TWO TREATISES Concerning the matter of the ENGAGEMENT.  
The first of an unknown Author, excepting against Mr. Dureus' Considerations for the taking of the ENGAGEMENT, to show the unsatisfactoriness thereof.  
The second of Mr. Dureus maintaining the satisfactoriness of his Considerations against the unknown Author's exceptions.  
LONDON, Printed by J. Clowes for Richard Wodenothe at the Star under St. Peter's Church in Cornhill, 1650.   

The first Treatise, whereof the Title was, Mr. Dureus his friend unsatisfied, or an Answer to a Paper published in print by Mr. John Dureus, entitled, (Considerations concerning the present Engagement, whether it may be lawfully entered into yea, or no?) affectionately presented to the serious consideration both of Mr. Dureus and all others that desire to give, and receive satisfaction concerning the truth.  
SIR.  
YOur Letter of November 27. sent to your friend for satisfaction of his Conscience (scrupling the taking of the Engagement) is come into these parts, and, as may be conjectured, into all parts of the Kingdom, so that it seems your second thoughts were to make every Reader so far your friend, as to help him in case of like irresolution. You observe in your select friend to whom you make your special address, that he hath been always affected to the Common cause of Liberty, against the designs of tyranny, upon which your Reader will soon observe, that such have their hesitancies in this business, and it is observed not by a few, that almost all such have their scruples, and almost only such. Others (on what Principles I shall forbear to speak) readily enough for the most part enter upon it; which confession of yours, seconded with the observation of others, doth much amuse your reader, that you should pass so heavy a censure on all that remaining unsatisfied, as yet suspend, having your own attestation, that they cordially pursue that which in your thoughts is the end of this, and all other public Engagements; namely, the  good of the Commonwealth. To which also they are ready to subscribe, not with the hand only, but with the heart likewise, if they were once persuaded that Covenants and public promises, bind not at all to accidental forms, (as you style them) when yet they are made by public authority, that did impose them the very Letter, or matter of such Covenants or Engagements. Somewhat I shall make bold to speak to your Considerations, to let you see how far in the thoughts of many, they fall short of carrying your Question in the affirmative, in which I shall endeavour to keep me to the principal heads, that tediousness may not be your trouble.  
Your first work is to reconcile this Engagement, to the Oath of Allegiance, and the National Covenant, attempting to make it good, that they are not opposite, and in reference hereunto, you lay down as a State maxim, that the obligation of King and Subjects are mutual, and must needs stand and fall together, according as the condition by which they are begotten, is kept or broken; which is nothing else but the Law, according to which he and his Subjects agree, that he shall be their King, and they his Subjects. When this is yielded, yet herein you fall short, that you do not produce that Law (to which he stands obliged) that doth declare this or that act of his, to be a full forfeiture of trust, and ipso facto inflict that penalty of the loss of all his regalities, and disobligation of his Subjects; If such a law were but produced and a transgression proved, it would perhaps serve to quiet many minds. Mr. Cook (if I mistake not) answering the objection, why no Law was made in such case against Kings, instead of producing a Law; only gives in the answer of Solon, why in his Laws he omitted the punishment of Parricides, freely confessing that as in the one, so in the other a Law was wanting; Those against whom the late war hath frequently been avowed to be made, have also Laws with large penalties in case of transgression made against them, (viz.) all such as are found Counsellors in evil, or as subordinate Officers are Agents in it; which page 13. you seem to grant to be good security, and what hath been still said for the immunity of Kings in this Nation (who act nothing as Kings in their own persons, but by subordinate Agents) You though an Alienigena cannot be ignorant, but you go on and tell us wherein the King hath been unsaithful to his trust, even to the absolving of his people pso facto from their Allegiance; it hath been (you say as you suppose) a perpetual custom in this Nation, for the Commons at all times to ask and propose the making of the Laws, and for the Lords and King to give consent thereunto; and after a few words of Explication you make your Application; If the King then should set himself wilfully to be above this reason of the Nation, which is the only Original of the Law, and refuse obstinately the Laws which they shall choose to be settled: he puts himself ipso facto out of the capacity of being a King any more unto them; and if this can be made out to have been the way wherein the late King set himself, and that it was the design of the House of Lords, to uphold and enable him to follow that way, it is evident that so far as he did by that means actually unking himself: so far also they that assisted him in that design, did unlord themselves in the state thereof. In which sentence of yours all readers, when they compare with it what you lay down for a rule pag. 10. may easily wonder at your great forgetfulness Here you judge definitively in the highest way of the rights which supreme powers have over us, and give in your verdict above all (that I know) hath ever been charged upon them; and there you say, for my own part I have taken this to be a rule whereby all private men, (such as I am) as Christian's ought to walk unblameablely under the Superior powers of this world; namely, that it doth not belong to us to judge definitively of the rights which the Supreme powers in this world pretend to have to their places, farther you say; It is no part of our Christian profession to become Judges of the great ones of this world, in respect of their rights and pretensions to power, for we are to behave ourselves as spiritual men in this world by the rule of our profession, and as strangers and pilgrims therein. Which passages how you will be able to reconcile I cannot reach: And your mistake of the Customs of this Nation (which so punctually you undertake to lay down,) equals your forgetfulness of yourself, so that here indeed (at least) you appear a stranger; the Laws are well known to have had still their first rise indifferently from-Lords and Commons, sometimes from the one, sometimes from the other: the business of money only excepted, which always with us gins with the Commons. And I suppose (however it fares with the Lords) Kings have not often been found guilty in refusal of their assent to Bills of Subsidies, Taxes, Pole-money, Tonnage, poundage, etc. And that it hath been a perpetual Custom for Kings and Lords to assent to all that the Commons have proposed, is boldly affirmed; endeavouring to persuade your reader, that not only de jure it aught to be so (which sure at some conference or other, the Commons for prevention of so many disputes and reasonings, would have charged upon the Lords) but that de facto it hath been so, when all that know any thing of the Custom of this Nation, very well know the contrary, that the Lords have given their assent or descent to Bills, (sent from the Commons) according as they have judged it most expedient, and often sent them back with amendments, according as in their sense they have judged them most meet to pass as Laws; and that Kings instead of yielding assent to Bills sent from Lords and Commons, have often times only returned a Le Roy avisera; which sometimes (as I have heard from singular Patriots) hath turned to the great happiness of the Nation.  
And as you pretend to have cleared the meaning of the Oath of Allegiance (which was made in our own age) by the consent as you say of all ages, so you go about a further explanation of it, by the third Article of the Covenant, which is not opposite to the Oath of Allegiance; and this obligeth (you say) to the preservation of the King's Person and Authority conditionally, and with a limitation only; namely, in the preservation and defence of the true Religion and Libertyes of the Kingdom; Which Comment of yours upon that Article of the Covenant (turning In into If, to make a condition of it, and changing the whole current of the words from ourselves to the Kings, so that they should be meant of the King's preservation of Liberty and Religion, and not our own (when all before and after mentioned, is our work and not his) is such, so forced and strained, that it will abide the censure of no indifferent and  reader, and is fully enough contradicted in those words which immediately follow, which you prudently conceal; That the world may bear witness with our Consciences of our loyalty, and that we have no thoughts or intentions to diminish his Majesty's just power and greatness.  
It was (as is well known) frequently charged upon the Parliament, that what ever their intendments were, for Religion and the public Liberties; yet they had an evil eye on his Majesty, not brooking his power and greatness, which was as frequently disavowed, as a scandal not sufferable; and in the Covenant for this very end this solemn appeal was inserted, in which we have first an acknowledgement that his Majesty stood vested with just power and greatness, and so no such forfeiture made as before you mention; And secondly a serious protestation made that we have no intention to diminish it, but as we resolve to preserve Religion and Liberty: so we oblige ourselves to loyalty to the King's person, and Authority, and from all thoughts or intentions to diminish his power and greatness, which is the true and clear meaning of it. Upon mention of the Laws and Liberties of the Kingdom, you say The King either refractorily casting them off, or seeming to yield unto them in such a way, that no trust could be given him, that he would keep what he yielded unto, the Parliament did actually lay him aside, and voted that no more addresses should be made unto him; Where you seem unresolved whether it were guilt in his Majesty, or jealousy in the Houses that occasioned those Votes? Whether the King did actually deserve them, or whether there was only jealousy, that he would render himself worthy of them? The suspected Wife Numb. 5. might not be cast off till her guilt was proved, though some are pleased to put Kings and Wives, both in one condition, to be cast off merely ad placitum, the one by the husband, the other by the people: which (as to Kings) you seem not to judge unreasonable; Then follows in your Letter from which time forward, he was no more an object of your Oath of Allegiance, but to be looked upon as a private man. Yes sure when the Parliament had again voted addresses to him, ejus est tollere, cujus est ponere, If the Parliament have a legistative, they have also legistranslative or repealing power: if Votes can set free, than Votes can reoblige: you go on, and say to an indifferent eye, it, (namely the Engagement) may be thought so far from being opposite to the true sense of either, that it may be rather a confirmation of the ground for which both the Oath of Allegiance, and third Article of the National Covenant was then binding; for confirmation of which, you say, this or that outward form of Government is wholly accidental, no ways essential to any Nation in the world; and therefore is alterable in respect of forms, as is most expedient for their exigent necessities, but to be governed by Laws, and to have the use of the true Religion, and of the National freedom, is absolutely necessary and essential to the being of a Commonwealth, passing by that State Paradox, that to have the use of the true Religion and of the National freedom, is absolutely necessary and essential to the being of a Commonwealth: so there neither is nor ever was any Commonwealth out of Christendom, nor many in it, (a few only having that happiness,) This takes wholly for granted, that all our Oaths have respected barely the esse of the Nation, or that which (you say) was called the Kingdom, when all that read them must confess, that they had immediate respect to the bene esse, in their present constitution, and external administration; we swear not barely to the remote end (which is the  good as you speak, of the Nation) but to the means which (in the judgement of those which you sometimes call the reason of the Nation) had a direct tendency to it, namely the continuance of Monarchy in the present line, any change attempted by men, necessarily in humane reason, tending to the Nations danger, if not ruin and destruction. Consult I pray you casuists, when the oath in the express letter looks at the means, which appears to lead to an end, whether it be enough for the party sworn to intent alone the end, in contradiction to the means, which was the matter of the Oath.  
If I come to a Garrison and be there questioned, whether I come from the enemy's quarters yea, or no? May I deny upon Oath that I came from thence, when indeed I did? satisfying myself with this, that I will not betray the Garrison where I am, the question whence I came being only accidental, the safety of the Garrison is the thing the Oath only intended; and to this in such an Oath I answer, Inquire whether this be not perjury?  
This evasion to eye the end and not look at accidental forms (as you call them) will facilitate a way to any Oath, and as easily disoblige, rendering the Oath vain as soon as it is entered; Thus it had been safe to have entered the Canon Oath (prescribed by the Convocation in the year that this Parliament did commence) for the establishment of the Hierarchy in Archbishops, Bishops, Deans, Deans and Chapters, Chancellors, etc. Seeing we might have entered into it (how opposite soever our judgements were against it) and then have avoided it, explaining ourselves that we swore to the end, namely Church-Government, & order for public edification, without respect to external forms, which is accidental; which Government being in our judgement best settled, in an Independent Congregational way (as some think) or in a Presbyterial Classical way (as others) this Oath thus interpreted, is so far from engaging to Prelacy, that it engageth against it, so far from binding to a non consent of the change and alteration of it (which was the letter of the Oath) that it binds us to a vigorous endeavour of change and alteration; thus also all Covenanters are disobliged from the second Article in the Covenant (which is to the extirpation of Prelacy, as there explained) in case they believe (as many do) that Church-Government is best settled, and the Church's edification best provided for in such a constitution, and so Covenanting against it in the letter of the Covenant, they Covenant for it in the end, which you say is only to be heeded. Neither can any State this way find any security in any Oath prescribed, all may enter; and then evade with this shift of the  good of the Commonwealth of the Nation, and plead that the necessity of the public good calls to the transgression and contradiction of it: Thus Zedekiah might have freed himself from his Oath of fealty to Nebucadnezar; it being (as he might have pleaded) against the  good of that Nation, that strangers should rule over them, and they be made a Province to Babylon, his Oath to serve him would have strongly engaged to a revolt from him. And the Oath of the Elders of Israel to the Gibeonites (thus understood) had been null in the very taking of it, evidently tending to the public damage, of which the Commons of Israel were very sensible, as appears in their exceptions taken against the Elders, for entering into it. Saul in the act which brought a three years' famine upon Israel (if this divinity might take place) had done a work singularly commendable, seeing it was his zeal to the house of Israel and Judah, which alone moved him (against the letter of his Covenant) to the slaughter of those persons, even the public good so evidently damnified, and endangered by their abode in the midst of the people. saul's slaughter of these Gibeonites had been as praiseworthy as david's (his successors) slaughter of the Jebusites, the public good being saul's end (the Holy-Ghost bearing witness) as well as David's; and what good the present State can reap by this Engagement (your interpretation being once admitted) I believe you know not which way to demonstrate; the engagers may say, they will be true and faithful to the Commonwealth, as now established without King or house of Lords, in their endeavour to re-establish a King and house of Lords; which they may think most tends to the honour and peace of it.  
You go on to answer a further Objection of your friends, that in the third Article of the Covenant, he is sworn to preserve, the Rights and Privileges of Parliament, amongst which this is one, that therein should be a house of Lords distinct from the Commons; and this another, that all the Members of the Commons should sit and vote freely; for when he swore, he meant a Parliament so constituted and no other.  
