CERTAIN MATERIAL CONSIDERATIONS Touching the differences of the present times, collected by a faithful pursuer of Peace and Truth.  1 COR. 13.8. We can do nothing against the truth, but for the truth. 1 THES. 5.21. Prove all things, hold fast that which is good. JAM. 3.17. The wisdom that is from above, is first pure, then peaceable, gentle and easy to be entreated. 
London, Printed 1642.   

Right Honourable,  
THese Collections which I herewith send, having passed the censure of some learned Friends with good approbation, I presume to commend to your Honour's perusal and final disposing: If I be out in any thing I shall accept it as a great favour if your Honour will stoop to advertise me of it. The notes upon the Observations I have not yet fairly copied out, being a weak scribe, in regard of my continuing infirmities: otherwise I had adventured them with these, (as I had a good while since designed them) to your Honour's hands: glad would my heart have been (as I presume many more) if the pen or tongue might rather have arbitrated these differences than the sword, which puts no difference between good and evil; The good God look down in mercy upon the Land, and put an happy end to these miseries which otherwise are like to put a miserable end to all our happiness. This is the constant prayer of▪  
Late at night and in haste  
Your Honours humbly devoted and (in these times) nameless servant in Christ jesus.   

To his Friend.  
SIR,  
HAving been much troubled (even to restlessness) in my thoughts, about the tender and dangerous distractions of these times, I have oft and earnestly besought Almighty God in my prayers, that he would so assist me with his spirit, that I might honestly set myself to seek the truth, so seeking might find it, and finding it might cheerfully embrace it, and constantly cleave unto it, in what case or danger soever I should find it. To this end I tasked myself to the saddest and severest Meditations my weak body and Intellectuals could undergo: which being (I trust by the guidance of GOD) resolved into these ensuing Hypotheses, I commit to your judicious and most impartial censure; being not so fond of my own fancies, but that I can endure to see them stripped naked, and if they prove not the issues of Truth, to disinherit them from ever having further possession of my thoughts. I see not many things, and hear not all; living so remote from any Town where the Tide of Books and reports flows in. Some Pamphlets there are walking about with as much confidence (and finding as good entertainment) as Truth itself needeth, and with a great deal less modesty than that useth to do: Pleas, Appeals, Reasons, etc. which beg the questions I looked they should prove, and left me more unsatisfied (rather) than they found me. I have hitherto (perhaps through fondness) more contentment from these conceptions of my own, which I entreat you to examine with all faithfulness and severity: as knowing that you cannot do yourself or me any greater injury, then to flatter me in falsehood; who am come (praised be God) so far towards wisdom, as hearty to thank him who rebukes me in love, and lovingly to honour him who refutes me with reason.  
Homo sum, errare possum: Christianus sum, Haereticus esse nolo. PHILALETHES.   

THe Book of Observations upon His Majesty's Answers and Expresses did most of all stumble me, but it was more by confounding then convincing my reason: upon a due examination it seemed to me but a solid piece of Sophistry, or learned Imposture, I have made some strictures throughout upon him, you shall see and censure them if I may receive any intimation that you guess them worth the looking on.   

Conscientiae laboro, non famae, non vitae.  
Whilst I was musing the fire kindled, and at the last I spoke with my pen; writing but what I believe, and believing what I writ to be the very truth, my conscience bearing me witness in the Holy Ghost.  
ALthough the King and Parliament assembled together, are the most honourable and supreme Court of the Kingdom, from whom there is no humane Appeal; yet they are still to be looked on but as a company of men subject to infirmities, passions, and errors as others are: and therefore may determine (even where they concur) things evil in themselves: or else we must grant that no Parliamentary Acts were ever evil in themselves (and so needed no abrogation) but only inconvenient for time and occasions, and so needed but suspensions, till fit seasons of reinforcing them might return. And if the whole may err in their determinations, much more may the parts severally and alone.  
