BELLAMIUS ENERVATUS: OR, A Full Answer to a Book Entitled A Plea for the Commonalty of London. WHICH IS As the Author Mr. Bellamy calls it; A Vindication of their Rights (which have been long withholden from them) in the choice of sundry City Officers. AS ALSO A justification of the power of the Court of Common-counsel in the making of Acts, or By-Laws, for the good and profit of the Citizens, notwithstanding the negative voices of the Lord Major, and ALDERMEN. Refuted by Irenaeus Lysimachus: Non habenti auferetur Et habere quod videtur. LONDON, Printed by Richard Cotes, 1645. TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE the Lord Mayor of the City of London; and to the Right Worshipful the Aldermen, his Brethren: Right Honourable, Right Worshipful, WHen at first I saw this empty Pamphlet, Entitled, A Plea for the Commonalty of London, peep out of the Press; much like a Glow-worm, proud of some counterfeit light, which it pretended to have; I imagined it the best way to let it alone, that it might shame itself by showing itself, as indeed needing no other enemy to overthrow it but its own weakness. But finding it since (with more success than desert) to scatter a large spawn about the City by a second Impression; and that this painted worm began to deceive too many dim-sighted Traveller: I thought fit (from the service I own to truth and Peace) and order which is a friend to them both) to send abroad this seasonable light, which though it be but small, is yet true, and I hope clear enough to discover the other to be no more than a silly worm. The Honour I bear to this famous City, and to the preservation of its Peace from all seditious rents, which some turbulent sick brains will be ever hatching in it, causeth me at this time to present to your wisdoms two humble motions: The first as touching this Pamphlet, which I now take upon me to answer; the second as touching the maintenance of that honour and power which God and the Kingdom have invested you with, and particular hands cannot justly take from you. As touching the Book, I will not aggravate the spirit that it carries, and that carries it along: nor the mischief that such a brat of too rash a brain, may breed (if not prevented) to yourselves and this City. What tumults, uproars, might in all likelihood follow such daring encouragements, in a multitude pricked with desire of power, and power of vindicating pretended privileges? (I bless God) it hath yet taken no such effect. Nor will I aggravate the Authors offence, whom (humbly submitting to your better judgements:) I conceive bound by Oath not thus desperately to have sent abroad (without order from that Court, whereof he is a Member) so dangerous a spark as this is, which though it seem little at the first, if not timely quenched, may quickly prove a great Incendiary. Nor last, will I tell you what power lies in your hands to punish such an offender, thus endeavouring to disturb the City's peace, by disturbing the City's Order and Government, and thus (I had almost said) violating his Sacred Oath. My Lord, I am not a man of that spirit: it was Caesar's honour that he overcame more, and more overcame by his clemency then his sword; the last overcame but the bodies of men, the other their minds: it will be your Lordship's honour, and the rest of your Brethren, who are all engaged in this Quarrel, in respect of the Author of this Pamphlet, to endeavour as not to lose by him, so if possible to gain him, and if not to more wisdom, to more obedience: But in the mean time I remember how Alexander dealt with one of his Soldiers, whom he heard railing at himself, who was his General. Though he might have punished him at his pleasure, yet he took only this revenge upon him: He caused Proclamation to be made throughout his whole Army, that such a Soldier had scandalously railed against Alexander. And that therefore for the time to come, he should have the liberty to say any thing what he listed, were it good or bad; no body at all regarding or taking notice of what was spoken by such a fellow as he. You shall not need to make Proclamation what injury the Author hath done you by this Pamphlet (who is, as it were, one of your Soldiers, and you his General) the Book itself sufficiently shows it; and the Answer a little more than the Book: Let me only commend unto you this Heroical Resolution; Neither to mind it for the present, nor him for the future, nor whatsoever he shall speak or write, till you find him wiser, and Let that be his punishment. My second Motion which concerns yourselves is this: That you would seriously consider, that the honour and power which is conferred upon you by Charter, and Custom, (the ancienter of the two) though it be in your hands to use, is not in your power to give away: nor will your famous City turn to be any other than a Monster of many Heads, when its renowned Government, which is now so fully established, and so bravely digested into a fit Method and Order; shall again be thrown into its old Chaos, by confusedly thrusting it into the hands of the Multitude, whom a great Emperor long ago compared to fire and water, that are good Servants, but bad Masters. My Lord, I do not any whit hereby charge or asperse those renowned Members of your own Body, the Commoners that sit below you: and without whom you yourselves are able to do nothing to any purpose: But as it is in the Natural body, so I would have it in this body Politic; I would not be censured to derogate from the Hand or Foot, because I do not grant them to be the Head: I shall in this ensuing Treatise give them all right that belongs to them; endeavouring only to withhold both you and them from usurpation: In which Golden mean to preserve both them and you, and this City from all factions and fractions which turbulent spirits may breed among you: it was the only Argument moved me now to set pen to paper, and is all that is desired or intended by him who is Your Lordships, Worships, and this Cities; in all humble Service, Ire. Lyfim. To the Reader. Reader, THou mayst for aught I know be a Party engaged on one side or other in this Quarrel, and so unfit to be a Judge: thou mayst perhaps look upon this Book with a pleasing eye, as wishing well to the Cause that it presumes to vindicate: or thou mayst perhaps condemn it before thou hast perused it: as choosing rather to have the Truth silenced, then that it should speak what is not pleasing unto thee: Or thou mayst be a third man, a man unconcerned on either part, and so impartial. Which of these soever thou art, let me give thee this caution: Let Truth be the Mine thou dig'st for in it, the Treasure thou seekest, the mark at which thou aimest: Read it without Prejudice, and judge it as thou findest it. I am not the City Advocate to plead their Rights; rather their Champion to defend them from wrong: I take not upon me to argue their Cause, but to answer Arguments already made against them: Under that Notion consider me, compare me, and censure me: only shut not thy Eyes against any clear light that shall appear in me, since to be wilfully ignorant, aught to be reckoned among sins of knowledge. Farewell. Bellamius Enervatus: OR, An Answer to a Plea for the Commonalty of LONDON. And first to the Proem. THe discontent that breeds in some kind of spirits, because they cannot do what they would, makes them next to do they cannot tell what. The occasion of this Mr. Bellamy's speech; first spoken, since published, to throw up all enclosures of Order in the City of London, by shuffling the Cards, and taking away all notes of distinction between the Head and Members thereof; did not principally arise from any just claim that he could make to the Privileges which he pleads for, but (as himself confesseth) he was put upon this motion because he had been crossed by the Lord Major and Aldermen a little before in a former motion. He tells you that upon the 16th of January last he made a motion that a certain obstruction in the Court of Common-counsel might be removed; which was caused by the Lord Majors using his Privilege of taking up the Sword and so dissolving the Court for the present, when he saw good; without their consents. The redress whereof (he tells you) he pressed with much earnestness, and Prometheus-like stole fire from heaven to quicken this creature of his own making, for he used the Arguments of the Lords and Commons in Parliament, made to the King for the continuance of their sitting as long as they saw good in Parliament, to the Lord Major for the continuance of his sitting, as long as they saw good in Common-counsel. But this not taking such offect as he hoped for, was yet the Spur that pricked him forward upon another design: that since he could not court them out of their Privileges, he would labour to force them: And * Read his own Proem at the latter end, thereupon it was that he endeavoured, 1. By the Charters of the City; 2. By Records witnessing their power in the practice of them; 3. By Equity and Reason; to extend the Commoners Rights a little further: and since it could not be yielded that the Lord Major in Common-counsel must sit still as long as they list, they will now both make him sit when they list; and (which is worse) Act what they list. Throughout which passage, give me leave to make these Observations: First, what Equity there was in his first motion upon the sixteenth of January. Secondly, What were the Arguments that he backed it with. Thirdly, What reason there was that upon the denial of that first motion he should now fall upon this. For his first motion upon the sixteenth of Janary it first argues a great deal of weakness in the Lord Major that he doth not know when to sit still, and when to rise for the City's good, unless Mr. Bellamy tell him. Secondly, it much asperseth the Lord Major's integrity, that he would not of himself sit as long to do the City or Kingdom service, as Mr. Bellamy would have him. Thirdly, it wrists the Sword itself out of the Lord Major's hand, it being given him to dispose according to Law in his own best judgement: which notwithstanding must now (during the time that a Common-counsel will sit,) though it be all day and all night, and never so much occasion to use it in the City) be surrendered (as it were) into the hands of Mr. Bellamy, till he please that the Lord Major shall take it up again. As touching the Arguments brought by Mr. Bellamy to back this motion, there are two things in them considerable: 1. whose they are: 2. what they are. First, Whose they are: