Animadversions UPON THOSE NOTES Which the late OBSERVATOR hath published upon the seven Doctrines and Positions which the KING by way Recapitulation (he saith) lays open so Offensive.  
London, Printed in the year 1642.   

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON those Notes which the late Observator hath published upon the seven Doctrines and Positions which the King by way of Recapitulation (he saith) lies open so offensive.  

POSITION I.  
THat the Parliament has an absolute indisputable power of declaring Law: so that all the right of the King and People depends upon their pleasure.   

To this the Observator saith.  
It has been answered, That this power must rest in them, or in the King, or in some inferior Court, or else all suits will be endless and it cannot rest more safely then in Parliament.   

ANIMADVERSION I.  
THe Observator hath contracted his Majesty's words, but hath kept the sense in more general terms, and seems (though but faintly) to justify the Position, by approving (I know not whose answer) That this Power can rest no where more safely, then in Parliament. He means the Parliament without the King; If he had allowed the King his place in Parliament, I now understanding man will easily subscribe, That the King in Parliament or the Parliament with him, have an absolute undisputable power, both to make and declare Law; and to end all Suits of what kind soever, determinable by humane law within the Kingdom. And here is the most safe resting of this Power (and here it hath ever rested) and not in the King alone (who claims not that Power, but is willing to govern his subjects according to the known Laws) and much less in a any inferior Court. But that such an absolute undisputable Power of declaring Law, as hath lately been assumed by the Mayor part of the present sitting Parliament, should be resting in them, is neither necessary for the ending of suits, nor can be, either for King or subject. If they may declare that for a Law, a fundamental Law, which never yet was Enacted, or had any being; and deny the plain undoubted Laws that have been Enacted, or frustrate them by some unheard of interpretation, (as if such interpretation had been some mental (or rather Parliamental) reservation laid up within the Parliament walls, to be produced upon emergent occasions, by their successors) they will have so full an Arbitrary power, that the right and safety of King and people must wholly depend upon their Votes. Which power can never be safe either for King or People, nor can they produce one precedent that may warrant such precedents. That the second Position.   

POSITION II.  
THat Parliaments are bound to no Precedents.   

OBSERVE. Statutes are not binding to them, why should then Precedents? Yet there is no obligation stronger than the Honour and justice of a Parliament.   

ANIMADVERSION II.  
IF Statutes be not binding to them, there is no reason that precedents should be. And he saith true, Statutes are not binding to them, that is de facto, they are not (for they in some things go directly against them) but de iure, they are; that is, they ought to be binding to them till they be repealed by the same power they were made, that is, by Bill orderly passed both Houses, and ratified by his Majesty's Royal assent. And unless they can show better reason than their bare Assertion: Precedents (as they are the best warrant so) they are, and aught to be the limits and buonds of their proceed. He might have said as truly, That Oaths are not binding to them: and therefore neither Statutes nor Precedents. But the Observator tells us (Pag 44.) That the Oaths of Supremacy and Allegiance are not endangered by making the Kingdom, and not the King, the proper subject of power. And he yields reason for it. For (saith he) he that ascribes more to the whole Universality, then to the King, yet ascribes to the King a true Supremacy of Power and Honour above all particulars. I wonder what he means by a true Supremacy of Power and Honour above all particulars. Surely, he means nothing but priority of place, and height of Title; for he is allowed little power over some particulars, namely, over the Members of either house, and whom else they please to exempt (as they did Sergeant Major Skippon for his power and commands. But this distinction helps them: The Members of either House are sharers in that Supremacy which is in the Universality and above his; and by the power of that Supremacy they can exempt whom they please from the power of this, inferior (pardon the phrase, absurdities cannot be expressed without a Soclecisme) Supremacy. Very good: But in good sober sadness, doth the Observator think this distinction was thought on by the Framers and enjoyners of that Oath, or that the Members of the House, at their entering the House did take their Oath to the King, as to the Supreme over all, with exeption of themselves, or reservation of an higher Supremacy to themselves, when they should be entered? It is hardly credible; Nor do all (that desire to tender all due honour to the Parliament) believe that they are so the Universality, or the Kingdom, as the Observator presumes. They are trusted by the Universality and Kingdom, and we pray, that they may discharge that trust, not knowing, but that a multitude of men subject (every one of them) to error, may fail in their Judgement, and being not exempted from the Common condition of the sinful Sons of Adam, may possibly, not rightly discharge the trust committed to them, as well, as the King, who is blasted with foul failings, and errors, & judgement. Me thinks, men that so much detest Popery, should not borrow the grounds of their reasoning from them: and I shall as soon believe the Counsel of Trent, telling us that thy are the Universal Church, and therefore cannot possibly err, as that the Parliament is the Universal unerring and unpervertibly just body of the Kingdom. And surely, the Spirit of declaring must needs reside in a strangely large measure in them, who have power▪ thus to declare not only Law, but Oaths too; a greater, than which the Pope's flatterers never gave him; and hardly ever any Pope assumed so great: Quote constringam mutantem Protea nodo? How shall these men be bound to do right, who so easily untie the knots of these sacred books of Law and Oaths? why, yes; There is a bond that will do it; The obligation of the Justice, and honour of a Parliament. But can any man be sure▪ that they whom neither Law, Custom, and Precedents of their Ancestors, nor Oaths can bind, will be always held in by the obligation of Justice and Honour? Is it not possible, that they may (in time) find a power in themselves of declaring that obligation void as well as have done the other? The same obligation of Justice and Honour, is as strong upon Kings, (and hath ever been held more powerful and obstructive in them, then in any state managed by a community; and yet they dare not trust his Majesty, though so obliged. The Observatour then must pardon me, if I desire, they may rather be held in, (and hold themselves so to be) by the old obligations of Law. Presidents, and Oaths, rather than that the King's liege-people should be put wholly to conside to that single oblation of the Justice, and Honour of a Parliament.   

