THE COMMONS Dis-Deceiver: Touching their deceitful delatory evasions of a desired speedy Treaty with the King; the only Expedient for a wished and happy Peace in the Kingdom. CONTAINING 1. Answers to the Reasons of the Commons, which they gave the Lords (at a Conference July 25. 1648.) against a Treaty. 2. Reasons why the Commons, rather than the Lords, are against a Treaty. 3. Reasons to show that it is safer and better, even for the Commons, to adventure on a Treaty, then to hazard a new War. PSAL. 26.4. I have not dwelled with vain persons: neither will I have fellowship with the deceitful. PSAL. 35.20. For why? their communing is not for peace: but they imagine deceitful words against them that would be quiet in the Land. Printed in the Year 1648. Brief Answers to the several Reasons given by the Commons at a Conference with the Lords, why they will have the three Bills sent and signed by the King before a Treaty. The Reasons, as collected and printed by an especial Order of Parliament, are these: 1. Reason. IF these Bills be not passed before the Treaty; the Parliament will leave their friends in such a condition, as they cannot be able to defend them, who have stood for them. Answer. This Reason looks only to the defence of their friends, who have stood for them: and not to the defence of the Kingdom, Church, and People, who keep and maintain them. 2. They say of their friends in general; not qualifying them by just, honest, good; but be they what they will, (if their friends, who have stood to them in their wicked designs, tending to the unsupportable miseries of the People,) yet these they must defend, be they who they will, or be they never so many. 3. But if these friends deserve, or are capable of, defence, why are not the Commons able to defend them in a Treaty? the Lords and yourselves, for whom they have stood, being the Treaters or Judges (for the most part) in the case controverted. 4. Stands this to honesty or reason? that rather than not defend such friends in unjust ways, you will hazard the declared good of the Kingdom, a Treaty? Me thinks with wise, just and good men, this should not be urged as a Reason. But the second happily will make amends for this, which is, 2. Reason. If they prevail who press on this Treaty, such godly Divines who are placed by the Parliament, shall be put out, and scandalous Ministers restored to their places. Answer. Before I answer the Reason, I shall examine some passages in the words and phrases; as, 1. Why they call themselves not the House, or Houses in Parliament, but the Parliament itself; which cannot be without the King, who by our Laws, (Sir Edw. Cook, M. St. john's, Pym, etc.) is the Head, the beginning and end of our Parliaments. 2. That they whom the one or the other House hath placed, are called Divines; as though they were the only Divines, the learned in that profession: and not so only, but as though they are the only holy, upright, and therefore called the godly Divines. 3. But the others whom they have put our, although for no other reason then that the other might be put in to serve the two Houses, these and all these without exception, are but Ministers, Servants, and that scandalous too: so that their Geese are Swans, white, godly Divines, all holy Pharisees; and all the rest foul black birds, or scandalous, very Publicans. 4. Where they say, these Ministers shall be restored to their places, imply they not that these places are justly the Ministers, and not lawfully belonging to their Divines? But not to insist on words and phrases, what reason is there in this, that rather than their so called Divines should leave what they unlawfully hold, or come to a trial (whether they be fit to hold, or the other Ministers to be restored) that we shall have no peace nor Treaty? Ahab that idolatrous bloody Tyrant was more just and reasonable than these Reasoners; for though he accounted the Prophet the troubler of Israel; yet he would treat, or put it to a trial, whether Elijah the Prophet, or Jezebels Priests were the better, and more deserving for God's Service; and not hazard all rather than put this to the trial. 3. Reason. If we treat with the King about calling in His Majesty's Declarations, we give a great advantage to the King against ourselves. Answer. If the Declarations on the King's part be just, and according to Law, why not give the King leave to treat, whether he should recall them? whereas if they be unjust, what need you fear, but that they shall be recalled? 2. Nay, what need you fear, when as the King hath promised, so a peace may be settled, that be they never so just and lawful on his part, yet for your sakes he will recall them? 3. But still see, that as the other two Reasons of a Treaty and Peace looked upon their friends: so this minds only themselves, and that so fare, that they will rather hazard all, then adventure to give an advantage to the King, (as they say) against themselves. 4. Reason. If the three Bills be not passed; they give opportunity to have the power of Parliament questioned for all the blood spilt in the late wars, which never was questioned by any of his Majesty's Predecessors. Answer. 