In answer of which, you first confess, and then endeavour to avoid, and if you did avoid as clearly, as you do confess ingenuously, you would give more satisfaction; you confess that these are Privileges, that the intention of the Covenant, was to preserve these, and that now such intentions cannot be prosecuted; which confession alone, is enough to create a bigger scruple in your friend, than the whole force of all which yet hath appeared in your answer can wipe off. Your way to avoid is, that your friend did what in him lay when time and place was, according to his Calling to prevent these breaches, and so cannot be accused of the infringement thereof; for when a fatal necessity of State, (as you say) in the course of divine justice with a power irresistible, not only to men of private, but to all that were in public vocations, did bring about that change upon the Parliament, no particular men's engagements were considerable. This no doubt is a clear justification of your friend, one man's sin pollutes not another, when by opposing, and in his place withstanding, he keeps himself from guilty participation. But in this excuse of him from breach of Covenant, in the infringement of Parliament Privileges, you do plainly charge that irresistible power (which you speak of) with it, He is therefore innocent because he did what in him lay, in his place to prevent this change; those than cannot be innocent, that being interested and obliged in the same Covenant, did yet with such a power (as you mention) work it; Neither can that supposed fatal necessity of State (which your answer speaks of) acquit that power from breach of their Covenant in such confessed infringement of Parliament-Priviledges.  
The reason of the Kingdom (as elsewhere you call it) saw no such necessity as your Paper takes for granted, but with high resolutions opposed when the power was at their doors, and themselves in imminent danger, both Houses judged the way that they were upon, to be the way most conducing to the State's safety; and it was their business and no other powers, in such case to give judgement. And in case this necessity had been real, and not imaginary or pretended; yet it were no sufficient plea for such a transgression. Joshua and the Elders of Israel understood no such State-divinity, to break Covenant on such grounds, much less on such pretences. Much might have been said by them to have necessitated a breach with those Gibeonites, with whom they had entered Covenant; Gibeon was one of their Royal Cities, and of danger to be possessed by such an enemy: or to have him still in their bowels to lay claim to it; the Land was Israel's by the gift of God, and too narrow for themselves in such multitudes to inhabit, there was no reason that the fat and the sweet should be devoured and eaten up by strangers. The arguments of Egypt against Israel, might well here have been taken up by Israel, when there falls out any war, they will join unto the enemies.  
These Reasons or the like of equal or greater strength Saul doubtless saw, when he sought to slay them (not out of any private spleen but) in his zeal to the house of Israel and of Judah; but none of these did sway with those Covenanters, and God himself acquits them from any mistake in the Obligation of that their Covenant, in his proceeding against the house of Saul before observed, when private men swear to their hurt, they must not change, when States swear they may not change: there is no security without God from any danger; it is more safe to keep with God, though seemingly we run upon peri, I then to quit the ways of God deserting him for prevention to speak the fairest, these reasonings come from unbelief.  
You go on, and say, You see what pinches your friend: He thinks that they that made the change broke the Covenant, and if he engage under this change as is desired, he thinks he breaks the Covenant also. To which you answer,  
First, That they who made the change will plead for themselves, that they are not guilty of any breach of Covenant notwithstanding the change. But this you leave to them to justify; And seeing you will not justify them, I shall not stand to implead them, your Reader being fully satisfied, that your own pen in your former confession hath already done it.  
Secondly you answer, For the consequence your friends make from the taking of the Engagement to a breach of the Covenant, it doth not at all follow to your understanding; for the direct and plain matter of the Engagement, binds him only to procure the good of the Commonwealth as now it stands; and because at all times and in all constitutions thereof, he is bound to do this no less by the Covenant itself, then by the Engagement; therefore his taking of this, to this effect, can be no breach of that, which you endeavour to make good by a comment upon the words of the Engagement; for the negative words, without a King and a house of Lords in the Engagement, may (as you say) be properly and most obviously taken, as an explication of the words now established, immediately going before, and not an absolute abnegation of the things looked upon truly, and as in themselves, with more words to the same purpose, which gloss of yours calls for some observation, and well deserves animadversion.  
First, necessarily implying a high charge of such inconsiderateness, in the heads of those that did devise, and in the power of those that do impose this Engagement, of which none can believe that they are guilty.  
1. They knew, that all the Subjects of this Nation, stood before engaged to the  good of this Commonwealth, (as by the dictates of nature, the obligation of reason, self-preservation, which each one knows is wrapped up in the public, so also) by an oath prescribed by their power since they entered upon it, reaching doubtless thus far, and (as some conjecture) intended further, that which was already done to their hands (as you say) by so many Oaths and Covenants, which themselves also since their investiture in power had done, they will not do over again, in words not at all further obliging, but only perplexing, amusing and ensnaring.  
2. They know that the Engagement in this sense will nothing tend to their establishment, as before hath been evidenced; yea they know with this gloss upon it, it hath a full tendency to their further danger, not a few being persuaded (how erroneously soever) that the public good is best provided for, and consequently the Engagement answered in their opposition, all of which is so clear to every eye, that it could not be hid from those that imposed this Engagement, so that none can think that they would trouble the consciences of so many thousands in such a needless way to their own non-benefit, yea to their further peril. If the Covenant mentioning Monarchy in a King, do tie us to a republic in a State, (as you before affirm) then the Engagement mentioning a republic without King or house of Lords, may tie us to Monarchy by the same reason.  
Secondly, This gloss carries a full contradiction in itself, you say, these words without King & house of Lords, may be properly and most obviously taken, as an explication of the word [as now established] immediately going before, and not an absolute negation of the things themselves; when as those words, as now established, do fully imply that abnegation of Kings & Lords, which you there mention, now being an adverb of time, the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the Engagement must needs stand in full opposition to the face of things in former administrations, it cannot look on the Commonweal abstractively as the same, in all revolutions and junctures of times, but as it now stands in a present different posture, as now is a full contradiction to your sense, as ever. And I pray you consider, whether the powers now established without King and Lords, have not voted down both King and Lords, as useless and dangerous; and therefore now established, is no other than an abnegation of Kings and Lords heretofore established; therefore your friend being in this pinched, is not yet eased.  
You go on as discerning that what is said will not hold. Suppose (say you) that in your apprehens●●● of matters, this Engagement doth materially settle some thing in the Commonwealth, which is contrary to the intention which you had in taking the Covenant; yet I say that by giving your assent thereunto, as matters now stand, you break not at all your Covenant, because your obligation to those matters by virtue of the Covenant, was extinguished before you were called upon to take this Engagement; now that which is extinct and made void, cannot be said to oblige any more.  
This supposition of yours, is wholly yielded by others, that it is in full opposition to the Covenant and other Oaths, (and so all your labour lost in endeavouring to reconcile them) and this which you now bring, is only held out for a Plea to carry it in the affirmative, that the Engagement may be entered, malè res agitur, cum tot opus est remediis, is wont to be said; for your Proposition, that that which is extinct and made void, can no more oblige, must be acknowledged as truth; with its just limitation, provided that those concerned in the Oath, have no hand in the extinguishing of it, for their own disobligation. David was bound by Covenant unto Jonathan, and his seed after him, had he consented to the death of Mephibosheth the Son of Jonathan, the matter of the Covenant had then been extinct, and yet David had been guilty of the breach of it; for your assumption that the matter of the Covenant as to the third Article, is extinct, it being impossible in nature to preserve the King's life now it is cut off: and the house of Lords now it is put down, I shall not stand upon that maxim, the King never dies, and so though the man be cut off, yet the King remains and may be preserved; if you please to look into the Preface of the Covenant, there we professed, That we had before our eyes the glory of God, and the advancement of the Kingdom of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, the Honour and Happiness of the King's Majesty, and his Posterity. As we dare not shut out the Glory of God, the advancement of the Kingdom of Jesus Christ: no more dare we wholly shut out the King's posterity from the Covenant; for the Lords though they sit not as Lords in Parliament, yet still they are as Lords, and in a capacity for actual admission. You say, they may have a title to this right, & yet be obliged, even for preservation of that right to suspend it for a time, and many I say are well satisfied, that they for such end do suspend, and yet dare not engage to an opposition of it.  
You yet go one step higher, and so you are at the highest in this particular, being willing to persuade your friend, that we are so far from being barred from the Engagement by the Covenant, particularly the third Article of it, that we are engaged to it; if the third Article of the National Covenant concerning Privileges of Parl. be yet in force in any degree, you say, than it binds us to preserve the Privileges of Parliament that now are, as well as those that then were. To which I say, I know no such distinction of Privileges that are, and were, Parliament Privileges being always the same, admitting of no such changes, though we, have no more Parliament actually existing, then in Wintertime we have Roses; yet as the properties of a Rose are still the same in all seasons, so are the Privileges of Parliament: and if there be any remainder of Privileges in actual being (as you contend) then the third Article that binds to preserve them, binds us to perfect them. A Physician cannot preserve unless he recover strength in his weak Patient: You conclude this first general piece of yours with hopes that your friend will find no cause to scruple any further at it, whereas others think that you have small cause of hopes that you have eased him of any of his Scruples.  
In your second part, you make it your business to satisfy your friend, concerning the power whereby this present Engagement is tendered, which he takes to be very doubtful, as a power unlawfully usurped, as also whether by this Engagement he shall make himself accessory to this usurpation.  
For the first, Instead of clearing their title as just and lawful, and acquitting it from usurpation, you make it unlawful to inquire and determine concerning it; holding out (as you say) the rule whereby you order your conversation, supposing him ready (as it seems) in all things to make you his precedent; in which way of yours, how dissonant you are from yourself, and how far you have been found a transgressor of your own rule, hath formerly been showed; yet (wheresoever the guilt lies) the transgression by you is aggravated to that height, as to be one the greatest Characters of the Spirit of Antichrist that exalts himself above all that is called God; and wherein (say you) hath he done this more remarkably towards Magistrates who are called Gods among men, then by exalting himself over them, to become a judge of all their rights and pretensions to power in this world? where I pray you take into your serious consideration, whether this spirit (that great Character of the spirit of Antichrist) doth manifest itself in the man of sin, in a careful enquiry and diligent search to find out to what power it is, that he justly owes subjection, and is to bind himself by Oath of feoalty, for faithfulness: or rather in his peremptory determinations of the forfeiture of right, in those that before were possessed of an undoubted title, and disobliging Subjects from their obedience, and to whom this Character of his doth most belong, whether to your friend or some other, I leave you sadly to consider. Yet after a long debate of the inconsistency of the duty which God appointed subjects, with the scrupulosity of this question, you are pleased to allow your friend in the judgement of discretion as a member of this Commonwealth, and concerned in the public welfare thereof to look upon superiors, to see how they pretend to stand; that is by what apparent right, and with what visible power they possess their place; Which liberty of judgement you yet allow with this reservation, that he suffer not his conscience to follow the dictates of it, for so he is bound up in that which follows, which yet you call the bounds of Christian liberty and rationality. Sure to me, blind obedience is to be preferred before such use of light, that when I believe I see my way, I have no allowance to walk in it: You help us by the way with some hints how we may judge who is our Superior; Such a Superior (I suppose) you mean whom we must engage to serve with faithfulness; and this we may judge say you, by the dictates of sense, reason and conscience; Sense, will show him who is actually in possession of all power, and places of Government over him, and by this he will perceive under whom he doth stand; Reason will show what he who is over him, pretends unto, whether yea, or not his pretences are backed with power, to maintain his right against all advarsaries therein; and whether yea, or no, the use of that power be limited by Law, or left wholly to his own will without Law and conscience will show, that he to whom God hath committed the plenary administration of public affairs with unconfrontable power, is God's Vicegerent over the society of those to whom his administration doth extend itself, either by virtue of a contract, which makes a Law, or by virtue of a conquest, which is bound to no Law; but the will of the Conqueror.  
As these lead your friend (as you suppose) whither you would have him led: so they would have also led Israel, in their respective junctures of time, to Cushan-Rushathim, to Eglon, to Jabin, to the Princes & chief powers of Midian, to Ammon, Moab and the Philistines. Israel had been thus bound to so many successive, and opposite Engagements: and bound up in bondage from seeking deliverance. No endeavour must ever be improved for any recovery of lost right, if this doctrine (in favour of all that are in possession and backed with power) shall take place. All whosoever they be, in case they can get into Sovereignty, may keep in: and all must assist in their holding of it, none may attempt any way, or make any plea for the most just recovery of their rights and liberties, so that either Israel sinned as oft as they were delivered, or else these dictates of sense, reason and conscience, going this way which you point out, may lead your friend into mistakes, and involve him in fears. Your distinction of administrations by virtue of a contract which makes a Law, or by virtue of a conquest which is bound to no Law, but to the will of the conqueror, were worth observation; if you would acquaint us which way the present power doth claim, for contract we know none, when we make any, both they and we ought to be faithful in it; Conquest (I think) you will not say, so you leave them to their own wills without any other rule in Government; in which you are scarce like to please any party, either those in power or such as are in subjection.  
As for the several queries, which you there put to your friend, I leave to yourself to find out (which you can soon do) where the question is miserably begged, and that taken for granted; which men of your friends scrupulosities have never yielded, and in all that I have seen, (in the arguments of those that stand up in defence of present proceed) I do not find so much as an attempt for the proof of it.  
To the second branch of your friends doubt, you say, that the Engagement being a duty just to be required by the present powers from their Subjects, without the performance of which there is no protection due unto them, and necessary to be performed by all that will not profess themselves desirous to overthrow the present safety, and public welfanre of the Nation; it cannot make those that take it accessary to the guilt of those that tender it, if any be in them, because, etc. But if the Engagement be not a duty, as men affected to the common cause of liberty (by your own concessions) are persuaded, than guilt will follow upon such supposition which you have laid down, and here you are very high in passing sentence upon those that (being conscious to themselves of the bonds of former Engagements) have forborn to subscribe in this; that they deserve not to have a being in the Commonwealth.  