he tells you they are the same which the Lords and Commons used to his Majesty for the continuance of this present Parliament: all that is his in them, is the Application: to fit those Arguments which were made by them for the Kingdom, to serve his turn for the City. For Answer to which (if I dare trust my memory) I shall acquaint you with an old story of a certain Recorder of your own City, who had a Malefactor indicted and convicted of murder before him, the Malefactor was called Skillman: the Recorder being somewhat facetious hearing such a name, thus quibbled upon it: Thy name (saith he) to the Prisoner is Skillman; take away S and it is Killman, take away K and it is Illman; thou hast an ill name which may half hang thee, and an ill cause which will quite hang thee. This sudden flash being favourably smiled upon by the Court; a certain Magistrate of the Country took special notice of: put it up in his Table-book, and the next time he sat upon the Bench, made this use of it: There was a malefactor brought before him, and convicted for stealing a horse, his name was Johnson: He presently asks him his name, the other answers his name was Johnson. Johnson (saith he) take away S, and it is Killman, take away K, and it is Illman, thou hast an ill name, which may half hang thee, and an ill cause which will quite hang thee. If this were but a Fable, the Moral is good: I will make no other Application of it to Mr. Bellamy, but thus: to let him know that all Arguments will not serve at all turns: nor is it any Plea for him that he hath brought the Arguments of the Lords and Commons, unless he can make them as fit for himself as they made them for themselves: and therefore we will look no further whose Arguments they are, but we will come in the next place to see what they are. And here he tells you; the particulars which he insisted upon were these three: 1. the raising of moneys for the Kingdom's City's occasions. 2. The Repayment of those moneys so raised by the Parliament Common-counsel 3. The redress of the grievances of the City Kingdom These three (he tells you) the Common-counsel cannot effect as they should do without the power of continuing together, till such time as these be throughly considered upon. All which we easily grant, but would feign know how these Arguments back his Motion; he brings us Arguments to prove why the Common-counsel should sit, till the necessary business of the City be effected; and therefore makes a motion that they may sit as long as they themselves list; whereby they do not urge for a power to sit while the necessary business of the City is effected: but while such trouble-Courts as himself shall please to tyre out the Lord Major and Aldermen with as impertinent speeches as he hath done here with one of almost an hour long, to no purpose at all, unless it be to make divisions. Dare you deny that there wants either so much wisdom in the Lord Major and Aldermen, that they know not when the Court is full of necessary business, and so requires their stay: or when the Court is burdened with Impertinent, longwinded, senseless Arguments, and is therefore fit to be dissolved, or adjourned? Or will you tie the Lord Major and Aldermen (though never so weary, by reason of their great age, and perhaps other bodily infirmities) not to rise from Common-counsel, till you will give him leave? unless you will do this, your Arguments may indeed make good, that it is fit the Lord Major should see necessary business effected for the City's good in convenient time, but can never prove, that he must therefore sit as long as you would have him. I come now to the last Observation: which in the third place I must speak unto: and that is this: What reason Mr. Bellamy had, that because this his first unreasonable motion took no effect, he should thereupon endeavour to press a second, of fare worse consequence than the former. Which was (as I conceive) just none at all: that because my Lord Major denied him this motion, he must therefore in the next press for more. Me thinks Mr. Bellamy, it had been enough for you to have said, My Lord Major was to blame, that would not hearken to so wise a man, and a motion so like himself: nor throw the City Charters at your feet to be mended: he was an obstinate, perverse, untoward man to maintain his and the City Privileges, when Mr. Bellamy had moved to have them given away. But for you upon the deny all of your first motion, presently to fall upon a second fare more desperate; it savours nothing in mine eye, but a thirst of revenge, that because my Lord Major would not give you his Sword, to keep by you as long as you pleased: you would therefore take it from him and cut out his tongue with it: by denying him and his Brethren those negative voices, which is indeed their Right and the City's Glory: and because he would not make your will Law; you would find out a Law to take away his will; and force the head only to act at the discretion of the members: as appears by your claim to an absolute power, which the Commoners themselves you say are invested with, of making City Laws, and choosing City Officers, whether the Lord Major and Aldermen will or no, if you be more per poll than they: the which you undertake in your Plea for the Commonalty of London, fully to maintain, and which I am now undertaking as fully as I can to Answer. A FULL ANSWER TO THE Plea for the Commonalty of LONDON. THis snarling Pamphlet (Cerberus-like) barks with three heads. He tells you p. 2. that he will for methods sake, deliver, what in this he hath to speak under three heads: and they are these. First, That this City by those favours and bounties which we and our Predecessors have received from sundry royal Kings of England, is now invested with many excellent immunities, franchises, and privileges. Secondly, Who are the proper recipients of those favours, or to whom the power of using and maintaining those favours, and Privileges granted to us by our royal Kings of England is committed. Thirdly, The Reasons or Arguments wherefore those persons unto whom this power is committed, should carefully and conscionably maintain and use those privileges with which they are entrusted. In the first of these he spends much time and words, and hath hard travel in Records to prove what no body denies; and is at last delivered of nothing but wind: He speaks no more but what we know, and acknowledge, and thankfully (I hope) embrace as we ought to do. And truly, I should not spend any time to examine this foundation, there is so little in it, that he can build any thing upon; only I remember what is taught me by the wisest of Kings: * Prov. 26.5. for which cause I shall trace him step by step; to show what unjustly he doth, and what justly I may pick out of these privileges. He tells you for proof of his first head: He hath a large and pleasant field to walk in: I grant it is a large and pleasant field enough, if men could think it so that walk in it: but it appears it is not large enough for him, which makes him at this time throw up Enclosures, and by entrenching upon the Rights of the Lord Major and Aldermen, strive to make it larger; but I shall desire him to remember, Cursed is he that removeth his Neighbour's Landmark. And now he compliments out these Privileges, both with the Princes that have conferred them, and the City that enjoys them, not knowing (saith he) whether more to magnify the favour of the one, or the happiness of the other: But here he tells you, ( * Men do not do in a large field, as they do in a curious garden. having so large a field to walk in) he must do men use to do in a curious garden; pluck here a flower, and there an herb, (which is an old cast simile, thread bare in his great grandfather's days) and when he hath done the best he can, he must leave many behind him for want of time and skill: which I confess I much wonder at, that want of time and skill should make him leave his gathering of flowers, who in so bad a time, and with so little skill hath notwithstanding ventured to bind up such a bundle of weeds as he hath in this farthel. And these flowers (he saith) he must leave behind him for some more able hand to gather them: I scarce believe he thinks there is an abler hand in England then his own, though he would have you bear him witness here of a great deal of modesty that he doth confess it. He tells you he can no way east his eye, but he beholds many witnesses of the great Privileges of this City: as first that they may sit in the capacity of a Common-counsel; which is a great Privilege (I confess) but not big enough for him: unless he and his Brethren the Commoners alone may sit in the capacity of an absolute Court, not at all regarding the presence of a Lord Major and Aldermen, or at best placing them but for Ciphers there. He acknowledgeth also the Sword (that Emblem of Authority) which is carried before the Lord Major, is another Argument to prove the power of the Lord Major; and therein the power of the City: but I must make bold here to put him in mind that if the power of the City subsist in the power of the Lord Major, then to take away the power of a Negative voice in Common-counsel, as also the power of taking up the Sword when he shall see time, from the Lord Major; is even to take away the power of the City, which by his own confession is placed in the head thereof, the Lord Major. He shows you next what London hath anciently been commended for: and sums it all up in Sir Edward Cooks words; who calls it the Chamber of the King, the Heart of the Commonwealth, the Epitome of the Kingdom. All this we grant, and bless God for; only we desire that this place which he calls the heart of the Commonwealth, may never be sick at the heart of those diseases and distempers which such members thereof as himself, strive to breed, and to cherish in it. But now he comes to prove his Proofs: to wit, that they enjoy these their Privileges, de Jure, as given and bestowed on them, not usurped by them; and those privileges he tells you are these two: First, To have the power to choose their own chief Governor, and subordinate Officers among themselves. Secondly, To have also the power to make such Laws, which are or shall be for their own welfare and best accommodation. For proof of the first of these (which is the City's power in choosing their own chief Governor, and subordinate Officers among themselves) he produceth many Charters granted in the time of Richard the first, King John, Edward the second, and Henry the eighth, as