TO THE HONOURABLE THE Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses, now assembled in PARLIAMENT.  
THE HUMBLE PROPOSITIONS OF WILLIAM BALL, alias BENNET, Gent.  
Concerning the Forts of this Kingdom. With some other Considerations of State.  
LONDON, Printed by Barnard Allop for Thomas Bayly, dwelling in the Middle-Row in Holborn, near unto Staple-Inne. 1641.   

TO THE RIGHT WORSHIPFUL Mr. SPEAKER.  
RIGHT WORSHIPFUL;  
YOur own real worth hath ever deserved those due Respects from me, which I have (as obliged thereunto) formerly tendered unto you; Now the eminence of your Place may command me humble service: which (according to my ability) I shall be ever ready (as in duty bound) to render at your pleasure. In token whereof, I have attempted to dedicate these Propositions, chief to your Worship, to whom they may most fitly have Relation, as being a principal Member of the great, and happy Representative Body of this most flourishing Kingdom, now assembled in Parliament. For the general good, and safety whereof, I have expressed, & set forth these, though mean, yet my well-meaning Endeavours, being over ready to endeavour 〈◊〉, as my much Honoured superiors shall ple●se 〈◊〉 command, and direct m●, ●nd G●d 〈…〉. Wh●se divine Providence, and G●od●esse, I shall ever implore, for the happy success of all public ●ff●ire●, ●nd great Designs important to this Nation, and remain always▪  
Your Worship's Servant to command WILLIAM BALL, alias BENNET.   

TO THE HONOURABLE THE Knights. Citizens▪ and Burgesses, Now assembled in PARLIAMENT.  
The humble Propositions of William Ball, alias Bennet, Gent. Concerning the Forts of this Kingdom, with some other Considerations of STATE.  

1.  
FOrasmuch, as all men as well Inferiors, as Superiors, are by the Laws, both of God and Nature; as also by Constitutions, Civil, and Military (grounded upon Reason, and Honour) bound to conserve, as much as in them lieth, their native Country; in which they receive the life of Men, and enjoy the liberty of Freemen; the most especial benefits (speaking morally) of this Lower world: every one therefore is, not to hid his Talon in the ground, but liberally to proffer, for the general good of his Country, what store soever he possesseth, or enjoyeth, whether or no, it be the endowment of Nature, or Fortune: so that persons in Authority, are to procure their Country's welfare by their well-ordered, and discreet Commands, and Government, Soldiers by their valour, and Discipline, the rich by their wealth, learned and experienced men by their knowledge and observation, Inferiors by prompt obedience, all by goodwill. To expose these assertions to approbation, I conceive no Author need to be cited, the Dictamen of reason averring them to be so, wherefore I cannot doubt, that much honoured Superiors (to whose grave censure I submit these my Propositions) will any way be offended, that I have Dedicated to them these subsequent Considerations, proceeding if not from sufficient reason, yet from entire goodwill; so that if I have inserted any one clause, that may give the least distaste; I humbly entreat, that — quis enim succenset amanti? Ovid Epist. Her Helen. etc. may excuse it.   

2  
THE most Politic- and martial men have generally esteemed Forts, and strong places, the safety not only of mean Provinces, but even of the greatest, and most puissant Kingdoms and Empires, the defects, and neglects whereof have many (too many) times been the occasions or rather causes of most irreparable Disasters, in great and commanding Monarchies, and Estates. The Roman Empire invaded by the Persians, Saracens, Goths and Vandals, the Greek Empire wholly subverted by the Turks; Spain over-runne by the Moors (with other Countries) were heretofore most lamentable Precedents of thraldom occasioned chief (according to humane principles of State) by no having their frontiers & ploces of importance strongly fortified: But to instance provinces, and s part more near, and notified unto us in these modern times, who knoweth not but that the small remnant of Hungaria, the States of Venice and Holland, the Islands of Sicily, Sardinia, Candy and Malta, ● even all Italy, are all principally conserved (speaking of the instrumental cause) from foreign subjection and tyranny by fort and strong places.   

