THE POWER OF KING'S DISCUSSED: OR, An Examen of the Fundamental Constitution of the Freeborn People of ENGLAND: In Answer to several Tenants of M. David Jenkins.  
By Will: Ball of Barkham, Esq  Sat Patriae Priamoque datum— 
LONDON, Printed for JOHN HARRIS, 1649.   

THE POWER OF KINGS DISCUSSED, etc.  
THe Freeborn people of England live or aught to live by or under a Law of common consent, the Supreme Ruler or highest Magistrate whereof is the KING, whose Oath is to conserve and maintain justas leges & consuetudines quas vulgus elegerit, etc. the just Laws and Customs which the Common People shall choose, (as many do expound it.) Others will have the Verb elegerit to signify hath chosen, according to the French Aurin choisy: and Mr. Jenkins allegeth this reason for it, 
Jenk. Resp. ad Prin.  Customs cannot refer to future time, and both are coupled together, Laws and customs; so that Elegerit must be taken in the Preterperfect Tense: But by the favour of Mr. Jenkins albeit Customs are not properly alterable as are Laws, and though Laws and Customs are coupled together, yea alterable Laws are nominated and placed before Customs; yet may the verb Elegerit be taken in the future Tense; for the Reason why Laws are inserted in the King's Oath, or propounded to the King in his Oath before Customs, is, first, because Laws are more worthy and noble than Customs, for that Laws are Rules or Regulations of the whole or entire People, but Customs are Rules only of some or of a part of the People, and that in some things only.  
Secondly, Laws are more ancient, to speak generally, than Customs, for it's very probable that the Saxons coming out of Germany into Britain brought the Common Law with them, as a Rule agreeable to the Law of Nature and Reason, which they had learned or had delivered unto them from their fathers; yet Customs they could not bring with them, for Customs have Relation to Place as well as to Persons, but neither the Saxons, nor any other People could have Relation to a Land or Country before they possessed it: so that the coupling of Laws and Customs together, or Nominating or Placing Laws before Customs in the King's Oath, is no amiable Reason, From whence a direct consequence may be deduced, that the Verb Elegerit must or aught to be taken in the Preterperfect Tense, or that it may not be taken in the Future-Tense, and consequently that the King may not be strictly tied and obliged in foro conscientiae, to conserve and maintain such just Laws as the Common-People shall at any time make choice of: but admitting the Verb Elegerit to be taken and expounded in the Preterperfect Tense, albeit there be difference in Grammar, yet is there no great difference in Logic or Reason; for the King taking his Oath to maintain the just Laws and Custome● which the People or Common-People have chosen, taketh his Oath by an Implicit or Tacite condition to conserve and maintain the just Laws which the People shall choose; for at the first making of that Oath, and at our Kings their taking of it ever since, the Common-people had then chosen, and have ever since conserved such choice, that not only there should be no Laws de futuro, for the time to come, without their Consent, but also that upon their Request or Petition our Kings should Redress such Aggrievances as they should complain of, and likewise propagate such just Laws as they should propound conducing to their general good or welfare: and that was the Reason why heretofore it was inserted in many Statutes, Be it therefore enacted by the King's Majesty, with Assent of the Lords, etc. and at the Request of the Commons, etc. wherein two things are to be noted, first, that the Commons did Request, not command or enforce our Kings to pass such Acts; secondly, that our Kings did upon such Requests usually pass them. And albeit the King have a Negative voice, or rather a voice for advise, or to advise, as the words Le Roy s'avisera import, yet I conceive that he is strictly tied in Foro conscientiae according to his Oath, and the end of his Government (which is the good of the People) to pass such Acts for Civil Government as the Commons shall Request him to pass. 
