To the Honourable, Major General SKIPPON, William Ball of Barkham, wisheth all good success and happiness.  
SIR,  
AT Your being in Redding, about what time the King's forces relinquished that place in May 1644. I presented unto You a paper, De jure Regnandi, et Regni, wherein was contained the heads and chief points of that Subject, and therein I promised to give farther satisfaction, which I hope I have now effected to the satisfaction of all indifferent men; and I have thought fit to dedicate it to Your Honour, to whom I first of all tendered the Epitome: remaining  
October 27. 1645. Your Honour's servant William Ball.   

Tractatus De jure Regnandi, & Regni: OR, The Sphere of Government, etc.  
MAny there are (too many at this day) who velis remisque, or rather vi & armis, do contend that the King's Prerogative power (as it is denominated) is like to Terra Australis Incognita, which is vast and unknown, and in a manner unlimited, extending from the Equator (as divers Cogmosgraphers describe) to the Pole Antarctic in latitude, and of an huge, yet uncertain longitude, some suppose it answers to all the degrees; and even so they would have the King's Prerogative power vast, and unknown, and in a manner unlimited, extending from the Equator of Law 90 degrees to the Pole or Period of sole Arbitrary Government in latitude; and in longitude so huge and uncertain, as that it answers to all the degrees of self end, to do every thing that Power would admit. Others there are, who suppose that the power of Parliament is like the Great Sea, which not only environs the Land, and enters into all the creeks and harbours, wheresoever its flux or currents can make way; but is thought also to extend from Pole to Pole, and to answer to all degrees of longitude by one denomination, or another, as it were boundless; for even so they would have the Parliaments power, not only to environ by limitation the King, and by their flux and currants of consultation to enter into all creeks and harbours of private policy, to make them beneficial for King and People; but it must be thought also to extend from Pole to Pole of Arbitrary jurisdiction, quasi ad placitum de omnibus, and (as these men would have it) to all degrees of absolute Authority, and as it were boundless. But these men must give me leave to tell them, that I cannot think the King's Terra Australis Incognita of Prerogative power, or the Parliaments Great Sea of juridical power to be so unlimited or boundless; or if they were, yet as the Air environs both the Land and the Great Sea, and gives life to all the creatures in them, and without which Air both Land and Sea would be desolate, and of no use; even so the People's good in general, environs both King and Parliament, and giveth life to all their actions, and without which Peoples good, both King and Parliament would be null, and of no use; and to make good this my opinion, or Assertion, I have inserted (as compendiously as I could) what of right generally belongs to King, Parliament, and People; submitting myself to more solid reasons or Arguments if given or produced.  
1. It is certain, that all power is of God, Rom. 13. and that it is derived from him either by extraordinary calling, or appointment, as was that of Moses, Aaron, etc. or by ordinary, which is either natural, as that power which a Parent hath naturally (grounded upon humane reason, as well as the Word of God) over his child; or Nationall, as that power which Potentates, or States have over their Subjects or People. And of power Nationall or Political, there are several species or forms, viz. Monarchy, Oligarchy, Aristocracy, Democracy, or mixed, or compounded of these forms: Monarchy is either unlimited, or limited; unlimited, is where tamburlaine jus Regni absolutê quâm Regnandi, as well the Law of the Realm absolutely, as the Law of Reigning, or ruling over, resides in one alone, as it did in Nabuchadnezzar, and is said to be in some of the Kings of the East, and of Africa at this day; limited is where Ius Regnandi, et Regni conditionatê, the Law of Reigning, or ruling over, and of the Realm conditionally resides in one alone, as it seemeth to have been in Darius, Dan. 6. who made not the Decree concerning sole petitioning himself, by himself alone (as did Nabuchadnezzar the adoration of the Image, Dan. 3) but by advice of his Princes, and Counsellors; nor could he alter his Statutes at his pleasure, as appears, Dan. 6. v. 15. and such like limited Monarches are the Great Turk, the King of Persia, and it may be the Emperors of Russia and Aethiopia; for these Potentates, albeit they can ad arbitrium, command to strangle, or deprive one man of his life, and he is deprived, and dispossess another of his goods, and he is dispossessed; yet can they not at their pleasure disannul, or alter their Religion, or fundamental Laws of their Nation: and this power of Monarchy unlimited, or limited, hath been imposed upon enslaved Nations, either by violent and unnatural conquests, as it was by the Assyrian, Caldean and Persian Monarches, etc. or by conquest, and consent (or agreement as it were) to undergo, and be governed by such power, as in Turkey, Muscovy; and in a manner in these days, in France, Castille, and Florence.  
