A Copy of a LETTER Written to an OFFICER OF THE ARMY BY A true Commonwealths-man, and no COURTIER, Concerning The Right and Settlement of our present GOVERNMENT and GOVERNORS.  
LONDON, Printed by Tho. Newcomb, over against Bainards-Castle in Thames-street. 1656:   

SIR,  
IF we look into our Stories from the Conqueror, (from whom the whole race of our Kings since have derived their Titles and Claims) we shall find it evident, that those that were originally the great Council of this Land, were originally such as had been Commanders under, and had helped that first William to the Sovereignty of this Kingdom: who, having now through his means obtained so great a share in the wealth of the Nation, seemed most likely to be regardful as well of his, as of the general safety and good thereof. To you therefore I shall make this my humble Appeal concerning the reasonableness of that Letter which I formerly addressed unto those that last of all sat as a Parliament amongst us; leaving it to you to determine whether they had not precedents, as well as reason, sufficient to have led them to the establishment of this Government in a more settled way then now it is. For we shall find that (all along) this great Council or Parliament have ever settled the succession on him that had the present power, although others might in legal appearance have a better title, and that confirmed by their own oaths also. Thus we find the said William the First generally obeyed by the English after the conquest of Harold, even as Harold was before; notwithstanding Edgar Etheling had the indubitable right from both, according to the then established Laws. And so again were the possession and hereditary right of his succeeding sons, William and Henry the First, sworn to and maintained by the Peers and others; notwithstanding also that these two, besides the claim of the said Edgar, might be also justly reputed Usurpers against the right of their elder Brother Robert yet living. The Sovereignty being next seized on by Stephen against the direct lineal right of the Issue of Maud the Empress, unto whom the said Peers had also sworn faith and allegiance; yet shall we again find them swearing to be faithful to him and his issue, and both they and others of the Nation generally taking his part against the said Maud and her children.  
To instance in all, would be too tedious: But it is apparent through the whole Story, that all Parliaments both before and after the addition of the House of Commons, have ever confirmed and settled the succession in him whose Writs they obeyed in their Summons, however a more apparent Title might seem to rest in some other person yet living. In which doing it could not yet be expected, but some mutterings and insurrections must arise from some particular persons, as well such as had been of the same party with the present Prince, who (like sons of Zerviah) out of discontent at their own smaller share of preferment, or the greater favour cast towards others than they thought fit, will thereupon be keeping the terms of War in time of Peace, and so dislike of their Prince's entertainment of any that have (like Abner) been of a contrary party, although their usefulness and fidelity be now apparent: As also of some again, who (like Shimei) out of some more particular love and relation to the deposed Family, 
2 Sam. ●6. 5, 6, 7, 8. 1 Sam. 20 14, 15, 42. 1 Sam. 2●. 2●, 22. 2 Sam. 3.1.  will be prone to cast the odium of blood and usurpation upon the person possessed; especially if from a mean degree he have come to the Throne, and had also taken an oath of fidelity to the former Prince and his family, as in the case of David to Jonathan and Saul; when as yet it was plain enough that Saul was not slain by David, but by the Philistines: And for that war between their houses, in which it is said, The house of David waxed daily stronger and stronger, and the house of Saul weaker and weaker; it is to be looked upon as the joint association of these of Judah also; who, having now submitted to another Head, opposed the other as a common enemy.  
And if we look into the latter times for the care taken by the then good Commonwealthsmen in settling this great affair, even to the time of Queen Elizabeth, we shall find the first Parliament humbly to solicit her to marry betimes. 
Annal. Eliz. fol. 25.  The Parliament (says Mr. Cambden) being to be dissolved, they all thought good that the Third Estate or Lower House should advise the Queen to marry betimes: yet would not the Temporal Lords join with them, lest any of them might seem to propound it in hope to prefer himself. And it's like, both they and all former Peers were also willing to have the Crown hereditary, lest they might also seem to be ambitious of succession themselves; as though they had been rather Pares as to the Sovereignty, then as a true Senate of Patres or Peres as to the Nation. Some words then used by the Speaker I shall particularly set down, that we may see how ancient Parliaments differed from some of late, they having as great a care to build and to establish, as these to pull down. There is nothing which with more ardent affection we beg of God in our daily prayers, then that our happiness hitherto received by your most gracious Government, may be perpetuated to the English Nation to all eternity. Whilst in our minds and cogitations we cast many ways how this may be effected, we can find none at all, unless your Majesty should either reign for ever, (which to hope for is not lawful) or else by marriage bring forth Children, heirs both of their Mother's virtue and Empire (which God Almighty grant.)  
And in the Parliamnt held in the ninth year of her Reign, when, through difference of Religions which then were, men began to propound to themselves sometimes one, and sometimes another to get the Sovereignty, in case she should die without a certain Successor: 
fol. 84.  Therefore (says my Author) the Higher House besought the Queen with all earnestness, by the mouth of Bacon L. Keeper, their Speaker; according to the duty which they own to God, the allegiance to their Prince, and love to their Country; that forasmuch as by her they now quietly enjoyed all the benefits of Peace, Justice and Clemency, both they and their posterity might securely and always enjoy the same by her. But (say they) they cannot enjoy the same, unless she marry, and withal design a Successor. Above all things therefore they do wish and pray her, that she will join herself in the sacred bond of marriage, to whomsoever, wheresoever, and howsoever it may please her, to the end she may have Children to be pillars of the Realm; constitute and appoint a Successor if she or her children (which God forbidden) should die without issue. That they should so earnestly beg this, which is so mainly necessary, there are (say they) many causes; to wit, the fresh fear which invaded all men, when very lately her health was endangered; the opportunity of the times, when the Estates of the Realm were now assembled, who would maturely deliberate of so weighty matters; the terror which she should strike into her adversaries, and the immortal joy wherewith she would replenish all her Subjects. They commend the Examples of her Ancestors, which in such cases have prudently provided for the security of their Posterity; condemning that speech of Pyrrhus, who said, He would leave the Kingdom to him which had the sharpest sword. Moreover they propound, how great a storm of calamities would hang over England, if she should put off her mortality, designing no certain Successor; That seditious and Civil Wars would break forth, wherein the Victory itself were most miserable: That Religion would be abolished, Justice smothered, the Laws trodden under feet, When there should be no certain Prince, which is the soul of the Law; and that the Kingdom would fall as a prey to Foreiners. And other calamities of that sort they reckon up and exaggerate, wherein all men would be included, if she should die without issue. Out of the sacred Scriptures also they modestly join hereunto precepts, counsels, and examples. At which time also the Lower House were more vehement in their expressions to the same purpose.  
These things have been the more largely collected and set down, that we might see the difference between Parliaments then, and since: For they were so far from usurping authority to themselves to alter the succession of the Prince in possession which had Heirs, under colour of their power of Election during the life of the Prince, that they claimed not a right to constitute an Heir or Successor unto him that had Children of his own. Even as in the time of Henry the Eight, they had (at his motion) settled the Crown sometimes upon the issue by one wife, and sometimes upon another; and at last left it to such as he should give it by his last Will and Testament. These Parliaments of Q Elizabeth consisting then of Papists chief, might more justly than now have suspected an averseness from the Religion professed or established, 
fol. 16.  especially in Fundamentals. But on the other hand (says my Author) she was much troubled at the impatience of some Ministers of the Word, who chose rather to forerun then expect Laws, and began to sow abroad the Doctrine of the Gospel more freely, first in private houses, then in Churches; and the people greedy of novelty, began to flock unto them in great numbers: It might have been objected, that she was a Woman, and so unfit to be acknowledged Head of the Church; which authority had been in the time of her Father settled upon the Imperial Crown of this Realm; A thing scoffed at as well by them which seemed more strictly zealous, as by the Papists themselves: And they might also, and with more right have insisted upon an Act of Parliament, whereby she stood disabled from the Government, and that as one declared illegitimate, and whose Mother had been condemned and executed for Adultery, Even by an Act of a Parliament consisting of King, Lords and Commons, and not made by a piece of a piece of a Parliament only. 
