CERTAIN QUERIES Lovingly propounded to Mr. WILLIAM PRYNNE, To be by him ingenuously resolved, from his large Treatise, entitled, The Sovereign Power of Parliaments:  
CONCERNING 

1. The People's power of electing, recalling, and punishing their Parliament-men.  
2. parliament-men's wages and rewards.  
3. Parliament-proceeding.  
4. Power of Parliaments.  
5. The People's power of electing Synod-men.  
6. A perpetual Parliament.  
7. The three Estates in Parliament.  
8. An Order, or Ordinance of Parliament.  
9 Parliament Protections.  
10. The Parliament and Army's Case.    Bonum est omnia scire. It is good to know all things. 
July. 16 Printed in the year of Liberty, 1647.   


I. Queries concerning the People's power of electing, recalling, and punishing their Parliament-men.  
WHether is it not the undoubted liberty of the Subject to choose their Parliament-men.  
Whether have Parliament-men so chosen any power to represent or act for the People, further than they have commission from those that chose them?  
Whether may Parliament-men so chosen, act, or go beyond the commission which they received from those that chose them?  
Whether are not all Parliament-men to be accountable to the respective Counties and Corporations that chose them?  
Whether may not all Parliament-men be found to have an unlimited power, even to destroy their respective Counties and Corporations, unless they were to be accountable unto the said Counties and Corporations?  
Whether if any Parliament-men refuse, are negligent, or unable to discharge the great trust reposed in them; may not the respective Counties and Corporations recall them back again as often as they please, and send others more honest, diligent, & better qualified for discharging so great a trust?  
Whether is any Parliament-men shall betray the trust reposed in them may not their respective Counties and Corporations proceed to punish them by fines, imprisonment, or death, according to the magnitude of their offences?  
Whether would it ever a whit the more endanger the being of Parliaments, though never so many of the Members of both or either House were questioned and punished for their unjust breach of trust; then if so many corrupt Judges of the Courts at Westminster were executed for their injustice or bribery, and honest men chosen in their places?   

II. Concerning parliament-men's wages and rewards.  
Whether doth it not only concern the respective Counties and Corporations to make allowance unto their respective Parliament-men for their ordinary expenses, and reward them for the in extraordinary services?  
Whether is it more in the power of Parliament-men to receive the Kingdom's monies, and distribute them amongst themselves, 5000. l. 10000 l. of ●0000. l. apeec●●●●on whatsoever pretences; than it is for so many Apprentices or other servants to be their own carvers, to pick their master's pockets, and take the monies out of their master's cash-chests, dividing them amongst themselves, according to what proportion they please, for wages 〈◊〉 reward?  
Whether are not such Parliament-men as liable to be punished by the known Laws of England, as Apprentices for fingering and disposing of their Master's monies without commission or consent?  
Whether ought not all such moneys, weekly pensions, and pretended rewards & considerations already received by any Parliament-men, be brought into a public Treasury for payment of the Kingdom's just debts; and not only such as received them, but such also as so profusely gave them, be made exemplary by some note or other, for thus arbitrarily disposing of the Kingdom's stock?   

III. Parliament proceed.  
Whether have not many of these present Parliament-men behaved themselves towards the people more like domineering Masters and Tyrants, than Representatives and Servants?  
Whether ought the high Court of Parliament to entertain any causes, save such as could not elsewhere find relief, or had been unduly sentenced in other Courts of Justice?  
Whether in this present Parliament have not Petitions been chief admitted through favour, or rejected for want of friends?  
Whether are not all Parliament-men censurable by their respective Counties and Corporations, for refusing to receive, or acquaint the House with such Petitions as have been given them, by any one, or more members of their respective Counties and Corporations?  
Whether ought not the debates, and all proceed of Parliament, with their subordinate Committees, except some few, which may require secrecy be made more public, if possible, than any of the Courts at Westminster?  
Whether ought not the Records, or Books of either House, lie open and free for any one to peruse, with such restriction only and oversight, as may secure them from being perverted or defaced?  
Whether ought not any Subject of England to have a copy of any Act, Ordinance, Order, or Vote of either House, at such cheapest rates, as may only produce the Officers a livelihood?  
Whether is it not requisite that a Parliament being once begun, no Member should absent himself without express leave, upon apparent danger of health; and in such case, another forthwith to be chosen in his place?  
Whether is it not requisite, that nothing pass as voted in either House, without three quarters of an exact full House; that is, three quarters of so many Members as each House consists of.  
Whether is it not requisite, that every particular Parliament-mans' name be registered, with his respective Yes or No, unto each Vote, that each County, Corporation, or any particular man may see how they behave themselves upon all occasions?   

iv Power of Parliaments.  
Whether were it not most unlawful and irrational, to suppose that Parliament-men or any other number of people may have an unquestionable or unlimited power, to live how they list or do what they list, without control or being accountable?  
Whether were not such an unlimited power in any number of people destructive is a Nation?  
Whether is not such men's power to be interpreted unlimited and boundless, as have no other rule for what they do, besides their own will and pleasure?   