Oligarchy, is where Ius Regni, sive Imperii, vel Reipublicae, the Law of the Realm or Empire, or Commonwealth, is entrusted to, and resident in a few, as it was in the Roman Triumvirs, who were not absolute, for they could not alter at their pleasure the Roman Laws, but were rather themselves alterable.  
Aristocracy, is where Ius Regni, sive Imperii vel Reipublicae, the Law of the Realm, or Empire, or Commonwealth, is resident in the Princes or chiefest of the people, and this power may be either inherent, and as it were absolute, as it is in Venice; or entrusted, or limited, or qualified, as in Holland and Geneva; for the Aristocratical Power, or States in those parts, give some account of their actions to satisfy the people.  
Democracy (to speak properly) is where Ius Reipublicae, the Law of the Commonwealth resides in the people, who have not only a perpetual power of nominating what Rulers and Governors they please, but also of dictating, or prescribing by what rules they will be governed by; and of this Democracy, if there be not an Exact, yet there is a near form in the Cantons of Switzerland.  
2. Mixed, or compound forms of Government consist sometimes, and in some places, of Monarchy and Aristocracy, as in Poland; or of Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, as in England: in Poland the Aristocracy hath been most prevalent: in England for the most part the Democracy hath prevailed: but I intent not to insist or instance what hath been defacto, or what ought to be de jure;— in England jus Regnandi is the Kings, he hath it introduced by conquest, which albeit that barely of itself it created not a just Title, yet joined with the consent of the Nation it 
Conquest without special warrant from God (as had the Israelites against the people of Canaan) or without a just N●tionall Ti● is unjust, ●●cause it is ● compained ● with two gr●si is, pride a● covetousness and is direct opposite to ● Law of natu● in that it depriveth other men of thei● liberty and propriety.  did; and to signify the King's introduction by conquest, the words â conquestu, are to this day inserted in all Fines: The King hath his jus Regnandi Dei, non populi gratiâ; and so hath the King of Poland (although he be elective) his jus Regnamdi Dei gratiâ, but not without, but by consent of his Nobility; in England it is our Kings by birthright: neither Nobility, or people can, or aught to deprive him of it, as long as he protecteth them according to the Laws, and conserveth them (to the utmost of his power) from foreign slavery or subjection.— And as Ius Regnandi is the Kings in England, so Ius Regni Actuals, & Potentiale, is the peoples in general (that is to say, the people in their several Degrees have right to their Laws in Being, and by their Feoffees, the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses, whom they intrust to give their consents, they have also right to the Laws in Posse, or to be) the King cannot, nor aught to nullify the Law or Laws at his pleasure: for as in a Lordship or Manor, the Law of Right of inheriting belongeth to the Lord, his heirs and successors; of which Right of inheriting, the Tenants of a Manor cannot, nor ought not to deprive the Lord, his lawful heirs and successors; and also in the same Lordship or Manor, the Law, or right of customs belongeth to the Tenants, their heirs or successors, of which right of customs the Lord cannot, nor aught to deprive the Tenants, their heirs or successors; even so is it, or aught to be in this Kingdom of England between the King and the people in general.  
