are referred to particular persons, Bishops, or Churches, a General Council also may err in the like; and if to make a Decree of a General Council to belong to faith, it be necessary, according to their doctrine, that it be a true, and proper Decree, and must also be propounded as of faith, or necessarily grounded upon some undoubted doctrine of faith, the like also they must say of the Decrees of Popes. From whence it clearly followeth, that, according to their own principles, no forcible argument can be drawn, either from the judicial sentence of Pope Gregory the seventh against Henry the fourth Emperor, or of Pope Innocent the third, against Philip, and Otho, or of Pope Innocent the fourth, in the Council of Lions, against Frederick the second, or from any other deposition of whatsoever King, or Emperor, or also from the Decree of the Lateran Council, although we should suppose, as we do not, that it doth concern the deposition of temporal Princes, and was made by true Ecclesiastical authority, without any necessity that Christian Princes should approve, and confirm the same, yet, I say, no forcible argument can be drawn from thence, to prove that the doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes, is an undoubted doctrine of faith; seeing that the former sentences, and depositions do only concern particular persons, and this Act of the Lateran Council is not, according to their own grounds, a true and proper Decree, and none of them are propounded as of faith, as any man of judgement, out of those rules, which Card. Bellarmine and Canus have brought to know when any Decree is propounded as of faith, may very easily perceive. 30 Besides that Widdrington inferreth absurdly, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, n Pag. 188. nu. 8. 9 that because the reason, which moved some Popes to grant that licence was uncertain, or seemed erroneous to some learned men, therefore it was uncertain also in itself, or to the Popes that gave the licence, as who would say, that because the reason of Pope Pius his Decree, concerning the observation of the Feast of Easter seemed uncertain to the Churches of Asia, therefore it was uncertain in itself, or to Pope Pius, who made the Decree: whereas the reason, or ground of the said Decree (to wit, the tradition of the Roman Church) was not only certain to Pope Pius, and his Successor Victor, o Euseb. l. 5. hist. c. 24. & 25 (who excommunicated the Churches of Asia for resisting it) but also to the first Council of Nice, which afterwards decreed the same, yea to the whole Church, which followeth the Decrees of the said Pope, and Nicen Council, accounting them for heretics that do contradict them, as I have showed before p See Chap. 13 nu. 4. & 7. And see also the answer thereunto chap. 13. nu. 22. & seq. . 31 The like also may be said of the rebaptisation of such as are baptised by heretics, which was condemned by the Sea Apostolic upon an assured ground, albeit the same seemed uncertain, and erroneous to Saint Cyprian, and to a Synod of Bishops with him, who were of contrary opinion. So as it is evident, that many things may seem uncertain to some learned men, and yet be most certain to the Sea Apostolic, and therefore Widdrington argueth very ridiculously, if he infer (as he seemeth to do) that the reason which moved some Popes to give licence to Priests to administer the Sacrament of Confirmation is uncertain, or erroneous, because it seemeth so to some learned men. 32 But besides that I made no such inference, as this man feigneth, and the Reader may plainly see by the examples, and instances which I have entirely set down, and Mr. Fitzherbert hath fraudulently concealed, it is evident, that he here insinuateth, giving credit therein to Fa. Lessius, a most dangerous, and pernicious doctrine, to wit, that all Catholics are bound to follow in matters, which are in controversy among learned men, the Pope's private spirit, faith, and knowledge, as though the Church of God were to be guided and governed, in matters which are questionable among learned Catholics, by the private faith, spirit, or knowledge of any man, yea of the Pope himself, or that Christ had promised his infallible assistance to the Pope's private knowledge, or judgement. 33 And first whereas Mr. Fitzherbert affirmeth, that although the reason which moved some Popes to grant licence to inferior Priests to administer the Sacrament of Confirmation seemed uncertain to some learned men, yet it was not therefore uncertain in itself, or to the Popes that gave the licence, he speaketh very improperly: For albeit truth and falsehood are taken from the thing itself (according to that known maxim of Aristotle, ex eo quod res est vel non est propositio dicitur vera vel falsa) and so may be said to be in the thing itself, yet certainty, as certain is opposed to doubtful, uncertain, fallible, probable, erroneous, is not properly in the thing itself, but in the understanding, and knowledge of men. For if we take certainty, as it is in the thing itself, which is rather to be called necessity, there is nothing that is past, which is not certain, or rather necessarily true; So that all the power, and authority, which Christ hath given to S. Peter, and consequently to the Pope, as he is Saint Peter's Successor, is most certain in itself, that is, most true, and necessary, yet all the power in particular, which Christ hath given to Saint Peter, and the Pope, is not certain quoad nos, that is, to the understanding and knowledge of the faithful, nor of the Popes themselves. 34 Secondly, whereas Mr. Fitzherbert affirmeth, that albeit the reason, which moved some Popes to grant that licence to Priests, seemed erroneous to some learned men, yet it was not therefore uncertain to the Popes that gave it; and again, It is evident, saith he, that many things may seem uncertain to some learned men, and yet be most certain, (he doth not say, may seem to be most certain) to the Sea Apostolic; insinuating thereby, that those Popes, who gave such licences, did not only think, or persuade themselves, that they did certainly know, but also that they did in very deed certainly know, (which is a far different thing) that they had authority given them from Christ to do the same: I would gladly learn of Fa. Lessius, from whom Mr. Fitzherbert hath taken this assertion, by what means those Popes came to such a certain knowledge of things revealed by Christ our Saviour, whereof other men, and perhaps far more learned than those Popes were in all sorts of learning both divine, and human, were so ignorant, uncertain, and doubtful. For my own part I do not know by what way any man, whatsoever he be, can have a certain knowledge, which is truly certain, and not only imagined, or thought to be certain, of things supernatural, and revealed by GOD, but by divine revelation: and this must be either a private revelation, whereby God revealeth himself to the private soul, or spirit of a man, as he did in the old Law to the Patriarches, and Prophets, and in the New to the Apostles, and to divers other holy men; or else it must be a public revelation, known, and approved so to be by the public declaration, or acceptance of the Church; for the public definitions of Popes, without the approbation of a general Council, or general acceptance of the Church, do still remain uncertain, seeing that it is as yet uncertain, and disputable among learned Catholics, whether the Pope hath authority to define certainly, and infallibly that this, or that thing which is in controversy among famous, and learned Catholic Divines, hath been revealed by God, or no. 35 If therefore when Mr. Fitzherbert, taxing me most ignorantly of ridiculous absurdity, doth so confidently affirm it to be evident, that many things may seem uncertain to some learned men, and yet be most certain to the Sea Apostolic, his meaning be, that the Sea Apostolic hath this certain knowledge by public revelation, or by some necessary consequence, which is evidently deduced from public revelation, I cannot possibly see how this can be true; for that public revelations, and those things, which are evidently deduced from public revelations, are not proper only to the Pope, but are common also to other learned men; and therefore also other learned men, who are as skilful, and perchance far more skilful in the knowledge of the holy Scriptures, and of public revelations, traditions, definitions, declarations, and of the general consent, and acceptance of the Church, than those Popes are may have as certain a knowledge of things supernatural, and revealed by public revelation, as those Pope's either have, or morally can have. 36 But if he mean, that the Sea Apostolic hath that certainty of knowledge, touching things revealed, by private revelations, or secret instincts, and inspirations, any learned man may plainly see, that this is spoken without sufficient ground: seeing that Christ our Saviour hath not promised an infallibility of truth, to the private knowledge of any Pope, or of the Prelates of the Church assembled together in a General Council, but only to their Decrees, and those not all, but to such only, which are propounded as of faith: Neither also is it certain, that Christ hath promised an infallibility of truth so much as to the Pope's public definitions, and decrees, which are propounded as of faith, if he define without a General Council, and much less to his private knowledge, and judgement; as it is manifest by the decrees of Pope Nicholas the first, and of Pope Celestine the third, whereof the first declared, q De cons. dist. 4 can. A quodam judaeo. that Baptism given in the name of Christ without expressing the three persons of the Trinity is valid, and of force, and the second, r Quondam in cap. Laudabilem de convers. coniugat. that Marriage is so dissolved by heresy, that the party, whose consort is fallen into heresy, may lawfully marry another, which doctrine is now condemned in the Council of Trent: and also by Pope john the 22. who publicly taught, s See Adrian. Papa in q. 2. de Confirm. circa finem, Castro. lib. 3. contra haeres. verbo Beatitudo haer. 62. Bell. l. 4. de Ro. Pont. c. 14 and if he had not been prevented by death was resolved to define, that the souls of the Blessed should not see God before the Resurrection: and by Pope Boniface the eight, who in a letter to Philip le Bell King of France affirmed, t See Nicol. Vignerius add an. 1300. & joan. Tilius ad ann. 1302. that he accounted them for heretics, who did not believe, that the said King of France was not subject to him in spirituals and temporals: And as for these private revelations, they may also be common to other virtuous and holy men as well as to Popes, and with the same facility, and upon the same grounds we may attribute private revelations, and certainty of private knowledge as well to the one as to the other. 37 And albeit it were so that many things are certain to the private understanding, and knowledge of some Popes, which are uncertain, and seem erroneous to other learned men, will my Adversaries therefore affirm, that those learned men are bound to follow the Pope's private judgement, and to believe him upon his bare word, if he say that he is certain his judgement, and knowledge to be true, until he make manifest to them the certainty thereof, and upon what grounds he is so certainly persuaded his judgement to be certainly true. This were doubtless a most pernicious doctrine, and the opening of a wide gap to errors and heresies. For than should the Doctors of Paris, See Pope Adr. in the place above cited. who caused Pope john to recall his error, have believed him, when he commanded his doctrine, or rather error to be held by all men, and induced the University of Paris that none should there take any degree in Divinity, unless he first should swear to defend and always maintain this error. Then should the Kingdom of France have believed Pope Boniface the eight, when he affirmed, that he accounted them for heretics, who did not believe that the King of France was not subject to him in spirituals, and temporals: and the like may be said of Pope Nicolas, and Pope Celestine. 38 Wherefore the plain truth is, that as well Popes may sometimes err and be deceived, albeit they are certainly persuaded their doctrine to be true, if other learned men after mature deliberation think it to be false, as other learned men may err and be deceived, albeit they think certainly their doctrine to be true, if the Pope after mature deliberation think it to be false: and whether of them do really err, when there are such controversies, we cannot certainly know, but by the future event. For if the doctrine which the Pope thinketh, and teacheth to be certain, be afterwards confirmed by any public definition of some Orthodoxal general Council, or be approved by the general consent, or acceptance of the Church, it is an evident sign, that the judgement of the Pope, and not of those learned men was really true; for which cause we now see, and say, that Pope Pius, and Victor did not err in their judgements concerning the celebration of the Feast of Easter, and that the Churches of Asia did err therein; and that S. Cyprian, and the other Bishops of Africa, did err in their judgements, concerning the rebaptisation of such as were baptised by heretics, and that Pope Stephen and Cornelius, who contradicted S. Cyprian, did not err. And contrariwise for the same cause we say, that Pope Nicholas, Pope Celestine, and Pope john, to omit now Pope Boniface, did really err in their judgements, and the other learned men, who were of contrary opinion, did not err, for that the doctrine of these is now approved by a public declaration, or general consent, and acceptance of the Church. But so long as the question betwixt the Pope, and other learned Catholics, shall still remain afoot, and not be decided, no man is bound to think the Pope's judgement to be certain, neither can he compel any man to believe the same, albeit the Pope be inwardly persuaded that his judgement is true, or certain, yet he ought not to be publicly contradicted by any man but with great submission, reverence, and respect. 39 But if the Pope, when there is a controversy betwixt him, and other learned men, should denounce censures against all those, who shall preach, or teach contrary to his doctrine, than we must doubtless be very careful not to oppose publicly against him without urgent necessity, by reason of scandal in seeming to contemn Ecclesiastical censures, but in such a case we must have in mind that golden document of devout and learned Gerson; The second truth is, saith he, that the Pope's sentence bindeth all men not to dogmatike, or teach publicly the contrary, Gerson in tract. de Examinat. doctrine. §. 2. veritas. except those that do find a manifest error against faith, and do perceive, that if they should not oppose themselves, great scandal to faith would arise by their silence: And if then there should be prosecuting of Censures, and punishments against them, let them be assured, that blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice. And thus much concerning this point, whereby the Reader may see whether I or my Adversary deserve the note of ridiculous absurdity. 40 But much more ridiculous, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, u Pag. 189. nu. 10. 11. is widdrington's inference, that the ground and reason of a general Decree, made by a Pope and general Council is uncertain, and subject to error, because some learned men are of opinion that some Popes had no sufficient reason to do some particular acts, or grant licences, or dispensations to some particular persons, which is a far different case from the other, and therefore, I say, his inference thereupon is so ridiculous, that a Scholar may be ashamed to make it; for albeit we should grant, that those Popes erred both in granting those licences, and in their grounds, yet it would not follow, that therefore the Pope together with the whole Lateran Council might err in the ground of their Decree, except we may infer quidlibet ex quolibet. And yet, forsooth, this is one of his probable answers. Therefore if he will argue against the Decree of the Council of Lateran by instances and examples, let him not produce the particular facts of some Pope's concerning some particular Countries, or persons, but some decree of a Pope, or general Council made for the direction and government of the whole Church (as this of the Lateran Council was) and then let him prove also that the ground of the said decree was uncertain, and then I will grant that he saith somewhat to the purpose. 41 But strange and intolerable is the false and fraudulent dealing of this man. For I neither made, nor intended to make in any one of my three instances any such inference, as he, to tax me of ridiculous absurdity untruly saith I have; neither did I apply any one of my instances, or examples to the decree of the Lateran Council, neither in any one of them is the Council of Lateran so much as named, and therefore to cloak his fraud more cunningly, he thought best to conceal my instances, lest the Reader might by his own writings, and looking over my instances, forth with discover his fraud and falsehood. Wherefore that inference, which I intended covertly to make by my first instance, was only this; that because the ground and foundation upon which certain Popes did by their decrees, and sentences ordain the Feast of the blessed Virgin's conception, give leave to Priests to administer the Sacrament of Confirmation, and dispense in the solemn vow of Chastity, was uncertain, and consequently could not appertain to faith, therefore the Mayor proposition of Fa. Lessius his first argument was not sound, but defective, to wit, That doctrine doth appertain to faith, which Popes, Counsels, and Doctors do propound or suppose as a certain foundation of their decrees and sentences, which proposition is general, and may be understood not only of the decree of the Lateran Council, but of all other Decrees and Sentences, either general or particular of Popes or Counsels, as of the Decree touching the Feast of the blessed Virgin's conception, of the judicial sentences of Pope Gregory the seventh against Henry the fourth in a Council held at Rome, and of Pope Innocentius the fourth, against Fredrick the second in the Council of Lions, and of all other Decrees of Pope's touching particular licences and dispensations, whereof two are mentioned in my first instance, and do evidently show the Mayor proposition of Fa. Lessus his first argument to be very unsound. 42 But if my Adversary will have that Mayor proposition of Fa. Lessius his first argument, which he produced without any restriction, or limitation to be restrained, and limited only to the decrees of Popes, and general Counsels, which are made for the direction and government of the whole Church, and do not only concern particular facts, licences, dispensations, and judicial sentences concerning some particular Countries, or persons, besides that I have declared above in what sense that proposition is true, to wit, that such decrees must be made by true Ecclesiastical and not civil authority, and also that they must be such decrees, and sentences, wherein it is certain and of faith, that the Church cannot err, I have also here produced a decree of Pope Sixtus the fourth, concerning the Feast of the blessed Virgin's conception, which was made for the direction and government of the whole Church, and yet the ground and foundation of that decree was uncertain, as I proved above, and will more clearly confirm beneath, and evidently show, how Mr. Fitzherbert to answer this decree is forced to forsake the doctrine of the most learnedst Divines of his own Society. And also I might add hereunto the decrees of Pope's touching the canonisation of Saints, the ground and foundation whereof doth not appertain to faith, seeing that as I showed before out of Canus, that it is not heretical to affirm, that the Church may err in the canonisation of Saints, and yet these decrees are made for the direction and government of the whole Church. But as concerning the decree, or rather Act of the Lateran Council, touching the deposition of temporal Landlords, or Magistrates, it is evident, that I made no inference, or any mention at all thereof in any one of my three Instances, or examples, as this man most shamefully affirmeth. 43 Yet if he will needs have me to apply this doctrine touching the uncertainty of the grounds, and foundations of Pope's decrees and sentences to the decrees of general Counsels, and in particular to the often named Act of the Lateran Council, I do confidently affirm, that whensoever it is uncertain, and disputable among learned Catholics, whether a general Council hath authority to make this or that decree by her spiritual power, without the consent and authority of temporal Princes, as to inflict temporal punishments, and to dispose of temporals, wherein temporal Princes only are supreme, and the Council maketh such a decree, concerning the inflicting of temporal punishments, or the disposing of temporals, without declaring that she doth make that decree by her spiritual authority, then, I say, it is lawful for any man without any note of heresy, error, or temerity to expound the decree of that Council, according to the probable opinion of those learned men, and to affirm, that the Council made that decree not by spiritual power, but by the consent and authority of temporal Princes. And this is our case concerning the decree, or rather Act of the Lateran Council: Neither is this to impugn the decree of the Council, but only to expound it according to the probable doctrine of Catholics. And if Mr. Fitzherbert will say, that this inference is ridiculous, absurd, improbable, and not to the purpose, and that hereby we may infer quidlibet ex quolibet, he showeth himself, as the plain truth is, to have small skill in Theological learning. 44 In the mean time saith he, x Pag. 190 nu. 12. ad finem. Widdrington, is to understand further concerning this point, that whereas he demandeth, whether it is not a most grievous error to grant such licences, whereupon most grievous Sacrileges may follow, to wit, the invalid administration of Sacraments? I answer, that the Church both doth, and may minister Sacraments in cases of necessity upon a probable opinion, without any danger of formal sacrilege, or sin; as when a child is baptised in one of his feet, or hands before he be fully borne into the world, or when the Sacrament of Extreme Unction is given to one of whom it is not certain whether he be fully dead. In these cases, I say, and divers other such, the Church doth administer Sacraments with some danger of invalidity (and yet without danger of formal Sacrilege) in respect of the great hope of benefit, which may follow to the souls of those to whom they are administered: and I verily think that there was never any Catholic so impious hitherto, as to condemn the same as sacrilegious, either in the most famous, and holy Father S. Gregory the Pope, or in any other of his successors: for albeit some learned men have indeed denied that they had authority to give such licence, yet they were not so inconsiderate, as either to condemn them of most grievous, or sacrilegious error, or to deny, that the other opinion was probable, seeing that it had been practised so long since by S. Gregory, and approved not only by so many most famous, and learned Doctors, but also by the Council of Florence, which treating of the Sacrament of Confirmation, and having said, that the Bishop is the Ordinary Minister thereof, addeth afterwards, Legitur tamen, etc. yet it is read, that a simple Priest hath administered it by the dispensation of the Sea Apostolic with Chrism, or holy Oil made by a Bishop. 45 So saith the Council, giving to understand, that although a Bishop is the ordinary Minister of the Sacrament of Confirmation, yet a Priest may be the extraordinary Minister of it by dispensation of the Sea Apostolic. And this I hope may suffice to free as well S. Gregory, as other Popes his Successors from all error, and much more all danger of sacrilege in this point. Besides that, the grant of such licences being mere matters of fact, and concerning only particular persons, and Countries could not any way prejudice our cause, albeit they were erroneous, or sacrilegious, seeing that (as I have sufficiently signified before) the question betwixt him, and us for the present is only about a general Decree of a General Council, ordained for the special good, and benefit of the whole Church, wherein we do indeed acknowledge the infallible assistance of the holy Ghost, though not in every particular fact of a Pope. Thus much for his first Instance. 45 But still this man discovereth either his gross ignorance, or his accustomed fraud. For first whereas I spoke only of error, of material sacrilege, and of invalid administration of the Sacrament of Confirmation, this man replieth of sin, of formal sacrilege, and of unlawful administration of Sacraments. For although it be certain, that a man may lawfully, and without sin, or formal sacrilege, minister Sacraments in cases of necessity, upon a probable opinion, yet it is not certain, that in such cases the Sacrament is ministered with effect, and without error, or material sacrilege; for truth, falsehood, and error have their denomination from the effect, or thing itself, and probable ignorance and error do make the act lawful, though not valid and with effect. 46 Secondly, there is a great disparity betwixt the examples, which Mr. Fitzherbert here bringeth concerning the lawfulness of ministering Sacraments upon a probable opinion, and the example which I brought concerning the licences granted by some Popes to inferior Priests, to administer the Sacrament of Confirmation. For the common doctrine and practice among Catholics is, that it is not lawful to minister upon a probable opinion those Sacraments mentioned by my Adversary, but in case of necessity, and when the necessity is past, because it was uncertain, or doubtful, whether they were valid, and had effect or no, to reiterate them again, upon condition, according to that doctrine which is certain, and without all controversy, doubt, or danger: But neither do Popes give licence to inferior Priests to minister the Sacrament of Confirmation only in time of necessity, neither is it the common practice among Catholics to reiterate again, after the necessity is past, the Sacrament of Confirmation ministered by those Priests, of whom there is a great controversy among learned Catholics, whether the Pope hath authority to give them any such licence or no. 47 Neither doth the Council of Florence * See Estius in 4. sent. dist. 7. §. 22. who answereth this authority of the Council of Florence. Castro ubi supra. either approve, or disprove this practice, but only relateth, that some Popes have given such licences, as the words before rehearsed by my Adversary do plainly show. And although S. Gregory did grant, or, as Alphonsus de Castro doth expound him, did for avoiding of scandal, only permit, which before he had forbidden, as a thing contrary to the ancient custom of the Roman Church, that certain Priests in Sardinia might confer the Sacrament of Confirmation, when Bishops were wanting, or, Adrianus ubi supra. as Pope Adrian doth interpret S. Gregory, he did not give leave to Priests to confer the Sacrament of Confirmation, but only to anoint the forehead of the person baptised with Chrism, in that manner as Pope Silvester is said to have ordained, that the Priest should anoint with Chrism the person baptised in the crown of the head, which he ordained, Hugo lib. 2. de Sacram. part. 7. cap. 3. as Hugo de S. Victore affirmeth, lest the person baptised should departed this life without Confirmation, according to all which expositions there is no Catholic, as I verily think, so impious, or inconsiderate, that will condemn S. Gregory of any sin, or formal sacrilege; yet other Popes have given that licence to inferior Priests, who are no Bishops to confer the Sacrament of Confirmation, without any such necessity, as to divers Abbots, and namely to the Abbot of Monte Cassino, where there is no such want, but rather over great plenty of Bishops, being so many thereabout, and having so small revenues to maintain their Episcopal dignity: Neither is it the custom, or practise of those Countries to confirm again those persons, who are confirmed by those Abbots, although it may very conveniently be done. And therefore albeit there be no danger, or prejudice to souls, to minister the Sacrament of Baptism, of Extreme unction, of Penance, or of holy Orders, in time of necessity upon a probable opinion, for that the practice, and custom is in such a case to minister them again when the necessity is past; yet it is a very dangerous, and pernicious error to minister either the Sacrament of Confirmation, or any other Sacrament only upon a probable opinion, if it may be ministered without any such probable doubt or danger, or when the necessity is past, not to reiterate upon condition the Sacrament again: So that although it be no dangerous, or pernicious error to minister that Sacrament as doubtful, which is indeed among learned Catholics accounted doubtful, yet it is most a dangerous and pernicious error, to minister that Sacrament as certainly to have effect, which nevertheless is by famous, and learned Catholics upon probable grounds accounted doubtful. 48 Thirdly, the Reader may plainly perceive the fraudulent dealing of this man, who wholly dissembleth in what manner I applied this example to all the three arguments brought by Fa. Lessius, and not only to his first argument, as he would make his Reader believe, and therefore he altogether concealeth the three instances which I brought to confront with Fa. Lessius his three arguments. For this assertion touching the invalid administration of Sacraments, which by way of an interrogation, as you have seen, I brought in my first example, to wit, that to err in the invalid administration of Sacraments is a very pernicious error, I did not affirm absolutely, but only ad hominem, with reference to the like assertion, which Fa. Lessius brought in his third argument, to which third argument, and not to his first, as my Adversary would seem to make his Reader believe, I afterwards applied this assertion. 49 For whereas Fa. Lessius in the Mayor proposition of his third argument affirmed, as you have seen, that it is a point of faith, that the Church cannot err in doctrine, and precepts of manners by teaching generally something to be lawful which is unlawful, or also by commanding something of itself unlawful, for that such an error is no less pernicious to the faithful than an error in faith: from which proposition he did infer, that it is therefore a point of faith that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, for that otherwise the Church should teach a most pernicious error and subjects should be incited to rebellions and perjuries: I in my third instance, which my Adversary hath wholly concealed, made, as you have seen, the like argument, and from the same Mayor proposition of Fa. Lessius his argument, I likewise inferred, that it is also a point of faith, that the Pope hath power to give leave to Priests to minister the Sacrament of Confirmation, and to dispense in the solemn vow of chastity, and so likewise it may be inferred, that the B. Virgin was not conceived in original sin, for that otherwise the Pope, in whom according to my adversaries doctrine, all the infallibility of the Church doth consist, should teach most pernicious errors, and the faithful should be incited to sacrileges, and injuries. 50 And if Mr. Fitzherbert to answer my third instance will affirm, that from the foresaid Mayor proposition of Fa. Lessius his third argument it cannot be well inferred, that the aforesaid doctrines mentioned in my third instance must be of faith, because it is no pernicious or sinful error, it being grounded upon a probable opinion of learned Catholics, which excuseth from all sin, to teach such doctrines, and to incite to such sacrileges and injuries, seeing that to err in this case is no sin, neither are the sacrileges and injuries grounded upon so probable an error formal, or sinful sacrileges, and injuries; if I say, he will answer thus: beside that he taketh error, sacrileges and injuries otherwise then error, rebellions, and perjuries are taken by Fa. Lessius, who, as it is evident, taketh them not only as they are sins to the conscience of man, but also as they are so, a part rei, and are commonly called material, not formal, or sinful errors, rebellions, and perjuries, the same also may be answered to Fa. Lessius his argument, to wit, that it cannot be well inferred from that Mayor proposition, that the doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes must be of faith, because it is no pernicious and sinful error in his opinion to teach those doctrines by him mentioned and to incite men to such rebellions and perjuries, which according to his opinion are not formal, and sinful rebellions, and perjuries. 51 Whereupon it is evident, that in the same manner as my Adversaries will answer my third instance, I will answer Fa. Lessius his third argument; and that if from Fa. Lessius his argument it may be well inferred, that the doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes is certain and of faith, it may also by my instance be well inferred, that the doctrines for the Pope's power to give authority to Priests to minister the Sacrament of Confirmation, and to dispense in the solemn vow of chastity, and also for the preservation of the B. Virgin from original sin, are certain and of faith, which how absurd it is to affirm, it is too too apparent. But more of this third argument beneath. 52 Lastly, to that which Mr. Fitzherbert saith in the end of this Chapter, that the grant of such licences being mere matters of fact, and concerning only particular persons, and Countries, could not any way prejudice his cause, albeit they were erroneous, and sacriledgious, seeing that the question, saith he, betwixt me and them for the present is only about a general decree of a general Council, ordained for the special good and benefit of the whole Church, wherein Widdrington acknowledgeth the infallible assistance of the holy Ghost, though not in every particular fact of a Pope, I answer first, albeit I will not condemn those Popes of any pernicious error that in time of necessity grant such licences upon a probable opinion, yet I cannot see, but that to grant such licences either as certain, when they are doubtful, or to grant them without necessity only upon a probable opinion, is a very dangerous and pernicious error, seeing that they concern the valid, and effectual administration of a Sacrament, which all men know to be a matter of great moment. 53 And albeit the grant of such licences be mere matters of fact, and concern only particular persons, and Countries, yet from thence it may be clearly gathered, that those Popes who granted them, did generally teach, that the Sacrament of Confirmation ministered by those Priests is a true, valid, and substantial Sacrament, which, if it be not so, is a very great and pernicious error in doctrine of manners; and also that the instances drawn from thence, do quite overthrow all Fa. Lessius his three arguments, and namely the first, whereof the Mayor proposition, as you have seen is general and without limitation, and may be applied to all decrees and sentences whatsoever of Popes or councils, whether they are general Decrees, or concern only particular persons or Countries. Neither is it true, as this man very shamefully affirmeth, that the question betwixt me, and them for the present is only about a general decree of a general Council ordained for the special good, and benefit of the whole Church: for the question betwixt them and me for the present is only about the first argument of Fa. Lessius, and my first instance made against the same, and especially about the truth of his Mayor proposition, which, as you have seen, speaketh of the ground, and foundation generally of all Decrees and sentences both of Popes, and councils, That doctrine, saith he, doth appertain to faith, which Popes, councils, and Doctors do propound, or suppose as a certain foundation of their Decrees, and sentences. So that my Adversary very untruly affirmeth, that the question betwixt me and them for the present is only about a general Decree of a general Council. And this may suffice for the confirmation of my first instance, and the confutation of all that, which Mr. Fitzherbert would seem to have made against the same, whereas he hath not, as you have seen, so much as set it down at all. Now you shall see, how fraudulently and ignorantly he hath in the next Chapter objected against my other two instances. CHAP. XV. Wherein widdrington's second example, and his instances grounded thereon, are confirmed, and M. Fitzherbert in impugning the same is convinced of manifest fraud, and ignorance, in taxing therein of fondness the learnedst Divines of his own Society. Also the third example of Widdrington, and his instances, grounded thereon, are proved to be sound and sufficient, and M. fitzherbert's fraud in relating of the said instances, and applying them to the Lateran Council, is plainly discovered. 1 MY Adversary in this Chapter showeth also the like fraud, and ignorance, as he did in the former. Thus therefore he beginneth. widdrington's second instance is, Widdr. ubi supra nu. 57 that Pope Sixtus the fourth made a Decree concerning the celebration of the B. Virgin's Conception, notwithstanding that it is uncertain, and disputed amongst the Divines without any blot of heresy, error, or mortal sin, whether the blessed Virgin cantracted original sin in her Conception, or was preserved from it by a peculiar providence of God, Ibidem. and therefore saith he, it is manifest, that the Doctrine, which is either proposed, or supposed by the Pope, as the foundation of his Apostolical Decree, and Constitution (concerning even the religious worship of God) is not so certain and undoubtedly true, but that it may be impugned without danger of grievous sin. So he: whereupon he inferreth, that the ground of the Canon of the Lateran Council may also be uncertain, or impugned without note of heresy, or sin. 2 But first it is very untrue that this was my second instance, which I brought to confront with Fa. Lessius his second argument, although it be true, that it was my second example, whereon both my first and second instance were grounded. For whereas Fa. Lessius to prove that the Pope's power to depose Princes doth belong to faith, argueth thus in his second argument; If a general Council should expressly define, that the Church hath power to depose Princes, no Catholic can make doubt, but that it should belong to faith, but seeing that she supposeth it as a certain foundation of her Decrees and sentences she is thought no less to affirm the same, therefore it ought to be accounted no less certain: To this argument I opposed an other instance not much unlike to it, which was this: If the Pope should expressly define, that he hath authority to give licence to inferior Priests to administer the Sacrament of Confirmation, and to dispense in the solemn vow of Chastity, or that the B. Virgin was not conceived in original sin, none of those Catholics that hold as Fa. Lessius doth, that the Pope cannot err in his definitions although he define without a general Council, can make any doubt, but that the aforesaid things should appertain to faith, but seeing that divers Popes do suppose the same, as a certain foundation of their Decrees and sentences, they are thought no less to affirm the same, therefore they ought to be accounted no less certain. This was my second instance: and therefore Mr. Fitzherbert in affirming my second example to be my second instance discovereth no less his fraud, than he doth both his fraud and ignorance in impugning the same. 3 Secondly, it is also very untrue, that I from this example inferred, as this man shamefully affirmeth, that the ground of the Canon of the Lateran Council may also be uncertain and impugned without note of heresy, or sin, seeing that it is evident, as you have seen before, that I neither impugned, but only expounded the Canon, or rather Act of the Lateran Council, neither did I apply any one of those three examples to the Canon of the Lateran Council, or in any one of my three instances made any mention of the Lateran Council at all. But as Fa. Lessius referred his second argument to the foundations not only of the Decrees of deposition, as he supposeth this decree of the Lateran Council to be, but also of the sentences of general councils, as in his opinion was that denounced against Fredrick the second, by Pope Innocent the fourth, in the presence of the Council of Lions, so also I referred my second Instance, to the foundations of Pope's D crees and sentences, upon whom all the infallibility of the Church, according to his doctrine, doth depend. And the same answer, which my Adversaries shall give to my second instance, will forthwith satisfy Fa. Lessius his second argument. 4 For all the difficulty thereof, as also of his former argument, consisteth in this, whether every doctrine which Popes, and councils suppose as a ground and foundation of their Decrees, and sentences, is always to be accounted a certain, and infallible ground, and not subject to error, or it may sometimes be only a probable ground, and not always an infallible point of faith: and my second Instance doth sufficiently convince, that it is not always a certain, and infallible ground, whereby Fa. Lessius his argument is quite overthrown. Besides that, the ground and foundation only of those Decrees of Popes, or general councils can be certain and infallible, which are made by spiritual, and not temporal authority, as I have said before, so that this argument of Fa. Lessius can little concern the decree or Act of the Lateran Council, touching the deposition not of temporal Princes, but only of inferior Magistrates, and Lords, seeing that it was made by the consent and authority of temporal Princes, to whom only, according to the probable doctrine of very many Doctors, the inflicting of temporal punishments, as of death, exile, privation of goods, imprisonment, doth belong. 3 Now let us see what Mr. Fitzherbert can say against this second example, which he would make his Reader believe to be my second Instance. But widdrington's instance, saith he a Pag. 194. nu. 2. & seq. , is as little to the purpose as the former, for albeit he allegeth not here a particular fact, but a general decree of a Pope directed to the whole Church, yet he abuseth his Reader in seeking to persuade him, that the foundation of that decree, was the opinion or particular persuasion of Pope Sixtus, Tom. 4. Concil. post vitam Sixti 4. §. cum prae exelsa. that the blessed Virgin was not conceived in original sin, whereas no such thing can be gathered by the decree, but only that his desire was by the concession of Indulgences, to stir up the people to the devote celebration of the Feast, and thereby to give thanks, and praise to Almighty God for the benefit, which all Christian men have received by her Conception; to which end it imported nothing at all how she was conceived; I mean, whether she were sanctified in the first instant of her conception, as very many do hold, or shortly after, as others teach, and therefore the decree of Pope Sixtus is observed as well by those that affirm her to have been conceived in original sin, as by those that deny it, because nothing is ordained in the decree in favour, Ibid. §. Grave nimis. or prejudice of either opinion. 4 This may appear as well by a latter Decree of his, whereby he ordained that both the opinions might be held, and taught without note of heresy (because, saith he, the question is not determined, and decided by the Church) as also by the express words of this Decree, wherein he signifieth that considering the ineffable dignity, and worthiness of the most blessed Virgin, it is convenient and necessary that all faithful Christians give praise and thanks to God for her marvelous conception, Note that word marvelous. to the end that by her merits, and intercession they may be made more capable of God's grace. Thus saith Pope Sixtus in his Decree, and then addeth, Hac igitur consideratione inducti, etc. Therefore being moved with this consideration, we determine and decree, etc. So he. And his determination and Decree was no other, but that all such as did with due devotion assist at the divine office and service, appointed for the celebration of that Feast, should gain all those Indulgences, which had been granted before to such as celebrated the Feast of Corpus Christi. 5 This then being the whole substance and effect as well of the Decree as of the motive thereof expressed therein, it is evident that Pope Sixtus had no other meaning in all this, then to move all Christians to the devout celebration of the feast of the conception of the blessed Virgin, no less then of her Nativity, and other Feasts, without any prejudice to the different opinions that either than were, or after might be held concerning the manner of her conception; in which respect the said Feast is celebrated by all Christians no less than her other Feasts, which is as much as Pope Sixtus desired and intended; whereby it appeareth, that his Decree is indifferent to both opinions, being observed by the maintainers of both, and that therefore it is not grounded upon either of both. 6 And now to apply this to our purpose, whereas Widdrington pretendeth by this Instance to prove, that the doctrine of the Pope's power to depose Princes is as uncertain, as the doctrine that the B. Virgin was conceived without original sin, which is impugned by very learned men, it is to be considered, that there is such disparity in the cases, and such weakness in his Instance, that he proveth nothing at all against us. For the Decree of Pope Sixtus had so little dependence on the doctrine of her immaculate Conception, that he might have made it (yea it would have been very lawful, just, and convenient) though he had held the contrary opinion; whereby it is manifest, that his opinion concerning the immaculate purity of her Conception was not the ground of his Decree (as Widdrington doth very fond suppose it to be) whereas in our question touching the Canon of the Lateran Council the case is far different, seeing that the said Canon hath such dependence on the doctrine of the Pope's power to depose Princes (which is necessarily supposed and included in it) that if the Pope have no such power, the Canon is utterly void, being altogether unjust, unlawful, and erroneous; Whereupon it evidently followeth, that the doctrine of the Pope's power to depose Princes, is the foundation of the Canon. 7 So as you see, that to impugn this undoubted ground of the Canon, he is feign to suppose, and urge a false ground of Pope Sixtus his decree, and consequently faileth wholly in the proof of that which he pretendeth; and therefore to make his Instance good, and the cases like, he should have proved, that the doctrine of the Pope's power to institute Feasts is uncertain, and imagined by learned Catholics without danger of sin, for Pope Sixtus his Decree touching the celebration of the Feast supposeth the truth of that doctrine, as in like sort the Canon of the Lateran Council concerning the deposition of Princes supposeth that the doctrine of the Pope's power to dispose Princes is certain, and true; and therefore I conclude, that his second Instance, wherein he supposeth a false ground, is as improbable, and impertinent as the former. 