Jenk. Resp. ad Prin.  But Mr. Jenkins and others make a Quaere and ask, who shall be Judges? whether such Laws as the Commons shall Request be just or no, the King is tied or obliged by Oath only to propagate and maintain the just Laws which the Common-People choose or Request. In Mr. Jenkins his opinion, the judges and the Masters of Chancery, with the Lords or Peers assisting the King ought to be judges of the Common-People, or of their Representatives, or trusties their Requests, rather than two, or three, or a few Commoners, who sometimes are not learned in the Laws of the Land. To this Quaere, and the Allegations, I answer, that the Commons Primario, or in the first Place are, and aught to be the judges, even as Customary Tenants are, and aught to be their own Evidences; although one man ought not to be judge in his own Case, yet all in a Kingdom, or Commonwealth, can have no judges of their Common Interest but themselves, or some amongst themselves, at leastwise no Competent judges: and where the Common Interest is controverted, there they, who have the greatest Interests, or whom it most concerns, aught to be judges Primario or in the first place; and surely the Common People in general have the greatest Interest in their Common Interest, and the Laws of the Land most concern them, wherefore they, or their Representatives, or trusties, aught to be judges Primario, or in the first place. And as touching that, many in the House of Commons are not sometimes learned in the Laws, nor have any great knowledge in State affairs; it may be so; and it may be wished, that none but such as have sound judgements, might sit in that Honourable House, and I believe that the words habiles homines, in the writ of Burgesses intent such men, and not men of great Estates, who are sometimes men of mean understandings, and yet by feasting (I will not say Bribing) or by flattering, or by an over-awing Power, attain to be Parliament men; howsoever, for as much as such men being chosen, are capable to consult and advise with others wiser than themselves, and are in matters of great Concernment, guided by the Discretion of others, their votes going along with the votes of others, they may be accounted competent judges, of what may be beneficial, or prejudicial, to the Commonwealth. Howsoever I do not exclude the Lords, or the House of Peers from being judges secundario of such matters, as generally concern the Kingdom: for although Mr. Jenkins conceive them not to be Vulgus, 
Jenk Resp. ad Prin.  truly I conceive the Lords in England to be but vulgus superlatum, even as Bishops are but clerici Prelati, and Aldermen but cives elati; in England the Nobles have no distinct or different Laws, as in Germany, Poland, and some other countries; these here inherit by the Common Law, or Laws Common to others; they also contract Bargain and sale by the same Laws, and are subject to the same Laws; some Privileges they have which make rather a Titulary, or circumstantial, than an Essential or specifical difference, between them and the inferior Common-People. But it may be some will say, why should not the Lords being dignified, or Noble, be Judges Primariò, or in the first place, rather than the Commons? I answer, that the Lords are not entrusted by the People, as are the Commons, and therefore in matters of General concernment, the Commons ought to precede them; notwithstanding de se & suis in things that merely concern the Lords, as also concerning matters of Fact, 
* And for this causo, as also to advise the King, are the judges, & Masters of Chancery called to the House of Peers. Jenkins in his [Cordial. etc.]  or controversy which shall happen by writs of Error, or otherwise to come into that most Honourable House, therein the Lords De Jure precede the Commons. But Mr. Jenkins will have the House of Peers to be Judges of the Laws, rather than the House of Commons, because the King by his writ saith, that he will consult and treat with the Peers, and Prelates of the Kingdom, for, and touching the great Concernments of the Commonwealth (for the King never sits in the House of Commons) the Peers do consulere and consequently (as saith Mr. Jenkins) judge of the concernments of the Commonwealth, the Commons do but Facere et consentire, according to such Consultation or judgement; which Power ad faciendum & consentiendum Mr. Jenkins saith the King gives them by his writ; & to strengthen his Opinion he quoteth a great Lawyer: But by the favour of Mr. Jenkins, and such as adhere to his opinion, albeit the King say in his writ, that he will consult and treat with the Prelates and Peers, touching the great concernments of the Commonwealth, for