1. That the Parliament, (i) the King & the two Houses have power to make war, (wherein blood may be and is spilt) is out of question. 2. But grant that the two Houses have without just power spilt so much blood: must we want peace rather than they shall hear of it, though without punishment. 3. Or rather than the two Houses should be questioned, whether they have such a power, must we be without a Treaty and Peace, and so fall into a new war to the spilling of more blood? and must this stand for a Reason too? 4 When they say the like was never questioned by any of his Majesty's Predecessors: we usually say a Negative of fact cannot be proved, especially in such a case, and after so great revolution of years and times: therefore had the Reasoners said, the like hath not for aught we read, or find; it had been more modest and more worthy of belief, then to say the like never was. 5 But if the like never was, the Reason may be, because the like Rebellion or War never was in the times of any his Majesty's Predecessors. There hath been wars in the times of his Majesty's Predecessors, between Party and Party, who should be the right Heir, and so should enjoy the Crown: or between the King and Barons, for obtaining and upholding each others rights; and betwixt the King and the rascality of the People, when those the Tail would usurp a power over the King the Head. But the like War as this: when after the King had redressed all their just grievances by so many Acts confirmed; when after he had given them more of his own just Rights from his Crown, than ever King in this Land before him did; when after promise of granting more, and more than they should in justice and reason demand; yet after all this, to prosecute him with war; to defame him to the world by black and false aspersions; to draw away the affections of the People; to imprison and hazard his sacred Person to the malice or devilish rage of base and unworthy People: I say (and it appears by our best Histories) that the like of this was never known in the Reigns of any his Majesty's Predecessors: and therefore in this respect well it may be said, that the like spilling ●f blood was never questioned by any of his Majesty's Predecessors. And then from hence, no more in reason can be concluded, than this or the like; That this act of theirs, being unparalleled, it may with justice be questioned; though not to punish the present Actors, yet to keep aftertimes from acting the like. But out of question it stands not with reason, that rather than it should be questioned, how, or by whom so much blood hath been spilt, that therefore we should have no Treaty, or peace; but go on, and engage in a war, to the shedding of floods of innocent, and guiltless blood. 1. And by the way observe, what may in some sort answer, confute, or deny these to be Reasons: whereas the three Bills to be sent and signed by the King, are, 1. For the Militia. 2. Religion and Church-government. 3. For the recalling of his Majesty's Declarations, etc. That there is not in all, nor in any part of their Reasons, one word, or syllable, concerning Religion, or Government of the Church; although in their Protestation, Covenant, and Declarations; they have usually to deceive the People, put and professed Religion and the Church in the first place, as the main piece of their principal care and endeavour. 2 Observe, whether in all their Reasons, there be the least care, or any mention of preserving the Laws of this Kingdom; of the Rights of the King; or safety of his Person; or of the Liberty and Propriety of the Subject; or of the Publke-weale; how to keep the Kingdom in wealth, safety, and honout, and to preserve the People from effusion of more blood. 3 Observe, whether all and every particular in their Reasons, do not speak, or tend only to the maintenance of their unjust, unlimited, usurped power in Parliaments; thereby instead of our good, certain, known Laws, to rule us by tyrannical destructive Ordinances; which are daily changeable; and certain only in this, that they tend to the maintenance of the power and profit only of themselves and their friends, but to the disgrace and debasing the King and his Subject; and the impoverishing and ruining the People and Kingdom; or to keep themselves, their wicked Instruments, and Adherents, not only from trial, or judgement, but from giving any answer, or account for all or any their unjustice, oppression, pursing the Kingdom's money: but instead thereof, for want of a Treaty, to be able to defend themselves and their Complices, in the continuance and pursuit of all their wicked courses. And had not the Devil (as we usually say) owed them a shame, or rather had not God suffered them, for their many horrible sins of gross hypocrisy, injustice, murder, oppression, irreligion, to have blinded them, (who are so wise in their generation) could a man conceive that in all their reasons they would have forgot the Worship of God; the Government of the Church; the good and safety of the King; the welfare of the Kingdom? but let all these sink and swim, so they can provide but for themselves, and for such as they may strengthen to stand by and for them. 1. In conclusion and to sum up the strength of these Reasons: whether or to what end really do they tend, but selera seleribus tueri, to defend maintain and continue their former exorbitant courses; by a pretext of securing themselves and friends; and at the best the holding up of an usurped power among themselves; which cannot be but by an addition of injustice to injustice, blood to blood and sin to sin, until sinne become unmeasureably sinful; and such as can expect no better fruit than confusion and destruction? 