POSITION III.  
THat they are Parliaments, and may judge of public necessity without the King, and dispose of any thing.   

OBSERVATOUR.  
They may not desert the King, but being deserted by the King, when the Kingdom is in distress, they may judge of that distress, and relieve it, and are to be accounted by Virtue of representation as the whole body of the State.   

ANIMADVERSION III.  
HIs Majesty sets down this Position in more words, but these are much to the same purpose, and upon these the inference which his Majesty makes follows undeniably, That then the life and liberty of the Subject, and all good Laws made for the security of them, may be disposed of, and repealed by the Major part of both Houses, at any time present, and by any ways and means procured so to be: And his Majesty shall have no power to protect them. They see nothing, that see not the misery, which may follow upon such a vast transcendency of arbitrary power, if it were invested in the Parliament, which (I dare boldly say) was never claimed by any Parliament, though in conjunction with (the head of it) the King. Every (the meanest) Subject hath such a right and propriety in his goods, that without law, they cannot be taken from him, though to be employed for the public good. And though the safety of the people, be the highest law and that do (many times) give a power above other laws, and against them, to the supreme magistracy in a state, to dispose of private men's estates, yet the unchangeable rule of Justice, must have place, even in that highest law, and that requires a compensation to be made to those, whose states or goods are so disposed of; and never gives power to uphold the public good with private injury. Nor can it be imagined, that a State upheld, by such helps, should not be able to make a just compensation to those, by whom it was upheld. But let us hear our Observatour. They may not (saith he) desert the King. Gramercy, for that; I am glad to hear they have yet any obligation upon them to tie them to the King. Yet I know not well, what he means by deserting the King: if he mean it in that sense which he doth the King's deserting of them, which (out of question) is his not assenting to whatsoever they shall think fit; Then in reason, they should not, by their disallowing all his Proposals, have driven him to descent from their, and so to have disserted them. Well; But being deserted by the King, when the Kingdom is in distress, they may judge of that distress, and relieve it. All their power then is upon supposition of the Kings deserting them. So that if it appear, that his Majesty hath not deserted them (as many good men believe he hath not, in the redress of any real grieveance,) than they have no such power. And however, they claim this power only when the Kingdom is in distress: but how, if the Kingdom be not in distress, or (at least) that distress be only or principally caused by their claiming of that power which cannot consist with the Honour and Royal Estate of his Majesty, which all men (by their late Protestation) are bound to defend. If it be so, that we may easily discern how fare they may stretch this power, which they claim only in order to distress; and that they may make as much use of it, as the Pope doth of his power, in temporals; In ordine ad spiritualia. He claims no more, (though some have said, he hath right to more;) and the Parliament will need no more, to do as much as he takes upon him to do with Christian Princes and States. But they must have a right to their power in this case of distress, whence have they that? why, they have it as the whole body of the State, and that they are, and must be so accounted, by virtue of representation very good. But let us consider his words a little more.  
There is no understanding man, but must and will acknowledge (unless he wilfully derogate from them,) that the Parliament represents the body of the State, for those ends, for which they convene, as an Ambassador doth the Prince that sends him, in the manage of that business for which he is sent; But this is not an absolute representation to all intents and purposes, besides, whom do they represent; The body (saith he) of the State. Be it so: but it is only the body, without the head. And if they were not by representation only, but really, the whole body of the people (if it were possible, they should convene together) they are all but an assembly of Subjects, of men to be governed, not to rule, to be commanded, not to command their Head and Sovereign: and then there can be no virtue of representation that can advance them to the power, which the Observatour ascribes to them, when such power was never in the whole body, which is represented. No, never such power in the whole body? I know the Observatours' stomach will rise here. Did not the People's consent, at first make Kings and convey power into their hands? Truly Sir, not solely; but grant it, what then? Marry, he saith than it is a principle in nature. Quicquid efficit tale est magis tale; In English, If the People make a King, they are more King themselves, or if they give power, they have more power: and may resume and exercise that power when they please. Excellent learning, and well applied, I believe he learned this piece from Suarez the jesuite. But the Observatour, may know; that that rule admits many limitations: and surely, it holds only In causis totalibus, which the People are not in the constitution of Kings. But suppose their consent, did at first give power to Kings; when their consent is given for them and their Successors to a King and his Heirs, can the succeeding People cut off the entail, and retract the consent their Ancestors have given? By what right? with what justice? I know not, but the People may contract for them and their Successors in the conveyance of Sovereign power (if ever they had it in their hands to give) as any man may in the conveyance of his lands or goods: and that such conveyance may be as binding to Successors in the one as in the other: and then I am sure they cannot have power at all times, and in all succeeding ages to resume what they have so given. Our King's right (so fare as it is derived from the People) is of this kind. And if he had no other grounds for his claim of Sovereignty, (as it is most certain, that he hath) such a consent once granted, were sufficient to bind the People that it cannot ever be lawful for them by a major part of them (coming in with their Nolumus hunc regnare super nos) to deprive him of that right. But surely, they would never make so absolute a grant of their power to Princes as to divest themselves of it. Good Sir, show me that proviso in their grant. But it seems to you unnatural they should: I do not wonder it should seem so to you, who make it agreeable to the Clearest beams of humane reason, and the strongest inclinations of nature, (and by consequence, as you would persuade the world, justifiable;) For every private man to defend himself by force if assaulted though by the force of Magistrate, or his own Father, and though he be not without all confidence by flight etc. I wish whilst you have such recourse to nature, you would not forget Christianity, which teaches subjection and obedience, and gives no liberty; (either to private men, or the mayor part of the communality) of resistance, but saith, they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. And if the Observator be a Gentleman, he should tender how he hath recourse to nature in point of right, lest he give occasion to some Wat Tyler's Chaplain, to preach again upon that text.  