8 Thus you see, that the whole substance of this Discourse, which Mr. Fitzherbert here hath made against my second example, which he truly affirmeth to be my second Instance, consisteth in this, that he denieth the ground and foundation of Pope Sixtus his Decree to be his opinion, and persuasion, that the blessed Virgin was not conceived in original sin, and affirmeth that I do very fond suppose the same; wherein I know not whether to tax him of manifest fraud, or palpable ignorance: for to shift off my instance, and to censure it, according to his usual manner, as fond, improbable, and impertinent, he is feign to forsake the common doctrine of the learnedst Divines of his own Society, as of Salmeron, Salmeron ad Rom. 15. tom. 13. disp. 22. Suarez tom 2. in 3. part. disp. 3. sec. 5. Vasquez tom. 2. in 3. part. disp. 117. cap. 5. Suarez, and Vasquez, who do constantly hold, that the immaculate, pure, and holy conception of the blessed Virgin was the ground and foundation of Pope Sixtus his Decree, and to tax very rashly, and arrogantly, their doctrine as fond, improbable, and impertinent, and very fraudulently, or unlearnedly to take hold, for a colour of his fraud, or ignorance, of certain answers of their Adversaries, which were seen, propounded, & confuted by them. Which to make most plain and manifest, I think it not amiss to set down verbatim, what Suarez (with whom Vasquez, and Salmeron, do agree in this point) writeth of this matter. 9 But at the last (saith Suarez to prove from the authority of the Church, that the blessed Virgin was preserved from original sin, and sanctified in the first instant of her conception) the Church of Rome two hundred years since generally receiving the celebration of this Feast, giveth special indulgences to the worshippers thereof: Whereupon she seemeth in some sort to have canonised the conception of the blessed Virgin. But perchance it will be said, that this conception is not celebrated, for that it is holy, but because it hath been a great benefit of God, and a beginning of greater. But this by no means is to be approved; because (as it is manifest by the understanding of the faithful) the Church doth not celebrate this Feast only for giving thanks in respect of God, but also in honour of the Virgin: but the Virgin should not be worthy of honour for her conception, unless therein she had been holy. Moreover S. Thomas, Bernard, and Ildefonsus do think, that it is sufficiently proved, that the blessed Virgin at the time of her Nativity was holy, for that the Church doth celebrate her Nativity, therefore the same judgement would they make of her Conception, if they should see the Feast to be celebrated. Lastly, Galatinus lib. 7. cap. 5. saith, that the Feast of her Conception is in some Martyrologies expressly set down for the most great purity, and sanctity thereof; and this will be made more evident by that which shall be said. 10 But some others say, that the Feast of the Conception was not celebrated, but of the Sanctification, at what time soever it was done, or truly (if the Feast of her conception be celebrated) it is not therefore because she was sanctified in the first instant, but because she was sanctified perchance that day. But this also is against the meaning of the Church, which ever intended to celebrate some special privilege and immunity of the Virgin upon this festival day, whereof are manifest signs: First, because Saint Bernard in the aforesaid 147. Epistle did understand in this sense the meaning of the Churches, which began to celebrate this Feast: For if they should celebrate only the sanctification, there were no cause why he should reprehend them. Besides, the Council of Basil doth plainly say, that it is an ancient custom of the Church to celebrate this Feast in honour of the Conception of the immaclate Virgin, or of the immaculate Conception of the Virgin, for the Latin words may bear both senses. 11 Thirdly, in a certain Roman office of this Feast, which is confirmed by the authority of Pope Sixtus the fourth this oftentimes is expressly said, and the intention of this Feast is declared. And after the same manner Pope Sixtus the fourth doth speak in the Extravagant, Cum praeexcelsa, and in the Extravagant, Grave nimis, de reliquijs & venerat. Sanctorum, calling her Conception pure, and immaculate, and granting Indulgences to those who do piously believe, and celebrate the same. And so also the Council of Trent understood these Decrees sess. 5. where she confirmeth them. Whereupon the same Pope Sixtus the fourth saith, that those do not sin, who think that the B. Virgin was conceived without sin, and for that cause do celebrate her Feast. Therefore without doubt this is the intention and reason of this festivity. Add, that in the same manner one may say, that when the Church doth celebrate the Nativity of the Virgin, it is not for that she was holy in her Nativity, but because she was sanctified within that day, but this is plainly false and absurd, as it is manifest by that which hath been said, therefore the same is for the present. And the reason is general, because the Church doth properly worship and celebrate the mysteries, and privileges of the holy Conception, and Nativity. Thus Fa. Suarez. 12 So as you see how Fa. Suarez not only saith, but also proveth, that the end, reason, ground, and foundation of Pope Sixtus his decree touching the celebration of the Feast of the B. Virgin's Conception, was for that the Pope supposed, that she was sanctified in the first instant of her Conception. And the same reasons Fa. Vasquez also bringeth. Only he urgeth another reason taken from the words of the Decree of Pope Sixtus, and related above by my Adversary, to wit, that the Pope in that Decree exhorteth the faithful to give praise and thanks to God for the wonderful, or marvelous Conception of the immaculate Virgin, but he could not call it a wonderful, or marvelous Conception, unless the B. Virgin were contrary to the accustomed manner conceived in grace and sanctity, for no other wonderful, or admirable thing could her Conception have, seeing that for as much as appertaineth to nature, she was conceived after the manner of other men, and women. 13 judge now, good Reader, whether this rash-headed ignorant man may not be ashamed to condemn so rashly the most famous, and learnedst men of his own Society, as he condemneth me, of fondness, improbability, and impertinency, for affirming so resolutely, that without all doubt the end, reason, ground and foundation of Pope Sixtus his Decree for celebrating the Feast of the B. Virgin's Conception was for that the Pope supposed her to be conceived in grace, and sanctity, and that all Christian people by celebrating her Feast should give praise and thanks to God for her holy and wonderful Conception, and contrary to the ordinary manner that other men are conceived, to the end that they thus celebrating her holy and marvelous Conception may by her merits, and intercession be made more capable of God's grace. But perchance Mr. Fitzherbert hath not read these Authors, and then his ignorance and rashness is the more blame worthy in taking upon him to be a teacher, and Censurer of others in these points of Schoole-divinitie, wherein he showeth himself to be so ignorant; and if he have read them, than his fraud is the more culpable to delude his Reader so shamefully in bringing arguments against their doctrine, to tax it of fondness, improbability, and impertinency, and in dissembling in what manner they have most clearly confuted the same. And therefore thou needest not much marvel to hear these words so frequent in this man's mouth, that my arguments, and answers are absurd, improbable, impertinent, foolish, ridiculous, malicious, erroneous, yea and heretical, and then most commonly when they are most sound and sufficient, and his Replies most weak and fraudulent, considering with what a bold face the silly ignorant man doth unlearnedly & arrogantly condemn in me & my doctrine, of fondness, improbability, and impertinency, the most famous Divines of his own Society. 14 And whereas Mr. Fitzherbert still harpeth upon the same string, to wit, that the undoubted ground and foundation of the Decree of the Lateran Council is, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, and that the Canon supposeth this doctrine to be certain, this is the main point about which we contend, for I have ever denied, and he hath no way sufficiently proved, but supposed, that this decree, or rather Act of the Lateran Council doth concern the deposition of temporal Princes, but only of inferior Magistrates, Landlords, or Lords, by the consent and authority of temporal Princes, from whom that Act had force to bind. And although the Pope's power to institute Feasts be a remote ground and foundation of the decree of Pope Sixtus, yet the immediate ground & foundation of that Decree was the purity and sanctity of the B. Virgin's Conception, in honour whereof he did institute that Feast, as I have showed before. And albeit I do not deny that the Pope hath authority to institute Feasts in the honour of Saints, and of sacred mysteries, yet I deny that the end, reason, ground and foundation for which such Feasts are instituted, is always certain and infallible, and that those mysteries are therefore infallibly sacred, as in this Feast of the B. Virgin's Conception it is apparent by the testimonies of most famous, and learned Divines. And lastly, although I do not deny, that the Pope hath authority to canonize Saints, or to declare them to be holy and blessed men, yet Melchior Canus feareth not to say, that it is not heretical to affirm, that the Pope may err therein, and the reason thereof he giveth, as I declared before, because the ground, whereon the Pope's judgement and declaration in such canonisations doth rely, to wit, the testimonies of men, is fallible, and exposed to error. And thus much concerning my second Instance, now to the third. 15 widdrington's third Instance, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, b Pag. 197. nu. 8. ad finem. being of the nature and quality of the first, is so sufficiently answered already, that I need not to stand long upon it: he saith that the Popes have oft dispensed with Princes, which had made a solemn vow of chastity, whereof he allegeth some examples, and because very learned Doctors do deny that the Pope hath authority to dispense in solemn vows, Widdrington inferreth as before, that the doctrine whereupon those dispensations were grounded, is not so certain, but that it may be impugned without sin, and consequently, that the like followeth also, concerning the doctrine of the Pope's power to depose Princes, which is the foundation of the Canon of the Lateran Council. Thus argueth Widdrington in substance. 16 But in all this he is as idle as in the rest, and shooteth his bolts at random, and clean wide of the mark, impugning a general Canon of an Ecumenical Council, by some particular facts of Pope's concerning particular men, which facts both he, and we grant may be subject to error: whereas not only we, but he himself also acknowledgeth the infallible assistance of the holy Ghost in the definitions, and decrees of general councils, as I have amply declared before c Chap. 13. nu. 1. 8. 9 10. & 11 . And therefore to make a good Instance in this case, and fit for the matter in hand, he should produce some Decree of a general Council, or at least of some Pope ordaining the practice of such dispensations, and show us withal, that notwithstanding the said Decree, some Catholic Doctors do deny the Pope's authority to dispense in vows, but this he neither doth, nor can do; for if ever any such Decree had been made, the Catholic Doctors whom he nameth, would not have doubted of the Pope's authority in that behalf, as they have done, because neither the doctrine itself, nor the practice thereof was ever decreed by any Pope, or General Council; whereby it appeareth evidently, that this his third Instance is suitable to the two former, and as improbable, and absurd as the rest of his arguments, and answers. 17 But still my Adversary persisteth in his accustomed fraud, not to say falsehood. For neither is this the third Instance, which I brought to confront with Fa. Lessius his third argument, as you have seen before, although it be indeed my third example, whereon all my three Instances were partly grounded, neither did I by this example either impugn the Decree of the Lateran Council, or infer from thence, as this man untruly affirmeth, that the Decree of the Lateran Council might be impugned without sin: For neither did I impugn, but only expound the Decree, or rather Act of the Lateran Council, neither did I in any one of my three Instances, or also examples make mention at all of the Lateran Council, nor also did I ever acknowledge, that the doctrine of the Pope's power to depose Princes, was the ground and foundation of the Decree of the Lateran Council. But for this cause I produced this example of Pope's dispensations in the solemn vow of chastity, to show, that the ground and foundation, especially of Pope's sentences of deposition, as was that sentence of Gregory the 7. against Henry the 4. in a Council held at Rome, and of Innocent the 4. against Frederick the second in the Council of Lions, and other such sentences, which concern particular men, doth not appertain to faith, by virtue of this proposition, whereon both the first and second argument of Fa. Lessius was principally grounded, That doctrine doth appertain to faith, which Popes, and Counsels suppose as a certain foundation of their decrees and sentences; for it is evident, that there is no more reason why the ground and foundation of Pope's particular sentences of depositions or punishments should appertain to faith, then of his particular grants of dispensations and privileges, whereby it appeareth evidently, that this was a fit example to confute Fa. Lessius his first and second argument, which there I took in hand in my first and second Instance to confute. 18 Besides, I brought this example in my third Instance, against Fa. Lessius his third argument, whereby he laboured to prove, that it is a point of faith that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, for that otherwise the Church and Pope should err in doctrine and precepts of manners by teaching generally something to be lawful, which is unlawful, or contrariwise, and also by commanding something of itself unlawful seeing that she teacheth, that a Prince being deposed, yea, and excommunicated by the sentence of the Pope, his subjects are absolved from his obedience, yea, and are bound not to obey him, until he be reconciled, if the Censure be denounced, whereby subjects are incited by the Pope to rebellions and perjuries. Against this argument, I brought my third Instance, which my Adversary fraudulently concealeth, and which was grounded not only upon this third example of Pope's licences given to Priests to Minister the Sacrament of Confirmation, and might likewise be grounded upon the second of Pope Sixtus his decree for the celebrating of the blessed Virgin's Conception. 19 For if Fa. Lessius his third argument be good, it may likewise be proved, as you may see by my third Instance, that it is a point of faith that the Pope hath power to dispense in the solemn vow of Chastity, to give licence to Priests to minister the Sacrament of Confirmation, and also that the blessed Virgin's Conception was pure, holy, and immaculate, seeing that from these dispensations, licences, and decree of Pope Sixtus, it evidently followeth, that the Pope teacheth generally that the marriage of professed religious persons is a true Sacrament, and the children begotten and borne by them are legitimate, and if the Parents be Kings, their children ought to be preferred in the Kingdom before all others, who may pretend otherwise a right thereto, and the Sacrament of Confirmation, ministered by an inferior Priest, with the Pope's licence is a true and valid Sacrament, and also that the honour and worship which is given to the blessed Virgin's conception is a true and religious honour; all which would according to Fa. Lessius his third argument, be false and pernicious, (because the faithful should thereby be incited to commit injuries, and sacrileges, yea, and against their wills by Censures be compelled thereunto) if the Pope hath no such power to dispense in the solemn vow of chastity, nor to give licence to Priests to minister the Sacrament of Confirmation, and that the blessed Virgin was not in her Conception pure, holy, and immaculate. But my Adversary to obscure the whole difficulty, and to blind the Readers understanding thought it best, not to set down fully, but in that lame manner, as you have seen Fa. Lessius his three arguments, and wholly to conceal the three Instances I made against them, whereby he might with a less show of falsity boldly affirm, that the three examples were my three Instances, and that they were brought by me of purpose to impugn the decree of the Lateran Council, both which how untrue they are, and also of what little force are all Fa. Lessius his three arguments, against which only I brought my three Instances, you have seen before. 20 For all the difficulty of Fa. Lessius his third argument, consisteth in the understanding of that Mayor proposition, It is a point of faith, that the Church cannot err in doctrine, and precepts of manners, by teaching generally something to be lawful, which is unlawful, or unlawful, which is lawful, or also by commanding something of itself unlawful. For if by doctrine of manners, & teaching generally, he mean a definitive teaching, or a propounding any thing, as of faith, with an obligation to bind all the faithful to believe that doctrine. I grant that it is a point of faith that the Church, or a general Council cannot err in such doctrine, or teaching, (for whether the Pope can err or no in such teaching, it is not a point of faith, but as yet a controversy betwixt the Roman and French Divines) but then I utterly deny that any general Council (yea, or any Pope) hath ever defined, or taught generally, that the Pope by virtue of his Ecclesiastical power hath authority to depose temporal Princes, to absolve subjects from their temporal allegiance, or to inflict temporal punishments. But if by doctrine, and teaching he mean opinative and probable doctrine and teaching, besides that it cannot be convinced that the Lateran Council, or any other general Council taught generally in this sense, that the Pope by virtue of his spiritual power hath authority to depose temporal Princes, his Mayor proposition is very untrue, and therefore from thence it doth not follow, that the doctrine of the Pope's power to depose Princes, is certain, and of faith. 21 Likewise, if by commanding something of itself evil, Fa. Lessius understand a general commandment, propounded to the whole Church, or all the faithful, I grant also that a general Council cannot err in imposing such general commandments, although this be not so clear a point of faith as the former, as I have showed before out of the doctrine of learned Canus; but then I deny, that any general Council hath ever given any such general commandment concerning all subjects, not to obey their temporal Prince, being deposed by the Pope, or to rebel, and plot conspiracies against him: But if by commanding, he understand particular decrees and commandments, propounded to particular persons, Bishops, Churches, or Kingdoms against any particular Emperors, Kings, or temporal Princes than I say, that according to the doctrine of Cardinal Bellarmine, and Canus, the Church, and much more, the Pope may err; and of this sort are the depositions, judicial sentences, and commandments of Pope Gregory the seventh, in a Council held at Rome against Henry the fourth Emperor, of Pope Innocent the fourth, in the presence of the Council of Lions against Fredrick the second Emperor, and all other particular depositions of whatsoever Emperors, Kings, or temporal Princes: and in these commandments the Popes were ever resisted, and contradicted both by Princes themselves, and also by learned and virtuous Catholic subjects, as it appeareth evidently, not only by the first depositions of Emperors, and Princes, but also by the two last, of our late Queen Elizabeth, and the last King of France, who were obeyed in civil matters by their Catholic subjects, & acknowledged by them to be their true and rightful Sovereigns, notwithstanding the Pope's particular declaration, sentence, and commandment to the contrary, as I have showed at large concerning our late Queen, in the first part, and of the King of France, the late troubles and civil wars in France, which are yet both fresh in most men's memories, and recorded also by Histories, are sufficient testimonies. 22 Thus thou seest, good Reader, that neither by this third example of Pope's dispensations in vows, whereon not only my third Instance, but also the two former were grounded, all which Mr. Fitzherbert hath fraudulently concealed, did I impugn the Decree of the Lateran Council, as the silly man to make some show of confuting them as absurd, improbable, impertinent, fond, and ridiculous, doth most untruly affirm; neither did I in any one of my examples, or Instances make any mention at all of the said Decree: seeing that I had before sufficiently answered to this Decree, not by impugning, but only by expounding it, and by clearly convincing, that according to the probable doctrine of very many learned Catholics, who are of opinion, that the Church cannot by her spiritual power inflict temporal punishments, it must, according to Mr. Fitzherbert's own principles, who acknowledgeth, that all laws, and decrees whatsoever are to be restrained and limited according to the power of the Lawmaker, etc. be understood of the deposing, not of temporal Princes, who are not subject to the authority of the Church, forasmuch as concerneth mere temporal matters, as is the inflicting of temporal punishments, for what cause, crime, or end whatsoever they be inflicted, but only of inferior Magistrates, Landlords, or Lords by the consent, and authority of absolute Princes; but that which I intended by my three examples, and instances was to show the weakness, and insufficiency of Fa. Lessius his three arguments, as I have sufficiently declared before. 23 But if I should press M. Fitzherbert a little further, and grant him for Disputation sake, which he is not able to prove, to wit, that the decree, or rather Act of the Lateran Council is to be understood of the deposition of temporal Princes, yet the silly man would have much ado to prove, as also I have signified before, that, according to the doctrine of Cardinal Bellarmine, and Canus, Cap. 13. nu. 7. & seq. which I have related above, it is such a Decree, that from thence it can be sufficiently gathered, that the doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes, is an undoubted point of faith: seeing that, according to their grounds, only those Decrees and precepts touching faith, or manners are infallible, and of faith, which are general, and universal, and belong to the whole Church, and all the faithful, and consequently as well clerk, as Laymen. For only in this case, saith Canus, the Counsels, Canus l. 5. de locis c. 5. q. 4. or Fathers are to be understood to pronounce of faith, when the sentence, or Decree belongeth to all Christians, when it bindeth all. Therefore the doctrine of Popes and councils, saith he, if it be propounded to the whole Church, if it be also propounded with an obligation to be believed, then doth their sentence, or Decree concern a point of faith. And concerning Decrees, and precepts of manners Canus teacheth the same. When the Church, saith he, in a matter of weight, and which is very profitable for the reforming of Christian manners, doth make laws to all the people, she cannot command any thing, which is contrary to the Gospel, or natural reason; but in manners not common to the whole Church, but which are referred to private men, or Churches, she may err through ignorance, not only in her judgement of things done, but also in her private precepts and laws. Bellar. l. 4. de Rom. Pont. cap. 3. & 5. And Cardinal Bellarmine also affirmeth, that those Decrees, or precepts concerning faith or manners, wherein the Pope, in whom he putteth all the infallibility of the Church, cannot err, must be general, and be propounded, and belong to all the faithful. 24 Now this Act of the Lateran Council, forasmuch as it concerneth the absolving of Vassals from their fealty, besides that it is not properly a Decree, according to my adversaries grounds, as I signified before, containing in it any precept or obligation, unless they will grant the Council to be above the Pope, nor also propounded as of faith, according to the rules of Cardinal Bellarmine and Canus before related, and therefore it cannot, according to their doctrine appertain to faith, it is not also a general Decree, and which appertaineth to the whole Church, and all the faithful; for it doth not concern Clergy men, who according to my adversaries false, scandalous, and seditious doctrine are not subject to temporal Princes, nor do owe to them any temporal allegiance, but only the temporal Vassals of temporal Lords, and those not all, but of such a Lord only, who for a year remaineth excommunicated for neglecting to purge his territories of heresy. For those words of the Council, ut ex tunc ipse, etc. that from that time the Pope may denounce his Vassals absolved from their fealty, can only bind, either the Pope to make that denunciation, or that temporal Lord, not to exact of his Vassals temporal fealty, or the Vassals not to give to that temporal Lord temporal fealty, and so it cannot bind Clergy men, who do not owe any temporal fidelity, or obedience to temporal Lords, according to my adversaries false doctrine, nor also all Vassals, but only those of that temporal Lord; whereupon the decree is not general, and belonging to all the faithful, which nevertheless is necessary, that any decree, or precept concerning faith or manners do appertain to faith. 25 And if perchance my Adversary will say, that it bindeth all Christians to believe, that such a temporal Lord is rightly deposed, and his temporal Vassals absolved from his obedience; Besides that, this cannot be gathered from the words of this Decree, it being not propounded as of faith, which condition nevertheless is necessary to make any Decree to appertain to faith, as I have showed before; the same may be said of all particular Decrees, precepts, sentences, depositions, dispensations, privileges and licences, which are made or granted by the Pope, or Council; and then all those three instances and examples, which I brought against Fa. Lessius his arguments are of force; for in like manner it may be said, that albeit those licences and dispensations do concern particular facts, and particular persons, yet they bind all Christians to believe, that such Priests, for example, do truly and really confer the Sacrament of Confirmation, and that such dispensations are valide and have effect, which how absurd this is it is manifest, and my Adversary here acknowledgeth as much. And this I hope may suffice to show the weakness, of Fa. Lessius his three arguments, and the sufficiency of my three Instances, which I opposed against them, and the fraud and ignorance of Mr. Fitzherbert in setting down, and confuting the same. CHAP. XVI. Wherein another argument, or rather answer of Widdrington is confirmed, and M. Fitzherbert in labouring to prove that Widdrington by his own grant is fallen into heresy or error, is convinced of palbable ignorance; and lastly, the Conclusion of all widdrington's discourse in his Preface, to his Apologetical Answer is confirmed, and what M. Fitzherhert excepteth against the same, and also his brief Recapitulation of all his Discourse in this his Treatise, are confuted. 1 AFter I had set down my three Instances, which I brought to confront with the three arguments brought by Fa. Lessius, desiring him to satisfy my Instances, and promising by his own answers, to satisfy his objections, I added another answer, or if you will call it, an argument, or instance in these words. Finally, are not the reasons by which councils are induced, or moved to define any thing, as it were some grounds, which are propounded, or supposed by them as foundations of their definitions and decrees? and nevertheless no Divine, as I suppose, will affirm, that those reasons are to be received by Catholics, with the same certainty as the definitions themselves. In councils, saith Cardinal Bellarmine, Bellar. l. 2. de Conc. cap. 12. the greatest part of the Acts do not appertain to faith. For neither the Disputations, which go before, nor the reasons, which are added, nor those things which are brought to explicate and illustrate, are of faith, See also Canus l. 6. de locis. c. 8. but only the bare Decrees, and those not all, but those only which are propounded as of faith. 2 These were my words in that Apologetical Preface, which albeit they are so clear, and manifest, that no man of any learning can take any just exception against them, especially seeing that I did not apply them in particular to any Decree, or Act of Pope or Council, yet Mr. Fitzherbert out of the profoundness, forsooth, of his Divinity will prove them to be absurd and impertinent, for so he is pleased to style the argument of this Chapter, widdrington's absurdity, saith he, by an other impertinent argument is further discovered. But let us see how well he discovereth this. There remaineth now, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, one argument only to be examined, which Widdrington addeth to his three Instances for the conclusion of the whole, reasoning thus in effect; that because the reasons, which move councils to define, and determine any thing, are, as it were, the foundations of their Decrees, and yet not so certain as the Decrees themselves (which he confirmeth by the opinion and doctrine of Cardinal Bellarmine, Vbi supra. and Canus) therefore the doctrine of the Pope's power to depose Princes (whereupon the Canon of the Lateran Council was grounded) is not so certain but that it may be erroneous, and impugned without offence. 3 But so shameful, and insupportable is the corrupt dealing of this unlearned and fraudulent man, that in very truth I am half ashamed to discover and lay open the same. For first it is too too manifest, that I made no such argument in this place, as this man feigneth, either concerning the Decree of the Lateran Council, or concerning the Pope's power to depose Princes, whereof here I made no mention at all. Neither also did I argue in this ridiculous manner, that because the reasons, which move councils to define or determine any thing, are not so certain as the decrees themselves, therefore they may be impugned without offence: As who should say, that because there is not promised to Popes such an infallibility, but that they may err in their private opinions, judgements, dispensations, licences, Censures, and Decrees, therefore they do err in the same, and such their opinions, dispensations etc. may be impugned, and denied without offence. If Mr. Fitzherbert had said without note of heresy, he had said something to the purpose, and spoken agreeably to the grounds, which I maintain, for what thing soever is not of faith, may be impugned, and denied without note of heresy, but to say, without offence, this is too too shameful and palpable a falsehood. 4 As for example, although Melchior Canus before related doth affirm, that it is not heretical to hold, that the Church may err in the canonisation of Saints, for the reason, which I there alleged out of him, and consequently, that he is not to be accounted an heretic, or an impugner of the Catholic faith, that should therefore say, that the Church hath or doth err in the canonisation of such a Saint, yet he affirmeth, that whosoever should say, that therefore the Church doth err in the canonisation of such a Saint, is a rash, and irreligious man, and deserveth therefore to be punished by the Church: So likewise although it be certain, that temporal Princes, and commonwealths may err in making temporal laws through ignorance, inconsideration, or some intemperate affection, and that therefore he is not to be reputed an heretic, who should rashly and without sufficient ground affirm that they have and do err in making such temporal laws, yet it is also certain, that what subject soever should rashly affirm, that his temporal Prince hath erred in making such, or such a law, and that such or such laws are unjust, is worthily accounted an impious, scandalous, and turbulent person, and deserveth therefore to be punished by the State. So as you see how many gross falsehoods this man hath imposed upon me in so few lines. 5 Wherefore all the argument I made here was, as you have seen, only this: The reasons, ends, and motives, for which councils are moved, or induced to make definitions and decrees, are not always so certain and infallible, as the definitions or Decrees themselves, but such reasons, ends, and motives are propounded by the Counsels as some grounds and foundations of their definitions, and decrees, therefore the grounds and foundations of Ecclesiastical definitions and decrees are not so certain, and infallible as the definitions & decrees themselves. Now what absurdity, or impertinency, trow you, can be found in this my argument? For I neither applied it to the Lateran Council, or to any other Decree of Pope, or Council, or to the doctrine of the Pope's power to depose Princes; neither did I say, that because the reasons of Ecclesiastical definitions, and decrees are sometimes uncertain and fallible, therefore they may be denied without offence: but all this is forged by my Adversary, that so he might have some colour to charge me with absurdity and impertinency: for so exorbitant is the bitterness of his zeal, not to use a more bitter word, that he will not have me to say scarce any one thing throughout all my writings, without some note either of heresy, error, temerity, fraud, malice, irreverence, ignorance, falsehood, impertinency, fondness, or ridiculous absurdity, from which imputations I have nevertheless cleared all my assertions, and evidently showed, that they are far more agreeable to his arguments, and answers. And if my Adversary had not been blinded with some intemperate passion, he might plainly have seen, that to no other end, & purpose I brought that argument, but to show, that the proposition, whereon Fa. Lessius grounded his two first arguments, whereof I did treat immediately before, to wit, that the grounds, and foundations of Ecclesiastical decrees and sentences must be certain, infallible, and of faith, is not so generally true, but that it is needful for Fa. Lessius to make a more clear explication thereof. 6 And albeit this be sufficient to justify this my argument, and to free it from all imputation of absurdity, and impertinency, yet for the better satisfaction of the Reader I will examine more particularly what he excepteth against the same. Wherefore after he had so falsely and fraudulently, as you have seen, set down the aforesaid argument, applying it to the Pope's power to depose Princes, and to the decree of the Lateran Council, and also affirming me to say, that because the reasons of Ecclesiastical Canons be sometimes uncertain, therefore they may be denied without offence, all which three things are forged by himself, and not spoken by me, and therefore to colour his fraud the better he thought it best, not to set down my argument verbatim, as there he found it, he writeth thus. a Pag. 200. nu. 2. Whereunto I answer, that by this argument Widdrington impugneth none so much as himself, granting that the Decrees of councils may be certain, though the reasons, whereupon they are grounded, be uncertain. 7 But as I do not grant, that all the reasons of Ecclesiastical Decrees are uncertain, and not of faith, for some, no doubt, are certain and of faith, so also I do not grant, that all Decrees of councils are certain and of faith, for some no doubt are not of faith, seeing that all Decrees of councils, Bell. lib. 2. de Conc. cap. 12. saith Cardinal Bellarmine, do not belong to faith, but those only which are propounded as of faith; but of this I have above treated more at large. So that if all decrees of councils are not certain, infallible, and of faith, no marvel that the reasons, grounds, and foundations of such Decrees, as they are reasons, grounds, and foundations thereof, may be uncertain, fallible, and not of faith. I said, as they are, reasons, grounds, and foundations thereof, for if otherwise they be decisions, definitions, or conclusions of some other general Council, in this respect they may be certain, infallible, and of faith. And this doth evidently impugn the two first arguments of Fa. Lessius, and the often named proposition, whereupon they are grounded, but how by this argument I impugn none so much as myself (as this man saith, but doth not prove) or any way impugn myself I cannot comprehend. 8 Whereupon it followeth, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, b Pag. 200. nu. 2. that the Decree of the Lateran Council, ordaining the deposition of Princes may be certain, and just, albeit the reasons, or doctrine which was the foundation of it were not certain; and so Princes may be lawfully deposed by the Pope, in such case, as the Lateran Council hath ordained, though the said Council might be moved thereto by an uncertain, or erroneous reason, so that albeit Widdrington should prove, that the ground of the Canon in question were uncertain, or erroneous, yet he should prove nothing against the Canon itself. 9 But fie Mr. Fitzherbert, that you should show yourself to be so grossly ignorant, and then especially when you tax your Adversary of absurdity, and impertinency, and to impugn him even by his own argument. Are not you ashamed to argue so childishly ex puris particularibus, from pure particular propositions against the known principles and rules of Logic? Some Decrees of councils may be certain, though the reasons & doctrine, whereupon they are grounded be uncertain, therefore the Decree of the Lateran Council ordaining the deposition of Princes may be certain, though the reasons, doctrine, and foundations thereof, be uncertain: As who should say; Some men may be very skilful in Divinity, although they never studied it, to wit, by supernatural infusion, and divine revelation, as Adam, Solomon, and our Saviour Christ according to his humanity; therefore M. Fitzherbert may be very skilful in Divinity, although he never studied the same. 10 But secondly, it is not true, that the Council of Lateran ordained the deposition of Princes, but only of inferior Magistrates, Landlords, or Lords by the consent and authority of temporal Princes: and therefore that Decree, or rather Act being not made by true Ecclesiastical authority doth not appertain to the present question concerning the certainty, & infallibility of Ecclesiastical Decrees, which are made by the spiritual Pastors of the Church, as they have spiritual and not temporal authority. Thirdly, my Adversary standing in his own principles will have much ado to prove, as I said before, that those words of the Council, ut extunc ipse etc. That then the Pope may denounce the vassals absolved from their fealty; do contain a proper decree, or precept concerning faith or manners, but the end, reason, and cause of the former decree, wherein it is ordained, that the Pope shall be certified, if the temporal landlord, or Lord, being excommunicated shall contemn to give satisfaction within a year, to the end that the Pope may denounce etc. unless he will have the Council to make laws, decrees, and Canons to bind the Pope: And that although it were a proper decree concerning manners, yet that is such a general decree, and belonging to all the faithful, as according to Cardinal Bellarmine, and Canus is required to make Ecclesiastical decrees to be infallible and of faith. So that the more my Adversary striveth to prove out of the aforesaid words of the Lateran Council, that the doctrine of the Pope's power to depose Princes is a point of faith, the more he bewrayeth his own ignorance, and the weakness of his cause, and the uncertainty of his new broached Catholic faith. 11 And truly it cannot be denied, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, c Pag. 200. nu. 3. but that great difference is to be made (as Widdrington saith well out of Cardinal Bellarmine) betwixt the certainty of the Decrees of councils, and of the reasons which are alleged therein; it being evident that all reasons are not of like weight, certainty, or probability; nevertheless, it were absurd to say, that the fundamental reason or doctrine, which is necessarily included, and supposed in any decree of an Ecumenical Council can be false; for so also the decree itself should be false, and the error of both justly ascribed to the holy Ghost, as Author thereof. 12 But here my Adversary shooteth his bolt far beyond the mark; for as not all Decrees of Ecumenical councils are certain, infallible, and of faith, but only those which are made by true Ecclesiastical authority, and are propounded as of faith, and which are general to the whole Church, and do bind all the faithful, so neither must the fundamental reason or doctrine, which is necessarily included in every decree of an Oecumenial Council be of necessity certain, infallible, and of faith, but it may be false, and exposed to error, as the decree itself, whereof it is a fundamental reason. 13 And this I say of decrees, saith Mr. Fitzherbert d Pag. 194. num. 4. 5. , that concern not only matters of belief, but also manners, or matters of fact, such as was the decree of the Apostles at Jerusalem, wherein they doubted not to say, Visum est Spiritui Sancto & nobis, Acts 15. It hath seemed good to the holy Ghost, and us, ascribing to the holy Ghosts assistance their determination, not only of the decree itself, but also of the foundation, whereupon it was grounded, I mean the equality, justice, and conveniency of it. For it cannot be denied, but that the holy Ghost assisted, and guided them first to determine what was lawful, and convenient to be decreed, and executed, and then after to ordain, and decree it, the one so depending on the other, that if they had failed in the former, they would not have justly decreed the latter; that is to say, if it had not been lawful and convenient for Christians at that time to abstain from strangled meats and blood, the Apostles could not have lawfully ordained, and decreed it; and therefore the Decree being just, and ascribed to the assistance of the holy Ghost, the foundation or ground, and all the necessary consequents thereof must needs be granted to be lawful and just, and to flow from one fountain, that is to say, from the holy Ghosts inspiration and assistance. 14 But first, as concerning matters of belief, I grant with Canus, that it is certain, and of faith, that the Church cannot err, when she propoundeth a doctrine of faith, with an obligation to bind all the faithful to believe the same: and likewise in Decrees concerning such manners and matters of fact, as are necessary to salvation, I grant also with the same Canus, that it is certain, that she cannot err in making such Decrees, for that consequently it would follow, as Canus well deduceth, that she may also err in doctrine of faith: and so the Church cannot command any thing to all the faithful, which is repugnant to the Gospel, or to the law of nature. But whether it be likewise certain and of faith, that the Church cannot err in Decrees concerning manners, and matters of fact, which are not necessary to salvation, I will not now dispute, for not giving occasion to my Adversaries to fly from the principal question touching the Decrees or Act of the Lateran Council, it being sufficient at this time, that the judicious Reader, by that which I have before related out of the doctrine of Canus, may have some light how to judge of this question. For he granteth that it is not heretical to affirm, that the Charch may err in the canonizing of Saints, for that her judgement herein dependeth upon an uncertain ground, to wit, upon the relation, information, and judgement of other men, which is uncertain and fallible, and consequently, according to his grounds, she may err in all such Decrees, which depend upon uncertain and fallible grounds, and foundations. And the leardnest Divines of his own Society, as Salmeron, Suarez, and Vasquez, who according to the Censure of this my rash and ignorant Adversary, are very absurd and impertinent therein, do constantly hold, that the fundamental reason of the Churches Decree concerning the celebration of the Feast of the B. Virgin's Conception, is not certain, and a point of faith, but controversed by learned Catholics without any offence, to wit, that she was sanctified in the first instant of her Conception, and that to honour this her pure, holy, and immaculate Conception the said Feast was instituted. 15 Secondly, it is not certain, that the Church now hath the same infallibility, in making Decrees concerning such manners, and matters of fact as are not necessary to salvation, which the Apostles had in making such Decrees, for that the judgement of the Apostles being extraordinarily illuminated, and assisted by the holy Ghost, did not only depend upon the relation, information, and judgement of men, but also upon the special, and extraordinary assistance of the holy Ghost, and therefore from that Decree of the Apostles concerning the not eating of blood and strangled meats, who were peculiarly and extraordinarily assisted, and replenished with the holy Ghost, and therefore might well say, Visum est spiritui & nobis, Acts 2. It hath seemed good to the holy Ghost, and us, no sufficient argument can be brought to prove, that therefore it is a point of faith, that the Church now cannot likewise err in making such Decrees. 16 Thirdly, Mr. Fitzherbert must also distinguish betwixt the lawfulness of an Ecclesiastical decree concerning manners and matters of fact, and the certainty, or infallibility thereof; for that many Decrees may be lawful, and consequently aught to be obeyed, until the unlawfulness, or injustice thereof be manifest, and yet not infallible, as it is evident in the civil laws of temporal Princes and Commonwealths, whose laws are lawful, and aught to be obeyed by their subjects, so long as the unlawfulness, or injustice of them is not apparent, and yet they are not therefore infallible. And so a Decree of the Church after due examination, approving the final sanctity of such, or such a man deceased, and upon that ground commanding all the faithful to celebrate his Feast, is lawful, and aught to be obeyed until it be manifest, that she was deceived, and misinformed by false relation, and yet it is not therefore infallible, and a point of faith that he is truly a Saint, and died in true sanctity, and holiness of life and soul. 17 Wherefore my Adversary for his better instruction may observe that, Caiet. tom. 1. opusc. tract. 15. de indulge. c. 8. which Cardinal Caietane, who nevertheless putteth all the infallibility of ihe Church in the Pope, writeth of Indulgences, and the canonisation of Saints: and he may if it please him learn from thence some special documents for his present purpose. It is always, saith he, presumed de iure by the law for the judge, unless there manifestly appear an error: and he that supposeth upon a lawful cause such an Indulgence to be given, doth affirm the truth, as he without falsity affirmeth such a one to be a Saint, supposing him to be rightly canonised. So that granting that such a man who is canonised should not be a Saint, but damned, the doctrine or preaching of the Church would not be lying or false; for here those things that do not appertain to faith are not understood to be affirmed but with a grain of salt, that is supposing those things which are commonly presumed. For the Church doth presume the canonisation to be rightly done, and likewise the Indulgence to be rightly given, but as human error may perchance happen in the canonisation of some Saint (as Saint Thomas affirmeth) so human error may happen in the giving of an Indulgence. But if any man think, that the Pope cannot err in these particular actions, as are dispensations as well of the temporal as of the spiritual goods of the Church, let him also think that he is not a man. 18 The like is also to be said, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, e P. 201. nu. 6. of the Decree of the Lateran Council concerning the deposition of Princes, to wit, that the holy Ghost assisted, and guided them, first to resolve what was lawful, and convenient to be decreed (that is to say, that Princes should be deposed by the Pope, if they would not purge their Countries of heresy) and afterwards to ordain and decree it; for if it had not been lawful and convenient, that the Pope should depose Princes in that case, the Council could never have lawfully decreed it, neither could the Decree possibly be lawful if the Pope had not that power; so as it is evident that the Decree being just (as proceeding from the assistance of the holy Ghost) the determination not only of the justice and conveniency of it, but also of the Pope's power to perform it, must needs be granted to proceed in like manner from the holy Ghost, inspiring as well the ground, and foundation of the Decree, as the Decree itself. 