MOreover the most flourishing Kingdoms and Monarchies, both Christian and Mahometan, disdain not, but rather wholly endeavour to have the bounds and borders of their dominions, if not extraordinarily, yet sufficiently strengthened with fortifications and Garrisons both in peace and war: so do the Roman or Germane Emperor, and Great Turk (notwithstanding of late the ordinary peace or Truce between them) keep the one the forts (or rather Towns) of Kamorra, Rab etc. the other of Strigonium, Buda etc. exactly maintained with all necessaries; thereby wiesly preventing the sudden events of war, if their enemies (albeit they make show of peace) should upon any distaste, or occasion of advantage given them, attempt an invasion: For such places of strength, although they are not always swords (which sometimes they are) to cut off an enemy, yet are they ever Bucklers to defend a Country, until such time, as either sufficient power can be aised to expel them; or that reasonable conditions be obtained, if so be that the enemy be not inviucible in respect of number.  
4. Nor can I, but commend in this point of fortifying (to omit the Hollanders of all our neighbour nations most careful) the French and Spanish, but especially the French: who, although they need not greatly fear, or at leastwise tremble at any foreign Invasion from their neighbours by Sea, which could impose the yoke of sujection upon them; by reason of their great, and united Land-forces, they are able to make, to expel, and vanquish any such powers, as could by shipping, Galleys, and the like, enter into their continent, yet have they on the Levant, & great Ocean Seas, strong towns, and Castles well furnished with good Garrisons, and necessary provision for defence, against a puissant Invader: as to begin on the Levant in France, Tolou, Marseilles, Narbon in Spain, Barcelona, Denia, Alicante, Cartagena de Levanto, Malaga, Gibraltar, Cadiz, the Groin, St. Sebastian's, Fonterabia; and again in France, Baion, Blois sur Garroun, Broige, Rochel quondam, Breast, St. Malos, Mount St. Michael, Grandvill, Cherbourg, Haure-de Grace, deep, Cales, &c, so that the consideration of these aforenamed places of importance, strongly erected, and warily kept, and repaired by those, and other our neighbouring Nations; have divers times moved me to ponder, whether their care in maintaining such Fortifications, or our confidence in omitting them, and, as it were, quitting the charge thereof, may be more commendable?  
5. First, therefore (not to flatter ourselves) I conceive, that it must be granted, that none of our best Sea-townes, or Castles, of Barwick, Hull, Yarmouth, Harwich, Sandon, Dover, Portsmouth, Plymouth, etc. are (as they now are contrived, and strengthened) to be compared with most of those in France, and Spain, aforesaid: For although the situation of some of ours, may be as convenient as some of theirs; yet our manner of fortifying is not to be equalised with theirs; considering their strong walls and Parapets, Bulwarks, Halfmoons, Horne-workes, Ports, Moots, Ditches, Rampires, and in some places Redouts, and Sconces; as in the Low-Countries: and what I conceive to be more worthy of consideration, and more to be looked into; many places of importance in this Kingdom, are in a manner without any Fortification at all; or else so weakly maintained, or ill composed, that in time of war (especially with the French our overseeing neighbours) they lie greatly (according to the Nature, and martial Discipline of these days) exposed to danger,  
6. For to instance, Milford Haven is a place of that situation, and convenience; that a great Navy, even the greatest (almost for burden, how soever for number) may arrive there; and being arrived, land what numbers they shall be able without any their eminent, or great danger, there being no place of strength to molest or hinder them, nor a people of any considerable power (although they want no courage) to resist them: and may not an Army out of Spain, or France (now more to be thought of) not only there land, but also there fortify themselves, wasting, and destroying the Countries of Pembrokeshire, Carmarden-shire, Glamorgan-shire, and Cardigar shire, before sufficient forces could be raised to resist them, and enforce them to desist? May not great powers likewise, not only spoil us, as before said; but also invade the heart of the Kingdom from thence, and that with much convenience to themselves, and inconvenience to us, for having so large, and safe and Haven (as is Milford-haven) for their fleet, if it should be by them well fortified, and kept (as that no doubt but they would do) might they not march along the Sea Coast through the plentiful Countries of Pembroke shire, Carmarden-shire, and Glamorganshire aforesaid, and from thence into Monmouth shire, Hereford shire, and so farther according to their Potency? Which how dangerous it might prove (God of his goodness defend it) not only to the ruin of those Countries, but also disanimating of our people living in, or about them; to the incensing of Domestical discontented factions (if any such should be) with other like Casualties. I leave it to the Consideration of my Superiors.  