When Adam dolue and Eve span,  
Who was then a Gentleman.   
He may find a goodly Sermon upon the text, set down by john Stow in Richard the second, and such Doctrine delivered upon it, the use, of which would shake his title to his inheritance, and the name of Gentleman.   

POSITION IU.  
That no Member of the Parliament ought to be troubled for Treason, etc. without leave.   

OBSERVATOUR.  
This is intended of suspicions only; and when leave may seasonably be had▪ And when competent accusers appear not in the impeachment.   

ANMADVERSION IU.  
HIs Majesty hath said so much of this and so little of it hath been answered, (or indeed is answerable,) that I shall not need to say muach. Only I observe the modesty of this Observatour; that he doth not absolutely say, they are not to be troubled for those crimes; but not upon suspicion only, etc. I know not what he may call suspicions, but I believe, the best evidences, may easily be held for bare suspicions, if they may not have liberty to speak out; and that they cannot have, unless the accuser be first in safe custody, and brought to trial where they may legally be produced, And, I believe, few wise men will think it reasonable, that the grounds of suspicion of Treason, should encessarily be opened before trial.   

POSITION V.  
THat the Sovereign Power resides in both Houses of Parliament: The King having no negative Voice.   

OBSERVATOUR.  
This power is not claimed as ordinary, nor to any purpose; but to save the Kingdom from ruin, and in case, where the Kingdom is so seduced, as that he prefers dangerous men, and persecutes his loyal Subjects.   

ANIMADVERSION V.  
HIs Majesty infers upon this Position. That himself must be Subject to their Commands. This sounds, but harshly in the ears of loyal Subjects; That any posture wherein they can be put, can raise Subjects to a capacity of Sovereignty, and reduce, their Sovereign to become their Subject. But he comforts us here, and tells us, this power is not claimed as ordinary nor to any purpose, etc. This is but poor comfort, it is not but it may be in good time, if they please. He doth not say, they shall not hereafter, or cannot claim it as ordinary, and to other purposes then that he names. So that there may be other causes, that may make them claim this power, as well as this. But indeed, they need no more, if it be in their power to declare that to be the case of the King and Kingdom when they please. But they will never do it, but where there is a just cause for it; and the truth leads them to it. Truly, I believe honourably of the justine and Wisdom of Parliaments; but I do believe, that they are not either infallible, or that they cannot possibly do amiss. And the Observatour must bring better arguments; (and I fear, he cannot bring so good to make me believe otherwise,) then ever yet were brought for the infallibility of a general Council. But I have said enough for the present of the residence of Sovereign power in the Parliament, and the ground of their claim to it, by the virtue of representation in my third Animadversion. I shall here only give the Reader a brief gloss upon the language here used by the Observatour. To save the Kingdom from ruin, (that is, from Monrachy or being goverued by the King. The King is seduced,) that is, he is persuaded (by his own understanding, and other evil Counselors,) not to part with Sovereignty, nor to become a Subject to his Subjects. He prefers dangerous men, (that is, such as would have him still to be their King prosecutes his loyal Subjects,) that is, such as would rule him, and the people at their pleasure.   

POSITION VI.  
THat the levying of forces against the personal commands of the King, (though accompanied with his presence) is not levying of war against the King: but war against his authority, not Person, is war against the King.   

OBSERVATOUR.  
If this were not so, The Parliament seeing a seduced King, ruinating himself, and the Kingdom, could not save both, but stand and look on.   