Camb. Annal. fol. 18.  Whereupon (says my Author) some seditious persons afterward took occasion thereby to attempt dangerous matters against her, as being not lawful Queen, albeit the English Laws have long since pronounced, that the Crown once worn quite taketh away all defects whatsoever. And as this unrepealing of that Act, and this Maxim of the Law, was then imputed to Bacon's wisdom, (on whom as an Oracle of the Law the Queen wholly relied in such matters) so (for further satisfaction of men's minds concerning the undoubted obedience which is due to the Possessor, in questions of like kind) I shall set down the determination of him, who by Lawyers themselves is accounted an Oracle of the Law since, namely my Lord Cook, who in the 3. part of his Institutes, f. 6, 7. in the Title of Treason, expounding the words of Nre Signior le Roy, says, that by le Roy is to be understood a King regnant, and not of one that hath but the name of a King. And then also he alleadges the instance of Q. Marry, on whom, as having indeed the sovereign power, the word le Roy was appropriate, although she were a woman, and her Husband at the same time styled King of England. Afterwards he quotes in the margin the Statute of 11 Henry 7. enacting, That none shall be condemned for any thing done in obedience to the present King or Sovereign, (for so the words of the Statute are, King or Sovereign;) He further saith, This Act is to be understood of a King in possession of the Crown and Kingdom: For if there be a King regnant in possession, although he be Rex de facto, & non de jure, yet is he Signior le Roy within the purview of this Statute; and the other that hath right, and is out of possession, is not within this Act. Nay, if Treason be committed against a King de facto, & non de jure, & after the King de jure cometh to the Crown, he shall punish the Treason done to the King de facto and a Pardon granted by a King de jure, that is not also the facto, is void. By all which it will appear, that the Law directs our fidelity to Nre Signior, our Sovereign Lord; not confining it to the stile and title of le Roy or King, to whom it is only due, as being actually Nre Roy, our Sovereign Lord the King. And indeed it would have seemed strange, if what by the Law is due to inferior powers, (as Lords of Manors, or the like) should have been denied to the chief: For in that case, the exception of a Disseisor against the right Heir, is not available to abate any Service or Acknowledgement which ought to come from a Tenant or Homager.  
Having thus (Sir) as shortly as I could, cleared my way of some most material doubts, I shall now crave your patience to peruse the following Letter; beseeching God to direct and bless you in the settling of the peace and good of these Nations. Which is the daily prayer of  
SIR, Your most affectionate Friend and Servant.   

SIR,  
YOu may please to remember, that upon some late discourses which passed between us concerning some things relating to the present establishment in our Government, and of that question of Hereditary or Elective succession; I did then trouble you with the relation of my opinion therein, and give you such reasons and arguments as did then occur, for the establishment of both: And which might serve by way of answer to those ordinary objections made to the contrary, which in malicious Pamphlets or otherwise were vulgarly spread abroad, both to disaffect the people, and to breed a distaste and jealousy both in Parliament and Army against the Protector and his settlement and proceed. But having now since had time more seriously to consider of the nature and consequences of the thing, both as it is in itself, and as it doth relate to the constitution of these Nations, and the present state of public affairs therein settled, I found myself on all hands so throughly satisfied with the inconveniencies that would accompany Election, and with the fallacies of all those specious arguments usually given for it, that I conceived it lay upon me as a duty, as well for your own farther satisfaction, as for that satisfaction you might herein give to others, both in the House and Army, to give unto you a more full and regular account of my conceptions herein: To the end that the prejudices of all  people may be herewith so far satisfied, that through murmur and ingratitude we do not again provoke God to desist in that course of establishment he hath now put us, and suffer us again to relapse into our former way of division and disorder; whilst, at once, we should show ourselves as well unjust and ingrateful towards him, as towards that his Minister whom he hath made so highly instrumental in so great a mercy.  
So far as this design of Election savours of injustice and ingratitude towards our present Superior, I shall desire you (Sir) first to consider, that as ambition and covetousness are vices to all men more or less incident, so in those or such like alterations of State as have happened to us, it cannot be expected that the acquisitions of the prevailing party, either for honour or riches, can be so equally or in such sort shared as to find general satisfaction. For as each one is then ready to set the highest rate he can on his own deserts and endeavours in the Common cause, even so must he consequently as much repine at the portions of others above him, and which are greater than his own, as to be thereby prompted to find out and promote all the ways he can both for abating from them, and for reducing them to an equality with himself: And if this cannot be effected, then at least to abridge them of continuance herein, that he also, as in right of election, may have his turn in those honours and estates which are highest. And this is also to be expected from such as have for a long time together made to themselves a way of trade and gain by means of that supreme and uncontrollable power and trust they then executed: when now being debarred of the perpetuity of their misused power, they are busy to vent abroad their angry and revengeful declamations as well against his power that hath done it, as his continuance therein; and to make it take the better, to palliate it with the show of public good.  
They say, that since all in the late engagement have run equal hazard, and have jointly adventured their lives and fortunes, why should any one person or family be suffered to engross all the prize to themselves? That the Cause they undertook was that which was common, and for the good of the whole people, and to render them happy, not the single advantage and preferment of any one man or his posterity. And if any one man should claim advantage or preferment above the rest, as having been (for his part) most eminent and active in the prosecution and danger thereof, yet why his son or posterity, who (perhaps) were not all, or very little meritorious therein? Will not the same justice and reason of eminent desert that preferred the Father to others of less desert than him, claim precedence for other persons of more present deserts and hopes before these also? Mark the dispensations of Providence and Nature; since they entail not Virtue and Wisdom to a Family, what is it but on purpose to advise us to a discreet liberty of choosing him that is best out of all, and not servilely to subject ourselves to such hazards and inconveniences as may accompany any one? In such sort as sometimes a person notoriously wicked, and sometimes (to the heightening of our woe) a Child shall be left to rule over us. That it is the strongest allurement to undertake acts of Tyranny and Injustice; since now they know they cannot be amoved, be they what they will: Nor will they at all study the content and satisfaction of the people, since they know they came in, and can continue therein without them. Whereas he that considers that his election comes from, and is made by the people, will probably, as in gratitude and kindness to them, study all ways to please and oblige them  
With these and such like discourses and arguments I find the ambitious heads of some persons (disaffected to the present Government, or indeed to any Government are all) have of late sought, not only to estrange the mind of both Parliament and Army one towards another, but to spread an universal jealousy and disgust against him that is now our higher Power: That so as under the odium and suspicion of that arbitrary Government which may be acted by one person, themselves may, more certainly, and in greater numbers, both at Committees and elsewhere, by virtue of the glorious title and countenance of a Parliament, still retain to themselves an unlimited power to settle and dispose of the Liberties and fortunes of others as they shall see good. And although, for the present there may not be so much fear of impression upon a just consideration of the approved moderation and discipline of the whole Army (the like whereunto I may confidently say no story can make instance in) yet, considering them as mortal in their particular members, and how that hereafter the hope of succession (a contrivance purposely brought in to engage and disaffect some of them) may work upon more ambitious and covetous heads, I have thought good to offer these Considerations following, as highly considerable, both in respect of Justice and gratitude to the person now in possession, and also in reference to the future good and tranquillity of the three Nations.  