19 But that the like cannot be said of the Decree or rather Act of the Lateran Council I have sufficiently showed before, both for that there is no mention made in that Council of the deposition of Princes, but only of inferior Magistrates, Landlords, or Lords, and also because that Act was not made by Ecclesiastical power, but by the consent, and authority of absolute Princes, and moreover for that it is not properly a Decree containing any precept of faith, or manners, but rather the end, reason, and cause of the former Decree. 20 And therefore howsoever Widdrington may cavil, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, f Pag. 202. nu. 7. about the certainty of some reasons that have been, or may be alleged in some Decrees of councils, he cannot with any show of reason, or probability deny, or call in question those foundations, and necessary grounds of this Canon, or say, that they are less certain than the Canon itself, as he seemeth most absurdly to affirm in this argument; wherein I wish also to be noted, how ignorantly he confoundeth the foundation of a Decree with the reasons, which move the Council to make it, or are added thereto, as though all the reasons, which are brought and alleged by a Council, or move them to determine any thing, were the foundations of their Decrees, whereas many reasons, yea texts of Scriptures are probably alleged in councils for the explicotion only, or some confirmation of their Decrees, and not as the foundations of them. 21 But how grossly this man seeketh to delude his Reader in this whole Discourse of his I have already made most manifest, and therefore the aspersions of absurdity, ignorance, and impertinency, wherewith he chargeth me, do agree to none so much as to himself. For neither did I make in the aforesaid argument any such inference concerning either the Decree, or the reason of the Decree of the Lateran Council, as he very shamefully would persuade his Reader, neither did I confound the foundation of a Decree with every reason which moveth the Pope or Council to make it, or are added thereunto, but only with fundamental reasons, and whereon that Decree doth wholly depend, in so much that the Pope or Council would not have made that Decree, but upon supposal that such a reason or doctrine is true: as is the reason, which moveth Popes to canonize any Saint, or to celebrate his Feast, for that they suppose him to have died in final sanctity, which reason is the foundation of their Decree, and yet is not infallible and of faith according to the doctrine of many learned Divines, as I showed before: And the like is also of the reason, which moved Pope Sixtus the fourth according to the doctrine of the learned jesuits to celebrate the Feast of the Blessed Virgins Conception, for that he supposed her Conception to be pure, holy, and immaculate, which reason, and ground, is nevertheless uncertain, although it was the foundation of Pope Sixtus his Decree, which according to Suarez, was also confirmed in the Council of Trent. 22 Whereby it appeareth also, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, g p. 202. nu. 8. how absurdly Widdrington comprehendeth the doctrine of the Pope's power to depose Princes under the title of reasons, moving the Council of Lateran to decree the deposition of them, seeing that the reasons of Decrees are so extrinsical thereto, that they may fail, and yet the Decree stand good, and be of force, whereas the foresaid doctrine of the Pope's power is so intrinsical, and as I may say, essential to the Decree of the Lateran Council, that it is necessarily included, and supposed in it, in so much that the said Decree cannot possibly stand, or be good if that doctrine be not true, as I have signified before, h nu. 6. and therefore he argueth as impertinently in this, as in the rest. 23 But first it is very untrue, that I comprehended the doctrine of the Pope's power to depose Princes under the title of reasons moving the Council of Lateran to decree the deposition of them, as this man, not to use his own absurd, and impertinent words, very shamefully affirmeth: Seeing that I never granted, that either the Decree of the Lateran Council, or the reason thereof doth concern the deposition of Princes, but only of inferior Lords, and Magistrates by the consent, & authority of Sovereign Princes, neither did I in any of my three Instances, or in this Argument, whereof now we treat, make any mention at all of the Lateran Council, although indeed I have now by the way, and without any necessity urging me thereunto signified, as you have seen above, that those words of the Lateran Council, ut extuncipse, etc. that then the Pope may denounce his Vassals absolved from their fealty, which my Adversaries affirm to be the Decree of the Lateran Council ordaining the practice of the Pope's power to depose Princes, cannot, according to their own grounds, be a true, proper, and formal Decree, containing any precept or obligation, but rather the reason, cause, and end for which the former Decree was made, as I have more amply declared before. 24 Secondly, neither are all the reasons of Decrees so extrinsical thereto, that they may fail, and yet the Decree stand good; for some are so intrinsical, and as I may say so essential to the Decree, that the Decree cannot possibly stand good, if the doctrine be not true, or at leastwise presumed to be true, as I showed before in the reason of the canonizing of Saints, and of celebrating their Feast in honour of their Sanctity, and also of celebrating the Feast of the B. Virgin's Conception in honour of the unspotted purity thereof: and of these and such like reasons I chief meant, when in the aforesaid argument I demanded, whether the reasons that move Popes and councils to define, or decree something, are not as it were certain grounds and foundations of their definitions and decrees. So that I may truly conclude with my Adversaries own words, that he argueth as ignorantly, impertinently, and absurdly in impugning this argument, as in the former, and in the same manner also he still goeth on. 25 But now will you hear, saith he, i p. 203. nu. 9 how well Widdrington concludeth this his last argument, and condemneth himself of error, or heresy? Thus than he saith, Quapropter, etc. Wherefore no man can doubt, but that great difference is to be made betwixt the voice, Vbi supra nu. 63 doctrine, and consent of the Church firmly believing, or defining any thing as a matter of faith, and the voice, doctrine and consent of the Church only probably thinking. For no Catholic man doth deny that he who contemneth to hear the voice of the Church firmly believing doth fall into error, or heresy, whereas Catholic Doctors (whose authority the learnedst of my Adversaries will easily admit) do plainly affirm, that he who being moved with sufficient reason doth not embrace the doctrine of the Church only probably thinking doth not expose himself to the danger of heresy, error, or temerity. For Alphonsus Salmeron, and Francis Suarez, men truly very learned, do bring the practice, and consent of the whole Church, to confirm the immaculate Conception of the B. Virgin, and yet that the contrary opinion may be defended without any danger of deadly sin they both plainly acknowledge and cannot also deny without great offence, we, saith Salmeron, do oppose the consent of almost the universal Church, & the uniform doctrine of all universities. Salmer. tom. 13. ad Rom. 5. disp. 51. §. deinde. Suarez tom. 2. disp. 3. sec. 2. And the second ground, saith Suarez, is to be taken from the authority of the Church. And first the universal consent almost of the whole Church; and especially for these two hundred years almost all Ecclesiastical writers, Bishops, almost all Religions, and Universities have subscribed. Thus Widdrington. 26 But first Mr. Fitzherbert is foully deceived in saying, or conceiving, that this is a conclusion of this my last argument. For it is a conclusion, and as it were a brief collection, and explication of all the answers I made in that Apologetical Preface to all the arguments, by which my Adversaries laboured to convince me, and my doctrine touching the Pope's power to depose Princes of temerity, error, and heresy. For seeing that all the arguments which they brought to prove my doctrine to be temerarious, erroneous, yea and heretical, were grounded chief upon the general voice, doctrine, and consent of the Church, as they pretend, I thought good for a conclusion of all my answers to these their false imputations, to admonish the Reader of the aforesaid difference betwixt the voice of the Church firmly believing, and only probably thinking, whereby he might plainly perceive, that, considering all my former discourse, and answers, I had clearly freed myself from all just imputation of heresy, error, and temerity. 27 But secondly, let us now see what exception Mr. Fitzherbert taketh against this my so manifest, and certain conclusion. Wherein I wish, saith he i Pag. 203. num. 10. , to be noted two things, the one, how confident Widdrington, is, that he hath proved by his three instances, or examples, and this his last argument, that the Church ordaining, and decreeing in the Lateran Council, that Princes shall in some cases be deposed by the Pope, did not firmly believe, but only probably think, that the Pope hath lawful power, and authority to do it, whereas you have seen his instances and arguments to be so weak, frivolous, and impertinent, that they have served to no other purpose, but to discover his folly, and the weakness of his cause. 28 But truly I cannot but greatly pity this poor man's case, albeit, I am much ashamed to see and discover his palpable fraud and ignorance. For neither did I in those three instances, or examples, or in this last argument make any mention at all of the decree of the Lateran Council; neither did I intend to make any inference from them concerning that decree, neither did I ever grant that the Church in the Council of Lateran did ordain, or decree, that Princes might in some cases be deposed by the Pope, but I always affirmed, that the aforesaid decree, or rather Act did only concern the deposition of inferior Magistrates or Lords, by the consent and authority of absolute Princes, & that therefore that Act, or decree, was not made by mere Ecclesiastical authority, and consequently could not be a matter of faith, but of fact only, as are all the decrees of temporal Princes concerning mere matters of fact. For although it be a matter of faith, that temporal Princes have authority to make temporal Laws, yet it is not a matter of faith, that in making such laws they cannot err, and therefore their laws are not matters of faith, but of fact only; but the Church in making laws to all the faithful concerning such matters of fact, or manners, which are necessary to salvation cannot err by commanding anything which is contrary to the Gospel, or the law of Nature, and therefore such laws are not only matters of fact, but also of faith. 29. That wherein I was confident is this, that seeing my Adversaries have not hitherto brought, nor will ever in my judgement be able to bring any one sufficient argument to prove that the doctrine of the Pope's power to depose Princes, was ever firmly believed by the Church as an undoubted point of faith, but at the most as a probable opinion, no Catholic man can be justly impeached of heresy, error, or temerity, as the aforesaid Conclusion of mine doth plainly convince, for maintaining the contrary doctrine. And whether the instances, arguments, and answers, which I have brought, be weak, frivolous, or impertinent, or Mr. Fitzh. replies altogether vain, and fraudulent, whereby he clearly discovereth both the weakness of his cause, and also his manifest fraud and ignorance, I remit to the judgement of any indifferent Reader. And thus much concerning his first observation. 30 The other thing which I wish, saith Mr. Fitzherbert l Pag. 204. nu. 11. 12. , to be noted is, how Widdrington giveth sentence against himself, as having incurred the note of error, or heresy, in contemning to hear the voice of the Church firmly believing; for if the Church had not firmly believed, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, she neither would nor could have decreed in the Lateran Council, that Princes should be deposed by the Pope; for albeit she doth, and may in particular cases practise some things upon a probable opinion (when there is no Definition, or Decree to the contrary) yet it were most absurd, and temerarious, if not heretical, to say, that she ever made a general Decree in a Council, touching either faith, or manners; but upon a most certain, and assured ground: and the reason is, for that otherwise the Decrees of general councils should sometimes be uncertain, as being grounded only upon a probable opinion; yea all their Decrees might always with some show of reason be impugned, and rejected by any contentious heretic, who might and would call the Decree in question, and say, that the same were only probable, as Widdrington doth in this case. 31 Therefore seeing it is most certain, and uniformly believed by all Catholic Doctors, See Bellar. de Concil. l. 2. c. 2. 3. 4. Item Can. l. 5. de locis c. 5. Bannes' 2ae. 2ae. q. 1. ar. 10. dub. 6. concl. 2. that no Decree of general councils made for the whole Church, touching either faith, or manners, can be repugnant to the verity of the holy Scriptures, or may be impugned, or called in question by any Christian man, it followeth evidently, that all such Decrees are founded upon assured grounds, and none upon probable opinions; for if the grounds thereof were or might be only probable, they might be repugnant to the Scriptures, and lawfully impugned or denied by any man. Whereupon it followeth, that seeing the Lateran Council hath for the special good of the Church decreed that Princes shall be deposed by the Pope in some cases, the said Council, and consequently the Church, doth firmly, and assuredly believe (and not think only probably) that the Pope hath power to depose Princes; and therefore I conclude, that Widdrington contemning and rejecting this belief of the Church, is by his own confession fallen into error, Luc. 19 or heresy; so as I may well say to him, with our Saviour in the Gospel, Ex ore tuo te judicio serve nequam. 32 But this observation of Mr. Fitzherbert is so childish, not to say ridiculous, that no Schoolboy would argue in such a childish manner: For what man that hath his wits about him, would make this conclusion, that his Adversary by his own sentence, grant, & confession, is fallen into error or heresy, and to prove the same bringeth two propositions, whereof the one his Adversary doth indeed very willingly grant, but the other which is the main difficulty between them he utterly denieth. By the same manner of arguing I might also prove, that Mr. Fitzherbert is by his own sentence, grant, and confession fallen into error, or heresy. For he granteth that the Pope hath no other authority to depose Princes, then that which was granted to S. Peter, and his Successors by those words, I will give thee the keys, etc. Whatsoever thou shalt lose, etc. Feed my sheep, or such like, and that whosoever impugneth that which is decreed in the holy Scriptures is fallen into error or heresy, but in those and such like words of the holy Scriptures, was only granted to Saint Peter, and his Successors authority, to expel men from the Church of Christ, not from temporal kingdoms, to bind and lose with spiritual, not with temporal bindings or loosings, to absolve from the bond of sins, not of debts, to inflict spiritual, not temporal punishments, therefore Mr. Fitzherbert contemning and rejecting the holy Scriptures is, by his own confession, fallen into error, or heresy; so as I may well say unto him with our Saviour in the Gospel, ex te ore tuo judico serve nequam: Now if I should have argued in this manner against him, he would quickly have answered, that albeit he grant the Mayor proposition, yet he denieth the Minor, and therefore cannot be said to grant the conclusion, which must be inferred from the granting of both the premises; and for my goodly argument he both would, and might deservedly have given me his usual, absurd, impertinent, fond, foolish, and ridiculous nicknames. 33. In this very like manner he argueth against me, to prove that by my own sentence, grant, and confession, I am fallen into error or heresy, for contemning and rejecting the voice of the Church, in a general Council firmly believing. For although I grant the Mayor proposition, to wit, that whosoever contemneth to hear the voice of the Church, or of a General Council firmly believing, or decreeing any doctrine, as certain and of faith, is fallen into error or heresy, yet I ever denied the other proposition, to wit, that the Church, in the Council of Lateran did either Decree the deposition of Princes, or firmly believe the doctrine thereof, as certain and of faith, and therefore it cannot be rightly inferred, that I grant the conclusion, which must be inferred from both the premises; for as the conclusion doth follow from both the premises, and not from one only, so he cannot be said to grant the conclusion, who granteth not both the premises or propositions, but one only. And therefore those words of our Saviour, Exore tuo te judico serve nequam, may fitly be applied to himself, who by his own arguing showeth himself to be a very ignorant, fraudulent, and slanderous man, in charging me to be fallen into error or heresy, by my own grant and confession, which every Schoolboy seethe to be most false. 34 And as concerning that general reason, which here he bringeth, why the Council of Lateran must firmly, and assuredly believe as certain and of faith, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, to wit, because it is most certain, and uniformly believed and taught by all Catholic Doctors, that no Decree of general councils made for the whole Church, touching either faith or manners, can be repugnant to the verity of the holy Scriptures, or called in question by any Christian man, and that therefore all such Decrees are founded upon assured grounds, and none upon probable opinions, etc. Besides that, this reason supposeth, which I ever denied, that in the Lateran Council was decreed the deposition of temporal Princes, which is the main question betwixt us; it needeth also some further explication. For if Mr. Fitzherbert mean, that no Decree of a general Council, made for the whole Church touching manners, or things commanded, or forbidden to be done (whether it be made by mere Ecclesiastical power, or by that temporal authority, which spiritual Pastors have received from the express and formal grant and privileges, or the virtual and consent, or connivence of temporal Princes) may be impugned, or called in question by any Christian man, without some note or aspersion of temerity, and impiety, of this I will not contend with him, for this also may be said of mere temporal laws, which are made by the Princes, Peers, and Commons of temporal kingdoms, for the temporal good thereof, which cannot be impugned, or called in question by any private man, without some note of temerity, and impiety. 35 But if his meaning be, that all Catholic Doctors do uniformly believe, and teach, that no Decree of a general Council made for the whole Church touching manners, which are not otherwise necessary to salvation, may not be impugned or called in question, without note of heresy, this is very untrue, and therein he showeth either to be little conversant in the reading of Catholic Doctors, or not to have well observed what they teach. For as I showed above, learned Canus dare not resolve whether it be heretical to affirm, that some custom, or law of the Church is evil or unjust, and he plainly affirmeth; that it is not heretical to hold that the Church may err in the canonizing of Saints, and the grounds of such Decrees may be uncertain, S. Tho. quod. 9 ar. vlt. S. Antonin 3. part tit. 12. c. 8. Caiet. tom. 1. Opusc trac 15. de indulge. c. 8. and fallible. Whereupon Saint Thomas, Saint Antoninus, and Cardinal Caietane do only say, that it is piously to be believed, that the Church cannot err in the canonizing of them. And besides that Salmeron, Suarez, and Vasquez, as I showed above, do constantly hold, that the ground, and foundation of Pope Sixtus his Decree touching the celebration of the Feast of the B. Virgin's Conception, Chap. 15. nu. 8 9 & seq. Suarez. disp. 21 sec. 2. was not certain, but only probable; Suarez also affirmeth, that it is not a point of faith, that the B. Virgin is corporally assumpted into heaven, although the Church doth celebrate the Feast of her Assumption, and the reason hereof he giveth, for that it is not as yet defined by the Church, neither is there any testimony of Scripture, or sufficient tradition which may make the belief thereof infallible. See. S. August. tom. 10. ser. 34. & 35. de Sanctis 36 Whereupon S. Augustine, in the book of the B. Virgin's Assumption, and serm. 35. de Sanctis, if he be the Author of them, doth seem to leave it as doubtful, although he doth not deny, but that it may piously be believed: Caiet. in opusc. de Concept ton. 2. opusc. trac. 1. c. 1 Sotus in 4. d. 43. q. 2. ar. 1. Abul. in c. 22. Matth. q. 230. And Cardinal Caietane, and Sotus say only, that it is a very pious opinion: and Abulensis saith, that it is only the more probable opinion. And as concerning the Resurrection of the Virgin, saith he, It is not necessary to hold the same, because it is not among the articles of our faith, neither is there any thing defined by the Church, that it ought to be held, therefore it is lawful for every one to think as he will. And the reasons which are brought to prove her Resurrection, are certain persuasions, and do not convince, and yet because it is commonly held, that she is risen, it is more reasonable to hold the same; but if any man do affirm the contrary, we do not repugn. Thus Abulensis. And hereof I thought good to admonish the judicious Reader, that hereby he may most clearly perceive both the ignorance of Mr. Fitzherbert, who so boldly affirmeth, that all Ecclesiastical Decrees which are made for the whole Church touching manners, are founded upon assured grounds, and none upon probable opinions, and also that we ought not to condemn so easily any doctrine of heresy or error, unless we see the contrary, by some clear definition of the Church, or some evident, and undoubted consequence deduced from thence, to be determined as a point of faith; neither is it sufficient in this case to bring only probable arguments, or which in our own judgement seem to demonstrate out of the holy Scriptures, ancient Fathers, Decrees of Counsels, or Theological reasons, which in the opinion of other learned Catholics do not convince it to be a point of faith. 37 Now you shall see what Mr. Fitzherbert concludeth, touching his Reply to all the answers I gave, especially to the Decree of the Lateran Council. And now having confuted, saith he, l Pag. 205. nu. 13. & seq. all that which I find in the Preface of his Apologetical answer, concerning the Council of Lateran, I will return to examine the rest of his text in his Admonition, from the which I have been a while diverted, by his remission of his Reader to the said Preface. Thus thou Widdrington concludeth in his Admonition concerning as well the Council of Lateran, as my whole Discourse. Priusquam igitur aliquis clare demonstrauerit, etc. Therefore before some one shall clearly demonstrate (I do not say, shall only show probably) that the answers, which I have given to the Council of Lateran, are altogether improbable, no effectual argument can be deduced from that Council, whereby it may certainly, and evidently be proved, that it is so certain, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, that the contrary may not be defended by Catholics without the note of heresy, error, or temerity. And this for the present may suffice to confute this Authors more prolix, then discourse; for I will perhaps in another place more exactly examine, of what small force or moment are every one of his arguments. Thus saith Widdrington for the upshot of his answers to me, wherein we may observe these points following. 38 First, whereas he exacteth, as you see, some clear demonstrations, that his answers to the Council of Lateran are altogether improbable, I hope, he, or at least the indifferent Reader may rest satisfied therein, seeing that I have made it clear that his answers to the said Council, are not only improbable, but also frivolous, and sometimes ridiculous, as being wholly impertinent to the matter, or else prejudicial to himself. Secondly, whereas he saith, that no effectual argument can be deduced from that Council against him, until it be demonstrated, that his answers thereto are improbable, I may now conclude, that seeing I have performed as much as he requireth in that behalf (having evidently showed the impobability of his answers) he cannot deny, but that our arguments deduced from that Council, are effectual to prove our intent, and that to show that neither, he, nor any Catholic can avoid the aspersion and note of heresy, if he perscuere obstinately to impugn, or deny the Pope's power to depose Princes, seeing that the practice of that power is most clearly decreed, and the verity of the doctrine necessarily included and supposed in the Decree. 39 Thirdly, whereas that which he hath said to so little purpose, as you have seen, seemeth to him sufficient to overthrow my whole discourse (which he termeth more prolix than solid) I remit the solidity, as well of my Discourse, as of his answers, to the judgement of the indifferent Reader, who may easily judge of both by that which hath been here debated betwixt us, seeing that of all his answers, arguments, and objections, no one hath appeared to be of any weight, worth, or probability. And truly I do not marvel, that my Discourse seemed prolix, yea very tedious to him, considering the little pleasure or gift that he could take therein; for a short way seemeth long, to such as pass it with difficulty, and disgust, finding where to stumble, or fall at every step. Finally, whereas he promiseth (though with a perhaps) to examine elsewhere every particular argument in my Supplement, he may do well for his Reputation, first, to make good that which he hath said already, lest such as shall have read this my Reply, and seen therein how he hath trifled hitherto, may care little to read what he shall write hereafter; but if he list to take the pains to perform his promise, I hope he shall reap as little credit and contentment thereby, as he is like to do by these his former labours; for how weak soever and insufficient I may be to encounter such a Hercules, or Goliath (who dare alone oppose himself to the whole army of Israel) yet I doubt not, but he shall find, that magna est veritas, & praevalet, and that the further he wadeth in this matter, the more he shall engulf himself in a sea of absurdities; In the mean time I hope thou hast noted, good Reader, that he hath not been able to disp●ooue any one thing in these two Chapters of my Supplement, which he impugneth, and that in examining his answers thereto, I have sufficiently overthrown the grounds of his Doctrine, and showed his vanity, and folly divers ways. For first I have etc. 40 But to Mr. Fitzherbert's three first observations, there needeth no other answer, then to deny them with the same facility, wherewith he affirmeth them: for neither he, nor I must herein be each others judge, but the indifferent and judicious Reader, who having duly examined both our writings, may easily discern, whether my answers be of no worth, weight, or probability, and his arguments and Replies effectual, convincing and demonstrative or no: and to whose arguments and answers, those fowl aspersions of improbable, absurd, malicious, fond, foolish, impertinent, and ridiculous, which are so frequent in this man's mouth, do more properly agree. And for his fourth, and last observation, he may see now that I have performed my promise, and that without a perhaps, I have confuted every particular argument, which he hath brought against my doctrine, either in the two first Chapters of his Supplement, or in this his Reply against the answer I made to his arguments in that brief Admonition; so that he, or at least the Reader may plainly perceive, that the reason, why I did not then answer every particular point of his Discourse, was not for that I found therein any great difficulty, seeing that what there I said it was more prolix, then solid, I have now convinced to be true, but because the brevity of that short Admonition or Preface, would not conveniently permit me to answer more particularly so prolix and verbal Discourse. 41 Wherefore I shall now expect what a learned Reply this unlearned man will make to save his credit, and to clear himself of those imputations of palpable fraud and ignorance, wherewith in this Treatise I do often charge him, & also of great want of charity, as in the next Chapter you shall more clearly see. But perhaps the best course and less prejudicial to his reputation that he can take will be, as D. Schulcknius, or rather Cardinal Bellarmine hath done before him, not to answer at all to the crimes whereof he is accused, but to procure from the Cardinals of the Inquisition that my book be forbidden without telling why or wherefore, for what cause or crime, or what bad doctrine either against faith or manners is contained therein, and by this means many men at least will be hindered from seeing his shameful fraud and ignorance. Foyes seeing that I have clearly showed, that all his vaunts and brags of having convinced my arguments, and answers to be improbable, absurd, impertinent, fond, foolish and ridiculous etc. are very vain and idle, notwithstanding that for the patching up of his Reply he hath had the helps of Cardinal Bellarmine, D. Schulckenius, Suarez, and Lessius, if now being left to himself alone, and destitute of their helps, and of their arguments and answers, which I have here confuted, he should wade any further in these deep Theological questions, wherein he hath already been so often over head, and ears, it is evident that he will cast himself headlong into the deep gulf of perpetual infamy. And therefore he may perchance think it his best way to get my book forbidden, without declaring why, or wherefore, which course although it may seem to him to be the wisest according to the wisdom of the world, yet, (to omit what it is to his soul and conscience, and before the sight of Almighty God) how prejudicial this course is both to his cause, and credit, how scandalous it is to Protestants, and what little satisfaction it giveth to Catholics, who are desirous, and are also bound to search out the truth in this dangerous and difficult point touching their obedience due to God and Caesar, and by such exorbitant prohibitions are hindered from the fully examining thereof, there is no indifferent man of any judgement but may most clearly perceive. 52 All the rest which Mr. Fitzherbert addeth in this Chapter, it being only a Recapitulaton, of that he saith he hath proved against me in this his whole Reply, needeth no other answer, then to affirm the quite contrary, and for confirmation thereof for avoiding of an over tedious repetition of what I have proved against him in this whole Treatise, and how I have cleared myself and my doctrine from all note of heresy, error, and temerity, and proved it to be truly probable, and himself to be a very ignorant, corrupt, and very vainglorious and unconscionable man, to remit the Reader to all the places which are here cited by him, and have been clearly confuted by me, and more particularly to the Contents, Abridgement, or as it were Index of all the things which are handled by me in this Treatise, which he may see partly in the very beginning of the first part before the Preface to the Reader, and partly of this third. 43 To conclude therefore this Chaper, seeing that I have made it manifest in his Treatise, that no one effectual argument grounded either upon the holy Scriptures, the law of Nature or Nations, the Canonical or Civil law, or any other Theological reason hath hitherto been brought by my Adversaries, which is sufficient to persuade any judicious man, that the doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes, to dispose of temporals or to inflict temporal punishments, is certain, and of faith, and the contrary heretical, erroneous, or improbable, it is evident, that the new Oath of Allegiance, which is chief grounded upon the denying and impugning of this doctrine, and the practice thereof, may with a safe, and probable conscience, and without any note of dangerous temerity, or mortal sin be taken by any Catholic man, notwithstanding that the Pope by several Breves hath judged, and commanded, or supposed the contrary, for that there is no danger of temerity, or disobedience not to follow the judgement and opinion of the supreme Pastor, when it is contrary to the doctrine of other learned Catholics, or not to obey his declarative precept, when it is not grounded upon any certain, and infallible doctrine, but either upon the false information, and understanding of other learned men, or upon the private and probable opinion, at the most, of his Holiness, as I have amply proved in my Theological Disputation, Disput. Theol. cap. 10. s●c 2. all which Mr. Fitzherbert in this Reply of his doth fraudulently conceal, who urgeth with might, and main, to terrify thereby the consciences of unlearned and scrupulous Catholics the Pope's declarative commandment, who by his Breves forbiddeth the Oath to be taken, for that it containeth in it many things, which are clearly repugnant to the faith and salvation, and craftily dissembleth the answers, which I have made thereunto and which are sufficient to quiet the conscience of any judicious Catholic man, and to take away all just fear and terror of conscience out of his mind. 44. And especially seeing that his Holiness, (which is very considerable, and worthy to be observed) hath been divers times with great instance, and importunity most humbly requested, and in some sort conjured by his Pastoral office and duty, to make manifest to distressed English Catholics one only thing among so many, which he saith in his Breves are in the Oath manifestly repugnant to faith and salvation, which his Holiness, without all doubt, in regard of his fatherly care, and Pastoral office both would and ought to have made manifest ere this, being urged thereto by so many and earnest Supplications, if he had not clearly seen (when he had more diligently examined the whole matter being so greatly urged, and importuned to name but one only thing among so many, which he said were in the Oath plainly repugnant to faith and salvation) both that his power to excommunicate, and to inflict Censures was not denied in the Oath, as Cardinal Bellarmine, and other Roman Divines by all probable conjectures, as you shall see in the next Chapter, had informed him, and also that the doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes, which is expressly denied in the Oath, and whereon his prohibition to take the Oath, according to the opinion of all my Adversaries, was partly grounded, was not a point of faith but only a controversy among learned Catholics, and as yet not decided by the judge, and m Trithemius in ●ronico. Monast. Hirsaugiensis ad annum 1106. consequently that it might be denied, and impugned by any Catholic man without any note of heresy, error, temerity, or any other deadly sin, so long as the question remaineth so undecided, and in controversy among learned Catholics. CHAP. XVII. Wherein M. Fitzherbert's uncharitable Admonition to the Catholic Reader, that Widdrington is no other than an heretic disguised and masked under the vizard of a Catholic, and that his submission to the Catholic Roman Church proceedeth from no other ground, but from a deep dissimulation, or rather an artificial and execrable hypocrisy to delude and deceive Catholics, is clearly confuted, and proved to be void of charity, learning, and sincerity. Also widdrington's answer to the Pope's Breves is confirmed, and he freed from all disobedience for not admitting them; and lastly the Decree of the Cardinals, forbidding widdrington's books, and commanding him to purge himself forthwith, is fully answered by his Purgation, and humble Supplication which he made forthwith to his Holiness. 1 MY unlearned Adversary T.F. having not been able in the former Chapters, as you have seen, to prove any one answer or position of mine to be improbable or to deserve the least note of temerity, although he often vaunteth, that he hath convinced, every one of them to be either fraudulent, malicious, impertinent, absurd foolish, fond, ridiculous, erroneous, or heretical, and then especially his custom is thus to brag, when he himself most of all discovereth his intolerable fraud, or palpable ignorance, now this ignorant and uncharitable man doth in this last Chapter turn the sharpness of his pen also against my person, showing himself therein to have as great want of charity, as of learning and sincerity, and laboureth to persuade his Reader, that albeit I pretend to be a Roman Catholic, and do submit myself, and all my writings to the Censure of the Catholic Roman Church, yet it is evident, that this is only of purpose to deceive the Reader, Sec nu. 1. & 19 and that no zealous Catholic can take me for any other than an heretic disguised, and masked under the vizard of a Catholic. So abundant is forsooth the charity and zeal of this Religious Father, that he feareth not to miscontrue most plain and manifest words, and deep and solemn Oaths and protestations in the quite contrary sense, to the great discredit of his neighbour, whereas by the rules of charity and justice he is commanded to interpret even doubtful speeches in the better and more favourable sense. * S. Thomas secunda secunda q. 60. ar. 4. But let us hear what he saith. 2. Having now answered, saith he, a Pag. 211. num. 1. my Adversary Widdrington, touching that which any way concerneth me, either in his Admonition before his Theological Disputation, or else in those other works of his, whereto he remitteth his Readers for their further satisfaction, I have taught it convenient (good Catholic Reader) to address this last Chapter only to thee, to admonish thee to take heed that thou be not seduced with his pretence to be a Catholic, or with the dedication of his book to his Holiness, and his submission thereof to the judgement of the Catholic Roman Church, whereby he professeth, that if by ignorance he have failed in any thing, which the Roman Church doth not approve, he doth also reprove it, condemn it, and wisheth it to be held as not written, let not this I say seduce thee, or move thee to think that he teacheth Catholic doctrine concerning the matter now in question, seeing that it is evident, that all this is but a false lustre and gloss cast upon his counterfeit ware, of purpose to deceive thee. 3 It is true all the books I have written hitherto, either in Latin, or English I did submit to the Censure of the Catholic Roman Church, and in the first book of all which I published in defence of the temporal right of Princes against Card. Bellarmine's reasons, (whereby he pretended to demonstrate that it is not so much an opinion, as an heresy to hold, that the Pope hath no authority by the institution of Christ to depose temporal Princes, and to dispose of temporals) besides the submission thereof, to the said Censure of the Catholic Roman Church, I did also solemnly protest, and call God to witness, that neither through the spirit of flattery, nor of contradiction, but sincerely moved with a vehement desire to find out the truth in this difficult controversy, which so nearly concerneth our obedience due to God, and Caesar, I did take upon me the writing of that Apology. 4 And my third book, which is the Disputation of the Oath, against which this man so greatly inveigheth, I did not only submit to the Censure of the said Catholic Roman Church, protesting also, that if either in that Disputation, or elsewhere I had through ignorance written any thing which she did not approve, I also did disprove it, condemn it, and would have it for not written, but also I did of set purpose dedicate it to his Holiness, most humbly and earnestly requesting him, that considering we had diligently examined all the parts and parcels of the oath, and yet could not find any one thing among so many, contrary to faith or salvation, his Holiness would be pleased in regard of his Fatherly care, and Pastoral office, after he had duly considered all those objections, which we did propound unto him, for, and against the Oath, to make known unto us his poor and afflicted Catholics, one only thing among so many, which are so manifestly repugnant to faith and salvation, as he had declared by his Breves, protesting, that if we could be assured of one only thing contained in the Oath, which is any way repugnant to faith, or salvation, we would forthwith obey his declarative commandment, and would hazard our lives, and all our fortunes in defence of the undoubted Catholic faith. 5 Now this uncharitable man, notwithstanding all these my protestations, and submissions, will contrary to the commandment of Christ our Saviour, & the known rules of charity, and justice, judge & censure my inward thoughts, which none but God, and my own conscience can know, and boldly affirmeth, that it is evident, b Nu. 1. that all this is but a false lustre, and gloss cast upon my counterfeit ware of purpose to deceive the Reader, and that I am an heretic disguised, c Nu. 19 and masked under the vizard of a Catholic, and that all my pretences to be a Catholic, d Nu. 26. and my submission to the Catholic Roman Church, proceeds from no other ground, but from a deep dissimulation, or rather an artificial, and execrable hypocrisy to delude and deceive Catholics. But God knoweth how wrongfully he belieth me, to whose justice, for the infinite wrong he hath done me, I do appeal, and I make no doubt, but that he will find him a most just judge, and severe revenger either in this life, or in the next, or both, unless he repent, and satisfy me in time, for the great wrong he hath done me. 6 But let us hear the reasons which this unconscionable man bringeth to colour this rash judgement of his. For if Widdrington, saith he e Pa. 212. nu. 2 so much respect and reverence his Holiness, and the Roman Church, as he pretendeth, how chanceth it, that utterly rejecteth three Apostolical Breves of his Holiness, upon no better ground and reason, but because his Holiness hath been ill informed of the matter, and consequently deceived and absurd? 7 But albeit with all my heart and soul I do greatly respect, and reverence the Pope's Holiness, the Sea Apostolic, the Roman Church, and the Catholic Roman Church, each of them in their due place and degree, but not all of them with equal respect and reverence, for that no learned Catholic can deny, but that betwixt all these a great difference is to be made, neither are the errors, misdemeanours, or imperfections of Popes, who being men and subject to human infirmities as others are, to be attributed to the Sea Apostolic, or to the Roman Church, although my ignorant Adversary seemeth not only to make no distinction betwixt the Pope, and the Sea Apostolic (whereas if he will but read S. Robert of Lincoln his life in Matthew Paris, he may see what difference he maketh betwixt Pope Innocent the fourth, whom he calleth Antichrist, Mat. Paris in Henrico 3 o. pag. 843. and whose Breves as containing in them something, which is hateful to Christ our Saviour, detestable, abominable, and very pernicious to mankind he refused to obey, and betwixt the most holy Sea Apostolic, which he saith can command no such detestable thing) but also he would make his Reader believe, that I take the Roman Church, and the Catholic Roman Church for all one, whereas it is manifest, that there is betwixt them, almost as great difference, as is betwixt the Kingdom of England, and the Christian world, or rather betwixt Rome, and Christendom, and also very many virtuous and learned Roman Catholics do not grant that infallible authority to the Pope's Holiness, or to the Roman Church, which they grant to the Catholic Roman Church, according to that saying of S. Hierome, si autho●i●as quaeritur, Hier. epist. 85. ad Euangrium. orbis maior est urbe, if authority be demanded, or sought for the world is greater than a City, which sentence the Gloss upon the Canon Legimus dist. 93. citing and expounding saith, Hear is an argument, that the Decrees of a Council do prejudicate, or go before the Pope's Decree, if they contradict it. 8 Nevertheless I do also willingly acknowledge, that I do not so much respect, and reverence his Holiness, as to believe that all the commandments of Popes are just, and all their Breves and Decrees are grounded upon infallible truth, or that any Catholic is bound to obey his Holiness declarative commandment, when it is only grounded upon a probable opinion, which no man is bound to follow, it being most evident, that where there is no authority to command, it is no irreverence or undutiful respect not to obey; As likewise although all Subjects are bound to respect and reverence their temporal Prince, and to obey him in temporals, as with all my heart and soul I do greatly respect and reverence my Sovereign Lord King JAMES acknowledging him to be my only Sovereign Lord in temporals, to whom I own all temporal allegiance, as I acknowledge his Holiness to be my supreme spiritual Pastor, to whom I own spiritual obedience, yet if the temporal Prince should command any thing which to his Subjects' consciences is manifestly unjust, they may without any irreverence or undutiful respect to their Prince not obey that unjust commandment, knowing in that case they are bound rather to obey God then men, especially if they be ready to suffer without resistance the penalty imposed by the law. 9 Secondly, that any Catholic might lawfully, and without any irreverence or undutiful respect to his Holiness not obey or admit his Breves forbidding Catholics to take the Oath, for that it containeth in it many things flat contrary to faith and salvation, I yielded in my Theological Disputation, f Cap. 10 sec. 2 nu. 50. & seq. two sufficient reasons, whereof the first and principal Mr. Fitzherbert here fraudulently concealeth, and both unlearnedly, and guilefully, as you shall forthwith see, he cavilleth only against the second and less principal reason. For I did not affirm, that no Catholic is bound to admit his Holiness Breves only for that he was ill informed of the matter, and consequently deceived and abused by Cardinal Bellarmine and his other Divines, albeit this alone had been a very sufficient reason, but chief and principally for that his Breves were grounded upon probable opinion at the most, that the Pope by the institution of Christ hath authority to dispose of all temporals, and to depose temporal Princes, which doctrine being not certain, but in controversy among learned Catholics, and as yet not decided by the judge, no Catholic is bound to follow, and consequently, according to the doctrine of Fa. Suarez, neither bound to obey his declarative commandment which is grounded thereon; for that a declarative precept, as is this of his Holiness forbidding Catholics to take the Oath hath no greater force, than the reason, whereon is grounded: but this first reason, which I brought for the chief and principal, Mr. Fitzherbert cunnigly dissembleth. 