2. In so great a number it is probable there still will be, (as it is certain now there are) some of green years, slender parts, small experience, little, or no learning either in Arts, or Law: and I may add (from the censures of some part of that Court upon the other) of (at least) suspected integrity: who as they are chosen by popular voices (wherein sinister References of times bear no small sway) so are they (probably) lead in Voting by Popular Arguments tending most to liberty: being incompetent Judges of the Method's and Mysteries of State-government. Whence it will follow, that since number of Voices, and not depth of Argument carries it; the fittest and justest Propositions, may be oft overborne by number, which cannot be confuted by reason.  
3 As it is true, that no evil aught to be imagined of the Parliament, so is it as true that No evil aught to be imagined of the King; and yet it is not untrue, that where there is none, the Greatest evil may be suspected, and the Greatest evil may be where None is imagined.  
4 Though no Evil aught to be imagined of the Parliament, conjunctim and in the lump: viz. That what the King and Both Houses shall faitly and freely conclude upon and enact, will prejudice no man; yet in regard of particular Members, when I know evil by them, I may suspect evil from them. Else why doth one part of the Parliament not only suspect, but say so much, and so great evil of the other? Whilst they mutually repute each other enemies to the State, which of all Civil evils is the greatest.  
5 When there is a noise of extreme danger (which all men fear) and then earnest undertaking for prevention, (which all men desire) it is easy to conceive, how readily men will assent, without a due examination either of the imminence of the danger, or lawfulness of the prevention: especially men of the weaker sort, not well able to judge of either.  
6 When it is possible that no one in either house of Parliament may be learned in the Laws, since Noblemen, Knights, Gentlemen, Citizens and Townsmen (of which they consist) are not necessarily so to be, nor one more than Another: I see not how the judgement of the Law can fully and properly reside in them; especially when the King consents not. And so much seems employed by the sitting of the Judges in the house; who (for aught I hear) have no other office there, but to advise or advertise in point of Law.  
7 When it is said, that the judgement of the major part of both houses is the judgement of the Parliament, and consequently of the Kingdom; I conceive it is not rightly affirmed. For (besides that the judgement of the Clergy is not (so much as in a shadow) there represented, who are a considerable part of the Kingdom, and should be presumed to have as good judgement, and be as good men as others:) I resign not my judgement but obedience to the Parliament: and not barely to the Burgesses of my own Town (whom perhaps I think very unfit, and who were chosen against my will,) but to the result determinations of both houses; and not to them only neither, but as all are allowed, confirmed, and perfected by the King's assent. For I am represented in the Commons but as subordinate to the King, and to join with the King and the Lords (not without, or against both, or either of them) to make Laws for the good of the Kingdom. So that when the Act is made by the concurrence of all three States; then, and (I suppose) not till then, it becomes obligatory, and as a peaceable Subject I must obey, if it be lawful before God; though my judgement be still free, and at home, and I do think it inexpedient, as the Negative part of Votes do. For it is impossible, and against Reason and Nature, that an understanding Man's judgement, backed with strength of Argument should be led captive merely by the odds of two or three voices.  
8 The major part of the houses being that part, which exceeds the other though but by three or four voices: shall not that Law which is concluded only by the advantage of those voices, without the King's consent, be a Lesbian Rule, or a Nose of wax; which upon a second Vote may pass the contrary way, upon a casual absence or presence of so small a number? The Law is a straight Rule, and always like itself. If such or such a thing be Law after it was so voted by the major part of the houses, it was Law before it was so voted; unless an absolute power of New-law-making be in such a Vote) and so might be put in execution without a new voting: only the Law ought to be produced. If the major part of the Votes of both Houses be only Declarative of the Law, then in reason the first Voting should stand, or else this will be a very uncertain rule: And so the case of ordering the Militia should not be according to Law, because it was first, and twice countervoted by the House of Lords. Such broad and obvious exceptions ought in matters of so high concernment, to be fully cleared and removed.  
