RESOLVED UPON THE QUESTION.  
OR A Question Resolved concerning the Right which the King hath to Hull, or any other Fort or place of strength for the defence of the Kingdom.  
Wherein is likewise proved, that neither the settling of the Militia as 'tis done by the Parliament, nor the keeping of Hull by Sir john Hotham, nor any other Act that the Parliament have yet done is illegal, but necessary, just, and according to that power which the Law hath given them.  
By Peter Bland of Grays-Inne Gent.  
Printed for Matthew Walbancke, 1642.   

TO THE WORTHY TO be honoured JOHN PYM Esquire, one of the Members of the Honourable House of Commons in Parliament assembled.  
SIR,  
WHen my reason is made known, I hope my presumption in dedicating these poor lines to your worthy self will appear more pardonable: I wrote, not out of an ambitious thought of instructing the profoundest judgements, but only to satisfy them, that for want of knowledge, lay scandalous imputations, not only upon that honourable House of Parliament in general whereof you are a member, but especially and in particular upon your upright self; for my own part, I am the least member of this distracted Kingdom, but have as good a right to the benefit of those laws this happy Parliament hath enacted as the greatest, and therefore am bound by way of thankfulness to vindicate their just intents and actions, against the opprobrious language of malignant Spirits: to the doing of which, this is my weak but hearty endeavour if you please to give it patronage it may deserve the press, therefore let your acceptance add courage to the future employments of him, who is both to yourself and to his country.  
A faithful servant PETER BLAND.   

To the Reader.  
READER,  
WHo ere thou be'st, read with a spirit as free from Faction as your Author, who desires neither to trample on Majesty, nor despise the authority of so high a Court as that of Parliament, but to give his due respects to both: What you find amiss gently correct; his ambition is either to convince others more ignorant, or be satisfied from others more knowing than himself. He wrote not this as if the Parliament knew not Law sufficient to justify their own actions, but to destroy their wonder whom he hath heard admire that the Parliament did not prove their own acts by visible Law, as well as disprove the Kings: time and greater engagements will not permit them to show every private man the public necessities; 'Tis sufficient they discern them, and this is argument enough to prove that sinister respects can never prevail with them to do unlawful acts, viz. because it can be no benefit to them (were it not the Kingdom's safety only that they aimed at) to spend their time, and hazard their lives and fortunes by steering in such cruel storms, for 'twere not wisdom in them that would fish, to trouble the waters themselves.  
FAREWELL   

The Question that is RESOLVED.  
WHether the right which the King hath to Hull, and all other Forts of strength for the defence of the Kingdom be by descent from the Blood-royal, or by way of trust.  
And for my part, I conceive He hath it by way of trust: but to resolve this question, I shall take leave of myself to use my own method. Which shall be first to show the strongest arguments that can be urged by them of the contrary opinion, who stand so much upon the descent, as to drown the trust; and afterwards I shall prove that notwithstanding all that they can say, he hath it by way of trust only.  
First then to argue for his descent thus I prove it: If He have it in His natural capacity, than he hath it by descent; but He hath it in His natural capacity, ergo,  
The consequence will not be denied, for I Intent by His natural capacity, as Charles the Son and Heir apparent of King james His Father of blessed memory; and if it be granted He hath it so, then surely the consequence must stand good.  
Then for the Minor, that He hath it in that capacity, thus I prove it.  
If the Treason which he commits that keeps one of those Forts, and levieth War against the King and His Liege people be against the King in His natural capacity, than the minor is good; and that that Treason when any one commits, it is against him in that capacity, thus I prove it.  
But I desire not to be mistaken, for I aim not at the worthy act of Sir john Hotham; for I hold it not levying of War within the letter of the Statute of 25. Ed. 3. if it were an offence th●t might taste of Treason (but I hold it is not) yet being out of the words of that Statute the Parliament and not the King himself nor his ●●●ge are to Judge of it by virtue of a clause in that act by which their ●erdecess●●●●●ve reserved that power for them:  
But to go forward with what I am to prove, viz. that s●ch a Teason as is mentioned before, nay any Treason is against him in his natural capacity: it appears by the form of indictment for Treason, for they must and do always conclude contra ligeantiae suae debitum and so Cook lib. 7. Calvin's case: which words prove that Treason is against him to whom ligeance is due, and then pray if it be against him to whom ligeance is due, is it not against the natural King, that is, against the King in his natural capacity? for all that knows but the definition of the politic capacity will confess that ligeance or homage cannot be done to such a body as is invisible.  
