A CAVEAT FOR SUBJECTS, Moderating the Observator. WHEREIN His chiefest Arguments are confuted, the King's just Prerogative manitained: and the Privilege of the Subject no ways Prejudiced:  
By William Ball, Gent.  
Printed at London 1642.   

A Caveat for Subjects.  
IT is usual (I know) for Books to have Prefaces, and Plays Prologues; but whosoever peruseth this, must expect nothing but concise reasons; forasmuch as Vnusquisque suo sensu abundat, so let him reflect and censure of this at his pleasure.  
The Observator, pag. 1. saith, That power is originally inherent in the people, etc.  
To this the answer is, that power is in God primario & per se, according to that of the Apostle; Rom. 13. and in the King or people, but only secundario & derivative; Power or dominion is not a gift of Nature, that is to say, naturally inherent in us: for if it were, than might all men have equal power, for that by nature we are all equal; but power is a gift of God to Nature, and is gratia gratis data; and yet power is congruous in nature, as was the power of King, and office of Priesthood in Melchisedec: for surely he had them both given, or appointed to him by God, being by interpretation King of Righteousness and King of Peace, Heb. 2.7. And therefore it is not likely that he usurped to himself the Regal title of King, no more than he did of being Priest; and yet it is very probable, that it was also agreeable in Reason and Nature, that although not tyrannical, yet peaceable Kingly reign, and sacred Priesthood did fitly belong to him: for he is by most Divines thought to have been Sem the eldest son of Noah: and by the law of Nature, of Moses, and of most Nations, the eldest is to inherit, so that what was the right of Adam, Seth, and Noah, 
Seth and his generation began first to call upon the name of the Lord, that is to say, to give to God some set form of worship as priests did, etc.  might belong unto him by birthright, although it may be God confirmed it unto him extraordinarily. But to return, power or dominion is derived from God, and congruous in Nature: but the power is in the people only when they are absolutely free to choose to themselves what form of government they please, as were the jews before they subjected themselves to Kings, being formerly freed from the bondage of Egypt by the singer of God. The Romans when they erected their Senate and Consuls, having rebelliously (for it was no better) shaken off the yoke of Kings. The Venetians, when they first instituted their Commonwealth. But in Monarchies, where the people have been brought into subjection either by the sword, as in Turkey, Persia, and the like; or by innate, and prescribing, and prevalent authority, as in Florence, or by both, as in France and Castille; in these Dominions power is not inherent in the people, but in the Prince. And although some hereditary Monarches are more limited than others, as is the King of France more than the great Turk, and the King of England more than the King of France: yet is their power derived immediately from God, and inherent in themselves, not in the people: for those limitations are (in conquered Nations) but mere donatives of grace proceeding from the Prince or his successors to the people, touching certain immunities and privileges; so that the Prince his power is the efficient cause of them, and such immunities or privileges are but as material effects. Now as it is most improper to say, that the effect should cause its own cause, so is it to say, that a privileged people should cause the Prince's power, or that Power should remain originally in such a privileged people.  
Some Nations elect their Rings, or Princes, and restrain them fare more by conditional inaugurations, then hereditary Monarches are, or aught to be restrained or limited. Yet have not such Nation's power in themselves totally, but only partially; that is, they have power to conditionare with their Kings or Princes, how fare forth they will be subject, and by what Rules they will be governed; but they have not power to conditionate with their Kings or Princes, that they will only be subject at their own pleasures, and as themselves shall think good; that is to say, if they please at any time, to assume more liberty unto themselves, and to alter and disannul former Constitutions of Government, they may do it without the consent of their Kings, or Princes. This they cannot do without treason to their Crowns or Diadems: For although the persons of such Princes be elective, yet is their power permanent, jure constituto Coronae; which though they claim not as from progenitor, yet are they invested therewith as from predecessors. And therefore being enthroned, they enjoy their dignities by prescription; that is to say, what belonged to their predecessors, belongeth in the same manner to them, being once invested; nor can such Nations revolt from their elected princes, without being reputed rebels.  
Now of this nature are the Kings of Poland, Hungary, and some other (to speak nothing of the Duke of Venice, for he is merely titulary, and a cipher) and such Kings first and principally claim their authority from God, the author of all power, who enspheareth them in the Orb of dignity above others.  