In which how prudertial it were to proceed in so high a way, I trust those that are in present power (how far soever by some forward spirits put on) will seriously consider. What extremes are apt to beget, we have had sad experience; such ways have often tended to the unjointing, and seldom have contributed any thing to the settling of a Nation, and how equal I would have you more deliberately to ponder. You have observed, that the late King's obligations and his Subjects were mutual; he was bound by Oath, as well as they, here subjects are called to engage without any Engagement at all from them in place of Sovereign power, when we are as Subjects tied, they are free, as Sovereigns; and what example can you find, when a power is new fet up, to bring in a people for consent under so high a penalty; In Scripture we cannot find any other consent in such case then voluntary. And in the Conquest of this Nation (and other revolutions of State) we find capitulations upon terms from either party; To press upon a people as soon as under a new power, not only a Command over their Persons and estates, (which already are in their hands) but also their Consciences, is a practice I believe scarce to be paralleled. and having their persons, and purses in their power, they have cause to protect them, though as yet Subjects desire to stand free in their Consciences, protection should be as large as subjection, Persons and Estates are already subject, and these aught to be protected for subjections sake.  
Here you tell us of the end of the Engagement, which is to give the Supreme power an assurance that we shall not betray it; but that we are willing to maintain all good intelligence for public concernments with it, notwithstanding the present changes brought upon the Commonwealth. But this gloss of yours, put upon the Engagement utterly spoils all assurance that possibly can be given, either to this State or any other, as formerly hath been showed, and I wish that you would more seriously consider, for if no respect is to be had to outward forms, but to the  good of the Commonwealth only; then all are at liberty (notwithstanding such Engagement) where they will to hold intelligence, provided that their judgements tell them, that the public is best provided for, that way in which they keep correspondence; if former Oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy, the Protestation and Covenant bond not at all to Monarchy there expressed; but to the public good abstracted from all particular forms, so that our Consciences are still free to subscribe to any platform, then entering this Engagement it doth no more bind to a Republic or Democraty, but leaves us free for Monarchy, as formerly settled and established; and I pray you farther take into your thoughts, which way the public (as now it stands) by such proceed can reap advantage, Non-subscibers (held back by conscience dictates) are most unlike to be forward; for their danger being so cautelous before they engage with their pen, they will be equally wary how they engage with their sword: showing themselves so tender of their own inward private peace; they will not be hasty to infest the public; and as they have so they will still in their place, and to their power withstand designs of Tyranny, taking care that Monarchy (if ever again reestablished) be kept within its bounds and limits; for those whose hands are gained, I do not understand what security can be expected by it, hearts and hands (we know) do not always hold pace together; and if any have minds bend to the public, this is a good lurking-hole to hid them from suspicion, and those interpretations of the Engagement which are held out to serve them in, together with others, wherewith many subscribers (as I hear) satisfy themselves, will also serve for an expedient to help them out, rendering their Consciences innocent in engaging, and freeing them from all Obligation of Conscience being thus engaged.  
Your third part (tending to satisfy your friend's scruple, that the consequence of the Engagement seems to tend to an opposition against the lawful Heir of the Crown, and right constitutions of Parliament) presupposed him to stand satisfied in the two former, and being built upon that bottom in case of dis-satisfaction in those; all this necessarily falls to the ground, and nothing needs to be spoken, that passage in it seems most observable, as for the dissolution of your tye and obligation to the heir of the Crown, I shall refer you to look upon God, whether he hath not dispossessed him wholly by his own do and Counsels, and by the guilt derived from his father and mother upon him, of all his interest in this Kingdom and Commonwealth; for because his aim and the aim of those that are about him, is not for the Commonwealth, but for the Kingdom, that is, not for the good of the society, but for self-greatness; Therefore God who takes and gives the rights of Government, hath done as it seemeth good in his own eyes, both with him who according to men claims the Crown, and with them that were the supporters thereof, etc. All of which (with much more that you have to the same purpose) might be satisfactory, if the work of God and not his word were our rule, if we must observe his hand, to go as he acts, and not his Command, to act what he enjoins, God may dispossess him and any Monarchy on earth at pleasure; Such is his Prerogative royal over all: but to infer from thence, that we may therefore engage against him (contrary to Covenant & highest obligation of oath) is that which will at no hand follow. A good child seeks his father's life, at that time when God is upon removal of him by stroke of death: Arguments of this stamp will give us warranty to act in all the evil that can be acted in the State, or against it; all evil of this nature (penal, not oriminal) God does and owns, if we follow his hand we shall have ours as high in guilt, as his is in justice; these providences (which men in these times make their encour agements) are no other than temptations, and set a door wide open to sins of all sorts, when they may be done with immunity and impunity of this divinity, will hold Israel's spoilers are injuriously by the Prophets branded as robbers, when God gave Israel to them, because they had sinned against him.  
You further say, that you conceive, that the Prophecy of the Prophet Isaiah, Chapter 24. verse 21. is begun to be fulfilled amongst us, somewhat more remarkably then in other parts of the earth as yet, which is this, And it shall come to pass in that day, that the Lord shall punish the host of the high ones that are on high, and the Kings of the earth upon the earth, and they shall be gathered together as prisoners are gathered in the pit, and shall be shut up in prison, and after many days shall be visited; Then the Moon shall be confounded, and the Sun shall be ashamed when the Lord of Hosts shall reign in Mount Zion, and before his ancients gloriously.  
How far God will go on in this way, (on which you suppose he is entered) it is not safe for man to determine, only we know, that when he is doing his work, we must hold to our duty, and seeing there is a time when these thus threatened shall be visited, (as there is foretold) not in judgement, but mercy (as appears in the context, and is confirmed by the consent of interpreters) it should be our work in the way and manner of the people of God of old, (acknowledging divine justice and their guilt) to implore the throne of grace in their behalf, that as in present they suffer what was threatened: so they may be fitted for the mercy promised. In the mean space Prophecies are no rule for our actions but Precepts, not that which God says he will do, but what his will is that we should do, must guide us; There was a Prophecy, that the Messiah should be cut off, and the time laid down, Dan. 9.26. there sin was yet nothing less that cut him off, he was delivered by the determinate Council of God; there were store of Prophecies, that witnessed the suffering of Christ, and yet with wicked hands he was Cr●cified and slain, they fulfilled the Prophets in Condemning him. David knew well that he must succeed Saul in the Kingdom, yet he waited God's time and would have no hand in his removal, though providence was more than once urged as an argument for his encouragement, that God had delivered him into his hands; if David had followed this rule, Saul had then died, and he over-timely (before God's approved time) had intruded upon the Throne. After some plain language spoken to those in power (which I wish may take that Prophets may have their mouths open, and with allowance to speak, not Placentia, but Salubria) you give us your Item or admonition that we be not wilfully scrupulous in these matters. In which you yet acquit your friend, when you spare not to charge divers others, where I wish you would take into your more serious consideration, if the Engagement be lawful, and a reconciliation possible with other Oaths (by multiplication of distinctions and new rules for their obligation) whether yet all things are so clear and doubts so fully removed, that no cause at all of Scruple remains. If there were no other thing then the multitude of all degrees that rest unsatisfied, (in whom both parts and piety are seen) that alone might be a good inducement, so far to suspect yourself, that if not truth, yet evidence on your part is wanting, though I doubt not but in some cases men may act against scruples, when the judgement on the other part stands convinced, and the scruples appear reasonless, or with very little of reason in them; yet to act against the dictates of their judgement (as many in this case must, whose reason on the most impartial enquiry into the state of the question, determins yours in the negative) were to sin against conscience, and to draw guilt upon their souls. You are pleased in your discourse (as also several others) to tell us of the danger of resisting powers, which you say, holds of all in power, usurped powers as well as others, when you might find in approved Authors, such distinctions of resistance, as may acquit those whom you seem to involve in so high a condemnation, and render them innocent; and I pray you consider in yourself, whether a just power with right unquestionable under a supposed forfeiture, may not challenge as much observance and subjection, and consequently their resistance to these, as dangerous as to men in power without title, only by usurpation. That which in conclusion I beg is, that those that see not with your eyes, and cannot warrant all that you approve, (having what to say if called unto it) may obtain from you a more  & candid censure, then to be judged unworthy of a being in that Commonwealth where by right of birth they have their freedom, and that you would not think that self-interest sways so many to keep close to the dictates of their Conscience, in a way in all appearance to their present and private ruin; more of Christianity would appear, in affording them your pity and your prayers, And the Lord give us a right judgement in all things.   

The Second Treatise. Mr. Dureus his friend further satisfied, Or, A Reply to some Objections made against his Considerations concerning the lawfulness of taking the Engagement; affectionately offered to the serious consideration of those that are scrupled at it. or at his Considerations about it.  
SIR,  
I Shall freely confess, that the Scope of your papers, (put into my hands a few days ago) is to me very acceptable; for which cause, as I think myself obliged, so in all uprightness I shall endeavour your further satisfaction; that so fare as the Lord shall enable me to discern the truth, I may hold it forth, for the manifestation of our duty in the business of the Engagement. 
The Design of this Discourse.  And if a course of amicable conferences had been more freely taken up heretofore, and regularly followed upon this subject, amongst godly Brethren, as it ought to have been in the Law of Peace and Truth; I make no doubt but some of these breaches might have been prevented, and perhaps some of the old wastes and ruinous heaps, might also have been repaired: but because these thoughts of healing and of building up, have not been laid to heart; therefore our unsettlements have not only continued: but we have therein been led on, unto sad courses of new divisions, and unchristian animosities; as for myself, I can call the searcher of all hearts to witness, that I have none other aim but to discharge a good conscience in this business, and for the Gospel's sake to seek out a Gospel-Remedy unto our public evils; for hereunto my thoughts have been many years ago lead forth; and seeing my affections do still continue to prosecute this design, not with humane contrivements, but by the Grace of God in true simplicity; I may therefore hope that God may be pleased in something happily to make me instrumental to his glory, and my unpartial solicitations for the ways of Unity and Peace, may become effectual to the comfort of his children: however I shall not cease to concur in true humility with prayers, and supplications unto the Father of Lights, and the fountain of all good gifts, that in end all who are upright in heart, may according to his Counsel be united in the spirit of Christ, and thereby (notwithstanding some diversities of apprehensions about humane affairs) be fitted more and more in spiritual concernments for his service, and their mutual edification: beseeching him withal, that none of our weaknesses and sinful distances of spirit amongst ourselves, may bring any reproach upon the holy profession of the Gospel, and of our Ministry; or open the mouths of our adversaries, to take advantages against us while they watch for our haltings. It is a sad matter that the Engagement intended for a ground of mutual safety, and an assurance of harmlessness, and indemnity amongst those that truly intent the  good of the Common wealth, should be so far misunderstood, as to prove rather an object of strife and division then of an agreement; 
The answer to the Preface.  and I am sorry that any of my expressions wherein I meant not to censure any body, who is conscionable, week or well-meaning; should be taken in another sense than I did offer them; but whether I have been in the fault by uttering them unadvisedly, or others, who through prejudices have mistaken me, I hope upon a further disquiry of these matters, it will in due time sufficiently appear, nor shall I ever (God willing) be found averse from rectifying a fault if I can discern it, when it is laid open to me.  
I shall then come to the observations which you offer upon my considerations of the Engagement, and that we may with more brevity, clearenesss, and readiness, have recourse to the heads of matters whereof notice is to be taken; I suppose our best course will be to mark the same with numerical Figures in the margin of our Papers, which shall show the things which answer each other, and direct us to the places to which we speak,  
1. The first thing you take notice of, is; that yielding an obligation to be settled between a King and his Subjects by a Law. according to which he is to be their King, and they his Subjects; yet you say I produce no such Law in this case: 
The plea that the King cannot be counted a transgressor of the law.  and if either the Law cannot be produced upon the transgression of which he doth ipso facto forfeit his Regalities: or if his transgression of that Law cannot be proved; that then in this case there is no ground to quiet men's minds concerning that which is befallen him. Now that a Law in this case cannot be produced you assert upon Mr. Cook authority, who gives the reason why no such Law was made, to be the same for which Solon made none to punish Parrioides, and that he cannot be counted a transgressor of the Laws, you assert upon this ground; because Kings in this Nation act nothing as Kings in their own persons, but only by subordinate Agents: whence you conclude, that neither such a Law being extant, nor although it were extant, he being in a capacity of being a transgress or against it; the thing which I allege for dissabling the obligation of his Subjects from him, can be of no force.  
To this I shall give this answer.  
That in my discourse I did not suppose any particular Positive and express Law extant between the King and his People specifying the tenure of their mutual obligation, 
The answer doth show what the law is to which a King is bound.  how far it should bind or not bind the Subject to him; but I suppose only this much: that there is a natural  and implicit law extant, known and presupposed by all men who make any contracts one with another, which is this: that no contract doth otherwise bind but according to the condition upon which it is made. If then a King is a King only upon this condition, that he shall intent to Rule legally, and not by will and force. and if he break this condition and actually attempt to rule, not legally, but by will and force, than he hath ipso facto forfeited his Regality: nor was it needful that any penalty should be expressly denounced against any such transgression no more then in Solon's Commonwealth against Parrieides, not because such a fault (if committed) was not punishable, but because all men by nature know what punishment it may deserve. So then the want of a positive law in this matter doth not make that which I say at all invalid: for although it be granted that there is no particular law declaring this or that act of his, to be a full forfeiture of trust: yet this is a known law to all, that consider him to be under an oath of Ruling legally; that in case he doth set himself to Rule lawlessy, he hath broken his oath, and fully forfeited his trust.  