3. And having said that Ius Regnandi is the Kings, I will first briefly insert what Ius Regnandi comprehends; it comprehends a power ordinary, and extraordinary; both limited, and qualified, neither absolute; and this last, some call Prerogative: The ordinary power of a King of England is to convene or assemble Parliaments, and to ratify or disannul what they shall generally approve, or disaprove of for the good of the Kingdom, or any essential part or member thereof; for as a Body politic the King is obliged in foro conscientia, to do any thing for the good of the Kingdom, provided that it destroy not his own right: The ordinary power also of a King of England is to nominate, and constitute Judges, and Civil Magistrates, Commanders and Officers Military; provided that such as concern the Public, be not generally disliked by the Public; because although it belongs to the King to appoint who shall sustain his person, or vices suas gerere, yet for as much as those persons do meddle with, and are conversant about the affairs of the Kingdom more than of the King, if Kingdom or Public therefore dislike them, the King ought in fore conscientiae, to displace them, and appoint such as they may like of. It is in the King's ordinary power also, to confer dignities, and to dispose of those things that merely concern his own Interest; I say merely, because the Crown is the King's Interest, but not merely his interest, he is owner of it but for his natural life, neither can he dispose of it. The King hath relation to the Crown but for his natural life, and then cedit alii.— The extraordinary (or Prerogative) power of a King of England, I define thus, Est virtus sive potentia in personâ Regiá benefaciendi sibi, & populo in quibus leges non sufficienter se extensas habent; a power residing, 
●xi extensas ●â leges se ●per inten● ad summū●ctum, cui ●dinantur ha●nt etsi n●n ●per dicunt ●dum illius ●ensionis.  or being in a King, whereby he may do good to himself, and people, in things wherein the Laws do not sufficiently extend; and this power may be said to be intra legem, sed non delege, this power is environed by the Law, and hath the same end that the Law hath, viz. the good of King and people; from this power extraordinary it follows, that if a sudden invasion should be before a Parliament could be convened, or assembled, (a thing not very likely) the King for the raising of forces for defence, might impose taxes upon his Subjects, such as were usually imposed upon them by consent of former Parliaments in such like cases; and for the doing or accomplishing thereof he may issue forth his Proclamations sufficiently strengthened with penal injunctions: But he ought forthwith to call, or assemble a Parliament, because the Public is involved as much, or more than himself, and that being assembled, not to do any thing without their consent: for to speak truly, a King of England is but in nature of an high Steward of the Kingdom by inheritance,— By this extraordinary power also a King may in some cases pardon (as they call it) or rather suspend or exempt the penalties due to convicted or condemned felons or traitors, for the Law only provides punishment due to such offenders; but the King may exempt the punishment, where the parties virtues, or deserts have formerly countervailed his misdeeds; or otherwise where there is hope and possibility, that he may by his good endeavours benefit the King, and Country as much as he hath damnified them; for these causes ought to be the end of exempting from punishment delinquents for matters or crimes of an high nature; and in such things as these consists the King's extraordinary power or Prerogative.  
4. Yet there is one thing greatly insisted upon, and affirmed by some to be a most essential part of the King's Prerogative, and that is the King's negative voice in Parliament; for my part I must confess that I could never be otherwise satisfied, but that all Statutes, or Acts of Parliament here in England, were made by consent of our Kings or Queens; and that the said Statutes, or Acts do themselves either explicitly, or implicitly demonstrate as much; for if it be not inserted in any Act or Statute, Be it therefore enacted by the Kings (or Queens) most excellent Majesty, with assent of the Lords and Commons, etc. then is it dictated, be it therefore enacted by Authority of this present Parliament, etc. wherein the King is comprehended as the head or chief of his Parliament, without whose consent (it seems) such Acts had not been in their full force and virtue,— not withstanding I do not see that because the King's consent doth give force or virtue to an Act or Statute, that therefore his non-consent, or negative voice is a most essential part of his Prerogative or power extraordinary, but rather of his ordinary power: and I conceive moreover power extraordinary or ordinary to consist rather in reason positive then negative, in being rather then in non being, and consequently in the King's power to consent, and Act, rather than in his power to non consent and non-act, which upon the matter, is but ens negativum, a denial of acting, enacting, or coenacting with the Parliament; 
●d hath free ●er to do at be plea●; yet the tribute of Omnipo●ce is not ●ominated ●● his not ●lingnesse to ●, but from power of ●ng able to ●, if willing; though the ●g have free ●er to con●● or dissent ●is Parlia●nt, even as ●s a body ●tick, yet the ●ue of his authority can● be deno●ated from non-wil●gnesse to ●sent, but ●● his pow●●facting, etc. ●illing.  wherefore concerning the King's negative voice in Parliament, I state the case thus; viz. that his consent is either necessary, or unnecessary to the consummating of an act in Parliament; if unnecessary, to what end should it be insisted upon? if necessary, then is his consent either voluntary, & free (as in reason it may seem to be, as well as the consent of either House of Parliament) or else the King is tied and obliged, not only in foro conscientiae, but jure determinato to give his consent; this last cannot be made appear; for a King of England hath power to write, if willing to give his consent Le Roy It veult, or if unwilling, Le roil avisera (as for that allegation which some bring, viz. that the King never writes, Le Roy le neult, or the King will not, it seemeth to me of no great consequence for if the King may as a Politic body advise as he pleaseth, he may consequently not will, till he please; wherefore his consent-must be voluntary, that is to say the King hath free power to consent or descent, even as he is a Body Politic, not withstanding that the virtue of his Authority consists in his positive power of consent, or being able to Act, etc. as aforesaid.  