ANIMADVERSION VI.  
I Thought this Position so strangely paradoxal, and so apparently contrary to reason and common sense, that no man would have appeared in defence of it. Yet this Observator never blushes, nor blinkes at it, but affirms it stoutly. But for all that I shall believe very slowly, That the King's person can at any time be without his Authority: Or that they may destroy the King's Person, to preserve the King. My Faith is not strong enough to believe these sublime points, and mysteries of State: I shall subscribe thus fare, That war against the King's Authority, (though in the absence of his Person) is war against the King: But that the King and his person should be in two places, will never (I fear) down with me. But however I'll see his reason: What's that? Why else the Parliament seeing a seduced King running himself and his Kingdom could not save both, but must stand and look on. Surely this reason is full of weight, and ready to burst, it is big with probability. I suppose the Reader understands his language here, by my former gloss; But if we should take the words as they sound the reason would seem as strange, as that which is brought to confirm. The King running himself and his Kingdom, a mad King, or an Idiot (he means) and than 'twas fit the Parliament appointed him a guardian. Ruining himself and his Kingdom. Is it possible; That the King should ruin himself and his Kingdom. What? The King alone? Is he alone able to do it without the people? It is hardly credible? If he have the people on his side, and a pevailing Major party, I think the Observator (standing to his own Principles) will not deny that he hath Sovereign power with him, and that it is unnatural to think the Community should destroy itself. But the Community (he will say) is to be looked at in Parliament. Well, But good Sir, may not the people withdraw the power of reprentation, which they granted to the Parliament; was their grant so absolute, and so irrevocable, that they dispossessed themselves wholly of taking or exercising that power, their own proper persons? Remember your principles about the conveying of Sovereign power into the hands of Kings; and if you can show no better Cards for their power of representation, than the People's revocable consent, (and I would feign know why it should be more revocable from Kings than men) you will find their tenure in it very tickle.   

POSITION VII.  
THat according to some Parliament they may depose Kings.   

OBSRVATOR.  
'tis denied that any King was deposed by a free Parliament, fairly elected.   

ANIMADVERSION VII.  
I Like this note better than all the rest, and am wholly of his mind: That never any free Parliament, fairly elected, deposed any King: and I hope (whatsoever his principles seems to insinuate) they do not believe they have power to do it, and pray that they may never attempt, (at least, not to be able to depose the King, or destroy Monarchy.   

The Author's Protestation.  
HAving finished these sudden Animadversions: I do protest in the presence of Almighty God, with my life, power, and estate to maintain and defend so fare as lawfully I may, the true Reformed Protestant Religion. His Majesty's Person Honour and Royal Estate, The just Liberties of the Subject, and the power and privileges of Parliament (so fare as I shall be able to know or understand them) and to do all other things contained in the late Protestation. And this I do sincerely, and from my heart, believe myself to be under the guilt of Perjury if I fail in any one thing here protested. And therefore shall never hold myself absolved by observing one, if I violate it in any other part. I shall ever defend his Majesty's Person, Honour, and Royal Estate, as my sole Sovereign, and the Parliament (next under him) in the highest capacity of Subjects as the Supreme Judicatory, the great Counnell and Body Representative of this Kingdom. And I pray, that all those that do cot join with me, may either speedily be converted or confounded.  
Faxit Deus.  
FINJS.    