And secondly, they acknowledge it from the general consent of the Nation which made choice of them, and over which they rule. And surely such was the right and title of Saul the first King of Israel: for he was appointed by God, 1 Sam. Chap. 9 vers. 17. then anointed by Samuel, chap. 10. vers. 1. afterwards approved by the people, ibid. vers. 24. And finally, confirmed in his Kingdom, Chap. 11. vers. 14. And in the same manner was David likewise established in his Kingdom; so that their first and chiefest claim was immediately from God, and their second from the consent of the people. Nor is it of any consequence to allege, as the Observator seemeth to infer, page 1. that those Kings had an extraordinary institution from God; and therefore they might more lawfully claim their right, as appointed, and appropriated to them by God. For to such Allegation it will be answered, That there is no power but of God, Rom. 13. So that whether God institute Kings by extraordinary, or ordinary means, it maketh no matter. For although Saul and David were instituted extraordinarily by God's special appointment; yet most of the Kings of judah and Israel reigned after them but by ordinary succession; had they not therefore the same power that Saul and David had? Surely the Scriptures tell us they had. The Priests and Prophets in the old Law had an extraordinary vocation, especially the Prophets: the Priests or Ministers of the Gospel have but an ordinary vocation, are they therefore defective in power to those of the old Law? Or have they not their vocation from God, because they have not extraordinary calling? Surly no. For how could Sacraments be administered, & the word preached? So it is with Monarches: for though they have but ordinary succession; yet is their power immediately from God. Our Sovereign is a free (though in some things a limited) Monarch, and deriveth therefore his power immediately (not mediately as do other inferior ministers of justice) from God. And as touching limitations and privileges, they are nothing else as (aforesaid) but acts of grace conferred on this Nation by his Majesty's predecessors in several ages, and at several times, and some of them lately by his Majesty himself, as the continuation of this present Parliament, the abolishing of the Star-chamber and high Commission censures, and the like. But these privileges, and others granted to the subjects, dis-invest the King of no primary or Birth-right-royalty, but only oblige him in honour to observe them as covenants. A Lord purchaseth a Manor for himself and his Heirs for ever; his son and successors grant certain Franchises to the tenants, and oblige their heirs for ever to perform them: so the tenants live in a more free state and condition than they did in the first purchasers days, and paying their rents, and performing their services, they are not altogeher subject to be turned out at the pleasure (or rather displeasure) of the Lord: but doth this Franchisement or freedom of theirs, cause the Lord to derive his right or title from his tenants? Law and experience tell us no. And this is our Sovereign's case; The conqueror by his sword, or by deed of gift, or rather indeed by both, came in as a Purchaser of the Kingdom of England for himself and his heirs for ever, and by the law of Conquest had power to have made greater alteration in the State than he did; and to have induced what form of government he had thought good, even as the King of Spain hath done in Navarre and the West Indies; yet he did not, but only imposed some hard things, as the having of Laws in the French tongue, which the people generally understood not, Cover-few-bell, and the like, his successors afterwards did immune and ease the people from such grievances, so that they lived, and live at more liberty, and enjoy more securely their liberties and properties: But do therefore such immunities granted to the people, cause the King to derive his power and right from the people? The laws and customs of all Nations and Kingdoms that live under Monarches, tell us no. The ancient and present Monarchies of the world being sufficient witnesses thereof, besides the Dictamen of Scripture and reason already inserted.  
The Observator pag. 2. saith, that it is an error in some Princes, to strive more to be great over their people, then in their people. It may be some Princes have committed such an error; but withal let the observator take notice, that it is convenient for a free Prince to be both, that is to say, to have them wealthy, and yet obedient subjects: for if he be only great in his people, and not over them, he may resemble the now Roman or Germane Emperor, or the ancient Kings of France, the one whereof is daily in danger to be dis-invested by commotion and combinations of his Princes; the other were heretofore almost continually molested by factions of their Peers and people; and surely, the French themselves have greatly occasioned the heavy burden of divers tributes & impositions which they undergo: for they ever and anon rising in Arms against their King, gave him occasion to slave them the more, by his reconquering of them, or reducing them into his obedience, so that had they subsisted in due allegiance, 'tis likely their King had been as equally great over as in them; which equality or parity in government, is (no doubt) the most happy and blessed co union that any Prince and people can enjoy.  