5. Furthermore for my part I conceive, that although the King have free power to consent or descent (even as he is a Politic body) and that his consent give force and virtue to an Act and Statute (as aforesaid) yet his dissent doth not or cannot frustrate, or make void an Ordinance concluded of and avouched by both Houses of Parliament, and generally accepted of by the whole, or major part of the Kingdom; and the reason is, because the Parliament is the representative Body of the Kingdom, entrusted by the Kingdom, and may therefore conclude of, and constitute what shall seem expedient for the good of the Kingdom; and such constitution, or Ordinance (generally admitted as aforesaid) hath, or aught to have the nature and vigour of Law, for Ius Regni tâm Actuale, quâm Potentiale, is the peoples in general, they are interested in that, the King's interest consists in jure Regnandi: but to this some it may be will object, that almost all immunities and privileges to Cities, and especially to Towns corporate, have been conferred by our Kings; yea some will not stick to affirm that all the liberties of the Kingdom have been granted by our Kings, and that therefore it may seem unjust that any constitution or ordinance should have the nature or vigour of Law, nolente Rege, to this I answer, that almost all such immunities or privileges are included Radically in the general liberties of the shares or shires of the Kingdom, so that they are not mere Grants of our Kings, but Treasures of the Kingdom in more special manner applied by our Kings to some places, and persons; and as touching all liberties of the Kingdom to have been granted by Kings, I confess I was once inclined to that opinion in respect of the conquest; but having considered that conquest barely of itself createth no just Title (as formerly instanced) and that the Laws and liberties which this Kingdom now enjoyeth were upon the matter existent before the conquest; & that the Conqueror, his heirs and successors were obliged, strict in foro conscientia, to conserve and maintain them (albeit they violated too many of them) I say these things considered, I cannot find how the liberties of the Kingdom should proceed from our Kings, but that they are the peoples in general by right, even as the Crown, or Ius Regnandi is the Kings by birthright; yet admitting that some immunities or privileges were granted by our Kings to some places and persons, or to the Kingdom in general; may not the people, or (their feoffees in trust) the Parliament make the best use of such Grants, as well as Kings have made use of Grants from their Subjects? And why should then the King's Grants of privileges or liberties (if any such have been) impeach the Subjects in general, or Parliament from doing what they may do jure Regni for their general good; any more than the Subjects Grants to Kings should impeach them from doing what they may do jure Regnandi for their own good? surely there can no reason be shown; so that for my part I conceive that Ordinances in nature as aforesaid have, and aught to have the force and vigour of Law.  