2. What is the end of all their reasoning, but to prefer the particular beings, estates and powers of some private persons, before the public worship of God, the weal of three Kingdoms; which are in hazard, if not in a too near certainty of ruin by a new war. 3. But that the Commons should be the Reasoners and Judges in this case, is most unjust and unreasonable; for, Judges ought to be men knowing the Law, and understand-throughly, and perfectly the cases wherein they are to be Judges. Now in sober sadness & a little truth, tell me; are all they who have voices among the Commons, & by whose voices these actions & reasons are maintained, are they I say all such known men, in the Laws of God, and man, of right reason, and best governing a Kingdom, as to be able to distinguish, vote, and judge in such high points? And if you tell me that for matter of Religion and Church, they have the Assembly of Divines to instruct them, for matters of Law Gentlemen of the long robe, and for matters of State some wise and experienced Politic to guide them, and must I take this for a satisfactory answer that all is well done that is thus done, and voted by such ignaroes, for is it fit that he shouln sit as Judge, who wanting knowledge of his own, must rely upon the judgement of an other, and so make his conscience ride upon another soul's back. But grant that all the Commons were able in point of knowledge to be judges, yet can we grant (that which is contrary to all reason, justice, and law) that parties to be judged should be Judges? and who can deny, but that if not all, yet 9 or 8. or 7. parts of the whole Commons now voting are parties in this cause, wherein they take upon them to be Judges? for is not he in all reason, justice and law, held and taken to be a party, who either hath gained, doth gain, holds or hopes to gain by the case wherein he is to judge? For, is it not presumed, and on good reason, that such a man by his self-love and proper interest, will forget upright Judgement, and lean to himself in his own cause? And if this be granted, which cannot be denied, then tell me, how many either of their Assembly of Divines at Westminster, or of their Gentlemen of the Long Robe in that House, or of the wise men amongst them, either have not had, or now have not offices, places or things of profit and power, which they are unwilling to lose, or be called to question for the holding or abusing of them? and I dare say, that of each hundred in the House there are not twenty, but have had, or now have places of profit and honour, held by the power and continuance of this Parliament, either in Offices, sequestered Estates, Lands of King, Queen, Prince, or Church, or in Pentions, Salaries, keeping of Parks, Forests, or the like; insomuch that the words of the Prophet are here verified, Micha 3.11: The heads thereof judge for reward, and the Priests thereof teach for hire, and the Prophets thereof divine for money. Ob. But some happily will say, if these cases debar the Commons to be the Judges in this case, than we must leave all to the King, or who else shall be the Judge? Resp. I answer, that the right power of judging is known and discerned by the Commission that grants and directs that power; and the Commission (as it were in this case) must be the Writ (as it's called) of Summons to the Parliament; and when the Writ of calling the Commons is ad consentiendum & faciendum, to assent and do, the Writ as Commission to the Lords is ad tractandum & impertiendum consilium, and (with the King) ad judicandum de arduis negotiis, etc. Whence I conceive I may rightly infer, that the Lords, or especially the Lords rather than the Commons, should be Judges in this case; and if their judgement may be heard, than a Treaty without sending the Propositions should be had. Again, if it be required that Judges should be free from partiality, to be led by affection, or interest: then I conceive, that though some of the Lords may be somewhat tainted here with: yet they are not so much infected, or not so many, and so deeply as these of the Commons are. If I should grant, that in our cases, or at other times, the Commons in such or the like case might Judge, as being the Representees of the People in England: yet if it appear that these Representees have deceived the general trust, and have acted either to their own private or wicked publike-ends: why may not the people recall their grant, and resume their own Power to Judge? add, that the Commons have deceived their trust is apparent, by their pointblank voting against, and crossing the Petitions of London, other Counties, and the hearty desire of the whole Kingdom for a Treaty. Ob. But