V The people's power of electing Synod-men.  
Whether have these present Parliament-men any Power or Commission besides their own will and pleasure, to alter or set up a new Religion?  
Whether if these Parliament-men have power to alter our Religion, may they not possibly reduce it unto Popery again, or set up such a new one, as yet was never heard of or imagined?  
Whether if they should set up Popery, or any other new-fashioned Religion, make new Creeds and Service-Bookes, must we not either conform unto them, or say, they had no Commission for setting of them up?  
Whether is there any known Law for enabling of a Parliament to ch●●●● a Synod, in such manner as that now assembled at Westminster was chosen?  
Whether is not the power in the people for choosing Synod-men, as wel●●●● as Parliament-men?  
Whether was it not an extraordinary breach upon the Subjects Libert● for these present Parliament-men to take upon them the choosing Synod-men in such manner as they did?  
Whether by that Act of choosing Synod-men, and reserving the last appease of all Synod matters unto themselves, together ●●th their arbitr●●● proceed in Civil matters, and their endeavouring to perpetuate bo●● one and other, doth it not appear, that these p●●sen● Parliament-men intended to enthral the whole Kingdom bot● in C●●●ll and Church-matters unto themselves, their sons, kindred and alliance, un●o the world's end?   

VI A perpetual Parliament.  
Whether a King of Monarch who is but one, if he should degenerate unto a Tyrant, be not easier to be suppressed then 500 Parliament-men, they turn Tyrants?  
Whether hath not a perpetual Parliament a capacity of preferring their son's kindred and alliance throughout the whole Kingdom to be chosen Parliament-men instead of such as die or shall be voted out at pleasure for not being of their faction even to the world's end?  
Whether hath not a perpetual Parliament a capacity of intrusting none with the Militia throughout the Kingdom, besides their sons, kindred and alliance, unto the world's end?  
Whether hath not a perpetual Parliament a capacity of preferring their sons, kindred and alliance, to be Committee-men throughout the whole Kingdom, unto the words end?  
Whether hath not a perpetual Parliament the like capacity of preferring their sons, kindred, and alliance, to be Judges, and Justices of the peace, and unto all Offices, both of repute and profit, throughout the whole Kingdom unto the world's end?  
Whether hath not a perpetual Parliament a capacity of preferring their sons, kindred and alliance, to have the sole command of the Navy unto the world's end?  
Whether this perpetual Parliament, with their son's kindred and alliance, being the sole Committee-men, and having all Offices of repute and profit in their own hands, together with the sole command of the Militia, both by Sea and Land, have not a capacity of becoming, the most absolute Tyrants which this Kingdom, or any Nation under the cope of heaven, ever endured?  
Since the Act for the Triennial Parliament was passed in the 〈◊〉 of King Charles, & that Act for not dissolving this present Parliament without ●●●sent of both Houses, not till the 17▪ of K. Charles; Whether were it not a contradiction, and a mere nullifying of the first Act of the 16▪ of K. Charles, to intent that this present Parliament should not have had a convement end, even within three years, that the Triennial Parliament might have had its due beginning according to the said first Act of the 16▪ of K. Charles?  
Whether is not a perpetual Parliament prejudicial to every man besides these present Parliament-men, their sons, kindred, and alliance; who by this means, are bereft of the honour of serving their Country in Parliament, when they should be called unto it?  
Whether is not a perpetual Parliament prejudicial to the whose Kingdom in general, which hath no possibility of enjoying the 〈…〉 abilities, or talents of any others, besides such as are present Parliament-men, their sons, kindred or alliance?  
Whether was it more in the King's power to make a perpetual Parliament, then to cause that there should never be any Parliament again?  
Whether was not the going about to establish a perpetual Parliament the greatest breach of the Subjects Liberty, which was ever made upon them▪  
Whether are not such as were most active in the Houses to contrive it, or advising of the King to pass it, with all others endeavouring to being about this perpetual Parliament, guilty of highest Treason which ever was committed, and most worthy to be questioned and punished, as the most destructive of all Counselors both against King and Parliament, unless they can make their innocence appear more clearly than hitherto it doth? and consequently,  
Whether ought we not to be more jealous of a Hydra, a manyheaded Tyranny, then of Monarchy, which having but one head, may easier be reduced upon any occasion of exorbitancy? and lastly,  
Whether are not both King and People obliged both towards their God and Country, for bending all their might and main to break on and put a period unto this perpetual Parliament?   