1. And I intent now by way of reason, to instance the general benefit and liberty, which the Subjects of England have by the Law, or rather their Law (I exclude not the King from any benefit thereof, but only from power of violation) The Law here in England (to comprehend all special Laws in one general term) is (as I conceive) A rule admitted by common consent, by which all men from the highest to the lowest (according to their several degrees) are to regulate their actions: to this, both King and people have consented; by this, both King and people are preserved; with this, both King and people are united, and as it were linked together: This Law is the true Robur Britanicum, whereof the Common-Law is the root and stock; and the Statutes, Acts and Ordinances of Parliament are the branches, which at several times upon several occasions, have spread themselves to solace the Subjects of this Kingdom, under which they might in peace repose: Now the Subjects of this Kingdom, which live under this Law of common consent, may be considered either as the Body essential, and so all natural or native persons of what degree soever in all Counties, Cities and Towns corporate, and wheresoever within the limits of this Kingdom are comprehended; or else the Subjects of this Kingdom may be considered as the Body representative, and so the Parliament is only intended consisting of Lords or Peers (quasipares inter se) and of Knights, Citizens and Burgesses, for the Counties, Cities and Towns corporate: These Knights, Citizens and Burgesses, are elected by the democratical body of Freeholders, and such like of the people, and do represent, or vices suas gerere (if the people without confusion or disorder could assemble together, there were no need of such election) so that these are the true Representative Body democratical of this Kingdom: the Lords are in nature of a Body Aristocratical, and the King in form of a Monarch: and these three (viz. King, Lords, and Commons) are in themselves so indifferently, and exactly composed without excess or defect ab origine, that as soul and body make but one entire man, so these three make but one entire power of government, the which (if defects or exorbitances should not, or do not distemper, as diseases do sometimes the soundest bodies, is without any flattery or vainglorious praise, the most excellent known form of government in the world.  
2. This power aforesaid may enact any thing in beneficium Regni, for the benefit of the Kingdom, be it general or special, etc. but this power in detrimentum libertatis, aut proprietatis generalis subditerum Angliae, cannot do any thing; not any thing I say to damnify the general liberty, and propriety of the Subjects of England, and the reason is, because the English are subditi potius, quam subjecti, such as have rather put themselves under a law by common consent, then enforced to undergo a Law.— Wherefore I conceive the L. Digby to be greatly mistaken, who affirmed that a King of England ensphered in his Parliament was as absolute as any Monarch of the East; some Monarches of the East can command to strangle one, and he is strangled; and to deprive another of his goods, or estate, and he is deprived; and this they can do ad placitum, without showing any cause; but the King and Parliament in England cannot do so; those Monarches can, and some of them have, and do make Laws that all their subjects estates shall be at their own disposals; viz. that 
The Parliament by imposing Subsidies and the like, do not dispose of the Subject's estates in general ad placitum: but only apply equally so much of every man's estate as seems convenient (in necessitatem Regni, etc.) the necessity of the Kingdom, and such like.  they may take from whom they please, what they please, all if they please, ad placitum; but in England the King and Parliament cannot do so; for the King (as aforesaid) is but in nature of high Steward of the Kingdom by inheritance, and the Parliament seoffees in Trust; and both tied by the great Indenture of Magna Charta to conserve the general liberty and propriety of the people: And it is to be noted, that (since Magna Charta was confirmed, which upon the matter, is but an Abridgement or Epitome of the liberties and rights of the Subjects of England before the conquest, which liberties and rights are grounded upon the Law of God and natural reason) when any King of England would have extraordinary supplies from the people, that (the Parliament being convened) the King hath given or shown some probable or seeming reasons why he desired, or had need of such supplies, and the Members of Parliament (I mean those of the House of Commons) at their return to the places which entrusted them, have likewise shown or manifested some general reasons, or causes to the people, why such extraordinary supplies were by them granted. (And surely were there now an account taken, and given of the extraordinary and vast supplies levied on the estates of the people, it would give a great satisfaction) so that neither King or Parliament did at any time take ad placitum, but ad necessitatem, nor did the people otherwise grant any extraordinary supplies of money.  