And therefore of an Alien enemy come and possess himself of any of the King's Forts, and levies war against him, and then is taken, this is Treason and yet our law in this case doth refuse to try him as out of its jurisdiction because he cannot be tried by indictment, for being no liege man to the King, the indictment cannot conclude that it was contra ligeantiae suae debitum: and therefore he shall be put to death by Matiall law: and so it was in 15. H. 7. Parking Warbecks case, who being an Alien borne in Flanders feigned himself to be one of the sons of Edward the Fourth, and invaded this Realm with great power, with an intent to take upon him the dignity royal: But being taken in the war, it was resolved by the Justices that he could not be punished by the Common Law; but before the Constable and Martial (who had special commission to hear and determine the same according to Marshal Law) he was sentenced to be drawn, hanged, and quartered, which was done and executed accordingly: and this appears in the book of Griffeth Attorney General and in the book of Hobert General to Henry the Seventh, and you may read it likewise in calvin's case Cook Lib. 7. fol. 6. b. and cases to the same purpose may read in 4. Mar. br. 32. & 3. & 4. Ph. & Mar. Dyer. 144.  
I shall not raise arguments to prove that Ligeance is due to the King in his natural capacity, as it was adiugded in 6. jacobi neither shall I mention how that the words of the letters patents of qeniztion be that the Patentee shall behave himself tanquam verus et fidelis ligeus domini regis, which proves that ligeance is due to the King in his natural capacity, for all this is not to my purpose, but because the King's Majesty himself whom I never think on but with reverence hath made use of the last argument, and others may and do urge the former, I shall sert down the definition of the Kings politipue capacity out of which the reader himself (thgogh but of slender judgement) may have reason sufficient to answer all the arguments hither to which seem to be of such force.  
The definition of it is this, it is a body framed by the polocy of man, invisible, immortal, not subject to any infirmity, nonnage, or infancy, so 'tis definid in calvin's case.  
And who cannot gather a reason (from hence) sufficient to deny the last Consequence; and say that though treason committed against the King by keeping of those sorts from him be treason against his natural capacity, yet it doth not follow that he hath them, it hath capacity: for the King hath but two capacities, his natural and his politic: now according to the definition of the latter their can be no treason committed against that cappacity it being an inanimate and invisible body, therefore needs must indictments conclude the treason to be against the natuerall capacity; but if that should be a good consequence that therefore he holds them in that capacity, than the next consequence would be that he might sell them when he please, which is directly against the Law, as was resolved by the whole Parliament in Ed. the thirds time, at which Parliament King john his resigning his Crown and Kingdom of England to the Pope, being discussed, upon mature deliberation, the Lords both Spiritual and Temporal, and all the Commons resolved with one accord that no King can put his Realm nor his people under such subjection without their assent, and contrary to his oath.  
The next argument may be urged is this, if immediately upon the death of any King the next heir is completely & absolutely King without any essential ceremony or act to be done, expost facto: then he that comes in as next heir hath it by descent and not by way of trust. But when a King dieth, immediately the next heir is King without any especial ceremony. ergo,  
For the Minor thus I prove it, it is expressly said in calvin's case, that the King holds the Kingdom of England by birthright inherent by descent from the blood Royal, whereupon succession doth attend, and therefore 'tis usually said to the King his Heirs and Successors, where the word Heirs is first named & in primo Maria Dyer. 92. a. 'tis expressly said, that the customs are annexed to the Crown, and the King hath an inheritance in them.  
In the first year of King james his reign if I mistake not; before his Majesty's Coronation Watson and Clarke Seminary Priests, were of opinion that his Majesty was not complete and absolute King before his Coronation: Now if that were not Law, the minor must needs fall for then though a right to the Crown descended, yet it was in the power of others to make him completely King by turning his possession in Law (as it were) into an actual possession, or else to hinder him from ragining: But you shall find it resolved (by all the judges of England then being) con rary to the opinion of those Priests that presently by the descent his Majesty was completely and absolutely King without that ceremony, and that Coronation was but a Royal ornament and outward sollemnisation of the descent: for example.  