7 Moreover, not Milford Haven only (lying upon large, and commodious Seas, and being likewise so situated, as that it may annoy (if once in the hands of a stranger) Ireland, as well as England, and greatly disunite them, or at leastwise molest their union; not only that, I say, but also to omit the mouth of the River of Carmarden, Swanzey, Cardiff, Newport, and Chepstow, or rather the mouth of the River of Wuy in Monmouth-shire, the mouth of Severn, Kingrode, Mynhead, and some other places in the Severn-Sea; the I'll of Sheppey in Kent, the mouth of Thames, and Tinmouth Castle have need (in respect of future Casualties) to be better looked unto, and strengthened: as likewise the towns of Pool, Waymouth, and Portland Island in Dorset shire, are (in my small insight) to be fare better fortified than they are. For first, Dorset shire is the nearest Country unto France (Kent only excepted) of any part of England; next, it is by nature least strong, as lying wholly upon the Sea, having no difficult Cliffs, or Rocks to encumber an enemy in landing. Thirdly, it lieth in the midst of the Southern Coast, having Eastward Hamshire, Sussex, and Kent; Westward Devonshire, and Cornwall: and Northward the body of the Kingdom: so that if a potent enemy should stand there, he might direct his forces Eastward, Westward, or Northward; according to his most advantage: as for the Castles of Waymouth, and Portland Island, they are not for strength considerable; and yet who knoweth not, but that that Island, and the land of the County, make a large Bay sufficient to contain a great Navy, where likewise they may ride at Anchor in reasonable safety, unless the South, or Southeast winds be extraordinarily stirring; so that, if that Island (let it seem of what importance it please) should be but taken, and well fortified by the French (besides the charge and hazard of recovering it, or blocking it up) they might shrewdly annoy us, having Normandy so near.  
8 And for that I have intimated the French, it may be thought either hate, or aversion (without fundamental reason) if I show not some prudent, or at leastwise, probable cause of suspicion in that Nation against us; wherefore, I have here briefly set down the particulars, which I conceive of the French proceed, and greatness. First, therefore it is well known that France is the greatest, most plentiful, and populous Kingdom in Europe, being at the least four times bigger than England, and having 5 times as many people. The King thereof is now the most absolute Monarch Christian (except the great Duke of Moscovie, or Emperor of the Abessines, whom we scarcely know) so that the King of France, his Sic volumus, sic jubemus, is in a manner a Law amongst the greatest part of his Subjects; and thereby he hath of late so augmented his Revenues, that those of France alone, exceed the Incoms of all the large Donions of Spain, and Portugal; or at the least wise, they equalise them: besides, France hath extended itself of late, through Lorraine, and in Artois, and Alsatia, Lording as it were over Savoy, and Piedmont: the Marquisate of Montferrat, and Duchy of Mantua in Italy, are likewise under the protection of France: but that which of all things ought most to awake us, is the French Conquest in Artois, aforesaid, so near unto us, and nearly concerning us, as I take it: the Proverb is, Tunc tua res agitur, paries cum proximus ardet. And is not our neighbour's house on fire in the Provinces of Flanders, are not Arras, Airs, and Hesden by the French taken in? for my part were St. Omers, Gravelling, and Dunkirk by them likewise subdued, I should account that house burntdown to the ground; and were the French once but Masters of Flanders, I would know whether (according to reason of State) they might not overmaster us, if they should make war upon us, as 'tis likely they would. If it should be said, and concluded, that in such Case we would, and should enter into a league both Defensive, and Offensive with the Hollanders; and by that means be enabled to oppose the French. To this I answer, that it is a question. First, whether, or no, the Hollanders would in such case break their league defensive, and offensive which they hold with the French, to join compact with us: for it may be very likely, that they would not draw upon them, so near, and powerful an enemy; besides, they have of late been aided by the F●ench, since they have in a manner been quit by us: Moreover, France can live of itself without Holland, but Holland can scarce live without France; as having great store of Corn, wine, and salt, and Canvas from thence: besides, 'tis very likely, that the Hollanders would be content to subsist, and to enrich themselves by trade (as do the Venetians) and so to live at peace with their neighbours: and to say that they would join with us merely for Religion's sake; it may seem so to a weak Opiniatist, but never to an understanding Statist; who well knoweth that Religion is many times the pretended, but seldom the real Cause of war, or leagues: and as for the Hollanders, I am of opinion, that they will never enter into war, or league, merely for Religion.  