3. But some it may be will object, and say, suppose the King and Parliament should make an act that they would & might dispose of all the Subjects estates in England (themselves excepted, or not excepted) and consequently that they might take from whom they please, what they please, all if they please, ad placitum; what remedy might the Subjects have? I answer that for my part, I suppose it almost impossible that the King and Parliament should do such a thing; but admitting of a kind of impossible possibility, I answer further, that in such case, the Counties, Cities, and Towns corporate might and ought first to petition against so great an injury, and if not remedied than they might declare and protest against such an act; if violated than they might defend themselves by Arms; for if the Representative Body of the Kingdom, may in the behalf of the Kingdom, raise Arms for the defence of themselves and the Kingdom, may not the essential? is not the cause more noble than the effect, in that it gives being to the effect? do not the Counties, Cities and Towns corporate give being, or a well-being to the Knights, Citizens and Burgesses by intrusting their power judicial to them? And yet by reposing or granting such Trust, they do not disinvest themselves of their right natural (no more than one that passeth an estate to feoffees in Trust for some causes and considerations, disinvesteth himself of the use intended or reserved) so that they may defend their liberties and proprieties even by law of Nature, which no special or Nationall Laws can nullify, unless men will become, or be made slaves, and lose the right of Nature. And besides it is an Axiom Political, ubi nulla protectio, ibi nulla subjectio; if therefore the King or Parliament, or King and Parliament should make an Act, that they might dispose of all Subjects estates ad placitum, as aforesaid, deficiunt â protectione; they fail or fall from the protection of the people; and then the people may deficere â subjectione, and protect themselves, their liberties and proprieties even by Law Political.  
4. But some will farther object that it may be, that the Counties, Cities and Towns corporate, do intrust all their power both judicial and Natural, fully and wholly as it were, to the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses, at their election, promising and covenanting to stand to all that they shall do in Parliament, etc. And they will it may be object, and say moreover that the King and Parliament are the Legislative power in England, and that they may as well make a Law to dispose of all Subjects estates in England, ad placitum, etc. as they have made, and can make Laws concerning Religion, and the like.— I answer, that albeit the Counties, Cities, and Towns corporate, do intrust their power judicial (not natural) to the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses, and promise to stand to what they shall do, yet they intrust it in beneficium Regni, nonperniciem (that is the proper and adequate object and end of their trust) and they promise to stand to what they shall do in matters disputable, whether 
Religion is a matter disputable.  they be Actual, or de facto, or Potential, wherein the Kingdom may be either benefited or damnified, and of such things the people make them their Judges, but not in matters indisputable, wherein without any dispute the Kingdom would be wholly damnified, and enslaved, and deprived of its natural right (as in the King and Parliament having a power to dispose of all men's estates ad placitum, as aforesaid, of such things they make them no Judges: and the word Represent infers as much, for to represent, or alterius vices gerere doth not import (as some would have it) to be an absolute judge or Umpire in all things, (for then he doth not represent, or vices gerere, but is absolute, and independent) but in some things moreover the writ whereby the Parliament is convened declares that they are not called together the omnibus, sed de quibusdam arduis Rebus, & negotiis regentibus, etc. some things need not Parliament Assemblies to determine of them, but only to conserve them from violation, as the general and fundamental liberty and propriety of the subject, etc. and as concerning that the King and Parliament are the Legislative power in England, I grant that they are in things disputable, as aforesaid, but not in things indisputable, such as is the general and fundamental liberty and propriety of the Subject grounded upon the Law of Nature, etc. concerning their lives and estates, as formerly mentioned.  
1. And now to satisfy such, who (by misinterpreting some places or texts of Scripture) suppose it most unlawful and heinous for a Nation or People to defend by Arms against a natural, or rather Nationall power (whether Potentate or Potency it makes no matter) their Laws and liberties if violated; I have thought good to discuss and resolve some of their chiefest Allegations; and first, that of the 13. to the Romans, Let every soul be subject to the higher power for there is no power but of God, etc. Concerning which Text, I say, that every soul ought to be subject to the higher power, so far forth as that power doth lawfully extend (for God commandeth no unlawful thing) either by divine Law, or by Law of Nature, or by Law of Nations: Power by Divine Law is that which hath extraordinary or special appointment by God; (as I have already instanced in the beginning) that of Nature is grounded upon common principles of reason; that of Nations upon prudent and political reasons and considerations: Now to this last Power subjection may be due more or less; for some Nations