New ERRORS Made Palpable by an old LIGHT:  
OR A Cheap and easy Method to Cure the Dissensions of the Time by a Septuagint of Conclusions, Composed and Experimented.  
BY Anthony Norwood, Esquire.  
LONDON, Printed by E. G. and are to be sold by CHARLES adam's, at the Marigold in Fleetstreet over against Fe●ter-Lane, 1652.   


LOng preambles to short discourses are like wide Lists to narrow , which though they set off the commodity, yet they yield no benefit to the Buyers. Instead therefore of a Preface, take (for the better understanding of that which follows) this brief survey of such political Axioms as have been held forth to the people for infallible verties by some of the late Aulicicall pretenders to Divinity.  

The Episcopal party determine thus.  
THat by the ordinance of God national government ought to be successively monarchical, or solely and hereditarily in one.  
That as the Israelites, so all Nations ought to be governed by Kings; and that Kings may not be resisted, deposed or punished.  
That as the primitive Christians, so all believing associations ought to have Bishops to superintend in their Ecclesiastical polity.  
That the Regal and Episcopal offices may be managed by two distinct persons in one and the same Commonwealth; and that both are of divine institution.   

The Antiepiscoparian Doctrines, speak to this effect.  
THat although there be no divine Law by which the government by Kings was constituted, but what was peculiar to the children of Israel, yet Regal Government ought to be continued in all Christian associations.  
That in some cases Kings may be resisted, but may neither be deposed nor punished.  
That, although there were Bishops and no Kings in that polity which was peculiar to the primitive Christians, yet the government by Bishops is Antichristian and aught to be discontinued.  
That in civil affairs government ought to be Monarchical and in one, but in Ecclesiastical concernments democratical and by many.   
This is sum of what they say, and at how wide a distance in opinion, the Prelatical and Presbyterian Doctors stand in opposition one to the other is manifest by these their publicly avowed principles; wherein I conceive each of them to be no less remote from truth; and this I shall endeavour to demonstrate in the ensuing propositions, that so the people of the Nation may be no longer blown in sunder, and disjointed by such impetuous counterblasts of blind, carnal and selfe-intending Rudiments.  
Thus than we begin.   

I.  
If in the first ages of the world, as well before the flood as after, every Father had by the Law of God and nature, a jurisdiction over his own family sole and independent of any other humane authority than was it a sin in any other to usurp upon their jurisdictions in any case whatsoever.  
But in the first ages of the world, as well before the flood as after, every Father had by the Law of God and Nature a jurisdiction over his own family sole and independent of any other humane authority.  
Therefore whosoever did then assume a power over any other Father or his family in any case whatsoever, did therein transgress the ordinance of God.   

II.  
If God was displeased with Nimrod, for arrogating to himself a jurisdiction over more families than his own, than was it not lawful for him so to do.  
But God was displeased with Nimrod, for arrogating to himself a jurisdiction over more families than his own.  
Therefore his so doing was not justifiable in the sight of Almighty God.   

III.  
If the disposing of the children of Israel into a select fraternity under Kings and Priests, was a typical representation of Christ and his Church, then is it not presidentially obliging.  
But the disposing of the Children of Israel into a select fraternity under Kings and Priests was a typical representation of Christ and his Church.  
Therefore although the institution were from God, yet doth it not oblige all people and in all times.   

iv  
If God was displeased with the Israelites for desiring to be governed by Kings, and if the precedent government by Judges did continue some hundreds of years, without any express dislike from God; then, if all Nations ought to be presidented by them, the government by Judges ought rather to be embraced then that of Kings.  
But God was displeased with the Israelites, for desiring to be governed by Kings; and the precedent government by Judges did continue 450. years, without any express dislike from God, Acts 13. 20.  
Therefore if all Nations ought to be presidented by the Israelites, the government by Judges ought rather to be embraced then that of Kings:   

V.  
If national government in a military form be not perpetuated by any universally binding Law of God, and if the Kings of Israel were distinguistable in their office from the Judges of that Nation by their military employment only, then is it more reasonable to say that all Nations may be governed by Judges, then that they ought to be everlastingly governed by Kings.  
But national government in a military equipage is not perpetuated by any universal Law of God, and the Kings of Israel were distinguishable in their office, from the Judges of that Nation by their Military employment only. 1 Sam. 10. 1.  
Therefore it is more rational to say, that all Nations may be governed by Judges, then that they ought to be everlastingly governed by Kings.   

VI  
If the government of the whole world were at any time in the power of one Man, then if Monarchical government be instituted by God, it is as lawful to subdivide it into as many Monarchies as there are families, as to divide it into so many Kingdoms as are now in Christendom.  
But the government of the whole world was by the donation of God solely and Monarchically in Nabuchadnezzar. Jer. 27. 7.  
Therefore, if Monarchical government be instituted by God, it is as lawful to subdivide it into as many Monarchies as there are families, as to divide it into so many Kingdoms as are now in Christendom.   