First, I say, that in this great change in the face of public affairs which hath happened and been brought about, all that have been active have not run equal hazards. For, as it is apparent that the Soldier hath run more hazard than others; so, amongst them again, although it be true, that as to the shock of a battle, the common Soldier is in equal or greater peril of his life, than his Captain or Colonel, yet since in the defeat of an Army, it is much the lesser patt that perish in the field; but the rest coming to be made prisoners, and so left to the usage of the Conqueror, it is not then to be thought but that the leader and Commander is more in danger of severe and exemplary punishment than the other. Besides which, in all Proclamations of pardon, which are the usual forerunners of open war or set battles, an offer of indemnity and grace useth to be made as to the body and ordinary sort of the adverse party and army, and only some few, and it may be but the General himself to stand excepted. And therefore I would desire those that be now Commanders in this present army to lay these things to heart, and to measure the case of their present General by that Gospel rule of do as thou wouldst be done unto. Do they not really believe that in case the King had prevailed, themselves should have undergone higher Censure and Punishment than those of inferior rank that served under them? and that, not only as having greater fortunes than them to lose, but also as having been more eminent and active against him than they. And do they not farther believe that their present General, as having most of all been eminent and forward in this whole enterprise, was not thereupon, proportionably in greatest danger of all? Therefore if they think it reasonable that those states and honours which by means, and as in reward of their public employment are come into their hands, should now remain as hereditary to their posterity, in like manner as they did to others before, they must, upon the same rule of equity determine that the like is most justly due to the Protector & his family also. If any of them by means of his own military and public employment, have increased his estate or degree so far as to be brought up to the rank and title of Esquire, will he be content that nothing of this shall descend to his son? Or if he have gotten the propriety of some Manor, and through that the jurisdiction and Honour which belongs to a Lord thereof, will they be content to exercise and enjoy all this but during life only, and then suffer both the acquired estate and Lordship to rest at the dispose of the Tenants, or those that have served under him? whereby these, as renouncing that their own former and proper relations and conditions of Tenancy and Obedience, should now take upon them to dispose, as they think good of the heir; and to share and distribute, as they please, all that belonged to the Father? And all this upon allegation it was a joint and public cause which they all undertook, and that these honours and Revenues being parcels of, and belonging unto that Commonwealth, for which they served, there was no reason that one should engross and appropriate that for which all had run like hazard and service: If they think this Levelling plea fit in this case to take place, there will then indeed be some equality though little discretion. But if they on their parts, like not to be reduced to this condition, but do rather judge it reasonable that since that Commonwealth, for whose sake and safety they have undertaken all this pains and hazard, hath belonging unto it, and to the necessary support and management thereof divers hereditary Officers, preferments, and Revenues, it is but just that those persons that have been most eminently faithful and active above others in the support of it and them, should by good equity be estated in those places and powers which are of greatest trust and benefit. For if this plea be not good, there are examples and precedents enough to be fetched out of foreign parts both for levelling of Gentry and Nobility, and also to make them mortal with the parent, and to depend on the arbitrary disposal of others. But if they would not, for their parts, have it well taken to have alterations purposely devised and set on foot to take from them and theirs what they had so highly deserved, so can they not but judge it as hard and unequal usage towards others. For, did any of them ever hear or read that the Sovereignty of this place was ever elective? If not, do they indeed think that this man that now hath it, is, for his part, so much the worst and most undeserving of any that ever yet ruled, that, for his exemplary infamy and disgrace, a particular law must be brought in to the prejudice of his posterity? I would fain demand of any of them that are fathers of children; Was not the honour & advancement of their house one great motive to this undertaking? Did they not beforehand know, that if they had been overcome, the infamy and loss accompanying Traitors and Treason (ever imputed to the weaker side) would have light on their posterity as much or more than themselves? And therefore since these their children (especially of such as have been eminent) have run their shares in the hazard of that shame and loss which did attend the success, and the greatest share too in the perpetuity thereof; they cannot therefore but conclude, that not only their own, but the race of those also that are above them, must, by good right, claim to be estated and settled in all such hereditary Offices as their father stood seized of, in reward or acknowledgement of their past service. There can be no man so weak of judgement or experience, but may easily conceive there would have been a more high measure of contempt and punishment inflicted on the posterity of the Protector then of any other, in case he had been overcome: Nor surely can any be so devoid of reason or conscience, as not to determine that by good consequence they do thereupon deserve also to be continued in the highest preferment that doth belong to that Commonwealth whose cause they maintained, and for whose safety they were put into such hazard.  
But to come yet nearer to them in their Proposals for Equality: Do they think sit indeed, that every person and every family engaged in this Cause, should enjoy an arithmetical proportion of power and advantage with that of their superiors, both in electing and being elected? Why, then must the poorest Cottager and Mechanic of all come in with their equal voice to choose, and also with his equal turn for being chosen, without any put-off for want of birth or breeding, or other personal endowment or fitting qualification which was not at his hand to be expected But if they cannot think it possible that this way could afford turns enough for the hundreth family in a Kingdom that have engaged; nor do think it farther necessary to erect an Herald's Office to register all that first ventured and acted in that Cause, with their several descents and pedigrees; then do they proceed partially according to their own rule, making an unequal choice amongst those that have equally engaged: Because equality of honour and preferment being due to that first equality of desert, and engagement in the Father only, how can it be forfeited by any accidental inferiority or impediment in the Son happening since? Will they wave this supposition of equal engagement and claim due unto all Families, and confine both the Electors and Elected unto some rank or order of men, and so by an exact pair of Scissors cut a Nation into two equalities; one that shall be equally and altogether uncapable of having voice or share in the Government, and the other of being constantly and equally capable of both (as in all elective Monarchies is practised) then by the same rule of justice that they observe a distance, and exclude those below from having an equality with them in some places of command or profit; he that is uppermost of all, may, as I said, exclude them again in that which is highest. For it may well be presumed, that he is as much above them of the highest rank of equality, as they again are above those that are below. If we look to the examples of Germany and Poland (the two only places where there is a sovereign Magistrate elected with any competent power) we shall find that Germany hath scarcely made any choice but out of their four great Families of Franconia, Swevia, Bavaria, and Austria, still making choice of one of those Dukes for Emperor; which they did not neither, till there was a failer in the family of Charles the Great, which was above them all. And as for Poland, their Stories tell us, That they have had Forty persons successively Reigning of one and the same Family: the like whereunto cannot be said of any hereditary Monarchy that I know of.  
And, Sir, if you would be satisfied with precedents as well as Reason, for this hereditary succession amongst ourselves, you shall find it adjusted even from the Founders and Originals of our English Nation. For did not those Armies of the Saxons that had helped the people of this Land against their Enemies, think it afterwards reasonable, that since themselves had shared in most of the great places of Trust and Command, and that also in the same way of approbation and hereditary right they found them possessed by others before, so also to settle their Generals and their Heirs in that place and degree of power which was highest of all? and this they did, although in their own Nation that Office did then pass by Election. And it will be also found that both Dane and Norman coming with their Armies afterwards, did, upon their success, settle themselves and their Chieftains in like manner.  
If we look abroad we shall find, Sir, that as these Saxons did in England, so the Francs (another people of Germany) did also settle their Leaders in the Kingdom of France; and although they had called themselves Francs, as impatient of the subjection of any other, yet did they most willingly submit to the Head of their own party. And mark those several lines of Kings that have therein swayed, and you will find that the several Families of Meroveus, Charles the Great, and of Capet, were such as by their own policy and prowess, and by the help of a powerful party had been advanced from the degree of Subjects to become absolute Kings, upon the expulsion of those that were their former Masters, and had the Title. Nay, look to Italy, Spain, France, Germany, Poland, Hungary, and all the world over, and you shall still find, that in all those State-alterations that have been made by a prevailing party, either domestic or foreign, the Head and Leader of that party hath still had the Diadem, or chief place of Authority settled on him and his Family. Neither Goths, Vandals, Lombard's, Huns, or any people whatever but acted accordingly: and however they were Nations most fond of the name of Liberty, as it is observed that all Northern people are, and might also be otherwise governed at home; yet, in this case, they still held it equitable, that since themselves had every one, by the conduct of their Chieftain, bettered his Fortunes, in possession of the Inheritances of persons of inferior Ranks, so proportionally should their General be settled in that which was highest. And as the examples of Republics, or of elective Monarchies have been few, and also inconsiderable, either for eminence or durance, in comparison of Monarchies, and those hereditary (which in most places hath always so continued without alteration, whereas no one place that hath been Republic or Elective, but what hath been longer and more eminent otherways) so is it farther observable, That when Greeks, Romans, Germans, Poles, or any other have erected Commonwealths, or made their Princes elective, it hath never been done after a Civil contest, and where one party hath gotten the better of the other by way of conquest, but was still done in peace, and by an unanimous consent of the whole Nation, and when there was no alteration of private men's Fortunes and conditions; and where also there was a failer in the Line of their last conquering Prince: at which time it is not to be supposed, that the Nobles or Senators would in their parity one to another, be content to submit to the constant Regiment of any third person and family amongst themselves. For so in Greece they set up their Commonwealths, when the Heraclidae, (that race of Kings amongst them that descended from their famous Warrior and defender Hercules) became extinct. And so they did in Germany and Poland, upon failer of the Lines of Charlemagne and Lechus. Or else (as in Rome) where the whole people did join in that discontent, and in seclusion of their Kings, and had no precedent Civil war thereabouts, or about the exercise of the Civil power. For had it so been, that side that had under a Cesar been victorious, and thereupon seated themselves and families in the honours and possessions of the adverse party, would certainly, in honour and gratitude, have made him and his issue Imperatores in the Civil State, who had all that while been Imperatores in the Field. And if we look to our Neighbours of the Low-Countries (a People that our Nation hath no reason to reckon as grateful to their Protectors) yet we shall find that they having in their Union against their King the King of Spain, been victorious through the conduct and assistance of the Prince of Orange, have thereupon confirmed unto the same Family the chief Office of Honour and Command heretofore executed among them: Under which, as they have hithetto thriven, so is it highly probable that the seclusion thereof, may prove the seclusion of all farther peace and happiness from that people,  
And now, Sir, after all this travail in foreign Stories, to return home, and home to yourself too, let me appeal to you as a Member of a Parliament of England; Did you ever read of any Parliament that did not settle the Government on the posterity of him that was possessed, and whose Writs they obeyed in their Summons? And therefore, Sir, since there is no competent example to be fetched herein out of any foreign Story, and since no one sort of people at any time inhabiting or possessing this Land, did ever in any age attempt to make this Government elective; such a thing to be at this time attempted, and towards such an one that hath in particular so well deserved, will seem a thing most of all unreasonable, as well as ungrateful.  