you may see in his book at large. I must confess it is a fine and easy thing to prove what no body denies: only let me observe thus much from his proofs, if the City can prove they have a power by Charter to choose their own chief Governor, the Lord Major, as I do not deny but they may yet ought they by that Charter, and are bound when they do choose, to choose a Lord Major indeed, and not a Sword-bearer in stead of a Lord Major. I say they ought to choose themselves a Lord Major, and therefore to grant him the power of a Lord Major to dispose of the Sword that is given him, according to his best ability, and understanding for the good of the City: but not to choose him to be no more than the City Sword-bearer, to lay down his Sword in Common-counsel when they list, and not to take it up again till they will give him leave, as Mr. Bellamy would have it to be, although they should enjoin him to sit all day or all night, he being never so old, weak, and unable to sit, or never so much tired with impertinences, and such frothy speeches as this is: or though he hath never so much necessary occasion to use the same Sword at the same time, either in the Court of Aldermen, the seat of Justice, or elsewhere, for the necessary good, and safety of the City. The next Privilege of the City that he goes about to prove is: that they have also the power to make such Laws, as shall be for their own welfare and best accommodation. And this he proves by the Charter of Edward the third, in the fifteenth year of his Reign: where indeed he draws a knife to cut his own throat: for I do not know how he could have picked out any Charter, which doth invest the Lord Major and Aldermen with a negative voice, and put the power of making Laws into their hands more than this Charter of Edward the third. I will relate the Charter itself in Mr. Bellamy's own words, it runs thus. We have granted further, for us and our Heirs, and by this our present Charter confirmed to the Major and Aldermen of the City aforesaid; That if any Customs in the said City, hither to obtained and used, be in any part difficult or defective, or any thing in the same newly happening, where before there was no remedy ordained, and have need of amending, the same Major and Aldermen, and their Successed with the assent of the Commonalty of the same City, may add 〈◊〉 ordain a remedy meet, faithful, and consonant to Reason, for the common pr●s● of the Citizens of the same City, as oft and at such time as to them shall be thought expedient. We will consider in this Charter but two things: First, to whom the Charter itself is confirmed. Secondly, how the power of this Charter must be used. First, to whom it is confirmed: it speaks plainly that it is granted to the Lord Major and Aldermen of the City, without so much as naming any interest that the Commons have in the grant of it. Whence I conclude, that the Lord Major and Aldermen of the City of London, were thought fit by the same King that granted this Charter, to be entrusted with the absolute power of the Charter to use it for the City's Good: even as Counsel is given to the Head, to use for the benefit of the whole body. Secondly, We are to observe how the power of this Charter, which is the power of making Laws, must be used. Read the words of the Charter, and they tell you thus: The Lord Major, Aldermen, and their Successors, have a power thereby given them, to make or mend what Laws they see necessary with the assent of the Commoners. From whence it will necessarily follow, that the Active power of making Laws, (nay of proposing Laws otherwise then by way of Counsel) rests wholly in the hands of the Lord Major, and Aldermen: and no more power is left in the Commoners, but to assent or to descent from those Laws, that shall seem good to be made by the Lord Major and Aldermen, and by their assent to ratify, or by their dissent to hinder them. So that now where lies the Negative voice? If the Commoners in regard of the greatness of their number shall out-vote the Lord Major and Aldermen (which at all times they easily may) and thereupon undertake to make or mend a Law: then is the very Charter itself absolutely and apparently broken. For it doth not say, we have granted to the Commons, that by the consent of the greater part of the Common-council: nor yet by the consent of the Lord Major and Aldermen, (much less without their consent) that they (to wit the Commoners) shall have power to make or mend a Law: But it faith, we have granted to the Lord Major and Aldermen to make the Law by consent of the Commoners. So that it must needs follow: that the Lord Major and Aldermen must either use their power to the making of a Law, or else let the Commons consent what they will, though they have a power to consent, they have no power by consenting to make a Law: And I would feign know whether that Law can be said truly to be made by the Lord Major, Aldermen, and their Successors: which is only carried by the Plurality of the voices of the Commoners, and thereupon made, though contrary to the consent of the Lord Major and Aldermen, as Mr. Bellamy would have them to be: and I would fain know whether the proper meaning of this Charter must not needs be thus: that the Lord Major and Aldermen (who being chosen by the City) are entrusted with the care and charge of the welfare of the same) shall have therefore power to make or mend Laws for the City's good: only this must be done with the Commons consent: that is, the Laws that are proposed by the Lord Major and Aldermen shall not pass without the consent of the major part of the Commonalty: which in such cases are always put for the whole: And this is all the Privilege the Commoners can glean out of this Charter. I confess I do not see that we need any more to prove the negative voices of the Lord Major and Aldermen, that they do of right and necessity belong to them, than this very Charter; which, First, is granted to them alone, without so much as naming the Commons: and secondly, placeth the power of making or mending a Law in them only, giving the Commoners no more power than is now granted them: which is either to assent or descent, when a Law is proposed, as I said before. I conclude this first head in Mr. Bellamy's own words: When I seriously consider what Privileges are thus granted to this City, I know nothing wanting to them, if they be not wanting to themselves to make them happy: that is, if this power of making or mending Laws, thus placed by Charter in the hands of those, who are chosen by, and entrusted with the care of the City, be still continued in its own proper place: But if the Commoners will usurp this power (contrary to Charter) into their own hands; and make their head, a head of clouts, if they then suffer at the present, by having such Laws made as shall be set up by faction, not wisdom, and if they suffer hereafter by the severity of future Princes, which may perhaps deny them the lawful use of those Charters which they have thus abused, they may thank themselves, and such instruments of their suffering, as Mr. Bellamy is; and I therefore pray God give you grace (as Mr. Bellamy saith) wisely and humbly to make use of them. I come now to the second head, or to the second thing handled, which is this: Who are the proper Recipients of those privileges, or to whom the power of using and maintaining those privileges and favours, granted to us by our Royal Kings of England, is committed. And in this Head he tells you he hath two things to speak to. 1. To show to whom these privileges have been granted. 2. To prove by whom these privileges have been practised. And here I must tell you this Argument deals like Hocus Pocus, that swallows hurds and spits fire, it repeats of the former Charters, enough to choke itself, but that it spits desperate conclusions from them. Desperate conclusions I call them in two respects: first, because they are contradictory: secondly, because they are false. First, I say, they are contradictory, he contradicteth himself in them; he tells you p. 9 in these words. If you take a Survey of all the Charters granted to this City, since the date of that grant of King John to this day, which are very many, they all run thus, or to this effect: To the Major, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of London; or, To the Major and Commonalty of the City of London: and yet in the very same page, nay the same clause of that sentence, reciting the Charter of Edward the second, in the twelfth of his Reign he tells you, That that Charter leaves a certain power in making, and amoving Sheriffs, and some other City Officers, wholly to the pleasure of the Commonalty, without any reference to the Major and Aldermen. So that you see how plainly he contradicts himself: he tells you first, That all Charters that ever were made run thus: viz. To the Major, Aldermen and Commonalty. And yet he recites a Charter in the very next words, where he labours to exclude both the Major and Aldermen. In the next place I am to prove his Conclusions drawn from these Charters are false: which I shall do by proving two things. First, That he falsely interprets the Charters themselves. Secondly, He argues falsely from his own Interpretations. First, He falsely interprets the Charters recited by himself: as In that Charter of Edward the second, which he saith is made to the Commons only, without reference to the Major and Aldermen: his Interpretation there is false, for that very Charter cannot but have a reference as well to them as to the Commoners. And that appears by the words of the Charter, which are these: That the Major and Sheriffs may be chosen by the Citizens of the said City: as Mr. Bellamy relates the Charter in his Book, p. 5. the latter end: Now it cannot be denied but the Major and Aldermen are Citizens of the City of London, and the principal of them. as Mr. Bellamy confesseth; if therefore the power of that Election be granted in general terms to the Citizens of London, though the Lord Major and Aldermen be not expressed in that Charter, (as there was no need they should) yet they are necessarily included, because they are Citizens, and so that very Charter (contrary to Mr. Bellamy's opinion) hath reference to the Major and Aldermen. Secondly, He argues falsely from his own interpretations; for Mr. Bellamy from this Charter thus interpreted, argues, or rather concludes two things in the very next words. First, That it is clear that in the City Privileges, the Commoners have an equal share with the Lord Major and Aldermen. Secondly, That if there be any difference, the advantage is to the Commons. Let us see how these will follow: If we should take it for granted that in choosing some City Officers the Lord Major and Aldermen are by Charter excluded, (which notwithstanding is absolutely false, and can never be proved,) as I have already showed) yet if it were true, a very little Logic will tell us, Syllogizari non est ex particulari. It is no good Argument that shall conclude, that because the Commoners have a right to this Privilege by Charter; (which is only the choosing of the Major, Sheriffs, and some City Officers, that therefore they have a right to all) nor will it follow that because the Lord Major and Aldermen have not a negative voyee in the choosing of some City Officers, but the Commons have a power in themselves to do it without them: that therefore the Lord Major and Aldermen have no negative voice in the making of Laws, when the Charter of Edward the third plainly gives it them. I shall desire you to take a little notice what a gross slur he puts upon you here. First, He tells you that all the Charters run thus: To the Major, Aldermen and Commons. Secondly, He brings you a Charter clean contrary in the next words, which he takes to be made only to the Commons without reference to the Major and Aldermen. Thirdly, He grounds from that Charter, and all the rest, 1. An equality that is between the Major, Aldermen and Commons. 