9 When the question is, Who shall be judge of Law? I conceive it must be meant, either of the sense of particular Laws, or of the latitude and scope of the Law in general. If of the first, I suppose the sense will appear, either first, By the clear light it hath in itself, (as the Sun shows its own light) or secondly, By references to other Laws or clauses touching the same argument which are more perspicuous. Or thirdly, By the usance and practice, which is the life of Laws. If none of these can make it plain, in my judgement it becomes no Law, but is obsolete, until a full sense be agreed on again by that full Authority which first made the Law. Otherwise I see not how any rule for declaring of Law can be always absolutely determinative. For (besides that the same thing is at divers votings, diversely voted) If the Votes of either House should chance (as possibly they may) to be equally divided, and the major part of both Houses severally, be necessarily required to determine; where shall the determination be, when the Votes of one (at least) are equally balanced? Unless we fly to a third way, viz. the major part of both Houses in gross, where the exception lies as full, because even then also they may chance to be equal. If it be understood of the Second, than that Latitude or Scope ought to be evinced from some Terms in the Law expressed, (which terms are to be produced) and not from the pleasure of any who shall say that is lawful which seems so to them: especially when they make themselves the sole Judges of Law and Equity. For whither will not such a liberty reach? A Transition is so made, à genere ad genus, from positive law to the law of reason; and that, being various according to diversity of apprehensions, cannot be imposed upon all, where the full Legislative power is not concurrent. And I conceive it is no● properly said, That in extreme danger, I may by Law do that which otherwise I may not do: but that in such a case, I may do that and be excused, which by Law I cannot do. As in an assault (I think) the Law doth not say, you may kill a man, or take away his weapon, but if you do it, The Law will not punish you, because it is against all reason, that where the Law affords me no help, it should not hold me excused for helping myself, when Necessity (which hath no law) is so pressing, that otherwise I must perish.  
10 When necessity and extreme danger are made the grounds, for (otherwise) doubtful and dangerous undertake, it were meet those Terms were rightly defined, that so we might clearly see the soundness of our warrant. I conceive it to be, when a man is so presently distressed, that he can make no possible use of any positive law to help him, and so becomes in a sort disobliged from it, and left free to the law of Nature, which prompts every thing to seek the preservation of itself. This necessity dispenceth with ordinary duties both to God and man. But we must be sure of the necessity before we assume the liberty. If a man steal, and plead necessity, he shall not be excused because the Law hath not left him remediless in his want. I may not take another's sword from him, because I have cause to fear he will hurt me; nor the sword that I have lent one, though he hath threatened to kill me, so long as he draws it not upon me, nor offereth force unto me: Because I have yet a remedy by law, and may bind him to the Peace, etc. And then much less may I wrest his away that hath sworn to defend me. When necessity is but supposed, no Simple and absolute necessity is confessed, and so no law under pretence of necessity is yet to be violated. The Kingdom may be in danger and yet the danger not extreme; nor any necessity such, but that it may be preserved by ordinary defence: or if the danger be urgent, we may not seek to prevent that without Law, which by law is well provided for already. In great dangers (such as now are supposed) the Kingdom is to be put into a posture of defence against Foreign Invasion, or Domestic Tumult and Rebellion. By Law and Custom the King is to order it. [And so much is acknowledged by the present Parliament in their Reply to the Kings Answer of the 29. of January: where (speaking of the Forts and Castles of the Kingdom) they have these words. viz. We confess the nomination of any person to those places, being so principal and inseparable a Flower of your Crown vested in you, and derived to you from your Ancestors, by the fundamental Laws of the Kingdom, you may reserve to yourself. And anon after speaking of the Militia, They say, Which Militia ●e likewise acknowledge by the Law is subject to no command but of your Majesty, and of Authority lawfully derived from you▪] Now the King carefully applying himself to it; I see not what necessity, or disobliging extremity can justly be alleged to dispossess him of it, when he is not convinced to have failed in his duty. To doubt that he will fail, is not to prove that he hath, but rather that yet he hath not done it. If the Enemy were landed, or the Subjects assaulted (which are degrees beyond our dangers, (at least) when this fell first into debate) the ordering of defence would be still in the King; (unless where particular outrages, enforced particular places to the defence of themselves by the law of Necessity, which awaiteth no Laws.) But if the King be regardless of his Trust and his people's safety, and let the Enemy graze along his Kingdom; or any of his Ministers prove false to the State, and either take with a Foreign, or become themselves a home Enemy, and the King strive not to suppress them, or (all which far be it to imagine) do animate and incite them to despoil his good Subjects; Then (and I suppose not till then) is the danger in extremity, and then is the plea just for the Laws of necessity▪ which do not only enable the State in common, but every man in particular to seek the preservation of himself and of his Country, by all such ways as stand not in opposition to the Law of God.  