You sh●ll find that Henry the sixth was not crowned until the eight year of h●● Reign: and yet divers men before his Coronation were attainted of treason, which clearly proves he was King before that ceremony was performed, for if he had not been King how could any man h●ve been attainted of treason for treason is a breach of allegiance and if there had been n● King there could be no allegiance due, and ●f no ligeance had been due, no bre●ch of it could be made, and then no treason; and this is made manifest by the reports of the 5. 6. 7. years of the same King which you may read at large in Cooks reports lib. 7. fol. 11. a.  
Another argument to prove that when any King of Eng. dies, his next Heir is King presently by descent, without any ceremony, may be this: If he should not be King presently upon the death of the Father or Ancstour, but must stay for some other ceremony to be done; then there would be an interregnum in Eng. which the Laws will not suffer.  
And to prove that the Laws do not suffer an inter regnum, 'tis easily gathered from the case in 9 E. 4. 51. where it is said, that if the King be seized of land by a defeaseable title, and dieth seized this descent shall toll the entry of him that hath right, which proves that he that is next King coming in as Son, hath it by descent, otherwise the entry of him that hath right could not be taken away: and it proves likewise, that he must not stay for His Majesty till some Act or other be done, for then there would be an inter regnum till that Act or ceremony were passed, and when that Act or ceremony were passed, than he should be in (as it were) from that Act, and then the entry of him that hath right cannot be taken away, and so is Litleton in his chap. of descents.  
There is likewise another case in our books, from whence you may draw the same conclusion, viz. If the Prince commit treason or murder, he must be tried according to Law as well as another subject, for he is but a Subject for there can be but one King at the self same time, in the self same Kingdom: But now if the King dies before the Prince be tried the very immediate descent of the Crown purgeth him of his treason or murder, or what ever his fact be, so that he shall not be arraigned, or tried for it.  
Which case proves that he hath the Crown immediately upon the descent; for if there were any ceremony that were essential to making him King, that ceremony might be delayed and the Prince might be attainted.  
If the Disseisor of an Infant convey the Land to the King who dieth seized, this is such a descent as shall take away the entry of the Infant, and so are the Books of 34. H. 6. 34. and 45. Ass. pl. 6. & Ploughed. come. 234. which proves clearly the descent. 'tis part of the oath of allegiance which is used to this day in every Leet, That you shall be true and faithful to our Sovereign Lord King Charles and his heirs; which word heirs, proves the descent.  
And thus I have showed you other arguments, which may be used to destroy the trust: but according to my promise in the beginning, I must now show where the fallacy and their mistake lies that use those arguments. And it lies in the consequence; for though the King comes to the Crown by descent, yet it does not follow that therefore he hath it not by way of trust: for without doubt, the trust descends with it and the trust is that only which he hath by descent: for, as I said before, if the King had such an estate by descent, as they conceive he hath, than he might sell the Crown, or dispose of it as he pleased.  
The Parliament did give Henry the eight power to dispose of the Crown to whom he pleased, by his Letters Patents or last Will; but when he intended to go in person against France, and therefore desired to have the Crown settled because he would not break that trust his people had reposed in him; you shall find that in 35. of that King, the Crown was settled by a Parliament then holden; and in the Preamble of that Statute that King himself did acknowledge the trust and confidence his people had formerly reposed in him.  
And to prove farther that a trust doth descend to the King of England with his Crown I shall show how Kingoms first began, and I shall take a difference between Kingdoms ruled by royal government, and Kingdoms of politic governance: and that was the difference made in answer to the Prince, who demanded how it came to pass, quod Rex unus plebem suam reguliter tantum regere valeat, sed regi alteri potestas hujusmodi denegatur Fortescue de laudibus legum Angliae, cap. 10. and I hope the same difference which did satisfy the Prince, will satisfy any troublesome spirit of these times.  