2. If there be any difference, the advantage is to the Commons. First, He saith the Commons have an equal share with the Lord Major and Aldermen, in City Privileges, because all Charters join them. Secondly, They have an advantage, if there be any difference, because that one Charter of Edward the second is made (saith he) only to the Commons, without any reference to the Major and Aldermen. Both which I thus disprove: first, because all the Charters, or any of them do not make them equal with the Lord Major and Aldermen: secondly, this Charter of Edward the second, gives them no advantage. First, I say no Charter makes them equal, which I prove two ways. First, Because the Charters cannot be so understood, as to make the Commoners equal with Lord Major and Aldermen. Secondly, The Charters themselves express the contrary. First, The Charters cannot be understood of an equality: for there is a great deal of difference in giving or granting things jointly, and granting or giving things equally. Things may be given jointly to many receivers, yet to one more, to another less, but if they be given equally, than the one hath as much share as the other. For example: in the natural body, strength is given to a Lion, and to every part of the Lion jointly, for he hath some strength in every part: but yet strength in the Lion is not given to every part of the Lion equally, because one part of him is stronger than another. Again, that may be said to be given jointly, in the benefit whereof many things have a joint interest, and yet not a joint exercise of the thing which is given them: thus wisdom is given to man, and to every part of man jointly, because every part of man receives benefit by it: and yet the exercise of this wisdom is only placed in the understanding, to whom is committed the power and charge of benefitting all other parts of the body by that wisdom which is only exercised by the understanding. In both these respects Charters may be made, and Privileges granted to the City jointly, and yet not equally▪ Jointly in the first sense, that is, the Privilege of making Laws, choosing Officers, or the like, may be granted to the City jointly, yet the Lord Major and Aldermen may have a greater power in the making of Laws, and choosing Officers, then the Commoners. Or else in the last sense; These Privileges may be conferred upon the City jointly, and yet the acting power of them may be committed only to the Lord Major and Aldermen, as in the two foregoing examples plainly appears. And that the power of making Laws, (which is the greater of the two City Privildges) though it be granted to the City jointly, yet it is not granted to the City equally, the Charter of Edward the third, which I explained before, doth clearly prove and that beyond all contradiction or objection. Thus you see the first thing is made good, viz. that none of the Charters give the Commons an equal (though a joint) share and power in City Privileges with the Lord Major and Aldermen. Secondly, I shall show you that the Charter of Edward the second, (which Mr. Bellamy saith, hath reference to another of King John) in point of difference gives the Commons no advantage. And that appears by the same Charters, which do confer a power into the hands of the Citizens without any distinction. Whence I thus Argue: 1. The Lord Major and Aldermen are Citizens, therefore they have an equal share in those Charters. 2. They are the principal head of the City as Mr. Bellamy confesseth; therefore if there be any difference, the advantage rather is to them. And thus much for the first particular, viz. to whom these City privileges have been granted. I come now to the second, viz. By whom they have been practised. Where Mr. Bellamy tells you, they have been practised always, as by the Charter of Edward the third they were granted, which must be by the Lord Major and Aldermen, with consent of the Commons, and for my part I desire no more but that they may continue so still: That in Laws proposed in Common-council to be made, the Lord Major and Aldermen may have the power of making, according to that Charter, and the Commons the power of assenting or dissenting and no more, which is according to the same Charter. And here Mr. Bellamy gives you many needless instances of things done by the joint and concurrent power of the Lord Major, Aldermen and Commons in Common-council: all which we know to be true, but must tell him thus much, if he would bring an instance for his own purpose, to do himself any good, he must show us when and where any thing hath passed in Common-council, which the Lord Major and Aldermen have refused to join with the Commons in: For, for such Acts to pass in Common-council, which the Lord Major and Aldermen think fit to join with the Commons in, this makes nothing against the negative voices of the Lord Major and Aldermen; but if he can give us an instance of an Act in Common-council, where a Law was made and established by the sole power of the Commoners, which though it were protested against by the Lord Major and Aldermen, yet the Commoners by their privilege made it pass: when he shows us such an example, he saith something towards the taking away of the negative voices of the Lord Major and Aldermen. But in the beginning of p. 11. he undertakes to prove this also, in these words: That all the determinative, binding, and concluding power of the Court of Common-council is in the plurality of the votes of the Lord Major, Aldermen, and Commons, jointly. (By which word [jointly] he means equally, or else we do not deny it) And that the Lord Major and Aldermen have no more power of a negative voice, then as single persons, which every member of that Court hath as fully as they, if their judgements in the Debate, sway them to the negative. And that the Aldermen alone, and by themselves cannot hold the negative against the Commons affirmative. I must needs confess Mr. Bellamy now speaks to the purpose: if he can but prove this, as he saith he will; he shall have my consent to have his motion very speedily granted And here, I commend him, he takes the choice of three weapons to make this good; and I am afraid all too short. 1. He proves it by practice. 2. By Argument. 3. By Equity and Reason. First, By practice, That it hath not been so; which he instanceth in a Case upon 17. of Feb. 1641. But as I told you, the whole speech had three heads, I must tell you this part of it wants a tail; this Example brought in by way of Argument, hath no Conclusion. But I shall first tell you what the Argument is; secondly, what the Conclusion must be. The Argument lies hid in the whole story, which is this, Feb. 17. 1641. A Petition was brought into the Court of Common-council, directed only to the Lord Major and Aldermen, and because it was not directed to the Lord Major, Aldermen and Commons, in Common-council assembled, the Court refused to take any cognizance of it. But the than Lord Major, Sir Richard Gurney, with the major part of the Aldermen then present in that Common-council, would have the Court to admit of that Petition; and the Court refusing, for the reason aforesaid; the Lord Major and Aldermen conceiving, (as I suppose, (saith he) that they should carry it by plurality of votes:) would have the Court divide, and numbered by the Poll: and so it was done, there was for the Petition, the Lord Major, seven Aldermen, and 61 Commoners, and against the Petition, five Aldermen, and 85 Commoners, and thus the members of the Court, (saith he) both Aldermen and Commoners, being reckoned together by the Poll, as members of the Court, the Question was determined, the Petition rejected, and the Authority of Common-council maintained. This is the example that he brings, by way of Argument, now what must be the Conclusion? By the Law of Logic, that thing which at first he undertakes to prove, must (after the Argument) be plainly in the same words laid down in the Conclusion. So than you must turn back to the beginning of the 11 page, to find the Conclusion, which must be thus. Therefore the Lord Major and Aldermen in this Court, have no more power of a negative voice then as single persons, which every member of the Court hath as fully as they, if their judgement in the Debate sway them to the Negative, and the Aldermen alone and by themselves cannot hold the negative against the Commons affirmative; This by the rules of Logic, and no other must be the conclusion. For Answer to which, give me leave to make these Observations out of Mr. Bellamy's own instance of Feb. 17. 1641. 