I say then that although in my discourse I named no law, yet my meaning was to produce the law of nature when I said that the Oaths were reciprocal, 
What absolves Subjects from allegiance to Kings.  standing & falling together, for this I take to be the law of nature in this case: that if a King doth break the oath of his legality towards his Subjects, his Subjects are absolved from the oath of their allegiance towards him.  
Concerning that which you say, that Kings as King's act nothing in their own persons, 
What laws Kings are exempted from, & not counted transgressors of in their own persons, and upon what conditions that exemption is granted them.  but only by their subordinat agents who alone are punishable when the law is transgressed, I know that this is the law in Cases of particular concernment, wherein some special positive laws are transgressed, but of the general concernment. whereby the whole ground of all legal government is taken away, that law cannot be understood. Besides I conceive, that the positive law which you mention, doth suppose that the King is oliged to give up his subordinate Agents (the transgessors of the laws) unto the course of Justice, and not to take all their faults upon himself, so as to protect them with the shield of his indemnity, or with the force of his word against the execution of vindicative Justice: for if he doth this; then he puts himself as to his own person, out of the case of indemnity wherein the law puts it: nor can that law be counted valid for him against his own will, and against the Equity of the law of nature; which in this ease doth make him guilty, for if a King as a King, by the intent of the law, doth act nothing in his own person but by his agents; and yet he will not be counted to have acted by his agents but to have done all their faults in his own person, than he declares ipso facto that he will not have the intent of the law valid as to himself, but that he will stand in his agents room and be looked upon as in their person and under their guilt, and consequently not as a King but as a transgressor; non quod volenti non fit injuria, est regula juris. Therefore I conceive thus; 
By 3. ways the prerogatives of exemption from being a transgressor may be lost by Kings.  That a King may make void as to himself, and lose the prerogative of the law made in favour to his person three ways. 1. If he set himself directly to disannul the general ground of all laws. For this cannot be imputed to any subordinat agents as their guilt, for they are looked upon and made punishable only as transgressors in particular matters. 2. If he doth in opposition to the intent of the law made for punishing transgressors, and for exempting his own person from the guilt of particular transgressions; take up on himself all the guilt of particular faults to protect iniquity and illegality; then he doth effectually make void the prerogative which the law doth give him. 3. If he doth by force take upon him to hinder the execution of the sentence of the supreme Judicature, for the protecting of transgressors against the law; for to do this; is the highest act of illegal government, and in effect the putting down of all laws. In all which Cases if you can make it appear to me rationally that by your positive law the King is to be meant no transgressor; I shall confess a mistake, but till then give me leave to think that I am no stranger to Reason, when I am bold to say, that no positive law of any Nation in the world, can disannul the law of Nature, which in suchlike cases, doth present a King even as a King to be in his own person a transgressor to the law-making power of the Nation, which is to be governed legally and not arbitrarily.  
The second thing which you take notice of, is a seeming inconsistency between two passages of my discourse. In the one (you think) I Judge definitly in the highest way of the Rights which Supreme powers have over us, and in the other which is pag. 10. I declare that it doth not belong to me or to any private man to Judge definitively of the rights which the Supreme powers in this world pretend to have to their places.  
To reconcile this seeming inconsistency, I shall desire you to reflect upon two things, 
The answer doth show the grounds of reconcileing it.  viz. The direct intent and proper subject of each part of my discourse, whereunto the things seemingly inconsistent do relate; which things in both places being very much different, and bringing a different respect upon the passages supposed to be opposite, when you shall perceive the same, I hope your mistake will be rectified.  
For in the first place my purpose is to declare what the fundamental constitution of the Government of this State is, as I conceive it agreeable to the Universal law of nature; by which all free Commonwealths are settled within themselves. But in the second place viz. pag. 10. my purpose is to declare how my friend ought to behave himself for the quieting of his scrupulous Conscience in the doubts which he had concerning the particular present Powers, and the lawfulness of their coming to their places.  
The proper subject of my discourse in the first place, is concerning the Legislative power of all Nations, as they are Commonwealths, and how in this Nation that power hath been settled of old: and the proper subject whereof I speak in the second place, is concerning the particular ways by which the present powers are come, and have a right to their places, which are things of a very different nature.  
Concerning the first, if you look upon the Universal law of nature, I suppose you will grant that no man ought to be ignorant of it; 
The application of the grounds to show the reconcilement of the passages.  & if you look upon the constitution of this State, as that law is observed therein, I hope you will allow me as one in matriculat into the Commonwealth, and concerned as well as others in the common welfare thereof, the judgement of discretion to consider and declare what I observe therein: which at this time I think is my duty to mention, but concerneing the second, I give advice to my friend how he may quiet his spirit about the matters which concern him not, and whereat he seems to be troubled, and decline to make myself a definitive Judge of the particular rights and proceed of those that God hath set over us to Rule the Commonwealth. So then in the forme● I observe what the law is under which we live: and in the latter I refrain from the judicature of particular matters whereunto I have no calling to be a judge: 
A mistake concerning the Commons right to make laws objected.  and what inconsistency is between these purposes, and between the discourses, which to this effect I make upon these subjects; I shall refer now to your second thoughts to collect, wherein I hope your imaginary difficulty to reconcile these passages will easily vanish,  
Concerning that which I say of the Custom of this Nation, that the Commons at all times have used to ask and propose the making of Laws, & that the Lords & King were wont to give their consent thereunto, you say, I do as far in this mistake as I did forget myself in the other. To this I say, It is well if I am not further mistaken. For I shall not stick to declare ingeniously the truth of my present thoughts, that when I now reflect upon the expressions which there I have used, 
The answer shows the objectors mistake and whence it proceeds.  concerning the National Custom, and compare them with what you offer to be considered here (although I see myself not guilty of the mistake wherewith you charge me, but can discern the grounds of your mistaking the drift and sense of my words to have been somewhat of the Printers fault; somewhat of your own inadvertency of my meaning yet) my words seem to myself somewhat more full than they needed to have been for the end for which I uttered them. For my end was only to show that the received Custom and liberty, whereby the Commons are wont to propose the making of laws, and the Lords and King are desired to give their assent thereunto, did arise at first, and was since continued upon the just and natural foundation of all laws in a free Nation: which is the reason of the Body thereof in Parliament. which I say hath the sole right to propose and choose the laws by which the Nation is to be ruled. This drift of mine you do not observe, and the fault of the Printer hath helped your mistake; for in the last Impression which I conjecture you have made use of; the particle where is put in stead of whence which was in the first, intimating the dependence of the custom of the Commons of this Nation upon the law of nature mentioned immediately before. Now because I intended to point at as much of this right and liberty of nature as I did find extant in the practice of our Parliament, and withal had a mind briefly to intimate the most material differences of Rights, which were in each of the members of Parliament, with reference to the whole Body, according to the forenamed law of nature; therefore I perceive my expressions did run out, under the general term of a National Custom, aswel upon that which by right might be practised: or rather by the nature of this constitution of government is proper to be practised, as upon that which the facto was in use amongst us.  
I am not ignorant that the laws have had their rise sometimes from the one, 
How the Laws do rise from the commons, and how from the King and Lords defferently  sometimes from the other house: but when I said that it was (as I supposed) a perpetual custom in this Nation for the Commons at all times to ask and propose the making of laws, I had an eye to the Coronation-oath, wherein the King is obliged to swear that he shall maintain the laws quas vulgus elegerit, which doth suppose to my understanding, no less than what I express, viz. that the right of ask and proposing of laws to be made doth originally reside in the people; with a  obligation in the King to consent thereunto. As ancient then as the Coronation-oath is, so long I suppose the Commons do lay claim to this right of choosing laws for themselves, and although all this be granted, yet it doth not follow that the King and Lords might not also propose any thing at all, for the making of laws unto the Commons. For to assert this right to belong originally and primarily to these, doth not wholly exclude the other from it: nor do my expressions import much more than a direct assertion of the right of the Commons which is in practice: which being raised and derived from the law of nature, might be inferred to be de jure primarily practised by them, and truly (though you seem to deny it, yet) I have been told very credibly and circumstantially, that the Commons since the sitting of this Parliament, have more than once upon special immergencies declared at Conferences to the Lords that this was their right, as they were the representatives of the Nation, and trusties for common safety. It is also granted that the Lords or King have by a received custom freely given or refused their assent to Bills offered as they have seen cause: this showeth that they sat not in Parliament as mere servants unconcerned in the main; but as joynt-Councellors for the main, in the things wherein their service was to be made use of towards the State, a man may be in his Principal relation a servant to another, and yet in such a degree of honour, as not to be obliged to do any thing by mere command without his own free consent: and so I conceive Kings and Lords to be in a free Nation, they may for themselves (if they think not fit to act.) surcease, but they cannot pretend to a negative voice, so as to make it unlawful for those that have a right to order their own affairs, to act without them, they are then to be counted Servi Honorarii non Mancipia legum, and because they may be considered justly as members of the State, who have a considerable State to venture in it, therefore they cannot be in equity deprived of a consultative vote in the making of laws (except by some faults they make themselves incapable thereof) although the power of choosing & making them doth not primarily belong unto them but to the Commons alone: and to these a right and prerogative to see them kept and executed, for herewith the Representees intrust them.  
That which you observe concerning the oath of allegiance (that it was made in our age) is no ways inconsistent with my assertion, that by the consent of all ages, the oath of allegiance ought to be understood as I explain it: 
In what sense the Oath of allegiance hath been in all ages.  for if you observe the strain of my discourse, you will see that I speak of the meaning of the oath as it is in the law of nature and Nations, that is, as in all ages such Oaths have been used; for all promises of Fealty and of free subjection unto Kings and liege Lords, in all people and Nations governed rationally by laws, are in my apprehension of the same kind with our oath of allegiance: and therefore this particular oath made in our age upon a special emergency, aught to be understood no otherwise then that same oath hath been always taken at all other times.  
The Comment which you say I make upon the third article of the Covenant, is your mistake of my construction of the Covenant, 
Concerning the sense of the third article of the Covenant whether the promise to preserve the King be conditional yea, or no.  and not my mistake of the meaning thereof, for I change not the In into If, as you say I do: for look upon my words again and you shall see that I allege the expression as it is in the text of the Covenant, but yet I say that the In of the Covenant doth contain a limitation of the defence and preservation promised to the King and his Authority, for if we promise to defend him and his Authority only in the defence and preservation of Religion and Liberties, than we are neither bound unto him absolutely, nor otherwise but in order to these, so than our meaning is to be bound, first to defend these for themselves, and then him and his Authority are included therein. But now if it should fall out that be by his own default should not be found in these, if he should put himself out of the sphere of that protecteion, which we oblige ourselves to maintain towards Religion and Liberty: and if he will not be looked upon as sub ordinate thereunto, but regarded by us, merely for himself: is not then his share of safety due to him this way (but refused by him as thus offered) lest to him, as from our acts of protection, because the intention of defending and preserving him and his just Authority, is taken up and concluded only as within the bounds of that endeavour, which is to be put forth for the maintaining of Religion and liberty, which is so far from being a forced and corstrained sense of the words that the more strictly you cleave to the letter thereof, the less respect is to be had unto him alone for himself, and without due regard to Religion and liberty. I do not say (as you misconstrue me) that the words of the Covenant are to be meant of the King's preservation of Religion & liberty, but I understand them of our preservation thereof, and I grant that with it we are bound to intent his preservation also, yet always so, as to intent him and his interest within that of religion and liberty and not without it, or separate from it, and by itself: nor did I leave out the words immediately following that the world may bear wituess with our Consciences of our loyalty, and that we have no thoughts to diminish his Majesty's just power and greatness) upon any such design as you imagine at all: for they do take nothing from the sense of a limited protection which I urge, but rather confirm the same, by declaring that to include all the respect which we own to him within our preservation of Religion and Liberty is the conscionable tenure of our true loyalty, and that we profess before all the world, that we acknowledge it not due to him upon any other terms, and that in so doing we foment no purpose to diminish any thing of his just power and greatness because it cannot be imagined that ever any power or greatness was legally intended to be given him, or justly possessed by him, which is not consistent with the true Religion, and the Liberties of the Nations. Whereupon my inference concerning him, (which I perceive you misinterpret, as if I offered it, as the meaning of the words of the Covenant) doth follow, that if he would not concur with the Representatives towards the maintaining of their Religion and Liberties, he put himself out of the protection, which in order thereunto was intended towards him.  
Here by the way observe a fault in the printing of the Considerations; for whereas it is said, none but his subjects are bound to defend his person, it should be none of his Subjects are bound, etc.  
I say then upon the whole matter with you, that the things charged against the Parliament, wherein they were accused to have an evil eye against the King were falsely and injuriously charged upon it, and justly disavowed by the Protestations which the Parliament put forth; because it was not possible for the Parliament to look any better way upon the King, then through the prospect of Religion and Liberty; and if he did vanish out of their sight, whiles they did hearty seek him within that prospect; it must not be imputed to the Parliaments eye, but unto his own carriage and motions which made him invisible to them there, where they were bound to seek him, and he bound to be found.  