ANIMADVERSIONS ANIMADVERTED.  
Or a Reply to the late Animadversions upon those Notes which a late Observator published upon the seven Doctrines and Positions which the King by way of Recapitulation lays open so offensive.  
THe Animadversor hath attacked the Observator, just like a weak and degenerous enemy, that durst not encounter his adversary in open field, but lodgeth himself in some obscure and ignoble passage, to attempt at least upon his Arriere-guard, not being able to pierce into his main body. The ingenious peruser of both, I doubt not, may discern that the Observator in the conclusion of his Treatise only recapitulated seven Refults out of His Majesty's papers, in contradiction to his Antecedent disquisition, and the Parliaments proceed, that so one might compend ously view the subject of his discourse, and as it were by an Index find out the consutation of His Majesty's positions, by the foregoing Arguments of the book, which the Animadversor very cautelously is pleased never to take notice of in the whole Discourse.  
1. In the first position, the Animadversor grants the Observators Arguments for the declarative power of Parliament in respect of the safe residence of that power in the bosom of the Jutelary Assembly; But with this restriction, That he should have allowed he King his place in Parliament, and not have named a Parliament without him. But how could the Observator without affronting impudence speak otherwise? seeing His Majesty in present is pleased actually to have his residence out of Parliament, and will not allow himself a place in it; but instead of concurrence with it, seeks the remotest distances from it. The better therefore to see how the King and Parliament are in parts we will first negatively and then positively open the present Controversy betwixt them, which is the cause of their disjunction. Which in the first place is not this which most men conceive. That when His Majesty shall agree, and the Parliament likewise agree, for establishing some new Law or interpreting some old, which may be for the particular commodity of some conditions of men only, in the commonwealth; Whether then the King ought to declare this or that to be Law exclusively of the Parliament, or the Parliament do the same exclusively of the King: But positively it is this, When there is visibly a danger ready to confound the whole commonwealth, and consequently all particular commodities and persons, Whether the State if then convened, may not lawfully of itself provide for its preservation, especially if the King either see not the danger, or seeing it will not provide for it in such manner as may give best security to Himself and Commonwealth: When therefore such a Question shall justly arise betwixt King and Commonwealth (which collectively is that we call a Parliament) it being of public interest of State, and so De jure publico, it cannot fall under the examination of any inferior judicature (with which those so known voted Laws, the Animadversor speaks of, are to be found). For that is furnished only with rules of particular (not universal) justice, for the decision of particular differences betwixt this or that man, for this or that thing. Which rules being too narrow for so capacious a subject, we must recurre to those that the original Laws of Nature and Policy hold out to us, which must needs be superior to the other. The chiefest rule of that is, Ne quovismodo periclitetur respublica, That by all means public safety be secured: And every State must principally endeavour to hold fast and sure our public sociable Incorporations one with another, from public distresses, calamities, and destructions, which may arise from ourselves or other foreign Kingdoms; And whilst that is done according as Nature's Laws and Policy prescribes in Universal justice, then may well in the mean time proceed to make or revise Laws of Particular justice, which is of particular things, whereby we may commutatively increase our fortunes and estates one by another, or by foreign commerce. But if those that sit at the head of the Commonwealth shall let lose the helm of it, and so let it float at all hazards, or else unadvisedly steer it directly towards rocks and shelves, Itself is bound by those original Laws (which surely may be some means) to save itself from a wrack: And how the King is not invaded or wronged by having himself and his Kingdom preserved from imminent danger, and how it is possible a King may ruin his Kingdom, follow in its just place. In the mean time from these premises we prove that the Parliaments method is most excellent; For in the first place it endeavours to secure the being of the Commonwealth now floating at hazard; And afterwards to apply its self to quicken particular Laws for our well-being. Now therefore the fundamental Law which the Animadversor so hotly calls for, and the Parliaments squares by is not such a one as (some say) was never known before it was broken; Nor (as he says) lies mentally or parliamentally in the walls of the Parliament House to be produced upon any emergent occasion: But is such a one as is couched radically in Nature itself, (and so becomes the very pin of law and society) and is written and enacted irrepealably in her Magna Charta, which we are not beholden to any sublunary power for, but belongs to us as we are living and sociable creatures. And no known act of particular Justice or right to this or that petty thing, can clash with this, but must in equity veil to it, as to its superintendent. For what can those particular Acts of Law, which are to increase our private and domestic profit advantage us? when it's doubtful in so great dangers whether we may enjoy our lives at all, or no. It is therefore notoriously calumnious and inconsequent which the Animadversor from hence affirms, That the Parliament affects an arbitrary power, or the particular rights in ordinary course of Justice, as also the safety of King and people must at all times totally depend on their Votes exclusively of the King: Which in the following Position comes to be more fully disproved: Which power we confess with him can never be safe either for King or people, nor is Presidentable.  
2. Positi. Parliaments are not bound to precedents (saith the Observator) because not to Statutes; viz. Absolutely; For the cause both of the one and the other is not permanent: And it's true therefore which the Animadversor saith, that they are durable, till they be repealed, which had been to good purpose had he ever denied it. For he rightly attributes not more power to Statutes then to other particular Laws (which (as is proved in the first Position, and further shall be in this) cannot in his case stand in equity, nor act beyond their power, and that contrary to the Legislative intent, viz. to be a violation of some more sovereign good introduceable, or some extreme and general evil avoidable; which evil otherwise might swallow not only Statutes but all other sanctions what ever. And thus in respect of the effect, they may be said in some sort to Repeal themselves: For really in such a case they become mortified, and can do no more for us. For the Parliaments case and controversy (which the Animadversor still forgets to be of preserving the whole Kingdom, and so, De jure publico) is of so transcendent a nature," That de facto it may not, and the jure it ought not to be restrained by petty and mortified Statutes