1. What the occasion of this difference was. 2. How it was managed. First, The occasion of the difference was, because the Petition was directed only to the Lord Major and Aldermen, and not to the Commoners. Secondly, How was this difference managed: first, The Lord Major and Aldermen moved to have the Petition accepted. Where I observe, therein they did but their duty, whose Office it is in all such cases, to move the Commons for their assent to whatsoever they think fit to have passed by them. Secondly, The Commons refused it; and herein they used but their Privilege, which is, when any Law is proposed by the Lord Major and Aldermen, to show their assent, or descent. Thirdly, Upon dissent of the Commons, The Lord Major and Aldermen would have the Court divided, and numbered by the Poll. Where observe; first, it was the Act of the Lord Major and Aldermen, upon dissent of the Commons, to put the business to the Poll, so that it was not then done by the Commons, which is the power they plead for: secondly, The Lord Major and Aldermen would have the business put to the Poll, which shows it was their voluntary Act to put it to Poll, they were not constrained by the Commons against their own wills to put it to the Poll. Fourthly, We are here to examine the reasons, why the Lord Major and Aldermen would have the business put to the Poll; and that Mr. Bellamy supposeth to be, Because they thought they should carry it by plurality of votes. Lastly, What was the upshot of the business: The Lord Major and Aldermen trusting to their own strength, and thereupon putting it to the Poll, lost it. In laying all these together you shall see what conclusions naturally flow from this Argument. First, That the Commons did at that time no more but dissent from the motion of the Lord Major and Aldermen: and therefore they did no more then, but what we now grant them. Secondly, The putting off the business to the Poll was the Act of the Lord Major and Aldermen; therefore it proves nothing that the Commons have any power to put any business to the Poll; but that that power rests in the Lord Major and Aldermen. Thirdly, The putting the business to Poll, was the Lord Major and Alderman's voluntary Act. Therefore not binding, nor necesssary, ever to be followed again, in such a case. Fourthly, The reason why the Lord Major and Aldermen put the business to the Poll, was Because they conceived they should carry it by plurality of Votes. Therefore if the Lord Major and Aldermen do not at any time conceive they shall carry their business through by plurality of Votes, they may choose to put it to the Poll. Lastly, The Lord Major and Aldermen thus unadvisedly relying on their own strength, putting the business to the Poll, quite lost it. Therefore let the Lord Major and Aldermen take heed of waving their own Rights, and putting any more businesses to the Poll, which they need not, lest they accordingly lose by it. And thus All in this Instance, draws a contrary way to that Mr. Bellamy would have it; and is so fare from making up his Conclusions, that it makes every Conclusion against him: so fare is it from showing any reason why the Lord Major and Aldermen by this practice should lose their negative voice, that it more confirms them in it: and gives them fair warning for putting any more businesses to the Poll, lest they be polled of all their Rights and Privileges by it: and lest (be their Cause never so good) they should be over-voted and lose it, which may easily come to pass when they think otherwise, as it did in this Instance with Sir Richard Gurney. But a little more to weaken this Mr. Bellamy's practical Argument, I must tell you it is nothing to the purpose, either to prove any thing for, or against a negative voice in the Lord Major and Aldermen, for it is plain all along the Story, that in this instance the voices of the Lord Major and Aldermen, were always affirmative, and never negative. They were first affimative to have the Petition accepted; they were also affirmative, to have the Court numbered by Poll: Now we do not maintain that the Lord Major and Aldermen have any more in an affirmative voice than the Commons: which is plainly against Charter: but we say their Privilege lies, in that they have a negative voice, whereby they can hinder the Commons from making Laws without them: Now Mr. Bellamy in this Instance proves nothing, but that the Lord Major and Aldermen had not an Affirmative voice granted them by the Commons, which nothing at all proves that therefore they have not a Negative. Thus I have showed you what he hath proved by Practice: I come now to show you how he proves by Argument that the Lord Major and Aldermen can have no Negative voice in making of a Law, but that the Commons as touching the making of a Law are above them. He undertakes it by way of Syllogism in this manner. The Major proposition. That Court which hath the power to make a Law, and by that Law to confer a Power upon the Lord Major and Aldermen, which they as Lord Major and Aldermen, had not before, is quoad hoc, that is, so far as to the making of a Law above the Lord Major and Aldermen. But this Court of Common-council hath such a power. The Minor proposition. The conclusion Therefore quoad hoc, that is, so fare as to the making of a Law, they are above the Lord Major and Aldermen. In which Syllogism the fallacy lies in the minor proposition, in the word Common-council. For if Mr. Bellamy by the word Common-council, mean the whole body of that Court; which consists of the Lord Major, Aldermen, and Commons jointly, without which there can be no Common-council: then I am of Mr. Bellamy's mind, and grant, that the whole Body of the Common-council, consisting as aforesaid; may confer a power not only upon the Lord Major and Aldermen, which they had not before, But upon any other capable person or persons, and in that respect are above them, as the whole is above any part. But if by the word Common-council, he means only a part of the Common-council, which are the Commons there Assembled: then (though, as we said before, the Common-council may, yet) the Commoners of themselves cannot make any such Law, contrary to the negative voices of the Lord Major and A dermon: nor are the Commons as towards the making of a Law above them: for it cannot hold that because the whole man is greater than the head, and (as the whole in respect of the parts above it) that therefore the hands or feet or any other particular part of the body is above the head. I shall give you an Example or two to make this clear. It is in the power of the Body, to move by the joint power of the Head, and so to do that which the Head cannot do otherwise, or which the head could not have done before: Therefore it is in the power of the hands alone, or any other member to do this whether the head will or no, and so to be in respect of that action above the head. Or thus, It is in the power of an Army (that consists of a General, Officers and Soldiers) to fight when they shall think fit. Therefore it is in the power of the Soldiers alone, to fight whether the General think fit or no, and so in that respect to be above the General. Just so looks Mr. Bellamy's Syllogism like one of these, when it is uncased. He tells you it is in the power of the Common-council, which consists of Lord Major Aldermen and Commons, to make a Law, and by that Law to confer a power upon the Lord Major and Aldermen, which they had not before: Therefore it is in the power of the Commons alone to do this, and in this respect to be above the Lord Major and Aldermen. His second Argument is of the same hatch, about the power of Common-council to take away a power which the Lord Major and Aldermen had before. One Answer serves them both, and that's this: if Mr. Bellamy will attribute that power and superiority to the Commons alone, which is in the Common-council rightly considered, he gives that to a part, which belongs to the whole: but if by Common-council, he means as I mean, and he ought to mean; then this Argument proves a great power and superiority in the Lord Major, Aldermen and Commons jointly above any part asunder, but no power at all in the Commons to make any Law without the Lord Major and Aldermen, nor any way to be above them. I shall ask him but one Question, and I have done with these Arguments. Whether a power was at any time given to the Lord Major and Aldermen which they had not before, or whether there was a power at any time taken from them which they had before, in Common-council, by the Commons alone, against the consents of the Lord Major and Aldermen. If there were ever such a power granted to, or taken away from the Lord Major and Aldermen in Common-council against their will, then that proves something towards the power of the Commons, that as touching the making of such a Law, they are above the Lord Major and Aldermen. But if not, though there have such Laws been made in Common-council; by joint consent of the Lord Major, Aldermen, and Commons, when the Lord Major and Aldermen saw no reason to use their negative voices; yet it doth not follow that they had no Negative voices, because they did not use them: or because they suffered such Laws to be made, that therefore (if they had pleased) they could not have hindered them. Thus his Arguments brought to prove that it cannot be so that the Lord Major and Aldermen should have a Negative voice in Common-council, but that the Commons as touching the making of Laws are above them: you see when they are throughly canvased, what they are; falsely pretending much Truth and soundness, but indeed containing nothing less. I handle him now at his last weapon, with which he undertakes to prove, that by Equity and Reason, it ought not to be so. And what is his Equity and Reason for it? it is because the Aldermen are in number but 26. the Commoners 230. Therefore (saith he) it is not Equity and Reason that so few should have a Negative voice over so many; but on the contrary that the greater number, as touching the making of a Law should be above them. This Argument is of the same litter with the other two and much favours them. 