Touching the causes why the King was laid aside, you say, that I seem unresolved whether it was guilt in his Majesty, or jealousy in the Houses that occasioned the Votes of Non-addresses. You say well, that I seem unresolved, 
Concerning the Votes of Nonaddresses whether they came from guilt in the King, or jealousy in the Houses.  because I was resolved, not to seem a resolver of that business. For I think it contrary to the Rule of my place and Calling, to make myself a Judge of the matter between them.  
The Reasons why a private man ought not to judge definitively of the proceed of his Superiors in their places, you will do well in matters of this nature, to follow as you see I do. And if all our Brethren would do so, they would free their spirits from great Snares, and find a readier way to do their duty without murmuring, then now they can light upon.  
But touching the parallel which you make between the King and Parliament, and a man jealous of his Wife, out of Numb. 5. methinks the Text will not yield the conclusion which you seem to infer from it; 
Deut. 24.1. Mat. 19.3.  for it is clear, that Moses permitted the Jews to give their Wives a Bill of divorce for slight occasions of dislike taken up against them, although they were altogether guiltless: therefore the intent of the Law of jealousy in Numb. 5. seems not to be for ordering of the way of her dismission; for a Bill of Divorce did order that way but only to quiet the spirit of jealousy, in the Husband, by bringing the matter between him and his Wife to some issue by God's determination of the matter of doubt.  
I know not why you say, that I seem to judge it not unreasonable, that the people may cast off their Kings ad placitum. It is altogether against my judgement; for except there be a breach of the fundamental trust, I know no placitum to be allowable; for there aught to be no more a divorce between the King and his People; for every slight cause, then between a Man and his Wife; and I think you intent not to make the bond stronger between a King and his People, than God hath made it between a Wife and her Husband. If then you will assert that there ought to be no divorce between them, without a breach of the fundamental Relation, which may be called State-Adultery, I shall not contradict you; but if you will go beyond the judgement of discretion peremptorily to define, where and what the first breach of trust was, I am not allowed to follow you, yet without any determinate judicature to look discreetly upon these matters, and to contemplate what may be rationally said unto them; I shall not blame you for it, viz. to consider whether the King made not a fundamental breach from the Parliament, when he intended to dissolve it by a Declaration, wherein he condemned them (if I am not mistaken) to be Traitors and Rebels? and whether when he called another Parliament at Oxford, he did not actually as it were marry himself to another Wife?  
Concerning the Votes of Non-addresses, you say they were recalled, and the King was made thereby an Object of the Oath of Allegiance.  
I say it is true, the Votes were recalled, but yet the repeal was only in order to a Treaty: therefore after the Treaty, 
In what sense the Votes of Non-addresses were recalled.  if no full conclusion did ensue, he was to be in statu que prius. The repeal than was not absolute, as the prohibition of addresses was: if therefore the Votes of absolute Non-addresses did dissolve the obligation as to private persons: and the Votes of conditional addresses for a public Treaty did not restore it in the event, I see not how he could become an object of our allegiance by repealing of those Votes.  
That which you say against the reasons which I allege to show, that the Engagement is so far from being opposite to the Oath of Allegiance, and the National Covenant, that it may rather be a confirmation of the ground for which both the one and the other was binding; runs out upon a great misconstruction of my sense, which easily might have been otherwise understood; for it was very obvious for any body to imagine, that in this case when we speak of a Common wealth, a Christian Commonwealth is to be understood; and upon this presupposal, 
What are the essentials of a Christian Commonwealth.  which I thought no ways obscure, I said, to be governed by Laws, to have the true Religion and the National Freedom, are things absolutely necessary and essential to the being of a Commonwealth, meaning a Christian Commonwealth, and although actually there be few, or have been few such Commonwealths in the world; yet that doth not refute my assertion of the nature of the thing; but that which you add concerning our Oaths that they had a respect not only to the esse, but also to the bene esse of the Nation doth seem some what more material: yet you mistake me wholly, 
How Oaths concerning means to an end are binding.  when you say that I take for granted, that all our Oaths did barely respect the esse not the bene esse, or external administration of the Nation; for I grant that we swore not only to the remote end, but also to the means which had a direct tendency thereunto, which then was judged by the reason of the Nation to be the form of Government, which at that time was established: this I freely grant, but withal I conceive, that the intent of all such Oaths was only to oblige unto the means so long, so far, and in quantum as they should have a direct tendency to the main end for which they were taken; and not absolutely whether they should have a tendency to the main end or no, whence this consequence will follow, that if the means cease to have such a tendency, (which upon emergencies may fall out) or become destructive to the end for which they were chosen, than the obligation to use them for such an end (though settled by an Oath) is no more binding; for if the Oath did bind only as to means for an end, and the things sworn to, do cease to be what they were, viz. means to that end: then to my understanding there is no further obligation in that Oath towards the use of them; and I pray consult your Casuists upon this matter, whether they can show any reason to contradict this assertion. Now this being to me a clear truth in respect of the obligation in general, of an Oath to the use of any means whatsoever, I shall proceed to state the case somewhat nearer to our present condition, as I understand it, and made it the ground of my discourse. I conceive then, 
The Case of taking the National Oaths, and the Engagement stated.  that private men in public concernments touching the Government of the State; when there is a necessary change in it, and a question, whether this or that form is most conducible to the main end of common safety? and whether the means formerly settled towards that end have any further fitness and tendency thereunto, yea or no? I say, in this matter of deliberation and in all concernments of such a public nature; private men are to be determined by the judgement of the supreme power which is over them, for the time: if then I (being a private man) be at one time called upon to declare my faithfulness to the use of the means which my Superiors judge fittest for public safety, do oblige myself under them to be faithful thereunto: and at another time, be called upon again, to declare my faithfulness to the use of other means (emergencies in the judgement of the supreme powers, having changed the nature of the former) or to declare my constant resolution, to be faithful to the main end of common peace and safety, notwithstanding the changes which they think necessary to make in the means; if I say, I be thus called upon, as one to be determined in such matters, by the supreme powers that are over me, do act without scrupling that which in itself I think just and lawful in my place to do; what blame can I bear, for yielding to different Declarations at several times, and upon different and necessary emergencies? now if this be the case whereof I speak, and whereinto we are cast (as clearly it is) than your whole discourse concerning the intention of a swearer towards the end, in contradiction to the means expressed in his Oath, is to no purpose, and I have cause to wonder that you exspaciat so largely upon a subject whereof there is so little occasion and appearance of ground given from that which I say; for I say nothing but that the sense of the Engagement to my understanding doth confirm the ground and main end for which the former Oaths were taken. I speak nothing of any man's private intentions; or of the interpretations which he may make mentally of the Oaths which are put to him, though different from the sense of those that offer them: I am so far from allowing of this in any body, that I conceive all such practices to be a mocking of God and men; but I speak clearly of the proper intent of the Engagement, and how consistent the sense thereof is with the main end of the former Oaths. And as for that which the former Oaths did mention touching the forms of Government then in being; I say that I conceive none of them so essential to any Nation, as that upon exigent necessities they may not be altered by the supreme power of that Nation: and how you come to conceive that I think it not unreasonable for a People to cast off their Kings, or change the form of their Government merely add placitum, when as I so expressly limit those alterations to a necessary exigency; I would have some cause to wonder, if I knew not that it is very incident to men forestalled in judgement or affection against others, to be inclined to misunderstand their words, and upon imaginary advantages against the opinions fathered upon them, to be willing to triumph over fictitious absurdities. I shall therefore pass by your whole discourse concerning the case of one coming to a Garrison; Concerning the Canan-Oath to confirm the Prelacy. Concerning the second Article of the National-Covenant, Concerning the making void of all security in every Oath which the State may prescribe, Concerning Zedekiah and how he might have justified his perjury against Nebucadnezer, Concerning the Elders of Israel, that they might have broken their Oath to the Gibeonites. Concerning Saul, that he might have justified the wrong he did unto them, and concerning the benefit which the present State may reap by the Engagement upon such an interpretation thereof as you are willing to put upon it, in my name against my sense.  
I say, I shall pass by all these particulars, because they are to no purpose: the whole case and my sense against which you pretend to allege them, being wholly mistaken, as I have already showed; nor came it ever in my heart to think that any man's private interpretation or intention to some remote end might justify him to take any Oath in a sense which is disagreeing from the meaning of those that give it; nor is it possible by any consequence to infer any such thing as justifiable, from any thing which I do say; and if you can make it appear that any such thing doth truly follow upon any assertion of mine, I shall as willingly as you condemn it.  
My Friend's objection from the third Article of the Covenant, you intent to strengthen two ways against the Engagement.  
First, when I confess that the former intentions to preserve the privileges of Parliament as then they were settled, cannot now be prosecuted; you tell me, that this alone is enough to create a bigger scruple than there is force in my answer to wipe off.  
Secondly, you make use of the plea which I allege for the justification of my Friend, to condemn those who did that which he could not allow, but rather found himself obliged to prevent and oppose in his place.  
Touching the first if you had shown what the scruple was, which that confession might create, I could have spoken to it, but seeing you conceal it, it is not my work to conjecture what it may be: the rather, because I cannot suspect that you suppose it to be a sin, to lay down alterable intentions, when God makes them impossible or sinful to be prosecuted.  
Touching the second I do not allow of your inference, viz: That if my friend is excusable from breach of Covenant in the infringement of Parliament-Priviledges, because he did contribute nothing thereunto: that therefore I do plainly charge with breach of Covenant those who brought this change upon the state. I say this consequence doth not follow, because the cases of those that brought this change about, was far different from that of my Friends; and such as by their place might make that to be right in them, which in my Friend would have been wrong: here the saying is morally true, cum duo faciunt idem, non est idem. For although though they are engaged into the same Covenant, 
Whether they who were the Authors of the change of Government, are to be judged guilty of the breach of Covenant yea or no?  yet the condition of public and private persons, or persons in trust or without trust, makes a vast difference as to matters of public concernment: nor am I a competent judge to define what is right or wrong in the management of public places, whereof the nature and circumstances are unknown to me, nor what the special emergencies of State were, which might justify their proceed: therefore I dare not beyond my line take upon me that which you do, to condemn them for Covenant-breakers, and that unheard: surely if in such cases every private man may make himself a Judge of the affairs entrusted unto others in public places, all Government will be utterly dissolved, and unextricable confusions will ensue. The fatal necessity of a State may be seen and apprehended by some that sit at the stern otherwise then by others: 
Nay, although it happen that they are a minor party.  and how far a party of Rulers in number less, and yet in point of trust more considerable, may act by their own apprehensions of necessity, contrary to the sense of a major party, is a thing which since the troubles of both Nations and the sitting of this Parliament hath oft times been decided. If you look upon the proceed of the leading men of both Nations, who have ventured upon erterprises of an extraordinary nature, in extraordinary emergencies, both without the assent, and sometimes against the sense of the major part. Now when men in supreme trust most considerable, differ in judgement concerning the way of common safety, from others who are in the same trust, but less considerable: what can we who are standers by, not acquainted with the grounds of their deliberations, nor called to the arbitrement of differences between them, do in such a case either as Christians or as rational men; but pray to God that they may agree, 
How standers-by that look upon public debates between Rulers in chief, should behave the 〈◊〉  and being peaceable in our own thoughts not to meddle beyond our line to judge either way, or to foment parties, or to provoke and harden one side against another; but to persuade all indifferently unto that concurrence and unity of spirit, which in known duties for common concernment is out of all doubt most edifying and blameless. If you would join with me to follow the Rules of this Divinity, rather than give way to prejudicated imaginations, you would see just cause to suspend your judgement concerning the plea which others have made of necessity, from censuring it in them as imaginary and pretended: and if you had a mind to refute the error of any point of (as you call it) State-Divinity to break Covenants, you would certainly be enabled to do it more effectually and impartially then hitherto you have done any thing which I have met withal in these papers; for the reasonings which Joshua and the Elders of Israel (as you personate them) might have alleged, and which you think Saul took up to colour his breach of Covenant with the Gibeonites: although indeed as you say, such reasonings come from unbelief; yet if they be not of the same kind with those which have moved the present powers to alter the former Government into this which now is▪ what have you gained to yourself by your reproof, but the guilt and discredit of a rash censurer? and what good have you done to him whom you have unadvisedly censured upon a wrong ground, but to make him averse from hearing you any further? as for myself I shall fully grant what you say, that the Rule whereby private men are obliged to keep their Covenant, must be observed in States proportionally caeteris paribus, that though they swear to their hurt, 
How States are bound to their Oaths.  they must not change, and that it is more safe to keep with God, although seemingly we run upon peril, then to quit the ways of God for prevention of peril. These maxims I do fully agree unto, and am much persuaded that none of the godly men who have had a hand in this change of Government will contradict the same; and because I am bound to believe this of them so long as nothing doth appear to the contrary: therefore I must represent unto myself, that which also I offer to your ingenuity to consider, that it is more charitable to say of them that they intended not to consult with flesh and blood, but with their Conscience and duty, when they took their lives in their hands to see justice executed: and if touching any of them hereafter any thing, contrary to this judgement of charity, should break forth as a matter of conviction, fit to be brought home unto his Conscience, I shall be so much the more fit to make him sensible of it, by how much I have had the better opinion, and never was inclined to wrong him by any evil surmises in my thoughts, for why should I think evil in my heart of men unknown to me? of men who are my Superiors, in public trust over me? and of men whose actions cannot only bear some plea; but in the plea (if matters of fact be found true) there is nothing irrational and contrary to the grounds of natural equity.  