you will ask if this power of judging what is fit to be done, in this point of Treaty be taken from the Commons, than who shall judge for the People? Resp. And I ask, who shall judge for them, the People, but the People themselves? for the Commons were chosen but as Representees for them; to put up from time to time, as sudden occasion should be offered, the desires and minds of the People; who could not at all times, and upon all occasions be present themselves: Whereas now in this Case, when the People both Understand, Petition, and call for Relief, if their Representees will not hear, nor move, nor vote for them; why should they not be heard speaking themselves: and I am sure in the beginning of this Parliament, it was thus practised, and not long since declared by both Houses: That it is the proper birthright of the Subject to Petition, that they may be heard; and accordingly they were, for a long time, to effect. But if you now are against this popular way of pleasing the many, by hearing their Petitions: which at first was held the right way, or the way to guide the two Houses: then why suffer you not the People to hear their chief Magistrates, and wisemen, speaking and moving for them: for, can it be conceived that the People eight years ago (wrought by fear, favour, wine or money, to choose you their Representees) should be tied and bound up to defend, do, and suffer; what you, all days of your lives, shall vote; though it be never so wicked, un-just, or against them or the Kingdom. Instead then of the Case, as put by the Reasoners, I conceive the Case will be this: That if no Treaty nor Peace can be had: then unavoidably must follow a decay of Trade; waste of the Wealth and Men of this Kingdom; the confusion of Religion, Law, and Justice, the necessary concomitants and consequents of un-civill-Warre and Arbitrary Government. And then the question will and must be briefly this: Whether in point of Religion, Law, Justice and Policy, all these should be certainly and necessarily brought on, rather than some few inconsiderable persons, who have transgressed all Law by God and man, by false worship, taking God's name in vain, profaning his holiday, dishonouring their parent; by murder, theft, false witnessing, should be put but in an hazard to answer for their transgressions? I say but in an hazard to answer their transgressions: For unless these men shall be wilfully, and obstinately set, to maintain, continue, and go on in their former wicked ways; they may have hope; nay they have a royal promise; and themselves are able in the Treaty to make it good, to obtain a general pardon for all; both for themselves, their friends, and their so called Godly Divines. And to make this grant, and pardon the more sure, and binding; they shall not only have the words, and faithful promise, and the assent of the King to an act in Parliament; but the concurrence of this, and the other two Kingdoms; many if not the most of which, are engaged as well, though not so much, as these commons: So that there is nothing that they can object against this Pardon, and assurance, but that they cannot; which is indeed, that they will not trust; and trust they cannot, or will not; that they may hereby hold, and continue their usurped power, and unjust gain; which in effect is as much as to say: Rather than they will forgo these by a Treaty and Peace; they will plunge not only the People of this, but of the two other Kingdoms; not only into an hazard, but into the certain losses of estates, and lives, and into a waste if not an utter ruin and destruction of three Kingdoms: which the People of the three Kingdoms (if God shall please to endow them with Wisdom, Judgement, and Resolution) will not suffer, but will rise, and join as one man to withstand and prevent. 2. The Reasons why the Commons are more averse to a Treaty, and so to Peace, than the Lords; are especially three; which hang upon these three cords, not easily to be broken (1.) Profit, (2.) Power, (3.) Reputation; in which the Commons gain, and the Lords, in general, lose. For the matter of Profit: some of the Commons by their art and power in Parliament, gain yearly many thousands; divers get thousands, and very few of them but by Offices, sequestred-Estates, Pentions, keeping of Parks, Forests; enjoying the Lands of King, Queen, Prince, and of the Church, have and receive good yearly incomes: for it hath been the policy of the leading men, to invite and persuade some few men (once of reasonable Consciences and more modest Souls) to take such Places and Lands, etc. as before mentioned; thereby not only to keep them silent from speaking against their Leaders: but hereby to keep their mouths open to cry I and No: and to so vote for, or against, what shall be directed by them, or as they hear Joller and Jumper mouth it first: Whereas the Lords the while (though perhaps the Speaker, the Keeper of the Seal, some chief Committee-men and others, may gain by Bribes) Yet such Lords as have great revenues, by the continual Taxes assessed, quartering of Soldiers, etc. must either abate or allow their Tenants in their rents, and so at the years end become loser's. And