or Laws, in acting so much good for us. But how should Precedents (as the Animadversor saith) be best warrants? or how should they be in the like degree limiting or binding that Oaths are? I beseech ye consider the consequence, Such or such a Parliament did not, or durst not do this or that; therefore may no Parliament do it? Some Parliaments (not comparable to the Worthies of this) have omitted some good out of supineness, some out of difficulty, to avoid a greater evil, which might be valuable with the good desired; some perhaps hath done ill, which the integrity and worth of this abhors to think of; so that neither King nor Parliament have reason to plead so strongly for coherence to Precedents. But both have better rules if they will not decline them, which are, To direct all by the interest of State, (which is never accusable of Injustice) And by Equity, which we may call a general Law: And, though it be variable according to the subject matter and circumstances, yet it is that only, which will not let summum jus, be summa injuria, which is the supremest right that can be done us. And it remains to be wished that the Animadversor would have shown us in this main business, wherein the Parliament hath gone cross, either to public interest of State, or Equity. To say (as the Animadversor doth) that this single and extraordinary case excludes the King from Supremacy (even above particulars) and divests him to the naked priority only of Place and Title, is that which blasts itself, unless the Animadversor be able to prove the King's exercise of his former power totally intercepted, and the more now then in other Parliaments of the like circumstances, or that he is ruined by having his Kingdom preserved. But Sergeant Major Skippon (who is a particular) was not permitted, to obey the King's summons of him, therefore the King (saith the Animadversor) is denied a power even above particulars. But we answer that his case reports to that of the Parliaments, and must stand or fall with the equity of that. In the mean time he is so employed, that he could not have been in any more redounding to His Majesty's solid happiness, which (rightly understood) would have produced rather an excuse then an accusation. For the Parliaments discharging of their trust (which the Animadversor fears so much) It is so notorious to all uncorrupted and unbiast judgements, that we have reason to pray, that those who so advisedly elected them, in a time of less danger to the Kingdom, than this present is, be not more disloyal to them, than they are to their choosers. What they have actually effected with the King's concurrence, the Animadversor I hope, will not except against; and what they desire further to effect (wherein they so humbly and patiently have attended his Majesty's concurrence) is only for the happier continuation of that other to us, and is to be reputed good or ill, in order to that. Where then is the evil for which the Parliament must be so scourged by all sort of hands? why did we engage them so studiously to wipe off that Rust, which began to eat so deep into the letter of our laws, and all our possessions? and to make new purchases for us of all our estates? if now being assembled they cannot discern what and where those laws are to be found, by the lustre and power of which they should act all this for us. We have blessings plentifully in store for his Majesty, but desire he would not reduce the ultimate resolution and reserch of Law (our blessing) to be in his own bosom, more than in that of the Parliaments, lest when God in his anger shall deprive us of so great a blessing as is his life and government, that die with him. I shall not multiply on the Animadversors Arguments; Of the possibility of the Parliaments erring, and not rightly discharging their trusts: all which might be more powerfully urged on one man confiding in his own singularity. He might have known them to have been unanswerably refuted, and killed before their birth. But since he will have the Parliament" so great practicians of Popish policy, in respect of some infallibility, which he says, and they never arrogated; save only a probability of less erring in that question betwixt his Majesty and themselves; let me, I say, nakedly recite what the learned and yet unanswered Divine in this matter (which the Animadversor so triumphs in) hath urged against the Papists, whom it most concerns, so to leave the Reader to assume what shall seem most deducible to himself; His words are these. 
Chilling. c. 2 p. 49.  * He that would usurp an absolute tyranny and lordship over any people, need not put himself to the trouble and difficulty of abrogating his Laws, made to maintain the common liberty; for he may frustrate their intent and compass his design as well, if he can get the power and authority to interpret them as he pleases, and have his interpretations stand for laws. I shall not need to recapitulate the condition of our Laws before the Parliament, nor yet what interpretations they received; Which interpretations were held so Authentic, that they made the Law but a nose of wax, to wring some times this way, for Ship-money, and for the lawfulness of it, as to make the King likewise the sole Judge and redresser of all public dangers, sometimes another way for legal monopolies, etc. Let the world than judge who arrogate most infallibility, or have more made use of Papists or Popish policy.  
3 The Observator saith that the Parliament deserted by the King in the whole Kingdom's distress may relieve it and the King. Here is asserted the public Interest of State, which can fall under no notion of any inferior Court to examine. But the Animadversor draws this consequence from thence; That then every man's estate may be wrested from his propriety and possession: Quàm urceus exit. Here he doth most palpably discover the looseness of his Logic and cause, and how little he holds to his premises, and state of the Controversy betwixt King and Parliament, which I so oft noted before; and shown the case to be De jure publico, and so political.  
Commutative therefore and Distributive Justice being of inferior matters, have their inferior Courts, and the apparent letter of the Law to decide, and power to actuate what is rightly decided. But this controversy being De jure publico, of a public right, it falls under the notion of another sort of Justice, whereas particular proprieties and possessions, fall under those two inferior sorts of Justice, as hath been proved in the conclusion of the first Position, which together with this show the sandiness and incoherence of the Animadversors consequence. Here therefore we will only note, that even in a common distress (which is less than a public) without a Vote of Parliament, or expecting any other dispensation of Right, a particular propriety may be destroyed by a Community to preserve itself: As when the Sea breaks in upon a County, a bank may be made of and on this or that man's ground whether he please or no; And when our Neighbour Vcalcyons house blazes, frequently we see some houses plucked down (where the fire actually broke not out) lest it should consume the whole street. And equity (before Poesy) that in respect of the propinquity of the danger, we are supposed to be even in the danger itself; and that the house so plucked down, is not supposed so much to be dilapidated as burnt.  Tuns tua res agitur paries cum proximus ardet. 