As for the Example of Joshua and the Elders of Israel, the chief business to be heeded therein (in my apprehension) is this, 
How Joshua was bound to his Oath made to the Gibeonites.  that we should observe the true account why Joshua and the Elders did stand to their Covenant with the Gibeonites: notwithstanding the murmuring of the Congregation against them; for the Congregation might justly have alleged not those slight and trivial matters which you mention, but the invalidity and nullity of the Oath itself, that it was ipso facto void, as being a transgression of the Commandment of God, 
Deut. 20.15.16.17.  who had forbidden the Israelites to enter into league with any of the people of the Land, or to suffer them to remain alive in it.  
Moreover, that the main circumstance and express ground of their contract with the Gibeonites was a mere nullity, and acknowledged to be a deceit; for the contract was made with this express condition, that the Gibeonites were none of the People of the Land, which being found otherwise, the contract was void.  
To this plea of the Congregation, what you would have answered I know not; but some Divines of good note confess upon these grounds, that the Oath which was made to the Gibeonites was void de jure, and that Joshua and the Elders were not bound to keep it, yet that de facto they resolved upon equitable Considerations to keep it ex parte tantùm; for that it was notkept ex toto is apparent; for it was kept only as to the main matter which was the promise of life, but as to the matter of freedom and confederacy, which is employed in the terms of Peace, and of a League with them. Josh. 9 verse 15. it was not kept; and yet the promise of freedom and confederation was no less covenanted with them than that of life. Now the equitable considerations which moved the Princes thus to qualify the contract, and not to make it wholly void, were as I conceive, the respect due to the Oath by the Lord God of Israel, verse 19 and to their own safety, lest wrath be upon us, verse 20. say they added the sin of wrath breaking their Oath: they were not free from guilt for swearing without taking Council with God: if now they should seem not at all to respect their Oath, this might heighten that guilt to bring forth a punishment, and I believe we shall do them no wrong, if we conjecture that they did consider also this inconveniency, that if they should wholly have disregarded their Oath, a disrespect would have been brought thereby deservedly not only upon themselves in point of fidelity, but also upon the name of God, in point of reverence in the minds of the Nations, who should have heard of this their breach of Oath but not have been able to know the grounds of the justifiableness thereof; for it was not possible suddenly (as matters than stood between them and Neighbour-Nations) to inform them of the just reasons of their not keeping their Oath; and to think that in equity this might have swayed somewhat with them is not unreasonable. But the main thing which did cast the balance is clearly that which in the Text is alleged, the equity of saving their life; for being in a straight by reason of their rash Oath, they followed that which was most safe, not wholly to disannul their promise, but to keep that part thereof which was most favourable, viz. to spare their lives; but the other part by which they should have been exempted from the condition of Bondmen, and made Confederates, was made void, although the Oath did no doubt include this promise as well as the other. So that de facto this part of the Oath being altered lawfully, it showeth that the other de jure might also have been altered, if the just fear of greater inconveniencies which might have followed upon the alteration, then upon the confirmation thereof, had not swayed with them: therefore upon more mature thoughts, this part of the Oath not being altered, but deliberately confirmed, it was made for ever afterward unalterable, and this confirmation of the Oath, as to that part which secured their lives, being violated by Saul for worldly ends, and for such considerations as you wrongfully think my grounds allow, was punished by God upon his Family; for the promise of life to the Gibeonites, being afterward ratified, not only by the Princes, but by the Congregation also, when they had been three hundred years, or thereabout in possession of their right, there could be no colour for Saul to persecute them to death; for although they should have had none other plea, but so long a prescription of time for their right to a livelihood in their service, I know not how in equity, it could have been taken from them.  
I conceive then that the first contract with the Gibeonites was not binding, and that Joshua in dealing afterward with them, 
Two soveral Contracts with the Gibeonites.  did bring them to be sensible of this, as it appeareth by their confession, and the resignation of themselves to his discretion, v. 24.25. begging their lives, and not claiming any right to it by contract: it appeareth also not to have been binding the jure out of v. 14. where the Text saith, they asked not council at the mouth of God, to intimate the neglect of respect due to God, and the transgression of his revealed will in the business, which clearly made the matter in itself a nullity: So that the Congregation, if they had executed the sentence of death, which God by Moses had denounced against them, could not have been counted transgressors against God, notwithstanding the Oath of Joshua and the Elders; but than it would have been counted cruelty in the Congregation, and breach of Oath in the Elders, and a disrespect in the people towards the Engagement of their Princes, and many other inconveniencies besides would have followed in reference to men and their interpretation of that action, if no equitable temperament had been found in the business, which upon a second Treaty (the first being declared void) was done with the consent of the Congregation: and this second Contract God did ratify, as appeareth by the punishment of Saul for the breach of it.  
Thus you have my sense of the Oath of Joshua to the Gibeonites; which in many and main things is different from the present case; only I have been thus large upon it, to prevent your mistake lest you should think (as I know some do) the first contract de jure binding, because confirmed by an Oath; and thereupon infer by this precedent, that an Oath is indissoluble, although it be made to establish a thing materially unlawful; and although it may fall out to oblige to something literally, which is contrary to the main intent thereof. Now I hold that if a thing once sworn, become either materially or formerly unlawful or by change of circumstances impossible to be done, that then the Oath is no more binding, but ipso facto extinct.  
In that matter which is said to pinch my friend, and my answer to it; you consider two things. First, because I say of those who have made this change in the Government, that they will plead for themselves; and because I take not upon me professedly to justify their proceed, you conclude (but most irrationally) that I condemn them for Covenant-breakers; but there is no equitable and ingenuous Reader, who can construe any thing out of any words of mine, which will yield such a conclusion; for I profess it is wholly against my Conscience, to do as you do, viz. to make myself a Judge, and out of my sphere to define matters this or that way concerning them; but you seem willing to catch at any thing to discredit them, which I see no warrant to do.  
Secondly, when I show my Friend that the consequence which he made (thus if I take (saith he) the Engagement, than I shall be accessory-to the breach of Covenant which I apprehend others are guilty of) was not good; you are much displeased at me for it, and intent to make not only an observation, but an animadversion upon my discourse concerning that matter: let me first represent briefly the substance of my reason which you seem not at all to take notice of, and then I shall take notice of, your animadversion.  
I show that his inference was not good, 
Why no man by the Engagement can be accessary to other men's sins (if they have any) for making a change in the State.  from the direct and plain matter of the Engagement, looked upon in the letter thereof, which binds us to nothing else, but to procure the good of the Commonwealth as now it stands, and this I say at all times is a duty to be done, however it stands: I say also, that to intent and do this, is agreeable to the intent of the Covenant, from whence to my understanding, is clearly inferred, that the taking of the Engagement to this effect, can be no breach of the Covenant which doth allow of this as a duty; for if the plain duty of the Engagement is that which the main intent and design of the Covenant doth presuppose, than the obligation to that can be no breach of this, and consequently his inference is not good; for it is clear that the Covenant obliging us to some particular duties of truth and faithfulness towards the Commonwealth, as it was then established with a King and House of Lords, cannot bind us up, from promising and intending to be true and faithful to the whole Commonwealth, as it is now established, without a King and House of Lords. The having or wanting of a King and House of Lords, is but accidental to the main duty of being true and faithful to the Commonwealth, as it is offered to us in the Engagement.  
To this matter of reason you say nothing, which yet was the main thing to be spoken to, if you intended an animadversion: But you tell me, that my discourse doth necessarily imply a high charge of inconsiderateness in those that made and imposed the Engagement, whereof none can believe them guilty; and this you intent to make good, by telling me further what they who made and imposed the Engagement knew, as inconsistent with my sense of the Engagement, wherein you follow your ordinary vein, to make the worst construction you can of my sense, and to presume to express their sense and intentions little to their commendation. To dispute with you conjecturally what their thoughts, were is no part of my duty, it is sufficient for my aim, to evince that the plain matter of the Engagement is a clear duty not disagreeable to the intent of the Covenant which you overthrow not; and therefore my answer to my friend's scruple stands firm; for which cause I think it needless to spend time upon the rectifying of your misconstruction of my sense of the Engagement, as if it meant by the duty which I press, only the  good of the Commonwealth, and had no respect at all to the  good thereof, and to the clause as it is now established. Nor shall I insist to make an animadversion upon your misapplication of this misconceived sense of mine, as if I took the Engagement in so large a signification, as that any man might foment under the words thereof what intentions he would, though never so destructive to the present Establishment: these things I shall pass by, because I suppose no candid Reader will so understand me, but will easily perceive that you frame to yourself fictious absurdities upon misconstrued notions.  
The observation which you make upon my interpretation of the words without a King and House of Lords, which I call an explication of the words (now established) immediately going before, and not an absolute abnegation of the things looked upon barely as in themselves, 
Whether the words without a King and House of Lords are an abnegation of them, barely and as in themselves.  hath somewhat a better colour of reason, then that which you mentioned before; and although I make no such account of that acception of these words, as to stand confidently upon it, that they cannot rationally bear any other interpretation; (for suppose they may by some consequence imply an abnegation of a King and Lords House, how will that oppose my assertion? or prejudice my reasoning with my Friend? yet your arguing against the abnegation of them so as I have mentioned, is not valid: for first, you take not up my expressions as they are delivered by me, and so contradict not my assertion, for you contradict only an absolute negation of the things themselves, and I assert, that the words do not mean, an absolute abnegation of the things looked upon, harely as in themselves. I make a difference between the negation of a thing and the abnegation of it. I may deny a thing to have a being, when it is not existent in rerum natura: and yet not intent to renounce all respect which may be had to it, looked upon barely in itself. I may confess that a thing is not in this or that respect, and yet not declare that I cast it off, barely in itself, and in all respects. Now I say that the [meaning of the] words of the Engagement in their proper and obvious sense import not the last, but only the first acception, where I would have you to take notice that the sense which you assert is not proper and obvious, but brought in upon many consequences, which though not irrational, yet not contradictory to what I say. Again in my expressions, the words barely as in themselves (for the word truly is not rightly printed, it should be barely) are reduplicatives, and you take them up without any reduplication, and speak of the things themselves. Now there is a great difference between a thing in a reflexive sense or reduplicative consideration, & between the direct notion of it, you take up my words as if I spoke of a King and House of Lords themselves, that is in a direct notion, and I clearly speak of them in a reduplicatve notion, barely as in themselves: therefore you contradict not what I say, although you pretend to show that my gloss (as you call it) carries a full contradiction in itself: it is true, that your wrong allegation of the gloss doth seem to make it contradictory by way of consequences to the Text; but how it hath a full contradiction in itself, you make it not at all appear. And this is the first point of your mistake in the wrong allegation of my words, and the non-observing that I speak of a proper and obvious sense of the Engagement, and not of a sense by consequence. The second is the invalidity of your consequence, as to my understanding; for you say, that the words as now established, do fully imply that abnegation of King and Lords House which I there mention, because the adverb now in the Engagement (say you) doth stand in full opposition to the face of things in former Administrations. I grant that now stands in opposition to time passed by way of consequence, but not in a direct and proper Notion; for I may look upon things as now established, without looking back and comparing them with that which hath been; but when you say, that as now is a full contradiction to my sense as ever, I confess I understand not that, for if as ever, doth in its proper and obvious notion, and in my sense comprehend all times past, present and to come, than I know not by what good consequence it can be said to be a full contradiction to that which is present; for that which is ever must needs also be now, or else is not ever. I confess that the Commonwealth as now established, hath voted down the King and Lords house, and declared that at present they are unfit to have any share or hand in the Government of this Commonwealth, and in this sense by the words of the Engagement, we deny them to have a being in this present establishment, which is all that rationally by our Superiors (I speak it with respect) can be desired, and in an obvious sense is offered by the words of the Engagement; but from hence doth not follow, that King and Lords are voted down, being looked upon barely as in themselves; for it is clear, that the Declaration all along hath a respect to the safety of this Commonwealth at present, to show the inconsistency of a King and Lords House with it; and so much I conceive may be inferred, that the Engagement doth imply by consequence a consent in the Subscribers to this, but that either the Declaration, by which King and Lords were voted down, or the Engagement doth oblige any man to assert that Monarchical Government in itself, or Aristocratical Power mixed with it, and looked upon in itself, is for ever to be rejected out of a Commonwealth, and that neither of them can consist with the safety thereof, is much more than was ever, (as I conceive) intended by those that made the Engagement, or then can rationally and equitably (I say again with respect) be imposed upon any men of judgement by their Rulers: nor is it at all needful to oblige Subjects to any such assertion, for the end for which the Engagement is offered, which is only to give the present powers an assurance of fidelity to the present State; but you and some others of your strain seem willing to screw up the sense of the words to such irrationalities as these are by forced consequences, that an Odium may fall upon the present Government, as if they were set against Monarchy and Aristocraty, rather for some self-ends, then for the present good of this Commonwealth, which to intent (if there be any such leaven in the bottom) is far from the duty both of a Christian, and of a good Subject, who should make the best construction of the actions of their Superiors, and refer unto them the judicature and management of public affairs, as they shall think it most expedient, which if my Friend would lay to heart as he ought, and practise accordingly he would soon find himself eased of any thing which in this kind might pinch him.  
