A Commonwealth Or▪ NOTHING: Or, MONARCHY and OLIGARCHY Proved Parallel in Tyranny. IN XII. QUERIES, Worthy the Consideration of all public Spirits in this juncture. By a Wellwisher to the true security of both Christian and Civil Liberty. London, Printed for Livewell Chapman, at the Crown in Popes-Head-Alley. 1659. June 14. A Commonwealth Or NOTHING; Or, MONARCHY and OLIGARCHY proved Parallel in Tyranny. I. WHether in the Circle of Government, the People have not had hitherto ample experience of Princely and private Spirits? or where a single Council hath the power of debate and result, whether or no it can be accounted a Commonwealth, and not an Oligarchy? In this case will our Grandee Officers of the Army, confederate with some Grandee Ministers of State, give a Government to the Parliament, People, and Army, as they have made and owned a Commander in chief? II. Why should the People's Representatives expect to perpetuate their power otherways then by Rotation? for so may not the Legislative authority sit continually, though successively? otherways, will not Intervals convert a Commonwealth into Monarchy, (the Legislative Authority intermitted) or into Oligarchy, in case they be Governed by a Council? III. Whether a Council of State in any Commonwealth, had Executive power, except in the management of a War, or Treaty with foreign States? How contrary then are the Armies Proposals (in the course of popular prudence) to a Commonwealth? nay, how natural▪ is it for any unlimited power to resolve according to their own, rather than the People's Interest? iv Whether for Brutus to expel Kings, and not to promote popular Liberty, was to lay obligation upon the People (in hatred of Oligarchy) to bring back Monarchy? but what end or interest can a supreme Council (thus constituted) have, to destroy itself by setting up Monarchy? V Grant civil Liberty, separable from Liberty of conscience, and then show us (who can) what security we shall have for our civil Liberty? was it not the pretence of the late Apostate usurper, that he could see no other means but force and violence to secure the Liberty of conscience? but what encouragement hath liberty of conscience had to trust more unto men then civil Liberty? or what became of civil Liberty entrusted to any Prince, or Oligarchy? and where hath the free State, or Commonwealth, been ever known, that gave not Liberty of conscience? in this sense, do they who dare trust men, understand me●? or do they who will not trust Laws, understand a Commonwealth? VI If Rome, Athens, Sparta, Venice, Holland, etc. were not molested with civil war and sedition, as Germany, France, Spain, England, etc. were▪ why then will men call a Commonwealth confusion? what confusion had we in England, whilst the Norman Line strove for absolute Power, the Barons for Liberty, York and Lancaster for Royal dignity, Parliaments, People, and Army under the usurped power of the late perfidious single Person? but how probable is it that an equal Commonwealth may be received with embraces, seeing a Tyranny came not only in, but was supported without bloodshed? VII. If Nimrod first broke the first Government, which was Paternal, by usurping absolute power to enslave the People by Policy, force, and fraud: if some Families put themselves under the power of one, as a Prince; others▪ under Aristocracy, wherein Noblemen▪ etc. bare sway, (as in Venice) or Aristocracies mixed with Democracies, like that of the United Provinces, where the great men consulting of the affairs of the Commonwealth with the People's Deputies, are Annually chosen; or Oligarchy, which is the Government of a Commonwealth, consisting of a small number, over powering the People by Policy and force, or who have Supremacy pu● upon them by the People: such were the Decemviri, and Triumvirs amongst the Romans▪ such the 30. Tyrants in Athens. And why then m●y not England, Scotland▪ and Ireland, be not only called, but become a Commonwealth? 1. By owning the Power to elect their Representatives▪ allowing them to sit but one year. 2. For that they tru●t not the Militia in the hands of one Person, nor the Law-making Power in a State Council, are they not also sparing in making places too specious for profit, power, titular turns, or duration of time? will now such a constitution be found freer from corruption, oppression▪ etc. then these wherein Persons Governing, are protected from justice or punishment for their arbitrary usurpations, etc. VIII. May we not without Intervals of Parliament (by frequent changing of Officers (civil and military,) in a little time, understand how to preserve ourselves, without the defective continuation of Persons, Counsels, Commanders, Senates? etc. nay, might we not at this very juncture (such qualifications premised) hope to preserve the Interest of the Commonwealth, though we put the absolute freedom of Election into the People's power? otherways, may not a Physician force his Patient for the accomplishment of his cure? does not true Liberty stand in need sometimes of necessary limitations? or is not just Liberty consistent with society? and aught we not put our helping hand to hinder the self-Assassination of one, much more of many? who would not endeavour to deprive any one of the Liberty of destroying himself? is it any wickedness to make a People happy against their wills? IX. Whether the present Parliament (as that public spirited Patriot Sir Arthur said) (having for these last 5. years been turned to grass) ought not now (to wipe away all forepast misprisions) to act like Men and Christians in all respects, labouring to prevent (for the future) all forepast usurpations, in Church, State, and Army, occasioned by plurality in places, exorbitance in Power, exuberance in Titles, or superfluity in pay? X. Whether those who have Apostatised from the good Old Cause, Protectors, and Instrument-makers, or Promoters, etc. such like pursuers of private or Personal imports, or such who suffered upon a public pursuance, abominating the usurpations and cruelties of Oliver Cromwell, aught to be first restored, or preferred in the Army? XI. Whether those who have formerly not only truckled under a single Person, (by making or promoting Instruments of Tyranny and servitude) but have still a Pope in their bellies, or a spite to popular Government, the avowed Enemy to their Lordly Gradenrs, which how loath they are to lay aside, is now too well witnessed by their unwillingness to receive their Martial Commissions from the People's Representatives in Parliament, etc. or those who are downright for a free State, and contented without any restauration or▪ reparation (as to places of profit and preferment, to walk in cuerpo either in City or Country) are fittest (both in Council and Army) to consider what kind of settlement is safest and most suitable to the preservation or promotion of public, popular freedom? XII. Whether a perpetual Parliament, a single Person, a Senate, or another House, etc. be not alternate Parents, begetting, and begotten; or however, very near of Kinne? And whether the People are obliged not only to suspect, but also to prevent the power, or promotion, of all such Aspirers? as whether the Parliament may not by overprudential procedures with such, weaken both the Hearts and Hands of their best friends? Lastly, whether the Parliament, the good People of these Nations, with all their honest Officers, Soldiers, (both in, and yet out of the Army) be not obliged unanimously to promote the public, in opposition to all private pursuances? FINIS.