'tis a pretty consequence if you mark it well. I shall give it you in another Instance or two. The Soldiers of an Army are fare more in number then the General and his Officers; Therefore it is not Equity or Justice, That (if at any time the Soldiers have a mind to fight) the Commanders should have a Negative voice over them or power to hinder them, because the Commanders are fare fewer in number then the Shoulders are. Or thus, The head in the natural Body is but one; the hands are two, so are the feet. Therefore the head ought not to restrain the hands or feet from doing any thing whatsoever (if it be from striking or hurting the head) because the hands and feet are more in number then the Head. Just thus holds Mr. Bellamy's Equity and Justice, in this place he acknowledgeth the Lord Major and Aldermen to be the Head, the Commons to be the Members, but these members (saith he) are fare more than the head, Ergo, the head ought not in the passing of a Law to have a Negative voice over the Members, but the members as touching the making of a Law, aught to be above the Head. But he tells you presently how much mischief would follow if a Negative voice should be left to so few as the Lord Major and Aldermen, over so many as the whole Body of the Commons assembled in Common-council. First, He saith, It would obstruct all good Laws from passing: To make which good, he must either prove there is less wisdom in the Lord Major and Aldermen, to know how to make a good Law, than there is in the Commons, or else there is less integrity in the Lord Major and Aldermen, to pass such Laws for the City's good, then there is in the Commons: Till one or both of these be proved, I shall give this Objection no further Answer. His second Argument is, that by this means the City would fall into a remediless way of Ruin: and he instanceth in the case of Sir Richard Gurneys standing out against the just desires and commands of the Parliament. I shall throw his own Instance at his head, and beat him with his last weapon. In the case of Sir Richard Gurney, I would fain know how the City fell into a remediless way of ruin. When it was found that Sir Richard Gurney was a man uncordiall and unfaithful to the Parliaments Service, was he not presently apprehended, removed, and committed by Authority of the same Parliament? and was not the City soon reduced from this remediless way of ruin? and a faithful and active Lord Major placed in his room? And do you not think it would happen so again, either in the Lord Major or Aldermen, if they should not be men of that integrity which is expected; would the Parliament think you, sit still, and look on, and provide the City no Remedy? Away then, for shame, with such senseless Arguments, See his own book, p. 16. l. 17. and let us hear no more of your sitting still, and sighing with your fingers in your Eyes; and cannot tell what you would have; which are Arguments fit for a child to beg Plums with, than a Common-council man, Privileges. But next he tells you what he hath done all this while, what he hath fully and clearly proved both by Charters and by Practice, I shall give it you in his own words: They are these, That the Lord Major, Aldermen and Commons conjunctim, and not either alone as separated or dis-junct from the other, are the proper recipients of those Grants and Privileges which our Royal Kings have in their bounty and favour invested this City with. And hath he raised all this dust, spent all this time and matter to prove this? I know no body that offers to deny it him: for my part, I have already granted, and will not now recall, that the proper Recipients of the City Privileges are the Lord Major, Aldermen and Commons conjunctim, that is, jointly, but not equally, as, the Lord Major and Aldermen may be joined with the Commons in one Commission, and yet have a greater power than they, by virtue of the same Commission, or the Commons may have joint Right with the Lord Major and Aldermen, to the City Charters, that is, to the benefit that is received by them, yet the power of acting and exercising those Charters may be entrusted in the Lord Major and Aldermen, as I have showed before. But here I must tell you what I may well fear, lest Mr. Bellamy in this claim (made to usurp the Rights of the Lord Major and Aldermen) do not sin against knowledge. My reason is, because if you compare but two things; what before he said he would prove; and what here he saith he hath proved: you will find he doth acknowledge a weakness in his own Arguments, that they cannot make good what he would have them. For Example, read p. 9 lin. 24. and pag. 11. lin. 1. of his book, and in those he tells you he will make clear: First, That the Commons have equal share with the Lord Major and Aldermen, in City privileges. Secondly, That if there be any advantage, it is to the Commons. Thirdly, That the Lord Major and Aldermen have no more negative voice t●en the inferior members of the Court. These things he undertakes to prove: and yet when he hath brought all the Arguments he can to prove them: he concludes his Arguments in the last line of the 16. and beginning of the 17. page, by telling you that he hath proved; what? First, He doth not say he hath proved That the Commons have an equal share with the Lord Major and Aldermen, in City privileges. Secondly, He doth not say there, that he hath proved any advantage to the Commons. Thirdly, He doth not say, he hath proved any thing at all to take away the Lord Major and Alderman's negative voice. All that he saith he hath proved, is, that the City privileges belong to the Lord Major, Aldermen and Commons jointly, which is no more than we grant: whence I conclude thus much. That Mr. Bellamy at first would have proved those things which he undertook to prove with all his heart: but finding when he had brought in all his Arguments, they were too weak to prove what he would have, though he said he would prove them at first, yet he dares not say, he hath proved them at last: but faith only he hath proved a joint share that the Lord Major, Aldermen and Commons have in City privileges, which for my part never was, or shall be denied him. But for all this, though he dares not say he hath proved what he undertook, (and if he should say so, no wise man would believe him) yet he lays as hard claim to the same Privileges, as if he had proved all before him: which makes me fear he sins against knowledge; for to endeavour by violence to gain, what a man cannot make good his right unto, is a plain sin of covetousness, and against knowledge. And now with a fair glozing conclusion, having thus prepared a Pill, he tries to make it work. It is a Linsey-wolsey-conclusion, and the last part spoils the first: In the first part, he tells your Lordship he honours you, with your Brethren, he acknowledgeth you to be the City's Head, and that in eclipsing your Honour they wound themselves. I would fain know if any man will believe this? when First, The honour he gives you, is to pull you down from being so high as your own Rights and Charters have made you: and to make your Lordship's power in a Common-council, no more than the youngest and meanest Commoner, who hath a voice as well (nay as good) as your Lordship, if your negative voice be once taken away. Secondly, He tells you, he acknowledgeth you under his Majesty to be head of this City: and yet the head must not have a negative voice to whatsoever the members will have done. Thirdly, He tells you that if they should go about to Eclipse your Honour they would wound themselves; when how can he go more about to Eclipse your honour, nay to destroy it, than he doth? by leaving you in a Common-council but the name of a Lord Major, but making you a Commoner only like himself. When 1. you shall have no more power of the Sword; when you have laid it down, you shall not take it up till he please. 2. When you shall have no more power or voice in Common-council, than the meanest Commoner that sits with you. But we are not yet come to the snake that lies hid in this grass, that appears in the next words, which are these. As we give you the honour of head-ship, take not from us the right of membership. If he would have spoke plain, he should have said rather, since we make you the head, we beseech you make us the hat, that we may be above our head. I know no body denies you the right of membership; if you could be content with that: but as it was thought strange by St. Paul that the members of the natural body should thus argue: that the hands or the feet should say thus to the head, because we are not the head, therefore we are not of the body: so is it no less strange in the body Politic; when the Commoners in Common-council, (whom Mr. Bellamy would have us suppose to be the bands and feet of the City) shall upbraid their head, as St. Paul saith, and tell him thus: Because we are not the head, therefore we are not of the body: Because we do not act the head in ordering the rest of the body; Because we have not as much power as the head, to make Laws without, and against our head; and because our head will presume to have a negative voice over us, and will not rather suffer us to have a negative voice over him; therefore he denies us the right of member-ship: No, if you unmask your claim, and let it appear with its own face, you do not beg of the Lord Major and Aldermen, the right of membership, for that is granted you, in your assenting and dissenting voices, when any Law is proposed, but you either would be the hat above your head, or at least have an equal power with him, which were to make two heads, and create a monster. But he tells you in the natural body; the head cannot act without the members, and therefore the Lord Major and Aldermen, though they be the head of this great City, yet they cannot act without the concurrent power of the Commons, as hands and feet to assist them. I answer, it is granted, that the Lord Major and Aldermen cannot act without the Commons; and hence it is that they may propose Laws as long as they will, but can make none without your consent: and this is the height of your privilege. But did you ever know in the natural body, that the hands and feet could act without the power of the head? this is that that you would do, we yield the Lord Major and Aldermen cannot work without you, but you would work without them, making what Laws you think good, without their consent, nay against their consent, if by plurality of voices you can but carry them. Wherein consider seriously what injury you would do them. If you should take away the power of a Negative voice from them, you think thereby you make them but equal with yourselves: you are mistaken; for you make them fare lower than yourselves: for, for your parts you have a negative voice (though not formally, yet in effect) since if the Lord Major and Aldermen propose a Law, you are able at any time, by reason of your number, if you but descent, to hinder it from passing; but as for them, when at any time the Commons shall propose a Law (unless you grant them a negative voice, to stop what they think not fit to pass) their number is so small, compared with yours, that they can never stop any thing from passing that you shall propose, (though you may stop any thing, that they propose) because they are so unequal to you in number. Thus it is clear what you go about, not to make your head equal with the rest of the