When I have said so much to you (Sir) on the behalf of the General, to serve as an Anti-Memento against the insinuations of such as would have the Army believe that the power and settlement of him and his family would prove an unsettling of them: I shall now on the contrary desire you to consider how the establishment of this one person and his family will be, under God, the most necessary and likely way to draw on their securities also; and that, even from the aforesaid arguments of most prime and principal engagement of the same cause. For since he and his have herein already so far adventured, as to be most of all uncapable of reconcilement and forgiveness, they may then be most sure that both he and his in order to their own defence and security, (which is no way else to be had but by the steady assistance of the Army) will be most intent and studious of all and every one of their several preferments and good wills, in such sort as not to make any the least alteration amongst them without necessary and just cause. Whereas another person or family that may hereafter be elected, and it may be contrary to their interest and liking, cannot be presumed to carry so ready and great a respect towards them and theirs, as experience doth warrant this man to have done. For if the power of election shall rest in such men as are not members of the Army, it is then likely, out of that enmity which usually passeth towards martial men, from such as are not of like quality or descent, all their former services may come to be forgotten, and themselves put off with contempt, as being now of no further use. And farther, it may be such an one shall be chosen as hath not been at all, or very little active in the same Cause with them; in which case their danger will also increase through that greater likelihood of his compliance with the adverse party: For how easy a matter may it be for such an one to be taken into favour there, and for some eminent breach of trust have such high dignity and reward promised and settled upon him and his, as may by far countervail that momentany title which he now holdeth? The which can never be feared from him that is of the same quality and engagement with themselves, and that is hereditarily fixed in this place; who being at the height already, and so settled, nothing can be offered him valuable to his resignation. And having so far spoken of these things as they carry a more particular concern to the Army, in answer to those that would disaffect them from their own General; I shall now answer those arguments whereby they endeavour to disaffect the whole Nation against the present Settlement, under the pretence of the good of the Commonwealth.  
You are hereupon, Sir, desired to consider, That when you discover in any men more than ordinary pretensions of zeal to the public good, and for advancement of the Liberties of the people; and, on the contrary, as strong invectives against Tyranny and Arbitrary government; and do withal find them offering and giving in strange proposals for the establishment of the one, and the prevention of the other, you may then, I say, be sure that that party from whom all this proceeds is such an one as mislikes his present condition; and, for the amendment of his fortune, doth either expect to be bribed by preferment from making any disturbance; or else he hopes, that, from the new shuffling of affairs in the alteration of State, he may have a better game dealt him then before. In the mean time all modest and judicious men do look upon mankind under Government, as in all other his worldly conditions, still subject and liable to many mischiefs and inconveniences. And therefore although each sort of settled Government carry with itself a certain benefit, even as Government; and that Monarchy and hereditary Monarchy, as the most settled form, is most preferrible to the rest, in respect of Divine appointment and institution, and of political practice and accommodation; yet, to suppose that any thing, submitted to the managery and accidents of humane frailty, can be thereupon found otherwise then liable to adverse accidents, beyond the cure of any mortal contrivance, will (as I said) argue an ambitious arrogance in the proposer, and also a credulous folly in the receiver. Besides, when I find God both punishing and threatening to punish people by sending such Princes as they deserve, what doth this invention of Election but look like a contrivance to defeat the decrees of Heaven in either of those ways of punishment, by a Child or an evil Prince? and what do they deserve, that take this course either in distrust of God's providence, or in prevention of their own punishment, but to find a remedy worse than the disease, and to be liable to certain evils, to avoid contingent ones? For, let us suppose ourselves even in the worst of these chances, either fallen under an evil or a childish heir, and yet we shall herein find it equal with that which is Elective. For, first, if a Child be left to succeed, then is it perfectly in the same condition; because of that person who is elected to rule in his stead, as his Protector and guardian. And this apparent advantage is then also usually found, that being done by the Father, who had more interest in the good of the public than any other, is not only done without danger of Civil war, but with due and  respect to the sufficiency of the person. In which case also the highest person and nearest of blood, is commonly chosen. Whereupon, by reason of his native high quality, the Subjects pay their obedience more readily than they would to a new raised person: And then, he and his Family having greater and more certain interest in the Commonwealth than any other, will, in that respect, be more careful to advance the good thereof then any other also.  