VII.  
If they who teach, that by the ordinance of God the government of a Christian Commonwealth ought to be Monarchical, and in one, do likewise affirm that by the like ordinance two or more ought to bear rule in the same Commonwealth, then is their doctrine contradictory to itself.  
But they who teach, that by the ordinance of God the government of a Christian Commonwealth ought to be Monarchically in a King, do likewise affirm that the Clergy have by divine right a gubernative power in the same Commonwealth.  
Therefore the Monarchical Doctors will have something to do to reconcile their own flat contradictions.   

VIII.  
If there be nothing in the ordinance to restrain Kings or Bishops to exercise what power, and over what people they please, nor any thing to prohibit the people to have as many, or as few, and what persons they please to be their Kings or Bishops, then is the doctrine of divine ordination of Kings and Bishops impertinent and inconsistent with peaceable government.  
But there is nothing in the ordinance to restrain either Kings or Bishops from exercising what power, and over what people they please, nor any thing to prohibit the people from having as many, or as few, and what persons they please to be their Kings or Bishops.  
Therefore the doctrine of divine ordination is impertinent, and not consistent with prudential and peaceable principles.   

IX.  
If the Ceremonial Law be abolished, and whatsoever was derived from that Law lost its efficacy when that was abrogated, than all forms of government constituted by that Law did determine with it.  
But the Ceremonial Law is abrogated, and whatsoever was derived from that Law lost its efficacy when that was abolished.  
Therefore all forms of government constituted by that Law are now determined.   

X.  
If neither before the Ceremonial Law was constituted, nor after it was abolished, God did prescribe the Laws or any set form of government, by which and none other, he would have all associated people unalterably governed, then is there not now remaining any municipal Laws or form of national government of an immediate divine institution.  
But neither before that Law was instituted nor after it was abrogated did God prescribe any such Laws, or form of government.  
Therefore no such Laws or form of government are now of an immediate divine institution.   

XI.  
If after the abolition of the Ceremonial Law no people were confined by God to any positive and known form of Polity, then after that Law was abrogated the fathers of families were not restrained by God, of any part of those rights, which were due to them before that Law was in force.  
But after the abolition of the Ceremonial Law no people were confined by God to any positive and known form of Polity.  
Therefore after that Law was abrogated the primitive rights of the Fatherhood might revert to them, notwithstanding any ordinance of God to the contrary.   

XII.  
If in the Gospel all those who are subordinate to the Father of a family be commanded to obey him in every thing, than Christianity doth not abridge a Father of any part of his primitive Prerogative.  
But all those who are subordinate to the Father of a family, are commanded in the Gospel to obey him in every thing. Eph. 5. 24. Colo. 3. 20, 22.  
Therefore a Father of a family loseth nothing of his primitive Prerogative by being converted to the faith.   

XIII.  
If merely by the donation of the graces of the spirit, no Father hath a more particular privilege, or prerogative then another, than no Christian Father hath more right than another to a gubernative superiority by divine dispensation.  
But no Father hath merely by the donation of the graces of the spirit, a more particular privilege or prerogative then another.  
Therefore upon that account, no Father hath by divine dispensation more right than another to a gubernative superiority.   

XIV.  
If believing Fathers have from God an equal, sole and independent power both by grace and nature, than no man hath a power to compel them to associate in government, or being associated to impose upon them in causes, either Civil or Ecclesiastical.  
But believing Fathers have from God an equal, sole and independent power both by grace and nature.  
Therefore no man hath authority to compel them to associate in government, or being associated to impose upon them in causes, either Civil or Ecclesiastical.   

XV.  
If no man have a power to impose upon believing Fathers, or to compel them to associate in government, then may such fathers retain their native freedom and independency in all causes as well Civil as Ecclesiastical.  
But no man hath by divine right a power to impose upon heleeving Fathers, or to compel them to associate.  
Therefore such Fathers may continue free and independent in both the said causes.   

XVI.  
If the preservation of peace and propriety, be the proper end of all national government, and if believing fathers have a right to preserve their own freedom against an obtruded power; then is it necessary, that in all Christian associations, government be so constituted, that the subordinate Fathers may be convinced of the lawfulness of the power and personal calling of their Magistrates.  
But the preservation of peace and propriety is the proper end of all nation all government, and believing Fathers have a right to preserve their own freedom against an obtruded power.  
Therefore it is necessary, that in all Christian associations, government be so constituted, that the subordinate Fathers may be convinced of the lawfulness of the power and personal calling of their Magistrates.   

XVII.  
If Magistrates may sin by usurping upon those over whom they have no warrantable jurisdiction, than some rule is necessary by which they may infallibly know as well to what people, as to what dispensations their authority may lawfully be extended.  
But Magistrates may sinne by usurping upon those over whom they have no warrantable jurisdiction.  
Therefore some rule is necessary, by which they may infallibly know as well to what dispensations, as over what people their authority may lawfully be extended.   

XVIII.  
If in a Christian Commonwealth neither parochial, provincial, or Monarchical Magistrates can be known or distinguished in their persons or power by the Law of God, then subordinate's cannot be convinced of the lawfulness of their personal calling and power by any divine directory.  
But in a Christian Commonwealth neither Parochial, Provincial, or Monarchical Magistrates can be known or distinguished in their persons or power by the Law of God.  
Therefore by a divine directory, subordinate's cannot be convinced of the lawfulness of the personal calling and power of any such Magigistrates.   