10. For seeing that his Holiness did only in general word forbidden English Catholics to take the Oath for that therein are contained many things which are manifestly repugnant to faith and salvation, without specifying in particular any one of those many things, I by probable conjectures, or rather by moral certainties, all circumstances considered, did gather, that his Holiness by those many things manifestly repugnant to faith and salvation, did either understand, as by all likelihood he did, his power to inflict Censures, to excommunicate his Majesty, to bind and lose in general, etc. and consequently his spiritual Supremacy, which he conceived were denied in the Oath, for that Cardinal Bellarmine did publicly in his book against his majesties Apology for the Oath of Allegiance also in this sense understand the same, and then it is apparent, that his Holiness was misinformed of the matter, and consequently deceived, and abused, for that it is too too manifest, as his Majesty himself hath against Cardinal Bellarmine convinced, that the Pope's power to inflict spiritual Censures, and to excommunicate his Majesty was not treated of at all in the Oath, but purposely declined; and Mr. Fitzherbert also seemeth covertly to confess as much, for that albeit in his Supplement he affirmed, See above chap. ● that the Oath is unlawful for that therein is denied the Pope's powers to excommunicate, for which in my Admonition I taxed him of falsity, yet now in his Reply he altogether flieth from that point, acknowledging in effect by his silence, that he dare not now maintain his former assertion. 11 But because I could not certainly know and affirm, although it be very probable, that his Holiness understood, those many things manifestly repugnant to faith and salvation, of his power to excommunicate, and to inflict Censures, etc. as Cardinal Bellarmine, Gretzer, Lessius, and Suarez, did understand them, I added the second part of the disjunction, to wit, that his Holiness understood those many things, etc. in the former sense, or else by those many things manifestly repugnant to faith and salvation he understood his power to depose Princes, to dispose of all temporals, and to inflict temporal punishments, for that his Holiness was of opinion, that the doctrine for his power to depose Princes, etc. which is expressly denied in the Oath, is certain and of faith; And if this be the meaning of his Holiness, then if he did adhere to this opinion by his own reading, study, and learning (whereof I have no certainty for that I know not whether his Holiness being accounted only a Lawyer and not to make profession of Schoole-divinitie, had before the publishing of his Breves exactly studied this question, and thoroughly examined all that could be objected on either side) then, I say that his Holiness was greatly mistaken, for that it is evident, that this doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes, etc. is not certain and of faith, but in controversy among learned Catholics and as yet not decided by the judge. 12 But if his Holiness did adhere to this opinion, and conceive that this doctrine for his power to depose Princes is certain and of faith, as it is very pobable he did, by the information of Cardinal Bellarmine, and other Divines of Rome, who consulted of the Oath, as Fa. Parsons relateth in his letter, than I say, that his Holiness hath also been ill informed of the matter, and consequently deceived and abused by them, for that it is a controversy among the Schoolmen, saith Trithemius, Trithem. in Chron. Monast. Hirsang. ad an. 1106. Almain. de dominat. civil. & Eccles conclus. 2. in probat. and as yet not decided by the judge whether the Pope hath power to depose the Emperor or no: And Almain a very famous school-divine and Doctor of Sorbon, with very many, or most Doctors, as he saith, doth resolutely affirm, that the Ecclesiastical power by the institution of Christ doth not extend to the inflicting of temporal punishments, as death, exile, imprisonment, privation of goods, much less of Kingdoms, but only of spiritual Censures, neither was he ever taxed by any man of heresy, error, or temerity for holding this opinion. 13 These were the reasons, which I propounded to his Holiness, why English, Catholics thought themselves not bound to obey his declarative precept contained in his Breves. For these are my express words in my Epistle Dedicatory to his Holiness. g Cap. 10. sec. 2 nu. 8. & seq. And this is the reason (most holy Father) why very few Lay Catholics of any name or worth with us do refuse to take the Oath being tendered them by the Magistrate. For while they advisedly call to remembrance, that this Oath, before it was by your Holiness declared to be manifestly repugnant to faith, and salvation, might with a probable, and consequently with a safe conscience be taken by any Catholic by reason of the authority of so many learned and virtuous Priests; and withal they do now not only consider, that your Holiness prohibition, being a mere declarative precept, can have no greater force to bind, than the reason whereon it is grounded and wholly dependeth, as beneath h C. 10. sec. 41. & seq. out of the doctrine of Fr. Suarez shall be made manifest, but also they are probably persuaded, that your Holiness was by Cardinal Bellarmine, and Fa. Parson's wrongfully informed of the reason, for which you forbade Catholics to take the Oath, to wit, for that it containeth many things which are plainly repugnant to faith, and salvation; seeing that neither your authority to chastise Princes, to excommunicate them, to inflict Censures, or any spiritual authority, which is certainly known to be granted by Christ to Saint Peter and his Successors is in this Oath denied as Cardinal Bellarmine, (whom Fa. Parsons, and divers other Divines of his Society do follow) by fallacious inferences laboureth to deduce, they cannot as yet sufficiently perceive, by what forcible argument they are bound with the perpetual temporal overthrow of themselves, and their whole posterity to obey your Holiness declarative commandment, which at the most is grounded upon a probable reason. Neither do they conceive, that they ought therefore to be accounted rebellious to the Sea Apostolic, for that they, reserving otherwise all dutiful reverence to your Holiness, do not in a matter, which is so prejudicial unto them, obey your Holiness Apostolical letters, which either are written upon false information, or grounded only upon a probable opinion. 14 And in the tenth Chapter of my Theological Disputation, h Sec. 2. nu. 50. 51. I brought to the objection taken from his Holiness Breves two answers, which are grounded upon these two reasons. To make therefore said I, now at the last a compendious answer to all the three Breves, and so also to the whole objection; To the first Breve, whereon the other two do depend, it is answered first, that although his Holiness thinking, and in his opinion supposing the Oath to be of itself unlawful, and to contain many things, which are contrary to faith, and salvation, doth therefore by his letters or Breves forbidden English Catholics to take it, yet seeing that this his prohibition is only a declarative precept, and founded in the private judgement, and opinion of his Holiness, as before i Num. 44. & sequen. we have showed, as we are not bound to follow the Pope's opinion against the probable opinion of other Catholic Divines, (than especially when by following it, very great prejudice is like to come to ourselves, and many others; and when the reasons and grounds for his opinion, are for the most part by all men accounted to be very unsound, as are almost all those arguments, which our learned Adversaries have objected against the oath) so also we are not bound to obey the Pope's declarative precept, which is founded in his opinion, and in the reason which he allegeth, which precept, according to the aforesaid doctrine of Franciscus Suarez, hath no greater force to bind, then hath his reason and opinion, whereon his declarative precept doth wholly depend. 15 Secondly, it is answered, that there is no English Catholic, who if he be well instructed, will take the Oath, or approve it to be lawful in that sense, wherein his Holiness by all probable conjectures hath condemned it. For it is probable, and in my judgement morally certain; that his Holiness did understand the words of the Oath in that sense, wherein the Divines of Rome did conceive them, and especially Cardinal Bellarmine, whose advise and opinion in this so weighty a Theological controversy, which must needs bring great good or harm to this kingdom, his Holiness, as it is very probable, both demanded, and followed, who therefore according to his Holiness mind, and by his permission wrote in defence of his Breves against his majesties Apology for the oath. But Cardinal Bellarmine understood the Oath in this sense, as though it denied the Pope's Primacy in spirituals, his power to excommunicate, to bind and lose, and also to dispense in Oaths in which sense doubtless it cannot be denied, but that it contains many things, which are flat contrary to faith and salvation, but no Catholic doth in this sense either take the Oath, or defend it to be lawful.; Neither are the arguments which Cardinal Bellarmine hath brought to prove the same, any way sound and sufficient, but very fallacious, as I have showed at large in the said Disputation. 16 All this which is only a part of the answer I brought from the objection taken from his Holiness Breves, I thought fit to repeat here again only for satisfaction of some scrupulous Catholics, who perchance fearing now to read my Disputation, it being forbidden by the Cardinals of the Inquisition, without declaring any cause either in particular, or in general, why it it is forbidden, of wnich their prohibition I will say more beneath, may here most clearley see, how sound, and without any irreverence, or undutiful respect to his Holiness, I propound to him the reasons for which English Catholics thought themselves not bound to obey his declarative precept contained in his Breves, humbly requesting him, that in regard of his Fatherly care, and Pastoral duty he would vouchsafe to instruct us in the Catholic faith, and to make known unto us but one of those many things, which he saith are in the Oath so manifestly repugnant to faith and salvation. 17 Whereby the Reader may easily perceive the egregious fraud of this my unlearned Adversary, in urging so vehemently to my disgrace, the objection drawn from the authority of his Holiness Breves, & concealing the principal answer, which I brought thereunto, & whereby I cleared myself from all just imputation of irreverence, or undutiful respect to his Holiness. For what irreverence or undutiful respect to his Holiness can be justly imagined in propounding to him, being the supreme Pastor of our souls, with all reverent and respective words, the reasons which do move us to think that he hath been misinformed of the true sense of the Oath, and the difficulties which do perplex our consciences concerning his Breves, and humbly requesting him in regard of his Fatherly love, and Pastoral office that he would vouchsafe to teach us, & instruct us in the Catholic faith, & in those things, which he saith are in the oath contrary to faith and salvation? No Catholic subject is bound so to respect and reverence his superior, albeit he be the Pope, as to obey his commandments, with blind obedience, when his conscience doth dictate unto him, that they are unjust, but he may with all dutiful respect propound to his Superior, although he be the Pope, the doubts and difficulties which his commandment hath brought to his perplexed conscience, & desire him, yea, and charge him, in regard of his Fatherly care, and Pastoral office, that he will vouchsafe to teach him, and instruct him, in what manner he may quiet his mind, and take away those difficulties which his commandment hath brought to his troubled conscience. 18 Whereupon it is a common doctrine among Divines, that when a Superior or Prelate commandeth any thing, whereof the subject hath a probable doubt, whether it be lawful or no, he is not bound forthwith to obey: And this is also conform to the rule and instruction, which Pope Alexander the third giveth to the Archbishop of Ravenna, and it is recorded in the Canon law, among the Pope's Decretals, Si quando aliqua tuae fraternitati, etc. If at any time, Cap. si quando, de Rescriptis. saith the Pope, we direct any thing to thy brotherhood, which doth seem to exasperate thy mind, thou oughtest not to be troubled, etc. Considering diligently the quality of the matter, for which we writ unto thee, either reverently fulfil our commandment, or by thy letters show a reasonable cause wherefore thou mayest not fulfil it; for we will suffer patiently, if thou do not that which was suggested unto us by bad insinuation, or information. And among others Dominicus Sotus writeth thus, Sot. de detegen. secret. memb. 3. q. 2. in Resp. ad primum. Prelates and judges are not in possession in respect of their subjects, unless for as much as they command lawful things, and therefore when it is doubtfully, whether they command a lawful thing, then if it be in prejudice of a third person, because that third person is also in possession of his fame & goods, the subject must incline to that part where there is the less danger. Neither are Prelates, who command nothing, whereby is feared any danger, to Religion, or the Commonwealth, or to a third person bound to render a reason; but simply they must be obeyed also in doubts, as it hath been said before, because then there is no danger, if it be presumed that the judge commandeth justly: But when such a danger to Relegion, or to the Commonwealth, or to a third person, is at hand, then if the Subject doubt, he doth not against obedience, if he require of his Prelate a reason of his commandment, propounding humbly the reason of his doubt. 19 And that this is our very case in refusing to obey his Holiness Breves, forbidding Catholics to take the new Oath of allegiance, by which prohibition such great prejudice to Religion, to the Commonwealth, to his Majesty, and to all his Catholic Subjects, is like to arise, and in humbly propounding to his Holiness the reasons of our doubts, any man of judgement may plainly perceive. And if his Holiness having taken upon him the charge and office of the Supreme spiritual Pastor, and thereby is bound by the express commandment of Christ, to feed without exception all the sheep of Christ his flock, that is, not only to punish, correct, and threaten them, but also to teach, and instruct them in the Catholic faith, and in all things necessary to salvation, especially when upon urgent cause they require it at his hands, if he will not vouchsafe to instruct the souls of us poor English Catholics, who by his Breves have been so greatly troubled and perplexed, and declare unto us some one of those many things, which he saith are in the Oath manifestly repugnant to faith and salvation, we having by private and public letters and petitions so often, so instantly, and so reverently demanded it at his hands, but instead of instruction to send threatenings, Censures, and prohibitions of our humble Supplications to be instructed by him, whereby our credit and good name is taken away by the uncharitable courses of some violent men, what great an account both his Holiness and his Counsellors herein have to render at the day of judgement, to Christ our Saviour the supreme Pastor, and judge of all, I tremble to consider, and I pray Almighty God with all my heart, that both his Holiness, and they of his Counsel; may more duly consider thereof, before it be to late. 20 Thus thou hast seen the two reasons and answers, which I brought why any Catholic man may lawfully, and without any irreverence, or undutiful respect to his Holiness, not obey his declarative precept contained in his Breves, now you shall see with what fraud, and ignorance my unlearned Adversary, having fraudulently concealed the first reason and answer, whereon I did chief rely, cavilleth against the second and less principal reason or answer, and taxeth me of irreverence, and want of respect to his Holiness, for saying, that his Holiness was by all likelihood misinformed of the true sense of the Oath, by Cardinal Bellarmine, and other Divines of Rome, and consequently deceived, and abused by them. 21 For can any man, saith M. Fitzherbert, k Pa. 212. nu. 2. with reason persuade himself, that in such an important matter, as is this of the Oath, so famous (or rather to say truly, so infamous) throughout Christendom, so prejudicial to the Roman Sea, so dangerous and burdensome to the consciences of English Catholics, and so pernicious to their temporal states (as the world knoweth it to be) can any man, I say, with reason imagine, that his Holiness did not at the very first, (before he published his first Breve) see the Oath itself, maturely weigh and ponder it, yea and sufficiently inform himself, of all circumstances necessary to the publication of his Apostolical and judicial sentence? this truly cannot be imagined of his Holiness, by any charitable Catholic. 22 But first to retort this frivolous argument of my unlearned Adversary upon Cardinal Bellarmine, and his book published against the Oath, can any man with reason persuade himself, that in such an important matter, as is this of the Oath, so famous throughout Christendom, and which so much concernech the Roman Sea, the Sovereignty of temporal Princes, the consciences and temporal states of English Catholics, and their obedience due to God and Caesar (as the world knoweth that it doth) can any man, I say, with reason imagine, that Cardinal Bellarmine, so learned, worthy, and reverent a man, did not at the very first (before he published his book against his majesties Apology for the Oath) see the Oath itself, maturely weigh and ponder it, yea and sufficiently inform himself of all circumstances necessary to the publication of his book? and yet it is evident, as his Majesty also hath convinced, that Cardinal Bellarmine did not rightly inform himself of the whole matter, and of the true sense of some clauses of the Oath, and was deceived, and abused English Catholics in affirming so boldly, that the Pope's power to inflict Censures, and to excommunicate his Majesty, is denied by those words of the Oath, notwithstanding any sentence of Excommunication, etc. which any Catholic may, without any breach of charity, or undutiful respect not only imagine, but plainly see, and say to be evidently untrue, and my Adversary himself, as I signified before, l Nu. 10. by his silence in this point, doth in effect acknowledge as much. 23 Besides, can any man with reason persuade himself, or imagine, but that in such an important matter, as is this of the Oath, so famous throughout Christendom, etc. his Holiness did at the very first, (before he published his first Breve) not only see the Oath itself, maturely weigh, and ponder it, yea and sufficiently inform himself of all circumstances necessary to the publication of his Apostolical and judicial sentence, but also that he demanded, yea and followed the advice and judgement of his learned Counsel (especially of Cardinal Bellarmine, whose opinion in Theological matters, is accounted at Rome, as it were an Oracle) concerning the true sense and meaning of the Oath, and of all the parts, and parcels thereof? this truly cannot be imagined of his Holiness, by any charitable Catholic. Which being so, as any charitable Catholic may not only imagine, but also evidently see, that Cardinal Bellarmine affirming so resolutely, that the Pope's power to excommunicate, to bind and lose in general, to absolve from Oaths in general, and consequently the Pope's Primacy in spirituals, is manifestly denied in the Oath, did misinform himself of the true sense and meaning of the Oath, and was deceived, so likewise any charitable Catholic may not only imagine, but also with moral certainty persuade himself (all circumstances considered) that his Holiness also was ill informed, and consequently deceived and abused by Cardinal Bellarmine of the true sense and meaning of the Oath. 24 Wherefore I never imagined, or conceived, as this man seemeth to impose upon me, and therefore chargeth me with irreverence, undutiful respect, and temerity, that his Holiness did not, before he published his first Breve, see the Oath itself, maturely weigh, and ponder it, & sufficiently, as he thought, inform himself, both by his own knowledge and learning, and also by the advice of his learned Divines, and especially of Cardinal Bellarmine, of the true sense and meaning of the Oath, and of all parts and parcels thereof; As likewise I never imagined, or conceived that Cardinal Bellarmine did not, before he published his first book against the Oath, see the Oath itself, maturely weigh, and ponder it, and sufficiently, as he thought inform himself, both by his own learning, and by the advice also of other Divines of Rome, of the true sense and meaning of the Oath, and of all the parts, and parcels thereof: yet as it is evident, that Cardinal Bellarmine, notwithstanding all his seeing, weighing, pondering, and informing himself of the true sense, and meaning of the Oath, was foully mistaken, deceived, & misinformed of the true sense, and meaning of those words, [notwithstanding any sententence of Excommunication, etc.] and some other clauses of the Oath, so also it is probable, that his Holiness was in the like manner mistaken and deceived, by the evil information of Cardinal Bellarmine, of the true sense and meaning of the aforesaid clauses. 25 And by this that also, which Mr. Fitzherbert immediately addeth, to tax me of temerity and malice, and of accusing his Holiness of lack of wisdom, of impiety, and manifest lying, is both answered, and his fraud and falsehood plainly discovered. And howsoever, saith he, m Pa. 212. n. 3 my Adversary Widdrington, or any other, might be so temerarious, to have that conceit at the first, yet he could not without great malice persist in that opinion, after the publication of the second Breve, wherein his Holiness acknowledgeth, and avoweth, that the former was not false, or surreptitious, but written upon his own certain knowledge, motion, and will, and after long and grave deliberation had, concerning all things contained therein, and that therefore the Catholics were bound to observe it wholly, rejecting all interpretations to the contrary. This being so, (according to my Adversaries own relation) it is most evident, that his Holiness had taken sufficient information of the whole matter, Disp. Theol. c. 10. sec. 2. nu. 59 and all the circumstances thereof, even before he published his first Breve, and therefore Widdrington affirming the contrary cannot have that opinion, which a charitable and pious Catholic aught to have, either of the wisdom, and piety of his Supreme Pastor, or of the authority and verity of his Apostolical Breves, and Decrees; but doth in effect charge him to have lied manifestly in his second Breve, when he testified that he made the first, with such mature deliberation, and certain knowledge, as you have heard. 26 To this second Breve, which his Holiness purposely sent hither, as he himself in the beginning thereof affirmeth, for that it was reported unto him that some here did say, that his letters or Breve dated the 22. of October 1606. concerning the forbidding of the Oath were not written according to his own mind, and his own proper will, but rather for the respect, and at the instigation of others, for which cause they went about to persuade others, that his commandments in the said letters were not to be regarded, I gave this answer, n Dis. Theol. c. 10 sec. 2. nu. 59 which my fraudulent Adversary altogether concealeth. In the second Breve which was dated the first of September 1607. it is only declared, that the former letters of his Holiness, (wherein he strictly commanded English Catholics that they should in no wise take the said Oath) were not false and surreptitious, but written, not only upon his certain knowledge, and by his own proper motion and will (by which words nevertheless he doth not intend to deny that he in writing them, used the advise, and opinion of others) but also after long and grave deliberation had concerning all the things which are contained in them, and that therefore they were bound to observe them exactly, setting aside all interpretation, which may persuade to the contrary. Which last words are so to be understood, that there must be made no frivolous interpretation of those letters, or no such interpretation, which should make any man to think, or make any doubt, that they were not written with his Holiness knowledge and privity, and by his own proper will. Salas disp. 21. de Leg. sec. 2. Sa in Aphoris. verbo Interpretatio nu. 5. For as joannes Salas, and Emanuel Sa, both of them Divines of the Society of jesus, do well observe, It is lawful for Doctors to interpret all laws, not indeed by a necessary public, or juridical, but a private and not binding interpretation, although the Prince should say, that it should be lawful for no man to interpret otherwise this our writing, for than he only forbiddeth frivolous interpretations, and which are expressly contrary to his mind. Which their doctrine is with far greater reason to be understood of the Pope's declarative precept, which is only grounded upon presumption, and upon his own opinion, and private judgement, whereby he persuadeth himself, that the thing which he forbiddeth is otherwise unlawful, as being forbidden by some former law, whose opinion and also declarative commandment grounded only upon his opinion, when it is against the probable doctrine of other Catholic Divines, may not only be interpreted, but also contradicted, as I showed before out of the doctrine of Suarez. Seeing therefore that this second Breve is only an approving and confirming of the former, it can have no more force to bind then the former hath, for confirming whereof it was written by his Holiness. 27 By this you may see, that I did not say, as Mr. Fitzherbert untruly affirmeth me to say, that his Holiness before he published his first Breve did not see, maturely weigh and ponder the Oath, and sufficiently as he thought inform himself of all the clauses contained therein; or that his first Breve was false or surreptitious, and not written upon his own certain knowledge, motion and will, and after long and grave deliberation concerning all things contained therein: But that which I said is, that notwithstanding all his long and grave deliberation, first either his first Breve was grounded not upon any certain doctrine and of faith, but only upon his own opinion and of the rest of his Divines, that the doctrine for his power to depose Princes is certain and of faith, which, for that the contrary is truly probable, and hath ever been maintained by learned Catholics, no Catholic is bound to follow, and consequently neither to obey his declarative precept, which was grounded thereon, as from the doctrine of Fa. Suarez I clearly deduced, and this was my first and principal answer to the first Breve, whereon the two other Breves did wholly depend: or else secondly that if his Holiness was persuaded by the information of Cardinal Bellarmine, and his other Divines, as by all likelihood he was, that in the Oath were contained many things flat contrary to faith and salvation, for that he thought his power to inflict Censures, to excommunicate, to bind and lose in general, and consequently his spiritual Supremacy, were denied in the Oath, that then he was ill informed, deceived, and abused by the advise of Cardinal Bellarmine, and of his other Divines, for that it is evident, as I convinced in my Theological Disputation, that no such thing is denied in the Oath, and this was my second, and less principal answer. 28 Besides that, Mr. Fitzherbert may in those last words of his, to wit, [that the Pope testified that he made the first Breve with mature deliberation and certain knowledge] use some cunning fraud: For his meaning may be, that his Holiness testified, that he made the first Breve not only with mature deliberation had concerning all things contained therein, but also with certain knowledge of the truth and verity of all that he affirmed therein, as though his Holiness should have said, that he knew certainly, that many things were contained in the Oath flat contrary to faith and salvation, as he affirmed in his first Breve, whereas it is evident that his Holiness said no such thing, but those words [certain knowledge] which in his second Breve were placed before, and not after those words [long and grave deliberation etc.] as this fraudulent man placeth them, (as though his certain knowledge did proceed from his long and grave deliberation) do only signify, that his Breve was not surreptitious, false, feigned, forged, or written without his privity and knowledge, but that it was his true, and undoubted letter or Breve, and that he certainly knew, that all therein contained was written by his own power will and motion, which I never denied, or meant to call in question. 29 And therefore very falsely and dishonestly doth Mr. Fitzherbert say, that I in effect charge his Holiness to have lied manifestly in his second Breve, when he testified that he made the first with such mature deliberation and certain knowledge, as you have heard. For I ever acknowledged, as his Holiness in his second Breve doth testify, that his former Breve was not false or surreptitious, but written as you have heard, upon his certain knowledge, motion, and will, and after long and grave deliberation had, concerning all things contained therein: yet from this long and grave deliberation it doth not follow, that therefore his Holiness, and his Divines found out the truth in all points, and were not in very deed mistaken, and deceived in the true understanding of some clauses of the Oath, and that they certainly knew, that the Pope's power to depose Princes, which is denied in the Oath, is a point of faith, or that his power to excommunicate, to bind and lose etc. which is a point of faith, is denied in the Oath. As also I do willingly grant, that Cardinal Bellarmine's book against his majesties Apology was his own true book, although masked under his Chaplains name, and not false or surreptitious, but written upon his certain knowledge, motion, and will, and after long and grave deliberation had concerning all things contained therein, and notwithstanding all this I dare boldly affirm, that he knew not certainly, that all the things which he said therein were true, and that in many things concerning the Oath, whereof some I have named before, he was foully mistaken, and deceived, as I have convinced in my Theological Disputation. 30 Now with the like fraud and falsity doth Mr. Fitzherbert run from the second Breve to the third, as he did before from the first to the second. And if the second Breve, saith he, o Pag. 213. nu. 4. did not suffice to clear his Holiness of this imputation, yet his third Breve must be abundantly sufficient to do it in the opinion of any reasonable man, seeing that he confirmed thereby his former judgement, giving express order, and faculty to Master George Birket, the late Archpriest (as Widdrington himself also signifieth) p Ibid. nu. 60. to punish by the deprivation of faculties all such English Priests of the Seminaries, as being subject to his jurisdiction had already taken the Oath, or had taught, or did still teach it to be lawful, and not abstain from the same, and resorme their error upon due admonition given them, and within a certain time to be prescribed unto them; whereby, I say any reasonable man must needs be induced to think, that his Holiness neither was nor could be all this time (which was more than two years) ignorant of the true nature, and quality of the Oath, and of the state of the question betwixt the Catholics and their Adversaries, especially seeing that now he began to draw his Apostolical sword, proceeding to the punishment of such as did take, or defend the Oath, which he could not lawfully do without due consideration, and diligent discussion of the whole controversy, and sufficient information of all the circumstances thereof, 31 Thus you see how Mr. Fitzherbert turneth, and windeth in such a running and fraudulent manner, that his Reader cannot well perceive of what imputation he means, when he saith, that if the second Breve be not sufficient to clear his Holiness of this imputation, yet his third Breve must needs be abundantly sufficient to do it. For that which I said only is, that his Holiness by all likelihood was not truly informed by Cardinal Bellarmine and his other Divines of the true sense, and meaning of some clauses of the Oath, against which you have seen with what fraud and falsity my ignorant Adversary hath wrangled and jangled, as though I had taxed his Holiness for publishing his first Breve, before he had seen, or maturely weighed and pondered the Oath itself, and all the clauses thereof, and without grave and long deliberation had concerning all things contained in his Breve, which how untrue this imputation is wherewith he chargeth me, I have already showed. Now this silly man laboureth to prove, as also he insinuated before, that because his Holiness did maturely weigh and ponder the Oath and every clause thereof before he sent hither his first Breve, and did sufficiently inform himself of all circumstances necessary to the publication of his Apostolical and judicial sentence, as well concerning the forbidding of the Oath by his first Breve, as also concerning the punishing of such Priests that should take, or defend the Oath to be lawful, by his third Breve, sent hither two years after, which he could not, saith my Adversary, lawfully do without due consideration, and diligent discussion of the whole controversy, and sufficient information of all the circumstances thereof, therefore his Holiness neither was, nor could all this time (which was more than two years) be ignorant of the nature and quality of the Oath, and that therefore he could not be ignorant, but certainly knew, that there are many things in the Oath flat contrary to faith, and salvation, as he had declared by his first Breve. 32 But to omit now those words [sufficient information etc. and that his Holiness did sufficiently inform himself etc.] which my Adversary here divers times repeateth, which because they are equivocal, and may have a double sense I will declare beneath, it is very untrue, and contrary to the doctrine of Cardinal Bellarmine, and of all other learned Divines to say, that certain and infallible knowledge of truth is in the Pope necessarily annexed to his long, grave, mature, and diligent consideration and discussion of any doctrine or matter, unless the doctrine and matter be of such a nature, and the discussion thereof be done with such circumstances, and in such a manner, as Christ hath promised him his infallible assistance, which even according to the doctrine of Cardinal Bellarmine, and Canus, Christ hath not promised him in such decrees or definitions, which are not directed, and do not appertain to the whole Church, as are these his Breves forbidding the Oath, whereof the two first are only directed to English Catholics, and the third only to Mr. Birket, than Archpriest. For in customs, laws, or decrees, which are not common to the whole Church, but are referred to private persons, or Churches not only the Pope, but also the Church may err and be deceived through ignorance; I say, saith Canus, not only in her judgement of facts, Canus lib. 5. q. 5. conel. 3. or things done (as whether such a one committed such a sin, hath lost his faculties, aught to be censured, and such like) but also in her private precepts and laws themselves: and the true and proper reason hereof he bringeth from the authority of Pope Innocent the third, which I related also above, q Chap. 13. nu. 11. for that albeit the judgement of God is always grounded upon truth, which neither deceiveth, nor is deceived, yet the judgement of the Church is now and then led by opinion, which oftentimes doth deceive, and is deceived, etc. 33 Whereupon the Reader may most clearly perceive, how unlearnedly my ignorant Adversary doth infer, that because his Holiness had a long, grave, and mature deliberation, and consultation, concerning the true sense of the Oath, and of every clause thereof, and did send hither his third Breve for punishing those Priests that should take or defend the same, therefore he could not be ignorant of the true sense of every clause thereof, but must certainly and infallibly know, that many things are therein contained flat contrary to faith and salvation, as he by his first Breve had declared; as though his sentence and judgement in Decrees, which are directed only to private persons or Churches, should be always grounded upon truth, which neither can deceive nor be deceived, and that he cannot err through ignorance, or be led by opinion, which oftentimes doth deceive, & is deceived in his private laws & decrees, which are not common to the whole Church, but do belong to private men, Bishops, or Churches; and that therefore those Priests whom he bindeth or punisheth by his Censure and sentence, may not be free before God, and those other Priests whom he doth not Censure, may not deserve punishment in the sight of God, according to that which Pope Innocent in the end of his aforesaid reason did affirm. 34 But those words which Mr. Fitzherbert often repeateth, that his Holiness after so long and grave deliberation had concerning all things contained in his first Breve, (among which the principal was that many things are contained in the Oath, which are manifestly repugnant to faith and salvation) was sufficiently informed of the whole matter, are very equivocal, and may have a double sense. For first these words may signify, that his Holiness after so long and grave deliberation was sufficiently informed to excuse him from sin for doing what he did, and for sending hither his Breves to forbid the Oath, and to punish those Priests that should take the Oath, or teach it to be lawful, and with this point (for that it little importeth our present question, whether the Oath not only in the Pope's opinion and conscience, but also really, truly, and certainly containeth in it many things flat contrary to faith and salvation, or no, and for that it is a thing secret and unknown to me) I will not inter meddle, but leave it to the conscience of his Holiness, and to the judgement of God, who searcheth the hearts and reins of men. Yet this I dare boldly say, that in my judgement his Holiness might have been more sufficiently informed of the whole matter, if he had consulted this question concerning the certainty of his authority to depose Princes, and whether his spiritual Supremacy, or any other doctrine of faith or manners necessary to salvation, is denied in the Oath, not only with his own Divines, who are known to maintain with such violence both his authority in temporals over temporal Princes, which is the principal mark at which the Oath doth aim, and his spiritual authority over the whole Church, or a General Council, but also with the Divines of France, who are not so vehement for either of them, and with the learned Priests and Catholics of England, whom it did most concern, and I am fully persuaded, or rather morally certain, that both the Cardinal Peron, and many other learned Catholics both of France and England, would at that time plainly have told his Holiness, and given him sufficient reasons for their saying, that neither the doctrine for his power to depose Princes, which is expressly denied in the oath, is certain, and of faith, or the contrary improbable, nor that his power to excommunicate, or any other spiritual authority of his, which is certain, and of faith, is denied in the oath. 35 And this also of my own knowledge is very true, as I have signified heretofore r In the Epistle dedicatory nu. 6. to his Holiness, that a certain Priest, not of meaner sort, did presently upon the resolution of Mr. Blackewell, than Archpriest, and of divers other learned Priests and Catholics, that the Oath might lawfully be taken, with all the speed he might write to Mr. Nicolas Fitzherbert, being then at Rome, and sincerely related unto him, how all things here had passed concerning the conference and resolution, of learned Priests end Catholics about the Oath, earnestly requesting him, that either by himself, or by means of a certain Cardinal, whom he named to him, he would deal effectually with his Holiness, not to be persuaded to send hither any Breve against the taking of the Oath, things standing as they did, for that otherwise his authority, as well temporal to depose Princes, as spiritual to define without a general Council, would be more strongly called in question by English Catholics, than it hath been in former times. Now if his Holiness had deferred for a time the sending hither of his first Breve, and in the mean space had demanded the opinion of English Catholics, whom most of all it concerned, in this difficult controversy about the lawfulness of the Oath, he might doubtless have been more sufficiently informed of the whole matter, than he was, or could be informed by his own Divines of Rome, whom (besides that they had not taken such pains in canvasing this question, touching the certainty of the Pope's authority to depose Princes, as many of our English Catholics had) he might have some cause to suspect, that they would speak partially in favour of his authority, either for hope of promotion, as being men fervent to advance all his pretended authority, or for fear of incurring his displeasure, and to be accounted Adversaries to the Sea Apostolical as the event alas hath proved to be over true. 37 Or secondly the sense and meaning of those words may be, that his Holiness by that long, grave, and mature deliberation and consultation was sufficiently, that is, truly and certainly informed of the whole matter, and of the true sense and meaning of all the clauses of the Oath, and this I say is very untrue, as likewise it is very untrue, that Cardinal Bellarmine, notwithstanding all his grave, mature, and long deliberation and consultation had concerning this controversy (for betwixt this consultation of his Holiness at which Cardinal Bellarmine was one of the chiefest, and the publishing of his second book against his Majesty there passed almost four whole years, and the consultation of his Holiness could continue but few months, seeing that the Oath was published here about june, and his Holiness first Breve was dated the first of October next following) he was greatly mistaken, and deceived both in the understanding of those words of the Oath [notwithstanding any sentence of Excommunication, etc.] and of divers other clauses thereof, as I have sufficiently convinced in my Theological Disputation, and Mr. Fitzherbert by his silence, and not replying to this point being urged by me thereunto doth in effect acknowledge as much: and also in his opinion touching the certainty and infallibility of the doctrine for the Pope's power to depose temporal Princes, which without any sufficient ground, (even according to his own principles,) he will needs have to be a point of faith. 38 And hereby you may see how falsely and slanderously, and with small respect to his Holiness, whom Mr. Fitzherbert would seem so much to reverence he concludeth in these words: s P. 214. nu. 5. Disp. Theol. c. 10. s. 2. nu. 46. Therefore he that thinketh otherwise of his Holiness (as Widdrington doth affirming that his Breves were grounded upon light foundations, and false informations) must needs hold him to be the most careless and negligent Pastor that ever governed the Church of God: whereby any man may judge what account Widdrington maketh of his Holiness, and his authority notwithstanding his submission of his writings to the Catholic Roman Church. 39 But first it is very untrue, that from my words any such inference can be gathered, as Mr. Fitzherbert here maketh. I gave indeed, as you have seen, two answers to his Holiness Breves which are briefly comprised in those few words [light foundations, and false informations.] My first and principal answer, which this fraudulent man altogeth concealeth, was this; that if his Holiness Breve forbidding Catholics to take the Oath, for that it containeth many things flat contrary to faith and salvation, was grounded upon the Pope's power to depose Princes, to dispose of temporals, to inflict temporal punishments, and to absolve subjects from their temporal allegiance, as all my Adversaries grant it was chief grounded thereon, than I say it was not grounded upon any certain doctrine, infallible, and of faith, but upon uncertain and fallible grounds, and which were always impugned by learned Catholics, which uncertain and fallible grounds I called light, for that they are not sufficient and weighty enough, let them be never so probable, to build thereon any certain and infallible doctrine of faith, and which every Catholic, unless he will deny his faith, is bound to follow. My second answer, (which this man doth also in great part conceal, for that I did particularly set down wherein his Holiness was misinformed which he wholly dissembleth) was, that if his Holiness Breve was grounded, as by all likelihood it was, upon this foundation, that his power to excommunicate, his power to bind and lose in general, and consequently his spiritual Supremacy, which according to the common doctrine of Catholics is indeed clearly repugnant to faith, is denied and impugned in the Oath, than I say, that his Breves were grounded upon false informations, for that there is no such thing denied in the Oath, as I have evidently convinced, howsoever Cardinal Bellarmine hath laboured to prove the contrary. And neither of these answers can be sufficiently confuted by any of my Adversaries, neither are they repugnant to the submission of my writings to the Catholic Roman Church. 