The Observator telleth us in the same page, that the King though he be singulis major, yet he is universis minor. But why so? The Head Natural is not only singulis, but also universis membris major Dignitate (though it may 'tis not so in universis, as shall be by and by declared) For the Head hath in itself all Senses, other Members receive from it, but Feeling only, and Motion; the Head governeth and directeth the whole Body, and is therefore in dignity more Noble than all the Members of the Body considered together: and yet though it be more noble and excellent than them all (for as much as Motion and Feeling dimane from the Brain which is in the Head to them all) notwithstanding in universis, in all things, or Faculties, the Head is not more excellent than all the Members; for the Heart is the Seat of Life (according to most Philosophers (being primum vivens, & ultimum moriens, and from it proceedeth natural heat; the Stomach likewise administereth sustenance, and aliment; the Feet go, and the Hands work, and without them the Head cannot subsist, yet are they all subordinate to the Head: and even so is it, or ought it to be in the Body Politic, unless we must believe the Observator, who in his 19 Page saith, That the Head Political receives more subsistence from the Body than it gives, etc. But by his leave, if Privileges and Immunities are (as they are) matters of Grace, proceeding from free Monarches (for of such the Treatise is) to the People, do not such Heads give as much subsistence to the Body Politic, as they receive from it? The Observator telleth us, Page 6. That Edward the First was the first (whether he were, or no, it is not material) that repaired the Breaches which the Conquest had made upon this Nation: if so, did not he, by such his reparation, give as much subsistence to the Common wealth, as he received from the Commonwealth, or Body Politic? And do not his Successors give likewise as much as they receive, when they confer the like acts of Grace? Surely, he that considereth rightly Magna Charta, and all other Privileges and Immunities, which now extend to the freeborn People of this Kingdom, will find them first to have proceeded from the Grace and Grant of our Kings: and therefore it is improper to say, That the Head Politic doth not give as much subsistence to the Body Politic, as it receives from it.  
The Observator saith likewise in his second Page, That id quod efficit tale, est magis tale; meaning thereby, that the People conferring, as the efficient Cause, Power on the King, have jointly more Power in themselves.  
It hath been showed already, that free Monarches, such as our King is, derive not their Power from the People, but immediately from God: But suppose, our King did secundarily acknowledge his Power from this Nations general consent; as it may be, doth the King of Poland acknowledge his Power in part from the Aristocracy of that Kingdom; and as Saul and David did in part from the jews approbation and consent: notwithstanding it follows not from hence, that the People are the sole efficient Cause of the King's Power, but only the secundary and partial. Now, when it is said, that id quod efficit tale, est magis tale, it is to be understood of entire and total causes; but in this case, the People being at the most but the partial cause of the King's Power, the Axiom of Rule faileth: as for example, the Moon being of herself a Body dark, receives her Light (at least wise her chiefest) from the Sun, as from an entire cause; the Sun is therefore truly said to be more Light, being the total subordinate cause of Light; in this case therefore it is truly said, id quod efficit tale, est magis tale: but the Sun, mediante homine; producit hominem; & mediante Leone, Leonem; & mediante Planta, Plantam; for that the Sun affordeth to all sensible and vegetable creatures an influx of vigour and natural heat: yet for as much as the Sun is, in the production of these creatures, but a partial and not an integral cause; it were absured to say, that the Sun were more a man▪ then is a man; or more a Lion, then is a Lion; or more a Plant, then is a Plant: and so is it to say, that because a King may acknowledge his Power in part received from the People's general consent, that therefore the People have more Power than himself.  
The Observator telleth us, Page 3. That the King's dignity was erected to preserve the Communality, the Communality was not created for his service.  
This somewhat too harsh, especially if we consider our King to be, in all Causes, as well Ecclesiastical as Civil, next and immediately under Christ, supreme Head and Governor: such words would have been better accommodated to a Duke of Venice, then to a King of England. The jews, I believe, when they asked a King at God's hands, were somewhat inclining to the Observators opinion: for they desired a King for their own ends, chiefly to judge them, and to fight their Battles; not well considering, that if they had a King, he must and aught to have a Kingly Dominion over them: Whereupon God caused the Prophet Samuel to instruct them concerning the Praeeminence of a King; and, that if they would have a King, a King would be such, and such a man, as is evidently characterized in the first of Samuel, chap. 8. where, amongst other things, verse 17. the Prophet saith, He will take the Tenth of your Sheep, and ye shall be his servants: Where, by the word will, he showeth the Authority which Kings would have; and by the word shall, he showeth the Obedience that subjects should have: nor did the Prophet speak of some, or to some few only; but of all, and to all the people (at leastwise to all the chiefest of them) saying, Ye shall be his servants.  