For the first, the Kingdom ruled by royal government, I shall show you how it first began, as it appears by the Author last quoted, cap. 12. and it was thus; Men in times passed excelling in power, and being greedy of glory and dignity, did many times by plain 〈◊〉 subdue unto them their neighbours the Nations adjoining, and compelled them to do them service, and to obey their commands, which commandments afterward they decreed to be unto these people very Laws; and by long sufferance of the same, the people so subdued, being by their subduers defended from the injuries of others, agreed and consented to live under the Dominion of the same their subduers, thinking it better for them to be under the empire of one man, which might be able to defend them against others, then to be in danger to be oppressed by all sich as would offer them wrong by violence: and those subduers thus ruling the people unto them subdued, took upon them to be called Rulers which our language terms Kings; reges a regendo, eorum quoque dominatus tantum regalis dictus fuit; and their rule or domination only was named royal or Kingly, Fortescu.  
Now in such a Kingdom I believe no trust was anext to the Crown, for that King usurped and compelled them to obedience; and 'tis such a Kingdom that those who are so violent against the Parliament do imagine this Kingdom of England to be, or else would have it so. But outs is the Kingdom of Politic and Regal governance, and it hath raised itself into a body, whereof the King is the head; & ut non potest caput corporis phesi ei nervos suos commutare, nequè membris suis propriae vires & propria sanguinis alimenta denegare; sic neque rex qui est caput corporis pollitici mutare potest leges corporis illius, nec ejusdem populi substantias proprias subtrahere, reclamuntibus eis aut invitis, Fort. cap. 13. fol. 32.  
Sicut in naturali corpore, ut dicit Philosophus, cor est primum vivens, habeus in se sanguinem quem emittit in omnia ejus membru unde illa vegetantur & viwnt: So in the body politic (sa th' Fortesc. fol. 31.) the intent of the people is the first lively thing having within it blood, that is to say, politic provision for the utility and wealth of the same people, which it dealeth forth and imparteth as well to the head as to all the members of the same body, whereby the body is nourished and maintained.  
So that you see hereby that our Kingdom of England is not of a Royal Government only, neither is the Crown of so divine a temper as to enable the King to rule by the Law within his own breast; no you see the intent of the people is the primum vevens, which like the heart, emittit sanguinem both to the head and all the members.  
And thus the Kingdom of England out of Brutus' retinue of the Troyans' which he first brought out of the coasts of Italy and Greece, first grew to a politic and regal Dominion; & ad tutelam legis subditor●m, ac corum corporum ac bonorum, rex talis erectus. For●. 32. and the same Author goes forward, & ad hanc potestatem a populo effluxam ipse habet, quo non licet et potestate al●a populo suo Dominari.  
And see the Prince himself acknowledgeth as much to his Chancellor being satisfied with the difference before taken; for in the 14. chapter of the same Author fol. 34. says the Prince, effugasti c●ncellarie, declarationis tuae lumine tenebras, quibus obducta erat a●●dmentis cridae: So that said he, I do most evidently see that no Nation did ever of their own voluntary mind incorporate themselves into a Kingdom for any other intent, but only to the end, 〈◊〉 thereby they might with more safety then before maintain themselves ●●d enjoy their goods from such misfortunes and losses 〈◊〉 ●●ey s●●od in fear of; for if they had not been, saith he nullam ob●●●● 〈◊〉 ●●em super ipsos rex hujusmodi: which proves without 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 descent of a trust.  
An● 〈◊〉 further proof that our Kingdom is not of regal only, but also of a politic governance: see Fort. fol, 25. b. where you may read word for word what I have penned. viz. the King of England cannot alter nor change the Laws of his Realm at his pleasure; for why? principatu namque nedum regali, sed & pollitico, suo populo Dominat●r. And were it otherwise, the King might take away the lives and estates of any Subjects at his pleasure; but in our Kingdom non stat ●ro ra●●one voluntas.  
And as much may be gathered from the words of Severus the Emperor, who being at York, and one lying prostrate at his feet craving pardon for some small fact he had committed, in the midst of his fury forbore to strike, saying, 'tis not my hand must govern the Empire.  
And the same Emperor shortly after ended his life in the City of York with these words, I found the State troublesome every where, and I leave it quiet even to the Britain's, and the Empire sure and firm to my children if they be good, but unsure and weak if they be bad.  