that they are properly his Assistants, he sitting with them, doth he therefore say that he will not treat with the Commons? nay, doth not the King treat with the Commons, by Messengers, when he desireth Aides and Subsidies, and have not the Commons a Negative voice therein? can the King and the Peers make an Act of Law without the Commons? are the Commons tied or obliged necessarily to do and consent to what the King and the Lords shall determine, as Mr. Jenkins seems to intimate? surely no, our Laws and customs speak them absolutely free in these things. And whereas Mr. Jenkins saith that the King by his writ gives Power to the Commons, ad faciendum & consentiendum, therein he is greatly mistaken; the King by his writ only appoints the place and time, and instances the words, ad faciendum & consentiendum, to show the cause or End of their Convention or assembling together, 
☞  but the People give them their Power, who elect or nominate them, and also transact their Power unto them, by their Parole at their Elections, and by their Indentures wherein they insert the words, ad faciendum & consentiendum, as from themselves to the Party's, whom in the said Indentures they Nominate and intrust: and indeed, were the Power of the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses, derived to them by the King's writ, such Indentures were needless and frivolous, the Sheriffs might only make their Return, se fecisse Electionem secundum Breve receptum, and such like. Moreover, it is against Reason that a People shall have Power to nominate and intrust some about their Affairs, and shall, for that end, allow them wages, (as do the Counties, Cities, and Towns Corporate, to the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses) and yet that such trusties or Stewards should derive no Power from the People their Trustors, neither as their Judges Delegate, nor Allegate; that is to say, neither as Judges for them according to Law, nor as Judges for them according to Reason and Conscience. But M. Jenkins conceiveth, the House of Commons to be no fit Judges of Laws, or Acts for the People's good, because they are not called ad consiliandum, but the House of Peers. And furthermore, 
Jenkins in his [Lex Terrae.] and his [Cordial.]  that the House of Commons are no Court, at leastwise no Court of Record, nor can give an Oath, or examine upon Oath; And that House which cannot do the less, cannot do the greater. By M. Jenkins, and other his adherents favour, is it not of greater moment and concernment to be called ad faciendum & consentiendum, then ad consiliandum, or consilium dandum? He, or they, who are called to Council, are called only to advise with; but he, or they, who are called ad faciendum & consentiendum, are called to Act with, or to be Co-enactors.  
Therefore the King, by his Writ, invites the People to do and consent, (by their Representatives) touching such difficult and urgent affairs as concern Himself, the State, and defence of the Kingdom of England, and Church of England, of which He intends to Consult with His Peers: And great Reason it is that the Commonwealth should, at the least, have free Power in herself to acknowledge her own, Finalem Concordantiam, her own, Facere & consentire, 
☞  albeit she were in nature of Femine Covert Baron (as M. Jenkins would have her) the King being sponsus Regni, 
Jenkins in his [Lex Ter. p, 41.]  qui per annulum is espoused to his Realm at His Coronation: And certainly the King conceives such Power inherent in the Commonwealth, when He declares in His Writ, Ita quod pro defectu Potestatis hujusmodi, seu propter improvidam Electionem Militum Civium, & Burgensium, etc. Moreover, I could tell M. Jenkins that Commonwealth hath greater Pours The KING receives the Ring at His Coronation, as doth Femme Covert Baron, and consequently the Commonwealth rather espouses the King, than the King the Commonwealth: So that the Commonwealth is Regina sui ipsius, 
☞  the King, Rex Rege●s, as was Philip the second of Spain in England, albeit modo difference, for he was King merely of Courtesy, but our Kings are Kings by Descent: And whereas M. Jenkins doth in several places except against the Power of the House of Commons, affirming that they are not fit to be Judges of the Laws of the Land, for that they cannot punish Felony, or Treason, nor give an Oath, nor are a Court of Record, etc. It maketh no matter whether they can do these things, or whether they are a Court of Record or no, in relation of their being Judges of the Laws of the Land, so fare forth as they are to judge of them; for the Commons are not called and chosen chief to judge of matters de facto, according to the Laws in Being, (for that the Courts of Justice may determine of) but to judge of the Laws themselves, 