40 So as you see that I made not that irreverent inference, which Mr. Fitzherbert here concludeth. I affirmed only the Minor proposition, to wit, that his Holiness Breves condemning the Oath, for that it containeth many things flat contrary to faith, and salvation, were grounded upon an uncertain and fallible foundation or doctrine, and light, that is, not weighty enough to make a matter of faith, to wit, that it is against faith to say, that the Pope hath not power to depose Princes, etc. and upon false informations, to wit, that his power to excommunicate, to bind and lose in general, and consequently his spiritual Supremacy is denied in the Oath; and both these my assertions I have sufficiently convinced to be true. But this silly man thinking thereby to lay a foul aspersion upon me of irreverence, and small respect to his Holiness, doth himself add the Mayor proposition not affirmed by me, and therein he plainly showeth his own irreverence, and small respect to his Holiness, and to many other Popes, accusing him and them by this Mayor proposition, which he addeth, to be the most careless and negligent Pastors, that ever governed the Church of God. For this is his Mayor proposition, whosoever affirmeth, that his Holiness Breves were grounded upon light, or uncertain foundations, and false informations, must needs hold him to be the most careless and negligent Pastor that ever governed the Church of God; by which his assertion he plainly showeth what little respect and reverence he beareth to his Holiness and sundry other Popes, who oftentimes, as I showed before out of Pope Innocent the third, t In the Canon, Anobis 2. de sent. Eucom. are oftentimes lead in their judgements and Apostolical sentences by uncertain opinions, which both deceive and are deceived, and not always by true informations, for which cause, saith Pope Innocent, it happeneth sometimes, that he who is bound before God is not bound before the Church, and he that is free before God is bound by a Censure of the Church. So that you see what account Mr. Fitzherbert, to use his own words, maketh of these Popes, holding them, according to this his assertion, to be the most careless and negligent Pastors that ever governed the Church of God. 41 For my own part I neither made that irreverent inference, which Mr. Fitzherbert here collected, but he himself out of his want of learning and judgement broached and invented that irreverent Mayor proposition, from whence, if it were generally true, that inference may indeed be gathered as well concerning his Holiness Breves, as also the Decrees and judicial sentences of other Popes, wherein as Pope Innocentius himself acknowledged they are sometimes lead, not by truth, but by opinion, and information, which oftentimes is false, and both deceiveth, and is deceived: neither did I deny, that his Holiness before he published his Breves, used grave, long, and mature deliberation concerning all things contained therein; albeit I must needs confess, that he might have used a more grave, long, and mature deliberation, if he would have consulted the matter not only with his own Divines of Rome, but also with those of France, and these of England whom most of all it concerned: and doubtless he might by them have had a more sufficient information of the whole matter and controversy, than he had by his own Divines alone, as the event showeth to be very true. But whether this his grave, mature, and long deliberation, and consultation with his Divines only of Rome, was sufficient to excuse him from all carelessness, and negligence before the sight and judgement of God, I will not, as I said before, it being a thing not known to me, meddle therewith: neither will I accuse, or excuse his Holiness from sin for sending hither his Breves so prejudicial to the King's Majesty, and to all his Catholic subjects, without making a more grave, long, and mature deliberation and discussion, but I leave it to the judgement of almighty God, who only knoweth the secrets of all men's hearts, when through ignorance or negligence they commit any offence. And thus you have seen, that fraud hath beguiled itself, and how in that snare, which Mr. Fitzherbert to tax me of irreverence and small respect to his Holiness hath said for me, is wily beguily caught himself. Now you shall see with what fraud and falsity this silly, ignorant, and deceitful man doth still go on. 42 And whereas Widdrington signifieth, saith he, u P. 214. nu. 6. that his Holiness was deceived by Cardinal Bellarmine, x Ibid. nu. 51. & 52. Item. epi. Dedic. nu. 8. and Fa. Parsons, he showeth himself very vain and absurd in this conjecture. For how can any man persuade himself with reason, that his Holiness, meaning to give his Apostolical sentence in a matter of so great importance, as was this of the Oath (which sentence he was well assured should be scanned and censured to the uttermost by all the Heretics and politics of Christendom) would suffer himself to be led or guided by any two, three, or few persons, were they never so learned, or well steemed of him? Besides that, it is evident to all those that know how that matter passed, that it was long debated in certain Congregations of Cardinals, and other great Divines, wherein Cardinal Bellarmine had only but one voice, as other Cardinals had, and Fa. Parsons none at all, for that he did not enter therein. 43 But observe, good Reader, the egregious fraud and falsity of this man, who would make thee believe, that I did say, that his Holiness was deceived and misinformed of the true sense and meaning of certain clauses of the Oath, only by Cardinal Bellarmine and Fa Parsons, and not also by the other Divines of Rome, who consulted of this matter; for which cause he omitted to set down entirely my second answer to his Holiness Breves, and also the particular points, wherein I said his Holiness was misinformed by them, lest that his manifest fraud and falsity should presently have been discovered. For albeit in my Epistle Dedicatory to his Holiness, I named only Card. Bellarmine, and Fa. Parsons, for that they were the two chief and principal men that first stirred in this Controversy by public writings, the one of the Italian, and the other of our English Nation, yet I did not there affirm, that his Holiness was misinformed, deceived, led, or guided only by Cardinal Bellarmine, and Fa. Parsons; and in my second answer, whereto also Mr. Fitzherbert in the margin remitteth his Reader, I expressly signified the flat contrary, and with Card. Bellarmine, (for Fa. Parson's there I named not) I also joined the other Divines of Rome. It is probable, said I, y Disp. Theo. c. 10. s. 2. nu. 51. and in my judgement morally certain, that his Holiness did understand the words of the Oath in that sense, wherein the Divines of Rome did conceive them, and especially Card. Bellar. etc. z See the rest above, nu. 15. And a little after I set down a copy of Fa. Parson's letter, wherein at the very beginning thereof, which words Mr. Fitzherbert fraudulently concealeth, he said, that about some four or five months ago it was consulted (at Rome) by seven or eight of the learnedst Divines that could be chosen, who gave their judgement of it. There reasons are many, but all deduced to this, that the Pope's authority in chastising Princes upon a just cause is de fide, and consequently cannot be denied, when it is called into controversy, without denying of our faith, nor that the Pope or any other authority can dispense in this. 44 Now what a false and fraudulent man is this to make his Reader believe that I should say that his Holiness was deceived only by Cardinal Bellarmine, and Fa. Parsons, and in a matter of so great importance as was this of the Oath, etc. would suffer himself to be led or guided any two, or three, or a few persons, etc. for which cause he concealed my words, which did expressly signify the flat contrary, thinking belike, that my Disputation of the Oath, being forbidden by the Cardinals of the Inquisition, no man would adventure to skan the matter, and examine whether he had dealt sincerely, or no, but must believe all to be true that he said, and so all his forgeries should go for currant ware. But truly such corrupt dealings is shameful in a Heathen writer, or any other moral honest man, much more in Mr. T-F. then Priest Esquire, and now an eminent man of the Society of jesus. But now Mr. T. F. laboureth much to free, not Cardinal Bellarmine, but his old friend Fa. Parsons from this Calumny, as he termeth it, and to show, that his Holiness, was not misinformed by Fa. Parsons, and induced by him to send hither his Breves, to forbid Catholics to take the Oath. 45 Whereto I also add, saith he a Page 215. num. 7. 8. 9 Disp. Theol. ca 10. sec. 2. num. 52. 53. & seq. , that Widdrington contradicteth, and overthroweeh his own calumny, touching Fa. Parsons, with a relation which he maketh to justify it, in his Theological disputation, wherein he layeth down the contents of a letter written by Fa. Parsons, to a friend of his in England, signifying that a consultation had been made by seven or eight of the best Divines in Rome about the Oath, and that he himself had conferred twice with his Holiness touching the same, and that in the first conference he and Thomas Fitzherbert propounded to his Holiness a certain mean of mitigation, or moderation, suggested by friends, to the which his Holiness answered, that his meaning was not to proceed to Censures against his Majesty, but rather to use all gentle and mild proceeding with him; but as for the authority of the Sea Apostolic, in such affairs, he was fully resolved rather to suffer death, then to yield one jot therein. And in the other conference, his Holiness being advertised that certain Priests did incline to the taking of the Oath, answered, that he could not take such for Catholics. 46 Thus doth Widdrington related Fa. Parson's letters touching his conference with his Holiness, before the first Breve was sent into England; whereby it is manifest that Fa. Parsons was so far from persuading or drawing his Holiness to the resolution which he took concerning the publication of his Breve, that he sought to induce him to some other course, propounding means of mitigation, which indeed I can testify to be true upon my own knowledge, as it may appear by my subscription to that letter of Fa. Parsons, which Widdrington mentioneth, if the original be yet extant. 47 And therefore to the end that thou mayest, good Reader, know somewhat more of this matter, and upon what occasion his Holiness spoke of Censures against his Majesty, thou shalt understand, that among other things tending to the mitigation which Fa. Parsons propounded, one was, that it might please his Holiness to offer to his Majesty, that if his Majesty would use at least some connivency, and moderation towards the poor afflicted Catholics his subjects, his Holiness would give sufficient assurance by means of Catholic Princes, that he would never proceed with Censures against him, but bind his said subjects under the pain of grievous Censure to yield unto his Majesty all temporal and civil obedience, for the security of his state and person; which motion his Holiness seemed not to mislike, and therefore signified, that the same was conform to his intention, which was not to proceed to the rigour of Censures against his Majesty, but to use all indulgent and courteous dealing towards him, albeit he was resolved rather to lose his head, then to yield any jot of his authority in such affairs. 48 But whether his Holiness misunderstood some clauses of the Oath, and was induced to forbid the said Oath, as containing in it many things flat contrary to faith, and salvation, only by the information, and instigation of Cardinal Bellarmine, and of other Divines of Rome, or also by the solicitation of Fa. Parsons, it is not much material to the substance of my second answer, which was, as you have seen, that it is probable, and in my judgement morally certain, that his Holiness understood the words of the Oath, in that sense wherein the Divines of Rome, and especially Cardinal Bellarmine, (for the reason I there alleged) did conceive them. But Cardinal Bellarmine understood the Oath in that sense, as though it denied the Pope's primacy in spirituals, his power to excommunicate, to bind and lose, and to dispense in oaths: wherein he was foully mistaken, as I convinced in the said Disputation. And doubtless both Fa. Parsons, and the Divines of Rome did agree with Cardinal Bellarmine in the understanding of the aforesaid clauses of the Oath; as also Mr. Fitzherbert himself did in his Supplement, as I showed before b Chap. 1. , follow their opinion, and conceive, that the Pope's power to excommunicate is denied in the Oath, although now by his silence, and not answering to that point, which I urged against him, it seemeth that he seethe himself to be deceived therein. Neither can there be made any doubt in the judgement of any prudent man, that if the Divines of Rome had dissented from Cardinal Bellarmine's opinion in that point, he durst never have adventured to affirm so confidently in his first book against his majesties Apology for the oath, that the Pope's power to excommunicate heretical Kings is plainly denied in the Oath, and especially after his Majesty had clearly convinced him of falsity in this point, again in his second book against his Majesty so boldly to confirm the same. 49 Moreover, that his Holiness was misinformed by Cardinal Bellarmine, with whom the other Divines of Rome did herein agree, I brought an another sufficient reason, taken from the first part of Fa. Parson's letter, which Mr. Fitzherbert doth fraudulently conceal, and relateth only the last part thereof, whereon I did not so much rely as upon the former, to prove that his Holiness was misinformed by Cardinal Bellarmine, and the other Divines of Rome, for of Fa. Parson's misinforming his Holiness I made no mention at all in that answer, but only of his urging his Holiness to send hither his Breves against the oath. My words were these c Num. 52. . Moreover, that his Holiness was persuaded, that in this oath is denied his spiritual authority to inflict Censures, is plainly gathered by a letter of Fa. Parsons, who did greatly urge and solicit his Holiness to send hither his Breves, as both some jesuits here with us do freely confess, and also no man who knoweth how our English affairs were carried at Rome in his days, can make any doubt thereof. This therefore is the true copy of that letter, etc. About some four o five months ago, it was consulted by seven or eight of the learnedst Divines, that could be chosen, who gave their judgement of it. Their reasons are many, but all reduced to this, that the Pope's authority in chastising Princes upon a just cause is de fide, and consequently cannot be denied when it is called into controversy without denying of our faith, nor that the Pope, or any other authority can dispense in this, etc. 50 Now Mr. Fitzherbert, doth fraudulently conceal this part of the letter, whereby it is manifest, that the Divines of Rome did suppose, that the Pope's authority to punish Princes, and consequently to excommunicate and to inflict spiritual Censures is denied in the oath; for otherwise, as I showed in that place, d Num. 57 they had argued very viciously against the known rules of Logic, from a particular, to infer an universal, as thus; The Pope cannot chastise Princes by taking away their lives, or dominions, therefore the Pope cannot chastise Princes; as though the inflicting of spiritual Censures, and the denouncing of anathema, Aug. lib. 1. contra adverse. leg. & prophet. cap. 7. which according to Saint Augustine, is more horrible than any corporal death, were not to be accounted a chasticing of Princes. We grant therefore, that the Pope may chastise Princes, by using Ecclesiastical Censures, which is not denied in the oath, but we utterly deny, that to deprive Princes of their dominions, or lives are to be ranked among spiritual, or Ecclesiastical Censures.; Thus I argued in that place from the first part of Fa. Parson's letter, all which my fraudulent Adversary thought best for his purpose to conceal, and to skip over to the other: part of the letter, thinking from thence to take some colourable argument to prove, both that Fa. Parsons did not persuade and draw his Holiness to the publication of his Breve, & also that the inference I made from thence, to wit, that his Holiness was persuaded, that his authority to inflict Censures is denied in the oath, is, sorsooth, improbable and impertinent, wherein, as you shall see, he continueth still his ancient fraud, and falsity. 51 For first I did not intend to prove by Fa. Parson's letter, or by his conference with his Holiness, that he urged and persuaded his Holiness to forbid the taking of the oath; two other reasons I brought here to confirm the same, which Mr. Fitzherbert after his usual manner concealeth: the one, that some jesuits here in England did freely confess the same; the other, that no man who konweth, how our English affairs were carried at Rome in Fa. Parson's time can make any doubt thereof: To which may be added two other; the first, that Mr. Nicholas Fitzherbert, whose letter is yet to be seen. did send word to a friend of his, that Fa. Parsons laboured much to have the oath forbidden: the second, that the Provincial of the jesuits at that time, who is yet living, did boast to divers persons, that he would cause to be reversed what Mr. Blackewell, than Archpriest had concluded concerning the lawfulness of the oath, and would procure a Breve from his Holiness, to forbid all Catholics to take the oath, and which with very great expedition, as I signified in my Epistle Dedicatory to his Holiness, was accordingly performed, all which are to any man of judgement very probable conjectures, if not moral certainties, that Fa. Parsons, did urge and solicit his Holiness to send hither his Breves against the taking of the oath. But howsoever it be, it is not much material to my second answer or reason, which is, that his Holiness was misinformed by Cardinal Bellarmine, and other Divines of Rome, that his power to excommunicate and to inflict Censures, and consequently his spiritual supremacy is plainly denied in the oath, whether Fa. Parsons did urge and incite his Holiness to forbid the oath, or no. 52 Besides, for the confirmation of my second answer, those words of the Breve, for that it containeth many things, which are manifestly repugnant to faith and salvation, and also his Holiness answer to Fa. Parsons, that he could not hold them for Catholics, who seemed to incline to the taking of the oath, are very considerable, for that before these our miserable times, wherein so many new fangled Doctors are ready to coin new articles of faith, and to tax with such facility, their Catholic brethren of error and heresy, that will not forth with approve their novelties, it was never in the Church of God accounted an heresy, to deny the Pope's authoirty to depose Princes, or to inflict temporal punishments, neither hath any Catholic Author, who writeth of heresies, or Cardinal Bellarmine himself relating the errors of Marsilius of Padua, ranked him among heretics, for denying the Pope's power to depose Princes: And very many Catholic Doctors, with jacobus Almain, who have not therefore been branded by any man with any note of heresy or error, do resolutely affirm, that the authority of the Church doth not extend, by the institution of Christ, to the inflicting of temporal punishments, as death, exile, imprisonment, privation of goods, much less of kingdoms, but only of spiritual Censures. And Fa. Suarez himself dare not avouch, Suarez l. 6. c. 1. that the Pope's spiritual authority is plainly, and manifestly, but only covertly denied in the oath: and this also he gathereth from many far fetched consequences, all which I have clearly answered in my Appendix against him: And therefore, from the aforesaid words of his Holiness, that he could not take those Priests for Catholics, that inclined to the taking of the oath, it may very probably be included, that he was fully persuaded, that not only his authority to depose Princes, but also his power to excommmicate, and to bind and lose in general, as Cardinal Bellarmine, and the other Divines of Rome then conceived, is plainly denied in the Oath. 53 Secondly, whereas Mr. Fitzherbert affirmeth, that he can testify upon his own knowledge, that Fa. Parsons was so far from persuading, or drawing his Holiness to the resolution, which he took concerning the publication of his Breve, that he sought to induce him to some other course, propounding means of mitigation, etc. I will not now contend about the thing itself, which he testifieth; for that this may very well be true, that Fa. Parsons did seek to persuade and induce his Holiness to that course of mitigation, which M. Fitzherbert mentioneth, to wit, not to proceed with Censures against his Majesty (to which course Fa. Parson's might imagine his Holiness to have at that time some inclination, in regard both of the new oath, then established by his Majesty, and the Parliament, which doth so much derogate from the pretended authority, which the Bishops of Rome, since the time of Pope Gregory the seventh, do challenge over temporal Princes, to deprive them of their Princely authority, and to absolve their subjects from their temporal allegiance, and also of the severe laws which were then newly enacted against Catholics, upon occasion of that horrible Gunpowder conspiracy plotted only by Catholics) and yet withal it may also be true (as only by the way I did affirm, and by many probable conjectures sufficiently confirm) that Fa. Parsons did also induce and move his Holiness to the publication of his Breve against the taking of the oath, for that betwixt these two, there is no repugnance at all: and whether he did or no, it is not much material to my second answer or reason, which M. Fitzherbert took upon him to impugn. 54 Nevertheless concerning Mr. Fitzher. testification upon his own knowledge, I must tell him in plain words, that I can give no credit to his testimony, albeit he should confirm it by solemn Oath, unless I could be morally certain, that he useth herein no equivocation, or mental reservation, whereof I can hardly be assured, considering especially his own particular practice of equivocation or mental reservation in the time of Pope Clement the eight in slandering, and traducing so falsely and shamefully those four Reverend Appellant Priests, for Schismatics, Spies, Rebels and disobedient persons to the Sea Apostolic &c. notwithstanding they being present them at Rome to crave justice, and to make manifest their oppression and innocency, and also in giving testimony to his Holiness upon his Oath, that those English books, which Fa. Parsons had delivered to the Inquisition with divers propositions therein contained, showing them to be heretical, erroneous etc. were truly translated, wherein how foully he, and Fa. Parsons with divers other their adherents did equivocate to defend Fa. Parson's credit, not only his own conscience, but divers other persons yet living can be a sufficient witness: and considering also the common doctrine and practice of many of his Society, not only touching equivocation, but also mental reservation, which in very deed is flat lying, grounded upon that chimerical, and not intelligible union, mixtion, and composition, or rather mere fiction of thoughts and words in one true mixed, and compound or rather feigned proposition: This I say being considered (to omit now divers other scandalous, and pernicious positions and practices to this purpose, which some of them especially of our English Nation do maintain, and whereof I will hereafter if they urge me thereunto more particularly treat) I can give no credit to any thing that Mr. Fitzherbert shall testify upon his own knowledge, unless by some other means I shall find it to be true. 55 Now you shall see, what Mr. Fitzherbert observeth out of his own testimony concerning Fa. Parsons conference with his Holiness to tax me of improbability and impertinency. This being so, saith he, e Pag. 217. I cannot omit upon this occasion to desire thee, good Reader, to note the improbable and impertinent inference, which Widdrington maketh upon this answer of his Holiness: Dispu Theol. cap. 10. sec. 2. nu. 57 for he inferreth thereupon that his Holiness did condemn the Oath by his Breves, and held them for no Catholics who inclined to take it, because he was persuaded that his authority to proceed with Censures against the King, and consequently his spiritual authority was denied thereby; and then he concludeth, Ibid. nu. 58. that if his Holiness was moved to condemn it for that cause by the instigation of Cardinal Bellarmine, Fa. Parsons, and those seven or eight Divines (mentioned in the letter above said) Nimis proh dolour, saith he, manifestum est etc. it is alas too manifest, that his Holiness was deluded, to the great ignominy of the Sea Apostolic, the grievous scandal of Protestants, and the utter temporal ruin of very many Catholics. So Widdrington. But I also must desire the Reader to note the egregios fraud, and falsehood of this man. For I did not there infer from the answer of his Holiness, as Mr. Fitzherbert untruly affirmeth, that his Holiness did condemn the Oath by his Breves, and held them for no Catholics who inclined to take the Oath, because he was persuaded, that his authority to proceed with Censures against the King, and consequently his spiritual authority was denied thereby: but I made this inference first from the doctrine of Cardinal Bellarmine, for that he was of opinion, from which Divines of Rome, and consequently neither his Holiness did dissent, that the Pope's power to excommunicate, and inflict Censures, his power to bind and lose in general, and consequently his spiritual Supremacy is plainly denied in the Oath: and secondly, from the first part of Fa. Parson's letter concerning the consultation of the Divines of Rome had touching the Oath; for that the Divines of Rome did also suppose, as I proved in that place, that the Pope's power to chastise in general, and consequently his power to chastise by spiritual Censures is denied in the Oath: So that I made there no inference from his Holiness answer to Fa. Parsons, but I only made an explication of the said answer, from the aforesaid inferences, showing from them the cause and reason, why his Holiness thought them to be no Catholics who inclined to take the Oath, for that he was persuaded by the advise of Cardinal Bellarmine and the other Divines of Rome, that his power to excommuniate and to chastise Princes by Ecclesiastical Censures is plainly denied in the Oath. And therefore Mr. Fitzherbert to conceal his fraud, omitteth to set down my express words, and the first part of Fa. Parson's letter, and what I inferred from thence. 57 Wherefore from the discourse, which there I made, and which Mr. Fitzherbert doth fraudulently conceal, I concluded, that Cardinal Bellarmine, Fa. Parsons, & the other Divines of Rome using such sophistical inferences (to wit, that because we must swear, that notwithstanding any sentence of Excommunication made or to be made against his Majesty, we will bear faith and true allegiance to his Majesty etc. therefore the Pope's power to Excommunicate Kings is denied in the Oath; and because the Pope's power to punish Kings by deposing them, and by absolving their subjects from their allegiance, is denied in the Oath, therefore the Pope's power to punish Kings in general, and to bind and lose in general is denied in the Oath) using I say such sophistical inferences to prove, that in the Oath are contained many things flat contrary to faith and salvation, were very grossly mistaken. And if his Holiness trusting to the learning and honesty of these men was moved to condemn the Oath for that cause by the instigation of them (as by all probable conjectures or rather by moral certainties he was, as I convinced before) it is, alas, too too manifest, that he was deluded to the great ignominy of the Sea Apostolic, the grievous scandal of Protestants, and to the utter temporal ruin of very many Catholics. 58 Now you shall see how childishly Mr. Fitzherbert cavilleth at that word [if] as though now at last I made a doubt, and durst not absolutely aver, that his Holiness was moved by the instigation of Cardinal Bellarmine, and the other Divines of Rome to condemn the Oath for the aforesaid causes. Wherein I wish to be noted, saith he, f Pag. 217. nu. 11. first upon what a weak ground Widdrington rejecteth the Pope's Breves, seeing that he relieth only upon his bare opinion, that the Pope was ill informed and deluded by others, which he laboureth seriously g Ibid. nu. 51. 52. & 57 to persuade his Reader to be very probable, although it is so conjectural, and uncertain, that he is feign to conclude, all as you heard h Nu. 58. with an if, or a peradventure: so as if the Pope was not moved unto it by the instigation of those whom he nameth, he concludeth, or proveth nothing but his own impudency and temerity in opposing his idle conceit and fantasy against the Pope's serious and solemn testimony, protesting in his second Breve (as you have heard) that he forbade the Oath upon his own certain knowledge, motion, and will after long and grave deliberation; and therefore I remit to the prudence, and good conscience of any sincere Catholic, whether he will believe in this case this man's vain conjecture, or the solemn protestation of his Holiness. 59 But in very deed I am ashamed that Mr. Fitzherbert should still so shamefully be wray his egregious fraud and ignorance. For it is evident that I made no doubt, but expressly, and without a peradventure affirmed, that it is very probable, yea and morally certain in my judgement, that his Holiness understood the words of the Oath in that sense, wherein the Divines of Rome, and especially Cardinal Bellarmine etc. did conceive them; and that Cardinal Bellarmine who wrote in defence of his Breves, did conceive them in this sense, that the Pope's Primacy in spirituals, his power to excommunicate, to bind and lose, and to dispense in Oaths, are denied in the Oath: And therefore every Schoolboy may perceive, that those words [And if his Holiness etc.] which are a conclusion of the former words, and therefore must have relation thereunto, are not to be understood in this sense, as my Adversary doth childishly gloss them, to wit, And if his Holiness was moved &c. as peradventure he was, but as it is very probable, yea and morally certain he was, as I said before. For what man can with any reason imagine, that Cardinal Bellarmine in the understanding of the Oath did dissent from the opinion of the Divines of Rome, who consulted thereon, or that his Holiness did dissent therein from the opinion of them both? And therefore this is no idle conceit, or fantasy of mine to conceive so of his Holiness, but a manifest truth, and moral certainty, and to conceive otherwise of his Holiness, to wit, that he followed not herein the advise of his learned Divines, and understood not the words of the Oath in that sense, as they after their long consultation did understand them, were rather to tax his Holiness of imprudence and temerity. 60 And if the conceit of mine be so idle, and conjectural, and uncertain, as this fraudulent man would seem to make it, why doth not he in plain words deny the same, and say that his Holiness did not understand the words of the Oath in that sense, wherein Card. Bellarmine, and the other Divines of Rome did conceive them: but childishly would make his Reader believe, that I myself grant it to be very conjectural and uncertain, by concluding my second answer with an if? whereas it is evident, that I said plainly it was morally certain, and therefore that [if] to be referred thereunto, and to have this sense, if it be true, or morally certain, as true it is, that his Holiness was moved etc. Or why did he not answer the arguments which I brought to prove, that it was morally certain, but passeth them over, as you have seen with fraud and silence? And when you, Mr. Fitzherbert, in your Supplement understood the Oath to deny the Pope's power to excommunicate and deprive Princes, and in respect of those two points took upon you to prove the Oath to be against all laws human and divine, although now your silence touching excommunication showeth your former courage to be quailed, can any man imagine, but that you being then at Rome understood those words of the Oath [notwithstanding any sentence of excommunication etc.] in that sense wherein Cardinal Bellarmine, and the other Divines of Rome, who consulted thereon, did conceive them? 61 All which being considered, you may take the impudence and temerity, which you would lay upon me, to yourself, and freely confess, that it is an idle, impudent, and temerarious conceit and fantasy for any man to believe, that his Holiness did not understand the words of the oath in that sense, wherein Cardinal Bellarmine, and his other learned Divines did conceive them, and thereupon was moved to forbid the ●●th. Neither is this against the Pope's serious and solemn testimony protesting in his second Breve, that he forbade the oath upon his own certain knowledge, motion and will, after long and grave deliberation, for these words; as I showed before, do not signify, that he forbade the oath, without the advice and counsel of his learned Divines, for the words, after long and grave deliberation, do rather signify the plain contrary, but by them it is only signified, that his Breve was not surreptitious and counterfeit, and made without his privity or knowledge. And therefore M. Fitzherbert, urging those words of his Holiness, which do only signify, that his Breve was not false and counterfeit, and made without his knowledge, to prove, that he did not understand the words of the oath in that sense, as Cardinal Bellarmine, and the other Divines of Rome did conceive them, and thereupon was moved to send hither his Breves, for the forbidding of the oath, showeth himself to be both childish and malicious, and to want both prudence and conscience, in taxing me of impudence and temerity, for affirming that, which no man of judgement, and without great irreverence to his Holiness can deny. 62 Now therefore M. Fitzherbert, will for Disputation sake admit, that the Pope was deluded, and falsely persuaded by others, that his spiritual power to inflict Censures is impugned by the oath, and will show withal, that I gain nothing thereby for the justification of the Oath, and for the disproof of his Holiness Breves. Secondly, saith he, i Pag. 218. na. 12. although we should admit, that the Pope was deluded, and falsely persuaded by others, that his spiritual power to inflict Censures is impugned by the Oath, yet Widdrington gaineth nothing thereby for the justification of the Oath, and the disproof of his Holiness Breves; and this I say for two reasons, the one because it doth not follow upon the answer of his Holiness to Fa. Parsons, that he forbade the Oath, for that cause (as any man may easily see who list to examine it:) the other reason is, for that the Oath is forbidden in the Breve expressly, because it contained many things contrary to faith, and the salvation of souls, whereby it is evident, that albeit his Holiness had been falsely persuaded, that his spiritual authority was impugned by the Oath, yet the prohibition of the said Oath in his Breve might be just, as being grounded upon other respects, seeing that the Breve declareth it to be unlawful for many causes, and doth not mention this for any of them. 63 Yes Mr. Fitzherbert I gain much thereby for the justification of the Oath, and the disproof of his Holiness Breves; for seeing that, as you yourself confess, the Oath is unlawful and condemned by the Breves, as containing in it many things flat contrary to faith and salvation, in respect of two principal points, to wit, the exemption of temtemporall Princes from the Pope's power to excommunicate, and depose them; if you admit, as needs you must and do, that his Holiness was deluded, and falsely persuaded by others, that his power to excommunicate, and to inflict Censures is denied in the Oath, you can give no sufficient reason, why his Holiness might not also be misinformed by them of the later, and be falsely persuaded by them, that his power to depose Princes, to dispose of their Kingdoms and to absolve their subjects from their temporal allegiance, which is indeed expressly denied in the Oath, is a point of faith, and the contrary doctrine heretical: yea it is as morally certain, that his Holiness was misinformed by them of this second point, & of all the clauses of the Oath, which are pretended to be flat contrary to faith and salvation, as he was misinformed by them of the former point: and so you may see the weakness of your second reason. 64 And as for your first reason, I cannot see what coherence at all it hath with that whereof you allege it to be a reason. For what connexion, or coherence, I pray you, is there betwixt this your assertion, that though you should admit, that the Pope was deluded, and falsely persuaded by others, that his spiritual power to inflict Censures is denied by the Oath, yet Widdrington should gain nothing thereby, for the justification of the Oath, and the disproof of his Holiness Breves, and this assertion, which you allege as a reason of the former, that it doth not follow upon the answers of his Holiness to Fa. Parsons. that he forbade the Oath for that cause. For who would not think that man not well to know what he spoke, that should argue thus: It doth not follow upon the answer of his Holiness to Fa. Parsons, that he forbade the Oath, for that he was deluded, and falsely persuaded by others, that his spiritual power to inflict Censures is impugned by the Oath, therefore though we should admit, that the Pope was deluded, and falsely persuaded by others, that his spiritual power to inflict Censures, is impugned by the Oath, yet my Adversary gaineth nothing thereby, for the justification of the Oath, and the disproof of his Holiness Breves. For besides that, I did not say in that place, that from the answer of his Holiness to Fa. Parsons, it followeth, that he forbade the Oath, for that cause, but I said indeed, that from the first part of Fa. Parson's letter, touching the consultation of the Divines of Rome about the Oath, and the doctrine of Cardinal Bellarmine, from whom the Divines of Rome did not dissent, who teacheth that the Pope's power to excommunicate even heretical kings, is plainly denied in the oath, it followeth that his Holiness forbade the Oath for that cause: Nevertheless it is evident that albeit we abstract wholly from Fa. Parson's letter; if my Adversary once admit, as he doth, that his Holiness was deluded and misinformed by others concerning this so manifest a point, he can give no reason why he might not also be deluded and misinformed by others concerning the other points which are pretended to be in the Oath, flat contrary to faith and salvation, and so by this my adversaries grant, I gain much for the justification of the Oath, and the disproof of his Holiness Breves, to wit, that they were grounded upon false informations, either that his spiritual power to inflict Censures is denied in the Oath, which is very untrue, or that his power to depose Princes is a point of faith, and the contrary heretical, which also is manifestly false, as I have sufficiently convinced in this Treatise. 65 And hereby that which Mr. Fitzherbert immediately addeth, is easily answered, Besides that, saith he, k p. 218. nu. 13 the answer of his Holiness to Fa. Parson's concerning the authority of the Sea Apostolic in such affairs (for so were the word of Fa. Parson's letter) did not exclude the deposition of Princes from his spiritual authority, but necessarily include it, because his said answer was to be understood, secundum subiectam materiam, that is to say, according to the meaning and drift of the Oath, which was the special subject of that Conference, and therefore, forasmuch as the Pope's power to depose Princes, and to discharge subjects of their allegiance, is directly denied by the Oath, and that the same is never effected, or performed, but by virtue of some Censure of Excommunication, it is manifest, that his Holiness, answering a demand concerning the Oath, and speaking of the authority of the Sea Apostolic in such affairs, included therein his power aswell to depose, as to excommunicate Princes, especially knowing well, as he did, that the Oath denying his power to depose Princes, doth by a necessary consequent deny his spiritual authority, which includeth that power, as I have sufficiently declared and proved in this Treatise l Chap. 2. per totum. Item chap. 5. & 6. . 66 You have heard before, that the words which his Holiness used to Fa. Parsons, were, that as for any actual using Censures against his Majesty he meat not, but as for the authority of the Sea Apostolic, in such affairs (which last words, in such affairs, are now added by Mr. Fitzherbert) he was resolved, and would rather lose his head, then lose one jot. Now my Adversary laboureth to show, that by those words, but as for the authority of the Sea Apostolic in such affairs, his Holiness meant to include not only the authority to use Censures, which only were mentioned in the words next going before, and to which only any man, according to the property of the words, would restrain them, but also to dispose them, which is not much material to the present purpose: for be it so, that his Holiness speaking of the authority of the Sea Apostolic in such affairs, included his power, as well to depose, as to excommunicate Princes, it is nothing to the matter; for that which I intent is, that his Holiness was by Cardinal Bellarmine, and the other Divines, who consulted of the Oath, not only misinformed, that his power to excommunicate and to inflict Censures, is plainly denied in the Oath, but also that his power to depose Princes, is a point of faith, and necessarily included in his spiritual authority, which is very untrue, as in this Treatise I have sufficiently declared and proved. 67 But that also which M. Fitzherbert addeth for a confirmation of his saying, to wit, that the Pope's power to depose Princes, and to discharge subjects from their allegiance, is never effected or performed, but by virtue of some censure of Excommunication, is both false, and also repugnant to the grounds of Cardinal Bellarmine. For Childericke King of France, which example Cardinal Bellarmine bringeth for a proof, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, was deposed, and his subjects discharged of their allegiance, and not by virtue of any Censure of Excommunication. And it is one thing, saith Becanus, Becanus incontrou. Anglic. c. 3. p. 2. pag. 108. to excommunicate a King, and another to depose, or deprive him of his kingdom: neither is the one necessarily connexed with the other. Many Kings and Emperors have been excommunicated, and not therefore deposed, and contrariwise many deposed, and not therefore excommunicated. And yet my ignorant Adversary, to patch up this silly answer of his, doth now agreeable to his learning boldly affirm, that the Pope's power to depose Princes, and to discharge subjects of their allegiance, is never effected or performed, but by virtue of some Censure of Excommunication; whereas I have sufficiently proved above, m Chap. 1. nu. 21. & seq. & chap. 5. sec. 2. 131. & seq. out of the doctrine of Suarez, & Becanus, and from the definition of excommunication, that deposition is not an effect of Excommunication, & that therefore although they are sometimes joined together, and that some Princes have been both excommunicated and deposed by the Pope, yet they were not deposed by virtue of the Censure of Excommunication, for that, as his Majesty did well observe, n In his Premonition. p. 9 Excommunication being only a spiritual Censure hath not virtue to work this temporal effect. 68 Now you shall see how uncharitably, and also unlearnedly this ignorant man concludeth this point. Whereupon it followeth, saith he, o p. 219. nu. 14 that albeit his Holiness had been persuaded by Cardinal Bellarmine, Fa. Parsons, and others (as doubtless he was, although this man would seem to deny the same) that the Oath denying the Pope's power to depose Princes, impugned his spiritual authority, he had not been deluded or deceived therein, nor had erred in the reason why he forbade the Oath, though he had forbidden it for that cause only, as it is evident by the Breve he did not, but for many respects. And therefore thou seest, good Reader, what probable exceptions this silly, sick, and scabbed sheep taketh to the judgement and sentence of his supreme Pastor, and what account he maketh of his Apostolical authority, and consequently what a good Catholic he is. 69 But if Mr. Fitzherbert mean, that the Oath denying the Pope's power to depose Princes and to discharge subjects of their allegiance impugneth his spiritual authority to excommunicate Princes, and to inflict spiritual Censures, as needs he must if he will speak to the purpose, for that all his former discourse hath been to impugn my second answer to his Holiness Breves, which was, that he was misinformed by Cardinal Bellarmine, and the other Divines of Rome, that his power to excommunicate Princes and to inflict spiritual Censures is denied in the Oath, than I say that his Holiness was foully deluded and deceived in that reason why he forbade the Oath as containing in it many things flat contrary to faith and salvation, although he did not forbid it for that cause only: But if his meaning be, that the Oath denying the Pope's power to depose Princes, (for to these two general heads and to all that which doth necessarily follow thereon, both this man and all my other Adversaries do chief reduce all their exceptions against the Oath, and if for any other respects his Holiness forbade the Oath, let my Adversary name them and he shall hear what we will say thereunto) impugneth his spiritual authority, for that it is a point of faith that the Pope hath power to depose absolute Princes, to dispose of their temporals, to inflict temporal punishments, and to discharge subjects of their temporal allegiance, and which consequently are included in his spiritual power, than I also say, that his Holiness was deluded, dedeceived, and erred also in this reason, why he forbade the Oath as containing in it many things flat contrary to faith and salvation, for that it is no point of faith, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, to inflict temporal punishments, etc. but the contrary hath ever been maintained by learned Catholics. 70 Neither was Almain (a famous Doctor of Paris) and those very many Doctors related by him, or any other of those learned Authors, whom partly I cited in my Apology, p nu. 4. & seq. and partly above in this Treatise, q Part. 1. ever accounted bad Catholics, or silly, sick, and scabbed sheep: Neither can Card. Bellarmine, even according to his own grounds, (as I have showed before) and in his own conscience, (whereunto I dare appeal herein,) affirm that the Decree, or rather Act of the Lateran Council, whereon all my Adversaries do now at last chief rely, to prove their doctrine of deposing to be of faith, although it should have mentioned, as it doth not mention absolute Princes, is sufficient to make it certain and of faith. And therefore this ignorant and unconscionable man calling me a silly, sick and scabbed sheep, and no good Catholic, for not believing this doctrine to be certain and of faith, which so many learned Catholic Doctors have ever maintained to be false, and for not admitting his Holiness declarative precept which is grounded thereon, and consequently hath no greater force to bind according to Suarez doctrine, then hath the reason whereon it is grounded, showeth himself to have neither learning nor charity, but a vehement desire to disgrace me with Catholics, and to take away my good name per fas & nefas, whether it be by right or wrong, as all the rest of his uncharitable and fraudulent discourse doth plainly convince. 71 To this purpose, saith he, r Pag. 219. nu. 15. 16. it is to be noted how peremptorily and arrogantly he writeth to his Holiness, saying, that if he condemn his books or writings as heretical or erroneous (upon the false informations of his Adversaries) he leaveth it to the judgement of his Holiness, and all the Christian world, how great an injury he shall do him, and what a great occasion he shall give thereby to the Adversaries to Catholic verity. So Widdrington. Wherein you see, he doth not promise his Holiness to retract or reform his writings and doctrine in case that he do condemn them, but anticipateth the judgement of his Holiness with a protestation of wrong, and of occasion of great scandal, insinuating also further that the whole Christian world will justify him therein, in which respect he confidently leaveth his cause to the judgement thereof, meaning by the Christian world (as may well be conjectured) some general Council whereto he meaneth to appeal; Disp. Theol. cap. 3. nu. 8. & cap. 10. nu. 23. and therefore he teacheth afterwards that it is a probable opinion that the Pope may err in any definition of his, if it be not approved by a general Council: so as he showeth evidently what starting hole he hath found already to escape away from the Censures of the Sea Apostolic, to wit, by appealing from the Pope to a general Council, as that miserable man his fellow Sheldon did, & all Apostates and heretics are wont to do at their first breach, and disunion from the Church. 