have agreed and covenanted as it were to be slaves, as the Persians, Muscovites, Turks, etc. others have made a better bargain for themselves in matters of subjection, as the English, Aragonez, etc. Now when the Apostle says, Let every soul be subject to the higher power, etc. he intends not that such as were less subject, should make themselves slavish by undergoing any kind of needless or enforced subjection; but only that they should be so far forth subject as God had made, or caused them to be subject: And the Apostle infers as much in the same Chapter, v. 7. Render therefore to all their deuce, tribute to whom tribute; custom to whom custom, fear to whom fear; honour to whom honour: he doth not say, Render more than is due if it be exacted: Moreover the Apostle in the words, Let every soul be subject, etc. induces a general cause of obedience, not a special or in some cases: for suppose the Apostle had said, Spare, or be merciful to all men, for there is no man but he is of God, or the Image of God; this had not prohibited, but it might have been lawful to punish malefactors; so when the Apostle says, Let every soul be subject to the higher power, for there is no power but of God, etc. This hinders not but that it may be lawful to oppose Tyrants, usurpers, and such like: And when the Apostle says farther, for whosoever resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God, etc. it must surely be understood of power one way, or other lawful (as the 3. v. in the same Chapter, and the verses following show) for if otherwise the enslaved or oppressed people may free themselves (if they find convenient occasion) from their bondage (without any special warrant from God) as did the petty Kings and people of Sodom and Gomorah, who were enslaved, or made Tributaries, Gen. 14. yet their levying War (or Rebellion) was not reprehended, but rather countenanced by the high Priest in the time of the Law of Nature, and the usurping Tyrants of the Nations called enemies of just Abraham their assistant, who surely would not have aided or rescued his brother, and the rest of his brother's friends without some special warrant from God, whereof we read of none) if their levying of War (or Rebellion) to free themselves from bondage had been unjust, but indeed the Law of Nature dictated their War to be just.  
2. Another Allegation greatly insisted upon (albeit I see no great reason for it) to prohibit Subjects to take Arms in any case of Tyranny and oppression against a Nationall Potentate, is the Text, Matth. 22. v. 21. Render therefore to Caesar the things which are Caesar's, and to God the things which are Gods; whereby some would conclude, that all temporal estates of Subjects are Caesars (or of such like as Caesar) and that therefore if Caesar should and would demand men to surrender all their estates into his hands they ought to do it; or otherwise, if he should by violence take it, they ought to permit him, and no way to resist him; but I answer to such, that there is in those words not only a distinction of things spiritual and temporal, Gods and Caesar's; but also a limitation of things temporal; for it is not said, Render all your money, or substance to Caesar, but the things which are Caesar's, so much as is due to him, his tribute money, and such like: It may be some Critic will object and say, that it is also said, And to God, the things that are Gods, and that therefore according to this interpretation God may seem also to be limited; not so; for where the Text will admit of limitation (as aforesaid) there it ought to be admitted, but where it will not without incongruity, there it ought not to be admitted; when we have done all what we can do in respect of God's service, we are but unprofitable servants, we cannot punctually perform our duties; but we may give, or Render too much to Caesar, or Caesars, 
●e ren●●●●ore ● is  Potentates or Potencies; unless they make it appear that what we Render is for our good, as well as for theirs.  
3. Some there are also who allege the 1 of Peter, 2. 13. Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man, for the Lords sake; whether it be to the King as supreme, etc. and hence they would infer that all Acts, or Ordinances of Kings ought to be obeyed, or otherwise undergone and suffered, they must not be resisted: But surely Acts 4. v. 19 and also 5. v. 19 in things touching God, their Ordinances ought not to be obeyed, if opposite to the Ordinances of God; and for Ordinances of man, it seems that the Apostle meant that they should submit themselves only to such as were legal by the Law of Nature and Nations; as the very next verse imports, or unto Governors, as unto them that are sent by him, for the punishment of evil doers, and for the praise of them that do well: Now the Apostle could not call any thing well done (for good there was none amongst the Heathenish Kings, and in his days there were no Christian Kings neither in old Babylon, or new; but if there were it maketh no matter) I say the Apostle could not call any thing ordained by man, or of the Ordinance of man, well done, but such as should be congruous to the Law of Nature and Nations; such thing or things which albeit they were not the Evangelio, yet they were not contra Evangelium; such as the Apostle St. Paul speaks of; that the Heathens without the Law written, did according to the Law, to the Ordinances of such natural, and national things doth the Apostle Peter command obedience, when he says, Submit yourselves to every Ordinance of man, etc. but not to unjust Ordinances, for that he could not mean if contrary to the Law of God, or of Nature and Nations.  