if you object that this likewise befalls the Commons as well as the Lords. I answer, that the least part of the Commons have any great store of Lands: and those who have; either by their power they can moderate and lighten their taxes laid on their lands; or else they have recompense 3, 5, 10, 20. for one, by their other places, offices, or ways of getting. If therefore according to their self-denying Ordinance of 4. April 1645. and their votes of the 10. of June 1647. those Commons should be deprived of those places, and ways of gaining; and be left to bear their own charge; and which is worst of all, to stand to the hazard, whether (when all profit ceaseth) they might at last obtain a pardon? you shall find them forward enough; yea try them this way, and I dare warrant they shall out-mouth the Lords for a Treaty. Especially if you can but clip them of that power, which they have in ruling more than the Lords; or if it be but to take them off the power in ruling the Lords themselves; for how immensely, might I not say, how infinitely have the Commons in this Parliament extended their privilege, and power beyond all measure and bond? not over and against the King, and all their fellow Subjects; but even over and against the Lords too; for when (as it appears by their several writs, which give and limit each of their powers) the Peers are called to advise and council the King; and the Commons to assent and do what shall be so advised; and when as the Commons, witness Sir Ed. Cook, are but as the grand Inquest to the Peers; who with the King are the only Judges; yet is it not so come to pass, that in this Parliament, when the Commons have first debated and voted; that they then have sent to the Lords, willing them to concur? and in case that they should not, that then the names of the dissenting Lords should be transmitted to the Commons, and so by them to be voted and declared enemies to the State? witness the message sent to the Lords by an eminent Member of the Commons Jan. 1641. and when all power of judicature is in the Lord's house, by reason of the Kings sitting there; and all Pardons of high nature doth belong only to the King: have not the Commons, witness their late Order 17. July 1641. taken upon them to give sentence upon the high insurrection (as they call it) in Kent? and to grant, publish, and proclaim a Pardon to so many as they please? and all this without the Lords. And the Commons having thus Lorded it in power over the Peers. it is easy to conceive, whether the Lords or Commons bear the greater sway? or have the greater power in pleasing or displeasing, punishing or rewarding either Soldier, Committee-men or the Subject in general? Especially when you consider, what is generally observed, that when the Commons keep to that which they call their Privilege, not to be impeached, sequestered their places, or judged by the Peers: yet the Peers in this Parliament have been impeached, sequestered, and sentenced by the Commons. Which being so, believe it, where the power is in ruling there will the opinion follow, of honouring and obeying, and by these two advantages of profit, and power, the Commons have gained to themselves the 3. cord of reputation, and esteem above the Lords, and therefore will be, as hitherto they are, more averse to the Treaty, and Peace then the Lords are, or will be, insomuch as they shall be greater loser's then the Lords by this Treaty and Peace, and as greater in loss, so more in fear and danger then the Lords. Not only in that they have overpowered and out-acted the Lords in the highest breach of Law and Loyalty, but in that they have given one to another such large sums of the money of the Kingdom, which by their own Ordinances should have been otherwise disposed: and for this in a Treaty, some happily fear a questioning, and some, if they be able, a refunding: Others may fear, and justly, that they shall be called to a reckoning for the vast sums of money by them received, and not accounted for; except perchance in a cursory way one to another: and what satisfaction can this be to the true man, that the thiefs have divided and accounted each to other the true man's goods? might I not add that divers of them are, or justly might be afraid of a Treaty; lest that they hear of the divers insolences, injuries, oppressions, bribes, yea and thefts committed by them, contrary not only to law, but to their own Ordinances. And may I not yet add, the strange never before heard of like privilege; that for so many years, many of them have kept themselves from paying their just debts; yea and hazarding by the length of this Parliament the utter defrauding of their creditors for ever; there being a Statute of Limitation, 21. Jac. c. 16. which confines all suits to certain years, which this Parliament hath exceeded already: and by this means, all actions against these debtors (being Parliament men) are frustrate and void in Law; and who can or dare sue a Parliament-man? least he be either committed to prison, whether the debtor ought to be sent, or enjoined to release the debt; as some have been constrained to do this Parliament. Lastly, The guilt and horror of Conscience is so great and clamorous to many of the leading Grandees in this Parliament, that they dare not trust themselves in a Treaty with the King, nor with God, or good men, and not, but only with an Army, and that of such Soldiers as shall be of their own choice and pay; who therefore will be ready on all turns, to prosecute their never so unjust, and devilish commands, be they either against the King, the Kingdom, or God himself? of all which we have had too great, and too long woeful experience. 