72 Hear Mr. Fitzherbert to confirm his rash and uncharitable judgement of me, that I am no good Catholic, but an heretic disguised, and masked under the vizard of a Catholic, taxeth me of divers things, wherein also he plainly discovereth his great want both of learning and charity. For first no man of judgement can deny, but that the aforesaid conditional words, which I used to his Holiness, are very true, to wit, that if he should condemn my books as heretical or erroneous, which do sincerely handle this dangerous, difficult, and great controversy, Azorius tom. 2 l. 12. cap. 5. q. 8. which ever hath been, saith Fa. Azor, betwixt the Bishops of Rome on the one side, and Emperors, and Kings on the other touching the Pope's power to deprive them of their kingdoms, upon the false informations of my Adversaries, he should both greatly wrong me & also give occasio of great scandal to the Adversaries of the Catholic faith. Now seeing that, as I there signified, I have clearly convinced, that my Adversaries, and especially Card. Bell. masked under the name of D. Schulckenius, hath most shamefully corrupted my words, misconstrued my meaning, and slanderously accused me of error and heresy, what show of arrogancy can any prudent man imagine it to be, to signify to his Holiness with humble and decent words, and especially in the defence of my innocency the plain and manifest truth, and to request his Holiness not to be misled in a matter of such importance by the bad informations of my Adversaries, nor to trust overmuch to their learning and conscience in this case, wherein they have so foully abused me, and deluded also his Holiness, and withal to admonish or forewarn him, that if he should be thus misled, all the Christian world would plainly see, that it would be both an infinite wrong to me, and an occasion of great scandal to the Adversaries of the Catholic Religion? 73 Secondly, Mr. fitzherbert's interpretation of those my words [I leave to the judgement of all the Christian world] to wit, that by the Christian world, I understand some general Council whereto I meant to appeal, is a very false, and slanderous conjecture. For albeit I am indeed of opinion, and I think that no man of learning, reading, or judgement can in his heart be of the contrary, whatsoever in outward show, to speak perchance ad Placebo, or for other respects he may pretend, that it is neither heresy, error, or temerity, but a doctrine truly probable, that the Pope may err in his definitions if he define without a general Council, and that a general Council is above a true and undoubted Pope, yet by all the Christian world I did not understand any general Council neither by those words did I mean, as God is my witness, to appeal to a general Council, if the Pope upon the false informations of my Adversaries should condemn my books, knowing it to be in vain for the redress of any present injury to appeal to that which is not, and God knoweth when it will be: although if the Council were actually assembled, I account it no arrogancy for any man, that is wronged by his Holiness upon the false suggestions, and informations of his potent Adversaries, to appeal thereunto: But by all the Christian world I understood all Christian men whatsoever, whether Clerks, or Laikes, Princes, or subjects, Prelates, or private men, friends, or foes, and my only meaning was, that those words which I spoke to his Holiness with the aforesaid condition, are so plainly and evidently true, that I durst therein appeal to the judgement and conscience of any Christian man whatsoever, yea and of my learned Adversaries themselves. 74 But I do not promise his Holiness, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, to retract and reform my writings in case that he condemn them, but I anticipate the judgement of his Holiness with a protestation of wrong and of occasion of great scandal. True it is, that I did declare to his Holiness, and admonish him in that place, (but not anticipate his judgement) how shamefully Cardinal Bellarmine had wronged me in his public writings, most falsely accusing me of error and heresy, and upon what weak and sophistical grounds he laboured to coin a new article of faith in a matter, which so merely concerneth our obedience due to God and Caesar, humbly requesting his Holiness, that he would not give credit to the false informations of my Adversaries, and especial of Cardinal Bellarmine, nor be over confident in his learning or conscience, but that he would be pleased to examine the whole cause himself, and not to give judgement against me, or censure my books upon the false reports of my accusers and adversaries, otherwise the whole world would plainly see what great wrong is done to me, and what great occasion of scandal would thereby arise to the Adversaries of the Catholic faith and Religion. Now what indifferent man that will speak without partiality, can justly accuse him as arrogant, presumptuous, or to anticipate the sentence of the judge, who being falsely accused of most heinous crimes, by one who is both his accuser, and witness against him, and also greatly favoured and esteemed by the judge, doth in defence of his innocency plainly and modestly declare in particular to the judge how foully and shamefully he is slandered, desiring him not to give sentence against him upon such false informations, but that he will vouchsafe to examine the cause himself, and not to be over confident in the testimony and conscience of his accuser, who is both in great favour with the judge and also is brought as a witness against him, otherwise all the standers by will perceive what manifest wrong is done him, and he will give his adversaries great occasion to except and exclaim against him. And this is my very case as you have seen before. 75 And whereas Mr. Fitzherbert objecteth, that I do not promise to his Holiness to retract, or reform my writings in case that he condemn them, to which he might also have added, that his Holiness hath now condemned, or rather forbidden some of my writings, and I have not as yet retracted or reform them: I answer first, that I know not well what this silly man would conclude from hence, unless he would make his Reader believe that I am obstinate in my doctrine, which the ignorant man calleth an heresy, and that I do still maintain that it is a probable doctrine, and consequently may be maintained by any Catholic, that the Pope hath not authority to depose temporal Princes, and that therefore I am no Catholic, but a formal heretic, disguised and masked under the vizard of a Catholic, and that all my pretences to be a Catholic, do proceed from no other ground, but from a deep dissimulation, or rather an artificial and execrable hypocrisy to delude and deceive Catholics: And this is the chief mark at which this rash-headed and uncharitable man aimeth at in this Chapter, whereby he plainly discovereth both the bitterness of his intemperate spleen little beseeming the spirit of a religious Priest, and also that he knoweth not himself what is required to be a Catholic, or to have true Catholic faith. 76 Secondly, therefore to answer this inference▪ I do boldly and resolutely affirm again, which also I have sufficiently convinced in this Treatise, that it is a doctrine truly probable, that the Pope hath no authority to depose absolute Princes, or to discharge their subjects of their temporal allegiance, and therefore it cannot truly be noted of heresy, error, or temerity, and so the imputation of heresy concerning the doctrine itself, is altogether avoided; and the submission of all my writings to the Censure and judgement of the Catholic Roman Church, professing that if through ignorance I have written any thing which she approveth not I do also reprove it, condemn it, and desire it to be h●ld for not written, which is a retractation and recalling in general of whatsoever I have written amiss, is sufficient to clear me from all imputation of obstinacy or wilfulness, until I be certified of some particular thing, which requireth a more particular retractation. 77 True it is, that I did not promise to his Holiness to retract, or reform my writings and doctrine, in case he should condemn them upon the false informations of my Adversaries, for that I was not bound to make any such promise, as you shall more fully see beneath: And now in that manner as the Cardinals of the Inquisition have by the commandment of his Holiness, as the Decree mentioneth, forbidden my Apology, and Theological Disputation, in the same manner I have retracted, and recalled all that I have written amiss: for as they have only in general forbidden those books not expressing any cause or crime either in particular, or in general for which they are forbidden, although I have most humbly and earnestly requested to know some cause thereof, so also I have in general retracted & recalled what I have written amiss, both by abhorring and detesting all heresy and error in general, and also by submitting myself to the Censure of the Catholic Roman Church, and solemnly protesting, to be most ready to correct whatsoever in my writings is to be corrected, to purge what is to be purged, to explain what is to be explained, and to retract what is to be retracted: which being so, with what face & conscience can this my ignorant and uncharitable Adversary so confidently affirm, that no zealous Catholic can take me for any other than an heretic disguised and masked under the vizard of a Catholic, and that all my pretences to be a Catholic do proceed from no other ground but from a deep dissimulation, or rather an artificial and execrab e hypocrisy? 78 But that unlearned Catholics may not be led blind fold by this ignorant and silly man, who presumeth to be a Doctor and Teacher in these difficult points of Schoole-divinitie, before he hath been scarce a Scholar therein, and that they may have some sufficient light and directions to discern upon what grounds they ought to build their Catholic faith, and whether they are bound to believe with Catholic faith all that doctrine to be faith, which the Pope with the Cardinals of the Inquisition, and his other Divines of Rome propoundeth as of faith, and that doctrine to be heretical or erroneous, which he with their advise and counsel condemneth as heretical or erroneous, I think it not amiss to set down two principal observations to direct them therein. 79 The first is, that it is certain, and agreed upon by all Divines, that true Catholic and supernatural faith must always be certain, and infallible, not only in respect of the object, or the thing which is to be believed, which must of necessity be true, but chief and principally in respect of the reason or medium, whereby we assent thereunto, for many opinions (which include intrinsically a fear and uncertainty, as true natural science, and supernatural faith include intrinsically a certainty, and exclude all fear, doubt, and uncertainty) are true, See Bannes secunda secundae q. 6. ar. 2. and in respect of their object also necessary, but the reason for which we believe, or give assent, is that which maketh our true Catholic and supernatural faith and judgement to be infallible, and this reason is the revelation of God, propounded to us by the Church. 80 The second is that it is also certain, that there is a great controversy betwixt the Divines of Rome, and other learned Catholics, especially of Paris, whether the Pope defining and determining any doctrine to be of faith, and the contrary heretical without a general Council may err or no, and whether the Pope be subject or superior to a general Council. Victor. relect. 4 de potest. Papae & Conc. proposit. 3. Bellar. li 2. de Conc. cap. 13. Whereupon learned Victoria affirmeth, that both opinions concerning the superiority of the Pope or Council are probable, and Card. Bellarmine himself confesseth, that although in the Council of Florence, and in the last Lateran Council, the question seemeth to be defined, yet because the Florentine Council hath not so, expressly defined it, and some make doubt, whether the Lateran Council, which hath most expressly defined it, Bellar. ibid. ca 17. (albeit afterwards he saith, that it is doubtful whether she defined it properly as to be held with Catholic faith) was truly a general Council, therefore unto this day it remaineth a question even among Catholics. And all the world seethe, that the Divines of Paris are admitted to Sacraments, which ought not to be tolerated, if they committed any heresy, error, or temerity, for defending this doctrine, as public harlots are in some sort permitted at Rome, but not suffered to receive Sacraments so long as they persist in that wicked life. 81 And from hence it evidently followeth first, that it is not certain and infallible, that the Pope, with his Cardinals and Divines, yea and with the particular Roman Church defining, determining, or propounding to the whole Church any thing to be believed formally, as of faith, without a general Council, cannot err and be deceived; and consequently such definitions cannot be certain and infallible, nor can be an assured ground of Catholic faith, nor a sufficient reason, motive, medium, or cause to believe any thing by him so defined with Catholic faith; for that the fundamental reason, medium, cause and motive to believe any thing with Catholic faith must be certain and infallible, as I showed before out of Bannes, from whom other Divines do not dissent herein, and if that reason be uncertain, doubtful, or fallible, the faith or belief, which is grounded and dependeth thereon, cannot be truly Catholic, and infallible. 82 Secondly, if the Pope's decrees and definitions in things to be believed, as of faith, albeit directed to the whole Church, and in things which do not concern his own particular interest, honour, authority, or prerogative, and wherein therefore there can be no suspicion, that he himself is led by affection, or his Counsellors and Divines by flattery to the making of such Decrees, are not certain and infallible, but may be false, and exposed to error, and consequently can be no sure ground of Catholic faith, what judgement can any sensible man make of such decrees or definitions, which are neither directed to the whole Church, but to particular persons or Churches, nor are propounded as of faith, nor grounded upon any doctrine which is certain, and out of controversy, but only upon a question maintained on both sides by learned Catholics, and which also concerneth the Pope's own interest, authority, and prerogative, as are his Breves directed to English Catholics, which are neither propounded to the whole Church, nor contain any definition as of faith, but only a declarative precept, which is grounded upon a controversy, which began in Pope Gregory the seventh his time, and hath since continued betwixt the Bishops of Rome, and Christian Princes, concerning the authority which Popes pretend to have over all their temporals? 83 Thirdly, if the Pope's Decrees together with the Roman Church, by which he declareth, and defineth any doctrine to be of faith, or against faith, may be fallible, and exposed to error, and consequently can be no certain rule or ground of Catholic faith, nor any sufficient reason, cause, or motive to believe any thing with Catholic faith, so long as this controversy among Catholics, concerning the Pope's infallibility in his definitions remaineth undecided, much less can a Decree of any Congregation of Cardinals declaring any doctrine to be of faith, or condemning any doctrine as heretical, erroneous, temerarious, or scandalous, be an assured ground of Catholic faith, or a sufficient reason for any man to believe with Catholic faith, that doctrine to be such, as their Decrees do declare or condemn. Which being so, what judgement, I pray you, can any reasonable man make of such their Decrees, which condemn no doctrine at all, either in general or particular, but only forbidden certain books to be read or kept, without declaring for what cause or crime either in particular, or in general they are forbidden, and such books also as are written against one of the chiefest of their Congregation, of which sort is that Decree of the Cardinals, wherein two books of mine, written chief against Cardinal Bellarmine are forbidden, without expressing any cause or crime at all, either in particular or general why they are forbidden. 84 Fourthly, by all this it is evident, what infinite wrong this my ignorant Adversary, (whether only through blind and inconsiderate zeal, or also through some passionate spleen taken against me for contradicting his writings, and some others of his Society, I leave to God & his own conscience to judge) hath both done to me in so falsely, and yet upon such childish grounds, accusing me to be no Catholic, but an heretic disguised and masked under the vizard of a Catholic, for not admitting the Pope's Breves and declarative precept, grounded at the most upon an opinion, which learned Catholics have ever impugned, and taxing my doctrine of heresy, for that my books are forbidden by the Cardinals of the Inquisition, without condemning any position contained in them of any crime, either in particular or general; and also into what eminent danger he both casteth himself headlong, and seeketh also to draw after him unlearned Catholics, if they will follow such a blind guide in ways, which he himself, for want of Scholastical learning hath never gone, by endeavouring to overthrow their Catholic faith, and to persuade them to build it upon fallible grounds, as upon Pope's Breves, which neither are directed to the whole Church, nor do contain any definition or declaration of any particular doctrine, and upon the Decrees of certain Cardinals condemning books only in general terms, which perchance some of them never read, nor for want of sufficient learning do well understand, but do rely either upon the relation or judgement of other men, to whom the charge of overseeing such books is committed by them, whereas the grounds of true Catholic faith, and the fundamental reason, why a man ought to believe any thing with Catholic faith, must be certain, infallible, and without all controversy. And thus you see in what a labyrinth this silly man hath wound himself, who seeking to persuade his Reader, that I am no true Catholic, but a disguised and masked heretic, under the name of a Catholic, for not building my Catholic faith upon uncertain and fallible grounds, and which are controversed among learned Catholics, plainly bewrayeth what a sound Catholic he himself is, and upon what sure grounds he buildeth his Catholic faith, and would have other Catholics to build the same, whereas according to the approved doctrine of all learned Catholics, unless it be built upon certain, undoubted, and infallible grounds, it cannot be a true Catholic faith, but only an uncertain and fallible opinion masked under the vizard of Catholic faith. 85 Lastly, that unlearned Catholics may walk warily, securely, and without danger, and be not misled blindfold by this my ignorant Adversary, they must carefully observe the difference betwixt the Church firmly believing, and probably thinking, or, which is all one, betwixt Catholic faith, and opinion. The first difference is, that the grounds of Catholic faith must be certain, and infallible, but the grounds of opinion are uncertain and fallible: and therefore although the Pope's definitions, made with mature deliberation, and grave counsel may be a sufficient ground for Catholics, to think with opinion, that the doctrine which he defineth, is true, if they have no convincing reasons to persuade them to the contrary, yet they cannot be sufficient for Catholics, I do not say, to think probably, but to believe assuredly with Catholic faith, the doctrine which he so defineth, without the approbation of a general Council to be true. The second difference is, that albeit every Catholic ought to be so firm, and steadfast in his Catholic belief, that he must needs believe the contrary doctrine, not only to be false à part rei, but also to be improbable, yet he ought not to be so firm, and steadfast in his opinion, as to condemn of heresy, error, or temerity other learned Catholics, who having duly examined all the reasons and grounds for that opinion, shall think against him, or be of the contrary opinion, although he pretend to prove his doctrine to be true, out of some Decree or definition even of a general Council, which Decree or definition, the other learned Catholics of the contrary opinion have seen, examined and answered thereunto, and this I proved at large in my Theological Disputation s Cham 10. sec. 2. , out of the express doctrine of Fa. Vasquez, which my ignorant Adversary doth fraudulently conceal, who, as you have seen, urgeth against me certain arguments, which I there related and answered, and dissembleth wholly the answers, which there I made to the same. 86 Wherefore, although the Pope be the supreme spiritual Pastor of all the faithful, and therefore aught to teach and instruct them in the Catholic faith, and in all other things which are necessary to salvation, as also every Bishop is a spiritual Pastor in his own Dioecesse, and therefore aught to teach and instruct all those that are committed to his charge in the Catholic faith, and in all other things necessary to the health of their souls, because as Cardinal Bellarmine well affirmeth, Bell. l. 5. de Ronvere, Pont. c. 3. that which the Pope is in the universal Church is every Bishop in his particular Dioecesse; and those words Pasce oves meas, Feed my sheep, Bell. l. 2. de. Rom. Pont. c. 12 in sine Edit. antiqu●●, saith he, and such like, which are spoken to Saint Peter, in regard of the Pastoral office are understood to be spoken to all Pastors: yet as no man is bound to believe with Catholic faith which the Bishop of the Dioecesse doth define or determine to be of faith so long as there is a controversy among learned Catholics concerning the certainty of that doctrine, for that it is certain and agreed upon by all Catholics, that every particular Bishop may err in his definitions, and consequently they cannot be any assured and infallible grounds of the Catholic faith; So also proportionally no man is bound to believe with Catholic faith any doctrine whereof there is a controversy among learned Catholics, albeit the Pope without a general Council shall define it to be of faith, for that it is a controversy among learned Catholics, whether the Pope defining without a general Council can err or no, and consequently until this controversy be decided and determined by a general Council, or the universal acceptance of the Church as a point of faith, such his definitions can be no assured and infallible grounds of true Catholic faith. 87 And if you demand, that seeing the Pope is the supreme spiritual Pastor of all the faithful, and therefore aught to teach them the Catholic faith, and direct them in the way to salvation, why are not all Christians bound to hear his voice, and to embrace all that he shall teach them, and to obey him in all that he shall command him? I answer with the like demand, seeing that every Bishop is the spiritual Pastor of all the faithful within his Dioecesse, and therefore aught to teach them the Catholic faith, and direct them in the way of salvation, why are not all the faithful within his Dio●cesse committed to his charge bound to hear his voice, and to embrace all that he shall teach them, and to obey him in all that he shall command them? 88 But perchance you will say, that the Pope is the supreme spiritual Pastor and his commandments are Apostolical, as Mr. Fitzherbert in this Treatise often urgeth against me the authority of the supreme spiritual Pastor, & his Apostolical Breves, and commandment, & therefore there is a great disparity betwixt the Pope and the inferior Bishops. True it is, that there is a great disparity and difference betwixt the Pope, who is the supreme Pastor, and other Bishops who are not supreme: but as there is a great disparity betwixt them, so there is a great difficulty and controversy among learned Catholics, in what this disparity, and this supremacy of the Pope doth consist; which were to long to examine at this present, perchance hereafter if my Adversaries will urge me thereunto I shall treat of this disparity and the Pope's Supremacy more at large. In the mean time all Catholics do agree in this, that the Pope's Supremacy doth not consist in this, that he cannot command any unlawful thing, and contrary to the law of God, or that he cannot teach false doctrine, and contrary to the word of God, or that he cannot exceed the authority, which Christ hath granted him, or that he cannot challenge to him a power or jurisdiction as due to him, which Christ hath not given him. Yea and according to the doctrine of many famous and learned Catholics cited by me elsewhere, t In disp. Theol. cap. 10. § 2 nu. 27. the Pope's Supremacy doth not consist in this, that he cannot err and be deceived in his definitions, albeit they be directed to the whole Church, if he define without the approbation of a general Council, or the acceptance of the universal Church, and consequently such his definitions cannot be certain and infallible grounds of true Catholic Faith. 89 Neither are his commandments, definitions, or letters called Apostolical, for that they are always conform to the law of God, and to the doctrine of the Apostles, neither is his authority called Apostolical, for that he hath always the assistance of the holy Ghost annexed to his Decrees and doctrine in that manner as the Apostles had, but chief and principally for that he is the successor of S. Peter the first Apostle, and hath authority and jurisdiction over all Christians, as the Apostles, and principally S. Peter had, although not with the like infallibility and continual assistance of the holy Ghost. And so the parity doth still remain betwixt the Pope and other Bishops, notwithstanding his Primacy, in that both are Pastors, and therefore are bound by their pastoral function to feed their sheep, to instruct them in the Catholic faith, and to direct them in the way to salvation, and yet their sheep are not always bound to hear and follow their voice or call, to believe with Catholic faith all their doctrine, or to obey all their commandments, for that their definitions are not certain and infallible, neither are they always so assisted by the holy Ghost, that they cannot command unlawful things, So that albeit the Pope be our supreme spiritual Pastor, Superior and judge, yet we are not bound to obey him but in lawful things, and to which his authority doth extend. 90 And if you ask again, to whom shall it belong to judge whether the Pope's definitions or doctrine be true or false, or his commandments conform to the law of God or no, or that he exceed the authority and commission which Christ hath granted him or no? I answer, that if we speak of judgement, as it is an act of justice, or of a judge doing justice, & supposeth in him a superiority & authority over the person whom he judgeth, which the Divines call judicium potestatis, a judgement of authority; then according to the Divines of Rome only God can judge the Pope's actions, except in case of heresy or of schism, when more than one contend to be Pope, for in these cases they grant that a general Council may judge the Pope: But according to the Divines of Paris, not only in the aforesaid cases, but also in many others, a General Council, whom they grant to be superior to the Pope, may by way of authority judge the Pope's actions, and declare, determine and define, whether his definitions, and commandments be conform to the word, and law of God or no. But if we take judgement, S. Thom. prima secunda q. 93 ar. 2. secunda secundae q. 51. ar. 3. & q. 60. ar. 1. as it is an act of the understanding, and is commonly called by the Philosophers the second act, or operation thereof, and signifieth a right discerning or determination of the understanding betwixt truth & falsehood, good and evil in every matter whether it be speculative or practical, and consisteth in the apprehension of a thing as it is in itself, which the Divines call judicium discretionis a judgement of discretion; then every learned man may judge and discern, whether the Pope's definitions or doctrine be true or false, and whether his commandments be conform to the law of God or no: neither is that vulgar saying, None can judge his superiors actions, to be understood of this judgement, but of the former; for this inward and private judgement is the guide of every man's conscience, by which, for that it is the rule of all moral actions, he must judge and discern all his thoughts, words, and deeds, actions, and omissions. 91 Seeing therefore it is a controversy among learned Catholics whether the Pope can err in his definitions, if he define without a general Council, and consequently they cannot be infallible grounds of Catholic faith, it is evident, that whensoever the Pope defineth any doctrine to be of faith, which in very deed is Catholic doctrine and of faith, we must not believe with Catholic faith, that doctrine to be Catholic and of faith because the Pope hath defined the same, for this reason and ground is, as I have said, uncertain, and fallible, but because the Catholic Church, 1. Tim. 3. which only is the infallible propounder of Catholic faith, and according to the Apostle, the pillar and ground of truth, hath approved the same to be Catholic and of faith. And thus much concerning the Pope's definitions and decrees in points of faith, and which are to be believed with Catholic faith. 92 Now concerning manners, and things commanded to be done, or not to be done, we must carefully distinguish betwixt declarative, and constitutive precepts or commandments: for in constitutive commandments, which do make the thing which they forbidden to be unlawful, and do not suppose it to be otherwise unlawful and forbidden by some former law, first, if the Pope command a thing which is manifestly lawful, and subject to his commanding power, we are bound to obey, but with this caveat or proviso, if by obeying we are not like to incur any probable danger of some great temporal harm, for that no Ecclesiastical law, setting aside scandal, or contempt, which are forbidden by the law of God and nature, doth seldom or never bind with any great temporal loss, as I observed elsewhere u In Disp. Theol. cap. 10. § 2. nu. 41. out of the common doctrine of Catholic Divines. Secondly, if the Pope perchance command a thing▪ which is manifestly unlawful, than we are bound not to obey, according to that saying of S. Peter, God must be obeyed ●ather than men. Acts cap. 5. 93 Thirdly, if it be doubtful, whether the thing, which the Pope commandeth be unlawful, or whether he hath authority to command that thing or no, In the discovery of D. Schulckenius calumnies, calum. 15 nu 12. & seq. Sot. de deteg. secret memb. 3. q. 2. then, as I observed elsewhere, according to the doctrine of many learned Divines, as Sotus, Corduba, Salon, Sayrus, and others, we must do that wherein there is less danger, according to that approved maxim, Of two evils the lesser is to be chosen. But Sotus doth more plainly and distinctly declare the whole matter. When the Superiors commandment, saith he, is of a thing secure and lawful, where no danger ariseth to the public good, or to a third person, in a doubtful matter we must for the most part obey. As for example, my Superior commandeth me to study,, or to help sick persons, which are actions, wherein there is no danger, although it be doubtful, whether he may impose such a commandment, I must obey; yet I added, saith he (for the most part) because I am not always bound to obey in a doubtful matter, as if the thing be over burdensome, or laborious to the subject; For if my Superior command me a long journey, and a hard, or uneasy thing, and it is doubtful whether he hath authority to command the same, I am not bound forthwith to obey. And a little beneath the same Sotus, as I related his words more at large above, affirmeth, that when it is doubtful, whether the Superior commandeth that which is lawful if it be in prejudice of a third person, because that third person is in possession of his credit, and goods, we must incline to that part where there is less danger. For when such danger doth arise to a third person, if the subject be doubtful, he doth not against obedience, if he demand of his Prelate a reason of his commandment, propounding humbly the reasons of his doubt. Thus Sotus. And by this the Reader may clearly understand the true sense and meaning of that vulgar maxim, In doubts we must obey our Superior, and stand to his judgement. 94 And as concerning declarative precepts, which do not make the thing, which they forbidden to be unlawful, but do only declare and suppose it to be unlawful, as being forbidden by some former law, they have no more force to bind, as Fa. Suarez expressly affirmeth, Suarez l. 3. de Leg. c. 20, nu. 10. then hath the reason whereon they are grounded. So that if the reason be certain, than we are bound to obey, if it be only probable, we are no more bound to obey that declarative commandment, than we are bound to follow the Pope's opinion, against the probable opinion of other learned Catholics. All this, and much more touching declarative, and constitutive precepts, and his Holiness Breves in particular, which do only contain a declarative precept, forbidding Catholics to take the Oath, for that it containeth many things flat contrary to faith and salvation, I declared in my Theological Disputation, x Ch. 10. sec. 2. which is abundantly sufficient to free me, and other English Catholics, from all note of disobedience, for not obeying in this doubtful and disputable matter his Holiness Breves, and his declarative precept contained therein, which is so prejudicial to his majesties authority and so dangerous to his Catholic subjects, not being able to find any one thing therein, which is repugnant to faith and salvation, especially humbly propounding to his Holiness the reasons of our doubts, and earnestly requesting to be satisfied therein. But Mr. Fitzherbert thought it fit for his purpose, to urge against me the objections which I there answered, and to tax me not only of disobedience, but also of error and heresy, and to conceal the answers which I made thereunto, wherein he plainly discovereth his unsincere, dishonest, and uncharitable proceeding, and that his only drift is to disgrace me with his Reader, and not to examine uprightly the truth of the cause. 95 To conclude therefore this digression, it is evident by the premises, that if the Pope without a general Council define any doctrine to be heretical, erroneous, or temerarious, and command all Catholics to believe the same, no Catholic is bound, or aught to believe with Catholic faith, that doctrine to be heretical, erroneous, or temerarious for this respect only, because the Pope hath defined and commanded the same, for that it is a controversy among learned Catholics, whether he hath any such authority infallibly to define or no; and consequently neither his definitions, nor his declarative commandments grounded thereon, can be certain and infallible grounds of Catholic faith. And thus much touching inward belief. But secondly, if the Pope command that none shall preach or teach against his definitions or Breves, than we must observe that golden rule of learned and devout Gerson, that if we neither perceive any manifest error against faith in his definitions or Breves, nor that by our silence some great scandal shall arise to Catholic faith, we must not dogmatize against them, otherwise we must speak freely and fear no Censures. See his words above, Chap. 14. num. 39 But notwithstanding this document of Gerson, if any learned man hath doubts and difficulties, which do trouble his conscience concerning the verity or lawfulness of the Pope's definitions or Breves, when they are greatly prejudicial to a third person, especially to a whole kingdom, it is lawful for him, according to the doctrine of Sotus, and others before rehearsed, to propound humbly to his Holiness the reasons of his doubts, desiring to be satisfied therein, for this is not to dogmatize, or to teach or preach publicly against them, (although this also according to Gerson be sometimes commendable, yea, and necessary) but it is a desire to be taught and instructed concerning the verity or lawfulness of them. 96 Thirdly, if the Pope should excommunicate nominatim▪ by name all those that shall teach, preach, or write against his definitions, or Breves, in case they perceive great scandal to arise to Catholic faith, if they be silent, and do not oppose themselves, or should excommunicate nominatim those, who shall write Supplications to his Holiness, to be taught and instructed concerning the verity, or lawfulness of his definitions or Breves, whereof they have great doubts and difficulties, which do perplex their conscience, than they must remember that saying of our Saviour, wherewith Gerson concludeth his golden document, that Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice, and let them assure themselves, that they are unjustly excommunicated, and free before God, howsoever the Pope hath tied them by his Censure: and therefore they may in this case carry themselves in that manner, as those who are not excommunicated in the sight of God, though by presumption, which often deceiveth, and is deceived, they may be thought by many persons, who know not their innocency, to be excommunicated: Yet they must not contemn the Censure, but also for fear of scandal observe it in the face of the Church, although secretly, and when no scandal is like to arise, they may do all that, which if they had not been excommunicated, they might have done; and they, who know their innocency, may in like manner converse with them secretly and without scandal, as they might before. But notwithstanding any such excommunication, they may still write supplications to his Holiness until he shall instruct them, and may still appeal to his Holiness, ad melius informandum, to inform him better, and to desire to be fully instructed, propounding humbly the reasons of th●●rdoubts. 97 Lastly, if the Pope, or the Cardinals of the Inquisition, shall forbid Catholics to read, or keep certain books, to know whether, and by whom such books may without any licence be read, and kept, or no, learned Catholics must diligently observe for what reason, ground, cause or end they are forbidden to be read, to wit, whether for that they are repugnant to faith, or good manners: and also they must carefully consider the natures, properties, and differences of declarative and constitutive precepts, and that, according to the common doctrine of Divines, whensoever the reason or end of any law doth generally cease, the obligation also of that law doth cease. So that if the books are forbidden, for that they are repugnant to faith, and thereupon may be dangerous to souls, and this reason is not true, but only pretended and falsely supposed, the reason, end, and cause of this prohibition doth altogether cease, to him who seethe this false pretence: And this observation I have set down chief for learned men; For those that be unlearned must be guided and directed by virtuous, discreet, and learned men, which learned men, who take upon them to guide and direct others, if through affectate and wilful ignorance they do err (for that they will not duly examine the matter, when they have sufficient cause to doubt thereof, but either for fear, or flattery will believe with blind obedience the Popes, or cardinals words, knowing certainly that they may err and oftentimes have erred, and now have sufficient cause to doubt, and consequently to examine whether at this present they have erred or no, seeing that learned Catholics do in public writings dedicated to his Holiness make great doubts, and give great reasons to show that they have erred at this very present, desiring to be satisfied therein) these learned men, I say, shall render a strict account at the day of judgement, for the temporal or spiritual harm, which those poor ignorant souls, who have trusted to their learning and conscience, have sustained by their advise and counsel, and also they are bound to make satisfaction and restitution in this world for all the temporal loss, which those poor souls have incurred by their rash and pernicious counsel, proceeding from wilful and affectate or desired ignorance. 98 Nevertheless also unlearned Catholics, when they have just cause to doubt of the truth & lawfulness of any Decrees either of Pope, or Cardinals, which are prejudicial to a third person, and especially to their temporal Prince, and the whole kingdom, are bound for as much as by their natural wit, and capacity they are able, to examine the matter, and not to be led blindfold without sufficient reason, which may fully satisfy their understanding and conscience. And this doctrine, which I have here in this digression set down, is so sound, easy and perspicuous, that no learned man can take any just exception thereat. Yet I have not set it down, for that it is necessary to satisfy my adversaries objections, which before I clearly answered, seeing that neither the Pope by his Breves, nor the Cardinals of the Inquisition by forbidding my books have defined, determined, or declared this doctrine of the Pope's power to depose Princes to be of faith, because there is no mention at all made of this doctrine either in the Pope's Breves, or in the aforesaid Decree of the Cardinals; but I have set it down only for satisfaction and instruction of the Catholic Reader that he be not led hoodwinked by the gross ignorance of my unlearned Adversary T.F. who, as it seemeth, doth not know what heresy, or disobedience is, & yet pretendeth to be their guide and director therein, but both of them may do well to remember that saying of our Saviour, Si caecus caeco ducatum praestet, ambo in foveam cadunt, If the blind be guide to the blind both fall into the ditch. And by all this it is evident, that I and other Catholics cannot any way be justly taxed of disobedience for propounding to his Holiness with all humility the doubts and reasons which we have, not to admit his Breves, which are so prejudicial to his Majesty and ourselves, and most humbly requesting him, that he will satisfy and instruct us therein, but alas what little satisfaction we have received from his Holiness you shall see beneath. 99 Now to return to my ignorant and uncharitable Adversary, who hath laboured in vain to prove not only that I am disobedient and irreverent to the Sea Apostolic, but also an heretic disguised, and that my submission to the Censure of the Catholic Roman Church proceedeth from no other ground but from a deep dissimulation or rather an artificial and execrable hypocrisy to delude and deceive Catholics, and also that my meaning is to escape the Censures of the Church by appealing from the Pope to a general Council, all which how false and slanderous they are you have already seen: and yet we read that the Doctors, and Catholics of Paris have divers times appealed from the Pope being not well informed and advised, to a future Council: now this silly and unconscionable man will, forsooth, confirm his aforesaid rash judgement of me concerning the last point of my appealing to a Council, by the example of Luther, who at his first breach and disunion from the Church, did, as all Anostataes and heretics are wont to do, appeal from the Pope to a general Council. 100 This is manifest, saith he, y p. 220. nu. 17 even in Luther himself, who after he had begun to set abroach his heresy, retained for a while the good opinion of many Catholics, with his pretence still to reverence, and highly esteem the Pope's authority insomuch that he wrote to Pope Leo in these words: Quare, Beatissime Pater, Surius an. 1517 prostratum me pedibus tuae Beatitudinis offero, etc. Wherefore most holy Father, I offer myself prostrate at the feet of your Holiness with all that I have, or am: do you quicken, or kill, call or recall, approve or reprove, as it shall please you, I will acknowledge your voice, as the voice of Christ governing in you. So he; making, as you see a far greater, and more absolute submission than Widdrington doth, albeit within a while after being condemned first by a Legate of the Pope, and after by the Pope himself, he appealed first from the Legate to the Pope, and afterward from the Pope to a future Council▪ and what became of him in the end the world hath seen, and felt by the bad fruits of his Apostasy; Ibid. anno 1519 Sed Deus meliora. 102 But first this silly man will not, as I suppose, find fault with Luther for the humble submission he made to the Pope, but all that he can reprehend in him, may be two things, the one is, that he did it not sincerely and from his heart, which if it be so, as also it may be otherwise, I cannot but much dislike such deep dissimulation; But for my own part I protest before almighty God, that the submission I made of myself and all my writings to the judgement and Censure of the Catholic Roman Church, I did it with all my heart and without any dissimulation at all. The second may be, that he did appeal afterwards from the Pope to a future Council, which although I do not intend ever to do, but will take patiently all the Censures, which shall be imposed upon me, I will only appeal still to the Pope himself to inform him better, and to make known to him and to the whole world my oppression and the justice of my cause: yet neither Luther nor any other can be accounted an heretic, Apostata, or Schismatic for appealing from the Pope to a future Council upon a just cause, seeing it is well known, that the Masters, Doctors, and the whole University of Paris did also appeal from the said Pope Leo to a future Council: The copy of this Appeal which was made in the year 1517. the 27. of March, is to be seen in Bochell. lib. 8. Decret. Eccles. Gallic. cap. 8. who were not therefore accounted heretics, Apostates, Schismatics, silly, sick, scabbed or rotten sheep. 102 Secondly, Luther within two years after he began to publish his doctrine, revolted wholly from the Catholic Roman Church, and renounced all obedience to the Bishop of Rome, but since I began to write, there be seven years fully expired, and yet I continue still in the unity of the Catholic Roman Church, and do acknowledge the Bishop of Rome to be my supreme spiritual Pastor, Father, and Superior. And albeit my opinion be, that no Catholic is bound to admit his Holiness Breves, forbidding Catholics to take the Oath, and to obey his declarative commandment contained therein, for the reasons signified before, which I humbly propounded to his Holiness, desiring him most earnestly, as being our chief Pastor, Teacher, and Instructor, to give us some satisfaction therein, yet I cannot therefore in the judgement of any learned man be justly accounted a disobedient child to his Holiness, seeing that it is evident, as I showed before out of Dominicus Sotus, that if a Superior impos● a commandment, whereby danger is feared to Religion, or to the commonwealth, or to a third person, (as all the world knoweth, that the forbidding of the Oath, is here in England prejudicial to Catholic Religion, to his Majesty and the temporal State, and to all his Catholic subjects) if the subject be doubtful, that such a danger will arise, he is not bound forthwith to obey, but he may without any disobedience demand of his Prelate a reason of his commandment, propounding humbly the reasons of his doubts. 103 Besides, Luther's doctrine was within two years condemned, not only in general words, but also his propositions were specified in particular, both by Pope Leo himself in his particular Bull concerning the same, and also by the famous Universities of Paris, Lovan, and Collen: But albeit two of my books are by a particular decree of the Cardinal▪ forbidden in general, and I commanded under pain of Censures to purge myself forthwith, yet they have neither expressed any one proposition in particular, neither as yet can I get them to name one proposition which is repugnant to faith or good manners, although I have most earnestly requested to know the same, protesting from my heart to be most ready to correct what is to be corrected to purge what is to be purged to explain what is to be explained, and to retract what is to be retracted: which their different proceeding against me and Luther doth plainly argue, that they have begun a work, which they cannot with their reputation continue, and that there is no such dangerous doctrine contained in my books, as Cardinal Bellarmine, against whom I did chief write, and who is my accuser. Adversary and judge, hath by all likelihood informed them, and would gladly to save his own credit, and that he hath not falsely to his great dishonour accused me and my doctrine of error, heresy, and of being no good Catholic, would make the world believe, for which at the day of judgement he shall render a strict account. And thus you see, that this comparison, which my indiscreet Adversary hath, to disgrace me, made betwixt me and Luther, doth nothing help, but greatly hurt his cause. 