As for that inconvenience, That a wicked Son may be heir to the Crown, and so leave a Kingdom necessarily subjected to such a Ruler; whereas in elective Monarchies there is a liberty to choose the most virtuous and fit person out of any family: It might be hereunto first answered, that in case of apparent unfitness in the elder, the Father (who can better judge thereof then others) will doubtless leave the Kingdom to some other son more fit, or else appoint such as Tutors and Guides over him, that his Kingdom and Family (things to be supposed of more concern to him then any else) shall not be hazarded by any of his vices or indiscretion: and there are not wanting precedents of this kind. But, to affirm that this course of Election is hereby made a constant way of prevention of all those mischiefs that may come from the hands of evil Governors, is a beging of the question, upon these and like suppositions. As first, That each person hath his abilities, inclinations, and moral habits so apparent, as not to endanger those that are to make use of him, through dissimulation. The next is, that all and each one of the Electors (to make it a free and discreet choice) are not only endued with an infallibility for the discovery of good and bad in the general, but also can distinguish and choose according to such particular virtuous habits as are most fit for him that is to execute the place of Governor in chief; and this as knowingly as the Carpenter can by sight tell the nature and kind of that wood he is to make use of. Next, and beyond this again, it must be presumed that, besides this knowledge, there must be in all and each of the Electors so much conscience and integrity adjoined, as to cause them constantly to choose each person for public regard sake only, and not according to any particular relation, or private liking or interest. Now since upon the failing of any one of these surmises, it is apparent that the constancy of their promised benefit must fail also, so much more upon the failing and uncertainty of all of them, (as is most evident they do) there can nothing of certainty be expected from this their promised benefit, as every man in his own judgement may presently conclude. For first, there is nothing that falls out more common within our notice, than the daily practice of the art of dissimulation; even so, that those that have highest design and intention to gain to themselves any advantage by the overreaching of others, are thereby also rendered the most studious and able proficients therein, and this most especially where ambition bears sway; for as then the aim is higher, so is this humour usually incident to persons of more than ordinary abilities: The which cannot again but tell them, that as all men do submit to Government but as out of necessity, and that since we cannot absolutely avoid the being under the government of some, and so consequently of being sometimes and in some things restrained of our wills, (to the end that others that would else in this time of general liberty injure us, may thereupon be restrained also) it comes therefore to pass that those that are most desirous and like to prevail in the obtaining of places of supreme power and command, do, for acceptance and general approbation sake, frame their outward behaviour in compliance to this humour: They not only put on a face of sobriety, meekness and clemency, whereby vulgarly to please, but more particularly to ingratiate with the Electors themselves, (who they know would have been absolutely governing still, had it not been for the fear of others) They make semblance to each party and person amongst them of a great sympathy and liking they have to them in their several ways and opinions, in such sort as in effect to persuade them, that to choose him to be their chief Ruler, is but the same as to rule in chief themselves by his means. Even as Marius and Silla, as they severally thought them most powerful to set them up in supreme authority, so did they severally court and comply with the humours of the people or Nobility; and during the time that the more popular part did bear sway, some in that state, the better to ingratiate themselves and obtain their election, have renounced their noble birth and quality, and caused themselves to be adopted by some inferior person. So that, in a word, as every man is to the world a dissembler in respect of his inward inclinations and faults, so from men of the highest aims are practices of this kind to be most expected. Whereupon it must fall out that he that can (Tiberius-like) most dissemble, shall be most sure of this honour: From whence it comes to pass, that it is ordinarily a people's happiness to be deceived in the qualities of the party. For the vulgar sort choosing according to meekness and softness of spirit only, are ready to conclude, that he governs all best, that governs all least: whereas the Electors again, being divided by factions amongst themselves, would have their opposites to be by him governed too much, and themselves not at all. Whereupon it will appear, that this fancied benefit leaves us but at as great or greater uncertainty than we were before; until they can prove that the art of dissimulation and the art of Regiment proceed from the same ability, and do always accompany one another in the same person. And if we look to our own Story, it was certainly a happiness to those that then lived, that by the right of descent they stood obliged to accept of Henry the fifth; one that neither for his virtuous life, or any other apparent behaviour, was so likely else to have been elected, as was Henry the sixth his son, being a Prince of more meek and pious behaviour. So hard a thing it is to discover and distinguish between those endowments and virtues, which are most proper to complete a good man and a good Prince. For he that is most accomplished in his Ethics, may be as far to seek in his Politics. Of which we have yet a more fresh instance in the persons and reigns of Richard the 3. and that of our late King Charles. When were the people in greater fear of severe usage, then at the entrance of the one; or did express greater joy and expectation, then at the entrance of the other? insomuch as I believe that there is scarce any one even of those that have most opposed him, but had he been then free to choose, would have given his voice for him. And yet it hath pleased God so far to deceive humane judgement and expectation, as to cause these Nations to undergo the greatest share of Civil calamities and changes in the time of this last: whereas in the time of the other the people enjoyed a continual security and quiet; and during that shorter time he did reign, there were yet more good laws made then in the reign of any Prince besides. Nay, I think I may boldly say, that upon the examination of our own Chronicles, or any else, it will be found that those persons that people have received or elected as their greatest darlings, have in their governments proved to them most fatal; and, on the contrary, such as they have been most afraid of, and have submitted unto only as out of sense of duty, have proved most fortunate: As it were on purpose to instruct and advise us, that the most high God and disposer of Kings and Kingdoms, will, as he sees good, make them instrumental for infliction of his wrath, or of his blessing to any people; and, by that usual deception of ours, in the judging of such as be either good or bad, doth thereby teach us, neither to trust in these things to the arm of flesh and our own judgement and contrivances, nor to cast so much distrust towards him and his care of us, as to refuse those persons he hath by his providence, and usual way of dispensation in that kind, set over us. For as he did never set up any government but Monarchy, nor did ever give that, or any settled office to any person, but he did withal give it to his posterity; so is it to be left to him alone to find out the means to change the same from family to family, as he shall really know the deserts both of the one and the other; and not leave it to us to contrive and set up elective Monarchies upon any such fond suppositions. For if such a consideration had been valuable to have made places of supreme trust and power elective, then certainly the High-Priesthood, requiring far more personal execution, and that in more divine affairs then that of King, (who was the first established Officer in Civil affairs) should not also have been entailed to a single family. In which kind notwithstanding it was still settled, and so to continue, till God by himself or by his Vicegerent saw just cause for alteration thereof. In which case as there were others ready still to supply those defects which childhood or other insufficiency might occasionally make in the high Priest hood, so may there be in the Civil Magistracy also, without running into danger of civil war through the abdication of a family of known desert, and still be but at the same hazard for goodness or sufficiency in the choice of another.  
If we appeal from discourse and argument to matter of experience and practice, in this question of the benefit of Election, we shall also find things to fall out quite contrary to their imagination and promises; and that, upon examination of foreign stories, and comparing the virtues and good government of such as have ruled in places elective, with the virtues and good rule of such as reigned in places hereditary; we shall truly find the people in a much happier condition under the last then under the first. For where shall we pick out any instance for a succession of Princes, so notoriously wicked, and in so great a number, as was in the Roman Empire after the Soldiery and Senate would there take upon them to make that Government elective, and neglect that more direct line of succession and that hereditary right which belonged to the issue of their brave and victorious Chieftain Caesar? What think we of Caligula, Nero, Otho, Vitellius, Caracalla, Heliogabalus, and other unmatchable examples both for ill life and ill government? And when we have pitched upon the best of them, it will not be any encouraging example for Christians to set up their Governor by election, since on their score we may justly lay the greatest part of those most bloody persecutions made against them: which until the time of Constantine the Great, who, with his Christianity, did again establish an hereditary succession, and so somewhat more increase and settle the glory of that Empire, the poor Christians found little joy or intermission. So easy and usual a thing it is for dissimulation, force or bribery to prevail in this kind.  
And if you will employ your thoughts upon the collection of such Princes as have been highly illustrious and eminent either in sacred or profane story, I do not think you will find any one that came in by election only, (in sacred story I am sure you will not) that deserves to be put either in the first or second rate. No, those Princes that were so glorious in conquests as to establish the three first Monarchies of the world, were all of them such as were hereditary: Nay, that which we call the fourth Monarchy, (because it was longest a Monarchy, and under that government it was longest, and had under it both rise and perfection, being from the Creation but 480 years a Commonwealth) doth owe unto hereditary Monarchy its chief and fundamental laws, and also that warlike discipline by means whereof it became so great and victorious afterwards. For all which, Sir, there is a reason at hand: Even because the foundation and achievement of greatness and empire, requiring a foregoing design and council, and that which is made upon experience also; and requiring a foregoing stock of Treasure, Navy, and other warlike ammunition and preparations together with a well disciplined and obedient Amry & lastly, requiring a good proportion of time for the prosecution and finishing thereof, it is not to be supposed that the life of any one person can be sufficient both to continue and perfect things of such length and difficulty: but rather, upon these considerations, it is to be conceived that every elective Prince will be discouraged from such attempts; not only because of danger and hardship, but also because he shall venture and labour for what shall not accrue to his family, and it may be that the glory and profit of all his works may come to be enjoyed by such a successor as is his enemy. And so again, in case any such enterprise should have been set on foot, it is as vain a thing to suppose that the emulation that doth usually attend Princes of this condition (and those that are best of them too) will let the successor contribute towards the accomplishment of any work begun by another, but rather to contrive one of his own, and that contrary also, to the increase of his own glory by the others disgrace. So that it being probable that his predecessor was not allied to him, but of another party or faction, those that were Enemies to the other are but so much the more likely to expect favour and protection, in stead of war and conquest from him. And it is farther considerable, that it will also require a good space of time for every new elected Prince to understand the state of his own affairs; and both to settle them, and secure himself against those of other parties and factions which he mistrusts, and have opposed him at home, before he can have time and opportunity to think of, and make provision for conquests abroad, (which then also must be supposed the more short, for that Princes are not elected young.) So that we are then only to expect such glorious and great acts to be achieved by any one such person as a Solomon or an Alexander, when they have succeeded as heirs to a David or a Philip; who, as well in love and care to their Kingdoms, as to their posterity that shall enjoy them, have been so provident and industrious in laying up all sort of provisions, and making such preparations and beginnings as are unto the accomplishment of so great works necessary. And it is very observable, that when God hath any great and glorious act or change to make in the world, or in any one Nation, he doth then also not only raise up a new family, like those of Caesar and Pepin, (for the greater manifestation of his power and appearance) but doth also bless the same with an Augustus or a Charlemagne; such a famous heir and successor, as may serve for completing and finishing the work: To the end that all the glory might not be appropriate to one neither. In which consideration, Sir, why may we not presume that as our present Protector hath been by his power and presence set up and made prosperous for some great and glorious end (of which we have been prudent foundations already laid,) so also that the full perfection and settlement of the work is to be expected from his heir. And more apparent hope may we have hereof also, then could at first be conceived of Henry the 5. lately mentioned; who yet succeeding a father, the first of his family, and raised by the sword, did make so good use of that establishment and those preparations he had made at home, that, to the great honour of this Nation, he became the most renowned Prince of any before or since.  