☞  De Facto & de Fieri, whether they be convenient or inconvenient, fit to be continued, or repealed; or whether new Laws ought to be made for the good of the Commonwealth or no; and these things they may do as Judges Allegate, or Vmpeeres for the People, although the House of Commons were no Court of Record. Moreover, I conceive that he, or they, who covenant with others to do any Act, or Acts, which shall be reasonably advised, or devised by the covenanties, or their Council, or the like, doth make such covenanties their Council, or Arbitrators, Judges Primario, or in the first place of such Act or Acts, and such Covenantors make themselves, or become Passive to the end, and Active to the means of such Covenant, that is to say, they are to do, or Act what the covenanties will (with Reason) have them do or Act, albeit the Acts which they do are their own Acts; even so that Potentate, who Covenanteth by Oath (for his Oath is Vice contractus vel compacti) to conserve and maintain the Just Laws and Customs which the People shall choose; 
☞  or otherwise the Just Laws and Customs which the People have chosen, (it being one of their Chosen Laws, that their Potentates shall de futuro upon their Request, redress their Aggrievances, be it by repealing Acts inconvenient, or enacting some de Novo) such Potentate doth surely make the People their Representatives or trusties, Judges Pirmario, or in the first place of such Act, and makes himself, or becomes Passive to the end, and Active to the means of such his contract by Oath; that is to say, He is to do what the People will (with Justice and Reason) have him to do or Act, albeit the Acts which he doth are his own Acts. But M. Jenkins saith, that both Houses have many times tendered unto our Kings, unjust and unreasonable Bills, which it had been better for our Kings to have denied, or not have passed, then to have consented to, and have passed; and Master Jenkins instanceth touching Religion, Bills tendered to Henry the 8. and to Queen Mary; Bills tendered unto Richard the 3. and also to the aforesaid Henry the 8. 
Jenkins in his [Lex Terrae.]  concerning Civil Government, etc. I conceive M. Jenkins might have instanced enough, and to many such Bills, but what of all this? Is there not Bonum Real, and Bonum apparens, secundum tendentiam vellietatis, Real Good, and seeming Good, which may be in itself evil? and is there not verum Real, and verum Formalt, secundum quod ad se fert Intellectus; a Real Truth, or a true Real Being, and an apprehended Truth, or a true apprehended Being, which may be no true Real Being; even so there is justum Real, and justum appaerens, or formale, an Act, or Being Really just, and seemingly or formally Just, as it is apprehended by understanding, and embraced by the will, which may be in itself unjust: wherefore, if the People (to whom the King is tied by Oath) or their Representatives or trusties, so long and so fare as they intrust them, shall on behalf of the People tender to the King, a Bill of Civil Government to them, seeming Just and Reasonable; but to the King seeming unjust and unreasonable, and it may be so in itself, the King notwithstanding, is by an Implicit Condition of his Oath, tied or obliged to pass such a Bill if it deprive not himself, of his own Just Rights, for Id juris est quod Nationis est, if a Nation or People, will induce themselves into an inconvenience, conceiving it convenience, the King cannot help it; he may use the best means he can, by advice, Arguments, and the like, to prevent it; but if the People, and their Representatives, will persevere in their Desire or Request, the KING (as aforesaid) is obliged to pass it, The KING is the supreme Ruler, or highest Magistrate for the People, or over the People ad agendum, to put the Laws in Execution; but the KING is not chief Judge of the Rules, or Laws, by which the People will be Governed; the People themselves, and those whom they intrust so fare as they intrust them, are, or aught to be Judges thereof Jure Primitive: moreover, if a Covenantee will desire, or require of a Covenantor an Act, (of which the Covenantee is Judge Primariò, or in the first Place) no way beneficial, but rather detrimental to him the Covenantee, the Covenantor is obliged to grant, or perform such an Act tending to the end of his Covenant, not otherwise to endamage himself; even so it is between the KING who is Covenantor by Oath, and the People who are covenanties concerning Laws and Statutes touching Civil Government to be enacted, or repealed, and abolished.  