3. Some brief Reasons▪ showing that it is safer & better for this Kingdom & the two houses in Parliament to Treat with the King, though he will not sign the three Propositions before the Treaty: then to engage in a new war, in Case the King should refuse the so joining of them. For 1. It's more than probable that the king will not sign the Propositions before the Treaty: (1) Because he hath already declared both his will and reasons against the so signing of them; and that when he had no such hope or appearance of help and relief as now he hath: (2) Because He knoweth the Kingdom of Scotland hath protested against his so signing these Propositions; and that the then Protestation is now again avowed in the late Declaration of their Estates to be the sense of their Kingdom: (3) Because the English Lords in this Parliament have given & published many strong and unanswerable reasons against the sending these Propositions before the Treaty: wherein they concur both with the King, and the Kingdom of Scotland. (4) Because not only the City of London, but the greatest and most considerable Counties, Professions, and conditions of men in this Kingdom join in the pressing a speedy Treaty, without relation to the Propositions. (5) Because the premitting these Propositions is urged and prosecuted mainly, if not only, by one Faction or Party, and is not seconded but by those who are interessed by places of profit, and honour; or by fear of coming to an account or after reckoning. (6) Because these two last parties, though joined in one, yet cannot by the hundreth part answer the number and power of those who will and are ready to oppose them in the three Kingdoms. 2. And let those who are apt to engage in a new War know, that as the fortune and success of all, even the best wars is doubtful; so that the event of this at least on their part is most hazardous; because it is against the desires, the safety, and good of three Kingdoms: all which will first, or last join together to maintain their own desired safety and good against that party; who ever, whose plots, designs, and arts so evidently appear, tending to the confusion and Destruction of the Church and Commonwealth. 3. But grant that the party, who are for a War rather than a Treaty, should in a battle or two get the better: yet can they conceive that hereby the war were ended, or that a peace, indemnity, or safety were concluded on their parts? No rather this would stir up and inflame the people in three Kingdoms to more hot and bloody wars: and these must necessarily draw on a decay of trade, a wasting of the wealth, and men, and thereby hazarding the ruin of this Kingdom: for it cannot be imagined that three Kingdoms, or the greater part of them will rest, and lie down to suffer the tyranny of one faction or Party, because it hath once or twice overcome them in battle. 4. Whereas if this party, who are for a war rather than a Treaty, should but once be overcome and scattered in any one pitched field or battle; it is not probable that they should ever be able to rise, recruit again, and to stand in battle against all their Opponents in three Kingdoms; who will be as careful to keep them, as they were willing to beat them, down? 5. And if this should come to pass, that they were once beaten & scattered; (1) then in what danger may they be, who have plotted, fomented, and maintained this war? (2) in what case will all the Monopilizers of Offices and places of profit be? (3) in what state will not only the Excise and Committee-men be, of the several Counties? but even they of the two Houses, for the many insufferable injuries and oppressions laid on their fellow Subjects? (4) How may it far with all those who without any account have for so many years together engrossed the greatest part of the wealth of this rich Kingdom? (5) Yea, may it not be feared, that not only the Bills which in this Parliament might have been yielded unto, but those Acts already passed may suffer question, opposition, or a repeal, as being obtained by fraud or force? (6) Nay, may it not hereafter weaken the honour, privilege, and power of Parliaments for ever, when the power of this shall be conquered by the Sword? 6. All which fears and dangers may readily be taken away by Acts of Pardon and Oblivion; and these may as easily be obtained and granted by a free-Treaty: I add by a free-Treaty; for if the King cannot obtain Liberty, nor a Treaty, unless he first sign the Propositions; then neither will this signing the Propositions be of force to bind him, he being not at Liberty at the time of signing: nor can the Treaty itself be construed free, because it was obtained and held per asperte FINIS.