4. Others greatly insist upon the 2. and 4. verses of the eight Chapter of the Book of Ecclesiastes, viz. I counsel thee to keep the King's commandment, and that in regard of the oath of God,— where the word of a King is, there is power, and who may say unto him, what dost thou? First, it is to be noted that Solomon speaks of a King who had (as almost all the Kings of the East his neighbours had) Potestatem vitae, & necis ad placitum, and were in a manner absolute; and such a one was Solomon himself upon the matter; for the people of Israel, when they desired a King, desired such a one as all the Nations had, 1 Sam. 8. 5. and those were such as I have instanced, especially those of their neighbour Kings; insomuch that God was angry or displeased with the people, that they would put themselves into so great a bondage, as to desire or become subject to such a King, or Kings of such a nature; & therefore God bad Samuel show them the nature of such a King; Now Solomon by way of counsel, or prudent policy adviseth men to keep the (legal) commandments of such a King (illegal he could not advise) in respect they had sworn to him (in the name of God as it seems) to do so: And if (as I have already instanced) a man become a slave to the great Turk, or swear slavery to him, he ought to perform it, for he hath sworn it in the name of God; but if not, he is not bound, he ought rather to make use of his freedom, according to that of the 1 Cor. 7. v. 21.— and as for the words, who may say to him what dost thou? it is true, such Kings were uncontroleable; but our Kings are not Kings of such a nature, we only swear to be true and loyal to them de jure Regnandi, (viz. that we in conscience believe them to be our lawful Kings, and that we will defend their Crown, Dignities, etc. to the uttermost of our power) which, God forbidden, any one should so much as imagine to deprive our Kings of; but we swear not to our Kings that they shall be the absolute disposers de jure Regni, we have otherwise conditioned; and therefore we are not any way comprehended in or by the before recited Texts to become slavish by keeping, or obeying all Commandments of our Kings of what nature soever: There are some other Texts of Scripture of the nature of these last recited, and reducible to the same exposition.  
5. Yet furthermore, I will instance one Text, Matth. 5. v. 39 But I say unto ye resist not evil, etc. Hence some will that free Subjects ought to suffer all indignities, oppressions and tyrannies, rather than to resist or defend themselves by Arms: But it is to be noted, that the true meaning of that Textis, that where God's name may by suffering be magnified, there men ought to suffer all indignities, rather than to resist; but where God's name may by suffering be rather dishonoured, then magnified, there men ought not to suffer actually but intentionally: as thus, A Judge if a base fellow should strike him on the one ear or cheek, aught to have so much patience, as that he could turn the other; yet he ought not actually to do it, lest his Authority, and the Laws of the Land also should suffer contempt: And a King, if an usurper should endeavour to dispose of his Sceptre (or lawful power exercised aught to have so much humility, as that he could let him have his Crown also, or right of Reigning) but yet he ought not actually to do it, lest he injure not only his Regal Authority, but also his Subjects in general, whose welfare he is bound to protect: And even so likewise, a people, if a Nationall Potent, or Potency should tyrannize or oppress them, ought (if it were possible all of them) to have so much patience and humility, as that they could suffer all indignities, yet they ought not always to suffer them, lest (in some cases) by too much suffering, the Law of God, of Nature, and of their Nation (all which they are bound to conserve) should be violated: in the Chapter before recited, v. 22. it is forbidden to call a brother fool, yet St. Paul called the Galathians fools, or foolish, Gal. 3. But how? out of admonition and compassion, not in hate or contempt, but in ordine ad Deum, to reprove, and advise them; and every act moral is specified by the object and end; so that if a People (to whom jus Regni belongs) take Arms to defend their Laws and liberties, etc. they do it not out of Rebellion, but in ordine ad Deum, to reduce and reform usurping or exorbitant Potentates or Potencies.  
Thus I conclude for the present, praying the Almighty Governor of all things, that King, Parliament and People, might in a happy union enjoy their just Power, Privilege and Proprieties. Amen.  
WILLIAM BALL.