XIX.  
If God hath no where entailed the Government of many families upon the eldest Son of the precedent governor, and if the Crown of Jsrael did not descend in a right line by priority of blood, then is there not either a divine precent or precedent to justify a claim to Magistracy by hereditary succession.  
But neither hath God entailed the government of many families upon the eldest Son of the precedent governor, nor did the Crown of Israel descend in a right line by priority of blood.  
Therefore he that claims a Crown by succession, will never be able to make out a good Title by the bare plea of a divine Charter.   

XX.  
If the jurisdiction of Augustus Caesar did extend to the whole known world, then, if government ought to be hereditarily monarchical no Nation of the world can at this day be under any known lawful Monarchical authority.  
But the whole known world was under the jurisdiction of Augustus Caesar. Luke 2. 1.  
Therefore the several Nations of the world cannot at this day be under any known lawful authority, if God hath appointed government to be hereditarily Monarchical.   

XXI.  
If the last line of English Kings did derive their title to the Crown from Conquest, and if there were any Kings in England before them, then, if the Crowns of Kings ought by the ordinance of God to descend to their next legitimate heirs, the title of the last Kings was invalid.  
But the last line of English Kings did derive their title to the Crown from Conquest, and there were Kings in England before them.  
Therefore, if the Crowns of Kings ought by God's ordinance to descend in a right line to their next legitimate heirs, the title of the last Kings was usurped, and whatsoever any of them acted as Kings was unlawful and is voidable.   

XXII.  
If the limits and precincts of no such Magistrates are laid out by any divine boundaries, then can they not infallibly know of what people they respectively may lawfully take cognisance by any theological dispensatory.  
But the limits and precincts of no such Magistrates are laid out by divine boundaries.  
Therefore of what people they respective may lawfully take cognisance is not determinable by Theology.   

XXIII.  
If no such Magistrates be distinguishable in their persons, power or precincts by any divine directory, than neither Magistrates nor Subordinates' can be convinced of their reciprocal allegiance, but by some humane demonstration.  
But no such Magistrates are distinguishable in their persons, power or precincts by any divine directory.  
Therefore neither Parochial, Provincial, or Monarchical Magistrates, nor their Subordinates' can be convinced of their reciprocal allegiance, but by some humane demonstration.   

XXIV.  
If it be a humane Law only by which the persons, power and precincts of all such Magistrates are known and distinguished, so as to create a mutual allegiance between them and their Subordinates', than no such allegiance can be created unless some known persons have a lawful power to make Laws.  
But it is a humane Law only by which such persons are so distinguished as to create a mutual allegiance.  
Therefore, unless some known persons have a lawful power to make Laws, no such allegiance can be created.   

XXV.  
If no man be bound to submit to such Laws as are constituted by an obtruded power, than the Lawmakers ought to have a known lawful power over that whole community, to which they pretend a power of giving Laws.  
But n o man is bound to submit to Laws constituted by an obtruded power.  
Therefore the Lawmakers ought to have a known lawful power over the whole Community.   

XXVI.  
If the Authority of the Law makers ought to extend lawfully to the whole Community, than it must be such as relating to all, doth not thereby infringe any known Law of God.  
But their Authority by whom Laws are made, aught to extend lawfully to the whole Community.  
Therefore, it must be such as relating to all, no divine Law is thereby infringed.   

XXVII.  
If the Law maker's Authority ought to be such as doth not infringe any known Law of God, and if originally the paternal jurisdiction be by divine right sole and independent, then in believing associations, none have a justifiable and satisfactory calling to make Laws and constitute public Magistrates, either Civil or Ecclesiastical, but the fathers of families or some deputed by them.  
But the Authority of Lawmakers must be such as doth not trespass upon any known Law of God, and the paternal Prerogative is sole and independent.  
Therefore none have a warrantable power to give Laws or impose Magistrates either Civil or Ecclesiastical upon believing associates, but the fatherhood or their deputies.   

XXVIII.  
If the Magistratical power neither of Kings, Priests, or Judges of Israel, did consist in making, but in declaring Law, then as they were Kings, Priests, and Judges, they had no Legislative Authority.  
But the Magistratical power neither of King's Priests, or Judges of Israel did consist in making, but in declaring Law.  
Therefore they had not any Legislative Authority belonging to them, as they were either Kings, Priests, or Judges.   

XXIX.  
If neither the Kings, Priests, or Judges of Israel had a Legislative power appending to their offices, and if there be no Law of God that giveth such power to such officers, than neither Kings, Priests, or Judges have by divine right a Legislative power in respect of their offices.  
But neither the Kings, Priests, or Judges of that Nation had a Legislative power appending to their offices, nor is there any Law of God that giveth such power to such Magistrates.  
Therefore by divine right, neither Kings, Priests, or Judge have a Legislative power by virtue of any of their offices.   