But some it may be will say, suppose the Commons or both Houses of Parliament should tender unto the KING a Bill, or Bills, destructive to His own Just Rights, is he bound to pass such? truly no! He may justly refuse them, for the End of His Oath is to conserve and maintain the Just Laws which the People have chosen, or shall choose, for their Good; not the unjust Laws which they shall choose to destroy or deprive Him of His Royal Right: Jus Regnandi is the Kings by descent, even as Jus Regni (to speak properly) is the People's by birthright, (no way excluding the King from any benefit thereof) The People promise or Covenant by Oath to obey the King as their supreme Governor or highest Magistrate, and to maintain Him, His Heirs, and lawful Successors, in His, and their just Rights and Dignities; and as the King's Oath toeth and obligeth Him to the People, certainly the People's Oath toeth and obligeth them to the King: although our King in England be not a Personal Monarch to make Laws, and Govern at His pleasure, as some affirm that the Great Turk, the King of Persia, and such like Tyrannical Princes do; (albeit, I conceive, that even those Potentates are in some things limited) yet out King is a Legal Monarch to Reign and Govern by Laws made and consented unto by the People; so that although the King have not an absolute Power to make Laws, 
☞  He hath an absolute Power to administer the Laws; and I hope there are none that will think or attempt otherwise.  
Having said, that the King is tied by an implicit Condition of His Oath (admitting the Verb Elegerit to be understood in the Preterperfect tense) to pass such Bills concerning Civil Government as the Commons or both Houses shall tender unto Him, (not destructive to Himself) and having said, notwithstanding, that the King hath a Negative Voice, or a Voice to advise, and consequently not to pass such Bills until he have advised; some it may be will say, that there is a contradiction or opposition in these Assertions; but there is none, for even every Covenantor may be the courtesy of the Law advise with Himself and His own Council, as well as with the Council of His Covenantee, before He make or do Acts tending to the End of His Covenant, and great Reason it is, that the King should have as great, or rather greater Freedom in that He is the supreme Ruler, or highest Magistrate of the Commonwealth; a freedom to advise, or to deny until advise be taken doth not Nul nec in foro conscientiae, nec in foro Juris, 
☞  the tie or obligation of Oath or Covenant so fare forth as such Oath or Covenant toeth or obligeth.  
Furthermore, concerning the King's Oath aforesaid, although He be tied and obliged by virtue thereof to pass Bills touching Civil Government, (as aforesaid) yet I conceive that He is not tied and obliged by virtue of His said Oath, to pass Bills touching Religion, tendered unto Him by the Commons, or both Houses of Parliament; for, at the making of that Oath, neither the Commons, nor their Representatives, or trusties; nor the King, or His Lords, or Peers, had any thing to do, or did meddle with matters touching Religion, to define, frame, or alter any thing therein; such things were then altogether performed by Ecclesiastical Counsels and Assemblies; nor would the People, nor did they tie or oblige the King by Oath to do that which (as then) they conceived He had no Power to do: and the Kings, who have successively taken that Oath since the first making thereof, have taken their Oaths according to the intent and meaning of that Oath when first compiled, and no otherwise; so that I do not conceive the King to be obliged by virtue of His said Oath to pass Bills touching Religion tendered unto Him by the Commons, or both Houses of Parliament.  
But some (it may be) will say, that the King is tied otherwise Ex Officio, to pass such Bills touching Religion, as the Commons, or both Houses shall tender unto Him; it may be so, but if so, yet both the King, and both the Houses, aught to be very cautelous and conscientious how they make Acts touching Religion, in which they may err themselves, and by which they may ensnare and molest other men's Consciences: however, the Kirk-men having borrowed (I suppose) some infallible Nightcaps from the Roman Bishops, dream exceedingly, that they interpret the holy Scriptures without error of the least jota.  