But I wonder by what Act or Declaration the Parliament hath denied a compensation to the sufferer in that kind, as the Question now stands? If all men did not know that the Parliament hath so provided for the indemnity of those at Hull, perhaps the Animadversor might have gained the credit of some modesty in averring, That the Parliament upholds public good with private misery. With the like grace also, and with sufficient confidence doth he tell us; That if there be a great distress in the Kingdom, it is caused by the Parliaments claiming that power which cannot consist with the Royal estate of his Majesty.  
'tis prodigious to all honest understandings, That the near engagements of war with the Scots twice merely upon misunderstandings; That the design of strangling the Parliament as soon as it was borne (for proof of which the Parliament presumes to have had too much sufficiency) That having the bloodiest and true Papistical war in Ireland raised against our Nation, and that against the Parliament especially (in the walls of whose house they have already endangered the a breach, Jam perlucente ruinâ.) That even now among ourselves we see some, who with more alacrity are ready to employ themselves against that sacred Assembly, than against those unchristian Rebels, and yet that all this should be too little to evince the Reality (as the Animadversor saith) of a distressed Kingdom; and who is yet more transcendent, That all this should be caused by the Parliament, which aims at nothing but the extirpation of the Parliament root and branch, and of which some part of it (viz. the Scotch troubles) had being long before the Parliament had any; and then I pray, how could it be the cause of it? How the King is head and we the body, and how the King cannot be insulted over by having his Kingdom and Self preserved from ruin, is proved at large by the Observer, beyond the capacity of any his animadversions. Whether the people may revoke all they actually have transacted to their King, is a Question very impertinently inserted by the Animadversor, in respect of any thing that the Observator hath in the Parliaments case; which is such, That when the King shall have endeavoured his utmost, he will find, that he shall not be able to preserve the Kingdom in extremity of distress, without the assistance of the Kingdom itself. However this the Observator denies, that the people could make such a conveyance of power to their Kings, as might prove destructive of humanity: So that much of the Animadvertors Divinity might have been husbanded for an aptor occasion. Neverthelsse, St Paul in the 13. of the Romans, tells us not what power is the highest, but that that power which is the highest aught to be obeyed. Again, St Paul speaks first of a few particular dispersed men, and those again in a primitive condition; who had no means to provide for their preservation. Moreover, it's very observable that St Paul in the 3. verse speaks of a Ruler, as our Law speaks of our King, viz. That he is not a terror to good, but to evil works: The Law likewise saith, The King can do no injustice. The interpretation of the one must square with the other, and that must be according to the distinction of Fact and Right. For according to Fact, St Paul's Ruler may be a torror to good, and a cherishing to evil works; but by Right he ought not to be so. Our Law saith, Our King rather ought not in Right, than that de Facto he cannot do injustice; For we know there have been both unjust Kings, and ill Rulers. But least there should be such, Scripture itself, as well as our Parliament, doth endeavour to bind them from exercising ill. As Deut. 17. ver. 18, 19, 20. The King shall have a book to learn to keep the Law, and to do according to it, lest his heart be lifted up above his brethren. And Ezech. 46.18. The Prince may not take of the people's inheritance by oppression, and thrust them out of it, but shallbe content with his own possession, lest other men be scattered from their possessions. Wherein then hath the Parliament denied the King that due which St Paul allows his Ruler? Who he saith (as is very observable through the whole Chapter) that he may be a Minister to us only for good: And to keep the Parliament even with St Paul, What else doth it hazard itself for, but for refusing to favour the King in an uncircumscribed power of doing ill? Which faculty he vindicates to himself irrestrainably, And that by virtue of some Right and enlargement of Law and Religion, even to do all manner of ill, if so be he shall ever be pleased so to do. Moreover, St Paul hath not, nor could any where repeal the laws of nature, so that if the Parliament in its case hath neither declined them, nor our own Original Contracts, nor the present interest of State, nor St Paul, Then I hope, it hath kept itself consonantly to Law and Religion.  
Out of all this (with what follows in the sixth Position) we may easily answer" to the Animadversors Objection of Resistance. For out of those premises it appears, That in the King there are two things only; First, His Person; Secondly, His office, authority, or as St Paul calls it, his Power. For his person, we hold it always inviolable: For his power or office, because St Paul saith, it respects us only for good, us very reasonable that we apply ourselves in obedience to that, for our own sakes as well as for his. But the Court Parasites they are not content with this distribution, but add to the person and power or office of a Prince, that which they call, The will or pleasure of a Prince; or rather they marry the power or office of a Prince to his Will: And so by that subtle conjunction they proving them all one (Quia omnis potestas est voluntatis) than they ask us the Question, Whether we are not equally bound to obey the one in all latitudes as well as the other? As if we had contracted for the evil as well as the good, and that, as it should seem best to the Prince we contracted with. But to that we clearlier answer, That because the will lies under an indifferency of commanding the ill, as well as the good, we may lawfully embrace that part and power only of his will which is to good, (as St Paul saith) which indeed is the very essence of his power, and makes him a King: and we may reject the other, which makes him a bloody Tyrant: Yet not so as to violate his person in any case, (no more than David would King Saul) but preservatively to thrust as fare from us as we are able, all other bloodsuckers, who are forward to execute on us his ruining commands; because in such a case he contracts his own ruin as well as ours, and is supposed to be in a distemper, and in stead of a wholesome potion to call for poison, which I think, no good or honest Physician would obey, but rather resist those that would obey him. Wherefore in these considerations, it is not here as the Animadversor saith of the Parliament; Nolumus hunc regnare super nos; but, Nolumus hos destruere nos. But of this in the sixth Position. And for this hath been asserted, I know I quote our own Gracious Prince, who hath been pleased thus to indoctrinate us in his several Protestations, of venturing his own life to preserve us in the fruition of our due liberties of Subjects; which we are sure we cannot enjoy from him, if by that Protestation he intended to force upon us a duty and allegiance of embracing all those tormentors whom he should send to us at any time, on any