XXX.  
If in Christian associations none have a warrantable and satisfactory calling to make Laws or constitute public Magistrates of any sort whatsoever, but the fathers themselves, or some deputed by them, than the Authority of the fatherhood of associated Christians, either persovally or representatively assembled, is sole independent and supreme in all causes, as well Civil as Ecclesiastical.  
But in Christian associations none have a warrantable and satisfactory calling to make Laws or constitute public Magistrates of any sort whatsoever, but the fathers themselves or some deputed by them.  
Therefore the Authority of the fatherhood of associated Christians, either personally or representatively assembled is sole independent and supreme in all causes, as well Ecclesiastical as Civil.   

XXXI.  
If it be not discernible who amongst the individual members of a Christian Commonwealth is more particularly inspired with the gifts of the Spirit than another, then in such associations the gifts of the Spirit are not convincing evidence of the lawful calling of any Magistrates.  
But it is not discernible who amongst the individual members of a Christian Commonwealth is more particularly inspired with the gifts of the spirit then another.  
Therefore the gifts of the Spirit are not competent to distinguish who in such associations ought to be Magistrates, and who subordinate's.   

XXXII.  
If in the associations of believers the gifts of the Spirit be not competent whereby to determine who ought therein to be Magistrates, then is there no other way to distinguish between Magistrates and subordinate's, but by the rule of Nature or consent.  
But in the associations of believers, the gifts of the Spirit are not competent whereby to determine who ought therein to be Magistrates.  
Therefore there is no other way to distinguish between Magistrates and subordinate's in such associations, but by the rule of Nature or Consent.   

XXXIII.  
If the Magistrates of a Christian Commonwealth are no other way distinguishable from subordinate's but by the rule of Nature or Consent, than the Government of Christian associations falls wholly under a natural and prudential speculation.  
But the Magistrates of a Christian association are no other way distinguishable from subordinate's, but by the rule of Nature or Consent.  
Therefore the Government of a Christian Commonwealth falls altogether under a natural and prudential speculation.   

XXXIV.  
If the Government of a Christian Commonwealth falls wholly under a natural and prudential speculation, than they who are of the Ministerial function have not therein any singular privilege to a gubernative power by divine dispensation.  
But the Government of a Christian Commonwealth hath its form and being merely from prudence and Nature.  
Therefore they who are of the Ministerial function, have therein no singular right to a gubernative power by divine dispensation.   

XXXV.  
If no Christian Father be prohibited the Graces of the Spirit, or before association forbidden by God to exercise the Ministerial function in his own family, then after association they have an equal liberty to officiate therein, notwithstanding any divine prohibition.  
But no Christian Father is prohibited the Graces of the Spirit, or before association forbidden to exercise the Ministerial function in his own family.  
Therefore, notwithstanding any divine prohibition, they have after association an equal liberty of officiating therein.   

XXXVI.  
If after association the believing fathers of Christian families have an equal liberty to officiate in the Ministerial function, then in a Christian Commonwealth the personal calling to the Ministerial office proceeds not from divine inauguration.  
But after association, the associated believing fathers of Christian families have an equal power to officiate in the Ministerial function, notwithstanding any divine prohibition.  
Therefore the persoval calling to the public Ministerial office must necessarily proceed from politic and prudential considerations.   

XXXVII.  
If in a Christian Commonwealth the personal disposing of the Ministerial office be from humane institution, and if believing fathers have originally an equal disciplinary power, then merely the calling to the Ministerial office cannot make a justifiable claim to a disciplinary Authority.  
But in such a Commonwealth the personal calling to the Ministerial office is from humane institution, and believing fathers have originally an equal disciplinary power.  
Therefore a claim to a disciplinary Authority cannot be made good merely by the calling to the Ministerial office.   

XXXVIII.  
If the Apostles thought it not reasonable that they should be obstructed in executing their Ministerial office by regulating the distribution of public Alms to distressed Christian widows, and if nothing belonging to discipline agrees better with the preaching of the Gospel than the duties of Charity, than a reason will be hardly found, why they who are set apart for Doctrine must therefore necessarily have to do with discipline.  
But the Apostles thought it not reasonable that they should be hindered in their Ministerial employment by regulating the distribution of public Alms to distressed widows, and nothing belonging to discipline agrees better with the drofession of a Minister of the Gospel, than the duties of charity. Act. 6. 2.  
Therefore an Apostolical reason is not to be found, why the Ministers of the Gospel must necessarily be Magistrates in office.   

XXXIX.  
If they who are Ministers in office have not thereby any privilege to be Magistrates in office, than the Episcopal office is not inseparably annsxed to the Ministerial function.  
But ehey who are Ministers in office have not thereby any privilege to be Magistrates in office.  
Therefore I cannot conceive it to be any profanation of the office, should some Lay-Elders be appointed to supply the places of such Bishops as were in the Churches of the primitive Christians.   

XL.  
If the Faith of the primitive Christians was the only cause why that polity which they had peculiar to themselves, was accounted holy, then is there no cause why some part of the polity of associated believing families should be esteemed more or less holy than some other.  
But the Faith of the primitive Christians was that alone for which the polity which they had peculiar to themselves was accounted holy.  
Therefore there is no cause why the polity of believing associates should be esteemed more or less holy in one part then in another.   