I go on, not (as you say) discerning that which is said will not hold; for you see it holds invincibly, but ex abundanti, yielding something to my Friend's weakness, more than perhaps was needful, I suppose in his apprehension of matters, that this Engagement doth materially settle something in the Commonwealth, which is contrary to the intention which he had in taking the Covenant; yet I say that by giving his assent thereunto as matters now stand, he doth not at all break his Covenant, because the obligation to those matters by virtue of the Covenant was exstinct, before he was called upon to take the Engagement, to this you say, that this opposition of mine is wholly yielded by others, both that the Engagement is in full opposition to the Covenant and other Oaths (and so all my labour lost in endeavouring to reconcile them) and that this which I now bring, is only held out for a plea to carry it in the affirmative, that the Engagement may be entered, malè res agitur (say you) cùm tot opus est remediis. To which I answer, malè cum ijs agitur quibus tot applicanda sunt remedia: it shows that their Disease may be brought to be stubborn, sed benè cum ijs agitur quibus tot suppetunt remedia: it shows that no cure is wanting, though the disease may seem desperate; for if the supposition which I make were wholly yielded unto as I make it, there would be no full opposition between the Covenant and other oaths found, otherwise then in the mistaken apprehensions of some that scare themselves at the Engagement without a just cause my labour therefore is not lost if things misunderstood may be rectified, as surely they may, and I hope by this time in some degree are. You admit, that that which is extinct & made void can no more oblige, with this limitation; provided that those who are obliged have no hand in extinguishing that which doth oblige them, 
Corcerning the matter of an Oath how it may be extinguished, or not extinguished.  to work out their own disobligation, this limitation I do admit, and your instance in David's case to Jonathan for preserving his seed, I allow. Yet if God had appointed Mephibosheth to die, and David to have given the sentence in the way of justice, do you think that David would have been guilty of the breach of oath made to Jonathan for the preserving of his seed? it is true we say the King dies not; that is, the supreme executioner of Laws dies not; but the King in his person was Civiliter mortuus, as to his office when he was Voted close prisoner in the Isle of Wight, and if there was just cause for it in the Judgement of the Supreme power of the Nation, their oath for his preservation being limited to a condition, they will be able to answer before a higher Judge than you or I for what they have done. The case which I suppose is concerning a private man, who is no Judge in public affairs, who had no hand in sentencing him; and therefore although in the preface of the Covenant, mention is made of the King and his Posterity, yet by his death the matter of the oath relating to him is extinct, and by the cause of his death the Law hath involved his posterity.  
That which you say here concerning Parliament-Priviledges, being always the same and unalterable, is only said and not proved; in like mauner when you tell me that we have now no Parliament actually existing, you beg the Question, and overthrow the fundamental position of a full House to be in the number of forty trusties, which I believe may be six times told in the List of those that now present themselves to that Assembly. Your comparison of a Physician who cannot preserve, except he recover strength, doth suppose many things which are not granted; therefore I shall not think them worthy of any larger answer then to tell you, that the Covenant never meant that private men of whom I speak should be Judges of Parliament-priviledges, or Physicians to the public diseases of the State. Now whether my friend hath any just cause to scruple further; neither you nor I are competent Judges, but the impartial Reader the third man, to whom, and to your own second thoughts I shall leave this matter.  
Upon the second part of my discourse to my friend, you make some observations, wherein you rather touch matters as it were in transcursu, exceptiously, then pitch upon a settled exception.  
You tell me first, that in stead of clearing the title of the present Powers as just and lawful, and acquitting it from usurpation, I make it unlawful to inquire and determine concerning it. To this I say, 
what the duty of Subjects is to their superiors.  till you make it appear that it is lawful for every private man to judge definitively of the Titles, Rights and Actions of the Powers that are over him, so as to oblige his Conscience to abstain from all lawful actings in his Calling under them, till he be satisfied in all his scruples concerning them, I must still for mine own part abstain from presuming to be their Judge in such matters, and dissuade others from that practice, and persuade them to do their own affairs quietly, and pray to God for their superior Powers.  
Then you blame me for holding forth the Rule by which I walk; as if I did intent to make myself in all things my friends precedent, or supposed him to be ready to follow me in all things. I see nothing can be so well meant and done but it may be ill taken, when men seek to make exceptions and not to edify; I thought the best way of edification was to hold forth the rules by which God doth teach us to walk; and because I would have no man to follow me further than he seethe a Rule, therefore I am interpreted to have an ambition to get followers: truly I shall follow you gladly if you will show me your Rule to be answerable to the word of God, and why show you not a fault in the Rule itself, if it is liable to exceptions; but if you can except nothing against it, why are you not so ingenious as to bear witness to the Truth? but when we hunt after contradictions, this is the Genius which leads us; we look not to the thing but to experiences, and in their wrong and worst side, afterward you say that I have been found a transgressor of mine own Rule. I see you allude to that which you said in your second exception but when you shall have answered that which I have said there to rectify your mistakes, than you will give me cause to think that you have a mind not only to tell me that I have transressed my Rule, but also to redress either me or my Rule if either be faulty; for which I shall thank you when you intent it as you ought to do.  
Concerning the Character of AntiChrist you deny nothing of that which I say, but you desire me to take it into my serious consideration to whom that Character doth belong; whether to those that seek out carefully to what power it is they own justly subjection that they may submit themselves thereunto, or to him who doth peremptorily determine of the forfeiture of Rights in those that before were possessed of an undoubted title, 
Concerning the spirit that exalts itself above Magistrates, where it appears most.  and disobliging Subjects from their Obedience.  
To this I say that I have considered seriously the matter, and find that the answer is easy, if the Case be stated as you offer it, upon a mistake in the second part, but let the Case be truly stated, and then consider you also where the Character of a Spirit exalting itself above Magistrates doth most appear: whether in him that submits himself to the higher Powers which God hath actualy set over him, and without disputing their title or making himself a Judge of their actions, doth all things just and lawful in his place under them as under the Ordinance of God, because he doth believe that all Supreme powers that are actually existent in the world are ordained of God, and aught to be submitted unto as God's Vice-gerents in their places for Conscience sake? or in him that doth nothing of all this, but making himself a Judge of the Powers that are over him and of their proceed, doth resist them as Usurpers, denying all obedience even in the best and lawfullest things commanded for public safety by them: doth despise their government, and speak evil of their dignity, and doth admit of none to have the right to Supreme power but whom he hath determined should have it? which of these hath most of the spirit of Antichrist judge ye? As for that which you call a peremptory determination of the forfeiture of Right in those that were before posse essed of an undoubted title, I can say this to it, that if you can show me that I make any peremptory determination of any thing in particular, I shall confess a fault, but if I do nothing more than represent the undeniable clear & general grounds of natural equity, upon which Rights may be forfeited, without making any special application thereof unto circumstances, or pronouncing a definitive sentence for or against any, as a Judge in the Case, than your censure will be found unjust and inconsiderate, and to see your error in it, look upon that which I have said unto your second observation.  
To the judgement of Discretion which I allow with a limitation, that it ought not to be set up so high within ourselves or over others, as to oblige our Conscience to follow it as the only Rule, and drown the thoughts of all other rules in point of obedience to the powers who are visibly over us; you say that blind obedience is better than such use of light, that when I believe I see my way, I have no allowance to follow it. This is a great mistake of my meaning, for so far as I allow to judge, I allow to follow light, I allow to judge, that is to discern and observe rationally who are in the visible possession of superiority, how they declare their own right, and with what power they stand; these things must be taken notice of, that men may be able to judge their own present station under whom they stand, whom God hath set over them, 
Concerning the judgement of discretion, & a definitive judgement, about what matters they are conversant.  and unto whom they own obedience for Conscience sake: so far as this judgement doth discover actual superiority, I oblige the conscience of every man in his particular actions to walk in the light thereof as a dutiful Subject; but I allow him not in the disquiry of matters concerning his superiors to go so far as to judge peremptorily of their proceed in their places, whether they do right or wrong, and whether their title be good or bad; in these things, because he cannot have that light which is requisite to settle a definitive judgement therein, and because he is not called to be a Judge of such matters, therefore I allow him not to oblige his Conscience to be entangled into any such judicature, or to suspend the acts of his civil and Christian obedience (wherein Conscience is to follow other clear Rules) upon his own or other men's observations of such things. In a word, I allow all men to seek out their way, and when they have found it to follow it conscionably: but they are to be directed, that in seeking their way they presume not above their line; their Line is to discern to whom they own the duty of a Subject, & what the thing is which by their superiors is required of them, whether it be answerable to the Law of God and nature, yea or no? within this line their judgement is to walk for themselves; but beyond this Line to make such observations of their Superiors ways, or to give way to the apprehensions which may be suggested unto them concerning the same from others, so far as to make those observations and apprehensions a rule to their conscience to walk by, is in my judgement irregular, and the very snare wherein at this time you and many others are taken in unawares, whiles you distinguish not between your own line and the line of others, and btweens the judgement of discretion & peremptory judgement, which are to be exercised about different objects and have a different relation unto Conscience, the things whereof I am no competent judge, I may diseern, with an observation of indifferency, leaving the determination thereof unto others to whom the judicature properly belongeth  
Concerning the Rule which I give, whereby Superiors may be discerned as agreeable to sense, to reason, and to conscience, you object,  
1. That if this Rule were right, Israel whensoever they were made Servants to their enemies, to Cushan Rushataim, to Eglon, to Jabin, to Midian, to Ammon, and to the Philistims, should have been bound up in bondage from seeking deliverance, nor any endeavour must have been used to recover lost rights. 
The difference between a State and v private man, in opposing oppressive powers over them.   
I answer, that this doth not follow at all.  
1. For the case of a private man is not the same with a whole state, this hath a right to govern itself independently, but no private man in a State can pretend unto this: therefore a State may endeavour to recover its right and liberty whensoever it can get strength to cast off the Government which is over it; but no private man may intent to make himself independent from all superior powers; he ought then to take notice of those that God hath set over him, to do his duty towards them.  
2. In a whole State, when it is oppressed by Foreigners, as when God sent those enemies to bring Israel into bondage there was no doubt, or need of a Rule to know who were their superiors; but here a particular man is supposed in a civil division, to be in doubt between two competitors, to whom he is to perform the duty of a Subject: the Rule than is only fitted for this case, and not for the other.  
3. In the deliverance of Israel from the oppression of their enemies it is said, that God raised them up Judges, and that he was with the Judge whom he raised, Jud. 2.16.18. therefore it followeth, that he put public Authority upon their deliverers, and consequently, that he did not allow private men to be otherwise then in subjection, as when he brought Nebuchadnezar against the Jews, who brought them away Captive into Babylon, he did Command all private men to be in subjection, and to pray for the peace of the place where they were Captives; 
Jer. 29.7.  even as the Apostle doth enjoin all Christians to be subject to the Roman Emperors (Rom. 13.) who for the most part were all usurpers.  
Secondly, 
How Subjects are to behave themselves towards these Powers, whether claiming superiority by Contract or by Conquest.  you object against that which I say about a Contract which makes a Law between Rulers and Subjects, and a Conquest which is bound to no Law, that it were worth observation, if I would acquaint you, which way the present powers do claim. I answer, my Council is, which way soever you are to look to your duty, and not to resist the Ordinance of God which is over you: use your own discretion to observe what you can, without making yourself a peremptory Judge of their way: and what I advise you to do, I endeavour to observe myself: therefore it is not reasonable that you should desire me to transgress mine own Rule, and go beyond my line to define other men's affairs which they have not called me to determine. I can discern a mixture in their way; to some they use the right of Conquerors, to others they walk by the Rule of a Contract: you may put yourself in either relation, for as your behaviour towards them is, so you are like to find them.  
Concerning the Queries whereof you say the Question is miserably begged, I have no more to say, but that I speak there in the name of others, and that it is left to your discretion to consider those Queries as the matter of them is offered in the nature of a plea for those who are accused of usurpation.  
And although you say, 
Concerning the Queries mentioned in the Considerations, how they are to be reflected upon.  you have never seen so much as an attempt for the proof of that which is taken as granted in these Queries; yet I can tell you that I have met with those that have in the presence of many, undertaken the proof thereof, which because it relates to matters of fact, whereof I can bear no infallible witness pro or contra: therefore I must leave it without a definitive sentence, as not being obliged in Conscience this or that way to a judicature, and yet I may rationally with an indifferent eye be inclined to assent more one way then another, always keeping my affection entire to the rule of my duty; for what ever the matters of fact be in other men's administrations, that is no rule to me in my sphere, I must look to the proper rule of mine own work with a respect to the matter and end thereof.  
To the second branch of my friends doubt, that which I offer (as a rule whereby to resolve his Conscience in the scruple it had you meddle not withal, but to avoid the evidence of that rule, you put another case and tell me. But if the Engagement be not a duty as men affected to the common cause of liberty (by mine own concessions) are persuaded, then (say you) guilt will follow upon such supposition which I have laid down. 
Concerning the Engagement that it is a Duty; and what doth follow thereupon.  To this I answer, that no man hath ever yet denied the Engagement to be a duty in the sense wherein I understand it, nor you yourself, although through prejudice against the present Rulers you are loath they should be understood to tender it in that sense wherein I offer it. Seeing then the Engagement in the sense in which I take it is undoubtedly a duty just to be required by the present Powers, you deal not rationally to suppose it to be no duty, except you had showed that either it could not bear the sense wherein I take it, or that that sense is not a matter of duty now to be performed as that it is unjust to be required: nothing of which you having done, and yet taking it for granted to be no duty (only because I confess that some men well affected to liberty are so persuaded, though it is clear that I think them to be in an error) you seem clearly to beg the question which is between us after that I have proved it; for having proved the Engagement to be a duty, and such a duty as is fundamental to all other former bonds; I may lawfully make it a ground to build some inferences thereon, and you not having disproved it to be what I say it is, have no ground to build any contrary inferences thereupon. Then also the inference which you make is, to my conception (if I take your meaning) needless; If (say you) it is no Duty, than guilt will follow upon such supposition which you have laid down, you had done well to have showed what the supposition is which you mean, for I cannot well guests at it. If you mean that the guilt of being accessary to other men's faults (whereof the question is) will follow upon the supposition that the Engagement is a duty when as indeed it is none; this may be granted, but is needlessly mentioned, because my presupposal that the doing of a duty can make no man accessary to another man's personal fault, doth sufficiently include; that if the thing done by him be not a duty, it will not excuse him from being accessary unto his fault.  