VII. The three Estates in Parliament.  
Whether is it not the first fundamental Law, or rather the cornerstone and groundwork of all the Laws of England; that no old Law shall be repealed, nor new Law made without concurrence of all the three Estates in Parliament?  
Whether are not these three Estates in Parliament, the King, the Lords, the Commons?  
Whether may it not be presumed an extraordinary policy in our Ancestors, to establish the foundation of all our Laws and Government rather upon these three Estates, then upon two or one?  
Whether according to the old Proverb, that it is better to have two strings to a bow then one, is it not more hazardous to have old Laws repealed, or new Laws made by one or two Estates only, then by all three Estates in Parliament?  
Whether is not the denial of a negative voice to either of the three Estates in Parliament, a reducing of the three Estates, unto a lesser number?  
Whether do not such go about to overthrow the groundwork, of all the fundamental Laws, who endeavour to reduce the three Estates in Parliament to two, or one?  
Whether are not such to be questioned and proceeded against as Arch-traytors to their Country, who go about to overthrow the very groundwork of all the fundamental Laws of the Kingdom, and seek to introduce a Government more hazardous, or less politic, than what our Ancestors had settled so long since, and prospered so well withal?   

VIII. As Order or Ordinance of Parliament.  
Whether is not in Act of Parliament, of more validity, and more binding, then in Ordinance, or abate Proclamation or single Order of either House of Parliament?  
Whether is the acting by a bare Ordinance as warrantable, as by an Act of all the three Estates in Parliament?  
Whether according to the known Laws of England, may not the three Estates in Parliament assembled, question, and even punish all such as have at any time acted by an Ordinance, or Order of either House of Parliament?  
Whether then doth is not exceedingly concern the whole Kingdom, that an Act of oblition bepassed, for all such matters as have been transacted without the Royal assent, since the beginning of this Parliament?   

IX. Parliament Protections.  
Whether is there laity 〈◊〉 that the Estates of Parliament-men, whether Lords or Commons, sh●●ld be exempted from paying of their just debts; much less the Estates of their servants, or persons of whomsoever they protect; and least of all, when a Parliament shall be spun out into such an everlastingness?  
Whether the keeping parliament-men's Estates, both of Lords and Commons, from being subject to pay debts, hath not likely been an effect of the tyrannous usurpation of Parliaments, rather than any just Law or practice?  
Whether have not these parliament-men's so long exempting their estates from paying debts, expressed them to be mere self-seekers, done them much hurt and discredit, and even dishonoured Parliaments, as much as any one act of theirs?  
Whether may it is not to be supposed that no act hath so much alienated the minds of London from these present Parliament-men, as their not paying their private debts unto the Citizens, to whom so many of them, both Lords and Commons, are so much engaged?  
Whether is it not probably to be judged, that many men have used indirect means to get themselves chosen Parliament-men, that they might thereby exempt both their persons and estates from paying debts, and be at liberty to cousin their fellow-subjects by privilege of Parliament?  
Whether have not many men with their whole families, not only much suffered, but been quite undone, through the death of so many Parliament-men, both Lords and Commons, during the overgrown Session of this everlasting Parliament?  
Whether is it not most of all unreasonable and unjust, that such Lords as have not been suffered to sit in the House of Peers for their malignancy, should yet their estates protected by the same House, from paying of their debts; whilst such as were dismissed the House of Commo●● for the same cause, became liable to payment of their debts▪ both in their 〈◊〉 and estates? And lastly,  
Whether if there had been any colourable Law or Custom formerly for freeing parliament-men's estates from paying debts, were it not a most ●●centio●● and unwarrantable Law or Custom 〈…〉.   

X. The Parliament and Armies Case  
By what know Law doth it appear, that this present Parliament ha● any other rule or ground for levying of a war, and keeping Armies on foot; beside the extreme necessity there of, for preservation of the Kingdom, or their party rather?  
Whether hath not the Army under the command of Sir Thomas Fairfax, the selfsame ground of extremest necessity, not to disband, until they see themselves and party secured, by the settlement of the Kingdom?   
FINIS.