104 Now you shall see what a fraudulent and uncharitable observation he gathereth from hence. That which I wish, saith he, z Pag. 121. nu. 18. 19 to be observed herein, is how little heed is to be taken to widdrington's submission of his writings to the Roman Church (he should have said Catholic Roman Church) considering his doctrine, and the course he holdeth in the maintaining thereof. For as Cicero said by Epicurus (who wrote sometimes very virtuously and thereby deceived many) it is not so much to be considered what he writeth, as what his grounds and principles are, and how well his writings agree therewith; as for example what opinion he or any other hath or can have of the authority of the Sea Apostolic, who purposely impugneth the jurisdiction thereof, contradicting (as I have showed sufficiently in this Reply) the ancient and general practice of the Church, the express Canons thereof, and the Decrees of Popes and General councils upon an absurd supposition partly of a bare probability in his own doctrine, & partly of a possibility of error in Decrees touching matters of fact, which he is not ashamed to say of the Decree of the famous Ecumenical Council of Lateran, albeit all Catholics do uniformly teach, that general councils lawfully assembled and confirmed by the Pope, cannot err in any general Decree, touching either faith or manners, as I have sufficiently signified before a See chap. 16. nu. 11. and 12. Besides that, he useth the very objections, arguments, answers, shifts, and evasions of heretics, discovering now and then such an arrogant, proud, and malicious spirit towards the Sea Apostolic, that no zealous, Catholic can read him without great disgust and indignation, or can take him for any other, than an heretic disguised, and masked under the vizard of a Catholic. 105 But to answer the false and fraudulent observation, or rather shameful calumniation of this malignant spirit, which he would gladly colour with the lustre of a feigned, intemperate and Pharisaical zeal to the Sea Apostolic, I may rightly say to him as Saint Paul said to Elymas the Magician, O plene omnidole & omnifallacia, Act. 13. etc. O full of all guile, and of all deceit, etc. For to begin with his later words, I do not use any other objections, arguments, and answers, than which virtuous and learned Catholics haved used before me; neither do I discover any arrogant, proud, or malicious spirit, towards the Sea Apostolic, whom I reverence and respect with all my heart; only the plain truth, which Catholic Doctors have said before me, and which oftentimes breedeth enmity, I do modestly, reverently, and without any flattery, which commonly procureth friends, ●●●downe. And this uncharitable and ignorant man might have done well to have named some one particular shift, or evation, which I have used, and which only heretics and no Catholics do use, or wherein I discover such an arrogant, proud, and malicious spirit towards the Sea Apostolic, that no zealous Catholic can read it without disgust and indignation, or take me for any other, than an heretic disguished and masked under the vizard of a Catholic. But this is a usual trick of slanderers and backbiters, to use such general speeches, lest if they should descend to particulars, their malicious and lying spirit would presently be discovered. 106 Secondly, this silly man cannot prove, that any one thing either concerning my doctrine, and the grounds and principles thereof; or concerning the course which I hold in the maintenance thereof, doth not agree with the submission I made of my writings to the censure and judgement of the Catholic Roman Church. For I do not impugn any authority or jurisdiction, which the Catholic Roman Church acknowledgeth as due to the Sea Apostolic, but I impugn only the Pope's authority to depose Princes, and to inflict temporal punishment as a thing certain, and necessarily to be believed or maintained by Catholics, for that the Catholic Church never acknowledged this authority to be due to him; neither was this doctrine in the primitive Church, and for many hundred years after by the ancient Fathers so much as dreamt on, but it hath been challenged & practised by some Popes since the time of P. Gregory the 7. Res ante ea secula inaudita, A thing not heard of before that age, saith Onuphrius, which their practice and the doctrine thereof hath nevertheless been ever contradicted by Christian Princes and their Catholic subjects; and therefore it cannot be rightly called the general practice of the Church nor ancient, but in respect of this our age; not from that practice can any sufficient argument be drawn to prove the doctrine to be certain, and of faith, and that the contrary cannot be maintained by any Catholic without the note of heresy, errors or temerity: Neither do I contradict or impugn the express Canons of the Church the decrees of Popes and general Counsels and especially of that famous Lateran Council but I expound them according to the probable doctrine of learned Divines * See above in the first part of this Treatise. See above chap. 11. from nu. 3. & cha. 12. from nu. 56. and Hostiensis upon the same Canon Per venerabilem. , and exposition of the Canonists cited by Innotentius, Hostiensis, and Ioa●●r Andreas upon the Canon Ad abolendam, and as the Gloss with those Doctors, whom Hostiensis mentioneth and calleth them Masters, understand the Canon Per venerabitem, Qui sily sint legitims, and I impugn and contradict the doctrine and expositions, which my Adversaries make of the Canons of the Church, and especially of the Decree or Act of this famous Lateran Council. 107 Thirdly, that observation, which my spiteful Adversary urgeth against me, may be also urged against Cardinal Bellarmine, and many other zealous and learned Catholics, who notwithstanding their submission to the Catholic Roman Church, yet they purposely impugn the authority and jurisdiction of the Sea Apostolic, contradicting the Pope's authority and dominion directly in temporals, his power to dispense in certain vows, and in marriage which is not consummated▪ to give leave to inferior Priests to minister the Sacrament of Confirmation, to define infallibly without a general Council, etc. albeit divers Popes have practised and maintained the contrary. And therefore if this man's inference be good, little heed is to be taken to their submission of their writings to the Catholic Roman Church, seeing that they purposely impugn the authority and jurisdiction of the Sea Apostolic. But the plain truth is, that little heed is to be taken to the writings of this ignorant and uncharitable man, seeing that to prove me to be no other than an heretic disguised and masked under the vizard of a Catholic, he bringeth such childish and witless arguments▪ which may be retorted upon Cardinal Bellarmine, and many other learned and zealous Catholics, who purposely impugn that authority and jurisdiction, which some only▪ or a great part of Catholics, but not the Catholic Church, or all Catholics do acknowledge as due to the Pope. 108 But now this uncharitable man at the last upshot will not shoot at random, as he hath hitherto done, but he will, forsooth hit the very mark, and will manifestly prove, that no zealous Catholic can take me for any other, than an heretic disguised, and masked under the vizard of a Catholic. And what more manifest argument, saith he b Pag. 222. num. 20. can a man desire of the truth hereof, then that his Books are printed Cosmopoli, and Albionopoli, that is to say in good English in London, with the consent and approbation of my Lord of Canterbury, & his fellows? Can any man persuade himself that their Lordships are turned Papists of late, or that they would suffer books to be printed under the name of Catholics, with Epistles dedicatory to the Pope, and submission of the whole to the Censure of the Roman Church, (he should have added also Catholic) if they did not know that the Author thereof meant the same for a mere mockery and derision of his Holiness, honouring him as the jews did Christ, when they kneeled down, and adored him, saying, ave Rex judaeorum, and spitting in his face. 109 But although I am infinitely wronged and slandered by this uncharitable man, in falsely accusing me of the greatest and most infamous crime that may be, to wit, of heresy and Apostasy and bringing such ridiculous arguments to prove the same, for the which at the day of judgement he hath much to answer, yet in very deed I do in some sort pity the silly man, for that before he began to enter into this difficult controversy, wherein he showed himself to have so little skill, he was of some account among English Catholics; and now he hath so much impaired, or rather quite lost that credit and good estimation they had of him, by discovering so grossly his great want not only of Theological learning, but also of moral honesty. The like uncharitable proceeding, and upon the like uncharitable & frivolous grounds, this zealous Father used against the Appellant Priests, in the time of Pope Clement the eight, to disgrace them with his Holiness, as having intelligence with the State, and to be no good Catholics, etc. but the effect hath proved, and Pope Clement also to the confusion of my backbiting Adversary, and his adherents hath confirmed, and which also I make no doubt, but that his Holiness, and all the world will ere it be long see and acknowledge concerning their course taken against me, that Mentita est iniquitas sibi, Iniquity hath belied itself. 110 Mark now upon what goodly principles he relieth, to prove me to be no other than a heretic disguised and masked under the vizard of a Catholic. My books, saith he, are printed at London, with the consent and approbation of my Lord of Canterbury, and his fellowet. Be it so: therefore from hence we may very well conclude, that all English Catholics are infinitely bound to his Majesty, and the State, who albeit by reason of that execrable Gunpowder plot, & the damnable grounds, and principles from whence it was derived, might have taken a fit occasion to repute all Catholics, without any distinction or difference of persons, to be capital enemies to his Majesty, and his temporal State, and to persuade themselves, and all the Protestant Subjects of the Realm, that no true and constant Roman Catholic, can be a true and constant subject to his Majesty, yet his Majesty and the State, out of their most gracious favour and clemency were contented, to permit his Catholic subjects, to clear themselves if they could, of this most foul imputation so dangerous to themselves, and so scandalous to their Religion, and to make known to the whole world, that according to the true grounds and principles of Catholic Religion, his Majesty might be assured, that they might continue both his true, obedient, and constant subjects in all temporal affairs, by virtue of the natural bond of their temporal allegiance, which the Pope hath not power to dissolve, and also dutiful children of the Catholic Roman Church, and of his Holiness in all spiritual matters, among which the deposing of Princes, and the disposing of temporals, are not, according to the doctrine of learned Catholics, to be numbered. 111 And for this cause, and upon this motive, as I conjecture, his Majesty and the State suffered us to write like Catholics of this point, and according to the grounds and principles of the Catholic Religion which we profess, and to submit our writings to the Censure and judgement of the Catholic Roman Church, and to dedicate them to his Holiness, to the end they might see, what he or other Catholics would, or could except against our doctrine. But this fradulent and uncharitable man, who like the diligent and careful Bee, might, as you have seen, from this permission, consent, or approbation of his Majesty and the State, gather honey to comfort the afflicted hearts of distressed Catholics, and to appease, and mollify the wrath, indignation, and bad opinion of his Majesty, and the whole kingdom conceived against us, by reason of that most horrible and abominable Powder-Treason plotted and attempted by Catholics, doth like the crafty and malignant serpent, gather from thence poison to inflict and afflict the hearts of his Catholic Countrymen, and to exasperate his Majesty and the State against himself, and other Catholics, and to increase the indignation and bad opinion, which the whole Realm hath conceived against us, wherein he discovereth his ill affected mind towards his Majesty, and his great want of charity towards his afflicted brethren. 112 But let us go on and see his childish collection: For can any man, saith he, persuade himself, that their Lordships are turned Papists of late, or that they would suffer books to be printed under the name of Catholics, with Epistles dedicatory to the Pope, and submission of the whole, to the Catholic Roman Church, if they did not know that the Author thereof meant the same for a mere mockery and derision of his Holiness, honouring him as the jews did Christ, when they kneeled down, and adored him, saying, ave Rex judaeorum, and spitting in his face? 113 It is very true, that no reasonable man can persuade himself, that their Lordships, and the State are turned Papists of late, for permitting Catholics to free themselves, from this scandalous and slanderous imputation, which this ignorant and uncharitable man, and his fellows would lay upon them, and to suffer their books to be printed under the name of Catholics, with Epistles dedicatory to the Pope, and submission of the whole to the Catholic Roman Church; as likewise no reasonable man can persuade himself, that Bishop Bancroft, and the State were turned Papists, for permitting the Apellant Priests to defend their innocency, and to free themselves from so many scandalous and slanderous crimes, which this uncharitable fellow, with Fa. Parsons and his adherents did object against them, and to suffer their books to be printed under the name of Catholics, and some of them to be dedicated to the Pope, and to the Cardinals of the Inquisition, and with submission of the whole to the Censure of the Catholic Roman Church; and also for furthering their Appeal, by releasing some out of prison for that purpose, and by letters moving the king of France in their behalf, that he would be a means to his Holiness, that their cause might be heard, and they not to be oppressed through the potency of their adversaries in the Court of Rome, and that if they were wronged they might be freed of those slanderous imputations, and if faulty, they might accordingly be censured; for which favours those Priests, and all their adherents were bound to give most hearty thanks to her Majesty and the State, by whose means they made known to the world their innocency and oppression, to the everlasting shame and discredit of their Adversaries, who in the like manner do now proceed against me, and other Catholics, who are desirous to make manifest to all the world their dutiful allegiance, which they own to God, and Caesar, and which their violent and uncharitable proceeding I make no doubt, but in the end will turn to their great shame and confusion, for truth and innocency, although for a time it may be oppressed, will in the end prevail. 114 Wherefore any man may persuade himself, that his Majesty and the State still remaining Protestants, may for many good reasons permit such books of Catholics, which clearly prove that no Protestant Prince can, according to the doctrine of learned Catholics, be deposed by the Pope, to be printed under the name of Catholics, with Epistles dedicatory to the Pope, and submission of the whole to the Censure of the Catholic Roman Church, yet knowing that the Author thereof meant the same truly and sincerely, and not for a mere mockery and derision of his Holiness, etc. as my Adversary falsely and childishly inferreth: which his inference, as I signified elsewhere may be retorted against Cardinal Bellarmine, who impugneth the Pope's direct authority and dominion in temporals and yet he dedicated his book to the Pope, and submitted the whole to his Censure, belike honouring him as the jews did Christ, when they kneeled down, and adored him saying ave Rex ludaeorum, and spitting in his face. A chief and principal reason, why the State may prudently permit some books of Catholics to be printed in the aforesaid manner, may be thereby to know truly and unfeignedly, whether Catholic religion, and temporal subjection to a Prince of another Religion, true spiritual obedience of Catholic subjects to the Pope, and true temporal allegiance of the said Catholic subjects to a King, who acknowledgeth no such spiritual obedience to the Pope may stand together; and how far the Pope's authority, by the institution of Christ, doth according to the grounds of Catholic Religion, extend in temporal affairs, to wit, whether to the deposing of heretical, or wicked Princes, to the disposing of all temporals, and to the inflicting of all temporal punishments, in order to spiritual good, or only to the inflicting of Ecclesiastical or spiritual Censures. 115 For what man of judgement can deny, that it is very necessary for his Majesty considering the Religion which he professeth, to know how far he may be assured of the unfeigned and constant loyalty of his Catholic subjects, and how far he may prudently permit, tolerate, or favour them when occasion shall require, without any probable danger of new gunpowder plots, or other innovations or conspiracies against the State, to be attempted by them publicly, or secretly, with the express or commandment, or licence of the Pope? Other reasons may be alleged, which may move the State to suffer my books to be printed in the aforesaid manner: one may be, a tender commiseration of distressed Catholics, who for yielding their temporal allegiance to his Majesty, as he by the new Oath hath required at their hands, and making known to the whole world the lawfulness thereof, even according to the grounds of Catholic Religion, are slandered and defamed, as being no good Catholics but heretics, disguised and masked under the Vizards of Catholics, which might move his Majesty and the State, to take compassion of them, and to suffer them to make their innocency and oppression known to the whole world, in that manner they should think fittest, being so infinitely wronged for his majesties sake in yielding him that temporal allegiance, which he requireth, and they in their consciences think to be due to him. 116 An other reason, may be a willingness in his Majesty, and the State to have plainly discovered to the whole world, the different grounds and principles in things concerning obedience due to God and Caesar, etwixt Catholics of quiet disposition, and in all other things good subjects, and such other Catholics, as in their hearts maintain the like violent bloody maxims that the Powder-Traytors did: and a desire that his Catholic subjects would plainly let him see, that in all temporal affairs they would and might lawfully, according to the grounds of Catholic Religion adhere to him, notwithstanding any authority, by which the Pope might pretend to command them the contrary, whereby himself, and his State might be the better secured from all perturbations, which might arise from thence, and they also freed from most grievous penalties, which otherwise would be imposed upon them. 117 And if the Pope should upon some occasion offered, be desirous to know, how the jews that are borne and live in his temporal Dominions, stand affected towards him in point of their civil loyalty and due obedience, and whether they thought, that their Chief Priest, or Synagogue, had according to the grounds of their Religion, authority, to absolve them from the bond of their natural allegiance, and for that cause should suffer books to be printed under the name of jews, with Epistles dedicatory to their chief Priests, and submission of the whole to the censure of their Synagogue; or if the French King should for some good respects be desirous to know the like concerning his Protestant subjects, and thereupon suffer books to be printed, under the name of Protestants, with Epistles dedicatory to their chief Ministers, and submission of the whole to their Congregation, or Synod, would not any man think it to be both a manifest slander, and childish inference, to conclude from hence, that either the Pope was turned jew, or the King of France become a Protestant, for suffering such books to be printed in that manner, or that therefore they knew the Authors of them meant the same for a mere mockery and derision of their chief Priests, Ministers, or Synods, honouring them as the jews did Christ, when they kneeled down, and adored him, saying, ave Rex judaeorum, and spitting in his face. And yet these are the manifest arguments, which this uncharitable and ignorant fellow objecteth against me to prove me an heretic disguised and masked under the vizard of a Catholic. 118 An other Argument of the like kind urgeth against mean other as foul a mouthed and uncharitable Adversary of mine, to wit, that my books are printed without licence and approbation of Catholic Superiors, contrary to the decrees of the Lateran Council under Pope Leo the tenth, and also of the Council of Trent. But, besides that this is more than this man doth know, or can sufficiently prove, it is well known, that neither that Lateran Council, nor the Council of Trent were ever authentically received here in England; whereupon clandestine marriage, which by a decree of the Council of Trent is made inualide, is here in England even among Catholics accounted a true and valid marriage. Moreover, it is well known, that according to the doctrine of many learned Divines, which I have related else where, c In Disp. Theol. cap. 10. sec. 2. nu. 41. Ecclesiastical laws do not bind, when there is danger of some great temporal harm by the observing of them; or when some other necessity to avoid great scandal, or danger to Religion, or the temporal commonwealth, to know the truth in a thing necessary to the great temporal or spiritual good or harm of many persons impugned by craft and violence, and to defend himself and his credit from the slanderous reports of uncharitable Adversaries, and such like necessities, which are commanded or permitted by the law of God and nature, all which may by any man of judgement be applied to the books written by me. 119 Besides that, saith Mr. Fitzherbert, d Pag. 222. nu. 20. and 21. their Lordships know full well, that Widdrington shall more easily instill his pernicious doctrine into the minds of Catholics, under the pretence and name of a Catholic, of a friend, and of a brother of theirs, then if he should discover himself to be a Protestant, and enemy of their cause, for as the Poet saith, Tuta frequensque via est per amici fallere nomen, Tuta frequensque licet sit via, crimen habet. Which one translated very aptly thus: It is a safe and common way by friendship to deceive, Though safe & common be the way, 'tis knavery by your leave. S. Ambrose saith, Nihil periculosius his haereticis esse potest, etc. S. Ambros de filii divunt. c. 1. Nothing can be more dangerous than those heretics, who with some one word only, as with a drop of poison, do infect the pure and sincere faith of our Lord, and of the Apostolical tradition. But what would he have said, if he had seen this fellows books impugning directly the Sea Apostolic, and the whole course of the Ecclesiastical government under a solemn protestation and profession of obedience to the Church? would he have thought any thing more dangerous, or pernicious than him, and his works? No truly. 120 That which his Majesty and the State might very well know (for their secret thoughts and intentions we cannot know but by conjecture) was this; that Catholics would hardly believe or read the writings and books of Protestants, in matters which may be thought to concern Religion: And therefore to the end his Catholic, subjects might plainly see and discern according to the grounds of Catholic Religion, the true difference betwixt spiritual obedience due to the Pope, and temporal allegiance due to himself, and the proper acts and objects of either of them, and thereby might the more easily be drawn to give him that temporal allegiance, which he requireth at their hands: And that also all other Catholics of other Countries might perceive the lawfulness of the Oath, against which the jesuits especially did so greatly exclaim, & upon what doctrine & principles his Majesty grounded the same; & also that he himself might certainly know, what particular exceptions his Holiness would or could take against any clause of the Oath, and what one thing in particular therein contained is contrary to faith and salvation, as his Holiness had in general in his Breves affirmed, that many things were therein clearly repugnant thereunto, his Majesty thought it not amiss to suffer my books to be printed under the name of a Catholic, with Epistles dedicatory to the Pope, and with submission of the whole to the censure of the Catholic Roman Church in that manner as books are usually printed by Catholics. And if S. Ambrose, or any other of the ancient Fathers were now alive, and should see books of certain Catholics directly impugning the Sovereign power and authority of Kings, and absolute that Princes (whom they did so highly honour and reverence, affirming them to be inferior in temporals to none but God alone) under pretence of zeal to the Sea Apostolic, and subjecting them to the coercive temporal power of spiritual Pastors, whereas their general doctrine was, that with temporal punishments they are not to be punished, but by God alone, and broaching by violence and without sufficient ground, with scandal to Catholic Religion, and contrary to the example of Christ and his Apostles, and the whole primitive Church, new articles of faith in prejudice of temporal authority; and not permitting any man either to call their new faith in question, or for his better instruction, or discussion of the controversy to propound any difficulty against the same, with a desire to be satisfied therein, albeit he submit himself and all his writings to the censure of the Catholic Roman Church, but with open mouth crying out against him, and calling him an heretic disguised and masked under the vizard of a Catholic: what would S. Ambrose, trow you, or any other of the ancient Fathers, if they were now alive, say of such Catholics? Truly that nothing can be more dangerous than such Catholics, who under pretence of zeal to Catholic religion, and to the Sea Apostolic, invent new articles of faith, in prejudice of Christian Princes, by wresting many places of the holy Scriptures, as Quodcunque solueris, Pasce oves meas, Secularia judicia si habueritis, etc. to a sense not dreamt of by the ancient Fathers, by reason of their potency in the Court of Rome, and their favour with his Holiness, whose authority they pretend to advance, unjustly persecuting those that discover their manifest frauds and falsehoods. 122 Lastly, that which Mr. Fitzherbert objecteth here against me, might Bartholus, Carerius, and other Canonists objecteth against Cardinal Bellarmine's book, directly impugning the authority of the Sea Apostolic under a solemn protestation and profession of obedience to the Church. But the plain truth is, that neither of us both do impugn that authority whiCh is certainly known and acknowledged by all Catholics to belong to the Sea Apostolic, but as he impugneth the direct power of the Pope to dispose of temporals, for that there is no sufficient ground to prove the same, albeit some Popes have challenged the same as due to them, and some Canonists affirm, that it is heretical to deny the same, so I impugn the doctrine of Cardinal Bellarmine, who holdeth, that it is certain, and a point of faith, that the Pope hath at least wise an indirect power to dispose of all temporals, and consequently to depose temporal Princes in order to spiritual good, for that there is no sufficient ground to confirm the same. 123 And the like argument might Mr. Fitzherbert urge against all those learned Catholics, who constantly deny the Pope to have authority to dispense in any true and lawful marriage which is not consummated (notwithstanding so many practices of Popes to the contrary) impugning directly the Sea Apostolic, and the whole course of Ecclesiastical government, under a solemn protestation and profession of obedience to the Church. For Saint Antoninus doth of affirm, Antonin. 3. part. tit. 1. cap. 21. § 3. Caiet tom. 1. opusc. trac. 28. de Matrim. q. unica. Navar. in Manual. cap. 22. nu. 21. Henriq. lib. 11. de matrim. cap. 8. nu. 11. in Com. lit. F. Sot. in 4. dist. 27. q. 1. ar. 4. that he saw the Bulls of Pope Martin the fifth, and Pope Eugenius the fourth, who dispensed therein: and Card. Caietane relateth, that in his time Popes did oftentimes dispense therein: and Navarre affirmeth, that Pope Paulus the third, and Pope Pius the fourth did dispense therein three or four times by his Counsel and advise. And Henriquez the jesuite saith, that Pope Gregory the thirteenth did in one day dispense therein with eleven persons: Whereupon Dominicus Sotus; although he submitteth himself, and all his writings to the Censure of the Church, is not afraid, notwithstanding this often practise of Popes, which my ignorant Adversary calleth the practice of the Church, to say that those Popes erred therein, following the Canonists opinion, which he affirmeth to have in it no show of probability: And why then may it not be said in like manner, that his Holiness condemning the Oath as containing in it many things flat contrary to faith and salvation, followed Cardinal Bellarmine's opinion, and other Divines of Rome, who hold, that the Pope's power to excommunicate, and inflict Censures is denied in the Oath, and that the doctrine, for the Pope's power to depose Princes, which is denied in the Oath, is certain and of faith, which their doctrine in my opinion hath in it no show of probability at all even according to those rules, which Cardinal Bellarmine himself requireth to make any doctrine of Pope, or general Council to be of faith. Whereby is plainly discovered the manifest fraud and ignorance of my uncharitable Adversary in affirming my doctrine to be heretical, and myself to be an heretic disguised and masked under the vizard of a Catholic, for denying the doctrine for the Pope's power to depose Princes to be of faith, whereas, even according to the rules which Cardinal Bellarmine requireth to make a matter of faith, he cannot bring any one argument, Which hath so much as a show of probability to convince the same. 124 Mark now the fraudulent Admonition, which. Mr. Fitzherbert giveth to his Catholic Reader, under pretence, forsooth of sincerity, and the fervent zeal he hath of his soul's health. And therefore I hope, saith he, e Pag. 223. nu. 22. thou wilt be wary (good Catholic Reader) and diligent to discover widdrington's fraud thereby to avoid the danger of his poisoned pen, pondering all this matter in the just balance of prudence, that is to say, that thou wilt counterpoise his vain pretence of probability, not only with the grave and sacred authority of the Churches practise for many ages, but also with the Canons of general and Provincial councils with the Decrees of Popes, and with clear doctrine of so many famous, and learned Writers as he impugneth. Also that thou wilt weigh his presumption in defending and justifying the Oath, with the judgement & authority of thy supreme Pastor, who condemneth and forbiddeth it, the pretended force and solidity of his doctrine and arguments, with the ridiculous absurdities, which thou hast evidently seen in his answers to me; outward shows of affection to thee, and desire of thy good, with the inward intelligence he hath with God's enemies, and thine (who employ him to deceive thee, serving themselves of him, as Fowlers do of birds, which they keep in Cages for stalls, to draw other birds with their chirping into their nets and snares.) Also that thou wilt balance thy obligation to man, with thy duty to God, and the loss of thy temporal goods, with the gain of everlasting glory, from the which the Devil seeketh by his means to debar thee, and therefore I wish thee ever to bear in mind this comfortable lesson of the Apostle, 2 Cor. 4. Quod momentaneum & leave est tribulationis nostrae aeternum gloriae pondus operatur in nobis. 125 But on the contrary side, I hope thou wilt be wary (good Catholic Reader) and diligent, first to discover the manifest fraud and falsehood of this unlearned and uncharitable man, thereby to avoid the danger of his slanderous and poisoned pen, in propounding to thee a new article of faith so prejudicial to the supreme authority of temporal Princes, so dangerous to thy own spiritual and temporal good, so repugnant to the example and practice of Christ and his Apostles and of the whole primitive Church, unknown to the ancient Fathers, until the time of Pope Gregory the seventh, which at the first broaching thereof, was branded with the mark of novelty: This novelty not to say heresy, Sigeb. ad ann. 1080. Onuph. lib. 4. de varia create. Rom. Pont. saith Sigebert, A thing unheard of before that age, saith Onuphrius; and lastly, not confirmed by any one argument, which hath any show of a probable proof to confirm, even according to Cardinal Bellarmine's grounds, any doctrine, which hath been in controversy among learned Catholics, to be certain and of faith, and the contrary to be heretical. 126 Secondly, that thou wilt ponder all this matter in the just balance of prudence, that is to say, that thou wilt counterpoise his vain pretended Catholic faith, newly broached in the Christian world, and the childish and ridiculous arguments brought to convince the same, with the example of Christ and his Apostles, with the practice of the primitive Church, with the doctrine of the ancient Fathers with the authority of learned Catholics, who were never accounted heretics, or ill believers, for impugning the same. 127 Thirdly, that thou wilt call to mind, what is required, even according to Cardinal Bellarmine's grounds, to make a matter of faith, so that all Catholics are bound to believe the same, and that all the Acts even of general councils do not appertain to faith, but only the bare Decrees, and those not all, but those only, which are propounded, as of faith. * See also Estius in Praefat epist. ad Hebraeos. Where also he affirmeth it to be probable, that David did not make all the 150. Psalms, although the Council of Trent in the Decree of Canonical Scriptures expressly mentioneth, David's Psalter of a 150. Psalms. Whereby thou mayest plainly see, that he hath brought no one argument, which hath any colour of a probable proof; drawn either from the practice of some Popes, which he falsely and fraudulently calleth the practice of the Church, or from any Canon, or Decree of Pope, or general Council, or from any other authority whatsoever to prove this doctrine of the Pope's power to depose Princes, to be a point of faith; and that the Council of Lateran doth neither treat of the deposition of absolute Princes, nor propound the doctrine, whereof it treateth, as of faith. 128 Fourthly, that thou wilt consider the doctrine of Sotus before rehearshed, not only concerning the Pope's dispensations in lawful and valide matrimony, when carnal copulation doth not follow, so often practised by divers Popes, which nevertheless he impugneth, as not having any show of probability, but also touching the duty of subjects towards their Superiors, when they command any thing which is prejudicial to a third person▪ and the Subject is doubtful of the lawfulness thereof: Whereby thou wilt clearly perceive, that it is no presumption to reject the judgement of his Superior, albeit he be our supreme Pastor, when it is contrary to the judgement of other learned Catholics, or not to obey his declarative commandment grounded thereon, especially humbly propounding to him the reasons of his doubts: Neither is it more presumption for any man to say, that the Pope was deceived in his Breves, following the doctrine of Cardinal Bellarmine, and some other Divines of Rome▪ who hold it a matter of faith, that the Pope hath authority to depose temporal Princes, seeing that many learned Catholics have ever maintained the contrary, than it was for Sotus, and many others of his opinion to say, that all those Popes that dispensed in the aforesaid Marriages were deceived, following the doctrine of the Canonists. 129 Fifthly, that thou wilt weigh my sound Replies and plain dealing, in propounding to thee sincerely the true state of every difficulty, and omitting nothing which he objecteth against me, with his childish and ridiculous arguments, and answers, and false and fraudulent proceeding, in seeking to confound thy understanding with general and ambiguous words, and which have divers senses, which he omitteth to explain, and in urging those arguments, which I myself objected and concealing the answers, which I made thereunto: and in imposing upon me many untruths, thereby to make some show of impugning my answers; and in particular concerning the Lateran Council, which he so often saith I do impugn, and then especially when I make no mention at all thereof, whereas it is manifest, that I do not at any time impugn that Decree or Act, but the exposition, which he and some others make thereof, and I do expound it according to the grounds and principles of learned Catholics, both Divines and Lawyers. Also that thou wilt balance thy duty towards God, with thy obedience due to Caesar, and render to either of them that which is their due; neither for fear of disgrace, human respect, or any other temporal loss thou wilt so adhere to the Pope, as to renounce thy allegiance due to thy temporal Prince, from which the Devil by my adversaries means under pretence of zeal to the Sea Apostolic seeketh to draw thee. And therefore I wish thee ever to bear in mind the express commandent of our Saviour, Matth. 22. Render the things that are Caesar's to Caesar, and the things that are Gods, to God: and for thy more particular direction herein, especially to remember that unboubted principle of Fa. Lessius, which above in the Preface, * nu. 15. 16. I did also recommend to thy memory, A power, which is not most certain, but probable, cannot be a ground, or foundation to punish any man, or to deprive him of his right and dominion, De Regulis juris in 6o. and ff. de Regulis juris In pari causa. which he really possesseth: for that according to the approved maxim both of the Canon and Civil law, In a doubtful or disputable case, the state or condition of the possessor is to be preferred. 130 Lastly, to that which this spiteful man objecteth against me concerning my inward intelligence with God's enemy's, &c. thereby to discredit me with Catholics, and to draw their affection from me, and to make them believe, that I am a Spy, and have intelligence with the State to seek the overthrow of Catholics I answer, that it is a most uncharitable and malicious slander. For I call God to witness, that I neither began, nor do continue to write of this dangerous and difficult question at the motion, instigation, counsel, or advise of any Protestant whatsoever, but upon my own free will and motion, after long deliberation had concerning all the dangers and difficulties which were like to befall me thereby, merely and sincerely for the love of God, of my Prince, and Country and a desire to know the truth in this important question which so nearly concerneth our obedience due to God and Caesar, as I solemnly and sincerely protested in the Preface of my first book. 131 And as for my intelligence with the State, I do sincerely protest, and call God to be both a witness and Revenger, if it be not true, that, albeit I have been sent for sometimes to my Lord of Canterbury's Grace, and other times (although but seldom) have gone unto him of my own accord about my own particular affairs, and should have gone oftener for divers respects, but that I thought it best to abstain, that such slanderous backbiters should not take occasion, thereby to make greater clamours against me, yet I never gave any intelligence or information against any Catholic man whatsoever, that might be to him the least prejudice in the world, albeit I have had sometimes both fit occasion, and just cause, and which in my conscience I might lawfully have done in defence of my own good name, to seek redress against some uncharitable persons, who have most unconscionably wronged me, and sought my overthrow, who although they be of great account among Catholics, yet if the truth were known, they would be most odious to all men for their execrable dissimulation, and unchristian carriage: Nevertheless I thought it best to remit my innocie and the justice of my cause, to almighty God, who in due time will be a just judge, and a severe Revenger, hoping that my patience might in time be an occasion of their repentance. Yet I do freely confess and acknowledge that I am infinitely bound to his Majesty, to my Lord of Canterbury & divers others of high place & degree, (although I have never spoken with them) for many special favours, among which I account this not to be the least, that they have graciously been pleased to suffer Catholics to make known to the world their unfeigned loyalty, and how much they detest that horrible and most abominable Powder-treason, and the bloody grounds and principles thereof, for all which their favours and benefits, I will ever pray for their eternal and temporal happiness, and account myself unable, to give them sufficient thanks for the same. And truly I do wish with all my heart, that all Catholics would give such outward tokens of their true and inward loyalty, and sincere affection towards his Majesty and the State, that they might deserve to receive some comfortable favour at their hands. 132 Now for a final conclusion Mr. Fitzherbert will bring a more authentical testimony and judgement, than his own, concerning myself and my writings, to wit, the forbidding of two books of mine by a Decree of the Cardinals of the Inquisition, which nevertheless, as you shall see, is rather a virtual confirmation, than any condemnation of my doctrine. And now to conclude, saith he, e Pag. 224. nu. 23. & 24. with a more authentical testimony, and judgement, than my own, concerning Widdrington and his works, I think good to give thee here a true copy of a Decree very lately printed, and published by a Congregation of Cardinals, deputed by his Holiness for the examination of suspected books, who by his Holiness express order and commandment have condemned and prohibited such books of his, as have hitherto come to their hands, to wit, his Apology and theological Disputation. For although they find by a certain Preface annexed to his Theol. Dispu. that he hath written also an other book against an English Doctor, yet because they have never seen it, they have not expressly, and separately censured, or named it in the Decree; nevertheless the subject thereof being such, as by the Preface it seemeth to be (that is to say, containing the same doctrine them he hath delivered in his other a books) all Catholics may easily judge, what opinion they ought to have of it, and may justly expect, that if he be a Catholic, as he professeth to be, he will now show it, not only changing privately his opinion, but also publicly retracting his doctrine, with all convenient speed thereby to clear himself, according to an express admonition given him in the said Decree, upon pain of such Ecclesiastical Censures, as shall otherwise be inflicted upon him. 133 The Copy of the Decree is this. DEcretum Sacra Conregationis Illustrissimorum S.R.E. Cardinalium a S. D. N. Paulo Quinto, Sanctaque Sede Apostolica ad Indicem librorum eorundemquc permissionem, prohibitionem, expurgationem, & impressionem in universa Republica Christiana specialiter deputatorum ubique publicandum. Sacra Congregatio Illustrissimorum S. R. E. Cardinalium ad judicem deputatorum, viso libro falso inscripto, Apologia Cardinalis Bellarminij pru jure Principum, adversus suas ipsius rationes pro authoritate Papali Principes Seculares in ordine ad bonum spirituale depon●ndi; Authore Rogero Widdringtono Catholico Anglo 1611. eiusdemque Authoris alio libro inscripto, Disputatio Theologica de juramento Fidelitatis Sanctissimo Patri Paulo Papae V. dedicata, Albionopoli 1613. utrumque librum damnandum, atque prohibendum esse censuit; sicuti de mandato Sanctissimi Domini nostri D. Pauli Papae V. prefenti decreto penitus damnat, & prohibet quovis idiomate impressium, aut imprimendum; ac nisi illorum Author, qui se Catholicum profiteur, quam primum se purgaverit, censuris ac alijs paenis Ecclesiasticis intelligat se omnino coercendum. Mandat autem, quòd nullus deniceps cuiuscunque gradus & conditionis sub paenis in Sacro Concilio Tridentino, & in Indice librorum prohibitorum contentis, supradictos libros audeat imprimere, aut imprimi durare, vel quomodocunque apud se detinere, aut legere, & subijsdem paenis praecipit, ut quicunque nunc eos habent, vel habuerint in futurum, locorum Ordinarijs, seu Inquisitoribus statim a presentis decreti notitia illos exhibeant. In quorum fidem praesens decretum manu, & sigillo Illustrissimi, & Reverendissimi Domini D. Cardinalis S. Ceciliae, Episcopi Albanensis signatum, & munitum fuit, die 16. Martij 1614 P. Episcopus Albanensis Candinalis S. Cecilia Locus ✚ Sigilli. Reg. fol. 50. Fr. Thomas Pallavicinus Ordinis Praedicatorum, Secretarius. Romae, ex Typographia Camerae Apostolicae. 1614 A Decree. TO be published every where made by the Sacred Congregation of the most Honourable Cardinals of the holy Roman Church, specially deputed by our most holy Lord Pope Paul the fift, and the holy Apostolic Sea, for the examination of books, and their permission, prohibition, purgation, and impression throughout the universal Christian Commonwealth. The Sacred Congregation of the most Honourable Cardinals of the holy Roman Church, deputed for the examination of books, having seen a book falsely entitled, An Apology of Cardinal Bellarmine for the right of Princes, against his own reasons for the Pope's authority to depose Secular Princes in order to spiritual good, written by Roger Widdrington an English Catholic, in the year of our Lord 1611. and another book of the same Author, entitled, A Theological Disputation concerning the Oath of Allegiance, dedicated to the most holy Father Pope Paul the fift, Printed at Albinopolis in the year of our Lord 1613. hath judged both the books worthy to be condemned and prohibited, and by the commandment of our most holy Lord Pope Paul the fift, doth by this present Decree utterly condemn, and prohibit them in what language soever they are printed, or to be printed; and except the Author of them, who professeth himself to be a Catholic, do clear himself forthwith, he is to understand, that he shall be thoroughly punished with Censures, and other Ecclesiastical penalties. Furthermore it commandeth under the penalties contained in the holy Council of Trent, and the Index of forbidden books, that none of what degree, or condition soever, be so bold from henceforth to print the foresaid books, or cause them to be printed or keep them with him in any sort, or read them. Also it commandeth under the same penalties, that whosoever hath them now, or shall have them hereafter, he shall presently upon the knowledge of this present Decree exhibit them to the Ordinaries of the places (where he is) or to the inquisitors. In testimony whereof this present Decree was signed, and sealed with the hand and seal of the most Honourable and most Reverend Lord, the Lord Cardinal of S. Caecila Bishop of Alba the 16. of March. 1614 P. Bishop of Alba Cardinal of S. Caecilia. The place ✚ for the seal. Regist. fol. 50. Fr. Thomas Pallavicinus of the Order of the Preachers, Secretary. Printed in Rome by the Printer of the Apostolical Chamber. 