members, but even fare below the feet; unless you will make as great a number of Aldermen as there are of Commons: that if they have their negative voices taken away, they may have some hopes left to carry on, or stop some things in City Government, by plurality of voices as you now do. The next clause I forbear to answer, because it is a plain Bull. He tells you, The best and soundest bodies are apt to distempers, and those maladies in the noblest parts are most dangerous; if therefore there be an Ulcer or Tumour in the bead (saith he) that hinders the necessary and natural motion of the rest of the members, and endangers the life of all: Oh then blame not the feet if they run forth to seek a Remedy, nor yet the bands if they apply it. A most gross Bull, as if it were possible for the feet to run, or the hands to act in applying a Remedy, when the distemper of the head (as he himself confesseth) hinders the natural and necessary motion of the rest of the members. But now to avoid all exceptions, lest any man should say, he hath not more than cleared all that he undertakes: you shall see he will not let an objection be in possibility to be made; but like one of Pharaohs Midwives he brings it into the world, and then destroys it. He tells you he foresees an objection that may be made against a part of that which he hath spoken: viz. The election of some City Officers, hath been time out of mind in other hands, and not the hands of the Commons. Me thinks if Mr. Bellamy's spectacles had been true, when he foresaw this Objection, he might have foreseen a bigger, and that's this. The Active power in making a Law, & the Negative voice in hindering a Law, have been time out of mind in the hands of the Lord Major and Aldermen, what say you to that? But it may be the same answer will serve both these Objections: Or because he gives a twofold Answer, we will try if the one will not serve the one, and the other the other. His Answer to this Objection is twofold. First, The same that Christ gave to the Pharisees in the case of Divorce: which is a little too bold in my Opinion. It is this, From the beginning it was not so: It was easy for Christ who was from the beginning, and is the beginning and ending; to tell what was so, or what was not so from the beginning: but for Mr. Bellamy thus to answer, I scarce see how he can fathom so great Antiquity as to make it good; nor indeed doth he go about it: for you must take his own word for it, that it was not so from the beginning, while he doth not allege any Charter, Record, or Authority to prove it by. His second Answer is this, If this power hath been time out of mind out of the Commons hands, than it was either lost by usurpation, or consent. If by usurpation (saith he) it is just it should be restored. We grant it, but leave him to prove the usurpation. But if by consent; then if cause and Reason require, the Common-council may reassume this lost power into their hands again, as they have done in another case. This we grant also: if Mr. Bellamy do not here again equivocate with the word Common-council. For we know the Charter of Edward the third, confirms a power to the Common-council of altering, as well as making Laws; and as any thing is made for the City's good by power of Common-council, so upon good reason it may be by the same power reversed: but than it must be done by power of Common-council indeed: which cannot be meant of the Commons alone, but of the Lord Major, Aldermen and Commons, jointly. And so I grant it: that if the Lord Major, Aldermen and Commons shall consent to reinvest you in that power; which (I confess, I do not believe you ever had in the beginning) though you confidently say so) no doubt but than you may reassume it. But if that power were heretofore (as you conceive) made over or given away, by your forefathers (upon solid reasons in their esteem) into the hands of the Lord Major and Aldermen, than (though you can show, it may be, better reasons, why to reassume it, than they had to give it away) it is not in your power (that is, it is not in the power of the Commons of themselves) to reassume it, without the consent of the Lord Major and Aldermen, who are now possessed of it: no more than it is in my power, when I list, without the consent of the possessor, to enter upon any Land or means, which my Father lawfully sold heretofore, upon pretence that I can show better reasons why I should keep it, than my Father shown why he should sell it. Thus you see you have made but one objection where you might have made many, and but the least, when you might have found fare greater, and yet both your Answers will not serve to satisfy that. First, You tell us from the beginning it was not so, which you never prove, and therefore we deny. Secondly, You tell us why, If your Privileges have been lost, they ought to be reassumed. First, If they were usurped, which we say they were not. Secondly, If given away by consent, which we say, without the consent of the Lord Major and Aldermen, who are the now possessors of those Privileges which you pretend to have lost, you of yourselves cannot reassume them. And thus like Heroules, I have cut off two of the heads of this Hydra, the third follows, which as it riseth, I shall likewise labour to destroy. And it is this, The Reasons or Arguments why those persons unto whom this power is committed, should carefully and conscionably maintain and use those Privileges with which they are entrusted. The Reasons he gives for this, are these two: First, From the damage and loss which our Predecessors have suffered for mis-usage and non-usage of those Privileges, and Immunities, which by the favour of former Princes have been bestowed on us. In prosecuting whereof, though he cite the Charter of Edward the third, the first of his Reign, to free the City from bearing the offences of particular ministers of Justice, yet he tells you, If the Common-council either not use, or mis-use their Privileges, they may expect to smart for it, as their Predecessors did; and here he instanceth in the fifteenth year of Edward the third, What it cost the City for not fully using their free Customs and Liberties: whence he observes, That it is not enough for us to use some of our Privileges, but we must use them all. My Lord, I shall urge no more upon your Lordship, and the rest of your Brethren in this place, then that you would remember Mr. Bellamy's observation: which is, That your Predecessors have smarted for not fully using their Privileges, and therefore it is not enough for you to use some of your Privileges, but you must use them all. I say so too, my Lord, Mr. Bellamy and I in this are both of a mind, it is not therefore enough for your Lordship to use the power of the Sword at home, or abroad in the City only, which is but some of your Privilege, but you must use it in Common-council too, by reserving in yourself, the power of laying it by when you please, and taking it up again when you please, whether with, or without the Commons consent, or else you do not use all your Privilege. Nor is it enough for you to use your assenting and consenting voices in Common-council only, as the Commons do use them, (which is indeed all their Privilege, but only some of yours,) but you must use your Negative voice also in Common-council, when your judgement tells you, it is for the City's good, or else you do not use all your Privilege. Yet do I not close with Mr. Bellamy, in that Conclusion that he draws from hence, That because you are bound to use all your Privileges, therefore you must use more than all. Nor do I conclude, that because you grant to the Commons, the choice of some Officers, are you therefore bound to grant them the choice of all, as Mr. Bellamy would have you? which is the same as this: that because the Law grants me an interest in some of the Land of the Kingdom, it ought therefore to grant me an Interest in all. For I think, as Mr. Bellamy thinks, but something more: He thinks it much better to use and keep what you have then to lose all; so think I by your Negative voices: but then he would have you to require more than all; that, I think, is usurpation. But the more to back this observation of his own, well raised, but ill managed, that you must use not only some, but all your Privileges; he tells you they are not wanting about the King, that would be glad to fill their Coffers with City coin, if they could pick a hole in its Coat. And he recites a Record of the sixteenth of Richard the second, wherein the Major, Aldermen, and Sheriffs were deeply fined, and the City Liberties seized by the King, because they had abused City Privileges. My Lord, I shall commend to your consideration, a short view of the Record itself, which is here cited by Mr. Bellamy, as if it made much for his Argument, when indeed nothing can make more against him. The Record runs thus: The King granted a Commission to inquire of all and singular errors, defects, and misprisions in the City of London, for want of good government in the Major, Sheriffs and Aldermen of the said City. Herein I shall desire your Lordship to take notice of two things: First, from whom this Government was expected: which was not from the Commons, but from the Major, Sheriffs and Aldermen; so runs the Commission. Secondly, for whose fault did both they and the City suffer? it was not for the fault of the Commons, but for the fault of the Major, Sheriffs and Aldermen. My Lord, if ever the like business come upon the stage again, that enquiry be made into the Government of the City of London, how it stands, it will be after the same manner. The Commission will run thus: to inquire what hath befallen for want of good Government in the Major, Sheriffs and Aldermen, not in the Commons, and how will you answer it? by saying the fault is not ours, for we gave up the City Government into the hands of the Commons, let them look to it; we gave them an absolute power of making Common-councels to sit as long as they pleased; and of making what Laws they pleased, by plurality of their own voices, without us or our consent: Do you think such an answer will serve your turn? No, (my Lord) it will be replied, you were by your Charters invested in this Power, You, not the Commons, were made the City Governors. The Commission will not be answered thus, that Mr. Bellamy laid a claim to your Privileges, and therefore you let them go, but it will fall heavy upon you, because you therefore let them go, and your punishment will be just, when you, from whom