9 But grant that we should enter into such a league with the Hollanders; I conceive, notwithstanding that France (if it had but Flanders added to it) would be superior to them and us by land, & no whit inferior by Sea; for to say, that the French in respect of their numbers both of horse and foot, would not in such case as aforesaid, be masters of the field, were merely to flatter ourselves, and they that are masters of the field, will in time be masters of as many towns and forts as they can besiege, and encompass or block up by land, if such towns cannot otherwise be succoured by Sea; and it may be even of them also: so that the Hollanders having their towns and Forts taken from them, would be enforced to break their league with us, and make their peace with the French: and if it should farther be said, that in such Case, we would not only make a league with the Hollanders; but also with other Princes, and States, who should assist us. I answer, that this bare saying, or supposition, must not go for a maxim. For first, it must be considered that, all Nations are most inclinable to them that can stand them in most stead; now great Britain, for that it is an Island, can stand no Nation in any great stead, for the invasion of France (at leastwise by land) and that chief, because our shipping (if we should be masters of the Seas) could not transport over any great powers, both of horse and foot (especially of horse) to make a considerable Conquest in so large a Continent, as is France.  
10 Nor is it consequence to say, that formerly we have made Conquests in France, with a small power. For 1. it must be considered, that the Nature and Discipline of war is greatly altered. Secondly, we then had a third part of France, or rather more under our obedience, having not now one foot within the main Land. Thirdly, France had then many Homagers and Peers, that durst, were able, and did oppose the King; so that, by that means it was disunited; whereas now, there is none of any Potency that dare control the King, or his commands; or if there be, yet can they not but quickly be reduced into subjection, or else expelled as Fugitives, France being now wholly under obedience. Fourthly, it must likewise be considered, that the Forts, Ports, and Citadels of France were not then so strong, as now they are, being now all for the Major part, re-edified according to modern Fortification. Fiftly, the Revenues of the Crown of France, are far greater than ever they were, as aforesaid, the Revenues of Normandy alone, equalizing now the revenues ancient, of the whole crown, whereby the King of France is enabled to levy, and maintain greater Armies: to all this may be added our long ease (a great Disease I fear) by which we are of late become unexpert, to attempt any notable designs against so potent a Nation, as is France.  
11 So that for the reasons alleged, we can not stand other Nations in any great stead, for the Invasion of France; and therefore 'tis to be thought, that the Germane Princes, as many as can stand us in any stead, would not decline from France, which doth & may avail them (especially if the House of Austria fall to decay) to incline to us, who can avail them but little; and the Portugals (if they continue in a Kingdom independent from Spain) will, in any occasion of great importance, either wholly devote themselves to France (for that it may assist them against the Castilians, as likewise for Corn, Canvas, etc.) or else the Portugals will remain Newtrals: as for Spain (if they should lose Flanders) they would find enough to do, to keep themselves in safety on the other side of the Pyrenans; and besides, they will conceive, it may be, that for as much as we never throughly assisted them in their Countries of Flanders, etc. that therefore they were no way obliged afterwards to engage themselves for us; and besides (Flanders once lost) they were not able to do us any great good; no more were Italy, Denmark, Poland, and Swedeland in respect of their remoteness; and it is most probable also, that those Nations would remain as Newters between the French and us.  
So that if France should gain Flanders, and then fall out with us, 'tis to be feared, that the war once turned upon us, would come wholly to our shares to bear, and make an end of; and in such case, I hope all will agree that it were very necessary, that all our Ports, and places of importance, were strongly fortified, and securely guarded: and surely it can not be amiss to foresee, and prevent inconveniences by times, and indeed I conceive it now even high time to be looked unto; for albeit that the French have not as yet wholly subdued Flanders, yet are they in a reasonable forwardness, & possibility of gaining it but letting that pass to take the event of war; admit now the French should make a peace or Truce with the Spanish, who (by reason of their many, and great troubles) would 'tis very propable (before all were lost in Flanders) be glad to embrace Peace or Truce; and forasmuch as the French are on the winning hand, 'tis very likely therefore, that they would capitulate for their own advantage: let it therefore be supposed, that it should be concluded between the French and Spanish, in a present Truce; that neither should aid, or assist the enemies of one another during the time of such peace or Truce; which condition I believe the Spaniards would not refuse if it were urged; because they would not have the Portugals, Catalonians, and such like aided against themselves: if therefore such Truce (as aforesaid) were made between those two Nations, suppose the French should even now turn their furies & ambition upon us, were it not than most requisite, that all our Ports, and places of Importance were securely guarded, and strongly fortified?  