11 When I protest to defend the power and privileges of Parliament; It is but so far as lawfully I may, and so far as I know them, or aught to know them being easy to be known, viz. such as by Custom and unanimous Consent have obtained as unquestionable, not such as are quarrelled among themselves, some claiming, and others gainsaying: nor such as are challenged, without, or against the King; who being part of the Parliament, aught to have Consent in the concluding of Privileges; at least ought not to be unprivileged without his consent whose privileges are protested for, as well as (and with) the rest, and the defence of them sworn to in the oath of Supremacy: Where we swear (to our power) to assist and defend all jurisdiction, privilege, pre-eminence and Authority granted or belonging to the King's Highness, his Heirs etc. If the disposing of the Navy, Forts, Magazines, and Militia be (as 'tis confessed they are) by the Law of the Land the Privilege of the King, there can be no distinction (to my apprehension) imagined, upon any fears, or jealousies whatsoever, (where no evil is by him actually practised, and all intentions of evil are absolutely abjured) to warrant any men, (few or moe, in Parliament, or out of Parliament, who have taken that Oath) to dispossess him of them, or detain them from him, in what manner soever he shall come to demand them. For the Oath is peremptory and unlimited, & non est distinguendum ubi lex non distinguit. To say they are detained for him, (not from him) might have some colour if the King were either a child, distracted, or Weak minded: But to an adult and understanding Prince, such a pretence is a higher derogation, by disparaging his wisdom or fidelity.  
12 Where power is invested in any; and by custom, and free consent of all is made hereditary: I conclave it cannot afterwards be limited with other conditions then at first were agreed on, without the consent of him that hath it.  
13 That which is certainly lawful, and but doubtfully dangerous, is to be chosen rather than that which is not certainly lawful, and but doubtfully safe, When A man offers no violence, (though upon good reason I fear he will hurt me) to let his sword alone is certainly lawful, and but doubtfully dangerous: To wrest it from him when he makes no assault, is not certainly lawful, (but rather certainly unlawful) and but doubtfully safe: (or rather undoubtedly dangerous) for by that occasion a quarrel may be made, and blood shed, which might otherwise possibly (at least) have been saved. I would the application were not easy.  
14 If a man being illegally dispossessed of his right, do (in heat of contention) use some illegal means for the recovery of it, that is not to be drawn into argument to justify the illegallity of the first usurpation. If a man unassaulted wrist my sword from me, and I afterwards beat him, he may not draw my after-beating into argument, to justify his taking my sword from me.  
15 When the envy of not yielding to the advice of his great Council, is cast upon his Majesty; It is fit to set the case upon its own legs. It seems by many passages in the observations, and other books and by more than Booke-passages, that the King is esteemed a Tyrant over his people. For what else is employed in the distrusting and Vilepending of his Oaths, Obtestations, Imprecations, Execrations? In reputing the Attendance and Company about him (whom he owns and protects) Enemies to the State in raising at least defensive Arms? in seizing his Navy, Shutting the Town Gates against him, and possessing his Forts and Magazines against his Command? For will a man wrest another's sword from him, if he do not presume he will draw it upon him? Nay, is it lawful to take any man's sword (if any man's then) till it be drawn upon him, or some violence offered him, or threats given him? [If it be said than it is too late, it may as well be said, till Then it is too soon] Now then, When they are so opinioned, and jealous of the King's love and fidelity; how can it be imagined that he should look on them as Ingenuous and Equal Counselors, and not be as distrustful of the sincerity of their advice? For how shall I persuade another to be directed by me as his friend, when I give him to understand that I take him for mine Enemy, that intends mischief against me? especially when the matter is not of ordinary concernment, wherein each ones Rights are left free and untouched; but such as trencheth deep into his Majesty's Prerogative, and tendeth not only to the spanning of his power, but mainly also to the quenching of his honour; whilst by yielding to such advice, he must tacitly confess that he is not worthy to be trusted, and by consequence openly proclaim that he is unworthy to be King.  