I desire therefore, that the Observator and all his other adherents, would take more special notice of this Text of the Prophet, and that of Saint Paul's confirmation of this Text, Let every soul be subject to the higher Power: For, though Christian Monarches ought not, by the Rules of Christianity, to Tyrannize, nor make our Sons their Slaves, or our Daughters their Concubines, and the like; as did many of the Kings of the Gentiles, and some of the jews; yet ought they not to be thought so contemptible, as that the Commonalty was no way created for their service.  
The Observator saith in the same Page, That the right of Conquest cannot be pleaded, to acquit Princes of that which is due to the people, as the authors and ends of all Power; for mere Force cannot alter the course of Nature, and frustrate Law; and if it could, there were more reason why the people might justify Force to regain due liberty, than the Prince might to subvert the same.  
By the Observators leave, for his first Clause it is answered already, That in Monarchies the people are not the authors or ends of Power: for the second Clause, That mere Force cannot alter the course of Nature, or frustrate the tonour of Law; that is to say, that mere Force cannot captivate and debase a people by nature free, & living under a law of common consent. I suppose the words, cannot alter, should have been, cannot, de jure, alter, or ought not to alter, etc. For that force can alter, and de facto hath altered the freedom and laws of people and nations, is known to most men, Histories and Chronicles testifying to the world, the several alterations & forms of government which conquerors have induced; but whether they ought so to have done, is a question; yet should the Observator and his adherents take advice, that though in Nature there is a parity of mankind, and therefore dominion may not seem to be intended by nature, yet God the author of Nature, foreseeing the fall of man, and the depravation in nature, which did ensue thereof, intended power and dominion, and that some should be masters and or hers servants; some command, and others obey; some should become slaves to tyrants, others subjects to free Monarches; others members of popular Estates: and these things God hath ordained by his divine wisdom, according to his will, and disposes and altars them at his pleasure: But as for the pot, it aught not to say to the Potter, Why hast thou made me thus? It is enough for it to know, that there is no power but of God, and so to be appliable to the use it was made for; if for hononr, to honour; if for servility, to servility, being subject for conscience sake, Rom 13.5.  
Of a strange nature therefore are those words, viz. There were more reason why the people might justify force to regain due liberty, than the Prince might to subvert the same. If this doctrine had been good, our Saviour would surely have counselled the jews (when they asked him whether it were lawful to give tribute to Caesar) to have kept their money in their purses, or to have made up a stock of it, and by force to have sought to regain their due liberty from Caesar, and not have bid them, Give unto Cesar what is Caesar's. If it be alleged, that in case Christ had counselled the jews so, they would have played the jews inceed, and have accused him of high treason; What then? would Christ have concealed, or did he at any time conceal the truth for sear of the jews accusations? When he was conjured to express whether or no he were the Son of God (a thing more hateful to the jews ears, than the denying of tribute could have been to the ears of the Romans) Christ answered, Thou hast said it, which is as much as Yes. But suppose the jews would have accused him of high treason, in case he had denied tribute to Cesar, and that God would not have such a vile imputation as treason laid on the redeemer of the world. Yet had regaining of due liberty by force been lawful, Christmight have said, Ye may give tribute to Cesar in the potential Mood (in which words no exception could have been taken) and not have said, give tribute to Cesar, or give unto Cesar what is Caesar's, in the imperative mood. Or otherwise, when they asked him, whether it were lawful to pay tribute to Cesar, he might only have answered them, Yes; but foreseeing in his divine wisdom, that some indirect constructions might be made of such a single word, as Yes, 'tis lawful to pay it, ye may pay it if ye please; 'tis not against the law of God, if ye do pay it, etc. therefore Christ bid them show him a piece of money, and bid them give it unto Cesar, informing the covetous minds of that perverse people, that they ought and were obliged to part with their money and substance to Cesar if demanded as a tribute; but 〈◊〉 let Arguments of Divinity pass, and to induce a few State reasons: If the people may justify force to regain due liberty, what Monarchy? what Aristocracy? what Popular estate can remain secure? the French subjects being in general oppressed with taxes, may revolt from their King, if this Tenet be good; and so may the Spanish: the Polish