Where it is objected, Sir, that hereditary sovereignty renders men more inclined to acts of tyranny and oppression, because he is not in fear to be called to account: It may be answered, that he that fears to be called to account, will be by so much the more provoked to destroy and oppress those that he thinks will be most instrumental therein. For, Tyranny being nothing else but Sovereign revenge upon such as may or have opposed and crossed them; and Subjects being to be presumed more ready and daring in that kind against him that was but lately their fellow, and whose anger they fear not (because of that account he is to make) then against him that is their Prince born, who thereupon is not so likely to conceive cause of hatred, and so to proceed to acts of tyranny. Besides, from the very act of Election itself, there must be cause of discontent and revenge administered to such like Princes; and that, from all such as have not been of his party, or have opposed, or not so strongly abetted his claim as he saw fit. Which provocations can never happen to the other; who, as in hereditary right, comes in without any such opposition. And it is also to be considered, that a Prince elected for term of life is as little in fear of being called to account as the other, if he be a Sovereign Prince: if not, he is (as I said) for that reason most like to tyrannize and oppress. And we shall therefore find Tyranny to be most cried out upon by the people under Elective governments, and Insurrection and Civil war oftenest raised upon that score.  
And lastly, whereas it is affirmed, that Princes elected, will, as in requital of that courtesy, be more kind and loving to the people than such as are hereditary; for that these, on the other side, may seem more neglectful of them, as claiming their admittance of right, and not of favour: It may be answered, that this very thing (if well considered) is also an inconvenience which follows Election. For, unless they can suppose that any Kingdom hath but one person fit or ambitious enough to stand for this choice, they must then next suppose, that the party chosen will be so far from being kind or grateful to such as were not of his party and did not join in his election, as he will be their enemy. Again it may be asked where they find these elections ever referred to the people in general, so as to induce him to kindness and acknowledgement towards them, and not still referred to some few certain Electors, as in Germany to six, nor but to a few in Poland, the Commons in both places being wholly excluded? Whereupon when the number of dissenting Electors shall be taken out of the roll of kindness, it may well on the other side be concluded, that Election doth prompt Princes to be careless of the good of their people in general, and to carry so partial a respect towards some few friends and favourites that have helped him to his sovereignty, and can continue him still in power, as to neglect and despise all the rest. So that equal justice being not to be expected from him in his public administrations, it were much better for a Prince to think he holds his power from and under God, and is to him alone accountable, then by such like devises to bribe or terrify him that is to execute the place of a Judge, and so lay a stumbling block for him that reproveth in the gate.  
By this time, Sir, I hope I have made good what I affirmed in the beginning, That all their arguments were but the insinuations of ambitious and factious heads, clouded under the specious shows of public good and equal justice. For it plainly appears, that instead of avoidance (as they pretend) their Proposals would necessarily bring us into slavery and oppression, by making our Princes (as of course) partial, unjust, and tyrannical. If they be then to seek in what they most rely upon, what will they answer to those more great and more certain miseries which are so constantly attendant on the other form? all of which are so necessarily leading to faction and siding, and to the unsettling of all estates and conditions, that no man regardful of public peace and content, and careful to avoid the danger of Civil war, Anarchy and confusion, can deliberately carry a wish that way. For since there cannot be any Political Government longer than there is an apparent Sovereignty somewhere abiding; from whose residence in one, few, or more persons, it comes to be called of this or that form; what shall we say of this Government, upon the death of the last elected Prince? If the supreme power be in the Electors, then is it now an Aristocracy: And why is it not to be feared that they may not proceed to election at all; but, by a kind of complot, keep it in their own hands? To think of setting up some other person or order to see them observe due time and method herein, is again to suppose the sovereignty not in them neither: for if they may be hindered from doing ill, so also from doing well, or not doing at all. And then how could the deceased Prince have sovereign power derived from his election, (supposing they gave it to him during life) if not they, but some others then had it? If, according to the fancied way of Coordination, the Sovereignty were partly in the Electors, and partly in the Third Order, then must both agree in the election, or else it will come to nothing. And this they will doubtless do in case they be friends and of one interest and opinion, or else are afraid of each others power. In which case, as Coordination will at best prove fruitless, because they are as like to comply in an ill choice as a good, so again, if they be enemies, that Commonwealth must run these two most certain perils; not only, through their contention, to be deprived of a good choice, when it is made; but be drawn into the most dangerous condition of Civil war, as being wholly engaged in two contraty parties. For, do greatness & sovereign power use to be slighted and unregarded, as that those that have it should be more ready to resign then increase it? Do men rather chose subjection, than principality; to be in the condition of beggars for favours, then be able to do them? Have we not seen a Parliament designing to make themselves everlasting? and may we not hereafter fear that a Council may do so too? And therefore it must needs be, that upon the death of every Elected Prince, the whole State and Government, and every man's fortune therein, must be left in tottering condition; whilst (during that interregnun) Every man may do what seems good in his own eyes; and so be as in a state of Anarchy. The which unhappy condition we find attributed to the Israelites before they had the Sceptre hereditarily settled (as was promised) in the Tribe of Judah, but were subject to the like Chasmes in government. And if any would know how it can be imagined that every man could be permitted to do what was right in his own eyes, or be in a state of Anarchy, where there is a standing Law for direction what to do, and standing Judges and Officers to see it done; and where, lastly, there is a standing high Court or Council above all. So that the Israelites having at that time all these, that is, the Law of Moses, the Priests and Levites, and other ordinary Judges; and having also their Sanhedrim or great Council of Elders, and prime men of their Tribes, we must therefore conceive that by every man's doing what seemed good in his own eyes, is not meant that every individual person did so to every man else; but the heads and leaders in these several Tribes whereof the Sanhedrim consisted, being divided amongst themselves by faction, and consequently drawing all those of their Tribe and party severally after them, it thereupon came to pass that every man being thus divided from every man, as under these separate associations, they did every man unto every man, what seemed good in their own eyes. And this befell them because there was no King or Judge in those days to judge between blood and blood, and plea and plea; that is, such matters as happened to fall out between the Elders and great ones; and so too hard in judgement to be determined in the ordinary Courts, or reconciled in that higher Court either: since these Elders were both judges and parties therein.  