13 If it be said, that we would be Masters of the Sea, and by that means we should be able to divert any of the French forces, and not suffer them to land. I answer, that first it is a question whether we could master the French at sea, as they may be provided, and I believe, if the Hollanders (being now in a league Defensive, and offensive with them) would join with them, we should be deceived, and it would be well for us to be equal with them; but admit we should be equal, or somewhat Superior to the French at sea; what great security could be built upon that: they may draw (if they find themselves too weak) our ships of war into one place, by daring us, and making show of a Conflict with their ships, ●nd yet with lesser vessels land an Army, or forces in another place, and there surprise some convenient Port, Town, or Castle, if not sufficiently fortified, and strengthened to make resistance; and how many times have weak places been suddenly subdued, to the great prejudice of the owners, experience hath showed to the ruin of many; on the other side strong places (if not betrayed or most negligently kept) have many times foiled an enemy, and secured a whole Province; for no enemy (except of an investible power) will return fare into another's Country, leaving a strong place behind him, to which his enemies may assemble, and join themselves against him to make head, and if not fight with him afterwards, yet cut off his succours, and Convoys, by the help of such a place, thereby, by little and little weakening, and disinabling him. If it be farther said, that we need not fear an Invasion from France, or any other Nation; and consequently need not erect any strong Forts, for that a puissant Army of above 20000. 30000. or 40000. at the most, cannot be by shipping transported, or landed in this Island, and as for such powers our trained, or Military bands (with other forces soon raised) would be able to overthrow them. I answer to this, that 'tis not good to put such a thing to hazard; for (to omit the danger of Combines, etc.) Although I grant our trained, or Military bands to be a very good means (I even the best we now have) to preserve us, and to suppress an enemy: yet forasmuch as they are used to fight in jest, not in earnest, they might be foiled by lesser powers of old soldiers: such as now are the French, throughly exercised in the wars of Germany, Italy, Spain, and the Low-Countries: so that I conceive and conclude howsoever, that our Ports, and places of importance are (notwithstanding of our Fleet, & trained Bands) to be strongly secured.  
14 It may be some will say, that there is no great fear that the French will at any time molest us, but let such give me leave to tell them, that I could wish it so, as well as they, and that all the world would, if it might be, live and continue in peace, and unity; nor do I for my part accuse, or say, that the French will, or have an intent to make war upon us; yet I verily believe, I know, that  

1. The French, in general, envy our King's Title to France.  
2. That they bear unto us, old, and late Grudges for our I'll of Rey's Voyage.  
3. That they desire to be the chief (if they can, the sole) Regent's in Christendom; and therefore seek wholly to disinvest the house of Austria, that none should be able to oppose them.  
4. That they have set at variance, the Princes of Germany, and fomented the wars there, to the ruin, and in a manner Desolation thereof.  
5. That they have seized upon the Duke of Lorraines' Country, and other places not belonging to them.  
6. That they have reduced Savoy into the Nature of Vassalage, and thereby opened a way into Italy.  
7. That they have animated the Rebellions of Catalonia, and such like.  
8. That their Cardinal (who is upon the matter, their Dominus fac totum) is a most politic Prelate, etc.   
Now thereefor, if in zeal to my Country, I do but suspect the worst (not insisting upon it vehemently) I conceive, I may be by all indifferent men excused. Notwithstanding, I request all (especially my Superiors) to pardon, if I have inserted any thing amiss; hoping, that what I have written concerning Fortifications, or the Fortifying Ports, and other places of importance, will worthily be taken into consideration. For as 'tis truly said, that the Earth is  Ponderibus librata suis; 
So may it be as truly said, that a Kingdom or Commonwealth is (or aught to be) by Justice, and Warlike power equally balanced.   

1 IF it be objected, that the Fortifying, and maintaining of places of Importance will be somewhat chargeable to the Kingdom. I answer, better some charge, than no security, or safety.  
2. If it be objected, that Forts, and strong places, have divers times been, and may be yet the Nests of Rebels: I answer, that such Care, Policy, and Vigilancy, may be used in placing, and displacing Governors, and Officers, as that we may be as well secured from such dangers, as are the Spanish, Dutch, Venetian, and of late, the French, with other Nations.  
3. If it be farther objected, that strong places (if once surprised by an enemy) are with greater difficulty regained, whereas weaker places are soon got again. I answer, that stronger places likewise, are better able to keep out an enemy: so that they cannot but by more difficulty be Conquered, and weaker (if they once come into the hands of an enemy) will be by them made strong, if they intent farther to invade; so that the recovering of a weak place soon lost, may cost as dear, as of a stronger.   
FINIS.