XLI.  
If it be through Faith only that holiness be imputed to man by God, and if wheresoever Faith is, there holiness be imputed, than sanctimony is not to be attributed more to one believing member of a Christian association, then to another.  
But it is through Faith only that holiness is imputed to man by God, and wheresoever Faith is, there holiness is imputed.  
Therefore sanctimony is not to be attributed more to one believing member of a Christian Commonwealth then to another.   

XLII.  
If holiness be an attribute belonging as well to all as to any believers, and to every part as well as to any part of the polity of believing associates, than the native power of a believing Fatherhood is not made less by a pretended personal or political holiness.  
But holiness is an attribute belonging as well to all as to any believers, and to every part as well as to any part of the polity of believing associates.  
Therefore a pretended personal or political holiness, cannot take away the native power of a believing Fatherhood.   

XLIII.  
If the authority of a Christian Commonwealth be solely and independently in the Fatherhood, and if lawful authority ought to be obeyed, than aught communicated Christians to subscribe wholly to that polity which is constituted by the Fatherhood, whether personally or electively congregated.  
But the authority of a Christian Commonwealth is solely and independently in the Fatherhood and lawful authority ought not to be disobeyed.  
Therefore communicated Christians are religiously bound to subscribe wholly to that polity which is constituted by the authority of the Fatherhood.   

XLIIII.  
If the Fatherhood of associated Christians have a right of power, sole independent and extendable to the whole Community, then is it no more lawful for any member therein associated to appeal from their determinations to his own judgement, or to a foreign Judicatory, in matters tending to public uniform worship, then in those which tend to the persecution of peace and prosperity.  
But the authority of the Fatherhood of associated Christians is sole, independent, and extendably to the whole Community.  
Therefore it is as unlawful for any associated member thereof to appeal from their determinations to his own judgement, or to a foreign Judicatory in matters tending to public uniform worship, as in those which tend to the preservation of peace and propriety.   

XLV.  
If the authority of the Fatherhood be sole and independent in all causes, than no foreign power can assume a jurisdiction over any member of a Christian association without sin.  
Bue the authority of the Fatherhood is sole and independent in all causes.  
Therefore it is a sin for any foreign power to assume a jurisdiction over any member of a Christian association.   

XLVI.  
If no foreign power can assume a jurisdiction over any associated members of a Christian Commonwealth without sin, than the pretended Roman Hierarchy is a sinful usurpation.  
But no foreign power can assume a jurisdiction over any associated members of a Christian Commonwealth without sin.  
Therefore the pretended universal Roman Hierarchy is usurpatious and unlawful.   

XLVII.  
If the paternal authority be sole, equal, and independent, than none hath by his own right a pre-eminence above another to act in their National Counsels.  
But the paternal authority is originally sole, equal, and independent.  
Therefore in a Christian Commonwealth no Father hath by his own right more or less power than another, to act in their National Assemblies.   

XLVIII.  
If in the associations of believing Fathers, no Father hath a greater privilege than another to act in their National Conventions, then if in their representative Assemblies one cannot act unless he be elected, no more may any other.  
But in Christian associations not one Father hath a greater privilege to act in their Common-Councels then another.  
Therefore, if in their representative Conventions one cannot act unless he be elected, no more may any other.   

XLIX.  
If in their representative Counsels none hath more power to act then another, unless he be elected, than the pretended power of Kings and Lords spiritual and temporal, to act by virtue of their own rights is not justifyable.  
But in the representative Counsels of associated believing Fathers, none hath more power to act then another, unless he be elected.  
Therefore the pretended power of Kings and Lords spiritual and temporal to act in such Counsels, by virtue of their own rights is not justifiable.   

L.  
If custom cannot destroy a right grounded upon an universal Law of God, the the authority of the Fatherhood cannot be voided by any customary claims.  
But custom cannot destroy a right grounded upon an universal Law of God. Mat. 15. 3. 4. 9  
Therefore no customary claims can make void the sole and independent authority of a Christian Fatherhood.   

LI.  
If the government of a Christian Commonwealth be solely and independently in the Fatherhood then whosoever assumes a power in competition with the Common-council of a believing Fatherhood, usurps upon their authority, and sins against God's ordinance.  
But the government of a Christian Commonwealth is solely and independently in the Fatherhood.  
Therefore whosoever assumes a power in competition with them, or with their representatives, doth thereby sin against God's ordinance.   

LII.  
If the Fatherhood of Christian associations have a sole and independent power, and if it be a sin to usurp upon that authority, then may the representative trusties of the Fatherhood, lawfully resist any such usurpation.  
But the authority of the Fatherhood of associated Christians is sole and independent, and it is a sin to usurp upon that authority.  
Therefore any such usurpation may lawfully be resisted by the representative trusties of the Fatherhood.   

LIII.  
If it be lawfully in the power of the representative trusties of the Fatherhood, to resist any such usurpation; then they are bound in honour and religion, not to suffer any to be competitors with them in government, if they have a potency wherewith to oppose.  
But it is lawfully in the power of the representative trusties of the Fatherhood to resist any usurped power.  
Therefore, if they be in a condition to prevent it, it stands not with their honour, nor honesty to suffer any to be their competitors.   