16 If the (so called Malignant party should chance to be the prevailing part in the houses, The King puts the case in his Answer to the Declaration of the 26 of May, pag. 8. and should allege that through the precipitancy of some men's pretended zeal, the Kingdom were like to run into confusion, (for such a case may be, and [Conspiracy for pretended Reformation] was the Title and Argument of a Book many years since) and therefore must be safely secured: and presuming the King favours that side, and not liking the course that he will take to secure the Kingdom, they should vote it lawful for them to do it themselves without him: must this presently be concluded to be the judgement of the whole Kingdom, and to be according to Law, when no law can be produced? and the King to be illaffected to his best Subjects, or to be misled by evil Counselors to undo himself and all his Kingdom, by not yielding to the advice of his great Counsel? or will the Adverse part take it well to be reputed Enemies to the State, a malignant Party, evil Counsellors & c? If not, It were but meet that the substantial differences of the case were so well opened, that they that desire to know what is just and right might tell where to find it; and that all men of moderate Capacity and Ingenuity, might clearly see the Infallibility of the one party, and the Hypocrify of the other.  
17 When the Forts, Magazines, Navy, Offices, etc. are said to be entrusted to the King, or the King entrusted with them for the good of the Kingdom; The fence of the word Entrusted, in this place would be cleared. Not to question whether the King have these things by way of Trust from the people; it will be of all granted, (as it is by the King himself) that God & the Law have trusted him with them, and that for the good of the Kingdom: and so to employ them he is further tied by his Oath. But there is a twofold trust, one that is Absolute and unlimited, otherwise then that the end is specified, supposed, or presumed: end not so much limiting the Trust, as the Trust denoting & implying the end. And there is a Trust conditionate and circumscribed in such sort, that to fail in the performance is to forfeit the Trust. The first gives a man a right to the thing entrusted; The second gives him only a right to the trust of the thing. I conceive the Kings Trust is of the first kind, who being presumed to mean All good to his people, (according to the Maxim in Politics, No evil aught to be imagined of the King) hath these things frankly and absolutely committed to his Governance and disposing: And however he shall order them, I suppose he is accountable to no man, nor questionable by any, unless he clearly, publicly, and undoubtedly dispose of them to the ruin of his Kingdom; and so puts the people to an evident extremity or lawless necessity. If there be any limits the Law should express them, For he being Supreme, there is no other power to impose them. Neither are the actions of his Ministers to be censured, unless by them the known Laws have been violated. If this Trust must be managed or regulated by both Houses of Parliament; First that Power should be made appear to the King and the People, and then there must either be a standing Court of Parliament, or else one must be called so oft as the King shall have occasion to send out Ships, take out, or put in powder or Ammunition into his Magazines, choose any Officers, etc. which is uncouth to conceive. If a man having confidence of his Friend, shall say to him, Sir, I will freely give up my whole estate into your hands, only you shall swear you will be a Father to my Children, here is implication of a Trust, and yet a clean right in the thing▪ so that he may set or sell, build or pull down, give or lend, and yet be accountable to none, nor falsify his Trust, so long as the Children want nothing (yea, and if he fails of the trust, perhaps some Court of Conscience may relieve them but I believe no positive Law can control him. The case is otherwise with Feoffees, or Executors in Trust, who have a right only to the Trust, and none to the thing entrusted, which is wholly the Heirs, the poor's or Legatiries to whom it was bequeathed.  
18 The Kings and Subjects interests are mutual He refers to every subject, and every subject unto him, as the Lines from the Centre to the Circle: And what interest he hath in one, he hath in another, and in all as well as in any: And his interest in them is of an higher Alloy, and more noble. As command i●, than subjection. The interest of protection is motuall. The 〈◊〉 is, that all the people are more worth than the King, but King & people and more worth then either.  