And therefore, Sir, if there be so muce danger of division and Civil war dependant on Elective principalities (even because they are Elective) what may we more justly fear to be the event of such things in this Nation; where now, more than ever, every man stands from every man so much divided in Civil interest, but much more in matters of Religion? If there were one man Micha found amongst them, setting up a Teraphim and a Priest to himself, while there was no King there; what think we of ourselves, that have lately had so many Micha's setting up their several Teraphims in every corner, and that with such extravagant affectation of dissent from what is established, that they persuade themselves, that to be heterodox is to be orthodox? Will it not in this case highly concern us as we love our peace and quiet, to keep constant to one person and family of most moderate principles, and which is well known to carry a tender and universal regard to all, and so most likely in good time to bring us to a happy union again; then, after his decease, to cast the Commonwealth into the danger of a new storm and shipwreck, by awaking the hopes of all that be heads and leaders in those several sects and factions that be among us, to be putting in for themselves, or some great favourer of their party? for if we find such packing and siding for election of Parliament men, or the like, what stirs may we look for at the choice of a Protector? Out of which contest and dispute, suppose we should be so happy as to wind ourselves without open War, and have one person at last chosen and agreed upon by the Major part of the appointed Electors; and suppose yet farther, that the present Army shall therein consent too, or else rest quiet; why yet since that person chosen must himself be of some party or another, and could not therefore come in by a joint or universal consent, will it not hence come to pass (as beforesaid) that he being now in power, shall be naturally provoked to acts of punishment and revenge towards such as have opposed, or have not, to his content and expectation, taken part with him? Whereupon, all that are of different parties from him must expect to live as in a state of persecution, or endanger a new civil War by joining in opposition. So that, if we be not actually broken one against another, yet advantage will be hereby still offered and increased; and the whole Nation continually espoused into several feuds and factions, to the overthrow of all charity and brotherly love. And if, to avoid this mischief, some way of restraint should be thought upon, by having a third Estate (like that in Poland) to bear a control over their King's actions; this, although it might, at some times, and for a while keep the sore from breaking out, yet would it but increase the swelling and distemper against a fit opportunity, by that increase of Opinions which should follow this general freedom and toleration; as he experience of those many more Religions and Opinions in the same Poland, then elsewhere, do witness to be the fruits of Elective and much limited Princes. Which is a course that cannot at all allay the discontents of those that live under his Government, and stand divided in interest or opinion. For since he must yet have some power left him to Rule with, he will still be as subject to be accused, by those that find themselves crossed for having transcended his limits in that little Trust, as if he had had more. The which jealousy will be also increased, as well from that insolence which doth usually accompany persons newly preferred, as also, from that degree of impatience which useth again to be cast towards such as were lately but of equal condition with us, and are by ourselves set up. Whenas, in Princes born, these things are not only patiently undergone, as out of sense of duty, but are also more tolerable and mild; as coming from such as were from their Cradles bred to sway Sceptres, and had been accustomed to such like honours and addresses.  
As thus, Sir, Elective and limited Monarchies do nourish qarties and factions, for want of a common centre of Union amongst themselves, so the generality of the subjects and people do in them live in the highest degree of servitude. Because those that call themselves the Free Princes and Nobility (as in Germany, Poland, Denmark, etc.) making it part of their freedom to debarr their Emperors and Kings from intermeddling in their Jurisdictions, or from hearing the appeals or addresses of their Subjects (which they arbitrarily govern according to their own private laws, and not after the common law of the Empire and Kingdom) they must thereupon be by so much the more enslaved, as their Emperor or King is less powerful. And that which yet makes their case more hard, is, that since they are also liable to more Taxes than others, paying not only to the support of their own Lords what they shall think fit, but also to the support of the Empire and Kingdom upon all public Levies, they are thereby unreasonably put to maintain a power that cannot protect them.  
And from the foregoing grounds it is, found that, as Elective governments may be observed more short-lived than Hereditary; so also, of those that have or do continue, there may be a daily lessening and declension observed in them; by suffering several parcels to be taken away by their Neighbours, or else to stand upon terms of absolute independency; as may be seen by those several petit States of Italy and elsewhere, cantoned off from the Germane Empire. For why should those absolute Princes and Lords, that have their peculiar Seignories and power, be so much concerned herein as to undergo the charge and hazard of recovering those Territories and Dominions to a common Sovereignty only, whereof themselves have so little honour or benefit? and why should the Emperor or Prince (who holds but for life) endanger or impoverish himself herein, since he shall still keep on the same rank and title; and have, it may be, a good sum for his connivance.  
And so again, for that very time they do continue, they come to owe their preservation more to outward occurrences and good luck, than their inward prudence or policy. As for example, the Germane Empire is beholding to the Turk, and to the Christian Princes its Neighbours for their agreement; who, by their continual fears from abroad, keep them united and in peace at home. And by the like accident is the Kingdom of Poland often kept from Civil War also: and also by keeping close to one family; which cannot afford many persons at once, whereby to make civil disturbance about Election. Besides, the Germane Empire is also kept in some agreement by that respect therein given to the Papal Sea. For the Pope having, by much struggling and policy, pulled down the power of those Emperors, and by his golden Bull settled it as now it is (having half the Electors Bishops) hath still kept up such a power and reverential respect amongst them, as to awe any one there, from making himself so great and absolute, as to be again in competition with him for mastery: or, (on the other side) to suffer the Electors or other Estates to invade or diminish that greatness and glory left him; lest also that honour of his own should abate in the loss of so honourable a servant. And since the time of Luther it hath been preserved by the policy of the Austrian family; who ever since getting their sons settled in their life times, have kept it from those distractions which might accompany new choice.  
Another inconvenience attending elective Sovereignty's, is decay of public Revenue, and provisions of all kinds both for war and peace. For how shall it be thought that those that hold but for his life, should either repair what was done by another, or attempt the erection of such magnificent works and foundations, which could not likely be in that time accomplished; and which, in the doing also, must rob his family of so much in propriety, as that cost would have come to? So that these things having their reasons apparent, I shall forbear examples therein, as I have done in many things foregoing, and shall do in most that follow; fearing also, Sir, that I have already made too great an assault on your patience, and transcended the allowable bulk of a Letter. But, Sir, since all men's reading and experience do inform them that money hath been and will be the usual purchaser of preferment, it must be presumed that the person aiming at this greatness, doth intent that the public stock shall again make good his disbursement. But, may some think, the Princes and Nobles, or those in power, will look to all exorbitance in this kind. No, Sir, they will rather encourage it: for they were the persons that were first bribed for his entrance, and so cannot in justice but see him (at least) repay himself again. Besides, they being but few, and bearing no great proportion in their own particulars, towards public levies, may be suspected less careful of what is done therein, and may also have their good will purchased by part thereof. As the necessity of compliance with the great ones that holp him in and do support him, must thus exhaust the public stock, so also the care and thought for preservation and maintenance of his own family and other dependants, must cause him to employ that study and endeavour which should be intent to advance the public stock as his own, to seek to take from it all he can, that it may be so indeed. So that if we should still make change of families for our Governor, and pick out of any according as one happened to have a fit person than another, it must be supposed that the same sum that would suffice for the maintenance of one family, would not, by much, be sufficient to afford proportions to advance and ennoble a great many, in such sort that they may carry a continual show and rank answerable to that place which was once executed by their ancestor. And if we think of putting the election and power of control in more persons (as in the people, in Parliaments, or the like) as thinking a multitude of suffrages and consents are not so easily purchased; we might yet be herein mistaken also, since we are informed that Caesar and others could tell how to bribe whole Commonwealths (or those that bore the name thereof) both to be elected and kept Dictator's, or the like offices: And that Senators or Parliament-men may be drawn by money, preferment, or other relation or interest, is but too truly known. If, Sir, you should think fit to choose but out of some few more Noble families, to avoid the impoverishing of the common stock by enriching so many little ones, as they do in Germany; then how will you do to pick out such in England, as now it is, without discontent and danger too, to arise from those that are secluded? Will you keep to one family, as they in Poland have done? why, this is yet better. But the best course of all is to do as they do now in Germany, and as hath been ever practised in these Nations, to keep not only to one family, but to observe the same order of descent in this chief place of authority, as is by the law of God and the Land observed in other families in the inheritance of all things else. Sir, when you have thus done, you and the rest of the House may then, and not till then, rest assured that you have answered that great trust reposed in you, The peace and settlement of these Nations. For to settle us otherwise, were but to unsettle us by that settlement.  
And this, Sir, I may also press upon you as a duty you own to those you represent, even the satisfaction of the desires of the people in general, which I may confidently affirm is strongly inclined to that only form of Government they have heretofore so long and so happily lived under, And which upon a just conference with that disparity which is between us and those other places where Election is practised, cannot with safety be altered.  