Master Jenkins saith, that the King is Principium Caput, 
Jenkins in his [Lex Terrae.]  & finis Parlamenti; the King is Principium, I grant Him, for that the King by His Writ appoints the time, and place, of Parliamentary Conventions, and that the King is Caput, I also grant it Him in that the King is the supreme Ruler, or highest Magistrate of the Commonwealth; but that the King is Finis, at leastwise, Finis integer aut tetalis Parlamenti, I deny it; for Finis, or causa finaelis, is causa propter quod, the cause for which a thing is ordained; and certainly, salus Populi, which is suprema Lex, the safety of the People, their general good and welfare is the end; at leastwise, the principal end of Parliamentary Conventions: and Master Jenkins seemeth in his [Cordial to the good People of London] to acknowledge as much, for whereas Master H. P. Barrister of Lincoln's Inn affirmeth, that the safety of the People is the supreme Law, (as indeed it is:) Master Jenkins replying to him, 
Jenkins in his [Cordial.]  faith, Neither do we swear, but His Majesty and we will swear to the contrary, and have sworn and have made good, and will by God's grace make good our Oath to the World, that the KING is not above the Law, nor above the safety of His People, the Law and the safety of His People, are His safety, His Honour, and His strength: these are Master Jenkins his words, whereby he acknowledgeth, That the safety of the People are the King's safety, honour, and strength; so that if the King be the end, or a partial end of the Parliament, according to his Assertion, the People's safety must needs be the principal or ultimate end.  
Master Jenkins saith, That it cannot be said the King doth wrong, and that it was declared by all the Judges, and Sergeants at Law, [Tempore.] The Reason is, (saith Master Jenkins) Nothing can be done in this Commonwealth by the Kings Grant, or any other Act of His, as to the Persons, Goods, Lands, Liberties of the Subjects, but must be according to the established Laws, which the Judges are sworn to ebserve and deliver between the King and His People, impartially to rich and poor, high and low; and therefore the Justices and the Ministers of Juctice are to be questioned and punished if the Laws be violated, and no Reflection to be made on the King.  
By Master Jenkins favour, if it be granted, that the King doth not wrong in ministering the Laws, but that the Ministers of the Laws whom the King intrusteth do the wrong, will it therefore follow, that it cannot be said that the King doth the wrong, otherwise both in His natural and politic capacity? surely no! The King may usurp (and yet be a King de Facto) as did Henry the first, his Brother Robert being alive; and William the second also, notwithstanding his Father's Will; Stephen; Richard the first, and John his Brother, (for Arthur Son of Geoffry Duke of Britain, third Son of Henry the second was right Heir to the Crown, Richard being the fourth Son, and John the fift Son of the said King Henry) Edward the third, while his Father lived (for though his Father were a dissolute Prince, yet the Son ought not to have usurped his Right; and albeit a People may (as did the petty Kings and People of Sodom and Gomorrah, the Jews, Athenians, Romans, and divers other Nations) free themselves from tyranny and slavery, yet they ought not Depose their King for vice) Henry the fourth that subtle Usurper, Richard the third that politic Tyrant.  
The King may break his faith and promise with his own People, and others, as did the Norman, and some of his Successors very constantly, as if it had descended to them with the Crown.  
The King may break his Oath, as did Henry the third, and some others.  
The King may, through his own covetous and ambitious desire, impose illegal Taxes upon the People, he may also engage himself and his People in unnecessary Wars and Broils, as Kings have done either; and if it be said, that Kings are in such things many times misled by their Counsels, and therefore they themselves ought to be excused; I answer, no ● for, Kings ought not to be misled by their Counsels, Privatio Rectitudinis in debito esse Actus Peccatum est; Kings have the means not to be misled in such matters if they will make use of it; but many times Kings will be led by Cabinet Counselors, Creatures of their own making, who depend upon them, and endeavour to humour and please their Princes for their own Ends, and not to counsel them according to prudence and justice: and sometimes Kings have done what liketh themselves without counsel.  
The King may by an over-awing Power, or by a kind of menacing, or high carriage, enforce, or cause the Representatives of the Kingdom to do, or agree to that, to which (if such unjust and indirect means were not used) they would not agree unto; as did Henry the eight, in obtaining the Lands of Abbeys and Monasteries; for admit the Abbeys and Monasteries deserved to be dissolved, yet for as much as their Lands were Terrae Regni non Regis, they ought to have been applied, and employed to the good of the Kingdom, not of the King, there being then neither Law, Reason, not Precedent for it: but K. Henry partly by frowns, mutterings, and threaten, and partly by promising that he would with those Lands maintain an Army for the defence of the Kingdom, and ease the People from other Taxes, and Payments, (which how well he performed, all men know) obtained and got into his hands those Lands by consent of both the Houses of Parliament: wherein how justly, or unjustly, both Houses dealt, I will not dispute it at this time.  