19 Personal differences of wisdom of folly, weakness or strength, courage or cowardice, meanness or excellency of parts or arts, make no difference in the Right of the King; though they show a great difference in Gods dealing with the Kingdom.  
20 When a King plays the Tyrant, or usurps upon his people's just Liberties, I conceive it must be either first by a violent suppression of old Laws and Customs yet in force, or se●ondly by a wilful obtrusion of new Laws by force, or thirdly by a wicked oppression by force without Law. When therefore Tyranny is imputed to, or employed in a prince, (of or against: whom, we ought not lightly to think any evil, or receive any accusation) it will become Christians thoroughly to examine upon what points he is convinced, and not to take up such reports by whole sale and in gros●●.  
21 If the King have not a Negative, he seems not to have so much power in Parliamentary Acts as one common Burgess: For if the Voice be even before, that Burgesses may be the casting voice of the House, and I see not so much as a vote allowed his Majesty.  
22 When the King shall think it not fit to give his consent to what the major part of Parliament shall agree upon, He is not barely to be considered, as one single man: against so many: For besides his Privy Counsel at hand, men accustomed to, and experienced in matters of State: and besides that possibly a very great number of both Houses are also of the King's mind; we are to consider the King as one best acquainted with the Rules and Mysteries of Government, being (as it were) the Trade to, and is which he hath been born, bred, and brought up: And therefore is presumed alone to see further into it, than many others together. For (besides that God hath a special way of communicating wisdom to Kings, in which regard A mice sentence is said to be in the lips of the King. Prov. 16.10. And the heart of Kings is unsearchable, Prov. 25.3.) Histories make it plain, that there are Ar●dya Imperij and Militia, which the King and Captains apprehend when a thousand do not and which perhaps may not be fit for all men, (nay not for any man else) to know.  
23 When an Adult and Prudent Prince shall own, approve of, and protect such and such Persons as his tried and known Friends or Counselors: If Any (under what pretence soever of their suggesting evil Counsel, when no evil practices are apparent, yea when such Counsels and Practices are utterly disavowed and abjured by the King) shall presume, not only without the King's consent, but against his express Command, to take up Arms to destroy and take off such Persons: though no Evil (quod absit) be intended against his Person; And yet who can tell what is in his heart that comes towards a man with a drawn sword in his hand ●) I see not what Distinction can help, but that such Arms are taken (not for, but,) against the King. Otherwise how can any thing be said to be done against God; who being inviolable in his Person, cannot otherwise be resisted, then by the blaspheming of his Name, breaking his Commands, rejecting his. Motions prosecuting, and persecuting his Servants, etc.  
24 When it is said, The King was made for the people, and not the people for the King; (besides, that the Comparison is as idle as that of the Members against the Belly in the Apologue, & the Apostle hath met with it, 1 Cor. 12.) it is (also) not absolutely true. For the King was no more made a man for others then they were for him, nor made a King more for the good and safety of the People then the people were put into such a posture of order & obedienche, that e might be safe as well as They: yea rather He, than Any (if not then many) of them, as being supposed the chiefest among them. The sense wherein it seems best to hold is; That The King was made for the need or necessity of the people, and not They for his: Viz. He can more securely be no King, than the People can be without a King. And He takes the surrender of their Power with the Dependences, and Consequences, not as a kindness from Them, but as doing a kindness to Them; (as is employed in the refusal of the Vine, Figtree, and Olive-tree to rule over the rest, in Jotham's Parable, Judg. 9.7. etc. and in the History of Jepthah, Judges 11.4. etc.) For on him▪ They unload their Cares and Fears, who foregoes his Own private Ease and Quiet, that He may procure it to his People: Himself taking care that all men else may live without Care. Now on whom the Necessity lieth most, on Them lies the greatest Obligation to respect. Therefore Saint Paul requires giving of thanks: for Kings, 1 Tim. 2.2. So may we say a Captain, a Pilot, a Physician, a Schoolmaster were made for the need of their Correlates, which should render Them more honourable, and rather draw respects to Them, then challenge greater observance from Them.  judge Righteous judgement. 
FINIS.