Peasants may rebel against the King and their Lords, for that they hold them in villinage: and the Townsmen and Boors in Holland, and the Pisani in Venice against the States, for their imposing on them terrible excizes. This Tenet, or Position, may quadrate, it may be with the Irish rebels (for they pretend by force to regain due liberty) but never with loyal subjects. And surely this Tenet or Position aforesaid, is dangerous to all the Monarchies and States of the world, I even to Parliaments themselves, if rightly considered, and opposite also to the law of God & Nations. The Observator telleth us, p. 13. that where the people by public authority will seek an inocnvenience to themselves, and the King is not so much interested as themselves, it is more inconvenience to deny it, then grant it. This is a strange assertion, and against all rule of Monarchical government. Suppose (for a supposition is no fallasie) that a Christian people should generally (which God forbidden) desire to revolt from Christianity to Mahometanisme; should their King grant it? they seem to be more interessed than the King, because it concerns their salvation or damnation, is it injustice therefore to deny it? Surely no; but most just and acceptable to God to hinder them from it. Suppose this nation should in general (which God of his goodness prohibit) desire to turn Anabaptist & Brownists, whereof there are to many already, is the King bound, or ought he to condescend to their desires? Surely not: but as God's Vice gerent to oppose such exorbitant inclinations of the people: but if the Assertion of the Observator be good, Pilate seems to be excusable whom the Observator condemneth in the page before: for the jews sought by authority of the Priests & Elders to crucify Christ, (an inconvenience enough to themselves) and instanced a law, and that by that law he ought to die, joh 1 9.7. and the jews were more interested in Christ, (he being their Countryman, and subject to their laws, as they conceived) then was Pilate: so that according to this assertion of the Observator, it was more inconvenience and injustice for Pilate to have denied to the jews Christ to have been crucified, then to have granted it. judica Deus.  
The Observator saith, pag. 17. The name of a King is great, I confess, and worthy of great honour, but is not the name of a people greater?  
The Observator must give me leave to tell him, that in Monarchies where there were or are Kings, the name of a people neither was nor is greater than the name of a King; Senatus populusque Romanus, ceased to be, and gave place to the name of Cesar: The Ottoman name at this day, dignifies that great Empire subject to that family; and so doth the name of Sophy the Persian. The name of the House of Austria decorates their dominions; and so doth that of Bourbon France. And I see no reason but why the name of Stewart should do as much in England. If it be asked, But what availeth the names of these great Monarches, without their Kingdoms or Dominions? The answer is, that Dominions are to Monarches, as it were, material subjects; themselves (from whom their names result) as Forms. Now as the Form is more worthy than its matter, so is a free Monarch more worthy than his Empire, in respect of dignity political.  
And indeed the word Monarch infers as much for Monarchy, and is derived from Monarch, not Monarch from Monarchy. But it may be some will instance from hence, that if it be so, the good of a Monarch seems to be preferred before the good of all his subjects in general, so that a whole Kingdom or Empire should be utterly pillaged, wasted and consumed, rather than his treasures be destroyed. Not so: for though Empires & Kingdoms are but as material subjects, and Monarches as forms political, yet even as in nature, forms cannot subsist without matter, (from whose power all forms, except the rational soul, are educed) so in policy, Monarchy cannot subsist without their people, from whose subjection & obedience their power is educed immediately from God, as are forms from matter by nature: the good of both therefore must be consistent together, so that not salus populi alone; as the Observator would have it. but salus Regis & populi, is the true end of Monarchical government.  
Thus have I briefly answered the Observators chief arguments, from whence all his other assertions and conclusions are drawn, desiring him and all others, rather to study how to produce reasons for obedience (where it is due) to Monarches, then to derogate from Monarchical government to endeavour how to incline, & not to disaffect (by nice positions) the distracted minds of the people towards the King▪ to propound prudent Arguments which might move the King to accommodate with his Parliament and not by lessening his authority, to divert him from it. Finally to seek how to unite the King and Commonwealth & not to disunite them by impertinent and invalid conclusions. God of his goodness grant co-union as much as in this world may be, between our Sovereign and his people, that 〈◊〉 may know truly how to rule, and they to obey.  
FINIS.