1614 134 To this Decree may be added a Letter, which the Pope's Nuntius in Flaunders wrote from Brussels to Mr. George Birket then Archpriest, touching my Theological Disputation, dedicated to his Holiness; the Copy whereof is this. Admodum reverend Domine uti frater in Christo dilectissimé. pervenit in urbem Disputatio Theologica de juramento Fidelitatis, tertium sub Widdringtoni nomine evulgatum opus. Ibi cum diligenter examinatum sit, declaravit Sanctissimus D. N. nullo modo se dicti operis dedicationem acceptare, & illius Authorem neque Ecclesiae filium, neque Catholicum existimare, omnesque insuper Catholicos ab illius lectione abstinere prorsus debere. De his ante paucos dies per Sanctae Romanae Inquisitionis Congregationis literas, de mandato suae Sanctitatis edoctus sum, ut de ijsdem ad Dominationem tuam imprimis scriberem, quò eadem istic Catholicis significes, ac pro tua prudentia innotescere cures. Deus Dominationem tuam Coelesti sua custodia muniat. Bruxellis 26. Novembr. 1613. Admodum Reverendae Dominationis tuae Amantissimus & studiosus. Very Reverend Sir, and as a Brother most beloved in Christ. THere came into the City of Rome a Theological Disputation, concerning the Oath of Allegiance, the third work published under the name of Widdrington. After it was there diligently examined, our most Holy Lord declared, that he in no wise accepted the Dedication of the said Work, and that he thought the Author thereof to be neither a child of the Church, nor a Catholic; and moreover, that all Catholics should abstain from the reading thereof. Of these things I was certified some few days since by Letters of the Congregation of the Holy Roman Inquisition, by the commandment of his Holiness, to the end that first of all I should write thereof to your Reverence, that you may signify the same to Catholics there, according to your wisdom to make it known to them. God defend your Reverence with his heavenly custody. From Brussels the 26. of Novemb. 1613. Of your Reverence most loving and respective. 135 Now from this Decree Mr. Fitzh. concludeth this last Chapter, and his whole Reply in this manner. So as, saith he f Pag. 225. num. 25. & 26. , I hope (Catholic Reader) thou shalt shortly be out of all doubt of what Religion Widdrington is; for if now, after that this controversy of the Oath hath been many years debated, and discussed by the learned Catholics of divers Nations, and determined by two Apostolical Breves, yea, and that his own Books written in defence of the Oath, are condemned by his Holiness, and he himself peremptorily admonished under pain of Ecclesiastical Censures, to clear and conform himself without further delay; if now, I say, after all this he will pretend (as hitherto he hath done) that his Holiness is still ignorant of the true state of the question, or that he is deceived & deluded by others; or else if he seek other new shifts, evasions, or delays to excuse, or defer his conformity to the judgement of his supreme Pastor, he shall show himself to he either a scabbed or rotten sheep, worthy to be excluded out of the fold (for fear he infect others) or else a ravening Wolf clad in a sheeps skin. Besides that, it will evidently appear, that all his former pretences to the a Catholic, and his submissions to the Sea Apostolic g He should have said to the Catholic Roman Church, for these be widdrington's express words. , have proceeded from no other ground, but from a deep dissimulation, or rather an artificial and execrable hypocrisy, to delude and deceive Catholics, which I leave (good Catholic Reader) to thy prudent consideration, and humbly beseeching Almighty God from the bottom of my heart to illuminate and inspire him with his grace, that he may see his own lamentable estate, and prevent the danger of his soul, wherein be runneth headlong, if he continue his wont course. 136 But to this Decree of the Lord Cardinals, and to the letter of the Pope Nuncius to Mr. Birkett, and also to all that which Mr. Fitzherbert concludeth from the aforesaid Decree, there needeth no other answer, then to set down my Purgation, & humble Supplication to his Holiness, wherein I desired to know any one thing, which in the Oath is repugnant to faith or salvation, as his Holiness in his Breves declared, that there are many things in the Oath flat contrary to faith and salvation, or any one thing in my books, which are against faith, or good manners, protesting with all sincerity, to correct what is to be corrected to purge what is to be purged, to explains what is to be explained, and to retract what is to be retracted. Whereby it will evidently appear, that I still remain an obedient child of the Church, and a true Catholic, and that my submission to the Catholic Roman Church was sincere, unfeigned, and did not proceed from the least dissimulation at all, and that from the aforesaid Decree no colourable argument can be drawn to prove me to be no Catholic, and child of the Church, and to condemn or disprove, but to justify, and to approve as well the Oath, as the doctrine, which I have taught in my Books. 137 This therefore is the Copy of my Purgation, and humble Supplication to his Holiness, which for satisfaction of some Catholics, who perchance have not seen it, and also for some other respects I think it not amiss to set down here again. To the most Holy, and most blessed Father Pope Paul the fift, Roger Widdrington an English Catholic, wisheth everlasting happiness. 1there came unto my hands some few days since, (most blessed Father) a certain Decree of the Sacred Congregation of the right Honourable Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church, who are deputed for the examining of Books, dated the 16. day of March, of this present year 1614 and printed in Rome by the Printer of the Apostolical Chamber, wherein two Books written by me sincerity and simplicity of heart, are by name, but yet only in general words, without naming any crime either in particular, or in general (at which many do marvel) altogether condemned and forbidden by the commandment of your Holiness; And the Author of them, unless he shall forth with purge himself, is threatened to be punished with Censures, and other Ecclesiastical punishments. 2 But what manner of purging your Holiness doth expect at my hands, who am the Author of those Books, and of what crime I ought to purge myself (seeing that in this Decree there is no crime either in particular or in general objected against me, of which I should purge myself, neither is my conscience privy to any crime for the making or publishing of those Books) I cannot verily in any wise perceive. I know that certain Doctors misinterpreting my words, have in their public writingsfalsly, and very injuriously, and not to speak a more heinous word (I pray God to forgive them) impeached me of certain crimes (by whose instigation I know not whether your Holiness hath been moved to condemn those Books) but considering that both they are my Adversaries in this controversy, and that they are moved in my opinion, rather by affection, then by reason, and also that they do foully corrupt my words, and wrest them to a bad sense, and never meant by me (as I could most clearly demonstrate a This I have since demonstrated to his Holiness in the discovery of D. Schulckenius, or rather Card. Bellarmine's slanders. to your Holiness, if it were now a convenient time) I do not think that so great authority is to be given, either to their sayings, or writings, of what learning or dignity soever otherwise they be, that they are of force to bind me, either to embrace their opinions, especially being grounded upon so weak foundations, or not to defend my innocency from their false accusations in such an exceeding great crime, as heresy is. 3 And that your Holiness may clearly perceive, that I have already in these books, which are forbidden by your commandment, purged myself as much, as is sufficient for a child of the Catholic Church, I think it necessary to repeat again, with as much brevity as may be, in what manner I have in those books made profession of the Catholic faith (which in my opinion abundantly sufficeth for the purging of myself from all imputation of heresy, error, or any other crime, which doth depend on these) and for what thing I made Supplication to your Holiness in that Disputation of the Oath of Allegiance, that thereby your Holiness may manifestly perceive, that some persons, not of the meanest degree, although perchance with the ignorant sort of people, they do greatly impair my credit, yet they do also bring your Holiness into no small obloquy both among prudent Cacholikes, and especially among those who are Adversaries to the Catholic faith, whiles they are not afraid to divulge (not so circumspectly in my judgement as is fitting) that your Holiness did in good earnest avouch, that you thought the Author of that Disputation, to be neither a Catholic, nor a child of the Church (whereas the Author doth profess himself both to be a Catholic, & a child of the Catholic Roman Church, and also submitteth most humbly that Disputation, and all his other writings to the judgement of the Holy Catholic Roman Church) neither that you would accept of the Dedication of that book, whereas that Dedication, as it is manifest by the Author's Epistle to your Holiness, was only a most humble Supplication of the Author, and of other Catholics to your Holiness, that your Holiness, as being the supreme Pastor of the Catholic Church, and whose office is to instruct, and confirm the sheep of Christ in the Catholic faith would be pleased to instruct them in the Catholic faith, and in those things, which your Holiness had declared by your Breves, to be in the Oath clearly repugnant to faith and salvation. And that your Holiness did speak the aforesaid words, both of the Author, and also of the Dedication, some here give forth, that your Holiness his Nuntius then residing at Brussels did signify as much to M. George Birket the Archpriest, who was then living, and that the same Nuntius did withal affirm, that he was certified thereof some few days since, (for so are the express words of the Nuntius his letters, b These letters were dated at Brussels 2. Novemb. 1613. & are to be seen above nu. 134. which are carried about among us) by letters of the Congregation of the holy Roman Inquisition, by the commandment of your Holiness, to the end, that he first of all should write thereof to his Reverence, that he according to his wisdom should signify as much, and make it knwone to Catholics. 4 First, therefore I the Author of those books did protest, that I composed them, being moved thereunto for the zeal of God, of Religion, and of my Country, and for more particular reasons, which I related in the beginning of those books, without any respect of worldly favour, or fear, neither with any obstinate mind, but only, to find out the Catholic truth, in this most weighty Controversy, which belongeth to the yielding of obedience due by the law of Christ, to God and Caesar, to your Holiness, who is the supreme Pastor. in earth of our souls, and to our King his most excellent Majesty, In Apol. ad Lect. in fine. who in temporals is inferior only to God; and I did submit most humbly whatsoever was contained in them, to the judgement and censure of the Catholic Roman Church, whose child I professed myself to be; and that if perchance any thing through ignorance had escaped me, In Disp. Theo. in fine. which should not be approved by her, I did disprove it, condemn it, and would have it for not written. In Disp. c. 6. sec. 3. nu. 18. & seq. 5 Besides, I did profess, that with all due honour and respect I did reverence all the Canons of the Catholic Church, although I did freely confess, that betwixt the Catholic Church and the Pope, who is only the first and principal member thereof, betwixt some Chapters, or Decrees of the Canon-Law, and betwixt others a great difference is to be made; and nevertheless I sincerely affirmed, that to every one, in his degree and place, I gave dutiful, but not equal credit. the vast Corpse of the Canon-Law, and in the volumes of the councils are contained, either sayings, or assertions of the ancient Fathers, or Decrees, or sentences of Popes or councils; and these are either doctrinal, and propounded as things to be believed by the faithful, or else moral, and which in the external discipline of the Church are commanded to be observed. 6 And first, I did acknowledge, that the doctrine which the Ancient Fathers, either in expounding the holy Scriptures, or in questions belonging to faith, have with uniform consent delivered, I did also undoubtedly believe, as being certainly persuaded, that it was inspired by the Holy Ghost. 7 Secondly, I also with Melchior Canus, and other Divines affirmed, that the doctrine also of all the holy Fathers in things, which do appertain to faith, may plously and probably be believed by Catholics, yet that it ought not of necessity to be followed as certain and infallible. 8 Thirdly, I did profess, that the definitions of General councils lawfully assembled, and confirmed by the Pope, wherein any doctrine is propounded to the whole Church, to be believed of all men as of Faith, are to be received by Catholics, as infallible rules of Faith. Nevertheless I did freely affirm with the aforesaid Melchior Canus, and Cardinal Bellarmine, that those the said councils are defined, or else supposed only as probable, and those assertions, which either incidently, and by the way are inserted, or for better declaration or proof of their decisions be produced, are sometimes subject to error, and may by Catholics without any wrong to the Catholic faith be rejected. This withal observing, of which also in other places I have admonished the Reader, that although I professing myself to be a child of the Catholic Roman Church, do most willingly embrace whatsoever General councils confirmed by the Pope, which represent the Catholic Church, do propound to the faithful as necessarily to be believed of faith, and which certainly, and evidently is known to be the true sense and meaning of the councils; Nevertheless, I do not undoubtedly believe every doctrine which either Cardinal Bellarmine (speaking with due reverence) or any other Doctor, seeing that they are not appointed by God, to be an undoubted rule of the Catholic Faith, do cry out to be Catholic doctrine, to be the voice of the Catholic Church, to be the meaning of the Scriptures, and councils, if especially some Catholic Doctors do hold the contrary; Them truly, as it is meet, I do reverence with all dutiful respect, and I do much attribute to their authority, but that all those collections, which they in their judgements do imagine to be evidently concluded from the holy Scriptures or councils (considering that oftentimes they are deceived and do deceive, For Card. Bellarmine himself in his old age hath recalled many things, which he wrote when he was younger, and perchance he now growing elder will recall more. and what they have written when they were younger, they may recall when they grow elder) are to be accounted for undoubted assertions of faith, and the contrary opinion of other Catholics to be rather esteemed an heresy, than an opinion, this truly I cannot take in good part. 9 Fourthly, concerning the Canons, or Decrees of General councils belonging to manners, and to the external government of the Church, I promised to be most ready to receive willingly all those Decrees, which in places where I shall live shall be generally received; for these are properly called the Decrees or Canons of the Catholic or universal Church, which are by common consent admitted by the Universal Church. Neither doubtless is any man bound to admit those Laws and precepts, which in the Country where he liveth, are not observed by the people, as according to the received opinion of Divines and Lawyers I there affirmed. And the same I there avouched is to be understood proportionally of the Decrees of Popes and Provincial councils. For as concerning the Pope's definitions belonging to faith, if he define without a General Council, I confess, that I have oftentimes averred, that very many, especially ancient Divines of the University of Paris, whose names I there c Cap. 10. sec. 2. nu. 27. related, are of opinion, that such Definitions, unless they be received by the Catholic Church as Definitions of Catholic Faith, are subject to error, whose opinion, both for the authority of so famous men, and also for the reasons and grounds, whereon that opinion is founded, I with many later Divines (to whose opinion also Cardinal Bellarmine himself d Lib. de Concil. cap. 13. doth plainly enough incline, howsoever he would seem also e Lib. 4. de Rom. Pont. c. 2. & li. 2. de council. cap. 17. to aver the contrary) have also oftentimes affirmed, that it is not to be condemned of heresy, error, or temerity, which also now again (speaking with all dutiful submission) I fear not to confirm. 10 Lastly, concerning my Disputation of the Oath, and the Dedication thereof, which seemeth to be that stone of offence, and rock of scandal to some Divines, especially of the Society of jesus, and to those Catholics who adhere to them, I cannot, to speak unfeignedly, in any wise understand what can justly be objected against it, or what fault I have committed, either in making it, or else in dedicating it to your Holiness, of which I should purge myself. For first of all I the Author of that Disputation, and Dedication, have therein professed, that I did not write it with any obstinate mind, but in manner of an humbly petition sincerely, and for many reasons, which I there related, to inform your Holiness more fully, who as here we think, hath not been rightly informed of the reasons, for which English Catholics are of opinion, that the Oath may lawfully be taken; and for this cause I did dedicate it to your Holiness that after you had carefully examined all the reasons, for which English Catholics do think the Oath may lawfully be taken, your Holiness might provide both for their spiritual and temporal safety, as according to your fatherly wisdom and charity should be thought most convenient. And therefore, as in the end of that Disputation I affirmed I did faithfully set down all the chiefest arguments, which are usually alleged as well against the taking of the Oath, as in favour thereof; neither did I affirm any thing of my own opinion, but only as representing the persons of them, who of set purpose do publicly maintain, that the Oath either may, or may not be lawfully taken, leaving it to the Fatherly care of your Holiness, that when you have been fully informed of the whole progress of the matter, and have diligently examined all the reasons, for which English Catholics, obeying the King's commandment, have taken the Oath you will be pleased particularly to approve them, or to condemn them, that Catholics in this so most weighty a matter, which doth so nearly concern the prerogative of your spiritual Authority, and of his majesties Royalty, being fearful to resist your Holiness precept declared in your Breves, and also being desirous to obey, as much as with a safe conscience they may, his majesties command, may clearly perceive, which particular clauses of the Oath, they are bound to admit, and which they are bound to reject, and may in plain and express terms without any ambiguity of words be instructed by your Holiness, in what manner they may satisfy their own conscience, your Holiness will, and also his majesties desire concerning all the particular parts of the Oath. For as they are very ready to hazard their whole temporal estate, and also to lose their lives for the Catholic faith, which by the Church (to whom this office belongeth to define matters of faith, and not to private Doctors, who may deceive and be deceived) is declared to be truly the Catholic faith; so doubtless they are unwilling to expose themselves, & their whole Family and Posterity, which this our age doth so much labour to advance, to eminent danger of their temporal utter ruin, only for opinions, although they be maintained by the greater and better part of Divines, so that others, although far fewer in number, do defend the contrary, But as they are desirous with all their hearts to obey your Holiness in spiritual matters, and in those things, which cannot be omitted without sin, so also they might justly think themselves to be more hardly used, than children are wont by their Parents, if in these times specially, wherein by reason of the Catholic faith, which they profess, they have grievously incurred his majesties high displeasure, who is of a contrary Religion, they should without sufficient reason be forbidden to give that temporal Allegiance to his Majesty which they persuade themselves to be by the Law of Christ due to him, having always before their eyes that commandment of Christ our Saviour, Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and the things that are Gods, Matth. 22. to God. 11 And that your Holiness may yet more clearly perceive, that this my Disputation of the Oath (which is rather to be called a most humble Supplication to your Holiness) was written in manner of an humble Petition, I think it not amiss to repeat also word by word these very last words of my Epistle to your Holiness. 12 This therefore (most Holy Father) is our most humble Supplication to your Holiness. First, that your Holiness will be pleased to examine diligently the reasons, for which our English Catholics do think the Oath may lawfully be taken, and whereof they are persuaded your Holiness is not yet rightly informed. Secondly, that after you have thoroughly examined them, you will vouchsafe in regard of your Pastoral carefulness to instruct them, what parts of the Oath are (I do not say according to the probable opinion of some Dhctours, but according to Catholic doctrine necessarily to be believed by all Christians) repugnant to faith and salvation, and therefore cannot be taken by any Catholic with a safe and probable conscience: Thirdly, that if your Holiness shall find, that you have not been rightly informed of those reasons, for which our English Catholics are of opinion, that the Oath may lawfully be taken, and that therefore they have not in a matter of so great weight proceeded rashly and unadvisedly, you will be pleased receive them, and their Priests into your ancient favour, and that if they, or any of them have, not through their own fault, but through the indiscreet zeal of others suffered any loss, or detriment in their good names, or other ways, it may be restored again to them in that best manner, as shall seem convenient to the charity, justice, and wisdom of your Holiness. 13 Now what there is contained in this our humble Petition, against which your Holiness hath just cause to take so high displeasure, that you will not accept thereof, I remit to the judgement of indifferent men, but especially of your Holiness. For by that which we have said, it doth manifestly appear, that this Disputation of the Oath was for that end composed by me, to inform your Holiness, (who is the supreme Pastor of the Catholic Church, and to whom Christ our Lord hath given charge to feed his sheep, not only with precepts and Censures, but also with the word of Doctrine, and to instruct them in the Catholic faith) truly of our state, and to propound unto your Holiness sincerely, and with all dutiful submission those doubts, and difficulties, which both to myself and to other Catholics do occur about this new Oath, which is commanded by his Majesty, forbidden by your Holiness, and daily taken by almost all Catholics of the better sort, to whom it is tendered, yea even by those, who have the jesuits for their directors, howsoever these Fathers do in outward show seem to condemn the same; that after your Holiness had duly examined the reasons, and arguments, which are usually alleged on both sides, against, and for the taking of the Oath, you would be pleased to satisfy our consciences, and to make known unto us, what parts of the Oath may, according to the principles of the Catholic faith, be lawfully, and what parts may not lawfully be taken; and lastly to declare unto us which be those many things, which your Holiness being not rightly informed by some, as we imagine, hath affirmed in your Breves to be clearly repugnant to faith, and salvation; for no man, be he never so great an enemy to the Oath, dare avouch, that all things contained in the Oath, are repugnant to faith, or salvation. 14 Now I beseech your Holiness to judge, first, whether I the Author of those Books, who have professed myself to be a Catholic, and a Child of the Catholic Roman Church, and have subjecteth all my writings to her judgement, and Censure, with that submission, that whatsoever should not be approved by her I would disprove, condemn, and have it for not written, aught to be judged by the Supreme Pastor, and Father of the Catholic Church to be no Catholic, nor a child of the Catholic Church. If I be no Catholic, doubtless I must be an heretic, and defend obstinately (seeing that heresy, to be imputed to sin, cannot be without obstinacy) some doctrine contrary to the Catholic faith. But (to say nothing at this time of the doctrine, which I maintained in those Books, which if it were clearly heretical, why did not that Sacred Congregation condemn those Books as heretical?) I protested to write nothing obstinately, but with an humble and submissive mind, and ready to recall my error, as soon as I should perceive to have erred in any thing. I confess indeed that I may err, but by God his assistance I will never be an heretic. And if perchance in any thing I have erred, it is no error of malice or obstinacy, but of ignorance: For I will never by God his protection, wittingly, and willingly defend any thing at all, which I shall know to be contrary to sound Doctrine, or to the Catholic faith. 15 Secondly, concerning that which some men, to no small scandal to Catholic Religion, and to the great disgrace of the Sea Apostolic, especially among those who be Adversaries to the Catholic Religion, do give out, that your Holiness should say, that you would not accept the Dedication of my Disputation concerning the Oath, or rather the most humble Supplication of myself and of other Catholics, as I have showed before, this only at this present I will say, that we English Catholics are doubtless most miserable, who daily enduring so many discommodities of this life for the Catholic faith which we profess, and having provoked his Majesty, a Prince otherwise most merciful, who professeth the contrary Religion, to take displeasure against us, which of all the rest we account most grievous, and having therefore for a long time been, and are daily made a pitiful spectacle to this whole Kingdom, now by humble Petition craving to be instructed by your Holiness in those things, which you by your Apostolical Breves have to our most great temporal prejudice declared to be manifestly repugnant to faith and salvation, do not only not deserve so much at your hands, as to be heard herein, but your Holiness doth forbid and condemn our Petition, and doth threaten the Author to be punished with Censures, and other Ecclesiastical punishments, unless he purge himself forthwith, & yet after an unusual manner impeacheth him of no crime whereof he should purge himself. 16 For behold (most blessed Father) how miserable and to be pitied is our case. Our King's most excellent Majesty, to whom by the law of Christ we own temporal allegiance, doth demand of us, under pain of incurring most grievous penalties, an Oath which he affirmeth to be only a temporal Oath, and of temporal Allegiance; your Holiness, to whom by the law also of Christ we are bound to obey in spirituals, hath by your Breves altogether condemned the same, as containing in it many things flat contrary to faith and salvation; and hath withal declared, that all those Priests, who either do take the said Oath, or do teach, or shall teach that it may lawfully be taken, shall be deprived of their faculties: We English Catholics, being between these two narrow straits, and fearing least that by avoiding the gulf of Charybdis, we should fall upon the rock of Scylla, that is, lest that we should not render to God, or Caesar, that which is their due, do most instantly request your Holiness, who is our Superior Pastor in spirituals, and whose proper office is to instruct and confirm the sheep of Christ in the Christian faith, that you will be pleased to show unto us those many things, or at least wise one among those many, which in this Oath are so repugnant to faith and salvation, to the end that we may both satisfy our own conscinces, and also fulfil your Holiness, and his majesties commands, as much as in us lieth, and Catholic Religion will permit: And nevertheless your Holiness doth not only not admit our Petition, wherein with all dutiful submission we do propound the reasons and arguments, which are usually objected against, and for the taking of the Oath, to be examined by your Holiness, and affirming nothing of our own opinion, but you do also by the evil information of others, as we are persuaded, wholly condemn the same without alleging any crime either in particular or in general against it: and do declare, that the Author thereof, or your humble Petitioner, except he purge himself forthwith, shall be grievously punished, and nevertheless you make no mention of any crime at all, whereof he should purge himself. 17 Is it perchance a crime for those that are in ignorance, error, and doubt, to have recourse to the supreme Pastor, and Doctor of the Church, to be instructed by him in faith, and with due submission to propound to him the doubts and difficulties, which trouble both their own and other men's consciences, to be answered and satisfied by him, and that not in things of small moment, but in such as under pain of incurring great penalties do belong to the yielding of due obedience to God and Caesar? Is it a crime for children that are hungry to crave bread of their Father, for sheep that want Pasture to require food of their Shepherd, for Disciples that are ignorant to beseech humbly some instruction of their Master and Teacher? We English Catholics do acknowledge your Holiness to be our spiritual Father, Pastor, and Master, and do most humbly request to be instructed by your Holiness in the Catholic faith, and in those many things, which your Holiness by your Breves hath declared to be plainly repugnant to faith and salvation; and your Holiness doth damn, and forbidden our Petition, and doth ordain, after a manner altogether unusual, that I the Author thereof, who in the name of the rest have written, and composed the same, except I purge myself very speedily, shall be punished most severely: For, as I think, in no tribunal on the earth, this custom is to be found, that any man is compelled by sentence of the judge to purge himself under pain of incurring most grievous punishments, unless the judge doth make known unto him the crime, for which, if he do not purge himself, he is to be condemned; Besides, that it is impossible for one to purge himself of that crime, whereof he is ignorant. 18. And to speak freely the truth (for now I being summoned before the highest tribunal on earth to purge myself, am by the law itself permitted to speak somewhat more freely, so that I speak truly and modestly) this new kind of condemning the books of Catholic Authors, and of commanding the Author to purge himself forthwith, being made by such a public Decree, and under pain of incurring the penalties contained in the Council of Trent, and in the Index of forbidden books, without naming any crime eiher in particular, or in general, for which they are condemned, and of which the Author should purge himself (considering that the same punishment is not appointed in the Index for reading without distinction all sorts of forbidden books, neither do all crimes require the same Purgation) doth make both the Sea Apostolic odious to the Adversaries of Catholic Religion, who will easily from hence take occasion to persuade themselves, that the Bishops of Rome are wont to reject at their pleasure, and to suppress violently by threatenings, and not by reason or argument those opinions, which they do not like, and to promote by favours, and not by reasons those opinions which are pleasing to them; and also doth little satisfy prudent Catholics, who can hardly persuade themselves, that the Sacred Congregation of the right Honourable Cardinals, who are reputed for the examination of books (to whose informations your Holiness giving credit as we are assuredly persuaded, hath condemned those books, and ordained, that the Author shall be severely punished, unless be purge himself forthwith) if they could have found in them any proposition, which is certainly known to be heretical, erroneous, or repugnant to sound doctrine, they would have passed it over with such great silence, and (contrary to the usual manner of the Sea Apostolic in condemning the books of Catholic Authors, but of such especially who are commanded under pain of Censures to purge themselves forthwith, as by innumerable examples, which are extant in the Tomes of the councils, and in the Bulls of Popes I could demonstrate) command the Author to purge himself only in general words, without showing any crime either in particular, or general, of which he should purge himself. 19 I therefore the Author of those books, whom the Sacred Congregation, by the commandment of your Holiness hath enjoined to purge myself, but as yet I know not of what crime, a most dutiful child of the Catholic Roman Church, and of your Holiness in spirituals, and withal a most loyal subject of the Kingdom of England, and of our Sovereign Lord KING JAMES in temporals, being summoned before your Holiness his supreme tribunal to purge myself, prostrate at your Holiness feet, do humbly request you, by the dreadful Majesty of God, the Supreme judge of all; First, that your Holiness will judge that which is right, and do me justice, and not give credit to the information of them who are my Adversaries in this controversy, and have foully corrupted my words contrary to my meaning, but that you will examine my cause by your own certain knowledge, and that you will make known to me all those things, or at least wise some of them, which in those my books condemned by your Holiness commandment are clearly known to be repugnant to faith or good manners. For I protest, that I am most ready to correct those things that are to be corrected, to purge what is to be purged, to explain what is to be explained, and to retract what is to be retracted. 2 Secondly, that if your Holiness after due examination of my writings shall find, that you have been misinformed by some persons, and that nothing is to be found in those books contrary to Catholic doctrine, as some perchance have suggested to your Holiness, you will be pleased to recall that sentence of the Sacred Congregation published against me, and my books, through evil information, or vehement importunity of some men, or through misunderstanding the true meaning of my words; and that you will have a care of my good name in that good sort, as shall beseem your wisdom, charity and justice; and that you will account me to be a Catholic, and a Child of the Catholic Roman Church. For that which I did write in another place, f In Disp. Theol. in Admon. ad Lect. nu. 8. I do here repeat again. I am a Catholic and a Child of the Catholic Roman Church, and if any man of what degree soever he be, shall wrongfully accuse me of heresy, let him know assuredly, that by the assistance of Almighty God I will by all those means, which God and Nature hath granted to innocent men to defend themselves, to the uttermost of my power defend myself from their calumnies or slanders, until the Church being fully informed of my opinion, shall in plain and particular words (for no man can recall errors until he know particularly what they be) condemn the same. 21 Thirdly, that your Holiness will command, that this my purgation, and most humble Petition may for future memory be registered among the Acts of the holy Office of the Inquisition, as the condemnation of my books is recorded, as it appeareth by the Decree itself, that those who hereafter shall succeed in that Office, may give their sentence and judgement as well of this my Purgation, as of that condemnation of my books, and whether I am to be accounted a Catholic, and a child of the Church, or an heretic. 22 But if your Holiness will not be pleased to admit this my Purgation, and most humble Supplication, and to recall the sentence which upon evil information hath been denounced against my books, and to have a care of my good name, which hath been wrongfully taken away, although I know right well that the same most merciful and great God, who in times past preserved the credit of that holy man Robert Grosted Bishop of Lincoln, with whom Pope Innocentius the fourth being wonderfully offended, g Mat. Paris in Henrico 3o. ad ann. 1253. §. Diebus sub ijsdem, & ad annu. 1254. §. Hoc etiam an. Dominus Papa determined to cast his dead bones out of the Church, and to bring him into so great obloquy, that he should be proclaimed throughout the whole world for an Heathen, Rebel, and diobedient, for that he had written to the said Pope Innocentius in the spirit of humility and love, ut errores suos crebros corrigeret, that he would correct his frequent, or accustomed errors, although I know, I say that the same God, who is not an accepter of persons, is able also to deliver me from the unjust attempts, and false informations of any whatsoever, and to make known my innocency to your Holiness, and to the whole Christian world; nevertheless prayers, tears, and patience, joined with the testimony of a good conscience, shall be my chiefest refuge, and this shall be my daily comfort, that it is no what less but rather more happy and grateful to God, to suffer persecution for justice sake at the hands of Kinsmen, and of the same Household, who in friendship and society ought to be more straightly linked, then of Strangers. 23 Finally, if in this Purgation, which the Sacred Congregation by commandment of your Holiness hath enjoined me, I have offended any man, as I hope I have not, by speaking any thing not with that circumspection as is fitting (for wittingly I would give no man any just cause of offence) I do most humbly crave pardon both of your Holiness, for whose temporal and perpetual felicity I will continually pray unto our most merciful God, and also of the whole Christian world. From my Study in the Feast of S. john Baptist. 1614 A most humble Child and Servant of your Holiness, and of the Holy Sea Apostolic. The Author of the Books as aforesaid, etc. 138 THis is the Purgation & humble Supplication, which I sent to his Holiness upon the Decree, and commandment of the Lord Cardinals to purge myself forthwith; which their Decree, if all things be duly considered, doth rather confirm, & strengthen, than any way condemn, disprove, or weaken any particular doctrine contained in my books. For can a man with reason imagine, that those most Illustrious Cardinals would not for their honour sake, and for satisfaction of the Christian world, have expressed some bad doctrine contained in my books, but have forbidden them in such general words, without expressing any one proposition which is in them repugnant to faith or good manners, and after such an unusual manner have commanded me to purge myself forthwith, and that under pain of Ecclesiastical Censures, without declaring any crime either in particular, or in general, whereof I should purge myself, if the could have named any one proposition, which they could have clearly maintained to be repugnant to the Catholic faith, or Christian manners? especially, seeing that my Theological Disputatation, as I have showed above in my Purgation, was only an humble Petition to his Holiness, and a sincere propounding to his Fatherly consideration the great and many difficulties, which by occasion of his Breves condemning the Oath, as containing in it many things flat contrary to faith and salvation, did vex, trouble, and perplex the souls and consciences of his poor afflicted Catholics, earnestly requesting him, and in regard of his Pastoral office, as it were conjuring him, that he would be pleased to satisfy their difficulties, and to make known to them any one thing in the Oath of those many, which by his Breves he had declared to be clearly repugnant to faith and salvation. 139 Now to say, as some Priests here with us, to excuse this strange proceeding of his Holiness and the Cardinals, do very indiscreetly and unlearnedly affirm, that it is against the Majesty of the Court of Rome, to give English Catholics particular satisfaction in these points, and that they must obey with blind obedience, and without any further examining of the matter, whatsoever his Holiness, and the Cardinals of the Inquisition do decree, and command, although it be in prejudice to themselves, and to their temporal Prince and State, it is alas rather to be pitied, then answered. For no man of learning or judgement can make any doubt, but that if a spiritual Superior, or Prelate of what dignity, or pre-eminence soever he be, shall command, or forbidden any thing, which is dangerous to Religion, to the Commonwealth, or to a third person, (as all the world seethe the forbidding of English Catholics to take the new Oath of Allegiance, to be here in England thus dangerous) and the subject is doubtful, whether his prohibition, or commandment be lawful, or proceedeth from lawful and undoubted authority or no, he is not bound forthwith to obey, but he may without any note of disobedience propound humbly to his Superior, or Prelate the reasons of his doubt, and the causes which move him to think assuredly, that his Superior, or Prelate was misled either by false information, or by his own fallible opinion in imposing such a dangerous command: and the Superior, or Prelate, and much more if he be the Supreme Pastor of our souls, is bound by his Pastoral office to feed all the sheep of Christ's flock, with the word of doctrine and instruction, in things necessary to salvation, when they shall humbly and earnestly desire to be therein instructed by him to whom the charge of their souls is principally committed by Christ our Saviour, in those words spoken to S. Peter, Pasce agos meos, Pasce oves meas, Feed my lambs, Feed my sheep. 140 Seeing therefore, that we have divers times most humbly and earnestly requested his Holiness, being the Supreme Pastor of our souls, to make known to us any one thing of those many, which he in his Breves hath only in general words declared to be flat contrary to faith and salvation, or any one proposition contained in my books which is repugnant to faith or good manners, protesting with all sincerity to purge, and retract forthwith whatsoever is to be purged and retracted, and have also propounded unto him most humbly the reasons of our doubts, and why we are persuaded, that he hath herein been misled, and drawn to this course either by his own fallible opinion, or by the bad information of Cardinal Bellarmine, and his other Divines, most instantly requesting to be satisfied herein, and as yet cannot receive from him any satisfaction at all: And which also is very considerable, seeing that I have since that time made known to his Holiness, and to all the world by public writings, the manifest slanders, which Cardinal Bellarmine masked under the name of Doctor Schulckenius, and who also in that Congregation of Cardinals deputed for the examining of books is one of the chiefest men, and which is more strange, both my principal Adversary, Accuser, and judge, hath very falsely imposed upon me, and how shamefully he hath corrupted my words and meaning to prove me an heretic disguised under the fair colourable name of a Catholic: and to impeach my doctrine of error and heresy; And besides the discovery of these shameful calumnies, for the which I demanded justice at his Holiness hands, I have also made an other Supplication to his Holiness, most humbly requesting him, either to declare unto us what one thing in the Oath is repugnant to faith and salvation, and what one proposition in my books is contrary to faith or good manners, or else to cause that Decree of the Cardinals against my books to be reversed, and to account me and other Catholics not to be disobedient children to the Sea Apostolic for not admitting his Breves which are grounded either upon such an opinion, which no Catholic is bound to follow, or upon the false information of Cardinal Bellarmine and his other Divines, or rather upon both: And considering also, that not only, neither Cardinal Bellarmine hath for his credit sake cleared himself as yet of those fowl aspersions and crimes wherewith I have charged him, nor his Holiness hath as yet vouchsafed to give any fatherly instruction or satisfaction in these our important difficulties and necessary requests, but also the said Cardinals have after their former manner condemned that my Supplication only in general words without taking notice of the slanders, which Cardinal Bellarmine did falsely impose upon me, or expressing any one proposition contained in that Supplication, or in any other my books contrary to Catholic doctrine or Christian manners, as in that Supplication I desired to know; All which things being considered, I leave, good Catholic Reader, to thy prudent consideration, whether this strange proceeding of theirs be not an evident sign to any indifferent man, that they can find no one thing in the Oath, which is repugnant to faith or salvation, nor any one proposition in my books contrary to faith or good manners, and that in they have entered into such an exorbitant, uncharitable, and injurious course, and also drawn his Holiness thereunto, wherein with their honours they can hardly go forward, and yet rather than they will seem to go backward, and acknowledge freely that by the advise of Cardinal Bellarmine and other Divines of Rome they have been deceived, they will still go on, and care not to have innocent Catholics by their unjust proceed to be accounted heretics, or disobedient children to the Sea Apostolic, which in the end will turn to their great shame and dishonour, and in the mean time, cannot be but very scandalous to Catholic Religion, very dishonourable to the Pope's Holiness, and themselves, very injurious to English Catholics, and very burdensome to their own consciences, which so many dangers I beseech Almighty God with all my heart, that he will inspire them to prevent in time, and before it be to late. So that it were far better for the credit of my Adversaries, and of their cause, and for the honour of the Sea Apostolic not to urge any more the Pope's Breves against the Oath, or the cardinals Decree against my books, but to bury them with perpetual oblivion, unless his Holiness, and the Lord Cardinals of the Inquisition will descend to some particular points, which with their reputation and honour they are able to maintain. The same submission * What reasons the State may have to permit such submissions, see above in this Chapter from num. 110. which I made heretofore of all my writings to the Censure of the Catholic Roman Church, I do here repeat again. FINIS. Errata. Page Line Errors Corrected. 9 25 even ever 30 8 soul souls 55 35 with them with him 108 34 the 70. judges the judges 116 28 Galgatha Galgala 131 1 make may make 144 19 presenting representing 155 36 of Princes of the Princes 170 14 shall beneath shall see beneath 200 31 was grace was not grace 200 36 reign jonathan reign of jonathan 250 43 nature natural 286 29 not of malice not malice 286 37 amongst our amongst others our 287 8 pertienent impertinent 330 4 exercied exercised 330 7 as that as at that 347 7 Laws Lawyers 372 25 self who would self would 389 17 or for 394 13 no nor 396 2 deserveth both in deserveth in 408 27 upon to upon him to 411 37 valued valid 418 37 of of his 435 19 Canonica Canonici 442 3 confuted confirmed 450 19 both them both of them 469 21 for that the for the 477 20 to believed to be believed 505 17 lilence licence 508 2 comfort confront 509 27 uncertain certain 515 42 dogmatike dogmatize 542 41 Decrees Decree 565 2 propound propounded 572 26 running cunning 576 32 altogeth altogether 584 12 included concluded 585 7 them then 591 15 meat means 591 23 despose depose 596 26 artificial artificial 596 28 aimeth at in aimeth in 630 19 nud and 636 11 Dhctours Doctors