LIIII.  
If the trusties of the Fatherhood cannot in honour or honesty suffer any to be sharers with them in government, they having a potency to oppose, than had it been dishonest and dishonourable in the present trusties of the Fatherhood, to yield an inherent right in the Militia and Negative voice to a King in their power, who had taken up Arms to maintain the encroachment.  
But the trusties of the Fatherhood cannot in honour or honesty suffer any to be sharers with them in government, they being in an opposing condition.  
Therefore had they yielded an inherent right in the Militia and Negative voice to a King who had put the Nation to a vast expense in a war raised to maintain the encroachment, they had neither done honestly nor honourably.   

LV.  
If the supreme power be solely and independently in the Fatherhood, and if their present trusties did by their public Remonstrances engage the people in a chargeable war against the contrary pretences, then if after the sword had determined the controversy, they had yielded up their sole and independent interests they might deservedly have been noted with the brand of infidelity to all succeeding generations.  
But the supreme authority is solely and independently in the Fatherhood, and their present trusties had engaged the people in a chargeable war by their public Remonstrances against the contrary pretensions.  
Therefore they might deservedly have been noted with the ignominious brand of infidelity to all succeeding generations, had they, after the sword had determined the controversy, yielded up any part of that sole and independent authority with which they were entrusted.   

LVI.  
If the Laws now in being do not agree in all points with the Laws of former ages, then, if the present Laws be of any force, it must necessarily be acknowledged that humane Laws are alterable and repealable.  
But the Laws now in being do not agree in all points with the Laws of former ages.  
Therefore, if the present Laws be of any force, it must be acknowledged that humane Laws are alterable and repealeable.   

LVII.  
If humane National Laws may lawfully be altered or repealed, than they may be repealed or altered by that authority, or the like to that by which they were or aught to have been made.  
But it is lawful to alter or repeal any humane National Laws.  
Therefore they may be altered or repealed by that authority or the like to that by which they were or aught to have been made.   

LVIII.  
If humane Laws may be altered or repealed by that authority or the like to that by which they were made, than the Fatherhood of Christian associations may alter or repeal any municipal Laws therein constituted.  
But humane Laws may be altered or repealed by that authority or the like to that by which they were or aught to have been made.  
Therefore the municipal Laws of Christian associations may be altered or repealed by the Fatherhood or their representatives.   

LIX.  
If humane Laws may be altered or repealed by the Fatherhood, and if Magistrates Parochial, Provincial, and Monarchical be of humane institution, than any such Magistrates may be outed of their authority by an act of the Fatherhood, either personally or representatively assembled.  
But municipal Laws may be altered or repealed by the Fatherhood, and all such Magistrates be of humane institution.  
Therefore any such Magistrates may be outed of their authority by an act of the Fatherhood whether personally or representatively assembled.   

LX.  
If in the English Nation there hath been at one and the same time, many King's independent one of another, from whom the last Kings could not derive any interest then to make out a justifiable title to the late Kings, it must be confessed that Kings may be deposed.  
But in the English Nation, there hath been at one and the same time, many King's independent one of another, from whom the last Kings could not derive any interest.  
Therefore the title of the late Kings was invalid, unless Kings may lawfully be deposed.   

LXI.  
If before association the Fathers of a Christian Commonwealth were equally independent, then after association they are equally obliged to submit to the Laws therein constituted.  
But before association, the Fathers of a Christian Commonwealth were equally independent.  
Therefore being associated, they are equally bound to submit to the Laws therein constituted.   

LXII.  
If the members of a Commonwealth be equally bound to submit to the Laws therein constituted, then, although the collective body of the Fatherhood be independent, yet independency ceaseth as to any individual Member.  
But the Members of a Commonwealth are equally bound to submit to the Laws therein constituted.  
Therefore as to any individual Members of a Commonwealth independency ceaseth after association.   

LXIII.  
If every individual Member of a Commonwealth be equally liable to the penalties of the Laws therein constituted, then for the same cause that any one may be put to death, for the same may any other.  
But every individual member of a Commonwealth, is equally liable to the Laws therein constituted  
Therefore for the same cause that any one may be put to death, for the same may any other.   

LXIV.  
If the Lawmaker may decree him to death, who acts any thing by which the established government of a Commonwealth may be endangered, and if the legislative power be solely in the Fatherhood, then much more may they order him to death, who acts any thing destructive to that authority, by which only such government can be established.  
But Lawmakers may decree him to death, who acts any thing by which the established government of a Commonwealth may be endangered, and the legislative power is solely in the Fatherhood.  
Therefore much more may they order him to death, by whom anything is acted destructive to that authority, by which only such government can be established.   

LXV.  
If the setting up of the Kings of Israel, is not so clearly approved by God, as the punishing of their offending Kings by death, than it is more reasonable to conclude from what was demonstrated by God to that Nation, that offending Kings ought to be punished, then that the setting up of Kings is necessarily enjoined.  
But the setting up of Kings, hath not so clear an approbation from God in that Nation, as the punishing of their offending Kings. 2 Kings 9 ch. 2 Kings 10. 30.  
Therefore from what was demonstrated by God to the children of Israel, it is more reasonable to conclude, that peccant Kings ought to be punished, then that all Nations ought to be governed by Kings.   