occasion (lawful or not lawful) to spoil us either of our lives or subsistence; If so be so much evil should possibly hereafter enter into his Majesty's sacred thoughts and will. Of which therefore seeing there is never a known Law of the Land, and that it hath no analogy with the true Protestant Religion, and our own just liberties of Subjects, we will presume that his Majesty abhors the thought of chaining us to such a slavery for his own part, both in Fact & Right; though alas he cannot promise us that all his Successors shall do the like. Wherefore the Animadversor doth plainly abuse his Majesty in this Argument, & doth desperately corrupt his present cause. Thus we see what evils we may thrust from us, and how we are bound to preserve the King's power or office, together with his person, as much as our own. But the Animadversor, together with his Tribe, preach another kind of doctrine, from whence they know how to raise better uses for their ends, than the King can do any; And that is, That instead of opposing the worst of those evils which a King's bare pleasure may be that we should suffer by the hands of other persons, that we should I say, simply betake ourselves to flight, leaving all that we have in this world, but our lives, to the King's disposal, and to be transferred to those whom he shall think better worthy of them than ourselves. But in the Parliaments case it hath been observed, that as it is impossible (in a manner) for a whole Kingdom to fly, so surely cannot that be required of it: This ease is not as david's (a particular man's) was, who being in the right yet in danger, fled indeed, but it was from one place to stand better on his guard in another.  
4 No Member of Parliament ought to be troubled for Treason upon suspicion only; especially, I say, in such a case, whereof not only the whole House, but the whole Kingdom knows itself to be a like culpable. And that the accused were in safe custody, is not to be doubted of by the Animadversor, if the engagement of a whole Kingdom can give security which is sufficient enough for five men, for aught the Amimadversor hath to the contrary.  
5. Because the Parliament to save a whole Kingdom once from ruin, hath used some power which is communicable to a whole Kingdom in such an extraordinary case; Therefore it may (saith the Animadversor) usurp it in ordinary cases; because it may declare the danger what it will at pleasure, and it is not infallible. As this consequence of the Animadversor is the same with that of the third Position, so may the answer of that be applied to this, to which I shall refer the Reader. This only will I add, That there is no need to create an Infallibility in the Parliament to discern matters of Fact within every man's cognizance; but to afford it only a probability of less erring or being less deceived rather than a particular Individual; And that it's common interest joined with its indirectness and integrity (of which the extraordinary exact choosing of the Members at the beginning, it is an extraordinary proof) may be a forcible improbability of its ever usurping such a power in ordinary cases, which as it cannot be serviceable any way to us (because ordinary cases have their most convenient courses certainly regulated) so can it not be but extremely dangerous to themselves alone, and no ways advantageous; Because in such cases we participate all of us of the like conveniences. This Position the Animadversor is pleased to conclude with a Riddle; That the ruin which the Parliament intends to save the Kingdom from, is to save it from Monarchy.— Risum teneatis amici? Are we so overgrown with that government, which our Laws are locked and cabenetted in, in such manner, that the wounding of the one is the bleeding of the other? Or is it true which the Bishops have so long pulpited at Court, that the raising of their power must be the Eclipse of the other? although we know, and all the world with us, That Monarchy was of a more extended latitude and absoluteness before Christianity was professed by any Monarch, than ever it was since: Or more coherently to the Animadversors own words; Can there be no abuses or Cobwebs in Church or Commonwealth, but they must needs be spun out of the bowels of Monarchy? so that the reforming and sweeping away of the one, must needs be the sweeping away of the other? For our own parts, we will not make them so much Son and Father, although the Animadversor be pleased to do his Majesty this good service. What then, the too too true ruin of the Kingdom is conceived to be, is set down in the third Position; And what Connexion there is in making Monarchy the same with that, let the refined'st and the rudest Logic collect.  
6.7. Whether levying of Forces against the personal Commands of the King, though accompanied with his presence, be to war against the King, is largely discoursed by the Observator beyond any force of reason which the Animadversor hath used to enforce the contrary. His Majesty acknowledged much of this to the Scots, whose preparations were in all respects like ours, and which his Majesty found to be Non tam contra quam praeter authoritatem Regis. after he had pressed the Animadversors arguments as warmly, as now he doth against other of his good Subjects, though yet suffering under the great calamity of his Royal displeasure. But to say little of that which is so notorious to us all of this Kingdom; Let us look over to France, and there we may see those who were as much Protestants as we, that levied arms against their King's commands, accompanied with his presence, and yet our King never thought them the worse Christians or Subjects for that, and therefore made himself a partisan with them in their very cause; so clearly was the piety and lawfulness of such an act at that time reconciled to his Majesty's conscience and understanding. All which the Animadversor must needs confess, unless he will own the present Declarations of the Rochelers, who with execrations of us say (upon the event of their war) that the Duke of Buckingham's design was to destroy and eat them up; and that they had preserved their liberties and Religion from any adulterate mixture of Popery, had they never seen him.  
But according to the Animadversor, It is impossible a King should ruin his Kingdom, because he shall always have the Major part with him. But modern miseries show us the contrary, witness the near depopulated Principalities of Germany. But to answer the Argument with like reason, I say, that after a King shall have destroyed the Minor part of his Kingdom with his Major, why may he not then, by some differences in the Major part, be a cause even to bring that to destruction too? But without supposing such a Fate, why may he not, Nero-like, for pleasure sake, desire that all the heads of the Major part stood but upon one neck, that so he might chop them off at a blow? Seeing then such a King may ruin his Kingdom, (by lamentable distresses & depopulations) and if a Parliament hath the power to hinder it, it doth that which it is bound to do, and which is neither against the person, or genuine authority of the King unless we can apprehend a King's authority without a Kingdom (which is the object it extends to and acts in, and which we have proved he may destroy) and with out which the Animadversor must needs reduce such a King to a barer Title, than he said our Parliament would reduce our King to.  
FINIS.