But to go on, 
Jenkins in his [Lex Terrae.]  M. Jenkins himself instanceth, that in King John's time the Nobles and Commons of the Realm conceiving that the Ancient Customs and Rights were violated, etc. Et paulo post, after the subjects had obtained their Rights and Liberties, which were no other than their Ancient Customs, etc. by which two instances of his, He in some sort acknowledgeth that the People were wronged in their Customs and Rights, from the time of the Norman Conquest, to the Reign of Hen. 3. and who did the wrong? Surely the Norman and his Successors, who severally violated them, not such Judges and Justices of the Laws who then were, for they did but as they were commanded: To conclude, the King may in these and the like things, both according to his natural and politic capacity, Peccare contra Deum, contra Proximum, & seipsum, and if it be said, notwithstanding, He can do no wrong, certainly that tenet if it be Ens Legis, it is scarce Ens rationis Ratiocinatae.  
That the King can do no wrong [in Curiâ,] nor the Pope err [in Cathedrâ,] I take them to be Axioms much alike: for my part I pretend not to the knowledge of the Laws, but honour the knowledge thereof: thus much I know, non jurari in verba magistri, I have heard say, that the greatest Clerks are not sometimes the wisest men; and I must tell M. Jenkins, and others, that sometimes also the greatest Lawyers are not the soundest Schoolmen, for if they were, some of them would not have said, and written, what they have: M. Jenkins saith, 
Jenkins in his [Cordial.]  The Law and Custom of this Land, is, that a Parliament hath Power over my life, liberty, lands, and goods, and over every other subject, etc. Pax cum pedibus, good Master Jenkins, not so fast; what doth Master Jenkins mean by the word, Power? if he mean by the word, Power, that the Parliament hath power to protect the lives, liberties, etc. of the People, I grant it him; or if he mean by the word, Power, that the Parliament hath power applicare in necessitatum Regni, the Proprieties of the People, I also grant it him; but if Master Jenkins mean by the word, Power, that the Parliament (including the King) hath an absolute Power to dispose of the People's Estates merè ad Placitum, I absolutely deny it; and touching this, I have formerly inserted Reasons in two Printed Books: Moreover, the Parliament cannot Tradere Populum Angliae aliene Juri, deliver over the Free People of England to a foreign Government, or to Laws imposed by Forainers, or composed and continued in relation to Forainers; nor can the Parliament by any Ordinance, or Act whatsoever, deprive the Free people of England of their innate Right of electing Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses for Parliament; in these things, and things of the nature of these tending to the fundamental Rights and Laws of the People, the Parliament cannot, nor ought not any way to violate the People, or Nation; if they do it, they do not only fall and fail from the Protection of the People, but they become Preditores & Hosts Patriae: The King is to consider that although he have his Jus Regnandi, his Crown by descent, and holds à Deo ordinariâ per successionem, God himself being the Efficient Cause primarily, yet he holds it in ordine ad Populum, in relation to the People, who tie him by Oath, etc. in England, salus Populi, not Majestas Imperii, is the chief object and end of Government: The Representatives or trusties of the People are also to consider that they are creati in Ordine ad Populum, not Nati in Ordine ad se, as are the Venetian Senators; that they are entrusted by the People according to the King's Writ, Pro quibusdam arduis & urgentibus Negotiis, not made unlimited or absolute in all things; so that the King and both the Houses of Parliament ought to endeavour for the general good of the Commonwealth.  
I am of Master Jenkins his Opinion in this, That the safety of the People is the safety of the King, and that the honour of the King is supported by the honour of the People, or Nation.  
WILLIAM BALL.  
FINIS.