LXVI.  
If by the gifts of grace and nature, the Fatherhood of a Christian association, have from God a sole independent and supreme authority, and if a Christian Fatherhood, Eldership and Presbytery do signify all one and the same thing, then in such associations Presbyterian Government instituted by God is not to be found, but in the personal or representative Assembly of the Fatherhood.  
But by the gifts of Grace and Nature, the Fatherhood of a Christian association hath from God a sole independent and supreme authority, and a Christian Fatherhood, Eldership, and Presbytery do signify all one & the same thing.  
Therefore unless it be in the personal or representative Assembly of the Fatherhood, Presbyterian Government instituted by God is not to be found in a Christian Commonwealth; and they who pretending for Presbyterian Government do quarrel with the representative Assembly of the Fatherhood, do contend with that for which they seem to contend.   

LXVII.  
If in the established Government of a populous Commonwealth, it be prudentially necessary that there be Governors of different qualifications, to whom those who are subordinate aught to be in subjection; and if where such Governors are, there necessarily must be priority and inferiority, and degrees of both, then in such a Commonwealth the native parity and equality of the individual subordinate members must be superseded.  
But in the established government of a populous Commonwealth, it is prudentially necessary that there be Governors of different qualifications, to whom those who are subordinate aught to be in subjection, and wheresoever such Governors are, there necessarily must be priority and inferiority and degrees of both.  
Therefore the parity and equality of the individual subordinate members must necessarily be superseded in the established Government of of a populous Commonwealth.   

LXVIII.  
If the Fatherhood of a Christian Association hath from God by the gifts of Grace and Nature, a sole and independent power in all causes as well spiritual as temporal, than all Oaths and Covenants destructive to their interests are sinful and void.  
But the Fatherhood of a Christian Commonwealth hath from God by the gifts of Grace and Nature a sole and independent power in all causes as well Ecclesiastical as Civil.  
Therefore all such oaths and covenants are sinful and void, as are destructive to their interests.   

LXIX.  
If it be inconsistent with the paternal Prerogative to have sharers with them in government, then if any member of a christian association do voluntarily vow allegiance to any other power, be it foreign or domestic, his vow is sinful, and the covenant void.  
But it is inconsistent with the paternal Prerogative to have sharers with them in government.  
Therefore if any member of a Christian association do vow allegiance to any other power be it foreign or domestic, his vow is sinful and the covenant void.   