You take notice of the expression wherein I say of some, that they deserve not to have a being in the Commonwealth, and you call it a high one, and a passing of sentence upon those that have forborn to subscribe this Engagement, being conscious to themselves of the bonds of former Engagemenns. Herein you give us an example of that way of apprehending things which is in the spirits of all men who are led by prejudice, for although the matter which I deliver is as clear a truth as any that can be thought upon in the way of morality, and relates to no particular persons at all, 
An instance of a prejudicated way of misinterpreting plain truths.  but mentions only a general and undeniable maxim, which is a principle of all human societies; yet you cannot look straightly, and with a single eye upon it as it is delivered, but through the Prospective of your prejudice you not only pervert my meaning, but relat my words otherwise then I do offer them; for I say, that this is a rule of justice, that all men are bound to show fidelity unto those of whom they desire protection, and that we ure bound to be ready to every good work towards those with whom we live. which is all that in the present state of this Commonwealth is required of us; which if we desire not to perform. we deserve not to have a being in it, these truths which I deliver as general maxims, and apply them to myself as well as to others, and universally to all men in all Commonwealths in the world, because you cannot deny either the premises or their coherrnce. You carp at the clause thereof; you call it a high sentence, and to make me odious you relate it as if I spoke it only of those that have forborn to subscribe the Engagement, which proceeds from a narrowness of spirit, which cannot look upon the face of universal Truths as in themselves they are offered to the understanding, without turning them awry to some partial application. And because your discourse which followeth hereupon (concerning the inconveniency of proceeding in so high a way, and concerning other things, whereof you make yourself a Judge and a Counsellor of State, rather to reprove then to entreat, and in a loving manner to advise that which is equitable) is all grounded upon this distorted apprehension of my words; I shall leave it as a matter in which I am not at all concerned, desiring you to judge equitably whether upon such a trial of your inclination to misunderstand and misreport plain words, so full of clear truth contrary to my sense, I have not sufficient cause to warn you, and justly to be jealous over you, lest you be no less injurious to your Superiors, and to all that which they do towards the public by misinterpreting the same towards others than you are to me, and how far such a strain is different from the spirit of Christ, and from the way of doing good to others, I shall seriously refer unto your more quiet and conscionable consideration, desiring you to weigh it by yourself at better leisure as in the presence of God.  
The discourse which you make upon my description of the end of the Engagement, which you call a gloss; is almost of the same strain with this immediately going before, the difference is only, that here the words are not so misreported, but by misconstruction of matters you wrong my meaning as much as you can by Consequences.  
I say, that the end of the Engagement is, to give the Supreme Power an assurance that we shall not betray it, but that we are willing to maintain all good intelligence for public concernments with it, notwithstanding the present changes brought upon the Commonwealth.  
You say, 
Concerning the end of the Engagement & what consequences follow thereupon.  that to intent this doth utterly spoil all assurance that possibly can be given either to this State or any other; and the reason you give (referring me to what hath been said before, where I found no reason at all, but uncharitable surmises, viz. in Sect. 10.) is this, that if no respect is to be had to outward forms, but to the  good of the Commonwealth only: then (say you) all are at liberty (notwithstanding such Engagement) where they will to hold intelligence; provided, that their judgements tell them that the public is best provided for, 
Where the observers consequence is related, & the answer thereunto shows the grounds of his error.  that way in which they keep correspondency.  
Hereunto let me for answer tell you,  
First, you never heard from me, that no respect was to be had to outward forms; for I believe that a due and conscionable respect is to be had to all outward forms, by those that are in an orderly way engaged to them, so long as they last; but that any men should be engaged to them after that they are altered and taken away without their default, or should be obliged to practise the maintaining of them to the disturbance of the public peace and welfare of a Nation, is a thing which I cannot understand, or that any outward form should be accounted essential to any Nation, 
Concerning the use of outward forms.  and more than accidental, so that by the supreme power thereof it may not be alterable upon exigent necessities, is another thing which doth pass my capacity, and yet except you assert these paradoxes, you will never make out the conclusions which you aim at, for the sense of former Engagements, as you make them obligatory to the Conscience at this time in opposition to this Engagement.  
Secondly, you never heard from me, that the  good of the Commonwealth only was to be intended without the outward good thereof also: 
Concerning the  and  good of the Commonwealth.  I believe that in a Commonwealth as in a man, there is a soul and a body, and that in both there is a substantial and accidental good, and that this is alterable, but that that is always in the eye of every one that is faithful to a Commonwealth, unalterably to be sought after, and that the alterable good of a Commonwealth, depends upon circumstances, and is determinable by the supreme power of every Nation, I suppose you will not deny, and here I shall tell you also, lest you mistake my notion of a Commonwealth, that I understand by it, not an abstract form, but a concrete substance consisting of the body of the Nation, as it is taken both collectively & representatively; for neither of these are at any time to be understood without the other in my discourses, or without some relation to each other.  
Thirdly, you never heard from me that every private man is to be made a Judge of that which is the public good, 
Concerning the judgement of private men, touching the public good.  as if it were free for him to follow any course without control, which his judgement tells him the public is best provided for; for I believe that all rational men, and honest Members of a Commonwealth, take that to be best for the public good which the supreme powers thereof declare fit to be prosecuted concerning it, according to the trust reposed in them; so that faithful Subjects will judge that they ought to be rationally concluded in such matters by their superiors. Upon these assertions I suppose you will be able to see how far you wrong my sense of the end of the Engagement; and truly if you would but have been a little ingenuous, and considered that the preface of the Act for taking of the Engagement, doth express in effect the same ends which I mention, you could not with any colour of reason have made the inferences upon it which you make: nay and the very letter of my words is clearly contradictory to your inference; for I declare the end to be, not to betray the supreme power, and to be willing to maintain with it all good intelligence, and you infer, than all are at liberty, notwithstanding such Engagement to hold intelligence where they will. How can a promise made to these supreme powers, (who are the representative Commonwealth) to be true and faithful to them; that is, not to betray them, but to maintain good intelligence for the public welfare with them; yield this conclusion, Ergo I am free to hold intelligence with their enemies against them; if I will understand by the public welfare their destruction? these are such distortions of a plain matter, that I wonder how you should come to strain your wit to beget them. There is much more of this kind of stuff in your following glosses, upon my words, which declare the end of the Engagement, to which I think fit to say nothing, for by what I have said already, you will be able to resolve yourself, of that which I could say unto the remainder of those your discourses.  
That which you observe concerning the dissolution of the tye of private men, to the Heir of the Crown, is, that we must not look unto the works of God alone, but also unto his word, to walk by a Rule, which I shall not contradict, but hearty affirm with you, and be ready to show that by the word as a Rule, we private men are bound to obey in things good and lawful the supreme powers immediately and actually over us under God, and not such as are not over us whom in opposition unto them we may be inclined to choose. As for the Engagement, it doth clearly oblige us to do our duty to the Commonwealth collectively and representatively without a King; but to my understanding the expression is not so against Kingly-power in itself considered; but that the supreme power of the Nation, may, if they see cause, and the public safety in their judgements (for they are only the competent Judges thereof) doth require it; set up a King again to morrow. I do not think it in the power of any supreme power; if they will be faithful to their trust to bind their own hands in such a way as not to do and undo; for this would be to oblige themselves to that which is against the nature of their trust; nor is it imaginable that the Covenant or any other obligation of Oath can be so high, as to bind us so to a King or his Heir, that we should not be able lawfully to promise truth and faithfulness to the Commonwealth without them, when they are not in place. The example of a Child to his Father, begs the Question; and then the Laws of men bind only to that which the letter directly imports, in respect of outward actions mentioned in them, and takes no notice of secret inward affections. The Argument taken from God's way of providence after a thing is done to acquiesce in it, by doing our duty in all other things which the same providence doth offer, can be no occasion to sin, or any snare to do evil, nor do I press it any further in this case, but to acquiesce at things past, which God hath altered, and to do a duty at things present, which God hath settled, and if this Divinity will not hold in reference to private men, I pray show us some better Rule, and we shall hearken to you in it.  
Concerning the place of Isaiah Chap. 24. vers. 21. where it is foretold that the Kings of the Earth shall be punished and afterward visited; I shall admit of your caveat, for I make only a probable conjecture of that which God hath done, or intendeth to do amongst us, and not a peremptory definition of that which shall fall out, 
Concerning the observation of Prophecies what the caveat is.  your admonition also concerning the doing of our duty I willingly receive, and grant that Prophecies touching that which God will do; are no rules for our actions, but the Precepts touching his will which we should do, must guide us. That which you discourse, of the fulfilling of the Prophecies concerning Christ to be put to death by wicked hands, is a Truth; Nay, if men be wicked, and have no respect to God in that which they do; although they be sent forth with a special and express command of his own upon their works, yet they do not his prescribed will as their duty, but only a material work wherein their aim may be undutiful. Jehu is a clear example of this.  
That which you bid me take into my serious consideration concerning the Engagement I hope God will enable me to do; I can say it before him; that I am not conscious to myself of want of Charity, and tenderness to those that are scrupled: nor do I think that this Engagement can be so clear to men preingaged in other strong bonds of duty which they cannot seedissolved, and prepossessed against the way of the change, perhaps more than comes to their share to judge of it, and of the persons which have brought it about; I say I think not that this Engagement can be so clear unto them, 
The grounds of Moderation towards dissenters about the Engagement.  as that they should suddenly without any debate in their Spirits, be carried to allow of it, therefore I have always been Sollicitou for'rs a moderation of proceed; and for amiable conferences, to beget a good understanding of doubtful matters whereinto by the necessities of the times we are fallen. I confess that evidence doth not always go along with Truth; for to make a thing evident it must be offered ad modum recipientis; and although men be such in whom both parts and piety are seen, yet sometimes they are so shut up with prejudices wherein corrupons work; that they act far below themselves: and I dare not say, that in the proposal of matters to cure them of prejudicated thoughts, there is always that humility, love, Prudency and imprejudicants used to them which is able to cure their disease without any further distemper and inflammation to their sores, sometimes it may be truly said medice cura teipsum & the Apostles memento, Gal. 6.1. to keep us in a meek temper, lest thou also be tempted is remarkable: therefore God forbidden that any should be pressed to act against judgement, & the dictates of their Conscience only by Club-law, who seek rationally to consider things belonging to duty in the fear of God.  
Concerning the resistance of powers, that which you offer is worth the consideration, and to help you to a decision of that which seemeth doubtful: I pray consider in the Authors which are approved upon that Subject, whether any doth allow that private men without all public respect, 
Concerning resistance of Powers.  may make such a resistance, and about things wholly good and lawful in themselves? as for the other question, what a just power with right unquestionable may challenge, is one thing, and what a private Subject under an usurped power may do in opposition to the power which is actually over him, is another thing: therefore I shall desire you also to consider, that private men's opinions concerning forfeitures of rights and usurpations without title, are not warrantable grounds to act towards the unsettlement of the public in opposition to powers that are, in plenary possession of all places of Government. As for your request in the conclusion, that those who see not with my eyes, and cannot warrant all that I approve (having what to say if called unto it) may obtain from me a more favourable censure then to be judged unworthy of a being in the Commonwealth, where by right of birthright they have their freedom; I shall profess that it never came in my thoughts so to censure any, 
Concerning mutual forbearance, and the equity thereof.  although I cannot but assert this to be a fundamental truth without which no Commonwealth can stand: That Protectio trahit allegianciam, and that whosoever is not desirous to perform every good work to the Society wherein he doth live, doth not deserve to have a being therein, although he were a hundred times borne in it. Birthright can give no man a just title to be an enemy to the Society wherein he hath a being; now he is an enemy to every Society, who is not desirous to perform every good work towards it; But God forbidden that any who hath what to say when called to it, should not be heard in the Society where he liveth and is borne. It hath been my earnest work to entreat men to say in a Christian way that which they had to say, and I have used, all the industry I could to bring them without partiality to it, that by the things wherein we agree, we might come to a further light in that wherein we agree not; but I have reaped nothing almost but jealousies, reproaches and slanders for my pains; and have been worse rejected here, even by men otherwise Godly, than I have been in Foreign parts amongst the stiffest Lutherans. Yet I hope that shall never make me weary in well doing, or vary from the Rule, whereby, as I am taught, to judge none before the time; till the secrets of hearts, and hidden designs of self-interest be opened; So I hope the Lord will enable me never to shut the Bowels of pity & compassion; or to restrain the affection of prayer and supplication against any, whom I shall perceive to be in any dangerous error and ignorance; and the like favour I shall also desire you to afford unto me when you look upon me in my frailties; and if we would be but truly careful thus to bear one another's burdens, rather than to complain and murmur against each other, or to misrepresent each other to the public, we should find more comfort in our way then now we do. I shall close with you in your last request. The Lord give us a right understanding in all things, and grace to follow the things which we understand, without partiality; which is the upright endeavour,  
of your Servant in Christ. Joh. Dury. From my Study this 24. May 1650.   

Reader, there is lately come out these several Books of Mr. Duries.  
1. A Case of Conscience concerning Ministers meddling with State-matters, in and out of their Sermons.  
2. Considerations concerning the present Engagement.  
3. Just Reproposal to humble proposals.  
4. His vindication of himself.  
5. Objections against the Engagement answered.  
FINIS.