My Lord Cook in the first part of his Institutes, fol. 60. b. observes that Littleton speaks of the King's prerogative but twice in all his Book, and in both places, saith Cook, he makes it part of the Laws of England; so that hence we may gather, that though the working brains of these times plead his Prerogative to him, y●t that cannot enable him to do what the Law forbids: for his Prerogative is but what power the Law gives him, and that power cannot be made greater without the assent of the whole Realm; Fort. fol. 40. ca 18. and what is the reason of this our happiness, that the King cannot make new Laws, damn old ones without the Subjects consent, but this? because our Kingdom is not governed with a power only royal but also politic.  
Aristotle in 3. Pollitic. saith, melius est civitatem regi viro optimo quam lege optima: it is better for a City to be governed by a good King then by a good Law. But for as much as every King is not such a man, therefore Saint Thomas, in the Book which he wrote to the King of Cyprus of the governance of Princes, wisheth the State of a Realm to be such, that it may not be in the King's power to oppress his people with tyranny.  
For my part I did not look upon our gracious King when I coated this; for of himself I take him to be that vir optimus, were he not misled and drawn to such engagements as will ruin himself, his posterity and Kingdom, if not by those of his best Council prevented; I mean the Parliament, who are engaged both for the safety of the King's Majesty's person and posterity, of themselves and the whole Kingdom, to strike all those who persuade his Majesty to do such acts as make the Laws seem but as cobwebs, which by his Prerogotive may be stretched, nay broken.  
Some there are which Object, that the King's Majesty hath been pleased to pass many gracious Acts already, and therefore seeing we have so many tokens of his good intent, why should he be doubted, or his intent questioned?  
Truly the Parliament and all the rest of his Subjects, must acknowledge his Fatherly care of them, in those Acts expressed: But if he be persuaded, nay resolved to break those Acts again by violence, what are we the better to say we have been happy in the making those Acts, the breach of which is ten times a greater misery? if a Father breeds his Son well, or allows him well whilst he lives, but when he dies, leaves him nothing whereby both he and his children, and his children's children may be the better, surely the care and piety of a Father is not in him complete. So Kings, if they make part of an age happy by governing well, or making good Laws, but at last breaks them again, and does not leave them as Testaments, whereby a perpetuity of good may descend to their Country; they are but mortal and transitory benefactors.  
I speak not this to incense the Subject against their lawful Prince, for I know no warrant for that: for, for his Majesty's pure self. His serious and often protestations command my Faith, both for his maintaining our Protestant Religion, and defence of his Subjects and their Liberttes; and I discern his words actuated, his building or repairing of Temples, his late Proclamations against Recusants, his excluding them his Army that will not take the oath of Supremacy and Allegiance, are for the first: his building of Ships in these late times, and his passing the Act for the continuance of this Parliament, are testimonies for the second: only the danger is, if those malignant spirits about him, should prevail with him (which I hope is impossible) to add ill end to those good Acts, by changing the use they were pretended for.  
Others there are, that grant the KING hath it by way of trust, but yet Object, that by Law a trust cannot be countermanded; and therefore Sir John hotham's keeping of Hull was against Law.  
To which I answer thus; I confess that by law a trust cannot be countermanded, but yet I shall take a difference between the trust of a private man's estate, and a trust of a kingdom; and if this difference should not stand good, see what a mischief would follow; and argumentum ab inconvenients is of great force in law, if that were a good argument, than our case in short were but thus:  
We have entrusted the King with the whole Kingdom, and this trust cannot be countermanded by us again, and if not then the King's estate in the kingdom, is as good as absolutely his own in Fee, and if so, than he may do what he will with the Crown: and if this mischief were remediless, what estate or property had any man in his own fortunes, when they all lay open to so great a hazard.  
Again, though for the avoidance of that mischief, it might be thought countermandable; yet that Act of Sir John Hotham is not a countermande but rather a strengthening of it: for by common presumption, the King being but one cannot pry into the actions and intents of all those that have procured his employments so well as his Parliament may, for plus vident oculi quam oculus: and therefore they finding such treachery and falseness in them (which the King either does not see, or else is wilfully impolliticke) thought it fit (as it was most seasonable indeed) to employ another whose faithfulness might prevent what they intended against both King and Kingdom; to which truth so soon as his Majesty shall give credit, and by that means they and the Kingdom be secured, his trust will appear the same it ever was, and he more able to discharge that trust reposed in him.  