LXX.  
If national Covenants be grounded upon a humane Law, and if the supreme legislative power ought to be obeyed as well in their abrogating as in their making of Laws, then, if the Law upon which a Covenant is grounded be taken away, the Covenant loseth its force.  
But national Covenants are grounded upon a humane Law, and the supreme legislative power ought to be obeyed as well in their abrogating, as in their constituting of Laws.  
Therefore all such covenants lose their force, if the Law upon which they are grounded be taken away.  
Truth is best discerned when in her plainest dress, I have therefore clothed these my conceptions in this home-span attire, that the sense and intendment of the conclusions may be obvious to the meanest capacity; wherein did I conceive the least inconsistency with even and upright reason, they should sooner have felt the flames, then seen the light: But lest I may therein seem to some, to savour too much of an affected singularity, I will close up the propositions with our Saviour's example, than which none is more proper for a Christian Man's imitation and direction; and from thence it seems to me, that the most material of the precedent inferences may rationally be deducted.  
Amongst the Evangelists, who, being particularly inspired, wrote the story of his life and passion, it is recorded, that he bestowed a chiding upon Peter, for opposing the Officers and Soldiers of the Common-council of his own Nation, in the defence of him his Master, when they came to lay violent hands upon him. And that he himself as Man, thought it no sin to submit his own body even to death, the same Council judging him guilty of a Crime, meriting so severe a punishment.  
It was the authority of this Council, to which our Saviour laid down the dearest of his earthly interests, not to the power of Pilate; for he washed the blood from off his guiltless hands and had the power been solely in him, made his desire to save him manifest, by pleading for his life, and justifying his spotless innocence, saying, I find no fault in the Man. It was the council then that gave the condemning sentence against him. We have a Law, and by that Law he ought to die, was the instrumental vote, that sent him an innocent to the meritorious Cross. Which council had he not been conscious, that it had lawfully a power over him, his submission thereunto had been a sin against himself, because it was in his power to summon Legions of Angels to his protection. And had he sinned, his suffering had not been efficacious to Man's salvation.  
Something may be said, why this example of our Saviour's is not altogether pertinent to this purpose. As first in respect of that saying of the Jews, wherein they disclaim any lawfulness in themselves to put any man to death; from whence it may be alleged, that our Saviour suffered not under the authority of the Jewish Council, but pilate's jurisdiction. Which is thus answered.  
It is apparent that the sentence of death was passed upon him by the council; and that was it which gave Pilate power over his life. And that that Nation had liberty to try offending natives by their own Laws is not less evident. Whereby it seems to me, that (they bring a conquered Nation) the allegiance between the Emperor and them, was regulated and circumscribed by reciprocal capitulations, and conditional Covenants, by which the executing power was reserved to the Imperial Officer: otherwise the levitical Law by which the Israelites were forbidden to suffer a blasphemer to live would have justified them no less in the execution then in passing the sentence. And therefore although the executing power was consentatively in Pilate (for which cause our Saviour may be said to suffer under him) yet was it authoritatively from that Magistracy which did yield to those conditions; and that may still be the Common-council of his own Nation.  
Again, whereas we say that the supreme authority is solely and independently in the Eldership of associated Christians, it may be objected, that this example will not make good the assertion: because we find that Priests, Pharisees and Scribes, were mixed with the Elders of the people in that council by which he was condemned. To this we reply, that.  
The people of Israel being admonished to make themselves Judges and Officers in all their Tribes, and the Priesthood not being enfeoffed by God with any judiciary authority, nor the orders of Scribes and Pharisees constituted by him, if we should say that these Priests, Scribes and Pharisees were made members of that council by the election of the people, it would be a long while before any thing could be produced to prove the contrary. Besides in matters hard to be judged, the people were directed to inquire of the Priests and Levites, & they might therefore be called by the Elders of the people to assist in their National Counsels, as it hath been the custom in England for the Judges at Law, and yet not have therein a condemnatory power. And this seems to be intendment of the Text, for after the High Priest had voted his answer to be blasphemous, he refers the sentence to the Council, and they thereupon condemn him to be guilty of death. Deut. 16. 18. Levit. 17. 9 Mark 14. 64.  
This was the case of that immaculate Lamb, who being to be offered up an expiation, for sin, was careful to preserve himself without spot, that man might be cleansed from the deep stain of his deadly pollutions, by that his underservedly bleeding Oblation.  
Christ the anointed and just one was sentenced to death by the unjust verdict of the Elders of of his own Nation; and yet he, having power to resist, submitted to the kill condemnation; because he knew it was not unjust so to do. Here we have an example beyond examples; a precedent equal to a precept. He is safe that can repose upon this Rock, seeing God hath made me a member, I will not scruple to obey such an authority as had power over my head. He did not expostulate the unjustness of the sentence; nor will I so much esteem of my own worth above his merits, as to think that any privilege or prerogative can exempt me from being under the lash of the like authority.  
So long as live in a society, I must be under some government, and it ought to be such as I may safely submit to. Not merely for the benefit sake, for if I go no further, my obedience exceeds not the gratitude of sensual Beasts, but like a Christian for conscience sake. Not my fancy, but my duty must guide me to be obedient. I cannot err by my submission to a lawful authority. And I shall hardly be persuaded, that being incorporated into a Christian Society, any Magistracy can have so lawful a power over me, as the Eldership or paternal Council of my own Nation, till I know upon whose judgement I may rely with better security then upon my alseeing and no sinning Saviour's.  
He was a King, a Priest and a Prophet, who, having a certain and infallible knowledge of all things, taught us by his example, to be obedient to the determinations of national counsels. And what pretenders soever there be to Prophecy, Priesthood or Kingship, who dare trust to their own conceptions, rather than to the path, which he who only can be their Saviour hath trodden out to them, they are not likely ever to come to the place that he hath provided for those who follow and believe in him, for he that thinks himself wiser than God cannot put any confidence in God.  
Adam sins, and in him all Mankind. To free Man from the punishment due for sin Christ is promised: God, to shadow forth the designed Christian Church, forms to himself a Church of the children of Israel, for whose sakes the Idolatrous Kings of Canaan, are destroyed by God's appointment. The Jsraelites desire, God is displeased, yet gives them Kings reserving the choice to himself. These Kings are types of him, who was to suffer for sin. Some of these Kings are by God's direction doomed to death for sinning. By God's predeterminate counsel the Kingship and Priesthood of Israel met both in him, who was preordained to be a sacrifice for sin: and Christ not without the consent of his Father, together with his life gives up the power of both to a council of his own Nation. By his death the Law by which those Kings and Priests were constituted is abolished; and all those made Kings and Priests to God the father, who by a true and lively faith, can lay hold upon his son's incarnation, passion and resurrection. Thus were Adam's posterity brought from bondage to liberty, from death to life. And whether the substance of the precedent propositions may not be reasonably collected from this exemplary progress to man's salvation, I leave to be determined by any ingenuous Christian, who will contemplate these circumstances in his sober, selfe-denying, and peace-projecting solitudes. Rev. 1. 6.  
To conclude. I am not so wise in my own conceit, as to think it impossible for me to be mistaken. It may be that my own blindness hath made me venture thus boldly into public; but I would be loath that that should lead any other man into the same error. If therefore through the want of judgement, I have in any thing herein by me published swarved from the truth, I I do humbly request, and shall think myself extremely happy to have my misapprehensions laid open by some ingenious and more knowing pen; which being done, let me undergo the severest of censures, if I be found in the number of those who hate to be reform.   
FINIS.