For Sir, since we have no such standing rank of Gentry, Nobility, and free Princes, as in Venice, Poland, Germany, etc. which should hereditarily make up the body of a standing supreme Council; nor do not now so much as allow of that ancient right of Peerage in our Parliaments, but have leveled all to the order of Commons: and since we do not, like other places, cast any such reverential fear towards Pope or any Foreign prince, from whom, as from an Umpire our differences might receive ready reconciliation; and we being also an Island, are not like other places, so much in danger of Foreign surprise and invasion, whereby to be frighted to agreement, in case we should fall out about the person or the power of the Prince to be elected. It is therefore much more, on our parts, to be feared, that upon the death of every Protector, a general jealousy and fear of what shall next happen will amuse and disturb every one, as not knowing whether they shall continue under the same laws and form of government they were before. For first, suppose it to be in the interval of Parliament, and so the chief power and command being in the Council, may they not by the same power they command them in all other things, forbidden the Keepers of the Great Seal for making out Writs, or the Sheriffs for making Elections? What likelihood that either will oppose a power in being, and able to reward as well as protect them; upon fear that a power may arise to punish them, but cannot do it till they be called, nor be called till themselves shall think fit? In which case to suppose the Army, such an one as may be then in being, shall lay aside all consideration of advantages to themselves, likely to be offered from such a Council as may be also, and on the contrary, to be ready to compel those that are their legal Superiors to proceed to election, or calling of a Parliament, is as far unlikely. Or suppose the Protector should die, the Parliament fitting; why then this being the supreme power, is it not to be presumed they will take to themselves as much power in matters of government as other Parliaments have done, and so rescind what was before established as an impeachment to their perpetuity, even the power of a Protector and his Council? Now as these confusions and alterations of the Government as now established, are more to be feared from us then in other places, both for want of practice in the steering and dividing of our duties amongst such like Coordinate powers, and for want of one only standing supreme Council to direct, without fear of a dormant higher power to succeed; so is it much more on our parts to be feared, that through that siding and intermeddling which an Army may hereafter make between these jurisdictions, both the government may be changed, and the public peace hazarded. For it being evident, that in all those places where the Sovereign Magistrate and the person of the highest rank is elective, and so the Government subject to intervals, there those of the next Order are hereditarily seized of the Sovereignty as in fee, until they shall again lease the same out to another for life; and so again, where the Sovereignty is hereditary in one family, there on the other side those next subordinate Officers to be employed in the Government are elective and dependent on him: It must therefore come to pass, that if this Council or Order of men that is to have power in the interregnum should be elective also, then must that Government depend upon contingencies; because there may not be enough of them, or enough rightly chosen to complete such an assembly. Now since with us there is not (as I said) such a standing Order or Council claiming power by birth, but it is in some sort necessary and convenient that the Officers of the Army should be taken in as members both of Council and Parliament, it will follow, that in case the Council should consist mostly of such, there were no likelihood that a Parliament should be called. But if the Parliament should have more or other than those that made up the Council, then is it again to be feared, that in order to the continuance of their own power, they would cause both the power of Council and future Protectors to be voted down also. For how can it be imagined, that in this vicissitude and sliding from one Master to another, they shall be so equally favoured and used by Protector, Parliament and Council, in their several turns of power, as to stand on all hands so indifferently engaged to all and each of them, that they shall not cleave to the one, and hate and despise the other; but shall, to a man, be one day for the Council against all other, and on the morrow when the Parliament shall sit, do the like for them? If things do not happen just so, then will one Coordinate overthrow the other, by their partial and unequal siding; Or that which is yet worse, by their division hereabout they will involve us into a state of Civil war. And truly, Sir, although from such an Army, such a Council, and such a Parliament as we now have, encroachments and justlings on one another are not to be much feared; yet, Sir, that there may be just ground given to suspect such events for the future, will be very apparent to him that shall reflect on those sad consequences which might have been the issue of such high and turbulent agitations and endeavours as were by some fiery spirits set on foot in the beginning of this very Parliament. You are not sure, Sir, that the Protector and the General shall always be the same man, or that he shall be of equal prudence and reputation with this; so as by his discretion & authority, all such mischief may be pre●●●ted. And therefore, Sir, since our future peace and estab●●●●ent ought chief to be provided for, I pray think in h●● uncertain a condition you leave us, if you leave all to depend on election; and that election to be or not be, to be well and orderly done or ill done, as the parties therein entrusted shall be faithful and able, or biased and ignorant. For it is not enough in such a case to propound things fit to be done by any, unless there be withal some others appointed to see them do it: the which also may fail in their trust, and so need others again to see them do their duties: and then it will come to pass that those that are last trusted will be chief or first trusted, whereas that high tituled officer that was first trusted will be least trusted, and so come to be lowest of all. And by this settling of watchmen upon watchmen, you will bring all business to a stand, whilst those officers that are to act shall have no power to act, and those that are not to act shall have all.  
But since experience doth make it manifest, that at last some persons must be trusted, and that for some time also; in order to reconcile public differences, how madly doth it look to take such a middle course herein, as shall neither attain the good, nor avoid the evil intended? They that will trust a man for his life, do run the utmost minute of hazard he hath to do it in; and do then set the gap open again, for Civil combustion about the next Election, when as his heir may prove as good as another. And they that will not afford their Prince so much power as to be in all causes, and over all persons supreme, do not only still want a decider of quarrels amongst themselves, but do also thereby add such new occasion of quarrels about power as they may afterwards have with him. And therefore since Election cannot assure us of goodness; nay, since good Princes may change to ill (as Nero that for 5 years was the best, & afterwards the worst of any) 'tis best to make sure of that certain benefit of public peace, by keeping close to one family, and by allowing sufficiency of power, then increase the disease by those remedies of election of persons, and limitation of his power.  
Sir, there was a time indeed when Monarchy and Tyranny, Parliaments and Liberty were thought to be the same, but the experience of our condition under that long, long, long, Parliament, a and that little once since; hath rectified our judgements, and brought us to look on that Text as Canonical, and on him as a wise man that said, For the wickedness of a Land many are the Princes thereof, but by a man of understanding the state thereof is preserved, Prov. 28.2. We do acknowledge that in the multitude of Councillors there is safety, Prov. 11.14. but we look for no such matter from a multitude of controllers. So that Vox populi being now Vox Dei, we hope you will, in your debates of Government, Ask for the old paths, where is the good way, and walk therein, that we may find rest for our souls, Jer. 6.16. In this Sir, we shall not contend with you for names, but things. If you will have our Sovereign Magistrate to be called Protector, we like it well: it is an Office we want, and do therefore desire he may have that power left him as will enable him to perform it: suffer him to wear a sword Sir, or else he can neither protect us nor himself. And if again, you will have our former great Council called by the Ancient name of Parliament, we pray you also, that the thing may be again reduced: and made agreeable to the name; let them have freedom to speak their minds, but not to do them. No more of that Sir. For it is a yoke which our Fathers never knew of, nor are we able to bear. And therefore as you and the rest do now represent us, and are to make known our grievances, we do desire that you would take notice of this as a great one. For you may rest assured that, were this Nation poled, not one in twenty but would desire their old Government again.  
But it is now time, Sir, to desire something for myself; namely, your pardon for the tediousness and extravagancy of the passed discourses, and also your  construction of my meaning in them, which was not to find fault with any thing already done, or to instruct you what to do. No, Sir, as you have always known me a quiet man under Government, and respectful to my present Superiors therein; so I beseech you to believe that I am so far from intending a Censure of any thing this way established, that my drift hath been to defend it against all others; especially that part which is most maligned, as having most tendency towards Monarchy. For, finding (as I said) many Pamphlets of late thrown abroad to render that Form odious and disadvantageous to the people, that thereby you might be prejudiced and affrighted from making any farther settlement that way, I have thereupon presumed it expedient, even for your own and public satisfaction, that something should be also said on the other side; that so you might be again brought to some even poise in your judgements, before you come to determination in this great affair. And therefore, as they would have had the World believe that you had not respected the people's welfare, if you had settled the Protector and his Issue; so have I endeavoured to make it appear, that you cannot do the Nation a better courtesy then by so doing. The which coming from one so disinteressed as I am to him and his family by any relation, will the sooner, I hope, find acceptance as a word spoken in season: Nay farther, Sir, He is one that I never received courtesy and encouragement from in the least kind; and as for his Children, I know not the face of one of them. What I have said, Sir, hath been that which in my judgement is most for the general benefit: And hath been the sudden issue of mine own brain, as by the indigestion both of method and matter will be but too apparent. The Author having nothing to boast of, but that he is  
SIR, Your most affectionate Servant.  
FINIS.