good Government is expected, give up all government out of your hands into the hands of the Commons, at the motion of Mr. Bellamy. Thus, my Lord, You see good reason why you should fit fast in the power which the mercy of God, the favour of sundry Kings, and your own Charters have seated you in: and use not only some, but all your Privileges, so you do not use more than all; since, if ever enquiry be made, and a hole be sought in the City's coat, it will be no excuse for you, that you at the request of Mr. Bellamy, gave over your privileges into the hands of the Commons: it being your duty to use them, and to use them fully yourself, to whose charge they are committed. Mr. Bellamy's second Argument is drawn from the obligation of a sacred Oath. Where you find him Common-placing about the distinctions, antiquity, authority, and binding power of an Oath. To which I leave him, and come to make mine own observations out of what he here saith. And first let me ask whether Mr. Bellamy himself have not in some sense or degree violated this sacred Oath, by publishing without the consent of the Common-council, (whereof he is a member) so desperate a clamour against the very ancient customs of the City as this, to the disturbance of its peace. Secondly, Let me tell your Lordship, that you and your Brethren the Aldermen, are tied also by another Oath to maintain the Privileges, not only of the City in general, but your own Privileges in particular; and till it be proved that a Negative voice in Common-council doth not belong to the Lord Major and Aldermen, nor taking up the Sword in Common-council, and departing when he sees good, doth not belong to the Lord Major, (which I would be loath to fast, till either of them be proved) I must put you in mind of your last Oath; that as you tender that, you keep them still in your hands, and maintain them. Thirdly, I must tell you that you violate the very Oath of a Freeman if you do not so. I shall give you that Oath, as Mr. Bellamy lays it down: It is this. The Franchises and Customs of this City you shall maintain. Now it is apparent, that the Lord Major and Alderman's Negative voice in making Laws, their absolute power in choosing some City-Officers, and the Lord Major's power to take up the Sword in Common-council at his discretion, and go away: These are all Customs of the City, and have been so time out of mind; and therefore I must put every Freeman of the City in mind to take heed, lest thus endeavouring to overthrow the City Charters and Customs, as Mr. Bellamy doth, he violate his Oath, which runs thus: The Franchises and Customs of this City you shall maintain. Thus you see Mr. Bellamy hath now gone through all that he proposed to himself, and I have traced him. He hopes he hath fully proved every particular, and I hope I have fully disproved him in every particular. And now as St. Paul said to Philemon in the behalf of Onesimus; he also speaks to you, telling you, Though he might enjoin you to that which is convenient, yet for Love's sake be rather entreats you. You are beholding to him, if he do there entreat you, where he might enjoin you. But by what Law might he enjoin you? by none that I know of unless it be Club-law, for all other Law is for you, and I am something afraid lest his injunction should be of that nature. For you may remember he tells you in his Epistle, That be deals like a forward and unexperiented Soldier, who more hardy than wary, loving his Country's Liberty, adventures to begin the Onset, to provoke and stir up more grave and skilful Commanders, to follow on in hope of victory: which simile, though I may not construe in the worst sense, and though I will charitably believe, it means no more than to encourage others by like claim and more earnestness rather to word you out of your Privileges then Sword you out, yet I cannot assure you that the multitude will all take it in that sense. Nor can I be persuaded, that when Mr. Bellamy hath raised but the tongues of a City in clamour, that it will be then in his power to hold their hands: especially when he gives them this encouragement, that it is in their power to enjoin you. But (I hope) God will preserve your Lordship, and your Brethren in more safety, and endue this City with more wisdom and peace, and therefore I leave the matter of enjoining to see what it is that he entreats for. And that is, For Love and Peace sake to join with them by your consent and assistance to settle all their Rights and Privileges upon their own basis. I confess this is but a reasonable motion, and so just, that I am confident your Lordship, together with your Brethren, will not deny, only you may please, first to see it proved, that they are not so already. And this he argues will much make for the City's safety, and for the service of the King and Parliament. But I must answer, the City will neither be in a good condition themselves, nor any way serviceable to the State, by being all head; but by being a well-composed body of Head and members. And here (he saith) he could weep out his own eyes: and let out his own bowels, if thereby he could but penetrate into the breast of your Lordship, and those worthy Aldermen your Brethren in this nick of time (it seems he is upon the spur, and cannot stay) to save a sinking City, if not a dying Kingdom. I Answer, he shall not need to do any of this if he will be quiet: Let him but hold his Tongue, and it shall be all ready done for him: the City shall be preserved from sinking from a Body into a monster by being all head: and the dying kingdom will be in a fare easier way to be preserved; when every member of the City in his proper sphere, and not in another man's Office, shall contribute help and influence into it. And now he puts you in mind, what is the Enemy's maxim, Divide & impera, divide and rule. I grant it is their maxim, but I conceive it is meant rather of such a Division as he goes now about to make in the City, by setting the Lord Major, Aldermen and Commons together by the ears under pretence of Charters, Privileges, and I know not what; such a Division as this will make for the enemy's advantage, and not an orderly Division of the City into head and members. He tells you, that the God of unity, the Charters of the City, and constitution of the Court of Common-council makes you one. Still I answer, it is one Body, not one Head. And now (he saith) he wants words to express his sorrow; he might have added, as he wants Arguments to make good his claim. He tells you, the Commons stand ready with stretched out arms, to embrace you, and therefore you must afford them like mutual embraces. What's meant by that? The Commons stretch out their arms, would have you rise from your seats of distinction and order, and come and incorporate yourselves into them, and be no greater, or rather lower than they; this he means by their embraces, and you on the other hand must do so, and that is his mutual embraces. And now he Conjures you in the Apostles words, If therefore there be any consolation in Christ, if any comfort of Love, if any fellowship of the Spirit, if any bowels and mercies in you. What then? that you would grant their just desires; That is, do them Justice, right or wrong; secondly, In love and peace to settle, and estate them in their Rights and Deuce: and under that pretence, settle and estate them in your Rights and Deuce; and lastly, to be of the same mind with them; he means, to give away your own Rights and Privileges, because they would have it so: and then, Oh quam bonum & jucundum! Oh how good and pleasant a thing is it for Brethren thus to live together in unity! And here he brings a fresh supply of Arguments, which he hath all this while kept in reserve: I must tell him it is high time to bring them out, (if not too late) for his other are quite routed. First, That as you are the head, and Governors of this City; What of that? you therefore aught to continue so, and not misplace the Government committed to your charge in the hands of others. Secondly, As you are bound by several sacred Oaths. viz. You shall maintain the Customs of the City; which you cannot do by letting go your Negative voices. Thirdly, As you tender the welfare and Liberties of your posterity; which binds you not to give from them what you cannot give to them again, that is, the very life and glory of the City, which is their Privileges. But he forbears, and so will I, and join issue with him in closing up all with the same City History upon Record; which he himself relates, beseeching you to consider seriously of it, and to make such application of it, as wisdom itself shall dictate to you. The Story is this; In the year 1389. William Vennor Major, and John Walcut, and John Lony Sheriffs, with the then Aldermen, who all by name stand blemished upon Record; that for the errors, defects, and misprisions in their Government, they were fined at 3000 marks, and the City Liberties seized on by the King: can you imagine that ever any water or Aqua fortis will wash and wear off this obloquy and reproach from them? no nor the like obloquy and reproach or a greater from you, when for a worse fault than misgovernment, I mean for not government at all, but resigning your own power and trust into the hands of others, it shall fall heavy upon you. Consider on the other hand, what the wisest of Kings will tell you, that a good name is better than ointment; better than the daubing flatteries of Mr. Bellamy. But suffer me to give you notice, that this good name will scarce belong, or be given to you: If for your lasting fame, but lasting shame, it shall stand upon Record to after ages when we are dead and gone; That in Anno 1645. when the Right Honourable Thomas Atkin was Lord Major, the Right Worshipful William Gibbs, and Richard Chambers, were Sheriffs, and that learned and able Lawyer and Patriot of his Country's Liberty, John Glynn was Recorder: and such and such worthy Knights and Gentlemen (all which men will very hardly believe you to be by such an action) were Aldermen: that then (as Diogenes prophesied of the world) the City was turned upside down, the head was laid lower than the feet; The Antipodes of Government was placed in the Commoners, and then by your assistance and consent; London, (I say the Commonalty of London) was not restored, but invested; not to their, but with your for ever lost Liberties and Privileges. Consider what I say, and the Lord give you understanding in all things. FINIS. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.