Others there are that do object the authority of Parliament to be much, but this is not binding which this Parliament does now, because the King doth not join with them; for 'tis no complete Parliament the head of that body being absent.  
But I shall prove by precedents, and reason, upon which law is partly grounded that the Parliament have that power in them which they so carefully make use of.  
I confess my Lord Cook in the first part of his Institues, thus derives the word Praerogativa: a prae id est ante and rogare, and saith he, it carries with it this sense, when an Act is passed by both houses of Parliament, before it can be made a Law they must praerogare the King's consent; but this dirivation of the word does, not prove that the King hath an absolute power of denying to pass any Bill that is brought him for the good of the Kingdom: but it signifies on his part aswell, that he cannot of himself enact any thing or lay any tax upon his Subject, but he must praerogare too, ask the consent of the Parliament.  
Besides, though what they do cannot be binding by way of Act without his consent, yet by way of Ordinance it may; in term. Micael. 21. E. 3. fol. 60. b. In a case touching the exemption of the Abbey of Saint Edmons Berry from the Bishop of Norwich, there was an Ordinance made by the Parliament without the King, and if you turn to the book you shall find these words in the judgement fuit ordeigne, which you may read likewise in selden's title of honour: But if I should admit that there were no law to prove their Act legal, yet sure I am there is good reason for it.  
As first from the words of the writ nostro quibusdam arduis rebus et gotiis urgentibus statu et diffentionem regni nostri Angliae concernentibus; which words rebus arduis et urgentibus negotiis proves they have power upon urgent occasions to do that which at the time of their doing it, they had no law to enable them thereto; for their calling by writ is authorty to enable them to sit in Parliament, and then their consent is law enough to bind us, and therefore if the Parliament do grant Subsidies by way of Ordinance and the King's hand is never put to it, yet it is sufficient enough to force a Payment from us because the Countries are bound by Indentures sealed to the Sheriff at the time of their election to stand to what they shall consent to in Parliament whom they have chosen: but by way of Act6 it cannot force us, because it cannot be pleaded as an Act but that upon a demurrer it will be overruled.  
Now if the Parliament could do nothing but what they had a law to enable them to do, what need the Country seal Indentures to wand to what they do, when as that law the Parliament went by, would force them to obey it without that waxed ceremony.  
Besides if the Parliament had not power to do an Act, to the doing of which there was no law at the time of their summons to enable them; then what need a Parliament be called at any time, for then any inferior Court had had as much authority (upon the matter) as that: but I conceive necessity is the law they are to look at, for they need not defer the doing of that which is for the Kingdom's good, for want of a law or a precedent to steer by; for if in times past the grave lawmakers had not done things according to their profound judgement, and as they saw fit without Precedents, how should any precedents have been left to future ages, and to this present Parliament? but surely they did, and surely this Parliament may, unless any one can prove the power of Parliament to be abated, and less now then in former times.  
I agree if a Parliament should assume to themselves that power, to sway every thing and never ask the King's consent, it were an abridgement of that prerogative the King hath in him by law; but there are many humble Petitions full of submission and allegiance to his Majesty that can prove this Parliament not guilty; were they not adjudged Traitors without trial: But again, if the King forsake them, and deny to pass those Bills they bring him for the good of the Kingdom, I think necessity enables, nay commands them to do it without him.  
I shall prove it all by one example, the like I hope shall not be heard of in our days; hath no man heard of a king deposed by a Parliament? Surely yes, and what law had they for it that did it besides convenience and the common good? and surely they did it without the King's consent too, or at least he consented whether he would or no, for if he had had an absolute power of denying, and by that could have frustrated their endeavours, he would never have consented to his own deposing; which proves strongly that they may do that which is for the good of the kingdom without the King if he refuse to join with them.  
But this I desire not, and the Parliament intent it not as they have declared themselves in several Declarations and Petitions; and I hope the most ignorantly violent of the vulgars', and the greatest zealots of any Sect what ever, will wish so much good to our kingdom, as that it may long be governed by this our gracious King Charles and his posterity, and that he may soon be free from those cruel engagements and inconveniences which the malignant party hath drawn him into. This is my heart prayer, only I used that great argument to prove a lesser, to argue a mejori ad minus, for omn● majus continet in se minus.  
FINIS.